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AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES AND SENATORIAL VOTING RECORDS

BY

Gregory Michael Browne

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1984

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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES AND SENATORIAL VOTING RECORDS

By

Gregory Michael Browne

I believe that the conventional ideological classification
of Americans into "conservatives" and "liberals" is inadequate. What
is required is a classification with several degrees of conservatism
and liberalism, and additional dimensions as well. Therefore I
constructed a more complex classification, with several cate-
gories and two main dimensions, building upon some classifications
of others and upon my own ideas.

I wished to see some systematic evidence to support my
theories. Therefore I tested them by examining Senatorial voting
records from 1959 to 1978. For the sake of making the investigation
manageable, the classifications and the voting study dealt with only
one issue area--that of economics, which seemed the most important.

The result of this examination was to find moderate to strong
support for all major cleavages between the categories of my model,

and for other cleavages also.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph (Alvina) Browne.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all of the help I received in
writing this thesis from my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph (Alvina)
Browne. In addition to raising me and paying for my education, they
have provided me with a home and support while I composed the thesis,
paid for the course fees and other fees necessary for my getting
credit for it, and put up with my work habits for a long time.

Also, to my father belongs credit for drawing the diagrams.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . .

IINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . .

(IHAPTER

I

II

1311

THE CLASSIFICATION. . . .

METHODOIIOGY O O O O O 0
Historical Background. .

TESTING THE MODEL: AN ANALYSIS

RECORDS . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . .
Survey of Voting Records.
Introduction. . . .
Income Taxes. . . .
Tariff Issues . . .
General Spending . .
Revenue Sharing . . .
Public Works. . . .
Social Security. . .
Labor Issues. . . .
Food Stamps . . . .

Aid to Families with Depedent

(W) o o o o 0
Housing . . . . .
Education. . . . .

THE VOTING

CEO and other poverty programs. . . .
Labor and HEW Departmental Funds . . .

Mass Transit. . . .

Government Aid to Business .
Wage and Price Controls .
Fuel Rationing and Related Programs . .
Federal Energy Administration (PEA) . .

No-Fault Insurance. .
Anti'tI'USt Law 0 o 0

iv

48
67

86

86
144
144
147
151
152
154
155
160
161
170

171
172
174
177
181
182
183
185
186
187
188
188

CHAPTER Page

Airline Deregulation. . . . . . . . 188

Consumer Protection . . . . . . . . 189

National Consumer Co-operative Bank. . . 190

Occupational Safety and Health Administra-

tion (OSHA). . . . . . . . . . 191

Environmental Issues. . . . . . . . 192
Correspondences Between the Cleavages From

the Voting Records and The Cleavages From

the Theoretical Mbdel . . . . . . . 198
Groups Produced By the Cleavages, and Their

Correspondences to Categories From the

Theoretical Model. . . . . . . . . 207
A Special Problem: The Place of the Southern
Democrats . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Cleavage Sets From the Voting Records Which
Do Not Correspond to Cleavages From the
MOdel. O O O O O O O O O O O O 219
IV CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

BIBLIOGRAPHY................237

LIST OF TABLES

Votes Used. . . . . . . . . . . .
Roll-Call Votes . . . . . . . . . .
Aggregations of Cleavages (Cleavage Sets) .
Summary of Correspondences Between Cleavages
From.Voting Records and Cleavages From the
Theoretical Model . . . . . . . .
Groups Produced By Cleavages From the Voting

Records and Their Correspondences With the
Categories of the Theoretical Model . .

vi

102
199

206

207

FIGURE

J10
211
112

213

114

155

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317

:18

LIST OF FIGURES

Liberals and Conservatives. . . . . . .
The Left-Right Dimension . . . . . . .
Attitudes toward equality . . . . . . .
Equality and government intervention . . .
European ideologies . . . . . . . . .
Attitudes toward equality in Europe. . . . .
The triangular scheme . . . . . . . .
The equality and liberty dimensions.

The distribution of ideologies in Europe . . .
The distribution of ideologies in the U.S.A..
The Hofstadter model (with extrapolations) .
The Weinstein model . . . . . . . . . .

The Weinstein model, and the liberty and equality
dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The modified Weinstein model and the triangular
SCheme O O O O O I O O O I O O O 0

Further modifications of the Weinstein model and
the triangular scheme . . . . . . . . .

Further modifications of the Weinstein model and
the triangular scheme (continued) . . . . .

Further modifications of the Weinstein model and
the triangular scheme (continued) . . . . .

The modified Weinstein model partially integrated
with the Hofstadter model . . . . . . .

vii

ll
12
15
15
18

19

22

23

24

24

25

26

FIGURE Page

19 Further integration of the Hofstadter and Weinstein
models: the rightism of the radical progressives. . 28

20 The extreme leftism of the radical progressives . . 29
21 The rightism and leftism of the radical progressives. 29
22 Simplification of Figure 21 . . . . . . . . . 30

23 The New Deal Era: integration of the Patterson and
Feinman categories into model . . . . . . . . 33

24 Rightist (Republican) New Dealers . . . . . . . 38
25 The Anti-Statist row extended leftward . . . . . 39
26 Degrees of Statism . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

27 The New Deal versus Great Society liberalism . . . 43

viii

INTRODUCTION

The importance of making an ideological classification of
the participants in our political process has been recognized over
the years by various people who have created typologies in the attempt
to fit political actions into them. However, most of these classi—
fications were simple, with only two, three or four categories, all
on one dimension. Consequently, many important figures do not fit
into them or fit rather poorly. This is taken by many to suggest
that there is not sufficient evidence of patterns in political
attitudes to warrant a classification, beyond noting "right" and
"left" poles on an axis, with people located at various points along
it.

Yet what needs to be considered is whether a more elaborate
and subtle classification could compensate for the inadequacies in
existing typologies. We contend in this thesis that such a classi-
fication can be made, and that it takes the form which will subse-
quently be outlined. We will then test its meaningfulness by attempt-
ing to fit it to current politics by examining Senatorial voting
records.

Therefore, this paper will present the proposed new classi-
fication and then test it by examining voting records in recent
decades. The first part will be based mainly on the reading of

secondary sources, including the typologies of others, while the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

second part will be based mainly on voting records, a kind of pri-
mary source.

This paper will have to put some restraints on its focus in
order to be of manageable scope. It was decided to focus on only
one issue area, and economics was chosen as the issue area. It was
selected because economics is rather basic ideologically; that is,
ideologies often derive their stands on other issues from their
stands on economic issues. We will elaborate further on this later.

The Senate was selected because it is a more manageable body
on which to do a voting study than is the House of Representatives,
which is the only real alternative body to study, if one wishes to
do a voting study of national politics.

The time frame for the analysis of the voting records also
needed to have limits. The slice of time from 1959 to 1978 was
selected because twenty years seemed to be the greatest length that
such a survey could be and still fit within the proposed scope of
this paper; and that particular twenty-year period seemed to encompass
the most interesting changes in the recent past.

The first chapter of this thesis will present the proposed
classification. It will examine conventional American and European
classifications, and typologies of Progressive Era politics (notably
those proposed by Richard Hofstadter and James Weinstein), of New
Deal politics, and of the Great Society era (especially that pro-
posed by Kevin Phillips), and related matters. As we proceed, a

classification will be sketched out. It will have two main dimensions:

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one involving equalitarianism and inegalitarianism and the other
involving libertarianism (individualism) and statism (collectivism).
Distinctions will be made between the liberalisms of the New Deal,
of the Great Society and of the Progressive Era, as well as between
(modern) liberalism, classical liberalism (modern conservatism)

and traditionalist conservatism.

The second chapter will explain the methodology of the

analysis of the voting records. It will also include sections on
the historical background period to be examined. In the third
chapter, the analysis itself will be done. First, we will summarize
the votes by issue area, and then aggregate the cleavages produced
by the votes into larger cleavages. Second, we will attempt to find
correspondences between the cleavages and those of the model.
Third, we will see into what groups the aggregate cleavages divide
the Senators, and then find the correspondences between the groups
and the categories of the model. Finally, the fourth chapter will
summarize the paper and discuss applications of this kind of work

to other subjects.

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CHAPTER I

THE CLASSIFICATION

The ideological classification of politicians in use in the
press and in ordinary classification does not usually go beyond the
"conservative-liberal" or "right-left" scheme. Sometimes, this

is a simple dichotomy of conservatives (rightists) and liberals

(leftists) (see Figure 1).

( Conservative 9

Figure l.--Liberals and Conservatives.

But right and left are directions on a dimension, thus implying a

continuum (see Figure 2).

Liberals Conservatives
+——(Left) (Right)-——+

Figure 2.--The Left-Right Dimension.

And so people are generally described as more or less conservative

or liberal, more or less "rightist" or "leftist". Or they are

 

 

 

 

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described as being somewhere between conservative and liberal, as
moderates (or moderate-conservatives or moderate-liberals), or as
somewhere in the center (or on the center-right or the center-left).
Various definitions of these terms are given. Nonetheless,
there exists (at least in regard to economic matters, with which we
shall be concerned here) pretty close agreement on.what these types
mean, at least in the actual practice of classification. The more
liberal or "to the left" one is, the more one favors the use of
government to make the members of society more equal, at least in
regard to wealth or economic power; the more conservative or "to
the right" one is, the more one opposes doing this. The (relative)
liberal or leftist thus supports the use of government to move toward
equality; the (relative) conservative or rightist opposes this1

(see Figure 3).

 

Liberal Conservative
+——(Left) (Right)-—+
+——-egalitarian inegalitarian——+

Figure 3.--Attitudes toward equality.

There is some ambiguity as to what it is about the liberal
(left) goals that the conservative (rightist) opposes. It is not
always clear whether conservatives are simply all of those opposed

to liberal egalitarianism (see Figure 2 again) or are, in addition,

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people who oppose the principle of government intervention (espe-

cially in the economy) whether for egalitarian purposes or not (see

 

 

Figure 4).
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Con:::v::ives Government
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Liberals for
’(/,/// (Left) 1
+—-egalitarian Equality inegalitarian -+

Figure 4.--Equality and government intervention.

This classification is a simplification of the prevailing
classification of ideologies applied in Europe, and commonly used
in the study of political philosophy as well. The principal cate-
gories are as follows: traditional conservatism (traditionalism),
classical liberalism, and socialism, with the addition of modern
liberalism as a transition or hybrid between classical liberalism

and socialism (see Figure 5).

 

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The resulting sequence (traditionalism—-classical liberalism-dmodern
liberalisme-socialism) also represents the ranking of the philoso-
phies in terms of their egalitarianism, from least to most (see

Figure 6). In general, from the time of the decline of the feudal

 

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Figure 6.--Attitudes toward equality in Europe.

 

 

 

nobility until at least the nineteenth century, the more inegalitarian
a group was, the more it supported its country's king, so that
traditionalist conservatives were his strongest supporters. There-
fore, in European parliaments of this period, the speaker (who was
the representative of the king) saw to it that the more supportive
of the king a party was, the farther it sat to the speaker's right
(the position of honor); the less supportive it was, the further to
the left it sat. Thus, the order presented above, which initially
was roughly reflective of the degree of support for the monarchy,
became a right-to-left order. And since this order was already one
of inegalitarianism to egalitarianism, "right" and "left" came to
imply these respective attitudes.

The traditionalist supporters of royalty and aristocracy
were, at first, in the position of defending the established powers

and trying to preserve the status quo. They were hence known as

 

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"conservatives". Their principal opponents were what were then
called liberals, and now called classical liberals (the other kind

of liberal being rare before the late nineteenth century). Conse-
quently, "conservative" came to be used as a synonym for rightist

and inegalitarian, and "liberal" came to be used as a partial synonym
for leftist and egalitarian.

What is called modern liberalism arose in the late nineteenth
century, accepting many socialist measures (especially in social
welfare) without being willing to abandon liberalism (including its
capitalistic economic principles) altogether. This philosophy was
partially liberal (in the classical liberal sense) in the first
place, and further strengthened its claim to the liberal title by
transforming the meaning of "liberalism" itself from freedom from
government to freedom from economic and social restraints in general,
such as freedom from want. And since "liberalism" had already become
partially synonymous with egalitarianism, modern liberalism there-
fore was able to paradoxically say that it was more "liberal" than
(classical) liberalism, and eventually, at least in the United States,
the only liberalism. Moreover, traditionalism in this country was
weak and classical liberalism, later joined by modern liberalism,
was strong. Consequently, the terms conservatism and liberalism
were not much used for a long time, and this made it easier for
modern liberalism to appropriate exclusive title to the term
"liberalism". Meanwhile, classical liberalism, as the more rightist
(and less "libera1) of the two major philosophies, came to be

called "conservatism”.2

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"Traditionalism" is the term applied to the dominant social
structure in European society through the end of the Middle Ages and
early modern times, and throughout much of the rest of the world
until the time of Western colonization and beyond. This broad
category includes tribal society, kingdoms and empires, absolute
monarchies and decentralized feudal regimes. Traditionalism is here
defined as a value-system which upholds an inequality--a legal-
political one as well as an economic one--which involves a hereditary,
more-or-less fixed and closed class system, whose origins were often
in brute force, but whose justification was made on the basis of
some innate superiority of blood or some mystic sanction. All
slavery and serfdom thus partake of traditionalism.

"Classical liberalism" refers to the philosophy which advo-
cates liberty from government, as typified by that of John Locke.

It says that all individuals possess certain natural moral rights
equally. These include the right to one's own labor and what the
labor produces (including what one withdraws from nature by this
labor). It is an injustice to violate these rights; government is
set up to protect these rights and has no right to violate them.
These principles may be taken in their most extreme form to mandate
pure laissez-faire, as the modern Libertarian Party would do, but
many who are called classical liberals (including, it seems, Locke
himself) would depart from it in many particular instances while
still adhering to the general principle. Generally similar ideas

have been advocated by others of this group, such as the British

 

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Whigs, Adam Smith, most of our "Founding Fathers", the Social
Darwinists, and, to some extent, John Stuart Mill.

"Socialism" refers to these philosophies which through common
(and presumably democratic) ownership (or at least control) of
wealth or the sources of wealth aim to achieve a more—or-less equal
distribution of wealth, and so achieve equality of condition. Var-
ious forms of socialism have been advocated by the likes of Robert
Owen, Fourier, Marx, Saint-Simon and the Fabians.

In short, traditionalism upholds unequal chances to be
wealthy (or perhaps better, unequal certainties); classical liberal—
ism favors an equal liberty to achieve unequal wealth or economic
condition; socialism seeks equality of economic condition. Another,
somewhat different (probably less accurate) way of approaching the
distinctions is to say that traditionalism defends inequality based
on the class into which one was born (which rests ultimately on con-
quest, racial origin or religious sanction); while capitalism defends
inequality based primarily on merit and effort (and inheritance and
gift from those who earned it by their merit and effort); and
socialism opposes both kinds of inequality.

Modern liberalism would move society to some degree in the
direction of equality of condition, while stopping short of socialism
and complete egalitarianism.

We may now make use of the conceptual scheme of some thinkers,
such as F. A. Hayek,3 who think of the three main ideologies as

representing a triangular scheme with one at each corner, and with

 

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modern liberalism on the side between classical liberalism and

socialism (see Figure 7). But triangularity implies two-
WClassic
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Traditional
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Figure 7.-—The triangular scheme.

dimensionality. And the study of political philosophy does indeed
make another distinction: classical liberalism is termed "liber-
tarian" (or "individualist") while both socialism and traditionalism
are called "statist" (or "collectivist") (with modern liberalism
somewhere in between). That is, the former opposes "big government"
(much government restriction of the liberty of the individual),
especially government intervention in the economy, seeing it as a
violation of his rights, while the latter two favor it. This follows
from their goals: classical liberalism wishes to abolish traditional
inequalities (castes, slavery, etc.) and any others that are the
product of government force, but wishes to preserve inequalities

that arise from the "natural" (non-governmental) processes of produc-
tion and trade (with the only natural routes to inequality to be
stamped out being private force and fraud), whereas socialism wishes

to use government to impose an equality (of condition) upon man and

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traditionalism.wishes to impose an inequality on them (both of which
are, from the classical liberal viewpoint, unnatural). In any case,
socialist equality and traditionalist inequality both require govern-
ment interference with "natural" economic processes (if only the
toleration of some men using force to enslave others, which tolera-
tion changes an anarchic violence into government violence, since a
government, as such, must monopolize violence, and therefore either
outlaw it or assume responsibility for it).

We now have two dimensions: inegalitarianism versus egali-
tarianism (which can be called the "equality dimension") and liber-
tarianism versus statism (which can be called the "liberty dimension")

(see Figure 8).

 

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Classical

    
    
     
    
   

 

libertarian Liberalism
Liberty Modern
Liberalism
statist

  

 

Socialism \

 
 

Traditional
1 \ Conservatism.)
+-egalitarian Equality inegalitarian —+
Figure 8.--The equality and liberty dimensions.
(At this point, we should note that it is a logical con-

clusion that any departure from pure classical liberalism--that is,

laissez-faire--to the right, left or any other direction, necessarily

13

requires the increase of state power, and so is a move toward
statism. Consequently, in the charts and discussion, the "liberty
dimension" will measure only that statism which is ngt_the product
of egalitarianism or inegalitarianism.)

Taking account of this two-dimensionality helps us to explain
the ambiguity in the American usage of the term "conservatism",
noted above. When the term is identified with inegalitarianism, then
it includes traditionalism as well as classical liberalism (plus
as that statism which would fall in the center on the equality
dimension, directly below classical liberalism); both of which stand
for inegalitarian opposition to modern liberalism's striving for
equality of condition. However, when conservatism is used as a
synonym for classical liberalism, then it implies opposition to
statism, as well as to equality (of condition).

To summarize the preceding discussion, we can say that we
now have two dimensions. The first is the inegalitarian--egalitarian
one (the equality dimension). This is what is usually called the
right-left dimension; the former is the equivalent of conservatism;
the latter, in this country, is the partial equivalent of liberalism.
The second dimension is the libertarian-statist (individualist-
collectivist) one (the liberty dimension).

On the equality dimension, the arrangement of the ideologies
from right to left is as follows: traditionalism, classical liberal-
ism, modern liberalism and socialism. On the liberty dimension,

classical liberalism is at the libertarian end of the scale,

 

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socialism and traditionalism are at the statist end, and modern
liberalism is in the middle. From this discussion, we can see that
socialism and traditionalism are weak in the United States, relative
to their condition in Europe. Conversely, classical liberalism is
strong here, relative to its condition in Europe. In terms of the
diagram, the political culture of the United States is distributed
more toward the libertarian end of the liberty dimension than is
that of Europe, and is distributed more tightly around the center on
the equality dimension4 (see Figures 9 and 10). Hence, when an
American is referred to herein as a statist, an egalitarian or an
inegalitarian, these terms are used in the American rather than the
European context, and so imply less extreme positions than they
otherwise would.

The South presents a special problem. The political position
of the bulk of Southern politicians in this century was one of sup-
port for the white supremacist regime which was set up in most of
the South in 18903 and which collapsed in the 19505 and 19605 under
the impact of the "civil rights" movement. This regime was based on
the disfranchisement, by the poll-tax and other means, of most blacks,
and many poor whites as well. It was racist, and since racism in
practice is a form of inequality based on ascriptive characteristics,
it partook of traditionalism to this extent. The disfranchisement
of the poor whites was, to some extent, a symptom of economic elitism
as well; how much it was, and how much this elitism is to be inter-

preted as a sign of traditionalist ideology is a matter of dispute.5

15

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There are further possibilities for elaboration of the
classification beyond the triangular scheme presented above. There
is reason to believe that there is more than one type of modern
liberalism. At the very least, it would seem likely from the model
that there are different degrees of "leftism"--that is, there could
be forms of modern liberalism close to classical liberalism, which
pass through various intermediate steps to a form which is close to
socialism. And perhaps one could perceive several meaningful incre-
ments of this leftism. It should be borne in mind that in the
twentieth century there have been in this country three major periods
of modern liberal legislation on the national level. That is to
say, there have been three major legislative agendas that brandish
egalitarian slogans and claim to benefit classes other than business
and the rich, usually at the expense of the latter two groups.

These were the programs of the Progressive Era (circa 1901—1920),
the New Deal (circa 1933-1939) and the Great Society (circa 1965—
1968). Each one increased the size of government: each successive
one increased Federal spending to a higher level than the previous
one, and thereby increased the burden of paying for it. (The Great
Society, in the sense of the Johnson-era programs and their succes-
sors, was not accompanied by a great rise in tax rates, but it led
to deficits which fueled inflation, which is a sort of tax, and
pushed people into higher tax brackets-—"bracket creep"--which
increased the tax burden.) It seems to make sense to think that

there would be some who would favor one program but oppose the next,

17

more extensive one. The same could apply to the stages in the
development of these programs--as, for example, the early and late
(or "First" and "Second") New Deals.

We begin with the Progressive Era (circa 1901-1920). At
first examination, the conflicts of this era seem much like contem-
porary ones to us, with "(modern) liberal" progressives proposing to
expand government for the sake of equality, and their "conservative"
(classical liberal) opponents resisting.6 However, there are quali-
fications to be made to this simple scheme.

The first for us to consider is that made by Richard

Hofstadter in The Age of Reform. There he argued that the average

 

progressive politician represented the petit-bourgeois small busi-
nessman (or his agrarian counterpart, the yeoman farmer), and that
his political attitudes followed suit. He was not as far left as
later (New Deal and post-New Deal) liberals; distrusting the "work-
ing class" (i.e., manual laborers) in general and trade unions in
particular, he was not a strong advocate of labor legislation, or,
for that matter, of the welfare state, and might have become a strong
opponent of these if he had lived long enough7 (see Figure 11).
Further, he was also distinguishable from latter-day liberals on the
liberty dimension as well as on the equality dimension, in his yearn-
ing for the classical liberal ideals of competition and, to a lesser
extent, small government.8

Other historians of this era, such as James Weinstein, have

advanced the concept of "corporate liberalism". This is a form of

8
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(modern) liberalism, which was enunciated or at least supported by
businessmen, who thought that they could benefit from liberal exten-
sions of government power, such as business regulation, especially
under the Federal Trade Commission and other regulatory commissions.9
If such regulations hurt a businessman's competitors more than they
hurt him, he stood to benefit. Regulations against price-cutting
protect an established business against the newcomer trying to

expand his market by undercutting the prices of the competition.

Many other regulations are harder to bear for the small newcomer
trying to grow than for the established big business.

In his The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State 1900-1918,10

 

Weinstein also notes that exponents of the corporate liberal philos~
ophy, such as the National Civic Federation, saw themselves as inter-
mediate between the conservative, old—style (mostly small) business-
men (represented by the National Association of Manufacturers), and
their opponents on the left. weinstein identified these "leftists"
as including not only the socialists, but also "neo-populists" such

as Robert LaFollette (see Figure 12). LaFollette wished to break

NEO-POPULISTS
(LaFollette, etc.)
(Small Business, etc.)

\ CORPORATE CONSERVATIVES

LIBERALS -——____ (N.A,M.)
(N.C.F. - Big Business) (Small Busi-
ness)
SOCIALISTS
+——-—- LEFT RIGHT-———~+

Figure 12.--The Weinstein model.

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20

the power of big business in order to restore free competition. A
strict or literal interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
high taxes (mainly personal income taxes on large fortunes, because
LaFollette opposed corporate income taxes as being harmful to small
businesses) were tools he proposed using (he even contemplated
nationalization, which, though not furthering competition, would
reduce the power of big business). LaFollette, although placed on
the left in the Weinstein scheme, did resemble the conservatives of
the NAM, in his wish to protect the interests of small business and
further competition, as Weinstein himself notes.

A further wrinkle is added to this picture of Progressive
Era politics by David Thelen in his study Robert LaFollette and the

Insurgent Spiri£.11 Here, LaFollette is shown as beginning his

 

political career with a strong confidence in the self-made man and
the American system of competition which allowed this man to rise.
These attitudes were naturally associated with conservative (classical
liberal) political attitudes, and such were the attitudes that he
held at the start of his political career. The apparent decline of
competition and increase of concentration in business constituted the
catalyst that led to his later more radical political views. Yet

he seems to have seen no revolutionary change in his political
philosophy, and there apparently was none. LaFollette thus seems

to share with the NAM conservatives not only their small business
constituency but also a fondness, on balance, for the ideals of free

market competition.

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21

At this point, we can see that LaFollette‘s view 100kS
similar to that of another "radical" politician of his time--William
Jennings Bryan. As was LaFollette, Bryan was an admirer of self-
employed people, although it was farmers rather than small business-
men that were his chief concern; also like LaFollette he was a lover
of relatively individualistic competition, approximately as it was
practiced in the nineteenth century, and he supported radical
measures in the antitrust and other fields, chiefly in order to
restore the competitive marketplace.

From this reading of Weinstein and Thelen, a two-dimensional,
four-category scheme of ideological classification for the Progres-
sive Era emerges. On the side of competition and small businessmen
we have two groups, one "conservative" and the other "radical"--on
taxes, nationalization and big business generally--the NAM conser-
vatives and the "neo-populists" such as LaFollette and Bryan,
respectively. On the side of concentration we again have two groups,
one conservative and one radical on taxes, nationalization and big
business generally--the corporate liberals and the socialists
respectively (see Figure 13).

This four-category scheme is two-dimensional, as was the
triangular one, and suggests it. The competitive dimension appears
to correspond to the liberty dimension, whereas the other dimension
appears to correspond to the equality dimension. The conservatives,
of course, are classical liberals, and the socialists are also

familiar to us. The "corporate liberals" seem to be statists of the

22

 

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mumHHmHoom

 

mommocwmsm HHmEm
A.z.<.zv
mo>wum>ummcou

 

 

muoaumm amaomw
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n.0uo

cm>am .muuoaaommqv
mumwasaom

can mumfiaamomlooz

 

 

ummH

 

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23

center--no farther left, or right, than the classical liberals--
between the traditionalists and the socialists. The populists and
nee-populists represented by Bryan and LaFollette represent a new

position, one which is egalitarian and libertarian (see Figure 14).

Classical Liberalism

 

Neo-Pop. V/7.

Cons.

 

 

 

 

l///JV/S::. Corp. Lib.

- Traditionalism

 

Figure 14--—The modified Weinstein model and the triangular scheme.

However, this tends to overstate the case. As we will see,
this last group is not necessarily egalitarian by modern (New Deal
and post-New Deal) standards in regard to social welfare measures.
Thus it is not as far left as the socialists are. Then again, it
tends to support many of the statist measures of a "progressive"
nature favored by corporate liberals, such as the FTC and anti-price
cutting measures.13 Therefore it is not as libertarian as at least
some conservatives. The resulting fact that it is only moderately
libertarian and only moderately egalitarian fits this LaFollette-Bryan

group in better with the triangular scheme (see Figure 15).

Fig

For
Sta-f
thr:

tra:

 

24

 

 

 

 

Cons.
Neo-
Pop.
,////// Soc. Corp.
Lib. 1

 

 

 

 

Figure 15.--Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the
triangular scheme.
It seems that the four-category scheme needs elaboration.
For one thing, the socialists are considerably more egalitarian and
statist than the members, or most of them, in each of these other

three groups. They are about as far removed from them as are the

traditionalists (see Figure 16).

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

////// Cons.
I
Neo-
/ Pop.
Corp.
Lib.
ah—_____
Soc.
I | Trad.

Figure l6.-Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the
triangular scheme (continued).

Fig
the

5.1

Fi

COD'

meag

bUSt

dimfi
La,

and

 

 

25

This leaves a gap in the statist-egalitarian quadrant of
Figure 13. Still, it is possible that there is a group similar to

the Bryan-LaFollette group on the equality dimension, but more

/\

statist (see Figure 17).

 

 

 

 

 

/ Cons .
7. .
Neo-
Pop.
/
? Corp.
Lib.
Soc. Trad.

 

 

 

Figure l7.--Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the
triangular scheme (continued).

We now seem to have integrated Weinstein's typology into the
conventional classification scheme.

At this point, it seems we can say that since some of the
measures advanced by the LaFollette-Bryan group (radical trust-
busting and some nationalization) seem to be extremely leftist even
by today‘s standards, we actually have,with respect to the equality
dimension, two columns: an extreme left column (including the
LaFollette-Bryan group) and a column more to the right (conservatives

and corporate liberals).

Roi

Elf.

 

 

 

 

Pi

26

What of those on the moderate left: what of the bulk of
Hofstadter's progressives? A column should be set up here in the

middle, embracing libertarian and statist divisions (see Figure 18).

Hofstadter Progressives

 

 

(Left)
Extreme Center Right
Left Left
Cons. Anti-Statist
Neo-Pop
and Populist Hoover

 

 

Progressive Statists
("Corporate Liberals") Statist

Beveridge Wood

 

 

 

 

Figure l8.--The modified Weinstein model partially integrated with
the Hofstadter model.

The libertarian division of the center-left would be typified by

Herbert Hoover, a self-proclaimed individualist who nonetheless

favored higher taxes on the rich, at least in 1920, who thought that

Coolidge had not trust-busted enough yet would not have trust-busted

as much as LaFollette, and who disliked government enterprises, let

14 Others who might belong here are George

alone nationalization.
Record, Irving Lenroot, Jonathan Bourne, William Randolph Hearst,

and perhaps Louis Brandeis. The statist division of the center-left

27

would include the more leftist of the corporate liberals. Perhaps
Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, with his big business support and plat-
form containing "social justice" proposals, belongs here with most
of his Progressive Party, and perhaps WOodrow Wilson should belong
here after adopting many of their proposals in 1916 (if Gabriel
Kolko's view of him as more inclined toward what we have called con-
centration than toward what we have called competition is accurate).
This category might be typified by William Allen White, with his
"sympathy for the underdog" coupled with his "middle-class fears of
the social revolution Roosevelt was guiding", as Otis Graham described
his attitudes. Others who seem to belong here include Albert
Beveridge, Gifford Pinchot, and Raymond Moley.15 The statist division
of the right (the right corporate liberals) might be typified by
Leonard Wood, an advocate of strong government with a pronounced
anti-left inclination. Probably Woodrow Wilson belongs here between
1913 and 1916 (again assuming Kolko's view of his stand on the con-
centration issue is accurate.) Others who seem to belong here
include Bainbridge Colby, James Burleson, Atlee Pomerene, Charles
Evans Hughes and Henry Stimson.16

The existence of this new category of left corporate liberals
indicates that many big businessmen came to support other forms of
seemingly anti-business government intervention besides that of
regulation of business. Apparently these businessmen concluded that
these measures hurt smaller competitors more than them, just as did
regulation,and were therefore beneficial to them. Further examples

of this will be seen later.

28

By this point, we have partially integrated Hofstadter's
typology into the modified Weinstein and conventional schemes, inso-
far as the right column of the modified weinstein model corresponds
to Hofstadter's conservatives, and the moderate and extreme left
columns together correspond to Hofstadter's progressives. This
leaves the later (New Deal) liberals of Hofstadter. In his scheme,
they are to the left of the extreme left of the Progressive Era,
including the radical progressives (the LaFollette-Bryan group)

(see Figure 19). However, the stands of this group in favor of

radical trust—busting and some nationalization put them to the left

Soc. Later Lib. Progressives Conserv. Conserv.
(New Deal and (Hofstadter's) (Class Lib.) (Tradit.)
Post-New Deal) l

[I Radical Moderates I
(Neo-Pop. etc.)
LaFollette,
Bryan, etc.

Figure l9.--Further integration of the Hofstadter and Weinstein
models: the rightism of the radical progressives.
of the New Dealers and in an extreme left position even by today's
standards (see Figure 20). On the other hand, this is not true of
their stands on other issues, on which they do not seem distinguish-
able from the more moderate of Hofstadter's progressives. This means
that the radical progressives are in some ways to the left of the
New Dealers and in some ways to the right of them. This may be

shown as in Figure 21.

fl

A.|.|1k val
PER
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4

 

Soc

 

Fig

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beil

bot

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Pub

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29

 

Progress. Later Progress. Conserv.
(Hofstadter) Liberals (Hofstadter)
Radical (New Deal- Moderate

 

 

Eras, etc.)

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 20.—-The extreme leftism of the radical progressives.

 

 

   
 

Conserv.
(Tradit.)

Conserv.
(Class. Lib.)

Social. Mod. Prog.

and Post—
New Deal)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 21.-—The rightism and leftism of the radical progressives.

This complex situation makes discussion of the group diffi-
cult, and it would be best if we could regard them henceforth as
being either to the right or to the left of the New Dealers, but not
both. Fortunately, it happens that the LaFollette-Bryan group has
been generally unable (since about the time of WOrld War I) to keep
issues of radical trust-busting and nationalization at the center of
public debate (indeed, the members of this group seem to be quite rare
Therefore, we may ignore the cleavage from this

in recent decades).

point on. This means, since the LaFollette-Bryan group seems to be

30

separated from the more moderate of Hofstadter's progressives only
by these issues, that we can treat the former as indistinguishable
from the latter. Since we will be ignoring the issues which make
the LaFollette-Bryan group seem extremely leftist, we will now
regard them as simply to the right of the New Dealers, in the same

category as the more moderate Left-Progressives (see Figure 22).

 

 

 

 

Later Progressive Progressive Conserv.
Liberals (Hofstadter) (Hofstadter)

(New Deal,

etc.) Radical Moderate

l \ f t

Later Progressive Conserv.
Liberals (Hofstadter)

(New Deal,

etc.)

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 22.-—Simplification of Figure 21.

We may now consider the New Deal. The so-called "First New
Deal" (1933-35) consisted mainly of business regulatory measures--
the NRA being the most important--and various subsidies. It seemed
to move the country toward statism but not toward the left (toward
equality). The "Second New Deal" (1935-39) was apparently a move
toward the left with the Social Security Act (including unemployment
compensation and Aid to Dependent Children as well as old-age pen-
sions), the National Labor Relations Act and wage-and-hour legisla-

tion. Also, it should be noted that the rise in personal income

31

taxes (including a lower exemption), initiated by Hoover, was per-
manently retained, with some egalitarian variations (split-rate
corporate taxes, taxation of dividends as personal income) in the
Second New Deal.

We may examine the New Deal in greater detail by considering

James T. Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal and

 

Ronald L. Feinman's Twilight of Progressivism.l7 These works pro-

 

vide grounds for thinking that the New Deal should be divided not
into two parts, but into three: 1933-35, 1935-57 and 1937-39. As
the New Deal moved left in 1935-37 (with the Social Security Act,
the NLRA and especially higher income taxes--especially those on
corporations, and new utility regulation--especially holding company
divestiture) and in 1937-39 (with renewed relief programs, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, proposals for public housing, etc.), its base
of support shrank, as we will elaborate below.

In his book, Patterson describes three kinds of conservative
Democratic opponents of the New Deal, which he commonly calls
"irreconcilables","conservatives" and "moderates", respectively
(he does not always use "conservatives" to refer to the middle group,
but we shall use the three terms in this way for convenience.) The
first group was in opposition in all three periods, the second in
the last two, and the third in the last period only. (In opposition
to all of these were the steadfast supporters of Roosevelt and his
New Deal, who stayed with him through all three periods and beyond.

Those who remained New Dealers after 1937 generally had undisputed

32

hold on the title, and on that of "liberal"--in the modern sense--
as well.)

As has been said, it seems that the New Deal, in 1933-35,
moved mainly toward statism and not toward equality, while in 1935-
37 and 1937—39, it made two steps toward equality. This suggests
that the moves of 1933-35 correspond to the boundary between Conser-
vatives (classical liberals) and Right-Progressive Statists (Right-
Corporate Liberals) in the model, while the moves of 1935-37 cor-
respond to the boundary between Right-Progressive Statists and Left-
Progressive Statists (Left-Corporate Liberals) and the moves of
1937-39 correspond to the boundary between the Left-Progressive
Statists and the New Deal Liberals. If, as seems very likely, these
correspondences are genuine, then Patterson's groups correspond to
categories from the model as follows: irreconcilable Democrats to
Conservatives (Classical Liberals), conservative Democrats to Right-
Progressive Statists, moderate Democrats to Left-Progressive Statists,
and liberal New Deal Democrats, of course, to New Deal Liberals (see
Figure 23).

Turning now to Feinman, we can see that his "Progressive
Republicans" seem to be political heirs of the "insurgent" Republi-
cans of the Taft and Wilson administrations, and to have been men
‘who would fit in the Left-Progressive category, constituting their
left wing--or their entire membership (the matter is unclear):
indeed, Borah, Hiram Johnson and LaFollette's son are included in

the group. In any case, this category includes the leftwardmost of

33

 

 

 

 

LaFollette,
etc .
Cons.
Hoover (Class Lib.)
"Progressive "Cons. Repu ."
Republicans" "Irreconcilable
(Feinman) Democrats"
New Deal Progressive Progressive
Libs. Statists Statists
(L) (R)
"New Deal "Mod. Dems." "Cons. Dems."
Libs. Dems."

 

 

 

 

Figure 23.--The New Deal Era: integration of the Patterson and
Feinman categories into model.

 

34

those who would have fallen in Hofstadter's progressive category.
These progressive Republicans, Feinman seems to indicate, thought
that Franklin Roosevelt was generally too far to the right in the
1933-35 period, about where he ought to be in the 1935-37 period,

and too far to the left in the third. It also appears that they
feared his statism from the first, as they worried over concentration
of power, wasteful spending and partisan use of relief programs.

It seems that this group would fall in the left-progressive
column of the model, along with the moderate Democrats of Patterson,
insofar as both groups supported the leftward moves of Roosevelt in
1935-37, while opposing his leftward moves of 1937-39. It would also
seem that these progressive Republicans were on the anti-statist
side (although perhaps not as much so as most conservative Republi-
cans and irreconcilable Democrats).

These conclusions based on the Patterson and Feinman books
are represented in Figure 23.

Now let us look at the Republican party, as it emerged at
the end of this period and remained in the ensuing decades. Its
members are commonly grouped into two wings: the "conservative"
wing (known as the "Old Guard", etc.) and the "liberal", "moderate"
or "moderate-to-liberal" wing (known as "Modern Republicans", etc.).
On economic policy, the main difference is supposedly over whether
they, in general, approved or disapproved of the New Deal. RObert
Taft was the leader of the former; Dewey and Willkie of the latter.
The latter group does seem to have accepted much of the New Deal,17

especially the social insurance measures of the Second New Deal.

35

There appears to be an association between the moderate-to-
liberal wing and big ("Wall Street") business. There is reason to
believe that many of the apparently egalitarian measures of the New
Deal were, as many of those of the Progressive Era were, examples of
corporate liberalism. It appears that many big businessmen came to
support much of the New Deal. They discovered that New Deal social
welfare and labor legislation could benefit them. In fact, support
for Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, who was advocating precursors of many
of these programs that year, came from a significant number of big
businessmen. Such businessmen seem to have concluded that the taxes
which pay for social welfare programs and the burdens of dealing
with strong unions would hurt their smaller competitors more than
them--as seemed to be the case with Progressive Era regulatory
measures.

This association of big business with this wing of the party
is matched by an association of small ("Main Street") business with
its conservative wing. This suggests the NAM conservatives of the
Progressive Era,18 just as the Dewey-Eisenhower group suggests the
old corporate liberals of the NCF.

The big difference between these scenarios is the interven-
tion of the New Deal, and the acceptance by the Dewey-Eisenhower
group of it, or at least of its basics, which means that this group
is on the left of the corporate liberal category--right or left

wings.

36

Or does it? Perhaps social insurance and wage-and-hour laws
are not as egalitarian as they seem. Social insurance, if paid for
entirely by the recipient, is not redistributionist, and if it merely
redistributes from the young to the old, it need not redistribute
from one class to another. Even such egalitarianism as does exist
may not be more pronounced than what existed under nineteenth-century
welfare arrangements. And the contributions of the employer may
burden him as does the corporate income tax; insofar as they hurt
small business more than large business, both measures can be regarded
as inegalitarian. Wage-and-hour laws may work in a similar manner,
and maximum-hours laws in particular may be seen as paternalistic
rather than redistributionist. And while the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) (the "Wagner Act") was surely, overall, a major
departure from laissez-faire in a pro-union direction (particularly
in its provisions relating to union elections, union recognition and
"unfair" practices of management), its provisions which simply
legalized unions was not a departure from laissez-faire (unless, of
course, one regarded unions as inclined toward being monopolistic
interferences with the free market.)

As it happens, the social security act, the NLRA, and the
NRA, which includes minimum-wage provisions, received considerable
support even from those who were commonly called conservatives (most
of whom opposed other major New Deal legislation of 1935 and after).
Most old progressives, according to Graham, had little objection to

these. Furthermore, Al Smith was a long-time advocate of minimum-wage

37

laws, while he and other Liberty Leaguers approved of the principle
of Social Security.

Thus, the "New Dealism" of the Dewey-Eisenhower group, or
some of them, need not have put them to the left of the moderate
left or even of the right, on Figure 18. However, their apparent
toleration for the expansion of government involved in the Hoover
tax increase and the overall spending increase of the New Deal (which
were not reversed in succeeding decades) meant that this group may
have been at least as far left as the Progressive left statists (left
corporate liberals).

All of this being true about many of the "Moderate-to-liberal"
Republicans does not exhaust the possibilities of greater egalitar-
ianism in members of the group. As Gary Reichard points out in his

Republicanism Reaffirmed, Eisenhower was not very closely associated

 

with the more explicitly liberal members of his party such as Javits,
and was not really a liberal Republican in the same sense that they
were. Dewey may not have been either, Reichard is inclined to
believe.19 This does not, however, prevent other Republicans from
being liberal in the New Deal sense.

Thus, we now have Republicans as well as Democrats in the
New Deal liberal category. ‘This category would be for people who
accepted those policies of the New Deal (and later) which repre-
sented a move to the left of left-wing Progressivism. These might
include pro-union stands on collective-bargaining issues and on

minimum-wage increases, and skewing of social insurance

38

benefit-contribution ratios and income tax rates in a more egali-
tarian direction.

It nonetheless seems likely that most New Deal "liberal"
Republicans were somewhere to the right of most New Deal Democrats,
perhaps on such things as deficit spending, which is commonly seen
as uniting both wings of the Republican party against the Democrats.

50, in regard to the New Deal, we may end up with left-wing

and right-wing New Deal categories (see Figure 24).

 

 

 

 

ZQFbI Cons.
Jette‘ Hoover
New Deal Progressive Statists
(Left) (Right)
Humphrey Javits (L) (R)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 24,-Rightist (Republican) New Dealers.

Since leaving the discussion of the Progressive Era, the
course of our investigation has allowed us to say relatively little
of the liberty dimension. In this regard, the Dewey-Eisenhower group
and the New Deal liberals, right and left, all seem to fall mainly
on the relatively statist side of the chart. Occasionally, a left-
leaning politician with somewhat pepulistic tendencies seems to
object to statism, and so follow in the footsteps of Hoover, Bryan
and LaFollette, but to their left, on New Deal and post-New Deal

issues (see Figure 25).

39

 

 

£656 Cons
12st (Class. Lib.)
{e .
McGovern? Hatfield? Hoover

 

 

Progressive Statists

Humphrey? Javits? (L) (R)

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 25.--The Anti-Statist row extended leftward.

There is some reason for thinking that more than two levels
are needed in the liberty dimension. For all of their inclination
toward regulated concentration rather than competition in the area
of business that characterizes the Dewey-Eisenhower group and
Woodrow Wilson, and for all the acceptance of social insurance of
at least the former, both seem to have a real abhorrence of big
government. The "Modern Republicanism" of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, as it is interpreted by Arthur Larson, has a presumption
against government,20 as do the attitudes of Wilson, even after he
moved toward accepting the "New Nationalism" of Theodore Roosevelt.21
This seems in contrast to Theodore Roosevelt (although the contrast
may be mainly rhetorical), who claimed that Jeffersonian mistrust
of government was out-of-date. This also seems to be in contrast

to most New Deal liberalism. Thus, we might distinguish three,

40

instead of two, levels on the liberty dimension--libertarian, moder-

ate and statist (see Figure 26).

 

‘\\‘\\ Cons.

 

 

 

Hoover
Dewey Al Smith
Eisenhower Wilson
Wilson (1913-1916)
(1916-?

Hamilton

T. Roosevelt
J. Connally

 

 

 

 

Figure 26.--Degrees of Statism.

The next step in the evolution of the model leads us to
move ahead to modern times, and to a discussion of the ideological
changes that occurred in the 19605 and 19705. Ideological classifi-
cations proposed regarding this era deal with the expansion of the
inventory of liberal programs beyond the New Deal levels.

The Great Society of Lyndon Johnson led to disaffection from
the Democratic party by many voters and political figures who had
supported the liberalism of the Democrats during the New Deal, and

Fair Deal and New Frontier years.

41

 

Kevin Phillips, in his book, The Emegging Republican Majority,
clarified the differences between the older kind of liberal, who
was leaving the party in the 19605, and the newer kind, who welcomed
the change.22 (Others, such as Walter Dean Bean Burnham, Everett
Carl Ladd, Jr., Jeffrey Hart and William A. Rusher have drawn similar
pictures.)23 The former kind of liberal was oriented toward the
working class and lower-middle class; the latter kind was oriented
toward the very poor, especially the hard-core unemployed and the
inner-city-dwellers. The former was "populistic"--suspicious of
elites, whether they were economic, intellectual or political; the
latter was led by an intellectual, political and economic elite.
The former thus represented the lower-middle and lower classes;
the latter united the very poor with rich and upper-middle
class intellectuals, bureaucrats and businessman who created,
ran and/or profited by the programs (the last being the latest
variation on the corporate liberal theme, it would seem).
The former was seen as practicing taxation of the few (rich) to help
the many (working poor), while the latter was seen as practicing
taxation of the many (middle and lower-middle classes, who were
pushed into higher tax brackets, and who suffered from the tax of
inflation) to help the few poor (slum dwellers). Such was the pic-
ture drawn by Phillips and others--most of whom were more sympathetic
to the former kind of liberalism, and saw themselves as spokesmen
for the interest groups that it represented--and such is the way
this group generally seemed to feel about the effects of the newer

social programs, whatever the facts may have been.24

42

(Many of the so-called "neo-conservatives", with their
implicit or avowed liking for the welfare state or the New Deal but
not the Great Society, seem to fit the image of the first type of
liberal.)

Phillips' book, moreover, implies a two-dimensionality to
the differences among modern liberals. As the unfolding of the
Great Society agenda repelled many hitherto strong supporters of
the New Deal and post-New Deal welfare state (mostly Democrats), it
was attracting other people (mostly Republicans) who had been more
or less unsupportive of earlier programs, but who were now coming
around to support them. Thus, Great Society and pre-Great Society
liberalism may be more than just degrees on a scale of post-New
Deal liberalism; they may represent two separate dimensions of
modern liberalism--that is, of what we have called herein "New Deal
liberalism (left and right)". This would allow the creation of four
sub-categories of this liberalism; those who were conservative
(classical liberal) on both dimensions; those who were liberal
(modern liberal) on both; those who were conservative on the Great
Society but liberal on previous programs; and those who were conser-
vative on previous post-New Deal programs but liberal on the Great
Society. It would appear that the first and last categories are
subdivisions of the New Deal right category of previous charts, and
that the second and third are subdivisions of the New Deal left
category, each of the older categories being bisected by the division

over the new Great Society program, as in Figure 27.25

43

[Size of boxes has no significance]

 

Cons.

 

Hoover

 

 

 

.N
ew Deal~ P i S i
(left) so rogress ve tat sts
R. (R1 L R
83’2“ gbt) ( ) ( )
0118

 

 

 

Figure 27.--The New Deal versus Great Society liberalism.

44

ENDNOTES

1Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public
Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1973). (P. 63 refers to both attitudes toward e uality
and toward government.) Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Poli-
tics in America (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1960), esp. pp.
135-6, (where attitudes toward big government are referred to, with
much reference to implicit class connection, showing the ambiguity
of the definition) and pp. 127, 139, 179.

2On the change from classical to modern liberalism, see
Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E.
Stokes (The American Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), pp. 193-4. On the modern identification of classical liberal-
ism and conservatism, see Friedrich A. Hayek, "Why I Am Not a Con-
servative" in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 397-411, esp. p. 397-8; Russell Kirk,
"Conservatism" in the Encyclopgdia Britannica, vol. 6, pp. 371-4
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc” 1966)- esp. Po 371; Peter
Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 131;
Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hayek, "Why I Am Not a Conservative", pp. 98-99.

4See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An
Interpretation of American Political Thogght Since the Revolution
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955).

 

5Some such as Hartz and others of the "consensus school" see
a (classical and modern) liberal consensus dominating the history
of the U.S., including the South, although they recognize some tradi-
tionalist elements there. It should be noted that the South could
be liberal relative to European traditionalists and still be tradi-
tionalist relative to the rest of the country. In any case, further
examination of these issues will have to wait until the voting
records are examined.

Whether the South is traditionalist or liberal, the question
remains whether it is overwhelmingly conservative (traditionalist or
classical liberal) or whether liberals (modern liberals) and conser-
vatives were more evenly matched. Among those close to the latter
position is Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., who, in his The Democratic South
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1963), pp. 44-52, talks

 

45

of the "populism" and "radicalism" of men such as James Vardaman.
Among those closer to the former position is J. Morgan Kousser, in
his The Shaping_of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974). He points out the conservative alliances

and policies of Vardaman and others were prominent after disfranchise-
ment of the lower classes (PP. 231-7). It seems that much of the
liberalism, at least at the low points of voter turnout (c. 1908-48,
as shown in Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction, by

Nunan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham; Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1975; pp. 8-10) was only apparent: some was rhetorical
only, and other aspects involved business regulation (whose inegali-
tarian possibilities have already been discussed) and regionalism

(aid to agriculture, rural development, public transportation systems,
and the kind of business regulation and tax policies which favor

state businesses over national, out-of-state businesses). Further
explanation will occur upon consideration of voting records.

6The view of the Progressive Era generally held by historians
of the so-called "progressive" school such as Charles Beard and
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

7Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

8Ibid. Also, Otis L. Graham, Jr. in Encore for Reform (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967) implies a similar distinction,
among those Progressives who opposed the New Deal, he points out an
aversion to class politics, interest group politics and unbalanced
budgets as being typical of them, especially on pp. 24-100.

 

 

 

9James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State,
1200-1918, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Also Gabriel Kolko, in
The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History
1900-1916, (New York: Macmillan, 1963), has had many influential
things to say about the matter.

10Weinstein, especially pp. 4-6.

 

 

11David P. Thelen, Robert M. LaFollette and the Insurgent
Spirit, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), pp. 10-13.

12LaFollette and most of the insurgents supported the FTC
(James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party System
1909-1916 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967]), and supported
the principle of a federal reserve system (PP. 107—11). Bryan was
not generally known for objecting to the domestic measures of the
Wilson administration during his years in it.

46

13Jean Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975). Other assignments to
this category are made on the basis of reading Graham and others.
Record, Lenroot and Bourne are placed here on the basis of reading
Otis Graham's Encore for Reform. Hearst is placed here because of
his quasi-populist reputation. Louis Brandeis is placed here because
of his reputation as a progressive supporter of competition with a
sympathy for small business interests.

14Graham, Encore for Refomg, and others. Beveridge is placed
here because he is sometimes counted among the "insurgent" opponents
of President Taft while being nonetheless an admirer of John Marshall.
The others are placed here on the basis of reading Graham's Encore
for Reform.

15Colby, Burleson and Pomerene are placed here on the basis
of Graham's Encore for Reform. Hughes and Stimson are placed here
because of their reputations as progressives (as governor of New
York and member of the cabinet, respectively) who came to support
Taft in 1912.

16Ronald L. Feinman, Twilight of Prggressivism: The Western
Republican Senators and the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1980) and James T. Patterson, Congressional Conser-
vatives and the New Deal: the Growth of the Conservative Coalition
in Congress, 1933-39 (Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

17The NAM was no longer so much a small-business organiza-
tion as it was in the earlier time, whether because power had shifted
to the larger members or because the average member had grown. How-
ever, in any case, the small versus large distinction may have to
be modified for the earlier period as well. Rather than there being
a positive correlation between size and liberalism, there may have
actually been a negative one for most businesses, with the smallest
businessmen tending to be Hofstadter-type or LaFollette type progres-
sives, and moderately large manufacturers being more to the right.
Probably it is only beyond a certain high threshold of size that
liberalism is strong. And this liberalism may not even be a func-
tion of size as such--it may have to do with central geographic loca-
tion or other factors. All that is important for this paper is (1)
that there are major ideological cleavages in the business community,
and (2) there is not a simple negative correlation between liberalism
and size.

18Gary Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisen-
hower and the Eighty—ThirdICongress (Rfioxville: ‘The University Press,
1978).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19Arthur Larson, What We Are For (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1959).

 

47

20Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,
1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 223-30.

21Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

22Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970);William A.
Rusher, The Making of the New Majority Party (Ottawa, 111.: Green
Hill Publishers, 1975) Everett Carl Ladd Jr., with Charles D. Hadley,
Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions
from the New Deal to the 1970;§_(New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).

23Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, in The Promise Of Great-
ness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), argue that
the national income share of the upper two quintiles decreased as
that of the lower one increased in the 1963-68 period (PP. 250-1).
This was partially because of the growth of social security and related
programs, which outweighed the growth in welfare and the New Great
Society programs. Interestingly, the former programs are not the ones
of that era which are most talked about by conservatives or liberals.
The latter ones were, even though they were smaller--and it is the
redistribution that they caused that the people described by
Phillips had most in mind.

24Other ideological classifications of interest have been
made by Clinton Rossiter in Conservatism in America: The Thankless
Persuasion (New York: Alford A. Knopf, 1958) and by a James
ReichleyiJIConservatism in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford
légministrations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981).

 

 

 

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Now that we have presented the classification which consti—
tutes the theoretical model, we may begin to take steps to enable
us to test it. We shall therefore discuss the methodology that
we will be using. The methodological topic to be considered first
is that of the scope of the investigation to be undertaken. Were it
possible, it would be desirable to make a universally comprehensive
ideological classification which would cover political attitudes
throughout history. Such a grand project is beyond the scope of
this paper; therefore, many reductions in scope have had to be made.
In making the decisions necessary to do so, the attempt has been
made to find the range of subject which comes closest to achieving
the two frequently incompatible ends: wide applicability and manage-
able size.

This attempt was apparent in the choice of the arena to be
studied. National politics was selected as the location of the
study because it exhibits more diversity than the politics of any
one state while the fact that it is a single political arena makes
the study more manageable than a study of several states.

The study of roll-call voting records on a national level
means a study of those of Congress. It was necessary to select one

chamber of Congress to examine, as to examine both would make the

48

49

scope of the study too large. So the Senate was chosen over the
House of Representatives because of the more manageable size.

A similar balance was sought in the determination of the
time frame of the study. The criterion of manageability favors the
selection of a short period; that of representativeness favors the
selection of a long one. This is the same principle which provides
that in taking a sample from a population, the best sample, all else
being equal, is the one which is most representative of the varia-
tion of the population--which means that it must represent as much
of the variety of the population as possible. Therefore, the best
"sample" time period would be the one which covers the most histori-
cal change (relevant to the study) within it. That would mean the
time frame that stretched across the most historical time boundaries.

The maximum amount of time over which it would be feasible
to study voting records, for this sort of work, seems to be about
twenty years. Therefore, the attempt was made to find a twenty-year
slice of time which encompassed the most possible change (in matters
of interest to this study).

Some limitations on where the search for this time frame was
to be conducted were already set. Since records are generally better

in more recent years, and since Congressional Quarterly, which was

 

chosen as the data base for the paper (see below), publishes
roll-call voting records only as far back as 1945, it was decided
that the time frame selected would have to be post-1944. On the

other hand, since the events of the Reagan administration are

50

perhaps too recent for proper historical perspective, 1980 seems to
be the last year that could be examined.

Within this general period, there is much to suggest that,
in United States politics, the biggest changes occurred, in a more—
or-less related manner, in the late 1960s and early 19705, and that
this period, or the start of it, constitutes a major historical
dividing line, and the end of it may constitute another. This
period was characterized not only by the arrival and perpetuation
of the Great Society programs, by political turmoil and by a rela-
tively high degree of liberalism compared to earlier and later
periods, but also by the presence of issues and cleavages that were
distinctive. Some of the Great Society programs and especially
spending increases provided new issues insofar as they were, in
earlier times, so unlikely to be enacted into law as not to be a
major issue at the center of political concern. Not commonly
noticed among these was the biggest of them all, the increase in the
Social Security program, especially in 1967, 1969 and 1972. More-
over, welfare (AFDC) spending became a major issue at this time.
And then there were the "social issues" and Vietnam. These were
mostly new issues. Similarly, the cleavages of the time were dis-
tinctive. Not only were the Northern and Southern Democrats divided
from each other, but the Northern Democrats and Republicans were
divided internally, with alliances frequently reaching across the
borders of the groups.

The end point of this turbulent and liberal period is

regarded here as being after the 1974 elections (in November 1974 or

51

January l975)--after the end of the Vietnam War, the departure of
Nixon and especially the fading of the New Left and the Counter-
culture, plus the election of a heavily Democratic Congress that
nonetheless was, in some ways, not as economically liberal as its
predecessors. In the ensuing years, some of the issues of the pre-
ceding period (especially poverty, welfare and the non-economic
issues) were de-emphasized, in favor of older concerns such as
unemployment, inflation and taxes. Similarly, some of the cleavages
of the 1965-74 period faded as some older patterns of cleavage began
to re-emerge (e.g. the 1976 Presidential election tended to align
the East and South behind the Democrats and the Midwest and West
behind the Republicans, in much the same way as the 1960 election
did).

Since, as has been stated, we wish our time frame to encom-
pass change and stretch across historical period boundaries, it
should cover the above-discussed turbulent and liberal period (circa
1965-74), and stretch backward and forward in time to encompass
parts of the preceding and succeeding periods. Thus, we would be
able to sample political history in three of the major subperiods
(1945-65, 1965-75, 1975-80) of the 1945-80 period in American his-
tory. The length of two Congresses (four years) seems like a reason-
able minimum length of time on each side of the base period for com-
parison. This would make the time frame run from the start of the
87th Congress (1961) to the close of the 95th (1978). However, in

the case of the preceding period, the time frame was extended

52

further back to 1959 because the elections of 1958 were an important
turning point insofar as they brought a Democratic landslide and,
more importantly, they are a convenient place to begin from the
point of view of bookkeeping, as so many political careers began in
1958 and so many ended then. The time frame is thus 1959 to 1978.
This time frame also has the advantage of allowing the comparison
of two periods of Republican control of the White House with two of
Democratic control.

In regard to the issues to be examined, the need to keep the
scope from being too wide dictated the selection of only one major
issue area to study. The desire for a broad range favored the choice
of the category of economic issues, and so this area was chosen.

The category of economic issues is larger, both in number of issues
and in number of votes, than any other major category of issues:
foreign affairs, racial issues, crime-related issues, etc.--even
the large category of "social issues" (which includes the last two
categories, among others). Economic issues provide the bulk of the
subjects of day-to-day political struggle.

In addition, economic issues have several other claims to
priority. Ideologies often derive their stands on other issues from
their economic principles. This is largely because most other
political issues have an economic aspect, if only in regard to the
issues of who will pay the cost of a given government activity (e.g.
administration of a civil-rights regulation or increasing our nuclear

weapons arsenal) and how peeple will be financially effected by it

53

(e.g. how the civil rights bill will affect the trade of the merchant
to whom it is applied, or who gets the contract to build the weapon).
Indeed, almost anything which involves material things (including
the human body and its labor power) has an economic aspect. And
those things which do not have an economic aspect (e.g. spiritual
matters) are really beyond government power to control anyway. 80
almost anything which can concern politics has an economic aspect.
Furthermore, some ideologies (e.g. capitalism, socialism, communism)
even advertise how important they consider economic issues by taking
their names from the economic system they advocate.

"Economic issues" will be taken to mean those which have as
their main concern the government's management of material wealth,
including its role in the distribution of it. As we have noted,
many issues, including all of those involving spending, have econo-
mic aspects, but not all are primarily concerned with these aspects,
and those which are not we will exclude. For example, the cost of
buying new weapons for our nuclear arsenal and the cost of prosecut-
ing criminals are issues, but they are not generally considered to
be the most important aspects of the debates over the issue areas
of nuclear arms and law enforcement. Therefore, these two issue
areas and others like them, are not commonly considered economic
issues, and votes on these subjects will therefore be excluded from
consideration.

The determination of exactly which votes involve economic

issues entails some difficulty. As Lee Anderson, Meredith Watts and

54

Allen Wilcox point out in their Legislative Roll-Call Analysis,1
the votes in question may not really be about the subjects they
appear to be about. For example, an anti-busing amendment to an
education appropriations bill would seem to be a racial ("civil-
rights") issue rather than an education spending issue. Yet some
may try to attach the amendment to cause the bill to lose some of
its supporters, and supporters of the amendment may vote against it
in response to this strategy. This would seem to create a problem.
Nonetheless, we need not consider it a great obstacle. Few would
deny that there is a strong correlation between the apparent and
the real subjects of bills, and that the great majority of the time
they are the same. Moreover, when one has several votes on the
same (apparent) issue area, over several years, as this study does
in a number of cases, and if one then sees that most or all of these
votes exhibit similar cleavages, it is unlikely that all or most of
the votes are other than what they seem. This points to the advan-
tage of scaling votes,which is similar to what is being done here
(in the theoretical classification and later in the results of the
examination of the votes), and scaling is recommended by Anderson,
Watts and Wilcox (as well as others) as just such a way of reducing
the problems of selecting votes (see below).

The demands of manageability set further limits on the issue
range. Votes involving only one area of industry, such as agricul-
ture, mining, natural resources, or energy, will be excluded, barring

some other reasons for including them (as in the case of gas

55

rationing votes, which are included because they are among the rela-
tively few votes dealing with the regulation of business). There is
room in this paper for consideration of only issues of general
interest.

The data base of this paper will consist of a compilation of
votes from.which the list of votes to be examined will be drawn.
This data base of votes will consist of those compiled by Congres-

sional Quarterly (QQ). The use of 9Q in this way is a common prac—

 

tice. We made this decision for two reasons. The first, is that
E9 provides a digest of the votes in the Congressional Record, leav-
ing out the most routine votes. The second reason is that QQDpro-
vides a tabulation of votes--and not only actual votes and announced

pairs (derivable from the Congressional Record), but also of

 

announced stands and answers to surveys conducted by ER itself.

All of these will be counted as votes in this paper, as we desire
that as much evidence as possible on the stands taken by Senators
on the issues be obtained; survey responses, announcements and even
pairs may not indicate as much commitment as actual votes, but they
should indicate which way a Senator is leaning, which is enough for
our purposes.

The particular §Q_compilation that will be used as the
primary data base is drawn from the lists found in gg's annual
Almanaog. The number of votes in these lists normally ranged from
over 300 to over 500 for each year in the years in question.

The total number of votes per year is too large for this

study. It might be a reasonable figure for a study with a time

56

frame of two or four years,2 but for one with a time frame of twenty
years such as this one, a reduction in the number of votes needs
to be made.

The problem lies in how we are to do it. Various authors
have warned of the problems involved in selecting votes using impres-
sionistic evaluations of the subject matter.3 As William Riker
points out, such criteria may be subjective (or at least not objec-
tively provable) and so not reproducible by other investigators.

In spite of such criticisms, there are authors who do indulge
in this practice. Michael Foley, who did a study with a fourteen-
year time frame, included only votes that he thought involved
"major policy" issues, and which involved the liberal-conservative
conflict that he was interested in; in his study of the Eighty-Third
Congress Gary Reichard examined votes in several predetermined
categories in a way similar to Foley's. However, both of these
then screened out those votes which did not scale.4

"Scaling" of issues is a way of arranging them in a definite
order, such that those who vote one way ("yes", for example) on a
given issue will vote that way (yes) on all succeeding issues in
the scale, while at the same time those who vote the opposite way
(in this case, "no") will vote in that way (no) on all the preceding
issues of the scale. In a perfect scale, then, there is no overlap
in the cleavages created by the issues on that scale. This suggests
that all of the issues are indicators of a common underlying vari-

able, in that they merely represent different degrees of attitudes

57

on the same dimension. And if one assigns numbers to the various
positions on a scale, then each of those numbers will describe a
specific combination of stands on all of the votes or the issues on
the scale (in contrast to what is true of an "index", wherein
describing a person as having a score of 78% "conservative", for
example, on a given set of votes, gives one no indication as to
which 78% of the votes it is on which the person is conservative).

A large set of issues which scale perfectly is seldom found,
so a certain percentage of perfect scalability (usually 90%) is
more or less arbitrarily regarded as acceptable for constituting a
scale.

Anderson, Watts and Wilcox propose scaling as a way of
getting around this problem;5 and many other authors join them in
praise of scaling.6 Such a method does have many advantages, as it
is reproducible and allows the voting legislators to "speak for
themselves" (as Riker put it) about which votes are important (i.e.,
those cleavages which are similar over many votes, or at least
parallel [scalable], suggesting a common underlying issue; such an
issue, which manifests itself in a large number of votes, may for
that reason alone can be regarded as important to those voting).

However, while scaling will screen out some votes and so
reduce the number of votes, the researcher will still have to con-
sider and compare all of the votes in whatever pool of votes with
which he starts, even though he will eventually eliminate some by

using the scale. This is fine if the original pool is not too large

58

for one's purposes. However, if it is too large, as ours is, one
will still need to find a way to reduce the number of votes, before
or in place of scaling.

Such a screening of votes is a topic less often treated than
is that of scaling. NOnetheless, we may consider it as best we can;
we may use the two main categories used by Anderson, Watts and
Wilcox to guide the discussion. One consists of those methods which
do not take into account the substance of the bill; the other
consists of those which do.7

The former category includes such mechanistic methods as
selecting only votes with a certain amount of dissent and using
random selection. The first of the two methods in this category
uses only those votes in which the size of the minority side was
greater than a given percentage of the total vote, on the assumption
that the least closely contested votes are the least important.8
This is a bad procedure, at least for this study, for it works
contrary to our purposes. Making the categories used in this thesis
is much like the constructing of a scale. As one approaches the
end of a scale, the sides of each cleavage necessarily became more
and more unequal, one growing larger and the other growing smaller.
Similarly, in this thesis, we have very large and very small cate-
gories, and are interested in all of them. In both cases, all
categories are important and of interest. Therefore, there is no
warrant for a procedure which ignores votes which are won by large

majorities. (There may be ground for ignoring small groups because

59

they are too small in absolute size for one to be sure they are not
idiosyncratic and random, but this is a different issue.)

The second proposed method in the first category, suggested
by Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, is that of choosing votes by random
selection.9 However, using such a procedure--and using the previous
procedure as we11--means abandoning the attempt to sort out the
important votes on the merits of their subject matter. It would be
better, then, to use some other method which did take account of the
subject if some way could be found of avoiding the weaknesses of the
impressionistic procedures mentioned above.

The second category consists of methods of selecting votes
which do consider their subject matter. The dangers of subjectivity
in selecting votes this way have already been noted.10 However,
since this is merely a preliminary selection of votes to examine
(to see if there is any evidence for the existence today of the
theoretical categories), rather than a selection of votes to be used
to determine how a classification is to be devised or an index is
to be constructed, and since we are not trying to weight votes
(beyond saying whether they are or are not worth studying), we will
not attempt to achieve more rigorous standards.

Devising criteria for selecting votes that can secure general
acceptance would seem to require extensive study of the votes. The
complexity of legislative maneuvering often makes it necessary to
follow the legislative process very closely in order to decide which

votes are important and meaningful and which are not. Not only must

60

the bills and amendments be selected, but it must be determined which
vote on each of them is important. The votes on "tabling" (killing)
a bill, passing it, passing a conference version of it, and over-
riding a veto may all be different from each other; the votes on
passing, tabling, reconsidering or tabling the reconsideration of an
amendment may also vary. Which votes are important and which repre-
sent the "real" stands of Senators on an issue must be determined.
It would seem that nothing short of an in-depth study of the legis-
lative history of the bills in question could give solid answers to
these questions.

It might therefore be necessary to rely on some "expert"
individuals or organizations who might evaluate the data for us.
If such an expert was generally recognized as such, then we would
have general agreement on the soundness of the list of selected
votes. We might be able to minimize such danger of biased judgement
that still remains by getting a panel of such experts (individuals
or organizations) to screen the votes, and then following the con-
sensus. (Riker objects to using such panels of experts. They may
not, he maintains, use the same standard for evaluating votes, and
therefore their collective decisions would not be meaningful.11
This argument does not seem sound. The logic of scaling, of which
Riker seems to approve, says that similar or at least parallel
cleavages of votes--which votes thus scale--indicate a common under-
lying issue which the scale brings out. The logic of using a panel

of experts is similar. If they produce similar lists of votes,

61

then this is strong reason for believing that they are using similar
standards to evaluate the importance of the votes.)

Who are the "experts" on whom we should rely? We should
choose from those who closely observe the legislative body in ques-
tion, either from the inside or from the outside. An example of the
former procedure was a study by Wilder Crane which used six members
of the legislature that he was studying to help him select votes.
Using such personal consultation is not within the plan of this
thesis, and gives rise to other problems, such as those of deciding
which legislators to choose. It would seem better to consult out-
side organizations which make it their business to watch the legis-
lative body, and which publish reports on their findings.12

In the case of Congress, there are several such bodies.
Since there still may be too much bias involved in picking one, as
Foley noted, it would seem best to adhere to the "panel" principle
and choose more than one organization. We may then make a list of
votes out of those mentioned by all of the panel groups, or by a
certain number of the groups. If we pick a number and then continue
to add to the panel, we will tend to increase the number of votes
on the final list; if we increase the number of panelists on whose
lists the vote must appear to be included on ours, while keeping
the number of groups on the panel constant, then we will reduce the
number of votes on our list. It was eventually decided to use three
panelists and require that at least two mention a vote. TWO would

be the lowest number to provide corroboration for a vote choice,

62

and so would require corroboration without making the requirements
for inclusion too strict.

The following lists, compiled by such organizations, were
eventually selected: the conservative Americans for Constitutional
Action (ACA)'s ACA Index (from 1963 through 1978), the AFL-CIO's
Committee on Political Education (COPE)'s Labor Looks at Congress
(from 1959 through 1978) and ng5 annual list of "Key Votes" (pub-
lished annually in Qg's Almanac and every four years in its Congress

and the Nation);3 The list of votes which were merely touched on in

 

COPE's publication would be very long, even if all votes outside the
chosen subject areas were eliminated. A list of only those relevant
votes where the number of votes on each side was reported would
also be very long. Therefore, it was decided to use the list that
could be made of only those votes which COPE judged important enough
to put, along with the numbers, in boldface type, and which were in
the relevant subject areas.

This particular combination of organizations has much to

commend them. Congressional Quarterly is in the full-time business

 

of watching and interpreting Congress. It seems that their selec-
tions, especially those of which votes on each bill are important,
deserve considerable attention. And, as has been said, 29 is often
used as a data base in roll-call analysis.

The other two organizations, ACA and COPE, are both political
pressure groups. Their voting records are compiled mainly for pur-

poses of rating legislators as friendly or unfriendly to their

63

causes, and so are somewhat of a sideline. This is in contrast to
the case of 9g, and makes their judgement in this somewhat less
valuable. On the other hand, the fact that both of these are
pressure groups gives them a keen interest in the business before
Congress. Since one of the components of the "importance" of a
vote is the degree to which people believe it to be important, the
testimony of these actors in the political arena is particularly
valuable in this matter.

The two balance each other well, the ACA being a conservative
group and the AFL-CIO being a liberal group; also, the former is an
ideological group, while the latter is an economic interest group.
Since 9Q is officially neither conservative nor liberal and
is neither an ideological pressure group nor an interest group,
this inclusion on the panel does not upset these balances.

In addition, for shorter periods of time, we will make use
of the United States Chamber of Commerce's political newsletter,

Congressional Action (hereinafter £9) (for the year 1978), and The

 

 

Almanac of American Politics (hereinafter éég) (1972 through 1980),
by Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Mathews (for the years
1973 through 1978).14 Back issues of the Chamber's newsletter are
almost unavailable, the 1978 issue being the only one available in
our time frame; the 5193232 only began publishing in 1972. Nonethe—
less, both provide some interesting votes.

(One other rating organization, the liberal Americans for

Democratic Action [ADA], was also considered. Its newsletter was

64

initially rejected because some years were not available, but, as
we have just seen, two other organizations with lists that did not
cover the time frame were used. This organization was finally
rejected because it provided few new kinds of votes, and because
the AFL-CIO is a liberal ideological organization in all but name,
as well as being a labor organization. The same cannot quite be said
for the Chamber of Commerce as a conservative organization, and so
it and the ACA provide more of a divergence of perspective than do
the AFL-CIO and ADA, at least on economic issues.)

All votes which appear on the lists of two of these five
organizations will go onto the final list, to be used in this study.
This procedure is somewhat similar to the one used by Duncan MacRae15

to compile a vote list. He took a list of twelve votes from the

010 News and added to it eight votes from The New Republic's list

 

for the same two-year period. He considered those two sets of votes
as subsets in his list. Apparently, there were some that were on

the New Republic list that were already on the CIO list, but he

 

grouped them with the other CIO votes because he considered the CIO's
list more important (as they were more involved in the legislative
process), and so was interested in the CIO and non-C10 votes as sub-
sets of his final list. If, however, he had considered the two
organizations'lists of equal value, he might have divided his into
three subsets: those only on the CIO list, those only on the N33_
Republic list, and those on both. If the two original lists were

equally valuable, then the set of votes which appeared on both would

65

seem to be more worthy of note than those which appeared on only
one, and so might be sorted out into a final list. What has been
done in this paper is much the same thing, except that we took the
vote lists of three organizations, instead of two, and kept the
overlap.

However, it was also decided that the judgement of fig should
be given more weight than that of the other three organizations.
This was because §Q_does not officially represent an interest,
ideological or other pressure group; and because it devoted its
full time to watching Congressmen, whereas the ACA and the AFL-CIO
watch and rate members of Congress as a sideline, largely in order
to make judgements about whom to support and whom to oppose in elec-
tions.

Weighting 92's judgement more heavily was accomplished by
deciding that ggfs selection of a vote for its list would count twice
--which means that votes on 99's list, now having a double endorse-
ment, would automatically be included on our final list.

The question then arose of what to do if two or more or the
organizations listed different votes on the same bill. Neither vote
‘was on both lists, yet the bill would seem to be of some importance,
having been listed twice, so it seemed that one or both of the votes
should be included.

It was eventually decided that the fact that a bill is listed
'by two organizations, even though on different votes, qualifies it

for inclusion, and that since the importance of each vote is an

66

indicator of the importance of the bill, only one of them needs to be
used on the final list. The procedure for choosing this vote will

be as follows: that vote will be selected which had the least

number of "?" responses, in 9g. These are the responses in which the
Senator neither voted, paired, announced a position nor responded

to 3.92 poll--those in which no position was indicated. If such a
response was obtained, we might reasonably guess that the Senators
were apathetic about this vote. If a larger number responded this
way about one vote than did about another, we may assume that the
Senators, on the average, considered the former a less important
vote.

If one of the lists is go, then the vote is of course
included automatically. If the vote on the other list has fewer "?"
responses, then it is included as well. If two of the organizations,
other than _C_Q_, list the same bill, the votewith fewer "?" responses
is included. If §Q_and two of the other organizations all list
different votes on the same bill, then the 99 vote is included, and

"?" responses is also

that vote from the other two which has fewer
included, even if it does not have less "?”5 than the §Q_vote.
Finally, we may note a special case. In the 19705, a number
of attempts were made to abolish food stamps for striking workers.
Amendments to this effect were proposed several times each year,
attached to various bills (food stamp reform bills, agriculture

appropriations, etc.). Several were listed by both ACA and COPE,

so one would assume that they were an important issue. Yet the same

67

vote was never listed by both the ACA and COPE, and none of them
would be eligible for inclusion on the final list under any of the
provisions so far mentioned, because they involved votes on the
"same" amendment to different bills. Still, it seems clear that for
most practical purposes it was the same amendment in content.

And COPE expressly used the word "same". On these grounds, we will
choose to regard the different votes as the same, and include one

of them, in accord with the procedure described above.

Historical Background

 

A further check on the soundness of the list of votes
selected is to be found in the determination of whether the economic
issues involved in the votes were important in the history of the
period.

Since this paper attempts to sample voting behavior from
the Great Society era and the era immediately before it and the one
immediately after it, the time frame of this study extends for
several years on each side of 1963-1975. The time frame does not
include all of these preceding and succeeding periods in their
entirety, but rather a portion of each for sampling. Nonetheless,
an overview of them in their entirety is in order so as to under-
stand the background of these issues.

As we noted earlier, the New Deal went through several stages,
emphasizing different kinds of issues and different coalitions over
them. In the last stage (1937-39), the coalitions, with their

stands on the issues, took the forms that they were to have for a

68

long while afterward. Opposition to the New Deal policy of wage-
and-hour legislation (or to the form it came to take), second
thoughts about the pro-union aspects of the National Labor Relations
Act, and impatience*with relief and other spending(with the resulting
deficits) eventually drove a bloc of Democrats and most "progressive
Republicans" into an alliance with those on their right, as James
Patterson and others have described (see above). This loose, infor-
mal grouping, beginning in about 1937, marked the beginning of the
"Conservative Coalition" of Congressional Republicans and conserva-
tive (eventually overwhelmingly Southern) Democrats.

From this time on, most Northern and a few Southern Democrats,
plus some Republicans, were known as "liberals", while most Republi-
cans--both those who had in the past been known as "progressives"
and those who had in the past been known as "conservatives"--and
most Southern Democrats (some of whom had previously been known as
New Dealers) were all known alike as "conservatives", constituting
the "Conservative Coalition" in Congress.

The liberals had generally supported the moves of Roosevelt
since 1937, and asked for further moves in the same direction; over
the years, they could be found favoring higher and more comprehen-
sive minimum wages, more generous and standardized unemployment
compensation, more egalitarian income tax policies, more public
housing, and more deficit spending in times of high unemployment.
The conservatives had often opposed Roosevelt from 1937 on, and over
the years would be found generally opposing liberals on the above

named issues.

69

After the 1938 elections, Republican gains augmented coali-
tion membership. They did so to such an extent that the coalition
was usually able, from this point until the 19605, to block passage
of major liberal legislation, thus bringing an end to several years
of major legislative activity. This is in part why it is commonly
said that the New Deal ”ended" in 1939 or soon thereafter simply
in the sense that there was a cessation of the passage of new pro-
grams of major significance, and not, of course, in the sense of
repealing the major parts of the New Deal. (Some programs which
were originally intended to be only temporary, such as work-relief,
were phased out in the next few years as the passing of Depression-
era conditions elemented the need for them.) Franklin Roosevelt
himself declared a few years later that he would devote his energies
to winning World War 11 rather than carrying on the fight for the
New Deal.

The period from 1939 to 1963 saw much change in American
politics, but there was a certain unity to the period as well. This
was the period between the end of the New Deal and the beginning of
the Great Society. There was no other such set of major social
programs enacted between these two. The proposed agenda of new
Social programs in 1963 was largely similar to that of 1939, with a
few additions that had been made in the intervening years. This
persistence of the agenda lead to a persistence of the coalitions
for and against it which had taken shape by 1939. The apparent

unwillingness of the electorate to tolerate further tax rate

7O

increases--and, to a lesser extent, larger budget deficits--to pay
for these programs was a major obstacle to the liberals and a boon
to the conservatives. (The tax increase in World War II was toler-
ated, but mainly for patriotic reasons; and while after it the tax
was not cut to prewar levels, most of the permanent spending
increase it funded was for defense, foreign aid, veterans pensions
and interest, not for domestic social programs.) It became neces-
sary for liberals to think of a new way to finance their programs.
They discovered that economic growth could increase revenues while
taxes were not increased or even decreased (in fact, lower taxes
would help stimulate such growth), and so frequently became great
advocates of economic growth. And it was not until economic growth
reached the level that it did in the early 19605 (later encouraged
further by a tax cut) that the liberals finally got their new pro-
grams passed as "the Great Society".

From the beginning of this period, the public was apparently
unwilling to vote for those who proposed higher taxes to cover new
programs. Spending on similar programs had already led to deficits.
These deficits were condemned by conservatives, but liberals were
inclined to argue that they seemed to stimulate the economy. How-
ever, to judge by the election returns, the public had limits to
its tolerance for deficits as well as limits to its tolerance for
taxes, as it did not give the liberal Democrats sufficient votes

to enable it to control the government.

71

World War II saw a great increase in spending and in per-
sonal income taxes to pay for it. The public was willing to accept
such a sacrifice for the patriotic endeavor, and by the time the
war was over, it had been conditioned to accept a higher level of
taxes than before. When, after the war, the ending of war-time
spending allowed taxes to be reduced, they were not reduced to pre-
war levels, but the public did not complain greatly. Meanwhile,
depression conditions finally ended with war-time creation of jobs
(and they did not return after the war, at least not in so severe a
form). The increased revenues in peacetime allowed increased spend-
ing, but the great bulk of these new expenditures were on defense
(especially with the onset of the Cold War), foreign aid, veterans
pensions and interest on the debt, with little left over for domestic
social programs.

In the late 19405, liberal President Truman and liberals in
Congress attempted to push for new social programs (under the name
of "the Fair Deal"). The liberal agenda was much the same as before
the war (social security expansion, minimum-wage increases, expan-
sion of public housing, etc.), with the addition of education and
health insurance. The coalitions supporting and opposing it were
the same, and the conservatives were still generally the larger of
the two. Hence, Truman was unable to get much passed in the way of
minimum-wage increases, aid to education and health insurance.

The increase in the housing program was also modest. An expansion

of social security coverage was enacted in 1950, but this was not a

72

great departure in principle. It was accompanied by a change of ADC
to AFDC. (In 1947 and 1948 Truman also had to accept a tax cut and
the Taft-Hartley Act from a Republican Eightieth Congress.)

Meanwhile, the Democrats had become increasingly identified
with such new social welfare programs, and since the voters were
apparently averse, for the most part, to higher taxes or higher
deficits, it is not surprising that the Democrats lost ground.
Their Congressional margins decreased in the 1942 elections, as the
Republicans broke through the 30% barrier in the Senate (as they had
in the House in 1938), for the first time since before 1935 and never
again sank below it. Later, in the 1946 elections, the Democrats
lost control of Congress for two years. Then, after the 1950
elections, there began a period of relative Republican strength,
lasting until after the 1958 elections, during which time the Repub-
licans never had less than 45% of the seats in either chamber of
Congress, and actually gained control of Congress with the 1952
elections. Also at this time, the Republicans gained control of
the Presidency and held it for eight years (1953-61). (They did not
again attain these heights until the Reagan administration.) Hence,
the liberals were still generally unable to get their list of pro-
grams passed, and might not have been able to do so before the 1958
elections, even without Eisenhower in the White House.

During the 19503, the liberal Democrats saw that middle-class

voters were generally supporting Republicans (except in the South,

73

where they generally supported conservative Democrats). Apparently
the middle class voter feared that the costs of putting the liberal
Democrats in office (in terms of taxes and inflation-causing budget
deficits) outweighed whatever benefits they may have stood to gain
from that party. In any case, the middle class was able to wield
enough political power to contribute to the thwarting of liberal
plans for further legislation. The liberal Democrats therefore began
to appeal to the middle class for support. One example of this was
Adlai Stevenson's de—emphasis of the class rhetoric which had char-
acterized the campaigns of Roosevelt and Truman. Yet the liberals
were still unable to offer the middle class reasons for trusting them
that the middle class found convincing. Soon, however, they dis-
covered a possible strategy.

During the Eisenhower years, the conservatives had been able
to curb spending somewhat, and so reduce the deficit (eliminating it
in some years) while even allowing a moderate tax cut. They were
helped in this by economic growth, which produced increased tax
revenue at the old, or even somewhat reduced, tax rates.

The liberals came to conclude that just as growth could allow
conservatives to reduce the deficit without having to cut spending
(or raise tax rates), so it could allow liberals to increase spend-
ing without having to increase the deficit (or raise tax rates), thus
allowing them to propose helping the poor without seeming so threaten-
ing to the middle class. However, economic growth had not yet reached

a high enough level to make their task easy. They began to

74

contemplate ways of actively encouraging growth by stimulating the
economy . At this time Keynesian attitudes were becoming quite
widespread among liberals, and according to Keynesians, there were
two ways of stimulating the economy: tax cuts and Spending increases.

Meanwhile, the liberals added to their agenda various pro-
grams concerned with eliminating poverty, particularly among the
very poor, such as the hard-core unemployed. In the period
between 1955 and 1960, they first proposed such policies as area
redevelopment, public works jobs and work training. This concern
produced another reason for liberals to seek economic growth; it
was believed by most of them that such growth would help reduce
poverty and unemployment, and some of them considered that it played
a more important role in doing so than such measures as job training,
etc., which addressed the supposed structural causes of the problems.

This brings us down to 1958. The conservative coalition was
still blocking most liberal measures, while liberals were increas-
ingly leaning toward economic growth as a way out of their predica-
ment. Then, in the election of that year, following (and probably
largely as a result of) the severe recession of 1957-58, the Democrats
won landslide majorities in Congress. The election especially
enhanced the ranks of Northern Democrats, and liberals among them.
And of course, this meant a substantial turnover in Congressional
membership. It is at this point that our study begins.

This increase in liberal strength, it turned out, was not as

great as it might have been; while the liberals did pass some

75

programs, they were able to pass few over Eisenhower's veto. Then
in 1960, when they finally regained control of the White House, the
Democrats lost their overwhelming margin of control in the House of
Representatives. Thus, the liberals still had a reason to continue
emphasizing economic growth as a way of paying for their programs.
This was confirmed when liberal President Kennedy and his liberal
allies in Congress attempted to push through the liberal agenda of
programs as augmented in the 19503 under the name of "the New
Frontier". They met with much frustration at the hands of the
conservatives, as Truman and his allies had. The conservatives
blocked passage of bills providing aid to school construction and
teachers' salaries, medical assistance for the aged, and a depart—
ment of urban affairs, and discouraged Kennedy from asking for others.
Most of what he did get Congress to pass was relatively minor: an
experimental food stamp program and some modifications in AFDC. (How-
ever, he did obtain a raise in the minimum wage and expanded cover-
age of it, and the passage of a bill providing for the establishment
of a program of manpower training and development.)

The liberals herefore considered the two Keynesian precrip-
tions for stimulating economic growth--tax cuts and spending
increases. Increased spending could consist of increased military
spending, and some of this was sought and obtained by Kennedy. How-
ever, since most liberals desired increased social welfare spending
anyway, this was the sort of spending that they most often contem-

plated.

76

The idea of tax cuts without increased social spending
appealed to many people, such as some businessmen. The idea of
increased social spending without tax cuts appealed to many liberals.
The liberals of the Kennedy administration followed a third, inter-
mediate course. While both tax cuts and spending increases were
meant to increase growth, and so were expected to reduce deficits,
both could have the short-run effect of exacerbating deficits, and
consequently arousing conservative opposition. Such opposition had
been successful in the past and might well be so again. However,
conservatives (classical liberals) oppose high spending (whether
accompanied by deficits or not) and, ultimately, favor low taxes
(although they may sacrifice this good in the short run to fight
deficits). Thus, Keynesians liberals were likely to find more sup-
port among their conservative opposition for tax—cutting than for
spending increases. Making this calculation, the Administration
liberals decided that before spending money on the social programs
which they, as liberals, desired, they would enact a tax-cut in the
hope that the tax would stimulate the economy so as to provide
revenues to balance later spending.

As it happened, Kennedy got some minor tax cuts passed in
1962, and then got a few programs (involving youth employment, area
redevelopment, a national service corps and aid to mass transit)
passed, at least through the Senate. However, Congress did not pass
his major tax-cut bill and other social programs until after his

death.

77

It was Lyndon Johnson who got these measures passed. He
secured the enactment of the Kennedy tax cut in 1964, which apparently
did lead to increased economic growth and to increased revenues.

This facilitated the new President's largely successful attempt to
enact the bulk of the remaining programs on the liberal agenda, under
the name of "the Great Society". Johnson had the Office of Economic
Opportunity (0E0) ("War on Poverty"), an umbrella bureau containing
various anti—poverty programs, established in 1964. That same year,
he also got bills passed providing for aid to urban mass transit

and the permanent establishment of food stamp programs to provide
help for the poor in purchasing food.

The passage of further legislation was aided by the Democrats'
increased majorities in Congress which accompanied the landslide
defeat of Goldwater in 1964 (they passed the 652 margin in the House
for the first time since 1961, and in the Senate, had been at or
above that percent since 1959; however, they lost much of this after
the 1966 elections). Other items on the agenda that Johnson got
passed, at least through the Senate, included bills providing for
aid to school construction and teacher's salaries (1965); medical
care for the aged ("Medicare"), financed through the social security
system (1965); funds for economic development of Appalachia (1965);
restrictions on air and water pollution (1965); establishment of the
Departments of Housing and Urban Development (1965) and Transporta—
tion (1966); subsidies to help pay for the costs of rent for low-

income groups (1965, 1966, 1967); a minimum wage increase (1966);

78

more generous unemployment compensation (including federal minimum
standards) (1966); and a "demonstration cities" program (1966).
Johnson's failures in this regard were few, with his inability to
get the right-to-work provision of the Taft-Hartley Act repealed
being perhaps the most important.

This victory for the liberals marked the end of this period
of about twenty-five years of liberal frustration, and the start of
a new period of increased government spending, as Congress enacted
the first major set of government social programs since the New
Deal but without a corresponding tax increase.

The tax cut, and later the Vietnam War, apparently fueled
an economic boom which produced enough revenue to balance the bud-
get in 1969, but that was for the last time.

Already, further spending growth had swollen the budget.
Trends in increased spending were begun in the Johnson years which
continued into the Nixon administration. The Vietnam War, going
back to 1965, had been a great contributor to spending growth, but
it was eventually outstripped by social welfare spending, and of

course was finally wound down to a close, in the Nixon years. While

the new anti-poverty and rent programs continued to be of modest size,
and education and health programs maintained their moderate sizes,
other social welfare spending began to grow substantially. The food
stamp program grew somewhat. More importantly, Congress enacted, in
1967,.the first of three large social security benefit increases, in

excess of the inflation rate. Also, in the Johnson years, AFDC grew

79

significantly, and with them, AFDC spending (in 1967, Congress made
some attempt to restrict the program, but voted down a tough work
requirement for mothers of school-age children while it actually
liberalized the program by making some families with fathers present
eligible). The food stamp program also grew at this time.

At this point, Johnson, believing that the public was still
not in favor of a major general tax increase (at least, not a per-
manent one), chose to run deficits and cover them by expanding the
money supply, thus causing inflation. A side effect of this was
"bracket creep"--the pushing of people, by inflation, into a higher
tax bracket. This increased their tax burden, as well as government
revenue.

In an attempt to deal with these programs, Congress enacted
spending cuts in 1967, and some more cuts and temporary surtax in
1968, but most of the spending was bequeathed to President Nixon.

He struggled somewhat to reduce the deficits. He got the surtax
extended temporarily in 1969, and he did end the Vietnam War in

1973. (Overall defense spending declined as well, in this period.)
However, the beginning of the winding—down of the war (1969-73) was
followed by, if it did not actually cause, a recession (1969-70),
which was bad for revenue. And Congress increased domestic spending,
taking up the slack--and more, causing the budget to swell still
further. In particular, Social Security was again increased signi-
ficantly in 1969 and 1972, while spending on food stamps grew as the

program was liberalized in 1969 and 1970.

80

Thus, social welfare spending increased, and to a great
degree, during the Nixon years, which is rather different from what
one might expect from a Republican administration. Nonetheless,
social spending eventually seemed to begin to level-off. However,
the liberal desire to enhance government power was not completely
thwarted, as a new drive for business regulation got under way, such
measures costing less than the social welfare programs and being
more politically popular (most of these passed Congress and had
Nixon's approval as well). This was in some ways the first big push
for regulation since the Progressive Era. It was further seen that
this movement was in any case qualitatively different from earlier
movement for regulation. It included the environmental legislation
such as air pollution legislation (as well as the older water- and
land-pollution programs going back to the Johnson years); worker
safety provisions such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA, 1970); and various consumer protection measures, such as
product safety legislation (1972, etc.) and a proposed Consumer
Protection Agency to intervene for consumers before existing regula-
tory agencies. In addition, Nixon, by means of an executive reorgani-
zation order, established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
in 1970. These proposals all seemed to be aimed rather exclusively
at helping consumers or employees of a business, or victims of its
pollution, rather than helping its competitors as well, as many Pro—
gressive Era proposals (antitrust, etc.)--somewhat ambiguously--

attempted to do. Accordingly, the new regulation is seen as less

81

sympathetic to business than the older regulation, and there seemed
to be less business support for it (although possibilities for
corporate'liberalism" even here should not be ruled out). Also,
these new regulations were more concerned with businesses' achiev-
ing specific standards of safety, pollution, etc., for the direct
benefit of the consumers and employees. This is in contrast to
older regulations which were concerned with somehow limiting busi-
ness's power, size or general economic discretion (as such things
as antitrust laws or anti-price—cutting legislation would do) on the
assumption that benefits for consumers and workers would flow from
that.

The rest of the economic history of the Nixon years is a
complex story of inflation; recession; inflation and recession
together ("stagflation"); and bracket creep; accompanied by wage/
price freezes and controls, and deficit spending, on the part of an
administration originally opposed to such policies.

The passing of the Great Society, the Vietnam War and the
Nixon Administration all contributed to the receding of many of the
issues of the late 19603 and early 19703, especially the non-economic
ones, from the forefront of public attention, as this relatively
liberal period came to an end and a new one arrived. The scene was
now left relatively clear for the older concerns of inflation,
unemployment and taxation--now generally more burdensome--to dominate
the Ford administration. However, Watergate left a legacy in the

form of a heavily Democratic Congress. This Congress again

82

increased the budget substantially, in spite of Ford's efforts to
the contrary, passing a food stamp bill and a public works bill over
his veto. In the area of labor, it passed a bill to allow common-
site picketing but Ford successfully vetoed it. Also, some minor
tax cuts were passed.

Nonetheless a backlash against "big government" was already
appearing among the public, and it soon began to influence parties.
Although a Democrat was elected in 1976, he claimed to favor
restraint in regard to spending and deficits. President Carter's
middle course satisfied neither conservatives nor liberals. He did
not greatly expand or greatly cut Spending or taxes, and what change
there was did not seem to go in any obvious direction. The most
important measures of his early administration seem to have been an
increase in social security taxes and the beginning of deregulation
in industries subject to regulatory commissions, while unions and
liberals were frustrated in their attempts to modify collective bar-
gaining rules in a pre-union direction.

Also in this period, those conservative Republicans who
found Fordtxxamoderate (in his ideological goals, economic strategies,
rhetoric and/or political alliances) had a better chance to dominate
their party without him in the White House, and took heart from the
growing conservatism of the political atmosphere. Further, many of
them had become impatient with "collecting the Democrats' taxes for
them": feeling that the "conservatives" (classical liberals) must

remember their goal of reducing the burdens of government, they

83

became advocates of substantial tax cuts. Such a course would not
only provide a needed economic stimulus and be politically more
popular than balancing the budget with low spending and high taxes,
but would, by stimulating the economy, more than make up for the
loss of revenue from lower rates, perhaps even balancing the budget.
This latter assumption (expressed by the Laffer curve) was the same
as that behind the 1964 tax cuts; along with other, different assump-
tions, it formed the new "supply-side" philosophy of conservative
economics. Most conservatives embraced it, including their leader,
Ronald Reagan, and conservatives in Congress began taking the low-
tax position on tax votes, supporting the Kemp-Roth amendment to the
income tax bill in 1978 (providing a 30% general personal income-tax
cut over three years). In 1980, conservatives were able to get
Reagan nominated for President and elected.

The political "swing to the right" of the 19703, indicated by
this movement among the Republicans and Carter's moderation among
the Democrats, marks the beginning of a new era. Just as the Ford
years were in many ways a reversion to the pre-Great Society era--
in terms of issues and ideals, though not in policy outcomes--the
succeeding years were ones in which the attempt was made to turn
the clock back farther, or at least to make a strong break with the
Great Society era. Furthermore, the Senatorial voting cleavages

after 1980 are rather distinctive as well.

84

ENDNOTES

lLee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen H. Wilcox,

Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern university
Press, 1966).

2William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance
of Roll-Calls in Voting Bodies", in Legislative Behavior: A Reader
in Theory and Research, ed. by John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, (Glen-
cover, IL: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 377-387; David B. Truman,
The Congressional Party: _A Case Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., l959k and Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues
and Factions from Legislative Votes", American Political Science
Review 59 (December, 1965), 909-926.

3Riker; and Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

 

 

 

4Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Con-
servative Institution 1959-1972 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
l972),and Gary Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisen-
hower_§pd the Eightijhird Congress (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1975).

 

 

 

 

5Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

6MacRae, "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions":
MacRae, "Some Underlying Variables in Legislative Roll-Call Votes",
Public Opinion Quarterly 18 (Summer l954),l9l-195; Fred 1. Green-
stein and Elton F. Jackson, "A Second Look at the Validity of Roll-
Call Analysis", Midwest Journal of Political Science 7 (May,
1963). 157-166.

 

 

7Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

8Riker; MacRae, "A.Method for Identifying Issues and
Factions"; MacRae and Susan Borker Schwarz, "Identifying Congres-
sional Issues by Multidimensional Models", Midwest Journal of Poli—
tical Science 12 (May, 1968), 181-201; Charles D. Farris, "A Method
of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress", Journal of
Politics 20 (May, 1958), 308-388.

 

 

 

9Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

10See Note 2.

85

11Riker.

12Wilder Cane, Jr., "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party
Voting", Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (August, 1960),

13Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1959-1978. (washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1959-1978); Americans for
Constitutional Action, ACA Index 1963-1978 (Washington, D.C.:
Americans for Constitutional Action, 1963—1978); and AFL-CIO: Labor
Looks at Congress has no votes in boldface type. However, since
such votes were always referred to previously as "key votes", those
votes called by that name in the 1978 book were considered the equi-
valent of votes in boldface type.)

14Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. Congressional Action
(Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., 1978); and
Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of
American Politics l972-1980 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1972-1980).
15MacRae, "Some Underlying Variables in Legislative Roll-
Call Votes", pp. 191—195.

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER III

TESTING THE MODEL: AN ANALYSIS

OF THE VOTING RECORDS

Introduction

 

Now we may turn to a consideration of the voting records.
We shall first examine the data presented in the chart, then try to
determine what cleavages and groups are exhibited by the votes, and
finally compare our findings to the theoretical model.1

From this point on, we shall, unless we specify otherwise,
use the terms "conservative" ("right") and "liberal" ("left") in the
sense used in everyday conversation and the press.

For the convenience of the reader, the charts tabulating the
votes have the Senator's names arranged in an apparent right-to-left
order (determined impressionistically, but with the results largely
in accord with the evidence of the votes);2 and the votes have been
grouped by issue areas, with the attempt being made to generally put
related areas near each other. Another decision that was made
regarding the voting lists is that all Senators who were in office
for less than two years would be excluded, as they would provide too
few votes for study.

To facilitate the description of the votes we will divide

the Senators into a few broad groups. These groups are based mainly

86

87

on conventional groupings, and are not necessarily the same as the
groups in our theoretical model or the groups which we will identify
after examining the voting records (although they usually do have
some basis in the theory and in the voting records). They are used
primarily to economize descriptions, in a more-or-less meaningful
way, and too much stress should not be placed on the assignment of
Senators to the groups.

The first division to be made is into Republicans and Demo—
crats. (James Buckley was elected as the Conservative candidate in
1970, but was admitted to the Republican caucus; Harry Byrd, Jr.,

a one-time Democrat who was re-elected as an Independent in 1970,
voted with the Democrats on organizing the Senate. These Senators
will consequently be regarded as Republican and Democrat, respect-

ively.) Congressional_guarterly next divides Democrats into North-

 

eners and Southerners, thus giving recognition to the liberal-
conservative conflict between the two wings of the party. However,
Cg, not wishing to get involved in actually making definitions of
"conservative" and "liberal", uses a simple geographic criterion for
grouping the Senators, grouping them into Northern and Southern
Democrats on the basis of a definition of "the South" as consisting
of the former Confederate States (Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas,
Louisiana and Texas) plus Kentucky and Oklahoma, and a definition of
"the North" as all the other states. These are good definitions of

the North and South, and we shall use them. However, the division

88 -

of the Democrats into wings on the basis of those geographical
groupings is inadequate for our purposes. While Northern Democrats
are overwhelmingly liberal--that is, they vote on the left side of
the issues in a large majority of cases--considerably less than all
of the Southerners are conservative. Southern Democrats Yarborough
and Kefauver are among the most liberal of all Senators, while Gore,
Sasser, and Harris are close behind, and Monroney, Kerr, Fulbright
and Smathers are mostly liberal.

Further, most Southern Democrats first elected in or after
1966 (Hollings, Morgan, Nunn, Stone, Chiles, Ford, Huddleston,
Bumpers, Johnston of Louisiana and Bentsen) are distinctly more
liberal than many of those elected before 1966, and yet they are
also generally more conservative than the more senior liberal South—
erners mentioned above.

Finally, we may note that a number of other Southerners
elected before 1966 (Long of Louisiana, Ellender, Sparkman, Hill
and Johnston of South Carolina) were well to the left of the old-
style conservatives (although Ellender and Hill often voted with
them), and most of them voted with the liberals more often. For
convenience, this group would be best grouped with the liberals.

This leaves us with several Senators—-Robertson, Harry Byrd
Sr., and Harry Byrd Jr. (of Virginia), Ervin, Jordan (of North
Carolina), Russell, Talmadge, Holland, Stennis, Eastland and McClellan,
all first elected before 1966, and Allen, first elected after (plus

Thurmond, when he was a Democrat, before September 1964), who had

89

voting records greatly different from the average Northern Democrat
and voted often (but far from always) with conservative Republicans,
while having voting records similar to each other's. They did not
even constitute a majority of the pre-l966 Southerners, but they did
constitute a plurality, and represented a type apparently unique to
the region. They can therefore be referred to as "Old South Demo-
crats".

Therefore, we have among the Democrats the Old South Demo-
crats; the New South Democrats (Chiles, etc.); and the liberals
Northern and Southern (Yarborough, etc., plus the group including
Sparkman, etc.). There are only two remaining Democrats who do not
fit into these groups. These are two Northern Democrats (Lausche
and Zorinsky) who voted much more often with conservative Republicans
than with their liberal fellow Northern Democrats. They are not
grouped with the conservative Old Southerner type of Democrat
because they generally voted with the conservative Republicans,
while the Old Southerners often diverged from the Republicans.

Turning now to the Republicans, we can divide them into
conservative and liberal wings as well. This too, is based on a
conventional scheme, but the boundaries are not so clear-cut. None-
theless, on the basis of their reputations and voting records, the
Republicans may be divided into "conservatives" and "liberals"
(these terms are primarily relative; "liberal" Republicans are not
necessarily as liberal as "liberal" Democrats). On the tables, the
former are those extending from Scott of Virginia to Baker, while

the latter extend from Saltonstall to Case of New Jersey.

90

The votes could be arranged in one of three ways: by
apparent similarity of subject, by similarity of cleavages, or by
some combination of these two. In the survey in the text, they
will be discussed in the first order. Then, we will attempt to
group them together in the second way. For the tables, the third,
middle way was chosen; this keeps together votes on ostensibly the
same subject, so a Senator's stand on each one may be determined,
but groups together subjects with similar cleavages, so patterns
may be discerned visually.

Y = a vote, pair, announcement or response to a 99 poll
in favor of the proposal.

X = a vote, pair, announcement or response to a‘gg poll
opposed to the proposal.

 

? = no indicated preference, or abstention from voting to
avoid a conflict of interest.

C = "conservative" position, in the conventional sense,and
position more favored by alleged "conservatives". than
alleged "liberals".

L = "liberal" position,in the conventional sense, and posi-
tion more favored by alleged "liberals" than alleged
"conservatives".

+ = position in favor of "small-government", but not more
favored by alleged "conservatives" than alleged "liberals"

- = position in favor of "big-government", but not more
favored by alleged "liberals" than alleged "conserva-
tives".

? = no known preference.

91

TABLE 1.-- Votes Used.

 

VOTE

COPE

 

1959

S 1555.

S 1515.

HR 2580.

1961

HR 3935.

S 1021.

S 1922.

1962

HR 10606.

RE 7576.

KB 11040.

HR 10650.

Landrum-Griffin bill: amendment to allow state
regulation of labor disputes. April 3.
(COLL. BARGAINING: 1959 STATE REC; Y I -)

Landrum-Griffin bill: amendment to provide
restraints on unions in form of "Bill of Rights"
for members. April 22.

(COLL. BARCNC: 1959 BILL OF HIS; Y I -)

:reconsideration of previous vote.
(COLL. EARGNG:

April 22.
1959 RECON. s or R; Y - -)

:smendment to ban secondary boycotts.
(COLL . BARGNC:

April 24.
1959 SECOND EOYCTS; Y I -)

Education (elementary and secondary) aid bill:
amendment providing aid for school construction
and teachers' salaries. February 3.

(1960A ELEM. AND SEC. EDUCATION; N I C)

:motion to reconsider amendment providing for
school construction and teachers' salaries.
February 3.

(19608 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION; Y I C)

Social security bill:
benefits for the aged.
(1960 MEDICARE; N - C).

amendment providing medical
August 23.

Minimum wage bill: amendment to narrow proposed
coverage. April 19.
(MIN. WAGE: 1961 COVERAGE; N I C)

Education (elementary and secondary) aid bill.
providing aid for operation. maintenance and
construction of schools and teachers' salaries.
May 25.

(1961 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION; N I C)

Housing program: amendment to provide a home-
loan program. June 8.
(1961A CEN'RL. HOUSING; Y I C)

:conference report. June 28.
(19613 CEN'RL HOUSING; N - C)

Public welfare bill:
benefits for the aged.
(1963 MEDICARE; N I C)

amendment providing medical
July 17.

amendment to delete funds to
July 18.

Atomic Energy funds:
build new reactor in Hanford. Washington.
(1962 NUCLEAR REACTORS; Y I C)
Communications Satellite bill: cloture.
(1962 COMSAT; N - C)

Income tax bill. providing some cuts:
August 14.
(INCOME TAXES:

passage.

1962 BILL: N I -)

August 14.

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

£72

 

VOTE

ACA

COPE

 

HR 11970.

a";

51.

HR 5517.

S 1163.

S 1321.

S 1831.

HR 6143.

1964

HR 8363.

S 2642.

HR 11865.

Kl:
- o
M

83.

HR 2362.

S 1648.

Trade bill: amendment limiting Presidential power
to cut tariff. September 18. X
(1962 TARIFF POWERS; Y I -)

Bill providing aid to local mass transit passage.
April 4. X
(1963 MASS TRANST. PASS.; N I C

Youth Employment bill: amendment removing section
establishing a Youth Conservation Corps. April 10. (X)
(1963 YOUTH CONS. CORPS. AM.; N I C)

:passage. April 10. X
(1963 YOUTH EMF. BILL; N I C

Bill continuing accelerated public works program:
amendment to cut funds. May 1.
(PUBLIC HORKS: 1963 ACCL.; N I C)

Bill continuing Area Redevelopment Program passage.
June 26. X
(1963 AREA REDEVEL.; N I C)

National Service Corps bill: passage.
(1963 NATIONAL SERVICE CORPS; N I C)

August 11.. 2:

Bill extending Manpower Development and Training
Act. especially youth training: passage.

September 26.

(1963 YOUTH TRAINING; N I C)

Bill to aid higher education: October 21.
(1963 HIGHER EDUCATION; N I C)

passage.

Income-tax cut bill: passage. February 7. X
(INCOME TAXES: 1964 GEN. CUT; N I -)

Bill establishing Office of Economic Opportunity:
(OEO): passage. July 23. X
(0E0: 1964 EST.; N I C)

Social security bill:
benefits for the aged.
(1964 MEDICARE; N I C)

amendment to provide medical
September 2. X

Hater pollution bill: amendment to delete provi-

sion allowing HEW to set water quality standards.

January 28. X
(1965 HATER POLLUT.; N I C)

Appalachian development bill: passage. February 1. X
(1964 APPALACHIA; N I C)

Bill providing a wide range of aid to elementary

and secondary education: passage. April 9. X
(1965 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: N I C)

Public works bill: amendment to cut funds. June 1.
(PUBLIC HORKS: 1965 CUT; Y I C)

:passage. June 1.
(PUBLIC HORKS: 1965 BILL; N I C)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

93

 

VOTE

CQ ACA

COPE

CC

 

HR 6675.

S 2213.

HR 6927.

HR 8283.

S 2084.

HR 77.

1966

HR 14012.

S 985.

HR 15119.

S 3708.

HR 13712.

Social security bill: amendment to provide
medical aid to the aged. July 9. X X
(1965 MEDICARE AMENDMENT; N I C)

:passage. July 9. X X
(1965 MEDICARE BILL; N I C)

Housing and Urban Dev. bill: amendment to
delete rent subsidies. July 15. X X
(1965 RENT SUBSIDIES; Y I C)

Bill to establish Department of Housing and
Urban Development: passage. August 11. X
(1965 EST. HUD DEPT; N I C)

OEO bill: amendment to provide for a governor's
veto over certain parts of the program. August 17. X
(1965 0E0 GOV'S. VETO; Y I C)

:amendment to reduce funding. August 18. X
(0E0: 1965 CUT; Y I C)

Highway beautification bill: passage. September 16. X
(1965 HIGHNAY BEAUT; N I C)

Bill to repeal portion of Taft-Hartley permitting
right-to~work laws: cloture. October 11. X
(COLL. BARGAININC: 1965 ABOLISH RICHT-TO-HORK;

N I -)

Supplemental Appropriations bill: amendment
to delete rent subsidies. April 27. X X
(1966 RENT SUBSIDIES; N I C)

Fair Packaging and Labelling bill: amendment to

delete provision establishing standard weights

and quantities. June 8. X
(1966 STANDARD QUANT. 0N LABELS; N I C)

Bill to establish national standards for unemploy-

ment compensation: amendment to provide extended

aid in recessions. August 8. X X
(UNEMP. COMP.: 1966 RECESSION; N I C)

:amendment to provide that minimum levels for

maximum benefits equal one-half the average state-

wide wage. August 8. (X) (X)
(UNEMP. COMP: 1966 MIN. BENS; N I C)

:passage. August 8. X X
(UNDIP. COOL: 1966 GEN STANDS; N I C)

Demonstration cities bill: amendment to delete

section providing for Demonstration Cities.

August 19. X X
(1966 DEMONST. CITIES; Y I C)

Minimum wage bill: amendment to delay increase.
August 25. X (X)
(MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 DELAY INV.; Y I C)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

94

 

 

(0E0: 1969 CUT; Y I C)

VOTE CQ ACA COPE AAP CC
:amendment to narrow coverage. August 26. (X) (X) X
(MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 COVERAGE; Y I C)
:passage. August 26. (X) X (X)
(MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 PASS; N I C)
1967
HR 9960. Independent offices and HUD appropriations bill:
amendment to delete rent subsidies. September 20. X X X
(1967 RENT SUBSIDIES; Y I C)
S 2388. OEO bill: amendment to provide governor's veto.
October 4. X X
(1967 OEO COV'S. VETO; Y I C)
:amendment to provide substitute public works
program. October 4. X X X
(0E0: PUB. WORKS AMEND. 1967); N u c
HJ Res 888. Continuing appropriations bill: amendment provid-
ing 52 cut in general spending. October 25. X X
(GEN. SPEND'G: 1967 CUT; Y I C)
HR 12080. Social Security bill: amendment to lower proposed
increase. November 21. X X X
(1967 SOC. SEC. INC.; Y I C)
1968
HR 15399 OEO supplemental appropriations: amendment aiding
Headstart program. March 12. X X
(1968 HEADSTART; N I C)
HR 154144. Excise Tax bill: amendment to strike spending cut
from following amendment. March 26. (X) X (X)
:amendment to provide general spending cut and
surtax. April 2. X (X) X
(1968 SPEND CUT and INCOME TAXES: 1968 SURTAX;
Y I C)
S 3497. HUD bill: passage. May 28. X
(1968 GEN. HUD; N I C)
HR 18037. Labor/HEN appropriations: amendment to increase 0E0
budget. September 6. X
(DEC: 1968 INCR.; N I C)
1969
HR 9951. Unemployment Tax bill: amendment to continue
surtax. July 31. X
(INCOME TAXES: 1969 SURTAX EXTENS.; N I C)
S 3016. OEO bill: amendment to provide governor's veto.
October 14. X X
(0E0 GOV'S. VETO; Y I C)
:amendment decreasing funds. October 14. X (X)

95

 

VOTE

COPE

 

S 2547.

HR 13270.

1970

HR 14705.

S 2548.

HR 16916.

HR 17923.

HR 11102.

HR 17255.

HR 17755.

HR 17550.

1971

 

SJ Res. 468.

S 575.

HR 8432.

Food stamp reform bill: amendment to increase

benefits. November 6.
(FOOD STAMPS: 1969 INCR. BENS.; N I C)

Tax reform bill and social security increase:
amendment to increase income tax exemption.

December 3.
(INCOME TAXES: 1969 EXEMPT; N I -)

:passage. December 16.

(INCOME TAXES 1969 GEN. TAX SHIFT and 1969

SOC. SEC. INC.; N I C)

Unemployment compensation bill: amendment

to include migrant workers in program.

February 23.
(UNEMP. COMP.: 1970 MGR. HORXERS; N I C)

School lunch bill: amendment liberalising provi-

sions. February 24.
(1970 SCHOOL LUNCH INCR.; N I C)

Funds for Office of Education bill: veto override.

hme30.
(1970 GEN. ED. FUNDS; N I C)

Agriculture bill: amendment to increase food stamp

benefits. July 8.
(FOOD STAMPS: 1970 INCR.; N I C)

Hospital construction bill: veto override.

August 18.
(HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION 1970; N I C)

Air Quality standards bill: amendment to remove

time limit on period when automakers can

seek

delays in meeting requirements on low-pollution

cars. September 22.
(AIR POLLUT.: APPEALS 1970; N I C)

Transportation Department funds bill: amendment

to delete SST funds. December 3.
(1970 SST; Y I C)

Social security bill: amendment to delete AFDC
(PAP), trade and health provisions. December 28.

(AFDC: (FAF) 1970; Y I C)

Transportation bill: amendment to restore SST

funds. March 3.
(1971 SST; N I C)

Public Works Acceleration and Regional Development

bill: conference report. June 8.
(PUBLIC HORKS: 1971 CONF.; N I C)

:veto override. July 14.
(PUBLIC BURKS: 1971 VETO; N I C)

Lockheed loan guarantee bill: passage.
(1971 LOCKHEED; N I C)

August 2.

(X)

(X)

X

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

(X)

96

 

 

VOTE CO ACA COPE AAP CC
HR 10947. Income tax bill: amendment to reduce variance
in depreciation allowance. November 15. X X
(INCOME TAXES: 1971 DEPREC. ALLOW. CUT; N I C)
:amendment to extend to single persons the
rates applicable to married persons.
November 22. (X) X
(INCOME TAXES: 1971 CUT SINGLES; Y I +)
S 2891. Bill to extend wage. price and related controls:
passage. December 1. X
(WAGE/PRICE CONTROLS: 1971 EXTENS.; N I C)
S 2007. Bill to extend the OED with child care and legal
services programs attached: veto. December 12. X
(1971 OEO/CHILD CARE/LEG. SVCES.; N I C)
1972
S 3419. Food. Drug and Consumer Product bill: amendment
to delete criminal penalties for violations of
regulations. June 21. X X X
(1972 PRODUCT SAFETY; N I C)
S 3010. OEO bill: amendment deleting provision that
would make the legal services program a separate
corporation. June 26. (X) X
(1972 LEGAL SVCES. CORP.; N I C)
S 1861. Minimum wage bill: amendment to reduce proposed
increase. July 20. X X X (X)
(MINIMUM WAGE: REDUCE INCR. 1972; Y I C)
S 945. No-fault auto insurance bill: motion to reconmut.
August 8. X X X
(1972 NO-FAULT; N I C)
HR 14370. Revenue Sharing bill: amendment to adopt distri-
bution formula favoring urbanized states.
September 6. X (X) (X)
(REV. SHAR.: 1972 DIST. FORM.; N I C)
:amendment on funding levels. requiring annual
approvals. September 7. X (X) (x)
(REV. SHAR.: 1972 FUNDS; N I C)
:passage. September 12. (X) X X
(REV. SHAR.: 1972 PASS; N I C)
S 3939. Highway bill: amendment to allow trust funds
to be used for railroads. September 19. X
(1972 HIGHNAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT; N I C)
HR 1 Social Security bill: motion to kill amendment
establishing Family Assistance Program with higher
benefits than Nixon version. October 3. X
(AFDC (PAP): 1972; Y I C)
S 3970. Consumer Protection Agency bill: cloture.
October 3. X

(1972 CONSUM. PROTECT. AGENCY; N I C)

97

 

VOTE

C0

ACA COPE

CC

 

HR 161310.

S 1081.

S 425.

S 2589.

1974

HR 7824.

S 2727.

S 354.

S 2984.

S 1539.

S 3458.

Bill to raise debt ceiling and authorize presi-
dential spending cuts: passage. October 17.
(GEN. SPENDG.: 1972 CUT; Y I C)

Highway bill: amendment to use highway trust
funds for mass transit. March 14.
(1973 HIGHWAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT; N I C)

Alaskan pipeline bill: amendment to deny right-
of-way for pipeline pending further environmen-
tal study. July 13.

(ALAS. PIPE: 1973 DELAY; N I C)

:amendment to bar judicial review of the envir-
onmental aspects of the bill and give permis-
sion to begin construction. July 17.

(ALAS. PIPE.: 1973 BAR JUD. REV.; Y I C)

Strip mining bill: amendment to prohibit surface
coal mining where government owned mineral but
not surface rights. October 8.

(1973 STRIP MINING; N I C)

Emergency Energy bill: fuel rationing amendment.
November 15.
(1973 urlosmc: N . C)

:motion to recommit to conference. February
1974.
(1974 GEN. ENERGY; N I C)

Bill to establish Legal Services
corporation: cloture. January 30.
(1974 LEGAL SVCES. CORP.; N I C)

Minimum wage increase: passage. March 7.
(MINIMUM WAGE: PASS INCR. 1974; N I C)

No-fault insurance bill: passage. May 1.
(1974 NO-FAULT; N I C)

Council on International Economic Policy bill:
motion to kill amendment giving President stand-
by power to control wages and prices in selected
industries under certain circumstances. May 1.
(WAGE PRICE CONT.: 1974 SELECT; N I C)

:motion to kill amendment continuing Cost of
Living Council and giving President power to

enforce price agreements after decontrol. May 1.

(HAGEIPRICE CONT.: PRICE ACREE./CLC 1974; N I C)

Education bill: amendment to change formula for
distributing aid to poor children. May 15.
(1974 EDUCATION FORMULA; Y I C)

Food stamp bill: motion to kill amendment to
and food stamps for strikers. July 22.
(1974 FOOD STAMPS FOR STRIKERS; N I C)

(X)

(X)

(X) (X)

X (X)

(X) X

(X) X

X (X)

(X) X

(X)

(X)

(X)

98

 

VOTE

CQ

ACA

COPE

 

S 707.

HR 1449.

HR 10710.

1975

HR 2166.

HR 4222.

HR 5900.

S 2711.

S 622.

1976

HR 5247.

S 354.

S 3136.

HR 9803.

S 3201.

S 2872.

Consumer Protection Agency bill: cloture.
September 19. X
(1974 CONSUM. PROTECT. AGENCY; N I C)

Community Services Bill: amendment to phase-out
0E0. December 11. X
(0E0: 1974 PHASE-OUT; Y I C)

Bill to give president powers to negotiate tariff
reduction: cloture. December 13. X
(1974 TARIFF POUERS; N I -)

Bill to reduce personal and corporate income

taxes and provide social security bonus: con-

ference report. March 26. X
(INCOME TAXES: 1975 GEN. CUT.; N I -)

School lunch and child nutrition bill: veto
override. October 7. X
(1975 SCHOOL LUNCH; N I C)

Bill to allow common-site picketing: passage.

November 19. X
(COLL. BARGAINING 1975: COMMON-SITE PICXETING;

N I -)

Highway bill: amendment to allow funds to be
used for mass transit. December 12. X
(HIGHHAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT 1975; N I C)

Energy bill (providing stand-by fuel rationing

powers. fuel efficiency standards. etc.):

conference. December 17. X
(1975 GEN. ENERGY; N I C)

Public Works bill: veto override. February 19.
(PUBLIC NORXS: 1976 lsT; N I C)

No-fault auto insurance bill: motion to kill.
March 31. X
(1976 NO-FAULT; Y I C)

Food Stamp Reform bill: passage. April 8. X
(FOOD STAMPS: 1976 REFORM; N I C)

Bill providing aid to child day care: veto
override. May 5.
(1976 CHILD DAY CARE; N I C)

Public Norks Jobs bill: veto override. June 8. X
(PUBLIC HORKS: 1976 2ND; N I C)

Federal Energy Administration bill: amendment
setting energy conservation standings for
construction of new buildings. June 15.

(1976 ENERGY CONSV. BUILDINGS; N I C)

:amendment establishing office to gather energy
information. June 15.
(1976 ENERGY INFO.; N I C)

(X)

(X)

99

 

VOTE

CQ

ACA COPE

CC

 

HR 10612.

S 3219.

HR 8532.

HR 14232.

HR 4876.

S Con

Res 19

S 275.

HR 5885.

HR 7555.

Income tax bill: amendment to end deferral of

taxes on unremitted earnings and profits of

foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. June 29. (X)
(INCOME TAXES: 1976 FOR CORP. CRED.; N I C)

:motion to kill motion to recommit bill so

as to remove all provisions except for those pro-
viding individual reductions and credit. August 5. X
(INCOME TAXES: 1976 PERS. BENS. ONLY; Y I C)

Clean Air bill: amendment to eliminate the

requirement that unpolluted air be kept that way.
August 3. X
(AIR POLLUT: 1976 NONDEGRADATION; Y I C)

:amendment to move date of compliance up from
1980 to 1979. August 5. X
(AIR POLLUT: 1976 EASTEN; N I C)

:amendment deleting provision to relax tolerance
limits for nitrous oxide. August 5. (X)
(AIR POLLUT: I976 TOUGNTEN; N I C)

Antitrust revision bill: amendment to make
tougher. September 6. X
(1976 ANTITRUST; N I C)

Bill appropriating money for Departments of
Labor and NEW bill: veto override. September 30. X
(1976 LABOR/HEW DEPT. FUNDS; N I C)

Economic Stimulus Tax-Cuts bill: amendment to
permanently reduce lower-bracket personal income

tax rates. April 27. X
(INCOME TAXES: 1977 PERS. CUT.; Y I C)

Economic Stimulus spending bill: amendment to cut
spending on public works. May 2. X
(PUBLIC WORKS: 1977 CUT; Y I C)

:passage. May 4. x
(PUBLIC WORKS: 1977 PASS; N I C)

Budget bill: amendment to cut housing funds.
May 4.
(1977 GEN'RL HOUSING; Y I C)

Farm-food bill: amendment to retain requirement
of partial payment for food stamps. May 24.
(FOOD STAMPS: 1977 PURCB REQUIREMENTS; Y I C)

Water Resources/User Fees bill: amendment to

authorize construction of a new water project.

June 22. X
(1977 WATERWAYS; N I C)

Labor/HEW funds bill: amendment to require
OSHA to submit an economic impact statement
with its regulations. June 28.

(OSHA: 1977 ECON. IMPACT; Y I C)

(X)

(X)

(X)

x (x)

100

 

VOTE CO ACA COPE AAP CC

 

S 1811. ERDA funding bill: amendment to cut funds for
Clinch River Breeder reactor. July 11. X X
(1977 NUCLEAR REACTORS; Y I C)

HR 3744. Minimum wage bill: amendment to provide youth
sub-minimum wage. October 7. (X) X
(MINIMUM WAGE: 1977 YOUTH SUB-MIN; Y I C)

HR 93946. Social Security bill: motion to kill amendment
to increase taxes and decrease employers' tax
base. November 14. X X X
(1977 SOC. SEC: FIN; N I C)

:amendment to raise age at which eased restric-

tions on outside earnings take effect in another

amendment. November 14. X
(1977 SS: EARN. LIM.; N I C)

1978
S 2493. Airline deregulation: amendment to loosen regu-
lation. April 19. X
(1978 AIRLINE DEREG.; Y I C)
:amendment to give displaced workers hiring prio-
rity instead of compensation. April 19. X
(1978 AIRLINE JOBS PROJECT; Y I C)
5 Con
Res 80. Budget bill: amendment to cut budget by $25
billion. April 25. X (X)
(1978 GENR'L SPEND. CUTS; Y I C)
HR 8309. Waterway user fees/water projects bill: amendment

to impose user fees. May 3. X X
(1978 WATERWAY USER FEES; Y I C)

HR 8410. Bill to revise NLRA to facilitate organizing of
unions: cloture. June 14. x x x x
(COLL. BARGAINING: 1978 NLRA; N I C)

HR 27777. Bill to establish National Consumer Cooperative
bank: passage. July 13. X X
(NAT. CONSUM. COOP. BANK. 1978; N I C)

MR 11445. Small Business/OSHA bill: amendment to exempt
small businesses with good safety records from
OSHA. August 2. X X
(OSHA: 1978 SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPT; Y I C)

HR 12936. Housing bill: cut funds. August 7. X X
(1978 GEN'RL HOUSING; Y I C)

HR 13511. Income tax bill: amendment to cut taxes further
for lower income brackets. October 6. X (X) (X)
(INCOME TAXES: 1978 PERS. CUT; N I C)

:amendment to cut individual tax rates 30!
over the next three years. October 6. (X) X (X)
(INCOME TAXES: 1978 KEMP-ROTH; Y I C)

101

 

VOTE

HR 5285.

CO ACA COPE

:amendment to cut corporate taxes. October 10. (X)
(INCOME TAXES: 1978 CORP. CUT; Y I C)

Medicare and Hospital Cost Containment bill:

motion to kill amendment to aid hospitals and

limit earnings. October 12. X
(1978 HOSPITAL COST CONT.; N I C)

Humphrey-Hawkins economic stimulus bill: amend-
ment to weaken provisions requiring reductions
of inflation to 31 by 1983. and 02 by 1988.

October 13.
(PUBLIC WORKS: 1978 NUM.-EAW. INFL.; N I C)

(X)

(X)

CC

ll)2

TABLE 2.--Roll-Call Votes.

 

mvcsm .oaoo
mu:\tonam
.mncou oup>cmm
panopuoz

me_e.oc» ease»
ucoum was:

.c-ucou
"goes; poonom

.co=~
”goes; possum

.ncou
.moo>m pound

stag use e_.gu

ouo>
m.>o¢
owe

.moosm .oom
\ocoo.v.¢euxcwc
I. assuomusa

uau

.toe_

you
.umw

0E0

 

msw—

mom—
mom.
mom—

mum—

Osm—

fiWWap
as.
was.

oom—
soo—
wo—

pump

eso—
oom—
moo—
mam—
coop

 

C

C

(Va.)

H. Byrd Sr.

C

C

(Va.)

H. Byrd Jr.

Robertson
Stennis

C

C

C C C C C

?

C C C

Eastland

C

L

C C C C C

McClellan
Allen

C
C
C
C

C C C C

Russell

C
C
C
C

C C C C

Holland
Ervin

C

L C C C C

L C C C

Jordan (N.C.)

Talmadge

Scott (Va.)
Thurmond

C
C

C
C

C C C C C
C C C C C

Tower

Helms

Goldwater
Curtis

C
C

C

C

C C C C C

Simpson
Butler

Buckley
Garn

Laxalt

C
C
C

C C C C

C C C C C

Hilliams (Del.)

Bennett

L

C C C C C

C

Dominick

C

C

Hickenlooper

c

c c c c
c c c .c c
c c c c

Hansen

C
C
C

Fannin

Hruska
Mundt

?

Hatch

Bartlett (0kla.)

Murphy
Gurney

C

C

1(13

 

mvcou .unoa
:u:\con~a

.mocou uu.>com
.ueo.~oz
neecaoch ease»
«Loom coo:

.528
2.2.3 32.3

.coe.
“goes; possum

.ntoo
.muusm poms;

ocuu hen v—ynu

ouo>
n.>ow
cue

.moo>m .ooa
\ocou.u__eu\9uo
T
uso-omuaa

oau

.co:~

oau
.umw

0E0

 

oka—

moo—
awo—

muo—

cum—

m3.
3.
£2

amo—
swap
oo—

pum—

cum—
moo—
moo—
meo—
can.

 

Mechem

Dworshak
Martin

McClure

C

C C C C C C

Jordan (1d6-)
Bridges
Cotton

C
C
C

C
C
C

C C C C

Miller

Allott

Capehart
Brock

Schoeppel
Dirksen

C
C

Lausche

Zorinsky

Case (S.Dak.)

Wiley

Lugar

L

C C C C L

Young (N.Dak.)

Hayakawa

Schmitt
Wallop
Roth

C
C

Carlson

Morton

C

Griffin

Domenici

Dole

Bush

C

Baker

Danforth

C

Saltonstall

Bellmon

C

C

C C L C L

Pearson

Stevens

1114

 

mucsm .oamo

3w:\coaom
.mucou oovscom
paeo.o~z
oe.e.~c» ease»
ocean use:
.c_u:ou

22.3 possum
.coe_

”cocoa _oogum
.ncou

.muosm peas;
9.8 58 3.5
ooo>

u.>oa

cum

.moo>m .mom

\ocau.u—.:U\Cuo

uaouomuem

emu

r. .coc_
usu
.umu

asap

moa—
awo—

muo—

cum—

«—
osm—

awo—
soo—
co—

paw—

«sm—
acm—
woo—
moo—
voo—

 

C

C C C C C

Ellender

Hill

C

C

Nunn

Stone

Bentsen
Chiles

C

Hollings
Morgan

DeConcini

Spong
Cook

Packwood
Boggs
Fong

L

C
C

C C C C

L

L C L C L

Beall Sr.

Beall Jr.
Taft

Saxbe

L
L C L C

L C C C

Kuchel

L
C
C

Cooper

C
L

Smith (Me.)
Prouty
Aiken

L

C

L C L C L

Chafee

L C L C L C

Scott (Pa.)
Heicker
Percy

C

Hatfield

Keating

Stafford

Schweiker
Heinz

Mathias

L

L

L L L C L

Javits

Goodell

105

 

woe—i Jame
3w:\coaea

.macou oo.>com
poeo.uoz
ue.e_ucp gaze»
ocean coo:
.e.ueou

£25.. possum
.coe_

”goes; possum

.ncou

.muo>m —ooom
menu Ago opveu
coo»

m.>ow
cuc

.mou>m .mom
\ocnu.up.su\ouo

j 3932...
LS
.cue.
as
as

CEO

 

cum—

noo—
nea—

mum—

cum—

a—
mum—

meow
soo—
ma—

pum—

tum—
aco—
camp
mwop
coa—

 

C
?

Brooke

L

?

L L L

Case

C L L L

?

C
L

Sparkman

Johnston (S.C )

Johnston (La.)
Long (La.)

L
L

Fulbright
Smathers
Frear

C

O'Mahoney
Hickey
Ford

Huddleston
Bumpers

L L L L

Gore

Moynihan

Edmondson

Kerr

L

Monroney

L
L
L

L

L L L L L
L L L L L

R. Byrd (u.va.)

Cannon
Bible

L

L

L

Anderson (N.Mex.)

Chavez

L

L
L L L L L

Hayden

L
L

L
L

Randolph
Montoya
Johnson

L L L L

Sasser
Bass

L

?

L L L L

Symington

L

Long ('40.)

?

L L L ?

Mansfield
Metcalf

L

L

L L L L L

Murray

106

 

mezzo .uaoo
zuzxcoaoa

.mncou uo.>cum
pseovuax
oe.c.oc» eu=o>
ocean use:
.e.ocou

£83 poogom
.coe.

"gonad poo‘om

.acou
.moosm p.904

menu Asa up—gu

ooo>
m.>ou
cue

.moosm .uoa
\ocou,u—_;u\cuo

“so-omeea
you

.coe.

you

.umu

0E0

muo—

non.
noo—
moa—

muo—

osm—

We:
a.
22

moo—
mom—
oo—

pump

cun—
auap
moo—
mco—
voo—

 

Eagleton
Gravel

L

L

LLLL
LLLLL

Harris

LLLL

L
L

C
L

L
L

LLLLL

Church
Melcher
Durkin
McIntyre
Biden
Leahy
Dodd

L

L

LLLL

L
L
L

L
L

L L L L L
L L L L L
L L L L L

Hartke

Proxmire
Burdick
Haskell
Riegle

Anderson (Minn.)

L

L

LLLLL
LLLLL

Magnuson

L
L
L

Jackson
McGee

L

LLLLL

L

?

L L

lnouye

Long (Haw.)
Matsunaga

L
L
L
L

L
L

LLLLL

Williams (N.J.)

Moss

L L L L L
L L L L L
L L L L L
L L L L L

L
L
L
L

Bayh

Pell

L

Pastore

LLLLL L

Ribicoff

J. Kennedy (Mass.)

Glenn

Stevenson
Gruening

LLL

LLL

LCL

LLL

LLL

L
L
L

L

L

Bartlett (Alsk.)

Morse

Hart (Colo.)

1117

 

«mead .uooa
muzxconua
.mncou oo.>com
passion:
ue.eaoc» ease»
acoum coo:

.=_o¢ou
"guess possum

.coe.
"cocoa pooeom

.ocou
.moo>m paaom

otao son u_.gu

ouu>
m.>ow
ow:

.moosm .mom
\ocou.vp_su\omo

1: sso-om.za
asu
.coe—
sag
.omu

0E0

 

ena—

moo—
noo—
coo—

mso—

eso—

_HMNG.
as.
was.

mea—
noo—
oa—

pum—

vsm—
aco—
wea—
moo—
voo-

 

L

L

L L L L L

McGovern

Abourezk

Cranston
Hughes

L

L

L L L L

McCarthy
Green

LCL
L L
L
L
L L
L
L L
LL
r
r e
e 0..
t r.
SEE
Hlb
890
The
BEN

Carroll

L

L L L L L

Young (0-)
Tunney

Smith (Mass.)
Muskie

Hathaway

L

R. Kennedy (N.Y.)

Hetzenbaum

McNamara

Humphrey

L
L
L
L

L

L L L L

Mondale

L
L L L L L

Tydings

L

Nelson

? L

L L

E. Kennedy (Hass.)

Sarbanes

Kefauver

L

L L L L

Yarborough

Clark (1a.)
Culver

L

?

L L L L

Hart (Mich.)
Douglas

Clark (Pa.)

108

 

.ueou umou
poo.nmo:

.uoscumcou
puu.amoz

——.m oceu_umt

nanosecoec
ocoowuo:

mm—u—u .umcoemo
ca: .eow
.uan 9:: .uwu

oc—mso:
—.t:oo

mo_m—mn:m
«so:
apostom
eo.uoo=vu
eovuoosom
Logo.:
ocean .nu .cuu
eo.uuosom
acumeouom
veg
agouequpw

mum—

asap
mco—
emo—
«cap
~oa—

mo—
woop

moo.

.ummo_

cam.
o_wo.
.lhgg.
48.
moo.
lawns.

 

eno—

noop
chap
moo—
_oo_
momm—
<owmp

 

C C C C C

C

C C C C

(Va.)

H. Byrd Sr.
H. Byrd Jr.
Robertson
Stennis

(Va.)

C C C C C
C C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C C

C

C C C C

L
L

C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C

C C C C C C

C
C
C

C C C C L C
C C C C L C
C C C L L C

Eastland

? C C C C L L

C

McClellan
Allen

C C C C C C L L
C C C C C C C C

C L C C C C C C

C C C C C
C C C C C

L C

?

C C C

Russell

L

C C C C L C
L C C L L C
L C C L L L
C C C L L C

Holland
Ervin

C C C C L
C C C C L

C
C
C

L L C C C C C L

Jordan (N.C.)
Talmadge

L

C L C C C C C C

C C C C L C C

Scott (Va.)
Thunnond
Tower

Helms

C

C C C C C C C C

C C C C C C C C

C C C C C C

C C C C

C

L

C

C

C
C

C C C C C

C C L C C C C C

C
C C C C C C

Goldwater
Curtis

C C C C C C ?

C

C C C C C

Simpson

Butler

Buckley

Garn

Laxalt

C

C L C C C C C C

C C C C C
C C C C C

C C C C C L C
C

C C C C C C

Williams (Del.)

Bennett

C

C L C C C C C C

C
C L C C C C C C

L

C
C C C C C

C

Dominick

L

C C C C

Hickenlooper

Hansen

L
C L C C C C C C

C L C C C L C C

C
C C C C C
C C C C

Fannin

C
C

C C C C L C

Hruska
Mundt

C

?

L C C L L

Hatch

Bartlett (Okla.)

Murphy

L

Gurney

109

 

.ocou smog
_aoiamoz

.uoacumeou
_as.amo=

—~_m memo—mot

mueoEveoe<
oc~o_not

mo.u.u .umcoemo
as: .coo
.uaoo 9:: .umm

ae.m=oz
_.ccow

3638...
any:
apostom
83.2.3

eo.uoo:uu
cues—x

mveam .um .eom
co.uuo:uu
acoucouom

can
acouemeopm

ano—

ema—
moo—
comp
vow—
Noa—

oo—
woo—
woo—
mcap

.lMNg.

Aka.
m.oo.
.xwpm.
imma—
can.
..moa_

 

cum—

noo—
oka—
mem—
poop
momm—
<ooa—

 

Mechem

Dworshak
Martin

McClure

L

C

L

Jordan (Ida.)
Bridges
Cotton

C
C C C L L

C

C L C C C C C L L

L L C C C C C C

L L L C C C C C

C C C C C C
C C L C C
C C C C C

?

C L C L

C C C L L C

Miller

C

Allott

Capehart
Brock

C
C C C L

Schoeppel
Dirksen
Lausche

L

?
C L L L C C L L

C L C C C C

C C L C C
C C C C C

L
C

C C C C

Zorinsky

C
L

C

Case (S.Dak.)

Wiley

cccnr.

Lugar

L

C L L L C C C C

C C C C C C C C

C C C C L L

Young (N.Dak.)

Hayakawa
Schmitt
Wallop
Roth

C

C

LCLC

CCCC

C L L C C C L L

C C C C C
C L L C C

L
L

C C L L
C C C C

Carlson

C C C C C C

?

C

C

Morton

Griffin

Domenici
Dole

C

Bush

Baker

Danforth

C C C C L L

L

C C C L

Saltonstall
Bellmon

L

C

L

Pearson
Stevens

C C C C C

1J1()

 

.scou smog
_.E.amo:

.auacumeou
pou.omo:

p——c oceu.vot

maeoeoeue<
used—9o:

woes—u .smeosoo
9:: .coa
.oauo 9:: .onu

ue.m:o:
—.ceou

uoLuemnmm
ac».
c.25com
co¢umuauw

eo.uuo:vu
toga—z

manna .vu .eom
eovuuuavu
mcooeooom

be.

meanness—u

mum—

osm—
mom—

voo—
wwop

oa—
oom—
moa—
moop

.lmws.

cam.
¢_oo_
..poo_
.lmaa_

 

[hwxwp
cum—

nom—
cem—
mwm—
pom—
coca—
«emo—

 

C C C L L C L L L C L C L L C C C C C L
L C L L

Ellender

Hill

L

?

C L C C C

C L C L L

CCCC

CLLC

Nunn

Stone

Bentsen

Chiles

Hollings
Morgan
Spong

DeConcini
Cook

Packwood

C C L L

L L C C C C L L

C

C C L L L
C C L L L

C L L L

L C L L L L

80995
Fong

L

C

C

C

Beall Sr.

Beall Jr.
Taft
Saxbe

C
C
L

L L C C L L L L
C L L C L C L L
L L L C C L L L
L L L C C C L L

C C L C C
C C L C C
L L L C C

L

C C L L
L L L L L C

Kuchel

Cooper

L L L L C L

Smith (Me.)
Prouty
Aiken

L

C C L C C

L L L C

C C L L L L

L L L L L L

L L L C C C L L

L

Chafee

L

L L L C C C L L

L L L L C C

C C C L L L

Scott (Pa.)
Heicker
Percy

Hatfield
Keating

C

L

L C C L

CCLC

LCLL

Stafford

Schweiker

Heinz

Mathias

L

L L L L L L L L L L L C L L L L

L C L L L L

Javits

Goodell

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L
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L L L L L L L
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L

C

C C L L L L

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Sparkman

Johnston (S.C.)

Johnston (La.)
Long (La.)

L

L L L C C C C C

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Fulbright
Smathers
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CCC

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Huddleston
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L

L C C C C L L C L L L L L L L L

L L L L L L

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Moynihan

Edmondson

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C C C L L
L L L C C L L L
L L C C L L L L
L L L L L L L L

L L L L

L L L L

L L L C C

L
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Monroney

L
L

L C C C L L C C
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Cannon
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L

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L

L

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L L L L L
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L

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L L L L L L

Hayden

L

L L L L L L L

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Randolph
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L

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Johnson (N.Mex.)

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L

L L L L L L L L
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L
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Murray

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Jackson
McGee

L L L L L L L L

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Long (Haw.)
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L
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L L L L L L L L

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L L L L L L L L

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L

L

L
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L

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Pastore

L L L L

L

L

L

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Ribicoff

L L

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J. Kennedy (Mass.)

Glenn

Stevenson
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L L L L L L L L
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L
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L

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Carroll

L

L L L L L L L C L L L L L L L L L L L

Young (04)
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Muskie

L

L L L L L L L L L

L L L L L L C

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L

R. Kennedy (N.Y.)

Metzenbaum
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L L L L L L L L

L L L L L L

L

L L L L

L L L L L L

L

L

Humphrey
Mondale
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L

L
L L L L
L L L L

L
L

L
L

L
L

L
L

L
L

L
L

Nelson

E. Kennedy (Mass.)

Sarbanes

L
L L L L L L

Kefauver

L

L L L L L L L L

L L L L

Yarborough

Clark (1a.)
Culver

L

L L L L L L L L

L L L L L L L

L L L L L L

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Hart (Mich.)

Douglas

L L L L L L L L
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L
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L L L L L L L L L

Clark (Pa.)

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H. Byrd Sr. (Va.)

(Va.)

H. Byrd Jr.

Robertson

Stennis

Eastland

McClellan
Allen

Russell

Holland
Ervin

4.

Jordan (N.C.)
Talmadge

Scott (Va.)
Thurmond

Tower

Helms

Goldwater
Curtis

Simpson
Butler

Buckley
Garn

Laxalt

Williams (Del.)

Bennett

Dominick

Hickenlooper

Hansen

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Mechem

Dworshak
Martin

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Jordan (lda.)
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Cotton

Miller

Allott

Capehart

Brock

Sc hoeppel
Dirksen
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Zorinsky

Case (S.Dak.)

Wiley

Lugar

Young (N.Dak.)

Hayakawa

Schmitt
Wallop
Roth

Carlson

Morton

Griffin

Domenici

Dole

Bush

Baker

Danforth

Saltonstall

Bellmon

Pearson

Stevens

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4mm: 1mg

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Ellender

Hill

Nunn

Stone

Bentsen
Chiles

Hollings

Morgan
Spong

DeConcini
Cook

Packwood
Boggs
Fong

Beall Sr.

Beall Jr.
Taft

Saxbe

Kuchel

Cooper

Smith (Me.)
Prouty
Aiken

Chafee

Scott (Pa.)
Weicker
Percy

L+

Hatfield
Keating

Stafford

Schweiker

Heinz

Mathias

Javits

Goodell

117

 

 

1mm: 1mg

 

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Brooke

Case

Sparkman

+

Johnston (S.C.)

Johnston (La.)
Long (La.)

Fulbright
Smathers
Frear

O'Mahoney
Hickey
Ford

Huddleston
Bumpers

Gore

Moynihan

Edmondson

Kerr

Monroney

R. Byrd (W.Va.)

Cannon
Bible

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Johnson

Sasser

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Eagleton

Gravel

Harris

Church

Melcher
Durkin

McIntyre
Biden
Leahy
Dodd

Hartke

Proxmire
Burdick
Haskell
Riegle

4.

Anderson (Minn.)

Magnuson

Jackson

McGee

Inouye

Long (Haw.)
Matsunaga

Williams (N.J )

Moss

Bayh
Pell

Pastore

Ribicoff

J. Kennedy (Mass.)

Glenn

Stevenson
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Bartlett (Alsk.)

Morse

Hart (Colo )

119

 

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Abourezk

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Muskie

Hathaway

R. Kennedy (N Y.)

Metzenbaum

McNamara

Humphrey
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Tydings

Nelson

.4.

F. Kennedy (Mass.)

Sarbanes

Kefauver

Yarborough

Clark (1a.)
Culver

Hart (Mich.)
Douglas

Clark (Pa.)

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5
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Air Pollut.

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H. Byrd Sr.
H. Byrd Jr.
Robertson
Stennis

C

C

C

L

(Va.)

Eastland

McClellan
Allen

C

L

Russell

Holland
Ervin

C

Jordan (N.C.)
Talmadge

Scott (Va.)
Thurmond

Tower

Helms

Goldwater
Curtis

Simpson
Butler

L

C

Buckley
Garn

Laxalt

C

Williams (Del.)

Bennett

Dominick

Hickenlooper

C
C
C

C

Hansen

Fannin

Hruska
Mundt

Hatch

Bartlett (0kla.)

Murphy
Gurney

121

 

Rev.
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m .
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Mechem

Dworshak
Martin

McClure

Jordan (Ida.)
Bridges
Cotton

Miller

Allott

Capehart

C

Brock

Sc hoeppel
Dirksen
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Case (S.Dak.)

Wiley

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C
L

L
L

C

L

Young (N.Dak.)

Hayakawa
Schmitt
Wallop

Lugar
Roth

Carlson

Morton

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Domenici

Dole

C

C

Bush

C

Baker

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C

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Ellender

Hill

C

Nunn

Stone

C

C C C C

Bentsen
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C
L

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C C

Morgan

C

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DeConcini
Cook

C
C

?

L L L C

Packwood

Boggs
Fong

L

Beall Sr.

L

C

Beall Jr.
Taft

L

C

Saxbe

Kuchel

Cooper

Smith (Me.)
Prouty
Aiken

Chafee

L
L L L C

Scott (Pa.)
Weicker
Percy

C

7

L L L
L L L C

C

C
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Hatfield

Keating

L

C L C C

Stafford

Schweiker
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C

Mathias

L L L L

Javits

Goodell

1J213

 

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Air Pollut.

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L

Brooke

Case

Sparkman
Johnston (S.C.)

L

Johnston (La )

Long (La.)

Fulbright
Smathers

Frear
O’Mahoney

Hickey
Ford

Huddleston
Bumpers
Gore

Moynihan

Edmondson

Kerr

Monroney

4.

L

R. Byrd (H.Va.)

Cannon
Bible
Anderson

L

(N.Mex.)

Chavez

Hayden

Randolph
Montoya

C

Johnson
Sasser

Bass

L

Symington

Long (Mo.)
Mansfield

C

Metcalf

Murray

124

 

 

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.50.. tau:— Nsm— C L ? C C L C C C C ? L L C L 7 L L L
902...qu :2 C L C C L C C C C C C C L L C C C C C
:2 C L C C C C L C L L L L C L C C C C C
hmm
as C L C C C L C C C L 1. L L C L C C C C
yous”. Nap L L L L C L L C L L L L L C C C
9:5: nvsum nap ? L l L L L L ? L L L ? L L C L L L L L
n 50—00 23 C C L L L 9. L L C C ? C L C L C L L 1.
Cali
AP $08.37;; p.3— L C L L L C L L L L L L L L L L L
.yoeoa him—z moo— L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
.yo—poa Loam: mm: L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
. cocoon-h camp C C C L C ? L ? L C L L L C C L L L L ? L L
t
10. :32: @3— C C L L C ? L ? L C L L L C C L C L L L L C C
1
% 532.86....
T 1:02 oso— L L L L L L L L L L L L L L ? L C L L L L L L
i
A $323 Ea— L L L L L L L L L L L ? L L L o ? L L
whouuumc s sm— . + . . + + ? + + . + + + . . o. + + . + + + .
.5293. 8.. L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
l \d )
~ ) “ ks
n n
.m J. m h.
m. ) W ( m.
w a m. n
n e e n n a g S f e 0 g L
0 r. r r 1K TI 0 0 n H a m e f n S n f.
t .l S .n e n V. e .l C 1.. e S S 0 e l\ n d r O n n .l e
e e .l C h .1. t n y (K m .1 e .l r. U S e V. u .1. 0 C e n e n «I e
l v r r C .K n e h d t x d .K 0. e n .K .W u 9 S .I S h .I t .l K n V e t S
wouMirIduwrmwsnmmc mmtisyisb emu...
E G H C W. m R B L D m P B ”m R A M h k l. L m m M M W. h m J. m S .M. k M

Hart (Colo.)

0

Rev.
Shar.

125

Air Pollut.

 

.yoonu «no:
-.mou p—osm

. .yoeoxm .eoou

y'aeocy

mus:

mono. mezzo—z
a...

.ymeoc» moo:
was.

«too.

.eLo. .ym.a

335.3

hmm

yomeou
33...... 2....

_H a...
sensor...

333.. .33....
.yo—poa coy-3
cocooo»
e33:
-eoyyooocmoo
188

m—oooo<
neoyooog
coo—ooz

usa—
sump

mnop
num—
@—

moa—
Nnup
mum—
msm—

puop

m...
a.

Nom—
asa—

nna—
muo—

mom.
mum.

usa—
usu—

usa—
enm—

_N...
8.

L
L
L

C
C
C

4.

(0.)
E. Kennedy (Mass.)

R. Kennedy (N.Y.)
Sarbanes

Smith (Mass.)
Metzenbaum

Neuberger
Muskie
Yarborough
Clark (1a.)
Culver

Hart (Mich.)
Douglas
Clark (Pa.)

McGovern
Abourezk
Cranston
Hughes
McCarthy
Green
Brewster
Engle
Carroll
Young
Tunney
Hathaway
McNamara
Humphrey
Mondale
Tydings
Nelson
Kefauver

 

14265

 

.m3t..y:<

seem no-ou
.lfieou .y-z

.yooyoca
you oeypcy<

.oo¢-oo
oeypcye

myommm yuouocm

m—oooy co
.ye-oo venue-am

August

...o.3t.
.538

ypouu o:

.oyeu uneven
..=.o..3.
.sueou 3.35
nucoeu .euu

.=.=3...¢
.m :82 now.“
_m .uu...
r. .meoyxu

usa—
usu—
unm—

osm—
~50—

cum,
.sta—

and...
c...
.1....
o...

 

usa—

man—
may

num—

cau—
nua—
pso—

 

(Va.)
H. Byrd Jr. (Va.)

H. Byrd Sr.
Robertson

C

L

L

L
L
C

Stennis

Eastland

McClellan
Allen

C

Russell

Holland
Ervin

C

L

Jordan (N.C.)

Talmadge

C
C
C

Scott (Va.)
Thurmond

C

Tower

Helms

C
C

Goldwater
Curtis

Simpson
Butler

C

Buckley

Garn

Laxalt

Williams (Del.)

Bennett

C
C

Dominick

Hickenlooper

Hansen

C

C
C

Fannin

Hruska
Mundt
Hatch

C

C

Bartlett (Okla.)

Murphy

Gurney

.1237

 

Wage-Price

ymoLy—yc<

some oo-ou
.538 you

..o..ot.
3o. oc....<

.uoulua
oeyyc.<
myoyom yooooca

n.0ouo co
..=aoo agave...

aoeom<

.yooyoco
.someou

y—oou oz

.oyeu aucoeu
..=.o..3.
.smeou aucueu

nausea .eou

.e.eo...¢

uou

\uoco< oo.cc
.8...
.meuyxu

Control

uno—
amo—
muo—

oxap
mum—

comp

eso—
[Inha—

.um...
....

Us.

asap

 

asap

WNW...
.m.
n...
....

mxo—
pump

 

Mechem

Dworshak

Martin

McClure

L

Jordan (Ida.)
Bridges
Cotton

C

Miller

C

Allott

Capehart

C

Brock

Schoeppel

Dirksen

Lausche

Zorinsky

Case (S.Dak.)

Wiley

Lugar

C

L

Young (N Oak.)

Hayakawa

Schmitt
Wallop
Roth

Carlson

Morton

C

Griffin

Domenici
Dole

C

Bush

C

Baker

Danforth

Saltonstall

Bellmon

Pearson

C

Stevens

128

 

Wage-Price

Control

ymocy—yc<

xeou oo-ou
.533 .yuz

.yuuyoca
you ocy—c—<

..o¢-oo
2. I...

1...... .38...

..oa~u co
.53.. 2.3.5..

aoeoo<

.yooyoca
.someou

y—o-u o:

.oye. aucoeu
moeyv—.ou
.oaeou uneven

aucoew .euu

2.8....
uou

\ooco< so...
you—om
.mcoyxu

unm—
asap
unm—

mum—
~50—

coop

:2
[:2
1m...
:2
[:2

usa—

 

usa—

m...
.2
:2
:2

muo—
pum—

 

C

Ellender

Hill

Nunn

Stone

C

Bentsen
Chiles

L
C

Hollings
Morgan
Spong

DeConcini

Cook

C
C

Packwood

Boggs
Fong

C

Beall Sr.

C
C

Beall Jr.
Taft

Saxbe

Kuchel

Cooper

Smith (Me )
Prouty
Aiken

C

Chafee

C
C
C
C

L

Scott (Pa.)
Heicker
Percy

Hatfield

Keating

Stafford

C

Schweiker

Heinz

L
L

Mathias

Javits

Goodell

129

 

Hage-Price

Control

umzsu_uc<

scum ao-ou
.523 .32

.uuouosn
sea uc——L.<

.nuzuoo
ocvpg.<

hummum uuzvosa

upona. co
.ucoac vL-vcoum

aucuo<

.uuouogs
.namcou

apnea 0:

.o»:_ gunmen

mu=.u__=m
.>mcou ausocm

ungocm .cuu

oc.co...¢

ugu

\vogu< ouvsa
woo—om
.mcuuxu

mum—
osm—
asap

mum—
~50—

oom—

chu—

LINK.—

film...
e...
.um...

eso—

 

usa—

NH”...
so.
a...
eta.

mum—
ps¢p

 

C
L
C

Brooke
Case

Sparkman

Johnston (S.C.)

L
L

L
L

Johnston (La.)
Long (La.)

Fulbright
Smathers
Frear

O'Mahoney
Hickey
Ford

Huddleston
Bumpers
Gore

Moynihan

Edmondson

Kerr

Monroney

L

C
L
C

L

R. Byrd (H.Va.)

Cannon
Bible

L

Anderson (N.Mex.)

Chavez

L
L

Randolph
Montoya

Hayden

Johnson
Sasser
Bass

Symington

Long (Mo.)
Mansfield
Metcalf

L
L

Murray

1:3(l

 

Hage-Price

Control

.mst...c<

scum colou
.ssmcou .uaz

.uuouOLa
now oc_psv<

.ao¢-oo
o:.—L.<

588.88:
«_uaa. co

..=.=c vague...

sucuo<
..uo.oca
.nsmcou

u—aou 0:

.ouc. magnum
moc_u—_:a
.sucou sugoeu

awsocu .cou

u=.=o....

ado
\oogo< ou.eg

ans—om
.mco.xu

asap
muo—
muo—

asa—
-o—

coo—

'No—

film...

..m.a.
c...

film...

eso—

 

osm—

HUN...
.0.
a...
.Na.

mma—
psa—

 

L
L

Eagleton

Gravel

Harris

L

Church
Melcher

Durkin
McIntyre

L

Biden

Leahy
Dodd

?
C
L

Hartke

Proxmire
Burdick
Haskell
Riegle

Anderson (Minn.)

L
L
I.
L

Magnuson

Jackson
McGee

Inouye

Long (Haw.)

Matsunaga

L L

L

Hilliams (N.J.)

Moss

L
L
L

Bayh
Pell

L
L

Pastore

Ribicoff

J. Kennedy (Mass.)

Glenn

L

Stevenson
Gruening

Bartlett (Alsk.)

Morse

Hart(Colo.)

1J3].

 

Rage-Price
Control

umaguwucd

scum 30.09
.528 .uoz

.uoouoca
non uc——L—<

.uuuluo
mc——L.<

s....m ..:uota

m—unoa co
.ucnac uuaucoum
Aucoa<

.uuouOLa
.ssucou

._=.. oz

.o»c~ magnum

ma=.u_.=o
.>m:ou Augueu

3.55 .59

ae.=o_..¢

gag

\uouo< ou.ga
«um—om
.mcouxu

oump
asap
who—

who—
~50—

noo—

e...
..n~m.
..m~o_
v...
run...

asu—

 

asap

HUM...
no.
n.9—
«so.

mam—
pum—

 

L

McGovern

Abourezk

C

Cranston

L

Hughes

McCarthy
Green

Brewster

Engle
Neuberger
Carroll

Young (0.)
Tunney

C

Smith (Mass.)
Muskie

L

Hathaway

R. Kennedy (N.Y.)

Metzenbaum

McNamara

L
C

Humphrey

Mondale

Tydings

L
L L L

Nelson

?

E. Kennedy (Mass.)

Sarbanes '

Kefauver

Yarborough

Clark (1a.)
Culver

L

L

Hart (Mich.)
Douglas

Clark (Pa.)

132

 

moon Lon: mazgouu:
«susguuo:

.v:u2<

«ago: .aan ”cue
——_n .aeu suao>
.mngou .mcou guao>
.pasoeox uuu<

 

n.3uupoan<
.cs 32.5.
l .28
.3
.25
5
.n .m—
0
u a...
C
H .28
b
m :3
.3
r. 32
i3 .55 "mm
.5... .8. .8»
3:... 5 =8 .3
0L8~ 098 .8“
.35 .uom .uom
..=u acne.
7.38
.xugam a
.3. .ueoam
ms uzu
mm .3 328
km”. .3

osm—
usu—

swo—
noo—
noo—
«cop
moop
cum—
“sa—
sum—
chap
osm—
psa—
—~o—
mom—
mwop
noop
sump
sump

aco—
mom—

ma.

moo—
wsmp
awa—
soo—

 

C C

C

(Va.)

H. Byrd Sr.
H. Byrd Jr.
Robertson

L C C C C C C

C

C C C C C

(Va.)

C C

C
C C L L L L L C L C L C C C

C C
C C

L
L

C
C

L
L

C C C C
C C C C
L C L C

Stennis

? C C C

9
C L L L L C C C L

C C L ? ? L L C L

?

Eastland
McClellan
Allen

C C

C

?

L L C L C L

C C

Russell
Holland
Ervin

L C

C
L L L L L

C C

C L L C

C C

L L L C L L L L L
C C L C L L L L L L L L L L

Jordan (N.C.)
Talmadge

CLL

CLL

C
C C C
C

C C
C C

C C C C C

C C C C C C C C C C L C C C

7 L
C C
C

L
C
C

C C C C
C C C C

C L C L

Scott (Va.)
Thurmond

C C C C C C C C C C C C C C

C

L

Tower

Helms

C

Goldwater
Curtis

C

C C

C L C C C C C C C C C C C C

C C

C

C C C C

C C

C

Simpson
Butler

L

Buckley

Garn

C C C C C
C C C C C

Laxalt

C C
C C

C
C C C L C

C

C

Hilliams (Del.)

Bennett

C
L

C C C C

C C C C C C C

C C C C

C

Dominick

C C

C

Hickenlooper

L C C C C C C

?

C

L

cccc
cccc
ccc.c

Hansen

C L C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C ?

Fannin

C C

?

C

Hruska

Mundt
Hatch

?

C

Bartlett (Okla.)

Murphy

Gurney

1433

wood gum: moguouax
32:35

.u=.e<
.xto: .aaa "cuo

——.n .nau gaze»
.mnsou .mcou gaze»
.—u>uvu¢ oos<

 

..gu...aa«
.—b:~ ”3a:utsz
in. mung
use
5 .o=~
.n ....
0
H 30>
.n .
um Leo.
N :3
uau
rll pout
.n.. .cL-u "mm
.c—u .uum .uom

.....m x.. so. ..
.Loc~ .uom .uom

Cup: .93 Jon
muse ucoam
p.5cuu

.xusam a
.3. .ueaam

.3.
.a. .....a
.3.

9

m

Spend

 

asa—
sam—

nom—
nom—
nam—
nam—
moo—
nuo.
usa—
sum—
@50—
ema—
psa—
psa—
moa—
moo—
nea—
una—
Nua—

awo—
“oo—

_wao.

mom—
Ngu—
man—
“no.

 

Mechem

Dworshak
Martin

?

C C C C

McClure

C C C C C C C

C C L C

Jordan (Ida )
Bridges
Cotton

C C

C C L C C
C C C C C
C C C C C

C C C L

C C

C C C C

Miller

C C

C

Allott

Capehart

C C L C

Brock

Schoeppel

C C

C
C

Dirksen

C C

Lausche

L

Zorinsky

Case (S.Dak.)

Hiley

CLCCCL

CLCCCL

L

C C C C C C C C C C C

Lugar

C C C

C

?

L L

L

C C C L

Young (N.Dak.)

C C 9.
C L C
c C C
7. c C
7. c C
C L C
a
w t
a L p
u .1 o
1
Va m 1|
m c a
S ”I

C C C C C C C

Roth

C C

C
C

Carlson
Horton

C C

C C C C C L C

?

L C C C

Griffin

L

C C C C C C C

Domenici

Dole

Bush

LCCLCCLC‘.’

C

C

?

c c c “c

Baker

C L L

Danforth

Saltonstall

Bellmon

? C C C L L C

7 C C L C C C C L L C C C

L

C C

?

C

Pearson

L L C L C L C

Stevens

134

 

 

38 Law: .3353; @8— c c L c L ? L L C L c L c L L c c c
Eastman: :2 CLCCLC L L c CLL CLLCCC
6:95
muse: .aan "OUO Nap C C L L L L C L L L L
:3 .3 53> nap C C C L C L L L C C L L L
69.3 .28 5:0» 32 C c L c C L c C c C c c
.—o>ovu¢ 35¢ nap C C L C C L L L L L t L
252.32 moo— C C L L L L L L L L L
.CE "33...; aa— C C C C C C C C C C C C C C L C C
l mu: :2 L L L L L C L L L L ? L L L L L L
0:9 :2 C L L C C C L C ? L ? L L C L L L
s .vcw @3— C L L L L L L L L L o L C L L L L L
.m .um— @3— L L L L L L C C L L C L L L L L L L
n”. 30> :2 L L L L C C C C C C L C C L C C L C L
W .259 :a— C L L L L C C C C C C C C C C ? C C C C L 7 C
Pu :3 no: L L L L L L L L
uau map L L L L C C L C C C C
l 32 noo— L C L L C L C ? C L L C
.5... .53 "mm “mg. L C L L L C ? C L o. C L L L L L L
.5... .03 .oom :3 ? C ? C C C ? C C ? C C. L C C C C
3.2.3 x2. :3 3
33:— .uom .8» mm: C L L L L L L C L C L L L C L L L L C
.59: .uvm .UOm soo— L L L C C o C o L L L L C L L
35 9.on «3— C C L L L L C L L L L C L L C L L
a... m
.xuuzm a
“no .vcoom moo— L ? C C C C C C C C C L C
uau was. C C C C C C L L o C C L C L C C L L L L
mum. .39 30—09 mm: L L C C C C C C C C C C C C C
kw... .59 30— L L C C C L C C L C L C C L C
r s .m a r. r. m m. a d a
w M. S M. n .U m S J l r {x V. e (\ H 1M. M. M W 5 S 1l.
mummmmmmmmummwmmnmmmmmmmmmmmmnmmmmm
l l u t h 0 o P 0 O 0 e u o r .1 a
EHNS&CHMSMCNBFRBHQchPAflkkfln—dmfifikkhpw

 

135

 

moon Com: aaxguuo:
whoxuouo:

.ecue<
mxgo: .oaa "cu:
._.n .nsu case»

.mnuou .mcou z.:o»
.posovoz uoL<

 

upguo—ona<
.cs "3.2.5:
In 3:.
uzu
s .vcm
.n ....
O
H 3..»
c
H 4:8
.0
W S E
uau
l 33
.E*a .cguu ”mm

.5...— .uom .uom
3:... 5 =8 3
.Luc_ .uom .uom
.35 .uom .uom
muau ecoam

pip-58

.x.L=m a
.39 .ocanm

.3
.5. o....o
.8

9

m

Spend

asap
sno—

soap
moa—
moa—
nam—
moo—
asap
~55.
ssmp
asap
ana—
psa—
psa—
moo—
mwa—
nau—
usu—
sno—

mom—
swa—

flflwwa.

woo—
Nsm—
wom—
som—

 

C ? L L L L L

L L C C L L L L L L L L L L

C C L C

Brooke
Case

L L

L
L

L
?

L C L C

C C

L

?

L L L L L L L L L C L

L

L C C C

Sparkman

Johnston (S.C.)

C L L L L
L C L L L L L L

L

Johnston (La.)
Long (La.)

C L
C C
L C

L L L L L L ?

L

L L C L

?

?

L L

L L L

Fulbright
Smathers
Frear

O'Mahoney

Hi:key
Ford

LLL

LLL

L L L L L

?

L L L L

Huddleston
Bumpers

L L C L L

L L

Gore

Moynihan

Edmondson

Kerr

C C

L
L L L L L L L C L L L L L L

?

Monroney

L L
L L
L L

L

L
L

L C C L L

R. Byrd (w.Va.)

Cannon
Bible

L L L L L L L L L L L L L

L

L L L L L L
L L L L L

C L L L

L L C L

L L

Anderson (N.Mex.)

Chavez

L L

Hayden

L

L C L L L L L L L L L L L L L L

L

L L C C L

Randolph
Montoya

L L L L L L

L L C C

Johnson

Sasser
Bass

L L

L L L L L L L

L

C C L C

Symington

L L
L L
L L

L
L L L L L L L

L L L L L L L L L L L

Long (Mo.)

L C L L

Mansfield
Metcalf

L

L

L

L

Hurray

14365

 

moon Low: maszuo:
mauygouu:

.ucmse
...o: .n:. Home

__.n .as. e.=o»
.mugou .mcou guao>
.—u>ovo¢ uoL<

 

..gu...aa<
.—uc_ "xaxlzsx
an: nuns
uau
s .u=~
.n da—
nm 3n»
.n
m .28
.m ....
uau
II: puu<
.s.. .=L.. "mm
.:.m .uow .uOm

....;m x.. cum av
do... .uom .8»

.Lu:_ .uom .uom

nuau venom

—.Lcue

.xusam a

.su .ucoam

- uau

n..m .3 338
a m

c. use

asu—
num—

soap
nom—
nom—
noo—
moo—
ano—
sump
unm—
oump
osm—
psa—
—~m—
mam—
moo—
noo—
sna—
smo—

aca—
snap

_waa_

moo—
wuo—
wom—
soo—

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Clark (Pa.)

144

Survey of the Voting Records

 

.lgtroduction

The votes, and the alignment patterns they produced, may now
be examined, grouped according to issue area. When a number of
votes in a given area are similar enough in their substance and in
the alignments of those voting for them, then they will be considered
collectively. Senators will be separated into those who were always
on the one side of the issue (when they voted), those who were
always on the other side (when they voted) and those who were some-
times on the one side and sometimes on the other. This will mean
different things in the case of different votes. For example, on
spending issues, Senators may be identified as consistent supporters
of high or of low spending, or as those with mixed voting records.
Votes on other kinds of issues would be described analogously.

(Later, after these voting alignments have been surveyed,
"conservative" and "liberal” sides will be identified for most of
them. Consequently, in the case of most issue areas, the Senators
will be divided into consistent conservatives, consistent liberals,
and moderates.)

In the case of each issue area examined, the Senators will
be considered as members of the groups discussed earlier (conserva-
tive and liberal Republicans, conservative Northern, 01d Southern,
New Southern and liberal Democrats). When, as usually happens, a
clear majority of a group is on a given side of a set of issues, it

will be simply noted that most of them are on that side. Only the

145

minority, the deviants, will be named individually. In some cases,

an individual has not taken stands on enough of the votes in a set

to state firmly where he belongs, yet there may be reason to believe,
on the basis of those votes on which he has taken a position (and
sometimes on the basis of his votes on other issues, and other facts),
that he can be placed on one side or another. We may note these as
"perhaps" belonging to a given side.

The following abbreviations will be used below: CR (Conser-
vative Republican), CND (Conservative Northern Democrat), OSD (Old
South Democrat), NSD (New South Democrat), LR (Liberal Republican),
and LD (Liberal Democrat).

The votes that were finally selected fell in the following
areas: income taxes; tariffs; general spending; revenue sharing;
public works (including public works jobs, Area Redevelopment, aid
to Applachia and youth employment, among other issues); water
projects; social security; labor issues (including unemployment
compensation, union legislation, minimum wages and food stamps for
strikers); food stamps; Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC); the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0), legal services,
child care, the School Lunch Program, Youth Training and the Nat-
ional Service Corps; housing (including rent subsidies, Demonstration
Cities, etc.); education aid; health (including Medicare, etc.);
general appropriations for the Departments of Labor and HEW; collec-
tive bargaining on railroads; aid to local mass transit; the Super-

sonic Transport (SST), Lockheed and the Communications Satellite

146

company; wage and price controls; fuel rationing and the Federal
Energy Administration (PEA); no-fault insurance; antitrust law, air-
line deregulation; consumer protection; the National Consumer
Cooperative Bank; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA); and environmental protection (including pollution, strip-

mining and Alaska pipeline); and nuclear energy.

Income Taxes

 

147

The first issue area to consider is that of income taxes.

The first vote in this area is that on the 1962 tax bill, which cut

various income taxes, including some business taxes.

FOR

most LDs

most OSDs

most LRs

CRs Mundt, Jordan (Ida.),
Cotton, Allott, Capehart,
Dirksen, Wiley, Carlson
and Martin

CND Lausche

The 1964 income tax bill
tax cut.
FOR

most LDs

most LRs

OSDs Holland, Robertson,
Jordan (N.C.), Eastland and
Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs

CND Lausche

OSDs Stennis and Russell

LRs Saltonstall and Keating

LDs Hart (Mich.), Douglas, Clark
(Pa.) Neuberger, Gore, Yarborough,
MacNamara, Morse, Bartlett (Alsk.)
Gruening and Burdick

was a general personal and corporate

AGAINST

most CRs

CND Lausche

OSDs Harry Byrd Sr., Ervin, Russell,
Stennis and McClellan

LRs Aiken

LDs Ellender, Proxmire and Neuberger

In 1968 a bill was passed providing for a spending cut

coupled with a surtax.

FOR

most LDs

LR Hatfield

OSD Talmadge

CRs Cotton and Young (N.Dak.)

In 1969, an amendment to

ing the surtax for one-half year.

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

CND Lausche

most LRs

LDs Sparkman and Gore

another bill was proposed extend-

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case, Aiken and
Hatfield
most OSDs

148

AGAINST

most CR3

most LRs

LDs Robert Byrd (W. Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Williams (N.J.), Young (0.)
and Nelson

Later in 1969, an income tax bill was passed which increased

personal taxation of the wealthy, decreased that of most other groups,

and increased the tax liability of businesses. It also provided an

increase in social security benefits of 15% with an increase in

social security taxes.
FOR

unst LDs
most LRs
most OSDs
CRs Young (N.Dak.) and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs

OSDs Russell and Holland

LRs Smith (Me.), Saxbe, Percy and
Brooke

Another vote concerning this bill was on an amendment to

increase the exemption.
FOR

most LDs

LRs Cook, Fong, Aiken, Prouty
and Hatfield

CRs Young (N.Dak.) and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs
most LRs
OSDs Russell, Holland and Harry
Byrd Jr.

A.vote from 1971 was on reducing the depreciation allowance.

FOR

most LDs
LR Case
OSD Stennis

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
most LRs
LDs Pastore and Ribicoff

Another vote on the same bill is on an amendment equalizing the

tax rate for single and married persons.

149

FOR AGAINST

CRs Allott, Young (N.Dak)., most CRs

Griffin, Dole and Baker most OSDs

OSD McClellan LRs Bellman, Cook, Boggs, Beall,
LRs Pearson, Stevens, Packwood, Taft, Saxbe, Smith (Me.), Prouty,
Fong, Weicker, Hatfield, Aiken, Scott (Pa.), Percy, Mathias,
Schweiker and Brooke Javits and Case (N.J.)

NSD Chiles NSDs Bentsen, Hollings and Spong
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long most LDs

(La.), Fulbright, Byrd (W.Va.),
Cannon, Bible, Anderson (N.Mex),
Randolph, Montoya, Mansfield,
Church, Williams (N.J.), Percy,
Young (0) and E. Kennedy

(Mass.)

The 1975 tax bill cut personal and corporate taxes.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

most LRs most OSDs

most NSDs LRs Bellman, Pearson and Hatfield
CRs Buckley, Brock, Dole, LD Mansfield

Domenici and Roth

The first 1976 tax vote was on killing a motion to recommit
the tax bill of that year to committee, with instructions to report
it back with only the personal tax benefits still in it. To oppose
the motion was to vote in favor of making the bill consist of
personal tax relief only.

FOR HAVING PERSONAL RELIEF ONLY AGAINST HAVING PERSONAL RELIEF ONLY

most LDs most CRs

most NSDs most OSDs

LRs Scott (Pa.), Weicker, most LRs

Mathias, Brooke and Javits LDs Byrd (W. Va.), Cannon, Bible,
CRs Tower, Laxalt, Garn, Randolph, Johnston (La.), Long
Helms, McClure, Domenici and (La.), Sparkman, Matsunaga, Inouye,
Baker Jackson, Magnuson, McGee, Ribicoff,

Pastore, Cranston and Burdick

150

Another tax vote was one from 1976 on tax credits for cor-

porations for taxes paid to foreign governments. The vote was on

reconsidering an amendment to reduce the effective benefits to the

companies.
FOR

most LDs

NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings,
Huddleston and Bumpers

LRs Schweiker, Brooke and
Case (N.J.)

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

most LRs

NSDs Bentsen, Stone, Morgan,
Johnston (La.) and Ford

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Randolph,
Gravel, Biden, McGee, Inouye,
Williams (N.J.) and Pell

The 1977 tax vote was on an amendment which would have made

a permanent tax cut for people with incomes under $20,000.

FOR

most CRs

CND Zorinsky

most LRs

LDs Biden, McIntyre, Durkin,
Riegle and Proxmire

AGAINST

most LDs

most NSDs

most OSDs

CRs Scott (Va.) and Young (N.D.)
LR Hatfield

Next, we have a 1978 tax cut vote on an amendment which

would have made a permanent tax cut for people with incomes under

$50,000.
FOR

most LDs

NSDs Ford, Huddleston, and
Bumpers

LRs Percy, Packwood, Schweiker,
Brooke and Case (N.J.)

CRs Helms, Thurmond, McClure,
Domenici, Dole and Griffin

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

LRs Packwood, Chafee, Weicker,
Mathias, and Javits

NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles, Hollings,
Johnston (La.) and Morgan

151

Another vote on the 1978 tax bill was on the Kemp-Roth
amendment, which provided for a 30% across-the-board personal tax

cut over a three-year period (beginning in 1979).

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CRs

most LRs NSD Nunn and Johnston (La.)

most NSDs LRs Bellman, Stevens, Schweiker,
most OSDs Packwood, Chafee, Percy and Heinz

LDs Proxmire, Sparkman, and Gravel
Still another vote on the 1978 bill was an amendment to cut

the corporate tax rate from 48% to 44%.

AGAINST NSDs Nunn, Stone, Chiles,

most LDs Bentsen, Ford and Johnston (La.)
NSDs Huddleston and Bumpers most LRS

OSDs Stennis, Eastland and LDS DEConcini, Cannon, Moynihan,
Talmadge Sparkman, Proxmire, Sasser, Biden,

Durkin, Leahy, Riegle, Anderson
FOR (Minn.), Gravel, Hart (Colo.),

mOSt CR3 Eagleton, Ribicoff, Williams and
OSD H. Byrd Jr. Inouye

CND Zorinsky

Tariff Issues

 

Another issue area is related to tariff protection, or at
least to executive discretion in lowering tariffs. One of the votes
was on a proposed amendment to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, to
preserve the requirement that the President inform Congress if he

cuts tariffs below a "peril point" determined by the Tariffs Com—

mission.

FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL POWER
most LDs most CRs

OSDs Holland and Jordan (N.C.) most OSDs

most LRs
LDs Cannon, Bible, Church and Dodd

152

The other vote was a 1974 vote involving cloture on a bill

to allow the President to negotiate trade agreements on lower trade

barriers.

FOR CLOTURE ON PRESIDENTIAL AGAINST CLOTURE ON PRESIDENTIAL
POWER POWER

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, mast CR3

McClellan, Allen and Ervin most NSDs Nunn and Hollings

CR3 Gurney and McClure mast LRs

LRs Schweiker and Case (N.J.) OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and
NSDs Chiles Talmadge

LDs Bible, Cannon, Metcalf,
Hartke, Bayh, Abourezk,
Muskie, Hart (Mich.) and
Proxmire

General Spending

 

We have several votes on this topic from the late 19603 and
early 19703 and another from 1978. Considering the former votes
first, we see that there is one on a spending cut in 1967, another
on a spending cut coupled with the imposition of a temporary surtax
in 1968 (see above), another on an amendment to this last proposal
that would remove the spending cut provision from it, and one on
giving the president power to cut the budget in certain areas, from
1972. We may consider separately the proposal from 1968 which
coupled the spending cut with a surtax. Considering the other three
(from 1967, 1968 and 1972) together, we can see that the following

alignment exists.

AGAINST ALL THREE CUTS HAVING A MIXED RECORD

most LDs CRs Jordan (Ida.) and Griffin
NSDs Hollings and Spong OSDs McClellan, Holland, Ervin,
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Jordan (N.C.) and Talmadge

Fulbright, Gore, Byrd (W.Va.), LRs Fong, Smith (Me.),Aiken,

153

AGAINST ALL THREE CUTS HAVING A MIXED RECORD

Cannon, Bible, Anderson(N} MexJ.‘Hatfield, Javits, Brooke and Case
Randolph, Montoya, Symington, (N.J.) and perhaps Weicker, Stafford,
Mansfield, Church, McIntyre, Schweiker and Mathias

Hartke, Pastore, Ribicoff,

McGovern, McCarthy and Nelson

FOR ALL THREE CUTS

most CRs

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.),
Stennis, Eastland (and perhaps
Russell and Allen)

perhaps CND Lausche

LRs Boggs, Cooper, Scott (Pa.)
and Percy (and perhaps Bellman,
Pearson, Kuchel and Prouty)

LD Proxmire

The 1968 proposal for a spending cut coupled with a surtax

was already discussed above under taxes, but we shall repeat the

findings.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CR3

LR Hatfield most OSDs
OSD Talmadge CND Lausche

CR3 Cotton and Young (N.Dak.) most LRs
LD Sparkman and Gore

The remaining vote on general spending is from 1978, and

is an amendment to a budget bill.

AGAINST FOR

CR Goldwater. Laxalt. Tower. CR3 Curtis, Helms, Scott (Va.),
Bartlett. Hansen. Young (N.Dak-) Thurmond, Hatch, McClure, Lugar and
and Dale Roth

OSDs Eastland, Stennis, and CND Zorinsky

Talmadge OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and Allen
mast LRs LRs Hatfield and Heinz

NSDs Bentsen, Chiles, Hollings, NSDs Nunn, Stone, Ford and Huddleston
Morgan, Johnston (La.) and LDs DeConcini, Sasser, Durkin,
Bumpers McIntyre, Biden, Leahy, Proxmire,
most LDs Haskell, Hart (Colo.), McGovern,

Church, Nelson and Metzenbaum

Revenue Sharing

 

154

In this area are several votes on the 1972 bill establishing

revenue sharing. One was a proposed amendment setting the amount of

revenue shared at $8,100,000.000 in the first two years and requiring

annual congressional approval of it in fiscal years 1974-77.

FOR

CRs Dominick, Hruska, Gurney,
Cotten, Allott, Young (N.Dak.)
and Roth

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, Ervin,
Jordan (N.C.), McClellan and
Allen

LRs Pearson, Stevens, Boggs,
Fang, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Bible,
Symington, Mansfield, Metcalf,
Gravel, Burdick, Magnuson,
Jackson, McGee, Inouye,
Williams (N.J.), Bayh, Pell,
Pastore and Ribicoff

AGAINST

CR3 Thurmond, Tower, Buckley, Curtis,
Bennett, Fannin, Jordan (Ida.), Miller,
Hansen, Brock, Griffin, Dale and Baker
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and

Talmadge

most LRs

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Fulbright,
Cannon, Anderson (N.Mex.), Randolph,
Montoya, McIntyre, Hartke, Proxmire,
Riegle, Moss, Stevenson, McGovern,
Cranston, Hughes, Muskie, Humphrey,
Mondale, Tunney, E. Kennedy (Mass.)
and Hart (Mich.)

Another vote was an amendment regarding the distribution of

aid. The amendment proposed an increase in the share going to

populous, urbanized states.
FOR

LDs Bible, Gravel, Williams
(N.J.), Ribicoff, Inouye, Bayh,
Pastore, Hartke, Stevenson,
Cranston, Tunney, E. Kennedy
(Mass.) and Hart (Mich.)

LRs Stevens, Boggs, Fang,
Saxbe, Scott (Pa.), Weicker,
Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
CRs Buckley and Roth

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDs

mast NSDs

LRs Bellman, Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
Cooper, Smith (Me.), Beall Jr.,
Percy, Hatfield and Mathias

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd

(W. Va.), Cannon, Anderson (N.Mex.),
Montoya, Randolph, Fulbright,
Proxmire, Eagleton, Symington,
Mansfield, Metcalf, Burdick, Church,
Moss, Jackson, Magnuson, Hughes,
Muskie, Humphrey, Mondale and
Nelson

155

The last vote was on passage of the bill.

FOR AGAINST

most CRs CR3 Goldwater, Curtis, Jordan (Id.)
OSDs Allen, Eastland, and Young (N.D.)

McClellan, Talmadge and OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Stennis

Jordan (N.C.) and Ervin

most LRs LRs Taft, Saxbe, Percy and Hatfield
NSDs Spong and Hollings NSDs Bentsen and Chiles

most LDs LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Bible, Symington,

Mansfield, Eagleton, Proxmire,

Burdick, Church, Stevenson,
Metzenbaum and Nelson

A related vote concerned the Humphrey-Hawkins bill of 1978,
an economic stimulus program which included a public works jobs
measure. The vote was on an amendment to the bill to modify a pro-
vision setting a goal of 3% inflation in 1983 and 0% inflation in
1988. The amendment would delete the 0% inflation goal and the time

limit for the 3% goal.

FOR DELETION AGAINST DELETION

most LDs most CR3

LRs Brooke, Case (N.J.) and mast OSDs

Heinz most LRs

OSD Talmadge NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Stone, Chiles
NSDs Ford, Huddleston, Bumpers, and Holland

Morgan and Johnston (La.) LDs Eagleton, Ribicoff, Proxmire,
CR Danforth Hart (Colo.), McGovern and Nelson

Public Works

 

The next area is that of public works. There are several
sub-areas within it. They are; (1) public works whose main purpose is
to provide public works jobs; (2) public works which aim not only
to provide jobs but also to assist in economic development; (3)

those projects whose main purpose is to provide regional economic

156

development, rather than directly providing jobs; and (4) public

works of the traditional sort, which serve other functions commonly

performed by government (e.g. the construction of roads, canals

and sewers).

area, that of youth employment.

Also included with this heading will be a fifth sub-

The first sub-area in the area of public works is that of

public works jobs projects.

It is represented by two votes from

1976 and one from 1977 on public works jobs programs, and one from

1977 on an economic stimulus package that included the public works

jobs program of that year.

and then the last.

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-
SPENDING SIDE

most LDs

LRs Javits, Case, Brooke,
Mathias, Stafford, Hatfield
and Weicker (and perhaps
Heinz, Taft and Beall Jr.)
NSDs Stone, Bentsen, Ford
and Huddleston

OSD Talmadge

CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-
SPENDING SIDE

most CR3

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and
McClellan

LD Proxmire

AGAINST

most CRs
OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.)
LD Proxmire

We will first consider the first three,

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Buckley, Brock, Roth and Baker
OSDs Eastland, Stennis and Allen

LRs Bellman, Pearson, Stevens,
Packwood, Fang, Schweiker and Percy
(and probably Scott of Pa.)

NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings, Morgan,
Johnson (La.) and Bumpers

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd
(W.Va.), Gravel, Biden, and Hathaway
probably CND Zorinsky

FOR

most LDs

most LRs

most NDs

most OSDs

CRS Thurmond, Schmitt, Lugar,
Danforth, Griffin, Domenici and
Baker

CND Zorinsky

157

The second sub-area of public works is that of public works
intended to provide economic development as well as jobs. Included
under this heading are a vote on cutting spending for an accelerated
public works program in 1963, a vote on passage of a 1965 bill, a
vote on an amendment to that bill reducing its spending level, and
two votes on passing a 1971 bill--a vote on the conference version
and the one an overriding the veto. (These are distinguished from
the more explicitly regional economic development votes, on the
Appalachia and Area Redevelopment bills—~see below).

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-SPENDING HAVING A MIXED RECORD

SIDE
CRs Fannin, Bennett, Murphy, Gurney,

most LDs Cotton, Dirksen, and Carlson
OSDs Eastland, Stennis, Ervin, OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), McClellan
and Jordan (N.C.) (and pro- and Talmadge (and perhaps Harry
bably Allen Byrd Sr. [Va.], Robertson and
LR Case (N.J.) (and perhaps Holland)
Schweiker) mast LRs

LDs Ellender and Proxmire
CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-SPENDING probably CND Lausche
SIDE
most CR3

The sub-area of regional economic development contains two
votes: the one on the Area Redevelopment Bill of 1963 and one on
the Appalachian Development bill of 1965. The only one voted
against the Appalachian bill but for the Area Redevelopment bill
was liberal Democrat Proxmire. Otherwise, the two votes form a

perfect scale, as shown below.

FOR

most LDs

most LRs

OSDs Ervin, Jordan (N.C.),
Talmadge and Holland

AGAINST

most CR3

OSDs Harry Byrd Sr. (Va.)
Robertson, Stennis, Eastland
and McClellan

LRs Pearson and Boggs

LD Ellender

158

IN FAVOR OF APPALACHIAN BUT OPPOSED
TO AREA REDEVELOPMENT

CR3 Bennett and Dirksen

CND Lausche

OSD Russell

LR Kuchel (and perhaps Beall Sr.)

The fourth kind of public works project is public works

so-called, as opposed to public works jobs.

list by this precise name.

projects which fit this description.

here.

We have none on our

However, there are some votes on water

There are two votes involved

The first (1977) is on a substitute amendment to build a dam

and locks in Illinois and have user fees studied.

FOR

CR3 Scott (Va.), Thurmond,
Tower, Laxalt, Garn, Hatch,
Hansen, Young (N.Dak.), Roth
and Danforth

OSDs Stennis, Eastland,
McClellan and Allen

LRs Stevens, Packwood, Percy,
Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz
NSDs Hollings, Johnston (La.),
Ford, Huddleston and Bumpers
LDs DeConcini, Sparkman, Lang
(La.), Moynihan, Eagleton,
Burdick, Magnuson, Jackson,
Williams (N.J.), Ribicoff,
Glenn, Stevenson, Cranston..
Tunney and Humphrey

AGAINST

CR3 Goldwater, Helms, Curtis,
McClure, Lugar, Hayakawa, Schmitt,
Domenici, Wallop, Griffin, Dale and
Baker

CN Zorinsky

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr.
Talmadge

LRs Bellman, Chafee, weicker,
Stafford, Mathias, Javits, Brooke

and Case (N.J.)

NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles and Morgan
LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Pell, Hart (Colo.),
Cannon, Randolph, Gravel,

McIntyre, Biden, Proxmire, McGovern,
Cranston, Muskie, Hathaway, Metzen—
baum, Nelson, E. Kennedy (Mass.),
Clark (1a.) and Culver

(Va.) and

159

The second vote relating to waterways was on an amendment to
authorize collection of user fees for them (1978).
AGAINST FOR

CR3 Scott, Thurmond, Tower, CRs Goldwater, Curtis, McClure,
Laxalt, Garn, Hatch, Bartlett Lugar, Hayakawa, Schmitt, Domenici,
(Okla.), Hansen, Young (N.Daka), and Wallop

Roth, Dole, Baker and Danforth CND Zorinsky

LRs Stevens, Packwood, Weicker, OSDs H. Byrd Jr. (Va.) and Talmadge
Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz LRs Bellman, Chafee, Stafford, Percy,

OSDs Stennis and Eastland Mathias, Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
NSDs Bentsen, Hollings, NSDs Nunn and Chiles

Johnston (La.), Ford, LDs Randolph, Melcher, McIntyre,
Huddleston and Bumpers Biden, Proxmire, Williams

LDs DeConcini, Sparkman, (N.J.), Bayh, Ribicoff, Glenn,

Long (La.), Moynihan, Byrd Stevenson, Cranston, Muskie,

(W.Va.), Eagleton, Gravel, Hathaway, Metzenbaum, Nelson,

Burdick, Magnuson, Jackson, E. Kennedy (Mass.), Clark (1a.)

Pell and McGovern and Culver

Related to these public works votes are two on the Youth
Employment bill of 1963. One is on the passage of it, the other
is an amendment to remove the portion of the bill which provided
for a Youth Conservation Corps (YCC). The only one opposed to the
amendment who opposed passage of the bill was Old South Democrat

Holland. Otherwise, the two votes scale perfectly.

FOR YCC AND BILL AGAINST YCC BUT IN FAVOR OF BILL
most LDs LRs Smith (Me.), Scott (Pa.),
LRs Fang, Cooper and Case Kuchel, Keating and Javits
(N.J.)

AGAINST YCC AND BILL

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

most LRs

LDs Monroney, Fulbright,
Sparkman, Hill and Ellender

160

Social Security

 

These votes include some on general increases in
benefits, another on changing the tax formula, and another on the
outside earnings limitation. In the first category are a vote on
a substitute proposal for a benefit increase (12.5% instead of 15%),
with a tax increase, and a vote on the passage of the 1969 income
tax bill, which included a 15% increase in social security benefits,

with a tax increase.

ON THE HIGH-SPENDING SIDE HAVING A MIXED RECORD

OF BOTH (High-Spending in 1967 but Low-
Spending in 1969)

most LDs

LRs Prouty, Aiken, Scott CR3 Cotton and Griffin

(Pa.), Hatfield, Javits OSD Russell

and Case(N.J.) (and perhaps LR Smith (Me.)

Packwood, Cook, Fang, perhaps CND Lausche

Schweiker and Mathias)

NSD Hollings (Low-Spending in 1967, but High-

OSD Ervin (and probably Spending in 1969)

Jordan of N.C. and Talmadge)

CR‘ Young (N.Dak.) OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Stennis,

Eastland and McClellan
ON THE LOW-SPENDING SIDE OF BOTH CR3 Dominick, Miller and Baker

LR Boggs
most CRs NSD Spong
OSD Holland LD Ellender

LRs Pearson and Percy

Another social security vote, from 1977, involved the ques-
tions of whether the wage base for employers should be raised to the
same or to a greater level than that to which it would be raised for
employee, and how high the tax rate should be. A substitute amend-
ment, providing for equal wage bases and a higher tax rate, was

proposed, and a motion was made to kill it.

161

AGAINST SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTITUTE
most LDs most CR3
LRs Stafford and Case (N.J.) most LRs

NSD Morgan

LDs Moynihan, Byrd (W.Va.),
Randolph and Inouye

Another vote on the same social security bill is on an amend-
ment concerning outside earnings limitations. An amendment to ease
the restrictions was proposed, but another (the one we are concerned
with) was proposed as a substitute. The substitute would have
moderated the original by raising the age at which its provisions

would take effect.

FOR SUBSTITUTE AGAINST SUBSTITUTE

most LDs most CR3

most LRs and NSDs OSDs Stennis, Eastland and Talmadge
CRs Curtis, Zorinsky and LRs Packwood and Percy

Roth NSDs Stone

LDs Randolph and Pell

Labor Issues

 

The next subject is that of labor issues. There are several
sub-areas within it: unemployment compensation, food stamps for
strikers, union (collective bargaining) legislation and minimumlwage
laws. The sub-area of unemployment compensation involves three
votes on a bill from 1966, one on a bill from 1970 and another on a
bill from 1972. The 1966 bill provided for the setting of national
minimum standards for the unemployment compensation systems in the

various states.

FOR BILL

most LDs
most LRs
OSD Talmadge

162

AGAINST BILL

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Saltonstall, Pearson and Cooper
LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman and
Smathers

Another vote on this bill is one an amendment to provide

full federal funding of extended unemployment compensation coverage

in recessions.
FOR

most LDs

LRs Javits, Case (N.J.),
Aiken, Prouty and Smith
(Me.)

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fang, Cooper
Kuchel and Scott (Pa.)

LDs Cannon, Bible and Symington

The third vote on this bill was on another amendment which

set minimum levels in each state for maximum benefits at one-half

the average statewide wage.
FOR

most LDs

LRs Boggs, Prouty, Aiken,
Javits and Case (N.J.)

CR Miller

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Pearson, Smith (Me.), Cooper,
Kuchel and Scott (Pa.)

LDs Cannon, Bible, Harris, Jackson
and McGovern

The next vote on unemployment compensation comes from 1970.

It is an amendment providing for the inclusion of migrant workers

in the program.

163

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

most LRs mast OSDs

CRs Murphy, Griffin, Dole LRs Bellman, Packwood, Boggs, Fang,

and Baker Smith (Me.), Scott (Pa.) and Mathias
NSD Spong
LDs Cannon, Bible, Long (La.) and
Ellender

The last unemployment compensation vote is from 1972. It

is on an amendment extending coverage beyond the existing time limits.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

most LRs most OSDs

NSD Chiles and Hollings LRs Smith (Me.), Cooper, Percy and
CR3 Baker, Griffin and Brock Mathias

OSD Talmadge NSD Spong and LD Sparkman

The next sub-area of labor issues is that concerning the

issues of food stamps for strikers. It contains one vote, from 1974.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs mast CR3

most LRs most OSDs

NSD Huddleston most NSDs

CR Young (N.Dak.) LRs Fang and Scott (Pa.)

Another sub—area is that concerning unions (collective bar-
gaining), which includes four votes on labor relations amendments
to the Landrum—Griffin bill (1959); a bill to abolish right-tadwork
laws (1965); a bill to allow common-site picketing (1975); and a
bill changing union recognition procedure in a pro-union direction.
The first vote is that on an amendment to the Landrum—Griffin bill
allowing state regulation of labor disputes where no federal regula-

tion applies.

164

The second vote on this bill is on an amendment establish-
ing a set of restraints on unions to protect their members, called

a "Bill of Rights".

AGAINST FOR
mast LDs most CR3
LR Javits mast OSDs
CND Lausche
most LRs
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Chavez
and Dodd

The third vote is on reconsidering the previous one.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CR3

LR Javits most OSDs
CND Lausche
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Chavez
and Dodd

The fourth vote is on an amendment that, among other things,

banned all secondary boycotts.

AGAINST FOR

LRs Kuchel, Cooper, Smith most CR3

(Me.), Aiken and Javits most OSDs
CND Lausche

LRs Saltonstall, Beall Sr., Scott
(Pa.), Prouty, Keating and Case (N.J.)
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Kerr,
Monroney and Bartlett

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

165

AGAINST

mast CR3

mast OSDs

CND Lausche

LR Saltonstall, Beall Sr. and Scott
(Pa.)

LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Kerr, Gore
and Kefauver

The next vote on collective bargaining is on a proposal to

repeal the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act allowing right-to-work

laws.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs,
Fang, Aiken and Prouty

LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
Fulbright, Smathers, Byrd (W.Va.),
Gore, Monroney and Hayden

The next collective bargaining vote is on the bill to allow

common-site picketing (1975).
FOR
mast LRs

most LDs
NSD Ford

AGAINST

mast CR3

most OSDs

most NSDs

LRs Bellman, Pearson, Fang, Scott
(Pa.) and Hatfield

LDs Sparkman, Cannon, McIntyre,
Glenn and Nelson

The last collective bargaining vote is on a bill which

would make it easier for unions to organize (1978).

FOR

most LDs
mast LRs

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

CND Zorinsky

mast NSDs LR Bellman

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.) and Cannon

166

The last sub—area of labor issues is that of minimum wage
legislation. There are several votes in this area which may be
grouped into a number of sets. From 1966 and 1974 are votes on the
passage of minimum wage increases; from 1961 and 1966 are votes on
the width of coverage of minimum wage laws; from 1966 is a vote on
delaying an increase and from 1972 is a similar one on reducing the
proposed increase; and from 1977 is one on providing a youth sub-
minimum wage.

There are two votes (from 1966 and 1974) on passage of bills
to increase the minimum wage. The first we will consider is the

one from 1966.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs mast CR3

most LRs most OSDs

OSD Talmadge LDs Ellender and Fulbright

CR3 Dominick, Mundt, Williams
(Del.), Bennett, Murphy, Miller,
Allott, Morton and Griffin.

The second bill of this kind to consider is the one from

1974.

FOR AGAINST
most LDs mast CR3
most LRs most OSDs
most NSDs LR Bellman
CR3 Brock, Young (N.Dak.), NSD Hollings

Domenici, Dale and Baker
OSDs Allen and Talmadge

These two bills may also be considered as a group.

FOR BOTH

most LDs

most LRs

OSD Talmadge

probably CRs Domenici, Dale
and Baker

HAVING MIXED RECORD

CR3 Bennett and Young (N.Dak.)
(and probably Dominick, Mundt,
Williams of Del., Murphy,
Miller, Allott, Brock, Morton
and Griffin

probably CND Lausche

OSD Ervin (and probably Jordan
[N.C.] and Allen)

LRs Pearson (and probably C00
and Taft) '
NSD Hollings (and perhaps most
other NSDs)

LD Fulbright

167

AGAINST BOTH

mast CRs
most OSDs
LD Ellender

Votes on the width of coverage come from 1961 and 1966.

First we will consider the 1961 vote.

FOR

mast LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

mast CR3

most OSDs

LDs Hill, Sparkman and Fulbright
(and perhaps Ellender and Smathers)

The other vote on this subject was from 1966.

FOR

mast LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, COOper,
Prouty and Aiken

LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
Fulbright, Smathers, Monroney,
Cannon, Bible and McGovern

168

We may now consider the two votes on width of coverage

together.
FOR AGAINST
most LDs most CRs
most LRs mast OSDs
CND Lausche
HAVING A MIXED RECORD LR Saltonstall
LD Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
CR Miller Fulbright, Smathers and Monroney

LRs Pearson, Cooper, Prouty
and Aiken (and perhaps
Beall Sr.)

LDs Cannon, Bible, Gore

and McGovern

Another kind of minimum wage vote is that on delaying a

proposed increase. We have one of these votes on our list taken

in 1966.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CR3
most LRs most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs

and Cooper

LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman, Long
(La.), Symington, Harris and Church

Still another kind of minimum wage vote is that on reducing

a proposed increase. We have one of these votes on our list taken

in 1972.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CR3
most LRs most OSDs

mast NSDs

LRs Bellman, Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
Fang, Beall Sr., Taft, Saxbe,
Hatfield and Mathias

LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long (La.)
and Mass

169

The proposal to delay the minimum wage increase in 1966 and
the one to oppose it in 1972 are alike in that they involve the
question of degree of increase, rather than that of whether there
should be an increase at all, which is implied in the vote on passage.
We may consider them now as a group.

AGAINST DELAYING AND REDUCTION FOR DELAYING AND REDUCTION

mast LDs mast LRs
most LRs most OSDs
most NSDs
HAVING A MIXED RECORD LRs Pearson and Cooper (and perhaps
Taft, Beall Jr., Cook and Packwood)
LRs Boggs, Fang and Mathias LDs Hill, Sparkman and Fulbright
LDs Long (La.), Randolph, (and perhaps Ellender and Smathers)

Symington, McIntyre, Moss,
Harris and Church

The last minimum wage vote to be considered is that on the
youth sub-minimum wage amendment of 1977, to permit the employing
of workers under 20 at 85% of the minimum wage for the first six

months on the job.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CRs

most LRs most OSDs

NSDs Bentsen, Johnston (La.), CND Zorinsky

Ford and Huddleston LRs Stevens, Bellman, Chafee, Percy,

Hatfield, and Schweiker
NSDs Nunn, Stone, Chiles, Hollings,
Morgan and Bumpers
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.) and Cannon
Several of these cleavages relating to labor issues can be
put together in something approximating a scale. The votes on the
scale, in approximate order from the least to the most "pro-labor" or

"pro-union", are: the minimum wage increases of 1966 and 1974

(considered together), the unemployment compensation act of 1966,

170

and the 1978 vote on making recognition easier for the unions. Scal-
ing with all of these, except the last one, are the amendments to
delay (1966) or reduce (1972) proposed minimum wage increases (con-
sidered together). (Many of the other votes are related to these.

For example, the boundary between the consistent opponents of broad
minimum-wage coverage and those with mixed records on the subjects
seem to correspond closely to that between opponents and supporters

of the 1966 unemployment compensation bill, while the boundary between
the consistent supporters of broad minimum wage coverage and those
with mixed records corresponds to the boundary between the supporters

and opponents of the 1978 union bill.)

Food Stamps

 

We may now turn to the next major area of votes, which is
that involving votes on food stamps (apart from those on strikers'
food stamps, already dealt with above). The following votes are
included in this category: an amendment to raise the increase in
spending provided for in the food stamps bill of 1969; an amendment

increasing food stamps funds in 1970; a bill to increase spending in

1976, and an amendment to eliminate the purchase requirement in 1977.

ON HIGH-SPENDING SIDE OF 0N LOWrSPENDING SIDE OF ALL FOUR
ALL FOUR
most CR3
most LDs most OSDs
most LRs

mast OSDs

171

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRS Dole, Baker, Lugar and Danforth
CND Zorinsky

OSD Talmadge

NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Johnston (La.)
and Morgan

LRs Boggs, Fang, Packwood,

Stevens and Schweiker (and

probably Aiken and Smith (Me.)

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd
(W.Va.), Cannon and Bible

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

 

The next issues are related to AFDC ("welfare", in the narrow
sense of that word). Both of the votes we have on this sUbject
relate to President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) proposals
in 1970 and 1972.

The 1970 vote was on a motion to kill the FAP proposal. The
motion was made by one of the FAP supporters (Long of Louisiana),
some of whom had became convinced that they could not get the FAP
accepted, and so sacrificed it to save the social security bill to
which the FAP amendment was attached. Since this vote would there-
fore not clearly indicate attitudes toward FAP or welfare, we will
not consider it further.

In 1972, several votes were taken relating to the FAP. The
one included on our list was an attempt to increase benefits above

the level proposed by Nixon.

FOR AGAINST
most LDs mast CRs
most LRs most OSDs

most NSDs

Housing

172

AGAINST

LRs Bellman, Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
Stevens, Fang and Saxbe

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd (W.Va.),
(W.Va.), Bible, Cannon, Anderson
(NgMex.), Randolph, Montoya, Fulbright,
Symington, Burdick, Eagleton,

Proxmire, Church and Magnuson

The area of housing consists of several sub-areas; general

housing appropriations, rent subsidies, and the Demonstration Cities

program. We may consider rent subsidies first. There are three

votes under this heading, from 1965, 1966 and 1967.

FOR ALL SUBSIDIES

most LDs
most LRs

HAVING A.MIXED RECORD

CR3 Murphy, Miller, Dirksen
and Morton (and perhaps
Griffin)

LRs Cooper, Prouty, Kuchel,
Fang and Boggs (and perhaps
Saltonstall)

LDs Hartke, Young (Ohio),
Bible and Hill

AGAINST ALL SUBSIDIES

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

NSD Hollings and Spong

LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Gare, Cannon and
Symington

Another topic under the heading of housing programs is that

of the Demonstration Cities program. There is one vote on this

topic from 1966, on a vote to delete funds for the program from a

bill.

173

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

most LRs most OSDs

CND Lausche NSDs Spong and Hollings

CRs Allott and Young (N.Dak.) LRs Boggs, Fang and Kuchel
LDs Byrd (W.Va.)

The sub-area of housing programs dealing with more general
housing matters includes votes from 1961 (two), 1965, 1968, 1977
and 1978. The first two of these in a vote on general housing

appropriations from 1961.

FOR AGAINST
most LDs CR Wiley
LRs Boggs, Fang, Javits and OSDs Ervin, Jordan (N.C.) and
Case (N.J.) Talmadge
most CRs
HAVING A MIXED RECORD most OSDs
CND Lausche
LR Keating LR Saltonstall, Smith (Me.), Aiken,
LDs Ellender, Gore and Kerr Cooper, Prouty, Kuchel and Scott
(Pa.)

The next vote in this area is that on the establishment of

the Department of Housing and Urban Development (1965).

FOR AGAINST

mast LDs most CR3

most LRs most OSDs

CRs Miller and Allott CND Lausche

OSD Jordan (N.C.) LRs Pearson and Cooper
LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman and
Bible

The next vote on housing matters is that on the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968, which provided aid to low-income
people by buy or rent housing, flood insurance, riot insurance

and other things.

FOR

most LDs
mast LRs
most CRs
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin,
Jordan (N.C.) and Talmadge

174

AGAINST

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, Holland and
Russell
CR Thurmond (a former OSD)

The remaining housing votes come are a vote from 1977 and

two from 1978, all involving votes on cutting general housing funds.

CONSISTENTLY FOR HIGH-SPENDING

most LDs

LR Packwood, Hatfield, Weicker,
Heinz, Javits, Brooke and

Case (N.J.) (and perhaps

Percy

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR3 Laxalt, Wallop, Hayakawa,
Baker and Danforth

LRs Stevens, Chafee, Stafford
and Mathias

NSDs Stone, Bentsen, Ford,
Huddleston and Bumpers

LDs Cannon, Melcher, Eagleton,
Church, Hart (Col.), Haskell,
Magnuson, Metzenbaum and Muskie

Educating

CONSISTENTLY FOR LOW-SPENDING

most CRs

most OSDs

LRs Pearson, Bellman and Schweiker
NSDs Chiles, Hollings and Johnston
(La.)

LDs Byrd (W.Va.)

The votes in this areas may also be divided into sub-areas.

The votes in 1960 (two), 1961 and 1965 form a natural group, as they

are all rather similar votes dealing with elementary and secondary

education.
CONSISTENTLY HIGH-SPENDING

most LDs
LRs Cooper, Smith and Aiken
(and perhaps CR Wiley)

CONSISTENTLY LOW¥SPENDING

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

and perhaps LR Beall Sr.

175

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR3 Miller, Case (S.Dak.), Mundt,
Dirksen, Carlson and Allott (and
perhaps Martin)

OSDs McClellan, Ervin, Jordan
(N.C.) and Talmadge

most LRs

LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Johnston
(S.C.), Long (La.) and Hayden

Another vote on educational appropriations is on a bill

providing funds generally for the Office of Education, from 1970.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs other CRs

most LRs LRs Bellman, Packwood and Smith
most NSDs (Me.)

most OSDs

CRs Hruska, Murphy, Jordan (Ida.),
Cotton and Young (N. Dak.)

Another kind of education vote is that from 1974, involving

a formula for distribution of aid to elementary and secondary schools.

AGAINST THE FORMULA FOR THE FORMULA
most LDs mast CR3
most LRs most OSDs

CRs Buckley, Roth and Griffin most NSDs
LRs Cook, Packwood, Fang, Beall Jr.,
Hatfield, and Mathias
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Johnston
(La.), Long (La.), Cannon, Bible,
Montoya, Symington, Mansfield,
Eagleton, Biden, Hartke, Proxmire,
Haskell, Church, Bayh and Pastore

The next vote is on aid to higher education. It is vote
on the passage of bill, in 1963, providing funds for this purpose.
FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3
most LRs most OSDs

176

CR3 Simpson, Hickenlooper, CND Lausche
Miller, Dirksen, Young(N.Dak.), LR Cooper
Carlson and Morton LDs Sparkman, Hill and Ellender

OSD Jordan (N.C.)

Health

The next issue area to be considered is that of health or
medical issues. This encompasses votes on medical "insurance" and
votes on hospitals. Considering the former topic first, we can see
that there are five votes on this topic. In 1960, 1962, 1964 and
1964 relatively similar proposals were put forth for what came to be
known as "Medicare", a program for helping the elderly with their
medical costs, financed partially or totally through the Social
Security System. With the 1965 vote, the amendment was adopted and
the bill (a social security bill) was passed. First we will count

the first four votes together.

FOR MEDICARE CONSISTENTLY AGAINST MEDICARE CONSISTENTLY
most LDs most CRs
LR Case (N.J.) most OSDs
LR Pearson
HAVING A MIXED RECORD LDs Ellender and Long (La.)

CR3 Mundt and Young (N.Dak.)

OSDs Russell, McClellan and
Talmadge

CND Lausche

LDs Hill, Sparkman, Fulbright,
Smathers, Kerr, Monroney, Byrd
(W.Va.), Bible, Cannon, Anderson,
Hayden and Randolph.

Now we will consider the vote on passage of the 1965 social

security bill, which included the last Medicare provision.

177

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

most LRs mast OSDs

OSDs Russell, McClellan and LR Pearson

Talmadge LDs Ellender, Long (La.), Anderson
CND Lausche (N.Mex.) and Harris

CR Carlson

The other medical votes relate to hospitals. The first is
one an overriding the VBtO of a bill providing for additional

hospital construction (1970).

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

most LRs LRs Packwood, Saxbe, Cooper, Smith
most OSDs (Me.) and Goodell

most NSDs

CRs Dominick, Fannin, Murphy,
Gurney, Cotton and Young (N.Dak.)

The other vote on hospitals was on an amendment to a 1978
hospital cost control bill, which would authorize hospital revenue
limits if certain goals were not met.

FOR AGAINST
most LDs mast CR3

LRs Bellman, Chafee, Stafford, most OSDs
Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.) most NSDs

NSDs Chiles and Bumpers LRs Pearson, Packwood, Percy,
CR Griffin Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz
CND Zorinsky LDs DeConcini, Long (La.), Melcher,

Church and Inouye

CEO and other poverty programs

 

We may next consider the votes on the 0E0 (Office of Economic
Opportunity--the War on Poverty). These votes fall into two groups.
The first group consists of votes dealing with spending--dealing with

the question of the establishment (1964) or continued existence

178

(1974) of the CEO or with appropriations to it (1965, 1968, 1969,

1971).

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-SPENDING
SIDE

most LDs

probably LRs Case (N.J.),
Mathias, Stafford, Keating,
Weicker, Percy and Kuchel

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Young (N.Dak.), Griffin,
Dale and Baker (and probably
Domenici)

OSDs Allen, Ervin, Jordan (N.C.)
and Talmadge

LRs Pearson, Fang, Taft, Beall
Jr., Smith (Me.), Cooper, Aiken,
Prouty, Hatfield, Scott (Pa.),
Schweiker, Javits and Brooke
(and perhaps Stevens and

Beall Jr.)

NSD Hollings (and perhaps Nunn,
Chiles, Spong, Johnston of La.
and Huddleston)

CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-SPENDING
SIDE

most CR3

most OSDs

probably CND Lausche

probably LRs Saltonstall, Bellman,
and Boggs

probably LDs Ellender and Hill

The other group of CEO votes consists of those on proposals

to permit governors to veto certain aspects of the program in their

states (1965, 1967 and 1969).
AGAINST THE VETO CONSISTENTLY

most LDs

most LRs Case (N.J.) and
Javits (and probably Brooke
and perhaps Mathias)

FOR THE VETO CONSISTENTLY

most CR3

most OSDs

CND Lausche

LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fang, Aiken

and Prouty (and probably Saltonstall,
Bellman, and Weicker)

NSD Spong and Monroney

LD Ellender (and probably Hill)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR Young (N.Dak.)

LRs Smith (Me.), Cooper and Scott

(and probably Percy and
perhaps Hatfield)

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.),
Fulbright, Smathers and
Byrd (W.Va.)

179

Another aspect of the poverty program which was voted upon

was the Head Start program, on which we have a vote from 1968,

regarding an increase in its funds.

FOR

most LDs

most LRS

NSDs Hollings and Spong
CND Lausche

CR3 Murphy, Dirksen and
Griffin

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDs

LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fang and

Smith (Me.)

LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman, Lang
(La.), Smathers, Bible, Anderson,
Hayden, Long (Mo.), Proxmire,
Bartlett (Alsk.) and Church

Related to three 0E0 votes is a 1971 vote on a bill to

extend the GED and begin a child development program and legal ser-

vices program for the poor.
FOR
most LDs

most LRs
most NSDs

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDs

LRs Pearson, Packwood, Smith (Me.),
Taft, Saxbe and Stevens.

There were two votes on the Legal Services program for the

poor, both involving proposals to make it an independent corporation.

The first, from 1972, was on an amendment to remove a provision

from an OEO bill.

180

FOR AGAINST

mast LDs mast CNDs

LRs Stevens, Taft, Saxbe, most OSDs

Scott (Pa.), Weicker, Percy, LRs Bellman, Cook, Packwood, Boggs,

Hatfield, Stafford, Schweiker, Fang, Beall Jr., Cooper, Smith (Me.)
Mathias, Javits, Brooke and and Aiken

Case (N.J.) LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long (La.),

most NSDs and Byrd (W.Va.)

OSD McClellan

The second, from 1974, was a vote on cloture on a bill to

achieve this same end.

FOR AGAINST

most LRs most CRs

most NSDs most OSDs

CR3 Roth, Griffin, Domenici and NSD Chiles

Dole LDs Sparkman, Johnston (La.),

OSD Talmadge Long (La.), Fulbright and
Cannon

Related votes from 1963 are those on a youth training bill,
(amending the Manpower Training and Development Act of 1962),

and the National Service Corps.. The former will be considered

first.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

LRs Boggs, Fang, Beall Sr., most OSDs

Kuchel, Scott (Pa.), Keating, LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Smith
Javits and Case (N.J.) (Me.) and Cooper

CR.Morton LDs Ellender, Hill, Long (La.)

and Johnston (S.C.)
The other one is on passage of the National Service Corps

bill.

181

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

LRs Javits, Case (N.J.), most OSDs

Keating, Fang and Cooper LRs Pearson, Boggs, Beall Sr.,

Prouty, Aiken, Smith (Me.), Kuchel

and Scott (Pa.)

LDs Engle, Young (0.), Gore, Johnston
(S.C.), Long (La.), Smathers & Ellender

Another vote is on a bill providing federal subsidies for

child day care centers in 1976.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3 and mast OSDs

most LRs LRs Bellman, Stevens, Packwood, Fang
most NSDs and Beall Jr.

The subject

CWO VOLES:

LD Sparkman and NSD Bentsen

of the School Lunch program for children involves

a 1970 vote an amendment providing more generous distribu-

tion standards and a 1975 vote on a bill to continue the program.

FOR BOTH PROPOSALS

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST BOTH PROPOSALS

most CRs

NSD Hollings(and perhaps
the other NSDs)

AGAINST THE 1970 PROPOSAL BUT
FOR THE 1975 ONE

CRs Dale and Baker

mast OSDs

perhaps NSD Spong

LRs Pearson and Scott (Pa.)
LDs Sparkman and Bible

Labor and HEW Dgpartmental Funds

 

Another vote which is related to several others, but is one

of a kind (on our list) is the 1976 vote an overriding a veto of a

measure appropriating funds for the departments of Labor and HEW.

FOR

most LDs

most LRs

most NSDs

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, and
Talmadge

CR3 McClure, Young (N.Dak.),
Domenici, Roth and Baker

‘Mas§_Transit

182

AGAINST

most CRs

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., McClellan and
Allen

LR Packwood

LDs Ribicoff and Proxmire

There are a number of votes related to federal aid to mass

transit.

highway trust funds to be spent on local mass transit.

The first votes in this group involve

a proposal to allow

Two of them

(from 1973 and 1975) propose allowing the funds to be used for local

mass transit generally.

The third proposal (1972) was to allow the

funds to be used specifically to aid rail transportation.

FOR ALL PROPOSALS

most LDs

most LRs

perhaps CRs Dominick, Bennett,
Brock, Miller and Allott

FOR THIS 1972 PROPOSAL, WITH A
MIXED RECORD ON THE OTHERS

LDs Metcalf, Symington,
Mondale and Muskie (and
perhaps Clark of la.)
LRs Beall Jr. and Taft
perhaps NSD Nunn

CRS Buckley and Griffin
(and perhaps Baker)

AGAINST ALL PROPOSALS

most CR3

most OSDs

most NSDs

LR Stevens

LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon, Randolph,
Sparkman and Long (La.) (and perhaps
Bible, Anderson (N.Mex.), Montoya,
Fulbright and Bayh)

FOR THE 1972 PROPOSAL; AGAINST THE
OTHERS

CRs Fannin and Hruska (and perhaps
Gurney)

OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.)

LD Church, Stevenson and Humphrey

(and perhaps Eagleton and Hughes)

183

This discussion leads us to consider the beginnings of
Federal aid to mass transit, and the vote on passing the bill estab-

lishing the program in 1963.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

LRs Javits, Case (N.J.) most OSDs

Keating, Kuchel and Scott LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs,
(Pa.) Cooper, Smith (Me.), Aiken, Prouty

and Beall Sr.
LDs Hill, McGee, McIntyre and Bayh

Government Aid to Business

 

Another group of issues includes votes on various matters,
all of which involve government aid to partnership with business.
These included aid to SST, aid to Lockheed and establishing the
Communications Satellite company.

The first of these is the issue of government aid to the
construction of a Supersonic Transport (SST) airplane. There are
two votes here an amendment to bills, one to delete funds from a

bill in 1970 and the other to restore funds in 1971.

FOR SST CONSTRUCTION AGAINST SST CONSTRUCTION

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, mast LDs

McClellan and Talmadge (and most LRs

perhaps Russell) CRs Jordan (Ida.), Hansen and Griffin
NSD Hollings (and perhaps Murphy and Roth)

LRS Bellman, Pearson. Ellender, NSD Spong (and perhaps Bentsen and
Boggs, Saxbe and Mathias (and Chiles)

perhaps Stevens, Beall Jr- OSD Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin, Jordan
and Taft) (N.C.) and Allen (and perhaps
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long Holland)

(La.), Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Randolph, Gravel,
Magnuson, Jackson, McGee,
Inouye and Moss (and perhaps
Yarborough and Dodd)

most CR3

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR3 Dominick, Cotton and Miller
LRs Cook, Fang and Smith (Me.)
LDs Proxmire, Muskie, Symington

and Anderson (N.Mex.)

184

The next vote is on a bill to provide loan guarantees to

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (1971).

FOR

most CRs

OSDs Eastland, Stennis, Allen
and Talmadge

LRs Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
Boggs, Fang, Cooper, Scott
(Pa.), Mathias, Javits and
Case (N.J.)

NSD Hollings

LDS Ellender, Sparkman, Long
(La.), Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Randolph, Metcalf,
Gravel, McIntyre, Inouye,
Williams (N.J.), Moss,
Cranston, Tunney and
Humphrey

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater. Buckley, Curtis,
Dominick, Jordan (Ida.) and Griffin
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin, Jordan
and McClellan

NSDs Chiles and Spong

LRs Bellman, SaXbe, Smith (Me.),
Aiken, Taft, Beall Jr., Weicker,
Percy, Hatfield, Schweiker, and
Brooke

most LDs

Another somewhat similar vote is that on the Communications

Satellite bill in 1962.

FOR

most CR3
most Lrs
most LDs
OSD Holland

The vote was on cloture of the filibuster.

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater and Tower

most OSDs (incl. Thurmond)

LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
Johnston (S.C.), Long (La.),
Fulbright, Gore, Kefauver,
Yarborough, Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Hayden, Burdick, Gruening,
Bartlett (Alas.), Morse, McGee
Neuberger, Carroll, Young (Ohio),
McNamara and Douglas

185

Wage and Price Controls

 

Another issue area is that of wage and price controls.
There are three votes in this area. The first vote, on extending
presidential authority that had already been granted in this area,

is from 1971.

FOR AGAINST

most LDS CR Goldwater

most LRs LDs McGovern, Harris, Hartke,
most NSDs Fulbright and Proxmire

most OSDS

most CR3

The other votes on wage and price controls were from 1974.
They are both on tabling (killing) two amendments to a bill on the
Council for International Economic Policy. One vote was on killing
an amendment to give the President standby powers to use wage and
price controls in selected industries, under certain conditions.
The other was on killing an amendment to continue the Cost of
Living Council to monitor inflation and give the President power to
enforce agreements on price increases when controls ended. The
only one to oppose killing the former, while favoring the killing
of the latter was Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.). Otherwise, the two votes
scale perfectly.

AGAINST KILLING BOTH

CR Roth

OSDS Eastland and Stennis
NSD Chiles

LRs Mathias, Javits and Case
(N.J.)

most LDs

186

FOR KILLING SELECTIVE WAGE FOR KILLING BOTH

PRICE CONTROLS; AGAINST KILLING

COST OF LIVING COUNCIL AND most CR3

PRICE INCREASES ENFORCEMENT OSDs Allen, Ervin and Talmadge
NSDs Nunn and Hollings

OSD McClellan LRs Stevens, Pearson, Bellman.

LRs Beall Jr., Taft and Fang, Aiken, Scott (Pa.), Weicker,

Stafford Percy, Hatfield, Schweiker and

NSDs Bentsen and Huddleston Brooke

LDs McGovern, Cranston, Muskie, LDs Gravel, Eagleton, Hartke,

Inouye, Bayh, McIntyre and Proxmire, Burdick, Abourezk, Clark

Byrd (W.Va.) (Ia.), Tunney and Metzenbaum

Fuel Rationing and Related Programs

 

Another issue area is that of rationing. The only votes on
it are those on fuel rationing. These consist of one vote (from
1973) on rationing as such, and two votes (from 1974 and 1975) on
general energy programs which include rationing proposals.

The vote from 1973 on rationing alone is on a proposal to

provide for stand-by rationing authority.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

most NSDs OSDS Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Allen
LRs Weicker and Case (N.J.) and Ervin

OSDs Stennis, Eastland and most LRs

McClellan LDs Long (La.), Cannon, Bible,

Montoya, Church, Biden, Hartke,
Bayh and Tunney

The votes from 1974 and 1975 are on energy programs includ-
ing provisions relating to stand-by rationing plans, oil price
control, conservation and relaxation of pollution standards.

FOR

most LDs

NSDs Huddleston and Chiles (and
perhaps Bumpers, Ford and Morgan)
LRs Javits, Brooke, Case (N.J.),
and Stafford (and perhaps Aiken)
OSDS McClellan and Talmadge)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR3 Roth, Young (N.Dak.),
Griffin and Baker

OSDS Stennis (and probably
Allen and Ervin)

LRs Stevens, Packwood, Scott
(Pa.), Percy, Hatfield and
Mathias (and probably Cook
and Schweiker)

NSDs Nunn, Chiles and
Hollings

LDs Montoya, Gravel, McGee
and Abourezk

187
AGAINST

OSDs Harry Byrd (Va.) and Eastland
LRs Bellman, Pearson, Fang, Beall
Jr., Taft and Weicker

NSD Bentsen and Johnston (La.)

LD Long (La.)

Federal Energy Administration (FEA)

 

The next issue area involves two votes from 1976, on amend—

ment to a bill dealing with the Federal Energy Administration. One

amendment set mandatory energy-conservation standards for new build—

ings.
FOR

most LDs

most LRs

NSDs Nunn, Hollings, Ford
and Huddleston

CR Laxalt

The other vote was on an

to gather information on energy.

FOR

mast LDs

LRS Javits, Brooke, Case
(N.J.), Heinz and Schweiker
NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings,
Johnston (La.), Ford,
Huddleston and Bumpers

AGAINST

most CRs

most OSDS

LRs Stevens, Bellman, Fang and
Hatfield

NSDs Stone, Chiles, Bentsen,
Morgan, Johnston (La.) and Bumpers
LDs Long (La.), Metcalf and Pastore

amendment to establish an agency

AGAINST

most CR3

mast OSDS

most LRS

NSDs Stone, Bentsen and Morgan
LDs Long (La.), Gravel, McGee
and Glenn

188

No-Fault Insurance

 

Votes on no-fault insurance constitute the next group.
These are proposals to require states to adopt no-fault plans.

Here we have them from 1972, 1974 and 1976.

FOR ALL AGAINST ALL
most LDs most CR3
most LRs most OSDs
CR Griffin most NSDs

LDs Gravel and Sparkman
HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Bennett and Brock

LRs Bellman, Packwood, Beall
Jr., Taft, Scott (Pa.),
Stafford and Mathias

LDs Cannon, Bible, Randolph,
Montoya, Hartke, Moss, Church
and McGovern

perhaps NSD Spong.

Antitrust Law

 

Another vote is that on a bill to make the antitrust laws

stricter (1976).

FOR AGAINST
mast LDs most CRs
most LRs most OSDS
OSD Harry Byrd Jr. and

Talmadge

CR3 Miller, Dole, Domenici,
rRoth, Baker and Griffin

Airline Deregulation

 

Another issue area concerning the regulation of business is
that of airline deregulation. This area contains two votes, both
on the deregulation bill of 1978. The first is on an amendment pro-

viding for broad areas of freedom in regard to market entry.

AGAINST

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Stennis,
Eastland and Talmadge

CR3 Scott (Va.), Young (N.Dak.),

Schmitt, Griffin and Danforth
CND Zorinsky

LR Stevens

NSD Bentsen

LDs Sparkman, Byrd (W.Va.),
Randolph, Melcher, Burdick,
Magnuson, Jackson and
Stevenson

189

FOR

most CR3

most NSDs

most LRS

mast LDs

LDs DeConcini, Long (La.), Sasser,
Byrd (W.Va.), Randolph, Gravel,
Glenn, Stevenson, McGovern and
Abourezk.

Another amendment to the bill concerned job security for

airline workers.

The amendment proposed giving displaced workers

preference in hiring instead of compensation, as then provided in

the bill.
AGAINST

most LDs

LRs Stevens, Weicker,
Stafford, Schweiker, Mathias,
Javits, Brooke and Case
(N.J.)

NSDs Stone, Chiles, Ford

and Huddleston

CRs Laxalt, Scott, Domenici,
Griffin and Danforth

Consumer Protection

 

FOR

mast CRs

mast OSDS

CND Zorinsky

LRS Bellman, Pearson, Chafee,
Hatfield and Percy

NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Hollings,
Morgan and Bumpers.

Next, the votes on a consumer protection agency will be con-

sidered.

These involve bills that proposed to establish an agency

to represent consumers before other regulatory agencies, from 1972

and 1974.
FOR BOTH
mast LDs

most LRs
most NSDs

CR Roth (and perhaps Domenici)

190

HAVING A MIXED RECORD AGAINST BOTH

CRS Griffin and Dale (and most CR3

perhaps Miller ) most OSDs

LR Fang (and perhaps Boggs, perhaps NSD Johnston (La.)
Saxbe, Prouty, Smith [Me.] LR Taft

and Cooper) LDs Bible, Long (La.), Sparkman
LD Cannon and Ellender

There are two more votes involving consumer protection.

The first is a vote on standard weights and measures on labels, from

1966.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CR3

most LRs most OSDS

OSD Harry Byrd Jr. LRs Boggs, Cooper, Scott (Pa.)

and Prouty
The remaining consumer protection vote is on a motion to
kill an amendment to a bill which provided for criminal penalties

for violations of consumer product safety measures from 1972.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

most LRs mast OSDs

NSD Bentsen LRS Stevens, Fang, Cooper, Smith

(Me.), Saxbe, Prouty, Aiken, Scott
(Pa.) and Stafford

NSDs Hollings and Spong

LDs Ellender and Inouye

National Consumer Co-operative Bank

 

There is one vote on this issue, on the passage of the bill

establishing the bank, in 1978.

FOR

most LDs

most LRs

NSDs Bumpers, Ford and
Morgan

CR3 Hayakawa, Thurmond,
Griffin, Dale and Baker
OSD Talmadge

191

AGAINST

most CR3

most OSDS

CND Zorinsky

NSD Bentsen, Chiles and Huddleston
LRs Bellman, Packwood and Chafee
LDS Sasser, Proxmire and Glenn

Occupational Safety_and Health Administration (OSHA)

 

There are two votes concerning the regulations of this

agency. The first, from 1977, was on an amendment requiring economic

impact statements to be prepared by OSHA when it issued new regula-

tions.
AGAINST

most LDs

NSDs Stone, Hollings,
Huddleston and Bumpers
LRS Mathias, Schweiker,
Javits, Case (N.J.) and
Brooke

FOR

most CRs

most OSDS

LRs Stevens, Packwood, Chafee,
Weicker, Hatfield, Stafford and
Heinz

NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles, Margan,
Johnston (La.) and Ford

LDs DeConcini, Sparkman, Cannon
and Church

The other vote was an amendment from 1978 which provided

that small businesses with a good safety record would be exempt

from OSHA regulations.
AGAINST

most LDs

most LRs

NSD Huddleston
OSD Talmadge

FOR

most CR3

most OSDs

LRs Stevens, Hatfield and Weicker
NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Hollings, Chiles,
Morgan and Bumpers

LDs Sparkman, Sasser, Cannon,
Randolph, Church, McIntyre and Biden

192

Environmental Issues

 

This broad area includes votes on air pollution control.
water pollution control, highway beautification, the Alaska pipeline
and strip mining. In the area of air pollution control, there are
four votes: one from 1970 and three from 1976. Two of the ones from
1976 consist of two amendments to a bill, one removing the require-
ment that polluters not make unpolluted air worse, and another moving
automakers' deadline for compliance one year sooner. These two
votes almost scale. The only exception was New South Democrat

Stone (who favored both amendments).

AGAINST DELETION OF NON- AGAINST DELETION OF NON-
DEGRADATION PROPOSAL AND DEGRADATION PROPOSAL BUT AGAINST
FOR HASTENING OF HASTENING OF DEADLINE
DEADLINE
most LRS
most LDs CR3 Curtis, Hansen, Buckley,
LRs Hatfield, Packwood, McClure, Domenici, Roth and Baker
Weicker, Mathias, Brooke NSDs Nunn, Chavez and Morgan
and Case (N.J.) LDs Randolph, Montoya, Eagleton,
NSD Bumpers Gravel, Burdick, Stevenson, McGee,
Humphrey and Mondale (and perhaps
FOR DELETION 0F NON- Symington and Inouye)
DEGRADATION PROPOSAL AND (and probably Biden, Hartke, Mondale
AGAINST HASTENING OF and Hart of Mich.)
DEADLINE
most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.),
Byrd (W.Va.) and Moss

A third vote on this same Clean Air bill was on an amendment
which deleted from the bill the provision relaxing current standards

for nitrous oxide emissions.

193

FOR AGAINST

most LDs mast CR3

LRs Javits, Case (N.J.) most OSDs

Brooke, Mathias, Hatfield, most NSDs

Weicker and Packwood LRs Bellman, Pearson, Stevens, Fang,
NSD Stone Beall Jr., Taft, Scott (Pa.), Percy

and Stafford

LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Cannon,
Randolph, Montoya, Eagleton, Gravel,
Church, McIntyre, Burdick, McGee
and Inouye

The 1970 air pollution vote involved a proposed amendment

easing the appeals process for the pollution deadlines for automakers.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs most CR3

most LRs OSD Russell, Holland, Eastland and
most NSDs Stennis

OSDS Harry Byrd Jr., Allen, LRs Hatfield and Packwood
McClellan and Talmadge LD Fulbright

CRs Murphy, Allen, Dominick

and Mundt

Another kind of pollution is water pollution. There is one
vote on it on our list, a vote on the Water Quality Act of 1965.
It is on an amendnent to delete the provision which gave the Secre-

tary of HEW authority to set water quality standards.

AGAINST DELETION FOR DELETION

most LDs mast CR3

mast LRs OSDs Robertson, McClellan and
mast LRs Talmadge

most OSDs LD Mansfield

CR3 Williams (Del.), Cotton,
Jordan (Id.), Young (N.D.),
Miller and Allott

CND Lausche

Another vote on a similar issue was on passage of a highway

beautification bill (1965).

194

FOR AGAINST
most LDs most CRs
most LRs most OSDs

CRs Fannin, Murphy, Dominick, LD Ellender
Williams (Del.), Jordan (Ida.),
Cotton. Young (N.Dak.) and

Dirksen
CND Lausche
The next vote on environmental issues is an the issue of

restraining strip mining. It is on an amendment from 1973 which

provides for federal regulation of it.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs most CRs

most LRs mast OSDS

most NSDs LDs Long (La.), Bible, Cannon and
CR3 Young (N.Dak.) and Roth Moss

OSD Allen.

There were two votes on the 1973 bill concerning the con—
struction of the Alaska pipeline. The first was antiproposed amend-
ment to delay construction until after further environmental studies
had been made.

The second vote was on a proposed amendment to bar judicial
review of environmental aspects of the bill, and authorize the

granting of permissions to begin construction of the pipeline.

AGAINST FOR

most LDs mast CRs

LRs Cook, Packwood, Aiken, most OSDS

Percy, Hatfield, Stafford, most NSDs

Mathias, Javits and Case LRs Bellman, Stevens, Fang, Beall
(N.J.) Jr., Taft, Saxbe, Scott (Pa.),
CR3 Buckley, Gurney, McClure, Weicker, Schweiker and Brooke
Roth and Dale LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd

(W.Va.), Cannon, Bible, Randolph,
Gravel and Hartke

195

The next issue area concerns nuclear energy--specifica11y,
the construction of nuclear reactors. There are two votes here.
The first is an an amendment to a 1961 nuclear energy bill to cut

funds for a new reactor in Hanford, Washington.

FOR AGAINST

most LDs mast CR3

LRS Javits, Aiken, Smith most OSDS

(Me.), Cooper and Kuchel LRs Saltonstall, Boggs, Fang,

Beall Sr., Scott (Pa.), Keating
and Cannon

LDs Ellender, Long (La.) and
Smathers.

The other vote is on an amendment to cut reduced funds for

construction of a breeder reactor at Clinch River, Tennessee.

FOR CUT AGAINST CUT
most LDs most CRs
most LRs most OSDs
most NSDs CND Zorinsky

LRs Schweiker, Heinz and Stevens
NSDs Johnston (La.) and Huddleston
LDs Long (La.), Sasser, Cannon,
Eagleton, Melcher, Burdick,
Magnuson, Jackson, Bayh and
Stevenson

Aggregation of Cleavages(into Cleavage Sets)

Having summarized the alignments on each vote in this way,
we may now try to group the resulting cleavages into larger groups
which involve several issues. To simplify the following discussion,
we will, on the basis of the common perceptions of the significance
of various issues, and the way groups of Senators lined up on them,

identify a "conservative" ("right") and "liberal" ("left") side of

most of the issues, in the ordinary sense of these terms. We may

196

recall that, at the start of this study, this common classification,
used in the press and everyday conversation, was discussed.
Generally speaking, the liberal or leftist favors the use of govern-
ment to achieve equality of condition, while the conservative or
rightist opposes this because he is generally less favorable to
government activity—-at least if this is used to achieve equality

of condition. This distinction is made solely for the sake of
simplifying the following discussion, and further meaning should not
be read into the terms. Consequently, further precision in these
definitions is unnecessary.

During the time period covered by this study, liberals
favored higher spending than did conservatives on food stamps, social
security, unemployment compensation, AFDC, food stamps (including
those for strikers), rent subsidies and other housing programs,
education, health programs, public works programs (especially those
for providing public works jobs), the 0E0 and other poverty programs
(the National Service Corps, Youth Training, Youth Conservation
Corps, Area Redevelopment), child care (including day care), legal
services for the poor, mass transit, and general appropriations for
the Departments of Labor and HEW, and other "social welfare" spend-
ing, and the overall budget. (Sometimes, conservatives opposed the
program in question entirely.) It follows that liberals were more
apt to favor expanding the coverage of these programs, to favor
setting minimum benefit levels, or raising them, and to favor easier

eligibility requirements for recipients of a program; conservatives

197

were more apt to feel the opposite way. The governor's veto of the
CEO, which would cause less money to be spent on it (as well as
protecting states' rights) was generally opposed by liberals and
favored by conservatives.

Liberals generally favored more regulation of business of
the kinds represented by wage-price controls, rationing, energy
conservation legislation, a consumer protection agency, consumer
product safety and labeling legislation, antitrust laws, and airline
deregulation, while favoring mandating no-fault insurance. Also,
liberals tended to favor stricter legislation regarding pollution
and environmental concerns, and stricter enforcement of it.

Tax legislation presents a more confusing picture. Conser-
vatives tended to want lower taxes but also to want balanced budgets,
and so often to advocate a high tax position; the first desire, for
lower taxes, has tended to win out since about 1977, while the
second, for balanced budgets, tended to be stronger through 1975.
Liberals were similarly torn between a desire to tax business and a
desire to administer a stimulus to the economy; liberals especially
opposed tax cuts that are not heavily weighted in favor of the lower
income groups. All of this applies mainly to income taxes, but
some of it applies to other tax proposals as well. Liberals seem
to want the tax-benefit ratio of social security to be skewed in
relatively egalitarian direction.

In the earlier descriptions of the alignments on the various

votes by issue areas, it was usually the case that the Senators

198

could be grouped into those who were consistently on one side of the
issue, those who were on the other, and those with mixed records. We
have just identified what the conservatives and liberal positions
were on each side of most issues; we can regard the groupings as
being groups of "conservatives", "liberals" and "moderates".

Furthermore, this placing of them into these three groupings
means that there have been two cleavages identified in each issue
area: one separating the conservatives from the moderates, and the
second, to its "left", separating the moderates from the liberals.
Therefore, we may henceforth identify each cleavage as the "right-
ward" or "leftward" cleavage associated with a given issue area.

Now we may attempt to aggregate the various cleavages in
the different issue areas discussed above into sets of similar
cleavages, each set presumably indicating a major underlying ideo-
logical change. The sets of cleavages, along with the adjuncts in

each set and changes within each set, are listed below.

Correspondences Between the Cleavaggs From the Voting
Records and the Cleavages From the Theoretical Model

 

 

The first set of cleavages (the main labor, rightward food
stamps and rightward education, health and housing cleavages, among
others) seem to correspond to that cleavage from the model which
separates the "Left-Progressive" column from the "Right-New Deal"
column. The cleavage from the model is the one which generally cor-

responds ta the conventional notion of what the "conservative"

199

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0000300000 04003 000000 .0 302 000
00000000>00 00000000 .000000 000000 0 00 .000 .0000 .000 .0> .0000 .m 000
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202

—libera1" dichotomy means in modern American politics-—i.e., Ameri-
can politics since the coming of the New Deal.

As has been said, it is commonly defined as a cleavage between
pro— and anti-New Dealers, but as has also been noted, many of the
anti-New Deal conservatives", from circa 1937 on had been New Deal
supporters earlier, or had at least accepted the "basics" of the
New Deal (the Social Security Act and the labor legislation). More-
over, much of the liberal agenda over which they fought dealt with
post-New Deal issues. The examination of the voting records makes
this point still more strongly. The growth in many of the programs
for which the liberals fought wasrun:achieved until Lyndon Johnson's
early Great Society programs (the establishment of the food stamp
program on a permanent basis, and Medicare), or even later in
Johnson's term (large Social Security and AFDC increases) or still
later (the later growth of the food stamp program in the Nixon era).
Hence, in a way we can say that the "New Deal" liberals did not
attain the completion of most of their goals until the Great Society
(or later), and these really should be called "Great Society lib-
erals". However, this would cause confusion with those we have been
calling Great Society liberals, indicating the need for another name
change, and such a modification in terminology will not be attempted
at so a late a point in the paper.

In any case, this cleavage in question seems to have been
the dominant one in American politics since the start of the late

New Deal (circa 1937), when most "progressive" Republicans and many

203

former New Deal Democrats (especially in the South) joined the "con-
servative" Republicans and "conservative" and "irreconciliable"
Democrats (mostly Southern) in a "conservative coalition". In 1937,
it sought to moderate pro-union trends in labor relations and reduce
spending on relief; in the 19605, its goals were not very much dif-
ferent, and the same can be said for those of its liberal opponents.

The second set of cleavages (the AFDC; the leftward food
stamps and the leftward rent and 0E0 cleavages, among others) seem
to correspond to that cleavage from the model which separates the
"New Deal liberals” proper (Right and Left wings considered as a
group) from the "Great Society liberals" (Right and Left wings, con-
sidered as a group). As the discussion of the first set of cleavages
suggested, these cleavages over "Great Society" issues were really
in some ways post-Great Society issues, just as the cleavages over
the "New Deal" issues were really over post—New Deal issues, even
Great Society issues. To some extent, the new era is carried in the
womb of the old. As the New Dealers were enacting most of their
program in the Great Society years, so the Great Society groups were
achieving some of their goals (rent subsidies, greater AFDC spend-
ing, expanded food stamps programs) in the late Johnson and post-
Johnson years.

To some extent, this is still the cleavage Phillips was say-
ing was replacing the "New Deal" cleavage in the 19503 and
especially the 19605, although it now appears that he was also

referring to our New Deal cleavage replacing earlier ones.

204

The third set of cleavages (the leftward social security,
general spending and public works jobs cleavages, the 1977 social
security and 1971 corporate tax cleavages) seems to correspond to
that cleavage on the model which separated rightist (Republican)
liberals (New Deal and Great Society varieties considered together)
from leftist (Democratic) liberals (New Deal and Great Society
varieties considered together). This cleavage appears to have been
around since the New Deal, or at least since the rise of liberal
Republicans as a distinct group, but it generally seems to have been
a subordinate one, which is usually obscured by the more Prominent
first two cleavages. In any case, it does not seem to be one much
talked about in political literature.

The fourth set of cleavages (the wage-price control and
rationing cleavages, and others) seems to correspond to the cleavage
from the model which separates the relatively libertarian rows from
the relatively statist rows, separating in particular the classical
liberals (conservatives) from the statist Right-Progressives (the
Rightist corporate liberals). Of the first five sets of cleavages,
this is the only one which involves the liberty dimension rather
than the equality dimension. The history of this cleavage has seldom
been enunciated, as its nature and separate existence have seldom
been perceived in political literature.

The fifth set of cleavages (the legal services, Consumer
Protection Agency and rightward 0E0 cleavages, among others) seems
to correspond to the cleavage on the model which separate the Left-

Progressive and Right-Progressive columns. This cleavage in the

205

model is the one which would seem at first to be the principal one
of the Progressive Era, but from other viewpoints, the matter is not
so clear. In any case, it is the one Hofstadter focuses on. It
most clearly showed itself in that era in income tax questions, and
seems to represent the principal egalitarian-inegalitarian cleavage
of the antitrust struggles. (The fourth set of cleavages, in the
voting records, discussed above, may represent the libertarian-
statist cleavage of the antitrust struggles.) However, the program
on the left side of this cleavage did not become implemented until
the middle New Deal (circa 1935-37) in the form of higher taxes,
especially on business, utility company divestiture laws, and a less
tolerant attitude toward big business under the antitrust laws. And
soon (circa 1937), people were distracted by another cleavage--the
first one discussed here. Nonetheless, this fifth cleavage has
occasionally managed to show itself, principally on tax questions
and questions of the regulation of business, but also in certain
aspects of the poverty program (where the emphasis on "a hand-up
instead of a hand-out" is suggestive of the qualified egalitarianism
of this position).

We may summarize these correspondences as follows:

 

206

TABLE 4.--Summary of Correspondences Between Cleavages From Voting Records and Cleavages From

the Theoretical Model.

 

Cleavages Prom Voting Records Cleavages

Cleavages From Theoretical Model:

 

Number Included in Set Categories Separated By 1t
1 labor (main). social security (rightward). Left-Progressive vs. Right New Deal
food stamps (righward). education (right-
ward), housing (rightward), etc.
2 AFDC. food stamps (leftward), rent (left- Great Society vs. New Deal
ward). GEO (leftward), etc. liberal Liberal
3 social security (leftward). general Left (Democratic) Right (Republi-
spending (leftward). economic development. Great Society and vs. can) Great
public works (leftward). 1977 social Left (Democratic) Society and
security formula and 1971 and 1978 New Deal Liberals Right (Republi-
corporate tax can) New Deal
Liberal
4 wage-price controls. rationing. etc. Left and Right Left and Right
Great Society: vs. Great Society:
Statist Anti-Statist
left and Right vs. Left and Right
New Deal Statist New Deal: Anti-
Statist
Left-Progressive vs. Left-Progressive
Statist (Left- Anti-Statist
Corporate liberal)
Right-Progessive: vs. Classical Liberal
Statist (Right- (Conservative) and
Corporate Liberal) Right-Progres-
sive: Anti-
Statist
5 Nat. Consumer Co-operative Bank. 050 Left Progressive vs. Classical Liberal

(rightward). etc.

(Statist and Anti-
Statist)

(Conservative) and
Right Progressive:
(Statist and Anti-
Statist)

207

Groups Produced Dy the Cleavages, and Their Correspondences

 

to Categories From the Theoretical Model

 

If this apparent correspondence between the cleavages of

the model and those suggested by the voting records is genuine, then

it follows that the various groups into which the Senators are

separated by the cleavages derived from the voting records should

correspond to the categories of the model.

The groups of Senators that are produced by these cleavages,

and their correspondences with the categories in the model are as

follows:

TABLE 5.--Groups Produced By Cleavages From the Voting Records and
Their Correspondences With the Categories of the Theore-

tical Model.

 

Stands on Category From Model
Cleavages to Which Group Cor—
Group 1 2 3 4 5 responds

 

Members of Group

 

l C C C C C Classical Liberal
(Conservative and
Right Progressive
Anti-Statist)

2 C C C L C Right Progressive:
Statist

3 C C C C L Left Progressive:
Anti-Statist

4 C C C L L Left Progressive:
Statist

S L C C C L Right (Republican)
New Deal: Anti-
Statist

Most conservative Repub-
licans such as Goldwater,
Curtis and Garn, plus
conservative Northern
Democrats Zorinsky and
Lausche

A few conservative
Republicans, such as
Roth

A few conservative
Republicans, such as
Dole and Domenici

A few conservative
Republicans, such as Baker

Some liberal Republicans
such as Fong and Aiken

208

 

Stands on Category From Model
Cleavages to Which Group Cor-

 

 

 

Group 2 3 4 5 responds Members of Group
6 C C L L Right (Republican) A few liberal Republicans,
New Deal: Statist such as Taft and Beall
Jr.
7 L C C L Right (Republican) A few liberal Republicans,
Great Society: such as Hatfield
Anti-Statist
8 L C L L Right (Republican) Some, if not most, lib—
Great Society: eral Republicans, such
Statist as Weicker, Mathias and
Javits
9 C L C L Left (Democratic) 0f doubtful existence,
New Deal: Anti- but may include a few
Statist liberal Democrats such
as Harris and Montoya
10 C L L L Left (Democratic) Some liberal Democrats
New Deal: Statist such as Robert Byrd,
Cannon and Bible
11 L L C L Left (Democratic) Some liberal Democrats,
Great Society: such as McGovern
Anti-Statist
12 L L L L Left (Democratic) Most liberal Democrats,

Great Society:
Statist

such as Humphrey, the
Kennedys and Jackson

 

Several other conceivable groups are not listed here, having

a doubtful existence due to the way the cleavages tend to scale.

Cleavages one, five and three tend to scale, in that order; cleavages

one, five and two tend to scale, in that order.

Such deviations

from these scales are so few (or so partial) that they may be ignored

for now.

209

Several of the listed groups are very minor. Group 7 is
an anti-statist variant of Group 8, Group 6 is a statist variant of
Group 5, and Group 9 (if it exists at all) is an anti-statist variant
of Group 10. These are are all so small, and so little different

from their larger relatives, that they can be largely ignored as

separate groups hereafter. Most of what is said about their respec-
tive larger relatives will probably apply to them.

Groups 2, 3, 4 and 11 are small groups of uncertain boundaries
and memberships (especially 11), but they are interesting and impor-
tant groups, especially 2, 3 and 4, which seem to represent groups
which were larger and more important in the past.

It may be noticed that the position of the Southern Senators
have not yet been mentioned much. These will be dealt with later.

We may now review the main groups in more detail.

Group 1 (Classical Liberals or Conservatives), includes
conservative Republicans Goldwater, Curtis, Simpson, Tower,
Hickenlooper, Butler (Md.), Buckley, Laxalt, Garn, Hatch, Helms,
Fannin, Williams (Del.), Schoeppel, Mundt, Hruska, Dworshak, Bartlett
(Oklagh Hansen, Bridges, Capehart, Schmitt, wallop and Brock, and
usually conservative Republicans Thurmond, Scott (Va.), Cotton,
Dominick, Bennett, Gurney, Jordan (Id.), Murphy, McClure, Lugar,
Dirksen, Hayakawa, Carlson, Allott, and Morton, and conservative
Northern Democrats Lausche and Zorinsky. The history of this group
before the New Deal is difficult to trace, if it was even one, self-

conscious group, but roughly it seems to have composed the

210

"conservative" (as opposed to "progressive" and "corporate liberal")
elements in both major parties then. With the coming of the New
Deal, we may identify it with those opposed to the New Deal from the
beginning. Later, it seems to have constituted the Taft-Goldwater
wing of the Republican party (and perhaps, later, the Reagan wing
as well, although Gerald Ford had been a moderate or borderline
member of the group, too).

The members of this group outside the South have been over-
whelmingly Republican since the end of the New Deal and, as will be
seen, the "conservative" Southern Democrats do not really fit here.
Its headquarters was in the East before the New Deal, but moved to
the Midwesttnrthe time it was over. Since, the 19503, it has moved
increasingly toward the West and, to a lesser extent, the South
("the Sunbelt" regions).

Group 2 (Right-Progressive Statists, or Right—Corporate
Liberals), probably includes Roth, and perhaps Danforth and Griffin.
This group constituted the less egalitarian wing of the corporate
liberals in the Progressive Era. Perhaps the candidacy of Leonard
Wood in 1920 best represents it. Later, this group supported the
early New Deal, but was alienated by its leftward moves in 1935 and
later. Probably mostly Republican (in the North) by the end of the
New Deal, some of the more rightist of the Dewey-Eisenhower "liberal"
Republicans belong in this group. John Connally would seem to
represent this group today, but not being a Senator, it is hard to
know which Senators he resembles most. Most of the members today

are probably Republicans of a "conservative" reputation.

 

211

In the Progressive Era, this group was probably strongest in
the East and in urban areas, but as labor influence grew in the
cities (and they moved left) this group probably transferred its
base to the suburbs, and later toward the Sunbelt (although they are
not as plentiful among Senators there as the prominence of people
such as Connally might suggest).

Group 3 and Group 4 (the Left-Progressive, Anti-Statist
and Statist branches, respectively) probably include Dole, Domenici,
Young (N.Dak.) and Hayakawa, and sometimes others (Group 3); and Baker
and sometimes Griffin and others (Group 4). These groups probably
constituted the main body of left and center "progressives" in the
Progressive Era. Their more radical members (LaFollette, Bryan and
the like) are better known than their moderate members, but the
latter may have been more common, and were probably more what
Hofstadter had in mind when he described the progressives. Probably
most would be anti—statist by today's standards; Hoover was a good
example of this. Statist ones were nonetheless probably found as
well. After 1937, these groups were increasingly alienated from the
New Deal, and most of their members (in the North) probably became
Republican, as many already were. Most of the "progressives"
eventually came to be seen as conservatives, as they generally are
today. In the present, as in the past, their strongholds (or at
least those of the anti-statist branch) seem to be in non-metropoli-

tan areas, especially in the western Midwest and the West.

212

It seems also that a large portion of the Dewey-Eisenhower
wing of the Republican party belongs in the more statist of these
groups. This largely urban group, concentrated in the East and
eastern Midwest, seems to share this intermediate position on the
equality dimension with the older progressive Republicans, and to
differ with most of them, and with the conservatives, mainly in being
more statist.

Group 5 (Right-New Deal Anti-Statists) and Group 6 (Right-
Great Society Anti-Statists) are composed of liberal Republicans. The
former group probably consists of Fong, Boggs, Smith, Aiken, Saxbe,
Packwood, Cook, and often, Kuchel, Cooper, Prouty, Beall Sr. and
Scott (Pa.): in their later years, Pearson, and, sometimes, Bellmon,
voted with this group. The latter group consists of Weicker, Staf-
ford, Mathias, Javits, Brooke, Case, Goodell, Schweiker (in his early

days) and usually Percy, Prouty, Hatfield, Scott (Pa.), Cooper and

Stevens (in his early days). Both of these groups were probably part
of the Wilkie-Dewey-Eisenhower wing of the Republican party in the
19405 and 19505, but seemed to grow dissatisfied with Eisenhower,
during his presidency, as being insufficiently liberal. They seem
generally to have supported Rockefeller in his quest for the presi-
dency. It seems that the differences between the two groups did not
become noticeable until after the 1966 elections, when newer liberal
Republicans, mostly from Group 6, began to enter the Senate. The
difference was usually not obvious, and seems to have been increas-

ingly obscured as the country has moved to the right. These groups,

213

especially the second, were mainly headquartered in urban areas,
especially in the East and eastern Midwest.

Group 10 and Group 12 are both composed of liberal Democrats.
Group 10 (the Left-New Deal:Statist category) includes Byrd (W.Va.),
Bible, and Cannon, sometimes Anderson (N.Mex.), Kerr, Monroney, Hayden,
Harris, Montoya, Randolph, Symington, Long (Mo.), Fulbright, Smathers,
Gore and Mansfield. Also, Southerners such as Long (La.), Sparkman
and Johnston (S.C.) and sometimes Ellender and Hill, seem to belong
here. Moynihan would seem to belong here on the basis of his repu-
tation as a one-time liberal alienated by the policies of the late
Johnson years, but his voting record is too short to confirm this.
Group 12 (the Left-Great Society: Statist category) is composed of
Hart (Mich.), Clark (Pa.), Culver, E. Kennedy (Mass.), Sarbanes,
Humphrey, Mondale, Metzenbaum, Tydings, Kennedy (N.Y.), Muskie,
Hathaway, Engle, Brewster, Hughes, McCarthy, Stevenson, Glenn, Pell,
Pastore, Williams, Inouye, Matsunaga, Jackson, Magnuson, Moss, McGee,
Riegle, Haskell, and Metcalf, (usually) Douglas, MacNamara, Young
(Ohio), Neuberger, Morse, Carroll, McGee, Bartlett (Alas.), Burdick,
Dodd, Mansfield, Biden, Leahy, McIntyre, Durkin, Harris, Clark (Ia.),
Montoya, Nelson, Cranston, Abourezk, Hart (Col.), Symington, Long
(Mo.), Randolph, Montoya, Anderson (N.Mex.), Hayden, Kerr, Gore,
Fulbright, and Smathers, and sometimes Tunney, McGovern, Eagleton,
Gravel, Hartke, and Church.

These two groups, together with the two liberal Republican

groups mentioned above, constituted the main support for Roosevelt's

214

New Deal after 1937 and for later liberal programs, although the
Republican groups were somewhat more frugal and tolerant of corpora-
tions in the area of taxes. These groups did not generally come
apart until the 19603, as was the case with the two liberal Republi-
can groups, and usually came apart over similar issues--most1y wel-
fare and welfare—related issues. Members of Group 10 were generally
less urban and more apt to be found in the western, southern, and
border states than the mainly urban members of Group 12. Those
members of the electorate who would probably fall into Group 10 were
often alienated from the Democrats in the Johnson era, going for
Wallace and, to lesser extent, Nixon in 1968, and for Nixon in 1972.
Most of the "neo-conservatives" probably belong here. By the late
1970s, the differences between groups 10 and 12, as was the case
with the differences between Groups 5 and 8, began to be submerged
as the country moved to the right.

The last group to be considered, Group 11 (the Left-Great
Society: Anti-Statist category) is composed of liberal Democrats.
Church, Hartke, Gravel, Eagleton, McGovern and Tunney should be
placed here, while Abourezk, Hart (Colo), Nelson, Cranston, Clark
(Ia.), Montoya, and Harris often approach this position, and Douglas,
McNamara, Young (Ohio), Neuberger, Morse, Carroll, McGee, Bartlett
(Alsk.) and Burdick have been known to. The history of this group
is typically liberal Democratic, as is its behavior in most economic

issues.

215

A Special Problem: The Place of the Southern Democrats

Now we may consider what to do with the Southern Democrats.
As has been said, some (Yarborough, Kefauver, Harris, Gore,
Fulbright, Smathers, Monroney and Kerr) voted much like Northern

liberal Democrats. Yarborough and Kefauver would fit very well

 

into Group 12, and Gore and Harris would fit almost as well. E
Fulbright,auuiSmathers would diverge somewhat in the direction of
Group 10, and Monroney and Kerr would do more so. All except the
first two Senators sometimes diverge from the liberals of Group 12 ;
on labor issues. t

Also included with the liberal Democrats in the survey sec-
tion were Long (La.), Sparkman, Johnston (S.D.), Ellender and Hill.
These generally, as has been said, seem to fit in with Group 10.

In some ways they form a transition between the liberal group above
and the more conservative Southerners to be described below. As a
group, they tend to vote as follows: conservative on cleavage two,
conservative on labor issues, and variable on other issues. Long,
Sparkman and (as far as can be ascertained) Johnston tend further to
be liberal on cleavage one, liberal or moderate on cleavage five,
moderate to liberal on cleavage three, and moderate on cleavage four.

Another group of Southern Democrats is the New South
Democrats. They tend to fall between groups 10 and 12, usually
being closer to 10, while they tend to be more conservative on labor
issues than either. They might best be divided into two groups.

The groups which is father to the left contains Bumpers, Ford and

216

Huddleston; the one to its right contains Bentsen, Stone, Chiles,
Hollings, and Morgan, and, on its rightward edge, Nunn, and usually
Johnston (La.). The two groups divide over a few issues, such as
the Social Security vote of 1977. This tends to make the rightward
group similar to Groups 6 and 5 (the Right-New Deal categories).
Finally, we come to the Old Southerners. They are commonly
seen as being very similar to the conservative Republicans on econo—
mic issues (and, in fact, on most issues, except racial issues.)
And it is true that the two groups tend to vote alike more often
than not. However, in a large minority of cases, they diverge.
These divergences consist mostly of those over social security (the
rightward one), public works and public works jobs (the rightward
ones), and school lunches in 1970, and passage of the 1969 tax bill--
and certain other taxes (the 1969 surtax extension and the 1977 tax
cut). Most of these relate to the sixth or seventh set of cleavages.
As was discussed above, the sixth set of cleavages most clearly
represents a conservative Republicans-versus-Old Southerners cleavage
as the seventh set tends to cut across the groups. It is in any case
clear that the Old Southerners are a separate group from the conser-
vative Republicans, who mostly belong to the Classical Liberal
category (though not exclusively--remember Roth, etc.). The ques-
tion now is one of where Old Southerners are to be placed. They are
clearly more statist, overall, then Classical Liberals, as their
position on the issues of set six indicate. They are to the right of

the other cleavages on the scale--those of sets one, two, three and

217

five——for the most part. So they seem to be inegalitarian and
statist. Yet they differ from such inegalitarian statists as Roth
on most cleavages of set six.

A possible explanation of their position, which is somewhat
bizarre, yet is in accord with many of the historical facts, is that
their "leftist" position on set six actually shows them to be the
right of (more inegalitarian than) the classical liberals. This
assumes the truth of the theory suggested in the first part of this
work, which described the theoretical model being tested--namely,
that the old-style Southerners are really traditionalist conserva—
tives. If this is true, then their embracing of seemingly leftist
propositions is not unusual: it is parallelled by the behavior of
Disraeli and Bismarck. Whether this is the result of a desire to
hinder an economic and political rival (Northern business), or a
feeling of pure spite for their bourgeois social rivals or a pater—
nalistic attitude twoard the lower classes, or a feeling that the
burdens of the programs on question will not fall very much on their
own shoulders (being carried partly by the beneficiaries, in the
case of certain "social insurance" programs, and/or partly by the
bourgeois businessmen), or some combinations of these motives is
unclear, but it is not vital for the purposes of this work to deter-
mine which. Suffice it to say that the Traditionalist Right and the
Socialist Left have often joined hands against the Classical Liberal

Center.

218

This interpretation of the Old South Democrats would not be
likely to be accepted by those who see the South as part of a bour-
geois liberal American consensus, among others. Another interpre-
tation of their behavior is that it is slightly populistic, in the
sense of being an indication of agrarian and petit-bourgeois dislike
of Northern big business. This sentiment was once regarded as
leftist, but with leftward drift of the political center in this
century it now seems moderately conservative. This theory, however,
seems weak, in view of the strong conservatism of this group on some
economic issues--on some legal services votes and on the 1968 HUD
vote, for example, more conservative Republicans take the liberal
position than do Old South Democrats; and in view of what Kousser
and others have to say about the success and future extent of
Populism in the South after the 18903.

More plausible is a variant of this view, which says that
the behavior of the Old South Democrats represents a regional
reaction of local big businessmen and big farmers, as well as small
businessmen and small farmers, to the threat of domination by out-
siders (i.e. Northern big businessmen). It is thus a case of rela-
tively conservative forces adopting leftdwing tools. This practice
seems to be common in the so-called Third World, among "conserva-
tives" who defend the positions of local elites, internally, while
joining the Left in trying to restrain American influence. This
explanation of Old South Democrat behavior is the safest and most

conservative.

219

There is some variety within the Old Southern group. Talmadge,
and to a lesser extent, Ervin and Jordan, are the most liberal, at
least in the sense of being egalitarian. Housing, education and the
establishment of the CEO are issues over which they have been known
to diverge from the rest. The most anti-statist and also the most
like the Republicans are the Harry Byrds and Robertson. Frequently
allied with them were Allen, or Ervin and Jordan, or Russell or
Holland (in different circumstances). The issues on this dimension
which most divided the group were ordinary public works, the Labor-
HEW funds vote of 1976, wage-price controls and rationing. Eastland,
Stennis and, to a lesser extent, McClellan, are relatively statist
and relatively inegalitarian.

Cleavage Sets From the Voting Records Which Do
Not Correspond to Cleavages From the Model

 

A number of the sets of cleavages mentioned above (the sixth
through the thirteenth) do not clearly correspond to the major
cleavages of the model. We may now consider how some of these may
be fitted in and what their historical significance may be.

The sixth and seventh sets of cleavages seem to involve the
liberty dimension more than the equality dimension, which makes them
seek like the fourth set of cleavages but unlike the first, second,
third and fifth sets. This is said for two reasons. One is because
the proposals involved seem less clearly egalitarian than most of
those involved in the other sets of cleavages--public works and

general social security increases as opposed to labor proposals,

220

food stamps, AFDC, anti-poverty measures and low-income housing.
The second reason is that these cleavages do somewhat parallel those
in set four (wage—price controls, rationing, etc.) Many of those
who are "liberal" on the cleavages of set four while being "conser-
vative on the others (of sets one, two, three and five) are "liberal"
on these cleavages of sets six and seven. These include a few
conservative Republicans such as Roth and most Old Southerners.

The cleavages of set seven (ordinary public works and Labor-
HEW funds in 1976) seem to be to the "right", or better, "above"
those of set four (if the liberty dimension is seen as being verti-
cal, with libertarianism at the top and statism at the bottom)
in regard to the Republicans, as various of them (such as Young of
North Dakota, Dole, Baker, Griffin, Roth and Domenici) seem to be
below at least some of these cleavages, but above those of set four.
(Things are different regarding the relationship of the cleavages
among Old Southerners: the cleavages of set seven are even with or
below those of set four.)

Insofar as the seventh and fourth sets of cleavages tend
to scale in this way, they might be identified with some of the
historical steps on the road to statism. The seventh set (ordinary
public works and Labor-HEW funds) may be the one to really repre-
sent the main cleavages between those who have accepted the lasting
changes wrought by the New Deal and those who have not, insofar as
these involved broadly-directed government spending, especially

that on public works and social security. In both the seventh set

221

and the New Deal cleavages, opposition to these things came from
conservative Republicans and a few Democrats, mostly Southern
(including Harry Byrd, Sr.), while almost everyone else supported
them. Besides public works and the programs under Social Security
act, other things brought by the New Deal include labor legislation,
various measures (such as attempts to provide public control of
water power through the TVA) to help people break away from excessive
dependence on big business, and (after 1935) a less tolerant anti-
trust policy toward business. The first two of these involve the
equality dimension more than the liberty dimension and the issue of
statism. The third, antitrust, would seem to do even more; however,
our examination of the Progressive Era showed that business often
supports or comes to support government regulation. And the revision
of the antitrust law of 1976 (which generally tightened the restric—
tiveness of the law) got the support of some Senators with otherwise
quite inegalitarian voting records (e.g. Roth and Harry Byrd Jr.):
indeed, it is very similar in its cleavages to the issues of the
seventh set of cleavages, differing mainly in that most Old South-
erners opposed it. This proposal would seem, then, to represent
something like the stand of the more aggressive (but not necessarily
egalitarian) regulationists. And so it seems to roughly fit in
with set seven, and confirm its status as a New Deal-versus-anti-
New Deal cleavage.

The fourth set of cleavages (rationing, wage-price controls,

etc.) may have its own historical implications. During the New

222

Deal, even in its early days, "progressive" Republicans (as described
by Feinman) seem to have feared Franklin Roosevelt's statist tenden-
cies, particularly his tendency to strengthen the executive and the
bureaucracy, and to support concentration of power in the state as
in business. Similarly, "Modern Republicans" of the 19408 and 19508
often joined their conservative fellow partisans in denouncing the
New Deal 5 tendency toward government economic planning. Usually,
this meant Keynesian deficit spending, rationing and wage-price
controls (at least in peacetime), and any proposal for more explicit
government direction of the economy. In our vote list, we have no
good examples of the last, nor of votes on deficits per se. There
are votes on public works jobs, which are intended as Keynesian
economic stimulus, but these belong in the sixth set of cleavages.
This leaves rationing and wage-price controls. These do belong in
the fourth set of cleavages, and were often denounced by Modern
Republicans (although Eisenhower accepted stand-by wage-price control
and authority), and involve a strong executive and bureaucracy, and
concentration of power, which most progressive Republicans disliked.
Our fourth set of cleavages, therefore, may represent this histori-
cal cleavage.

The seventh and fourth sets of cleavages thus seem to cor-
respond to the two cleavages on the liberty dimension indicated in
Figure 26. The cleavages of set seven would correspond to those
separating the Conservative category and that with Hoover in it from

those with Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson, Al Smith, Theodore Roosevelt,

223

Hamilton and John Connally in them. The cleavages of set four

would correspond to that separating the Conservative category and
those with Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson and Al Smith in them from those
with Theodore Roosevelt, Hamilton and Connally in them. Those in
between the two cleavages (the likes of Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson

and Al Smith) would seem to be the sort of people who can tolerate

a large quantity of "big government" (in terms of legislation, spend-
ing and/or taxes), while still being quite fearful that government
will get too powerful.

The cleavages of set six (social security, public works jobs,
school lunches in 1975 and the 1969 tax bill) are somewhat different
from those of set seven. Conservative Republicans, including even
some, such as Roth, who were below the sixth set, tend to be united
in being above or to the right of the seventh set of cleavages,
while Old Southerners, including some, such as Harry Byrd, Jr., who
were above the seventh set of cleavages, tend to be united in being
below the cleavages in the sixth set, as are most other Democrats,
and most liberal Republicans. While set seven resembles set four
considerably--both of them putting most Republicans in opposition
to many if not most Old Southerners--set seven tends to unite the
conservative Republicans and Old Southerners internally while divid-
ing them from each other, whereas set six tends (as set four does)
to cut across the boundaries between the conservative Republicans
and Old Southerners. Moreover, set six tends to join Old Southerners

——who have reputations of being as conservative, or even more

224

conservative, than the conservative Republicans—dwith liberal Demo-
crats and liberal Republicans. The implications of these findings
will be discussed below, when the Old Southerners are discussed.

Perhaps this divergence between these two "conservative"
groups reflects some underlying Democratic versus Republican cleavage
which gives the party differences real meaning. The cleavages of
set eight seem to exemplify such a distinction more clearly. In
general, it seems that, while cleavages over welfare-type and labor-
type issues tend to cut across party lines, certain tax issues and
certain spending programs of broad coverage (social security) or
macroeconomic implication (public works) tend to correspond to party
lines, in many cases. However, the evidence on this which is found
in the data here does not warrant stressing this matter very strongly,
and we will say little more of this.

The cleavages of set nine and ten are of uncertain origin.
They suggest the old Democratic-versus-Whig battles over internal
improvements, which later become Democrat-versus—Republican battles.
By the time of the Wilson Adminstration, however, even most Democrats
seem to have come to accept spending on certain kinds of improve-
ments (e.g. road building) and related aids to economic activity
(e.g. loans to farmers). So it is not surprising that even most
conservative Republicans today like to spend federal money on some
domestic projects. In regard to some, such as certain hOSpital and
education appropriations (cleavage set nine), they join the great

majority of other Senators in supporting the projects. In regard

225

to others, such as aiding Lockheed, providing money for an SST,
granting near-monopoly status to a private company in connection
with the Communications Satellite, constructing certain water pro-
jects without charging user fees, and sharing funds with local
governments, most of those known as liberals have been known to
oppose them, the liberals generally not favoring the groups being
aided, and thus reverse the normal stands of the groups on federal
domestic spending.

This leads us to the eleventh set of cleavages. These seem
to involve regional coalitions, and thus suggest that constituency
interests are exercising an overriding effect on these.

The twelfth set of cleavages may represent the division,
which appeared in the 19608 among liberal Democrats, between
upholders of the "consensus" politics of the 19508 and its various
manifestations (including the latest version of corporate liberalism
and, in non-economic matters, a bipartisan foreign policy), and their
criticscnmthe left. This division appeared most prominently over
the Vietnam War, but involved other issues.

The thirteenth set of cleavages seems to separate from the
main body of liberals those "liberal" Republicans who sometimes
dragged their feet on various items of the liberal agenda in the
Kennedy years, but then came to support them in the Johnson years
(at least from 1965 on). Perhaps these cleavages represent the basis
(along with the first set of cleavages) for setting-up a category

of truly moderate Republicans (opposed to merely moderately liberal

226

Republicans) between the right and left wings of the party, but the
evidence does not yet seem to warrant a clear decision in favor of

doing this.

227

ENDNOTES

1A step by step description of a procedure used in making
an analysis similar to that done here, showing how issues cleavages
may be aggregated and then used to create groups into which indi-
viduals may be placed is providedzhnHarold J. Spaeth's Supreme Court
PolicyiMaking: Explanation and Prediction (San Francisco: W. H.
Freeman and Company, 1979), especially on pp. 128-137.

21h addition to prior study and preliminary examination of
the records, some ideas for the arrangement of names were obtained
from Michael Foley's The New Climate: Liberal Influence on a Con-
servative Institution 1959-1972 (New Haven: Yale university Press,
1972), particularly the voting tables in the back of the book.

 

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Our examination of the evidence has generally confirmed the
existence and importance of the cleavages and groups in the model,
and supplied us with additional information.

The existence of a liberty dimension was confirmed, as was
the existence of the various cleavages from the model: the Progres-
sive (and conservative)-ver8us-New Deal, or Conservative-Liberal
cleavage (identified with the first set of cleavages); the New Deal
liberal (and conservative)-versus-Great Society liberal cleavage
(identified with the second set of cleavages); the Republican and
Old Southern-versus-liberal Democrat cleavage (identified with the
third set of cleavages); the relatively statist-versus—relatively
anti-statist cleavage (identified with the fourth set of cleavage)
and the Left Progressive-versus-Right Progressive (and conservative)
cleavage (identified with the fifth set of cleavages).

Other cleavages were also found. Some contrast between
conservative Republicans and Old Southerners had been expected, but
not so great a one as was found. And the frequency with which the
Old Southerners voted with the liberal Democrats was greater than
what was expected. Also, the practice of liberal and conservative
Republicans joining forces against these two wings of the Democrats,
which occurred on several occasions, was not expected.

228

229

The other cleavage of major interest that was found was
another one along the liberty dimension, which seems to be related
to New Deal issues, particularly on public works. This allows a
refinement of the liberty dimension, which was nonetheless implied
in the description of the model.

The work which has been done in this thesis has helped to
shed light on a number of problems in American political history:
(1) Progressives in the New Deal era. The "progressives"
are commonly seen as the "(modern) liberals" (in the conventional
sense) of the Progressive Era. Yet many of them opposed the New
Deal, a supposedly "liberal" program. Some see this opposition as
the result of frustrated ambition or the possession of prickly or
uncooperative dispositions on the part of individual progressives.
However, we should consider the possibility that their opposition
arose from ideological differences with the New Deal. This need
not mean that they were really "conservative", in the Progressive-
Era sense, but rather that they were somewhere in between these
conservatives and the New Dealers. In other words, they wished to
move the country to the left of where it was, but only so far left,
and the New Deal went beyond this point. The situation seem to be
clarified considerably if concepts from this paper's model are used,
especially the Left-Progressive and New Deal categories, as con-
trasted with each other, and the liberty dimension, as contrasted

with the equality dimension.

230

(2) New Deal and Great Society liberals. The 19608 saw
many formerly loyal supporters of the New Deal liberal Democratic
coalition desert the party, in apparent opposition to the policies
of the Great Society. George Wallace (in 1968) and Richard Nixon
(in 1968 and 1972) seem to have won the support of many of these
voters. What was the nature of their disagreement with the liberal
leaders? As in the case of the progressives in the New Deal, we
seem to have the case of people who wanted to move the country left
at one time, but only so far left; now the political situation in
the country had gone beyond that point, and they were now on the
right.

(3) The Progressive Era itself. The ideological complexity
of this era, above and beyond personality conflicts, seems to be well-
recognized. In particular, the nature of "corporate liberalism"
needs to be determined more precisely. Is it merely liberalism as
advocated by the corporations, or a special, moderate kind of
liberalism, or something neither wholly liberal nor wholly conserva-
tive? There is a need for concepts from this work--the contrasts
between the equality and liberty dimensions, between Right and Left
Progressivism, between radical and moderate Left Progressives,
etc., and there seems to be room for considerable further analysis
of this kind.

(4) The ideological position of Herbert Hoover. This man's
philosophy was clearly quite complex, as he was a man of many

contrasts--individualist yet regulatory technocrat, quasi-corporatist

231

yet would-be trust-buster, foe of socialism and the New Deal yet
advocate of soak-the-rich tax policies. Clearly there is a need
for concepts used in this paper-—particularly the category of
moderately Left-Progressive Anti-Statists, into which he seems to
fit.

(5) The stages of the New Deal. The fact that Franklin
Roosevelt lost some of his supporters with every step of the New
Deal should, in itself, lead people to realize that a scale of
attitudes needs to be applied to this situation. The Anti-statist/
Statist, Right-Progressive[Left-Progressive and Left Progressive/
New Deal dichotomies are needed here.

(6) The conservative—liberal conflict within the post-New
Deal Republican party. The fact that ”liberal Republican" Dwight
Eisenhower was not particularly close ideologically to "liberal
Republicans" such as Jacob Javits shows us the need to discriminate
more finely among Republicans than we do by merely dividing them
into conservative and liberal wings. This suggests that there should
be a scale of attitudes for this situation, with conservative
Republicans, Eisenhower type "Modern Republicans" and more clearly
liberal Republicans such as Javits distinguished from each other.

There are many other area where the sort of analysis done
in this paper would be useful:

(1) Conservatism in the Progressive Era. This is a little—
studied subject. Therefore it is not very surprising that there is
not a clear definition of it, or even a reasonable enumeration of

who these "conservatives" were. So-called conservatives such as

232

President Taft considered themselves progressives and certainly
supported much progressive legislation; the latter can also be said
about people such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. As to people such as
Joseph Cannon, who thought that Taft was too far to the left, their
voting records are not well-known: it would be interesting to see how
much progressive legislation they turn out to have voted for. So

it is clear that much work remains to be done here, and some general
conceptual clarification and definition would be helpful even with-
out (or as preparation for) the conducting of in-depth studies of
them, such as those of their voting records.

(2) Democrats before the New Deal. It is often said that
the Democrats were often quite conservative before the New Deal.

Yet here, too, "conservatism" needs to be defined. "Conservative"

Al Smith, for example, supported much "social insurance" and labor

legislation of the type enacted in the New Deal (of which he was

so critical). Again, we see a lack of the sense of the often rela-
tive nature of the terms "conservative" and "liberal" (and "right"

and "left").

(3) The ideological position of Coolidge, Harding and their
supporters in the 19208. They are called "conservatives", usually
in contrast to being "progressives"--yet they repealed very little
Progressive Era legislation. Some say that they used existing
regulations and commissions to help business rather than to restrain
it--but this is nothing new to modern students of the Progressive

Era. It is simply "corporate liberalism"--and it must be remembered

233

that "corporate liberals" are "liberal" in some sense, and so a
simple labeling of them as conservatives is not enough.

(4) wendell Wilkie and Thomas Dewey. The two are often
classed together as "moderate" or "liberal", "internationalist"
opponents of Robert Taft. Yet it also has been argued that Wilkie
was more liberal than Dewey-ébut was he? This is a matter which
should be settled, if only because it may relate to later cleavages
among moderate-to—liberal Rebpublicans.

(5) The "neo-conservatives". This term refers to various
people, such as Daniel P. Moynihan, who had once been regarded (by
themselves and others) as liberal and were not often in opposition
to other liberals, and were sometimes called conservatives, even
though they generally claimed not to have changed. Their deviation
from mainstream liberalism has been attributed by some to personality
factors, as was the opposition of many progressives to the New Deal.
As in the previous case, we recommend considering an ideological
explanation. It seems that these "neo-conservatives" probably fit
in the category of New Deal liberals alienated by the Great Society,
described above.

(6) The Reagan-Ford battle for the Republican Presidential
nomination in 1976. Was this a revival of the Taft-Willkie, Taft—
Dewey and Taft-Eisenhower battles of earlier decades? Or was it an
internal struggle within the Taft-Goldwater wing of the Republican
party? It would also be interesting to know to what extent this

cleavage was a revival of much earlier cleavages that had become

234

suppressed as politics had moved left, causing these groups to put
aside their quarrels in the face of a greater enemy to the left.

(7) We should ascertain for certain whether the "supply-side"
versus "monetarist" conflict among conservatives in recent years
represents the same as cleavage as the Reagan-Ford conflict.

(8) The ideological positions of Richard Nixon and Jimmy
Carter. That they are difficult to determine seems to be widely
accepted, so few will dispute that they need further examination.

(9) The ideology of Southern politicians. There are still
many disputes about the South to be settled, as has already been
indicated. However, in addition, we have discovered a surprising
amount of economic liberalism in such supposedly ultraconservative
Senators as Eastland and Stennis, which provides another puzzle to
solve.

This sort of study can be extended still further, to various
non-economic issue areas (foreign affairs; racial issues, crime and
other "social issues"; etc.). The field of classification in those
areas is at about the level of development as it is in the area of
economic issues: typologies with only two, three or four categories
and only one dimension is about as much as is generally achieved in
these areas. Then, of course, one may try to integrate these typo-
logies in those areas with each other and with those in the economic
area. This seldom gets beyond a four-category, two-dimensionsl

classification, based on conservative-liberal dichotomies in

235

the areas of economics and foreign affairs, or economics and social
issues.

Furthermore, we may hope that ideological classifications may
be extended to other countries. A sort of beginning of this was
included in the action on the theoretical model, when American and
European politics were compared. A wider spectrum may be expected
in European politics, and perhaps greater complexity in terms of the
number of dimensions (e.g. the inclusion of an explicitly religious
dimension); on the other hand, some reduction in dimensions may be
possible (e.g. antitrust issues seem to be of relatively little

importance in Europe).

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