

ELITE COMMUNICATION AND LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE DURING INTER-  
GROUP CONFLICTS

By

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A THESIS

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

Communication—Master of Arts

2014

## **ABSTRACT**

### **ELITE COMMUNICATION AND LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE DURING INTER-GROUP CONFLICTS**

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This thesis investigates universal themes in the violence-legitimizing communication of elites during inter-group conflicts. A comparative content analysis was conducted across communication from elites who have been internationally recognized as having played some kind of leadership role for in-groups that have committed acts of violence against out-group(s). Data stretching across two decades from four different countries were examined; including the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. A thematic coding scheme was developed, using Susan Benesch's proposal on dangerous speech and prevention of group violence and perspectives from Social Identity Theory as the theoretical groundwork. Coding and analysis revealed that across countries and temporal spans, elites bolster in-group and out-group distinctions through their language choices, but typically avoid outright derogation. Moreover, they commonly create non-falsifiable facts about current, past, or future events; and employ allegations against the intentions, plans and activities of the out-group. Several additional themes were identified as well. Implications for future research and theory examining antagonistic public communication are discussed.

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To *them*. The survivors, victims and true victors of mass violence and genocide.  
And  
To Pappa, for his insight & Mamma, for her foresight.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although copyright laws protect authors and give them sole ownership of their works, but in essence a manuscript is always an amalgamation of ideas, suggestions, guidance and challenges put across to a writer by others. I could not have done this research without the help of so many individuals who impacted my journey so positively. My sincere and deep gratitude extends to Dr. Timothy R. Levine for being a great teacher, friend, mentor and being there since my day one at Michigan State University. I am particularly thankful to the committee members Dr. Stephen Lacy and Dr. Daniel Bergan for putting in their valuable time, commitment and suggestions during the course of this thesis.

I have great appreciation and gratitude for the Fulbright program which brought me to Michigan State University for which I am thankful. Here, several teachers within the Department of Communication and outside have helped me shape my thinking and develop a perspective. I remain grateful to them. To my friends, dear roommate and buddy Yongrong Shen, and classmates who lent listening ears and their time to challenge and support me: *bohat shukriya!*

This thesis required collaboration of translators and I was fortunate to work with Ms. Vidya Mohan at Less Commonly Taught Languages Program on campus and an anonymous translator. I am thankful to them for helping me on time and with efficiency on translations and accuracy checks.

Finally, I wish to extend my immense gratitude and appreciation for my advisor Dr. Steven McCornack. He has been a tremendous support, the better thinker, certainly the better editor and above all a true mentor from the start of this project. I owe any finesse in this draft to him while all the errors and mistakes remain truly mine.

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## WORDS AND ACTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

The relationship between words, contexts, and their impact upon people has long been a subject of investigation within the social sciences and humanities. In particular, scholarly attention has focused on the use of speech during conflicts. This domain has received attention not just because of its practical importance, but because of the legal need related to international law; that is, specific trials and investigations in which individuals are accused of inciting hatred and violence against others during conflicts (See Benesch, 2008). International and local tribunals routinely indict individuals for inciting violence through communication.

The scholarly literature examining the relationship between communication and violence blossomed following World War II (focusing primarily upon German propaganda). Following the genocides in Rwanda and Serbia during the early 1990s, an additional body of literature emerged on the rhetoric that helped incite these genocides. But whereas critical-rhetorical and communication scholars have sometimes examined particular, individual, political speeches occurring during these periods, rarely have scholars have focused upon thematic similarities in the discourse of empowered individuals *across* speeches, cultures, and temporal spans. Moreover, careful comparison of speech themes across countries and different instances of genocide has almost never been done<sup>1</sup>. A majority of existing literature on communication during violence does not appear to have a clear systematic analysis of messages (e.g., speeches or broadcasts), but rather, critical assessments of scattered political narratives. This may be because many scholars who did such studies herald from disciplines other than communication, such as History or Political Science (e.g., Kaufman, 2001; Mann, 2005 and Zubero 2012).

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<sup>1</sup> For an exception see Morus (2000). Her dissertation compared rhetoric from Hitler, Pol Pot and Rwanda.

The failure of scholars to examine consistent speech themes during times of genocide is remarkable, from both theoretical and practical perspectives. In terms of communication theory, it would seem essential to have a deeper understanding of the particulars of messaging that might play at least a partial causal role in triggering subsequent violence. From a practical perspective; speech acts during conflicts may have two consequences: firstly, they might act as precursors to violence and in extreme cases genocide. Secondly, certain groups may bear psychological or social harms such as humiliation and fear. This makes it pertinent to understand the dynamics of such dangerous speech, so that a timely identification can lead to important preventive or controlling measures, such as inhibiting speakers and/or inoculating audiences (Benesch, 2012). Further, in an op-ed written by Benesch and Abramowitz in the *The Wall Street Journal*, the authors suggest that inflammatory speech can be a “prelude to murder.” This is not hyperbole, given the evidence of violence in Kenya, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda following the public dissemination of such speech (2013). Thus, it is both theoretically and practically important to investigate thematic patterns within such speeches.

This thesis investigates the topical themes present within the speech of empowered individuals during various periods of genocide and mass violence, both past and present. In doing so, Susan Benesch’s framework on dangerous speech from the realm of international law (2012), and Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory (1981) will be used to develop a coding and classification scheme. My focus will be upon public speeches and broadcasts made by elites in four countries: Myanmar (Burma), Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka. I examine the presence of common themes (or lack thereof) which legitimized violence in elite communication in geo political entities where incidences of intra-state, inter-group conflicts occurred over time. From this examination, I create a taxonomy of themes prevalent during such conflicts.

In the remainder of this thesis, I shall do the following. First, I will detail the four countries which comprise the focus of this research, and their relevant histories. Second, I review existing literature focusing upon communication and incitement against out-groups. Third, I present my rationale and research questions for the thesis. Fourth, I discuss my method. Fifth, I detail the results of my analysis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my analysis, along with limitations of this study.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This thesis is an attempt to investigate themes which are present in elite communication during inter-group, intra-state conflicts across cases and decades; with a special emphasis on legitimization of violence. In this section, I first delineate basic concepts and key terms. Then I discuss inter-group conflict, and provide brief backgrounds on my four countries of analytical focus (Myanmar, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka) where such mass violence amongst different identity-based groups has occurred. I then describe findings in the literature on the nature of elite rhetoric, and the role of media in elite communication. I close with a description of Susan Benesch's framework titled: *Dangerous speech: A proposal to prevent group violence* and concepts from Social Identity Theory which will guide my analysis.

### **Key Terms and Definitions**

In this thesis, I conceptualize “inter-group conflict” as conflict between nations, ethnic and racial groups. Certainly, conflicts also exist in smaller groups, such as organizations, teams and clubs; but those types fall outside the domain of my focus (Ashmore, Jussim and Wilder, 2001). In the context of this analysis, only identity-based groups such as religious, ethnic, and/or linguistic groups within a single geopolitical entity (intra-state) are under investigation and national or inter-state group conflicts are not considered. For instance, conflict amongst Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats during the early 1990s in former Yugoslavia is an example of intra-state, inter-group conflict. Because most inter-group conflicts involve identity or ethnicity based groups, the terms “inter-group” and “inter-ethnic” are used interchangeably in this thesis.

The conflicts that comprise the focus of this investigation have similar characteristics. First, a hierarchal pattern exists in the conflict, whereby certain elites (e.g., rebel leaders or presidents) spearhead a certain cause. Second, ordinary people volunteer to commit acts of

violence against other groups in large proportions. For instance, many perpetrators during the genocidal conflict in former Yugoslavia were, in fact, volunteers who were not part of the government or the armed forces, but who took part in the violence nonetheless (Kirschke, 2010). Third, the concept of rules and ethics of war are absent, and there is usually systematic extermination of out-group members, including women, the elderly, and children (Kaufman, 2001).

My specific analytical focus is upon “elite communication” during such conflicts. By “elite,” I mean leading individuals and organizations which spearheaded or represented some identity-based groups, and who were accused publicly of involvement in conflicts. By “communication,” I am focusing upon public forms of communication, such as broadcasts and speeches that were widely available to audiences during these conflicts.

### **The Four Countries of Analytical Focus**

Myanmar, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka are four different countries in terms of culture, languages, geographical regions, and history. But they have a tragic and terrible characteristic in common: Violent inter-group conflicts. In the past forty years or so, these states have had remarkably parallel periods of intra-state, inter-group violence; during which ordinary citizens belonging to different ethnic groups and under the leadership of certain elites have taken up arms against each other to kill, loot and destroy – resulting in the deaths and forced expulsions of millions. These countries were chosen as foci because of the following reasons: a) instances of inter-group but intra-state conflict b) mass violence, expulsion or genocide c) identity-based groups involved but not more than four groups within each country d) accessibility of data and e) conflicts and relevant elites known to publics outside of these countries.

- **The genocide in former Yugoslavia.** Europe's big tragedy after World War II was the genocide in the former Yugoslavia where thousands of people were killed and horribly affected in a civil war that betrayed the continent's confidence about lasting peace. The former Yugoslavian federation comprised various linguistic and religious groups who shared Slavic origins. The federation had geographic prowess in Eastern Europe, with close ties to the former Soviet Union. The president of the federation, Josep Tito, somehow kept various groups together, despite the growing nationalism and loss of power that resulted in the formation of several nation states following World War II.

Not long after Josep Tito's death in 1980, tensions in the Yugoslavian federation started to emerge, as Croatia and Macedonia began to flex muscles of independence. The election in 1990 gave the nationalists victory which allowed Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia to declare independence in 1991. A year later, the Bosnian prime minister also moved for separation; and Bosnia was recognized by the European Union and the United States. However, the Bosnian Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic emerged as a leader to Serbs living in Bosnia and in the federation, making him the biggest opponent to calls for successions.

Beginning in 1992 and ending in 1995, mass violence and genocide plagued the Yugoslavian region; where an estimated 100,000 people (majority Bosniaks) were killed (Tabeau & Bijak, 2005). Several thousands were made homeless, expelled or raped. The war engulfed three main parties – Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks – and Bosniaks suffered the heaviest losses.

The war also was disastrous for western diplomacy. First, the UN-Dutch peace-keeping mission was criticized severely for failing to keep Bosnian refugees from harm during the Srebrenica massacre. An estimated 8,000 men and boys were systematically removed by Serb forces, shot dead, and thrown in mass graves; while peace keepers entrusted with their protection

were on duty. What's more, several rounds of peace talks moderated by Western powers failed, leading to NATO allied bombing of the Serbian city of Belgrade. Although this bombing ended both the conflict and Serbian control, it also splintered the ties between those linked with the former U.S.S.R and the West.

- **The genocide in Rwanda.** While the world reeled from the Bosnian genocide, another tragedy broke out soon after in Rwanda. Mahmood Mamdani, in his historical account of the country and the genocide that unfolded in early 1994, suggested that the colonization in Rwanda created distinct identity patterns for the two main groups – Hutus and Tutsis – with the former as an "indigenous majority" and the latter as an "alien minority" (pp. 103, 2001). This distinction, in his opinion, is a direct consequence of the colonial Christian influence which perceived Tutsis as more “European” and “Hammitic” in origin; whereas the Hutus were considered “subservient” by virtue of their darker skin tones.

Rwanda was originally a German colony and at the start of the twentieth century, the power was handed over to Belgium. Under the Belgian rule, people in Rwanda were issued identity cards based on their ethnic group; thus creating a politicized identity in black and white. Also under the colonial rule, Tutsis remained in power – controlling agriculture and local politics – while Hutus remained under-privileged. Mamdani tracks Rwanda's transition of decolonization, where strains occurred within the colonialists and the colonized. In 1959, the first social revolution started to sweep the country; with an emerging Hutu elite demanding liberation from both the white power holders and the Tutsi. Although this movement successfully dismantled Tutsi control over local politics; it also solidified Hutu-Tutsi tensions.

Post-colonization Rwanda saw remarkable shifts in power, as Hutus began to dominate the local politics and educational systems -roles traditionally occupied by the Tutsis. Moreover,



Tutsis started to receive the “alien minority” treatment; becoming the recipients of discrimination and hostility. In 1994, a plane carrying the Rwandan president (who was Hutu in ethnicity) was shot down in neighboring Burundi. The Hutu-led government blamed the Tutsis rebels for the incident, and ultimately considered all Tutsis as responsible. Thousands of volunteers joined hands to eliminate the “Tutsi problem” – resulting in the deaths of almost 800,000 people (also among them moderate Hutus). In a just a few days, entire villages were burnt or razed to the ground; with mass expulsions, killings, rapes and looting which was targeted mostly at the Tutsi population. The Rwandan genocide is considered the worst event of mass violence in Africa.

- **The Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka.** Like its other South Asian neighbors, Sri Lanka was a British colony from 1833 to 1949. During the British rule, many Tamil speakers from the Indian south were brought to the Sri Lankan north to work on coffee and tea plantations. Close proximity to India's southern region, which was also governed by the British, allowed an influx of missionaries who formed several educational institutes in the predominantly Tamil north. This subsequently allowed a high number of Tamils to be employed in the British civil service.

After Sri Lanka's independence in 1949, many Indian Tamils were left disenfranchised and lost their citizenships, as the country's political landscape began to be colored by Sinhalese nationalism, including efforts such as making Sinhalese the official language. In 1958, anti-Tamil riots erupted; killing 200 Tamils and displacing thousands. The ethnic tensions continued into the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a movement was started by Sinhalese Marxist students and Sri Lanka was adopted as the official name of the country; further intensifying Tamil-Sinhalese tensions. In 1977, riots left 100 Tamils dead following elections which allowed a Tamil party to win all of the seats in the north of the country.

In 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the rebel movement against the Sinhalese government from the northern and eastern parts of the country, under the leadership of Vellupillai Prabhakaran. In 1983, the militia ambushed 13 soldiers which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Tamils. This incident is called The First Eelam War. In its efforts against the state, LTTE used several guerilla warfare tactics, such as suicide bombings and the use of human shields, in its armed struggle with the government. The leader Prabhakaran became a wanted man not only in Sri Lanka, but also internationally which resulted in his continued hiding. However, every year, Prabhakaran would give a Heroes' Day speech which celebrated Tamil martyrs and charted the militia's stance on politics.

The civil war in Sri Lanka ended when Prabhakaran was killed by the Sri Lankan government in 2009 and a ceasefire was announced all over the country. Surprisingly, very little research has gone into Tamil rhetoric and violence, despite the nature of the conflict being large scale and terribly taxing on respective groups. The extent of the damage included destruction of almost half of the Sri Lankan airlines fleet, two heads of state assassinated, mass expulsions, use of humans as shields, suicide bombings, and killings.

- **The rise of extremism in Myanmar.** A minority group called the Rohingyas live in the Western part of Myanmar that borders with Bangladesh. This area is called the Rakhine state, and its people are considered one of the world's most persecuted minority by the UN (BBC, 2014). The Rohingyas are stateless, and are not accepted by either Bangladesh or Myanmar. In recent years, they have been severely affected by inter-group conflict and tension, primarily because of state policies and rhetoric of a renegade Buddhist monk named Ashin Wirathu who is leading a campaign against them. According to unofficial figures, thousands of Rohingyas have been displaced and hundreds have been killed.

Recently, the government of Myanmar ordered an international NGO to leave the Rakhine state; which means that thousands of Rohingyas are now deprived of basic medication and resources (BBC, 2014).

Wirathu is considered extremely controversial, has been branded as *The face of Buddhist terror* by *TIME* (Beech, 2013). Wirathu has proclaimed himself "The Buddhist bin Laden," and the Rohingya conflict is still ongoing.

### **Communication during Intergroup Conflict**

The scholarly study of elite communication during inter-group conflict has focused primarily upon large-scale conflicts which have received global coverage or greater media attention. The exemplar for this trend is the case of the Nuremburg trials, which indicted several Nazis including the German Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels. In the mid 1990s, the study of conflict communication garnered new interest following the genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Some of this attention has been in the form of critical analyses focusing upon individual speeches, and the use of certain rhetorical themes by individual speakers. A bulk of commentary or any ideas on elite communication during conflicts stems from disciplines such as Political Science, Anthropology and History.

In the subsequent paragraphs, I will elaborate some common themes found by historians and communication scholars in elite communication and the role of media as elites.

- **Myths and symbolism.** Historians, critical and rhetorical scholars have suggested several characteristics that typify the communication of elites during intergroup conflicts, such as myths - which are modern versions of old stories or stories created a new, ethnic symbolism, narratives and rhetoric to fuel hatred and recruit volunteers (Bozic-Roberson, 2004; Kaufman, 2001). For instance, Serb nationalists in their rhetoric against other

ethnic groups created a myth of a battle fought between Bosniaks and Serbs in the fourteenth century in Kosovo, which then was used to claim that Serb lands were invaded by Turks and made them (Serbs) into victims of violence (Mann, 2005). However, scholars believe that this was a false account used in war rhetoric; designed to create “politicization of ethnicity” – the efforts made by then Serbian president Milosevic to use ethnic identity as the basis of argumentation and identification in his political narratives (Bozic-Roberson, 2004; Mann 2005)

Some work on rhetoric outside of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia has looked into elite communication during violent conflicts. Roy and Rowland (2003) found in Hindu rhetoric accusations against Muslims and claims that Muslims are a minority with too much influence. They also suggested that Hindu rhetoric appeals to religious sentiments, by invoking myths and the promise of saviors. Zubero (2012), in his critical examination on Rwanda and Germany, argues that elites make strangers of out-groups. Zubero’s work is not a systematic analysis of either Rwandan or German communication, and does not specify any particular messages of how it happens. But he does suggest that in the context of Nazi Germany, Jews were called out as Jews despite being citizens of Germany, which was an attempt to differentiate them something other than German.

- **Salience of identity and name calling.** Focusing on role identity and redemption, it has been suggested that former Serbian leaders rose to power through their use of rhetoric and politicization of ethnicity well before the conflict started (Bozic-Roberson, 2004). Morus, in her work on why violence may have been normalized in former Yugoslavia, argues similarly to Michael Mann; suggesting that Milosevic’s speeches focused on myths and the exclusiveness of the Serbian people (2007). Politicization of ethnicity or

identity salience also was found by Donohue (2012) in his framing study of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTL) broadcasts in Rwanda. Donohue also noted that humiliating an out-group by calling them names such as ‘cockroaches’ was one of ways RTL communicated to Hutu audiences.

Studying elite communication during intra-state, inter-group conflict from a comparative perspective is rare and Morus’ dissertation on rhetoric in genocidal regimes in Rwanda, Cambodia and Nazi Germany is an example of it. She finds similarities in language, such as hailing a savior, dehumanization, and de-individuation of an out-group; and portrayals of in-groups as victims of historical injustices that must be addressed to remove any present danger (2000).

A different approach to understanding hate speech was undertaken by Glaeser, who developed an economic model of political hatred. He suggests that activities pertaining to monetary and economic benefits are at top of the political agenda and politicians use hate-mongering to attain some kind of material gains. These messages include blaming an out-group for some economic grievances or lack of resources (2005).

- **Media as elites during conflicts.** The role of elites is not limited to individuals making public speeches. Instead, the media forms an integral part of elite networks; as evidenced from work in Africa, particularly Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. In an examination of Serbian communication during the civil war, Bozic Roberson (2004) and Kissoupoluos (2007) suggested that Milosevic was very efficient in manipulating media (such as TV and newspapers) to create ethnic problems and gain power. Li (2004) also suggested that radio in Rwanda along with other factors was used to pursue Hutu ambitions against Tutsis. Only Strauss remains an exception, in his argument that the role of the RTL in

the genocide was not as significant as suggested, and that the radio motivated only a few individuals (2007). However, a powerful analysis made by Yanagizawa-Drott (2010) shows that number of broadcasts received by users in Rwanda correlated highly with the number of killings within particular areas. The role of the media in genocides is not only limited to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Recent work on the role of radio and violence in Kenya has also come to the surface; suggesting that although the intensity of rhetoric cannot be compared to RTLM, the radio did play some role in inciting violence (Beyene, 2012).

Comparative work in understanding the role of the media during inter-group violence is not prevalent either; but Beyene (2012), Frère & Marthoz (2007) and M'Bayo (2005) are a few notable exceptions. Beyene, in her dissertation, did a comparative study of the Kenyan and Rwandan media's role to investigate how types of media can exacerbate ethnic violence. Her research suggested that countries with weak or absent institutional regulatory mechanisms have media affecting ethnic violence. Frère & Marthoz (2007) and M'Bayo (2005), in their works on conflicts and media in Africa, focus on factors such as the lack of journalistic training, and political and institutional factors in the media's role in violence.

Based on the literature review above, themes such as identity salience, out-group dehumanization, ethnic polarity, myths and stories can be extracted (amongst others) in the rhetoric of elites in incidences of intra-state but inter-group conflicts<sup>2</sup>.

### **Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks**

In the following paragraphs, I will delineate an analytical framework and theory of relevance which can help explain elite communication during conflicts.

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<sup>2</sup> Appendix A contains a list of studies and the themes extracted from them.

- **Benesch's framework on dangerous speech.** Susan Benesch is a scholar who is associated with the World Policy Institute and who works within areas of conflict communication. In 2012, she presented an analytical framework to the institute, which is a recent attempt at systematically identifying what constitutes “dangerous speech” (2012). By “dangerous speech,” Benesch refers to what is commonly termed “hate speech” that is, communication "... that denigrates people on basis of their membership in a group such as an ethnic or religious" (pp.1). She believes that the importance of speech and its effect on persuasion have been studied previously, but not in the context of violence. The capacity of a communication acts "to inspire action" in contemporary times, the international law implications for distinguishing dangerous communication from free speech, and concern for preventing future violence, all guide her work. Her proposal is available online on the institute's website.

In Benesch’s framework, *A proposal to prevent dangerous speech*, she identifies five key variables, of which one or all may be utilized by a speaker. With these areas, she delineates questions which help assess the extremity of a speech. Benesch believes that although these areas are important; not all may be factors in determining consequences. For instance, in some cases audience vulnerability due to grievances can play a bigger role in triggering violent outcomes.

1. **The speaker.** This refers to the speaker and his/her position with respect to the group. Benesch urges the reader to think about his/her identity, prominence, and influence as relevant factors in dangerous communication.

2. **The audience.** The audience at the receiving end of such communication is important to understanding the effects of dangerous speech.

The proposal recommends understanding whether the speaker is communicating

with his/her group or all groups at large. If the speech is directed to his/her own group, then it certainly contains more hazardous implications.

3. **The speech act.** This variable looks into the speech act itself – that is, if it contained any humiliating terms for the out-group; a direct call for violence; elliptical language and any fear-mongering or victimization.

4. **The socio-historical context.** In order for a speech act to trigger violence, the social historical context is also important; such as, previous contentions between groups, weak governance, and any recent violence following speech.

5. **The mode of transmission.** Media outlets which are without competition, repetition of messages, the use of music, and inaccessibility of alternative opinions also can intensify a speech.

Benesch's work is an important addition particularly in international law and genocides. Yet, to date, her work has not been put to the test on the speeches which were actually made during inter-group conflicts. For the purpose of this thesis, the variable of "The Speech Act" will be investigated rigorously through thematic analysis of elite communication.

- **Social identity theory.** This theory suggests that the part of an individual's self-concept which is derived from group membership is called "social identity" (Tajfel, 1981). An integral part of this theory is the impact of social identity on an individual's emotional and behavioral levels. Group membership may be highly relevant to create a sense of attachment and mutual fate amongst people; thereby urging them to act in certain ways.

This theory has already been put to the test in order to understand the words and actions of elites and volunteers in several inter-group conflicts; particularly in Rwanda and the former



Yugoslavia. For instance, Donohue (2012) and Morus (2000) used aspects on categorization, social and collective identity from the theory to understand communication in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, respectively. They explicated framing techniques such as "us vs. them;" in-group and out-group differences, messages of mutual fate and dependence; use of name calling; and pejorative statements by elites. The theory has been used extensively in the fields of social psychology and communication, and this makes it suitable to understand arguments made within contexts of inter-group conflicts.

## **RATIONALE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY**

The importance of understanding what elites say in times of conflicts is not merely a scholarly exercise, because its implications are far-reaching; such as in areas of international law. After the genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, several people were put on trial for incitement to genocide. Media elites such as the founders of the RTLM Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwizan, and Hassan Ngeze – the editor of *Kangura* (wake others up!) – were found guilty of those charges during the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Kagan, 2008). It seems pertinent to study the argumentation forms that are pervasive in elite communication during conflicts in a comparative fashion, so that macro structures can be identified.

Most of the existing literature on communication during conflicts describes and comments on elite communication that is employed to attain certain goals during conflicts. But the literature does not examine *universality* in the themes of elite communication during inter-group, intra-state conflicts. Instead, there is a tendency to: a) focus on only one conflict at a time; b) rely solely on critical interpretation to analyze the content of speeches or broadcasts; c) use very small samples such as between one to three speeches/broadcasts at a time; d) investigate mostly infamous and well-known conflicts such as Rwandan or Bosnian genocides in isolation; and e) compare elite communication in terms of critical theory rather than speech or communication analyses (for e.g. Kaufman, 2001; Zubero, 2012). In light of this, it becomes pertinent to inquire if there is any universality to elite communication:

**RQ1: What themes are common to elite communication during intra-state and inter-group conflicts across different cases and decades?**

## The Chosen Elites

Based on the literature and involvement of key figures, the following elites have been identified as important and relevant to this thesis.

1. **Ashin Wirathu:** He is a renegade Buddhist monk in Myanmar who has explicitly called for removal of the Rohingya Muslims and initiated a campaign that encourages followers only to trade with certain Buddhist factions in the country. Wirathu is currently active in his anti-Rohingya campaign and his speeches are available online in Burmese.
2. **Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM):** Radio broadcasts in Rwanda were one of the most successful means of communicating with militia and identifying Tutsi targets. New research indicates that the extent to which radio waves were received in an area is strongly correlated with the number of people that were killed in that area (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012). During the conflict, RTLM was controlled by Hutu sympathizers and labeled Tutsis as *inyenzi* or ‘cockroaches’ (Donohue, 2012). Several broadcasts by the RTLM were made in French and Kinyarwanda.
3. **Vellupillai Prabhakaran.** Prabhakaran was the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE; a Tamil militia that claimed to fight for the rights for Tamils from the majority Sinhalese population in Sri Lanka. For nearly four decades, the Sri Lankan state was at war with the Tamil rebel groups. Prabhakaran was killed in 2009. His speeches were made in the Tamil language.
4. **Slobodan Milosevic:** Milosevic was the president of former Yugoslavia and gained power after the death of Josep Tito. Milosevic identified himself as a Serb and purported to claim the rights of Serbs when Bosnia and Croatia sought independence. Milosevic

was later apprehended and accused of crimes against humanity. His public addresses have been recorded in Serbian.

The content under review will be speeches made by the above-mentioned elites, and these speeches will form the units of analyses. The availability of speeches or broadcasts varies greatly from one conflict to another. For instance, the number of recorded and available broadcasts is much higher for the RTLM than for Ashin Wirathu's speeches. I think that this could be due to several reasons: a) the speeches were censored b) they were never recorded c) criminal or judicial inquiry or time lapse may have made more records publicly available d) the speeches may only be distributed through local media, and e) the use of local language may hinder accessibility in English.

The sampling of speeches for this thesis, therefore, depended heavily on the availability and the translation of speeches

**Table 1. Sample.<sup>3</sup>**

Source/Speaker	Number of speeches	Languages
Ashin Wirathu	Two	English (originally in Burmese)
RTLM	Six	English (originally in French and Kinyarwanda)
Slobodan Milosevic	Three	English (originally in Serbian)
Vellulipai Prabhakaran	Six	English (originally in Tamil)
Total	Fifteen	

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix C for details on dates of speeches/broadcasts and their media.

In this comparative analysis, I expect to find the following themes: Evidence of in-group vs. out-group argumentation such as the speaker addressing to his group. Moreover, I believe that reduction of an out-group to sub-human or evil forms may be found. I think that speakers may also present "facts" which may be difficult for audiences to verify or cross-check and may appear to be correct on the surface. These "facts" may be about wrongdoings attributed to the out-group, some historical accounts, or the fight put up by the in-group against alleged injustices. Speakers may also resort to suggesting the danger that the in-group faces in the future (particularly in relation to others), or how much they have already suffered. The elites can also be praising the sacrifices of the in-group, exhorting others to follow the suit, or offering new instructions and/or showing some effort for group solidarity.

### **Coding and Analysis**

As described previously, I expected certain themes to be present in the discourse of elite's communication during intergroup conflicts, based on the work of Susan Benesch and Social Identity Theory. These included in-group/out-group argumentation or logic and/or referencing, use of derogatory words for the out-group, calling for violence and historical/present injustices. But I also wanted the data to "speak for themselves." Consequently, I reviewed all of the speeches and broadcasts available, and made extensive notes of apparent themes. From this preliminary assessment, a set of eleven tentative themes was extracted and defined; including guidelines for coding discourse excerpts into each category. To count as a "theme," a thematic point of emphasis had to be present in the communication of at least two different elite sources.

This initial coding scheme (see Appendix B) was then tested, by having an additional coder independently assess a set of thirty discourse excerpts. Inter-coder agreement on this initial assessment was low: specifically, coders agreed on only 19 of 30 excerpts. The coding

scheme was then revised; specifically, the initially-proposed themes titled “Anger or sadness as justification of riots” and “Veneration of the martyrs or the fallen” were dropped, and the criteria for coding the other themes were refined.<sup>4</sup> Inter-coder agreement was then tested anew, within a different sample of 20 discourse excerpts. Inter-coder agreement for this set was 19 out of 20; producing a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.94. I now turn to a detailed description of the final, reliable coding scheme; along with some of the discourse excerpts from my data that instantiate these categories and were used to test them.

### **1. Defining differences and/or conflation of the in-group identity with the national or supra-ethnic identity**

This theme derives in part from Social Identity Theory and refers to speakers' assumptions that the in-group is *the* national group, while the out-group is external to the nation and thus foreign. This also includes speakers' claims to a group's ethnic identity connected to larger regional identity.

In instantiating this theme within their discourse, speakers may use certain words to define, extrapolate, advocate, and/or reiterate ethnic differences between their groups and targeted others. They also may talk about in-group defining characteristics, such as cognitive, moral and physical traits. They may also use words which clearly refer to an out-group and can also use the opportunity to give historical evidence as to why these differences exist. They may refute any ideas which suggest that differences are of little or no importance.

(Note: This thematic category does not include derogatory words used for an out-group.)

RTL: *We have already confirmed that ethnic groups exist and even tried to see their characteristics over the years in the history of Rwanda.*

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix B for drafts used during the development of the coding scheme and relevant excerpts and details.

Milosevic: If we fail to create and strengthen this front, comrades, *there will be no Kosovo, there will be no Serbia and there will be no Yugoslavia.*

**2. Call for duty/exhortation.** This refers to speakers encouraging members of their in-group to protect themselves, take certain actions, do certain things and/or ensure their survival. This may be in form of a general call to duty, or detailed actions such as boycotts, taking up arms, patrolling, staying put, passing information, keeping an eye on others, defending against attack, and communicating in certain ways. The speakers may also use the words or equivalents to requests. The speakers can also use exhortation or consequential warnings to those who are scared or reluctant to comply.

Milosevic: *Therefore we the Communists, must do everything in our power to eliminate the consequences of the nationalist and counterrevolutionary forces both in Kosovo and other parts of the country.*

RTLTM: *The ministry of defense asks the population who live in areas where the war is taking place and those who live in Kigali to keep on being vigilant so that no enemy can infiltrate.*

**3. Meta-out-group connections.** The speakers may connect the out-group or the conflict to some other out-group of ethnic or political identity/power/ideology/race/religion/nationality; including international countries, groups, organizations or persons. These “meta-out-groups” (i.e., out-groups associated with the targeted out-group) may be considered conspiratorial; siding with or controlling the out-group, negligent or critical of the speaker's group, richer, powerful, all-knowing, rulers and in some way intangible. However, enemies on the ground may be considered an embodiment of such meta-out-groups.

Wirathu: If we lose now, they would form groups and by the support of *Saudi Arabian* oil money, they would compete against our businesses.

Prabhakaran: The *Indian military* occupation of Tamil Eelam posed a major challenge to our determination.

**4. Claims of victory – “we win, they lose”.** During the conflict, the in-group elites often refer to instances in which they may be winning the war or taking control of the situation. This also includes abasing the enemy and attempts to demoralize the out-group as losers.

RTLTM: People are asking: "What has become of the Inkotanyi in Kigali City? *The score of the Inkotanyi is indeed sealed; the fate of the Inkotanyi in Kigali city was sealed at about 2 PM, yesterday, Monday when the inhabitants killed at least nine Inkotanyi at the Sun City Hotel in Nyamirambo.*

**5. Anecdotes.** The speaker may inform the audience of specific examples of an out-group's activities or events that purportedly have happened, through personally witnessed accounts, or by claiming credible information/source/witness. First person or third person narratives are most likely to be employed – but importantly, the anecdotes typically are impossible to verify.

Wirathu: *Let me tell you one thing. I visited Myot Hla Township. Local monks complained that they could not perform Buddhist ritual ceremony on Martyrs day.*

**6. Fact-making and allegations.** Akin to “anecdotes” (i.e., Theme 5, above), this theme involves non-falsifiable claims made by the speaker, informing the public of some facts, actions, events, plans or strategy of the out-group and/or any other group/situation/event/historical incident. This also includes allegations or false claims aimed at an out-groups' strategy, plans, beliefs or intentions. These allegations may appear to be damaging to the speaker's in-group or to



peace in general. This also includes any historical or mythical stories presented as facts. The distinction between this theme and “anecdotes” is that the facts presented are not framed as personal (i.e., first- or third-person experiences).

Wirathu: *At first their plan was to invade those three towns on the anniversary of 8.8.88.*

RTLM: *Still, RPF Inkotanyi (reference to Tutsi rebel army), has never really agreed to stop the combats.*

RTLM: *About a thousand persons cross the border daily, fleeing from the Inyenzi, those Inyenzi who continue to target intellectuals, as well as those they accuse of being interahamwe. They actually check identity cards and do not spare any Hutu.*

RTLM: *Still, RPF Inkotanyi (reference to Tutsi rebel army), has never really agreed to stop the combats.*

**7. Importance of land/territoriality.** This refers to claims of ownership/possession of a region or land and that being a symbol of the ethnic group. This also includes referring to a particular area, to an entire country, or region in order to protect and/or defend it. Speakers may also suggest what areas or borderlines are problematic and a source of future trouble for the in-group or national solidarity.

Prabhakaran: *Today the war of aggression against our land by the enemy has reached a phenomenal scale.*

Milosevic: *Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give Kosovo away.*

**8. Name calling.** The speakers may use racist, derogatory slurs and/or swear words against the out-group; including reducing them to sub-human levels such as animals, insects such as cockroaches, and/or condemned religious or mythical beings such as devils. They may also

include character-defining yet negative attributive words such as: wicked, enemy, chauvinistic, and so forth.

RTLTM: *When you tell them: "You Inkotanyi, you kill people, you kill people atrociously, you indulge in torture", they resort to flattery with their smooth tongue, pride and arrogance.*

RTLTM: *Inyenzi...*

**9. Historical/present injustice or victimization.** The speakers may suggest to the audiences that they are victims of gross historical or present injustices which makes they are victims of gross historical or present injustices which makes them victims. They may also suggest that their group "deserves" power but they have been denied any resources which are either rightfully theirs or a function of prejudice.


Prabhakaran: *This aggressive war that has been launched in the guise of a "war for peace" and as a "war for the liberation of the Tamils" has seriously disrupted the peace of the Tamils, reduced them to refugees, as subjugated people, destroyed their social and economic existence and brought them intolerable suffering.*

## RESULTS

Following figure and table present the results. The results were calculated by doing frequency counts of all the themes across all speakers. It was found that theme one “Defining differences and/or conflation of the in-group identity with the national or supra-ethnic identity” and theme six “Fact making and allegations” were the most commonly used themes.

Figure 1. uses a column chart where total frequencies were calculated by aggregating all the frequency of themes across all the speakers. Table 2. separates themes by speakers and the reader should be able to see how themes occur by frequency by each speaker.

**Figure 1. Total number of themes across all speakers.**



**Table 2. Themes by each speaker.**

	<b>Milosevic</b>	<b>RTLM</b>	<b>Prabhakaran</b>	<b>Wirathu</b>
<b>Differences</b>	35	209	64	18
<b>Call for duty</b>	16	72	7	7
<b>Meta-out-groups</b>	2	17	7	7
<b>Claiming victory</b>	1	35	11	0
<b>Anecdotes</b>	4	9	0	3
<b>Fact making &amp; allegations</b>	34	126	46	28
<b>Territoriality</b>	7	1	47	4
<b>Name calling</b>	1	87	20	5
<b>Historical/present injustice</b>	14	10	28	0

## DISCUSSION

Previous scholars across various traditions have examined violence-inciting “hate speech.” Yet most analyses have narrowly focused upon particular texts or speakers. In this thesis, I have identified and analyzed the presence of consistent themes existing *across* speakers, cultures, and temporal spans. In doing so, nine consistent themes were identified that occur within the speech of elites during periods of intergroup violence.

However, these results also suggest (albeit in a preliminary fashion) that these themes are not proportionally distributed within the speech of elites. Instead, my data suggest that while all of these themes are routinely utilized, themes pertaining to in-group/out-group differences and fact-making/allegations comprise the most common forms.

Past scholars also have focused their attention heavily on ideas that immediately seem extremely negative or brutal such as threats or calling names like *Inyenzi* (cockroaches). Moreover, there has been extraordinary emphasis on theme of historical injustice or victimization of the in-group by scholars. The data analyzed in this thesis validates the presence of such themes. However, a speech is more than some names and ideas of historical injustice. It is a combination of several themes; and in my data, in-group out group referencing and fact making and allegations are the most commonly used ones.

Social Identity Theory had informed the literature review of this thesis on how in-group/out-group referencing and categorization can be used to mark groups and create identities. Consistent with the literature and theory’s ideas, one of the dominant themes across speakers and speeches involved the use of words or sentences that define, categorize or create differences between groups. However, an interesting observation is the fact that speakers also conflate in-group identity with the national identity. For instance, a speaker on RTLM suggested that they

(i.e., the Tutsi) want to slap Rwandans. This implies that Hutus and ethnic groups other than the Tutsis are Rwandans – but *the Tutsi's are not*. This is akin to Zubero's idea regarding German propaganda against Jewish people; in which the rhetoric of Nazi leaders constantly referred to the Jews *as Jews* – despite the fact that they were German nationals – thus rendering them foreigners in their own land. The usage of this theme is persistent across the RTLM, Wirathu and Milosevic.

At the same time, this latter theme was largely absent within the speech of Prabhakaran. This raises the question of, why? My take on this is that it reflects the nature of the particular conflict. Prabhakaran was a minority rebel separatist who was fighting against the state. Therefore, his claim for Tamil identity cannot be conflated with Sri Lankan identity – unlike the other speakers who were embroiled in conflicts where they represented the majority and the minorities were being persecuted.

The single most common theme within my data, however, was fact-making and allegations. This is defined as when speakers create information or relay news either about the present or the past. This includes making allegations on part of the out-group, challenging their motives and using different kinds of facts or even myths to bolster their claims. The practical and theoretical significance of this finding is noteworthy. Past scholars have focused all too often upon specific, egregious speech acts, such as making threats, calling for violence or name calling. But this does not appear (from my data) to be the dominant theme used to potentially elicit violence and create division. Instead, elites during intergroup conflicts pepper their speech with non-falsifiable allegations and statements, designed to “stir up” or “convince” their in-group – all the while appearing as if all they're doing is “sharing information.” For examples, speakers may claim that Canada is taking care of Tutsi orphans, or that the Rohingyas plan to invade

towns in the Rakhine state. In saying things like this, elites are (in effect) making political or social arguments. And critical to this “fact sharing” is that the information in question is non-falsifiable: it would be hard (if not impossible) for an ordinary listener in his or her house in a small village, town or even a city to verify these allegations. One may argue that the quality of arguments could be a concern and reasonable audiences may be able to understand them. However, borrowing from Levine’s Truth Default Theory, I would suggest that people will have a “truth default” which makes them susceptible to believing in things they hear rather than challenging or doubting it immediately (2014). In addition, given that these “facts” are shared within the broader cultural context of conflict, it is likely that they not only would be believed, but they would incite anger. Violence may not necessarily be legitimized by the use of words such as “cockroaches” or “evil,” but when “facts” are presented in conjunction and in bulk that cast the out-group in a harshly negative light, it’s not especially surprising that violence may result.

Whereas many scholars in the past have focused their attention upon the use of derogatory words such as ‘cockroaches’ against out-groups (Benesch, 2012; Benesch & Abramowitz, 2013; Donohue, 2012); my data suggest that such incidences are not proportionally dominant. That being said, they did prevail within the RTLM data. One broadcast contained the word *Inyenzi* (cockroach) 67 times! The use of negative words or slurs does exist, but it is not the most important thing in elite communication and does not solely depend on usage of extreme labels such as vermin or insects. Besides the RTLM, most speakers used negative attributes to define their enemies rather than outright name calling, including such terms as: wicked, evil, arrogant and chauvinistic. The prevalent idea – posited in past research and in Benesch’s

proposal – that so-called “dangerous speeches” contain words that reduce humans to vermin may be heavily influenced by RTLM data.

Benesch, in her treatise, encourages her readers to look for calls for violence and elliptical language in communication. In my theme of “Call for duty/Exhortation,” I coded for violent and non-violent ideas, whereby the speakers encouraged the listeners that they “must” and “should” do certain things. Akin to “Name calling,” the RTLM data turned out to be the only one which contained very specific commands such as asking the population to train, or be vigilant. The other speaker who called for action with certain commands was Wirathu, who asked his audience to economically boycott the products of the Rohingyas. Other speakers such as Milosevic and Prabhakaran did not necessarily give explicit calls for violence but did exhort for certain actions such as joining Communist forces and LTTE respectively. Again, RTLM proved to be an outlier in the intensity of their arguments and specifications. This is not to say that elites do not ask for actions; but rather, that the language they use is not always specific or as frequent.

Another interesting aspect of elite communication during conflicts is their idea of claiming victory over the out-group, or at least making progress under duress or holding their ground. Surprisingly, none of the research in the past has looked into this. In my data, speakers consistently refer to how well they are doing and how poorly the out-group is performing. From a social psychological point of view, this is simply a morale booster for the in-group and humiliating for the out-group. A speaker like Prabhakaran, who was involved in a militaristic conflict against the Sri Lankan state, consistently boasted of his group’s prowess and skill in defeating the state army. However, his speeches did not contain the intensity of language



displayed by the RTLM. The RTLM radio broadcasters went to extreme lengths to humiliate Tutsis. For instance, one broadcaster remarked:

*“The score of the Inkotanyi is indeed sealed; the fate of the Inkotanyi in Kigali city was sealed at about 2 PM, yesterday, Monday when the inhabitants killed at least nine Inkotanyi at the Sun City Hotel in Nyamirambo. When they were flushed out, one of them, who was very wily, managed to escape. But that makes no difference... he can run but he cannot hide. The inhabitants killed nine of their people who did not know what to do, as they had run out of ammunition, food and were in rags.”*

There were several other explicit references to how Tutsis were resorting to eating unripe coffee because they are losing the war and thus facing suffering.

My data also clearly suggest that the prevalence of certain themes is dependent upon the specific cultural and conflict context in which the speech is occurring. For example, the theme of territoriality (i.e., focusing on the importance of land or region) was used most often by Prabhakaran, followed by Milosevic. Why? In Prabhakaran’s case, territory was extremely focal, considering that the Tamils were situated in the North of the country and that was the region fighting for independence. Similarly, the conflict in former Yugoslavia was largely territorial, and various groups were claiming independence which was against Serbian president Milosevic’s ideas. Future scholars interested in examining such speech should always consider the particular cultural and conflict-related contexts in which themes arise.

One of the most interesting and novel themes within my analysis is the emergence of what I have described as “*meta-out-groups*.” All of the speakers within my data suggested that some other religious, national, or local groups are siding with their enemies, thus rendering those third parties as some kind of meta-out-group. Thus, it may be logical to conclude that any

success against the out-group is also a victory against the meta-out-group or the third party. This theme has also not been touched upon by previous researchers.

The particular content of speeches also must be viewed through the lens of the mediums being used to present that content. Specifically, I have little doubt that one reason why the RTLM stands out as the most vicious and extremist in its communication is because the medium of communication was mediated. The RTLM was a private entity run by broadcasters and journalists whose profession gives them at least some prerogative of free speech in many respects across the globe. Moreover, radio broadcasts can last from few minutes to several hours where speakers can communicate unhindered particularly given the circumstances. Such broadcasts also were culturally legitimated by others in positions of power: the ruling Hutu party and the government gave its blessings to the radio because of the presence of several officials such as the Prime Minister and the President, and several prefects making appearances on its shows. Moreover, one broadcast examined in this thesis was made a few months before the conflict actually began. The broadcast contains explicit reference to out-groups and historical explanations to presence of different ethnic groups in Rwanda and even uses the words *Inyenzi* once. This should encourage researchers to see if the conflict was in the pipeline months before it actually led to genocide.

This thesis is an exploratory attempt in the subject of elite communication but it does not strictly adhere to the rules of quantitative content analysis. For such an undertaking, random sampling, independent coders and other relevant measures have to be taken. However, this thesis tried to develop a coding scheme which can facilitate such endeavors in the future.

## **Limitations and Implications for Future Research**

Understanding communication during conflicts may be a well-intentioned exercise, but it is still a difficult one. Conflicts by their very nature impede recordings and transmission of important data and the dynamics of research times frames do not help much either. This study is limited in its sample size and due to a comparative nature, does not account for several other differences amongst the countries of focus. The motivation behind such a study was to explore elite communication within the depths of available data and most importantly within the given time frame and constraints of the research design. Further research can look into the types of facts and allegations and how different themes are used in combination with each other. I think that the future looks bright as this and other studies can help move the theory of conflict communication forward, develop sensitive scales and thematic coding schemes and be applied to other domains besides genocide. It is in hope that such measures can be used to predict conflicts and their nature in hope that they can be forestalled.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix A

**Table 3. Elite communication themes during intra-state, inter-group conflicts from the literature.**

Source	Conflict types	Themes
Bozic-Anderson, 1992; Bozic Roberson, 2007	Ethnic: former Yugoslavia	Identity, ethnic polarization
Desrosiers, 2010	Ethnic: Serbia and India	Identity salience, use of myths
Donohue, 2012	Ethnic: Rwanda	Identity, us vs. them
Donohue, 2012	Ethnic: Rwanda	Out-group dehumanization
Glaeser, 2005	Inter-group	Economic reasoning
Kaufman, 2001	Ethnic and inter-group: former Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany	Myths, symbolism
Kissoupoulous, 2007	Ethnic: Serbia and India	Ethnic polarization, identity
Mann, 2005	Ethnic: former Yugoslavia	Victimhood, false accounts/myths
Mann, 2005	State sanctioned: Nazi Germany	Economic reasoning

**Table 3 (cont'd)**

Morus, 2000	Ethnic and Inter-group: Cambodia, Rwanda and Germany	Dehumanization, fear of the enemy and injustice.
Morus, 2007	Ethnic: former Yugoslavia	Myths, false stories/accounts
Morus, 2007	Ethnic former Yugoslavia	Exclusiveness of in-group
Roy and Rowland, 2003	Communal: India	Victimization, minority vs. majority
Roy and Rowland, 2003	Communal: India	Myths, redemption
Zubero, 2012	Inter-group: Rwanda and Germany	Identity, social construction of stranger

## Appendix B

A preliminary examination of texts made for themes in Draft 1 and its examples. This draft was then tested with new excerpts from the data. To improve inter-coder reliability, some improvements and changes were made (including dropping theme 2) which led to Draft II. A new test was employed which improved reliability, dropped theme *Veneration of martyrs/fallen* and helped finalize Draft II whose improved version is already presented above in the Coding & Analysis section. Draft II below contains excerpts from first and second inter-coder reliability tests.

### Themes draft I

Following are the commonly appearing themes from a preliminary investigation of the data. Each theme is defined and is followed by an example. Note that some themes may be overlapping with each other.

#### **1. Conflation of the in-group identity with the national or supra-ethnic identity**

This refers to speakers' assumptions that the in-group is THE national group while the out-group is external to the nation and thus foreign. This also includes speaker's claims to a group's ethnic identity connected to larger regional identity. (Note: This is akin to Zubero's classification of making strangers out of out-groups)

*Wirathu: From Mawlamyine to Yangon, the coach is empty and their people use it but from Yangon to Mawlamyine the coach is still full because our golden Burmese use it. So they (Rohingyas) reduced the price. At first it was 6000 kyat but then they reduced to 5000 kyat. Still no Burmese used the service. Then they reduced up to 3500 kyat. Now, all are using it again. If we lose now, they would form groups and by the support of Saudi Arabian oil money, they would compete against our businesses.*

#### **2. Anger/Sadness as justification for riots**

The refers to speakers using a grievous incident as a cause of anger/sadness which subsequently produced unruly behaviors such as rioting, looting or killing. A speech may be delivered after a grievous or sad incident and can contain references to the said incident.

*RTLTM (Rwandan President Sindikubwabo): Peace and security were already undermined in the town of Kigali due principally to anger and sorrow that Rwandans got because of their enemies who made them orphans.*

**3. Call for duty/exhortation.** This refers to speakers encouraging the audiences to protect themselves and/or ensure their survival. This may be in form of call or duties to detailed mechanisms or strategies such doing certain actions, boycott, take up arms, patrol, stay put, ignore, encourage others, pass information, keep an eye on others, defend, and communicate.

The speakers may also use the words or equivalents to requests. The speakers can also use exhortation or consequential warnings to those who are scared or reluctant to comply.

*Prabhakaran. This is crucial for the survival of the Tamil race. Our Nation has been forced into a necessity to struggle for survival. The young generation of Tamils cannot escape from this national duty, from this call of history. Any delay in this task will endanger the existence of our Nation. Therefore, I call upon the younger generation to join our liberation movement without delay. The earlier the*

*young men and women join our movement the quicker we can achieve the objectives of our struggle.*

*Wirathu: If all our people travelling from both side support only travelling on both sides and support only our fellow Buddhist even in nationalist sense and sacrifice the amount 1500 kyat , we golden Burmese would win this fight.*

*RTLTM - prefect of Kigali 14/04/1994: As you know that citizens have their own means to ensure security in their localities. I want them to remain courageous as they showed it these last days (sic), to conduct night patrols, to prevent the enemy from infiltrating because as it is evident, the war in town is different from the war in the forest*

**4. The third party connection.** The speakers may connect the out-group to some other out-group of ethnic or political identity/power/ideology/race/nationality including international countries, groups, organizations or persons. These meta-outgroups may considered conspiratorial, siding with or controlling the out-group, negligent or critical of the speaker's group, richer, powerful, all-knowing, rulers and in some way intangible. However, enemies on the ground may be considered an embodiment of such meta-outgroups.

*RTLTM: Today certain white people, especially Americans, Canadians and Belgians believe that the villain in this country is the machete-wielding Hutu, whereas the Hutu is trying to ensure the Hutus are not annihilated by the descendants of Gatutsi.*

*RTLTM: The United States has a little known phenomenon called lobbying. This is donate money to leading candidates in return for favors once they are elected. This is a clever tactic. It is now used, for instance, by Museveni through certain wily individuals who defend his interests before American members of congress. Then the congressmen bring pressure to bear on the President of the United States. That is how this kind of decision is arrived at. A Hima from Uganda uses American crooks and they tell the President to "kill the Hutus".*

*RTLTM: Thus as we were saying, it is the Tutsi MUSVENI group that the American's are assisting. Er... as I indicated earlier, the aid brought in by the Americans is for the Inkotanyi to go and study in their country, in places like Arkansas, Bill Clinton's home state. Such aid has bow increased from \$150,000 to \$400,000 US dollars. Besides, they have disbursed \$50,000 or rather \$500,000 US dollars to fund the demobilization of soldiers of MUSEVINI's army. Nevertheless, there has been no reduction in the army strength as most of the Ugandan troops concerned gave been sent here. Part of the money was used to purchase arms, which is the reason we are living under the threat of annihilation.*

*RTLTM: I agree with you with what you have said about the white men... those white men who sold us, those Tutsis who sold us abroad., Henceforth, I know that there are some white Canadians here who are doing everything to have the surviving Tutsi orphans atGisimba's and in other places to be sent abroad.*

*Wirathu: If we lose now, they would form groups and by the support of Saudi Arabian oil money, they would compete against our businesses.*

*Prabhakaran: The Indian military occupation of Tamil Eelam posed a major challenge to our determination. At that historical conjuncture when we were hard pressed by the military supremacy of a world power, we fought with fierce determination without giving up the cause. During that dangerous situation,*



*determination became our ultimate weapon. It was by that moral power we were able to confront a great military power of the world.*

*Prabhakaran: We are now facing a new challenge, a new war of aggression.*

*Our historical enemy, Sinhala Buddhist Chauvinism, has taken institutional form in the guise of Chandrika's regime and has been conducting a genocidal war against the Tamil race.*

## **5. We win, they lose**

During the conflict, the in-group elites may refer to instances where they may be winning the war or taking control of the situation. This also includes abasing the enemy and attempts to demoralize the out-group.

*RTLM: People are asking: " What has become of the Inkotanyi in Kigali City? The score of the Inkotanyi is indeed sealed; the fate of the Inkotanyi in Kigali city was sealed at about 2 PM, yesterday, Monday when the inhabitants killed at least nine Inkotanyi at the Sun City Hotel in Nyamirambo. When they were flushed out, one of them, who was very wily, managed to escape. But that makes no difference... he can run but he cannot hide. The inhabitants killed nine of their people who did not know what to do, as they had run out of ammunition, food and were in rags.*

**6. Anecdotes.** The speaker may inform the audience of an out-group's activities through a personally witnessed account or by claiming credible information/source/witness.

*Wirathu: Let me tell you one thing. I visited Myot Hla Township. Local monks complained that they could not perform Buddhist ritual ceremony on Martyrs day. I was blown off. What a rude governor of the Township I said. I thought the authority was so rude. How come they refused to perform Buddhist rituals that day General Aung San was assassinated. But the local monks explained me that the property owner is a 'Kalar' (slur for Rohingya Muslims) and he does not allow us to perform.*

**7. Fact-making and allegations.** This refers to speaker informing the public of some facts, actions, events, plans or strategy of the out-group. This also includes allegations or false claims aimed at an out-groups' strategy, plans, beliefs or intentions. These allegations may appear to be damaging to the speaker's in-group or to peace in general.

This also includes any historical or mythical stories presented as facts.

*Wirathu: At first their plan was to invade those three towns on the anniversary of 8.8.88. But at the time of the Taung-goke incident, they were confident because they had had prior military trainings and enough weapons. They waged a war and tried to invade three towns in May in an untimely fashion i.e., before their actual plan. But their war wasn't successful, thus as a revenge they are attempting again now.*

*Wirathu: They have joined the political parties not because they are interested in politics, not because they respect human right but for the sake of their people. Their religion is the most abusive of human rights. They are seriously abusing freedom of belief.*

*RTLM: About a thousand persons cross the border daily, fleeing from the Inyenzi, those Inyenzi who continue to target intellectuals, as well as those they accuse of being interahamwe. They actually check identity cards and do not spare any Hutu.*

*RTLM: Thus as we were saying, it is the Tutsi MUSVENI group that the American's are assisting. Er... as I indicated earlier, the aid brought in by the Americans is for*

*the Inkotanyi to go and study in their country, in places like Arkansas, Bill Clinton's home state. Such aid has now increased from \$150,000 to \$400,000 US dollars. Besides, they have disbursed \$50,000 or rather \$500,000 US dollars to fund the demobilization of soldiers of MUSEVINI's army. Nevertheless, there has been no reduction in the army strength as most of the Ugandan troops concerned have been sent here. Part of the money was used to purchase arms, which is the reason we are living under the threat of annihilation.*

**8. Veneration of martyrs/fallen.** The speakers may mention and/or praise the fallen and suggest to the audiences that their sacrifices must never be forgotten.

*Prabhakaran: Today is the day of remembrance of our country's brave martyrs. Today we pay our respect to those heroes who valued the freedom of their country more than their life and gave their life for it. We light the lamp of gratitude in our hearts and honor them.*

**9. Importance of land.** This refers to claims ownership/possession of a region or land and that being a symbol of the ethnic group. This also includes referring to a particular area, to an entire country, region in order to protect and/or defend it. Speakers may also suggest what areas or border lines are problematic and a source of future trouble for the in-group or national solidarity.

*Prabhakaran: Today the war of aggression against our land by the enemy has reached a phenomenal scale. Having mobilized all its military power and having utilized all its national resources, the enemy has launched a massive invasion on the Jaffna soil. Our traditional land of ancient historical glory is being systematically destroyed by the enemy's firepower. The intense shelling that rains down unabatingly has wiped out the face of Jaffna. The fundamental objective of this war of aggression is to destroy the economic resources and the cultural heritage of Jaffna thereby uprooting the national life of the people.*

**10. Defining differences and name calling.** The speakers may use the speech to define, extrapolate, advocate, reiterate ethnic differences between their group and the rest. They can also talk about in-group/out-group defining characteristics such as cognitive, moral and physical traits. They may also use words which clearly refer to an out-group and can also use the opportunity to give historical evidence as to why these differences exist. They may refute any ideas which suggest that differences are of little or no importance.

Moreover, in order to stress differences, the speakers may use racist, or derogatory or identifying slurs. They may also include character defining yet negative attributive words such as: devil, wicked, enemy, chauvinistic.

*RTLM: When you tell them: "You Inkotanyi, you kill people, you kill people atrociously, you indulge in torture", they resort to flattery with their smooth tongue, pride and arrogance.*

**11. Historical or present victimization/injustice.**

The speakers will suggest to the audiences that they are victims of gross historical or present injustice which makes them victims. They may also suggest that their group "deserves"

power but they have been denied any resources which are either rightfully theirs or a function of prejudice.

Prabhakaran: *This aggressive war that has been launched in the guise of a "war for peace" and as a "war for the liberation of the Tamils" has seriously disrupted the peace of the Tamils, reduced them to refugees, as subjugated people, destroyed their social and economic existence and brought them intolerable suffering*

## Themes draft II

### **1. Conflation of the in-group identity with the national or supra-ethnic identity/Defining differences**

This refers to speakers' assumptions that the in-group is THE national group while the out-group is external to the nation and thus foreign. This also includes speaker's claims to a group's ethnic identity connected to larger regional identity. The speakers may use the speech to define, extrapolate, advocate, reiterate ethnic differences between their group and the rest. They can also talk about in-group/out-group defining characteristics such as cognitive, moral and physical traits. They may also use words which clearly refer to an out-group and can also use the opportunity to give historical evidence as to why these differences exist. They may refute any ideas which suggest that differences are of little or no importance.

(Note: This is akin to Zubero's classification of making strangers out of out-groups)

RTLTM: *...another item of news about the Inkotanyi*

RTLTM: *We have already confirmed that ethnic groups exist and even tried to see their characteristics over the years in the history of Rwanda*

**2. Call for duty/exhortation.** This refers to speakers encouraging the audiences to protect themselves and/or ensure their survival. This may be in form of call or duties to detailed mechanisms or strategies such doing certain actions, boycott, take up arms, patrol, stay put, ignore, encourage others, pass information, keep an eye on others, defend, and communicate. The speakers may also use the words or equivalents to requests. The speakers can also use exhortation or consequential warnings to those who are scared or reluctant to comply.

Milosevic: *Therefore we the Communists, must do everything in our power to eliminate the consequences of the nationalist and counterrevolutionary forces both in Kosovo and other parts of the country.*

Milosevic: *The first thing, I want to tell you comrades in connection with this goal is to stay here.*

RTLTM: *We have already confirmed that ethnic groups exist and even tried to see their characteristics over the years in the history of Rwanda.*

**3. The third party connection.** The speakers may connect the out-group to some other out-group of ethnic or political identity/power/ideology/race/nationality including international countries, groups, organizations or persons. These meta-out-groups may be considered conspiratorial, siding with or controlling the out-group, negligent or critical of the speaker's group, richer, powerful, all-knowing, rulers and in some way intangible. However, enemies on the ground may be considered an embodiment of such meta-out-groups.

RTLTM: *For a long time, the white man has harboured the erroneous conception that Tutsi are good people.*

Prabhakaran: *Our historical enemy, Sinhala Buddhist Chauvinism, has taken institutional form in the guise of Chandrika's regime and has been conducting a genocidal war against the Tamils.*

RTLTM: *You must have understood that Belgian policy has suffered a setback, as France has assumed the leading role in Rwandan politics.*

#### **4. We win, they lose**

During the conflict, the in-group elites may refer to instances where they may be winning the war or taking control of the situation. This also includes abusing the enemy and attempts to demoralize the out-group.

RTLTM: *Why are you running to eat our flour in Magerwa? While in CND, were not you eating pleasant food? Your relatives were not bringing you milk there? Now your arrogance made them to be exterminated.*

**5. Anecdotes.** The speaker may inform the audience of an out-group's activities through a personally witnessed account or by claiming credible information/source/witness. first person or third person

RTLTM: *In all corners, we don't see any Inkotanyi.*

Wirathu: *When I visited Meikthilar, a person said, the ostrich has become Muslim (reference to NLD party becoming a Muslim party).*

RTLTM: *A woman living in Nyamirambo asked me to salute a young man, her son, Army Sergeant Asumani, in Cyamingu.*

**6. Fact-Making and allegations.** This refers to speaker informing the public of some facts, actions, events, plans or strategy of the out-group. This also includes allegations or false claims aimed at an out-groups' strategy, plans, beliefs or intentions. These allegations may appear to be damaging to the speaker's in-group or to peace in general. This also includes any historical or mythical stories presented as facts.

Wirathu: *At first their plan was to invade those three towns on the anniversary of 8.8.88.*

RTLTM: *Still, RPF Inkotanyi (reference to Tutsi rebel army), has never really agreed to stop the combats*

RTLTM: *You must have understood that Belgian policy has suffered a setback, as France has assumed the leading role in Rwandan politics.*

RTLTM: *So we found that the attack of the Inkotanyis was the major factor which undermined our security in Kigali.*

**7. Importance of land/territoriality.** This refers to claims ownership/possession of a region or land and that being a symbol of the ethnic group. This also includes referring to a particular area, to an entire country, region in order to protect and/or defend it. Speakers may also suggest what areas or border lines are problematic and a source of future trouble for the in-group or national solidarity.

Prabhakran: *This war is being waged for liberation of our land*

**8. Name calling.** The speakers may use the speech to define, extrapolate, advocate, reiterate ethnic differences between their group and the rest. They can also talk about ingroup/outgroup defining characteristics such as cognitive, moral and physical traits. They may also use words which clearly refer to an out-group and can also use the opportunity to give historical evidence as to why these differences exist. They may refute any ideas which suggest that differences are of little or no importance.

Moreover, in order to stress differences, the speakers may use racist, or derogatory or identifying slurs. They may also include character defining yet negative attributive words such as: devil, wicked, enemy and chauvinistic.

RTLM: When you tell them: "You Inkotanyi, you kill people, you kill people atrociously, you indulge in torture", *they resort to flattery with their smooth tongue, pride and arrogance.*

RTLM: ...*Inyenzi*

### **9. Historical or present victimization/injustice.**

The speakers will suggest to the audiences that they are victims of gross historical or present injustice which makes them victims. They may also suggest that their group "deserves" power but they have been denied any resources which are either rightfully theirs or a function of prejudice.

Prabhakaran: *The five year rule of Chandrika has been a curse on Tamil people. The monumental tragedy that our people encountered in the form of war, violence, death, destruction, displacement, hunger and starvation was the worst form of Tyranny ever suffered by the Tamils*

Milosevic: *It is not right that some get to educate their children abroad while others have to escort their children around the corner to so that they do not get beaten up or raped on this short journey.*

## Appendix C

**Table 4. List of Speeches**

<b>Date of speech/broadcast</b>	<b>Medium</b>
<b>Milosevic</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 24, 1987</li> <li>• October 17, 1988</li> <li>• November 19, 1988</li> </ul>	Public address Public address Public address
<b>Prabhakaran</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• November 27, 1993</li> <li>• November 27, 1995</li> <li>• November 27, 1996</li> <li>• November 27, 1999</li> <li>• November 27, 2000</li> <li>• November 27, 2001</li> </ul>	Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio
<b>RTL</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• December 12, 1993</li> <li>• April 11, 1994</li> <li>• April 14, 1994</li> <li>• May 17-18, 1994</li> <li>• May 28, 1994</li> <li>• June 09, 1994</li> </ul>	Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio
<b>Wirathu</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exact date undetermined. Possibly 2012</li> <li>• Exact data undetermined. Possibly end of 2012 and early 2013</li> </ul>	Available on youtube.com  Available on youtube.com

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