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AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES AND SENATORIAL VOTING RECORDS

By

Gregory Michael Browne

A THESIS

Submitted to
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in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES AND SENATORIAL VOTING RECORDS

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I believe that the conventional ideological classification of Americans into "conservatives" and "liberals" is inadequate. What is required is a classification with several degrees of conservatism and liberalism, and additional dimensions as well. Therefore I constructed a more complex classification, with several categories and two main dimensions, building upon some classifications of others and upon my own ideas.

I wished to see some systematic evidence to support my theories. Therefore I tested them by examining Senatorial voting records from 1959 to 1978. For the sake of making the investigation manageable, the classifications and the voting study dealt with only one issue area--that of economics, which seemed the most important.

The result of this examination was to find moderate to strong support for all major cleavages between the categories of my model, and for other cleavages also.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph (Alvina) Browne.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all of the help I received in writing this thesis from my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph (Alvina) Browne. In addition to raising me and paying for my education, they have provided me with a home and support while I composed the thesis, paid for the course fees and other fees necessary for my getting credit for it, and put up with my work habits for a long time.

Also, to my father belongs credit for drawing the diagrams.

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
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INTRODUCTION

The importance of making an ideological classification of the participants in our political process has been recognized over the years by various people who have created typologies in the attempt to fit political actions into them. However, most of these classifications were simple, with only two, three or four categories, all on one dimension. Consequently, many important figures do not fit into them or fit rather poorly. This is taken by many to suggest that there is not sufficient evidence of patterns in political attitudes to warrant a classification, beyond noting "right" and "left" poles on an axis, with people located at various points along it.

Yet what needs to be considered is whether a more elaborate and subtle classification could compensate for the inadequacies in existing typologies. We contend in this thesis that such a classification can be made, and that it takes the form which will subsequently be outlined. We will then test its meaningfulness by attempting to fit it to current politics by examining Senatorial voting records.

Therefore, this paper will present the proposed new classification and then test it by examining voting records in recent decades. The first part will be based mainly on the reading of secondary sources, including the typologies of others, while the



second part will be based mainly on voting records, a kind of primary source.

This paper will have to put some restraints on its focus in order to be of manageable scope. It was decided to focus on only one issue area, and economics was chosen as the issue area. It was selected because economics is rather basic ideologically; that is, ideologies often derive their stands on other issues from their stands on economic issues. We will elaborate further on this later.

The Senate was selected because it is a more manageable body on which to do a voting study than is the House of Representatives, which is the only real alternative body to study, if one wishes to do a voting study of national politics.

The time frame for the analysis of the voting records also needed to have limits. The slice of time from 1959 to 1978 was selected because twenty years seemed to be the greatest length that such a survey could be and still fit within the proposed scope of this paper; and that particular twenty-year period seemed to encompass the most interesting changes in the recent past.

The first chapter of this thesis will present the proposed classification. It will examine conventional American and European classifications, and typologies of Progressive Era politics (notably those proposed by Richard Hofstadter and James Weinstein), of New Deal politics, and of the Great Society era (especially that proposed by Kevin Phillips), and related matters. As we proceed, a classification will be sketched out. It will have two main dimensions:

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one involving equalitarianism and inegalitarianism and the other involving libertarianism (individualism) and statism (collectivism). Distinctions will be made between the liberalism of the New Deal, of the Great Society and of the Progressive Era, as well as between (modern) liberalism, classical liberalism (modern conservatism) and traditionalist conservatism.

The second chapter will explain the methodology of the analysis of the voting records. It will also include sections on the historical background period to be examined. In the third chapter, the analysis itself will be done. First, we will summarize the votes by issue area, and then aggregate the cleavages produced by the votes into larger cleavages. Second, we will attempt to find correspondences between the cleavages and those of the model. Third, we will see into what groups the aggregate cleavages divide the Senators, and then find the correspondences between the groups and the categories of the model. Finally, the fourth chapter will summarize the paper and discuss applications of this kind of work to other subjects.

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CHAPTER I
THE CLASSIFICATION

The ideological classification of politicians in use in the press and in ordinary classification does not usually go beyond the "conservative-liberal" or "right-left" scheme. Sometimes, this is a simple dichotomy of conservatives (rightists) and liberals (leftists) (see Figure 1).



Figure 1.--Liberals and Conservatives.

But right and left are directions on a dimension, thus implying a continuum (see Figure 2).



Figure 2.--The Left-Right Dimension.

And so people are generally described as more or less conservative or liberal, more or less "rightist" or "leftist". Or they are

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people who oppose the principle of government intervention (especially in the economy) whether for egalitarian purposes or not (see Figure 4).




Figure 4.--Equality and government intervention.

This classification is a simplification of the prevailing classification of ideologies applied in Europe, and commonly used in the study of political philosophy as well. The principal categories are as follows: traditional conservatism (traditionalism), classical liberalism, and socialism, with the addition of modern liberalism as a transition or hybrid between classical liberalism and socialism (see Figure 5).




Figure 5.--European ideologies.

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The resulting sequence (traditionalism--classical liberalism--modern liberalism--socialism) also represents the ranking of the philosophies in terms of their egalitarianism, from least to most (see Figure 6). In general, from the time of the decline of the feudal




Figure 6.--Attitudes toward equality in Europe.

nobility until at least the nineteenth century, the more inegalitarian a group was, the more it supported its country's king, so that traditionalist conservatives were his strongest supporters. Therefore, in European parliaments of this period, the speaker (who was the representative of the king) saw to it that the more supportive of the king a party was, the farther it sat to the speaker's right (the position of honor); the less supportive it was, the further to the left it sat. Thus, the order presented above, which initially was roughly reflective of the degree of support for the monarchy, became a right-to-left order. And since this order was already one of inegalitarianism to egalitarianism, "right" and "left" came to imply these respective attitudes.

The traditionalist supporters of royalty and aristocracy were, at first, in the position of defending the established powers and trying to preserve the status quo. They were hence known as

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"conservatives". Their principal opponents were what were then called liberals, and now called classical liberals (the other kind of liberal being rare before the late nineteenth century). Consequently, "conservative" came to be used as a synonym for rightist and inegalitarian, and "liberal" came to be used as a partial synonym for leftist and egalitarian.

What is called modern liberalism arose in the late nineteenth century, accepting many socialist measures (especially in social welfare) without being willing to abandon liberalism (including its capitalistic economic principles) altogether. This philosophy was partially liberal (in the classical liberal sense) in the first place, and further strengthened its claim to the liberal title by transforming the meaning of "liberalism" itself from freedom from government to freedom from economic and social restraints in general, such as freedom from want. And since "liberalism" had already become partially synonymous with egalitarianism, modern liberalism therefore was able to paradoxically say that it was more "liberal" than (classical) liberalism, and eventually, at least in the United States, the only liberalism. Moreover, traditionalism in this country was weak and classical liberalism, later joined by modern liberalism, was strong. Consequently, the terms conservatism and liberalism were not much used for a long time, and this made it easier for modern liberalism to appropriate exclusive title to the term "liberalism". Meanwhile, classical liberalism, as the more rightist (and less "liberal") of the two major philosophies, came to be called "conservatism".²

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"Traditionalism" is the term applied to the dominant social structure in European society through the end of the Middle Ages and early modern times, and throughout much of the rest of the world until the time of Western colonization and beyond. This broad category includes tribal society, kingdoms and empires, absolute monarchies and decentralized feudal regimes. Traditionalism is here defined as a value-system which upholds an inequality--a legal-political one as well as an economic one--which involves a hereditary, more-or-less fixed and closed class system, whose origins were often in brute force, but whose justification was made on the basis of some innate superiority of blood or some mystic sanction. All slavery and serfdom thus partake of traditionalism.

"Classical liberalism" refers to the philosophy which advocates liberty from government, as typified by that of John Locke. It says that all individuals possess certain natural moral rights equally. These include the right to one's own labor and what the labor produces (including what one withdraws from nature by this labor). It is an injustice to violate these rights; government is set up to protect these rights and has no right to violate them. These principles may be taken in their most extreme form to mandate pure laissez-faire, as the modern Libertarian Party would do, but many who are called classical liberals (including, it seems, Locke himself) would depart from it in many particular instances while still adhering to the general principle. Generally similar ideas have been advocated by others of this group, such as the British

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Whigs, Adam Smith, most of our "Founding Fathers", the Social Darwinists, and, to some extent, John Stuart Mill.

"Socialism" refers to these philosophies which through common (and presumably democratic) ownership (or at least control) of wealth or the sources of wealth aim to achieve a more-or-less equal distribution of wealth, and so achieve equality of condition. Various forms of socialism have been advocated by the likes of Robert Owen, Fourier, Marx, Saint-Simon and the Fabians.

In short, traditionalism upholds unequal chances to be wealthy (or perhaps better, unequal certainties); classical liberalism favors an equal liberty to achieve unequal wealth or economic condition; socialism seeks equality of economic condition. Another, somewhat different (probably less accurate) way of approaching the distinctions is to say that traditionalism defends inequality based on the class into which one was born (which rests ultimately on conquest, racial origin or religious sanction); while capitalism defends inequality based primarily on merit and effort (and inheritance and gift from those who earned it by their merit and effort); and socialism opposes both kinds of inequality.

Modern liberalism would move society to some degree in the direction of equality of condition, while stopping short of socialism and complete egalitarianism.

We may now make use of the conceptual scheme of some thinkers, such as F. A. Hayek,³ who think of the three main ideologies as representing a triangular scheme with one at each corner, and with

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modern liberalism on the side between classical liberalism and socialism (see Figure 7). But triangularity implies two-




Figure 7.--The triangular scheme.

dimensionality. And the study of political philosophy does indeed make another distinction: classical liberalism is termed "libertarian" (or "individualist") while both socialism and traditionalism are called "statist" (or "collectivist") (with modern liberalism somewhere in between). That is, the former opposes "big government" (much government restriction of the liberty of the individual), especially government intervention in the economy, seeing it as a violation of his rights, while the latter two favor it. This follows from their goals: classical liberalism wishes to abolish traditional inequalities (castes, slavery, etc.) and any others that are the product of government force, but wishes to preserve inequalities that arise from the "natural" (non-governmental) processes of production and trade (with the only natural routes to inequality to be stamped out being private force and fraud), whereas socialism wishes to use government to impose an equality (of condition) upon man and

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traditionalism wishes to impose an inequality on them (both of which are, from the classical liberal viewpoint, unnatural). In any case, socialist equality and traditionalist inequality both require government interference with "natural" economic processes (if only the toleration of some men using force to enslave others, which toleration changes an anarchic violence into government violence, since a government, as such, must monopolize violence, and therefore either outlaw it or assume responsibility for it).

We now have two dimensions: inegalitarianism versus egalitarianism (which can be called the "equality dimension") and libertarianism versus statism (which can be called the "liberty dimension") (see Figure 8).




Figure 8.--The equality and liberty dimensions.

(At this point, we should note that it is a logical conclusion that any departure from pure classical liberalism--that is, laissez-faire--to the right, left or any other direction, necessarily

requires the increase of state power, and so is a move toward statism. Consequently, in the charts and discussion, the "liberty dimension" will measure only that statism which is not the product of egalitarianism or inegalitarianism.)

Taking account of this two-dimensionality helps us to explain the ambiguity in the American usage of the term "conservatism", noted above. When the term is identified with inegalitarianism, then it includes traditionalism as well as classical liberalism (plus as that statism which would fall in the center on the equality dimension, directly below classical liberalism); both of which stand for inegalitarian opposition to modern liberalism's striving for equality of condition. However, when conservatism is used as a synonym for classical liberalism, then it implies opposition to statism, as well as to equality (of condition).

To summarize the preceding discussion, we can say that we now have two dimensions. The first is the inegalitarian--egalitarian one (the equality dimension). This is what is usually called the right-left dimension; the former is the equivalent of conservatism; the latter, in this country, is the partial equivalent of liberalism. The second dimension is the libertarian-statist (individualist--collectivist) one (the liberty dimension).

On the equality dimension, the arrangement of the ideologies from right to left is as follows: traditionalism, classical liberalism, modern liberalism and socialism. On the liberty dimension, classical liberalism is at the libertarian end of the scale,

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socialism and traditionalism are at the statist end, and modern liberalism is in the middle. From this discussion, we can see that socialism and traditionalism are weak in the United States, relative to their condition in Europe. Conversely, classical liberalism is strong here, relative to its condition in Europe. In terms of the diagram, the political culture of the United States is distributed more toward the libertarian end of the liberty dimension than is that of Europe, and is distributed more tightly around the center on the equality dimension⁴ (see Figures 9 and 10). Hence, when an American is referred to herein as a statist, an egalitarian or an inegalitarian, these terms are used in the American rather than the European context, and so imply less extreme positions than they otherwise would.

The South presents a special problem. The political position of the bulk of Southern politicians in this century was one of support for the white supremacist regime which was set up in most of the South in 1890s and which collapsed in the 1950s and 1960s under the impact of the "civil rights" movement. This regime was based on the disfranchisement, by the poll-tax and other means, of most blacks, and many poor whites as well. It was racist, and since racism in practice is a form of inequality based on ascriptive characteristics, it partook of traditionalism to this extent. The disfranchisement of the poor whites was, to some extent, a symptom of economic elitism as well; how much it was, and how much this elitism is to be interpreted as a sign of traditionalist ideology is a matter of dispute.⁵




Figure 9.--The distribution of ideologies in Europe.

Figure 10.--The distribution of ideologies in the U.S.A.

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There are further possibilities for elaboration of the classification beyond the triangular scheme presented above. There is reason to believe that there is more than one type of modern liberalism. At the very least, it would seem likely from the model that there are different degrees of "leftism"--that is, there could be forms of modern liberalism close to classical liberalism, which pass through various intermediate steps to a form which is close to socialism. And perhaps one could perceive several meaningful increments of this leftism. It should be borne in mind that in the twentieth century there have been in this country three major periods of modern liberal legislation on the national level. That is to say, there have been three major legislative agendas that brandish egalitarian slogans and claim to benefit classes other than business and the rich, usually at the expense of the latter two groups. These were the programs of the Progressive Era (circa 1901-1920), the New Deal (circa 1933-1939) and the Great Society (circa 1965-1968). Each one increased the size of government: each successive one increased Federal spending to a higher level than the previous one, and thereby increased the burden of paying for it. (The Great Society, in the sense of the Johnson-era programs and their successors, was not accompanied by a great rise in tax rates, but it led to deficits which fueled inflation, which is a sort of tax, and pushed people into higher tax brackets--"bracket creep"--which increased the tax burden.) It seems to make sense to think that there would be some who would favor one program but oppose the next,

more extensive one. The same could apply to the stages in the development of these programs--as, for example, the early and late (or "First" and "Second") New Deals.

We begin with the Progressive Era (circa 1901-1920). At first examination, the conflicts of this era seem much like contemporary ones to us, with "(modern) liberal" progressives proposing to expand government for the sake of equality, and their "conservative" (classical liberal) opponents resisting.⁶ However, there are qualifications to be made to this simple scheme.

The first for us to consider is that made by Richard Hofstadter in The Age of Reform. There he argued that the average progressive politician represented the petit-bourgeois small businessman (or his agrarian counterpart, the yeoman farmer), and that his political attitudes followed suit. He was not as far left as later (New Deal and post-New Deal) liberals; distrusting the "working class" (i.e., manual laborers) in general and trade unions in particular, he was not a strong advocate of labor legislation, or, for that matter, of the welfare state, and might have become a strong opponent of these if he had lived long enough⁷ (see Figure 11). Further, he was also distinguishable from latter-day liberals on the liberty dimension as well as on the equality dimension, in his yearning for the classical liberal ideals of competition and, to a lesser extent, small government.⁸

Other historians of this era, such as James Weinstein, have advanced the concept of "corporate liberalism". This is a form of

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


Figure 11.--The Hofstadter model (with extrapolations).

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the power of big business in order to restore free competition. A strict or literal interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and high taxes (mainly personal income taxes on large fortunes, because LaFollette opposed corporate income taxes as being harmful to small businesses) were tools he proposed using (he even contemplated nationalization, which, though not furthering competition, would reduce the power of big business). LaFollette, although placed on the left in the Weinstein scheme, did resemble the conservatives of the NAM, in his wish to protect the interests of small business and further competition, as Weinstein himself notes.

A further wrinkle is added to this picture of Progressive Era politics by David Thelen in his study Robert LaFollette and the Insurgent Spirit.¹¹ Here, LaFollette is shown as beginning his political career with a strong confidence in the self-made man and the American system of competition which allowed this man to rise. These attitudes were naturally associated with conservative (classical liberal) political attitudes, and such were the attitudes that he held at the start of his political career. The apparent decline of competition and increase of concentration in business constituted the catalyst that led to his later more radical political views. Yet he seems to have seen no revolutionary change in his political philosophy, and there apparently was none. LaFollette thus seems to share with the NAM conservatives not only their small business constituency but also a fondness, on balance, for the ideals of free market competition.

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At this point, we can see that LaFollette's view looks similar to that of another "radical" politician of his time--William Jennings Bryan. As was LaFollette, Bryan was an admirer of self-employed people, although it was farmers rather than small businessmen that were his chief concern; also like LaFollette he was a lover of relatively individualistic competition, approximately as it was practiced in the nineteenth century, and he supported radical measures in the antitrust and other fields, chiefly in order to restore the competitive marketplace.

From this reading of Weinstein and Thelen, a two-dimensional, four-category scheme of ideological classification for the Progressive Era emerges. On the side of competition and small businessmen we have two groups, one "conservative" and the other "radical"--on taxes, nationalization and big business generally--the NAM conservatives and the "neo-populists" such as LaFollette and Bryan, respectively. On the side of concentration we again have two groups, one conservative and one radical on taxes, nationalization and big business generally--the corporate liberals and the socialists respectively (see Figure 13).

This four-category scheme is two-dimensional, as was the triangular one, and suggests it. The competitive dimension appears to correspond to the liberty dimension, whereas the other dimension appears to correspond to the equality dimension. The conservatives, of course, are classical liberals, and the socialists are also familiar to us. The "corporate liberals" seem to be statist of the




Figure 13. --The Weinstein model, and the liberty and equality dimensions.

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center--no farther left, or right, than the classical liberals-- between the traditionalists and the socialists. The populists and neo-populists represented by Bryan and LaFollette represent a new position, one which is egalitarian and libertarian (see Figure 14).




Figure 14.--The modified Weinstein model and the triangular scheme.

However, this tends to overstate the case. As we will see, this last group is not necessarily egalitarian by modern (New Deal and post-New Deal) standards in regard to social welfare measures. Thus it is not as far left as the socialists are. Then again, it tends to support many of the statist measures of a "progressive" nature favored by corporate liberals, such as the FTC and anti-price cutting measures.¹³ Therefore it is not as libertarian as at least some conservatives. The resulting fact that it is only moderately libertarian and only moderately egalitarian fits this LaFollette-Bryan group in better with the triangular scheme (see Figure 15).

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


Figure 15.--Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the triangular scheme.

It seems that the four-category scheme needs elaboration. For one thing, the socialists are considerably more egalitarian and statist than the members, or most of them, in each of these other three groups. They are about as far removed from them as are the traditionalists (see Figure 16).




Figure 16.--Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the triangular scheme (continued).

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This leaves a gap in the statist-egalitarian quadrant of Figure 13. Still, it is possible that there is a group similar to the Bryan-LaFollette group on the equality dimension, but more statist (see Figure 17).




Figure 17.--Further modifications of the Weinstein model and the triangular scheme (continued).

We now seem to have integrated Weinstein's typology into the conventional classification scheme.

At this point, it seems we can say that since some of the measures advanced by the LaFollette-Bryan group (radical trust-busting and some nationalization) seem to be extremely leftist even by today's standards, we actually have, with respect to the equality dimension, two columns: an extreme left column (including the LaFollette-Bryan group) and a column more to the right (conservatives and corporate liberals).

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What of those on the moderate left: what of the bulk of Hofstadter's progressives? A column should be set up here in the middle, embracing libertarian and statist divisions (see Figure 18).




Figure 18.--The modified Weinstein model partially integrated with the Hofstadter model.

The libertarian division of the center-left would be typified by Herbert Hoover, a self-proclaimed individualist who nonetheless favored higher taxes on the rich, at least in 1920, who thought that Coolidge had not trust-busted enough yet would not have trust-busted as much as LaFollette, and who disliked government enterprises, let alone nationalization.¹⁴ Others who might belong here are George Record, Irving Lenroot, Jonathan Bourne, William Randolph Hearst, and perhaps Louis Brandeis. The statist division of the center-left



would include the more leftist of the corporate liberals. Perhaps Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, with his big business support and platform containing "social justice" proposals, belongs here with most of his Progressive Party, and perhaps Woodrow Wilson should belong here after adopting many of their proposals in 1916 (if Gabriel Kolko's view of him as more inclined toward what we have called concentration than toward what we have called competition is accurate). This category might be typified by William Allen White, with his "sympathy for the underdog" coupled with his "middle-class fears of the social revolution Roosevelt was guiding", as Otis Graham described his attitudes. Others who seem to belong here include Albert Beveridge, Gifford Pinchot, and Raymond Moley.¹⁵ The statist division of the right (the right corporate liberals) might be typified by Leonard Wood, an advocate of strong government with a pronounced anti-left inclination. Probably Woodrow Wilson belongs here between 1913 and 1916 (again assuming Kolko's view of his stand on the concentration issue is accurate.) Others who seem to belong here include Bainbridge Colby, James Burleson, Atlee Pomerene, Charles Evans Hughes and Henry Stimson.¹⁶

The existence of this new category of left corporate liberals indicates that many big businessmen came to support other forms of seemingly anti-business government intervention besides that of regulation of business. Apparently these businessmen concluded that these measures hurt smaller competitors more than them, just as did regulation, and were therefore beneficial to them. Further examples of this will be seen later.

By this point, we have partially integrated Hofstadter's typology into the modified Weinstein and conventional schemes, insofar as the right column of the modified Weinstein model corresponds to Hofstadter's conservatives, and the moderate and extreme left columns together correspond to Hofstadter's progressives. This leaves the later (New Deal) liberals of Hofstadter. In his scheme, they are to the left of the extreme left of the Progressive Era, including the radical progressives (the LaFollette-Bryan group) (see Figure 19). However, the stands of this group in favor of radical trust-busting and some nationalization put them to the left




Figure 19.--Further integration of the Hofstadter and Weinstein models: the rightism of the radical progressives.

of the New Dealers and in an extreme left position even by today's standards (see Figure 20). On the other hand, this is not true of their stands on other issues, on which they do not seem distinguishable from the more moderate of Hofstadter's progressives. This means that the radical progressives are in some ways to the left of the New Dealers and in some ways to the right of them. This may be shown as in Figure 21.

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Progress. (Hofstadter) Radical	Later Liberals (New Deal- Eras, etc.)	Progress. (Hofstadter) Moderate	Conserv.
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Figure 20.--The extreme leftism of the radical progressives.

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; transform: rotate(-15deg); display: inline-block;"> Radical Prog. (LaFollette, Bryan, etc.) </div>				
Social.	Later Lib. (New Deal and Post- New Deal)	Mod. Prog.	Conserv. (Class. Lib.)	Conserv. (Tradit.)

Figure 21.--The rightism and leftism of the radical progressives.

This complex situation makes discussion of the group difficult, and it would be best if we could regard them henceforth as being either to the right or to the left of the New Dealers, but not both. Fortunately, it happens that the LaFollette-Bryan group has been generally unable (since about the time of World War I) to keep issues of radical trust-busting and nationalization at the center of public debate (indeed, the members of this group seem to be quite rare in recent decades). Therefore, we may ignore the cleavage from this point on. This means, since the LaFollette-Bryan group seems to be

separated from the more moderate of Hofstadter's progressives only by these issues, that we can treat the former as indistinguishable from the latter. Since we will be ignoring the issues which make the LaFollette-Bryan group seem extremely leftist, we will now regard them as simply to the right of the New Dealers, in the same category as the more moderate Left-Progressives (see Figure 22).




Figure 22.--Simplification of Figure 21.

We may now consider the New Deal. The so-called "First New Deal" (1933-35) consisted mainly of business regulatory measures--the NRA being the most important--and various subsidies. It seemed to move the country toward statism but not toward the left (toward equality). The "Second New Deal" (1935-39) was apparently a move toward the left with the Social Security Act (including unemployment compensation and Aid to Dependent Children as well as old-age pensions), the National Labor Relations Act and wage-and-hour legislation. Also, it should be noted that the rise in personal income

taxes (including a lower exemption), initiated by Hoover, was permanently retained, with some egalitarian variations (split-rate corporate taxes, taxation of dividends as personal income) in the Second New Deal.

We may examine the New Deal in greater detail by considering James T. Patterson's Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal and Ronald L. Feinman's Twilight of Progressivism.¹⁷ These works provide grounds for thinking that the New Deal should be divided not into two parts, but into three: 1933-35, 1935-57 and 1937-39. As the New Deal moved left in 1935-37 (with the Social Security Act, the NLRA and especially higher income taxes--especially those on corporations, and new utility regulation--especially holding company divestiture) and in 1937-39 (with renewed relief programs, the Fair Labor Standards Act, proposals for public housing, etc.), its base of support shrank, as we will elaborate below.

In his book, Patterson describes three kinds of conservative Democratic opponents of the New Deal, which he commonly calls "irreconcilables", "conservatives" and "moderates", respectively (he does not always use "conservatives" to refer to the middle group, but we shall use the three terms in this way for convenience.) The first group was in opposition in all three periods, the second in the last two, and the third in the last period only. (In opposition to all of these were the steadfast supporters of Roosevelt and his New Deal, who stayed with him through all three periods and beyond. Those who remained New Dealers after 1937 generally had undisputed

hold on the title, and on that of "liberal"--in the modern sense--as well.)

As has been said, it seems that the New Deal, in 1933-35, moved mainly toward statism and not toward equality, while in 1935-37 and 1937-39, it made two steps toward equality. This suggests that the moves of 1933-35 correspond to the boundary between Conservatives (classical liberals) and Right-Progressive Statists (Right-Corporate Liberals) in the model, while the moves of 1935-37 correspond to the boundary between Right-Progressive Statists and Left-Progressive Statists (Left-Corporate Liberals) and the moves of 1937-39 correspond to the boundary between the Left-Progressive Statists and the New Deal Liberals. If, as seems very likely, these correspondences are genuine, then Patterson's groups correspond to categories from the model as follows: irreconcilable Democrats to Conservatives (Classical Liberals), conservative Democrats to Right-Progressive Statists, moderate Democrats to Left-Progressive Statists, and liberal New Deal Democrats, of course, to New Deal Liberals (see Figure 23).

Turning now to Feinman, we can see that his "Progressive Republicans" seem to be political heirs of the "insurgent" Republicans of the Taft and Wilson administrations, and to have been men who would fit in the Left-Progressive category, constituting their left wing--or their entire membership (the matter is unclear): indeed, Borah, Hiram Johnson and LaFollette's son are included in the group. In any case, this category includes the leftwardmost of




Figure 23.--The New Deal Era: integration of the Patterson and Feinman categories into model.

those who would have fallen in Hofstadter's progressive category. These progressive Republicans, Feinman seems to indicate, thought that Franklin Roosevelt was generally too far to the right in the 1933-35 period, about where he ought to be in the 1935-37 period, and too far to the left in the third. It also appears that they feared his statism from the first, as they worried over concentration of power, wasteful spending and partisan use of relief programs.

It seems that this group would fall in the left-progressive column of the model, along with the moderate Democrats of Patterson, insofar as both groups supported the leftward moves of Roosevelt in 1935-37, while opposing his leftward moves of 1937-39. It would also seem that these progressive Republicans were on the anti-statist side (although perhaps not as much so as most conservative Republicans and irreconcilable Democrats).

These conclusions based on the Patterson and Feinman books are represented in Figure 23.

Now let us look at the Republican party, as it emerged at the end of this period and remained in the ensuing decades. Its members are commonly grouped into two wings: the "conservative" wing (known as the "Old Guard", etc.) and the "liberal", "moderate" or "moderate-to-liberal" wing (known as "Modern Republicans", etc.). On economic policy, the main difference is supposedly over whether they, in general, approved or disapproved of the New Deal. Robert Taft was the leader of the former; Dewey and Willkie of the latter. The latter group does seem to have accepted much of the New Deal,¹⁷ especially the social insurance measures of the Second New Deal.

There appears to be an association between the moderate-to-liberal wing and big ("Wall Street") business. There is reason to believe that many of the apparently egalitarian measures of the New Deal were, as many of those of the Progressive Era were, examples of corporate liberalism. It appears that many big businessmen came to support much of the New Deal. They discovered that New Deal social welfare and labor legislation could benefit them. In fact, support for Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, who was advocating precursors of many of these programs that year, came from a significant number of big businessmen. Such businessmen seem to have concluded that the taxes which pay for social welfare programs and the burdens of dealing with strong unions would hurt their smaller competitors more than them--as seemed to be the case with Progressive Era regulatory measures.

This association of big business with this wing of the party is matched by an association of small ("Main Street") business with its conservative wing. This suggests the NAM conservatives of the Progressive Era,¹⁸ just as the Dewey-Eisenhower group suggests the old corporate liberals of the NCF.

The big difference between these scenarios is the intervention of the New Deal, and the acceptance by the Dewey-Eisenhower group of it, or at least of its basics, which means that this group is on the left of the corporate liberal category--right or left wings.

Or does it? Perhaps social insurance and wage-and-hour laws are not as egalitarian as they seem. Social insurance, if paid for entirely by the recipient, is not redistributionist, and if it merely redistributes from the young to the old, it need not redistribute from one class to another. Even such egalitarianism as does exist may not be more pronounced than what existed under nineteenth-century welfare arrangements. And the contributions of the employer may burden him as does the corporate income tax; insofar as they hurt small business more than large business, both measures can be regarded as inequalitarian. Wage-and-hour laws may work in a similar manner, and maximum-hours laws in particular may be seen as paternalistic rather than redistributionist. And while the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (the "Wagner Act") was surely, overall, a major departure from laissez-faire in a pro-union direction (particularly in its provisions relating to union elections, union recognition and "unfair" practices of management), its provisions which simply legalized unions was not a departure from laissez-faire (unless, of course, one regarded unions as inclined toward being monopolistic interferences with the free market.)

As it happens, the social security act, the NLRA, and the NRA, which includes minimum-wage provisions, received considerable support even from those who were commonly called conservatives (most of whom opposed other major New Deal legislation of 1935 and after). Most old progressives, according to Graham, had little objection to these. Furthermore, Al Smith was a long-time advocate of minimum-wage

laws, while he and other Liberty Leaguers approved of the principle of Social Security.

Thus, the "New Dealism" of the Dewey-Eisenhower group, or some of them, need not have put them to the left of the moderate left or even of the right, on Figure 18. However, their apparent toleration for the expansion of government involved in the Hoover tax increase and the overall spending increase of the New Deal (which were not reversed in succeeding decades) meant that this group may have been at least as far left as the Progressive left statist (left corporate liberals).

All of this being true about many of the "Moderate-to-liberal" Republicans does not exhaust the possibilities of greater egalitarianism in members of the group. As Gary Reichard points out in his Republicanism Reaffirmed, Eisenhower was not very closely associated with the more explicitly liberal members of his party such as Javits, and was not really a liberal Republican in the same sense that they were. Dewey may not have been either, Reichard is inclined to believe.¹⁹ This does not, however, prevent other Republicans from being liberal in the New Deal sense.

Thus, we now have Republicans as well as Democrats in the New Deal liberal category. This category would be for people who accepted those policies of the New Deal (and later) which represented a move to the left of left-wing Progressivism. These might include pro-union stands on collective-bargaining issues and on minimum-wage increases, and skewing of social insurance

benefit-contribution ratios and income tax rates in a more egalitarian direction.

It nonetheless seems likely that most New Deal "liberal" Republicans were somewhere to the right of most New Deal Democrats, perhaps on such things as deficit spending, which is commonly seen as uniting both wings of the Republican party against the Democrats.

So, in regard to the New Deal, we may end up with left-wing and right-wing New Deal categories (see Figure 24).




Figure 24. --Rightist (Republican) New Dealers.

Since leaving the discussion of the Progressive Era, the course of our investigation has allowed us to say relatively little of the liberty dimension. In this regard, the Dewey-Eisenhower group and the New Deal liberals, right and left, all seem to fall mainly on the relatively statist side of the chart. Occasionally, a left-leaning politician with somewhat populist tendencies seems to object to statism, and so follow in the footsteps of Hoover, Bryan and LaFollette, but to their left, on New Deal and post-New Deal issues (see Figure 25).

			Cons (Class. Lib.)
McGovern?	Hatfield?	Hoover	
		Progressive Statists	
Humphrey?	Javits?	(L)	(R)

Figure 25.--The Anti-Statist row extended leftward.

There is some reason for thinking that more than two levels are needed in the liberty dimension. For all of their inclination toward regulated concentration rather than competition in the area of business that characterizes the Dewey-Eisenhower group and Woodrow Wilson, and for all the acceptance of social insurance of at least the former, both seem to have a real abhorrence of big government. The "Modern Republicanism" of the Eisenhower administration, as it is interpreted by Arthur Larson, has a presumption against government,²⁰ as do the attitudes of Wilson, even after he moved toward accepting the "New Nationalism" of Theodore Roosevelt.²¹ This seems in contrast to Theodore Roosevelt (although the contrast may be mainly rhetorical), who claimed that Jeffersonian mistrust of government was out-of-date. This also seems to be in contrast to most New Deal liberalism. Thus, we might distinguish three,

instead of two, levels on the liberty dimension--libertarian, moderate and statist (see Figure 26).

		Cons.
	Hoover	
	Dewey Eisenhower Wilson (1916-?)	Al Smith Wilson (1913-1916)
	T. Roosevelt	Hamilton J. Connally

Figure 26.--Degrees of Statism.

The next step in the evolution of the model leads us to move ahead to modern times, and to a discussion of the ideological changes that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Ideological classifications proposed regarding this era deal with the expansion of the inventory of liberal programs beyond the New Deal levels.

The Great Society of Lyndon Johnson led to disaffection from the Democratic party by many voters and political figures who had supported the liberalism of the Democrats during the New Deal, and Fair Deal and New Frontier years.

Kevin Phillips, in his book, The Emerging Republican Majority, clarified the differences between the older kind of liberal, who was leaving the party in the 1960s, and the newer kind, who welcomed the change.²² (Others, such as Walter Dean Burnham, Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., Jeffrey Hart and William A. Rusher have drawn similar pictures.)²³ The former kind of liberal was oriented toward the working class and lower-middle class; the latter kind was oriented toward the very poor, especially the hard-core unemployed and the inner-city-dwellers. The former was "populistic"--suspicious of elites, whether they were economic, intellectual or political; the latter was led by an intellectual, political and economic elite. The former thus represented the lower-middle and lower classes; the latter united the very poor with rich and upper-middle class intellectuals, bureaucrats and businessman who created, ran and/or profited by the programs (the last being the latest variation on the corporate liberal theme, it would seem). The former was seen as practicing taxation of the few (rich) to help the many (working poor), while the latter was seen as practicing taxation of the many (middle and lower-middle classes, who were pushed into higher tax brackets, and who suffered from the tax of inflation) to help the few poor (slum dwellers). Such was the picture drawn by Phillips and others--most of whom were more sympathetic to the former kind of liberalism, and saw themselves as spokesmen for the interest groups that it represented--and such is the way this group generally seemed to feel about the effects of the newer social programs, whatever the facts may have been.²⁴

(Many of the so-called "neo-conservatives", with their implicit or avowed liking for the welfare state or the New Deal but not the Great Society, seem to fit the image of the first type of liberal.)

Phillips' book, moreover, implies a two-dimensionality to the differences among modern liberals. As the unfolding of the Great Society agenda repelled many hitherto strong supporters of the New Deal and post-New Deal welfare state (mostly Democrats), it was attracting other people (mostly Republicans) who had been more or less unsupportive of earlier programs, but who were now coming around to support them. Thus, Great Society and pre-Great Society liberalism may be more than just degrees on a scale of post-New Deal liberalism; they may represent two separate dimensions of modern liberalism--that is, of what we have called herein "New Deal liberalism (left and right)". This would allow the creation of four sub-categories of this liberalism; those who were conservative (classical liberal) on both dimensions; those who were liberal (modern liberal) on both; those who were conservative on the Great Society but liberal on previous programs; and those who were conservative on previous post-New Deal programs but liberal on the Great Society. It would appear that the first and last categories are subdivisions of the New Deal right category of previous charts, and that the second and third are subdivisions of the New Deal left category, each of the older categories being bisected by the division over the new Great Society program, as in Figure 27.²⁵

[Size of boxes has no significance]




Figure 27.--The New Deal versus Great Society liberalism.

ENDNOTES

¹Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). (P. 63 refers to both attitudes toward equality and toward government.) Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), esp. pp. 135-6, (where attitudes toward big government are referred to, with much reference to implicit class connection, showing the ambiguity of the definition) and pp. 127, 139, 179.

²On the change from classical to modern liberalism, see Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes (The American Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 193-4. On the modern identification of classical liberalism and conservatism, see Friedrich A. Hayek, "Why I Am Not a Conservative" in The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 397-411, esp. p. 397-8; Russell Kirk, "Conservatism" in the Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 6, pp. 371-4 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1966), esp. p. 371; Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 131; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

³Hayek, "Why I Am Not a Conservative", pp. 98-99.

⁴See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955).

⁵Some such as Hartz and others of the "consensus school" see a (classical and modern) liberal consensus dominating the history of the U.S., including the South, although they recognize some traditionalist elements there. It should be noted that the South could be liberal relative to European traditionalists and still be traditionalist relative to the rest of the country. In any case, further examination of these issues will have to wait until the voting records are examined.

Whether the South is traditionalist or liberal, the question remains whether it is overwhelmingly conservative (traditionalist or classical liberal) or whether liberals (modern liberals) and conservatives were more evenly matched. Among those close to the latter position is Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., who, in his The Democratic South (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1963), pp. 44-52, talks

of the "populism" and "radicalism" of men such as James Vardaman. Among those closer to the former position is J. Morgan Kousser, in his The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). He points out the conservative alliances and policies of Vardaman and others were prominent after disfranchisement of the lower classes (pp. 231-7). It seems that much of the liberalism, at least at the low points of voter turnout (c. 1908-48, as shown in Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction, by Nunan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham; Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975; pp. 8-10) was only apparent: some was rhetorical only, and other aspects involved business regulation (whose inegalitarian possibilities have already been discussed) and regionalism (aid to agriculture, rural development, public transportation systems, and the kind of business regulation and tax policies which favor state businesses over national, out-of-state businesses). Further explanation will occur upon consideration of voting records.

⁶The view of the Progressive Era generally held by historians of the so-called "progressive" school such as Charles Beard and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

⁷Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

⁸Ibid. Also, Otis L. Graham, Jr. in Encore for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) implies a similar distinction, among those Progressives who opposed the New Deal, he points out an aversion to class politics, interest group politics and unbalanced budgets as being typical of them, especially on pp. 24-100.

⁹James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Also Gabriel Kolko, in The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History 1900-1916, (New York: Macmillan, 1963), has had many influential things to say about the matter.

¹⁰Weinstein, especially pp. 4-6.

¹¹David P. Thelen, Robert M. LaFollette and the Insurgent Spirit, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), pp. 10-13.

¹²LaFollette and most of the insurgents supported the FTC (James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party System 1909-1916 [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967]), and supported the principle of a federal reserve system (pp. 107-11). Bryan was not generally known for objecting to the domestic measures of the Wilson administration during his years in it.

¹³ Jean Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975). Other assignments to this category are made on the basis of reading Graham and others. Record, Lenroot and Bourne are placed here on the basis of reading Otis Graham's Encore for Reform. Hearst is placed here because of his quasi-populist reputation. Louis Brandeis is placed here because of his reputation as a progressive supporter of competition with a sympathy for small business interests.

¹⁴ Graham, Encore for Reform, and others. Beveridge is placed here because he is sometimes counted among the "insurgent" opponents of President Taft while being nonetheless an admirer of John Marshall. The others are placed here on the basis of reading Graham's Encore for Reform.

¹⁵ Colby, Burluson and Pomerene are placed here on the basis of Graham's Encore for Reform. Hughes and Stimson are placed here because of their reputations as progressives (as governor of New York and member of the cabinet, respectively) who came to support Taft in 1912.

¹⁶ Ronald L. Feinman, Twilight of Progressivism: The Western Republican Senators and the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) and James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatives and the New Deal: the Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-39 (Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

¹⁷ The NAM was no longer so much a small-business organization as it was in the earlier time, whether because power had shifted to the larger members or because the average member had grown. However, in any case, the small versus large distinction may have to be modified for the earlier period as well. Rather than there being a positive correlation between size and liberalism, there may have actually been a negative one for most businesses, with the smallest businessmen tending to be Hofstadter-type or LaFollette type progressives, and moderately large manufacturers being more to the right. Probably it is only beyond a certain high threshold of size that liberalism is strong. And this liberalism may not even be a function of size as such--it may have to do with central geographic location or other factors. All that is important for this paper is (1) that there are major ideological cleavages in the business community, and (2) there is not a simple negative correlation between liberalism and size.

¹⁸ Gary Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress (Knoxville: The University Press, 1978).

¹⁹ Arthur Larson, What We Are For (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959).

²⁰ Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 223-30.

²¹ Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

²² Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); William A. Rusher, The Making of the New Majority Party (Ottawa, Ill.: Green Hill Publishers, 1975); Everett Carl Ladd Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970's (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).

²³ Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, in The Promise Of Greatness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), argue that the national income share of the upper two quintiles decreased as that of the lower one increased in the 1963-68 period (pp. 250-1). This was partially because of the growth of social security and related programs, which outweighed the growth in welfare and the New Great Society programs. Interestingly, the former programs are not the ones of that era which are most talked about by conservatives or liberals. The latter ones were, even though they were smaller--and it is the redistribution that they caused that the people described by Phillips had most in mind.

²⁴ Other ideological classifications of interest have been made by Clinton Rossiter in Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion (New York: Alford A. Knopf, 1958) and by a James Reichley in Conservatism in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1981).

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Now that we have presented the classification which constitutes the theoretical model, we may begin to take steps to enable us to test it. We shall therefore discuss the methodology that we will be using. The methodological topic to be considered first is that of the scope of the investigation to be undertaken. Were it possible, it would be desirable to make a universally comprehensive ideological classification which would cover political attitudes throughout history. Such a grand project is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, many reductions in scope have had to be made. In making the decisions necessary to do so, the attempt has been made to find the range of subject which comes closest to achieving the two frequently incompatible ends: wide applicability and manageable size.

This attempt was apparent in the choice of the arena to be studied. National politics was selected as the location of the study because it exhibits more diversity than the politics of any one state while the fact that it is a single political arena makes the study more manageable than a study of several states.

The study of roll-call voting records on a national level means a study of those of Congress. It was necessary to select one chamber of Congress to examine, as to examine both would make the

scope of the study too large. So the Senate was chosen over the House of Representatives because of the more manageable size.

A similar balance was sought in the determination of the time frame of the study. The criterion of manageability favors the selection of a short period; that of representativeness favors the selection of a long one. This is the same principle which provides that in taking a sample from a population, the best sample, all else being equal, is the one which is most representative of the variation of the population--which means that it must represent as much of the variety of the population as possible. Therefore, the best "sample" time period would be the one which covers the most historical change (relevant to the study) within it. That would mean the time frame that stretched across the most historical time boundaries.

The maximum amount of time over which it would be feasible to study voting records, for this sort of work, seems to be about twenty years. Therefore, the attempt was made to find a twenty-year slice of time which encompassed the most possible change (in matters of interest to this study).

Some limitations on where the search for this time frame was to be conducted were already set. Since records are generally better in more recent years, and since Congressional Quarterly, which was chosen as the data base for the paper (see below), publishes roll-call voting records only as far back as 1945, it was decided that the time frame selected would have to be post-1944. On the other hand, since the events of the Reagan administration are

perhaps too recent for proper historical perspective, 1980 seems to be the last year that could be examined.

Within this general period, there is much to suggest that, in United States politics, the biggest changes occurred, in a more-or-less related manner, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and that this period, or the start of it, constitutes a major historical dividing line, and the end of it may constitute another. This period was characterized not only by the arrival and perpetuation of the Great Society programs, by political turmoil and by a relatively high degree of liberalism compared to earlier and later periods, but also by the presence of issues and cleavages that were distinctive. Some of the Great Society programs and especially spending increases provided new issues insofar as they were, in earlier times, so unlikely to be enacted into law as not to be a major issue at the center of political concern. Not commonly noticed among these was the biggest of them all, the increase in the Social Security program, especially in 1967, 1969 and 1972. Moreover, welfare (AFDC) spending became a major issue at this time. And then there were the "social issues" and Vietnam. These were mostly new issues. Similarly, the cleavages of the time were distinctive. Not only were the Northern and Southern Democrats divided from each other, but the Northern Democrats and Republicans were divided internally, with alliances frequently reaching across the borders of the groups.

The end point of this turbulent and liberal period is regarded here as being after the 1974 elections (in November 1974 or

January 1975)--after the end of the Vietnam War, the departure of Nixon and especially the fading of the New Left and the Counter-culture, plus the election of a heavily Democratic Congress that nonetheless was, in some ways, not as economically liberal as its predecessors. In the ensuing years, some of the issues of the preceding period (especially poverty, welfare and the non-economic issues) were de-emphasized, in favor of older concerns such as unemployment, inflation and taxes. Similarly, some of the cleavages of the 1965-74 period faded as some older patterns of cleavage began to re-emerge (e.g. the 1976 Presidential election tended to align the East and South behind the Democrats and the Midwest and West behind the Republicans, in much the same way as the 1960 election did).

Since, as has been stated, we wish our time frame to encompass change and stretch across historical period boundaries, it should cover the above-discussed turbulent and liberal period (circa 1965-74), and stretch backward and forward in time to encompass parts of the preceding and succeeding periods. Thus, we would be able to sample political history in three of the major subperiods (1945-65, 1965-75, 1975-80) of the 1945-80 period in American history. The length of two Congresses (four years) seems like a reasonable minimum length of time on each side of the base period for comparison. This would make the time frame run from the start of the 87th Congress (1961) to the close of the 95th (1978). However, in the case of the preceding period, the time frame was extended

further back to 1959 because the elections of 1958 were an important turning point insofar as they brought a Democratic landslide and, more importantly, they are a convenient place to begin from the point of view of bookkeeping, as so many political careers began in 1958 and so many ended then. The time frame is thus 1959 to 1978. This time frame also has the advantage of allowing the comparison of two periods of Republican control of the White House with two of Democratic control.

In regard to the issues to be examined, the need to keep the scope from being too wide dictated the selection of only one major issue area to study. The desire for a broad range favored the choice of the category of economic issues, and so this area was chosen. The category of economic issues is larger, both in number of issues and in number of votes, than any other major category of issues: foreign affairs, racial issues, crime-related issues, etc.--even the large category of "social issues" (which includes the last two categories, among others). Economic issues provide the bulk of the subjects of day-to-day political struggle.

In addition, economic issues have several other claims to priority. Ideologies often derive their stands on other issues from their economic principles. This is largely because most other political issues have an economic aspect, if only in regard to the issues of who will pay the cost of a given government activity (e.g. administration of a civil-rights regulation or increasing our nuclear weapons arsenal) and how people will be financially effected by it

(e.g. how the civil rights bill will affect the trade of the merchant to whom it is applied, or who gets the contract to build the weapon). Indeed, almost anything which involves material things (including the human body and its labor power) has an economic aspect. And those things which do not have an economic aspect (e.g. spiritual matters) are really beyond government power to control anyway. So almost anything which can concern politics has an economic aspect. Furthermore, some ideologies (e.g. capitalism, socialism, communism) even advertise how important they consider economic issues by taking their names from the economic system they advocate.

"Economic issues" will be taken to mean those which have as their main concern the government's management of material wealth, including its role in the distribution of it. As we have noted, many issues, including all of those involving spending, have economic aspects, but not all are primarily concerned with these aspects, and those which are not we will exclude. For example, the cost of buying new weapons for our nuclear arsenal and the cost of prosecuting criminals are issues, but they are not generally considered to be the most important aspects of the debates over the issue areas of nuclear arms and law enforcement. Therefore, these two issue areas and others like them, are not commonly considered economic issues, and votes on these subjects will therefore be excluded from consideration.

The determination of exactly which votes involve economic issues entails some difficulty. As Lee Anderson, Meredith Watts and

Allen Wilcox point out in their Legislative Roll-Call Analysis,¹ the votes in question may not really be about the subjects they appear to be about. For example, an anti-busing amendment to an education appropriations bill would seem to be a racial ("civil-rights") issue rather than an education spending issue. Yet some may try to attach the amendment to cause the bill to lose some of its supporters, and supporters of the amendment may vote against it in response to this strategy. This would seem to create a problem. Nonetheless, we need not consider it a great obstacle. Few would deny that there is a strong correlation between the apparent and the real subjects of bills, and that the great majority of the time they are the same. Moreover, when one has several votes on the same (apparent) issue area, over several years, as this study does in a number of cases, and if one then sees that most or all of these votes exhibit similar cleavages, it is unlikely that all or most of the votes are other than what they seem. This points to the advantage of scaling votes, which is similar to what is being done here (in the theoretical classification and later in the results of the examination of the votes), and scaling is recommended by Anderson, Watts and Wilcox (as well as others) as just such a way of reducing the problems of selecting votes (see below).

The demands of manageability set further limits on the issue range. Votes involving only one area of industry, such as agriculture, mining, natural resources, or energy, will be excluded, barring some other reasons for including them (as in the case of gas

rationing votes, which are included because they are among the relatively few votes dealing with the regulation of business). There is room in this paper for consideration of only issues of general interest.

The data base of this paper will consist of a compilation of votes from which the list of votes to be examined will be drawn. This data base of votes will consist of those compiled by Congressional Quarterly (CQ). The use of CQ in this way is a common practice. We made this decision for two reasons. The first, is that CQ provides a digest of the votes in the Congressional Record, leaving out the most routine votes. The second reason is that CQ provides a tabulation of votes--and not only actual votes and announced pairs (derivable from the Congressional Record), but also of announced stands and answers to surveys conducted by CQ itself. All of these will be counted as votes in this paper, as we desire that as much evidence as possible on the stands taken by Senators on the issues be obtained; survey responses, announcements and even pairs may not indicate as much commitment as actual votes, but they should indicate which way a Senator is leaning, which is enough for our purposes.

The particular CQ compilation that will be used as the primary data base is drawn from the lists found in CQ's annual Almanacs. The number of votes in these lists normally ranged from over 300 to over 500 for each year in the years in question.

The total number of votes per year is too large for this study. It might be a reasonable figure for a study with a time

frame of two or four years,² but for one with a time frame of twenty years such as this one, a reduction in the number of votes needs to be made.

The problem lies in how we are to do it. Various authors have warned of the problems involved in selecting votes using impressionistic evaluations of the subject matter.³ As William Riker points out, such criteria may be subjective (or at least not objectively provable) and so not reproducible by other investigators.

In spite of such criticisms, there are authors who do indulge in this practice. Michael Foley, who did a study with a fourteen-year time frame, included only votes that he thought involved "major policy" issues, and which involved the liberal-conservative conflict that he was interested in; in his study of the Eighty-Third Congress Gary Reichard examined votes in several predetermined categories in a way similar to Foley's. However, both of these then screened out those votes which did not scale.⁴

"Scaling" of issues is a way of arranging them in a definite order, such that those who vote one way ("yes", for example) on a given issue will vote that way (yes) on all succeeding issues in the scale, while at the same time those who vote the opposite way (in this case, "no") will vote in that way (no) on all the preceding issues of the scale. In a perfect scale, then, there is no overlap in the cleavages created by the issues on that scale. This suggests that all of the issues are indicators of a common underlying variable, in that they merely represent different degrees of attitudes

on the same dimension. And if one assigns numbers to the various positions on a scale, then each of those numbers will describe a specific combination of stands on all of the votes or the issues on the scale (in contrast to what is true of an "index", wherein describing a person as having a score of 78% "conservative", for example, on a given set of votes, gives one no indication as to which 78% of the votes it is on which the person is conservative).

A large set of issues which scale perfectly is seldom found, so a certain percentage of perfect scalability (usually 90%) is more or less arbitrarily regarded as acceptable for constituting a scale.

Anderson, Watts and Wilcox propose scaling as a way of getting around this problem;⁵ and many other authors join them in praise of scaling.⁶ Such a method does have many advantages, as it is reproducible and allows the voting legislators to "speak for themselves" (as Riker put it) about which votes are important (i.e., those cleavages which are similar over many votes, or at least parallel [scalable], suggesting a common underlying issue; such an issue, which manifests itself in a large number of votes, may for that reason alone can be regarded as important to those voting).

However, while scaling will screen out some votes and so reduce the number of votes, the researcher will still have to consider and compare all of the votes in whatever pool of votes with which he starts, even though he will eventually eliminate some by using the scale. This is fine if the original pool is not too large

for one's purposes. However, if it is too large, as ours is, one will still need to find a way to reduce the number of votes, before or in place of scaling.

Such a screening of votes is a topic less often treated than is that of scaling. Nonetheless, we may consider it as best we can; we may use the two main categories used by Anderson, Watts and Wilcox to guide the discussion. One consists of those methods which do not take into account the substance of the bill; the other consists of those which do.⁷

The former category includes such mechanistic methods as selecting only votes with a certain amount of dissent and using random selection. The first of the two methods in this category uses only those votes in which the size of the minority side was greater than a given percentage of the total vote, on the assumption that the least closely contested votes are the least important.⁸ This is a bad procedure, at least for this study, for it works contrary to our purposes. Making the categories used in this thesis is much like the constructing of a scale. As one approaches the end of a scale, the sides of each cleavage necessarily became more and more unequal, one growing larger and the other growing smaller. Similarly, in this thesis, we have very large and very small categories, and are interested in all of them. In both cases, all categories are important and of interest. Therefore, there is no warrant for a procedure which ignores votes which are won by large majorities. (There may be ground for ignoring small groups because

they are too small in absolute size for one to be sure they are not idiosyncratic and random, but this is a different issue.)

The second proposed method in the first category, suggested by Anderson, Watts and Wilcox, is that of choosing votes by random selection.⁹ However, using such a procedure--and using the previous procedure as well--means abandoning the attempt to sort out the important votes on the merits of their subject matter. It would be better, then, to use some other method which did take account of the subject if some way could be found of avoiding the weaknesses of the impressionistic procedures mentioned above.

The second category consists of methods of selecting votes which do consider their subject matter. The dangers of subjectivity in selecting votes this way have already been noted.¹⁰ However, since this is merely a preliminary selection of votes to examine (to see if there is any evidence for the existence today of the theoretical categories), rather than a selection of votes to be used to determine how a classification is to be devised or an index is to be constructed, and since we are not trying to weight votes (beyond saying whether they are or are not worth studying), we will not attempt to achieve more rigorous standards.

Devising criteria for selecting votes that can secure general acceptance would seem to require extensive study of the votes. The complexity of legislative maneuvering often makes it necessary to follow the legislative process very closely in order to decide which votes are important and meaningful and which are not. Not only must

the bills and amendments be selected, but it must be determined which vote on each of them is important. The votes on "tabling" (killing) a bill, passing it, passing a conference version of it, and overriding a veto may all be different from each other; the votes on passing, tabling, reconsidering or tabling the reconsideration of an amendment may also vary. Which votes are important and which represent the "real" stands of Senators on an issue must be determined. It would seem that nothing short of an in-depth study of the legislative history of the bills in question could give solid answers to these questions.

It might therefore be necessary to rely on some "expert" individuals or organizations who might evaluate the data for us. If such an expert was generally recognized as such, then we would have general agreement on the soundness of the list of selected votes. We might be able to minimize such danger of biased judgement that still remains by getting a panel of such experts (individuals or organizations) to screen the votes, and then following the consensus. (Riker objects to using such panels of experts. They may not, he maintains, use the same standard for evaluating votes, and therefore their collective decisions would not be meaningful.¹¹) This argument does not seem sound. The logic of scaling, of which Riker seems to approve, says that similar or at least parallel cleavages of votes--which votes thus scale--indicate a common underlying issue which the scale brings out. The logic of using a panel of experts is similar. If they produce similar lists of votes,

then this is strong reason for believing that they are using similar standards to evaluate the importance of the votes.)

Who are the "experts" on whom we should rely? We should choose from those who closely observe the legislative body in question, either from the inside or from the outside. An example of the former procedure was a study by Wilder Crane which used six members of the legislature that he was studying to help him select votes. Using such personal consultation is not within the plan of this thesis, and gives rise to other problems, such as those of deciding which legislators to choose. It would seem better to consult outside organizations which make it their business to watch the legislative body, and which publish reports on their findings.¹²

In the case of Congress, there are several such bodies. Since there still may be too much bias involved in picking one, as Foley noted, it would seem best to adhere to the "panel" principle and choose more than one organization. We may then make a list of votes out of those mentioned by all of the panel groups, or by a certain number of the groups. If we pick a number and then continue to add to the panel, we will tend to increase the number of votes on the final list; if we increase the number of panelists on whose lists the vote must appear to be included on ours, while keeping the number of groups on the panel constant, then we will reduce the number of votes on our list. It was eventually decided to use three panelists and require that at least two mention a vote. Two would be the lowest number to provide corroboration for a vote choice,

and so would require corroboration without making the requirements for inclusion too strict.

The following lists, compiled by such organizations, were eventually selected: the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)'s ACA Index (from 1963 through 1978), the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE)'s Labor Looks at Congress (from 1959 through 1978) and CQ's annual list of "Key Votes" (published annually in CQ's Almanac and every four years in its Congress and the Nation).¹³ The list of votes which were merely touched on in COPE's publication would be very long, even if all votes outside the chosen subject areas were eliminated. A list of only those relevant votes where the number of votes on each side was reported would also be very long. Therefore, it was decided to use the list that could be made of only those votes which COPE judged important enough to put, along with the numbers, in boldface type, and which were in the relevant subject areas.

This particular combination of organizations has much to commend them. Congressional Quarterly is in the full-time business of watching and interpreting Congress. It seems that their selections, especially those of which votes on each bill are important, deserve considerable attention. And, as has been said, CQ is often used as a data base in roll-call analysis.

The other two organizations, ACA and COPE, are both political pressure groups. Their voting records are compiled mainly for purposes of rating legislators as friendly or unfriendly to their

causes, and so are somewhat of a sideline. This is in contrast to the case of CQ, and makes their judgement in this somewhat less valuable. On the other hand, the fact that both of these are pressure groups gives them a keen interest in the business before Congress. Since one of the components of the "importance" of a vote is the degree to which people believe it to be important, the testimony of these actors in the political arena is particularly valuable in this matter.

The two balance each other well, the ACA being a conservative group and the AFL-CIO being a liberal group; also, the former is an ideological group, while the latter is an economic interest group. Since CQ is officially neither conservative nor liberal and is neither an ideological pressure group nor an interest group, this inclusion on the panel does not upset these balances.

In addition, for shorter periods of time, we will make use of the United States Chamber of Commerce's political newsletter, Congressional Action (hereinafter CC) (for the year 1978), and The Almanac of American Politics (hereinafter AAP) (1972 through 1980), by Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Mathews (for the years 1973 through 1978).¹⁴ Back issues of the Chamber's newsletter are almost unavailable, the 1978 issue being the only one available in our time frame; the Almanac only began publishing in 1972. Nonetheless, both provide some interesting votes.

(One other rating organization, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action [ADA], was also considered. Its newsletter was

initially rejected because some years were not available, but, as we have just seen, two other organizations with lists that did not cover the time frame were used. This organization was finally rejected because it provided few new kinds of votes, and because the AFL-CIO is a liberal ideological organization in all but name, as well as being a labor organization. The same cannot quite be said for the Chamber of Commerce as a conservative organization, and so it and the ACA provide more of a divergence of perspective than do the AFL-CIO and ADA, at least on economic issues.)

All votes which appear on the lists of two of these five organizations will go onto the final list, to be used in this study. This procedure is somewhat similar to the one used by Duncan MacRae¹⁵ to compile a vote list. He took a list of twelve votes from the CIO News and added to it eight votes from The New Republic's list for the same two-year period. He considered those two sets of votes as subsets in his list. Apparently, there were some that were on the New Republic list that were already on the CIO list, but he grouped them with the other CIO votes because he considered the CIO's list more important (as they were more involved in the legislative process), and so was interested in the CIO and non-CIO votes as subsets of his final list. If, however, he had considered the two organizations' lists of equal value, he might have divided his into three subsets: those only on the CIO list, those only on the New Republic list, and those on both. If the two original lists were equally valuable, then the set of votes which appeared on both would

seem to be more worthy of note than those which appeared on only one, and so might be sorted out into a final list. What has been done in this paper is much the same thing, except that we took the vote lists of three organizations, instead of two, and kept the overlap.

However, it was also decided that the judgement of CQ should be given more weight than that of the other three organizations. This was because CQ does not officially represent an interest, ideological or other pressure group; and because it devoted its full time to watching Congressmen, whereas the ACA and the AFL-CIO watch and rate members of Congress as a sideline, largely in order to make judgements about whom to support and whom to oppose in elections.

Weighting CQ's judgement more heavily was accomplished by deciding that CQ's selection of a vote for its list would count twice --which means that votes on CQ's list, now having a double endorsement, would automatically be included on our final list.

The question then arose of what to do if two or more of the organizations listed different votes on the same bill. Neither vote was on both lists, yet the bill would seem to be of some importance, having been listed twice, so it seemed that one or both of the votes should be included.

It was eventually decided that the fact that a bill is listed by two organizations, even though on different votes, qualifies it for inclusion, and that since the importance of each vote is an

indicator of the importance of the bill, only one of them needs to be used on the final list. The procedure for choosing this vote will be as follows: that vote will be selected which had the least number of "?" responses, in CQ. These are the responses in which the Senator neither voted, paired, announced a position nor responded to a CQ poll--those in which no position was indicated. If such a response was obtained, we might reasonably guess that the Senators were apathetic about this vote. If a larger number responded this way about one vote than did about another, we may assume that the Senators, on the average, considered the former a less important vote.

If one of the lists is CQ, then the vote is of course included automatically. If the vote on the other list has fewer "?" responses, then it is included as well. If two of the organizations, other than CQ, list the same bill, the vote with fewer "?" responses is included. If CQ and two of the other organizations all list different votes on the same bill, then the CQ vote is included, and that vote from the other two which has fewer "?" responses is also included, even if it does not have less "?"s than the CQ vote.

Finally, we may note a special case. In the 1970s, a number of attempts were made to abolish food stamps for striking workers. Amendments to this effect were proposed several times each year, attached to various bills (food stamp reform bills, agriculture appropriations, etc.). Several were listed by both ACA and COPE, so one would assume that they were an important issue. Yet the same

vote was never listed by both the ACA and COPE, and none of them would be eligible for inclusion on the final list under any of the provisions so far mentioned, because they involved votes on the "same" amendment to different bills. Still, it seems clear that for most practical purposes it was the same amendment in content. And COPE expressly used the word "same". On these grounds, we will choose to regard the different votes as the same, and include one of them, in accord with the procedure described above.

Historical Background

A further check on the soundness of the list of votes selected is to be found in the determination of whether the economic issues involved in the votes were important in the history of the period.

Since this paper attempts to sample voting behavior from the Great Society era and the era immediately before it and the one immediately after it, the time frame of this study extends for several years on each side of 1963-1975. The time frame does not include all of these preceding and succeeding periods in their entirety, but rather a portion of each for sampling. Nonetheless, an overview of them in their entirety is in order so as to understand the background of these issues.

As we noted earlier, the New Deal went through several stages, emphasizing different kinds of issues and different coalitions over them. In the last stage (1937-39), the coalitions, with their stands on the issues, took the forms that they were to have for a

long while afterward. Opposition to the New Deal policy of wage-and-hour legislation (or to the form it came to take), second thoughts about the pro-union aspects of the National Labor Relations Act, and impatience with relief and other spending (with the resulting deficits) eventually drove a bloc of Democrats and most "progressive Republicans" into an alliance with those on their right, as James Patterson and others have described (see above). This loose, informal grouping, beginning in about 1937, marked the beginning of the "Conservative Coalition" of Congressional Republicans and conservative (eventually overwhelmingly Southern) Democrats.

From this time on, most Northern and a few Southern Democrats, plus some Republicans, were known as "liberals", while most Republicans--both those who had in the past been known as "progressives" and those who had in the past been known as "conservatives"--and most Southern Democrats (some of whom had previously been known as New Dealers) were all known alike as "conservatives", constituting the "Conservative Coalition" in Congress.

The liberals had generally supported the moves of Roosevelt since 1937, and asked for further moves in the same direction; over the years, they could be found favoring higher and more comprehensive minimum wages, more generous and standardized unemployment compensation, more egalitarian income tax policies, more public housing, and more deficit spending in times of high unemployment. The conservatives had often opposed Roosevelt from 1937 on, and over the years would be found generally opposing liberals on the above named issues.

After the 1938 elections, Republican gains augmented coalition membership. They did so to such an extent that the coalition was usually able, from this point until the 1960s, to block passage of major liberal legislation, thus bringing an end to several years of major legislative activity. This is in part why it is commonly said that the New Deal "ended" in 1939 or soon thereafter simply in the sense that there was a cessation of the passage of new programs of major significance, and not, of course, in the sense of repealing the major parts of the New Deal. (Some programs which were originally intended to be only temporary, such as work-relief, were phased out in the next few years as the passing of Depression-era conditions elemented the need for them.) Franklin Roosevelt himself declared a few years later that he would devote his energies to winning World War II rather than carrying on the fight for the New Deal.

The period from 1939 to 1963 saw much change in American politics, but there was a certain unity to the period as well. This was the period between the end of the New Deal and the beginning of the Great Society. There was no other such set of major social programs enacted between these two. The proposed agenda of new Social programs in 1963 was largely similar to that of 1939, with a few additions that had been made in the intervening years. This persistence of the agenda lead to a persistence of the coalitions for and against it which had taken shape by 1939. The apparent unwillingness of the electorate to tolerate further tax rate

increases--and, to a lesser extent, larger budget deficits--to pay for these programs was a major obstacle to the liberals and a boon to the conservatives. (The tax increase in World War II was tolerated, but mainly for patriotic reasons; and while after it the tax was not cut to prewar levels, most of the permanent spending increase it funded was for defense, foreign aid, veterans pensions and interest, not for domestic social programs.) It became necessary for liberals to think of a new way to finance their programs. They discovered that economic growth could increase revenues while taxes were not increased or even decreased (in fact, lower taxes would help stimulate such growth), and so frequently became great advocates of economic growth. And it was not until economic growth reached the level that it did in the early 1960s (later encouraged further by a tax cut) that the liberals finally got their new programs passed as "the Great Society".

From the beginning of this period, the public was apparently unwilling to vote for those who proposed higher taxes to cover new programs. Spending on similar programs had already led to deficits. These deficits were condemned by conservatives, but liberals were inclined to argue that they seemed to stimulate the economy. However, to judge by the election returns, the public had limits to its tolerance for deficits as well as limits to its tolerance for taxes, as it did not give the liberal Democrats sufficient votes to enable it to control the government.

World War II saw a great increase in spending and in personal income taxes to pay for it. The public was willing to accept such a sacrifice for the patriotic endeavor, and by the time the war was over, it had been conditioned to accept a higher level of taxes than before. When, after the war, the ending of war-time spending allowed taxes to be reduced, they were not reduced to pre-war levels, but the public did not complain greatly. Meanwhile, depression conditions finally ended with war-time creation of jobs (and they did not return after the war, at least not in so severe a form). The increased revenues in peacetime allowed increased spending, but the great bulk of these new expenditures were on defense (especially with the onset of the Cold War), foreign aid, veterans pensions and interest on the debt, with little left over for domestic social programs.

In the late 1940s, liberal President Truman and liberals in Congress attempted to push for new social programs (under the name of "the Fair Deal"). The liberal agenda was much the same as before the war (social security expansion, minimum-wage increases, expansion of public housing, etc.), with the addition of education and health insurance. The coalitions supporting and opposing it were the same, and the conservatives were still generally the larger of the two. Hence, Truman was unable to get much passed in the way of minimum-wage increases, aid to education and health insurance. The increase in the housing program was also modest. An expansion of social security coverage was enacted in 1950, but this was not a

great departure in principle. It was accompanied by a change of ADC to AFDC. (In 1947 and 1948 Truman also had to accept a tax cut and the Taft-Hartley Act from a Republican Eightieth Congress.)

Meanwhile, the Democrats had become increasingly identified with such new social welfare programs, and since the voters were apparently averse, for the most part, to higher taxes or higher deficits, it is not surprising that the Democrats lost ground. Their Congressional margins decreased in the 1942 elections, as the Republicans broke through the 30% barrier in the Senate (as they had in the House in 1938), for the first time since before 1935 and never again sank below it. Later, in the 1946 elections, the Democrats lost control of Congress for two years. Then, after the 1950 elections, there began a period of relative Republican strength, lasting until after the 1958 elections, during which time the Republicans never had less than 45% of the seats in either chamber of Congress, and actually gained control of Congress with the 1952 elections. Also at this time, the Republicans gained control of the Presidency and held it for eight years (1953-61). (They did not again attain these heights until the Reagan administration.) Hence, the liberals were still generally unable to get their list of programs passed, and might not have been able to do so before the 1958 elections, even without Eisenhower in the White House.

During the 1950s, the liberal Democrats saw that middle-class voters were generally supporting Republicans (except in the South,

where they generally supported conservative Democrats). Apparently the middle class voter feared that the costs of putting the liberal Democrats in office (in terms of taxes and inflation-causing budget deficits) outweighed whatever benefits they may have stood to gain from that party. In any case, the middle class was able to wield enough political power to contribute to the thwarting of liberal plans for further legislation. The liberal Democrats therefore began to appeal to the middle class for support. One example of this was Adlai Stevenson's de-emphasis of the class rhetoric which had characterized the campaigns of Roosevelt and Truman. Yet the liberals were still unable to offer the middle class reasons for trusting them that the middle class found convincing. Soon, however, they discovered a possible strategy.

During the Eisenhower years, the conservatives had been able to curb spending somewhat, and so reduce the deficit (eliminating it in some years) while even allowing a moderate tax cut. They were helped in this by economic growth, which produced increased tax revenue at the old, or even somewhat reduced, tax rates.

The liberals came to conclude that just as growth could allow conservatives to reduce the deficit without having to cut spending (or raise tax rates), so it could allow liberals to increase spending without having to increase the deficit (or raise tax rates), thus allowing them to propose helping the poor without seeming so threatening to the middle class. However, economic growth had not yet reached a high enough level to make their task easy. They began to

contemplate ways of actively encouraging growth by stimulating the economy . At this time Keynesian attitudes were becoming quite widespread among liberals, and according to Keynesians, there were two ways of stimulating the economy: tax cuts and spending increases.

Meanwhile, the liberals added to their agenda various programs concerned with eliminating poverty, particularly among the very poor, such as the hard-core unemployed. In the period between 1955 and 1960, they first proposed such policies as area redevelopment, public works jobs and work training. This concern produced another reason for liberals to seek economic growth; it was believed by most of them that such growth would help reduce poverty and unemployment, and some of them considered that it played a more important role in doing so than such measures as job training, etc., which addressed the supposed structural causes of the problems.

This brings us down to 1958. The conservative coalition was still blocking most liberal measures, while liberals were increasingly leaning toward economic growth as a way out of their predicament. Then, in the election of that year, following (and probably largely as a result of) the severe recession of 1957-58, the Democrats won landslide majorities in Congress. The election especially enhanced the ranks of Northern Democrats, and liberals among them. And of course, this meant a substantial turnover in Congressional membership. It is at this point that our study begins.

This increase in liberal strength, it turned out, was not as great as it might have been; while the liberals did pass some

programs, they were able to pass few over Eisenhower's veto. Then in 1960, when they finally regained control of the White House, the Democrats lost their overwhelming margin of control in the House of Representatives. Thus, the liberals still had a reason to continue emphasizing economic growth as a way of paying for their programs. This was confirmed when liberal President Kennedy and his liberal allies in Congress attempted to push through the liberal agenda of programs as augmented in the 1950s under the name of "the New Frontier". They met with much frustration at the hands of the conservatives, as Truman and his allies had. The conservatives blocked passage of bills providing aid to school construction and teachers' salaries, medical assistance for the aged, and a department of urban affairs, and discouraged Kennedy from asking for others. Most of what he did get Congress to pass was relatively minor: an experimental food stamp program and some modifications in AFDC. (However, he did obtain a raise in the minimum wage and expanded coverage of it, and the passage of a bill providing for the establishment of a program of manpower training and development.)

The liberals herefore considered the two Keynesian precriptions for stimulating economic growth--tax cuts and spending increases. Increased spending could consist of increased military spending, and some of this was sought and obtained by Kennedy. However, since most liberals desired increased social welfare spending anyway, this was the sort of spending that they most often contemplated.

The idea of tax cuts without increased social spending appealed to many people, such as some businessmen. The idea of increased social spending without tax cuts appealed to many liberals. The liberals of the Kennedy administration followed a third, intermediate course. While both tax cuts and spending increases were meant to increase growth, and so were expected to reduce deficits, both could have the short-run effect of exacerbating deficits, and consequently arousing conservative opposition. Such opposition had been successful in the past and might well be so again. However, conservatives (classical liberals) oppose high spending (whether accompanied by deficits or not) and, ultimately, favor low taxes (although they may sacrifice this good in the short run to fight deficits). Thus, Keynesians liberals were likely to find more support among their conservative opposition for tax-cutting than for spending increases. Making this calculation, the Administration liberals decided that before spending money on the social programs which they, as liberals, desired, they would enact a tax-cut in the hope that the tax would stimulate the economy so as to provide revenues to balance later spending.

As it happened, Kennedy got some minor tax cuts passed in 1962, and then got a few programs (involving youth employment, area redevelopment, a national service corps and aid to mass transit) passed, at least through the Senate. However, Congress did not pass his major tax-cut bill and other social programs until after his death.

It was Lyndon Johnson who got these measures passed. He secured the enactment of the Kennedy tax cut in 1964, which apparently did lead to increased economic growth and to increased revenues. This facilitated the new President's largely successful attempt to enact the bulk of the remaining programs on the liberal agenda, under the name of "the Great Society". Johnson had the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) ("War on Poverty"), an umbrella bureau containing various anti-poverty programs, established in 1964. That same year, he also got bills passed providing for aid to urban mass transit and the permanent establishment of food stamp programs to provide help for the poor in purchasing food.

The passage of further legislation was aided by the Democrats' increased majorities in Congress which accompanied the landslide defeat of Goldwater in 1964 (they passed the 65% margin in the House for the first time since 1961, and in the Senate, had been at or above that percent since 1959; however, they lost much of this after the 1966 elections). Other items on the agenda that Johnson got passed, at least through the Senate, included bills providing for aid to school construction and teacher's salaries (1965); medical care for the aged ("Medicare"), financed through the social security system (1965); funds for economic development of Appalachia (1965); restrictions on air and water pollution (1965); establishment of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (1965) and Transportation (1966); subsidies to help pay for the costs of rent for low-income groups (1965, 1966, 1967); a minimum wage increase (1966);

more generous unemployment compensation (including federal minimum standards) (1966); and a "demonstration cities" program (1966). Johnson's failures in this regard were few, with his inability to get the right-to-work provision of the Taft-Hartley Act repealed being perhaps the most important.

This victory for the liberals marked the end of this period of about twenty-five years of liberal frustration, and the start of a new period of increased government spending, as Congress enacted the first major set of government social programs since the New Deal but without a corresponding tax increase.

The tax cut, and later the Vietnam War, apparently fueled an economic boom which produced enough revenue to balance the budget in 1969, but that was for the last time.

Already, further spending growth had swollen the budget. Trends in increased spending were begun in the Johnson years which continued into the Nixon administration. The Vietnam War, going back to 1965, had been a great contributor to spending growth, but it was eventually outstripped by social welfare spending, and of course was finally wound down to a close, in the Nixon years. While the new anti-poverty and rent programs continued to be of modest size, and education and health programs maintained their moderate sizes, other social welfare spending began to grow substantially. The food stamp program grew somewhat. More importantly, Congress enacted, in 1967, the first of three large social security benefit increases, in excess of the inflation rate. Also, in the Johnson years, AFDC grew

significantly, and with them, AFDC spending (in 1967, Congress made some attempt to restrict the program, but voted down a tough work requirement for mothers of school-age children while it actually liberalized the program by making some families with fathers present eligible). The food stamp program also grew at this time.

At this point, Johnson, believing that the public was still not in favor of a major general tax increase (at least, not a permanent one), chose to run deficits and cover them by expanding the money supply, thus causing inflation. A side effect of this was "bracket creep"--the pushing of people, by inflation, into a higher tax bracket. This increased their tax burden, as well as government revenue.

In an attempt to deal with these programs, Congress enacted spending cuts in 1967, and some more cuts and temporary surtax in 1968, but most of the spending was bequeathed to President Nixon. He struggled somewhat to reduce the deficits. He got the surtax extended temporarily in 1969, and he did end the Vietnam War in 1973. (Overall defense spending declined as well, in this period.) However, the beginning of the winding-down of the war (1969-73) was followed by, if it did not actually cause, a recession (1969-70), which was bad for revenue. And Congress increased domestic spending, taking up the slack--and more, causing the budget to swell still further. In particular, Social Security was again increased significantly in 1969 and 1972, while spending on food stamps grew as the program was liberalized in 1969 and 1970.

Thus, social welfare spending increased, and to a great degree, during the Nixon years, which is rather different from what one might expect from a Republican administration. Nonetheless, social spending eventually seemed to begin to level-off. However, the liberal desire to enhance government power was not completely thwarted, as a new drive for business regulation got under way, such measures costing less than the social welfare programs and being more politically popular (most of these passed Congress and had Nixon's approval as well). This was in some ways the first big push for regulation since the Progressive Era. It was further seen that this movement was in any case qualitatively different from earlier movement for regulation. It included the environmental legislation such as air pollution legislation (as well as the older water- and land-pollution programs going back to the Johnson years); worker safety provisions such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA, 1970); and various consumer protection measures, such as product safety legislation (1972, etc.) and a proposed Consumer Protection Agency to intervene for consumers before existing regulatory agencies. In addition, Nixon, by means of an executive reorganization order, established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. These proposals all seemed to be aimed rather exclusively at helping consumers or employees of a business, or victims of its pollution, rather than helping its competitors as well, as many Progressive Era proposals (antitrust, etc.)--somewhat ambiguously--attempted to do. Accordingly, the new regulation is seen as less

sympathetic to business than the older regulation, and there seemed to be less business support for it (although possibilities for corporate "liberalism" even here should not be ruled out). Also, these new regulations were more concerned with businesses' achieving specific standards of safety, pollution, etc., for the direct benefit of the consumers and employees. This is in contrast to older regulations which were concerned with somehow limiting business's power, size or general economic discretion (as such things as antitrust laws or anti-price-cutting legislation would do) on the assumption that benefits for consumers and workers would flow from that.

The rest of the economic history of the Nixon years is a complex story of inflation; recession; inflation and recession together ("stagflation"); and bracket creep; accompanied by wage/price freezes and controls, and deficit spending, on the part of an administration originally opposed to such policies.

The passing of the Great Society, the Vietnam War and the Nixon Administration all contributed to the receding of many of the issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially the non-economic ones, from the forefront of public attention, as this relatively liberal period came to an end and a new one arrived. The scene was now left relatively clear for the older concerns of inflation, unemployment and taxation--now generally more burdensome--to dominate the Ford administration. However, Watergate left a legacy in the form of a heavily Democratic Congress. This Congress again

increased the budget substantially, in spite of Ford's efforts to the contrary, passing a food stamp bill and a public works bill over his veto. In the area of labor, it passed a bill to allow common-site picketing but Ford successfully vetoed it. Also, some minor tax cuts were passed.

Nonetheless a backlash against "big government" was already appearing among the public, and it soon began to influence parties. Although a Democrat was elected in 1976, he claimed to favor restraint in regard to spending and deficits. President Carter's middle course satisfied neither conservatives nor liberals. He did not greatly expand or greatly cut spending or taxes, and what change there was did not seem to go in any obvious direction. The most important measures of his early administration seem to have been an increase in social security taxes and the beginning of deregulation in industries subject to regulatory commissions, while unions and liberals were frustrated in their attempts to modify collective bargaining rules in a pre-union direction.

Also in this period, those conservative Republicans who found Ford too moderate (in his ideological goals, economic strategies, rhetoric and/or political alliances) had a better chance to dominate their party without him in the White House, and took heart from the growing conservatism of the political atmosphere. Further, many of them had become impatient with "collecting the Democrats' taxes for them": feeling that the "conservatives" (classical liberals) must remember their goal of reducing the burdens of government, they

became advocates of substantial tax cuts. Such a course would not only provide a needed economic stimulus and be politically more popular than balancing the budget with low spending and high taxes, but would, by stimulating the economy, more than make up for the loss of revenue from lower rates, perhaps even balancing the budget. This latter assumption (expressed by the Laffer curve) was the same as that behind the 1964 tax cuts; along with other, different assumptions, it formed the new "supply-side" philosophy of conservative economics. Most conservatives embraced it, including their leader, Ronald Reagan, and conservatives in Congress began taking the low-tax position on tax votes, supporting the Kemp-Roth amendment to the income tax bill in 1978 (providing a 30% general personal income-tax cut over three years). In 1980, conservatives were able to get Reagan nominated for President and elected.

The political "swing to the right" of the 1970s, indicated by this movement among the Republicans and Carter's moderation among the Democrats, marks the beginning of a new era. Just as the Ford years were in many ways a reversion to the pre-Great Society era--in terms of issues and ideals, though not in policy outcomes--the succeeding years were ones in which the attempt was made to turn the clock back farther, or at least to make a strong break with the Great Society era. Furthermore, the Senatorial voting cleavages after 1980 are rather distinctive as well.

ENDNOTES

¹Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen H. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

²William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll-Calls in Voting Bodies", in Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. by John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, (Glencover, IL: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 377-387; David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959); and Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes", American Political Science Review 59 (December, 1965), 909-926.

³Riker; and Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

⁴Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution 1959-1972 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), and Gary Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1975).

⁵Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

⁶MacRae, "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions": MacRae, "Some Underlying Variables in Legislative Roll-Call Votes", Public Opinion Quarterly 18 (Summer 1954), 191-195; Fred I. Greenstein and Elton F. Jackson, "A Second Look at the Validity of Roll-Call Analysis", Midwest Journal of Political Science 7 (May, 1963), 157-166.

⁷Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

⁸Riker; MacRae, "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions"; MacRae and Susan Borker Schwarz, "Identifying Congressional Issues by Multidimensional Models", Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (May, 1968), 181-201; Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress", Journal of Politics 20 (May, 1958), 308-388.

⁹Anderson, Watts and Wilcox.

¹⁰See Note 2.

¹¹Riker.

¹²Wilder Cane, Jr., "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting", Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (August, 1960), 237-49.

¹³Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1959-1978. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1959-1978); Americans for Constitutional Action, ACA Index 1963-1978 (Washington, D.C.: Americans for Constitutional Action, 1963-1978); and AFL-CIO: Labor Looks at Congress has no votes in boldface type. However, since such votes were always referred to previously as "key votes", those votes called by that name in the 1978 book were considered the equivalent of votes in boldface type.)

¹⁴Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. Congressional Action (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., 1978); and Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics 1972-1980 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1972-1980).

¹⁵MacRae, "Some Underlying Variables in Legislative Roll-Call Votes", pp. 191-195.

CHAPTER III
TESTING THE MODEL: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE VOTING RECORDS

Introduction

Now we may turn to a consideration of the voting records. We shall first examine the data presented in the chart, then try to determine what cleavages and groups are exhibited by the votes, and finally compare our findings to the theoretical model.¹

From this point on, we shall, unless we specify otherwise, use the terms "conservative" ("right") and "liberal" ("left") in the sense used in everyday conversation and the press.

For the convenience of the reader, the charts tabulating the votes have the Senator's names arranged in an apparent right-to-left order (determined impressionistically, but with the results largely in accord with the evidence of the votes);² and the votes have been grouped by issue areas, with the attempt being made to generally put related areas near each other. Another decision that was made regarding the voting lists is that all Senators who were in office for less than two years would be excluded, as they would provide too few votes for study.

To facilitate the description of the votes we will divide the Senators into a few broad groups. These groups are based mainly

on conventional groupings, and are not necessarily the same as the groups in our theoretical model or the groups which we will identify after examining the voting records (although they usually do have some basis in the theory and in the voting records). They are used primarily to economize descriptions, in a more-or-less meaningful way, and too much stress should not be placed on the assignment of Senators to the groups.

The first division to be made is into Republicans and Democrats. (James Buckley was elected as the Conservative candidate in 1970, but was admitted to the Republican caucus; Harry Byrd, Jr., a one-time Democrat who was re-elected as an Independent in 1970, voted with the Democrats on organizing the Senate. These Senators will consequently be regarded as Republican and Democrat, respectively.) Congressional Quarterly next divides Democrats into Northerners and Southerners, thus giving recognition to the liberal-conservative conflict between the two wings of the party. However, CQ, not wishing to get involved in actually making definitions of "conservative" and "liberal", uses a simple geographic criterion for grouping the Senators, grouping them into Northern and Southern Democrats on the basis of a definition of "the South" as consisting of the former Confederate States (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas) plus Kentucky and Oklahoma, and a definition of "the North" as all the other states. These are good definitions of the North and South, and we shall use them. However, the division

of the Democrats into wings on the basis of those geographical groupings is inadequate for our purposes. While Northern Democrats are overwhelmingly liberal--that is, they vote on the left side of the issues in a large majority of cases--considerably less than all of the Southerners are conservative. Southern Democrats Yarborough and Kefauver are among the most liberal of all Senators, while Gore, Sasser, and Harris are close behind, and Monroney, Kerr, Fulbright and Smathers are mostly liberal.

Further, most Southern Democrats first elected in or after 1966 (Hollings, Morgan, Nunn, Stone, Chiles, Ford, Huddleston, Bumpers, Johnston of Louisiana and Bentsen) are distinctly more liberal than many of those elected before 1966, and yet they are also generally more conservative than the more senior liberal Southerners mentioned above.

Finally, we may note that a number of other Southerners elected before 1966 (Long of Louisiana, Ellender, Sparkman, Hill and Johnston of South Carolina) were well to the left of the old-style conservatives (although Ellender and Hill often voted with them), and most of them voted with the liberals more often. For convenience, this group would be best grouped with the liberals.

This leaves us with several Senators--Robertson, Harry Byrd Sr., and Harry Byrd Jr. (of Virginia), Ervin, Jordan (of North Carolina), Russell, Talmadge, Holland, Stennis, Eastland and McClellan, all first elected before 1966, and Allen, first elected after (plus Thurmond, when he was a Democrat, before September 1964), who had

voting records greatly different from the average Northern Democrat and voted often (but far from always) with conservative Republicans, while having voting records similar to each other's. They did not even constitute a majority of the pre-1966 Southerners, but they did constitute a plurality, and represented a type apparently unique to the region. They can therefore be referred to as "Old South Democrats".

Therefore, we have among the Democrats the Old South Democrats; the New South Democrats (Chiles, etc.); and the liberals Northern and Southern (Yarborough, etc., plus the group including Sparkman, etc.). There are only two remaining Democrats who do not fit into these groups. These are two Northern Democrats (Lausche and Zorinsky) who voted much more often with conservative Republicans than with their liberal fellow Northern Democrats. They are not grouped with the conservative Old Southerner type of Democrat because they generally voted with the conservative Republicans, while the Old Southerners often diverged from the Republicans.

Turning now to the Republicans, we can divide them into conservative and liberal wings as well. This too, is based on a conventional scheme, but the boundaries are not so clear-cut. Nonetheless, on the basis of their reputations and voting records, the Republicans may be divided into "conservatives" and "liberals" (these terms are primarily relative; "liberal" Republicans are not necessarily as liberal as "liberal" Democrats). On the tables, the former are those extending from Scott of Virginia to Baker, while the latter extend from Saltonstall to Case of New Jersey.

The votes could be arranged in one of three ways: by apparent similarity of subject, by similarity of cleavages, or by some combination of these two. In the survey in the text, they will be discussed in the first order. Then, we will attempt to group them together in the second way. For the tables, the third, middle way was chosen; this keeps together votes on ostensibly the same subject, so a Senator's stand on each one may be determined, but groups together subjects with similar cleavages, so patterns may be discerned visually.

Y = a vote, pair, announcement or response to a CQ poll in favor of the proposal.

X = a vote, pair, announcement or response to a CQ poll opposed to the proposal.

? = no indicated preference, or abstention from voting to avoid a conflict of interest.

C = "conservative" position, in the conventional sense, and position more favored by alleged "conservatives", than alleged "liberals".

L = "liberal" position, in the conventional sense, and position more favored by alleged "liberals" than alleged "conservatives".

+ = position in favor of "small-government", but not more favored by alleged "conservatives" than alleged "liberals"

- = position in favor of "big-government", but not more favored by alleged "liberals" than alleged "conservatives".

? = no known preference.

TABLE 1.-- Votes Used.

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
<u>1959</u>						
S 1555.	Landrum-Griffin bill: amendment to allow state regulation of labor disputes. April 3. (COLL. BARGAINING: 1959 STATE REG; Y = -)	X		(X)		
S 1515.	Landrum-Griffin bill: amendment to provide restraints on unions in form of "Bill of Rights" for members. April 22. (COLL. BARGNG: 1959 BILL OF RTS; Y = -)	(X)		X		
_____	:reconsideration of previous vote. April 22. (COLL. BARGNG: 1959 RECON. B OF R; Y = -)	(X)		X		
_____	:amendment to ban secondary boycotts. April 24. (COLL. BARGNG: 1959 SECOND BOYCCTS; Y = -)	(X)		X		
<u>1960</u>						
S. 8.	Education (elementary and secondary) aid bill: amendment providing aid for school construction and teachers' salaries. February 3. (1960A ELEM. AND SEC. EDUCATION; N = C)	X		X		
_____	:motion to reconsider amendment providing for school construction and teachers' salaries. February 3. (1960B ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION; Y = C)	(X)		X		
HR 2580.	Social security bill: amendment providing medical benefits for the aged. August 23. (1960 MEDICARE; N = C).	X		X		
<u>1961</u>						
HR 3935.	Minimum wage bill: amendment to narrow proposed coverage. April 19. (MIN. WAGE: 1961 COVERAGE; N = C)	X		X		
S 1021.	Education (elementary and secondary) aid bill, providing aid for operation, maintenance and construction of schools and teachers' salaries. May 25. (1961 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION; N = C)	X		X		
S 1922.	Housing program: amendment to provide a home-loan program. June 8. (1961A GEN'RL. HOUSING; Y = C)	(X)		X		
_____	:conference report. June 28. (1961B GEN'RL HOUSING; N = C)	X		(X)		
<u>1962</u>						
HR 10606.	Public welfare bill: amendment providing medical benefits for the aged. July 17. (1963 MEDICARE; N = C)	X		X		
HR 7576.	Atomic Energy funds: amendment to delete funds to build new reactor in Hanford, Washington. July 18. (1962 NUCLEAR REACTORS; Y = C)	X				
HR 11040.	Communications Satellite bill: cloture. August 14. (1962 COMSAT; N = C)	X				
HR 10650.	Income tax bill, providing some cuts: passage. August 14. (INCOME TAXES: 1962 BILL: N = -)	X				

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
HR 11970.	Trade bill: amendment limiting Presidential power to cut tariff. September 18. (1962 TARIFF POWERS; Y = -)	X				
<u>1963</u> S6.	Bill providing aid to local mass transit passage. April 4. (1963 MASS TRANST. PASS.; N = C)	X	X	(X)		
S1.	Youth Employment bill: amendment removing section establishing a Youth Conservation Corps. April 10. (1963 YOUTH CONS. CORPS. AM.; N = C)	(X)	(X)	X		
_____	:passage. April 10. (1963 YOUTH EMP. BILL; N = C)	X	X	(X)		
HR 5517.	Bill continuing accelerated public works program: amendment to cut funds. May 1. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1963 ACCL.; N = C)		X	X		
S 1163.	Bill continuing Area Redevelopment Program passage. June 26. (1963 AREA REDEVEL.; N = C)	X	X	X		
S 1321.	National Service Corps bill: passage. August 14. (1963 NATIONAL SERVICE CORPS; N = C)	X	X			
S 1831.	Bill extending Manpower Development and Training Act, especially youth training: passage. September 26. (1963 YOUTH TRAINING; N = C)		X	X		
HR 6143.	Bill to aid higher education: passage. October 21. (1963 HIGHER EDUCATION; N = C)		X	X		
<u>1964</u>						
HR 8363.	Income-tax cut bill: passage. February 7. (INCOME TAXES: 1964 GEN. CUT; N = -)	X	X	X		
S 2642.	Bill establishing Office of Economic Opportunity: (OEO): passage. July 23. (OEO: 1964 EST.; N = C)	X	X	X		
HR 11865.	Social security bill: amendment to provide medical benefits for the aged. September 2. (1964 MEDICARE; N = C)	X	X	X		
<u>1965</u> S4.	Water pollution bill: amendment to delete provision allowing HEW to set water quality standards. January 28. (1965 WATER POLLUT.; N = C)	X	X	X		
S3.	Appalachian development bill: passage. February 1. (1964 APPALACHIA; N = C)	X	X	X		
HR 2362.	Bill providing a wide range of aid to elementary and secondary education: passage. April 9. (1965 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: N = C)	X	X	X		
S 1648.	Public works bill: amendment to cut funds. June 1. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1965 CUT; Y = C)		X	(X)		
_____	:passage. June 1. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1965 BILL; N = C)		(X)	X		

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
HR 6675.	Social security bill: amendment to provide medical aid to the aged. July 9. (1965 MEDICARE AMENDMENT; N = C)	X	X	X		
_____	:passage. July 9. (1965 MEDICARE BILL; N = C)	X	X			
S 2213.	Housing and Urban Dev. bill: amendment to delete rent subsidies. July 15. (1965 RENT SUBSIDIES; Y = C)	X	X	X		
HR 6927.	Bill to establish Department of Housing and Urban Development: passage. August 11. (1965 EST. HUD DEPT; N = C)		X	X		
HR 8283.	OEO bill: amendment to provide for a governor's veto over certain parts of the program. August 17. (1965 OEO GOV'S. VETO; Y = C)		X	X		
_____	:amendment to reduce funding. August 18. (OEO: 1965 CUT; Y = C)	X				
S 2084.	Highway beautification bill: passage. September 16. (1965 HIGHWAY BEAUT; N = C)	X				
HR 77.	Bill to repeal portion of Taft-Hartley permitting right-to-work laws: cloture. October 11. (COLL. BARGAINING: 1965 ABOLISH RIGHT-TO-WORK; N = -)	X		X		
<u>1966</u>						
HR 14012.	Supplemental Appropriations bill: amendment to delete rent subsidies. April 27. (1966 RENT SUBSIDIES; N = C)	X	X	X		
S 985.	Fair Packaging and Labelling bill: amendment to delete provision establishing standard weights and quantities. June 8. (1966 STANDARD QUANT. ON LABELS; N = C)	X		X		
HR 15119.	Bill to establish national standards for unemployment compensation: amendment to provide extended aid in recessions. August 8. (UNEMP. COMP.: 1966 RECESSION; N = C)	X	X	(X)		
_____	:amendment to provide that minimum levels for maximum benefits equal one-half the average state-wide wage. August 8. (UNEMP. COMP.: 1966 MIN. BENS; N = C)	(X)	(X)	X		
_____	:passage. August 8. (UNEMP. COMP.: 1966 GEN STANDS; N = C)	X	X	(X)		
S 3708.	Demonstration cities bill: amendment to delete section providing for Demonstration Cities. August 19. (1966 DEMONST. CITIES; Y = C)	X	X	(X)		
HR 13712.	Minimum wage bill: amendment to delay increase. August 25. (MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 DELAY INV.; Y = C)	X	(X)	(X)		

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
	:amendment to narrow coverage. August 26. (MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 COVERAGE; Y = C)	(X)	(X)	X		
	:passage. August 26. (MINIMUM WAGE: 1966 PASS; N = C)	(X)	X	(X)		
<u>1967</u>						
HR 9960.	Independent offices and HUD appropriations bill: amendment to delete rent subsidies. September 20. (1967 RENT SUBSIDIES; Y = C)	X	X	X		
S 2388.	OEO bill: amendment to provide governor's veto. October 4. (1967 OEO GOV'S. VETO; Y = C)		X	X		
	:amendment to provide substitute public works program. October 4. (OEO: PUB. WORKS AMEND. 1967); N = C	X	X	X		
HJ Res 888.	Continuing appropriations bill: amendment provid- ing 5% cut in general spending. October 25. (GEN. SPEND'G: 1967 CUT; Y = C)	X	X			
HR 12080.	Social Security bill: amendment to lower proposed increase. November 21. (1967 SOC. SEC. INC.; Y = C)	X	X	X		
<u>1968</u>						
HR 15399	OEO supplemental appropriations: amendment aiding Headstart program. March 12. (1968 HEADSTART; N = C)		X	X		
HR 154144.	Excise Tax bill: amendment to strike spending cut from following amendment. March 26.	(X)	X	(X)		
	:amendment to provide general spending cut and surtax. April 2. (1968 SPEND CUT and INCOME TAXES: 1968 SURTAX; Y = C)	X	(X)	X		
S 3497.	HUD bill: passage. May 28. (1968 GEN. HUD; N = C)	X				
HR 18037.	Labor/HEW appropriations: amendment to increase OEO budget. September 6. (OEO: 1968 INCR.; N = C)	X				
<u>1969</u>						
HR 9951.	Unemployment Tax bill: amendment to continue surtax. July 31. (INCOME TAXES: 1969 SURTAX EXTENS.; N = C)	X				
S 3016.	OEO bill: amendment to provide governor's veto. October 14. (OEO GOV'S. VETO; Y = C)		X	X		
	:amendment decreasing funds. October 14. (OEO: 1969 CUT; Y = C)		X	(X)		

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
S 2547.	Food stamp reform bill: amendment to increase benefits. November 6. (FOOD STAMPS: 1969 INCR. BENS.; N = C)		X	X		
HR 13270.	Tax reform bill and social security increase: amendment to increase income tax exemption. December 3. (INCOME TAXES: 1969 EXEMPT; N = -)	X		(X)		
_____	:passage. December 16. (INCOME TAXES 1969 GEN. TAX SHIFT and 1969 SOC. SEC. INC.; N = C)	X		(X)		
<u>1970</u>						
HR 14705.	Unemployment compensation bill: amendment to include migrant workers in program. February 23. (UNEMP. COMP.: 1970 MGR. WORKERS; N = C)		(X)	X		
S 2548.	School lunch bill: amendment liberalizing provisions. February 24. (1970 SCHOOL LUNCH INCR.; N = C)		X	(X)		
HR 16916.	Funds for Office of Education bill: veto override. June 30. (1970 GEN. ED. FUNDS; N = C)		X	X		
HR 17923.	Agriculture bill: amendment to increase food stamp benefits. July 8. (FOOD STAMPS: 1970 INCR.; N = C)	X	X	X		
HR 11102.	Hospital construction bill: veto override. August 18. (HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION 1970; N = C)		X	X		
HR 17255.	Air Quality standards bill: amendment to remove time limit on period when automakers can seek delays in meeting requirements on low-pollution cars. September 22. (AIR POLLUT.: APPEALS 1970; N = C)	X				
HR 17755.	Transportation Department funds bill: amendment to delete SST funds. December 3. (1970 SST; Y = C)	X		X	X	
HR 17550.	Social security bill: amendment to delete AFDC (FAP), trade and health provisions. December 28. (AFDC: (FAP) 1970; Y = C)	X				
<u>1971</u>						
SJ Res. 468.	Transportation bill: amendment to restore SST funds. March 3. (1971 SST; N = C)	X		X		
S 575.	Public Works Acceleration and Regional Development bill: conference report. June 8. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1971 CONF.; N = C)	(X)	X	X		
_____	:veto override. July 14. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1971 VETO; N = C)	(X)	(X)	(X)		
HR 8432.	Lockheed loan guarantee bill: passage. August 2. (1971 LOCKHEED; N = C)	X	X			

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
HR 10947.	Income tax bill: amendment to reduce variance in depreciation allowance. November 15. (INCOME TAXES: 1971 DEPREC. ALLOW. CUT; N = C)	X		X		
_____	:amendment to extend to single persons the rates applicable to married persons. November 22. (INCOME TAXES: 1971 CUT SINGLES; Y = +)	(X)			X	
S 2891.	Bill to extend wage, price and related controls: passage. December 1. (WAGE/PRICE CONTROLS: 1971 EXTENS.; N = C)	X				
S 2007.	Bill to extend the OEO with child care and legal services programs attached: veto. December 12. (1971 OEO/CHILD CARE/LEG. SVCS.; N = C)	X				
<u>1972</u>						
S 3419.	Food, Drug and Consumer Product bill: amendment to delete criminal penalties for violations of regulations. June 21. (1972 PRODUCT SAFETY; N = C)	X		X		X
S 3010.	OEO bill: amendment deleting provision that would make the legal services program a separate corporation. June 26. (1972 LEGAL SVCS. CORP.; N = C)		(X)			X
S 1861.	Minimum wage bill: amendment to reduce proposed increase. July 20. (MINIMUM WAGE: REDUCE INCR. 1972; Y = C)	X	X	X		(X)
S 945.	No-fault auto insurance bill: motion to recommit. August 8. (1972 NO-FAULT; N = C)	X	X	X		
HR 14370.	Revenue Sharing bill: amendment to adopt distribution formula favoring urbanized states. September 6. (REV. SHAR.: 1972 DIST. FORM.; N = C)	X	(X)	(X)		
_____	:amendment on funding levels, requiring annual approvals. September 7. (REV. SHAR.: 1972 FUNDS; N = C)	X	(X)	(X)		
_____	:passage. September 12. (REV. SHAR.: 1972 PASS; N = C)	(X)	X	X		
S 3939.	Highway bill: amendment to allow trust funds to be used for railroads. September 19. (1972 HIGHWAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT; N = C)	X				
HR 1.	Social Security bill: motion to kill amendment establishing Family Assistance Program with higher benefits than Nixon version. October 3. (AFDC (FAP): 1972; Y = C)	X				
S 3970.	Consumer Protection Agency bill: cloture. October 3. (1972 CONSUM. PROTECT. AGENCY; N = C)	X				

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
HR 161310.	Bill to raise debt ceiling and authorize presidential spending cuts: passage. October 17. (GEN. SPENDG.: 1972 CUT; Y = C)	X				
<u>1973</u>						
S 502.	Highway bill: amendment to use highway trust funds for mass transit. March 14. (1973 HIGHWAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT; N = C)	X			(X)	
S 1081.	Alaskan pipeline bill: amendment to deny right-of-way for pipeline pending further environmental study. July 13. (ALAS. PIPE: 1973 DELAY; N = C)	X	X		(X)	
	:amendment to bar judicial review of the environmental aspects of the bill and give permission to begin construction. July 17. (ALAS. PIPE.: 1973 BAR JUD. REV.; Y = C)	(X)			X	
S 425.	Strip mining bill: amendment to prohibit surface coal mining where government owned mineral but not surface rights. October 8. (1973 STRIP MINING; N = C)	X	X			
S 2589.	Emergency Energy bill: fuel rationing amendment. November 15. (1973 RATIONING; N = C)	X	(X)	(X)		
	:motion to recommit to conference. February 1974. (1974 GEN. ENERGY; N = C)	(X)	X	(X)		
<u>1974</u>						
HR 7824.	Bill to establish Legal Services corporation: cloture. January 30. (1974 LEGAL SVCES. CORP.; N = C)		(X)	X		
S 2727.	Minimum wage increase: passage. March 7. (MINIMUM WAGE: PASS INCR. 1974; N = C)		X	X		
S 354.	No-fault insurance bill: passage. May 1. (1974 NO-FAULT; N = C)	X		X	X	
S 2984.	Council on International Economic Policy bill: motion to kill amendment giving President standby power to control wages and prices in selected industries under certain circumstances. May 1. (WAGE PRICE CONT.: 1974 SELECT; N = C)		(X)	X		
	:motion to kill amendment continuing Cost of Living Council and giving President power to enforce price agreements after decontrol. May 1. (WAGE-PRICE CONT.: PRICE AGREE./CLC 1974; N = C)		X	(X)		
S 1539.	Education bill: amendment to change formula for distributing aid to poor children. May 15. (1974 EDUCATION FORMULA; Y = C)	X				
S 3458.	Food stamp bill: motion to kill amendment to end food stamps for strikers. July 22. (1974 FOOD STAMPS FOR STRIKERS; N = C)		(X)	X	(X)	

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
S 707.	Consumer Protection Agency bill: cloture. September 19. (1974 CONSUM. PROTECT. AGENCY; N = C)	X	X	X		
HR 1449.	Community Services Bill: amendment to phase-out OEO. December 11. (OEO: 1974 PHASE-OUT; Y = C)	X				
HR 10710.	Bill to give president powers to negotiate tariff reduction: cloture. December 13. (1974 TARIFF POWERS; N = -)	X				
<u>1975</u>						
HR 2166.	Bill to reduce personal and corporate income taxes and provide social security bonus: conference report. March 26. (INCOME TAXES: 1975 GEN. CUT.; N = -)	X				
HR 4222.	School lunch and child nutrition bill: veto override. October 7. (1975 SCHOOL LUNCH; N = C)	X				
HR 5900.	Bill to allow common-site picketing: passage. November 19. (COLL. BARGAINING 1975: COMMON-SITE PICKETING; N = -)	X				
S 2711.	Highway bill: amendment to allow funds to be used for mass transit. December 12. (HIGHWAY FUNDS FOR MASS TRANSIT 1975; N = C)	X				
S 622.	Energy bill (providing stand-by fuel rationing powers, fuel efficiency standards, etc.): conference. December 17. (1975 GEN. ENERGY; N = C)	X	X	X		
<u>1976</u>						
HR 5247.	Public Works bill: veto override. February 19. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1976 1ST; N = C)		X	X		
S 354.	No-fault auto insurance bill: motion to kill. March 31. (1976 NO-FAULT; Y = C)	X	X	(X)	X	
S 3136.	Food Stamp Reform bill: passage. April 8. (FOOD STAMPS: 1976 REFORM; N = C)	X	X			
HR 9803.	Bill providing aid to child day care: veto override. May 5. (1976 CHILD DAY CARE; N = C)		X	X		
S 3201.	Public Works Jobs bill: veto override. June 8. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1976 2ND; N = C)	X	X			
S 2872.	Federal Energy Administration bill: amendment setting energy conservation standings for construction of new buildings. June 15. (1976 ENERGY CONSV. BUILDINGS; N = C)		X			
	:amendment establishing office to gather energy information. June 15. (1976 ENERGY INFO.; N = C)		X	(X)		

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
HR 10612.	Income tax bill: amendment to end deferral of taxes on unremitted earnings and profits of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. June 29. (INCOME TAXES: 1976 FOR CORP. CRED.; N = C)	(X)		X		
_____	:motion to kill motion to recommit bill so as to remove all provisions except for those providing individual reductions and credit. August 5. (INCOME TAXES: 1976 PERS. BENS. ONLY; Y = C)	X		(X)		
S 3219.	Clean Air bill: amendment to eliminate the requirement that unpolluted air be kept that way. August 3. (AIR POLLUT: 1976 NONDEGRADATION; Y = C)	X		(X)		
_____	:amendment to move date of compliance up from 1980 to 1979. August 5. (AIR POLLUT: 1976 HASTEN; N = C)	X		(X)		
_____	:amendment deleting provision to relax tolerance limits for nitrous oxide. August 5. (AIR POLLUT: 1976 TOUGHTEN; N = C)	(X)		X		
HR 8532.	Antitrust revision bill: amendment to make tougher. September 6. (1976 ANTITRUST; N = C)	X				
HR 14232.	Bill appropriating money for Departments of Labor and HEW bill: veto override. September 30. (1976 LABOR/HEW DEPT. FUNDS; N = C)	X				
<u>1977</u>						
HR 3477.	Economic Stimulus Tax-Cuts bill: amendment to permanently reduce lower-bracket personal income tax rates. April 27. (INCOME TAXES: 1977 PERS. CUT.; Y = C)	X				
HR 4876.	Economic Stimulus spending bill: amendment to cut spending on public works. May 2. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1977 CUT; Y = C)	X				
_____	:passage. May 4. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1977 PASS; N = C)	X				
S Con Res 19	Budget bill: amendment to cut housing funds. May 4. (1977 GEN'RL HOUSING; Y = C)		X	X		
S 275.	Farm-food bill: amendment to retain requirement of partial payment for food stamps. May 24. (FOOD STAMPS: 1977 PURCH REQUIREMENTS; Y = C)		X	(X)		
HR 5885.	Water Resources/User Fees bill: amendment to authorize construction of a new water project. June 22. (1977 WATERWAYS; N = C)	X				
HR 7555.	Labor/HEW funds bill: amendment to require OSHA to submit an economic impact statement with its regulations. June 28. (OSHA: 1977 ECON. IMPACT; Y = C)		X	X		

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
S 1811.	ERDA funding bill: amendment to cut funds for Clinch River Breeder reactor. July 11. (1977 NUCLEAR REACTORS; Y = C)	X			X	
HR 3744.	Minimum wage bill: amendment to provide youth sub-minimum wage. October 7. (MINIMUM WAGE: 1977 YOUTH SUB-MIN; Y = C)		(X)	X		
HR 93946.	Social Security bill: motion to kill amendment to increase taxes and decrease employers' tax base. November 14. (1977 SOC. SEC: FIN; N = C)	X	X	X		
_____	:amendment to raise age at which eased restrictions on outside earnings take effect in another amendment. November 14. (1977 SS: EARN. LIM.; N = C)			X		
<u>1978</u>						
S 2493.	Airline deregulation: amendment to loosen regulation. April 19. (1978 AIRLINE DEREG.; Y = C)	X				
_____	:amendment to give displaced workers hiring priority instead of compensation. April 19. (1978 AIRLINE JOBS PROJECT; Y = C)			X		
S Con Res 80.	Budget bill: amendment to cut budget by \$25 billion. April 25. (1978 GENR'L SPEND. CUTS; Y = C)		X	(X)		
HR 8309.	Waterway user fees/water projects bill: amendment to impose user fees. May 3. (1978 WATERWAY USER FEES; Y = C)	X			X	
HR 8410.	Bill to revise NLRA to facilitate organizing of unions: cloture. June 14. (COLL. BARGAINING: 1978 NLRA; N = C)	X	X	X	X	
HR 27777.	Bill to establish National Consumer Cooperative bank: passage. July 13. (NAT. CONSUM. COOP. BANK. 1978; N = C)		X			X
HR 11445.	Small Business/OSHA bill: amendment to exempt small businesses with good safety records from OSHA. August 2. (OSHA: 1978 SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPT; Y = C)		X	X		
HR 12936.	Housing bill: cut funds. August 7. (1978 GEN'RL HOUSING; Y = C)		X	X		
HR 13511.	Income tax bill: amendment to cut taxes further for lower income brackets. October 6. (INCOME TAXES: 1978 PERS. CUT; N = C)	X			(X)	(X)
_____	:amendment to cut individual tax rates 30% over the next three years. October 6. (INCOME TAXES: 1978 KEMP-ROTH; Y = C)	(X)			X	(X)

VOTE		CQ	ACA	COPE	AAP	CC
	:amendment to cut corporate taxes. October 10. (INCOME TAXES: 1978 CORP. CUT; Y = C)	(X)			(X)	X
HR 5285.	Medicare and Hospital Cost Containment bill: motion to kill amendment to aid hospitals and limit earnings. October 12. (1978 HOSPITAL COST CONT.; N = C)	X			X	
S 50.	Humphrey-Hawkins economic stimulus bill: amend- ment to weaken provisions requiring reductions of inflation to 3% by 1983, and 0% by 1988. October 13. (PUBLIC WORKS: 1978 HUM.-HAW. INFL.; N = C)			(X)	X	X

TABLE 2.--Roll-Call Votes.

	OEO					1971 OEO/Child Care/ Leg. Svces.	1965 OEO	1967 Gov's	1969 Veto	1976 Child Day Care	1972 Legal Svces. Corp.	1970 School Lunch: Incr.	1975 School Lunch: Contin.	1968 Head start	1963 Youth Training	1963 National Service Corps.	1976 Labor/HEM Dept. Funds
	1964 Est.	1965 Cut	1968 Incr.	1969 Cut	1974 Phase-Out												
H. Byrd Sr. (Va.)	C	C				C	C							C	C		
H. Byrd Jr. (Va.)			C	C	C			C	C	C		C	L	C		C	
Robertson	C	C					C								C	C	
Stennis	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	
Eastland	C	C	C	?	C	C	C	?	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	
McClellan	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	C	C	C	
Allen				C	L	C		C	C	C	C	L	C			C	
Russell	C	C	C	C			C	?	C					C	C	C	
Holland	C	C	C	C			C	C	C			C		C	C	C	
Ervin	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C		C	C	C	
Jordan (N.C.)	L	C	C	C		L	C	C	C		C	C		C	C	C	
Talmadge	L	C	?	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	C	C	C	
Scott (Va.)					?				C		C		C			C	
Thurmond	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
Tower	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
Helms					C				C		C		C			C	
Goldwater	C			C	?	?		C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	
Curtis	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
Simpson	C	C					C				C			C	C	C	
Butler																	
Buckley					C	C	C		C		C		C			C	
Garn									C				C			C	
Laxalt									C				C			C	
Williams (Del.)	C	C	C	C			C	C	C						C	C	
Bennett	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	C	
Dominick	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	?	
Hickenlooper	C	C	C				C	C						C	C	C	
Hansen			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	
Fannin			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	
Hruska	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
Mundt	C	C	C	C		?	C	C	C		?	C		C	?	C	
Hatch																	
Bartlett (Okla.)					C				C		C		C			L	
Murphy			C	C	C		C	C	C			C	L				
Gurney				C	C	C		C			C	C	C				

	OEO					1971 OEO/Child Care/ Leg. Svces.	1965 OEO	1967 Gov's	1969 Veto	1976 Child Day Care	1972 Legal Svces.	1974 Corp.	1970 School Lunch: Incr.	1975 School Lunch: Contin.	1968 Head start	1963 Youth Training	1963 National Service Corps.	1976 Labor/HEM Dept. Funds
	1964 Est.	1965 Cut	1968 Incr.	1969 Cut	1974 Phase-Out													
Mechem	C															C	C	
Dworshak																		
Martin																		
McClure					C				C	C		C		C				L
Jordan (Ida.)	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C		C		C		C	C	C	
Bridges																		
Cotton	C	C	?	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C		L	C	C	
Miller	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C		C		C		C	C	C	
Allott	C	C	?	C		C	C	C	C		C		C		C	C	C	
Capehart																		
Brock					C	C					C	C	C	C				L
Schoepfel																		
Dirksen	C	C	C				C	C							C	C	C	
Lausche	C	C	C				C	C							L	C	C	
Zorinsky																		
Case (S.Dak.)																		
Wiley																		
Lugar																		
Young (N.Dak.)	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	L	C	C	L	C	C	L	C	C	C	L
Hayakawa																		
Schmitt																		
Wallop																		
Roth					C	C				C	C	L		L				L
Carlson	C	C	C				C	C							C	C	C	
Morton	C	C	?				C	C							L	L	C	
Griffin			L	C	L	C		C	C	C	C	L	?	C	L			C
Domenici					L					C		L		L				L
Dole				C	L	C		C	C	C	C	L	C	L				?
Bush																		
Baker			C	C	L	C	C	C	C	?	C	C	L	C				L
Danforth																		
Saltonstall	C	C					C									C	C	
Bellmon				C	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C				?
Pearson	C	C	L	C	L	C	C	C	C	L	?	L	C	L	C	C	C	L
Stevens					C	L		?	C	C	L	L	L	L				?

	OEO					OEO/Child Care/ Leg. Svces.	OEO 1965	Gov's 1967	Veto 1969	Child Day Care 1976	Legal Svces. 1972	Corp. 1974	School Lunch: Incr. 1970	School Lunch: Contin. 1975	Head start 1968	Youth Training 1963	National Service Corps. 1963	Labor/HEW Dept. Funds 1976
	Est. 1964	Cut 1965	Incr. 1968	Cut 1969	Phase-Out 1974													
Ellender	C	C	C	C		C	C	C		C		C		C	C	C		
Hill	C	C	C			C	C								C	C	L	
Nunn					L				L		L		L					L
Stone									L						L			L
Bentsen				?	L				C	L	L				L			?
Chiles					L	L			?	?	C				L			L
Hollings			C	C	L	L		C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L			L
Morgan													L					L
Spong			C	C		L					L		C		L			
DeConcini																		
Cook				?	L	C		?			C	L	L					
Packwood				C	L	C		C	C	C	C	L	L	L				C
Boggs	C	C	C	C		L	C	C	C		C		C		C	L	C	
Fong	L	C	L	C	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C	L	L	?
Beall Sr.	C						C									L	C	
Beall Jr.					L	C			C	C	L	L	L					L
Taft					L	C			L	L	L	L	L					L
Saxbe				C		C		L			L		?					
Kuchel	L	L	L				C	C							L	L	C	
Cooper	L	C	L	C		C	C	L	C		C	C	C		L	C	L	
Smith (Me.)	L	C	C	C		C	L	C	C		C	C	C		C	C	C	
Prouty	L	L	?	C			C	C	C				C		L	L	C	
Aiken	L	C	L	C	L	C	C	C	C		C	L	C		L	L	C	
Chafee																		
Scott (Pa.)	L	C	L	C	L	C	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	
Weicker					L	?				L	L	L		L				L
Percy			L	L	?	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			L
Hatfield			L	C	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			L
Keating	L				L	L					L				L	L		
Stafford					L	L			L	L			L					L
Schweiker				C	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L					L
Heinz																		
Mathias				L	?	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L				L
Javits	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Goodell				C				L					L					

	OEO					1971	OEO/Ch1ld Care/ Leg. Svces.	1965	1967	1969	1976	1972	1974	1970	1975	1968	1963	1963	1976
	Est.	Cut	Incr.	Cut	Phase-Out														
	1964	1965	1968	1969	1974	1971													
Eagleton				L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L					L
Gravel				L	L	?		L	L	L	L	L	L	L					L
Harris		L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L		?	L		L				
Church	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	C	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L		L
Melcher											L			L					L
Durkin											L			L					L
McIntyre	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Biden					L						L	L		L					L
Leahy											L			L					L
Dodd	L	L	L	L				L	L	L			L			L	L	L	
Hartke	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Proxmire	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	C	
Burdick	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L		L
Haskell					L						L	L		L					L
Riegle																			
Anderson (Minn.)																			
Magnuson	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Jackson	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
McGee	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L		L
Inouye	L	L	?	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		?
Long (Haw.)																			
Matsunaga																			
Williams (N.J.)	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Moss	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Bayh	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L		L
Pell	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L
Pastore	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L		L
Ribicoff	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		C
J. Kennedy (Mass.)																			
Glenn											L			L					?
Stevenson					L	L					L	L	L	L					L
Gruening	L	L	L					L	L							L	L	L	
Bartlett (Alsk.)	L	L	L					L	L							C	L	L	
Morse	L	L	L					L	L							L	L	L	
Hart (Colo.)											L			L					L

	OEO					1971 OEO/Child Care/ Leg. Svces.	1965 OEO Gov's Veto			1976 Child Day Care	1972 Legal Svces. Corp.		1970 School Lunch: Incr.	1975 School Lunch: Contin.	1968 Head start	1963 Youth Training	1963 National Service Corps.	1976 Labor/HEW Dept. Funds
	1964 Est.	1965 Cut	1968 Incr.	1969 Cut	1974 Phase-Out		1965	1967	1969		1972	1974						
McGovern	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Abourezk					L				L		L		L					L
Cranston				L	L	L			L		L	L	L	L				L
Hughes				L	L	L			L		L	L	L					
McCarthy	L	L	L	L			L	L	L			L			L	L	L	
Green																		
Brewster		L	L				L	L							L	L	L	
Engle	L																	C
Neuberger	L	L					L									L	L	
Carroll																		
Young (O.)	L	L	L	L			L	L	L			L			L	L	C	
Tunney					L	L				L	L	L		L				L
Smith (Mass.)																		
Muskie	L	L	?	?	L	L	L	L	?	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Hathaway										L		L		L				L
R. Kennedy (N.Y.)		L					L	L							L			
Metzenbaum											L							
McNamara	L	L					L									L	L	
Humphrey	L				L	L				L	L	L		L		L	L	L
Mondale		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			L
Tydings		L	L	L			L	L	L			L		L				
Nelson	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
E. Kennedy (Mass.)	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Sarbanes																		
Kefauver																L	L	
Yarborough	L	L	L	L			L	L	L			L			L	L	L	
Clark (Ia.)					L					L		L		L				L
Culver										L				L				L
Hart (Mich.)	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L
Douglas	L	L					L									L	L	
Clark (Pa.)		L	L				L	L							L	L	L	

	Elementary and Secondary Education	Gen. Ed. Funds	Higher Education Formula	Rent Subsidies	Gen'l Housing	Est. HUD Dept. Gen. HUD Demonst. Cities	Medicare Amendments	Medicare Bill Hospital Construct. Hospital Cost Cont.
	1960A 1960B 1961 1965 1970	1963	1974	1965 1966 1967	1961 1961B 1977 1978	1965 1968 1966 1960	1962 1964 1964	1965 1970 1978
Mechem		C						
Dworshak	C C C				C		C C	
Martin								
McClure			C		C ?			C
Jordan (Ida.)		C L C	C	C C C		C L C	C C C	C
Bridges	C C C				C C		C	
Cotton	C C C L L ?		C	C C C C C		C L C C C C C L L	C	
Miller		C L C L		C C L C C		L L C C C C C C		
Allott	C C C L L C			C C C C C		L L L C C C C C C		
Capehart	? ? C				C C		C C	
Brock			C					
Schoeppel	C C C				C		C C C	
Dirksen	C C C L L			C C L C C		C L C C C C ? L		
Lausche	C C C C	C		C C C C C		C L L L C C L L		
Zorinsky					L L			L
Case (S.Dak.)	C C L				C C		C	
Wiley	L L L				C L		C C	
Lugar					C C			C
Young (N.Dak.)	C C C C L L	C	C	C C C C C	C C	C L L L C C C C	L C	
Hayakawa					C L			C
Schmitt					C C			?
Wallop					C L			C
Roth			L		C C			C
Carlson	C C L L L			C C C C C		C L L C C C L L		
Morton	C C C C	L C		C L L C C		C ? C C C C C C		
Griffin		L L	L	L	C ?	L C		C L
Domenici			C		C ?			C
Dole		C C			C C			C C
Bush	C C C				C C		C C	
Baker		C C		C	L C	L		C C
Danforth					L C			C
Saltonstall	C C C L L			C C C C		L C C C C L L		
Bellmon		C C			C C			C L
Pearson		L L L C	C	C C L	C C	C L C	C C L C	C
Stevens			L		C L		C C C C C	L C

	INCOME TAXES														1962 Tariff	1974 Powers	
	1962 Bill	1964 Gen. Cut	1968 Surtax & Spend Cut	1969 Surtax Extens.	1969 Exempt. Raise	1969 Gen. Tax Shift (& Soc. Sec. Inc.)	1971 Deprec. Allow. Cut	1971 Cut Singles	1975 Gen. Cut	1976 For Corp. Credit	1976 Pers. Bens. Only	1977 Pers. Cut	1978 Pers. Cut	1978 Kemp-Roth			1978 Corp. Cut
Mechem																	
Dworshak																	
Martin																	
McClure									-	C	L	C	+	C	?		-
Jordan (Ida.)	+	+	C	C	-	C	C	-									-
Bridges																	
Cotton	+	+	L	C	-	C	C	-									?
Miller	-	-	C	C	-	L	C	-									
Allott	+	+	C	C	-	C	C	+									
Capehart	+																
Brock							C	-	C	?							+
Schoepfel																	
Dirksen	+	+	C														-
Lausche	+	-	C														?
Zorinsky												L	+	C	C		
Case (S.Dak.)																	-
Wiley	+																
Lugar											C	-	C	C	C		
Young (N.Dak.)	-	-	L	C	+	L	C	+	-	C	C	L	-	C		-	+
Hayakawa														C	-	C	C
Schmitt														C	-	C	C
Wallop														C	-	C	?
Roth								-	+	C	C	C	-	C	C		+
Carlson	+	+	C														
Morton	+	+	C														
Griffin			C	C	-	C	C	+	-	C	C	C	+	C			+
Domenici										+	C	L	C	+	C	?	+
Dole				C	-	C	C	+	+	C	C	C	+	C	C		+
Bush	-																-
Baker			C	L	+	L	C	+	-	C	L	C	-	C	C		+
Danforth														C	-	C	C
Saltonstall	-	+															-
Bellmon				C	+	L	C	-	-	C	L	C	-	C	C		
Pearson	+	+	C	C	-	C	C	+	?	C	L	C	-	L	C		+
Stevens				C	+	L	C	+	-	C	C	C	+	C	C		+

	INCOME TAXES															1962 Tariff	1974 Powers
	1962 Bill	1964 Gen. Cut	1968 Surtax & Spend Cut	1969 Surtax Extens.	1969 Exempt. Raise	1969 Gen. Tax Shift (& Soc. Sec. Inc.)	1971 Deprec. Allow. Cut	1971 Cut Singles	1975 Gen. Cut	1976 For Corp. Credit	1976 Pers. Bens. Only	1977 Pers. Cut	1978 Pers. Cut	1978 Kemp-Roth	1978 Corp. Cut		
Eagleton				L	+	L	L	+	+	L	L	L	-	L	C		+
Gravel				L	+	L	L	+	+	C	C	L	-	C	C		+
Harris			L	L	+	L	L	+									
Church	+	+	L	L	+	L	L	-	?	L	L	?	+	L	L		+
Melcher												L	+	L	C		
Durkin											L	C	+	L	C		+
McIntyre			C	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	C	C	+	L	L		+
Biden									?	C	?	C	+	C	C		
Leahy									+	L	L	L	+	L	C		+
Dodd	+	+	C	L	+	L											-
Hartke	+	+	L	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	?						-
Proxmire	+	-	L	C	+	L	L	+	+	L	L	C	+	C	C		-
Burdick	-	+	L	C	+	L	L	+	+	L	C	L	+	L	L		+
Haskell									+	L	L	L	?	?	?		+
Riegler												C	+		C		
Anderson (Minn.)	+	+		L	?	L	C							?	C		
Magnuson	+	+	L	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	C	L	+	L	L		+
Jackson	+	+	C	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	C	L	+	L	L		+
McGee	+	+	L	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	C						+
Inouye	+	+	C	L	+	L	L		+	C	C	L	+	L	C		+
Long (Haw.)	+																+
Matsunaga												L	-	L	L		
Williams (N.J.)	+	+	L	C	+	L	L	-	+	C	L	L	+	L	C		+
Moss	+	+	C	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	L						+
Bayh			L	L	+	L	L	+	+	L	C	L	+	L	L		-
Pell	+	+	C	L	+	L	L	-	+	C	L	L	+	L	L		-
Pastore	+	+	C	L	+	L	C	+	+	L	C						+
Ribicoff			L	L	+	L	C		+	L	C	L	+	L	C		+
J. Kennedy (Mass.)				?	+												
Glenn									+	+	L	L	-	L	L		
Stevenson							L		+	L	L	L	+	L	L		+
Gruening	-	+	L														+
Bartlett (Alsk.)	-	+	L														+
Morse	-	+	L														+
Hart (Colo.)									+	L	L	L	+	L	C		

	1967	1967	1970	1976	1976	1976	1965	1965	1973	1973	1973	1962	1970	1971	1971	1972	1972	1972	1963	1972	1973	1975	1977	1978	
	Nuclear Reactors		Air Pollut.			Water Pollut. Highway Beaut.		Alas. Pipe.		Strip Mining		SST	Lockheed	Rev. Shar.			Highway Funds			OSHA					
	1967	1977	Appeals	Non-Degradation	Hasten	Toughen	Water Pollut.	Highway Beaut.	Bar. Jud. Rev.	Delay	Strip Mining	Comsat	1970	1971	1971	Dist. Form.	Funds	Pass	Mass Transt.	Pass	Highway Funds	Mass	Transit	Econ. Impact	Small Business Exempt
H. Byrd Sr. (Va.)	C						L					C													
H. Byrd Jr. (Va.)	-	L	C	C	C		C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C			L	C	C	C	C
Robertson	C						C	C				C									C				
Stennis	L	-	C	C	C	C	?	C	?	C	?	C	L	L	L	?	L	C			C	C	C	C	C
Eastland	L	?	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	?	?	C	L	L	L	C	L	L			C	C	C	C	C
McClellan	C	?	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	C	C	L	L			C	C	C	C	?
Allen	-	L	C	C	C				C	C	L		C	C	L	C	L	L			C	C	C		C
Russell	C	C					L	?				C	L								L				
Holland	C	C					L	C				L	C								C				
Ervin	C	L					C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C			C	C	C		
Jordan (N.C.)	C	L					C	L				C	C	C	C	C	L	L			C	?			
Talmdge	C	?	L	C	C	C	C	?	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C	C	L			L	C	C	C	C
Scott (Va.)	-	L	C	C					C	C	C														C
Thurmond	C	-	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C	C	L			C	C	C	C	C
Tower	C	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C	C	L			C	C	C	C	C
Helms	-	C	C	C					C	C	C													C	C
Goldwater	C	-	?	C	C	C			C	C	?	C	L	L	C	C	?	C			C	?	C	?	C
Curtis	C	-	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C	C	C	C			C	C	C	C	C
Simpson							C	C													C				
Butler	C											L													
Buckley			L	C	C				L	?	C			L	C	L	C	L			L	L	C		
Garn	-	C	C	C																				C	C
Laxalt	?	C	?	C																			C		C
Williams (Del.)	C	C					L	L					C								C				
Bennett	C	C					C	C	C	C	?		L	L	L	C	C	L			C	L	L		
Dominick			L				C	L	C	C	C		C	L	C	C	L	L			C	L	L		
Hickenlooper	C						C	C													C				
Hansen	-	C	L	C	C				C	C	C		C	C	L	C	C	L			C	C	C	C	C
Fannin		?	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C		L	L	L	C		?				L	C	C		
Hruska	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	C	L	L			C	L	C	C	
Mundt	C	L					C	L				?	?	?	?	?	?	?			C	?			
Hatch	-																								C
Bartlett (Okla.)	?	C	C	C					C	C	C												C	C	?
Murphy		L					C	L					L												
Gurney		C							L	C	C		L	L	L	C	L				L	C			

	1967	1967	1970	1976	1976	1976	1965	1965	1973	1973	1973	1962	1970	1971	1971	1972	1972	1972	1963	1972	1973	1975	1977	1978						
	Nuclear Reactors	Appeals	Non- Degradation	Hasten	Toughen	Water Pollut.	Highway Beaut.	Bar.Jud.Rev.	Delay	Strip Mining	Comsat	SST	Lockheed	Dist. Form.	Funds	Pass	Mass Transp.	Pass	Highway Funds	Mass	Transit	Econ. Impact	OSHA	Small Busi- ness Exempt.						
Mechem																									C					
Dworshak	L																													
Martin																														
McClure		-	L	C	C			L	C	C													C	C	C	C				
Jordan (Ida.)			C			L	L				L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C									
Bridges	C																													
Cotton	C		C			L	L	C	C	?	L	C	L	L	C	L	L	C	C	C										
Miller	C		C			L	C				L	L	C	L	C	C	L	C	L											
Allott	C		L			L	L				L	L	L	L	C	L	L	C	L											
Capehart	C										L																			
Brock			C	?	?			C	C				L	L	C	C	L				L	L	?							
Schoeppel	C																													
Dirksen	C					C	L				L																			
Lausche	L					C	L				L																			
Zorinsky		-																						C	C					
Case (S.Dak.)	C																													
Wiley	?										L																			
Lugar		-																							C	C				
Young (N.Dak.)	L	-	C	C	C	C	L	L	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				
Hayakawa		-																								C	C			
Schmitt		-																								C	C			
Wallop		-																								C	C			
Roth		-	L	C	C			L	C	L			C	L	L	L	L				L	L	L	C	C	C				
Carlson	C					L	C				L															C	C			
Morton	C					C	L				L															C	C			
Griffin	-	?	C	C	C	C		C	?	C		C	C	C	?	C	L				L	L	C	?	C	C				
Domenici		-	L	C	C			C	C	C																C	C	C		
Dole		-	L	C	C	C		L	C	C		L	L	L	C	C	L									C	C	C	C	
Bush	C										L																			
Baker	-	-	L	L	C	C		C	C	C		L	L	L	C	C	L				?	L	C	C	C	C	C	C		
Danforth		-																												
Saltonstall	C					L	L				L																			
Bellmon		-	?	L	C	C		C	C	C		L	L	C	C	C	L				?	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	
Pearson		-	C	L	C	C	L	C		C	C	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	C	L	L	?				C	C	C	C	
Stevens		-	L	L	C	C		C	C	C		L	L	L	L	L	L	L									C	C	C	C

	Nuclear Reactors		Air Pollut.			Water Pollut.		Highway Beaut.		Alas. Pipe.		Strip Mining		SST		Lockheed	Rev. Shar.			Highway Funds		OSHA						
	1967	1977	1970	1976	1976	1976	1965	1965	1973	1973	1973	1962	1970	1971	1971		1972	1972	1972	1963	1972	1973	1975	1977	1978			
Eagleton	-		L	L	C	C				L	C	?		C	C	C		C	?	C		L	?	C	L	L		
Gravel	+		L	L	C	C				C	C	L		L	L	L		L	L	L		?	C	C	L	L		
Harris			L				L	L						C	C	C		?	?	?		C						
Church	L	-	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	?	L		C	C	C		C	C	C		L	L	L	C	C	C	
Melcher	-																										L	L
Durkin	+		L	L	L	L																			C	L	L	
McIntyre	+		L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L	L			C	C	L		C	C	L		C	L	C	C	L	C	
Biden	?		L	?	?				L	L	L													L	L	L	C	
Leahy	+		L	L	L	L																		C	L	L		
Dodd	L		L									L	L									L		C				
Hartke	L		L	L	?	?	L	L	C	?	L	L	C	C	C		L	C	L		L	C	C	C				
Proxmire	L	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	C		C	C	C		C	L	L	L	L	L	
Burdick	L	-	L	L	C	C	L	L	L		?	C	C	C	C		C	L	C		L	C	C	C	L	L	L	
Haskell	+		L	L	L				L	L	L																	
Riegle	+																										L	L
Anderson (Minn.)	+																										L	L
Magnuson	L	-	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	C		C	L	L		L	L	L	C	L	L	
Jackson	L	-	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	C		C	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	
McGee	L		?	L	C	C	L	L	L	?	?	C	L	L	C		?	L	L		C	?	C	C				
Inouye	?		L	?	C	C	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	C		L	L	L		L	C	L	L	L	L	L	
Long (Haw.)	L											L																
Matsunaga	+																										L	L
Williams (N.J.)	L	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	L		L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Moss	L		L	C	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L		C	C	L		C	L	L	L				
Bayh	-		?	L	L	L	L	L		L	L			C	C	C		L	L	L		C	C	C	?	L	L	
Pell	L	+	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L			C	C	C		?	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	
Pastore	L		L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C		L	L	L		L	L	L	L			
Ribicoff	+		L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L			C	C	C		L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L
J. Kennedy (Mass.)																												
Glenn	+		L	C																					C	L	L	
Stevenson	-		L	C	L					L	L				C	C		L	C	C		L	L	C	L	L	L	
Gruening	L						L	L					C										L					
Bartlett (Alsk.)	L						L	L					C										L					
Morse	L						L	L					C										L					
Hart (Colo.)	+		L	L																					C	L	L	

	Nuclear Reactors		Air Pollut.				Water Pollut. Highway Beaut.		Alas. Pipe. Bar. Jud. Rev. Delay		Strip Mining Comsat	SST		Lockheed	Rev. Shar.			Highway Funds			OSHA			
	1967	1977	1970 Appeals	1976 Non-Degradation-Hasten	1976 Toughen	1965	1965	1973	1973	1973		1962	1970		1971	1971	1972 Dist. Form.	1972 Funds	1972 Pass	1963 Mass Transt.	1972 Pass	1972 Highway Funds	1973 Mass	1975 Transit
McGovern	+	L	?	?	?	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	?	C	C	L	?	L	L	?	L		
Abourezk	+	L	L					L	L											L	L	L	?	
Cranston	+	L	L	L	L			C	?		C	C	C	L	C	L			L	L	L	L	L	
Hughes		L			L						C	C	C	C	C	L			L	C				
McCarthy	L	L				L	L	L		L	C							L						
Green																								
Brewster						L	L																	
Engle	L									L								L						
Neuberger	L					L	L			C								L						
Carroll	L									C														
Young (O.)	L	L				L	L			C	C							L						
Tunney			L	L	L			C	L	L	C	C	L	C	L			L	L	L				
Smith (Mass.)	L									L														
Muskie	L	+	L	L	C	?	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	C	L	L	
Hathaway	+		L	C				L	L	L					C	L			L	C	L	L	L	
R. Kennedy (N.Y.)						L	L																	
Metzenbaum	+																						L	L
McNamara	L					L	L											L						
Humphrey	L	+	L	L	L			L	L	L	L	C	L	C	C	C	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	
Mondale			L	L	?	?	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	C			
Tydings			L			L	L				C													
Nelson	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	
E. Kennedy (Mass.)	+	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	
Sarbanes	+																						L	L
Kefauver	L																	L						
Yarborough	L	L				L	L			C	L							L						
Clark (Ia.)	+		L	L	L			L	L	L	L									L	C	L	L	
Culver	+		L	L																L		L	L	
Hart (Mich.)	L	C	L	?	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	L				
Douglas	L					L	L			C									L					
Clark (Pa.)	L					L	L			L									L					

	Wage-Price Control			Rationing	Gen. Energy		Energy Consv. Buildings	Energy Info.	No Fault			Consum. Protect. Agency	Standard Quant. on Labels	Product Safety	Airline De-Reg.	Airline Job Protect.	Nat. Consum. Co-op Bank	Antitrust
	Extens. Select	Price Agree/CLC			1974	1975			1972	1974	1976							
H. Byrd Sr. (Va.)																		
H. Byrd Jr. (Va.)	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	C	C	L
Robertson													L					
Stennis	L	L	L	L	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C
Eastland	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C
McClellan	L	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?				C
Allen	L	C	C	C	L	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				C
Russell													L					
Holland													C					
Ervin	L	C	C	C	L				C	C	C	C	C	C				
Jordan (N.C.)	L								C		C	C	C	C				
Talmadge	L	C	C	?	L	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	L
Scott (Va.)		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			L	L	C	C
Thurmond	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C
Tower	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C
Helms		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C	C	C
Goldwater	C	C	C	?	C	C	?	?	C	C	C	C		?	?	?	C	?
Curtis	L	C	C	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	C	C
Simpson													C					
Butler																		
Buckley	L	C	C	C	C	C	?	?	C	C	C	C	C					C
Garn					C	C	C		C	C					C	C	C	C
Laxalt					C	L	C		C						C	L	C	C
Williams (Del.)													C					
Bennett	L	C	C	C	C				C	L	C	C	C	C				
Dominick	L	C	C	C	C				C	C	C	C	C	C				
Hickenlooper													C					
Hansen	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C	C
Fannin	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				C
Hruska	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				C
Mundt	?								?				C	?				
Hatch															C	C	C	
Bartlett (Okla.)		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C	C	C
Murphy													C					
Gurney	L	?	?	C	C				C	C	C	C		C				

	Wage-Price Control		1973	Gen. Energy		1976	1976	No Fault			Consum. Protect. Agency		1966	1972	1978	1978	1978	1976
	1971	1975		1974	1974			1975	1972	1974	1976	1972						
Mechem																		
Dworshak																		
Martin																		
McClure		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C	?	C	
Jordan (Ida.)	L							C		C		C	C					
Bridges																		
Cotton	L	C	C	C	C			C	C	C	C		C	C				
Miller	L							C		L			C	C				
Allott	L	C	C					C		?			C	C				
Capehart																		
Brock	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	L	C	C			C			C
Schoeppel																		
Dirksen														C				
Lausche														C				
Zorinsky															L	C	C	
Case (S.Dak.)																		
Wiley																		
Lugar															C	C	C	
Young (N.Dak.)	L	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	L
Hayakawa															C	C	L	
Schmitt															L	C	C	
Wallop															C	C	C	
Roth		L	L	C	C	L	C	C	L	L	C	L	L		C	C	C	L
Carlson														C				
Morton														C				
Griffin	L	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	?	L	L	L
Domenici		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		L			C	L	C	L
Dole	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L		C	C	C	L	L
Bush																		
Baker	L	C	C	?	L	C	C	C	C	C	?	C		C	C	C	L	L
Danforth															L	L	C	
Saltonstall														C				
Bellmon	L	?	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	?		C	C	C	C	C
Pearson	L	?	?	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	L	L
Stevens	L	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L		C	L	L	L

	Wage-Price Control		Extens. Select	Price Agree/CLC	Rationing	Gen. Energy		Energy Consv. Buildings	Energy Info.	No Fault			Consum. Protect. Agency	Standard Quant. on Labels	Product Safety	Airline De-Reg.	Airline Job Protect.	Nat. Consum. Co-op Bank	Antitrust
	1971	1975				1974	1973			1974	1975	1976							
Ellender	L	C	C											L	C				
Hill																			
Nunn			C	C	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C			C	C	C	C	L
Stone							L	C	C		C				C	L	L	L	L
Bentsen	L	C	C		L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	L
Chiles	L	L	L		L	C	L	L	L	C	C	C	L	L	?	C	L	C	L
Hollings	L	C	C		?	L	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	L	C	C	L	L	L
Morgan							L	C	C		C				C	C	L	L	L
Spong	L									L		L			C				
DeConcini																C	C	L	
Cook	L	C	C		C	L				C	C	L	L		L				
Packwood	L	C	C		C	L	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	?	C	L
Boggs	L									L		L		C	L				
Fong	L	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	L	?	?	L	C	L	C			L
Beall Sr.																			
Beall Jr.	L	C	L		C	C	C	L	C	L	L	C	L	L	C				?
Taft	L	C	L		C	C	C	L	C	L	L	C	C	C	C				L
Saxbe	?				?										C				
Kuchel														?					
Cooper	L									L		C	C	C	C				
Smith (Me.)	L									L		L	L	L	C				
Prouty														C					
Aiken	L	C	C		C	C				L	L	L	L	L	L				
Chafee																C	C	C	
Scott (Pa.)	L	C	C		C	C	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L	C	C			L
Weicker	L	C	C		L	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	?	C	L	L	L
Percy	L	C	C		C	C	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	L	L
Hatfield	L	C	C		C	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	L	L
Keating																			
Stafford	L				C	L	L	L	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	L	L
Schweiker	L	C	C		C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L
Heinz																C	L	L	
Mathias	L	L	L		C	L	C	L	L	C	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	L	L
Javits	L	L	L		C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L
Goode														L	L	C	L	L	L

	Wage-Price Control			1973	1974		1975	1976	1976	1972	1974		1972	1974	1966	1972	1978	1978	1978	1976
	Extens. Select	Price Agree/CLC	Rationing		Gen. Energy	Energy Consv. Buildings					Energy Info.	No Fault								
Eagleton	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	L	L		L	C	L	L	L	?
Gravel	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L		L	C	C	L	L	L
Harris	C														L	?				
Church	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L
Melcher																	L	L	L	
Durkin					L	L	L	L	L	L	L					C	L	L	L	L
McIntyre	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	?	L	?	?
Biden		L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L		L				L	L	L	L	L
Leahy					L	L	L	L								C	L	L		
Dodd												L		L						
Hartke	C	?	L	C	L	L	?	?	L	C	L	L	L	L	L					?
Proxmire	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	C	L	L
Burdick	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L
Haskell				L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L				?	?	L	L	L
Riegle																	C	L	L	
Anderson (Minn.)																	C	L	L	
Magnuson	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Jackson	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
McGee	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	C	L	L	L	?	L	L	L					?
Inouye	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L
Long (Haw.)																				
Matsunaga																	C	L	L	
Williams (N.J.)	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L
Moss	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L				?
Bayh	?	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	?
Pell	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L
Pastore	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L					L
Ribicoff	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L
J. Kennedy (Mass.)																				
Glenn	L				L	L	L	C		L							C	C	C	L
Stevenson	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	C	L	L	L
Gruening																				
Bartlett (Alsk.)															L					
Morse															L					
Hart (Colo.)					C	L	L	L	L								C	L	L	L

	Wage-Price Control			Rationing	Gen. Energy		Energy Consv. Buildings	Energy Info.	No Fault			Consum. Protect. Agency		Standard Quant. on Labels	Product Safety	Airline De-Reg.	Airline Job Protect.	Mat. Consum. Co-op Bank	Antitrust
	Extens. Select	Price Agree/CLC			1974	1975			1976	1972	1974	1976	1972						
McGovern	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	?	C	L	L	
Abourezk		C	C	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	C	L	L	
Cranston	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	
Hughes	L	L	L	L	L	L			L	L		L	L	L					
McCarthy														L					
Green																			
Brewster														L					
Engle																			
Neuberger														L					
Carroll																			
Young (O.)														L					
Tunney	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L				?	
Smith (Mass.)																			
Muskie	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	
Hathaway	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		C	L	L	L	
R. Kennedy (N.Y.)														L					
Metzenbaum		C	C		L										C	L	L		
McNamara																			
Humphrey	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L				L	
Mondale	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			?	
Tydings														L					
Nelson	L	L	L	?	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	
E. Kennedy (Mass.)	L	L	L	?	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	
Sarbanes															L	L	L		
Kefauver																			
Yarborough														L					
Clark (Ia.)		C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L			C	L	L	L	
Culver					L	L	L	L	L						C	L	L	L	
Hart (Mich.)	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L				L	
Douglas														L					
Clark (Pa.)														L					

	Gen. Spend'g				1978	1967	1969	1977	1977	1963	1965	1965	1971	1971	1976	1976	1977	1977	1978	1965	1963	1963	1963	1963	1967	1977	1978
	Cut	Delete	Cut	Spend. Cut & Surtax.																							
Eagleton					L	L	L	L					L	L	L	L	L	L	C					L	L	L	
Gravel					L	L	L	L					L	L	L	L	C	L	L					L	C	L	
Harris	L	L	?	L		L	L				L		L											C			
Church	C	C	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			
Melcher					L		L	L									L	L	L						L	C	
Durkin					C		L	L									L	L	L								
McIntyre	L	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	?	C	L	L	L	L	L	C	C	
Biden					?		L	L							C	L	L	?	L						C	C	
Leahy					C		L	L						L		L	L	L							C	C	
Dodd	L	L		C		?	L			L	L	L								L	L	L	L	L			
Hartke	L	C	?	L		L	L			L	L	L	?	L	L	L				L	L	?	L	L			
Proxmire	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	L	L	C	C	
Burdick	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	
Haskell					C		L	L						L	L		L	L	L						L	?	
Riegle					L		L	L									L	L	L						C	C	
Anderson (Minn.)					L		L	L									L	L	L								
Magnuson	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	
Jackson	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	
McGee	L	L	?	L		L	L			L	L	L	L	L	L					L	L	L	L	L			
Inouye	L	L	L	C	?	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	
Long (Haw.)																											
Matsunaga					L		L	L									L	L	L						?	L	
Williams (N.J.)	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	
Moss	L	L	L	C		L	L			L	L	L	L	L	L					L	L	L	L	L			
Bayh	L	L	?	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	?	L	L	L	L	L	?	C	C	
Pell	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	
Pastore	C	L	L	C		L	L			L	L	L	L	L	L					L	L	L	L	C			
Ribicoff	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	
J. Kennedy (Mass.)																											
Glenn					L		C	L						L	L	L	L								L	C	
Stevenson					L		L	L				L	L	L	L	?	?	?							L	C	
Gruening	L	L		L		L				L	L	L								L	L	L					
Bartlett (Alsk.)	L	L		L		L				L	L	L								L	L	L					
Morse	L	L		L		L				L	L	L								L	L	L					
Hart (Colo.)					C		L	L							L	?	L	L	C						C	?	

	Gen. Spend'g		1968 Spend. Cut & Surtx.	1978 Genr'l Spend Cuts	1967 Soc. Sec. Incr.	1969 Soc. Sec. Incr. (& Gen Tax Shift)	1977 Soc. Sec. Fin.	1977 SS: Earn. Lim.	1963 Acc'l	Public Works				1977 Pass	1978 Hum-Haw: Infl.	1965 Appalachia	1963 Area Redevel.	1963 Youth Cons. Corps.	1963 Youth Emp. B111	1967 OEO: Pub. Works Amend.	1977 Waterways	1978 Waterway User Fees
1967 Cut	1968 Delete Cut	1972 Cut								1965 Cut	1965 B111	1971 Conf.	1971 Veto									
McGovern	C	C	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L
Abourezk					L			?	L				L	L	L	L	L				?	L
Cranston			L		L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L						C	C
Hughes						L				L												
McCarthy	L	C		L	?	L			L	L	L				L	L	L	L	L			
Green																						
Brewster	L	L		L		L			L	L					L	L	L	L				
Engle									L							L	L	L				
Neuberger									L	L	L					L	L	L	L			
Carroll																						
Young (O.)	L	L		L		L	L		L	L	L				L	L	L	L	L			
Tunney												L	L	L								
Smith (Mass.)																						
Muskie	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	?	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C
Hathaway					L		L	L					C	L	L	L	L				C	C
R. Kennedy (N.Y.)	L	?		?		L				L						L			L			
Metzenbaum					C		L	L					L	L	L						C	C
McNamara									L	L						L	L	L	L			
Humphrey			L		L		L	L	L	L	L		L	L		L	L	L	L		L	
Mondale	L	L	L	L		L	L			L	L	?	L	L	L				L			
Tydings	L	C		C		L	L			L	L					L			L			
Nelson	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	C
E. Kennedy (Mass.)	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C
Sarbanes					L		L	L					L	L	L						C	C
Kefauver									L							L	L	L				
Yarborough	L	L		L		L	L		L	L					L	L	L	L				
Clark (Ia.)					L		L	L					L	L	L						C	C
Culver					L		L	L					L	L	L						C	C
Hart (Mich.)	L	L	L	L		L	L			L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	
Douglas						L				L	L	L				L	L	L	L			
Clark (Pa.)	L	L		L						L	L	L				L	L	L	L	L		

	Coll. Bargaining						Unemp. Comp				Minimum Wage				Food Stamps									
	1959 Bill of Rts.	1959 Recon. B of R	1959 Second. Boycots	1959 State Reg.	1965 Abolish Right-to-Work	1975 Common-site Picketing	1978 MLRA	1974 Food Stamps for Strikers	1966 Gen. Stands.	1966 Recession	1966 Min. Bens.	1970 Migr. Mkrs.	1961 Coverage	1966 Delay Inc.	1972 Red. Inc.	1966 Pass.	1974 Incr.	1977 Youth Sub-Min.	1969 Incr. Bens.	1970 Incr.	1976 Reform	1977 Purch. Requirements	1970 AFDC	1972 (FAP)
H. Byrd Sr. (Va.)	-	-	-	C	C							C												
H. Byrd Jr. (Va.)						C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Robertson	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C									
Stennis	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Eastland	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C
McClellan	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	?	?	?	?	?	C
Allen						C	C				C			C		L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Russell	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	?	C	C	C	C			C	?				?	
Holland	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C				C	
Ervin	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C		C	C			C	C
Jordan (N.C.)	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	L			C	C			C	C
Talmadge	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	?	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	L	C	C	C	L	C	C	C
Scott (Va.)						C	C	C									C	C		C	C			
Thurmond	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Tower					C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Helms						C	C	C									C	C		C	C			
Goldwater	-	-	-	C	C	C	C				C	C		C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	?
Curtis	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	?	C	C	C
Simpson					C			C	C	C		C	C	C										
Butler	-	-	-	C							C													
Buckley						?	C	C						C		C			C					C
Garn						C	C										C		C	C				
Laxalt						C	C										C		C	C				
Williams (Del.)	-	-	-	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L			C	C				C	
Bennett	-	-	-	C	C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C		C	C			C	C
Dominick					C		C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C		C	C			?	C
Hickenlooper	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C										
Hansen					C	C	C	C			C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Fannin					C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C		C	C	C	C		C	C	C		C	C
Hruska	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C	?		C	C
Mundt					C	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	?	L			C	C			C	?
Hatch							C												C		C			
Bartlett (Okla.)							C	C	C	C								C	C	C	C			
Murphy						C		C	C	C	L	C	C	L					C	C			?	
Gurney							?				C			C	C	C		C	C				C	C

	Coll. Bargaining							Unemp. Comp				Minimum Wage				Food Stamps									
	1959	1959	1959	1959	1965	1975	1978	1974	1966	1966	1966	1970	1967	1966	1966	1972	1966	1974	1977	1969	1970	1976	1977	1970	1972
	Bill of Rts.	Recon. B of R	Second. Boycts	State Reg.	Abolish Right-to-Work	Common-site Picketing	NLRA	Food Stamps for Strikers	Gen. Stands.	Recession	Min. Bens.	Migr. Wkrs.	Coverage	Delay Inc.	Red. Inc.	Pass.	Incr.	Youth Sub-Min.	Incr. Bens.	Incr.	Reform	Purch. Requirements	AFDC	(FAP)	
Mechem																									
Dworshak	-	-	-	C									C												
Martin																									
McClure						?	C	C									C	?			C	C			
Jordan (Ida.)					C				C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C				C				L	C
Bridges	-	-	-	C									?												
Cotton	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C			C	C
Miller					C				C	C	L	C	L	C	C	C	L			C	C			?	C
Allott	-	-	-	C	C				C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L			C	C			C	C
Capehart	-	-	-	C									C												
Brock						C	C							C		L									C
Schoeppel	-	-	-	C									C												
Dirksen	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C			C									
Lausche	-	-	-	C	C			C	C	C	C	C	C			L									
Zorinsky							C											C					L		
Case (S.Dak.)	-	-	-	C									C												
Wiley	-	-	-	C									?												
Lugar							C											C						L	
Young (N.Dak.)	-	-	-	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Hayakawa							C											C						?	
Schmitt							C											C						C	
Wallop							C											C						C	
Roth							C	C						C		C	C	C			C	C			C
Carlson	-	-	-	C	C				C	C	C	C	C	C		C									
Morton	-	-	-	C	C				C	C	C	C	C	C		L									
Griffin						C	C	C	?	?	?	L	C	C	C	L	?	C	C	C	C	C	C	L	C
Domenici						C	C	C								L	C				C	C			
Dole						C	C	C			L			C		L	C	C	C	C	C	L	C	C	C
Bush	-	-	-	C									L												
Baker						C	C	?			L			C		L	C	L	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Danforth							C											C						L	
Saltonstall	-	-	-	C	C				C	C	C	C	C	C		L									
Bellmon						C	C	?			C			C		C	C	C	C	?	C	C		C	C
Pearson					C	C	L	L	C	C	C	L	C	C	C	L	L	?	C	C	L	L	C	C	C
Stevens						L	L	L			L			L		L	L	C	L	?	?	C		?	C

	Coll. Bargaining							Unemp. Comp				Minimum Wage				Food Stamps									
	1959	1959	1959	1959	1965	1975	1978	1974	1966	1966	1966	1970	1967	1966	1972	1966	1974	1977	1969	1970	1976	1977	1970	1972	
	Bill of Rts.	Recon. B of R	Second. Boycots	State Reg.	Abolish Right-to-Work	Common-site Picketing	MLRA	Food Stamps for Strikers	Gen. Stands.	Recession	Min. Bens.	Migr. Mkrs.	Coverage	Delay Inc.	Red. Inc.	Pass. Incr.	Youth Sub-Min.	Incr. Bens.	Incr.	Reform	Purch. Requirements	AFDC	(FAP)		
Ellender	+	+	+	L	C				C	C	C	C	C	C	C			C	C				C		
Hill	+	+	+	L	C				C	C	C		C	C	C	L									
Nunn							C	C	C								L	C			L	C			
Stone							C	C							C			C			L	L		C	
Bentsen							C	C	C						C	L	L				L	L		C	
Chiles							C	C	C						C	L	C				L	L		C	
Hollings							C	C	C		L				C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L		? C	
Morgan							C	C										C			C	L			
Spong											C				C			L	L	C				C	C
DeConcini								L										L				L			
Cook								?			L				C	L		L	L					L	C
Packwood						L	L	?			C				C	L		L	C	C	L	L		C	C
Boggs					C				L	C	L	C	L	L	C	L	L			C	L			C	L
Fong					C	C	C		L	C	L	C	L	L	L	C	L	L		C	L	C		? C	
Beall Sr.	-	-	-	C								C													
Beall Jr.							C	L							C	L					C			L	
Taft						L	L								C	C					L			?	
Saxbe											?				C				L	L				L	C
Kuchel	-	-	+	L	L				L	C	C	L	L	C	L										
Cooper	-	-	+	L	L				C	C	C	L	L	C	C	C	L			L	L			L	L
Smith (Me.)	-	-	+						L	L	C	C	L	L	L	L	L			C	C			L	L
Prouty	-	-	-	L	C				L	L	L	L	L	C	L					C	L			C	
Aiken	-	-	+	L	C			L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	C	L		L	L			C	L
Chafee							L											C				L			
Scott (Pa.)	-	-	-	C	L	C		C	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			L	L
Weicker						L	L	L							L	?	L				L	L		L	
Percy				L	L	L	L				L			L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L		?	L	
Hatfield						C	L	L			L				C	L	C	L	L	L	L	L		C	L
Keating	-	-	-	L								L													
Stafford						L	L	L									L	L			L	L			
Schweiker						L	L	L			L				L	L	C	L	L	L	C		L	L	L
Heinz							L											L				L			
Mathias						L	L	L			C				C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L
Javits	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Goode																				L	L				

	Coll. Bargaining							Unemp. Comp				Minimum Wage				Food Stamps									
	1959 Bill of Rts.	1959 Recon. B of R	1959 Second. Boycots	1959 State Reg.	1965 Abolish Right-to-Work	1975 Common-site Picketing	1978 MLRA	1974 Food Stamps for Strikers	1966 Gen. Stands.	1966 Recession	1966 Min. Bens.	1970 Migr. Mkrs.	1961 Coverage	1966 Delay Inc.	1972 Red. Inc.	1966 Pass.	1974 Incr.	1977 Youth Sub-Min.	1969 Incr. Bens.	1970 Incr.	1976 Reform	1977 Purch. Requirements	1970 AFDC	1972 (FAP)	
Eagleton						L	L	L			L			L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	
Gravel						L	L	L			L			L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	
Harris					L	L	L		L	L	C	L	L	C	L	L			L	L			L	C	
Church	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	C	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	?	C	
Melcher							L											L				L			
Durkin						L	L							L	L			L			L	L			
McIntyre					L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L
Biden							L	L									L	L			L	L			
Leahy						L	L											L			L	L			
Dodd	-	-	+	L	L				L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L			L	L			?		
Hartke	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	?	?	L	L	L		L	?	?	L	L	
Proxmire	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C
Burdick					L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	C
Haskell						L	L	L										L	L		L	L			
Riegle							L															L			
Anderson (Minn.)							L											L				L			
Magnuson	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L
Jackson	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L
McGee	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L		?	?	
Inouye					L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	?	L	
Long (Haw.)													L												
Matsunaga							L											L				L			
Williams (N.J.)	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L
Moss	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L		L	L	L		C	L	
Bayh					L	L	L	L	L	L	L	?	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Pell					L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Pastore	+	+	+	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Ribicoff					L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
J. Kennedy (Mass.)	+	+	+	L																					
Glenn						C	L											L		L		L			
Stevenson						L	L	L						L	L	L	C		L		L			L	
Gruening	+	+	+	L	L				L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L									
Bartlett (Alsk.)	+	+	-	L	L				L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L									
Morse	+	+	+	L	L				L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L									
Hart (Colo.)						L	L												C			L			

Survey of the Voting RecordsIntroduction

The votes, and the alignment patterns they produced, may now be examined, grouped according to issue area. When a number of votes in a given area are similar enough in their substance and in the alignments of those voting for them, then they will be considered collectively. Senators will be separated into those who were always on the one side of the issue (when they voted), those who were always on the other side (when they voted) and those who were sometimes on the one side and sometimes on the other. This will mean different things in the case of different votes. For example, on spending issues, Senators may be identified as consistent supporters of high or of low spending, or as those with mixed voting records. Votes on other kinds of issues would be described analogously.

(Later, after these voting alignments have been surveyed, "conservative" and "liberal" sides will be identified for most of them. Consequently, in the case of most issue areas, the Senators will be divided into consistent conservatives, consistent liberals, and moderates.)

In the case of each issue area examined, the Senators will be considered as members of the groups discussed earlier (conservative and liberal Republicans, conservative Northern, Old Southern, New Southern and liberal Democrats). When, as usually happens, a clear majority of a group is on a given side of a set of issues, it will be simply noted that most of them are on that side. Only the

minority, the deviants, will be named individually. In some cases, an individual has not taken stands on enough of the votes in a set to state firmly where he belongs, yet there may be reason to believe, on the basis of those votes on which he has taken a position (and sometimes on the basis of his votes on other issues, and other facts), that he can be placed on one side or another. We may note these as "perhaps" belonging to a given side.

The following abbreviations will be used below: CR (Conservative Republican), CND (Conservative Northern Democrat), OSD (Old South Democrat), NSD (New South Democrat), LR (Liberal Republican), and LD (Liberal Democrat).

The votes that were finally selected fell in the following areas: income taxes; tariffs; general spending; revenue sharing; public works (including public works jobs, Area Redevelopment, aid to Appalachia and youth employment, among other issues); water projects; social security; labor issues (including unemployment compensation, union legislation, minimum wages and food stamps for strikers); food stamps; Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), legal services, child care, the School Lunch Program, Youth Training and the National Service Corps; housing (including rent subsidies, Demonstration Cities, etc.); education aid; health (including Medicare, etc.); general appropriations for the Departments of Labor and HEW; collective bargaining on railroads; aid to local mass transit; the Supersonic Transport (SST), Lockheed and the Communications Satellite

company; wage and price controls; fuel rationing and the Federal Energy Administration (FEA); no-fault insurance; antitrust law, airline deregulation; consumer protection; the National Consumer Cooperative Bank; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); and environmental protection (including pollution, strip-mining and Alaska pipeline); and nuclear energy.

Income Taxes

The first issue area to consider is that of income taxes.

The first vote in this area is that on the 1962 tax bill, which cut various income taxes, including some business taxes.

FOR

most LDs
most OSDs
most LRs
CRs Mundt, Jordan (Ida.),
Cotton, Allott, Capehart,
Dirksen, Wiley, Carlson
and Martin
CND Lausche

AGAINST

most CRs
CND Lausche
OSDs Stennis and Russell
LRs Saltonstall and Keating
LDs Hart (Mich.), Douglas, Clark
(Pa.) Neuberger, Gore, Yarborough,
MacNamara, Morse, Bartlett (Alsk.)
Gruening and Burdick

The 1964 income tax bill was a general personal and corporate tax cut.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
OSDs Holland, Robertson,
Jordan (N.C.), Eastland and
Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs
CND Lausche
OSDs Harry Byrd Sr., Ervin, Russell,
Stennis and McClellan
LRs Aiken
LDs Ellender, Proxmire and Neuberger

In 1968 a bill was passed providing for a spending cut coupled with a surtax.

FOR

most LDs
LR Hatfield
OSD Talmadge
CRs Cotton and Young (N.Dak.)

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
most LRs
LDs Sparkman and Gore

In 1969, an amendment to another bill was proposed extending the surtax for one-half year.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case, Aiken and
Hatfield
most OSDs

AGAINST

most CRs
most LRs
LDs Robert Byrd (W. Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Williams (N.J.), Young (O.)
and Nelson

Later in 1969, an income tax bill was passed which increased personal taxation of the wealthy, decreased that of most other groups, and increased the tax liability of businesses. It also provided an increase in social security benefits of 15% with an increase in social security taxes.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
most OSDs
CRs Young (N.Dak.) and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs
OSDs Russell and Holland
LRs Smith (Me.), Saxbe, Percy and
Brooke

Another vote concerning this bill was on an amendment to increase the exemption.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Cook, Fong, Aiken, Prouty
and Hatfield
CRs Young (N.Dak.) and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs
most LRs
OSDs Russell, Holland and Harry
Byrd Jr.

A vote from 1971 was on reducing the depreciation allowance.

FOR

most LDs
LR Case
OSD Stennis

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
most LRs
LDs Pastore and Ribicoff

Another vote on the same bill is on an amendment equalizing the tax rate for single and married persons.

FOR

CRs Allott, Young (N.Dak)., Griffin, Dole and Baker
 OSD McClellan
 LRs Pearson, Stevens, Packwood, Fong, Weicker, Hatfield, Schweiker and Brooke
 NSD Chiles
 LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long (La.), Fulbright, Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon, Bible, Anderson (N.Mex), Randolph, Montoya, Mansfield, Church, Williams (N.J.), Percy, Young (O.) and E. Kennedy (Mass.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Cook, Boggs, Beall, Taft, Saxbe, Smith (Me.), Prouty, Aiken, Scott (Pa.), Percy, Mathias, Javits and Case (N.J.)
 NSDs Bentsen, Hollings and Spong
 most LDs

The 1975 tax bill cut personal and corporate taxes.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most NSDs
 CRs Buckley, Brock, Dole, Domenici and Roth

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Pearson and Hatfield
 LD Mansfield

The first 1976 tax vote was on killing a motion to recommit the tax bill of that year to committee, with instructions to report it back with only the personal tax benefits still in it. To oppose the motion was to vote in favor of making the bill consist of personal tax relief only.

FOR HAVING PERSONAL RELIEF ONLY AGAINST HAVING PERSONAL RELIEF ONLY

most LDs
 most NSDs
 LRs Scott (Pa.), Weicker, Mathias, Brooke and Javits
 CRs Tower, Laxalt, Garn, Helms, McClure, Domenici and Baker

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most LRs
 LDs Byrd (W. Va.), Cannon, Bible, Randolph, Johnston (La.), Long (La.), Sparkman, Matsunaga, Inouye, Jackson, Magnuson, McGee, Ribicoff, Pastore, Cranston and Burdick

Another tax vote was one from 1976 on tax credits for corporations for taxes paid to foreign governments. The vote was on reconsidering an amendment to reduce the effective benefits to the companies.

FOR	AGAINST
most LDs	most CRs
NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings, Huddleston and Bumpers	most OSDs
LRs Schweiker, Brooke and Case (N.J.)	most LRs
	NSDs Bentsen, Stone, Morgan, Johnston (La.) and Ford
	LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Randolph, Gravel, Biden, McGee, Inouye, Williams (N.J.) and Pell

The 1977 tax vote was on an amendment which would have made a permanent tax cut for people with incomes under \$20,000.

FOR	AGAINST
most CRs	most LDs
CND Zorinsky	most NSDs
most LRs	most OSDs
LDs Biden, McIntyre, Durkin, Riegle and Proxmire	CRs Scott (Va.) and Young (N.D.)
	LR Hatfield

Next, we have a 1978 tax cut vote on an amendment which would have made a permanent tax cut for people with incomes under \$50,000.

FOR	AGAINST
most LDs	most CRs
NSDs Ford, Huddleston, and Bumpers	most OSDs
LRs Percy, Packwood, Schweiker, Brooke and Case (N.J.)	LRs Packwood, Chafee, Weicker, Mathias, and Javits
CRs Helms, Thurmond, McClure, Domenici, Dole and Griffin	NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles, Hollings, Johnston (La.) and Morgan

Another vote on the 1978 tax bill was on the Kemp-Roth amendment, which provided for a 30% across-the-board personal tax cut over a three-year period (beginning in 1979).

AGAINST

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs
most OSDs

FOR

most CRs
NSD Nunn and Johnston (La.)
LRs Bellmon, Stevens, Schweiker,
Packwood, Chafee, Percy and Heinz
LDs Proxmire, Sparkman, and Gravel

Still another vote on the 1978 bill was an amendment to cut the corporate tax rate from 48% to 44%.

AGAINST

most LDs
NSDs Huddleston and Bumpers
OSDs Stennis, Eastland and
Talmadge

FOR

most CRs
OSD H. Byrd Jr.
CND Zorinsky

NSDs Nunn, Stone, Chiles,
Bentsen, Ford and Johnston (La.)
most LRs
LDs DeConcini, Cannon, Moynihan,
Sparkman, Proxmire, Sasser, Biden,
Durkin, Leahy, Riegle, Anderson
(Minn.), Gravel, Hart (Colo.),
Eagleton, Ribicoff, Williams and
Inouye

Tariff Issues

Another issue area is related to tariff protection, or at least to executive discretion in lowering tariffs. One of the votes was on a proposed amendment to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, to preserve the requirement that the President inform Congress if he cuts tariffs below a "peril point" determined by the Tariffs Commission.

FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER

most LDs
OSDs Holland and Jordan (N.C.)

AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL POWER

most CRs
most OSDs
most LRs
LDs Cannon, Bible, Church and Dodd

The other vote was a 1974 vote involving cloture on a bill to allow the President to negotiate trade agreements on lower trade barriers.

FOR CLOTURE ON PRESIDENTIAL
POWER

OSDs Stennis, Eastland,
McClellan, Allen and Ervin
CRs Gurney and McClure
LRs Schweiker and Case (N.J.)
NSDs Chiles
LDs Bible, Cannon, Metcalf,
Hartke, Bayh, Abourezk,
Muskie, Hart (Mich.) and
Proxmire

AGAINST CLOTURE ON PRESIDENTIAL
POWER

most CRs
most NSDs Nunn and Hollings
most LRs
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and
Talmadge

General Spending

We have several votes on this topic from the late 1960s and early 1970s and another from 1978. Considering the former votes first, we see that there is one on a spending cut in 1967, another on a spending cut coupled with the imposition of a temporary surtax in 1968 (see above), another on an amendment to this last proposal that would remove the spending cut provision from it, and one on giving the president power to cut the budget in certain areas, from 1972. We may consider separately the proposal from 1968 which coupled the spending cut with a surtax. Considering the other three (from 1967, 1968 and 1972) together, we can see that the following alignment exists.

AGAINST ALL THREE CUTS

most LDs
NSDs Hollings and Spong
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.),
Fulbright, Gore, Byrd (W.Va.),

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Jordan (Ida.) and Griffin
OSDs McClellan, Holland, Ervin,
Jordan (N.C.) and Talmadge
LRs Fong, Smith (Me.), Aiken,

AGAINST ALL THREE CUTS

Cannon, Bible, Anderson (N. Mex.),
 Randolph, Montoya, Symington,
 Mansfield, Church, McIntyre,
 Hartke, Pastore, Ribicoff,
 McGovern, McCarthy and Nelson

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

Hatfield, Javits, Brooke and Case
 (N.J.) and perhaps Weicker, Stafford,
 Schweiker and Mathias

FOR ALL THREE CUTS

most CRs
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.),
 Stennis, Eastland (and perhaps
 Russell and Allen)
 perhaps CND Lausche
 LRs Boggs, Cooper, Scott (Pa.)
 and Percy (and perhaps Bellmon,
 Pearson, Kuchel and Prouty)
 LD Proxmire

The 1968 proposal for a spending cut coupled with a surtax
 was already discussed above under taxes, but we shall repeat the
 findings.

AGAINST

most LDs
 LR Hatfield
 OSD Talmadge
 CRs Cotton and Young (N.Dak.)

FOR

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 most LRs
 LD Sparkman and Gore

The remaining vote on general spending is from 1978, and
 is an amendment to a budget bill.

AGAINST

CR Goldwater, Laxalt, Tower,
 Bartlett, Hansen, Young (N.Dak.)
 and Dole
 OSDs Eastland, Stennis, and
 Talmadge
 most LRs
 NSDs Bentsen, Chiles, Hollings,
 Morgan, Johnston (La.) and
 Bumpers
 most LDs

FOR

CRs Curtis, Helms, Scott (Va.),
 Thurmond, Hatch, McClure, Lugar and
 Roth
 CND Zorinsky
 OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and Allen
 LRs Hatfield and Heinz
 NSDs Nunn, Stone, Ford and Huddleston
 LDs DeConcini, Sasser, Durkin,
 McIntyre, Biden, Leahy, Proxmire,
 Haskell, Hart (Colo.), McGovern,
 Church, Nelson and Metzenbaum

Revenue Sharing

In this area are several votes on the 1972 bill establishing revenue sharing. One was a proposed amendment setting the amount of revenue shared at \$8,100,000,000 in the first two years and requiring annual congressional approval of it in fiscal years 1974-77.

FOR

CRs Dominick, Bruska, Gurney, Cotten, Allott, Young (N.Dak.) and Roth
 OSDs Stennis, Eastland, Ervin, Jordan (N.C.), McClellan and Allen
 LRs Pearson, Stevens, Boggs, Fong, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Bible, Symington, Mansfield, Metcalf, Gravel, Burdick, Magnuson, Jackson, McGee, Inouye, Williams (N.J.), Bayh, Pell, Pastore and Ribicoff

AGAINST

CRs Thurmond, Tower, Buckley, Curtis, Bennett, Fannin, Jordan (Ida.), Miller, Hansen, Brock, Griffin, Dole and Baker
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and Talmadge
 most LRs
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Fulbright, Cannon, Anderson (N.Mex.), Randolph, Montoya, McIntyre, Hartke, Proxmire, Riegle, Moss, Stevenson, McGovern, Cranston, Hughes, Muskie, Humphrey, Mondale, Tunney, E. Kennedy (Mass.) and Hart (Mich.)

Another vote was on amendment regarding the distribution of aid. The amendment proposed an increase in the share going to populous, urbanized states.

FOR

LDs Bible, Gravel, Williams (N.J.), Ribicoff, Inouye, Bayh, Pastore, Hartke, Stevenson, Cranston, Tunney, E. Kennedy (Mass.) and Hart (Mich.)
 LRs Stevens, Boggs, Fong, Saxbe, Scott (Pa.), Weicker, Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
 CRs Buckley and Roth

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Cook, Packwood, Cooper, Smith (Me.), Beall Jr., Percy, Hatfield and Mathias
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd (W. Va.), Cannon, Anderson (N.Mex.), Montoya, Randolph, Fulbright, Proxmire, Eagleton, Symington, Mansfield, Metcalf, Burdick, Church, Moss, Jackson, Magnuson, Hughes, Muskie, Humphrey, Mondale and Nelson

The last vote was on passage of the bill.

FOR

most CRs
OSDs Allen, Eastland,
McClellan, Talmadge and
Jordan (N.C.)
most LRs
NSDs Spong and Hollings
most LDs

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater, Curtis, Jordan (Id.)
and Young (N.D.)
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Stennis
and Ervin
LRs Taft, Saxbe, Percy and Hatfield
NSDs Bentsen and Chiles
LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Bible, Symington,
Mansfield, Eagleton, Proxmire,
Burdick, Church, Stevenson,
Metzenbaum and Nelson

A related vote concerned the Humphrey-Hawkins bill of 1978, an economic stimulus program which included a public works jobs measure. The vote was on an amendment to the bill to modify a provision setting a goal of 3% inflation in 1983 and 0% inflation in 1988. The amendment would delete the 0% inflation goal and the time limit for the 3% goal.

FOR DELETION

most LDs
LRs Brooke, Case (N.J.) and
Heinz
OSD Talmadge
NSDs Ford, Huddleston, Bumpers,
Morgan and Johnston (La.)
CR Danforth

AGAINST DELETION

most CRs
most OSDs
most LRs
NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Stone, Chiles
and Holland
LDs Eagleton, Ribicoff, Proxmire,
Hart (Colo.), McGovern and Nelson

Public Works

The next area is that of public works. There are several sub-areas within it. They are; (1) public works whose main purpose is to provide public works jobs; (2) public works which aim not only to provide jobs but also to assist in economic development; (3) those projects whose main purpose is to provide regional economic

development, rather than directly providing jobs; and (4) public works of the traditional sort, which serve other functions commonly performed by government (e.g. the construction of roads, canals and sewers). Also included with this heading will be a fifth sub-area, that of youth employment.

The first sub-area in the area of public works is that of public works jobs projects. It is represented by two votes from 1976 and one from 1977 on public works jobs programs, and one from 1977 on an economic stimulus package that included the public works jobs program of that year. We will first consider the first three, and then the last.

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-
SPENDING SIDE

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case, Brooke,
Mathias, Stafford, Hatfield
and Weicker (and perhaps
Heinz, Taft and Beall Jr.)
NSDs Stone, Bentsen, Ford
and Huddleston
OSD Talmadge

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Buckley, Brock, Roth and Baker
OSDs Eastland, Stennis and Allen
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Stevens,
Packwood, Fong, Schweiker and Percy
(and probably Scott of Pa.)
NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings, Morgan,
Johnson (La.) and Bumpers
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd
(W.Va.), Gravel, Biden, and Hathaway
probably CND Zorinsky

CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-
SPENDING SIDE

most CRs
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and
McClellan
LD Proxmire

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
most NDs
most OSDs
CRS Thurmond, Schmitt, Lugar,
Danforth, Griffin, Domenici and
Baker
CND Zorinsky

AGAINST

most CRs
OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.)
LD Proxmire

The second sub-area of public works is that of public works intended to provide economic development as well as jobs. Included under this heading are a vote on cutting spending for an accelerated public works program in 1963, a vote on passage of a 1965 bill, a vote on an amendment to that bill reducing its spending level, and two votes on passing a 1971 bill--a vote on the conference version and the one on overriding the veto. (These are distinguished from the more explicitly regional economic development votes, on the Appalachia and Area Redevelopment bills--see below).

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-SPENDING
SIDE

most LDs
OSDs Eastland, Stennis, Ervin,
and Jordan (N.C.) (and pro-
bably Allen
LR Case (N.J.) (and perhaps
Schweiker)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Fannin, Bennett, Murphy, Gurney,
Cotton, Dirksen, and Carlson
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), McClellan
and Talmadge (and perhaps Harry
Byrd Sr. [Va.], Robertson and
Holland)
most LRs
LDs Ellender and Proxmire
probably CND Lausche

CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-SPENDING
SIDE

most CRs

The sub-area of regional economic development contains two votes: the one on the Area Redevelopment Bill of 1963 and one on the Appalachian Development bill of 1965. The only one voted against the Appalachian bill but for the Area Redevelopment bill was liberal Democrat Proxmire. Otherwise, the two votes form a perfect scale, as shown below.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 OSDs Ervin, Jordan (N.C.),
 Talmadge and Holland

AGAINST

most CRs
 OSDs Harry Byrd Sr. (Va.)
 Robertson, Stennis, Eastland
 and McClellan
 LRs Pearson and Boggs
 LD Ellender

IN FAVOR OF APPALACHIAN BUT OPPOSED
TO AREA REDEVELOPMENT

CRs Bennett and Dirksen
 CND Lausche
 OSD Russell
 LR Kuchel (and perhaps Beall Sr.)

The fourth kind of public works project is public works so-called, as opposed to public works jobs. We have none on our list by this precise name. However, there are some votes on water projects which fit this description. There are two votes involved here. The first (1977) is on a substitute amendment to build a dam and locks in Illinois and have user fees studied.

FOR

CRs Scott (Va.), Thurmond,
 Tower, Laxalt, Garn, Hatch,
 Hansen, Young (N.Dak.), Roth
 and Danforth
 OSDs Stennis, Eastland,
 McClellan and Allen
 LRs Stevens, Packwood, Percy,
 Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz
 NSDs Hollings, Johnston (La.),
 Ford, Huddleston and Bumpers
 LDs DeConcini, Sparkman, Long
 (La.), Moynihan, Eagleton,
 Burdick, Magnuson, Jackson,
 Williams (N.J.), Ribicoff,
 Glenn, Stevenson, Cranston,
 Tunney and Humphrey

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater, Helms, Curtis,
 McClure, Lugar, Hayakawa, Schmitt,
 Domenici, Wallop, Griffin, Dole and
 Baker
 CN Zorinsky
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.) and
 Talmadge
 LRs Bellmon, Chafee, Weicker,
 Stafford, Mathias, Javits, Brooke
 and Case (N.J.)
 NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles and Morgan
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Pell, Hart (Colo.),
 Cannon, Randolph, Gravel,
 McIntyre, Biden, Proxmire, McGovern,
 Cranston, Muskie, Hathaway, Metzen-
 baum, Nelson, E. Kennedy (Mass.),
 Clark (Ia.) and Culver

The second vote relating to waterways was on an amendment to authorize collection of user fees for them (1978).

AGAINST

CRs Scott, Thurmond, Tower,
Laxalt, Garn, Hatch, Bartlett
(Okla.), Hansen, Young (N.Dak.),
Roth, Dole, Baker and Danforth
LRs Stevens, Packwood, Weicker,
Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz
OSDs Stennis and Eastland
NSDs Bentsen, Hollings,
Johnston (La.), Ford,
Huddleston and Bumpers
LDs DeConcini, Sparkman,
Long (La.), Moynihan, Byrd
(W.Va.), Eagleton, Gravel,
Burdick, Magnuson, Jackson,
Pell and McGovern

FOR

CRs Goldwater, Curtis, McClure,
Lugar, Hayakawa, Schmitt, Domenici,
and Wallop
CND Zorinsky
OSDs H. Byrd Jr. (Va.) and Talmadge
LRs Bellmon, Chafee, Stafford, Percy,
Mathias, Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
NSDs Nunn and Chiles
LDs Randolph, Melcher, McIntyre,
Biden, Proxmire, Williams
(N.J.), Bayh, Ribicoff, Glenn,
Stevenson, Cranston, Muskie,
Hathaway, Metzenbaum, Nelson,
E. Kennedy (Mass.), Clark (Ia.)
and Culver

Related to these public works votes are two on the Youth Employment bill of 1963. One is on the passage of it, the other is on amendment to remove the portion of the bill which provided for a Youth Conservation Corps (YCC). The only one opposed to the amendment who opposed passage of the bill was Old South Democrat Holland. Otherwise, the two votes scale perfectly.

FOR YCC AND BILL

most LDs
LRs Fong, Cooper and Case
(N.J.)

AGAINST YCC BUT IN FAVOR OF BILL

LRs Smith (Me.), Scott (Pa.),
Kuchel, Keating and Javits

AGAINST YCC AND BILL

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
most LRs
LDs Monroney, Fulbright,
Sparkman, Hill and Ellender

Social Security

These votes include some on general increases in benefits, another on changing the tax formula, and another on the outside earnings limitation. In the first category are a vote on a substitute proposal for a benefit increase (12.5% instead of 15%), with a tax increase, and a vote on the passage of the 1969 income tax bill, which included a 15% increase in social security benefits, with a tax increase.

ON THE HIGH-SPENDING SIDE
OF BOTH

most LDs
LRs Prouty, Aiken, Scott
(Pa.), Hatfield, Javits
and Case (N.J.) (and perhaps
Packwood, Cook, Fong,
Schweiker and Mathias)
NSD Hollings
OSD Ervin (and probably
Jordan of N.C. and Talmadge)
CR Young (N.Dak.)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD
(High-Spending in 1967 but Low-
Spending in 1969)

CRs Cotton and Griffin
OSD Russell
LR Smith (Me.)
perhaps CND Lausche

(Low-Spending in 1967, but High-
Spending in 1969)

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Stennis,
Eastland and McClellan

ON THE LOW-SPENDING SIDE OF BOTH
most CRs
OSD Holland
LRs Pearson and Percy

CRs Dominick, Miller and Baker
LR Boggs
NSD Spong
LD Ellender

Another social security vote, from 1977, involved the questions of whether the wage base for employers should be raised to the same or to a greater level than that to which it would be raised for employes, and how high the tax rate should be. A substitute amendment, providing for equal wage bases and a higher tax rate, was proposed, and a motion was made to kill it.

AGAINST SUBSTITUTE

most LDs
LRs Stafford and Case (N.J.)

FOR SUBSTITUTE

most CRs
most LRs
NSD Morgan
LDs Moynihan, Byrd (W.Va.),
Randolph and Inouye

Another vote on the same social security bill is on an amendment concerning outside earnings limitations. An amendment to ease the restrictions was proposed, but another (the one we are concerned with) was proposed as a substitute. The substitute would have moderated the original by raising the age at which its provisions would take effect.

FOR SUBSTITUTE

most LDs
most LRs and NSDs
CRs Curtis, Zorinsky and
Roth

AGAINST SUBSTITUTE

most CRs
OSDs Stennis, Eastland and Talmadge
LRs Packwood and Percy
NSDs Stone
LDs Randolph and Pell

Labor Issues

The next subject is that of labor issues. There are several sub-areas within it: unemployment compensation, food stamps for strikers, union (collective bargaining) legislation and minimum wage laws. The sub-area of unemployment compensation involves three votes on a bill from 1966, one on a bill from 1970 and another on a bill from 1972. The 1966 bill provided for the setting of national minimum standards for the unemployment compensation systems in the various states.

FOR BILL

most LDs
 most LRs
 OSD Talmadge

AGAINST BILL

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LRs Saltonstall, Pearson and Cooper
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman and
 Smathers

Another vote on this bill is one on amendment to provide full federal funding of extended unemployment compensation coverage in recessions.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Javits, Case (N.J.),
 Aiken, Prouty and Smith
 (Me.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fong, Cooper
 Kuchel and Scott (Pa.)
 LDs Cannon, Bible and Symington

The third vote on this bill was on another amendment which set minimum levels in each state for maximum benefits at one-half the average statewide wage.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Boggs, Prouty, Aiken,
 Javits and Case (N.J.)
 CR Miller

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LRs Pearson, Smith (Me.), Cooper,
 Kuchel and Scott (Pa.)
 LDs Cannon, Bible, Harris, Jackson
 and McGovern

The next vote on unemployment compensation comes from 1970. It is an amendment providing for the inclusion of migrant workers in the program.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 CRs Murphy, Griffin, Dole
 and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Packwood, Boggs, Fong,
 Smith (Me.), Scott (Pa.) and Mathias
 NSD Spong
 LDs Cannon, Bible, Long (La.) and
 Ellender

The last unemployment compensation vote is from 1972. It is on an amendment extending coverage beyond the existing time limits.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 NSD Chiles and Hollings
 CRs Baker, Griffin and Brock
 OSD Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Smith (Me.), Cooper, Percy and
 Mathias
 NSD Spong and LD Sparkman

The next sub-area of labor issues is that concerning the issues of food stamps for strikers. It contains one vote, from 1974.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 NSD Huddleston
 CR Young (N.Dak.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 LRs Fong and Scott (Pa.)

Another sub-area is that concerning unions (collective bargaining), which includes four votes on labor relations amendments to the Landrum-Griffin bill (1959); a bill to abolish right-to-work laws (1965); a bill to allow common-site picketing (1975); and a bill changing union recognition procedure in a pro-union direction. The first vote is that on an amendment to the Landrum-Griffin bill allowing state regulation of labor disputes where no federal regulation applies.

The second vote on this bill is on an amendment establishing a set of restraints on unions to protect their members, called a "Bill of Rights".

AGAINST

most LDs
LR Javits

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
most LRs
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Chavez
and Dodd

The third vote is on reconsidering the previous one.

AGAINST

most LDs
LR Javits

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Chavez
and Dodd

The fourth vote is on an amendment that, among other things, banned all secondary boycotts.

AGAINST

LRs Kuchel, Cooper, Smith
(Me.), Aiken and Javits

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LRs Saltonstall, Beall Sr., Scott
(Pa.), Prouty, Keating and Case (N.J.)
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Kerr,
Monroney and Bartlett

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LR Saltonstall, Beall Sr. and Scott
(Pa.)
LDs Fulbright, Smathers, Kerr, Gore
and Kefauver

The next vote on collective bargaining is on a proposal to repeal the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act allowing right-to-work laws.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs,
Fong, Aiken and Prouty
LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
Fulbright, Smathers, Byrd (W.Va.),
Gore, Monroney and Hayden

The next collective bargaining vote is on the bill to allow common-site picketing (1975).

FOR

most LRs
most LDs
NSD Ford

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Fong, Scott
(Pa.) and Hatfield
LDs Sparkman, Cannon, McIntyre,
Glenn and Nelson

The last collective bargaining vote is on a bill which would make it easier for unions to organize (1978).

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Zorinsky
most NSDs LR Bellmon
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.) and Cannon

The last sub-area of labor issues is that of minimum wage legislation. There are several votes in this area which may be grouped into a number of sets. From 1966 and 1974 are votes on the passage of minimum wage increases; from 1961 and 1966 are votes on the width of coverage of minimum wage laws; from 1966 is a vote on delaying an increase and from 1972 is a similar one on reducing the proposed increase; and from 1977 is one on providing a youth sub-minimum wage.

There are two votes (from 1966 and 1974) on passage of bills to increase the minimum wage. The first we will consider is the one from 1966.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 OSD Talmadge
 CRs Dominick, Mundt, Williams
 (Del.), Bennett, Murphy, Miller,
 Allott, Morton and Griffin.

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LDs Ellender and Fulbright

The second bill of this kind to consider is the one from 1974.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most NSDs
 CRs Brock, Young (N.Dak.),
 Domenici, Dole and Baker
 OSDs Allen and Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LR Bellmon
 NSD Hollings

These two bills may also be considered as a group.

FOR BOTH

most LDs
 most LRs
 OSD Talmadge
 probably CRs Domenici, Dole
 and Baker

AGAINST BOTH

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LD Ellender

HAVING MIXED RECORD

CRs Bennett and Young (N.Dak.)
 (and probably Dominick, Mundt,
 Williams of Del., Murphy,
 Miller, Allott, Brock, Morton
 and Griffin
 probably CND Lausche
 OSD Ervin (and probably Jordan
 [N.C.] and Allen)
 LRs Pearson (and probably Cook
 and Taft)
 NSD Hollings (and perhaps most
 other NSDs)
 LD Fulbright

Votes on the width of coverage come from 1961 and 1966.

First we will consider the 1961 vote.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LDs Hill, Sparkman and Fulbright
 (and perhaps Ellender and Smathers)

The other vote on this subject was from 1966.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Cooper,
 Prouty and Aiken
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
 Fulbright, Smathers, Monroney,
 Cannon, Bible and McGovern

We may now consider the two votes on width of coverage together.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR Miller
LRs Pearson, Cooper, Prouty
and Aiken (and perhaps
Beall Sr.)
LDs Cannon, Bible, Gore
and McGovern

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LR Saltonstall
LD Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
Fulbright, Smathers and Monroney

Another kind of minimum wage vote is that on delaying a proposed increase. We have one of these votes on our list taken in 1966.

AGAINST

most LDs
most LRs

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs
and Cooper
LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman, Long
(La.), Symington, Harris and Church

Still another kind of minimum wage vote is that on reducing a proposed increase. We have one of these votes on our list taken in 1972.

AGAINST

most LDs
most LRs

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
Fong, Beall Sr., Taft, Saxbe,
Hatfield and Mathias
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long (La.)
and Moss

The proposal to delay the minimum wage increase in 1966 and the one to oppose it in 1972 are alike in that they involve the question of degree of increase, rather than that of whether there should be an increase at all, which is implied in the vote on passage. We may consider them now as a group.

AGAINST DELAYING AND REDUCTION	FOR DELAYING AND REDUCTION
most LDs	most LRs
most LRs	most OSDs
	most NSDs
HAVING A MIXED RECORD	LRs Pearson and Cooper (and perhaps Taft, Beall Jr., Cook and Packwood)
LRs Boggs, Fong and Mathias	LDs Hill, Sparkman and Fulbright (and perhaps Ellender and Smathers)
LDs Long (La.), Randolph, Symington, McIntyre, Moss, Harris and Church	

The last minimum wage vote to be considered is that on the youth sub-minimum wage amendment of 1977, to permit the employing of workers under 20 at 85% of the minimum wage for the first six months on the job.

AGAINST	FOR
most LDs	most CRs
most LRs	most OSDs
NSDs Bentsen, Johnston (La.), Ford and Huddleston	CND Zorinsky
	LRs Stevens, Bellmon, Chafee, Percy, Hatfield, and Schweiker
	NSDs Nunn, Stone, Chiles, Hollings, Morgan and Bumpers
	LDs Sparkman, Long (La.) and Cannon

Several of these cleavages relating to labor issues can be put together in something approximating a scale. The votes on the scale, in approximate order from the least to the most "pro-labor" or "pro-union", are: the minimum wage increases of 1966 and 1974 (considered together), the unemployment compensation act of 1966,

and the 1978 vote on making recognition easier for the unions. Scaling with all of these, except the last one, are the amendments to delay (1966) or reduce (1972) proposed minimum wage increases (considered together). (Many of the other votes are related to these. For example, the boundary between the consistent opponents of broad minimum-wage coverage and those with mixed records on the subjects seem to correspond closely to that between opponents and supporters of the 1966 unemployment compensation bill, while the boundary between the consistent supporters of broad minimum wage coverage and those with mixed records corresponds to the boundary between the supporters and opponents of the 1978 union bill.)

Food Stamps

We may now turn to the next major area of votes, which is that involving votes on food stamps (apart from those on strikers' food stamps, already dealt with above). The following votes are included in this category: an amendment to raise the increase in spending provided for in the food stamps bill of 1969; an amendment increasing food stamps funds in 1970; a bill to increase spending in 1976, and an amendment to eliminate the purchase requirement in 1977.

ON HIGH-SPENDING SIDE OF
ALL FOUR

most LDs
most LRs
most OSDs

ON LOW-SPENDING SIDE OF ALL FOUR

most CRs
most OSDs

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRS Dole, Baker, Lugar and Danforth
 CND Zorinsky
 OSD Talmadge
 NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Johnston (La.)
 and Morgan
 LRs Boggs, Fong, Packwood,
 Stevens and Schweiker (and
 probably Aiken and Smith (Me.)
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd
 (W.Va.), Cannon and Bible

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

The next issues are related to AFDC ("welfare", in the narrow sense of that word). Both of the votes we have on this subject relate to President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) proposals in 1970 and 1972.

The 1970 vote was on a motion to kill the FAP proposal. The motion was made by one of the FAP supporters (Long of Louisiana), some of whom had become convinced that they could not get the FAP accepted, and so sacrificed it to save the social security bill to which the FAP amendment was attached. Since this vote would therefore not clearly indicate attitudes toward FAP or welfare, we will not consider it further.

In 1972, several votes were taken relating to the FAP. The one included on our list was an attempt to increase benefits above the level proposed by Nixon.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs

AGAINST

LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
 Stevens, Fong and Saxbe
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd (W.Va.),
 (W.Va.), Bible, Cannon, Andersen
 (N.Mex.), Randolph, Montoya, Fulbright,
 Symington, Burdick, Eagleton,
 Proxmire, Church and Magnuson

Housing

The area of housing consists of several sub-areas; general housing appropriations, rent subsidies, and the Demonstration Cities program. We may consider rent subsidies first. There are three votes under this heading, from 1965, 1966 and 1967.

FOR ALL SUBSIDIES

most LDs
 most LRs

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Murphy, Miller, Dirksen
 and Morton (and perhaps
 Griffin)
 LRs Cooper, Prouty, Kuchel,
 Fong and Boggs (and perhaps
 Saltonstall)
 LDs Hartke, Young (Ohio),
 Bible and Hill

AGAINST ALL SUBSIDIES

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 NSD Hollings and Spong
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Gore, Cannon and
 Symington

Another topic under the heading of housing programs is that of the Demonstration Cities program. There is one vote on this topic from 1966, on a vote to delete funds for the program from a bill.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 CND Lausche
 CRs Allott and Young (N.Dak.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 NSDs Spong and Hollings
 LRs Boggs, Fong and Kuchel
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.)

The sub-area of housing programs dealing with more general housing matters includes votes from 1961 (two), 1965, 1968, 1977 and 1978. The first two of these in a vote on general housing appropriations from 1961.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Boggs, Fong, Javits and Case (N.J.)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

LR Keating
 LDs Ellender, Gore and Kerr

AGAINST

CR Wiley
 OSDs Ervin, Jordan (N.C.) and Talmadge
 most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LR Saltonstall, Smith (Me.), Aiken, Cooper, Prouty, Kuchel and Scott (Pa.)

The next vote in this area is that on the establishment of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (1965).

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 CRs Miller and Allott
 OSD Jordan (N.C.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 LRs Pearson and Cooper
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman and Bible

The next vote on housing matters is that on the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which provided aid to low-income people by buy or rent housing, flood insurance, riot insurance and other things.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most CRs
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin,
 Jordan (N.C.) and Talmadge

AGAINST

OSDs Stennis, Eastland, Holland and
 Russell
 CR Thurmond (a former OSD)

The remaining housing votes come are a vote from 1977 and
 two from 1978, all involving votes on cutting general housing funds.

CONSISTENTLY FOR HIGH-SPENDING

most LDs
 LR Packwood, Hatfield, Weicker,
 Heinz, Javits, Brooke and
 Case (N.J.) (and perhaps
 Percy

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Laxalt, Wallop, Hayakawa,
 Baker and Danforth
 LRs Stevens, Chafee, Stafford
 and Mathias
 NSDs Stone, Bentsen, Ford,
 Huddleston and Bumpers
 LDs Cannon, Melcher, Eagleton,
 Church, Hart (Col.), Haskell,
 Magnuson, Metzenbaum and Muskie

CONSISTENTLY FOR LOW-SPENDING

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Pearson, Bellmon and Schweiker
 NSDs Chiles, Hollings and Johnston
 (La.)
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.)

Education

The votes in this areas may also be divided into sub-areas.
 The votes in 1960 (two), 1961 and 1965 form a natural group, as they
 are all rather similar votes dealing with elementary and secondary
 education.

CONSISTENTLY HIGH-SPENDING

most LDs
 LRs Cooper, Smith and Aiken
 (and perhaps CR Wiley)

CONSISTENTLY LOW-SPENDING

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Lausche
 and perhaps LR Beall Sr.

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Miller, Case (S.Dak.), Mundt,
Dirksen, Carlson and Allott (and
perhaps Martin)
OSDs McClellan, Ervin, Jordan
(N.C.) and Talmadge
most LRs
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Johnston
(S.C.), Long (La.) and Hayden

Another vote on educational appropriations is on a bill
providing funds generally for the Office of Education, from 1970.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs
most OSDs
CRs Hruska, Murphy, Jordan (Ida.),
Cotton and Young (N. Dak.)

AGAINST

other CRs
LRs Bellmon, Packwood and Smith
(Me.)

Another kind of education vote is that from 1974, involving
a formula for distribution of aid to elementary and secondary schools.

AGAINST THE FORMULA

most LDs
most LRs
CRs Buckley, Roth and Griffin

FOR THE FORMULA

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LRs Cook, Packwood, Fong, Beall Jr.,
Hatfield, and Mathias
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Johnston
(La.), Long (La.), Cannon, Bible,
Montoya, Symington, Mansfield,
Eagleton, Biden, Hartke, Proxmire,
Haskell, Church, Bayh and Pastore

The next vote is on aid to higher education. It is vote
on the passage of bill, in 1963, providing funds for this purpose.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs

CRs Simpson, Hickenlooper, Miller, Dirksen, Young (N.Dak.), Carlson and Morton OSD Jordan (N.C.)	CND Lausche LR Cooper LDs Sparkman, Hill and Ellender
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Health

The next issue area to be considered is that of health or medical issues. This encompasses votes on medical "insurance" and votes on hospitals. Considering the former topic first, we can see that there are five votes on this topic. In 1960, 1962, 1964 and 1964 relatively similar proposals were put forth for what came to be known as "Medicare", a program for helping the elderly with their medical costs, financed partially or totally through the Social Security System. With the 1965 vote, the amendment was adopted and the bill (a social security bill) was passed. First we will count the first four votes together.

FOR MEDICARE CONSISTENTLY

most LDs
LR Case (N.J.)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Mundt and Young (N.Dak.)
OSDs Russell, McClellan and
Talmadge
CND Lausche
LDs Hill, Sparkman, Fulbright,
Smathers, Kerr, Monroney, Byrd
(W.Va.), Bible, Cannon, Anderson,
Hayden and Randolph.

AGAINST MEDICARE CONSISTENTLY

most CRs
most OSDs
LR Pearson
LDs Ellender and Long (La.)

Now we will consider the vote on passage of the 1965 social security bill, which included the last Medicare provision.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 OSDs Russell, McClellan and
 Talmadge
 CND Lausche
 CR Carlson

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LR Pearson
 LDs Ellender, Long (La.), Anderson
 (N.Mex.) and Harris

The other medical votes relate to hospitals. The first is one on overriding the veto of a bill providing for additional hospital construction (1970).

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 CRs Dominick, Fannin, Murphy,
 Gurney, Cotton and Young (N.Dak.)

AGAINST

most CRs
 LRs Packwood, Saxbe, Cooper, Smith
 (Me.) and Goodell

The other vote on hospitals was on an amendment to a 1978 hospital cost control bill, which would authorize hospital revenue limits if certain goals were not met.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Bellmon, Chafee, Stafford,
 Javits, Brooke and Case (N.J.)
 NSDs Chiles and Bumpers
 CR Griffin
 CND Zorinsky

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 LRs Pearson, Packwood, Percy,
 Hatfield, Schweiker and Heinz
 LDs DeConcini, Long (La.), Melcher,
 Church and Inouye

OEO and other poverty programs

We may next consider the votes on the OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity--the War on Poverty). These votes fall into two groups. The first group consists of votes dealing with spending--dealing with the question of the establishment (1964) or continued existence

(1974) of the OEO or with appropriations to it (1965, 1968, 1969, 1971).

CONSISTENTLY ON HIGH-SPENDING
SIDE

most LDs
probably LRs Case (N.J.),
Mathias, Stafford, Keating,
Weicker, Percy and Kuchel

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Young (N.Dak.), Griffin,
Dole and Baker (and probably
Domenici)
OSDs Allen, Ervin, Jordan (N.C.)
and Talmadge
LRs Pearson, Fong, Taft, Beall
Jr., Smith (Me.), Cooper, Aiken,
Prouty, Hatfield, Scott (Pa.),
Schweiker, Javits and Brooke
(and perhaps Stevens and
Beall Jr.)
NSD Hollings (and perhaps Nunn,
Chiles, Spong, Johnston of La.
and Huddleston)

CONSISTENTLY ON LOW-SPENDING
SIDE

most CRs
most OSDs
probably CND Lausche
probably LRs Saltonstall, Bellmon,
and Boggs
probably LDs Ellender and Hill

The other group of OEO votes consists of those on proposals to permit governors to veto certain aspects of the program in their states (1965, 1967 and 1969).

AGAINST THE VETO CONSISTENTLY

most LDs
most LRs Case (N.J.) and
Javits (and probably Brooke
and perhaps Mathias)

FOR THE VETO CONSISTENTLY

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Lausche
LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fong, Aiken
and Prouty (and probably Saltonstall,
Bellmon, and Weicker)
NSD Spong and Monroney
LD Ellender (and probably Hill)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CR Young (N.Dak.)
 LRs Smith (Me.), Cooper and Scott
 (and probably Percy and
 perhaps Hatfield)
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.),
 Fulbright, Smathers and
 Byrd (W.Va.)

Another aspect of the poverty program which was voted upon was the Head Start program, on which we have a vote from 1968, regarding an increase in its funds.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 NSDs Hollings and Spong
 CND Lausche
 CRs Murphy, Dirksen and
 Griffin

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Pearson, Boggs, Fong and
 Smith (Me.)
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman, Long
 (La.), Smathers, Bible, Anderson,
 Hayden, Long (Mo.), Proxmire,
 Bartlett (Alsk.) and Church

Related to three OEO votes is a 1971 vote on a bill to extend the OEO and begin a child development program and legal services program for the poor.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most NSDs

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Pearson, Packwood, Smith (Me.),
 Taft, Saxbe and Stevens.

There were two votes on the Legal Services program for the poor, both involving proposals to make it an independent corporation. The first, from 1972, was on an amendment to remove a provision from an OEO bill.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Stevens, Taft, Saxbe,
 Scott (Pa.), Weicker, Percy,
 Hatfield, Stafford, Schweiker,
 Mathias, Javits, Brooke and
 Case (N.J.)
 most NSDs
 OSD McClellan

AGAINST

most CNDs
 most OSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Cook, Packwood, Boggs,
 Fong, Beall Jr., Cooper, Smith (Me.)
 and Aiken
 LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long (La.),
 and Byrd (W.Va.)

The second, from 1974, was a vote on cloture on a bill to
 achieve this same end.

FOR

most LRs
 most NSDs
 CRs Roth, Griffin, Domenici and
 Dole
 OSD Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 NSD Chiles
 LDs Sparkman, Johnston (La.),
 Long (La.), Fulbright and
 Cannon

Related votes from 1963 are those on a youth training bill,
 (amending the Manpower Training and Development Act of 1962),
 and the National Service Corps.. The former will be considered
 first.

FOR

most LDs
 LRs Boggs, Fong, Beall Sr.,
 Kuchel, Scott (Pa.), Keating,
 Javits and Case (N.J.)
 CR Morton

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Smith
 (Me.) and Cooper
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Long (La.)
 and Johnston (S.C.)

The other one is on passage of the National Service Corps
 bill.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case (N.J.),
Keating, Fong and Cooper

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Pearson, Boggs, Beall Sr.,
Prouty, Aiken, Smith (Me.), Kuchel
and Scott (Pa.)
LDs Engle, Young (O.), Gore, Johnston
(S.C.), Long (La.), Smathers & Ellender

Another vote is on a bill providing federal subsidies for
child day care centers in 1976.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs

AGAINST

most CRs and most OSDs
LRs Bellmon, Stevens, Packwood, Fong
and Beall Jr.
LD Sparkman and NSD Bentsen

The subject of the School Lunch program for children involves
two votes: a 1970 vote on amendment providing more generous distribu-
tion standards and a 1975 vote on a bill to continue the program.

FOR BOTH PROPOSALS

most LDs
most LRs
NSD Hollings (and perhaps
the other NSDs)

AGAINST BOTH PROPOSALS

most CRs

AGAINST THE 1970 PROPOSAL BUT
FOR THE 1975 ONE

CRs Dole and Baker
most OSDs
perhaps NSD Spong
LRs Pearson and Scott (Pa.)
LDs Sparkman and Bible

Labor and HEW Departmental Funds

Another vote which is related to several others, but is one
of a kind (on our list) is the 1976 vote on overriding a veto of a
measure appropriating funds for the departments of Labor and HEW.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most NSDs
 OSDs Stennis, Eastland, and
 Talmadge
 CRs McClure, Young (N.Dak.),
 Domenici, Roth and Baker

AGAINST

most CRs
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., McClellan and
 Allen
 LR Packwood
 LDs Ribicoff and Proxmire

Mass Transit

There are a number of votes related to federal aid to mass transit. The first votes in this group involve a proposal to allow highway trust funds to be spent on local mass transit. Two of them (from 1973 and 1975) propose allowing the funds to be used for local mass transit generally. The third proposal (1972) was to allow the funds to be used specifically to aid rail transportation.

FOR ALL PROPOSALS

most LDs
 most LRs
 perhaps CRs Dominick, Bennett,
 Brock, Miller and Allott

AGAINST ALL PROPOSALS

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 LR Stevens
 LDs Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon, Randolph,
 Sparkman and Long (La.) (and perhaps
 Bible, Anderson (N.Mex.), Montoya,
 Fulbright and Bayh)

FOR THIS 1972 PROPOSAL, WITH A
MIXED RECORD ON THE OTHERS

LDs Metcalf, Symington,
 Mondale and Muskie (and
 perhaps Clark of Ia.)
 LRs Beall Jr. and Taft
 perhaps NSD Nunn
 CRS Buckley and Griffin
 (and perhaps Baker)

FOR THE 1972 PROPOSAL; AGAINST THE
OTHERS

CRs Fannin and Hruska (and perhaps
 Gurney)
 OSD Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.)
 LD Church, Stevenson and Humphrey
 (and perhaps Eagleton and Hughes)

This discussion leads us to consider the beginnings of Federal aid to mass transit, and the vote on passing the bill establishing the program in 1963.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case (N.J.)
Keating, Kuchel and Scott
(Pa.)

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Saltonstall, Pearson, Boggs,
Cooper, Smith (Me.), Aiken, Prouty
and Beall Sr.
LDs Hill, McGee, McIntyre and Bayh

Government Aid to Business

Another group of issues includes votes on various matters, all of which involve government aid to partnership with business. These included aid to SST, aid to Lockheed and establishing the Communications Satellite company.

The first of these is the issue of government aid to the construction of a Supersonic Transport (SST) airplane. There are two votes here on amendment to bills, one to delete funds from a bill in 1970 and the other to restore funds in 1971.

FOR SST CONSTRUCTION

OSDs Stennis, Eastland,
McClellan and Talmadge (and
perhaps Russell)
NSD Hollings
LRS Bellmon, Pearson, Ellender,
Boggs, Saxbe and Mathias (and
perhaps Stevens, Beall Jr.
and Taft)
LDs Ellender, Sparkman, Long
(La.), Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
Bible, Randolph, Gravel,
Magnuson, Jackson, McGee,
Inouye and Moss (and perhaps
Yarborough and Dodd)
most CRs

AGAINST SST CONSTRUCTION

most LDs
most LRs
CRs Jordan (Ida.), Hansen and Griffin
(and perhaps Murphy and Roth)
NSD Spong (and perhaps Bentsen and
Chiles)
OSD Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin, Jordan
(N.C.) and Allen (and perhaps
Holland)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Dominick, Cotton and Miller
 LRs Cook, Fong and Smith (Me.)
 LDs Proxmire, Muskie, Symington
 and Anderson (N.Mex.)

The next vote is on a bill to provide loan guarantees to
 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (1971).

FOR

most CRs
 OSDs Eastland, Stennis, Allen
 and Talmadge
 LRs Pearson, Cook, Packwood,
 Boggs, Fong, Cooper, Scott
 (Pa.), Mathias, Javits and
 Case (N.J.)
 NSD Hollings
 LDS Ellender, Sparkman, Long
 (La.), Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
 Bible, Randolph, Metcalf,
 Gravel, McIntyre, Inouye,
 Williams (N.J.), Moss,
 Cranston, Tunney and
 Humphrey

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater, Buckley, Curtis,
 Dominick, Jordan (Ida.) and Griffin
 OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Ervin, Jordan
 and McClellan
 NSDs Chiles and Spong
 LRs Bellmon, Saxbe, Smith (Me.),
 Aiken, Taft, Beall Jr., Weicker,
 Percy, Hatfield, Schweiker, and
 Brooke
 most LDs

Another somewhat similar vote is that on the Communications
 Satellite bill in 1962. The vote was on cloture of the filibuster.

FOR

most CRs
 most Lrs
 most LDs
 OSD Holland

AGAINST

CRs Goldwater and Tower
 most OSDs (incl. Thurmond)
 LDs Ellender, Hill, Sparkman,
 Johnston (S.C.), Long (La.),
 Fulbright, Gore, Kefauver,
 Yarborough, Byrd (W.Va.), Cannon,
 Bible, Hayden, Burdick, Gruening,
 Bartlett (Alas.), Morse, McGee
 Neuberger, Carroll, Young (Ohio),
 McNamara and Douglas

Wage and Price Controls

Another issue area is that of wage and price controls.

There are three votes in this area. The first vote, on extending presidential authority that had already been granted in this area, is from 1971.

FOR

most LDS
most LRs
most NSDs
most OSDs
most CRs

AGAINST

CR Goldwater
LDs McGovern, Harris, Hartke,
Fulbright and Proxmire

The other votes on wage and price controls were from 1974. They are both on tabling (killing) two amendments to a bill on the Council for International Economic Policy. One vote was on killing an amendment to give the President standby powers to use wage and price controls in selected industries, under certain conditions. The other was on killing an amendment to continue the Cost of Living Council to monitor inflation and give the President power to enforce agreements on price increases when controls ended. The only one to oppose killing the former, while favoring the killing of the latter was Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.). Otherwise, the two votes scale perfectly.

AGAINST KILLING BOTH

CR Roth
OSDs Eastland and Stennis
NSD Chiles
LRs Mathias, Javits and Case
(N.J.)
most LDS

FOR KILLING SELECTIVE WAGE
PRICE CONTROLS; AGAINST KILLING
COST OF LIVING COUNCIL AND
PRICE INCREASES ENFORCEMENT

OSD McClellan
LRs Beall Jr., Taft and
Stafford
NSDs Bentsen and Huddleston
LDs McGovern, Cranston, Muskie,
Inouye, Bayh, McIntyre and
Byrd (W.Va.)

FOR KILLING BOTH

most CRs
OSDs Allen, Ervin and Talmadge
NSDs Nunn and Hollings
LRs Stevens, Pearson, Bellmon,
Fong, Aiken, Scott (Pa.), Weicker,
Percy, Hatfield, Schweiker and
Brooke
LDs Gravel, Eagleton, Hartke,
Proxmire, Burdick, Abourezk, Clark
(Ia.), Tunney and Metzenbaum

Fuel Rationing and Related Programs

Another issue area is that of rationing. The only votes on it are those on fuel rationing. These consist of one vote (from 1973) on rationing as such, and two votes (from 1974 and 1975) on general energy programs which include rationing proposals.

The vote from 1973 on rationing alone is on a proposal to provide for stand-by rationing authority.

FOR

most LDs
most NSDs
LRs Weicker and Case (N.J.)
OSDs Stennis, Eastland and
McClellan

AGAINST

most CRs
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr. (Va.), Allen
and Ervin
most LRs
LDs Long (La.), Cannon, Bible,
Montoya, Church, Biden, Hartke,
Bayh and Tunney

The votes from 1974 and 1975 are on energy programs including provisions relating to stand-by rationing plans, oil price control, conservation and relaxation of pollution standards.

FOR

most LDs
NSDs Huddleston and Chiles (and
perhaps Bumpers, Ford and Morgan)
LRs Javits, Brooke, Case (N.J.),
and Stafford (and perhaps Aiken)
OSDs McClellan and Talmadge)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Roth, Young (N.Dak.),
Griffin and Baker
OSDs Stennis (and probably
Allen and Ervin)
LRs Stevens, Packwood, Scott
(Pa.), Percy, Hatfield and
Mathias (and probably Cook
and Schweiker)
NSDs Nunn, Chiles and
Hollings
LDs Montoya, Gravel, McGee
and Abourezk

AGAINST

OSDs Harry Byrd (Va.) and Eastland
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Fong, Beall
Jr., Taft and Weicker
NSD Bentsen and Johnston (La.)
LD Long (La.)

Federal Energy Administration (FEA)

The next issue area involves two votes from 1976, on amend-
ment to a bill dealing with the Federal Energy Administration. One
amendment set mandatory energy-conservation standards for new build-
ings.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
NSDs Nunn, Hollings, Ford
and Huddleston
CR Laxalt

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Stevens, Bellmon, Fong and
Hatfield
NSDs Stone, Chiles, Bentsen,
Morgan, Johnston (La.) and Bumpers
LDs Long (La.), Metcalf and Pastore

The other vote was on an amendment to establish an agency
to gather information on energy.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Brooke, Case
(N.J.), Heinz and Schweiker
NSDs Nunn, Chiles, Hollings,
Johnston (La.), Ford,
Huddleston and Bumpers

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
most LRs
NSDs Stone, Bentsen and Morgan
LDs Long (La.), Gravel, McGee
and Glenn

No-Fault Insurance

Votes on no-fault insurance constitute the next group.

These are proposals to require states to adopt no-fault plans.

Here we have them from 1972, 1974 and 1976.

FOR ALL

most LDs
most LRs
CR Griffin

AGAINST ALL

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LDs Gravel and Sparkman

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRs Bennett and Brock
LRs Bellmon, Packwood, Beall
Jr., Taft, Scott (Pa.),
Stafford and Mathias
LDs Cannon, Bible, Randolph,
Montoya, Hartke, Moss, Church
and McGovern
perhaps NSD Spong.

Antitrust Law

Another vote is that on a bill to make the antitrust laws
stricter (1976).

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
OSD Harry Byrd Jr. and
Talmadge
CRs Miller, Dole, Domenici,
Roth, Baker and Griffin

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs

Airline Deregulation

Another issue area concerning the regulation of business is
that of airline deregulation. This area contains two votes, both
on the deregulation bill of 1978. The first is on an amendment pro-
viding for broad areas of freedom in regard to market entry.

AGAINST

OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Stennis,
Eastland and Talmadge
CRs Scott (Va.), Young (N.Dak.),
Schmitt, Griffin and Danforth
CND Zorinsky
LR Stevens
NSD Bentsen
LDs Sparkman, Byrd (W.Va.),
Randolph, Melcher, Burdick,
Magnuson, Jackson and
Stevenson

FOR

most CRs
most NSDs
most LRs
most LDs
LDs DeConcini, Long (La.), Sasser,
Byrd (W.Va.), Randolph, Gravel,
Glenn, Stevenson, McGovern and
Abourezk.

Another amendment to the bill concerned job security for airline workers. The amendment proposed giving displaced workers preference in hiring instead of compensation, as then provided in the bill.

AGAINST

most LDs
LRs Stevens, Weicker,
Stafford, Schweiker, Mathias,
Javits, Brooke and Case
(N.J.)
NSDs Stone, Chiles, Ford
and Huddleston
CRs Laxalt, Scott, Domenici,
Griffin and Danforth

FOR

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Zorinsky
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Chafee,
Hatfield and Percy
NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Hollings,
Morgan and Bumpers.

Consumer Protection

Next, the votes on a consumer protection agency will be considered. These involve bills that proposed to establish an agency to represent consumers before other regulatory agencies, from 1972 and 1974.

FOR BOTH

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs
CR Roth (and perhaps Domenici)

HAVING A MIXED RECORD

CRS Griffin and Dole (and
perhaps Miller)
LR Fong (and perhaps Boggs,
Saxbe, Prouty, Smith [Me.]
and Cooper)
LD Cannon

AGAINST BOTH

most CRs
most OSDs
perhaps NSD Johnston (La.)
LR Taft
LDs Bible, Long (La.), Sparkman
and Ellender

There are two more votes involving consumer protection.

The first is a vote on standard weights and measures on labels, from 1966.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
OSD Harry Byrd Jr.

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Boggs, Cooper, Scott (Pa.)
and Prouty

The remaining consumer protection vote is on a motion to kill an amendment to a bill which provided for criminal penalties for violations of consumer product safety measures from 1972.

FOR

most LDs
most LRs
NSD Bentsen

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Stevens, Fong, Cooper, Smith
(Me.), Saxbe, Prouty, Aiken, Scott
(Pa.) and Stafford
NSDs Hollings and Spong
LDs Ellender and Inouye

National Consumer Co-operative Bank

There is one vote on this issue, on the passage of the bill establishing the bank, in 1978.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 NSDs Bumpers, Ford and
 Morgan
 CRs Hayakawa, Thurmond,
 Griffin, Dole and Baker
 OSD Talmadge

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 CND Zorinsky
 NSD Bentsen, Chiles and Huddleston
 LRs Bellmon, Packwood and Chafee
 LDs Sasser, Proxmire and Glenn

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

There are two votes concerning the regulations of this agency. The first, from 1977, was on an amendment requiring economic impact statements to be prepared by OSHA when it issued new regulations.

AGAINST

most LDs
 NSDs Stone, Hollings,
 Huddleston and Bumpers
 LRs Mathias, Schweiker,
 Javits, Case (N.J.) and
 Brooke

FOR

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Stevens, Packwood, Chafee,
 Weicker, Hatfield, Stafford and
 Heinz
 NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Chiles, Morgan,
 Johnston (La.) and Ford
 LDs DeConcini, Sparkman, Cannon
 and Church

The other vote was on amendment from 1978 which provided that small businesses with a good safety record would be exempt from OSHA regulations.

AGAINST

most LDs
 most LRs
 NSD Huddleston
 OSD Talmadge

FOR

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LRs Stevens, Hatfield and Weicker
 NSDs Nunn, Bentsen, Hollings, Chiles,
 Morgan and Bumpers
 LDs Sparkman, Sasser, Cannon,
 Randolph, Church, McIntyre and Biden

Environmental Issues

This broad area includes votes on air pollution control, water pollution control, highway beautification, the Alaska pipeline and strip mining. In the area of air pollution control, there are four votes: one from 1970 and three from 1976. Two of the ones from 1976 consist of two amendments to a bill, one removing the requirement that polluters not make unpolluted air worse, and another moving automakers' deadline for compliance one year sooner. These two votes almost scale. The only exception was New South Democrat Stone (who favored both amendments).

AGAINST DELETION OF NON-
DEGRADATION PROPOSAL AND
FOR HASTENING OF
DEADLINE

most LDs
LRs Hatfield, Packwood,
Weicker, Mathias, Brooke
and Case (N.J.)
NSD Bumpers

FOR DELETION OF NON-
DEGRADATION PROPOSAL AND
AGAINST HASTENING OF
DEADLINE

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.),
Byrd (W.Va.) and Moss

AGAINST DELETION OF NON-
DEGRADATION PROPOSAL BUT AGAINST
HASTENING OF DEADLINE

most LRs
CRs Curtis, Hansen, Buckley,
McClure, Domenici, Roth and Baker
NSDs Nunn, Chavez and Morgan
LDs Randolph, Montoya, Eagleton,
Gravel, Burdick, Stevenson, McGee,
Humphrey and Mondale (and perhaps
Symington and Inouye)
(and probably Biden, Hartke, Mondale
and Hart of Mich.)

A third vote on this same Clean Air bill was on an amendment which deleted from the bill the provision relaxing current standards for nitrous oxide emissions.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Case (N.J.)
Brooke, Mathias, Hatfield,
Weicker and Packwood
NSD Stone

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
most NSDs
LRs Bellmon, Pearson, Stevens, Fong,
Beall Jr., Taft, Scott (Pa.), Percy
and Stafford
LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Cannon,
Randolph, Montoya, Eagleton, Gravel,
Church, McIntyre, Burdick, McGee
and Inouye

The 1970 air pollution vote involved a proposed amendment
easing the appeals process for the pollution deadlines for automakers.

AGAINST

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs
OSDs Harry Byrd Jr., Allen,
McClellan and Talmadge
CRs Murphy, Allen, Dominick
and Mundt

FOR

most CRs
OSD Russell, Holland, Eastland and
Stennis
LRs Hatfield and Packwood
LD Fulbright

Another kind of pollution is water pollution. There is one
vote on it on our list, a vote on the Water Quality Act of 1965.

It is on an amendment to delete the provision which gave the Secre-
tary of HEW authority to set water quality standards.

AGAINST DELETION

most LDs
most LRs
most LRs
most OSDs
CRs Williams (Del.), Cotton,
Jordan (Id.), Young (N.D.),
Miller and Allott
CND Lausche

FOR DELETION

most CRs
OSDs Robertson, McClellan and
Talmadge
LD Mansfield

Another vote on a similar issue was on passage of a highway
beautification bill (1965).

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 CRs Fannin, Murphy, Dominick,
 Williams (Del.), Jordan (Ida.),
 Cotton, Young (N.Dak.) and
 Dirksen
 CND Lausche

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LD Ellender

The next vote on environmental issues is on the issue of restraining strip mining. It is on an amendment from 1973 which provides for federal regulation of it.

FOR

most LDs
 most LRs
 most NSDs
 CRs Young (N.Dak.) and Roth
 OSD Allen.

AGAINST

most CRs
 most OSDs
 LDs Long (La.), Bible, Cannon and
 Moss

There were two votes on the 1973 bill concerning the construction of the Alaska pipeline. The first was on a proposed amendment to delay construction until after further environmental studies had been made.

The second vote was on a proposed amendment to bar judicial review of environmental aspects of the bill, and authorize the granting of permissions to begin construction of the pipeline.

AGAINST

most LDs
 LRs Cook, Packwood, Aiken,
 Percy, Hatfield, Stafford,
 Mathias, Javits and Case
 (N.J.)
 CRs Buckley, Gurney, McClure,
 Roth and Dole

FOR

most CRs
 most OSDs
 most NSDs
 LRs Bellmon, Stevens, Fong, Beall
 Jr., Taft, Saxbe, Scott (Pa.),
 Weicker, Schweiker and Brooke
 LDs Sparkman, Long (La.), Byrd
 (W.Va.), Cannon, Bible, Randolph,
 Gravel and Hartke

The next issue area concerns nuclear energy--specifically, the construction of nuclear reactors. There are two votes here. The first is on an amendment to a 1961 nuclear energy bill to cut funds for a new reactor in Hanford, Washington.

FOR

most LDs
LRs Javits, Aiken, Smith
(Me.), Cooper and Kuchel

AGAINST

most CRs
most OSDs
LRs Saltonstall, Boggs, Fong,
Beall Sr., Scott (Pa.), Keating
and Cannon
LDs Ellender, Long (La.) and
Smathers.

The other vote is on an amendment to cut reduced funds for construction of a breeder reactor at Clinch River, Tennessee.

FOR CUT

most LDs
most LRs
most NSDs

AGAINST CUT

most CRs
most OSDs
CND Zorinsky
LRs Schweiker, Heinz and Stevens
NSDs Johnston (La.) and Huddleston
LDs Long (La.), Sasser, Cannon,
Eagleton, Melcher, Burdick,
Magnuson, Jackson, Bayh and
Stevenson

Aggregation of Cleavages (into Cleavage Sets)

Having summarized the alignments on each vote in this way, we may now try to group the resulting cleavages into larger groups which involve several issues. To simplify the following discussion, we will, on the basis of the common perceptions of the significance of various issues, and the way groups of Senators lined up on them, identify a "conservative" ("right") and "liberal" ("left") side of most of the issues, in the ordinary sense of these terms. We may

recall that, at the start of this study, this common classification, used in the press and everyday conversation, was discussed.

Generally speaking, the liberal or leftist favors the use of government to achieve equality of condition, while the conservative or rightist opposes this because he is generally less favorable to government activity--at least if this is used to achieve equality of condition. This distinction is made solely for the sake of simplifying the following discussion, and further meaning should not be read into the terms. Consequently, further precision in these definitions is unnecessary.

During the time period covered by this study, liberals favored higher spending than did conservatives on food stamps, social security, unemployment compensation, AFDC, food stamps (including those for strikers), rent subsidies and other housing programs, education, health programs, public works programs (especially those for providing public works jobs), the OEO and other poverty programs (the National Service Corps, Youth Training, Youth Conservation Corps, Area Redevelopment), child care (including day care), legal services for the poor, mass transit, and general appropriations for the Departments of Labor and HEW, and other "social welfare" spending, and the overall budget. (Sometimes, conservatives opposed the program in question entirely.) It follows that liberals were more apt to favor expanding the coverage of these programs, to favor setting minimum benefit levels, or raising them, and to favor easier eligibility requirements for recipients of a program; conservatives

were more apt to feel the opposite way. The governor's veto of the OEO, which would cause less money to be spent on it (as well as protecting states' rights) was generally opposed by liberals and favored by conservatives.

Liberals generally favored more regulation of business of the kinds represented by wage-price controls, rationing, energy conservation legislation, a consumer protection agency, consumer product safety and labeling legislation, antitrust laws, and airline deregulation, while favoring mandating no-fault insurance. Also, liberals tended to favor stricter legislation regarding pollution and environmental concerns, and stricter enforcement of it.

Tax legislation presents a more confusing picture. Conservatives tended to want lower taxes but also to want balanced budgets, and so often to advocate a high tax position; the first desire, for lower taxes, has tended to win out since about 1977, while the second, for balanced budgets, tended to be stronger through 1975. Liberals were similarly torn between a desire to tax business and a desire to administer a stimulus to the economy; liberals especially opposed tax cuts that are not heavily weighted in favor of the lower income groups. All of this applies mainly to income taxes, but some of it applies to other tax proposals as well. Liberals seem to want the tax-benefit ratio of social security to be skewed in relatively egalitarian direction.

In the earlier descriptions of the alignments on the various votes by issue areas, it was usually the case that the Senators

could be grouped into those who were consistently on one side of the issue, those who were on the other, and those with mixed records. We have just identified what the conservatives and liberal positions were on each side of most issues; we can regard the groupings as being groups of "conservatives", "liberals" and "moderates".

Furthermore, this placing of them into these three groupings means that there have been two cleavages identified in each issue area: one separating the conservatives from the moderates, and the second, to its "left", separating the moderates from the liberals. Therefore, we may henceforth identify each cleavage as the "rightward" or "leftward" cleavage associated with a given issue area.

Now we may attempt to aggregate the various cleavages in the different issue areas discussed above into sets of similar cleavages, each set presumably indicating a major underlying ideological change. The sets of cleavages, along with the adjuncts in each set and changes within each set, are listed below.

Correspondences Between the Cleavages From the Voting
Records and the Cleavages From the Theoretical Model

The first set of cleavages (the main labor, rightward food stamps and rightward education, health and housing cleavages, among others) seem to correspond to that cleavage from the model which separates the "Left-Progressive" column from the "Right-New Deal" column. The cleavage from the model is the one which generally corresponds to the conventional notion of what the "conservative"

TABLE 3.--Aggregations of Cleavages (Cleavage Sets)

Cleavage Set Number	Alignment of Senators on Set of Cleavages	Cleavages Included in Cleavage Set	Comments
1	lib. Dems., lib. Reps. and (usually) New S. Dems vs. cons. Reps., Old S. Dems and cons. N. Dems.	Food stamps (rightward cleavage), social security (rightward), most labor issues (especially unemployment compensation in 1966, expanded minimum-wage coverage in 1961, food stamps for strikers and minimum wage increases in 1966 and 1972, and, to a lesser extent, union legislation), education votes in the 1960-65 period (rightward), rent subsidies (rightward), medical assistance (rightward), the income tax vote of 1975, the establishment of HUD, the Youth Employment bill, Youth Training (Manpower Development and Training amendments) and aid to Mass Transit in 1963, aid to Appalachia and Area Redevelopment, the air pollution votes in 1976 (rightward) and strip mining, and, to a lesser extent, child day care, Demonstration Cities, the National Service Corps and the 1969 income tax bill.	
2	most lib Dems. and some lib Reps. vs. some lib. Dems., some lib. Reps., cons. Reps., Old S. Dems., cons. N. Dems., and (usually) New S. Dems.	Food stamps (leftward), AFDC (FAP) (particularly 1972), the OEO governor's vetoes (leftward), rent subsidies (the leftward one), school lunches (the 1970 vote on liberalizing the program), the Head Start increase of 1968, public works jobs (leftward), air pollution votes of 1976 (leftward) and the Alaaka pipeline delay.	The biggest difference between this set of cleavages and the first set is that many liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans who were to the left of the former were to the right of these latter ones. Hence we can say the two sets of cleavages scale with each other.
3	lib Dems. (and sometimes New S. Dems.) vs. lib. Reps., cons. Reps., Old S. Dems and Cons. N. Dems.	Social security (leftward), general spending cuts (leftward), the Humphrey-Hawkins anti-inflation amendment (leftward), the Youth Conservation Corps (leftward) some corporate taxes (the 1971 depreciation allowance and the 1978 corporate cut) and the social security tax vote of 1977.	The biggest difference between this set of cleavages and the first set is that the liberal Republicans, who were to the left of the first set of cleavages, are to the right of these cleavages. Thus, we can see that the two sets of cleavages scale with each other. However, this third set of cleavages

Cleavage Set Number	Alignment of Senators on Set of Cleavages	Cleavages Included in Cleavage Set	Comments
4	<p>a few cons. Reps., most Old S. Dems., some lib. Reps., New S. Dems. and most lib. Dems.</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>most cons. Reps., cons. N. Dems., sometimes a few Old S. Dems., some lib. Reps. and some lib. Dems.</p>	<p>Wage-price controls, fuel rationing and to a lesser extent, no-fault insurance.</p>	<p>does not scale with the second set (even though the second set scales with the first set as does the third); instead it cuts across the second set of cleavages: some liberal Democrats (Byrd of W.Va., Cannon, and Bible, for example) are to right of the second set and the left of the third, while many liberal Republicans (Percy, Stafford, Mathias and Javits, for example) are to the left of the second set and to the right of the third (while both groups are to the left of the first set).</p>
5	<p>lib. Dems., lib. Reps., New S. Dems., some cons. Reps. and sometimes a few Old S. Dems.</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>most cons. Reps. and most Old S. Dems. and usually cons. N. Dems.</p>	<p>Nat. Consumer Co-operative Bank, OEO, (rightward), OEO gov. vetoes (rightward), min. wage increase pass. (1966 and 1974) and to a lesser extent, consumer prot. agency and Legal Serv. Corp.</p>	<p>In general, these cleavages, as has been said, tend to cut across most of the others, and so they do not scale with them. In fact, it seems probable that this cleavage is on the liberty dimension of the theoretical model, while the others are probably on the equality dimension (see below).</p> <p>The alignments of Senators on these cleavages differ from those on the cleavages of the first set because some conservative Republicans who were to the right of the first set of cleavages are to the left of this set. Hence, the first and fifth sets of cleavages scale. The fifth set also scales with the second set and with the third set (as does the first set). Indeed, the fifth set seems to join the first, second and third sets in belonging on the equality dimension of the model. Not surprisingly, it cuts across the fourth set.</p>
6	<p>lib. Dems., lib. Reps., New S. Dems. and Old S. Dems.</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>cons. Reps.</p>	<p>Social security (rightward), econ. devel. public works (rightward), school lunches (1975), the Kemp-Roth amendment and 1969 tax bill (passage)</p>	
7	<p>lib. Dems., lib. Reps., New S. Dems., most Old S. Dems., cons. N. Dems. and some cons. Reps.</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>most cons. Reps. and a few Old S. Dems.</p>	<p>Public works jobs (rightward) and Labor/NEW funds (1976)</p>	

Cleavage Set Number	Alignment of Senators on Set of Cleavages	Cleavages Included in Cleavage Set	Comments
8	lib. Dems., Old S. Dems. and New S. Dems. vs. cons. Reps. and lib. Reps.	1977 tax cut and 1969 tax exemption increase and, to a lesser extent, economic development public works (leftward)	
9	lib. Dems., lib. Reps., New S. Dems., Old S. Dems. and many cons. Reps. vs. some cons. Reps.	1970 hospital construction bill and 1970 education bill.	
10	many lib. Dems., many lib. Reps., some N.S. Dems., a few con. Reps. and a few Old S. Dems. vs. most cons. Reps., most Old S. Dems., some New S. Dems., some lib. Reps. and some lib. Dems.	Lockheed, SST, Communications Satellite, and waterways and waterway user fees.	
11	most lib. Dems. and some lib. Reps. vs. cons. Reps., Old S. Dems., some lib. Reps. and some lib. Dems.	1974 education formula, highway funds for mass transit and, to a lesser extent, no-fault insurance.	
12	some lib. Dems. and sometimes some New S. Dems. vs. some lib. Dems., some New S. Dems., lib. Reps., cons. Reps., Old S. Dems. and cons. N. Dems.	1976 and 1978 foreign tax votes and, in some aspects, the 1976 personal benefits tax amendment to tax cut bill and 1962 tax vote.	
13	lib. Dems. and some lib. Reps. vs. cons. Reps., Old S. Dems., cons. N. Dems. and many lib. Reps.	Education bills (1960, 1961 and 1965) Medicare (1960-1965), Demonstration Cities, passage of the 1969 tax bill, and some aspects of the 1976 personal tax benefits amendment.	Some of these votes have already been mentioned, as they approximate more than one cleavage pattern.

-liberal" dichotomy means in modern American politics--i.e., American politics since the coming of the New Deal.

As has been said, it is commonly defined as a cleavage between pro- and anti-New Dealers, but as has also been noted, many of the anti-New Deal conservatives", from circa 1937 on had been New Deal supporters earlier, or had at least accepted the "basics" of the New Deal (the Social Security Act and the labor legislation). Moreover, much of the liberal agenda over which they fought dealt with post-New Deal issues. The examination of the voting records makes this point still more strongly. The growth in many of the programs for which the liberals fought was not achieved until Lyndon Johnson's early Great Society programs (the establishment of the food stamp program on a permanent basis, and Medicare), or even later in Johnson's term (large Social Security and AFDC increases) or still later (the later growth of the food stamp program in the Nixon era). Hence, in a way we can say that the "New Deal" liberals did not attain the completion of most of their goals until the Great Society (or later), and these really should be called "Great Society liberals". However, this would cause confusion with those we have been calling Great Society liberals, indicating the need for another name change, and such a modification in terminology will not be attempted at so a late a point in the paper.

In any case, this cleavage in question seems to have been the dominant one in American politics since the start of the late New Deal (circa 1937), when most "progressive" Republicans and many

former New Deal Democrats (especially in the South) joined the "conservative" Republicans and "conservative" and "irreconcilable" Democrats (mostly Southern) in a "conservative coalition". In 1937, it sought to moderate pro-union trends in labor relations and reduce spending on relief; in the 1960s, its goals were not very much different, and the same can be said for those of its liberal opponents.

The second set of cleavages (the AFDC; the leftward food stamps and the leftward rent and OEO cleavages, among others) seem to correspond to that cleavage from the model which separates the "New Deal liberals" proper (Right and Left wings considered as a group) from the "Great Society liberals" (Right and Left wings, considered as a group). As the discussion of the first set of cleavages suggested, these cleavages over "Great Society" issues were really in some ways post-Great Society issues, just as the cleavages over the "New Deal" issues were really over post-New Deal issues, even Great Society issues. To some extent, the new era is carried in the womb of the old. As the New Dealers were enacting most of their program in the Great Society years, so the Great Society groups were achieving some of their goals (rent subsidies, greater AFDC spending, expanded food stamps programs) in the late Johnson and post-Johnson years.

To some extent, this is still the cleavage Phillips was saying was replacing the "New Deal" cleavage in the 1950s and especially the 1960s, although it now appears that he was also referring to our New Deal cleavage replacing earlier ones.

The third set of cleavages (the leftward social security, general spending and public works jobs cleavages, the 1977 social security and 1971 corporate tax cleavages) seems to correspond to that cleavage on the model which separated rightist (Republican) liberals (New Deal and Great Society varieties considered together) from leftist (Democratic) liberals (New Deal and Great Society varieties considered together). This cleavage appears to have been around since the New Deal, or at least since the rise of liberal Republicans as a distinct group, but it generally seems to have been a subordinate one, which is usually obscured by the more prominent first two cleavages. In any case, it does not seem to be one much talked about in political literature.

The fourth set of cleavages (the wage-price control and rationing cleavages, and others) seems to correspond to the cleavage from the model which separates the relatively libertarian rows from the relatively statist rows, separating in particular the classical liberals (conservatives) from the statist Right-Progressives (the Rightist corporate liberals). Of the first five sets of cleavages, this is the only one which involves the liberty dimension rather than the equality dimension. The history of this cleavage has seldom been enunciated, as its nature and separate existence have seldom been perceived in political literature.

The fifth set of cleavages (the legal services, Consumer Protection Agency and rightward OEO cleavages, among others) seems to correspond to the cleavage on the model which separate the Left-Progressive and Right-Progressive columns. This cleavage in the

model is the one which would seem at first to be the principal one of the Progressive Era, but from other viewpoints, the matter is not so clear. In any case, it is the one Hofstadter focuses on. It most clearly showed itself in that era in income tax questions, and seems to represent the principal egalitarian-inegalitarian cleavage of the antitrust struggles. (The fourth set of cleavages, in the voting records, discussed above, may represent the libertarian-statist cleavage of the antitrust struggles.) However, the program on the left side of this cleavage did not become implemented until the middle New Deal (circa 1935-37) in the form of higher taxes, especially on business, utility company divestiture laws, and a less tolerant attitude toward big business under the antitrust laws. And soon (circa 1937), people were distracted by another cleavage--the first one discussed here. Nonetheless, this fifth cleavage has occasionally managed to show itself, principally on tax questions and questions of the regulation of business, but also in certain aspects of the poverty program (where the emphasis on "a hand-up instead of a hand-out" is suggestive of the qualified egalitarianism of this position).

We may summarize these correspondences as follows:

TABLE 4.--Summary of Correspondences Between Cleavages From Voting Records and Cleavages From the Theoretical Model.

Number	Cleavages From Voting Records Included in Set	Cleavages From Theoretical Model: Categories Separated By It	
1	labor (main), social security (rightward), food stamps (rightward), education (rightward), housing (rightward), etc.	Left-Progressive	vs. Right New Deal
2	AFDC, food stamps (leftward), rent (leftward), OEO (leftward), etc.	Great Society Liberal	vs. New Deal Liberal
3	social security (leftward), general spending (leftward), economic development, public works (leftward), 1977 social security formula and 1971 and 1978 corporate tax	Left (Democratic) Great Society and Left (Democratic) New Deal Liberals	vs. Right (Republican) Great Society and Right (Republican) New Deal Liberal
4	wage-price controls, rationing, etc.	Left and Right Great Society: Statist	vs. Left and Right Great Society: Anti-Statist
		Left and Right New Deal Statist	vs. Left and Right New Deal: Anti- Statist
		Left-Progressive Statist (Left- Corporate Liberal)	vs. Left-Progressive Anti-Statist
		Right-Progressive: Statist (Right- Corporate Liberal)	vs. Classical Liberal (Conservative) and Right-Progressive: Anti- Statist
5	Nat. Consumer Co-operative Bank, OEO (rightward), etc.	Left Progressive (Statist and Anti- Statist)	vs. Classical Liberal (Conservative) and Right Progressive: (Statist and Anti- Statist)

Groups Produced By the Cleavages, and Their Correspondences
to Categories From the Theoretical Model

If this apparent correspondence between the cleavages of the model and those suggested by the voting records is genuine, then it follows that the various groups into which the Senators are separated by the cleavages derived from the voting records should correspond to the categories of the model.

The groups of Senators that are produced by these cleavages, and their correspondences with the categories in the model are as follows:

TABLE 5.--Groups Produced By Cleavages From the Voting Records and Their Correspondences With the Categories of the Theoretical Model.

Group	Stands on Cleavages					Category From Model to Which Group Corresponds	Members of Group
	1	2	3	4	5		
1	C	C	C	C	C	Classical Liberal (Conservative and Right Progressive Anti-Statist)	Most conservative Republicans such as Goldwater, Curtis and Garn, plus conservative Northern Democrats Zorinsky and Lausche
2	C	C	C	L	C	Right Progressive: Statist	A few conservative Republicans, such as Roth
3	C	C	C	C	L	Left Progressive: Anti-Statist	A few conservative Republicans, such as Dole and Domenici
4	C	C	C	L	L	Left Progressive: Statist	A few conservative Republicans, such as Baker
5	L	C	C	C	L	Right (Republican) New Deal: Anti-Statist	Some liberal Republicans such as Fong and Aiken

Group	Stands on Cleavages					Category From Model to Which Group Corresponds	Members of Group
	1	2	3	4	5		
6	L	C	C	L	L	Right (Republican) New Deal: Statist	A few liberal Republicans, such as Taft and Beall Jr.
7	L	L	C	C	L	Right (Republican) Great Society: Anti-Statist	A few liberal Republicans, such as Hatfield
8	L	L	C	L	L	Right (Republican) Great Society: Statist	Some, if not most, liberal Republicans, such as Weicker, Mathias and Javits
9	L	C	L	C	L	Left (Democratic) New Deal: Anti-Statist	Of doubtful existence, but may include a few liberal Democrats such as Harris and Montoya
10	L	C	L	L	L	Left (Democratic) New Deal: Statist	Some liberal Democrats such as Robert Byrd, Cannon and Bible
11	L	L	L	C	L	Left (Democratic) Great Society: Anti-Statist	Some liberal Democrats, such as McGovern
12	L	L	L	L	L	Left (Democratic) Great Society: Statist	Most liberal Democrats, such as Humphrey, the Kennedys and Jackson

Several other conceivable groups are not listed here, having a doubtful existence due to the way the cleavages tend to scale. Cleavages one, five and three tend to scale, in that order; cleavages one, five and two tend to scale, in that order. Such deviations from these scales are so few (or so partial) that they may be ignored for now.

Several of the listed groups are very minor. Group 7 is an anti-statist variant of Group 8, Group 6 is a statist variant of Group 5, and Group 9 (if it exists at all) is an anti-statist variant of Group 10. These are all so small, and so little different from their larger relatives, that they can be largely ignored as separate groups hereafter. Most of what is said about their respective larger relatives will probably apply to them.

Groups 2, 3, 4 and 11 are small groups of uncertain boundaries and memberships (especially 11), but they are interesting and important groups, especially 2, 3 and 4, which seem to represent groups which were larger and more important in the past.

It may be noticed that the position of the Southern Senators have not yet been mentioned much. These will be dealt with later.

We may now review the main groups in more detail.

Group 1 (Classical Liberals or Conservatives), includes conservative Republicans Goldwater, Curtis, Simpson, Tower, Hickenlooper, Butler (Md.), Buckley, Laxalt, Garn, Hatch, Helms, Fannin, Williams (Del.), Schoeppel, Mundt, Hruska, Dworshak, Bartlett (Okla.), Hansen, Bridges, Capehart, Schmitt, Wallop and Brock, and usually conservative Republicans Thurmond, Scott (Va.), Cotton, Dominick, Bennett, Gurney, Jordan (Id.), Murphy, McClure, Lugar, Dirksen, Hayakawa, Carlson, Allott, and Morton, and conservative Northern Democrats Lausche and Zorinsky. The history of this group before the New Deal is difficult to trace, if it was even one, self-conscious group, but roughly it seems to have composed the

"conservative" (as opposed to "progressive" and "corporate liberal") elements in both major parties then. With the coming of the New Deal, we may identify it with those opposed to the New Deal from the beginning. Later, it seems to have constituted the Taft-Goldwater wing of the Republican party (and perhaps, later, the Reagan wing as well, although Gerald Ford had been a moderate or borderline member of the group, too).

The members of this group outside the South have been overwhelmingly Republican since the end of the New Deal and, as will be seen, the "conservative" Southern Democrats do not really fit here. Its headquarters was in the East before the New Deal, but moved to the Midwest by the time it was over. Since, the 1950s, it has moved increasingly toward the West and, to a lesser extent, the South ("the Sunbelt" regions).

Group 2 (Right-Progressive Statists, or Right-Corporate Liberals), probably includes Roth, and perhaps Danforth and Griffin. This group constituted the less egalitarian wing of the corporate liberals in the Progressive Era. Perhaps the candidacy of Leonard Wood in 1920 best represents it. Later, this group supported the early New Deal, but was alienated by its leftward moves in 1935 and later. Probably mostly Republican (in the North) by the end of the New Deal, some of the more rightist of the Dewey-Eisenhower "liberal" Republicans belong in this group. John Connally would seem to represent this group today, but not being a Senator, it is hard to know which Senators he resembles most. Most of the members today are probably Republicans of a "conservative" reputation.

In the Progressive Era, this group was probably strongest in the East and in urban areas, but as labor influence grew in the cities (and they moved left) this group probably transferred its base to the suburbs, and later toward the Sunbelt (although they are not as plentiful among Senators there as the prominence of people such as Connally might suggest).

Group 3 and Group 4 (the Left-Progressive, Anti-Statist and Statist branches, respectively) probably include Dole, Domenici, Young (N.Dak.) and Hayakawa, and sometimes others (Group 3); and Baker and sometimes Griffin and others (Group 4). These groups probably constituted the main body of left and center "progressives" in the Progressive Era. Their more radical members (LaFollette, Bryan and the like) are better known than their moderate members, but the latter may have been more common, and were probably more what Hofstadter had in mind when he described the progressives. Probably most would be anti-statist by today's standards; Hoover was a good example of this. Statist ones were nonetheless probably found as well. After 1937, these groups were increasingly alienated from the New Deal, and most of their members (in the North) probably became Republican, as many already were. Most of the "progressives" eventually came to be seen as conservatives, as they generally are today. In the present, as in the past, their strongholds (or at least those of the anti-statist branch) seem to be in non-metropolitan areas, especially in the western Midwest and the West.

It seems also that a large portion of the Dewey-Eisenhower wing of the Republican party belongs in the more statist of these groups. This largely urban group, concentrated in the East and eastern Midwest, seems to share this intermediate position on the equality dimension with the older progressive Republicans, and to differ with most of them, and with the conservatives, mainly in being more statist.

Group 5 (Right-New Deal Anti-Statists) and Group 6 (Right-Great Society Anti-Statists) are composed of liberal Republicans. The former group probably consists of Fong, Boggs, Smith, Aiken, Saxbe, Packwood, Cook, and often, Kuchel, Cooper, Prouty, Beall Sr. and Scott (Pa.): in their later years, Pearson, and, sometimes, Bellmon, voted with this group. The latter group consists of Weicker, Stafford, Mathias, Javits, Brooke, Case, Goodell, Schweiker (in his early days) and usually Percy, Prouty, Hatfield, Scott (Pa.), Cooper and Stevens (in his early days). Both of these groups were probably part of the Wilkie-Dewey-Eisenhower wing of the Republican party in the 1940s and 1950s, but seemed to grow dissatisfied with Eisenhower, during his presidency, as being insufficiently liberal. They seem generally to have supported Rockefeller in his quest for the presidency. It seems that the differences between the two groups did not become noticeable until after the 1966 elections, when newer liberal Republicans, mostly from Group 6, began to enter the Senate. The difference was usually not obvious, and seems to have been increasingly obscured as the country has moved to the right. These groups,

especially the second, were mainly headquartered in urban areas, especially in the East and eastern Midwest.

Group 10 and Group 12 are both composed of liberal Democrats. Group 10 (the Left-New Deal:Statist category) includes Byrd (W.Va.), Bible, and Cannon, sometimes Anderson (N.Mex.), Kerr, Monroney, Hayden, Harris, Montoya, Randolph, Symington, Long (Mo.), Fulbright, Smathers, Gore and Mansfield. Also, Southerners such as Long (La.), Sparkman and Johnston (S.C.) and sometimes Ellender and Hill, seem to belong here. Moynihan would seem to belong here on the basis of his reputation as a one-time liberal alienated by the policies of the late Johnson years, but his voting record is too short to confirm this. Group 12 (the Left-Great Society: Statist category) is composed of Hart (Mich.), Clark (Pa.), Culver, E. Kennedy (Mass.), Sarbanes, Humphrey, Mondale, Metzenbaum, Tydings, Kennedy (N.Y.), Muskie, Hathaway, Engle, Brewster, Hughes, McCarthy, Stevenson, Glenn, Pell, Pastore, Williams, Inouye, Matsunaga, Jackson, Magnuson, Moss, McGee, Riegle, Haskell, and Metcalf, (usually) Douglas, MacNamara, Young (Ohio), Neuberger, Morse, Carroll, McGee, Bartlett (Alas.), Burdick, Dodd, Mansfield, Biden, Leahy, McIntyre, Durkin, Harris, Clark (Ia.), Montoya, Nelson, Cranston, Abourezk, Hart (Col.), Symington, Long (Mo.), Randolph, Montoya, Anderson (N.Mex.), Hayden, Kerr, Gore, Fulbright, and Smathers, and sometimes Tunney, McGovern, Eagleton, Gravel, Hartke, and Church.

These two groups, together with the two liberal Republican groups mentioned above, constituted the main support for Roosevelt's

New Deal after 1937 and for later liberal programs, although the Republican groups were somewhat more frugal and tolerant of corporations in the area of taxes. These groups did not generally come apart until the 1960s, as was the case with the two liberal Republican groups, and usually came apart over similar issues--mostly welfare and welfare-related issues. Members of Group 10 were generally less urban and more apt to be found in the western, southern, and border states than the mainly urban members of Group 12. Those members of the electorate who would probably fall into Group 10 were often alienated from the Democrats in the Johnson era, going for Wallace and, to lesser extent, Nixon in 1968, and for Nixon in 1972. Most of the "neo-conservatives" probably belong here. By the late 1970s, the differences between groups 10 and 12, as was the case with the differences between Groups 5 and 8, began to be submerged as the country moved to the right.

The last group to be considered, Group 11 (the Left-Great Society: Anti-Statist category) is composed of liberal Democrats. Church, Hartke, Gravel, Eagleton, McGovern and Tunney should be placed here, while Abourezk, Hart (Colo), Nelson, Cranston, Clark (Ia.), Montoya, and Harris often approach this position, and Douglas, McNamara, Young (Ohio), Neuberger, Morse, Carroll, McGee, Bartlett (Alsk.) and Burdick have been known to. The history of this group is typically liberal Democratic, as is its behavior in most economic issues.

A Special Problem: The Place of the Southern Democrats

Now we may consider what to do with the Southern Democrats. As has been said, some (Yarborough, Kefauver, Harris, Gore, Fulbright, Smathers, Monroney and Kerr) voted much like Northern liberal Democrats. Yarborough and Kefauver would fit very well into Group 12, and Gore and Harris would fit almost as well. Fulbright, and Smathers would diverge somewhat in the direction of Group 10, and Monroney and Kerr would do more so. All except the first two Senators sometimes diverge from the liberals of Group 12 on labor issues.

Also included with the liberal Democrats in the survey section were Long (La.), Sparkman, Johnston (S.D.), Ellender and Hill. These generally, as has been said, seem to fit in with Group 10. In some ways they form a transition between the liberal group above and the more conservative Southerners to be described below. As a group, they tend to vote as follows: conservative on cleavage two, conservative on labor issues, and variable on other issues. Long, Sparkman and (as far as can be ascertained) Johnston tend further to be liberal on cleavage one, liberal or moderate on cleavage five, moderate to liberal on cleavage three, and moderate on cleavage four.

Another group of Southern Democrats is the New South Democrats. They tend to fall between groups 10 and 12, usually being closer to 10, while they tend to be more conservative on labor issues than either. They might best be divided into two groups. The groups which is father to the left contains Bumpers, Ford and

Huddleston; the one to its right contains Bentsen, Stone, Chiles, Hollings, and Morgan, and, on its rightward edge, Nunn, and usually Johnston (La.). The two groups divide over a few issues, such as the Social Security vote of 1977. This tends to make the rightward group similar to Groups 6 and 5 (the Right-New Deal categories).

Finally, we come to the Old Southerners. They are commonly seen as being very similar to the conservative Republicans on economic issues (and, in fact, on most issues, except racial issues.) And it is true that the two groups tend to vote alike more often than not. However, in a large minority of cases, they diverge. These divergences consist mostly of those over social security (the rightward one), public works and public works jobs (the rightward ones), and school lunches in 1970, and passage of the 1969 tax bill--and certain other taxes (the 1969 surtax extension and the 1977 tax cut). Most of these relate to the sixth or seventh set of cleavages. As was discussed above, the sixth set of cleavages most clearly represents a conservative Republicans-versus-Old Southerners cleavage as the seventh set tends to cut across the groups. It is in any case clear that the Old Southerners are a separate group from the conservative Republicans, who mostly belong to the Classical Liberal category (though not exclusively--remember Roth, etc.). The question now is one of where Old Southerners are to be placed. They are clearly more statist, overall, than Classical Liberals, as their position on the issues of set six indicate. They are to the right of the other cleavages on the scale--those of sets one, two, three and

five--for the most part. So they seem to be inegalitarian and statist. Yet they differ from such inegalitarian statistes as Roth on most cleavages of set six.

A possible explanation of their position, which is somewhat bizarre, yet is in accord with many of the historical facts, is that their "leftist" position on set six actually shows them to be the right of (more inegalitarian than) the classical liberals. This assumes the truth of the theory suggested in the first part of this work, which described the theoretical model being tested--namely, that the old-style Southerners are really traditionalist conservatives. If this is true, then their embracing of seemingly leftist propositions is not unusual: it is paralleled by the behavior of Disraeli and Bismarck. Whether this is the result of a desire to hinder an economic and political rival (Northern business), or a feeling of pure spite for their bourgeois social rivals or a paternalistic attitude toward the lower classes, or a feeling that the burdens of the programs on question will not fall very much on their own shoulders (being carried partly by the beneficiaries, in the case of certain "social insurance" programs, and/or partly by the bourgeois businessmen), or some combinations of these motives is unclear, but it is not vital for the purposes of this work to determine which. Suffice it to say that the Traditionalist Right and the Socialist Left have often joined hands against the Classical Liberal Center.

This interpretation of the Old South Democrats would not be likely to be accepted by those who see the South as part of a bourgeois liberal American consensus, among others. Another interpretation of their behavior is that it is slightly populist, in the sense of being an indication of agrarian and petit-bourgeois dislike of Northern big business. This sentiment was once regarded as leftist, but with leftward drift of the political center in this century it now seems moderately conservative. This theory, however, seems weak, in view of the strong conservatism of this group on some economic issues--on some legal services votes and on the 1968 HUD vote, for example, more conservative Republicans take the liberal position than do Old South Democrats; and in view of what Kousser and others have to say about the success and future extent of Populism in the South after the 1890s.

More plausible is a variant of this view, which says that the behavior of the Old South Democrats represents a regional reaction of local big businessmen and big farmers, as well as small businessmen and small farmers, to the threat of domination by outsiders (i.e. Northern big businessmen). It is thus a case of relatively conservative forces adopting left-wing tools. This practice seems to be common in the so-called Third World, among "conservatives" who defend the positions of local elites, internally, while joining the Left in trying to restrain American influence. This explanation of Old South Democrat behavior is the safest and most conservative.

There is some variety within the Old Southern group. Talmadge, and to a lesser extent, Ervin and Jordan, are the most liberal, at least in the sense of being egalitarian. Housing, education and the establishment of the OEO are issues over which they have been known to diverge from the rest. The most anti-statist and also the most like the Republicans are the Harry Byrds and Robertson. Frequently allied with them were Allen, or Ervin and Jordan, or Russell or Holland (in different circumstances). The issues on this dimension which most divided the group were ordinary public works, the Labor-HEW funds vote of 1976, wage-price controls and rationing. Eastland, Stennis and, to a lesser extent, McClellan, are relatively statist and relatively inegalitarian.

Cleavage Sets From the Voting Records Which Do
Not Correspond to Cleavages From the Model

A number of the sets of cleavages mentioned above (the sixth through the thirteenth) do not clearly correspond to the major cleavages of the model. We may now consider how some of these may be fitted in and what their historical significance may be.

The sixth and seventh sets of cleavages seem to involve the liberty dimension more than the equality dimension, which makes them seek like the fourth set of cleavages but unlike the first, second, third and fifth sets. This is said for two reasons. One is because the proposals involved seem less clearly egalitarian than most of those involved in the other sets of cleavages--public works and general social security increases as opposed to labor proposals,

food stamps, AFDC, anti-poverty measures and low-income housing. The second reason is that these cleavages do somewhat parallel those in set four (wage-price controls, rationing, etc.) Many of those who are "liberal" on the cleavages of set four while being "conservative" on the others (of sets one, two, three and five) are "liberal" on these cleavages of sets six and seven. These include a few conservative Republicans such as Roth and most Old Southerners.

The cleavages of set seven (ordinary public works and Labor-HEW funds in 1976) seem to be to the "right", or better, "above" those of set four (if the liberty dimension is seen as being vertical, with libertarianism at the top and statism at the bottom) in regard to the Republicans, as various of them (such as Young of North Dakota, Dole, Baker, Griffin, Roth and Domenici) seem to be below at least some of these cleavages, but above those of set four. (Things are different regarding the relationship of the cleavages among Old Southerners: the cleavages of set seven are even with or below those of set four.)

Insofar as the seventh and fourth sets of cleavages tend to scale in this way, they might be identified with some of the historical steps on the road to statism. The seventh set (ordinary public works and Labor-HEW funds) may be the one to really represent the main cleavages between those who have accepted the lasting changes wrought by the New Deal and those who have not, insofar as these involved broadly-directed government spending, especially that on public works and social security. In both the seventh set

and the New Deal cleavages, opposition to these things came from conservative Republicans and a few Democrats, mostly Southern (including Harry Byrd, Sr.), while almost everyone else supported them. Besides public works and the programs under Social Security act, other things brought by the New Deal include labor legislation, various measures (such as attempts to provide public control of water power through the TVA) to help people break away from excessive dependence on big business, and (after 1935) a less tolerant anti-trust policy toward business. The first two of these involve the equality dimension more than the liberty dimension and the issue of statism. The third, antitrust, would seem to do even more; however, our examination of the Progressive Era showed that business often supports or comes to support government regulation. And the revision of the antitrust law of 1976 (which generally tightened the restrictiveness of the law) got the support of some Senators with otherwise quite inegalitarian voting records (e.g. Roth and Harry Byrd Jr.): indeed, it is very similar in its cleavages to the issues of the seventh set of cleavages, differing mainly in that most Old Southerners opposed it. This proposal would seem, then, to represent something like the stand of the more aggressive (but not necessarily egalitarian) regulationists. And so it seems to roughly fit in with set seven, and confirm its status as a New Deal-versus-anti-New Deal cleavage.

The fourth set of cleavages (rationing, wage-price controls, etc.) may have its own historical implications. During the New

Deal, even in its early days, "progressive" Republicans (as described by Feinman) seem to have feared Franklin Roosevelt's statist tendencies, particularly his tendency to strengthen the executive and the bureaucracy, and to support concentration of power in the state as in business. Similarly, "Modern Republicans" of the 1940s and 1950s often joined their conservative fellow partisans in denouncing the New Deal's tendency toward government economic planning. Usually, this meant Keynesian deficit spending, rationing and wage-price controls (at least in peacetime), and any proposal for more explicit government direction of the economy. In our vote list, we have no good examples of the last, nor of votes on deficits per se. There are votes on public works jobs, which are intended as Keynesian economic stimulus, but these belong in the sixth set of cleavages. This leaves rationing and wage-price controls. These do belong in the fourth set of cleavages, and were often denounced by Modern Republicans (although Eisenhower accepted stand-by wage-price control and authority), and involve a strong executive and bureaucracy, and concentration of power, which most progressive Republicans disliked. Our fourth set of cleavages, therefore, may represent this historical cleavage.

The seventh and fourth sets of cleavages thus seem to correspond to the two cleavages on the liberty dimension indicated in Figure 26. The cleavages of set seven would correspond to those separating the Conservative category and that with Hoover in it from those with Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson, Al Smith, Theodore Roosevelt,

Hamilton and John Connally in them. The cleavages of set four would correspond to that separating the Conservative category and those with Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson and Al Smith in them from those with Theodore Roosevelt, Hamilton and Connally in them. Those in between the two cleavages (the likes of Dewey, Eisenhower, Wilson and Al Smith) would seem to be the sort of people who can tolerate a large quantity of "big government" (in terms of legislation, spending and/or taxes), while still being quite fearful that government will get too powerful.

The cleavages of set six (social security, public works jobs, school lunches in 1975 and the 1969 tax bill) are somewhat different from those of set seven. Conservative Republicans, including even some, such as Roth, who were below the sixth set, tend to be united in being above or to the right of the seventh set of cleavages, while Old Southerners, including some, such as Harry Byrd, Jr., who were above the seventh set of cleavages, tend to be united in being below the cleavages in the sixth set, as are most other Democrats, and most liberal Republicans. While set seven resembles set four considerably--both of them putting most Republicans in opposition to many if not most Old Southerners--set seven tends to unite the conservative Republicans and Old Southerners internally while dividing them from each other, whereas set six tends (as set four does) to cut across the boundaries between the conservative Republicans and Old Southerners. Moreover, set six tends to join Old Southerners --who have reputations of being as conservative, or even more

conservative, than the conservative Republicans--with liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans. The implications of these findings will be discussed below, when the Old Southerners are discussed.

Perhaps this divergence between these two "conservative" groups reflects some underlying Democratic versus Republican cleavage which gives the party differences real meaning. The cleavages of set eight seem to exemplify such a distinction more clearly. In general, it seems that, while cleavages over welfare-type and labor-type issues tend to cut across party lines, certain tax issues and certain spending programs of broad coverage (social security) or macroeconomic implication (public works) tend to correspond to party lines, in many cases. However, the evidence on this which is found in the data here does not warrant stressing this matter very strongly, and we will say little more of this.

The cleavages of set nine and ten are of uncertain origin. They suggest the old Democratic-versus-Whig battles over internal improvements, which later become Democrat-versus-Republican battles. By the time of the Wilson Administration, however, even most Democrats seem to have come to accept spending on certain kinds of improvements (e.g. road building) and related aids to economic activity (e.g. loans to farmers). So it is not surprising that even most conservative Republicans today like to spend federal money on some domestic projects. In regard to some, such as certain hospital and education appropriations (cleavage set nine), they join the great majority of other Senators in supporting the projects. In regard

to others, such as aiding Lockheed, providing money for an SST, granting near-monopoly status to a private company in connection with the Communications Satellite, constructing certain water projects without charging user fees, and sharing funds with local governments, most of those known as liberals have been known to oppose them, the liberals generally not favoring the groups being aided, and thus reverse the normal stands of the groups on federal domestic spending.

This leads us to the eleventh set of cleavages. These seem to involve regional coalitions, and thus suggest that constituency interests are exercising an overriding effect on these.

The twelfth set of cleavages may represent the division, which appeared in the 1960s among liberal Democrats, between upholders of the "consensus" politics of the 1950s and its various manifestations (including the latest version of corporate liberalism and, in non-economic matters, a bipartisan foreign policy), and their critics on the left. This division appeared most prominently over the Vietnam War, but involved other issues.

The thirteenth set of cleavages seems to separate from the main body of liberals those "liberal" Republicans who sometimes dragged their feet on various items of the liberal agenda in the Kennedy years, but then came to support them in the Johnson years (at least from 1965 on). Perhaps these cleavages represent the basis (along with the first set of cleavages) for setting-up a category of truly moderate Republicans (opposed to merely moderately liberal

Republicans) between the right and left wings of the party, but the evidence does not yet seem to warrant a clear decision in favor of doing this.

ENDNOTES

¹A step by step description of a procedure used in making an analysis similar to that done here, showing how issues cleavages may be aggregated and then used to create groups into which individuals may be placed is provided in Harold J. Spaeth's Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979), especially on pp. 128-137.

²In addition to prior study and preliminary examination of the records, some ideas for the arrangement of names were obtained from Michael Foley's The New Climate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution 1959-1972 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), particularly the voting tables in the back of the book.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Our examination of the evidence has generally confirmed the existence and importance of the cleavages and groups in the model, and supplied us with additional information.

The existence of a liberty dimension was confirmed, as was the existence of the various cleavages from the model: the Progressive (and conservative)-versus-New Deal, or Conservative-Liberal cleavage (identified with the first set of cleavages); the New Deal liberal (and conservative)-versus-Great Society liberal cleavage (identified with the second set of cleavages); the Republican and Old Southern-versus-liberal Democrat cleavage (identified with the third set of cleavages); the relatively statist-versus-relatively anti-statist cleavage (identified with the fourth set of cleavage) and the Left Progressive-versus-Right Progressive (and conservative) cleavage (identified with the fifth set of cleavages).

Other cleavages were also found. Some contrast between conservative Republicans and Old Southerners had been expected, but not so great a one as was found. And the frequency with which the Old Southerners voted with the liberal Democrats was greater than what was expected. Also, the practice of liberal and conservative Republicans joining forces against these two wings of the Democrats, which occurred on several occasions, was not expected.

The other cleavage of major interest that was found was another one along the liberty dimension, which seems to be related to New Deal issues, particularly on public works. This allows a refinement of the liberty dimension, which was nonetheless implied in the description of the model.

The work which has been done in this thesis has helped to shed light on a number of problems in American political history:

(1) Progressives in the New Deal era. The "progressives" are commonly seen as the "(modern) liberals" (in the conventional sense) of the Progressive Era. Yet many of them opposed the New Deal, a supposedly "liberal" program. Some see this opposition as the result of frustrated ambition or the possession of prickly or uncooperative dispositions on the part of individual progressives. However, we should consider the possibility that their opposition arose from ideological differences with the New Deal. This need not mean that they were really "conservative", in the Progressive-Era sense, but rather that they were somewhere in between these conservatives and the New Dealers. In other words, they wished to move the country to the left of where it was, but only so far left, and the New Deal went beyond this point. The situation seem to be clarified considerably if concepts from this paper's model are used, especially the Left-Progressive and New Deal categories, as contrasted with each other, and the liberty dimension, as contrasted with the equality dimension.

(2) New Deal and Great Society liberals. The 1960s saw many formerly loyal supporters of the New Deal liberal Democratic coalition desert the party, in apparent opposition to the policies of the Great Society. George Wallace (in 1968) and Richard Nixon (in 1968 and 1972) seem to have won the support of many of these voters. What was the nature of their disagreement with the liberal leaders? As in the case of the progressives in the New Deal, we seem to have the case of people who wanted to move the country left at one time, but only so far left; now the political situation in the country had gone beyond that point, and they were now on the right.

(3) The Progressive Era itself. The ideological complexity of this era, above and beyond personality conflicts, seems to be well-recognized. In particular, the nature of "corporate liberalism" needs to be determined more precisely. Is it merely liberalism as advocated by the corporations, or a special, moderate kind of liberalism, or something neither wholly liberal nor wholly conservative? There is a need for concepts from this work--the contrasts between the equality and liberty dimensions, between Right and Left Progressivism, between radical and moderate Left Progressives, etc., and there seems to be room for considerable further analysis of this kind.

(4) The ideological position of Herbert Hoover. This man's philosophy was clearly quite complex, as he was a man of many contrasts--individualist yet regulatory technocrat, quasi-corporatist

yet would-be trust-buster, foe of socialism and the New Deal yet advocate of soak-the-rich tax policies. Clearly there is a need for concepts used in this paper--particularly the category of moderately Left-Progressive Anti-Statists, into which he seems to fit.

(5) The stages of the New Deal. The fact that Franklin Roosevelt lost some of his supporters with every step of the New Deal should, in itself, lead people to realize that a scale of attitudes needs to be applied to this situation. The Anti-statist/ Statist, Right-Progressive/Left-Progressive and Left Progressive/ New Deal dichotomies are needed here.

(6) The conservative-liberal conflict within the post-New Deal Republican party. The fact that "liberal Republican" Dwight Eisenhower was not particularly close ideologically to "liberal Republicans" such as Jacob Javits shows us the need to discriminate more finely among Republicans than we do by merely dividing them into conservative and liberal wings. This suggests that there should be a scale of attitudes for this situation, with conservative Republicans, Eisenhower type "Modern Republicans" and more clearly liberal Republicans such as Javits distinguished from each other.

There are many other area where the sort of analysis done in this paper would be useful:

(1) Conservatism in the Progressive Era. This is a little-studied subject. Therefore it is not very surprising that there is not a clear definition of it, or even a reasonable enumeration of who these "conservatives" were. So-called conservatives such as

President Taft considered themselves progressives and certainly supported much progressive legislation; the latter can also be said about people such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. As to people such as Joseph Cannon, who thought that Taft was too far to the left, their voting records are not well-known: it would be interesting to see how much progressive legislation they turn out to have voted for. So it is clear that much work remains to be done here, and some general conceptual clarification and definition would be helpful even without (or as preparation for) the conducting of in-depth studies of them, such as those of their voting records.

(2) Democrats before the New Deal. It is often said that the Democrats were often quite conservative before the New Deal. Yet here, too, "conservatism" needs to be defined. "Conservative" Al Smith, for example, supported much "social insurance" and labor legislation of the type enacted in the New Deal (of which he was so critical). Again, we see a lack of the sense of the often relative nature of the terms "conservative" and "liberal" (and "right" and "left").

(3) The ideological position of Coolidge, Harding and their supporters in the 1920s. They are called "conservatives", usually in contrast to being "progressives"--yet they repealed very little Progressive Era legislation. Some say that they used existing regulations and commissions to help business rather than to restrain it--but this is nothing new to modern students of the Progressive Era. It is simply "corporate liberalism"--and it must be remembered

that "corporate liberals" are "liberal" in some sense, and so a simple labeling of them as conservatives is not enough.

(4) Wendell Wilkie and Thomas Dewey. The two are often classed together as "moderate" or "liberal", "internationalist" opponents of Robert Taft. Yet it also has been argued that Wilkie was more liberal than Dewey--but was he? This is a matter which should be settled, if only because it may relate to later cleavages among moderate-to-liberal Republicans.

(5) The "neo-conservatives". This term refers to various people, such as Daniel P. Moynihan, who had once been regarded (by themselves and others) as liberal and were not often in opposition to other liberals, and were sometimes called conservatives, even though they generally claimed not to have changed. Their deviation from mainstream liberalism has been attributed by some to personality factors, as was the opposition of many progressives to the New Deal. As in the previous case, we recommend considering an ideological explanation. It seems that these "neo-conservatives" probably fit in the category of New Deal liberals alienated by the Great Society, described above.

(6) The Reagan-Ford battle for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976. Was this a revival of the Taft-Wilkie, Taft-Dewey and Taft-Eisenhower battles of earlier decades? Or was it an internal struggle within the Taft-Goldwater wing of the Republican party? It would also be interesting to know to what extent this cleavage was a revival of much earlier cleavages that had become

suppressed as politics had moved left, causing these groups to put aside their quarrels in the face of a greater enemy to the left.

(7) We should ascertain for certain whether the "supply-side" versus "monetarist" conflict among conservatives in recent years represents the same as cleavage as the Reagan-Ford conflict.

(8) The ideological positions of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter. That they are difficult to determine seems to be widely accepted, so few will dispute that they need further examination.

(9) The ideology of Southern politicians. There are still many disputes about the South to be settled, as has already been indicated. However, in addition, we have discovered a surprising amount of economic liberalism in such supposedly ultraconservative Senators as Eastland and Stennis, which provides another puzzle to solve.

This sort of study can be extended still further, to various non-economic issue areas (foreign affairs; racial issues, crime and other "social issues"; etc.). The field of classification in those areas is at about the level of development as it is in the area of economic issues: typologies with only two, three or four categories and only one dimension is about as much as is generally achieved in these areas. Then, of course, one may try to integrate these typologies in those areas with each other and with those in the economic area. This seldom gets beyond a four-category, two-dimensional classification, based on conservative-liberal dichotomies in

the areas of economics and foreign affairs, or economics and social issues.

Furthermore, we may hope that ideological classifications may be extended to other countries. A sort of beginning of this was included in the action on the theoretical model, when American and European politics were compared. A wider spectrum may be expected in European politics, and perhaps greater complexity in terms of the number of dimensions (e.g. the inclusion of an explicitly religious dimension); on the other hand, some reduction in dimensions may be possible (e.g. antitrust issues seem to be of relatively little importance in Europe).

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