:. A?“ 8“ Ju\\‘ - "$.th 1‘14. *; «.3... _. 1- ‘T “2}; ._.r...'..- ”we :wm“ "fwzaég .. 315$“: ' 3.4.3413 9.. yo! V: 31.73, ' re. 3" ‘5 '3‘: ' v s f :3“!!- \ yuan-n ' “ if IHINWH“NW““11111111W WWI * 31293 3150 HENRY M It: H is; 21. $15111" I..Hw..-«'rw:!'2'v 'ml'kl ,vfl 6t: .0: - D-‘ This is to certify that the thesis entitled SELF-PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THE ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP ROLES OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRA TORS presented by Charles B. House, Jr. has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for the Eh.D. degree in Adminigtrgtion and Higher Education ;2 / I C , / £23254 7 ’ Aélflfi Major professor ABSTRACT SELF-PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THE ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP ROLES OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS BY Charles B. House, Jr. The hypothesis which the research examines is that, following the introduction of faculty collective bargaining in certain public institutions of higher education, changes have occurred in the perceptions which executive administra- tors have concerning their own decision-making roles and administrative functions. Four institutions were selected, all of which are public four-year, degree-granting, colleges or universities. All are institutional members of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities and all had been operating with a collectively negotiated faculty agreement or contract for at least one year. The institutions were visited and structured interviews// were held with the presidents, chief academic affairs officers, and one or two deans on each campus. Altogether, fourteen officers were interviewed and their responses con— stitute the body of data in the research. Each person was asked to react to a list of thirty-eight decision-making items. The items were grouped according to the five Data Element Categories identified by the National Center for Charles B. House, Jr. Higher Education Management Systems. The categories are: Course-related, Facilities-related, Finance-related, Staff- related, and Student-related. The officers interviewed perceived three kinds or levels of effects attributable to faculty collective bar— gaining which bear upon their decision-making roles or administrative functions. These are: 1. Changes in the institutional environment to which they are required to make adjustment; 2. The specific adjustments in administrative pro- cedure which the officers are required to make as a result of the bargaining relationship; and, 3. Changes in the values and attitudes of the officers which bear upon their administrative styles and professional satisfaction. The officers perceived the formalization of staff— related procedures as reducing their freedom to make dis- criminating judgments in individual cases. They generally feel that they may become, or may be viewed by others as becoming, rigid and bureaucratic in their administrative behavior. The legal framework of collective bargaining forces a congruence between d2 fagtg_and g3 lure decision- making power and leads to a sharp delineation of faculty and administrative roles. Administrative decision—making mppears, as a result, to become more centralized as the 1Cons of final decision converges toward the holders of SE jure power. The sharp delineation of faculty and Charles B. House, Jr. administrative roles may encourage administrators to adopt a managerial posture in place of a collegial style of academic leadership. The formal and often adversarial relationships resulting from collective bargaining may interfere with the informal interactions with faculty which many of the administrators felt essential to their exercise of leadership and which are the source of much of their personal satisfaction. SELF-PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON THE ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP ROLES OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS BY Charles B. House, Jr. A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Administration and Higher Education College of Education 1975 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No one completes this academic task without incurring a vast human debt--to family, teachers, classmates, and co-workers. I acknowledge that debt with gratitude to: My wife, whose support and help came when they were most needed; My grown and growing sons, who were interested in something which lies so far from their world, and who gave up things they wanted so that the work could be finished; My colleagues and fellow-workers, who were sensitive enough to know when to ”prod" and when to stand silent; My professors, who probably deferred more to my gray hairs than they should have; My parents, who sacrificed more to send me to high school than I have to send their grandchildren to college; and, Very specially, to Miss Sylvia Ryin, M.A., to whom the subject of this thesis will seem strange and alien, but who taught me good English usage, and who infected me at an early age with her own reverence for liberal learning. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH, DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM, LIMITATIONS AND DEFINITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY. General Introduction and Purpose of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . Description of the Problem . . . . . . . . Limitations and Definitions . . . . . . . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . Faculty Collective Bargaining: History and Some Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bargaining and Governance: More Causes and Some Possible Consequences . . . . . . III. ALPHA AND BETA STATE COLLEGES . . . . . . . . Alpha State College . . . . . . . . . . . Beta State College . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. MENTOR AND TUTOR UNIVERSITIES . . . . . . . . Mentor University 0 O O O O O O O O O O . Tutor University . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. ANALYSIS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMEN- DATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH . . . . . . . . Institutional Effects . . . . . . . . . . The Administrative Response . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations for Further Research . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Page 29 45 69 7O 88 103 103 126 169 169 179 188 189 190 193 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 Alpha State College Summary Table of Affected Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2 Beta State College Summary Table of Affected Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3 Mentor University Summary Table of Affected Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 4 Tutor University Summary of Table of Affected Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 iv CHAPTER I GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH, DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM, LIMITATIONS AND DEFINITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY General Introduction and Purpose of the Research Faculty collective bargaining is an offspring of the turbulence which has characterized American higher education for the last decade or more. In the complex interaction of intellectual, political and economic forces, faculty union- ization appears both as the cause and consequence of changes which have occurred within the academic community. In the nearly seven years since its modest appearance among four- year colleges and universities, collective bargaining for faculties has made important gains, particularly among newly- established institutions and former teachers colleges which are in the process of "emergence" toward the status of multi- purpose universities. While collective bargaining has not proved, as some had earlier predicted, to be a tide which would rapidly engulf the entire academic profession, it is now firmly established in a significant number of institutions. Collective negotiation over "the terms and conditions of employment" is now an option for virtually all faculties. Because collective bargaining is now accepted as a respectable form in which to deal with certain issues of 1 concern to academic professionals, it is important that the process be studied and understood as thoroughly as possible. If faculties are to exercise wisely their choice to bargain or not to bargain collectively, and if administrations are to develop responses which preserve or enhance the educational effectiveness of their institutions, evidence must be un- covered concerning the conditions which are most likely to eventuate if collective bargaining is adopted. An obvious feature of the large body of writing on the subject is the admittedly speculative nature of comment on the effects of collective bargaining on unionized institutions. In the early stages of the faculty union movement in higher education, a great deal of attention was given to the causes of faculty unionization. Now that collective bargaining is an estab— lished pattern in some institutions, evidence of its effect is accumulating and the assessment of the impact now appears as the most important task connected with the study of the issue.1 This dissertation should make a limited but useful contribution to an understanding of the impact of faculty 1Jack H. Schuster, "Emerging Issues in Faculty Bargaining" (Address prepared for delivery at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 1973, Mimeographed). Page 2. "Although the literature on faculty unionism has ballooned in the past several years, only fragmen- tary evidence is presently available on the post- contract institutional experience with faculty collective bargaining. Unfortunately, research to date has ignored almost totally the impact of col- lective bargaining, especially on inst1tutional governance at four-year institutions." Collective bargaining on certain aspects of administrative performance in one important category of unionized institutions. Description of the Problem The particular aspect of collective bargaining impact which the dissertation will examine is concerned with the effect of collective bargaining on the decision-making roles of executive administrators in unionized institutions: campus presidents or chief executive officers, provosts or chief academic officers, and deans of schools or colleges. These institutional officers are chosen because they are the ones whose duties are most directly involved with the primary academic functions of instruction, research and public service. The research is based on the hypothesis that following the introduction of faculty collective bargaining changes have occurred in the decision-making roles and administrative functions of executive administrators. The changes may have occurred in connection with procedural contraints on admin- istrative authority. New tasks may have been introduced or former ones removed. Realignments may have been made necessary in the proportion of time and attention required by the various components of the administrative agenda. Changes may have come about in the degree of influence which the administrators are able to exert over the processes of institutional planning and budgeting, or in the techniques and avenues which they select for the exercise of educational leadership. Agencies external to the campus may have become more directly, or conceivably less directly, involved in internal campus decisions, affecting accordingly the roles of executive administrators. The combination of circum- stances and the human dynamics surrounding the bargaining relationship may have affected the ability of administrators to exercise leadership as well as altering the kinds and degrees of satisfaction which administrators take in their work. The research may best be described as "oral history." Through a series of personal interviews the reactions of individuals occupying principal administrative offices in unionized institutions are elicited, asking them to reflect systematically on the cahnges which have taken place in the conditions of their administrative functions subsequent to the introduction of faculty collective bargaining. Much of the literature on academic collective bargaining is produced by attorneys with special eXpertise in labor law or by academic personnel managers many of whom are trained in industrial relations. While these writers are profoundly aware of the differences between the conditions of collective bargaining in academic institutions and in general public employment or industry, their assumptions are based in industrial relations theory. Academic presidents, vice presidents, and deans, on the other hand, rarely come to their positions with specific training in personnel man- agement or labor relations. Many have, perforce, become expert in the management of academic collective bargaining, but their approach is conditioned by a more general set of academic values and assumptions. This dissertation seeks to view faculty collective bargaining from the position of these academically trained and oriented executives as they work out the necessary accommodations between the culture of the academy and this new--and in some respects alien-- method of structuring relationships and arriving at decisions. Assessment of change of any kind requires some "baseline" for judgment. Where the change is attributed to an event or to some alteration in circumstances, that "baseline" would logically be the conditions which existed before the event or alteration in the circumstances. Ideally, a careful descrip- tion would be made of the pre—existing condition which would then be compared point-for-point with the condition pre- vailing at some point following the introduction of the new factor. Appropriate controls would be present to permit discrimination between what is identified as the cause of change and what might be the mutual effect of still other unidentified influences. As desirable as that approach might be, however, it is hardly possible where the putative cause of change is faculty collective bargaining. Unionization of the faculty is anticipated by many institutions, but by the time it is recognized as a probable eventuality, some of the effects are already present and the time has passed for an unbiased "pretest." For purposes of this research, reliance on the memory and conscious perception of involved individuals is necessary. The fallibility of human recollection renders its evidence suspect as regards accuracy of detail, and the involvement of personalities reduces the objectivity of their response. These caveats are necessary when interpreting the results of such a personal inquiry. What is being examined, however, is precisely this set of human responses and perceptions. The evidence which they provide cannot be uncritically generalized for other individuals in other settings; but that qualification does not reflect adversely on the quality of the evidence which emerges. The qualification serves instead to refine the definition of the purpose of the research and the kinds of use to which the results may profitably be put. The purpose is to reveal the personal responses of actors in the processes of academic decision- making and leadership as adjustment takes place to a new set of relationships among the various institutional consti- tuencies. The counterparts of these administrators in other institutions facing the same change in relationships will have that additional insight into some results which they may anticipate and, at the very least, be helped to avoid repeating the mistakes of others. Limitations and Definitions The interviews were confined to campus presidents, provosts or vice presidents for academic affairs, and the deans of schools or colleges in state colleges or regional universities belonging to the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. The officers identified are the ones who now share, by line of delegation, the central administrative functions associated with the academic pro- gram of institutions of higher education. In some insti- tutions, the Chairpersons of academic departments would normally be added to that chain of authority. They have been excluded from this research for two reasons. In the first place, the number of departments and department Chairpersons to be found on most state college campuses creates a problem of sheer numbers. The numbers are less important for logistical considerations than they are for the extreme diversity that they represent. The diversity arises both from the individual personalities of the chair- men and from the differing characteristics and idiosyn- cracies of the departments they represent. In the second place, the position of department Chairpersons poses a very special problem in the organization Of collective bargaining. Whether their primary role is that of faculty member or administrator is unclear, leading to the question of their inclusion within or exclusion from the faculty bar- gaining unit. In some unionized institutions they are members of the bargaining unit and in some they are not. Since this dissertation is directed toward the specific responses of academic administrators, the inclusion of Chairpersons would introduce a distracting variable. The problem posed by the department chairperson in relation to academic collective bargaining is a particularly important one and should be the subject of more extensive survey research. Further specification and.delimitationislaccomplished by the definitions which are applied to key terms in the dissertation title. Faculty Collective Bargaining "Collective bargaining", as the term is applied in ordinary discourse, can describe a wide variety of relation- ships, and it embraces several stages in the development of any particular collective bargaining agreement. "Faculty collective bargaining" is employed in the dissertation to describe the condition which occurs when formal, legal and exclusive recognition has been granted by the governing board of an institution of higher education to an organiza- tion representing a bargaining unit which includes faculty members employed by the institution, and when a negotiated and legally ratified agreement exists between the governing board and the bargaining unit. Whenever a piece of writing deals intensively with a single topic, a simple compositional difficulty arises. Frequent necessary reptition of the term makes for literary dullness. For that reason, a certain latitude is desirable for the use of synonyms. Writers on the subject of faculty collective bargaining frequently shorten the term to "collec- tive bargaining" when it has been established that the main subject is collective bargaining for faculty members. Likewise, the definition is extended to a variety of terms including "academic collective bargaining", "faculty union- ization", "Faculty negotiations", or simply "unionization." If any of these alternate terms are used to refer to anything other than faculty collective bargaining, that is specified. Faculty collective bargaining, as the term is employed here, consists of three phases or stages. The first of these is an organizational phase during which a petition is circu- lated, a bargaining unit is defined, a bargaining agent is elected and formal recognition is granted. The "bargaining unit" is the group of employees whose employment is to be included in the collectively-negotiated agreement. The bargaining unit is distinguished from the "bargaining agent", which is the organization recognized as the authorized exclusive negotiating representative of the bargaining unit. The bargaining agent may or may not include members of the bargaining unit, although it generally does, just as there will frequently be members of the bargaining unit who choose not to belong to the bargaining agent organization. The second phase of collective bargaining is the "negotiation" phase. This is the period of time during which representatives of the bargaining agent and the employ- ing institution meet to negotiate the contract which will apply for whatever period of time the negotiators agree upon. One or two years is usual, although occasionally the contract 10 term is three years. Near the end of that time the negoti- ating process is repeated. The third phase of collective bargaining is the period of contract administration during which institutional administration is conducted according to the terms of the negotiated contract. The dramatic publicity and the "mys- 'tique" of active negotiations tends to obscure in the public Inind the importance of continuing contract administration. Tflae term "faculty collective bargaining" has deliberately tween defined in such a way as to include this period during hfliich faculty and administration live together and order tflieir affairs according to the terms of the negotiated agreement. During this phase of the relationship the most basic effects of collective bargaining may be expected to aPpear. Beyond this there is an extensive glossary of collec- tiJJe bargaining terminology most of which has been developed ill the industrial or public employee sectors. To anticipate tine substance of the dissertation, that language may itself 'hawe the subtle effect of casting academic collective bar- gaining in the direction of industry or nonacademic public employment. As occasion requires, these terms will be introduced and defined. Public Four-Year Colleges and Universities The wide variety of institutions which have develOped in American higher education renders ambiguous almost any 11 general term of reference. That observation is particularly true of the designations of "college" and "university." While those common words are occasionally used in the disser- tation in their indefinite and inclusive sense, this defini- tion will identify the class or category of colleges and universities which are the limited concern of the research. The state colleges and regional universities are tflnose institutions which basically constitute the membership (Jf the American Association of State Colleges and Univer- ssities (AASCU). This interesting group of schools has Ixeceived its most comprehensive descriptive treatment in E. .Alden Dunham's book prepared for the Carnegie Commission or1 Higher Education and entitled, Colleges of the Forgotten Anuericans. In his foreward to the book, Clark Kerr offers a <3apsule description which suggests one of the qualities “filich make the AASCU institutions particularly interesting tC) students of academic collective bargaining: The state colleges and regional universities are America's most restless institutions of higher learning. Their history spans less than 150 years, but during that time they have typically played four changing roles: as post-high school academies, as normal schools devoted solely to the education of teachers, as four-year liberal arts colleges with strong technical emphasis in teacher education, industrial arts and home economics, and as compre- hensive colleges giving also professional education in engineering and business administration and graduate work at the M.A. level. Some have become regional universities with research programs and Ph.D. degrees. And there still remains an unset- tled quality about their functions, Etandards, offerings, faculties, and clientele. 2E. Alden Dunham, Colleges of the Forgotten Americans, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969). P vii. 12 The "unsettled quality" has made the state colleges and regional universities particularly receptive to faculty collective bargaining, and it is among them that collective bargaining has made its most dramatic inroads into four-year institutions of higher education. At the same time, the climate of growth, the adjustment to new conditions, the efforts to improve academic quality and to respond to new eniucational demands make these institutions-~sometimes described as the "emerging universities"--a particularly auztive laboratory for the study of the effects of academic (Kallective bargaining on a wide range of institutional functions . Academic Leadership Roles of University Administrators This term is intended to encompass and describe what- eVer it is that administrators "do" in connection with the EEducational enterpise in institutions of higher learning. quiet set of activities consists, in the most general sense, ‘3f the whole range of tasks necessary to organize, facilitate, enable and operate the total program of a college or univer- Sity--to establish an institutional environment within which Scholars can study and teach and students can learn. In the simplest and most primitive academic communities two functions were present which could be described as "administration." One of these was the combined function of bursar-secretary-housekeeper, and the other was that of the "headmaster" or presiding professor. The specialized, 13 differentiated and bureaucratized administrative organizations Of modern universities are little more than the evolved extension of those minimum necessary ancilliaries to the academic process. From the "bursar-secretary-housekeeper" duties, management functions have developed relative to the physical plant, budget and investment, purchasing, record- .keeping, and a wide range of "auxilliary services" such as laousing, cafeterias, bookstores and public entertainment. {Phe "headmaster" is now a president or chancellor responsible :for taking the lead in coordinated planning of the academic Exrogram, which involves organizing the faculty for academic Ellanning. Student problems occur in both areas. On the Cnne hand their physical requirements must be supplied and tflleir financial responsibilities insured. On the other hand, provision is necessary for their support in matters related to the academic program. "Academic management" is a term which some now prefer 635 a description of the administrative function in higher education. The term is suspect in some quarters, however, 'because of its suggestion that academic adminiStration is ‘more closely aligned with business management than with education, and because it would seem to ignore the important differences between the academy and a business enterprise. Those objectives are not, in themselves, sufficient reason for rejection of the term. Hungate, in his definition of management in higher education specifically includes the 14 academic functions of coordinated planning and policy forma- tion as essential parts of the administrative function in academic institutions. Using that broad definition, "manage- ment" would be an acceptable and useful term for this dissertation, and it will probably creep in as a synonym. There are other reasons, however, why "management" is unacceptable as a primary term of reference. In the ‘vocabulary of collective bargaining, "management" assumes Ineanings and connotations which tend toward an industrial linderstanding of the word, limiting rather than expanding Jits applicability to the role of administration in higher enducation. Again anticipating the substance of the study, one of the factors cited as a contributing reason for the Eidoption of collective bargaining by some faculties has been time adoption of a "management posture" by institutional adiministrations. There is no question concerning the value (If management science to the operation Of educational iJlstitutions. Likewise, there is no doubt that colleges and universities have been entirely too slow in adopting and.applying sound management principles within their own Operations. The academic enterprise has suffered accordingly in educational as well as fiscal terms. But management science needs to he enlisted in the service of educational goals, to become a part of the arsenal of techniques through which academic leadership is exercised. President Dodds, in his essay on the academic presi- dency, makes much of the need for academic leadership which is informed by a well-articulated philosophy of education.3 The writer of this dissertation subscribes to that view and considers it as important now as when Dodds was writing. The dissertation deals with a fairly limited and technical subject in the field of higher education administration, but this selection of terms affords an opportunity to imply scmething of a larger purpose in its writing. Methodology Any analysis or assessment of change in the decision- Inaking processes of colleges and universities in the early axud mid-19703 must take into account two general and funda- nuental conditions. One of these is the scepe and complexity (NE change itself. The second consideration is the complexity arua variety of the processes by which decisions are arrived 31: within the academic setting. Research which attempts to isolate the consequences of faculty collective bargaining “ulst deal with difficult problems arising from these two Conditions . A Climate of Change American higher education in the 197OS--and the larger Culture of which it is a part--is characterized by rapid and continual change. Under those circumstances, causes and consequences tend to merge and blur. A single event can produce a number of effects both immediate and remote, and —_ 3Harold W. Dodds, The Academic President - Educator or Caretaker? (New York: McGraw—Hill, 1962), p. 47f. 16 a number of causal factors can combine to produce a single result. The rapid rate of change, quite apart from the direction or content of particular changes, has an effect upon persons and institutions, producing the condition which Alvin Toffler4 has described as "future shock" and contri- buting further to the difficulty of dissecting the elements of cause and effect. Discrimination between collective bargaining as a <:ause of change and as a concomitant result of more remote ‘and complex influences is difficult, and a great care must lee exercised in avoiding simplistic post hog interpretations. 1\1so, within the general climate of change, collective bar- EIaining may combined with a variety of other forces bearing upon institutions to produce yet further change. When c3011ective bargaining is the most dramatic or visible factor--as it often is--Observers may be tempted to assign tile entire weight of causation to that single factor, when Iits actual effect is only proportional with other combined influences. The problems arising from the complex nature of change processes are familiar ones to the designers of survey research, and statistical techniques are available to COpe With them. In nonstatistical research, such as that being described here, awareness of the problems is necessary in 4 1970). Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, (New York: Random House, 17 order to avoid claiming more for the research than the evidence warrants. The dissertation describes the percep— tions, experiences and reactions of involved individuals concerning the effects of faculty collective bargaining within the areas of their own professional concern. The significance of that record of experience is historical and humanistic, rather than statistically predictive. The 19erceptions of involved individuals, distorted as they may lae by human subjectivity, are still a part of a very limited laody of evidence from which to begin to assess the effects <3f academic collective bargaining on institutions of higher education. Beyond that, the perceived effects are actual tr) the extent that the perceptions provide the basis for EiCtion and response by principal participants in the process. Academic Decision-Making More directly related to the content of the research 318 the complex nature of decision-making in academic insti— tnations. Academic collective bargaining is, itself, a way <3f coming to certain kinds of decisions and it adds an addi- tional factor to the complexity of academic decision-making. Mary Parker Follett wrote: "An executive decision is only a moment in a process. The growth of decision, the accumulation of authority, not the final step, is what we need most to study."5 This research deals with an aspect of 5Mary Parker Follett, "The Meaning of Responsibility in Business Management," a paper included in Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, Dynamic Administration (New York: Harper and 18 that "accumulation of authority" in institutions of higher. education. To a greater extent than other formal organiza- tions, colleges and universities are characterized by a wide distribution of decision-making authority. In light of that fact, Follett's remark becomes even more important for the study of decision-making in the academic setting. Corson describes the situation thus: The process of deciding is distinctive in the college or university in the degree to which final responsibility for making decisions is ‘ diffused. Substantial independent authority for making various types of decisions is allo- cated beyond the trustees and the president to a faculty as a group, to individual teachers, to department heads, to deans, to coaches, and to administrative officers. It follows, hence, that the government of a college or university poses distinctive problems in finding ways of enlisting and integrating the energies, initi- ative, and zeal of the relatively larger number among whom6responsibility for decision-making is shared. The AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and z\Cademic Negotiations observes that, "Theoretically, there aire innumerable ways in which decision-making.authority ‘Could be distributed between the faculty and the administra- tion."7 The Task Force then proceeds to describe a continuum ¥ Brothers, 1940). p. 140, cited in John J. Corson, Governance 0f Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p0 110 6John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 11. 7Faculty Participation in Academic Governance, report of the AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations, Campus Governance Program (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1967). p. 14. 18 that "accumulation of authority" in institutions of higher. education. To a greater extent than other formal organiza- tions, colleges and universities are characterized by a wide distribution of decision-making authOrity. In light of that fact, Follett's remark becomes even more important for the study of decision-making in the academic setting. Corson describes the situation thus: The process of deciding is distinctive in the college or university in the degree to which final responsibility for making decisions is ‘ diffused. Substantial independent authority for making various types of decisions is allo- cated beyond the trustees and the president to a faculty as a group, to individual teachers, to department heads, to deans, to coaches, and to administrative officers. It follows, hence, that the government of a college or university poses distinctive problems in finding ways of enlisting and integrating the energies, initi- ative, and zeal of the relatively larger number among whomsresponsibility for decision-making is shared. The AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations observes that, "Theoretically, there area innumerable ways in which decision-making.authority could be distributed between the faculty and the administra- ti<>r1."7 The Task Force then proceeds to describe a continuum \ gg‘DizlmerS. 1940), p. 140, cited in John J. Corson, Governance Eitblleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), J. (DJ 6John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Universities 9‘? York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 11. tiles 7Faculty Participation in Academic Governance, report of GEE! 1AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representat1on and Academ1c Amthiations, Campus Governance Program (Washington, D.C.: 1::ican Association for Higher Education, 1967), p. 14. 19 along which the general decision-making mode in a particular institution could be located and described. The continuum extends from "Administrative Dominance" at one end to "Faculty Dominance" at the other. Intermediate points are established in "Administrative Primacy," "Shared Authority" (the midpoint), and "Faculty Primacy." That linear distri- bution of decision-making authority is useful for a "capsule" description of particular decision-making styles. The model is also conceptually useful to illustrate the equilibrium of authority between faculty and administration. For a more refined analysis, however, the linear con- C€§fizis inadequate. There are, in fact, several sets of cxxardinates required, corresponding to the several institu- ticnaal constituencies, each of which represents a center of POWer. The " locus of decision" is among, rather than Faculty power is exercised through between, constituencies. departments and schools, as well as through institutional legislative bodies. Students have informal influence over decisions in almost all institutions, and in many students have a formal role in policy-formation. The administration 13 r10t a single center of power, but several such centers: the’ IDresident or chancellor, vice-presidents, deans, direc- Boards tors . managers and heads of offices or departments. O f. “Dirustees, once content to let faculty, students and a - o I I t “JLIIistration order campus affairs w1th l1ttle d1rect inter- ve - O I I rlt:JLon, are now exerting more authority over campus dec1s1ons. \ 81bid., pp. 15-16. 21 and constituencies that can potentially become involved in any decision, the problem is compounded by the situational nature of academic decisions. Institutions have a wide variety of functions which give rise to issues for decision, and different viewpoints and competencies must be brought to bear on each issue. The point at which any decision becomes final, and the process by which it arrives at finality, will vary with the subject. Furthermore, each decision of substance requires a prior decision on procedure. "Deciding how to decide" may turn out to be the more important of the two. The "locus of decision" is the point of equilibrium lbetween centers of influence and authority at which a deci— sion becomes final. More important than locating that ter- Iminal point, however, is the tracing of the process by which a (decision arrives there. Deciding is a process which takes Place over time, and'the shape of the decision is in a cOndition of change and refinement until it reaches a state of? neturity. Decision, as an executive act, may be nothing "KDJTe than the conscious recognition that the process of deciding has reached its culmination. That is the thrust of Follett's remark that, "The growth of decision, the acC—‘Vuanulation of authority, not the final step, is what we need most to study.” Within the framework of this general understanding of lee nature of academic decision-making, this research has 8 I C>I1S3ht to uncover evidence of the ways in Wthh some ii . . czéi<3emic administrators perceive that their roles in the 22 process of academic decision-making have been changed as a result of the adoption of collective bargaining by the faculties of their institutions. Those perceptions include: 1. ways in which the loci of finality of the various kinds of decision have shifted relative to themselves sub- sequent to the adoption of faculty collective bargaining; 2. changes in the degree and kind of authority or influence which they are able to exert over the decision- making processes; 3. the degree to which the changes are directly or indirectly attributable to the presence of faculty collec- 'tive bargaining; and. 4. general observations concerning the degree to deich the officers' ability to exercise leadership and efEEect educational change has been diminished or enhanced. The Research Method The method selected which, given the limitations of tile? research, appeared likeliest to yield evidence illumina- tiriSJ the issues just identified was the relatively simple one of conducting structured interviews with central admin- lstlTative officers of selected institutions. Presidents (or Chancellors), Provosts (or Academic Affairs Vice- P . tees:idents), and Deans of schools, colleges, or facult1es w 0 ealrfiér interviewed on four campuses 1n three states. Faculty collective bargaining is an institutional ED . . . hehomenon. Even though the trend 1s nationw1de, the form 23 which the bargaining relationship assumes on any campus varies with factors in the local setting. Accordingly, the officers were interviewed in institutional groups. Inevitably, the evidence collected assumed some of the characteristics of institutional case studies. Background information was assembled concerning each institution visited. This included the size and general programmatic character of the institution, its relationship to the organ- izational structure of higher education in the state, a brief history of faculty collective bargaining on the campus, and a review of the current negotiated faculty agreement. .Although the research was conducted in this institutional form, the reports are not represented to be institutional case studies. That would require a more comprehensive iJTvestigation with all campus constituencies, and such a Procedure lies beyond the scope of the research. One important logistical consideration in planning tines interview format was economy of time. Administrative tlilne is an institutional resource reducible to a dollar all“Gunt, and the persons who were interviewed were precisely tJIE! ones who would be most conscious of that fact. The most efficient procedure proved to be one in which the it“:£erviewees were asked to review a list of decision-making tXDIPCics, selecting for further discussion only those which we be most importantly affected by faculty collective bargain- i. . . r‘SB'. The interv1ewees were then permitted to reflect 24 narratively on the topics which appeared to them to be of primary concern. Decision topics were listed according to National Center for Higher Education Management Systems Data Element categories.10 Topics listed were, by NCHEMS category, as follows: COURSE - RELATED Admission policies and standards Curriculum content and degree requirements Grading standards and policies Academic calendar Introduction, deletion, or change of programs Acceptance of sponsored research Conduct of extension and public service programs \IO‘UI-fiWNI-J O FACILITIES - RELATED 1. Classroom and laboratory assignment and schedule 2. Faculty office assignment and amenities 3. Classroom, laboratory and office maintenance 4 New.facilities planning and physical plant development 5. Automobile parking space FINANCE - RELATED 1. Preparation of institutional request budget 2. Prosecution of the budget request with state ~ agencies 3. Internal allocation of the appropriated budget 4. Establishment of student fee schedules 5. Establishment of prices and fees for auxilliary services 6. Development of management information and planning systems 7. Solicitation of private funding for institutional development 8. Allocation of student financial assistance \— ( 10James S. Martin, Data Element Dictionary: Course Technical Report 29 of the National Center for Higher Egucation Management Systems at WICHE, Boulder, Colorado, ‘72), p. 4. - ,, 25 STAFF - RELATED 1. Appointment of new faculty 2. Retention or nonretention of faculty 3. Awarding of faculty tenure 4. Retrenchment of faculty for reasons of financial exigency 5. Promotion of faculty 6. Evaluation of teaching effectiveness 7. Establishment of faculty work load 8. Faculty compensation 9. Faculty grievance procedures 0. Establishment of personnel policies for admin- istrative or support staff 11. Selection and appointment of administrative officers 12. Affirmative action STUDENT - RELATED 1. Student development and academic support 2. Counseling and student health . Residence hall programs . Student conduct and discipline . Student activities and organizations . Student participation in institutional governance O‘U‘lubb) Topics in the list have not been duplicated, although some could obviously be included in more than one category. An attempt was made to word the topics in such a manner tJIElt: they would define the areas for discussion while all-c>'wing considerable latitude in the response. This approach kmass adopted because it exploits the principle advantage wflj—czh the interview technique has over survey research; naunleely, that the respondent is free to limit the discussion ar1<1 thus expand the range of possible responses. While prea(:ision is sacrificed and a great deal of dependence is plea<:ed upon interpersonal communication between the inter- vieVver and the interviewee, the possibility is created that s I LII3jective shadings of opinion and perception are captured. 26 Consideration was originally given to the use of a tape recorder to capture statements verbatim. That technical aid might have improved the quality of the reporting, but the possibility was rejected in part because tape recorded conversations were at the time of the interviews the subject of sensitive national attention. In addition, it was felt that, on a subject of institutional sensitivity, conversa- tion would be less inhibited if that kind of verbatim On all occasions, assurances were record did not exist. given that officers and institutions would not be named in the dissertation, and that this information, together with raw notes on the interviews and visits would be held con-- fidential between the researcher and his guidance committee. This initial chapter of the dissertation has attempted to trace the genesis of the research in the experience and perceptions of the writer and in the thought given to the me‘tllod by which he might best approach the problem. Before pr(Dceeding to a report and analysis of the evidence gathered, a further background will be established in a review of that portion of the published literature which bears most inmE><3rtantly on the subject of the research. That review forms the substance of the succeding chapter. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE In the six years or so since the advent of faculty collective bargaining in American four-year colleges and universities, the academic community has generated what it would characteristically term "a vast literature" on the subject. Collective bargaining has become a leading item in the educational press and on the agenda of conferences and seminars. Study centers have been organized to analyze the phenomenon, and a professional association has been formed among institutional officers who are particularly con cerned with faculty contract negotiation and administra- tiOn. The eventual appearance of a new professional journal is predictable. In spite of the sheer volume of words devoted to the subject, however, the actual body of ideas, opinions and observed facts is limited. One bibliographer Sal's, off the record, "Everyone is still writing the 'first a‘Z'T‘:icle' on collective bargaining!" Treatments of faculty collective bargaining fall into Se‘ieral fairly well-defined categories, or various combin- 3“tions of them. They include: Narratives or chronicles, historical, journalistic, subjective or interpretative: Analysis of causes and prediction of consequences; 27 28 Description and analysis of negotiated contracts; Legal opinions and analyses; Practical manuals for managing the various phases of the bargaining relationship; and, Advocacy and controversy. More recently, a new category of discussion has appeared which concerns the student involvement in and response to collective bargaining by the faculty. Understandably, the earlier discussions of faculty collective bargaining were principally concerned with its causes. These early articles contained a great deal of speculation and opinion, but as more faculties were unionized "harder" evidence became available, permitting careful study and data-based conclusions regarding the conditions which led faculties to organize. The larger question, however, is what the consequences of faculty collective bargaining will be. That question remains unanswered in any form other than impression or, at best, informed speculation. The body of experience is now reaching the level where it is possible to collect data and draw conclusions. A number of recent articles call attention to the need for research into the "impact" of faculty collective bargaining and several such studies are now in progress. Clearly, this is the area of greatest current need for study in the field of academic collective bargaining, particularly in view of the usefulness of such studies to institutions which must plan for the future with collective bargaining as a condition. 29 Faculty Collective Bargaining: HiStory and Some causes In his 1918 book, The Higher Learning_in America,l Thorstein Veblen made one of those sardonic reverse prophe- cies which admit a possibility even as they deny the fact. He wrote, "Professors refuse to join unions or engage in collective bargaining because of a feeling prevalent among them that their salaries are not in the nature of wages and that there would be a species of moral obliquity implied in overtly so dealing with the matter." Veblen was concerned about the kinds of market-place values which appeared to him as threatening the academic quality of American universities, and trade unionism in higher education looked like the ultimate--if absurd--extension of those values. By 1973, the possibility of faculty unionization had been realized in 62 four-year institutions of higher education or multi- campus university systems and in 150 two—year post-secondary institutions. In 1915, three years before Veblen published his book, the academic profession in America marked its arrival at maturity with the formation of the American Association of University Professors. Fundamental to the purposes of the AAUP was the maintenance of academic freedom and its safe- guard in professorial tenure. Fifty-eight years later this 1Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America (Stanford, Academic Reprints, 1954 [1918]). 2"212 College and University Faculties with Collective Bargaining Agents," The Chronical of Higher Education, November 26, 1973.' 30 prestigious professional organization was representing twenty-five faculties as their exclusive agent in collective negotiations over "terms and conditions of employment."3 Although the faculties of some community colleges had been engaged in collective bargaining since 1966 or even earlier, unionization for the faculties of four-year insti- tutions made a relatively modest appearance in 1967. In the summer of that year, an agreement was negotiated by the faculty of Bryant College of Business Administration, Rhode Island. Six months later, an agreement was concluded with the faculty of the United States Merchant Marine Academy in New York.4 In both cases, the faculty bargaining agent was the American Federation of Teachers. The specialized character of these two institutions, one of them a private school and the other a federal one, permitted the events to pass virtually unnoticed by the wider academic community. Although organizing activities were taking place on a number of campuses, the full arrival of collective bargaining for university faculties was marked by the agreement reached in September of 19695 by the giant multi-campus City Uni- versity of New York (CUNY) with the two bargaining units into which its 10,000 full and part-time faculty members 31bid. 4Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. VanEyck, Collective Bargaining Comes to the Campus (Washington, D.C.: ACE, 1973), pp. 17-18. 5 Ibid., p. 17. 31 were divided.6 In 1970, Central Michigan University became the first single-campus public university to enter into a collectively negotiated contract with its faculty.7 Shortly thereafter, St. John‘s University of New York, a private university, and Southeastern Massachusetts University, a state institution, signed faculty agreements.8 From that point, the spread of faculty collective bargaining has pro- vided better exercise for scorekeepers than for historians. Reasons which would account for the readiness of university faculties to organize for collective bargaining have been the subject of much discussion, speculation, and analysis. The reasons are complex. Some of them are deeply subjective or unique to particular institutions, so that motives which would apply across the academic profession are difficult to isolate. Some of the motives are, of course, economic; but economic issues cannot by themselves account for the move- ment toward faculty unionization, nor are faculty economic concerns identical with the ones which drove industrial employees to organize. For one thing, collective bargaining came to the campus at a time when professors were beginning to achieve a modest degree of affluence. Between 1958 and 6E. Alden Dunham, Colleges of the Forgotten Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 107. 7Robert G. Howlett, "Perspectives in Public Sector Bargaining" in Terrence N. Tice, ed., Faculty Power: Collec— tive Bargaining On Campus (Ann Arbor: Institute of Continu- ing Legal Education, 1972), p. 24. ' ‘ ‘ 8Carr and Van Eyck, 9p. cit., p. 18. 32 1970, faculty salaries increased at an average annual rate nationwide of about 7 percent.9 But substantial and, in some cases, even dramatic gains kindled even greater expec- tations, particularly among younger and junior faculty. A principle of relative disadvantage seems to operate.10 There was little agitation as long as professors lived in isolated college communities where everyone shared the same level of genteel poverty and where the academic salary established the community standard. For many, the lower level of financial reward appeared to be a worthwhile trade- off for the congenial academic life style. In the burgeoning suburbia which now surrounds university cities, professors are apt to mingle in community life with professionals in industry, business, law and medicine; and the professor, particularly the young professor, rapidly becomes conscious of an economic differential between himself and professionals of his own age who have invested the same amount of time and money in professional training. A similar process occurs within the academic institu- tions themselves. When some faculty members reached the level of real affluence, aided by fat research grants and the academic "star" system, a corresponding discontent was 9Lewis B. Mayhew, "Faculty Demands and Faculty Mili- tance," Journal of Higher Education, 41, No. 1, (Winter 1967), p. 344. See also: Carr and VanEyck, 9p. cit., p. 43. 10 Mayhew, gp. cit., p. 344. 33 generated among those who aspired to equal rewards. Whether one attibutes the discontent over salaries to jealousy or to justifiable grievance over inequities, the result is the same. A bitterness was created toward a system of salary determination that permits such disparities.ll The faculty of the Basic College may conclude--rightly or wrongly--that they have been penalized in order to provide some princely salaries in the Department of Biochemistry. As is true of the young in an affluent society, young professors expect, often unrealistically, to reach the top early. They are impatient with the administration for not moving them along more rapidly, particularly when their academic credentials are superior to those of their senior colleagues, as is often the case. They see nothing profes- sionally inappropriate about joing a union as a means of closing the status differential more quickly. Experience demonstrates that rapidly-growing faculties with a high proportion of their members in junior ranks are particularly inclined toward the adoption of collective bargaining. The matter of economic benefit is, moreover, tied to the whole professional apparatus of rank, tenure and promo- tion. The adversaries of the junior faculty are, at this 11William Boyd, "Collective Bargaining in Academe: Causes and Consequences," Liberal Education, 57, No. 3, (October 1971), p. 308. 12John C. Livingston, "Collective Bargaining and Professionalism," Educational Record, 48, No. 1, (Winter 1967), P. 79. See also: Dunham, 9p. gi£., p. 106. 34 point, not the administrative bureaucracy, but the academic hierarchy in their departments.13 Instructors and assistant professors know that their destinies are not in the hands of their academic peers, but of their professional superiors, and the traditional academic processes appear designed and manipulated to keep it that way. The price of admission to senior ranks is, or seems to be, compliant behavior at the expense of academic freedom and professional initiative. Moreover, teaching effectiveness--usually stated as a principal criterion for promotion--does not appear to be articularly related to age or rank, leading to the younger teachers' feeling that they deserve better consideration on that ground alone. Collective bargaining provides an obvious means of outflanking the professional power structure in matters of advancement and tenure. If the urgencies of youth provide some of the reasons for faculty unionization, the insecurities of middle age add others. As Lewis Mayhew and others have pointed out, faculties are especially "union-prone" in junior colleges and in former teachers' colleges which have become multi- purpose universities. In these latter institutions there may be a sizable segment of the faculty who feel that they have left one comfortable reference group, but have not yet been totally accepted by another. The threat to the ego is intensified by the presence of academic "stars" and the 13Livingston, gp. cit., pp. 79-80. 35 bright and aggressive young products from the good graduate schools who inevitably appear as institutions develop toward mature university status.l4 There will be those among the Older teachers college cadre who fear that they are "mar- ginal" professionals, and the feeling expresses itself, in Mayhew's words, as "anxiety, punitiveness, rage, and a search for scapegoats." The administration is an available target and the union becomes the weapon.15 Administrative behaviors have doubtless contributed to faculty unionization, but in ways that are difficult to define and which have received little treatment in the literature--perhaps because so much of that literature has been produced by administrators. Any conclusions, therefore, must be largely speculative. Administrative authoritarian- ism of an obvious sort is less of an issue than might ordinarily be expected. Collective bargaining seems to have come to some schools concurrently with a change away from the authoritarian administrations which were often characteristic of the teachers' colleges-~an administrative style which was easy for them to absorb from the elementary and secondary school systems. That may itself offer a partial explanation. Historians have pointed out that revolutions are less likely 14Henry L. Mason, College and University Government (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1972), p. 21. See also: Carr and VanEyck, _p. cit., p. 58. 15Mayhew,‘<_>p_. cit., p. 343. 36 to occur as a reaction against utter powerlessness than as a response to the first taste of freedom. Some of the "new breed" of administrators came from faculty ranks and wanted very much to be Viewed as colleagues by their own faculties. It came as a baffling and disappoint- ing surprise when they were not, in spite of their efforts at demonstrating a faculty orientation. Then, too, in their zeal to move their institutions along the spectrum toward nature university status, they may have been less democratic than they thought, more or less unconsciously replacing the old despotism with a more subtle manipulation. Sheila Polishook,16 commenting on the emergence of faculty unions at CUNY, attributes much of the faculty's attitude to administrators' failure to "read" accurately the faculty sentiments about the administration. She quotes the CUNY president as saying, "It is as unusual to find ifaculty members who consider themselves employees as to find administrators who consider themselves managers." ’Phat view may have been naive. Professor Polishook pointed out that "many" CUNY administrators had been trained in educational administration, rather than the "academic" disciplines, citing that as evidence that the administrators considered themselves to be academic managers. Her reply to the president's quoted statement was, "We are employed, __ 16Sheila S. Polishook, "Collective Bargaining and the City University of New York," Journal of Higher Education, 41, No. 5, (May 1970). PP. 377-386. 37 we are salaried, and we work under fixed conditions, controlled not by ourselves, but by those who hired us." Whether or not the CUNY administrators regarded them- selves as "managers," Polishook anticipates another set of influences working on administrators to force them into a management position gig 3 gig their faculties. One of these forces is collective bargaining itself, of which one presi- dent of a unionized institution said, "A cynical faculty member might suspect that it is all a management plot." More important is the management revolution in academic administration which has come with leaner days in the universities and the pressing need to allocate scarce resources efficiently. Indifference or disdain on the part of influential senior professors is a factor in establishing a climate favorable to unionization. When faced with the decision Whether or not to unionize, the classical academic response ought to be rigorous examination of the issues and reasoned debate over them. That is what university faculties are suPPPSed to do best. Instead, the response of the very individuals who should be the most skilled practitioners of that academic art is to quit the arena. Thus, the decision to unionize is, in some measure, a decision by defa1111:. A strange coalition forms between youthful, able, stYlistically radical professors and the older "marginal" faculty members whose personal style is likely to be severely con'Servative. That coalition is enough to carry the day for 38 the union, given the inaction of the mature and professionally powerful seniors.17 There is some indication that this pattern of behavior may hue changing. In 1972 and 1973, a number of faculties rejected unionization in agency elections. Commentators are cxeutious about identifying the rejections as a trend, and tflae only reasons they are willing to suggest are "more aggrenssive, knowledgeable administration activity, combined "18 One possibility is that with.llingering faculty caution. more syenior professors are doing their homework and entering the Exelitical debate. In any event, it is too late for the instidrutions already engaged in collective negotiations, since «experience from other sectors of the economy indicates that tflne adoption of collective bargaining is far easier than i:ts abandonment, even when the results are unsatis- factorfiy from the viewpoint of the organized employees them- SEIVes;.19 A far greater likelihood, as Carr and VanEyck SUQQGSSt, is the replacement of one bargaining agent by another_20 In addition to the internal climate of institutions, therEi are external forces which provide impetus in the \ 17Boyd, gp. cit., pp. 309-310. in 18Jack H. Schuster, Emerging Issues in Faculty Bargain- EHE) 4Address prepared for deIivery at thé l73fd’meetifig of a1: Ihnerican Political Science Association, 1973, p. 6. See ‘33 Carr and VanEyck, op. cit., pp. 146—148, 152-156. Th . lgphilip W. Semas, "Faculties at the Bargaining Table," r-xe Chronicle of Higher Education, November 26, 1973, p. 9. 20Carr and Van Eyck, QE- cit., p. 14. 39 direction of faculty unionization. Some of these forces derive from the social environment. Collective bargaining is a method for the resolution of group interests which is widely accepted in industrialized society, and its methods and terminology are understood by almost anyone who reads the newspapers. Furthermore, unionization has been purged of its ”strong-arm" connotations by its widespread adoption among teachers in the public schools and among other white- collar public employees. The present distribution of faculty collective bargaining in higher education shows a marked concentration among institutions in the industrialized northeast quadrant of the continental United States, suggest- ing that professors are more ready to organize when they are located in geographical proximity to industry, and where the cOllective negotiation of labor contracts is a frequent and Visible event.21 A further important element in the social "ripple- effect" is the manner in which faculty collective bargaining is Communicated within the educational community. Lower schOOl teachers were the first to organize, followed by faculty in the junior colleges who were often a part of the Same public school systems. Finally, collective bargaining \ In _ 21Faculty Collective Bargaining in Postsecondary FBEEEutions: - 'Eie Impact on the Campus and on Hie State, by 19‘; Education Commission of the States, (Report No. 28, May "M 2) . p. 2. See also: Bill Aussieker and J. W. Garbar1no, In.eaS-uring Faculty Unionism: Quantity and Qual1ty," \dsgpriai RelatiOns, 12, No. 2, (May 1973). 40 was adopted by the faculties of four-year colleges and universities. Dunham remarks that some of the part-time faculty at CUNY when that institution was unionized were "moonlighting" public school teachers and already members of the AFT . 22 What accounts for that spread, at least in part, is the demonstration that collective bargaining works where faculty salaries are concerned. The comparison of salary scales before and after the introduction of collective bargaining provides strong evidence of the ability of collective negotiation to bring about rapid improvement in compensation. Administrations have claimed that the compensation packages won at the bargaining table were about what they had planned to grant anyway, and so it may have been; but the simplest interpretation of the evidence is that collective bargaining provides immediate financial gain for the faculty.23 The actual movement to organize requires the presence 0f Somme group or organization which is willing to offer J‘tself as a bargaining agent.24 The American Federation of Of Teachers (AFT), an AFL-CIO affiliate with long experience \ 22Dunham, 9_p_. cit., p. 107. ti 23Boyd, 22' cit., p. 310. See also: Faculty Collec- ‘~X§Ll§§rgaining, gp. cit., note 21, p. 3. gai . 24Joseph W. Garbarino, "Emergence of Collective Bar- Uniittngy" in E. D. Duryea and Robert S. Fisk, eds., Faculty i§j§¥%§_and Collective Bargaining (San Franc1sco: Jossey-Bass, . pp. 13-15. 41 in negotiating for teachers in the public schools, was an active early proponent of college faculty unionization. AFT organizing activity drew in the National Education Associa- tion, .also active in the public schools, as a competitor in bargaining agent elections. The super-professional AAUP at firnet treated the union movement in higher education with disdaini as being unworthy of professors. The 1968 State- ;figflgs of the AAUP strongly support that anti-union position.25 In the: same‘year, however, Harry Marmion predicted that, "The IUAUP may need to decide whether to continue on the high road.ch professionalism or go to where the action is, where the Hennbers are, and where many feel the future of higher education lies."26 'The AAUP has evidently come to agree with Marmion. Already in 1968, while continuing to maintain its anti-union posturwe, the AAUP reached a position where it could recog- niZe tile legitimacy of a "withholding of services" by the facultqg under certain grave circumstances. Five years later, the AAUP was representing the faculties of twenty-five inStitutions of higher education as their exclusive agent for collective bargaining. As for the other national organiza- tions in 1973, the AFT was the bargaining agent at forty-eight (M . 25Louis Joughin, ed., Academic Freedom and Tenure, adlSon: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 349-350. Ed 26Harry A Marmion, "Unions and Higher Education," \“Sational Recorg, 49, No. 1 (Winter 1968), p. 46. \ 42 institutions, the NEA at ninety institutions, and merged affiliates of the AFT and NBA at twenty institutions. Twenty-nine faculties were represented by independent faculty associations. These figures represent both two-year and four-year institutions, both public and private. The influence of the law itself is a matter of central importance, not only where the incentives to faculty union- ization are concerned, but also where the consequences are being assessed.27 The availability of a legal framework for collective bargaining clearly encourages adoption of the method. New York's 1967 "Taylor Law" is widely identified as an important factor in the unionization of faculties in New York's public universities.28 Since 1965, eighteen states have enacted legislation ‘which permits collective bargaining by public employees. Three of these make special provision for the faculties of public institutions of higher education. The great prepon- derance of organized faculties are in states which have 27Kenneth P. Mortimer and G. Gregory Lozier, Collective Bargaining; Implications for Governance (The Pennsylvania State University, Center for the Study of Higher Education, Report No. 17, June 1972): PP. 3—4. See also: Garbarino, 92° cit., p. 3: "The extension to government workers, particularly at the state level, of the right to organize for collective bargaining is the most important single reason for the present form and growth of academic unions." 28William F. McHugh, "Collective Negotiations in Public Higher Education,” College and University Business, 47, No. 6, (December 1969), p. 41. See also: Polishook, op. 935., and Schuster, op. cit., p. 4. 43 comprehensive public employee bargaining laws.29 In addition to the states with public employee bargaining laws, six others, including California, have laws requiring public employers to "meet and confer" with their employees.30 The situation in Michigan is complicated by the fact that the state's public universities are constitutionally incorporated and thus exist as branches of government rather than as public agencies. The applicability of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act is thus in question. Five university faculties in Michigan are engaged in collective bargaining. In each case, the faculty claims that they are negotiating under the provisions of the act and the govern- ing board claims that it is at the table ex gratia. The Charade works well as long as the issue is not put to the test in the courts. That is almost certain to happen rather sooner than later, with important implications for the autonomy of the Michigan institutions. Federal law accomplishes for most private colleges and universities what state legislation has done for public ones. In 1970, responding to petitions from Cornell and Syracuse Universities, the National Labor Relations Board agreed to assume jurisdiction over employment relations at those two private institutions, permitting them to negotiate with their 29Terrence N. Tice, "The Situation in the States," in Terrence N. Tice, ed., Faculty Bargaining in the Seventies (Ann Arbor: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1973), pp. 178-238. 3oIbid. 44 employees under Federal labor law.31 In so doing, the NLRB reversed an earlier position taken in its 1951 Columbia University decision. There was no apparent recognition by the universities, the several amici curiae, or the NLRB, that the decision would open the way for the faculties of private institutions to organize and negotiate with their institutions in the status of "employees." The NLRB did admit in its decision that it was "entering a hitherto uncharted area." The NLRB has since ruled that it would assume labor jurisdiction over private institutions having a gross annual income of $1,000,000, or more, bringing approximately 80 percent of private higher education under its authority.32 The important issue raised by the NLRB decision is the same one faced by public institutions which are organized undertfluaprovisions of state legislation. The issue is how to define and accomodate within the law the unique nature of faculty employment, using criteria developed with entirely different classes of employees in mind. The question comes sharply into focus when decisions are made about who shall be included within a bargaining unit and who shall be excluded. This crucial discrimination between "managers" and "employed professionals" is one which has important implications for 31183 NLRB 41, 74 LRRM 1269 (1970). 32Carr and VanEyck, gp. git., p. 28. See also: Myron Lieberman, "Professors, Unitel," Harper's Magazine, 243, No. 1457 (October 1971). p. 62. Lieberman, at that time, put the figure at "more than two-thirds." 45 the governance systems of educational institutions; and frequently the decision is made not by the institutions themselves, but by the employment relations boards applying nonacademic criteria. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education defines the problem crisply: The Federal National Labor Relations Act is based on industrial experience. State laws on bargaining are based on the special nature of the civil service. The sharp industrial deline- ation between management and labor does not fit higher education; nor does the hierarchical civil service relation fit the more collegial approach taken on a campus. Faculty members are neither industrial workers nor civil servants. Their special profession and the special nature of the institution in which they are employed both call for separate treatment. Bargaining and Governance: More Causes and Some Possible Conseqpences Economic considerations provide much of the impetus for faculty collective bargaining. They may even be the most powerful influence at work on the individual professor as he marks his ballot in an agency election. For the faculty union movement as a whole, however, economics are secondary to a set of motives related to the government of institutions. Schuster says, "Despite collective bar- gaining's ostensible preoccupation with economic issues, the most consequential issues for the life of the university 0 O I O I 34 revolve around bargaining's impact on univer51ty governance." 33The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Gover— nance of Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1973), p. 50. 34Schuster, gp. cit., p. 6. 46 Even if the single reason for unionization were the matter of faculty salaries, the threat to traditional governance systems is an obvious one. Ralph Brown sums it up in his often-quoted version of the "domino theory": Once a bargaining agent has the weight of statu- tory certification behind him, a familiar process comes into play. First, the matter of salaries is linked to work load; work load is then directly related to class size, class size to range of offerings, and range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also lead to bargaining over admissions policies.35 The American system of higher education, both public and private, is characterized historically by a strong sense of public responsibility. There is an equally strong con- cern for academic freedom and the autonomy of the faculty in matters related to their educational functions. Inter- posed between the two are the institutional presidents and their administrations. The office of the president, in its extended sense, is seen, on one hand, as implementing the directives of the lay board, and, on the other hand, as representing the judgments of the faculty to the board and to the supporting public constituency. The scheme is gen- erally described as a "shared authority" and it functions in a kind of kinetic--and tenuous--political balance. The effectiveness of the system depends heavily upon the poli- tical skill of the participants and the measure of trust 35Ralph Brown, "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Michigan Law Review, March 1969, p. 1075. J 47 that exists between them. The system of shared authority or "codetermination" contrasts with the line-and-staff decision-making hierarchy of industry, the military, or the civil service bureaucracy. The concept of shared authority finds its most complete and concrete delineation in the "Statement of Government of Colleges and Universities," published in the AAUP Bulletin (Winter 1966). The statement was a joint effort by the AAUP Committee "T" on College and University Govern- ment, the Commission on Administrative Affairs of the ACE, and, at a later stage, the Associated Governing Boards.36 The statement acknowledges that, with few exceptions, the governing board is the "final institutional authority."37 The statement is, however, stronger and more explicit in describing the governing role of the faculty: The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process. On these matters the power of review or final decision lodged in the governing board, or delegated by it tothe president, should be exercised adversely only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communicated to the faculty. (Section V)38 The position of the president as the interlocutor of the system is established by the statement that, 36Mason,"9p. Cit., p. xii. Text reproduced in Joughin, pp. cit., pp. 90-101. 37Joughin, pp. 933., p. 96. 381bid., p. 93. 48 It is the duty of the president to see to it that the standards and procedures in Operational use within the college or university conform to the policy established by the governing board and to the standards of sound academic practice. and, His leadership role is supported by delegated authority from the board and the faculty.3 [Emphasis mine.] Most of the current literature on the governance of higher education supports the concept Of shared authority, although it is frequently acknowledged that the condition is an ideal one and exists only to a relative degree in parti- cular institutions.40 Existence of the concept, even as a philosophical ideal, is valuable to the academic community. As Sanford Kadish has observed, ". . .It has tended to be the mode of rapprochement between bureaucracy and profes— sionalism in institutions of higher education to which faculties have traditionally aspired."41 Governance under the principle of shared authority is continually in flux and there is an almost infinite variety of forms which it can assume in operation. Mortimer and Lozier identify three basic shared authority models: ". . .joint participation in decision-making: agreements to 391bid., pp. 97, 98. 40See e.g., The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Governance of Higher Education, op. cit., Recommendation 14, p.'41. Mortimer and Lozier, pp. £33., p. 4. 4lSanford Kadish, "The Strike and the Professoriate," AAUP Bulletin, Summer 1968, p. 163. 49 separate jurisdictions among interdependent constituencies; and collective negotiations."42 Israel Kugler, identifying himself as a spokesman for the AFT and faculty unionism, is more forceful in describing collective bargaining as an effective and authentic instrument of shared authority: A parliamentary model in which the working faculty engaged in teaching and research would select all administrators and have them responsible to the faculty for the carrying out of faculty policy is a desirable ideal, but a utopian one. Facing reality, we must recognize that-professors are not officers of an institution on appointment, but professional employees. By banding together in a union and seeking collective bargaining status, the imbalance of power can be redressed and the untrammelled authority of the administra- tor-trustee combine effectively checked. A truly shared authority is the result.43 There are several forces at work in the American academic community which have prompted some faculties to concur with Kugler and opt for collective negotiations as an instrument of governance or as an adjunct to the more traditional systems. Some of these forces are the product of the 19603 "boom” in higher education and the concurrent campus ferment.44 Universities, the established ones at least, became centers of power to a degree unprecedented in their history. That power was economic and political as well V.— f 42Mortimer and Lozier, 2p. cit., p. 4. 43Israel Kugler, "The Union Speaks for Itself," Educational Record, 49, No. 4, p. 415. 44Fac‘u'ltngarticip'ation'i'n Asademic Governance (Washington: American AssoCiétiofi for Higher Education, 1967), po 9. I ‘ 50 as intellectual. Power is a form of energy which, once it exists, must go somewhere. In spite of his nod to "shared authority," Kugler's statement translates: "Power." One of the factors in the emergence of collective bargaining is the possession of power itself, quite apart from the goals it might be expected to serve. In a more practical direction, the affluence of the sixties produced explosive growth in the size and complexity of many institutions, together with changes in their educa- tional functions. Single-purpose teachers' colleges became multi-purpose universities-~the so-called "emerging univer- sities." The old governance systems were unable to cope with the stresses of change. Even in established and dis- tinguished universities, the mechanisms of university govern- ment showed signs of stress, prompting the creation of "governance commissions" on many, if not most, campuses. The studies of governance at Princeton and at California are 45 Another product of the general two important examples. concern for governance was the joint AAUP-ACE-AGB "Statement" cited above. Duryea and Fisk relate the emergence of collective bargaining to the whole "governance crisis" in higher education: w A . _...l ... . 'SCaleb Foote and Mayer, Henry, The Culture of the University:' GoVernance and EduCation (San Francisco: jossey-Bass, I960). 51 The specific influences prodding academicians and other professionals to turn to collective bar- gaining are numerous, and not all bear on every situation. More fundamentally, in our view, the emergence of unions relates significantly to the changing nature of college and university government.46 The professional power resident in the faculties of established universities had its "spilléover" effect on the faculties of the "emerging" universities. Of these latter schools, Garbarino says, As their mission changed and new departments and colleges were created, the new faculty recruited for these units had high expectations of profes- sional independence and of professional influence over institutional policy. The conversion to the prestigious university status also legitimized high expectations among the old faculty. However, the administrators and estab- lished faculty leadership of some of the new systems were slow to adopt the forms of governance and faculty power associated with universities, at least in the opinion of some of their faculty constituents, and unionism appeared as a device to hasten the process.47 Throughout the 19605, a new set of social priorities began to make its influence felt with implications for university government more serious, even, than the growth of professional power. The "knowledge explosion" and the consequent rise in academic prestige led to a theory of 46E. D. Duryea and Fisk, Robert 8., "Impact of Union- ism on Governance," in Dykman W. V., ed., The Expanded Campus, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 19727. p. 1072 47 Garbarino, 9p. cit., p. 11. m 52 social, economic, and professional reward based on merit. The new social thrust arose from an entirely different direction: the "revolution of rising expectations" produced by the success of the civil rights movement. Equality of social opportunity, with its corollary in equality of access to higher education, became the leading social priority. Across the society, the dominant political theory became "one man, one vote," with maximum extension of poli- tical franchise. Within the universities, students pressed, with some success, for a voice in determining the academic policies which affected them. Again, the catchword was "power"--"Black power," "student power," and ultimately "professor power." The egalitarian revolution affected faculties in two basic ways. One of these was in the ideological identifica- tion of faculty members, particularly younger faculty members, with the aspirations of the disadvantaged and disenfran- chised--a condition which many felt they shared. Ladd and Lipset see a link between the ideological orientation of faculty and their attitudes toward faculty unionism.48 They see ideological considerations, however, as balanced by factors related to professional achievement: 48Everett Carll Ladd and Lipset, Seymour M., "Union- izing the Professoriate," Change, 5, No. 6, (Summer 1973), p. 41. The perception is supported quantitatively by the Carnegie Commission, pp. cit., p. 94. 53 The liberalism of the elite school faculty pushes them one way, but the factors relating to their professional status at once shove them in the opposite direction. . . . .There is an important clash, then, between the interests and values of successful academics and of trade unionism, which is largely egalitarian.49 On the other hand, the student power movement, supported by younger and professionally less powerful professors pro- voked, in some instances, a backlash from conservative and, given the general correspondence between age and ideology, older faculty members. The highly vocal quality of student protest gave students access to presidents and a priority on administrative agendas which was threatening to the generally silent "establishment" professoriate. They, too, were hung on the horns of a dilemma, their professional instincts disinclining them toward unionism, but their apparently "neglected" status prompting them to seek some 50 An interesting and continuing feature of base of power. the campus power contest is the interaction of student power with faculty power. Student power was a factor in the emergence of faculty unions. Presently, faculty unionism and faculty power appears to be a factor in the growing interest in the organization of student unions.51 The whole power crisis in higher education caused many faculty members to become disenchanted with, and even 49Ibid. 50Carr and VanEyck, pp. pip., p. 94. 51Schuster, pp. cit., pp. 7, 9. 54 contemptuous of, academic senates, the most common vehicle of shared authority. In some institutions, the senate had never commanded very much respect. A common View of senates was that they often debated issues without result until the questions became moot. Ih the academic culture the academic senate is often caricatured as a "debating society." In fact, senates in many institutions are self-perpetuating oligarchies of tenured professors, or dominated by administra- tive members and presidential appointees.52 In any event, senate credibility is undermined by its dependence on the 53 In some cases, senates had—— administration for funding. and have-~sizable pp £3359 power in academic decision-making, but the pp jppp authority still lies with the administration and the board and that is unsatisfactory to some faculty 54 The union offers itself as an avenue to power members. which is recognized in the law. Furthermore, senates have not as a rule proved respon- sive enough to demands for necessary curricular change and educational innovation. This is a matter of frustration to enthusiastic teachers anxious for educational reform. To them, the union offers a means which is justified by the 52The Carnegie Commission, pp. cit., p. 47. McConnell pp. cit., PP. 101-103. 53Mortimer and Lozier, pp. cit., p. 5. 54Facu1ty'PartiCipatiOn in Academic Governance, pp. cit., pp. 14-15. 55 educational end, even if it requires the sacrifice of some aspects of the professional image.55 Academic senates are not, of course, the only vehicle for the exercise of faculty shared authority. Probably the fundamental locus of decision-making as it involves the great bulk of the faculty is the academic department. In the departments those decisions are made which affect the individual professor most directly: the matters of appoint- ment, reappointment, promotion, tenure, class assignment and curriculum. The department is also the "first instance" recourse in faculty grievances.56 These are the very deci- sions which are at issue when faculty collective bargaining is under consideration and the manner in which those decisions are arrived at is likely to be directly affected by negotiations. Departmental styles and internal organizations are as diverse, almost, as the individuals of which they are composed. Dressel identifies a correspondence between the professional quality of departments (as rated in the Cartter Report) and a democratic style of departmental decision-making.57 There is also evidence to indicate that faculty favor collective 55Kugler, pp. cit., p. 416. 56Archie R. Dykes, Epculty Participation in Academic Decision-Making (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1968), p. 30. 57Paul L. Dressel, The Confidence Crisis, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), p. 39, p. 142. 56 bargaining more in institutions where departmental organiza- tions appear to be less democratic.58 If some incentives to unionize arose out of affluence and the flow of power, other incentives came with depression and threats to that power.59 The ideological controversies of the mid-sixties, beginning with the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley and culminating in the convulsive student unrest over the Southeast Asia War in the spring of 1970, provided political excuse for reduced public funding to higher educa- tion. Public accountability became an important new factor in the alignment of power on campus. California's governor, Ronald Reagan, used the occasion of a public groundbreaking at Bakersfield State College to serve public notice on the academics: Our public institutions have been established and financed by the people. They are the vehicles for the expression of cultural values and goals of the people, as well as the repository of knowledge and the distributor of truth. The members of the various education boards are all agents of the people. Through these instruments the people should have not only 8 voice, but also accounta- bility and recourse.6 GOvernor Reagan is certainly no revolutionary, but his cry of "power to the people" echoes the rhetoric of the student 58Duryea and Fisk, pp. cit., pp. 108-109. 59Ping, pp. cit., p. 104. 60Ronald Reagan, "Excerpts of Prepared Remarks by Governor Ronald Reagan," (Bakersfield State College ground- breaking ceremony, April 11, 1969) Mimeograph, (Sacramento, California, Office of the Governor, 1969). 57 political activists, leading some to speculate that he and Mario Savio could have used the same speechwriter! Politics aside; the demands for accountability have a direct influence in the direction of unionization. For one thing, legislatively imposed "accountability" with its thinly- disguised overtones of anti-intellectualism has contributed to the atmosphere of tension among faculty members, exacer- bating intra-mural tensions and driving them toward whatever basis of collective security they can find, one of which is the faculty union. But accountability has more fundamental implications. Those implications were apparent even before the period of student unrest and before the financial reverses of the early 19703 were fully felt. Educational costs were rising too rapidly and too much of the increased cost was a result of fiscal inefficiency in university operations.61 In the decade between 1958 and 1968, college enrollment nationwide doubled, but income and expenditures tripled and capital expenditure quadrupled.62 The result of the requirement for accountability is the development of planning systems within universities which apply the principles of management science. A few alert administrations began the development of planning and manage- ment systems before they were imposed by the funding agencies. Where they have not been initiated from within they are 61Earl F. Cheit, The New Depression in Higher Education, (New York: McGraw-Hill,‘l971Y, p. 5. 62Ibid. 58 rapidly being imposed from without in the form of PPBS budget reporting.63 Just as collective bargaining, by casting faculty in the role of employee, casts administration in the role of management, the "managerialization" of administration has the effect of further catalyzing the relationship. A whole new dimension is thus added to the governance problem: how to develop decision-making patterns that will allow for expert management, while preserving for the faculty their necessary role in making the educational judgments which fall within the province of their unique professional expertise. Institutions involved in faculty collective bargaining have evolved three basic bargaining formats in an effort to balance all of the complex ingredients in the governance problem.64 Limited bargaining involves an agree- ment to negotiate only on the issues of faculty compensation and the status of the union. Process bargaining adds to the economic issues bargaining on procedures, particularly those governing personnel decisions: promotion, tenure, reappoint- ment, and grievances. Comprehensive bargaining throws open the campus government structure to negotiation, including the decision-making systems concerned with the substance of academic judgments. In comprehensive bargaining, the issue of what is to be bargained is itself bargainable. 63Education Commission of the States, pp. cit., p. 15. 64Ping, pp. cit., p. 100. 59 Most unionized faculties have professed a desire to limit bargaining to "terms and conditions of employment" or to bargaining on compensation and personnel procedures. A notable exception is Boston State College, Massachusetts, where the entire governance system of the college is specified 65 in the negotiated agreement. The intention of the union is generally sincere, but the line between limited or process bargaining and comprehensive bargaining is a difficult one to maintain, for the reasons which Dean Brown so succinctly stated. The AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiation issued an early warning: While we support a division of issues between a bargaining agent and an academic senate when both are well—established on a campus, we recognize that any such demarcation is likely to be un- stable over time. Five years later, the same cautionary note was being sounded by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education: The basic choice at the present time, we believe, is among (1) codetermination and (2) collective bargaining, or (3) some combination between the two where codetermination is effective in some subject-matter areas (such as the curriculum) and collective bargaining in others (such as salaries). This latter alternative may not turn out to be a possible combination in the longer run, however, because collective bargaining may tend to sup- plant codetermination in an irreversible process. And it should be clearly understood that faculty members cannot have it both ways--they cannot engage in codetermination and in collective bar- gaining on the same issues at the same time. 65Carr and VanEyck, pp. cit., p. 209. 66AAHE Task Force, pp. cit., p. 65. 67Carnegie Commission, pp. cit., p. 47. 60 Evidence is beginning to appear in support of the predictions. Negotiated agreements at Central Michigan University have supported the principle of codetermination in academic matters. Nonetheless, an Unfair Labor Practice claim has been filed by the CMU faculty bargaining unit with 68 The claim the Michigan Employment Relations Commission. is directed against "teaching effectiveness" policies devel- oped by the Academic Senate and accepted by the Board of Trustees. The claim alleges that the policy affects "terms and conditions of employment" and hence falls among the bargainable issues under the negotiated agreement. McConnell sums up the governance issues sharply: Crudely put, the division is between the principle of shared decision-making and shared authority in a community with common interests, as espoused by the AAUP; and the assumption of a permanent conflict of interest between faculty and admin- istration requiring confrontation, collective bargaining, and coercive sanctions, as held by the AFT. 6 The consequences of academic collective bargaining are still largely a matter of speculation, particularly where the effect on governance systems and decision-making patterns is concerned. What is universally agreed is that significant effects can be expected. The traditional models of governance in higher education assign a good many "management" rights to faculty members. They are responsible 68MERC Case No. C 74 A-19. 69McConnell, pp. cit., p. 109. 61 for some purposes to administrative officers, but adminis- trative officers are also responsible to the faculty.70 A dean is accountable in both directions, being both the ad- ministrative executive for his or her school and the advocate of the school and its faculty with the central administration. The president is as much an advocate of the institutional faculty to the governing board as he or she is an agent of the board in the exercise of executive authority. The question then arises in connection with collective bargaining, "Who bargains with whom?" Industrial collective bargaining makes a clear distinction between management and labor. No such clear demarcation is possible in institutions of higher education.71 Clearly, faculty will not be permitted to "sit on both sides of the table." There is the real likelihood that the kind of clear separation between manager and employee which exists in industry will be forced upon higher educa- tion as a consequence of faculty unionization, fundamentally altering the academic relationships which have long existed. What is at stake is not simply some ideal of collegial good fellowship, although that, too, may suffer. What is infin- itely more important is that the quality of academic decision- making which depends heavily upon distribution of various 7oFacultprarticipation in Academic Governance, pp. cit., p.’l9. 710. Dalls Sands, "The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, 1, 1971, p. 158. 62 decision-making functions across the academic community, may be deteriorated in a number of ways. In the first place, the assumption that a permanent conflict of interest exists between faculty and administra- tion as it exists between industrial labor and management, may cause the ethics and tactics of political power to be substituted for the primacy of reason and rational persuasion. Bucklew points out that some of the most reasoned argument he has heard on campus occurred at the bargaining table.73 That speaks well for the negotiators in that particular setting, but it does not alter the fact, observed by so many others, that the bargaining system has an adversary relation- ship as its basic premise, confrontation and coercion as its method, no matter how civil a form the process may take. Wollett underscores the point: Collective negotiations is itself a political system and the leaders of a. . .negotiations structure-~the negotiators, the executive boards, the departmental stewards--are themselves poli- ticians. They are not enlisted in the service of reasonableness, rationality, or the persuasive power of ideas. They are concerned with getting more, as management is with giving less. They understand that their ability to achieve this objective depends upon the effective mobilization and utilization of political power.74 72Finkin, pp. cit., p. 154. 73Semas, pp. cit., p. 11. 74Donald H. Wollett, "The Status and Trends of Collec- tive Negotiations for.Faculty in Higer Education," Wisconsin Law Review, 1, 1971, p. 32. 72 63 What is agreed among virtually all analysts of academic collective bargaining is that the process will force a clear and formal distinction between academic management and pro- fessional employees. The relationship between them will be specified and codified in legally binding contracts. Mortimer and Lozier state what is a general consensus: One feature of collective bargaining is the dis- content on the part of many faculties to rely on informal or noncodified procedures in matters relevant to the terms and conditions of their employment and to the provisions for faculty participation in institutional decision-making. As a result, collective bargaining portends to interject major changes in faculty-administrative relations in higher education.75 The increased specificity and codification of per- sonnel procedures may very well improve their fairness-- although not necessarily their benevolence--to individual faculty members. Codified grievance procedures will increase the likelihood that each adverse personnel decision will routinely be tested through institutional proceedings and in the courts. That can prove hideously expensive in time and energy to all parties76 and would further strain faculty-administrative relationships. A more serious effect of strict legal contractualiza- tion could be what Garbarino calls a "convergence toward the 75Mortimer and Lozier, pp. cit., p. 1. 76Neil S. Bucklew, "Fiscal Judgment in Bargaining Can Uncover Hidden Costs," College and University Business, 50 (March 1971): pp. 47-48. 64 77 The politics of a union require that positions average." be taken which reflect the interests of the voting majority. Those positions are unlikely to be the ones selected by the academic elite. The dynamics of collective bargaining, as described by Oberer and others, will probably operate to replace the professional power and influence of the ablest scholars and teachers for the will of the majority of the faculty expressed on a one man, one vote basis.78 The effect would be to substitute adequacy for excellence as the criterion of academic performance. The effect is already visible in union demands that initial academic appointments be classified as "probationary." That would create a condition in which institutions would be required to "show cause" for nonreappointment--"instant tenure," in effect.79 Boyd identifies a possible threat to academic freedom itself in the collective and egalitarian quality of faculty 80 Academic freedom is a protection which the unionism. academic community has maintained against the encroachments of repressive political systems and authoritarian religion. 77Joseph Garbarino, "Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market," Higher §pucation and the Labor Market (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). p. 34. 78Walter Oberer, "Faculty Participation and Decision Making," in Stanley Elam and Michael H. Moskow, eds., Employment Relations in Higher Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1969), p. 143. 79Ladd and Lipset, pp. cit., p. 42. 80Boyd, pp. cit., p. 315. 65 An equally serious challenge to academic freedom arises from within the faculty in what John Stewart Mill called the "tyranny of the majority.5 A dissenting minority will be disenfranchised at the bargaining table. The principle of tenure was developed as the ultimate bulwark of academic freedom. If tenure comes to be treated as one of the "terms and conditions of employment," as is almost certain to happen in collective negotiations, tenure becomes bargainable and subject to being traded off for other short-term gains in the contract.81 That is only one way in which academic freedom itself can become, as Boyd says, "a casualty of the bargaining table." Dressel characterizes the collective bargaining issue fundamentally as a struggle between the opposing values of freedom and equality.82 The implications of faculty collective bargaining for the autonomy of institutions are obvious. Negotiations and the ensuing processes of contract administration bring agents other than faculty, students, administrator and governing boards into the decision-making milieu. One of these external agents is the national bargaining association, unless the institution belongs to that minority which have ,independent bargaining units. In any event, state or national énnployment relations boards and the courts will make and. \ 81William W. Van Alstyne, "Tenure and Collective Bargaining," in C. Kerry Smith, ed., New Teaching, New Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971). pp. 10-17. 82Dressel, Return to Responsibility, pp. cit., p. 89. 66 enforce decisions which directly affect internal institu- tional decisions and decision-making processes. Further- more, there will be pressure by bargaining units in public institutions to bargain directly with the ultimate fiscal authorities.83 Dressel says, Almost certainly, collective bargaining in higher education will move to state-wide or system-wide levels and in the process will destroy much of the autonomy of the separate campuses. Thus, collective bargaining in a state system of higher education will ultimately promote centralization of decision making. Collective bargaining will contravene the individual and departmental autonomy for which many faculty members have battled for so long.84 Perhaps the most substantive article on the effects of faculty collective bargaining to appear within the last Year is the one by Charles Ping which treats the relationship bet“Ween faculty unionism and institutional planning.85 Ping describes a planning format which is both rational and real- istic. An information base is constructed, including com- Prehensive cost analysis. Assumptions are made explicit. Institutional goals are specified in terms which permit sub- SQQUent evaluation. The planning decisions, including the Setting of priorities, utilize the particular capabilities Which belong to each segment of the academic community. Ping describes the distribution of the various roles in the plan- ning system: 83Ibid. 84Ibid., p. 89 851bid. 67 Faculty have primary responsibility for research, courses, majors, and other programs of instruction. The determination of institutional objectives and priorities provides a basis for decisions on the program objectives of particular units. While consultation with and critique by faculty are basic to informed decision making, and accounta- bility to the community is essential to acceptance, decision making as a whole involves determination by administrators, governing boards, and, in public institutions, state agencies. Thus, although the division is not complete, planning activity is basically a responsibility of the faculty; review of planning is basically a responsibility of the administration. This; analysis is important because it moves the discussion of shared authority out of the traditional setting and into the :Eramework of a management system. While the planning Systenn which Ping describes applies highly-quantified cost accoruating procedures, it is fundamentally informed by the acadennic values and educational philos0phies of the tradi- tiona 1 academy . In relating faculty unionism to the problem of deli- berate and rational planning, Ping identifies a classical Hegeldian correspondence of thesis and antithesis. The thesis is tllaat unionization is a stimulus to planning and supports 1t it; a number of ways. Planning and bargaining are both formEiland systematic attempts to describe and influence future conditions. Both require the development of a highly detailed and accurate base of information, and both require the: Ilse of scrupulous cost accounting procedures. The C U o ' oqléllstions which establish the "the51s" are not speculative. “-~1‘__ 86 Ibid., p. 101. 68 They are observed and experienced products of faculty collective bargaining. The "antithesis" remains in the realm of speculation. It is that "bargaining may be a deterrent to effective program-oriented planning." The reasons Ping adduces in support of the antithesis are similar to those brought forward by other writers. Ping sees those elements in the collective bargaining form, as it is presently under- stood, which cannot permanently exist with any governance or decision-making pattern which is based on faculty and administration shared authority. The "conflict of interest" assumption will drive faculty bargainers into a protective stance regarding salaries, job security and academic "due Process." The result will likely be to "give form and expression to a sense of alienation from the institution and its primary role." "Protection is an understandable ObjeCtive," says Ping, ". . .it may reflect special interests 0f the part with little regard for the whole so important In institutional planning."87 \ 87 Ping, pp. cit., p. 104. CHAPTER III ALPHA AND BETA STATE COLLEGES In all, five institutions of higher education were visited in the course of the dissertation research. All are members of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. One of the five schools visited was sub- sequently excluded from the study since its working experi- ence with faculty collective bargaining was found to be less than one year. The remaining four institutions are referred to by pseudonym as Alpha State College, Beta State College, Mentor University and Tutor University. The four colleges and universities fall naturally into two pairs, although that was not intended when they were selected for study. The fact that one pair, in their aCtUal identities, are state colleges and the other pair are universities is only a superficial discrimination. The}? are all of roughly similar size and internal adminis- tr‘E‘t-‘L‘re organization. The principal difference is that the tWO state colleges belong to multi-campus state systems Of higher education, while the two universities are governed by individual governing boards. The differing forms of State control impose somewhat different leadership roles upon the central campus administration and result in signi- fi . . . czarltly different problems in faculty collective bargaining. 69 70 The pairs of institutions are accordingly treated in succeeding chapters of the dissertation. Alpha State College Alpha State College is one of a number of schools which comprise a state system of public higher education. Policies for the operation of the colleges and universities in the system are established by a state board of higher education and the office of the chancellor. Local control is vested in a board of trustees whose executive officer is the president of the college. Alpha was originally a municipal normal school serving a medium-sized manufacutring city which in turn is part of a larger metropolitan complex. The school maintained its mUHiCipal connection for more than sixty years. In the 19203 it became a state teachers college, expanded its program to a full four years, and began offering the bachelor's degree. In the 19503 the college was relocated to a very attractive suburban campus, and administrative efforts were undertaken to“in the words of the college catalogue--"strengthen the liberal arts potential of the college." Two residence halls were constructed which presently accommodate less than ten percent of the more than seven thousand students enrolled. Two more residence halls will open in 1974 and Will approximately double the number of resident students. but Alpha will obviously continue mainly as a commuter co . . llege. The institution now characterizes itself as a 7l coeducational, multi-purpose college offering graduate programs at the master's degree level and undergraduate curricula leading to the bachelor of arts or bachelor of science degree in the traditional disciplines of the liberal arts, in the fine and performing arts, in teacher education, nursing, and in business administration. The student clientele is drawn largely from the suburban complex. Many students are the children of blue- collar families which have moved from the city into the suburbs within the last twenty years, and most are the first generation of their families to attend college. Efforts are being made to expand the enrollment of students from the core city and from racial minorities. Programs are offered in Black Studies and Urban Studies, and imaginative special comPOnents of the teacher education program are aimed at Providing special preparation for work in the urban setting. Concern is expressed by the president and the chief academic officer for the development of programs designed to meet the Special needs of the surrounding community and its students. The Visitor also senses a desire to shape the institutional image on the model of the private university. The internal governance system of the college includes an All-College Senate with representation from faculty, Studel'its and administration, and a Faculty Forum which represents the exclusive concerns of the faculty. Both bo - . dles are advisory to the president and have no direct authority. 72 The faculties of all the state colleges and univer- sities were organized in 1971 into a single collective bar- gaining unit. The unit is now affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers. Bargaining takes place at the system level. Campus presidents are consulted concerning the state's bargaining position, but actual negotiations are carried out by the state office of employee relations. On the union side . each campus local is represented in negotiations. The negotiated agreement provides for union-administration conferences at the campus level to resolve those issues which are purely local. Members of the bargaining unit are ful1--time teaching faculty, department Chairpersons, non- managerial administrative staff, librarians, student per- sonnel staff, demonstration teachers, and nonteaching Prefessionals holding faculty rank. The President The President and the Vice President for Academic Affairs were both present at the interview. The Vice President was a recent appointment and had, in fact, been on the campus for slightly over a week. His experience was insufficient to respond independently to the questions. The President chose to respond to the topics by category, refeI‘ring to particular items by way of example. 99333\Se_- Related Little change has occurred in the patterns of presi- dential decision-making and leadership as they regard the 73 Twable 1. Alpha State College Summary Table of Affected Items Item Respondent Pres. VPAA Dean Dean Course - Related Admissions policies Curriculum and degrees Grading standards Academic calendar , X Change of program ' ‘ X Sponsored research Public service/Extension Class size X X EWacilities - Related Schedules and space Office assignment Maintenance New facilities Parking Ffiinance - Related Budget preparation X State budget process Internal allocation Student fees Auxiliary service fees Management and planning Private funding Student financial aid S taff - Related Faculty appointment X X X Faculty retention X X X Faculty tenure X X X Retrenchment Faculty promotion X X X Evaluation of instruction X Faculty work-load X X Faculty compensation Grieveance procedures X X Admin. personnel policies Administrative appointment Affirmative action X >< Eigudent - Related Student development Counseling and health Residence hall programs Conduct and discipline Activities and organizations Participation in governance NOTE: In this and subsequent Summary Tables, an indica- ‘tion is made when the respondent has given specific indication (bf some effect of faculty collective bargaining on the listed decision-making item. 74 academic program. Academic program decisions are not subject to negotiation and, in any event, most academic policies are the product of decision which occur at the level of the chancellor's office and the state board. Facilities-Related Facilities planning and utilization are management rights under the negotiated contract. If there is a change in the handling of decisions regarding the schedule, use of Planning of facilities, it is in the direction of greater administrative control . Finance-Related The process of budget preparation has been more affect- ed by the requirements of the state chancellor's office than by faculty collective bargaining. Internal allocation is accomplished by "line item" appropriation, so the local campus administration has little control in any event. The largest item in the budget is compensation which is determined in collective bargaining at the state level and the outcome 0f negotiations is reflected in the line-item appropriations. While the impact of negotiations on compensation items is C1insect and provision for negotiated increases is made in the appropriated budget, no similar provision is made for the hidden costs of the contract. There is no provision for additional administrative staff to handle the tasks associated Wlth administration of the contract at the campus level. 75 Where a liberalized faculty leave of absence policy is negotiated, there is no provision for temporary faculty to cover the absence. The only avenue open is to spread the student load by increasing class size. Staff—Related Collective bargaining has markedly increased the general atmosphere of contention between faculty and admin- istration. There is little assumption of mutual trust. This is not to say that most of the faculty, or even a majority, are adversarial; but the climate is seriously affected by the abrasive minority which constitute the union leadership. That may be a purely temporary condition. The president has had to spend a great deal of time during the past academic year meeting with faculty in small groups to "mend the poli- tical fences" and attempt to increase the level of trust. The leading faculty issues have been compensation and job Security, with academic policies receiving little attention.1 Grievance procedures have required a great deal of time in the office of the president and vice presidents. The negotiated procedures for the handling of faculty grie— vancZes require careful preparation and documentation. All but one of the grievances processed have concerned nonpromo- tlon or nonreappointment. The final step in the grievance, \ 1At the time of the visit, final preparation were being Wade for the spring commencement exercises. A good deal of 1'“terest and speculation centered around a provision in the new union agreement which makes the wearing of academic garb Optional where the faculty are required to attend ceremonial ufictions. Administrators were wondering how many faculty would exercise the option not to robe. 76 procedure occurs in the chancellor's office and certain types of grievance may be submitted to binding arbitration. Other grievances may be submitted to advisory arbitration. None of the grievance decisions originating on the Alpha campus have been reversed. The most important secondary effects of the negotiated grievance procedure, in addition to the increase in the total number of grievances, are the effects of potential grievances 0n the processes of appointment, promotion, and the granting of tenure. Line administrators are required to give careful and detailed scrutiny to all personnel transactions which take place under their supervision. Procedures are explicit and require detailed compliance at the risk of creating a grievable error. New appointments are evaluated much more carefully in order to maximize the likelihood of subsequent favorable personnel decisions. As a consequence, the aca- demic quality of faculty appointments will probably improve. Where procedures require the decision of faculty com- mittees, as in the case of reappointment or promotion, a pr°blem has frequently occurred. Faculty committees have tended to give only positive recommendations, forcing the necessary and difficult negative decisions upon the presi- dent. During the last year, an interesting exchange took Place between the president and the All-College Promotion com1'l'littee. The committee recommended candidates for pro- motion far in excess of the available openings at the higher ranks. The recommendations were rejected by the president 77 and, after, considerable dialogue with the committee, a pro- cedure was agreed upon in which the committee categorized its recommendations as "highly recommended" and "recommended", thus accomplishing the necessary discrimination! Spident- Related Students have seats and votes in the All-College Senate, Inuztfliere is little overall student interest or involvement in insatitutional politics. Since the students are mainly anmmrters, they attend classes and go home. There is no discernable effect of collective bargaining on the way in Vflfitfl the president deals with students and student—related decisions. A possible effect is that more presidential time is absorbed with faculty matters, so student concerns are 19ft 'to the Dean of Student Affairs. Dean U. Dean U. has been at Alpha State College for several years; and during the academic year 1973-1974 served as ACtiIlg'V'ice President for Academic Affairs. Prior to the Visit: the dean had marked several items on the list of de- CiSjJDIn-making topics which he perceived as having been impcui‘tantly affected by academic collective bargaining. In the (flourse of the interview, it became apparent that still Other tOpics were affected in a secondary manner. 78 Course-Related Curriculum Content and Degree Requirements Subsequent to the introduction of faculty collective bargaining there has been less faculty interest in the aca- demic program generally. The issues of compensation and job security tend to dominate faculty concerns. Dean U. identi- fied several reasons which might account for the change in the faculty's interests. Since the focus of union activity lies in the areas of compensation and job security, these become the absorbing topics of conversation among faculty members. The faculty perceives a real power to affect, through negotiation, the conditions of their own employment, whereas their perceived ability to influence the academic program through two levels of bureaucracy is limited. .Academic Calendar Before collective bargaining, there was an informal understanding the faculty would be present when classes were .in session and for such time as might be required to plan :for the next year,or to carry out committee responsibilities. rI‘he negotiated agreement now specifies thirty-two weeks of regular classes which are to take place between September 1 and June 30. Precise credit-hour loads are specified (Eilthough not class sizes or student credit-hours). Addi- ti-<:>na1 teaching assignments, such as summer session or over- 10ads entail extra compensation. The effect is not that faculty remain on campus until June 30, but rather that they 79 leave as soon as their specified teaching duties have been completed, making it difficult to assemble faculty for planning and preparation. The "letter of the law" prevails. Facilities-Related and Finance—Related No important changes were noted which might be attri- butable to collective bargaining. Staff-Related Appointment of Faculty Before the introduction of collective bargaining, appointments tended to be casual. Departments selected new faculty and the appointments were processed as a matter of routine. The president, the academic vice president, and the deans now insist on careful justification of new faculty appointments. Planning is done further in advance and selection processes are completed earlier. There is very little last-minute hiring. Departments may be forced to cancel classes or expand sections in preference to hasty (appointments of new faculty. When questioned, the dean (admutted that student programs could be disrupted. Ihetention (or nonretention) of Faculty Again, prior to the introduction of faculty collective hfiirgaining, decisions on retention or nonretention were made irIformally. This is not to say that such decisions were iIll-considered or capricious, but there were few formal 80 processes. No documentation was required in support of decisions to reappoint or not to reappoint. While the negotiated agreement specifies only that appointment and reappointment of faculty members is by the college Board of Trustees upon recommendation by the presi- dent, the agreement contains the requirement that criteria and procedures for reappointment be explicit and be communi- cated in written form to all employees. Major changes in the procedures are negotiable at the local campus level. Each faculty member's personnel file is open to him or her, and all items which bear upon reappointment or promotion are to be transmitted to the faculty member with allowance of time for a reply. As a consequence of these procedures and the opportun- ities their complexity affords for the occurance of grievable error, much more of the dean's time is devoted to procedural reviews of personnel recommendations. The actual procedure at.Alpha State College is for departmental faculty committees ‘to make reappointment recommendations directly to the presi— 4dent who then transmits his own recommendations to the Board ncern for procedural correctness. Procedural formality itself, however, reflects a general societal obsession with contracts and contractual protections. Collective bargaining raises the visibility-level of procedures, but could be less a cause than a symptom of the general abSence of trust in the society. Tutor UniVersity Tutor University shares the common heritage of former teachers' colleges which have become, or are in the process of becoming, multi-purpose public universities. Founded 127 as a normal school and business institute, the school has passed through successive stages of state normal school, state teachers' college, and state college. Tutor was accorded university status in the early 19605 under the same provisions of state law which apply to Mentor Uni- versity. The institution presently enrolls more than fourteen thousand students and offers a variety of degrees at the Baccalaureate and Master's level. Educational Specialist degrees are offered in three areas and one doctoral program is in the final stages of approval. Tutor was one of the earliest four-year institutions to organize for faculty collective bargaining and it provides an almost classic case-study of the unionization of a faculty. Nearly all of the elements were present which have been identified as contributing to faculty adoption of collective bargaining. The growth years of the 19605 brought a variety of changes to the campus which were disturbing to the older teachers' college faculty. New young professors joined the faculty, bringing with them a broader professional outlook. The student body became more representative of the entire state population, rather than of the predominantly rural university locale. At the time of faculty unionization, a new president had been in office for one year. He was viewed as liberal and democratic, but his predecessor had been regarded as an autocrat. Some interpreters of the event are of the 128 «opinion that the union was a weapon forged for use against that earlier administration. Some of the faculty had reason, however, to mistrust the new administration. Student protest was occurring across the nation and on the Tutor campus, and students were seen as having more ready access to the President and a higher place on his (agenda of priorities than had the faculty. Growing student p0wer was threatening a hegemony of older faculty. 'The younger faculty had their own causes to press: (advancement in rank and access to economic benefits at a Inore rapid rate than would be permitted by the actuarial :rates of their faculty seniors. "Old Guard" and "Young 'Turks" had different aims, but common cause. The President adopted a cooperative attitude toward 'the union, determined to prevent collective bargaining :from disturbing collegial relationships any more than rNecessary. By and large, union-administration relation- SIlips have remained civil. From the beginning, both the uu'lion and the administration have attempted to separate afimademic issues from "terms and conditions of employment," rEiferringthe latter to collective negotiation and the former 'tCD faculty senate processes. The senate is viewed by the faiculty as possessing considerable power, but cumbersome ‘111 its Operations. Recent union negotiating demands have bEigun to encroach upon senate decisions. The bargaining agent for the Tutor faculty is a zl<>cal affiliate of the National Education Association. 129 Table 4. Tutor University Summary Table of Affected Items Item Respondent Pres. VPAA Dean Dean Course-Related Admissions policies Curriculum and degrees Grading standards Academic calendar Change of program Sponsored research Public service/Extension Facilities-Related Schedules and space Office assignment Maintenance New facilities Parking Finance-Related Budget preparation State budget process Internal allocation Student fees Auxiliary service fees Management and planning Private funding Student financial aid Staff-Related Faculty appointment Faculty retention Faculty tenure Retrenchment Faculty promotion Evaluation of instruction Faculty work-load Faculty compensation Grievance procedures Admin. personnel policies Administrative appointment Affirmative Action Student-Related Student development Counseling and health Residence hall programs Conduct and discipline Activities and organizations Participation in governance (General) (Governing board relations) ___ xx xx xxxxx xxxx ><><>< 130 The President Historians of the emerging institution of higher education have commented that a turning-point in the evolution from teachers' college to multi-purpose univer- sity occurs wehn an institution appoints its first president whose academic antecedents are not in some field connected with teacher preparation. The President of Tutor University occupies that position in his own school's history. His Ph.D. is in one of the basic disciplines of the liberal arts and was earned at a "prestige" university. He has been a faculty-member and dean and he clearly feels that he possesses the academic instincts of a professor. Before becoming president at Tutor, he served as a vice-president in a large complex university. Course-Related The President is deeply concerned about the need for curricular change at Tutor University and is frustrated 'that what he views as necessary changes have not occurred 3m0re rapidly. He is not conscious of any overt, direct <3ffect of faculty collective bargaining on the strategies fOrcurriculum development which have been employed by the iniministration under his leadership. There are, however, some:fundamental indirect effects. Collective bargaining traditionally addresses the issue of job security. In a Period of change in the patterns of student enrollment, with the implications of enrollment for faculty positions. -. 131 the problem of job security for the faculty has impinged upon the process of curriculum development. Faculty members have little faith in the ability of the institu- tion or its administration to predict the direction that enrollment patterns are likely to take. Any curricular change is mistrusted because of the uncertain consequences in terms of faculty jobs. The job security goals of the faculty union bring union influence to bear in opposition to new curricular structures. As an example, the President cited the failure in two successive years of attempts to reform the under- graduate program of general education. The faculty Senate made extensive studies and committees put in long hours of work, but no scheme emerged which the Senate regarded as acceptable. The "hidden agenda" played upon by the union was the job security of the faculty, particularly in the school of Arts and Sciences from which the faculty union draws its greatest support. Privately, the President feels that the matter of job security could be dealt with openly in collective negotiation with the union. That obstacle removed, the educational issues could be dealt with on their own merits. He is unable, however, to secure agreement on that point among the other members of his central administration. Therefore, the official position of the administration is that clear separation must be maintained between 132 "academic issues" and "terms and conditions Of employment." The latter are matters for collective negotiation, while the former are deliberated in the departments, schools and Academic Senate. The President pointed to what he characterized as a paradox--that administrative attitudes toward collec- tive bargaining with the faculty, rather than the collec- tive negotiation format itself, hinders the ability to deal wih the human implications Of curricular change. He views collective bargaining as an instrument for the achievement Of academic goals and is hopeful, although not optimistically so, that a new model of collective bargaining will evolve which is unique to the academic community. Administrative Opposition to faculty negotia- tions per se exacerbates adversarial behavior on the part of the faculty union and interferes with the development Of a collective bargaining model appropriate to the university. With faculty and administration thus at logger-heads, adversarial ”trade union" attitudes dominate the faculty position and ultimately the model is determined by the labor arbitrator along industrial lines. The Tutor experience supports the President in his view. Relationships between the administration and the union have remained civil, but a succession of issues which lie on the blurred borderline between "academic concerns” and "terms and conditions Of employment" have been raised 133- by the union as "unfair labor practices." The principal example is a "teaching effectiveness program" passed by the Senate and adopted by the Board of Trustees. A pro- gram for the improvement of instruction seems clearly to lie within the province of the academic decision-making system, but the faculty union claims that the matter should have been negotiated at the bargaining table and the claim is supported by the state's employment relations commission. The matter is in the courts. What the par- ticular issue illustrates is that collective bargaining, by linking employment concerns to academic ones, is almost certain to encroach more and more upon academic decision- making. The administration is engaged in a losing defen- sive struggle, and what is given up in the process is the ability to mold the character of the bargaining form that ultimately emerges. In the end, academic issues will be negotiated in trade-union terms. A The President returned to his argument for an academic model of collective negotiation. He pointed out that, with a few exceptions, the faculty union leadership has represented the best leadership Of the faculty as a whole. The same faculty leaders are present both in the Academic Senate and the union. He recalled the plaintive question of one member of a faculty negotiating team: "Hey, we are the same people. Why do you trust us in one setting and not in the other?” Given a mutual willingness to make the 134 system work, the President feels that collective bargaining could develop into a new kind Of collegiality. Again, he remarked that what stands in the way is an administra— tive mind-set, and that for him publicly to break ranks with that position would be regarded by his administrative ‘ colleagues as a betrayal Of high principle. Perhaps the most important consequences for the President and for his style Of administrative leadership are seen as the unresolved differences which consume human :resources and divert energies from essential academic tasks. 'rhose differences occur within the administration, between eadministration and faculty and between faculty members. lie adds to that list the unresolved ambivalences in his crwn mind which take their toll Of his own energies. IFacilities-Related The negotiated agreements at Tutor University have 11<>t contained references to facilities in the manner of some K-12 and community college contracts. The item, however, elicited a contingent Observation from the Pre- £3£ikient. The Observation was that collective bargaining jLEB :not, in itself, new to the campus.' The university has been negotiating with maintenance, food service, clerical, and security employees for years, frequently over matters JLI‘G‘rtolving facilities. He cited the case of a colleague- p“resident whose institution was in regular negotiation with C) vet fifteen employee unions, not counting the faculty. 135 Experience with collective bargaining is a valuable aid to dealing with the faculty in negotiations. The system is a highly-evolved form Of problem-solving in industrial society. It is a means for resolving the power-balance, on the order of the forms of international diplomacy which were developed in the Nineteenth Century. Some people have learned to deal with the system and they have learned what issues can be settled at the bargaining-table and how the various problems should be approached in negotiation. The worst consequences of collective bargaining occur when the participants are naive or inexperienced. The President cited as evidence occasions where parties at impasse have called in expert bargainers and the impasse has been rapidly broken. Finance-Related The first Observation addressed by the President to this category Of decision-making items was that university finance has been scandalous without unions! Secretiveness has developed and faculty unions are not alone in being misled about the state of the university budgets--presidents are frequently fooled by the technocrats who control the flow of information. The result of that is that the amount of money whichremains for allocation in accordance with the president's judgment is severely reduced. That margin is small enough, at best, and it is further reduced when por- tions Of the free monies are "squirrelled away" (the 136 President's term) by account directors under Obscure budget- lines for their own purpOses. éThe President sees his principal financial goal, therefore, as gaining control of the budget. In some ways, faculty collective bargaining has assisted him in that task, but the cost Of the process may Offset the advantages gained. That is almost certainly the case in the short run. Nevertheless, faculty negotia- tions have speeded the process of developing management information systems within the university. Proposals arising in negotiations need to be costed-out rapidly and accurately and projected over, perhaps, five years. That need has led to the development Of a highly-sophis~ ticated data-processing program for payroll. In terms Of personnel, the President estimated that approximately four and one-half administrative positions have been added to deal with faculty collective bargaining. That does not mean that all of the officers' time is spent on matters related tO faculty bargaining, but without bargaining the university could probably have gotten along without them. One vice-president has been added with primary responsi- bility for bargaining and contract administration. A staff attorney has been added and at least one additional systems analyst has been hired. The university Controller, once a middle-management position, has emerged as a high-level executive Officer, and additional personnel have been added 137 to the Office Of institutional research. That administra- tive growth is costly. Furthermore, it conflicts with another important goal of the President, which is to reduce the ratio of administrative personnel to faculty. While the President sees no serious or long-range effects of collective bargaining on the legislative budget- appropriations process, he believes that some unfortunate consequences have been suffered and he feels that he has been "beaten over the head with the contract" in legis- lative budget hearings. Some legislators feel that the administration has "caved in" to union pressures and have made it clear that the university should not expect the legislature to fund the contract over and above the standard appropriations for compensation increases. A union argument has been that the union organization at the state level would be a valuable ally in the campaign for additional appropriations. That has not proven to be the case. Industrial uniosn are a potent political force in the state, but they do not view academic unions as trustworthy members Of the labor fraternity. In addition, the state affiliate Of the NEA, with which the faculty union is associated, has focused its lobbying influence on K-12 appropriations and has been instrumental in diver- ting money away from higher education. One further element enters into the President's problem in dealing with both the union and the legislature. 138 He cannot argue publicly with the legislature for higher compensation for the faculty and simultaneously negotiate with the faculty for lower increases. He finds his points with the legislature turned against his representatives at the bargaining table. Staff-Related The administration Of Tutor University is decentralized in its operations. The final decision in staff-related matters, that is to say those final recommendations which go from the administration to the governing board, are determined by the Provost in consultation with deans and department Chairpersons. The President is involved when required to resolve indecision or controversy. He deals with the "hard cases" involving reappointment, promotion or tenure. His Observations, are, accordingly, somewhat detached. He commented on the forces which, in his observation, collective bargaining has either intensified or injected into staff-related decision-making. These he described as an "Obsessive egalitarianism" and a prevading climate Of legalism. The former reduces the ability Of academic leaders to make discriminating judgments about individuals and the latter requires the establishment of elaborate files Of objective evidence which may or may not bear upon the real reasons for the decisions which are taken. The quality of the evidence is determined by its acceptability in grievance proceedings and court cases. 139 The President feels that the effect Of these forces will be to establish a condition of "instant tenure" for each faculty member appointed. Termination will be pos- sible only because of the institution's dire financial distress or for documented incompetence of the faculty member. Discretionary judgment will necessarily be moved back to the appointment process. High risk appointments, which can yield some Of the most exciting additions to the faculty, will be discouraged. The President predicts the development of highly-detailed preappointment investigative procedures. The matter Of faculty compensation called forth con- siderable reflective comment from the President. He began by stating the premise that compensation ought not be determined by "market-place considerations" alone. He explained that by suggesting that salaries and fringe benefits ought not be based purely on the amOunt necessary to attract and retain a competent faculty, but on some computed level which is scaled to the local cost Of living and to the standing Of the university among similar insti- tutions in the state. He estimated that Tutor should pro- bably stand about fifth among the institutions in its state with respect to median faculty compensation. That was Obviously a subjective judgment "Off the top of the head." He went on to suggest, however, that a good, scholarly study could arrive at a formula which would include not only 140 the factors already menioned but also some gross proportion of the university budget which ought to be committed to faculty compensation. That study would also relate faculty compensation to those environmental factors which would translate in terms of faculty satisfaction: library, laboratory supplies and equipment, university support Of creative and scholarly activities, and cultural enrichment. He commented, epigrammatically, that "most faculty members want to be comfortable in a rich environment, not rich in an impoverished environment." If anxiety and economic insecurity were removed, the university would have nO dif- ficulty attracting and retaining an excellent faculty. Returning to his earlier theme, he Offered the Opinion that a collective negotiation model could be developed which would lead to a comprehensive and Objective analysis of resources and their apportionment in a way which would lead to faculty satisfaction and responsible use of public funds, ". . .and that," he said, "is the test Of successful negotiations--where both parties leave the table satisfied." Student-Related The student concern is high on the President's list of personal priorities. Student interest in faculty collec- tive bargaining is on the rise and in quiet and unsophisticated ways they are beginning to question the process. They have adopted the "consumer" role, questioning the impact Of faculty negotiations on the cost of their education and 141 also upon its quality. They have observed a certain faculty preoccupation with themselves which encroaches upon professors' interests in providing quality instruction--or so some students believe. Early in the history Of faculty negotiations in the university, a question was raised publicly about the role, if any, which students should have in the process. The administration proposed the inclusion of student body president as an Observer at the bargaining sessions. That was rejected by the union which argued that the student body president was biased toward the administration, and the proposal collapsed. As a counter, the union presented a set Of bargaining demands which were a reprise Of demands that had been made at one time or another by students. The demands were abandoned without serious negotiation and were viewed by the administration as an attempt to ingratiate the union with the student body. What became immediately apparent was that the attempt tO include students in nego- tiations had risked making students pawns in the tactics of bargaining and had encouraged students to "choose sides." In the President's view that would be unhealthy and for that and other reasons he now opposes the presence of students at the bargaining table. He imagines a negotiated agree- ment, however, which might include a student critique of the initialled contract before it is submitted for ratification. 142 There was only one effect noted which bore specifi- cally on the relationship between the President and the student body in the on-going life of the unversity. The President feels that the secretive behavior associated with bargaining--the guardedness with which information is treated--interferes with relationships by preventing him from being as fully open and honest with students as he would be were there less need to guard information. Relationships with both students and faculty assume an additional measure of sensitivity, since so much that is said and done takes On an interpretation connected with negotiations. General The collective bargaining relationship with the faculty has, in subtle ways, altered the relationship between the President and the governing board. He has always viewed himself as a "double agent" in that relation- ship, representing the interests Of the faculty to the board and interpreting board policies to the faculty. The adversarial concept Of collective bargaining held by most board members makes it difficult for the President to act as an interpreter of the views Of the academic professionals without appearing to be their covert ally. Board members may question from time to time ”just which side Of the table he sits on." In the opposite direction, 143 the same adversarial climate erodes the trust in the President which faculty members must have if he is to be regarded as an authentic interpreter Of policy. The faculty are liable to suspect that his utterances are tactical, rather than forthrightly interpretative. The President's generalized judgment is that, in unionized institutions, the tolerance for ambiguity on the part Of academic leaders will be raised to a higher level of importance. The President of Tutor university retains a high level of satisfaction with his academic leadership role, although he remarked that that is not so with some of his colleague presidents. He quotes one colleague as saying that, "When my school gets a faculty union is when I will learn to enjoy golf." The President went on to Observe that a number Of presidents in unionized institutions had begun to regard their roles more as routine management jobs and less as callings, and had turned to sources Of personal satisfaction outside of the institutional setting. The Provost Like the President, the Provost Of Tutor University began his academic career as a professor in one of the fundamental disciplines of the liberal arts. His career has included the deanship of a liberal arts college and a year as acting president of the same college. His appoint- ment as Provost occurred about one year prior to the 144 negotiation of the first faculty contract. He is the first Officer at Tutor University to hold the title of Provost and holds the concurrent title of Vice President for Academic Affairs. The addition Of the Provost's title signifies a position in the administration close to that of a "co-president," in that his authority in academic affairs is virtually equal to that Of the President.) His principal achievements at Tutor University have been the establishment of a data-based system Of academic planning and the intro- duction Ofa.highly'innovative nontraditional "university without walls" program. He impressed the interviewer as a tough-minded leader with a profound affection for the traditional values Of the academy. Acknowledging the same detailed effects of faculty collective bargaining that were mentioned by other academic officers, he carried their implications to their most fundamental level in terms of their impact upon academic values. Course-Related The Provost's first comment on the course—related decisionmaking items was that the presence of collective bargaining with the faculty raises Obstacles tO the Open exploration Of ideas. Considerations of bargaining tactics gain priority over the discussion of proposals on their merits. In his view, collective bargaining formalizes a structure which is predominantly concerned with job security. Such a structure is inherently conservative and opposed to 145 revolutionary change. The first response of the faculty to a proposal for change is the question, "What will this do to my 'matrix of security' in the department and school?" .As evidence he cited the same debate over general education that the President mentioned. His procedure in introducing curricular change has been to assemble faculty task forces to gather data, examine issues and produce recommendations. These efforts have tended to be time-consuming and ultimately abortive because of the "hidden agenda" of questions related to job security and compensation. He attributes the "foot-dragging" of faculty in response to the task forces and their recommen- dations, at least in part, to the very fact that the initiative was an administrative one. That observation led to a comment on a change which he perceives in his personal relationships with faculty. He acknowledged that when he first moved from faculty to administration he took some good-natured ribbing from his faculty friends about his having "gone over to the other side," but collective bargaining has made that earlier separation more real. The sense of an abstract ex officio suspicion of his motives on the part of faculty has in- creased. Some Of the words he used were, "I have grown paranoid-- always sensitive to footsteps behind me Of people who are looking for an opportunity to attack." An example he used was the teaching effectiveness 146 program, also alluded to by the President. He considered the plan a reasoned and reasonable academic response to the problem of improving instruction—-and it was greeted by an Unfair Labor Practice charge by the faculty union. He confesses that the signals were there while the plan was being developed, but he failed to assess their importance. At the time of the interview, the Provost was engaged in a struggle to maintain the separation of matters related to the nontraditional degree program from the issues being negotiated with the union. The inherent conservatism of the union and the loss Of flexibility which he sees as occurring as a consequence Of bargaining has convinced him that to bargain anything which touches upon the nontraditional program would remove the capacity of the program to respond rapidly to new educational needs. In summary, the Provost called out two basic charac- teristics of faculty collective bargaining which he believes interfere with curricular development. The first of these was that collective bargaining is extremely expensive in terms of time and energy-—both physical and intellectual energy; and the expense accrues both to faculty and adminis— trators. He expressed a personal resentment Of his own expenditure of mental effort in connection with the nego- tiation and administration Of the bargained agreement and indicated that he had "more important things to do." He also Observed that he had witnessed the utter consumption 147 of the mental capital of bright people. Secondly, he indi- cated that the legal quality Of the role-definitions which emerge from the negotiated contract inhibit initiative, even where there is a willingness to press ahead with some academic enterprise. There is a nagging fear on the part of some faculty members that to go beyond contractual requirements may constitute a breaking Of the ranks with fellow faculty in the union. The consequence is a blocking of the individual faculty-member's right to self-determination. Facilities-Related There was little perceived change in the manner by which decisions are arrived at in respect to facilities. The Tutor contracts have avoided trivial specifications concerning Office space, heat, lighting and some of the other items which have been bargained elsewhere. Program— statements for new buildings are developed in consultation with the people who will use them. Finance-Related Finance-related decisions are of one piece with all Of the decisions related to allocation Of institutional resources, both human and physical. The Provost maintains that resource allocation is, and always has been, a re- sponsibility and prerogative of administration as the per- sons who maintain a comprehensive view Of all the competing needs. That principle was under attack and was eroded 148 during the late 19605 and early 1970s as a product of the "participation revolution" which characterized those years in American universities. Because those were years Of affluence for universities, it was convenient to permit a widespread sharing of finance-related decisions. Tough and controversial decisions were not required since money was sufficient to support most Of the private interests. Resources were occasionally misused as a consequence. The fiscal crisis of the mid-19705 made a different kind of stewardship essential tO institutional survival. Collective bargaining actually aided in the return Of fiscal management to the administration. The bargain- ing process permitted a clearly-focused line Of decision- making. The clear separation Of functions which others have noted as a product Of collective bargaining gave adminis- tration the right to allocate money, subject to bargaining over faculty compensation. The bargained compensation item reduces the absolute amount of money available for allocation, but the power to allocate rests with the administrative managers. In terms of administrative style, some of the modes of commerce were adopted--tardi1y for the fiscal health of institutions. The planning system adopted by Tutor University was made possible by such a return Of control. Union bargainers are intent on finding new areas Of the budget which might provide funds for conversion into 149 compensation settlements. Student financial aid could become just such a target-category. The Provost reported that such a possibility had been raised in his presence by a union spokesman. Staff-Related The fundamental impact perceived by the Provost was, once again,the change in the quality of relationships which resulted from the formalized procedures which appear to be inevitable with unionization. A trivial but highly indicative example was the change which tOOk place in the letters to the faculty dealing with matters related to their appointments. It was customary to include courteous expres- sions of appreciation in such correspondence, softening their bureaucratic tone. That changed after a facu1ty member who failed for reappointment raised a grievance citing the ”courtesy language" Of his letter as a formal evaluation! Even these modest efforts tO be humanely gentle became matters Of controversy. The climate of relationships is not hostile, and the faculty member in the case mentioned was not angry, even though he was dis— appointed. He merely identified what he thought was a procedural loophole. The point is that collective bargaining requires such legal precision in every communication that great care is necessary in the framing of correspondence, and in building the files Of evidence which support the decisions 150 which are communicated. That is a consequence Of collec- tive bargaining important in itself; but more important, to the mind Of the Provost, is the manner in which those requirements increase the trend toward depersonalization Of the college. The appointment process has changed in that the Provost has insisted on more careful scrutiny Of credentials and has taken more pains in the interviewing Of prospective new faculty members. In interviews with highly promising candidates, the Provost has had to respond to various questions concerning the effect Of the faculty union on the professional environment. Retrenchment is a matter of vital concern to the union. While the Tutor faculty has increased somewhat in total number over the last few years, some departments have suffered the loss Of faculty positions due to the shifting patterns of student enrollment. The reductions have been accomplished by nonreappointment Of nontenured faculty. A number Of the nonreappointments have led to grievances by the faculty members affected and the union has supported them. The Provost feels that the union claims the right to deal with retrenchment as an issue separate from the academic issues involved. The evaluation of instruction, as has already been mentioned, was attacked by the union in an Unfair Labor Practice charge claiming that evaluation is a condition 151 of employment subject to collective bargaining. The union attitude toward evaluation diminishes the capability of department Chairpersons, deans, and the Provost to make rational judgments about people. The necessity imposed by formalized procedures, supported by threat of grievance, is that all judgments be objectified and that evaluators are able tO say only those things which can be documented. What is lost are those "sloppy but important" subjective judgments. One quality of the able academic leader was, at one time, the ability to make wise subjective judgments about the quality of people. The exercise of that important ability is now discouraged. At this point, the Provost asked leave to digress and became quite eloquent on the matter Of the need to make several kinds Of discriminating judgments within the academic community. An abstract of his remarks is that the matter Of discriminating judgment lies at the heart Of the jUStifica— tion for the existence of a college or university. Uni- versity education consists in learning the ability to separate the true from the false, the good from the bad, the beauti- ful from the ugly, the right from the wrong. Faculty collec- tive bargaining, by its emphasis on equal treatment for all, is complicit in an erosion Of the commitment both to the possibility and the desirability Of reasoned and discrim- inating judgment. "How," he said, "are we to respond to our students who are subject to the academic judgments of 152 faculty who, in another setting, reject the principle of judgment?" The ultimate result is a fundamental change in the nature Of the academic community from one dependent upon its own internal dynamic to a system dependent upon the extrinsic judgments of the courts. Faculty tenure is undergoing a subtle but fundamental change. In every case where an "agency shop" contract has been negotiated, tenure has become subservient to the contract. The current contract at Tutor contains what is commonly described as an agency shop clause, in that faculty members are required by the contract to pay an agency fee if they do not pay union dues. Tenure is protected by a modifying clause which places the burden Of collection on the union. The "subtle change," however, occurs as tenure is increasingly regarded as job security and loses its important status as a bulwark Of academic freedom. The effect Of collective bargaining on faculty compensation was described succinctly as a reduction in the amount of total resources available and, consequently, of the "free money" which might otherwise be used by the Provost in the development of the academic program. A second effect is, in Biblical paraphrase, "to lay dollars on equals and unequals alike." Where someone is doing something really fine,there is difficulty in finding ways to recognize that excellence. Being unable to reward extraordinary people with money, the Provost is driven to 153 finding devices for accomplishing the same purpose less straightforwardly. A series Of staff-related effects perceived by the Provost involved changed relationships with his administra- tive subordinates. The precision required in personnel operations makes closer monitoring necessary over the work of subordinates. More time is required in consultation and more documents need to be re—drafted to accommodate some technical detail. The Provost is also conscious of a close watch by middle-level administrators over the rela- tionship between the central administration and the faculty union. As yet no administrative-professional union has emerged; but there is an association of administrative and professional staff members which could rapidly become a union if it were felt that settlements with the faculty were made at the expense of administrators. That is a potential problem which the Provost must continually keep in mind in his relationships with his professional staff. Student-Related The Provost has little direct contact with students, but they are his uppermost concern as the Objects of the whole educational task. He worries about the dollar—impact on students as tuition increases constantly become nec- essary for institutional survival and quality. The Provost is also concerned over the long-range implications of "triads" formed by the shifting alignments 154 (If faculty, students, and administration. Three parties 1J1 discussion tend to fall into "two against one" coalitions. .As student support is courted by faculty on one hand and adndnistration on the other, a likelihood exists that students will be both used and abused. General Summarizing his reflections on the effects Of faculty collective bargaining on his own academic leadership role, the Provost confessed that he has suffered some loss Of perspective. A professor by instinct, he finds himself increasingly anti-faculty in the tone Of some of his spontaneous remarks. He expressed dissatisfaction with the "posturing" which has characterized the bargaining rela- tionship--the pattern of absurd demands being answered by contemptuous responses. Along with the tactical "posturing" goes the guardedness Of conversation and erosion of openness and trust. The result is a species of institutionalized dishonestyixmwhich the Provost is complicit and which is foreign to his own instincts. He is Optimistic, however, in his own deep-seated belief in the reality Of a community of scholars and Of his own ability to experience richness and delight in that community. He is unwilling to concede that the pattern of relationships which presently appear to emerge from collective bargaining is characteristic of the university Of the future. 155 Dean I. Dean I. has been the dean Of his school for almost seven years, having come from the professorial ranks at another university. He continues to be a more productive scholar than is usual for administrators in emerging institutions. As such, he is symbolic of the whole pro- cess of institutional emergence among the former teachers' colleges, exhibiting a set of academic values and experi- ences broader than those which characterized the deanship in schools whichthought primarily in terms of preparing teachers for the public Schools. His comments reflected that background. Course-Related Given his general orientation, Dean I. had less to say than might have been expected about the effect of faculty bargaining on curricular development. He indicated early in the interview that, in his opinion, the key tO course and curriculum development is the development of a faculty. Hence, many Of his reflections upon leadership in course-related matters are subsumed in his comments on staff-related issues. His principal assertion in the matter Of curriulum was that the bargaining relationship Operates tO stifle curricular innovation, since new developments generally involve effort over and above the expected minimum, and the union posture generally is to discourage such extra effort. 156 Facilities-Related There are no direct effects of collective bargaining on decisions relating Uofacilities. An indirect effect is created, however, by the cost of negotiated compensation patterns. Money is negotiated away in compensation which could be spent in the improvement Of facilities and equipment. Finance-Related Finances are allocated through the institutional planning system. The Dean's influence is exercised in connection with the Operation Of that system. While most Of his decisions revolve, in one way or another, on the availability Of financial resources, there is no direct relationship between collective bargaining and specifically finance-related matters. Once again, the indirect effect is felt through the general limitation on available money. The crucial matter of faculty compensation falls among staff-related matters. Staff-Related In discussing staff-related issues, Dean I. put forward a conceptual model from which most Of his specific comments flowed. Faculties in emerging universities tend to fall into something like a normal curve in terms of ability and incentive. A few professors will be self-motivated achievers and a few will habitually perform at the minimum. Between 157 are the bulk of faculty members who will be influenced in their performance by "the carrot and the stick" with the most powerful influence being the "carrot"--that is, the promise of reward for improved performance. The "juiciest carrot" is financial reward, i.e., merit pay increases. A tenet of faculty unions, including the one at Tutor, is Opposition to merit pay, and the Tutor contract includes negotiated compensation increases which are applied without reference to judgments of merit. The most powerful incen- tive to improvement is thus removed. Tutor University's "Achievement Award" system simply reinforces those faculty members who would be most likely to achieve without it. Beyond that, the negotiation of financial rewards applied equally tO all has the effect Of encouraging performance, not at some median level, but at the minimum. A direct effect Of the "union mentality" is perceived in this connection. Dean I. reported changes which he had Observed in individual faculty members which he attributes to union-inspired pressure to relax their professional efforts. That pressure may be simply an effect Of the union environment, or it may be more direct. In one instance a grievance proceeding was threatened, though never pursued, against a faculty member whose colleagues thought was doing too much. If that was true, and the Dean clearly perceived it to be, the implications for academic freedom are fright- ening--and that fact was acknowledge in the interview. 158 In the whole issue of faculty develOpment, which he regards as his single most important concern and central to the educational quality Of his school, Dean I. feels that necessary instruments for his exercise Of leadership have been removed. With the bulk Of the faculty whose performance is influenced by external forces, recognition by the society of professionals was once a potent incentive. That profes- sional recognition has been superceded by the ethos Of the union. That ethos is one which so strictly links economic rewards to stipulated work that minimum performance is encouraged and even demanded. Negotiated compensation has removed matters of salary and salary as related to judgments of merit from the decision-making agenda. In establishing the entry-level Of compensation for new faculty, considerations have reduced themselves to, in Dean I.'s words, "The calculation of what a year's experience is worth dollarwise." He regards that as a necessary but defective criterion, since it makes no distinction between persons who have developed with experience and those who have simply "repeated the first year over and over again." The precise price-tagging of increments of academic experience is made necessary by negotiated systems Of inequity-adjustment, supported by the threat of formal grievance. That comment led to a discussion Of procedure-formal- ization in all personnel transactions. Dean I. estimated 159 that he finds it necessary to consult the negotiated agreement an average Of twelve times weekly. His judgments are based on an interpretation of contract-language, rather than upon his own reasoned assessments or some form Of consultation, as would be the case if the contract were not present. Files are being built for procedural purposes only, so that decision can be defended before grievance panels or in the courts. Most procedures, Dean I. feels, should have been developed anyway, and some improvements in personnel pro- cedures have resulted. On the other hand, he feels that had the procedures not developed in a context of collective bargaining they would have been done differently and better. He cited a study of faculty work-load units which was com- missioned by the Academic Senate, but was heavily influenced by union sympathizers. Had the union influence not been present, he feels that a useful report would have been produced in brief form. As it stands, the report is "twelve inches thick" and inconclusive. That occurred, he believes, because of a calculated union effort to Obscure the issues and stall the development of a Senate assessment Of work-load unitl the issue could be treated at the bargaining table. He believes that the union presence in the Senate is regularly employed to serve similar tactical ends. 160 Student-Related Dean I. has personal contact with students who are members Of his Advisory Council and others who come to him for advice. He does not characterize these students as ones who are concerned about "student power" but about the personal implications Of the bargaining process for their personal educational programs. The student concerns are described as a general anxiety, particularly about the possibilities of a faculty strike and its possible effect upon their propspects for graduation. The Dean has sought to allay those anxieties and to encourage others to do the same. General Dean I. is concerned both for professionalism and collegiality as those environmental factors are influenced by collective bargaining. He concedes that his own collegial relationships are diminished by the size of his school. He has also found it necessary to withdraw somewhat in the interests of decision-making Objectivity. He feels, however, that the union has "played upon" these occurrences. His withdrawal is occasioned in part by a caution about the handling of information. He is uncertain about how informa- tion might be used which he shares, either deliberately or inadvertently, so that he is continually concerned about the need to guard his conversation. That fact alone inter- feres with free communication, and he feels that he is a 161 effective communicator between his faculty and the central administration as a result. The Dean's most important constituency is his corps of department Chairpersons. They are members Of the bargaining unit, but carry administrative responsibility. Their ambiguous position has led to two types of behavior. In one pattern, the chairperson identifies with the faculty and becomes an adversary of the Dean. In the other pattern, he or she identifies with administration and may become an adversary of the faculty. In either case, the collegial and consultative relationship which ought to exist with the office of the Dean is disturbed. Dean T. Dean T. has held his deanship at Tutor University for about eight years, becoming well-established in the position before the organization of the faculty union. He was a member Of the university bargaining team in the first contract negotiations to take place on the campus. While the great majority of Officers interviewed in the course of the research were cordial, interested and Open, Dean T. was unusually so. He was an easy person with whom to visit. The observation is more than incidental. He indicated than an important aspect of his administrative style has been to cultivate easy and Open personal rela- tionships with faculty, and that Openness is what he per- ceives to have been most seriously affected by the climate of faculty unionization. 162 He established the theme early in the interview. In response to the initial questions concerning course- related items, he said, "Let me ramble a bit first." The "rambling" centered upon the altered relationships which the Dean perceived as a consequence of collective bargaining. He had successfully established a relationship with faculty which permitted a free flow Of conversation, dialogue and good-natured argument. Faculty felt free to drop in at the Office late in the day to chat. Those conversations usually had an agenda which might not be immediately apparent, but in the process of getting to the point a great deal Of information could be gleaned about what was going on in the departments. The real agenda of the visits was usually related to faculty salary or to projects for which the support of the dean was being enlisted. The informal relationships which the dean found so useful, upon which he had come to depend, and which he found genuinely enjoyable ended with the appearance Of the union. Dean T.'s interpretation of the "drying up" Of the relationships was that faculty members no longer feel a need to enlist the dean as an advocate with the central administration. The union now occupies that position. Even the conversations which take place in social settings have been affected. Dean T. senses that if he joins a group Of faculty at coffee subjects are changed and drift Off into irrelevancies. 163 The analysis Offered by Dean T. is that collective bargaining is a highly formalized pattern Of information- exchange and faculty members are afraid to convey infor- mation, even inadvertently, outside Of the formal structures established by the bargaining relationship. The contrac- tualized relationship affects more than the kinds Of discussion which might involve bargaining subjects. The whole process of contract administration lays out formal procedures for communication between the faculty and admin- istration. For example, a faculty member who has a complaint will be more likely to follow the form for raising a grie- vance rather than raising the matter in a more or less casual conversation with the dean. That is contrary tO the administrative style which Dean T. had cultivated as his principal leadership technique. He said, "It is more time-consuming and I need to work harder to keep the formal structures from interfering with communication." He also stated positively that, "The more people lean toward the union, the less I see of them. That wasn't so before. ”Now, when I need to see them I have to look for them." An interesting exception to that rule has been some union members who were involved as adversaries of the dean at the bargaining table. A new relatiOnship of confidence and "collegiality" appears to haveemerged from those arduous sessions. Apparently, a certain comeraderie grows between bargaining adversaries, at least in the experience of Dean T. Course-Related The Observation on relationships touches almost every category of decision-making items. Beyond that, Dean T. sees little direction effect on course-related items. New program development is not difficult. He indicated that there is still enough faculty ambition tO keep up-to-date, but he could wishzflmrmore future orientation——more Of a desire to lead the professions, rather than merely to stay abreast of developments that occur elsewhere. Faculty research has been affected. Strides were being made in the direction Of encouraging "forefront" research, but the union has contributed to a relaxation of attitudes. Where compensation and job security is the issue, the union inspires confidence and the professional effort is relaxed. Facilities-Related The indirect effect Of collective bargaining is to divert funds into compensation which might have been free for minor remodeling of facilities. That was once an on-going process and has ceased to all intents and purposes. Finance-Related The process Of budget-preparation is made much easier for the dean. There is no need to build cases for differ- ential faculty compensation based on merit. The tough decisions regarding the apportionment of compensation increases have disappeared in the bargaining process. The 165 process of determining amounts for supplies and equipment is also made simpler by an institutionwwideplanning process which is concomitant with, if not an effect of, collective bargaining. Staff-Related All personnel Operations lose flexibility. The nec- essity of one rule for all achieves a kind Of superficial fairness, while depriving the Dean Of the ability to deal with individual situations, either of merit or demerit. Grievance procedures exist under both the negotiated contract and Senate rules. Dean T. sees the same influences at work in both, however. The presence of the union as a supporter of grievances under either system increases the "grievance mentality" of the faculty. The effect on all personnel procedures is the familiar one of increased proceduralization and scrupulous attention to the construc- tion Of faculty dossiers. The processes for the appointment Of new faculty have been considerably tightened in view Of the difficulty likely to be encountered if a faculty member is not reappointed and eventually tenured. In regard to compensation, the reduction of flexibility extends not only to the matter Of direct compensation, but also of the sorts Of informal compensation that once constituted an important system of rewards. Those rewards could once have been granted in the form of professional 166 opportunities, interesting assignments, or equipment and other academic support. These are not difficult to provide. Dean T. returned to the theme Of faculty relation—- ships in connection with the discussion Of staff-related items. The biggest change he notes is a deterioration in collegial relationships. He described "collegiality" in his experience as the blend of intellectual interests and personal affections which enriches the entire life Of the institution and constitutes an important form Of reward for all who work in the university. He confesses that his own zest is depleted by the emerging climate and that his leadership tends toward a "middle management" role, domin- ated by the supervision of formal procedures. Student-Related There was no perceived effect on the relationships between the dean and the few students with whom he has regular contact. He has student members on his advisory committee, but there is a stipulated understanding that faculty matters will not be dealt with in the presence of students. CHAPTER V ANALYSIS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH The officers interviewed were willing and, in most cases, even eager to talk about their perceptions of the effects Of faculty collective bargaining on their institu- tions and upon the academic society generally. They were less able, though no less willing, tO describe the effects of the bargaining relationship upon themselves and their own administrative functions. That was to be expected given the difficulty involved in any kind Of rational self— examination. When the interview nOtes were translated into narrative, however, clues appeared which permit some conclusions to be drawn about the ways in which this limited sample Of college and university administrators see their own academic leadership roles as having been affected by faculty collective bargaining. Most of the persons who have been involved in the public discussion of academic collective bargaining are ones who have become, in some degree, experts on the subject. They are faculty and administrators who have been leaders in the processes Of unionization, negotiation, and contract administration in their own institutions. Some are labor 167 168 attorneys, personnel administrators, or scholars and teachers Of administration and higher education. A few Of the fourteen persons formally interviewed in this research fall within those categories. The majority, however, are working academic administrators for whom faculty unionization has become a condition of the working environment and is not a principal focus of scholarly or professional interest. They have simply had to live with the "fall-out" of faculty negotiations. Reflection on the evidence suggests that there are three levels of self-perceived effects Of faculty collec- tive bargaining which bear on the academic leadership roles of administrators in institutions of higher education. The first of these is the range Of effects which the officers see as having altered procedures and climates within the institutions. These general institutional effects alter the matrix within which administrators must function and the changes are ones to which academic leaders are forced to adjust their leadership behaviors. A second level of effects are the specific adjustments which the Officers have made to cope with the requirements of negotiation and administration Of their Offices in the presence Of the union and the negotiated agreement. These are the things which administrators are required to do or feel compelled to do or to refrain from doing as a conse- quence of the bargaining relationship with the faculty. 169 The third level of effects is the subjective one which consists of changes in the values and attitudes of the academic leaders. These may be the most important effects in terms of their impact on theleadership function, since they are so intimately involved in goal identification and in shaping the personal styles by which goals are communi- cated and support enlisted for their implementation. These subjective effects are also the most difficult and risky ones to assess. Institutional Effects Throughout the presentation of interview evidence, topics have been discussed in the order adopted for the interview structure; that is: Course-Related, Facilities- Related, Staff-Related, and Student-Related. The evidence compiled reveals a primary concentration of perceived effects in Staff-Related items. Effects which were perceived in other areas were most frequently identified as the secondary consequences Of Staff-Related changes. Analysis Of the evidence is aided, therefore, by a change in the order in which the decision-making categories are treated. The order which will be adopted for this purpose is one which represents the radiating consequences Of staff-related effects. That order is: Staff, Finance, Course, and Student. Facilities-Related effects appear to be so minimal as to require no extended comment. In all of the institutions visited, facilities management has been 170 regarded as an administration responsibility and the faculty unions appear willing, thus far, to leave decisions regarding facilities to administrators. The institutional effects which are described are the ones perceived by presidents, academic vice-presidents, and deans in their own immediate surroundings. They are not derived from comprehensive and Objective case-studies. Their importance and their value is that they represent the sets Of conditions to which the Officers interviewed have found it necessary to adjust their own behaviors. The effects noted are "real" to the extent that respondents regard them as "real." Staff-Related Faculty collective bargaining is, by definition, a staff-related occurrence. Within the category of Staff- Related items, union negotiating efforts appear tO have been concentrated on compensation and other items which bear upon compensation and job security. Collective bar- gaining introduces a method of determining faculty compen- sation which differs radically from the systems which traditionally have prevailed in institutions of higher education. That traditional pattern featured independent negotiation by individual professors with department chairpersons or committees, deans, and the central adminis- tration. Merit considerations and circumstances of individual need were generally taken into account. The 171 traditional system of determining salary and fringe benefits may have been compromised in some institutions prior to the introduction of collective bargaining. Growth in the size of faculties and administrative attempts to "rational- ize" compensation using personnel-management methods had already begun to depersonalize the process, although merit features were generally retained to a greater extent than that permitted by collective bargaining. Negotiated contracts in all of the institutions visited have included formulized computation of salaries and fringe benefits, with the formulas being applied to all members of the bargaining units. Compensation decisions are consequently effectively removed from administrative desks to the bargaining table. Once the agreement has been reached, the only responsibility which falls upon the administration is to insure that the contract is impeccably applied. In addition to the primary impact on the way compensation decisions are arrived at, there are secondary effects connected with those other staff-related concerns which have implications for compensation: appointment and promotion procedures and the assessment Of faculty work-load. A leading concern of industrial unions has been the jOb security Of bargaining unit members. Their academic counterparts do not appear to differ in this respect. When the continuing power of the union depends upon the support of a majority Of the bargaining-unit membership, the union 172 must concentrate its efforts on those matters which are Of the greatest immediate concern to the members. At a time when academic employment is threatened, job security is clearly one of those urgent matters. Reappointment, non- reappointment, tenure and faculty retrenchment become crucial issues, either for direct negotiation or for careful monitoring by the union of policy decisions occur- ring in the governance processes. A high level Of sensi- tivity is given to all employment security-related matters by the threat Of grievance in decisions concerning individ- uals and the threat Of Unfair Labor Practice claims in decisions Of policy. Each Of the respondents mentioned the vastly increased specificity and formality Of procedures that is a feature of contemporary life in their institutions. Each employ- ment-related decision requires documentation acceptable in a court of law since each such decision, however routine it may appear, is a potential cause Of grievance and legal action. Faculty unionism may be as much a symptom as a cause of the "proceduralization" Of employment relations. There was evidence at all Of the institutions in the research that personnel management systems were being developed prior to, or concurrently with, the unionization Of the faculty. All of the institutions had unionized employees before their faculties became unionized and employment relations apparatus was present to deal with them. 173 Whatever the causal relationship between faculty collective bargaining and proceduralization may be, the Officers interviewed were unanimous in their perceptions that the presence Of a faculty union had increased the climate of legalism in relationships with the faculty. Procedures connected with all faculty personnel transactions had become detailed and explicit. The union appears ready to espouse grievance proceedings, whether the grievance procedures are a part Of the negotiated agreement nor are ones established through the governance system. In each of the institutions, some indication was given of changes which had occurred in the relationships between faculty and administration which could be attri- buted to the union presence. At Alpha and Beta colleges, the changes appeared to take the form of a general low level Of contention over relatively minor issues. At Mentor and Tutor universities, the issues appeared to be more substantive. Evidence of that is the Unfair Labor Practice charge at Tutor and, Of course, a full—fledged faculty strike at Mentor. Particularly at Tutor, repeated mention was made Of the effect Of unionization on the flow Of communication with the faculty and the general sensi- tivity surrounding the sharing Of information. Finance-Related Collective bargaining has one obvious impact on institutional finance and finance-related decisions. 174 Negotiated compensation settlements are taken "off the top" of any new money appropriated. :What remains is the amount available for allocation to program. Academic program support and faculty compensation are competing considera- tions at the bargaining table. At Alpha and Beta, where negotiations take place at the state level, and where the budgets reach the campus in line-item appropriations, the main effect is felt in the hidden costs Of collective bargaining-—the administrative and clerical time which is consumed by contract administration. With no additional money appropriated for these purposes, the result is usually tO add to administrative work-load. That actually serves one budgetary purpose Of the Chancellor's office--to increase campus "productivity." At Mentor and Tutor, where appropriations are not by line-item, and where bargaining takes place on the campus, the problems are compounded. Negotiators for the univer- sities are protecting free money for programs and the university administrations must make internal adjustment for compensation settlements. In any event, the result is to reduce the amounts available for noncompensation items and to restrict flexibility in academic program development. Course-Related The negotiated agreements in effect at all of the institutions included in the research encompass only items which can be considered "terms and conditions Of employment." 175 The agreements at Alpha, Beta, and Mentor contain "past practices" clauses which protect the existing governance systems Of the institutions and the rights Of faculty tO participate in those systems to the extent provided by existing policies. The SCOpe Of negotiations at Tutor is limited to "compensation and other terms and conditions of employment." Such restrictions are intended to separate matters related tO the academic program from those issues which are specifically related to employment. The latter falls within the scope of collective bargaining while the former remains for decision within the campus governance system. That theory may not stand the test of practice because of a complex interaction which occurs between matters related to staff and finance and course-related issues. That interaction was evident from the remarks of Officers in all of the institutions, although it became particularly explicit at Mentor and Tutor. Again, the compensation and job security syndrome was seen to operate. Compensation settlements have the direct effect on program support and development money that has already been described. In addition, at least one person in each institution identified the connection between compensation and faculty work-load. Program development frequently involves an uncalculated amount Of additional faculty time. The "no pay, no work" position of unions generally leads faculty under union influence 176 to insist that time spent on new program development be assessed as a portion of the total work-load and compen- sation credit granted. None of the persons who commented in this vein intended to imply that all faculty adopt such a view, but the union positions adopted in regard to faculty work-load make the matter sensitive and in some cases actual restrictions were noted. Job security concerns create another range Of effects on course-related decisions. These hinge in part on the relationship between faculty composition and curricular development. Faculty quality is also directly linked to the quality Of academic programs. Procedural constraints on nonreappointment Of nontenured faculty reduce the amount of flexibility for adjustment to changing programmatic needs. The decision not to reappoint or not to tenure increasingly requires a documentation of cause, and such decisions aremore likely than not to be tested in grievance proceedings. Where the problem is that of protecting faculty quality in the face Of retrenchment, the seniority system favored by unions would make the date of appointment the determining consideration apart from any assessment of quality or of the relationship between individual faculty competencies and the curricular needs of the department. That is particularly damaging to institutions where the best-qualified professors and the ones whose training and interests are directed toward the most recent develop- ments in their fields are among the most recently appointed. 177 Gains in Affirmative Action are likely to be lost in the same process. Job security becomes an issue in curricular change in another way. Professors are leery Of any change which has an unpredictable effect on departmental enrollments. The academic vice presidents at Beta College and Tutor University were particularly articulate in describing this attitude and its effect on the possibilities of gaining faculty support for any restructuring Of the curriculum. Faculty concern over job security is certainly not something which arrived with faculty unions. The fiscal and enrollment crisis in institutions Of higher education have made the times anxious ones. The union either "plays upon" these anxieties for purposes related to its own base of power, or it offers personal protection in the face of them, depending on the viewPOint one adopts. The adminis- trators interviewed frequently acknowledged that the union position is understandable, but that it conflicts with their own leadership goals. Only the Tutor president suggested that the validity Of the job security goals Of the union might be accepted and used as the basis for cooperation in solving the course-related problems that occur. Contrary to what might have been expected, faculty power for its own sake, as represented by union "clout" in academic decision-making, did not appear as an issue. Agency-election rhetoric apparently gave way to the "bread 178 and better" concerns, in the institutions visited. What did become apparent was that administrations and unions might find themselves negotiating the academic program anyway as employment-related matters become inexorably linked to educational ones. Student-Related A more vocal generation of students liked to point out that almost everything that goes on in the university is a "student-related" concern to the extent that it affects the quality, cost, or convenience of education. In the institutions visited, however, administrative Officers note few, if any, direct student-related effects of faculty collective bargaining. Students generally have taken little interest. At Alpha and Beta colleges, where bar- gaining takes place away from the campus, it would be entirely possible for a student to be unaware that the faculty is organized for collective bargaining. That would not be the case at Mentor and Tutor universities where collective bargaining is a highly-visible occurrence on campus. The most important student—related effect, reported at both Menotr and Tutor, was the financial one. Where the main issue in negotiations is compensation, and the "free money" is being divided at the bargaining table between compensation and program support, an Option is to increase the amount by raising tuition. A similar effect was noted at Alpha State College, where the only way of dealing with faculty work-load limits was to increase class size. 179 At Tutor University, students have become alert to their stake in faculty collective bargaining as a result Of the possible impact either on the cost or the quality of their education. Regardless of how real the threats may be, they have become matters Of public discussion in connection with negotiations and student concern has been raised accordingly. The Administrative Response The most Obvious institutional effect attributed to faculty collective bargaining, and the effect most frequently noted by the officers interviewed, was the "proceduraliza- tion" of employment relations. Personnel policies and procedures have become more explicit, more subject to appeal and grievance, more likely to result in some form of legal action. The persons most frequently involved in faculty personnel transactions are the deans and chief academic Officers. These described the effect on themselves as a limitation Of the Options Open to them. While the Officers may be subjectively conscious Of losing Opportunities to be flexible in their handling Of decisions, the person sitting across the desk from them is likely to describe the changed behavior as "more rigid." More than personnel decisions are involved. Once again, the "ripple-effect" occurs as decisions related to course and finance become involved with the staff-related constraints which emerge from collective bargaining. 180 A more important change in the administrative role results from the climate of proceduralization and legali- zation, and the change has implications not only for specific administrative action but also for leadership styles and for the personal attitudes of the administrators. Decision- making in institutions of higher education has traditionally been more decentralized than in other types of administra- tive organizations. 93 jugg power resides almost exclusively with governing boards and is delegated through an adminis- trative hierarchy. 22.:2929 power, on the other hand, is Often widely distributed to faculty legislative bodies, to committees, to academic departments, and to individual professors, as well as to lower echelons Of the administra- tion. Many academic leaders hold the Opinion that the academic quality and educational effectiveness Of institu- tions depends upon just such a distribution of power. In the institutions that were visited, the procedural and legal climate was seen as requiring a congruence between 99 1353 and g2 £3929 power. Several of the Officers described the effect as a delineation and separation Of functions between faculty and administration. The earlier, more traditional, academic system functioned more or less effectively because it tol- erated certain ambiguities about who actually possessed decision-making power in a variety of circumstances. The legal and procedural requirements of collective bargaining 181 do not permit such ambiguity.' The framework Of law which structures and regulates the Collective bargaining rela- tionship is derived from the industrial system. It assumes the existence of two parties, management and labor. The bipartite structure Of collective bargaining under the color of law requires academic negotiators to assume the separated and defined roles of management and employees. The result is to force aconvergence in administrative functions and leadership styles toward a management posture, even where the administrative Officers themselves do not seek that role. The Mentor president expressed it force- fully: "They bargain, we manage." Some Of the Officers acknowledged that the "management posture" Of academic administrators cannot be entirely attributed to faculty collective bargaining. One product Of the 19705 fiscal crisis in higher education is the high level of importance which has been given to management accountability in public colleges and universities. Manage- ment science provides the technique and the economy furnishes the inventive. In response to public demand, state govern— ments are insisting that appropriated tax dollars be scrupulously managed in their use, and that insistance is handed down through each level of the educational bureau- cracy. Accordingly, executive administrators are required to assign a high priority to gaining management control over those decisions which lead to a commitment Of resources. 182 In that way, faculty collective bargaining, by forcing a definition of the management function, assists in the establishment of management control. The perceived effects Of proceduralization varied among the institutions visited. Particularly at Beta State College, the highly proceduralized state system Of higher education had anticipated most of the procedural effects which were attributed elsewhere to faculty collective bargaining. At Beta, administrative Officers, particularly at the level of president and vice president, already ap- peared tO regard themselves as managers with authority delegated from the state system Chancellor. Bargaining occurs at the state level and its effects on the local campus were perceived by the Beta Officers to consist mainly of changes which had occurred in the climate of their relationships with the local faculty. At Mentor and Tutor univerisities, administrators at all levels were seeking to define their own roles and were grappling with the academic implications of an increasingly management-oriented administrative style. Alpha State College exhibited a third pattern of administrative response. Extraordinarily detailed personnel procedures and resulting faculty attitudes toward their academic employment were attributed to faculty collective bargaining. Bargaining in that state, however, takes place between faculty representatives and the state govern- ment, and the procedures which result are promulgated by 183 the Office Of the state Chancellor of higher education. "Managerialization" Of the state system has not developed tO the state Of sophistication evident at Beta College. Officers at Alpha are responding to directive which they have little part in making and they are attempting to shape their individual relationships with faculty around those procedures. The more procedures preempt the individual judgment Of academic leaders, the less inclined they may be to exercise leadership and judgment where opportunities exist. Dean T., at Tutor University, remarked wistfully that he was feeling more and more like a "middle manager." Dean I., at the same institution described the number of times that his decisions were determined by the contract, and all Officers, particularly at the dean level, made reference to the amount of time consumed simply by procedural matters. Strong leadership character will be required for those Officers to resist falling into a purely ministerial role. (This faintly pejorative use of the word "ministerial" is borrowed from legal terminology which employs the word to describe an act or duty which admits of no personal discre- tion in its performance.) Uniformity in the administration of explicit proce- dures requires a centralization of administration. That trend was most noticeable at Mentor and Tutor Universities where centralization was replacing an earlier decentraliza- tion. The occurrence once again reflects the convergence 184 of dg fagtg power in the direction of £3 lure authority. The Observation Of the Mentor president that the governing board had become more involved in day-to-day administrative decisions may be evidence of that convergence. The loss of decision-making "flexibility" mentioned by several of the deans may also illustrate the trend. They could be losing their original authority not only to abstract "pro- cedures" but also to the higher administrative authorities with whom they must now consult in the application Of those procedures. In the chaotic institutions which emerged from the 19605, the virtues Of uniformity and centralized management control may seem attractive. There are some institutions, however, in which the ill-defined and ambiguous processes Of shared authority and peer judgments have worked well. Mentor and Tutor universities appeared to be such institu- tions, or were close to becoming so. They may pay a price in quality with the introduction Of procedures that can be defended before a labor arbitrator, particularly if those procedures too greatly restrict the ability or the incentive of "front-line" administrators to exercise their leadership. Alpha and Beta state colleges, and their administrative Officers, show less change and less stress resulting from centralization of authority. That is probably because, as campuses Of larger state systems, their decision-making was already more centralized. 185 Anticipating the effects on the academic quality of: institutions, some administrations have pinned their hOpes on a limitation of the scope of negotiations. They hope to limit the effects Of proceduralization by confining the pro- cedures to matters related to faculty employment, leaving the academic program within the existing governance forms. They are, in effect, attempting to adopt two modes Of relationship with the faculty. In one mode the faculty would be employees and the administration would be manage- ment. In the other mode, the faculty would be professional participants in a system of shared authority. All of the institutions visited were attempting to maintain such a separation. That may succeed, but the evidence indicates that the policy will only serve to delay the inevitable. The "ripple-effect" will continue tO cause an erosion of the territory protected from negotiation, even where the erosion is resisted both by the union and the administration. Accompanying the specific effects on procedures and decisions that were Observed in the institutions, a range Of effects appeared which are related to the emotional climate of relationships on the campuses. Most of the presidents, vice presidents, and deans in the interview group attempted tO remain Objective in their assessments Of_ the impact Of faculty unionization upon themselves and their leadership roles. Presidents particularly appeared guarded in their comments, except possibly the president Of Tutor. 186' Nevertheless, a reading of the interview narratives might lead the Objective outsider to conclude that what was being constructed was a tract against faculty unionism. The tone was adversarial, even where that was not intended. At Alpha and Beta colleges, where the substantive effects Of collective bargaining occurred at a level above the local campus, the principal effects noted on campus were onces having to do with a general climate of conten- tiousness. The issues that could be decided on the campus were few and relatively trivial. As a consequence, the con- tentiousness took the form Of petty bickering. The textbook controversy at Beta is an example. Beyond that, there was on both campuses a kind of ill-defined anxiety among ad- ministrators about where and when the next issues might appear. At Mentor and Tutor, where substantive issues are settled in on-campus bargaining, and where the administra- tors are principal actors in the negotiating process, the anxieties were better defined although there still remained some uneasiness about possible unanticipated occurrences connected with the union relationship. The Tutor prOvost spoke of "listening for the footsteps" behind him. At Tutor, relationships between the administration and the faculty union appeared to be formal and civil, with matters Of controversy being referred to formal procedures and to the courts. On-going relationships on the campus remained civil while matters were being settled by attorneys. 187 At Mentor, there appeared to be an assumed adversary rela- tionship with the faculty union, although Dean E. felt compelled to emphasize that an adversary relationship need not be a hostile one. His need to comment in that vein may reveal that the adversary relationship in his institu- tion had, in fact, at some points been pontaminated by hostility. The Tutor president put the adversarial relationship into perspective when he remarked that the assumption of an adversarial posture by an administration, however civil a form that may take, increases the likelihood that the union response will be adversarial. The Tutor provost was less sanguine. His Opinion is that union control of its membership and its negotiating potency requires a militant "posturing." He reversed his president's analysis claiming, in effect, that administrative adversariness is a product of union militance. A more neutral analysis can be derived from the statements of all the Tutor Officers concerning the sensi- tivity Of information and the constraints on free and open conversation with faculty members. Collective bargaining is a formal, structured relationship. Communication that once flowed spontaneously between faculty and administration is now funneled into formal channels. Informal understandings are reduced to writing and memorandum records are kept as evidence for possible grievance proceedings. Responses are 188 confined to the cold print. In the process, something is lost which would be present in free human interaction. Something is also gained in precision and even-handedness, but the loss in terms of responsiveness to individual con- cerns and the pure richness Of human intellectual compan- ionship may not be worth the price. Summary Preceding chapters Of the dissertation report the perceptions of a group Of academic administrators concerning the effects of faculty collective bargaining on their own leadership roles and functions. This concluding chapter develops an analytical outline within which to assemble and relate those perceptions. The outline begins with the Observation that the fundamental concerns Of faculty unions are matters related to faculty compensation and job security. The primary effects Of collective bargaining are felt in decisions related to those two concerns. The decision-making items most directly affected are compensation, faculty work-load, promotion, reappointment-nonreappointment, tenure, and retrenchment. The items primarily affected impinge upon another set of decision-making issues which are themselves consequently affected in important ways. These include items directly related to the academic programs Of the institutions: financial support, course and curriculum development, and faculty development. The climate of relationships within 189 the academic communities, particularly relationships between faculty and administration, is altered. Students are affected by the impact of collective bargaining on the cost of education and, in some institutions, by the dis— turbed relationships. The formalization Of staff-related procedures reduces the freedom of administrators to make discriminating judg- ments in individual cases. They may become, or may be perceived as becoming, rigid and bureaucratic in their general administrative behavior. Moreover, the procedural and legal framework Of collective bargaining requires both a congruence between d3 jugs authority and d3 fagtg power and a clear separation Of role and function between faculty and administration. The result appears to be a centrali- zation of administrative decision-making and a shift in the locus Of final decision toward the holders of £3 1253 authority. A second result is to encourage a managerial posture on the part Of campus administrations. The formal and Often adversarial relationships between faculty and administration may interfere with the informal human inter- actions which many administrators consider essential to their exercise Of academic leadership. Conclusions Two future possibilities exist for academic leadership in a framework Of faculty collective bargaining. The first possibility is that collective bargaining may enhance 190 leadership. Tough-minded people on both sides of the table would focus on who has the right to make what decisions. Aggressive, anticipatory decision-making could be the result as roles become sharply delineated. On the other hand, collective bargaining may drive some leaders, equally tough- minded, out of leadership positions in.higher education who were there out Of some vision Of what the academic community might have been, who feel that such a community ought not be committed to self interest, and that it represented, perhaps, the last Opportunity to live with a convictional and function idealism. Recommendations for Further Research This research has dealt with the impact of an histor- ical event on one category of higher education institutions. These institutions have been characterized as "emerging" colleges and universities. The term "emerging" embraces a wide range Of changes and developments in size, educational mission, and academic quality. An important research under- taking would be to develop measurable indices of institu- tional maturity. Such basic research would provide a necessary "baseline" for many kinds of "impact studies. The difficulties in such research are Obvious. There is little consensus on the precise direction which institu- tional development ought to take. In fact, a healthy attitude evident in many developing institutions is that their mature character need not duplicate either each other 191 or the model Of the complex prestige university. Measure- ments Of development, therefore, would need to include evaluation Of the goal-setting processes as well as pro- gress toward the goals identified. As difficult as the task might be, it is not impossi- ble. Institutional research is increasing in sophistica- tion in most developing institutions as a product Of fiscal necessity and public accountability requirements. Data is becoming more readily available at less cost to the insti- tutions in time and effort. Research Of the kind described would be worth the investment if it led to a more precise identification Of development goals, a more reliable measure Of progress toward them, and a "baseline" for assessing the effect of conditions or events occurring within the institutional environments. More directly related to the issue Of faculty collec- tive bargaining and its effects on colleges and universities would be research into the developing body Of relevant law. Collective bargaining is a process sanctioned and regulated by law. The law, including legislation, court decision, and rulings of the regulatory agencies, establishes the condi- tions for collective negotiation and influences its outcome. Collective bargaining has developed within the indus- trial system. Its extension tO the public sector and to higher education has raised important and difficult questions. New legal forms will be required if collective bargaining law is to be developed in ways which take account of the 192 organizational differences between colleges and universities and the industrial system or other public agencies. Legal research in connection with faculty collective bargaining would consist of analysis of public employee collective bargaining legislation, and analysis of court decisions and regulatory agency judgments in matters arising from the bargaining relationship within colleges and univer- sities. The usefulness Of such research, beyond its own historical and philosophical content, would be to inform future decisions Of legislatures, courts, and regulatory agencies. The outcome might be new collective bargaining forms which would help tO preserve the character of colleges and universities as communities of scholars. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Books, Papers and Reports Adell, B. L. and Carter, D. D. Collective Bargaining for University Faculty in Canada. Kingston, Ontario: Industrial Relations Center, Queen's University, 1972. Baldridge, J. Victor, ed. Academic Governance: Research on Institutional Politics and Decision Making. Berkeley, California: McCutchan, 1971. , ed. Power and Conflict in the University: Research in the Sociology Of Complex Organization. New York: J. Wiley, 1971. Begin, James P. FacultygBargaining: Historical Overview and Current Situation. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Institute of Management and Labor Relations, 1973. Blackburn, Robert T. and Bylsma, Donald, Jr. Changes in Organizational Structure and Locus of Decision- Making: A Test Of Theory in Community Colleges Before and After Collective Negotiations. ERIC 057 791, 1970. Bylsma, Donald and Blackburn, Robert T. Changes in Faculty Governance and Faculty Welfare: Some Empirical Consequences Of Collective Negotiations. ERIC ED 058 882, 1971. Boissonnasa, C. M. Faculty Governance and Collective Bar— gaining in Institutions Of Higher Education. Ithaca, New York: Industrial Relations School, Cornell University, 1972. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Governance Of Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. Carr, Robert K. and VanEyck, Daniel K. Sgllective Bar- gaining Comes tO the Campus. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1973. Cheit, Earl F. The New Depression in Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. 193 194 Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, William R. Keast and John W. Macy, Jr. Faculty Tenure. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973. Deegan, W. L., McConnell, T. R., Mortimer, K. P. and Stull, H. Joint Partigipation in Decision Making: A Study Of Faculty Government and Faculty-Administra- tive Consultation at Fresno State College. Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Educa- tion, 1970. Duryea, E.D., Fisk, R.S. and Associates. Faculty Unions and Collective Bargaining. San Franciso: Jossey-Bass, 1973. Dressel, P. L. The Confidence Crisis. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970. and Faricy, W. H. Return to Responsibility. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972. Dunham, E. A. Colleges Of the Forgotten Americans: A Profile Of State Colleges and Regional Universities. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Dykes, A. R. Faculty Participation in Academic Decision- Making. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1968. Faculty Collective Bargaining in Postsecondary Institutions: The Impact on the Campgs and on the State. The Education Commission Of the States, Report NO. 28, May 1972. Faculpy Participation in Academic Governance. Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1967. Foote, C. and Mayer, H. The Culture of the University: Governance and Education. San Francisco: Jossey- Bass, 1968. Fratkin, S. Collective Bargaining in Higher Education? How Fast? How Far? National Association Of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, Staff Paper, February 14, 1972. Haak, H. H. Collective Bargaining and University Governance: The Case of the CaIifornia State COIIEges. San Diego: Public Affairs Re5earch INst1tute,‘San Diego State College, 1968. 195 Haehn, J. O. A Survey Of Faculty and Administrator Atti: tudes in Collective Bargaining. A Report to the Academic Senate, California State Colleges, May 1970. Hodgkinson, H. L. 'Institutions in Transition: A Profile of Change in Higher Education (Incorporating the 1970 Statistical Report). New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. and Meeth, Richard L., eds. Power and Authority: Transformation of Campus Governance. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971. An Impartial Review Of Collective Bargaining by University Faculties. East Lansing: Faculty Affairs Committee, Michigan State University, March 9, 1971. Interim Report of the Faculty_Senate Committee to Study Collective Bargaifiing. Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, April 9, 1970. Ladd, E. C., Jr., and Lipset, S. M. Professors, Unions and American Higher Education. Berkeley: The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973. Joughin, L., ed. Academic Freedom and Tenure. Madison: University Of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Labor Relations in Higher Education. New York: Practicing Law Institute, Course Handbook Series, No. 47, November-December 1972. Lee, E. C. and Bowen, F. M. The Multicampus University: A Study of Academic Governance. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1971. Mason, H. L. College and University Government. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1972. McConnell, T. R., and Mortimer, K. P. The Faculty in Academic Governance. Berkeley, California: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, 1971. Mortimer, K. P., and Lozier, G.G. Collective Bargaining: Implications for Governance. University Park: Center for the Study of Higher Education, Pennsylvania State University, June 1972. Report Of the Ad Hoc Committee on Collective Bargaining. Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, January 31, 1972. 196 Rourke, F. E. and Brooks, G. E. The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Schuster, J. H. Emerging Issues in FacultygBargaining. Address prepared for delivery at the l73rd meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1973. Smith, Bardwell, ed. The Tenure Debate. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973. Tice, T. N., ed. Faculty Bargaining in the Seventies. Ann Arbor: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1973. , ed. Faculty Power: Collective Bargaining on Campus. 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"212 College and University Faculties with Collective Bargaining Agents," The Chronical of Higher Education, November 26, 1973. 197 "The Council Position on Collective Bargaining," American Association Of University PrOfessors Bulletin, 57, Winter 1971, pp. 511-512. Davis, B. M. "Unions and Higher Education: Another View," Educational Record, 49, Spring 1968, pp. 139-144. Duryea, E. D., and Fisk, R. 8. "Impact of Unionism on Governance." In D. W. Vermilye, ed. The Expanded Campus. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972, pp. 105-115. Emmet, T. A. and Howe, R. (Guest Editors). "How to Live with Faculty Power: A Handbook on Collective Bar- gaining," College and University Business, 53, NO. 6, (December 1972), pp. 25-44. Finkin, M. W. "Collective Bargaining and University Government," American Association Of University Professors Bulletin, 57, Summer 1971, pp. 149-162. . "Collective Bargaining and University Government," Wisconsin Law Review, NO. 1, 1971, pp. 125-149. Garbarino, J. W. "Faculty Unionism from Theory to Practice," Industrial Relations, 11, February 1972. . "Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market," Higher Education and the Labor Market. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. . "Emergence of Collective Bargaining." In E. D. Duryea and R. S. Fixk, eds. Faculty Unions and Collec- tive Bargaining. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973. Hanley, D. L., S.J. "Issues and Models for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Liberal Education, 57, NO. 3, (March 1971), pp. 5-14. Howlett, R. G. "Perspectives in Public Sector Bargaining." In T. N. Tice, ed. Faculty Power: Collective Bargain- ing on Campus. Ann Arbor: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1972, pp. 23-36. Kadish,Sanford. "The Strike and the Professoriate," American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 54, Summer 1968, pp. 160-168. Kugler, I. "Collective Bargaining for the Faculty," Liberal Education, 56, March 1970, pp. 78-85. . "The Union Speaks for Itself," Educational Record, 49, Fall 1968, pp. 414-418. 198 Ladd, E. C. and Lipset, S. M. "Unionizing the Professoriate, Change, 5, NO. 6, (Summer 1973), pp. 38-44. Leslie, D. W. "NLRB Rulings on the Department Chairmanship," Educational Record, 53, Spring 1971. Lieberman, M. "Professors, Unite!" Harper's Magazine, 243, NO. 1457, (October 1971). PP. 64-70. Livingston, J. C. "Collective Bargaining and Professional- ism," Educational Record, 48, NO. 1, (Winter 1967), pp. 79-88. and Christiansen, A. S. "State and Federal Regulation of Collective Negotiations in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, 1971, NO. 1, pp. 91-111. Marmion, H. A. "Unions and Higher Education," Educational Record, 49, (Winter 1968), pp. 41-48. Mayhew, Lewis B. "Faculty Demands and Faculty Militance," Journal of Higher Education, 40, NO. 5, (May 1969), pp. 337-3502 McConnell, T. T. "Faculty Government." In H. L. Hodgkinson and L. R. Meeth, eds.' Power and Authority. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971, pp. 98-125. McHugh, W. F. "Collective Negotiations in Public Higher Education," College and University Business, 47, No. 6, (December 1969), pp. 41-44. Moskow, M. H. "The Scope Of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, NO. 1, 1971, pp. 33-54. Oberer, W. "Faculty Participation and Decision Making." in S. Elam and M. Moskow, eds. Employment Relations in Higher Education. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Inc., 1969, pp. 132-180. Polishook, Sheila S. "Collective Bargaining and the City University Of New York," Journal of Higher Education, 41, NO. 5, (May 1970), PP. 377-386. Ping, C. J. "Unionization and Institutional Planning," Educational Record, 54, NO. 2, (1973), pp. 100-106. Sands, S. D. ”The Role Of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, No. 1, 1971, pp. 150-176. 199 Semas, P. W. "Faculties at the Bargaining Table," The Chronical Of Higher Education, November 26, 1973, p. 9. "Statement on Goverment of Colleges and Universities," American Association of University Professor Bulletin, 52, Winter 1966, pp. 375-379. Van Alstyne, W. W. "Tenure and Collective Bargaining," in G. K. Smith, ed. New Teaching, New Learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971, pp. 10-17. Wollett, D. H. "The Status and Trends of Collective Negotiations for Faculty in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, 1971, NO. 1, pp. 2-32. III. Bibliographies Allen, J. C. "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," 1971-1973, National Center for the Study Of Collec- tive Bargaining in Higher Education, Baruch College, City University Of New York, New York, 1973. Blumer, D. and Lusier, V. "Selected Bibliography." Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, Washington, D.C., 1974. Carr, R. K. and Van Eyck, D. K. Collective Bargaining Comes to the Campus. Washington, D.C.: American CounEil on EducatiOn, 1973. Gillis, John W. 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