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The Nationalization of Voting in  
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Organization and Institutions in  
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Jonathan Edward Monroe

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THE NATIONALIZATION OF VOTING IN  
PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES:  
PARTY ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN  
VENEZUELA, ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY

By

Jonathan Edward Monroe

A DISSERTATION

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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## ABSTRACT

### THE NATIONALIZATION OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES: PARTY ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN VENEZUELA, ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY

By

Jonathan E. Monroe

This study is concerned with the problematic nature of mandates in presidential regimes, in particular the tendency for elections to the national legislature to be based on a local and/or sectarian vote. Two questions are asked. What relationship exists between styles of party organization and the nationalization of voting? Under what conditions do the presidential elections inhibit or encourage the nationalization process? Regression models are employed to assess the tendency of votes to "swing" according to local or national forces and to measure the electoral linkages between the presidential and legislative branches of the principal parties. It is found that styles of party organization exert a strong influence on the tendency to nationalize legislative voting. Centralized parties tend to prevent presidential elections from generating an unstable pattern of legislative voting. Concurrent elections, while strongly linking the legislative and presidential branches, nevertheless do not guarantee a stable, nationalized vote at the legislative level. In general, it is found that, contrary to widespread perceptions, under certain conditions presidential regimes are capable of producing a shared, "national" mandate.

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To My Parents

To My Parents

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Brian Silver, Jeffrey Riedinger, Mark Jones, and Scott Gates. Special thanks to Brian Silver for his help in focusing this study and charting its course. Thanks to Karen, Iris, Rhonda, and Elaine for their patience over the years. I owe debts of gratitude to John Ishiyama for many productive conversations and to Mei Mah for support throughout.

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## **Chapter One**


### **Introduction: the Nationalization of Legislative Elections in Presidential Regimes**

This study deals with two related issues: the nationalization of legislative elections and the impact of presidential elections on that process. To say that elections are "nationalized" is to say either that votes tend to "swing" among sub-national electoral districts in response to the same forces (Stokes, 1965), or that voting is homogeneous across electoral boundaries (Claggett, et al, 1984). One of the findings of the earlier studies (Stokes, 1965; Jackman, 1972) was that structures of government could affect the tendency of a system to nationalize.

The propensity of South American elections to respond to regional forces has often been noted, but has seldom been discussed in much depth. Literature on South American politics has frequently decried this tendency (MacDonald and Ruhl, 1989), with explanations ranging from inadequate parties (Scott, 1966), to electoral systems (Gonzalez, 1989, viz Uruguay), to the separation of powers (Shugart and Carey, 1992). By exploring the experiences of Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay I hope to shed light on the nationalization process, not only in the South American context, but in the broader context of presidential regimes.

An exploration of the South American cases is interesting not only from an historical standpoint, as a description of processes under way in developing democracies, but also





## Chapter One

### Introduction: the Nationalization of Legislative Elections in Presidential Regimes

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An exploration of the South American cases is interesting not only from an historical standpoint, as a description of processes under way in developing democracies, but also

insofar as it gives us an opportunity to explore the broader issue of nationalization. Earlier studies focused either on government structures in comparative context (Stokes, 1965; Jackman, 1972) or on single cases (Brady, 1985; Kawato, 1989). All of the studies focused on stable, developed democracies.

The structural issue, while important, has been left at the level of federal versus unitary, or parliamentary versus presidential distinctions. This obscures differences in institutional arrangements within classes of regimes and may tend to exaggerate the importance of the more-general distinctions. Moreover, with the analysis kept at either the single-case level, or at a very broad level of generality, it is all but impossible to draw systematic comparisons among institutional differences below the regime level and among parties - the level at which nationalization is actually observed.

The absence of attention to differences among parties is an important gap that needs to be filled in this literature, since it is the party, after all, which competes in the electoral marketplace. In this respect the South American cases, all of which are presidential regimes, provide an exceptional opportunity to explore the process of nationalization within a regime-type. These cases also provide us with a greater variety in the types of party organizations than was present in the earlier studies.

What will distinguish this study from previous studies of the nationalization process, then, will be its attention to

two central issues: first, the role of parties will be explicated in such a way as to draw clear parallels with the organizational practices of parties; second, we will here be looking at specific institutions rather than models based on government structure. What emerges, I think, will not only be a more complete picture of the organizational and institutional forces favoring a nationalization of electoral forces, but also a suggestive line of enquiry which can be improved and built upon.

To complete the task outlined above we will need a theoretical perspective that accomplishes two things: provides an explanation for the tendency of parties to nationalize their vote, and provides an explanation for cross-national (rather than cross-party) differences in nationalization which can be logically attributed to different institutional arrangements within the presidential type. This is outlined in Chapter Two.

The perspective adopted here is a "minimalist" perspective (Schumpeter, 1950). It is assumed that democracy is, at base, a procedure for alternating governments via elections. From this perspective it is natural to focus on the relations between parties and their electorates, and to give particular attention to institutions which alter the context of that relationship. The central theses of this study are therefore that differences among parties, particularly organizational differences, are an important determinant of nationalization, and that presidential regimes may usefully be

distinguished, for present purposes, by their electoral arrangements - particularly those which exhibit some potential for altering the relations between the president and legislature (specifics must follow the presentation of the theory in later chapters).

In sum, this study contributes to the study of nationalization in two important ways: first, it expands the substantive focus to include developing democracies with widely variant partisan and institutional characteristics from those studied earlier; second, it expands the theoretical content of this literature in that it provides a theory which explicates the relations between party organization, institutional differences within the presidential type, and the nationalization of voting.

The cases - Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay - were selected first of all because each has well-developed party systems (in the sense that there have been a reasonably long series of elections in which the principal contenders have been retained). For the periods included - 1958-1978 for Venezuela, 1983-1989 for Argentina, and 1966-1989 in the case of Uruguay - each was at a roughly similar stage of development in terms of net wealth and modernization of the media (an important consideration in the earlier studies). Also important as a research design issue are the structural similarities in their governing and electoral systems. All have strong presidents. All used some variant of proportional representation (differences to be discussed later: structural

issues are discussed in more depth in Chapters Two and Six). And finally, all are relatively homogeneous in terms of cultural cleavages, which always has the potential to become a disturbing factor in a research design.

These broad, systemic constants permit concentration on the institutional and party organizational variables mentioned earlier. Differences in electoral laws - principally, the type of proportional representation and the nature of the electoral cycle - are emphasized in cross-national comparison. Party organization varies both within and among countries, which permits a stronger assessment of the independent influence of the institutional variables. Specifics regarding research design are discussed throughout in relation to specific hypotheses.

The principal findings of this study can be summarized in two parts. First, in Chapter Five evidence is presented which demonstrates that where legislative elections are considered independently, methods of party organization exert a strong influence on the nationalization process. Second, in Chapter Eight we find that where certain party organizational traits are combined with a concurrent electoral cycle, a condition here exemplified by Venezuela, a particular pattern of linkages between the presidential and legislative elections emerges. Further, the evidence suggests that this pattern permits presidential elections to contribute to the nationalization of legislative elections. This linkage, I suggest, allows parties to cut across the barriers of the

separation of powers (in the sense that the branches share a common electoral fate).

What makes these results particularly interesting, albeit within the limits of a small selection of cases, is that the absence of either the organizational or institutional foundations of the "pattern" referred to above appears to imply a pattern more typical of presidential regimes - i.e., an electoral divorce between the branches. In these systems, Argentina and Uruguay, the presidential elections do not become agents of nationalization, and parties are inhibited in their ability to become "nationalizers."

The implications of these results are manifold. First, they deny the rather easy condemnations of presidentialism which have become all too common recently. Second, they imply that an electoral pattern similar to that typical of parliamentary systems can be maintained in a presidential context (patterns of governing fall outside the scope of this study). Third, they underscore the significance of parties and electoral systems in national political development (a goal of the earlier studies of Stokes and Jackman which was never realized owing to the high level of analysis they worked at). Finally, at a theoretical level, the results demonstrate the utility of a minimalist theory of party organization for comparative analysis.

Before turning to the theoretical material presented in Chapter Two, we might well ask the question: "why study nationalization in the South American context?" What bearing

does this have on the conduct of politics in that region? My brief comments here will focus on typical problems of government, and especially those associated with the development of party organization.

The nationalization of voting is a topic whose importance, particularly in South America, extends far beyond mere description of patterns of voting. In presidential regimes the separation of powers is maintained not only through formal divisions of responsibilities, but by a division of mandates. Studies of American politics have long emphasized the tendency of a separation of powers to divide the mandate along national and constituency lines (Schumpeter, 1950). The legislator becomes a "constituency delegate" (Stokes, 1965; Jackman, 1972). While it can reasonably be argued that the United States case also includes electoral system effects (Riker, 1986), cross-national studies by Stokes (1965) and Jackman (1972), as well as more recent work on presidential regimes by Shugart and Carey (1992), suggest that either or both of the government structure and the powers of the president are negatively related to the nationalization of elections.

The study of nationalization thus bears a direct relation to the construction of mandates. Focusing exclusively on presidential regimes will here give us, indirectly, an insight into the electoral origins of deadlock. In a region of the world where deadlock has been a continuing problem, even to the point of undermining democracy itself, the form of the



mandates, and an explanation thereof, takes on an added importance. The restriction of this study to presidential regimes serves this purpose well.

This study is not about the governing of presidential regimes, though this is a related issue. Since the problems of "deadlock" and "immobilism" bear a relation to the construction of mandates, however, I will devote some attention here, and in Chapter Six, to these issues.

As Lijphart (1977) has argued, presidential regimes pose unique problems in the realms of political conflict and in the process of governance. Presidential regimes concentrate political conflict on a single office, which only one of a small number of nationally significant parties can win. Linz (1990) and Horowitz (1990) concur that in pluralistic societies this contest can unleash destabilizing jealousies among competing groups that may undermine democracy itself.

With regards to the process of governing it has been suggested that the separation of powers typical of presidential regimes poses additional problems: the principal concerns being "immobilism" (Weinstein, 1975), resulting from ineffective legislatures, or governments of obstruction, wherein the legislative and executive branches compete to the disadvantage of all (Sundquist, 1992; Cox, 1987).

The concerns noted about the functioning of presidential systems ultimately hinge on the question of how the electoral process constructs the mandates of the executive and legislative branches. Lijphart's concern over political

conflict is related to the plurality rule (or majority rule, where run-offs are employed) employed in presidential elections. It is not inconceivable for a candidate to hold the most powerful office who has been rejected at the polls by as much as seventy-five percent of the voting population. Where concerns for minority rights are strongly held, this can lead to a delegitimation of the regime.

The concern over "obstructionism" is common to all presidential regimes and centers on the differing constituencies of the president and the legislators. Legislators may be subject (justifiably) to the charge of political sectionalism; i.e., that they serve the needs of their constituents rather than the general welfare of the nation. Government can become an arena of competing mandates.

These criticisms of presidential regimes alert us to two basic problems. First, obstructionism, while common to presidential regimes, is probably of greater concern to developing democracies which are more prone to crisis and possess fewer constraints against anti-democratic solutions. Second, in seeking to understand these problems we cannot be blind to the electoral realities of legislative-executive relations. The nationalization of voting, in particular, shows promise as a means for assessing the problem of conflicting mandates. We must then begin by understanding the causes of a nationalized vote.

The presidential regimes of South America provide an extraordinary, and by and large ignored, opportunity to study

the nationalization of voting in legislative elections. Obstructionism and regionalism are both commonly acknowledged problems in South America. For the researcher, these countries offer a wealth of institutional and party-organizational differences within a context of similarity in historical and ethno-graphic backgrounds. Here we will focus on Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay. These cases, apart from other considerations detailed in later chapters, supply the minimal needs of this research: a reasonable series of elections which retain the principal parties.

Frequently, discussion of the problem of deadlock in legislative-executive relations centers on the merits of expanding the president's powers. In the United States the debate in recent years has centered on the proposed line-item veto. In situations of crisis, the viability of legislatures as institutions may be questioned: "reformist" sentiment reaches beyond the institutional or legal levels toward the regime itself. The Uruguayan coup of 1973 and the 1992 coup in Peru followed in the wake of harsh criticisms of the performance of legislatures in dealing with protracted internal crises.

Rather than traversing this familiar ground, I suggest that the emphasis on inter-branch power relations is misplaced. While presidential power is indeed an issue, what has been neglected are the longer-term electoral processes underlying governments of obstruction; that is, the failure to develop a mandate linking the legislative and executive

branches.

The perception that structures of government matter as future determinants of successful governance has been a focal point of debate in many transitional regimes. In the search for an optimal fit between societal pluralism and government structure Nigeria has been through a number of traumatic experiments with federalism and presidentialism (Horowitz, 1985). Urban-rural splits, manifested in Conservative-Liberal conflict, have motivated experiments with collegial executives and unusual systems of intra-party preference voting in both Uruguay and Colombia. Debates in post-Weimar Germany emphasized the relative merits of parliamentarism versus presidentialism and proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems as means of containing urban-rural rivalries (Pulzer, 1983). In each of these cases the underlying concern was that the failure to build a regime capable of including the relevant representatives of a society's sectional groupings would impair its ability to build a sense of legitimacy with these populations. Any sense of national unity would then be highly unlikely if the national government was perceived as the tool of a single interest.

In a related area of research others, such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), David Apter (1956), Giovanni Sartori (1976) and Hans Daalder (1966), have explored the relevance of interest groups and parties as means of forging national unity. Parties, in particular, were seen as the principal means of channeling societal demands to the

government and hence they could be regarded as, at least, potential agents of national integration.

Many noted, like Robert Scott (1966) and Samuel Huntington (1968), that parties were often the weak links in the chain; that they merely replicated the demands of particular groups and their interests and therefore did not function as conflict-mending political brokers. They communicated into the system private interests inimical to the public-spiritedness required to create a truly national polity. These studies suggest that the attributes of parties need to be taken seriously in the study of nationalization.

Scholars have also long recognized that in the building of democratic systems it is wise to pay attention to how the system structures electoral competition. Madison's concern with the "spirit of faction" is echoed in the works of those studying national integration in Latin America. Latin American parties have, throughout their history, frequently been dominated by notables and by external, sectional interests. Seldom have they exhibited the delicate balance between ambition and responsibility, between public and private interest, which is generally regarded as the hallmark of developed democracies. Robert Scott, writing in 1966, noted that:

"..throughout Latin America the absence in most party systems of nationalizing and integrating political parties that can act as auxiliary political structures to band together the operations of an expanding polity is one of the most important factors contributing to the problem of effective public policy formulation." (p.331)

This concern is still relevant. Uruguay and Colombia, while often considered models of democratic stability in South America, also provide vivid examples of how fractured parties have imbued their polities with a highly personalized struggle for patronage. The spoils system has inhabited these governments at every level, and in both cases has directly contributed to the loss of political freedom (Weinstein, 1975; Osterling, 1989).

Occasional attempts at pact-making notwithstanding, the spirit of faction remains a fundamental problem which elite pacts may solidify even as they succeed in buying time. The alienation of voters, particularly the young, under the Colombian National Front illustrates both the underlying weakness of parties and the potential for political decay and instability which plagues a political arena based on the satisfaction of particularistic needs. In both the Uruguayan and Colombian cases the electoral laws have become defenders of this status quo (Gonzalez, 1991; Shugart, 1992) Carlos Waisman (1988) has observed similar problems at work in Argentina:

"As long as the party system is weak, and interest groups and bureaucratic organizations such as unions, the military, and others are strong, politicized, and independent from parties, there is a danger that an explosion of demands could trigger the destabilization mechanism that destroyed elected governments in the past." (p. 100)

In order to become agents of national integration, in order to develop an electoral arena in which the national and

sub-national achieve a balance conducive to governing in a separation of powers system, parties must be able to control as well as to merely adapt to their electoral marketplace. Moreover, they must be given institutional incentives to pursue a nationalized vote; which is to say, institutions must make such a goal a precondition for winning on a national scale. The goal of this study is simply to demonstrate the validity of these assertions.

The nationalization of electoral politics is a fundamental indicator of the extent of the "common ground" upon which the two branches stand. In particular, I will show that this process is linked to the development of certain kinds of organizational attributes in parties, that electoral institutions influence the ability of parties to develop nationalized electorates, and that it is the "type" of presidential regime rather than the powers exercised by the president that promote or retard nationalization.<sup>1</sup>

The research questions that motivate this study do not center around the conduct of government, though this would be an obvious corollary line of enquiry. Here I look specifically at how mandates are constructed along regional or national lines in the electoral marketplace. Three related questions are asked. First, what relation, if any, exists between the

---

<sup>1</sup> Shugart and Carey's assertion cannot be directly tested here because presidential power does not vary among the cases. What can be demonstrated is that other factors can alter the typical electoral relationships and that presidential power does not homogenize the results across cases when other factors are operative.

nationalization of voting patterns and the organizational attributes of parties? Second, what relation exists between the institutional attributes of a presidential system and the nationalization of elections? Third, how do electoral institutions and other aspects of a party's "environment" influence a party's tendency to promote nationalization? With these concerns in mind, this study of nationalization may well provide the groundwork for a theory of the electoral origins of deadlock in presidential regimes.

Our South American cases also permit an expansion in the content of our institutional analysis of nationalization. All the cases are presidential regimes, but there are widely varying electoral practices among the cases. The theoretical value of shifting attention to South America is thus that we are permitted to assess nationalization processes in relation to specific attributes of parties and also to consider sources of variation within the presidential regime-type.

Every attempt has been made to avoid uncontrolled sources of variation at the structural level, but given the data requirements of this study we are forced to accommodate Argentine federalism. This is not a problem of great concern, however, as we are focusing on elections to national office. The direct effect of federalism, in any event, can best be described as indirect, through its influence on the structure of parties. The effects of such "background" variables are



worth noting, and I will do so where appropriate.<sup>2</sup>

The theory outlined in the next chapter will be applied to the Argentine, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan elections, for the periods mentioned earlier. The 1985 and 1987 elections in Argentina were midterm elections, while all the elections for the other cases were concurrent. These cases offer a wide degree of variation in party-organizational styles, among the major parties in particular, which is seldom the case in more-developed democracies of the presidential type.

The institutional variables - concurrence of elections and ballot type - were chosen for theoretical reasons (explained in Chapter Two), and because these aspects of the electoral systems are closely associated with "atenuated-presidentialism" - a variant of the presidential regime practiced in Venezuela (Brewer-Carias, 1982; rules were changed somewhat after the 1989 constitutional reforms) which has been credited with making "party government" possible. Venezuela and Argentina employ the same balloting procedures (proportional representation with closed lists), while Uruguay uses a variant of intra-party preference voting. Thus, the concurrence variable becomes operative in the Venezuela-Argentina comparison. The variance in electoral procedures

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<sup>2</sup> Truman (1967) emphasized effects on party organization in his classic paper, "Federalism and the Party System" (cited from Wildavsky, Aaron, ed. American Federalism in Perspective Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 81-108.) He concluded that the nominations process, more so than the electoral activities of parties, reinforced localism and reflected the federal structure.

across all cases provides a strenuous test for the independence of the party organization variable.

The elections included were chosen for practical reasons. The 1983-1989 elections in Argentina were chosen because these have been among a small number of elections in which the Peronists were not barred from participation (1951 and 1973 being the other - these were included in the analysis of presidential elections in Chapter Eight: problems associated with this are discussed there).

The use of electoral coalitions is always a problem in tabulating votes. Votes were here counted as "party" votes only if the vote was cast with that party's name. The Uruguayan elections were chosen on the basis of constitutional continuity, so only the elections following the 1966 reforms were included. The Venezuelan series ends, somewhat arbitrarily, at 1978. The 1983 and 1988 elections could have been included without sacrificing constitutional continuity, but here I chose to emphasize maintaining continuity with the other cases in terms of the number of elections and the time-span covered.

## Chapter Two

### The Nationalization of Voting in Theoretical Perspective

#### Introduction

The theory adopted here draws heavily on minimalist perspectives on democracy and party politics. Minimalism accords closely with the concerns of this work. Briefly stated, minimalism<sup>3</sup> assumes that the underlying motive of competition in a democracy is the control of offices through electoral competition. Institutional effects on party organization and behavior are then assessed in light of their role in structuring electoral competition. Arguing from such a perspective we would then be led to consider whether the institutional system provides incentives for parties to construct nationalized electorates. In developing countries, where we cannot always expect a close fit to have developed between parties and their institutional environment, we are also led to consider whether parties exhibit an independent effect (one not premised purely on institutional incentives) on nationalization.

The theory developed in this chapter aims to encompass both of the concerns noted above: the roles of institutions and party organization in the nationalization process.

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<sup>3</sup> This perspective has its roots in the works of Schumpeter (1950) and Downs (1957). It has been elaborated by Schlesinger (1975; 1984), Epstein (1967), Sartori (1976), and others.

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### The Nationalization of Voting

The "nationalization" of voting can take on more than one meaning. In an abstract sense it refers to the process through which national governmental bodies increasingly become the focus of political life as their resources and responsibilities grow. It can also take on a more perceptual meaning, in which nationalization refers to the salience of national politics to individuals or the affect (positive or negative) which they attach to it. Daalder (1966) saw these two aspects interwoven in the realm of partisan politics. As he put it (p. 66), "parties can be agencies of both integration and disintegration. They assist national integration if they serve as genuine brokers between disparate regional or social interests (without losing their national existence in the process). They are likely to strengthen centrifugal forces, on the other hand, if they become passive tools of sectional interests." Where a national polity exists alongside a sectionalized society, in other words, parties become the brokers among potentially competing groups *provided that the party can maintain sufficient independence from all such sectional groups*. It is not difficult to extrapolate the character of the "active" party from the above statement: a multi-interest organization which aims to become nationally significant in the electoral sense.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This implies that the cases should be parties that were, or had a reasonable chance of becoming, nationally significant. I defined "significant" as having occupied the third-place position in at least one election.

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The studies of the nationalization of electoral forces, both the earlier and the more recent, have also suggested that parties play an important role in the process of nationalization, but discussion of the organizational attributes of the parties they studied has been strangely absent.<sup>5</sup> The exact nature of the relationship between parties and nationalization has not been given much consideration, nor can the form of the relationship be inferred from the data presented in those studies. Rather than dealing directly with the role of parties in the process, the Stokes (1965) and Jackman (1972) studies relied on models of government structure in which the behavior of parties was left as an assumption.

These "responsible party" (represented by Canada and the United Kingdom) and "constituency delegate" (represented by the United States) models, while suggestive and probably valid for the cases examined, cannot provide much guidance for further cross-national comparisons since they do not allow for variation among parties and because they do not sufficiently identify the features of regimes which might be used to properly classify them. Moreover, since the models correspond closely to the presidential-parliamentary distinction it is an open question as to whether these categories are interchangeable with the above. We might well ask what

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<sup>5</sup> The original study was Stokes' 1965 paper, which was followed by Jackman's (1972) and Katz's (1973). There is something of a gap thereafter until Clagget, et al. (1984), Brady (1985) and Kawato (1989).

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features a presidential system could possess which would qualify it as a member of the "responsible party" class. The later studies have shed little light on the question of party and/or regime influences on the nationalization process since they were little concerned with parties per se, and because they focused solely on the United States (Brady, 1985; Kawato, 1989, e.g.).

The literature focusing on the "nationalization of electoral forces," as the preceding paragraph suggests, cannot provide much theoretical guidance for this work. The tools employed by those researchers and the concepts informing them, on the other hand, are of great interest.

Jackman's (1972) interpretation of the problem of national integration provides a ready linkage with the electoral data which will be employed here. He stated that nationalization occurs when, "citizens' geographical or spatial location in the society does not help predict their political attitudes and behavior. Under such circumstances, sectionalism (i.e. behavior based on sub-national identifications) becomes politically irrelevant" (p. 572). Since the focus of these studies has been on partisan voting it might be more appropriate to say "electorally" rather than "politically" irrelevant. In any case, this implies, as Katz (1973) has pointed out, several ways of conceptualizing "nationalization": the degree of similarity in vote-swings across districts or, the degree to which vote-swings respond to the same electoral forces and/or issues.

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Clearly these are not mutually exclusive interpretations, but the former interpretation will be used in this study (due mainly to the data requirements of the latter, which cannot be met for the South American cases). Some approximation with the latter interpretation, or the spirit of it, can be reached by examining the similarity of votes across elections and/or the similarity of district-level and national-level elections. These options come into play in Chapter Six and will be discussed there.

For the purposes of this study Jackman's operational definition of nationalization is entirely appropriate. He states (p. 578) that, "if the national electoral 'swing' (expressed as the mean change in the party vote from one election year to the next) accounts for the change in each riding [i.e. district] adequately - that is, if there is little variance around the national swing - we will infer that national effects are of prime importance." Naturally, then, if districts cluster around the regional or district cross-election means, then the attribution of variance would be changed accordingly.

The above operational definition captures only one dimension of nationalization, however: what Claggett, et al. (1984), described as its "movement." An election may have been nationalized in the sense that voters tended to "swing" according to a national pattern, but this does not imply that the "configuration" of the vote (the dispersal of the total vote across regions and districts in a given election) was

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nationalized. Swing voters may respond to national forces while a static electorate votes consistently along regional or district lines.<sup>6</sup> The methodological options and the theoretical significance of this distinction will be discussed further on.

### **Theoretical Perspective**

The literature on party organization calls attention to two characteristic goals of parties, the emphasis on one or the other normally reflecting substantially divergent research priorities. One line of research emphasizes the place of the party within the democratic regime. The party behaves and organizes in a manner highly responsive to its electoral incentives. Incentives are created by society's distribution of preferences (Downs, 1957), by the availability of offices (Schlesinger, 1984), and by election laws (Duverger, 1963).

This view is often characterized as "minimalist" insofar as it asserts that the party's place within the political system imposes on it the "minimal" goal of presenting viable candidates for elective office. The survival of the organization, or at least its significance, is measured in proportion to its success in gaining elective offices (Sartori, 1976; Epstein, 1967; Schlesinger, 1984). For the

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<sup>6</sup> In studies of U.S. elections this has often been referred to as a "normal vote." Usually this term implies a partisan vote which is stronger during midterms owing to the absence of national forces: an electorate mobilized by the presidential election or, in rarer instances, a national realignment.

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political party, democracy is at base an electoral "market," in which votes are exchanged for representation. The structure of the market defines the means through which the minimal goal can be satisfied, and thus exerts a direct impact on the behavior and organization of parties. Less attention, generally, is devoted to understanding how parties act to structure the market.

An organizational, or "organic," view of parties, stemming from the pioneering work of political sociologists like Ostrogorski (1953) and Michels (1962), and recently advocated by Panebianco (1988), sees the party as a partially autonomous organization. The organizational features of parties are partly a result of interaction with the market, but the organization itself seeks to control and structure the market.

The differences in emphasis between the above two perspectives center on how the party interacts with its market. Where minimalists see the adaptation of the party to change in the market as normal, rational, and functional, Panebianco offers the obverse as a characterization of the real relationship between the party and the market. The party-as-organization, being adverse to uncertainty and change, finds it necessary to give preference to organizational imperatives aimed at protecting its internal cohesion, often to the detriment of electoral pursuits. Adaptive behavior is not the norm, but is a disruptive process associated with electoral trauma, such as the intrusion of competitors into

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The points of division between these perspectives basically center on two issues: the goals of parties, and the place of the party within the wider political regime. The party-as-organization theorists hold that the minimalists overstate the "minimalism" of the electoral goal and understate the potential of the party to transform its environment in the course of interacting with it. Those arguing from a minimalist perspective might well argue, in return, that Panebianco overstates organizational autonomy by understating the constitutive role of democratic institutions in party organization. Electoral activity, and hence democracy, is part of what a party is. The balance between electoral and organizational goals is indeed determined by the relative salience of these goals for members of a party, but should a party entirely forego electoral goals it ceases to be a party.

Despite these differences, the gulf is actually not as wide as it appears. As the foregoing comment suggests, the differences may ultimately hinge on the relative salience of goals within the party itself; party organization and behavior emerges from the balancing of these goals (defined more specifically further on).

An illustration taken from Argentine politics demonstrates the importance of reconciling these perspectives. During a period lasting, approximately, from 1983 to 1987 the Peronist party was locked in a struggle whose main antagonists

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could be characterized, broadly, as the office-holders (the "renovator" branch) and the unionist branches of the party.<sup>7</sup> Through most of its history the Peronist party had relied on the support of the working class to secure it a predominant position in Argentine elections. During the military regime, which left power in 1983, the country had undergone a period of deindustrialization, however, which weakened the electoral strength of labor. The dominant position of labor in the Peronist party had therefore become a liability (which was exacerbated by the appearance of complicity between the unionists and the military during the military's withdrawal from power), limiting the party's ability to adopt a more centrist, middle-class-oriented electoral strategy.

Two goals were then at odds with each other. One was to preserve the established patterns of internal governance and programmatic cohesion within the party, the other was to change the governance of the party so that an electorally efficient strategy could be pursued. When the "renovators" ultimately succeeded in reducing the role of the unions in the party they not only succeeded in conforming the party to its electoral goal (and in preserving its place in the party system), they prevented the party from being colonized by an "interest group" which could have held the party locked in an unresponsive electoral position. The preservation of

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<sup>7</sup> The outline of this struggle bears a similarity to the forces which ruptured the Labour Party of the United Kingdom during the mid-1980s.

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traditional organizational goals and perquisites would have come at the expense of electoral rationality. As this example suggests, the question of "balance" among basic party goals is not only relevant to party behavior (e.g. the type of program it presents) but to party organization: goals, organization and behavior are closely interlocked.

Within both the minimalist and the organic perspectives (here referring most specifically to Panebianco) there is a suggestion that the basic party goals - what Schlesinger (1984) refers to as the "office-seeking" and "benefit-seeking" goals - are made manifest in the types of "goods" which the party produces.

Within all parties there is a balance between selective benefits which are privately held (such as office or other remunerations) and collective benefits which are held publicly (programs and policies). Schlesinger (1984) observes that the relative importance attached to the distribution of these goods within the party has organizational consequences which in turn are expressed in basic behavioral differences. He notes (p. 395) that: "The office-seeking force is generally perceived as the flexible, compromising aspect; collective goods, or policy goals, are usually seen as the less flexible, more ideological aspect." It is the office-seeker whose goals must be met in the electoral arena, while the benefit-seeker may regard compromise toward electoral goals as a betrayal of programmatic or ideological commitments.

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different pattern of accomodation with the electoral market than the benefit-seeker. Career success can be measured in terms of votes, and career stability can be measured in terms of his/her plurality. Maximizing the plurality requires programmatic flexibility. Office-seekers are therefore expected to struggle against interference from the party's ideologues in their efforts to appeal to voters.

Benefit-seekers, on the other hand, will tend to minimize the plurality by reining in candidates and preserving the purity of the party's programmatic commitments, which is itself a medium of exchange within the party. Consequently, office-seekers can more appropriately be referred to as the party's "brokers" - those who seek to bring the maximum diversity of opinion under the party umbrella (without thus sacrificing its electoral appeal) - while benefit-seekers may represent a brake on the party's potential to broaden its coalition of supporters.

For an organization imbalanced in favor of benefit-seekers the strategy most conducive to organizational success, as they perceive it, would be control of the electorate; the building of stable bases of support founded on shared interests and identities. The numerical strength of such an organization reflects, at an abstract level, the mobilizational potential of its program/ideology. We might say that there is an upper limit set on the mobilization of supporters and the attraction of new voters by the organizational priority of limiting the internal discordance

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centering on the program, or more generally, the "identity" of the party. Internal controls and control of sectors of the electoral market are therefore interdependent priorities. In essence this condition stems from the fact that many members of the party will receive little benefit, or even negative benefit, from mere electoral conquest.

What can be derived from the above comments is that there is a crucial distinction among organizational goals in parties: there are parties which are organized around programs and there are parties which merely put forth programs. As Epstein (1967, p.262) has cautioned, "All parties and candidates present policies and the differences in emphasis do not seem crucial in and of themselves." The crucial difference is an organizational one.

From this perspective, it is an assumption that parties organized around the dispersal of collective goods are predisposed to subordinate "market" considerations to organizational cohesion around collective goals. This comes closer to the image of the party in Panebianco's work. The party becomes an instrument for "directing" ambitions and "controlling" votes rather than merely "supporting" ambitions and "collecting" votes.

It is not really possible to make determinations about which image of the party is generally accurate. The context - the structure of the electoral market - must determine which "image" survives the electoral test. This is really a central tenet of minimalist theory: a party cannot be assessed without

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reference to the structure of the electoral market. As Schlesinger (1985) observed, an apparently weak organization (here referring specifically to the largely supportive role of the party bureaus in the United States) may be quite strong if the market defines organizational success according to the ability of individual candidates to deliver offices to the party. The validity or wisdom of one or the other "image" of the party is really determined by the institutional context of the "electoral market."

### **Organizational Tendencies of Parties**

The tendencies discussed in the previous section can be summarized, for purposes of constructing a typology, as two organizational attributes: professionalization and centralization. These are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Professionalization occurs as a party vests organizational power in the hands of those who seek to occupy elective office. Thus, the concept refers not only to the "balance of tendencies" referred to earlier, but to the organizational power backing the aims of each tendency. An entirely professionalized party corresponds to the organizational primacy of office-seekers.

A centralized party seeks to concentrate the power of decision and the coordination of the party's branches. Thus, while professionalization refers to qualities of the party leadership, centralization defines qualities of the

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organizational resources employed by the leadership. A highly centralized party uses a central bureau to direct every level of the organization. This usually implies a commonality of organizational practices at each level. The two concepts correspond roughly to the distinction between aims and means (only roughly, since aims are established only by assumption).

### **Nationalization in Theoretical Perspective**

As the previous discussion emphasized, party organization represents a balance of goals, or tendencies, within a party and the organizational resources underlying those goals. Now, it is not only the case that goals create organization, but organization also constrains the choice, or elevation, of goals within the party. That is, a party, because of its organizational choices, develops resistances to the elevation or sublimation of different goals: premised, naturally, on their degree of convergence with the dominant tendencies of the party.

These resistances ultimately affect the ability and motivation of a party to respond (by adaptation or control) to sources of uncertainty. The principal sources of uncertainty are those relating to the vote. Since the party possesses imperfect knowledge about the premises of voters' decisions the party exists in a constant state of uncertainty.

Without, for now, considering factors exogenous to the party, we may say that in the party's relations with the electorate the basic issue is the relative importance of, and

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uncertainty surrounding, the "swing" vote or the "committed" vote. Organizational priorities regarding the electorate center on degrees of emphasis: capturing the swing, retaining (or constructing) the party faithful, or both. There must always be some tension between these priorities since capturing the swing risks offending the committed voter, who may resent expansions of the electoral coalition: programmatic concessions always have the potential of offending the existing coalition. Retaining the committed voters may risk stagnation, marginalization, or simply the loss of seats that might otherwise be gained, particularly when the social bases of the existing coalition corrode (for parties of the Left, e.g., the erosion of the manufacturing sector).

As this discussion clearly intimates, the adaptive/expansive response to uncertainty is more likely to be elevated within a professionalized party. Centralized parties (those which are not also professionalized) should tend to emphasize capturing and holding committed voters.<sup>8</sup> The

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<sup>8</sup> This is actually something of a commonplace observation in general organization theory (Perrow, 1986, for example). The basic relationship between organization and uncertainty is well drawn by Simon (1981, p. 51), who states:

"If what is uncertain is a multitude of facts about conditions in individual markets, then decentralized pricing will appear attractive; if the uncertainty is global, infusing major events that will affect many parts of the organization in the same direction, then it may be advantageous to centralize the making of assumptions about the future and to instruct the decentralized units to use these assumptions in their decisions."

Naturally it would be well to exercise caution in extrapolating from a field with different concerns. The

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combination of party attributes, in other words, speaks to the elevation of goals in relation to basic sources of uncertainty. Without belaboring the point, all of this begs the question: "what does a nationalizing party look like?"

If we were concerned merely with the occasional bout of national euphoria, or some other ephemeral influences on the vote, we might be content to describe the nationalizing party as one which generates national swings. But since we are concerned with a process rather than a discrete occurrence we must expect more than that.

First, a nationalizing party must not only generate a national movement of votes, but it must also be capable of creating a stable tendency in the electorate. The difference referred to here is that between a party that "rallies" support and one which "captures" support by providing a consistent focus on national politics and political figures that transcends the events of a discrete election. Stability may be evident in the configuration (or change in it over time) of the legislative vote. But since the legislative elections are not based on national constituencies, additional considerations are of theoretical and substantive interest.

Second, then, we must give some thought to how national

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comments above refer to an exchange of private goods whereas we are here concerned with organizations which dispense both public and private goods. Nevertheless there is a clear analogy to draw from "pricing" to the candidate's appeal to a constituency (see Ware, 1979, for example), and between the uncertainty about "assumptions" referred to above and uncertainty concerning voters' decision premises.

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forces intrude into the legislative sphere. Since, from a purely juridical standpoint, presidential elections are the only truly national elections this is a logical place to begin. I would not imply that where the presidency is the dominant concern that parties will tend to nationalize their legislative vote, in fact the opposite seems more likely (for reasons developed in Chapter Six). Rather, the question is one of, first, electoral linkage between the legislative and presidential nuclei of the party, and second, the routinization (or stabilization) of this relationship. A centralized party seems more likely to link what can often be highly autonomous electoral organs since it will possess an organizational resistance to any attempt at "freelancing" within the party, especially as regards the program. Equally important, however, is that the party will insist that the national force be absorbed, or be made consistent with, the totality of electoral coalitions embodied in the party.

A third, and very important, consideration is the incentive system, exogenous to the party, which, in essence, determines the electoral value of a stable, nationalized, and "linked" vote. This consideration stands large in this study because of our concern with the stability of the nationalization process. Structured incentive systems, here referring specifically to institutional arrangements, create durable incentives which may frustrate or assist a nationalizing party. Here, then, I must digress briefly into a theoretical discussion of the "electoral market," which will

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Given that a party's organization and goals center on the management of forms of uncertainty, our description of the electoral market necessarily focuses on how it elevates different forms of uncertainty in the calculations of parties. To clarify this discussion I begin by outlining what the electoral market *does not do*, and what aspects of it are not directly relevant to the research questions.

The electoral market does not create votes, nor does it manufacture swings or determine their location. Rather, it determines the relative importance of the swing votes or the committed votes, where "importance" roughly equates with their instrumentality in acquiring offices. These influences are durable in that they transcend elections.

A distinction must be maintained between aspects of the institutional environment which structure electoral outcomes and those which influence the structure of parties. Since these are interdependent phenomena, what this amounts to is a concern over the "directness" of the effects with respect to electoral outcomes.

Federalism, as one example, creates an additional layer of opportunities for holding elective office (below the national level), and thus creates a layer of party nuclei around those offices (Schlesinger, 1984), but does not by itself exert an influence on the conversion of votes into offices - i.e. it does not have a direct bearing on electoral

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uncertainty. Federalism may well tend to decentralize parties, and this in turn effects the parties' relations with the market, but we would then be speaking *directly* of a partisan effect, and *indirectly* of an institutional effect.

Ballot type (closed lists versus intra-party preference voting, for example), for most of our concerns, also exerts an indirect effect: closed lists tending towards the centralization of parties, for example. The ballot type may have both a direct and indirect effect, however, in that it may exaggerate the effects of proportionality. For the office-seeker, the possibility of acquiring an office is both mechanically determined - by the conversion of votes into offices - and by his/her relationship to the party: i.e. the relative autonomy of the office-seeker in the nominations process. A high threshold of representation and a closed list procedure, for example, produces countervailing tendencies: the former encouraging self-reliance in the electoral contest and the latter encouraging reliance on the party as a source of votes. Here, then, the office-seeker's perception of the location of votes is at issue.

With these considerations in mind, the electoral market is defined as: the combination of institutional and social (not dealt with here) forces affecting the *magnitude* and *dispersion* (or location) of electoral successes. Given the discussion of parties above, it should be plain that the electoral market structures uncertainty. From the above definition, then, uncertainty varies with respect to magnitude

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Since so many institutional forces, considered as influences on elections, are channelled through the party, the set of institutions to be considered here is necessarily narrowed. Some may object to a narrow focus on electoral rules, but I would offer two defenses for this choice of emphasis. First, as mentioned above, party organization is likely to embody the indirect effects of many institutions, particularly those which describe a government's structure (which were the focus of the Stokes and Jackman studies). Second, this narrowing of variables around direct effects makes sense as a "first cut," since it focuses our attention on rules which most-directly influence a party's success in the elections.

Uncertainty will here be divided into two components, each of which corresponds to one of the two organizational dimensions of parties. Uncertainty has **magnitude** and **dispersion**. Magnitude refers to the expected gains or losses (whether in votes or seats) a party will experience as a result of an election. The gain or loss of seats is directly related to the "swing" in an electorate from one election to the next. The magnitude of this swing and its expected effect on the distribution of seats is therefore the overriding partisan concern in relation to this dimension of uncertainty.

The dispersion of uncertainty is the more-strictly qualitative dimension of uncertainty. Every market is composed of sectors, the extent of whose interdependence - or tendency

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to respond to the same forces - is variable. For elections, in which constituencies are regionally defined, we are most concerned with the tendency of a market's sectors to correspond to juridical divisions, or regional agglomerations of those divisions.

With regards to the magnitude of uncertainty it is the proportionality of the system which concerns us most. Single-member districts, at one extreme, elevate the importance of the swing votes because the margin of victory in terms of seats bears, potentially, little relation to the margin of victory in terms of votes.<sup>9</sup> Where district size is generally small, therefore, we would expect the pressures on parties to adapt to the market to increase, thus decreasing the transformative potential of the parties vis-a-vis the market.

Low district size, whose effect on parties basically centers around the disparity created between the percentage of seats and the percentage of votes won, tends to focus the party more strongly on office-seeking. This expectation is

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<sup>9</sup> The literature on the effects of electoral laws is quite extensive. Recent works include: Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart, eds. Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986; Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Shugart Seats and Votes: the Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Usually the effect of single-member districts is viewed in terms of the tendency to reduce the number of significant parties. This presumes that the parties which survive possess the organizational capacity to adapt to the market; the system rewards flexibility and hence encourages professionalization. This effect diminishes as the number of seats elected per constituency increase. As organizational survival depends less on achieving pluralities in a multitude of districts the magnitude of uncertainty decreases and the control of swing voters declines in importance.

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rooted in the considerable literature on the political effects of electoral laws (and proportional representation in particular). Systems with low district size, by decreasing the proportionality of elections, empower the office-seeking tendency by exaggerating the overall requirements for achieving a position of significance in the political system. Duverger (1963) discussed this in terms of the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral laws.

The mechanical effect is simply the relationship established by electoral laws between votes and actual representation. A nationally significant party must be capable of generating pluralities across a wide variety of constituencies. By extension, this means that office-seekers must be given the flexibility to construct an individualized program which at once retains a core of supporters while also capturing the swing voters, whose importance to party "survival" is necessarily elevated.

The psychological effect of low district magnitude, which has been subjected to considerable criticism (Riker, 1986; Sartori, 1986), is embodied in the phenomenon of the "wasted vote," where it is hypothesized that voters will tend to vote strategically, supporting only the major contenders, so as to avoid throwing their votes away on lost causes. Either way the effect of proportionality is conceptualized, the effect of low district magnitude should be to elevate the magnitude of uncertainty.

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here also center on electoral rules. To address the concept of dispersion we must identify rules which set constraints on the extent to which branches of the party must respond to the same forces/uncertainties. One relevant set of rules would be those which establish what I refer to as the "ballot dependence" of members of a party on the party at large. This corresponds to the distinction between closed-list proportional systems and systems with intra-party preference voting (single-member districts with primaries would fall into the latter category).

Where members of the party are made "independent" on the ballot, constraints on responding to the dispersion of uncertainty are lifted. Where members are dependent on the party through the ballot, the party is encouraged to respond to uncertainty from the perspective of the party as a whole.

The concurrence of presidential and legislative elections can have a similar effect. Concurrent elections encourage office-seekers at the sub-national level to identify with the national contest (Erikson, 1988; Campbell, 1985). The presidential election can exert a centripetal influence on party competition at all levels, thus constraining the dispersion of uncertainty. Nonconcurrent elections provide no such constraint.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Shugart and Carey (1992) have shown that concurrent elections can produce a centripetal effect on party systems similar to that of low district size (i.e. a tendency towards two-party competition). The rationale for this effect is different from that associated with district size, however. District size exerts a constituency-specific effect - that is, parties are "eliminated" on the basis of their ability to generate pluralities within discrete districts. The party's



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To summarize, the earlier discussion of professionalization and centralization implied certain dispositions toward the electoral market. Professionalization tends toward a flexible, adaptive disposition in which ambitions for office are given a relatively high organizational priority. Since office-seeking involves attention to the swing voter, the professionalized party directs much of its attention not to the core of its supporters but to the marginal votes which decide the outcomes of elections (i.e. it controls uncertainty by increasing its plurality). Professionalization should thus interact most strongly with the magnitude of uncertainty. Electoral rules affecting the required size of victories at the polls provide an additional element of interaction with the market.

Centralization, with its attendant emphasis on control, stability, and the management of group identity, focuses the organization more on its interaction with the dispersion of uncertainty. Electoral rules affecting the homogeneity of constituencies (concurrence) or the ability of the organization to relegate control of sources of uncertainty to discrete members or branches of the party (ballot dependence) are of the greatest concern here. A summary of electoral rules is provided in Tables 1 through 3.

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problem, then, is to assess and respond to the forces determining the vote in each district. Concurrence, on the other hand, is expected to harmonize the electoral forces themselves. The party's environment - the dispersion of uncertainty - is directly effected by this electoral arrangement.

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**Table 1** Electoral Rules -- Legislative

	<u>Formula</u>	<u>Ballot Type</u>	<u>Intra-party Preference</u>
Argentina	d'Hondt	closed	no
Venezuela	d'Hondt	closed	no
Uruguay	d'Hondt	closed	yes <sup>1</sup>

	<u>Ticket Splitting</u>	<u>Coalitions</u>	<u>Electoral Cycle</u>
Argentina	yes	yes	C/NC
Venezuela	yes <sup>2</sup>	yes	C
Uruguay	no	yes	C

<sup>1</sup> Intraparty preferences are exercised by voting for sublemas within the party, or by voting for listas within each sublema.

<sup>2</sup> The voter casts two ballots: one for the presidential ticket and one for the remaining offices. There is no ticket splitting among the sub-national offices.

**Table 2** District Magnitudes and Seat Bonus/Penalty for First Second and Third Place Parties

	<u>Average DM</u>	<u>Bonus/Penalty: 1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>
Argentina	5.3 (3.6) <sup>1</sup>	+7.4%	+4.1	-1.6
Venezuela	7.6 (5.6)	+3.8	+5.9	-0.5
Uruguay	5.2 (2.9)	+0.5 <sup>2</sup>	0.0	0.0

<sup>1</sup> Figures in parentheses are average district magnitudes computed without the two largest districts. Figures are for the last election included in the study.

<sup>2</sup> Uruguay employs a two-stage application of PR-list. Seats not awarded in the first stage are awarded by the Corte Electoral according to a national quotient: thus these are referred to as "national" seats. The extreme proportionality evident above is the result of this procedure.

**Table 3** Electoral Rules -- Presidential Elections

	<b>Direct Election</b>	<b>Re-election</b>
Argentina	yes <sup>1</sup>	no
Venezuela	yes	no <sup>2</sup>
Uruguay	yes	no

<sup>1</sup> Voters elect a Board of Electors, but since there is no winner-take-all rule this is equivalent to direct election.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to the 1993 reforms.

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### **Plan of Chapters Three through Eight**

Now that the theory has been outlined it is necessary to consider how it will be applied towards answering the two central research questions: under what conditions do parties become agents of nationalization in legislative elections?, and, what role do the presidential elections play in this process?

To begin to answer the first question we must first establish the existence of variability within countries in parties' nationalization profiles. Second, it must be shown that these differences in profiles cut across national boundaries.

These concerns are addressed in Chapters Three through Five. Because party type represents such a crucial variable in this study, Chapter Three deals extensively with the criteria for classification and the case materials upon which the classifications are based. Hypotheses and methods are presented in Chapter Four. Legislative nationalization profiles are then presented in Chapter Five.

These data are presented prior to the analyses of presidential election effects for a number of reasons. One is clarity of exposition. The second research question involves a more complex series of data analyses and a more-focused discussion of theoretical considerations and research design issues. Another reason is that since proportionality and ballot-type effects refer specifically to the conversion of legislative votes into seats, it makes sense to establish

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their effects prior to consideration of effects stemming from the presidential elections. With this done, we can then proceed with some measure of confidence in interpreting the independent effects of the presidential elections (as it turns out the electoral rules do not appear to exert a great impact on the magnitudes of the nationalization scores).

Chapters Six through Eight develop the ideas, hypotheses, and methods of analysis necessary to address presidential-legislative electoral linkages. Party organization and the electoral cycle there emerge as the decisive influences.



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## Chapter Three

### A Typology of Parties

#### Introduction

What kinds of parties are likely to promote the nationalization of elections?

The literature on democratization and national integration offers some clues about the attributes we might expect from a "nationalizing" party. These literatures are replete with references to how parties go about solving a variety of problems: representation, interest aggregation, channelment, mediation, brokerage, and so forth.<sup>11</sup> Taken in sum, what they provide is an image of what might be called a "professionalized" party: one which is not rigidly programmatic and which possesses a good measure of autonomy vis-a-vis potentially colonizing secondary associations, such as labor unions and business associations.<sup>12</sup> While this image of the party is frequently called forth it is seldom examined in much detail.

The minimalist theory of party organization naturally

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<sup>11</sup> Recent works include: Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Przeworski (1991); Huntington (1991); Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992). Earlier works culling similar observations include: Almond and Verba (1963); LaPalombara and Weiner (1966); Daalder (1966).

<sup>12</sup> I chose this term not to suggest that other parties lack "professionalism" but instead to suggest that these are parties within which the professional politician - one for whom elected office is more than a secondary job, a position considered necessary for the furtherance of other ends - is an influential actor within the party bureaucracy.

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calls to mind the image of the professionalized party as well. Sartori (1976, p. 63), for example, offers the following definition of political party:

"A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office."

The suggestion here, as also in Duverger's, Schlesinger's, and others' work, is that parties organize around their electoral goal. With considerations of principle (a preoccupation of early thinkers like Burke) and internal structure left out, it would be easy to extrapolate from this that the natural state of the party is that of a multi-interest representational body. This, of course, is a statement made "ceteris paribus" and ignores the concern in minimalist theory over the constitutive effects of institutional arrangements. Michels (1962), and others, might argue that organizational priorities also exert an impact on the extent to which a party approaches the multi-interest "ideal," but would not disagree that this is the pattern most conducive to building national unity.

Parties, however, can be multi-interest bodies in a number of ways. Parties in the United States, Uruguay, and the United Kingdom all represent diverse coalitions of social forces, but no one would argue that they are organizationally interchangeable. Nor would anyone argue that they have the same effects on the character of elections or the conduct of

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government. In each case organizational strategy is colored by the manner in which mandates are conferred in elections and by the government structures in which mandates are brought into action.

Uruguayan parties are substantially reliant on factions in the electoral process, largely due to the use of a form of intra-party preference voting in both legislative and presidential elections (Gonzalez, 1991). The United Kingdom's parties behave differently than those in the United States, in both elections and government, owing to the parliamentary system: the similarity in their election rules notwithstanding. Both electoral rules and basic governing institutions exert a strong impact on party behavior and organization.

Our immediate concern is not with the forces shaping parties but merely with describing them. Within the three cases mentioned above there is, among the major parties, a consensus that winning elections is a central party goal: office-seekers occupy central places in the party hierarchies. But the parties of the United States and Uruguay are clearly qualitatively different than those in the U.K. Parties in the U.K. are much more hierarchically organized and party members, owing to the imperative of governing as a party, are much more committed to supporting the programmatic directives of the national executive committees.

Using the term mentioned earlier, we could say that all three countries possess "professionalized" parties, but the

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parties of the U.K. tend to be more centralized - a direct reflection of the greater emphasis on supplying collective goods both within and without the party. We could also say that U.S. parties are qualitatively different from Uruguayan parties since their decentralization centers more on individual candidates and their supporters rather than organized factions. Either way, however, there are branches within the party which exercise considerable autonomy.

### **Professionalization and Centralization**

Professionalization is a concept directed at the question of "who" is recruited and advanced within party organizations. In a professionalized party office-holders and office-seekers exert great influence within the party. It is therefore a quality associated with membership in a party and the terms of that membership.

Since it will be difficult in practice to distinguish between office-seekers and benefit-seekers, we can probably settle for indirect measures, such as the origins of party leaders. Where party leaders are consistently recruited from specific sectors of society, or specific secondary associations, we would infer that the party has less flexibility in constructing itself around the office-seeking goal. Behavioral indicators can also be used, such as the degree of conflict between office-seekers and the party bureaucracy and the outcomes of those conflicts.

Below, I discuss some of the measures which could be



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applied to judge a party's level of professionalization and centralization. The "ideal" measure is then followed by some summary judgements about the character of the parties included in this study. It will be noted that these are seldom based on "ideal" measures but rather on data which is suggestive of similar priorities. This method of presentation is used to highlight both the strengthes and weaknesses of these judgements. Fuller descriptions of the parties are offered at the end of this chapter.

The parties which will be characterized below are: Democratic Action (AD), the Christian Democrats (COPEI), and the Republican Democratic Union (URD) of Venezuela;<sup>13</sup> the Peronists and Radical Civic Union (UCR or, "Radical") of Argentina;<sup>14</sup> the Colorados, Nationals, and the Frente Amplio ("Broad Front") of Uruguay. These parties were chosen because, for at least a period of two to three elections, each constituted part of a two or two-and-a-half party system.

In the ideal case we would be able to look at the origins of party members at a variety of levels: grassroots, party leadership, and candidates. In practice the grassroots level is relatively bereft of data and only the upper levels of party bureaus are generally given much attention in both secondary and primary source materials. In any event some

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<sup>13</sup> The acronyms correspond to their Spanish names: Acción Democrática, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (more commonly referred to as the Partido Socialcristiano), and Unión Republicana Democrática.

<sup>14</sup> Unión Cívica Radical

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presentation of the ideal is necessary before an assessment can be made of what is actually to be done. The criteria for classifying cases has been borrowed directly from Duverger (1963).

At the grassroots level the principal criterion will be the extent to which the party relies on voluntary association as a means of subscribing members. Duverger referred to this as the "direct" or "indirect" membership base of the party. Where direct membership is prevalent the party comes closer to the image of a voluntary association. Membership is an individual act of volition. This does not presume any particular motive, but simply accentuates the personal relationship between the member and his/her party.

Membership in Colombian parties, for example, is often motivated by the desire to acquire government employment. Here, though, the defining element of the member to the party is not the patronage itself but the direct, personal relationship between the party and the member. Indirect membership, on the other hand, means that membership is a consequence of membership in some other associational group. While such membership may well serve a member's individual needs, the defining feature of his/her relationship with the party is one in which group priorities have the initiative. For the party, this kind of membership base may imply that the potential leadership pool will be constrained by the group bases of the party and that control over the party program may be, in effect, in the hands of an external group.

The membership bases of the Venezuelan parties can best be described as "direct." Relationships with secondary groups are institutionalized in the form of youth groups, workers' affiliates, teachers' and professional associations, and so on, but co-membership is not mandatory in any sense. Rather, parties compete within these sectors (Myers, 1973; Herman, 1988).

In Uruguay, the nature of the party organizations negates any possibility of "lema" (a term referring to labels recognized as "permanent parties") membership being captured by, or the lemas themselves capturing, secondary associations. The strongest unit of organization in the party is, in fact, the sublema, roughly equivalent to the old ward machines of the United States. Party loyalties, in addition, tend to be a highly personal matter, centering on identifications passed on through the family (Gonzalez, 1991). The Frente Amplio deviates from this pattern. Much of the work of its Comites de Base centers on mobilizing workers' support - which is to say, it has a more ideological, sectoral orientation towards membership, recruitment, and activism.

Indirect membership within the Peronist party of Argentina centered principally on its union affiliates, and particularly the 62 Organizations, which was explicitly politicized. While union mobilization was, from the beginning a cornerstone of Peronist electoral strategy, this contrasts with a leadership base of diverse origins and which was largely similar in terms of class and occupation to that of

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the Radicals (Ranis, 1971, eg.). The Radicals, typical of many predominantly middle-class parties, did not have strong union affiliations and, by and large, relied on direct membership.

The party leadership pool is naturally also an important indicator. Two issues will be given particular attention: the sources of leadership with regards to external groups and the sources of leadership internal to the party. One indicator of professionalization is the diversity of external sources of leadership. Where the pool of leaders is drawn predominantly from a single sector, or from a small selection of groups, the party would be considered less professionalized. This indicator naturally produces a bias in favor of larger parties, which is why it is advisable to look at internal recruitment of leaders as well. One such indicator is the extent to which party leadership is drawn from the ranks of office-holders and potential office-holders, as opposed to party bureaucrats and ideologues.

Another indicator is the extent to which the party exhibits flexibility in the top leadership posts. Where, for example, the leadership remains unchanged, even in spite of electoral rebuffs, we would presume that factors other than electoral considerations determine placement within the party (this provides, incidentally, a direct analogue with the "organic" school of thought, whose central finding is that party bureaucracies ultimately become rigid and unresponsive).

The criteria for assessing the candidate pool are essentially the same as those for the leadership pool: i.e.

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the patterns of internal and external recruitment. Parties that consistently seek outsiders to fill legislative slates or presidential nominations would be considered to lean towards professionalization.<sup>15</sup> Where such information is lacking, high turnover rates and low age at entry into the legislature have also been suggested as indicators that offices are sought as ends in themselves rather than as means to forward policy goals (Schlesinger, 1965).

Venezuela's major parties, while internally competitive, have been subject to generational rigidity. This has provoked calls for greater internal democracy and a strengthening of the party congresses as decision-making organs. The 1967-68 conflict within AD (Democratic Action) is particularly revealing, insofar as control of the national executive permitted the less-popular candidate, Gonzalo Barrios, to gain the presidential nomination over Luis Prieto Figueroa, the winner of the party primary.

The predominance of Jóvito Villalba within the URD (Republican Democratic Union) has also been problematic in this regard: a stagnation of leadership owing to Villalba's personalist style and control of the party's inner circle.

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<sup>15</sup> This criterion would be difficult to apply to minor parties since reliance on outsiders for presidential nominations, as mentioned earlier, is dictated by their position. Nor does such reliance compromise the benefit-seeking tendency of the party in this case. As an example, the presidential elections in France, Schlesinger (1991) notes, have served to sustain highly programmatic parties that "specialize" in positioning themselves to deliver voters outside of the Center to the parties/candidates capable of winning the presidency.

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Closed electoral lists, to some extent, account for these leadership dilemmas.

Uruguayan sublemas tend to have a highly personalized leadership base, but in this case the DSV system of inter-factional competition helps to make the lemas internally democratic **at that level**. Nominations frequently have brought relative newcomers into political office (Guidobono, 1986). In addition, potential candidates dissatisfied with their prospects under one sublema boss have frequently exercised the option of lending their services to another.

During the years of Perón's dominance placement within the Peronist party often depended on Perón's or the unions' approval (Rock, 1986). This could be considered the norm for some sectors of the party until the legislative group and the provincial factions asserted themselves after 1983.

Peronism follows the typical pattern of "verticalism" insofar as tight personalist control at the center often implies looser arrangements at the periphery. For this reason, and because of the ideological and factional inchoateness of the party, Peronism is often characterized as a "movement" rather than a party (Snow, 1971, eg.).

Factional conflict within the Radical party appears to have been more open and competitive than in the Peronist party. While this has often been disruptive, many of the conclusions drawn about factionalism in the Radical party have been based upon the experience of the party during the years (approx. 1955-1970) when Peronism was excluded from electoral



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competition: a circumstance which virtually dictated a split within the Radical party given the effective two-party format. In the post-1983 era democratic inter-factional conflict has produced decisive resolutions of party leadership questions.

In sum, then, the professionalized party is candidate-centered insofar as its membership and leadership profile, as well as the organizational power given to office-seekers, places the fewest constraints on the office-seeker in his/her quest to gain office. Internal democracy is probably the most accessible indicator with regards to these criteria. It is also "differentiated" (Apter, 1956) insofar as the claims of external groups on the party are either balanced by competing claims or controlled in some other way. These general criteria should be kept in mind when looking at more-specific indicators. The latter should not override one's judgement if the general should clash with the specific in the balance of evidence.

Centralization refers to the extent to which key party activities are controlled by central party bureaus or leadership groups. Two general indicators will be discussed: structural coherence and intensiveness of organization.

Structural coherence means that there is stability and predictability in the processes of advancement within the party. Centralization is highest where the organized leadership, usually a national executive committee, closely monitors, and has substantial influence over, the recruitment of candidates and party leaders. Where advancement depends

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upon performance in direct internal elections,<sup>16</sup> or upon one's place in a faction, we would consider the party to be somewhat less centralized. Where advancement is based upon informal, irregular procedures, such as the will of particular party notables, we would consider the party to be decentralized.

By these criteria, AD and COPEI (Christian Democratic Party) would be considered centralized, owing to the predominance of the national executives in recruitment and nominations. The same could be said, though to a lesser degree, of the Radicals.

Within the URD the personal influence of its long-time leader, Jóvito Villalba, disrupted structural coherence.<sup>17</sup> Peron's influence within the Peronist party would lead to a similar judgement. More recently, "verticalism" has been less a factor than unionism, although the attempts to bring back Isabel Perón in 1984 seemed regressive. Later, verticalism broke down entirely as the unions lacked the electoral resources to secure control of the party.

The "traditional" parties of Uruguay (the Colorados and Nacionales) are clearly decentralized owing to the role of the

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<sup>16</sup> This is to be distinguished from procedures for electing party leaders, who then control the nominations process, as has been the case in the Radical party and in the major Venezuelan parties.

<sup>17</sup> For details see the more detailed commentary on the URD provided in the case histories of the parties.

sublema.<sup>18</sup> The Frente Amplio is a more difficult case because, although it is nominally an alliance of separate organizations, it has strived to conduct itself as a distinct party.<sup>19</sup> Its organizational methods seem to be a mixture of a confederal alliance with democratic centralism: founded on "base" committees and coordinated by a central policy bureau.

"Intensively" organized parties possess central, national policy-making bureaus which are formally and informally superior to external groups (Duverger, 1963). In addition, the party replicates its national structure at each level of organization (Panebianco, 1988). Janda and King (1985) code this according to the existence of institutionalized party organs below the national caucus, then the regional caucus, etc. By this coding Uruguay's traditional parties would be considered decentralized since, below the national level, factional (sublema) organs supplant lema organs. The Frente Amplio's national executive, on the other hand, directs partisan activity down to the grass-roots level.

Venezuela's major parties have national executives which exert vertical control, and the structure of the national organs is replicated at each sub-national level (Martz, 1966;

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<sup>18</sup> Uruguayans use the term "traditional party" to designate the parties which formed during the Nineteenth century, and later fought in the civil wars. The unique standing of the traditional parties in the civic-consciousness probably also accounts for the recognition of these parties as "permanent" parties in party law.

<sup>19</sup> More detail on this question is provided in my comments in Chapter Two, pages 69-70.



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Myers, 1980; Arroyo, 1986). The campaign (and pre-campaign) activities of Democratic Action and COPEI, as the studies in Penniman (1980) vividly demonstrate, show a degree of technical and organizational coordination which distinguishes them from other parties in the region. Maintaining a consistent set of organizational principles makes this coordination and control possible (see below).

This survey of indicators, while useful for illustrative purposes, leaves open many areas of ambiguity, not the least because the directly relevant data is seldom available. Some attention must also be given to the issue of combining these indicators to create a summary judgement of a party's "type." I conclude this section, therefore, with a brief discussion of the problems inherent in generating these judgements.

The criteria presented above are meant to provide a guide or "map" for assessing party organization. Archival research does not provide us with ideal indicators. Rather, we must look for suggestive pieces of information in the available materials and infer what we can from that. For this reason the discussion of the parties in Chapter Two does not adhere dogmatically to the indicators discussed above. Another problem in categorization is the reliance of the organizational categories on the idea of a "balance" among tendencies within a party: this issue centers chiefly on the concept of "professionalization." Unfortunately it is not possible to arrive at a hard-and-fast rule for this judgement.

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centralization do not imply an absence of professionalization, and vice-versa. Nor should it be considered that the concepts must point in one direction or another uniformly. A party may be centralized in one respect and decentralized in another. While this would be a severe problem in a large-n study, we can here rely on secondary evidence and judgement to resolve such classificatory dilemmas.

Since a party's organizational structure can serve a variety of ends, it is necessary to consider carefully the relationship between professionalization and centralization. One purpose of organization is control: control over votes and control over the identity and aims of the party (which is to say, control over the membership). For the benefit-seeker, the organizational imperative is to define and resolve the party's "identity" and to stabilize and routinize party activity around that identity. Nevertheless, an "intensively" organized and coherent structure may also serve to further the discrete ambitions of a party's office-seekers.

Centralization cannot be regarded as the antithesis of professionalization. Their coexistence is, in fact, the source of strength for the "mass-membership" party (Duverger, 1963), which supports a large membership base by distributing collective goods, but retains electoral viability by elevating the status of office-seekers within the party. This is particularly relevant when parties organize intensively to compete at the ideological "center."

We can now outline four types of parties based on their

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combination of professionalization and centralization. These categories will be employed throughout this work.

### **Typology of Parties**

#### Professional-Centralized

The leadership of the professional-centralized party is drawn from the ranks of those who hold office, or are judged to have good prospects to do so. Nevertheless, party leaders also participate in party organs whose role is not only to support candidates, but to direct their actions.

In parliamentary systems the relatively tightly disciplined "backbencher" is one manifestation of the dual role of the party. It is the national leadership which directs the party, and prepares it to fulfill its role in government. The task of the backbencher is to demonstrate his/her value to the party first by helping it to fulfill its role in government, and second by winning elections (a secondary task because for the backbencher it is the party as much as his own effort which decides the election). Through this arrangement the party elite gain a high degree of flexibility while controlling a stable support group in the legislature (and at a lower level, the grassroots).

Because this party concentrates the real power held within the party, much of its success as an organization depends on its ability to distribute collective, rather than selective, benefits to its members. Thus, "electability" is generally somewhat less an important characteristic of the

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backbencher than is the case for, as an example, the junior congressperson in the United States.

Those who render services **within** the party are often targeted for advancement. Occasionally, this will be true even for the most visible representatives of the national party.<sup>20</sup> In sum, this is a party in which the selective benefits of office accrue disproportionately to the party elite, while collective benefits sustain the party at lower levels. This division is then reflected in patterns of recruitment and advancement, as well as in a hierarchically organized party apparatus which emphasizes a top-down pattern in devising strategy and defining the party's identity.

Democratic Action and COPEI both fit rather neatly into this category so I will not belabor the point. The only other party which fits is the Radical Civic Union of Argentina. This judgement is based upon the "office" orientation which is fostered by factional competition and the middle class base of the party, and by the notable manner in which factional conflict has translated into effective national leadership of the party. The party falls short of the ideal insofar as, up till the period of the Renovation and Change faction's dominance of the party, it would be difficult to say that the Radicals had the organizational capacity to translate national

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<sup>20</sup> It was commonly averred that this consideration was prominent in the choice of John Major to succeed Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party. The choice of Gonzalo Barrios as the presidential nominee of Accion Democratica in 1968 is a more directly relevant example.



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control of the party into provincial and local control.<sup>21</sup>

### Professional-Decentralized

The professional-decentralized party exhibits a central organizational apparatus of limited activity. The "party of notables," in which the organization steps forward prior to elections and exists mostly to support the efforts of a specific candidate(s), exemplifies this type. This type is the organizational progenitor of the rather disjointed verticalism exhibited within the URD.

Mass mobilization and personal leadership have had a productive, but very uneasy relationship within the Peronist movement. This is one reason why Peronism vacillates between this and the nonprofessional-decentralized type. This type of party, where there has been an attempt to reconcile with a mass base, tends to produce crises of leadership as the representatives of the movement's political wings naturally seek to control the top ranks of the party.

A less extreme example is the system of parties found in the United States, wherein parties have emerged as permanent structures but limit themselves to recruitment and campaign support services. Discipline is not well-enforced and program is largely a broad guideline within which candidates exercise a great deal of autonomy in tailoring appeals to specific constituencies. An absence of central control over nominations

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<sup>21</sup> See Snow (1971) and Snow and Manzetti (1993), for examples, on this problem.

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would be a corollary of this condition.

In essence, this type of party embodies a bargain in which candidates deliver offices to the party. In return the party supports them and agrees not to interfere with their efforts. In Uruguay, factions and factional leaders deliver offices to the party. For any type of centralized party the situation will normally be reversed.

This type of party survives principally by distributing selective benefits. The efforts of benefit-seekers within the party cannot be dismissed, but it is the drive for office, fueled by office-seeking ambition, which ensures the party's survival as an electorally significant organization.

The emphasis on selective benefits has significant organizational consequences. "Outsiders" with good electoral prospects will often be preferred to party insiders. Thus, career paths will tend to be rather unstable; a fact which has been noted not only in the context of U.S. parties, but also in countries with similar party organizations, like Uruguay, Colombia, and Peru (prior to the Fujimori "coup"). The decentralization of real power within the party is also notable. Key decisions regarding program and strategy are made by candidates and their "nuclei." In systems like those of Uruguay and Colombia those decisions are made by factions, while the national executive committees have the appearance of confederal arrangements.

In cases like the Republican Democratic Union in Venezuela, a single notable holds the reins, resulting in

centralized power without centralized organization (in the sense used here). One could argue that in such a party the institutionalization of the party would de-personalize power, thus threatening the perennial leadership's ambitions for office. In each of these cases, "office" is the dominant concern of the leadership but, for varying reasons, the party-as-organization is eschewed as the means to that end.

#### Nonprofessional-Centralized

The nonprofessional-centralized party, in contrast to the above, purchases whatever success it achieves by distributing collective benefits. Party activity is framed within a bureaucracy whose members are paid with "belonging," "solidarity," "ideology," and other intangibles. Tangible benefits will normally be framed within the party program itself (a leftist party advocating redistributive measures, for example). The party's "identity" is thus the natural focus of intra-party controversy. The determination of the breadth and boundaries of this identity is held tightly by a centralized bureau. Changes of identity will normally result from traumatic internal struggles, or occasionally from the trauma of assuming the reins of government.

The relationship of this type of party to the electoral market is somewhat complex owing to its more-ambivalent posture towards the necessity of electoral accommodation. Whereas for the professionalized party the success of decisions regarding the party's programmatic identity are

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directly and visibly measured in the market, the market produces no such resolution for the nonprofessional party. The primary reason for this is that questions of program are tied also to the distribution of power among factions and to the internally defined means for allocating power. Additionally, the threat of disaffecting the membership, whose concerns are centered on collective benefits, must continually be reckoned with. Disruptions in the flow of such benefits may be regarded as more costly than electoral failure.

The Frente Amplio exhibited this tendency in "forcing" its most electorally-significant partners from the alliance in order to preserve the organizational and ideological "vision" of its leadership. The problematic aspect of the Frente is its degree of centralization. It is both an alliance and a party. This requires more elaboration than I can give here, so I must refer the reader to the case histories presented further on. In sum, I have chosen to emphasize the fact the Frente Amplio operates as a party distinct from its constituent parts and that it does exercise discipline over its members in a manner untypical of the traditional Uruguayan parties.

#### Nonprofessional-Decentralized

In the nonprofessional-decentralized party the means or procedures through which the party identity is managed are at their least coherent state. Neither office-seekers nor benefit-seekers can be said to control this process. One likely form such a party may take is as a front group for some

secondary association: the party as such is not the relevant locus of organizational power.

The highly personalized attachment between Perón and the unions in Argentina would be one example of this type. Since the relatively influence-poor candidates and bureaucrats/activists cannot serve two Caesars, as it were, it is unlikely that there will be more than one such group (if there were, the resulting factionalism might empower the party as a broker, thus releasing it from its organizational mire). Under these conditions the party resembles an interest group, insofar as it acts on behalf of another association rather than taking on some measure of autonomy in its internal affairs.

A party can also reach this state when it is experiencing what Panebianco (1988) referred to as a "crisis of identity;" where office-seekers and benefit-seekers clash, with no apparent victor, over the definition of party goals. In this case the party offers a bewildering spectacle of instability. The rump party congress held by Peronist office-seekers in 1986 is one example: both congresses offered alternative programs, claimed the same leader (Isabel Perón), and offered alternative slates.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that the two examples mentioned above are highly dissimilar. The first would tend to have a highly centralized structure, even though the party itself is not the locus of decisionmaking power. The second would suffer from the opposite malady - a, probably temporary, loss of both internal and external means of control. This "type" is thus problematic. For the countries studied here a resolution is not entirely necessary as only the second example is found



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The means for classifying this last type of party obviously lie somewhat outside of the measures discussed earlier. For the first example this isn't a problem since the indicators do take into account the party's relations with external groups. For the second example we would have to rely on information about internal partisan conflict, and of the extent to which this manifests itself in organizational challenges to the established party order, such as: competing party congresses, the existence of rump executive committees with real influence, competition over the party label itself, etc.

The Peronist fit this category "neatly" only in the 1983-1987 period. Prior to that period of crisis, I have chosen to emphasize the decentralization of the party outside of the unionist sector. As I have noted earlier, the party has been characterized by a division between unionist and "provincial" (for want of a better term) elements, which also corresponded fairly well to what have been referred to as the "benefit-seeking" and "office-seeking" tendencies within parties: this can therefore be considered a fundamental division. It would be hard to refer to the party as having been strictly "professionalized" either, since the office-seeking tendency of the party never really had control of the party until 1987. It would probably be most accurate to say that the party has vacillated between the professional-decentralized and the

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nonprofessional-decentralized types.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Parties of Venezuela**

Democratic Action is both a cause and consequence of nationalization in Venezuela's political history. Its entry into politics followed a succession of nineteenth-century revolts which drained the power and authority of the latifundia, thus eliminating a traditional barrier to the nationalization of politics.

Venezuela is one of the few Latin American states in which the regionalism of the rural aristocracy was overcome in such decisive fashion. The extraordinary centralization of power under the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez followed. Lasting from 1908 to 1935, the Gómez dictatorship oversaw the discovery of oil, the internationalization of agriculture, the integration of the internal market, and the development of a national bureaucracy.

Democratic Action emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as the principal popular opposition to Gomez. Its aims were revolutionary, its politics socialist, and its organization tailored to grass-roots mobilization - much in the tradition of marxist-leninist "cellular" organization. In time it became

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<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that the earlier-mentioned conflict between Gonzalistas and Prietistas within AD did engender conflict over the party label, and thus represented a considerable crisis. But since Barrios controlled the national executive the electoral courts made short work of deciding the issue in favor of the Gonzalistas. The conflict, while disruptive, cannot be put into the same class of "fundamental" conflict as the Peronist situation in 1983-87.

a "movement," embracing the loyalties, ultimately, of a broad cross-section of Venezuelans and covering a wide swath of ideological positions, though the leadership remained staunchly socialist.

During the first democratic experiment (1945-1948) - the "trienio" - AD polled upwards of seventy percent of the vote. With an exaggerated sense of its mandate (both from its status as a movement and the fact that it was the only serious contender) AD embarked on a hurried path of socialist social engineering which ultimately provoked a conservative backlash.

AD entered the 1958 elections with a conciliatory (and pragmatic) move towards the center. By this time COPEI had also emerged as a well-organized opposition party (which would outlive the URD and other personalist vehicles which showed early strength) and also occupied space close to the center. AD's move naturally aggravated the more-extreme leftists still lodged under its umbrella and hence the next ten years saw a number of splits from the party. The Revolutionary Left departed in 1960, as did a number of young "adecos" who were frustrated by the continued predominance of "Generation of 28" adecos in the party leadership and on electoral lists.

The importance of these splits lie in what they tell us about organizational priorities. While the splits certainly damaged AD's voting strength in the short run it would be ridiculous to imagine that the extreme elements of the party could have remained in an organization which was increasingly committed to governing all Venezuelans. The continued presence

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of these elements, in any but a marginal sense, would ultimately have damaged the party's public credibility and its internal unity.

The 1968 split was particularly emblematic since it involved a popular member of the party vying for the presidential nomination. Luis Prieto of the AD Left, was passed over, despite being, arguably, the most electable candidate AD could then field. The party man, Gonzalo Barrios, was instead favored with the nomination. The message in this case was clear: Prieto was outside of the party's ideological mainstream and therefore unfit to hold the party banner. Prieto left the party before the elections, which AD narrowly lost, and formed his own party (the People's Electoral Movement). After the election AD turned its attention towards shoring up the rift created by the nominations struggle.

AD exhibited a number of tendencies during this period which are important for its classification. First, it showed a keen sense of its role as a governing party and the necessity of operating near the ideological center - even if this resulted in short-term losses. Second, its electoral commitments were clearly balanced by its commitment to maintaining a coherent ideological stance. Third, its organizations had the capacity to restrain elements of the party considered "dissident."

AD has, from its beginning, exhibited a great deal of agreement between its formal and informal structures of power. The legislative group is strong within the party apparatus,

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with virtually all of the party leadership coming from the ranks of the deputies and senators. The National Executive Committee meets in continuous session and the chief policy-making organ of the party, the National Political Committee, is actually a sub-committee of this group. The structures that exist at the national level are replicated at each level of the organization, with the levels corresponding to electoral boundaries.<sup>24</sup>

Internal party rules have tended to ensure that service to the party precedes office-holding. Six years of party service were required before a member could seek national office. This would also have the effect of insulating the party from outsiders and of drawing potential leaders into the organizational culture.<sup>25</sup>

The National Executive Committee exercised a great deal of control over the electoral lists put forward in each department. The same has also been true of COPEI. In 1973 the CEN reserved the power of decision over half the electoral office nominations. The executive of COPEI reserved such power over one-third of the electoral posts. This has ensured that the national leadership could maintain control of the

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<sup>24</sup> Much of the information pertaining to the early organization of the party is taken from Martz (1966).

<sup>25</sup> Unions frequently exercise considerable power within Latin American parties. AD and COPEI provide exceptions. The trade union movements were mobilized and organized by AD and COPEI (the Confederation of Workers being an arm of AD, while the Worker's Front is a dependency of COPEI). See, for example Mertz (1966) and Herman (1980).

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legislative groups, and also ensured that the leadership retained their offices (Arroyo, 1986).

While these practices contributed to generational "rigidity," it also assured that the party career structure would replicate the party's concern for being perceived as a governing party. This element of centralization existed alongside the practice of operating parallel party organs during elections. These could be regarded as somewhat comparable to the election committees surrounding legislative candidates in the United States, but these committees normally replicated the membership of the permanent organs of the party. This practice was the subject of internal reform in 1993; recommendations for democratizing nominations were also considered.<sup>26</sup>

The organizational structure of COPEI provides some slight contrast with that of AD. Since 1968, COPEI has focused on a regionally-based campaign strategy and has built up a system of regional directorates towards that end. Like AD, the party is highly centralized in recruitment and nominations practices.

The emphasis on, and need for, centralized control was evident in the 1973 elections when the party sought to attract prominent independent candidates and up-and-coming regional leaders to shore up the lists. These deviations from normal patterns of career advancement were said to have caused

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<sup>26</sup> FBIS-LAT-93-045, Mar. 10 1993, p. 39, "Meeting's Final proposals."

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considerable "internal distress" (Martz and Baloyra, 1976, p.87). Thereafter, traditional party virtues of discipline, apprenticeship, and technical superiority in election management were stressed as means for advancing the party's interests.

COPEI's regional bases are important for understanding the statistics that will be presented later. When it entered the electoral arena in 1958 its principal base of support was the Andean region, which gave the party a highly unbalanced "look." COPEI's expansion was based also on developing regional electorates and the "movement" of its vote reflects this regionally-based strategy.<sup>27</sup>

The "third" party in the 1958 elections (which since decayed to virtual extinction) was the Republican Democratic Union. This party is widely considered to have been a personal vehicle of its founder, Jóvito Villalba. Organizationally, it bore little resemblance to either AD or COPEI. It lacked a permanent organizational structure at virtually all levels.

Nominations and recruitment were less the province of formal executive committees than they were of Villalba and his close associates, although factions within the party did exist and competed for leadership posts and nominations. The URD's perennial organizational problem was its lack of penetration into Venezuelan society, outside of a fairly strong commitment by eastern peasants (Myers, 1973).

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<sup>27</sup> Myers (1980) provides an excellent discussion of COPEI's expansion.

While Villalba was a popular figure and convincing orator (traits shared by others who ran for President with this party's support), rallies were seldom followed up with grass-roots mobilization of great consequence. Villalba operated something of a travelling convention which, outside of Caracas, could not consistently hold the loyalties of voters.

The dominance of Villalba is not sufficient, therefore, to class this party as "centralized." In fact, as was suggested earlier, it is inimical to such a classification. The party bureaucracy never developed as a means for constructing, defending, and propagating a party "identity" to which members and voters could attach themselves. It remained, in the truest sense, a personalist party with an identity closely attached to its leader. Competition among factions and personalities was the principal means of career advancement, but this was not mediated by coherent, impersonal intra-party rules and practices.

This displacement of organization by personality is one important reason for being skeptical of the appearance of centralization in these types of parties generally. The vulnerability of these and more "verticalist" parties once they have been "beheaded" demonstrates the vital difference between structural coherence and strong personal leadership.

The organizational fluidity of the party ultimately undercut its electoral goals. Villalba's leadership was not maintained by superior organizational and mobilizational skills, nor, necessarily, by the mediation of electoral

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results, but instead by the elimination of rivals who might have strengthened the party.

Leonardo Montiel Ortega, a popular leader of the younger generation of "urredistas" (Villalba himself was a member of the Generation of 28), was a strong critic of the party's strategy and organizational ineptitude. In 1978, however, he failed to gain a congressional seat and was shortly forced out of the party by Villalba (Martz, 1980).

Prior to the 1968 campaign, a similar conflict produced similar results. Villalba opted to ally with a number of small parties - the Popular Democratic Force and the National Democratic Front - to support the candidacy of Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas. The apparent reason for this decision was Villalba's presidential ambitions; he did not want to place his party and his future in a position of subordination to Democratic Action, which would dictate the nomination of the presidential candidate.

Others in the party, Juan Dominguez Chacin being chief among them, argued that alliance with AD was the more rational choice given ideological and social affinities, and also because the URD had until very recently been a member of AD's coalition government. Personal ambition centered on the presidency thus conflicted with, we may reasonably suppose, ambitions centered on sub-national offices and the strengthening of the party apparatus. Chacin, like Ortega after him, was removed and his supporters marginalized (Myers, 1973).



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Categorizing this party has been very difficult owing partly to the relative paucity of attention given to its organizational attributes in the literature, and also to ambiguity with respect to professionalization. It is quite clearly not to be regarded as centralized. The decision to classify it as professionalized owes to its orientation, almost exclusively, towards the goal of putting its leaders in office. Its ideological flexibility, as well as its understandable desire to remain flexible with regards to the demands of extra-party organizations as well as its potential coalition partners, also figure heavily.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, the dominance of Villalba's personality in the party is a complication.<sup>29</sup> As was noted earlier, personal control does not imply centralization in the sense used here. The URD provides, I think, an example of this principle. As Myers (1973) noted with respect to the 1968 campaign, the three "personalist" parties that supported Burelli Rivas did not have the organizational capacity to transfer votes and loyalties to their joint candidate. Rival ambitions and ideological incompatibilities instead carried the day.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> I refer here to the URD's, and particularly Villalba's, troubled relations with AD, particularly in the period leading up to the 1968 elections.

<sup>29</sup> This, however, did not stop the party from courting the popular Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal for the presidential nomination in 1958

<sup>30</sup> The Popular Democratic Force was led by Arturo Usler Pietri, a well known intellectual from Caracas, while the National Democratic Front was led by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, a hero of the restoration of democracy in 1957 and

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Following the 1978 elections the Venezuelan parties were largely unchanged from the picture presented here. The principal organizational problems for AD were generational rigidity and the perception that the party had become over-bureaucratized and was beginning to lose touch with the electorate. These factors provoked a decision to restructure the leadership of the party by appointing "young charismatic men to leadership positions."<sup>31</sup> Seventeen secretaries-general positions became vacant as a result.

The URD's situation was more difficult to assess. Despite its concentration of support in Caracas, where Villalba's charisma was an operative factor, the URD continued to expend its meager organizational resources in a futile search for national significance. The URD's decline, correspondingly, has been national in scope, perhaps reflecting this dispersal of effort.<sup>32</sup> Its fate has been similar to that of many "parties of notables" in South America which have been unwilling or unable to expand their organizational capacity at the grass-roots level.<sup>33</sup>

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a very prominent presidential candidate in 1958. PDF was a party of the Right, while the FND was a party of the Left.

<sup>31</sup> FBIS-LAM-79-017, Jan. 24 1979, p. L3, "Democratic Action Reorganizes Party Leadership."

<sup>32</sup> See the results for the variance-components model presented further on.

<sup>33</sup> This is, of course, a phenomenon of more general interest as well. Organizational transformation has been, given the institutional incentives, the necessary counterpart of modernization and the advent of universal suffrage (see Ostrogorski, 1952 and Duverger, 1963, for examples). The

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### The Parties of Uruguay

The two "traditional" parties of Uruguay, the Colorados and Nationals, were direct outgrowths of caudillo politics. Unlike the Venezuelan parties, they organized, originally, within the context of civil wars (19th and early 20th century) rather than after their resolution. [The Colorados were the more liberal (in the economic and social senses) party and developed a loyal following in the urban areas, especially Montevideo. The Nationals were a party of the conservative interior and were also "clerical." ]

Despite the fact that the party ("lema") labels are significant as symbols of party identity, [and party loyalties tend to be passed on with great consistency from generation to generation,] these are actually among the more fragmented parties included in this study. The central loci of power in these parties are not so much the national organs, but the factions ("sublemas") out of which the parties themselves grew. The parties are, in effect, confederations of the factions. The national organs are not very authoritative as there is little ideological cohesion in either party. The question of nominations is settled first by the factions and later during the general elections which have a kind of built-in primary system.

The binding force for these parties is the peculiar

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histories of the Conservative and Liberal parties in the United Kingdom, and of the Social Christians in Germany, are very interesting in this regard.

electoral system - the Double-Simultaneous Vote - which is itself an institutional expression of the traditional strength of the factions.<sup>34</sup> The distinctive feature of this system is that, regardless of ideological/programmatic distance among the factions, there is very little to be gained by splitting from the party "lema."

Not surprisingly, the parties have a multi-class character. Programmatic and ideological flexibility are rewarded by the electoral system and permitted within the party organizations themselves. The parties also tend to exhibit a great deal of discontinuity in political careers. Gonzalez (1991) has calculated that 56 percent of the deputies and 40 percent of the senators elected in 1984 had held no prior elective office prior to the coup. This can partly be explained by the electoral punishment levelled at factions which were regarded as having been too friendly with the military government. It is also a consequence of the reliance of politicians on patronage positions for their livelihoods.

Guidobono (1986) has presented evidence that the elevation of new-comers has been a common feature of Uruguayan politics since the 1950s. In Colombia, which has similar parties, electoral system, and a broad patronage system, similar tendencies have been observed: there, the explanations tend to focus on the importance of patronage jobs and on the status value of elective office. The distribution of selective

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<sup>34</sup> The workings of this system are discussed in Chapter Four, Hypothesis 5.

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benefits can therefore be considered the principal organizational "glue."

The career structures of these parties are not strongly centralized, in terms of there being a party-mandated road to elective office. Some authors (Solari, 1964; Biles, 1972) characterized these as purely pragmatic parties, in that electoral ambitions appear to be dominant.

The recruitment process in both parties was/is decentralized, with the leaders of the principal factions exerting control over the lists quite apart from the influence of the national committees. Effective coordination of the sub-lemas by any national-level organ is not a notable feature of these parties (Janda, 1980).

The Frente Amplio, while formally an alliance of leftist parties, is actually organized as a separate party with its autonomous organs reaching down to the "base" level. Unlike the traditional parties, where the "bases" (political clubs) are not coordinated effectively, coordination of the militants is very much a part of the Frente Amplio's strategy.

The Constitutive Declaration of the Frente Amplio (1971) describes the front as an organization based on nuclear organizational principles, with common authorities, common mandate, and some disciplinary mechanisms. Rules adopted by the "Special Commission" were to be considered obligatory for all those signing the declaration then, and all those who would join the front thereafter. Among the common authorities adopted at that time were a Tribunal of Political Conduct,

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Sectoral and Regional Base Committees, and intermediary groups to coordinate the actions of the committees.<sup>35</sup>

The national organs of the party are the Plenary, composed of delegates of each member of the Frente. Voting in the Plenary is weighted, but it is not sensitive to differences in electoral strength. The most popular member (at the time) - the Government of the People - received just as many votes as the Communists, who were substantially weaker in electoral terms. This is a detail of substantive importance insofar as it indicates an organizational rejection of elections as the mediator in intra-front disputes.

The general recommendations of the Plenary are communicated to an executive committee - Mesa Ejecutiva - which takes all actions "necessary and convenient" to put into practice the decisions of the Plenary (Aguirre Bayley, 1985, pp. 102-103). The Comités de Base are the grass-roots agents of the party: organizing workers' cells, for example.

The Frente Amplio's principal organizational problem of the post-transition period (1984-1989) was the issue of centralization - particularly, conflicting conceptions about its role as a party and the role of the party's executive in the control of nominations. The Left, and particularly the Communists (who occupy a central position in the organization), viewed the organization as a party. The program

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<sup>35</sup> For information and documents pertaining to the founding of the Frente Amplio, Miguel Aguirre Bayley provides a fairly comprehensive selection in El Frente Amplio: historia y documentos Montevideo: Ediciones de Banda Oriental, 1985.



agreed upon at the National Convention was expected to be the final word and candidates were expected to support it.

The Center-Left, represented by the Party for the Government of the People (PGP) and the Christian Democrats (PDC), regarded the organization as a "front," much in the spirit of the traditional lemas. The PGP also happened to be the majority fraction of the Frente Amplio, as it polled 40 percent of the total party vote in 1984.<sup>36</sup> Both center-left parties split from the Frente in 1989 to form the Nuevo Espacio.

The immediate context of the split was the insistence of the further-left leadership on fielding a unity candidate for president.<sup>37</sup> The broader context was the difference in attitudes mentioned above. The Frente's vice-presidential candidate, Jose d'Elia, in a statement revealing of the Left's view, claimed that the PGP was part of the "ideological unity" of the Frente Amplio.<sup>38</sup> Another official of the party stated, similarly, that "the Broad Front is not a mere electoral option, a circumstantial pact, nor a politician's agreement... The Broad Front is for us the broad road towards socialism in

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<sup>36</sup> The PGP had 11 of 21 deputies and 3 of 6 senators.

<sup>37</sup> They preferred either an alternative candidacy to Gen. Liber Seregni (retired) or a dual candidacy with Hugo Batalla, the leader of the PGP. This latter arrangement would have been logical given the electoral law, but would have risked alienating the far-left.

<sup>38</sup> FBIS-LAM-84-223, Nov. 16 1984, p. 115, "Socialists Deny Discord Within Broad Front."

our country."<sup>39</sup>

These statements reject the idea that the Frente Amplio was a pragmatic adjustment by the Left to the Double-Simultaneous Vote system and point to ideology and unity as the party's calling cards. Both the PGP and the PDC found attempts at reform in the direction of greater electoral competitiveness to be half-hearted and regarded the influence of the far-Left to be disproportional to its electoral strength.<sup>40</sup> They, in turn, were regarded as "more interested in the electoral campaign than in reorganizing the coalition."<sup>41</sup>

Shortly after the PGP and the PDC left the front, it was joined by several radical groups, including the MLN-Tupamaros (the political wing of a former guerilla movement). Overall, the Frente Amplio's organization and activities reveal a lack of willingness to forego its intra-organization goals - principally ideology and an insistence on unity - even as its electoral significance increased from 1971 to 1984. Rather, it has remained quite solidly within the confines of its urban

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<sup>39</sup> FBIS-LAM-85-054, March 20 1985, p. K1, "Communist Official on Plans to Rebuild Party."

The rejection of the front as an "electoral convenience" is also stated explicitly in the Constitutive Declaration.

<sup>40</sup> The PDC would later cite the recovery of its "autonomy and its representatives" as one of its reasons for splitting with the FA. FBIS-LAT-88-251, Dec. 30 1988, p. 23, "PDC Suspends Participation in Broad Front."

<sup>41</sup> FBIS-LAT-88-22, Nov. 17 1988, p. 45, "Broad Front Facing 'Internal Crisis'."

base in Montevideo.

### **The Parties of Argentina**

Both of the major parties, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Justicialist (Peronist), are currently broad-based, multi-class organizations. The Radicals entered the post-transition period in this state; the Peronists achieved this only after approximately five years of internal struggle. These two parties have essentially monopolized the "center" of Argentine politics, and with that state of affairs comes the necessity of presenting at least the appearance of possessing the capacity to govern on behalf of the majority of Argentines.

Their histories of electoral success, particularly in the case of the Peronists, impose limits on the extent to which they will, as organizations, tolerate the possibility of being relegated to the status of "third" parties. The concentration of the vote reinforces the tendency to regard this as a two-party system, even though the use of proportional representation would tend to militate against this.<sup>42</sup> Of the six deputies that the minor parties won in 1983, five came

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<sup>42</sup> Sartori (1986) has discussed the conditions under which proportional systems can maintain a two-party format. These center mainly on the distribution of the electorate's preferences (uni-modal; relatively few salient issue-dimensions). Shugart and Carey (1992) have suggested that presidential systems, particularly with concurrent elections, tend to promote a two-party format; the extension to legislative elections does appear to be very sensitive to the use of concurrent elections, though.

from a single district.

Both Peronism and Radicalism have, historically, resembled movements as much as parties, encompassing factions of diverse ideological views. Both have also been, at one time or another, characterized by personalism, and have relied on the charisma of their leaders. For the Radicals, Hípolito Yrigoyen was emblematic of this tendency. Nevertheless, the party labels have had great and durable meaning for their supporters over and above considerations of personality, as evidenced by their resurgence after military rule in a virtually unchanged two-party format.

For the Peronists, however, personalism has been a more enduring problem than has been the case for the Radicals. Acute factionalism after the death of Juan Perón, and the attempts to nominate Isabel Perón for the presidency in 1984 (a last-ditch attempt to unify the party), demonstrate the overriding importance of personality.

The Radicals, while exhibiting some similar traits, are organizationally distinct from the Peronists. Radical congresses have been the decisive instruments for nominating the top leadership positions and candidacies. Raúl Alfonsín's undisputed leadership of the party after military withdrawal served to unify the party, and the ease with which opposing factions gave way and supported the new leadership presents a starkly different picture from what was happening within Peronism at that time.

During Alfonsín's tenure an additional step to unify the



party was taken in the form of an alteration of party rules; specifically, abolishing the rule requiring the President of the country to step down from the presidency of the party. The Radical party's attention to local organization has also been a notable feature.<sup>43</sup> Although the local committees, whose purpose is essentially to homogenize regional voting, have often been ineffectively coordinated, this appears to have improved under the Renovation and Change (RyC - "Renovación y Cambio") leadership, who have been applauded by other members of the party for their grass-roots efforts.

Party discipline is also managed more effectively than has been true for the Peronists. During the 1984-87 period, when as many as four principal Peronist factions were voting against each other in parliament, the UCR managed to maintain a high degree of discipline. At least one source has also mentioned that career partisans are typically given preference for advancement within the party (Day, 1988).

The Argentine parties emerged from military rule in relatively unchanged form. The Radicals and the Peronists had, particularly during the final three years of military rule, kept up functioning party organizations. Though there was a law on the books banning party activity, this ban was not

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<sup>43</sup> The party's successes have more recently been attributable to the influence of the Renovation and Change faction. But Waisman (1991) notes that development of the mass base has been a constant priority for the Radicals, perhaps owing to the legal proscriptions employed against them prior to 1910 and during the military and Peronist governments of 1930-1955.

enforced during the last two years (though the military was more stringent in enforcing rules aimed at keeping the union activists loyal to Peronism inactive - especially the "62 Organizations," the political wing of the General Confederation of Labor).

The Radicals were traditionally a party of the middle class with relatively few or no ties to the unions. The Peronists, on the other hand, had dominated the political scene since the 1940s, winning every national election they contested. Their strong connection to a disciplined working class vote engineered by highly politicized unions was a major source of strength.

With the "center" of politics shifted in favor of the Peronist stronghold, Peronism developed great expectations of itself. During the military's tenure, however, divisions were sown in union ranks, the "verticalism" of the organization became a liability when it was "beheaded" by the death of Juan Perón in 1974, and the numerical strength of labor was decreased by "deindustrialization."

The beheading of the Peronist party brought into prominence an old division in Peronist ranks which had earlier surfaced during Perón's exile (after 1955): that between the syndical sector (largely the CGT) and what were then known as neo-Peronists - a confederation of provincial parties. The latter were perceived as the more compromising aspect of Peronism, willing to consider alliances with the Radicals and cooperation with the Frondizi and Illia governments.

This union/provincial split was echoed in a debilitating internal struggle lasting from 1983 to 1987, in which it more plainly displayed its close relationship to the office-seeking and benefit-seeking tendencies of the party (this split is detailed further on). This struggle also pointed out the continued relevance of the description of the Peronists as a "movement." Whereas the Radicals have polled as much as seventy percent of their vote from the middle class in areas like Buenos Aires, Peronist support has been much more diverse and potentially fractious, with support divided among, for example, the unionist urban working class and the "caudillistic" working class of the interior provinces.<sup>44</sup>

The return to democracy thus brought into focus some fundamental organizational dilemmas for the Peronists. In the early going it was not clear that they had the capacity to respond to them, at least in a manner that would allow them to regain their electoral hegemony. The vital question, "who controls the party?" was unanswered in 1983.

The union branches and the *politicos* (career politicians) vied for supremacy; each based their claims on highly disparate goals. The union branch, dubbed "officialists," argued for continuity with the past in terms of both ideology (and hence benefits to labor) and the distribution of

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<sup>44</sup> Snow (1971) points out that Perón's early support drew heavily from peasants from the interior who were accustomed to patronal politics. Many of the smaller parties attached to Peronism in the interior maintained this characteristic. Often these parties have had a Center-Right orientation.

organizational power (under Perón, verticalism had often implied an arbitrary, even highly-personalized, discipline over office-holders).

The politico branch - dubbed "renewalists," or "renovators" - argued for an ideological shift towards a new center, now perceived to be further to the right and infused with the interests of the middle class. Since this seemed unlikely under the stifling rule of the unions, such an approach could only involve dislodging the unions.<sup>45</sup>

The Radicals, by contrast, had never adopted a verticalist style of organization and had a long history in which electoral concerns (and internal elections) determined the distribution of organizational power. As the elections of 1983 approached, factional disputes centered on slates of candidates rather than on more-fundamental questions. The faction which emerged triumphant in the general election, the Renovation and Change Movement of Raúl Alfonsín (its presidential candidate), had earlier secured control of the leadership of the party (the National Committee) in the internal elections.<sup>46</sup>

The victory of the RyC was secured by widespread

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<sup>45</sup> For a detailed discussion of the Radical and Peronist organizations in the period just prior to the 1983 elections see: Cavarozzi, Marcelo "Peronism and Radicalism: Argentina's Transition in Perspective," in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds. Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-85 San Diego: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 143-174.

<sup>46</sup> FBIS-LAT-83, August 1, 1983, p. B2, "Alfonsin Named Head of the UCR National Committee."

confidence in Alfonsín's electability (he had been a vocal opponent of the military and organizer of opposition) and by the perception that the RyC was the more youthful and energetic of the contending factions. The role of the RyC in organizing grass-roots opposition to the military was very important in this regard. The victory of the RyC, moreover, was acknowledged and supported by virtually every major element of Radicalism.

A spokesman for the National Line faction, speaking prior to the internal elections, summed up a typical Radical attitude towards internal, factional divisions when he said, "the Radicals are 80 percent united and 20 percent split. The 80 percent keeps us together and the 20 percent keeps us democratic."<sup>47</sup> The leader of the Yrigoyenist Affirmation Movement, Luis Leon, made a similar statement: "We don't want to argue about names. We want to be nationally significant."<sup>48</sup>

These attitudes contrast sharply with the prevailing winds in Peronism at that time. The Peronists could not come to agreement on the procedures that would be used to nominate candidates and leaders of the party. This conflict was so intense that a meeting to discuss the issues could not be organized. Party discipline broke down as some Peronist

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<sup>47</sup> The rhetorical value of such a statement for a post-transition election should not be ignored.

<sup>48</sup> FBIS-LAT-82, July 19, 1982, pp. B1-B2, "Radical Party Plenary Session to Choose Leaders."

factions initiated separate talks with the military (the unionist elements were given the bulk of public attention in this regard and it proved to be electorally damaging). The Peronist Youth openly called for the resignation of the entire party leadership.<sup>49</sup>

Not surprisingly, the 1983 loss brought increased demands for reform in the party. But with the climate of conflict in the party this actually led to further polarization and organizational paralysis. The Peronist Youth continued to berate their elders; they regarded the loss as a betrayal of the Peronist's natural position in Argentine politics. The divorce between the officialist and renewalist tendencies became more pronounced.

The officialists exhibited interest in bringing Isabel Perón back into active leadership of the party (despite the disastrous experience of 1973-76), who they regarded as a potential symbol of unity. This move was quickly matched by the renewalists, who, for a time, also claimed Isabel as their leader. By 1984, a reorganization of the party was ostensibly in the works under Perón's leadership. Her moves would have placed the unionists, once again, in control of the party.<sup>50</sup> Perón later backed away from this reform.

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<sup>49</sup> FBIS-LAT-82, March 5, 1982, p. B3  
 FBIS-LAT-82, July 19, 1982, p. B2  
 FBIS-LAT-83, April 29, 1983, p. B11  
 "Peronists Face Paralyzing Ray," in Latin America Political Report 83-32, August 19, 1983, p. 8

<sup>50</sup> FBIS-LAT-84, June 7, 1984, p. B4, "Peronists to Announce Reorganization."

In a very real sense, the 1983 elections served to clarify the electoral position of the Peronists. It was apparent that the party's strong union identification had hindered their appeal to the middle class. The idea of a "military-syndical" pact, a supposed power-sharing agreement, was given great credence and brought the democratic credentials of the entire party into question. The entrenchment of the unions in positions of power, however, dictated that the road to reform would be strewn with debilitating conflict. The failure to resolve this conflict - to rid itself of the perception that it responded to a limited sector of interests - contributed to electoral failure in both 1983 and 1985.

Conflict reached its peak in 1984 when the renewalists walked out of the party congress in Buenos Aires. Those that remained were the loyalists of Herminio Iglesias, a union-affiliated leader, and the representatives of the 62 Organizations. Those who walked out included all of the party's senators, more than 70 (out of 111) national deputies, and 9 out of 12 of the department governors - in effect, the entirety of what we have referred to as the "office-seeking" tendency of the party.<sup>51</sup> Both groups then proceeded to build competing organizational structures, including separate

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<sup>51</sup> FBIS-LAT-84, Dec. 17, 1984, p. B4, "Peronist Congress Splits; Delegates Walk Out."

FBIS-LAT-84, Dec. 17, 1984, p. B5, "Dissidents Hold 'Rump' Convention."

FBIS-LAT-84, Dec. 18, 1984, p. B2, "Justicialist Faction Elects New National Council."

congresses and national executives.

After the loss in the 1985 midterm elections the rift within the party had still not been sealed.<sup>52</sup> In 1987 Peronist leaders agreed to a single, "unity" slate, which essentially recognized that the renewalists were the only viable electoral option the party could put forward. Having won the 1987 elections, the predominance of the renewalists was reinforced such that, by 1989, Carlos Menem (by now the party's leader and presidential candidate) could form a cabinet that virtually shut the unions out. The victory in the 1989 General Election saw the party adopt a very flexible approach to electoral strategy. The Peronist coalition included not only a great portion of the Left, but also incorporated conservatives and business interests - moves which engaged the ire of the unions.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The two groups ran separate lists in which the Frejudepa -the renewalist alliance - took 26% of the vote in Buenos Aires (Peronism's traditional preserve and the largest single district in the country) and 11 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Frejuli - the alliance of officialists - gained only 9% of the vote and only 3 seats in the Chamber. The officialists were thus the big losers in the election and this helped to facilitate their demise in the party prior to the 1987 elections. See: "Radicals Sweep the Elections," in Latin America Political Report 85-44, Nov. 8, 1985, p. 3. The elections also pushed the renewalists' allies in the General Confederation of Labor - the reform-minded Committee of 25, forward as a possible rival to the 62 Organizations. The officialists' losses were interpreted as a "message" to the unions to adopt more-democratic procedures. See: "CGT Hierarchy in a Crossfire," in Latin America Political Report 85-46, Nov. 22, p. 9.

<sup>53</sup> "Postscript: Argentina," in Latin America Political Report 87-41, October 2, 1987, p. 12.

"Peronist Unions Are None Too Happy With Menem's Choice of Friends," in Latin America Political Report 89-26,



As was mentioned earlier, the signal departure of the experience of the Radicals from that of the Peronists was that they began the transition and post-transition periods with the capability to authoritatively resolve internal conflict. The victory of the RyC was grounded in organizational success and electoral appeal. The cohesion of the party, moreover, was not overly disturbed by its losses in 1987 and 1989.

After the 1989 defeat Raúl Alfonsín was once-again elected president of the party and the RyC retained a dominant position on the party's executive board.<sup>54</sup> Rather than signalling stagnation, this was interpreted as an effort to avoid fractious disputes and as a recognition of the skills of the RyC leadership.

While the Radical party cannot be considered centralized to the same degree as the major Venezuelan parties it is not possible, either, to place it in a class with either the Peronists or the traditional parties of Uruguay. It might be best to consider it intermediate (along this dimension), but the classification will stand, bluntly, as "centralized."

Peronism has been dramatically altered under the leadership of the Menem faction. The party has moved closer to a center-right position, has achieved some centralized control over electoral lists, and has pursued advantageous alliances

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July 1, 1989, p. 1.

FBIS-LAT-89-053, March 21, 1989, p. 35, "Electoral Courts Approve New Alliances."

<sup>54</sup> FBIS-LAT-89-223, Nov. 21, 1989, p. 4, "Former President Alfonsin Elected UCR Leader."

with popular independents and provincial parties.<sup>55</sup> It would be difficult to argue, however, that the party is going to become highly centralized in the immediate future.

Menem has made party discipline an issue, but this is largely a response to the imperatives of governing in difficult circumstances: holding the party together in the wake of privatization schemes and highly-partisan union conflict. At the same time, the Peronist leadership has advocated reforms in the electoral laws which would, in fact, undercut the centralization of the party. One such reform would have allowed intra-party preference voting, a scheme which is widely regarded as antithetical to centralized control.

One difficulty that arises in categorizing these parties is that, apart from the extreme fragmentation of the Peronists during the 1983-1987 period, their histories tend to color perceptions. The earlier history of Peronism, for example, is often characterized as "verticalist," implying a highly centralized structure. But, as Snow and Manzetti (1993) wrote:

"...the Peronist party was held together almost exclusively by the personality of Juan Perón; however, even at its height, Peronism was not a unified national party with a coherent program. In the Federal Capital and its working class suburbs it was primarily a labor party, but in other areas it

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<sup>55</sup> Many of these small parties share Menem's center-right orientation. Menem's leadership in the party opened up the opportunity to sharply increase the number of such alliances as compared with 1987. Nevertheless, the use of such alliances has been common throughout the history of the party. For information on the scope of these alliances see Venturini (1989).

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was essentially a Social Christian movement, an ultranationalist Catholic organization, or simply a personalist vehicle for provincial *caudillos*." (p. 79)

With respect to the Radical party, Snow and Manzetti (1993) note:

"During much of its history radicalism was essentially an alliance of provincial *caudillos*. This personalism, plus factions that became virtual parties within the party (each had its own offices, program, and membership list), has long been a Radical hallmark. Party factionalism declined during the first half of the Alfonsín administration, but it returned as soon as the Radicals began to lose electoral support." (p. 79)

This reading of party history would tend to suggest that the structural coherence of these parties is not a predictable organizational feature so much as a consequence of the relative predominance of particular factions at particular times: the RyC of Alfonsín in the post-transition period, for example, and the *menemistas* of the Peronist party after 1989.

Factionalism tends to imply a bypassing of the party. Under Perón, the state became the principal means for distributing patronage and the unions provided an alternative organization through which support for the regime could be mobilized. But to say that factionalism, and the consequences attributed to it, were somehow the Argentine "norm" distorts, I think, the record. Factionalism, including, as noted above, organizational fragmentation in the Radical party during much of the 1955-1973 period, was an adjustment to the opportunities provided by bans on the Peronist party. Factionalism served to recreate the two-party format under

different party labels.

Where factionalism is a prominent part of partisan life, which is certainly not a unique or pathological condition, the keys to assessing the organizational character of the parties are the extent to which they seek allies and/or mediation of internal conflict from outside of themselves. Where internal procedures prove adequate in resolving inter-factional ambitions and uniting the party behind the victor it is really not necessary to impute structural incoherence to the party.

For the Radicals, during the 1983-1989 period, internal mediation was the norm (even though factional conflicts excited the interests of powerful external groups). The Peronists, on the other hand, have often relied on external mediation channeled through the person of Juan Perón, and later, Isabel Perón. In the current era, internal mediative processes acquired authority only after 1987. These concerns inform the categorization of these parties (as presented earlier).

## **Chapter Four**

### **Nationalization in Legislative Elections: Hypotheses and Methods**

This chapter begins the analysis of legislative nationalization by first focusing on party organization effects. Hypotheses are also presented respecting the effects of institutions on electoral uncertainty in legislative elections - proportionality and "ballot dependence."

#### **Hypotheses**

##### **Hypothesis One -- Professional-Centralized**

In professional-centralized parties there is a balance of office-seeking and benefit-seeking tendencies. This combination results in an expansive disposition towards both dimensions of nationalization: movement and configuration. On the movement dimension the party seeks to construct electoral coalitions which can capture the swing votes. On the configuration dimension, the party responds to the demands of its mass-membership base. In other words, it seeks to create stable blocs of voters in all localities.

- a) the movement of votes will be nationalized.
- b) the configuration of votes will tend toward an expansion of nationalization over time.

##### **Hypothesis Two -- Professional-Decentralized**

This type of party comes closest to the largely adaptive role ascribed to the party in minimalist theory. With few

organizational constraints on the office-seeker the party responds to market signals, conforming itself to voting patterns and institutions of the market (for example, district magnitudes -- considered further on).

a) since the party is sensitive to the swing of votes the movement of votes should tend to be nationalized.

b) the configuration of nationalization will not tend to expand over time and/or the scope of nationalization will tend to contract.

### **Hypothesis Three -- Nonprofessional-Centralized**

The defining features of this type are a general insensitivity to the swing vote and an organizational imperative to define and hold sectors of the electorate.

a) the movement of votes will occur at the regional or district levels.

b) without the expansive influence of the office-seeking tendency this type of party should have a stable configuration of nationalization over time.

### **Hypothesis Four -- Nonprofessional-Decentralized**

The defining feature of this type is a general lack, or loss, of control over the electorate. The swing vote is not "organized" by a national movement and blocs or sectors ally with, or defect from, the party in a more or less random, opportunistic fashion.

a) the movement of votes will tend to occur at the

regional or district levels.

b) the measures for the configuration of nationalization will tend to either instability or a contraction of nationalization.

For the configuration of nationalization these hypotheses could be problematic since patterns of voting may have settled themselves prior to the elections included here. The hypotheses, however, refer to the tendency for these measures to change over time, not to the actual patterns. It may be useful to ask, therefore, whether the observed patterns "fit" the institutional or historical proclivities of the system before determining what the effect of the parties has been over a relatively short time span. We will be able to address some institutional differences directly. These hypotheses are presented below.

#### **Hypothesis Five -- Proportionality**

The less proportional the electoral system the greater the sub-national forces in legislative elections.

As was mentioned earlier, where the movement of nationalization is concerned we are principally interested in the proportionality of the electoral system (district magnitude). Where configuration is concerned it is "ballot dependence" which we must account for.

On the proportionality dimension, Uruguay and Argentina



most closely resemble each other. In both cases there are a small number of districts which elect a large number of deputies while the "interior" districts average 3-4 seats per district. For the greater number of districts, then, we would expect district forces to be predominant (since it is assumed that the tendency to respond to district forces is inversely related to the size of the districts). However, in terms of the electoral system as a whole, it must be acknowledged that large districts contribute a disproportionate share of the rewards of "office" to the parties and will tend to weigh more heavily on their behavior.

One way of checking the validity of this hypothesis would therefore be to remove the largest districts (here the two largest) from the analysis and observe the effect on the parties which traditionally rely most and least heavily on these districts. Those which rely on them most should tend to exhibit a deflation of the national force and an increase in the district force (in Uruguay, the Frente Amplio relies heavily on the Montevidean vote and, of the traditional parties, the Colorado party has traditionally been the "urban" party).

#### **Hypothesis Six -- Ballot Dependence**

Closed-list systems will have a more nationalized configuration of votes than systems employing any variant of intra-party preference voting.

On the "ballot dependence" dimension, Argentina and Venezuela are similar cases. As was suggested earlier, closed-list systems should tend to produce a nationalized configuration of votes. While intra-party preference voting would be expected to retard nationalization along the configuration dimension, this expectation cannot be simply applied to Uruguay.

The Uruguayan Double Simultaneous Vote system makes use of a pooled vote tabulation procedure in which factional votes are included in the party total. Thus, with the party as the unit of analysis, this may actually inflate nationalization scores. What we would expect, therefore, is a marked disparity between nationalization scores at the party and faction levels. Data broken down by faction was not available for the legislative elections, but data for the presidential elections is presented in Chapter Nine.

#### **Data**

The election data are district level returns (a "province" or "department"). The district data was also collected into historical/geographical regions. For Argentina the deputorial elections of 1983, 1985, 1987, and 1989 were included. For Uruguay, the elections of 1966, 1971, 1984, and 1989. And for Venezuela the elections of 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, and 1978. The 1971 and 1984 elections in Uruguay are separated by a period of military government, which nevertheless did not appear to have altered the relationships

among the parties substantially.

The parties were classified according to the criteria mentioned earlier. I have earlier tried to present a reasonably detailed picture of each of the parties. The classifications were as follows (the actual coding for the Peronists reflects the '83-'87 period) :

**Table 4: Classifications of the Parties**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Type</b>
Democratic Action (Venezuela)	Professional-Centralized
COPEI (Venezuela)	Professional-Centralized
Republican Democratic Union (Venezuela)	Professional-Decentralized
Colorado (Uruguay)	Professional-Decentralized
Nacional (Uruguay)	Professional-Decentralized
Frente Amplio (Uruguay)	Nonprofessional- Centralized
Peronist (1983-85) (Argentina)	Nonprofessional- Decentralized
Peronist (1987-89)	Professional-Decentralized
Radical Civic Union (Argentina)	Professional-Centralized

**Research Design**

A number of the variables which figured prominently in some of the earlier studies of democratization have been held constant in this study. The purposes of this are to focus attention on the organizational variables and also to deal with variations within the institutional structures of presidential regimes. These "constants" are: presidential power, modernization of the media, and regional loyalties based on ethnic/linguistic criteria.

All of the cases considered here are presidential systems. Ethnic divisions are not politically significant in any of these countries. There are small native populations while the bulk of the populations are european descendants. In all cases media campaigns are extensive and sophisticated. The difference between Venezuela and the other countries in terms of the dates of the elections is probably not a problem since Venezuela is considered to have integrated modern campaign techniques earlier than most South American countries (Martz and Baloyra, 1976).

The time period of the analysis has been kept relatively short. The data for each country spans no more than five elections and over no more than thirty-three years. This may avoid, for example, dramatic shifts in variables considered "constant," such as the development of media. More importantly, the time periods employed provide the maximum constitutional/institutional continuity possible for these countries.

The short time periods involved incur a cost insofar as there are insufficient elections to assume that cross-election peculiarities are not biasing the results. This problem of "sensitivity" to particular elections must be given some attention.

It should be remembered, however, that while the number of elections is small, the data refers to a wide variety of parties. If the variance-components measure is sensitive to particular elections (one election being more "nationalized" than others, perhaps) then this should effect each party regardless of organizational type. A test for sensitivity thus already exists in the diversity of parties.

It should be noted that the hypotheses stated above refer specifically to parties which are, or were, nationally significant (this includes several "third" parties - the Republican Democratic Union and the Frente Amplio which have had periods of ascent and/or descent). The reason for this stricture is to simplify the assumptions made about party goals. Among these parties we can safely assume that some form of electoral victory on a national scale was a fundamental organizational goal.

The format of the party system, which could be considered an important facet of the "electoral market" (though I have not discussed this explicitly) has also been held constant. All of these countries have had two or two-and-a-half party systems.

## Methods

Since the focus of this study is on theoretical issues surrounding the nationalization of elections rather than methodological issues, no alternative model of nationalization is offered. The relative merits of earlier-developed models have been amply discussed in the literature (Katz, 1973; Kawato, 1988), but few gains have been made in terms of cross-national explanation of the phenomenon.

The most substantively-interesting improvements on the models developed by Stokes (1965) and Jackman (1972) were offered by Claggett, Flanigan and Zingale (1984), who presented an analysis-of-variance model which assessed both the "movement" and "configuration" of votes. The earlier models were directed exclusively at the "movement."

Kawato (1988) made much of the failure of the Claggett, et al., model to confirm the findings of Stokes and Jackman. I do not, however, see any reason to question the validity of those models based on this observation alone. Claggett, et al., partitioned their data into regions rather than districts. Regional means may conceal substantial among-district variation, however, so their methods need not be considered "strictly comparable," as was argued.

Another of Kawato's concerns was that Stokes' model (and therefore Jackman's, which replicated the analysis-of-variance procedure using regression on dummy variables) does not actually measure the movement of nationalization. He argued that the conceptual goals of the model were compromised by the

use of party vote percentages rather than the "swing" of such votes across elections. The use of "swing" is implicit in these models, however, as the results are based on variances from national, regional, and district means. The data entered into the model need not be in the form of vote-swings for the model to measure the movement of nationalization.

The model employed in this study is Jackman's version of the variance-components model, which is a regression on dummy variables. The reasons for this are quite pragmatic. First, although this model does not measure "configuration," that deficiency can easily be remedied by making use of simple descriptive measures such as Rose and Urwin's (1975) "cumulative regional inequality index," and by using simple coefficients of variation - "V-scores" (Brady, 1985). Second, Jackman's model is both easily applied and interpreted, and requires a minimum of manipulation of the data by the researcher.

#### **The Variance-Components Model for the Movement of Nationalization**

Jackman's model uses multiple regression on yearly party vote returns to estimate the net variance contributed by national (yearly means), provincial (district/department), and regional electoral forces. The district-level returns are regressed on "dummy" variables representing the three forces. As such it is equivalent to analysis-of-variance in general, and Stokes' model in particular. In the model presented below



some of the subscript and coefficient symbols have been changed, but it is exactly equivalent to Jackman's model.

$$Y_{ijk} = a + \sum_k a_k X_k + \sum_i b_i Z_i + U_{ijk}$$

where:  $Y_{ijk}$  = party vote (%) in year k, region i,  
and district j  
 $a$  = estimate of party vote in year 1,  
region 1  
 $a_k$  = estimated difference between party vote  
from year k to year 1  
 $b_j$  = estimated difference between party vote  
in region j from region 1  
 $U_{ijk} = Y_{ijk} - Y_{ijk}(\text{estimated})$   
 $X, Z$  = dummy variables

The most important feature of this general model is that it can be decomposed for separate estimates of the national and regional effects. This is possible because as long as the number of districts is unchanged, and they do not overlap, the model is "proportional" - the X terms are not correlated with the Z terms. The national and regional effects are estimated by the r-square of the decomposed models. The district effect is estimated from '1 - r-square' of the combined model (above).

The variance-components scores for the national, regional and district effects are interpreted as the percentage of variance in the movement of votes across all districts which is explained at each respective level of vote-aggregation.

**Configuration of Nationalization (per election year):**

The cumulative regional inequality index (CRI) measures the difference between the dispersal of voters across districts and the dispersal of a party's total national vote across districts. It is calculated from the formula shown below:

$$\sum |(V_j/V_n) - (P_j/P_n)|/2$$

where:  $V_j$  = voters in district j  
 $V_n$  = national vote total  
 $P_j$  = party's vote in district j  
 $P_n$  = party's national vote total

For our purposes the final division by two is unnecessary (its purpose being to set the range of the measure between 0 and 1), so this step will be foregone in the presentation of the scores. The CRI can be interpreted as a comparison of the dispersal of a party's vote against an ideal - conformance with the actual distribution of voters. The closer a party approaches such a distribution the closer the score will be to zero.

Since the scores are determined solely by the pattern of votes, interpretation of the CRI is relatively straightforward. While changes in the electoral fortunes of parties will exhibit some regional dispersion it is the dispersion which is measured, not the changing electoral fortunes of the parties.

Having presented the measures corresponding to the hypotheses presented earlier, we can now turn to the data

analysis. We find in Chapter Five that nationalization is an attribute of parties: the data conform fairly well to the organizational traits of the parties. I mention this now because later, when we turn to the effects of the presidency, this interpretation is not overturned, but is substantially revised.

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## Chapter Five

### Nationalization in Legislative Elections: Data Analysis

The variance-components data presented below (Tables 5 and 6) suggest a number of conclusions. First, these results point out the importance of cross-party and cross-national analysis in the study of nationalization. The variability in scores among parties within the same country - especially Uruguay and Argentina - amount to a rejection of the propositions developed in the earlier studies.

Hypotheses premised on systemic variables cannot account for the variety of nationalization scores across parties. Instead, we might suggest that such explanations are only appropriate where variation in party type is absent (which was generally true of the earlier studies).

Not all the hypotheses linking party type to nationalization scores are clearly supported, but there is, especially given the newness, instability, and the ever-present possibility of uncontrolled sources of variation in these democracies, a fair degree of conformance with the hypotheses. All of the "professionalized" parties exhibit high nationalization scores, with the exception of the Nacional party of Uruguay (which is traditionally, it should be recalled, the party of Uruguay's interior, where district magnitudes are uniformly low - 2-4 seats).

It is worth noting the strong contrast in the experiences of two "third" parties in Venezuela and Uruguay. Support for

the URD (the Republican Democratic Union of Venezuela) declined over the course of the five elections and its decline in terms of "swing" reflects a national movement away from the party (not in terms of configuration - in fact, the opposite holds). The Frente Amplio's ascent, on the other hand, accompanies a regional movement of votes (exploiting the proportionality of the Montevideo district). These patterns are consistent with an explanation based on party type. These results, however, are also consistent with Hypothesis 5 ("proportionality"), so some attempt must be made to assess the impact of district magnitude on the nationalization scores.

Table 5: Variance Components

<b>Professional-Centralized Parties</b>			
	<b>AD</b>	<b>COPEI</b>	<b>UCR</b>
<b>National</b>	.441	.392	.389
<b>Regional</b>	.269	.345	.068
<b>District</b>	.290	.263	.544
<b>Professional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
	<b>Colorado</b>	<b>Nacional</b>	<b>URD</b>
<b>National</b>	.455	.115	.490
<b>Regional</b>	.127	.573	.143
<b>District</b>	.418	.313	.367
<b>Nonprofessional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
	<b>Peronist</b>		
<b>National</b>	.099		
<b>Regional</b>	.005		
<b>District</b>	.895		
<b>Nonprofessional-Centralized Parties</b>			
	<b>Frente Amplio</b>		
<b>National</b>	.125		
<b>Regional</b>	.723		
<b>District</b>	.152		

If Hypothesis 5 is correct, the removal of the larger districts - somewhat arbitrarily, the two largest, by district magnitude - should result in an overall decline in the national component. In the case of the Colorado party this should be seen as a shift from the national to the district component. For the Frente Amplio and the Nacionales this may be seen as a shift from the regional and national to, predominantly, the district component, owing to the additional weight that Montevideo exerts on their regional scores.

For the Peronist and Radical parties we would expect a net shift to the district component (see comments on Hypothesis 5a in Chapter Four), although the Peronists already have a strong concentration in that component. Since Venezuela's districts are uniformly large I do not expect substantial deviations from what has already been observed.

The results shown in Table 6 largely support Hypothesis 5. The concentration of proportionality, or the concentration of population, has a marked effect on the nationalization profiles of these parties. The net change in the variance components scores are higher for Uruguayan parties, undoubtedly owing to the weight exerted by the classification of Montevideo as a region. The changes in the scores, however, are not overly large, so they should not intrude on our interpretation of the data presented in Chapter Eight.

As expected, the largest overall increases in the district components are found in Uruguay and Argentina (although the Peronist party deviates from this pattern,



already having an extremely high district score). The increase for the Nationals was also accompanied by a large decrease in the regional component. This is consistent with the gradual change in its role as the "interior" party and its increased presence in Montevideo. The results for the Frente Amplio show how important the Montevideo vote was in the earlier results.

Venezuelan parties, including the URD, show very little change, though there is a uniform increase in the district component. Excluding the Peronist party, the average change in the district component is 16.8 percentage points higher for non-Venezuelan parties than for Venezuelan parties. We can safely say, therefore, that concentrated proportionality/population produces a somewhat disjoint party-electorate relationship. This implicitly points out the continued relevance of urban-interior differences.

As a methodological note, these results can be attributed to different party-electorate relations in the larger versus the smaller districts because the national yearly means employed in the model are based on district percentages and are therefore not weighted; that is, the results are not artifacts of the removal of a large proportion of the electorate from the analysis.

Table 6: Variance Components -- Two Largest Districts Removed

Professional-Centralized Parties				
	AD	COPEI	UCR	
National	.490 (.049)*	.346 (-.046)	.337 (-.052)	
Regional	.198 (-.071)	.365 (.020)	.005 (-.063)	
District	.312 (.022)	.289 (.026)	.658 (.114)	
Professional-Decentralized Parties				
	Colorado	Nacional	URD	
National	.402 (-.053)	.147 (.032)	.454 (-.036)	
Regional	.118 (-.009)	.337 (-.200)	.158 (.015)	
District	.480 (.062)	.480 (.167)	.389 (.022)	
Nonprofessional-Decentralized Parties				
	Peronist			
National	.063 (-.036)			
Regional	.050 (.045)			
District	.887 (-.008)			
Nonprofessional-Decentralized				
	Frente Amplio			
National	.300 (.175)			
Regional	.318 (-.405)			
District	.382 (.230)			

\* figures in parentheses are net differences in these scores from those presented in Table 6.

For most parties the trends observed in the scores for the configuration of nationalization are as expected, with the important exception that the Argentine parties are clearly deviant (see Table 7). Accion Democratica and COPEI have both seen a gradual evening-out in the dispersion of their support. The Republican Democratic Union, on the other hand, seems to have progressively lost control over its bases of support in the various districts.

The percentage increase in the URD's CRI scores from 1958 to 1978 is quite dramatic at +288.0%. Despite the apparent predominance of a national swing away from the URD, its losses contributed to an already-fragmented cross-district profile. This accords with the earlier portrayal of the party as one which seldom established roots even when it had success in mobilizing voters during election years.

From 1961 to 1989 the percentage decrease in CRI scores for the Colorado and Nacional parties was notable, though somewhat less dramatic than the changes experienced by the URD, at 255.0% and 66.5% respectively. This contrasts with the Montivideo-based Frente Amplio which, while naturally having greater overall CRI scores, experienced decidedly less change over time (approximately +2.0%). These results closely correspond with Hypotheses 2b and 3b.

Conflict within the Frente Amplio during this period (discussed in Chapter Three) suggests a pattern of organizational resistance to "expansion" peculiar to this type

of party.<sup>56</sup> It is also significant to note that in spite of the party's impressive gains in Montevideo since 1961, elsewhere the party's electoral support has virtually stagnated (see Table 8, below). In sum, the picture this paints is of a party whose nationalization is constrained by the power exercised by those factions with the least adaptive orientation toward the market.

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<sup>56</sup> In the previous chapter it was noted that prior to the 1989 elections the center-leaning faction of the party (Government of the People), also the most electorally successful faction, split from the party in a controversy over the degree of control exercised by the largely-Marxist leadership over nominations.

**Table 7: Cumulative Regional Inequality Index**

<b>Professional-Centralized Parties</b>			
<b>Election</b>	<b>AD</b>	<b>COPEI</b>	<b>UCR</b>
1	.355	.496	.116
2	.335	.463	.089
3	.256	.346	.110
4	.128	.155	.192
5	.117	.122	
<b>%change</b>	-303.4	-406.6	+60.4
<b>Professional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
<b>Election</b>	<b>Colorado</b>	<b>Nacional</b>	<b>URD</b>
1	.067	.191	.560
2	.069	.227	.552
3	.124	.214	.580
4	.171	.287	1.197
5			1.610
<b>%change</b>	+255.0	+66.5	+288.0
<b>Nonprofessional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
<b>Election</b>	<b>Peronist</b>		
1	.156		
2	.197		
3	.137		
4	.124		
<b>%change</b>	-20.5		
<b>Nonprofessional-Centralized Parties</b>			
<b>Election</b>	<b>Frente Amplio</b>		
1	.564		
2	.548		
3	.546		
4	.575		
<b>%change</b>	+2.0		

**Table 8: Vote for Frente Amplio in Montevideo and Interior**

<u>Election</u>	<u>Montevideo</u>	<u>Interior</u>
1966	16%	5%
1971	30	9
1984	34	9
1989	35	8

The results for the Argentine parties suggest that party type was not overly significant in determining the configuration of their votes. In spite of organizational differences there is little to suggest differences in the dispersion of their electoral support across districts. This would tend to point to an institutional variable (or any variable representing shared experience among the two parties) as a possible explanation.

Hypothesis 6 suggested that a closed-list electoral system would produce a more nationalized configuration of votes than an intra-party preference voting system. The magnitude of the differences between Uruguay's and Argentina's scores, however, does not support this conclusion. This could be due to the pooling of votes in Uruguay, which would "mechanically" homogenize the vote even where the factional votes were highly unevenly distributed. The inavailability of legislative votes broken down by faction makes it impossible to move this beyond the level of speculation.

## **Conclusions**

With the exceptions as noted, it does appear that party type has predictable associations with both the movement and configuration of nationalization. The results for electoral systems have been left very sketchy, but there does, at least, appear to be some support for Hypothesis 5.

While there may be good reason to hypothesize independent effects for electoral systems, the available cases constrain

development of a research design capable of identifying among-party variations which can be logically traced to the electoral systems. This was less true for Hypothesis 5 because it was possible to identify concomitant variation for district size and parties' nationalization scores (i.e., district size was a controllable factor). For Hypothesis 6 (ballot dependence), however, we can only speculate since no within-system variation in ballot types can be exploited.

It is important to consider the contrast between these results and the claims made in the earlier studies of nationalization. The within-country variability in nationalization scores cannot sustain an explanation based on either government structure or level of modernization. This conclusion will be revised in the upcoming chapters.

The results so far intimate an organizational effect. The data for the configuration of nationalization seem suggestive of a "stability" in the process for centralized parties. The class of professional-centralized parties mobilizes a national movement, yet also controls uncertainty across a wide spectrum of the electorate. This does not, however, constitute direct evidence that such parties possess a stable nationalized vote. An investigation of presidential-legislative linkages will clarify this issue, and will also offer an interesting series of "puzzles" which require some additional data analysis. What we find in Chapter Eight is that party organization does not by itself imply either a stable nationalization process or a linkage between the legislative and presidential nuclei.



## **Chapter Six**

### **Nationalization and the Presidency**

This chapter begins with a two-part elucidation of the problems in inter-branch relations created by the separation of powers. First, the division of the mandate is discussed. The second section explores intra-party relations between the presidential candidates and legislators. We then take up the problem of developing a perspective for understanding the impact of presidential-legislative electoral relations on the nationalization process.

#### **The Mandate in Presidential Regimes**

Among scholars studying Latin America and other parts of the developing world presidentialism has many critics. Linz (1992), for example, has noted that the majority of the unstable or failed democracies of this century have been presidential systems. Data supporting this "statistical" failure of democracy has been gathered which shows that presidential systems have a higher rate of military coups, a lesser tendency to generate majority governments in the legislature, and a lesser ability to adapt to multiparty settings (Stepan and Skach, 1994).

In some cases, these systems have been accused of ungovernability, resulting from the "immobilism" that frequently sets in where the President lacks a majority with

which to govern in the legislature.<sup>57</sup> Riggs (1988) has suggested that one cause of failure in presidential regimes results from electoral systems which reinforce the regime's everpresent capacity for deadlock. PR-list, he argued, promotes disciplined voting in legislative assembly and hence can exacerbate deadlock.

Divided government is an electoral as well as an institutional phenomenon, and parties are the primary extra-institutional linkage between the branches. Recognizing the pitfalls of weak parties, Nino (1993) has recommended reforms that blend presidential and parliamentary practices. Premier-presidentialism (not unlike the French Fifth Republic), he argues, would provide the benefits of party government (capacity for reform and strong, disciplined parties) without raising the specter of government instability.

Sartori's (1994) analysis points in this direction, as does Shugart and Carey's (1992). Sartori, in particular, emphasizes the compatibility of parties with parliamentary practices, or at least a parliamentary "style." Party organization is a precondition of a parliamentary style of government. Suleiman (1980), in reference to the governability of the French Fifth Republic, concurs on this basic point,

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<sup>57</sup> References to immobilism in South American regimes are too numerous to cite in detail here. Weinstein (1975) and Gonzalez (1989,1991) have discussed this in relation to Uruguay. The Caldera government (1968-1973) is regarded as the classic case in Venezuelan politics, though the problems associated with constructing governing coalitions are a constant feature of politics (Myers, 1973; Martz and Baloyra, 1976).

of the French Fifth Republic, concurs on this basic point, noting that presidential power by itself cannot guarantee the functioning of a presidential system. Rather, he notes (p. 143) that strong parties have infused the legislature with an authority which previous republics had lacked.<sup>58</sup>

In some cases, presidential power is specifically singled out as the culprit behind a presidential system's failures. Writing about Argentina, Snow and Manzetti (1993), find that the excessive powers traditionally enjoyed by the Argentine President have had effects which cascade throughout the political system, but most particularly within the party system. Parties are regarded as ineffective. Lacking a strong voice in national affairs (most legislation is initiated by the Executive) the parties have remained largely concerned with constituency affairs.

Removed from the center of power, parties have little

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<sup>58</sup> For the bulk of parties in presidential systems the requirements of governing the system seem to militate against strong, disciplined organization. Riggs (1988) and Linz (1994) have both suggested that presidential systems and strong parties are inimical to each other, principally because strong parties would limit the president's freedom to maneuver, particularly when there is a hostile majority. Presidentialism favors weak parties which can be bargained with on the basis of selective benefits ("pork"). At the same time, however, the weakness of the parties further isolates the president by placing him/her at odds with the structure which links the branches of government. Hence the "anti-party" mood in the executive referred to by Stepan and Skach (1994), and others.

The problematic nature of the relationship of the president with his/her party is well summarized by Lijphart (1994), who argues that within the office of the president one can find an electoral mandate characterized by majoritarianism, but the capacity to govern according to majoritarian principles is rare, or at least of separate origin.

incentive to engage in the tasks of legitimating government actions and acting as intermediaries between the government and the people (Snow and Manzetti, 1993, pp.76-85). Thus we have a very direct contrast with the image of the modernizing dictator, or charismatic leader, so common in South American politics. Where the centralization of power once served, albeit crudely, to unite the disparate regions and provinces in South America under centralized rule, the strong president is here regarded as an almost regressive force, depriving parties of their natural role in binding the national society.<sup>59</sup>

These propositions surrounding the role of the Presidency in political life are often contradictory, or at least they do not obviously reinforce one another. In general, presidential systems are accused, alternately, of conferring a mandate which is over-concentrated or under-concentrated. Over-concentration is stressed by those concerned with politics in plural societies and by those concerned more broadly with the deleterious effects of presidential power (like Snow and Manzetti, above). Under-concentration is stressed by those who see the conduct of government in presidential systems as the principal dilemma: namely, immobilism and deadlock.

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<sup>59</sup> The limitations of presidential systems in this regard have been widely discussed. While some accuse presidential regimes of lacking the ability to employ their mandates to govern effectively (see Robinson, 1985 and Sundquist, 1986, on the case of the United States), others see the centralization of power as a fundamental cause of political conflict in developing polities (Lijphart, 1977; also see Horowitz, 1985, though his criticisms of presidentialism are less sweeping).

One problem in analyzing the effects of presidential regimes on the construction of the mandate has been the tendency to ignore the diversity of presidential regimes (Lijphart, 1992; Mainwaring, 1992). In studies of Latin American politics it is typical to refer to the "executive power", and to the deleterious effects of excessive power. What is seldom considered, however, is whether presidential power is systematically related to other facets of the political system - a neglect which Shugart and Carey's (1992) book went a long way towards correcting.

If the presidential regime is to be given a fair hearing some allowance must be made for the variance within the regime type. As we have already seen, regional and district-level partisan voting in Venezuela has gradually given way to a more nationalized pattern of voting since 1958. Yet, Venezuela's presidency does not appear to deviate markedly from other South American regimes in terms of the range of powers available to the President. All of the cases considered here, in fact, had strong presidents, by international standards. What then accounts for the differences in experience with nationalization?

I will suggest in this chapter that Venezuela's experience owes not only to the strength of its parties, but to the fact that it is a different type of presidential regime than either Argentina or Uruguay. Venezuela's presidential system more closely approximates a "party government" model of democracy and thus encourages stronger linkages between the

executive, the party, and the legislature. This model has been called "atenuated-presidential" (Brewer-Carias, 1982), and is associated with the use of closed-list proportional representation and concurrent elections.

The explanation offered here, then, focuses on the under-concentration of the mandate in some presidential regimes. Here, this phenomenon will be illustrated in terms of broad patterns of voting. To establish this point we must look not only at the nationalization of voting in presidential elections, but also at other indicators which more-directly address aspects of presidential-legislative linkage. In the process of doing this we will strip away some of the "appearance" of a nationalized vote in the Republican Democratic Union of Venezuela, the Colorado party of Uruguay and the Radical party of Argentina. Specific reasons, organizational and institutional, will then be offered as to why these cannot be considered "nationalizing" parties, in the sense employed here.

### **The President Within the Party**

Following the minimalist perspective on political parties, the presidency is here regarded as, at base, an object of electoral competition. Because it is a singular office, with enormous governing and agenda-setting potential, and because it is normally the only truly national office, the powers of the presidency can, in a sense, set limits on the effectiveness of competition below the national level.

Competition for the presidency is analogous to the case of a single-member legislative district. Where a majority rule is not in effect, but rather a plurality rule (which is the case for all the countries considered here), the effect is especially pronounced. A president may be elected with a relatively small percentage of the vote. Thus, the "threshold of representation" will tend to be very high and will have the effects normally associated with high thresholds - a tendency to reduce the number of significant competitors (Shugart and Carey, 1992). A majority rule with run-off elections somewhat reduces this effect.<sup>60</sup>

For large, nationally significant parties it seems somewhat counterintuitive to suggest that there may be incentives to adopt a less-than-national outlook. First of all, this is a question of degree. The party that needs less than a majority to win has less, not "no" incentive to nationalize its programs and/or organization.<sup>61</sup> The important point here is that the party may not need a strongly articulated, centralized structure with which to rally each

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<sup>60</sup> The emblematic case being the French Fifth Republic.

<sup>61</sup> Some exceptions need to be noted. First, majority rules always involve some form of run-off election, which Schlesinger (1990) has found to encourage the creation of specialized, second-ballot parties. Another point, which is too complicated to go into here, is that this ignores the interdependence of legislative and presidential elections. Where there are strong district-level branches of the party, organized around, perhaps, competition over single-member districts, we might reasonably expect the national party to rely on these organizations to deliver votes to its presidential slate.

level of the organization around the presidential campaigns.<sup>62</sup>

In terms of party organization, the presidency can, by the nature of its powers, become very problematic. Because the party seeks to reward its followers not only with ideology, programs, and patronage, but with the opportunity to hold office, an ineffective legislature sets limits on the range of rewards that can actually be offered to its more ambitious members.

The reliance of the Peronists, and to a large extent the Radicals, in Argentina on charismatic leaders is one side-effect of a powerful presidency (and a long history of personalist politics). In Peron's Argentina, the Peronist bureaucracy was as often as not regarded by Peron as a barrier between himself and the people, rather than as a means for communicating with them (Rock, 1989). Purges of recalcitrant party leaders, labor leaders, and office-holders, as well as a most cynical manipulation of the organized ideological tendencies within the party (such as the Peronist Youth) were all indicative of a highly personalized "verticalism." The leader, in essence, supplanted the party, even though on paper the party itself was quite extensively organized.

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<sup>62</sup> I am tempted to refer to this as the partisan equivalent of "contracting out" for services. The Peronists have been the most active of our cases in this regard. One can only speculate what the case would be if Argentina employed concurrent elections exclusively. I suspect that the regional parties would lose their separateness of identity and, hence, would have nothing to bargain with in relation to Peronists.



In Colombia and Uruguay the relative ineffectiveness of the legislature co-exists with a strong status motivation for office-holding. Tenure in office tends to be short as, once the office has been acquired, it has served its purpose and its benefits can then be "recycled" to another of the party faithful.

The organizational counterpart of a strong President is not, however, the dissolution of parties. It is simply that the national party has relatively little to offer those whose careers center on offices outside of the national party's interest or influence. We might well speak of "weak" parties as being the syndrome attached to a strong president, but it is important to specify exactly what we mean by weak. A more illuminating term would be one that we have used already - decentralized; however, a specific meaning has already been attached to this term.

The organizational effect can probably be described most accurately as a lack of structural cohesion between the presidential and legislative "nuclei" of the party.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, we have seen a long-running tendency for regional branches of both the Peronist and Radical parties to be relatively autonomous, despite the attested "verticalism" of the former. More revealingly, in the Peronist party the local units have been the bases of the "professional" or

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<sup>63</sup> Referring to the experience of the United States, V.O. Key wrote of "mid-term atomization," in Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 3rd ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952 (p. 515).

"office-seeking" branch of the party (1985's Renovators), as Snow and Manzetti (1993) have noted. This division of labor, as it were, between the sub-national and national units of the party could be considered merely a remnant of Peronism's organizational history if these traits were not also seen, in less exaggerated form, in the Radical party and other South American parties.

It might be said that verticalism suffers from a limited attention span, thus opening up opportunities at the district and local levels for those outside of the national party's sphere of interest. Until recently the national party organs had long been dominated by the union wing, and consequently the party's activities centered around patronage programs and an ideological orientation which had relatively little interest for those outside of the country's principal urban areas.

Where the presidency can potentially be won with a small percentage of the national vote, and where the potential always exists that a mandate may be withheld at the legislative level, the national party and the presidential candidate may well be satisfied with a relatively narrow core base of support which can then be supplemented with the promise of particularistic benefits to various other groups, regions, etc. For these purposes a structurally cohesive party can be considered both unnecessary and counter-productive. This is made possible first at the electoral level, as discussed above, and secondly at the level of government and

inter-branch relations.

The president who does not expect to "govern" in the legislature may at least govern on selected issues by forming cross-party issue coalitions. This style of government requires flexibility with regards to the president's own party as well as the capacity to deliver patronage in exchange for key votes.

Similar observations hold true for Uruguayan parties, though with substantial deviations owing to the electoral system. It has frequently been said, even by those who emphasize treating the party as the fundamental unit of analysis in the study of Uruguayan electoral politics (Gonzalez, 1986), that the factions are more intensively organized than the parties themselves (MacDonald and Ruhl, 1989; Taylor, 1951). In a certain manner of thinking this is really quite efficient for the office-seekers since they are freed, to a limited extent, from the intrusion of the national party and the extensive patronage powers wielded by the President, who must buy legislative cooperation on a piecemeal basis.

The problem of presidential power is accommodated by radical separation of the legislative units of the party from the national organs, which formally head the party. This permits each actor, the legislator and the president, to govern in their own way. The legislator, who lacks the formal power to govern, attends to his/her constituency by bargaining with the president (often irrespective of partisan

attachment). The president governs by forming (or attempting to form) issue coalitions (Kaminsky, 1989). In either case, however, the emphasis of the party as a whole is necessarily distracted from national concerns and the construction of a truly national electorate.

None of this discussion should be taken to suggest that the parties direct less effort as organizations towards capturing the presidency. For nationally significant parties the presidency must always be the natural focus of competition. Instead, what this suggests is that strong presidencies detract from the cohesion of the "nuclei" surrounding national office with those surrounding subnational offices.<sup>64</sup>

Regionalism is also a related counterpart of the strong President. In these respects, Colombia's government has been almost ideal-typical. Dix (1977) reported that virtually every administration since WWII had felt compelled to make use of the decree power to get social and economic legislation of national importance past the Congress. Kline's (1975) research revealed that a large proportion of congresspeople were socialized into a reactive conception of their role; they regarded investigation, interpellation and amendment as their principal avenues of influence into the law-making process. In

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<sup>64</sup> The term "nucleus" is perhaps a bit clumsy in the context of South American, and most particularly Uruguayan and Colombian politics. Usually the scope of a faction's influence extends through a variety of offices owing to the control of patronage. It is perhaps more appropriate to refer to a "machine" style of politics.

other words, they regarded legislative initiative on matters of national concern as outside their job description.

More important for our purposes, however, is how strongly this appearance of presidential dominance contrasts with the regionalism of politics. Carlos Lleras Restrepo (President of Colombia, 1966-70) once commented that, "Not one single executive bill has been passed by Congress, while in four months of government I have had to sign numerous regional aid laws... which if totalled would represent the national budget for ten to twenty years."<sup>65</sup> It is the contention here, that this kind of isolation of the Executive, which occurs in government, also occurs in the electoral arena. The tendency of a system with a strong President will be, *ceteris paribus*, towards a dissimilarity in legislative and presidential voting patterns among districts.

The forging of strong electoral coalitions within the party is counterproductive in this strategic milieu because this would necessarily imply pre-commitments that would limit the president's flexibility. The organizational counterpart of this strategy is fairly straightforward: the presidential nucleus maintains a respectful distance from the other branches of the party, focuses on the merits and personality of its candidate, and exercises, when it can, a largely negative discipline on the rest of the party. For the

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<sup>65</sup> Quoted in Robert Dix, "The Colombian Presidency: Continuities and Changes." in Dibacco, Thomas, ed. Presidential Power in Latin American Politics New York: Praeger, 1977.

legislator flexibility is also an important issue, especially when the president cannot seek re-election (all cases here). The legislator loses the president's gains in popularity and feels the taint of the president's losses (Valenzuela, 1989).

The behavior of Juan Perón and Jóvito Villalba (discussed earlier), of Venezuela's Republican Democratic Union, provide numerous examples of these organizational tendencies. Within small, ideologically rigid parties, the champing-at-the-bit of the parties' picked front-men provides a different spectacle, but one whose roots nevertheless hark back to the systemic tension between the president and the legislature, and the president and his party. Parties like the Movimiento al Socialismo and the Movimiento Revolucionaria de la Izquierda in Venezuela accede to the demands that the visibility of the presidential elections places on them by bidding for the most popular figures in the Left, while demanding ideological concessions, at least, in the candidate's rhetoric.

With these concerns about the problems of constructing linked mandates in mind, we can now turn to some theoretical considerations.

### **The Presidency and Nationalized Voting**

Our goal here is to uncover forces which encourage parties to create a stable, nationalized vote *in spite of* the formal separation of powers.

If we are to conceive of a role for the presidential elections in this process we must establish some connections

between the presidential and legislative elections. That is, the presidential elections must become a relevant location of votes, and movements of votes, for legislators. Those parties which become "nationalizers" will, in addition to exhibiting this linkage, also exhibit cross-election stability in their legislative vote. Which is to say, the presidential elections will not become *disruptions* of a normally localized voting pattern: a condition often regarded as typical in the context of elections in the United States (Kernell, 1975; Campbell, 1985).

The argument presented here consists of three parts. First, I establish that the separation of powers by itself (that is, irrespective of other considerations, like presidential power) establishes an antinomy between presidential and legislative voting patterns. Second, I establish the rationale for focusing on the concurrence of elections as the principal factor in the presidential-legislative linkage. Third, I argue that party-organizational factors ought to have the most direct impact on the stability of the linkage.

Though this study takes nationalization as a goal, it is not my purpose to deplore the rationality of the citizen attached to local politics. If we take Schumpeter's (1950) view of the matter as a starting point we would, to the contrary, conclude that an attachment to national politics widens the sphere of irrational or irresponsible citizen choice.

The localistic citizen responds to the reality that their representatives dispense patronage according to locally-determined biases. They correctly act on the basis that they possess more information and interest on local issues. Well enough. But if localism becomes an attribute of the legislator's political portfolio another set of problems arises.

We may assume, for example, that pervasive localism not only reinforces but exaggerates the antinomy of presidential and legislative mandates. A legislator may become a pure constituency delegate, or he/she may be forced to divide national issues along two lines: those to which strong local sentiments attach and those to which they do not - these providing the sole field of truly national issues.

If, at the extreme, the legislature becomes affixed in voters' minds as a representative of local interests, it is logical then for the President to become the sole representative of national interests. The next logical step for the voter would then be to conceive a dual role for the president: on the issues of local concern, which the legislator represents, the president is expected to "give in;" for issues of national concern the president can be regarded as an elected dictator. This does not deviate too much from South America's experiences in this century.

On the one hand, presidential elections will become excessively national in character and, on the other, the legislative elections excessively local. Separation of powers



thus takes on a very literal perceptual meaning, including also the mandate, and excludes the "sharing" of responsibilities usually meant by the term.

The comments in this and the previous section suggest one implication particularly worthy of note: localism and separation of powers are mutually reinforcing. To put it another way, a separation of powers system cannot by itself manufacture nationalized voting in the legislature. We can also conclude that presidential power is a symptom of localism and possesses nothing suggestive of a "cure." This assumption is based not only on the origins of strong presidents and the institutional dynamics of a separation of powers (discussed earlier), but also on the interpretations put on the system by voters which become the bases upon which mandates are claimed.

Would a less powerful president conduce to nationalized voting? Not according to this argument. The mere existence of the separation of powers establishes the antinomy of presidential and legislative mandates. If there is a pre-existent localist bias the result of a weaker president would be a legislature with a predatory disposition towards the presidency. A nationalized outlook would first have to be created by an act of political will.

This act of political will, as the earlier chapters suggested, presupposes partisan activity. To make nationalization work localist legislators must be gathered into a collectivity with national interests and import. Taking this step requires electoral incentives.

For the reasons discussed, we would tend to dismiss the separation of powers as anything but a constraint on nationalization (see Schattschneider, 1942, for an early discussion). We must therefore look elsewhere for the electoral incentives. The incentives of interest must possess the following characteristics: they must bind the legislator to the party (therefore an indirect effect) and focus the party on movements in the national "district."

I have already suggested that PR-list and "ballot dependence" possess the characteristic of binding legislators to the party. But since these have an indirect effect through the parties this should be considered background knowledge. The separation of powers tends to create a contradictory set of incentives. Thus, we may speak of two coexisting incentive systems, the choice among which need not be in any way pre-determined. Pressure in one direction or the other must originate in the party itself, or in the incentives provided by other institutions.

Focusing the party on national politics presents a separate but related problem. A party may want to communicate national issues to its candidates and electorate but it faces the inescapable dilemma that a national constituency and representative already exist. Trivial as this may sound, the party cannot pretend that the presidency doesn't exist. It therefore requires an incentive for both candidates and electorate to draw a plausible connection between the legislative and presidential constituencies.

For the legislator and his/her constituency this means conceiving of the district-level vote as possessing a dual efficacy: the candidate is placed in office by both a local and national constituency and the voter elects both a local and national representative. This connection is always possible (a sense of effective participation in national politics could have a symbolic or status value to the legislator and voter alike), but it is facilitated by concurrent elections.

Concurrent elections, of all electoral arrangements, have the most direct impact on the legislator-president electoral relationship. Concurrent elections, quite simply, change the content of the electorate. Where voting is not mandatory the size of the electorate is increased, bringing in normally uncommitted or apathetic voters who are mobilized by the more exciting national contest. The size of the potential national swing vote is thus increased.

Where midterms are employed a legislative candidate may view the national swing vote as a disruption of normal patterns of voting - a potential threat to "safe" seats. The expansion of voting, or interest in voting (likely the case when voting is mandatory), may be unwelcome to both a legislator and his/her core supporters because the national movements dilute the efficacy of their district-centered efforts and carefully cultivated bases of support (see Burns, 1963, for a discussion of the American experience). The profile of the midterm voter includes localism and

partisanship, while the on-year election more likely mobilizes additional voters around national and/or less-partisan concerns.

If a country holds concurrent elections exclusively its legislative candidates will have a strong incentive to participate in capturing the masses of uncommitted swing voters. Such an organizational imperative would tend to elevate the office-seeking tendency of a party, while also placing a premium on its capacity to mobilize support (a mass-membership, or professional-centralized party). I suspect this tendency can only strengthen when voting is made mandatory; that is, where a constant supply of swing voters exists.

The incentive system created by concurrent elections consists, in a sense, of making "disruption" of normal voting patterns the norm. It focuses electoral competition on the (national) swing voter. If both midterms and concurrent elections are employed we might just as well expect the legislator to attempt to insulate his/her constituency during on-year contests. In any event, no clear logical necessity impels him/her to jump on or off the national bandwagon. In this case, two compelling incentive systems exist: a localist and a nationalist.

The existence two competing incentive systems creates a problem which, frankly, I cannot resolve without speculating. It seems to me that the path a party takes - in a nationalizing or localizing direction - depends on how the party chooses (or has chosen in the past) to organize or

mobilize the national vote.

Where support is mobilized by the party, where the party itself is symbolic of the national vote, legislative candidates have some influence over, or "ownership" of, the national vote. The party also provides a mediative, or insulative, body between the national and local levels: i.e. it depersonalizes, to some extent, the national vote. If the president becomes the symbol of national politics and the national vote the legislator is once again relegated to the status of a passive consumer of national movements beyond his/her control. He/she can really only exercise negative influence.

The above speculation clearly points to party type as a decisive factor when presented with conflicting incentives. In Argentina (which uses concurrent and nonconcurrent elections) we would then expect the Peronists to embody the dual incentive structure: the organizational distance between the legislator and president should be reflected in the differences between the nationalization scores at each level. The Radicals will also be affected by these conflicting incentives, but their organizational history should impel them in the opposite direction (resulting in an experience similar to that of the Venezuelan parties).

Turning to the issue of the stability of voting patterns, the aspect of party organization most relevant to this concern is centralization. Where political careers are managed by the party, rather than by the individual nuclei of the party, we

are more likely to see a stable pattern. Since the party possesses the capacity to focus its legislative candidates on a national program, the presidential elections are less likely to become disruptions (even in the case of small parties which run coalitional presidential candidates the party will attempt to insulate the legislative group - in this case stability would not be a counterpart of nationalization, but of localization). This by itself does not imply "linkage," only a relative absence of disruptive potential.

Concurrence seems to have some surface plausibility as an influence on stability, but the national forces which are communicated into the legislative elections must still be managed and focused. The distinction between linkage and stability centers, then, on the capacity to manage uncertainties generated by the intrusion of national forces in local races.

This construction of the problems of presidential-legislative linkages, and the stability of nationalization processes, creates some problems. First, note that by including party organization as a variable we have explicitly excluded a systemic tendency with regards to stability. Concurrence may link, but need not stabilize. Second, where party organization may operate to create a stable, nationalized legislative vote, if the concurrence factor is absent the divorce between the legislative and presidential nuclei may still be evident - we could conclude that nationalization proceeds according to separate pathes in each

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branch of the party. There may be nationalized voting at both levels, but no electoral convergence such that the party could become a nationalizer in the sense that it produces a convergence of mandates at each level. The only condition which seems to satisfy all our criteria for nationalizing parties is a "package" of factors: concurrence and centralized party organization - conditions met only in the case of Venezuela's "atenuated-presidentialism."

### **Conclusions**

The propositions that emerge from this discussion will inform the analysis of presidential effects on nationalization. These propositions may be summarized as follows:

1. A separation of powers negatively effects the relationship between presidential and legislative voting. Hence, the nationalization of legislative voting would not be expected to exhibit a strong similarity to the nationalization of presidential voting.

2. Whatever the level of presidential power, national politics must be "communicated" to the legislative districts. It is therefore necessary to consider what factors influence the tendency for presidential and legislative politics to become interlocked. The nature of the parties (using the typology developed earlier) has been suggested above, but institutional factors, like the use of closed electoral lists and the concurrence of the legislative and presidential



elections, must also be considered.

3. Where institutional and party-organizational factors coexist to create strong bonds - particularly electoral - between the executive and legislature, we may speak of a form of "party government" (at the level of the party or party system) or of a regime of "atenuated-presidentialism" (Brewer-Carias, 1982) - a term which has been used to suggest that parties have the capability to cut across the normal boundaries of a separation of powers system.

Taken as a whole, and viewed within the context of a group of cases which possess strong presidents, these propositions suggest that presidential power can only act as a brake on the nationalization of politics where other factors are actively promoting, or failing to overcome, a poor linkage between presidents and legislatures. Here, the emphasis is on the electoral linkage. The research problem is to discover whether the operative factors are specific institutional arrangements, party organization, or a combination of both - identified here as a regime type ("atenuated presidentialism").

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Nationalization and the Presidency: Hypotheses and Methods**

#### **Hypotheses**

##### **Hypothesis 1 ("Party Type"):**

Centralized parties will exhibit: a) a greater similarity in their legislative and presidential nationalization profiles than non-centralized parties, and, b) greater cross-election stability than non-centralized parties.

##### **Hypothesis 2 ("Concurrence"):**

For countries holding concurrent elections (Venezuela only: data not available for Uruguay) parties will exhibit a greater linkage of presidential and legislative voting than for countries holding midterms (Argentina).

##### **Hypothesis 3 ("Atenuated-Presidential"):**

Those parties which are centralized, and which compete exclusively in concurrent elections (Democratic Action and COPEI) will exhibit all of: a) similarity in presidential and legislative nationalization profiles, b) cross-election stability in legislative voting, and, c) linkage of presidential and legislative voting. In sum, they will possess the attributes of "nationalizers" identified earlier.

## Research Design

The comparisons required to test these hypotheses must eliminate a number of competing hypotheses, which I will here state rather informally.

For Hypothesis 1, two conditions must be met. First, the results must eliminate any overriding systemic effect (i.e. there can be no Argentine Model, for example, which induces homogeneity across parties). Second, we must give attention to expected results for specific party types. For example, the Radicals, Democratic Action, and COPEI (professional-centralized parties) should all have a stable, nationalized vote, the Frente Amplio should have a stable but not nationalized vote (a non-professionalized, but centralized party), while the Peronists and the Republican Democratic Union should not have a stable vote.

Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, requires the opposite set of tendencies. Here the results of the data analysis should not cluster around party type, but instead around country of origin. The Republican Democratic Union would then find itself back in the "Venezuelan family," and the Radicals and the Peronists would converge.

Hypothesis 3 actually represents the combination of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Since only two parties (Democratic Action and COPEI) possess the hypothesized factors underlying a stable, linked, and nationalized vote, other parties should deviate from that pattern according to the factor (or factors) which they lack. The Republican Democratic Union, for example,

should have a linked vote, but not a stable vote, while the Radical party should have a stable vote, but not a linked vote.

The loss of the Uruguayan case, once we turn to the linkage data, is unfortunate, since we lose the interesting comparisons between the centralized and non-centralized parties (the "traditional" parties in comparison with the Frente Amplio), all operating within a format of concurrent elections. Some of the data relating to cross-election stability is suggestive of the nature of the linkages, and largely confirms my suspicion that the factional nature of partisan conflict in this case creates "midterms," or their effects, for the factions which do not field the front-running presidential candidate. This is a speculation, however, and the data cannot directly support or refute it. Nevertheless, it is something worth keeping in mind since it has implications for the nationalization of voting in systems which employ intra-party preference systems in combination with traits conducive to party government (recalling that the factionalism of Uruguayan parties is sustained within such a system).

### **Methods for Hypothesis 1**

A test of Hypothesis 1 will require, first, a measurement of the movement and configuration of nationalization. The methods will be identical to those employed in Chapter Five. Since the term "national forces" really embodies everything

that the parties experience in common, this includes, but does not distinguish among, institutional effects.

The nationalization data by itself can say very little about the extent to which legislative votes are guided by the performance of the party in the national arena of the presidential elections. The hypotheses presented here address this relationship in the context of two types of elections. The unit of analysis is the party in legislative elections.

The connection between these elections and broader national forces will be inferred from propositions extant in the literature on midterm elections (U.S. and cross-national perspectives). Focusing on the stability in legislative voting across elections tells us something about the longer-term effects of "exposure" to the presidential elections that would be obscured if the similarity in presidential and legislative votes during a single election only were measured.

Studies of midterms elections have drawn inferences about the role of national forces in legislative elections by determining which previous (or current, in some studies) election had the greatest covariance with the current election (election at time  $t$ ). Simply put, when midterms are sensitive to the previous on-year election, national forces are presumed to be at work. When the midterm co-varies with previous midterm elections (or an aggregate of them, such as the "normal vote") we may presume that district forces are the dominant factor in the legislative elections (Erikson, 1988).

This is a substantively different measure of the national

force in elections than those presented earlier. This measure directly reflects the party's ability to construct a stable vote within a specific incentive structure (that created by the electoral cycle).

Studies of midterm elections in the United States suggest a close connection with the study of nationalization. The "surge and decline" and "regression to the mean" hypotheses (Campbell, 1985; Campbell, 1966) both propose that midterm elections are characterized by a withdrawal of the president's coattails and a return to normal patterns of constituency and/or party-specific patterns of voting. By extension, this would imply that regimes which hold only concurrent elections are subject to a constant intrusion of national stimuli into the legislative contests. Midterms emphasize and sustain the separate origins of the executive and legislature. Thus we might expect there to be little systematic relationship between the nationalization of voting for presidential and legislative elections - they proceed at their own paces.

Another school of thought suggests a different pattern of relationships. The "presidential referendum" and "negative vote" models of midterm elections (Tufte, 1975; Kernell, 1977; Mughan, 1986) both imply that the swing in midterm votes remains sensitive to the outcome of the last on-year election. This is based on either an assessment of the performance of the president (presidential referendum) or a general tendency to negatively evaluate the party of the president (negative voting). In either case, what concerns us is that national

concerns remain paramount in the minds of voters.

In relation to the broader concern of this work, the process of nationalization, the analysis of midterms is both worthwhile and necessary. Midterm elections have been regarded by some as an obstruction to the articulation of national policies and national interests (Robinson, 1985; Sundquist, 1992). These criticisms are based largely on the presumption that midterms create a localistic "preserve," which thereby diverts national debate towards what might be derisively referred to as concerns of "pork." Localism is reinforced by the relatively low levels of mobilization and information (though not necessarily of turnout, since voting can be made mandatory) typical of midterm elections. We might further infer an underlying assumption that the natural role of the presidential elections is to erode these localistic tendencies.

This, however, is an assumption which might only pertain to regimes with relatively weak presidents (as in the case of the United States), a point that Shugart and Carey (1992) draw out in some length. Shugart and Carey's statements about the localizing tendencies of strong presidents suggest an interesting inversion of the relationship normally presumed to exist between presidential and legislative elections.

If, in fact, strong presidents build support by distributing, or promising to distribute, particularized benefits, we might be confronted with a situation in which the vote (both presidential and legislative) during on-year

elections may be anticipated by the performance of parties during midterms: which is to say, the president builds an electoral coalition around the momentum exhibited in the previous, off-year election. We have already seen that the variance components for both the Peronists and the Radical Civic Union contain a substantial district force (dominant for the Peronists). We may now examine this finding with specific attention to the presidential-legislative relationship.<sup>66</sup>

Here I will state the general form of the model used to test for cross-election stability. As the form of the model does not change with each of its possible permutations I will not present each of these separately. The model is a simple autoregressive function relating district returns in a given election to returns from a previous election or elections. Model 1 shows a simple bivariate relationship, while Model 2 is intended to demonstrate the relative effects of a midterm and an on-year election on an election designated as the dependent variable.

$$\text{Model 1: Election}_t = a + b_1 \text{ Election}_{t-1}$$

$$\text{Model 2: Election}_t = a + b_1 \text{ On-Year}_{t-k} + b_2 \text{ Midterm}_{t-j}$$

where: k=number of elections since last on-year election

j=number of elections since last midterm

t=current or "dependent" election year

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<sup>66</sup> To do this properly will require expanding the time-frame for the Argentine data. This involves some costs, however, as the elections from 1945 to 1955 were manipulated under the Peronist regime, and because in later elections the Peronists were frequently prohibited from taking part.



**Presidential-Legislative Electoral Linkage (Hypothesis 2)**

This hypothesis requires a direct comparison of legislative and presidential votes at the district level. Unfortunately, because the DSV system makes distinguishing sublema results for the legislature and the presidency all but impossible, at least with the data at hand, Uruguay must be excluded from this analysis. Also, since the smaller parties in Venezuela generally fielded coalition candidates, who were often political independents or notables, it is not possible to perform this analysis for those parties either, at least not in a manner which is directly comparable with the larger parties. For Argentina's midterm elections the last presidential election will be used as the independent variable.

Note that since the analysis, for now, is confined to Argentina and Venezuela, PR-list, and any combination of factors with it, is implicit in this analysis. Thus there is, at this time, no direct test for this factor. This is not damaging as the effect of PR-list is an indirect effect which manifests itself through its tendency to lead to the creation of centralized parties. Since the major parties in both countries either conform with this description, or, as in the case of the Peronists, have been seen to be evolving in the expected direction, it is hoped that the absence of a direct test of the variable is not biasing the results.

Since the hypothesized effects of party organization and concurrence of elections have been discussed earlier, I will

not elaborate further here. The models presented below represent the simple, election-by-election relationship between presidential and legislative votes (by district). Party organization and concurrence enter as "dummy" variables. Note that since Uruguay must be excluded from this analysis the "CON" (concurrence) variable merely represents Venezuela: the notation is used only to refer back to the hypothesis stated earlier.

**Model 3:**  $LEG_t + a + b_1 PRES_t + b_2 CON$

**Model 4:**  $LEG_t + a + b_1 PRES_t + b_2 PTY$

**Model 5:**  $LEG_t + a + b_1 PRES_t + b_2 CON + b_3 CON*PRES$

**Model 6:**  $LEG_t + a + b_1 PRES_t + b_2 PTY + b_3 PTY*PRES$

where: CON=concurrence (Venezuela)  
 PTY=dummy variable for party organization  
 CON\*PRES=interaction variable  
 PTY\*PRES=interaction variable

## **Chapter Eight**

### **An Analysis of Executive-Legislative Linkages and their Effects on the Nationalization of Voting**

#### **The Nationalization of Presidential Elections**

In this section I will present a replication of the analysis performed in Chapter Four, for the same parties competing in the presidential races. For Argentina, additional data from the 1951 and 1973 elections is included. The choice of these elections was due entirely to the fact that these contests pitted the Radicals and the Peronists against each other, whereas in the intervening years the Peronists were prohibited from participating (as Peronists) in the elections.

The discontinuity in the data is a problem worth keeping in mind, but the alternative would be to ignore the fact that the Peronist-Radical competition has been the fundamental axis of Argentine electoral politics for all of this century. Moreover, there is no reason to expect this discontinuity to produce a bias in favor of regional or district nationalization scores. At worse, it might amplify the assumed effect of any trends affecting the measure - modernization of media, for example - present in the intervening period. Since the effects of these trends run counter to the hypotheses presented here (see Jackman, 1972), any bias can be considered conservative.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> It should be kept in mind that the variance-components scores measure the predominance of cross-election variance as against the variance exhibited within regions and districts for the same period. It is not necessary, only desirable, that

The data for Uruguay is presented somewhat differently than in the previous chapter. Here I have presented separate results for the first and second place factions. As one might expect, given the tendency for presidential races to exert a centripetal effect on parties, usually focusing on two nationally significant organizations, the same holds true for the intra-party competition, with two nationally significant factions within each of the major parties emerging and remaining fairly stable over time.

The Frente Amplio is something of an exception in this regard, probably because it has had little chance of gaining the presidency, thus removing the "glue" that would hold stable coalitions of forces together. The Frente has also frequently insisted on unity slates for the presidency. The factional data provides, I think, information which is lost by considering the party as a whole, especially insofar as it highlights the role of presidential candidates and the effects the successful candidate has on a faction's vote.

What is most immediately apparent in the variance-components analysis (see Table 9, below) is the amplification

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the periods be of the same duration. It is desirable because we cannot presume that the swing between the first and last election represents the dominant trend over a series of intervening elections. However, since voter choice, in this case, was constrained over the intervening elections, presuming otherwise results in an unsustainable counterfactual argument; i.e., we would be making methodological assumptions based upon a set of election results which never actually occurred. Thus, it is not possible to either assume or empirically assess bias in this instance. Since the method itself is not transgressed by the addition of these elections there is no reason to exclude them.

of the national component at the expense of the regional component in decentralized parties.

Table 9: Variance Components -- Presidential Elections\*

<b>Professional-Centralized Parties</b>			
	<b>AD</b>	<b>COPEI</b>	<b>UCR</b>
<b>National</b>	.442 (.002)	.532 (.140)	.477 (.088)
<b>Regional</b>	.253 (-.016)	.270 (-.075)	.091 (.023)
<b>District</b>	.310 (.020)	.200 (-.063)	.432 (-.112)
<b>Professional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
	<b>URD</b>		
<b>National</b>	.396 (-.093)		
<b>Regional</b>	.201 (.058)		
<b>District</b>	.400 (.033)		
	<b>Colorado (1st faction)</b>	<b>Colorado (2nd faction)</b>	
<b>National</b>	.682 (.227)	.442 (-.013)	
<b>Regional</b>	.016 (-.110)	.011 (-.116)	
<b>District</b>	.302 (-.116)	.547 (.129)	
	<b>Nacional (1st faction)</b>	<b>Nacional (2nd faction)</b>	
<b>National</b>	.634 (.519)	.312 (.197)	
<b>Regional</b>	.043 (-.530)	.043 (-.530)	
<b>District</b>	.547 (.129)	.645 (.332)	
<b>Nonprofessional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
	<b>Peronist</b>		
<b>National</b>	.666 (.567)		
<b>Regional</b>	.059 (.054)		
<b>District</b>	.276 (-.619)		

\* Figures in parentheses are differences from the legislative variance-components.

The Radical party exhibits a similarity between legislative and presidential nationalization scores which is akin to the pattern for the Venezuelan parties. Being just one case it is not sufficient to draw conclusions, but it does suggest that party centralization represents an operative variable with respect to the similarity of legislative and presidential nationalization. The differences observed between the Radicals and Peronists accord with earlier comments (Chapter Seven) concerning the dual incentive structure created by midterm elections. There I suggested that the "choice" of incentives would be dictated by party type.

It is not surprising that the Peronists exhibit the magnification of nationalization in the presidential races and that these scores contrast sharply with the legislative nationalization scores shown earlier. The organizational gulf between the national and subnational branches of the party appears to make the party much more susceptible to the "surge" (or decline) accompanying presidential electoral politics. Their more staid rival, the Radicals, while also experiencing some magnification, presents a much more muted contrast between the legislative and presidential results.

The surge in nationalization associated with presidential races is concentrated in those parties with the least organizational capacity for control of the electorate and of their own members. Thus we end up with the interesting paradox that nationalization in presidential elections is actually symptomatic of organizational weakness, whereas the opposite

is a better description in the context of legislative elections. But it is not that simple, if the results for the Republican Democratic Union (URD) are factored in. Venezuela as a whole seems, for now, to exhibit a distinct pattern, which contradicts Hypothesis 1.<sup>68</sup>

The problematic pattern, then, is the lower national scores for Venezuelan parties in general. I will first suggest an explanation based on party type, since the data needed to resolve this problem (cross-election stability) has not yet been presented.

As would be expected, the URD has the smallest score. But why should Venezuelan parties, which arguably are the most nationalized of all these cases, have lower scores for presidential elections than the others?

Parties with a cohesive and disciplined organization are not only instruments for nationalizing politics, they are also instruments of electoral control. Thus, the two major parties in Venezuela not only encourage an emphasis on national politics, they are also protected from the transient, and frequently large movement of votes that follows from a campaign centered principally on the person and charisma of

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<sup>68</sup> Argentine and Uruguayan campaigns are frequently a mixture of populist demagoguery and deal-cutting with state and local party leaders. The 1987 and 1989 campaigns of the Peronists, in particular, saw an intense courting of local notables. On average, the Peronist ticket in any given district included approximately three parties of the right and center-right which seldom operated beyond the boundaries of their home district (Venturini, 1989). In Uruguay, of course, the need for such maneuvers is obviated by the electoral system.



the presidential candidate.

The opposite holds for the URD, which *did* emphasize the personality of its leader as the focal point of its campaigns, and the vote for the presidency was, apparently, less national than the voting for its legislative slates. This oddity is explicable from the organizational and historical context of the party's electoral activities.

While the decline of the URD in the legislative elections was premised on a national tendency (especially the consolidation of the two-party system) the personalist vote for the presidency - for Villalba or a candidate sponsored by the URD - was, relative to AD (Democratic Action) and COPEI (Christian Democratic), unstable across elections. The organizational distance between the presidential and legislative nuclei could, then, have manifested itself in this slight decline in nationalization for the presidential races.

This explanation could also be trivial, however, as the data also represents the fact that URD candidacies were often multi-party candidacies (though still personalist). The least objectionable observation is the purely descriptive one: there was a high degree of similarity between legislative and presidential nationalization scores. An interpretation must wait until the cross-election stability data is presented.

The scores for the first and second placed sublemas in Uruguay make an instructive comparison. These scores indicate that there is a relatively small front-runner, or "coattails," effect, and that there is something of a return to the

localistic bases of the parties when the presidency is out of reach. The party therefore comes to embody two countervailing tendencies: one based on a temporary magnification of the "normal" vote owing to interaction with the presidential race, the other based in a greater localism where the presidential candidate is not as strong.

The strategic milieu for a second-place faction is actually quite similar to the position the URD found itself in after the 1968 elections: the presidential candidate's realistic function is to become a centerpiece of the legislative races. We can only speculate what the results would be like under a different electoral system, but it is probably safe to say that the DSV variant of intra-party preference voting creates a mixture of incentives to which these fragmented parties respond fairly predictably.

The scores for the cumulative regional inequality index (Table 10) largely reflect the trends noted above. The Argentine and Uruguayan parties generally possess scores indicating greater nationalization on the configuration dimension, while the Venezuelan parties, excepting the URD, have scores which reflect the trends noted earlier for the legislative elections. For the URD, the scores for presidential and legislative elections are, as we would expect, not at all similar.

Because data on the sub-lemas of the Frente Amplio was unavailable in the form required for most years, I can only present the V-scores (Table 11) for its factions for the 1984

elections. The scores for the other parties are also presented for purposes of comparison. What is evident in the factional breakdowns, for both the CRI index and the data presented for V-scores, is the same trend noted above: a general tendency for the winning faction to receive a more nationalized vote than the second place faction. This is particularly true for the Nationals in 1984, when Herrerismo was strongly outpolled in Montevideo, accounting for much of the observed disparity.

What we can observe, then, is a stable tendency, across elections, for the presidential vote to be more nationalized, as measured here, than the legislative elections. This tendency is more pronounced in Argentina and Uruguay. By and large, though, this tendency also corresponds to party type. Since it is a regime-level explanation which is contradicted by these results, we can assume for now that party type gives a better explanation. The conclusion, at this point, is indeterminate since there is one deviant case either way.

Once again, the differences between the first and second place factions in Uruguay deserve a special note. While the effect of the "front-runner" is clearly evident in these figures, the differences are not so striking as for the "movement" of nationalization discussed earlier. One reason for this is the strength and stability of party voting outside of Montevideo. Thus, it is not difficult to see why the distribution of votes is more stable than the swing. While the swing moves according to national pressures, with few exceptions, it is evenly distributed (except when the vote in

Montevideo is highly asymmetric).

It should also be noted that for the Frente Amplio, the trend seems to be reversed, with the first place faction exhibiting a more uneven distribution than the second place faction. This is due to the enormous importance of the Montevidean vote to the Frente Amplio. The faction that wins Montevideo should win the party, and this will naturally inflate the normally uneven distribution of votes typical of the party as a whole.

Table 10: CRI Index -- Presidential Elections

<b>Professional-Centralized Parties</b>			
<b><u>Election</u></b>	<b>AD</b>	<b>COPEI</b>	<b>UCR</b>
1	.3647	.5484	.2048
2	.3398	.4863	.2218
3	.1979	.2573	.1109
4	.1117	.1323	.1532
<b>Professional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
<b><u>Election</u></b>	<b>URD</b>		
1	.4975		
2	.3928		
3	.2355		
4	.1846		
<b><u>Election</u></b>	<b>Colorado (1st place)</b>	<b>Colorado (2nd place)</b>	
1	.1124	.2092	
2	NA	NA	
3	.1908	.7807	
4	.1846	.1927	
<b><u>Election</u></b>	<b>Nacional (1st place)</b>	<b>Nacional (2nd place)</b>	
1	.1381	.2284	
2	NA	NA	
3	.1189	.7807	
4	.1452	.2984	
<b>Nonprofessional-Decentralized Parties</b>			
<b><u>Election</u></b>	<b>Peronist</b>		
1	.1448		
2	.0807		
3	.1013		
4	.1143		

Table 11: V-scores -- Uruguayan Sublemas, 1984

<b>Colorado</b>	
	<b>V-score</b>
Batllismo	.2729
Union Colorada y Batllista	.3549
<b>Nacional</b>	
	<b>V-score</b>
Por la Patria	.1571
Corriente Nacional y Herrerista	.6407
<b>Frente Amplio</b>	
	<b>V-score</b>
Lista 99	.9153
Democracia Avanzada	.6739

Thus far I have not drawn attention to the distinction between the movement and configuration of nationalization employed in Chapter Two. The reason for this omission is simple. For the presidential elections we are, in a sense, investigating voting patterns in a single district. Where two or two-and-a-half party system formats are prevalent we would have little reason to expect that the "national district" would show anything but a national pattern.

One possibility that I did not consider though, is that the relationship observed earlier between party organization and the configuration of nationalization might actually reverse itself for these elections; that is, less-structured parties having lower CRI scores. This could occur for essentially the same reasons it is observed in the variance-components scores: the presidential elections are the only truly national elections for these cases (in which case it still remains to be decided if this is an organizational or systemic effect).

In the Venezuelan elections spanning the years 1958 to 1978 we can see that the configuration gradually changed from one of wide dispersion to a pattern of general sameness across districts. This coincides with the emergence and consolidation of COPEI's position in the party system and the subsequent emergence of a party system dominated by COPEI and Accion Democratica.

For Uruguay and Argentina the two-party format had already been established and was fairly stable throughout the

periods studied. Party system format does not adequately address the difference observed among Argentina's parties, nor the similarity of the UCR's results with those of the AD and COPEI. Organizational differences and similarities seem to mesh well with these results, but such an explanation would rest on the assertion that only parties actively link, or fail to link, the presidential and legislative contests. The data, as presented so far, does not provide a test of that assertion.

#### **Cross-election Stability of Voting for the Legislature**

To review briefly, the concurrence of elections addresses both our concern over the stability of legislative voting and the role played by presidential elections. This stability, as the literature cited in Chapter Seven suggested, can also be indicative of nationalization, but that is a secondary concern. What concerns us most is whether national forces emerge as disruptions of legislative voting patterns or whether they are integrated more or less "smoothly" into the legislative pattern. We must also provide some grounds for determining whether this is an effect of the electoral cycle or whether parties control stability.

If the electoral cycle were the dominant factor, nonconcurrent elections should show no systematic relationship with the last concurrent election and should covary with a "normal" vote or with its simple approximation - the last midterm. If nonconcurrent elections are really not less



national in character (the "referendum" model) then the vote will remain stable irrespective of the type of election. If party type were predominant, then no systemic pattern would emerge.

Cross-election stability may be indicative of long-term stability of legislative voting, and it does address our concern with the intrusion of national forces, yet it does not directly assess the immediate, short-term linkage evident in any given election. That is the subject of the next section of this chapter.

Looking at Tables 12 through 15, below, which correspond to Models 1 and 2 for the Argentine parties, what is probably most apparent is the lack of a typical trend. The 1983 on-year election is a good predictor of the 1985 midterm results, but the 1987 midterm bears no relationship to the 1983 results. For the 1989 on-year election the single best predictor is the 1987 midterm. It seems safe to say that for the Peronists the most recent election is the most predictive election.

Given the tribulations experienced by the Peronist party during this period these results are probably to be expected. As it redefined itself organizationally it redefined itself electorally as well, culminating in the historic shift to the center-right under Menem. It remains to be seen whether the future of Peronism will be one of greater electoral stability. If they choose to mimic the Radicals in organization as well as ideology (Alfonsín's vote was skewed towards the center-right), the results for the Radical party suggest that this is

a feasible scenario.

The Radicals' results for Model 1 demonstrate that the 1983 on-year election is strongly correlated with both the subsequent midterm elections. It is also the strongest single predictor of the 1989 on-year election. These results are suggestive of a pattern of stability in the Radical vote which is not evident in the Peronist vote. It also suggests that the Radical vote is much less subject to "surge and decline" than the Peronist.

Various permutations of Models 1 and 2 are presented in the tables below. Note that in all the tables each year/variable is followed by the designation "C" - concurrent election - or "NC" - nonconcurrent election - in parentheses.

Table 12: Model 1 -- Peronist Party

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>1983 (C)</u>	<u>1985 (NC)</u>
<b>1987 (NC)</b>			
coefficient		-.078	.683
partial r		-.061	.494
sig. level		.783	.017
constant	10.224		
error	6.528		
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.304		
sig. level	.009		
<b>1985 (NC)</b>			
coefficient		.772	
constant	9.937		
error	5.300		
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.497		
sig. level	.0001		

**Table 13: Model 2 -- Peronist Party**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>1983 (C)</u>	<u>1985 (NC)</u>	<u>1987 (NC)</u>
<b>1989</b>				
coefficient		.266	-.051	.545
partial r		.241	-.044	.550
sig. level		.281	.846	.008
constant	.654			
error	5.565			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.405			
sig. level	.0037			
<b>1989</b>				
coefficient		.472		
constant	9.420			
error	6.568			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.172			
sig. level	.0251			

**Table 14: Model 1 -- Radical Civic Union**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>1983 (C)</u>	<u>1985 (NC)</u>
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**1987 (NC)**

coefficient		.599	.481
partial r		.396	.334
sig. level		.0616	.1205

constant	1.270
error	8.559
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.490
sig. level	.0003

**1987 by 1983**

coefficient	.959
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constant	3.756
error	8.868
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.452
sig. level	.0002

**1985**

coefficient	.747
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constant	5.168
error	6.137
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.514
sig. level	.0000

The results for the Radical party in Model 2 (Table 15, below) provide a contrast, though not necessarily decisive one, with the results presented above for the Peronists. For the model showing the relationship between the 1989 election and the previous elections the most obvious contrast is the lack of any variable showing a statistically significant relationship, though the model as a whole has a moderately high r-square and is itself significant.

This pattern of results is normally associated with autocorrelation - that is, there is a high degree of interdependence among the variables which renders the coefficients uninterpretable (from a statistical standpoint). This interdependence, of course, is exactly what we would expect in the context of a more-structured party organization. Since the coefficients are unreliable in this context, however, it is necessary to decompose the equation and examine it piecemeal.

Decomposing the equation reveals that legislative voting was generally stable, irrespective of the type of election. No strong "surge" or "decline" associated with on-year elections is detected.

**Table 15: Model 2 -- Radical Civic Union**

<b>Dependent Var.</b>	<b>Equation</b>	<b>1983 (C)</b>	<b>1985 (NC)</b>	<b>1987 (NC)</b>
<b>1989 (C)</b>				
coefficient		.320	.208	.203
partial r		.224	.154	.215
sig. level		.317	.493	.337
constant	14.872			
error	8.083			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.321			
sig. level	.0129			
<b>1989 by 1987</b>				
coefficient				.464
constant	21.141			
error	8.268			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.290			
sig. level	.0025			
<b>1989 by 1983</b>				
coefficient		.670		
constant	16.709			
error	8.110			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.317			
sig. level	.0039			

What is striking about about the separate models for 1983 and 1987 is how, relative to the Peronists, there is a fairly high degree of correlation with each of the previous elections. It would be overstating the case to imagine that these results are purely a reflection of organizational capacity, especially given the fact that the 1983 elections were the first that the Peronists had lost in open competition since the party was formed under Juan Perón. Nevertheless, as will be made evident in the results presented below, the Radical vote resembles the pattern for the two major Venezuelan parties more than it does the Peronist.

For Democratic Action, COPEI (Tables 16 and 17) cross-election stability extends past the most immediate election to the two, three, or four elections preceding the 1978 general election. While the most recent election is generally the strongest predictor of the vote, later elections are both strong and statistically significant predictors.

The vote for the Republican Democratic Union (URD) appears to respond only to the most recent previous election, with the exception of 1958-1963 when there was only a small, insignificant relationship (I have presented more equations for the URD to better represent this relationship). The 1958-1963 results could be due to the 1958 candidacy of Adm. Wolfgang Larrazábal, a popular figure who ran with the support of several minor parties. He had been the principal figure in the provisional government created after the coup of junior officers in 1957.



Larrazábal ran particularly well in Caracas and surrounding districts. A large dropoff from the 1958 vote in these districts may account for some of the peculiarities of the 1958-1963 vote. Jóvito Villalba, the perennial leader of the URD, headed their presidential ticket in 1963.

Across all the Venezuelan parties, the pattern, though certainly not the magnitude, of the relationships, is fairly similar to the Radicals' pattern of cross-election stability. It would be stretching, however, to impute much significance to this since there are too few elections. The most reasonable conclusion to draw from this data is that, generally, cross-election stability is more typical of the centralized parties.

With respect to Hypothesis 1, then, it is now possible to state that the pattern of results observed in Table 9, for the centralized parties, is stronger than the contradictory "Venezuelan" pattern. When cross-election stability is accounted for, the URD and the Radical party cease to represent deviant cases. We must still ask why the URD exhibited similar legislative and presidential nationalization profiles. The answer will become more apparent when we look at the data for presidential-legislative electoral linkage. For now, we must turn to the results for Uruguayan parties.

**Table 16: Model 1 -- Democratic Action**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1973</u>
<b>1978</b>					
coefficient		-.288	.604	-.126	.609
partial r		-.682	.781	-.144	.765
sig. level		.0009	.0000	.5435	.0001
constant	9.700				
error	2.552				
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.815				
sig. level	.0000				

**Table 17: Model 1 -- COPEI**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1973</u>
<b>1978</b>					
coefficient		-.214	.030	.399	.420
partial r		-.187	.018	.509	.306
sig. level		.0909	.8627	.0001	.0092
constant	20.066				
error	2.760				
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.758				
sig. level	.0000				

**Table 18: Model 1 -- Republican Democratic Union**

<b>Dependent Var.</b>	<b>Equation</b>	<b>1958</b>	<b>1963</b>	<b>1968</b>	<b>1973</b>
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**1978**

coefficient		.009	-.059	-.193	.818
partial r		.101	-.220	-.384	.897
sig. level		.6712	.3507	.0948	.0000
constant	1.253				
error	1.099				
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.883				
sig. level	.0000				

**1973**

coefficient		.001	.213	.434
partial r		.006	.332	.377
sig. level		.9799	.1416	.0922
constant	-4.265			
error	2.652			
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.771			
sig. level	.0000			

**1968**

coefficient		.047	.520
partial r		.237	.915
sig. level		.2889	.0000
constant	-.373		
error	2.421		
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.853		
sig. level	.0000		

**Cross Election Stability -- Results for Uruguay**

Data for Uruguay is presented to provide a contrast with the results for Venezuela: these cases being similar on the concurrence dimension. The problems with the data for Uruguay have already been noted, and in so far as an analysis of the Uruguayan data with regards to the similarity of legislative and presidential voting patterns can not be performed, the use of Uruguay as a comparator is restricted in its applicability to some of the concerns of this work.

The comparison is useful in that Uruguay shares with Venezuela the use of concurrent elections, while its major parties are highly decentralized parties. In short, it provides a means of assessing the contribution of concurrent elections to cross-election stability in legislative votes in a system where other requisites of party government are absent.

As was the case for the analysis of the nationalization of presidential elections, the data presented here correspond to the sublemas rather than the lemas. The distinction between first place and second place sublemas, however, has been dropped. The reason for this change is that, in the previous analysis, we were assessing the surge or decline associated with the front-running presidential candidate in the cross-election swing. The identity of the sublema was not important for that purpose.

The current analysis requires that the identity of the sublema, to the greatest extent possible, remain constant

across elections. This is not as simple as it sounds since coalitions of sublemas form and break with great frequency, particularly within the Nacional party and the Frente Amplio (the two major sublemas in the Colorado party - the Batllismo and Union Colorada y Batllista sublemas - have maintained relatively fixed identities, though there has been fluctuation in their coalitions).

Where coalitions have formed, broken, changed names, etc., I have associated those sublemas with their nearest possible "relative," i.e. the coalition in the next election with the most common significant members. In some cases a sublema or coalition has been dropped from consideration due to excessive eclecticism in its makeup across elections, or due to an inability to clearly identify it with a previous sublema or coalition.

The accepted and deleted cases are shown in Table 21, below. For the Frente Amplio, as is noted, the comparison is made across the 1971 and 1984 elections. While this is not entirely satisfactory, data at the level of the sublema was not available for the 1966 and 1989 elections.

There are a number of reasons why Uruguay could be expected to exhibit different cross-election variability in legislative election results than did Venezuela. For one, though the elections were concurrent, the division into sublemas means that each sublema will be under different pressures from national electoral forces depending on how they place in a given election.

It would be expected that a sublema which placed first in consecutive elections, or which placed first in one election but not the other, will tend to have less cross-election stability than a sublema which was less viable as a contender for the national office and therefore less susceptible to national forces disturbing its normal pattern of votes. A sublema is considered to have backed a front-runner if there was greater than a ten percentage point difference between the first and second place sublema.

The Frente Amplio should have a higher degree of stability in its vote across elections than the traditional parties since it has fielded unity slates for the presidential race and because of its more-centralized style of organization. Since the coalitions compared across the 1971 and 1984 elections held the second place in 1971 and the first place in 1984, the uniqueness of the Frente Amplio will be put to a fairly stringent test, albeit with few cases (assuming that this pattern does exhibit cross-election instability in the other cases).

The results for sublemas which placed first in consecutive elections are especially important since it could reasonably be argued that the second place faction was, for all intents and purposes, taking part in a midterm election. The expectations outlined above in fact reverse the normal expectations for concurrent elections, insofar as they might normally produce legislative elections that remain consistently sensitive to the national election.

Here, concurrent elections, rather than reinforcing a stable, nationally-oriented vote, create a disturbance in normally district-centered patterns of voting. To the extent that these expectations are confirmed we can safely reject the proposition that the concurrence of elections is a sufficient condition determining the tendency of legislative elections to respond to national forces. In this case it is the DSV system of intra-party preference voting, and the organizational "style" it supports, which appears more significant. The centralized party - the Frente Amplio - appears to have maintained a stable vote, but the data here is sparse.

**Table 19: Coalitions of Sublemas for Legislative Elections**

<b>Colorado:</b>		<u>1966-1971</u>
1st place	<b>Union Colorada y Batllista/ Union Nacional Reeleccionista (UCB/UNR)</b> . Formed after a split within the UCB - some joined the Batllismo sublema. Leadership largely unchanged	
2nd place	<b>Batllismo</b>	
		<u>1984-1989</u>
1st place	<b>Batllismo Unido</b> (Batllismo coalition formed with a number of smaller sublemas)	
2nd place	<b>Union Colorada y Batllista</b>	
<b>Nacional:</b>		<u>1966-1971</u>
1st, '66	<b>Herrerismo-Ruralismo</b>	
2nd, '71		
2nd, '66	<b>Reforma y Desarrollo/Defensores de las</b>	
1st, '71	<b>Leyes</b>	
		<u>1984-1989</u>
1st place	Coalition of Corriente Nacional Herrerista, Movimiento de Rocha, Por la Patria and others/ <b>Herrerismo</b>	
2nd place	The second place sublemas in both elections were eclectic coalitions with little discernible relation to each other (referred to as <b>"Other"</b> in Table 23).	
<b>Frente Amp.:</b>		<u>1971-1984</u>
2nd, '71	<b>Frente del Pueblo</b> (included Lista 99, Gobierno del Pueblo, and Partido Demócrata Cristiano)/Socialismo-Democracia-Libertad (included much of the FDP, except the PGP and PDC dropped out)	
1st, '84		
1st, '71	<b>Frente Izquierda/Democracia Avanzada</b>	
2nd, '84	As I was unable to draw a clear connection between these two coalitions, this case can be ignored (referred to as <b>"Other"</b> in Table 23).	





Table 20: Model 1 -- Uruguay, 1966-1989, by Sublema

Sublema Name	Equation	Sig.			
		Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	level	Place	
UCB/UNR	1971 by 1966	-.036	.551	1	
Batllismo	1971 by 1966	.707	.000	2	
Herrerismo- Ruralismo	1971 by 1966	.113	.058	1,2	
Reforma y Desarrollo	1971 by 1966	.008	.109	2,1	
Batllismo Unido	1989 by 1984	.598	.000	1	
UCB	1989 by 1984	.246	.018	2	
Herrerismo	1989 by 1984	-.057	.863	1	
"Other" Nacional Coalitions	1989 by 1984	-.003	.346	2	
FDP/Socialismo- Democracia-Lib.	1984 by 1971	.691	.002	2,1	
"Other" FA Coalitions	1984 by 1971	.504	.001	1,2	

Uruguay's results for Model 1 (Table 20, above) do not conform to what we would expect if the concurrence of elections was the dominant influence on cross-election stability. A glance at the table would suggest that there is no pattern whatsoever in the results. Partly this could be due to shifts in coalitions of sublemas or schisms within them, but I would also suggest that there is some order in the results.

First, although the results for Batllismo-Unido in 1984-1989 are deviant<sup>69</sup>, by and large the placement of each sublema in the elections - whether they were first or second in the balloting - does appear to have the expected effect. Those sublemas which placed first in either or both of the two elections generally had a less stable vote than those which placed second in both (the cases labelled "other" are not included in this assesment).

As expected, the Frente Amplio sublemas had high r-squares. This result could be due to organization, as suggested earlier, but it could also be due to the fact that the Frente Amplio did not have a reasonable chance of carrying any district except Montevideo in the presidential races. Perhaps for this reason the Frente Amplio vote is less contaminated by national forces.

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<sup>69</sup> Deviant only if one ignores the comparison among results for Batllismo over time. There was a significant loss in cross-election stability in 1984-1989 relative to 1966-1971, when Batllismo was the first place faction in both elections.

### **Linkages Between Presidential and Legislative Elections**

The results presented here correspond to Models 3 through 6, as well as a combined model comparing the merits of the concurrence and party organization dummy variables. Some of the data is presented in graphic form to aid interpretation. The data analyses generally support Hypothesis 2.

The regression models make extensive use of dummy variables, so a note on their interpretation would be helpful here. One class of such models (which has already been employed to acquire the variance-components results) is an additive model with no explanatory variable (here I will refer to an "explanatory" variable as any variable which is not a "categorical" or "dummy" variable). For this type of model the regression is equivalent to an analysis of variance.

The dummy (D) "organizes" the data for the dependent variable (Y) into categories. Since the dummy is effectively a constant, this amounts to a comparison of means. The beta coefficient for D measures the expected difference between the mean for the category and the mean outside of the category (for  $D=0$ ) - the mean for the "excluded" category which is found in the constant term. Since the difference in means associated with the dummy has no slope, the observed effect is one of intercept-shifting, which corresponds to the assumption that slope does not vary among categories.

For a model with a dummy variable and an explanatory variable (X) the interpretation of the beta coefficients for the dummies does not change much. The intercept-shift measured

by beta now corresponds to the relationship between X and Y. The constant term corresponds to the expected value of Y when both X and D equal zero. This procedure amounts to estimating two separate regression equations. For  $D=0$ , Y equals the constant plus  $\beta_{x_0} * X$ . For  $D=1$ , Y equals the constant (unchanged) plus  $\beta_{x_1}$  plus  $\beta_{x_0} * X$ . Each equation has the same slope, but the second equation is modified by an additional constant.

For many applications, including some of the hypotheses tested below, the assumption of equal slope is not realistic. This problem can be addressed by employing a model which accounts for both additive and multiplicative effects of the dummy's categories.

Multiplicative effects are addressed here through the use of interaction variables: the interactive term being the multiplication of an explanatory variable by the dummy variable. This form of regression model tests the assumption that the relationship between Y and X may be modified by both slope-shifting and intercept-shifting effects. The interpretation of the additively-entered dummy remains the same, but the beta coefficient for the interactive term represents the slope change associated with a category of the dummy variable.

The method is essentially the same as running two separate regressions on Y and X where the data for each has been parcelled into groups corresponding to the 0 and 1 values of the dummy variable (in the simplest case). The benefit of

performing a single regression with a dummy variable is that the significance of the intercept and slope-shifts can be directly measured from the standard errors of the beta coefficients for the additive and interactive terms of the dummy.

The hypotheses relating concurrence and party type to the similarity between legislative and presidential voting imply both slope and intercept shifts. The expected increase in the similarity of votes is a slope-shifting effect, but another side of this effect could be an across-the-board surge or decline in predicted values for legislative election results. For the CON dummy variable, the excluded category is Argentina ( $D=0$ ). The same expectations apply to the party type dummies, for which the professional-decentralized type (here, just the URD) is the excluded category.

If concurrence exerts a strong impact on the similarity of voting patterns, it might reasonably be asked whether the stability in legislative voting is merely a by-product of the stimulus provided by the presidential elections; this "stability" has been shown to be variable across party type, however. The results for cross-election stability in Uruguay, also do not support the attribution of a determinative influence to concurrence: this would appear to be contingent on institutional as well as party-organizational factors. The Uruguayan data, in fact, could be interpreted to suggest that the concurrence of elections undermined stability in the context of fragmented parties and intra-party preference

voting.

Taken as a whole, these observations suggest another conclusion: that the relationship between legislative and presidential voting in Venezuela, and its possible influence on the cross-election stability of legislative votes, are made possible by its combination of institutional and party-organizational factors.

Tables 21 through 25 demonstrate that in cross-national perspective the electoral cycle is the predominant factor determining the similarity of legislative and presidential voting. Differences among parties, as Table 25 most clearly shows, are subsumed by system-level factors.

In light of the results for the cross-election stability of elections this is an interesting finding not only because it suggests that concurrent elections bring national forces into legislative elections (which is a commonplace observation), but also because the differences in the results of these analyses clearly demonstrate that cross-election stability is a separate phenomenon from what is measured in this section. For the nationalizing parties, stability is premised on a consistent intrusion of national forces, but "intrusions" and "consistency" arise from different sources. Recalling the comparison of legislative and presidential nationalization scores (Table 9), the overall pattern, then, suggests that in Argentina and Uruguay the nationalization of legislative elections was relatively unrelated to the presidential elections, even where organizational strength

(the Radical party) was evident.

While it is possible to assert that the close relationship between legislative and presidential votes in Venezuela produces a stability in legislative elections premised on national factors, it is not possible to make that assertion for Argentina. The wide disparities between presidential and legislative voting instead suggest that subnational forces are at least equally, if not more, important determinants of the observed levels of (in)stability. In fact, given the results presented for Uruguay, we might reasonably conclude that presidential elections are a cause of instability in this context.



**Table 21: Model 3 -- Additive Effect of Concurrent Elections**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>PRES</u>	<u>CON</u>
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**LEG**

coefficient		.808	-2.180
partial r		.814	- .115
sig. level		.0000	.0092

constant	5.533
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.708
sig. level	.0000

Table 22: Model 4 -- Additive Effect of Party Type

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>PRES</u>	<u>PTY2</u>	<u>PTY3</u>
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LEG

coefficient		.749	7.566	9.580
partial r		.808	.344	.313
sig. level		.0000	.0000	.0000

constant	.103
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.743
sig. level	.0000

**Table 23: Model 5 -- Additive and Interactive Effects of CON**

<u>Dependent Var.</u>	<u>Equation</u>	<u>PRES</u>	<u>CON</u>	<u>CON*PRES</u>
-----------------------	-----------------	-------------	------------	-----------------

**LEG**

coefficient		.004	-40.540	.945
partial r		.004	- .591	.585
sig. level		.9339	.0000	.0000

constant	39.622
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	.808
sig. level	.0000

**Table 24: Model 6 -- Additive and Interactive effects of PTY**

<u>Independent Var.</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Partial R</u>	<u>Sig. level</u>
PRES	.669	.592	.0000
PTY2	2.009	.054	.2222
PTY3	38.892	.353	.0000
PTY2*PRES	.179	.158	.0003
PTY3*PRES	-.644	-.256	.0000

**For dependent variable = legislative vote**

**Constant** 2.003

**Adj. R<sup>2</sup>** .773

**Sig. level** .0000

**Table 25: Combined Models 5 and 6**

<u>Independent Var.</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Partial R</u>	<u>Sig. level</u>
PRES	-.079	-.051	.2492
CON	-36.333	-.491	.0000
PTY2	-.016	-.001	.9913
PTY3	4.425	.041	.3614
CON*PRES	.856	.488	.0000
PTY2*PRES	.167	.166	.0002
PTY3*PRES	.104	.041	.3521

**For dependent variable = legislative vote**

**Constant** 36.470

**Adj. R<sup>2</sup>** .827

**Sig. level** .0000

As expected, CON had both a slope and intercept effect. The strength of this categorical variable was such that the presidential election results themselves were a poor and insignificant predictor in cross-national perspective. Both the intercept and slope shifts associated with the party type categories disappear in the final model as well (Table 25). While the slope shift for PTY2 remains significant this is probably not of any substantive significance since those results are dominated by the Venezuelan parties. The small shift observed can easily be accounted for by the mild distortion of that variable owing to the inclusion of the UCR. Without the UCR the variable would not deviate much from the slope when PTY=0, which corresponds to that of the URD.

In sum, this data supports the conclusion that while there were significant cross-national and cross-party differences in the stability of legislative votes across elections, the relationship between legislative and presidential votes appears to be determined by the electoral cycle. This accords with comments of Myers (1973), who argued that the combination of concurrent elections and closed-list balloting had produced an electoral market in Venezuela in which legislative elections were closely linked to the presidential contest.

The close connection between the legislative and presidential contests is further reinforced by the tendency for the president of the party to also be the presidential candidate, thus re-enforcing in the voters' minds the

perception of the election as a mandate for the executive officer to enact a national party program. The figures presented below demonstrate in graphic fashion the strength of this conclusion.

Figures 1-4 show that the party type distinction is completely insignificant in this analysis. The Radical party is not only dissimilar to the other professional-centralized parties, but shows absolutely no relationship between legislative and presidential results (see Figure 1). Looking at the data for the Peronists (Figure 2) we can see that the pattern very closely fits that for the Radicals, the only difference being a relatively low dispersion of presidential votes for the Peronists.


These data suggest that the cross-election stability observed earlier in the legislative election returns for the Radicals cannot be considered a consequence of the influence of presidential elections. If the legislative vote is not "organized" by the presidential this leaves party-organization itself as the more reasonable explanation. However, we must then also conclude that the nationalization of the Radical vote (and the similarities observed for legislative and presidential results) does not imply an electoral linkage between the presidency and the legislature.

In Figure 3 we can see that while the URD experienced more variance around its line of "best fit" the pattern is much closer to the other Venezuelan parties than to its organizational "neighbor", the Peronist party (see Figures 3


and 4). The pattern of results for Venezuelan parties suggests, in opposition to the observation made about the Radical party, that the similarity of presidential and legislative nationalization scores is part of a "package" - including a close electoral linkage between the presidential and legislative nuclei - associated with institutional forces beyond, though perhaps including, the effect of party organization alone.

The Venezuelan model is therefore one in which elections for both branches are stable, nationalized, and linked: a situation which would seem to accord well with the governing requirements of a presidential regime - especially as this relates to the problem of deadlock. As the data for the URD indicates, these results are not guaranteed by institutional factors, though institutions create a pressure, but include also the organizational decisions made by parties. Thus while we can argue that nationalizing parties did not emerge in Argentina, owing to the absence of a concurrent electoral cycle, the presence of that cycle could not make nationalizers of all Venezuelan parties if the political will was lacking. The pattern of results observed throughout this chapter points to a confirmation of Hypothesis 3 ("Atenuated-Presidential").







**Figure 1: Similarity of Presidential and Legislative Votes -- Professional-Centralized Parties**



**Figure 2: Similarity of Presidential and Legislative Votes -- Peronist Party**



**Figure 3: Similarity of Presidential and Legislative Votes -- Republican Democratic Union**



**Figure 4: Similarity of Presidential and Legislative  
Votes -- Venezuela**

## Chapter Nine

### Conclusions and Implications for Further Research

#### Summary of Findings

We began with the rather simple observation that party organization matters as a determinant of legislative patterns of nationalization. This by itself represents a substantial improvement in our understanding of the process, not simply because party organization's differ in this respect, but because we now have some idea why they differ and in what specific ways the differences matter.

The picture complicates itself when we turn to the role of presidential elections: not simply because this portion of the analysis begs a further study of governing processes and inter-branch relations, but because the presidential elections are not merely discrete factors exogenous to the legislative elections. They are, in fact, a significant component of the "national force" we have sought to capture.

It is almost surprising - and granted, the number of cases is small - that such a clear pattern would emerge, and that "nationalizing parties" should emerge defined essentially by two factors: organizational and institutional. While this result elevates an additional question - what institutional factors support the organizational tendencies observed? - we can derive lessons of some importance from what has been presented.

One lesson is that decentralized parties, even movements

with rich histories like that of the Peronists, do not put down the kind of roots which encourage a national focus in legislative politics. It might be argued that the recent travails of the party have something to do with this, but it must also be recognized that those problems arose *because* of the organizational framework, and the distorted power relations, of the Peronist party up till 1987. The Republican Democratic Union is an especially interesting case because it began as an electorally strong party in a system conducive to nationalization, yet it too could not take on a role of focusing legislative electoral politics.

The experience of the Radical party might well be taken as a lesson, where concerns over inter-branch relations are strongly felt, in the importance of institutional reform. The party managed to create a stable, nationalized vote, but this vote has remained un-linked to the national constituency of the presidential candidate. This suggests that party reform is not enough. The style of governance in Argentina, as opposed to Venezuela (during the period studied), corroborates this speculation.

The above point is worth noting, even with the limited nature of the data, and especially given the on-going and largely unresolved debates among U.S. scholars over the relative importance of organizational and institutional factors in overcoming deadlock (Truman, 1967; Sundquist, 1992; Jacobson, 1990, etc.). But since this represents only a small piece in that puzzle, I will not speculate further. Rather, it

could more usefully be asked: how can this research can be improved and expanded to provide a clearer picture of nationalization processes and inter-branch linkages?

### **Suggestions for Further Research**

Though there are undoubtedly a great number of issues that deserve attention, I will here restrict myself to three themes that arose in the course of this study which have been left in the realm of speculation and/or assumption: the problem of the "dual incentive structure" created by midterm elections; the effects of certain "background" variables on party organization; the underlying assumption, thus far unelaborated, that within parliamentary systems the problems discussed here necessarily exhibit a different character. I will not attempt to elaborate wholesale research designs, but rather outline a problem-directed program: i.e., one with a high potential for rooting out inaccuracies in the findings of this study.

It was suggested earlier that parties with a centralized structure will tend to respond to midterms by emphasizing the nationalizing potential of the on-year elections. The Radical party emerged as the emblematic case, and the result was a stable, nationalized, though unlinked legislative vote. Two other South American cases (though I do not mean to suggest that the analysis should be restricted to this area) employed nonconcurrent elections while offering a reasonable number of elections for study. Brazil, from 1954 to 1964, and Chile,

from 1945 to 1973. The Brazilian parties were relatively loose in structure, perhaps due to an overwhelming proportion of votes being cast along the lines of intra-party preferences, in comparison to the principal Chilean parties.

Other cases could of course be suggested, but the general priority ought to be to establish the independent effect of party organization in constructing a stable, nationalized vote. In a larger-n study, perhaps including cases with well-institutionalized parties, this research could also begin to uncover the institutional framework underlying parties which fit this profile.

The importance of concurrence in relation to linkage could be further reinforced by replicating these analyses for Costa Rica, which shares with Venezuela the use of concurrent elections and whose National Liberation Party shares the same organizational type as the major Venezuelan parties. Once these and other, similar cases have been addressed, the natural point of departure would be to compare their experiences with those of parliamentary systems. Such research could also serve to increase our understanding of long-term electoral dynamics in parliamentary systems (discussed further below).

Any attempt to address the indirect impact of variables effecting party organization would involve us in a study of large proportions, and would necessarily involve cross-area research. A relatively narrow focus on the two variables identified here - federalism and ballot type - would certainly



be inadequate once the field was expanded to include parliamentary systems. Argentina, Brazil (1954-1964), Venezuela (after 1989), have had federal systems, while Costa Rica, Venezuela (before 1989) and Uruguay were unitary. Closed-list systems were employed in Argentina, Venezuela and Costa Rica, while intra-party preference systems were used in Brazil and Uruguay.

Establishing the independence of either factor in a study of small size would be difficult owing to the fact that their expected effects would frequently be reinforcing. Nevertheless, theoretically grounded studies of the determinants of fundamental attributes of party organization are lacking, and such an attempt would illuminate not only the issue of nationalization, but also the general theory of party organization.

As a final research note, it might well be asked whether presidential systems are as peculiar as it is often suggested. Certainly, one of the claims of this study partially obscures that contention. Atenuated-presidentialism does seem to exhibit parliamentary tendencies, both in the construction of the mandate and in the conduct of parties in the government. It would therefore be advisable to address ourselves to the institutional arrangements within parliamentary systems which inhibit party government and the nationalization of voting.

This expansion of the research design would certainly open up a host of possibilities, but I can suggest a few areas where focused comparisons could be instructive. Party

organization and its determinants would be the most likely starting point. Federative parliamentary systems which employ proportional representation formulas, for example, may be particularly susceptible to the formation of regionally-based parties and parties of the non-professional-centralized type (Germany, for example, though its formula is "mixed").

#### **A Note on Recent Reforms**

Finally, it has been noted that both Argentina and Venezuela have undergone revisions of their constitutions. Before closing, then, it would be worthwhile to consider the potential impact of these reforms given the results of this study.

The reforms in Argentina were substantial, including re-election for the President, a majority/run-off system for presidential elections, and the creation of a prime ministerial position known as the Chief of Cabinet. The context of the legislative elections, however, has not changed much. Midterm elections will still be held, though less frequently because the President now serves a four year term. Thus, while the legislature can potentially exert pressure on the executive by voting down the "government," the President remains electorally isolated from the legislature. The necessity of installing the officer known as "Chief of Cabinet" probably will not have the same effect as the installation of a prime minister since the coalition will be under pressure to dissolve at the midterm, thus replicating



the electoral cycle effects which existed previously.

Reforms in Venezuela were aimed at the excesses of the previous system, particularly what came to be an excess of hierarchical control within the parties. The parties were perceived as unresponsive to constituency interests (Shugart, 1992). Venezuela now has a "mixed" electoral system, with somewhat more than half of the deputies to be elected in single-member districts. This reform could elevate the importance of personalist voting and thus loosen candidates from the influence of the party hierarchy.

The change in the electoral system corresponds with the direct election of governors. The intention of this reform was also to localize politics to a greater extent. In the first gubernatorial elections three parties of the Left, which heretofore had not had great success in national elections, managed to capture gubernatorial office. These plurality-rule races encourage the building of coalitions to compete with the larger parties (as do the single-member districts for legislative office).

The long term effects of these changes are difficult to assess, but nevertheless, I think two possibilities deserve attention. The retention of proportional representation for half the legislative seats could very well mitigate the effects of the plurality elections, particularly if the national electoral quotient operates to preserve the positions of the smaller parties. One scenario (relying on the plurality effects) would see the 1989 elections as a deviation, with the

large parties ultimately using the advantages the electoral system gives them to further consolidate the two-party system. This would obviously have some benefits in terms of governing.

Another scenario, however (which we might model after the German example), would have some of the smaller, leftist parties capturing gubernatorial office and using this position as a springboard and as a means of securing its representation (especially in the plurality races) within those districts. Such a regional party might well stand a chance of making further inroads, but even if it didn't, it could have some nuisance value in the legislature and could force the formation of governing coalitions (like the Free Democrats and the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats in Germany).

On the one hand, then, the system could enhance the possibility of creating governing majorities, but on the other, it could do the opposite. The outcome may well depend on the willingness of the Left to create durable and/or institutionalized coalitions. The latter problem may lead to pressure towards a premier-presidential system in the future.

The effects of these changes on the nationalization of politics are likely to be negative in the long run, since the partisan foundations of these voting patterns are likely to change. If the system does indeed move towards a constituency-delegate model, or if regionally based parties begin to make a mark, then some change in voting patterns is likely. Whether this poses a threat to the governability of the system is difficult to say. Since the changes in the institutional

format of the legislative elections have been significant, but not traumatic, and have taken place within an institutionalized party system, I doubt that the changes will be dramatic.

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