This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

A DEVELOPMENTALIST INTERPRETATION
OF ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

presented by

Hope Elizabeth May

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Philosophy

Rhoda H. Kotzin
Major professor

Date December 15, 2000

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE
05 04 06 MAY 0 2 2006		

A DEVELOPMENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*

By

Hope Elizabeth May

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

2000

ABSTRACT

A DEVELOPMENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*

By

Hope Elizabeth May

Aristotle's chief ethical work, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*), has given rise to a number of lively scholarly debates. Chief among them, is the debate about Aristotle's conception of the human good or *eudaimonia.* Aristotle defines *eudaimonia* as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (*NE* 1098a17-18). But several different kinds of psychic virtues are all discussed in the *NE, viz., ethical virtue and sophia.* Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with the combination of ethical virtue and *sophia*, or whether he believes that *eudaimonia* consists in the activity of *sophia* alone. Inclusivists endorse the former alternative, whereas intellectualists endorse the latter.

Aristotle's "function argument" (*NE* 1097b22-1098a18) -- the argument which leads Aristotle to conclude that *eudaimonia* is "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue" -- has become the locus of the dispute

between intellectualists and inclusivists. The present work focuses on this dispute. I argue that both intellectualist and inclusivist interpretations of Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, are flawed. For both accounts ignore Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings. As I will show, Aristotle's views about human development play a crucial role in the function argument. Once this fact is appreciated, we are able to see that ethical virtue is a *developmental prerequisite* for *sophia,* and hence that *sophia* cannot be actualized without ethical virtue. This conclusion challenges those intellectualists who claim that in some cases, ethical virtue and *sophia* can come into conflict with one another.[1] These intellectualists conclude from this that *eudaimonia* consists in contemplative activity alone, and that ethical virtue is merely instrumentally valuable. On this view, ethical virtue is valuable only to the extent that it helps one to be a better contemplator. I reject this view and argue that ethical virtue is necessary for the development of *sophia*. Thus, *eudaimonia* is activity in accordance with ethical virtue and *sophia*, *but these virtues are hierarchically related since ethical virtue is a developmental prerequisites of sophia.* This is the primary conclusion of this work.

---

[1] See Cooper ([1971], 149-168), Kraut ([1989], 181).

For Michael Russo

"*the friendship of good persons is good, and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other.*"

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It takes a village to complete a dissertation. For me, that village was a global village that connected me to the nurture and support from various individuals who inhabit a variety of "local" villages throughout the United States: the villages of East Lansing and Mt. Pleasant, Michigan; Portland, Oregon; Silver Springs, Maryland; Columbus, Ohio; Pomona, New York; and South Orange, New Jersey. I am grateful for living at time and in a society which allowed such easy and rapid communication with all of the persons in these villages. Without these political and technological luxuries, the present work would probably not exist, at least not in its current form.

Of course, there are a number of individuals who not only helped me to develop and clarify the ideas in this dissertation, but also supplied me with needed support and encouragement, especially during the more difficult parts of the writing process. I was fortunate enough to work with three such individuals: Dr. Nicholas Smith, Dr. Rhoda Kotzin, and Dr. John Rauk.

Professor Smith first introduced me to Greek philosophy, and encouraged me to develop my interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* when I first proposed the idea in his seminar for ancient Greek ethics that was offered at Michigan State University. Professor Smith is one of those rare individuals who not only provided me with unmatched academic and intellectual assistance, but who has also been a constant source of emotional support and inspiration. I cannot thank him enough for all he has done for me. Dr. Kotzin provided me with needed support both emotionally and intellectually. My conversations with her were invaluable as they were enjoyable. I thank her for sharing her views on Aristotle with me and for helping me through the most difficult parts of the doctoral process. Being able to work with Professor Kotzin, a formidable scholar, was an experience which I cherish and for which I remain grateful. Finally, my conversations with John Rauk were crucial to the development of my argument. I am grateful to him for taking the time to help me to clarify my interpretation, for his careful reading of Aristotle's texts and of my argument, for asking the many excellent questions that helped me to see the details of my own position, and also for providing support and encouragement.

In addition to these individuals, there are others who helped in the completion of this work. I have benefited by the comments and criticisms of

Carl Anderson, Albert Cafagna, and Winston Wilkinson, my other committee members. I am also grateful to Peter Asquith, Daniel Kolak, Joseph Salerno, Michael Russo, Joe Martin, Jason Ellenburg, Robert Stecker and the other members of the philosophy department at Central Michigan University (where I was teaching when the bulk of this dissertation was written). Each of these persons, in their own way, helped me to take pleasure in the writing of this work, and helped me to recover my self-confidence when needed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

APo.	*Posterior Analytics*
Top.	*Topics*
Ph.	*Physics*
DA	*De Anima*
Mem.	*De Memoria*
Somn.	*De Somno*
Juv.	*De Juventute*
PA	*De Partibus Animalium*
MA	*De Motu Animalium*
GA	*De Generatione Animalium*
Metaph.	*Metaphysics*
NE	*Nicomachean Ethics*
EE	*Eudemian Ethics*
Pol.	*Politics*
Rhet.	*Rhetoric*

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*), is devoted to the topic of the human good (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν) or *eudaimonia* (εὐδαιμονία) (*NE* 1097b22-23).[1] However, there is much scholarly controversy regarding Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*. Scholars dispute the question of whether Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with the single, solitary end of theoretical activity (ἐνέργεια θεωρητικὴ), or whether he identifies *eudaimonia* with a *combination* of different activities.

[1] "*Eudaimonia*" is typically rendered in English as "happiness." I have decided not to adopt this usage since the word "happiness" has connotations which Aristotelian *eudaimonia* does not. English speakers use the word "happiness" to refer certain moments or episodes within a life. According to Aristotle, however, *eudaimonia* is the most final object of desire (*NE* 1094a18-22). It is not an episode that "comes and goes." Rather, it is an activity which all our desires are "for the sake of." According to Aristotle, the desire for *eudaimonia* is fashioned by nature so that a human being may fully develop into a rational animal, and ideally, into an animal who reasons excellently. Thus Aristotelian *eudaimonia* has a naturalistic or biological basis. Our conception of "happiness" does not.

The Difficulty

Aristotle's own imperspicuity regarding his conception of *eudaimonia* is partly responsible for the scholarly debate that surrounds it. In book I of the *NE*, Aristotle defines the human good as "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the best and most complete/final/perfect (*teleiotatos*/τελειότατος)" (*NE* 1098a17-18).[2] Aristotle, however, discusses three different kinds of virtues in the *NE*. Two of these virtues -- the virtues of character (VoC) (ἀρεταὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς), and *phronêsis* (φρόνησις), are interentailing. For Aristotle claims that the VoC and *phronêsis* are necessary conditions of one another: *phronêsis* cannot exist without the VoC, and the VoC cannot exist without *phronêsis* (*NE* 1144b30-32). Since Aristotle claims that the VoC and *phronêsis* are interentailing, I will refer to the combination of these two virtues as *ethical virtue*.[3]

The third kind of virtue discussed in the *NE* is philosophical wisdom or *sophia* (σοφία). According to Aristotle, *sophia* is the combination of *nous* (νοῦς) and *epistêmê* (ἐπσιτήμη) (*NE* 1141a19-20).[4] Aristotle's definitions of

---

[2] Since scholars disagree about how to render "*teleiotatos*," I have provided the three standard translations of this term. My interpretation of this word will be offered in chapter two of this work.

[3] Aristotle defines the VoC as "states of character (ἕχεις) concerned with choice (προαιρετική), lying in a mean (μεσότης) (*NE* 1107b36-1107a2)." He defines *phronêsis* as the excellence of the opinion making faculty (δοξαστικός) (*NE* 1140b26-27).

[4] Although the standard interpretation of "*sophia*" is "philosophical wisdom," our notion of "philosophical wisdom" is much broader than Aristotle's. It is useful to regard *nous* as the intellectual

nous and *epistêmê* are technical notions that will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4. For now, we can think of *nous* as a developed disposition that grasps definitions of general terms such as "mammal," and "rhetoric." Thus, if the term "mammal" were to be defined as "a warm blooded and haired animal that nourishes its young with milk," then this fact would be grasped by *nous*. We can think of *epistêmê* as the ability to demonstrate the *logical consequences* of the definitions that are grasped by *nous*. Thus *sophia*, the combination of nous and *epistêmê*, involves both the grasp of definitions, and the ability to demonstrate the consequences of these definitions.

Although he discusses several kinds of virtues in the *NE*, and although he defines the human good as activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue (*NE* 1098a17-18), Aristotle does not explicitly state *which* virtue is the best and *teleiotatos*. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the *NE* as a whole does seem to provide a clue as to whether Aristotle identifies ethical virtue or *sophia* as the best and *teleiotatos*. For the focus of the *NE* is ethical virtue. In fact, nine out of the ten books comprising the *NE* are devoted either to the VoC, or to *phronêsis* -- the two components of ethical virtue. Aristotle's discussion of *sophia*, on the other hand, comprises a brief section in book VI of the *NE* (*NE* 1141a9-1144b8), and several paragraphs in book X (*NE* 1177a12-1178a32). Thus, the fact that the *NE* consists in detailed discussion about the constituents of ethical virtue, and the fact that

---

power that enables a human being to grasp definitions, and to think of *epistêmê* as the ability to

the *NE* contains relatively few remarks about *sophia*, suggest that Aristotle believes that ethical virtue is best and *teleiotatos*.

However, the final book of the *NE* appears to cause problems for the view that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with ethically virtuous activity. For here, Aristotle claims that *nous* is the best thing in us, that the best activity is theoretical, and ethically virtuous activity is *inferior* to theoretical activity (*NE* 1177a12-18, *NE* 1177a22-25, *NE* 1177b1-4, *NE* 1178a5-9). Indeed, given that the focus of the *NE* is ethical virtue, it is odd that at the end of this work, Aristotle states that theoretical activity is best and most pleasant. Moreover, the fact that Aristotle claims that theoretical activity is superior to ethically virtuous activity, poses a serious threat to the view that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with ethically virtuous activity. Aristotle's remarks in book X of the *NE* seem to imply that he identifies *eudaimonia* with theoretical activity, and hence that the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is *sophia*.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not tell us how to reconcile book X with the rest of the *NE*. Nor is he clear about the relationship amongst ethical virtue, *sophia*, and *eudaimonia*. Is Aristotle implying that ethically virtuous activity has *no* role in the *eudaimôn* life? If so, then why is the bulk of the *NE* concerned with the VoC and *phronêsis*? If ethically virtuous activity *does* have some role in the best life for man, then what is the nature of this role? And how is this to be reconciled with book X?

---

demonstrate the logical consequences of definitions. For a brief description of *sophia* see *NE* 1141a9-b8.

The Debate

The alleged discrepancy between book X and the earlier books of the *NE*, has given rise to intense scholarly disagreement about Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*. I will refer to this scholarly controversy as the *intellectualism debate*. At the crux of the intellectualism debate are two competing interpretations of *NE* 1098a17-18. For here, Aristotle defines the human good as activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, and there is disagreement about *which* virtue is best and *teleiotatos*.

As we will see, at the heart of the intellectualism debate is a disagreement about both the meaning of "*teleiotatos*" and the nature of the "for the sake of" (χάριν) (FTSO) relationship. For at *NE* 1098a16-18, Aristotle defines *eudaimonia* as "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (κατὰ ἀρετήν), and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the best (ἄριστος) and *teleiotatos*." Earlier, Aristotle states that a *teleiotatos* end is an intrinsically desirable end that is never chosen for the sake of any other end, and is the ultimate end *for the sake of* which all other ends are chosen (*NE* 1097a29-b4). The fact the meaning of *teleiotatos* is defined in terms of the FTSO relationship, reveals that these two notions are conceptually connected. And the fact the human good is defined as activity in accordance with the *teleiotatos* virtue, subsequently reveals the conceptual connection amongst *eudaimonia*, the meaning of "*teleiotatos,*" and the FTSO

relationship. Indeed, since the latter two notions are crucial to Aristotle's definition of *eudaimonia*, they have become integral to the intellectualism debate.

Intellectualism

According to some scholars, Aristotle identifies the best *teleiotatos* virtue with *sophia*, and hence believes that *eudaimonia* consists in theoretical activity alone.[5] These scholars endorse an *intellectualist* interpretation of Aristotelian *eudaimonia*. Intellectualists claim that all other goods, including ethical virtue, are valuable only because they help to promote theoretical activity. In order to support their position that the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is *sophia*, intellectualists interpret *teleiotatos* as "most perfect," and claim that the FTSO relationship is *causal-normative* relationship.[6] It is causal, because all goods, including ethical virtue, are valuable primarily because they help to promote theoretical activity -- the characteristic activity of *sophia*. And it is normative, because theoretical activity provides a norm and a standard that determines the extent to which all other goods are pursued.

---

[5] See Cooper (1975), Devereux (1981), Hardie (1965), Kenny (1978), and Kraut (1989). Kraut claims that ethical virtue is an intrinsically desirable good, but that it is not a component of *eudaimonia*. See Kraut ([1989], 215). Irwin (1991) has persuasively argued that Kraut's interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle's *eudaimonist* project. For Kraut claims that ethical virtue is intrinsically *and* instrumentally desirable. Irwin points out that this is problematic. For why should one choose ethical virtue for its own sake, if it is not a component of *eudaimonia*?

[6] Kraut ([1989], 200-203).

Inclusivism

Although intellectualism accords well with Aristotle's remarks at X.7.8, many scholars have rejected this reading because of its rather unpalatable consequences. For intellectualism implies that it is possible for a *eudaimôn* individual to behave in ways that are incompatible with ethical virtue.[7] Since intellectualists claim that ethical virtue is not a component of the *eudaimôn* life, they also believe that it is possible for one to be *eudaimôn* and to shirk the ethical virtues. Kraut, for instance, claims that in some cases, theoretical activity can and should be maximized by abandoning ethically virtuous activity.[8]

> ... .if you manage to escape detection, then certain injustices might bring you more contemplation than less. For example, if you ignore the needs of your parents, and no one finds out about this neglect, then your standing in the community will not suffer, and you will have more time for theoretical activity. My interpretation does not attribute to Aristotle the assumption that such cases cannot occur.[9]

Many have found intellectualism unacceptable since it implies that one can be *eudaimôn* while ignoring the needs of one's family, friends, and community. Scholars simply cannot accept the idea that Aristotle believes that the *eudaimôn* individual is solely concerned with theoretical activity, and does not

---

[7] See Cooper ([1971], 149-168), Kraut ([1989], 181).

[8] This is consequence of Kraut's claim that the more theoretical activity that one engages in, the more *eudaimôn* one is. See Kraut ([1989], 9). See also Cooper ([1971], 149-150).

[9] Kraut ([1989], 181).

value social, political, and family life unless doing so helps to promote such activity. For if this were true, then Aristotle would be arguing for a life that, in our own day, would be looked upon with disdain. Thus, many scholars reject the idea that Aristotle identifies the good life with a life which the average person would deem to be morally reprehensible.

Because many scholars find an intellectualist interpretation of the *NE* unacceptable, they embrace an alternative *inclusivist* interpretation of the *NE*.[10] Scholars who endorse inclusivism reject the view that *eudaimonia* consists in theoretical activity alone, and argue instead that *eudaimonia* is an end composed of various intrinsically desirable goods, namely, ethical virtue and *sophia*. Thus, inclusivists identify the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with a *combination* of goods. On such a view, the *eudaimôn* individual is *necessarily* ethically virtuous, since ethical virtue is a component of *eudaimonia*.[11] In contradistinction to intellectualists, inclusivists interpret *teleiotatos* as "most complete," and claim that the FTSO relationship is

---

[10] Inclusivists also reject intellectualism because proponents of this view typically claim that ethically virtuous activity is merely instrumentally valuable. See Cooper ([1971], 163-165), and Kraut ([1989], 5-6). Kraut argues that even though ethical virtue is not a component of the most happy life, it is nevertheless both instrumentally and intrinsically desirable. However, Irwin ([1991], 383-386) points out that to say that the *eudaimôn* individual values certain intrinsic goods that are *not* components of *eudaimonia*, is incompatible with Aristotle's eudaimonistic project. But there is further problem for the view that ethical virtue is merely instrumentally valuable. For if it is true that the virtues of character are valuable only when being used to help promote theoretical activity, then it follows that since courage (ἀνδρεῖον) is one of the virtues of character, then courageous activity is only valuable if it promotes theoretical activity. But this is absurd. For Aristotle defines courage as "being fearless in the face of death in battle" (*NE* 1115a24-31), and it is rather difficult to see how such a virtue could help promote theoretical activity.

[11] Roche ([1988], 191). Although all inclusivists agree that *eudaimonia* is a end that contains a plurality of virtues, they disagree about which goods comprise *eudaimonia*. Ackrill (1980) claims that all intrinsically desirable goods comprise *eudaimonia*. Purinton (1998) disagrees, claiming instead that all and only virtuous activities, activities of the rational soul, comprise *eudaimonia*. Keyt (1983) holds a similar view to Purinton's, claiming that all of the rational virtues comprise *eudaimonia*.

relationship between part and whole.[12] According to inclusivists, then, the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is the most complete, all inclusive virtue, wherein each individual good is desirable for the sake of this all-inclusive end.

Although all inclusivists agree that both ethically virtuous and theoretical activity are components of Aristotelian *eudaimonia*, some believe that theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are *equally* desirable, whereas others believe that theoretical activity is *more desirable* than ethically virtuous activity.[13] I call the former group *simple inclusivists*, and the latter group *moderate inclusivists*.[14]

There are, then, at least three different positions within the intellectualism debate. *Strict intellectualists* claim that *eudaimonia* consists in theoretical activity alone, that ethical virtue is not a component of *eudaimonia*, and that ethical virtue is valuable only to the extent that it helps promote theoretical activity. In order to support their view, intellectualists interpret "*teleiotatos*" as "most perfect," and believe that the FTSO relationship is a causal-normative relationship. *Simple inclusivists* claim that theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are both intrinsic goods that are

---

[12] Ackrill ([1980], 19-20).

[13] Ackrill (1974) suggests that theoretical and ethically virtuous activity are equally desirable. See Irwin (1991), Keyt (1983), and Roche (1988) for the view that theoretical activity is more desirable than ethically virtuous activity.

[14] Importantly, although moderate inclusivists claim that theoretical activity is more valuable than activity that is ethically virtuous, they do not also believe that one should eschew the ethical virtues in order to maximize theoretical activity, as do the strict intellectualists. For moderate inclusivists claim that ethical virtue is a necessary condition of theoretical activity. As David Keyt puts it, "...theoretical activity is to be maximized but only within the constraints of practical wisdom and moral virtue. Moral activity is the foundation, and theoretical activity the superstructure, in the best life for a man." Keyt ([1983], 370). On such a view, it is impossible for ethical virtue to be compromised for the sake of theoretical activity, since the ethical virtue is necessary for its operation.

equally desirable components of *eudaimonia*. Finally, *moderate inclusivists* agree that *eudaimonia* includes ethically virtuous and theoretical activity, both of which are intrinsically desirable, but they add that theoretical activity is more desirable than activity that is ethically virtuous. Both groups of inclusivists interpret "*teleiotatos*" as "most complete," and believe that the FTSO relationship is a relationship between part and whole.

Developmentalism

In what follows, I argue for two importantly related conclusions. First, both the intellectualist and inclusivist account of the FTSO relationship, as well as their respective interpretations of "*teleiotatos*," are inadequate. For both views fail to recognize that the meaning of *teleiotatos* and the nature of the FTSO relationship are rooted in Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings. For in *Generation of Animals*, *Parts of Animals* and *Physics*, Aristotle describes the FTSO relationship as a mechanism that *nature* uses in the biological development of organisms, and he repeatedly discusses how nature brings about some product or process, for the sake of some subsequent stage of development (*GA* 743a16-18, *PA* 639b26-640a1, *Ph.* 199a17-18).[15] I will show that *pace* the claims of both intellectualists and inclusivists, in the context of the *NE*, "*teleiotatos*" should

---

[15] Aristotle also claims that in addition to nature, *human beings* also act for the sake of some end (*NE* 1093a18-22). However, intellectualists and inclusivists have focused only on the *human* use of the FTSO relationship, and have ignored *nature's* use of this mechanism. Both uses are important to Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, as I will show.

be interpreted as "most final," the FTSO relationship should be understood as a relationship of final causality, and that the relata of the FTSO relationship are *stages in the biological development of a human being*. In my view, if X is for the sake of Y, then X is a developmental stage that is necessary for the realization of Y.

My interpretation is most akin go the moderate inclusivist viewpoint, although I reject the moderate inclusivists account of the meaning of "*teleiotatos*" and the FTSO relationship. One could say that my account strengthens the moderate inclusivist position by showing that it has a biological basis. For the second conclusion for which I argue is that ethical virtue is a developmental prerequisite of *nous*, and hence of *sophia* (for *sophia*, as mentioned above, is the combination of *nous* and *epistêmê* (*NE* 1141a19-20). Once we understand that the relata of the FTSO relationship are developmental stages, we will be able to see that ethical virtue is a developmental prerequisite for the actualization of *sophia*. Intellectualists and inclusivists have failed to appreciate this fact not only because they have ignored the biological basis of Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, but also because they have misleadingly characterized the nature of ethical virtue. For they describe ethical virtue as if it is essentially concerned with one's commitments to others, and/or with the control of one's passions.[16] To be sure, Aristotle surely believes that family, friends and community are valuable (*NE* 1169b28-1170b19, *NE* 1123a4-5), and even claims that a man ought to

[16] See Kraut ([1989], 181. Cooper ([1971], 149-150), quoted earlier in the Introduction.

help his friends and children become good if they are living under ignoble laws (*NE* 1180a29-31). Aristotle also believes that it is important for one's appetites to listen to, and hence be controlled by, reason (*NE* 1119b10-15). However, the *essence* of ethical virtue, according to Aristotle, neither consists in one's commitment to other people, nor in one's having a chaste disposition. Rather, the essence of Aristotelian ethical virtue consists in the excellence of the psychological mechanisms that are responsible for excellent human action, viz., *correct belief*, *correct desire*, and *correct deliberation.* As mentioned above, the components of ethical virtue are the VoC and *phronêsis.* And according to Aristotle, whereas the VoC imply ensure that one's desires are *aimed* at the correct objects (NE 1144a7-9), *phronêsis* is an *intellectual* virtue (ἀρετή διανοίας) (*NE* 1139a1) of the faculty that forms opinions (*NE* 1040b25-26), and implies an excellence in deliberation (*NE* 1141b9-10). Since opinions can either take the form of universal (e.g., "all humans or mammals") or particular (e.g., "Socrates is a human") judgments, then *phronêsis* implies that both kinds of opinions are correct.[17] Such correctness of opinion, as we will see, is necessary for the complete actualization of *nous*, and hence for *sophia.*

The structure of my argument is as follows: in chapter 1, I explicate Aristotle's function argument -- the argument which concludes with Aristotle's definition of *eudaimonia* at *NE* 1098a17-18. The intellectualist and inclusivist interpretations of this argument will be the focus of chapter 2. I

will examine their divergent account of the meaning of *teleiotatos*, as well as the nature of the FTSO relationship. In chapter 3, I show that the intellectualist and inclusivist accounts of the meaning of "*teleiotatos*" and the FTSO relationship are inadequate since both fail to recognize the biological basis of Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*. In chapter 4, I explain why ethical virtue is necessary for the development of *nous*. In chapter 5, I provide another argument against intellectualism by explaining why ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*, and conclude with some speculative remarks about Aristotle's intention in writing the *NE*.

[17] Cf. *NE* 1142a11-23.

CHAPTER 1: THE DIFFICULTY

My aim in this chapter is to provide an explication of Aristotle's function argument, the argument which concludes with the definition of *eudaimonia* as, "activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue" (*NE* 109817-18). As we will see, Aristotle's remarks in X.7,8 cause difficulties for the interpretation of *NE* 109817-18. These difficulties have led to scholarly debate surrounding the interpretation of the function argument.

The Function Argument

In the opening book of the *NE*, we learn that Aristotle's aim is to discover the nature of *eudaimonia*, or the human good. The function argument (*NE* 1097b22-1098a18) is Aristotle's attempt to pinpoint the human good. According to this argument, the human good can be defined

through the *ergon* (or function) of man (*NE* 1097b10-11).[1] Aristotle claims that the *ergon* of man is excellent rational activity (*NE* 1097b34-1098a4), and he defines *eudaimonia* as activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue (*NE* 109817-18). Aristotle's arguments for these claims are reviewed below.

The guiding assumption behind the function argument is Aristotle's claim that the human good can be defined through man's *ergon* (*NE* 1097b10-11). Aristotle's provides an analogical argument for this claim:

> Presumably, however, to say that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might be first be given, if we could ascertain the function (ἔργον) of man. Just as for a flute player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity (πρᾶξις), the good (τἀγαθὸν) and the "well" (τὸ εὖ) is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he has a function. What then can this be? Life seems belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar (ἴδιον) to man. (NE 1097b22-34).[2]

In this passage, Aristotle argues that since the good of an artist resides in his *ergon*, then the good of a man likewise resides in the human *ergon*. This argument seems problematic, however. First, it is not at all clear what is relevantly similar between human beings and artists. Artists,

---

[1] The word "ἔργον" is usually translated as "function." Aristotle claims that we can discover the *ergon* of man if we discover what is ἴδιον, or peculiar to man *(NE* 1097b35). Although some commentators believe that Aristotle means that we can discover the ἔργον of man if we discover *any* property that is peculiar to man (e.g., telling jokes), I agree with Jennifer Whiting (1988) that this way of interpreting "ἴδιον" is incorrect. Rather "ἴδιον" refers to the essence of a creature. Whiting's interpretation is supported by *GA* 736b4.

[2] All translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are by David Ross, unless otherwise noted.

of course, are human beings, but it is unclear as to what is similar between the artist qua artist, on the one hand, and the human qua human, on the other. Moreover, it is not at all clear that man has an *ergon*, in the same way that a flautist or a sculptor has an *ergon*. A particular artist or craftsman has a determinate *ergon*. The *ergon* of a doctor, for instance, is to heal, and the *ergon* of a rhetorician is to persuade. But it is not certain that a human being has a determinate ergon. Perhaps man is born without a specific *ergon*, and decides for himself which *ergon* or *erga* he wants to adopt.[3] A human being could decide to be a flautist, or adopt the *ergon* of a sculptor, without there being a specific *ergon* of human beings. Possibly aware of such an objection, Aristotle supports his claim that man has an *ergon* with the following argument:

> Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a *ergon*? Or as eye, hand, foot and in general each of the parts has an *ergon*, may one establish that man similarly has an *ergon* apart from all these? (*NE* 1097b28-34).

Aristotle seems to believe that since a human being's body parts each have their own *ergon*, then there is a specific *ergon* of a human being. Thus, Aristotle appears to advance the following argument:

> 1.If some parts of a human being have an *ergon* or function, then a human being has an *ergon* or function.
> 2. Some parts of a human being have an *ergon* or function
> A human being has an *ergon* or function.

The argument is valid, but the first premise is problematic. For it simply does not follow that if some parts of X are Y, then X is Y. Just because the atoms

comprising Socrates cannot be seen with the naked eye, it does not follow that Socrates cannot be seen with the naked eye.[4] Aristotle's argument appears to commit the fallacy of composition.[5]

Despite the difficulties surrounding *NE* 1097b28-34, Aristotle proceeds as if he has said nothing objectionable. And after establishing that man has an *ergon*, Aristotle next claims that the *ergon* of a human being can be discovered if one discovers what is *idion* to human beings:

> Just as for a flute player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity (πρᾶξις), the good (τἀγαθὸν)and the "well" (τὸ εὖ) is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he has a function... .What then can this be? Life seems belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar (*idion*) to man. (*NE* 1097b25-1097b34).

According to Aristotle, the *ergon* or function of man can be determined if one discovers what is *idion* to human beings. Most scholars interpret "*idion*" as "peculiar."[6] Ackrill, for instance, writes:

> Aristotle has clearly stated that the principle of the *ergon* argument is that one must ask what powers and activities are peculiar to and distinctive of man.[7]

---

[3] This is Jean Paul Sartre's criticism of Aristotle's assumption that man has a predefined *ergon*.

[4] There is the additional problem that the similarities between the crafts, body parts and human beings seem weak. Is Aristotle claiming that a human being has an *ergon* because, like a hand, a human is part of some larger organism? T. H. Irwin ([1980], 35-36) puts the problem well:

> When Aristotle offers to say what happiness is, he refers to the "function" or "characteristic activity" (*ergon*) peculiar to human beings: just as a hammer or a leg has a function, a living organism has one... .This argument is not easy to accept. Is the inference from artifacts and organs to human beings secure, or does it rely on the disputable assumption that a human being is an artifact, or else the limb of a larger organism?

[5] The fallacy of composition is committed when the following premise is assumed "if the parts of X have property P, then X has the property P." This claim is not always true. The parts of a wristwatch may be inexpensive, but this does not mean that the wristwatch itself is inexpensive.

[6] An exception is Whiting (1986) who argues that the *idion* of man is identical to man's essence.

[7] Ackrill ([1980], 27).

and Kraut:

> Our function cannot simply be to live, since that is something we have in common with plants, and we are looking for what is peculiar--to human beings... .[Aristotle] is looking for what is peculiar (*idion*) to human beings.[8]

But if Aristotle is claiming that the *ergon* of a human being is determined by what is merely peculiar to a human being, then the connection between a thing's *ergon* and its good is tenuous. Why is it the case that man's *ergon*, which is determined merely by what is peculiar to human beings, is relevant to what is *good* for man? Aristotle does not seem to be aware of these questions, and he states that rational activity is *idion* to human beings:

> Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be shared by the horse, the ox and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle (ἔχοντος λόγον).

In claiming that the human good is determined by man's *ergon*, and in claiming that man's *ergon* is determined by man's *idion*, Aristotle seems to be advancing the following argument:

1. The human good is determined by the human *ergon*
2. The human *ergon* is determined by what is *idion* to human beings.
3. Rational Activity is *idion* to human beings.

<u>4. The human *ergon* is rational activity</u>

The human good is determined by (consists in) rational activity

---

[8] Kraut ([1989], 313). Both Kraut and Ackrill recognize a difficulty here. For if Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with *sophia*, then since the God contemplates, then *sophia* is not peculiar to human beings. Kraut avoids this difficulty by claiming that Aristotle is using "*idion*" to refer to that which is peculiar to man *relative to animals*, not relative to *all living things*. So, on Kraut's view, there is no difficulty for Aristotle to claim both that contemplation is *idion* to man, and that the God contemplates. See Kraut ([1989], 316).

This argument, though valid, is problematic. For there are many activities that are *idion* to human beings *other than* rational activity, such as gambling and giving to charity, for instance. If "*idion*" indeed means "peculiar," as most scholars assume, then we need an explanation as to why Aristotle singles out *rational activity* as the *ergon* and *idion* of man. Why is rational activity, rather than say, giving to charity, the *ergon* and *idion* of man? Why should we dismiss the view that the human good consists in giving to charity? Aristotle appears to provide no answer to these important questions.

Nevertheless, after stating that "the life of the rational element" is *idion* to man, Aristotle makes the important claim that the rational element is two-fold:

> Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this one part of the element that has a rational principle has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought (διανοούμενον). (*NE* 1097b34-1098a4-5).

After establishing that there are two parts to the rational element of the soul, Aristotle then returns to the notion of the human *ergon*, and makes the general claim that the *ergon* of a good thing is for the thing to perform its *ergon* well (*NE* 1098a8-11). From this it follows that the *ergon* of a good man, is for man to perform his *ergon* well. Thus, if the *ergon* of man is rational activity, then the *ergon* of a good man is excellent rational activity.[9] So Aristotle concludes the function argument with the following claim:

> the human good is activity (ἐνέργεια) of the soul in accordance excellence, and if there is more than one excellence, then it is in accordance with the best and most *teleiotatos* (*NE* 1098a16-18).

I am leaving "*teleiotatos*" uninterpreted for now because of the disagreement about how to render this claim. The term "*teleiotatos*" is the superlative form of the adjective "*teleios*". "*Teleios*" can be rendered either as "perfect," "complete," or "final." Accordingly, "*teleiotatos*" can be interpreted as "most perfect," "most complete," or "most final." We will see soon enough that much hinges on which of these meanings is selected.

Put in standard form, Aristotle function argument is as follows:

> 1. The good of any artist resides in that artist's *ergon* (*NE* 1097b25-28).
> 2. If man has an *ergon*, the good of man resides in that *ergon* (*NE* 1097b24-5).
> 3. Body parts and artists each have their own *ergon* (*NE* 1097b28-34).
> 4. Man has an *ergon* (*NE* 1097b34).
> 5. The good of man resides in man's *ergon* (from 1,4).
> 6. The *ergon* of man can be discovered if one discovers what is *idion* to man. (*NE* 1097b34-35).
> 7. Activity of the rational principle is *idion* to man (*NE* 1098a3-4).
> 8. The *ergon* of man is activity of the rational principle.
> 9. The human good resides in activity of the rational principle.
> 10. the *ergon* of a good thing is for the thing to perform its *ergon* well (*NE* 1098 a8-11).
> 11. The *ergon* of a good man is the excellent activity of the rational principle.
> 12. There are two elements of the rational principle (*NE* 1098a4-5).
> The human good is activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are many, in accordance with the best and most *teleiotatos* (*NE* 1098a16-18).

---

[9] Aristotle explicitly states that by "life of the rational element," he means life in the sense of activity or actuality (*energeia*) (*NE* 1098a5-6). In other words, *eudaimonia* is the operation or activation of the rational element. According to Aristotle, merely possessing this element is not sufficient for *eudaimonia*. Rather, if one is *eudaimôn*, then one's rational element must be actualized, i.e., in use.

The qualification that Aristotle makes at the conclusion of the function argument, viz., that the human good is excellent activity in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, seems to refer back to his remark that there are two elements of the rational principle (*NE* 1098a4-5). Aristotle appears to be saying that of these two rational elements, *eudaimonia* is activity in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos*.

The Difficulty of X.7,8

So far I have laid out Aristotle's function argument and have mentioned some of the difficulties involved therein. However, in addition to the seemingly problematic moves that Aristotle makes in the function argument, his remarks about *sophia* in book X, the final book of the *NE*, further complicate the matter. For the earlier books of *NE*, especially books I through VIII, contain detailed discussions about ethical virtue, which is a combination of the VoC and *phronêsis*. Given that the conclusion of the function argument states that *eudaimonia* is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, and given that Aristotle spends the bulk of the *NE* discussing ethical virtue, one is naturally inclined to believe that Aristotle equates the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with ethical virtue, and hence that *eudaimonia* consists in ethically virtuous activity. However, Aristotle's remarks in X.7,8 seem to create conflict with this inclination. For in X.7, Aristotle claims that best activity is not ethically virtuous activity, as one might expect, but is *theoretical*:

> If [*eudaimonia*] is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue -- and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason (νοῦς) or
>
> something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler (δοκεῖ ἄρχειν φύσιν) and guide and take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine (θεῖον) or only the most divine element in us, the activity (ἐνέργεια) of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness (τελεία εὐδαιμονία). That this activity is theoretical we have already said (*NE* 1177a12-18).[10]

Later, at X.8, Aristotle explicitly states that the life in accordance with the "other virtue" is inferior to the theoretical life (*NE* 1178a9). Presumably, Aristotle is referring to ethical virtue, since this is the only other virtue that is discussed in detail in the *NE*. And at *NE* 1178b31-21, Aristotle claims that the philosopher, most of all, will be *eudaimôn*. These remarks seem to be out of place in the *NE*. For the earlier books suggest that *eudaimonia* is ethically virtuous activity, whereas X.7,8 seems to imply that *eudaimonia* is theoretical activity. It is unclear how Aristotle would reconcile these two views. Does he believe that *ethical virtue* is the best and *teleiotatos* virtue? Or does he believe that the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is *sophia*? Or, does Aristotle believe that the *eudaimôn* life consists in a combination of both ethically virtuous *and* theoretical activity? Indeed, Aristotle's function argument seems to involve a thicket of difficulties. Not only do his moves within the function argument seem problematic, as reviewed above, but there is also the tension between X.7,8 and the earlier books of the *NE*.

[10] I have modified Ross' translation slightly and used the adjective "theoretical" instead of "contemplative".

Scholars have been particularly frustrated by the fact that Aristotle is unclear about which virtue he believes is best and *teleiotatos*, and there is notorious debate about how the conclusion of the function argument should be interpreted. Should the conclusion of the function argument be interpreted in light of X.7,8, or should X.7,8 be eschewed when interpreting the function argument? There are indeed scholars who endorse the latter alternative, and argue that X.7,8 was not originally part of the *NE*.[11] Such an account at least acquits Aristotle of outright inconsistency, as it places the blame on some careless editor of Aristotle's corpus.

Other scholars advance less charitable accounts of the relationship between X.7,8 and the rest of the *NE*. According to this school, Aristotle actually contradicts himself in the *NE*. W. F. R. Hardie and John Cooper, for instance, argue that Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with ethical virtue in the first nine books of the *NE*, and identifies the best

---

[11] See references in Roche ([1988], 192, n.31). Textual evidence seems to rule out such an explanation. For in book X of the *NE*, Aristotle seems to refer back to his discussion of *eudaimonia* in book I, where he claims that *eudaimonia* is a *teleiotatos*, self-sufficient and intrinsically desirable end (*NE* 1097a15-1097b21); and that *eudaimonia* is an activity in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue (*NE* 1098b18-19). In chapter X.7, these remarks are echoed. There, Aristotle states that *sophia* is the highest (κρατίστος) virtue, that it is the best (ἀρίστος) thing in us, and that activity in accordance with *sophia* is τελεία εὐδαιμονία (*NE* 1177a12-13). Although Aristotle never explicitly claims that *sophia* is identical to the *teleiotatos* end, he seems to imply this much. Aristotle's reference to *sophia* as ἀρίστος seems to refer back to the conclusion of the function argument, which states that *eudaimonia* is activity of the soul in accordance with the best (ἀρίστος) and most *teleios* virtue (*NE* 1098a16-17). Moreover, Aristotle states that contemplative activity is self-sufficient (αὐτάρκεια), and desired for its own sake (*NE* 1177a27-b3); and in book I, he tells us that these two qualities are characteristic of *eudaimonia* (*NE* 1097a15-1097b21). Thus, Aristotle seems well aware of his preceding discussion about *eudaimonia*, even in the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

and *teleiotatos* virtue with *sophia* in the final book of the *NE*. Such an account interprets the *NE* as containing a flagrant contradiction.[12]

There are, however, many scholars who argue that Aristotle presents a unified and coherent account of the best and *teleiotatos* virtue in the *NE*.[13] Yet, there is disagreement even among these scholars. They disagree about whether Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue solely with theoretical activity, or whether Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with a combination of ethically virtuous and theoretical activities. *Intellectualists* endorse the former interpretation, whereas *inclusivists* endorse the latter. In the next chapter, these competing interpretations are discussed.

---

[12] Hardie ([1965], 279) and Cooper ([1975], 165-180). Cooper argues that Aristotle's inconsistency in the *NE* is caused by the fact that, in the earlier books of the *NE*, Aristotle accepts the psychological theory of the *Eudemian Ethics*, whereas at other points, Aristotle accepts the psychological theory of the *De Anima*. Since these two theories are inconsistent with one another -- the psychological theory of the *Eudemian Ethics* identifies a human being as a combination of mind and body, but the psychological theory of the *De Anima* identifies a human being with *nous*, which is non-bodily -- Aristotle's discussion of the human good is inconsistent. Cooper (1987) has rejected this rather uncharitable reading and now embraces inclusivism.

[13] See Cooper (1987), Keyt (1981), Kraut (1989), Purinton (1981), Roche (1988), Whiting (1986).

CHAPTER 2: INTELLECTUALISM AND INCLUSIVISM

In this chapter, I discuss some of the prominent intellectualist and inclusivist interpretations of *NE* 1098a17-18, the conclusion of the function argument. Since intellectualists and inclusivists disagree about the proper interpretation of the term "*teleiotatos,*" which appears in the conclusion of the function argument, it is necessary to discuss the different interpretations of this term. Furthermore, since the meaning of "*teleiotatos*" is conceptually wedded to the nature of the "for the sake of" relationship (*NE* 1097a28-35), I will also discuss both the intellectualist and inclusivist accounts of this relationship.

Intellectualism

As mentioned earlier, intellectualists believe that the referent of the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is *sophia.* Although Aristotle neither explicitly states that *sophia* is the *teleiotatos* virtue, nor identifies *eudaimonia* with a single

activity, he does say that activity in accordance with *sophia* is *teleia* happiness (*NE* 1177a17-18). He also states that *nous* is the highest and best thing in us:

> If [*eudaimonia*] is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest (κρατίστος) virtue – and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason (νοῦς) or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler (δοκεῖ ἄρχειν φύσιν) and guide and take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine (θεῖον) or only the most divine element in us, the activity (ἐνέργεια) of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness (τελεία εὐδαιμονία). That this activity is we have already said (*NE* 1177a12-18).

This passage seems to refer back to the conclusion of the function argument which states that the human good is activity in accordance with the *aristos* and *teleiotatos* virtue (*NE* 1098a16-17). Thus when Aristotle states that *eudaimonia* is activity in accordance with the *aristos* and *teleiotatos* virtue in I.7, intellectualists believe that he is tacitly referring to theoretical activity. Daniel Devereux puts the point well:

> In view of the close relationship... .[between] X.7 and the definition of I,7, most commentators have supposed that Aristotle must have had philosophical contemplation in mind when he formulated his definition of happiness [in book one]. In other words, Aristotle deliberately sets up an equation between happiness and the activity of contemplation in I,7, but the reader can only see this in retrospect.[1]

Intellectualists find further support for their claim that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* solely with theoretical activity, by noting that Aristotle describes it with superlative adjectives. For instance, shortly after the function argument, Aristotle states:

---

[1] Devereux ([1981], 251).

> *Eudaimonia*, then, is what is best, most beautiful and most pleasant, and these things are not separate according to the epigram at Delios:
>
> The most just is the most beautiful, and heath is best, but most pleasant is winning what one loves.
>
> For all these things belong to the best activities, but we say that *eudaimonia* is identical to these activities, or the best one of these. (*NE* 1099a24-31).

Intellectualists claim that the fact that Aristotle describes *eudaimonia* with superlative adjectives suggests that he believes that *eudaimonia* consists in a single, solitary activity, rather than a combination of them. For a superlative seems to single out one entity from several alternatives. According to intellectualists, when Aristotle states above that *eudaimonia* is "one of these, or the best one of these" he seems to be singling out a particular activity.[2] Moreover, when Aristotle claims that the life in accordance with the other virtue is inferior to life in accordance with *nous* (ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) (*NE* 1178a5-9), intellectualists aver that he is singling out *sophia*, to the exclusion of ethical virtue. Intellectualists, then, argue that Aristotle's manner of speaking about *eudaimonia* reveals that he identifies *eudaimonia* with one, rather than many, activities.

The intellectualist thesis that Aristotle has theoretical activity in mind at 1098a17-18 influences not only their interpretation of the superlatives, "*aristos*" and "*teleiotatos,*" that appear in the conclusion of the function

---

[2] Intellectualists also argue that *NE* 1099a24-31 demonstrates the implausibility of an inclusivist reading of the function argument. For inclusivists believe that *eudaimonia* is a combination of virtuous activities. But at *NE* 1099a24-31, Aristotle draws a contrast between a plurality of activities ("these activities") and a single activity "one of them." And he states that *eudaimonia* is identical to the best activities or one of the best. But by "one of the best activities" Aristotle cannot mean, *pace* the inclusivists, "a plurality of activities" else there would be no contrast between "a plurality of activities" and "the best one." See Kraut ([1989], 243).

argument, but also their view about the referent of "*idion.*" For they think that since Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with theoretical activity alone, then "*aristos*," "*teleiotatos*" and "*idion*" should be interpreted accordingly. This seems relatively innocent when considering the adjective "*aristos*," which means "best." But interpreting "*teleiotatos*" and "*idion*" to refer to a single activity is more difficult.

Consider the term "*idion*" for a moment. We saw in chapter one, that after Aristotle claims that rational activity is *idion* to man, he distinguishes two parts of the human soul -- one part that possesses a rational principle, and one part that is obedient to a rational principle (*NE* 1098a4-5). Aristotle also states that this latter part is *irrational* or *without reason* (ἄλογον) (*NE* 1102a26-28). Importantly, the irrational part of the soul is *also* comprised of two parts -- the part that is responsible for nutrition and growth, on the one hand, and the part that can either obey or disobey the rational soul (NE 1102a32-1102b-14). Whereas the former part of the soul is shared by animals, Aristotle seems to think that the latter part is not. For one can only possess the second type of irrational soul if one possesses reason (else, there would be nothing for this type of irrational soul to obey or disobey). Since human beings are the only animals that possess reason, it follows that the second type of irrational soul is unique to human beings.

Aristotle also distinguishes two parts of the *rational* soul -- one portion which possess a rational principle in the strict sense (κυρίως), and the other having the tendency to obey as one does one's father (NE 1103a1-4). Later,

Aristotle states that the part of the rational element which obeys is the part that forms *opinions* (δοξαστικός) (*NE* 1140b25-26, 1144b14-16), that the virtue of this part is *phronêsis* (*NE* 1140b27-28), and that *phronêsis* implies ethical virtue (*NE* 1144b30-32):

> It is not possible to be good in the strict sense (κυρίως ἀγαθὸς) without practical wisdom (φρόνησις/*phronêsis*), or practically wise without moral virtue (ἀρεταὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς) (*NE* 1144b30-32).

Now, one way of understanding "*idion*" is to see it as encompassing the two rational elements -- the part that forms opinions, and the part responsible for theoretical activity (*nous*), *and* the part of the rational soul that is unique to human beings. For *all* of these parts are unique to human beings.[3] This reading of "*idion*," is of course incompatible with the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identifies the human good with a *single* activity. For if man's *idion* encompasses *all* of the unique parts of the human soul , then the human good would be activity in accordance with the virtues of all these parts of the human soul. This contradicts the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identifies the human good solely with activity in accordance with *sophia*. Thus, intellectualists reject the above reading of "*idion.*"[4] In their view, the *idion* of man is the single peculiar characteristic that is best and *teleiotatos*.

---

[3] This view is argued for by Purinton (1998). Contrast Purinton with Irwin ([1980], 49), who claims that the human *idion* can include any and all characteristics that are possessed by other creatures, as long as there is just one characteristic that is uniquely possessed by man:

> If x can do A,B, and C, and nothing else can do C, but other things can do A and B, we might describe x's peculiar function either as "doing A,B, and C" or as "doing C". Now it is fairly clear that Aristotle understands the peculiar activity of man in the first, inclusive way.

[4] The argument that Kraut ([1989], 239 n. 32) gives against the inclusivist reading of "*idion*" is that such a reading is incorrect since on it, " no organization is imposed upon our ends." Indeed, according to the intellectualist, Aristotle's primary project is to tell us how to organize our ends so that one activity

As mentioned above, intellectualists also interpret "*teleiotatos,*" in accordance with their view that Aristotle identifies the human good with a single activity. However, "*teleiotatos*" can either mean most perfect, most complete, or most final. Since the term "perfect" is congenial to the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with a single activity, intellectualists believe that by "*teleiotatos*", Aristotle means "most perfect."[5] However, the term "*teleiotatos*" is conceptually wedded to the "for the sake of" (FTSO) relationship. So if intellectualists want to interpret "*teleiotatos*" as referring to a single activity, they need to provide an account of the FTSO relationship that is compatible with this view.

The Intellectualist Account of the "for the sake of" Relationship:

In the following passage, Aristotle explains the nature of a *teleios* end, by appealing to the "for the sake of" (χάριν) relationship:

> Since, in fact, there appears to be more than one end (τέλος), and we desire some of for the sake of another (e.g., wealth, flutes, and in general instruments), it is clear that not all ends are *teleios* ends; but best good appears to be *teleios*. With the result that, if, for its part, there is only one *teleios* end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most *teleios* of these will be what we are

---

outweighs all others in importance. Since a broad interpretation of "*idion*" is incompatible with this project, Kraut alleges, then such a reading must be rejected. Kraut's argument is weak. A broad interpretation of "*idion*" is compatible with there being an organization imposed upon our ends. Keyt (1983) provides such a view. According to his view, *eudaimonia* includes both ethical virtue and theoretical activity, but theoretical activity ought to be maximized within the constraints imposed by ethical virtue.

[5] Cooper ([1975], 100, n. 10), Kraut ([1989], 242-243). Kraut makes an important distinction between a *teleios* end (a perfect end) and an end that is *teleiotatos* (a most perfect end). Kraut argues that Aristotle's distinction between a perfect end and a most perfect end, refers to two different conceptions of happiness. *Eudaimonia* qua perfect end is activity in accordance with virtuous activity. On the other hand, *eudaimonia* qua most perfect end is activity in accordance with *sophia*, the intellectual virtue responsible for excellent theoretical activity.

> seeking. Now we say that the thing which is pursued (τὸ διωκτὸν) for itself (καθ' αυτο) is more *teleios* than that which is pursued for the sake of another, and that which is never desired for another (τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν) more *teleios* than the things that are desirable both for themselves and for another, and the end in an absolute sense (ἁπλῶς) is always desired for itself and never for another. And *eudaimonia* seems to be this most of all. For we desire this always for itself and never for another, but honor,
>
> pleasure, reason (νοῦς) and every virtue we desire for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we desire them also for the sake of (χάριν) *eudaimonia*, judging that on account of them we shall be *eudaimôn*. But no one chooses *eudaimonia* for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself (*NE* 1097a25-1097b6).[6]

Note that immediately after claiming that some ends are more *teleios* than others (*NE* 1097a29-35), and that *eudaimonia* is the most *teleios* end (*NE* 1097a35), Aristotle justifies the latter claim by claiming that, "we choose [*eudaimonia*] always for itself and never for another, but honor, pleasure, reason and every virtue we choose for themselves... .but we choose them also for the sake of happiness" (*NE* 1097b1-1097b4). Since Aristotle explains the nature of the most *teleios* end by appealing to the fact that all other ends are chosen for the sake of *this* end, Aristotle believes that the term "*teleios*" is conceptually connected to FTSO relationship.[7]

In accordance with their view that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with a single activity, intellectualists claim that the FTSO relationship is, at the very

---

[6] My translation.

[7] Purinton ([1998], 263) denies that there is a conceptual connection between Aristotle's discussion of ends that are *teleios* in different degrees, and the meaning of "*teleiotatos* " in the function argument. This claim contradicts the texts, however. For after Aristotle states that some ends are more *teleios* than others (*NE* 1097a29-35), he then claims that *eudaimonia* is the most *teleios* end (*NE* 1097a35). Then, Aristotle uses the explanatory "*gar*" to reveal that he does see a conceptual connection between *teleios* ends and the *teleiotatos* end: " for we choose (*eudaimonia*) always for itself and never for another, but honor, pleasure,

least, a causal-normative relationship.[8] Richard Kraut, a proponent of intellectualism, offers this account of the FTSO relationship.

According to Kraut, Aristotle's opening remarks in I.1, provide an important clue to properly understanding the nature of the FTSO relationship:

> As there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends are also many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity--as bridle- making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under the art of riding, and in the same way other arts fall under yet others--in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. (*NE* 1094a1-16).

Kraut believes that in claiming that some arts are subordinate to other arts, Aristotle is claiming that some goods are subordinate to other goods. This seems reasonable enough, as Aristotle claims that the *end* of an art is the *good* of that art (*NE* 1094a1-3). So, if the end of one art is subordinate to the end of another art, as the end of bridle making is subordinate to the end of riding, and if ends are identical to goods, then some goods are subordinate to other goods. Kraut makes the further claim, however, that goods comprise a *hierarchy*, and hence that the subordination relation between two different goods is a hierarchical relation. Inclusivists, as we will soon see, deny that the subordination relation between two goods is a hierarchical relation, and argue instead that the subordination relation should be understood as a relation between part and whole.

---

reason and every virtue we choose for themselves ...but we choose them also for the sake of (χάριν) happiness" (*NE* 1097b1-1097b4).

[8] Kraut ([1989], 200-203) defends this claim.

Kraut claims that at the bottom of the hierarchy of goods are the least valuable goods, which are dubbed the "imperfect goods." These goods are only desirable for the sake of some other good. Wealth and musical instruments, for instance, are desirable only for the sake of something else, and therefore are imperfect goods. Next on the hierarchy are the "moderately perfect goods," viz., goods that are both desirable for the sake of some other good *and* are intrinsically desirable. Finally, at the pinnacle of this hierarchy is the most perfect good, a good that is intrinsically desirable and is never desired for the sake of any other good:

> ...every good of human life is to be located somewhere within a hierarchy that has a single end at its pinnacle. The lowest row of this hierarchy contains ends (such as wealth) that are not goods in themselves, but are desirable only on condition that they lead to further goods. Above this row, Aristotle places goods (such as honor) that are desirable in themselves, though they are not to be identified with happiness. Still higher are those intrinsically desirable ends (virtuous activities) that are properly identified with happiness. Each good on a lower row is choiceworthy for the sake of some good on a higher row.[9]

Importantly, Kraut claims that each row in this "hierarchy of goods" is related to the next, higher level of goods by the FTSO relationship. The imperfect goods on the bottom row are pursued for the sake of some other good; the goods on the middle row are pursued for their own sakes *and* for the sake of some other good, and the topmost good is pursued solely for its own sake.[10] Kraut argues that Aristotle's appeal to the crafts, illustrates that the FTSO relationship is at least partly causal:

---

[9] Kraut ([1989], 6). Cooper ([1987], 201-202) also adopts this reading of "most *teleiotatos*."

> [The FTSO relationship] is a causal one, at least in part. The process of making the bridle causes the product to come into being: the bridle is then used as an instrument that facilitates the activity of riding; and riding in battle is a means of defeating the enemy and achieving victory.[11]

According to Kraut, the FTSO relationship is causal because he believes that if A is for the sake of B, then A is at least partly responsible for B's coming into being.[12] So, if exercise is for the sake of weight loss, then it is so (partly) because exercise promotes weight loss, i.e., causes it to come into being. But Kraut also believes that the FTSO relationship is a *normative* relationship: if A is for the sake of B, then B provides a norm that guides A. So, if exercise is for the sake of weight loss, then it is so not only because exercise promotes weight loss, but also because weight loss provides a norm that regulates exercise. For the amount of weight that one wants to lose determines how much one should exercise:

> The bridlemaker decides how to treat his raw material by looking to a paradigm of the finished product, and the proper design of his product is determined by the expert rider... .The horseman tells the bridlemaker what sort of bridle he needs; so the activity of riding provides a standard for how bridles should be made. And in turn, the bridlemaker puts himself at the service of the rider, who puts himself at the service of the general; each lower discipline plays a causal role in the pursuit of each higher discipline, and the higher disciplines in turn provide the norms for the proper pursuit of the lower disciplines.[13]

---

[10] Kraut ([1989], 299-300).

[11] Kraut ([1989], 200).

[12] That this is what Kraut means by "causal" is confirmed at Kraut ([1989], 201). Kraut thinks that, if A is for the sake of B, then there is a causal relationship between A and B, viz., A causes B to come into existence. I agree that if A is for the sake of B, then there is a causal relation between the two, but in some cases, if B is the form of an object or organism, then B can cause A to come into existence in order for the form to be completely realized in matter (*PA* 639b24-640a9). I believe that this is the correct understanding of the FTSO relationship in the *NE*, as I will argue later.

[13] Kraut ([1989], 201).

According to Kraut, then, some goods A, are pursued for the sake of other goods B, because A causes B to come into being, and because B provides a norm for the pursuit of A.

Accordingly, Kraut interprets the FTSO relationship in light of his interpretation of "*teleiotatos*" as "most perfect." He claims that if an end is merely *teleios*, then it only "moderately perfect" -- i.e., it is not the end for the sake of which *all* other ends are pursued, and hence is not the pinnacle of the hierarchy of goods. But if an end is *most* perfect, and hence is *teleiotatos*, then it belongs at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. For this end is "the that for the sake of which" all other ends are pursued. Claiming that perfect ends are ultimately pursued for the sake of a single, most perfect end, is of course, compatible with the intellectualist thesis that Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with the single virtue of *sophia*. For *sophia*, the most perfect virtue, is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of goods. Hence all other goods, including ethical virtue, are pursued for the sake of *sophia*.[14]

Such is the intellectualist account of the conclusion of the function argument. Guided by their conviction that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with theoretical activity alone, intellectualists adopt a narrow interpretation of "*idion*," interpret "*teleiotatos*" as most perfect, and the FTSO relationship as a causal normative relationship.

On the other hand, inclusivists provide different interpretations of "*idion*," "*teleiotatos*" and the FTSO relationship, and consequently adopt a

different reading of the conclusion of the function argument. For as mentioned earlier, *inclusivists* reject intellectualism because they are unwilling to accept an interpretation of *eudaimonia* that does not include ethical virtue. Inclusivists, therefore, believe that Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with a *combination* of ethical virtue and *sophia*. Let us examine the interpretation of the function argument proposed by inclusivists.

Inclusivism

In contradistinction to intellectualists, inclusivists deny that X.7,8 are the crucial passages in understanding Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia* at the conclusion of the function argument. There are several reasons why inclusivists reject an intellectualist reading of 1098a16-18. First, the focus of the *NE* is ethical virtue, and inclusivists believe that it would be strange if the best and *teleiotatos* virtue referred to *sophia*, since Aristotle rarely discusses this virtue in the *NE*.[15] Second, inclusivists believe that several passages in book I wherein Aristotle discusses the general nature of *eudaimonia* reveal that he believes that *eudaimonia* includes a plurality of goods. In one of these passages, Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is an end that is self-sufficient (αὔταρκες), intrinsically desirable and unqualifiedly *teleios* (*NE* 1097b14-21):

> The self-sufficient (αὔταρκες) is established as that which, when considered by itself, makes a life choiceworthy and in need of nothing. And we think happiness to be this sort of thing. And still, it is the most choiceworthy of all since it is not counted along with other goods,

[14] Kraut argues that the life in accordance with ethical virtue (*phronêsis*) is also happy life, but it is not perfect (*teleios*) happiness. This makes sense of Aristotle's remark at *NE* 1178a9. See Kraut ([1989], 16).

[15] See Roche ([1988], 186).

> because being counted along with other goods, it would clearly be more choiceworthy with the least of goods. For what is added is an increase (υπεροχή) of goods, and of goods, the greater is always the more choiceworthy, It appears, in fact, that *eudaimonia* is *teleios* and self-sufficient, being the end of our actions.

Inclusivists believe that the above passage implies that Aristotle identifies *eudaimonia* with a combination of activities, rather than just one. In order to understand why inclusivists believe this, it is useful to make a distinction between two types of goods which I shall call first order goods, and second order goods. First order goods are discrete goods such as health, wealth, and ready-wit. Think of a second order good as a class whose members are first order goods. Thus, the combination of health, wealth, and ready-wit would be a second order good.

Inclusivists claim that the appropriate interpretation of the above is one that recognizes the distinction between first and second order goods. For when Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is not a good that can be counted along with others, he is claiming that *eudaimonia* is a second order good. First order goods can be made more choiceworthy by combining them with other choiceworthy goods.[16] If we add friendship to health, for instance, then friendship+health, is more choiceworthy than friendship taken singly. But suppose *eudaimonia* is a first order good. If it is, then *eudaimonia*+friendship would be more choiceworthy than *eudaimonia* simpliciter. But, claims

---

[16] This is not entirely correct. It is not a *first order* good that is made more choiceworthy when we add it to another first order good. For it is the *combination of the two* that is more choiceworthy. The degree to which a health is choiceworthy is a constant. It is second order ends that vary in desirability. A second order end that contains health+wealth+beauty, is more desirable that a second order end that contains just health and wealth.

Aristotle, this cannot be since *eudaimonia* is the greatest of all goods, and is therefore most choiceworthy. Inclusivists take this to mean that *eudaimonia* is the greatest good because it *includes* all intrinsically desirable goods:[17]

> Aristotle says that we regard [*eudaimonia*] as the most worth while of all things, *not* being counted as one good thing among others.... for *then* (if it *were* simply the most worth while of a *number* of candidates) the addition of any of the other things would make it better, more worth while -- and it would *not* have been lacking in nothing. He is saying, then, that *eudaimonia*, being absolutely final and genuinely self-sufficient, is more desirable than anything else in that it *includes* everything desirable in itself. It is best, and better than everything else, not in the way that bacon is better than eggs and than tomatoes (and therefore the best of the three to choose), but in the way that bacon, eggs and tomatoes, is a better breakfast than either bacon or eggs or tomatoes-- and is indeed the best breakfast without qualification.[18]

Intellectualists of course, deny that the above passage commits Aristotle to an inclusivist conception of *eudaimonia*. Their argument is that the above merely implies that *eudaimonia* cannot be improved upon.[19] So, rather than reading *NE* 1097b14-20 as implying that *eudaimonia* is a second order good that contains other goods, intellectualists claim that *NE* 1097b14-20 simply states

---

[17] Although all inclusivists agree that *eudaimonia* is a second order good, they disagree about which first order goods comprise *eudaimonia*. Ackrill (1980) claims that all intrinsic goods comprise *eudaimonia*. Purinton (1998) disagrees, claiming instead that all and only virtuous activities, activities of the rational soul, comprise *eudaimonia*. Keyt (1983) holds a similar view to Purinton's, claiming that all of the rational virtues comprise *eudaimonia*.

[18] Ackrill ([1980], 21).

[19] So, for instance, Kraut ([1989], 270-271) claims:

> Ackrill and many others infer... .[from the above passage] that [Aristotle] is identifying happiness not with any one good such as contemplation but with the composite of all intrinsic goods. But I see no evidence that Aristotle takes this further step... .Instead, I take him to be saying that virtuous activity of the rational soul has the very property that is attributed to happiness in this passage: if one has the greatest possible amount of this activity, one thereby lives a life that cannot be improved upon. The addition of some other kind of good to virtuous activity does not yield a sum that is more desirable than virtuous activity alone; it does not produce more happiness, because happiness consists in virtuous activity alone. And supplementing happiness with something other than happiness does not bring more happiness.

that Aristotle believes that a life that contains the maximal amount of virtuous activity can never be improved upon.[20]

Now that we better understand what motivates the inclusivist thesis that Aristotle believes that the human good includes a plurality of activities,[21] let us return to the question of how inclusivists interpret the FTSO relationship, and therewith, the conclusion of the function argument. First, since inclusivists believe that *eudaimonia* includes other goods, they render "*teleios*" and "*teleiotatos*" as "complete" and "most complete," respectively. Indeed, rendering "*teleiotatos*" as "most complete" accords with the belief that *eudaimonia* is an end that includes other goods.

Presumably, an incomplete end is an end to which one could add more goods, and a complete end is one that includes all goods.[22]

---

[20] Although Aristotle does not state explicitly that the best life is the one in which contemplation is maximized, he does say something similar at *NE* 1177b32-35:

> We must not live according to the advice that says to think human thoughts since we are human, nor according to the advice that says to think mortal thoughts since we are mortal, but we must, as much as possible, be immortal and do everything in order to live in accordance with the best thing in us.

One might believe based on the above, that Aristotle is claiming that we should engage in theoretical activity as much as possible (for he believes that a life in accordance with reason is divine -- *NE* 1177b30-31). But Aristotle is not saying that we should theorize as much as possible, but that we should try as hard as we can do live in accordance with the best thing in us. If the inclusivists are right, the best thing could be a combination of ethical virtue and *sophia*.

[21] In further support of the inclusivist claim that Aristotle believes that *eudaimonia* includes both ethical virtue and *sophia*, is the fact that Aristotle continues his discussion of *eudaimonia* as if he believed that ethical virtue was one of its components. For instance, Aristotle confirms the truth of his definition of *eudaimonia* by showing that accords with popular beliefs about it, and in doing so, he suggests that ethical virtue is a component of *eudaimonia*. For immediately after claiming that some people identify *eudaimonia* with virtue, that others identify it with practical wisdom, and that others with philosophic wisdom, Aristotle states that *all* of these views are correct in at least some, and perhaps most, respects. See *NE* 1098b24-29.

The Inclusivist Account of the "for the sake of" Relationship

How do inclusivists interpret the FTSO relationship given their interpretation of "*teleiotatos*" as most complete? Rather than seeing the FTSO relationship as a casual and normative relationship between two ends, inclusivists claim that if A is for the sake of B, then A is a *constituent* or *part* of B. Thus, rather than seeing the subordination between two ends as a hierarchical relation, inclusivists believe that the subordination relation is a mereological relation -- a relation between part and whole:

> One does not putt in order to play golf as one buys a club in order to play golf... .It will be "because" you wanted to play golf that you are putting, and "for the sake" of a good holiday that you are playing golf; but this is because putting and golfing are constituents of or ingredients in golfing and having a good holiday, respectively, not because they are necessary preliminaries... .[this is a] kind of subordination which makes it perfectly possible to say that ethical action is for the sake of *eudaimonia*.[23]

Interestingly, the very passages to which intellectualists appeal in support of their position, are appealed to by inclusivists in support of their alternative reading. Recall, for instance, Kraut's appeal to I.1 in order to support his account of the FTSO relationship as a causal-normative relationship. Ackrill also takes note of this passage, but he draws attention to the fact that in this passage, Aristotle states that some activities which are ends in themselves, are for the sake of other activities. Let us quote Aristotle in full so that we can

---

[22] Ackrill distinguishes a complete (*teleios*) end from a end that is most complete (*teleiotatos*). Ackrill claims that a partially complete end includes some, but not all intrinsic goods. A most complete end, on the other hand, contains all intrinsic goods. (Ackrill ([1980], 25-28).

better understand why Ackrill believes that his remarks in I.1 support inclusivism:

> Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; *some are activities*, others are products apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends are also many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity--as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under the art of riding, and in the same way other arts fall under yet others--in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. *It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities.*(*NE* 1094a1-17).

According to Ackrill, it is not immediately clear what Aristotle means in claiming that intrinsically desirable activities can also be for the sake of other activities. Of course, Kraut has no problem saying that an activity can be intrinsically desirable and also exist for the sake of some other end. For his account of "moderately perfect" goods is an account of such activities. Nevertheless, Ackrill finds it difficult to understand the FTSO relationship as a causal-normative relationship, since he cannot accept that one activity could use or exploit another:[24]

> It is after all not obvious what is meant by saying that one action or activity is for the sake of another, in cases where the first does not terminate in a product or outcome which the second can use or exploit....It would be natural to expect that corresponding to the initial distinction, there would be a fundamental distinction between the ways

---

[23] Ackrill ([1980], 19-20).

[24] Against Ackrill is Aristotle's claim at *EE* 1248a29 that "virtue is an instrument of *nous*."

> in which activities of two different types could be subordinate to another activity. The idea of the use or exploitation of a product or outcome being inappropriate where the subordinate activity is not directed to a product or outcome, what immediately suggests itself instead is a relation like that of part to whole, the relation an activity or end may have to an activity or end that includes or embraces it.[25]

Ackrill's resistance to interpreting the subordination relation between intrinsically desirable activities as a relation of instrumental causality, compels him to interpret the subordination relation as a relation between part and whole. On this view, when Aristotle claims that one activity, A, is for the sake of another activity, B, he is claiming that A is part of B. Thus when Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* is the *teleiotatos* end since all our activities are for *its* sake, Aristotle is claiming that all our activities are *components* of *eudaimonia*. And when, at the conclusion of the function argument, Aristotle states that *eudaimonia* is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, inclusivists interpret this as the claim that *eudaimonia* is activity of the soul in accordance with the most *complete* virtue, i.e., the virtue that *includes* all other virtues, and hence *ethical* virtue, as its components.

But if inclusivists believe that Aristotle identifies the best and *most teleios* virtue with the virtue that contains all virtues, then how do they explain Aristotle's remarks at book X. 7,8, in which Aristotle claims that activity in accordance with *sophia* is *teleios* happiness (*NE* 1177a17-18), that

---

[25] Ackrill ([1980], 18-19).

sophia is the best (*aristos*) thing in us (*NE* 1177a12-13); and that activity in accordance with ethical virtue is an inferior form of happiness (*NE* 1178a9)?

Inclusivists claim that although X.7,8 suggests that theoretical activity is best, and hence that it is superior to the ethically virtuous activity, this does not mean that *eudaimonia* consists in theoretical activity alone.[26] Rather, *eudaimonia* consists in both theoretical *and* ethically virtuous activity, but theoretical activity is the primary component in the *eudaimôn* life. As David Keyt puts it, "moral activity is the foundation, and theoretical activity is the superstructure, of the best life for a man."[27] According to this view, ethical virtue provides some of the necessary conditions for contemplation. One inclusivist states, for instance, that ethical virtue provides a "condition of quiescence" in which the mind is not distracted from philosophical work.[28] By arguing that ethical virtue provides necessary conditions for the attainment and operation of *sophia*, inclusivists offer an interpretation of X.7,8 which is compatible with their reading of the function argument.[29]

---

[26] Not all inclusivists make this claim. Ackrill ([1980], 32) concedes that X.7,8 implies that Aristotle believes that theoretical activity is more valuable than ethical virtue, and consequently that it would be "impossible for him to give a rule for combining *theoria* with virtuous action in the best life." Thus, Ackrill thinks that the earlier books of the *NE* are inconsistent with X.7,8. Roche (1995), Keyt (1981), Purinton (1998), and Cooper provide accounts of X.7,8 which make it consistent with the earlier books of the *NE*.

[27] Keyt ([1981], 370).

[28] Cooper ([1987], 192).

[29] Keyt ([1981], 381-382) concedes that *NE* 1177b1-2 implies intellectualism, but he thinks that it is the only passage that does so. But Aristotle merely states in this passage that theoretical activity alone is loved for its own sake. On my view, this passage does not pose a difficulty for inclusivism. For Aristotle is saying that only theoretical activity is *only* loved for its own sake. This is completely consistent with the view that *eudaimonia* includes both ethical virtue and *sophia*. For we could say that *eudaimonia* includes all the rational virtues, *and* that some of these rational virtues (ethical virtue) are desired for the sake of some

Thus far, I have explained the motivation for both intellectualist and inclusivist readings of the function argument. Convinced that Aristotle identifies the best and *teleiotatos* virtue with the single virtue of *sophia*, intellectualists draw support for this view from key passages in book X, whereas inclusivists draw support for their reading of *NE* 1098a16-18, from book I and the bulk of *NE* which is concerned with the topic of ethical virtue. The literature on the subject continues to be a debate between these two irreconcilable positions. In my view, both approaches of are incorrect. Both intellectualism and inclusivism are faulty since they fail to recognize that the meanings of "*teleiotatos*" and "*idion,*" as well as the nature of the FTSO relationship, are rooted in Aristotle's views about the proper biological development of human beings.

As we have seen, intellectualists believe that *NE* X.7,8 are the key passages in understanding how to interpret the function argument. Inclusivists, on the other hand, believe that Aristotle's preoccupation with ethical virtue in the *NE*, is most relevant to the correct understanding of the function argument. In my view, however, Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings are crucial to the correct understanding of the function argument, and hence to the meaning of "*teleiotatos*," "*idion*," and the FTSO relationship. Thus claim is substantiated in the next chapter.

---

other rational virtues (*sophia*), since it is *nature* that needs ethical virtue in order to excellently actualize

sophia in a human being. I will argue for this claim in detail later.

CHAPTER 3: A DEVELOPMENTALIST READING OF THE FUNCTION ARGUMENT

My aim in this chapter is to provide an interpretation of the conclusion of the function argument (*NE* 1098a16-18) that incorporates Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings. As we have seen, the interpretation of "*teleios*," "*teleiotatos*," and the FTSO relationship is crucial to one's interpretation of the function argument, and subsequently to Aristotle's definition of *eudaimonia*. In this chapter, I discuss the significance of these concepts to Aristotle's account of biological development, and will show that they illuminate his discussion of "*teleios*" "*teleiotatos*" and the FTSO relationship at *NE* 1098a16-18. For as we will see, the FTSO relationship is a relationship of *final causality*. Thus if A is for the sake of B, then B is the final cause of A. I also argue that in the context of the *NE*, the relata of the FTSO relationship are *developmental stages*, one of which is necessary for the development of the other. In the chapter following this one, I explain how ethical virtue is necessary for the development of *nous*.

Biological Development and Hypothetical Necessity

According to Aristotle, both man-made artifacts and living organisms are produced by the mechanism of "hypothetical necessity." A hypothetical necessity is simply a condition that must obtain if a certain end is to be realized. Thus, *if* one is going to make a saw, then steel is necessary for its completion, and *if* one desires to teach Latin, then one must first know Latin. Thus, steel is hypothetically necessary for the production of a saw, and knowledge of Latin is hypothetically necessary if one desires to teach the subject. Aristotle describes how hypothetical necessity is involved in the medical, rhetorical and political crafts:

> A doctor does not deliberate about whether he should heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, not a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, not does any one else deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only, they consider how it will be achieved by this, and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause which in the order of discovery is last. (*NE* 1112b11-24).

A craftsman, then, not only determines the most efficient way to make a bed, for instance, but also determines the steps that are necessary for making a bed, and the *precise order* of these steps. This is what Aristotle means when, in the above passage, he says, "[craftsmen] consider how [their end] will be achieved by *this*, and by what means *this* will be achieved." Thus, a craftsman starting from his end, surveys the gamut of ways that a bed can be made, and then selects one of these ways as the most efficient. After doing

so, he then reasons through a chain of hypothetical syllogisms, which is, in effect, the algorithm for the production of the bed. This chain of hypothetical syllogisms "unfolds" in a reverse order insofar as the bed is produced *last*, and the stages that are necessary for the realization of the bed are formed *first*. But the stages that are necessary for the realization of the bed are *not* performed *for their own sakes*, but for the sake of the *bed*. Wood may be necessary for the production of a bed, but the craftsman does not want wood for its own sake, but for the sake of making a bed.

According to Aristotle, hypothetical necessity also operates in nature:

> There is "absolute necessity," which belongs to eternal things, and there is "hypothetical" necessity, which has to do with everything that is formed by the processes of nature, as well as with products of art, such as houses and so forth. If a house, or any other end, is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material be available; one thing must first be formed, and set in motion, and then another thing; and so on continually in the same manner up to the end, which is the final cause, for the sake of which every one of those things is formed, and for which it exists. The things which are formed in nature are in like case. (*PA* 639b24-641a1).

> Because man is such and such, therefore the process of his formation (γένεσις) must of necessity be such and such and take place in such a manner; which is why first this part is formed, then that. (*PA* 640a34-b4).

Thus, just as a craftsman produces his product via the mechanism of hypothetical necessity, so too, does nature. However, when an organism is being produced, it is not a *craftsman* that implements the chain of hypothetical syllogisms -- the instructions for the making of an organism – but the *soul*. Obviously, by "soul" Aristotle means something very different than the notion of soul assumed by dualistic theories of mind and body.

Aristotle does not believe that an immaterial soul is "in" a material body. For he speaks of the soul as if it were a craftsman, whose material is the body:

> there is a parallel between a craft's need to use tools, and the soul's need to use the body. (*DA* 407b25-26).

Aristotle claims that soul is also the *form* and final cause of the body:

> For the body, far from being one of the things said of a subject, stands rather itself as subject and is matter. It must then be the case that the soul is substance (οὐσία) as the form (εἶδος) of a natural body which potentially has life. (*DA* 412a17-21). [1]

> The soul, then, is the cause and principle of the living body, and as these are talked of in several ways, so is the soul the cause of the body in the three ways we have distinguished; for it is the cause as that from which the movement itself arises, and as that for whose sake it is, and as the formal substance (οὐσία) of ensouled bodies (*DA* 415b8-12).

In claiming that the soul is the form of a natural body, Aristotle is claiming that the soul contains the definition or essence of that body, and is the "shape" (μορφὴ) of that body. Aristotle identifies the form of a body with its *nature* (φύσις) (*Ph.* 193a28-31), and he identifies the nature of a body with both the shape and the definition of that body (*Ph.* 193a28-193b5). However, Aristotle believes that the nature of a particular organism is *not* something that exists at

---

[1] All translations of *De Anima*, are by H. L. Tancred, unless otherwise noted. Aristotle distinguishes three different grades of potentiality. A substance can be potentially X, 1) given its membership in a certain species (e.g., a man is potentially^1 a knower since he is one of those things that can know), 2) if it is in possession of a capacity that is not being exercised (e.g., a man is potentially^2 a knower when he is sleeping), and 3) if it is exercising a capacity (e.g., a man is potentially^3 a knower if he is exercising his capacity for knowledge) (*DA* 417a25-417b1). The latter two grades of potentiality correspond to two grades of actuality -- the first grade of actuality is tantamount to the possession of a capacity, whereas the second corresponds to the exercising of this capacity (*DA* 412b5-a22).

the outset, but is something that biological development *tends towards*. An organism, in other words, is the *end* of biological development:

> What grows qua growing grows from something into something. Into what then does it grow? Not into that from which it arose but into that which it tends. The shape (μορφὴ) then is nature. (*Ph.* 193b16-18).
>
> It is not the case that when an animal is formed at that same moment a human being, or a horse, or any other particular sort of animal is formed, because the end or completion (τέλος) is formed last of all.... (*GA.* 736b2-4).

Given Aristotle's view that natural products presuppose certain conditions and are made by the mechanism of hypothetical necessity, then it follows that if the end or nature of an organism is to be completely realized, then certain conditions must be present. And Aristotle states that the conditions that are necessary for the attainment of the end, exist *for the sake of* that end:

> So we have these three things: (1) the end, which we describe as being that for the sake of which <other things are>; (2) the things which are for the sake of the end, viz., the activating and generative principle (second, because the existence of that which is productive and generative, qua such, is relative to what it produces and generates); (3) the things which are serviceable, which can be and are employed by the end. (*GA* 742a28-33).
>
> Thus, those instrumental parts which are in their nature generative must always be there themselves prior to the rest, for they are for the sake of something else, as being a first principle (ἀρχὴ). (*GA* 742b3-6).

Now that we understand how nature makes its products, and that the developmental stages of an organism occur for the sake of an end, we are in a position to see that Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia* is rooted in his views about biological development. For Aristotle states that the end of a human being is reason (λόγος) and *nous* :

> The exercise of rational principle (λόγος) and thought (*nous*) is the ultimate end of man's nature. (*Pol.* 1334b15-16).[2]

If reason and *nous* are the end of human development, then it follows that the development of a human being tends *towards*, and hence is for the sake of *nous*. It also follows that *nous* is realized at the natural end of the development of a human being. So Aristotle writes:

> In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and the irrational (ἄλογος) is prior to the rational. This is proved by the fact that all the signs of appetite -- such as anger (θυμός) and wishing (βούλευσις) and desire (επιθυμία) --are visible in children from their very birth; while reasoning (λογισμός) and thought (*nous*)
>
> are faculties which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. (*Pol.* 1334b20-24).
>
> It is not the fact that when an animal is formed at that same moment a human being, or a horse, or any other particular sort of animal is formed, because the end or completion (τέλος) is formed last of all, and that which is peculiar (*idion*) to each thing is the end of its process of formation. That is why it is a very great puzzle to answer another question concerning *nous*. At what moment and in what manner, do those creatures with this principle acquire their share in it, and where does it come from? (*GA* 736b2-7).

Aristotle's explicit statement that the *idion* (i.e., *nous*), is the end of the biological development of a human being, is relevant to the function argument. For there, recall, Aristotle claimed that the good of man could be defined if one discovers the *idion* of man:

> Just as for a flute player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity (πρᾶξις), the good (τἀγαθὸν) and the "well" (τὸ εὖ) is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he has a function... . What then can this be? Life seems belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar (*idion*) to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and

[2] All translations of *Politics* are by Ernest Barker unless otherwise noted.

> growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be shared by the horse, the ox and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle (ἔχοντος λόγον). (*NĒ* 1097b25-1098a3).

But if Aristotle believes that the good of man can be discovered if one discovers the *idion* of man, and if the *idion* of a creature is formed *last* in that creature's development, then it is logical that *the good of man is discovered by discovering the final stage of human development.* Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, therefore, is based upon his views about the biological development of human beings. Aristotle's remarks about *nous*, and that its characteristic activity, *theoria*, are thus also based on his biological views. For in the final book of the *NE,* Aristotle writes:

> [theoretical activity] is best (κρατίστη) (for *nous* (νοῦς) is best, and the things that are known are the best objects of *nous*). (*NE* 1177a14-22). [3]

Aristotle makes the above claim because he believes that what is best is the ultimate end, i.e., the most final cause, of some process:

> Not every stage that is last claims to be an end, but only that which is best (βέλτιστον). (*Ph.* 194a32-33).
>
> "That for the sake of which" means what is best (βέλτιστον) and the end of things that lead up to it. (*Ph.* 195a24-25).

The reason why Aristotle believes that *nous* is best is clear. For *nous* is the final cause of a human being's development, and the final cause of a human being's development is best.

---

[3] My translation.

The Function Argument Revisited

Let us now apply the above results to the conclusion of the function argument. As discussed in the last chapter, intellectualists and inclusivists disagree about Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, and hence have divergent interpretations of *NE* 1098a16-18. There, recall, Aristotle defines *eudaimonia* as "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are many, in accord with the best and *teleiotatos*." Intellectualists believe that the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is *sophia*, and that ethical virtue is not a component of *eudaimonia*, whereas inclusivists believe that the best and *teleiotatos* virtue is a combination of ethical virtue and *sophia*. Crucial to both of these interpretations is a specific interpretation of "*teleios*," "*teleiotatos*" and the FTSO relationship. Whereas intellectualists interpret "*teleios*" and "*teleiotatos*" as "perfect" and "most perfect," they understand the FTSO relationship as a relationship of instrumental causality: if A is for the sake of B, then A causes B. Inclusivists, on the other hand, interpret "*teleios*," and "*teleiotatos*" as "complete" and "most complete," and understand the FTSO relationship as a relationship between part and whole. So, if A is for the sake of B, then A is a part or constituent of B.

Given that Aristotle bases his conception of *eudaimonia* on the biological development of a human being, I believe that in the context of the *NE*, the correct interpretation of "*teleios*" is "final," and that the correct interpretation of "*teleiotatos*," is "most final." In my view, a *teleios* end is

an end that is *both* a final cause of some process, *and* a necessary condition for the realization of another end. On the other hand, a *teleiotatos* end is the *most* final cause of some process, and is *not* a necessary condition for the realization of an end. To illustrate, suppose that one wants to make a saw. In order to do so, one needs steel. Further suppose that one does not have any steel, and hence needs to walk to the market to purchase some. Now in this scenario, the end of the walk is the purchasing of steel (PS), and so PS is the final cause of the walk. But although PS is a final cause, it is not the *most* final cause. For PS is for the sake of a saw. And so, one could say that whereas PS is a final cause, the making of a saw is the *most* final cause of this sequence. Similar cases arise in nature. For in the case of the production of an animal, nature makes the heart for the sake of producing the nutritive faculty (*GA* 740a24-30), and nature makes the nutritive faculty for the sake of the perceptive, for this is the end of the formation of an animal (*Juv.* 469b4). So whereas the nutritive faculty is the final cause of the heart, it is not the most final cause.

The conclusion of the function argument states that the human good is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the meaning of this claim is not immediately clear. For although Aristotle discusses the constituents of ethical virtue (i.e., the virtues of character (VoC) and *phronêsis*) in detail, his remarks in the final book of the *NE* strongly suggest that he believes that *sophia* is the best and

teleiotatos virtue. And as we have seen, scholars disagree about the precise relationship among *eudaimonia*, ethical virtue, and *sophia*.

As we will see, the relationship between ethical virtue and *sophia* is one of *final causality*. For ethical virtue is a necessary condition of, and hence exists for the sake of, *sophia,* its final cause. The details of this claim will be discussed in the next chapter. But for now, we can point out that Aristotle's remarks about *education* lend strong support to this view. For Aristotle claims that the VoC, which are concerned with pleasure and pain, should be produced for the sake of reason and mind:

> Moral excellence (ἠθικῆ ἀρετὴ) is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as to both delight in and be pained by the things we ought; this is the right education (ὀρθὴ παιδεία). (*NE* 1104b8-13).

> The exercise of rational principle (λόγος) and thought (*nous*) is the ultimate end of man's nature. It is therefore with a view to the exercise of these faculties that we should regulate from the first, the birth and the training in habits of our citizens. (*Pol.* 1334b15-16).

> In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and the irrational (ἄλογος) is prior to the rational. This is proved by the fact that all the signs of appetite -- such as anger (θυμός) and wishing (βούλευσις) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) --are visible in children from their very birth; while reasoning (λογισμός) and thought (*nous*) are faculties which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. The conclusion which follows is obvious. Children's bodies should be given attention before their souls; and their appetites should be the next part of them to be regulated. But the regulation of their appetites should be intended for the benefit of (ἕνεκα) their minds
>
> (*nous*)-- just as the attention given to their bodies should be intended for the benefit of their souls. (*Pol.* 1334b20-28).

The last passage is particularly revealing. For there, Aristotle states that the regulation of the āppetites, i.e., having the appropriate pleasures and pains, i.e., possessing the VoC, is achieved for the sake of *nous*. This is a clear statement that the VoC are not produced for their own sake, but for the sake of *nous*. And it is quite reasonable to infer from this, that Aristotle believes the reason why the VoC are for the sake of *nous*, is that they are necessary for its attainment. For *why else* would Aristotle claim that the appetites should be regulated for the sake of *nous*?

Also note that in the first passage, Aristotle states that right education (ὀρθὴ παιδεία) consists in feeling pleasure and pain appropriately, i.e., the possession of the VoC. According to Aristotle, human beings do not automatically possess the VoC, but do so by a process of habituation (ἐθιζεῖν) (*NE* 1103a14-b25). By habituation, Aristotle simply means the repeated practice of an action ("learning by doing," as it were). Thus, in order to acquire the virtue of courage one must first perform a sufficient number of courageous acts. At *NE* 1104b8-13 above, Aristotle is claiming that we ought to be brought up in a particular way so that we possess the VoC, and he refers to this sort of upbringing as "right education." So we can say that the possession of the VoC is a *final cause* of right education. But we have also seen that the VoC are realized for the sake of *nous*. Thus the possession of the VoC is a *teleios* end, but is not *teleiotatos*. For the possession of the VoC is the end of right education or habituation, but the end of the VoC is

nous. In other words, right education is for the sake of the VoC, and the VoC are for the sake of *nous*.

When we understand that Aristotle uses "*teleios*" and "*teleiotatos*" to describe different degrees of final causality, it is clear that both intellectualists and inclusivists not only have incorrect interpretations of these terms, but also have an incorrect understanding of FTSO relationship. For the FTSO relationship is neither a relationship of instrumental causality, nor a relationship between part and whole, but a relationship of *final* causality.

Why the Intellectualist Account of the "for the sake of" Relationship is Incorrect

On Kraut's view, recall, to say that rubbing is for the sake for heat, is to say rubbing causes heat. Although it is true, in at least some sense, that a stage that is necessary for the realization of an end (SN), *causes* the realization of the end (E), Kraut's account of the FTSO relationship ignores the fact that the *reason why* SN is produced is because it is *necessary* for E. In other words, Kraut's account of the FTSO relationship ignores that E is the *final cause* of SN. In confining his discussion of the FTSO relationship to *goods*, some of which are more valuable than others, Kraut has failed to see that FTSO relationship is one of final causality.

Kraut, moreover, believes that goods comprise a hierarchy with merely instrumental goods at the bottom, goods that are instrumentally and intrinsically desirable above these, and a single good that is intrinsically, but not instrumentally desirable at the pinnacle. Kraut claims that goods that are

instrumentally and intrinsically desirable are "*teleios*," i.e., "perfect," and that the good at the pinnacle of the hierarchy is *teleiotatos*, i.e., most perfect. But these interpretations are incorrect. For a *teleios* end, as I have argued, is a final cause that is also a necessary condition of the realization of a *most* final cause. And a most final cause is a final cause that is not a necessary condition for the realization of any further end.

Although I agree with Kraut's claim that a "*teleios*" end is desired for the sake of something else, I do not believe that all *teleios* ends are either "moderately perfect" and hence are intrinsically desirable, although *some* could be. Recall that Kraut believes that a "*teleios*" end is an intrinsically desirable end that is also desired for the sake of something else.[4] I reject this reading. As we have seen, there can be a stage that is both the final cause *and* a necessary condition for the attainment of some further end; e.g., the purchasing of steel which is done for the sake of making a saw. But of course, one does not desire to purchase steel *for its own sake*. Therefore, there are some *teleios* ends that are not intrinsically desirable. Hence, Kraut's claim that every *teleios* end is intrinsically desirable, is false.

Why the Inclusivist Account of the "for the sake of" Relationship is Incorrect

It should also be clear why I reject the inclusivist interpretation of the FTSO relationship. According to inclusivists, the FTSO relationship is a

[4] Kraut ([1989], 241-251).

relationship between part and whole. But it is simply absurd to say that, if the purchasing of steel is necessary for the making of a saw, then the purchasing of steel is *part of* the saw. True, one *needs* steel in order to make a saw, and nature needs the heart in order to make a human being, but just because X is needed to do Y, does not mean that X is a part of Y.[5] Thus, inclusivists are incorrect in interpreting "*teleios*" as complete, and in interpreting the FTSO relationship as a relationship between part and whole. It is rather that, if A is for the sake of B, then B is the final cause of A. And if B is a final cause of some process or activity that is never a hypothetical necessity, then B is the *teleiotatos* end.

Thus far I have argued that the FTSO relationship is a relationship of final causality. I have also argued that, whereas a *teleios* end is a final cause of some process that is also necessary for the realization of a subsequent end, a *teleiotatos* end is an ultimate final cause, and hence is not hypothetically necessary for the realization of any subsequent ends. Thus, when Aristotle states that *eudaimonia* is activity of the soul in accordance with the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, he is claiming that *eudaimonia* is activity in accordance with the virtue for the sake of which all virtues are realized. Now, I agree with intellectualists that Aristotle identifies *sophia* as the best and *teleiotatos* virtue, and I also agree with their claim that ethical virtue is a *teleios* end. But my accounts of the meanings of *teleios* and *teleiotatos* differ from those proposed by the intellectualists, and so the similarity between my and their

view is only at the surface level. For Kraut believes that *sophia* is *teleiotatos* because it is at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of goods; and he believes that ethical virtue is *teleios* because it is an intrinsically desirable end that is *not* at this pinnacle. On my view, however, *sophia* is the *teleiotatos* virtue because it is the complete actualization of *nous*, which is the *teleiotatos* stage of human development. Moreover, ethical virtue is *teleios* because it is both a final cause (of right education), and is necessary for the development of *nous*.[6] In the next chapter, I show why Aristotle believes that ethical virtue is necessary for the development of *nous*.

---

[5] See Keyt ([1987], 36) for discussion and references. I am not claiming that is if X is for the sake of Y, then X can *never* be part of Y.

[6] And since *sophia* presupposes *nous* (for *sophia* is the combination of *nous* and *epistêmê* (*NE* 1141a19-20)), then *sophia* presupposes ethical virtue. Both "*nous*" and "*epistêmê*" are technical notions that will be more thoroughly in chapter 4. It is useful to regard *nous* as the intellectual power that enables a human being to grasp definitions, and to think of *epistêmê* as the ability to demonstrate the logical consequences of definitions.

CHAPTER 4: WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS HYPOTHETICALLY NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF *NOUS*

So far we have seen that Aristotle's definition of *eudaimonia* is based on his views about biological development. For in claiming that the human good can be discovered through man's *idion* (*NE* 1097b34-35), which is formed last in the development of a human being (*GA* 736b4-5), Aristotle is claiming that the human good is defined in terms of the end towards which the development of a human being tends. As we now know, Aristotle claims that the end of human development is *nous* (*Pol.* 1334b15-16). Since the end of a developmental process is achieved through the mechanism of hypothetical necessity (*PA* 639b24-641a1), it follows that certain preconditions must be satisfied in order for *nous* to completely realized.

In this chapter, I will show that ethical virtue is a precondition of the complete realization of *nous*. I say "complete realization" because although

human beings possess the capacity for *nous* by nature, it is not the case that all human beings actualize this capacity. For *nous* is an intellectual virtue (ἀρετή νοητικοῦ) that enables human beings to grasp the first principles of demonstrations (*APo.* 100b5-15). However, the first principles of a demonstration can only be grasped after one has consciously and deliberately used the method of dialectic (διαλεκτικός) to sift through and clarify the relevant opinions or *endoxa* on the subject. According to Aristotle, *endoxa* (τὰ ἔνδοξα) are opinions accepted by the majority, by wise persons, or by craftsmen (*Top.* 100b21-23, 104a12-37), whereas dialectic is a process of criticism by which first principles are discovered (*Top.* 101a37-b4).[1] The sort of criticism that Aristotle has in mind here is rational criticism, a method in which a claim is modified or rejected, after its flaws and merits are made explicit. Thus, by weeding out the flaws and retaining the merits of various received opinions on a subject, one arrives at first principles. Clearly, not every human being engages in such an activity. Thus, not every human being actualizes her potential for *nous*.

The fact that first principles are discovered via the method of dialectic is important. For dialectic proceeds by determining the strengths and weaknesses of an opinion by comparing and contrasting it with the facts, by detecting ambiguities, and by drawing relevant and important distinctions.[2] However, not everyone possesses these skills. Aristotle himself notes that

[1] All translations of *Topics* are by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge unless otherwise noted. See Reeve ([1992], 34-45 for discussion.

most people are unable to make important distinctions (*NE* 1172b3). In addition, people can misjudge the strengths or weaknesses of opinion, as well as misjudge the veracity of an opinion (*NE* 1172a28-1172b1). Add to this, the fact that the majority of people have false opinions (*Rhet.* 1378a20), and it is clear that only a very limited number of human beings possess the wherewithal to actualize their potential for *nous*. For one needs to know *what* to criticize and what to praise -- what portion of an opinion is true, and what portion of an opinion is false -- in order to arrive at first principles. Put bluntly, one needs to be an excellent judge of opinions, in order to arrive at first principles.

But if *nous* presupposes that one is an excellent judge of opinions, then how is this excellence acquired? Aristotle's answer to this question, as we shall see, is that one acquires an excellent opinion making faculty (OMF) through the acquisition of *ethical virtue*. In fact, *phronêsis*, which is necessary and sufficient for ethical virtue, is, according to Aristotle, the excellence of the opinion making faculty (δοξαστικός) (*NE* 1140b26-27). *Phronêsis,* moreover, implies both *sunêsis* (σύνεσις), a virtue which enables one to be a good judge of *another's* opinion (*NE* 1143a14-15), as well as equity (ἐπιεικῆ), which is the ability to modify or sharpen a universal claim in light of a counterexample (*NE* 1137b26-27).[3] Clearly, each of these abilities is

---

[2] See Reeve ([1992], 34-45).

[3] To be sure, Aristotle does not define equity (ἐπιεικῆ) as the ability to modify or sharpen a universal claim in light of a counterexample. Rather, he defines equity as the virtue responsible for the appropriate correction of a law when a particular circumstance arises which challenges the universality of that law (*NE* 1137b26-27). For instance, one may have as a law "do not steal." However, a woman may have stolen

necessary for the effective dialectical consideration of *endoxa* by which first principles are discovered. Hence, *phronêsis* is necessary for the discovery of first principles. And since one's capacity for *nous* is only actualized when one grasps first principles, then *phronêsis* is necessary for the actualization of *nous*.

I will begin by briefly discussing Aristotle's epistemology. For *nous* plays a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, viz., it grasps the first principles upon which the acquisition of knowledge depends, as we will see. I will then show that the development of *nous* requires several hypothetical necessities in order to be realized. I will argue, in the way outlined above, that ethical virtue is one of the hypothetical necessities that is required for the realization of *nous*.

Nous

In order to understand the nature of *nous*, some preliminary marks about Aristotle's epistemology need to be made. Aristotle's standards for knowledge are high. For he claims that in order to know or understand some claim P, 1) P must be necessarily true, and 2) one must be able to explain P. In order to explain P, one must *demonstrate* P:

---

food from the market next store to prevent her children from starving to death. In light of this circumstance, one might demand that one modifies the law to read, "do not steal unless it is absolutely necessary for the survival of innocent children." Modifying the law in this way is, of course, a *species* of modifying a claim in light of a counterexample. For the law is the "claim" and the particular circumstance that challenges the universality of the law is the "counterexample." Thus, equity is the application of the general ability to correctly modify a claim in light of a counterexample, to the laws themselves.

> We think (οἰόμεθα) we understand (ἐπίστασθαι) a thing simpliciter (ἁπλῶς)... .whenever we think we are aware (γινώσκειν) both that the explanation because of which the object is, is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise. (*APo.* 71b9-16).
>
> By demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) I mean a scientific deduction (συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν); and by scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν) I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand (ἐπιστάμεθα) something. (*APo.* 71b16-18).

To demonstrate a claim, is to deduce it from premises that are necessarily true and universal (*APo.* 71b9-16, 88b31). By "universal," Aristotle means a statement about a class or category of things, rather than a statement about a particular entity. Thus "all men are bipeds" and "all prime numbers are odd" would qualify as universal statements, whereas the statement "Socrates is a man" would not. Note that if P must be derived from universal premises, then P *itself* must be universal. For no statement about a particular entity follows from universal statements. Thus universal statements comprise both the *explanans* and the *explanandum* of the demonstration.

According to Aristotle, then, knowledge implies the ability to deduce a true and universal proposition, from other true and universal propositions. Of course, one could always ask how one knows whether the universal *premises* of a demonstration are true. In other words, if knowing P consists in showing that it can be deduced from true, universal propositions: R, S, then one can challenge one's claim to know P, by asking how one knows that R and S. Aristotle's definition of knowledge implies that, if one knows that R and S, then one has demonstrated R,S from *other* premises, T, U. But this just pushes the question back -- for we can ask how we know T and U. Aware of

this potential problem, Aristotle claimed that there must be starting points of demonstration that are themselves undemonstrated and indemonstrable. Aristotle refers to these undemonstrated starting points as "immediates" (ἄμεσος):

> But we say that neither is all understanding (ἐπιστήμη) demonstrative (ἀπόδεικτικός), but in the case of the immediates (ἄμεσος) it is non-demonstrable (ἀναπόδεικτος) --and that this is necessary is evident; for if it is necessary to understand (ἐπίστασθαι) the things which are prior and on which the demonstration depends, and it comes to stop at some time, it is necessary for these immediates to be non demonstrable. So as to that we argue thus; and we also say that there is not only understanding (ἐπιστήμη) but also some principle (ἀρχή) of understanding (ἐπιστήμη). (*APo.* 72b18-25).

According to Aristotle, then, there must indemonstrable starting points that provide the foundation for demonstration. However, only very specific kinds of statements can serve as the starting points of demonstrations:

> If, then, understanding (ἐπίστασθαι) is as we posited, it is necessary for demonstrative understanding (συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν) in particular to depend on things which are true (ἀληθής) and primitive (πρῶτον) and immediate (ἄμεσος) and more familiar than (γνωριμώτερα) and prior to (πρότερον) and explanatory of the conclusion (αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος) (for in this way the principles will also be appropriate to what is being proved). For there will be deduction even without these conditions, but there will not be demonstration; for it will not produce understanding (ἐπιστήμη) (*APo.* 71b19-25).

Aristotle also claims that the conclusions of demonstrations are universal (*APo.* 88b31), and it follows from this that the starting points of demonstrations are likewise universal, for no universal statement can follow from a statement about a particular. Thus, the starting points of demonstration must be universal, true, primitive, immediate, more familiar

and prior to the conclusion of the demonstration. Although Aristotle does not give a specific example of an immediate and familiar statement, he presumably thinks that a statement such as "all men are bipeds" is more immediate and familiar than the statement "all prime numbers are odd."

Although Aristotle is very specific about the kind of propositions that can serve as the starting points of demonstrations, one can, of course, ask how we know that such propositions are true. For as stated above, Aristotle claims that the immediates are true, and since the immediates are not proven from true premises (for they are not proven at all), then how can we be certain that they are true? Aristotle claims that the truth of the immediates is guaranteed by the fact that they are grasped by *nous*. For *nous* is an intellectual virtue which is always correct, and which grasps the starting points of demonstrations (*APo.* 100b5-17, *NE* 1141a2-8):

> Since of the intellectual states by which we grasp truth some are always true and some admit falsehood (e.g. opinion (δόξα) and reasoning (λογισμός) --whereas understanding (ἐπιστήμη) and *nous* are always true), and no kind other than comprehension is more precise than understanding, and the principles of demonstration are more familiar, and all understanding involves an account (λόγος) --there will not be understanding of the principles; and since it is not possible for anything to be truer than understanding, except *nous*, there will be *nous* of the principles (ἀρχή)... .so if we have no other true kind apart from understanding, *nous* will be the principle (ἀρχή) of understanding.

Thus, the starting points of demonstration are not grasped by *any* intellectual faculty, they are grasped by the faculty of *nous*. Aristotle's standards for the starting points of demonstration, and hence knowledge are high indeed. For one cannot acquire knowledge unless one starts with true, universal

propositions -- propositions that are apprehended by *nous*. Furthermore, one cannot apprehend the propositions grasped by *nous* unless one has engaged in the dialectical consideration of *endoxa*.

The Hypothetical Necessities of the Actualization of *Nous*

As we now know, *nous* is the final stage of human development, and hence human beings can be said to possess the potential for *nous*. However, care needs to be exercised when thinking of *nous* as a natural potential. For in the *De Anima*, Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of potentiality:

> But we should draw some distinctions as regards potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐντελέχεια)....First then there is say, a knowing just in the way that we would say that a man is knowing in that man is one of those things that know and have knowledge; and then there is a knowing in the thing in the way that we (in fact) say that a man who has learned grammar is knowing (but each of these two is potentially knowing not in the same way, rather the first is so in that his genus and matter are of the right kind, the other in that he has the potentiality to contemplate whenever he will, providing no external factor prevents him) (*DA* 417a21-28).[4]

According to Aristotle, if we say that Socrates has the potential to speak Japanese, we could mean that 1) Socrates could, in principle, learn Japanese if he wanted to, but does not, as yet, possess such an ability; or we could mean that 2) Socrates could, if called upon, speak Japanese at will. Note that Socrates can possess the second sense of potentiality only *after* learning Japanese. In other words, Socrates can possess the second sense of potentiality only if he first learns and understands the Japanese language. This is another instance of

[4] All translations of *De Anima* are by Hugh Lawson-Tancred unless otherwise noted.

Aristotle's doctrine of "hypothetical necessity." For Socrates can possess the second sort of potentiality only if certain necessary conditions are satisfied.

Just as there are two different senses in which Socrates has the potential to speak Japanese, there are two different senses in which human beings have the potential for *nous*. Thus, when we say that human beings have the potential for *nous*, we could mean that human beings, in virtue of being the sort of creature that they are, could possess *nous* if they wanted to; or we could mean that someone could actualize their potential for *nous* at will. As mentioned above, in order for a human being to possess the second sort of potentiality, certain hypothetical necessities need to be satisfied.

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle describes some of the hypothetical necessities that are necessary for the actualization of *nous*. For instance, Aristotle describes the development universals, which are the components of the principles grasped by *nous*. As mentioned above, these principles are true, universal, and relatively familiar statements such as "all human beings are bipeds." Of course, before one correctly grasps such statements, one must first grasp the *individual* universals that are the components of these statements. In other words, in order to apprehend the statement "all humans are bipeds," one must first apprehend the universal "human," and the universal "biped." According to Aristotle, the possession of universals arises out of certain cognitive operations that are natural to human beings. Aristotle refers to the grasp of an individual universal as "experience"

(ἐμπειρία) (*APo.* 100a16-18), and he claims that experience arises out of sense perception and memory:

> So from perception (αἴσθησις) there comes memory (μνήμη), as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a single experience. (*APo.* 100a3-6)[5]

According to Aristotle sense perception gives rise to memory, which then produces experience, the grasp of a universal. By "memory" Aristotle means an impression that is caused by sense perception, and he likens to acquisition of memories to a piece of wax receiving the impression of a seal:

> The process of movement [sensory stimulation] involved in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of a percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal. This explains why, in those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no mnemonic impression is formed; just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water; while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed, as happens to [the stucco on] old [chamber] walls, or owing to the hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are defective in memory (*Mem.* 450a30-b9).[6]

According to Aristotle, then, perception gives rise to memories, i.e. impressions or "after images." When a sufficient amount of these mnemonic impressions have been acquired, they coalesce and give rise to experience – the possession of a universal (*APo.* 100a3-6). Thus, sense perception and memory are hypothetically necessary for the acquisition of universals. Universals however, are hypothetically necessary for the actualization of *nous*.

---

[5] All translations of the *Posterior Analytics* are by Jonathan Barnes unless otherwise noted.

[6] All translations of *De Memoria* are by J. I. Beare unless otherwise noted.

For *nous* is actualized when it grasps true, universal, familiar and immediate propositions that provide the starting points of demonstration. Thus, sense perception, memory and experience are hypothetically necessary for the actualization of *nous* in human cognition.

We now know that in addition to sense perception, memory and experience, one also has to engage in dialectic in order to completely actualize one's capacity for *nous*. For the first principles or immediates of a demonstration are apprehended only after considering the flaws and merits of germane opinions. Importantly, the consideration of the flaws and merits of various opinions is not a *proof* of those opinions. For first principles are undemonstrated. Rather, the dialectical consideration of a statement consists in the sharpening and clarifying of another's opinion -- i.e., by drawing important distinctions and by providing clear definitions of the terms involved therein. Suppose that one considers the statement "all pleasure is good." Although this statement is somewhat clear, it can be made more precise in several different ways. First, one can provide definitions of the term "pleasure," and of the term "good." Second, one can note any important distinctions among kinds of pleasures and/or goods. Third, one can determine whether there are any counterexamples to the statement, and if so, modify the statement in light of those counterexamples. For instance, one could point out that some pleasures are bad for human beings, and modify the above statement to "some pleasures are good." Note that these several

methods do not constitute a proof of the statement that "all pleasure is good." Rather, they simply clarify and sharpen this statement.[7]

Sense perception, memory, and the dialectical consideration of opinions, then, are all hypothetically necessary for the complete actualization of *nous*. Yet, there is something missing in this account of the actualization of *nous*. For the universal statements apprehended by *nous* are always correct (*APo.* 100b5-17, *NE* 1141a2-8), and this implies that one's dialectical consideration that led one to these statements has been on target. But as mentioned earlier, the dialectical examination of principles can go wrong in a number of ways: people can fail to make important distinctions (*NE* 1172b3), can misjudge the strengths or weaknesses of opinion, and can misjudge the veracity of an opinion (*NE* 1172a28-1172b1, *Rhet.* 1378a20). In order for the dialectical consideration of *endoxa* to result in the apprehension of first principles, one needs to know *what* to criticize and what to praise -- what portion of an opinion is true, and what portion of an opinion is false. But how can we be certain that our definitions, our conceptual distinctions, and our opinions, are correct?

Although Aristotle does not explain how we can be certain that our dialectical reasoning is sound, he does provide an answer to this question in the *NE*. For Aristotle defines *phronêsis* as the excellence of the opinion making faculty (δοξαστικός) (*NE* 1140b26-27). This excellence, moreover, implies a number of intellectual excellences. Aristotle tells us that *phronêsis*

[7] See Reeve ([1992], 39-45).

implies an excellence in deliberation (*NE* 1142b31-33), as well as *sunêsis* and equity (ἐπιεικῆ). *Sunêsis* is a virtue which enables one to be a good judge of another's opinion (*NE* 1143a14-15), whereas equity is the ability to modify or sharpen a universal claim in light of a counterexample (*NE* 1137b26-27). It is easy to see how *phronêsis* will useful in the dialectical consideration of opinions. For, one who possesses *phronêsis*, not only has correct opinions, but can detect correct opinions, and can modify opinions correctly.

In addition to implying *sunêsis*, equity, and an excellence in deliberation, *phronêsis*, as we know, also implies the virtues of character (VoC). The VoC are not excellences of the OMF, however, but are excellences of the appetitive faculty (*NE* 1119b10-15). Interestingly, in claiming that *phronêsis* implies the VoC, Aristotle is claiming that the excellence of the opinion making faculty, implies an excellence of the appetitive faculty. As we shall see, this is because the VoC provide the *preconditions for an excellent opinion making faculty*, viz., moderated pleasures and pains. Once we understand the nature of the VoC, we will understand even more clearly why Aristotle claims that *phronêsis* produces (ποιεῖν) and gives birth to (γίγνεσθαι) *nous* (*NE* 1143b35, *NE* 1145a9). Let us, then, briefly turn to the nature of the VoC, so that we that we can see how they contribute to the excellence of the opinion making faculty, and therewith, to the development of *nous*.

The Virtues Of Character

At *NE* 1106b36-1107a2 Aristotle provides a definition of the virtues of character:

> Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice (προαίρεσις), lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, thus being determined by a rational principle, by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.

When Aristotle states that ethical virtue consists in a mean, he is referring to a mean regarding pleasures and pains:

> Moral virtue is concerned with passions and actions and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate... .and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little... .but to feel them in at the right times, with reference to the right motive, and in the right way, is both what is intermediate and is best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Now virtue is concerned with actions and passions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being
>
> praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. (*NE* 1106b24-28).[8]

Scholars have failed to realize that possession of the VoC prevents one from being prone to a number of *epistemological* malfunctions. For instance, at *Mem.* 450a30-b9, Aristotle claims that those who are overly passionate are unable to retain the impressions (memories) that are necessary for the development of experience:

> The process of movement [sensory stimulation] involved in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of a percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal. This explains why,

[8] See also *NE* 1106b16-17, *NE* 1106b24-25, *NE* 1107a4-5, *NE* 1109b30.

> in those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no mnemonic impression is formed; just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water; while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed, as happens to [the stucco on] old [chamber] walls, or owing to the hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are defective in memory (*Mem.* 450a30-b9).

In claiming that those who are moved on account of excessive passion are unable to retain memories, Aristotle is implying that the passions can adversely effect the cognitive mechanisms that are necessary for the actualization of *nous*. For memory, as we have seen, is necessary for the development of *nous*. It is indeed noteworthy that Aristotle claims that that excessive passion can adversely affect one's faculty of memory. For the VoC, which imply that one's passions are regulated, would rule out this sort of distortion.

But the possession of the VoC not only protects one's faculty of memory from the excesses of passion, but they also protect one's faculty of opinion from being likewise corrupted:

> It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. (*Rhet.* 1354a25-16).[9]

> They [members of the assembly] will often have allowed themselves to be much so influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. (*Rhet.* 1454b8-11).

[9] All translations of *Rhetoric* are by W. Rhys Roberts unless otherwise noted.

> The emotions are all those feelings that so change men to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure (*Rhet.* 1378a20)

On the basis of the above passages, one might surmise that Aristotle believes that any degree of passion should be avoided. Aristotle does not think this, however. For he claims that passion should not be avoided but regulated, moderated (*NE* 1119b10-15). The implication is that, in the above passages, Aristotle is not claiming that passion *simpliciter* corrupts ones intellectual faculties, but that *excessive* passion does so.

Understanding that excessive emotion hinders the faculties of memory and opinion, enables us to see *why* Aristotle believed that the having one's passions regulated *is* a virtue. For at *NE* 1106a15-17, Aristotle states:

> Every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence, and makes the work (*ergon*/ἔργον) of that thing be done well.

But the *ergon* of man, as we have seen, is rational activity (*NE* 1097b34-1098a4-5). Given that Aristotle defines the *ergon* of a human being in terms of what is *idion* to human beings (*NE* 1097b34-35), it follows that the *ergon* of man is that activity of *nous*. For the *idion* of a creature is formed last in that creature's development, and the *nous* is the final stage of human development (*GA* 736b2-7). Thus, in protecting the faculties of memory and opinion from the corrupting effects of excessive passion, the VoC are helping nature to achieve its end of *nous* in a human being. For the actualization of *nous* requires the proper functioning of the faculties of memory and opinion,

as we have seen. And in helping nature to achieve its end of *nous*, the VoC enable human beings to perform their *ergon* well.

Thus far we have seen that ethical virtue is necessary for the actualization of *nous*. For *phronêsis* implies that one's opinions about the human good are excellent, that one is an excellent judge of opinions, and that can appropriately modify universal claims in light of counterexamples. Moreover, the VoC guarantee that one's faculties of opinion and memory will not become corrupted by excessive passion. Ethical virtue, therefore, is tantamount to a number of epistemological excellences that are hypothetically necessary for the actualization of *nous*, and *eo ipso* for the completed development of a human being.

In failing to understand that ethical virtue implies a number of epistemological excellences, intellectualists have wrongly claimed that one could be *sophos*, without possessing ethical virtue. For rather than understanding ethical virtue as a constellation of desiderative and intellectual excellences, Cooper and Kraut, as we have seen, speak of ethical virtue as being essentially concerned with one's commitments to other people.[10] This misconception of ethical virtue has caused intellectualists to claim that ethical virtue could sometimes be incompatible with *sophia*.[11] Indeed, *if* ethical virtue is essentially concerned with our commitment to others, and *if* *eudaimonia* consists solely in theoretical activity, then it is not difficult to imagine cases in which one's concern with others conflicts with their pursuit

[10] See Cooper ([1971], 149-168), Kraut ([1989], 181).

of *theoria*. But ethical virtue, as I have shown, does not merely consist in the excellence of our behavior towards others. Rather, it is also an intellectual excellence which ensures the proper functioning of the cognitive mechanisms required for the development of *nous*. Indeed, ethical virtue is necessary for *sophia*, since *sòphia* is the combination of *nous* and *epistêmê* (ἐπσιτήμη) (*NE* 1141a19-20). Thus, intellectualists are wrong in claiming that ethical virtue and *sophia* could come into conflict with one another. For *sophia* needs ethical virtue in order to be realized.

In addition to being necessary for *sophia*, however, it can also be shown that ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia* -- regardless whether one identifies it with the sole activity of contemplation, or with a combination of goods. Even if one does not accept my claim that ethical virtue is necessary for the development of *nous* and hence *sophia*, one *must* accept that ethical virtue is a necessary condition of *eudaimonia*. This claim, of course, contradicts the intellectualist thesis that one can be *eudaimôn* and lack ethical virtue. I will argue for this claim in the next chapter.

---

[11] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 5: WHY ETHICAL VIRTUE IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF *EUDAIMONIA*

In this chapter, I provide an additional argument against intellectualism by showing that ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*. For Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* consists in living well (εὐζωία) and *acting* well (εὐπραξία) (*NE* 1098b20-2). We will see that in addition to being necessary for the apprehension of first principles, ethical virtue is also necessary if one is to *act* with excellence. Thus, since *eudaimonia* consists in living and acting well, then ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*.

I will proceed as follows. After making some general remarks about Aristotle's theory of action found in *De Motu Animalium* (*DMA*), I will discuss the nature of the VoC and *phronêsis*, the two components of ethical virtue. In addition to providing the epistemological preconditions for the actualization of *nous*, we will see that the VoC and *phronêsis* are also excellences of two different parts of the human soul that are involved in human action, viz., the part which is the seat of desire (*NE* 1102a33-1103a7),

and the part which is responsible for opinions (*NE* 1140b26). After discussing the components of ethical virtue, we will then see how the combination of the VoC and *phronêsis* is responsible for right action. For right action implies not only that one's desires are aimed at the correct objects, but also that one's deliberation is correct. And whereas the VoC guarantee the former condition, *phronêsis* guarantees the latter. Once it is demonstrated that ethical virtue consists in the excellence of the psychological mechanisms which govern human action, it will become clear that ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*.

After demonstrating that ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*, I will defend my position against the intellectualist view that ethical virtue sometimes conflicts with, and hence is not necessary for, *eudaimonia*. For intellectualists have characterized ethical virtue as if it is primarily concerned with one's commitments to others. But as we have seen, ethical virtue also implies a number of epistemological excellences. The intellectualists' failure to fully appreciate Aristotle's account of ethical virtue has misled them into believing that *eudaimonia* can exist without ethical virtue, as I will show.

Aristotle's Action Theory

According to Aristotle, all action springs from thought (διάνοια) and desire (ὄρεξις) (*DMA* 700b23-24). Such a view sounds relatively straightforward. For it seems as if Aristotle is merely claiming that all action springs from belief and desire. Virtually any action can be explained in terms

of belief and desire. For instance, the act of walking to the refrigerator can be explained in terms of one's desire for food, on the one hand, and one's belief that food is in the refrigerator, on the other. And similarly with all other actions. But although at *DMA* 700b23-24, Aristotle *sounds* as if he is merely claiming that all action springs from belief and desire, his actual view is more complex.

Importantly, Aristotle makes a distinction between *two* types of desires involved in human action, wish (βούλησις) and choice (προαίρεσις). To merely say that action springs from a combination of belief and desire, is to ignore this important distinction. According to Aristotle, wish is the desire for the end (τέλος) and the good (*NE* 1113a15), and choice is "deliberate desire" (βουλετικὴ ὄρεξίς) (*NE* 1113a9-14). In order to understand the difference between wish and choice, it helps to be mindful of Aristotle's belief that all human action is purposeful, and hence is for the sake of some end or goal (τέλος) (*Ph.* 198a11). And as we saw in chapter 3, Aristotle claims that the "that for the sake of which" an action is done is a *good* (ἀγαθόν):

> Let us return to the good that we are seeking and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end. (*NE* 1097a15-21)

According to Aristotle, then, the end or purpose of an action is a good. Clearly, Aristotle's use of the term "good" is different from our usage of this term. For we typically use the word to denote a property or an attribute of

some object. Aristotle's view, however, is that the good of an action is its end, and as he states in *Physics* 194b33-35, the end, which is the "that for the sake of which" an activity is undertaken, is its *final cause*. Thus, Aristotle uses the term "good" to denote the final cause of some activity.

The difference between wish and choice can be made clear when we are mindful of Aristotle's claim that human beings act for the sake of an end. For Aristotle believes that the various actions of a human being should be organized so that they are performed for the sake of one, ultimate end:

> ... .we must enjoin every one that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the good life to
>
> aim at (whether honor or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he well then do all of his acts, since not to have one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly. (*EE* 1214b6-11).[1]

According to Aristotle, there should be a single end by which all of a human beings actions are guided, and he refers to the *desire* for this end as *wish* (*NE* 1111b26). The object of one's wish, therefore, is the ultimate end and final cause of one's actions.

Importantly, the wish for an attainable object or activity causes one to *deliberate* about how one's wish can be satisfied. This seems reasonable enough. For in order to realize one's end effectively, one ought to *think* and *deliberate* about the means by which it can be realized. In the following

[1] All translations of the *Eudemian Ethics* are by J. Solomon, unless otherwise noted.

passages, Aristotle implies that one's desire for an end causes one to think about the means by which that end can be attained:

> A doctor does not deliberate about whether he should heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, not a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, not does any one else deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only, they consider how it will be achieved by this, and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause which in the order of discovery is last. (*NE* 112b11-24).

> The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of thought: since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy, this must first be present, e.g., a uniform state of the body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something which he himself can produce. Then the process from this point onward, i.e., the process towards health, is called a "making." (*Metaph.* 1032b4-9).

The above passages indicate that thinking about how to realize one's end, can give rise to other ancillary desires -- desires for the *means* by which one's end can be realized. A doctor who desires to produce health, for example, might only be able to satisfy this desire by satisfying the desire to produce heat. Thus, the doctor's desire to produce heat is a means by which he realizes his end of health. Similarly, his desire to produce heat might only be satisfied by rubbing. Thus, the desire to rub is the means by which one satisfies one's desire to produce heat. Crucially, the doctor's desires for the means are *result* of deliberation, to which Aristotle refers as *choices*. Note that this example shows that a choice can sometimes be the final cause of *another* choice. For instance, the doctor rubs for the sake of his desire to produce heat.

Also note that both *Metaph.* 1032b4-9 and *NE* 112b11-24, indicate that deliberation involves the discovery of conditions that are *hypothetically necessary* for the achievement of one's end. For Aristotle writes, "they consider how it [the end] will be achieved by *this*, and by what means *this* will be achieved, till they come to the first cause which in the order of discovery is last." Thus, the deliberation that is caused by end-setting, enables one to discover the most efficient sequence of hypothetical necessities by which one's wish can be satisfied. For instance, suppose that I wish for wealth. Given my wish for wealth, suppose that I deliberate as follows: I desire wealth; wealth can be made by securing a well paying job; being a corporate lawyer is a well-paying job; I need to go to law school to become a corporate lawyer; and so on. Thus my wish for wealth causes me to discover the means by which wealth is achieved. I then *choose* to go to law school and *choose* to become a corporate lawyer, for these choices enable me to attain my object of wish.

According to Aristotle, then, there are two very different desires involved in human action. On the one hand, there is *wish* which is the final cause of one's actions, and on the other hand, there are *choices*, i.e., the means by which our wish is satisfied. Thus he writes:

> wish relates to the end, choice to the means; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts that will make us healthy (*NE* 1111b26-28).

Indeed, on Aristotle's view, it is not enough to say that actions are the result of thought and desire. For this overly simplistic account of action glosses

over the important distinction between wish and choice. To explain action merely as a combination of belief and desire, moreover, also ignores the role that deliberation plays in determining many of our desires, and hence actions.

However, Aristotle's theory of action is complicated in a further way. For Aristotle believes that, in the case of human beings, there is a *proper* end of action, and hence, that there is a *correct* object of wish. Thus, although every human being acts for the sake of wish, the actions of only *some* human beings are caused by the correct setting of the end:

> That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the good, others for the apparent good... . Are we to say that absolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for each person the apparent good; that that which is in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man, while any chance thing may be so to the bad man, as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth wholesome are wholesome for bodies which are in good condition, while for those that are diseased other things are wholesome--or bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on; since the good man judges each class of things rightly? (*NE* 1113a15-30).

Aristotle goes on to say that pleasure causes many people to have an incorrect object of wish. For pleasure appears to be the good, but is not (*NE* 1113a33-1113b2). Those who are self-indulgent (ἀκόλαστος), for example, are mistaken in pursuing pleasure in excess (*NE* 1150a19-21).

In addition to believing that there is a proper object of wish, Aristotle also claims that deliberation can be correct or incorrect. Thus, actions can be flawed owing to faulty deliberation. Aristotle claims that error in deliberation can be about either the "universal" (καθόλου) or "the particular" (τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον):

> Error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular; we may fail to know either that all water that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy. (*NE* 1142a20-22).

As we have seen, Aristotle believes that deliberation consists in the discovery of the most efficient sequence of hypothetical necessities that culminate in the realization of ones end. And it is easy to see how a sequence of hypothetical necessities could involve both universal and particular judgments. Consider Aristotle's remark about deliberation in *De Motu Animalium*:

> ... .whenever someone thinks that every man should take walks, and that he is a man, at once he takes a walk. Or if he thinks that no man should take a walk now, and that he is a man, at once he remains at rest. And he does both of these things if nothing prevents or compels him. I should make something good; a house is something good. At once he makes a house. I need a covering. A cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make, I need a cloak, I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion "I have to make a cloak," is an action. And he acts from a starting point. If there is to be a cloak, there must necessarily be this first, and if this, this. And he does this at once. (*DMA* 701a13-22).

In this passage, Aristotle indicates that the thinking by which one realizes the hypothetical necessities of an action, involves judgments that are both universal (e.g., "every man should take a walk," "a house is something good") and particular (e.g., "I am a man, "I need a cloak"). And it is not difficult to imagine how one's deliberations could involve incorrect universal or particular (or both) judgments. After discovering that one should obtain a law degree in order to achieve one's goal of wealth, for instance, one might wrongly believe that in order to obtain a law degree, one should first become a paralegal. This would be a mistaken universal judgment. For it is false to say, "anyone who wants to be a lawyer, must first be a paralegal." We could

also imagine how incorrect *particular* judgments could be involved in deliberating about how to become wealthy. For instance, one might discover that in order to achieve their end, they should invest money in a good mutual fund. But one could, of course, be mistaken about *which* particular mutual fund is a good one.

In order to act with excellence, then, one must not only have a correct object of wish, but also must deliberate with true opinions. For if one's wish is not correct, then one is acting for the sake of an incorrect end. And if one's deliberation involves false opinions, then one will be mistaken about how to realize one's wish. Acting well, therefore, consists in actions that are performed for the sake of the correct object of wish, and in understanding the best way that this end can be achieved. One who acts well knows what to desire, and how to get it. And as we are about to see, it is ethical virtue that is not only responsible for one's being correctly aimed at the right end, but is also responsible for the correct deliberation which enables one to effectively achieve this end.

Why Ethical Virtue is Necessary for *Eudaimonia*

In order to see how ethical virtue is necessary for correct action, we first need to understand the nature of its components, the VoC and *phronêsis*. Let us first consider the nature of the VoC. In the last chapter, we saw that Aristotle believes that the passions should be regulated because excessive passion can damage the cognitive mechanisms that are required in the

development of *nous*. The VoC, as we now know, imply that one'spassions are regulated. But although the VoC imply that one's passions are regulated, the VoC are not *merely* a state of character in which one passions are regulated. For Aristotle also states that the VoC are concerned with "choice" (προαίρεσις):

> Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice (προαίρεσις), lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, thus being determined by a rational principle, by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. (NE 1106b36-1107a2).

Aristotle's reference to the man of practical wisdom, the *phronimos*, in the above definition is not insignificant. For the *phronimos* possesses *phronêsis*, and we saw in the last chapter that *phronêsis* is the excellence of the opinion making faculty. In addition, the *phronimos* also possesses "correctness in thinking," i.e., the ability to apprehend the orderly sequence of hypothetical necessities that culminate in right action (*NE* 1142b12-15). The *phronimos*, in other words, can deliberate with excellence (*NE* 1142b31-33).[2] In claiming that the VoC are choices that are determined by the *phronimos,* Aristotle is claiming that one who possesses the VoC, acts in accordance with choices – deliberate desires -- that are the results of a *correct* deliberative process.

---

[2] Given that *phronêsis* is the excellence of the opinion making faculty (*NE* 1140b26), we might conclude that the *phronimos* deliberates with excellence because he has correct opinions. However, Aristotle explicitly states that deliberation can go wrong either if one's deliberation is incorrect *or* if one's end is incorrect, if one wishes for the wrong things:

> Excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation... .there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for the incontintent man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach a result of his calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. (*NE* 1142b15-19).

So in order to deliberate correctly, it is not enough to have correct opinions, one must also have correct *wish*. Aristotle states that it is ethical virtue which guarantees that one's wish is for the right object (*NE*

But as we know, in order to be act with excellence, one must not only be able to deliberate well, but one must also have one's wish aimed at the correct end. For one could be an excellent deliberator, but have their wish aimed at the wrong object (*NE* 1142b15-19). For instance, someone who pursues wealth as their primary aim could achieve his end as a result of accurate deliberation, i.e., deliberation that involves only true statements, but such a person would not be acting well, according to Aristotle (*NE* 1096a8-10).

In addition to claiming that the VoC is an excellence of choice, Aristotle also claims that the VoC ensure that one is aimed at the correct end:

> virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means (*NE* 1144a7-9).

The fact that the VoC also guarantee the correctness of the object of wish, is yet another way in which ethical virtue necessary for right action. For the components of ethical virtue are *phronêsis* and the VoC. And whereas *phronêsis* guarantees that one's deliberation is correct, the VoC guarantee that one's end is correct.

It is clear, then, that ethical virtue is necessary for excellent activity. But if ethical virtue implies an excellence of the psychological mechanisms governing human action, then ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*. For when describing *eudaimonia*, Aristotle explicitly states that it consists in living well (εὐζωία) and *acting* well (εὐπραξία) (*NE* 1098b20-22). But since

---

1144a7-9). The ethical virtues, so to speak, anchor one's wish, and weigh it down so that it is not disturbed by excessive pleasure or pain..

good action requires ethical virtue, and since *eudaimonia* is good action, then it follows that *eudaimonia* requires ethical virtue.

The argument that I am advancing is not difficult. It simply acknowledges the important fact that *eudaimonia* is some sort of excellent and right activity, and that this sort of activity cannot exist without ethical virtue. For excellent activity is activity in accord with correct desire and correct deliberation. And whereas the VoC are responsible for the former condition, *phronêsis* is responsible for the latter.

Although inclusivists would be in agreement with my claim that ethical virtue is necessary for *eudaimonia*, intellectualists would not. For intellectualists not only deny that ethical virtue is a component of *eudaimonia*, but they also believe that *eudaimonia* and ethical virtue can come into conflict with each other. Recall Cooper's comment:

> One might imagine that anyone who actually lived... .[a life in accordance with theoretical activity] would show himself on numerous occasions somewhat less than morally upright. He might indeed find it useful to have a façade of virtue, in view of his need for at least the forbearance of others; and he might find a certain advantage for his dominant purpose in the disciplining of his inclinations and emotions which... .[Ethical] virtue brings. But being ultimately concerned only with his own intellectual accomplishments, he would, it would seem, surely on occasion find it rational at least to neglect to do some positive act of virtue, if not actually do something immoral, as a means to the furtherance of his consuming interest. He would in fact live a retiring, contemplative life, with no special concern for the supposed values of social, political and family life.[3]

[3] Cooper ([1971], 149-150).

According to Cooper, ethical virtue can actually disrupt one's pursuit of theoretical activity.[4] However, the intellectualist thesis that ethical virtue can conflict with theoretical activity rests on a misunderstanding. For note that Cooper characterizes ethical virtue as if it is essentially concerned with one's commitments to others. As Cooper says, the *eudaimôn* individual lives a retiring, contemplative life, with no special concern for social and familial values. Indeed, *if* ethical virtue is essentially concerned with ones commitments to others, and if *eudaimonia* consists in theoretical activity alone, it is easy to see why intellectualists believe that ethical virtue could conflict with, and hence not be a necessary condition of, *eudaimonia.* For there are a myriad of cases in which one can imagine that one's pursuit of theoretical activity is hindered by one's commitments to others. However, as we have seen, ethical virtue is *not* essentially concerned with one's commitments to others. Rather, ethical virtue also consists in a number of epistemological excellence that are necessary not only for the apprehension of first principles, but also for excellent action. Intellectualists have mischaracterized the nature of ethical virtue indeed, and in doing so, they have been unable to see that ethical virtue is *necessary* for *eudaimonia.* Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* consists in living well and acting well (*NE* 1098b20-22). And since ethical virtue is necessary for acting well, it is necessary for *eudaimonia*, as I have shown.

[4] Kraut concurs with this claim. See Kraut ([1989], 181).

CONCLUSION

Thus far, I have established not only that ethical virtue is necessary for the actualization of *nous*, and hence *sophia*, but that it is also necessary for *eudaimonia*. I have also demonstrated the biological basis of Aristotle's view of *eudaimonia*. According to this view, *eudaimonia* is excellent activity in accordance with the completed development of human nature, *nous*, which is the *idion* of human beings. There are variety of reasons why scholars have failed to recognize that Aristotle's view of *eudaimonia* is rooted in his account of human development. Aristotle's unique views of the soul and the importance that he places on final causality, among them. But I also believe that another reason why scholars fail to properly understand the *NE*, is because they view it primarily as a standard work in moral philosophy. However, Aristotle explicitly states that this is not his primary project. In fact, he claims that ethical works whose primary aim is simply to explicate a theory of morality are *useless* (*NE* 1103b26-28). This claim is interesting given my view that Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia* is biologically based.

For if *eudaimonia* presupposes the proper biological development of a human being, then what, exactly, is Aristotle's purpose in writing this work? Aristotle reveals the answer in the following interesting passage:

> The purpose of the present study is not, as it is in other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge: we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else there would be no advantage in studying it. (*NE* 1103b26-28).

Aristotle explicitly states the he is not just disseminating knowledge about ethical virtue for its own sake, but is doing so in order for his audience to "become good" (ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενέσθαι). However, in claiming this, Aristotle does not mean that he is discussing the nature of the human good so that his audience can possess the VoC. For Aristotle claims that the VoC arise not through teaching (ἐκ διδασκαλίας), but through a process of *habituation* (ἐθιζεῖν) (NE 1103a14-b25).[1] And importantly, Aristotle implies that his audience should have *already* been habituated to possess the VoC:

> Anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits (*NE* 1095b4-6)

If the audience of the *NE* already possesses the VoC, then in what sense is Aristotle's discussion in the *NE* supposed to make his audience good?

Being *eudaimôn* and hence completely good, involves much more than the possession of the VoC. I have argued that *eudaimonia* presupposes the completed development of a human being, which is *nous*. But in order for

---

[1] It is by engaging in courageous acts, in other words, by which one obtains the virtue of courage. Thus, one obtains the virtue of courage by becoming accustomed to performing courageous acts, and similarly with the other virtues of character.

nous to be completely actualized, one must undertake the dialectical consideration of *endoxa*, as we have seen. For the dialectical consideration of *endoxa* is necessary for the apprehension of first principles, and hence for the actualization of *nous*.

C. D. C. Reeve argues that the *NE* is mainly a dialectical search for first principles in ethics, and hence that Aristotle is arriving at ethical first principles by examining *endoxa*.[2] I agree with these claims and they are supported by the texts (*NE* 1095b4-8, *NE* 1147b13-17, *NE* 109722-23, *NE* 1098b10-1099b6). However, I also believe that Aristotle is not clarifying the first principles of ethics for its own sake, but for the sake of transforming his students. This transformation is not merely intellectual, however. It is not that Aristotle's students have been transformed simply because they have learned something, as Reeve assumes.[3] For the transformation that Aristotle's students undergo, is *conative, desiderative.*

By engaging in dialectic with his audience, Aristotle is helping to actualize his students' potential for *nous*. But in so doing, Aristotle is sharpening and defining the object of wish at which his audience is aimed. For Aristotle is refining his audience's sense of pleasure, by exposing his audience to a rational pleasure that is more noble than the pleasure that is associated with ethical virtue.

---

[2] Reeve ([1992], 34-45).

[3] Reeve ([1995], 22).

To see this, recall that one who possesses ethical virtue both acts from choices that are caused by correct deliberation, and has the correct object of wish. According to Aristotle, however, the object of wish can become more refined through experience, depending on the pleasures that one has encountered. Suppose for instance that the object of one's wish is rational activity. According to Aristotle, all desire is for the pleasant (*DMA* 701b33-36), and therefore, if the object of one's wish is rational activity, then one will find rational activity pleasant. But suppose that the only rational activity that one knows is *ethically virtuous activity*. Acting in this way is rational, since one's desires and actions proceed from deliberation and reflection. And as Aristotle tells us, *phronêsis* is a virtue of the rational soul (*NE* 1140b25-28). But acting in accordance with ethical virtue, is, of course, not the *only* kind of rational activity, for one could also engage in scientific demonstration. Aristotle's audience is in the precise condition that I have described above. They possess the VoC and hence are aimed at the correct object, viz., rational activity. However, Aristotle's students only have experience with one type of rational activity, viz., ethically virtuous activity. Aristotle's audience, however, has not yet experienced another, higher rational activity, rational activity in accordance with *sophia*. To experience this sort of rational activity one must demonstrate true statements from first principles, principles that are apprehended by *nous*.

I have argued that the *NE* should be understood as a pedagogical work by which Aristotle intended to help his students actualize their potential for

complete *eudaimonia*. I have also argued that, *however* one defines *eudaimonia*, ethical virtue is one of its necessary conditions. Thus, the intellectualist thesis that ethical virtue can actually conflict with *eudaimonia* is incorrect. There are admittedly further questions that need to be answered. For instance, are any of Aristotle's other works transformational? And if the *NE* was intended by Aristotle to actualize his audience's potential for complete *eudaimonia*, then what implications does this have for the "teachability of virtue" issue? These questions are important. It was my aim in this work not only to describe what I take to be the nature of Aristotle's view of the human good, but also to present a new context in which these questions can begin to be answered.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ando, T. 1958. Aristotle's *Theory of Practical Cognition*, Kyoto.

Ackrill, J.L. 1980. "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, in Rorty, 15-33.

Anton, J. and Preus, A. (eds.). 1983. *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy.* State University of New York Press.

Barker, E. 1958. *The Politics of Aristotle.* Oxford.

Barnes, J. (ed.). 1984. *The Complete Works of Aristotle.* Princeton.

Barnes, J. 1984. *Posterior Analytics* in Barnes, 114-166.

Beare, J.I. 1941. *De Memoria* in McKeon, 607-617.

Burnyeat, M. 1980. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good," in Rorty, 69-92.

Burnyeat, M. 1992. "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible (A draft),' in Nussbaum and Rorty, 15-26.

Bynum, T. 1993. "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," in Durrant, 90-109.

Cashdollar, S. 1973. "Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception," *Phronesis* 8, 156-75.

Caston, Victor. 1996. "Aristotle on the Relation of Intellect to the Body: Commentary on Broadie," *Proceedings from the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy* 12, 177-191.

Charlton, W. 1993. "Aristotle's Definition of Soul," in Durrant, 197-216.

Cooper, John. 1975. *Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle.* Harvard University Press.

Cooper, John. 1987. "Contemplation and Happiness: a Reconsideration," *Synthese* 72, 187-216.

Devereux, Daniel. 1981. "Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness," O'Meara, 247-260.

Durrant, M. 1993. *Aristotle's* De Anima *in Focus*. Routledge.

Everson, S. 1997, *Aristotle on Perception*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Hardie, R.P. and Gaye, R.K. 1941. *Physica* in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard Mckeon. Random House. 211-394.

Hardie, W.F.R. 1965. "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," *Philosophy* XL, 277-295.

Hardie, W.F.R. 1980. *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Irwin, T.H. 1978. "First Principles in Aristotle's Ethics," *in Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 3, edited by P.A. French. University of Minnesota Press.

Irwin, T.H. 1980. "The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics," in Rorty. 35-53.

Irwin, T.H. 1988. *Aristotle's First Principles*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Irwin, T.H. 1991. "The Structure of Aristotelian Happiness," in *Ethics* 101, 382-91.

Jaeger, W. 1948. *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, translated by R.Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kenny, Anthony. 1978. *The Aristotelian Ethics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Keyt, David. 1983. "Intellectualism in Aristotle," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, edited by J.Anton and A. Preus. State University of New York Press, 364-87.

Korsgaard, Christine. 1986. "Aristotle on Function and Virtue," *History of* Philosophy Quarterly, 259-279.

Kraut, Richard. 1989. *Aristotle on the Human Good.* Princeton.

Kraut, Richard. 1995. "Reply to Professor Roche" In Sim, 138-148.

Lawson-Tancred, H. 1986. *Aristotle's* De Anima. Penguin.

McKeon, Richard. 1941. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Random House.

Modrak, D.K., 1976. "*Aisthesis* in the Practical Syllogism," Philosophical Studies 30, 379-91.

Modrak, D.K. 1987. *The Power of Perception*. Chicago.

Mure, G. R.G. 1941. *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* . Random House.

Nagel, Thomas. 1980. "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in *Essay's on Aristotle's Ethics*, in Rorty, 7-14.

Nozick, Robert. 1981. *Philosophical Explanations*. Harvard.

Nussbaum, M. 1978. Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium*. Princeton.

Nussbaum, M.C. and Rorty, A.O (eds.). 1992. *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima. Oxford.

O'Meara, D. (ed.). 1981. *Studies in Aristotle*. Catholic University of America Press.

Ostwald, M. 1962. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Macmillan.

Peck, A.L. 1942. *Aristotle's Generation of Animals*. Harvard.

Peck, A.L. 1955. *Aristotle's Parts of Animals* Harvard.

Purinton, Jeffrey. 1998. "Aristotle's Definition of Happiness," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* XVI, 259-297.

Reeve, C.D.C. 1995. *Practices of Reason.* Oxford.

Roberts, R. 1946. *Aristotle's Rhetoric.* Oxford.

Roche, Timothy. 1988. "*Ergon* and *Eudaimonia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation," Journal of the History of Philosophy 26:2. 175-194.

Roche, Timothy . 1995. "*The Ultimate End of Action: A Critique of Richard Kraut's* Aristotle on the Human Good" in Sim, 115-138.

Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed.), 1980. *Essay's on Aristotle's Ethics.* Berkeley.

Ross, D. 1980. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.* Oxford.

Shiner, Roger. 1979. "*Aisthesis*, *Nous*, and *Phronesis* in the Practical Syllogism,"*Philosophical Studies* 36, 377-387.

Sim, May (ed.). 1995. *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature*. Rowman and Littlefield.

Slakey, T. 1993. "*Aristotle on Sense Perception,*" in Durrant, 75-89.

Solomon, J. 1984. *Eudemian Ethics* in Barnes, Princeton, 1921-1981.

Sorabji, R. 1993. "*Body and Soul in Aristotle,*" in Durrant, 162-196.

Solomon, J. 1954. *Ethica Eudemia* Oxford.

Sprague, R. 1968, "The Four Causes: Aristotle's Exposition and Ours," *Monist* 52 no. 2, 298-300.

Wedin, M. 1988. *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*. Yale.

Whiting, Jennifer. 1986. "Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle" *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie* 68, 70-95.

Whiting, Jennifer. 1988. "Aristotle's Function Argument: A Defense" *Ancient Philosophy* 8, 33-48.

Wilkes, Kathleen. 1980. "The Good Man and the Good for Man in *Aristotle's Ethics*," in Rorty,341-357.