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THESIS

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dissertation entitled

A DEVELOPMENTALIST INTERPRETATION
OF ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

presented by

Hope Elizabeth May

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
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A DEVELOPMENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE’S
NICOAMCHEAN ETHICS

By

Hope Elizabeth May

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

2000

ABSTRACT

A DEVELOPIVIENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE’S
NICOAJACHEAN ETHICS

By

Hope Elizabeth May

Aristotle’s chief ethical work, the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), has
given rise to a number of lively scholarly debates. Chief among them, is the
debate about Aristotle’s conception of the human good or eudaimom'a.
Aristotle deﬁnes eudaimonia as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue
(NE lO98a17-l8). But several different kinds of psychic virtues are all
discussed in the NE, viz., ethical virtue and sophia. Unfortunately, it is
unclear whether Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with the combination of
ethical virtue and sophia, or whether he believes that eudaiinonia consists in
the activity of sophia alone. Inclusivists endorse the former alternative,
whereas intellectualists endorse the latter.

Aristotle’s “function argument” (NE lO97b22-1098a18) -- the
argument which leads Aristotle to conclude that eudaimonia is “activity of

the soul in accordance with virtue” -- has become the locus of the dispute

between intellectualists and inclusivists. The present work focuses on this
dispute. 1 argue_that both intellectualist and inclusivist interpretations of
Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, are ﬂawed. For both accounts ignore
Aristotle’s views about the biological development of human beings. As I
will show, Aristotle’s views about human development play a crucial role in
the function argument. Once this fact is appreciated, we are able to see that
ethical Virtue is a developmental prerequisite for sophia, and hence that
sophia cannot be actualized without ethical virtue. This conclusion
challenges those intellectualists who claim that in some cases, ethical virtue

1 These intellectualists

and sophia can come into conﬂict with one another.
conclude from this that eua’aimonia consists in contemplative activity alone,
and that ethical virtue is merely instrumentally valuable. On this View,
ethical virtue is valuable only to the extent that it helps one to be a better
contemplator. I reject this View and argue that ethical virtue is necessary for
the development of sophia. Thus, eua’aimonia is activity in accordance with
ethical virtue and sophia, but these virtues are hierarchically related since

ethical virtue is a developmental prerequisites of sophia. This is the

primary conclusion of this work.

 

‘ See Cooper ([1971], 149-168), Kraut ([1989], 181).

iv

Copyright by
Hope Elizabeth May
2000

For Michael Russo
“the ﬁiena’ship of good persons is good, and they are thought
to become better too by their activities and by improving
each other.”

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It takes a village to complete a dissertation. For me, that Village was a
global village that connected me to the nurture and support from various
individuals who inhabit a variety of “local” villages throughout the United
States: the villages of East Lansing and Mt. Pleasant, Michigan; Portland,
Oregon; Silver Springs, Maryland; Columbus, Ohio; Pomona, New York;
and South Orange, New Jersey. I am grateful for living at time and in a
society which allowed such easy and rapid communication with all of the
persons in these villages. Without these political and technological luxuries,
the present work would probably not exist, at least not in its current form.

Of course, there are a number of individuals who not only helped me
to develop and clarify the ideas in this dissertation, but also supplied me
with needed support and encouragement, especially during the more difﬁcult
parts of the writing process. I was fortunate enough to work with three such

individuals: Dr. Nicholas Smith, Dr. Rhoda Kotzin, and Dr. John Rauk.

vi

Professor Smith ﬁrst introduced me to Greek philosophy, and encouraged
me to develop my interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics when I ﬁrst
proposed the idea in his seminar for ancient Greek ethics that was offered at
Michigan State University. Professor Smith is one of those rare individuals
who not only provided me with unmatched academic and intellectual
assistance, but who has also been a constant source of emotional support and
inspiration. I cannot thank him enough for all he has done for me. Dr.
Kotzin provided me with needed support both emotionally and intellectually.
My conversations with her were invaluable as they were enjoyable. I thank
her for sharing her views on Aristotle with me and for helping me through
the most difﬁcult parts of the doctoral process. Being able to work with
Professor Kotzin, a formidable scholar, was an experience which I cherish
and for which I remain grateful. Finally, my conversations with John Rauk
were crucial to the development of my argument. I am grateful to him for
taking the time to help me to clarify my interpretation, for his careful
reading of Aristotle’s texts and of my argument, for asking the many
excellent questions that helped me to see the details of my own position, and
also for providing support and encouragement.

In addition to these individuals, there are others who helped in the

completion of this work. I have beneﬁted by the comments and criticisms of

vii

Carl Anderson, Albert Cafagna, and Winston Wilkinson, my other
committee members. I am also grateful to Peter Asquith, Daniel Kolak,
Joseph Salerno, Michael Russo, Joe Martin, Jason Ellenburg, Robert Stecker
and the other members of the philosophy department at Central Michigan
University (where I was teaching when the bulk of this dissertation was
written). Each of these persons, in their own way, helped me to take
pleasure in the writing of this work, and helped me to recover my self-

conﬁdence when needed.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................... XI

INTRODUCTION .......................................... l
The Difﬁculty ....................................... 2
The Debate ........................................... 5
Intellectualism ........................................ 6
Inclusivism .......................................... 7
Developmentalism .................................. 1 0

CHAPTER 1

THE DIFFICULTY ......................................... 14
The Function Argument ............................. 14
The Difﬁculty of X.7,8 ......... ‘ ..................... 21

CHAPTER 2

INTELLECTUALISM AND INCLUSIVISM ........... 25
Intellectualism ......................................... 25
The Intellectualist Account of the “for the sake of”
Relationship .......................................... 30
Inclusivism ............................................ 36
The Inclusivist Account of the “for the sake of”
Relationship ........................................... 40

ix

CHAPTER 3 -
A DEVELOPMENTALIST READING OF THE FUNCTION

ARRGUMENT ................................................ 46
Biological Development and
Hypothetical Necessity ................................. 47
The Function Argument Revisited .................. 53

Why the Intellectualist Account of the “for the sake of”

Relationship is Incorrect ............................... 57

Why the Inclusivist Account of the “for the sake of”

Relationship is Incorrect ............................... 58
CHAPTER 4
WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS HYPOTHETICALLY NECESSARY FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOUS .......................... 61

Nous ...................................................... 64

The Hypothetical Necessities of the

Actualization of Nous .................................. 68

The Virtues of Character ............................... 74
CHAPTER 5
WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF
E UDAIMONIA .................................................. 79

Aristotle’s Action Theory .............................. 80

Why Ethical Virtue is Necessary for Eudaimonia..87

CONCLUSION ................................................... 92

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................... 97

APo.
Top.
Ph.
DA
Mem.
Somn.
Juv.
PA
MA
GA
Metaph.
NE
EE
Pol.
Rhet.

ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Posterior Analytics
Topics

Physics

De Anima

De Memoria

De Somno

De Juventute

De Partibus Animalium
De Motu Animalium
De Generatione Animalium
Metaphysics
Nicomachean Ethics
Eudemian Ethics
Politics

Rhetoric

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (NE), is devoted to the topic of the
human good (to divepu'mwov dryaOov) or eudaimonia (aboatuovior) (NE
1097b22-23).l However, there is much scholarly controversy regarding
Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia. Scholars dispute the question of
whether Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with the single, solitary end of
theoretical activity (évépyeta Gewpntuch), or whether he identiﬁes eudaimonia

with a combination of different activities.

 

' “Eudaimonia” is typically rendered in English as “happiness.” I have decided not to adopt this usage since
the word “happiness” has connotations which Aristotelian eudaimonia does not. English speakers use the
word “happiness” to refer certain moments or episodes within a life. According to Aristotle, however,
eudaimonia is the most ﬁnal object of desire (NE 1094a18-22). It is not an episode that “comes and goes.”
Rather, it is an activity which all our desires are “for the sake of.” According to Aristotle, the desire for
eudaimonia is fashioned by nature so that a human being may fully develop into a rational animal, and
ideally, into an animal who reasons excellently. Thus Aristotelian eudaimonia has a naturalistic or
biological basis. Our conception of “happiness” does not.

1

The Difficulty -

Aristotle’s own imperspicuity regarding his conception of eudaimonia
is partly responsible for the scholarly debate that surrounds it. In book I of
the NE, Aristotle deﬁnes the human good as “activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the
best and most complete/ﬁnal/perfect (teleiotatos/tsltetétoctog)” (NE 1098a17-
18).2 Aristotle, however, discusses three different kinds of virtues in the NE.
Two of these virtues -- the virtues of character (VoC) (dipstoti tﬁg ﬁﬁntxﬁg),
and phronésis (rppovnotg), are interentailing. For Aristotle claims that the
VoC and phroné‘sis are necessary conditions of one another: phronésis cannot
exist without the VoC, and. the VoC cannot exist without phrone‘sis (NE
1144b30-32). Since Aristotle claims that the VoC and phroné‘sis are
interentailing, I will refer to the combination of these two virtues as ethical
virtue.3

The third kind of virtue discussed in the NE is philosophical wisdom or

sophia (oorpioc). According to Aristotle, sophia is the combination of nous

(vobg) and episté‘mé (énorrﬁun) (NE 1141a19—20).4 Aristotle's deﬁnitions of

 

2 Since scholars disagree about how to render “teleiotatos,” I have provided the three standard translations of
this term. My interpretation of this word will be offered in chapter two of this work.

3 Aristotle deﬁnes the VoC as “states of character (Exetg) concerned with choice (npoatperucﬁ), lying in a
mean (uaoémg) (NE 1107b36-l 107a2).” He deﬁnes phronésis as the excellence of the opinion making
faculty (Soﬁaortxég) (NE 1140b26-27).

" Although the standard interpretation of “sophia” is “philosophical wisdom,” our notion of
“philosophical wisdom” is much broader than Aristotle's. It is useful to regard nous as the intellectual

2

nous and epistéme‘ are technical notions that will be discussed more
thoroughly in chapter 4. For now, we can think of nous as a developed
disposition that grasps deﬁnitions of general terms such as “mammal,” and
“rhetoric.” Thus, if the term “mammal” were to be deﬁned as “a warm
blooded and haired animal that nourishes its young with milk,” then this fact
would be grasped by nous. We can think of episté‘mé as the ability to
demonstrate the logical consequences of the deﬁnitions that are grasped by
nous. Thus sophia, the combination of nous and episté‘mé, involves both the
grasp of deﬁnitions, and the ability to demonstrate the consequences of these
deﬁnitions.

Although he discusses several kinds of virtues in the NE, and although
he deﬁnes the human good as activity of the soul in accordance with the best
and teleiotatos virtue (NE 1098a17—18), Aristotle does not explicitly state
which virtue is the best and teleiotatos. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the NE
as a whole does seem to provide a clue as to whether Aristotle identiﬁes
ethical virtue or sophia as the best and teleiotatos. For the focus of the NE is
ethical virtue. In fact, nine out of the ten books comprising the NE are
devoted either to the VoC, or to phronésis -- the two components of ethical
virtue. Aristotle's discussion of sophia, on the other hand, comprises a brief
section in book VI of the NE (NE 1141a9-1144b8), and several paragraphs in
book X (NE 1177a12—1178a32). Thus, the fact that the NE consists in

detailed discussion about the constituents of ethical virtue, and the fact that

 

power that enables a human being to grasp deﬁnitions, and to think of epistémé as the ability to

the NE contains relatively few remarks about sophia, suggest that Aristotle
believes that ethical virtue is best and teleiotatos.

However, the ﬁnal book of the NE appears to cause problems for the
view that Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with ethically virtuous activity. For
here, Aristotle claims that nous is the best thing in us, that the best activity is
theoretical, and ethically virtuous activity is inferior to theoretical activity (NE
1177a12-18, NE 1177a22-25, NE 1177b1-4, NE 1178a5-9). Indeed, given
that the focus of the NE is ethical virtue, it is odd that at the end of this work,
Aristotle states that theoretical activity is best and most pleasant. Moreover,
the fact that Aristotle claims that theoretical activity is superior to ethically
virtuous activity, poses a serious threat to the view that Aristotle identiﬁes
eudaimonia with ethically virtuous activity. Aristotle's remarks in book X of
the NE seem to imply that he identiﬁes eudaimonia with theoretical activity,
and hence that the best and teleiotatos virtue is sophia.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us how to reconcile book X with
the rest of the NE. Nor is he clear about the relationship amongst ethical
virtue, sophia, and eudaimonia. Is Aristotle implying that ethically virtuoUs
activity has no role in the eudaimon life? If so, then why is the bulk of the
NE concerned with the VoC and phronésis? If ethically virtuous activity does
have some role in the best life for man, then what is the nature of this role?

And how is this to be reconciled with book X?

 

demonstrate the logical consequences of deﬁnitions. For a brief description of sophia see NE 1 14 l a9-b8.

The Debate -

The alleged discrepancy between book X and the earlier books of the
NE, has given rise to intense scholarly disagreement about Aristotle's
conception of eudaimonia. I will refer to this scholarly controversy as the
intellectualism debate. At the crux of the intellectualism debate are two
competing interpretations of NE 1098a17-18. For here, Aristotle deﬁnes the
human good as activity of the soul in accordance with the best and teleiotatos
virtue, and there is disagreement about which virtue is best and teleiotatos.

As we will see, at the heart of the intellectualism debate is a
disagreement about both the meaning of “teleiotatos” and the nature of the
“for the sake of” (xéiptv) (FTSO) relationship. For at NE 1098a16—18,
Aristotle deﬁnes eudaimonia as “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue
(Kata dipstﬁv), and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the best
(Ziptotog) and teleiotatos.” Earlier, Aristotle states that a teleiotatos end is
an intrinsically desirable end that is never chosen for the sake of any other
end, and is the ultimate end for the sake of which all other ends are chosen
(NE 1097a29-b4). The fact the meaning of teleiotatos is deﬁned in terms of
the FT SO relationship, reveals that these two notions are conceptually
connected. And the fact the human good is deﬁned as activity in accordance

with the teleiotatos virtue, subsequently reveals the conceptual connection

amongst eudaimonia, the meaning of “teleiotatos,” and the FT SO

 

relationship. Indeed, since the latter two notions are crucial to Aristotle's
deﬁnition of eudaimonia, they have become integral to the intellectualism

debate.

Intellectualism

According to some scholars, Aristotle identiﬁes the best teleiotatos
virtue with sophia, and hence believes that eudaimonia consists in theoretical
activity alone.5 These scholars endorse an intellectualist interpretation of
Aristotelian eudaimonia. Intellectualists claim that all other goods, including
ethical virtue, are valuable only because they help to promote theoretical
activity. In order to support their position that the best and teleiotatos virtue
is sophia, intellectualists interpret teleiotatos as “most perfect,” and claim
that the FTSO relationship is causal-normative relationship.‘5 It is causal,
because all goods, including ethical virtue, are valuable primarily because they
help to promote theoretical activity -- the characteristic activity of sophia.
And it is normative, because theoretical activity provides a norm and a

standard that determines the extent to which all other goods are pursued.

 

5 See Cooper (1975), Devereux (1981), Hardie (1965), Kenny (1978), and Kraut (1989). Kraut claims that
ethical virtue is an intrinsically desirable good, but that it is not a component of eudaimonia. See Kraut
([1989], 215). Irwin (1991) has persuasively argued that Kraut's interpretation is inconsistent with
Aristotle's eudaimonist project. For Kraut claims that ethical virtue is intrinsically and instrumentally
desirable. Irwin points out that this is problematic. For why should one choose ethical virtue for its own
sake, if it is not a component of eudaimonia?

6 Kraut ([1989], 200-203).

Inclusivism
Although intellectualism accords well with Aristotle's remarks at X.7.8,
many scholars have rejected this reading because of its rather unpalatable
consequences. For intellectualism implies that it is possible for a eudaimon
individual to behave in ways that are incompatible with ethical virtue.7 Since
intellectualists claim that ethical virtue is not a component of the eudaimon
life, they also believe that it is possible for one to be eudaimon and to shirk
the ethical virtues. Kraut, for instance, claims that in some cases, theoretical
activity can and should be maximized by abandoning ethically virtuous
activity.8
.if you manage to escape detection, then certain injustices might
bring you more contemplation than less. For example, if you ignore
the needs of your parents, and no one ﬁnds out about this neglect, then
your standing in the community will not suffer, and you will have more
time for theoretical activity. My interpretation does not attribute to
Aristotle the assumption that such cases cannot occur.9
Many have found intellectualism unacceptable since it implies that one can be
eudaimon while ignoring the needs of one's family, friends, and community.

Scholars simply cannot accept the idea that Aristotle believes that the

eudaimon individual is solely concerned with theoretical activity, and does not

 

7 See Cooper ([l971], l49-l68), Kraut ([1989], 181).

8 This is consequence of Kraut's claim that the more theoretical activity that one engages in, the more
eudaimon one is. See Kraut ([1989], 9). See also Cooper ([1971], 149-150).

9 Kraut ([1989], 181).

value social, political, and family life unless doing so helps to promote such
activity. For if this were true, then Aristotle would be arguing for a life that,
in our own day, would be looked upon with disdain. Thus, many scholars
reject the idea that Aristotle identiﬁes the good life with a life which the
average person would deem to be morally reprehensible.

Because many scholars ﬁnd an intellectualist interpretation of the NE
unacceptable, they embrace an alternative inclusivist interpretation of the
NE.10 Scholars who endorse inclusivism reject the view that eudaimonia
consists in theoretical activity alone, and argue instead that eudaimonia is an
end composed of various intrinsically desirable goods, namely, ethical virtue
and sophia. Thus, inclusivists identify the best and teleiotatos virtue with a
combination of goods. On such a view, the eudaimon individual is
necessarily ethically virtuous, since ethical virtue is a component of
eudaimonia." In contradistinction to intellectualists, inclusivists interpret

teleiotatos as “most complete,” and claim that the FTSO relationship is

 

'0 Inclusivists also reject intellectualism because proponents of this view typically claim that ethically
virtuous activity is merely instrumentally valuable. See Cooper ([1971], 163- 165), and Kraut ([1989], 5-6).
Kraut argues that even though ethical virtue is not a component of the most happy life, it is nevertheless
both instrumentally and intrinsically desirable. However, Irwin ([1991], 383-386) points out that to say
that the eudaimon individual values certain intrinsic goods that are not components of eudaimonia, is
incompatible with Aristotle's eudaimonistic project. But there is further problem for the view that ethical
virtue is merely instrumentally valuable. For if it is true that the virtues of character are valuable only when
being used to help promote theoretical activity, then it follows that since courage (dcvﬁpeiov) is one of the
virtues of character, then courageous activity is only valuable if it promotes theoretical activity. But this is
absurd. For Aristotle deﬁnes courage as “being fearless in the face of death in battle” (NE 1 l 152124-31), and
it is rather difﬁcult to see how such a virtue could help promote theoretical activity.

H Roche ([1988], 191). Although all inclusivists agree that eudaimonia is a end that contains a plurality of
virtues, they disagree about which goods comprise eudaimonia. Ackrill (1980) claims that all intrinsically
desirable goods comprise eudaimonia. Purinton (1998) disagrees, claiming instead that all and only
virtuous activities, activities of the rational soul, comprise eudaimonia. Keyt (1983) holds a similar view
to Purinton's, claiming that all of the rational virtues comprise eudaimonia.

relationship between part and whole.12 According to inclusivists, then, the
best and teleiotatos virtue is the most complete, all inclusive virtue, wherein
each individual good is desirable for the sake of this all-inclusive end.
Although all inclusivists agree that both ethically virtuous and
theoretical activity are components of Aristotelian eudaimonia, some believe
that theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are equally desirable, whereas
others believe that theoretical activity is more desirable than ethically virtuous
activity.13 I call the former group simple inclusivists, and the latter group
moderate inclusivists.l4
There are, then, at least three different positions within the
intellectualism debate. Strict intellectualists claim that eudaimonia consists in
theoretical activity alone, that ethical virtue is not a component of
eudaimonia, and that ethical virtue is valuable only to the extent that it helps
promote theoretical activity. In order to support their View, intellectualists
interpret “teleiotatos” as “most perfect,” and believe that the FTSO
relationship is a causal-normative relationship. Simple inclusivists claim that

theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are both intrinsic goods that are

 

’2 Ackrill ([1980], 19-20).

‘3 Ackrill (1974) suggests that theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are equally desirable. See Irwin
(1991), Keyt (1983), and Roche (1988) for the view that theoretical activity is more desirable than ethically
virtuous activity.

'4 Importantly, although moderate inclusivists claim that theoretical activity is more valuable than activity
that is ethically virtuous, they do not also believe that one should eschew the ethical virtues in order to
maximize theoretical activity, as do the strict intellectualists. For moderate inclusivists claim that ethical
virtue is a necessary condition of theoretical activity. As David Keyt puts it, “. . .theoretical activity is to be
maximized but only within the constraints of practical wisdom and moral virtue. Moral activity is the
foundation, and theoretical activity the superstructure, in the best life for a man.” Keyt ([1983], 370). On
such a view, it is impossible for ethical virtue to be compromised for the sake of theoretical activity, since
the ethical virtue is necessary for its operation.

equally desirable components of eudaimonia. Finally, moderate inclusivists
agree that eudaimonia includes ethically virtuous and theoretical activity, both
of which are intrinsically desirable, but they add that theoretical activity is
more desirable than activity that is ethically virtuous. Both groups of
inclusivists interpret “teleiotatos” as “most complete,” and believe that the

FTSO relationship is a relationship between part and whole.

Developmentalism
In what follows, I argue for two importantly related conclusions. First,
both the intellectualist and inclusivist account of the FTSO relationship, as

3

well as their respective interpretations of “teleiotatos,’ are inadequate. For
both views fail to recognize that the meaning of teleiotatos and the nature of
the FTSO relationship are rooted in Aristotle's views about the biological
development of human beings. For in Generation of Animals, Parts of
Animals and Physics, Aristotle describes the FT SO relationship as a
mechanism that nature uses in the biological development of organisms, and
he repeatedly discusses how nature brings about some product or process, for
the sake of some subsequent stage of development (GA 743a16-18, PA
639b26-640al, Ph. 199a17-18).15 I will show that pace the claims of both

intellectualists and inclusivists, in the context of the NE, “teleiotatos” should

 

'5 Aristotle also claims that in addition to nature, human beings also act for the sake of some end (NE
1093a18-22). However, intellectualists and inclusivists have focused only on the human use of the FTSO
relationship, and have ignored nature '5 use of this mechanism. Both uses are important to Aristotle's
conception of eudaimonia, as I will show.

10

 

be interpreted as “most final,” the FT SO relationship should be understood
as a relationship of ﬁnal causality, and that the relata of the FTSO relationship
are stages in the biological development of a human being. In my view, if X
is for the sake of Y, then X is a developmental stage that is necessary for the
realization of Y.

My interpretation is most akin go the moderate inclusivist viewpoint,
although I reject the moderate inclusivists account of the meaning of
“teleiotatos” and the FTSO relationship. One could say that my account
strengthens the moderate inclusivist position by showing that it has a
biological basis. For the second conclusion for which I argue is that ethical
virtue is a developmental prerequisite of nous, and hence of sophia (for
sophia, as mentioned above, is the combination of nous and epistémé (NE
1141a19-20). Once we understand that the relata of the FTSO relationship
are developmental stages, we will be able to see that ethical virtue is a
developmental prerequisite for the actualization of sophia. Intellectualists and
inclusivists have failed to appreciate this fact not only because they have
ignored the biological basis of Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, but also
because they have misleadingly characterized the nature of ethical virtue. For
they describe ethical virtue as if it is essentially concerned with one's
commitments to others, and/or with the control of one's passions.l6 To be
sure, Aristotle surely believes that family, friends and community are valuable

(NE 1169b28-1170b19, NE 1123a4-5), and even claims that a man ought to

 

'6 See Kraut ([1989], 181. Cooper ([1971], 149-150), quoted earlier in the Introduction.

11

 

help his friends and children become good if they are living under ignoble
laws (NE 1180a29—31). Aristotle also believes that it is important for one‘s
appetites to listen to, and hence be controlled by, reason (NE lll9b10-15).
However, the essence of ethical virtue, according to Aristotle, neither consists
in one's commitment to other people, nor in one's having a chaste disposition.
Rather, the essence of Aristotelian ethical virtue consists in the excellence of
the psychological mechanisms that are responsible for excellent human action,
viz., correct belief, correct desire, and correct deliberation. As mentioned
above, the components of ethical virtue are the VoC and phrone‘sis. And
according to Aristotle, whereas the VoC imply ensure that one's desires are
aimed at the correct objects (NE 1144a7-9), phroné‘sis is an intellectual
virtue (dtpetﬁ Stavoiag) (NE 1139a1) of the faculty that forms opinions (NE
1040b25-26), and implies an excellence in deliberation (NE ll4lb9-10).
Since opinions can either take the form of universal (e.g., “all humans or
mammals”) or particular (e.g., “Socrates is a human”) judgments, then
phronésis implies that both kinds of opinions are correct.‘7 Such correctness
of opinion, as we will see, is necessary for the complete actualization of nous,
and hence for sophia.
The structure of my argument is as follows: in chapter 1, I explicate
Aristotle's function argument —— the argument which concludes with
Aristotle's deﬁnition of eudaimonia at NE 1098a17—18. The intellectualist and

inclusivist interpretations of this argument will be the focus of chapter 2. I

 

l2

 

 

will examine their divergent account of the meaning of teleiotatos, as well
as the nature of. the FTSO relationship. In chapter 3, I show that the
intellectualist and inclusivist accounts of the meaning of “teleiotatos” and the
FTSO relationship are inadequate since both fail to recognize the biological
basis of Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia. In chapter 4, I explain why
ethical virtue is necessary for the development of nous. In chapter 5, I
provide another argument against intellectualism by explaining why ethical
virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, and conclude with some speculative

remarks about Aristotle's intention in writing the NE.

 

'7 Cf. NE 1142a] l—23.

l3

 

 

CHAPTER 1: THE DIFFICULTY

My aim in this chapter is to provide an explication of Aristotle's
function argument, the argument which concludes with the deﬁnition of
eudaimonia as, “activity of the soul in accordance with the best and
teleiotatos virtue” (NE 109817-18). As we will see, Aristotle's remarks in
X.7,8 cause difﬁculties for the interpretation of NE 109817-18. These
difﬁculties have led to scholarly debate surrounding the interpretation of the

function argument.

The Function Argument

In the opening book of the NE, we learn that Aristotle's aim is to
discover the nature of eudaimonia, or the human good. The function
argument (NE 1097b22-1098a18) is Aristotle's attempt to pinpoint the human

good. According to this argument, the human good can be deﬁned

14

through the ergon (or function) of man (NE 1097b10-11).1 Aristotle claims
that the ergon of man is excellent rational activity (NE lO97b34—1098a4), and
he deﬁnes eudaimonia as activity of the soul in accordance with the best and
teleiotatos virtue (NE 109817-18). Aristotle's arguments for these claims are
reviewed below.

The guiding assumption behind the function argument is Aristotle’s
claim that the human good can be deﬁned through man's ergon (NE
1097b10-l l). Aristotle's provides an analogical argument for this claim:

Presumably, however, to say that happiness (ebbouuovior) is

the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is

still desired. This might be ﬁrst be given, if we could ascertain the

function (Epyov) of man. Just as for a ﬂute player, a sculptor, or any
artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity

(trpdtélg), the good (tdtyabov) and the “well” (to 813) is thought to

reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he has a

function. What then can this be? Life seems belong even to plants,
but we are seeking what is peculiar (i'Stov) to man. (NE 1097b22-

34).2
In this passage, Aristotle argues that since the good of an artist resides
in his ergon, then the good of a man likewise resides in the human ergon.

This argument seems problematic, however. First, it is not at all clear what is

relevantly similar between human beings and artists. Artists,

 

' The word “ifpyov” is usually translated as “function.” Aristotle claims that we can discover the ergon of
man if we discover what is iotov, or peculiar to man (NE 1097b35). Although some commentators believe
that Aristotle means that we can discover the Zépyov of man if we discover any property that is peculiar to
man (e.g., telling jokes), I agree with Jennifer Whiting (1988) that this way of interpreting “i'810v” is
incorrect. Rather “i'810v” refers to the essence of a creature. Whiting’s interpretation is supported by GA
736b4.

2 All translations of the Nicomachean Ethics are by David Ross, unless otherwise noted.

15

of course, are human beings, but it is unclear as to what is similar between

the artist qua artist, on the one hand, and the human qua human, on the
other. Moreover, it is not at all clear that man has an ergon, in the same way
that a ﬂautist or a sculptor has an ergon. A particular artist or craftsman has
a determinate ergon. The ergon of a doctor, for instance, is to heal, and the
ergon of a rhetorician is to persuade. But it is not certain that a human being
has a determinate ergon. Perhaps man is born without a speciﬁc ergon, and
decides for himself which ergon or erga he wants to adopt.3 A human being
could decide to be a ﬂautist, or adopt the ergon of a sculptor, without there
being a speciﬁc ergon of human beings. Possibly aware of such an objection,
Aristotle supports his claim that man has an ergon with the following
argument:

Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or

activities, and has man none? Is he born without a ergon? Or as eye,

hand, foot and in general each of the parts has an ergon, may one

establish that man similarly has an ergon apart from all these? (NE

1097b28-34).
Aristotle seems to believe that since a human being's body parts each have
their own ergon, then there is a speciﬁc ergon of a human being. Thus,
Aristotle appears to advance the following argument:

1.If some parts of a human being have an ergon or function, then a

human being has an ergon or function.

2. Some parts of a human being have an ergon or function

A human being has an ergon or function.

The argument is valid, but the ﬁrst premise is problematic. For it simply does

not follow that if some parts of X are Y, then X is Y. Just because the atoms

16

 

comprising Socrates cannot be seen with the naked eye, it does not follow
that Socrates cannot be seen with the naked eye.4 Aristotle's argument
appears to commit the fallacy of composition.5
Despite the difﬁculties surrounding NE 1097b28-34, Aristotle proceeds
as if he has said nothing objectionable. And after establishing that man has an
ergon, Aristotle next claims that the ergon of a human being can be
discovered if one discovers what is idion to human beings:

Just as for a ﬂute player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all
things that haveﬂa function or activity (npﬁtﬁtg), the good (tétyocGov)and
the “well” (to 313) is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem
to be for man, if he has a function... .What then can this be? Life seems
belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar (idion) to

man. (NE 1097b25-1097b34).
According to Aristotle, the ergon or function of man can be determined if
one discovers what is idion to human beings. Most scholars interpret
“idion” as “peculiar.”6 Ackrill, for instance, writes:

Aristotle has clearly stated that the principle of the ergon argument

is that one must ask what powers and activities are peculiar to and
distinctive of man.7 '

 

3 This is Jean Paul Sartre's criticism of Aristotle's assumption that man has a predeﬁned ergon.
There is the additional problem that the similarities between the crafts, body parts and human beings seem
weak. Is Aristotle claiming that a human being has an ergon because, like a hand, a human is part of some
larger organism? T. H. Irwin ([1980], 35-36) puts the problem well:
When Aristotle offers to say what happiness is, he refers to the “function” or
“characteristic activity” (ergon) peculiar to human beings: just as a hammer or a leg has a
function, a living organism has one... .This argument is not easy to accept. Is the
inference from artifacts and organs to human beings secure, or does it rely on the
disputable assumption that a human being is an artifact, or else the limb of a larger
organism?

5 The fallacy of composition is committed when the following premise is assumed “if the parts of X have

property P, then X has the property P.” This claim is not always true. The parts of a wristwatch may be

inexpensive, but this does not mean that the wristwatch itself is inexpensive.

6 An exception is Whiting (1986) who argues that the idion of man is identical to man's essence.

7 Ackrill ([1980], 27).

17

 

and Kraut:

Our function cannot simply be to live, since that is something we

have in common with plants, and we are looking for what is

peculiar--to human beings... .[Aristotle] is looking for what is

peculiar (idion) to human beings.8
But if Aristotle is claiming that the ergon of a human being is determined by
what is merely peculiar to a human being, then the connection between a
thing's ergon and its good is tenuous. Why is it the case that man's ergon,
which is determined merely by what is peculiar to human beings, is relevant
to what is good for man? Aristotle does not seem to be aware of these
questions, and he states that rational activity is idion to human beings:

Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next

there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be shared

by the horse, the ox and every animal. There remains, then, an
active life of the element that has a rational principle (é’xowog

Myov).
In claiming that the human good is determined by man’s ergon, and in
claiming that man’s ergon is determined by man’s idion, Aristotle seems to
be advancing the following argument:

1. The human good is determined by the human ergon

2. The human ergon is determined by what is idion to human beings.
3. Rational Activity is idion to human beings.

4. The human ergon is rational activity

The human good is determined by (consists in) rational activity

 

8 Kraut ([1989], 313). Both Kraut and Ackrill recognize a difﬁculty here. For if Aristotle identiﬁes the
best and teleiotatos virtue with sophia, then since the God contemplates, then sophia is not peculiar to
human beings. Kraut avoids this difﬁculty by claiming that Aristotle is using “idion” to refer to that which
is peculiar to man relative to animals, not relative to all living things. So, on Kraut's view, there is no
difﬁculty for Aristotle to claim both that contemplation is idion to man. and that the God contemplates.
See Kraut ([1989], 316).

18

 

This argument, though valid, is problematic. For there are many activities
that are idion to human beings other than rational activity, such as gambling
and giving to charity, for instance. If “idion” indeed means “peculiar,” as
most scholars assume, then we need an explanation as to why Aristotle
singles out rational activity as the ergon and idion of man. Why is rational
activity, rather than say, giving to charity, the ergon and idion of man? Why
should we dismiss the view that the human good consists in giving to charity?
Aristotle appears to provide no answer to these important questions.

Nevertheless, after stating that “the life of the rational element” is
idion to man, Aristotle makes the important claim that the rational element is
two-fold:
Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and
growth. Next there would be an active life of the element that has a
rational principle; of this one part of the element that has a rational
principle has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one,
the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought
(Stavoobuevov). (NE lO97b34-1098a4-5).
After establishing that there are two parts to the rational element of the soul,
Aristotle then returns to the notion of the human ergon, and makes the
general claim that the ergon of a good thing is for the thing to perform its
ergon well (NE 109838-11). From this it follows that the ergon of a good
man, is for man to perform his ergon well. Thus, if the ergon of man is

rational activity, then the ergon of a good man is excellent rational activity.9

So Aristotle concludes the function argument with the following claim:

 

l9

 

the human good is activity (évépyetoc) of the soul in accordance
excellence, and if there is more than one excellence, then it is in
accordance with the best and most teleiotatos (NE 1098a16-18).

I am leaving “teleiotatos” uninterpreted for now because of the disagreement
about how to render this claim. The term “teleiotatos” is the superlative
form of the adjective “teleios”. “Teleios” can be rendered either as
“perfect,” “complete,” or “ﬁnal.” Accordingly, “teleiotatos” can be
interpreted as “most perfect,” “most complete,” or “most ﬁnal.” We will
see soon enough that much hinges on which of these meanings is selected.

Put in standard form, Aristotle function argument is as follows:

1. The good of any artist resides in that artist's ergon (NE
1097b25-28).

2. If man has an ergon, the good of man resides in that ergon
(NE 1097b24-5).

3. Body parts and artists each have their own ergon (NE
1097b28-34).

4. Man has an ergon (NE 1097b34).

5. The good of man resides in man's ergon (from 1,4).

6. The ergon of man can be discovered if one discovers what is
idion to man. (NE 1097b34-35).

7. Activity of the rational principle is idion to man (NE 1098a3-
4).

8. The ergon of man is activity of the rational principle.

9. The human good resides in activity of the rational principle.
10. the ergon of a good thing is for the thing to perform its
ergon well (NE 1098 a8-11).

11. The ergon of a good man is the excellent activity of the
rational principle.

12. There are two elements of the rational principle (NE 1098a4-
5).

The human good is activity of the soul in accordance with

virtue, and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the best
and most teleiotatos (NE 1098a16-18).

 

9 Aristotle explicitly states that by “life of the rational element,” he means life in the sense of activity or
actuality (energeia) (NE 1098a5-6). In other words, eudaimonia is the operation or activation of the rational
element. According to Aristotle, merely possessing this element is not sufﬁcient for eudaimonia. Rather,
if one is eudaimon, then one's rational element must be actualized, i.e., in use.

20

The qualiﬁcation that Aristotle makes at the conclusion of the function
argument, viz., that the human good is excellent activity in accordance with
the best and teleiotatos virtue, seems to refer back to his remark that there
are two elements of the rational principle (NE 1098a4-5). Aristotle appears to
be saying that of these two rational elements, eudaimonia is activity in

accordance with the best and teleiotatos.

The Difﬁculty of X7 ,8

So far I have laid out Aristotle's function argument and have
mentioned some of the difﬁculties involved therein. However, in addition to
the seemingly problematic moves that Aristotle makes in the function
argument, his remarks about sophia in book X, the ﬁnal book of the NE,
further complicate the matter. For the earlier books of NE, especially books I
through VIII, contain detailed discussions about ethical virtue, which is a
combination of the VoC and phroné‘sis. Given that the conclusion of the
function argument states that eudaimonia is activity of the soul in accordance
with the best and teleiotatos virtue, and given that Aristotle spends the bulk
of the NE discussing ethical virtue, one is naturally inclined to believe that
Aristotle equates the best and teleiotatos virtue with ethical virtue, and hence
that eudaimonia consists in ethically virtuous activity. However, Aristotle's
remarks in X.7,8 seem to create conﬂict with this inclination. For in X7,
Aristotle claims that best activity is not ethically virtuous activity, as one

might expect, but is theoretical:

21

If [eudaimonia] is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable
that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue -- and this will be
that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason (voirg) or

something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural
ruler (Soxsi dtpxew tpbow) and guide and take thought of things noble
and divine, whether it be itself also divine (OeiOV) or only the most
divine element in us, the activity (éVép'YEICX) of this in accordance with
its proper virtue will be perfect happiness (teleia euﬁatuovior). That
this activity is theoretical we have already said (NE 1177a12-18).10
Later, at X.8, Aristotle explicitly states that the life in accordance with the
“other virtue” is inferior to the theoretical life (NE ll78a9). Presumably,
Aristotle is referring to ethical virtue, since this is the only other virtue that is
discussed in detail in the NE. And at NE ll78b31-21, Aristotle claims that
the philosopher, most of all, will be eudaimon. These remarks seem to be out
of place in the NE. For the earlier books suggest that eudaimonia is ethically
virtuous activity, whereas X.7,8 seems to imply that eudaimonia is theoretical
activity. It is unclear how Aristotle would reconcile these two views. Does
he believe that ethical virtue is the best and teleiotatos virtue? Or does he
believe that the best and teleiotatos virtue is sophia? Or, does Aristotle
believe that the eudaimon life consists in a combination of both ethically
virtuous and theoretical activity? Indeed, Aristotle's function argument seems
to involve a thicket of difﬁculties. Not only do his moves within the function

argument seem problematic, as reviewed above, but there is also the tension

between X.7,8 and the earlier books of the NE.

 

'0 I have modiﬁed Ross’ translation slightly and used the adjective “theoretical” instead of “contemplative".

22

 

Scholars have been particularly frustrated by the fact that Aristotle is
unclear about which virtue he believes is best and teleiotatos, and there is
notorious debate about how the conclusion of the function argument should
be interpreted. Should the conclusion of the function argument be
interpreted in light of X.7,8, or should X.7,8 be eschewed when interpreting
the function argument? There are indeed scholars who endorse the latter
alternative, and argue that X.7,8 was not originally part of the NE.11 Such an
account at least acquits Aristotle of outright inconsistency, as it places the
blame on some careless editor of Aristotle's corpus.

Other scholars advance less charitable accounts of the relationship
between X.7,8 and the rest of the NE. According to this school, Aristotle
actually contradicts himself in the NE. W. F. R. Hardie and John Cooper, for
instance, argue that Aristotle identiﬁes the best and teleiotatos virtue with

ethical virtue in the ﬁrst nine books of the NE, and identiﬁes the best

 

” See references in Roche ([1988], 192, n.3l). Textual evidence seems to rule out such an explanation.
For in book X of the NE, Aristotle seems to refer back to his discussion of eudaimonia in book I, where he
claims that eudaimonia is a teleiotatos, self-sufﬁcient and intrinsically desirable end (NE 1097a15-
1097b21); and that eudaimonia is an activity in accordance with the best and teleiotatos virtue (NE
1098b18- 19). In chapter X.7, these remarks are echoed. There, Aristotle states that sophia is the highest
(Kpatimog) virtue, that it is the best (dpiorog) thing in us, and that activity in accordance with sophia is
tekior euﬁatuovia (NE 1 l77a12-l3). Although Aristotle never explicitly claims that sophia is identical
to the teleiotatos end, he seems to imply this much. Aristotle's reference to sophia as o’tpiotog seems to
refer back to the conclusion of the function argument, which states that eudaimonia is activity of the soul
in accordance with the best (dipiorog) and most teleios virtue (NE 1098a] 6-17). Moreover, Aristotle states
that contemplative activity is self-sufﬁcient (abtdpxetoc), and desired for its own sake (NE 1 l77a27-b3);
and in book I, he tells us that these two qualities are characteristic of eudaimonia (NE lO97alS-1097b21).
Thus, Aristotle seems well aware of his preceding discussion about eudaimonia. even in the ﬁnal book of
the Nicomachean Ethics.

23

and teleiotatos virtue with sophia in the ﬁnal book of the NE. Such an
account interprets the NE as containing a ﬂagrant contradiction. '2
There are, however, many scholars who argue that Aristotle presents a
uniﬁed and coherent account of the best and teleiotatos virtue in the NE.'3
Yet, there is disagreement even among these scholars. They disagree about
whether Aristotle identiﬁes the best and teleiotatos virtue solely with
theoretical activity, or whether Aristotle identiﬁes the best and teleiotatos
virtue with a combination of ethically virtuous and theoretical activities.
Intellectualists endorse the former interpretation, whereas inclusivists
endorse the latter. In the next chapter, these competing interpretations are

discussed.

 

‘2 Hardie ([1965], 279) and Cooper ([1975], 165-180). Cooper argues that Aristotle's inconsistency in the
NE is caused by the fact that, in the earlier books of the NE, Aristotle accepts the psychological theory of
the Eudemian Ethics, whereas at other points, Aristotle accepts the psychological theory of the De Anima.
Since these two theories are inconsistent with one another -- the psychological theory of the Eudemian
Ethics identiﬁes a human being as a combination of mind and body, but the psychological theory of the De
Anima identiﬁes a human being with nous, which is non-bodily -- Aristotle's discussion of the human good
1s inconsistent. Cooper (1987) has rejected this rather uncharitable reading and now embraces inclusivism.

'3 See Cooper (1987), Keyt (1981), Kraut (1989), Purinton (1981), Roche (1988), Whiting (1986).

24

CHAPTER 2: INTELLECTUALISM AND IN CLUSIVISM

In this chapter, I discuss some of the prominent intellectualist and
inclusivist interpretations of NE 1098a17-l8, the conclusion of the function
argument. Since intellectualists and inclusivists disagree about the proper

9

interpretation of the term “teleiotatos,’ which appears in the conclusion of
the function argument, it is necessary to discuss the different interpretations of
this term. Furthermore, since the meaning of “teleiotatos” is conceptually
wedded to the nature of the “for the sake of” relationship (NE 1097a28-35), I

will also discuss both the intellectualist and inclusivist accounts of this

relationship.

Intellectualism
As mentioned earlier, intellectualists believe that the referent of the best
and teleiotatos virtue is sophia. Although Aristotle neither explicitly states

that sophia is the teleiotatos virtue, nor identiﬁes eudaimonia with a single

25

 

activity, he does say that activity in accordance with sophia is teleia
happiness (NE 1177a17-18). He also states that nous is the highest and best
thing in us:

If [eudaimonia] is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable
that it should be in accordance with the highest (Kportimog) virtue —

and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason (voiig)
or something else that is this element which is thought to be our

natural ruler (Soxei (’itpxetv tpﬁow) and guide and take thought of things
noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine (Gsiov) or only the
most divine element in us, the activity (évépyera) of this in accordance
with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness (teleia ebbouuovia).
That this activity is we have already said (NE 1177a12-18).
This passage seems to refer back to the conclusion of the function argument
which states that the human good is activity in accordance with the aristos
and teleiotatos virtue (NE 1098a16-17). Thus when Aristotle states that
eudaimonia is activity in accOrdance with the aristos and teleiotatos virtue in
1.7, intellectualists believe that he is tacitly referring to theoretical activity.
Daniel Devereux puts the point well:
In View of the close relationship... .[between] X7 and the deﬁnition of
1,7, most commentators have supposed that Aristotle must have had
philosophical contemplation in mind when he formulated his deﬁnition
of happiness [in book one]. In other words, Aristotle deliberately sets
up an equation between happiness and the activity of contemplation in
1,7, but the reader can only see this in retrospect.l
Intellectualists ﬁnd further support for their claim that Aristotle identiﬁes
eudaimonia solely with theoretical activity, by noting that Aristotle describes

it with superlative adjectives. For instance, shortly after the function

argument, Aristotle states:

 

lDevereux ([1981], 25]).

26

Eudaimonia, then, is what is best, most beautiful and most
pleasant, and these things are not separate according to the
epigram at Delios: .
' The most just is the most beautiful, and heath is best, but
most pleasant is winning what one loves.
For all these things belong to the best activities, but we say that
eudaimonia is identical to these activities, or the best one of
these. (NE 1099a24-31).
Intellectualists claim that the fact that Aristotle describes eudaimonia with
superlative adjectives suggests that he believes that eudaimonia consists in a
single, solitary activity, rather than a combination of them. For a superlative
seems to single out one entity from several alternatives. According to
intellectualists, when Aristotle states above that eudaimonia is “one of these,
or the best one of these” he seems to be singling out a particular activity.2
Moreover, when Aristotle claims that the life in accordance with the other
virtue is inferior to life in accordance with nous ((3 Kurt} tov vobv Biog) (NE
1178a5-9), intellectualists aver that he is singling out sophia, to the exclusion
of ethical virtue. Intellectualists, then, argue that Aristotle's manner of
speaking about eudaimonia reveals that he identiﬁes eudaimonia with one,
rather than many, activities.
The intellectualist thesis that Aristotle has theoretical activity in mind at
1098al7-18 inﬂuences not only their interpretation of the superlatives,

“aristos” and “teleiotatos,” that appear in the conclusion of the function

 

2 Intellectualists also argue that NE 1099a24-3l demonstrates the implausibility of an inclusivist reading of
the function argument. For inclusivists believe that eudaimonia is a combination of virtuous activities.
But at NE 1099a24-31, Aristotle draws a contrast between a plurality of activities (“these activities”) and a
single activity “one of them.” And he states that eudaimonia is identical to the best activities or one of the
best. But by “one of the best activities” Aristotle cannot mean, pace the inclusivists, “a plurality of
activities” else there would be no contrast between “a plurality of activities” and “the best one.” See Kraut
([1989], 243).

27

argument, but also their View about the referent of “idion.” For they think
that since Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with theoretical activity alone, then

99

“aristos, “teleiotatos” and “idion” should be interpreted accordingly. This
seems relatively innocent when considering the adjective “aristos,” which
means “best.” But interpreting “teleiotatos” and “idion” to refer to a single
activity is more difﬁcult.

Consider the term “idion” for a moment. We saw in chapter one, that
after Aristotle claims that rational activity is idion to man, he distinguishes
two parts of the human soul -- one part that possesses a rational principle, and
one part that is obedient to a rational principle (NE 1098a4-5). Aristotle also
states that this latter part is irrational or without reason (iﬂoyov) (NE
1102a26—28). Importantly, the irrational part of the soul is also comprised of
two parts -- the part that is responsible for nutrition and growth, on the one
hand, and the part that can either obey or disobey the rational soul (NE
1102a32-1102b-14). Whereas the former part of the soul is shared by
animals, Aristotle seems to think that the latter part is not. For one can only
possess the second type of irrational soul if one possesses reason (else, there
would be nothing for this type of irrational soul to obey or disobey). Since
human beings are the only animals that possess reason, it follows that the
second type of irrational soul is unique to human beings.

Aristotle also distinguishes two parts of the rational soul -- one portion

which possess a rational principle in the strict sense (nupicog), and the other

having the tendency to obey as one does one’s father (NE 1103a1-4). Later,

28

Aristotle states that the part of the rational element which obeys is the part
that forms opinions (Soéaottxog) (NE 1140b25-26, ll44b14-l6), that the
virtue of this part is phroné‘sis (NE 1140b27-28), and that phroné‘sis implies
ethical virtue (NE ll44b30—32):

It is not possible to be good in the strict sense (Kupimg dryaebg) without
practical wisdom (tppovnotg/phrone‘sis), or practically wise without
moral virtue (dipetai rﬁg ﬁbucﬁg) (NE 1144b30-32).

Now, one way of understanding “idion” is to see it as encompassing the two
rational elements -- the part that forms opinions, and the part responsible for
theoretical activity (nous), and the part of the rational soul that is unique to
human beings. For all of these parts are unique to human beings.3 This
reading of “idion,” is of course incompatible with the intellectualist thesis that
Aristotle identiﬁes the human good with a single activity. For if man's idion
encompasses all of the unique parts of the human soul , then the human good
would be activity in accordance with the virtues of all these parts of the
human soul. This contradicts the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identiﬁes
the human good solely with activity in accordance with sophia. Thus,
intellectualists reject the above reading of “idion.”4 In their view, the idion

of man is the single peculiar characteristic that is best and teleiotatos.

 

3 This view is argued for by Purinton (1998). Contrast Purinton with Irwin ([1980], 49), who claims that
the human idion can include any and all characteristics that are possessed by other creatures, as long as there
is just one characteristic that is uniquely possessed by man:
If x can do A,B, and C, and nothing else can do C, but other things can do A and B, we might
describe x's peculiar function either as “doing A,B, and C” or as “doing C”. Now it is fairly clear
that Aristotle understands the peculiar activity of man in the ﬁrst, inclusive way.

4 The argument that Kraut ([1989], 239 n. 32) gives against the inclusivist reading of “idion” is that such a

reading is incorrect since on it, “ no organization is imposed upon our ends.” Indeed, according to the
intellectualist, Aristotle's primary project is to tell us how to organize our ends so that one activity

29

 

As mentioned above, intellectualists also interpret “teleiotatos,” in
accordance with their View that Aristotle identiﬁes the human good with a
single activity. However, “teleiotatos” can either mean most perfect, most
complete, or most ﬁnal. Since the term “perfect” is congenial to the
intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with a single activity,
intellectualists believe that by “teleiotatos”, Aristotle means “most perfect.”5
However, the term “teleiotatos” is conceptually wedded to the “for the sake
of” (PT SO) relationship. So if intellectualists want to interpret “teleiotatos”

as referring to a single activity, they need to provide an account of the FTSO

relationship that is compatible with this view.

The Intellectualist Account of the “for the sake of” Relationship:
In the following passage, Aristotle explains the nature of a teleios end,

by appealing to the “for the sake of” (xdptv) relationship:

Since, in fact, there appears to be more than one end (tékog), and we
desire some of for the sake of another (e.g., wealth, ﬂutes, and in
general instruments), it is clear that not all ends are teleios ends; but
best good appears to be teleios. With the result that, if, for its part,
there is only one teleios end, this will be what we are seeking, and if
there are more than one, the most teleios of these will be what we are

 

outweighs all others in importance. Since a broad interpretation of “idion” is incompatible with this
project, Kraut alleges, then such a reading must be rejected. Kraut's argument is weak. A broad
interpretation of “idion” is compatible with there being an organization imposed upon our ends. Keyt
(1983) provides such a view. According to his view, eudaimonia includes both ethical virtue and theoretical
activity, but theoretical activity ought to be maximized within the constraints imposed by ethical virtue.

5 Cooper ([1975], 100, n. 10), Kraut ([1989], 242-243). Kraut makes an important distinction between a
teleios end (a perfect end) and an end that is teleiotatos (a most perfect end). Kraut argues that Aristotle's
distinction between a perfect end and a most perfect end, refers to two different conceptions of happiness.
Eudaimonia qua perfect end is activity in accordance with virtuous activity. On the other hand, eudaimonia
qua most perfect end is activity in accordance with sophia, the intellectual virtue responsible for excellent
theoretical activity.

30

seeking. Now we say that the thing which is pursued (to dicoxrbv)
for itself (KOLG' auto) is more teleios than that which is pursued for the
sake of another, and that which is never desired for another (to
unbénore 51' 62701.0 aipetbv) more teleios than the things that are
desirable both for themselves and for another, and the end in an

absolute sense (archaic) is always desired for itself and never for
another. And eudaimonia seems to be this most of all. For we desire
this always for itself and never for another, but honor,

pleasure, reason (vofrg) and every virtue we desire for themselves (for if
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but
we desire them also for the sake of (xdtptv) eudaimonia, judging that
on account of them we shall be eudaimon. But no one chooses
eudaimonia for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other
than itself (NE 1097a25-1O97b6).6
Note that immediately after claiming that some ends are more teleios than
others (NE 1097a29-35), and that eudaimonia is the most teleios end (NE
1097a35), Aristotle justiﬁes the latter claim by claiming that, “we choose
[eudaimonia] always for itself and never for another, but honor, pleasure,
reason and every virtue we choose for themselves... .but we choose them
also for the sake of happiness” (NE 1097b1—1097b4). Since Aristotle explains
the nature of the most teleios end by appealing to the fact that all other ends
are chosen for the sake of this end, Aristotle believes that the term “teleios”
is conceptually connected to FTSO relationship.’

In accordance with their view that Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia with

a single activity, intellectualists claim that the FTSO relationship is, at the very

 

6 My translation.

7 Purinton ([1998], 263) denies that there is a conceptual connection between Aristotle's discussion of ends
that are teleios in different degrees, and the meaning of “teleiotatos “ in the function argument. This claim
contradicts the texts, however. For after Aristotle states that some ends are more teleios than others (NE
1097a29-35), he then claims that eudaimonia is the most teleios end (NE 1097a35). Then, Aristotle uses
the explanatory “gar” to reveal that he does see a conceptual connection between teleios ends and the
teleiotatos end: “ for we choose (eudaimonia) always for itself and never for another, but honor, pleasure,

31

least, a causal-normative relationship.8 Richard Kraut, a proponent of
intellectualism, offers this account of the FTSO relationship.

According to Kraut, Aristotle's opening remarks in 1.1, provide an

important clue to properly understanding the nature of the FT SO relationship:

As there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends are also many;

the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of

strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall

under a single capacity--as bridle- making and the other arts concerned

with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and

every military action under the art of riding, and in the same way other

arts fall under yet others--in all of these the ends of the master arts are

to be preferred to the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the
former that the latter are pursued. (NE 1094a1-16).

Kraut believes that in claiming that some arts are subordinate to other arts,

Aristotle is claiming that some goods are subordinate to other goods. This

seems reasonable enough, as Aristotle claims that the end of an art is the

good of that art (NE 1094a1-3). So, if the end of one art is subordinate to the

end of another art, as the end of bridle making is subordinate to the end of

riding, and if ends are identical to goods, then some goods are subordinate to

other goods. Kraut makes the further claim, however, that goods comprise a

hierarchy, and hence that the subordination relation between two different

goods is a hierarchical relation. Inclusivists, as we will soon see, deny that the

subordination relation between two goods is a hierarchical relation, and argue

instead that the subordination relation should be understood as a relation

between part and whole.

 

reason and every virtue we choose for themselves ...but we choose them also for the sake of (xdptv)
happiness” (NE 1097b 1 - l 097b4).

8 Kraut ([1989], 200—203) defends this claim.

32

Kraut claims that at the bottom of the hierarchy of goods are the
least valuable goods, which are dubbed the “imperfect goods.” These goods
are only desirable for the sake of some other good. Wealth and musical
instruments, for instance, are desirable only for the sake of something else,
and therefore are imperfect goods. Next on the hierarchy are the
“moderately perfect goods,” viz, goods that are both desirable for the sake
of some other good and are intrinsically desirable. Finally, at the pinnacle of
this hierarchy is the most perfect good, a good that is intrinsically desirable
and is never desired for the sake of any other good:

...every good of human life is to be located somewhere within a
hierarchy that has a single end at its pinnacle. The lowest row of this
hierarchy contains ends (such as wealth) that are not goods in
themselves, but are desirable only on condition that they lead to further
goods. Above this row, Aristotle places goods (such as honor) that are
desirable in themselves, though they are not to be identiﬁed with
happiness. Still higher are those intrinsically desirable ends (virtuous
activities) that are properly identiﬁed with happiness. Each good on a
lower row is choiceworthy for the sake of some good on a higher
row.9
Importantly, Kraut claims that each row in this “hierarchy of goods” is
related to the next, higher level of goods by the FTSO relationship. The
imperfect goods on the bottom row are pursued for the sake of some other
good; the goods on the middle row are pursued for their own sakes and for
the sake of some other good, and the topmost good is pursued solely for its

own sake.‘0 Kraut argues that Aristotle's appeal to the crafts, illustrates that

the FTSO relationship is at least partly causal:

 

9 Kraut ([1989], 6). Cooper ([1987], 201-202) also adopts this reading of “most teleiotatos.”

33

[The FT SO relationship] is a causal one, at least in part. The process
of making the bridle causes the product to come into being: the bridle
is then used as an instrument that facilitates the activity of riding; and
riding in battle is a means of defeating the enemy and achieving
victory.ll

According to Kraut, the FT SO relationship is causal because he believes that
if A is for the sake of B, then A is at least partly responsible for B's coming
into being.12 So, if exercise is for the sake of weight loss, then it is so (partly)
because exercise promotes weight loss, i.e., causes it to come into being. But
Kraut also believes that the FTSO relationship is a normative relationship: if A
is for the sake of B, then B provides a norm that guides A. So, if exercise is
for the sake of weight loss, then it is so not only because exercise promotes
weight loss, but also because weight loss provides a norm that regulates
exercise. For the amount of weight that one wants to lose determines how
much one should exercise:
The bridlemaker decides how to treat his raw material by looking to a
paradigm of the ﬁnished product, and the proper design of his product
is determined by the expert rider... .The horseman tells the bridlemaker
what sort of bridle he needs; so the activity of riding provides a
standard for how bridles should be made. And in turn, the bridlemaker
puts himself at the service of the rider, who puts himself at the service
of the general; each lower discipline plays a causal role in the pursuit of

each higher discipline, and the higher disciplines in turn provide the
norms for the proper pursuit of the lower disciplines.13

 

'0 Kraut ([1989], 299-300).
“ Kraut ([1989], 200).

‘2 That this is what Kraut means by “causal” is conﬁrmed at Kraut ([1989], 201). Kraut thinks that, if A is
for the sake of B, then there is a causal relationship between A and B, viz., A causes B to come into
existence. I agree that if A is for the sake of B, then there is a causal relation between the two, but in some
cases, if B is the form of an object or organism, then B can cause A to come into existence in order for the
form to be completely realized in matter (PA 639b24-640a9). I believe that this is the correct understanding
of the FT SO relationship in the NE, as I will argue later.

‘3 Kraut ([1989], 201).

34

According to Kraut, then, some goods A, are pursued for the sake of other
goods B, becauseA causes B to come into being, and because B provides a
norm for the pursuit of A.

Accordingly, Kraut interprets the FT SO relationship in light of his
interpretation of “teleiotatos” as “most perfect.” He claims that if an end is
merely teleios, then it only “moderately perfect” -- i.e., it is not the end for
the sake of which all other ends are pursued, and hence is not the pinnacle of
the hierarchy of goods. But if an end is most perfect, and hence is teleiotatos,
then it belongs at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. For this end is “the that for
the sake of which” all other ends are pursued. Claiming that perfect ends are
ultimately pursued for the sake of a single, most perfect end, is of course,
compatible with the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identiﬁes the best and
teleiotatos virtue with the single virtue of sophia. For sophia, the most
perfect virtue, is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of goods. Hence all other
goods, including ethical virtue, are pursued for the sake of sophia.‘4

Such is the intellectualist account of the conclusion of the function
argument. Guided by their conviction that Aristotle identiﬁes eudaimonia
with theoretical activity alone, intellectualists adopt a narrow interpretation of
“idion,” interpret “teleiotatos” as most perfect, and the FTSO relationship
as a causal normative relationship.

On the other hand, inclusivists provide different interpretations of

“idion,” “teleiotatos” and the FTSO relationship, and consequently adopt a

 

35

different reading of the conclusion of the function argument. For as
mentioned earlier, inclusivists reject intellectualism because they are unwilling
to accept an interpretation of eudaimonia that does not include ethical virtue.
Inclusivists, therefore, believe that Aristotle identiﬁes the best and teleiotatos
virtue with a combination of ethical virtue and sophia. Let us examine the

interpretation of the function argument proposed by inclusivists.

Inclusivism

In contradistinction to intellectualists, inclusivists deny that X.7,8 are
the crucial passages in understanding Aristotle's account of eudaimonia at the
conclusion of the function argument. There are several reasons why
inclusivists reject an intellectualist reading of 1098a16-18. First, the focus of
the NE is ethical virtue, and inclusivists believe that it would be strange if the
best and teleiotatos Virtue referred to sophia, since Aristotle rarely discusses
this virtue in the NE.15 Second, inclusivists believe that several passages in
book I wherein Aristotle discusses the general nature of eudaimonia reveal
that he believes that eudaimonia includes a plurality of goods. In one of these
passages, Aristotle claims that eudaimonia is an end that is self-sufﬁcient

(oditapxeg), intrinsically desirable and unqualiﬁedly teleios (NE 1097b14-21):

The self-sufﬁcient (oditocpxeg) is established as that which, when
considered by itself, makes a life choiceworthy and in need of nothing.
And we think happiness to be this sort of thing. And still, it is the most
choiceworthy of all since it is not counted along with other goods,

 

‘4 Kraut argues that the life in accordance with ethical virtue (phronésis) is also happy life, but it is not
perfect (teleios) happiness. This makes sense of Aristotle's remark at NE ll78a9. See Kraut ([1989], 16).

'5 See Roche ([1988], 186).

36

because being counted along with other goods, it would clearly be
more choiceworthy with the least of goods. For what is added is an
increase (unepoxﬁ) of goods, and of goods, the greater is always the
more choic'eworthy, It appears, in fact, that eudaimonia is teleios and
self-sufﬁcient, being the end of our actions.
Inclusivists believe that the above passage implies that Aristotle identiﬁes
eudaimonia with a combination of activities, rather than just one. In order to
understand why inclusivists believe this, it is useful to make a distinction
between two types of goods which I shall call ﬁrst order goods, and second
order goods. First order goods are discrete goods such as health, wealth, and
ready—wit. Think of a second order good as a class whose members are ﬁrst
order goods. Thus, the combination of health, wealth, and ready-wit would
be a second order good.

Inclusivists claim that the appropriate interpretation of the above is one
that recognizes the distinction between ﬁrst and second order goods. For
when Aristotle claims that eudaimonia is not a good that can be counted
along with others, he is claiming that eudaimonia is a second order good.
First order goods can be made more. choiceworthy by combining them with
other choiceworthy goods.16 If we add friendship to health, for instance, then
friendship+health, is more choiceworthy than friendship taken singly. But

suppose eudaimonia is a ﬁrst order good. If it is, then eudaimonia+friendship

would be more choiceworthy than eudaimonia simpliciter. But, claims

 

‘6 This is not entirely correct. It is not a ﬁrst order good that is made more choiceworthy when we add it to
another ﬁrst order good. For it is the combination of the two that is more choiceworthy. The degree to
which a health is choiceworthy is a constant. It is second order ends that vary in desirability. A second
order end that contains health+wealth+beauty, is more desirable that a second order end that contains just
health and wealth.

37

Aristotle, this cannot be since eudaimonia is the greatest of all goods, and is
therefore most choiceworthy. Inclusivists take this to mean that eudaimonia
is the greatest good because it includes all intrinsically desirable goods:l7

Aristotle says that we regard [eudaimonia] as the most worth while of
all things, not being counted as one good thing among others... for
then (if it were simply the most worth while of a number of candidates)
the addition of any of the other things would make it better, more
worth while -- and it would not have been lacking in nothing. He is
saying, then, that eudaimonia, being absolutely ﬁnal and genuinely self-
sufﬁcient, is more desirable than anything else in that it includes
everything desirable in itself. It is best, and better than everything else,
not in the way that bacon is better than eggs and than tomatoes (and
therefore the best of the three to choose), but in the way that bacon,
eggs and tomatoes, is a better breakfast than either bacon or eggs or
tomatoes-- and is indeed the best breakfast without qualiﬁcation.18

Intellectualists of course, deny that the above passage commits Aristotle to an
inclusivist conception of eudaimonia. Their argument is that the above merely
implies that eudaimonia cannot be improved upon.19 So, rather than reading
NE 1097b14-20 as implying that eudaimonia is a second order good that

contains other goods, intellectualists claim that NE 1097b14-20 simply states

 

‘7 Although all inclusivists agree that eudaimonia is a second order good, they disagree about which ﬁrst
order goods comprise eudaimonia. Ackrill (1980) claims that all intrinsic goods comprise eudaimonia.
Purinton (1998) disagrees, claiming instead that all and only virtuous activities, activities of the rational
soul, comprise eudaimonia. Keyt (1983) holds a similar view to Purinton's, claiming that all of the
rational virtues comprise eudaimonia.

'8 Ackrill ([1980], 21).

'9 So, for instance, Kraut ([1989], 270-271) claims:
Ackrill and many others infer... .[from the above passage] that [Aristotle] is identifying happiness
not with any one good such as contemplation but with the composite of all intrinsic goods. But I
see no evidence that Aristotle takes this further step... .Instead, I take him to be saying that
virtuous activity of the rational soul has the very property that is attributed to happiness in this
passage: if one has the greatest possible amount of this activity, one thereby lives a life that
cannot be improved upon. The addition of some other kind of good to virtuous activity does not
yield a sum that is more desirable than virtuous activity alone; it does not produce more happiness,
because happiness consists in virtuous activity alone. And supplementing happiness with
something other than happiness does not bring more happiness.

38

that Aristotle believes that a life that contains the maximal amount of
virtuous activity can never be improved upon.20
Now that we better understand what motivates the inclusivist thesis
that Aristotle believes that the human good includes a plurality of activities,“
let us return 'to the question of how inclusivists interpret the FT SO
relationship, and therewith, the conclusion of the function argument. First,
since inclusivists believe that eudaimonia includes other goods, they render
“teleios” and “teleiotatos” as “complete” and “most complete,”
respectively. Indeed, rendering “teleiotatos” as “most complete” accords

with the belief that eudaimonia is an end that includes other goods.

Presumably, an incomplete end is an end to which one could add more

goods, and a complete end is one that includes all goods.22

 

20 Although Aristotle does not state explicitly that the best life is the one in which contemplation is
maximized, he does say something similar at NE 1 177b32-35:
We must not live according to the advice that says to think human thoughts
since we are human, nor according to the advice that says to think mortal thoughts since
we are mortal, but we must, as much as possible, be immortal and do everything in order
to live in accordance with the best thing in us.
One might believe based on the above, that Aristotle is claiming that we should engage in theoretical
activity as much as possible (for he believes that a life in accordance with reason is divine -- NE 1 l77b30-
31). But Aristotle is not saying that we should theorize as much as possible, but that we should try as hard
as we can do live in accordance with the best thing in us. If the inclusivists are right, the best thing could
be a combination of ethical virtue and sophia.

2‘ In further support of the inclusivist claim that Aristotle believes that eudaimonia includes both ethical
virtue and sophia, is the fact that Aristotle continues his discussion of eudaimonia as if he believed that
ethical virtue was one of its components. For instance, Aristotle conﬁrms the truth of his deﬁnition of
eudaimonia by showing that accords with popular beliefs about it, and in doing so, he suggests that ethical
virtue is a component of eudaimonia. For immediately after claiming that some people identify eudaimonia
with virtue, that others identify it with practical wisdom, and that others with philosophic wisdom,
Aristotle states that all of these views are correct in at least some, and perhaps most, respects. See NE
1098b24-29.

39

The Inclusivist Account of the “for the sake 01” Relationship
How do inclusivists interpret the FTSO relationship given their
interpretation of “teleiotatos” as most complete? Rather than seeing the
FTSO relationship as a casual and normative relationship between two ends,
inclusivists claim that if A is for the sake of B, then A is a constituent or part
of B. Thus, rather than seeing the subordination between two ends as a
hierarchical relation, inclusivists believe that the subordination relation is a
mereological relation -- a relation between part and whole:
One does not putt in order to play golf as one buys a club in order to
play golf... .It will be “because” you wanted to play golf that you are
putting, and “for the sake” of a good holiday that you are playing golf,
but this rs because putting and golﬁng are constituents of or ingredients
in golﬁng and having a good holiday, respectively, not because they are
necessary preliminaries... .[this is a] kind of subordination which makes
it perfectly 2possible to say that ethical action is for the sake of
eudaimonia.
Interestingly, the very passages to which intellectualists appeal in support of
their position, are appealed to by inclusivists in support of their alternative
reading. Recall, for instance, Kraut's appeal to 1.1 in order to support his
account of the FT SO relationship as a causal-normative relationship. Ackrill
also takes note of this passage, but he draws attention to the fact that in this

passage, Aristotle states that some activities which are ends in themselves, are

for the sake of other activities. Let us quote Aristotle in full so that we can

 

22 Ackrill distinguishes a complete (teleios) end from a end that is most complete (teleiotatos). Ackrill
claims that a partially complete end includes some, but not all intrinsic goods. A most complete end. on
the other hand, contains all intrinsic goods. (Ackrill ([1980], 25-28).

40

better understand why Ackrill believes that his remarks in 1.1 support

inclusivism:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly
been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain
difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are
products apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be
better than the activities. Now, there are many actions, arts and
sciences, their ends are also many; the end of the medical art is health,
that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics
wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity-—as bridle-
making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall
under the art of riding, and this and every military action under the art
of riding, and in the same way other arts fall under yet others--in all of
these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to the subordinate
ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It
makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of
the actions, or something else apart from the activities.(NE 1094al-
17).

According to Ackrill, it is not immediately clear what Aristotle means in
claiming that intrinsically desirable activities can also be for the sake of other
activities. Of course, Kraut has no problem saying that an activity can be
intrinsically desirable and also exist for the sake of some other end. For his
account of “moderately perfect” goods is an account of such activities.
Nevertheless, Ackrill ﬁnds it difﬁcult to understand the FTSO relationship as a
causal-normative relationship, since he cannot accept that one activity could
use or exploit another:24

It is after all not obvious what is meant by saying that one action or

activity is for the sake of another, in cases where the ﬁrst does not

terminate in a product or outcome which the second can use or

exploit. . ..It would be natural to expect that corresponding to the initial
distinction, there would be a fundamental distinction between the ways

 

23 Ackrill ([1980], 19-20).

24 Against Ackrill is Aristotle's claim at EE 1248a29 that “virtue is an instrument of nous.”

41

in which activities of two different types could be subordinate to
another activity. The idea of the use or exploitation of a product or
outcome being inappropriate where the subordinate activity is not
directed to‘ a product or outcome, what immediately suggests itself
instead is a relation like that of part to whole, the relation an activity or
end may have to an activity or end that includes or embraces it.25
Ackrill's resistance to interpreting the subordination relation between
intrinsically desirable activities as a relation of instrumental causality, compels
him to interpret the subordination relation as a relation between part and
whole. On this view, when Aristotle claims that one activity, A, is for the
sake of another activity, B, he is claiming that A is part of B. Thus when
Aristotle claims that eudaimonia is the teleiotatos end since all our activities
are for its sake, Aristotle is claiming that all our activities are components of
eudaimonia. And when, at the conclusion of the function argument, Aristotle
states that eudaimonia is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and
teleiotatos virtue, inclusivists interpret this as the claim that eudaimonia is
activity of the soul in accordance with the most complete virtue, i.e., the
virtue that includes all other virtues, and hence ethical virtue, as its
components.
But if inclusivists believe that Aristotle identiﬁes the best and most
teleios virtue with the virtue that contains all virtues, then how do they

explain Aristotle's remarks at book X. 7,8, in which Aristotle claims that

activity in accordance with sophia is teleios happiness (NE 1177al7-18), that

 

2" Ackrill ([1980], 18-19).

42

 

 

 

sophia is the best (aristos) thing in us (NE 1177a12-l3); and that activity in
accordance with ethical virtue is an inferior form of happiness (NE ll78a9)?
Inclusivists claim that although X.7,8 suggests that theoretical activity is
best, and hence that it is superior to the ethically virtuous activity, this does
not mean that eudaimonia consists in theoretical activity alone.26 Rather,
eudaimonia consists in both theoretical and ethically virtuous activity, but
theoretical activity is the primary component in the eudaimon life. As David
Keyt puts it, “moral activity is the foundation, and theoretical activity is the
superstructure, of the best life for a man.”27 According to this View, ethical
virtue provides some of the necessary conditions for contemplation. One
inclusivist states, for instance, that ethical virtue provides a “condition of
quiescence” in which the mind is not distracted from philosophical wor .28
By arguing that ethical virtue provides necessary conditions for the
attainment and operation of sophia, inclusivists offer an interpretation of

X.7,8 which is compatible with their reading of the function argument.29

 

2" Not all inclusivists make this claim. Ackrill ([1980], 32) concedes that X.7,8 implies that Aristotle
believes that theoretical activity is more valuable than ethical virtue, and consequently that it would be
“impossible for him to give a rule for combining theoria with virtuous action in the best life.” Thus,
Ackrill thinks that the earlier books of the NE are inconsistent with X.7,8. Roche (1995), Keyt (1981),
Purinton (1998), and Cooper provide accounts of X.7,8 which make it consistent with the earlier books of
the NE.

27 Keyt ([1981], 370).
28 Cooper ([1987], 192).

29 Keyt ([1981], 381-382) concedes that NE ll77bl-2 implies intellectualism, but he thinks that it is the
only passage that does so. But Aristotle merely states in this passage that theoretical activity alone is loved
for its own sake. On my view, this passage does not pose a difﬁculty for inclusivism. For Aristotle is
saying that only theoretical activity is only loved for its own sake. This is completely consistent with the
view that eudaimonia includes both ethical virtue and sophia. For we could say that eudaimonia includes all
the rational virtues, and that some of these rational virtues (ethical virtue) are desired for the sake of some

43

Thus far, I have explained the motivation for both intellectualist and
inclusivist readings of the function argument. Convinced that Aristotle
identiﬁes the best and teleiotatos virtue with the single virtue of sophia,
intellectualists draw support for this View from key passages in book X,
whereas inclusivists draw support for their reading of NE 1098a16-18, from
book I and the bulk of NE which is concerned with the topic of ethical virtue.
The literature on the subject continues to be a debate between these two
irreconcilable positions. In my View, both approaches of are incorrect. Both
intellectualism and inclusivism are faulty since they fail to recognize that the
meanings of “teleiotatos” and “idion,” as well as the nature of the FTSO
relationship, are rooted in Aristotle's views about the proper biological
development of human beings.

As we have seen, intellectualists believe that NE X.7,8 are the key
passages in understanding how to interpret the function argument.
Inclusivists, on the other hand, believe that Aristotle's preoccupation with
ethical virtue in the NE, is most relevant to the correct understanding of the
function argument. In my View, however, Aristotle's views about the
biological development of human beings are crucial to the correct
understanding of the function argument, and hence to the meaning of
“teleiotatos,” “idion,” and the FTSO relationship. Thus claim is

substantiated in the next chapter.

 

other rational virtues (sophia), since it is nature that needs ethical virtue in order to excellently actualize

44

 

sophia in a human being. I will argue for this claim in detail later.

45

CHAPTER 3: A DEVELOPMENTALIST READING OF THE
FUNCTION ARGUMENT

My aim in this chapter is to provide an interpretation of the conclusion
of the function argument (NE 1098a16-18) that incorporates Aristotle's views
about the biological development of human beings. As we have seen, the
interpretation of “teleios,” “teleiotatos,” and the FI‘ SO relationship is crucial
to one's interpretation of the function argument, and subsequently to
Aristotle's deﬁnition of eudaimonia. In this chapter, I discuss the signiﬁcance
of these concepts to Aristotle's account of biological development, and will

9, ‘6

show that they illuminate his discussion of “teleios teleiotatos” and the
FTSO relationship at NE 1098a16-l8. For as we will see, the FTSO
relationship is a relationship of ﬁnal causality. Thus if A is for the sake of B,
then B is the ﬁnal cause of A. I also argue that in the context of the NE, the
relata of the FTSO relationship are developmental stages, one of which is

necessary for the development of the other. In the chapter following this one,

I explain how ethical virtue is necessary for the development of nous.

46

Biological Develppment and Hypothetical Necessity
According to Aristotle, both man-made artifacts and living organisms
are produced by the mechanism of “hypothetical necessity.” A hypothetical
necessity is simply a condition that must obtain if a certain end is to be
realized. Thus, if one is going to make a saw, then steel is necessary for its
completion, and if one desires to teach Latin, then one must ﬁrst know Latin.
Thus, steel is hypothetically necessary for the production of a saw, and
knowledge of Latin is hypothetically necessary if one desires to teach the
subject. Aristotle describes how hypothetical necessity is involved in the
medical, rhetorical and political crafts:
A doctor does not deliberate about whether he should heal, nor an
orator whether he shall convince, not a statesman whether he shall
produce law and order, not does any one else deliberate about his end.
Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be
attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider
by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by
one only, they consider how it will be achieved by this, and by what
means this will be achieved, till they come to the ﬁrst cause which in
the order of discovery is last. (NE 1112b11-24).
A craftsman, then, not only determines the most efﬁcient way to make a bed,
for instance, but also determines the steps that are necessary for making a
bed, and the precise order of these steps. This is what Aristotle means when,
in the above passage, he says, “[craftsmen] consider how [their end] will be
achieved by this, and by what means this will be achieved.” Thus, a

craftsman starting from his end, surveys the gamut of ways that a bed can be

made, and then selects one of these ways as the most efﬁcient. After doing

47

so, he then reasons through a chain of hypothetical syllogisms, which is, in
effect, the algorithm for the production of the bed. This chain of hypothetical
syllogisms “unfolds” in a reverse order insofar as the bed is produced last,
and the stages that are necessary for the realization of the bed are formed
ﬁrst. But the stages that are necessary for the realization of the bed are not
performed for their own sakes, but for the sake of the bed. Wood may be
necessary for the production of a bed, but the craftsman does not want wood
for its own sake, but for the sake of making a bed.
According to Aristotle, hypothetical necessity also operates in nature:
There is “absolute necessity,” which belongs to eternal things, and
there is “hypothetical” necessity, which has to do with everything that
is formed by the processes of nature, as well as with products of art,
such as houses and so forth. If a house, or any other end, is to be
realized, it is necessary that such and such material be available; one
thing must ﬁrst be formed, and set in motion, and then another thing;
and so on continually in the same manner up to the end, which is the
ﬁnal cause, for the sake of which every one of those things is formed,
and for which it exists. The things which are formed in nature are in
like case. (PA 639b24-641a1).
Because man is such and such, therefore the process of his formation
(yéveotg) must of necessity be such and such and take place in such a
manner; which is why ﬁrst this part is formed, then that. (PA
640a34-b4).
Thus, just as a craftsman produces his product via the mechanism of
hypothetical necessity, so too, does nature. However, when an organism is
being produced, it is not a craftsman that implements the chain of
hypothetical syllogisms -- the instructions for the making of an organism —

but the soul. Obviously, by “soul” Aristotle means something very different

than the notion of soul assumed by dualistic theories of mind and body.

48

Aristotle does not believe that an immaterial soul is “in” a material body.
For he speaks of the soul as if it were a craftsman, whose material is the
body:

there is a parallel between a craft’s need to use tools, and the soul’s
need to use the body. (DA 407b25-26).

Aristotle claims that soul is also the form and ﬁnal cause of the body:

For the body, far from being one of the things said of a subject, stands
rather itself as subject and is matter. It must then be the case that the

soul is substance (oboia) as the form (ei50g) of a natural body which
potentially has life. (DA 412al7-21). ’

The soul, then, is the cause and principle of the living body, and as
these are talked of in several ways, so is the soul the cause of the

body in the three ways we have distinguished; for it is the cause as that
from which the movement itself arises, and as that for whose

sake it is, and as the formal substance (oboioz) of ensouled bodies (DA
415b8-12).
In claiming that the soul is the form of a natural body, Aristotle is claiming that
the soul contains the deﬁnition or essence of that body, and is the “shape”
(uoprph) of that body. Aristotle identiﬁes the form of a body with its nature
(tpirotg) (Ph. l93a28-3l), and he identiﬁes the nature of a body with both the

shape and the deﬁnition of that body (Ph. l93a28-l93b5). However, Aristotle

believes that the nature of a particular organism is not something that exists at

 

" All translations of De Anima, are by H. L. Tancred, unless otherwise noted. Aristotle distinguishes
three different grades of potentiality. A substance can be potentially X, 1) given its membership in a
certain species (e.g., a man is potentially] a knower since he is one of those things that can know), 2) if it
is in possession of a capacity that is not being exercised (e.g., a man is potentially2 a knower when he is
sleeping), and 3) if it is exercising a capacity (e.g., a man is potentially3 a knower if he is exercising his
capacity for knowledge) (DA 4l7a25-417bl ). The latter two grades of potentiality correspond to two grades
of actuality -- the ﬁrst grade of actuality is tantamount to the possession of a capacity, whereas the second
corresponds to the exercising of this capacity (DA 412b5-a22).

49

the outset, but is something that biological development tends towards. An
organism, in other words, is the end of biological development:

What grows qua growing grows from something into something. Into
what then does it grow? Not into that from which it arose but into
that which it tends. The shape (uoptpij) then is nature. (Ph. 193b16-18).

It is not the case that when an animal is formed at that same moment a
human being, or a horse, or any other particular sort of animal is

formed, because the end or completion (téltog) is formed last of all....
(GA. 736b2-4).

Given Aristotle's View that natural products presuppose certain conditions and
are made by the mechanism of hypothetical necessity, then it follows that if the
end or nature of an organism is to be completely realized, then certain
conditions must be present. And Aristotle states that the conditions that are
necessary for the attainment of the end, exist for the sake of that end:
So we have these three things: (1) the end, which we describe as being
that for the sake of which <other things are>; (2) the things which are
for the sake of the end, viz., the activating and generative principle
(second, because the existence of that which is productive and
generative, qua such, is relative to what it produces and generates); (3)
the things which are serviceable, which can be and are employed by

the end. (GA 742a28-33).

Thus, those instrumental parts which are in their nature generative

must always be there themselves prior to the rest, for they are for the

sake of something else, as being a ﬁrst principle (dipxij). (GA 742b3-6).
Now that we understand how nature makes its products, and that the
developmental stages of an organism occur for the sake of an end, we are in a

position to see that Aristotle's account of eudaimonia is rooted in his views

about biological development. For Aristotle states that the end of a human

being is reason (K6709) and nous :

50

The exercise of rational principle (Myog) and thought (nous) is the
ultimate end of man's nature. (Pol. l334b15-l6).2

If reason and nous are the end of human development, then it follows that the
development of a human being tends towards, and hence is for the sake of
nous. It also follows that nous is realized at the natural end of the
development of a human being. So Aristotle writes:

In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and
the irrational (62710709 is prior to the rational. This is proved by the
fact that all the signs of appetite - such as anger (0111.169) and wishing
(Boﬁheuotg) and desire (emfluuioc) --are visible in children from their
very birth; while reasoning (homopég) and thought (nous)

are faculties which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. (Pol.
l334b20-24).

It is not the fact that when an animal is formed at that same moment a
human being, or a horse, or any other particular sort of animal is
formed, because the end or completion (téltog) is formed last of all, and
that which is peculiar (idion) to each thing is the end of its process of
formation. That is why it is a very great puzzle to answer another
question concerning nous. At what moment and in what manner, do

those creatures with this principle acquire their share in it, and where
does it come from? (GA 736b2-7).

Aristotle's explicit statement that the idion (i.e., nous), is the end of the
biological development of a human being, is relevant to the function
argument. For there, recall, Aristotle claimed that the good of man could be
deﬁned if one discovers the idion of man:

Just as for a ﬂute player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all
things that have a function or activity (npﬁtﬁtg), the good (tdtyoceov)
and the “well” (to 813) is thought to reside in the function, so it would
seem to be for man, if he has a function... . What then can this be?
Life seems belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar
(idion) to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and

 

2 All translations of Politics are by Ernest Barker unless otherwise noted.

51

growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to
be shared by the horse, the ox and every animal. There remains, then,

an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Exowog
Myov). (NE 1097b25-1098a3).

But if Aristotle believes that the good of man can be discovered if one
discovers the idion of man, and if the idion of a creature is formed last in
that creature's development, then it is logical that the good of man is
discovered by discovering the ﬁnal stage of human development. Aristotle's
conception of eudaimonia, therefore, is based upon his views about the
biological development of human beings. Aristotle's remarks about nous, and
that its characteristic activity, theoria, are thus also based on his biological
views. For in the ﬁnal book of the NE, Aristotle writes:

[theoretical activity] is best (Kpatiom) (for nous (vofrg) is best, and the
things that are known are the best objects of nous). (NE 1177al4-22). 3

Aristotle makes the above claim because he believes that what is best is the
ultimate end, i.e., the most ﬁnal cause, of some process:

Not every stage that is last claims to be an end, but only that which is
best (Bélvctotov). (Ph. l94a32-33).

“That for the sake of which” means what is best (BéATIOTOV) and the
end of things that lead up to it. (Ph. 195a24—25).

The reason why Aristotle believes that nous is best is clear. For nous is the
ﬁnal cause of a human being's development, and the ﬁnal cause of a human

being's development is best.

 

3 My translation.

52

 

The Function Argument Revisited

Let us now apply the above results to the conclusion of the function
argument. As discussed in the last chapter, intellectualists and inclusivists
disagree about Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, and hence have
divergent interpretations of NE 1098a16—18. There, recall, Aristotle deﬁnes
eudaimonia as “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if the
virtues are many, in accord with the best and teleiotatos.” Intellectualists
believe that the best and teleiotatos virtue is sophia, and that ethical virtue is
not a component of eudaimonia, whereas inclusivists believe that the best and
teleiotatos virtue is a combination of ethical virtue and sophia. Crucial to
both of these interpretations is a speciﬁc interpretation of “teleios,”
“teleiotatos” and the FT SO relationship. Whereas intellectualists interpret
“teleios” and “teleiotatos” as “perfect” and “most perfect,” they
understand the FT SO relationship as a relationship of instrumental causality: if
A is for the sake of B, then A causes B. Inclusivists, on the other hand,
interpret “teleios,” and “teleiotatos” as “complete” and “most complete,”
and understand the FT SO relationship as a relationship between part and
whole. So, if A is for the sake of B, then A is a part or constituent of B.

Given that Aristotle bases his conception of eudaimonia on the
biological development of a human being, I believe that in the context of the
NE, the correct interpretation of “teleios” is “ﬁnal,” and that the correct

interpretation of “teleiotatos,” is “most ﬁnal.” In my view, a teleios end is

53

 

an end that is both a ﬁnal cause of some process, and a necessary condition
for the realization of another end. On the other hand, a teleiotatos end is the
most ﬁnal cause of some process, and is not a necessary condition for the
realization of an end. To illustrate, suppose that one wants to make a saw. In
order to do so, one needs steel. Further suppose that one does not have any
steel, and hence needs to walk to the market to purchase some. Now in this
scenario, the end of the walk is the purchasing of steel (PS), and so PS is the
ﬁnal cause of the walk. But although PS is a ﬁnal cause, it is not the most
ﬁnal cause. For PS is for the sake of a saw. And so, one could say that
whereas PS is a ﬁnal cause, the making of a saw is the most ﬁnal cause of this
sequence. Similar cases arise in nature. For in the case of the production of
an animal, nature makes the heart for the sake of producing the nutritive
faculty (GA 740a24-30), and nature makes the nutritive faculty for the sake of
the perceptive, for this is the end of the formation of an animal (Juv. 469b4).
So whereas the nutritive faculty is the ﬁnal cause of the heart, it is not the
most ﬁnal cause.

The conclusion of the function argument states that the human good is
activity of the soul in accordance with the best and teleiotatos virtue. As was
discussed in Chapter 1, the meaning of this claim is not immediately clear.
For although Aristotle discusses the constituents of ethical virtue (i.e., the
virtues of character (VoC) and phronésis) in detail, his remarks in the ﬁnal

book of the NE strongly suggest that he believes that sophia is the best and

54

teleiotatos virtue. And as we have seen, scholars disagree about the precise
relationship among eudaimonia, ethical virtue, and sophia.

As we will see, the relationship between ethical virtue and sophia is one
of final causality. For ethical virtue is a necessary condition of, and hence
exists for the sake of, sophia, its ﬁnal cause. The details of this claim will be
discussed in the next chapter. But for now, we can point out that Aristotle's
remarks about education lend strong support to this view. For Aristotle
claims that the VoC, which are concerned with pleasure and pain, should be
produced for the sake of reason and mind:

Moral excellence (110116] dperh) is concerned with pleasures and pains;
it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account
of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have
been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato
says, so as to both delight in and be pained by the things we ought; this
is the right education (6p0h nonﬁeia). (NE 1104b8-13).

The exercise of rational principle (71.6709 and thought (nous) is the
ultimate end of man's nature. It is therefore with a view to the
exercise of these faculties that we should regulate from the ﬁrst, the
birth and the training in habits of our citizens. (Pol. l334b15-16).

In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and
the irrational (éihoyog) is prior to the rational. This is proved by the
fact that all the signs of appetite -- such as anger (Ouu6g) and wishing
(Boﬁheuotg) and desire (émfluuia) --are visible in children from their
very birth; while reasoning (7107101169 and thought (nous) are faculties
which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. The conclusion
which follows is obvious. Children's bodies should be given attention
before their souls; and their appetites should be the next part of them
to be regulated. But the regulation of their appetites should be
intended for the beneﬁt of (Evexor) their minds

(nous)-- just as the attention given to their bodies should be intended
for the beneﬁt of their souls. (Pol. 1334b20-28).

55

The last passage is particularly revealing. For there, Aristotle states that the
regulation of the appetites, i.e., having the appropriate pleasures and pains, i.e.,
possessing the VoC, is achieved for the sake of nous. This is a clear statement
that the VoC are not produced for their own sake, but for the sake of nous.
And it is quite reasonable to infer from this, that Aristotle believes the reason
why the VoC are for the sake of nous, is that they are necessary for its
attainment. For why else would Aristotle claim that the appetites should be
regulated for the sake of nous?

Also note that in the ﬁrst passage, Aristotle states that right education
(6p01’1 nonbeioc) consists in feeling pleasure and pain appropriately, i.e., the
possession of the VoC. According to Aristotle, human beings do not
automatically possess the VoC, but do so by a process of habituation (éGtCEiv)
(NE 1103a14-b25). By habituation, Aristotle simply means the repeated

9

practice of an action (“learning by doing,’ as it were). Thus, in order to
acquire the virtue of courage one must ﬁrst perform a sufﬁcient number of
courageous acts. At NE 1104b8-l3 above, Aristotle is claiming that we
ought to be brought up in a particular way southat we possess the VoC, and
he refers to this sort of upbringing as “right education.” So we can say that
the possession of the VoC is a ﬁnal cause of right education. But we have
also seen that the VoC are realized for the sake of nous. Thus the possession

of the VoC is a teleios end, but is not teleiotatos. For the possession of the

VoC is the end of right education or habituation, but the end of the VoC is

56

nous. In other words, right education is for the sake of the VoC, and the
VoC are for the sake of nous.

When we understand that Aristotle uses “teleios” and “teleiotatos” to
describe different degrees of ﬁnal causality, it is clear that both intellectualists
and inclusivists not only have incorrect interpretations of these terms, but also
have an incorrect understanding of FTSO relationship. For the FTSO
relationship is neither a relationship of instrumental causality, nor a

relationship between part and whole, but a relationship of ﬁnal causality.

Why the Intellectualist Account of the “for the sake 01” Relationship is
Incorrect

On Kraut's View, recall, to say that rubbing is for the sake for heat, is
to say rubbing causes heat. Although it is true, in at least some sense, that a
stage that is necessary for the realization of an end (SN), causes the
realization of the end (E), Kraut’s acdount of the FT SO relationship ignores
the fact that the reason why SN is produced is because it is necessary for E.
In other words, Kraut's account of the FTSO relationship ignores that E is the
final cause of SN. In conﬁning his discussion of the FTSO relationship to
goods, some of which are more valuable than others, Kraut has failed to see
that FTSO relationship is one of ﬁnal causality.

Kraut, moreover, believes that goods comprise a hierarchy with merely
instrumental goods at the bottom, goods that are instrumentally and
intrinsically desirable above these, and a single good that is intrinsically, but

not instrumentally desirable at the pinnacle. Kraut claims that goods that are

57

instrumentally and intrinsically desirable are “teleios,” i.e., “perfect,” and
that the good at the pinnacle of the hierarchy is teleiotatos, i.e., most perfect.
But these interpretations are incorrect. For a teleios end, as I have argued, is
a ﬁnal cause that is also a necessary condition of the realization of a most ﬁnal
cause. And a most ﬁnal cause is a ﬁnal cause that is not a necessary condition
for the realization of any further end.

Although I agree with Kraut's claim that a “teleios” end is desired for
the sake of something else, I do not believe that all teleios ends are either
“moderately perfect” and hence are intrinsically desirable, although some
could be. Recall that Kraut believes that a “teleios” end is an intrinsically
desirable end that is also desired for the sake of something else.4 I reject this
reading. As we have seen, there can be a stage that is both the ﬁnal cause
and a necessary condition for the attainment of some further end; e.g., the
purchasing of steel which is done for the sake of making a saw. But of
course, one does not desire to purchase steel for its own sake. Therefore,
there are some teleios ends that are not intrinsically desirable. Hence, Kraut's

claim that every teleios end is intrinsically desirable, is false.

Why the Inclusivist Account of the “for the sake of” Relationship is
Incorrect

It should also be clear why I reject the inclusivist interpretation of the

FTSO relationship. According to inclusivists, the FTSO relationship is a

 

4 Kraut ([1989], 241-251).

58

 

relationship between part and whole. But it is simply absurd to say that, if
the purchasing of steel is necessary for the making of a saw, then the
purchasing of steel is part of the saw. True, one needs steel in order to make
a saw, and nature needs the heart in order to make a human being, but just
because X is needed to do Y, does not mean that X is a part of Y.5 Thus,
inclusivists are incorrect in interpreting “teleios” as complete, and in
interpreting the FT SO relationship as a relationship between part and whole.
It is rather that, if A is for the sake of B, then B is the ﬁnal cause of A. And if
B is a ﬁnal cause of some process or activity that is never a hypothetical
necessity, then B is the teleiotatos end.

Thus far I have argued that the FTSO relationship is a relationship of
ﬁnal causality. I have also argued that, whereas a teleios end is a ﬁnal cause
of some process that is also necessary for the realization of a subsequent end,
a teleiotatos end is an ultimate ﬁnal cause, and hence is not hypothetically
necessary for the realization of any subsequent ends. Thus, when Aristotle
states that eudaimonia is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and
teleiotatos virtue, he is claiming that eudaimonia is activity in accordance
with the virtue for the sake of which all virtues are realized. Now, I agree
with intellectualists that Aristotle identiﬁes sophia as the best and teleiotatos
virtue, and I also agree with their claim that ethical virtue is a teleios end.
But my accounts of the meanings of teleios and teleiotatos differ from those

proposed by the intellectualists, and so the similarity between my and their

59

 

 

view is only at the surface level. For Kraut believes that sophia is
teleiotatos because it is at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of goods; and he
believes that ethical virtue is teleios because it is an intrinsically desirable end
that is not at this pinnacle. On my View, however, sophia is the teleiotatos
virtue because it is the complete actualization of nous, which is the teleiotatos
stage of human development. Moreover, ethical virtue is teleios because it is
both a ﬁnal cause (of right education), and is necessary for the development
of nous.6 In the next chapter, I show why Aristotle believes that ethical virtue

is necessary for the development of nous.

 

5 See Keyt ([1987], 36) for discussion and references. I am not claiming that is if X is for the sake of Y,
then X can never be part of Y.

6 And since sophia presupposes nous (for sophia is the combination of nous and epistémé (NE 1141a19-
20)), then sophia presupposes ethical virtue. Both "nous" and "epistémé" are technical notions that will be
more thoroughly in chapter 4. It is useful to regard nous as the intellectual power that enables a human
being to grasp deﬁnitions, and to think of epistémé‘ as the ability to demonstrate the logical consequences of

deﬁnitions.

60

CHAPTER 4: WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS HYPOTHETICALLY
NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOUS

So far we have seen that Aristotle's deﬁnition of eudaimonia is based
on his views about biological development. For in claiming that the human
good can be discovered through man's idion (NE 1097b34-35), which is
formed last in the development of a human being (GA 736b4-5), Aristotle is
claiming that the human good is deﬁned in terms of the end towards which
the development of a human being tends. As we now know, Aristotle claims
that the end of human development is nous (Pol. l334b15-l6). Since the end
of a developmental process is achieved through the mechanism of
hypothetical necessity (PA 639b24-641a1), it follows that certain
preconditions must be satisﬁed in order for nous to completely realized.

In this chapter, I will show that ethical virtue is a precondition of the

complete realization of nous. I say “complete realization” because although

61

human beings possess the capacity for nous by nature, it is not the case that
all human beings. actualize this capacity. For nous is an intellectual virtue
(dipeth vontucoir) that enables human beings to grasp the ﬁrst principles of
demonstrations (APo. 100b5-15). However, the ﬁrst principles of a
demonstration can only be grasped after one has consciously and deliberately
used the method of dialectic (51001.8Kt1k6g) to sift through and clarify the
relevant opinions or endoxa on the subject. According to Aristotle, endoxa
(tt‘x Evboﬁoc) are opinions accepted by the majority, by wise persons, or by
craftsmen (Top. 100b21-23, 104a12-37), whereas dialectic is a process of
criticism by which ﬁrst principles are discovered (Top. 101a37-b4).l The sort
of criticism that Aristotle has in mind here is rational criticism, a method in
which a claim is modiﬁed or rejected, after its ﬂaws and merits are made
explicit. Thus, by weeding out the ﬂaws and retaining the merits of various
received opinions on a subject, one arrives at ﬁrst principles. Clearly, not
every human being engages in such an activity. Thus, not every human
being actualizes her potential for nous.

The fact that ﬁrst principles are discovered via the method of dialectic
is important. For dialectic proceeds by determining the strengths and
weaknesses of an opinion by comparing and contrasting it with the facts, by
detecting ambiguities, and by drawing relevant and important distinctions.2

However, not everyone possesses these skills. Aristotle himself notes that

 

' All translations of Topics are by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge unless otherwise noted. See Reeve ([1992],
34—45 for discussion.

62

 

most people are unable to make important distinctions (NE ll72b3). In
addition, people can misjudge the strengths or weaknesses of opinion, as well
as misjudge the veracity of an opinion (NE 1172a28-1172bl). Add to this,
the fact that the majority of people have false opinions (Rhet. 1378a20), and it
is clear that only a very limited number of human beings possess the
wherewithal to actualize their potential for nous. For one needs to know
what to criticize and what to praise -- what portion of an opinion is true, and
what portion of an opinion is false -- in order to arrive at ﬁrst principles. Put
bluntly, one needs to be an excellent judge of opinions, in order to arrive at
ﬁrst principles.

But if nous presupposes that one is an excellent judge of opinions, then
how is this excellence acquired? Aristotle's answer to this question, as we
shall see, is that one acquires an excellent opinion making faculty (OMF)
through the acquisition of ethical virtue. In fact, phrone‘sis, which is
necessary and sufﬁcient for ethical virtue, is, according to Aristotle, the
excellence of the opinion making faculty (50antuc6g) (NE 1140b26—27).
Phrone‘sis, moreover, implies both sunésis (O'DVEO'IQ), a virtue which enables
one to be a good judge of another's Opinion (NE 1143a14—15), as well as
equity (énttZlKﬁ), which is the ability to modify or sharpen a universal claim in

light of a counterexample (NE ll37b26-27).3 Clearly, each of these abilities is

 

2 See Reeve ([1992], 34-45).

3 To be sure, Aristotle does not deﬁne equity (émsucﬁ) as the ability to modify or sharpen a universal
claim in light of a counterexample. Rather, he deﬁnes equity as the virtue responsible for the appropriate
correction of a law when a particular circumstance arises which challenges the universality of that law (NE
1 l37b26-27). For instance, one may have as a law “do not steal.” However, a woman may have stolen

63

necessary for the effective dialectical consideration of endoxa by which ﬁrst
principles are discovered. Hence, phronésis is necessary for the discovery of
ﬁrst principles. And since one's capacity for nous is only actualized when one
grasps ﬁrst principles, then phronésis is necessary for the actualization of
nous.

I will begin by brieﬂy discussing Aristotle's epistemology. For nous
plays a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, viz., it grasps the ﬁrst
principles upon which the acquisition of knowledge depends, as we will see. I
will then show that the development of nous requires several hypothetical
necessities in order to be realized. I will argue, in the way outlined above,
that ethical virtue is one of the hypothetical necessities that is required for the

realization of nous.

Nous

In order to understand the nature of nous, some preliminary marks
about Aristotle's epistemology need to be made. Aristotle's standards for
knowledge are high. For he claims that in order to know or understand some
claim P, 1) P must be necessarily true, and 2) one must be able to explain P.

In order to explain P, one must demonstrate P:

 

food from the market next store to prevent her children from starving to death. In light of this
circumstance, one might demand that one modiﬁes the law to read, “do not steal unless it is absolutely
necessary for the survival of innocent children.” Modifying the law in this way is, of course, a species of
modifying a claim in light of a counterexample. For the law is the “claim” and the particular circumstance
that challenges the universality of the law is the “counterexample.” Thus, equity is the application of the
general ability to correctly modify a claim in light of a counterexample, to the laws themselves.

64

We think (oi6u800t) we understand (information) a thing sirnpliciter
(anxiog). .. .whenever we think we are aware (ytvcboxsw) both that the
explanation because of which the object is, is its explanation, and that it
is not possible for this to be otherwise. (APo. 71b9-l6).

By demonstration (61116581ﬁtg) I mean a scientiﬁc deduction

(oulthoytou‘ov émorn uov11<6v); and by scientiﬁc (entomuovm6v) I

mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand (érttotétuseoc)

something. (APo. 71b16-18).

To demonstrate a claim, is to deduce it from premises that are necessarily true
and universal (APo. 71b9-16, 88b31). By “universal,” Aristotle means a
statement about a class or category of things, rather than a statement about a
particular entity. Thus “all men are bipeds” and “all prime numbers are
odd” would qualify as universal statements, whereas the statement “Socrates
is a man” would not. Note that if P must be derived from universal premises,
then P itself must be universal. For no statement about a particular entity
follows from universal statements. Thus universal statements comprise both
the explanans and the explanandum of the demonstration.

According to Aristotle, then, knowledge implies the ability to deduce a
true and universal proposition, from other true and universal propositions. Of
course, one could always ask how one knows whether the universal premises
of a demonstration are true. In other words, if knowing P consists in showing
that it can be deduced from true, universal propositions: R, S, then one can
challenge one's claim to know P, by asking how one knows that R and S.
Aristotle's deﬁnition of knowledge implies that, if one knows that R and S,

then one has demonstrated R,S from other premises, T, U. But this just

pushes the question back -- for we can ask how we know T and U. Aware of

65

   

 

this potential problem, Aristotle claimed that there must be starting points of
demonstration that are themselves undemonstrated and indemonstrable.

Aristotle refers to these undemonstrated starting points as “immediates”

(@8909):

But we say that neither is all understanding (émorr’iun) demonstrative
(6m68amuc6g), but in the case of the irnmediates (61118009) it is non-
demonstrable (61vour6881mog) --and that this is necessary is evident; for
if it is necessary to understand (éniotaoflat) the things which are prior
and on which the demonstration depends, and it comes to stop at some
time, it is necessary for these irnmediates to be non demonstrable. So
as to that we argue thus; and we also say that there is not only
understanding (éntotﬁun) but also some principle (6tpx1'1) of
understanding (émorﬁun). (APo. 72b18-25).

 

According to Aristotle, then, there must indemonstrable starting points that
provide the foundation for demonstration. However, only very speciﬁc kinds
of statements can serve as the starting points of demonstrations:

If, then, understanding (éniotocoﬁon) is as we posited, it is necessary for
demonstrative understanding (ouhhoytoubv éntomuov1K6v) in
particular to depend on things which are true (dhneﬁg) and primitive
(npdnov) and immediate (dingoog) and more familiar than
(yvooptudrtepoc) and prior to (np6tepov) and explanatory of the
conclusion (aitiwv rob ouunepotouatog) (for in this way the principles
will also be appropriate to what is being proved). For there will be
deduction even without these conditions, but there will not be

demonstration; for it will not produce understanding (éntotﬁun) (APo.
71bl9-25).

Aristotle also claims that the conclusions of demonstrations are universal
(APo. 88b3l), and it follows from this that the starting points of
demonstrations are likewise universal, for no universal statement can follow
from a statement about a particular. Thus, the starting points of

demonstration must be universal, true, primitive, immediate, more familiar

66

and prior to the conclusion of the demonstration. Although Aristotle does
not give a speciﬁc example of an immediate and familiar statement, he
presumably thinks that a statement such as “all men are bipeds” is more
immediate and familiar than the statement “all prime numbers are odd.”
Although Aristotle is very speciﬁc about the kind of propositions that
can serve as the starting points of demonstrations, one can, of course, ask
how we know that such propositions are true. For as stated above, Aristotle
claims that the irnmediates are true, and since the irnmediates are not proven
from true premises (for they are not proven at all), then how can we be
certain that they are true? Aristotle claims that the truth of the irnmediates is
guaranteed by the fact that they are grasped by nous. For nous is an
intellectual virtue which is always correct, and which grasps the starting
points of demonstrations (APo. 100b5-l7, NE 1141a2-8):

Since of the intellectual states by which we grasp truth some are
always true and some admit falsehood (e. g. opinion (86Eoz) and
reasoning 0107101169 --whereas understanding (emotimn) and nous are
always true), and no kind other than comprehension is more precise
than understanding, and the principles of demonstration are more

familiar, and all understanding involves an account (Myog) --there will
not be understanding of the principles; and since it is not possible for
anything to be truer than understanding, except nous, there will be
nous of the principles (dpxﬁ). .. .so if we have no other true kind apart
from understanding, nous will be the principle (dpxﬁ) of understanding.

Thus, the starting points of demonstration are not grasped by any intellectual
faculty, they are grasped by the faculty of nous. Aristotle's standards for the
starting points of demonstration, and hence knowledge are high indeed. For

one cannot acquire knowledge unless one starts with true, universal

67

propositions -- propositions that are apprehended by nous. Furthermore,
one cannot apprehend the propositions grasped by nous unless one has

engaged in the dialectical consideration of endoxa.

The Hypothetical Necessities of the Actualization of Nous
As wenow know, nous is the ﬁnal stage of human development, and
hence human beings can be said to possess the potential for nous. However,
care needs to be exercised when thinking of nous as a natural potential. For
in the De Anima, Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of potentiality:
But we should draw some distinctions as regards potentiality (56v0tutg)
and actuality (évrehéxera)... .First then there is say, a knowing just in
the way that we would say that a man is knowing in that man is one of
those things that know and have knowledge; and then there is a
knowing in the thing in the way that we (in fact) say that a man who
has learned grammar is knowing (but each of these two is potentially
knowing not in the same way, rather the ﬁrst is so in that his genus and

matter are of the right kind, the other in that he has the potentiality to
contemplate whenever he will, providing no external factor prevents

him) (DA 417a2l-28).4

According to Aristotle, if we say that Socrates has the potential to speak
Japanese, we could mean that l) Socrates could, in principle, learn Japanese if
he wanted to, but does not, as yet, possess such an ability; or we could mean
that 2) Socrates could, if called upon, speak Japanese at will. Note that Socrates
can possess the second sense of potentiality only after learning Japanese. In
other words, Socrates can possess the second sense of potentiality only if he ﬁrst

learns and understands the Japanese language. This is another instance of

 

4 All translations of De Anima are by Hugh Lawson—Tancred unless otherwise noted.

68

 

Aristotle's doctrine of “hypothetical necessity.” For Socrates can possess the
second sort of potentiality only if certain necessary conditions are satisﬁed.

Just as there are two different senses in which Socrates has the potential
to speak Japanese, there are two different senses in which human beings have
the potential for nous. Thus, when we say that human beings have the potential
for nous, we could mean that human beings, in virtue of being the sort of
creature that they are, could possess nous if they wanted to; or we could mean
that someone could actualize their potential for nous at will. As mentioned
above, in order for a human being to possess the second sort of potentiality,
certain hypothetical necessities need to be satisﬁed.

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle describes some of the
hypothetical necessities that are necessary for the actualization of nous. For
instance, Aristotle describes the development universals, which are the
components of the principles grasped by nous. As mentioned above, these
principles are true, universal, and relatively familiar statements such as “all
human beings are bipeds.” Of course, before one correctly grasps such
statements, one must ﬁrst grasp the individual universals that are the
components of these statements. In other words, in order to apprehend the

99

statement “all humans are bipeds, one must ﬁrst apprehend the universal
“human,” and the universal “biped.” According to Aristotle, the possession of
universals arises out of certain cognitive operations that are natural to human

beings. Aristotle refers to the grasp of an individual universal as “experience”

69

(éuncrpior) (APo. 100al6-18), and he claims that experience arises out of sense
perception and memory:

So from perception (oci'0011019 there comes memory (uvnun), as we
call it, and from memory (when it occurs often 1n connection with the
same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a
single experience. (APo. 100a3- 6)5

According to Aristotle sense perception gives rise to memory, which then
produces experience, the grasp of a universal. By “memory” Aristotle
means an impression that is caused by sense perception, and he likens to
acquisition of memories to a piece of wax receiving the impression of a seal:

The process of movement [sensory stimulation] involved in the act of
perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of a percept, just
as persons do who make an impression with a seal. This explains why,
in those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no
mnemonic impression is formed; just as no impression would be
formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water;
while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being
frayed, as happens to [the stucco on] old [chamber] walls, or owing to
the hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not
implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are
defective 1n memory (Mem. 450a30— b9).

 

According to Aristotle, then, perception gives rise to memories, i.e.
impressions or “after images.” When a sufﬁcient amount of these mnemonic
impressions have been acquired, they coalesce and give rise to experience —
the possession of a universal (APo. 100a3-6). Thus, sense perception and
memory are hypothetically necessary for the acquisition of universals.

Universals however, are hypothetically necessary for the actualization of nous.

 

5 All translations of the Posterior Analytics are by Jonathan Barnes unless otherwise noted.

6 All translations of De Memoria are by J. I. Beare unless otherwise noted.

70

 

   

For nous is actualized when it grasps true, universal, familiar and immediate
propositions that -provide the starting points of demonstration. Thus, sense
perception, memory and experience are hypothetically necessary for the
actualization of nous in human cognition.

We now know that in addition to sense perception, memory and
experience, one also has to engage in dialectic in order to completely actualize
one's capacity for nous. For the ﬁrst principles or irnmediates of a
demonstration are apprehended only after considering the ﬂaws and merits of
germane opinions. Importantly, the consideration of the ﬂaws and merits of
various opinions is not a proof of those opinions. For ﬁrst principles are
undemonstrated. Rather, the dialectical consideration of a statement consists
in the sharpening and clarifying of another’s opinion -- i.e., by drawing
important distinctions and by providing clear deﬁnitions of the terms involved
therein. Suppose that one considers the statement “all pleasure is good.”
Although this statement is somewhat clear, it can be made more precise in
several different ways. First, one can provide deﬁnitions of the term
“pleasure,” and of the term “good.” Second, one can note any important
distinctions among kinds of pleasures and/or goods. Third, one can determine
whether there are any counterexamples to the statement, and if so, modify
the statement in light of those counterexamples. For instance, one could
point out that some pleasures are bad for human beings, and modify the

above statement to “some pleasures are good.” Note that these several

71

 

methods do not constitute a proof of the statement that “all pleasure is
good.” Rather, they simply clarify and sharpen this statement.7

Sense perception, memory, and the dialectical consideration of
opinions, then, are all hypothetically necessary for the complete actualization
of nous. Yet, there is something missing in this account of the actualization of
nous. For the universal statements apprehended by nous are always correct
(APo. 100b5—17, NE ll41a2-8), and this implies that one's dialectical
consideration that led one to these statements has been on target. But as
mentioned earlier, the dialectical examination of principles can go wrong in a
number of ways: people can fail to make important distinctions (NE 1172b3),
can misjudge the strengths or weaknesses of opinion, and can misjudge the
veracity of an opinion (NE 1172a28-1172bl, Rhet. l378a20). In order for
the dialectical consideration of endoxa to result in the apprehension of ﬁrst
principles, one needs to know what to criticize and what to praise -- what
portion of an opinion is true, and what portion of an opinion is false. But
how can we be certain that our deﬁnitions, our conceptual distinctions, and
our opinions, are correct?

Although Aristotle does not explain how we can be certain that our
dialectical reasoning is sound, he does provide an answer to this question in
the NE. For Aristotle deﬁnes phronésis as the excellence of the opinion
making faculty (50E0t0tuc69 (NE 1140b26-27). This excellence, moreover,

implies a number of intellectual excellences. Aristotle tells us that phroné‘sis

 

7 See Reeve ([1992], 39-45).

72

 

 

implies an excellence in deliberation (NE 1142b3l-33), as well as sunésis
and equity (émsucﬁ). Sunésis is a virtue which enables one to be a good

judge of another's opinion (NE ll43al4-15), whereas equity is the ability to
modify or sharpen a universal claim in light of a counterexample (NE
ll37b26—27). 'It is easy to see how phronésis will useful in the dialectical
consideration of opinions. For, one who possesses phronésis, not only has
correct opinions, but can detect correct opinions, and can modify Opinions
correctly.

In addition to implying sune‘sis, equity, and an excellence in
deliberation, phronésis, as we know, also implies the virtues of character
(VoC). The VoC are not excellences of the OMF, however, but are
excellences of the appetitive faculty (NE lll9b10-15). Interestingly, in
claiming that phronésis implies the VoC, Aristotle is claiming that the
excellence of the opinion making faculty, implies an excellence of the
appetitive faculty. As we shall see, this is because the VoC provide the
preconditions for an excellent opinion making faculty, viz., moderated
pleasures and pains. Once we understand the nature of the VoC, we will
understand even more clearly why Aristotle claims that phronésis produces
(noreiv) and gives birth to (yiyve000u) nous (NE 1143b35, NE 1145a9). Let
us, then, brieﬂy turn to the nature of the VoC, so that we that we can see
how they contribute to the excellence of the opinion making faculty, and

therewith, to the development of nous.

 

73

The Virtues Of Character
At NE 1106b36-1107a2 Aristotle provides a deﬁnition of the virtues of
character:

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice (npooripe0t9,
lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, thus being determined by
a rational principle, by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it.

When Aristotle states that ethical virtue consists in a mean, he is referring to a
mean regarding pleasures and pains:

Moral virtue is concerned with passions and actions and in these there
is excess, defect, and the intermediate... .and in general pleasure and
pain may be felt both too much and too little... .but to feel them in at
the right times, with reference to the right motive, and in the right way,
is both what is intermediate and is best, and this is characteristic of
virtue. Now virtue is concerned with actions and passions, in which
excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is
praised and is a form of success; and being

praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue.
Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at
what is intermediate. (NE 1106b24-28).8
Scholars have failed to realize that possession of the VoC prevents one from
being prone to a number of epistemological malfunctions. For instance, at
Mem. 450a30-b9, Aristotle claims that those who are overly passionate are
unable to retain the impressions (memories) that are necessary for the
development of experience:
The process of movement [sensory stimulation] involved in the act of

perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of a percept, just
as persons do who make an impression with a seal. This explains why,

 

8 See also NE 1 lO6bl6-l7, NE ] lO6b24-25, NE 1 lO7a4-5, NE 1 lO9b30.

74

 

 

in those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no
mnemonic impression is formed; just as no impression would be
formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water;
while there' are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being
frayed, as happens to [the stucco on] old [chamber] walls, or owing to
the hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not
implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are
defective in memory (Mem. 450a30-b9).

In claiming that those who are moved on account of excessive passion are
unable to retain memories, Aristotle is implying that the passions can
adversely effect the cognitive mechanisms that are necessary for the
actualization of nous. For memory, as we have seen, is necessary for the
development of nous. It is indeed noteworthy that Aristotle claims that that
excessive passion can adversely affect one's faculty of memory. For the VoC,
which imply that one's passions are regulated, would rule out this sort of
distortion.

But the possession of the VoC not only protects one's faculty of
memory from the excesses of passion, but they also protect one's faculty of
opinion from being likewise corrupted:

It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or

pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. (Rhet.

1354a25-16).9

They [members of the assembly] will often have allowed themselves to

be much so inﬂuenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-

interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their

judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain.
(Rhet. 1454b8-11).

 

9 All translations of Rhetoric are by W. Rhys Roberts unless otherwise noted.

75

 

 

The emotions are all those feelings that so change men to affect their
judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure (Rhet.
l378a20) '

On the basis of the above passages, one might surmise that Aristotle believes
that any degree of passion should be avoided. Aristotle does not think this,
however. For he claims that passion should not be avoided but regulated,
moderated (NE 1119b10—15). The implication is that, in the above passages,
Aristotle is not claiming that passion simpliciter corrupts ones intellectual
faculties, but that excessive passion does so.

Understanding that excessive emotion hinders the faculties of memory
and opinion, enables us to see why Aristotle believed that the having one's
passions regulated is a virtue. For at NE 1106a15-17, Aristotle states:

Every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of

which it is the excellence, and makes the work (ergon/Emov) of that

thing be done well.
But the ergon of man, as we have seen, is rational activity (NE 1097b34—
1098a4-5). Given that Aristotle deﬁnes the ergon of a human being in terms
of what is idion to human beings (NE 1097b34-35), it follows that the ergon
of man is that activity of nous. For the idion of a creature is formed last in
that creature's development, and the nous is the ﬁnal stage of human
development (GA 736b2-7). Thus, in protecting the faculties of memory and
opinion from the corrupting effects of excessive passion, the VoC are helping

nature to achieve its end of nous in a human being. For the actualization of

nous requires the proper functioning of the faculties of memory and opinion,

76

 

as we have seen. And in helping nature to achieve its end of nous, the VoC
enable human beings to perform their ergon well.

Thus far we have seen that ethical virtue is necessary for the
actualization of nous. For phronésis implies that one's opinions about the
human good are excellent, that one is an excellent judge of opinions, and that
can appropriately modify universal claims in light of counterexamples.
Moreover, the VoC guarantee that one's faculties of opinion and memory will
not become corrupted by excessive passion. Ethical virtue, therefore, is
tantamount to a number of epistemological excellences that are hypothetically
necessary for the actualization of nous, and eo ipso for the completed
development of a human being.

In failing to understand that ethical virtue implies a number of
epistemological excellences, intellectualists have wrongly claimed that one
could be sophos, without possessing ethical virtue. For rather than
understanding ethical virtue as a constellation of desiderative and intellectual
excellences, Cooper and Kraut, as we have seen, speak of ethical virtue as
being essentially concerned with one's commitments to other people.10 This
misconception of ethical virtue has caused intellectualists to claim that ethical
virtue could sometimes be incompatible with sophia.” Indeed, if ethical
virtue is essentially concerned with our commitment to others, and if
eudaimonia consists solely in theoretical activity, then it is not difﬁcult to

imagine cases in which one's concern with others conﬂicts with their pursuit

 

'” See Cooper ([1971], 149468), Kraut ([1989], 18”

77

 

of theoria. But ethical virtue, as I have shown, does not merely consist in
the excellence of pur behavior towards others. Rather, it is also an intellectual
excellence which ensures the proper functioning of the cognitive mechanisms
required for the deve10pment of nous. Indeed, ethical virtue is necessary for
sophia, since sophia is the combination of nous and epistémé (énortﬁun) (NE
1141al9-20). Thus, intellectualists are wrong in claiming that ethical virtue
and sophia could come into conﬂict with one another. For sophia needs
ethical virtue in order to be realized.

In addition to being necessary for sophia, however, it can also be
shown that ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia -- regardless whether
one identiﬁes it with the sole activity of contemplation, or with a combination
of goods. Even if one does not accept my claim that ethical virtue is
necessary for the development of nous and hence sophia, one must accept
that ethical virtue is a necessary condition of eudaimonia. This claim, of
course, contradicts the intellectualist thesis that one can be eudaimon and lack

ethical virtue. I will argue for this claim in the next chapter.

 

” Ibid.

78

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 5: WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS A NECESSARY
CONDITION OF E UDAIMONIA

In this chapter, I provide an additional argument against intellectualism
by showing that ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. For Aristotle
claims that eudaimonia consists in living well (abqwia) and acting well
(efmpocéia) (NE 1098b20-2). We will see that in addition to being necessary
for the apprehension of ﬁrst principles, ethical virtue is also necessary if one is
to act with excellence. Thus, since eudaimonia consists in living and acting
well, then ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.

I will proceed as follows. After making some general remarks about
Aristotle's theory of action found in De Motu Animalium (DMA), I will
discuss the nature of the VoC and phroné‘sis, the two components of ethical
virtue. In addition to providing the epistemological preconditions for the
actualization of nous, we will see that the VoC and phronesis are also
excellences of two different parts of the human soul that are involved in

human action, viz., the part which is the seat of desire (NE 1102a33-1103a7),

79

 

and the part which is responsible for opinions (NE ll40b26). After
discussing the components of ethical virtue, we will then see how the
combination of the VoC and phronésis is responsible for right action. For
right action implies not only that one's desires are aimed at the correct
objects, but also that one's deliberation is correct. And whereas the VoC
guarantee the former condition, phroné‘sis guarantees the latter. Once it is
demonstrated that ethical virtue consists in the excellence of the psychological
mechanisms which govern human action, it will become clear that ethical
virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.

After demonstrating that ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, I
will defend my position against the intellectualist view that ethical virtue
sometimes conﬂicts with, and hence is not necessary for, eudaimonia. For
intellectualists have characterized ethical virtue as if it is primarily concerned
with one's commitments to others. But as we have seen, ethical virtue also
implies a number of epistemological excellences. The intellectualists' failure to
fully appreciate Aristotle's account of ethical virtue has misled them into

believing that eudaimonia can exist without ethical virtue, as I will show.

Aristotle's Action Theory
According to Aristotle, all action springs from thought (516w0101) and
desire (6peét9 (DMA 700b23-24). Such a view sounds relatively

straightforward. For it seems as if Aristotle is merely claiming that all action

springs from belief and desire. Virtually any action can be explained in terms

80

 

 

 

of belief and desire. For instance, the act of walking to the refrigerator can
be explained in terms of one's desire for food, on the one hand, and one's
belief that food is in the refrigerator, on the other. And similarly with all
other actions. But although at DMA 700b23-24, Aristotle sounds as if he is
merely claiming that all action springs from belief and desire, his actual view
is more complex.

Importantly, Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of desires
involved in human action, wish (006M019 and choice (npooripeotg). To
merely say that action springs from a combination of belief and desire, is to
ignore this important distinction. According to Aristotle, wish is the desire for
the end (1837109 and the good (NE 1113a15), and choice is “deliberate desire”
(Bouhetuch 6pe§i9 (NE lll3a9-l4). In order to understand the difference
between wish and choice, it helps to be mindful of Aristotle's belief that all
human action is purposeful, and hence is for the sake of some end or goal

(téhog) (Ph. l98al 1). And as we saw in chapter 3, Aristotle claims that the
“that for the sake of which” an action is done is a good (61y0196v):
Let us return to the good that we are seeking and ask what it can be.
It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine,
in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of
each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine
this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other

sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end. (NE
1097a15-21)

According to Aristotle, then, the end or purpose of an action is a good.
Clearly, Aristotle's use of the term “good” is different from our usage of this

term. For we typically use the word to denote a property or an attribute of

81

 

   

 

some object. Aristotle's View, however, is that the good of an action is its
end, and as he states in Physics l94b33-35, the end, which is the “that for the
sake of which” an activity is undertaken, is its ﬁnal cause. Thus, Aristotle
uses the term “good” to denote the ﬁnal cause of some activity.

The difference between wish and choice can be made clear when we
are mindful of Aristotle's claim that human beings act for the sake of an end.
For Aristotle believes that the various actions of a human being should be
organized so that they are performed for the sake of one, ultimate end:

.we must enjoin every one that has the power to live according to

his own choice to set up for himself some object for the good life to

aim at (whether honor or reputation or wealth or culture), with
reference to which he well then do all of his acts, since not to have
one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly.
(EE 1214b6-11).1

According to Aristotle, there should be a single end by which all of a human
beings actions are guided, and he refers to the desire for this end as wish (NE
llllb26). The object of one’s wish, therefore, is the ultimate end and ﬁnal
cause of one's actions.

Importantly, the wish for an attainable object or activity causes one to
deliberate about how one's wish can be satisﬁed. This seems reasonable
enough. For in order to realize one's end effectively, one ought to think and

deliberate about the means by which it can be realized. In the following

 

' All translations of the Eudemian Ethics are by J. Solomon, unless otherwise noted.

82

 

passages, Aristotle implies that one's desire for an end causes one to think
about the means by which that end can be attained:

A doctor does not deliberate about whether he should heal, nor an
orator whether he shall convince, not a statesman whether he shall
produce law and order, not does any one else deliberate about his end.
Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be
attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider
by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by
one only, they consider how it will be achieved by this, and by what
means this will be achieved, till they come to the ﬁrst cause which in
the order of discovery is last. (NE ll2b11-24).
The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of
thought: since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy, this must ﬁrst
be present, e. g., a uniform state of the body, and if this is to be
present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus
until he reduces the matter to a ﬁnal something which he himself can

produce. Then the process from this point onward, i.e., the process
towards health, is called a “making.” (Metaph. 1032b4-9).

The above passages indicate that thinking about how to realize one's end, can
give rise to other ancillary desires -- desires for the means by which one's
end can be realized. A doctor who desires to produce health, for example,
might only be able to satisfy this desire by satisfying the desire to produce
heat. Thus, the doctor's desire to produce heat is a means by which he
realizes his end of health. Similarly, his desire to produce heat might only be
satisﬁed by rubbing. Thus, the desire to tub is the means by which one
satisﬁes one's desire to produce heat. Crucially, the doctor's desires for the
means are result of deliberation, to which Aristotle refers as choices. Note
that this example shows that a choice can sometimes be the ﬁnal cause of
another choice. For instance, the doctor rubs for the sake of his desire to

produce heat.

83

 

Also note that both Metaph. 1032b4-9 and NE 112bll-24, indicate
that deliberation involves the discovery of conditions that are hypothetically
necessary for the achievement of one's end. For Aristotle writes, “they
consider how it [the end] will be achieved by this, and by what means this
will be achieved, till they come to the ﬁrst cause which in the order of
discovery is last.” Thus, the deliberation that is caused by end-setting, enables
one to discover the most efﬁcient sequence of hypothetical necessities by
which one's wish can be satisﬁed. For instance, suppose that I wish for
wealth. Given my wish for wealth, suppose that I deliberate as follows: I
desire wealth; wealth can be made by securing a well paying job; being a
corporate lawyer is a well-paying job; I need to go to law school to become a
corporate lawyer; and so on. Thus my wish for wealth causes me to discover
the means by which wealth is achieved. I then choose to go to law school
and choose to become a corporate lawyer, for these choices enable me to
attain my object of wish.

According to Aristotle, then, there are two very different desires
involved in human action. On the one hand, there is wish which is the ﬁnal
cause of one's actions, and on the other hand, there are choices, i.e., the
means by which our wish is satisﬁed. Thus he writes:

wish relates to the end, choice to the means; for instance, we wish to be

healthy, but we choose the acts that will make us healthy (NE

1 1 1 1b26-28).

Indeed, on Aristotle's View, it is not enough to say that actions are the result

of thought and desire. For this overly simplistic account of action glosses

84

 

over the important distinction between wish and choice. To explain action
merely as a combination of belief and desire, moreover, also ignores the role
that deliberation plays in determining many of our desires, and hence actions.
However, Aristotle's theory of action is complicated in a further way.
For Aristotle believes that, in the case of human beings, there is a proper end
of action, and hence, that there is a correct object of wish. Thus, although
every human being acts for the sake of wish, the actions of only some human
beings are caused by the correct setting of the end:
That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the
good, others for the apparent good... . Are we to say that absolutely
and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for each person the
apparent good; that that which is in truth an object of wish is an object
of wish to the good man, while any chance thing may be so to the bad
man, as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth
wholesome are wholesome for bodies which are in good condition,
while for those that are diseased other things are wholesome--or bitter
or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on; since the good man judges each
class of things rightly? (NE 1113a15-30).
Aristotle goes on to say that pleasure causes many people to have an
incorrect object of wish. For pleasure appears to be the good, but is not (NE
1113a33-lll3b2). Those who are self-indulgent (6tK6h0t0to9, for example,
are mistaken in pursuing pleasure in excess (NE 1150a19-21).
In addition to believing that there is a proper object of wish, Aristotle

also claims that deliberation can be correct or incorrect. Thus, actions can be

ﬂawed owing to faulty deliberation. Aristotle claims that error in deliberation

can be about either the “universal” (KOCOéADU) or “the particular” (t6 KaO’

EK0i0tov):

85

 

   

 

Error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the
particular; we may fail to know either that all water that weighs
heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy. (NE ll42a20—
22). '
As we have seen, Aristotle believes that deliberation consists in the discovery
of the most efﬁcient sequence of hypothetical necessities that culminate in the
realization of ones end. And it is easy to see how a sequence of hypothetical
necessities could involve both universal and particular judgments. Consider
Aristotle's remark about deliberation in De Motu Animalium:
.whenever someone thinks that every man should take walks, and
that he is a man, at once he takes a walk. Or if he thinks that no man
should take a walk now, and that he is a man, at once he remains at
rest. And he does both of these things if nothing prevents or compels
him. I should make something good; a house is something good. At
once he makes a house. I need a covering. A cloak is a covering. I
need a cloak. What I need, I have to make, I need a cloak, I have to
make a cloak. And the conclusion “I have to make a cloak,” is an
action. And he acts from a starting point. If there is to be a cloak,
there must necessarily be this ﬁrst, and if this, this. And he does this at
once. (DMA 701al3-22).
In this passage, Aristotle indicates that the thinking by which one realizes the
hypothetical necessities of an action, involves judgments that are both
universal (e.g., “every man should take a walk,” “a house is something
good”) and particular (e.g., “I am a man, “I need a cloak”). And it is not
difﬁcult to imagine how one's deliberations could involve incorrect universal
or particular (or both) judgments. After discovering that one should obtain a
law degree in order to achieve one's goal of wealth, for instance, one might
wrongly believe that in order to obtain a law degree, one should ﬁrst become

a paralegal. This would be a mistaken universal judgment. For it is false to

say, “anyone who wants to be a lawyer, must ﬁrst be a paralegal.” We could

86

 

also imagine how incorrect particular judgments could be involved in
deliberating about how to become wealthy. For instance, one might discover
that in order to achieve their end, they should invest money in a good mutual
fund. But one could, of course, be mistaken about which particular mutual
fund is a good one.

In order to act with excellence, then, one must not only have a correct
object of wish, but also must deliberate with true opinions. For if one's wish
is not correct, then one is acting for the sake of an incorrect end. And if
one's deliberation involves false opinions, then one will be mistaken about
how to realize one's wish. Acting well, therefore, consists in actions that are
performed for the sake of the correct object of wish, and in understanding the
best way that this end can be achieved. One who acts well knows what to
desire, and how to get it. And as we are about to see, it is ethical virtue that
is not only responsible for one's being correctly aimed at the right end, but is
also responsible for the correct deliberation which enables one to effectively

achieve this end.

Why Ethical Virtue is Necessary for Eudaimonia

In order to see how ethical virtue is necessary for correct action, we
ﬁrst need to understand the nature of its components, the VoC and phronésis.
Let us ﬁrst consider the nature of the VoC. In the last chapter, we saw that
Aristotle believes that the passions should be regulated because excessive

passion can damage the cognitive mechanisms that are required in the

87

 

development of nous. The VoC, as we now know, imply that one'spassions
are regulated. But although the VoC imply that one's passions are regulated,
the VoC are not merely a state of character in which one passions are
regulated. For Aristotle also states that the VoC are concerned with “choice”
(npooripeotg): '
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice (npoocipe0t9,
lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, thus being determined by
a rational principle, by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it. (NE 1 106b36-1107a2).
Aristotle's reference to the man of practical wisdom, the phronimos, in the
above deﬁnition is not insigniﬁcant. For the phronimos possesses phronésis,
and we saw in the last chapter that phronésis is the excellence of the opinion
making faculty. In addition, the phronimos also possesses “correctness in
thinking,” i.e., the ability to apprehend the orderly sequence of hypothetical
necessities that culminate in right action (NE 1142b12-15). The phronimos, in
other words, can deliberate with excellence (NE 1142b3l-33).2 In claiming
that the VoC are choices that are determined by the phronimos, Aristotle is

claiming that one who possesses the VoC, acts in accordance with choices —

deliberate desires -- that are the results of a correct deliberative process.

 

2 Given that phronésis is the excellence of the opinion making faculty (NE ll40b26), we might conclude
that the phronimos deliberates with excellence because he has correct opinions. However, Aristotle
explicitly states that deliberation can go wrong either if one's deliberation is incorrect or if one's end is
incorrect, if one wishes for the wrong things:
Excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation... .there being more than one kind
of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for the incontintent
man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach a result of his calculation what he sets before
himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil.
(NE ll42b15-l9).
So in order to deliberate correctly, it is not enough to have correct opinions, one must also have correct
wish. Aristotle states that it is ethical virtue which guarantees that one's wish is for the right object (NE

88

 

But as we know, in order to be act with excellence, one must not
only be able to deliberate well, but one must also have one's wish aimed at
the correct end. For one could be an excellent deliberator, but have their wish
aimed at the wrong object (NE ll42b15—l9). For instance, someone who
pursues wealth as their primary aim could achieve his end as a result of
accurate deliberation, i.e., deliberation that involves only true statements, but
such a person would not be acting well, according to Aristotle (NE 1096a8-
10).

In addition to claiming that the VoC is an excellence of choice, Aristotle
also claims that the VoC ensure that one is aimed at the correct end:

virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us
take the right means (NE ll44a7-9).

The fact that the VoC also guarantee the correctness of the object of wish, is
yet another way in which ethical virtue necessary for right action. For the
components of ethical virtue are phroné‘sis and the VoC. And whereas
phronésis guarantees that one's deliberation is correct, the VoC guarantee that
one's end is correct.

It is clear, then, that ethical virtue is necessary for excellent activity.
But if ethical virtue implies an excellence of the psychological mechanisms
governing human action, then ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.
For when describing eudaimonia, Aristotle explicitly states that it consists in

living well (cirCmioc) and acting well (eimporéioc) (NE 1098b20—22). But since

 

l l44a7-9). The ethical virtues, so to speak, anchor one's wish, and weigh it down so that it is not disturbed
by excessive pleasure or pain..

89

 

good action requires ethical virtue, and since eudaimonia is good action,
then it follows that eudaimonia requires ethical Virtue.

The argument that I am advancing is not difﬁcult. It simply
acknowledges the important fact that eudaimonia is some sort of excellent
and right activity, and that this sort of activity cannot exist without ethical
virtue. For excellent activity is activity in accord with correct desire and
correct deliberation. And whereas the VoC are responsible for the former
condition, phroné‘sis is responsible for the latter.

Although inclusivists would be in agreement with my claim that ethical
virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, intellectualists would not. For
intellectualists not only deny that ethical virtue is a component of eudaimonia,
but they also believe that eudaimonia and ethical virtue can come into
conﬂict with each other. Recall Cooper's comment:

One might imagine that anyone who actually lived... .[a life in

accordance with theoretical activity] would show himself on numerous

occasions somewhat less than morally upright. He might indeed ﬁnd it
useful to have a facade of virtue, in View of his need for at least the
forbearance of others; and he might ﬁnd a certain advantage for his
dominant purpose in the disciplining of his inclinations and emotions
which... .[Ethical] virtue brings. But being ultimately concerned only
with his own intellectual accomplishments, he would, it would seem,
surely on occasion ﬁnd it rational at least to neglect to do some positive
act of virtue, if not actually do something immoral, as a means to the
furtherance of his consuming interest. He would in fact live a retiring,

contemplative life, with no special concern for the supposed values of
social, political and family life.3

 

3 Cooper ([1971], 149-150).

90

 

 

 

According to Cooper, ethical virtue can actually disrupt one's pursuit of
theoretical activity.4 However, the intellectualist thesis that ethical virtue can
conﬂict with theoretical activity rests on a misunderstanding. For note that
Cooper characterizes ethical virtue as if it is essentially concerned with one's
commitments to others. As Cooper says, the eudaimon individual lives a
retiring, contemplative life, with no special concern for social and familial
values. Indeed, if ethical virtue is essentially concerned with ones
commitments to others, and if eudaimonia consists in theoretical activity
alone, it is easy to see why intellectualists believe that ethical virtue could
conﬂict with, and hence not be a necessary condition of, eudaimonia. For
there are a myriad of cases in which one can imagine that one's pursuit of
theoretical activity is hindered by one's commitments to others. However, as
we have seen, ethical virtue is not essentially concerned with one's
commitments to others. Rather, ethical virtue also consists in a number of
epistemological excellence that are necessary not only for the apprehension of
ﬁrst principles, but also for excellent action. Intellectualists have
mischaracterized the nature of ethical virtue indeed, and in doing so, they
have been unable to see that ethical virtue is necessary for eudaimonia.
Aristotle claims that eudaimonia consists in living well and acting well (NE
1098b20-22). And since ethical virtue is necessary for acting well, it is

necessary for eudaimonia, as I have shown.

 

4 Kraut concurs with this claim. See Kraut ([1989], 181).

91

 

 

CONCLUSION

Thus far, I have established not only that ethical virtue is necessary for
the actualization of nous, and hence sophia, but that it is also necessary for
eudaimonia. I have also demonstrated the biological basis of Aristotle's view
of eudaimonia. According to this View, eudaimonia is excellent activity in
accordance with the completed development of human nature, nous, which is
the idion of human beings. There are variety of reasons why scholars have
failed to recognize that Aristotle's View of eudaimonia is rooted in his account
of human development. Aristotle's unique views of the soul and the
importance that he places on ﬁnal causality, among them. But I also believe
that another reason why scholars fail to properly understand the NE, is
because they View it primarily as a standard work in moral philosophy.
However, Aristotle explicitly states that this is not his primary project. In fact,
he claims that ethical works whose primary aim is simply to explicate a
theory of morality are useless (NE 1103b26-28). This claim is interesting

given my View that Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia is biologically based.

92

 

 

 

 

For if eudaimonia presupposes the proper biological development of a
human being, then what, exactly, is Aristotle's purpose in writing this work?
Aristotle reveals the answer in the following interesting passage:

The purpose of the present study is not, as it is in other inquiries, the

attainment of theoretical knowledge: we are not conducting this inquiry

in order‘to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else

there would be no advantage in studyng it. (NE 1103b26-28).
Aristotle explicitly states the he is not just disseminating knowledge about
ethical virtue for its own sake, but is doing so in order for his audience to
“become good” ({v’ dryaeoi yevéoflou). However, in claiming this, Aristotle
does not mean that he is discussing the nature of the human good so that his
audience can possess the VoC. For Aristotle claims that the VoC arise not
through teaching (éx 5150i01<0thi0t9, but through a process of habituation
(éOtCeiv) (NE 1103al4-b25).l And importantly, Aristotle implies that his
audience should have already been habituated to possess the VoC:

Anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and

just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have
been brought up in good habits (NE 1095b4-6)

If the audience of the NE already possesses the VoC, then in what sense is
Aristotle's discussion in the NE supposed to make his audience good?

Being eudaimon and hence completely good, involves much more than
the possession of the VoC. I have argued that eudaimonia presupposes the

completed development of a human being, which is nous. But in order for

 

' It is by engaging in courageous acts, in other words, by which one obtains the virtue of courage. Thus,
one obtains the virtue of courage by becoming accustomed to performing courageous acts, and similarly
with the other virtues of character.

93

 

nous to be completely actualized, one must undertake the dialectical
consideration of endoxa, as we have seen. For the dialectical consideration of
endoxa is necessary for the apprehension of ﬁrst principles, and hence for the
actualization of nous.

C. D. C. Reeve argues that the NE is mainly a dialectical search for ﬁrst
principles in ethics, and hence that Aristotle is arriving at ethical ﬁrst
principles by examining endoxa.2 I agree with these claims and they are
supported by the texts (NE 1095b4-8, NE 1147bl3-17, NE 109722-23, NE
1098b10-1099b6). However, I also believe that Aristotle is not clarifying the
ﬁrst principles of ethics for its own sake, but for the sake of transforming his
students. This transformation is not merely intellectual, however. It is not
that Aristotle's students have been transformed simply because they have
learned something, as Reeve assumes.3 For the transformation that Aristotle's
students undergo, is conative, desiderative.

By engaging in dialectic with his audience, Aristotle is helping to
actualize his students' potential for nous. But in so doing, Aristotle is
sharpening and deﬁning the object of wish at which his audience is aimed.
For Aristotle is reﬁning his audience's sense of pleasure, by exposing his
audience to a rational pleasure that is more noble than the pleasure that is

associated with ethical virtue.

 

2 Reeve ([1992], 34-45).

3 Reeve ([1995], 22).

94

 

To see this, recall that one who possesses ethical virtue both acts from
choices that are caused by correct deliberation, and has the correct object of
wish. According to Aristotle, however, the object of wish can become more
reﬁned through experience, depending on the pleasures that one has
encountered. Suppose for instance that the object of one's wish is rational
activity. According to Aristotle, all desire is for the pleasant (DMA 701b33-
36), and therefore, if the object of one's wish is rational activity, then one will
ﬁnd rational activity pleasant. But suppose that the only rational activity that
one knows is ethically virtuous activity. Acting in this way is rational, since
one's desires and actions proceed from deliberation and reﬂection. And as
Aristotle tells us, phronésis is a virtue of the rational soul (NE 1140b25-28).
But acting in accordance with’ethical virtue, is, of course, not the only kind of
rational activity, for one could also engage in scientiﬁc demonstration.
Aristotle's audience is in the precise condition that I have described above.
They possess the VoC and hence are aimed at the correct object, viz., rational
activity. However, Aristotle's students only have experience with one type of
rational activity, viz., ethically virtuous activity. Aristotle's audience, however,
has not yet experienced another, higher rational activity, rational activity in
accordance with sophia. To experience this sort of rational activity one must
demonstrate true statements from ﬁrst principles, principles that are
apprehended by nous.

I have argued that the NE should be understood as a pedagogical work

by which Aristotle intended to help his students actualize their potential for

95

 

complete eudaimonia. I have also argued that, however one deﬁnes

eudaimonia, ethical virtue is one of its necessary conditions. Thus, the
intellectualist thesis that ethical virtue can actually conﬂict with eudaimonia is
incorrect. There are admittedly further questions that need to be answered.
For instance, are any of Aristotle's other works transformational? And if the
NE was intended by Aristotle to actualize his audience's potential for
complete eudaimonia, then what implications does this have for the
"teachability of virtue" issue? These questions are important. It was my aim
in this work not only to describe what I take to be the nature of Aristotle's
view of the human good, but also to present a new context in which these

questions can begin to be answered.

96

 

 

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