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
Smallholder Land Interests, Political Opportunities,
and Farmer Organization: A Case Study of the
Zimbabwe Farmers Union

presented by

Maria E.O. Arnaiz

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**SMALLHOLDER LAND INTERESTS, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND
FARMER ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF
THE ZIMBABWE FARMERS' UNION**

By

Maria E. O. Arnaiz

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ABSTRACT

SMALLHOLDER LAND INTERESTS, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND FARMER ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE ZIMBABWE FARMERS UNION

By

Maria E. O. Arnaiz

Farmer organizations are widely perceived as one way to represent the rural disenfranchised. Rarely have studies investigated how these organizations represent different and conflicting interests or whether they are democratic. If donors intend to use farmer organizations to promote broad-based rural development, then we need to understand which interests mobilize and are represented by them. This dissertation examines organizational policy-making in the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), a farmer organization that counts commercial and smallholder farmers as members. Both member groups seek greater access to land. Under what conditions can and do smallholder members prevail in getting the ZFU to articulate their land demands?

The study asked; would smallholder members have greater opportunities for political action on land policy at the district level? Would those mobilizing for land within the ZFU be more likely to achieve their goals at the district level? The district level coincides with the level of implementation for land policy and suggests stronger rules for leadership accountability and participatory decision-making. To explore these questions, data were collected through individual and group interviews at the district and national levels and household and farm surveys in Shamva District.

The study found that the ZFU's positions on land favor the interests of its senior leaders, and members did not mobilize nationally to challenge those positions. Members had more opportunities for political action at the district level but did not take advantage of them. They perceived the ZFU as a service delivery organization ineffective in dealing with resettlement issues and chose to access land through informal land markets, illegal occupation, and opportunistic expansion. These actions facilitate land exchange within the boundaries of the smallholder areas but do little to alleviate land scarcity. For members to use the ZFU to articulate their land needs, they must see it as effective in acquiring land for them. Unfortunately, the highly publicized farm invasions of 2000 - carried out largely by opportunistic squatters - reinforced the notion that individual action rather than collective action is the most effective way of acquiring land.

To David, Manny, and Emilio for putting the dissertation into perspective

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I would like to thank Dr. Deborah Merrill-Sands and Dr. John Farrington for giving me the opportunity to work on the ISNAR/ODI collaborative research project that brought me to Zimbabwe and introduced me to the ZFU. Berean Mukwende, the ZFU senior projects officer, and the late Gary Magadzire, the ZFU president, gave me access to staff, leaders, and members. Staff, members, and leaders, were extremely helpful and willing to share with me documents, reports, and project papers. I would especially like to thank Liz Mhlanga who arranged interviews for me at the ZFU and with ministry staff and leaders and staff at the CFU and ICFU. Without the ZFU's cooperation, this dissertation would not have been possible.

Cheryl Danley, a friend and colleague, introduced me to the IDS research group headed by Sam Moyo. I would like to thank Cheryl and Sam as well as Louis Masuko and Naomi Wekwete for providing collegial and administrative support. In the field, Mercy Nyamagwanda and Petronella Jeche, my research assistants, offered invaluable help in organizing meetings, interviews, and translations. The Chief Executive Officer of Shamva's Rural District Council, Mrs Jones, the District Administrator, and Agritex field agents greatly facilitated the field research. Finally, I would like to thank my advisor,

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I assume full responsibility for any omissions, inaccuracies, or errors of interpretation.

PREFACE

My interest in the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) began in January 1995. As a research associate for a collaborative ODI/ISNAR study, I had the opportunity to work with ZFU senior staff and leaders to develop and implement a study of the organization's actual and potential capacity to participate in technology development. In the course of the study, I spoke with ZFU members, leaders, and staff from the grassroots to the national level, and acquired a real appreciation for what the ZFU has accomplished in helping members address their production problems. At the same time, I recognized a dilemma common to organizations that represent such a broad interest group. On any single issue, ZFU members had different and often conflicting interests. How can an organization reconcile those interests and equitably represent them? For donors, the answer is critical for appreciating the realistic role the ZFU and similar organizations can play in promoting smallholder development and grassroots democracy.

Because of my work with the ZFU, I was invited to join a study to investigate the district-level impacts of economic structural adjustment sponsored by the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Zimbabwe. My role in the study was to investigate the role of farmer organizations in helping farmers cope with economic structural adjustment. In the process, I also investigated the issue of equitable representation in the ZFU at a district-level and in the context of Phase II resettlement.

The IDS study concluded in October 1997. Significant political changes affecting the resettlement program have occurred since the end of my study. In the ZFU also, changes in leadership and staff have taken place. This dissertation is limited in its

capacity to address how changes beyond the study period have affected conditions within the ZFU that shape the political opportunities for its smallholder members. Thus, most the discussion is limited to the period 1995-1997. When available, I use information from secondary sources like reports, conference papers, seminar proceedings, and newspaper articles to update the data obtained during the study period in Zimbabwe.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the subsequent rise of democratic governments throughout the developing world created considerable academic, political, and donor agency interest in the study of "civil society." The World Bank, bilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations invested heavily in the study and promotion of societal groups considered vital to the sustainability of fledgling democracies. Of greatest concern was the role that these organizations would play in providing a political voice for the various historically disenfranchised groups. To this end, the Bank and others targeted farmer organizations considered to be the most likely to represent the rural disenfranchised.

The interest in farmer organizations (FO's) rests on the assumption that if poor farmers organize, they can create a "demand-pull" for services and policies needed by them from government and non-governmental organizations and the private sector. By making the demands listed below, FO's can help to create an environment favorable to smallholder production (Bratton, 1986; Zinyama, 1992).

1. Demand that national research systems provide smallholders with appropriate technologies, and that national extension services provide them with appropriate technical advice (Chambers et al, 1989; Merrill-Sands and Collion, 1994; Merrill-Sands and Kaimowitz, 1990).

2. Demand pricing, marketing, and other agriculture policies that promote their interests (Bates, 1981; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Bratton, 1987).
3. Demand favorable terms from suppliers and from buyers (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993).
4. Demand a more equitable distribution of property rights to water and land (Moyo and Skalnès, 1992; Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989; Lipton, 1974).

Growth in smallholder agriculture can lead to growth in the overall economies of many developing nations where smallholder agriculture contributes significantly to the gross national product (GNP) (Hussi et al, 1993). Growth in the general economy strengthens democratic institutions. Conversely, a stagnant economy and declining real incomes contribute to the instability of newly democratized governments (Duncan and Howell, 1992).

Research on FO's has considered the conditions for their *emergence* (Bingen, 1994; Bray, 1991; Carroll, 1992), *development* (Bingen et al, 1995; Farrington and Bebbington, 1994; Uphoff, 1993; ISNAR, 1995), and *effectiveness* (Arnaiz et al, 1995; Bingen and Bratton, 1994; Ndiame, 1994; Wellard and Copestake, 1994). If a desire to strengthen the voice of the rural poor drives donor and academic interest in FO's, then internal issues of mobilization and representation become critical. Yet, many FO studies do not address these issues focusing instead on state-societal relations and projecting upon "these organizations democratic aspirations, credentials, and capacities" (Bratton, 1994a). Assuming FO's are democratic or participatory becomes untenable as the size of the FO increases, and it represents broader interests. National-level FO's are desirable because their scale and inclusiveness adds to their credibility but doubts persist about their capacity to identify, represent, and communicate a broad range of members' interests (ISNAR, 1995).

To understand the role FO's can play in promoting broad-based rural development, research must also consider internal issues of mobilization and representation. This study seeks to do so by examining how the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU), a smallholder farmer organization, chooses between conflicting member interests in the land policy arena. The ZFU is unique among farmer unions because its membership includes large-scale commercial (LSC) and small-scale commercial (SSC) farmers. The government's new land policy identifies black commercial and smallholder farmers as recipients of the resettlement program. Given the limited availability of resettlement lands and its incompatible land-use characteristic, commercial and smallholder interests do conflict. Within this context, can poorer members prevail in getting the ZFU to represent their land interests? What factors facilitate internal mobilization among them?

LAND AND SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE

Land represents the most critical asset in agricultural production in Zimbabwe. Since the pre-colonial period, societal groups have sought privileged access to prime farmland (Beach, 1986). Colonial policies granted most of the fertile lands to white (LSC) farmers while sequestering the rural majority on mostly marginal lands in drought-prone areas. After twenty years of Independence, the distribution of land rights inherited from the colonial period remains largely intact.

During the 1980s, donors and scholars pointed to Zimbabwe's smallholder agriculture as the success story of sub-Saharan Africa. After just five years of Independence, black farmers dramatically increased their production of maize and cotton (Rhorbach, 1989; Mariga, 1994). However, from 1988-1995, maize and cotton yields

dropped by 26% and 28% respectively bringing into question the sustainability of the yield gains achieved earlier (MLAWD, 1995). Recurrent drought during this period contributed to the erosion of production gains, but analysts suggest a more fundamental reason; gains in production came at the cost of long-term soil fertility. The intensification of smallholder agriculture coupled with mounting population pressures in the smallholder areas gave rise to the highest erosion rates in the country (Whitlow, 1988). The limited access smallholder farm households have to quality farmlands poses the major impediment to their continued development (Maposa, 1995; Skalmes and Moyo, 1992).

The land problem faced by smallholders is two-fold. First, the fixed boundaries of the communal lands means that succeeding generations have access to ever diminishing parcels of land (Mehretu, 1994). Campbell et al (1989) found a negative association between parcel size and soil degradation. Second, the placement of the communal lands in drought-prone areas with primarily sodic soils makes them unsuitable for intensive agriculture (Muir, 1994). Yet, post-Independence agriculture policies encouraged smallholder farmers to intensify production. Responding to these incentives, smallholder farmers readily adopted the use of chemical fertilizers in place of manuring and rotations, and expanded their production of maize and cotton at the expense of traditional crops like millet and sorghum (Roth, 1990).

Yield differences between high rainfall and low rainfall areas illustrate the importance of land access in the development of smallholder agriculture. Population densities in high rainfall areas exceed population densities in low rainfall areas almost three-fold. On average, farmers in the high rainfall areas have smaller landholdings than

farmers in the low rainfall areas (Sithole and Atwood, 1990). Yet, Stack (1994) found that smallholders in the higher rainfall areas achieved higher and more consistent yields than their counterparts in drought-prone zones. Bratton (1986) and Cousins et al. (1992) concluded that access to better quality lands allowed smallholders in higher rainfall areas to capture a disproportionate share of the development benefits from government policies. Moreover, differences in land quality explained why farmers in the lower rainfall areas sought food aid from the government even during average rainfall years whereas farmers in the higher rainfall areas did not (MLAWD, 1995).

THE LAND POLICY ARENA

Land presents a strong mobilizing principle for Zimbabwe's black farmers. During the Liberation War, freedom fighters mobilized the rural majority around a demand for the return of "lost lands" (Lan, 1985). In the post-Independence period, the Mugabe government used the land issue to consolidate its political base in the rural areas and to mobilize that base when it felt politically vulnerable. The slow-down of the first resettlement program coincided with the signing of a unity accord between the two major political parties, ZANU (PF) and ZAPU (PF).¹ Critics contend that the government's renewed interest in resettlement came in response to the demand for multiparty elections made by the World Bank and IMF as part of their loan package (Dashwood, 1996).

The 1992 Land Act, the enabling legislation for Phase II of the resettlement

¹ ZANU (PF) is the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), the ruling political party. ZAPU (PF) was the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Patriotic Front), the major opposition party until the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987. ZAPU (PF) folded into ZANU (PF).

program, expanded the pool of beneficiaries for resettlement to include all black farmers and aspiring black farmers. Consequently, the previously unified black lobby for land splintered into two groups: commercial farmers and smallholder farmers in the communal areas (CA). Each group considers access to commercial lands as critical for their own development. The relative scarcity of resettlement lands puts these interests in direct conflict.

Zimbabwe's farm lobby comprises three farmer unions, each representing a major farm sub-sector. The CFU, Commercial Farmer Union, represents the narrow interests of the mostly white large-scale commercial farm class. The ICFU, Indigenous Commercial Farmer Union, represents the interests of black large-scale commercial and emergent farmers.² Both the ICFU and the CFU want government to invest in the maintenance of the commercial farm areas. The difference lies in the CFU's opposition to the government's land acquisition policy and the ICFU's support of it. The ICFU argues that government has a responsibility to invest in the development of black commercial agriculture and to provide commercial farmers with land (ICFU, 1999).

Unlike the ICFU and CFU, the ZFU represents both peasant and commercial farmers; a consequence of the bitter debate preceding the 1992 Land Act³ and on-going processes of rural differentiation. Peasant farmers from the resettlement areas (RA) and the communal areas (CA) account for the majority of the ZFU's members. However,

² Emergent farmers are those in business or non-farm sectors looking to become commercial agricultural producers.

³ The Mugabe government strongly encouraged a merger between the two farmer organizations representing black farmers at that time to show solidarity among them for the new Land Act. The NFAZ (National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe) represented CA and RA farmers, and the ZNFU (Zimbabwe National Farmers Union) represented black small-scale commercial (SSC) farmers (Bratton, 1994a).

commercial farmers make-up a disproportionate percentage of the national leadership. Unlike the ICFU and CFU, the land interests between ZFU members and between members and leaders differ and conflict (Arnaiz et al, 1995; Burgess, 1994a).

The "top-down" nature of governmental decision-making requires smallholder farm interests to have a strong policy voice at the national level to counter the ICFU and CFU in the land policy arena. This study defines policy voice as "claim-making" - the ability to access resources to or to modify the goals and procedures of an existing program or project (Bratton, 1988; Esman and Uphoff, 1984). The government maintains a highly regulated structure of organized interests that leaves smallholder farmers with few alternatives outside of the ZFU or ZANU (PF) to articulate their demands to national policy-makers.

Until the farm invasions of 2000, the government had moved cautiously in defining and implementing its land policy, recognizing the political necessity of maintaining the support of each farmer union (Moyo, 1998). White LSC farmers contribute significantly to the national economy, and in the government's view, the successful implementation of its economic structural adjustment program required the cooperation of the CFU (Skalnes, 1996). The ICFU offers a justification for the acquisition of commercial farms by high-ranking party and government representatives (Moyo, 1995). The rural poor represent ZANU (PF)'s political base for ZANU (PF), and the party's desire to retain their support strengthens the ZFU as an actor in the land policy arena.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN THE ZFU

Donors seek to develop the ZFU as policy voice for poor black farmers (Riddell, 1994). Many believe that having a strong national organization like the ZFU is sufficient for the expression of smallholder farm interests in policy-making (Burgess, 1992). This belief, however, rests on the assumption that an organization like the ZFU can capture and represent the diversity of interests present within the smallholder population. Yet, this assumption cannot hold in the context of conflicting interests, as is the case regarding land policy. The limited availability of resettlement lands and their incompatible-use characteristic suggest that the ZFU cannot effectively represent interests of its commercial members and its poorer members.

The ZFU appears to favor commercial farm interests in its stated positions on resettlement. In 1994, the Union's President, G. Magadzire, argued that *"not every person who requires land should have access to such land. The [ZFU] believes that only competent⁴ farmers should be allocated land under the resettlement program"* (ZFU, 1995). The apparent conflict between commercial and smallholder land interests requires smallholder members to have a policy voice within the Union. Do opportunities exist for poorer smallholder farmers to prevail in getting the ZFU to express their land demands? Do they have a policy voice within the Union? The process whereby poor members mobilize through the organization and the conditions facilitating or blocking mobilization is the focus of this dissertation.

⁴ The ZFU defines competent farmers as those: (1) ranking among the better-producing farmers in their communal area; (2) having experience in commercial farm management; and (3) having formal training in agriculture at the certificate, diploma or degree level.

The literature on peasant farm organizations has paid little attention to issues of interest mobilization and representation within the context of organizational policy-making (Bratton, 1994a). Two dominant views have shaped research in this area. One viewpoint assumes that all members share similar interests and that organizational decision-making is an apolitical process (see Burgess 1992, 1997). Hence, the focus lies in elucidating organizational structures associated with decision-making. A second viewpoint contends that over time, leaders co-opt their organizations, especially those representing the poor and illiterate. Michels' (1915) "Iron Law of Oligarchy" explains that the interests of leaders and members diverge as the organization prospers. Ineffective rules for holding leaders accountable, a shortcoming often found in organizations representing the poor, allow leaders to use the organization for their own self-interests (Fox, 1991).

The two viewpoints presented above represent extremes and the reality for most FO's lies somewhere in between. Even in narrow interest organizations, like the CFU, interests between members diverge and conflict (Skalnes, 1989). The presence of conflicting interests suggest that organizational policy-making has a political dimension. Similarly, leaders do not often have broad discretionary power over decision-making. Rival factions and other sources of decision-making power act as a check and balance on the leadership's tendencies to co-opt their organization (Bingen, 1996a; Fox, 1991).

This dissertation contends that the decision-making process within the ZFU and similar organizations requires an analysis that joins an examination of interest mobilization with an understanding of the structure of political opportunities. Differences in the structure of policy arenas can explain why poor farmers may have

greater opportunities to influence decision-making in some policy arenas but not in others. The dissertation also looks compares the opportunities for political action present at the national level and at the district (local) level. In Zimbabwe, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the authority of the state weakens with distance from the administrative center, Harare. The implementation of land policy at the local level presents smallholder farmers and their representatives with opportunities to bargain with government officials on program implementation.

Research Objectives

The study's research objectives are grouped under three major categories: descriptive, methodological, and theoretical.

Descriptive:

1. To describe the relationship between land policies and land degradation in the communal areas making the case that sustained smallholder agricultural development requires re-distribution of rights to land to benefit small-scale farmers. To evaluate the impact of current and proposed land policy on agricultural production in communal, resettlement, and commercial areas. Given the objectives of proposed land policy, what will be the structure of smallholder agriculture in the future?
2. To identify Zimbabwean land policy and its constituent policy arenas.

Methodological

3. To assess the “openness” of the ZFU’s political system to demands from its members. The analysis examines political opportunity structures (POS) between land policy arenas and within each arena looking to see if structures at the national level differ in make-up from political opportunity structures at the local level.
4. To identify the land interests of poor, middle-income, and wealthy smallholder farmers. To understand their response to the POS's that they face when lobbying for their land interests within the ZFU.

Theoretical

5. To review concepts and theories from the policy analysis, social movements, and


rational choice literature to understand the dimensions of political opportunities. The study's framework identifies factors related to structure and agency as shaping the political opportunities for poor farmers within a membership organization.

6. To propose specific recommendations for expanding the political opportunities poor farmers have to influence land policy. Eight years have passed since passage of the 1992 Land Act, and the government has yet to declare a definitive policy on resettlement. The rural poor have not participated in this process, and consequently, their frustration expressed itself in widespread occupations of white-owned farms from February to May 2000. To defuse the situation, the government must in the near future find a way to include the rural poor in the land policy process.

Research Locale and Methods

The study uses data obtained from a survey of smallholder farm households in Shamva District located about 115 km northeast of the Zimbabwean capital, Harare (figure 1.1). The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) research team implemented a household survey in February-March 1996 administering the questionnaire to 468 randomly selected households in the district. This researcher also gathered data from group and key informant interviews carried out at the national, district, and village levels. Finally, this study uses data from a previous study, *Farmer Organizations in Technology Development and Transfer*, a collaborative research between the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) of London, and the International Service for National Agriculture Research (ISNAR) of the Hague.

Figure 1.1 Administrative Map of Zimbabwe



ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

The following chapter discusses the role of public policy in the development of the large-scale commercial, small-scale commercial, and smallholder farm classes. It argues that colonial land and agriculture public policies gave white farmers the foundation for their development including the accumulation of wealth and political power. On the other hand, it impoverished the black majority. The inequities in wealth translated into inequities in political power. Although the government invited the NFAZ and the ZNFU to participate in policy-making, their limited finances and analytic capacities put them at a disadvantage when competing against the CFU in the land policy arena. Consequently, the CFU effectively managed the land policy process to the benefit of its members.

Chapter 3 discusses the political ecology of land degradation in the smallholder farm areas. Colonial and post-Independence policies created conditions of poverty, land scarcity, and household food insecurity in the communal areas. These conditions defined the context of smallholder agriculture and shaped the production choices available to communal area farmers. The volatility of smallholder production coupled with a survival imperative created barriers to the adoption of technologies capable of maintaining and enhancing soil fertility; these technologies require at least three years before yielding a material benefit. Consequently, smallholder farmers use technologies that deplete soil fertility but in the short-term, allow them to meet their subsistence needs. In this way, land and agriculture policies have contributed to land degradation in the smallholder farming areas.

The discussion in Chapter 3 underscores the need for poor farmers to have a

political voice in the land policy arenas and in the broader agriculture policy arena.

Chapter 4 outlines an approach for investigating issues of smallholder mobilization and representation in the context of organizational policy-making. It combines concepts dealing with collective action, policy arenas and economic goods, and political opportunity structures. The conceptual approach identifies research questions specific to the land policy arena that are addressed in the following chapters.

Chapters 5 and 6 are the analysis chapters. Chapter 5 examines the national context of organizational policy-making. It describes national level political opportunity structures within the ZFU, provides a profile of the leadership, and describes how the political opportunity structures are "open" or "closed" to member mobilization around land issues. Given the nature of the political opportunity structures, it discusses why members have mobilized or not mobilized around their land interests. Chapter 6 provides a similar examination at the district level focusing on ZFU structures within Shamva District. The study contends that political opportunity structures differ between national and local levels, and that local political opportunity structures are "open" to member mobilization.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and conclusions of the study and discusses the implications of the findings given the recent political crisis triggered by the farm invasions of 2000. Does the sudden availability of lands through the resettlement program create greater incentives for smallholder farmers to use the ZFU to articulate their land demands? It gives recommendations for donors interested in strengthening the policy voice of poor farmers and identifies areas for further study.

CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND POLICY

Few in Zimbabwe dispute the observation that acute land hunger exists in the communal areas, and for moral and national security reasons, most support the idea that the rural poor should have greater access to land. Despite such public support and an ambitious land resettlement program, the Zimbabwean government had transferred only 2.7 million hectares of commercial farmland to smallholder farmers by 1990. Most of this land is located in the more arid regions of the country (Bratton, 1994b; Kangai, 1996). Twelve million hectares including almost all of the prime farmland remain in the LSC farm sector.

What underlies the post-Independence government's reticence toward redistributing land to the rural poor? Some note that many officials believed smallholder farmers inherently are subsistence-oriented and therefore, less efficient than commercial farmers. Until the land crisis of 2000, officials hesitated taking land from the core of the commercial farm sector because of the commercial agriculture's contribution to the national economy (Marcus, 1994; Roth, 1990). Second and more significantly, many in government blamed smallholder farmers, their land husbandry, and traditional tenure for the degradation of the communal areas (CA). They argued that even if smallholders

attained commercial production levels in the short-term, in the long-term, they would degrade the commercial lands much as they have their own lands (Skalnes and Moyo, 1992). The rationale blaming smallholder farmers for their low productivity and the environmental problems of the CA's echoes the arguments made by colonial authorities and the settler farm lobby to justify apartheid land policies (Alexander, 1994).

This chapter argues that land and agricultural policies represent choices made by the government in favor of a few well-organized interests. Because only 17% of Zimbabwe's total land area can support intensive agriculture, farm groups have sought privileged access to these lands as the basis for their development and the accumulation of wealth and political power. In addition to land apportionment, settler farmer groups won complementary policies that transferred productive resources like labor and capital from the African farm sector to settler agriculture (Arrighi, 1973; Malahala, 1980). Consequently, by 1970, colonial policies had effectively transformed a once thriving and partially commoditized African agriculture into a subsistence agriculture practiced on over-crowded and for the most part, degraded lands. Settler farmers, on the other hand, developed from "subsistence producers into a highly successful bourgeoisie with a claim to being essential to the capacity of the country to feed itself" (Stoneman, 1989:12). Since the late 1980's, black commercial farmers and business owners have sought similar policies to facilitate their development.

The remainder of this chapter discusses how public policies influenced the development of each of the three farm classes: large-scale commercial, small-scale commercial, and smallholder agriculture. It examines critical policies and programs that shaped the economic, social and institutional context of smallholder and commercial

agriculture. It also discusses the role of organized interests in framing important policy issues and in the policy process.

COLONIAL LAND POLICIES

Given the scarcity of prime farmland, land ownership and control of its resources has figured prominently in the political economy of Zimbabwe. During the pre-colonial period, the pattern of land ownership reflected the social hierarchy and the wealthiest families had exclusive access to the most fertile lands (Beach, 1983). This is not to say that the poor did not have access to lands. Embedded within Shona and Ndebele culture is the belief that each man should have access to enough land to support his family (Dzingirai, 1996; Yudelman, 1964). Alternately, white colonization of Zimbabwe meant increasing land alienation for the African majority. The settler ideology required that whites maintain their dominance in the settler economy, and they did so largely through policies that excluded Africans from the most fertile lands.

Company Rule and Laissez-Faire Policies

Shona-speaking people first settled into the area now known as Zimbabwe around 200 BC. Throughout the pre-colonial period, Zimbabwe comprised a number of dynasties like the Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa, Rozvi, and Torwa empires. Beginning in the 1830s, the Ndebele, an offshoot of the Nguni from South Africa, established their own kingdom in southern Zimbabwe. The Ndebele, who were pastoralists, occasionally raided the Shona, who were primarily cultivators, to the north and east. This practice resulted in considerable animosity between the two ethnic groups; a situation exploited by the Rhodesians to consolidate their control over the new colony (Beach, 1983;

Connah, 1990; Mutambirwa, 1980). In 1890, Cecil Rhodes and his “Pioneer Column” crossed the Limpopo River in the south and invaded Zimbabwe for the British South Africa Company (BSA). From 1890 to 1923, the BSA governed the colony as a business venture.

During the early period of colonization, the BSA did not pursue an interventionist land policy. Under pressure from the British government, it established reserves in Gwai and Shangani in 1894 although it did not require Africans to live there. Africans could remain in the European areas so long as they were employed or rented their lands. In some cases, Africans remained as squatters. Though the BSA had sold or given away large tracts of land, much remained undeveloped. As of 1903, less than 10% of the African population lived on the reserves.

The BSA's business interests in the colony dictated its policy toward Africans. Believing that Rhodesia's gold reserves equaled those of South Africa, the BSA initially focused its investments on developing the mining sector. It imposed taxes and levies on Africans to force them into wage labor at the mines. At the same time, it allowed African agriculture to develop because at the time, few settler farmers were able to produce for the market. Thus, the early colonial economy relied on Africans to meet their food and industrial demands. African farmers responded positively to the new market incentives and some reinvested their off-farm wages back into their farms to expand cropping area to purchase cattle, ploughs, and other farm equipment and hire labor. In 1904, African production accounted for more than 90% of the total agricultural output in the colony (Mutabambirwa, 1980).

The context of African agriculture changed in 1908 when the BSA shifted the emphasis of its economic policy from mining to agriculture. Realizing that Rhodesia's mining prospects fell far below expectations of a "Second Rand," the BSA decided to recoup its investments through land sales to prospective commercial farmers. In the coming years, the BSA developed railways and other transportation infrastructure to service the settler areas and offered credit and training to new settler farmers. As the settler population grew, so did the demand for cheap African labor. The Chartered Administration imposed more taxes and levies on Africans thereby forcing those unable to pay their obligations to move to the reserves. By 1913, about 40% of the African population lived on the reserves. However, the continuing importance of African agriculture in the settler economy gave the Chartered Administration reason not to forcibly move those who remained in the settler areas (Mahalala, 1980).

During the early years of the colony, the demands of settler farmers were often subordinated to those of the mining sector. To increase its political representation, nine farmers' associations merged in 1904 to form the Rhodesian Agricultural Union (RAU). Composed of the few successful and progressive farmers in the colony, the RAU sought greater water and land rights though with little success (Mutambirwa, 1980; Phimster, 1988a). With the implementation of the "White Agriculture Policy" in 1908, the Chartered Administration took more seriously the demands made by the RAU and began to consult them regarding the development of settler agriculture. The RAU, in turn, outlined a policy that would eventually become the cornerstone for the development of settler agriculture. It argued for the elimination of competition from African producers. One way of doing so was to put "the native cultivator ... in reserves...so far away from

railways that the white trader will not be able to buy from him and compete with white farmers."⁵ A corollary benefit would be the maintenance of a pool of cheap African labor (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989).

Land Apportionment

Formal segregation of the races into European and African areas did not transpire until passage of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. Despite the demands made by settler farmers for separate areas in 1923, the newly elected settler government moved slowly in that direction. In 1927, the Morris-Carter Land Commission recommended formal segregation and repeal of the "Cape Clause,"⁶ but government did not act on these recommendations until 1930 when worldwide recession threatened the viability of settler agriculture (Malahala, 1980; Moyana, 1984).

By 1920, the settler farmer population exceeded that of other sectors of the economy. Its sheer numbers and the increasing importance of settler agriculture to the development of the colonial economy meant that the farm lobby occupied a more central role in policy-making. Regarding land, two rationales dominated the discussion. Progressive farmers, most of whom belonged to the RAU, argued that Africans be legally barred from owning or renting farms in the settler areas because their poor land husbandry posed a threat to the cattle and crops of settler farmers. For the majority, however, farming was a "speculative gamble," and world market prices dictated cropping choices more so than any long-term plans to cultivate the land or to develop their farms

⁵ Mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, 1907, as cited in Phimster (1988a), p. 65.

⁶ The Cape Clause gave blacks the right to purchase lands.

as sustainable business enterprises. Tobacco, cattle, and maize prices bottomed out in the late 1920s leaving many of them bankrupt and close to losing their farms. For them, land apportionment came to be mandatory for the maintenance of white agriculture.

Increasingly, the settler ideology took on more racial overtones: "We are here to make this a white man's country...we must keep the upper hand."⁷

The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 formalized the dual structure of land ownership and production relations that persist to this day. Settler farmers received about 50% of the land including the most fertile lands in the higher rainfall areas. African farmers received less than a quarter of the land, mostly areas in the drought-prone regions. To compensate the few African farmers who lost their farms pursuant to the Land Act and to encourage black farmers to enter into commercial production, the government set aside about 8% of the designated lands for Native Purchase Areas (NPA). African farmers continued to farm in the European areas illegally until after World War II when the government decided to settle ex-servicemen and immigrants from Britain and South Africa on the undeveloped lands.⁸ The government forcibly relocated the squatters to newly created natives reserves on tse-tse fly infested areas in the northwest (Nyambara, 1997).

In many ways, the 1930 Land Act defined the development paths for commercial and peasant farmers by determining the quality and quantity of lands each sector had access to and the system of land tenure. Settler farmers gained freehold rights to almost all of the best farmlands. Black small-scale commercial farmers gained similar rights to

⁷ Cited in Phimster (1988a), p. 194.

⁸ In 1945, the colonial government estimated that 78,500 families continued to live outside of the natives reserves on crown land, forest areas, unassigned land, and alienated land

land with moderate productive potential and more importantly, held the title deeds to their farms. Yet, by keeping the amount of land in the NPA's small, the government effectively limited the amount of political power that the black commercial sector could attain. The majority of black farmers settled on marginal lands and possessed only usufruct rights to that land. The communal tenure of the reserves made it difficult for black farmers to benefit from land rents and improvements that they made upon their land. Though an informal land market did develop in the communal areas, it did not increase tenure security for smallholder farmers (Cheater, 1990).

Table 2.1 Chronology of land legislation

1894	Establishment of natives reserves in Gwaii and Shangani
1898	Defeat of Africans in first Chimurenga (Liberation War). Natives reserves expanded to 10 million ha.
1920	Native reserves set to 8.4 million ha.
1930	Land Apportionment Act. Established European, African and Native Purchase Areas
1953	Recommendations of 1948 Commission on Land accepted. Native reserves expanded to 12.3 million ha.
1967	Tribal Trust Lands Act fixes size of tribal trust lands (formerly the native reserves) at 18.2 million ha. 18.1 million ha set aside for European occupation.
1969	The Land Tenure Act confirmed the distribution of land under the Tribal Trust Lands Act
1977	The 1941 Land Apportionment Act appended to allow Africans to purchase land in the European areas.

Source: D. Nkala: 53, Box 3.1.

Over time, other land acts would increase the amount of land in the African areas, but none challenged white ownership of the most fertile lands (table 2.1 and 2.2). Ultimately, the land issue became “a potent symbol that conveniently summarized the inequities of colonial rule,” and was used by both ZANU (PF) and ZAPU-PF to mobilize support in the countryside (Bratton, 1994b; Moyana, 1984).

Table 2.2 Distribution of Land: 1930-1989

Land Classes	1930 Land Act^a (‘000 ha)	NLHA 1953^b (‘000 ha)	Independence 1980^c (‘000 ha)	1989^d (‘000 ha)
European Areas (LSC areas)	19,900	18,960	15,300	11,020
natives reserves (CA)	8,700	10,000	16,300	16,350
Native Purchase Areas (SSC)	3,000	2,260	1,640	1,380
State Parks	240	1,580	4,310	6,339
Resettlement areas	0	0	0	3,290
Urban and Others ^e	7,236	6,279	1,525	700
Total	39,076	39,079	39,075	39,079

^a Rukuni (1994): 18.

^b World Bank,(1986)

^c Central Statistics Office.

^d MLAWD (1995)

^e Other includes unassigned lands, undetermined lands and urban areas up to 1980. From 1980 onwards, this category included state farms, urban areas and land not accounted for in any of the land categories.

AGRICULTURE POLICIES AND RURAL DIFFERENTIATION

Agriculture policies to consolidate the position of settler agriculture in the colonial economy accelerated on-going processes of rural differentiation among the African populace and facilitated the development of a black commercial farm class. Colonial policies did not impoverish all African farmers because African farmers did not have access to the same land resources. The quantity and quality of land one could access mitigated the effects of colonial policy.

The Roots of Black Commercial Agriculture

From the beginning, the colonial government used taxes and levies⁹ on African production to control the flow of labor from the reserves to the settler economy. When demand for labor rose, government increased taxes forcing males to seek off-farm wage-earning jobs to meet their household's tax burden. For the majority, male out-migration created greater household food insecurity and poverty. However, a minority of African farmers capitalized on opportunities to earn wages and invested their earnings in their farm enterprises. They bought cattle, ploughs and other farm assets, and rented lands to expand their own farms. From this group of farmers, a select few succeeded in purchasing farms first in the European areas¹⁰ and later, after land apportionment, in the Native Purchase Areas (NPA) (Phimster, 1988a).

The colonial government recognized the need for a reliable alternative source of maize production for times when settler farmers switched to the production of higher-value crops such as tobacco.¹¹ It sought to facilitate the limited development of black commercial agriculture, and so, placed the NPA's in higher rainfall areas adjacent to the settler farm areas. Proximity to the settler farm areas allowed NPA farmers to realize higher producer prices than farmers in the reserves. When the government installed a

⁹ For example, the government responded to the demands of the least efficient of settler farmers, small-scale and medium-scale farmers, for price subsidies. To pay for the subsidies, the government taxed African agriculture through discriminatory pricing policies. The 1934 Amendment to the Maize Control Act established a two-pool pricing system. Medium- and small-scale settler farmers, the least efficient farmers at the time, received prices 40% above parity prices. African and LSC producers received minimal prices after the Maize Control Board (MCB) covered its export losses (Cliffe, 1981; Leys, 1959; Rukuni, 1994).

¹⁰ By 1925, 19 farms comprising 19,000 ha belonged to black farmers (Roth, 1990).

¹¹ Throughout the colonial period, commercial farmers shifted to tobacco or other high-value crops when world market prices rose for these commodities. To make up shortfalls in domestic food production, government used pricing policy to encourage Africans to market a greater proportion of their maize

single-channel marketing system in response to settler farmer demand for price supports and subsidies, it levied an implicit tax on African farm production.¹² It placed the marketing points in the settler areas, far from the reserves. NPA farmers whose land was adjacent to settler farm areas, incurred lower transportation costs than farmers in the reserves. Because of high transportation costs, farmers in the reserves often sold to middlemen for prices well below those of the marketing boards (Amin, 1992).

The government intended to develop black commercial agriculture but not the subsistence agriculture of the reserves, and its agriculture policies reflected this distinction. In 1949, the government imposed a levy on maize and other commodities sold to the Maize Control Board by African farmers. In 1951, a period of high tobacco prices on the world market, the government decided to relieve NPA farmers of the production levies assessed against other African farmers (Yudelman, 1964). In 1971, during UDI, the government facilitated the formal organization of black commercial farm interests by giving the African Farmers' Union (AFU)¹³ the right to collect a levy on all NPA production (Mufeman, 1997). In contrast, it did not give a similar right to the organization representing smallholder growers, the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), until 1994.

The benefits realized by black commercial farmers from colonial policies put them in a position to take advantage of opportunities that presented themselves shortly before and after Independence. During the transition from UDI to majority rule, the

production (Yudelman, 1964).

¹² Colonial agriculture policies in general sought to reduce the competitiveness of African agriculture and did so by raising the barriers to entry into domestic commodity markets (Leys, 1959; Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989).

Muzorewa government lifted the ban on African purchases of LSC farms and implemented a program to assist eligible African farmers to secure farm leases or to purchase farms. Most of those able to take advantage of these opportunities came from the NPAs. NPA farmers owned their farms and could use them as collateral whereas communal tenure in the CA's denied CA farmers this opportunity (Weiner, 1989).

The Master Farmer Program

The colonial government recognized the need to maintain African agriculture to meet the subsistence demands of the population in the reserves. To combat the rising incidence of land degradation in the reserves, the government created a professional farmer training program in 1926, the Master Farmer program, aimed at promoting the adoption of "modern" farm practices. Colonial officials believed that the adoption of modern practices and technologies by Africans would raise yields and so reduce the land pressures contributing to soil degradation in the reserves.

The government appointed E.D. Alvord, a former American missionary, as director of the Master Farmer Training (MFT) program. Alvord enlisted African demonstrators to implement the program believing Africans would only listen to their own. Demonstrators had the task of recruiting trainees and establishing demonstration fields in their areas. The MFT program advocated the rationalization of land-uses in the reserves and provided instruction in rotations, manuring, clean-till, and the use of improved seed and breeds. Those who passed received master farmer certificates giving them the opportunity to purchase lands in the NPA's (Phimster, 1988a).

¹³ Later renamed the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union (ZNFU).

Demonstrably higher yields distinguished Master Farmers from other African farmers but distrust of the government's intentions limited the success of the MFT program. Many worried that if they raised their production the government would increase their taxes or take their land away. Yet, African farmers did not wholly reject the practices promoted by the MFT program. Specifically, they adopted those practices that addressed their immediate needs. For example, the moldboard plow, a labor saving innovation, became widely used by the end of the 1930s. Africans also adopted the use of larger-grained and higher yielding maize varieties, and began to manure at higher

Table 2.3 **Five year average production of grain^a, land cultivated and herd size in the native areas, 1900-1950**

YEARS	'000 kgs	'000 ha	Yield (kg/ha)	'000 head of cattle ^b
1900-1905	17545	240	73	74
1905-1910	22545	305	74	198
1910-1915	18818	372	51	380
1915-1920	22545	480	47	609
1920-1925	24727	474	52	949
1925-1930	26000	528	49	1408
1930-1935	24454	619	39	1698
1935-1940	28727	645	44	1578
1940-1945	32090	769	42	1836
1945-1950	37272	942	40	1792

Source: Yudelman (1964): Appendix B.

^a Estimates based on bags of grain. Millet, sorghum, maize, rice, beans and groundnuts production converted to grain equivalents. Maize accounted for about 50% of total output.

^b Estimates based on recorded number of moving through dipping stations.

rates. These innovations allowed farm families to raise production and farm incomes almost immediately, a necessity to cope with the tax burden imposed by the government (Drinkwater, 1992). Table 2.3 shows a leveling of grain yields from 1930 onwards suggesting that the new practices allowed farmers to halt the decline in yields.

While the majority of farmers chose not to adopt the practices disseminated through the program, those who did realized significant innovator's rents. From 1949-1959, a period when African production accounted for a third of total maize sales, analysts estimated that NPA and master farmer production made up more than three-quarters of this figure (Mosely, 1983). Master Farmers used their wealth and farming success to cultivate relationships with village chiefs and colonial authorities, the authorities charged with allocating land in the reserves. Eventually, they gained access to more and better quality lands than the majority of farmers in the reserves (Nyambara, 1997; Ranger, 1985). The most successful managed to purchase farms in the NPA's. From the 1950s onwards, the government required a master farmer certificate for African wanting to buy farms in the NPA's.

ORGANIZING FARM INTERESTS

The colonial government solicited the participation of organized interests but at the same time, regulated their expression by designating one organization to represent the demands of each sector in the economy (Murray, 1970). In agriculture, the colonial government through the Farm Licensing and Levy Acts encouraged the development of farmer organizations to represent commercial interests by providing for them a stable and fixed funding source. It did not do likewise for smallholder farm interests and excluded their organization from national-level policymaking.

White Commercial Farm Interests

Founded in 1904, the Rhodesian Agricultural Union (RAU) represented the largest settler farmers. The rapid development of settler agriculture during the 1930s led

to a splintering of farm interests along commodity and regional lines though the RAU maintained its position as the pre-eminent spokesperson for commercial agriculture. Recognizing the need to consolidate farm interests to minimize its own costs in policy negotiations, the Rhodesian government proposed a unifying strategy to the RAU. If the RAU agreed to merge with all other commercial farmer associations to form a single organization, then government would pass legislation establishing “closed shop” rules for commercial agriculture. In 1942, the RAU reorganized itself as the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union (RNFU) later renamed the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU). In return, government passed the 1942 Farm Licensing and Levy Act making it mandatory for all LSC farmers to buy farm licenses from the RNFU and in effect, to become members of the organization. It also gave the RNFU the right to collect a levy on all marketed commercial production of selected commodities assuring it a sustainable funding base (Phimster, 1988a). With a reliable source of funding, the RNFU developed its analytic capacity and the political power to challenge government in policy-making.

Black Commercial Farm Interests

The first organization to represent African farmers exclusively was the Bantu National Congress (BNC) established in 1925. Originally begun by veterans of the first World War and progressive African farmers, the BNC eventually came to represent farmers in the NPA's. In 1942, it reorganized itself into the African Farmers’ Union (AFU) in response to the creation of the RNFU. The AFU, while operating at the periphery, was somewhat effective because of the economic importance of NPA agricultural production (Mufema, 1997). During UDI, the government realized it had to increase African maize production as part of its policy of import-substitution. Within this

context, the government passed the 1971 Farm Licensing and Levy Act establishing “closed shop” rules for NPA farmers, and giving the AFU the right to collect a levy on all NPA production. After Independence, the 9,000 strong AFU renamed itself the Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) (Herbst, 1990). The AFU used the license and levies monies to support its lobbying activities committing its staff and resources to its head office in Harare.

Black Smallholder Farm Interests

Unlike the RNFU and AFU, farmers in the reserves did not formally organize on their own, but organized by the government as an extension of the Master Farmer Training program. In 1967, extension agents organized trainees into master farmer clubs. In 1970, those clubs merged to form a regional association, the Victoria Provincial Association of Master Farmer Clubs (VPAMFC). Master farmer clubs in other provinces later formed their own associations. By the late 1970's, the provincial associations merged to form the National Association of Master Farmer Clubs (NAMFC) (Mutimba, 1986).

The VPAMFC and later, the NAMFC, maintained close ties to the government. It drew most of its financial support from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and technical and financial assistance from the extension service. Begun as a technical organization, its activities revolved around the Master Farmer Training Program and farmer-to-farmer extension. Its reliance on government funds and services prevented it from publicizing and representing its members’ demands. The extension service warned that it would lose government support if it attempted behave like a “farmers’ union.” The NAMFC deliberately excluded any mention of representing members’ demands in its constitution

although it continued to do so covertly (Mutimba, 1990). At Independence, the NAMFC renamed itself the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) and opened its membership to women and non-master farmers.

The inability to collect a levy on smallholder production hampered the political development of the NFAZ. Relying on donor funding and to a lesser extent, members' dues, the NFAZ invested its resources in strengthening structures for delivering services to members. The ZNFU, on the other, developed itself primarily as a lobbying organization, a benefit of the levies it could assess against small-scale commercial production. Though the NFAZ had the largest constituency, it held the least political power among the three farmer unions at Independence until the merger in 1991 to create the ZFU (Makumbe, 1994). NFAZ's weakness revealed itself in its inability to influence resettlement policy. The CFU, on the other hand, would marshal its resources and political influence to manage the land policy process to the advantage of its members. The desire to acquire the right to levy smallholder production influenced the NFAZ president to agree to a merger with the ZNFU in 1991 to form the ZFU (Bratton, 1994a).

POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND POLICY

Rhodesia, under the leadership of Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front Party, made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965 after refusing to accept a new constitution giving Africans more rights. Exiled African nationalist parties, ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), operating from Mozambique and Zambia, waged a guerrilla war against the Ian Smith regime. The war escalated in the 1970s with the mass mobilization of the peasantry (Lan, 1985). Both sides agreed to a ceasefire in 1979, and under the

chairmanship of the British, settled on a new constitution, the Lancaster House Agreement. The constitution guaranteed whites 20 seats in the Parliament for seven years and contained a Bill of Rights that protected the property rights of the white minority (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989).

In 1980, the black majority voted Robert Mugabe and his party, ZANU (PF) into power. At Independence, the new government felt compelled to address the land grievances of the rural majority to “*neutralize a looming crisis of expectation on the part of the land hungry population.*”¹⁴ Land, after all, was the central issue of the Liberation War (Moyana, 1984; Riddell, 1978). Yet, in spite of an ambitious start, the government’s efforts at land reform slowed considerably by the mid-1980s. The national economy’s structural dependency on commercial agriculture, a legacy of the colonial period, made officials and donors averse to transferring too much commercial land to smallholder farmers. At the same time, a new class of black farmers with roots in the NPAs emerged to demand government-purchased lands and assistance for their development. Their demands, couched within the language of economic nationalism and structural adjustment, resonated with government and party officials, many of whom owned LSC farms.

Resettlement 1980-1990

Zimbabwe launched its first resettlement program soon after Independence in September 1980. Initial targets of 18,000 families to be resettled in three years soon grew to 162,000 families to be resettled by 1985. To administer the program, the GoZ

¹⁴ MPED 1981:124 as quoted in Alexander [1994].

created the Ministry of Land, Resettlement, and Rural Development (MLRRD) in 1980. However, momentum for resettlement slowed by 1985. The government dismantled the MLRRD dividing its responsibilities between the Department of Agricultural and Extension Services (Agritex)¹⁵ and the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE).¹⁶ At the same time, the government drastically cut the budget for farm acquisitions and the development of resettlement schemes. By 1989, for all intents and purposes, Zimbabwe's first resettlement program ended. The government had resettled 52,000 families on about 3.3 million ha and exceeded the land reform efforts of Kenya and other African countries (Bratton, 1994b). However, the Mugabe government had not changed the fundamental structure of land ownership and agricultural production inherited from the colonial period (Wiener, 1989). The majority of commercial farms purchased for resettlement were located in NR's III and IV, and large-scale commercial farmers retained control of 12 million ha or 40% of the prime farmlands.¹⁷

The government blamed the slowdown of the resettlement program on lack of money. Bound by the Lancaster House Agreement, Zimbabwe's first constitution, the government had to purchase farms on a "willing buyer/willing seller" basis and with foreign currency. The rise in land prices beginning in 1983 with the return of whites to Zimbabwe limited the government's opportunities to purchase more lands for resettlement. Moreover, it lacked the money to build the necessary supporting infrastructure on land it had already purchased. The government leased these properties to white and black commercial farmers. Despite promises of financial assistance from

¹⁵ Agritex lies within the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR).

¹⁶ DERUDE lies within the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD).

Great Britain, the United States, and other donor nations, only Great Britain contributed to the resettlement exercise. Drought during the late 1980s further diminished government resources for resettlement and other development projects (Cliffe, 1981; Roth, 1990; Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989).

Scholars identify two other motivations underlying the slow-down of the resettlement program. First, the government recognized the reliance of the national economy on production from the large-scale commercial farm sector. As of 1990, the large-scale commercial farm sector employed over 225,000 workers and produced 68% of the gross agricultural output, 82% of crop sales, 94% of marketed livestock, and 50% of export earning (von Blanckenburg, 1992). The CFU argued that transferring lands to peasant farmers would depress commercial production and risk the economy's health. The CFU produced reports and policy papers to support the rationale of low productivity and poor land husbandry first articulated by the Rhodesian government.¹⁸ The government's refusal to confiscate white-owned farms, as empowered by the 1985 Land Act, illustrates its tacit acceptance of the CFU's argument.¹⁹

A second motivation identified by scholars was self-interest. By the late 1980s, high-ranking members of the government and of ZANU (PF) had acquired large-scale commercial farms. As absentee landowners, many owned farms vulnerable to

¹⁷ For a full description of the resettlement program see Bratton [1990], Cliffe [1988], and Gasper [1990].

¹⁸ The findings of the government-sponsored Riddell and Chavunduka commissions appeared to support the CFU's characterization of smallholder production. However, both commissions acknowledged severe land hunger in the CA's and blamed land scarcity for keeping smallholder households from raising their incomes to a level that lets them meet their basic needs (Alexander, 1994).

¹⁹ The 1985 Land Act identified commercial farms heavily indebted to the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC) and lands classified as under-utilized or abandoned by the Derelict Land Board as appropriate for government expropriation.

government expropriation through the derelict land clause in the 1985 Land Act.

Government's refusal to acquire land in this way protected the interests of these black large-scale commercial farm owners as well as those of white farm owners (Bratton, 1994b; Marcus, 1994).

Without the authority to collect levies on smallholder production, a benefit given to the CFU and the ZNFU, the NFAZ could not develop an effective policy voice in the land policy arena. Moreover, its close ties to the government prevented it from confronting the government on its administration of the resettlement program; many of the services it provided to members were government services (Makumbe, 1994). The statistic that over half of those resettled from 1980-1990 were squatters illustrates the inability of the NFAZ to facilitate the acquisition of resettlement lands by its members. Its only significant victory in the land policy arena came with the government's agreement to change to emphasize farming experience and capacity rather than needs in the settler selection process (Herbst, 1990).

Resettlement 1990-1997

The slow-down of the resettlement program reflected a fundamental shift in the government's development policy. Throughout the 1980s, donors and scholars applauded President Mugabe's socialist approach to development. Government programs facilitated the smallholder maize and cotton successes of the 1980s and extended health and education services to the rural areas (Eicher, 1990). During this period, blacks in business as well as agriculture took advantage of new economic opportunities introduced by black majority rule. By the late 1980s, the emergent black middle class and upper class sought a change in the government's development strategy. Impatient with the slow

pace of economic growth, they blamed the government's socialist programs and lobbied for the government to use economic rather than equity objectives to guide the investment of public resources. Their demands resonated with high-ranking Cabinet and party members who convinced President Mugabe to apply for a World Bank loan and to agree to implement an economic structural adjustment program in 1989 (Skalnes, 1995).

The increasingly vocal black business and commercial farm interests organized formally into the Indigenous Business Lobby (IBL) and the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Association (ICFA).²⁰ Like the settler farmers before them, both organizations argued that the scarcity of fertile farmland required land-uses that maximized its production potential. Smallholder farmers, they argued, practiced subsistence agriculture. Subsistence agriculture could not generate the production or the employment opportunities that commercial agriculture could. Therefore, the nation would realize greater benefits if resettlement land went toward the development of black commercial agriculture rather than the maintenance of a subsistence farm class. The government used this argument in its 1990 Land Policy Statement to justify its decision emphasizing the development of commercial agriculture through the resettlement program (Moyo, 1995).

Despite its intentions to use the resettlement program to develop black commercial agriculture, the Mugabe government mobilized popular support for its new land policy and the new land bill by resorting to the pre-Independence rhetoric of re-acquiring the "lost lands." The CFU opposed the new land bill because of a provision

²⁰ The ICFA renamed itself the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) in 1997 after the government formally recognized it as a legitimate spokesperson for black commercial farmers. Government also gave black commercial farmers the freedom to affiliate with either the CFU or the ICFU. Previously, all registered large-scale commercial farmers had to purchase their farm licenses from the CFU and to effectively become members (see 1997 Farm Licensing and Levy Act).

that would give the government the authority to confiscate lands without having to compensate the owners. The CFU argued that the new land bill would violate the constitutional rights to property of white farmers. The IMF, World Bank, Great Britain, the United States, and other western nations agreed with the CFU and opposed the government. The World Bank and IMF feared that a radical land reform program would decrease investors' confidence in the Zimbabwean economy and jeopardize the continued implementation of ESAP (Maposa, 1995).

Responding to the CFU's challenge, the government mobilized the black farm lobby in support of the bill. To show solidarity among black farm interests, the government urged the presidents of the NFAZ and ZNFU to merge, and they did in 1991 to form the ZFU. Some scholars argued that the government co-opted the leadership of both farmer unions by promising to give the new organization the right to levy smallholder production. They also suggested that the merger weakened the policy voice of CA and RA farmers. ZNFU leaders assumed half of the national leadership positions within the ZFU including the presidency though commercial farmers made up less than 3% of the ZFU membership (Bratton, 1994a).

The demands made by the Indigenous Business Lobby's (IBL) and Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union (ICFU) that the government invest in the development of black commercial agriculture fell within a broader movement for affirmative action. The "indigenization movement" called for the government assistance to increase the percentage of blacks in the productive sectors of the economy much as the colonial government had done for whites. Regarding commercial farms, the IBL argued that ownership would give blacks the collateral needed to develop other business ventures,

and so, was critical for their development in both non-agriculture and agriculture sectors.

Critics of the "indigenization movement" observed: *"[I]ndigenization appears to be merely a slogan to popularize government policies which are intended to replace a white elite with a black elite."*²¹ Soon after passage of the 1992 Land Act, the Zimbabwean press revealed that government officials were among the first to benefit from the new resettlement program. The MLARR Minister, W. Mangwende, who had led the movement for the new Land Act, received the first farm acquired under the new resettlement program though the government had originally targeted Bath Farm for the resettlement of 18 families.²² The land scandal exposed the government to criticism from its supporters and donors. ZANU (PF)'s own newspaper asked: *"If a black elite replaced a white elite on a LSC farm, can we say that land redistribution has taken place?"*²³ The government claimed to have rescinded the leases to its own officials, but in 1999, the press revealed that the government had not done so, and the Minister of Lands, K. Kangai, renewed those leases for a hundred years.²⁴

Throughout this period, the ZFU did not publicly criticize the government's resettlement program but openly supported it as a necessary mechanism for transferring land from whites to blacks. On many issues, it adopted a view similar to the government's viewpoint. For example, like the government, the ZFU favored the distribution of resettlement lands based on farming ability rather than need. It argued for the use of economic principles to guide the selection of settlers and the development of

²¹ "The Land Scandal," *Africa Report*, January 1, 1995.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "Chefs get 100-year leases," *the Financial Gazette*, October 7, 1999.

resettlement schemes (ZFU, 1995). Implicitly, the ZFU's positions discriminated against the land interests of the landless and the land-poor who lacked the assets and training needed to enter commercial farming.

Despite its rhetoric, the government continued to address land policy as a political policy rather than development policy. Blaming donors for their unwillingness to fund the Phase II resettlement program and unwilling to make-up the shortfall itself,²⁵ the government acquired less than 1% of the six million hectares it claimed to need to de-congest the communal areas. From 1990-1997, it resettled less than 2,000 families per year, well below the targeted 50,000 families identified in its land policy statement (Moyo, 1998). Most of the white farm owners succeeded in getting their farms de-listed. For example, of the more than 1,500 farms identified for acquisition by the government in 1997, only 321 remained on the list a year later; the courts ordered the others removed for procedural and other errors. Of the remaining 321, critics complained that most were unsuitable for resettlement based on criteria defined by Agritex.²⁶

At the Donor Conference on Land held in Harare in September 1998, the government hoped to raise US\$ 2.2 billion but managed to raise less than US \$1 million for its resettlement program. Donors criticized the government's resettlement plans for being too ambitious and lacking administrative transparency. The U.S., Great Britain, and others tentatively agreed to fund land acquisitions and resettlement on the condition that the government (1) prioritize the resettlement of CA farmers and (2) agree to pay fair

²⁵ In 1999, the Minister of Lands requested Z\$3.6 billion to acquire and implement the resettlement program. The government allocated only \$150 million ("Land Reform De-railed!" *the Insider*, February 26, 1999).

²⁶ "Land Reform Derailed!" *The Insider*, February 26, 1999.

market value for acquired commercial farms.²⁷

As of 1998, the GoZ had not publicized a definitive land policy but released a land policy framework (1998) broadly defining the issues addressed by the new resettlement program. Its land policy framework identifies four separate policy domains: land acquisition, settler selection, land tenure reform, and settlement support services (see Appendix A). The farm invasions of 2000 create considerable uncertainty regarding the implementation of the Phase II resettlement program. Though the government announced its intentions to resettle farmers on the invaded farms according to the program guidelines, it has not determined how it will deal with the squatters already on the land or on farms not identified for resettlement.

SUMMARY

Government influenced the development of the large-scale commercial, small-scale commercial, and smallholder farm sectors through land and agriculture policies. Land policies determined the quality and quantity of land each sub-sector had access to, and as importantly, the applicable land tenure system. Whereas settler farmers gained freehold tenure to the most fertile lands, the black majority received marginal lands and possessed only usufruct rights to them. Without an adequate basis for accumulating wealth, land policies impoverished the black majority while ensuring the development of the settler farm class. Colonial policies facilitated the limited development of black commercial farmers to address a need for a backstop to settler food production. Assigning only 8% of the designated lands to the small-scale commercial black sector

²⁷ *Ibid.*

effectively limited the political power that black commercial farmers could acquire.

Independence in 1980 strengthened the policy voice of black farmers to the extent that the government invited the ZNFU and the NFAZ to participate in policy-making. However, a legacy from the colonial period was their political ineffectiveness vis-à-vis the CFU in the land policy arena. The economic power of white large-scale commercial farmers coupled with the analytic, financial, and political resources available to the CFU allowed them to control the land policy process during the 1980s. Government's fear of depressing the production of the large-scale commercial farm sector and its constrained finances effectively protected the core of the commercial farm sector from the resettlement program. The statistic that over half of those resettled during the 1980s were squatters speaks to the ineffectiveness of the NFAZ in the land policy arena.

The new Phase II resettlement program and the 1992/1996 Land Acts reveal the increasing influence of black business and commercial farm interests. The convergence of land interests between them and high ranking members in government and ZANU (PF) facilitated a shift in government's approach to development and specifically, to the resettlement program. The new land policy favors the use of the resettlement program to facilitate the development of black commercial agriculture. The IBL considers land ownership to be a critical factor in the development of blacks in the agriculture and the non-agriculture sectors.

A consequence of the contentious debate preceding the passage of the 1992 Land Act appears to be the muting of the policy voice of smallholder farmers. To create the appearance of solidarity for the proposed land bill, public officials convinced the presidents of the NFAZ and the ZNFU to merge their organizations into one organization,

the ZFU. In return, the government would confer upon the ZFU the right to collect a levy on smallholder production. However, the merging of the two organizations created an organization where black commercial farmers occupy almost half of all the senior leadership positions, including the presidency, though they account for less than 3% of the membership. Placing smallholder and commercial farm interests within a single organization creates a situation where only one group of farmers will have the opportunity to have their land interests expressed by the ZFU.

The policies described in this chapter created conditions of poverty, land scarcity, and political disenfranchisement among the black rural majority. These conditions define the context within which smallholder farmers operate and significantly contribute to the degradation of the communal lands. Poverty and household insecurity shorten farmers' planning horizons and create barriers to the adoption of technologies that can enhance soil fertility but that provide benefits only in the long-term. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between public policies, poverty, and land degradation in the smallholder farm areas.

CHAPTER 3

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF LAND DEGRADATION

To understand as well as to be in a position to solve the third world's environmental crisis is to appreciate the ways in which the status quo is an outcome of political interests and struggles.²⁸

Chapter 2 discussed the relationship between the government and selected farm interests in the land and agriculture policy process. This chapter focuses on the consequences of these political processes on farm practices and land degradation. It begins with a broad examination of how key colonial and post-Independence policies created conditions of poverty, low production, and household food insecurity; conditions that define the communal areas (CA). It then links these conditions to changes in farm practices and the impact of those practices on CA land resources. Chapter 3 includes a case study of smallholder agriculture in Shamva District to illustrate the argument at the local level. A contrast is made with the role of government policies in the conservation of commercial land resources.

²⁸ Bryant and Bailey (1997:5).

TRANSFORMING OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

Conservation in the Native Reserves

Until Land Apportionment in 1930, moderate population densities in the reserves remained allowed for the continued use of farm methods that maintained soil fertility such as shifting cultivation, leaving land to fallow, hoe-based cultivation, and inter-cropping.²⁹ Forced migration coupled with a 3% annual rate of population growth meant that the population in many of the reserves exceeded the land's carrying capacity³⁰ during the 1930s (Robinson, 1953). Consequently, African farmers abandoned shifting cultivation and leaving land to fallow causing soil fertility to decline (Cheater, 1984). Black farmers maintained production levels by bringing marginal lands into production, but clearing these lands exposed the sandy soils to wind and rain erosion, accelerating the process of land degradation in the reserves.

As the viability of African agriculture declined, the pressure to seek off-farm wages increased to pay taxes and fees assessed by the government.³¹ The out-migration of male household members created labor bottlenecks during critical periods of the cropping season depressing production and ensuring that labor-intensive measures to maintain soil fertility went undone (Mahlahla, 1980).

²⁹ Authority of the Colonial Secretary. 1924. Official Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia: Statistics and General Information. Cited in Yudelman (1964).

³⁰ Carrying capacity as determined by the Ministry of Agriculture using models. The post-Independence government used the same models to determine viable land sizes for communal land reorganization (Alexander, 1994).

³¹ The colonial government subsidized settler agriculture using the taxes and fees (e.g., marketing and dipping fees) assessed against African households.

Responding to declining yields, African farmers adopted the moldboard plow, a labor saving innovation, and higher yielding large-grained maize varieties; both technologies were disseminated through the master farmer program. These two changes in the smallholder farm system helped to halt the decline in African grain yields.³² Smallholder farmers also began to apply manure to their fields. Lacking the money to purchase chemical fertilizers, manuring offered a cheap alternative and contributed to maintaining yields by protecting soil fertility. Though labor-intensive, African farmers widely adopted manuring (Drinkwater, 1992).

The adoption of the moldboard plow and ox-traction contributed to an increase in cattle holdings among African farmers. The cattle population grew because African households used cattle to cope with the risk inherent in their dryland farming systems. From 1915 to 1950, the African herd increased five-fold surpassing the carrying capacity for livestock in most of the reserves during the 1930s and creating problems of over-grazing and degradation in the communal grazing lands (table 2.3) (Phimster, 1988a).

Maintaining grain yields from 1940-1970 did not relieve land pressure in the reserves for population growth continued at 3% annually. Tax obligations and household food needs prompted the expansion of smallholder agriculture to lands designated for forestry or grazing. By 1950, land degradation in the reserves had progressed to the point of severely limiting the capacity of African farmers to increase yields per hectare within the context of available technologies. Yudelman (1964) explained the increase in marketed African maize during the 1950s as the result of two factors. First, Africans extended maize production to lands previously planted in other crops or left fallow.

³² From 1900 to 1940, grain yields fell from 7300 kg/ha to 4400 kg/ha (table 2.3).

Second, Africans sold a greater percentage of their production rather than retaining it for household consumption.

Aside from the master farmer program, the colonial government used coercive measures to gain compliance among African farmers with land-use directives from the Ministry of Agriculture. The 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) imposed compulsory de-stocking, introduced title deeds, required the rationalization of land-uses in the reserves,³³ and forced title deed holders to be full-time farmers. Officials harshly implemented the NLHA program assessing considerable fines or imprisoning non-compliant farmers.

The NLHA impoverished African households in several ways. First, the restructuring of land rights to create individual tenure made landless 150,000 families.³⁴ Second, requiring male heads of households to be full-time farmers denied African families critical non-farm revenue sources. Third, compulsory destocking forced African families to dispose of cattle exceeding the carrying capacity for their home areas as calculated by agriculture officials and decreased the African herd by a third.³⁵ Destocking generated resistance from African farmers for whom cattle was material wealth and the basis of their farming system. In addition, the reduction of the African herd meant a significant drop in the amount of manure applied to the fields and contributed to losses of soil fertility in the reserves (Machingaidze, 1991).

³³ By 1950, the reserves had been renamed the "tribal trust lands" or TTL.

³⁴ Under the NLHA, families received transferable titles to economic units of land. No family could own more than three economic units but neither could families subdivide the land so that it was smaller than one economic unit. The NLHA estimated about 200,000 holdings in the reserves but at the time, there were about 350,000 households (Rukuni, 1994).

³⁵ The influx of cattle into the market meant African families did not realize adequate compensation and settler farmers would benefit from the low price.

The draconian measures of the NLHA to manage land-use in the reserves created resentment among the African population. Widespread acts of passive and violent protest by farmers in the reserves and in the urban areas compelled the government to repeal the NLHA in 1962 (Yudelman, 1964). Protest against the NLHA fed into the Black Nationalist Movement that later expressed itself as ZAPU (PF) and ZANU (PF).

Another significant factor contributing to low production in the reserves was the lack of technologies appropriate for the dryland farming systems of African farmers. The colonial government did not invest in research to develop appropriate conservation and production technologies for African farmers choosing instead to disseminate technologies developed for settler farm systems in the higher rainfall areas (Avila et al, 1989; Rukuni, 1994). It did create the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG), housed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to provide extension services to the reserves, but it did not make the necessary resources available for DEVAG to be effective. Understaffed and under-funded, DEVAG focused its programming on the master farmer training program (Mutimba, 1986).

Conservation in the Settler Areas

The settler farm sector also faced problems of soil erosion and land degradation due to the mismanagement of land resources by settler farmers. The colonial administration passed legislation in 1913 barring two particularly damaging practices: indiscriminate logging and stream bank cultivation. Yet, settler farmers continued to use farm practices that promoted soil erosion because many of them operated their farms with the aim of making money quickly and then returning to South Africa. Like African farmers, the majority of settler farmers had short planning horizons that discouraged the

adoption of many conservation technologies. The CFU wanted the government to regulate land management in the settler areas. At the time, the majority of settler farmers did not belong to the CFU and opposed any government attempt to regulate their land-uses. The CFU lacked the political influence needed to push through such a controversial program (Phimster, 1988a).

The government recognized that many settlers had no previous farm experience, so it created a research and extension system to provide them with appropriate technologies and training. In 1934, the government established a conservation experiment station, Glenara Farm, to develop conservation technologies for settler farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture also tested livestock and crop varieties for environmental suitability and determined appropriate practices. In 1948, the government established the Department of Research and Specialist Services (DRSS) to institutionalize agriculture research and to develop technologies to intensify production. In 1950, it created the Conservation and Extension (CONEX) department to provide extension services to commercial farmers (Avila et al, 1989; Tawonezvi, 1994).

In 1941, the government passed the Natural Resources Act (NRA) that institutionalized farmer management of natural resources in the settler areas, a concept originally proposed by the CFU in 1935. The NRA established a Natural Resources Board (NRB) tasked with developing natural resource management policies, and divided the settler farm areas into Intensive Conservation Areas (ICA). An elected committee of farm owners within each ICA oversaw the implementation of natural resource management policies and monitored compliance among ICA members. The government empowered the ICA committees to impose severe penalties for resource mismanagement.

The ICA concept succeeded in instilling a strong conservation ethic among settler farmers, and along with government subsidies and institutional support, resolved the land degradation problem in the settler areas (Harvey, 1997).

The colonial government sought to control the development of African agriculture to prevent it from competing with settler agriculture and to maintain a source of cheap labor for the settler economy (Amin, 1992). Land degradation in the reserves contributed to the achievement of both policy goals by eroding the capacity of African farmers to produce enough to meet subsistence and non-subsistence needs. The diminished resource endowment of the communal areas limited the positive impact of post-Independence policies to stimulate smallholder production for the market, to improve the quality of life in the rural areas, and to halt land degradation.

THE CONTEXT OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE: 1980-1997

During the first five years of Independence, the government invested in the productive capacity of the CA's through increased funding for infrastructure, research, extension, and credit. After 1985, however, government policy turned away from the equity objectives driving public investment in the CA's and embraced the economic objectives promulgated by the emergent black middle- and upper-classes. The government's first economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) implemented in 1990 emphasized productivity increases in the high-potential areas and in the commercial agriculture sector and paid little attention to investment in the CA's (FSR, 1991). Its Phase II resettlement program explicitly favored the development of black commercial farmers at the expense of the rural poor (Moyo, 1995). The following section discusses how post-Independence marketing, technology, and economic policies reinforced and in

some cases, worsened conditions of poverty, household food insecurity, and low production in the CA's, perpetuating the colonial political economy of land degradation.

Land Resources


At Independence in 1980, about one million farm households lived in the communal areas (CA), and 66% of them lived in low rainfall zones characterized by periodic drought, natural regions IV and V. Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions (NR) based on climatic and soil conditions. NR I has the greatest productive potential for intensive agriculture and NR V has the lowest. More than 60% of the large-scale commercial areas occupied lands in NR's I-III versus 28% of the CA's (table 3.1, figure 3.1).

Table 3.1 Distribution of land ('000 ha) by natural region and farm class, 1990

Farm Class	NR I	NR II	NR III	NR IV	NR V	Total
Large-scale commercial areas	200 (1.8%)	3690 (32.9%)	2410 (21.5%)	2430 (21.7%)	2490 (22.3%)	11220
Communal areas	140 (0.9%)	1270 (7.8%)	2820 (17.2%)	7340 (44.9%)	4780 (29.2%)	16350
Small-scale commercial areas	10 (0.7%)	240 (17.4%)	530 (38.4%)	500 (36.2%)	100 (7.2%)	1380
Resettlement areas	30 (0.9%)	590 (17.9%)	1240 (37.7%)	810 (24.6%)	620 (18.8%)	3290

Source: MLAWD (1995): 10

Figure 3.1 Agroecological Map of Zimbabwe



KEY	Natural Regions	Farming Type	Annual Rainfall	Land Use
	I	Specialized, Diversified	> 1,000 mm Low Temperatures	Forestry, Fruit, Intensive Livestock, Crop Production
	II	Intensive	750 - 1000 mm Summer Only	Crops Livestock
	III	Semi-intensive	650 - 800 mm Infrequent, Heavy Mid-season Dry Spells	Maize, Tobacco Cotton
	IV	Semi-intensive	450 - 650 mm Periodic Seasonal Drought, Severe Mid-season dry Spells	Livestock, Fodder
	V	Extensive	< 650 mm Low and Erratic Zambezi Valley < 600 mm Save-Limpopo Valley	Livestock on Natural Veld

Source: Gore et al (1992)

Population density is positively correlated to the incidence of land degradation in the communal areas (Campbell et al, 1989). Population densities in the CA's exceeded those in the LSC areas three to five times over (table 3.2). The CA's have the highest rates of soil loss with the greatest losses being in the low rainfall areas, NR's IV and V. Of the 1.8 million hectares of eroded land, 80% are located in the CA's. According to Whitlow (1988), by 1987 almost a third of all the communal lands had "severe" to "very severe" problems with soil erosion versus only 1.3% of the commercial lands.

Table 3.2 Distribution of population in CA and LSC lands by natural region

Natural Region	Communal Area		Large-scale commercial	
	% of population in CA	Population density per km ²	% of population in LSC area	Population density per km ²
I	1.2	57.4	11.1	20.2
II	14.6	39.1	47.2	17.4
III	22.0	30.2	16.8	6.0
IV	43.5	23.7	15.7	5.3
V	18.7	18.1	9.3	4.4

Source: Mehretu (1994): 57

Post-Independence policies to stimulate smallholder production did not account for the degraded nature of many of the communal lands. The government sought to transfer technologies developed for commercial farm systems to the communal areas. In most cases, these technologies were inappropriate for smallholder dryland farming systems. Consequently, the government's agrarian policies increased household food insecurity and poverty especially in the low-potential zones, NR's IV and V. The government's refusal to fund the national research and extension system at a level necessary for it to carry out research aimed at smallholder agriculture denied smallholders technologies to address their subsistence needs in a sustainable manner.

Marketing Structure and Institutions

To stimulate smallholder production for the market, the government lifted many of the production constraints imposed by colonial policy. It built marketing depots and collection points in the rural areas, increased smallholder access to production loans, included traditional smallholder crops as controlled crops, offered higher producer prices, and made available research and extension services. In the first year after Independence, it distributed seed packs containing hybrid maize seed and chemical fertilizers among the rural poor to jump-start production after the war (Rhorbach, 1989). Smallholder farmers responded in five significant ways. They;

- increased the area planted to maize and cotton (table 3.3);
- reduced the area planted to traditional food crops (table 3.3);
- diversified into other cash crops such as tobacco and groundnuts;
- increased their use of inorganic fertilizers and hybrid seed; and
- used short-term production loans.

Table 3.3 **Changes in CA cropping patterns: 1970-1989**

	<i>Crop area growth rate</i>		<i>Crop production growth rate</i>	
	1970-80	1980-89	1970-80	1980-89
Maize	2.0%	2.2%	5.3%	9.0%
Cotton	1.6%	25.0%	-1.1%	26.5%
Sorghum	-8.3%	3.8%	-6.6%	5.0%
Pearl millet	5.8%	-3.4%	4.2%	1.1%
Bullrush millet	13.0%	-2.8%	-2.1%	-1.2%
Groundnuts	-0.7%	-3.9%	19.9%	-1.3%

Source: Roth (1990): Annex I

Responding to government policies aimed specifically at increasing maize and cotton production, smallholder farmers dramatically increased their production of these

crops from 1980-1988.³⁶ Donors and scholars heralded the increases in smallholder production as the success story of sub-Saharan Africa (Eicher, 1990, 1995). However, closer examination of the smallholder production gains from 1980-88 reveals the skewed distribution of development benefits. Farmers in the higher rainfall regions, notably the Mashonaland provinces and parts of the Midlands, accounted for the greatest per capita increase in maize production and sales. In areas characterized by erratic rainfall and periodic drought during the cropping season, the Matabeleland provinces and Masvingo, maize production remained low and farmers retained most all of their production for home consumption (table 3.4). Though CA's in Manicaland are located in high rainfall areas, the extreme nature of land scarcity in the province depresses production and increases household food insecurity (Stack, 1994).

Table 3.4 Maize production, marketing, and retention by province

	Mash East	Mash Central	Mash West	Manica-land	Mid-lands	Mat. North	Mat. South	Mas-vingo
Maize as % of total production 1980-82	88.2	93.4	97.5	61.9	83.4	57.7	48.3	69.1
1983-88	87.8	95.7	98.5	72.0	87.3	61.5	35.2	58.5
Maize production per capita (kg) 1908-82	216	299	507	219	430	71	165	305
1983-88	385	584	668	219	412	118	97	183
Maize sales as % of production 1980-82	70.9	77.3	48.9	19.4	26.7	9.9	0.4	14.3
1983-88	54.6	71.7	68.7	28.0	23.9	3.6	0.4	21.0

Source: Stack (1994): 260

³⁶ From 1980-1986, smallholders raised maize yields by 50% compared to the period immediately preceding Independence (Rohrbach, 1989). Smallholder seed cotton production more than doubled from 77,022 tons in 1980 to 173,550 in 1988 (Mariga, 1994).

The maize technology package disseminated by the government included hybrid maize varieties not originally meant for dryland farming systems. The yield response of the maize hybrids depended on the availability of sufficient levels of water and nitrogen during the cropping season with yields dropping precipitously under drought or even low-rainfall conditions (Piha, 1993). In NR's IV and V, almost permanent drought conditions exist, hence, farmers in these areas did not realize the same production gains as farmers in the higher rainfall regions using the same varieties. Even during good rainfall years, districts in NR's IV and V reported chronic food shortages (Sachikonye, 1992).

The widespread adoption of these hybrid maize varieties created greater household food insecurity among smallholder families in NR's IV and V who already were grain-deficient households (FSR, 1991). Forced to sell their maize to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) or to another buyer soon after the harvest when producer prices are lowest, they later bought milled maize at much higher prices after exhausting their supplies. The one-way flow of grain³⁷ out of the CA's and its return as a value-added product, mealie-meal, imposed an implicit cost on these households. Grain-deficient households had to absorb transportation and large-scale milling costs reducing their income by about 30% (Jayne et al, 1994).

The implementation of ESAP in 1991 liberalized maize marketing but did not increase the profitability of smallholder maize production. Though producer prices rose, prices for chemical fertilizers, seed, and other agricultural inputs as well as transportation rose at a much higher rate leaving smallholder maize producers worse-off (MLAWD,

³⁷ The single-channel marketing system prohibited inter-district sales of maize grain thereby centralizing maize milling in the large urban centers. Even after market liberalization in 1991, the growth of local millers has been slow (Masuko, 1997).

1995; Oni, 1996). Because large-scale millers did not expand to the rural areas as quickly as the government intended, smallholder maize producers did not realize the best prices for their maize. Increasingly, they sold to middlemen or "briefcase buyers" who paid low prices for the maize and later sold the maize to the large-scale millers in Harare or the GMB for much higher prices (Matanda and Jeché, 1997; Rubey and Masters, 1994).

Smallholders face a more favorable marketing environment for cotton because it represents an important export crop. During the 1980s, LSC farmers moved out of cotton production and turned to higher-value crops leaving a "gap" in the market. The government and the remaining LSC cotton growers recognized that to maintain their share of the world market, they would have to facilitate cotton production among smallholder farmers. Consequently, the CCGA (Commercial Cotton Growers Association), donors, textile manufacturers, and buyers funded extension, research, credit, and marketing for smallholder cotton producers. The statistic that smallholders accounted for 70% of national cotton production in 1995 speaks to the success of these support systems.

In contrast to the maize story, liberalization of cotton markets benefited smallholder cotton producers. By 1996, four major companies, the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTCO), Triangle, Cotpro³⁸, and Cargill-Zimbabwe competed for smallholder cotton production, and producers realized greater credit opportunities and prices. However, the benefits of smallholder cotton production tend to be concentrated in the higher rainfall areas and among better-off smallholder farmers. Because of stringent market requirements, buyers only purchase cotton from registered producers. A farmer

³⁸ Owned and operated by the CCGA.

must join a grower group to be registered, but the cotton companies only select the most productive farmers based on their three-year production record and credit history. The varieties distributed by the cotton companies do not perform well under drought conditions effectively excluding farmers in NR's IV and V.³⁹

Technology

While the Mugabe government expanded the mandates for the national research and extension systems to include the smallholder farm sector, there remains a lack of appropriate varieties and conservation technologies for smallholder farming systems. This situation illustrates the long-term under-investment by the colonial and post-independence governments in research for smallholder producers. Responding to the government mandate at Independence, the Department of Research and Specialist Services (DRSS) created a Farming Systems Research (FSR) Unit and committed 50% of its operational funds toward smallholder farm research. However, donors funded much of the on-farm trials and research directed at smallholder growers (Avila et al, 1989). Since 1982, the government has committed successively lower levels of funding for research, and the context of agricultural research changed for the worse.

- Government resources committed to DRSS declined 35% in real value.
- The proportion of total recurrent expenditure committed to salaries increased from 50%-70% and only 9% of operational funds available for actual research.
- Most research stations and institutes within DRSS run out of operating funds six months before the end of the fiscal year (ARC, 1995).

³⁹ Interview with M Mangundu and J. Zvismou, Growers' Services, COTCO Tafuna Depot, November 30,

Fearing DRSS would no longer address their production needs, commercial farmers through the CFU chose to develop their own research and extension system soon after Independence. The Agricultural Research Trust (ART) Farm serves as the center for on-farm trials and varietal testing. The withdrawal of CFU financial support exacerbated the financial crisis within DRSS.

Despite the degraded nature of many of the communal lands, yields per hectare still fell below the productive potential of the CA's. Technologies to improve the management and performance of existing crops and new crops suitable to the arid environment of the CA's could raise smallholder production helping them to meet their needs (ARC, 1995; Avila et al, 1989). In the absence of a coordinated national research effort, NGO's have stepped in to facilitate farmer-to-farmer research on moisture and soil conservation technologies.⁴⁰ However, their efforts are local and not coordinated and therefore, cannot properly address the problems of low productivity and household food insecurity prevalent among smallholders. The lack of appropriate on-the-shelf technologies perpetuates the condition of low production in the communal areas.

The development and transfer of cotton technologies for smallholder farmers has occurred within a different context than maize technology development. The CCGA established the Cotton Training Institute (CTI) to provide three-week courses on cotton production and Integrated Pest Management (IPM) courses to smallholder farmers. The CTI subsidizes smallholder training courses and works closely with Agritex and the Cotton Research Institute (CRI) to develop and test cotton varieties appropriate for

1995.

⁴⁰ See for example HIVOS [1988], ITDG [1994].

smallholder conditions (Mariga, 1994). This system is enhanced by the fact that the CRI and CTI are located on adjacent farms. However, the CRI has not escaped the funding problems besetting the rest of the national agricultural research system; donor funding has not prevented the attrition of experienced breeders nor maintained off-farm trials in the CA's (ARC, 1995).

Though CRI breeders consider smallholder production conditions, it is not the main criterion driving the breeding program. Breeders develop cotton varieties first to meet the demands of the world cotton market as defined by the cotton companies. Consequently, the variety disseminated to smallholder farmers is not necessarily the most appropriate. For example, R502, the cotton variety most widely disseminated by the cotton companies in 1995, did not perform well under the arid conditions and was prone to aphid infestation. Though smallholders preferred R501 because of its drought tolerance, the cotton companies decided to replace it with R502, a variety that yields a longer staple and better thread quality (Arnaiz et al., 1995).

Intensifying smallholders maize and cotton production, an objective of government policies, promotes the use of practices and technologies inappropriate for agroecological conditions in many of the CA's. Consequently, intensification often results in the loss of soil fertility and structure. Smallholders require technologies to replace soil nutrients beyond simply applying chemical fertilizers. The government's unwillingness to properly support national agriculture research efforts jeopardizes whatever production gains smallholder farmers have realized since 1980 (ARC, 1995).

Conservation

The post-Independence government responded to land degradation in the CA's in much the same way as the colonial government by imposing a system of land-use it considered necessary to bring about sustainable production in the CA's. The government's decision to de-emphasize the resettlement program coincided with its decision to channel resources to increasing the productivity of the communal lands. "Communal Land Reorganization" comprises programs of soil conservation, land-rationalization, and centralization. Like the colonial government, the Mugabe government chose to maintain the prime farm lands in commercial production with black commercial farmers as the main beneficiaries.

Modeled after the 1951 NLHA, communal land reorganization⁴¹ sought to rationalize land-use by demarcating arable and grazing areas, and relocating families to centralized villages. It also imposed destocking, forced the construction of conservation infrastructure, and established a system of title deeds. Officials supporting communal land reorganization commented that the NLHA was not wrong in its content but in its implementation. Acts of passive resistance by CA farmers and constrained government financing limited the implementation of this program (Alexander, 1994).

The Mugabe government also addressed the land degradation problem by delegating the responsibility for natural resource management to local government. However, it did not provide the level of funding necessary for local governments to manage effectively their natural resources. The Rural District Councils (RDC) developed

⁴¹ The Communal Lands Act of 1982 and its 1985 amendment empower the government to regulate land-uses in the communal and resettlement areas and enables communal land reorganization.

land-use and zoning maps but lacked the resources to implement their plans (Masuko, 1993, 1995). Government departments tasked with natural resource management faced similar financial constraints.⁴²

The amalgamation of local government structures for white areas (rural councils) and black areas (district councils) to create a single structure for local government, the RDC, weakened the capacity of the ICA's to manage land-uses in the commercial areas.⁴³ The natural resources sub-committee within the RDC is tasked with developing and implementing local resource management policies, and for providing support to the ICA's. The financial problems faced by the RDC trickles down to its sub-committees. The lack of funding available to the ICA's negatively affects their initiative and ability to manage land resources. At a meeting convened by the CFU to discuss the newly formed RDC's, the chairman for the natural resources sub-committee of Gutu RDC commented:

Although no accurate information is available on the present number of functional sub-committees nor their operational effectiveness, the general opinions expressed at a recent meeting of the Environmental Affairs Committee were of declining interest and effort by the old ICA's, while in the small-scale sector, I doubt if any new sub-committees have been established.

(Keith Harvey, CFU meeting on RDC's, February 1997)

To summarize, marketing policies to stimulate smallholder marketed production without complementary technology and conservation policies have had the unintended consequences of greater household food insecurity and poverty among smallholder families especially in the low rainfall areas. From 1980-1994, the number of people

⁴² Agritex has primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with soil conservation regulations, natural resource officers for the NRB oversee compliance with other environmental regulations, and forestry officials have oversight responsibility for forest resources.

⁴³ The 1988 Rural District Council Act amalgamated the two structures of local government, but the two

requesting government food aid rose from 3.5 million to over 14 million.⁴⁴ ESAP contributed further to the impoverishment of smallholder families by raising the cost of food staples and farm inputs. From 1991-1994, the first five years of the ESAP program, the cost of a rural shopping basket rose by almost 300%.⁴⁵

Poverty contributes to environmental degradation because rural households adopt strategies to meet their immediate needs but often result in the long-term degradation of their lands (FSR, 1994; Gore et al, 1992). Non-farm activities like gold panning degrade stream-banks and grazing areas. The costs of land degradation go beyond the CA's. For example, where commercial and communal areas lie adjacent to each other, gold panning contributes to the siltation of dams downstream thereby compromising the capacity of large-scale commercial farmers to practice irrigated agriculture.

PUBLIC POLICIES AND LAND-USE IN SHAMVA DISTRICT

Shamva District lies in NR's II and III, and its smallholder producers have benefitted from the government's marketing and agricultural policies (figure 3.2). Shamva's smallholder producers rank among the most productive in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, a rapidly growing population on land with fixed boundaries means that they face increasing land scarcity, poverty, household insecurity, and consequently, land degradation. In the RA's, land scarcity has only recently become an issue but the incidence of land degradation is on the rise. The implementation of ESAP impoverishes Shamva's farmers because of reduced public investments in institutions supporting

did not actually merge until 1993.

⁴⁴ MLAWD, 1995: 105.

smallholder agriculture (e.g., Agritex, AFC) and steep increases in the prices of agricultural inputs and basic foodstuffs. Consequently, Shamva's farmers have adopted practices to meet their immediate needs but also degrade their lands.

The following section describes the context of smallholder agriculture in Shamva District and discusses the impact of ESAP on the farm and non-farm practices of smallholder farmers. Shamva District is unique in that communal, resettlement, and large-scale commercial farm areas lie adjacent to each other. The data used in the discussion come from a survey of 468 smallholder households in Shamva District.


Farming Systems

The LSC area occupies the southern areas of the district whereas the communal lands lie in the center and to the north, areas with lower productive potential. The resettlement areas occupy land in the north-central part of the district that formerly were LSC cattle ranches. Soils in the LSC area are moderately shallow to moderately deep silty loams over reddish-brown to yellowish-brown clay. The rich soils and moderate temperatures found in the south make possible the tree savanna system that dominates the area. In the RA's and CA's, soils are a mix of moderately deep to deep coarse-grained sands over loamy sands and sandy loams over sandy clays (Savanhu, 1997).

Smallholders in the CA's and RA's have dryland farming systems reliant on ox-traction for tillage. In Shamva, the average parcel size in the CA's is two hectares per

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Figure 3.2 Agroecological Map of Shamva District



family and in the RA's, four hectares. Maize represents the major food crop and cotton the major cash crop in the smallholder farming system. About 98% of the respondents grew maize, and 50% of the CA respondents and 71% of the RA respondents grew cotton (table 3.5, 3.6). Minor crops include groundnuts, sorghum, and burley tobacco. Despite an effort by Agritex and the ZFU to promote horticulture production, it remains limited to garden plots maintained by women for food and supplemental income. Principe Irrigation Scheme represents the exception. The sixty scheme farmers have access to one hectare each of irrigated land and grow vegetables for sale locally and in Harare's central market.

Table 3.5 Percent of CA and RA farmers growing maize and cotton in 1995

	Grew Maize		Grew Cotton	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Madziwa CA (n=288)	98.6%	1.4%	57.4%	42.6%
Bushu CA (n=77)	98.7%	1.3%	41.0%	59.0%
Mupfurudzi RA (n=76)	96.2%	3.8%	70.9%	29.1%

Table 3.6 Mean maize and cotton area (ha) 1995

Farming Area	Maize	Cotton
Madziwa CA (n=288)	1.2	0.5
Bushu CA (n=77)	1.1	0.3
Mupfurudzi RA (n=76)	2.3	1.1

Access to lands with good soils and moderate rainfall allowed Shamva's smallholder producers to realize higher average yields than the national average (table

3.7). In the 1990s, Zimbabwe experienced droughts in 1991/92 and 1994/95. Table 3.7 shows the effect of the droughts on maize and cotton yields. To make-up shortfalls in production and income, smallholders in Shamva and elsewhere sold their cattle (Kinsey et al., 1998). The Agritex Area District Officer for Shamva District estimated a loss of a third of the smallholder herd from 1990-1995.⁴⁶ More than a third of the respondents owned no cattle (table 3.8). Smallholders, however, did not sell their farm equipment during the drought. The relatively high rate of farm asset ownership among smallholders speaks to their productive capacity (table 3.9).

Table 3.7 A comparison of maize and cotton yields between Shamva's smallholders and the national average

	Madziwa CA	Mupfurudzi RA	National Average
Maize			
1994-95*	750.0	N/a	1213
1993-94	2100.0	2240	1124
1992-93	1750.0	2222	1090
1991-92*	3.3	1815	158
1990-91	2275.0	0	1101
Cotton			
1994-95*	750.0	N/a	672
1993-94	1000.0	678.6	612
1992-93	1000.0	1128.1	676
1991-92*	116.5	791.7	195
1990-91	950.0	1662.5	700

Source: Crop forecasting figures, Agritex provincial office, Bindura.

* Drought years

Table 3.8 Cattle holdings 1995

	Own no cattle	Mean herd size
Madizwa CA (n=292)	34.9%	4.8
Bushu CA (n=79)	38.5%	4.5
Mupfurudzi RA (n=77)	15.2%	7.6

⁴⁶ Interview with Mr. Matare, Agritex District Officer, Shamva Town, November 10, 1995.

Table 3.9 Farm asset ownership

	Plow		Scotch cart		Cultivator	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Madziwa CA (n=288)	73.4%	26.6%	41.6%	58.4%	45.4%	54.6%
Bushu CA (n=77)	70.5%	29.5%	33.3%	66.7%	42.3%	57.7%
Mupfurudzi RA (n=76)	94.9%	5.1%	59.5%	40.5%	54.4%	45.6%

ESAP, Marketing and Credit

Market liberalization did not change the pattern of maize marketing among Shamva's smallholder producers. In 1995, over 90% of smallholder producers sold their maize to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the former government parastatal because of the lack of other buyers, principally large-scale millers, in the local markets (Masuko, 1997). In light of high transportation costs, a consequence of ESAP, some smallholders chose to sell "briefcase buyers" rather than transport their crops to the GMB depot (Matanda and Jeché, 1997). Some ZFU members grouped together to transport their maize to the GMB depot and realize some economies-of-scale (Arnaiz, 1997).

The majority of smallholder cotton producers continued to market their cotton to the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTCO), the former marketing parastatal. Until 1996, COTCO was the only cotton company to operate a depot in Shamva, but that year, it moved its operations to Bindura Town, and Cargill-Zimbabwe began operations at the old COTCO depot. Aside from the cotton companies, "briefcase buyers" including some LSC farmers in the district, bought cotton from RA and CA farmers who could not afford to transport it to either the Cargill or COTCO depot. COTCO did attempt to lower transportation costs for its farmers by sending trucks out to the CA's and RA's to collect

the cotton. Because COTCO organizes its farmers into farmer groups, they were more likely than maize producers to organize group transport (Arnaiz, 1997).

The droughts of 1991/92 and 1994/95 prevented a number of smallholder producers from repaying loans to COTCO and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). A high default rate among smallholders in the district left many ineligible for production loans from the AFC or COTCO.⁴⁷ Moreover, the retraction of government subsidies, an ESAP requirement, left the AFC with less money to use as loans for the smallholder sector, thus, even eligible smallholders did not receive production loans in 1995.⁴⁸ Lack of money prevented more than half of the respondents from purchasing agricultural inputs in 1995/96 (Matanda and Jeché, 1997). A strategy adopted by smallholders to cope with cash shortages was to contract with LSC farmers to exchange labor in-kind for fertilizer and seed.⁴⁹

Land Scarcity

In 1992, Shamva District had a population of 93,938 people spread out across an area of 2666.2 km². Madziwa and Bushu CA's have the highest population density, 47.9 persons/km²,⁵⁰ and the LSC farm areas have the lowest population density at 13 persons/km². The population in the CA's is a result of a moderate fertility rate⁵¹ and a

⁴⁷ The repayment rates for 1994-95, a drought year, were less than 50% for AFC loans and 66% for COTCO input loans. Interviews with M. Marowa, AFC loan officer Bushu, November 29, 1995 and M. Mangundu and J. Zvismou, Growers' Services, COTCO Tafuna Depot, November 30, 1995.

⁴⁸ Interview with Mr. Muposhi, AFC Loan Officer, Bindura Office, November 11, 1995.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mr. G. French, December 6, 1995 and Mrs. Jones, District Administrator, June 27, 1995.

⁵⁰ Population density for the communal areas is greater than that reported in the 1992 census because this statistic did not include the 706.2 km² occupied by the Umfurudzi Safari Area considered a part of Shamva District.

⁵¹ The average household size is 4.5 persons (Wekwete, 1997).

high immigration rate. The RA's which were established in the early 1980s have a population density of 22.9 persons/km², less than half of that in the CA's (CSO, 1993).

There exists a need for land among Shamva's smallholders. The resettlement list kept at the Rural District Council offices contains over 3,000 families. When asked if their land was adequate to meet their families needs, almost half of the respondents reported no. Land scarcity appears to be a greater problem in Madziwa CA than in Bushu CA or Mupfurudzi RA (table 3.10). In the CA's, the average landholding per family is two hectares, a figure below the average of 3.28 hectares determined by Sithole and Attwood (1990) in their multi-district survey of CA farmers. In the RA's, the average crop holding was four hectares, a figure that suggests increasing land scarcity. Originally, settlers received five hectares of arable land from the government (Wekwete, 1997).

Table 3.10 **Is your land adequate to meet your family's household needs?**

	Madziwa CA (n=291)	Bushu CA (n=94)	Mupfurudzi RA (n=79)
Yes	49.5%	61.7%	63.3%
No	50.5%	38.3%	36.7%

A consequence of land scarcity is the intensification of agricultural production. Agritex recommends leaving at least 40% of arable land fallow from year-to-year. On average, RA and CA respondents left about 22% of their land fallow (table 3.11). By comparison, a survey of LSC farmers in Shamva District revealed that on average 43% of their land is left as grassland or fallow land.⁵²

⁵² IDS/Ford survey of 19 LSC farmers in Shamva District.

Table 3.11 Mean percent of land left fallow 1995

Farming Area	% land left fallow
Madziwa CA (n=292)	22%
Bushu CA (n=79)	23%
Mupfurudzi RA (n=78)	22%

Poor farmers unsure of their survival in agriculture from one year to the next tend to have short-planning horizons. They tend not to adopt most conservation technologies; these technologies yield benefits only after five years, a planning horizon of little relevance to their immediate needs (Woomer and Swift, 1994). Among the respondents, 59% reported using contour ridging⁵³ and 17% reported manuring. Less than 10% of the respondents used other conservation technologies like tied ridging, agroforestry, or composting. By comparison, a survey of 19 LSC farmers in Shamva District⁵⁴ revealed that 37% manured and 89% had contour ridges on their farm. In addition, almost half used tied ridging, a fifth practiced agroforestry, and 63% practiced no-till. The obvious difference between Shamva's smallholders and LSC farmers is the size of their landholdings. The average farm size among the LSC farm respondents was 925 hectares.

Land Degradation

To increase land access, smallholders encroached upon communal grazing areas and high-risk areas. Savanhu (1997) found that farmers in Madziwa CA had cultivated lands on the foothills and foot slopes, areas reserved for grazing lands. A comparison of

⁵³ Contour ridging is the construction of dykes across the slope of the land to prevent soil erosion.

⁵⁴ The respondent pool capture almost 50% of the LSC population of Shamva District where there are 39

Landstat photographs from before Independence and 1986-88 shows extensive deforestation in Madziwa CA with most of the savanna woodland turned into open grasslands. In one ward in Madziwa CA, Savanhu estimates less than 5% of the area retains its original vegetative cover. Forest and vegetative cover are greater in the RA's, but Savanhu found evidence of fields encroaching on the foot slopes and foothills. Throughout the smallholder areas, Savanhu found open cultivation to be the prevalent land-use.

The survey respondents noted the increasing incidence of land degradation in their areas. About 25% of the CA respondents found their land to be of very good or good quality, and a third thought their cropland to be of poor quality. By comparison, 75% of the RA respondents found their land to be of very good or good quality (table 3.12).

Table 3.12 Rank quality of croplands

	Madziwa (n=292)	Bushu (n=80)	Mupfuruza RA (n=79)
Very good	4.5%	2.5%	26.6%
Good	25.0%	22.5%	46.8%
Satisfactory	37.7%	45.0%	16.5%
Damaged	21.9%	25.0%	8.9%
Not fit for agriculture	11.0%	5.0%	1.3%

Overgrazing and encroachment has resulted in some degree of land degradation in the grazing areas. Savanhu (*ibid*) believes gully and hill erosion in foot slope and foothill regions is probably due to overgrazing. A third of the CA respondents versus 11% of RA respondents found their grazing lands to be of poor quality (table 3.13).

Table 3.13 Rank quality of communal grazing land

	Madziwa (n=274)	Bushu (n=76)	Mupfuruzi/Sanye (n=79)
Very good	3.3%	3.9%	30.4%
Good	20.4%	30.3%	43.0%
Satisfactory	32.8%	39.5%	15.2%
Damaged	25.2%	19.7%	3.8%
Not fit for grazing	18.2%	6.6%	7.6%

The more degraded nature of the communal lands relative to the resettlement lands makes their production more vulnerable to drought. Soil erosion and loss of soil structure decreases the buffering capacity of the soil. In 1994/95, 75% of Bushu respondents and 54% of Madziwa respondents lost their entire maize crop versus only 34.2% of the RA respondents (table 3.14). Consequently, 79% of the respondents used government food aid through the grain loan scheme in 1995/96.

Table 3.14 1994-1995 maize production

	Madziwa (n=292)	Bushu (n=79)	Mupfurudzi (n=77)
Realized no production	54.3%	74.5%	34.2%
Realized some production	45.7%	25.5%	65.8%

Without adequate assistance from the government or access to production credit, Shamva's smallholder producers had to find other ways to raise the money to purchase seed and chemical fertilizers after the 1994/95 drought. They sold their cattle, sought off-farm employment, and carried out non-farm income generating activities, principally gold panning (Kinsey et al, 1998).

Next to farming, gold panning has become the farmers' most important source of income. Entire families go up to the mountains to pan during the winter.

(M. Maropa, Agritex agent Mupfurudzi RA, November 17, 1995)

This year, we have no money to buy fertilizers for our maize crop. The AFC will not give out loans because we defaulted last year. To get money for fertilizers and seed and food, families are turning to gold panning in the river nearby. Families have formed syndicates where the men dig and the women and children transport the dirt to the river where they process it.

(Councilor and community workers, Gono Ward, Bushu CA, November 15, 1995)

Gold panning is an environmentally damaging process. Those who pan for gold go to government lands, grazing areas, and in rare cases, LSC farms where they dig deep holes and transport the dirt to water sources like rivers to process. Shamva's RDC considers gold panning to be the major environmental problem in their district. According to G. French, the chairperson for the Natural Resources sub-committee of the RDC, *"Gold panning is the major cause of environmental problems in our district. Gold panners destroy river banks causing major problems with siltation."* Increased siltation of waterways reduces the water capacity of dams downstream in the LSC farm areas.

The RDC attempted to regulate gold panning by declaring certain gold panning areas protected zones. Yet, it lacked the human and financial resources to evict the illegal miners from the protected zones and to enforce conservation and natural resource laws. It approached the Ministry of Mining Affairs and NGO's for financial assistance but was unsuccessful.⁵⁵

The Shamva case study illustrates the relationship between public policies, land practices, and land degradation. The CA's have the highest population density and smallest average landholdings in the district, and consequently, its lands were degraded more so than lands in the RA or LSC area. However, within the RA's, the processes of land fragmentation and intensification of agriculture was evident and so too the

⁵⁵ Interview with G. French, Chair RDC Natural Resources sub-committee, December 6, 1995.

consequences (Elliot, 1996). The post-Independence government's incomplete implementation of the first resettlement program coupled with its retraction from agricultural marketing, research, and credit, contributed to the increase of poverty and household food insecurity among Shamva's smallholder families during the 1990s. Reliant on government grants, the RDC lacked the funds to regulate environmentally damaging land practices.

SUMMARY

Public policies define the rights of individuals to natural resources, and it is this structure of rights that mitigates the impact of environmental change, like land degradation, by allocating the benefits and costs among societal groups (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The settler minority benefited from land degradation in the reserves; land degradation compromised the capacity of African farmers to produce for the market. In the post-Independence period, white LSC farmers and now blacks interested in acquiring commercial farms benefit from land degradation in the CA's and RA's. Low production among smallholders reinforces the CFU's and the Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union (ICFU) contention that if given commercial land smallholders could not attain the production levels of commercial farmers (ICFU, 1999). Hence, commercial lands should remain in commercial production, and rights to the land ought to remain with white LSC farmers or given to emergent black commercial farmers. In the colonial and post-Independence period, the rural majority bore the costs of land degradation through impoverishment and household food insecurity.

To break the cycle of poverty, low production, and land degradation, smallholder producers must develop an effective policy voice to gain greater access to land and as

importantly, to win higher levels of support for institutions that support smallholder agriculture (Bratton, 1988; Merrill-Sands and Collion, 1994). The regulated structure of organized interests maintained by the government requires smallholder farmers to use either the ZFU or ZANU (PF) to participate in the policy process. For farmers using the ZFU, they must first develop a policy voice within the Union to compete with commercial and other farm interests also represented by the ZFU. The following chapter presents a conceptual approach to understand the structure of political opportunities faced by smallholder members within the ZFU. It also discusses the incentives or disincentives for mobilization presented by the policy type and nature of the "good" affected.

CHAPTER 4

SMALLHOLDER MOBILIZATION FOR LAND WITHIN FARMER ORGANIZATIONS: A CONCEPTURAL APPROACH

As discussed earlier, to protect the rights of settler farmers, the colonial government used the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 to grant the best lands to settler farmers and to remove blacks to lands with limited productive potential in drought-prone areas. Though the post-Independence government recognized the two black farmer unions, the NFAZ and the ZNFU, these Unions did not succeed in fundamentally changing the distribution of land rights inherited from the colonial period. Limiting a rapidly growing agrarian population to a fixed amount of land without the benefit of appropriate technologies created the conditions contributing to land degradation in the communal areas⁵⁶ (CA).

The scarcity of farmland capable of sustaining intensive agriculture creates incentives for white and black farmers to gain or maintain access to these lands through the policy process. A strong white farmers' union, the CFU, backed by the World Bank and IMF and a government unwilling to risk economic instability worked for several years to maintain the status quo. More recently, the growing influence of opposition

⁵⁶ See chapter three.

parties and donor demands that the Phase II resettlement program be oriented to benefit the rural poor has strengthened the ZFU's political voice in the land policy arena.

The government nevertheless maintains a highly regulated structure of organized interests and limits participation in policy debates to organizations that it recognizes as legitimate representatives of societal interests. The rules of participation require smallholder farmers to articulate their demands through the ZFU to have a voice in the national debate on land. However, the inclusion of commercial farmers as ZFU members, even though they represent a minority, creates a conflict of land interests between them and farmers from the resettlement areas (RA) and CA's . In this context, it cannot be assumed that the ZFU represents the land interests of its smallholder or poorer members raising fundamental questions about the role of poor farmers in shaping land and agricultural policy, and in addressing the problems of land degradation in the smallholder farming areas

This chapter outlines an approach for investigating issues of smallholder mobilization and representation within the context of organizational policy-making. This approach combines concepts developed from economic and political studies of organizations specifically dealing with collective action, policy arenas and economic goods, and political opportunity structures. The chapter concludes with several specific questions that will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6.

FARMER ORGANIZATIONS AND THE POLICY PROCESS

Collective Action

Rational choice theorists assume that individuals act and make decisions in a consciously self-interested and economically rational manner. Individuals calculate the

perceived costs and benefits associated with alternative courses of action and choose that course which maximizes their utility. Applying this assumption to group behavior, Mancur Olson (1965) convincingly argued that large or “latent” groups of self-interested individuals will not come together to achieve a common or group interest. For individual members, the level of benefits arising from group action are too small and the costs of ensuring that others contribute are too great. In small or “privilege” group situations on the other hand, the benefits per individual rise as policing costs decline thereby making collective action more likely.

Olson observes that some latent groups have organized formally, but individuals join these groups to access services and other benefits rather than to lobby for common interests. These organizations, according to Olson, use selective or private benefits to attract and maintain their membership. Consequently, lobbying activities are a "by-product" of their economic activities. Olson points out that often organizations begin by providing services and goods and only later, enter into political activities. Latent groups may also come together if their representative organizations have the authority or capacity to coerce individuals to join like the use of "closed shop" rules in the United States and Europe.

The American Farm Bureau (AFB) illustrates many features of an organized latent group (*ibid*: 148-159). Access to extension services, information, and technologies were critical in attracting and maintaining membership. Although the AFB began as a service organization to facilitate the dissemination of farm technologies, it eventually developed a lobbying capacity at the national level. An advantage enjoyed by the AFB was government financial support through the 1914 Smith-Lever Act and the presence of

a farmer-oriented agriculture research and extension system that had "on-the-shelf" technologies ready for dissemination. Few if any of these conditions exist for smallholder farmers in the developing nations thus raising the question, what incentives can compel them to join in a collective action?

Bates (1981) applied key assumptions of rational choice theory and Olson's concepts to an examination of why policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa have tended to favor policies that are not in the direct interests of their country's smallholder farmers. Bates argues that where governments have the latitude to choose between interests, those with the greatest access to policymakers, like large farmers, often succeed in promoting policies in their favor. Following Olson, Bates notes that the size distribution of production affects the incentives and capacity of farmers to organize in defense of their interests. Large-scale farmers and farmers of specialty crops (as "privilege groups") can more easily organize to influence government policy because of their limited numbers. On the other hand, the geographic dispersion, limited access to communication infrastructure, lack of finances, and disparity of interests all conspire against poor farmers organizing themselves to act collectively. Bates concludes that because of their inability to organize, poor farmers (as "latent groups") have not effectively lobbied for agricultural policies. Subsequently, agriculture policies do not promote the development of smallholder agriculture.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ As agriculture develops, the size of the farm sector decreases, a consequence of greater production efficiencies and the inelastic consumption function for food (Cochrane, 1979; Ellis, 1989). Production efficiencies are gained through the adoption of more-capital intensive and specialized technologies. Farmers within each specialized sub-sector lobby for their own policies. The relatively small size of the potential group of beneficiaries guarantees a large payoff for each member (Bonnen, 1992). As farmers specialize, they also make asset-specific investments, like the purchase of farm equipment intended for a specific use. The economic imperative to protect the value of these investments provides strong incentives to lobby for policies that maintain or enhance the profitability of their production

Bates stimulated development scholars to identify the conditions for the formation and development of farmer organizations⁵⁸ (Hirshmann, 1984; Korten, 1984). Second, it encouraged researchers to take a closer look at farmers organizations (FO's) in the policy process and to understand under what conditions that they have succeeded (Schmid and Soroko, 1997). To this end, research considered factors such as policy type (Bratton and Bingen, 1994; Bratton, 1987; Skalnes, 1995), organizational structure and services (Arnaiz et al., 1995; Carroll, 1992; Makumbe, 1994), political regime (Herbst, 1990; Bingen, 1994, 1996b; Bray, 1991), relations with external actors (Farrington and Bebbington, 1994; Wellard and Copestake, 1994; Ndiame, 1994), and culture/history (Anderson, 1994; Bebbington et al., 1991; Bunker, 1987).

Many of the studies focused on state-societal relations and assumed that members shared similar interests. Responding to Bates, scholars reasoned that if smallholder farmers organized, then they would succeed in gaining favorable policies (see Burgess 1992, 1997). Farmer organizations were conceptualized as an apolitical entity or black box used by members to articulate their demands to policymakers.

Skalnes' (1989) study of the Commercial Farmers' Union in Zimbabwe found that even among commercial farmers (a "privilege group") members' interests differed and often conflicted. Similarly with smallholder farmers, studies of peasant differentiation document the divergence of interests among the rural poor as their agriculture develops (Amin, 1992; Cousins et al., 1992). Accepting that the interests of smallholder farmers

systems (Cochrane, 1979; Williamson, 1985). In developing nations, commercial farmers lobby for higher prices because size and efficiency differentials mean that they capture most of the benefits (Bratton, 1987; Bates, 1988).

⁵⁸ See also the Series on Rural Local Government, Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

do differ challenges the belief that their organizations can represent all of their interests equitably. How and under what conditions farmer organizations mobilize becomes an important question if we are interested in how a farmer organization might promote smallholder development. We cannot, as Bratton (1994a) observed, assume that peasant organizations are democratic and that smallholders' interests will prevail. In fact, as Michels' (1918) "iron law of oligarchy" suggests, organizational leaders often use their position for their own self gain.

Incentives

Olson (1965) argued that the high exclusion costs of public policies create disincentives for their provision especially within latent groups. To overcome the disincentives, organizations must provide members with selective or private benefits. What incentives can be used to compel members to join in a collective action within their organization? Prevailing at the organizational level does not mean that the organization will succeed in winning the policy in the national policy arena nor will the costs of excluding those who did not contribute diminish. The tenuous relationship between contributing to the provision of a policy and actually obtaining the desired policy weakens incentives for collective action.

Rational choice scholars have begun to identify the role of psychological variables in an individual's choice to join in a collective action (Ostrom, 1998). Schmid (1987:199) notes that "people have various capacities for trust and opportunism," and an individual's personality must also be considered. Altruism changes the value of benefits and costs associated with a collective action.

Anthropologists have long argued that individual behavior cannot be divorced from the cultural, social, and economic circumstances of the individual. Regarding smallholder farmers, anthropologists characterize their society as constituting a "moral economy" where group cultural values and norms over-ride individual objectives. The "moral economy" perspective attributes a distinctive social and economic logic to peasants which differs from the "rational" capitalist logic (Sanford, 1991; Scott, 1976). Smallholder farmers operate within risky environments unsure of their survival from one year to the next. The web of relationships represented by the community acts as a safety net or insurance during times of crises and drought (Scott, 1979; Wolf, 1966). Customs and traditions maintain this system of reciprocity and exchange. Threats to the continued viability of their community or culture create a powerful incentive for smallholder farmers to participate in collective action (Anderson, 1994; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Hyden, 1990; Bebbington et al., 1991).

Mobilizing Processes

The costs of mobilizing within an organization include more than the costs entering into an individual's decision process. The mobilizing process involves identifying common interests, packaging those interests into a persuasive message, and communicating that message to the target population. To do all of this requires resources. The actual costs depend upon the size of the target population and its geographic dispersion (Kitschelt, 1986). A political entrepreneur can bear the initial costs of mobilization to facilitate collective action (Marwell and Oliver, 1988; Popkin, 1988). Because smallholder farmers lack the resources to play this role, it often falls upon external actors such as NGOs, government actors, and more recently, retired or

retrenched civil servants to do so (Farrington and Bebbington, 1994; Gubbels, 1993; Ndiame, 1994; Tandler, 1994).

Mobilizing within large peasant organizations raises many of the constraints described above. The costs of communicating with other members may still be considerable for most peasant organizations lack adequate mechanisms for communicating between and across organizational levels (Carroll, 1992; Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Organizers can use pre-existing organizational structures, like affiliated clubs and associations, to communicate their message and to mobilize members. Political entrepreneurs continue to play a critical role in mobilizing members (Fox, 1991), but interfering in an organization may dissuade external actors from becoming involved (Fisher, 1994). Consequently, poor farmers face considerable costs to mobilizing for their interests in their organizations.

To summarize, high exclusion costs create disincentives for the provision of public policies by "latent groups" like smallholder farmers. Latent groups do not organize formally in the absence of selective benefits or coercion. The mobilizing process itself creates costs. In the extreme case, smallholder farmers may mobilize to protect the basis of their cultural and social reproduction, i.e., their community. Given these conditions, the small group size of commercial farmers in the ZFU (a "privileged group") means that they face stronger incentives to mobilize around land policy than poorer members.

POLICY ARENAS, OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, AND FARMER POLITICAL ACTION

Policy research has begun to look at the internal political dynamics of farmer organizations and its impact on the type of policies pursued by the organization. Fox's

(1991) longitudinal study of a Mexican co-operative found that the presence of multiple loci of power, i.e. rival factions, at the highest levels of the organization facilitated leadership accountability and increased the opportunities for ordinary members to have their interests expressed by the organization.⁵⁹ Bratton's (1994a) analyses of the decision by the presidents of the NFAZ and ZNFU to merge to form the ZFU exposed the political dimension of organizational decision-making. Bingen (1994, 1996a, 1996b) and Bingen et al (1995) similarly explored issues of leadership, accountability, and decision-making in a Malian cotton farmers union and linked these issues to the organization's ability to identify and represent its members interests. Together, these studies showed that the opportunities for poor members to have their interests expressed by their organization varied widely across organizations. Some organizations possess greater democratic capacities than others.

Policy Types and Goods

What the studies above do not do is consider how political opportunities may vary across policy arenas. Theodore Lowi⁶⁰ (1964) provides a classification of public policies that illustrates how opportunities and incentives for political action differ between policy arenas. Lowi explains that expectations define relationships between people and in politics, public policies determine those expectations. Therefore, the type of policy at stake defines political relationships or the power structure of its related policy arena. The power structure delimits the opportunities available to participating political actors.

⁵⁹ See also Lachenmann (1992) who carried out a longitudinal study of a farmers' movement in Senegal.

⁶⁰ For a review of articles addressing Lowi's policy classification, see Spitzer, 1987.

Lowi identifies three types of public policies based upon the breadth of their expected impact.⁶¹ Distributive policies do not aim to transfer resources or rights between groups thus its impacts are not inter-related; a benefit for one group does not incur a cost on another. Regulatory and re-distributive policies do transfer rights between groups and create a zero-sum game. The two differ in terms of the level at which the policy impacts occur. Regulatory policies affect groups within a sector only. Re-distributive policies transfer rights across racial or class lines affecting society at the highest levels.

Each type of policy gives rise to its own type of policy arena. Lowi explains the differences between policy arenas in terms of conflict and competition between interests. Re-distributive policies give rise to conflictual but non-competitive arenas. The threat of transferring rights between classes mobilizes societal and political elites to control the policy process and to exclude weakly organized interests, like smallholder farmers, from participating. Regulatory policies give rise to competitive and conflictual arenas with numerous participating interests. Opportunities to form coalitions on an issue by issue basis exist, and the ability to form coalitions distinguishes interests that succeed (Browne, 1990). Distributive policy arenas have the lowest level of conflict and competition though numerous interests do participate. The limited political cost of distributive policies means that all participating interests can gain favorable policies. Politicians often use distributive policies as "patronage policies" to co-opt opposition and to gain political support.

⁶¹ Lowi (1972) identified a fourth class of public policies, constituent policies, to include policies that affected organizational practices within government bureaucracies or political parties.

The notions of conflict and competition help this study to begin to identify policy arenas where smallholder farmers have opportunities and incentives for political action. By definition, policies for land reform and land tenure reform exhibit traits of re-distributive policies suggesting that smallholder farmers have constrained opportunities for political action (Lipton, 1974). However, land policy in Zimbabwe comprises several policy decisions each made within its own constituent policy arena.⁶² Using concepts from institutional economics, Schmid (1987) develops a complementary and more nuanced approach to understanding opportunities for political action by smallholder farmers.

Schmid (1987) defines property rights as rules that order and control human interdependence and determine access to or ownership of "goods." Policies represent the formal expression of these rules. Goods have inherent characteristics that create different contexts for human interdependence and these characteristics determine how one person's actions can potentially affect the welfare of another. Schmid identifies six relevant characteristics: incompatible-use, joint-impact, transaction costs, economies-of-scale, surplus, and fluctuating supply and demand.

Individuals acquire goods by bidding directly for them or through the policy process. In the case of land, individuals use the policy process to acquire rights to land that they lack the resources to acquire on their own. Land, like water and other factors of production possess an incompatible-use characteristic; one person's use of the good precludes its use by another. The capacity to exclude another from using a resource

⁶² For a description of the constituent land policies, see chapter 2.

creates power⁶³ for the owners of incompatible-use goods (IUG's) (*ibid*: 44).

Consequently, policies that aim to transfer rights to land create highly conflictual policy arenas similar to Lowi's re-distributive policy arenas.

A single policy can generate different goods, and each good creates incentives and disincentives for its acquisition. Settler selection policy determines access to resettlement lands, an IUG that creates strong incentives for its provision but only among communal area farmers. Other farmers are not eligible for settlement on village resettlement schemes. Limiting the pool of beneficiaries to smallholder farmers creates opportunities for political action especially among poor farmers. However, settler selection policy implicitly influences the direction of smallholder agriculture development, and within the black farm lobby there exist competing preferences for how smallholder agriculture should develop. A preference for the use of resettlement lands to facilitate the commercial development of smallholder agriculture creates an incentive for powerful interests like black commercial and business interests to participate in this policy arena. Their entry diminishes the opportunities for political action by smallholder farmers who want to use resettlement lands to facilitate their own social and cultural reproduction.

Some policies affect goods that do not create conflictual arenas. Joint-impact goods (JIG's) like roads or pricing and credit policies do not create the same interdependencies as IUG's because these goods are used but not consumed, a positive-

⁶³ Schmid explains that power is the capacity to force one's preference upon others. Schmid implicitly equates economic power with political power. Owners of IUG's can charge rent for the use of the resource and in this way, accumulate wealth. That wealth can then be re-invested in the political process to gain policies ("rules") that enhance their capacity to accumulate wealth. Those who do not own an IUG, like poor farmers, do not have a basis for accumulating wealth and so by definition, have

sum game. High exclusion costs create the greatest disincentive for their provision (*Ibid*: 75). Nevertheless, the resultant policy arena resembles Lowi's distributive policy arena. Smallholder land interests have the greatest opportunity for political action in the least conflictual policy arenas.

High transaction costs can prevent political action by smallholder farmers and other latent groups and therefore, maintain the status quo (*Ibid*: 97). Transaction costs are a by-product of all exchanges. In the policy process, it includes contractual, bargaining, information, and other costs related to gaining consensus and commitment from group members. Transaction costs rise as group size increases. At a certain level, transaction costs dissuade interests from participating in the policy process. In this sense, commercial farmers (a "privilege group") have an advantage over smallholder farmers because of their small group size.

In certain contexts, transaction costs can create conditions where the preferences of smallholder farmers can prevail. The initial rights distribution to a resource matters in determining who bears most of the transaction costs. Land tenure reform policy proposes to privatize land rights in the communal areas and install a system of title deeds. However, there already exists in the communal lands a structure of effective land rights⁶⁴ and rules for the allocation of those rights through traditional authorities and to a lesser degree, local government (Cheater, 1990). To transform the present system, the government (the "bidder") must appeal to each rights holder (the "seller") to relinquish

less power in the policy process than owners of IUG's like commercial farmers and business owners.

⁶⁴ Effective land rights means that individuals have de facto land rights. Communal land tenure gives individuals only usufruct rights to land, but the state's inability to regulate the informal land markets in the communal areas means that those on the land have effective rights to it.

their current rights and to apply for new land rights. The lack of a guarantee that households will receive the same or even any land under the new tenure system creates weak incentives for cooperation by smallholder households. The large number of "sellers" creates high contractual costs for the government (the "bidder"). High contractual costs favor smallholder interests desiring to preserve the current system of land rights in the communal areas. Government would not face similarly high contractual costs in the resettlement areas where the population is less and the land rights structure has not yet fully developed.⁶⁵

Insights drawn from Schmid's (1987) paradigm for institutional performance and Lowi's (1965) policy classification have relevance for understanding choices made by organizations to pursue one policy position over another. Variables like the structure of political relations, interdependencies created by the type of "goods" sought, and transaction costs constrain and create opportunities for smallholder political action. Though the political dynamics of organizational decision-making are not equivalent to the political dynamics of national policymaking, similarities exist. Other structural variables also shape the political opportunities for action by smallholder farmers. These variables can act as substitutes or complements to the political factors introduced above and can expand or constrain the structure of political opportunities.

Political Opportunity Structures

The concept of political opportunity structure from the social movements literature helps us to understand how changes in the institutional structure or informal

⁶⁵ Resettlement area farmers have leasehold rights to land acquired from the government.

power relations of a political system affect opportunities for political action. Movement scholars often use the concept of political opportunity structure (POS) as the key explanatory variable for determining the timing and outcome of social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). If political opportunities expand, i.e., become facilitative, then even weak movements can succeed. Conversely, strong movements can fail when political opportunities contract, i.e., systems become closed or authoritarian (Tarrow, 1996).

At a system or societal level, McAdam (1996:27) identified four conditions that specify the structure of political opportunities.

1. Access to the institutionalized political system.
2. The stability of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity.
3. Opportunities for forming coalitions with elite allies.
4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression.

The first dimension acknowledges the importance of the formal legal and institutional structure of the political system in determining the types and number of access points available to social movements. The second and third conditions recognize the informal structure of power relations specific to an issue area. These two factors modulate the political "voice" of social movements. They can add to or take away from the strength of their collective action efforts and at the same time, increase or decrease access to policy arenas and decision-makers. The last factor refers to the tolerance of a political regime to dissent and challenges from societal actors.

Social movement scholars have applied the POS approach to study the emergence of social movements and to make cross-national comparisons between social movements. For the purposes of this study, the POS approach can be adapted to study mobilization within membership organizations and to make comparisons between policy arenas. Four

conditions that specify the structure of political opportunities at the organizational level are as follows.

1. Formal structures and rules of decision-making and accountability.
2. The cohesiveness of elite groups.
3. Opportunities for forming coalitions with elite groups.
4. Leaders' background, goals and propensity to listen to members.

Membership organizations, like political systems, have formal structures and rules for decision-making that dictate the access members have to decision-makers and the decision-making process. Decision-making structures can be horizontal and participatory or vertical and "top-down". Within large organizations, decision-making tends to be "top-down" and decision-making power concentrated at the apex level. The apex level can consist of a single executive (president), a committee or a national assembly. In their review of peasant organizations, Esman and Uphoff (1984), Carroll (1992), and Clark (1990) found that members had more opportunities to influence decision-making through their representatives when decisions were made by committee or assembly.

Complementary to formal structures of decision-making are the rules that hold leaders accountable to members. Organizations representing the poor and illiterate have long been observed as lacking effective rules for leadership accountability. Assuming self-interested leaders, rational choice scholars focus on identifying formal organizational structures that limit leaders' discretionary behavior. While informal social rules and relationships also limit discretionary behavior, these derive from the formal structures of the organization (Ostrom, 1998; Robertson and Tang, 1995). The informal structure of power relations between organizational actors may play a greater role in holding leaders accountable. Distributing decision-making power across several groups facilitates monitoring of leaders' actions and allows each group to limit the discretionary behavior

of the other (Bingen, 1996; Fisher, 1994; Fox, 1991). In small groups, customs, traditions, and rules define the relationship between leaders and members and outline the obligations each has to the other (Ostrom, 1990; Taylor, 1987; Uphoff, 1992, 1993).

Most organizational studies that address issues of representation have focused on the formal structures and rules of decision-making. Based on a finding of “democratic” or “un-democratic” organizational structures, the authors then draw conclusions about the opportunities members have to press for their interests (see Makumbe [1994], Ng’ethe and Odero [1994]). The political factors overlooked by this approach become increasingly important as the level of conflict and competition within a policy arena rises. Opportunities to form coalitions and the relative stability of elite groups play a critical role in defining political opportunities within regulatory and re-distributive arenas.

The fourth condition of organizational political opportunity structures relates to leaders’ willingness to listen to and be influenced by their members. A considerable body of empirical studies support the observation that in peasant organizations, leaders do have choice and the freedom to exercise that choice (see Bebbington et al, 1991; Bingen, 1996a; Bunker, 1987; Fox, 1991; Nuijten, 1992). The structural variables discussed above set the stage for policy-making, and leaders can take advantage of these stage arrangements (Long and Long, 1992). In some instances, leaders have acted on behalf of their membership even in the absence of structures holding them accountable. Why leaders do so can be explained by their background, experiences and training which shape their normative notions of what is “right.” In a parallel situation, Grindle and Thomas (1991) found that personal backgrounds, formal training, and perceptions played as much a role in the decision-making of bureaucrats as did pressure from interest groups

and donors. Like leaders in organizations, bureaucrats have acted independently to push through policies they thought necessary and appropriate. The efforts of sympathetic leaders can substitute for the resources poor farmers need to compete effectively in conflictual policy arenas but often lack; sympathetic leaders can open the closed political opportunity structures of regulatory and re-distributive arenas for poor farmer interests.

Policy Implementation

Conditions structuring political opportunities within organizations varies according to the level of analysis. Access points in the policy process are not limited to the national level although it may be at this level where policy is formulated. Policy implementation often occurs at the local level and offers actors another point of access. Numerous empirical studies have shown that during implementation, government officials and technicians often re-negotiate national policy with local leaders (Arce, 1993; Arce et al., 1994; Drinkwater, 1992; Moore, 1994; Nuijten, 1992).

Policies implemented at the local level offer farmers greater access and inclusion in the policy-making process. Members are physically and socially closer to their local leaders creating more opportunities to hold leaders accountable. Members and leaders have face-to-face interactions and share multi-stranded relationships (Taylor, 1988). Social norms and a shared cultural background strengthen lines of accountability. Principles of reciprocity and covenant circumscribe the relationship between members and leaders and define their expectations and obligations (Bingen, 1996b; Hyden, 1990).

The degree of heterogeneity within peasant organizations decreases moving from the national down to the local level. Base units usually draw their membership from one village or from neighboring villages. Thus, members and leaders operate similar farming

systems within the same production environment. In Zimbabwe, historical factors have segregated the principal farming sectors into discrete areas. Consequently, separate ZFU groups exist for large-scale commercial, small-scale commercial, resettlement, and communal area farmers suggesting three important differences between political opportunity structures at the national level and at the local level.

1. Local leaders and their members share common interests making it more likely that they would represent members' demands since it would also be in their interests.
2. Homogeneity of interests in the base units facilitates coalition building and reduces the "conflictual" level within regulatory and re-distributive policy arenas.
3. The small group size reduces the transaction costs of mobilizing around land policy thereby creating more opportunities for smallholder political action.

The preceding discussion suggests the likelihood of smallholder farmer mobilization is inversely related to the "closed" or "open" nature of the political opportunity structure. A closed structure limits access to decision process and gives leaders considerable discretionary authority. Leaders' attitudes toward, and empathy for poorer members and their interests can make a closed POS's more open. Greater opportunities for political action exist at the local level, especially in land policy. At the local level, a more direct relationship between action and actually acquiring resettlement land exists creating stronger incentives for collective action. Smaller group size reduces transaction costs including exclusion costs. Within the ZFU base-units, decision-making is more participatory and rules for accountability stronger. Physical proximity also suggests a common production environment and consequently, shared interests between leaders and members. The conditions create open POS's for land issues at the local level.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The analysis limits itself to the settler selection policy arena for theoretical, empirical and logistical reasons. Settler selection policy comprises two critical policy decisions: settler selection criteria and distribution of land between commercial and village resettlement schemes. Theoretically, these policy decisions conform to Lowi's regulatory and re-distributive policies though both decisions involve the allocation of rights to land, an incompatible-use good. This permits the analysis to consider a broad range of variables that can influence the structure of political opportunities within the ZFU, and the response of poorer members. At an empirical level, considerable research has been carried out regarding settler selection policy giving this study more opportunities to compare and validate results. Of equal importance, settler selection policy has occupied a central role in the debate over land since Independence, and one would expect smallholder farmers to be aware of, and to have developed a position on these issues. This would not necessarily be the case with any of the lesser-debated issues. Finally, funding and time constraints prevented consideration of other policy arenas.

The conceptual discussion suggests three hypotheses listed below along with the major research questions.

1. *Members face closed POS's at the national level and open POS's at the local level..*

The size of the organization, their distance from decision-makers and the decision-making process, and the lack of adequate mechanisms for communicating across and between administrative levels suggest closed POS's for poor members. At the local level effective rules for accountability exist, and leaders and members share a

common background and interests creating conditions of open POS's.

- a. What are the political opportunity structures of the settler selection policy arena at the national level and at the local level?

2. *Members mobilize at the local level around their land interests but not at the national level.* The disincentives associated with large groups work against mobilization at the national level. Opportunities to influence land policy at the local level, the level of implementation, clarify the connection between action and obtaining land thereby strengthening incentives for political action. Small group size at the local level lowers transaction costs and facilitates mobilization.

- a. Given the transaction costs associated with the provision of land policy, what incentives for mobilization does land policy offer poor, middle and rich smallholder farmers
- b. What are the land interests of the ZFU's leaders? Does their background or training predispose the ZFU's leaders to champion the land interests of their poorer members even in the absence of pressure?
- b. What are the implications of funding issues on leadership accountability?

3. *Members will go outside of the ZFU to resolve their land demands if faced with closed political opportunity structures in the organization.*

- a. Whose land interests does the ZFU represent in its national positions on settler selection and scheme organization?
- b. If poor farmers cannot use the ZFU to resolve their land issues, then what other channels are available to them?
- c. If the ZFU does not speak for poor farmers, what are the implications for land degradation in the CA's and for the development of smallholder agriculture?

SUMMARY

The conceptual approach outlined in this chapter provides a way for understanding the opportunities and incentives for political action available to smallholder farmers in the land policy arena. It combines concepts from the social movements, rational choice, and public choice perspectives.

The land policy process creates strong disincentives for smallholder political action. Land creates power for its owners and attempts to re-structure land rights stimulates societal and political elites to participate in the policy arena. Their participation creates highly conflictual arenas. As the conflict level rises, so too the costs of participation. Often, smallholder farmers lack the resources to overcome the transaction costs of mobilizing a large and widely dispersed population and so, do not even participate in the land policy arena.

Zimbabwe's land policy comprises several policy decisions and not all generate conflictual policy arenas. Credit and infrastructure policies generate goods that are used by not consumed and so give rise to non-conflictual or distributive policy arenas where smallholder interests can succeed. Policy decisions that affect a smaller population, like settler selection policy, have policy arenas where smallholder farmers have opportunities for political action. Alternately, policies determining the allocation of land between village and commercial resettlement schemes have policy arenas where commercial farm and business interests compete with smallholder farmers. In this arena, smallholder interests have limited opportunities for political action. The transaction costs of mobilizing and participating in the policy process dissuade political action by smallholder interests thereby preserving the status quo. However, where smallholder farmers own the

rights to a resource, transaction costs prevent government and commercial farm interests seeking to change the rights structure from doing so.

The incentives for political action grow weaker in the context of internal mobilization for several reasons. First, the high exclusion costs associated with the provision of public policies also exist when mobilizing within an organization. Other members who may benefit from the policy will choose to "free-ride" rather than participate. Moreover, prevailing at the organizational level does not necessarily mean that the organization will acquire the desired policy. The added step in the process creates considerable disincentives. Costs also derive from the political opportunity structures of land issues within the organization. Closed political opportunity structures, i.e., limited access to the decision process and decision-makers and weak rules for leadership accountability, impose a cost on smallholder interests seeking to participate in decision-making. As in the broader context, the smaller group size of commercial farmers gives them an advantage in mobilizing versus the much larger group size of smallholder farmers even within the organization.

The disincentives and costs of mobilization decrease at the local level. First, the local level coincides with the level of implementation for land policy. The potential short-term and tangible payoff (i.e., acquiring resettlement land) to political action at the local level creates strong incentives for mobilization. The small group size of the ZFU base-units reduces the transaction costs of mobilization. Operating within a similar production environment facilitates shared land interests between members and local leaders indicating less conflictual policy arenas. These factors suggest that smallholder farmers have greater opportunities and incentives for political action in local land policy

arenas. Chapters Five and Six address the research questions by examining the national and local contexts for smallholder political action in land policy within the ZFU.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study combines qualitative and quantitative methods within a case study framework. Qualitative data gathered from individual and group interviews identified issues and questions addressed in a household survey and an organizational survey. Afterwards, follow-up interviews were used to validate survey results and to explore in-depth other issues not adequately addressed by the surveys.

The research in Shamva District was carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of ten, eight of whom were affiliated with the University of Zimbabwe. Shamva's unique qualities make it a good site to address the research questions posed by this dissertation. Few other districts have the diversity of smallholder and farm interests represented in Shamva. Proximity to large-scale commercial farms, a number of which have been designated for acquisition by the government, has kept the settler selection and land acquisition issues in front of smallholder farmers.

Data Collection and Sources

Data collection occurred in five distinct phases. First, the research team carried out a rapid rural appraisal in June 1995. Second, my research assistant and I carried out individual and group interviews from September to December 1995. I relied on my research assistant and Agritex agents to translate for me during the interviews. Third, the research group developed an extensive questionnaire on agricultural production, marketing, political activities, and viewpoints on the land issue. The group tested the

questionnaires in February 1996 and implemented the survey March-April. I organized follow-up interviews in February-March 1997 and presented my initial results to representatives of farmers' groups, agritex, NGOs, and local government in Shamva.

1. **Interviews.** Key informant interviews were carried out with ZFU leaders and staff at the national, provincial, and local levels; elected leaders in the CFU and ICFU; officials in line ministries tasked with resettlement; and representatives on the rural district council.
2. **Group interviews.** Focal group interviews were carried out with ZFU clubs and non-ZFU members. Wards were chosen using the following criteria: dominant production system, environmental condition, proximity to markets and main roads, and presence of ZFU. Agritex (extension) agents, ZFU local staff, and village development workers recruited the participants. Representatives of ten ZFU clubs, three area associations, and the district council participated.
3. **Household survey.** The household survey adopted a stratified random sampling design. Ten wards were chosen to reflect the agroecological, economic, and social diversity of the district. The rural district council and village headmen compiled a list of residents for each ward. The researchers then chose randomly from the lists until 10% of each ward's population had been chosen. The study recruited enumerators from the University of Zimbabwe.
4. **Secondary sources.** This study also collected information from government documents, reports, and papers; ZFU reports, papers, and magazines; CFU reports and magazines; NGO reports; and newspaper articles and journal articles.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

The conceptual approach presented in Chapter Four helps us understand the opportunities and incentives for smallholder mobilization within organizations like the ZFU. It suggests that an open political opportunity structure (POS) and strong incentives facilitate mobilization. More specifically, it suggests that smallholders will not mobilize at the national level to advance their land interests because of organizational structures that preclude their participation in decision-making and weak incentives.

This chapter examines the political opportunity structure defined by the structure of decision-making and rules for accountability in the ZFU and the impact of ZFU leaders' farm background and ideology on opportunities for smallholder mobilization. In the face of closed POS's, leaders could take the initiative to facilitate member mobilization and speak out on behalf of members. Why they do so depends upon their background, training, and belief system (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Without pressure from members, it is likely that the ZFU's national positions on land would more closely reflect leaders' own interests. The analysis compares the ZFU's positions on land with those of members from Shamva District to test this statement. Chapter Five concludes with a discussion of conditions at the national level that dissuade member mobilization.

DECISION-MAKING AND LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY


Structure of Decision-making

The ZFU is a large and complex organization with over 165,000 paid-up members scattered across all 56 districts in the country. It has its national headquarters in Harare, the capital city, a provincial office in each of the eight provincial capitals, and district offices in 28 districts with more planned. It has well-educated staff distributed across seven departments, five of which have programmatic responsibilities: the marketing, economics and research, field and projects, education and training, and information departments (see Appendix B).

Its complex structure with authority centralized in its apex and with specialized departments to facilitate the planning and implementation of a broad array of member programs. At the district level (the "local level") district organizers administer ZFU programs from the national office and provide technical assistance to the district councils and area councils (Figure 5.1). Where the ZFU has not opened a district office, the provincial organizer and provincial marketing officer carry out a similar role. Village clubs and producers' associations, the ZFU's base-units, operate autonomously from the head office organizing to pool assets and resolve common production problems (Mutimba, 1986).

The ZFU hierarchy consists of five levels: the national, provincial, district, ward (WADCO), and village (VIDCO) (Figure 5.1). The leadership committees for the ZFU councils include a chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary, and treasurer. Communal and resettlement area farmers organize into clubs at the village (VIDCO) level. At the ward

Figure 5.1 ZFU leadership and administrative hierarchy



level, club chairpersons come together to form an area council. Each area council represents 6-10 clubs. In the small-scale commercial farming areas, farmers organize at the ward (WADCO) level to form producer associations. Area council chairpersons and producer association chairpersons together form the district council. In the research district, for example, the 13 area council chairpersons and the four members of the leadership committee comprise the ZFU Shamva district council. District chairpersons come together to form a provincial council, and all four members of the leadership committees for each of the councils sit on the national council. National commodity chairpersons also sit on the national council.⁶⁶ The leadership committee for the national council, the President's council, includes the President and his three vice-presidents.

The ZFU's constitution identifies the Annual General Meeting (AGM) or Annual Congress as the highest decision-making body within the Union. Members of the national council, national commodity chairpersons, and the four members of the district leadership committees have the right to attend and to vote at the AGM. The AGM lasts but three days. In the interim, the national council's decisions regarding policy and programming are binding. In the day-to-day management of the ZFU, the ZFU president holds considerable decision-making authority. He maintains an office at the national headquarters and is required to treat his presidency as a full-time position.⁶⁷ Senior leaders and staff defer to the president in all the decision-making (Bratton, 1994a). A

⁶⁶ The ZFU has a commodity committee structure that parallels its administrative structure from the district level to the national level. Commodity committees act as sub-committees to the main council and have the responsibility of communicating commodity issues up and down the hierarchy. District and provincial commodity committees are generalist committees. At the national level, separate committees exist for grain, cotton, oilseeds, and livestock.

⁶⁷ The CFU president is also expected to carry out his organizational responsibilities full-time but is limited to one term in office.

senior officer remarked that "everything must pass over the president's desk for final approval."⁶⁸

The national council has six sub-committees to assist it in its duties. Of these, the most influential is the *management sub-committee* chaired by the president, and comprising the vice-presidents, the provincial chairpersons, and some national commodity chairs. The management sub-committee supervises the senior staff and the day-to-day operation of the Union. It acts as the planning committee for the council and develops programs and policies that it considers necessary to achieve the union's objectives. It also oversees the implementation of the ZFU's policies. The *finance sub-committee* chaired by the president develops the fiscal budget and supervises the financial administration by the senior director. The remaining four sub-committees deal with agriculture-related issues: *livestock, land and mobilization, production and marketing, and women and youth development*.

According to the ZFU's national leaders, the leadership hierarchy represents the principle mechanism for communicating demands up to the national council. At each level, leaders have the task of reporting their members' demands to the next higher level during council meetings. At the AGM, district leaders have the once-a-year opportunity to bring up their members' grievances, interests, and demands directly before national council members. Aside from the AGM, ordinary members and district leaders have little direct contact with members of the national council and must rely on members of their provincial councils to relay their demands up to the national council.

⁶⁸ Interview with B. Mukwende, senior field and projects officer, March 20, 1995.

Leaders at all levels have not effectively communicated members' demands up the hierarchy or information down to the grassroots mainly. At the district and lower levels, village clubs and councils lack the funds to send their chairpersons to area and district council meetings.⁶⁹ This explains in large part the poor information flows below the provincial level (Riddell, 1994).

We need to target facilitators and other farm leaders particularly at the area level. These individuals should be informed, and they should pass the information on to their members. This way, information is funneled to the grassroots. The problem is that the leadership at the area level is not very active or strong and this can be explained by the lack of money.

(Interview with E. Chikava, ZFU marketing officer, November 22, 1995)

Aside from the leadership hierarchy, members can communicate their demands to national leaders through the staff. However, this is a restrictive channel for communication. The economics and the marketing departments have the main task of identifying, aggregating, and prioritizing members' interests. They do so primarily through household and farm-level surveys. It is important to note that the national council, especially the *management* sub-committee, determines the scope and content of the surveys. The survey data enters the decision cycle in the form of briefing papers provided to the national leadership. Senior leaders rely on the senior staff to inform them of members' demands.

⁶⁹ Leaders at the village and area levels must use group funds to pay for their bus fares to ZFU meetings, and the majority of those funds come from member dues. Of the Z\$20 fee collected from each member, village clubs and area councils retain only 5% or Z\$1. In 1997, the typical village club had an operating budget of Z\$25 and the typical area council had an operating budget of Z\$200, insufficient to pay for its chairperson's fare to all of the area council or district council meetings. The ZFU head office retains 50% of all membership fees collected from communal and resettlement areas.

The commodity committees are important in discussions with government, particularly on pricing policies. The Economics Department puts together the information, but it is the representatives for the committees who argue the case with government.

(Interview with E. Zhou, senior economics Officer, January 18, 1995)

To the extent that national leaders are also full-time farmers, they lack the time to research issues on their own. The briefing papers represent their primary source of information on issues that they must debate and vote upon in the national council.

Land Policy Positions

The decision process outlined in the ZFU constitution regarding land policy illustrates the constrained opportunities members have to participate in national-level decision-making. According to the ZFU constitution and project documents,⁷⁰ the *Land and Mobilization* sub-committee has the primary responsibility for developing the Union's position on land policy. The first vice-president chairs the sub-committee, and the national council chooses from among its members the remaining sub-committee members. The ZFU constitution does not require the sub-committee to hold consultations with the general membership. Sub-committee members identify members' land interests either through conversations with farmers in their home areas or from information supplied to them by the economics department. As of 1997, the sub-committee had yet to commission surveys to identify members' land demands.⁷¹ The

⁷⁰ ZFU. "Development of the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union: A Cooperation Project with Swedish Cooperative Centre." July 1, 1994 - June 30, 1997. Project document.

⁷¹ In 1995, the Economics Department (caps?) developed production profiles of its membership based on a household survey it administered. In 1997, it contracted with a University researcher to carry out a production survey of 300 members nationwide to determine members' training, production, and marketing needs within the context of economics structural adjustment (ESAP). ZFU economists also implemented commodity-specific ESAP-related studies (Interview with E. Zhou, senior economics

ZFU economists usually rely on data from government, academic, and CFU sources, as the basis for briefing papers submitted to sub-committee and national council members.⁷²

In theory, the *Land and Mobilization* sub-committee identifies and articulates farmers' land problems and outlines the Union's policy position vis-à-vis land issues. In practice, it does not appear to play a significant role in determining the Union's policy positions on land. For example, the *Land and Mobilization* sub-committee did not participate in the development of the Union's position paper on its views regarding critical issues in smallholder agriculture including resettlement and land tenure. The process, initiated by *Management* sub-committee, relied on a committee of farm leaders hand-picked by the ZFU president to outline the Union's positions. After ratification by the AGM, a second committee comprising the eight provincial secretaries developed a second draft with the assistance of senior economics staff. Afterwards, the *Management* sub-committee made its own revisions. In early 1995, the national council received the final draft and ratified it after making revisions of its own.⁷³ At no point did the committees discuss consult members at the grassroots. The *Land and Mobilization* sub-committee had no recognized role in the process.

The restricted channels of communication between the national level and the grassroots give the national council and particularly, the president, considerable discretion in decision-making. The "top-down" style of decision-making embodied in the Union's hierarchical leadership structure presents few points of entry for members. The

officer, February 14, 1995; Interview with E. Tsikisayi, senior economist, March 5, 1997).

⁷² This is evident upon reviewing the proceedings of an ZFU-organized workshop on resettlement. The *Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe Options for the Future* held on March 16, 1995, Harare.

⁷³ Interview with E. Zhou, Senior Economics Officer, January 18, 1995, ODI/ISNAR Study.

lack of transparency of decision-making within the ZFU implies that members have even more limited access to the decision cycle than suggested by the formal structures of decision-making (Riddell, 1994).

Rules for Leadership Accountability

Effective rules for leadership accountability do not offset the concentration of decision-making authority in the national council. The electoral process represents the main mechanism for holding leaders accountable. As laid out in its constitution, the ZFU follows a practice of indirect elections, a process that relegates ordinary members to selecting leaders at the grassroots only.⁷⁴

The lines of accountability between ordinary members and leaders weaken as one goes up the hierarchy. At levels above the ward, ZFU leaders must appeal to council members at the level immediately below rather than to their members at the grassroots to retain their positions. A rule requiring those voted into leadership positions at higher levels to relinquish positions previously held at a lower level further weakens the opportunities for members at the grassroots to hold leaders accountable. For example, members of the provincial council voted into leadership positions on the provincial committee must give up their position as district chairpersons. Doing so insulates them from the politics in their former district councils. Only council members can remove a

⁷⁴ Members of a club elect a committee whose chairperson sits on the area council.
Members of an area council elect a committee whose chairperson sits on the district council.
Members of the district council elect a committee whose chairperson and secretary sit on the provincial council.
Members of the provincial council elect a committee whose members all sit on the national council.
Members of the national council elect the ZFU president and up to three vice-presidents.
Members of the national council appoint council members to sit on each of the standing committees.

member of that council's leadership committee. District council members can vote out their representative to the provincial council who also serves as their district chairperson.

The weak structure of leadership accountability is further weakened by a tradition of "leaders for life" in the NFAZ and ZNFU. During its 51 years, the ZNFU had only four presidents⁷⁵. The NFAZ had one president during its 12-year existence, and its president and vice-presidents had held similar positions in the Victoria Province Master Farmers Association (VPMFA), the NFAZ's parent organization (Mutimba, 1986). The ZFU lost its first president, G. Magadzire who was the former ZNFU president, in 1996 to illness. His replacement, S.D. Hungwe, had served as a vice-president in the ZFU, NFAZ, and VPMFA. In the elections of 1998, national council members re-elected S.D. Hungwe.

Given its short history, it is unclear whether this tradition will continue in the ZFU. Although critics observed irregularities during its founding elections (Bratton, 1994a), recent experiences give mixed messages. As directed by its constitution, the ZFU held general elections in 1994. The timing of elections was from the "bottom-up" with club and association leaders elected first. At the district level, a number of district council seats changed hands, while at the provincial level, four of the eight provincial chairpersons lost their positions. There was no turnover among the president's council.

Funding

In addition to electoral rules, funding presents another way for members to hold leaders accountable. Organizations that rely on members' dues tend to be more

⁷⁵ Interview with K.B. Matekaire, ZFU senior director and former ZNFU director, March 13, 1995.

responsive to their membership. In this situation, members' refusal to pay their dues has a direct impact on the organization's viability. Alternately, organizations that rely on sources of income other than members' dues like donor funding are independent of any threatened financial pressure from disgruntled members.

The ZFU national office retains 50% of all collected members' dues yet members' dues make up only 20% of the ZFU's annual operating budget.⁷⁶ Levies assessed on all marketed smallholder production account for about 60% of the ZFU's budget (table 5.1)⁷⁷ and donor funding for the remaining 20%. The levies created "closed shop rules" for the ZFU effectively forcing all smallholder farmers to contribute to the Union's development though the ZFU's members represent less than 20% of the smallholder population. To get the levies back, non-members had to get a letter from the ZFU provincial or district office stating they were not ZFU members. Farmers then mailed the letter to the collecting agency, i.e., the Grain Marketing Board, Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, or Cold Storage Commission, and waited for their refund check in the mail.⁷⁸ The costs of reclaiming the levies assessed against their sales discouraged many non-members from making a claim.

⁷⁶ Fifty percent of the annual dues paid by CA and RA farmers and 80% of the annual dues paid by SSC farmers go to the national office. Village clubs retain only 5% of all dues collected. Associations and clubs also pay a one-time registration fee upon joining the Union.

⁷⁷ The levy generated Z\$ 25 million or about US\$ 3.12 million (US \$1 = Z \$8 in 1995). The Farm and Licensing Act of 1994 is the enabling legislation.

⁷⁸ There is not strong support among smallholder farmers in general for the levies collected by the ZFU. ZFU members complained that they were not consulted beforehand nor were they informed once the Union began collecting the levies. "ZFU has the authority to levy crops, MP told." *The Sunday Mail*, March 9, 1997.

Table 5.1 Percentage of smallholder sales levied by ZFU (1995)

Commodity	% of total sales
Groundnuts	1.50
Maize	1.50
Sorghum	1.50
Cotton	1.40
Tobacco	1.00
Sunflower	1.00
Beef	0.55
Small stocks	0.45
Soyabeans	0.40
Pearl millet	0.25
Finger millet	0.25

The levies weaken members' ability to hold their senior leaders and staff accountable. Monies collected from the levies support the national office, the provincial offices, and programs not explicitly supported by donor funding.⁷⁹ At the district level, however, lines of accountability between members and the district organizer are stronger because members' dues support the district office. If the district organizer cannot mobilize new members or retain existing members, then the district office would close putting the district organizer out of a job. The ZFU senior economist explained that the national office decided not to support the district offices because it wanted to force district staff to be responsive to members in their district.

The value of the levies as a source of funding may be short-lived. The on-going privatization of agricultural marketing means buyers in addition to the former marketing boards can bid for smallholder production. This places the ZFU in a position where it must convince private buyers to collect its levies, but these companies find little

⁷⁹ Interview with E. Tsikisayi, senior economist, March 5, 1997.

economic reason to do so.⁸⁰ The former marketing boards may also soon stop collecting the levies for the ZFU and CFU. Previously, the government paid for the administrative costs of collecting the levies through subsidies paid to the marketing boards. The suspension of government subsidies means the ZFU or some other organization must step in to pay for the administrative and other costs associated with collecting the levies.⁸¹

LEADERSHIP PROFILE

The organizational processes reviewed above describe a situation not unlike those found in other large membership organizations that represent the poor (Carroll, 1992; Esman and Uphoff, 1984). An elite leadership enjoys considerable discretionary authority, and ordinary members have limited access to higher-level decision processes. Within this context the personal, professional, and farm background of the leadership becomes important to understand the land interests articulated by the ZFU.

Farm Background

Commercial farmers comprise less than 3% of the ZFU's membership but account for a much greater percentage of the ZFU leadership, an artifact of the merger in 1991.

The ZNFU contingent vigorously opposed both majority rule and proportional representation, insisting instead on parity between communal and small-scale [commercial] farmers in the ZFU leadership. Hence, the top four national executive positions were shared, with the ZFU presidency going to the former ZNFU leader; the same was true for the posts of provincial chairman, where five former NFAZ and three former ZNFU leaders were returned (Bratton, 1994a, p. 26).

⁸⁰ Interview with E. Tsikisayi, senior economist, March 5, 1997.

⁸¹ Government of Zimbabwe. 1996. *Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, 1996-2000*, Harare, Zimbabwe: Government Publications.

The 1994 elections led to a high turnover among the leadership. For the first time, a woman assumed the position of provincial chairperson. Even so, communal and resettlement area farmers did not gain greater representation among the national leadership. Of the 39 members of the national council, at least a third operate commercial farms (table 5.2). The actual percentage is likely greater since background information on other members of the provincial committees, all of whom sit on the national council, could not be obtained.

Table 5.2 ZFU's national leaders and farm ownership (1997)

Position	Location	Production Enterprise
President	LSC farm area	Irrigated horticulture
1 st vice-president	CA	Maize, cotton
2 nd vice-president	CA	Maize, cotton
3 rd vice-president	SSC farm area	Maize, cotton
Provincial chair Mashonaland West	CA	Maize, sunflower, groundnuts
Provincial chair Mashonaland Central	LSC farm area	Maize, horticulture
Provincial chair Mashonaland East	No information	No information
Provincial chair Midlands	SSC farm area	Maize/cotton
Provincial chair Matabeleland South	No information	No information
Provincial chair Matabeleland North	No information	No information
Nat'l commodity chair -- Cotton	SSC farm area	Seed cotton; irrigated horticulture
Nat'l commodity chair -- Grains	LSC farm area	Maize, sorghum
Nat'l commodity chair -- Tobacco	LSC farm area	Irrigated tobacco
Nat'l commodity chair -- Horticulture	LSC farm area	Irrigated horticulture
Nat'l commodity chair -- Livestock	CA	Maize, cotton
Nat'l commodity chair -- Coffee/tea	LSC farm area	Tea plantation

The rules for representation facilitate the over-representation of small-scale commercial farmers on district councils that include small-scale commercial (SSC) farming areas. The ZFU constitution does not impose a limit on the number of producer associations that can represent a single SSC farming area or on the number of village clubs that can represent a single VIDCO. However, at administrative levels above the base-units, only one council can represent each administrative area. For example, only

one area council can represent a ward regardless of the number of village clubs in that ward. Because producer associations organize at the ward level, SSC farmers in theory, can send as many representatives as they wish to sit on the district council; chairpersons for the producers associations sit on the district council. On the other hand, communal and resettlement area farmers cannot send more representatives than the number of wards in their district to the district council. The following example illustrates the advantage held by SSC farmers in district-level decision-making. To counter what they considered over-representation of communal area interests, SSC farmers in the Copper Queen SSC area split their producer associations into smaller groups and doubling the number of SSC farmers on the district council (Arnaiz et al, 1995).

Land Interests

Since Independence, the land interests of commercial farmers and master farmers in the communal areas have converged. In 1980, the government intended to use the resettlement program to address inequities in wealth distribution inherited from the colonial period and to reward the rural majority who were instrumental in the Liberation War (Moyo, 1995). In line with this objective, resettlement guidelines favored the selection of the landless, ex-combatants, ex-farm workers, and refugees, and discriminated against the selection of master farmers. The resettlement policy did not identify SSC farmers as beneficiaries.⁸²

⁸² Chapter 2 includes a description of the resettlement program.

The NFAZ sought privileged access to resettlement lands for its members, who in the early 1980s were mainly master farmers living in the communal areas.⁸³ The NFAZ argued that the scarcity of fertile land necessitated its allocation to those who could maximize its productive potential. From the start, the NFAZ lobbied against the use of the resettlement program as a tool for social justice. In 1984, it released a position paper on resettlement arguing for the use of farming capacity rather than need as the basis for selecting resettlement farmers. It scored a significant policy victory when government expanded the selection criteria to include farming capacity (Makumbe, 1994).

In 1987, the ZNFU released its own position paper on resettlement. Like the NFAZ, it urged the government to select only master farmers and other progressive farmers for resettlement. In addition, it argued for the expansion of the resettlement program to facilitate the development of black commercial agriculture and outlined a resettlement scheme organized around mid-size commercial farms. The ZNFU president, G. Magadzire said: "*The ZNFU is committed to ensuring that commercial agriculture is not run down to 'another communal type'.*"⁸⁴ SSC farmers had no interest in trading their farms for five hectares of undeveloped land with only leasehold tenure.

Government policies promoting the commercial development of smallholder agriculture facilitated a convergence of land interests between progressive farmers in the communal areas and small-scale commercial farmers (Amin, 1992; Cousins et al., 1992). A minority of communal area farmers had developed their farm enterprises to the extent that they sought commercial farms and not just a place on a resettlement scheme.

⁸³ The NFAZ did not open membership up to non-master farmers and women until 1980. As the VPMFA, it restricted membership to master farmers.

⁸⁴ *The Herald*, January 17, 1991.

Recognizing a growing and vocal demand for commercial farms by black farmers, the government created the Tenant Farmer Scheme, a program offering black farmers inexpensive leases to commercial farms. Although critics identified the main beneficiaries of the Tenant Farmer Scheme as ranking government, military, and party officials⁸⁵, G. Magadzire, the ZNFU president fully supported the program.

What is important is to dilute the present position of Africans on one side and white farmers on the other. For instance, in prime areas like Mazowe or Banket, you need to plant blacks in between white farmers for two reasons: break the network of racial neighborhood and create a nation of people of which race is not important. Second...blacks need to take that experience [from white farmers]. We cannot do that by secluding them and forming reserves of blacks.⁸⁶

When asked about the Tenant Farmer Scheme in 1992, G. Magadzire, then the ZFU president, maintained his position that "*the Tenant Farmer Scheme is the surest way to create a black commercial farmer class. It need not compromise plans to distribute land among poor peasant farmers⁸⁷.*" The 1992 Land Act gave black commercial farmers and master farmers the legal basis to pursue their interests in acquiring government-purchased lands beyond the Tenant Farmer Scheme. Assuming leadership positions in the ZFU gave them a more visible political platform upon which to articulate those interests.

Ideology

The ZFU's senior leaders believe that the commercial development of smallholder agriculture presents the only meaningful path for sustainable development. This belief

⁸⁵ "The Land Scandal," *Africa Report*, January 1, 1995.

"One Man Went to Mow," *Africa Confidential*, October 7, 1994.

"Zimbabwe Landed in Trouble," *Africa Confidential*, April 1994.

⁸⁶ *The Herald*, January 17, 1991.

⁸⁷ "One Man Went to Mow," *Africa Confidential*, October 7, 1994.

reveals itself in the role leaders identify for the ZFU in smallholder development. In 1995, G. Magadzire identified the organization's primary purpose as the instruction of its members in the "business of farming"⁸⁸. S.D. Hungwe who succeeded G. Magadzire said during a meeting of the Land sub-committee: *"Farmers should farm with the main aim of making a profit instead of consumption. In the long run, all farms should be commercialized."*⁸⁹ Their belief system makes it unlikely that the ZFU's senior leaders would advance the land interests of poor farmers even in policy arenas where they do not have a direct interest. The landless and the land-poor lack the assets and training to participate in commercial agriculture.

Most of the ZFU's senior leaders participated in the master farmer training program and are proponents of the program. The master farmer ideology identifies the commercialization of smallholder agriculture as the optimum development path for smallholder farmers. By maximizing the productive potential of their lands, smallholder farmers can improve their living conditions and facilitate the sustainable development of their lands. It identifies the continued use of subsistence practices and traditional tenure as the root cause of land degradation in the communal areas (Alexander, 1994). Within this paradigm, land is a productive asset not a basis for cultural and social reproduction.

The preceding discussion illustrates the divergence of background and land interests between leaders and members. Moreover, it identifies the dominant ideology among the ZFU's senior leaders as creating incentives for their participation in land policy arenas where they can realize no direct benefit. Consequently, policy arenas

⁸⁸ Interview with G. Magadzire, ZFU president, February 4, 1995.

⁸⁹ Comment made by S.D. Hungwe, chair of the NFAZ land committee, at a national council meeting, 5/17/91. Notes taken by research assistant, RGPA Zimbabwe Project.

where poor farmer interests may have had political opportunities like settler selection policy become more competitive and closed to them. Closed political opportunity structures at the national level and a leadership not predisposed to champion the land interests of poor farmers suggest that the Union's positions on land would reflect the interests of its senior leaders rather than its members. The next section illustrates this argument. The final section discusses factors contributing to member demobilization around land issues at the national level.

POSITIONS ON RESETTLEMENT AND OTHER LAND ISSUES

To illustrate the divergence of the Union's and members' perspectives on land issues, the analysis contrasts the ZFU's positions on resettlement, settler selection, and land tenure with the opinions of 55 ZFU members who responded to the study's survey. The ZFU households represent the opinions of one district only, Shamva District, which lies within the most productive area in Zimbabwe. Its farmers have access to better lands than the majority of smallholder farmers and can be considered more productive and commercially-oriented than their counterparts in the marginal areas. Therefore, their opinions - as one group of smallholders - should more closely mirror that of the national leadership.

Commercial versus Village Resettlement Schemes

At the societal level, land acquisition policy is re-distributive in nature because it proposes to transfer rights to land from the mostly white large-scale commercial farm

sector to black farmers.⁹⁰ The ZFU takes the populist position of acquiring and transferring land as soon as possible to black farmers. It rejects out-of-hand the CFU's offer of 1.5 million hectares that its members have made available for resettlement arguing that the amount cannot satisfy the demand for land among peasant farmers (Moyo, 1998).

Land acquisition policy does not give way to contentious debate among the black land lobby. With the exception of a few black LSC farmers whose poor farm management practices have made their farms vulnerable to government acquisition, land acquisition represents a "win-win" situation for black farmers. For them, the sticky issue lies in the allocation of land between village schemes and commercial resettlement schemes.⁹¹

The questionnaire did not ask if respondents supported the use of resettlement lands for commercial resettlement schemes, but their positions can be inferred based on their response to a question asking their opinion of the resettlement program (table 5.3). About 83% of the ZFU respondents and 80% of the non-ZFU respondents considered the resettlement program a success because it benefited the poor and landless. The government and the ZFU consider the resettlement program of the 1980s a failed experiment because of its emphasis on equity rather than efficiency. Based on their responses, ZFU and non-ZFU farmers favor implicitly the allocation of resettlement lands to village resettlement schemes. The ZFU favors the allocation of lands to commercial

⁹⁰ In its 1990 Land Policy Statement, the government proposed to reduce the large-scale commercial farm class from 16.4 to 6 million hectares.

⁹¹ Chapter Two includes a description of village resettlement schemes and commercial resettlement schemes.

resettlement schemes.⁹²

Table 5.3 Perspective on land redistribution

	ZFU (n=55)	Non-ZFU (n=393)
It helps the landless	35.2% (n=19)	32.7% (n=130)
It results in fairer distribution of land	35.2% (n=19)	37.5% (n=149)
It reduces land pressure in the CA	13.0% (n=7)	8.6% (n=34)
It increases national income and productivity	9.3% (n=5)	10.1% (n=40)
It decreases national productivity	0.0%	3.3% (n=13)
It causes conflicts	3.7% (n=2)	2.5% (n=10)
It is unfair, only those known to authorities get land	1.9% (n=1)	0.8% (n=3)
No opinion	1.9% (n=1)	1.5% (n=6)
Other	0.0%	3.0% (n=12)

Settler Selection Criteria

The ZFU and others recognize that the scarcity of commercial land means that the resettlement program cannot provide land to all of the farmers who want land.⁹³ The ZFU believes that only the most efficient producers should benefit from the resettlement program, and those who cannot be resettled should seek jobs outside of agriculture (FES, 1998). The viewpoint that excess labor ought to transfer from agriculture to the

⁹² In 1997, the distribution of land between communal, resettlement, small-scale commercial and large-scale commercial areas were as follows: 50.8%, 10.2%, 4.3%, and 33.4%. The ZFU considers the ideal distribution of land to be 30% communal areas, 30% resettlement areas, 18% small-scale commercial areas, and 20% large-scale commercial areas (Magurah, 1998). An increase in the size of the resettlement areas would offset the decrease in the size of the communal areas. Only small-scale commercial farmers would realize any real gains in land access.

⁹³ The government can only resettle 300,000 families on the amount of land it intends to acquire (GoZ, 1998). According to the ZFU's plan, only 200,000 families can be resettled.

manufacturing or industrial sector conforms to the dual sector models that guided development policy throughout the 1960s and again during the 1980s (Timmer, 1990). The ZFU is not alone in its continued adherence to this incomplete development model. In Zimbabwe, academics and government officials also favor the idea that less efficient producers ought to go to the non-farm sector (Rukuni, 1998).

Consistent with this viewpoint, the ZFU promotes resettlement models that foster more commercialized production within the smallholder sector. To this end, it supports irrigation schemes and outgrower schemes such as the *Mkwesine Estates* and *Panorama Farms*.⁹⁴ The Mwakasine Estates and Panorama Farm models can accommodate only a fraction of the farmers that could otherwise be resettled on family farm schemes.⁹⁵ In line with its thinking on the resettlement program, the ZFU endorses the following four criteria for the selection of resettlement farmers (Magurah, 1998; ZFU, 1994).

1. Demonstrated capacity to farm commercially
2. Farming experience, education, or training
3. Farm equipment ownership
4. Origin in communal areas with high population densities

⁹⁴ *Mkwesine Estate* has resettled 191 farmers on 10 hectare sprinkler irrigated plots. Farmers received short-term loans to assist in initial plantings of sugar cane and a long-term loan for the capital value of the developed land. *Panorama Farms* has accommodated seven tenant farmers, each given 10 hectares of land, and 70 resettlement farmers, each receiving 12 hectare plots. Farmers at Panorama farms receive technical and financial support for tobacco production.

⁹⁵ Panorama Farms is one of several model resettlement schemes managed by the CFU as per an agreement with the President of Zimbabwe signed in 1993. CFU provided the land for Panorama Farms free to the government for resettlement. The Farmers' Development Trust, formerly the Tobacco Development Trust, was established by the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) to provide training in tobacco production to current and future growers. The ZTA has guaranteed loans to Panorama Farm farmers, and neighboring commercial tobacco farmers have assisted through the loan of equipment and the provision of seed plants (Archibald, 1995).

Hippo Valley Estates Ltd., a major producer of sugar cane, and Triangle Ltd., a processor of sugar cane and cotton, purchased Mkwesine Estates in the late 1970s by. The Estate provided training and supervision to its farmers as well as loan financing. The Estate undertakes to harvest, haul and deliver farmers' cane to the mills (Spear, 1995).

The criteria promoted by the ZFU closely follow the criteria used by the colonial government to select farmers for the Native Purchase Areas (NPA's).⁹⁶ Like the colonial government, the ZFU wishes to resettle farmers with more skills and assets than those resettled before them. With the exception of the final criterion, the ZFU selection criteria discriminate against the landless or land poor whose constrained access to land limits their productive capacity and consequently, impairs their ability to accumulate farm assets. The ZFU criteria describe graduates of the agricultural schools and colleges, farm managers, as well as master farmers; beneficiaries identified in the ZNFU and NFAZ position papers on resettlement. Contrary to the ZFU's position, more than 75% of the ZFU and non-ZFU households in the survey felt that the landless and the young people should be the primary beneficiaries of the resettlement program. Only 9% believed that "good" farmers – such as those identified by the ZFU - should be the primary beneficiaries (table 5.4).

Farmers in Shamva District are concerned that their children will be landless or at best, land-poor. On-going land fragmentation has left many of them with parcels inadequate to support their current households, much less share with their children in the future.

Moreover, in the village resettlement areas, farmers do not have the right to pass their land on to their children (Wekwete, 1997).⁹⁷ When asked how their children would get this land, 70% of the ZFU households and 66% of the non-ZFU households expected government, through the resettlement program, to provide the land.

⁹⁶ In 1953, the government required a master farmer certificate to purchase lands in the NPAs. By 1957, it required applicants to own capital assets or cash equivalent to 300 pounds sterling. By the 1960s, it had adopted a point system that rewarded ownership of farm equipment, agriculture experience, and proven character of the applicant. The colonial government wanted to ensure that farmers in the newer NPAs were more skilled and better financed than those in the older NPA's (Weinrich, 1975).

Table 5.4 **Responses to "who should benefit from the resettlement program?"**

	ZFU (n=55)	Non-ZFU (n=393)
The landless	61.8% (n=34)	44.5% (n=175)
The young people	18.2% (n=10)	33.1% (n=130)
Those who are good farmers	9.1% (n=5)	13.7% (n=54)
Anyone who wants land	9.1% (n=5)	5.8% (n=23)
Other	1.8% (n=1)	2.5% (n=10)

Land Tenure

The ZFU contends that land degradation in the communal areas is a result of poor land husbandry rooted in the traditional land tenure system. Farm families have usufruct rights to land given to them by the headmen or *sabhuku* of their villages. In the 1990s, local government started to take this responsibility away from local authorities but has realized only marginal success.

In the document, "Policy Viewpoints of the Union," the ZFU states:

The land tenure system in communal and resettlement areas is neither environmentally, socially nor economically sustainable. There is a need to develop a land tenure system that can bring new impetus to production growth and development within the smallholder sector. [It] should be changed so that smallholder farmers can equally compete with their commercial farmer counterparts under the new economic environment. (p.18)

It proposes the rationalization of land tenure systems between the smallholder and commercial sectors, and believes that communal area farmers should be able to buy and

⁹⁷ Communal Lands Act 1981.

sell their land. In this way, resources would be put to their most efficient use. To facilitate this process, the ZFU proposed that productive farmers, as evidenced by their production record, should be favored during the titling process.

In contrast, more than 90% of the ZFU and non-ZFU households do not agree with privatization, believing that it is their right to have access to communal land (table 5.5). Most argue that the land is communally owned and a gift of nature. A few commented that they had fought for the land and so have a right to it. Twenty percent of ZFU households fear that privatization would lead to the concentration of land in the hands of the rich and leave the majority landless; an outcome implicitly favored by the ZFU (table 5.6).

Table 5.5 Responses to "should land be bought and sold in the communal areas?"

	ZFU hh (n=55)	Non-ZFU hh (n=397)
Yes	8.1%	8.6%
No	94.5%	91.4%

Table 5.6 Responses to "why shouldn't communal land be bought or sold?"

	ZFU hh (n=43)	Non-ZFU hh (n=301)
It is communally-owned	48.8% (n=21)	58.8% (n=177)
It is a gift of nature	18.6% (n=8)	19.6% (n=59)
It is what we fought for	11.6% (n=5)	8.3% (n=25)
It will lead to problems/the rich will buy all the land	20.9% (n=9)	13.3% (n=40)

Table 5.7 Responses to "what are the benefits of title deeds?"

	ZFU HH (n=55)	Non-ZFU HH (n=397)
No benefits	50.0%	53.9%
Creditors would take my land away	0%	1.3%
Will give more security	18.5%	20.2%
Will give the incentives to develop land	5.6%	3.3%
Will be able to secure more credit	7.4%	6.5%
Will allow us to use land as we wish	7.4%	5.5%
Don't know	9.3%	8.8%
Other	1.9%	0.5%

The survey respondents' attitude toward title deeds contradicts their opposition to the privatization of communal lands. About 40% of the survey respondents believe that there are benefits to having title deeds to their land. Respondents felt that title deeds would give them greater tenure security, which in turn gives them greater access to credit and incentives to develop their land (table 5.7). The benefits identified by the respondents match those articulated by the ZFU in support of title deeds. The apparent contradiction between table 5.5 and table 5.6 may indicate that respondents recognize the increased tenure security that title deeds give them and at the same time fear the potential for negative consequences arising from privatization.

The preceding analysis strongly suggests that the positions advocated by the ZFU's national leaders do not reflect the positions of its smallholder members. Although the survey included only a small sample of ZFU members from Shamva District, the socioeconomic and farm background of the respondents suggested that their views would more closely mirror those of the national leadership. The respondents had more productive farm operations and owned greater farm assets than their counterparts in the marginal areas (Arnaiz, 1997; Attwood and Sithole, 1990). The finding that their views differ from the ZFU's policy positions is significant. Smallholder farmers who live in

marginal areas and who practice subsistence agriculture would be less likely to hold views similar to those of the ZFU leadership than the pool of survey respondents.

INTERNAL MOBILIZATION

Donors fund the ZFU to increase the political voice of poor farmers (Riddell, 1994). A survey of ZFU members in three districts found that members want the ZFU to act as their "lawyer" and to lobby for their interests vis-a-vis the government and private sector actors (Arnaiz et al, 1995). In the case of land policy, it is clear that the ZFU's positions favor the interests of its commercial farmers and wealthier members. Though the Union's positions do not reflect those of most of its members at the grassroots, members have not mobilized to confront their national leaders. Why they have not done so can be explained in terms of the high exclusion costs associated with the provision of public policies and members' expectations of the ZFU.

Demand for Land

Scholars and donors assume that there exists a strong demand for land among the rural poor. They attributed the absence of an effective demand for land by the rural poor in the late 1980s to the organizational weakness of the NFAZ (Amin, 1992; Herbst, 1990; Skalmes and Moyo, 1990). However, the rural poor represent a differentiated population whose land interests differ; the demand for land may not be uniform among them (Burgess, 1992; Cousins et al, 1992).

The findings of a recent government-sponsored survey, the "Poverty Assessment Survey," reveal that land is not a priority among the rural majority. Of the 19,000 rural and urban households surveyed, only a minority considered poor land quality or land

scarcity as the main cause of poverty in their home areas. They identified enhancing the productivity of their land through production loans and the construction of irrigation infrastructure as a more effective solution to poverty (Bowyer-Bower, 1998). The Shamva District household survey yielded a similar finding. Of the 466 households, less than 6% identified land shortage as their main farm problem even though the average plot size for the respondents fell below the national average. More than half of the respondents cited the shortage of inputs and lack of draft power as their main production constraints (table 5.8).

Table 5.8 Farm problems by ZFU affiliation

	None	Shortage of inputs	Shortage of draft power	Army worm	Land too small	Other	Total
Non-ZFU hh (n=411)	24.6%	51.3%	9.9%	8.1%	3.8%	2.3%	100%
ZFU hh (n=55)	32.7%	40.0%	12.7%	7.3%	5.5%	1.8%	100%

Do the Poverty Assessment and Shamva District surveys mean that there does not exist a significant demand for land among the rural poor? The rural poor comprise the landless, land-poor, and households with access to sufficient lands. Surveys like the two cited here tend to under-count the landless and land-poor because they often rely on a list compiled by local or central government agents who use the "stand" or home site to define the study population. These lists usually overlook the landless, especially squatters. In 1997, the government estimated that over 200,000 families were "squatting" on state land, grazing land, and other properties⁹⁸. The squatter population will continue

⁹⁸ "Southern Africa Development: Plenty of Rhetoric, Little Land." *Inter-Press Service English News Wire*, April 23, 1997.

to rise as the population within the communal areas grows and opportunities for employment in the non-farm sectors remain limited. Although the landless and land-poor may be in the minority, they nevertheless represent a sizeable majority.

Perception, Expectations, and Incentives for Mobilization

There exists among poor farmers, including members of the ZFU, a strong demand for land for themselves and for their children (see table 5.4). However, land policies present weak incentives for internal mobilization because of the associated high exclusion costs; those not willing to contribute to a policy cannot be prevented from benefiting. The long-term and uncertain payoff to collective action also creates weak incentives for mobilization. From 1990 to 1997, the government had acquired less than 50,000 hectares and resettled about 2,000 families per year, figures far below the targets outlined in its initial land policy proposal (Moyo, 1998). At the village-level, Phase II resettlement has had far less of a visible impact than the resettlement program of the early 1980s that resettled about 34,000 families in the first four years (Gasper, 1990).

Members' perception of the ZFU as a service delivery agency rather than a lobbying organization influences the demands that they make and their expectations of the type and level of benefits that they should receive to make their membership worthwhile. The ZFU's historical roots lie in service provision. The NFAZ began as an organization to facilitate the dissemination of agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers, and farmers joined to access extension services and tax exemptions on farm tools, seeds, and inputs (Mutimba, 1986). Only after the merger with the ZNFU, an organization that emphasized lobbying activities, did the NFAZ as the ZFU begin to develop its lobbying capacities through the expansion of its economic staff and leadership

training (Appendix A). Despite its greater interest in its lobbying capacity, the ZFU continues to emphasize its service delivery role to members. On the inside cover of its monthly magazine, the ZFU defines its roles as the following.

- Ensuring a better package for farmers
- Negotiating for viable producer prices
- Coordinating marketing facilities
- Arranging for grain bags
- Coordinating transport arrangements
- Working for sales tax exemption on agricultural inputs
- Facilitating the purchase of farm implements
- Encouraging group work
- Giving expert advice to farmers
- Providing information on current farming issues

The use of selective benefits to attract and retain members is consistent with the experiences of other farmer organizations in the North and South (Schmid and Soroko, 1997).

Farmers join the ZFU to access services and goods and not necessarily to pursue their common interests in the policy arena (Arnaiz et al, 1995; Arnaiz, 1997; Makumbe, 1994). Despite the ZFU's efforts to inform their local leaders of the Union's lobbying functions in "leadership training seminars," members at the grassroots continue to see the organization as a service delivery agency. Consequently, members do not expect nor do they make demands on their leaders to lobby for their land interests. Members' low expectations of the organization's lobbying activities give senior leaders the political space to the ZFU to promote their own interests in land and other policy areas. Though they may not receive the credit for their lobbying efforts, leaders also do not have to answer to the membership for the policy positions adopted by the Union.

SUMMARY

To summarize the findings in this chapter, the hierarchical structure of decision-making centralizes decision-making authority in the national council and restricts ordinary members' access to the decision process at the national level. Weak rules for leadership accountability, exacerbated by the poor channels of communication between the national and local levels, mean members cannot sanction their leaders directly. Attaining the right to levy smallholder production provided the ZFU a stable source of funding but at the same time, weakened already weak rules for leadership accountability. The political opportunity structure for smallholders remains restrictive at the national level in the land policy arena.

This, however, allows national ZFU leaders to promote their own ideology and interests through the Union's positions on land. Moreover, senior leaders' background and belief system makes it unlikely that on their own they will speak for the interests of their poorer members. A comparison of the ZFU's positions on land with the opinions of members in the study district suggest that at the national level, the Union does not speak for the land interests of a majority of its members.

Members have not mobilized to challenge the Union's land positions even though they demand land. Despite their interest, land policy represents them with weak incentives because of the associated high exclusion costs and an uncertain payoff, especially since the Phase II resettlement program has yielded few concrete results. Equally important, members have not joined the ZFU as a means to realize their common policy interests. Instead, access to services and goods (selective benefits) and the Union's historical function as a service delivery agency overshadow current efforts to expand

lobbying activities. Apparently, members are not likely to make demands on an organization if they think it lacks the capacity to implement those demands.

Confronted with closed national political opportunity structures, smallholder members may face more open political opportunity structures at the local level because of stronger rules for leadership accountability and participatory decision-making processes. The district level coincides with the level of implementation for resettlement policy. The possibility of a tangible payoff strengthens the incentives for mobilization faced by poor farmers. Together, these two conditions indicate a greater likelihood for internal mobilization, an issue addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE DISTRICT CONTEXT

Conditions that limit political opportunities at the national level do not necessarily hold at the local level where members have greater access to the decision process and stronger rules for leadership accountability (Bratton and Bingen, 1994; Uphoff, 1993). The local or district level coincides with the level of implementation for resettlement policies. Tangible payoffs to collective action strengthen incentives for mobilization (Arce, 1993). As suggested in Chapter 4, poor members of the ZFU face more open political opportunity structures at the local level and are more likely to mobilize at that level than at the national level. This chapter explores this idea through a case study of Shamva District in Mashonaland Central Province.

Chapter 6 begins by examining political opportunity structures for land at the district level followed by an analysis of leaders' and members' land interests. We assume that members and leaders share more interests because of a common production environment. Given this, we are interested in examining whether ZFU smallholder members have mobilized at the local-level around common land interests. Do the conditions that inhibit mobilization at the national level also exist at the local level? The chapter concludes by discussing how smallholder farmers have gained access to land outside of the resettlement program and its implications for land degradation.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

In 1995, the Shamva District ZFU had 1,453 paid-up members,⁹⁹ with a majority of members living in the Madziwa communal area. The fewest live in the resettlement areas of Mupfurudzi and Sanye. Agritex agents do not support the ZFU in the resettlement areas,¹⁰⁰ a situation unlike that in other districts where the ZFU and Agritex work "hand-in-glove" (Arnaiz et al, 1995).

There are no ZFU personnel in the resettlement areas. Agritex is not invited to their mobilization meetings. There are bad relations between Agritex and ZFU here. I do not see any benefit to being a ZFU member and I do not encourage farmers to join. In other areas, ZFU has promised farmers many things to get them to join but does not come though on those promises.

(Interview with Mr. Maropa, Agritex agent, November 17, 1995)

Among the seven districts that make-up Mashonaland Central Province, Shamva District had the fourth highest level of membership. However, ZFU members in Shamva account for about 8% of the district's population, a figure surpassed only by Rushinga District (22%) and Centenary District (9%) in the province. In 1996, membership almost doubled because district leaders promised prospective members cattle through a government-sponsored re-stocking program. Only 84 farmers in the district received heifers and few went to ZFU members. Membership dropped down the next year since in the eyes of many it had not delivered on its promise.

⁹⁹ Source: ZFU's registry office, Harare, March 1995.

¹⁰⁰ ZFU leaders had mobilized in the resettlement areas and promised access to credit programs, transportation, assistance with tillage, and other services. According to the extension agents, the ZFU had not delivered on any of these promises. The agents do not trust the ZFU and feel that it is only there to take advantage of farmers in the resettlement areas. Consequently, they discourage farmers from joining (Interview with Mr. Mavunga, Resettlement Officer, Mupfurudzi RA, March 11, 1997).

Structures of Decision-making

The ZFU district council represents the highest decision-making body below the provincial level. The district council comprises the chairpersons for each of the area councils and the four members of the council's leadership committee. It meets once a month like the thirteen area councils but village clubs follow their own schedule. As stated in Chapter 5, the district council has the responsibility of communicating up to the provincial level and national level members' problems or issues that it cannot address. Similarly, it disseminates information from the national level down to the area councils and to the grassroots. For two reasons, the Shamva's district council has not effectively carried out this role.¹⁰¹ First, village clubs and area councils lack the funds to send their chairpersons to the council meetings on a regular basis.¹⁰² Second, the location of the district council meetings creates difficulties for representatives from Bushu communal area to attend.

Madziwa communal area and Bushu communal area sit about 45 km apart with Madziwa CA to the north and Bushu CA in the center adjacent to the commercial farm areas. Before the amalgamation of rural and district councils in 1993, Madziwa communal area housed the district council offices. In 1994, the newly formed Rural District Council (RDC) moved to its offices to Bushu Ward,¹⁰³ but the ZFU district council continued to meet in the old council offices in Madziwa (Figure 6.1).

¹⁰¹ Interview with ZFU marketing officer, P. Zakariah, Bindura Town, October 30, 1995.

¹⁰² Group interview with ZFU leaders in Bushu CA, November 15, 1995.

¹⁰³ Historically, rural councils acted as the local government in white areas and district councils in black areas. Amalgamation of rural and district councils occurred in July 1993 per the 1988 Rural District


In an interview with several village club leaders in Bushu ward and Kajakata ward in Bushu communal area, leaders accused Madziwa communal area leaders of having co-opted the district council. They noted that all four members of the leadership committee lived in Madziwa communal area. The refusal of the leadership committee to re-locate the ZFU district council meetings to Bushu or to a more central site excluded the participation of Bushu leaders who often lacked the funds for bus fares. Further, they accused the leadership committee of diverting ZFU services and benefits to Madziwa members. Bushu leaders felt two district councils, one representing each communal area, would best serve their interests.¹⁰⁴

The perceived inability of Bushu leaders to influence decision-making within their district council also derives from the fact that Madziwa communal area has three times as many wards as Bushu communal area. Because only one area council can represent each ward, Madziwa representatives outnumber Bushu representatives three to one. Putting aside the problems of attendance, the process of aggregating members' interests, a necessity for large farmer organizations like the ZFU, inevitably results in the "muting" of minority voices.

Council Act.

¹⁰⁴ Group interview with ZFU members in Gono Ward, Bushu CA, October 14, 1995, and in Kajakata Ward, October 15, 1995.

Figure 6.1 Administrative map of Shamva District



Source: Matanda and Jeché (1997)

Village clubs have a horizontal or simple structure of decision-making. Leaders or members may call meetings when they wish to introduce an activity or issue and members participate in decision-making through a "show-of-hands." In Gokwe District, Midlands Province, and Chivi District, Masvingo Province, Arnaiz et al. (1995) found that village clubs responded to their members' production problems more often than area councils or district councils. In some cases, ZFU village clubs had affiliated clubs organized around special activities like horticulture whose members did not belong to the ZFU. In Shamva District on the other hand, almost all of the clubs existed only to access services delivered by the ZFU national office (Arnaiz, 1997). Older clubs were more likely to organize their own activities than those recently formed. For example, the ZFU clubs in Bushu ward organized asset pooling, marketing, and extension activities at the club level and at the ward level. The first club formed in 1987, and in 1997, eight village clubs represented members in six VIDCO's in Bushu ward.

At the time of the study, three national ZFU leaders lived in Shamva District albeit in the large-scale commercial area: the ZFU president, the provincial chairperson, and the vice-chairperson for the national horticulture commodity committee. According to the ZFU members interviewed, the ZFU president and the provincial chairperson had not visited their areas though the provincial chairperson's farm lies adjacent to Bushu communal area. The horticulture vice-chair had visited some of the ZFU groups in the area but as part of her own program to promote smallholder horticulture production. Unique among ZFU leaders, she used her own funds to visit with members¹⁰⁵. The minimal contact between the ZFU's national leaders and members in Shamva District

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Mr. E. Chikava, ZFU senior marketing officer, Harare, November 25, 1995.

supports the earlier observation regarding the closed nature of the national political opportunity structures.

Leadership Accountability

At the club and area level, the physical and social proximity of members and leaders facilitate members' efforts to hold their leaders accountable. Each club has the responsibility for writing its own by-laws, and contrary to the demand by the national office to hold elections every three years, village clubs in the study area did not hold to a rigid schedule for elections. Of the 10 village clubs interviewed, all called elections on an "as-needed" basis when members became dissatisfied with their leaders' performances. For example, members had removed a village club leader affiliated with the sorghum grower groups only after they caught him stealing money.

There have been three votes since the club formed in 1986. The people on the committee have remained the same although they have been moved from position to position. If someone does not do well in one position, they are given lower positions to encourage them to work harder.

(Interview with ZFU club, Gono ward, October 14, 1995)

Established in 1983. If the committee is doing well, we do not change or vote a new one in. As yet, we have faced no problems.

(Interview with ZFU club, Kajakata ward, Shamva District, October 15, 1995)

Funding

The district council secretary identified the district council's two main responsibilities as communicating member grievances to the provincial level and recruiting new ZFU members. Of the two, recruiting new members occupied most of his time, and he mobilized for the ZFU daily. The leadership training courses offered by the

national office to district and area leaders emphasizes the recruitment of new members.

The Shamva District Council lacked the funds needed to address members' demands. The district council retains only 10% of all members' dues collected¹⁰⁶ and does not receive additional funding from the levies.¹⁰⁷ In 1995, the council had an operating budget of Z \$2,906 (US \$363), an amount insufficient to reimburse council members' bus fares for the year.¹⁰⁸ Though the district council's reliance on members' dues hampered its ability to provide services to its members, at the same time, it strengthened the informal and formal rules for leadership accountability.

Land Interests

Within broad-interest organizations like the ZFU, the units at the grassroots represent more homogenous interests because members and leaders operate within the same physical, social, and cultural environments. This is true in Zimbabwe where colonial policies segregated commercial and peasant farmers. In Shamva District, the majority of smallholder farmers practice rainfed agriculture based on a maize/cotton rotation and ox-traction hence members ought to share common interests with leaders.

To examine this question, the analysis considers the production background of ZFU members and leaders responding to the household survey and their land interests

¹⁰⁶ Membership dues are distributed as follows: village clubs (5%), area council (5%), district council (10%), provincial council (30%), and national council (50%).

¹⁰⁷ At the time of this study, the national council had not yet specified a plan on how to spend the levies though it had begun to support some staff positions and programs. It aims to use the money for research and other unspecified areas. One of those areas was to assist district councils with funding for bus fares and special projects. But to receive the money, district councils had to submit budget proposals and project plans; requirements that surpassed the capacity of Shamva District Council. Interview with B. Mukwende, senior Field and Projects officer, Harare, March 17, 1997.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Mr. Mandizha, ZFU district secretary, Madziwa CA, March 4, 1997.

vis-à-vis resettlement. Only six of the 55 ZFU members who participated in the survey identified themselves as leaders. Because they represent a small sub-sample, the analysis used wealth as a proxy variable to overcome this shortcoming. Previous studies have shown that leaders tend to be wealthier than members (see for example Bingen, 1986a; Bunker, 1987; Fox, 1991; Nuijten, 1993).

The analysis divides respondents into four categories based on farm asset ownership. Previous studies used herd size as the primary indicator of wealth but these studies did not factor in the impact of drought on herd sizes (Drinkwater, 1992; Burgess, 1992).¹⁰⁹ Kinsey et al. (1998) in a panel study of three resettlement areas including Mupfurudzi RA in Shamva District found that households coped with drought primarily by selling their cattle. They only rarely sold personal items, household effects, or agricultural equipment to raise cash during drought years. Given that Zimbabwe had a severe drought in the production season immediately preceding the household survey, it is appropriate to use ownership of agricultural implements as a wealth indicator. The wealth categories based on farm asset ownership are as follows.

Category	Assets own
Poor	None
Middle	Plow and/or cultivator
Rich	Plow, cultivator, scotch cart and/or bicycle
Very Rich	plow, cultivator, scotch cart, bicycle, tractor and/or car

Applying the wealth categories to the entire survey sample, the analysis found a positive relationship between the study's wealth categories and other indicators of wealth like herd

¹⁰⁹ Zimbabwe experienced two serious droughts between 1991 and 1995 that drastically reduced the smallholder herds.

size, production levels, and production acreage (table 6.1)

Table 6.1 Wealth class by farm characteristics (n=466)

Wealth group	Herd size	Grew maize 1995	Mean maize output (kg)	Grew cotton 1995	Mean cotton output (kg)	Mean total maize + cotton area (ha)
Poor (n=96)	1	93.7%	82.9	27.4%	183.7	2.8
Middle (n=123)	3	100.0%	344.8	56.1%	210.7	5.1
Rich (n=230)	8	99.1%	512.5	68.3%	341.6	5.7
Very rich (n=16)	11	100.0%	1391.9	60.0%	408.7	7.1
Totals (n=466)	5	98.3%	414.3	56.4%	293.6	5.0

No ZFU respondents fell into the “very rich” category and only a few (n=6) fell into the “poor” category. For the statistical analysis, the responses of "middle" farmers are taken to represent those of "members" while the responses of "rich" farmers are taken to represent those of "leaders." For descriptive purposes, the responses of poor members are included in each of the tables below.¹¹⁰

Table 6.2 Breakdown of ZFU respondents by wealth category

Wealth category	N
Poor	6
Middle	20
Rich	29
Very Rich	0
Total ZFU members	55

Land Size and Quality

Although not statistically different, more members considered their land inadequate to meet their household's needs than poor farmers or leaders. Almost three-

¹¹⁰ The test for significance uses a likelihood ratio chi-square statistic appropriate for analysis of categorical data (Norusis, 1990).

quarters of the members found their land inadequate versus about half of the leaders and poor farmers (table 6.3).

Table 6.3 "Is your land adequate to meet your household's needs?"

	Poor (n=6)	Members (n=20)	Leaders (n=29)
Yes	50%	30%	41.4%
No	50%	70%	58.6%

Table 6.4 Assessment of cropland by ZFU members

ZFU	Poor (n=6)	Members (n=20)	Leaders (n=29)
Very good	16.7%	15.0%	6.9%
Good	33.3%	40.0%	37.9%
Satisfactory	16.7%	25.0%	37.9%
Badly damaged	0.0%	20.0%	17.2%
Not fit for agriculture	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%

When asked to assess the quality of their cropland, half of all respondents rated their land as either "very good" or "good" (table 6.4). This suggests that farmers who considered their land inadequate to meet their household's needs most likely meant that their parcels were too small rather than being of poor quality.

Production Constraints

Considerably more leaders, almost half, responded that they have no farm problems whereas only 25% of members responded likewise. Among members reporting to face production problem, the majority identified input shortage as their greatest constraint. A slight statistical significance was found between the responses of members

and leaders suggesting a difference in their production environments.¹¹¹ Leaders appear to have fewer production problems than members or poor farmers (table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Major farm problems expressed by ZFU members

	Poor (n=6)	Members (n=20)	Leaders (n=29)
None	0.0%	25.0%	44.8%
Shortage of inputs	66.7%	55%	24.1%
Shortage of draft animals	16.7%	10%	13.8%
Army worm	16.7%	5%	6.9%
Land size	0%	0%	10.3%
Other	0%	0%	0%

None of the poor farmers or members cited land size as a major constraint to production. Only three leaders cited parcel size as a constraint. There appears to be a conflict between the responses in table 6.5 and those in table 6.4, but the information in table 6.5 refers to just one farm problem, the problem which posed the greatest constraint to production. Although more farmers, especially members, may find their land size to be too small, it may not represent the biggest or the most pressing farm problem.

Opinions on Resettlement

Farmers in all three categories support the use of the resettlement program to benefit the landless and young people (table 3.1). Few identify "good farmers" (i.e., the most productive) as the appropriate beneficiaries of resettlement (table 6.6).

¹¹¹ Likelihood ratio = 9.09124; df = 5; significance = .10548

Table 6.6 "Who should benefit from resettlement?"

	Poor (n=6)	Members (n=20)	Leaders (n=29)
Landless	83.3%	60.0%	58.6%
Young people	16.7%	15.0%	20.7%
Good farmers	0.0%	5.0%	13.8%
Anyone who wants land	0.0%	15.0%	6.9%
Other	0.0%	5.0%	0.0%

The widespread support for the use of the resettlement program to benefit the young and the landless can be understood within the context of land scarcity in the communal lands of Shamva District. Resettlement area and communal area farmers worry about where their children will find land. On-going land fragmentation has left a number of households land-poor or without enough land to pass on to all of their children (Wekwete, 1997). Almost a third of all of the ZFU members interviewed expect the government to give their children land (table 6.7). There was not significantly statistical difference between the responses of members and leaders suggesting some commonality of interest between them.

Table 6.7 "How will your children get land?"

	Poor (n=6)	Members (n=20)	Leaders (n=29)
Be given by government	60.0%	65.0%	75.9%
Settle where they wish	20.0%	10.0%	10.3%
Be given by headman	0.0%	10.0%	6.9%
Inheritance	0.0%	15.0%	3.4%
Buy land	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Don't know	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%

The preceding analysis provides empirical evidence showing members and leaders at the local level do share similar production constraints and land interests.

Although leaders experience fewer production problems than members, both have an interest in seeing the resettlement program assist young people and the landless, a position contrary to that of the government and the ZFU.

MOBILIZATION AT THE GRASSROOTS

Local government officials and district-level representatives of line ministries have the responsibility of implementing resettlement policy. The settler selection committee, individuals who actually choose settlers for the resettlement schemes, includes the Agritex area supervisor (area AEO), the district resettlement officer, the RDC Chief Executive Officer, and as of 1997, the ZFU district chairperson. The settler selection process occurs at the end of the implementation phase for settler selection policy. Thus, at the district-level, strong incentives exist for farmers to mobilize around settler selection because of the potential short-term and tangible payoff to action. However, interviews with district leaders reveal that the ZFU has never approached the RDC to challenge the list of settlers for resettlement. The district carried out two resettlement exercises from 1990-1995 (see Appendix C). Only a contingent of VIDCO councilors headed by Chief Bushu, one of four traditional chiefs in the district, challenged the selection of settlers.

The conditions at the local level appear open to member mobilization around land issues. Why have ZFU members not done so? As was the case in the national context, members' perception of the ZFU's capacities influenced their decision not to use the Union to articulate their land demands to policy-makers. The performance of the resettlement program in Shamva District also affected the incentives for mobilization.

Role of ZFU

The ZFU in Shamva District emphasizes its role as a service delivery agency to attract and maintain membership. The ZFU club members and leaders said that farmers joined the ZFU to access the benefits listed below (table 6.8). All but two of the benefits fall into Olson's (1965) category of "selective benefits." The policies lobbied for by national and local leaders and recognized by members are commodity pricing and marketing policies.

Pricing and marketing policies affect goods with a joint-impact quality; the use of the good by an individual does not preclude its use by another. Joint-impact goods (JIG's) create incentives for their provision for two reasons. The associated policy arena is distributive in nature, i.e., has low levels of conflict, meaning that participants face relatively low costs to acquire desired policies. Second, the likely and tangible benefits create incentives for the ZFU's local leaders to participate in the policy arena. They understand that they must deliver benefits directly or through the policy process to members to retain their leadership positions.

Table 6.8 ZFU benefits

<u>Direct Benefits</u>	<u>Indirect Benefits</u>
Sales tax exemption	Lobbying for better prices vis-à-vis buyers
Grain bag loans	Lobbying for favorable marketing policies
Group purchase of inputs	
Grower contracts	
Technical training	
Project support	
"Lawyer" vis-à-vis marketing boards	
Women's income-generating groups	
Marketing and pricing information	

At the district level, farmers joined the ZFU to access the services listed above. To do so, they had to become members of a ZFU village club. All but three of the ten ZFU clubs interviewed had organized since 1990, and these clubs formed ostensibly to access ZFU services (Arnaiz, 1997).

The group got together for sales tax exemption and to get other ZFU benefits. As a group, we don't do anything except wait for things from the ZFU which were promised.

(Interview with ZFU club, Nyamaropa ward, November 27, 1995)

Mrs. Mavudzi [vice-chair for the national horticulture committee] promised us mange tout [snow peas] seed and horticulture contracts. That is why we joined the ZFU.

(Interview with ZFU members, Principe Irrigation Scheme, November 16, 1995)

District leaders understand that: "*members expect us to listen and support them in their projects so that they see a difference between a member and a non-member.*"¹¹²

Poor farmer organizations rarely venture into advocacy because their members do not tolerate uncertain and long-term payoff horizons (Bratton and Bingen, 1994). District leaders chose not to participate in local land politics though some are well-placed to influence local resettlement policy. The ZFU district chairperson, Mr. Muzondo, is also a ward councilor from Madziwa communal area. As a ward councilor, he sits on the Rural District Council (RDC) that along with traditional chiefs has the responsibility of land allocation in the district. Yet, Mr. Muzondo addressed the RDC only to lobby for roads and community projects, all joint-impact goods.¹¹³ The Chief Executive Officer for the

¹¹² Interview with Mr. Mandizha, ZFU district secretary, Madziwa, March 19, 1997.

¹¹³ Interview with Mr. Zendera, CEO Chaminuka RDC, Chaminuka council offices, March 3, 1997.

RDC said: *"The ZFU [chair] is ineffective in land issues."* ZFU members do not see their local leaders as participants in local land politics.

People don't believe that the ZFU has anything to do with land allocation and resettlement. They are unaware of national efforts in this area. [VIDCO and WADCO] councilors claim all of the power."

(Interview with Mr. Mandizha, ZFU district secretary, March 19, 1997)

Land access has an incompatible-use quality that creates incentives for powerful interests to participate in land policy arenas. The highly conflictual nature of re-distributive policy arenas like land policy creates costs that dissuade ZFU local leaders from participating. Their decision not to participate in local land politics reinforces the perception that the ZFU is only a service delivery agency and not an actor in the land policy arena.

Performance of the Resettlement Program

In the minds of many, the ZFU acts as a government department facilitating smallholder farmer access to public programs. The selective benefits that it uses to recruit and maintain members derive from its unique relationship with the government. As the NFAZ, it offered members privileged access to extension services. As the ZFU, it expanded its services to include access to government credit programs and food assistance (Arnaiz et al, 1995). From 1990-1997, the government resettled about 2,000 families per year. The limited availability of land through the resettlement program provides weak incentives for farmers to use the ZFU to gain access to land. Farmers have greater opportunities to get land outside of the resettlement program.

Historically, large-scale commercial (LSC) farmers owned most of the area in Shamva District. At Independence, 69% (1446.8 km²) of the land belonged to them¹¹⁴. Black farmers lived in either Madziwa or Bushu communal areas. Surrounded by commercial farms, Bushu communal area (CA) served as a source of cheap labor for the farms and commercial mines in the district.¹¹⁵ The *Umfurudzi Safari Area*, public lands, occupied 706.2 km² along the northeastern border of the District. Independence in 1980 brought with it considerable change in the settlement patterns in Shamva District. As of 1997, the LSC sector occupied 33.2% or 885.18 km² and RA's made up 16.3% of the land or 434.8 km². The size of the CA's and government lands remained the same.¹¹⁶

Resettlement in Shamva District extends back to the colonial period when in the late 1970s, the transition government built "protected villages" or keeps in the northern wards of Madziwa CA. Shamva District shares a border with Mt. Darwin and Rushinga districts to the north, areas that were under the comrades' control during the Liberation War (Lan, 1985). To cut-off support given to the comrades by the rural populace, the government forcibly resettled black farmers in protected villages where they remained under the surveillance of government troops. After the war, some of the families decided to stay.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Mashonaland Central Province Comparative Tables: district population indicators and information for development planning. CSO, November 1989.

¹¹⁵ There are two commercial mines in the district. Shamva mine is located to the south of Shamva town, and Madziwa mine is located some 35 km northeast of the town.

¹¹⁶ Mashonaland Central Province Comparative Tables: district population indicators and information for development planning. CSO, November 1989.

Census 1992, Provincial Profile Mashonaland Central. Central Statistical Office, Harare, Zimbabwe.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Mrs. E. Jones, District Administrator, Shamva town, November 2, 1995.

Large-scale resettlement by the government occurred after 1980. Almost all of the commercial farmers located between Madziwa CA and Umfurudzi safari area abandoned their farms or chose to sell them immediately after the war. The government purchased 22 farms and developed them for resettlement (Figure 6.1). Resettlement began in 1981 with the establishment of Mupfurudzi resettlement scheme and Simba Youth producers' cooperative, the two pioneer schemes in the country. The government settled 566 families on the Mupfurudzi scheme, a Model A scheme organized around 18 nucleated villages. Twenty-nine ex-combatants and their families moved onto the old Paraidon Farm to begin Simba Youth cooperative (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990).

The government established six other Model B producers' cooperatives in the district after Simba Youth: Batsaranai Farming Collective, Chiororo, Fundanevu, Dairies of Shashi, Kubudirira, and Kushingirira. However, most of the families on the district's resettlement list did not want to resettle on the collective farms preferring spaces on Model A schemes, the village resettlement schemes. The district council had a difficult time resettling these schemes and membership never reached the levels identified by Agritex as necessary to implement the farm plans it had developed¹¹⁸.

Since Mupfurudzi, the government has made available only one other village resettlement scheme, Sanye, which lies adjacent to Bushu CA. Occupying a much smaller area, the government resettled 86 farm families on the scheme in 1989. In 1991-1992, the government developed the last resettlement scheme in the district, Principe Irrigation Scheme, located adjacent to the Sanye resettlement area. Principe Irrigation

¹¹⁸ Interview with Mr. E. Veremu, District Extension Officer, Ministry of National Affairs, Shamva town, November 2, 1995.

Scheme was developed with funding from DANIDA (Danish Aid). Sixty farm families received one hectare each of irrigated land and access to dryland cropping areas and communal grazing areas.

The most active period of the resettlement program coincided with the earliest years of the post-Independence period from 1980-1984. During this time, the Mugabe government used land and access to other production services to consolidate their political presence in the rural areas (Moyo, 1995). The new land policy responds to the demands made by an emergent black middle and upper classes (Skalnes, 1995).

Resettlement in Shamva District since 1991 illustrates the government's emphasis on commercial agriculture development in its new land policy. From 1991-1997, the government purchased four commercial farms in the district. Unlike the previous acquisitions, the newly acquired farms are located in the southern half of the district, in the middle of the LSC farming area (figure 6.1). Rather than using the farms for resettlement, the government chose to lease three of the farms to emergent black commercial farmers, some of whom occupied senior positions in the government and ZANU (PF).¹¹⁹ It planned to use the fourth farm, Bend Farm, for smallholder farmers but scuttled these plans in 1994 though the RDC had already confirmed the selection of 22 families. The RDC chairperson said the government lacked the money to develop the farm for resettlement.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Of the 39 registered LSC farmers in the district, 19 are black farmers; 15 bought their farms, and four are leasing their farms from the government.

¹²⁰ Source: Minutes from IDS/Ford Shamva Project Farmers' Workshop, Chaminuka Council Offices, March 20, 1997.

Black LSC farmers have benefited in another way from the new land policy. Of the LSC farmers in the district, some are high-ranking party and government officials. Though LSC agriculture occupies more than a third of the district's lands, the amount of commercial land identified falls below the provincial average (Moyo, 1998). Some of the black-owned farms in the district meet the criteria used to identify farms for acquisition.¹²¹ In Shamva District, Phase II resettlement has not made more land available for smallholder farmers forcing them to seek other ways to gain access to more lands.

LAND ACQUISITION OUTSIDE OF THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

There exists a strong demand for land in Shamva District. From 1990-1997, only 82 families out of more than 3,000 on the Rural District Council's resettlement list have received land. Smallholder farmers have sought to acquire land through channels outside of government, but overwhelmingly, their efforts have not relieved congestion in the communal areas. They have acquired land largely through the informal land market in the communal areas or through illegal occupation. Both mechanisms do not add to the land available to smallholder farmers but simply facilitates the exchange of land within the communal areas.

Land Sales

Cheater (1991) and Nyambara (1997), in their studies of land acquisition, document a long history of land exchange among smallholder farmers. The authors identify land sales between farmers and the sale of lands by traditional authorities as

¹²¹ Interview with Mr. Nherera, ICFU president, March 4, 1997, and interview with Ms. Jones, Shamva DA, November 13, 1995.

accepted practices in the informal land markets of the CA's. Headmen and chiefs traditionally allocate lands to private bidders and individuals also exchange land rights among themselves. Holleman (1969) observed that those leaving a parcel of land received compensation from those taking it over.

An informal land market exists in Shamva District. In Madziwa CA, farmers accuse their traditional chief, Chief Nyamaropa, of selling arable land and land in the grazing areas to outsiders. One farmer reported that Chief Nyamaropa had sold some of her land to "strangers from Harare."¹²² The survey results lend support to the anecdotal information gathered during the farmer group interviews. When asked what changes they had seen in land ownership in their communities since 1990, three-quarters of the respondents from Madziwa CA reported migration and settlement in the grazing areas (table 6.9). More than a third of the communal area respondents reported that they were born outside of the district supporting the claim of heavy migration into the district

Table 6.9 Changes in land ownership observed in community since 1990 by area

	Madziwa CA (n=290)	Bushu CA (n=80)	Mupfurudzi RA (n=76)
Migration and settlement in grazing areas	72.8%	68.8%	75.0%
Out-migration	7.6%	5.0%	3.9%
None	10.3%	7.5%	13.2%
Don't know	4.8%	12.5%	3.9%
Other	4.8%	6.3%	3.9%

¹²² Interview with farmers in Mutumba ward, Madziwa CA, December 1, 1995.

Table 6.10 Means of acquiring cropland

	Madziwa CA (n=293)	Bushu CA (n=81)	Mupfurudzi RA (n=79)
Allocated by Headmen (chief)	63.5%	61.7%	1.3%
Inherited	29.0%	23.5%	8.9%
Resettled by government	1.4%	2.4%	81.0%
Bought from an individual	1.0%	1.2%	0.0%
Renting	1.4%	1.2%	0.0%
Settled on own	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Others	3.4%	9.9%	2.5%

When asked how they had acquired their land, more than 60% of the CA respondents reported that they received their land from traditional authorities (table 6.10). Though the 1988 Rural District Council Act gives the RDC authority to allocate land, in practice traditional authorities retain considerable power over land allocation in their areas.¹²³ When asked whom they approached to resolve land conflicts, almost 60% of the respondents from the CA's said they went to either their headmen or chief versus 26% who approached either their councilors or the RDC.

Moyo et al. (1997), a researcher on the Shamva District study, found evidence of land sales among farmers in the resettlement schemes. The government regulations that apply to RA's give farmers limited tenure. If they should abandon or leave the parcel assigned to them, then the parcel reverts to the government. The resettlement officer or the RDC has the authority to reallocate the parcel to another farm family on the

¹²³ Moyo et al. (1997) reports another incident of land sales in the Umfurudzi Safari Area, government lands. An individual claiming to be a descendent of the old Chief who ruled an area within the Umfurudzi Safari area sold parcels to people from outside Shamva District for Zim \$300 - \$500 apiece. The area claimed by Chief Onyimo straddles the northern border of the Safari area and spills into neighboring Mt. Darwin district.

resettlement list. In the Mupfurudzi resettlement area, farmers who could no longer farm sold their plots to outsiders rather than relinquishing the plots to the resettlement officer.¹²⁴

In Principe Irrigation Scheme, two settlers sold their plots without ever having moved to the scheme.

It has come to the attention of this office that while two families have abandoned settlement at [Principe], someone has taken it upon himself to identify and resettle people ... without authority and above all without following correct procedures for vetting would-be settlers.

(Memo from E. Matashu, AEO Irrigation, August 4, 1994)

The study also found that resettlement farmers increased their land holdings by opportunistically expanding to otherwise undeveloped areas. This type of expansion is unlikely in the CA's where almost every piece of arable land is already under cultivation (Savanhu, 1997). In a memo, the Agritex officer notes:

Farmers at Principe Irrigation Scheme appear to have opened more land up for their dryland cropping besides what you allocated them. Due to the problems of deforestation and particularly siltation of our water source, could you assist in controlling this development?

(Memo from E. Matashu, AEO Irrigation, October 31, 1994)

The illegal expansion of croplands in resettlement has precedents dating back to the colonial period when the government forcible blacks in "wilderness" areas of Midlands Province. Settlers expanded their croplands into undeveloped lands owned by the residents of the area. They gained effective rights to the land by clearing it and planting crops (Nyambara, 1997).

¹²⁴ Source: Minutes from Chaminuka Rural District Council Meetings, August 28, 1996.

Land Occupation

For people frustrated or impatient with the government, squatting has become an effective mechanism for acquiring new lands (Herbst, 1990). In Shamva District, the squatter issue has a more complex dimension. During the colonial period and through the post-Independence period, immigrants from neighboring Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi came to the district to work on the commercial farms, in the mines, and to escape a civil war. Despite government's attempts to repatriate the migrants, especially Mozambican citizens in 1995, many have refused. Some have married Zimbabwean citizens, and others are second or third generation immigrants.

Immigrants cannot acquire land through the resettlement program although resettlement has displaced many foreign farm workers. Because they have no kinship ties with the local population, they also cannot go to the traditional authorities to get land. Among the few options available to them is to settle illegally in grazing areas and on state lands.¹²⁵ Moyo et al. (1997) found 13 squatter families in the Mupfurudzi resettlement area who had settled onto their land in 1987. Of the 13 families, eight were second-generation Mozambicans who felt that the land rightfully belonged to them since they had had possession of it for so long.

The RDC has the responsibility of managing the squatter problem in the district. It organized a squatter eviction committee in 1995, however, lack of funds prevent it from evicting many of the squatters (Masuko, 1995). At the village level, farmers in Gono ward expressed frustration with the squatters who had settled in areas designated

¹²⁵ Sources: Interview with Mrs. E. Jones, District Administrator, Shamva town, November 2, 1995, and Mr. Zendera, CEO Chaminuka RDC, Chaminuka council offices, March 3, 1997.

for a grazing scheme. The VIDCO councilor said that they had grown tired of waiting for the RDC to act and evicted the squatters themselves, however, the squatters only returned soon after.¹²⁶ At the time of this study, squatters had yet to settle on the commercial farmlands in the district.¹²⁷ The situation changed in February 2000 during a series of land takings led by a militant group of ex-combatants. Peasant farmers claimed several white-owned and black-owned farms in the District.

Non-governmental sector

The non-governmental organization, Danish Aid People-to-People (DAPP), has established an outgrower scheme in Shamva District to provide an alternative mechanism for farmers to acquire land. DAPP purchased three commercial farms and in 1995, began its program to train smallholder farmers in commercial production of horticulture, cotton, forestry, and livestock production. The aim of the program is to teach farmers how to be commercial producers, and to help them save the money needed to buy their own farms. The program puts a percentage of each farmer's income into a savings account that s/he can access after completion of the three-year program. Following the Panorama Farm model, farmers receive loans for inputs, cattle, and equipment, and three hectares of land for cropping.

¹²⁶ Interview with VIDCO councillor, village health workers (2), and Agritex agent, Gono ward, November 15, 1995.

¹²⁷ Herbst (1990) documents the widespread squatter problem in Nyanga district during the 1980s. In 1998, squatters claimed land on three farms in Marondera district (NYT, June 22, 1998).

SUMMARY

As discussed earlier (see Chapter 3) extensive over-grazing and land exhaustion is found in the communal areas of Shamva District. According to the provincial AEO (Agritex Extension Officer), many areas in the district show signs of "burnt ground syndrome." Soil erosion and siltation in water sources, consequences of over-grazing, deforestation, intensive cotton and maize production, and gold panning, are also becoming evident in the resettlement areas.¹²⁸ Land fragmentation in the CA's has left parents with not enough land to pass on to their children who wish to continue farming. These problems have their roots in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act that sequestered a growing peasant farm population on reserves with fixed boundaries.

This chapter has shown that the political opportunity structure at the local level is open to smallholder members of the ZFU. Strong incentives to mobilize around land issues also exist. Under these conditions, it was expected that smallholder members would mobilize to use the ZFU's local structures to advance their interests to the RDC, the resettlement officers, and other local decision-makers. Instead, smallholders have not mobilized within the ZFU. Smallholders do not consider the ZFU an effective actor in the land policy arena. On the contrary, they see it mainly as a service delivery agency, a role critical for the recruitment and maintenance of its membership. The choice by district leaders in Shamva District not to undertake lobbying activities reinforces members' perception of the organization's capacities. Consequently, smallholders use other channels to access land.

The performance of the resettlement program in the district also weakens the incentives for members to mobilize around land issues. Farmers join the ZFU to access government programs and services, but the limited availability of lands through the resettlement program means that they would have few opportunities to get land using the ZFU. Though 88.5% of the survey respondents felt that the government should provide their children as well as the landless and poor with land, their own personal experiences suggest otherwise.

Going outside the resettlement program may help to address their immediate land needs, but it does not alleviate the structural conditions contributing to land degradation with the fixed boundaries of the communal areas. Without access to commercial lands, the alternatives to the resettlement program only facilitate the exchange of land within the boundaries of the CA's. Squatting in the grazing areas and on state lands extends cultivated areas to lands considered high-risk erosion areas accelerating the processes of land degradation. Chapter 7 reviews the findings and conclusions of this study and discusses its broader implications for smallholder development in Zimbabwe.

¹²⁸ Chapter 3 describes the environmental problems found in Shamva District.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The central question posed in this dissertation was: How can the structure of political opportunities be altered so that smallholder members can prevail upon their leaders to articulate their land demands to national policymakers? The study looked specifically at the opportunities available to members of the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU), the officially recognized representative of smallholder interests. The analysis examined the structure of political opportunities and incentives available to smallholder members in the context of resettlement policy at the national level and at the local level. The study addressed the research questions below.

1. What political opportunity structures do members face at the local level and at the national level regarding land policies?
2. What incentive for mobilization does land policy offer members and leaders? Have ZFU members mobilized around their land interests at the national level or at the local level?
3. Whose land interests does the ZFU represent?
4. What other channels can poor farmers use to resolve their land issues? What are the implications for land degradation in the communal areas and for the development of smallholder agriculture?

STUDY FINDINGS

The National Context

The ZFU's decision-making structure concentrates decision-making power in the national council and the President's council. Financial constraints prevented effective communication between national and local levels and provided members with few opportunities to monitor the actions of their national leaders. The process of indirect elections plus the ZFU's reliance on levies rather than members' dues means that members cannot sanction their senior leaders. Moreover, members and senior leaders did not share common interests because of differences in their production systems and backgrounds. While, commercial farmers accounted for more than third of the national leadership at the time of this study, including half of the President's Council, they made up less than 5% of the ZFU membership. Most of these senior leaders share an ideology of commercialization or modernization derived from their training in the master farmer program, and this ideology manifests itself in the belief that the ZFU ought to facilitate the commercialization of black agriculture. Together these factors allow senior leaders the political space to use the Union to articulate their own land interests.

Furthermore, the ZFU's official positions and members' opinions on land issues diverge widely. The ZFU's positions reflected the interests of its senior leaders who support the use of the resettlement program to develop black commercial agriculture. On the other hand, smallholder members value land for its role in their own social and cultural reproduction, and they support the use of the resettlement program to provide land for their children. Land fragmentation in the CA's and RA's has compromised the

ability of smallholder farmers to pass on to their children land to sustain their households.

Though the ZFU's land policy runs counter to the interests of its membership, smallholder members do not mobilize at the national level to protest the Union's land positions. Members' perception of the ZFU's capacities provides an explanation. The ZFU's senior leaders define their organization as a service delivery agency. They use services as the "hook" to recruit and retain members. Like the predecessor organization, the NFAZ, ZFU activities center on service provision and rarely venture into lobbying for members' interests (Herbst, 1990; Makumbe, 1994). Though the ZFU has emphasized its lobbying activities since 1991, poor communication between the national and local levels means that most members remain unaware of this political role.

While the case of only one ZFU district precludes generalization of the results to the broader ZFU membership, the findings do provide insights about the opportunities available to ZFU members to pursue their land interests. Shamva District lies in a high-rainfall region and farmers realize higher and more reliable crop production than their counterparts in the drought-prone areas. Their agroecological situation suggests that they might share common land interests with the ZFU's senior leaders on resettlement policy. The findings to the contrary raise real questions about the ZFU's ability to represent the land interests of smallholder farmers, and more broadly the influence of smallholder farmers in the land policy process.

The District Context

Smallholder members face conditions favorable to mobilization at the local level. Participatory structures of decision-making and strong rules for accountability facilitate members' use of village clubs and area councils to address production problems.

Members and local leaders also share similar land interests, thereby creating less conflictual arenas at the local level than at the national level. The Shamva Rural District Council carried out two settler selection exercises from 1990-1994 creating the real possibility of gaining access to resettlement lands through the policy process. In this context, members faced strong incentives to mobilize around the settler selection process.

However, members do not mobilize around settler selection issues within the ZFU at the local level. As in the national context, local leaders' definition of the ZFU as a service delivery agency creates low expectations among smallholders for the Union's capacity to resolve land demands. The decision by local leaders not to become involved in local land politics, even though they were positioned to do so, reinforced the perception of the ZFU's capacities. Members join the ZFU to access services and not necessarily to demand program or policy changes from the government. In short, members see lobbying as a "by-product" of the ZFU's economic activities.

The Union's activities in the marketing and pricing policy arenas present an important exception to this observation. Policies affecting joint-impact goods (JIG's) such as producer prices and marketing relationships create more incentives for their provision than policies affecting incompatible-use goods (IUG's) like land. The incentives to provide these goods derive from the relatively low costs associated with their provision and the potentially large pool of beneficiaries. Alternately, land policies affect incompatible-use goods; its use by one precludes its use by another raising the costs of its provision while at the same time reducing the potential pool of beneficiaries. From the organization's perspective, lobbying for marketing and pricing policies can yield tangible benefits available to all of its members. At the district level, land policies

would benefit only a few ZFU members.

Members' decision to go outside of the ZFU to acquire lands results from the limited availability of resettlement lands in Shamva District. The limited availability of resettlement lands means that even if local leaders did participate in settler selection, only a few ZFU members could actually benefit. Thus, the value of a ZFU membership lies in the privileged access one gains to government programs like extension, credit, drought-aid, and tax exemption for agricultural inputs (Arnaiz, 1997; Arnaiz et al, 1995; Makumbe, 1994).

Since members do not value the ZFU as a means of acquiring land, they instead approach their traditional authorities and local government officials to make their demands for land. In Shamva District farmers act as individuals and acquire land through informal land markets, opportunistic expansion, and illegal occupation of state land and grazing areas.¹²⁹ While farmers may resolve their immediate land demands through these channels, they do not alleviate the structural condition at the root of land scarcity and land degradation in the communal lands, the distribution of rights to land.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

This study showed that even under favorable structural conditions, members do not use the ZFU to articulate their land demands. By their actions, they expressed greater confidence in their own initiative to access land. Members' perception of the ZFU's capacity to be an effective actor in land policy reinforces going outside of the organization to resolve land issues. The perceived capacities of the Union derive in part

¹²⁹ Burgess (1992) and RUD (1988) reached similar conclusions.

from the role the ZFU's leaders have defined for the organization vis-à-vis farmers.

Equally important, it derives from the performance of the resettlement program.

To change the structure of incentives at the local level so that members use the ZFU to articulate their land demands, the ZFU itself must be seen as effective in influencing land policy and obtaining land for members. Members do confront ZFU leaders and staff to express their dissatisfaction with the level or quality of the services provided. They know from past experiences that mobilizing around issues of marketing, transportation, extension, and credit can lead to tangible results (Arnaiz et al., 1995).

During the 1990s, Phase II resettlement failed to meet the targets set out in the government's 1990 Land Policy Statement.¹³⁰ From 1990-1997, it resettled about 2,000 families per year well below estimates of about 5,000 families per year (Moyo, 1998).¹³¹ In contrast, the original resettlement program resettled 34,000 families from 1980-1984 (Roth, 1990). Government has acquired less than 1% of the six million hectares of commercial land it claimed to need to address congestion in the CA's (GoZ, 1998; Moyo, 1998). At the district level, the resettlement program has had a minimal impact on the day-to-day lives of smallholder farmers. In Shamva District, only 82 families out of more than 3,000 have moved off the resettlement list though commercial farms occupy more than a third of the district's land area.

As of 1997, the government lacked the resources and the political will to meet its resettlement targets. The government complained that it lacked the money to purchase

¹³⁰ The government revised its targets for land acquisition in its 1998 Land Policy Framework to reflect concessions made to donors at the Donor Conference on Land held in Harare, September 1998.

¹³¹ The government of Zimbabwe has resettled about 64,000 families since Independence, a figure that far exceeds the results of similar resettlement efforts. Still, it represents only half of the projected 150,000 families the government hoped to settle in the original resettlement exercise (Bratton, 1994b). In Phase

the farms and to develop already acquired farmlands for resettlement.¹³² At the donor conference on land in 1998, the government raised less than US \$ 1 million.¹³³ It sought US \$ 1.9 billion to implement its Phase II resettlement program. The government did not step in to make-up the shortfall and refused to provide the Ministry of Lands with a level of funding necessary to acquire more than a handful of farms.¹³⁴ Despite President Mugabe's threats to confiscate white-owned farmland, in practice, the government did not acquire farms for which it could not pay.¹³⁵

The government did not appear willing to invest in implementing its Phase II resettlement program relying instead on donor aid that was not forthcoming. The implication for the ZFU was that it would have limited opportunities to obtain land for its members at the local level. Consequently, the structure of incentives would remain the same and members would continue to go outside of the ZFU and the resettlement program to acquire land. In 2000, a change in the government's approach to land acquisition made significantly more land available through the resettlement program.

In February 2000, voters rejected constitutional amendments that would have increased Mugabe's presidential powers and given the government the authority to

II resettlement, the government aims to resettle 500,000 families (GoZ, 1998).

¹³² "Land Reform Derailed!" *The Insider*, February 26, 1999.

¹³³ Donors accused the resettlement program of cronyism and for its lack of transparency. In 1999, the government offered gave government and party officials 100-year leases to 400 farms originally slated for the resettlement of poor farmers ("Chefs get 100-year Leases on State Land." *The Financial Gazette*, October 7, 1999).

¹³⁴ In 1998, Minister of Lands, K. Kangai, complained how the government could justify its commitment to land reform if it was only willing to provide Z\$ 150 million (US \$ 6 million) for land acquisition. In 1999, the government provided Z \$ 350 million (US \$ 9.6 million) for land acquisition. "The Futility of Defying History." *The Financial Gazette*, April 27, 2000; "Land Reform Derailed!" *The Insider*, February 26, 1999.

¹³⁵ "Zimbabwe Talks Tough But Steps Softly in Battle Over Land," *the New York Times*, April 11, 2000.

acquire farms without compensation. The President's critics accused him of attaching the provision for farm acquisitions to gain the popular vote.¹³⁶ They interpreted the defeat of the constitutional referendum as a vote of no confidence for the Mugabe government and a first step in Mugabe's removal from office. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by the ZCTU president, Morgan Tsvangirai, posed the most significant challenge to ZANU-PF's rule since Independence. The MDC and CFU together with other civic organizations opposed the constitutional referendum.¹³⁷

In a speech a week after his defeat, Mugabe urged a group of veterans from the Liberation War to invade white-owned farms.¹³⁸ Raising issues of race and land, Mugabe accused whites of being "enemies of the state" and blamed them for the failure of the economic structural adjustment program and for the resettlement program.¹³⁹ By targeting whites, Mugabe also attacked the MDC for the MDC had the support of the CFU and white business owners.¹⁴⁰ By August, the war veterans led by Chenjerai Hunzvi and their supporters had taken control of over 1,600 farms.

Mugabe's reasons for endorsing the farm invasions had more to do with his desire to retain political power than a sincere wish to see the rural poor acquire lands. At the time of the farm invasions, Mugabe faced opposition not only from the MDC but also

¹³⁶ "Zimbabwe Constitution Vote is a Showdown for Mugabe." *The Financial Gazette*, February 12, 2000.

¹³⁷ "Zimbabwe Voters Break with Past." *The New York Times*, February 16, 2000.

¹³⁸ The group of war veterans led by C. Hunzvi had also invaded farms in November 1998. "Air of Crisis in Zimbabwe Grows after Threat to Seize 841 Farms." *The New York Times*, December 1, 1998.

¹³⁹ "Tsvangirai Accuses Mugabe of Inciting War Against Whites." *The Financial Gazette*, April 20, 2000. "White Farmers Villified." *The Financial Gazette*, April 19, 2000.

¹⁴⁰ In 1998, Mugabe facilitated a partnership between the CFU and the ZCTU when he announced plans to seize white-owned farms and decreed that Unions could no longer call strikes. The partnership between the CFU and Tsvangirai, the president of the ZCTU, continued when Tsvangirai became the leader of the MDC ("Zimbabwe Smolder While Mugabe Shops." *Guardian*. November 30, 1998).

from within his own party, ZANU-PF, who blamed him for Zimbabwe's eroding economy.¹⁴¹ The political crisis initiated by the farm invasions allowed Mugabe to move the parliamentary elections from April to June and to dissolve Parliament.¹⁴² Before dissolving Parliament, he succeeded in getting a "land nationalization law" passed giving his government authority to confiscate farms and winning him political support from the rural areas.

The physical intimidation and thuggery aimed at MDC supporters, farm laborers, and whites in the months preceding the elections caused many in Zimbabwe and among the international community to question the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. Robin Cook, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, asked could "free and fair" elections really be held in this environment.¹⁴³ The election results gave ZANU-PF a narrow victory and a slight majority in Parliament.¹⁴⁴

In June, the government announced plans to acquire the 841 properties that it had originally designated for acquisition back in 1997.¹⁴⁵ It wants to resettle poor farmers immediately though the farms lack the necessary infrastructure. The war veterans and other squatters have so far refused to vacate the farms including those not identified by the government for acquisition. C. Hunzvi, elected Member of Parliament in the June elections, demanded that his followers receive 20% of all acquired properties though they

¹⁴¹ "Mugabe Faces Party Revolt." *The Financial Gazette*. April 20, 2000.

¹⁴² "Tsvangirai Accuses Mugabe of Inciting War Against Whites," *The Financial Gazette*. April 20, 2000.

¹⁴³ "UK to Offer Conditional Aid for Zimbabwe Land Reform." *The Financial Gazette*. April 27, 2000.

¹⁴⁴ ZANU-PF held 147 of the 150 seats in Parliament prior to the elections. "Pressure on Mugabe to Go." *The Financial Gazette*, June 29, 2000.

¹⁴⁵ "Mugabe to List White Farms to be Seized." *The New York Times*, June 1, 2000.

make up less than 1% of the population.¹⁴⁶ The government insists that it will resume the resettlement program and choose settlers according to the settler selection criteria defined in its 1998 Land Policy statement. It has not stated what it plans to do with the squatters already on the farms.

The sudden availability of lands through the resettlement program does not strengthen the incentives for members to use the ZFU to access these lands. Rather, the events of 2000 reinforce the notion that individual initiative rather than collective action through the Union is the most effective way to acquire land. Squatters rather than NFAZ members benefited most from the resettlement program in the 1980s and it is likely that squatters will gain the rights to the land that they already occupy in 2000. Government acquiesced to squatters' demand for land in the 1980s and again in 1998.¹⁴⁷ Mugabe's support of the farm invasions and the role played by the war veterans in the campaign make it very difficult for the government to order the squatters off the farms.

The farm invasions of 2000 suggest that so long as Mugabe remains in power, the Zimbabwean political system will become less tolerant of opposing views. Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, the government jailed journalists critical of its policies and violently quelled protests by University students.¹⁴⁸ The movement toward a more repressive regime creates a hostile policy environment for farmer organizations. Within this political context, farmer organizations have retreated from political activities and emphasized economic activities; farmer organizations do not often lead the opposition

¹⁴⁶ "Splinter Group Lobbies War Vets to End Anarchy." *The Financial Gazette*, May 25, 2000.

¹⁴⁷ "Zimbabwe Squatters: Land Claims on White Farms." *The New York Times*, June 22, 1998.

¹⁴⁸ "Bomb Destroys Zimbabwe Newspaper Press." *The New York Times*, January 28, 2001.
"Chombo Plots to Oust Judges." *The Zimbabwe Independent*, January 29, 2001.

against repressive regimes (Bray, 1991; N'gethe and Odera, 1994; Kaimowitz, 1988).

The ZFU's senior leaders will face considerable disincentives for political action in opposition to the government on land and other re-distributive issues. Though the Union has developed positions on policies contrary to the government's position, it has been on sector-specific or narrow issues. It has not made public its position on the farm invasions of 2000. Given the source of the benefits offered by the ZFU, it would not want to jeopardize its relationship with the government for its survival depends upon maintaining that relationship. The government provides the ZFU with the services that it uses to attract and maintain its membership and gives it the right to levy. In 1995-96, the levies accounted for 60% of the ZFU's annual operating budget. The implication for smallholders is that the political opportunity structures for land policy will become more closed within the ZFU, and they will continue to be excluded from the formal land policy-making process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy

The results of this study indicate a need for the government to address the related issues of land scarcity, poverty, and land degradation in the smallholder areas. That farmers go outside of the resettlement program to acquire land and do not use the ZFU, their formal channel to the land policy process, underscores the ineffectiveness of the resettlement exercise to date. Conditions of economic deprivation experienced by the rural poor made them vulnerable to political manipulation by Mugabe. A result of the widespread farm invasions and consequent confiscation of white-owned farms has been

the destabilization of the Zimbabwean economy. As unemployment rises in the urban areas, people return to their home areas and attempt to re-enter farming.

The resettlement program cannot alone address land scarcity, poverty, and land degradation in the communal areas but ought to be complimented with economic and social policies. Creating wage opportunities outside of agriculture will reduce land pressure in the rural areas; there already exists a significant demand for wage-employment among the rural poor. Rather than forcing people out of agriculture, government can entice them to enter other economic sectors. In this way, the population in the rural areas will decrease thus alleviating the condition underlying poverty and land degradation. Though not supported by the study findings, insights gained from conversations with farm leaders, members, and government officials suggest that to address poverty, land scarcity, and land degradation in the CA's, policy-makers ought to consider the following.

1. *Resettlement policies cannot alone decongest the CA's* because not enough land exists in Zimbabwe to provide land to all of those who want it (Bratton, 1994b).
2. *Government needs to put into place complimentary policies to create jobs in the rural areas and in the urban areas.* The Poverty Assessment Survey of 1998 indicated that a majority of Zimbabweans would rather work for wages rather than farm. This finding suggests that a significant number of people are in farming because they have few alternatives. Jobless youth were among those invading commercial farms.
3. *People must have the skills needed by manufacturing and industry.* Government ought to implement education policies in the rural areas to prepare the population to move into the non-agriculture sector. Education has a corollary benefit. As a population becomes more educated, its rate of population growth decreases. In the study area, household sizes fell below the provincial and national averages. Respondents were also better educated than the national average (Wekwete, 1997).
4. *Employment creation is linked to the performance of the general economy.* Zimbabwe needs to implement properly the current economic structural adjustment program. The World Bank-Zimbabwe criticized the government for only partly implementing the current economic program though it is in its tenth year. The

government remains the majority shareholder for the former marketing and financing parastatals and continues to subsidize their operations. Thus, many of the former parastatals, notably the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC), have cash flow problems, which have negative implications for the ability of peasant and commercial farmers to acquire production loans.

The government will require donor funding to achieve the above, but the World Bank, the IMF and other donors have withheld funding for resettlement and economic programs pending a resolution to the current land crisis. Donors want the government to demonstrate respect for and a willingness to protect the property and rights of white farmers. Thus, the government must resolve the squatter issue to regain donor confidence, and as importantly, to maintain large-scale commercial (LSC) production. The Zimbabwean economy continues to rely on LSC production. During the farm invasions, LSC farmers halted preparations to plant winter crops like wheat. Annual wheat production is worth Z\$ 3 billion (US \$ 83 million) at the primary producer level with downstream industries adding more.¹⁴⁹ The Zimbabwean economy has 50% unemployment and 60% inflation.¹⁵⁰ It cannot afford to lose production from non-confiscated farms.

Specific recommendations supported by this research are listed below.

1. *Implementing the resettlement program in a more transparent manner.* Donor support for the resettlement program depends upon the government's demonstration that resettlement lands are actually going to the poor rather than government cronies. If government can follow the procedures outlined in its Land Policy Framework (1998), then it will benefit from donor aid. A politically difficult but necessary step will be to force the squatters on confiscated farms to go through the settler selection process. Otherwise, it reinforces the notion that the most effective way to acquire land is to illegally occupy it rather than to go through the resettlement program.

¹⁴⁹ "Farm Invasions Threaten Sector with Collapse." *The Financial Gazette*. April 20, 2000.

¹⁵⁰ "Zimbabwe's Economy Falters but Many Ask Who Really is to Blame?" *The New York Times*, April 8, 2000.

2. *Down-sizing the Phase II resettlement program.* Donors criticized the government's Phase II resettlement program as being over-ambitious and unrealistic. Down-sizing the program to a scale that government can finance and administer effectively would be appropriate. Given the changes brought about by the recent farm invasions, government will have to finance quickly the development of supporting infrastructure on the newly resettled farms at a minimum to maintain national food security.¹⁵¹
3. *Committing sufficient resources to the resettlement program.* The decision by farmers to go outside of the resettlement program to acquire land has negative implications for land-use management in the rural areas. Farmers did so because of the limited availability of land. Committing resources to resettlement to acquire farms and put in the necessary infrastructure can strengthen the incentives for farmers to go through the government to acquire land. The availability of resettlement lands through the resettlement program also strengthens incentives for members to articulate their land demands through the ZFU especially at the level of implementation.
4. *Creating alternative channels for farmers to access the resettlement policy process.* The ZFU may not be the best vehicle to represent poor farmer land interests. The government can create consultative groups comprising shareholders at the district level to develop and implement resettlement policies. It can also create Land Boards¹⁵² comprising traditional authorities, local government, and private citizens to resolve land conflicts and oversee land-use at the WADCO and VIDCO levels. The Land Boards can also assist the settler selection committees and the land identification committees in their duties.
5. *Recognizing the need demand for land among the rural majority for their social and cultural reproduction.* The resettlement program ought to embrace efficiency and equity objectives, and the distribution of land between commercial and village resettlement schemes must reflect these twin objectives. The resettlement program can also invest in the development of social as well as agriculture supporting infrastructure in the rural areas to improve the quality of life for those remaining in the CA's.

¹⁵¹ In mid-November 2000, the government made available US \$ 16 million in soft loans to farmers as they start preparing for the new season. Thousands of communal, small-scale and resettled farmers, including those newly resettled under the controversial commercial farm settlement program will benefit from the fund.

¹⁵² The ZFU advocates the creation of land boards at the district level to arbitrate land disputes within the context of individual land ownership in the communal and resettlement areas. Interview with E. Tsikisayi, ZFU senior economist, March 5, 1997. The land boards would have the same responsibilities given to the Intensive Conservation Area Boards during the Pre-Independence period (see chapter 3).

Donor Policy

Zimbabwe's constitution allows for freedom of association. However, recent events suggest that the government will not be so tolerant of different and opposing societal views. The World Bank and the IMF have demanded that the government adopt democratic reforms as a condition for funding (Dashwood, 1996). Donors have an obligation to provide funding for resettlement and complimentary programs once the government meets the conditions that donors set forth at the donor conference on land in 1998. Historically, donors have not kept their promises of aid for the resettlement program with the exception being Great Britain. Lack of funding is a legitimate reason for the slowdown in Phase II resettlement. Only after the land crisis of 2000 did Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark step forward to provide funding. However, the money was not to implement the resettlement program but to compensate the owners of confiscated farms. At the same time, donors must demand that the government also invest its resources in resettlement. In this way, the government can demonstrate its commitment to the program.

Future Research

Zimbabwe's colonial history, structure of organized interests, and wide-scale efforts at land reform make it a special case. With the exception of South Africa, no other country in sub-Saharan Africa has a comparable structure of organized interests to represent the agriculture sector. That said, the issues of mobilization and representation addressed in this dissertation have relevance for other farmer organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. This study provided some insights into the internal dynamics of policy-making within the ZFU. Its shortcoming lay in its use of a case study approach and the

limited scope of policy issues that it addressed. This type of research would benefit from comparative studies that include the variables below.

1. *Policy types.* The relationship between internal mobilization and policy types needs further examination. Policy types, and an appreciation of the characteristics of the goods affected by policy, can lead to a greater understanding of the structure of incentives for mobilization faced by members in a policy arena.
2. *Organizational type and scale.* This study assessed the political opportunities available to farmers within a farmer union. The "top-down" structure of decision-making did not facilitate the participation of members and weakened rules of accountability. Federations and grassroots organizations have horizontal structures of decision-making suggesting open POS's. Do poor farmers have more opportunities to prevail upon their leaders in these types of organizations to articulate their interests? Do members mobilize more around political issues in federations and grassroots organizations?
3. *Capacity of the political system.* Members' perception of their organization's capacities affects the incentives for mobilization that they face within their organization. For the ZFU, the limited availability of resettlement lands created weak incentives for members to use the organization to access lands. The relationship between the government's capacity to implement programs and the incentives for members to use their organization to access those programs requires further research.
4. *Openness of the political system.* Previous studies identified a relationship between the openness of the political system and the activities of farmer organizations. This study found the ZFU did not oppose the government on broad-interest issues like land. Under what political conditions do farmer organizations challenge the government on re-distributive policies? Does the decision to do so come from the membership or from the leadership?
5. *Members.* The study's conceptual approach suggested that previous experiences with collective action through the organization facilitate member mobilization. Unfortunately, members in the case study district did not have many positive experiences using the ZFU to articulate land demands. Would members located in areas with a stronger ZFU presence be more likely to use their organization rather than go outside of the organization to articulate their land and other demands?

Land has occupied a central role in the colonial and post-Independence political economy of Zimbabwe. Mandivambi Rukuni (1998), the former chairperson of the Land Tenure Committee and the National Task Force on Land Policy observed:

Since 1890, the land question has singularly had the most significant impact on Zimbabwe's political and economic history. A national solution to the land question may well be the most important national investment as we enter into the 21st century...[L]and reform has to provide a solid basis for long-term economic growth and social integration...[L]and resettlement or re-distribution alone is no longer adequate. It is more appropriate to plan and invest for "land and agrarian reform"...transforming land distribution patterns, strengthening land tenure security, strengthening rural institutions, and providing services to land-users.

Farmer organization has a role to play in facilitating land and agrarian reform.

The ZFU provides smallholder farmers with production services and access to credit, all economic services that facilitate smallholder development. It hopes to participate in the development of rural institutions, like the land boards, to manage land administration and land-use in the smallholder and commercial farming areas. However, it has not effectively facilitated the expression of smallholder demand for land especially at the grassroots exposing a need for other organizational structures to do so.

Unless the land movement is rejuvenated at the grassroots level, we cannot hope to change the political and economic pattern that we have seen after Independence. It is important for grassroots organizers to go back and ensure that people who need land and who need it first are actually maintained.¹⁵³

(Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC and ZCTU president)

¹⁵³ Quoted in "Southern Africa Development: Plenty of Rhetoric, Little Land." *Inter-Press Service English News Wire*, April 23, 1997. ZCTU is the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and MDC is the Movement for Democratic Change, the main opposition party challenging ZANU-PF in the 2000 elections.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE LAND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The GoZ's land policy framework comprises five separate policies: land acquisition, settler selection, land tenure reform, communal land reorganization, and settlement support services¹⁵⁴ (GoZ, 1998). The section broadly outlines each policy domain.

Land Acquisition. Analysts have estimated that up to five million hectares of commercial farmland are under-utilized or derelict (Roth, 1990; Weiner et al., 1985). Government seeks to identify and acquire these properties. It believes that black producers can optimize the productive potential of these lands with the proper support. “Land reform policy must seek to achieve optimal land utilization and increased productivity so as to deliver employment growth, improved income distribution, and environmentally sustainable use of natural resources” (Moyo, 1998)

Acquisition policy outlines the procedures for identifying and acquiring commercial farmland. Land acquisition policy is determined at the highest levels of the government and within the ruling party, ZANU (PF). Control over which farms are identified for acquisition resides with land identification committees at the district, provincial, and national levels. At the national and provincial levels, these committees are chaired by the highest ranking ZANU (PF) official at that level who in turn, select members of the committee. In theory, all stakeholders must be represented, however,

¹⁵⁴ The GoZ policy framework identified environmental policy among its constituent policies. However, the description was sparse requiring only an environmental impact assessment for proposed agricultural

representatives of the CFU are absent from these committees. At the district level, the land committees are technical committees chaired by the district administrator (DA) who may invite stakeholders to sit on the committee. Each committee is tasked with identifying and evaluating farms for resettlement using criteria developed by the Department of Agriculture Extension and Technologies (Agritex) and published in the government's 1990 Land Policy Statement.

Land acquisition policy offers incentives to both white and black farmers to become involved politically. White farmers stand to lose about 50% of their land if government meets its goal of acquiring five million hectares for resettlement. Equally important, the government has not been clear whether it will compensate the owners and if so, how much (The Insider, January 1999). The CFU staunchly opposes current land acquisition policy claiming the government has yet to resettle all of the land it current owns (FES, 1998). For black commercial and aspiring commercial farmers, land acquisition policy offers them an opportunity to lease or own commercial farmland, an opportunity they would not have otherwise given the high commercial bank rates (ICFU, 1999). The landless and land hungry in the communal areas stand to gain access to land. The ZFU supports land acquisition policy unconditionally whereas the ICFU has some reservations since some of its members' farms qualify under the selection criteria (FES, 1998).

Settler Selection. Settler selection policy has the most direct and visible impact on the day-to-day lives of smallholder farmers and their families. It lays out the criteria for identifying CA farm families for resettlement and outlines the procedures for

developments in the resettlement and communal areas.

identifying and choosing those families. Also, it determines the type and number of farmers who would be eligible for each of the five resettlement models¹⁵⁵ identified for Phase II resettlement. A critical issue that has yet to be openly debated is the distribution of government-purchased lands between the A₁ scheme (peasant production) and A₂ scheme (commercial farm production).¹⁵⁶

After the donor conference on land reform in September of 1998, the GoZ amended its settler selection criteria and proposed scheme types in response to donor demands. The government now proposes to set aside 80% of government purchased lands for Model A₁ or single family farm settlement. Settlers in this scheme will be chosen from the CA's and from among displaced farm workers, ex-mine workers, and ex-combatants. Beneficiaries of Model A₂ (commercial farm settlements) and irrigation schemes will be chosen from people with formal training in agriculture and farm management and with the resources and inclination to farm full-time commercially (GoZ, 1998).

¹⁵⁵ Five resettlement models are as follows.

- a. Model A₁: Family farms with shared grazing land, woodlots, and water sources. Each household can receive from 3-6 hectares for cropping depending upon natural region.
- b. Commercial Grazing Model or Three-Tier Model: Settler households receive 180 hectares of which three hectares are used for residential and agricultural purposes. The remaining 177 hectares are pooled into communal grazing areas.
- c. Model A₂: Settler households allocated self-contained farming units ranging from 50-300 hectares in size depending upon natural region.
- d. Communal Area Reorganization Model: Reorganize land in the communal areas according to the A₁ model.
- e. Irrigation Schemes Model: Located wherever dams are constructed, each household receives 1 to 10 hectares depending upon the recommended farm enterprise.

¹⁵⁶ The scheme targeting aspiring black commercial farmers, the Tenant Farmer Scheme, has been folded into the Model A₂ schemes.

The settler selection criteria adopted by the government follows closely the criteria used by the colonial government to select farmers for resettlement on the NPA's. Both sets of criteria place an emphasis on ownership of farm implements, a master farmer certificate, and agricultural experience. The colonial government sought to place in the newer NPA's farmers with more skills and capital assets than those who had been resettled before them (Weinrich, 1975). The current government seeks a similar conclusion for the resettlement areas.

District committees comprising traditional authorities, local government, and the ZFU select farmers for resettlement on A₁ scheme. Administrative rule devised by the Ministry of Lands determines the composition of the selection committees. Selection committees use selection criteria developed by Agritex and approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Officials from within the Ministry of Lands select farmers for resettlement on Model A₂ (commercial farm) schemes. Current settler selection policy has yet to determine the selection and the selection process.

Once a separate policy, communal area reorganization policy now lies within the broader settler selection policy. Considered a "technical" policy, responsibility for its formulation and implementation lies with the Ministry of Agriculture and specifically, the Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (Agritex) (Alexander, 1994). A consequence of communal land reorganization will be the displacement of households from their land and in some cases, displacing families from their CA raising two important questions the government has not yet fully addressed. Who will decide which families will remain? Second, where will displaced families go? The ZFU and CFU support this plan arguing that the current organization of communal areas fosters

land degradation and low production (ZFU, 1994).

Land Tenure Reform. The government adopted most of the recommendations contained in the Land Tenure Commission's final report (1995) although it has yet to publish its definitive policy on tenure reform. Broadly, land tenure reform intends to rationalize land tenure systems across the three farm classes. Government planners expect that establishing freehold and transferable titles for all of Zimbabwe's farmland will lead to a vibrant land market that can make land available at reasonable prices and sizes. In this way, black farmers can realize greater access to land (Rukuni, 1998).

Thus far, government proposes to grant freehold title in all of its resettlement schemes and group title with respect to grazing land. Presently, the state owns all of the resettlement lands. Resettlement farmers operate under a permit system that requires them to farm full-time, limit the size of their herds, follow best management practices as proposed by Agritex, and prevents them from renting out their lands. Violation of any of these conditions can lead to their ouster from the resettlement scheme. However, the government has failed to evict those who have violated the above conditions because of institutional inefficiency and lack of political will. Still, resettlement farmers operate under a great deal of uncertainty.

The new policy proposes to transfer ownership of communal lands to village communities and to maintain traditional tenure at the individual level. The power to distribute land will rest with the traditional authorities. Presently, the Rural District Councils (RDC), and traditional authorities share this responsibility. The new policy also intends to establish a hierarchy of land boards to act as watchdogs over land transfers, conflicts, and arbitration. The ZFU, CFU, and ICFU all support the granting for freehold

titles to communal area and resettlement area farmers. In their view, it is the only way to foster more responsible land husbandry among smallholder farmers.

Settlement Support Services. The new settlement support services policy proposes to provide resettlement beneficiaries with (1) basic infrastructure, (2) marketing, credit, and extension services, (3) training, (4) rural service centers¹⁵⁷, and (5) mechanical tillage. Government also proposes to survey, subdivide, and demarcate all resettlement areas to facilitate the granting of land titles. Government intends to create planning committees at the local level tasked with planning the support services for the resettlement areas and recruiting private sector actors to supply some of these services. Government technicians, RDC's, and representatives of farmer organizations, community groups and NGOs will make-up these committees.

¹⁵⁷ A rural service center will be created for every 500 farm families. It will include clinics, schools and industrial, commercial and residential stands, and offices for government departments. These centers are intended to facilitate the creation of off-farm employment opportunities and the provision of services to farmers.

APPENDIX B

ZFU STAFF

The ZFU has full-time staff at its national headquarters in Harare, in each of the provincial capitals, and in more than half of the districts. The national headquarters staff consists of a Senior Director, Director and seven department heads. The ZFU has five programmatic departments: marketing, economics and research, education and training, field and projects, and information. The registry department maintains the membership database. Not counting administrative staff, the ZFU had over 77 paid staff of whom 22 worked out of its national headquarters in 1997. At each level, staff is responsible for the implementation of ZFU programs and the day-to-day management of the Union with oversight from the management committee, a subcommittee of each council.

Table B.1 ZFU staff composition and distribution (1997)

Department	Head Office	Provincial Office	District Office
Marketing	1	8	8
Economics & Research	6	3 regional*	0
Education and Training	5	0	100*
Information	2	0	0
Field and Projects	4	8	28***
Registry	2	0	0

* Region 1 covers Masvingo and Manicaland. Region 2 covers Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. Region 3 covers Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, and Mashonaland East.

** District trainers are volunteers paid an allowance and not considered salaried staff.

*** Donors like FES, SMV (Dutch), and HIVOS, support specific district offices. In other areas, member subscriptions alone support the offices.

Since 1991, the ZFU has built up its professional staff largely through donor funding. Most of the senior officers at the national office hold a university degree. Provincial and district officers possess at least a degree from an agriculture school or a

high school diploma.

Table B.2 Staff changes 1995-1997

	Size of paid staff 1995*	Size of paid staff 1997
Economics and Research	5	9
Marketing	9	17
Field and Projects	24	35
Education and Training	2	5
Total	40	66

* Does not include administrative, secretarial, and other supporting staff. Departments not counted include the registry, administration, and information departments.

The premier department within the ZFU is the Economics and Research department, the only department whose staff all possess a university degree. Whereas the remaining departments have the responsibility of sourcing, developing and implementing programs for members, the Economics department has a broader mandate. It carries out policy research and participates in policy formulation. To do so, it routinely collects farm-level data or contracts researchers at the University of Zimbabwe to do so. It also provides technical assistance in the form of briefing papers and seminars to national leaders representing the ZFU in negotiations/debate with other farmers' unions, governmental ministries, and agro-industry. The Economics department provides technical and organizational support to the commodity committees.

APPENDIX C

SETTLER SELECTION

The sections below describe the settler selection process for Principe Irrigation Scheme and Bend Farm.

Principe Irrigation Scheme

Principe irrigation scheme located adjacent to the Sanye Resettlement area accommodates 60 smallholder families. It lies within NR II. Each family has access to one hectare of irrigated land, 0.5 hectares for dryland cropping, and communal grazing land. DANIDA (Danish Aid) funded scheme construction. Authorities opened the scheme for resettlement in September 1993.

The selection of farmers for Principe irrigation scheme was carried out previous to the amalgamation of Chaminuka District Council and the Shamva Rural Council in 1993. Chaminuka District Council acted as the local government for the communal and resettlement areas. The task of selecting settlers for Principe fell to the district council. In 1992, the district council began the process of selecting settlers for Principe. First, the district council decided that they would only choose settlers from the resettlement list kept at the council office. They did not want to consider farmers from outside of the district. To choose from among the 3,000 farmers on the resettlement list, the district council devised its own selection criteria and process. Its primary objective was to ensure the representation of each ward on the list later submitted to a technical committee for final selection. WADCO councillors who sit on the RDC had the responsibility for identifying qualified farmers.

A technical committee comprising the provincial resettlement officer, the district resettlement officer, the district officer for DERUDE (Department of Rural Development), the Agritex area supervisor, and a representative of the district council culled through the candidates. Administrative rules defined within the Ministry of Local Government determined the make-up of the technical committee. The committee rated each applicant based on a scoring system developed by the Ministry of Agriculture that considers two criteria: need for land and farming capacity. Being a ZFU member did not add to an applicant's score. The RDC offered those with the highest scores plots on the scheme¹⁵⁸.

Following on their assertion that only qualified farmers be selected for resettlement, ZFU's national leaders have lobbied the Ministry of Local Government to require the technical committees to use a list of prospective settlers kept at the ZFU's provincial office. Mr. Mavunga, the resettlement officer who sat on the technical committee for the Principe scheme, rejected the idea of using a list kept by the ZFU arguing that it was not fair to just select ZFU members. Moreover, he saw no need for ZFU to sit on the selection committee feeling it would only introduce bias. Mr. Muchena, the Agritex supervisor who also sat on the committee agreed that it would be inappropriate to include the ZFU on the selection committee¹⁵⁹.

Reviewing the list of farmers selected for the Principe Irrigation Scheme, few are members of the ZFU. According to Mr. Mavunga, the deciding factor was who among the prospective settlers wanted to farm under the stringent conditions imposed on

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Mr. A Mavunga, Mupfurudzi resettlement officer, Zvimonanga office, March 2, 1997.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Mr. Muchena, Bushu area Agritex supervisor, March 2, 1997.

irrigation schemes. Many of the older and more experienced farmers on the list refused to settle on the irrigation scheme because of the small plot size and restrictive production environment. In the end, most of the settlers were either young single men or young couples with only one child, and a minority owned cattle and a plough¹⁶⁰.

Bend Farm

Bend Farm is located in the southern half of Shamva District within the large-scale commercial farming area. Covering approximately 1,233 ha of land in NR II, Agritex determined that Bend Farm could accommodate 22 settler families. In 1994, the Shamva RDC began the initial screening of the resettlement list. The RDC sought to get equal representation from each ward in the district, and created a second list comprising names submitted by each WADCO councilor. A technical committee rated each of the applicants using a score sheet similar to the one used in earlier selection exercises. The ZFU was excluded from the technical committee, and according the RDC CEO, no one from the ZFU complained of their exclusion¹⁶¹. A contingent headed by Chief Bushu contested the final selection of settlers accusing the RDC of favoritism.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Mr. R. Zhoya, Principe Irrigation Scheme Agritex Officer, Principe office, November 11, 1995.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Mr. Zendera, CEO Chaminuka Rural District Council, Chakonda office, March 3, 1997.

Score Sheet for Rating Settlers in Shamva District

The scoring sheet below was used during both settler selection exercises. The maximum score is 50. The applicant must score at least 25 to be eligible for resettlement.

Need for Land

1. Number of dependents. Get 1 point for each child below the age of 18. (max = 5 pts.)
2. How many hectares do you currently crop? (max = 5)
0-1 ha = 5 pts.
1-2 ha = 4 pts.
2-3 ha = 3 pts.
4-5 ha = 2 pts.
> 5 ha = 0 pts.

Suitability

1. Age (max = 10)
18 = 3 pts
(add one point per year older than 18)
25-35 = 10 pts
(drop 1 point per year older than 35)
45 = 3 pts.
Over 55 ineligible
2. Skills (consider both spouses if married) (max = 10 pts)
(a) Trained master farmer both spouses = 10 pts
(b) Proven agriculture ability based on past marketing and production record = 8 pts
(c) Any other skills relevant to farming like business skills, mechanical skills, handling of specialized crops
3. Education (consider both spouses if married) (max = 10 pts)
(a) both spouses completed their diplomas = 2 pts
(b) both spouses completed primary school = 1 pt
4. Health (max = 10 pts)
(a) negative points if disabled or chronically sick

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