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MICHIGAN NEWSPAPERS AND THE CANADIAN
RECIPROCITY AGREEMENT OF 1911

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MICHIGAN NEWSPAPERS AND THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY
AGREEMENT OF 1911

By

Phillip Charles Buta

A THESIS

Submitted to .
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1995

ABSTRACT

MICHIGAN NEWSPAPERS AND THE CANADIAN RECIPROCIT Y
AGREEMENT OF 1911

By

Phillip C. Buta

Reciprocity scholars have long argued that American
newspapers selfishly proposed and fought for a reciprocity
agreement with Canada because it was a means to reduce the price of
newsprint. The purpose of this study is to offer a comprehensive
review of newspapers in one state, Michigan, in an attempt to
evaluate this long held tenet of reciprocity scholarship.

This study is based on a review of over two hundred
newspapers, various professional journals, and government
documents. Secondary sources also provided significant material on
the political situation in Washington.

This thesis has shown that newspapers in Michigan faced the
agreement with a complex and often conflicting array of economic,
political, social, and regional concerns that led to a diverse
newspaper response. The narrow focus of reciprocity scholars on
large regional newspapers, ignored the politically animated smaller
dailies and weeklies that made up the majority of the American

newspaper press.

Copyright by
PHILLIP CHARLES BUTA
1 9 9 5

For my wife
Wendy Collins Buta
whose patience and support knows no bounds

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to especially thank Dr. Gordon T. Stewart whose guidance
and suggestions helped bring this thesis to fruition. I would also like to
express my appreciation to Dr. David Bailey and Dr. Susan Sleeper-Smith
for their insightful comments during their review.

I would also like to thank my parents, Charles and Irene Buta for their
encouragement and support. Finally, I would like to thank my wife,
Wendy Collins Buta, who along the way learned more about reciprocity
than she thought she would.

Table of Contents

List of Tables ................................................................................................... vii

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
II. The Michigan Connection 1846-1911 ..................................................... 12
III. The Reciprocity Debate of 1911 ................................................................ 21
IV. Michigan Press Reaction to the Economic Issues ............................... 47
V. Political and Regional Responses .............................................................. 82
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 125

vi

LIST OF TABLES

1. Michigan and Ontario Agricultural Prices in 1910-1911 ................ 77

vii

Chapter I

Introduction

The state of Michigan has always maintained a deep interest in
Canadian-American relations. This interest was a direct result of the
extremely close economic, social, professional, familial, and
geographic relationships that have developed between Canada and
the Great Lakes region since the colonial era. From the era of the
Canadian rebellions in the 1830's to the Free Trade Agreement of
1988, Michigan has directly felt the impact of Canadian-American
relations. Agreements and treaties made between London and
Washington, and later Ottawa and Washington, often gathered front-
page coverage in Michigan newspapers and became focal points of
Michigan political debates.

The Canadian Reciprocity Agreement of 1911 illustrated the
considerable impact of the relationship between Ottawa and
Washington on the state of Michigan. The agreement proposed the
elimination and reduction of duties on numerous agricultural and
natural articles produced in both countries. In addition, the
agreement promised to reduce or eliminate duties on a smaller
number of manufactured products. These numerous reductions
directly affected a substantial majority of Michigan's agricultural and
manufacturing interests. Western Michigan fruit, central Michigan
dairy products, and eastern Michigan wheat all exemplified the wide
range of agricultural products directly effected. Although primarily
an agricultural agreement, Michigan industries directly benefited

from certain schedules. For example, Detroit automobile

2

manufacturers received a lower duty on the export of their product
into Canada as a result of the agreement. Grand Rapids furniture
manufacturers received their raw material, lumber, free of duty as a
result of the agreement.

Reaction to the agreement in Michigan, often diverse and
complex, characterized the nation's response. For example, Michigan
farming organizations, such as the State Grange, often developed the
arguments used by the National Grange in their fight against the
agreement in Washington DC. Michigan dairy farmers echoed the
dairy opposition voices coming from states like New York and
Vermont. Michigan farm implement manufacturers reflected other
midwestern implement manufacturers in their desire for a greater
share of the Canadian market. Michigan's responses truly depicted
the nation as a whole with its diverse agricultural, natural product,
and manufacturing interests.

Michigan newspapers furnish an excellent portrait of the local
and regional responses to the agreement in the state. Local
newspapers were of great importance to their communities in 1911.
For large and small communities, the local organ or organs
symbolized the progressive and thriving society that existed within
their locality or region. In most cases, local news often received
more coverage than national news, unless they overlapped, as the
reciprocity agreement demonstrated. As the main sources of local,
national, and international news for Michigan citizens, local
newspapers provided them with a clearinghouse for information.
Information on the anti-reciprocity position of the local grange often

appeared in the same issue that discussed the problems encountered

3
by Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier in selling the agreement to
Canada. In addition, Michigan newspapers provided the local
citizenry an outlet for their concerns as well as a hub for local debate
through their letters to the editor sections. Finally, many, but
certainly not all, newspapers attempted to persuade their readers
through editorials. A local newspaper that failed to mirror local
sentiment often acknowledged these differences and addressed their
community's concerns. A local newspaper clearly offers a picture of
local and regional responses that a national or even a state
organization, politician, or interest can not provide.

Scholars of the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement of 1911 have
focused on two areas of study. Some scholars have focused on
President William Howard Taft and his Administration. These
scholars have questioned the motivating factors behind the
Administration's desire for reciprocal relations with Canada. Other
reciprocity scholars have focused on the debate over the agreement
that engulfed the country for the first half of 1911.

Scholars have focused primarily on President William Howard
Taft's reasons for soliciting a potentially controversial agreement. L.
Ethan Ellis fired the initial shot over this question when he concluded
that "All in all the times were troubled for Mr. Taft. Tariff reform a
boomerang, the powerful press hostile, foreign policy under attack,
Congress in turmoil, and the country showing signs of revolt, small
wonder that he sought a way out of the woods. A path must if
possible be opened to the clearing before a November storm closed

the way."1 Ellis deduced that the political climate demanded action

 

1L. Ethan Ellis, Reciprocity 1911: A Study in Canadian-American Relations

4

from Taft on the troublesome tariff. The agreement provided the
necessary response to urban demands for tariff reform with its
hoped for benefits of cheaper food. In addition, the promise of free
newsprint might have delivered an uneasy press into the Taft fold in
time for the upcoming elections. Ellis believed that constant pressure
from newspaper publishers dating back to the failure of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff directly led to the Taft Administration's Canadian
reciprocity policy.2

Ronald Radosh suggested an alternative reason for the
Administration's policy. In discounting Ellis' conclusions on the
influence of newspaper publishers and the political situation, Radosh

surmised:

to view the Taft Administration's desire to achieve a
treaty as a result of its succumbing to the pressure of one
narrow interest [in this case the newspaper publishers]
misses the point. In reality, it was the American
manufacturers who were the most vociferous supporters
of reciprocity, and their persistent activity on behalf of a
treaty was responsible for its emergence as a political
issue.3

Radosh concluded that American manufacturers, no longer in need of
protection from foreign industries and deeply concerned about a
saturated American market, aggressively sought the opening of
foreign markets to American products. The continued efforts by

American manufacturers since the turn of the century propelled the

 

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 15.
21bid., pp. 28-34, 69-71.
3Ronald Radosh, "American Manufacturers, Canadian Reciprocity, And the

Origins of the Branch Factory System," Canadian Association for American
Studies Bulletin 3, no. 1 (spring/summer 1967): p. 26.

issue into national prominence.

Robert E. Hannigan introduced a very different perspective of
the Administration's reasons for seeking reciprocity. Hannigan
suggested that Ellis and Radosh have offered "...motivations, largely
electoral, which are less incorrect than too narrow."4 In its place
Hannigan offered a more complex view, where economic necessity
replaced political considerations. "By 1910," he argued that

American policymakers,

had come to the conclusion that an integrated North
American economic order, organized around the needs of
the American industrial system, would be little short of
critical to the future prosperity of American business.
They wished to block Canada's development into a core
state, to guarantee for the American economy a cheap
and continuous supply of Canadian natural products, and
to secure for American firms the Canadian market for
industrial goods.5

Hannigan clearly situated the Administration as primarily concerned
with developing a continental economy in which the United States
dominated. As a result of this continental economic system, the
United States would find itself better able to compete in the world
economy.

In his review of the Taft reciprocity policy as well as
subsequent scholarship, Gordon T. Stewart observed that "Hannigan
placed Canada squarely in the midst of American open-door

diplomacy of the early twentieth century." But Stewart added,

 

4Robert E. Hannigan, "Reciprocity 1911: Continentalism and American
Weltpolitik," Diplomatic History 4 (winter 1980): p. 2.
5ibid., pp. 2-3.

A problem arises, however, in treating the Canadian
relationship in the same conceptual terms as America's
relationship with China or the Latin American states. The
stubborn fact remains that Canada's geographical
contiguity to and similarity with the United States in
economic organization and expectations have given it a
special place in US. policy formulationsfi

For Stewart, Hannigan's failure to take into account the unique
economic situation between the United States and Canada that
already existed in 1910-1911 provided an incomplete portrait of the
Taft Administration's policy development. Stewart showed that,
despite imperial tariff preferences, American exports to Canada
continued to grow in proportion to British exports during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The situation had
transcended tariff barriers, to where the United States and Canada
inevitably became natural trading partners. In defining the
motivating factors behind the Taft Administration's reciprocity

program Stewart, sounding strikingly similar to Hannigan, added,

The American goals were to continue to detach Canada
from the empire, increase the US. share of the Canadian
market, gain readier access to Canadian natural resources,
and encourage, in general, Canadian integration into a
unified North American economy. It was not so much a
case of obtaining an open door as of taking the door off
its hinges.7

Much like the arguments used by Hannigan, Stewart believed that a

 

6Gordon T. Stewart, "A Special Contiguous Country Economic Regime: An
Overview of America's Canadian Policy," Diplomatic History 6, no. 4 (fall 1982):
p. 340.

71bid., p. 346.

7

continental economy was the primary objective of the
Administration's reciprocity policy. Stewart clearly placed the
motivations beyond the simpler political arguments put forth by Ellis
and Radosh. In addition, he argued that the Administration had
developed a Canadian policy, distinct from its general open door
policy, which took into account the unique relationship between the
two countries. These conclusions exhibited an evolution in the study
of the Taft Administration's policy goals.

Reciprocity scholars have also turned their attention to the
reciprocity debate that occurred throughout the country in the first
half of 1911. Again, Ellis laid the groundwork on the subject for
subsequent reciprocity scholars. Ellis utilized Congressional debates
as well as major regional newspapers and professional journals from
around the country in an attempt to define the nation's response.
Regrettably, Ellis' study fell short in its comprehensiveness in one
critical area, the reaction of the American newspaper publishers to
the agreement. In his study of newspaper publishers he failed to
take into account two important groups. First, Ellis neglected the
newspaper publishers of Michigan in his study. The state of
Michigan provided the nation with numerous individuals and
organizations that played a key role in the national debate. The
absence of the Michigan press left a significant gap in his study.
Second, Ellis' study of newspaper publishers' reaction, focused on
large regional newspapers, overlooking an untold number of smaller
dailies and weeklies. The problem with this limited perspective
becomes apparent in his conclusion that, "The press also took a

remarkably unanimous stand, regardless of political or sectional

8

allegiances."3 A closer examination of the Michigan press
undermines Ellis' far-reaching conclusion over press unanimity and
shows diversity in newspaper response.

Kendrick A. Clements offered that the American response to
the agreement symbolized a mutated form of American
expansionism. The administration, as well as many in the American
public understood that "reciprocity would promote the development
of cultural and economic ties which would also encourage unionism
in Canada," in addition, these American unionists "opposed the
coercive tactics of annexationism, which they regarded as self-
defeating."9 The concept of unionism placed Canada squarely along
the lines set out in Hannigan and Stewart: a unified North American
economy with the United States as the predominant power.
Clements, like Ellis, simplified the position taken by newspaper
publishers when he commented, "...strongly backed by most
newspaper publishers (who hoped for cheaper pulp for newsprint),
Taft pressed tirelessly for the measure."10 Apparently Clements did
not accept Ellis' view of an "unanimous stand" by the press. In its
place Clements offered a much vaguer assertion of newspaper
publishers' response that needs clarification.

Steven B. Zamiara introduced a uniquely regional view to
reciprocity scholarship that placed Michigan squarely at the forefront
of the national debate over the agreement. Zamiara proposed that

the influence and ideas of Michigan politicians, organizations,

 

8Ellis, p. 85. In addition, Ellis' attempts to find trends in newspaper response
along chronological lines are not entirely borne out in this author's research.

9Kendrick A. Clements, "Manifest Destiny and Canadian Reciprocity in 1911,"
Pacific Historical Review 42 (1973): p. 34.

lOIbid., p. 35.

9

industrialists, and others extended far beyond Michigan into the
realm of the national debate that centered in Washington. Through
his study of some of the numerous Michigan men who appeared
before congressional committees, Zamiara postulated that: "Michigan
was...responsible for most of the arguments used by the opponents of
reciprocity."11 In addition, Zamiara placed Michigan pro-reciprocity
forces at the forefront of the debate in Washington. But Zamiara,
much like Ellis, placed Michigan newspapers in an apparently
harmonious position by stating that "...the most vocal supporters of
reciprocity were the newspaper publishers, for the agreement would
remove the $4.90 per ton duty on newsprint..."12 Zamiara's study
came up short primarily because of his failure to mention the
divisions within the Michigan press. True, many Michigan publishers
were some of the most vocal supporters of the agreement, but many
others were some of the most vocal opponents of reciprocity as well.
Stewart offered the most recent review of the American
public's response to the agreement. His study focused on the
strategic thinkers in the Taft Administration. The key figure for
Stewart was Charles H. Pepper of the Bureau of Trade Relations in
the State Department. Pepper developed and implemented the
policy and responded to the criticism from farmers and their
organizations.13 The arguments developed by Pepper became the
main source of material used by the pro-reciprocity publishers,

politicians, and industrialists throughout the debate of 1911. Stewart

 

11Stephen B. Zamiara, "Michigan and Canadian Reciprocity: 1911," Michigan
Academician 2, no. 3 (winter 1970): pp. 101-102.

121bid., p. 100.

13Gordon T. Stewart, The American Response to Canada Since 1776 (East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992), pp. 105-113.

10

regrettably made little mention of the press and their stand during
the first half of 1911.

A reassessment of press reaction seems necessary. Borrowing
a quote from Robert E. Hannigan, the conclusions reached by
reciprocity scholars on press reaction "...are less incorrect than too
narrow." Certainly the possibility of a lower cost for newsprint
would appeal to any newspaper publisher. But concerns over the
local economy or the political affiliation of a certain publisher
unquestionably influenced the stand taken by a local newspaper. By
revealing that 1 in 4 Michigan newspapers that took a stand opposed
the agreement, this study will suggest that anti-reciprocity
newspapers were a more vocal and significant force than most
reciprocity scholars have concluded. Ellis, the only reciprocity
scholar to detail newspaper response, studied only a small portion of
the American press. In his limited study of the nation's urban
dailies, Ellis repeatedly commented on the rarity of anti-reciprocity
newspapers, even though he outlined a contemporary poll that
seemingly countered his claims over newspaper response.” Radosh
and Clements joined Ellis in concentrating on large daily newspapers

and national forces like the American Newspaper Publishers

 

14In his study of the dailies' response to the agreement during the period of
February 9-March 4, 1911 Ellis looked at forty-four daily newspapers
throughout the country and commented that three of these newspapers
opposed the agreement. The contemporary poll from the Chicago Tribune that
Ellis used showed a striking similarity with the conclusions of this author. It
showed that in twenty-two western and central states, only seventy-three per
cent of newspapers that responded, favored the agreement. Ellis had a
tendency to define newspaper response solely on the arguments presented by
urban dailies. Ellis also described another poll taken in Vermont by the Free
Press of Burlington. This poll more closely resembled Ellis' conclusions by
revealing that eighty-seven per cent of the newspapers that took a position on
the agreement, favored it. Ellis, pp. 85-87, 108-109, 136-139.

11

Association (ANPA). Ellis even pointed out that the ANPA received

its financial support from ...slightly over three hundred of the
country's two thousand dailies."15 This hardly constituted an
authoritative view of the countless other smaller dailies and weeklies
that did not get involved in the ANPA's activities. This paper will
include these "lesser" newspapers from a state deeply effected by

the agreement and come to a different, broader view.

 

151bid., p. 30.

Chapter II
The Michigan Connection 1846 - 1911

The origin of formal economic relations between the United
States and Canada can be traced to the repeal of the British Corn
Laws in 1846.16 This action by the British government eliminated
the preferential treatment Canadian agricultural and natural
products received in the British market. Canada found itself in need
of a new market for its surplus. The United States, with its growing
demand for natural and agricultural products coupled with its
geographical proximity, offered the most likely alternative market.
Preliminary negotiations, begun as early as 1846, failed to lead to
any agreement. Repeated attempts by Canadian and British officials
met with continued rebuke in Washington by a Congress that wanted
more than a free exchange of natural and agricultural products. By
1853 American interest in opening the St. Lawrence to American
commerce coupled with growing concerns over the rights of
American fishermen off the Canadian coastline, provided the
American congress the impetus to give Canada access to the
American market. The treaty approved by the United States Senate
in August 1854, satisfied these chcerns and gave the Canadians the
free access to the American market which they had desired since
1846.

During the treaty's tenure, trade between the two countries

 

16Many of the details of this summary of 19th century Canadian-American
relations originated from the United States Tariff Commission's, Reciprocity
and Commercial Treaties (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1919),
pp. 21-24. Also David Drury, "Michigan's View of the Canadian Reciprocity
Treaty, 1854-1866" (master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1959), pp. 1-29.

12

13
increased substantially and both enjoyed a fair amount of economic
prosperity.17 But by 1863, the United States began to seriously
consider abrogating the treaty. Numerous developments since the
treaty's inception created a climate in the United States which deeply
opposed reciprocal relations with Canada. First, in order to raise
revenues in 1858, Canada raised numerous duties on American goods
not on the free list. Many in the American government saw this as a
snub to the spirit of the treaty, that being the increase in trade
between the United States and Canada. Second, the Union, much like
the Canadian government, needed to raise revenues. These revenues
went to pay for the growing costs of the war with the Confederacy.
As a result, protectionism gained a foothold and quickly spread
throughout the Union. Finally, Canadian sentiment toward the
Confederacy's cause led to much resentment of Canada and provided
another salvo against the treaty. By March 1865, the United States
gave the one year notice for termination as required by the terms of
the treaty of 1854.

Michigan interest in a closer Canadian-American relationship
quickly coalesced shortly after becoming a state. During the mid-
nineteenth century, Michigan farmers joined state Democrats in
support of a closer relationship with Canada.18 Farmers considered
that higher tariffs benefitted only industrialists and restricted their

access to manufactured goods. In addition, the opening of the St.

 

17Reciprocity scholars and contemporaries debated the agreement's impact on
both nations. Many scholars have pointed out that numerous factors like the

Crimean War, population expansion in both countries, and the American Civil
War exerted more influence than the treaty on both economies. See Drury, pp.
9-21 and US. Tariff Commission, p. 22.

18Drury, pp. 30-47.

14

Lawrence to Michigan farmers promised an alternative and possibly
cheaper route to the industrialized eastern seaboard. During the
duration of the treaty the Republican rise to power led to a radical
change in the state's view of the agreement. Michigan farmers,
supporters of the treaty before its enactment, now opposed the
agreement because of the perceived detrimental effects on Michigan
agriculture.19 Michigan wheat, wool, and barley farmers felt that
prices for their products had dramatically fallen as a direct result of
the increased Canadian competition. Michigan farmers, joined by
Michigan lumbermen, formed a significant opposition to a renewal of
Canadian reciprocity that would once again resurface with the
agreement of 1911.

For thirty years after the abrogation of the treaty, successive
Canadian governments repeatedly attempted to reestablish
reciprocal ties, but met with continued rejection from an
unresponsive United States. American indifference and hostility to
these overtures ushered Canada into the "National Policy." The
"National Policy" planned to build Canadian self-sufficiency through
the development of the western provinces and as a result provide a
market for manufacturing interests in Quebec and Ontario. In the
words of Prime Minister John A. McDonald they attempted to "go it
alone." This entailed an elaborate rail transportation system linking
the western provinces to the rest of Canada. This also meant the
raising of tariffs to protect infant industries in the eastern provinces
from foreign, mostly American, competition.

Sir Wilfred Laurier's ascension to power in 1896 led to the

 

19Ibid.. pp. 51-57.

15

continuation and expansion of the "National Policy" goals of
developing domestic industry and agriculture. Laurier, frustrated
with continued American obstinacy, sought another foreign market
for Canada's growing agricultural and manufacturing exports. The
result of this search came in the form of a return to the imperial
preference. Laurier, commenting on this shift in Canadian policy,
bluntly reported, "T here will be no more pilgrimages to Washington.
We are turning our hopes to the old motherland."20 Tired of
continued rejection, the Canadian government would no longer take
the initiative in seeking out reciprocal relations with the United
States.

The rise of protectionism in American society after the Civil
War manifested itself in the success of the Republican party.
Through Republican legislation like the Dingley Act of 1897, tariffs
continued to rise on foreign goods. The popularity of protecting
American industry from cheaper European products appealed to
many urban Americans concerned about job security.

The beginning of the twentieth century brought a gradual shift
in the protectionist views of the American public. The rising cost of
living for those in urban areas coupled with concerns over a
predicted shortage of natural and agricultural products, led to a
rethinking by the American public of the Republican tariff policy.
This policy came under increased attack from a Democratic party
that found increased electoral success in the rapidly growing cities of
the Northeast and Midwest. The Republican party grew deeply

divided on how to properly implement the tariff. Standpatters in

 

20Ellis, p. 5.

16

Congress held to the stringent Republican protectionist doctrine of
the late nineteenth century. Progressive or Insurgent Republicans in
Congress held that the protectionist system needed to adapt to
current public demands. These Republicans considered that the
failure of standpatters to respond to the public's demand for tariff
reform promised continued Democratic successes at the polls.

With his election to the presidency in 1908, William Howard
Taft found himself caught in the middle of this quagmire. During the
campaign, Taft, a Republican, understood the political situation and
pledged to reduce the excessive tariff rates that had piled up during
past Republican administrations. The first opportunity for Taft to
fulfill his campaign pledge came in March 1909 with the introduction
of the Payne-Aldrich tariff to the nation.

The bill that passed the House of Representatives upheld many
of the ideals inherent in Taft's pledges for tariff revision. Duty
reductions in coal, hides, iron ore, wood pulp, lumber, newsprint, and
numerous other natural products, promised to prove popular to
various sections of the population. The bill then encountered a
Senate less inclined to the ideal of tariff reform. The Senate left
many of the reductions from the House bill absent from the final
Senate bill. Taft, realizing that it was the best bill he could get from
a standpat Senate, signed it into law and proclaimed it "...the best
tariff measure ever passed by a Republican Congress, and hence the
best tariff bill the people have ever known."21 It quickly became
apparent that Taft misjudged the public's response to the bill.

Supported by many in the American public, tariff reform

 

211bid., p. 13.

17

Republicans and free trade Democrats argued that the final version
of the tariff act failed to properly address the growing crisis in
America, namely the high cost of living.

The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 directly led to a trade conflict
with Canada. New provisions ‘in the act authorized the President to
penalize a country that might discriminate against American goods.
An agreement made by Canada, with France, offered tariff reductions
on certain products entering Canada in return for lower duties in the
French market. Through the interpretation of the new tariff laws of
the United States these reductions were discriminatory and a trade
war with Canada appeared imminent. Against this backdrop
Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox sent a delegation to Ottawa
to prevent a rift in Canadian-American trade relations. Negotiations
in March 1910 resolved the tariff dispute and opened up the
opportunity to discuss reciprocal relations. The Administration, now
aware of the public's dissatisfaction with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff,
attempted to once again tread in the waters of tariff reform.

The Taft Administration's keen interest in reciprocity did not
find an apparent match in the Laurier government. Although
interested in gaining the support of farmers in the western
provinces, who sought free access to the huge American grain
market, Laurier realized that the successful National Policy, based on
self-sufficiency, also proved immensely popular in the industrialized
east. The National Policy, born out of the American rejection of the
1854 treaty, led to a rise in British nationalism in the eastern
provinces. Laurier, convinced that a limited agreement on natural

and agricultural products could give him the western farmers' vote

18

without alienating the imperialist, industrialized east, agreed to enter
negotiations in November 1910.

During the negotiations with Canadian officials the American
representatives had a clear set of objectives. First, the Taft
Administration, deeply concerned with Canada's drift toward a closer
relationship with the British Empire, sought to cut imperial ties and
reintegrate Canada into the continental economy. Second, in this
integrated economy, Canada would provide the badly needed raw
materials for American industry as well as a nearby source of
agricultural surplus that would stabilize food prices in the United
States. Third, even though the American delegation realized the
political difficulties Laurier might face from eastern manufacturers,
they sought reductions on a smaller number of manufactured items
to avoid opposition from agricultural groups on the ground that the
agreement unfairly discriminated against their interests. The result
of two months of negotiations came in the form of an agreement in
January 1911.

Michigan opened the year 1911 in the midst of significant
changes in the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The
Michigan of 1911 illustrated the nation's shift from a rural to an
urban society. The 1910 census of Michigan considered the rural
population as slightly larger than the urban population.22 By 1911,
many in the state believed that the situation had reversed, giving the

urban population the slight edge. Flint, with a population of

 

22Statistics from the 1910 census come from two sources: Deckerville Recorder,
April 28, 1911, p.4 and Frederick C. Martindale, Secretary of State, comp.,
Michigan Ofl'icial Directory and Legislative Manual For the Years 1911-1912,
pp. 280-283, 619-716.

19
approximately 13,000 in 1900, exemplified this shift to an urban
society when it grew to more than 38,000 in 1910. In nine other
Michigan cities the population exceeded 20,000 and in many of these
cases they encountered the same phenomenal growth patterns over
ten years as Flint. This massive growth of Michigan urban centers
translated into increased economic and political might.

Michigan symbolized the growing importance of the Midwest's
manufacturing and agricultural resources to the nation at large. For
example, at the beginning of 1911 the automobile industry of
Michigan consisted of forty-five companies in ten cities. This
important industry clearly placed Michigan as the leading state for
automobile manufacturing ‘with a yearly output of 315,250
automobiles. Pulp and paper manufacturers were another significant
industry in the state of Michigan. In 1911 they maintained thirty-
nine mills spread out among twenty-four cities. In addition,
manufacturers of agricultural implements, cement, cereals, furniture
as well as many others, comprised an integral part of the Michigan
economy.

Michigan agricultural interests maintained a strong political
and economic influence after their decline from majority status.
Through their representative organizations, Michigan farmers
influenced the positions taken by many in the state legislature as
well as the United States Congress. The Michigan State Grange,
Michigan Farmer's Alliance, Ancient Order of Gleaners as well as
other organizations, represented a farming population whose
products were often highly in demand. Products like western

Michigan fruit found a lucrative market in Chicago. Corn and wheat

20

from the southern lower peninsula and sugar beets, beans, and other
grains from the thumb were all significant agricultural products sent
to American and world markets

The Civil War had altered Michigan from a traditionally
Democratic state to a Republican stronghold. Michigan Republicans
maintained this dominance for the next forty years through their
uniformity on issues like the tariff. By 1911 the state Republican
party had already begun to experience the forces that had overtaken
the national party. In other words, progressive, tariff reform minded
Republicans replaced the more conservative, stand-pat elements of
the party. The elections of 1910 illustrated this shift within the
Michigan Republican party. Progressive Republicans, Chase 8. Osborn
and Charles E. Townsend, replaced conservative Republicans as
governor and as a United States Senator respectively. Their
predecessors, Fred W. Warner and Julius C. Burrows, opposed tariff
reform measures and would come out against the agreement of 1911.
The elections of 1910 also resulted in the addition of two Democrats
to represent Detroit and Grand Rapids to the United States House of
Representatives. Previously the twelve members of the Michigan
delegation were Republicans. The state Republican party discovered
that a rift, much like the chasms among the national Republicans, had
developed within the party and this often translated into increased

success for the Democratic party.

Chapter III
The Reciprocity Debate of 1911

In a message to Congress on January 26, 1911, William Howard
Taft officially presented the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement to the
American public. This message outlined Taft's reasons for seeking
reciprocity with Canada as well as encouraged Congress to act quickly

on the agreement:

We have reached a stage in our development that calls
for a statesmanlike and broad view of our future
economic status and its requirements. We have drawn
upon our natural resources in such a way as to invite
attention to their necessary limit...A farsighted policy
requires that if we can enlarge our supply of natural
resources, and especially food products and the
necessities of life...we should take steps to do so now...a
source of [food] supply as near as Canada would certainly
help to prevent speculative fluctuations, would steady
local price movements, and would postpone the effect of
a further world increase in the price of leading
commodities entering into the cost of living.23

Taft's statements and actions on reciprocity with Canada laid the
groundwork for a debate over reciprocity and the Republican tariff.
For the next six months the country found itself embroiled in a
debate that engulfed the nation.

The immediate reaction from Democratic and Republican
leaders mirrored the relatively quiet wariness of many of their
constituents. Congressman Edward L. Hamilton of Michigan

embodied this cautious approach: "I have so far had but little

 

23US. Congress. Canadian Reciprocity Special Message of the President of the
United States Transmitted to the Two Houses of Congress January 26, 1911. 6lst
Cong., 3rd sess., 1911. S. Doc. 84, pp. v-vii.

21

22

expression from Michigan. Before acting I desire full information
and am taking measures to obtain as complete expression as
possible."24 For Hamilton this meant writing numerous letters to
influential constituents in the fourth district asking for their opinions
of the agreement. In a similar fashion, congressman Francis Henry
Dodds asked for comments from local businessmen and newspapers
in the eleventh district. In a few instances, newspapers in some of
the major cities in Michigan provided politicians with some
immediate feedback. The Detroit Free-Press declared Taft's plan "A
surprisingly good agreement..." The Free-Press added, "Don't
reject...our best customers and friends, the Canadians...or they will
reject us."25 The Evening Press of Grand Rapids joyfully declared
that "the prospect for freer trade relations between the two countries
and an ultimate decrease in the cost of living seems to be in sight."26
These words of hope echoed those used by Taft in his special
message of January 26. In most cases though, politicians,
newspapers, and organizations took the first five days after the
agreement's introduction to formulate their positions.

The month of February signified an end to the relative calm
that initially greeted the agreement. Newspapers, farming
organizations, andfprotectionist Republicans in Congress began a
vocal debate that continued nearly unabated for the next five
months. To build support for the agreement, President Taft set out
on a tour of midwestern states making notable stops in Ohio, Indiana,

and Illinois. During the tour, Taft reiterated many of the arguments

 

24The Calumet News, January 30, 1911, p. 1.
25Detroit Free Press, January 27, 1911, p. 4.
26The Evening News (Grand Rapids), January 27, 1911, p. 4.

23
for reciprocity that he made in his message to Congress. In addition,
he addressed the mounting concerns coming from midwestern
farmers. On February 10, at the National Corn Exposition in
Columbus, Ohio, Taft attempted to defuse agricultural opposition to

the agreement:

In respect to com the American farmer is king and will
remain so...[the] sending of any part of Canada's surplus
[wheat] through our country...will not affect the price of
wheat for our farmers...Anyone who would initiate a
policy to injure the farmer has much to answer for before
the bar of public opinion. Let this agreement be adopted
and in six months the farmers on the border who now
have fears will rejoice...The price of wheat...is fixed by
what all wheat exporting countries, including the United
States and Canada, can get for their surplus in
Liverpool.27

The midwestern farmer would not suffer any harm in the
implementation of the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement. For the corn
farmer, Canadians simply could not compete with American
production. For wheat farmers, the price for surplus wheat from
both the United States and Canada depended on the prices set in
Liverpool. Therefore an influx of Canadian wheat into the United
States for milling or reexport would not effect the prices paid to
American farmers. The next day, in a speech to the Illinois
Legislature in Springfield, Taft reiterated his concerns over the

American supply of natural and agricultural products:

The increase of our population and the reduction of our
farm exports are going on so rapidly that unless a great

 

27The Adrian Daily Telegram, February 11, 1911, p. 1.

24

increase in production is brought about within our
borders we shall soon consume all that we raise and shall
need a source of food supply like that of Canada, right at
our doors. We shall be blind, indeed if we reject the
golden opportunity to add to the strength and vitality of
our country by thus increasing our self-supporting
capacity...now Canada is in the mood! She is at the
parting of the ways! Shall she be an isolated country, as
much separated from us as if she were across an ocean or
shall her people and our people profit by the proximity
that our geography furnishes.28

Within this context, Taft envisioned Canada as the part of the
continental economy providing the natural and agricultural products
needed for the rapidly industrializing United States. Canada simply
was a natural extension of the American economy.

The House of Representatives acted quickly on the proposed
agreement, passing it after only two days of debate on February 14,
by a vote of 221 to 92. The speed of the agreement's passage
reflected the shift in the public's response to the tariff. Many
Republicans joined Democrats in the belief that some degree of tariff
revision had become a necessity. Many Michigan representatives,
concerned over the political repercussions of taking a firm position
on the agreement, decided not to vote. Of the twelve Michigan
congressmen, seven did not vote, two favored the agreement, and
three opposed. Michigan newspapers of all political persuasions
viewed this relative lack of response by the Michigan delegation as
appalling. "As we observed yesterday," explained the Adrian Daily
Telegram, "the Michigan delegation was conspicuous for its

absence...Reciprocity was by far the most important issue voted upon

 

23William Howard Taft Papers, Series 9c, Reel 579, pp. 9-10.

25

in Washington since the Payne bill...And Michigan is more directly
interested than any other border state."?-9 The anti-reciprocity
Midland Republican, forgiving the absence of its own Congressman
Loud, considered that"...it does appear strange that so large a
number, more than half the Michigan delegation, should be absent."30
The pro-reciprocity Manistee Daily News complained about "...our
weak kneed Michigan congressmen, who crawl under the sofa when
there is a vote on matters affecting their constituents."31 In the
opinion of these and other newspapers, the potentially huge impact
of the agreement on the state of Michigan should have translated
into a stronger response by the Michigan delegation.

The agreement received much different treatment in the
Senate. The opening of Senate hearings on February 20 left thirteen
days until the session expired. The Senate, already occupied with
other significant legislative and procedural duties, determined that
action on reciprocity during the third session was highly improbable.
In addition to these time constraints, many stand-pat Republican
senators, including those from Michigan, sidestepped the agreement
because they sought to avoid a confrontation with the President. On
March 4 the sixty-first congress came to a close without voting on
reciprocity. On that same day Taft called for the sixty-second
congress to have an extraordinary session on April 4, specifically for
the passage of the reciprocity agreement.

An interesting debate took place on the campus of Michigan

 

29rhe Adrian Daily Telegram, February 16, 1911, p. 4.
30The Midland Republican, February 24, 1911, p. 4.
31The Manistee Daily News, Febraury 28, 1911, p. 2.

26

Agricultural College on February 22.32 The debate, "Why is the
Country Divided: The Reciprocity Question," consisted of six members
of the College's faculty and administration presenting their
arguments before judges and an audience of students. The judges
promised to give a verdict on the agreement's merits after the
debate. The debate turned into quite a spectacle. Students filled the
armory in half an hour and many stood for the debate. The M.A.C.
Band played before and after the debate, creating an enthusiastic
and patriotic crowd on Washington's Birthday. The negative team,
led by M.A.C. President J.L. Snyder, focused their arguments
primarily on the possible injury to the Michigan farmer. They
concluded that a flood of Canadian agricultural products would lead
to lower prices for Michigan farmers' goods. In addition, the
agreement unfairly singled out farmers and made little reductions on
manufactured items. The affirmative team, consisting of three of the
college's faculty, focused their arguments on the consumer. Professor
W.O. Hendrick argued that "It is a question...in the interests of the
whole people and not for one class only. The farmer should not be
allowed to monopolize our markets."33 The judges considered the
debaters equally convincing and turned to the audience for a
decision. The audience also considered both sides convincing and

divided fairly evenly on the final verdict.34

 

32The following description of the campus debate comes from the two weekly
campus newspapers The Holcad, February 27, 1911, p. 14 and The M.A.C. Record,
February 28, 1911, p. 2.

33The M.A.C. Record, February 28, 1911, p. 2.

34Each of the two campus papers took a different view of the final audience
results. The student-run, The Holcad, argued that the show of hands from the
audience proved inconclusive and inaccurate. But a final decision, most likely
by the judges, gave victory to the affirmative team. The M.A.C. Record,

27

On March 1 and 2 the interest of Michigan turned to the
Democratic and Republican state conventions. The Democrats
convened on March 1 in Muskegon and as the Muskegon News
Chronicle pointed out, delegates and observers quickly realized the
most significant issue facing the convention: "That Canadian
reciprocity would be the big bone of controversy was indicated in the
hotel corridor discussions previous to the district caucusses [sic]...The
battle over reciprocity, it became apparent, was largely one between
the agricultural districts and the cities."35 The agricultural delegates'
anti-reciprocity arguments received little consideration from the
urban delegates who commanded the convention. As a result, the

convention approved of reciprocity in its platform:

Having been repudiated by the people throughout the
country at the last election, the administration is now
seeking to escape from its fatally wrong position on the
tariff question by a movement to establish a reciprocity
treaty with Canada. We recognize the merit embodied in
the true principle of reciprocity properly applied with a
concurrent downward revision of the tariff and we
commend the statesmanship of the democratic
representatives in congress who rose above partisanship
in connection with the pending treaty.36

The Republican convention that assembled the next day in Saginaw

also found delegates deeply divided on the reciprocity issue. The

 

published by the college, estimated that two-thirds of the audience voted. Of
that two-thirds, 230 voted for the affirmative and 291 voted for the negative,
giving the negative a margin of fifty-six per cent to forty-four per cent. The
reasons for this difference are not clear, but possibly the college run paper,
run by an anti-reciprocity administration, may have slanted the final results.
Likewise, the student-run paper may have been heavily influenced by a
faculty that was pro-reciprocity.

35Muskegon News Chronicle, March 1, 1911, p. 1.
36Ibid., March 2, 1911, p. 2.

28

Michigan press considered these divisions within the Republican
party as somewhat similar to those encountered by the Democrats,
but acknowledged that they were on a much larger scale. The News-
Palladium of Benton Harbor echoed a familiar observation when it
commented on the Republican convention: "Reciprocity
overshadowed all other questions relating to the platform. Farmer
delegates were generally counted as opposed to the Canadian
agreement and the city delegates in favor of it." The News-Palladium
continued, "Both at Muskegon and Saginaw the same question caused
the only real discussion - the reciprocity plank."37 Michigan
politicians' overwhelming concern for reciprocity clearly showed the
perceived impact of the agreement on the Michigan populace. In
Saginaw, Governor Osborn presented an impassioned speech in
support of the agreement. Faced with a strong desire by most
delegates to avoid defining the position of the state party, Osborn
declared, "It is impossible for this convention to indorse President
Taft and ignore the reciprocity agreement with Canada, the greatest
of his works."38 But Osborn faced a convention overwhelmingly
concerned with the opposition of Republican farmers, a key group in
the Republican fold. The final platform praised Taft but intentionally
avoided any reference to reciprocity.

The end of the sixty-first congress on March 4 brought
representatives and senators back to Michigan, where they entered
into the continuing debate that had engrossed the entire state. The

voices that continued to grow in volume came from the opposition,

 

37The News-Palladium (Benton Harbor), March 2, 1911, p. 1 and March 4, 1911,
p. 4.
38Derroir Free Press, March 3, 1911, p. 1.

29
most notably from the grange. Local granges continued to discuss
the issue and sent numerous resolutions opposing the agreement to
their representatives. Grange leaders, most notably N.P. Hull, Master
of the Michigan State Grange, canvassed the state on speaking tours
to strengthen and mobilize the opposition. One interesting discussion
on reciprocity that took place during the recess came from former
Congressman and Senator-elect Charles E. Townsend. Townsend
proposed an amendment to the reciprocity agreement that would
encourage Canadian and American officials to confer on the
possibility of developing a Great Lakes to ocean waterway. Governor
Osborn strongly supported the Townsend plan: "The development
and improvement of the St. Lawrence basin is as important to the
people who occupy the North American continent as is the Missouri
basin."39 The proposal apparently offered Townsend a defense
against the anti-reciprocity farmers of Michigan. The possibility of
lower transportation costs to the eastern seaboard and Europe would
definitely appeal to the state's farmers. Townsend proclaimed that
"For every dollar the farmers lose by reciprocity, they would gain ten
through this project...It will bring ocean competition into the heart of
the American continent.”0 At the end of the month Townsend
brought this message to the Zach Chandler Republican club in
Lansing. The farmers present showed surprisingly little concern for
this issue and diverted him away from the subject in order to get to
the agreement's proposed duty reductions on agricultural products.

As this event clearly showed, Townsend's attempt to placate the

 

39St. Joseph Evening Herald, March 6, 1911, p. l.
40The Port Huron Times Herald, March 3, 1911, p. l.

50

farmer failed. The Michigan State Grange successfully developed an
organized movement that was unwavering in its opposition to the
agreement

The beginning of the extraordinary session of the sixty-second
Congress signaled a new direction for that body, one that involved
tariff revision. The elections of 1910 installed a fundamentally
different Congress from the sixty-first. The House of Representatives
had a Democratic majority for the first time since 1895. The Senate
came under the increased influence of tariff reform minded
Republicans. Taft found more allies for reciprocity, but a vocal
majority of the Republican party remained opposed to the
agreement.

Much like the previous session, the House acted quickly on the
measure, passing it in three weeks by a vote of 268 to 89. The
Democrats in the House, eager to move on to a more general revision
of the tariff, gladly led the way to the agreement's passage. Unlike
the previous session, the entire Michigan delegation voted on the
agreement, with four supporting the agreement and eight opposed.
The latter certainly feared the political effect of voting for an
agreement which most Michigan farmers opposed. John M.C. Smith,
representing the third district, declared his concerns for the farmer

and his vote before the House:

No one has undertaken to say how it will be of benefit to
the American farmer, and that task, I apprehend, will not
be demonstrated upon the floor of this Chamber. It is not
satisfactory to them to say they will not be injured. The
question is, How will they be benefited? Do you think
that by admitting the farm products free into their
market you will benefit them?...l hold in my hand more

51

than 40 telegrams, received yesterday and to-day, all
protesting against the enactment of this proposed treaty
into law...the majority are sent by farmers and granges.41

The two Michigan Democratic congressmen, representing Detroit and
Grand Rapids, voted for the agreement, much to the delight of their
urban constituents. In addition, one of the two Republicans that
voted for the agreement was H. Olin Young. Young represented an
Upper Peninsula that possessed‘a large number of mining towns
seeking lower prices on food stuffs. On the whole, the Michigan
delegation voted along clearly defined lines that placed the
agreement against the backdrop of a social conflict between urban
and rural societies.

For the next three months the attention of the country shifted
to the Senate. The Senate Finance Committee became the focus of
that attention with its hearings on the reciprocity agreement in April
and May. Over a hundred effected interests, a majority of which
opposed the agreement, appeared before the committee to make
their case. Michigan interests were well represented at the hearings
with leading agricultural, industrial, commercial, and political men
from throughout the state testifying before the committee.

N.P. Hull, Master of the Michigan State Grange and President of
the American Dairy Farmer's Association, led a delegation of
Michigan agricultural leaders to the hearings in early May. The
delegation joined other farming organizations from around the

country in a well-orchestrated attack against the agreement directed

 

“US. Congress. Senate. Reciprocity with Canada, Compilation of 1911, 62nd
Cong, lst sess., 1911. S. Doc. 80, pp. 2988-2990.

52

by the National Grange and its allies. These delegates had clearly
defined goals. First, they sought to underline the political strength
still held by farmers and second they discussed the likely
detrimental effects the agreement would have on the farmer. Hull's
Michigan delegation led the way. "I want to say one word in regard
to the sentiment in Michigan," explained J.W. Hutchins, Secretary of

the Michigan State Grange,

I am among the farmers, and I am a farmer myself...I
know what their sentiment is. I know what their talk is.
To-day they stand unanimously against this
measure....Party lines have fallen to pieces, and we are
standing united as farmers against this measure. We
believe that it will be injurious to the farmers. We are
not here alone representing the Michigan State Grange,
with its 900 organizations and 70,000 members. We are
voicing the emphatic opinion of the farmers of
Michigan.42

Another important figure in the Michigan agricultural delegation,
former Michigan governor Fred M. Warner, focused his comments on
the detrimental impact of the agreement on the Michigan and
national dairy industries. Warner argued that farmers and others
involved in the Michigan dairy industry received a higher price for
butter, cheese, and milk than their counterparts in Canada. The
agreement would result in the lowering of American dairy prices to
the levels paid to Canadian competition. These price reductions
would not only effect dairy products, but the vast majority of

Michigan agricultural products. "Michigan is interested greatly in the

 

42US. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Reciprocity with Canada.
Hearings on H. R. 4412. 62nd Cong, lst sess., 1911. 8. Doc. 56, pp. 297-306.

33

production of hay," added Warner,

and in talking with one of the largest dealers in
Detroit...he told me that two-thirds of the hay he sold last
year was from Canada, and the Canadian farmer paid a $4
duty. It can not fail to make a difference in the price,
and from a citizen's standpoint, irrespective of party, it
would appear to me that the farmers in this country,
whether of Michigan or Minnesota, should have the same
consideration at your hands as the man that is making
automobiles in the city of Detroit or a man that is making
stoves; if you are going to give preferences to one, we
certainly ought to have it for the other.43

Warner questioned the agreement's exclusive focus on agriculture
and wondered aloud why manufacturing interests appeared to
receive preferential treatment. These comments echoed a prevalent
tenet of the anti-reciprocity cause that believed the agreement
offered the farmer a raw deal.

C.E. Bassett, Secretary of the Michigan State Horticultural
Society, offered the Finance Committee an area of agriculture rarely
seen during the debates. The focus on wheat and other grains by
agricultural interests-dominated the discussions before the
Committee. Bassett's concern over the welfare of Michigan fruit
farmers expanded the sphere of the hearings. Bassett refuted claims
by proponents of the agreement that the Canadian market actually
offered American fruit growers an expanded home market. "The

possibility of fruit raising in Canada," Bassett observed,

is marvelous, a great deal more than I ever expected, and
a great deal more, I believe, than you gentlemen

 

43Ibid.. pp. 492-497.

34

appreciate...we export just as many as we import...It is
true gentlemen, that figures do not lie, but sometimes
figures can be manipulated in such a manner that they
get a good way from telling the truth, and it is well to
understand why it is possible we have exported to
Canada a half a million barrels of apples in a single year
and at the same time received from Canada a half a
million barrels. It must be understood that the half
million barrels which went from the states into Canada
were not consumed, but were sent there because of the
fact that shipments could be best made through the port
of Montreal...So that our exportation, you may call it, into
Canada, of nearly half a million barrels was practically for
a foreign market other than Canada, while the direct fruit
from Canada was for American consumption, and came
into direct competition with our fruit.44

So instead of aiding the American fruit grower, the agreement
threatened to undermine his control of the American market.
Bassett described his recent trip through Ontario where he
discovered that many Canadian fruit growers did not harvest their
fruit because of the high tariff wall and small Canadian market. The
agreement promised to eliminate this wall and as a result, Ontario
fruit growers would flood American markets like Detroit with their
cheaper products. In the case of Detroit, Ontario fruit growers, closer
to the market than their western Michigan counterparts, could sell
their product at a much lower price. The agreement promised to
disrupt the Michigan fruit growers' markets and offered them no
benefits in return. The Canadian market was simply too small to
make a difference to American fruit growers. Bassett concluded on a

somber note when he discussed the future of American agriculture:

 

441bid.. pp. 43-44.

35

The effect of this bill will be not only to reduce the
market values of our crops, but it means a setback to
agriculture. It means many more times the loss of any
few dollars; it means the loss of our crops and land, too. I
hate to hear a man talk dollars. I tell you there is a
matter of principle in this, and while it is true that wheat
might be injured and fruit injured and milk and butter
and cheese, it is going to lessen and lower the standard of
agriculture in the States.45

Clearly Bassett saw the agreement as the impetus for a decline in the
status of the American farmer. The agreement promised to further
the continuing exodus of rural residents to the more thriving urban
centers of America.

A small number of Michigan manufacturing industries effected
by the agreement also appeared before the Finance Committee. The
most notable was the pulp and paper industry. Nathaniel H. Stewart
of Kalamazoo represented the paper manufacturers of Kalamazoo,
Allegan, Berrien, and St. Joseph counties. He concluded that the
agreement "meant, if carried into effect, the annihilation of the
paper-mill manufacturing institutions of Michigan, as well as the
whole of the United States."46 Stewart explained that the Canadian
mill owner had the advantage of easier and cheaper access to raw
materials. Much like the agricultural delegation that preceded him,
Stewart questioned why the agreement singled out his industry
while other industries remain protected. Stewart outlined the
importance of his industry to the state of Michigan and the United

States:

 

451bid., p. 47.
461bid.. p. 1335.

36

This is something like the fifth industry in the United
States - the paper industry - and it involves in capital
invested in the mills about $400,000,000, with an annual
output in those mills of something like $300,000,000...in
the entire state of Michigan, we have to-day 39 paper
mills and 9 wood and sulphite mills...in the entire state of
Michigan, we have invested in this paper industry
$20,800,000, and I speak in general for all, as I speak to
the tune in my own county of $9,450,000 alone...In the
Kalamazoo mills, alone...we employ 250 people to the mill.
Nine of them means 2,250 employees alone...and they are
most all heads of families...and the average of four to one
in a family is not any too great, and we have 9,000
people living off those mills in my own county...To stop
those wheels running means idleness and starvation for
those people; it means the roofs will tumble down and let
in the sunlight and rain in the plants, and as they are
destroyed our people are building up an alien country.47

Stewart certainly painted a bleak picture of the American paper and
pulp industry's future. Bernard Benson of the International
Brotherhood of Paper Makers assisted Stewart in his fight against the
agreement. Benson represented 4,000 Kalamazoo paper mill

employees. He briefly explained the position of his union:

We believe anything detrimental to the industry will be
detrimental to the workers that are engaged therein. For
that reason we protest against the passage of this
reciprocity bill...we believe the transfer of the industry to
Canadian soil will eventually compel us who work at the
trade to go there to work, and we do not feel that we
want to be compelled to leave our native country.48

This patriotic appeal on the part of this union representative coupled

with the economic argument from Stewart provided the foundation

 

47Ibid., p. 1339-1340.
481b1d., p. 964.

37

for the industry's opposition to the agreement.

Michigan's pro-reciprocity manufacturers did not show the
intensity of their anti-reciprocity counterpart. The Senate Finance
Committee did not hear any direct testimony from Michigan
manufacturers in support of the agreement. Twenty-eight furniture
manufactures from around Grand Rapids had Senator William Alden
Smith read a petition to the Senate on April 6. It praised the
agreement and asked for the removal of all duties on manufactured
furniture and refrigerators traded between the two countries. Three
other significant industrialists appeared before the committee:
James Couzens, general manager of Ford Motor Company; Henry
Leland, manager of Cadillac Motor Car Company; and Levi L.
Barbour, vice president of the Michigan Bolt and Iron Works. They
came as part of the seven member delegation representing the
Detroit Board of Commerce. All three decided to defer their
discussion to Milton A. McRae, President of the Detroit Board of
Commerce.

Strangely, McRae, Detroit's commercial leader, focused his
attention on a rebuttal of the agricultural delegation's arguments
against reciprocity. McRae said little to the Finance Committee about
the possible benefits to Detroit or his newspaper interests as a result
of this agreement. He argued that the American farmer had nothing
to fear from duty reductions. "The United States will remit duties to
the amount of $4,850,000 by the recip'rocity agreement," explained
McRae,

Yet of this $4,850,000 more than $1,600,000 comes from
duties on lumber, and nearly $500,000 accrues from

38

duties levied on the imports of fish. These two sums
aggregate $2,100,000. This leaves a balance of
$2,700,000, which the farmers might allege would be
taken out of their pockets...As a matter of fact, there must
be subtracted from this $2,700,000 the duties levied on
pulp, fertilizers, tobacco, salt, railroad ties, wooden staves,
cedar posts, mica, and coke. The pitifully small amount
left compared to the great agricultural communities of
the United States leads one to ask, "Why all the
opposition?"”'9

McRae also reiterated the pro-reciprocity tenet that asserted that as
wheat exporting nations Canada and the United States depended on
overseas markets to set prices. In turn, the agreement would not
effect the price of American wheat because even if the Canadian
wheat grower sent his product to the United States, the aggregate of
' the American and Canadian surplus would still end up in Europe. In
addition, McRae observed that the agreement offered benefits to
certain Americans including farmers. American millers would profit
from Canadians sending wheat to the United States instead of Europe
for processing. The farmer would also benefit from the agreement
because of the duty reduction on lumber, their primary building
material. On the whole, McRae's overwhelming concern for the
farmer's well-being showed the defensive nature of many of the
proponents of the agreement. They attempted to avoid discussion of
the benefits that they might accrue and instead focused on the
farmer and his interests.

Michigan Governor Chase S. Osborn also appeared before the
Senate Finance Committee in May. His decision to testify was a direct

result of the Michigan agricultural delegation's testimony. In a May

 

493. Doc. 56, p. 590.

39

15 letter to Taft, he offered his assistance:

If I can be of slightest service in favor of the treaty, I will
go to Washington. The alleged representatives of the
farmers of Michigan who have been in Washington giving
their views do not reflect, in my opinion, the dominant
sentiment of Michigan and do not represent all of the
farmers by any means. I am a full member of the
Michigan grange and know something of the farmers [sic]
sentiment.50

Two days later Osborn came to Washington and testified before the
Finance Committee. Osborn focused his presentation on two aspects
of the Michigan response to the agreement. First, as mentioned
above, he questioned the validity of the Michigan agricultural
delegation's representativeness. Second, he sought to undermine
their conclusion that the agreement would prove detrimental to
Michigan farmers.

As the state's chief executive, Osborn believed that he truly
understood the sentiment of the state of Michigan. His
understanding of that sentiment differed greatly from the
observations of the agricultural delegation. Osborn pointed to the
debate over the agreement that occurred at the Michigan
Agricultural College in late February as evidence of the true

sentiment of the state:

You had the president of our Michigan Agricultural
college before you the other day, a most distinguished,
eminent gentleman and a scholar. He appeared upon the
side of a debate recently...upon the question of this
reciprocity proposition. He was against it, and some of

 

50Taft Papers, Series 6, Reel 414.

40

the other professors of the faculty were against it, and
arrayed for it against these debaters were a number of
the younger professors, and when they had concluded the
judges of the debate refused to give a verdict, and it was
left to the vote of about 1,100 of the young students,
representing the farming element of Michigan. They
decided in favor of reciprocity three to one. I simply give
you that as an indication of the fact that these younger
representatives of the farm homes have given this some
thought, and that probably may be taken in a measure to
reflect the sentiment of their fathers.51

Osborn considered this one of the many signs that not all Michigan
farmers supported the position of the Michigan State Grange.

With 100,000 acres of farm and timber lands, Osborn felt that
if the agreement would hurt anyone financially, it would hurt him.
For the bulk of his testimony, Osborn refuted the perception that
Canadian agriculture would come into direct competition with
American agriculture. In order to defend this conclusion Osborn
compared the wheat crops of Canada and the United States. Osborn

declared that in the harsh climate of the Canadian prairies,

Everywhere on the height of land it is true the frost
comes every single month of the year, so there can be
absolutely no intelligent or any successful competition
between any part of Canada and at least Michigan, and I
think there can be no competition with any part of the
United States...they can not compete with Michigan fruits
in the Berrien County district; and now the Michigan fruit
district has taken itself away clear up to the Straits on
the west side, where the climate is moderated by the

 

518. Doc. 56, p. 925. Osborn's conclusion of a three to one margin conflicted
with the reports of the two college newspapers. As mentioned earlier, both
newspapers reported an extremely close decision. His reasons for reporting
the skewed numbers appear obvious, given his strong pro-reciprocity
position. See note 32.

41

winds that come over Lake Michigan.52

The two countries raised essentially different products as a result of
the climactic conditions. Frost in the prairies of western Canada
produced a poorer grade of wheat than that produced in Michigan or
in the American prairies. In addition, the moderate climates of
western Michigan could find no equal for fruit raising in Canada.
After three weeks of further hearings, the Senate Finance Committee
passed the bill onto the Senate for consideration on June 8.

Michigan Senators William Alden Smith and Charles E.
Townsend contributed notable speeches to the Senate debates of
June and July. Senior Senator Smith held fast to his convictions on
protectionism. Echoing the concerns of the old protectionists, Smith
pondered,"...what are the privileges of American citizenship? To
labor and toil, preparing the vineyard for the stranger who only
comes to us at daybreak and again recrosses our border as the sun
goes down." Smith then appealed to his colleagues to remember the
strong emotional and historical ties the United States had to its

agrarian farmers:

The burdens of this Government have in times past been
heavy and hard to bear; were we able to enlist our
northern neighbors when the day of reckoning came?
Did they assuage the anguish of broken hearts or bind up
the exposed wounds; did they defend us on the field of
battle alongside the farmer soldier whose interest is now
in jeopardy; did they pay the debt incurred in the
maintenance of the Union of the States, the largest ever
assumed by a free people? No! It fell upon the toiler in
factory and field, and without complaining he has paid it

 

521bid.. p. 928.

42

ungrudgingly.53

The paper mill industry joined the farmer as a victim of the
agreement. Smith described the promise of this growing Michigan
industry: "The paper-mill industry in the State of Michigan is yet in
its infancy; forests and men and money are ready to contribute
abundantly as the demand for paper increases."54 The agreement
promised to undermine the development of this industry by
transferring its control to Canadian paper mills that manufactured
the product at a much lower cost. Smith's speeches lauded the long
standing protectionist belief that nascent industries and agriculture
needed protection to grow in the face of cheaper foreign competition.
Townsend regarded the agreement as incomplete, but not
damaging to interests of Michigan. In his first major address before

the Senate in late June, the junior Senator from Michigan announced:

Personally, I would not have brought it [the agreement]
forward at this time and in this form if I had been in
control of this matter. I would have striven hard and
long for a treaty which would have included all of the
products of Canadian and United States industries...It
would have seemed in the eternal fitness of things that
there should be one great economic unit in habitable
America north of the Gulf of Mexico. It is one country by
nature, but in the economy of man it has been made in
two, accompanied by all the economic waste of separate
organizations.55

Nature dictated a unified North American economy, this agreement

provided the first step toward this goal. Like Osborn, Townsend

 

533. Doc. 80, p. 3339.
54Ibid., p. 3485.
55Ibid., p. 3519.

43

painted the Canadian hinterland as a kind of frozen tundra
unsuitable for agriculture, "1 would prefer to clear a farm from
among the forests and stump barrens of Michigan than to encounter
the frosts and privations of northern Canada."56

Townsend's deep waterway project constituted the heart of his
position. The project provided the focus for his arguments and
culminated in an amendment to the agreement. The amendment
asked the President to undertake negotiations with Canadian officials

to develop the waterway:

This bill will be, we hope, a step in the direction of
commercial peace and harmony. Thus the way will be
open for the beginning of the final and greatest
achievement of all, viz., the opening up to the mighty
commerce of Canada and the United States a deep
waterway from the Lakes to the ocean through that
international stream, the St. Lawrence River...Being
convinced that the project which I propose will confer
greater benefits on both countries than those which flow
from any tariff...I seek to project it upon the attention of
the Senate and of the country....To me this is a greater
proposition than the Panama Canal.57

On July 21, the Senate, urged by Taft to pass the Canadian
Reciprocity Agreement without amendments, rejected Townsend's
deep waterway amendment. Later that day, Senator Smith gave one
of the last major speeches on the agreement before the Senate. He
again reiterated the need for protectionism and added that Canada
needed to cut its imperial ties in order to become truly independent

on the North American continent. On July 22 the Senate passed the

 

561bid., p. 3520.
57Ibid., p. 3526-3531.

44

agreement by a margin of 53 to 27. The positions taken by the
Michigan Senators reflected the divisions in Michigan, between
progressive and stand-pat Republicans, between urban and rural
societies, and within the agricultural community itself.

The nation's attention immediately shifted to the debate in
Canada. Prime Minister Laurier called for elections almost
exclusively to settle the reciprocity issue. Canadian opposition to the
agreement found a political outlet through Robert Laird Borden and
the Conservative party. Opposition mainly came from eastern
industrialists and those desiring to maintain close ties with the
British Empire. Laurier garnered support from western farmers,
many of which were ex-Americans, who desired access to the huge
American market. In this atmosphere, the debate naturally focused
on the course of Canadian development. The Conservative opposition
argued that the American delegates secretly veiled the annexation of
Canada, the real purpose of reciprocity, behind the facade of closer
economic relations. The Conservative strategy appealed to the
emotions of the British Canadians. They even enlisted the support of
British poet Rudyard Kipling: "It is her own soul that Canada risks
today. Once that soul is pawned for any consideration Canada must
inevitably conform to the commercial, legal, financial, social, and
ethical standards which will be imposed on her by the sheer
admitted weight of the United States."58 The emotional card played
by the Conservatives along with concerns over the loss of American
branch factories and a host of other problems with the Liberal

government led to its overwhelming defeat on September 21.

 

58Montreal Star as quoted in Detroit Free Press, September 8, 1911, p. 1.

45

American interest in Canadian elections reached a new high, as
The Calumet News observed: "The United States never watched a
Canadian election before with so much interest, and though the result
was awaited in Canada with feverish concern, Americans waited it
with hardly less anxiety. The reason for this was that this country
never before had such a direct interest in a Canadian election."59 The
Detroit Free Press discussed its experiences: "The election across the
border stirred up almost as much interest on this side as if Detroit
had taken an active part in the casting of the ballots. The Free Press
office was fairly bombarded with telephone calls..."60 Most larger
Michigan newspapers covered the events leading up to the election.
They offered in depth coverage into the positions of each party as
well as the dynamics of the electorate. The evening of the election
found Taft at a banquet in Kalamazoo, where he discovered the
results: "The defeat of reciprocity in Canada is a great
disappointment to me. I had hoped that the pact would be put
through to prove the correctness of my judgement that it would be a
good thing for both countries. It takes two to make a bargain, and, if
Canada declines, we can still go on doing business at the old stand."‘51

For the people of Michigan the reciprocity debate extended far
beyond the halls of the United States Congress. From local debates at
county libraries and area granges to larger debates at venues like the
Michigan Agricultural College or the Republican State Convention,
Canadian reciprocity was more than a peripheral issue for the vast

majority of the Michigan populace. The expected impact of the

 

59Calumet News, September 22, 1911, p. 4.
60Derroir Free Press, September 22, 1911, p. 6.
61The Calumet News, September 22, 1911, p. 1.

46

agreement on Michigan placed many of the state's leaders at the
forefront of the national debate. N.P. Hull, William Alden Smith,
Chase Osborn, Milton McRae and other Michigan men provided
national leadership that was deeply rooted in a concern for the

welfare of Michigan interests.

Chapter IV

Michigan Press Reaction to the Economic Issues

The debate over reciprocity confirmed the significant roles
Michigan newspapers played in their local communities and regions.
The sheer number of Michigan newspapers attested to this
importance. Approximately 600 newspapers existed in the Michigan
of 1911. From cities like Grand Rapids, with seven English language
newspapers, to communities like Lincoln (population of 123 in 1910),
newspapers dotted the Michigan landscape. The existence of these
newspapers suggested that the Michigan populace supported and
depended on their local paper for news, information, and opinions.
Likewise a local newspaper often reflected the opinions of its
readers. If they found themselves at odds with the local populace on
an issue, as many did with reciprocity, they addressed the concerns
of their region or locality in their editorials or news articles. The
remainder of this paper will focus on thematic issues that ran
throughout Michigan newspaper response. By defining and analyzing
these issues and concerns of Michigan publishers, a new and more
considered approach to newspaper reaction will rise from reciprocity
scholarship.

L. Ethan Ellis provided subsequent reciprocity scholars with a
framework for study. Many have expanded on Ellis' conclusions,
offering a more detailed picture of the situation in Washington and
across America. As mentioned earlier, Ellis provided the only major
analysis of newspaper response to the agreement. This analysis

deserves a reassessment for two reasons. First, in his study of the

47

48

nation's press he concluded that an unanimity in response existed
toward the agreement, when in fact there was much diversity.
Second, he studied the press reaction along chronological lines,
offering little detail of press reaction along economic, social, political,
and geographical lines.

Ellis' study of the American press focused exclusively on major
urban and regional papers that maintained close ties with the
American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA). These large
metropolitan dailies used substantial amounts of newsprint and the
proposed duty reduction on newsprint would mean considerable
savings for these publishers. For obvious reasons then, most of the
newspapers in Ellis' analysis favored the agreement. The problem
with Ellis' narrow study of the American press was that it left out
smaller city dailies and town weeklies that made up the majority of
the Michigan and American newspaper press. The ANPA counted
only five Michigan newspapers from Detroit, Grand Rapids, and
Jackson as members of their organization in 1911. Ellis provided an
excellent study of the ANPA, its leadership, and its members but this
analysis does not constitute a true picture of the nation's
newspapers. Concerns over the possible effects of the agreement on
local interests had an equal, if not greater influence on the
newspaper publishers of Michigan, than the benefits of free
newsprint. A closer examination of the Michigan press will show
great diversity in response to the agreement of 1911.

Ellis' study of the pro-reciprocity press focused on three
periods during the debate: the first two weeks after the agreement's

announcement on January 26, the last weeks of the 6lst Congress at

49
the end of February and the beginning of March, and the extra
session of the 62nd Congress in May, June, and July.62 Ellis suggested
that at these three periods during the debate, certain issues and
arguments (e.g., that the agreement would not injure the farmer)
emerged and received greater attention than others. This approach
comes up short for two reasons. First, a study of the Michigan press
shows apparent differences with his conclusions. In many cases, the
Michigan press highlighted certain arguments at times different than
those mentioned by Ellis.63 In other words, Michigan newspapers
followed few of Ellis' chronological patterns. Second, Ellis'
overwhelming concern for the chronological pattern of the debate,
resulted in a lack of depth when it comes to examining the wide
range of issues that concerned newspapers. This failure necessitates
a different approach to the study of newspaper reaction, an approach

that reviews issues individually and not chronologically. The

 

“For Ellis' chronological patterns see pp. 85-86, 108-109, 136-138.

63For example, Ellis concluded that the first mention of possible trust
involvement in the opposition to the agreement came during the
extraordinary session (Ellis, p. 137). This study found numerous pro-
reciprocity newspapers that mentioned trust involvement in the first three
months of 1911 (See Detroit Free Press, February 15, 1911; The Hillsdale Daily,
January 28 and 30, February 13 and 27, 1911; and The Monroe Democrat, March
10, 1911). In addition, Ellis observed a "conspicuous absence" in early
newspaper discussion of the agreement's benefits to American farmers (Ellis
pp. 85-87). This study found many early discussions on the agreement's
beneficial aspects to the Michigan farmer. Examples of newspapers that
discussed the agreement's benefits to Michigan farmers are in The Saginaw
Daily News, February 1, 1911 (Why Canadian Reciprocity Will Benefit Our
Farmers); The Daily News of Grand Rapids, February 1 and 4, 1911; and The
Allegan Gazette, February 4, 1911. Finally, Ellis believed that in the first weeks
of the debate, "Where possible, local interests became the basis of favorable
arguments" (Ellis, p.85). This study discovered that many newspapers in
localities that would have benefited from the agreement used national (i.e.,
cost of living) arguments to defend the agreement in equal or greater
frequency during the first weeks of the debate. For some examples of
newspapers that based early arguments (January 27-February 9) almost
entirely on national issues see The Bay City Times, The News Palladium of
Benton Harbor, and The Saginaw Daily News.

50

primary issue, raised by those on both sides of the debate, concerned
the economic impact of the agreement. Ellis acknowledged this and
along with his lengthy treatise on the publishers' demands for free
newsprint focused his brief review of newspaper response on
economic issues within the chronological time line. However, in
addition to the economic issues, newspapers also gave generous
attention to political, social, and regional concerns.64 A detailed
analysis of these "other" issues coupled with a more structured
approach to newspaper reaction to economic issues, will lead to a
more comprehensive and thorough study than that provided by Ellis.
The following pages will review newspaper responses to certain
national economic concerns, as well as find trends in newspaper
responses along political, social, and regional lines. In addition, this
section will evaluate Michigan newspaper response to the
agreement's duty reduction on newsprint and offer a perspective not

found in Ellis' study. This review will reveal the various factors that

 

64Ellis did not ignore these issues entirely; rather he provided coverage that
only scratched the surface of these important issues. In a scant six sentences
be briefly described certain aspects of these non-economic issues. For
example, Ellis' coverage of newspaper publishers‘ political discussions was
limited to those publishers amused at the predicament of Congressional
Insurgents. (Insurgents favored tariff reform, but since they came from
agricultural districts deeply opposed to reciprocity, they became reciprocity's
biggest opponents). However, Michigan newspapers engaged in the
reciprocity debate argued over numerous other political theories and realities
such as Republican protectionism, the elections of 1910, and the upcoming
elections of 1912. Ellis also made a brief reference to newspaper concern over
local interests in the debate's first weeks, regrettably these general remarks
provided little insight into a very significant and diverse influence on
newspaper publishers. Finally, Ellis limited his review of regional newspaper
response to two brief observations: first, he reported that midwestern
newspapers were those most likely to show amusement at the Insurgents'
dilemma and second, he remarked that the discussion of free newsprint was
limited to midwestern and southern newspapers. These brief and relatively
insignificant comments failed to provide any appreciable understanding of
regional patterns. Ellis pp. 85-86, 108-109, 136-137.

51

not only influenced an individual newspaper publisher, but also led
to a diverse Michigan press response to the agreement.

Michigan newspapers, much like those of the entire United
States, focused on the effects of the proposed agreement on the
national economy. The Taft Administration's goals behind the
reciprocity agreement, namely, lowering the cost of living, securing a
nearby source of raw materials and agricultural products, and
creating a closer economic and social relationship between the two
countries, became the foci for much of the debate in Michigan
newspapers. An additional economic question that garnered a huge
share of newspaper attention originated in the farmers' concerns
over the effect the agreement might have on the prices for their
goods. These economic issues provided the fodder for much of the
debate of 1911.

The possibility that the agreement might have lowered the cost
of living appealed to many in the cities and larger towns of Michigan.
Taft hoped that the agreement would calm urban concerns about the
increasing costs of foodstuffs. But Taft cautioned urban dwellers not

to expect too much:

It is my own judgement that the reciprocity agreement
will not greatly reduce the cost of living, if at all. It will,
however, steady prices by enlarging the reservoir of
supplies for those things that are raised in both countries,
and it will make more remote the possibility of cornering
such commodities and extorting excessive prices for them
from the public.‘55

 

65Taft's Fourth of July speech in Indianapolis, lndiana. See US. Congress.
Republican Reciprocity. 62nd Cong., lst sess., 1911. S. Doc. 63, p. 5.

’52

Charles M. Pepper of the Bureau of Trade Relations in the State
Department, the author of the Taft Canadian reciprocity policy, added

that the agreement might lead to ...the possibility of cheapening the
food supply, or at least preventing it from becoming higher in the
future."66 The cost of living issue obviously held some weight in the
Administration's policy formulation, but many in the pro-reciprocity
press tended to exaggerate the projected claims of Taft and Pepper.
On the whole, pro-reciprocity newspapers believed that the
placing of Canadian agricultural and natural products on the free list
would tend to lower the prices of these items for the consumers of
Michigan. The Manistee Pioneer-Tribune declared that the purpose
of the agreement was clear: "President Taft is trying to lower food
bills, by this scheme of reciprocity, and as soon as the consumer gets
this through his noodle, strong pressure will be brought upon
congress to stand by the nation's ruler."67 For tariff-reform minded
newspapers the tariff often represented the demon of high prices.
To many in the pro-reciprocity press, the consumer had long
suffered in the face of better organized farmers and industries that
had secured protection for their products in the past. The actions of
these organized interests resulted in higher consumer prices for food
products and industrial goods. Many newspapers felt the agreement

reversed this trend. The Detroit Times in a blunt comment that

echoed throughout the state press mentioned: "It is about time the

 

66Stewart argued persuasively that Pepper "originated modern American
policy toward Canada." The Taft Administration drew from Pepper's research
and depended on his conclusions to answer opponents of the agreement. See
Stewart pp. 105-112. Pepper quote from State Department Archives as quoted
in Stewart p. 107.

67The Manistee Pioneer-Tribune, February 3, 1911, p. 4.

53

consumer got some little consideration out of Washington."68 Much
like the Administration, some in the pro-reciprocity press cautioned
consumers against expecting too much. "It is likely that no change

will be apparent for some time," observed The Daily Mining Gazette,

and then only in the direction of steadying prices to a
reasonable level...The truth is that the consumer,
overjoyed at the prospect of legislation actually intended
to relieve him, has set up a howl of delight that has
alarmed high protectionists. The consumer has been
accustomed so long to being ignored, sat upon and told to
sit quiet in his corner and pay the bills that any little
attention like the reciprocity measure goes to his head.69

The pro-reciprocity press agreed that the consumer would benefit,
but differed on the degree of that benefit.

Anti-reciprocity newspapers took issue with the conclusion
that the tariff caused the high cost of living. They felt that those who
sought a reduction in the cost of living focused on the wrong target.
According to newspapers like The Pigeon Progress, the real culprit

behind the high cost of living went unnoticed:

No legislation that would tend to lower the price which
the farmer gets for the products of the farm would in any
degree lessen the "high cost of living." The tariff on these
products is not responsible for this-it is the excessive
rates charged for transportation, and the exorbitant
profits made by those "middlemen" through whose
several hands these products must pass before reaching
the consumer. If Congress really wants to do something
to reduce the cost of food it might be well for it to
investigate this phase of the situation.70

 

680elroir Times, February 10, 1911, p. 12.
69The Daily Mining Gazette (Houghton), February 12, 1911, p. 4.
70The Pigeon Progress, March 10, 1911, p. 1.

S4

The problem with the middlemen revolved around their control of
the market for foodstuffs. Trusts controlled the distribution of
agricultural products to the cities. The cold storage houses joined the
milling and meat packing monopolies in the manipulation of the
prices for food products. They held eggs and dairy products from the
market in order to inflate their prices. The agreement apparently
would assist them in consolidating their control of the market. These
monopolies would receive their raw materials in a free market and
sell their finished product in a protected market. The Clare Sentinel
continued along these lines, "Ostensibly the treaty was intended to
lessen the cost of living, but it is not consistent in this...why is wheat
free, tariff on flour, pork free, tariff on bacon."71 The anti-reciprocity
press asked those urban laborers clamoring for lower food prices to
contemplate the effects of the agreement. "Cattle, sheep, and hogs are

to come in from Canada free," The Northville Record observed,

but the duty of 1/4 cents per pound remains on the meat.
The laboring man will not want to buy a big fat steer and
stake him out in the back yard so as to cut off a hunk of
fifteen or eighteen cent beef every day for dinner. To be
sure wheat is booked to come in free under the treaty
but the laboring man eats flour and not wheat and the
duty on flour is left at fifty cents per barrel.72

The desired beneficiaries of the agreement, the consumers, would not
benefit from it, since they did not directly use the products reduced.

Pro-reciprocity newspapers wrestled with this issue of trust

 

71Clare Sentinel, February 24, 1911, p. 4.
72The Northville Record, March 3, 1911, p. 4.

55

control. They approached the problem from two different
perspectives. A mostly Democratic group of the pro-reciprocity
newspapers argued that the agreement did not go far enough to help
the consumer. "The chief criticism of the president's reciprocity

program," The Kalamazoo Gazette observed,

is that while it is supposed to give consumers of this
country free access to the markets of Canada, it will do
this largely through the middle man, and that in most
important cases these middle men are members of the
great trusts which have so rapacidualy [sic.] advanced
prices on the necessities of life.73

The "ultimate consumer" received little relief from the agreement
and the lumber, cold storage, milling, meat, and other trusts received
the benefits of lower duties. A larger number of the pro-reciprocity
press argued that because of the United States' proximity to Canada,
the agreement essentially undermined trust control of foodstuffs.
The Fowlerville Review suggested that "the general public would be
the gainer in that it would reduce the cost of living in both countries,
and with increased territory it would be impossible to manipulate
the food products as they can be manipulated at the present time."74
The food trusts, not the farmers, became the victims of the

agreement. The Marshall Statesman observed that:

Unless the big concerns that have succeeded in taking
charge of the distribution of food stuffs extend their
operations so as to get control of the products of Canada,
the result will be a material decrease in the cost of many
kinds of food in the United States...It is only when

 

73The Kalamazoo Gazette, February 3, 1911, p. 4.
74The Fowlerville Review, February 2, 1911, p. 1.

56

foodstuffs get into the hands of large distributing
agencies that they reach a class small enough to combine,
and wealthy enough to control process. If these men
combine to advance the prices they do it for themselves -
not the farmers, and the free import of Canadian
foodstuffs, would cut into their excessive profits, and not
into the prices the farmer receives.75

The agreement promised to reduce the cost of living by undermining
trust control of food distribution and the farmer would receive no
injury from this process.

Many Michigan newspapers joined others throughout the state
in challenging the essence of the cost of living question. In the first
week of debate, Congressman Charles E. Townsend suggested that the
cost of living, "quality considered," was not too high. For Townsend,
Michigan citizens enjoyed an unprecedented amount of economic
prosperity that lead to their abandonment of frugality. As a tariff-
reform minded Republican, who would later vote for the agreement,
Townsend shocked many in the pro-reciprocity press."5 The Detroit

Times sharply retorted:

There are some thinly-stocked cupboards around these

 

75The Marshall Statesman, March 3, 1911, p. 4.

76The reasons for Townsend's reactionary views on the high cost of living
issue become immediately apparent when studying the response of Michigan
newspapers. Townsend, like many of his colleagues, were known to "straddle
the fence" on controversial issues. He sought to avoid alienating any of his
constituents, who often held contradictory views on the tariff and cost of
living issues. Townsend never opposed the agreement outright, but sought to
mollify the Opposition by offering the deep waterway project. Taft brought
much pressure on Townsend during the fight for reciprocity and this
pressure, along with the tariff reform fervor that ousted Julius Burrows and
placed Townsend in the senatorial seat, contributed toward his vote in favor of
reciprocity. See Detroit Times, February 10, 1911, p. 12; The Hudson Post, May
16, p. 4., printed an excellent letter from Townsend that showed his
noncommittal attitude on reciprocity; and The Saturday Evening Star of
Jackson February 18, 1911, p. 4.

57

parts just now, which TALK about the "QUALITY" of living
will not help fill...The owners of these cupboards weren't
considering the "quality of living" when they marched to
the polling booths and dropped in their votes for
Townsend...They have to overlook the matter of quality.77

This impassioned reply to Townsend's comments certainly
established the cost of living question as a class issue. Townsend
apparently addressed a different segment of society than the
working classes discussed by the Times. The Lowell Ledger

progressed a little further:

Some senators object to President Taft's tariff treaty with
Canada on the ground that the price of living is not too
high. How very comfortable it is to draw a congressional
salary from Uncle Sam; and how easy everything looks
from that point of view. Let the honorable gentlemen try
it from the laboring man's standpoint, and try making a
daily wage do the work of two. "Oh, but that's different
you know."78

These pro-reciprocity papers questioned Townsend's understanding
of working class conditions. They considered his focus on the middle
and upper classes as exclusive of the real situation encountered by
the laboring classes of Michigan.

Michigan newspapers on both sides of the reciprocity debate
often agreed with the issue of quality raised by Townsend. The pro-
reciprocity, pro-tariff reform, Manistee Pioneer-Tribune commented,
"If the man who howls about the cost of living as compared to
twenty years ago will honestly get down and figure he will find that

if living costs more than it did twenty years ago, it is partially

 

77Detroit Times, February 1, 1911, p. 12.
78The Lowell Ledger, February 2, 1911, p. 6.

58

because he buys more and lives higher."79 A majority of the
newspapers that echoed Townsend's comments were negative. Soon
after Townsend's statements, the anti-reciprocity Huron County
Tribune of Bad Axe added, "Those who complain of living expenses
should not forget that they never before had so much to buy living
with."30The Tribune continued along this line with an editorial in
May which described the common cost of living situation of a local

citizen:

It's the craze for variety. The postman used to come
twice a day [week?]; now he comes five times. The
telephone not only costs $60 a year, but doubles the
orders at the grocers and of course the grocers' bill.
Hardwood floors mean twice the work of carpets.
Theatres and picture shows take time and money. The
costs of guests is doubled - we have six courses instead of
three, with expensive desserts. The old way was good
enough but we haven't had the moral courage to follow in
the face of common practice...the determining principle in
fixing the standard of living should be the discovery of
the minimum needed to maintain full efficiency.81

This position differed greatly from that mentioned by the Detroit
Times and Lowell Ledger. The focus on the working classes by these
newspapers portrayed an urban group struggling to survive against
rising food prices. On the other hand, Townsend, The Huron County
Tribune and others focused on a middle class, often rural, population
that experienced a vastly prosperous lifestyle unmatched by
anything known before in this country. The cost of living was not

the issue, rather the morality and frugality of the age were the

 

79The Manistee Pioneer-Tribune, August 4, 1911, p. 4.
80The Huron County Tribune(Bad Axe), February 10, 1911, p. 2.
811bid., May 26, 1911, p. 4.

59
issues. A newer, more expensive urban age had overtaken the old
moderation of rural life.

Supporters of Canadian reciprocity in the press and in
government, urged opponents to take a broader view of the
agreement. This meant taking a look at the beneficial socioeconomic
aspects of future continental unity. The Administration led the way
in this crusade. In a speech to the National Grange, Agriculture
Secretary James W. Wilson explained that, "Whether the political
union of two countries ever comes about or not, we will become more
and more one people, developing along similar lines and supplanting
each other in many respects."32 The Administration's Canadian
policy expert, Charles Pepper, believed that, "The Canadian
Reciprocity Agreement in substance amounts to extending the area of
protection on this continent."33 The Administration clearly believed
in a type of unified North American economy that addressed the
nation's concerns over future shortages in agricultural and natural
products. In addition, the future may bring the continued opening of
the Canadian market to American manufacturers. In other words,
the two nations would adapt to each other's needs to form a
continental economy in order to better compete in the world market.

The pro-reciprocity Michigan press joined the Administration
in stressing that critics should look beyond the local effects of the
agreement and look to the future of the nation as a whole. They
echoed the concerns of many of their readers as well as the president

when they addressed the agricultural and natural product shortages,

 

82Taft Papers, Series 6, Reel 398, p. 5.
”ma, Series 6, Reel 399.

60

the need for new foreign markets for American products, and the
need to follow those natural lines of trade that the United States
shared with no other country.

The rapid growth of American cities in the early twentieth
century translated into concerns over the United States' self-
sustaining capabilities. The shrinking rural population meant that
fewer farmers grew less for these expanding cities. The long term
economic effects of this situation concerned many Michigan
newspapers and government officials. As mentioned earlier, Taft's
concern over the limitations of the American supply of agricultural
and natural products influenced his Administration's decision to seek
reciprocity. These very concerns reverberated throughout the
Michigan press. Some in the pro-reciprocity press agreed that, "The
grain production for this country is said to be even now but little in
excess of the local consumption and the Canadian grain may be
needed here as our own city population grows."34 These expected
shortages led many papers to seek out the origins of the problem. "It

should be remembered,"The Manistee Daily News commented,

that ours is not solely a manufacturing country nor solely
an agricultural country, but a blending of both. It is
apparent that our production of foodstuffs at the present
time is not keeping pace with demands. It is but
reasonable then to permit our people to buy dairy
products, eggs, poultry, meats, and vegetables from the
cheapest markets...What Canada can spare us may be of
some assistance until our own farms are made more
productive and are increased in numbers.85

 

8‘lBesides a few minor changes in syntax, virtually the same article appeared
in a few western Michigan newspapers. See The Dowagiac Daily News,
February 4, 1911, p. 7 and The Niles Daily Sun, February 2, 1911, p. 1.

85The Manistee Daily News, January 30, 1911, p. 2.

61

Canadian agricultural products apparently provided temporary relief
until American farmers could increase production or more in the
American public turned to farming.

The anti-reciprocity press concluded that the solution to the
problem of agricultural shortages lay in the profitability of American
farming. As farmers received less for their products, the economic
opportunities in the urban centers of Michigan expanded, leading
many to leave their agrarian heritage. To counter this trend,
politicians, newspapers, and organizations from across the nation
promoted a "back to the farm" movement. The movement proposed
that, in return for farmers remaining on or returning to agricultural
lands, they would receive a higher profit than in the past. These
profits, comparable to those earned in the cities, would come as a
result of protection from cheaper foreign competition. Clearly then,
anti-reciprocity newspapers believed the agreement undermined
this movement to enhance American self-sufficiency. The American
agricultural supply would increase under a movement to encourage
farming and the projected need for Canadian grain would dissipate.
"We talk about keeping the young man on the farm," pondered the
Livingston Republican, "but what object is there for him to stay
where he can make nothing. The reciprocity idea is a severe blow to
the cry, back to the soil."86 In addition to the economic benefits
derived from the movement some observed the social benefits of
rural life. "Our population has increased so very much more rapidly

in the cities than in the country," suggested the Ypsilanti Daily Press,

 

86Livingston Republican (Howell), February 8, 1911, p. 1.

62

that we have the spectacle of the law of enlightened self-
interest, as enthroned in the cities and their population,
working against the agricultural interests and, it seems to
us, to the decided injury of this country...it will certainly
retard the flow of the "back to the farm" stream which
sociologists and the philanthropists and the railroad
corporations have so industriously been at work upon for
the last few years, in order to overcome the congested
centers in the cities and overcome the rapid increase in
criminality, insanity and other permanent burdens
loaded upon the rest of the people, by reason of
unsanitary conditions, by reason of starvation conditions,
of underpaid and underfed conditions in the cities, which
react upon the country and build up a cost charge which
everybody who has any property at all has to help in
shouldering.87

Anti-reciprocity newspapers questioned Taft's reasons for turning to
Canada for grain instead of encouraging its production in the United
States. Most in the anti-reciprocity press did not envision the
continental economy of the Taft Administration. Rather, they sought
to keep the United States self-sufficient in an increasingly global
economy.

In addition to concerns over the American agricultural supply
the Taft Administration also desired a nearby source of raw
materials for American industries. These desperately needed natural
products included such commodities as iron ore and various
minerals, fertilizers, and the most significant, timber. The Michigan
lumber industry, an important industry to the state in the nineteenth
century, had declined in significance by 1911. The relatively trivial

attention given to it during the debate by newspapers, politicians,

 

87 Ypsilanti Daily Press, April 29, 1911, p. 2.

63

and organizations attested to this declining importance. No organized
lumber organizations in the state made any significant comments in
opposition to the agreement. Congressman Joseph W. Fordney, with
significant ties to the industry, provided the most vocal outlet for the
lumber industry's concerns. In a speech and discussion period
before the House that lasted for over two hours, Fordney commented:
"I say that it is absolutely unfair to put the product of that great,
magnificent industry, the product of the mills, upon the free list
unless you are going to help the consumer, and I ask you whether or
not the reductions recently made inured to the benefit of the
consumers?"88 Interestingly, Fordney, the lumber representative in
Congress, focused the majority of his attention on the farmer. He
accepted this strategy because farmers provided a much better
example of an injured interest than the lumber trust of the country.
Michigan newspapers made little mention of the agreement's
impact on the state's lumber and natural products industries. Most
of these sparse comments came from pro-reciprocity newspapers
seeking to strengthen their arguments. Often these newspapers
turned to local lumber industries to bolster their defense of the
agreement. "Congressman H.O. Young of this district," observed The
Daily Mining Gazette of Houghton, "argues...that it will hurt the paper
business and the lumber business of this district. We do not agree
with the congressman and we believe that the lumberman of the
local district is satisfied that the measure will work him no injury."89

Some pro-reciprocity newspapers noted that opponents came

 

883. Doc. 80, pp. 2265-2266, 2700-71.
89The Daily Mining Gazette (Houghton), February 7, 1911, p. 4.

64

primarily from natural products industries. The Daily Tribune in
South Haven noted that the only local-opponents were "our paper
manufacturers," The Tribune then added, "and the gentlemen who
own most of our forests object to competing with the crown-lands of
Canada."90 Fordney's concern for the farmer led some newspapers to
question his motives. The St. Johns News sarcastically mused that
"It cannot be possible that Congressman Fordney opposes the
Canadian reciprocity treaty because it puts lumber on the free list.
Banish the thought! Mr. Fordney's concern for and love of the farmer
has nothing to do with it [free lumber]."91 Anti-reciprocity
newspapers considered the reductions on Canadian timber as
minimal and these reductions would not bring the two nations any
closer together. "The duty on lumber is so low," observed The Clinton
Republican of St. Johns, "amounting to about 8 per cent last year,
while the average of the entire protected list was about 40 per cent,
that its removal will make very little difference to the manufacturer,
and no difference to the consumer."92

The concept of a continental economy that originated with the
administration and became advocated by the pro-reciprocity press
also included in its platform the opening of the Canadian market to
American manufactured products. In early January Canadian
negotiators refused to allow massive duty reductions in
manufactured items, realizing the potential political problems this
might have entailed. American negotiators, more concerned about

reductions in natural and agricultural products, asked for minimal

 

90The Daily Tribune (South Haven), June 27, 1911, p. 2.
91The St. Johns News, February 15, 1911, p. 2.
92The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), February 2, 1911, p. 4.

6S

reductions in manufactured goods to appease a potentially hostile
rural population. Michigan's urban, pro-reciprocity newspapers
rejoiced at the prospect of freer access to the Canadian market. The
Detroit Free-Press: believed that "it [the agreement] increases the
possibilities of exporting the products of Detroit factories."93
Michigan manufacturing centers would find in Canada a developing
agricultural and raw material economy needing the industrial
strength of the United States to fully develop the potential of the
Canadian northwest. This potential market appealed to many as The
Niles Daily Sun gleefully observed, "When the vast northwest
territory is fully populated, as it bids fair soon to be, what a market
it will afford American manufacturers."94 Some in the anti-
reciprocity press questioned the need to open the Canadian market
for American manufacturers. "You say we can ship in
our...automobiles," declared The Northville Record, "well we don't
want to. Can't make enough autos now to supply the United States
demand."95 For many in the anti-reciprocity press the American
market for agricultural and manufacturing products still needed
further development under the protectionist system.

One additional area that apparently fit into the continental
economy scheme related to American agricultural products finding
an outlet in Canada. Michigan farmers joined the anti-reciprocity
press in condemning this as an absurd idea. Canada, a predominately
agricultural country with few major metropolitan centers and a total

population of approximately 9,000,000, obviously would have little

 

93Detroit Free Press, January 27, 1911, p. 4.
94The Niles Daily Sun, February 2, 1911, p. 1.
95The Northville Record, February 3, 1911, p. 4.

66

need for American agricultural products. Pro-reciprocity
newspapers countered with the argument that the Michigan farmer
produced many agricultural goods that often complemented those
raised by the Canadian farmer in their harsh northern climates. The
Escanaba Daily Mirror gave a detailed example of an agricultural

product that fit into this category:

It is noted in trade reports that a considerable quantity
of fresh eggs are now finding their way across the
Canadian border, to meet the demand for this farm
product among our friends in Canada. The egg season in
Canada naturally begins somewhat later than it does in
this land, due to the difference in climate, and as a
consequence while eggs are plentiful and comparatively
cheap in the northern states at the present time, the
Canadian supply is not sufficient to meet the needs of the
people of the country and they are in the market for
American eggs...And more of these eggs would find a
market in Canada were it not for the Canadian tariff of
three cents per dozen levied on importations...ln the
same manner, when eggs are plentiful in Canada, and
scarce and dear in this country, the American tariff of
five cents per dozen prevents eggs from Canada being
shipped to this country to supply the demand...Just now
the American farmers are at an actual disadvantage in
not being able to get rid of their surplus by sending it to
Canada.96

Free trade in agricultural products between the two countries would
end the massive price fluctuations farmers had experienced in the
years leading up to the agreement. The increased Canadian demand,
as well as supply, would stabilize prices and undermine speculative
corners. Additional pro-reciprocity newspapers suggested that other

products, ranging from western Michigan fruit to central Michigan

 

96Escanaba Daily Mirror, March 13, 1911, p. 4.

67

potatoes, would follow this pattern. On this latter product The Daily
News of Grand Rapids observed a recent occurrence that

strengthened this argument:

In 1908 the American potato crop was short, especially in Michigan,
and the price went over a dollar a bushel. Canada had a large crop,
but the American duty of 25 cents a bushel...largely prevented
importations. Tempted by these high prices, in 1909 American
farmers paid exorbitant rates for seed to overplant, the result being
such an overcrop that the price delivered on cars to Greenville and
other Michigan primary markets slumped to 10 cents and
below...There was meantime a good price for potatoes in the
Canadian market, but the Canadian tariff of 20 cents a bushel...was
sufficient to prevent American farmers benefiting therefrom.97

The Canadian market offered Michigan farmers a natural
complement to the American market. The stability the Canadian
market offered Michigan farmers compensated for any minor losses
from the agreement's duty reductions.

Inherent behind the argument that an economic continental
union would prove beneficial was the belief that Canadians were, for
the most part, economically and socially the same as Americans.
Michigan's pro-reciprocity newspapers believed that similarities in
areas ranging from the wages of midwestern and Ontario paper mill
workers to organizations like the Free Masons, confirmed the
equivalence of Canadian and American societies. For many in the
pro-reciprocity press these similarities alluded to something more
far-reaching. The Muskegon News Chronicle considered the

relationship:

 

97The Daily News (Grand Rapids), February 1, 1911, p. 4.

68

remarkable when we...consider both peoples are from the
same stock, that they use the same social and economic
ideals and that they are very much alike as to the
tolerance in respect of religion. The world's history
shows, almost without exception, that where such
condition's exist, the two peoples eventually become
one...And if it turns out that reciprocity is good business,
it is very likely that soon Uncle Sam and Miss Canada will
be one, in body, soul and pocketbook - in all save the
name.98

For many in the pro-reciprocity press, the economic and social
similarities meant that some type of political union was inevitable.
This unionist position differed greatly from the annexationism of the
nineteenth century by suggesting that Canada would join the United
States in mutual support of unification.99

The anti-reciprocity press divided on the issue of Canadian
equality with the United States. A minority of anti-reciprocity
newspapers argued that the similarities existed and political union
appeared as a viable solution.100 "We realize that in the Canadian,"

stated the Mt. Clemens Monitor,

 

98Muskegon News Chronicle, March 14, 1911, p. 4.

99For further discussion of unionist thinking see Clements, pp. 33-34. For
discussion of the impact American statements on annexationism and unionism
had in Canada see Stewart, pp. 114-117 and Ellis pp. 109, 114, 146. Pro-
reciprocity newspapers' unionist views strongly resembled the unionism of
national leaders.

100Reciprocity scholars have long argued that the interest by reciprocity
opponents, in annexation and political union, came from their desire to agitate
British Canadians against the agreement. This agitation would lead to its
eventual defeat in the Canadian elections of September. Difficulty arises
however, when this argument is placed in the context of local newspaper
opposition. Comments on political union by reciprocity opponents in the
Senate, House, and even state legislatures were certainly heard by Canadians.
On the other hand, an anti-reciprocity local newspaper with a circulation of
five or ten thousand probably would have not been heard by the Canadian
electorate. In addition, the number of anti-reciprocity newspapers that
commented on this was relatively small enough to discount this as a tactic. See
Clements, p. 38.

69

we are bringing into competition with our agriculture no
cheap peon, and that in time the equilibrium will be
restored...The friends and foes of reciprocity in this
country would send up a unanimous shout of welcome if
the whole of Canada will come right into the union.
That's where it belongs, and is likely to be.101

Most in the anti-reciprocity press thought of the Canadian farmer
along the lines of the European peasant. A cheaper Canadian living
standard translated into an essentially unfair advantage for the
Canadian farmer over his American counterpart. Anti-reciprocity
newspapers like the Alcona County Herald believed that "The
Canadian farmer has the advantage of his American competitor in
cheaper lands, cheaper wages, and a lower cost to the consumer for
clothing and foodstuffs."102 The Herald echoed the long-held
Republican, protectionist tariff policy, that supposedly ensured
American farmers and laborers against the pauper labor conditions
of Europe.

The pro-reciprocity press pointed out that Canadian economic,
social, and political conditions being just like the United States'
conditions meant that American tariff policy toward Canada was
essentially different than that with the nations of Europe. "The
arguments that have impelled us to establish heavy tariff duties with

European countries," declared The Pontiac Press-Gazette,

do not nor never have applied to Canada. Situated at our
very door, enjoying natural resources needed in our
development and possessing a market for our

 

101Mt. Clemens Monitor, July 28, 1911, p. 4.
102The Alcona County Herald (Lincoln), May 12, 1911, p. 1.

70

manufactured goods, Canada has been shown, instead of
favoritism, the same cold shoulder that has guided our
relations with cheap labor nations abroad.103

This issue of continental unity and economy, secondary for many in
the anti-reciprocity press, provided the crux of the pro-reciprocity
press' argument. In most cases, local and individual interests'
concerns must take a back seat to the good of the country.

Another economic issue that garnered much attention in the
Michigan press concentrated on the possible detrimental effect of the
agreement on the Michigan farmer. The Michigan State Grange, local
farming organizations, farmers, and the anti-reciprocity press,
believed that this issue provided the foundation for their entire case
against the agreement. In addition, these groups considered the
agreement as essentially unfair to the farmer because it placed many
agricultural products on the free list and lowered few duties on the
products the farmer purchased.

The concern over the agreement's impact on the Michigan
farmer originated in the duty free importation of Canadian
agricultural goods mandated by the agreement. The belief that
surplus Canadian agricultural products, most notably wheat, would
flood the American market instead of heading to European markets,
deeply concerned those in the anti-reciprocity press A rising supply
in the United States would lead to a subsequent decline in the prices
paid for American agricultural products. The anti-reciprocity, Alcona
County Herald, sardonically commented, "Canada's surplus in

agricultural products is about 50% and that of the United States

 

103The Pontiac Press-Gazette, January 27, 1911, p. 4.

71

about 7%. With this surplus rushed to the American market, would it
be reasonable to suppose that the prices paid the farmer would be
the same?"104 Evidence to support these conclusions about price
reductions visibly existed in markets before the agreement's passage.

"Wheat in Minneapolis," observed The Clinton Republican,

dropped over nine cents per bushel in the first three
weeks of Canadian reciprocity agitation. Beans and eggs
also took a big drop...The Republican will venture the
prediction that values on all farm products will average
much lower the coming year if the so-called reciprocity is
adopted. The agitation has already cost our farmers a
vast amount of money.105

The potential increase in the American supply of agricultural
products without an equally dramatic rise in the American demand
for these products translated into lower prices for Michigan farmers.
Pro-reciprocity newspapers declared that the Michigan farmer
had nothing to fear from the influx of a Canadian surplus. In terms
of production, Canadian agriculture offered little challenge to the
American agricultural juggernaut. A trickle of Canadian agricultural
products would have little effect on the supply and price in the
United States. The Hartford Day Spring placed the Canadian surplus
in discernible terms: "So far as the surplus farm products which
Canada might send to the United States are concerned, New York city
would take most of them for luncheon and still call for practically

their regular allotment of American crops."105 Unwillingness to

 

104Alcona County Herald (Lincoln), May 12, 1911, p. 1.
105The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), March 2, 1911, p. 6.
106Hartf'ord Day Spring, May 17, 1911, p. 4.

72

accept and ignorance to these facts by reciprocity opponents
frustrated many reciprocity proponents. "Note this colloquy before
the ways and means committee of the house," stated The Evening

Copper Journal of Hancock,

Mr. R.P. Grant of Watertown has repeatedly told the
committee that the Canadian agreement would ruin the
dairy business, in the same spirit in which Mr. Warner
the Farmington cheese-manufacturer, has been trying to
have his Michigan brethren believe. After Congressman
Hill of Connecticut had listened to Mr. Grant's assertions
for some time he offered this challenge: "Do you know
the amount of butter Canada exports to the United States
or to any other country?" "No," replied Mr. Grant. "Do
you know anything about the figures on Canadian dairy
products?" "No," replied the witness a second time.
"Then," asked Mr. Hill "on what grounds do you oppose
this agreement?" The incident is significant because it
fairly represents the attitude of mind of the vast majority
of men who are frightened lest the free exchange of farm
products with Canada will put the American farmer out
of business...Canada's surplus barley has averaged
2,331,000 bushels for the last three years. The United
States raised 162,000,000 bushels of barley last year, For
the last twenty years the annual crop variation in our
barley crop has materially exceeded the Canadian
surplus. A great bugaboo that isn't it! Canada has
increased her wheat exports from an average of
15,000,000 bushel a year to an average of 40,000,000
bushels in the last five years; but her average surplus in
recent years is only 6 percent of the crop of the United
States and her present annual exports are less than the
yearly variation in our crop. Another great bugaboo!107

Concerns raised by farmers and the anti-reciprocity press over the

possible flooding of the American market simply had no merit. The

 

107The Evening Copper Journal (Hancock), February 13, 1911. p. 4.

73
only impact Canadian agricultural products would have in the
American market came from the price stability they would offer
farmers and consumers.

Pro-reciprocity newspapers also took a decidedly more global
view of market forces, when they claimed that the agreement would
not lower the prices Michigan farmers received for their products.
Canada and the United States, both agricultural exporting countries,
depended on markets overseas to set prices on certain agricultural
products. The most notable case involved the Liverpool market for
wheat. "T he Liverpool market regulates the price of wheat,"
remarked The Hillsdale Daily, "the big wheat crop of Canada can be
dumped into Liverpool, where it comes in open competition with the
wheat of the United States, and the quantity and the demand makes
the price."108 Therefore, the farmer, currently competing with
Canada in a free market in Liverpool, did not need protection in the
United States market. Prices for wheat and other internationally
traded products would remain the same as the useless tariff wall
between the United States and Canada disappeared. The Detroit

Free-Press pondered a certain scenario:

If it could be imagined that immediately upon securing
reciprocity with this country she [Canada] would refuse to
send another dollars worth of it [wheat] to Great Britain
and ship it all to the United States, which is all that could
be imagined, it would simply result in diverting our own
products from home consumption to the British market,
and we should gain the customers whom the Canadians
had abandoned...ln short, in respect to food, the whole
world is one great stomach.109

 

108The Hillsdale Daily, March 17, 1911, p. 2.
109Detroit Free Press, June 30, 1911. p. 4.

74

The Michigan farmer had nothing to fear from a Canadian
counterpart that sold his product at essentially the same price to
essentially the same markets.

The anti-reciprocity campaign in Michigan quickly took issue
with the world market view.‘ They believed that Michigan farmers
received substantially higher prices for their products than their
Canadian counterparts. N.P. Hull pointed out that "The price of
wheat in this country will average ten or twelve cents a bushel
higher than wheat of a similar grade in Canada. This ought to
disprove the claim that the price of wheat is governed by the
Liverpool market."110 While pro-reciprocity newspapers believed
these differences came from transportation costs to market, anti-
reciprocity newspapers concluded that these differences stemmed
from the cheaper Canadian living standard. "We hope that the
standing difference in the price of wheat," commented The Ypsilanti

Daily Press,

between Minneapolis and Winnipeg of ten cents a bushel
may in reality simply represent the cost of
transportation. But we are very fearful that it does not
represent simply the cost of transportation. If it does
not, we hope that the cheap wheat grown on the rich, but
cheap virgin soil of Canada and delivered to the
Minneapolis mills in competition with the dearer wheat
grown on this side of the line may not work a damage to
the farmers.111

Since the Canadian farmer had a lower standard of living, he could

;_

110Kalamazoo Telegraph-Press, June 39 1911’ P- 11-
lllYpsilanti Daily Press, July 25. 1911. p- 4-

75

sell his product at a lower price than his American counterpart and
still make a profit.

Pro-reciprocity newspapers considered this bluster over price
differences by the opponents of the agreement as based more on
fiction than truth. To counter the vagueness of their anti-reciprocity
counterparts, many pro-reciprocity newspapers sought concrete
examples of price similarities in Canada and the United States.
Instead of comparing prices at Winnipeg and Minneapolis, these
proponents of the agreement compared local market prices where
the farmer sold his product. The Allegan Gazette studied prices in

certain Michigan and Ontario cities (see Table 5.1):

In hope to quiet the apprehension many farmers feel
over the Canadian reciprocity agreement, because they
fear a decline in prices of farm produce if free
importation of it from Canada is provided, the following
quotations from market reports in Michigan and Canadian
papers of the dates stated are given. It will be noted that
in many instances the Canadian prices are higher than
those in Michigan, and in but few instances are lower.
Besides, the Canadian prices show quite as much
fluctuation as do our own, indicating that they are subject
to the effects of seasons and of varying supply and
demand.112

Prices often were comparable across the board in products ranging
from grains like wheat and oats to perishables like butter, eggs, and
cheese. The Ontario markets consistently had higher prices than the
Charlotte market and lower prices than the Pontiac market. The
placement of the Canadian markets in between these two Michigan

markets bolstered pro-reciprocity arguments over price similarities.

 

1121b1d.

Table l

76

Michigan and Ontario Agricultural Prices in 1910-1911113

 

 

 

 

July 1910
Pontiac Windsor
Wheat $1.02 $1.09
Potatoes 20¢ 40¢
Rye 70¢ 68¢
Oats 48¢ 39¢
Cheese 16¢ 12¢
Butter 27¢ 22¢
Eggs 18¢ 20¢
Chickens 55¢ 50¢
Hay $15 $11
February 1911
Michigan Ontario
Pontiac Charlotte Windsor Welland
Wheat $1 83¢ 87¢ 85¢
Rye 90¢ --- 68¢ ---
Barley $1.60 --- $1.34 ---
Buckwheat 95¢ --- 90¢ ---
Oats 43¢ 28¢ 40¢ 35¢
Butter 24¢ 14 to 18¢ 26¢ 25¢
Eggs 28¢ 12¢ 28¢ 25¢
Cheese 28¢ 12¢ ---
Corn 65¢ 55¢ 60¢ 60¢
Hay $18 & $20 --- $12 & $13 ---
Straw $12 --- $7.50 ---
Potatoes 50¢ 35¢ 75¢ 60¢
Steers --- 3 1/2 to 4 1/2¢ --- 7¢
Hogs --- 9 1/2¢ --- 9 1/2¢
Veal calves --- ~10 to 11¢ --- 10 to 12¢
Chickens. --- 12 to 14¢ --- 17¢

 

113The Allegan Gazette, March 25, 1911, p. 2. The Gazette studied Pontiac and

Windsor markets on July 1, 1910 and February 11, 1911.

Welland market surveys were taken on February 21, 1911.

The Charlotte and

77

Anti-reciprocity newspapers complained that the agreement
unfairly singled out the farmer. The farmer bore the brunt of the
tariff reductions, while American manufacturers escaped relatively
unscathed. The American farmer would have to sell his product in a
free market and purchase his supplies in a protected market. As
mentioned earlier, anti-reciprocity newspapers believed that the
duty free entrance of Canadian agricultural goods would lower the
prices paid for the American farmer's goods, while the prices for the
products he needed remained high behind a protective tariff. The
Taft Administration had realized this potential problem during
negotiations. It quickly became apparent to American negotiators
that any large scale duty reductions on manufactured items would
not be palatable to Canadian negotiators concerned with the
development of their infant industries. Anti-reciprocity newspapers
pounced on this issue and declared that if Canada did not want to
open her industrial market to American farmers for certain
advantages in the American agricultural market, then the agreement
was not acceptable nor equitable.

A substantial majority of anti-reciprocity newspapers devoted
a considerable amount of attention to the agreement's perceived
inequities. The Hanover-Horton Local, commenting for the first time
in 1911 on a national issue, bluntly stated, "The bill is strangely
partial to the manufacturer and prejudicial to the American
farmer."114 This prejudice against the American farmer would prove
costly in the long run as his living Standard would decline. The

Northville Record satirically commented on the agreement's impact

 

114Hanover-Horton Local, May 12, 1911. p- 4-

78

from the perspective of the American manufacturer:

Gee! but this Reciprocity business would be a good thing
for us manufacturers. Take off the tariff on all farm
products...That will force down the price of the Michigan
farmers [sic] product, and when the farmer wants to buy
clothing, groceries, household goods, milk cans and tin
pails, etc., we will soak him good and plenty with the aid
of a protective tariff. Great! Isn't it. Free trade for all
the farmer has to sell and a tariff on all he buys...Of
course he will sell his products for 20 to 30 per cent less
and he will pay the same old price for what he buys and
his farm will drop in value 20 per cent, but that's all
right, he will be the easy mark.115

Many anti-reciprocity newspapers, organizations, politicians, and
farmers considered the policy of protection as vital to the nation's
progress. The agreement took away one part of the protectionist
wall and, in so doing, threatened to undermine American industrial
and agricultural development. Many others in the anti-reciprocity
movement determined that the "raw deal" the farmer received was
reversible if more reductions came on the products used by the
farmer, the Mt. Clemens Monitor commented, "Off with the duties on
automobiles, on products of soda ash, on woolen manufacturers, on
drugs, on boots and shoes, on sugar. If the farmer is to go on the free
list because his products are high in price (although that may be
questioned), then let the other fellows come in and 'take theirs.‘ The
argument is just as good one way as it is the other."116 Protectionist
Republicans joined Democratic free-traders in demanding a fair deal.

Protection for all (preferable to most Republican newspapers) or

 

115The Northville Record, February 10, 1911, p. 4.
116Mt. Clemens Monitor, February 3, 1911. P- 4-

79

protection for none, became the cry of the anti-reciprocity campaign.
Michigan's pro-reciprocity newspapers took issue with the
contention that the agreement unfairly discriminated against the
Michigan farmer. They argued that the agreement offered numerous
reductions on manufactured goods which would translate into

enormous benefits for the farmer. "Opponents of the ratification of

the reciprocity agreement with Canada have misrepresented it,

commented the Ludington Record-Appeal,

as a treaty which will lower the duty on commodities
which the American farmer has to sell, but not on the
commodities which he has to buy...[but] the United States
rate is reduced from 45 to 20 per cent, on...agricultural
implements...our rates on farm wagons as well as on
traction engines...are lowered...Cream separators are
manufactured by Canada in large quantities, but are
excluded from our market by a duty of 45 per cent...this
duty has been abolished...In the manufacture of wire
fencing Canada has made considerable progress, and
therefore galvanized wire and barbed wire are made free
by the agreement, for the benefit of our rural
population...The farmer above all else, however, has been
demanding for years that the timber resources of Canada,
especially in so far as available for building homes, shall
be admitted into the United States free. This is done
under the agreement.117

Pro-reciprocity newspapers believed that certain trusts (e.g., paper,
lumber, etc.), as well as the Grange leadership, deceived the farmer
into accepting that the agreement would prove detrimental to their
interests, when in fact, the agreement fulfilled many of their long-

standing desires for tariff reductions. In essence, the agreement

 

117Ludington Record-Appeal, April 13, 1911, P. 2.

80

offered farmers something better than a fair deal.

Anti-reciprocity newspapers discounted the effects of these
duty reductions. They believed the reductions offered little or no
tangible benefits to the farmers of Michigan. The Pigeon Progress
observed that farmers considered "The pretended reduction of
duties on the Canadian manufacturers as a 'fraud and a sham' and
laugh at the attempt to fool them with the removal of duty on steel
wire fencing when Canada produces practically none of these for
export."113 In addition, anti-reciprocity newspapers downplayed the
importance of reducing the duty on lumber. The Clinton Republican
of St. Johns claimed that "the duty on lumber is so low...that its
removal will make very little difference...to the consumer."119
Therefore, a realistic portrayal of the industrial situation in Canada,
as well as the American tariff situation with Canada, would reveal
the inaccuracies of the reciprocity proponents' claims.

Pro-reciprocity newspapers argued that their major problem
with the agricultural opposition was the inherent selfishness of their
position. The "what's in it for us" attitude by opponents of the
agreement irked many in the pro-reciprocity press of Michigan. The
Northville Record, an anti-reciprocity sheet, illustrated this selfish

economic view: '...'acting on the theory of self preservation' and 'who
is who' in a horse trade, we can't for the life of us see where us
fellers in the Second Congressional district can gain a cent's worth
and we can see where we stand to lose."120 The pro-reciprocity

press argued that views such as these divided the nation by placing

 

113The Pigeon Progress, March 10, 1911, p. 1.
119The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), February 2, 1911, p. 4.
120The Northville Record, February 3. 1911. P- 4-

81

selfish local interests above those interests of the nation as a whole.
"The American farmer has: long pursued a selfish policy," commented

The Evening Copper Journal of Hancock,

Grown fat upon lands which in many cases were given
him by our government, he has persisted in producing as
little as was deemed proper...Upon a 160 acre farm he
has grown less than a Belgian or German farmer would
grown on ten, but at the same time has asked that the
American people pay him quite as much for the sixteenth
part as his brother on the other Side of the ocean receives
for the whole.121

For the good of the nation, the farmer could no longer expect the

consumer to pay for his inefficient and selfish policies.

 

121The Evening Copper Journal (Hancock), March 4, 1911, p. 4.

Chapter V

Political and Regional Responses

Contemporaries of the debate as well as reciprocity scholars
have tended to divide the anti-reciprocity and pro-reciprocity camps
into two socioeconomic groups. The conflict pitted the rural anti-
reciprocity farming communities against the urban pro-reciprocity
masses seeking cheaper foodstuffs. To some degree, the argument
holds up to the scrutiny of historical research. Most Michigan
farming communities argued aggressively against the agreement for
the economic reasons stated above. Most of the cities and larger
towns in Michigan argued vehemently for the agreement.

In the context of this perceived urban versus rural conflict,
newspapers defined their positions by taking into account their own
interests as well as the generic definition of their communities'
interests. By this definition, unanimous or near unanimous support
Should have come from urban newspapers. Upon examining sixty
Michigan newspapers in cities of 5,000 or more, fifty-three, or
eighty-eight per cent, favored the agreement. This overwhelming
response in favor of the agreement certainly corresponded with the
perception that most urban dwellers favored the agreement.
Michigan's rural newspapers encountered a much more complex
situation. As a result, rural newspapers lacked the harmony of their
urban counterparts. Of seventy-nine newspapers studied in
Michigan towns and smaller cities of less than 5,000, fifty-one, or
sixty-two per cent favored the agreement. These results

undermined two very different contentions. First, the unanimity of

82

83
the press mentioned by Ellis and other reciprocity scholars, obviously
did not hold up to closer scrutiny. Second, rural newspapers
obviously did not fit neatly into the urban pro-reciprocity versus
rural anti-reciprocity distinctions. In so doing they often reflected
the volatile and diverse opinions of their rural readers. The
agreement's provision for free newsprint certainly influenced rural
publishers' views, but this alone did not explain why many still
opposed the agreement and why many others snubbed their anti-
reciprocity readers by taking a pro-reciprocity position. The failure
of Michigan's rural newspapers to fit into either of the clearly
defined roles above suggests the need for a further evaluation of the
impact of politics and local interests on the rural, and to some degree
urban, publisher.

Partisan politics had much to do with a Michigan newspaper's
position as well as how it went about defending the position it had
taken. The agreement received three different political evaluations
from Michigan newspapers. Stand-pat Republican newspapers
considered the agreement the ultimate betrayal of the protectionist
system, which had so successfully built the United States home
market. For Democratic newspapers, the agreement symbolized the
beginning of the end for the Republican protectionist system. In
addition, the agreement signaled a shift in the Republican party
toward the free trade philosophies endorsed by the Democratic
party. Finally, Independent newspapers, usually from the
progressive wing of the Republican party, considered the agreement
in harmony with their approach that sought to lower the tariff

downward, while offering a revised and updated approach to the

84

protectionist system of the nineteenth century.122

Newspapers throughout the United States polled their
colleagues during the debate in an attempt to define the attitudes of
the nation's press as well as its readers. The Chicago Tribune and the
Burlington (Vt. ) Free Press led the way by polling newspapers in
their respective regions. A similar poll, taken by the Grand Rapids
Herald, studied the response of Michigan newspapers along political
lines. The Herald canvassed the approximately six hundred
newspapers in the state and received 369 responses. The poll
discovered that 262 of the respondents, or seventy-one per cent,
favored the agreement.123 Pro-reciprocity newspapers clearly
viewed this poll as reflective of the state's desire for a change in the
tariff. Most, like the Escanaba Daily Mirror, expanded the scope of
the study and declared that "the poll may be taken to correctly
reflect public sentiment in Michigan on this subject."124 In other
words, local newspapers, familiar with local sentiment, would
accurately represent that sentiment. Anti-reciprocity newspapers
challenged these conclusions. The Howard City Record played down

the results of the poll:

The Grand Rapids Herald must have a wonderful

 

122Independent newspapers overwhelmingly supported tariff reform. In
most cases these newspapers held progressive Republican beliefs, but in many
cases these newspapers supported Democratic ideals and candidates. Examples
of Democratic newspapers that labeled themselves Independent were the
Detroit Times and The Bay City Times. In addition, not all of the state's
progressive Republican newspapers considered themselves Independent,
rather many retained their Republican affiliation. Examples of progressive
newspapers that maintained a Republican label were numerous, see The News-
Palladium of Benton Harbor and The Allegan Gazette.

123Numerous Michigan newspapers reprinted the results of The Herald's poll.
This version came from the Escanaba Daily Mirror, March 16, 1911, p. 2.

1241bid.

85

mathematician somewhere in hiding around its office.
After statistics that only little over 300 of 600 Michigan
editors had stated how they stand on Canadian
Reciprocity as now proposed, will the Herald kindly
explain how it deduced the alarming statement by a
headwriter that 71 per cent of Michigan editors favor this
particular brand of so called "reciprocity." It appears to
The Record that this is a case of letting one's enthusiasm
run away with them. So long as not even 71 per cent of
the whole number replied and the Herald concedes that
those who did reply were not anywhere near unanimous
on the proposition what is the use of making this kind of
play?125

Anti-reciprocity newspapers clearly saw fault in the accuracy of the
poll. Even if the findings were accurate, they showed that a
significant opposition to the agreement existed in the state.
Categorizing Michigan newspapers further, along political lines,
resulted in a better understanding of these differences in newspaper
reaction.

The majority of Michigan newspapers considered themselves
Republican. As a result, many Michigan newspapers needed to
reconcile Taft's Canadian reciprocity agreement with the policies of
nineteenth century protectionists James Blaine and William
McKinley. Blaine and McKinley were the quintessential examples of
extreme Republican protectionism. They advocated high tariffs as a
way to develop the industrial strength of the United States as well as
develop a strong home market for American farmers.

Inevitably, Republican newspapers developed different

interpretations of the compatibility of the reciprocity agreement and

 

125mg Howard City Record, March 16, 1911, p. 4.

86

protection. A closer study of state Republican newspapers supports
this contention. Of the eighty-seven Republican newspapers that
proclaimed their positions, fifty-nine, or sixty-eight per cent favored
the agreement, leaving nearly a third of the Republican newspapers
opposed to the agreement. These statistics show striking similarity
to the poll taken by The Grand Rapids Herald. The Herald declared:
"Among partisan Republicans, 68 per cent favor the reciprocity
treaty."126 The theoretical debate over the direction of the
Republican party had much to do with these divisions.
Pro-reciprocity Republican newspapers argued on two different
fronts that the Canadian reciprocity agreement complemented the
policy of protection. First, they argued that the nineteenth century
policy of protection included reciprocity. The News-Palladium of
Benton Harbor declared that "the Republican party from the days of
Blaine, father of the reciprocity doctrine, down to the present time
has declared in its platforms that it favored reciprocity, reciprocity
as the hand maid of protection."127 The theory of reciprocity
traditionally entered into the Republican protectionist philosophy.
Both of the party's stalwarts had long ago, as The Big Rapids-Pioneer
pointed out, declared themselves in favor of reciprocity:
"Theoretically the agreement is nothing more than what James G.
Blaine argued for two decades ago, and what McKinley set his heart
upon doing and was shot in cold blood as he was making a plea in its
behalf."128 In an attempt to show the obvious relationship

Republican protectionists had with reciprocity, The Daily Mining

 

126The Escanaba Daily Mirror, March 16, 1911, p. 2.
127The News-Palladium (Benton Harbor), February 4, 1911, p. 4.
128The Big Rapids Pioneer, May 9. 1911. P- 2-

87

Journal of Marquette brought out an interesting story:

City attorney Brown yesterday resurrected a Republican
button, distributed in the presidential campaign of 1896,
which has particular interest at this time in view of the
opposition to the proposed reciprocity agreement with
Canada by many old school Republicans. ~This button,
used in the campaign preceding McKinley's election, bears
the words, "Reciprocity and Protection," printed on the
pearl...The inscription on the button shows that
reciprocity is not a new principle with the Republican
party, even in the high protective days of the McKinley
bill.129

Those protectionists that opposed the reciprocity agreement with
Canada could not logically defend their positions. Secondly, pro-
reciprocity newspapers argued that Blaine and McKinley essentially
never encountered the economic and political problems like those of
1911. The growing demand for agricultural and natural products
had pushed national production to its limits. Taft adapted the
protectionist policies of the nineteenth century to fit current and
future needs. In addition, the popularity of tariff reform forced
Republicans to rethink their protectionist policy. "It rather conserves
Protection speaking now practically and politically," declared the
Menominee Herald Leader, "because it grants the artisans and
mechanics of this country an arrangement which they believe will
afford them a wider market for their wares and thereby forestalls
their hostility to Protection as a whole."130 By appeasing the

populace with smaller reductions, reciprocity would save protection.

 

129The Daily Mining Journal (Marquette), February 18, 1911, p. 4.
130Menominee Herald-Leader, February 7, 1911, p- 2-

88

Anti-reciprocity Republican newspapers in Michigan
considered the agreement an abandonment of the protectionist policy
of the past. In their opinion, Blaine and McKinley endorsed
reciprocity on commodities that did not come into direct competition
with American products. The agreement lowered duties on
numerous products grown or manufactured in both Canada and the
United States. "This measure strikes at the root of the protective
principle and is not likely to bring general prosperity," contended

The Howard City Record,

Reciprocity died with the revered James G. Blaine; but the
reciprocity advocated by Blaine was the genuine article.
It was not tinctured with placing staples of the farm on
the free list and granting in return lower duties in a few
things imported but not used to any great extent by the
United States.”1

Abandoning the protection of the agricultural class had major
political implications. The Midland Republican suggested that: "if a
large element of the party sees the direct protection entirely
removed from its class of products, it will surely insist that it be
removed from other products. In other words, the farmers will
demand that manufacturers be treated the same as themselves."132
In contradiction to the pro-reciprocity claim that the agreement
would defend protectionism against the rising tide of free trade, anti-
reciprocity Republicans believed that this attempt at reciprocity
would hasten the downfall of the protectionist system. Politically,

the Republican party would lose its core constituency to a Democratic

 

131The Howard City Record, February 2. 1911. p. 4-
132The Midland Republican, February 24. 1911. p. 4-

89
party that offered a fair deal.

The Democratic newspapers of Michigan overwhelmingly
supported the agreement as a first step toward free trade. This
study found only six newspapers that openly stated their Democratic
philosophies. Five of these six newspapers, or eighty-three per cent,
favored the agreement. The one paper that opposed the agreement
considered it detrimental to its local paper making industry. These
statistics compared favorably with those from The Grand Rapids
Herald, which stated that seventy-nine per cent of Democratic
newspapers in the state favored the agreement.133

The Democratic newspapers of Michigan argued that the
agreement indicated a step in the right direction. The Observer of
Grand Rapids suggested that "the idea embodied [in the agreement]
is Democratic doctrine pure and simple"134 The Observer continued
by declaring: "Wtih [sic.] the Republicans reciprocity was to have
been the beginning and end of tariff reform. With the Democrats it is
but a beginning."135 A beginning indeed, for the Democrats exploited
the opportunity to gain politically from those opposed to the
agreement because it unfairly discriminated against the farmer.

They often echoed the sentiment that came from The Ionia Standard:

While the Democratic members in congress are willing to
let President Taft have his reciprocity agreement with
Canada, they want the country to have the benefit of its
good features, shorn of its bad ones, and to that end a
companion measure was passed, known as the "Farmers'
Bill," which provides against the discriminations

 

133Escanaba Daily Mirror, March 16, 1911, p. 2.
134The Observer (Grand Rapids), February 4, 1911, p. 2.
1351bid., April 3, 1911, p.2.

90

contained in the President's measure.136

The bill provided numerous reductions on products the farmer
purchased. As a result, Democrats believed that farmers would
prefer free trade in everything to the Republican reciprocity policy
of free trade only on what they sold. The Standard concluded that
"the chief ground of opposition was that it strikes a deadly blow at
the principle of protection. If this is so, it would not be cause of
great grief to a large portion of the American people, who are greatly
tired with the uses to which the principle has been applied in
furthering monopolistic privilege."137 The Democratic newspapers in
Michigan considered Taft's policy their own and attempted to one up
him as he sought to respond to the American public's desire for tariff
reform. Interestingly, Democratic newspapers in cities like Ionia and
Kalamazoo supported the agreement, while their Republican
counterparts in these cities opposed the agreement. With this in
mind, it is obvious that partisan politics often influenced a
newspaper's position on the reciprocity agreement, sometimes taking
precedence over local economic concerns.

The Independent newspapers of Michigan represented a wide
spectrum of political philosophies. However, two political
philosophies dominated the Independent press of Michigan. The first
group, tariff reform minded Republican newspapers, sought to avoid
the Republican label because of its interchangeability with
protectionism. Second, Democratic newspapers, in a Strongly

Republican state and locale, sought to avoid alienating any of its

 

136The Ionia Standard, April 28. 1911, P- 4-
137rbid., July 28, 1911, p. 4.

91
readers with a Democratic label. This study discovered forty-six
self-proclaimed Independent newspapers that commented on the
agreement.138 Of this number forty, or eighty-seven per cent,
favored the agreement. These numbers differed slightly from those
given by The Grand Rapids Herald, which calculated that seventy-
eight per cent of Independents favored the agreement.”9 In
general, Independent newspapers embraced the agreement as a step
toward the destruction of large trusts, that had developed under high
tariffs.

Moving beyond the realm of political philosophies and into the
realm of political realities, it became obvious that the elections of
1910 and 1912 greatly influenced the thinking of the Taft
Administration, politicians, organizations, and newspapers. Both
elections entered the discussion in such a major way that they
appeared in practically every newspaper that took a stand on the
agreement.

The congressional elections of 1910 ended twenty-two years of
Republican control of the House of Representatives. Progressive
Republican newspapers, like The Minden City Herald, believed that
as a result of the last elections the agreement took on added

importance to the party:

Some of the old standpatters have not yet learned that
we had an election last fall and that the Democrats will
soon be in power because of the stupidity of the party to
see what the people demanded. They still insist all is

 

138The Michigan Manual provided the basis for the "Independent" label on
newspapers. Each newspaper in the state reported its position to the manual
compiled by the Secretary of State.

139Escanaba Daily Mirror, March 16, 1911. p. 2.

92

well. President Taft has the foresight to see what the
people want and to provide for them. He knows to refuse
their demands means party ruin.”O

The failure of the Republican party in 1910, a result of their widely
unpopular protectionist policies, signaled to many progressives in the
party the need for action. The Republican party could either lead the
way in lowering the tariff or lose control of the Senate and the
Presidency in 1912.

Grudgingly, many protectionist newspapers in Michigan joined
the crusade for reciprocity. The Bay City Tribune, a staunch
protectionist daily, argued that the party must acquiesce to the

public's demand for tariff reductions:

It is broadly claimed that the Democratic landslide last
November was the result of the country being dissatisfied
with the high cost of living and which the tariff was
claimed as the chief contributory agent...The Tribune has
always stood by the protectionist principle, but since...the
voice of the country as manifested at the polls last
November, sustains the contention regarding the tariff,
we are about convinced that it would be an act of wisdom
to adopt the Canadian reciprocity treaty...Since the people
of the country have indicated by their votes a desire for
lower tariff medicine, why not give it to them?141

The voters had demanded reform because they believed the tariff
led to the high cost of living. Many protectionist newspapers, like
The Tribune, believed that the Republican party needed to comply
with this popular, though misconceived, mandate. Simply put, the

voters had rejected protectionism and the country would soon

 

140Tlre Minden City Herald, February 10, 1911, p. 4.
l"'lThe Bay City Tribune, January 31. 1911. p- 2-

93

discover the consequences of such an action.

Democratic newspapers declared that the elections of 1910
were a clear signal to Congress of the necessity of changing the tariff.
The Monroe Democrat commented on this voter revolution: "The
people who elected the majority of the next Congress are entirely
satisfied with the result and have ceased agitation. They are silently
and patiently awaiting the execution of their mandate."142 The
reciprocity agreement with Canada was a first step in this direction.

Looming above all these discussions were the upcoming
elections of 1912. Republican newspapers, concerned about the
farmer vote in 1912, led the way in discussing the future political
ramifications of the reciprocity agreement. Anti-reciprocity
Republican newspapers declared that this reciprocity policy led to
the desertion of the party faithful. The Northville Record predicted
that urban wage earners would join farmers against the agreement
after they realized that it would not reduce their cost of living: "The
Republican party will find that the farmers and the wage earners
will show in no uncertain manner their resentment of such action in
the next national campaign."143 Because of this resentment of the
Taft Administration's action, "farmers will wake up and vote for a
good new style democratic ticket that will stand for free trade on
everything else."144 In some cases though, the Democrats would also
pay the price come election time. The Alcona County Herald of

Lincoln declared in early March:

 

142The Monroe Democrat, March 10. 1911, p. 2-
l“The Northville Record. April 24. 1911. P- 4-
1441bid., February 4. 1911, p. 4.

94

Now that Congress has adjourned without acting upon the
Reciprocity matter, it is up to the Democrats in the next
Congress to take action on the measure. If it is passed by
the Democratic votes, that party will find that whatever
gains it has made in the "off year" will be lost in 1912 by
their action, especially will this be true of those
representing agricultural states.145

Any candidate, either Democratic of Republican, that supported the
agreement, would encounter an agricultural voting block in the
upcoming election that would oppose his reelection.

Many pro-reciprocity Republican newspapers also feared the
political consequences of the agreement. The elections of 1912
appeared as an ominous sight on the horizon. The Detroit F ree-Press
concluded that "The rural voter who is going to be alienated from
the party because of reciprocity has made up his mind that President
Taft must be held to account for originating the policy, and will,
unless he undergoes a change of heart in the next 18 months, vote
with the Democrats next year to give voice to his resentment."146
These concerns dissipated somewhat after the Canadians rejected the
agreement in September. Relieved to hear of the agreement's failure,

The Oxford Leader stated:

In our opinion Taft will gain politically by the Canadians'
verdict...The farmers, always with the Republican party,
who threatened to be swept away from Taft owing to
their bitter animosity to his reciprocity program, having
no cause of complaint, will line up for the Republican
candidate as of yore...Taft has lost his fight for larger
continental trade relations, but he has gained politically

 

145Alcona County Herald (Lincoln), March 10, 1911, p. 4.
146Detroit Free Press, March 4. 1911, P- 4-

95

in his chances for arenomination and a re-election.147

The philosophy of the Michigan Republican press was to put the
agreement behind them and proceed forward as if the agreement,
and all of its political headaches, never existed.

An interesting facet of the study regarding Michigan
newspapers and the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement originates in
the distinctly local flavor of newspaper arguments. Up to this point,
the vast majority of this paper's commentary has focused on the
national issues that resonated throughout the Michigan press ranging
from the high cost of living problem to the national political
consequences of the agreement. A large minority of Michigan
newspapers also addressed their concerns and hopes over the
agreement's impact on their locality or region. This paper studied
reaction to the agreement from six regions: the Thumb, southeast
Michigan, central Michigan, western Michigan, northern Michigan,
and the Upper Peninsula.”8 Each of these regions' unique local
economies played a significant role in influencing a newspaper's
stand on the agreement. Therefore, certain trends become apparent
in each of the regions' newspapers.

Agriculturally, each of the regions often raised crops quite

 

147The Oxford Leader, September 29, 1911, p. 4.

148In the discussion over regional responses to the agreement, newspapers in
cities over 25,000 are studied separately from their respective regions. The
interests of a newspaper in a city this large usually did not match those of the
rest of the region's newspapers. Michigan's large urban dailies held interests,
namely lower cost for foodstuffs and newsprint, similar to those of other
urban newspapers throughout the nation. In addition, the agreement's
expected benefits to numerous Michigan industries, led most of Michigan's
urban newspapers to support the agreement for reasons unrelated to a
region's interests as a whole. For examples, see the Detroit Times and The
Kalamazoo Gazette.

96

different from the others. In western Michigan the fruit grower
dominated the region's agricultural output, while in the Thumb
farmers that raised beans found it a profitable choice. The
newspapers and farmers in these regions also differed greatly in
their response to the agreement. From vehement opposition to tacit
disapproval to cautious endorsement, each of these agricultural
regions responded in its own way to the agreement.

Newspapers in the Thumb strongly opposed the agreement. Of
the ten newspapers studied in this region, only three, or thirty per
cent, favored the agreement. The Thumb produced a wide range of
products ranging from wheat to dairy products. The reciprocity
agreement lowered duties on most of the products they raised. This
meant that Ontario farmers across Lake Huron, who raised similar
products to the farmers of the Thumb, had free access to the primary
market of the Thumb region, Detroit. "In Canada we will find that
the principle argument in favor of reciprocity is that it will benefit

the Canadian farmer," observed The Brown City Banner,

Thinking farmers must conclude that it cannot benefit the
Canadian farmer by giving him access to Michigan
markets without reducing the price to the Michigan
farmer, which will result from oversupply...So-called
reciprocity will ruin the market of the Michigan farmer
on peas and barley and reduce the price on rye.”9

The predicted flooding of the Michigan marketplace with surplus
Canadian goods would be especially damaging to the profits of

farmers in the Thumb. The newspapers in this region held closely to

 

149The Brown City Banner, April 28. 1911, SUPPL

97
the argument that the Canadian farmer had the advantages of
cheaper land and wages as well as a lower tariff. The agreement
seemed to threaten the future of the expanding sugar beet industry
in the Thumb. The Huron County Tribune of Bad Axe commented on
the possible free entry of sugar beets: "The question is important to
the beet sugar companies of Canada as well as Michigan. If beets are
on the free list it will mean much more competition for the
companies."150 Canadian companies received far less for their
product and the agreement would result in declining prices for the
Michigan sugar beet industry to the levels of their Canadian
counterparts. The few newspapers that favored the agreement in
the Thumb also showed concern for the farmer's welfare. In general,
they hoped the Administration would address the concerns of the
region's farmers. The Deckerville Recorder believed that: "If
President Taft and his reciprocity supporters would only give
Michigan farmers a little reciprocity on the things he has to buy we
don't know of anybody who would register any particular kick on the
reciprocity scheme."151 The Recorder, in an editorial entitled

"Reciprocity vs. $13.00 Hay," commented,

In the face of the adoption of the reciprocity pact by
congress and favorable prospects for its adoption by the
Canadians the present price of hay Should effectually
dispel the grave fears which have been instilled into the
minds of Michigan farmers...A Wheatland township
farmer has just disposed of this season's crop of hay
consisting of 200 tons at the record-breaking price at the
season's opening of $13.00 per ton. This with the general
strengthening of the market on the various products of

 

l50The Huron County Tribune (Bad Axe), May 19, 1911, p. 3.
151The Deckerville Recorder, February 17, 1911, P- 2-

98

Michigan farms should leave little to be feared from
Canadian reciprocity.”2

Instead of depressing the local economy as others in the region
predicted, the agreement would actually have little or no impact on
the Thumb's economy.

Another region that possessed a significant number of
newspapers opposed to the agreement was the southeast region.
This study reviewed fourteen newspapers in the region and
discovered that nine, or sixty-four per cent, favored the agreement.
The opposition to the agreement appears relatively minor when
taking into consideration the fact that many of the communities
which these newspapers represented depended heavily on
agriculture and their control of the Detroit market. "It seems to us
that farmers are discriminated against," observed The Hudson Post,
"and as Lenawee and Hillsdale counties are agricultural, that our
friends are hardly treated fairly."153 Anti-reciprocity newspapers in
this region made the perceived inequities of the agreement the
foundation of their opposition. The Northville Record asked: "What
have you bloomin gents on t'other side of the river got to offer? You
propose to send in a million tons or more of hay free where you now
pay a $3 per duty. Why wouldn't that other million ton duty free
tend to lower the price on the Michigan product? Why wouldn't the
six cents per dozen on eggs tend to reduce the price of Michigan

grown eggs?"154 The agricultural products Ontario farmers would

 

1521bid., August 4, 1911, p. 2.
153The Hudson Post, April 7, 1911. p- 4.
154The Northville Record, February 3, 1911, p. 4.

99

send into Michigan markets would considerably lower the prices paid
to Michigan farmers. The prices for these products did not come
from a world market price, but rather they depended on the local
supply and demand in markets like Detroit and Pontiac. The Ontario
farmer had long sent his product to Michigan with the tariff added to
the price. Eliminating the tariff therefore, meant a reduction in
prices to the levels the Canadian farmers truly received without the
tariff.

The large number of pro-reciprocity newspapers in the
southeast region may have been a direct result of the numerous
towns and smaller cities that would have directly benefited from the
agreement's enactment. The opening of the Canadian market to
American industrial products as well as the possibility of gaining
access to cheaper raw materials, both appealed to the region's
industrialists. Adrian, with its significant steel fence factories,
applauded the elimination of the duty on wire fencing. The
agreement offered them the countless benefits of gaining access to a
nearby market that needed their product. Hillsdale's furniture
manufacturers, interested in lowering their production costs,
welcomed the agreement's duty reductions on lumber. However
significant many of these, industries were to the region, agricultural
concerns still dominated many of the discussions. The region's pro-
reciprocity newspapers argued that the agreement benefitted
farmers and that many of the region's farmers favored the
agreement. The reasoning for this position originated in the strong

presence and influence of the Grange in the region.155 They

 

155The Grange had numerous local chapters in the region. Lenawee County,

100

attempted to convince the local farmer that his views and those of
the Grange were not-always in harmony. The region's pro-
reciprocity newspapers repeatedly attempted to undermine and
discredit the Grange. The Monroe Democrat explained the realities of

the Grange's organized opposition:

The admission of the...lobbyists, who have been
engineering the protest of the "farmers" against the
Canadian reciprocity agreement before the senate finance
committee shed a significant illumination on the
campaign against the bill. The disclosure that they
looked to such eminent agriculturalists as the lumber
trust, such industrious farmers as the pulp trust...for
financial assistance in promoting the 'farmers' campaign
may indicate an unexpectedly altruistic strain in these
corporations or, which seems more probable, that these
manufacturing interests. were the tail that was waging
the farmer dog. Inquiry as to the extent of the protest by
the farmers' organizations, membership and so forth, led
to the further admission that the opposition was
originated and confined'largely to the circle of officials in
those organizations. Out of this community of interest the
"publicity promoters" have evolved the supposedly
dominating protest of the great body of American
farmers. Considered as a demonstration of publicity
promotion it was impressive, but as evidence of the real
attitude of the real farmers to the Canadian pact it has
now been shown to be worthless156

The region's pro-reciprocity newspapers continually criticized the
Grange leadership and its association with eastern manufacturers.
Although many Michigan farmers rejected the views of their leaders,

others still blindly accepted the Grange arguments over the

 

with 34 ponoma granges, had the largest number of any county in the state.
In addition, Hillsdale (23), Washtenaw (12), and Oakland (13) counties had a
significant number of grangers.

156Monroe Democrat, June 6, 1911. p. 2-

101

agreement's detrimental effects. Through education, most notably in
local newspapers, these farmers would realize the beneficial aspects
of the agreement.

The central region of Michigan provided another example of
the divisions in the Michigan press over the merits of the agreement.
Of the thirty-four newspapers studied, twenty-two, or Sixty-five per
cent, favored the agreement. Much like the southeast region,
newspapers in towns and smaller cities that had industries that
directly benefitted from the agreement, often supported it. Big
Rapids possessed furniture and wood products industries that would
have enjoyed the benefits of free lumber. The local newspaper, The
Big Rapids Pioneer, wholeheartedly supported the agreement. The
region's agricultural towns that had little or no industry, often, but
not always, opposed the agreement.157 Towns like Ithaca, which
provided numerous services for local farmers ranging from
creameries to agricultural supplies, found many reasons to oppose
the agreement. The region consisted of agricultural communities that
raised a wide range of products ranging from dairy products in Ionia
to corn and wheat in Midland. The focus of debate in the region
centered on two aspects. First, the concern that the farmer would
bear a tremendous burden, again occupied much of the discussion.

Secondly, the political effects of the agreement on the Republican

 

157To declare that all rural newspapers opposed the agreement is certainly
incorrect. In this region, newspapers in Springport, Frankenmuth, Durand,
and other non-industrial towns, supported the agreement. However, the
majority of non-industrial towns in the region opposed the agreement.
Likewise, the Charlotte Tribune and Clinton Republican of St. Johns opposed
the agreement even though it promised benefits to industries in their
respective towns. The difficulty of categorizing any absolutes in newspaper
response is apparent.

102

party also garnered much attention.

Anti-reciprocity newspapers in the region reiterated concerns
over the effect of the agreement on the farmer. The Clinton
Republican of St. Johns commented that local hay farmers tended to
believe that if "the proposed Canadian reciprocity treaty with Canada
is adopted, it will cost Michigan farmers from $3 to $4 per ton. The
prospects of the treaty has already cost the farmers a very large
sum."158 The region's pro-reciprocity newspapers defended the
agreement against accusations that it would prove injurious to the
region's farmers. The Hastings Banner attempted to quell the fears
of local farmers: "If it shall work harm to the farmers of either
country, the hardships need not be long endured. The treaty
provides that it can be terminated at any time by either party to the
agreement. Under such a condition no one need to fear anything
calamitous from Canadian reciprocity."159 Unlike the positions taken
by other regions' pro-reciprocity newspapers, the central region's
pro-reciprocity newspapers understood the reality of local farmers'
opposition. The Evening Argus of Owosso commented along these
lines: "Canadian reciprocity which is now being agitated all over our
country does not have many supporters in this locality...Some who
planned to build barns and hire help for the coming season, are loath
to carry out plans till the question is settled."160 Pro-reciprocity
newspapers generally conceded that farmers opposed the agreement,
but they suggested that the agreement's enactment would prove the

baselessness of the farmers' concerns.

 

158The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), March 16, 1911, p. 6.
1”Hastings Banner, June 29, 1911, p. 4.
160The Evening Argus (Owosso), February 9, 1911, p. 3.

103

In the central region, the agreement's impact on the upcoming
Republican campaign for 1912 also garnered much attention from
newspapers on both sides of the issue. The pro-reciprocity, The
Evening Argus of Owosso, evaluated the potential political problems:
"There seems to be one thing certain: That President Taft's advocacy
of Reciprocity has cost him many friends among the farmers. Here
[if] the nomination for a republican candidate for president [were]
the order of business for tomorrow, practically every farmer and
small-town delegate would be against the present incumbent."161
The anti-reciprocity, The Clinton Republican of St. Johns, warned:
"Mr. Taft nor any other republican cannot be elected president
without the farmer vote."162 The deep interest shown by region's
newspapers in the political ramifications of this agreement correlated
with the predominance of Republican newspapers in the region.
Nearly three out of four newspapers in the region held to some form
of Republican principles. The potential for a political disaster, as a
result of the agreement, on national, state, and local Republicans
deeply concerned those in the Republican press of central Michigan.

Western Michigan newspapers held remarkably similar views
toward the agreement. This study reviewed twenty-five newspapers
in the region and discovered that twenty-two, or eighty-eight per
cent, favored the agreement. Often based in agricultural
communities, the positions of these pro-reciprocity newspapers
further undermined the assumption of a unified rural press opposed

to the agreement. The few newspapers in the region that opposed

 

161Ibid., February 16, 1911, p. 6.
1(”The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), May 11, 1911, p. 4.

104

the agreement did not possess the fervor of those in the Thumb,
central, or southeast regions of Michigan. Their infrequent
arguments against the agreement focused on national issues and they
failed to mention any local concerns.

Pro-reciprocity newspapers in western Michigan
enthusiastically supported the agreement. They often detailed the
benefits the agreement offered the region's fruit growers. "Not all
Michigan farmers...are opposed to the agreement," explained the

Hartford Day Spring,

Certain of them who grow fruits see in the measure the
opening of a new market for the products of their
orchards, a market that will remove a part of their crop
from competition with western fruits and a possible
betterment of price. If their interest happens to be fruit,
there are farmers who believe that reciprocity is not half
bad.163

The benefits of a new market for local fruit growers, a large and
expanding proportion of western Michigan agriculturalists, certainly
interested many in the region. Others in the region's pro-reciprocity
press saw the agreement as beneficial not only because it opened a
new market, but also because it promised to lower the costs of
various manufactured goods. "At the present time our own
manufacturers are selling goods to the Canadian farmers for less
money than they are selling them to our home people," explained

The News Palladium of Benton Harbor,

If the duty is removed then the Canadian manufacturer
can have an opportunity to sell machinery to the farmers

 

163Hartford Day Spring, May 17. 1911, P- 4-

105

at a lower rate. The market that the farmers of this
locality have for their fruits is the near-by city of Chicago
and the farmers of Canada and the farmers of the far
west will have to pay a tariff to the railroads that will
give us a better and more practical protection than any
that the government can give...farmers...will also send the
Canadians our luscious peaches, for which, having once
tasted, they will be willing to pay liberal prices.164

The local fruit grower did not need to fear any encroachment of their
current market, Chicago, and may in fact discover a new market in
Canada. The News-Palladium continued: "There are very few
peaches raised in Canada and what few there are produced bring a
high price. When the Canadian government takes off the duty on
American peaches the Berrien peach crop that is raised will bring
more money."165 The pro-reciprocity newspapers in the region
apparently felt their opinions justified after a group of fruit growers
and dealers met in Hartford on February 17. The organization
discussed the interests of Michigan fruit growers in the "fruit belt" of
western Michigan, which included the counties of Berrien, Allegan,
and Van Buren. The result of their discussions received much
attention in the western Michigan press. The Niles Daily Sun
commented on this important conference: "All subjects were treated,
but the most prominent was reciprocity...lt seemed to be the
consensus of opinion that reciprocity would be beneficial to the fruit
growers of this State; at least, it could not do them much harm, and if
it should prove a benefit to the country as a whole, it would be to

their interests to support it."166 The region's pro-reciprocity

 

164The News Palladium (Benton Harbor), April 10. 1911. p- 2-
1l551bid., May 11, 1911, p. 2.
166The Niles Daily Sun, February 17, 1911. p- 3-

106

newspapers considered this half-hearted endorsement by the
organization for western Michigan fruit growers and dealers as
evidence of the prevailing opinion of the region's farmers.

In the northern lower peninsula the agreement received
relatively scant attention. Tepid support by the region's pro-
reciprocity newspapers countered the small number of subdued anti-
reciprocity newspapers in the region. Eighteen newspapers
responded to the agreement and thirteen, or seventy-two per cent,
favored the agreement. The Cheboygan Democrat exemplified the
region's scant and serene coverage of the agreement by summing up
its position in a lone comment: "Canadian reciprocity won't be the
best thing in the world for our paper mill."167 The rest of the region
reiterated a wide range of concerns raised in the national debate,
ranging from the cost of living issue to questioning the motives of the
farmers' representatives in Washington. The only other reference to
the agreement's effect on local concerns sarcastically came from the
Alpena Argus Pioneer when it quipped: "This reciprocity agitation, at
Washington, has already injured the farmers of Northern Michigan
by provoking these heavy rains that are flooding our low-lands."168

In the larger cities of the state, where agricultural concerns
played a minor role to industrial interests, there existed a near
unanimity in support of the agreement. In cities over 25,000, not
included in the previous regional studies, this author reviewed
twenty-two newspapers and discovered that twenty, or ninety-one

per cent, favored the agreement. In addition, in the Upper Peninsula,

 

167Cheboygan Democrat, March 10, 1911, p. 2.
168Alpena Argus-Pioneer, June 28, 1911, p. 2.

107

where agricultural development was slow and mining interests
continued to grow in importance, this study reviewed sixteen
newspapers and fifteen, or ninety-three per cent, favored the
agreement. The reasons behind this outpouring of support appear
obvious. As mentioned earlier a predicted lowering in the cost of
foodstuffs, a reduction in duties on raw materials needed for
Michigan industries, and the reduction in duties on manufactured
items that could enter the Canadian market, all played a key role in
the development of urban and industrial opinions of the agreement.
A closer look into the arguments presented along local lines will
provide a detailed picture of the Michigan urban and Upper
Peninsula response.

The overwhelming support the agreement received from urban
newspapers was not entirely unanimous. One of the two urban
newspapers that opposed the agreement, the Kalamazoo Telegraph-
Press, took its position purely on the grounds that the agreement
would greatly harm local pulp and paper manufacturers.159 "Local
paper manufacturers are much interested in the...proposed Canadian

reciprocity agreement," observed the Telegraph-Press,

If Canadian print paper is placed on the free list,
American print mills will be unable to compete, not so
much because the Canadians have better mills, but they
have their waterpower and their timber close at hand. If
a clause could be inserted in the reciprocity treaty,

 

169The other urban newspaper that opposed the agreement was The Creston
News of Grand Rapids. Strangely, the newspaper originally came out in
support of the agreement, but by July its position had changed. The reasons
for this shift are unclear, but it is possible that the newspaper looked for
guidance from its native son, Senator William Alden Smith. Smith did not
openly declare his opposition to the agreement until April. Many of the
general arguments frequently used by Smith also appeared in The News.

108

removing the Canadian export duty from wood pulp, the
proposition would not be so oppressive to the American
paper mill industry; but if the treaty goes into effect,
Canadian print paper will come in free, and American
mills cannot obtain their pulp without paying the
Canadian export duty. This is why Michigan, and more
particularly Kalamazoo paper manufacturers are opposed
to the agreement now before the senate.”0

The intolerable situation presented by the Canadian duty on wood
pulp from crown lands proved to be the problematic part of the

agreement. Eliminating this duty would result in a more level and
fair playing field. "The proposed reciprocity treaty admits the free
admission of wood pulp only from free-hold lands," continued The

Telegraph-Press,

whereas over 90 per cent of the pulp comes from crown
lands, all of which must pay an export duty. When Mr.
Milhan of the Bryant Paper Co. [of Kalamazoo] was in
Washington with the other Michigan paper
manufacturers, he suggested to the friends of reciprocity,
that the proposition would be all right if Canada could be
compelled to take off the export duty on wood pulp.”1

The Telegraph-Press did not cloud its argument with a half-hearted
attempt to Show concern for the Michigan farmer. Rather, it bluntly
proclaimed its concerns over the agreement's effect on local industry
and declared its support for the agreement if Congress addressed
these concerns. This study also reviewed another Kalamazoo
newspaper, The Gazette. Surprisingly, The Gazette ignored local

concerns and supported the agreement because it believed in the

 

170Kalamazoo Telegraph-Press, May 20, 1911. p- 4.
1711bid., May 31, 1911, p. 4.

109

Democratic party's pledge that the agreement was a first step toward
complete free trade. In this case politics, not local concerns,
obviously influenced The Gazette's position.

The large majority of Michigan's urban newspapers favored the
agreement and many did so with an eye on local conditions. The
benefits for local industries were often numerous and far-reaching.
The Bay City Tribune observed the impact of the agreement on the

local economy:

Saginaw Valley lumber dealers who handle pine will be
strongly committed to the Canadian reciprocity treaty. It
puts lumber on the free list and relieves importers of
pine lumber of a duty of $1.25 a thousand feet. It is
believed it would also build up a large trade in other
products between Canadian ports on Lake Huron and Bay
City.”2

In addition to lower prices for lumber dealers, the agreement would
more importantly lead to inereased activity in the city's ports. Local
industries also received an impetus as a result of the agreement.

"The Canadian reciprocity proposition," observed The Tribune,

will prove advantageous to the woodworking industry of
Bay City. The present tariff on lumber imported from
Canada is $1.25 a thousand feet and some 65,000,000
feet came to the Saginaw river last season from Ontario
on which a duty of $1.25 a thousand feet was paid by the
importers. It is rightly contended if the duty is entirely
removed importations will be stimulated and
consequently a longer life will be given the local box
factories, planing mills, etc.”3

 

172The Bay City Tribune, January 30, 1911, p. 2.
1731bid., February 5. 1911, p. 15.

110

The agreement promised to give new life to a woodworking industry
that had suffered from high production costs. Bay City newspapers
believed that the agreement offered the community a multitude of
benefits that promised greater prosperity in the future.

Newspapers in Michigan's two largest cities also deserve the
attention of this study. Grand Rapids and Detroit possessed
numerous industries that directly benefitted from the agreement.
Grand Rapids possessed over five hundred factories involved in a
wide range of industries, most notable of which was the furniture
industry. The "furniture city" especially looked forward to the lower
production costs that would have come from the agreement's
enactment. "The furniture industry has something to gain and
nothing to lose from the proposed reciprocity with Canada,"

commented The Evening Press,

The present protective rates on furniture entering the
United States are not changed, but it is proposed to admit
free from Canada rough lumber and partially
manufactured lumber at reduced rates. This... would help
the furniture factories get raw materials advantageously,
without endangering the market for their completed
product.174

In Detroit the benefits to local industry appeared obvious. The
Detroit Free-Press commented on the impact the agreement had, not

only on the automobile industry, but also on the Detroit consumer:

The scheme [reciprocity]...works especially favorably for
this section of the country. It permits an enlarged
importation of food stuffs, for which Detroit feels a keen

 

1“The Evening Press (Grand Rapids), January 27, 1911, p. 19.

111

need, while it increases the possibilities of exporting the
products of Detroit's factories. The decrease of Canada's
tax on motor vehicles alone would ensure favor for the
treaty here, if no other item in the schedules were of
local application.175

The automobile industry as well as the over one thousand other
Detroit industries, would enjoy access to the growing Canadian
market. Many in Detroit envisioned a grand scheme that placed
these local industries into a larger context, beyond current economic
conditions. Mayor Thompson and Detroit newspapers pictured a
future in which Detroit had a pivotal role in the development of
Ontario as well as Canada. "The city of Detroit is especially concerned
in having the agreement made law by both governments," observed

the Detroit Free-Press,

Standing on the border of the two countries, her
commercial growth was seriously hampered by the
overwhelming of Chicago on the south, west and north,
while on the east her natural market was cut off by the
insurmountable barrier of the tariff...The agreement will
largely loosen the bonds which confine her commerce on
the east. She is now a larger city than any in Canada.
With complete free trade between the two countries,
there is no reason why she should not become the
industrial metropolis of Canada, all points in which she
can reach by water or rail more conveniently than any
other Canadian city.”6

Detroit's past, present, and future explicitly included Canada as a key
part of the city's development. The agreement would end the

artificial barriers of the past and lead to the explosive development

 

175Detroit Free Press, January 27, 1911. P- 4-
176Ibid., February 13, 1911, p. 4.

112

of Detroit as well as Canada. The future boded well for the city of
Detroit as a result of this agreement.

In the Upper Peninsula the reasons for the nearly unanimous
support of the region mirrored those given by the major cities of the
state. Newspapers throughout the Upper Peninsula repeatedly
Stressed the widespread support the agreement received in the
region. The Menominee County Journal of Stephenson briefly
commented on the reasons for this support: "Reciprocity with Canada
is popular in the upper peninsula, which is in dire need of cheaper
food products."177 The cost of living issue became the chief
argument for the agreement in the region's press. Upper Peninsula
mining towns saw the agreement as a solution to the problematic
high cost of living in the region. The Calumet News reported on this
question: "Considerable local interest is being manifested in the
proposed reduction in tariff rates between the United States and
Canada and speculation is rife as to whether the changes would be a
benefit or detriment to this district." The News continued by
focusing on a supporter of the agreement in nearby Laurium: "One of
the copper country wholesale houses now finds it cheaper to import
turnips from Canada, paying the duty on them, than to raise them in
this country, and that the quality of the imported article is better
than that raised in this country."178 The cheaper and tastier turnip
provided but one example of the economic benefits the agreement
inured for the region's consumers.

The benefits to the Upper Peninsula also came in the form of

 

l77Menominee County Journal (Stephenson), February 18, 1911, p. 4.
178The Calumet News, January 31, 1911, P- 7-

113

increased shipping for the ports on Lake Superior. The Evening
Copper Journal of Hancock commented on the impact of this action:
"As the nearest reciprocal port for Canadian wheat shipments, via
Keweenaw point...the Copperdom has every reason to be greatly
interested."179 The economic benefits of this movement of products
through the copper region were enormous. Canadian wheat bound
for overseas and American markets might first come through the
region's mills for processing and shipment.

Upper Peninsula newspapers devoted little attention to the
agreement's effect on the region's mining, paper, and lumber
industries.180 Early in the discussion Representative H. Olin Young
briefly questioned the impact of the agreement on the region's
industries: "It will hurt our lumber and print paper industry in the
upper peninsula."181 Young also believed that the agreement's
reductions on iron ore had little impact on the Upper Peninsula since
Canada had not developed competitive grades of iron ore. The
position of Young quickly changed after he encountered the pro-
reciprocity newspapers and populace of the region, even in such

strong lumber towns like Ontonagan and Manistique. Iron Ore in

 

179The Evening Copper Journal (Hancock), January 30, 1911, p. 4.

130m this study, the lone newspaper in the Upper Peninsula that opposed the
agreement, The Gladstone Della, did so apparently because of the same reasons
given by the Kalamazoo Telegraph-Press. These newspapers believed the
agreement unfairly discriminated against the Michigan paper maker. Other
Upper Peninsula newspapers generally ignored the agreement’s possible
impact on the region's lumber and paper industries. The reasons for this lack
of attention are unclear. Many of the newspapers in the Upper Peninsula may
have felt the considerable influence of mining towns, purely interested in
lowering the cost of foodstuffs. This influence, coupled with the promise of
free newsprint and the progressive Republican nature of many of the region's
newspapers, could possibly explain why they virtually ignored the concerns
of the region's lumber and paper industries.

181Menominee Herald-Leader, January 30, 1911, p. 4.

114

Ishpeming commented, in an article entitled "Would Assist Our

Miners," that local mining interests found benefits in the agreement:

The Canadian pact, as just settled, would aid our mining
industries because we make steels cheaper than does
Canada, having better mines, better plants and skilled
workmen. It would be different with Germany or
England, where labor is skilled as our own, where they
have fine equipments and where labor is paid very much
lower wages than in America. Free steel would be
against us decidedly.182

The Canadian mining industry simply could not compete with their
more entrenched and highly developed Michigan counterparts.
Finally, prevalent among Upper Peninsula newspapers was an
anger at the lower peninsula Michigan farmer, rarely found in the
remainder of the state.”3 Michigan farmers had long benefitted
from a high tariff on their products. Unlike the pro-reciprocity
newspapers in other regions, Upper Peninsula newspapers believed
farmers and middlemen were to blame for high prices. Iron Ore of

Ishpeming embodied this approach:

We are heartily tired of the cry of the granger to add to
the duty of the things he produces and to make it harder
for the mines to do business. The farmer has been
getting the fat of the land for many years and if he wants
to decrease the cost of his plows he must also agree to
give us cheaper butter, eggs, and flour. All we want is
fair play, but the farmer isn't disposed for that sort of a
game.134

 

182Iron Ore (Ishpeming), April 29, 1911, p. 1.

183Upper Peninsula newspapers' anger at the Michigan farmer also developed
as a result of the Michigan State Grange's push for a tonnage tax through the
state legislature. This tax on the products of the Upper Peninsula mines
became a contentious point in 1911. Ibid., March 4, 1911, p. 4.

1841bid., February 25. 1911. p. 4-

115

Much like rural anti-reciprocity newspapers in the Thumb, central,
and eastern sections of the lower peninsula, pro-reciprocity
newspapers of the Upper Peninsula viewed their respective
opponents as selfish and unconcerned over the welfare of the other.
The newspapers of Michigan found themselves at the heart of a
controversy. The agreement eliminated the duty on newsprint
calling into question the impartiality of pro-reciprocity newspapers'
statements in support of the agreement. As mentioned earlier, some
scholars, most notably Ellis, considered newspaper publishers, not as
innocent beneficiaries, but rather as the masterminds behind the
agreement. Many contemporaries of the agreement originally
developed this perception. Michigan newspapers certainly stood to
directly benefit financially from the agreement's proposed duty
reductions on newsprint, but the issue was much more complex for
the local newspaper. Unlike large, national organizations such as the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, local newspapers
needed to look beyond the direct economic benefits to review the
impact the agreement might have on their communities as a whole.
This study gathered data on weekly and daily newspapers
throughout the state of Michigan and the conclusions apparently
provide evidence that dailies, in greater need for cheaper newsprint
supported the agreement in overwhelming numbers, while weeklies,
which used significantly less newsprint, divided on the agreement.
Of the fifty Michigan daily newspapers studied, forty-six, or ninety-
two per cent favored the agreement. On the other hand, Michigan

weeklies showed much less decisiveness, of the eighty-nine studied,

116

fifty-eight, or sixty-five per cent favored the agreement. The
divisions among Michigan's weekly newspapers were a result of
differences in political and local conditions. These conditions
obviously influenced certain newspapers more than the promise of
free newsprint.

The Michigan newspapers opposed to the agreement found it
interesting that urban dailies suddenly found themselves entangled
in the details of agricultural economics. Newspapers in all the major
cities of Michigan discussed the agreement's impact on the farmers of
the state. The Livingston Republican in Howell doubted the sincerity
of urban newspapers' concern for the Michigan farmer: "The city
papers favor reciprocity because they think it will make print paper
cheaper. Then too, the city writer knows as much about conditions on
the farm as a hog knows about Latin. Do not be misled by their
smooth talk about helping the farmer. They want cheap eggs and
cheap wheat."185 The urban newspapers' coverage over the details
on such subjects as the Liverpool market, different grades of wheat,
transportation costs, and climactic conditions, led many in the rural
press to question the motivations behind these large newspapers.
Urban newspapers veiled their desire for free newsprint under the
false pretense of helping the farmer. The Howard City Record wryly
added: "The farmers should remember to patronize more generously
those daily papers that are laboring so valiantly to promote Canadian
reciprocity and force lower prices for farm produce."186

N.P. Hull, master of the Michigan State Grange, implicated

 

185Livingston Republican (Howell), June 28, 1911. p. 4.
186The Howard City Record, February 9. 1911’ p. 4°

117

urban dailies as the driving force behind the agreement. He believed
that "this reciprocity proposition started with the big metropolitan
newspapers who want free print paper. I am told that a delegation
of these big papers called Speaker [of the House] Cannon some time
ago and told him if he would support such a proposition they thought
they had influence enough to nominate him for president."137
Michigan's anti-reciprocity newspapers agreed that the selfish
actions of these large newspapers were obvious. The Clinton
Republican of St. Johns commented on the influence these

newspapers had on the Taft Administration:

President Taft was undoubtedly actuated by a sincere
belief that the Canadian reciprocity treaty would be a
good thing for the whole country, and in his position he
was backed up by the metropolitan newspapers and
muck raking magazines, in a selfish desire to get free
trade with Canada on wood pulp and print paper. In
order to seem consistent, they had to advocate free entry
of some other things, and farm products were selected,
instead of manufactured articles...President Taft...has
been influenced in his position by the city newspapers
and magazines for free trade on many of the farmer's
products.188

The agreement's origins, in the opinion of many reciprocity
opponents, clearly lied in the urban newspapers' desire for cheaper
newsprint. In other words, the American Newspaper Publishers
Association (ANPA), the organization representing big city dailies,
provided the impetus for the agreement. This conclusion received a

degree of validation after the disclosure of the intimate relationship

 

187Hull's comments came from an interview with the Kalamazoo Telegraph-
Press,.-June 3, 1911, p. 11.

188The Clinton Republican (St. Johns), August 8, 1911, p. 4.

118

between the State Department and the ANPA. John Norris and
Herman Ridder of the ANPA remained in close contact with various
State Department negotiators during the discussions between
American and Canadian officials in early January. Two days before
the agreement became public, Ridder detailed the agreement's pulp
and paper provisions in a letter to members of the ANPA.”9 For
others, like Senator Charles Townsend, the ANPA did not represent

the whole of newspaper opinion. Townsend declared in Congress:

I wish to discuss...the influence of a representative of the
American Newspaper Publishers' Association...I am
exceedingly sorry that the newspapers, or certain of
them, have not purged themselves of the charge that this
is measure for the benefit of their special interest...lt
would have been better for the influence of the press if it
had not asked for an exception in its behalf. I know that
all of the newspapers of the country are not parties to
this special-favor clause. The lobbyists only represented
a few as compared with the whole of the papers, and I
personally know that many papers are for this agreement
because of principle. They believe in it and support it,
because it is right.190

Townsend and others in the pro-reciprocity press considered the
ANPA a liability to their cause for reciprocity. The ANPA's actions,
taken regardless of smaller newspapers' opinions, had undermined

the impartiality of all newspapers.191

 

189Ellis, p. 69. Ellis believed the ANPA was the driving force behind the
agreement. Their support in 1912 was sought by the Taft Administration.

1903. Doc. 80, p. 3470.

191These comments are not meant to deny the fact that some smaller
newspapers supported the agreement because of the newsprint reduction,
rather they point out that the ANPA's actions were controlled by a small
number of newspaper publishers, most notably William Randolph Hearst.
Hearst used approximately a tenth of the country's entire consumption of
newsprint. Ellis, on pp. 138-139, briefly described the Hearst campaign for

119

However, many pro-reciprocity newspapers attempted to deny
the claim that publishers had anything to do with the agreement.
Newspapers, like The Evening News in Battle Creek, ridiculed the
claims made by reciprocity opponents: "The discovery that the
newspapers are behind the Canadian reciprocity move, with the
purpose to make money on 'print' paper needs go only a little way
farther to find that the angels are behind the Mexican revolution in
order to have the fun of smelling smoke."192 The Bay City Times
sarcastically added: "Of course the newspapers put reciprocity in the
republican platform, also drew up the bill and put all those ideas in
to President Taft's head." The Times then added: "Anyway, the
newspaper will probably be willing to assume the responsibility and
honor of bringing about the measure, even though they did not have
anything to do with it."193 Many pro-reciprocity newspapers did not
believe that they influenced the President any more than the Grange
or lumber industry. These preposterous accusations simply had no
merit.

On February 9 John Norris of the ANPA sent out a list to
newspaper publishers that defined the agreement's beneficial
aspects for the state of Michigan. The list contained numerous
Michigan agricultural and manufacturing industries that would
benefit from freer trade with Canada. In addition to this list,
prepared by the Bureau of Trade Relations in the State Department,
the accompanying letter urged newspapers to push for the adoption

of the treaty on the grounds that free newsprint would prove

 

reciprocity.
192The Evening News (Battle Creek), May 11, 1911, p. 4.
1”The Bay City Times, February 15, 1911. p- 2-

120

beneficial to publishers.194 This letter from the ANPA resulted in
additional animosity from anti-reciprocity newspapers. They
believed that they had a duty to the public to expose the cover-up
by the ANPA and big city dailies. Norris' list appeared in a majority
of the state's newspapers, but the letter to publishers almost never
appeared and rarely received any mention. Anti-reciprocity
newspapers believed the action by pro-reciprocity newspapers to not
publish or discuss the accompanying letter showed the covertness of
their positions. The real interests of pro-reciprocity newspapers lied
not in the benefits to the state, but rather in their own self-interest.
The Mount Clemens Monitor explained the real purpose of the list
and its accompanying letter from the ANPA: "Last Saturday THE
MONITOR received a long screed favoring Canadian reciprocity, as a
peculiar benefit to Michigan. It was sent from New York by a
newspaper association, of which Herman Ridder, owner of the Staats-
Zeitung, is president, and its inspiration was the hope of cheaper
paper."195 Michigan's anti-reciprocity newspapers had exposed the
selfishness of many of their proponent brethren.

Although newspapers debated the issue of self-interest, their
main arguments on the proposed duty reductions on print paper
revolved around their own conflict with paper makers. In recent
years the ruthless paper trust had continually raised the price of
newsprint. This meant that pro-reciprocity newspapers essentially
made a defensive argument for their position on print paper's duty

reductions. John Norris of the ANPA provided the leading

 

194Ellis, p. 107.
195Mount Clemens Monitor, February 17, 1911. P- 4-

121

commentary in Washington for newspaper publishers: "All but two
of the 50 print paper-makers of the country...are violating the
Sherman law by restricting the use to which the paper they sell can
be put."196 The paper trust had unfairly regulated prices and the
agreement might lead to the dissolution of this trust. The Manistique
Pioneer-Tribune explained the common problems faced by Michigan

newspapers:

It appears that mercenary interests have combined to
oppose reciprocity. The average newspaper, that has
been paying a heavy toll to the paper trust, is in favor of
reciprocity because it sees in it an opportunity of
securing paper at a cheaper price. The average country
newspaper used to secure its supply of print paper at
about $10 or less per ton. The price since the trust has
been manipulating the prices, has been fluctuating
between $50 and $55 per ton. It means that an office the
size of the Pioneer-Tribune has been paying tribute to
the trust of from $120 to $150 per year. This is one of
the reasons why we would like to try reciprocity, for a
time, it would reduce the price of paper in the future, but
of course it would never replace the $1500 paid into the
coffers of the greedy monopoly during the past few
years.197

Pro-reciprocity newspapers did not stand alone in their accusations
against the paper trust. The anti-reciprocity, Ypsilanti Daily Press,

suggested an alternative to the reciprocity agreement:

The fact is that for the last three of four years the
publishers of most of the country dailies and weeklies at
least could scarce afford to put them out for the price
they have been putting them out...So far as we are
concerned, we are not going to ask for the adoption of

 

196The Adrian Daily Telegram, February 9. 1911. P. 3.
197The Manistique Pioneer-Tribune, June 9, 1911, p. 4.

122

this treaty in its present form. But we will ask the pulp
schedule to remain at the paper trusts' expense.198

Wholeheartedly behind the movement for cheaper newsprint and
the breaking up of the paper trust the Daily Press added:
"Newspapers of course are interested in getting free wood pulp and
free print paper. They have been soaked to the limit by the paper
trust and they cannot be blamed for endeavoring to get free print
paper and, if they do get it, this will operate to the advantage of
everybody that reads the newspapers, in all probability."199 Many
other anti-reciprocity newspapers weighed the personal benefits of
free newsprint with the impact the agreement might have on
Michigan farmers. Clearly, many came out on the perceived moral
side with the Michigan farmer. The Alcona County Herald in Lincoln
concluded that "Newspapers are being constantly urged to favor the
passage of the bill on the ground that it will materially reduce the
price of print paper. However, the saving of a few dollars each
month doesn't outweigh a principle with the average newspaper, we
are glad to note."200 Anti-reciprocity newspapers as a group
endorsed the agreement's idea 0f hitting the paper trust, but felt it
did too much damage to Michigan farmers to provide a reason to
support the entire accord.

The belief that newspaper publishers had lost their
impartiality did not come solely from anti-reciprocity newspapers.

The Petoskey Evening News concluded that the newspapers of

 

198Ypsilanti Daily Press, February 10, 1911, p. 4.
1991bid., March 2, 1911, p. 4.
200Aleona County Herald (Lincoln), February 21, 1911. p. 4.

123

Michigan had indeed lost their innocence in this fight. The News
considered that the fight in Washington between the publishers and

pulp and paper manufacturers:

gives color to the trust claim that all the papers are for
reciprocity because they want access to Canadian print
paper, and the opponents of reciprocity are making the
most of the farmers that the papers are all actuated by
purely selfish motives in this matter...At least it has made
the reciprocity side of the fight harder since it has robbed
the papers of that degree of influence which can come
only through disinterestedness.201

No matter what they said, pro-reciprocity newspapers constantly
found themselves answering to accusations of self-interest.

The Canadian Reciprocity Agreement of 1911 exposed an
American society deeply divided over the tariff, politics, and
urbanization. American newspapers provided local communities
with an important conduit for expressing their distinctly local
perspective of these issues. Politicians and voters turned to an
animated and politically active newspaper press for help in defining
the political boundaries of the era. Reciprocity scholars, most notably
Ellis, have overlooked the diversity of newspaper response because
they have generally limited their studies to major regional
newspapers. This small fraction of the American newspaper press
can not provide a clear understanding of the full range of responses
that came from a very lively and diverse majority of smaller dailies
and countless weeklies. This study detailed the complex and often

conflicting nature of many of the economic, political, social, and

 

201The Petoskey Evening News, May 8, 1911, P- 1-

124

regional concerns that a typical Michigan newspaper publisher
considered during the debate of 1911. Much like the evolution of
reciprocity scholarship on the Taft administration's motives (Ellis to
Radosh to Clements to Hannigan to Stewart), this thesis has taken the
next step, after Ellis, in the development of reciprocity scholarship on
newspaper response. Future reciprocity scholarship should expand
on this study of Michigan newspapers to include reviews of
newspapers in other border states deeply effected by the agreement
from New York and Vermont to Minnesota and Wisconsin. A
thorough study of newspapers in other states may further develop
the comments on diversity brought forth in this paper and lead to a
major revision of the American newspaper response to the

agreement of 1911.

Bibliography

Bibliography
A. Primary Sources
1. Newspapers

The newspapers in the following list, compiled from research at the
State of Michigan and Michigan State University libraries, provided
the author with a clear picture of the diversity of the Michigan
newspaper response. This list does not include seventy-six other
Michigan newspapers that the author studied. Those newspapers did
not editorialize on the issue of reciprocity and in many cases they
failed to provide any coverage of the agreement. This study
reviewed newspaper response from the negotiations of early January
to the final reflections after Canada's defeat of reciprocity in late
September.

Acorn (Three Oaks)

The Adrian Daily Telegram
The Albion Evening Recorder
Alcona County Herald (Lincoln)
The Allegan Gazette

Alpena Argus-Pioneer
Battle Creek Daily Moon

The Battle Creek Enquirer
Battle Creek Journal

The Bay City Times

The Bay City Tribune
Belding Banner

The Bellaire Independent
Benzie Record

Berrien Springs Era

The Big Rapids Pioneer

The Boyne Citizen

The Brown City Banner

The Burr Oak Acorn

The Calumet News

Camden Advance

Cedar Springs Clipper
Charlevoix County Herald (East Jordan)
Charlevoix Courier
Charlevoix Sentinel
Charlotte Republican

125

126

Charlotte Tribune

Cheboygan Democrat

The Chesaning Argus

Clare Sentinel

The Clinton Republican (St. Johns)
The Courier and Republican (Coldwater)
Crawford Avalanche (Grayling)

The Creston News (Grand Rapids)

The Daily Commercial-Hustler (Three Rivers)
The Daily Mining Journal (Marquette)
The Daily News (Grand Rapids)

The Daily Times-News (Ann Arbor)
The Daily Tribune (South Haven)

The Decatur Republican

The Deckerville Recorder

Detroit Free Press

Detroit News

Detroit Times

The Diamond Drill (Crystal Falls)

The Dowagiac Daily News

The Durand Express

Edwardsburg Argus

Elk Rapids Progress

Escanaba Daily Mirror

Escanaba Morning Press

The Evening Argus (Owosso)

The Evening Copper Journal (Hancock)
The Evening News (Battle Creek)

The Evening News (Sault Ste. Marie)
The Evening Press (Grand Rapids)
The Flint Daily Journal‘

The Fowlerville Review

The Frankenmuth News

The Gladstone Delta

Gladwin County Record (Gladwin)
Grand Ledge Independent

Grand Traverse Herald (Traverse City)
Gratiot County Herald (Ithaca)
Greenville Independent

Hanover Horton Local

Hartford Day Spring

Hastings Banner

The Hillsdale Daily

127

The Holcad (East Lansing)

Holland City News

Houghton Daily Mining Gazette

The Howard City Record

The Hudson Post

The Huron County Tribune (Bad Axe)
The Ionia Daily Sentinel

The Ionia Standard

The Iosco County Gazette (East Tawas)
Iron Ore (Ishpeming)

Ironwood News-Record

Isabella County Enterprise (Mount Pleasant)
Jonesville Independent

The Kalamazoo Gazette

Kalamazoo Telegraph-Press

The Kalkaska Leader

Lansing State Journal

Livingston Republican (Howell)

The Lowell Ledger

Ludington Record-Appeal

M.A.C. Record (East Lansing)

The Mancelona Herald

Manistee Daily Advocate

The Manistee Daily News

The Manistique Pioneer-Tribune
The Manton Weekly Tribune

The Mariette Leader

The Marshall Daily Chronicle
Marshall Statesman

Menominee County Journal (Stephenson)
Menominee Herald Leader

The Midland Republican

The Minden City Herald

The Monroe Democrat

Mount Clemens Monitor

Mount Pleasant Times

Muskegon News Chronicle

Newberry News

The News-Palladium (Benton Harbor)
Niles Daily Star

The Niles Daily Sun

The Northville Record

The Observer (Grand Rapids)

128

The Olivet Optic

The Onaway Outlook 1

The Ontonagan Herald

The Oxford Leader

The Parma News

The Petoskey Evening News

The Pigeon Progress

The Pontiac Press-Gazette

The Port Huron Times-Herald
The Portland Observer

Presque Isle County News (Millersburg)
The Record Eagle (Traverse City)
Reed City Clarion

The Roscommon Herald

The Saginaw Courier-Herald
The Saginaw Daily News

The St. Johns News

St. Joseph Evening Herald

The Saturday Evening Star (Jackson)
The Springport Signal

The Times (Grand Rapids)
Tuscola County Advertiser (Caro)
Tuscola County Pioneer (Vassar)
The Whitehall Forum

The Wolverine Citizen (Flint)
Ypsilaniti Daily Press

2. Government Documents

The following select list of government documents cites those
most relevant to this paper. The most notable government
documents for any reciprocity scholar, the Senate hearings during
the 62nd Congress and the Senate's compilation of 1911,
respectively provided excellent information on the response of
many of Michigan's special interests as well as the details of the
Senate debates of May, June, and July. The 6lst and 62nd
Congresses also reprinted a plentiful supply of other documents
dealing with reciprocity ranging from cabinet member speeches to
tariff commission reports.

Martindale, Frederick C., Secretary of State, comp., Michigan
Official Directory and Legislative Manual for the Years 1911-
1912. Lansing, 1911.

129

US. Congress. Canadian Reciprocity: Special Message of the
President of the United States Transmitted to the Two Houses of
Congress, January 26, I911. 6lst Cong., 3rd sess., 1911. S. Doc.
787.

US. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Reciprocity with
Canada: Hearings on HR. 32216. 6lst Cong., 3rd sess., 1911. S.
Doc. 834.

US. Congress. Reciprocity: Address by Hon. William H. Taft at the
Banquet of the Marion Club, Indianapolis, 1nd, July 4, 1911 on
Republican Reciprocity. 62nd Cong., lst sess., 1911. S. Doc. 63.

US. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Reciprocity with
Canada: Hearings on HR. 4412. 62nd Cong., lst sess., 1911. 8.
Doc. 56.

US. Congress. Senate. Reciprocity with Canada: Compilation of
1911. 62nd Cong., 1st sess., 1911. 8. Doc. 80.

3. Other Primary Sources

The Taft Papers provide the reciprocity scholar with another vital
source of information. The papers include notable speeches and
letters that offer a glimpse at the reasoning behind the
administration's Canadian reciprocity policy. The papers include
frequent correspondence between Taft and various Michigan men,
most notably Governor Chase Osborn and J.L. Hudson of the Detroit
Board of Commerce, that discussed issues like the political
ramifications of Taft's policy in the state of Michigan. The weekly
professional journals below provide examples of the views of the
state's agricultural (The Michigan Dairy Farmer and The Michigan
Farmer) and commercial (The Detroiter) organizations.

The Detroiter. (Detroit: Detroit Board of Commerce), 1, no. 6-13,
January 1911-August 1911.

The Michigan Dairy Farmer. (Detroit: Dairy Farmer Company), 2-3,
February 4, 1911-September 23, 1911.

The Michigan Farmer and Live Stock Journal. (Detroit: Lawrence
Publishing Company), 136, no.5-137, no. 14, February 4, 1911-
September 30, 1911.

William Howard Taft Papers

B. Secondary Sources

1. Books

130

Anderson, Judith Icke. William Howard Taft: An Intimate History.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981.

Baker, Richard Cleveland. The Tariff Under Roosevelt and Taft.
Hastings, NE: Democrat Printing Co., 1941.

Ellis, L. Ethan. Reciprocity 1911: A Study In Canadian-American
Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

Hechler, Kenneth W. Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the
Taft Era. New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1964.

Stewart, Gordon T. The American Response to Canada Since 1776.
East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992.

Tansill, Charles Callan. Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.

2. Articles

Clements, Kendrick A. "Manifest Destiny and Canadian Reciprocity
in 1911." PaCinc Historical Review 42 (1973): 32-52.

Hannigan, Robert E. "Reciprocity 1911: Continentalism and
American Weltpolitik." Diplomatic History 4 (winter 1980): 1-18.

Radosh, Ronald. "American Manufacturers, Canadian Reciprocity,
and the Origins of the Branch Factory System." Canadian
Association for American Studies Bulletin 3, no. 1
(spring/summer 1967): 19-54.

Stewart, Gordon T. "'A Special Contiguous Country Economic
Regime': An Overview of America's Canadian Policy." Diplomatic
History 6, no. 4 (fall 1982): 339-357.

Zamiara, Steven B. "Michigan and Canadian Reciprocity: 1911."
Michigan Academician 2, no. 3 (winter 1970): 93-102.

3. Other Secondary Sources

Drury, David. "Michigan's View of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty,
1854-1866." Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1959.

McDonald, Ada Jean. "Canada's Rejection of Reciprocity 1911: An
Examination of Factors Influencing the Electorate in
Southwestern Ontario." Master's thesis, Michigan State
University, 1964.

US. Department of Commerce and Labor. Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce. The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of
the United States for the Year Ending June 30, 1912.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1913.

US. Tariff Commission. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties.

131

Washington, DC: GPO, 1919.