ABSTRACT

A. S. SILVOhIN I’d-4D HIS "MALEN'KIIA PIS'l‘vIA":
A PL’BLISHER'S PLBLIC C(JJ‘J'L‘JIEI‘JTARY
ON TSARIST RUSSIA, 1900-1906

By
Robert Anthony Bartol

lNkuile the Russian revolutionary press has been the
subject; <>£'<:onsiderable scholarly attention, the Russian
legal press has been largely neglected as an area of study.
The present research examines the published opinions of
Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin, wealthy publisher of Tsarist

Russia's largest legal newspaper Novoe vremia. The study

focuses on the views of Suvorin as expressed in his Novoe

 

W column "Malen'kiia pis'ma" during the years 1900-
1906, a particularly turbulent period of Russian history.
As owner and publisher of Novoe vremia, Suvorin held a

unique position from which to acquire information and ex-

press his personal commentaries on Russia's major foreign

and domestic issues. The study, therefore, has three main

purposes: first, to examine a major viewpoint being dis-
seminated to the Russian public; secondly, to lay the basis
for the analysis of the relationship between Suvorin's opin-

ions and the entire spectrum of political and social thought

Robert Anthony Bartol

of the era; and, finally, to contribute to the understanding

of the reactions of the wealthy classes as they faced foreign

defeat and domestic upheaval.

At the beginning of 1900, Suvorin endorsed Russia's
foreign policies aimed at peaceful expansion in the Far East.
But when the Boxer Crisis in the summer of 1900 threatened
Russia's railway interests, Suvorin modified his views to

defend Russia's military intervention and occupation of

Evianchuria. Suvorin's support for Witte's foreign policies

coincided with his endorsement of Witte's domestic programs

which attempted to industrialize Russia and assure its

future economic progress. In conjunction with Witte's sys-

tem, Suvorin urged progressive reforms which he believed vi-

tal to Russia's strength and progress. He especially cham-

pioned educational reforms designed to extend educational
opportunities and preserve Russian culture. When Witte was
forced to resign, Suvorin shifted his support to the zemstvo

movement, which he believed would bolster Russian nationalism

and bring reforms "from above" to overcome Russia's

backwardness .

When Japan's attack on Port Arthur initiated hos-
tilities, Suvorin abandoned opposition to war against Japan.
Instead, he urged the Russian population to temporarily sup-

press desires for reform and to support the war effort until

victory. However, repeated defeats exposed Russia's domestic

weakness and forced Suvorin to demand certain domestic reforms

Robert Anthony Bartol

which he regarded as vital to victory. As popular discontent
with the government's failure to initiate effective domestic
reforms mounted, Suvorin called for the convocation of a rep-
resentative Zemskii Sobor to resolve the war issue and to re-
unite the people with the Tsar. The Tsar's decision to nego-
tiate peace disappointed Suvorin, who continued to advocate
military victory as the only acceptable conclusion of the
war with Japan. Consequently, he regarded the Treaty of
Portsmouth as a serious blow to Russia's international pres-
tige; but he resigned himself to the war's outcome, hoping
peace and the Tsar's concession to summon an Imperial Duma
would result in progressive reforms.

Instead of peace and reform, the end of the war was
followed by increased revolutionary upheaval which forced
the Tsar to issue the October Manifesto granting political
freedom to the Russian people and legislative powers to the
Imperial Duma. Since the October Manifesto embodied the
basis for the progressive reforms desired by Suvorin, he
supported the document, as well as the new Witte govern—
ment simultaneously formed by the Tsar. At the same time,
he advocated use of strong measures against revolutionary
elements which sought a constituent assembly and an end to
the autocracy. Suvorin urged an immediate calling of the
Duma and hoped the noble and bourgeoisie classes would as-
sume leadership. Although he himself was not a member of a

particular party, among the existing parties he favored the

Robert Anthony Bartol

Octobrists. Even though the impressive election victories
of the Kadet Party disappointed him, Suvorin continued to
support the Imperial Duma, believing that it would reunite
the Russian people. Suvorin's sympathy for the Octobrist
Party reflected the general theme of his "Malen'kiia
pis'ma" which was based primarily on a nationalistic phi-

losophy and a desire for progressive reforms of the

autocracy.

A. S. SUVORIN AND HIS "MALEN'KIIA PIS'MA":
A PUBLISHER'S PUBLIC COMMENTARY
0N TSARIST RUSSIA, 1900-1906

By

Robert Anthony Bartol

A THESIS

Submitted to
Ruchi an State'University

in partial fu fillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1972

@DCopyright
By
Robert Anthony Bartol
1972

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation, like most others, has benefitted
from a multitude of kindnesses and I am indebted to a number
of persons for helping make this study possible. My deepest
gratitude goes to the members of my doctoral committee:
Professor Arthur E. Adams, Professor Alan W. Fisher and
Professor Donald N. Baker. Their help and understanding
inspired my dedication to research and the completion of
this work. In addition, I wish to express my appreciation
to the many members of the Department of History at Michigan
State University who followed my efforts with sympathetic
interest and who were generous with their time in discussing
my ideas.

I acknowledge with gratitude the Michigan State
University Graduate School research fellowship and the grant
awarded me under the auspices of the Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies Program at Michigan State University.

Finally, I owe special gratitude to my wife, Kathryn,

for her'encouragement and support.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0

Chapter

1.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ,

FROM PEASANT T0 JOURNALIST. . . . . . .
MOGUL OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLISHING WORLD .
SUVORIN AND THE BOXER CRISIS. . . . . .
PEACE ADVOCATE TURNS WAR PROPAGANDIST .
PUBLICIST OPPOSES PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY

SUVORIN URGES "REFORM FROM.ABOVE" . . .
WAR INTERRUPTS THE "COMING OF SPRING" .
APOLOGIST FOR THE OCTOBER MANIFESTO . .

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . .

iii

Page

iv

21

67

106

149

190

225

261

29h

300

INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Aleksei
Sergeevich Suvorin, a self-made millionaire, owned and pub-
lished Tsarist Russia's largest newspaper, Novoe vremia. In
this capacity, Suvorin had control over one of the main
sources of information during a particularly turbulent period
in Russian history, 1900-1906. Between 1900 and 1906 Russia
faced both foreign and domestic crises. The Boxer Rebellion
and the Russo-Japanese War embroiled the country in conflict
in the Far East while increasing discontent at home culmin-
ated in a revolution which marked the end of strong auto-
cratic rule. During this era, a series of articles which
Suvorin wrote and published in a Novoe vremia column,
"Malen'kiia pis'ma," provided a rare continuous and widely-
circulated commentary on major issues. Yet, in spite of his
unique position virtually no research has been conducted on
the opinions which Suvorin was disseminating to his readers.
Considered a conservative and, undoubtedly because of his
wealth alone,,an influential member of society, he repre-
sents an element which has been neglected during the heavy
concentration of research on Russia's revolutionary
movements.

The purpose of the present research is threefold.

iv

First, it examines a major viewpoint being disseminated to

the Russian public during a crucial period in Russian his-
tory. Secondly, the research lays the groundwork for the
study of Suvorin's opinions as they fit into the entire
spectrum of political and social thought of the era. Fin-
ally, the present study contributes to the understanding of
the position of the wealthy classes as they faced foreign
defeat and domestic upheaval.

CHAPTER I

FROM PEASANT T0 JOURNALIST

On February 27, 1909, hundreds of prominent Rus-
sian citizens thronged the day-long events celebrating the
50th jubilee of Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin's literary ca-
reer. Throughout the festivities numerous speakers lavished

praise on the publisher of St. Petersburg's Novoe vremia,

 

lauding his literary and philanthropic contributions. The
homage paid to Suvorin on that occasion was all the more re-
markable because his rise to a position of tremendous wealth
and power was extraordinary for a man of such humble origins
as his.1 For, Aleksei Suvorin entered the world on Septem-
ber 11 (0.3.), 183h, in the peasant village of Korshevo,
district of Voronezh, the birthplace of his father. He was
the first of nine children born to Sergei Dmitreevich Suvorin
(178t-1855), a former state serf and retired military officer,
and Aleksandra L'vovna Sokolova, the daughter of a local
priest and Sergei's second wife. At the time of his second

marriage, Sergei was #9 years old and more than twenty years

 

13. L. I., "Piatidesiatiletnii iubilei Alekseia

Sergeevichu Suvorina," Istoricheskii vestnik, ClVI (Jan-
uarWrApril, 1909), 193-203.

his wife's senior. He had just retired from a military ca-
reer which began in 1807 when he was called into the Im-
perial Russian army at the rank of private and assigned to
the Preobrashchenskii Regiment. Here he was fortunate to
meet a companion, "Uncle," who taught him to read and write,
utilizing an ABC book which Sergei bought at a flea market.
As a result the peasant Sergei later saw that his sons learned
the reading and writing which were to play so crucial a role
in Aleksei's future career.2

After recovering from wounds suffered in the vi-
cinity of the battle of Borodino in 1812, Sergei was made an
officer. He became quartermaster and paymaster in the
Kostromskii infantry regiment, rose to the rank of staff
captain and received a silver medal for his participation in
the war with Turkey. In 1829 he was promoted to captain, a
rank which also gave him a patent of nobility and which was
probably a factor in later enabling Aleksei to enter a mili-
tary academy. After the 1832 Polish campaign, Sergeii re-
tired to his native village with some savings and a 600-
xwflfle pension. Within a short time his first wife and the
mcmher of their two daughters died of cholera. Soon after,

Sergeii married Aleksandra and began the second family which

 

2"Roditeli A. S. Suvorina," Istoricheskii vest-
nik, CXXXIV (August-December, 1913), 5 3 . - ’13 a
eksei Sergeevich Suvorin, Biograficheskii ocherk,"

Istoricheskii vestnik, CXXXIV (January-march, 1912), A-S.
Hereinafter referred to as "Suvorin."

 

 

 

 

vmuld produce one of Russia's foremost publishing magnates.

Ekrgei was a well-liked and respected member of the local
umnunity, sought by his neighbors as an adviser and friend.
In l8h5 he served in the Voronezh Gubernia Noblemen's
Assembly.3

Sergei settled his family on farm land, renting
out part of the land and planting oats and rye on the re—
mainder. Aleksei's childhood, therefore, was spent in a
ruaal peasant environment under the somewhat militaristic
dimmipline of his father who referred to him as "a little
Scfldier." Suvorin's adult comments reveal a deep respect
fcu‘his father whom he described as strong, courageous and
e)dnemely active. His mother "also always bustled about"
and.Suvorin noted that although she was illiterate she took
ngm.care of the children, none of whom died during child-
hOod or adolescence. Suvorin's feelings about his parents
appear to have encouraged his later publishing efforts to
enlighten the Russian peasants.‘+
The family lived in a two-building izba with a

tnlatched roof. The furnishings were carved by Sergei
himself. Adjacent to the izba, the industrious Sergei

'p]~anted a grove of fruit trees and built a grain mill to

\
“ "Roditeli A. S. Suvorina," p. 553; Glinskii,
Suvorin, " p. L...

hGlinskii, "Suvorin," pp. 5-6.

contribute to the support of his large family. Ordinarily

tme family ate in the kitchen with the workers hired by

the father. Meals consisted mainly of bread and cabbage

eaten from a common bowl with wooden spoons. On Sundays

and holidays the fare included tea and the family ate by

themselves in one of the "rooms." As an adult Suvorin re-

called that they made no use of individual tableware and

napkins-ma deep contrast to his later luxurious life style.

5

As a child, Aleksei received part of his education

roaming the fields and forests which surrounded his home and

pliwing on the banks of the Bitiug River.
Of‘activity gave him a rather limited range of experience.
Tficukers who helped build his father's mill dined with the
finnly and gave the young Suvorin his first exposure to
SLlch things as separate eating utensils, "01d Believers"
a~1'1C1"dining rooms." Until he began to learn to read, the
OTlly‘book Aleksei had ever seen was his father's Bible.
‘Aleksei's father prayed a great deal but did not force the
Children to join him, although he read to them from the
B1b1e. Here also he apparently influenced his son Aleksei
whoremained deeply religious throughout his life, often

Qnoting biblical passages in his writings.

When Aleksei was seven, he and one of his

53119.2.» PP- law-7; "Roditeli .... S. Suvorina,"
p. 5530

This small radius

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inpthers began to study reading and writing, learning "will-
ingly" under the direction of a young fellow who lived in the
village. They continued their studies with the sexton Pavel
Petrovich Ermolaev, the husband of their stepsister Nataliia.
Since he was rarely at home, their stepsister supervised
their work by having them repeat the lessons aloud. Thus,
Suvorin later recalled, they memorized their arithmetic prob-
lemm with no understanding of the steps involved. After
atxmt two years, the brothers were sent to the district school
at;Bobrov, where the teachers were apparently no better. Two
Inonths later Aleksei took an exam for the new Mikhailovskii
<3adet Corps School in Voronezh and on petition was accepted.
TTuaschool offered a general education program which included
thedramatic arts, dancing and music; this program was to
Play a crucial role in Suvorin's educational development and
future career.

Coming to Voronezh in l8AS, Suvorin moved from
53 Small rural village atmosphere into a different and

challenging environment. "I found myself in totally new

cc>nditions," he wrote reminiscing some years later. Even
th*e-beds with their clean linens astounded the peasant boy.
H53 also found that most of the students had much better ed-
11cEational backgrounds than he. Many of them could even

Speak French while he found to his chagrin that he spoke

\

6Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 7; "Roditeli A. S.
Suvorin." pp. 556-57.

 

 

 

 

 

the folk Russian of his mother. At first his fellow cadets
tfi'more prestigious backgrounds teased Aleksei for his peas-
ant manners and origin. However he diligently committed
himself to study and quickly adapted to his new environment,
giving up his village ways.

Attending school in the provincial capital pro-
vided exciting cultural and social opportunities for
Suvorin.8 In his memoirs he recalled being invited to the
hcmms of his teachers and fellow students, where he first
loecame familiar with secularized dramatic arts, literature,
dimming and music. He describes reading with passion his
first secular book, Iurii Miloslavskii. In his teachers'
htmms he secretly became familiar with the works of the
Rxmsian poet A. S. Pushkin including Ruslan i Liudmila and
Efiflgmhisaraiskii fontan; and memorized such banned works as
m Veliki \_r_ Ostrotozhske.9

Through a cadet friend, Kolin, Aleksei at age

fOurteen saw his first stage production, Novichki 1 liubi.

\

7

Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 8.

p 8Baron von Haxthausen, The Russian Empire: Its
Iéigple,lnstitutions and Resources, trans.*by RobertFaire,

. (LOndOn: Frank Cass and Co.,‘Ltd., 1968), 383-90. This
$53 a reprint of Baron von Haxthausen s earlier work describ-

lrlg his travels in Russia during the mid-nineteenth century.
Twie narrative of his visit to the city of Voronezh and town
(NF Bobrov, in 18h3, provides an interesting account of the
§xzonomic and cultural developments of this region where
'ileksei Suvorin was living and studying.

9Glinskii, "Suvorin," pp. 10-11.

 

 

 

He was so intrigued that he became a devotee of the numer-
ous dramatic productions at the newly-built Voronezh thea-
ter. In later life drama-patron Suvorin fondly recalled

his attendance at the performance of such productions as
Velizarii, Materinskoe blagosloven'e, Skopin-Shuiskii, and
Tsarstvo Zhenshchin. Here he became acouainted with famous
jperformers like Shvan, Vasil'ev, Lenskii and his wife,
Nkmhalova, and Priakhina. Suvorin even attempted at this
eauiy age to write his own stage plays and joined in the
fknmation of a school theatrical society through which he
jplayed the comic role of a drunken soldier in Vecher i3
Zfdzhi velikago ggsudaria and also performed in other pro-
dimtions. These experiences marked the beginning of a life-
11mg association with the Russian theater. Reflecting on
Iliseducation at the Mikhailovskii Cadet Corps School and
his social activities in the city of Voronezh, Suvorin ac-
claimed the discipline and training at the school and the
‘Wealth of cultural opportunity opened to him.10

In 1851, after completion of his cadet corps stud-

ies, Aleksei entered special classes in the Dvorianskii
lRegiment, later called the Konstantinovskii Military School.
Ennile with the regiment, he completed as far as "Predstaviv"
3| biographical dictionary of outstanding persons which he

"Modeled on a similar work of the French historian Bouillet.

lOIbid., pp. 10-11.

 

 

 

This early literary composition evoked a reprimand from
the military superiors, who scolded him for quoting the
Russian writer V. G. Belinsky and for treating such "free
thinkers" as Byron and Voltaire in a sympathetic manner.
In 1853 Suvorin graduated from the Dvorianskii regiment
in combat engineering but declined to enter the military
service, believing that he could not adjust to the rigors
of'military life. Instead he sought entrance to a univer-
sity but a lack of finances prevented him from continuing
ihis formal education.

Soon after, Suvorin passed the test for teacher
OfTa district school and returned to Bobrov. Here he be-
Cémm a schoolmaster, tutor and later a teacher of geogra-
‘Pkw in the district school, earning a meager salary of
lems than fifteen rubles. To supplement his earnings,
Suvorin engaged in preparing articles for local period-
iCal publications and other literary enterprises. In
:1858 he produced his first literary piece of significance,
5’ Russian translation of The Captive, by the French writer,
ELierre-Jean de Beranger. Subsequently, Suvorin succeeded
it! publishing translations of verse and a series of humor-
Okla Sketches of country life which appeared in the peri-

CHiical publications Moskovskii vestnik, Vaza, Vesel'chak

\

llS. Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," Ensiklopedicheskii
5§lovar' (St. Petersburg, 1901), XIII, 89h; Glinskii,

" uvorin," pp. 13-1h.

 

and Russkii dnevnik. These literary successes attracted the

attention of a Count Ferzen, in the province capital Voronezh,

who invited Suvorin to become a private tutor there. Later

Suvorin obtained a position as a teacher of geography and

history at the Voronezh district school and also taught at
12
two girls' boarding schools in the area.

Cultural and literary life in the city of Voronezh

'prpved exciting and interesting for Aleksei. Soon after

aruiving in the city he was in regular contact with the
ILocal literary circle headed by M. F. de-Pule, Suvorin's
fknmmr Russian language teacher at the Mikhailovskii Cadet

Ccups. He also made the acquaintance of the poet I. S.

Nilitin. Through these literary contacts Suvorin became
a regular reader of Poliarnaia zvezda and Alexander
Her‘zen's Kolokol and was stimulated to continue his liter-

ar‘Ypursuits.l3 He also contributed to a local publication,

.ESEQmezhskaia beseda, edited by de-Pule and to the Nbscow

weekly Russkaia rech', under the pseudonym "V. Markovfll’+

\

1 12Vladimir Yermilov, Anton Pavlovich Chekhov:
\860-1205 (Moscow 1960), p. 199; Glinskii, "Suvofin,T
‘)~ ; emerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 89A.
13 - n - n
Glinskii, Suvorin, pp. lA-ls.

ll’Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 89A; "V. Markov"
“”13 the first of numerous pseudonyms utilized by Aleksei S.
ESlavorin during his long career. For a complete list see
I1. F. Masanov, Slovar' psevdonimov russkikh pisatelei i
Q&eheemennykh deiateTei, IVTMoscow,1960) 1.58.

 

 

10

The articles proved to be popular and Suvorin's talent as

aijournalist soon began to gain recognition.

Some of Suvorin's contributions to Russkaia rech'
attracted the attention of the journal's publisher, Count
Sal'ias, who invited Suvorin to come to Moscow. The deci-
sion was a difficult one because of the uncertainty which
lay ahead. Nevertheless, in July, 1861, too poor to pay
fcu'transportation, Suvorin traveled on foot to a peasant's
hinsin a town some eight or nine miles away from Moscow.
Beflbre long he gained a permanent position on the staff of
Busskaia rech'. Thus began the main thrust of Suvorin's
3cmrnalistic career. Through the social opportunities
Inade available by Count Sal'ias, Suvorin was able to gain
entry into the leading literary circles of Moscow, which

1included the young rising writers N. S. Leskov, V. A.
Sleptsov and A. I. Levitov. Within a short time Suvorin's
circle of acquaintances included such noted literary fig-
ures as A. N. Ostrovskii, M. E. Saltykov, N. A. Nekrasov,
(30unt L. N. Tolstoi and I. S. Turgenev. At the home of
:I. S. Aksakov he met members of Moscow's Slavophile cir—
<3les. Here he witnessed arguments among the city's
Slavophiles and Polish and Lithuanian visitors over the
55tatus of the western and southwestern regions. It is

§>robab1e that these experiences influenced his later

 

 

ll

15

Pan-Slavist approach to many of Russia's problems.
In early 1862, Russkaia rech' ceased publication
and left Suvorin in a difficult financial position. His
writings had, however, come to the attention of N. G.
Chernyshevskii, radical editor of Sovremennik, who invited
Suvorin to become a regular contributor. Such works as
"Soldat i soldatka" written under the pseudonym
"sznakomets" gained popularity with the liberal Russian
reading public who viewed him as an earnest progressive
liberal writer. Such popularity also attracted the suspi-
cious attention of the Oppressive government censors; but
Mdth great skill Suvorin adapted his writings to circum-
vwmt the whims of Tsarist censors. This successful rela-
‘tionship with the censors in Moscow facilitated diverse
literary activities. At the invitation of Count Tolstoi,
Suvorin composed and published brief booklets and pamphlets
for the peasants at Tolstoi's estate, Yasnaya Polyana.
Suvorin's dedication to making cheap literary
editions available to the Russian population, a goal he

“Nbuld pursue on a large scale when he became a wealthy

\ _-=

15Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 894; Yermilov,
{Anton Pavlovich Chekhov: 1860-1905., p. 200; Glinskii,
Suvorin:Tr pp. I6-18.

l6Yermilov, Anton Pavlovich Chekhov: 1860-
11901“ p. 200; Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 891.;Nasanov,
scow, 1957), 257.

12

publisher, inspired him actively to support the Moscow-
centered Obshchestvo rasprostraneniia poleznykh knig.
For this society, which published books for peasants,

Suvorin produced three works: Ermak, pokoritel' Sibiri,

 

Boiarin Matveev, Istoriia smutnago vremeni. The last

 

work failed to gain the censor's approval and had to be
published later in Suvorin's career. Subsequently, the
harassment of the Tsarist censors extended into Suvorin's
other journalistic ventures. For example, his article
"Alenka" intended for Fedor Dostoevskii's journal Vremia
was prevented from publication by the censors. Instead,
Ehvorin managed to publish the article in another journal,
Enechestvenny zapiski, where he became a regular contributor.17
In 1863 Suvorin's patrons in Moscow's literary
(flrcles, Count Sal'ias and his wife, encouraged the young
,kmrnalist to pursue his literary career in the Russian
empire's capital city, St. Petersburg. At this same time
Suvorin's writings had come to the attention of V. F. Korsh,
the liberal editor of the S.-Petersburgskiia vedomosti, one
Of the capital city's moderately liberal newspapers.
Suvorin, therefore, accepted an offer of a position on
Korsh's editorial staff and moved to St. Petersburg. With-
in a few months his literary talent and expertise in deal-

ing with the censorship officials won him the position of

k

17Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 89A; Glinskii,
"Suvorin," p. 18.

13

chief sub-editor and final copyreader at a salary of 2,000
rubles a year. The S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti under Korsh
voiced a moderately liberal editorial policy, supporting the
reforms of the l860's--particular1y the controversial peas-
ant land and Polish questions. Because of this liberal or-
ientation, the newspaper and its final proofreader were con-
stantly under careful scrutiny by the government censors.
Suvorin was, however, quite successful at piloting the news-
paper through the censor's narrow bounds. In the process he
garnered increasing skill in pleasing the censor's eye, an
invaluable talent he later perfected in the management of
the own publishing enterprises.

The income from his position on the S.-Peterburgg

 

gjia vedomosti proved inadequate and the young journalist
smught additional financial resources by writing reviews
fin'the Russian journal Russkii invalid under another pseu-
<kmym "A. I-n." In addition, Suvorin continued as a regu-

lar contributor to Chernyshevskii's journal, Sovremennik.

 

Here, under the pseudonym "Neznakomets" he published
sketches of peasant life which helped establish him as a
gfifted and popular writer. Contemporary readers saw in

Shvorin a witty Satirist, especially appealing to the

Nina A. Toumanova, Anton Chekhov: The Voice of
'hdli ht Russia (New York: Columbianniversity Press,
p. linskii, "Suvorin," 19; V. M. Chernov
'Z'ilgekhov i Suvorin," Novii zhurnal (New York), XI (1916’,
'(+70

 

1h

emerging populist liberal thought of his readers in this
19

era of reforms.

The reform-minded elements of St. Petersburg's
literary circles embraced the young journalist as the son
of a peasant who had personally experienced the poverty
and misery of the peasant world. To the literary circles
he was a plebian "raznochinetz," who disclosed in his
writing a sensitivity to the life and attitudes of Russia's
lower rural classes. Even in the midst of such talented
contributors as K. D. Kavelin, A. I. Koshelyov, N. I.
Kostomarov, and A. D. Gradovskii, Suvorin's Sunday
feuilletons were applauded. Under the editorship of
Kbrsh, these regular contributors, and especially Suvorin,
lmcame a leading element in the moderate liberal movement
much criticized contemporary Russia's backwardness and
mmmorted the reforms of the 1860's. Suvorin and his
colleagues issued caustic and resolute denunciations of
the officials and persons responsible for both the slow-
rmss in carrying out the reforms and for the stagnant pol-
icies guiding Imperial Russia's political, social and lit-
erary life. The Russian bureaucracy did not remain idle in
the face of this criticism and its censors constantly re-
‘dewed and pressured Suvorin. But his skill in circum-

meing the censorship prevailed, and his Sunday

k

, 19Vemerov, "A. s. Suvorin," p. 895; Glinskii,
‘SUVOI‘ln," p. 19.

 

 

15

feuilletons, "Nedel'nye ocherki i kartinki" under the
pseudonym "Neznakomets," earned him the title, "King of
the Feuilleton."20

It was this reputation which eventually made him
a prime target in the reactionary wave that swept Imperial
Russia after the abortive assassination attempt on the life
of Tsar Alexander II by the terrorist D. V. Karakozov, in
April, 1866. Suvorin was the first liberal writer to be
tried under the new "Temporary Censorship" regulations.
His book, Vsiakie: Nechto 1 rode povesti, was published
the same week as the assassination attempt and served as
the basis of the charges brought against Suvorin. The
tmok contained previously published articles from his daily
columns in the S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti which featured
lampoons of many public figures and government officials as
vmll as scathing commentaries on contemporary Russia. But
Imeause Suvorin had included some new critical articles and
tmcause his pseudonym "A. I. Bobrovskii" was mistakenly
linked to revolutionary circles, the chief censor in St.
Ihtersburg, N. A. Nekliudov, ordered the 1500 copies of the
tmok seized and the author investigated by the oppressive

'Hurd Section for "anarchist propaganda threatening the

. 20Chernov, "Chekhov i Suvorin," pp. 2h5-A7;
Vemerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 395.

16

security of the Tsar."21

At his censorship trial, the Third Section intro-
duced Suvorin's correspondence with N. G. Chernyshevskii
and A. N. Pleshcheev as evidence. These letters, seized
in a night raid on Suvorin's home, were used to support
the charge of "treasonable disrespect towards the estab-
lished institutions of the realm." This was to be the com—
mon charge leveled during the next four decades against
numerous other writers who dared to criticize Russian con-
ditions. Although the attorney K. K. Arsen'ev did not pre-
vent Suvorin's conviction, he did succeed in getting the
sentence reduced from three months in prison to three weeks'
detention in the guardhouse at Staryi arsenal in St. Peters-
tmrg. In addition to sentencing Suvorin to guardhouse con-
finement from February 27 to March 20, 1867, the court or-
Mned all copies of Vsiake burned. In May, 1867, about
1A62 copies were burned and the remaining copies were con-
fiscated by the censorship office for its records. In 1909,
tumn the repressive censorship regulations were revised,
Suvorin revived this earlier work to provide insight

into the theoretical basis of the "new trends" shaping

21Alexander Kornilov, Nineteenth Century Russia,
at by Alexander S. Kaun, trans.-ByIRobert'Bass (New'York:
Capricorn Books, 1966), p. 345; G. L. 1., "Vsiakie.
(kherki sovremennoi zhizni A. S. Suvorina " review of
W, by A. S. Suvorin in Istoricheskii vestnik,
aguary-April, 1909’, 700-70I; CIInsEII, "Suvorin,"
pp. 2h‘2 .

 

 

17

Russian journalism and institutions in the 1860's.22
The trial and prison experience did not extin-
guish Suvorin's journalistic and literary zeal. He re-

sumed his position at the S.-Peterburg§kiia vedomosti,

 

where his celebrated Sunday feuilletons continued to be
a leading attraction. As before, Suvorin's articles were
sharp polemics on contemporary questions. The sting of
his fine wit and candidness directed against public fig-
ures engendered the hostility of reactionary personalities.
His column included biting criticism of such prominent
nmn as Ivan Aksakov, M. N. Katkov, Prince V. P. Meshcherskii
and Skerystin for their reactionary attitudes, political
intrigues and especially their corrupt railroad schemes.
PM concentrated his criticism especially on M. V. Katkov,
mfitor of the Mbskovskiia vedomosti, whose editorials sup-
rmrted the narrow-minded nationalism and reactionary con-
servatism of the Tsarist government.23 Suvorin's liberal
cmmmentaries made him a leading contributor to the success
of the S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti; and, in turn, broadened
the prospects for a successful journalistic career.

In the latter half of the 1860's, Suvorin expanded
his journalistic activities to the highly respected monthly

__..._

22Ibid.

23Vladimir Petrovich Meshcherskii, Moi
Vps ominania, II (St. Petersburg, 1865- 81), 15 8; Vemerov,
"A. S. Suvorin," p. 895; Glinskii, "Suvorin," pp. 27-28.

 

 

 

18

"thick" journal Vestnik Evropy; and in the years 1869 to
1872 he became a regular contributor. His leading articles
in Vestnik Evropy included: "Novii roman Viktora Giugo"
in 1869; "Frantsuzskoe Obshchestvo v novom roman Flobera"
and "V gostiakh i doma (Zametki o German'i)" in 1870; and
"Russkaia dramatich stsena" and "Istoricheskaia satira
(Istoriia odnogo goroda Shchedrina)" in 1871. During this
period Suvorin continued to be the leading feuilleton writ-
er on the S.-Peterburg§kiia vedomosti, where the liberal
polemics of its writers incensed the reactionary circles

to the extent that they demanded the termination of Korsh's
editorship.

The opportunity to stifle Suvorin thus came in
187A, when Korsh was forced to surrender control of the
rmwspaper to the Russian banker Baimakov. Under Baimakov's
nmnagement, an editor with conservative views was appointed
fln‘the S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti. Suvorin's services
here no longer desired and his affiliation with the
LwPeterburgskiia vedomosti terminated, but his journal-
istic career was not ended.2h

Fortunately for Suvorin, he retained his posi-
tion with the journal Vestnik Evropy and accepted a posi-

tflbn as theatrical critic and agricultural affairs

k

2l"Chernov, "Chekhov i Suvorin," p. 2A7; Vermerov,
"A. S. Suvorin," p. 895; Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 27;
Ivleshcherskii, Moi vospominania, II, 2A7.

19

commentator for the journal Melve. In the meantime his
financial position had improved through a successful pub-
lishing venture begun in 1872. It was in this year that

he began the annual publication of the Russkii kalendar,

 

an almanac that was to enjoy popular use throughout Russia.
Revised and published annually, this almanac offered a
great wealth of information and was to enjoy forty-five
years of publishing success. Its volumes contained general
and statistical information on religion, geography, popu-
lation, financial affairs, trade, agriculture, means of
communication, insurance, and all branches of government
and departments of state service in Imperial Russia. The
volumes also included chronicles of both foreign and Rus-
sian events and a necrology containing interesting bio-
graphical notes.25 The Russkii kalendar was an immediate
mmcess and afforded him some long-awaited financial sta-
bility and independence.

Thereafter, his monetary position continued to
Inmrove. In the year 1875 Suvorin was again writing his
Impular Sunday feuilletons--this time for the publication
Qfigshevaia vedomosti. That same year he published two
lmoks of essays which enjoyed good sales records.26 With

the combined financial resources of these activities,

2SGlinskii, "Suvorin," p. 29.

26Vermerov, "A. S. Suvorin," p. 895.

20

Suvorin could explore new horizons. From this time for-

ward his career in journalism assumed a national signifi-
cance that was to overshadow the numerous accomplishments
of his early career. His major contributions to the Rus-
sian newspaper world were yet to come. Aleksei was about

to establish his own publishing empire.

 

CHAPTER II

MOGUL OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLISHING WORLD

On February 16, 1876, the adventurous Suvorin

risked the savings from his journalistic writings and the

gupfits from his highly successful Russkii kalendar' to pur-

 

chase two-thirds interest in a faltering St. Petersburg

1

daily newspaper and publishing house, Novoe vremia. This

 

acquisition, in partnership with a prominent St. Petersburg
attorney, V. I. Likhachev, was perhaps the most important
step in the talented writer's career.2 As a journalist
turned publisher, during the next three decades Suvorin be-
CfiMe a major disseminator of information in Tsarist Russia,
as well as an extremely wealthy Russian entrepreneur. His

Success in building Novoe vremia into a publishing empire

 

can be attributed mainly to exceptional managerial talent.
Ah displayed an unusual ability to grasp how popular and
amnionally-charged issues could be utilized to help in-

<Hease his newspaper's circulation, while skillfully

 

lNovoe vremia, March 27 (April 9), 1906, p. 2.

va. I. Likhachev," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'

(St. Petersburg, 1897), XXI, 833-
21

 

 

22

gauging the direction and bounds of government censorship.
In addition he made continual efforts to incorporate the
latest newspaper technology, making his publishing methods
the best and most advanced in Russia. His continued recep-
tivity to new publishing opportunities increased his hold-
ings, which in turn greatly enhanced his wealth and posi-
tion in Russian society. Finally, personal persuasion and
the promise of wealth and fame enabled him to attract and
patronize some of Russia's finest literary and artistic

talent.

At the time of his purchase of Novoe vremia,

 

Russian newspaper and publishing firms were in general not
reliable business ventures. With the exception of Mikhail
Katkov's Moskovskiia vedomosti, few of Russia's newspapers
had managed to avoid violations of the censorship policies
and become financially successful. Until Suvorin acquired
it. flgvoe vremia, originally founded in 1868 to serve as a
literary organ for the political views of Polish landowners,
had been a feeble publication with a small circulation and
a~Poor business reputation.3 During the two weeks after the
fbrmal purchase, Suvorin anxiously prepared the first edi-
tion of his newspaper in offices on Nevskii prospekt. When
Ehworin's first Novoe vremia edition of one page with six

cxflumns appeared on Sunday, February 29, 1876, the 13,300

 

"Novoe vremia," Ibid., p. 278.

23

copies were eagerly snapped up by St. Petersburg readers.“
This enthusiastic reception encouraged the new publisher to

believe that under his management Novoe vremia would be a

 

thriving daily newspaper.
Initially, £2129 vremia's readers and regular sub-
unibers were attracted by the new publisher's progressive
reputation and past Journalistic achievements. St. Peters-
mug's progressive literary circles were particularly hope-
flfl.that the popular journalist who championed "outspoken-
ness” and "frankness" in editorial policies would revive the
spirit of V. F. Korsh's liberal S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti
5

cfi‘the earlier seventies. The appearance of two eminent
figures of St. Petersburg's liberal literary circles-~the
satirist,.M. E. Saltykov; and the poet, N. A. Nekrasov--

as featured contributors in the first edition seemed to sup-
Port these liberal expectations.6 Based on the editorial
intentions and views voiced in the first edition and in suc-
ceeding weeks, St. Petersburg's liberal circles welcomed A.

Suvorin and Novoe vremia into the progressive camp. The

enthusiasm of St. Petersburg's liberal circles for Suvorin

—.._

“Novoe_yremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 2.

5N. I. Abramovich, Novoe vremia i soblaznennye
nfladents , Biblioteka obshcheit vennykh i literaturnykh
pamertov, No. 3 (Petrograd, 1916), p. 19. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Novoe_yremia.

61bido, p. 180

2h

and his newspaper was, however, to be short-lived. When
Novoe vremia circulation failed to increase significantly
in the first two months of publication, Suvorin, realizing
circulation could be boosted by capitalizing on the Russian
newspaper readers' interest in the rebellious disturbances

of the South Slavs in the Balkans, altered Novoe vremia

 

editorial policies? The newspaper began to exploit the un-
gnecedented outburst of Pan-Slavist and nationalist senti-
ment for the South Slavs' anti-Turkish revolts.

The uprisings of the South Slavs in Bosnia, Bul-
garia and Herzegovina, beginning in June, 1875, encouraged
Russian newspapers to vie in their denunciations of Turkish
nflsrule. The ferocity with which the Turks suppressed the

Bulgarian rebellion in May, 1876, provided Novoe vremia the

 

Opportunity to join with other Russian newspapers in unfurl-
ing a rallying banner of Pan-Slavist and nationalist senti-
ment. Riding on the wave of "Slavic excitement," £3193
Eremia's editorials and articles began extolling Pan-Slavist
Sympathies.8 This new direction in editorial policy im-
Inbved the circulation of Novoe vremia and the St. Peters-

tmrg daily began the rise to prominence.9

Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 31.

8
Novoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 3.

9

Abramovich, Novoe vremia, pp. 18-19.

25

In its editorials and articles Novoe vremia sup-

 

ported Russian Pan-Slavist efforts to alter official Rus-
sian government policy which sought to localize the con-
flict and avoid Russia's involvement. When the Russian
government remained firm in its rejection of Pan-Slavist
appeals, Suvorin, in a Novoe vremia article, "Imeet pravo
rm vozstanie," continued his attempts to induce a policy
change, declaring:
Whatever the government is like, I am ready
to sacrifice my soul to it if it proceeds to
liberate the Slave and drive the Turks from
Europe. . . That is why I seek to arouse the
public: I am seeking to separate its aspir-
ations from official one8° I want it to demon-
strate its independence.10
In his desire to support militant Pan-Slavist and national-
ist positions, Suvorin recruited new contributors for the
newspaper's editorial staff. Among these were such well-
known chauvinist and Pan-Slavist champions as K. A.
Skal'kovskii, S. N. Syromiatnikov, and I. N. Potapenko.ll
with the addition of these journalists, jingoist and Pan-

Slavist views increasingly dominated; and Novoe vremia

 

Fmssionately campaigned for a deeper involvement of the
FNssian people in aiding the South Slavs, even in the ab-

mnme of the Russian government's assistance.

 

10
S. A. Nikitin, Slavianskie komitety v Rossii
v 1858-1876 gpdakh (Moscow, 1960), p. 327.

11
Abramovich, Novoe vremia, p. 19.

26

In May, 1876, Serbia began preparations for war
with Turkey and requested Russian government support. When
the Russian government refused to become involved, Russian
Pan-Slavist organizations appealed directly to the Russian
people for volunteers and financial assistance for the Ser-
bians. In support of the Russian General EL G. Cherniaev's
call for volunteers, Novoe vremia stated:

We express our sincere sympathy to all Rus-

sians not bound by duties of service who set

forth to fight for the holy cause of the lib-

eration of Slavdom from the Turkish yoke.

There in the common struggle with the Ottomans

will be forged the firmest bonds between Rus-

sian society and the self-liberating Slav world.
The opening of hostilities against Turkey in June 1876 by
Serbia and Montenegro saw Russian Pan-Slavist and national-
ist agitation reach a high pitch. In militant tones Novoe

Vremia hailed the Serbians' dramatic struggle against Turkish

rule. Novoe vremia zealously exalted the Serbians for their

 

gallant defense of their borders and protection of Serbia's
t'I‘ade. In the newspaper's view these South Slavs were hero-
ically fighting to guarantee human rights, while defending
Eflavic civilization and orthodoxy. After the Russian govern-
flmnt, maintaining its policy of non-intervention, refused a
loan to Serbia, Novoe vremia dramatically outlined the
Wflfligation" of the Russian peOple as individuals to help,

stating:

Upon Russian society there lies a sacred

obligation to assist these heroic fighters
with all its means, principally with money.
The Serbian loan must be subscribed by our

 

27

resources so that in the history of this
struggle the Russian name will play the
proper role even if Russia itself does not
take a more active part in it . . . Nothing
can prevent noble sacrifices on the part of
society itself if only it can be profoundly
inspired to help the fighters for freedom.
We helped Garibaldi and the Italians; can we
not even help the Slavs free themselves from
slavery? I am convinced that Serbia will
not be allowed to perish even if farkey
should turn out to be the victor.

Throughout the summer of 1876, as Serbia's war
vdth Turkey waged on, Novoe vremia continued to press for a
change in government policy and recommended the direct mili-
tary involvement of Russia in the Balkans. Novoe vremia as-
mnted Russia's future as a world power was at stake. In
keeping with the Russian Pan-Slavist belief that it was Rus-
sia's historic mission to liberate the South Slavs, 39192
Vremia proclaimed that only when Constantinople was in Rus-
Sia's control, could Russia become a true world power. Only
under Russia's leadership and military assistance could Tur-
key be defeated and the Slavs be united into a great feder-
ation.13 The propagation of these Pan-Slavist views in the

Eflfited atmosphere of a newspaper readership vitally con-

Mnmed with the fate of the South Slavs produced increasing

12
Novoe vremia, June 28 (July 10), 1876, p. l;
hbvoe vremia, June 27 (July 9), 1876, p. 1, cited by David
c enz e, e Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism: 1875-1878
98thII8’ Newaork: Icornell University Press, 1967), pp. 97-
, O

13Ib1de, pp. 111‘112.

28

circulation for Suvorin's newspaper.

To assure his newspaper of immediate and suitable
coverage of the struggle in the Balkans, Suvorin himself
traveled to the field of conflict as the first Russian cor-
respondent for Novoe vremia. Journeying through the Balkans,
Suvorin observed the general strife and issued graphic dis-
;mtches from Constantinople, Bucharest and Serbia. His re-
ports clamored for Russia to liberate the South Slavs from
'hukish misrule. Especially after the crushing defeat of the

EMrbs in August, 1876, Suvorin and Novoe vremig joined in the

 

loud outcry for vigorous action by the Russian government in
obtaining an armistice to save the Serbs from annihilation.lh
During Russia's operations against Turkey on be-
half of the Serbs and South Slavs in 1877, Suvorin was in
an advantageous position to report Russian army operations.
He managed to associate himself with the staff of the color-
fUl Pan-Slavist Russian commander, General Cherniaev.ls
Since Suvorin's early cadet school training and military
Service almost immediately earned him the welcome and hos-
Ifitality of the Russian military men, he procured open ac-

16

6835 to first-hand information on the Russian army's exploits.

14 ‘
Glinskii, "Suvorin," pp. 29-30.

151bid., p. 31.

16Novoe vremia, February 28 (march 13) 1901, p. 3.

29

Shrewdly capitalizing on these abundant opportunities,
Suvorin dispatched vivid reports of the heroic deeds of
the Russian troops. His picturesque and exciting articles
appearing in the St. Petersburg daily contributed to its
increasing popularity, and the aggressive Russian national-
ist tone of Suvorin's articles established the publisher
eum.his newspaper as leading proponents of Pan-Slavism and
Ewesian nationalism. His zealous commitment to these ex-
treme views remained a permanent basis for his newspaper's
editorial policies. In fact these positions caused Suvorin
to become sole owner of the St. Petersburg daily and pub-
lishing firm. Likhachev, taking serious exception to
Egg 3 vremia's newly-found biases and the courting of
readers on the basis of extreme emotionalism, dissolved
the partnership in 1877.17

Suvorin's complete ownership henceforth caused
liberal critics directly to attribute Novoe vremia's edi-
tOrial practices to the publisher's personal attitudes and
HBnagement. To St. Petersburg's liberal circles, these new
Pan-Slavist and nationalist editorial views marked an aban-
MNmmnt of the liberal editorial intentions expressed in the
first edition.18 The circles' immediate disappointment re-

mflted in overt hostility and in an ever-increasing criticism

 

1
7Novoe vremia, March 27 (April 9), 1906, p. 2.

Abramovich, Novoe vremia, pp. 13-14, 19.

30

of Novoe vremia's convictions. Novoe vremia's editorial

 

practices were judged to be an opportunistic effort to ex-
pand circulation for the sake of financial remuneration.
Suggesting this motive, Nevin Winter wrote: ". . . liberal-
ism did not 'pay' as he learned in his earlier struggles,
and Suvorin wanted money."19 Suvorin's practice of balancing
editorial policies to woo readers and at the same time to
conform to government restrictions caused liberals, and es-
pecially radicals, to regard him as a traitor to his ear-
lier views. To characterize Suvorin's attitudes and figggg
vremia's editorial tone, Saltykov coined the phrase, "At
your service."20 While it is difficult to assess motives,
the sensationalism with which news of the Balkan crisis was
handled and the care with which Suvorin avoided stands of-
fensive to the government suggest that he gave high prior-
ity to remaining in business.

The increasingly repressive newspaper censorship
accompanying Alexander III's reactionary reign influenced
Suvorin's cautious management of his newspaper's editorial
policies. Publishing under the terms of the Temporary
Press Law of 1866, which now were even more stringently and

arbitrarily enforced, constantly subjected Novoe vremia to

 

19Nevin Winters, The Russian Empire of Today and
Yesterday (London: Simpson, marshall, Hamilton, Kent7E7§3.,
191a), p. 286.

 

20V. L. Rogachevski, Noveishaia russkaia
literature (Mbscow, 1923), p. 97}

 

31

the whims of government censorship. Numerous newspapers,
unable or unwilling to satisfy the demands of the censors,
were suppressed.21 Novoe vremia was one of the newspapers
which survived by continually altering its views to comply
with the dictates of press censorship. Suvorin's past ex-
perience in satisfying the government censors helped him
keep his newspaper alive. Controversial topics and edi-
torial views which would invoke the fatal wrath of the cen-
sors were carefully avoided. The newspaper specialized in
reporting foreign news, taking care to conform to the of-
ficial foreign policies of the government. Caution in re-
porting domestic news proved particularly challenging,
since the newspaper had received two "warnings" from the
censors on January 6, 1879, and Cctober 2, 1880.22

These two "warnings" periled the newspaper's
existence. Even though the daily was one of two privi-
leged St. Petersburg newspapers permitted to publish its
editions without prior censorship, a third "warning"
issued by the censors for having published news offensive

to the government would have brought about the extinction

 

21For a detailed analysis of the difficulties en-
countered by Russian journalists see Benjamin Rigberg's two
articles: "The Tsarist Press Law, 1897-1905," Jahrbgcher

fur Geschichte Osteuro as, XIII (1965), 331-43; and "The
Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations, 1899-1917 "
Jahrbucher ffir Geschichte Osteuropas, XIV (1960), 327-a6.

22Novoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 2.

32

of the newspaper.23 In a discussion with the famous
English journalist, w. T. Stead, the publisner of Novoe
vremia discussed the circumstances of his newspaper's two
"warnings." Suvorin began by explaining the incident which
provoked the first warning:

I was away from the office. My locum tenems
wrote a New Year's article of the usual kind,
retrospective and speculative. He wound it
up by a flourish in which he expressed a hope
that New Year would bring Russia good things
in its train--peace, prosperity, and a little
liberty. For that innocent aspiration the
Novoe vremia received its first warning.

 

When Stead commented in surprise, "fierely for
hoping the hew Year would bring Russia a little liberty?"
Suvorin replied:

Precisely; that was the only offense. The
second was even more extraordinary. You may
remember during General Loris Melikoff's Minis-
try, General Greig, then Finance Minister, made
a provincial tour in which he made some cur-
ious speeches.

Stead affirmed, "I remember it perfectly."
Suvorin continued:

Well, General Greig was utterly wrong in these
speeches, and the Novoe vremia pointed out in one
or two trenchant articles that the Minister's
figures did not correspond to the facts, and

that he was obviously unfit for his place.

"That was rather strong, was it not?" asked Stead.

 

23The fundamental law of press censorship was the
"Ustav o cenzure i pechati " Svod zakonov rossiikoi imperii,
3rd ed., XIV, Article 11.0 ( St. Petersburg: 19027. PromuT—
gated in 1873, the law permitted the Chief Administration
for Press Affairs to prohibit discussion of questions con-
sidered important to the government.

warned?

33

The publisher of Novoe vremia replied:

Yes, but it was perfectly true, and the proof
of that was that in a few days General Greig
was compelled to resign.

The amazed Stead asked, "Then, why were you

Suvorin offered the following explanation:

Oh, that was in order that Loris Melikoff
might clear himself from the suspicion of
having inspired the articles. Loris
Melikoff notoriously wanted to get rid of
General Graig, and therein he was cuite
right. But he did not wish people to say
that he had set on the Novoe vremia to at-
tack his colleague, and so he issued the
second avertissement.

Stead inquired further:

But that was absurd. Surely, when General
Greig fell, and the justice of your criti-
cism received the strongest possible con-
firmation, the warning was withdrawn?

To this cuery, the publisher responded:

By no means; it is still on record against
me. And any day I may receive a notice
that, owing to some paragraph or other
which offends someone in the Ministry of
the Interior, my third warning has been
issued, and my property is ruined.

When the eminent English journalist inquired why

the Russian publisher did not appeal this injustice to the

Tsar, he received this reply:

He (Suvorin) could write to the Emperor,
no doubt; but what would be the result?
The Emperor would naturally of necessity
lay his complaint before the Minister of
the Interior. The more entirely the
Emperor took Suvorin's side, the more
indignant would be the Minister that

the matter had been taken over his head

34

to the Emperor. If the Emperor was
determined, his immediate petition
might be gained, but he would probably
be marked down for vengeance at the
first opportunity. The Minister would
bide his time, but he would take good
care that someone suffered for my tem-
erity in appealing to the Emperor
against his Department.

To avoid the disaster of a third "warning,"

Novoe vremia carefully conformed to the dictates of the

 

"secret circulars" promulgated under article 1L0 of the cen-
sorship law.25 Article lhO forbade editors to touch upon
any topic withdrawn from discussion by secret circulars or
verbal prohibitions. Even the newspaper's advertisements
could be censored. Subject to the whimsical enforcement of
these censorship practices, the publisher of Novoe ygemia
and his staff judiciously sought to cultivate cordial re-
lations with the government and especially with the Minis-
try of Communication and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
agencies which exercised control over Novoe vremia's vital
access to foreign news telegrams.26 These telegrams were
the prime source for the invaluable foreign news pub-
lished in Novoe vremia's editions. The professed Russian

nationalism and the support Novoe vremia evidenced for the

 

24w. T. Stead, Truth About Russia (London:
Cassell & Co., 1888), pp. 216-17.

25For a study of these secret circulars consult:
Rigberg, "The Tsarist Press Law, 189h-1905," pp. BBS-Al.

26Scythicus, "The Russian Press," The National
Review (London), XXXV (April, 1900), 311-12.

35

government's foreign policies enhanced the St. Petersburg
newspaper's position with the government and its censors.
Throughout the eighties and nineties, Egygg
vremia's extreme Russian nationalist editorial positions
aligned with government policies. In supporting Russia's
foreign policy in the Balkans following the diplomatic de-
feat of Russia at the hands of Germany, Novoe vremia's
editorial position expressed vigorous anti-German and anti-
Austrian views opposing the interests of these countries in

27

the Balkans. Novoe vremia became notorious for its anti-

 

German attitudes that even carried over into regular editor-
ial criticism of the numerous Russian government officials
with German names.28 In support of the Russian government's
position against England's involvement on the Afghanistan

border in l88h, Novoe vremia editorials raised chauvinist

 

cries and continued their anti-English tones into the

20

twentieth century. Although these positions characterized

 

27John F. Baddeley, Russia in the "Eighties"
(London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1921), pp._122, 200;
Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tears and the Rus-
sians, II (New York: E. P. Putnast Sons,‘189hf, hté;‘Louis
Levine, "Pan-Slavism and European Politics," Political
Science Quarterly, XXIX (December, 191A), 678.

28Hans Heilbronner, "The Administrations of Loris-
Melikov and Ignatiev, 1880-1882" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion,8Department of History, University of Michigan, 195h),
p. 52 o

2C’JBaddeley, Russia in the "Eighties," pp. 213-1h;
Vladimir I. Gurko, Features andfiFigures of the Past: Govern-
ment and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas‘Il (StafiTOrd:
Stanford University Press,‘1939), p. 37h.

é..\....

36

Novoe vremia's main editorial tenets, it was not uncommon

 

for the newspaper to alter or completely reverse an editor-

ial stand to accommodate a change in government policies.30

Novoe vremia's views on Russia's domestic issues

 

were equally supportive of the government's reactionary doc-
trines, "Russia for the Russians" and "law and order." In

promulgating these ideas, Novoe vremia editorials were noted

 

for their anti-Semitic, anti-Polish and anti-Finnish tones
and for their strong opposition to autonomy and political
equality for these minorities.31 Zealous editorial support
was also given to government Russification. In return,

Novoe vremia shared in the government's indirect subsidi-

 

zation of "loyal" papers. These subsidies were in the form
of official advertisements placed in Novoe vremia. The
newspaper's reputation for accepting these subsidies and
altering editorial policies to suit the government earned it
the nickname "Weathercock" and criticism for being a semi-
official paper.32 Nevertheless, the publisher of the news-

paper, cognizant of the reactionary atmosphere prevailing,

pursued editorial policies assuring his newspaper's

 

30For several examples see Irene Grfining, Qig_
russische offentliche Meinun und u den
rossm c ten 1 7 -l 94, Berlin and Konigsberg, 1929),

31

      

Scythicus, "The Russian Press," p. 314.

32Rogachevski, Noveishaia russkaia literatura,
p. 96.

37

continued operation. Under Suvorin's guidance, the news-
paper avoided receiving the fatal third "warning" and it
flourished. Since his newspaper could not safely prosper
on the basis of editorial appeals which might offend the
censors, Suvorin concentrated his attention on transform-
ing the St. Petersburg daily into a first-rate news service.
To direct the modernization of his newspaper, the
energetic and ambitious publisher personally guided the

daily operations of Novoe vremia from his private living

 

quarters and ornate offices above the publishing firm on
Nevskii prospekt.33 Suvorin regularly worked late into
the night, giving close attention to the details of pub-
lishing the newspaper's editions. Under his supervision,
advanced newspaper techniques were implemented; and the
St. Petersburg daily earned a reputation for modern meth-
ods unrivaled among Russian newspapers.3“ Novoe vremia's
organizational structure was a major aspect of the news-
paper enterprise to benefit from Suvorin's attention. To
improve the functioning of Novoe vremia, Suvorin created
an editorial board with himself as chairman. This editor-
ial board was composed of the editors responsible for the

supervision of the various departments and sections of

 

33v. Gribovskii, "Neskol'ko vstrech s A. s.
ngorinym," Istoricheskii vestnik, CXiX (October, 1912),
1 l.

3L'Abramovich, Novoe vremia, p. 12.

38

Novoe vremia's editorial and publishing operations. The

 

division into departments and sections was another alter-
ation of Suvorin's, intended to foster an efficient and
rapid news-gathering and reporting system. In his role as
chairman of the editorial board, Suvorin tactfully coordin-
ated and guided the various editors in the shaping of Ngygg
vremia's editorial policies. The result was an editorial
unity unusual for a Russian newspaper.35 Suvorin, who took
pride in the daily's organizational structure, characterized

Novoe vremia as a "parliament"36 where journalists with var-

 

ious shades of views on foreign and domestic affairs were
represented. Within the operational framework of the organ-
izational structure, the editors, writers and contributors
were allowed a certain degree of what they termed "cossack
freedom."37 Although the "cossack freedom" may have per-
mitted staff members to have mixed views, the published con-
tents did not reflect controversial stands that might offend
the censors. Nevertheless, Suvorin's innovativeness and

Novoe vremia's prosperous growth deSpite the obstacles of

 

censorship enabled the publisher and his newspaper to at-

tract some of the best Russian writers and editors

 

35
Ibid., p. 11.

~—

36E. J. Simmons, Chekhov: A Biography (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1962), p. 105.

 

37Chernov, "Chekhov 1 Suvorin," p. 249.

39

38

receptive to Suvorin's views.
Among the numerous conservative editors and jour-

nalists joining the Novoe vremia's staff, the most renowned

 

were V. P. Burenin, M. O. Men'shikov and V. V. Rozanov. The
first, V. P. Burenin, joined the publisher's editorial staff
in the first few months of Suvorin's ownership. Burenin was
at that time already an old friend and close confident of
the publisher. Their friendship dated back to 1862, when
Burenin, as a senior editor of the journal, Otechestvennyia
za iski, made an urgently-needed financial loan of 15

rubles to the young and struggling feuilleton-writer
Suvorin. This act of kindness sparked a life-long friend-
ship and Burenin was one of the first recruited as an edi-
tor of £9323 vremia. In the first year, when Novoe vremia's
editorial policies were shifted to ran-Slavist and nation-
alist tones, it was Burenin who assisted Suvorin in this
changeover. During the time the publisher was traveling in
the Balkans in 1876 and 1877 as a special war correspondent,
he entrusted Burenin with the publication of Novoe vremia
and Suvorin's Balkan reports. Through the years Suvorin re-
lied heavily and continually on his friend. The unoues-
tioned confidence in Burenin was returned by his devotion

39

to Novoe vremia's publisher.

 

38Abramovich, Novoe vremia, p. 35.

39Chernov, "Chekhov i Suvorin," p. 2u5.

#0

In return for his devoted services and friend-
ship, Suvorin permitted Burenin to enjoy an influential
role in Novoe vremia's management. The publisher made his
old friend a member of Novoe vremia's editorial board and
allowed Burenin freedom to write numerous articles ex-
pressing extremely conservative and nationalist views. Al-
though Burenin's extreme positions invoked criticism and
controversy, Suvorin did not restrain him. Before Anton
Chekhov, Suvorin's literary protege, realized Suvorin shared
and supported Burenin's views as conducive to Novoe vremia's
prosperity, Chekhov believed it was Burenin and similar ex-
tremely conservative and Russian nationalist writers who
manipulated Duvorin's direction of figvoe vremia's editorial
policies."0 Thus for a long time Chekhov did not comprehend
that Suvorin actively recruited and conscientiously supported
extremist journalists of Burenin's type.

Another renowned journalist of equally extreme con-
servative convictions was M. 0. Menshikov. When recruitedas
a contributor for the Novoe vremia, Menshikov was being
snubbed and even ostracized by most Russian journalists for

#1

his extremely conservative positions. Joining Novoe

vremia provided Menshikov-~aetaunch advocate of DeMaistre's

LO
Simmons, Chekhov: A Biography, p. 442.

hlAlexander, Grand Duke of Russia, Once a Grand
Duke (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1932), p. 199.

hl

monarchist view, chauvinist and vociferously anti-Semitic--
the opportunity to publish his views. His ideas and partic-
ularly his reactionary concepts of "law and order" coincid-
ed with Suvorin's and the publisher placed Menshikov on
39193 vremia's editorial board."2 Menshikov became a long-
time writer for £913; vremia. Suvorin's employment of
Menshikov and journalists of similar convictions and the
publishing freedom permitted them contributed to £212;
vremia's reputation as an extremely conservative newspaper
catering to Russia's ruling circles.

A third extremist writer, V. V. Rozanov, joined
the newspaper in the nineties. An established journalist,
ROZBnOV‘WaB drawn in part by 39393 vremia's conservative rep-
utation and its anti-Semitic tones. In addition to this
ideological compatibility, Rozanov, as were numerous other
talented journalists and writers, was attracted by Suvorin's
practice of paying his workers well. Almost immediately
Rozanov rose to prominence with Burenin and Menshikov as
symbols of £2193 vremia's conservative position.“3

While these three writers were perhaps the most
notorious £2192 vremia journalists at the turn of the cen-

tury, the newspaper boasted a long list of contributors.

 

“zAbramovich, Novge vremia, pp. 29-30.

“BRichard Hare, "V. V. Rosanov: A Centenary
Appreciation," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXV

(December, 1956 , .

'8

.3.

#2

Included in this list were the writers: B. V. Gei, K. A.
Skal'kovskii, S. I. Smirnov, A. N. Maslov, I. la.
Pavlovskii and A. V. Amfiteatrov. Despite Epvoe vremia's
conservative reputation and the dominance of extremely
conservative writers, talented Russian writers of diverse
convictions eagerly sought publication of their work in
Egggg vremia in order to gain recognition and enjoy the
excellent pay.4h Suvorin's effort to employ the best jour-
nalistic talent available was therefore successful.

In combination with the improvement of the editor-
ial aspects of £2193 vremia, the energetic publisher devoted
his attention to introducing advanced publishing techniques.
£9199 vremia's superiority as a news service was centered on
an elaborate network of foreign correspondents and an effi-
cient editorial staff. Spread across Russia and in foreign
lands, flgygg_vremia journalists formed a vast communication
system for the rapid reporting of foreign and domestic news
to the newspaper's St. Petersburg offices. In addition the
morning and evening editions of the flgxgg,ygggig were strat-
egically coordinated with the midnight and noon releases of
foreign news telegrams from the censorship office of the
Imperial Telegraphic Agency.“5 An annual subscriber to

these foreign news releases, through careful planning,

 

hhAbramovich, flgvoe vremia, p. 35.

“SScythicus, "The Russian Press," p. 312.

#3

Novoe vremia was able to offer foreign news items to St.

 

Petersburg readers more quickly than most of its rivals and
to provincial subscribers twenty-four hours before the news
appeared in the provincial newspapers.“6 Despite figygg
vremia's conservative and controversial editorial policies,
subscription to the daily became a necessity for persons
seeking timely knowledge of international and national news.
In his work, Thg £329 2f Riddles, Hugo Ganz relates ob-
serving nggg vremia in numerous Russian houses and question-
ing various readers as to why they subscribed to the news-
paper. The characteristic reply was, "Infamous but indis-
pensable1"l*7 By the end of the nineteenth century, £9123
vremia enjoyed a reputation as a leading source of rapid and
vital information and its large circulation reflected the
newspaper's importance.

A prominent feature in the Novoe vremia's system
for swiftly disseminating news to subscribers was the prac-
tice of publishing a Moscow edition of the newspaper,

Vechernee vremia. The Moscow edition received daily dis-

 

patches of important news from the St. Petersburg offices of
Novoe vremia. At first these news dispatches were tele-

graphed and later telephoned to Moscow. In addition to the

 

h6§gvoe vremia, February 28 (13 March), 1901, p. 2.

a7Hugo Ganz, The Land of Riddles (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, l90hi, p. 216.

hh

items from St. Petersburg, the Moscow edition specialized
in reporting news of Moscow governmental activities and
provincial news. This combination of St. Petersburg and
local news appealed to Moscow readers, causing Vechernee
vremia to achieve a substantial circulation and financial
success. The Moscow publishing venture, capitalizing on
modern communication means and advanced publishing methods,
demonstrated Suvorin's alertness to the profit potentials
of continuous innovation. In 1892 the publisher's adven-
turous spirit led him to seriously consider publishing
£9193 vremia in Paris but financial costs proved prohib-
itive."8 Continually improving every aspect of 52193
vremia became characteristic of Suvorin's management and
increased his prestige.

The format of Novoe vremia's editions illustrates
the publisher's propensity to adopt modern newspaper styles.
As early as 1880, Novoe vremia editions contained commercial
advertisements and a classified ad section.“9 That same
year the newspaper began including illustrations, photo-
graphs and sketches depicting news events of the day. When

cartoon caricatures became fashionable, Novoe vremia

 

8
A S. S. Koteliansky ed., Life and Letters of
Anton Chekhov, trans. by Phi ip TomiIIinson (London: 0.

Reutledge & Sons, Ltd., 1927), p. 208. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Anton Chekhov.

thovoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 2.

 

45

incorporated them into its editions. As an added attrac-
tion, in 1881 Suvorin instituted a Wednesday illustrated
supplement featuring belles-lettres and bibliography.50
With outstanding men of letters as contributors, the lit-
erary supplement was well received; and in 1891 special
editor F. I. Bulgakov assumed responsibility for its pub-
lication. Under Bulgakov's supervision the literary qual-
ity of the supplement magnified readership and in 1897 a
new Sunday supplement increased circulation even further.51
While these additions to Novoe vremia's format were not
totally novel to Russian newspapers, the daily's special-
ized handling of them met with unusual success.

Through this series of modifications Suvorin pro-
duced an Imperial Russian daily newspaper which was closely
comparable in composition, characteristics and quality to
some of the leading daily newspapers in Western Europe. In
an average Novoe vremia edition the leading article was de-
voted to news of foreign politics and events. This article
was generally composed of telegrams received from the Ngygg
vremia's correspondents throughout the world. News on Rus-
sia's provinces followed. Most of these news items were

presented in the shape of lengthy extracts from foreign and

provincial capital newspapers. Next appeared the

 

50
"Novoe vremia," Entsiklopedicheskii slovar',

p‘ 2780

51Novoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 2.

#6

St. Petersburg news featuring ordinary municipal, legal,
sporting, theatrical and musical reports. A considerable
portion of the edition was taken up with official and semi-
official government announcements, such as imperial decrees,
and notices of the senate, various ministries or the state
banks. Included regularly was a chronicle of the public ap-
pearances of the Tsar and other members of the imperial
family, as well as railway time schedules. When available,
semi-official government statistics were published. The
remainder of an edition was usually devoted to articles,
frequently in the form of letters to the editor, dealing

at length with proposed or announced reforms on social and
educational questions. A section criticizing the merits

and demerits of contemporary foreign publications appeared
ahead of the classified ad section. An average edition of
Nglgg vremia provided readers with an abundance of domestic
information and foreign news. The large number of subscrib-
ers in Russia's provinces reflects to some degree the value
of its content to readers throughout Russia.

To keep pace with the growth of Novoe vremia's
circulation, Suvorin also concentrated on upgrading the
quality and performance of his newspaper's typography sec-
tion. The number of workers employed in this section of

the newspaper's operation increased to #17 employees in

#7

1901, representing more than a threefold increase since

2
1876.5 Novoe vremia's printing craftsmen were ranked

 

among the best in Russia due to the publisher's foresight.
Realizing the need to improve the printing business and
supply his newspaper with skilled printers, in 188A

Suvorin established the first private school for typo-
graphic apprentices.53 The four-year courses in the school
were organized in conjunction with the Novoe vremia's typog-
raphy section. Apprentices were taught the typography busi-
ness (theory and practices); the Russian, French and German
languages; arithmetic; geography; Russian history; drawing
and calligraphy. Over 205 apprentices completed the school
by 1901 and more than half of these were employed by £2122
vremia. Skilled typographical workers were attracted to
Novoe vremia by the same good pay and employment conditions
that Suvorin offered journalists. Characteristic of
Suvorin's generous treatment towards his typography workers
was the financial support he extended to establish a sav-
ings and loan association for employees in Novoe vremia's
offices, book store and typographic section. In addition to
the normal savings benefits, members of this savings associa-

tion received unemployment loans, sick pay, accident and

 

521bid., pp. 2-3.

‘ 53W. M. Kovalevsky, La Russia a la fin du l9e
siecle (Paris: Paul Dupont, 1900), p. 927.

#8

life insurance benefits. Medical services were provided

Ngggg_vremia's typography workers and their immediate fam-
ilies when Suvorin opened a dispensary with a physician in
attendance and a pharmacy to dispense medicines)”+

For workers without families and for typographic
school apprentices, Novoe vremia established a hostel. For
the reading pleasure of his employees, Suvorin provided a
library and books. Annually, Suvorin sponsored a festive
Christmas party for his workers and their families.55 In
general, Aleksei S. Suvorin was regarded as a generous em-
ployer; and his employees liked and respected him. The ab-
sence of any major labor disturbances or difficulties at
Ngyg§_vremia indicates that Suvorin's labor relations, well
ahead of their time, were a success.

The physical plant of Novoe vremia also received
attention. In the course of twenty-five years, 1876-1901,
the changes in the format and the increased circulation
from 13,300 to 60,000 demanded improvements in printing
machinery. Thus Suvorin continually installed the most
modern equipment available throughout the world in order
to keep pace with the enormous output of newsprint. For
the first twenty—five years of publication, the length of
this newsprint equalled 400,000 versts. In 1900 Suvorin

 

5I‘Novoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 3.

55Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 36.

#9

installed the latest in electric rotary presses imported
from its place of manufacture in Chicago, Illinois. The

Novoe vremia printing facilities, at the opening of the

 

twentieth century, were the most advanced in Imperial Rus-
sia. The sixteen-million-ruble gross expenditures in the
first twenty-five years of operations reflect the news-
paper's financial achievements}6

The success of the Novoe vremia newspaper carried
over into its publisher's other activities. The Ngygg
vrgmia publishing firm also grew in size and importance.
Departing from more traditional practices and concentrating
on producing inexpensive editions of reading materials for
mass audiences, the Novoe vremia enterprise became one of
the largest publishing firms in late nineteenth century
Russia. An ardent nationalist, Suvorin's concern with en-
couraging the enlightenment and education of the Russian
people inspired him to direct his firm's activities into
offering reading materials, not only to the wealthy, but
also to the vast majority of impoverished peasants and
lower classes.57 These ventures into this new readership
market occurred at an opportune time, when various efforts
to improve the literacy of the lower classes were engender-

ing some degree of positive response. The aroused reading

 

56

Novoe vremia, February 28 (March 13), 1901, p. 2.

 

57Kova1evsky, La Russie a la fin du l9e siecle,
p- 9310

50

interests of these lower classes created consumers for
the inexpensive printed material offered by the 119193
vremia firm.

Among the most popular and successful Egypt:
*vremia publications produced for mass reading was a series
[entitled "Cheap Library." This series of inexpensive edi-
‘tions featured primarily literary classics of Russian and
.foreign writers. First called "Deshevaia biblioteka" and
Skater titled "Novaia biblioteka,"58 these publications were
modeled on the French "Universelle bibliotheque." The
:individual editions in the Russian series were produced in
numbers varying from ten thousand to forty thousand and
ctistributed throughout Russia in a network of Novoe vremia
lxook stores located in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Karkov, Kiev,
Ckiessa and Saratov. Also, Novoe vremia enjoyed the privi-
lxege of selling its publications in newsstands located in
Emissian railway stations.59 Weekly, the Novoe vremia news-
paper featured a catalogue listing of the publishing firm's
(xfferings which over the years included a wide variety of
topics. On an average, these inexpensive pamphlet-size
books were priced at one and one-half kopecks for thirty-

two printed pages and were within the financial reach of

 

58
Glinskii, "Suvorin," p. 35.

59Simmons, Chekhov: A Biography, p. 105.

51

the poorer classes.00 The early emphasis on foreign writ-

ers published in their native languages gave way to a dom-
inance of Russian translations of these foreign literary
works. Later, special attention was given to original
works written by Russian authors for peasant readers.
Suvorin's voluminous series of inexpensive books made a
significant contribution to increasing the reading mater-
ials available to the lower classes in the last part of the
nineteenth century.

The "Cheap Library"series of the Novoe vremia
publishing firm was but part of Suvorin's diligent effort
to offer printed materials to Russian readers. Other im-
portant publications included a cheap edition of a Russian
dictionary issued in June, 1888, at the very low price of
one and three-fourths rubles. For mass consumption, Ngygg
vremia annually published the popular Russkii kalendar',
priced at only fifteen kopecks. Observers of reading mater-
ials in the hands of the Russian peasants reported mainly
various Novoe vremia and religious publications in peasant

61 Such observations tend to reflect the popularity

homes.
that Novoe vremia offerings enjoyed among their new peasant

readers.

 

60A. A. Bakhtiarov, Istoria russkii knigakh
(St. Petersburg, 1890), pp. 250-51.

61L. L. Lodian "Siberian Literature," Book-Lover:
A Magazine of Book Lore (San Francisco), March, 1 A, p.

52

The peasant reading market was not the only area

where the Novoe vremia publishing firm made inroads. For

 

wealthy Russian readers who could bear the high monetary
expense imposed by the censorship policies of the Russian
government, Suvorin published a new edition of A. N.
Radishchev's Eyteshestvie ii Peterburga I Moskvy in 1888.
This edition of the controversial work marked the first un-
censored version of Radishchev's work to appear in Russia
since its original publication in 1790. In fact, it was
superior to the edition published in 1868 by the editor,

P. A. Efremov, who deleted three important chapters at the
insistence of the Russian censorship officials. The 1888
edition was reproduced from an original copy of Radishchev's
work obtained for Suvorin by the Moscow antiquarian, P. P.
Shibanov, after a tedious and exhaustive series of searches.
When the censors' permission was finally granted to publish
this 1888 edition of the Pyteshestvie i; Peterburga X

Moskv , two conditions restricted this reading material from
the grasp of the Russian masses. First, the quantity of the
publication was not to exceed one hundred copies; and, sec-
ond, the cost of individual copies was set at from twenty-
five to sixty rubles each, depending on the format and

paper quality.62 Despite these exorbitant prices, this pub-

lication sold out in only two days. The printing of this

 

62N. P. Smirnov-Sokol'skii, Rasskagy o knigakh
(Moscow, 1959), pp. 119-20.

53

historically significant work, along with the publication
of his inexpensive editions, characterized Suvorin's ef-
forts to provide the Russian people with informative read-
ing materials despite the hazards of the oppressive censor-
ship policies.

Suvorin's staunch Russian nationalist views also
stimulated the wealthy publisher to promote things Russian
through other activities. This concern with the develop-
ment of Russian culture was especially evident in the field
of Russian historical scholarship. The opportunity to make
a lasting contribution to Russian historical studies pre-
sented itself in late 1879, when S. N. Shubinskii, editor
of the historical journal Drevniaia i novaia Rossiia, ap-
proached the Novoe vremia publisher for assistance.
Shubinskii, having obtained the permission of the censor-
ship authorities to publish a new historical-literary
monthly journal, wanted Suvorin to apply his organizational
talents and managerial skills to publishing the new journal
Istoricheski; vestnik. This new journal was intended to over-
come the deficiencies of the three existing historical pub-
lications: Russkaia starina, Russkii arkhiv and Drevniaia

i novaia Rossiis. Plagued by inefficient operations, small

 

subscription lists, bad designs and formats, the three
journals were financial failures. Recognizing that this new
publication would contribute to the advancement of Russian

historical scholarship, Suvorin agreed to publish

54

Istoricheskii vestnik, beginning in January, 1880.63

The popularity Istoricheskii vestnik enjoyed in
its first year proved the wisdom of eliciting Novoe vremia
publisher's participation in issuing the new journal. By
the end of 1880, subscriptions totalled 2,379, due largely
to Suvorin's devotion to the journal's business Operations.
The modern publishing facilities of the Novoe vremia pub-
lishing firm were utilized. A specially-designed large tyne
vvas introduced along with a modern format. Because the
earlier historical publications were reputedly irregular
in delivery to subscribers, Suvorin directed close atten-
tion to guaranteeing speedy and regular delivery.6“
Quickly, the new journal earned a respected reputation in
Russian academic circles.

Leading Russian historical academicians and lit-
erary scholars were contributors to the Istoricheskii
vestnik. Among the noted Russian historians contributing
during the first year were N. I. Kostomarov, K. N.
Bestuzhev-Riumin, I. E. Labelin. To attract subscribers,
the material published focused on contemporary historical
and literary questions. In the course of the next three

decades, the Istoricheskii vestnik's subscriptions continued

 

63Dvatsatipiatiletie 'Istoricheskago vestnika,'"
Istoricheskii vestnik, XCVIII (October-December, 190A), I.

641212.... p. VI.

55

to increase and the journal thrived. The pages of the pub-
lication were open to historical and literary scholars repre-
senting varied cultural, political and social views. Despite
the fact that Suvorin "was responsible for all accuracy and
calculations" appearing in the Istoricheskii vestnik, the
editors and contributors enjoyed freedom in the presentation
of their positions.65
Generally, the composition of the Istoricheskii
vestnik featured belles-lettres, recollections, historical
letters and historical-literary essays. Special attention
was given to the publishing of the accounts of foreign
travelers to Russia, and a critical bibliographic section
appeared in each edition. In the section dealing with rec-
ollections by important Russian notables, articles pre-
sented detailed eye-witness accounts and vivid pictures of
past and contemporary Russian historical events. This sec-
tion offered Russian historians an abundance of primary
source material for analysis. Other sections treating
archaeology, ethnology, geography and foreign news reviews
were equally profitable to historians. Suvorin's contin-
ued patronage of this historical-literary journal made it
one of the most valuable publications in late nineteenth
century historical circles. Its over one hundred and fifty

volumes, published before the Bolsheviks ceased publication

 

65
Ibid., pp. VI-VII.

 

56

in 1917, remains a treasury of information on Russian his-
tory. In line with Suvorin's desire to improve and develop
Russian culture, the Istoricheskii vestnik is a lasting
asset to Russian history.

Suvorin's contributions to the field of Russian
historical studies extended into other activities. From his
St. Petersburg publishing firm, the historical works of N.
K. Shil'der, B. B. Glinskii and other significant Russian
historians, as well as leading foreign historians, were
published for his Russian readers. For the masses, his
firm produced popularized historical studies dealing with
the lives and reigns of Tsar Peter the Great, Tsarina
Catherine II, Tsar Paul I, Tsar Alexander I and Tsar
Nicholas I. Some of these editions Suvorin wrote himself.
In addition, the Novoe vremia publishing firm produced
photographic collections illustrating the history of art
in the leading art galleries of Western Europe, and es-
pecially the excellent Russian gallery, the Hermitage, in
St. Petersburg. Through the years, Suvorin's firm sought
to popularize Russian history and provide historical pub-
lications for all the classes of Russian people.66

As an amateur historian, Aleksei Suvorin, him-
self, produced some historical studies. His special in-

terest focused on Smutnoe vremia. His research on this

 

66Glinskii, "Suvorin," pp. 39-h0.

57

important era in Russian history did not gain scholarly
recognition, but his own analysis of these events influenced
Suvorin's later attitudes on the historical development of
the Russian people. One study produced by Suvorin at the
end of the nineteenth century did gain some attention. This
was a series of articles, first published in the flglgg
vremia newspaper and later incorporated into a book, wherein
he proved that copies of poems in the Russian Archives sup-
posedly written by the Russian poet, A. S. Pushkin, were
really forgeries.67 This work, plus the relentless and
continued support he gave, through his publishing firm, to
publications of Russian historical scholarship, are evi-
dence of Suvorin's efforts to promote Russian cultural de-
velopment and stimulate Russian national pride.

An ardent admirer and patron of the Russian arts
and letters, the wealthy owner of flpvoe vremia deeply in-
volved himself in Russian dramatic arts during the last dec-
ade of the nineteenth century. Ever since he had been ex-
posed to the Russian theatrical world as a young cadet,
Suvorin had maintained a keen interest in Russia's dramatic
arts. In his early career with the §.-Peterburgskiia

vedomosti, he served as a drama critic and later performed

 

the same service with his own newspaper until 1895, when

the wealthy publisher became an active patron and member

 

67Ibid., p. 42.

58

of the St. Petersburg Theatrical Literary-Artistic Society
which he helped organize. A very active member of the
dramatic society's managerial board, and later, board chair-
man, Suvorin purchased the Malyi teatr in St. Petersburg
With his personal funds. There,with the assistance of its
wealthy patron, the dramatic society managed to stage a
number of theatrical productions which ordinarily were
banned from public performance by the theatrical censors.68
Leading examples of Suvorin's skill in influencing the
theatrical censors to allow the Malyi teatr to perform
previously censored plays were: Vlasm' t'my, by Count L.
N. Tolstoi; a trilogy by Count A. K. Tolstoi; Chaika by

A. P. Chekhov; and a series of dramatic works by Western
European writers.69 Equally important to the Malyi

teatr's dramatic group was the wealthy patron's leader—
ship in organizing and managing its performances. Suvorin
recruited the finest theatrical performers available, zeal-
ously canvassing provincial theatrical groups to bring out-
standing talent to the Malyi teatr stage. Through his ef-
forts, numerous gifted actors and actresses were introduced

to the St. Petersburg theatrical world, and accomplished

directors were retained for productions. In addition he

 

68

E. Karpov, "A. S. Suvorin i osnovanie teatra
literaturno-artisticheskago kryzhka," Istoricheskii vestnik,
CXXXVII (August-December, l9lh), #49.

691bid., pp. 879-82.

m

59

acquired the latest theatrical equipment available in Rus-
sia and in Western Europe for the Malyi teatr. Suvorin also
wrote plays including a drama, Medeia; the comedies,

Tat'iana Repina and Vopros; and a five-act historical drama,

 

Tsar' Dmitrii Samozvanets i Tsarevna Kseniia. The latter,
based on his historical interests and studies, was con-
ceived as a critical analysis of conditions during Russia's

Smutnoe vremia. As a historical interpretation, this drama-

 

tic work received a degree of recognition; but, as was the
case with Suvorin's other dramatic endeavors, the play was
lacking in dramatic quality. Despite the deficiencies of
these dramatic works, Suvorin's patronage and energetic
activity in the St. Petersburg theatrical arts continued.
Although the stage productions in the Malyi teatr did not
represent extremely high levels of dramatic achievement,
Suvorin and this theatrical group offered unique opportun-
ities for the numerous gifted performers and directors in
the St. Petersburg theatrical world to present their work.70
Many of these same artists were major participants in Rus-
sian dramatic achievements that followed. Suvorin's patron-
age of Russia's dramatic arts reflected his continued in-
terest in Russia's cultural development, and he gave finan-

cial support to many Russian artists.

It was upon numerous Russian writers and

 

7°Ibid.. pp. u59-65.

60

journalists that the wealthy publisher mainly bestowed
financial benefits to assist them in their literary activ-
ities. Through the years, the Novoe vremia publisher reg-
ularly searched for the best writing talents in Russia; and
he paid them well to contribute to his St. Petersburg daily
and publishing enterprises. Some of the writers who en-w
joyed Suvorin's financial favors were: Maslov;
Skal'kovskii; I. I. Iasinskii; Prince Bariatinskii; D. S.
Merezhkovskii; and Potapenko.71 The best and most well-
known example of Suvorin's patronage was his protege, Anton
P. Chekhov, a literary giant of Russia's Silver Age in
literature. The fifteen-year-long business association and
friendship between the young writer and his patron reveals
the wealthy publisher's devotion to assist promising young
writers.

The relationship between the budding writer and
Aleksei S. Suvorin began in the latter part of December,
1885, shortly after the publisher read Chekhov's recently
published book of comic stories. The owner of the £919;
vremia enterprise perceived Chekhov's potential and invited
the financially-distressed writer for an interview in his

Novoe vremia office.72 Although the interview was brief and

 

formal, the young writer was so impressed with the powerful

mogul of the Russian publishing world that Chekhov

 

71K. I. Chukovskii, Chekhov, (Moscow, 1958), p. 101.

72Chernov, "Chekhov i Suvorin," pp. 218-19.

61

immediately wrote home an account of the meeting. Chekhov's
depiction of the interview in Suvorin's private office indi-
cated that Suvorin received him very cordially. Immediately
after shaking hands with the still relatively-unknown writer,
Suvorin expressed his pleasure and satisfaction with
Chekhov's literary work. Chekhov was invited to become a
regular contributor to the Novoe vremia's Wednesday lit-
erary supplement with a substantial financial payment for
his contributions. When Chekhov accepted this generous of-
fer, Suvorin advanced money to the needy writer with no con-
ditions attached. Over tea, the new employer advised
Chekhov to be frugal in monetary matters and cautioned
abstinence from vodka. The aspiring writer left the figygg
vremia offices favorably impressed and awed by his new em-
ployer, who was soon to become his patron and intimate
friend, showering the young writer with numerous financial
benefits during the next fifteen years.73
This business association with Suvorin, whose
purse was always open to writers and who loved being a
patron, opened new literary horizons to Chekhov. Suvorin,
who paid his writers well and who set no limits or deadlines
on his writers, published Chekhov's first feuilleton,
Panikhida, on February 15, 1886, in the flgygg vremia's Wed-
nesday literary supplement. Upon the recommendation of

Suvorin, the young writer dropped his previous pseudonym,

73Koteliansky, Anton Chekhov, p. 69.

62

"Antosha Chekhonte," and published under his own name.7“
Publishing his stories in Russia's largest and most widely
circulated newspaper enhanced Chekhov's reputation. As
the popularity of his protege increased, Suvorin intro-
duced a special Saturday supplement, in addition to the
Wednesday supplement, to feature Chekhov's stories.75
The sixteen stories which appeared during the next two
years were later published by Suvorin in a separate book
entitled E sumerkakh. Entered by Suvorin, this book won
the Pushkin Prize in Literature for Anton P. Chekhov, in
October, 1888.76

Voluminous correspondence and numerous friendly
visits characterized the fifteen-year friendship of Suvorin
with Chekhov. The frequency of Suvorin's letters is re-
flected in Chekhov's published correspondence. When
Chekhov visited the Russian capital, Suvorin regularly in-
vited him to visit the Suvorin household as a guest. Each
summer, Suvorin and Chekhov visited each other's summer

homes, and when Suvorin's family vacationed in Western

 

7“Ronald Hingley, Chekhov: A Bio ra hical and
Critical Study (New York: Barnes and NoBIe, Inc., I955),
p. 7b.

75Koteliansky, Anton Chekhov, p. 19¢.

76Hingley, Chekhov: A Biographical and Critical
Stud , p. 78.

63

77

Europe, Chekhov accompanied them as Suvorin's guest.
During these meetings, Suvorin engaged the writer in long
discussions on topics concerning Russia's political, social
and cultural problems. Commenting on his older friend's

performance in these lengthy discussions, Chekhov expressed

this opinion:

. . . He is a big man. He plays exactly the
same part in art as a setter does in hunting
woodcock--that is, he works by his devilish
flair and is always burning with passion.

He is a self-taught man, hence his whole-
someness and his purely dog-like unspoiled
nature; hence, too, his independence of out-
look. Being poor in theories, he was forced
to develop in himself what nature had so
richly endowed him with; involuntarily he
developed his instinct to the dimensions of
a great mind. Merely to speak with him is

a pleasing experience and when you get to
understand his conversational manner, his
sincerity, which the majority of talkers
lack, then chat with him becomes almost

a delight.7

Suvorin's friendship with Chekhov and the young
writer's esteem for the wealthy publisher remained firm as
long as Chekhov overlooked Suvorin's decidedly conservative
and nationalist views. When Suvorin's staunch anti-Semitic
views, eXpressed in articles and editorials on the Dreyfus
Case in France, conflicted with Chekhov's increasingly

liberal views, their friendship grew strained and their

 

77V. Nemirovitch-Dantchenko My Life in the Rus—
sian Theatre, trans. by John Cournos Boston: Little, Brown
& 50., 1955), p. 61.

78Koteliansky, Anton Chekhov, p. 112.

6h

business association ended.79 Despite Chekhov's rejection
of Suvorin's political views and the Novoe vremia's edi-
torial policies, the writer expressed his admiration for
the wealthy publisher's achievements as a patron of Rus-
sian culture. In defense of Suvorin, Chekhov said he had
been the first to increase the salaries and improve the
working conditions of the newspaper profession; he had be-
friended many poor writers and had carried them along with
sums of money, which he realized he would never recover;
and he brought to the publishing business an instinct for
developing Russian culture as well as making profits.
"When history finally judges him," concluded Chekhov, "let
us not forget these aspects of Suvorin's life."80

The tributes of praise and esteem bestowed on
Aleksei S. Suvorin, the son of a peasant, at the twenty-
fifth anniversary jubilee celebration honoring his leader-
ship of the Novoe ygemia newspaper and publishing firm,
reflected the recognition of his accomplishments. At the
festive celebration, on February 26, 1901, prominent per-
sons from all aspects of Russian society praised Suvorin

for his remarkable achievements as a journalist, publisher

 

9Abramovich, Novoe vremia, p. 35.

80Simmons, Chekhov: A Biography, p. 583.

65

and wealthy patron of the Russian arts and letters.81

His sole proprietorship of one of Russia's most
widely-circulated newspapers and a prominent publishing
firm permitted him to exercise control over a vast pub-
lishing system communicating vital information and editor-
ial opinions to a wide segment of Russian society. From
this strategic position in Russia's publishing world,
Suvorin was able to widely circulate his observations and
views on the issues and events shaping Russia's historical
development in the tumultuous years leading to the revolu-
tionary upheaval of 1905 and the convocation of the Russian
Duma in 1906. The public views of Suvorin on the foreign
and domestic problems of Imperial Russia in these event-
ful years became known to his Russian readers in his col-
umn titled "Malen'kiia pis'ma," published regularly in

Novoe vremia. Because he was careful to judge the re-

 

strictions of Russia's censorship in his articles, Suvorin
successfully managed to express shades of editorial crit-
icism acceptable to the dictates of the government's
censors.

At the turn of the century, when the Russian
government's disastrous foreign policies produced domestic
unrest and disorders which threatened the continued exis-

tence of the autocratic system of government, Suvorin's

 

81flpvoe vremia, March 3 (March l6), 1901,

 

pp. 2-30

66

views in his "Malen'kiia pis'ma" revealed a strong nation-
alism, a leaning towards progressive domestic reforms and
a rather conservative stance towards changes in the polit-
ical structure. The growing crisis in the Far East, in
particular, gave Suvorin ample opportunity to display his

nationalism.

CHAPTER III

SUVORIN AND THE BOXER CRISIS

The Boxer Rebellion in China, which originated in
the fall of 1899, began to threaten seriously Russian inter-
ests in the Far East in the summer of 1900. With the Man-
churian segment of the Trans-Siberian railroad only partial-
ly constructed, the Russian government cautiously sought to
avoid actions which might prevent the railroad's completion
while attempting at the same time to maintain Russia's power
position in the region. The reading fare which Suvorin of-
fered the Russian public through his "Malen'kiia pis'ma"
during the Boxer crisis was threaded with the themes of
nationalism and Russian economic self-interest, and unmit-
igatedly supported the policy recommendations of the Minis-
ter of Finance S. In. Witte.

Minister of Foreign Affairs M. N. Murav'ev formu-
lated the early Russian government policy on the Boxer ques-
tion. At the time of the policy's adoption in February,
1900, Murav'ev appraised the Boxer movement as primarily
directed against European missionary efforts and economic
concessions in China. Since Russia did not participate in

either of these activities to any significant extent,

67

.n
.d

 

68

Murav'ev recommended that Russia curtail its expansive pol-
icies and avoid any further conflict in the Far East until
the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1902. Witte,
mastermind of the railway, shared Murav'ev's view and joined
in supporting a Russian policy of peace and retrenchment in
the Far East.1 During the spring of 1900, however, the
Boxer movement increased in scope and intensity.

However, while Novoe vremia published reports of

 

the events in China throughout the spring of 1900, Suvorin
himself remained silent on the subject of the Chinese dis-
orders and Russia's role in the Far East. This lack of com-
ment cannot be attributed either to ignorance or unavail-
ability of data. From Suvorin's published memoirs it is
evident that he enjoyed ready access to information on China
both from his newspaper correspondents and through his ac-
quaintance with the men directing Russia's Far Eastern pol-
icy. His personal associations included Murav'ev, Witte,
and one of Witte's close friends, Prince E. E. Ukhtomskii,
publisher of the S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti, head of the
Russo-Chinese Bank and chief of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way Board. Although Suvorin reported meeting with these
three important figures on several occasions in early 1900,

his memoirs do not indicate the disorders in China were a

 

1M. Pokrovskii, "Tsarskaia diplomatiia o
zadachakh Rossii na Vostoke v 1900 g.," Krasnyi arkhiv,

XVII (1926), h-25. Krasnzi arkhiv will be hereinafter
referred to as K.A.

 

69

topic of conversation. While motives cannot be ascertained,
the publisher's lack of public comment on the Chinese events
appears to be consonant with Murav'ev's and Witte's view
that the Chinese situation did not threaten Russian interests
in the Far East.2

The situation changed in early June, 1900, when
the Boxer movement threatened the foreign legations in
Peking. The Boxers murdered the German ambassador, be-
sieged the foreign legations in Peking, and were success-
fully resisting Chinese government efforts to quell the
disorders. Alarmed, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy,
Austria, Japan, the United States and other countries with
legations in Peking decided to "take concerted measures"
to protect their diplomats and citizens in Peking by form-
ing an international military expedition.3 Despite its de-
sire to avoid involvement, the Russian government felt com-
pelled to participate in this international intervention.
On June A Murav'ev justified Russian participation by claim-
ing Russia's prestige in the Far East might suffer if it

failed to assist in rescuing its own and the other foreign

legations. The Russian government also feared major

 

2A. S. Suvorin, Dnevnik A. S. Suvorina, ed. by
.Mikh. Krichevskii (Mescow,fil923), pp. 223-A0. Hereinafter
referred to as Dnevnik.

3Confidential telegrams from M. Cirs, Russian Am-
bassador at Peking, May 27, 1900 and June 7, 1900, K.A.,
XIV (1926), 12.

70

Japanese interference if no Russian action was taken.’+
The decision to dispatch Russian troops to China deeply in-
volved Russia in the Chinese crisis. It was only on June
15, after Russia had made military commitments, that
Suvorin expressed concern in his memoirs about the problems
in China; but he still avoided publishing his views on the
government's actions.

On June 17 Murav'ev submitted a memorandum to
Nicholas II revising the basis of Russian policy in view
of the growing boxer threat. Murav'ev saw Russia's role
in the Far East as necessarily different from the positions
of the other major powers. Anxious to avoid the open hos-
tility of the Chinese government, Murav'ev believed that
Russia should maintain a low profile. Under no condition
should it seek the leadership of the international forces.
Russian troops should limit their involvement to freeing
the legations and guaranteeing the safety of Russian sub-

jects and their property. The presence of Russian troops

 

l’A memorandum from Count Murav'ev to Nicholas II,
June 7, 1900, Ibid., p. 13.

SSuvorin, Dnevnik, p. 2&2. For background on the

crisis in China see am L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Im-
ferialism, 1890-1302 (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

we a riskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the
Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and‘Power Politics, 1895-

iladéIphia: ‘UnIVersity ofIPennsyIvaniaIPress, 719A6);
and Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881- l90h;
'with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the‘Russo-Japanese
war (Berkeley: *University of‘CZlifOrnia Press, 1958) es-
pecially chapters VI and VII.

 

 

‘r

71

would prevent the other European states from taking action
without Russia's consent.6 When this policy was approved
by Nicholas II, the Russian government entered the China
crisis believing it would not be hampered in its "freedom of
action" to renew friendly relations with China as soon as
possible.

When Murav'ev died suddenly on June 21, Count V.
N. Lamsdorf was nominated provisional director of the min-
istry of foreign affairs by Witte.7 With Lamsdorf in this
position, Witte took control of Russia's diplomacy in the
Far East. Lamsdorf's immediate action was to endorse
Murav'ev's policy of June 17.8 The "separate course" em-
phasis adopted by Lamsdorf was well suited to Witte's atti-
tude on Russia's imperative need to avoid conflict in the
Far East until the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria was
completed.

The outbreak of boxer disorders in Manchuria on
June 26 and the attacks against hussia's Chinese Eastern
Railway induced Lamsdorf and Witte to utilize the "separate

course" approach. On the day that news of Boxer disorders

 

6A memorandum from Count Murav'ev to Nicholas II,
June 17, 1900, K.A., XIV (1926), lh-15.

7S. In. Witte, Vospominaniia I (Berlin, 1922),

159-160.

8A memorandum from Count Lamsdorf to Nicholas II,
July 13, 1900, K.A., XIV (1926), 17-19; Anatolii Ia.
Kantorovich, AmeriEa v bor'be za Kitai (Moscow, 1935), 127.

72

in Nanchuria reached St. Petersburg, Witte received a tele-
gram from Li Hung-Chang, a special adviser to the Chinese
Imperial Court, requesting assistance in resolving the dif-
ficulties with the foreign states having legations in Peking.
Witte replied immediately, hoping to initiate separate ne-
gotiations with China which would allow removing Russian
troops from the international military expedition before
it reached Peking. His communique included terms promis-
ing that Russia would not declare war and would support
Chinese government efforts to resolve the crisis if China
would keep peace in Manchuria and would protect the lives
of Russian citizens in China. At the same time Witte made
arrangements for Prince Ukhtomskii to depart for China and
open negotiations in July; but military developments were
to complicate matters and bring Suvorin's public support
for Witte's policies.9
The need to dispatch Russian troops to Manchuria
on July 3 to protect the Chinese Eastern Railway and the
successful offensive action of the international forces in
seizing the city of Tientsin on July lu aggravated dis-
agreement within the Russian government. General A. N.
Kuropatkin, minister of war, challenged the peaceful di-

plomacy of Lamsdorf and Witte and advocated Russian mili-

tary leadership of the international forces to swiftly

 

9B. A. Romanov, Rossiia v Man'chzhurii, 1892-
1906 (Leningrad, 1928), pp.'250-25I.

73

"polish off Peking." Li Hung-Chang's reply of July 26
expressing willingness to meet with Prince Ukhtomskii
aided the Witte peace approach.lo

Late in the evening of July 28, while Witte was
immersed in efforts to stall Kuropatkin's Peking plan,
Suvorin visited witte's home where the major topic of
discussion was China. Suvorin's memoirs note that Witte
showed him records of a November 28, 1897, discussion
with Murav'ev concerning plans to occupy Port Arthur and
that Witte had been opposed to that action. Witte also
recounted that he had told Murav'ev on the day before his
death that Russia's troubles in China had begun with the
seizing of the port city.11 Two days later, on July 30,
Ngygg vremia published the first of a series of "Malen'kiia
pis'ma" arguing support for the major Far Eastern policies
advocated by Witte.

Suvorin began his discussion by asserting that
he regarded the military activities in the Far East a "war."
Noting England's huge weekly expense in conducting military
operations against the Boers in South Africa, Suvorin argued
Russia also might soon be spending "twenty million" a week

for military operations in China. The publisher questioned

 

loA memorandum from Count Lamsdorf to Nicholas II,
July 13, 1900, K.A., XIV (1926), 18-19.

llSuvorin, Dnevnik, pp. 242-2A3.

7A

whether Russia's participation and the financial burdens
which would be incurred were necessary. Responding nega-
tively, he asserted: ". . . no one knows what started the
war and why it began. . ." In a rebuttal to the proposal
to advance aggressively on Peking, Suvorin contended this
act would "theoretically" mean "war." In addition, it
would mean "losses to Russian fathers, mothers, and wives."
As an added reason for his opposition, Suvorin recalled the
1876 crisis over "Constantinople and the bosporus." Al-
though he had supported war in that instance, Suvorin de-
clared that the Chinese situation was entirely different.
In the Balkans, "taking the Bosporus meant closing the
Black Sea. In doing this Russia reduced expenses for the
army and armaments, and strengthened her political influence
in the Balkan Peninsula and provinces." Thus, Russia was
"recompensed" for its losses. Displaying a profit orienta-
tion which was typical, Suvorin asked what Russia would
gain by seizing Peking. War with China, Suvorin told his
reading public, would not be glorious and "promised nothing
except difficulties and expenses." Suvorin conveniently
did not mention the large Russian military operations in
.Manchuria which Witte had directly initiated to protect the
Chinese Eastern Railway.12

After strongly opposing military action in China,

 

12Novoe vremia, July 17 (July 30), 1900, p. 2.

75

Suvorin defended independent Russian diplomacy by criti-

13 Citing the

cizing the attitudes of the European states.
false rumors about the death of the Chinese Emperor and
Empress, he suggested that reports about the gruesome
"horrors" of the Boxers were not verified. The Europeans
were "exaggerating everything" in saying that the
"...Chinese were cunning and treacherous..." and that the
Chinese could not be trusted. European talk of suppress-
ing the Chinese, Suvorin believed, was an equally exag-
gerated reaction. China was an enormous country with a
large army; conducting a war against it would be diffi-
cult.1h Criticism of European hostile attitudes and ac-
tions towards China became a major theme in Suvorin's
"Malen'kiia pis'ma." Such arguments helped provide con-
tinual rationale for Russia's "separate course."

In keeping with his newspaper's anti-German bias,
Suvorin stated particular disagreement with the extreme
views of German Emperor Wilhelm following the murder of the
German Ambassador Baron von Kettler in Peking. Wilhelm's

"war cry" demanding "exemplary chastisement and vengeance"

on the Chinese and the "razing of Peking to the ground"

 

Suvorin used the term "Europe" or "European"
in much of his writings regarding the Boxer Rebellion and
ordinarily was referring mainly to Great Britain, France
and Germany.

1h
Novoe vremia, July 17 (July 30), 1900, p. 2.

76

were not Russia's attitudes. Despite German claims that

"neighborly ties" bound Germany and Russia together in the
Far East, Russia's own interests obliged her to judge the
situation in China for herself and act accordingly. "It
is impossible for us to forget that China is also our
neighbor..." Russia, Suvorin argued, could not occupy
China and hope to save its good neighborly relations with
China. Russia's vital interest, the "Siberian Road,"
joined China and Russia more closely than ever. In addi-
tion, Suvorin insisted Russia was "one-third Asiatic" and
shared the same aims as China. By stationing a large num-
ber of Russian troops on her neighbor's borders, Russia
would only serve as Europe's "policeman watching China."ls
Opposing the attack on Tientsin, Suvorin at-
tempted to engender support for peace by expressing sym-
pathy for the Chinese people and defending them. He ex-
plained the defeat of the superior Chinese forces at
Tientsin by noting that confusion during the stormy night
of the battle accidentally benefited the European troops.
The disorders in China were primarily an internal "revol-
ution" comparable to the French Revolution. Drawing on
his personal historical research, Suvorin also saw the dis-
turbances as paralleling Russia during the Smutnoe vremia

at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Poland's

 

 

77

"interference" in Russia's domestic affairs during that

historical period united the Russian people against the
Poles. "This interference was fatal for the Poles!" In
a similar manner the disturbances in China manifested the
reaction of the Chinese people to foreign involvement in
their domestic affairs. Russia, Suvorin recalled, had
interfered only once in Chinese affairs during China's war
with Japan, and Russia had acted in support of China.
Suvorin asked Russians not to regard their Chinese "broth-
ers" as enemies in the present crisis. Instead, they
should understand the predicament of the Chinese people
faced with internal strife and struggling against European
attempts to saddle them with European culture and religion.
In opposing further military activities in China, criticiz-
ing European attitudes, and sympathizing with the Chinese
people, Suvorin actively encouraged reader support for
policies advocated by Lamsdorf and Witte.

The Novoe vremia publisher's backing of the
Lamsdorf and Witte position occurred at an opportune time.
On the Sunday afternoon before Suvorin's initial article
appeared, Witte met with Tsar Nicholas II to discuss Li
Hung-chang's proposal and to plan Russia's response. Two

days later on July 31 the Tsar approved Prince

 

78

Ukhtomskii's journey to negotiate with Li.17 The belief
that the summer rains and lack of sufficient troops in
China would hamper the advance of the European expedi-
tionary forces for several weeks added to Witte's hopes for
an independent peace with China. Meanwhile, on Wednesday,
August 1, Lamsdorf and Witte adopted a "wait and see"
policy while Russia's negotiations with Li Hung—Chang were

18

pursued. The next day Lamsdorf recommended rejection of

France's overtures to form an alliance for the purpose of
influencing the other major powers in China.19
When Suvorin's views were challenged by the

Russian newspaper Novosti, he retorted that his comment
"taking the Bosporus" meant only closing the Black Sea to
war ships of other countries and not closing the Black Sea
to nonmilitary activities. The Novosti, he added in a
critical note, should be concerned primarily with the Rus-
sian people and not the "whole world." As to his idea that
Russia was "one-third Asiatic," Suvorin replied, whether

Russians wished it or not, Russia was only "two-thirds

European." Suvorin based this proposition on the fact that

 

7Romanov, Rossiia v Man'chzhurii, 1892-1396,
p. 184.
18Draft of a reply to Marquis Montebello, French

Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 1, 1900, K.A., XIV
(1926), 20.

19A memorandum from Count Lamsdorf to Nicholas II,
August 2, 1900, Ibid., pp. 21-22.

79

some degree of Asiatic blood flowed in Russian veins and
that Asiatic culture and nationality still existed in the
composition of Russian society. Even Peter the Great's
reforms did not succeed in destroying all the Asiatic
traits in Russian culture but only assimilated Asiatic
characteristics to revitalize the whole culture.20
Answering the charge that he was unduly sympa-
thetic to the Chinese, Suvorin replied by asking if the
Chinese people deserved the severe punishment demanded by
"Christian and enlightened Europe." Europe was viewing
China as a criminal, but a criminal is given a lawyer and
in court consideration is given to his background, charac-
ter and circumstances. Citing an item from current news,
he pointed out that even the assassin of the King of Italy
was being given a trial. Suvorin said he viewed the
Chinese as a law court might, and asserted the Chinese
people were entitled to the same treatment accorded crim-
inals. but utilizing a concept ahead of its time, Suvorin
contended in actuality, "a nation cannot be a criminal. A
criminal must be a separate person, a leader, but not the
nation."21

Nevertheless, in agreement with Witte's stance,

Suvorin declared his support for Russia's unquestioned

 

2ONovoe vremia, July 20 (August 2), 1900, p. 2.

21
Ibid.

80

right to defend her borders and in particular her inter-
ests in Manchuria. He based his position on the fact that
Russia is part of Asia.22 Perhaps he saw no contradiction
between arguing for non-interference in China and at the
same time supporting Russian troop movements in Manchuria.
The fact that he for the most part avoided mentioning Man-
churia, however, suggests that he recognized the contra—
diction but felt the railroad's importance justified mili-
tary action. On the question of China proper, Suvorin ar-
gued, on the other hand, that military action in that area
would only serve Europe's purposes and enough Russian blood
had been needlessly shed for European interests and "order"
in Europe during the past century. Taking a position
slightly at odds with that of Lamsdorf and Witte, Suvorin
believed Russian military forces in the Chinese situation
should not be placed under a European supreme commander.
But he agreed Wholeheartedly with the view that Russian
forces should not be used to advance Europe's "greedy im-
perialism" in China. Europe had not carefully considered
"China's exploitation" and the complicated situation in
Peking proved this. As an example of Europe's superficial
analysis, he cited Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu's £3 renovation
d3 l'Asie. Noting that the French author had been in

China shortly before the Chinese disorders began, Suvorin

 

22Ibid.

81

charged Leroy-Beaulieu did not have a foreboding of the

present events. On the contrary, he said the French au-
thor erroneously believed Europe could easily divide and
exploit China because the "Chinese Jacobins" were indif-
ferent to nationalism and the Chinese government. The
publisher concluded by emphasizing that Russia had not
joined Europe in "humbling and plundering" China in the
1860's. Instead, Russia "with a huge investment and
noble courage" had united China with Europe by building
the Trans-Siberian Railway and it did not profit Russia's
future in Asia to embitter or divide China.23

The continuance of the Russian government's
June 17 policy was made more apparent on August 6 when
Tsar Nicholas II consented to the German Emperor Wilhelm's
nominee, Field Marshall Alfred von Waldersee, as the com-
mander-in-chief of the international forces in China. The
Tsar's endorsement of Waldersee dampened the hopes of
Kuropatkin and the advocates of a more aggressive military
policy by Russia. On the same day, Witte received addi-
tional encouragement when Lamsdorf was appointed acting
director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and announced

that nussia was not in a hurry to march on Peking.24 The

 

23
Ibid., pp. 2-3-

2“A letter from Count Witte to D. S. Sipiagin,
Minister of Internal Affairs, August 7, 1900, K.A., XVIII
(1926), 35-36.

82

Witte and Lamsdorf policy appeared to be overcoming its
opposition in St. Petersburg and Witte expressed the be-
lief that the Tsar's acceptance of Waldersee would benefit
his efforts for a separate peaceful settlement.

In an article the next day Suvorin conveyed his
confidence in Witte's policies, although, as usual, he did
not mention Witte by name. Amidst rumors that Li Hung-
chang was dead, Suvorin claimed that the Chinese were
seriously preparing to open negotiations for peace. Re-
gardless of Li Hung-Chang, the "Chinese patriots" realized
now that their struggle had begun too early and their prep-
arations were not adequate. However, their plan to liberate
China from foreigners was achieving success. The courageous
resistance of the Chinese people was causing some in Europe
to hesitate over "partitioning China" and opening China as
a new horizon for Europe. He noted the irony that the
Chinese were fighting with weapons the Europeans, espe-
cially the Krupp munitions firm, had sold to them. With
God's help and these weapons from Europe the Chinese would
defend their independence. Just as Peter the Great won
the Battle of Poltava by imitating his "teacher, Sweden,"
so the Chinese could win by learning from Europe.25

Suvorin blamed China's hostility towards Russia

on Russia's participation in the international military

 

25
Novoe vremia, July 25 (August 7), 1900, p. 1.

83

action at Tientsin and near Peking when mediations began.
This was a rebuff to China. The affair in China, Suvorin
hammered at his readers, was Europe's problem. Russia's
interests were best served by "independent action" and
"only this independent pledge calms our Siberian borders
and our trade relations with China."26

Encouraging reader identification with China,
Suvorin described Europe's attitude towards China as re-
sembling the European approach towards hussia in the 16th
and 17th centuries. Russia was an enigma to Europe for
hundreds of years and so was China. Arrogantly, Europe
considered itself better than Russia. As proof, Suvorin
suggested that one should read the works of foreign travel-
ers to Russia and see that they visited only Moscow. "Even
the best--Herberstein, Fletcher, Meierberg, and O'Leary--
did not have a foreboding that Russia has a powerful govern-
ment. They censured our form of government, our adminis-
trators, bribery and ignorance and laughed about our re-
ligious forms, our customs, and character." These travel-
ers could be compared to contemporary European travelers
to China. Suvorin asked, what do they know? He believed
China would not change or give in to Europe. In the con-
flict with Europe the Chinese "...placed questions about

their independence above the right to life. It is necessary

26Ib1do, pp. 1-20

BA

for all mankind to take these questions seriously."27 Thus

in his column Suvorin continued to stress arguments which
supported a Russian policy of peace and independent action
towards China.

The accuracy of Suvorin's analysis that the
Chinese were prepared to negotiate was demonstrated later
that same day. The Chinese government announced Li Hung-
chang was appointed to act as its representative in peace
negotiations. The effect of this news raised hopes in St.
Petersburg that a "reconciliation" of the two "neighbors"
was imminent.

Suvorin commented favorably on the anticipated
"reconciliation" with China and the Chinese intention to
"apply energetic measures for the establishment of tran-
quility among the Chinese." Suvorin argued the Chinese
were not a warlike people; but were "...a nation, i.e., col-
lected people, conscious of their unity and possessing an
idea of national honor." Mentioning that in early May a
telegram from D. D. Pokotilov, Witte's financial agent in
Peking, had indicated that the population was peaceful,
Suvorin declared that it was now obviously the Chinese
population and not only the Chinese government opposing
the European forces marching to Peking. This stubborn re-

sistance he attributed to the economic "concessions" granted

 

27
Ibid., p. 2.

85

the European powers by the Chinese government.28

In reply to criticism of his views from German
diplomatic circles, Suvorin declared that it was difficult
to accept European policies in China because the Chinese
people did not regard European "concessions" as beneficial
to them. This view of the European concessions echoed the
Russian government's position. Explaining his version of
the origin of the conflict, buvorin argued the Chinese
people were eXploited by the concessions and as their pa-
tience ended they began a revolution against their govern-
ment for granting them. When all the European concession-
aires came to the assistance of a Chinese government power-
less to suppress the revolution, the whole Chinese pOpula-
tion and army rose up against Europe. The complicated inter-
national conflict in China then created demands for a Euro-
pean supreme commander. Suvorin questioned Wilhelm II's
choice of Field Marshal Waldersee for this post. He be-
lieved that the appointment of a general in Germany, rather
than one on the scene of the conflict, would create new
problems. But he considered it likely that the Chinese
crisis would resolve itself before Waldersce arrived and
that a supreme commander would not then be necessary.29

The latter view was in agreement with Lamsdorf's and

 

2?;91g,, July 28 (August 10), 1900, pp. 1-2.

29
Ibid.

 

86

Witte's belief that either peace negotiations would have
begun or Peking would have been taken before Waldersee

30 The appoint-

could arrive in China and assume command.
ment of Waldersee also caused Suvorin to raise doubts
about the German general's mission with the "European con-
cert" in Europe. Suvorin wanted this concert to end with-
out a "solo" for Germany and he believed Waldersee's ap-
pointment meant difficulties for Russia in China. The
problem in China was not a "Gordian Knot" to be cut with
a sword. If the "sword" was used in China, it would un-
leash problems for many years to come. Moreover, if
Europe were to "open" China to European culture, it would
threaten Russia's position in the Far East and Russia
. .31

could not permit this.

Insisting that nussia and China were not enemies,
Suvorin again argued that Russia's greatest effort must be
to seek a peace treaty with Chin). Going a step further
than Lamsdorf and hitte, he suggested an "alliance" in the
Far East similar to the Triple Alliance in the West, with

Russia, Turkey and China as members. "Where Genghis had

reigned" lay Russia's future destiny. "In the East we are

 

30A letter from Count Witte to D. S. Sipiagin,
August 23, 1900, K.A., XVIII (1926), 39.

31Novoe vremia, July 28 (August 10), 1900, p. 2.

 

87

more heard, more understood, and more of our business is
there."32

On August it, with the recent actions of the
Chinese government indicating peace negotiations would be-
gin shortly between Russia and China, Suvorin reasserted
the necessity for Russia to enter into an alliance with
Turkey and China. In Asia "Russia must not desire new
acquisitions, but a new influence, new proof of our might
and importance, a new hegemony." Above all, in this new
alliance in the East, nussia must seek "independence of
states." The increasing and persistent rivalries among
the European states in China for "spheres of interest" com-
pelled mussia to seek alliances if she wished to retain her
"great role" in Asia. In a chauvinistic tone, he asserted
the Russian people were peaceful and not warlike. The Rus-
sian Tsar demonstrated this peaceful quality with his ef-
forts to convene the Hague Conference. Suvorin stated,
perhaps knowing the action would be initiated, that he
would not be astonished if the Russian embassy left raking
to end its interference in Chinese affairs. The coura-
geous, self-respecting Russian nation did not need terri-
torial gains from China; and dussian troops only-remained

in China to limit and shorten the war and to exercise

 

32Ibid.

88

Russia's "resolute influence on the Far East."33

Concerning Field Marshal Waldersee's command over
Russian troops, Suvorin modified an earlier view and indi-
cated his leadership would be acceptable but only under the
condition that the Russian military representatives' opin-
ions would be honored. This changed sentiment was more in
conformity with the stance taken by Lamsdorf and Witte. At
the same time Suvorin rejected the claims of the German
press that Waldersee was "all-powerful." Russia's interests
in the Far East were so “vital and essential" that they must
not be "suborinated" to Maldersee's commands or to the "gen-
eral interests of Europe." He suggested that China and the
powers with troops in China were at the crossroads of war
or peace, and he preferred the latter}!+

Suvorin critized European arrogance and treatment
of China, claiming that Europe exaggerated the seriousness
of the situation in China. Recalling that he had expressed
this view three weeks earlier, Suvorin proceeded to show
that developments in China supported his charge. He con-
cluded, "For Europe, China...is a mysterious country."
One reason for the failure to comprehend China, Suvorin
suggested, was the lack of language proficiency of most

foreign diplomats assigned to the Far East. Alexander III

 

BBLElégv August 1 (August 1h), l900, p. 2.

3“Ibid.

89

had directed Russian diplomats to be skilled in the native
languages of the eastern countries to which they were as-
signed. This language proficiency enabled the Russian
diplomats to analyze the local politics, press and popu-
lation. Suvorin claimed that a study of the servants in
the Peking foreign legations revealed they were all Chi-
nese who understood the languages of the foreign diplomats
and thus could intelligently serve the foreign embassies.
By contrast, the diplomats did not understand Chinese and
conseouently did not know what was happening in China:
"To know the languages of other countries is to know the
correct course with them. It is to know the spirit of
these countries and to understand their character and the
evolution in their spirits." In addition, Suvorin criti-
cized the inadequacy of Western European atlases, noting
that they devoted more attention to Switzerland than to
China. The English, he declared, duplicated a map of
China from a Russian version. Suvorin suggested to flgygg
vremia readers that only Russia really understood China
and that consequently its independent action in China was
justified. He concluded by asserting that Europe had in-
volved itself in China to divide it up and had prophesied
that European forces would not retreat when the legations

35

were finally freed.

 

3?;gigg, August 5 (August 18), 1900, p. 2.

90

On August 19 St. Petersburg was surprised by the
news that the international relief forces had taken Peking.
The foreign legations were released. This development
startled Witte and Lamsdorf, who had believed that bad wea—
ther and insufficient forces were delaying the advance.

However, Witte accepted the fait accompli; with the lega-

 

tions free, Russian diplomacy could emphasize peaceful in-
tentions even more strenuously.

Having staunchly opposed the march on Peking,
Suvorin now reversed his position. On August 20 he her-
alded the relief of the foreign legations in Peking, laud-
ing the role Russian troops had played in the action. He
praised General N. P. Lenivich for his leadership and for
his "tricky role as a field marshal" in storming the gates
of Peking, comparing the event to the triumphal march into
Paris in 1814. Now that the foreign legations were released,
Duvorin hoped the crisis would end. "The Chinese are suf-
ficiently beaten down: Why Continue?" The publisher shared
the position of Witte and Lamsdorf that there was no need
for the international forces to conduct further punitive ex-
peditions against the Chinese revolutionaries. He believed
that it was wise for the international forces to cease mili-
tary operations and to wait in Peking until Field Marshal

Waldersee arrived. Suvorin speculated whether the European

 

36A letter from Count Witte to U. S. Sipiagin,
August 10, 1900, K.A., XVIII (1926), 39.

91

powers would allow the Chinese Emperor who had fled from
Peking in June to return.37 He was no doubt particularly
interested in this point since the Russian government was
attempting to negotiate with the Emperor's representative.
Turning his attention to Waldersee's mission,
Suvorin considered the alternatives open to Waldersee as
supreme commander. Waldersee's primary measure for re-
storing order should be to "compel the Christian mission-
aries to abandon commercial aims and commercial methods for
converting the Chinese to Christ. Christ is the God of
love and brotherhood but not the God of commerce and re-
tailing." Suvorin condemned the Europeans for making the
Christian Chinese a privileged class by extending patron-
age to Christian Chinese firms. The Chinese people were
tolerant, but use of material advantages to proselytize
was alienating them. Moreover, the missionaries humil-
iated the Chinese people and their religion with sermons
based on scorn and contempt. Suvorin questioned whether
Russian diplomats would aid the Chinese and "remove this
evil." He believed that Russian diplomats had the right to
assist the Chinese and he emphasized that Russian diplomats
must "fearlessly and boldly stand on the side of the Chi-

nese" proposing this as the first step to take in China.38

 

37Novoe vremia, August 7 (August 20), 1900, p. 2.

331b1d.

92

On August 22 Suvorin attacked Europe's planned
reforms for China and the economic motives he believed were
involved. In particular, he singled out the "female ques-
tion" that the Europeans were raising in China. Chinese
women were bound to traditional dress fashions; but Europe
would allow them to dress in European styles. Such changes
were not for the betterment of Chinese women. "If women
were liberated and given the right to dress in European
styles and live in European fashion, imports would immed-
iately increase significantly." There were 200 million
women in China. Suvorin believed Germany considered this
when it said "commercial war" was necessary for the comfort
of the Chinese. He criticized Europe for ignoring that the
Chinese workers were poor and for saying their handicraft
industries were all they needed for their simple life.
Suvorin forecast for his readers the spectre of these poor
and hungry Chinese workers flooding into Russia's Siberian
land and commented that this prospect was not good for Rus-
sia's future. He mentioned that the United States prohib-
ited Chinese workers because their low wages led to strikes.39

Suvorin continued to be very much concerned about
the "Allies" under the leadership of Field Marshal haldersee.
He quoted Waldersee's comment to Wilhelm II when leaving for

China: the "...order to retreat will not come from my

 

39Ibid., August 9 (August 22), 1900, p. 2.

93

mouth." He also noted Waldersee's conversation with news-
paper reporters during which he told them he expected great
danger. From Waldersee's attitude Suvorin believed the con-
tinuance of war in China was inevitable.“0

Suvorin's sympathy for the "wild Chinese fanatics"
and his proposal for an alliance in the Far East were at-
tacked by one of the authors of a pamphlet representing the
events in China as a manifestation of the "yellow peril."
In his August 23 reply to the demands of the Kiev publicist
"Kievlianin" that the Chinese officials be hanged, Suvorin
stated that he believed "human understanding" and "rational
judgment" must prevail over the heated indignation of cri-
tics like the Kiev publicist. China already was receiving
punishment in Manchuria, Tienstin and Peking and everyone
desired the speedy return of peace and the normal order.
The losses suffered in conflict did not affect international
affairs. As proof, Suvorin noted Russian and French losses
in the Napoleonic invasion of Russia did not prevent the
two countries from entering into an alliance. He rejected
the Kiev publicist's charge that Russia would be joining
in an alliance with Muslims and pagans. Pointing out Rus-
sia's population included several million Muslims, Suvorin
declared Christian Europe based its culture and law on the

pagan cultures of Greece and Rome. China had a culture that

 

“01b1d.

9A

was over a thousand years old and that was respected in the
world. The Chinese were not "pagans." Studies of Buddha
and Confucius by scholars proved the Chinese culture had
fine moral rules. His proposal for a Russian alliance with
China and Turkey was not a sign of hostility toward Europe
but a sign of his determination to protect Russia's inter-
ests in the Far East and bring Russian "order" there. In
promoting Russia's well-being, he denied that he was guilty
of Germanophobia or Anglophobia. Instead, he declared that
he was exercising his patriotic right to defend his govern-
ment's foreign policies just as the English and German press
were defending their governments. The principle of discuss-
ing Russian foreign policy in the press, Suvorin recalled,
was defended in a document by former Minister of Internal
Affairs D. A. Tolstoy, who "considered it highly wholesome."
He asserted that his motivations were the same as foreign
writers who wished their diplomats to be perfect. He said
that he, too, wanted the Russian "eagle to be brilliant"

and successful. Suvorin wondered why his praise of Russian
diplomacy was received so "poorly." His proposal for Russia
to seek an alliance with China and Turkey was in Russia's
future interest. It was in no way meant to show hostility
towards Europe or Russia's ally, Francef‘l

Witte and Lamsdorf at this point were working to

 

Novoe vremia, August 10 (August 23), 1900, p. 2.

 

95

return the situation in the Far East to normal as soon as

possible. In a meeting with Nicholas II on August 25 they
decided that Russia would remove her delegation and troops
from Peking to Tientsin. Russia would also indicate her
readiness to negotiate with the Chinese Emperor, who was

42

regarded as the lawful lead of state. These views were
made known to the other nations in a circular on August 28.
The desired effect of these actions was to set Russia apart
from the other powers in the eyes of the Chinese government
and to encourage the beginning of peace negotiations. In
addition, Russia sought to soothe China and Europe by indi-
cating in the same circular that she intended to withdraw
from Manchuria when order was restored and the railway
protected.’+3

With Lamsdorf about to announce the departure of
the Russian legation and troops from Peking and Russia's
readiness to negotiate, Suvorin reasserted his opposition to
continued war against the Chinese people on August 25. The
Chinese were human beings and could not be treated as out-

side the laws of humanity. In a tone he was to alter dur-

ing the Russo-Japanese War, he deplored regarding the

 

thussian government circular note to major Rus-
sian embassies, August 25, 1900, K.A., XIV (1926), 28-29.

43D1e Grosse Politik der Euro-Eischen Kabinette
1871-19lh, Vo . 1’ : i e na rren un- . e ~=c te '00-
1202, ed. by Johannes eps us, ' orec t f. =art o oy an-
r edrich Thimme (Berlin, l92h), no. L621.

96

Chinese as a "dirty and foul influence" to be suppressed
and destroyed as one would a "rabid dog." He believed
preaching hatred and war against the Chinese people con-
tradicted the principles of Christian love. It would be
pitiful to continue waging war against a nation "which de-
sires only that it remain in peace." The Chinese were in-
voluntarily drawn into a war "by international envy and in-
trigue." Evidence of this "international envy" was now ob-
vious in the actions of the major foreign powers. The Chi-
nese desired only justice and objectivity in settling this
international situation. Suvorin forecast that the Chinese
faced grave difficulties because of the "inflamed appetites"
of the European powers. Implying that the matter was out
of Russian hands, Suvorin stated that he was happy Field
Marshal Waldersee was named supreme commander and was re-
sponsible for the complicated situation. Russia was not

at war with the Chinese revolutionaries. Russia sought
peace; its proper role in the Far East was as a "peace-
maker." He argued that the Russian army demonstrated this
when it halted at Peking to await the arrival of Field
Marshal Waldersee.““ The publisher's portrayal of Russia
as a peacemaker in the Far East was essentially the same
image Witte and Lamsdorf were attempting to project in

their message to the other powers.

 

“#Novoe vremia, August 12 (August 25), p. 2.

 

97

Suvorin's sympathetic views towards the Chinese
and his proposal for a "Triple Alliance" were criticized
in the foreign press. Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, editor

of Grazhdanin, quoted the allegations voiced by the editor

 

of the Eeriiner Taggblatt charging that Suvorin was preach-

 

ing "Pan-Slavism" and that his alliance proposal did not
represent an official Russian government policy. On August
28 Suvorin denied there was any basis to the first point.
The charge of "Pan-Slavism," Suvorin contended, was a decoy
intended to draw attention away from the "Pan-Germanism"
evidenced in Germany's occupation of Kiaochow. Germany's
action obviously showed that it desired a "political influ-
ence in China." As for the origin of his proposed alliance,
Suvorin claimed the source was German government officials
who had argued such an alliance in the Far East would work
against England. Suvorin speculated that the German en-
couragement of this alliance and the enthusiasm of the
Germans towards Russia building the Trans-Siberian Railroad
were part of the German government officials' "far-sighted"
plans for German penetration into the Far East. Now that
Russia's movements in the Far East were successful, Germany
and the rest of Europe were mistaken to believe Russia
would be hindered from exerting her influence. Suvorin
declared that he agreed with Prince Meshcherskii's view,
"Before you Russians work for the King of Prussia, do the

work for yourselves." From the attitude expressed in the

98

German press, Suvorin surmised that Field Marshal Waldersee
was not a "battle general, but rather an administrator and
politician." The German press failed to realize Russia

was "considering her future influence" in the Far East.
Russia, after a half-century of movement, had learned a
great deal about the Far East and was wise enough to not

LS

turn China over to Europe.
On the next day, August 29, Suvorin turned his
attention to the question of beginning negotiations in
China. Supporting the position of Lamsdorf and Witte,
Suvorin declared that, since Peking was liberated, nego-
tiations should begin immediately and not await the arrival
of Field Marshal Waldersee. It was wrong for the Europeans
to bicker over the question of which government should con-
duct the negotiations. The Chinese Emperor was alive and
Li Hung-Chang was empowered by him to conduct negotiations.
Europe's evasion of beginning negotiations could prove dis-
astrous. He reminded the Europeans that during the Franco-
Prussian War a provisional government was set up by the
French people and that it insisted on continuing the war.
A similar situation had occurred in Russia during the

Smutnoe vremia, when the Russian people formed a "govern-

 

ment of the people's defense" and waged war for several

years against foreign interference. Suvorin questioned

 

ASLEEQL» AUEUSt 15 (August 28), p. 2.

99

whether the same situation might not occur in China if
Europe was unsuccessful in crushing the revolt against
the Manchu dynasty. Based on his analysis of the Chi-
nese historical tradition, Suvorin believed that China's
proper form of government was a monarchy. Therefore, he
concluded Russia should not involve herself in China's
domestic affairs and should immediately negotiate peace
with the Chinese Emperor's representative. Russia, he de~
clared, "Is a peace-maker and not a participant in the
trade-warriors' war; we will not break lances for the
'open door.'" The Far Eastern railroad made it necessary
that Russia support Chinaf‘6

As the Russian embassy and troops prepared to
withdraw from Peking to Tientsin, Suvorin described Rus-
sia's action as displaying "full generosity in relations
with the Chinese Emperor and true philanthropy in dealing
with the peaceful Chinese population." Quoting a commun-
ique from the Chinese Emperor, Suvorin told his readers
that he interpreted it to mean that the withdrawal of troops
was a prerequisite to peace negotiations. Suvorin hoped
"complications" would not upset this Russian withdrawal.
"The possibility of these complications was foreseen in a
circular telegram by Lamsdorf stating that 'Russia will

not fail to withdraw her troops from her neighbor's empire

 

hélhidL, August 16 (August 29), p. 2.

100

if the actions of the other powers will not serve as ob-
stacles to this withdrawal.'" Although all the powers
involved had consented to Lamsdorf's "fundamental prin-
ciples" of July 13,h7 Suvorin predicted problems would now
arise. In typically anti-German fashion, Suvorin stated
the difficulty would be with Germany, which he saw as de-
siring railway interests rivaling those of Russia. He
discussed the summary of an article in the Marine-Rundschau
suggesting that haldersee's mission was to provide a solu-
tion to Germany's problems with China. He wondered what
this article meant when it said that Waldersee would do
this by "military power" and questioned whether Waldersee
would wage war in China. He denied Wilhelm II's claim that
Germany and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder in pursuing
hostilities. Russia would not be reduced to a secondary role
in the Far East by Germany. Russia had established a "win-
dow in China" and its "international and historical rights"
in the Far East were very great. Germany must consider

this.“8

The announced withdrawal of Russia's embassy and

 

h7Lamsdorf's circular stated four rinciples:
l) harmony among powers with interests in Ch na;
2) no partitioning of China; 3) preservation of the Chinese
government which existed before the Boxer crisis;
A) restoration of this Chinese government to legitimate
power through common action. See Kantorovich, Amerika
v bor'be za Kitai, p. 127.

“gigggg, August 21 (September 3), p. 2.

101

troops from Peking aroused European criticism, but on Sep-
tember 7 Suvorin pointed out that Russia was carrying out
the objectives it stated in June. Russia's position was
difficult because by leaving Peking it broke the "European
concert" in which it played an important role. Russia must
break from participating in this European concert whose
"commercial interests" were the sources of disturbance in
China. Russia had assisted Europe when necessary and now
it was time to go home and build its railroad in Manchuria.
Undoubtedly, Europe was displeased with Russia and a tele-
gram already suggested Russia was not honoring her commit-
ments; but Suvorin contended that the major powers were
only instigatina trouble in China by showing discord. Let
China control its own destiny and pacify the disturbances
with its own forces. Germany and England were really in-
tending to set China against Russia. Our relations with
Europe are "double-edged: one side in friendship; the
other side, hostility. On one side we are cordial with
Europe, but on the other side we have our own interests,
which we are ready to defend even beyond a peace position."#9
Amidst growing European concern that Russia would
seize Manchuria, Suvorin denied this was Russia's intention.
In line with Witte's view, he argued that the financial bur-

den and geographic characteristics of Manchuria would not

 

v

hggpgggfl August 25 (September 7), p. 2.

102

make it a desirable acquisition for Russia. The Russian
railway in a Chinese Manchuria was more profitable than all
of Manchuria as a Russian province. This railway undoubt-
edly would bring development and inhabitants, Suvorin sug-
gested, citing England as an example of a country which
developed its overseas interests through railroads. Rus-
sia wanted peaceful relations, especially since she re-
quired a warm-water port, and this is what she had in
Dalny and Port Arthur. That is why the railway was neces-
sary. Russia must have the railway, the port and the sea
in order to help maintain peace in the world.50

The European powers did not share Suvorin's con-
fidence that Russian policies in the Far East would result
in peace. They also doubted that she would honor the com-
mitments made in Lamsdorf's circular of August 28. In his
"Malen'kiia pis'ma" of September 12 Suvorin commented on
statements in the European press that Russia was not with-
drawing from Peking. These charges were based on announce-
ments by General Lenivich that Russian troops would winter
in Peking. Suvorin replied that Lamsdorf's circular of
August 28 was the new direction in Russia's policy and that
General Linevich's orders instructed him to withdraw but
made this action dependent upon conditions in Peking.
Suvorin admitted that he did not know whether the Russian

SOIbid.

103

embassy and troops were withdrawing but he argued, if they
were not, it was because General Lenivich felt conditions
in Peking prevented him from doing so. Suvorin asserted
that the vague actions of the other powers in reply to
Lamsdorf's note made the Russian position difficult. As
an example, he observed the United States also wanted to
withdraw but made her action dependent upon steps taken by
the other powers. He declared the United States desired

a "separate agreement" with China, and he sympathized with
the United States' position. The other countries were de-
liberately lingering and delaying their decisions to set-
tle the situation in Peking just as they were obstructing
Li Hung-Chang's journey. Under these circumstances Russia
must abandon the European states and settle with China
separately. Russia was honoring the "fundamental princi-
ples" while the other European powers were now ignoring
the terms of this agreement by seeking to "divide the
Celestial Empire." Suvorin predicted Europe would circum-
vent the literal terms of the "principles" and create
"spheres of influence." This latter term, he insinuated,
was devised by diplomats to accomplish the partition of
China. Suvorin reemphasized Lamsdorf's note made Russian
withdrawal dependent upon "the actions of other states."
Russia must not abandon China. Russia's half century of
movement into the Far East was on the "threshold of a new

historical ediface." Russia must stand on its fourth

10h

principle--China must not be divided.51

Replying to a domestic critic of the Witte-
Lamsdorf policy, on September 15 Suvorin attempted to
ouelch Russian desires for Chinese territory. He repud-
iated the arguments of Prince E. N. Trubetskoi in the
S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti calling for the division of
China to remove the prospect of a future "Mongol Yoke"
over Europe and Russia. Quoting Prince Trubetskoi's ap-
praisal that Russia was compelled by present events to
share in the division of China, Suvorin replied the Chi-
nese people and Europe would object to Russia seizing
Manchuria and Mongolia. Such a step would only complicate
Russia's position in Asia. The hostility of the native
population would require Russia's military occupation of
these areas and this would increase the danger of war.
hew acouisitions would also impose huge financial burdens
on Russia. As for the Chinese people, he contended, if
Russia's withdrawal led them to mistakenly believe that
China had won a victory over Russia, Russia had the re-
sources to defend herself in the future against China's
"Mongol Yoke." Further, the Chinese would be incapable
Of striking against Russia since they would be concentrat-
ing for a long time on liberating themselves from exploi-

tation by Europe. Suvorin concluded it was more profitable

Slléigg, August 30 (September 12), p. 2.

105

for Russia to live in peace with the "yellow races" and
even assist them than to participate in destroying them.52
Suvorin's article on September 15 ended his dis-
cussion of the Russian government‘s policies in the Far
East. His views expressed over the two months essentially
supported the peace and "separate course" policies which
Witte and Lamsdorf pursued in the Chinese crisis. Although
his articles concentrated primarily on the situation in
China, the figygg vremia publisher also unconditionally ap-
proved Russia's military occupation of Manchuria. It was
the Manchurian occupation which proved to be the basis for

Russia's future crisis in the Far East and her disastrous

war with Japan.

 

522239;, September 2 (September 15), p. 2.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE ADVOCATE TURNS WAR PROPAGANDIST

Once the end of the Boxer crisis in September,
1900, stabilized Russia's position in the Far East, Suvorin
turned to domestic affairs. However, Russia's reluctance
to withdraw from Manchuria increasingly alarmed the major
powers, particularly Japan. When it became apparent in
late 1903 that Russian-Japanese negotiations over Manchuria
and Korea had reached a critical stage, Suvorin returned to
Russia's policies in the Far East. In discussing the nego-
tiations, he supported a moderate, peaceful policy and
strongly opposed war with Japan. Only when negotiations
failed and Japan attacked the Russian squadron at Port
Arthur on February 8, 190a, did Suvorin favor war. with
the Japanese onslaught, Suvorin assumed the role of a
staunch Russian nationalist, zealously seeking to engender
popular support for Russia's war effort in the face of an
unprecedented series of military defeats.

A meeting with Nicholas II held during the week
of May 2-7, 1903, to reevaluate Russian policy in the Far
East set Russia firmly on the path to confrontation with
Japan. As a result of the meeting, Nicholas approved a

106

107

"new course" of action advocated by Captain A. M.
Bezabrazov. The subsequent appointment of Bezabrazov as
"state secretary" in charge of implementing the new policy
was indicative of the rise in influence of a small circle
with aggressive, money-making plans for Manchuria and
Korea. The so-c lled "Bezabrazov Circle" took a position
in direct opposition to the advice of Russia's more cau-
tious ministers, Lamsdorf, Witte and Kuropatkin. The
"new course" championed by the Circle caused Russia to ig-
nore an April 8, 1902 treaty with China whereby Russia had
agreed to evacuate Manchuria according to a set timetable.
Instead, Russia remained in Manchuria, re-occupied terri-
tory in southern Manchuria and advanced into new areas of
Korea. At the same time, Russia sought to close Manchuria
to any other foreign penetration while encouraging the
broad development of Russian enterprises. Under the "new
course," Russia also began to expand its military forces
in order to defend Russian interests in Manchuria.

Alarmed by Russia's actions, Japan, on July 28,
1903, proposed that both nations enter into direct negotia-
tions to resolve their conflicts of interest in Manchuria
and Korea. Having received the agreement of the Russian
government to negotiate, on August 12, 1903, the Japanese

submitted their recommendations for a settlement. In

 

8 1Romanov, Rossiia v Man'chzhurii 1892-1906, p.
#2 .

108

essence, the Japanese insisted that Russia respect the in-
dependence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and
Korean empires and maintain the "open door" policy in those
countries. In addition, Japan proposed a recognition of
Japanese interests in Korea in return for the recognition
of Russia's special interests in Manchuria.2 The Japanese
terms directly challenged the aggressive Russian policies
promoted by the Bezabrazov Circle.

Even as the Japanese were opening negotiations
with Russia, the situation grew more complicated. In a
special report Kuropatkin had advised against Russia's

3 Witte

continued involvement in the Yalu concessions.
urged that Russian expansion in Manchuria "take place natu-
rally, without precipitating events, without taking pre-

mature steps, without seizing territory."“ But instead, in
a conference on August 1, 1903, Nicholas II elected to pur-
sue the Bezabrazov policies and on August 13 he created the
Far Eastern viceroyalty with Admiral Alexiev as Viceroy.

The Tsar's edict exempted the viceroyalty administration

from the control of the regular ministries and gave it

2Wladimir Burtzew, Der Zar und die auswartige
Politik (Berlin, 1910), pp. 57~58.

 

3A. N. Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina,"
K.A. II (1922), us-aa.

~-—-_.’
1,

Witte, Vospominaniia, I, 218.

109

responsibility for diplomatic relations in the Far East.
This action placed Eezabrazov and his cohorts in charge of
Russia's Far Eastern policy and cast Russia on an inevi-
table collision course with Japan.

After almost three years of silence on the sub-
ject, Suvorin reinitiated discussions of Russia's Far
Eastern policy on the same day the Japanese submitted
their proposals. His comments were included in an article
repudiating European press claims that Russian domestic un-
rest, especially the strikes in southern Russia were a sign
of "backwardness" and weakness in foreign affairs. 0n the
contrary, Suvorin argued that the turbulence was indicative
of Russia's development over the past half-century, during
which time Russia accomplished great feats in the Far East.
Despite "treacherous and jealous neighbors," the Russian
people, working in harmony and believing in Russia's power,
would continue to bolster Russia's aspirations in the Far
East. These views disseminated at the beginning of direct
negotiations with Japan appear to have been an effort to
encourage support for continued Russian involvement in the
Far East.5

Shortly after Suvorin's article was published,
relations between Japan and Russia grew more strained. The

creation of the viceroyalty in the Far East brought about

5Novoe vremia, July 30 (August 12), 1903, p. 2.

110

the resignation of Witte as minister of finance on August
29, 1903. In his memoirs Witte described the attitude ex-
isting in the Russian government regarding the Far East as
follows: "We were headed straight for war and at the same
time we did nothing to prepare ourselves for the eventual-
ity; we acted as if we were certain that the Japanese would
endure everything without daring to attack us."6 In tqis
situation, Witte chose to resign rather than share responsi-
bility for the provocative policies dictated by the
Bezabrazov Circle.7 The fall of Witte, accompanied by the
creation of the special "Committee of Far Eastern Affairs"
charged with the conduct of all Far Eastern affairs, alarmed
Japan further. It was clear that Russia's Far Eastern pol-
icy was almost completely under the control of the Bezabrazov
Circle.

Suvorin treated kitte's fall with guarded com-
umnts on September 11. Carefully avoiding references to
the Far East, Suvorin concentrated on praising Witte's tal-
ent and achievements as minister of finance. Extolling the
former minister as a well-known Slavophile and admirer of
enlightened autocracy, Suvorin proclaimed Witte an imagin-

ative man who by his energetic work and management had

6

Witte, Vospominaniia, I, 260.

7Romanov, Rossiia v Man'chzhurii 1892-1906, pp.
(thaw-1+5 o

111

accomplished remarkable feats in his service as minister

of finance.8 Nevertheless, Suvorin did not mention the
Siberian railway even though in an article on March 7,

1903 he had heralded Vitte's railway efforts in the Far
East and labeled the project one of the great feats in the
history of the Russian people.9 In concluding his comments
on Witte's resignation Suvorin was careful to make his
analysis conform to the prevailing feelings by emphasizing
that Witte's financial policy encroached too much upon

Russian policy in general.10

Meanwhile, Russia's relations with Japan deterior-
ated even further due to the manner in which Russia conduct-
ed negotiations. Russia held back response to Japan's first
note and then Count Lamsdorf proposed that the negotiations
be transferred to Tokyo. This suggestion added to the de-
lay and throughout the month of September Russia continued
to stall while improving Russian military strength in the
Far East. After a delay of eight weeks, Russia's counter-
Proposals were presented to the Japanese government on
October 3, 1903. The counter-proposals made it clear that

Russia would continue the occupation of Manchuria after

8Novoe vremia, August 29 (September 11), 1903,

9
Ibid., February 22 (March 7), 1903, p. 2.

101219;, August 29 (September 11), 1903, p. 2.

112

October 8, 1903, the date fixed for the final evacuation.
Moreover, the Russian reply ignored Japan's request for a
mutual agreement regarding the independence and territor-
ial integrity of the Chinese Empire and the "open door" in
China and Korea. Russia also insisted that Japan recog-
nize Manchuria as "in all respects outside its sphere of
interest."11 The unyielding Russian proposals indicated
that the'Bezabrazov Circle underestimated the danger cre-
ated by Russia's actions in the Far East. The Tsar him-
self seemed to have only contempt for Japan and naively be-
lieved Japan would not dare to attack Russia; but, on the
other hand, it was clear that Nicholas did not desire hos-
tilities with Japan.12 In mid-October Suvorin noted in his
personal diary that shortly after Russia's reply was deliv-
ered to the Japanese, the Tsar instructed Foreign Minister
Lamsdorf "that there should be no war."13

On October 30 Japan made important concessions in
its answer to Russia's counter-proposals. The most impor-

tant was that Japan would recognize Manchuria as outside its

Sphere of special interest in return for a recognition by

11Romanov Ocherki diplomatichgskoi istorii

B.A.
.EBfisko-iaponskoi voiny 1895;1902(M05cow, 19557, pp. 2h2-E3.

123. S. Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora
Lkoiaia II, I (Belgrade, 1935)“, 220.

13

Suvorin, Dnevnik, p. 301.

113

Russia that Korea was outside Russia's sphere of special in-
terest. Once again Russia resorted to evasive, delaying
tactics in replying. Throughout November negotiations grew
more critical and when the mediation efforts of the King of
England were rebuffed, the danger of war became apparent.
Amidst speculation in the European press over
mounting tensions between Russia and Japan, Suvorin charged
that Europe, and not Japan, was the cause of the crisis in
the Far East. Since Russian interests posed an obstacle to
European expansion in Asia, Europe intrigued with Japan
against Russia.ls Nevertheless, the alarm concerning war
in the Far East was unnecessary. Suvorin contended that,
as a Russian journalist who represented Russian society,
he did not desire nor encourage war with Japan. Despite
Japan's demands, Russia could not abandon its railroad in-
terests in Manchuria which cost millions to develop. Echo-
ing the position of the moderates, he reasserted the view
he had expressed during the Boxer crisis: Russia did not
need to annex Manchuria as a Russian province. But, it
was tragic that Japan, bolstered by an alliance with Eng-
land and supported by the United States, might declare

War against Russia. The enthusiasm in Japan for war against

1
“A. Gal'perin, Anglo-iaponskii soiuz, 1902-

1921 (Moscow, 19h7), po 195-

SNovoe vremia, November 18 (December 1), 1903,

 

p. 2.

11h

Russia Suvorin condemned as the work of the Japanese press
which openly boasted of the lands and money to be taken
from Russia.16 If Japan declared war against Russia, Japan
would arouse the patriotism of all Russians and unite them
against Japan. It was a tragedy that a great state could
not retreat in the face of a small state's attack; and, as
an example of such a tragic war, Suvorin cited Great
Britain's war with the two Boer Republics. but if Japan
attacked Russia, the Russian people would be forced to
wage war on the smaller nation.17
In the Russian counter-reply, delayed until
December 11, Russia again deliberately omitted any reference
to Manchuria. Ten days later Japan submitted a third note
to Russia making it clear that Japan regarded Manchuria as
an integral part of any peaceful arrangement with Russia.1
Despite Japan's insistence on settlement of the Manchurian
question, the Tsar continued to be influenced by the

Bezabrazov Circle and ignored Japan's demands. Meanwhile

advocates of a moderate policy endeavored to reverse

16The role of the Ja anese press in the period of
the prewar negotiations is ana yzed in Shumpei Okamoto, The
£_panese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese war (New York:
COIumbiaIUniversity Press, 1970), pp. 57;104.

Novoe vremia, November 18 (December 1), 1903,
P- 2.

18Maurice Bompard, Mon ambassade en Russie, 1903-
1008 8(Paris, 1937), p. 1.3.

115

Russia's aggressive "new course" and reach a peaceful com—
promise with Japan. In a conference with the Tsar on De-
cember 28, Lamsdorf, Kuropatkin and Witte united in urging
that Russia make concessions to Japan on the question of
Manchuria. In essence they supported recommendations con-
tained in a report which Kuropatkin filed after traveling
in the Far East. Kuropatkin's report urged Russia not to
annex Manchuria and to withdraw from the recently occupied
area. Kuropatkin concluded, "he should keep only North
Manchuria. The new frontier will not touch Korea and will
not provoke complications with Japan."19 Persuaded by the
three moderates, during the conference Nicholas II agreed
to include Manchuria in an agreement with Japan.20 For a
brief time it appeared that Russia would make concessions
in its next reply to Japan.

In an article on January 5, 190A expressing sup-
port for domestic reform, Suvorin made an appraisal of the
Far East situation which echoed the conciliatory attitude
of the moderates. In his estimate of the differences with

Japan, Suvorin concluded the chief issues centered on

o
1’8. B. Glinskii, "Prolog russko- -iaponskioi
Voin " Istoricheskii vestnik, CXXKVII (August- December,
1914), 623-25; Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A N. Kuropatkina, "
K .A., II (1922), 9.1. 95.

20A. N. Kuropatkin, Zapiski generala Kuropatkina
0 russkoiaponskoi voine. Itogi voiny, ed. by_I.
I:5r1—<51:y'sc:hnikov (Berlin,‘I9O9),TppIIl73-7h.

116

Russia's construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the
seizure of Port Arthur and the continued occupation of Man-
churia since the Boxer crisis of 1900. These activities

and Russia's current policies created the complex situation
in the Far East from which only war would result if Russia
did not make concessions to Japan. The essential question
in determining Russia's compromise with Japan was whether
Russia needed to occupy all of Manchuria or only the north-
ern part in order to maintain land ties with Port Arthur.
Based upon his knowledge, Suvorin doubted whether the annex-
ation of all Manchuria was advantageous. But, he added, the
Tsar must analyze the advantages and disadvantages of ced-
ing Manchuria as a Russian province; and, if the Tsar de-
cided in favor of annexing Manchuria, Suvorin declared that
he was bound to support the Tsar's policy. Appropriation
Oflnanchuria, however, would evoke the hostility of Russia's
neighbor China and would lead to the partition of China.
Mhfluaugh the Manchurian question was the source of the con-
fliCt»‘with Japan, Suvorin claimed the most important aim of
Russiean policy must be to preserve Russia's "supremacy in
Asia." The basis for Russia's power in the Far East was not
the C>Ccupation of Manchuria but the Trans-Siberian Railway;
and Rliaisia's recent vague policy in the Far East must be

PeplaLCed by a "well-defined and firm program" to protect

117

Russia's railway interests.21

0n the next day, January 6, 190A, the Russian
government delivered a reply to Japan's proposals of De-
cember 21, 1903. The position of the Russian government
remained unchanged and it was clear that Nicholas II had
ignored the advice of the moderates. It was apparent also
that the Bezabrazov Circle continued to advocate a policy
of aggression on the theory that Japan could be bluffed.22
The positions of the two governments were as irreconcil-
able as ever and tensions mounted as both sides prepared
for war.

The world press sided with Japan against Russia,
predicting Russia's defeat. Even some elements of the
Russian press urged Russia to sell her railway interests
ha Manchuria and abandon Port Arthur. Suvorin retorted
that if England did not abandon Wei-hai-wei and Germany
dhi not abandon Kiaochow, it was not necessary for Russia
tozabandon Port Arthur. Adding that he was not sympa-
thetuic to all of Russia's aims, Suvorin stated Russia's
mOW-Ement to the Pacific Ocean and the establishment of
fir7'1‘borders were important aspects of Russia's policy in
the Paar East. He rejected charges that these new

\

21
Novoe vremia, December 23, 1903 (January 5,

3 p. 30

II 22Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina," fi;&;’
(1922), 80.

118

territories in the Far East were too inaccessible from
European Russia to be valuable. Instead, he pointed to
the distant colonial possessions of France, England and
Germany. Even though these colonies were located across
vast ocean distances, they were developed by the European
states. In contrast Russia enjoyed the advantage of being
linked by land to the new territories in the Far East and
now with the Trans‘Siberian Railway, Russia had a logical
claim and link to her possessions. Nevertheless, Suvorin
cautioned against any overly aggressive policies endanger-
ing these Russian possessions.23

On January 13, l90h, Japan made a fourth attempt
to obtain an agreement with Russia but this time Japan's
Proposal amounted to an ultimatum and an early reply was
demanded. Once again the negotiations dragged on and when
the Japanese approached Witte in an effort to alert the
Russian minister of foreign affairs concerning the gravity
0? tdie crisis, Witte learned Count Lamsdorf could do nothing.
LamSciorf replied, "I take no part in the negotiations."2l'
At tfle same time the military activities of the two coun-
tries; greatly accelerated and it was clear war would break

out Iznless Russia quickly returned a favorable reply to

\

 

2
3Novoe vremia, December 28, 1903 (January 10,

.p. [to

2h
Witte, Vogpominaniia, I, 261.

1904)

119

Japan.
Recognizing that the complicated relations be-
tween Russia and Japan brought Russia to the brink of war,
Suvorin once again defended Russia's vital interests in
the Far East on January 25. He asserted that the Trans-
Siberian Railway was at the center of the complex crisis
in the Far East. This railway was more than just a
"Siberian" road; it was an "iron bridge" important not
only for economic ties with Asia but also as a vital link
between Europe and Asia. The railway reinforced the "in-
dissoluble ties" and "special influence" which Russia
possessed in Asia. Citing Professor V. O. Kliuchevskii's
views that Russia historically served as a mediator be-
tween Europe and Asia because of her geographic location,
Suvorin declared the Trans-Siberian Railway was a memor~
able and peaceful step in Russia's effort to fulfill her
destiny in Asia. Peter the Great had opened a window to
Europe; and now Nicholas II opened a gate to the Pacific
Ocean. The whole world recognized Russia's accomplish-
ment, but now Russia's critics expected her to abandon
her railway interests in Manchuria and Port Arthur. Rus-
sia faced a choice whether to retreat and be humiliated as
5file had been twice before in the Balkans or remain in Man-
Cknlria and face the frightening "spectre of invasion by

t1763 yellow races." Suvorin, who really favored peace,

120

25

predicted Russia would not retreat.

Russia's reply to Japan was delayed until the
first week of February, while rumors circulated in the
press that Russia would make favorable concessions to
Japan. On February 5, Suvorin charged that if war broke
out, it was because Japan desired war. War would be a
tragedy but Japan was encouraged by the English press,
particularly the London Timgg, whicheassured Japan that
Russia's position in the Far East was weakened by internal
strife. Suvorin condemned the Japanese press for foolish-
ly belittling Russia's concessions as evidence of Japanese
superiority over Russia. He urged Russia's leadership to
cooly and rationally decide the question of peace or war.
The tense relations between the two countries, Suvorin
concluded, were tragicv?6

On the next morning, February 6, Japan finally
lost patience and terminated the negotiations in view of
"Russia's repeated delays to reply without intelligible
reasons and its naval and military activities, irreconcil-
able with pacific aims."27 Japan severed diplomatic rela-

tions stating that it would take such independent action as

x

25
Novoe vremia, January 12 (January 25), 1904, p. 2.

26 .
Ibid., January 23 (February 5), 1904, p. 3.

2 a
[4 7K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston:
‘oughton Mifflin, 1904), pp. 342-43.

121

was necessary to defend its "menaced position" and to pro-
tect its rights and interests.28 Japan's actions accom-
panied by this ominous statement made the outbreak of hos-
tilities imminent. Upon learning the news of this rupture
of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan, flgygg
vremia published a special edition announcing the news to
the Russian public. Novoe vremia's editorial defended the
Russian diplomacy claiming the government in a "pacific
spirit" made "all possible concessions" to Japan. The
newspaper rejected accusations that Russia protracted ne-
gotiations for the purpose of gearing up for war. Instead,

Novoe vremia charged Japan's negotiations were a "farce"

 

to prepare for war. When the Japanese severed diplomatic
relations, Novoe vremia proclaimed:
...The Japanese threw off the mask; not even
awaiting the Russian reply, they recalled their
minister. Asiatics have shown themselves
Asiatics; they were not even able to observe
the slightest decency. History knows no case
of similar behavior. We are convinced that
public opinion in Russia wiél give the
Japanese the proper reply.
While the breaking of diplomatic relations "does not neces-
sarily mean war," Novoe vremia feared that of the three a1-
termatives facing Russia "~vwar, mediation or a prolonged

tension," war was inevitable. Accusing the Japanese of

Ibid.

 

29Novoe vremia, January 25 (February 7,) 1904,

 

122

being responsible for the crisis created by the cessation
of diplomatic relations, Novoe vremia concluded:

Russia stands on the threshold of great

events, and every son of Russia without

distinction of convictions, will con-

sciously and sincerely say today: "Japan

has gerself willgg it. So let it be.

10d e With us.

In his article in the same edition, Suvorin specu-
lated on the danger of war and called upon the Russian peo-
ple to face future events with courage and determination.
Once again he criticized the foreign press particularly in
England, France and Germany for "scolding Russia" by writ-
ing stupid and unfounded nonsense. These writings were the
work of "universal Jewish agitation" against Russia follow-
ing the Kisnev program. Japan was a victim of this "Jew-
ish agitation" and had become a tool of England for tear—
ing Russia to pieces. He wondered why Europe's great and
talented leadership was not coming to Russia's assistance
in this crisis. In particular, Suvorin criticized the
German Emperor Wilhelm II who in the past had been very
Vocal in his views on the Far East but who now remained
silent. Why was this "skillful diplomat" who first dis—
Cnissed the "dangers of the yellow peril for Europe" now
keeping his thoughts secret? Wilhelm II had ordered the

0<3cupation of Kiachow and had been instrumental in moving

Ehzrope against the "yellow peril" during the Boxer crisis

\ A

3°Ibid.

 

123

in China. Japan, Suvorin recalled, had been specifically
included as part of the yellowperil in Wilhelm's numer-
ous pronouncements and the German Emperor even presented

a picture to Nicholas II representing Russia as the de-
fender of Europe and Christianity in a struggle with the
yellow races. Wilhelm's silence puzzled and disappointed
Suvorin. Nevertheless, Suvorin urged peace and reconcilia-

tion between Russia and Japan. Unfortunately, Russia and

Japan did not understand each other and the two countries
were about to enter into a tragic war. Russia and Japan
must recognize one another's interests and "break the ex-
pectations of Europe..." for war between them. Russia was
not preparing for war with Japan as she had prepared for
war with Turkey in 1877; instead Russia sought peace but
was ready to meet with great courage any threats or chal-
lenges to its new markets in the Far East.31

Facing the prospect of imminent war, the next day
the Tsar wired new orders to the Far Eastern commander. In
these orders, Nicholas II instructed "that the Japanese,
and not we, be the ones to start military operations..."32
Russia did not have to wait long for Japan's challenge be-

Oause on the same day, February 8, Japanese destroyers

K

31Ibid., p. 3.

1: 32Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkinav" Eaflav
I (1922) , 109.

124

entered Port Arthur and shelled the Russian naval squadron
without a declaration of war. Because the Russian squad-
ron was unprepared for a "surprise" attack, the Japanese
inflicted heavy losses on the Russian battleships in the
harbor. The following day Japan formally declared war on
Russia.
News of the Japanese attack and Russian losses
at Port Arthur reached St. Petersburg on February 9.
Suvorin, who had preferred peace, now came to the support
of Russia's war effort. In his article of February 10,
Suvorin noted that a state of shock and gloom had prevailed
over the population in St. Petersburg on the morning of
February 9. News of the heavy losses inflicted upon the
Russian souadron in the well-planned and executed Japanese
attack alarmed Russians concerning the Japanese prepara—
tions for war. Suvorin charged that the Japanese "sur-
prise" attack without a declaration of war ignored the
rules of modern diplomacy; Japan's actions were treacher-
ous and dishonorable.33 Attempting to rally patriotism,
Suvorin proclaimed that while Russia enjoyed a reputation
for military victories on land, the naval disaster at Port
‘irthur was one of Russia's worst military misfortunes. The
date of the Port Arthur attack marked the anniversary of
another great calamity in Russian history when Russia's

\ -

33
Novoe vremia, January 28 (February 10), 1904,

I)- _3.

125

great post Pushkin was fatally wounded on February 8, 1837.
But just as Russian poetry did not die as a result of this
great loss, so Russia would not die as a result of the naval
disaster at Port Arthur. As evidence, Suvorin pointed out
that the anxious and gloomy atmosphere of the morning gave
way to expressions of Russian patriotism. When additional
news was received later in the afternoon and the Tsar is-
sued a manifesto declaring war, crowds gathered in front
of the Winter Palace and cheered. This was the great
Russian patriotic spirit which created Russia and this
wave of patriotism would carry Russia and her people
through this terrible war to victory.3h With this ar-
ticle, Suvorin and Novoe vremia embarked upon a campaign
to generate support for the war aginst Japan and to dem-
onstrate that the Russian public was solidly behind the war.
In the first few days following the outbreak of
war there were demonstrations and telegrams to the Tsar
from many parts of the Russian empire manifesting loyalty
and patriotism. However, as Witte indicated in his memoirs,
some of these early demonstrations were organized by the
government or were largely made up of the military and

35

Eovernment elements of the Russian population. Suvorin

endeavored to utilize these demonstrations in encouraging
3l’Ibid.

3SWitte, Vospominaniia, I, 262.

 

126

citizen enthusiasm. In his article on February 12, Suvorin
argued that Japan threw down "the gauntlet" when she at-
tacked Port Arthur. Now Russia faced what would be an ex-
tended and difficult war. A telegram from vaoe vremia's
London correspondent quoted the Japanese attache there as
saying that Japan was well-prepared for a long war.
Suvorin stated that he did not desire war with Japan; but
now that war was an accomplished fact, he supported it be-
cause Russia's future role in the Far East was threatened.
Above all, the Russian people must direct their attention
to this crisis with Japan and unite in the war effort for
the preservation of Russia's interests in the Far East.
The current enthusiastic demonstrations were reminicent
of the patriotic sentiments against the Turks in 1877
that contributed to Russia's victory against Turkey. In
the quarter of a century since that war, Russia had de-
veloped into an "invincible power" and Suvorin predicted
Japan's treachery would cause the Russian people to con-
centrate their talent on crushing the Japanese.36
At the outset of military operations it was ap-
Parent that the Russian naval forces were strategically
iTnportant to Russia's military success. Consequently, the
l-<>sses inflicted upon the squadron at Port Arthur and the

frighting condition of Russia's Far Eastern naval forces

Novoe vremia, January 30 (February 12), 1904,

 

127

immediately concerned the Russian public. When a
Moskovskiia vedomosti writer, the German Count Gaventlov,
criticized their poor performance and quality, Suvorin de-
fended the Port Arthur seamen.37 Praising the patriotism
of two wealthy Russian patrons who made large contributions
toward the construction of additional ships for the Russian
navy, Suvorin appealed to his readers to join in making
similar contributions to a "fleet fund." For a quarter of
a century, Suvorin declared, he and his newspaper had con-
tinually published polemics urging a strong and modern
navy. In particular, Novoe vremia's multitude of articles
had urged the Russian navy to acquire submarines, since
submarines were relatively inexpensive in comparison to

the enormous costs of battleships and were well-suited to
Russia's defense needs. Russia's military leadership was
well aware of Russia's naval weakness but chose to concen-
trate on building and maintaining Russian land forces be-
fore developing Russia's navy. Referring to General
Kuropatkin's report as Minister of War in 1900, Suvorin ex-
Pressed agreement with the report's recommendations, but
the losses of the naval forces at Port Arthur raised ques-
txions about Russia's naval strength. Russia's future posi-
tlion in the Far East made it obvious that Russia must have

a large fleet in the Pacific Ocean. With the powerful

\

37Ibid.

 

128

321.61ck Sea fleet locked in the Black Sea by terms of the
Tfixreeaty of Berlin, Suvorin urged the public to aid in
S‘t;]?engthening the navy by contributing to Russia's Volun-

t eeear Fleet Fund. Russia and the Tsar needed this financial
a;j_ci because the expense of building the Trans-Siberian
Railway had prevented construction of a strong fleet in the
Pacific Ocean.38

Not everyone agreed with Suvorin's campaign to

r~eaziwse funds for the Volunteer Fleet. Prince Meshcherskii,
publisher of Grazhdanin, charged in his newspaper that
53L11v1>rin's patriotic entreaties were "overdone" and smacked
<31? chauvinism.39 Suvorin rejected Meshcherskii's criticisms,
asserting that Russia needed a powerful fleet and his pa-
triotic appeals were necessary if Russian society was to be
erlc:c>uraged to donate for such a fleet's construction. Pa-
tr'2'1.<:>tism in time of war was not chauvinism when it involved
EIFC>xriding soldiers and sailors with the necessary enuipment.
It; inras the duty of wealthy Russians to display their love
fVDI‘ LRussia by publicly making large subscriptions for the
'Vf].e:et fUnd." Suvorin discounted Meshcherskii's contention
that the "fleet fund" was a fantastic adventure because a
fleet could not be constructed in a short time, arguing
innat; creation of a Russian fleet depended upon action and

38%, February 3 (February 16), 1904, p. 3.

39Ibid., February 7 (February 20), 190u, p- 3-

129

not: merely discussion. Re boasted that Novoe vremia's

 

c ampaign raised several thousand rubles in only four days.
The Russian public obviously desired to assist the govern-
ment and he proclaimed his newspaper would continue its
fund-raising campaign for the "fleet fund." is additional
justification for his position, Suvorin included in a post-
script the Tsar's announcement that the "Committee on the
Status of the Naval Fleet" was appointed to solicit volun-
tary subscriptions for Russia's fleet. This early effort
of Suvorin and his newspaper to stimulate financial backing
for Russia's naval construction characterized Suvorin's avid
su pport of Russia's war effort.‘+0
The losses inflicted on Russia's naval forces in

tSl‘le first weeks of the war made it apparent that Russia
Could not maintain command of the seas. Russia now turned
to preparations for a long land war as its only hope to
defeat Japan. This strategy placed a tremendous burden on
the Russian army. To conduct military operations in Man-
churia, Russia had to mobilize large numbers of troops in
E-L11‘c>pean Russia and transport them across the vast distance
of Siberia to the theater of military operations. Such an
undertaking required time and the best military leadership
in I"dissia. Russia's existing naval forces at Port Arthur
Were in a position to threaten and delay Japanese landings

\

“01b1d.

 

130

err1<i pain time for the Russian army. Against the protests
0.1? the Bezabrazov Circle which feared the appointment
WTCDIAld weaken the position of Viceroy Alexiev, the Tsar
' clearned Kuropatkin to command Russia's land forces in
Pizaxichuria.hl

On February 22 Suvorin proclaimed his pleasure
art; the news of Kuropatkin's appointment. He lauded the
general's talents and reputation as Russia's most distin-
guished military leader, recalling his own personal associa-
tion with the general dating back to the Russo-Turkish War
hflkieeri Kuropatkin was a junior officer serving with the popu-
123Jr‘ General Skobelev. General Kuropatkin was a patriotic
Eirlci industrious officer who justly merited the respect of
Russia's army and navy leaders and was the leader most able
t<> c3vercome the great obstacles confronting military oper-
313i4<>ns against the Japanese. Recalling the graft and cor-
ruptzion that permeated the Russian army during the Sevasta—
PCil. campaign and Russo-Turkish war, Suvorin praised in par-
ticular Kuropatkin's promises to simplify the administra-
t3i£>r1 of the army and to make supply operations efficient
and graft-freef’2

World opinion as represented by the foreign press

I AIOl'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia
“3 I, 229.

2
h Novoe vremia, February la (February 27), l90t,
3 and Novoe vremia, February 9 (February 22), 1901., p. 2.

 

P.

131

c: ontinued to be dominantly sympathetic towards Japan. Re-
ferring to the prevailing hostility towards Russia, Suvorin
challenged the credibility of the anti-Russian attitudes
in the world press. Although newspapers in general repre-
sented public opinion, in this instance the "radical
press" was not objective in its judgment of Russia. In-
stead, these "radical" newspapers openly concentrated upon
arousing passions and enflaming hostility and conseouently
they did not represent public opinion. Conveniently,
Suvorin viewed the newspapers sympathetic to Russia as
rational and objective representatives of public opinion.
These newspapers, Suvorin observed, were primarily the in-
fluential newspapers in France and Germany. In France the
SYF'TIpathies of the newspapers for Russia were reflective of
the French people. As evidence, Suvorin cited his personal
recollections of the numerous public demonstrations in
FFarice when the Russian fleet visited in October, 1893.
Sirlce that time the rise of radical parties in France and
Gex‘rnany moved these two powers in the direction of a
PaF>12>I'ochement with England. Under the influence of England,
Japan's fervent sympathizer, France's friendship for Russia
cooled in the months before the war. But the Japanese at-
t"'Mk on Port Arthur revived the anti-English sentiments of
the French people and their positive feelings for Russia.
The r'e<:ently-expressed sympathy of the German Emperor,
Suvorin stated, clearly evidenced that country's friendly

attitude towards Russia. If England intervened on Japan's

132

1+3

side, France and Germany might not remain neutral.
The anti-English sentiments of Suvorin and figygg
vremia continued to grow. Novoe vremia charged England with
having permitted the Japanese to use Wei-hai-wei, an Eng-
lish port on the China coast, as a base for Japanese naval

operations!“ Also, Novoe vremia accused England of a

 

breach of neutrality when British naval officers aided in
the delivery of two warships to Japan. It declared that
British officers helped the Turks in the war of 1878.

" Now," said the newspaper, "British sailors are in com-
mand of Japanese ships. The profession of condottiere is

a recognized thing in the British army."l"’5 Novoe vremia's

 

accusations were publicly denied by Lord Selborne in the
English Parliament and were said to be based on mendacious

rumors invented by Novoe vremia. The London Times in an

 

editorial on February 26 supported Lord Selborne's repud-
iat ion of Novoe vremia's charges and concluded by agreeing

that Novoe [remga's story that the Japanese were allowed

"1+6

 

tO use Wei-hai-wei was "a most wicked falsehood.

The criticisms of Russia in the London Times

“My February 13 (February 26), 1901., p. 3.

“#12194. January 29 (February 11), 190b, p. 2.

h51bid., February 18 (March 2), 1904, p. 2.

héThe Times (London), February 26, 190h, p. 7.

133

caused Suvorin to denounce the Times as a propaganda or-

gen for anti-Russian elements in England. Despite the
English government's declared neutrality in the Far East-
er'n conflict, the views and anti-Russian tone of the Lon-
don [gags represented a portion of the English people who
hated Russia and desired Russia's defeat. The Russian peo-
ple believed that Japan would not have attacked if it were
not for England's instigation and the support of English
public opinion. England's actions in the present situa-
tion confirmed the suspicions of the Russian people about
its hostility towards Russia since the end of the Russo-
Turkish war. England's policy of "benevolent neutrality"
fanned the flames of Russian patriotism against Japan and
England. But Russia, as a developing state, was now
equal to England and would prove her equality by success-
ful military deeds in the Far East. Russia's war effort
Was a national movement which English anti-Russian pol-
icies stimulated. Thus, Suvorin and his newspaper seemed
dEtermined to arouse Russian public opinion against England
as part of their effort to induce the population to support
the wan“?
Once again on March 15 Suvorin appealed for con-

tributions to the Volunteer Fleet. Re traced the precedent

for contributions to construct a Volunteer Fleet to an

\

L7
Novoe vremia, February 23 (March 7), l90h,

 

p. 3.

13‘»

a rticle, "Russkoe kreiserstvo" which appeared in
Pravitel'stvennyi yestnik on May 1, 1878. Suvorin claimed
this appeal to strengthen Russian naval power was prompted
by European powers attempting to deprive Russia of bene—
fits gained in the Treaty of San Stefano. By dispatching
l arge naval units to the Black Sea where Russia was de-
fenseless, the European naval powers had threatened Russia
into agreeing to the terms of the Congress of Berlin. The
article's author argued that while Russia proved invincible
on land, Russia was completely open to attack on the seas.
He asked the Russian people to donate funds for vessels
Which would serve Russian trade in peacetime and provide a
re serve fleet in case of war. The article concluded that
building a Volunteer Fleet would be a continuous business
and not merely a temporary project. Suvorin noted that by
September 20, 1878 this appeal had raised three million
I‘L‘lt>2l.es and on that day the first ship was purchased. The
first task of the Volunteer Fleet had been returning Rus-
Siam troops from the Turkish war. Later, this fleet par-
ticipated in Russia's maritime trade and in the eighteen
Years prior to the outbreak of war with Japan received an
annual subsidy from the treasury. In 1902 the fleet num-
bered eight steamers with a capacity of 60,000 tons. The
existence of this Volunteer Fleet was justified because it
Sen/ed as a partial deterrent to England's interference in
Russia '5 policies. This fleet indicated that after the

Crimean War Russia would not be bound by restrictions

135

against a Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The bitterness
c>:£‘ Russians over these restrictions was replaced by pa-
t: rfiiotic pride when the Volunteer Fleet was created and
when later Tsar Alexander III embarked upon the construc-
tzzixon of the Black Sea fleet. However, financial circum-
ss1bzances made construction of Russia's naval power a slow
‘:>1713cess and now once again Russian society must partici-
‘p>aa1:e. Japan's sudden attack on Port Arthur and the war
1.x) the Far East made it obvious that Russia's wealthy
c itizens must open their purses and assist their govern-
niearit in building Russia's navy. These voluntary donations
c:<>111d.be used to accuire submarines for use at Port Arthur
against the Japanese. Suvorin admitted he did not regard
1“lizr‘rlself a specialist in naval affairs; but, as a patriotic
RLlssian, he was certain that voluntary donations would con-
tri bute to Russia's ultimate victoryj‘8

Suvorin's efforts to generate popular support for
tries war were appreciated by the Russian government. On
Meit‘ch 9 the Tsar himself received Suvorin and the editor
(ff ‘3;,-Peterburgskiia vedomosti as representatives of the
Fhlssssian daily press. In reply to their loyal expressions
01‘ devotion, the Tsar stated:

I have been following the Press with atten-

tion lately and have become convinced that
it interprets events rightly. The national

1+8
Ibid., March 2 (March 15), l90h, p. 2.

136

spirit which animates the Press has
given me profound satisfaction. I hope
the Press will continue to show itself
worthy of its task, to express the feel-
ings and thoughts of the country, and to
use its great influence on public opinion
in order to impart to £5 the truth and
nothing but the truth.

The Tsar's actions suggest that he welcomed and wished to

encourage the patriotic zeal of Suvorin and l\ovoe vremia.

 

Within a week of his audience with the Tsar,

ESIAfivorin proclaimed the Russian people were united in the
war effort by their sorrow over the losses suffered in the
FVEi]? East. As evidence of popular enthusiasm, Suvorin
FDCDIiJTted to the wires from General Kuropatkin, who was
Stepping in Moscow while en route to the Far East.
Klljrwopatkin reported that he was welcomed on his arrival by
‘tlita mayor, the chairman of the zemstvo, numerous noble
lfiaéicjers and the elite of Moscow society. The delegation
members expressed their faith that Russia could meet the
JaIDéanese challenge against "...Russia's stronghold on the
SY1C>Jres of the great ocean." Suvorin pointed out that these
Hllssssian delegates preferred peace to war and he agreed war
was utterly useless. Wars were destructive and exhausting
{VDI' the state and all citizens. but the war against Japan
was necessary because Russia could not simply admit her
holdings in the Far East were insignificant and liouidate
them in mediation. Russia could not suffer a new

\

C.“
11) “’Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik, February 28 (March
’ 1901;, p. 2.

137

humiliation greater than the Berlin Congress. The question
of Manchuria must be settled only after a victorious war.
The most important issue at stake was Russia's reputation
as a world power and Russia's victory over Japan would
prove Russia's significance as a great and enlightened
state. Suvorin alluded to those who argued for Russia's
defeat because they believed a period of internal reforms
would follow similar to the era of reforms after the de-
feat of the Crimean War. Such persons he branded as mad
men who failed to realize that the defeat of the Russian
army meant the defeat of the Russian people. Once Russia
achieved victory in the Far East, Suvorin insisted, Korea
must be returned to Japan as a protectorate, Manchuria
should be given back to China and Russia should withdraw
from all lands that were not essential for Russia's con-
solidation with Port Arthur. In addition, Russia must
not attempt to partition China; instead, Russia should form
an alliance with China. All of Russia's "educated society"
aspired for an end to the war because the war interfered
With internal reforms; but that "educated society" real-
ized only a Russian victory could end the war and bring a
return to reforms.5

By late March it was obvious that the war would

be long. Reports from the Far East indicated Russian naval

 

50Novoe vremia, March la (March 17), 1904, p. 2.

 

138

forces were on the defensive and the Russian army was un-
prepared to effectively defeat Japan's troops. On Feb-
ruary 18 the government had told the Russian people that
considerable time would be needed in order to strike blows
at Japan which were really representative of Russia's
might.51 General Kuropatkin in his public speeches re-
iterated the same view, cautioning Russians to be prepared

52

for a war lasting at least eighteen months. Suvorin
began to suggest that the army faced complicated problems

in the war with Japan. He compared the future of the
struggle with Japan to earlier wars during the reigns of
Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, when Russia's
military fortune fared badly in the early stages of war

with the Swedes and Turks. hith the outbreak of hostili-
ties, Suvorin said he had read a great deal about Japan

and the condition of Japan's military development. He con-
cluded that Japan was a formidable opponent who had success-
fully implemented European military techniques in a fashion

similar to Russia's military development during Peter the

Great's war with the Swedes.53 Suvorin cited Pierre

 

 

51 . .
avitel'stvennyifyestnik February 5
(February 18;, I§Uh, p.*3. ,

52Russkii invalid, February 12 (March 12), lQOh,

 

p. 2.

53Novoe vremia, March 9 (March 22), 1904, p. 2.

139

Leroy-Beaulieu's article in the Revue des deux mondes as
the best analysis of Japan's strength that he had read.
The French economist regarded the Japanese people as
highly patriotic and rated Japan's military capability as
comparable to most of the best European military powers.
The Japanese army was an excellent military organization
capable of placing hO0,000 troops in the field against
Russia. Japan's navy was rated equal to that of the
United States. The Japanese economy was strong largely
because of remarkable economic growth in the last half
century and Japan could easily finance a war with Russia.
Finally, the French economist regarded Japan's form of
government, which resembled the French Directory, as
shabby; but he believed this government did not obstruct
the Japanese army in waging a successful war against
Russia.5h Although Suvorin agreed with Leroy-Beaulieu's
conclusion that Japan was a powerful state, he criticized
the article for failing to make significant comparisons
between Japan and the Russian Empire. Suvorin declared
Russia was also a strong power. The primary difficulty
confronting Russia in conducting military operations

against the Japanese would be the mountainous terrain of

Korea, giving the Japanese an advantageous position.

5I’M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, "Le Japon et ses
ressourses dans la guerre actuelle," Revue des deux mondes
(Paris). XX (190h). 389-419.

140

In addition, the Japanese enjoyed closer proximity to the
field of military operations, offering them shorter and
easier supply lines. In contrast, Russia's supply lines
were long and Russia would not be able to land forces on
Japan's mainland without facing the interference of Eng-
land and the United States. However, Japan might success-
fully invade Russian territory and Suvorin warned that
such an occurrence would meet determined resistance by
the Russian people. Suvorin agreed with the French econ-
omist that a lengthy and difficult war between these two
countries would be unprofitable for both, but he predicted
that Russia would be the victor.55

Suvorin's effort to give patriotic stimulus to
his readers continued. On March 28 Suvorin reported that
General Kuropatkin was scheduled to arrive in Manchuria
and assume command of the Russian army. Suvorin reminded
his readers that Kuropatkin's strategy would be to defeat
Japan's land forces and that this would require time.
Meanwhile, the Russian navy had to be mainly concerned with
keeping the Japanese naval forces from taking Port Arthur.
Therefore, instead of providing a few expensive battleships,
a large number of submarines and destroyers should immed-
iately be sent to Port Arthur. The Russian fleet aroused

the interest of all Russians who were now conscious of

55

T

NOVOe vremia, March 9 (March 22), 190h, p. 2.

 

lal

their responsibility to these seamen. As proof, he noted
that in the city of Moscow, which formerly paid little at-
tention to the Russian navy, lectures urging support for
the fleet were drawing large audiences. This was partic-
ularly significant because Moscow, an inland city, had been
primarily concerned with Russia's land forces since the de-
feat of Napoleon. Such interest, Suvorin proclaimed, exem-
plified the spirit of the Russian people behind the Russian

56

war effort.

On April 1 5uvorin questioned what motivated
Japan's courage and daring to believe she could conquer
Russia. Re charged that Great Britain and the United
States instigated Japan to attack Russia because these
two powers feared Japan and Russia as trade rivals in Asia
and hoped Russia and Japan would ruin each other. Foreign
newspapers, especially the London Timgg, encouraged Japan
by printing articles and editorials depicting Russia as
weakened by domestic unrest and on the brink of revolution.
Further, Japan was overly confident because it had a con-
stitution and believed it equal in standing to the en-
lightened states of Europe. An alliance with Great Britain
and Russia's reluctance to embark upon a war contributed
to Japan's confidence in her military superiority. All

these factors caused Japan to carry out a surprise attack

 

56L2ig;, March 15 (March 28), 1904, p. 3.

1A2

on Port Arthur. Now the Russian people desired only vic-
tory and rejected any mediation which would humiliate Rus-
sia. Only as a victorious gladiator would Russia willing-
ly grant generous concessions to Japan and agree to recog-
nize Korea as a Japanese protectorate.57

As further proof of patriotic sentiment in Rus-
sia over the war, Suvorin referred to an interview with
L. N. Tolstoi which appeared in the French newspaper
Figaro. Despite his claims to be free from such feelings,
by his actions this world-famous pacifist displayed deep
patriotism for Russia. The writer of the article had
learned from Tolstoi's wife that Tolstoi, who hoped wars
would cease, drove regularly twenty—eight miles to Tula
for the latest telegraph reports about the war. Suvorin
argued Tolstoi's "Russian soul" made him impatient to
learn about the destiny of the Russian army. The feelings
of Tolstoi, who symbolized the great spirit and genius of
the Russian people, originated in the patriotic movement
of 1812 which saw the ascent of Russia's power. Suvorin
proclaimed Tolstoi's book Egg and Peace captured for
future generations the patriotic spirit of the Russian
people and it was Tolstoi's own patriotism which caused

his concern about the destiny of Russia in this war.58

57l§i§;. March 19 (April 1), l90h, p. 2.

58.3.2224. march 28 (April 10), 1901., p. 1..

1A3

A telegram on April l3 from Port Arthur informed
the Russian people of another important Russian naval loss.
The battleship Petropavlovsk struck a mine and sunk with a
heavy loss of lives. Among the dead was Admiral S. O.
Makarov, who, upon taking command of the Port Arthur squad-
ron after the first Japanese attack, had rejuvenated the
naval forces. His death along with the loss of the
Petropavlovsk demoralized the seamen at Port Arthur and
crippled the effectiveness of the Russian sguadron.59 The
news of this disaster engendered gloom and stupefication
when it was announced in a special edition of the St.
Petersburg newspapers.

Displaying his religious fervor, Suvorin de-
scribed the disaster as another of "God's tests" for the
Russian people. He observed that this "laconic telegram"
had the same demoralizing effect on the Russian people as
the news of the first attack on Port Arthur, but hope re-
mained alive. Disagreeing with some naval-circle opinions
that the Port Arthur squadron should have been limited to
defensive maneuvers, Suvorin sided with Admiral Z. P.

Rozhdestvenskii's views in the Petit Parisien defending

 

9Serge Terestchenko, La guerre navale Russo-
Japonaise (Paris, 1931), pp. 179-80.

lhh

Makarov's offensive actions.60 Admiral Makarov and his
souadron, Suvorin argued, had given Russia two vital months
in which to mobilize the army.61

The piecemeal manner in which the war news con-
cerning the loss of the Petropavlovsk was divulged angered

the Russian press. In Grazhdanin, Prince Meshcherskii

 

bitterly attacked the withholding of news and argued that
the government's cynicism towards the Russian people was
unpardonable.62 Joining in the criticism, Suvorin charged
that official telegrams were too brief and vague for the
Russian press and public to obtain adequate information.63
As examples, he cited the two dispatches concerning the
first attack on Port Arthur and the loss of the
Petropavlovsk. Official war-news dispatches released to
the Russian press must contain more reliable and complete
information if the courage and confidence of the Russian
public in the war effort was to be maintained. Suvorin

argued it was evident that the first dispatch concerning the

Petropavlovsk was utterly misleading and brought a flurry

 

6OEgtit Parisian, April 11, 190h, p. 3.

61Novoe vremia, April 2 (April 15), 190A, p. 2.

62
Grazhdanin, April 5 (April 18), 190A, p. 2.
63

 

Novoe vremia, April 2 (April 15), 1904, p. 2.

1A5

of rumors concerning the cause of this tragedy.6l+ In

particular, he censured the editorial staff of the Trade
Telegraph Agency for issuing dubious accounts of military
activity. Although intended to arouse patriotism and ben-
efit the government, the rumors resulting from these mis-
leading reports would only undermine patriotic sentiment
by creating doubts in the minds of the Russian people.
Only with truthful and detailed reports could the Russian
press arouse the patriotism of the Russian people to sup-
port the government in the war against Japan.

A few weeks later Suvorin repeated his concern
that the Russian press was not kept well informed by the
government. In an article on May 1 rejecting England's
offers of mediation, Suvorin criticized the minister of
foreign affairs for failing to provide the Russian press
with information about Russia's policies in Tibet. With-
out access to the Russian documents, the Russian press
could not stimulate public opinion against England's
charges of Russian intrigue in Tibet. Suvorin added that
he believed press discussion was good and aided in stimu-

66

lating public support for foreign policies.

6h
Ibid., April 3 (April 16), 1904, p. 3.

651bid., April 6 (April 19), 190A, pp. 2-3.

66
Ibid., April 18 (May 1), 1904, pp. 2-3.

1A6

The sinking of the Petropavlovsk caused Suvorin

to comment on the two factors contributing to the deplor-

able condition of the Russian navy. First, the naval regu-
lations introduced by Naval Minister N. M. Chikhachev, a
former director of the Black Sea Steamship Company, were
adopted from a commercial fleet and were unsuitable for a
military fleet. Incorporation of these naval regulations
into the Russian navy gave rise to neglect, carelessness
and mismanagement, and was largely responsible for the
wasted energy and useless loss of lives. The heroic Rus-
sian seamen now bitterly remembered that Novoe vremia had
opposed the adoption of these regulations.67 These naval
regulations gave rise to the second factor-~namely, the de-
ficiency of technical education in the Russian navy which
in the last nineteen years failed to keep pace with western
naval training and techniques. In rebuttal to critics who
argued that it was premature for Russia to adopt western
techniques, he pointed to the development of Russian lit-
erature and art as proof that it was feasible for Russia

to successfully adopt western techniques. His criticism,
Suvorin declared, was a patriotic effort to improve the navy
in the face of public pressure to explain the current naval

deficiencies.

 

7Ibid., April 13 (April 26), 190h, p. 2.

68Ibid., April 19 (May 2), 190a, p. 2.

m

lh7

When Admiral N. I. Skrydlov was appointed com-
mander of the Pacific squadron, Suvorin praised the new
commander as an important addition to the leadership of
the naval forces. But new leadership and the courage of
Russian seamen were insufficient to assure Russia's vic-
tory over Japan. Technical knowledge was also a vital
factor in the war. To emphasize its importance, Suvorin
cited the valuable technical knowledge that the Japanese
utilized against Russia. During the Russo-Turkish Ear,
the Japanese carefully observed Russian military opera-
tions and were profitably using this knowledge in prepar-
ing for the war against Russia. Suvorin urged Russian
military leaders to study Japanese military operations and
capitalize on this technical knowledge in planning military
strategy.69 It was a sad mistake that Russia knew so little
about Japan while the Japanese were obviously well-informed
about Russia. Suvorin attributed this ignorance about
Japan's technical development to the failure of Russian
diplomats to observe and study Japan's development.70

It was becoming increasingly clear that Russia
was ill-prepared to wage war in the Far East, a fact which
Suvorin had apparently realized long before the disagree-

ment with Japan had reached war proportions. Suvorin had

 

églElQ;: April 10 (April 23). 1904, p. 3.

O
7 Ibid., April 16 (April 29), 1904, pp. 2-3.

11.8

attempted to reinforce the moderate policies of Witte,
Lamsdorf and Kuropatkin, believing that imprudent attempts
to acquire new territory and concessions in the Far East
could jeopardize Russia's current holdings. He was well
aware of the extent to which building the Trans-Siberian
railway had strained the Russian economy and recognized

that complications in the Far East could result in ir-

reparable losses for Russia. For these reasons, Suvorin

sstrongly advocated caution and peace in the Far East. Con-
fronted with war, a disorganized, ill-equipped military and
an unenthusiastic populace, Suvorin actively used the forum

of Nov_o_§ vremia to attempt to prod Russia towards victory.

 

After the death of Makarov, Russia's navy forces
adopted a totally defensive strategy and ceased to be an
effective fighting force. Meanwhile, the field of conflict
moved to the land where Suvorin had predicted the invincible

Russian army would defeat the Japanese and win the war for

RLlssia.

CHAPTER V
PUBLICIST OPPOSES PEACE 'WITHC'L'T VICTORY

Taking advantage of an early naval victory over
the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, the Japanese initiated
land operations against the Russians in May, 1901.. It was
on land that the Russians hoped to defeat the Japanese, but
the long series of blows which the Japanese now dealt the
Russian army added fuel to the internal discontent against
the war. Faced with increasing pressure for peace, Suvorin
nevertheless doggedly rejected mediation and insisted upon
the need for Russian supremacy over the Japanese. Utiliz-
ing his position as a disseminator of information, he at-

tempted to convince his readers that peace without victory
Would mean irreparable losses for Russia. At the same time
he carefully hid his own discouragement with Russia's mili-
tary performance. When peace negotiations began in the sum-
mer of 1905, Suvorin continued his efforts to maintain pub-
110 interest in the Far East by portraying Russia as a
Strong, battle-ready nation only reluctantly engaging in
peace talks. Thus, Suvorin, who had first been opposed to
the War in the Far East, now constituted a major force
agaihSt a negotiated peace.

149

150

The news of Russia's naval setback with the sink-
ing of the Petropavlovsk and the loss of Admiral Makarov
was followed by the announcement of the Anglo-French Entente
in April. The announcement created speculation that England
would seek an alliance with Russia and mediate peace between
Russia and Japan.1 On April 29, Suvorin charged an alliance
with England would only restrain Russia's expansion. he-
calling that England had rejected Russian offers to mediate
peace between England and the Boers, he argued that Russia
must likewise reject England's offer. England's motives
for offering to mediate were unclear. Observing that Great
Britain possessed few interests in Korea and Manchuria, he
conjectured that it was Russia's railroad interests in
northern Asia that whetted England's appetite. Conse-
quently, it was ridiculous to believe England would be as-
sisting Russia as a mediator.2

Two days later Suvorin reasserted his opposition
when he answered the letter of S. N. Syromiatnikov pub-
lished in Novoe vremia. Citing the letter as a typical
argument in favor of English mediation, Suvorin asserted
that Russia could not forget England's important role in
the affront given Russia at the Congress of Berlin. Fur-

thermore, England's insults and the hostility evidenced in

_~

1Gal'perin, Anglo-iaponskii soiuz, 1902-1921,
pp. 210-212.

2Novoe vremia, April 17 (April 30), 1904, p. 2.

151

the English press made it impossible for the two countries

to engage in cordial negotiations until Russia emerged vic-
3

torious over Japan. At the same time Suvorin attacked

Prince Meshcherskii, editor of Grazhdanin, for questioning

 

in his daily column whether Russia's interests in the Far
East justified war with Japan. He also condemned
Meshcherskii's appeal for the conclusion of peace through
mediation by Russia's enemies. It was Japan who began this
war when Russia refused to retreat. Under these circum-
stances, when one party desired war, war could not be
avoided. Consequently, Russia had no choice but to defend
herself.

While Suvorin was engaged in defending Russia's
war effort and rejecting mediation, military events in the
Far East moved in an unfavorable direction. Having secured
the command of the sea, the Japanese began landing their
army in late April. On May 1 the first major land engage-
ment of the war was fought at the Yalu River. Within a
week the Japanese army defeated Russian forces under the
command of General M. I. Zasulich. This outcome gave Japan

a significant moral victory which the European press

 

3Ijgvoe vremia, April 18 (May 1), 1904, pp. 2-3.

A,
Novoe vremia, May 1 (May it), 190A, p. 2.

152

acclaimed, comparing it to Germany's victory over France

5 In Russia the news of the Yalu defeat shook the

in 1870.
confidence of the Russian public and the Russian press re-
acted by attempting to reassure the people of Russia's mili-
tary strength.6

As the Russian troops retreated from positions on

the Yalu and around Port Arthur, Novoe vremia and Suvorin

 

joined in the effort to bolster waning Russian patriotism.
Suvorin treated the Yalu retreat as an action similar to
the battle of borodino, when Russian armies were forced
temporarily to fall back. He denounced those elements in
Russian society who claimed to be glad because of Russia's
defeats and rejected their argument that this was a "sec-
ond Sevastapol" signifying the failure of the government.
Victory at Sevastapol would have brought the liberation of
the peasants along with other reforms. It was shameful for
any Russian to wish the defeat of his country in order to
bring political reforms. On the contrary, victory would
bring progressive reforms by renewing Russia's spirit and
reuniting all social classes. As an example, Suvorin

cited Germany's victory over France in 1870 which was

5M. Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-

iaponskaia voina," in Obshestvennoe dvizhenie v rossii v
Rachale XX-go veka, ed. by L. Martov (St. Petersburg, 1910)
II, 2.

61bid., p. 20.

153

followed by thirty years of unusual development; while
France, which was defeated and humiliated, spent many diffi-
cult and bitter years recovering from her defeat.7
By the middle of May the Japanese army had suc-
ceeded in isolating fort Arthur and by the end of the month
had laid seige to the naval base. The Russian army showed
itself incapable of checking the Japanese advance and the
poor performance of the Russian forces engendered criticism
of military operations. A major problem for the Russian
forces was a conflict between Admiral Alekseev and General
Kuropatkin over strategy. Alekseev, the commander-in-chief,
insisted that Russian forces challenge the Japanese at every

8 Kuropatkin, commander of the army, preferred

opportunity.
a strategy of gradual retreat similar to Russia's 1812 cam-
paign against Napoleon. Under his plan, the Russian forces
would conserve their strength until large numbers of troops
could be brought from the European section of Russia. Then
the superior Russian forces would crush the Japanese armies.

The conflict between the two commanders produced an inde-

cision in strategy that contributed to the failures of the

 

7Novoe vremia, May 5 (May 18), 190A, p. 3.

V. A. Apushkin, Russko-iaponskaia voina (St. Peters-
burg, 1910), p. 7a.

9Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina," K.A;,
LXVIII (1935), 81-83. "

15h

Russian forces.

To reassure the public, Suvorin threw his sup-
port behind Kuropatkin, utilizing what he termed were "ob-
jective" comments based on information available from
government telegrams. Suvorin emphasized that the overall
direction of Russia's military operation lacked "talented
leadership" and "harmony," but he carefully praised
Kuropatkin both for his leadership and for his zealous
work in preparing the Russian army for combat. The Japan-
ese army had the advantage because its forces were well-
eouipped for mountain fighting. Suvorin asserted that in
January he had urged equipping Russian forces with mountain
artillery but his suggestion was ignored. Now these initial
setbacks due to the shortage of mountain artillery justified
his position. His own critical assessment of Russia's mili-
tary operations was motivated by patriotism, he wrote. Now
overtly acknowledging the existence of revolutionary ele-
ments, he condemned them for exposing Russia's military
weakness only for the purpose of undermining public moraleiO

Despite such efforts by Suvorin and others, agi-
tation against the war grew in Russia. Witte, the former
minister of finance, joined in comdemning the war as unnec-
essary and charged it was the result of intrigue by the

Bezobrazov Circle. In hopes of extricating Russia from the

 

10Novoe vremia, June 12 (June 25), 190A, p. 2.

155

war, Witte made an unsuccessful attempt to initiate peace
negotiations with the Japanese while in Berlin in July,
1901..11

The plight of the encircled Port Arthur garrison
and the inability of Russia's Far Eastern naval forces to
wrest command of the seas from Japan concerned supporters
of the war. In early July an ardent campaign was launched
urging the dispatch of a second naval squadron to the
Pacific. Since by the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
the Convention of London the Black sea fleet could not
leave the Black Sea, the advocates of this plan demanded
that the Baltic fleet be sent to the Far East to relieve
Port Arthur and defeat the Japanese fleet.12 Suvorin and
his newspaper became a leading force in the movement to
send the Baltic fleet to the Far East.13

To arouse Russian patriotism, Suvorin turned to
an earlier example of Russia's determination in a time of
crisis, which was cited in S. M. Solovev's historical
works. During the reign of V. I. Shuiskii, the Russians

defeated the Polish and Lithuanian troops attacking the

 

11Romanov, Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii
russko-iaponskoi voiny_189§-19Q], p. 320.

12A. I. Gippius, Deprichniakh nashei voiny s
igponiei. S pgilozheniiami (Dokumenty). St. Petersburg,
1905. PP- #3-h7.

13Novoe vremia, June 21 (July a), 1901, p. 2.

156

defenseless city of Novgorod. The Russian inhabitants of
Novgorod had no weapons nor were they prepared to defend
their city. But when the Poles attacked,the inhabitants
built fortifications, forged weapons and trained an army.
Four times the Russians repulsed the Poles. This was a
heroic example to be imitated by the Russian people in
the struggle with Japan. Once again it was obvious that
Russia was ill-prepared for war and crudely backward in
its techniques. The Russian people must overcome Russia's
backwardness in order to be victorious in this war.1

In July the Japanese forces continued their suc-
cessful advance and moved closer to Port Arthur. The chron-
ic failures of the Russian army shook the confidence of the
Russian people in their government.15 With the increasing
mobilization of troops, opposition to the war and against
the government mounted. Suvorin reacted by defending his
country's position. He denied Russia intended to expand
into Korea and Manchuria; Russia was involved in this war
to protect her present and future position in the Far East.
The war in the Far East was a test of Russia's power just

as Russia was tested during her wars in Astrakhan, Kazan,

 

1
“Ibid.

15Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia
II, I, 2hl-A2.

157
16

Crimea, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Therefore, Russia
must not be beaten in Asia. This war was being fought not
only against Japan, but also against England and the United
States, which were sympathetic to the Japanese. Russia had
made great sacrifices in the Far East and Russia must not
simply retreat because of the recent defeats. In particular,
Suvorin condemned Count Tolstoi's peace plan advocating that
Russia abandon its interests in Manchuria. Russia estab-
lished itself in the Far East by building the railroad, se—
curing Port Arthur and stationing a fleet in the Pacific.
The war was a trial by God of the Russian people. Despite
the reverses suffered by the Russian army and navy, Suvorin
predicted the Russian army would surprise the world by de-
feating Japan on land. He conceded that now Russia's mili-
tary leaders realized Japan for the present was invincible
on the seas, but he predicted that the Baltic squadron would
reclaim Russia's naval honor.17
A large segment of world press opinion appeared
to sympathize with Japan. The Russians were regarded as
the villains against Japan, a smaller power, who was defend-
ing her vital interests in Asia as well as preventing Rus-
sia's expansion into Manchuria and Korea. The early vic-

tories of the Japanese were welcomed and praised by the

 

16
Novoe vremia, June 26 (July 9), 190A, p. 2.

Ibid.

 

158

European and American press.

Suvorin criticized the foreign journalists for
their acclaim of the Japanese military successes. The
Japanese were barbarians and could be compared to the Huns,
Avars and Mongols who swept over nations like a hurricane,
destroying them and their civilizations. One only had to
view Japanese art and compare it to European art to see the
ugliness and vulgarity in Japanese culture and society.
Suvorin wondered why Europeans praised the Japanese with
their decadent culture for their sudden successful use of
European weapons and military techniques against Russia.

At the same time Suvorin lamented that Russia faced a more
formidable opponent than England against the Boers. Unlike
the Boers, Japan was a nation of fifty million or about one-
third the population of Russia. In addition, Japan enjoyed
the advantage of English and American contraband. Unfor-
tunately, Russia's military forces in the Far East were un-
prepared for Japan's challenge; and, if they had been pre-
pared, Japan would have been defeated already and the supe-
riority of the white race defended. Russia would prove the
superiority of the white race over the squinted-eyed yellow
race despite the bravery and "genius" of the Japanese mili-
tary. But he cautioned that the Japanese threatened to in-
vade Russia because Japan had successfully mastered modern
scientific and technical advances. The Russian people must

meet the challenge of the Japanese, who were confident of

159

18

their invincible military130wer.

Revolutionary activities increased to the point
where on July 28 V. K. Plehve, minister of the interior and
architect of the Far Eastern war, was assassinated. The
"little victorious war" over Manchuria and Korea that Plehve
had advocated to relieve internal discord was proving to be
a stimulus to Russia's domestic problems. Meanwhile in the
Far East the Russian forces continued to meet with failure.
The Russian counterattack to relieve Port Arthur in late
July was easily turned back. When Japanese forces moved
close enough to Port Arthur to bring the naval squadron un-
der direct fire, an unsuccessful attempt was made to move
the squadron to Vladivostok on August 10. Efforts of the
Vladivostok squadron to aid Port Arthur by attacking the
Japanese fleet resulted in another defeat for Russia's naval
forces.19 The news of these events created a grim mood in
St. Petersburg.

Taking note of the Russian public's distress,
Suvorin concentrated on the difficulties of the encircled
Port Arthur garrison in a series of articles. He joined
with Men'shikov in appealing to the Russian people to per-

form a "Herculean feat" and contribute funds for the

 

l8Ibid., July 2 (July 15), lQOA. P. 2.

w

19Pavlovich, "Vneshnaiaia politika i russko-
iaponskaia voina," pp. 22-23.

160

strengthening of the Baltic squadron so that it could be
sent to rescue Port Arthur.20 Kuropatkin also called for
the Baltic squadron to be sent to the Far East as part of
his strategy to defeat the Japanese.21 Kuropatkin's plan
was succeeding because now Russia had an army of four hun-
dred thousand troops in the Far East. This force was incom-
parable to the small force available a few months earlier
and Suvorin speculated a decisive battle was near.22 Until
the main Russian forces engaged the Japanese army, Suvorin
made Port Arthur a rallying cry for the Russian people to
work for victory. He lauded General A. M. Stessel's deter-
mination to continue defending Port Arthur even after the
Vladivostok squadron failed to rescue the garrison.23
The situation in the Far East in late August
brought rumors of peace between Russia and Japan. English
newspapers recommended that Russia conclude a peace even if
Russia's prestige suffered. Suvorin condemned the position

of the English press, arguing that a peace settlement would

only be an interlude during which Russia and Japan would

 

20Novoe vremia, July 25 (August 10), 1904, p. 2.

21Kuropatkin, "Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina," K.A.,
II (1922), p. 28.

22
Novoe vremia, August A (August 17), l90h, p. 2.

2
3Novoe vremia, August 8 (August 21), lQUL, p. 2.

 

161

continue arming to resume hostilities. Russia had not
foolishly expended her energy and money in Asia to be dealt
defeat and humiliation. Furthermore, Russia was not yet de-
feated. The Baltic squadron still existed and part of the
Port Arthur souadron remained to continue the war on the
seas. On land the Russian army was large and would continue
to fight even if Port Arthur fell. The Russian army had
been holding the Japanese in a small area for six months
and Kuropatkin's army would check the Japanese advance.
Japanese fanaticism had failed to conquer the Russians and
rumors of peace were the result of Japanese, not Russian,
agitation for peace.2h
As Suvorin rejected the possibility of peace, a
major battle between the Russian and Japanese forces was
raging near Liaoyang. After twelve days, Kuropatkin's
forces retreated. The Russian troops fought well and re-
treated in good order, but the failure of the large con-
centration of Russian forces to defeat the Japanese evoked
criticism of Kuropatkin in St. Petersburg.25 Suvorin,
however, defended Kuropatkin's decision to retreat rather

than endanger the troops with encirclement, charging crit-

ics in St. Petersburg did not fully comprehend Kuropatkin's

2h
Ibid., August 19 (September 1), 1904, p. 2.

25Romanov, Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii
russkojiaponskoi voinyg1895-1907, pp. 324-325.

162

position and were not representative of Russian patriotism.
When his attacks on Kuropatkin's critics for "haughtiness"
and "abusive criticism" were challenged, Suvorin replied

that he did not intend to intimidate patriotic Russians. A

series of articles in Razvedghik by M. I. Dragomirov par-

 

ticularly annoyed him. This critic, Suvorin charged, based
his critical comments on incomplete reports of the Liaoyang
battle. The absence of accurate battle reports made compe-
tent analysis difficult and unwise. The reports of 59193
vremia's correspondent in the Far East, V. I. Nemirovich-
Danchenko, supported his own defense of Kuropatkin's con-
duct. Kuropatkin needed more troops and supplies before he
could defeat the Japanese. The "haughty" St. Petersburg
critics failed to understand that the condition of the
Trans-Siberian Railway was a major source of Kuropatkin's
problems.27 Instead of criticizing Kuropatkin, these
critics should concentrate their attention on eliminating
the railway delays caused by quarrelsome generals and of-
ficials. As the details of the Liaoyang battle were re-
ported, the people demanded to know why the Russian army
was not as well equipped as the Japanese forces. The St.

Petersburg critics, and especially Dragomirov, the "small

 

6Novoe vremia, August 23 (September 5), l90h,

 

2
7Ibid., August 25 (September 7), l90h, p. 2.

163

28

Napoleon," did not have an answer.

The success of the Japanese against the Russians
began to change some attitudes in England and arouse con-
cern over the Japanese "yellow peril" in Asia. As evidence
of this viewpoint began to appear in the London Tim§§,29
Suvorin asserted that for a long time Novoe vremia had been
publishing editorials and articles by its foreign corres-
pondents concerning the Japanese threat. These writers
pointed out that the Japanese slogan "Asia for Asiatics"

really meant "Asia for Japan." As early as June, G. S.

Veselitskii, who wrote for Novoe vremia under the name

 

"Argus," presented these views to the Central Asiatic
Society in London. Veselitskii opened the eyes of the
English public to Japan's threatening power. As further
evidence, Russkii invalid indicated Japan was capable of
putting one million troops equipped with the latest Euro-
pean military arms into the field. The spectre of Japan's
future military power was causing England and Europe to
reconsider Russia's role in Asia. In the past Russia was
always suspect for her intentions in Asia, but now Japan
was the center of suspicion. The London Timgg, Suvorin ob-

served, did not wish Japan to dominate China. But Suvorin

 

28 .
Ibid., August 28 (September 10), l90h, p. 2.

29
190h, p. 7.

Editorial, The Times (London), September 7,

16h

objected to the Eimgg' argument regarding England's role
in India and China. England regarded itself as the best
counsel for solving government problems in these areas and
Suvorin questioned whether it was not possible for Japan to
do the same in Asia. Japan was now receiving sympathy and
attention from other Asiatic states and was replacing Eng-
land as a model. An alliance with China would give Japan
the power to challenge England's authority in Asia. Be-
cause Japan capitalized on the alliance with England, Rus-
sia was fighting the war in Asia to defend her own inter-
ests as well as those of England and Europe. A Japanese
victory over Russia would, therefore, be a victory over
England because the "yellow foes" of Russia were also Eng-
land's enemies. England erroneously believed supremacy in
Asia could be shared with Japan, which in the future would
threaten England's empire in India. It seemed clear that
England and Russia shared common interests and a common
enemy and that England should well understand the need for
victory over Japan after her experience in the Boer War.
For Russia this victory was more necessary than England's
victory over the Boers; the honor of the Russian army and
the Russian people were at stake. The patriotism aroused

by the war would bring victory and the "spring" of reforms

165

that the Russian people awaited.30

While the Russian army moved back to positions
near Mukden, discussion centered on the performance of
Kuropatkin and the Russian forces at Liaoyang. In their
defense, Suvorin questioned the division of responsibility
between Alekseev and Kuropatkin. Advocating one supreme
commander, he cited the success a similar military organ-
ization had brought Russian forces under General A. V.
Suvorov against the French. The defense of Port Arthur
under General Stessel was a prime example of success in
utilizing a single commander. Suvorin endorsed Russkii
invalid praise for the excellent performance of the Japan-
ese troops under the leadership of a well-organized head-
quarters. In comparison, the lack of a general staff in
the Russian army resulted in discord and poor performance.
In addition, Suvorin urged that experienced troops be dis-
patched to the Far East instead of mobilized peasants.
These peasants were untrained and inadequately informed
about the reasons for the war in the Far East. Russia's
use of these troops and the lack of a unified command were
major sources of Kuropatkin's difficulties during the
battle of Liaoyang.31

Despite current problems, Suvorin proclaimed

V

Bolbigg, August 30 (September 12), 190h, p. 2.

3¥1pigg, September 8 (September 21), 1904, p. 2.

166

Russia's land and naval forces were fighting well and grow-
ing stronger. The early mistakes and deficiencies would be
corrected and Prince Meshcherskii's appeal for Russia to
seek peace should, therefore, be rejected. Russia's best
troops were not yet committed in the Far East and favorable
conditions still existed for a Russian victory. Further-
more, Russia's finances were capable of sustaining the war
effort. Russia's military prospects were improving because
Kuropatkin saved his troops at Liaoyang to build the army
for a decisive battle at Mukden. Suvorin compared
Kuropatkin's strategy to General M. I. Kutuzov's retreat to
MOscow after the Russian loss at Borodino in the 1812 cam-
paign. Kuropatkin's strategy would ultimately prevent the
Japanese from victory in the war. Those elements who sup-
ported KurOpatkin for commander-in-chief wanted Russia to
succeed in the war.32 Efforts to have General Kuropatkin
made commander-in-chief received a boost from Prince K. D.
Shirinskii-Shikhmatov who, upon his return from the Far
East, visited with the Tsar on October 7. The prince
praised Kuropatkin to the Tsar and reported that Alekseev
was responsible for the failure of the Russian army's
operations. The Tsar replied that he was aware of the
situation because Suvorin's "Malen'kiia pis'ma" were

excellent in exposing the problems and he complimented

 

2
3 Ibid.

167

Suvorin's journalism.33

In his next article, Suvorin claimed his desire to
see Kuropatkin made commander-in-chief was supported by a
multitude of letters he had received since his recent ar—
ticle on the subject. These letters from representatives of
all classes in Russian society convinced Suvorin that
Kuropatkin was immensely popular with the Russian people.
They were confident that Kuropatkin would carry out his
pledge to fulfill the Tsar's command and defeat the Japan-
ese at Mukden.3h Within two weeks, Suvorin's efforts were
rewarded when Kuropatkin was made commander-in-chief. In
his article on October 27 Suvorin welcomed the news and
pledged support of Kuropatkin.35

While the Novgg vremia publisher campaigned for

 

Kuropatkin's appointment, another peace initiative was

presented to Russia. On October 20 Novpe vremia announced

 

that United States President Theodore Roosevelt was attempt-
ing to mediate between Russia and Japan.36 Roosevelt, who
officially proclaimed his country's neutrality at the open-

ing of hostilities, was personally sympathetic to Japan's

 

Suvorin, Dnevnik, p. 321.

3“Novoe vremia, September 27 (October 10), 1904,
p. 3.

351b1d., October 14 (October 27), 1904, p. 3.

36Ibid., October 7 (October 20), 190A, p. 2.

168

cause but was ready to volunteer his cooperation to stop
the hostilities.37 Roosevelt invited Germany and France
to join him in the venture.38 He made the peace move dur-
ing a lull in the fighting between the two armies when the
battle lines had stabilized and the war had turned to the
trenches. At the same time Japanese efforts to take Port
Arthur continued to meet with stiff resistance and the war

appeared to be at a stalemate.

In Russia there was growing evidence that a
large element of the population favored peace and that

only the Tsar, the military and a circle of officials pre-

39

ferred continuing the war. A Novoe vremia editorial on
October 20 admitted that certain factions in Russia leaned
toward peace and mediation but it said:

If we wish to get the true import of such lean-
ings, we must remember that we have two factions advo-
cating peace-~first, the extreme reactionaries, who
wish in their old way to hide their heads under their
wings and to reestablish a hollow peace for their own
tranquility and, second, the radicals, who think that
the war has weakened the government enough, and who
hope that a disgraceful peace will entirely discredit
it. There is a third element of calm and progressive
Russians--namely, the majority, who admit that the war
has shown many points of weakness, but who stand for

 

37Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese
War (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), pp. A7-50.

38Romanov, Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii
russko-iaponskoi voiny 1895-1907, pp. 3A3-AA.

39Romanov, Rossiia v Man'chzhurii 1892-1906,
p. 513.

169

absolute victory over the Japanese, so that whatever
reforms shall subsequently be inaugurated shall prove
the outcome of the natural evolution of the Russiga
monarchy and not be due to pressure from Without.

Four days later, Suvorin reiterated his paper's
position, rejecting a claim by the French Iggpg correspon-
dent that Russia suffered a crushing defeat at Liaoyang.
Roosevelt's endeavors for a peace conference proved the
Japanese were weakening. Therefore, Russia's enemies
wished to compel her to conclude a peace with Japan before
her ultimate victory; but the Russian people demanded vic-
tory and the reforms and improvements it would bring. The
Tsar sincerely desired to grant the true wishes of the Rus-
sian people once the Japanese were defeated. Only by work-
ing with the Tsar for victory would the Russian people ad—
vance.“1 Thus Suvorin very cleverly made reforms contin-
gent upon the population's continued support of the war.
It is, unfortunately, difficult to ascertain whether
Suvorin's increasingly open discussion of reforms had the
Tsar's concurrence or whether it reflected the decreasing
ability of the autocratic regime to stifle expressions
favoring reform.

Although Suvorin was publicly expressing confidence

in Kuropatkin and Russia's increasing strength, his personal

40
Novoe vremia, October 7 (October 20), 190A, p. 2.

#1
Ibid., October 11 (October 2A), 190A, p. 2.

170

diary reveals quite different personal views. After receiv-
ing the news of Kuropatkin's retreat from Liaoyang, Suvorin
expressed despair and indignation with Russia's leadership
of the war. Liaoyang was a Sedan for Russia, he wrote. The
Russian fleet was annihilated and now the Russian army was
decimated. He speculated that Russia would be forced to ac-
cept a disgraceful peace if England did not permit the Bal-
tic souadron to reach the Far East. The internal situation
of Russia was equally ticklish because the Tsar's absolute
power was a fiction. The Tsar was under the domination of
bureaucrats and other self-seeking persons. It was not
surprising that the Russian people were increasingly dis-
turbed with this arbitrary regime. After studying the
situation facing Kuropatkin at Liaoyang, Suvorin and his
editors privately blamed Kuropatkin whom they called

bezdarpyi. The telegrams from the Far East demoralized

 

them and they feared that the Russian army was destroyed
by this tragic defeat at Liaoyang. Since Suvorin and his
editors held these critical personal views of the war and
Kuropatkin, it seems apparent that the published praise and
confidence in Kuropatkin and Russia's war effort was pri-
marily propaganda designed to raise public morale.)+2

Clearly, Suvorin was attempting to carry out his intention

of influencing public support for the war with Japan as he

#2
Suvorin, Dnevnik, p. 318.

171

had done in 1876 during the war with Turkey.43

The military situation in the Far East following
the retreat from Liaoyang placed the Port Arthur garrison in
an even more critical position. To rescue Port Arthur, the
Tsar dispatched the Baltic squadron in mid-October. While
passing through Dogger fishing banks, hoever, the ill-trained
and tension-ridden Russian squadron opened fire on English
fishing vessels, mistaking them for attacking Japanese war-
ships. The incident provoked a serious crisis between Eng-
land and Russia. After discussing the incident with Cap-
tain N. Klado, Suvorin and his newspaper defended the con-
duct of Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvenskii, the Baltic squad-
ron's commander.h“ Suvorin insisted that Russian naval
. regulations required the Baltic squadron to be battle-
ready at all times and to regard all foreign vessels as a

45

possible enemy even in neutral waters. England's

threats of an ultimatum and war were condemned. An investi-

46

gation would exonerate the Russian squadron. Meanwhile,

Suvorin urged the Russian public to remain calm until the

 

“31b1d., p. 307.

M’Ibid., p. 322.

hSNovoevyremia, October 19 (November 1), 1904,

p. 3.

L6Ibid., October 30 (November 12), 190a, p. 3.

w

172

truth was known.“7 It was important that war with England
be averted even though England had been aiding Japan and
was largely responsible for Russia's humiliation during the
Congress of Berlin.“8

Popular disenchantment with the war in the Far
East increased significantly in late l90h. Incidents of op-
position to troop mobilization occurred throughout Russia.h9
The zemstvo organizations proved to be a major source of
agitation against the war and by November, 190A were in-
strumental in a national movement demanding reforms.50
With the military Operations at a stalemate everywhere but
at Port Arthur, Suvorin concentrated his attention on Rus-
sia's internal problems and only turned to the siege of
Port Arthur to rally support for the war.

The Japanese, realizing the necessity of taking
Port Arthur before the Baltic squadron arrived, launched a
major assault on the fortress in mid-November. By the mid-

dle of December the fall of the fortress was anticipated.

In St. Petersburg's gloomy atmosphere the demands for peace

‘—v

h7Ibid.

halhige. October 19 (November 1), 1904, p. 3.

thl'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia
g, I, 256.

50Bompard,_Mgn Ambassade en Russie (1903-1908),
pp. 90-92.

173

and reforms grew stronger. Suvorin responded by reit-
erating that Russia could only have peace and reforms after
victory over Japan. Only in the joyous spirit of victory
would russian internal creativity flourish. In the discon-
tent and uncertainty dominating Russia, the glorious story
of Port Arthur's courageous defense offered consolation.
This Herculean feat marked a glorious page in Russia's his-
tory and refuted criticism of Russia's military capability.51
The fall of Port Arthur on New Year's Day, 1905 made a huge
impression on the foreign press and the Russian people. News-
papers in England, France, Germany and Italy, while praising
the valor of General Stessel and his troops, concluded that
this defeat ended Russia's importance not only in the Far
East but in Europe. It was time for Russia to conclude
peace. Popular opposition to the war was growing; the Rus-
sian population desired peace.52
The views of the foreign press and the growing
peace movement in Russia did not sway Suvorin's support for
continuance of the war. Although the fall of Port Arthur
was a grave misfortune for Russia, Suvorin denied Russia's
prestige and influence in Asia was destroyed. Further,

Suvorin challenged claims in the foreign press that demon-

strations and appeals for peace in newspapers and zemstvos

51Novoe yremia, December 7 (December 20), 1904, p. 3.

52

Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaig
E! I, 258.

17h

indicated "all wished peace" in Russia. These elements did
not speak for all Russia's people. On the contrary, the pa-
triotic sacrifices of the Russian military forces and the
responses of cities and villages throughout Russia to the
war effort proved the loyalty of the people to Russia's
cause in the Far East. Although it was possible that the
people did not fully understand the need for Port Arthur
and railway interests in Manchuria, Suvorin declared that
all understood the importance of Russia's honor in this war.
To achieve victory, Suvorin appealed for the unity of the
Russian people, and asserted that internal division would
only bring the frightening prospect of revolution and the
collapse of Russia. The hopes of the Russian people rested
on General Kuropatkin's army and the Baltic scuadron. To
the bewilderment of Europe, hussia would resolutely con-
tinue the war until victory.53
Only two weeks later, on January 22, events in St.
Petersburg indicated the attitude of the Russian population
was quite different from Suvorin's published claims. On
that day a peaceful procession of workers seeking to pre-
sent a petition for general reforms to the Tsar ended in a
tragic massacre. This event, "Bloody Sunday," signaled the
beginning of more violent expressions of opposition to war

and the Tsarist government's indifference to the welfare

V

Novoe vremia, December 24, 190h (January 6,
1905): Pp- 3-h.

 

175

and peaceful aspirations of the Russian people.5b Although

Suvorin sympathized with the St. Petersburg workers' de-
sires for internal reforms and especially the summoning of
a Zemskii Sobor, his published opinions on continuing the
war did not alter. On the anniversary of the Japanese at-
tack on Port Arthur, Suvorin conceded that the first year
of war resulted in a number of reverses for the Russian
navy and army. Port Arthur had fallen and the Russian mili-
tary future seemed bleak; but Suvorin doggedly argued that
the Russian people refused to accept defeat.55

The military situation after the fall of Port Ar-
thur and the heightening of internal disturbances caused
Roosevelt again to initiate mediation efforts.56 Peace over-
tures were begun in London through the Russian ambassador and
through the German Emperor whom Roosevelt hoped would influ-
ence Nicholas II to seek peace. This peace movement also
received the endorsement of Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph,
but was rejected by the Russian government as unacceptable

to the supporters of the war.

Suvorin reflected the Russian government's

 

ShA. M. Pankratova, Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia
lgO5-l9OZgg., (Moscow, 1951), pp. 61-68.

55Novoe vremia, January 27 (February 9), 1905, p. 2.

 

56Romanov, Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii russkg:
iaponskoi voinyjl895-I907, pp. 361-62.

176

rejection of these peace overtures. Re eXpressed shock at
the Austrian Emperor's suggestion that Russia should seek a
peace settlement, claiming negotiated peace at this time
would be "disgraceful." On three earlier occasions the
opportunities for a peace settlement had been far better
than after the surrender of Port Arthur and the develop-
ment of internal strife in Russia. Now, with the threat of
revolution, a "disgraceful peace" would be used by the revolu-
tionary movement as proof of the government's impotence.
Suvorin asserted that he had received many letters from peas-
ants expressing concern that the revolutionary movement was
in the hands of the Japanese and threatened disaster for
Russia in the war. Others feared a hasty peace at this time
would destroy national pride and hasten the revolutionary
movement and civil war. Several letters believed a "dis-
graceful peace" and revolution in Russia would result in
Europe uniting against Russia just as Europe collaborated
against France during the French Revolution. To bring Rus-
sia victory, Suvorin urged the summoning of a Zemskii Sobor
to unite the Russian people torn by internal strife and the
war. He questioned the position of the Minister of Inter-
ior Sviatopolk-Mirskii that a Zemskii Sobor was possible
only in a peace time.57 Internal discord was damaging the

war effort. Suvorin was shocked that striking students and

 

57
Novoe vremia, February 1A (February 27), 1905,

177

teachers were closing schools and universities in an effort
to undermine the Russian government and protest the war.58
In addition, Suvorin criticized some military leaders for
their disparaging comments on military operations.59

While Suvorin was expressing these views, the
long-awaited decisive battle began near Mukden. A large con-
centration of Russian forces under Kuropatkin's command en-
gaged an almost equal number of Japanese forces in a two-
week battle ending on March 10. The outcome was a victory
for the Japanese. The battle of Mukden was to be the last
major land engagement of the war and this defeat brought
Kuropatkin's replacement as commander-in-chief.60 The re-
sults of the battle of Mukden produced a widespread demand
in Russia for a reassessment of the war. Numerous conser-
vative newspapers that had supported the war now joined in
the clamor for peace. Suvorin, however, still did not ad-
vocate peace, even though he compared Mukden to Russia's de-
feat at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805. Admittedly, Mukden
damaged Russia's morale and added to internal discord. The

Russian government's silence on the situation in the Far East

contributed to the confusion of the Russian peOple. The

Sslbid;, February 26 (March 11), 1905, p. 3.

59
Ibid., February 28 (March 13), 1905, p. 2.

Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia
II, I, 276-770 T

178

inadequacy of Kuropatkin's brief report of Russia's posi-
tion and editorials in London newspapers suggesting the de-
feat at Mukden would force Russia to seek peace were cre-
ating alarm and confusion. If the Russian press was to as-
sist the government in calming alarm, the Russian government
must present the general facts and clearly state its pol-
icies.61 In reply to other neWSpapers urging peace, name-

ly Grazhdanin and Novosti, Suvorin argued that Russia faced

 

great challenges during the Smutnoe vremia and the war of
1812. Russia refused to be disgraced during these struggles
and emerged with honor and dignity. The Russian people were
wise and now would not permit Russia to lose her power and
achievements in the Far East after only one year of war.
The Russian people would continue the war even if the Japan-
ese conquered all of Manchuria and reached the Volga.62
By the end of March the peace movement began to
gain momentum. While Roosevelt approached Japan and Russia,
the French Foreign Minister T. Delcassé appealed directly

to the Tsar to negotiate.63 Meanwhile as talk of peace con-

tinued to dominate the Russian press, Suvorin belabored his

 

61Novoe vremia, March 3 (March 16), 1905, p. 2.

ézlbiQL, March 5 (March 18), 1905, p. 2.

63Maurice Paleologue, Qn Grand Tournant de la
_§91itique Mondiale (190A-l906) (Paris, I93A), pp. 261-63.

179
64

rejection of a negotiated peace. In April, the Russian
government was still not ready to acknowledge defeat and the
Tsar remained determined to continue the struggle.65 He was
supported by the German Emperor Wilhelm who feared that end-
ing the war after the long series of Russian defeats might
end the monarchy in Russia.66 Furthermore, Suvorin's view
that Russia as a great power must defeat Japan in order to
maintain her position in the Far East and in international
affairs persisted in some circles in St. Petersburg. War
militants believed that the early defeats did not represent
Russia's true military strength and Russia would crush the
Japanese when the superior numbers of her land forces were
moved to the Far East. Consequently, the Tsar and the sup-
porters of the war rejected peace and placed their hopes in
the Baltic squadron recapturing control of the seas. Suvorin
pledged his support for the Tsar's determination to continue
the war. He condemned the extreme conservatives and rad-
icals for desiring peace which he asserted would only bring
revolution. Letters from different estates, men and women,

wives of soldiers and peasants, proved that the Tsar's war

 

6"’Novoe vremia, March 16 (March 29), 1905, p. 3.

6
5Bompard, Mon Ambassade en Russia (1903-l908,
pp. 123-2“.

66A. A. Sergeiev, ed., "Vilgelm II o russko-
iaponskoi voine i revoliutsii 1905 goda," K.A., IX (1925),

62‘650

180

policy had broad support. Hopes of victory were placed in
the Baltic squadron which had reached Singapore; the destiny
of Russia would be determined by the Baltic squadron.67 The
Baltic squadron represented the final encouragement Suvorin
could offer a war-weary Russian people.

The long-awaited battle took place in the Tsushima
Strait at the end of May and resulted in the complete de-
struction of the Baltic squadron. Immediately after the news
of Russia's defeat was transmitted, Roosevelt revived his
peace drive.68 Japan was willing to have Roosevelt mediate
but Russia required more encouragement. Even though the
Tsar received recommendations to make peace from several
sources including the German Emperor, he hesitated.69

While the Tsar deliberated, Suvorin expressed
shock at the naval catastrophe and the rising tide of revo-
lutionary activities. To combat declining Russian morale,
Suvorin again urged the immediate convocation of a Zemskii
Sobor. A Zemskii Sobor would unite the Russian people by

bringing together their most talented representatives. Unity

was necessary before Russia could resolve the question of

67Novoe vremia, March 30 (April 12), 1905, p. 3.

 

68E. P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth (Lexington,
Ky.: University of Kentucky Press,1969), pp.I56-S7.

8 69Ol'denburg, Tsarstyovanie imperatora Nikolaia II,
I, 2 3.

181

war or peace.70 Of the two alternatives, Suvorin made clear
his preference for war. The Japanese peace proposals re-
quired territorial concessions and a huge indemnity, and
such demands would only bring national shame and burden fu-
ture generations.71 The Zemskii Sobor would not be forced
to conclude peace because Russia still had an army and was
not defeated.72 Only a Zemskii Sobor could engender the
growth and development in Russia necessary to support the
war. Japan, he pointed out, waged the war under a parlia-
ment and free press which insured honesty while Russia's de-
ficiencies remained hidden. Now, little by little, Russians
learned their country was not as prepared for war as Rus-
sia's officials had led them to believe. A Zemskii Sobor
would investigate government activities and remove the
doubts concerning Russian war preparedness.73

On June 6, the Tsar called military leaders to-
gether to consider the question of war or peace. Some of
the views expressed at the conference incorporated Suvorin's
position. For example, General P. L. Lobko advised seeking
the opinion of the Russian people by convoking a Zemskii

Sobor. He cautioned that the return of a defeated army

 

7°Novoe vremia, May 19 (June 1), 1905, p. 3.

1
7 Ibid., May 20 (June 2), 1905, p. 3.

721bid., May 22 (June a), 1905, p. 3.

73Ibid., May 2h (June 6), 1905, p. 3.

182

would be detrimental to Russia's internal situation and he
favored continuance of the war. However, the impact of
Tsushima and the spread of disorders in Russia appear to
have swayed the Tsar to consider peace. That evening the
Tsar notified the American ambassador that he had decided.

74

to accept mediation.
Although Suvorin did not directly condemn the
Tsar's action, he greeted the news by criticizing the terms
of peace proposed by the Japanese. At the same time, Suvorin
condemned revolutionaries and conservatives alike for urging
acceptance of Japan's peace terms. The revolutionaries were
traitors because their activities in the army and navy frus-
trated Russia's military operations. They urged acceptance
of a disgraceful peace in order to bring discredit upon the
Tsar's government and add to popular discontent.75 Conser-
vatives like Prince Mercherskii in Grazhdanin favored peace
because a "reawakening of war patriotism" and a meeting of
the Zemskii Sobor would bring demands for reforms and lim-
its on the Tsar's powers. Not everyone shared the views of
either the conservatives or radicals. Suvorin insisted
that the numerous letters he received indicated that there

was popular opposition from all estates to a peace

 

7AB. A. Romanov, ed., "Konets russko-ia onskoi
voiny; voennoe soveshchanie 24 maia 1905G. v Tsar om Selo,"

K.A., xxVIII (1927), 203-09

75Novoe vremia, May 26 (June 8), 1905, p. 3.

183

containing territorial concessions and an indemnity. The
Japanese might have won a victory over Russia's bureaucrats
but Japan would discover the Russian people were invincible.
Peace or war could only be decided when there was mutual
consent and trust between the people and their government.76
Only a Zemskii Sobor could arrange a peace settlement accept-
able to all the Russian people and avoid the indignation
which would sweep Russia if a disgraceful peace were
concluded.77

Suvorin's disapproval extended to Roosevelt and
mediation in Washington. He viewed the American president
with distrust and compared Roosevelt's role as an "honest
broker" to Bismarck's role in the Congress of Berlin when
Russia lost the fruits of victory. He questioned whether
Roosevelt was really Russia's benefactor and savior as
claimed by world opinion. It was Japan which was exhausted
from the war, while Russia had the resources to continue and
Roosevelt certainly knew this. Roosevelt was mistaken to be-
lieve Russia would accept Japan's peace demands as moderate.
Russia rejected these demands at the beginning of the war
8

and would continue the war rather than accept them.7

In June, Suvorin's opposition to peace was shared

 

7612ise. June 5 (June 18), 1905, p. 3.

771239;, June 1 (June 1h), 1905, p. 3.

78Ibid., June 5 (June 18), 1905, p. 3.

184

by many government officials and especially by Russia's mili-
tary leadership. Generals Linevich and Kuropatkin and the
Minister of War V. V. Sakharov urged the Tsar not to con-
clude peace and to continue the war until the Russian army

was victorious.79

As more and more Russian troops arrived
in Manchuria with the improvement of transportation over the
Trans-Siberian Railway, the confidence of the military lead-
ers and their supporters mounted. While the details of the
peace conference were being arranged, however, these oppo-
nents of peace were dealt a serious blow when the Japanese
army succeeded in occupying Sakhalin Island with little
resistance from the Russian army. Shortly thereafter the
Tsar finalized diplomatic arrangements for a Russian peace
delegation under the leadership of Witte to meet with
Japan's representatives at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Witte and the Russian peace delegation arrived in
the United States on August 2. Witte, who believed Russia
could not continue the war and who favored peace, worked
out a strategy with Dr. E. J. Dillon to sway the American
public to Russia's side. Upon his arrival, Witte delivered
a brief statement emphasizing the friendly feelings of Rus-

sia for the United States.80 Along his route to Portsmouth,

79Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-
iaponskaia voina," p. 31.

80Witte, Vospominaniia, II (Berlin, 1923),

h15“160

185‘

Witte endeavored to make a favorable impression upon the
American press and public. Apparently, Suvorin shared
Witte's desires to win American sympathy because, in a re-
versal of his earlier anti-American position, he praised
Witte's efforts. Witte, Suvorin wrote, was truly a clever
and talented representative of the Russian people. Witte's
speech characterized the spirit of Russia's traditional
friendship for the United States expressed by A. I. Hertsen
on December 1, 1858 at Kolokol. Hertsen's article reprinted
the same day in the Novoe vremia argued that since Russia
and the United States shared the shores of the Pacific Ocean,
the two countries must be fellow travelers in the Far East
and join in an alliance to protect their mutual interests.
Since Suvorin's son Boris was a member of Witte's delegation,
it seems probable that buvorin's sudden friendly overture
towards the United States was part of Witte's strategy.

Nevertheless, as the peace conference convened in
Portsmouth, the "Malen'kiia pis'ma" still maintained a hard
line against peace. Suvorin, who later commented that nei-
ther he nor Witte really expected a peace settlement, prob-
ably wanted to project a strong Russian war readiness both
because it would enhance Russia's position at the conference

. 82 .
and because he expected the war to continue. Thus in his

 

81Novoe vremia, July 24 (August 6), 1905, p. 2.

82I21g;J August 17 (August 30), 1905, p. 3.

186

column, he claimed the Russian "man-in-the-street" opposed
Witte concluding peace with Japan. The Russian people would
never accept a peace granting territorial concessions and an

83

indemnity to Japan. Witte must reject such a "disgraceful
peace" because it would destroy Russia's position and in-
terests in the Far East. Furthermore, Suvorin insisted that
the Russian "man-in-the-street" shared his conviction that
only a Zemskii Sobor could decide the question of war or
peace.8h

The growing opposition of Suvorin and other mili-
tant war elements to the course of the peace negotiations
created an impression at Portsmouth that the Russian public
was increasingly disenchanted with Japan's peace terms and
preferred a renewal of the war.85 On August 26, when the
peace negotiations reached a critical stage, Witte categor-
ically rejected Japan's demands for an indemnity and terri-
torial concessions. The Japanese now believing that their
demands were not acceptable to the Russian people and that
military operations would resume when the peace negotiations
broke down, surprisingly agreed to Witte's conditions and
signed a peace settlement on August 29, 1905.

The news of peace did not produce public

 

83___Ib1'._d_-., July 29 (August 11), 1905, p. 2.

ehiplgyd July 30 (August 12), 1905, pp. 2-3.

85Ibid., August 13 (August 26), 1905, p. 3.

187

demonstrations of joy in St. Petersburg. Reactions to the
news varied; but a mood of indifference and apathy tended

to prevail. Suvorin reacted with a degree of surprise and
disappointment that peace had been concluded. Re dis-
approved of the peace and charged that it implied Russia
lost the war. By agreeing to a "disgraceful peace," Rus-
sia failed to endure the test of her power and strength.

In accepting peace, Russia suffered incalculable losses
while Japan gained at Russia's expense. Suvorin regretted
Russia's forfeitures primarily because he still insisted that
the Russian army was not defeated and that Japan's compro-
mises indicated her uncertainty about continuing the war.86
However, Suvorin argued in defense of Witte that peace was
forced upon the Russian delegate when the Russian army failed
to conduct aggressive operations against the Japanese and
when the revolutionary movement in Russia undermined Witte's
position at the peace conference. Suvorin praised Witte's
diplomatic skill under these difficult circumstances and
proclaimed Witte carried out a "diplomatic victory" in
forcing Japan to compromise its demands. Although Suvorin
regarded the peace as undesirable and questioned whether it
would be lasting, he resigned himself to accepting it. The

Russian people needed peace in order to concentrate their

 

86£2£st August 17 (August 30), 1905, p. 3.

188
87

attention on Russia's domestic problems.

The conclusion of peace scuttled Suvorin's cam-
paign supporting the war. The terms of peace now terminated
the imperialist Russian expansion in the Far East that
Suvorin had so zealously supported for almost a decade.
During the Boxer crisis and the pre-war negotiations with
Japan, Suvorin had opposed use of military force to advance
Russia's policy and continually argued for peaceful penetra-
tion. In consonance with Witte he sought to curb the ag-
gressive policies of the Bezabrazov circle, which he fore-
saw would inevitably plunge the country into armed conflict
and jeopardize Russia's economic interests in the Far East.
When Japan attacked Port Arthur and declared war on Russia,
Suvorin became an avid supporter of the war. Since Japan,
an emerging power, had challenged the great Russian giant
in the Far East, Suvorin felt that Russia could retain her
economic interests and her power position in Asia and the
world only by decisively crushing the aggressor. A skilled
propagandist, Suvorin appealed to the Russian people to
recognize the great economic losses which Russia would suf-
fer were she not victorious. Asking for patience and using
a variety of devices, such as the fleet fund and the threat
of the yellow peril, he attempted to keep the population

solidly and enthusiastically behind the war. Faced with a

k

872219;: August 18 (August 31), 1905, p. 3.

189

series of devastating military defeats and blunders, Suvorin
saw the mood of the people change rapidly. Recognizing that
the population found it increasingly difficult to understand
the view that Russia's Far Eastern interests were worthy of
the current hardships and human sacrifice, Suvorin subtly
changed his arguments to appeal to national honor. As possi-
bilities of a negotiated peace presented themselves, Suvorin
found himself in strong opposition. When sagging morale and
the revolutionary movement threatened to completely disinte-
grate support for the war, Suvorin threw his weight behind
popular demands for a Zemskii Sobor. He believed that the
immediate convocation of a Zemskii Sobor could and would
reunite the people behind the war and carry Russia to vic-
tory. Although he had private misgivings about the way in
which the war was being conducted, at no time did he allow
his published writing to convey anything but faith in Rus-
sia's ultimate victory. His consistent and forceful at-
tempts to portray Russia as a willing and able warrior may
well have been an important factor in the outcome of peace

negotiations even though Suvorin would have much preferred

a military victory.

CHAPTER VI

SUVORIN LRGES "REFORM FROM ABOVE."

From 1900 until the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War, the Russian domestic scene was dominated by
Witte's ambitious economic and industrial development pro-
gram. Aimed at rapid industrial transformation, Witte's
program concomitantly triggered increasing political, eco-
nomic and social discontent and inspired demands for the
modernization of many facets of Russian society. During
this era, Suvorin supported those domestic reforms which he
felt were compatible with his own political philosophy and
his views on the nature of Russian society. His stance on
economic and social issues was essentially progressive and
nationalistic while he remained conservative towards changes
in the autocratic form of government.

The "Witte system" called for the fastest possible
industrialization while providing for improvement of peasant
conditions, expansion of civil liberties, and the extension
of educational opportunities to all classes. By 1900, how-
ever, the "system" was under attack by agrarian interests

for placing undue emphasis on industrialization at the

190

 

191

expense of other areas in Russian society. Nevertheless,
the basic tenets of the "Witte system" were laid down in
February, 1900, when Witte submitted a report "On the Con-
dition of Our Industry" to Nicholas II. In essence, Witte
wanted the Tsar to initiate "reform from above" by rapid
industrialization. Witte's report emphasized the vital
necessity of foreign capital to finance Russia's industrial
development and gave rise to agrarian agitation against
foreign investors.1

Taking issue with critics who said that foreign
capital threatened Russia's economic independence, Suvorin
expressed his support for Witte's policy on March 30, 1900.
When reactionary critics of Witte's policies challenged his

views in the pages of the Kievlianin, Suvorin denounced such

 

chauvinism, pointing out that if Russia did not use foreign
capital to hasten industrialization it would have to borrow
the money at heavy interest. He insisted that his support
for Witte's policy did not include permitting foreign in-
vestors to make Russia their "submissive servant."2 While
foreign companies and foreign technicians would not be al-
lowed to interfere in Russia's domestic affairs, foreign

capital could be utilized to meet the needs of the Russian

 

1"Dok1adnaia zapiska Witte Nikolaiu II," Istorik
marksist, II (1935), 130-

2Novoe vremia, March 17 (March 30), 1900, p. 2.

192

economy. By defending Witte's plea for an influx of for-
eign capital, Suvorin made clear his desire for the rapid

industrialization of Russia.

Agricultural problems continued to pose obstacles
to Witte's industrialization policies. Repeated crop fail-
ures and persistent peasant unrest gave rise to increasing
concern in official circles and spokesmen for Russian agrar-
ian opinion, especially landowners, charged that Russian
agriculture was deteriorating under the burdens Witte placed
on it.3 The dire plight of the peasants indicated reforms
were necessary but jurisdiction over peasant affairs was
outside Witte's ministry. In November, 1901, the Tsar, un-
der pressure from all sides to remedy the problems of Russian
agriculture, appointed a commission under the chairmanship
of V. I. Kokovtsov "for a thorough analysis of the question
of the economic decline of the center in comparison with the
economic conditions of the other parts of the Empire."h
Shortly thereafter, in January, 1902, Nicholas directed
.Minister of Interior D. S. Sipiagin to update peasant legis-
latixui since the reforms of Alexander II. Finally, in Feb-
ruaxur, 1902, the Tsar made Witte chairman of a Special Com-

rnisicni on the Needs of Agriculture Industry. This appointment

 

3A. A. Polovtsev, "Dnevnik A. A. Polovtseva,"
K.A., XXXXVI (1931), 128-29.

“I. V. Chernyshev, Agrarno-krestianskaia politika
Rossii za 150 let (Petrograd, I918T, pp. 267-68.

193

gave Witte control over the rural economy and assigned him
the difficult task of reforming peasant conditions.5
Although in earlier years Suvorin had deplored the
condition of the Russian peasants, his "Malen'kiia pis'ma"
ignored the peasant reform work under Kokovtsov and Sipiagin.
When Witte assumed chairmanship of the commission to improve
the rural economy, however, Suvorin immediately supported
the minister of finance. Suvorin rejected rich-landowner
allegations that Witte's industrialization policy ignored
rural economic problems and exploited the agricultural
classes to the benefit of the industrial classes. He also
dismissed the landowners' complaints that Witte's adoption
of the gold standard threatened their welfare and the privi-
leges of the landed gentry. The commission, including the
ministers of interior and agriculture as well as numerous
agricultural experts, would provide reforms for the improve-
ment of the rural economy. These specialists would also fur-
nish explanations as to whether the financial system injured
the rural economy and would thus end the "nonsense" directed
against Witte's financial measures. Attacks against Witte,
Suvorin charged, were "vulgar" and "tactless" gossip which
the commission should ignore and concentrate on the compli-
cated task of examining the long history of rural economic

problems. Rural economic problems involved more than just

 

5Polovtsev, "Dnevnik A. A. Polovtseva," K.A.,
III (1923), 11A.

I‘IIIIA IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIEFu-

19h

the plight of landowners and included the peasants and the
whole mode of village economy. Peasant complaints, neglected
since their liberation, must be considered if rural problems
were to be solved. The commission would repudiate the
"superfluous words" and "self interests" of landowners.6
Focusing on the "great work" of the commission,
Suvorin indicated that he, like Witte, believed in "reform
from above."7 The commission was completing the unfinished
reforms of Russia's rural economy begun with the emancipa-
tion of the peasants forty years earlier. The past forty
years showed that only elementary changes were begun in
peasant affairs and that very vital and important reforms
were still needed. Suvorin proclaimed that Russian history
indicated the Russian government was the initiator and lead-
er of all important reforms. Since Smutnoe vremia, the Rus-
Asian state had built an empire, organized all social classes,
created the army and arranged all the essential activities of
the Russian people. The Russian government in the past forty
years guided the developments in the rural economy. It gave
the peasants land, decreased redemption payments, established
peasant.banks and created the Ministry for Agriculture. Un-
fortunately, the measures introduced were sometimes contra-

dictory, producing added discord in the rural economy. Now

 

6Novoe vremia, January 27 (February 9), 1902, p. 2.

7S. I. Witte, ngoderzhavie i zemstvo (Stuttgart:
J. H. Dietz, 1903), pp. €753? .

195

it was necessary for the government again to assess past and
present conditions and to introduce reforms for the creation
of a healthy rural economy.8

The peasant, and not the landowner, Suvorin argued,
must be the principal beneficiary of rural reforms. The com-
mission must not introduce reforms shaping Russia's rural
economy in imitation of Germany's agriculture economy, as
Prince Meshcherskii advocated. The German agrarian system
benefited only a few rich landowners and was unsuitable for
Russia. The period since emancipation proved that the vast
majority of Russian noble landowners did not possess the en-
ergy or talent to improve Russia's rural economy. Despite
landowner criticism, Suvorin assured his readers that Witte,
assisted by agricultural specialists, would produce rural
reforms which would balance the needs of all interested
parties.9 Thus, Suvorin supported Witte's plans and urged
the autocratic government to undertake a vast program of
peasant reforms which would continue the progressive atti-
tudes of the eighteen-sixties.

The need for these reforms became clearer in suc-
ceeding months when peasant uprisings in Poltava and Kharkov

10
accented rural distress. Facing rising rural discontent,

 

8Novoe vremia, January 27 (February 9), 1902, p. 2.
91bid., January 28 (February 11), 1902, p. 2.
10Suvorin, Dnevnik, pp. 288-89.

196

Witte sought support for his commission by consulting local
committees from counties and provinces.11 Witte viewed the
peasant commune as the source of rural distress and the local
committees who shared Witte's opinion joined in seeking the
abolition of the commune.12 For almost a year Witte and the
commission labored toward this end. On February 3, 1903,
Witte's hopes to abolish the commune were frustrated. The
Tsar, under pressure from Witte's agricultural opponents,
issued an imperial decree upholding the "inviolability of
the communal organization of peasant land ownership."13
Despite the Tsar's action, Suvorin continued to
express his faith in Witte and the reforms recommended by
the commission. The local committees were the "voice of
the land," offering calm and sensible approaches which the
government would be wise to heed. Suvorin endorsed aboli-
tion of the commune and encouraged creation of an individ-
ual land-owning peasant class. Peasant reform, Suvorin pro-
claimed, now was the most urgent matter facing Russia and
the minister of finance should concentrate on this domestic

1h

crisis rather than on the Far Eastern railway. Suvorin,

11V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past,
pp. 222‘211-0 f ‘—

12Polovtsev, "Dnevnik A. A. Polovtseva," K.A.,
III (1923), ILA-AS.

13V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past,
pp. 217-18.

l"Novoe vremia, February 22 (March 7), 1903, p. 2.

 

 

197

therefore, pressed for peasant reform and urged Witte's con-
tinued leadership in reorganizing Russia's rural economy.

It should be noted that Suvorin's support for
peasant reform and for Witte occurred when the minister of
finance's position was deteriorating. Minister of Interior
Plehve, Witte's opponent, was pressuring for more reaction-
ary policies and less reform in domestic affairs.15 Join-
ing forces, Plehve and the Bezabrazov circle forced Witte's
retirement from the Ministry of Finance and brought to an
end the Witte system. As mentioned earlier, Suvorin's re-
action to Witte's downfall was an expression of the publish-
er's admiration for Witte and his accomplishments. While
Witte had made many significant contributions in long-
neglected areas, Suvorin noted that Witte had not devoted
sufficient attention to alleviating the friction between
rural and industrial development. Although he regretted
Witte's departure, Suvorin was convinced Russian society
would profit by the changes resulting from Witte's leader-
ship.16 He continued to support progressive change and be-
lieved that the autocracy would undertake additional "enlight-
ened" reforms.

One effect of the industrial development acceler-

ated by Witte's system was the generation of pressure for the

 

15Witte, Vospominaniia, I, 262.

2 16Novoe vremia, August 29 (September 11): 1903:
P— o

198

reorganization of Russian schools. Witte's program placed
particular emphasis on increasing technical knowledge and
Suvorin supported the idea of a network of technical

17

schools. Such a system would end the necessity of Russians

going abroad for technical education and would reduce the

18

need for foreign technicians. Suvorin claimed that he
shared Russia's desire for liberation from foreign technical
subservience and summed up his position with the motto,
"Russia for Russians."19

Although Witte had concentrated his personal ef-
forts on advanced technical education, the minister of fi-
nance also pressed for mass education. His influence en-
couraged the Ministry of Education to recognize the neces-
sity of reforming the educational system promulgated by the
archaic and reactionary philosophy of Count Dmitri Tolstoi.20
The initiative to liberalize this classical educational sys-
tem designed for the elite began in 1898 with Minister of
Education N. P. Bogolepov. Bogolepov, a champion of mass
education, increased government expenditures for primary

education and extended the number of secular schools. In

secondary education, Bogolepov formulated and implemented a

 

17Ibid., March 26 (April 8), 1900, p. 3.
18.129“ March 17 (March 30), 1900, p. 2.
191219;: M3TCh 26 (April 8), 1900, p. 3.

20Witte, Samoderzhavie i zemstvo, pp. 148-51.

199

reform scheme for the liberalization of the Tolstoi system
but in February, 1901, his assassination interrupted the
completion of his plans.21 However, his successor, General
Petr Vannovskii, acknowledged the necessity of continuing
the reform movement and announced his intentions to revise

Russian schools.22

Suvorin favored Vannovskii's intended reforms but
insisted that the new minister could not improve Russian
education without funds. In the last forty years, Russia had
attempted three reforms of the educational system but each
had failed to materialize because funds were not made avail-
able. Great promises were unfulfilled and Russian professors
and teachers were not productive because they were underpaid.
Therefore a fine national education system to serve the needs
of the empire was not built. Spelling out the deficiencies
of the Tolstoi approach, Suvorin called for an educational
system accessible to all classes of Russian society. A
"ladder system" would make it possible for any Russian citi-
zen to pursue an education based on his abilities and needs.
Talent and innate ability would be the main determinants of
his rise through the educational system and completion of

university studies. The Russian government must provide the

 

v.
lebido’ pp. 158-590

2201ga Trubetskaia, Kniaz s. N. Trubetskoi:
vapominaniia sestry (New York: Chekhov Publishing House,

1953) : p0 1&2.

 

200

funds to support such a national education system and elim-
inate wealth as a prerequisite of educational opportunity.
In essence, Suvorin recommended a universal educational sys-
tem to replace the existing system which catered to the
elite. Vannovskii, he believed, understood the need to
create a democratic educational system, but such a trans-
formation paralleled Peter the Great's educational efforts
and certainly could not be accomplished without funds.

Thus, Suvorin urged government financial support for educa-
tion reforms.

When his appeal for increased funds to provide
universal education was ridiculed, Suvorin reiterated his
support for General Vannovskii and his reform intentions.

An increased budget, he repeated, was essential to educa-
tional reforms. Russia's chronic shortage of financial sup-
port for education dated back to the very beginning of the
reform era of the 'sixties. As proof, Suvorin cited a letter
of N. I. Pirogov to Baroness Raden in 1862. Pirogov, a
liberal educator who expressed the idea of a democratic lad-
der system, emphasized that adequate funds were essential to
creating quality education in Russia. Despite Pirogov's
warning, financial appropriations for education remained a
problem. Suvorin said he could understand the indifference

of the poor classes to education but the critical attitude

 

2
3Novoe vremia, March 22 (April 4), 1901, p. 3.

201

of wealthy Russians towards increasing educational expendi-
tures was a puzzle.2h Pirogov clearly stated in 1862 that
funds for education must be significantly increased if the
aims of education were to be achieved. Vannovskii adopted
Pirogov's educational objectives and Suvorin urged revision
of Russia's education budget to support the minister of
education.25
Taking issue with Suvorin's views on education,
Prince Meshcherskii rejected Suvorin's argument that addi-
tional funds were necessary and he objected to the reference
to Pirogov's theories as the basis for new educational re-
forms. Meshcherskii charged that Suvorin unrealistically
expected an immediate miracle from the minister of finance
to produce millions of rubles for the education budget.
Suvorin replied that he did not expect large funds for re-
forms in education immediately but that increased funds for
education were necessary. The minister of finance, Suvorin
argued, obviously shared his convictions because Witte in
recent years had attempted to increase the budget for Russian
schools. In his defense of the classical system in Russia
and its costs, Suvorin challenged, Meshcherskii failed to

recognize the deficiencies of the system. In thirty years

 

241212;. March 25 (April 7), 1901, p. 3.

25A. S. Suvorin, Pis'ma A. S. Suvorina k V. V.
Rozanovu (St. Petersburg, 1913f, pp. 9§F9h.

26Grazhdanin, March 27 (April 9), 1901, p. 3.

 

 

II I
':a

202

the classical system had failed to produce "distinguished

persons" involved in public service, as Meshcherskii claimed.
If Russia wished to remain a major power, the classical sys-
tem, which produced largely negative results and neglected
educating the lower classes, could not be continued. For
proof, one had only to look at the seventy-thousand univer-
sity graduates of the classical system to see the army of
"idiots" and "ignoramuses" this system produced by concen-
trating on Latin and Greek grammar rather than preparing
students in serious scientific work and practical knowledge.
The source of deficiencies in the classical system Suvorin
attributed to the adoption of European educational methods
in an archaic form. In addition, Suvorin disagreed with
Meshcherskii's contention that Russia must concentrate on
building a few quality schools before expanding. It was
possible, he argued, to build an excellent school system

for the benefit of all. The time was at hand. The Russian
people must be educated if Russia was to become a modern en-
lightened state. It was a misfortune that Russia's gymna-
siums and universities did not enjoy a reputation for inspir-
ing scholarship in students when the masses of the Russian
people hungered for education. Peasant children, anxious to
read and write, were the victims of this tragedy. These
poorly-dressed and undernourished children were forced to
walk miles in the snow to substandard schools where eoually

impoverished teachers taught. These rural "pigsty" schools

IL
- _ .LE.

203

were deplorable when compared to expensive universities and
technical schools. Russia must make an extraordinary effort
to eliminate these dire conditions in order to offer Russian
youth the best education possible. Also, Russia must estab-
lish new schools on all educational levels. The schools
should be modeled after the French system which included
small universities in each province, where peasant children
could exercise their "inalienable and sacred right" to pur-
sue an education.27 Suvorin, of course, could speak from
first—hand knowledge about the educational plight of peas-
ant children. Now the largely self-educated Suvorin sought
to use his influence to improve the educational opportunities
of Russian children from backgrounds similar to his.

When Vannovskii assembled a commission to prepare
education reforms, the news was greeted with criticism.28
The character of this commission indicated that it would con-
tinue the preliminary liberalization of Russian school our-
riculum begun by Bogolepov. Under Bogolepov, efforts were
begun to reduce the emphasis on Latin and Greek grammar and
classics. Further, teachers were given some discretionary
Powers to concentrate on new ideas and present contemporary
subjects. Vannovskii's intentions to proceed along these

liberal lines were viewed as a dangerous threat to the

¥

27Novoe vremia, April 8 (April 21), 1901, p. 2.

28Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia II,
I) 163-6L.

204

Tolstoi system and Opponents of reform challenged curriculum
changes.29 Commenting on Prince S. Trubetskoi's article in
the S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti expressing alarm over resist-
ance to educational changes, Suvorin joined in condemning
critics of reform. Trubetskoi charged these critics were
confused and frightened by new teaching methods which were
imagined to be responsible for radicalism in Russian schools.
In addition, critics complained that de-emphasiaing Latin

and Greek grammar would undermine the training of future
generations. The recommended reforms of recent commissions
were considered by some to be alien and fanciful schemes
which sought to revolutionize Russian schools.3O These
harsh views, Suvorin asserted, were represented by the
Moskovskiia vedomosti, heir to Katkov's concept of classical
schools and the Tolstoi system. For over thirty years, the
pages of this newspaper defended the meaningless rote method
which the shameful Russian classical system perpetuated. New
teaching methods were branded as "radical" and ignored by
critics even though the Tolstoi system inspired only hatred
in students towards schools. Critics feared that innovative
teaching methods concentrating on the "movement of ideas"

would give students knowledge of social atmosphere and

 

29A. Kireev, "O predstoiashchei reforme nashego
obrazovaniia," Russkii vestnik, January 1902, p. 317.

30S.-Peterburgskiia vedomosti, May 1 (May In),
1901, p. 3.

205

encourage social disorders.

The reform proposals of Vannovskii's commission
were ratified by the Tsar in early June, 1901, and scheduled
for implementation in September of the same year. Essen-
tially, Vannovskii began the creation of a unified secondary
school system to be completed within the next three years.
Under this system, Latin and Greek, the core of Tolstoi's
classical system, were downgraded in importance and removed
as admission requirements to the universities. Curriculum
revisions gave increased time to such contemporary subjects
as modern languages, geography and sciences. The drift of
these revisions was against the traditionalism of the Tolstoi
system. Defenders of this system revived their opposition
in November, 1901, when comments from school districts
stirred a reaction against Vannovskii's threat to the
Tolstoi system.32

Once again, Suvorin rose to defend Vannovskii's
reform plans. He made clear his disapproval of classical
studies under the Tolstoi system. Classicism, Suvorin con-
ceded, provided an excellent foundation to Western Europe's
academic system. For instance, the fine English universi-

ties, Cambridge and Eton, were founded on classical studies.

 

31Novoe vremia, May 5 (May 18), 1901, p. 2.

32Kireev, "O predstoiashchei reforme nashego
obrazovaniia, " p. 319.

206

Even Germany and France were committed to classical studies.
Russians encountered difficulty with classical studies,
Suvorin suggested, because the Tolstoi system failed to im-
part a true appreciation of the classics. Tolstoi introduced
only the first stages of classical studies and the result
was a lifeless and incomplete educational system with little
connection to Russia's historical tradition. Introducing
Vannovskii's reforms, Suvorin argued, would balance Russian
education. Classical studies offered an important under-
standing of European society because Latin and Greek were
the essence of Europe's scholarship in the time of the
Renaissance while Russia remained backward until Peter the
Great reformed Russia. The classical studies were intro-
duced into Russian education in order to open the wealth of
European antiquity and scholarship. However, with Russian
translations of the classics available, Suvorin believed it
was not now necessary for the masses of Russian children to
study the classical languages in order to appreciate the
classics. Studying the classics must not be compulsory,

but several gymnasiums should retain the classical languages
for those who wished to study them.33 The new school reforms
were designed to incorporate appreciation of the foreign
classics in an independent Russian school system which

would no longer merely imitate European schools. Instead,

 

NOVOG Vremia, November In (November 27), 1901:

 

pp. 2-3.

207

Suvorin shared the minister of education's appeal, on March
20, 1901, that the Russian education system should hence-
forth concentrate on strengthening the foundations of Rus-
sian culture. The greater emphasis given to Russian liter-
ature in preference to classical studies would hopefully
stimulate youth to know and appreciate their country.
Hence, Suvorin viewed Vannovskii's reforms as instilling
both general knowledge and patriotic devotion to Russia.
His support of educational changes was indicative of his
desire for progressive reforms which would modernize Rus-
sia, encourage nationalism and preserve the autocracy.

At the same time he supported educational reforms,

Suvorin joined a debate on the question of religious freedom.

The press dialogue on this topic began in October, when M.
A. Stakhovich, a Slavophile landowner from the Orel province,

argued for religious freedom in a speech before a missionary

congress in Moscow. In November, 1901, when articles by the

priest T. Cherkasskii appeared in the S.~Peterburg§kiia

vedomosti, Suvorin joined in the press discussion.

 

Cherkasskii had advocated abolishing church schools and sem-
inaries and replacing them with theological faculties under
Lumiversity control. In addition, he had suggested that
priests be elected and be restricted from wearing clerical
clothes in public. Suvorin objected to Cherkasskii's sug-
gestdxnas, claiming that the Old Believers already incorpor-

ated Cherkasskii's wishes into their religious practices.

208

Yet, because of their militant religious spirit and prac-
tices, the Old Believers had faced hostility and a denial of
religious freedom for two and one-half centuries. Suvorin
stated his stance was in the middle between Cherkasskii and
opponents of religious freedom. He claimed further that his
position and his newspaper's editorials represented "pro-
gressive convictions" held by many educated secular and spiri-
tual persons, including ministers and administrators}!+
These opinions incorporated the position of Professor B. N.
Chicherin, a man of moderate views. His book, Istoriia
politicheskikh uchenii, offered the finest definition of re-
ligious freedom. In Chicherin's opinion, religious freedom
permitted every citizen the right to follow whatever religious
belief he chose without fear of punishment or compulsion to
practice any particular creed. However, Suvorin emphasized
Chicherin's opinion that the state was not bound to tolerate
religious sects which might undermine or offend public
morals. In this area of "church and state relationsfl Suvorin
placed his support with the state, which must be free to de-
velop relations with citizens without church interference.35

Although Suvorin appeared to be accepting a liberal view to-

wards freedom for various religious sects, his position really

 

“My October 5 (October 18), 1901, p. 1.

BSIbid;, November 3 (November 16), 1901, p. 2.

209

only extended to tolerance of religious groups which did not
conflict with the aims of the Russian state and the official
religion, Orthodoxy.

Suvorin's view on the importance of religious is-
sues involving minorities was evident in his attitude toward
the Old Believers. Unlike his position towards certain
other religious minorities, Suvorin approved of changes in
the Russian criminal law softening punishments against the
Old Believers. Even the Holy Synod recognized that the Old
Believers were no longer a serious threat to Orthodoxy and
recommended a conciliatory attitude and tolerance. The re—
forms in the legal code merely reflected the Christian love
of Orthodoxy and were designed to advance the brotherly unity
of the Russian people.36 While Suvorin's attitude towards
religious tolerance for the Old Believers appeared to be pro-
gressive, in fact, Suvorin was only supporting reform measures
for a religious minority that he no longer regarded as a
threat to Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism.

The Poles, however, were a minority that Suvorin
wished assimilated. Although the Poles were a Slavic people,
Suvorin claimed that the Catholicism of the Poles clashed
with Russian Orthodoxy. The origin of this conflict he
traced to Smutnoe vremia when invading Polish Catholics

threatened the existence of the Russian state and Orthodoxy.

 

36Ibid., December 25, 1903 (January 7, 1904), p. 7.

m

210

Since then, the religious differences remained a source of
conflict.37 Suvorin observed that the Poles were responsible
for two abortive revolutions against the Russian Tsar. Fur-
thermore, Polish political intrigue was always rumored at the
source of revolutionary activity in Russia. When, in May,
1901, the Russian government deliberated the establishment of
zemstvos in the heavily Polish~populated provinces in western
and southwestern Russia, Suvorin favored their introduction
as an effective means to advance the assimilation of the
Poles into Russian society. The Russian and Polish elements
would be brought together in the zemstvos and the zemstvo
schools would succeed in educating the youth in Russian cul-
ture. The work of "Russification" would be carried out by
the zemstvos and Polish culture would be rebuffed in these
provinces.38 In practice, therefore, Suvorin did not tol-
erate Polish Catholicism and supported the government's pol-
icy of "Russification" to suppress and eventually eliminate
this religious group.

Suvorin's harsh treatment of Jews was a notorious
example of his intolerance of religious minorities which he
felt threatened Orthodoxy. In fact, his criticism of the
Jewish population earned Suvorin a reputation as one of Rus-

sia's leading anti-Semites. Suvorin primarily directed his

 

37123gg, August 7 (August 20), 1900, p, 2,

38Ibid., May 3 (May 16). 1901. p- 2-

211

attacks against the Jews for not assimilating into Russian
society. The Jewish people, Suvorin claimed, managed to
survive for thousands of years by their ability to accommo-
date to circumstances while still preserving their religion.
The beginnings of disorders involving Jews he traced back to
pogroms in Odessa when he was an editor with the S.-Peter-
burgskiia vedomosti. Although the Jewish pogroms that fol-
lowed were largely motivated by economic issues, Suvorin ar-
gued that Jewish problems were increasingly tied to the
question of religious freedom. Suvorin excluded Jews from
the privilege of religious freedom mainly because he doubted
that Jews could really become loyal Russian citizens. Jews
could not change their allegiance from the "Promised Land"
to Russia; but only Jews who converted to Christianity
could become loyal Russian citizens.39
Suvorin also displayed his anti-Jewish attitudes
in other ways. For example, he permitted the St. Petersburg
Theatrical-Literary-Artistic Society to perform an anti-
Jewish play "Kontrabanda" in his Malyi teatr. Charges that
this play, representing only the negative side of Jews, ex-
cited religious and racial hatred were dismissed by Suvorin
as the smears of Jewish writers and short-sighted liberals.
It was the Jews, by their opposition to the performance of

this play, who intensified hatred against themselves. The

 

3912iéaa December 2 (December 15), 1903, p. 3.

212

public, Suvorin insisted, had a right and responsibility to
see this play.l+0

Another facet of Suvorin's anti-Jewish attitudes
surfaced in his article supporting the formation of a Union
of Stage Activities Members of the Russian Theatrical Society.
While extolling the merits of this Union, Suvorin criticized
permitting "members of the Israelite religion" to participate
without restrictions. There were great numbers of Jews in-
volved in all aspects of the Russian theater. Suvorin ar-
gued that the number of Jews allowed to participate in the
theater should be restricted by a quota similar to the ten-
per-cent quota imposed on Jewish students in universities.
These ouotas in education insured that only the most quali-
fied Jews obtained an education while the educational sys-
tem maintained a Slavic essence. In addition, Suvorin did
not believe that Jews should earn the "rank of honorary cit-
izenship" for theatrical achievements, since Russia did not
bestow similar rewards on other craftsmen, such as black-
smiths or farmers, for achievements.

In general, Suvorin feared the Jewish population
would become an economic and privileged element in the pro-
fessional and industrial sectors of Russian society. When

the Jewish newspaper Novosti attacked the Novoe vremia bookstore

 

holgid;, January 7 (January 20), 1901, p, 2,

“libid;, February 5 (February 18), 1901, p. 2.

213

for discriminating against Jewish students, Suvorin charged
the Novosti was always full of Jewish lies and slander against

Novoe vremia. In the face of increasing Jewish attacks,

 

Novoe vremia represented a "small Egypt" and Suvorin was its

 

"pharaoh" fighting Jewish expansion. The existence of Jewish
elements that resisted assimilation in the Russian population
threatened the homogenity of the Russian state."2 Following
Chicherin, such elements should, therefore, not be accorded
religious freedom.

Suvorin also shared many of Chicherin's views on
the Russian political process and termed Chicherin's ideas on
Russia's development and stagnation "enlightened patriotism."
buvorin and Chicherin both had tremendous admiration for the
reforms of Alexander II as a foundation for a secure politi-
cal order in Russia.“3 Suvorin's discussion of Chicherin's
works in late 1901 reflected the increasing political agita-
tion in the country. Early political activity emerged pri-
marily in the ranks of the zemstvo leaders, who made moderate
demands for reforms while Nicholas II and nis government con-
tinued to adhere to policies of repression and reaction
against them. This unyielding policy in the face of growing
discontent, especially among the workers and peasants, only

focused increasing attention on politic 1 questions and the

 

“leggg, November 6 (November 19), 1901, p. 2.

“31211;: November 3 (November 16), 1901, o. 2.

 

 

21h

need for reforms. This period marked the formative stage

of what later evolved into the liberal movement under the
zemstvos. Consonant with his support of Witte's progressive
plans, Suvorin joined in stimulating public sentiment for
reform.

In January, 1902, Suvorin compared Russia's politi-
cal climate to the atmosphere of the sixties and earlier pe-
riods of reform. The first parallel Suvorin envisioned was
between the events in 1902 and the moods of Smutnoe vremia,
when the old boyar—dominated government ignored the lower
classes' demands for reform and was destroyed. Suvorin
agreed with C. T. Platonov's book, Ocherki pg istorii smuty,
that middle classes, merchants and lesser nobility were the
victors in this struggle and emerged as the new ruling class.
This same element in the zemstvos now led the movement for
reform. In another similarity, Suvorin observed that Russia
had experienced eras of reform in each of the past three
centuries. Each reform period was preceded by war and severe
internal discontent and disturbances. Coincidentally, the
reform eras corresponded to the decades of the sixties in
the three past centuries. These events marked the reigns of
Alexis, Catherine II, and Alexander II, in the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. In each
reign, reforms were introduced from above to ouell domestic
discontent aggravated by the impact of war. Now, alluding to

the Far Eastern situation, Suvorin questioned whether another

215

"foreign invasion" would occur. He hoped, instead, that the
only "foreign invasion" would be "reason" and "enlighten-
ment."hh He confidently proclaimed the reforms of the six-
ties would direct Russia in a new historical cycle towards a
bright future.

Peaceful reforms did not materialize as Suvorin
had hoped. Instead, the government continued to pursue re-
actionary policies and ignore the moderate demands of the
zemstvos. The spring of 1902 saw the spread of rural unrest,
and the April assassination of Minister of Interior Sipiagin
brought more repressive policies from new Minister of Interior
Plehve. A general strike in southern Russia during the summer
of 1903 accented the seriousness of the domestic crisis and

generated Speculation in the European press of a revolution-

45

ary tide in Russia.

A nationalist at heart, Suvorin defended Russia
against the "lies" circulating in the European press. Worker
unrest was created by rapid and unprecedented industrial de-
‘velopment. Russia's industrial development, occurring in
14333 than fifty years, transformed the society so dramatically
tduat education and legislation could not keep pace with chang-

iJug conditions. Russia would now give eoual time to these

thbid., January 1 (January la), 1902, p. 7.

‘5London Times, September a, 1903, p. a.

216

reforms.

While domestic discontent mushroomed, the zemstvos
progressed in their struggle against the government's reac-
tionary policies. The government's punitive measures had un-
wittingly tended to strengthen zemstvo opposition. "Beseda,"
a small group of zemstvo oppositionary elements led by N.
Shipov, rallied progressive leaders by holding periodic con-
ferences and planning activities throughout Russia. In 1901,
these activities gave impetus to the publication of a journal,

Osvobozhdenie. Published abroad, the journal was dedicated to

 

all phases of reform and attempted to unite those interested
in the political liberation of Russia. Additional stimulus
to the zemstvo movement developed in early 1902, when Witte's
study of agricultural problems encouraged the first all-
Russian congress of zemstvo leaders in Moscow to demand par-
ticipation of the zemstvos in government policy-making.“7
These demands were repeated at the April, 1902, congress.
Next, the new liberal organization, Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia,
aimed at establishing a democratic constitutional regime in
thssia, was founded in July, 1903.h8 As a result of these

EN3tivities, the zemstvos, in August, 1903, formed the basis

héNovoe vremia, July 30 (August 12), 1903, p. 2.

 

‘ 47D. N. Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom
(NIOSCOWD 1918), pp. 152-580

#81. P. Belokonski, Zemskoe dvizhenie (Moscow,
1911+), PP. l7h-75, 191-92.

E?

 

 

217

of a new reform movement.

Meanwhile, the general strike had drastically
undermined the Tsar's confidence in Witte's domestic pol-
icies and contributed to the minister of finance's downfall
in mid-August, 1903. With the departure of Witte, Suvorin
transferred his support to the zemstvos as acceptable insti-
tutions to foster reforms. It was almost three months after
Witte's fall, however, before Suvorin published his support
for the small, moderate zemstvo element led by D. N. Shipov.
Suvorin's views became known in his rebuttal to Prince
Meshcherskii's attacks on Shipov and seventeen other zemstvo
leaders for leaving a meeting with Kokovtsov's agricultural
commission. Suvorin scolded the Grazhdanin editor for in-
sulting the zemstvo leaders. The zemstvo leaders were deter-
mined to eloquently express their opinions regarding rural
life and Russia would profit from their experience.“9 In
defending the zemstvo leaders, Suvorin broke his silence on
zemstvos and their activities, which had lasted while Witte
ivas in power. Since Witte was an avowed opponent of the
zemstvos, Suvorin's silence until Witte's fall was not sur-
Inrising.50 Furthermore, Suvorin's support for Shipov and
hiss followers showed his sympathy for the Slavophile element

Vflrich made up a small, rather conservative, wing of the

thovoe vremia, October 31 (November 12), 1903, p. 3.

 

508. I. Witte, Konspekt lektsii o narodnom i

osudarstvennom khoziaistve (St. Petersburg, l9l2), p. 183.

218

zemstvo movement.

In contrast to Meshcherskii, Suvorin asserted that
he did not fear another reform period as dangerous or revolu-
tionary. Russia needed reasonable and creative reforms. The
source of these reforms must be the government if revolution
from "below" was to be avoided. Yet, at the same time,
Kokovtsev's recent request for advice from zemstvos leaders
was an important Step in allowing responsible elements to
participate in government affairs. The zemstvos were not
seeking to formulate legislation; their role was to provide
the government with the opinions of the people. Shipov was
representing the "petition" of the people to the Tsar.5 By
urging the government to continue seeking the participation
of the Shipov-led zemstvos, Suvorin cast his support with
those zemstvo elements who desired progressive reforms while
preserving the autocracy.

The zemstvos, Suvorin recalled, had emerged a half
century earlier, when the government sought to renovate Rus-
sian society by initiating "lawful order" in place of the
(tisorder, slavery and arbitrary legal system of the eighteen-
fd.fties. He conceded that efforts to develop "lawful order"
evgantually would lead to parliamentarianism and currently
the: vast majority of zemstvos leaders favored such a movement.

Suvxorin, however, did not believe Russia was prepared for

51Novoe vremia, November 3 (November 16), 1903, p. 2.

 

219

parliamentary institutions, contending that Russia required
a well-developed legal system and strong local political
institutions before a parliament could be introduced.52
Thus, he openly rejected the desires of some of the more
liberal zemstvo leaders for a representative legislative

body operating within the framework of a constitutional mon-
archy. Instead, he preferred the more gradual participation
of the zemstvos in Russian life and their serving as an ad-
visory organ to the government on local affairs.

Suvorin's interest in the zemstvos reflected his
opinion that the pressing needs of agriculture were at the
source of growing unrest. While the government made an in-
tensified effort to improve industry, the important needs of
agriculture were neglected. Russian agriculture was cur-
rently in dire distress because, due to the government's
neglect, the peasants continued to cultivate the lands with
primitive farming techniques and lived in poverty. The
government must exert the same determined efforts to develop
agriculture as it was applying on behalf of industry. With-
cnit extraordinary initiative by the government, Suvorin pre-
di.cted the agriculture question, which influenced all Russia's
Prliblems, would not improve. The millions spent annually to

Combat chronic famines were much larger than the small sums

2
5 Ibid., November 8 (November 21), 1903, p. 3.

220

appropriated to improve agriculture.53 The zemstvos could
effectively help the government solve these rural problems
since they were self-governing institutions which had already
produced systematic programs to improve local conditions.5h

Nevertheless, the prevailing reactionary circles in
the government continued to regard the zemstvos as a threat 5*
to autocracy. Minister of Interior Plehve pursued his re-
pressive policies against the zemstvos and joined forces with
the ambitious Bezabrazov Circle in diverting the attention of
the nation to the Far East.55 By early December, the criti-
cal negotiations with Japan were replacing domestic reforms
as the leading issue before the Russian public. Suvorin op-
posed these tactics and deplored the possibility of war with
Japan.56 Instead, the publisher preferred that domestic re-
forms remain the chief concern of the government and people.

The favorable comments of Suvorin on zemstvo acti-
vities and his prediction of another political "spring" drew
further criticism from Prince Meshcherskii. In contrast to
Meshcherskii, who blamed the reforms for the Polish insur-
remtion and the "nihilism" that followed, Suvorin repeated

Iris sympathy for a repetition of the reforms of the sixties.

53LEEQL, November 5 (November 18), 1903, p. 3.
Shlbid;, November 16 (November 29), 1903, p. 3.
55Witte, Vospominaniia, I, 262.

S6Novoe vremia, November 18 (December 1), 1903,

 

 

221

 

These reforms were beneficial to Russia but were poorly re-
ceived because Russian society was largely illiterate and
did not fully comprehend or appreciate their significance.
Furthermore, the administration's bungling alienated a sector
of educated citizens. Unfortunately, during the remainder of E“‘
Alexander II's reign, the government ignored disenchanted F

elements and wasted time and energy in fighting wars rather

than using its resources to effectively complete the reforms.
Under Alexander III, Russia remained at peace and the reform
movement resumed progress in local and national education,

in the organization of financial affairs, in the development
of industry and in the establishment of noble and peasant
banks. Nicholas II had already completed two important feats:
the Trans-Siberian Railway and financial reform. The govern-
ment accomplished all this in only forty years, when it was
popular to believe the government's domestic program was stag-
nant and internal reforms were suspended.57 As a journalist
who had lived through the reigns of four tsars, Suvorin de-
clared Russia was on the brink of another "creative" era like
tlie sixties and not in the midst of "doom," as popularly con-
cxeived.58 The vast majority of the Russian people were ra-
timbnal and supported civil order but they insisted on active-

lY participating in Russian life and on assurance of their

57123QL, December 3 (December 16), 1903, p. 3.

SSEEid;, December 12 (December 25), 1903, p. 3.

222

legal rights.59
In late December, 1903, Suvorin praised the prog-

ress reports of the Commission on the Needs of Agriculture

as indicative of the Tsar's intentions to introduce other
creative reforms from above and complete the renovation of
Russia begun in 1861. Furthermore, a review of the materials
compiled by the commission proved the contributions of the
zemstvos to Russia. The sixty-volume report of the commission
offered an excellent study of agricultural problems and

Suvorin urged the government to carry out the reforms

suggested.

In the face of the growing crisis with Japan,
Suvorin made his last appeal to the government not to post-
pone important domestic reforms because of foreign affairs.
As a prime example of neglect, Suvorin cited the judicial
system which was partially revamped in 1867. The new court
reforms were only superficial and did not fundamentally im-
prove the legal system. Subsequent reform attempts failed
to materialize and the stagnation in the courts contributed
'totpopular misunderstanding and discontent. The educational
System suffered from the same dereliction, giving rise to
(file recent controversy between classicists and realists.

Thee institution to solve these problems was the zemstvo to

sglbid;, December 3 (December 16), 1903, p. 3.

éolbid;, December 16 (December 29), 1903, p. 3.

223

which the "best people" were elected and which had gained
considerable experience in the last fifty years. Reforms
were neglected, Suvorin lamented, because the zemstvos were
not given full responsibility in these areas. It was the
recent activities of the zemstvos that stirred the begin-
ning of another "spring." Despite the barbs by another
journalist against his support of reforms and zemstvos,
Suvorin predicted that widespread public discussions would
show the existence of a serious movement demanding reforms
despite the threat of war with Japan. Political reforms
at home were far more important than territorial claims at
stake in the Far East; the government must not be diverted

61

from domestic reforms. Unfortunately, Suvorin's plea went

unheeded. In a few weeks, Russia plunged into the disastrous
war with Japan and the movement for reform subsided momentar-
ily while public attention focused on the war.

Originally, Suvorin's reform desires had begun with
his support for the Pitte system which sought to overcome
iiussia's industrial backwardness. Witte's program encouraged
ESuvorin to champion progressive reforms in Russia's educa-
tzional system. He also favored improvement in the treating
01? minorities, hoping that the change would result in the
I¥rpid assimilation of minorities into Russian society. When

Witte was forced to resign and the stepped-up zemstvo

éllElQL: December 23, 1903 (January 5, 190h), n. 3.

22h

movement stirred hopes for a new "spring" of political re-
forms, Suvorin favored a repetition of the reforms "from
above" that characterized the 1860's. A nationalist and a
firm believer in autocracy, he carefully supported only
those progressive reforms which he felt would both retain
the Russian autocratic political system and accelerate the

modernization of Russia.

CHArTER VII

WAR INTERRUPTS THE "COMING OF SPRING."

The outbreak of war changed the high priority
Suvorin placed on domestic reforms. He foresaw that a mili-
tary victory over Japan would be difficult to achieve and
shifted his emphasis towards encouraging an enthusiastic
public commitment to winning the war. The series of military
defeats and bureaucratic blunders that marked the conduct of
the war, however, soon caused Suvorin to renew his interest
in limited internal reforms as a necessary step towards vic-
tory. When domestic discord and revolutionary activities
reached high proportions, Suvorin increased his support of
reforms still further, hoping that the prospect of politi-
cal change from above would quell the disorder and unite a
dissident population behind the war.

The Japanese attack on Port Arthur triggered the
disruption of reform discussion and directed public attention
on the Far East. Suvorin summarized the prevailing attitude
on February 25, 190A, when he wrote that the Japanese threat

pushed aside his early dreams of "spring" and focused his

225

226

concern on Russia's victory}- The Russian people were eoual-
ly caught up in this patriotic spirit, he claimed, dismiss-
ing rumors that there were Russians who desired defeat for
their country because they believed defeat would bring
changes in Russia similar to the reforms which followed the
end of the Sevastopol campaign in 1856. According to his
own memories of the period, the defeat of Russia at Sevasto-
pol was not responsible for ushering in the era of reforms.
On the contrary, victory would have brought the same reforms
because the reform movement was strong before the Sevastopol
campaign. Russia was moving towards political maturity
again and a military victory rather than a crushing defeat
would be the best assurance of progressive reforms. France's
slow development since her humiliation by Germany in 1870 was
ample evidence of the devastating effects military losses
could have upon a country.2 Thus, with Russia immersed in
war, Suvorin strongly opposed internal discord and, during
the next four months, concentrated on stimulating patriotism
while avoiding discussion of domestic issues.

By the end of June, 1904, however, Russia's ob-

vious military ineptness prompted Suvorin to criticize

 

1E. Maevskii, "Obshchaia kartina dvizheniia," in
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka,
ed. byI._Martov, II (St. Petersburg,1910I7‘36.

2Novoe vremia, February 10 (February 25), 190h, p.
3; March 192(April I), 1904, p. 2; May 5 (May 18), l90h, p.
3.

227

Russian education, noting that in the vital area of scien—
tific instruction, Russian students were far behind their
European and American peers. Undoubtedly, Russia's weak
educational system contributed to Russian backwardness in
agriculture, culture and industry, as well as to the current

3

military crisis in the Far East. The navy's deficiencies
in technical education were a major factor contributing to
combat losses against Japanese naval forces. Such short-
comings were a manifestation of Russia's need to develop
technical education in all spheres of Russian life.“
Suvorin's comments on the Russian educational sys-
tem constituted an indirect attack on the policies of.Minis-
ter of Interior Plehve who resumed influence over Russian
education with Witte's exit from political power. Under
Plehve's guidance, the reform-oriented Minister of Education
Vannovskii was succeeded by the conservative G. von Sanger
and later by the reactionary V. Glazov. By the early summer
of 1904, Plehve had resurrected the reactionary Tolstoi edu-
cational system and was seriously impeding advances in tech-
nical education.5 Suvorin's position reflected the growing

interest in internal reforms among the Russian public and

the zemstvo movement during the summer of 190h. Where war

 

31bid., June 10 (June 23), 19ou, p. 2.

"Ibid., June 28 (July 11), 190a, p. 2.

5Ol'denburg, Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia II,
I , 195-96o

228

patriotism had initially distracted public attention from

domestic reforms, the string of military defeats now caused
the population to look internally for explanations of Rus-
sia's poor performance.6 Opposition to Plehve's repressive
domestic policies began to revive and culminated in his as-
sassination on July 28, 1904 by a revolutionary terrorist.
Plehve's death signaled the need for the Tsarist government
to consider reforms.

Plehve's assassination was not welcomed by Suvorin
whose immediate public reaction was to condemn political
assassination as an irrational measure to gain "freedom" for
the Russian people. Plehve's assassination would only rally
the enemies of Russia's development and delay moderate and
peaceful reforms. Although he did not champion Plehve's re-
pressive policies, Suvorin regarded his assassination as the
murderous act of a madman. History proved that assassina-
tion was a political mistake; Plehve's assassin did not rep-
resent the general views of Russian society. Nevertheless
Suvorin pointed out that in the last two years many impor-
tant problems were unresolved because Russia's poorly-
organized ministers and administration failed to deal ef-

fectively with them. Petty squabbles among the ministers had

 

6Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-
iaponskaia voina," pp. 20-21.

7E. N. Trubetskoi, "Voina 1 biurokratsiia," Pravo,
XXXIX (September 26, 1904), 1,872-875.

229

prevented decisive action before the war; now, the people
expected the ministers to unite and concentrate their ef-
forts on winning the war.8 Thus after a considerable period
of silence on domestic issues, Suvorin found that certain
internal conditions were subverting the war effort and accel-
erating public aspirations for reform. At least some aspects
of the "spring" about which he dreamed could not wait until
the war's end. Not only were reforms necessary for the sake
of managing the war, but Suvorin now appeared to believe

that some progress in the direction of reforms would be nec-
essary to keep the people behind the war effort.

To end ministerial discord Suvorin urged the Tsar
to create a "cabinet of ministers" as a replacement for the
current system in which the ministers each reported directly
to the Tsar and met only infrequently in a Council of Minis-
ters presided over by the Tsar. Liberals and conservatives
both supported a true policy-making cabinet of ministers
headed by a prime minister as essential to ending obsolete
government practices. A united cabinet of ministers would
provide a stable government responsive to the needs of the
population and would strengthen the state in the immediate
future. The separate policies of ministers only complicated
state business and impeded its advance. A cabinet would be

an important change in the governmental system which had

 

8Novoe vremia, July 16 (July 29), 190h, p. 2.

230

provided leadership and reforms "from above" since Peter the

Great opened the window to Europe. However, Suvorin claimed,
the governmental system established by Peter was sound and
most importantly was designed for creative change by the
Tsar.9 Hence, Suvorin adopted a moderate position which
looked to the Tsar as the catalyst for change and did not
seek fundamentally to alter the autocracy.

In conjunction with ministers united behind a
solid government program, Suvorin suggested, the zemstvos
could provide excellent assistance to the government bureauc-
racy. Contrary to Meshcherskii's charges, the zemstvos
would provide government officials with independent advice
and candid criticism. Only the coordinated efforts of the
ministers, government officials and zemstvos could cope
with Russia's problems.10 With military operations falter-
ing in the Far East and public confidence in the government
crumbling, Suvorin urged a reversal of Plehve's reactionary
programs, the adoption of moderate policies designed to pro-
mote reforms and the extension of government participation to
include the zemstvos.

Meanwhile Nicholas II gave serious consideration
to a new minister of interior who would continue Plehve's

policies, but the major defeat for the Russian army at

 

91bid., July 19 (August 1), 190a, p. 2.

10Ibid., July 25 (August 7), 1904, p. 2.

231

Liaoyang accelerated the reform movement. As a result,
Nicholas II chose Prince P. D. Sviatopolk-Mirski as minis-
ter of interior on September 8, 1904. The new minister, who
was considerably less conservative than Plehve, promised
policies which would restore mutual "trust" between the peo-
ple and state. His assurance that a "political spring" had
begun was welcomed by the public and created a brief period

of optimism.11

Privately Suvorin welcomed Sviatopolk-Mirski but
publicly he remained silent.12 Instead, the encircled de-
fenders of Port Arthur and the defeats inflicted on
Kuropatkin's forces occupied Suvorin's attention as he at-
tempted to rally war support. Claims that the war was not
popular, Suvorin insisted, were not true.13 With Russia's
honor and army threatened, political differences over dom-
estic cuestions were subordinated to the cause of victory.
However, he claimed that the patriotism responsible for the
mass support of the war was also producing the "political

spring" he had expected before the war.1h Suvorin, there-

fore, characterized the reform movement as a product of the

 

11Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-iaponskaia
voina," p. 25.

12Suvorin, Dnevnik, pp. 320-21.

l3Novoe vremia, August 28 (September 10), 1904, p. 2.

1“Ibid., August 30 (September 12), 1904, p. 2.

 

232

patriotic enthusiasm generated by the war effort rather than
a manifestation of domestic unrest and dissatisfaction with
the autocratic government. He appears to have been attempt-
ing to establish a cause and effect relationship between sup-
port for the war and reform, while at the same time mini-
mizing the seriousness of the growing domestic discontent.
Thus, when Suvorin rejected an offer from President Roosevelt
to mediate, he denied that Russia's domestic problems neces-
sarily symbolized the decline of the population's patriotism.
0n the contrary, the Russian people wanted victory in the Far
East because reforms would accompany it. Suvorin was cer-
tain the people's reform aspirations would be rewarded by
the Tsar when victory brought peace.

Meanwhile the new minister of interior's moderate
pronouncements engendered a large-scale, enthusiastic re-
sponse from the public and moderate elements of the zemstvo
movement under D. N. Shipov's leadership led in consoli-
dating a national reform movement.16 The increased activi-
ties of the zemstvos inspired the liberal zemstvo wing or-
ganized under the Union of Liberation to pressure for demo—

cratic reforms and a constitutional monarchy.l7 In early

 

ISLEid;, October 11 (October 24), 1904, pp. 2-3.

16
pp. 2A0-l4’30

Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom,

l7Chernyshev, Agrarno-krestianskaia politika za 150
at, p. 2680

H

233

October, with the assistance of Sviatopolk-Mirski, Shipov
joined with Union of Liberation leaders in calling for a
third zemstvo congress to meet in early November, 1904.18
Sviatopolk-Mirskii's promises to restore "public
confidence" and his interaction with the zemstvos excited
Suvorin, who hoped the forthcoming zemstvo congress was the
beginning of serious "creative" activities. Only by in-
volving progressive elements in its affairs could the govern-
ment counteract the spread of revolutionary ideas. Partici—
pation of citizens in government affairs was the fastest
course to renewed harmony.19
Throughout October the congress appeared to have
the Tsar's sanction. However, on the eve of the congress,
the Tsar refused to approve the meeting because liberal
zemstvos leaders made clear their intentions to discuss
broad political reforms. Despite the Tsar's objection, the
zemstvo congress met in St. Petersburg from November 6 to
9, 1904, and adopted "eleven points" which demanded moder-

ate democratic reforms.

These "eleven points" became the rallying point

 

 

 

lsShipov, VOSpominaniia i dumy o perezhitom,
pp. 244-53-

19Novoe vremia, September 21 (October 4), 1904,
p. 2.

20Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom,
pp. 25"?‘85 o

234

A

for reform elements throughout Russia.‘1 In essence, these
points constituted a national program requesting the Tsar
to grant civil liberties and summon a representative nation-
al assembly.22 In mid-November, the "eleven points" were
submitted to the minister of interior and the Tsar for con-
sideration. While the government studied these demands, a
"banouet movement" began on November 20 and spread through-
out Russia. The dinner participants, representing most pro-
fessional bodies, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and teachers,
expressed agreement with the demands of the zemstvo leaders.
These banquets were evidence of widespread public support
for reforms.23 By early December, the professional and
educated classes were almost unanimous in endorsing the
zemstvo resolutions.

As the government appeared to be compromising on

the "eleven points! Suvorin commented favorably in his

 

21
Suvorin, Dnevnik, p. 322.

22The "eleven points" included freedom of speech,
association, press, and religion; no punishment without judi-
cial proceedings; the inviolability of person and home; the
responsibility of officials for violations of the law; equal-
ity of rights for all citizens; peasant reforms; expansion
of zemstvo responsibilities and calling of an assembly of
"representatives of the people." The entire text of the
prograg is found in Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom,
pp. 15 -52.

23N. Cherevanin, "Dvizhenie intelligentsii" in
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX:go veka,
edl‘by L.‘Martov, II (St._Petersburg, 1910),146963.

235

24
memoirs on the national movement. In Novoe vremia he

 

wrote that public activities in support of the zemstvo de-
mands were the basis of the "political spring" that he fore-
casted a year earlier. However, he cautioned that political
change in Russia would be much slower than in Europe. The
minister of interior would have to study the moods and abil-
ities of various groups demanding reforms before he could act.
Hence, the minister was following a policy of laissez faire,

laissez passir. Furthermore, the war effort complicated ex-

 

tensive political reforms. Despite these difficulties,
Suvorin insisted the demands for reforms and the social-
political awakening was passing beyond small political cir-
cles to the masses. The leadership of this reform movement
was provided by Shipov and M. A. Stakhovich, whom Suvorin
viewed as spokesmen for the progressive elements of the no-
bility and leaders really representative of Russia. He
claimed they typified sensible thinking Russians and did not
merely repeat Slavophile arguments or copy western ideas as
M. M. Speranski did in preparing his constitutional project.
Instead, they offered an independent view of the Russian popu-
lation's needs. Suvorin declared his support for Shipov's
and Stakhovich's concept of a representative assembly which
would act as a consultative body and would bring cooperation

between the people and their government. Creating this

 

2“Suvorin, Dnevnik, p. 326.

236

representative assembly would assure reforms through peaceful
evolution rather than violent revolution. Political freedom
and a representative assembly were the immediate needs of the
Russian people and Suvorin urged the Tsar to grant zemstvo de-
mands. The Tsar and Russian people must work together on re-
solving domestic needs in order to avoid undermining the war
against Japan.25 In supporting Shipov and Stakhovich,

Suvorin once again allied himself with moderate elements
within the zemstvo movement who favored continuance of the
autocracy and victory in the war with Japan.

In an effort to pacify society and stem revolu-
tionary feelings, the Tsar and the Council of Ministers dis-
cussed the possibility of zemstvo representatives partici-
pating in legislation. As a result, on December 25 the Tsar
issued a ukaze promising a series of reforms, including free-
dom of speech, religious tolerance, and local government.

At the last minute the Tsar had decided not to include any
mention of a representative assembly.26 Suvorin praised the
Tsar's ukaze promising improvements, proclaiming that it
proved the "political spring" was real. The Tsar's program
of government reforms surpassed the peasant emancipation.

The government's project to "find the best means" and

25Novoe vremia, November 30 (December 13), 1904,
p. 3.

268. B. Veselovskii, Krestianskii vgpros i
kgestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 1902-1906Agg ‘(St. Petersburg,

1907), pp. 27-2g0

237

resolve Russia's vital problems was a challenging task but
the Council of Ministers working with the zemstvo represent-
atives would undoubtedly provide a favorable answer to pOpu-
lar demands for civil liberties and freedom from the arbi-
trary abuses of government bureaucracy. In a concluding
burst of optimism, Suvorin proclaimed Russia was entering a
Renaissance.27
The failure of the autocratic government to in-
clude plans for a representative assembly in the ukaze of
December 25, 1904 generated increased radicalism by the be-
ginning of the new year and dealt a blow to Shipov's leader-
ship of a loyal zemstvo movement. Mass movements now loomed
as the main effort to secure reforms from the Tsar and news
of the fall of Port Arthur heightened the spread of disorders
and strikes among workers and peasants.28 Suvorin reacted to
Port Arthur's surrender with an emotional appeal for Russian
patriotism and condemned the growing discord arising from the
mass movements. Above all, he feared the possibility that a
revolution would cause the complete collapse and defeat of

Russia in the Far East. In the face of Japan's threat,

Suvorin hoped the people would reject revolutionary ideas

 

27Novoe vremia, December 15 (December 28), 1904,
p. 3.

28Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-iaponskaia
voina," pp. 20-21.

238

and unite behind their Tsar.29 However, the workers did

not follow the course of action which Suvorin outlined. Two
weeks later, on January 22, 1905, a peaceful procession of
St. Petersburg workers seeking to present a petition to the
Tsar were fired upon by Russian troops. As news of this
"Bloody Sunday" massacre spread, it further discredited the
government and accelerated domestic turbulence. By late
January, large segments of Russia's professional classes,
workers and students were engaged in "sympathy strikes" de-
manding reforms.

The paramount demand of the nation-wide revolu-
tionary movement was for a constituent assembly.30 Whether
such an assembly should be an authentic parliament or merely
a consultative body emerged as a central issue of debate be-
tween radical and moderate reform elements. Suvorin chose
the latter position and publicly advocated calling a Zemskii
Sobor to remedy the domestic crisis brought on by the events
of "Bloody Sunday." Although his position was a moderate
one, Suvorin found it necessary to defend his demand from at-
tacks by the reactionary former editor of Russkoe delo,
Sergei Sharpov. Sharapov, an extreme Slavophile, condemned

Suvorin's appeal for a Zemskii Sobor as a threat to the

 

29Novoe vremia, December 2h, 190A (January 6, 1905),
pp. 3-h~

30Trubetskaia, Kniaz S. N. Trubetskoi:
vospominaniia sestgy, pp. 9I-99.

239

autocracy.31 In reply, Suvorin declared Sharapov was con-
fused on the historic role of the Zemskii Sobor in assist-
ing the autocracy. The history of Moscovy clearly showed
the Zemskii Sobor provided sensible advice to the Moscow
Tsars. These "representatives of the Russian people"
strengthened the autocracy and, even more importantly,
elected Michael Romanov, Tsar. Following the Smutnoe
vremia, the Zemskii Sobor ably assisted the youthful Tsar

in freeing Russia from domestic trouble and foreign in-
vaders. Unfortunately, when a bureaucracy was created later
to assist the Tsars, the Zemskii Sobor fell into disuse. It
was not until Catherine II summoned a legislative commission
that an attempt was again made to consult with national
representatives. The materials of Catherine's commission,
kept secret for almost a century, revealed that commission
deputies contributed opinions on the condition of Russia,

as well as suggestions on decentralizing the governmental
system.32 The published materials of Catherine's commis-
sion inspired Alexander III to consider convoking a Zemskii
Sobor to reform Russia and unite the people with the Tsar.
Regretfully bureaucrats, and especially the minister of

interior, obstructed this project because they failed to

 

31

Novoe vremia, January 16 (January 29), 1905,

 

p. h.

BZIbid.

2&0

understand the historical role of the Zemskii Sobor.33

Hence, Alexander III did not summon a Zemskii Sobor and the
project remained dead until 1902, when Plehve objected to
popular demands for a Zemskii Sobor.3h The Zemskii Sobor,
Suvorin claimed, was an institution consistent with Russia's
historical development. Russia should not make the irrepar-
able mistake of France in 1789 when the Estates General un-
der the manipulation of the third estate broke with France's
historical past and eventually adopted a written constitution.
Instead, Russia should follow England's more natural politi-
cal development and through the Zemskii Sobor should grad-
ually adopt an unwritten constitution.35
By early February, Suvorin turned his attention to
strikes by the intelligentsia, which he found difficult to
accept as legitimate. Unlike the workers who struck mainly
for economic reasons, the intelligentsia's aims were pri-

marily political in character and seemed to contradict the

many privileges the intelligentsia had received under

 

33Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press,‘l905), pp. 311418.

3“V. A. Rosenberg, Iz istorii russkoi pechati:
organizatsiia obshchestvennago mneniia v‘Rossii i
nezavisimaiaTbezpartfinaia gazeta "Russkiia védOmosti"

(I863-l918), (Prague, l92hl, p.‘158.

35Novoe vremia, January 16 (January 29), 1905
p. A.

2&1
36

Russia's bureaucratic system. Suvorin's criticism of the
intelligentsia focused on their demand for a parliament

and their rejection of a Zemskii Sobor. He condemned the
small minority of professors and students in the universi-
ties who, in striking for a parliament, prevented other
professors and students from pursuing their scholarly in-
terests. Opponents of a parliament found it impossible to
express their views because of threats from this small min-
ority. Suvorin claimed he had received many letters from
students and their families expressing concern about intimi-
dation for opposing radical or revolutionary students. By
preventing non-strikers from attending classes, the striking
students violated academic freedom and ultimately contributed
to continuing the technical inferiority of Russia evident in

37

the war. The strikes in the universities only accented

the backwardness of Russian education and the poor quality

of students, who now were squandering millions of rubles

38

appropriated for their education. Above all, Suvorin

wanted the schools to remain open and he condemned any at-

tempt either by the strikers or the government to close

39

them. Instead he suggested that professors and students

 

36l§ig4J January 25 (February 7), 1905, pp. 2-3.

37%: February 6 (February 19), 1905, p. 3.

38121Q;: February 3 (February 16), 1905, p. 3.

39;22Q;; February 9 (February 22), 1905, p. 3.

2h2

pursue L. N. Tolstoi's advice for "passive resistance"
against the government's objectionable policies. Although
he admired the students for their ideals and was concerned
because students died on "Bloody Sunday," Suvorin argued
that the students would lose far more in a strike than they
would gain.#0
Pointing to the example of France, Suvorin warned
the intelligentsia to consider the consequences of initiating
a constitution and using a strike or a revolution to achieve
their goals. He condemned all the Russian intelligentsia
participating in the strike movement. The extent of these
strikes threatened revolution and eventual civil war. The
intelligentsia was imprudently contributing to this fright-

AZ Furthermore

ening threat and ignoring rational thinking.
Suvorin censured the intelligentsia for its lack of patriot-
ism and its failure to support the war effort.h3 Suvorin,
therefore, was disenchanted with the intelligentsia on two
major counts, involvement in movements which he felt could
destroy the present political structure and lack of commit-

ment to winning the war. The intelligentsia's "irrational"

actions exemplified the vital need for a Zemskii Sobor which

 

holbigg, February 3 (February 16), 1905, p. 3.
hllgléix February 9 (February 22), 1905, p. 3.
#22212;. February 3 (February 16), 1905, p. 3.

ABEEEQL’ January 25 (February 7), 1905, p. 3.

2h3

offered a rational and peaceful means to achieve reforms.
Suvorin hoped convoking a Zemskii Sobor would influence the
intelligentsia to abandon the strike and concentrate on
peaceful reforms.

The revolutionary movement, Suvorin charged, was
interfering with the government's conduct of the war and
weakening Russia's military position. He claimed numerous
letters from peasants condemned the revolutionaries for
subverting the war effort and agreed that the revolutionary
movement was influenced by Russia's enemy, the Japanese, who
hoped to force the government into concluding an unfavorable
peace. For this reason he abhorred the revolutionary move-
ment's demands for peace and instead urged the government to
convoke a Zemskii Sobor which could also discuss the war.

He categorically rejected the government's position that a
Zemskii Sobor could be summoned only in peacetime.“5

Meanwhile, the Tsar, alarmed by the Spread of dis-
orders and the assassination of officials, considered meas-
ures for "pacifying society." Following the advice of his
top officials, particularly Minister of Finance Kokovtsev,
on March 1, 1905, the Tsar issued a ukaze in which he an-

nounced his intention to summon an imperial duma of elected

deputies to participate in the preliminary discussion of

 

thbid., February 3 (February 16), 1905, p. 3.

45%: February 11+ (February 27), 1905, p. 3.

2AA

legislative measures.“6 On the same day A. G. Bulygin re-
placed Sviatopolk-Mirskii as minister of interior and was
directed to solicit popular opinions as to the nature of the
prospective duma. Issued while Russia was suffering defeat

at thden, the Tsar's compromise was not enough to satisfy the
country. The zemstvos and educated classes continued their
demands for a genuine parliament based on English or French

#7

models.
Suvorin greeted the Tsar's ukaze with jubilance,
proclaiming that all his life he impatiently waited for the
day in Russian history when the Tsar would summon the voice
of the people. The Imperial Duma was equal to a Zemskii
Sobor and would subject all future legislation to mature
and rational public consideration.l+8 Obviously Suvorin was
satisfied by the Tsar's concession and was willing to accept
a consultative assembly with no limitations on the autocracy.
However, not everyone shared Suvorin's enthusiasm. In the
wake of the Tsar's ukaze, new societies were organized to
formulate reform proposals. The new organizations began to

take on the character of political parties which were still

 

“6v. N Kokovtsov Iz moego proshlago: vospomininia,
1903-1919gg. I. (Paris. 193i),

h7V. A. Maklakov, Vlast i obshchestggnnost na
zakate staroi Rossii, vospominaniia (Paris, 19367, pp. 357-
61.

haNovoe vremia, February 17 (March 2), 1905,
p. 3.

2A5

illegal.49 Suvorin noted the formation of constitutional,
progressive and revolutionary groups. The latter, he con-
sidered the most effective group but he condemned its dedi-
cation to destroying order. Instead he supported a moderate
group which would work harmoniously with the Tsar within the
framework of the autocratic system.SO Nevertheless, earlier
comments show he recognized that political conditions in Rus-
sia were forcing various elements to form militant
organizations?l

By mid-March, Suvorin lamented that the domestic
strife was comparable to the war tragedy. Russia was in a
constant state of chaos and almost every citizen was con-
cerned about his national pride after Russia's series of
military defeats. The domestic breakdown from strikes added
to this horror. The most unfortunate action was the closing
of Russia's schools.52 Suvorin joined with Prince
Meshcherskii in comdemning the minister of education for the
"criminal and disgraceful" act of closing all universities

and other higher institutions of learning. Displaying his

 

“9v. A. Maklakov, Vlast i obshchestvennost na
zakate staroi Rossiiljvospomifianiia (Paris, I936), pp. 357-
El.

50Novoe vremia, February 22 (March 7), 1905, p. 3.
51gggg;, February 12 (February 25), 1905, p. 3.

SZLQLQL, February 26 (March 11), 1905, p. 3.

2A6

increasing impatience with bureaucratic ineptness, Suvorin
charged that the minister of education's action was indica-
tive of the government's arbitrariness which Pirogov had
sought to eliminate by seeking self-government of the uni-
versities. It was imperative that the minister of education
acknowledge that closing the universities was an extreme
measure imposed upon a majority of non-striking professors
and students. Furthermore, Suvorin criticized the govern-
ment's silence on the future of the universities after their
closing.53 The government's constant silence characterized
its attitude towards the public and left the people unin-
formed; this weakened the government's influence and power.
Along similar lines, Suvorin was firmly convinced that the
entire domestic crisis could have been averted if the govern-
ment had kept the press well-informed on its policies be-
fore the tragic events of January 22. The public alarm
aroused by Father G. A. Gapon could have been calmed by the
press; but, unfortunately, Minister of Interior Sviatopolk-
Mirskii did not confide the government's position until
January 2h. Suvorin himself was not told of the government's
conciliatory intentions until late in the evening of Jan-
uary 21 when it was too late to effectively influence public
attitudes. The press, Suvorin asserted, was sympathetic to

the government and, with the government's confidence, the

 

53Ibid., March 15 (March 28), 1905, p. 3.

2L7

press would strive to maintain order. For example, when the
Tsar announced his intention to summon a Zemskii Sobor, the
press zealously publicized his action. The government
bureaucracy should acknowledge the power of the press and

5h

utilize its effectiveness. Suvorin's comments reveal that
he not only understood that mass media could be utilized to
influence public opinion but also that he was willing to al-
low the government to utilize the private press in that
manner.

In the early spring moderate elements began to form
political groups and, since political parties were illegal,
began to meet in private quarters to conduct their business
meetings.55 Suvorin looked favorably upon these meetings
of "moderates" as a return to "reason" in Russian political
affairs. The men meeting in these "secret apartments" were
senators, rich landowners, zemstvo leaders and leaders of
the nobility, who labored to overcome the revolutionary
movement and introduce "reasonable" reforms. Basically,
these leaders united around the "eleven points" adopted by
the zemstvos. However, they remained vague as to the nature
of the representative institution which they desired. In
contrast, the revolutionary parties explicitly demanded a

constituent assembly elected by secret ballot. Suvorin made

 

5“Ibid., March 3 (March 16), 1905, p. 2.

55Trubetskaia, Kniaz s. N. Trubetskoi:
Egspominaniia sestgy, pp. I20e26.

248

clear his disapproval of a constituent assembly. Such an
institution would not govern Russia nor solve problems and
therefore would not serve the needs of the people. MOSt
importantly, the peasants would not be adequately repre-
sented.56 Suvorin believed that only a Zemskii Sobor would
assure the Russian peasants representation and he supported
the concept of universal suffrage.57 He did not, however,
favor national elections to the Zemskii Sobor since he be-
lieved this electoral system would not necessarily elect
the "best" persons. Unlike the United States and Western
Europe, Russia was an empire composed of numerous nation?
alities in addition to a wide spectrum of political groups.
Determination of election districts must be made only after
due consideration of the geographic history and ethnographic
influences on the population of an area. While speaking
Russian was an essential oualification, Suvorin did not re-
gard formal education as necessary. An education require-
ment would only restrict the peasants from the Zemskii Sobor
at a time when their role was increasingly important. The
peasants were improving their economic and educational con-
ditions in comparison to peasants in the Zemskii Sobor of
earlier centuries; self-education was changing the peasants

and they could certainly contribute to the Zemskii

 

56Novoe vremia, April 2 (April 15), 1905, p. 3.

57l2$§gr January 29 (February ll), 1905, p. 3.

249

Sobor.58 Suvorin also encouraged the election of women and
«hen he was denounced by a Grazhdanin critic, reiterated
his faith in the ability of women to participate in govern-
ment.59 Yet he argued that religious requirements should be
applied to non-Christians and singled out Jews for exclusion
from a Zemskii Sobor.60 The upper classes in the Zemskii
Sobor would be influential. However, Suvorin denied that
nobles should have the same veto power which that class had
earlier in the Polish diet, pointing out that such absolute
veto power had led to Poland's downfall.61

The Zemskii Sobor was the proper basis for the
Russian nation but Suvorin feared the substitution of a
constituent assembly if the parties for peaceful reforms
failed to unite and consolidate their power. Only the
Zemskii Sobor would offer a program beneficial to both
workers and peasants; therefore, the moderate parties must
immediately counteract extremist propaganda directed towards
the peasants and workers.62 Furthermore, peaceful moderates
must make their aspirations known to the government.‘ Suvorin

acknowledged the leadership of Shipov and I. I. Petrunkevich

 

531bid., February 2 (February 15), 1905, p. a.
59%, February 1+ (February 17), 1905, p. 30
60gbggg, February 2 (February 15), 1905, p. a.
61%. February 3 (February 16), 1905, p. 3.

ézlélia. APril 2 (April 15). 1905, p. 3.

250

in uniting peaceful progressive elements. They were joined
by Prince 3. S. Trubetskoi and several other zemstvo leaders
in Moscow and by the members of K. F. Golovin's political
salon in St. Petersburg. Suvorin claimed all the classes of
Russia were represented in this movement which was dominated
by zemstvos consisting of landowners, merchants and the
clergy. These three estates had been an important nucleus
in securing the liberation of the peasants and now once again
would replace the intelligentsia in leading the people.63

In late April, Suvorin returned from a visit to
Tulsk province where he claimed peace and tranquility
reigned among the peasants. He saw no evidence of agrarian
disorders and found the population calm. The peasants in
Tulsk disapproved of agrarian disruption and especially
condemned strikes by professional classes. These peasants
who represented Russia's spirit were disillusioned by the
revolutionary threat to their country and were primarily
concerned about the victory of Russia against Japan.6h
Presumably Suvorin reported his trip in an attempt to con-
vince the public that the mainstream or "spirit" of Russia
disdained the current internal disorders and concurred with

his contention that the issue of top priority should be

winning the war.

 

633239;, April 3 (April 16), 1905, p. 3.

6h£§£§m April 17 (April 30), 1905. p. 3.

251

On Easter, 1905 the Tsar released a declaration
of religious freedom for all Slavic Christians. Suvorin
praised this historic ukaze for creating a "brotherly
attitude" towards Polish Catholicism. Religious freedom
for all Slavic Christians reduced misunderstandings be-
tween Catholic and Orthodox Christians. Optimistically,
Suvorin regarded the granting of religious freedom as
strengthening civil liberties and freedom of the press.

The ukaze ended persecution of the Old Believers who re-
mained loyal Russians under all the years of oppression.65
The creation of religious freedom also revived the possi-
bility of re-uniting the entire Russian church, which could
bring added unity to the Russian people. Apparently Suvorin
welcomed any type of rapprochement which could reduce the
current discord.

A zemstvo congress, meeting on April 22-26, split
on the question of the nature of a national representative
assembly and how delegates should be elected.66 On May A
Suvorin reported that the majority of zemstvo leaders sup-
ported a constituent assembly while the minority under
Shipov favored a Zemskii Sobor. In an attempt to bolster
Shipov's position, Suvorin quoted Professor Maxim

Kovalevskii's statement asserting that zemstvo leaders who

 

“$21.21;. April 20 (May 3). 1905, p. 3.

66Shipov, Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom,
pp. 266-67.

252

supported a constituent assembly did not really understand
the meaning of parliamentary government. Shipov and his
followers, Suvorin claimed, realized western political in-
stitutions could not simply be adopted to Russia in the same
fashion as western technology or inventions. Russia's his-
tory, customs and educational level dictated the character-
istics of political institutions. This meant Russia's repre-
sentative assembly must be a Zemskii Sobor.67 At the same
time, Suvorin offered critical remarks about a constitution.
A constitution not only outlines the rights of citizens but
it also specifies duties and restrictions. To prove his
point, he cited rather esoteric examples of restrictions on
public gatherings in Germany or England. Despite popular
beliefs to the contrary, Suvorin argued that a constitution
did not completely eliminate arbitrariness. Freedom demanded
laws as well as respect for law and order. The difficulty

of insuring both freedom and order was illustrated in the
present upheaval where, under the guise of freedom, pro-
fessional criminals often used political activities for their
personal gains. The large body of ruffians who threatened
disorders in St. Petersburg and province capitals on May 1
were indicative of the fact that laws were only meaningful

if they protected the peaceful citizens.68

 

67Novoe vremia, April 21 (May a), 1905, p. 3.

681bid., May 5 (May 18), 1905, p. 3.

253

Suvorin observed that demands circulating in Rus-
sia showed that all classes were primarily interested in de-
veloping their own interests under the guise of "self-deter-
mination." When the Jewish population petitioned Witte,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Suvorin commented that
the Jewish petition was a demand for payment on a promissory
note comparable to the Shakespearian character Shylock's de-
mand for a pound of Christian flesh. 9 In his rejection,
Witte informed the Jewish petitioners that over one hundred
million Russian peasants did not have equal rights but re-
mained loyal and productive citizens. To give the Jewish
population rights similar to the Poles and Finns would be
unjust. Suvorin welcomed Witte's refusal and launched an
attack on the Jews for their wealth and powerful position in
France, England and Germany. He charged the Jewish minor-
ities in these countries exercised a disproportionate influ-
ence over the press, banking, trade and other business acti-
vities. Russia could ill afford to allow the Jewish popula-
tion to acquire a comparable position in Russian business and
society.70 The strength of Suvorin's anti-Semitic feelings
is shown by the fact that, despite Jewish offers to raise

funds for Russia's war effort and influence an end to the

 

698. I. Witte, Memoirs, trans. by Abraham Yarmolinsky

(New York: Doubleday, Page & 50., 1921), pp. 381-82.

7ONovoe vremia, May 11 (May 2A), 1905, p. 3.

25h

revolutionary movement, Suvorin still urged Witte and the
government to reject the Jewish petition.

By the end of May the defeat of the Russian fleet
in Tsushima Strait created a defeatist mood among the popu-
lation and heightened the potential for revolution.71 Re-
counting the misfortunes that befell Russia, Suvorin placed
the blame for the terrible situation on the shoulders of the
incompetent Russian bureaucracy. Now Russia could no longer
wait for the Bulygin commission, the group appointed by the
Tsar to plan a representative assembly, to complete its work.
The terrible war news coupled with popular demands for re-
forms made an immediate calling of a Zemskii Sobor essen-
tial.72 Then domestic problems would be resolved by Russia's
more rational representatives who recognized the struggle
against Japan must be given priority over domestic needs.73
Since the fall of Port Arthur, Suvorin had repeatedly called
for a Zemskii Sobor as the only means to revive Russia's
patriotic feelings. Suvorin's insistence on an immediate
meeting of the Zemskii Sobor was seconded by Prince
Meshcherskii in Grazhdanin. The two writers viewed the
Zemskii Sobor meeting as paramount to returning patriotism

and unity to the Russian people. The increasing violence

 

71Pavlovich, "Vneshniaia politika i russko-
iaponskaia voina," p. 30.

72N;gvoe vremia, May 18 (May 31), 1905, p. 3.

73%, may 19 (June 1), 1905, p. 30

255

by the revolutionaries on the left and the "Black Hundreds"
on the right drew equal condemnation from Suvorin who in-
sisted that the wishes of the people were not really repre-
sented by these violent groups.7h
Suvorin's call for the Zemskii Sobor evoked crit-

icism that he and Novoe vremia had not consistently supported

 

a representative assembly. He countered by asserting that
his public support of a representative assembly dated back to
December 12, l90h, when he backed the demands of the zemstvo
congress. He further claimed that after the fall of Port
Arthur he had advised the Russian government to seek consul-
tation with an assembly of the people on the issue of con-
tinuing the war. Moreover, on January 2A, in the aftermath
of "Bloody Sunday," he and about fifteen or twenty other
representatives of the press met with Minister of Interior
Sviatopolk-Mirskii to discuss the condition of Russia. In
this meeting, Suvorin urged that the Tsar immediately de-
clare his intentions to convoke a Zemskii Sobor and appoint
an election commission. The time originally suggested for
the Zemskii Sobor meeting was autumn when the harvest was
completed and Russia was nearing victory in the war. How-
ever, this was previous to Russia's crushing defeat at
Mukden and the destruction of the Baltic souadron. It was

these defeats and the heightened domestic turmoil which made

 

7hM’ ‘M'ay 21(June 3), 1905, p. 3.

256

it necessary to call the Zemskii Sobor immediately, and thus
Suvorin claimed his present position was not a contradiction
of his earlier stance.75

When Prince Meshcherskii called for immediate
peace, Suvorin maintained that such a "disgraceful peace"
would only magnify internal discontent. Only a Zemskii
Sobor could decide the issue of peace or war in a fashion

76

acceptable to all the Russian people. Even when President
Roosevelt's offer to mediate peace was accepted by the Tsar,
Suvorin continued to insist on the Zemskii Sobor as the sole
representative institution with the mutual "trust" and "con-
sent" of the people and the government to decide peace or

77

war.

The headline "Revolution in Odessa" in the
Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik and reports in the London Timgg
depressed Suvorin who condemned the revolutionary mutiny on
the battleship Potemkin. Suvorin depicted the Potemkin
mutineers as traitors to Russia who threatened Russia's honor
and weakened the war effort. These disgraceful revolutionary
actions held the frightening spectre of burning, destruction

and civil war if these madmen did not stop.78 In the face

 

751bid., May 22 (June A), 1905, p. 3.

 

761bigg, June 1 (June 1h), 1905, p. 3.

77Ibid., June 11 (June 2h), 1905, p. 3.

 

73lbid;, June 22 (July 5), 1905, p. 2.

257

of increasing violence, Suvorin supported the deputation of
Russian leaders who met with the Tsar on June 6 requesting
peaceful reforms.79 He lamented, however, that disunity
within the government and moderate parties as well as their
political ineptness made it easy for the revolutionary
parties to operate. The revolutionaries declared that
power was in the hands of the people and that the people
must destroy the government and establish a "democratic
republic." To this destructive cry, Suvorin replied that
the majority of the people were basically comfortable with
their "old home" and would follow the lead of the peaceful
parties.80

On August 19, the Tsar announced plans for the
Imperial Duma and a reform program. Suvorin welcomed the
Tsar's announcement as another significant step in the
"fifty year revolution" which began with the liberation of
the peasants. Although the Tsar did not grant the consti-
tution demanded in the press, Suvorin believed the differ-
ences between all the classes in Russia could be resolved
in the Imperial Duma.81

Less than two weeks after the Tsar announced the

 

79Trubetskaia, Kniaz S. N. Trubetskoi:
vospominaniia sestry, pp.“l§7-Ah.

80Novoe vremia, June 23 (July 6), 1905, p. 3.

81l239;, August 7 (August 20), 1905, p. 3.

258

creation of a Duma, Witte signed the Treaty of Portsmouth
and ended the Russo-Japanese Mar. Suvorin, who regarded
the peace treaty as a defeat for Russia, criticized the
revolutionary movement for its detrimental influence on the
war effort and peace discussions. Fortunately for Russia,
Witte, who was a talented and energetic representative,
managed to overcome the handicap created by Russia's domes-
tic disorders. Although Suvorin was not pleased with peace,
he accepted the peace treaty and immediately focused his sup-
port on the pending Imperial Duma. Suvorin regarded the
peace treaty as a sign of Russian failure to meet the "test"
of war and he was now concerned lest Russia fail in peace
and be totally ruined. The Imperial Duma held all Russia's
hopes for the future.82

With peace in the Far East, Suvorin was once again
free to concentrate on domestic issues. He had opposed the
imprudent Bezabrazov policies which led to the military
conflict with Japan because Russia had fulfilled its vital
needs in the Far East with the acquisition of the Trans-
Siberian railway and Port Arthur. Building the railway had
taxed the country's resources and now other obstacles to
Russia's modernization increasingly concerned Suvorin. He,
therefore, supported Witte's industrialization policies, ex-

pansion of educational opportunities for the masses,

822222;, August 17 (August 30), 1905, p. 3.

259

participation of national representatives in governmental
decision making on a consultative basis and other reforms
which he felt would overcome Russia's "backwardness." The
Japanese attack on Port Arthur, however, compelled Suvorin
to temporarily abandon the reforms which he had advocated.
He foresaw the magnitude of the Japanese threat and placed
heavy emphasis on encouraging enthusiastic public support
for the war; but he soon recognized that the "coming of
spring" could not wait. The barrage of defeats exposed

the ineptitude of the bureaucracy and made obvious the need
for improvements in governmental operations. In addition,
disorder and strikes in favor of freedom of speech, citizen
participation in governmental processes and other reforms
were gaining momentum. At the same time opposition to the
war began to spread rapidly. Suvorin reacted by shifting
some attention back to internal reform in hopes of en-
couraging a war-weary people on to victory. He first at-
tempted to argue that victory would bring reforms; but as
it became clear that the population would not wait, he
placed greater emphasis on immediate action and heralded
even minor conciliatory gestures of the Tsar as giant steps
towards the "coming of spring." As the revolutionary move-
ment mushroomed, Suvorin increasingly emphasized the need
for a Zemskii Sobor as the only Russian institution which
could solve current problems; and after the defeat of

Tsushima he advocated an immediate convocation of the

260

Zemskii Sobor in the hope that it would unite the people
behind the war. He continually rejected demands for a
constituent assembly, supporting only those elements who
favored preservation of the autocracy. Meanwhile, his

pleas for Tsarist concessions to encourage support for the

war remained virtually ignored. The issue of victory, how-

ever, was solved in a disappointing manner when Witte con-
cluded peace at Portsmouth. Nevertheless Suvorin could
again give his full attention to domestic matters and

szrospects of the Imperial Duma presented some hope to the

t roubled Suvorin.

CHAPTER VIII
APOLOGIST FOR THE OCTOBER MANIFESTO

The end of the war and the Tsar's promise of a
consultative Duma did not bring an end to domestic dis-
orders. During the months of September and October, 1905,
a general strike paralyzed the country and forced yet an-
other concession from the Tsar, the October Manifesto. With
the October Manifesto, Nicholas II promised the introduction
of civil liberties, extension of suffrage beyond the limits
of the August 6, 1905 ukaze, and legislative authority for
the Imperial Duma.1 Since it embodied many of the moderate
reforms which he had advocated, Suvorin endorsed the October
Manifesto and he severely criticized those political groups
which continued to press for more radical concessions. In
the face of continued disorders, he chided Witte's govern-
ment for its permissive stance, urging instead that the gov-
ernment reassert its control over the population. As relative
Peace was restored in the cities, he further attacked the

government bureaucracy for its failure to convoke the Duma

(S 1v. Ivanovich Rossiikiia par-tn soiuzy i liai
t. Petersburg, 1906;. Do T-

261

262

and for its attempts to restrict the Duma's powers. Although

he basically supported Witte's government, Suvorin had come
to view the Duma as the only forum where major problems could
be solved. Hence he increasingly concerned himself with the
Question of which elements in society should have the most
influence in the Duma.

The August 6 ukaze announcing a Duma had failed to
stem growing unrest. Agrarian disorders mounted in September
and by the end of the month confusion and revolutionary up-
heaval dominated vast sections of Russia, including Poland,
the Caucasus and Siberia. Finally, in October a railroad
strike spread rapidly across the country and provided the
stimulus for a general strike which brought Russia to a
standstill. Faced with a choice between bloody repression
01" compromise, Nicholas II chose the latter and issued a
M inifesto on October (17 0.8.) 30. To implement the con-
Cessions of the October Manifesto and to reestablish the
ROVernment's authority, Nicholas returned Witte to power as
Prime minister.2 Although the October Manifesto succeeded
in satisfying many Russian citizens, the Tsar's concessions
did not entirely eliminate opposition and restore order. In
early November, Witte faced the difficult task of organizing
a cabinet and government capable of winning public confidence.

During the two eventful months preceding the

S 2Sergius Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia, ed. by A. L.
idorov, III (Moscow, 1960), AXLS.

263

granting of the October Manifesto, Suvorin was vacationing
in Italy. Trips to Europe were a frequent activity for the
wealthy editor and, therefore, his absence from St. Peters-
burg was not unusual. When the news of the October Mani-
festo reached Suvorin in Italy, however, he immediately de-
parted for St. Petersburg. Because of the railway strike,
Suvorin was forced to take a long indirect route, reaching
the Russian capital by boat from Norway.3 Meanwhile he was
unable to receive information from Russian sources regard-
ing events there and could not formulate his opinions until
after his return.
In his first article on the political situation,

Suvorin expressed his immediate surprise over the news of
the revolution, the weakness of the government and the
granting of the Manifesto. Nevertheless, he endorsed the
October 17 ukaze saying the Tsar had given the people a
"radical" constitution which would calm emotions and end
the revolution. The granting of political freedom by the
Tsar was not too "late." Russia was now a "free country"
and the constitution would reunite the people. Saying it
Was time for the revolutionary disorders to end, Suvorin
urged Witte to take action against those elements which

1+

r‘eJeCi‘ed the Tsar's concessions.

3Novoe vremia) October 29 (November 11), 1905,

“Ibid.

261+

As the new government under Witte's leadership
sought to restore order, the extreme left rejected the
October Manifesto and vowed to continue the revolutionary
struggle? Although the moderates, made up largely of the
newly-formed Kadet i-‘arty, abandoned revolutionary activi-

t ies, the vast majority was dissatisfied with the Manifesto
and chose to oppose Witte's government in the Duma.6 The
majority in the zemstvo movement sided with the Kadets,
Vlhile a small minority led by Shipov supported the October
Nianifesto but refused to accept posts in the Witte govern-
ment.7 The attitudes of both the revolutionaries and mod-
erates left lfiitte's government with little significant
popular support.

One of Witte's first attempts to gain public trust
was to meet with leaders of the press and seek their assist-
ance. Although Suvorin was not present, Novoe vremia was

I‘eOI‘esented at the stormy and unproductive session in which

Witte was rebuffed by most of the press.8 Nevertheless, it

 

5"Listovk tsentral'novo komiteta RSDRP "K russkomu
narodu" p0 povodu manifesta l7 oktiabria s prizyvom k
Prodolzheniiu bor'by." Revoliutsii 1905-1907gg. v Rossii:
Mmenty i materialy: Tserogssfiskaia polfticheskaia
§_§_§_chka v oktiabre 1905 goda, I (Moscow, 1955f, 197.

63. L. Frank, Biografia P. b. Struve (New York:
1956) . p. 1.9.

7 Y 0 co 0 o
Shipov Jos ominaniia 1 dum o erezhitom o .
338—45. . ’ p y p 3 .p

K A "Interv'iu S. Iu. Witte s predstavileliami pechati,"
_.__-_. XI-XII (1925), 99-105.

265

seems probable that Witte, based on earlier contacts, sought
and obtained Suvorin's support. When the October Manifesto
and i-"itte's government were attacked by revolutionary ele-
ments during a second general strike, Suvorin defended the
government and echoed Witte's appeal for press repudiation
of revolutionary propaganda. Suvorin argued that no one
really wanted violence, strikes and ruin. Journalists could
succeed in quelling disorders by rationally interpreting the
franifesto and government policies until the Duma assembled.9
Suvorin's stance during a period of relative freedom of the
press reflected his faith in the October Manifesto and his
intentions to support Witte's government as well as his be-
lief in the power of the press.

Witte attempted to deal with the second general
strike which the St. Petersburg Soviet called on November ll.

10

by following a policy of moderation. He made a direct appeal

to the Soviet for an end to the strike, but the appeal proved

ll

f'I‘uitless and the general strike continued. Witte then chose

to wait until the strike movement weakened before taking re-

Pressive measures to establish order and introduce reforms.12

9Novoe vremia, November 8 (November 2t), 1905, p. h.

 

lOwitte, Vospominaniia, III, 139.

llTysiacha deviat'sot piatyigggd v Peterburge, II
(Moscow, 1925f, 39.

12H. D. Mehlinger and J. M. Thompson, Count Witte

and.the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution (Blooming—
ton. Indiana University lsress, @725, pp. 3b-33.

266

Meanwhile Witte appealed to other elements in the
society for support against the strikers.13 When Witte asked
the Congress of Zemstvo and City Leaders meeting in Moscow
for assistance, however, Suvorin criticized Witte's overly

cautious stand against the anarchy caused by the general

tJI

ii
strike. Witte's admission to the zemstvo leaders that the {f
government was weak astounded Suvorin, who felt that the i

srczvernment's feeble policies only delayed the implementation
()1? the new political freedom and legal order. Witte's ef-
1?c>rts to appease the revolutionaries and radicals consti-
t;L1t;ed a disastrous policy. The government had made a mis-
‘taalce in furnishing a constitution which provided only the
means to revolution and neglected protection for society.
Irisstead of appealing for trust, Suvorin demanded that the
,Ecrvwarnment act forcefully to command confidence and obedience.
III £3ddition, Suvorin recommended an immediate meeting of the
Chanua and urged Witte to reject the suggestion of radical
Zemstvo leaders that a constituent assembly be summoned. A
C<>nsstituent assembly would only bring anarchy and prevent
Russia from reaching a peaceful and orderly settlement of
its complex problems.

In an effort to combat revolutionary activities,
Suvorin condemned the St. Petersburg Soviet's call for a

u

13E. D. Chermenskii, Burzhauziia i tsarizm v
gavoliutsii 1905-1907gg; (Moscow, 1939), p. 151.

l("Novoe vremia, October 30 (November 12), 1905,

 

p' 1+.

 

267

second general strike but he regarded the Soviet as a power-
ful enemy whose determination and courage were admirable.
The Soviet's program to win additional demands for the work-
ers was attractive and its appeals to "comrades" were flatter-
:i.ng.]'5 However, Suvorin observed that many workers ignored

the Soviet's call for another general strike. He believed

mar—m

the unity of the revolutionary movement was broken by the
promises of the October Manifesto and the general strike
could not succeed in destroying the government.16 Fortu-
nately, he concluded, the Soviet had not attracted support
from the peasants, bourgeoisie and nobility who were now
looking to the government for leadership.17 Presumably
Suvorin regarded these three classes as receptive to the new
government and the October Manifesto.

In Suvorin's view, a small minority in the Congress
0f Zemstvo and City Leaders meeting in Moscow was representa-
tive of Russia's finest and most sensible leaders. This min-
ority supported the Manifesto and opposed continued revolu-
t"ionary activities.18 Suvorin particularly praised Prince
E- N. Trubetskoi for his efforts to moderate radical demands.

However, when the radical elements under Miliukov and

\

lslpidg, November 28 (December 11), 1905, p. 2.
léggigg, November 8 (November 24), 1905, p. a.
17I21d;, November 28 (December 11), 1905, p. 2.

1.61-32. 18Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past, pp.

268

E’ertrunkevich dominated the congress and its resolutions,
ESLivorin charged the congress was an "imposter" for the Im-
yaeerial Duma. "Revolutionary" leaders in the congress were
ignoring the needs of all sides of Russian society in pref-
eazrence to their own demands.19 Many congress leaders,
ESvaorin asserted, did not realize Russia had two governments,
c>r1e led by Witte and the other by the St. Petersburg Soviet.
GPPIe congress leaders, who represented primarily rural areas,
cizici not understand the power of the Soviet in Russia's urban
c:<eriters or the effectiveness of a general strike as a weapon
zigzaiinst the government. This strike power placed Russia at
the mercy of anarchism. Suvorin observed that a gifted an-
archist theoretician argued that acquiring power was more im-
puozrtant than acquiring rights in achieving freedom. The
Moscow Congress and Witte did not fully understand the So-
Viet ’s grasp of the concept of power. In particular, Witte
f¥iifiLed to realize the necessity of establishing the power
Of a new government by convoking the Imperial Duma imme-
diately. Instead, Suvorin lamented, he intended to rely on
nnilzitary forces to crush revolution. Russia could best be
SaVed by its own rational power and by the leadership of
Strong government officials. But only the "weak" voice of
'Ifiittez’s government was heard. Furthermore, Witte chron-

ically failed to keep his promise to confer with the peOple.

 

l
9Novoe vremia, November 15 (November 28), 1905,

 

269

Without a Duma, Witte's government was autocratic because he
consulted only with the Tsar. In addition, the press and the
public demanded action against the revolutionaries. In the
face of all these outcries, Suvorin wondered why Witte remain-
ed inactive and silent. Witte's inaction only promised fur-
ther violence for Russia.20 Suvorin, therefore, continued
his attempts to prod Witte into forcefully crushing the revo-
lutionary movement. He also considered the calling of the
Duma an essential step in assuring the future viability of
the Russian political system. Russia not only needed the
opinions of the public in solving current problems; but
without the convocation of the Duma the Tsar's promises to
the people went unfulfilled.

Suvorin's discussion of the government's weak
leadership continued into early December when he complained
that the legal government appeared to be powerless. This
was unfortunate because a month after receiving political
freedom, Russian society was cast back into the same general
strike and riot conditions existing before the October
Manifesto.21 Suvorin observed that the revolutionaries
acted more quickly than the government. Political develop~
ments which took months and years during the French Revolu-

tion were occurring in Russia within a span of weeks. The

20lbid., November 18 (December 1), 1905, p. 3.

ZIIEEQL, November 24 (December 7), 1905, p. 2.

270

technological advances in the press, railways and telegraph
were significant factors in the rapid spread of Russia's
revolutionary activities. In a very short time the revolu-
tionaries could excite large parts of the country and ef-
fectively stage political strikes. The government responded
sluggishly to these activities and Suvorin believed the crit-
ical issue facing Russia was whether Witte would be "strong-
willed" and restrain the anarchist drive to create a repub-
lic.22 Suvorin maintained that Witte should convoke the Duma

23 Admittedly, the

in January and no later than February.
Duma was not a guarantee of freedom from revolution, but
Suvorin was convinced that the Duma would force ministers to
act and end the discord and hostilities among groups.2h
Delaying the meeting of the Duma until March would only aid
revolutionary elements.25 The lingering question of Duma
elections encouraged further agitation and gave the revolu-
tionaries an opportunity to capitalize on the weakness of the
new government. The Moscow Soviet terrorized Moscow and

added to the uncertainty. It was the responsibility of Witte

to break the power deadlock by immediately holding elections

 

22;g;g., November 25 (December 8), 1905, p. 3.
23Ibid., November 28 (December 11), 1905, p. 2.

ZAEEEQL, November 29 (December 12), 1905, p. 2.

25I2i9;, November 28 (December 11), 1905, p. 2.

271

26

and convoking the Duma.

Suvorin discussed Witte's views with the English
journalist, Dr. E. J. Dillon, who had recently interviewed
the prime minister. When told of Witte's claim that the revo-
lutionaries could not be victorious without the assistance of
society, Suvorin retorted that only through the Duma could
the power of the people help Witte to cope with the new revo-
lutionary crisis. However, Suvorin regarded as erroneous
Witte's view that society must be calm before convoking the
Duma. All the educated and professional classes placed their
faith in the October Manifesto and the government, but be-
lieved it was essentiwl for the Duma and not Witte's govern-
ment to legislate new laws. Consequently, Witte's laws would
not be regarded as Vilid by the public until the Duma con-
firmed them. At the same time, hitte mistakenly condemned
many supporters of the October Manifesto as revolutionaries
and failed to recognize new political parties were emerging
which were firm in seeking immediate implementation of polit-
ical freedom. Nevertheless, Suvorin was confident that Witte
wished to implement the promises of the October Manifesto
even though he did not seem to realize the need to unite the
country in the Duma in order to defeat the revolutionary

27 .
movement. Although Suvorin continually criticized Witte's

 

26l219;, November 29 (December 12), 1905, p. 2.

27Ibid., December 3 (December 21), 1905. Do 3.

272

inaction, he did not wish to see the prime minister resign.
When the radical press in late December demanded Witte's re-
moval, Suvorin made it clear that even though Witte made
mistakes, without Witte's leadership Russia would be de-
stroyed. Russia could not last a week without Witte.28
Moscow was the scene of Witte's decisive confron-
tation with the revolutionaries. On December 20, the Moscow
Soviet called a general strike that developed into an armed
uprising. In this crisis, Witte's government acted swiftly
and forcefully to quell the disturbance and restore order.
Within two weeks of its outbreak, the governor-general in
Moscow, Admiral F. V. Dubasov, ruthlessly suppressed the
uprising.29 At the same time, rebellious activities ini-
tiated in other cities were crushed by government forces.
By mid-December, Witte's moderate and indecisive policies
towards the revolutionaries were abandoned for policies of
repression and reaction to restore order.30
In Suvorin's view, the end of the armed uprising in

31

Moscow marked a turning point for Witte’s government.

 

zalbid;, December 17 (December 30), 1905, p. 3.

29Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v revoliutsii
l§O§-l907gg., pp. 22h-26.

30T. H. von Laue, "Count Witte and the Russian
Revolution of 1905," American Slavic and East Europen Review,
XVII (February, 1958), 39-AO.

31

 

Novoe vremia, December 29, 1905 (January 11, 1906),

 

pp. 3-4.

273

Suvorin interpreted the renewed peace as a sign that the revo-
lution was ending and the vast majority of citizens were ex-
pressing their confidence in the Tsar and the October Mani-
festo.32 In summarizing the crisis, Suvorin wrote that Witte
assumed power in an almost hopeless situation and produced
the October Manifesto in an energetic effort to remove the
danger to the government. Unfortunately, Witte's actions
did not destroy the revolutionary movement. Instead, the
government's weakness inspired another general strike and
sparked widespread peasant disorders. Witte's use of "tem-
porary" laws and his procrastination in holding elections
for the Duma aided the revolutionaries. Fortunately, the
Moscow uprising forced hitte's government to crush the
revolutionaries, bringing an end to the stalemate.33
The government's policy of repression proved suc-
cessful and the beginning of the new year found the revolu-
tionary movement in sharp decline. The Russian public ex-
hausted by the chaos welcomed the return to peaceful activi-
ties.3h Freed from revolutionary pressures, the government
and public now concerned themselves with the moderate re-

forms promised in the October Manifesto and preparations for

 

BZIQig;, December 11 (December 24), 1905, p. 3.

33Ibid., December 29, 1905 (January 11: 1906):
pp. 3-#-

BhW. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage: A Personal
History through Two Russian Revolutions to Democragy and
FreedomJ I905-l960 (New York: ‘Vanguard Press, 1961), p. 91.

27h

the meeting of the Duma. 5 Suvorin summed up the public's
mood in his New Year's day article when he expressed his joy
over the government's restoration of power and the return

of normal activities. In an optimistic note, Suvorin pre-
dicted that in the new year the Duma would bring freedom and
eouality because it would be composed of national representa-
tives candidly expressing the popular will in legislation.
The representatives would come from all areas of society

and include educated, illiterate, rich and poor persons. For
the first time in Russia's history, "honest thinking persons"
would impartially judge Russia's affairs and produce

36

effective laws.

Although he praised a Duma representing all classes,

Suvorin had earlier indicated that he wanted the bourgeoisie
and nobility to be the two most influential classes in the
new political system. Since the October Manifesto, Suvorin
had looked to the bourgeoisie for leadership in guiding
peaceful political development.37 Suvorin was well aware
that Russia did not have a large bourgeoisie,38 but he felt
that Moscow's commercial classes were rapidly filling the

bourgeoisie role. Suvorin believed that the commercial

 

35Chermenskii Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v revoliutsii
1905-1907gg., pp. 232-35.

36Novoe vremia, January 1 (January 14), 1906, p. 6.
37léiéa: October 30 (November 12), 1905, p. 4.

381bid., July 17 (July 30), 1905, p. 3.

275

classes were largely responsible for Mescow's rise to a cen-
ter of political leadership. Because of their extensive ex-
perience with economic affairs, workers and the government
bureaucracy, however, the Moscow bourgeoisie had been par-
ticularly alert to the need for reforms and reorganization.
When the Japanese war accelerated class strife and eXposed
domestic weakness, the bourgeoisie joined in demanding a
constitution and supporting revolutionary activities. How-
ever, revolutionary excesses after the October Manifesto
caused the bourgeoisie to split from the revolutionary ranks.
During the Moscow Zemstvo Congress, A. I. Guchkov, repre-
senting the "progressive" voices of the bourgeoisie, had
defended the new government against the continued revolu-
tionary threat. These progressive voices of the wealthy
and powerful bourgeoisie, Suvorin concluded, were emerging
as a formidable political force.

The Russian nobility was the other class which
Suvorin viewed as an important and desirable influence in the
new government. He defended the nobility from the attacks of
revolutionaries seeking extinction of the noble classes. At
the same time, Suvorin criticized the nobles for failing to
defend their estates and their hereditary land rights against
peasant seizures. Unless members of the nobility joined in

demanding their rights, the revolutionaries would eliminate

 

39Ibid., December In (December 27), 1905, pp. 2-3.

276

them. This would be a tragic loss because the nobility sup—
plied the talent and leadership for the bureaucracy, mili-

tary and society. Most importantly, eliminating the nobil-

ity would destroy the source of Russia's enlightenment and
culture. As the first step in renewing leadership, Suvorin
urged the nobility to curb agrarian disorders, arouse the
government from inaction and exercise noble power against
revolution. In addition he claimed that the nobles should
petition Witte to hold elections and immediately convoke the
Duma, since “itte and the Tsar would not ignore a petition
from the noblesf"O Suvorin, therefore, viewed the nobility
as a powerful potential ally of Witte's government and a
countervailing force against the revolutionaries. But he
feared that the position of the nobility was severely jeop-
ardized by radical solutions to the land question. In
suggesting an immediate meeting of the Duma he apparently
felt that the nobility would be able to resolve the land
ouestion in its favor within the Duma framework.

Land was indeed a volatile issue. In fact, the
peasant question succeeded the urban strikes as the main
problem facing fiitte's government, as peasant disturbances
remained high in January, 1906.“1 For several years, Witte

had advocated elimination of the peasant commune and the

 

h0Ibid., December 16 (December 29), 1905, P- 3-

hlB. B. Veselovskii and others, eds., A rarn i
vopros v sovete ministrov (l906g.), Moscow, 192A, pp. 7 -7l.

277

creation of a private landowning peasant class; but the gov-
ernment‘s failure to implement land reforms made the disen-
chanted peasants susceptible to revolutionary agitation.“2
The peasant disorders, sparked by a poor harvest in late
1905, gained momentum following the promulgation of the

#3 Under the influence of Socialist

October Manifesto.
Revolutionary and Social Democratic agitators, peasants in-
terpreted the new "freedom" as the right to drive out land-
owners and seize large estates.hh At the height of the peas-
ant violence in late October, Witte's government considered

a proposal from D. F. Trepov for compulsory alienation of
noble lands to the peasants.h5 However, on November 3,

Witte chose instead to cancel all redemption dues and com-
missioned a leading agricultural expert, N. N. Kutler, to
devise an alternative plan to give more land to the peasants.’+6
Kutler's program retained forcible eXpropriation of noble

lands as an essential part of his solution to peasant land

 

“2T. H. von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrial-
ization of Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 115-16.

“30. T. Robinson, Rural Russia Under the Old Regime
(New York: Macmillan Co., l9h9), pp.Il7h4&5.

448. N. Prokopovich, Agrarnyi krisis i
meropriiatiia pravitelstva (Moscow, 1912), pp. h6-h9.

assergius Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ed. by A. L.
Sidorov, II (Moscow, 1960), 172.

héVeselovskii, Agrarnyi vopros v sovete ministrov

(ic;oog.), pp. 3-u, 30-48.

278

hunger and by the middle of January, 1906, it was the main

project under consideration by Witte's government. However,

Kutler's plan was severely attacked by nobles and large

landowners.

By the end of January, opponents succeeded in gain-

raw
7

ing support from the Tsar who made several public pronounce-

4

ments against the Kutler plan. Nicholas based his opposition
on the principle of "the inviolability of private property.""’8
Suvorin, who had already expressed his dedication to the de-
fense of private property and his opposition to expropriation
of noble lands, joined in condemning Kutler's project. The
target of Suvorin's attack was Kutler's Jewish assistant,
Professor A. A. Kaufman, a member of the Kadets. Reflecting
his habitual anti-Semitic stance, Suvorin questioned the
government's reliance on "Jews" for assistance in solving the
problems of the Russian people. Jews helped create the revo-
lution and now Kaufman was being used by the bureaucracy to
prepare a legislative project. The Council of Ministers must
resolve this important question with the help of Russian
landowners and peasants rather than the advice of Kaufman

‘who was a close associate of members of the radical Jewish

IBund which stood for expropriation and elimination of

 

“71bio., pp. 63-70.

#8"Sovremennik," pseud., Nikolai II, razoblachenii
(Herdin, n.d.), pp. 32h-26’ Veselovskii,f3grarnyi vopros
:!_govete ministrov (1906gg), pp. 72-80.

 

279

landowners. Although Suvorin admitted his respect for Jewish
artistic talent, Russia's legislation to resolve agricultural
problems must not be determined by Jews whom he did not re-
gard as loyal to Russia and the principles of private property.
Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding the discussion of
Kutler's project raised serious concern among landowners that
Jewish capitalists would profit from the expropriation of
noble lands. In defense of the landowners' rights, Suvorin
insisted that all government discussion of the land question
must be public and the rights of the landowners represented.
Thus, Suvorin joined with the noble classes in repudiating
Kutler's project. Suvorin's position reflected the return-
ing confidence of the nobility and landed classes. Shortly
after, Witte, under pressure from the Tsar, obtained the
resignation of Kutler.

The removal of Kutler did not end Witte's efforts
to resolve the land question before the meeting of the Duma.
In January, a special commission entitled "0n the Study of
Immediate Measures to Improve the Conditions of Peasant
Landholdings" had been established under the chairmanship of
A. P. Nikol'skii. The February report of Nikol'skii's com-
xnission to the Council of Ministers urged the government to
take immediate steps in assisting the peasants acquire land.

The commission further recommended that the government

 

thovoe vremia, January 19 (February 1), 1906, p. 3.

280

place the land project under the control of local zemstvo
leaders.50 Opponents of the commission's recommendations
feared that the designation of local land commissions would
make the program vulnerable to dominance by left-wing

zemstvo members who would implement their own radical pro-

mud

’“F

grams. In addition hikol'skii's program neglected to re-

affirm the principle of private property to the satisfaction

of the nobles and landowners. Finally, dissenters viewed
Witte's efforts to implement a land reform program as an

attempt to usurp a prerogative of the Duma.51

While fitte's government considered Nikol'skii's
program, reports reached St. Petersburg of renewed peasant
attacks against landowners in Saratov Province. When reports
of excesses against landowners in Saratov province reached
St. Petersburg, Suvorin reacted by repudiating the mis-
conceptions of the peasants regarding the October Manifesto.
He charged that the radicals at the Moscow Congress of
Zemstvos deliberately misled the peasants with extreme state-
ments on the land question and the government's passive
attitude on the issue perpetuated peasant confusion. The
radicals in the Moscow Congress conveniently chose to ig-

‘nore those parts in the French Declaration of the Rights of

 

503. M. Dubrovskii, Stolypinskaia zemel'naia
reforme (Moscow, 1963), pp. 954101.

51Veselovskii, Agrarnyi vopros v sovete ministrov

(l906g.) , pp. 126.31.

281

Egg outlining property rights. Unfortunately, the October
Manifesto did not explicitly state a principle of property
rights and the position of landowners remained in doubt.
Suvorin deemed it essential that the government guarantee
by law the rights of property. Government land policies
involving expropriation were only a repetition of the no-
torious "Zubatovism." Suvorin predicted that if the
"Zubatovism" approach to the workers question brought revo-
lution, government involvement in expropriation of lands
would certainly strengthen the revolutionary movement on

the countryside.52

Despite his condemnation of peasants for their
violence against landlords, Suvorin claimed that the peas-
ants were good and reasonable men who wished the land ques-
tion to be decided by the Duma. Bureaucrats, however, were
interfering by devising projects to settle the land question
before the Duma met. Adding to peasant disenchantment was
the fact that the bureaucrats who were preparing projects
were not experts on Russia's agricultural economy. Even
Witte's talent and experience did not qualify the prime
minister to produce a satisfactory settlement of the land
question. The landowners faced the greatest risks under the
arbitrary bureaucracy's unskilled projects. Fortunately,

the Tsar, who recognized the landowners' rights and their

 

52Novoe vremia, February 2 (February 15), 1906,
p. 30

282

importance in the rural economy, endeavored to protect the
future of the landowner class.53 It seems likely that
Suvorin's personal wealth, publishing empire and large
rural estate influenced his concern over the land question
and his advocacy of the principle of private property.

The early months of 1906 saw a great deal of or-
ganizational activity by Russia's political parties. The
electoral law of December 2a, 1905, had extended universal
suffrage to most Russians under an indirect electoral sys-
tem.5h In addition, the moderate forces in Russia desired
early elections for the Duma55 and in January, 1906, Witte
moved to arrange for elections. On February 8, the govern-
ment announced plans to convoke the Duma on April 27.56
Suvorin greeted the news with joy, maintaining that society
remained backward largely because of the bureaucracy's cur-
rent oppression and society's lack of participation in the
government. He believed the Duma would unite Russia, or-

ganize reforms and guarantee political freedom for all Rus-

sians. In addition, the Duma would provide Russia with new

 

53Ibid., February 3 (February 16), 1906: P- 3-

5‘s. M. Sidel'nikov, Obrazovanie i deiatel'nost
peryoiggosudarstvennoi dumy (Moscow,‘196§T, pp. 72475.

551. v. Piaskovskii, Revoliutsiia l905-l907gg.

Phassii (Moscow, 1966), p. 179; Witte, Vospominaniia, II, 322.

Sésidel'nikov, Obrazovanie i deiatel'nostgpervoi
ggsudarstvennoi dumy, p. 37.

 

283

laws which would include rights of private property and le-
gal protection for everyone. Also, the Duma would eliminate

bureaucratic interference and obstruction of the peOple's
57

participation in the government.

The election campaign for the Duma saw numerous 1
parties emerge representing a variety of political convic- E:
tions. However, most of the parties were weak and inexpe- E~
rienced in the area of political campaign practices. Con- ‘
sequently, the strongest and best-organized party, the Kadets,
emerged from the outset of the campaign as the most effec-
tive party and the assured winner in the elections. The
slightly leftist Kadets drew their support largely from the
progressive elements of the zemstvo movement, liberal in-
telligentsia and professional classes. Founded in October,
1905, the Kadets adopted a party program calling for civil
liberties, universal suffrage, a constituent assembly and
expropriation of lands with compensation. With this program,
‘the Kadets joined with the revolutionaries in supporting
the two general strikes and rejecting the October Manifesto.
Imxt the peasant violence and the Moscow uprising led the

Kadets to moderate their party program and participate in

the Duma elections.

At their secOnd party congress held in Moscow in

January, 1906, the Kadets abandoned their support for

 

57NQMQ§ £22913» February 15 (February 28), 1906, p. h.

28A

revolutionary tactics and a constituent assembly and in-
stead began preparation for the forthcoming elections. Al-
though the Kadet program excluded these earlier revolution-

ary positions, the Kadets continued to propose radical po-

sitions. For example, the Kadets demanded equality for the 1
he? 1—

Jews, autonomy for Poland, freedom of religion for all other %

nationalities and exclusion of the Russian language from E

schools where Russians were a minority.58 Identifying him-
self as a nationalist, Suvorin attacked the program adopted
at the Kadet Party Congress in Moscow. The October Mani-
festo in no way included these freedoms for minorities nor
did the Manifesto grant these minorities the right to per—
secute Russian citizens for objectionable government policies.
Since the source of Russian "reason" and "spirit," the Duma,
did not exist, Suvorin asserted Russian citizens were not
responsible for government policies in the borderlands.59
Suvorin's strong nationalistic feelings seemed to
orient him towards membership in the extreme nationalistic
party, the Union of Russian People. However, Suvorin denied
Inembership in this party of "hatred" and "passion," stating
that he preferred to remain outside a party and place his
political faith in Russia and the people. In his view the

Russian spirit was incorporated in the October Manifesto. The

 

58PraVO, January 15’ 1906, no. 2, pp. 1510-58.

59Novoe vremia, February 20 (March 5), 1906, p. 2.

285

new political freedom restored Russian dignity and Suvorin
hoped for a revival of patriotism.

Witte, too, chose to remain outside the ranks of
an organized party but he did not share Suvorin's faith in
the ability of the people to resolve major issues within the
Duma.61 During February, the Crown Council met to consider
legislative measures determining the powers of the Duma and
limits on its authority. Ultimately these measures were in-
corporated into the Fundamental Laws. Fearing the public
was politically immature, Witte wished to limit the author-
ity of the Duma.62 Suvorin, however, did not share Witte's
view and repudiated Witte's position published in Witte's
semi-official newspaper Russkoe gosudarstvo. The government
was treating its citizens like children, Suvorin fumed. The
government's rude attitude towards the people's participation
in the Duma characterized the chronic contempt of the ruling
circles for the Russian public. Now when Russians were free
to meet and resolve the peasant question, as well as the

clash between the propertied and non-propertied classes, the

-_-.-——

 

6ol§ig4J February 20 (March 5), 1906, p. 2,

61Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the
.Iaaaiat Government in the l¥0§ Revolution p. 75;‘Novoe
XEEELQ, e ruary varch , , p. 5.

62"Tsarskosel'skie soveshchaniia: Protokoly
gekretnavo soveshchaniia v fevrale 1906 goda pod predsedaterstvom
DYVshavo imperatora po vyrabotke Uchrezhdenii Gosudarstvennoi
DumY i Gosudarstvennavo Soveta," B loe, V-VI (November-
ecember, 1917), 292-304.

 

 

286

bureaucracy again interfered and wanted to impose restric-

tions. Instead of these repressive limitations, Suvorin ar-

gued the government should raise the citizens' hopes and con-
fidence by energetically inviting them to assist the govern-
ment in transforming Russia.63 The current "distrust" be-
tween educated society and the government, Suvorin claimed,
began with Sviatopolk-Mirskii's failure to resolve Russia's

problems. how, the reluctance of the government to grant

political freedom except under threat further destroyed

educated society's trust. Furthermore, the new government's

"passive role" against the strikes following the October
Manifesto convinced society the present government could not

effectively govern a great country without the meeting of a

Duma 0 61+
In another rebuttal of the Witte government's
position, Suvorin charged that hitte's newspaper Russkoe

_gosudarstvo insulted the bourgeoisie by ignoring the contri-

 

butions of this class. Since the origin of Russia, the mer-

chant class consistently supported the government and per-

sistently'worked to develop trade and manufacturing. Now

Rosskoe gosudarstvo foolishly dared to scorn the bourgeoisie
for ignorance, political arrogance towards the government and

political opportunism. The government by taking this

 

63Novoe vremia, February 27 (March 12), 1906, p. 2.

éegpggg, March 5 (March 18), 1906, p. 3.

 

 

287

disparaging position would only further alienate itself from
this influential class as it had from the nobility and

65

zemstvos.

The Russian bourgeoisie Suvorin defended tended to
provide the support for the Union of October 17, or the
Octobrist Party. The leadership of this party was provided
by Shipov's minority group which split from the Congress of
Zemstvo and City Leaders in November, 1905. Shipov joined
with a group predominantly composed of Moscow industrialists
and merchants led by A. I. Guchkov to found the Octobrist
Party in late 1905. The Octobrist program supported the
October Manifesto but did not demand going beyond it. The
party wanted civil liberties, the Duma and a constitutional
monarchy. The strong nationalist orientation of the
Octobrists favored increasing Russia's military power and
prestige. Octobrist leaders were generally supportive of
Witte's government but highly critical of the government's
weakness against the revolutionary movement and urged speedy
convocation of the Duma as the best means to assure order.66
Throughout the elections for the Duma, the Octobrists offered
oPposition to the Kadets whose program they regarded as too

radical. However, the April election results gave the Kadets

a Clear-cut victory over the Octobrists.

—¥

65Ibid., March 7 (March 20). 1906. P- 3.

66Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia i tsarizm v revoluitsii
i5- ~1907gg., pp. 232-38.—~

 

 

288

The news of Kadet Party victories in the Duma
elections did not surprise Suvorin who would have preferred
an Octobrist Party victory. Although he was not a member of
the Octobrist Party, Suvorin acknowledged this party as his
preference for leadership in the Duma. In contrast to the
Kadets and revolutionaries, the Octobrist Party program was
not merely "propaganda" and "daydreams" to gain voter sup-
port. Unfortunately, the Octobrists were complacent in their
campaign activities and did not realize the necessity to
actively campaign against the Kadets. In addition, the
Octobrist leaders were victims of their own "honesty" in pre-
senting their program to the voters.67 Thus, Suvorin recog-
nized that the political inexperience of the Octobrists con-
tributed to their poor showing.

Although he was not pleased with the election re-
sults, Suvorin renewed his support for the Duma. Since the
Duma was not composed of extremist parties, Suvorin believed
the Duma would unite the Russian people. Furthermore, the

Duma would reunite the Russian people with the Tsar who was

honoring his promises. The Duma would prove that Russia was

not politically bankrupt as the extremist parties charged and
68

trust would return to Russia.

In evaluating the political parties after the

 

67Novoe vremia, March 22 (April A), 1906, p. 2.

 

68Ibid., March 27 (April 9), 1906, p, 2,

 

289

elections, Suvorin conceded the Russian peasant was the basis
of all political power. The Kadet Party was naturally most
likely to win peasant support, while the parties on the right,
which tended to represent the nobility, could hardly expect
to engender peasant enthusiasm. The official name, the Con-
stitutional Democratic Party, made the Kadet Party sound
like the spokesman for popular freedom; the Kadet name and
program conveyed a militancy for a new society and future.
However, Suvorin challenged whether the Kadets really repre-
sented the principles stated in the party name. The Kadets
stood between a constitution and a revolution and Suvorin
viewed them as being closer to the latter.69

Suvorin stated his desire for a "progressive" party
which stood for "Russian nationalism." He would have chosen
the title "national-democratic" for this party and suggested
a platform advocating political freedom, economic planning
and tolerance for national cultures who did not threaten Rus-
sian nationalism. However, the Jewish population was exclud-
ed from participation in Suvorin's political scheme. The
Jews, Suvorin charged, had been instrumental in exciting the
revolutionary disorders. The Kadet success in the elections
was largely the result of large financial contributions from
the Jewish population which was notorious in Europe for its

political bribery. By comparison, most Russian political

 

69219.... March 28 (April 10), 1906, p. 3.

 

290

parties did not have equally large financial funds to support ‘
political propaganda.7O

When A. A. Stolypin and A. A. Pilenko announced
that the Octobrist Party would cooperate with the Kadets in
working for a constitutional government, Suvorin condemned
their tactics. Russia had no previous parliamentary exper-

ience and it was likely that under the new regime public

WPFTT H
9.

opinion would change often. The Octobrists were too hasty in
attributing the Kadet victory to widespread dissatisfaction
with the government. Suvorin believed the political climate
could change to favor the Octobrists. The Kadets were vic- (
torious largely because naive voters believed their passion- (
ate propaganda. Also, the Kadets capitalized on their party's I
name while the Octobrists were restricted. Suvorin urged the
Octobrists to avoid cooperation with the Kadets and concen-
trate on unifying their own party membership. In addition,
the party leadership must form a headquarters staff and com-
mander—in-chief similar to the military organization sug-
gested by Kuropatkin during the war. The party could then
concentrate on its opponents' weaknesses in the parliamentary
struggle and prepare a strong program.

Shortly before the Duma was scheduled to meet,

Suvorin analyzed the results of the past year. The Duma was

 

Ibid.

 

711212;; April 2 (April 15), 1906, pp. 2-3.

291

meeting almost a year after the disastrous war strained Rus-
sia's domestic tranquility. The year was one of constant
turmoil and threats to the survival of Russia. Questions
were raised regarding all facets of Russian society and now
the Duma was finally meeting to decide these questions.
Finally, after forty years of hearing a negative reply to the
petition of the Russian people for a voice in the government,
the Russian people were going to have their share in govern-
ment when the Duma convened. Even if only a small number
of these representatives were talented leaders, Suvorin pre-
dicted Russia would benefit.72

0n the eve of the Duma, Suvorin observed that if
the political parties united in a patriotic spirit of self-
lessness under talented leadership, then there was nothing
the Duma could not accomplish.73 As rumors circulated that
Witte would resign when the Duma met, Suvorin praised Witte
for his service to the Russian government and people. Al-
though he confessed to differences with Witte, Suvorin re-
garded him as a source for many of the reforms introduced.
Witte's reform efforts dated back to December, l90h, when
the Tsar promised improvements in Russian government and
society. Undoubtedly, history would view Witte as one of

Russia's most talented leaders in domestic and foreign affairs.

 

72%. April 9 (April 22), 1906, p. 3.

ӣ919.... April 11 (April 24), 1906, p. 2.

 

292

As for the reforms, Suvorin regarded these as granting the
Russian people the most desirable degree of freedom possible.
This reform era ushered in a reasonable government guided by
law and justice. The "party" system opened government busi-
ness to public discussion. Perfect peace in society was not
possible but a way was now open through the Duma. Unfor-
tunately, Witte might be lost to the government at this time,
a move which Suvorin viewed as a serious loss to the Duma
and the Russian people. Even the Kadets, Suvorin said, were
alarmed at the possible resignation of Witte. Witte was
dedicated to reforms and even though his continuance as
prime minister assured the Duma of a formidable political
adversary, Witte's resignation would be a severe loss to the
government's reform efforts. Therefore, Suvorin hoped this
extreme measure would not occur.74 Meanwhile in Suvorin's
view, the Duma held the fate of Russia.

Thus Suvorin, who had earlier advocated the call-
ing of a Zemskii Sobor to act as a consultative body, now
supported a Duma with legislative powers. The granting of
the October Manifesto had surprised Suvorin, but he welcomed
it as a means of curbing the revolutionary movement. When
the Manifesto did not bring the peace he anticipated, how-
ever, Suvorin urged Witte's new government to take strong and

<iecisive action against the revolutionaries. While he

 

7“Ibid., April 19 (May 2), 1906, p. 3.

basically supported hitte's government, he disagreed with
Witte's failure to immediately convoke the Duma, believing
that the people would be unwilling to accept Witte's "tem-
porary laws" and the continued Tsarist domination for more
than a brief period. Furthermore, Suvorin feared revolu-
tionary or bureaucratic solutions to such major issues as
the land ouestion. He increasingly looked to the nobility
and the bourgeoisie as the elements which should have heavy
leverage in Russia's decision-making processes, and he felt
these two groups could wield major influence in the Duma if
it were called immediately. Even after the Kadet victories
in the elections, Suvorin continued to support the Duma in
spite of the fact that the Kadet program was more radical
than he would have liked. While he disavowed membership in
any of the existing parties, he hoped the Octobrist Party
would be more successful in future Duma elections. His own
formula for a "national-democratic" party, however, re-
vealed a nationalistic orientation which had pervaded his
writing throughout his journalistic career. Russia had
suffered a disastrous war and a tragic revolution. Now
Suvorin hoped the coming Duma would rekindle the national-
ism which he considered the lifeblood of Russian society and
which he had continually attempted to encourage in his

"malen'kiia pis'ma."

CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Aleksei S. Suvorin, who began his life in a peas-

ant village had become by 1900 owner and publisher of Novoe

vremia, Russia's largest newspaper. Thus he occupied a

unique vantage point from which to observe and comment on

the domestic and foreign crises confronting Russia during

the turbulent years 1900 to 1906. Through a Novoe vremia

series, "Malen'kiia pis'ma," Suvorin was able to eXpress his
personal views on a variety of major events and issues.
Based largely on themes of nationalism and progressive re-
forms, his polemics received wide circulation throughout

Russia.
Typical of his concern with national interests,

Ehxvorin encouraged a policy of peaceful eXpansion in the
Far East, believing that the trans-Siberian railway and a

warm-water port were essential to Russia's future economic

progress. When the boxer Crisis threatened Russia's railway

interests in the summer of 1900, however, Suvorin supported

Witte's use of limited military force to occupy Manchuria and

protect the railway. Nevertheless, he opposed permanently

291+

295

annexing Manchuria, concurring with Witte that such a move
could jeopardize Russia's important current holdings. When
the intrigues of the Bezabrazov Circle threatened to provoke
open confrontation with Japan, Suvorin vigorously opposed
war, preferring instead to concentrate on needed domestic
reforms. Enthused by Witte's efforts to overcome Russia's
backwardness, Suvorin urged reforms in several major areas.
He championed changes in the educational system, particular-
ly the expansion of educational opportunities and an increased
emphasis on Russian culture at the expense of classical stud-
ies. He also favored improvement in the treatment of minor-
ities, hoping to encourage their rapid assimilation into
Russian society. After the Bezabrazov Circle forced Witte's
resignation, Suvorin increasingly turned to the zemstvo
movement as the vehicle to help bring about reforms by
assisting the government in an advisory capacity. The
changes he advocated were mainly steps which he felt would
bolster Russian nationalism and overcome the country's back-
wardness while preserving its unique culture. Ultimately
reforms would come "from above," thus reuniting the people
Land the Tsar.

The outbreak of war, however, interrupted Suvorin's
131_ans for reform. When Japan attacked Port Arthur, he prompt-
iLgr'shifted his emphasis towards encouraging patriotism and
fizll.participation in winning the war. Dreams of "spring"

Intlst wait, he concluded, but the numerous war reversals soon

296

forced him to revise his forecast. While at first he had
attempted to maintain popular support for the war by claim-
ing only victory would bring reforms, defeats at Mukden and
Tsushima engendered Suvorin’s increased interest in immediate
changes. He stepped up his criticism of the bureaucracy and
began to call for a Zemskii Sobor to resolve the war issue.
These efforts, however, were primarily aimed at winning the
war, since he continued to prefer the postponement of most
internal changes. He felt that certain improvements in the
bureaucracy would strengthen Russia's battle potential and
hoped a Zemskii Sobor could rekindle war patriotism. As de-
feats mounted and popular discontent with the war increased,
the Tsar, much to Suvorin's chagrin, conceded to negotiate
peace. Although he praised Witte's negotiating skill, the
Treaty of Portsmouth disappointed Suvorin, who believed that
the Russian nation had failed an important test of its inter-
national power. He wondered, in the face of defeat, whether
Russia would be able to meet its impending domestic test and
looked forward to the summoning of the recently-announced
Imperial Duma.
While Suvorin vacationed in Western Europe, a
greneral strike culminated in the issuance of the October
fifla nifesto. Although Suvorin considered the Manifesto, which
ggrnanted political freedom and gave legislative powers to the
Duma, a radical document, he accepted it. He also supported

lfljsbte's "new" government which assumed leadership simultaneously

297

with the granting of the Manifesto. As a result, he strongly
criticized the revolutionary elements for their renunciation
of the Manifesto and their demands for a constituent assembly,
claiming that convoking such a body would be inconsistent
with Russia's current institutional :ramework and would inter-
fere with the gradual political development of the country.
In the face of continuous upheaval, Suvorin expressed dis-
satisfaction with the Witte government's failure both to
take strong action against revolutionary elements and to call
the Duma immediately. When a second general strike forced
the government into action and brought relative peace to the
urban areas, Suvorin began to concentrate on those elements
which he felt should wield a heavy influence in the Duma.
Since the zemstvo leaders had grown increasingly radical,
Suvorin now looked to the bourgeoisie and the nobility for
leadership, hoping that these two groups would be success-
ful in the elections finally called by Witte. Even after the
liberal Kadets won impressive victories in the elections,
Suvorin continued to support the impending Duma, believing
that it would reunite the Russian people and rekindle
rLational sentiments. He overtly disassociated himself from
tflie Union of Russian People, calling it a party of "hatred"
arid chided the Octobrists, a moderately-rightist party more
tHD his liking, for joining in a coalition with the Kadets
tnafore the Octobrists had matured as a political party. His

ovni formula for a "national-democratic" party was built on

298

nationalistic and progressive concepts which typified his
basic philoSOphy.

His approach to foreign affairs and domestic prob-
lems was dictated by his desire to foster Russia's national
interests. Thus the reforms which he advocated were essen-
tially directed towards progress which would strengthen the
nation rather than promote individual welfare or democratic
ideas. Even his concept of the autocratic government's role
was consonant with a concern for national interests. The
origin of the Russian state he traced to Smutnoe vremia when
the representative Zemskii Sobor rescued Russia from foreign
invasion and reestablished autocratic rule. Since that time
the autocratic system had served Russia by providing the
source of leadership, and, in each succeeding century, the
autocrats had provided Russia with "reforms from above."
However, Suvorin recognized that Russia's existence at the
turn of the twentieth century was threatened by backward-
ness. Consequently, he looked to the Tsar and his govern-
ment for progressive reforms to strengthen the state. He
viewed the Witte system as a determined effort to overcome
Russia's weaknesses. Other progressive reforms, such as
«changes in education and in the status of minorities, were
ecqually important to assuring Russia's future greatness.

Enren his anti-Semitic position was directed primarily against
a: cultural and national orientation which he felt endangered

Emissia's unity. When the war with Japan exposed Russia's

299

external and internal frailty, Suvorin attempted to tap the
same patriotic spirit which he believed had enabled Russia

to emerge victorious and revitalized from Smutnoe vremia,
the Napoleonic Invasion, and the Russo-Turkish War. Hence,
he looked to a meeting of the Tsar and the people in some
type of representative body, preferably a Zemskii Sobor, as
the means to resurrect Russian patriotism to rescue Russia
from defeat by Japan and revolutionary disorders. Conse-
quently, he welcomed the consultative Duma announced in
August and even accepted a legislative Duma which the
October Manifesto incorporated as consistent with Russia's
historical tradition of "reform from above."

Thus, the themes of nationalism and historical
evolution ran through Suvorin's writings causing him to ad-
vocate changes which would encourage Russification and pa-
triotism, modernize the country, and enhance Russia's inter-
national prestige and power. The emergence of political
parties, however, changed the political arena, and Suvorin's
increasing support of the interests of the nobility and the
.middle class began to move him in a conservative direction.

“21th the meeting of the Duma a new era in Russia's political
Iiistory began and forced Suvorin to alter his views and con-

‘vilctions to meet the rapidly changing situation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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PAMPHLETS AND UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Abramovich, V. I. Novoe vremia i soblaznennye mladentsy.
Biblioteka SEshchest vennykh i Iiteraturfiykh
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and Ignatiev, 1880-1882." Unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Michigan, 1954.

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