1128 631 THS Ml IGCHI GAN STATEU l mm;11111111 11111 31411 4130 l! 96818 This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Role of the State and Balanced Urban Hierarchy: The Case of South Korea presented by June Woo Kim has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Master of Art d .Sociology-Urban Studies egree 1n Major professor Date 5&7zL 67?; 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution ‘-—__ .4— ._._-—- LIBRARY Michigan State University PLACE u nerunu BOXto mamm- checkout as... your record. 10 Avom Hues Mum on or More an. duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU In An N'l‘innutivo ActloNEqual Opportunity Instituion WM! H- —‘___—“ _———__%_ _ THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND BALANCED URBAN HIERARCHY: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA BY June Woo Kim A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF ART Department of Sociology and Urban Studies Programs 1995 ABSTRACT THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND BALANCED URBAN HIERARCHY: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA BY June Woo Kim This article was written for the further understanding of the urban processes in South.Korea, specifically of the urban hierarchy. Previous literatures focused on the external parameter and the internal variables. External parameter is the structural position of South Korea in the world economy. Internal variables are the 1)transportation infrastructure built during the Japanese colony, 2)absence of urban-based elites, and 3)the developmental state. The present paper noted that the South Korea has maintained relatively balanced city system and argued that the priority in.explanation, among the internal variables, should be endowed to the role of the state. The developmental state established after 1961 military coup changed the class structures and the transportation infrastructure. Also the autonomy of the developmental state in South Korea led the decentralization by indirectly supporting transportation infrastructure and by directly relocating industrial sites. Copyright by JUNE WOO KIM 1995 This thesis is dedicated to my father (Dr. Yung Che Kim) , mother (Ms. Myeung Hae Lee), elder syster (Ms. 800 Im Kim), and younger brother (Mr. Sung Jee Kim) iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I'd like to thank to my committee members: Dr. Richard Hill (the chairperson of my committee), Dr. Steven Gold, and Dr. John Schweithzer. Many references used in this thesis are from the reading list of Dr. Hill's course "comparative urban theory." The course was intellectually stimulating. It was not just his teaching that enabled me finish the thesis. For several times he gave me precious comments which helped me a lot. The distinction between demographic and functional primacy is one of them. Dr. Schweitzer, who is my major advisor in Urban Affairs Studies, enable me to have a double major degree and also financial opportunity. His concern about outreaching academic expertise to down-to-earth gave me great impression. Helping his research has been great experience to me. Dr. Gold gave me opportunity to think how this thesis can be related with my future research by his comments. Along with his comments I also thank his kindness in helping me finish the thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ListOfTableSOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Vii ListOf Figures.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO Viii Chapter I. INTRODUCTIONOO0.00....OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 1 II. MEASUREMENT OF URBAN HIERARCHY................ 6 III. PREVIOUS RESEARCHES ON THE URBAN.............. 9 HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH KOREA IV. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN SOUTH KOREA........ 17 V. THE STATE AND URBAN POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA..... 22 VI. CONCLUDINGRWSCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 28 BIBLIOGRAPHYOODOOOO0.00.00.00.00...0.0.00.0000000000133 vi LIST OF TABLES page Table 1. Urban Concentration / ........................ 13 Primacy Indices 1960 - 1980 2 0 urban Population GrOWthrate . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 14 1960 - 1970 and 1970 - 1980 3. Trends in Seoul’s Share of ................... 15 Urban Population LIST OF FIGURES page Figures 1. Location of Industrial Estates Connected. . . . . . . . . . 26 with Ports and highways 2. IPercent.of Incremental Urban Population in........ 2? Seoul, Busan and other cities viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Problems of urbanization and demographic changes in the Third World have received a great deal 7 of attention in the second half of the twentieth century. The area's rapidly growing cities and steadily increasing populations present an enormous challenge to researchers, planners and political leaders. Despite important differences in the ratio of urban to rural population and the patterns of city growth among these nations, urbanization has become a pervasive phenomenon in the most parts of the Third World (Smith, 1985). A surge of interest in population, urbanization and development in the 19503 and 19603 resulted in a number of social science research projects focusing on the Third World's population and development. Some of the researchers brought the basic assumptions of the then-dominant "modernization theory" perspective to their work. This model of development was explicitly or implicitly based on North American and European experiences (Keyfitz, 1965). Urbanization was seen primarily as an endogenous dynamic within the Third World 2 societies. Presumably, these countries were traveling a course previous ly fol lowed by the West . City growth , industrialization, and social, political, and economic development were conceptualized as intermeshed, mutually- reinforced changes leading to modernity (Bose, 1971). As social scientists began to acquire a better understanding of the processes of Third World urban growth, the developmentalist assumptions of the conventional paradigm came into question. Unfortunately, the empirical reality of the cities in the Third World provided little evidence to support the view of the city as a dynamic generator of economic and social development. Instead researchers (e.g., McGee, 1969) were reporting increasing levels of urban primacy, burgeoning squatter settlements, growing unemployment, and heightened inequalities. Urban.primacy came to be one of the hot issues. It is not difficult to understand why. The primate city, more than any other urban phenomenon, has been closely identified with the structured economic imbalances and social inequalities characteristic of the Third World countries, countries we now refer to as the peripheral parts of an all-encompassing world- economy. Theories of both economic dependency and urban primacy grew up with the Latin American experience in mind. In Latin America, economic domination by colonial and post- colonial powers of the world-economic core was obvious to most observers and urban primacy was overwhelmingly in evidence. 3 The main popularizer of dependency theory, Andre Gunder Frank (1969), paid special attention. to urban (primacy in Ihis description of the mechanisms promoting the underdevelopment of Latin .America. After Frank, other students of underdevelopment in the Third World elaborated upon that model with theories of direct relevance to urban primacy per se. Urban primacy became an explanation for economic dependency and economic dependency became an explanation for urban primacy (Castells, 1977). One common problem in much of these researches is the tendency either to emphasize the dichotomy between "core” and ”periphery" or "dependent" and "autonomous. " Adherence to this over simplified notion of dependency, however, implies a basic uniformity among a wide range of non-core nations. This is inadequate given the obvious diversity in developmental dynamics among Third World nations. This deficiency is at least partially corrected when a more comprehensive conception of world economic system, like that proposed by Wallerstein (1976), is accepted. This reconceptualization further allows for and intermediary stratum of "semiperipheral" countries as "a necessary structural element in the world economy (Wallerstein, 1976).” But this reformulated approach stressing hierarchical strata in the world.economy is not without weaknesses, either. A common critique of the entire dependency/world-system "school” involves the overemphasis on external relations and 4 inadequate attention to the internal dynamics of the areas labeled dependent. Recently, many scholars (Walton, 1982; Nemeth and Smith, 1985) claimed that systems of cities in developing nations are considerably more complex than many researchers in both the modernization and dependency/world- system paradigms have acknowledged. Careful attention is now being paid to the ignored "internal dynamics". Internal socio- political factors such as class relations, the state, and ecological infrastructure, seem to exert themselves as intermediating variables between the role of a nation in the world economy and the urban system of a given nation. Kim says: "None of the particular theories of urban primacy pays any attention to how variations in the local substrate, such as variations in local class structure, condition in the pattern of urban development (And two equally underdeveloped economies can be otherwise quite different). Thus none of the theories can explain, for example, why Guatemala developed a primate city before 1970, but El Salvador did not. The only theory that can explain the divergent patterns in those two countries is taking the local and historical conditions into account (1988, p. 89)." These class-relational urban theorists accept world system interrelationship as broad parameter and internal political ecological variables as specific patterns. In some countries the role of the state was found to be one of the important 5 internal variables. For example, Hill and Fujita (1995), while basically accepting the world system theory, argued that the strong developmental state in Japan played a great role in the functional primacy of Tokyo over other cities. This article tries to articulate the role of the state in South Korea as the most important internal variable in the urban process. Specifically, I'll concentrate on the city size distribution of South Korea during the developmental government period led by president Park, from 1961's military coup until the year of 1979. 7 The second method is based on the assumption that a regular distribution of city sized is ”normal" and facilitates balanced economic growth. This concept has been so widely accepted that it has taken a form of a rule, the rank-size rule. In a city system that conforms to the rank-size rule, the second largest city is one-half the size of the largest, the third largest city is one-third the size of the largest and so on (Walters, 1985). When this ideal rank-size distribution is graphed on double-logarithmic paper, it forms a straight line, hence it has also been called a log-normal distribution. In this article, urban hierarchy is measured basically by demographic city size distribution. But it seems necessary and also appropriate to point out that there is the other way of measuring urban hierarchy. It is measuring "the size of cities” in terms of its functional role rather than the population. This concept of "functional primacy" are based on the assumption that cities are systematically arranged in hierarchies according to the functions they perform (Friedmann, 1964). Friedmann (1964) additionally'suggests‘that the existence of a hierarchy of urban places is functional for the system as a whole: it "represents the ultimate means for organizing a geographic area into its component social political-administrative and economic spaces." Berry and Kasarda (1977) makes essentially the same point when they 8 argue that the urban hierarchy is "the instrument whereby society, polity and economy are integrated over space." A system.of cities performs those integrative functions because cities are centers of economic activity, nodes of transport and communications networks, and centers of regional economies. Hill and Fujita (1995) studied the increasing functional primacy of Tokyo over other cities in Japan. They used the term ”Central Management Functions" which are the command, coordination, and innovation activities that enable a city to become a regional, national and global power. In this section, I distinguished demographic primacy and functional primacy. Demographic primacy, which is to be used in this article, is one of the two important measurements for the urban hierarchy. CHAPTER III PREVIOUS RESEARCHES ON THE URBAN HIERARCHIAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH KOREA As mentioned in introduction, the close connection between dependency theory and the primacy of the Third World has been presented. But focusing on the primacy hinders an explanation of the dynamics of cities in newly industrializing Asian nations such as South Korea. South Korea does not have a highly primate city size distribution. Manufacturing and other types of specialized cities grew that were not satellites of the national metropolis, Seoul (Mills and Song, 1979). As national metropolis and center of control / coordination activity, Seoul is dominant, but South Korea does not have a highly primate city system by the world standards. In 1960 the Davis primacy index (D = P1/(P2+P3+P4), which is the population proportion of the primate city divided by the population sum of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th cities) had an average of about 1.42 and a range from 0.51 to 4.64 in the forty-six countries of the world which had at least four urban areas with.more than 100,000 people. Davis' primacy index for Korea was 0.87 in 1955, rose steadily to 1.53 in 1970, and fell 10 slightly to 1.51 in 1975. The 1975 value of davis' index for Korea is slightly above the 1960 worldwide average of 1.42 but well below its value for such countries as Argentina, France, Hungary, and Mexico. Japan's primacy index was 1.62 in 1950. Thus, despite the concentration of people in Seoul, Korea is not a highly primate country by worldwide standard. Previous researches trying to understand South Korea's relatively even urban hierarchy have articulated both external broad parameter and specific internal variables. About the external broad parameter, the position of the South Korea in the world economy was found to be helpful in distinguishing the urban hierarchy of South Korea with those of others. After comparing the patterns of urbanization in the Philippines and the South Korea, Nemeth and Smith (1983) concluded that there is a relationship between the two countries’ present structural positions in the world economy. In the article, three internal variables are presented: ecological factor, class.structure, and the state..About.ecological factors, they focus on the well developed railroad and port system built during the Japanese colonialization period. Second, they argue that the absence of the indigenous urban-based elites is the characteristics of the Korean class relations. Third one is the existence of the strong, developmental state. Their arguments about internal variables can be reorganized by the time sequence. During the Japanese colonial rule (1910 - 1945), the investment.on the urban infrastructure 11 in South Korea led to the balanced urban hierarchy. The colonial rule and the following Korean War (1950) led to the absence of the urban-based elites. Absence of urban-based elites enabled the developmental state established after 1961 military coup, start the Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) strategy (Kim.& Roemer, 1979). EOI is again contributed to the decentralization because it did not need manufacturing factories to be located.near the primate city. In other words, what he is arguing is that balanced urban hierarchy has been maintained throughout the history of Korea and the internal variables are equally important factors. Contrary to their explanation, I contend for the primacy of the state in explaining South Korea's relatively low primacy rate. First, the contribution of Japanese rule to the social infrastructure of South Korea is meager. It is not until the 19603 that the highway sytems, which is similar to the interstate freeway system in the United States, has started to be built. It was the developmental state who started to build the highway system. Second, there did exist the urban based elites. There was a parasitic bond between monopoly capitalists and corrupt state bureaucrats. It was also the developmental state who changed this class structure. To make things short, as far as the "balanced urban hierarchy of South Korea” is concerned, it is "the role of the state” where the analysis should start. In order to support my own contention, I'll show the 12 fluctuation in primacy rate between 1960s through 19803, which can be a good evidential data in identifying of the causality relations among the internal variables. Nemeth and Smith's arguments are based on the static, and simplified description of the urban phenomenon in South Korea. The primacy rate of South Korea, in fact, never stayed quite constant, rather it has changed significantly over time. As in Table 1, during the 19603 population concentration to Seoul, the capital and primate.city of South.Korea, is spectacular. During the 19703, population decentralization can be found out. Seoul's population share out of the sum of the rest of the cities, reduced from .719 in 1970 to .627 in 1980. Table 2 shows that the urban population growth rate of Seoul during the 19603 was 1.127, which is quite high compared to the .55 for Busan the second largest city and .44 for other cities. During the 19703, the urban population growth rate of Seoul drops to .45. other cities' population growth dramatically rises up to .93. During the 19603, Seoul was a :magnet for internal migration. Between 1960 and 1970, Seoul absorbed nearly 52 percent of total urban population growth, which is about 40 percent of total migration. It is in the 19703 that other cities as alternative destinations for internal migration gained in prominence. After 1970, Seoul's share in total.urban population increment fell greatly and became smaller thereafter (Kim, 1988). Table 3 indicates that the year of the 1971 was the peak in Seoul's share of the urban populations. Table 1 Year 13 Urban Concentration / Primacy Indices 1960 - 1980. (Sources: 1960, 1970, 1980 Korean Pop- ulation Censuses; Nam, Sunghee. 1988. From Overurbanization to Decentralization: An An- alysis of South Korean Urbanization 1960-19- 80." Ph.D. Dissertation. Pp. 113. Univer51ty of Wisconsin.) Seoul/ Seoul/ Seoul/ Seoul/ Next City Next 5 Cities rest of cities Total pop 1980 1970 1960 2.674 1.160 .627 21.67(Z) 2.943 1.223 .719 17.61(Z) 2.100 .856 .473 9.78(Z) 14 Table 2 : Urban Population Growthrate 1960-1970 and 1970 -1980 (Sources 1960,1970,198O Korean Population Censuses; Nam, Sunghee. 1988. "From Dyerurbani- zation to Decentralization: An AnalySis of Sou- Korean Urbanization 1960-1980." Ph.D. Disserta- tion. Pp. 114. University of WisconSin.) 1960—1970 1970-1980 Seoul 1.127 .45 Busan .55 .59 other cities .44 .93 15 Table 3 Trends in Seoul's share of Urban Population (Sources: Ministry of Home Affairs, Munici- pal Yearbook of Korea: Kwon, Non Yong. 1981. "A Study of the Economic Impact of Industrial Relocation: The case of Korea." Urban Studies . 18 : P p . 7 9 . ) tear Urban pop. Seoul's pop. Seoul's Extropy Concentration (A) (13) share (BIA) measure ratio k V. “A 561 7,109 2,577 36.26 2.3683 28.14 3963 8,732 3,255 37.27 2.4449 29.46 .965 9,267 3,471' 37.45 2.4413 29.56 467 10,155 3,969 39.94 2.4029 30.67 3969 11,505 4,777 41.52 2.3243 32.94 1971 13,519 5,851 43.28‘ 2.2633‘ 37.28‘ 1973 14,988 6,290 41.96 2.3660 33.45 1975 16,793 6,890 41.03 2.3818 33.01 5:77 19,218 7,526 40.71 2.3786 33.09 79 20,416 8,114 39.74 2.4298 32.71 16 To my opinion, this fluctuation in primacy rate seems to be directly related to the South Korean government's decentralization policy in the course of rapid economic development, as I'll explain more in detail. It also supports my claim that the state is an active agent shaping the urban process in South Korea. It means that the priority should be endowed to the role of the state in explaining the city hierarchy in South Korea. For this purpose the emergence of developmental state after the military coup in 1961 and its characteristics would be examined in the next section. CHAPTER IV THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN SOUTH KOREA The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the states in the East Asian NICs has frequently been commented upon. Government is seen as the ”senior partner" in’ the public-private relationship. South Korea (together with Japan) have been described as "strong states" in the sense that they can formulate policy goals independently of particular groups (Cummings, 1984). Here emphasis will be put on the role of South Korean government in the context of incorporation and expansion of her role in the world capitalism. Before Korea’s colonialization by Japan in the early twentieth century, Korea was ruled by an alliance of the king and the local landlords. Japanese rule started from 1910, which quite damage these traditional ruing groups. After liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, land reform started. By the end of the Korean War in 1953, the landlord class had largely lost its power base (Cumming, 1979). The undoubted significance of the land reform to economic development, however, leaves one question unanswered: Why did the inchoate capitalist class not become monopolists and 17 18 financiers? They could have amassed vast fortunes, without industrializing Korea by pumping their profits into remunerative investments. They could have been transformed into rentiers or financial capital. In fact, industrialization was limited in the 19503. The government leaders in tandem with large businessmen weaved dense personal networks. The most effective means of gaining a fortune was to process raw materials supplied to the government through 0.8. aid. For example, Samsung, the largest conglomeration in the 19903, dominated the processing of the three whites (sugar, flour and cotton) in the 19503 (Lie, 1992). Here a useful contrast can be drawn with Brazil. Peter Evans’(1979) "tripartite" model posits on alliance between the state, local bourgeoisie and foreign capital. In South Korea the same alliance resulted in relative stagnation. By the time of 1960, a handful of individuals had amassed spectacular wealth and were in the process of constituting themselves as financial capitalists, amassing monopoly profits and rents. After the military coup in 1961, the leader of the coup, General Park took power. Park was able to achieve relative autonomy firstly, because of the disarray among the major social classes. The traditional ruling class had lost its power after the land reforms. The nascent capitalist class was dependent on state patronage. The working class was numerically insignificant, while the farmers were not organized. In this context, Park's control of the military was 19 crucial in his achieving a degree of autonomy in the direction of state policy. In my opinion, the other reason of the autonomy held by the state is because the state itself changed the class relationships. The state broke the parasitic bond between monopoly capitalists and corrupt state bureaucrats. Park went so far as to arrest leading financiers and industrialists. The former monopolists returned, but deprived of their financial control (Woo, 1991). The result is decisive rechannelling of capital flows into industrial production by the guidance of the state. The autonomy of the South Korean government can be analyzed in several ways. First is the hegemony in the economic decision-making. Economic decision-making in South Korea has been highly centralized. In South Korea the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established to take responsibility for planning and budgeting after the Park coup in 1961. It was also put in charge of price control, foreign aids, loans and investment and transfer of technology (Jenkins, 1991). Second is the control of the state over the financial system. In common with Japan, South Korea has relied heavily on financial and monetary means to control the private sector. In South Korea the state had a majority holding in all the major banks until the early 19803, and the government controlled directly or indirectly, more than two-thirds of the investible resources in the economy (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1981). 20 Third is the relative independence from the foreign influence. In South Korea, the state played a much more restrictive role about foreign capital and technology than was generally the case in Latin America, subordinating foreign investment to national development strategy (Fajnzylber, 1981). Investment was channelled toward export activities in order to»gain access to foreign markets or into joint ventures in order to obtain know-how, while the domestic market was largely preserved for local capital. Fourth is the direct or indirect subsidies to ‘the corporations. It will be just a mere myth to think that South Korean economic growth was due to just industrialization policy. Rather active government intervention in economy is more noteworthwhile. The government of South Korea played a crucial role in allocating scarce financial resources to export-oriented firms. Government policies ensured that exporting would be profitable. The South Korean Productivity Center found that of the country’s fifty leading exports, almost all would have produced at a loss if not for the government subsidies (Gittelman, 1988). The main point of this section is that at least in South Korea 1)the state changed the class structure in its way to gain the autonomy, 2)due to its autonomy, the state can influence in most social processes including the one related to urban areas. In next section, I'll see how urban policy pursued by the developmentalist state of South Korea in the 21 19603 and 19703 has shaped the urban hierarchy of South Korea. CHAPTER V THE STATE AND URBAN POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA Development policies in South Korea in 19603 reflect the overriding concern with rapid industrialization as the principal strategy in raising aggregate national income. While this basic aim of the development strategy has, by the usual indicators of growth, appeared to have been achieved, a number of problems such as heightened interregional inequalities which is easily seen as the continual concentration of Seoul, have put a slight dent in this success model. It can be said that even under the Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) strategy the industrial capitalists felt no need to move their facilities away from the metropolis. Labor concentrated industrial sectors were flourishing, and Seoul was a good place for communication and use of various resources. In light of these problem, the South Korean. government set forth. a new' development plan for comprehensive land development. Firstly, heavy investment on transportation infrastructure was an integral part of it. South Korean central government with its strong planning and implementation function played a great role in transforming 22 23 not only the national economy as a whole but also the spatial distribution. Four Five-Year Development Plans(FYDP) were completed during the period of 1962-81. Highway construction was the major achievement during the second FYDP(1967-1971) period. Cities along these corridors have changed their specialization during the 19603 with the improved accessibility of the major metropolises, Seoul and Busan (Kim, 1988) . Population growth during 1970-75 appears to correspond closely to the construction of major highways (Meyer & Min, 1987) . City growth along the new-built highways are spectacular, leading to the decreasing population ratio of the primate city of Seoul. Secondly, government policy for industrial location is of great significance. South Korea formulated a National Land Development Plan(1972-81) . One of the major objectives of this plan is to develop new regional growth poles (Kwon, 1981) . The central government has several policy instruments to enforce industrial estate development. These include the standard price system of real estate, tax exemption and loans to the firms that wish to locate in industrial estates. The purpose of the standard price system of real estate is to fix the land price in the designated areas. This is being applied to all industrial estates. As to tax exemptions, any factory locating in the industrial estates is exempted from property tax. The factories moving from Seoul or Busan to these industrial estates are also exempted from other taxes such as income tax, 24 corporation tax, registration tax and acquisition tax. Loans are given by the Korean Industrial Bank with high priority to the firms which are going to establish factories in the industrial estates. On the other hand, high acquisition taxes and registration taxes are levied on any new factory in Seoul to reinforce the decentralization industries. The levy is as high as 5 times the regular one. Industrial estates constructed by government occupy 22 per cent of all industrial sites in the country in terms of area as of 1970 (Kim, 1978). These industrial estate is highly connected with transportation infrastructure which has been significantly improved during the late 19603 as shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, these cities with large industrial estate such as Pohang, Gumi, and Olsen were intermediate-sized cities. The cities received disproportionate attention from the central government doubling their population in less than a decade. The growth of the intermediate-sized cities has been spectacular since the early 19703 as in Figure 2. The major thrust of the third FYDP (1972-76) was the promotion of heavy and chemical industries. Heavy industrial complexes were built in these cities which are specialized in the industries such as steel, automobile, chemistry, electronics. The rapid growth of population in a number of intermediate-sized cities (with population between 100 and 500 thousands) help to reduce the primacy of Seoul and stabilized city size distribution. All in all, the South Korean government led the balanced 25 urban Ihierarchy' by either indirectly supporting infrastructures or directly relocating industrial sites. Figure 1 26 Locations of Industrial Estates Connected with Ports and Highways. (Sources: Kim, An-Jae. 1978. "Industrialization and Growth Pole Development in Korea: A case study of the Ulsan industrial complex." Pp. 66. in Growthpole Strategy and Re gional Development Policy. edited by F. Lo and Salih. OxfordzPergamon.) Induitriol est: re 257- of total area For t 25 7. ct for volume 0' cargo Express nigh...” Connecting food 27 Figure 2 Percent of Incremental Urban Population Absorbed in Seoul, Busan and other cities. (Sources: Eco- nomic Planning Board, Population and Housing Census 1960-1980 and Advance Report of Population and Housing Census 1985. Seoul, Korea; Kim, Won Bae. 1988. "Population and Redistribution Policy in Korea: A Review." 7: Pp. 66.) Other 70 Cities,_ 60 so 40 30 20 _ 10 -- 1960 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 CHAPTER VI CONCLUDING REMARKS This article was written for the further understanding of the urban processes in South Korea, specifically of the urban hierarchy. Previous literatures focused on the external parameter and the internal variables. External parameter is the structural position of South Korea in the world economy. Internal variables are the 1)transportation infrastructure built during the Japanese colony, 2)absence of urban-based elites, and 3)the developmental state. The present paper noted that the South Korea has maintained relatively balanced city system and argued that the priority in explanation, among the internal variables, should be endowed to the role of the state. The developmental state established after 1961 military coup changed the class structures and also the transportation infrastructure. Also the autonomy of the developmental state in South.Korea led the decentralization by indirectly supporting transportation infrastructure and by directly relocating industrial sites. Judging from the city size distribution as I have done in this paper, South Korean government's decentralization policy 28 29 has been no doubtly successful. However, what simultaneously have happened at the same time is the ”functional primacy phenomenon." For example, almost all of the headquarters of big corporations in South Korea are located in Seoul. It is primarily to keep better intimate contacts with the high officials. Future research may be needed to examine 1)the relationship of the role of the state and the functional primacy, 2)the relationship between the demographic primacy and functional primacy. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Berry, Brian J. L. and John K. Kasarda. 1977. W Uzbgn_£g919gyy_New York:Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. Bose, A. 1971. "The Urbanization Process in Southeast Asia." edited by L. Jakobson and V. Prakash. U;ban11gtign_gng WE... Beverly Hills, CA=Sage- Caetelle. 14- 1977. WWW Cambridge, MA:MIT. Cumminqe. 8- 1979. MW Vol. 1- Princeton:Princeton University Press. Cumming, B. 1984. "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences. " International Qrganizatieni 38:1-40- Datta-Chaudhuri, M. K. 1981. "Industrialization and Foreign Trade:The Development Experiences of South Korea and the Philipines." Pp. 47-77. edited by E. Lee W MW Geneva:ILO- Ettlinger, N. 1981. "Dependency and Urban Growth: A Critical Review and Reformulation of the Concepts of Primacy and Rank-size." Eaxirgnment_and_zlanningi 13:1389-1400. Evans, P. 1979. Dependent Qeyelopment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fajnzylber, F. 1981. "Some Reflections on South-east Asian Export Industrialization." CEPAL Review. Dec:111-132. Friedmann, John. 1964. ”Cities in Social Transformation." in We... edited by J - Friedmann and W. Alonso. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press. Frank. A- 1969. WM NY:Monthly Review Press. 30 31 Gittelman, Michelle. 1988. "The South Korean Export Miracle: Comparative Advantage or Government Creation? Lessons for Latin America." WM 42:187- 98. Hill, Richard Child and Kuniko Fujita. 1995. "Osaka's Tokyo Problems - "WW Beeeexene_forthcoming. Jenkins, Rhys. 1991. "The Political Economy of Industrialization: A Comparison of Latin American and East AsianfiNewly Industrializing Countries." neyelepment and_9han331 223197-231- Keyfitz, N. 1965 "Political-Economic Aspects of Urbanization in South and Southeast Asia." edited by P. Hauser and L. Schnore. Tne_§t2rx_2f_grbaniz_tien1 NY: Wiley. Kim, An-Jae. 1978. "Industrialization and Growth Pole Development in Korea: A Case Study of the Ulsan Industrial Complex." in ,peyelennen;__£elieye__edited by F. Lo and. K. Salih. Oxford:Pergamon. Kim, K. S. and. M. Roemer. 1979. Granth__and__§trustural Inenefiezmeeiene Cambridge:Harvard University. Kim, Won Bae. 1988. "Population Redistribution Policy in Korea: A Review." 7:49-77. Kwon, Won-Yong. 1981. "A Study of the Economic Impact of Industrial Relocation: The Case of Korea." W 18:73-90. Lie, John. 1992. "The Political Economy of South Korean Development." WW 7:285-300. McGee, T. G. 1969. Ine Soutneest Asian QiEy, NY:Praeger. Mehta, Surinder' K. 1969. "Some. Demographic and, Economic Correlates of Primate Cities: A case for reevaluation." in W Garden City. NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Meyer, David R. and Kyonghee Min. 1987. "City Employment change in the Republic of Korea, 1960-1970." Urban szwfl-Glé. Nam. Sunqhee- 1988 W W Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Wisconsin. 32 Nemeth, Roger J. and David A. Smith. 1985. "The Political Economy of Contrasting Urban Hierarchies in South Korea and the PhilippineS-" in MM Eeenemye edited by Michael Timberlade. Orlando:Academic Press. Smith, Carol A. 1985. "Theories and Measures of Urban Primacy: A Critique- " in 112W edited by Michael Timberlade. Orlando: Academic Press. Smith, David A. 1985. "International Dependence and Urbanization in East Asia: Implication for Planning." WW 4: 203- 33. Song, Byung-Nak..1981. "Economic Growth and Rural-Urban Relations in Korea." in W W edited by Fu- Chen Lo. Nagoya, Japan: Maruzen Asia. Wallerstein, I. 1976. "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis. " W 3:461-84. Wallerstein, I. 1982. "The International Economy and Peripheral Urbanization." Pp. 119-35 edited by N. I. Fainstein and S. S. Fainstein W W Newbury Park, CA:Sage. Walters, Pamela Barnhouse. 1985. "Symbols of cities and urban primacy: Problems of definition and measurement. " in ' e - c edited by Michael Timberlake. Orlando:Academic Press. Woo, J. E. 1991. e w ft: t t Korean_1ndu§trialization1 NY: Columbia University Prese- 11111111111111 11111111111111“