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THE MARCH RIOT: A FAILURE IN COMMUNICATION

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ABSTRACT

THE MARCHE RIOT: A FAILURE IN COMMUNICATION

By

Jiashan Zhang

The March Riot, a bloody clash between Tibetans and local police during March 5-7 1989, exposed China's ethnic problems and had the effect of reshaping Han-minority relations. Both the Riot and the changes in ethnic relations as a result of the Riot appeared more significant for the study of intercultural communications.

By Taking the Riot as a special case, the writer of this thesis re-examined the Han-Tibetan history, analysed Chinese and American criticisms of the Riot, and explored the causes of the Riot ethnically and culturally.

The quantitative and in-depth study of the Riot has convinced the writer that beyond ethnic and cultural differences, there is another factor known as mental make-up that affects Tibetans in their attitude towards Han-Tibetan relations. The study also revealed some weak links in the theory of intercultural communications.

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THE MARCH RIOT: A FAILURE IN COMMUNICATION

--- on Tibetans' cultural differences from
the Han Chinese and their mental
make-up manifested in these differences
in their relationship with the Hans

Introduction

Minority problems in socialist countries have at last found ways to come to surface in communist polity. Much like the ghost that gets free when the curious fisherman opens the thousand-year-sealed bottle in the well-known Arabian Nights, these problems are causing and will continue to cause communist leaders unceasing headaches in their desperate endeavor to modernize their countries. Albanian minority's unrest in Yugoslavia, Georgians' clash with the Soviet police, Tibetan's demonstrations against the Chinese government. Racial or ethnical issues have constituted an unprecedented challenge to the communist utopia. No wonder newscasters from ABC, CBS, NBC or CNN have all shown extraordinary zeal while numbering "changes in socialist countries" one after another.

Unexpected as they were, minority problems in socialist countries are now viewed as equally severe, if not more severe than those in capitalist countries. This commonness proves again the human beings' incapability to solve strifes among themselves. "Freedom and equality" advocated by capitalist believers sounds extremely good, "communism and world unity" practised in socialist countries seems even more desirable, but people from one ethnic group are just as bellicose as ever with other groups in matters ranging from national integrity, political self-determination, economic equality and cultural preservation to genocide, apartheid, discrimination, and segregation.

This paper is intended to try some deep waters in the recently erupted riot in Lhasa of Tibet, as the event reveals to the world one phase of China's reality and has the effect of reshaping allround Tibetan-Han relations in the future. A study of the background of the event, the development of the event, and the causes of the event would surely provide some insightful thoughts for a scientific prediction. The writer of the paper, however, cannot be so ambitious as to give an overall account of the Riot, his academic propensity and personal interest will narrow the study to some cultural factors that played a big role in brewing the bloody occurrence in March of 1989. But, I will honestly describe the Riot, re-examine the Tibetan-Han relations and analyse all sorts of opinions about the Riot in order that some new theoretical explorations free of

political propaganda or national bias should be well established.

The writer of the thesis also find it a good opportunity to apply what I have learned in the Communication Department to an exemplary case. It is my hope that the study of the Riot may help open a new ground for intercultural studies as a whole. For many scholars have expounded on cultural differentiation of one nation from another, few on fusion of different cultures; many scholars have based their intercultural studies on an international background, few on the ethnic groups within a sovereign state; many have paid more attention to intercultural communication in capitalist countries, few in socialist countries.

This paper is essentially a case study. It would be quantitative in source collection and in-depth in analysis. The complicity of the Tibetan-Han relationship convinces me that there is much background information about the riot that is worthy of particular attention. Another notice should also be made that the impossibility of access to first-hand data or information from among Tibetans or Hans living in Tibet makes me rely solely on newspapers, periodicals and books for research sources. But, compared with TV and radio broadcasting, these written publications have two more advantages: they keep verifiable hard copies of records and they provide insightful as well as objective information.

A Brief Literature Review: The March Riot And Relevant Communication Theories

From the very beginning of the March Riot, the writer of the thesis tended to exclude allegations such as that the Riot was triggered by national separatists and foreign influences and that the Han-Tibetan relations were aggravated by communists' cruelty. The March Riot exposed ethnic tensions between Hans and Tibetans when communications between these two groups of people became more frequent and direct in the past forty years after the strengthened national unity by the Chinese communists. Ethnic differences were not fully recognized, cultural traditions were not fully appreciated, influences of one culture upon the other were not appropriately adjusted, and these led to misunderstanding, distrust, grievances and confrontation that were crystalized in the March Riot.

But what theories so far explored in intercultural communication are applicable in the particular case of the March Riot? What theories appear irrelevant to the nature of the March Riot? What theoretical building can the Riot contribute to the much established intercultural communication domain? Questions are so straightforwardly raised because the March Riot deserves particular concern since it has occurred in a country caught between tradition

and modernization under a communication pattern characteristic of communist countries.

The March Riot and the Scope of Intercultural
Communication

As it is well known, the interest of scholars in interpersonal behavior across cultures is not new. Research in the general areas of intercultural relations can be traced back to the work of political scientists and anthropologists in the 1930's and 1940's. But it was not until some time after these periods that sociologists and linguists became interested in culture. Communication scholars came still later. Over several decades of development, however, two schools of thought took form in the intercultural communication domain: the cultural dialogue group and the cultural criticism group. 1

Rooted in the conception of science as a practical tool for human use, the cultural dialogue group upheld that theories should accommodate world understanding and that intercultural communication was one attempt to organize human society along mutually satisfying lines. Derived from this view were some internationalists and humanitarian concerns. They believed that cultural dialogue served as a tool to world communication. Cultural criticism sought to find the points of conflict in cultures in order to isolate them as researchable issues in transcultural interaction.

For the cultural critics there was little need to seek similarities and universals until a classificatory system that adequately described cultures was developed. Diverted as these two schools appeared in research priority at the initial periods of intercultural communication development, they actually had the same goal to improve human understanding. Now no scholar can claim himself solely belonging to one of the two groups.

Directed separately or jointly by these two schools, applied intercultural communication studies have undergone important stages of development, from the interpersonal to the organizational, from the civilian to the governmental, from the west to the oriental.

But it is easy to find out that the development of intercultural communication is considerably pragmatic. It was first attracted to tourism, then it was applied to diplomacy, and then it was adopted by transnational corporation bosses. In the United States alone, communication scholars are mostly devoted to US-Japan relations in regard of western-oriental studies.

Not a single book or even a paper can be referred to in the study of the March Riot in China. As a matter of fact, intercultural communications studies are found lacking or inadequate in these following aspects:

- 1) Intercultural communication between capitalist countries and communist countries. Communication of this kind differs from communications between USA and Japan, and

USA and Europe. For the latter communications, peoples of different races or nations either have same and similar values, beliefs, rules that are innate in their own culture or have come to share or agree on a large amount of values, beliefs and rules as a result of many years of cultural exchanges under a same political system, a common market economy and capitalized morality. Peoples in communist countries have been living in, if not yet accustomed to, another set of values, beliefs and rules through several decades of Marxist education and practice. Compared with communications between the western and oriental cultures, and between the ancient and the modern cultures, the communications between the capitalist and communist cultures are more apt to lead to misunderstanding and conflict.

2) Communication between the dominant culture and the minority culture within a country. This is not nonexistent, but surely inadequate. Dothy L. Pennington has commented on Black-White communication in the USA in a pretty sharp tone: "In acknowledging the many definitions of communication provided by scholars, one can see that throughout the literature, black-white communication, in a broader sense of race relations, has been treated by scholars in other disciplines as sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology. Thus, the area, as treated by communication scholars, is in a state of infancy, and suffers something of an identity crisis in terms of theory and research generation as well as integration." 2 It is also my

observation that most racial problems in the States are attributed to social injustice or racial discrimination.

3) Communication between ethnic groups with distinctive cultures within communist countries. Unlike the situation in a capitalist country where minority cultures are usually confronted with a majority culture, any two cultural groups in communist countries are faced with three cultures. Above the two traditional cultures belonging to any two ethnic groups, there is a culture bred by Marxism, a man-enforced homogenousness in everything. In capitalist countries minority cultures would be gradually melted to the major culture, while in communist countries all cultures are expected to conform to the communist culture.

The March Riot and Barriers to Intercultural Communication

Intercultural communication is defined by most communication scholars as communication between members of different cultures, whether defined in terms of racial, ethnic or socioeconomic differences. The more diverse the two cultures are, the wider the division between the peoples. Intercultural studies nowadays seem to have attached too much attention to people's recognition of cultural differences just for the purpose of improving mutual tolerance and understanding. To some extent these

theories have facilitated differentiation instead of fusion of cultures.

With a view to accepting differences as they are, scholars bring to account three major barriers to successful intercultural communication: 1) ethnocentrism, which is simply defined as an attitude or way of behavior rooted in a people's mind that their culture is superior to the culture they come to communicate with, 3 2) mass effect, a phenomena Robert Escarpit describes as "seems to arise when an observer's channels of communication are inadequate to the number of people with whom he has to deal," 4 3) stereotyping: a tendency that people often have some ungrounded assumption of a group of people whom they have little knowledge of or little contact with but whom they have to get in contact with now or soon. 5

With no intention to question the existence of the three barriers, I would like to call people's attention to some phenomena that people from culture A often do not conceal their sense of superiority in front of culture B while people from culture B admit their inferiority and culture B modestly learns from culture A. True examples are the Manchu-Han relations in China's history and Japan-Western relations in early 1800's. We find here that ethnocentrism may stop working as a barrier. When people of a culture consider something good in another culture would not endanger their own culture but would ensure further

development of their culture, they would not mind taking it even if the other side is ethnocentric.

This leads us to the discussion of a new issue of mental make-up of an ethnic group in intercultural communication, which we will focus on in the following chapters of this thesis. Under certain circumstances, it is a people's mental make-up that plays a vital role in intercultural contacts. A people's accepting or refusing another culture depends to a great extent on how the people feel about the culture instead of how the culture is presented to them. Studying the recorded history of China, we may be certain that the Tibetans are a people tolerant with and willing to learn from other cultures. But modern history also verifies this point of view that there is a tendency among Tibetans to resist any outside culture only for the sake of reserving their culture.

The March Riot and Cultural Effects of Intercultural Communication

For people flying from one country to another over oceans or across continents, the world is becoming smaller and smaller. But the effects of modern technology are paradoxical in regard of individuals in the communication process. People who have been confined to a relatively stable place, the world has grown larger with openings of communication and transportation. Satellite TV and

computerized information networks make them feel they are no longer limited to being members of their own small communities. Yet, in no sense can they be members of a global community in the same way that they are members of their own immediate communities. Such a double role that people have to play in the world today is discovered by Paul Bohannon. He named it "a two-story culture." 6

But, intercultural communications develop in a way not always confined to individuals. As Colin Cherry has pointed out, they are more and more institutional. 7 The cultural effects of intercultural communication are particularly apparent in individuals as an ethnic group.

Scholars studying these cultural effects used to stress differentiation. Now there are some scholars more interested in fusion. One result of this interest is the emergence of a new notion known as Cultural Homogenization, a tendency for cultures in contact with one another to become increasingly similar to one another. 8 Cultural homogenization implies that some aspects of one culture will dominate and eliminate the corresponding aspects of the other. S. L. Tubbs takes "the standard American English" for an example. The standard American voices on television, he says, are responsible for a standard American dialect and the disparagement of such nonstandard dialects as those spoken by blacks and people who live in the specific regions of the country. 9.

In the present world, every culture is a distinctive and independent entity and at the same time an inheritance and

fusion of more than one older cultures. The Han culture is eventually a mixture of the native culture in the Central Plain ¹⁰ with cultures from India, Arab, Mongolia, etc.. The American culture, basically Anglo-Saxon, is much hued by black culture and western Indian culture.

Against the general trend of cultural fusion, there are some anti-tidal phenomena that should be called by-products of cultural homogenization. They can be divided into two categories. Category 1 is made up of nationalist entities that strongly protest against cultural homogenization. Their demands are echoed in the United Nations for more cultural independence in the establishment of a new world information order. "Governments are insisting that broadcasters sharply decrease the proportion of programs which are purchased abroad." ¹¹ Category 2 refers to those ethnic groups with a distinctive culture within a country. They persist that the national culture threatens their regional cultures. This concern is reflected in the emergence of a "fourth world", a cultural autonomy of a minority in a country. ¹² The Tibetan culture, although much isolated from the outer world, belongs to the fourth world.

Contemporary history also witnessed a mutation of cultural homogenization, a communist culture, that looms large over the eastern sphere of the globe. It is put forward for our study due to that it is new and exists in a way different from western cultures. Cultural homogenization

would lose much of its meaning without a study of this communist culture.

The Communist Culture and the March Riot

The new culture is so defined because it is characteristic of communist countries. It is a new culture because it is super-ethnic and super-racial. It is worthy of our attention because it provides more content for the intercultural communication studies.

Super-raciality might be its first characteristic. It came from Marxism in Germany and had no inherent connection with cultures that it would have to co-exist with later on in the eastern countries.

The second characteristic of this culture is its transcending of native cultures. The matrix of this culture was introduced to some eastern countries by native Marxists. Following the communists' victory, the culture was adopted by, though sometimes imposed on, the people in the country. As a ruling culture, it claims incomparable power.

Communist culture is also international. Under several decades of communist rule, cultural structure as well as political and economic structures in a communist country is transformed. What is presented to today's world are remarkable similarities between countries like the soviet Union and China, Vietnam and Cuba, the Eastern Germany and Mongolia. If we look at the world macrogeographically, there

are approximately only two cultures, the capitalist culture and communist culture.

Like what is happening to the capitalist culture, communist culture is also undergoing a cultural homogenization. This universal trend is even more pronounced since communist countries opened their door to other countries. And it is also owing to the influx of western cultures, the homogenization process in communist countries appears more problematic. The minority movements in the Soviet Union and the March Riot in China reflect honestly the predicament the communists are thrown into during this historical process.

Homogenization in western culture is different from that in communist culture. For the western culture, it is one firmly established set of values, beliefs, ways of life, concepts of life etc. that assimilate other less influential cultures around. In bilateral relations, it is the minor that conforms to the major, though the major would have to be adjusted in some way during the assimilation process.

Communist culture seems to fly from the sky to conquer any cultures within its sphere of influence. In any bilateral relations, it is three cultures functioning simultaneously: the major culture, the minor culture and the communist culture. Both the first cultures would have to give in to the latter. There have been growing trends towards a cultural unity in communist countries, though for the time being it is the situation of a tri-party existence.

The Soviet Union and China are typical of the communist culture. What they have done are rejection of "chauvinism" in the majority culture and "local nationalism" in the minor cultures. To fulfill the vacuum left out by these criticisms, they propagated a communist doctrine with an attempt to build up a set of new values, beliefs and conception in life. The Soviet Union is believed to have achieved considerable success. For the Chinese, the difference that communism has made is also profound. Throughout China, the national color is red instead of Hans' yellow and Tibetan's white; the "gods" that they worship are Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, not Confucius for Hans and the Dalai Lama for Tibetans (though people from both groups are still trying to resist this worship), the song they sing is the Internationale, the dress they officially wear is the "Mao Suit" that has no connection with their traditional clothing. The value they both uphold is socialist collectivism. The ultimate goal for both ethnic groups is neither Heavenly Peace for the Hans, nor Shangarila for the Tibetans, it is a raceless and classless communism.

The advantage of this culture is that it breaks through ethnic barriers more easily without necessarily hurting the feelings of each cultural group. That means people's mental make-up is more positively kept in balance. But it is to admit that the development of this culture is still in its initial period.

Problems in ethnic relations within communist countries arise for the most part out of the imbalance of the tri-party relations or out of the violation of the agreement on the communist culture. It is often seen as the majority culture's Chauvinism replacing the new cultural construction promised to all nationalities. The March Riot in China is an example. When the Hans showed "sincerity" to Tibetans that they were building a new culture together, like the situation prior to the cultural revolution, Tibetans were not much upset. When Hans put new culture aside and catered to Taiwanese by Han nationalism, as we can see nowadays, Tibetans would just do the same by resigning to their own culture.

Description of the March Riot

The Martial Law

It was not until the Chinese State Council declared martial law in Lhasa on March 7, 1989, that the Lhasa Riot became a world issue. The State Council statement, signed by Chinese Premier Li Peng, said that a decision on imposing martial law was made because some separatists had been making troubles in Lhasa constantly over the past few days, severely disturbing social stability. It stated that the martial law decree was aimed at maintaining social order,

protecting people's lives and property and preventing encroachment upon public property. 13

Authorized to enforce the martial law, the government of Tibet issued three orders on the same day. According to China Daily, the first order included these regulations: 1) Martial law would be imposed within Lhasa's city limits and the surrounding area beginning at midnight (00:00 Beijing Time and 16:00 GMT) of March 7; 2) All meetings, parades, strikes, petitions and any other gatherings were banned while martial law was in effect; 3) Traffic control was imposed and all persons and vehicles must be authorized and pass a security check before entering the cordoned-off area; 4) No foreigners were allowed to enter the area without permission; 5) Public security departments and personnel on martial law duty had the right to search suspects and places where criminals may hide; 6) Any person who defied martial law or who instigated others to do so would be severely punished. The second order stipulated that 1) no one was allowed to instigate separatist actions by any means in any places, 2) public security personnel, armed police and People's Liberation Army men on duty had the right to take necessary measures to put down disturbances, they could detain troublemakers on the spot and take action against anyone who would resist arrest. The third order gave details of traffic control measures to be imposed in the cordoned-off area. 14

Two days later, the governor of Tibet issued the 4th, 5th and 6th orders. Order #4: Foreign guests, experts working in Lhasa, foreign personnel in Sino-foreign joint ventures and tourists permitted to stay in Lhasa should show special ID issued by the regional government. Order #5: Those who had planned, instigated or taken part in the riot by beating, smashing, looting or burning or who had given shelter to criminals must surrender to the police for leniency; offence reporters would be protected; retaliates would be severely punished. Order #6 restated the disciplines the public security officers, armed policemen and PLA soldiers should abide by while carrying out the martial law. 15

Three Days of Unrest

Facts showed that the situation in Lhasa had been turning from bad to worse for three consecutive days before the martial law declaration. China Daily was the only Chinese mass medium to expose the Riot on March 6 in a small piece of news entitled "11 Killed in Lhasa Violence" 16 saying that the Riot began at noon when 13 separatist lamas and nuns marched along Bakuo Street shouting slogans like "independence for Tibet". In the afternoon, about 600 rioters demonstrated in East Beijing Street and began to smash windows, loot shops, restaurants and hotels and set fires. They also damaged more than 20 public cars and

ambulances. The violence escalated as some demonstrators threw stones and opened fire at armed policemen killing one and wounding more than 40. Later, the armed police fired back. It reported that 10 demonstrators and on-lookers were killed in the violence and more than 60 wounded.

The Washington Post was also quick to report on the incident on March 6. This newspaper offered a description of the accident much longer than that by China Daily. In addition to its repetition of Xinhua News Agency, it quoted a European as saying: "At the outset, the police may have intended to fire warning shots. But one demonstrator was hit in the foot by a pistol bullet and another in the leg." The tourist in Lhasa who declined to give his name on the phone said that "A second wave of policemen armed with AK47 semi-automatic rifles rushed to the scene between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.. This was when most of the serious casualties were inflicted." 17

The second day was started by a group of separatists who gathered in the Bakuo Street in the morning and began beating up passers-by, destroying their bicycles and throwing stones at policemen. In the afternoon, about 300 masked rioters began to smash shops and government buildings and set fire. Having failed to stop the rioters with tear gas, the armed police opened fire. One rioter was killed and 8 injured, including two policemen. 18 Contrary to China Daily, the Washington Post announced on March 7 that "The

death toll for the last two days were about 30 and the injured at well over 100." 19

The third day in Lhasa saw hundreds of rioters continuing to storm through streets and lanes, looting shops and attacking police and on-lookers. China Daily said that masked rioters in the city's Beijing Road intercepted and attacked passers-by and piled up stolen bicycles and burned them. But no casualties were reported in the violence. 20 The Washington Post's report of the third day's riot focused on the Chinese troops manoeuvres. "An American traveller who declined to be identified by name said the first signs of troop movements came about 12:15 a.m. today, when loud speakers began blaring, apparently warning people to stay off the streets and to obey martial law regulations." 21 The New York Times also joined in the riot reporting on March 8, with a piece of news entitled "Tibet is Under Martial Law" and a commentary. 22 The Riot appeared on the front page of the Central Daily News from Taiwan on March 8. That was a round-up of news reports by western mass media, with a Taiwanese commentary bearing the title "The Unrest Foretells Tibetan Future." 23

Previous Skirmishes

Prior to the three-day Riot, demonstrations and all sorts of conflicts between the Tibetans and the police had taken place inconsistently over a span of 18 months. On

September 27, 1987, a riot initiated by some lamas broke out, ending in a injury of 24 policemen, destruction of two transportation vehicles, 24 and arrest of 27 lamas and nuns. 25 During the Oct 1 riot in 1987, 43 cars and motorcycles were destroyed, a police station was set fire to by the rioters, 325 security officers and policemen got wounded and 6 killed. 26 But the Washington Post said 10 policemen and 9 demonstrators including 3 Buddhist monks got killed. 27 On October 6, 1987 police arrested 60 lamas who marched to Lhasa to demand the release of lamas arrested in the earlier protests, and on the following day, the government cut off communications and increased security forces in Lhasa in an effort to prevent protests. 28 Six months passed before a new pro-independence demonstration erupted. The Washington Post's records indicated that at least 18 monks and an unknown number of civilians and policemen were killed. 29 The December 10 riot (1988) was comparatively peaceful. About 30 lamas and nuns gathered at Ramoqe Temple in Lhasa. On their way to the Jokhang Temple, they spread leaflets for independence to attract citizens. The police fired warning shots when they were attacked by the troublemakers with stones and liquor bottles. In the ensuing chaos, some people were killed or injured. 30

The Situation After the Martial Law

Peace was resumed as soon as the martial law was imposed. The People's Daily reported on the front page on March 9 that the first day of martial law was accompanied with ordinary religious activities, opened offices and shops, and ordered urban life on the streets. The Lhasa residents were said to greet soldiers and police on patrol duty. 31

The same newspaper said the next day that more people were seen coming out to the streets. Some rioters went to the police and acknowledged their involvement in the Riot. Other news or photos demonstrated that governmental officials at all levels in Lhasa went to salute the soldiers, that workers were organized to clear the ruins, that residents gathered around reporters to denounce the riots, that Tibetan parents sent their sons or brothers at the PLA recruiting station, etc.. 32

March 10, the third day since the troops were stationed in Lhasa streets, was predicted as extremely dangerous because it was the 30th anniversary of the aborted uprising led by the 14th Dalai Lama and aristocrats in 1959. As a matter of fact, the rioters had threatened to evoke a larger riot. But all worries were proved unnecessary. The day was peaceful, except for several proindependence slogans found at remote corners of the street. The People's Daily was in

pretty good spirits, saying: "The sky was cleared up, the force 6 wind (on the Beaufort scale) had finally subsided."

33 Sure enough, no further demonstrations or conflicts have been reported since then.

Comments and Criticisms From the Press

The imposition of martial law evoked world-wide repercussions. During the whole second week of March (5-11), the Tibetan problem became a major event in almost all mass media in the world. The Washington Post carried the issue from March 5 through 11, with long and detailed description, commentaries and criticisms. The New York Times came a little late with the news, but also allowed the Riot to take a very important position in its "international" section during the week. The Time magazine briefed the event in its March 20 edition, bearing the title "Chafing Under the Yoke". 34 The Newsweek carried a rather exquisite commentary in its March 20th issue: "A Firestorm in Shangarila-la". 35

Taiwan, the KMT (Chinese National Party) controlled island, showed a particular interest in the Riot. Impossible to get direct information about the riot from Tibet, its newspapers relied on foreign mass media and sometimes China's Xinhua News Agency for news sources.

The 14th Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile in India can not be expected to keep silent over the whole issue.

But, their voice on the March riot was for the most part aired by the Western mass media.

The Chinese press, under direct control of the Communist Party, usually took a low-keyed attitude towards minority troubles lest they should "make a show of the government". This time, however, they all came out lodging a unrelenting combat against the Tibetan exiles and foreign criticisms of the Riot.

Controversy over the Riot between the Chinese and the westerners, or the Taiwanese or the Dalai Lama were apparent at the first glance of the press belonging to any of them. It can be seen in their choice of description of, and their emphasis of opinions about, the Riot.

American Press: A Proindependence Movement Against Chinese Invasion and Rule

The American press spoke in one voice in their definition of the Riot. Publications in the United States all called it a proindependence movement. To justify this basic notion, they used "Chinese invasion", "Chinese annexation", "Chinese rule", "Communist domination", etc. to determine the nature of Tibetan-Han relationship. Their reports of the riot can be summed up in the following:

- 1) A peaceful demonstration was cracked down by Chinese police in violation of human rights.

It was only the police who had guns and who fired the first shot, they declared. The Washington Post reported on March 6: "A European tourist gave a different (from the Chinese official press) version of events. He said the police had opened fire on Buddhist monks and nuns who were demonstrating peacefully before any rioting occurred." 36 On account of the later riots, the American press noted the rioters had no weapons in their struggle with the police. "..... At times the city's ancient Tibetan quarter echoed with bursts of automatic weapons as security forces fired wildly at demonstrators who were armed only with rocks and slingshots." 37

2) Casualties counted by American press were
bigger than Chinese reports

In its first touch of the event, the Washington Post expressed its certainty through "observers" that "the real casualty toll from the rioting was almost certain to be higher than that which was reported by the official news agency." 38 Look at the Newsweek's estimation: "Tibetan sources estimated that more than 100 died in the three days' of gradually diminishing unrest. One foreign witness said he saw Chinese soldiers dumping up to 60 corpses into military trucks on the first afternoon of the rioting." 39 (see Table 1)

3) Quotations from tourists were unanimously used to
contradict Chinese press

Table 1 **Estimation of Casualties in Lhasa Riots**
September 27 1987 --- March 7 1989

Chinese Press				American Press				
Time	Dead	Wounded	Arrested	Source	Dead	Wounded	Arrested	Source
Sept. 27 87	24			B. R. Nov. 21 88			27	W. P. Mar. 8 89
Oct. 1 87	6	325		B. R. Nov. 21 88	19		60	W. P. Mar. 8 89
March 5 88	6	328	20	B. R. Nov. 21 88	18			W. P. Mar. 8 89
Dec. 10 88	1	13		B. R. Dec. 19 88	2	13		W. P. Mar. 8 89
Mar. 5-7 89	12	100		C. D. Mar. 8 89	30	100		W. P. Mar. 8 89
					75	300		N. Y. T. Mar. 8 89
					100	110	1000	N. W. Mar. 20 89

Note: B.R. = Beijing Review
C.D. = China Daily
W.P. = Washington Post
N.Y.T. = New York Times
N.W. = Newsweek

Source: The writer's compilation from newspapers or periodicals as mentioned above

These witnesses' description was given more space in each newspaper though the witnesses of the Riot were unknown to readers, some of whom even declined to reveal their nationality. They were reached by newspapers through phone calls either directly from Lhasa, or from Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan Province.

4) The Riot and Martial Law Decree showed
Chinese incapability of control

"The ineptness and brutality of the local Chinese government have radicalized the situation and forced people into the hands of the more extreme nationalists." said Prof. Mathhew Kapstein from the University of Chicago. 40 The Newsweek further reasoned that by resorting to massive forces the Chinese leadership was effectively admitting defeat. 41

The Washington Post commented in a equally cold tune: the incident constituted a serious blow to the Chinese communist party. "Each day has shown that the carrot-and-stick approach to Tibet is not working." said a western diplomat in Beijing according to the Washington Post. 42

5) The Riot was racially related

The rioters' looting, beating and burning activities were also given some account in their analyzing the riot causes, though such an account was overshadowed by their stress on the proindependence sentiment. As the Washington Post had discovered, some Tibetans inflicted heavy damage on Chinese (Hans) buildings and businesses. 43 The Newsweek's

report was more detailed: "Shouting protesters attacked more than 50 Chinese-owned shops and restaurants along Lhasa's Beijing Road. A young Tibetan beat a Chinese boy with a chain." 44 Reports also confirmed that Tibetan demonstrators savagely beat a number of Chinese civilians during the rioting. 45 According to a correspondent in Lhasa for the Guardian newspaper, two Chinese riding bikes on the street were stoned by a mob, and many burning bicycles on the streets indicated other Chinese bike riders had also been attacked.

Based on these facts, Robert Thurman, a professor of Hindu-Tibetan Buddhist studies at Columbia University, estimated that Anti-Chinese feeling in Tibet grew during the Cultural Revolution in late 1960's, when bands of Chinese destroyed all but handful of Tibet's 3,500 monasteries and defrocked several hundred thousand monks, and that China had moved in so many settlers into Tibet that Chinese now far outnumbered Tibetans, and that most of the immigrants found Tibetans backward and tended to learn only a few words of the local language, thus breeding more bad feelings among Tibetans. All these factors "have made the Tibetans desperate," he concluded. 46

Eliot Sperling, a professor of the Tibetan studies at Indiana University, said: "What you have in Tibet is a classic example of colonial troubles, only it is happening much later than the struggle for independence in Southeast Asia or Africa." 47 "If the policies continue as they

are," warned Steve Marshall, a frequent traveller to Tibet, "in 10 or 20 years Tibetan culture will be something you can only read about in the library." 48

Taiwan press: An Anti-violence, Anti-communist Movement

There are only two Taiwanese newspapers found in MSU library, the KMT-run official Central Daily News, and the unofficial Lianhebao. But, official or not, press in Taiwan would have to keep in tune with the government on matters concerning mainland China. The Central Daily News usually represents the Taiwan press.

The Riot came to the Central Daily News on March 7, with a piece of news released by AFP and a photo of a rioting scene on the front page. From that time on, more space was given to Tibetan problems. On the March 9 issue alone, five pieces concerning the Riot were seen in the CDN. Taiwan's attitude toward the Riot and their opinions of it can be divided into four categories:

- 1) The Riot was an anti-violence, anti-communism movement

An editorial entitled "A Just Anti-Violence Movement in Tibet Should not be Misinterpreted" proclaimed that the riot was in nature a just movement against communist slavery and violence. It said the communists had two "poisonous arrows" to cope with minorities: "oppose local nationalism" by which they justified their suppression of anti-communist movements

and "regional autonomy" by which they openly exploited the minorities. So, "All Chinese can not bear any longer with the communist dictatorship, not to speak the Tibetan compatriots." 49

2) The riot was not aimed at independence, nor should it be led astray to a proindependence movement

That is why the above mentioned editorial warned against "misinterpretation" of the riot. The newspaper fervently reminded people of "the equality of five nationalities" (Han, Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchu, Hui), a political idea advocated by early KMT politicians when the Republic of China was founded in 1911, and it further propagated the Taiwanese government's idea: "In the big family of the Chinese, all nationalities would be protected by the Constitution and enjoy complete economic and political equality." 50 The newspaper suggested to the Dalai Lama that his struggle against the Chinese government be combined with the KMT's interests. If not so, it pointed out, his struggle would be fruitless and the whole situation in Lhasa be worsened.

3) The Riot was a sequelae of cultural revolution

Jiang Cong, one of the "Bandits-controlled-Area Affairs" experts, asserted that the Tibetans had different purposes in their 1959 uprising and the present movement. The event in 1959 was aimed at opposing the way of communist control, while the riot in March was against the control per se. Two factors would account for the change of purpose: the

disastrous cultural revolution which almost destroyed Tibetan religion and the enlightenment of Tibetans as a result of communication development in Tibet. Based on this assertion, he further suggested Hans should dispose with "those sayings that we take for granted but actually hurt the Tibetans' feelings like 'the past history of Tibet is the darkest, poorest, the most backward and most reactionary' as the communists had imposed on people." 51

4) The disturbance exposed racial problems

The CDN quoted AFP as saying tourists believed the inflow of large number of young Hans into Lhasa bred Tibetans' hostility. These young Hans from neighboring provinces went there and opened many restaurants, groceries, repair shops etc.. A revisiting European had exclaimed: "Great changes have taken place since I went there only five months ago." The Han and other minority business men helped bring about the changes. They went there at the encouragement of the government for two advantages that these people could not enjoy elsewhere: no residence requirement and low income tax rate. But they turned out to be the targets of the rioters. 52

The Dalai Lama: Appeal to the International Society for Protection of Human Rights

Responses were heard from the Dalai Lama regime quickly after the martial law decree. Michael Van Walt, a lawyer in

Washington working as legal adviser to the Dalai Lama, talked to the New York Times, saying the unrest was "the most serious challenge to China's governance of Tibet since 1959." 53

The office of the Dalai Lama from the Indian hill town of Dharmasala issued a statement on March 8 strongly protesting the Chinese government's action. It called the action an acknowledgement that Beijing had "lost control of the situation" and the step (to impose martial law) an authoritarian measure "instituted to justify the continuing abuses of human rights in Tibet." 54

On March 10, a mass demonstration was organized in New Delhi, India, to protest against the martial law. Several hundreds of demonstrators, many of whom belonged to youth or women's groups, marched at the India Gate near the Parliament, carrying placards that denounced "Chinese atrocities" and called for Tibetan independence. A Chinese national flag and an effigy of Premier Li Peng were burned by the demonstrators.

The Dalai Lama deliberately chose another way to call world attention to Tibetan problems. Earlier than the exiles' statement of protest, Reuter reported the Dalai Lama appealed to world leaders from his exile home to help persuade China to "stop continuing violations of human rights and find an early solution" to the conflict in Tibet.

To cooperate with the Dalai Lama, Rinchen Dharlo, the Dalai Lama's representative in the United States, contacted with the New York Times in his office and said he was "very disappointed" with the US government's attitude toward the situation. "It is unfortunate that President Bush did not push the Chinese on Tibet during his visit, as he would have with the Soviet Union or South Africa." "There is apparently a double standard for human rights." 56

Chinese press: Nationalist Separatism and Foreign
Interference

It was not unexpected that Chinese mass media as a part of the whole communist propaganda network would react in a unitary manner and counterattack the confronting mass media either from Taiwan or from the western world.

- 1) The Riot was planned, instigated and directed by separatists abroad

In an effort to fend off foreign press criticisms of the use of martial law, Xinhua News Agency rebutted: "Conclusive evidence is now available to show that the riot on Feb. 10 and the following riots beginning on March 5 were instigated by the Tibetan separatists outside China." It disclosed that exiled separatist leaders had recently sent agents under the guise of tourists to incite riots and smuggle weapons into the region. The smugglers put guns into the hands of the

rioters who fired as they pleased during the past weeks. 57
 Danzeng, a Tibetan top leader in the Tibetan government said
 he and his colleague had collected full evidence to show the
 Riot was a carefully designed separatist action. 58

- 2) The Martial Law decree had nothing to do with
 human rights

A People's Daily commentator said: "Some people outside
 China accusing the Tibetan government of 'infringing on
 human rights' have turned things upside down." "Among people
 abroad who indulge in loud and empty talks about human
 rights, some are none other than those who had themselves
 trampled on the Tibetans' human rights before and during the
 1959 armed rebellion. Is it not hypocritical for them to
 plead the world for human rights concerns?" 59

On March 16, the American Senate and the European
 Parliament each passed a resolution on the Tibetan problem,
 condemning the use of force and the violation of human
 rights in Tibet. Beijing Review asked in response what these
 two legislative bodies would do when they were in Chinese'
 shoes. 60

- 3) Opinions supporting the martial law were favoured
 by the Chinese press

Lhamin Soinam Lhunzhub, a former aristocrat and
 presently vice chairman of the Tibet Regional Committee of
 CPPCC 61 said: "I have been waiting for such a decision.
 The people have had enough of violent rioters who beat
 people up, smash things, loot shops and set fires in these

days." 62 Ghabar Tsidanpingsu, a well-known Tibetan scholar of Tibetan culture, said: "The order is given in time. Be tough when it is necessary." 63 An American professor was quoted by the official press as saying that it was wise for the Chinese government to impose martial law since it evidently helped keep social stability. 64

4) Chinese press warned against foreign interference

At a meeting with delegates from Hong Kong and Macao, Chinese minister of the United Front broke the news with them that some separatists who had received terrorist training in some other country were despatched to Tibet with arms for an planned new riot before the martial law order. He said there was a rather big number of people including some "harddying imperialists and wildy ambitious foreigners" who still dreamed of separating Tibet from China. A European women who was exposed recently to the police by a "patriotic lama" was an example. Sent by the separatist clique, the woman came to Lhasa with instructions to organize a riot. She had been to Lhasa several times under different names, the minister said. 65

5) The Chinese press never mentioned the Riot was
a racial conflict

They did not do that because they knew it was a most sensitive topic in a country with 56 officially recognized minorities. Instead, a leader of the Tibetan government said the initial aim of the riot was to destroy Party and

governmental grass-root units, public security offices and news and propaganda institutions. 66

Analyses of Causes and Roots of the Riot

All comments put forward by different newspapers might, as I surpose, be mostly politically biased. They are to influence people, not to convinced people.

The motive of "independence" can not be justified in the present China. The history of political and cultural contacts since the 7th century, with that of the Qing Dynasty in particular, repudiate the so-called "patron and priest" relationship between Tibetan spiritual leaders and Chines emperors.

"Human rights" is only the Tibetan refugees' strategy to seek more sympathy and support from the world. Their treatment of the ordinary Tibetan people was extremely cruel.

"Foreign interference" is an excuse by which the Chinese government put down Tibetan demonstrations. Some foreign involvements were detected in anti-governmental activities, but the Tibetan movements were on the whole carried out by Tibetans themselves.

The Tibetan separatists' activities were not supported by most Tibetan people. The demonstrations, which were confined to Lhasa, do not represent Tibetns' will in their relations with China. But, the March Riot, both as a

continuence and climax of the previous similar social disturbances, do reflect some grievances existing between the Tibetans and Hans.

The Riot Viewed in a Racial Perspective

Damages on the streets showed the rioters' targets were not administrative organs of the local government. The beating of Hans and non-Tibetan nationalities showed the rioters' enemy was not the police. As it was confirmed by both American and Chinese newspapers, the police came to keep peace only after the rioters began to beat passers-by, including some Han boys and girls, and ransacked their businesses.

But, most reporters and editors ostensibly paid little heed to it. The reasons for this intentional negligence may vary from country to country. The Americans' main concern is pro-independence and human rights in Tibet. They mentioned again and again Chinese invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950.

The Taiwanese denied that the Riot was related to overall Han-Tibetan relationship because on the one hand they must seek any opportunity to attack the communists, and on the other hand they should keep their image as the sole legal government of greater China, the map of which includes not only Tibet but the People's Republic of Mongolia.

The Chinese did not even use "racial" or "ethnic" in all reports on the March Riot. The reason was very simple, for thousands of years, racial and ethnic assimilation and conflict had been going hand in hand in this most populated country. Political turmoil and economic stagnation as a result of racial struggle often set the country decades back in overall development. Imagine how dangerous it would be when minority problems constitute a real threat to a 56-nationality country where the Han-inhabited area amounts to 88% of the total population and less than 38% of the total territory while the minority-inhabited area makes up only 12% of the population yet 62% of the whole territory. 67

It is out of question the Riot was racially involved. What remain problematic are whether the Riot is merely a case of race for race's sake, whether it is something in addition to racial hatred, or whether it is something apart from racial confrontations.

In this regard, the first thing worthy of attention is that the Tibetans are only one of the 56 nationalities in China and one of the several nationalities even in Tibet (others: Menba, Luoba, Hui, Naxi, Han, etc.). They are the seventh largest minority group next to Zhuang, Hui, Uigur, Yi, miao and Manchu. (see Table 2) Given that China's minority policy is not in favour of some minorities while biased against some others, a question can be raised that why the Tibetans are against Hans while others are not.

Table 2 Distribution of 55 Minorities Over China

Name	Population	Distribution Area
Achang	20441	Yunnan
Bai	1131124	Yunnan
Baoan	9027	Gansu
Benglong	12295	Yunnan
Bulang	58476	Yunnan
Buyi	2120469	Guizhou
Dai	839797	Yunnan
Dawoer	94014	Innermongolia Heilongjiang
Dong	1425100	Guizhou Yunnan Guangxi
Dongxiang	279397	Gansu
Dulong	4682	Yunnan
Elunchun	4132	Innermongolia Heilongjiang
Ewenke	19343	Innermongolia Heilongjiang
Gaoshan	1549	Taiwan Fujian
Gelao	53802	Guizhou
Hani	1058836	Yunnan
Hezhe	1476	Heilongjiang
Hui	7219352	Ningxia Gansu Henan Hebei Qinghai Shandong Yunnan Xingjiang Bei Tian
Jing	11995	Guangxi
Jingpo	93008	Yunnan
Jinuo	11974	Yunnan
Keba	2065	Tibet
Kazak	907582	Xinjiang Gansu Qinghai

Kerean	1763870	Jilin Liaoning Heilongjiang
Kirgiz	113999	Xinjiang
Lagu	304174	Yunnan
Li	817562	Guangdong
Lisu	480960	Yunnan
Man	4299159	Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Hebei Beijing Innermongolia
Maonan	38135	Guangxi
Menba	6248	Tibet
Maio	5030897	Guizhou Hunan Guangxi Sichuan Guangdong
Mongolian	3411657	Innermongolia Xinjiang Liaoning Heilongjiang Qinghai Gansu
Mulao	90426	Guangxi
Naxi	245154	Yunnan
Nu	23166	Yunnan
Ozbek	12453	Xinjiang
Pumi	24237	Yunnan
Qiang	102768	Sichuan
Russian	2935	Xinjiang
Sala	69102	Qinghai Gansu
She	368832	Fujian Anhui Jiangxi Zhejiang Guangdong
Shui	286487	Guizhou
Tajik	26503	Xinjiang
Tatar	4127	Xinjiang
Tibetan	3870068	Tibet Qinghai Sichuan Gansu Yunnan
Tu	159426	Qinghai
Tujia	2832743	Hunan Hubei
Uygur	5957112	Xinjiang
Wa	298591	Yunnan
Xibo	83629	Xinjiang Liaoning

Yao	1402676	Guangxi Hunan Yunnan Guangdong Guizhou
Yi	5453448	Sichuan Yunnan Guizou Guangxi
Yugu	10569	Gansu
Zhuang	13378162	Guangxi Yunnan Guangdong

Source: CHINESE MINORITIES, by Ma Yin
Beijing: China Youth Press, 1987

Note: Bei = Beijing Tian = Tianjin

Some people proclaimed that Han-Tibetan relations were worsened because the Hans were carrying out a genocide in Tibet. A western writer took this horrifying word for the title of his book. 68 In an attempt to explore Chinese cruelty, the writer resorted to exiles in Tibet for unverified information. Rumors about forced sterilization and killing of Tibetan infants were spread all over the world. The western countries are still inclined to believe the 1.2 million deaths since the 1959 uprising. 69

Reliable historical records estimated that Tibetan population in the 7th century was at 4.62 million, that frequent wars reduced the population to 0.56 in the 13th century and that it rose to 0.94 million by the 18th century. 70 The first national census was made in 1951. The Tibetan government reported Tibetan population throughout the country was 2.77 million strong (with 1.2 million in Tibet). The Dalai Lama agreed to the estimation. The figures in Tibet remained almost the same in 1964 for the second population census. The third census in 1982 showed Tibetan population at 3.8 million (1.89 million in Tibet), with a 2.3 percent annual average increase, higher than national average of 2.1. In 1985, the population in Tibet alone rose to over 1.90 million. 71 The so-called sterilization and infanticide were pure fabrication. But it is not deniable that a big number of Tibetans were killed during the 1959 uprising. According to recently disclosed Chinese documents, the death toll was 87,000. 72

Another assertion concerning Han-Tibetan relations is what the Dalai Lama has declared and what the New York Times agreed to: "Tibetans have become a minority in Tibet." 73 The Dalai Lama said there were 7.5 million Hans in Tibet. 74 This is too big to be true. The 1982 census showed there were only 91,000 Hans, compared to 1.76 million Tibetans in Tibet. (see Table 3) In the 1986 census, the Hans were reduced in number to 73,000 but Tibetans increased to 1.93 million. 75 And most of the Hans in Tibet are temporarily helping the region with economic or cultural constructions. The reason why western tourists found many Hans in Tibet was that most the Hans staying there are scattered in Lhasa.

Back to the March Riot. There are some tiny aspects people should be aware of. First, unlike the 1959 uprising which had reached all parts of Tibet, the Riot, together with other riots in the previous 18 months, took place only in Lhasa. Secondly, of the "Chinese shops" destroyed by the Rioters, some were owned by other nationalities instead of Hans. A reporter with the People's Daily found a Hui young man who complaint in tears that a dozen shops owned by Hui people were burnt to ashes. 76 Thirdly, the rioters were mostly composed of lamas, nuns and young people "who had not seen the old Tibet." 77 The number of the rioters once reached 600 in the three-day unrest. This was a small figure in a city of 110,000 citizens. Finally, although the rioters had given full vent to their grievances against Hans, they showed no sign of hatred of Tibetan officials and religious

Table 3 Population Comparison Between Tibetans And Hans
In Tibet According to Age Groups

Age	Population			Percentage		
	Total	Tibetan	Han	Total	Tibetan	Han
0-14	679619	653880	25739	36.6	96.2	3.8
15-19	196991	187690	9301	10.6	95.3	4.7
20-24	158548	148878	9670	8.5	93.9	6.1
25-29	136462	121249	15213	7.4	88.9	11.1
30-34	116312	105315	10997	6.3	90.5	9.5
35-39	105804	99317	6487	5.7	93.9	6.1
40-44	97714	91645	6069	5.3	93.8	6.2
45-49	87845	83535	4310	4.7	95.1	4.9
50-54	75942	73847	2095	4.1	97.2	2.8
55-59	64391	63451	940	3.5	98.5	1.5
60-64	50817	50441	376	2.7	99.3	0.7
65-+	85528	85341	187	4.6	99.8	0.2
Total	1855973	1764589	91384	---	95.1	4.9

Source Beijing Review, April 4-10, 1988

Notes: A: Data in this table are based on 1982 population census
B: Population of other minorities in Tibet is not included

leaders who had been working with Hans, who had expressed clear-cut disagreement with them and who had taken measures to suppress them. On the contrary, they suspected the Chinese government had murdered the Panchen Lama, one of the two spiritual leaders in Tibet and a closest friend of the communist party who died in January, 1989. 78

The Riot is a racial clash, but it is not limited to a racial clash. Otherwise the phenomena listed above could not be satisfactorily explained. The Hans did not resort to a genocide, they had not tried to outnumber Tibetans there, they had not exploited natural resources, and they had not deprived Tibetans political rights enjoyed by other nationalities. The American press admitted that tremendous efforts had been made by Chinese government to improve economic and living conditions in Tibet. 79

More important is another fact that the commonly accepted racial differences between Hans and Tibetans are actually non-existent. Tibetan and Han nationalities are out of the same race. Dr. Snellgrove upheld that "origin of the Tibetan people is generally sought among the nomadic, non-Chinese Chiang Tribes". 80 Disagreeing with him on the definition of Chinese, Chinese scholars hold almost the same point of view. 81 Archaeological discoveries in Qamdo Prefecture (in Tibet) of a site dating back to the Neolithic Age indicated that the primitive Tibetan societies had formed close ties with people along the Huanghe River (the Yellow River --- cradle of Chinese culture) up to 5000 years

ago. 82 According to historical records, the Chiang tribe (now spelled as Qiang) constituted one of the several tribes in China about 4000-5000 years ago. Their sphere of influence covered the present Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu provinces. Most of them being nomadic, they were once subdued by the Huns (one part of which became ancestors of Hungary, and other parts assimilated to Hans). During the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), they submitted to the authority of the Han Monarchy and ceased to play a major role in Chinese history. One part of the tribe was integrated with Hans in the Han-populated areas, one part settled down in Tibet and is now known as Tibetans and one part remained at the Tibet-Sichuan border keeping the name of Qiang. (see Table 2) 83

Dr. Srisha Patel, an anthropologist, made an insightful study of the somatometric characters of Tibetan refugees in Indan. He also confirmed the Tibetan-Han consanguineous relationship: "The people of Tibet, though isolated themselves and emerged as a geographically variety of Mongoloid stock, definitely at one time had contributed to the population type of China, Korea and Manchuria." 84

The Riot Viewed in a Cultural Perspective

Problems between the Hans and Tibetans became racial (ethnic) problems mostly because of thick barriers blockading the two groups of people from getting in more

frequent and harmonious communications in history. These barriers were first determined by harsh geographical and climate conditions, and later more apparent in divergence in cultural building. Different deposits of knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, religion and concepts of life acquired respectively by the two peoples transcended their physical similarities as well as dissimilarities in the course of generations. Unfortunately, cultural gap was enlarged with countless warfare aimed to conquer the other group. It is more rational to search for the Riot causes in the thousand-year old cultural heritages handed down to the present Han and Tibetan peoples than the sheer "racial" differences.

Let us have a look at the Han-Tibetan cultural differences.

Language: Like any culture which is first distinguished in language, the Tibetans developed a written form of language during the seventh century under the most famous king of Songtsan Gampo who got Tibet united for the first time. Although it is generally agreed that Chinese and Tibetan languages belonged to a Sino-Tibetan family characterized by monosyllabism, scale of pitch (use of tone) and non-inflections, 85 The written form of Tibetan language is different from Chinese in that: 1) the Chinese have vertical and horizontal strokes that are not seen in Tibetan, 2) Chinese is pictographic while Tibetan is phonetic, and 3) Chinese writing is originally vertical but

Tibetan was horizontal when it was not affected by Chinese imperial writing style. Some scholars asserted the Tibetan alphabets were an adaptation from Sanskrit. 86 The emergence of a language determined the impossibility of Tibetans' cultural integration with the bigger Chinese family.

Religion: It is not a hyperbole that the Tibetan culture is a culture of religion. A general view concerning Tibetan Buddhism holds that it was during the 640's, also in Songtsan Ganpo's rule, that Buddhism was introduced to Tibet. The King's most famous wives, one from China's Tang Dynasty (618-907) and the other from Nepal, both brought with them as dowry many Buddhist classics and donated much to the construction of centers for Buddhist worship. 87 But Chinese scholars believe Buddhist did not set foot in Tibet until the Reign of Chisong Dezan (742-797), who ordered the construction of the Sanyie Temple in a true sense of Buddhism and converted the first group of people to Buddhism. 88

Both Han Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism are from Mahayana. Their differences can be briefly summed up in the following: 1) Tibetan Buddhism was heavily influenced by the environmental realities of living in a harsh land, severe cold and winds, effects of the rarefied air and geographic isolation. So there was a stronger belief in the supernatural and every person was religious. 89 The Han Buddhism on the other hand tended to lay more emphasis on

man and real life, e.g., Han monks may eat meat lightly and heartedly and volunteer in warfare without restraint, 2) Tibetan Buddhism is an integration of common Buddhism with traditional Bon religion. It is now called Lamaism. It drives every believer into a complete submissive position. Man is born to suffer and he should forebear with sufferings in order to obtain a better rebirth. Contrary to this special religious performance, Han Buddhism encourages people to gain a rebirth by rendering kindness on other people. 3) Theocracy took root in Tibetan governance as a result of officially forced popularization of Buddhism. This so-called "harmonious blend of religion and politics" 90 put a Dalai Lama on a position of king. Each reincarnation of a Dalai Lama is a choice of a new ruler. Han Buddhism has never been a dominant force in governance though some emperors claimed to be Buddhist believers. What had guided the ruling class was the doctrine of Confucianism. Some non-Chinese scholars assumed that Confucianism had prevented Buddhism from flourishing in Han areas. The encounter between these two schools was not merely a matter of conflicting metaphysics or ethics, it was a clash between two different patterns of living, each with its own schedule of objectives, classes and privileges. The outcome was the Buddhist minority in China and majority in Tibet. 91

Social customs: Scholars of Tibetan culture anonymously admit that religion had pervaded all aspects of life in Tibet. The deeply religion-hued everyday life and social

customs would have to deviate from the man-oriented society in the central plains of China. There being too many to be covered in this short thesis, only one aspect concerning the birth, marriage and death of men is discussed herewith for a glimpse of differences in social customs.

A child, no matter it is a boy or a girl, is born to a Tibetan family without necessarily inheriting the family's name. This means Tibetans have no family names. Hans, on the other hand, are perhaps too picky about family names. A small number of aristocratic Tibetans may have their birth place or fief for surnames. Louis King, counsel of the Great Britain in Tibet in early 1920's, had noted stories told by his Tibetan wife who said that Tibetans in areas bordering on Han-inhabited places had long before adopted Han surnames. She herself, born to an aristocratic family, had a surname of Sun. 92

Most Tibetans bear names given by monks. They can be classified into these following groups: 1) religious: Quzhen (magic lamp), Duo jie (Buddha's warrior attendant), Qianba (Maitreya), 2) auspicious: Dejie (fortune), Zhaxi (auspicious), Ciren (longevity), 3) of expectation: Lobu (precious), Wangqiu (rich and noble), Duoqin (powerful man), 4) of natural elements: Nima (the sun), Jiakuo (the sea), dwa (the moon). 93

In regard of mate choice and marriage, Tibetans are more liberal than Hans. Tibetan women enjoy considerable freedom.

They are never segregated or expected to be bashful in the way law or customs decreed in other parts of China. 94

Polyandry was noted by all writers on Tibetan culture. Chinese official publications in 1980's also mentioned it, but pointed out it used to exist only among landlords or serf owners for the purpose of keeping wealth or inheriting family titles. Polyandry was often practised by a woman taking more than one husbands by marrying not only the man she had been betrothed to but his brothers, sometimes father and his sons. The children of such a union were considered to be the issue of the eldest of the group, to whom the mother first married, and his brothers, even if they were in fact the fathers of some of the children, would be called uncles by all. When the wife retired with one of the men, his boots were left outside the door. Others would retreat.

Tibetans believe that after a person dies there is a critical period of 49 days before the beginning of the next birth. A proper rebirth requires the conduct of certain prescribed rituals during the interim period. Upon a death, monks are called in to perform these rituals. If it can be afforded, these monks will stay with the body, in shifts, throughout the 49 days. 95 Then the body would be taken out by sort of professional carriers. They left the body on top of a specific mountain for the vultures or beasts of prey. Very often they would cut up the body to make it easier for the animals to consume. A few days later the place would be revisited, the remaining bones would be

crushed to a powder so that nothing of the body is left. Disgusted with Hans' ground burial, Tibetans would only let those who died by violence or from leprosy be deserted deep into the earth. 96

ART AND LITERATURE: There are almost no literary or artistic works that do not reflect religious concerns in Tibet. Tibetan art and literature is a mixture of the native and imported elements. This does draw Tibetans farther from the Hans. Tibetan art is already well-known throughout the world. Its literature is no less diversified and beautiful than Hans'. Tibetan legends attribute the creation of human beings to a heavenly god incarnated in a monkey and its mate, a female demon on earth, 97 while the Hans' legends trace their roots to a tribe chieftain Fuxi and his sister Nuwa, about five thousand years ago when a disastrous flood engulfed people except the brother and sister taking refuge in a gourd. 98 Tibetan poetry is little affected by Han poetry, too. The world-level epic "Gatsar" outshines Han literature in particular. With 1.5 million lines totalling several ten millions of words, the epic describes a legendary hero, King Gatsar, in the 11th century in his warfare against aggression and evil.

With these cultural differences, the Tibetans became more and more culturally conscious in front of the Han nationality as well as the whole world. This can be found in Prof. Namkhai Norbu's "historical treatise": THE NECKLACE OF GZI. This Tibetan scholar in exile refused mildly almost all

foreign elements in regard of the origin of Tibetan people, Tibetan language, Tibetan religion and Tibetan country. 99

Even if people accepted the alleged Genocide in Tibet had led to a racial sentiment against Hans, it would still mean some sentiment only from the Tibetan upperclass who were deprived of various kinds of privileges in Tibet. But cultural damage is quite different, it is real and it hurts the feelings of the ordinary people. Tibetans' grievance against Hans is more cultural than racial. THE RED STAR OVER TIBET may remind Americans of the book THE RED STAR OVER CHINA by Edgar Snow in 1930's. But the Tibetan writer reversed Snow's opinion of Chinese communists. The last chapter of the book was FLIGHT TO FREEDOM, in which the author's mother explained the reasons for her flight after Han officials mobilized Tibetans in rejecting the reactionary monks: "I can not exist without practising my faith." "What hope is there for me when I am not allowed to prepare the future path along which I alone have to travel after death?" 100 Fifteen years later, the same author came to denounce "indoctrination, hard labour and religious persecution" during the cultural revolution. 101

Another Tibetan, who was also a graduate from the Beijing Central Minority Institute and later a reporter with the Tibet Daily described in the same feeling how the Red Guards destroyed temples and cultural relics, banned the portraits of the Dalai Lama, forced the nomads to cut short their longer hair, etc.. 102

The March Riot convinced people of the mob's motives driven by a strong cultural consciousness. Most involved were young lamas and young people, a group of people a Taiwanese writer called "the generation enlightened by Western culture", who are more or less inoblivious to a new world trend for cultural identification among ethnic groups.

What Is Beyond Ethnic and Culture

But there are some other phenomena that neither racial grievances nor cultural destruction could provide us with a satisfactory explanation.

First of all, if people were justified to denounce the communists' activities in the cultural revolution, they can find little to prove that the Hans have evoked a cultural persecution today in Tibet. On the contrary, the Chinese government had made tremendous efforts to improve Tibet. In early 1980's, the late party-secretary Hu Yaobang went to Tibet and initiated about 40 cultural construction projects. The Tibetan governor, Duojie Cairang, said in his report to a conference that the subsidies that the central government offered to Tibet averaged 500 yuan per capita annually, higher than those offered to other autonomous regions. 103

In Religion: The Tibetan government had allocated more than 24 million yuan (Chinese dollars) since 1980 in special funds to rebuild or renovate monasteries. By 1987, more than 200 monasteries and over 700 sutra reciting halls had been

rebuilt and opened as houses of worship for more than 14,000 monks and nuns. The monks had their farm land and each of them receives an average of more than 500 yuan a year in alms. To improve education in Buddhism, a Tibetan Academy of Buddhism was founded in 1983 and an Academy of Tibetan Buddhism in Beijing chaired by the Panchen Lama was founded in 1986. Another two Buddhist associations also came into being in the 1980's. A magazine of Tibetan Buddhism had printed several millions of sutra. 104

Development in other cultural aspects might have grown faster owing to their continuance even during the cultural revolution.

Education: A table (see Table 4) based on Taiwan-collected data shows the rapid increase of numbers of schools and students in Tibet. Beijing Review had commented: "Before 1951 there was not a single school in the modern sense in Tibet. What there was were some old-styled private village schools." 105 The illiteracy rate had dropped from over 98% in 1951 to a little over 60% in 1987. 106 Tibetan students were also sent to the United States, one is now in MSU.

Use of Tibetan language: The British magazine The Economist published an article entitled "Speaking our Own Language" by its special correspondent in Lhasa who spoke in a sarcastic tone of a designation approved by the Tibet's legislature that "the major language would be Tibetan" in Tibet. 107 To him, it was the first time that Tibetan was

Table 4 Education Development Over 40 Years in Tibet

Year	Primary School	Middle School	Tech School	College	# of Students
-1951	10	0	0	0	N/A
1959	13	1	0	1	2500
1965	1822	4	1	1	71775
1975	4865	27	23	3	N/A
1977	6000	30	20	3	200000
1980	6431	55	29	4	N/A
1981	6266	55	30	4	240000
1984	2542	55	13	3	145499
1986	2388	64	14	4	148000

Source: Beijing Review, Dec. 7-13, 1987
 Wei, E, The Study of Present Conditions
 In Tibet, (Taipei, Taiwan), 1986

Note: Data between 1959 and 1984 are based on
 The Study of Present Conditions In Tibet

Data between 1975 and 1984 are questionable
 as it was the period of cultural revolution
 When irregular Workers' Universities or
 Peasants' Universities were opened.

Data of 1951 & 1986 come from Beijing Review.

recognized as the official language. This is not true. An American scholar named Israel Epstein repudiated some ideas like this with his personal experience in Tibet as a press specialist. 108 The learning of the Tibetan language by Han cadres was required by the People's Liberation Army authorities in early 1950's. The Tibetan government stipulated in 1956 that all documents be translated into both Han Mandarin and Tibetan, and conferences or meetings at all levels use Tibetan as the first official language. 109 In primary school, pupils attend both Tibetan and Mandarin classes. Middle schools mostly use text books in Tibetan language and colleges offer Tibetan courses. What might be seen as problematic is that on condition that Tibetans study mainly Tibetan in their language classes, they are required to study Mandarin. In schools where conditions are permitted, foreign languages (like English) are also taught. Bilingual phenomena are seen everywhere in Tibet: the names of streets, official documents, radio and TV broadcasting, newspapers, etc..

Mass media: In April 1956, the first newspaper in Tibet, Tibet Daily, came into being and was edited in Chinese and Tibetan separately. The newspaper now enjoys an average daily circulation of 50,000. The Tibet People's Press was set up in 1971. Up to the end of 1983, 194 kinds of books totalling 12 million words were published by the press, of which 123 kinds were in Tibetan, making up 63% of the books total and 77% of the words total. 110 If publications in

Tibetan by the Nationality Press in Beijing were also included, the number would be much bigger. Radio broadcasting started in January 1959. The Tibet Radio Station aired programs to Tibetans abroad in February 1964. From 1966, the Station was charged with overseas broadcasting of Hindi language. In 1973, broadcasting programs were divided into two for Chinese listeners and Tibetan listeners. In 1978, a special radio program was devoted to people in Changdu Prefecture in Changdu dialect.

111 Tibet TV was born in Lhasa in 1976. Tibet TV broadcasting began in late 1977. 1979 saw color TV in Tibet. In 1987, the Central TV in Beijing began airing programs in Tibetan specially for Tibetan-inhabited areas.

Art and Literature: Modern institutions of art or literature were not existent in Lhasa in early 1950's. The first professional organization of performing arts, the Tibet Song and Dance Ensemble, was established in 1956 and soon became one of the most famous throughout the country. Now similar troupes make up to 13 in addition to many art and cultural centers scattered in every prefecture and city in Tibet. A school of arts was set up in 1979. Two magazines Tibet Arts and Tibet Mass Arts are popular among Tibetans. A special organization in charge of historical sites and cultural relics began functioning in 1959.

Table 5 lists medical development in Tibet and compares it with that in other parts of China. It is easy to find in

Table 5 Development of Tibet's Health Service 1958-1984

Item	1958		1965	
	Tibet	Whole Country	Tibet	Whole Country
Medical Establishments	43	122954	193	224266
Bed	174	462000	1631	1033000
Per 1000 people	0.15	0.71	1.19	1.42
Doctors	247	547000	987	763000
Per 1000 people	0.2	0.84	0.72	1.05

Tibet	1978		1984		Increase in 84 over 78	
	Whole Country	Tibet	Whole Country	Tibet	Whole Country	Tibet
855	166932	928	198256	22	0.6	
4421	2042000	4619	2412000	27	5	
2.48	2.12	2.35	2.33	16	3	
2738	1033000	3566	1381000	14	3	
1.54	1.08	1.82	1.34	9	0.6	

Source: The Statistical Year Book of China (1986) and
A General Survey of Tibet's Economy (1965-85)

Note: Figures for the whole country in the 1958
column are based on the 1957 materials.

this table that the Tibetans are rather privileged in cultural development.

All these evidence showed that Tibetan culture had been flourishing instead of "becoming something only read about in the library." (see Note 46) When We relate these cultural developments to the March Riot, we may feel, much like the feeling of a reporter with the Christian Century (magazine) in 1987 when demonstrations accelerated, that: "The demonstrations were ill-timed, for China has been trying to make up for the atrocities that took place during the cultural revolution." 112 So, the March Riot looks remote from the cultural damages.

More puzzling was that the riots would not happen until twenty years later after the worst damages done to Tibetan culture during the cultural revolution. Being a chaos, the cultural revolution had given reins to all emotions. The Dalai Lama and his men were most active at that time, too. But the local Tibetans' response was too small to compare with the March Riot. The "people's resistance" in the cultural revolution in Kunsang Paljor's interpretation was only a few secret murders by the revenging upperclass and the so-called "armed struggle" was between confronting sects of the Red Guards. 113

If another phase of the cultural atrocity during the cultural revolution is disclosed, the alleged Tibetan cultural crusade against Hans is more mystic. The 10th Panchen Lama, a most revered spiritual leader and "true

friend" of the communist party, was a righteous and outspoken person. He suffered a lot during the cultural revolution. In his last public speech on January 17, 1989, he spoke of the cultural revolution as a "disaster not only for Tibetans but for the entire country's 56 nationalities," and that "The disaster was neither directed against the Tibetans nor was it a campaign launched by Hans against Tibetan culture." 114 He said the cultural relics and the monasteries were destroyed mainly by the Tibetan masses inspired by the revolutionary zeal. These remarks could be proved true by the book TIBET, THE UNDYING FLAME, in which Tibetans were divided into two opposite groups vying to destroy the "four olds". 115 The real situation being like this, why should Hans alone take the blame for the destruction? The Han and other nationality business men, the victims of the March Riot, had completely nothing to do with cultural destruction, either.

If their hatred of Hans since the cultural revolution can be well let off, Tibetans should not let go those Tibetans who are working with Hans at all levels of government. On the contrary, they never attacked these "lackeys of the hans". The biggest "traitor", Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, was not accused even by the Dalai Lama personally. 116 This aristocrat led the resistant army and was defeated by the PLA. Captured, he volunteered to persuade the Dalai Lama to negotiate with the central government. He signed the 17-

point agreement, which is still considered by Tibetan exiles to have sold out Tibetan independence. He supported the central government in smashing the 1959 uprising. The Panchen Lama is another example. He was among the first to hail the Chinese victory in 1949 and asked for Tibetan liberation. He denounced the "Tibetan lazybones" while analyzing the riots in 1987. He criticized the Dalai Lama of his independent ideas. He violated one of the strictest Buddhist principles by marrying a Han woman. But these could not sway Tibetans' respect for him. When all these phenomena are brought to light, people could not help asking a simple question: why do the puritan-like cultural defenders tolerate traitors of their culture when they sacrifice everything including their lives to fight against the "destroyers of their culture"?

In order to seek an answer to this puzzlement and also to seek an explanation of the culture vs. riot dilemma, it is necessary to leave the Riot aside and go into history for a brief review of Tibetan relations with Hans and other nationalities over one thousand years.

It is acknowledged that Tibetan-Han official contact began in 641 A.D. with the Tang Princess' marriage to Tsongsan Gangbo. But the nature of Tibetan-Han relationship was best depicted in a treaty two centuries later. The treaty was carved on three pillars and preserved in Changan (capital of the Tang Dynasty), at the Tang-Tubot (Tibet) border and in Lhasa. It proclaimed a "unity between the

Uncle (Tang) and the Nephew (Tibet)". 117 The uncle-nephew alliance showed on the one hand Han-Tibetan relations were really close and on the other hand the Tibetans were always reluctant to see their kingdom annexed by Han rulers.

But Tibetan relationship with China as a whole was completely different once the country was ruled by minorities. This has happened twice in history. In the 13th century, under the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1279-1367), the then already multinational realm of China was reunified with Tibet organically included. Kublai Khan, the noted Yuan emperor, appointed Phagspa, a leading Tibetan lama, as the regional ruler under the court of Beijing. A unified system of administrative divisions, military garrisons and currency prevailed throughout the country including Tibet. 118

During the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty (1616-1911), Tibet became once again an integral part of China. In 1720, the Manchu armies entered Lhasa, bringing with them imperial officials charged with administrative reorganization of the area. The lay-clerical administration (the Kasbag) was then affirmed and celebrated by instructions from Beijing. The Dalai Lama and the Kasbag members were subject to central control through high commissioners (ambans) in Lhasa. 119

Tibetan-Chinese history denied what the 14th Dalai Lama had reiterated that "there were many signs of de facto Tibetan independence. a big country (China) bullying a little one (Tibet)." 120 But another question may arise from the Tibetan-Chinese history: Why could Han-Tibetan

relations not be closer and happier during a span of 13 centuries than the 400 years of minority rule in China? The question is more acute with a historical fact that cultures from Mongols and Manchus were apparently backward, brutal and more alien to Tibetans, if compared with the Han culture, a fact that the Dalai Lama admitted. 121

Mental Make-up vs. Ethnic and Culture

In Han-Tibetan relations, explanations for ethnic conflicts based on cultural differences are far from being adequate.

Some anthropologists and communications scholars from China have been taking pains to break new ground for Han-minority studies. The representative of them is Dr. Fai Hsiao-tung. 122 He pointed out in 1980 that "A commonly shared mental make-up manifested in a community of culture is extremely important in our distinguishing an ethnic group from another." and that "This characteristic might be more important than other characteristics in constituting and sustaining the ethnic community." 123 Taking his ideas as one starting-point, Chinese scholars proceed with the study of communication patterns and communication behaviors among 56 nationalities, especially those involving Han-minority relations. They have found out that an ethnic group of people is so distinguished from others mainly by a community of language, a community of territory, a community of

economic life and a community of mental make-up, that mental make-up and culture are not equal and independent of each other but the first is manifested in the latter, and that on many occasions it is mental make-up instead of cultural differences that affects communications between two ethnic groups. 124

The Formation of Mental Make-up

A community of mental make-up is a seemingly abstract but substantial state of mind existing in the ideology of a group of people, felt consciously or unconsciously by that group of people in their contacts among themselves or with other groups of people. 125

There are three factors that deal with the formation of mental make-up. First, it comes into being after the establishment of a nation where a community of language, territory, and economic life are remarkably developed. A language knowledgeable to a group of people enables them to exchange ideas and emotions and consequently gives rise to a sense of common identity. They begin to feel "we are of the same kind." The community of territory prolong and extend contacts between the group members, breeding unconsciously kinship among group members when in contacts with other groups. A community of economic life has similar effect in reinforcing the kinship within members of a group of people.

Secondly, given that the formation of mental make-up is a long process, it could not be exempted from a group of people's traditions and social customs. Traditions and customs refer to a stereotyped habitual force of a human society that emerged with people's struggle against natural threats and other people's oppression. Through these struggles, the group of people felt the necessity of unity. This knowledge would sublimate and become part of a mental make-up of the group. Finally, religion provides a set of social and moral principles, values, beliefs and concepts that guide a group of people's thinking and behavior. They would all serve to cast the later coming mental make-up.

The Implications of Mental Make-up

In view of racial or ethnic unity, mental make-up serves as a centripetal force. It safeguards a nation or a group of people against any challenge on their survival as a distinctive ethnic or racial entity. It stimulates the whole group to resist aggression and to share responsibility in construction of their nation. But, ethnic centripetrality also reduces centripetality of a multi-ethnic country. It is therefore a barrier to interethnic communication and sometimes to ethnic equality within a country.

In regard of every member of the national community, mental make-up helps foster egoism in a group member which is identical with that in any other member of the same

group. Such an egoism has two layers of meaning. First it refers to a community member's knowledge of commonality between him and other members of his community. Secondly it refers to his knowledge of the difference between his community and other community. Through individual egoism, mental make-up arouses in the group of people an ethnic pride, confidence and dignity. When it feels superior, it may not much mind some alien existence within the group. When it feels endangered, it will resist alien factors. When it feels inferior, it will either resist foreign influences or adopt foreign influences.

The formation of mental make-up could not be avoid of a community of language and territory, but a kinship bred with mental make-up might later exceed territory and even language. For example. A group of Mongols were sent by the Yuan Emperor to defend an important pass on China's southern border located in today's Yunan Province. Several centuries of isolation from the mainstay of Mongols made them changed in language, clothing, social customs and even physical features. But they cherish a strong and affectionate feeling for Mongolians in the north and are in turn fraternally treated by the Mongolians.

In terms of spiritual life, there exists unanimity among members of a same group. This is concerned with legends on the origin of the group, the explanation of natural phenomena, the belief in certain god or gods, etc..

The Manifestations of Mental Make-up

Seemingly elusive or unfathomable, mental make-up is not easy to be realized by people. But when we come to the cultural factors overhanging an ethnic or racial community, we can ascertain its existence. As it is mentioned earlier, culture is the major and direct manifestation of mental make-up. That is to say, culture is the form in which mental make-up exposes itself. Not mental make-up per se.

According to Porter and Samovar (1982), culture is defined as the deposit of knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, timing, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a large group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving. They also declare that culture manifests itself in patterns of language and in forms of activity and behavior that act as models for both the common adaptive acts and the styles of communication that enable people to live in a society within a given geographic environment at a given state of technical development at a particular moment in time.

This makes clear the difference between culture and mental make-up. Since a culture is known to the world by patterns of language and forms of acts in conformity to a certain set of beliefs, values, concepts etc., a mental make-up is presented to people by the culture out of which

it grows. Other specific aspects such as aesthetic standards, national characters, historical traditions, literature and arts, which combine to constitute a culture are mere the more concrete aspects of its manifestation. Take aesthetics for example, mental make-up is reflected in Hans who regard yellow as supremacy, in Tibetans who appreciate white, in the French who prefer blue and pink, in some Africans who admire black.

Tibetans' Mental Make-up in Relation to Hans and Other Minorities

Centuries of social, economic and cultural development in relative isolation bred in Tibetans' mind a strong belief in what they have perceived, what they have valued and what they have put in behavioral principles. Such distinctive features that are often referred to as cultural characteristics have distanced Tibetans farther and farther from Hans and gradually brought forth a seemingly unfathomed sentiment or state of mind that in turn not only obstinately sustain the cultural differences but also prescribes a limit to Tibetan cultural exchanges and cultural fusion with Hans and other peoples around.

It is owing to their mental make-up that Tibetans take much pride in their culture and therefore: 1) try every means to minimize influences from other cultures on their culture, 2) bravely resisted modern colonialism with a

mighty strength incompatible with their small number of people in a homogeneous society in late 1890's and early 1900's, when huge countries like India and China were colonized or semi-colonized. Their resistance against the British and Russians are even highly appreciate by Hans, 126 3) appear more willing to cooperate with some people in the world whose purpose for preserving the Tibetan culture was almost similar to that of some rare animals or historical ruins. 127

It is their mental make-up that drove the majority Tibetans into unconditional obedience to the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and other living Buddhas. These handful of people are not only the symbol of internal unity but also a spiritual backing in confrontation with outside forces. They remain protectors of Tibetans' accustomed way of life even though these people and the whole aristocrat class have violated the strict religious principles, deprived them of basic human rights, or even "betrayed" their own "country". A strong sense of "being of the same kind" overcame their resentment against these deviations when in front of their common enemy --- "the destroyers of their belief". If Hans still seemed to be thousand miles afar, the Tibetans might not have been so tolerable among themselves, like the situation in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when, according to historical records, most of the Dalai Lamas were short lived, dying as victims of internal strifes when the Ming emperors loosened their tight on Tibet. 128 Now, in order

to face up to Hans, the Tibetan upper class got united around their spiritual leader as they feel safe with the Dalai Lama.

The Chinese government is getting aware that the mere presence or absence of one person will make a complete difference. 129 From 1959 through the end of 1970's, the Dalai Lama were denounced as a rebellion bandit. Later, he was sorted out of the rebellious aristocrats. In early 1980's, the central government called for his return, but in condition that he stay in Beijing. Now they allow him to settle in Lhasa only if he gives up Tibetan independence. No one now openly criticizes him. Every one knows no one but he can set Tibet in permanent peace.

The harmonious relations between Tibetans and Mongols and Manchus in Chinese history is explainable with Tibetans' mental make-up. Both Mongols and Manchus were former subjects of the Han rulers and had paid tributes. Their rule of China undoubtedly raised the national status of Tibetans, psychologically if not substantially, making them feel no longer inferior. Actually, Tibetans enjoyed more political and cultural privileges under their rule. During the reign of Kublai Khan, a celebrated lama named Phagspa (1235-1280) was honored by emperors with titles like the "spiritual tutor", "state preceptor", "king of the great and precious law," etc.. Phagspa created a new "quadratic" script based on Tibetan alphabet for the Mongols. Lamaism was also accepted as the religion of the Yuan Dynasty. 130 In 1652,

the 5th Dalai Lama was invited to Beijing by the Qing emperor. His title as Dalai (Mongolian meaning the vast sea) Lama (Tibetan meaning the supreme mentor) was first confirmed imperially and offered a gold seal. 131 But, when it was with Hans, the Tibetans were always on guard, fearing the overwhelming Han culture would swallow them up.

The March Riot reflected partially how Tibetan mental make-up had worked. With so many Hans and other nationalities running businesses in Lhasa, with so many different languages, so many different clothes, they were psychologically disturbed. Their own homogeneous features were diminishing. Although the Hans had done nothing wrong in Tibet by opening businesses, Tibetans would beat them any way because they did not like to see those potential threats to their culture.

The Hans' Failure in Communicating with Tibetans

The Tibetans started to cry for independence at the notorious Simla Conference in India at the direction of the British in 1913. Of the six demands put forward by the Tibetan delegation, the first was "Tibetan independence".

132 At the same time, the Dalai Lama began a purge of opponents. Pro-Han elements were sought out and punished, including thousands of monks. Lay aristocrats in opposition were unceremoniously dumped into the dungeon under the Potala Palace. 133 A British special agent named Ford

killed a living Buddha named Geda with poisoned tea when the latter was on the way to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama for liberation of Tibet in 1950. 134

Under such circumstances, the Chinese communists' policy towards Tibet was both absolute and cautious. This accounted for their success in the 1950's. The cultural revolution in 1966 was a watershed in communist policy making, since during and after that period, cultural contacts ceased to go through a consistent but gradual process with full consideration of Tibetans' capability to endure the Han influence. Too much confident in their intention that they were doing all good for Tibetans, the communists had gone beyond what that people's mental make-up would allow them to accept. The result was misunderstanding, suspicion, conflict and warfare. The March Riot indicated an ultimate form of Han-Tibetan conflict, but not the only form for the struggle.

To study how Han-Tibetan relations turned from good to bad under communist rule and examine how Tibetans were affected mentally and psychologically during the process, it is necessary to compare some communist policies at different periods of time and analyze the features of the policies.

the 1950's: Flexible Policies for Tibet

The Chinese communists were rather successful in applying the class theory into ethnic relations within China

in the 1950's and opened a new phase in ethnic and intercultural communication. The late Chairman Mao had said: "National (ethnic) struggle is in the end class struggle." To do what he wished, the communists made efforts in the following aspects: 1) Propagate the slogan: "Poor people among Hans and Tibetans are from one family." The poor people of Hans were exploited and oppressed by national bourgeoisie and imperialists. The Tibetans poor had the same fate under the Tibetan aristocrats and religious forces. Ethnic discrimination and oppression came upon both peoples as a result of the ruling classes feuding for power. Poor people from both sides should get united for mutual liberation. In doing so, the communists laid aside the ethnic and cultural differences existing between two nationalities for centuries and won over the ordinary Tibetans, who made up of more than 80% of the Tibetans population.

2) Based on the class line, the communists called on people to "go to the root and criticize Han Chauvinist ideas, namely the reactionary ideas characteristic of Kuomintang." 135 In this way they washed hands off the wrong doings of Hans to minorities in the past centuries, posing a new image as the true saver of all nationalities and dispelling Tibetan's suspicion of Hans as a whole.

3) They split up and demoralized the upper class in Tibet. Knowing that Tibetan people had a strong feeling for the spiritual leaders and the aristocrats due to the same

cultural root, the communists took a wait-while-persuade attitude with a work focus on the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. They would rather delay the "reform" than offend the upper class. The result was that ordinary Tibetans and a big number of the upper class did not get involved in the 1959 uprising and the uprising was easily crushed.

4) Political reform was separated from cultural reform. The political reform known as "Democratic Reform" was enforced soon after the 1959 uprising. But, Tibetan culture and Tibetan way of life were untouched except for some monasteries that took part in the uprising. At the same time, the communists opened schools, ran youth clubs, sent Tibetan children to schools in other provinces and invited Tibetan delegations to visit other provinces, for the purpose of cultivating a sense of new culture in Tibet. To these, Tibetans showed no signs of repugnance.

1960's and 1970's: Rigid Class Struggle

The initial success enabled Hans to stay in Tibet. But, from the March Riot, we perceive that Tibetans do not so much appreciate Hans there as they used to. The reasons for the change of attitude can be that the endless class struggle and other political movements had got too many people involved and criticized, and that political movements were too much mixed up with cultural preservation.

1) When old class enemies were cleared out, new enemies would have to be created, just as what the extreme leftists had done elsewhere in China. This shook the fragile recognition by ordinary Tibetans of the "Mother China". The story of Wangyal was exemplary. He was a poor peasant entrusted to a cooking task for the administrative faculty in a district. His carelessness one day caused a fire in the office building. He was accused of hating the people's government. With a physical persecution in sight, the poor guy fled to join the Dalai Lama in India. 136

2) Radical measures aimed at eliminating the "Four Olds" were randomly applied throughout China during the cultural revolution without any ethnic or cultural discrimination. All but a few temples and tombs with historic significance were ruined. The Hans, who suffered most severely, did not care much, but the Tibetans were frightened to see a cultural extinction.

3) Communist criticism of Tibetan social and cultural system backfired later on. Planned to awaken people's consciousness against the upper class, the communists described Tibet as "the most savageous, darkest and reactionary." 137 Under this sort of propaganda, children sent to study in Beijing often felt being humiliated. The more educated they were, the more resentful of these allegations. To get rid of the sense of inferiority, Tibetan students resorted to many forms of actions. 138 A number of the graduates who went to join the Dalai Lama showed the

communist failure in brain-wash. The March Riot also saw educated young lamas and college students among the demonstrators.

the 1980's: Han Nationalism

The recent ten years of economic reform saw drastic change of Han attitude towards Han-minority relations. Going away from the principle of "the unity of all nationalities" and the class struggle theory, Hans, especially those from the intellectual circles are blindly pursuing a narrow-minded and short-sighted Han nationalism. The March Riot is in part an indirect consequence of the flagrant drive.

Two movies about Tibet demonstrated this change. THE SERF in the 1960's exposed the cruelty of the upper class in Tibet. Real and emotional, it stimulated a nationwide sympathy for the Tibetan people. THE HEARTLESS SWEETHEART in 1985, which was declared to contribute to Tibetan culture, stirred up a sensational protest even before it was released. It was a lovestory between two young people caught in a family feud. Without any hint on time, place and history, the pure fabrication revealed a most primitive and savageous life in Tibet and hurt sharply Tibetan people's feelings. Students in Beijing organized a mass

demonstration, something rare in early 1980's China. The Panchen Lama also denounced it as sabotaging national unity.

The revival of Han nationalism is on the most part due to the communists' new political drive to reunite the country with Taiwan. This reunification, as defined by a veteran Kuomintang official and recognized by communists, is a reunification of two parts of China by a culture shared by people on both sides of the Taiwan strait. 139 I have been watching closely what is going on in Chinese newspapers. A brief content analysis was done on three months of the People's Daily. (overseas edition, Sept. 88, Dec. 88, April 89) Outcomes of the analysis are shown in two tables. (see Tables 6 & 7) Through these three periods of time, we can find these following trends in China's policy making concerning nationalism:

- 1) Nationality-policy priority goes to Taiwan, where most people are of Han origin and still use the same language and cherish similar cultural traditions. News and reports on Tibetans and other nationalities are incomparable with those on Taiwan both in number and space. Not included in this analysis is a page devoted in each day's edition to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.

- 2) Emphasis was put on Han ethnic kinship and Han culture in the reunification propaganda. If the Chinese leaders argue that a relatively smaller coverage of Tibetan affairs does not imply their neglect of Tibetans and other

Table 6 Demonstration of Han Nationalism Relative to Taiwan
(September 1988, December 1988, & April 1989)

Category	Articles		% Articles Tol			Space (sq.cm.)		% Space Tol				
	Sept.	Dec.	April	Sept.	Dec.	April	Sept.	Dec.	April			
Ethnic Kinship	9	14	4	15.5	31.8	9.1	1160	2173	439	13.0	35.4	9.4
Personal Relations	1	2	2	1.7	4.5	4.5	432	266	320	4.9	4.3	6.9
legislative contacts	0	2	2	0.0	4.5	4.5	0	156	220	0.0	2.5	4.7
Cultural Contacts	24	11	13	41.4	25.0	29.5	4582	1605	1282	51.5	26.1	27.5
Political Contacts	16	7	4	27.6	15.9	9.1	2011	989	450	22.6	16.1	9.6
Economic Contacts	4	6	6	6.9	13.6	13.6	385	726	509	4.3	11.8	10.9
Religious Contacts	1	0	6	1.7	0.0	13.6	45	0	642	0.5	0.0	13.8
Sports Contacts	3	1	7	5.2	2.3	15.9	282	20	802	3.2	0.3	17.2
Others	0	1	0	0	2.3	0.0	0	208	0	0.0	3.4	0.0

Total	58	44	44	100.0	99.9	99.8	8897	6143	4664	100.0	99.9	100.0

Source: The writer's compilation from People's Daily (o.e.)
Sept. 1988, Dec. 1988, & April 1989

Table 7 People's Daily's News Coverage of Taiwan and Minority Groups
September 1988, December 1988, & April 1989

Category	# of Articles				% of Articles Total			
	Sept.	Dec.	April	Total	Sept.	Dec.	April	Total
Taiwan	58	44	44	146	71.6	67.7	61.1	67.0
Tibetan	4	9	23	36	4.9	13.8	31.9	16.5
Mongolian	1	0	3	4	1.2	0.0	4.2	1.8
Others	18	12	2	32	22.2	18.5	2.8	14.7

Total	81	65	72	218	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: The writer's compilation from People's Daily (o.e.)
September 1988, December 1988, & April 1989

nationalities, the Hans' attitude towards Taiwanese has at least distanced other nationalities.

3) A decline in article numbers and space of the two categories mentioned in 2) is evident in columns for April following the March Riot, while reports on Tibet and other nationalities have increased. This change is meaningful in that the Chinese authorities have already felt the negative effects of the cultural reunion propaganda.

What could not be contained in the tables are the Han frenzies that go beyond people's imagination. To strengthen Taiwanese consanguinity with Hans in the mainland, a grand reconstruction of the tombs of Yan and Huang (legendary emperors of the Han race) were launched, organized by provincial party leaders and joint by people from Taiwan. To warm the compatriots' hearts, governments at all levels have granted home returning Taiwanese including murderers and war criminals in communist black-list with privileges ranging from low cost of air tickets to free transportation vehicles. To show how faithfully they are protecting Han culture, the communists lavished money on Confucianist ceremonies. To show their patriotic piety, these communist atheists opened sea ports in spite of the threat from the Taiwan navy to let in god whorshippers. 140

No one has ever estimated how much impact these shameless flirt with Taiwan at any cost has had on Tibetans and other nationalities. But there is an undeniable fact that there have been more outcries from other nationalities

for demands of all sorts. The Ugurs' demand for a nuclear free zone in northwest of China, the Muslims demonstration against the publication of an insulting book, the Manchus request for more ethnic identity, the Tibetans' March Riot, etc.. All these seem to show other nationalities would also like to follow suit and go their own way in the "big family".

The Chinese communists is now on the way of awakening. The People's Daily agenda is found reset after the March Riot, when 1) reports on Taiwan is deliberately decreased, 2) emphasis on Han kinship and cultural acknowledgement is annulled, 3) information about other nationalities especially about Tibet have remarkably increased. On the other hand, the newspaper has done the following jobs in April: 1) issuing a new call for talks with the Dalai Lama from the minister of United Front Ministry, who admitted that the Dalai Lama's presence in Tibet would help with Tibetan stability, 141 2) giving eminent space to new archaeological discoveries in favour of Han-Tibetan racial closeness. 142 3) launching a new wave of criticism of the shallow allegation that Hans were decedents of the dragon. 143 All these changes are owed to the bloodshed in the March Riot.

Conclusion

The March Riot, a term the writer of the thesis gives to the three days of unrest in Lhasa of Tibet, is an extraordinary incident in China's social life. Occurring in a country where 56 nationalities live together and at a time when the country is pursuing an opening policy, the Riot involved several hundreds of Tibetan people, most of whom were young lamas and nuns in smashing shops and harassing people from Han and other non-Tibetan nationalities. The police having failed to crack down on the mob, martial law was imposed in the capital city of Tibet.

Since it was the largest and longest mass riot in Lhasa's contemporary history, since it ended in the first order of martial law throughout the country, the March Riot drew concern from all corners of the world. Various kinds of explanations were given by people holding different views through mass media of the true causes of the Riot. The explanations reflected part of the truth, but some of them were politically or culturally biased.

The writer of this thesis believes the study of the Riot is not limited to the past ten years of China's opening to the world, it should not be limited to the communist rule since 1950 in Tibet, either. To seek the nature of the Riot, people have to go hundreds of years far back into Tibetan-Han relations. Not denying the political factors in facilitating the Riot, the writer also believes that the

Riot epitomized the tension in Han-Tibetan ethnic relations. It happened mostly due to the many cultural differences between Han and Tibetan people and culturally consolidated states of mind possessed respectively by the two nationalities.

Through the case study, the writer of the thesis has found out that the Riot is not a problem of race for race's sake. Cultural differences made the two ethnic groups look at Han-Tibetan history from different angles and evaluate contemporary events concerning their relations in different terms. But, centuries of frequent contacts and relatively successful cultural homogenization in the first two decades of communist rule convinced people that there are some more subtle elements affecting Han-Tibetan relations. This, as the writer has observed, is known as a mental make-up attached to a racial or ethnic group of people and manifested in the community of that group's culture. Mental make-up formulates and adjusts people's evaluation of and attitude towards their own culture and cultures that they have come in contact with. A nation's culture might be belittled, but the nation's pride is not hurt, A nation's pride is hurt, but its culture is not necessarily or really tarnished. The Han-Tibetan relations were unstable in history because the overwhelming Han culture had always kept Tibetans on guard that their own culture not be swallowed up. When minorities came to rule China, Tibetans felt safe in contact with whole China. Good han-Tibetan relations were

found during the first two decades of communist rule in China as Tibetans as well as Hans were made to believe they were building a new culture above Han and Tibetan cultures. The opening policy in the 1980's ushered in an upsurge of Han nationalism for cultural reunification of China with Taiwan. Disillusioned with Hans' selfishness, Tibetans stood up for more ethnic identity.

It is also the writer's discovery in this case study that the March Riot not only exposed Han-Tibetan conflict within China, but also provided much significance for the study of intercultural communications. The traditional intercultural communication studies are found quite limited in scope. When the communist countries are pursuing an opening policy and expanding their contacts with the western world, a new phase of intercultural communications is revealed. As it is discussed in detail in the first chapter, the present world is seen divided into two parts in terms of intercultural communication: the capitalist culture and the communist culture. The communications between these two cultures (e.g., the Chinese vs. the American) would give rise to problems that are more complicated than those involving countries of the same capitalist culture (e.g., American vs. European). Intercultural communication scholars do need to make a fresh start in studying the patterns of communications between the two major cultures. The March Riot may provide them with some instructive clues as the Riot occurred at a time when a communist country was

encouraging the influx of western tourism, western investment and many other western elements into Tibet, and the Riot evoked Lhasa residents' awareness of modern ideas like human rights for the first time in their protests, and the Riot presented to the world a new Tibetan generation "enlightened by modern western culture". The Chinese government may draw a good lesson in how to prevent "capitalist cultural infiltration" while continuing communications with the western countries. The Americans, on the other hand, may also learn how to preserve and popularize what they believe right on condition that the other side does not get offended. Countries or peoples of different cultures should resort to the most basic principle: understanding of the cultural differences.

The intercultural communications between ethnic groups within a country also differ from the communist world to the capitalist world due to the simple fact that in a communist country there are always three cultures affecting communications between any two ethnic cultures and it is always the communist culture that intends to conquer the two local ethnic cultures. In a capitalist country, any minority culture, e.g., the Black culture or the Hispanic culture, tends to conform to the white American culture. The study of March Riot revealed that in a communist country like China the Han-Tibetan relations turned to be good when the communist government called on people to build a common communist culture (such as the situations in the 1950's).

The relations between the Hans and Tibetans or between the Hans and some other minorities appeared problematic when the Hans followed a selfish Han nationalist policy (like the past ten years when the Hans were trying to cury favour with the Taiwanese). The previous chapter all indicated that the March Riot was representative of the change.

The study of the Riot may throw some light on what will really blockade successful communications between ethnic groups and on how different cultures are homogenized within a communist country. Of the three barriers to successful intercultural communications, ethnocentrism is taken as the most detrimental. The writer of this thesis admits it is true in many cases. But ethnocentrism may stop working as a barrier. The western-Japanese relations in the 1800's, the Han-Manchu relations in the 1600's could verify the new idea. The background information on Mongol-Tibetan relations, the Manchu-Tibetan relations, which have been much described in the previous chapters, also supports the new idea. The March Riot itself has shown in particular that when the Tibetans are encouraged spiritually and supported financially than ever in China's history bloody clash between Tibetans and government police took place. The last chapter of the thesis leads people to think of mental make-up of an ethnic group. It may play a role in blackading communications between two ethnic groups. Once the Chinese government gave up efforts to build a new culture, once the government encouraged the Tibetans to go more on their own

way in cultural development and at the same time allowed Hans to retreat to Han nationalism, the Tibetans and other minorities would feel again alienated from the "motherland of China". The March Riot crying for independence has already occurred. More similar events will occur unless the government makes minorities believe that the 56 nationalities in China are still in "one big family".

When the thesis was about to be completed, the writer was surprised to see that this thesis had touched on some very important themes each of which could be developed into a book. The contributions the thesis has made to future intercultural communication studies, if readers think the thesis has any contribution, may be summed up in these following aspects: 1) A new scope of intercultural communications. When traditional theories included intercultural communications between individuals, between groups, between organizations and between nations, this thesis suggests the intercultural communications between the capitalist culture and communist culture. It is not that communication scholars have failed to discover the new sphere, but that the present international relations, which are much improved by communist countries with their opening policy, have unveiled a long existing but unknown culture, in addition to a political system, in the communist world. 2) A new communication pattern between ethnic groups in a communist country. Any two ethnic groups would be faced with three cultures in a communist country, while any minority

ethnic group in a western country conforms to the dominant culture. 3) The significance of mental make-up in affecting intercultural communications between ethnic groups. As it is discussed in this thesis, mental make-up often determines an ethnic group's attitude towards its own culture and other cultures. 4) A re-evaluation of China's minority policy in the past ten years. The March Riot, as a climax of all internal problems after a ten-year implementation of the new political and economic plan, would urge interested scholars to re-examine the possibility of the new policy and compare it to the policy in Mao's era. It is not a pure political matter, for, by studying minority policies at different periods of time in China, people may be able to decide what ideas would facilitate successful communications between ethnic groups in a communist country.

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