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University

 

 

This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM:

ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION
IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

presented by
Kimberly L. Ludwig

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D Political Science

' degree in

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Major professor

MAL

MSU i: an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Iluliluliun 0-12771

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PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM:
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION
IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC
By

Kimberly Lynn Ludwig

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2001

ABSTRACT
PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM:
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION
IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC
By

Kimberly Lynn Ludwig

This dissertation takes as its starting point the observation that economic interest
groups, as agents of civil society, played important roles in the wave of democratic
transitions that swept the African continent in the early 1990's. What have been the
consequences of political transition, and in addition economic reform, for the groups that
took part in these movements to pluralist democracy? Focusing on the case of Zambia, a
cross-temporal and cross-case approach is used to ascertain the effects of institutional
change on three types of economic interest groups: labor unions, business associations,
and farmers’ groups. Analyzing the institutional change resulting from the transition from
a one-party, quasi-corporatist state to a multi-party, pluralist state, the dissertation
evaluates the prospects for the development of pluralism in Zambia. It concludes that, in
general, several developments predicted by pluralist theory have indeed occurred: there
has been an increase in the number of new groups, new types of institutional access to
government decision makers have appeared, and there is increased direct lobbying of
government over policy issues. However, the continuation of neopatrimonial rule and a

nostalgia for corporatist-type arrangements which limit demands upon government, bode

poorly for further pluralist development.

The body of the dissertation examines groups from a comparative perspective, and
analyzes the variation found in the way that the dual reform process has impacted different
groups. By analyzing these groups’ membership incentives, organizational resources, and
influence strategies, the study finds that an important variable explaining the variation
between groups along these dimensions is consideration of the groups’ prior institutional
relationship to the state. This relationship impacts why individuals joined and continue to
belong to these groups; it affects factors relating to organizational sustainability, and it
affects the strategies and successes (or lack thereof) that groups have in attempting to
influence policy in the new regime. These findings indicate an important institutional path-
dependency in the interest group system between the previous regime and the current one,

which helps to explain continuing constraints to pluralist development.

 

 

Copyright by
KIMBERLY LYNN LUDWIG
2001

 

 

 

For my parents.
Claudia Lynn Jantz
and
James Myron Ludwig

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many heartfelt thanks are in order to the numerous people who contributed to the
successful completion of this dissertation. I would especially like to thank my committee
chair, Professor Michael Bratton, for his steady support and insightful comments
throughout the life of the project, from proposal to fieldwork to the final product. I am
also grateful to Professor Nicolas van de Walle for his avid interest in and astute critiques
of the study. Both Professor Bratton’s and van de Walle’s long experience with studying
political change in Africa were invaluable as I sought to understand the complex processes
unfolding in Zambia during my field work and writing. I would also like to thank my
“non—Africanist” advisor, Professor Michael Mintrom, for sharing his insights on theories
of interest group activity and organization, and directing me to several innovative studies
which informed some of the methodologies used in this project; Professor Robert Lowry
also deserves thanks in this regard. Special recognition is also due to Professor Brian
Silver, for joining the committee when need arose, and for arranging support for the final
stages. In addition, much appreciation is due to the faculty, staff, and my graduate student
colleagues at Michigan State University’s Political Science Department, for the
considerable support and encouragement afforded me during my doctoral studies and the
completion of my dissertation.

The research for this dissertation was funded by the United States Agency for
International Development under its Zambia Democratic Governance Project. I would
like to thank the USAID/Zambia mission for both its support and hospitality while I was in

Zambia; most especially, many thanks are due to Democracy and Governance Officers Jim

vi

 

 

Polhemus and Miles Toder for their assistance and generous exchange of information and
opinions. I am also most grateful to several others at the mission who helped my work to
proceed as smoothly as it possibly could, most especially Cynthia Bryant, Toni Enraca,
Henry Kalwani, Mambepa Kalwani, and Jeffrey Miyanda.

Though the people who assisted and befriended me during my research stay in
Zambia number far too many to include everyone here, there are several who deserve
special mention. I am enormously grateful to Show George Makaha and Chris
Simuyemba, whose assistance with fieldwork, translation and data processing, and
especially with the extensive travel and long hours of the membership survey, was
invaluable. I would also like to express my gratitude for the assistance provided by the
Institute for African Studies (renamed the Institute for Social and Economic Research);
here, special thanks are due to Dr. Ilsa Mwanza and Dr. Oliver Saasa. Also, I would
particularly like to thank Jim and Michelle Polhemus, whose hospitality and many
kindnesses were invaluable to my introduction to Zambia. I am also infinitely grateful to
Rose and Gladstone Ngwira, and their wonderful, generous family, who always succeeded
in making me feel right at home during my stays in the Copperbelt, and who made my time
there so rewarding. I also owe a special note of gratitude to Toni and Anthony Enraca,
for making me feel right at home during my stays in Lusaka. And many thanks to the
other wonderful Zambians, Americans and others who shared their homes, families, friends
and hearts with me during my stay in Zambia.

I would also like to acknowledge, with much appreciation, several of organizations
I worked with most frequently during the course of my research: the Zambia Congress of

Trade Unions, the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia; the Zambian Association of Chambers

 

of Commerce and Industry, the Zambia Association of Manufacturers, the Zambia
National F anners’ Union; the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers;
the Zambia Cooperative Federation, and the Provincial Business Associations Project. I
am most grateful to the staff and members of all the organizations I came into contact
with, many of whom can be found in the list of interviews in the appendix, for contributing
so much to this study. For participating patiently in lengthy interviews, and contributing
their knowledge, expertise and opinions to this project, I would especially like to express
my gratitude to Austin Muneko, Charles Muchimba, Gideon Phiri, Moses Simemba, Theo
Bull, Mark O’Donnell, George Grey, Kambidima Wotela, Charles Zandala, Jones
Haachinda, Beverly Nakaponda-Sakala, and special thanks to “Uncle” Max Sichula.
Many thanks also to the many other staff and members of these organizations, too
numerous to mention, whose hospitality, time and generosity made this dissertation
possible. I’d like to also express my gratitude to the National Archives and the Zambia
Consolidated Cooper Mines’ Archives for sharing their impressive collections. It should
be pointed out that while the above-mentioned persons and institutions generously shared
their knowledge and time, any errors in the data or analysis presented are wholly mine.
Finally, I would like to thank the people back here at home whose friendship and
support were so essential to the final stages of this project: thanks to John Metzler for his
generosity of spirit, endless kindness and wise counsel; thanks to my friends and family,
especially to my sister Heidi Hopkins and mother Claudia Jantz, for continuous
expressions of love, motivation and support; thanks to Barbara Cooper-Haas for always
being there, and to Ron Mason for daily walks and help with the bibliography; and very,

very special thanks to Patrick Lydon, for lighting the way.

viii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. xi
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... xi‘
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... xv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... ‘
CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ t
2.1 Theoretical Issues .................................................................................................. 1
2.1.1 Institutional Frameworks: Pluralist and Corporatist Models .................... 1(
2.1.2 State-society Relationships in Post-Independence Africa ......................... 1‘.
2.1.3 Theories of the African State .................................................................... 1‘.
2.1.4 The Representation of Interests in Africa ................................................. 22
2.1.5 Economic Considerations: Effects of Development and Reform ............. 21
2.1.6 Dual reform and Interest Representation in Africa ................................... 3(
2.2 Theoretical Hypotheses ........................................................................................ 3 f
2.2.1 Establishing the Counterfactual ................................................................ 32
2.3 The State and Interest Representation in Zambia ................................................. 3‘
2.3.1 Development of the One Party State ........................................................ 31
2.3.2 State-Society Relations: Emerging Corporatism. ..................................... 3t
2.3.3 Zambia in Crisis: the Adoption of Dual Reform. ..................................... t
2.4 Research Design and Methods .............................................................................. 4i
2.4.1 Main Research Questions .......................................................................... 4
2.4.2 Main Propositions / Working Hypotheses ................................................ 4‘
2.4.3 Expected Value-Added ............................................................................. 42
2.5 Units of Analysis and Data Collection ................................................................. 42
2.5.1 Logic linking the data to the propositions ................................................. 4:
2.6 Synopses of Chapters ........................................................................................... 44
CHAPTER THREE:
THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA’S SECOND REPUBLIC ..................................... 4!
3.1 Examining “Economic Society” in Zambia .......................................................... 4‘.
3.1.1 Economic Activity .................................................................................... 5i
3.1.2 Policy Relevance of Economic Sectors ..................................................... 5i
3.1.3 Political Strength of Economic Sectors ..................................................... 62
3.1.4 Summary: The Shape of Economic Society .............................................. 6‘
3.2 Economic Interests, Organization, and Politics in Zambia’s 2nd Republic ............ 6‘
3.2.1. The Origins of Economic Organizing in Zambia ...................................... 6:

3.2.2: The Colonial and Independence Period: Pluralism and Racial Divides 6'

ix

3.2.3 Summary: Origins of Organizing ..............................................................
3.3 The State and the Organization of Interests: Institutional Analysis ......................
3.3.1 The Move to Corporatism Under the One-Party State ..............................
3.4 Summary: The Effects of Corporatism on Economic Organizations in Zambia ..
3.5 An Institutional Framework for Interest Representation in the Second Republic.
3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ECOLOGY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS
IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC ..........................................................................................

4. 1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................
4.2 The Political-Economic Context of Interest Group Development ........................
4.3 The Ecology of National Economic Interest Groups in the Third Republic ....... 1
4.3.1 State-Dominated Corporatist Groups ...................................................... l

The Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)
4.3.2 State-Negotiated Corporatist Sector Groups ........................................... 1

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)
4.3.3 Former Quasi-Pluralist Sector Groups .................................................... 1

Zambia Asociation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)
Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZN FU)

4.3.4 New Groups on the Scene ....................................................................... l.
4.4 Coordination and Competition in the Interest Group System. ............................ 1.
4.4.1 Inter-group Coordination ......................................................................... 1.
4.4.2 Inter- and Intra- Group Competition ....................................................... 1
4.5 The Inclusion of Economic Interests ................................................................... 1
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER FIVE:
MOTIVATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP: JOINING AND PARTICIPATING IN GROUP ACTIVITY ....1
5.1 Pluralism at the Micro-level: What Motivates Interest Group Members? ....... . l
5.2 Theories on the Incentives for Group Membership ............................................. l
5.3 The Institutional Context: Membership Incentives in the Second Republic ....... l
5.4 The Institutional Context in the Third Republic and Resulting Membership
Incentives ............................................................................................................. 1
5.5 Analyzing Membership Incentives: The 1997 Membership Survey .................. 1
5.6 Analyzing Membership Incentives ...................................................................... 1
5.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample .................................................................. 1
5.6.2 The Nature of Organizational Incentives ................................................ l
5.7 Analyzing the Factors Important to Membership Incentives .............................. 1
5.7.1 Perceptual and Value Characteristics: the Role of Efficacy .................... 1
5.7.2 Purposive Incentives: Group Activity as a Responsibility ...................... 1
5.7.3 Considering the Most Important Benefits to Group Membership .......... l
5.8 The Decision to Join ........................................................................................... l
5.9 Separating Political from Economic: The Pivotal Role of Politics ..................... 1
5.10 Considering the Trade Unions ............................................................................ l
5.11 Conclusion: Evaluating Membership Incentives in the Third Republic ............. 2

CHAPTER SIX:

“ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES ~ INTEREST GROUP AUTONOMY AND CAPACITY” ........ 20E
6.] Pluralism at the Intermediate Level: The Relevance of Resources .................... 205
6.2 Theoretical Issues: Autonomy and Capacity from an African Perspective ......... 211
6.3 The Paradox of Autonomy and Capacity ............................................................ 215
6.4 Variations in Organizational Capacity ............................................................... 212
6.4.1 Financial Resources: Revenues and Expenditures ................................. 22]
6.4.2 Technical and Administrative Capacity ................................................ 236
6.5 Interest Group Autonomy .................................................................................. 247
6.5.1 External Control: Government, Donors, and Others ............................. 245
6.6 Summary ............................................................................................................ 256
6.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 25E
CHAPTER SEVEN:
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND PATHWAYS TO INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC ...... 26(
7.1 Pluralism at the Macro-Level: Gaining Access to Government ....................... 26(
7.2 Pathways to Influence in the Second Republic .................................................. 261
7.3 Possible Channels for Influencing Economic Policy in the Third Republic ....... 26(
7.3.1 The Changing Relationship Between Groups and Government ............. 265
7.3.2 Institutional Access to Government in the Third Republic .................... 274
7.3.3 Strategies for Influence .......................................................................... 275
7.4 Government— Ministries, Parliament, Public Boards and Committees .............. 283
7.4.1 Summary: Pathways to Influence in the Third Republic ....................... 295
7.5 Policy Interests ................................................................................................... 30(
7.6 Policy Influence .................................................................................................. 30(
7.6.1 The Annual Budget: the Effects of Organizational Resources ............... 306
7.6.2 Privatization Policy: the Inflexibility of Economic Reform ................... 311
7.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 3 1 3
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC ............ 31A
8.1 Change and Continuity ....................................................................................... 314
8.2 Effects of Prior Institutional History ................................................................... 315
8.3 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................... 323
APPENDIX 1: List of Economic Interest Groups ............................................................ 32f
APPENDIX 2: Methodology Notes ................................................................................. 32E
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 334

xi

Table 2.1

Table 3.1

Table 3.2

Table 3.3

Table 3.4

Table 3.5

Table 4.1

Table 4.2

Table 4.3

Table 5.1

Table 5.2

Table 5.3

Table 5.4

Table 5.5

Table 5.6

Table 5.7

Table 5.8

Table 5.9

Table 5.10

Table 5.1 1

LIST OF TABLES

Data and Analysis ..................................................................................... 4:
Zambia: The Development of Economic Interests, 1965-1991 ................ 51
GDP by Type Of Economic Activity, 1980-1991 ..................................... 5'
Exports of Principle Commodities ........................................................... 6i
Economic Sectors and their Interest Groups, 1965-1991 ......................... 82
Theoretical Framework for Development Of Economic Interests ............. 81
Main Points of MMD Campaign Manifesto ............................................. 9t
Main Economic Reforms .......................................................................... 9'
Representation on Boards and Committees ............................................ 114
The 1997 Membership Survey Sample ................................................... 16S
Demographic Characteristics Of the Sample ........................................... 161
Political Characteristics of the Sample ................................................... 17!
Benefits Provided by Group .................................................................... 17‘
Group Leaders Perceptions ..................................................................... 17‘
Benefits Realized by Members ............................................................... 17'
Most Important Benefits to Continuing Membership ............................. 18I
Top Five Most Important Benefits .......................................................... 18'
Effect of Contributions on Group’s Success or Failure .......................... 18.
Effect of Income Level on Efficacy ....................................................... 18)
Responsibility as Motivational Factor ..................................................... 18

xii

Table 5.12

Table 5.13

Table 5.14

Table 5.15

Table 5.16

Table 5.17

Table 5.18

Table 5.19

Table 5.20

Table 6.1

Table 6.2

Table 6.3

Table 6.4

Table 6.5

Table 6.6

Table 7.1

Table 7.2

Table 7.3

Table 7.4

Table 7.5

Other Benefits .........................................................................................
Reasons for Joining .................................................................................
Most Important Reason for Joining ........................................................
Most Important Benefit at Present ..........................................................
Reaction if Group Stopped Services .......................................................
Reaction if Group Stopped Lobbying .....................................................
Classification of Members ......................................................................
Hypothetical Case ~ Union Members .....................................................
Evaluating Member Incentives ...............................................................
Expenditure Items ...................................................................................
1996 Revenues ........................................................................................
Analysis of Membership Dues and Revenues ........................................
Organizational Staffs ..............................................................................
Initial and Current Funding Sources .......................................................
Initial and Current Funding Sources, by Sector ......................................
Consequences of Transition ....................................................................
Groups, Government Agencies, and Policy Issues .................................
Group Political Activity .........................................................................
Analysis of Coverage in Times of Zambia .............................................

Privatization in Zambia ..........................................................................

xiii

Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
Figure 3.4
Figure 3.5
Figure 3.6
Figure 3.7
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.5
Figure 6.1
Figure 6.2
Figure 6.3
Figure 6.4
Figure 7.1

Figure 7.2

 

LIST OF FIGURES

Business Interests after Zambia’s 1973 Election ...................................... 55
Zambia: GDP Data 1980-1990 ................................................................. 58
GDP by Economic Activity, 1980-1991 ................................................... 59
Zambia Employment Data, 1980-1990 ..................................................... 63
Founding Dates of Major Interest Groups ................................................ 66
Typology Of Interest Representation System ............................................ 85
Categorizing the Interest Group System ................................................... 89
Founding Dates of Surveyed Interest Groups .......................................... 132
The Structure of the Interest Group System in Zambia .......................... 135
Interest Groups in Zambia, Primary Units .............................................. 136
Possible Incentives for Interest Group Membership ............................... 153
Membership level of Groups in Sample ................................................. 162
List of Membership Benefits ................................................................... 172
Responses to Open-Ended Question: Other Benefits ............................. 187
Matrix of Incentives ............................................................................... 196
Expectations for Sustainable Levels of Organizational Capacity ........... 218
Membership Levels and Subscriptions .................................................. 220
Evaluating the Potential for Organizational Capacity ............................ 242
Importance of Funding Strategies .......................................................... 254
Structure of Government and Representation ........................................ 262
Structure of Government and Representation ........................................ 267
xiv

 

 

 

Figure 7.3
Figure 7.4
Figure 7.5
Figure 7.6
Figure 7.7
Figure 7.8
Figure 7.9
Figure 7.10
Figure 7.1 1
Figure 7.12

Figure 7.13

Change in Cooperation After the Transition .......................................... 272

Change in Cooperation, by Group .......................................................... 272
Analysis of Frequency of Interaction with Government ......................... 27(
Analysis Of Frequency of Interaction with Government, by Group ........ 27t
Influence Strategies ................................................................................ 28(
Influence Strategies, by Type Of Strategy ............................................... 28(
Frequency of Mention in Times of Zambia ............................................ 29E
Provision of Service in Policy Areas ...................................................... 301
Level of Regulation in Policy Areas ....................................................... 302
Table of Policy Objectives ...................................................................... 305
The 1996 and 1997 Budget Processes .................................................... 30‘.

XV

ABBREVIATIONS

National Apex Groups

NASSF
PFU
ZACCI
ZCF
ZFE
ZCTU
ZNF U

National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmers
Peasant Farmers’ Union

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Zambia Cooperative Federation

Zambia Federation of Employers

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

Zambia National Farmer's Union

Local and Other Affiliated Groups(see Appendix One)

Other Groups and Policies

ASIP
BOZ
CSO
DAC
EAZ
ILO
IRA
ZK
MAF F
MCTI
ML
MOF
MMD
MP
PSRP
ZCCM
ZIMCO
ZPA
ZRA

Agricultural Sector Investment Program
Bank of Zambia

Central Statistical Office

District Agricultural Committee

Economic Association of Zambia
International Labor Office

Industrial Relations Act

Zambian Kwacha (local currency)

Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
Ministary of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Ministry of Finance

Movement for Multiparty Democracy
Members of Parliament

Public Sector Reform Program

Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
Zambia Privatization Industry

Zambia Revenue Authority

 

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“Uupamfiwe, e ulwa ne cibi”

Literally translated, “the anxious person fights with the door.” This Bemba proverb counsels
people to take initiative when facing a problem. “People with problems should take the initiative to
get them solved. Normally (the proverb is) used to advise someone with a big problem to take
some measures towards its solution in order to encourage others to come to his aid.”

Nyambe Sumbwa, “Zambian proverbs,”
Lusaka: Multimedia Publiciations, 1993, pp. 10.

“...it became apparent to us that the struggle for multi-party democracy in our country could not be
won through the currently monopolized and personalized structures... a new movement for plural
democracy was not only required to be formed but was a historical necessity. We drew up an
Operational programme (which included) the creation ofa broad-based steering committee for
multi—party democracy, as a coalition of all forces— workers, intellectuals, students, farmers,
unemployed people, religious organization and the business community— Opposed to the one party
dictatorship in Zambia... The very first act in our campaign required that we link our efforts
against the one party state tyranny with other individuals and institutions that had shown a resolve
to campaign for multi-party democracy in our country. At the very onset we identified the Zambia
Congress of Trade Union (ZC T U) and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga (a prominent businessman) as the
most probable allies.

Derrick Chitala,

Preface to “The Hour has Come!” pp. iv-vi,

(emphasis mine).

“It is essentially imperative in a democracy that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with
their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and
execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes make it desirable that citizens be
allowed and encouraged through the law tojoin together in groups based on similar social and
economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity
touches these likes and interests. Trade unions and other pressure groups exist for this purpose or
need.

Dr. Remy Mushota,
“The Hour has Come!” pp. 30.

Zambia was the first English-Speaking country in Africa to complete a peaceful
democratic transition, and one of the first in a “wave of democracy” that swept much of
the continent in the early 1990's. Zambian participants in the “Movement for Multi-party
Democracy (MMD),”as well as international observers of African affairs, had high hopes
at that heady time for the potential of Zambia’s fledgling democracy. It was a moment of
historical importance, a time to take initiative and Struggle against the closing door of
Zambia’s political and economic malaise. Many Zambians eagerly rose to the challenge.
Leading the charge, providing the organizational resources and financial grease that
permitted a conference of democracy supporters to become a bonafide political party,
were representatives of the business community and the trade union movement. Perhaps
most important, the charge was about more than a transfer of power from one party to
another, the charge was about fundamental institutional change: the transformation of
one-party, state-corporatist rule to a pluralist democracy.

Much has been written about Zambia’s historic transition in 1991, especially about
the role of civil society in the transition and the effects of the transition on political and
electoral institutions. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this growing literature,
indeed to the increasing literature on democratic transition in Africa in general, by
focusing on a less-often addressed topic, the role of economic interest groups in
democratic transition processes. The attempted transition to democratic pluralism,
whether or not successful, marks an important change in the development of state-society
relations across the continent since independence. With independence from colonial rule

in the 1960's, many African states adopted the quasi-pluralist institutions of the colonial

—. ,‘

administration, including multi-party competition and associational pluralism. However,
these arrangements soon gave way to different political ideologies and pressing political
exigencies. The tenets of “African socialism” rationalized the imposition of political
uniformity via single-party rule and highlighted the primacy of the political, paving the way
for the adoption of command economies. Whether populist-socialist or merely politically
pragmatic, the worldviews adopted across Africa after independence were statist in
orientation; the expansion of the state and the centralization of power in the hands of its
elite operated as a dominant political logic.

In tandem with these developments, state-society relations were marked by
attempts at state—corporatism, in which the state sought to incorporate key sectors of the
economy and existing social organizations into the state/ruling party apparatus. The
transition to multi-party democracy across Africa in the 1990's, and Zambia’s transition in
particular, thus marks a potential watershed in the development of state—society relations.
As these new regimes adopt the ideology, or at least the rhetoric, of pluralist democracy
and market economies, what is happening to the former corporatist relationships between
key economic groups and the state? More broadly, what are the prospects for, and the
constraints to, the development of pluralism in state-society relations in Africa?

Key to this inquiry is the issue of “dual reform” in Africa, i.e. cases in which
structural economic adjustment and reform is undertaken simultaneously with political
reform. Economic interest groups such as trade unions and business associations are
similar to other associations in civil society in the role they played during the political
reform processes of the early 1990's. Like human rights groups, women and youth

groups, and church groups, they helped to organize the popular protest against standing

 

authoritarian regimes that precipitated democratic transition processes across the
continent (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). And similar to these other groups, they have
since been affected by the break—down of corporatist state-society relations and the
realization of new rights and freedoms. Economic interest groups differ from other agents
in civil society, however, in the role that they simultaneously play in economic reform; that
is, how both members and organizations affect and are affected by structural adjustment
and economic liberalization. Even as the advent of more pluralistic politics Opens the
arena of activity across the board for civil society organizations, economic interest groups
are differentially affected by their changing role in the economy and vis-a-vis the state.
The development Of pluralism in this arena is thus affected both by changes in political
institutions as well as by structural and institutional changes in the economy arising from
economic reforms.

This dissertation explores theoretical issues concerning the development of
pluralism in Africa’s new democracies through a comparative analysis Of economic interest
groups in one African country, Zambia. Zambia offers an especially relevant case for this
inquiry for several reasons. First, immediately following independence, the pluralist
institutions of the former British colonial administration were maintained up until 1972,
when an Official one-party state was declared and the government began to move to
nationalize key sectors of the economy and incorporate the organizations that represented
them into the ruling party apparatus. This institutional structure was abruptly altered in
1991 with the transition to multi-party rule, when these ties were formally broken and

political and associational pluralism re-adopted. Zambia thus provides a rich case in which

the effects of the transition from state-corporatism to pluralism can be studied. Second,

 

 

the new MMD government in 1991 firmly committed itself to structural adjustment and
economic liberalization policies. Zambia thus provides a clear case of a “dual reform”
process. And finally, as one of the most industrialized countries in Africa, Zambia has
well-differentiated economic interests, including one of the strongest trade union
movements in the region, numerous business associations located throughout the nine
provinces, and a plethora of different varieties of farmer’s organizations.

In examining the adoption of pluralism and the subsequent effects of dual political
and economic reform processes on interest groups in Zambia, this study focuses on three
principal interest group elements: their memberships, their Strategies for organizational
maintenance, and their Strategies for gaining policy influence. Pluralist theory offers broad
hypotheses as to expectations for the former and latter; where memberships are
concerned, we expect that people will flock to join a burgeoning number of associations
according to their like and shared interests, and to pursue common goals through their
participation in such groups; where policy influence is concerned, we expect that groups
will experience a more open, competitive, and plural political space, and a corresponding
increase in influence over government policy. In between the levels of individual members
and interaction with the state lies the issue of organizational resources; an implicit
assumption of a pluralist view of politics is the assumption of sustainable organizations,
necessary if governments are to be effectively lobbied and members are to be drawn
voluntarily to join group activity. Corporatist systems solve this problem by incorporating
groups into government structures and providing them directly (if not always adequately)
with resources, or at least regulated access to steady resources. In order for groups to

draw members and exert influence under the newly pluralist system, we must expect that

 

they will maintain, if not increase, their organizational capacity.
The three principle research questions of this study are thus:

0 What are the key incentives for interest group membership in Zambia’s multi—
party democracy? Are they incentives that promote further pluralist developmen'

0 How have interest groups adapted to the severing of corporatist ties to the state‘.
Are they maintaining and even improving organizational capacity?

0 What are the key strategies for interest groups in seeking influence in the new
system? Do groups perceive a more open and plural political space in which to
lobby? Are they gaining increased influence over economic policy?

In addressing the questions above, this study seeks to make contributions to
several literatures. First, it deepens the literature on democratization and civil society
(which has been criticized as often being too diffuse) by focusing on a specific “partial
regime” within the larger polity, that is, the “pressure regime” (Schmitter 1997:245) and
on a Specific type of civil society organizations-- interest groupS-- and analyzing the
diverse and complex effects of reform on this narrow sector. Second, it contributes to th
literature on state-society relations in Africa by disaggregating the hypothesized effects c
the adoption of pluralism in a former one-party, state-corporatist system, and identifying
the changes as well as the continuities. And finally, it adds to the rich literature on how
dual reform processes are affected by organized economic interests, with a detailed
empirical analysis of how these processes in turn affect the groups involved.

Chapter Two fleshes out the theoretical points highlighted above, focusing on the
issue of post-independence state-society relations in Africa. AS we are concerned with
specifically economic interest groups, the concepts of corporatist versus pluralist

relationships between the state and organized interests is pertinent, and dealt with in dete

The particular brand of corporatism adOpted by Africa’s one-party states during this

 

period is discussed and analyzed with respect to its effects on the development of state-
society relationships, and its relationship to the economic deterioration experienced by
many African states in the 19703 and 19805 iS examined. Widespread economic and
political crises resulting from mismanagement and the deteriorating legitimacy of the state
ushered in a wave of democratic transitions in the 19903, resulting in systemic change
from corporatist to pluralist institutions mediating the relationship between the African
state and organized interests in the broader society. The Specifics Of these developments
in Zambia are reviewed, and hypotheses are formulated concerning the effects of the
adoption of pluralism on Zambia’s interest group system. Finally, the research design and
methods of analysis for the study are discussed, and a synopsis of the remaining chapters

given.

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER Two

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

"How different are the problems of public policy-making in a society where there are no effective
mechanisms for the articulation of political demands, from one in which there is an elaborate set
of structures for the formulation of demands, and the transmission of these demands into the
party and governmental systems. The kinds of interest groups which are present in a society, the
specificity or diffuseness of their demands, their conception of the political arena and of the
"rules of the game," the ethos which they bring with them into the political process--these are the
raw materials of politics-- the unaggregated demands-- which some set of mechanisms must
transform into political personnel and public policy."

Gabriel Almond, 1958: 271

2.1 1 Theoretical Issues

At the time of Zambia’s historic transition, the founders of the Movement for
Multiparty Democracy had clear ideas about the outlines of the pluralist democracy they
desired. Under the heading, “Interest Groups” in his treatise on the constitutional
framework of the new system (see quote, page one), Dr. Mushota painted a traditional
pluralist vision of group politics. What are the basic prerequisites and institutions of such
a system, and how do they differ from the previous state-corporatist system that came

before?

 

 

 

To explore the basic assumptions that underlie understandings of interest
representation and interest group activity, it’s useful to turn to the structural-firnctionalist
literature. Almond and Powell observe that “every political system has some way of
formulating and responding to demands... the simplest form of interest articulation (in
which citizens make requests, demands and pleas for policies) is the individual making a
request to a city council member, tax officer, village head or tribal chieftain” (1996270).
According to pluralist theory, as political societies have grown larger and such face to face
interactions become less possible and less effective, individuals turn to acting collectively
with others who Share their interests, and interest groups are born. In some cases,
however, the state or some other authority steps in to form groups “from the top down.”
Over time, “systematic connections” develop, or are legally created, between these
groups, and between groups and government; these “systematic connections” are directly
or indirectly influenced by the nature of the state. According to Almond and Powell, “the
differences in types of connections allOw us to talk of different ‘interest group systems,”
(1996274), or what Schmitter refers to as “distinctive subsystems within the polity”
(1992:157). Schmitter also makes the important point that the interface between such
“group systems” and government is one of representation: “These groups-- their
solidarities and their conflicts-- make independent contributions to determining political
outcomes... Representation is the key (but not the exclusive) relationship between such
groups and the making of authoritative decisions” (ibid). In light of the ascendency of

“neo-institutionalist” frameworks over Almond and Powell’s “structural-functionalist”

 

 

 

framework, we can consider “interest group systems,” as representational institutions',
that is the informal and formal rules and constraints through which groups represent, and
governments receive, the articulation of specific interests. Scholars note that there are
theoretically and empirically different ways in which such systems develop and operate.
2.1.1 Institutional Frameworks:

Pluralist and Corporatist Models of Interest Representation

Modern interest group theory distinguishes most often between two “ideal types”
of interest group systems: pluralism and corporatism.2 Interest group systems do not
emerge out of the ether; rather, the nature of specific interest representation systems are
intricately linked to the nature of the state, both in the way in which the state structures
relations with and within civil society, and in how it exercises domination and authority
over those relations (Stepan 1978). Thus, pluralist representation systems follow the logic
of liberal democracies (principally the United States), while corporatist systems can be
found in regimes that announce "organic-statist" principles, that is, a body of ideas
stressing the political community, the concession theory of association, and the central
role of the state in achieving the common good" (found principally in Latin America and
the Iberian peninsula). While pluralism is argued by some to be the only type of interest

representation system compatible with democracy (Diamond 1999:23 2), others argue that

 

l"Institutions are the rules ofthe game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that Shape human interaction... Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to
everyday life... they define and limit the set of choices of individuals... they are therefore the framework in
which human interaction takes place..." Douglas North, 1990.

2 To these, Schmitter (1974) would add “monist” and “syndicalism” as two further types of interest
representation. Almond and Powell (1996) distinguish between three types: “pluralist,” “democratic
corporatist,” and “controlled” interest group systems. I here referjust to “pluralism” and “corporatism,”
since they are most pertinent and since most of the other typologies have been developed to pin down
different types of corporatist regimes which are not critical to the Zambian case.

10

 

 

 

certain types of corporatism are better suited to producing the stable “partial regimes” of

interest mediation necessary to democracy (Schmitter 1992). As noted above, the
founders of Zambia’s new democracy envisioned a pluralist interest group system to
replace the variant Of corporatism that had come to dominate state-society relations. How
are the two different? Pertinent to the question of Zambia’s transition, is one necessarily

more democratic than the other?

Pluralism

In general, the pluralist interest group system is one comprised of “multiple,
voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined organizations
operating outside the immediate control of the state” (Schmitter 1974:94-98). Several
assumptions underpin this type of group system and are necessary, if not sufficient, to its
stability. First, such systems assume the institutional environment of liberal democracy,
where well-protected individual and group freedoms permit and encourage associations to
form, and where the spheres Of civil society and private life exist autonomous and
insulated from state control. According to Diamond, the parameters of such an
environment are: first, the absence of reserved domains of power for actors not
accountable to the electorate; second, the horizontal accountability of officeholders to one
another, primarily to constrain executive power; third, extensive provisions for political
and civic pluralism as well as individual and group freedoms, so that “contending interests
and values may be expressed and compete through ongoing processes of articulation and
representation, beyond periodic elections.” A fourth requisite is the existence of the “rule

of law,” through which freedom and pluralism is secured (1999210).

11

 

 

 

 

The theory Of pluralist interest group systems also implicitly makes several socio-
psycho-economic assumptions. First and foremost is the assumption that such groups
have common interests: thus, “there is no group without its interest”(Bentley 1908), and
“every group has its interest” (Cattell 1955215). In addition, traditional “group theory”
assumes that there exists a natural propensity among humankind to form and join
associations.3 Among those early theorists who eschew this initial assumption Of an
innate “tendency” to join, there can instead be found the assumption that it is the evolution
of modern, industrial societies out of “primitive” societies that produces the proliferation
of present—day groups.4 This line of argument assumes that the economic / structural
differentiation in developing societies results in the emergence of new associations which
take on some of the functions that familial and kinship groups had previously undertaken.
However, as Olson points out, this line of reasoning must also either rest on the “tendency
to join” assumption, or assume that small and large groups attract members for the same
reason— to perform a function, further a demand, or meet a need for a group of people
(1965:20)— which ultimately brings about a “collective action problem.” For Olson, the
solution to this problem is that groups exist and flourish where they are able to provide
selective incentives to group members. Olson’s work in this area thus points to a further
assumption underlying pluralist interest group systems— that is, that groups (especially

large groups) in pluralist systems are able to provide some kind of selective incentive to

 

3 See Truman (1951), Bentley (1908). Though this “joining tendency” was perhaps most pronounced
in the United States, it had cross-cultural adherents: for example, the famous Italian philosopher Gaetano
Mosca has argued, “men have an ‘instinct’ for ‘herding together and fighting with other herds...,’” while
Georg Sirnmel, in one of the classics of sociological literature, emphasized a “ubiquitous and inevitable
character of group affiliation in Germany” (Olson, 1971: 17).

4 See Maclver (1932:147), for discussion. See also Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (1955: 9).

12

 

 

group members, in order to overcome the collective action problem.

Recently, democratization theorists have suggested that such pluralist group
systems not only arise from democratic environments, but can in fact assist in the
establishment Of democracy in polities once under authoritarian rule. This line of
reasoning has especially been of interest in sub-Saharan Africa, where in a wide range of
countries (including Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria. Niger, Ghana, Kenya. South Africa,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and even Zaire) “the initial impetus for democratic change
emanated from a vast panoply of autonomous actors in civil society,” among which were
trade unions, producer groups, and professional associations (Diamond, 1999:236, see
especially Bratton and van de Walle 1997).5 Theorists in this vein Often begin with
DeToqueville’s observation that an active associational realm encourages the participation
of citizens and the constraints on the state necessary for democracy to thrive: “according
to de Toqueville, the state Should be overseen and checked by the “independent eye of
society,” made up of a “plurality of interacting, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil
associations” whose functions are to nurture basic rights, to advocate popular claims, and
to educate citizens in the democratic arts of tolerance and accommodation.” (quoted in
Bratton 1994154, emphasis mine). This quote makes an important point: theorists in this
tradition (usually implicitly) Specifically associate the participatory and state-constraining

benefits of civil society with pluralism.

 

5 The topic of civil society in Africa is receiving increasing attention; the following works give the
reader a small sample of the issues in this growing literature: Peter Lewis, “Political Transition and the
Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa”; Naomi Chazan, “Africa’s Development Challenge”; Naomi Chazan,
“Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy,” Michael Bratton and
Nicolas van de Walle, “Toward Governance in Africa”; Michael Bratton, “Civil Society and Political
Transitions in Africa,” and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Associational Life, Civil Society, and Democratization in
Ghana,” E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Civil Society in Africa.”

13

 

 

Not all theorists agree, however, that the active associational realm envisioned by
pluralists encourage democracy. In his classic work on the factors behind “the rise and
decline of nations,” Olson makes a persuasive argument that pluralist interest group
systems in developed economies actually impede economic efficiency and implicitly
threaten democracy. As his argument is important to laying the assumptions of
hypotheses to be discussed in this study, it is worth looking at in closer detail. Olson’s
line of reasoning is as follows: because some of the groups in any interest group system
will necessarily be more influential than others, “the attainment of a symmetrical
organization of all groups with a common interest is not possible. Members of small
groups will have disproportionate organizational power for collective action; thus, their
interests will be more privileged than others’. Furthermore, pluralism’s splintering of the
associational realm into a plethora of special interest groups has the effect of making
political life more divisive. The motivation of organizational leaders to preserve group
effectiveness ensures that few organizations will dissolve, so these societies accumulate
narrow special-interest, collusion blocks over time. Since such organizations have
powerful incentives to seek a larger Share of the national income, the distributional
coalitions they form will “create barriers to entry in the marketplace, reduce an economy’s
dynamism and rate of growth, and increase regulation, bureaucracy, and political
intervention in markets.” (1965:74-75).

Huntington (1968) also has reservations, although of a different nature, about the
impact of strong societal interests on the polity—- political inclusiveness is indeed desirable,
but only if proper institutions exist to constrain participation in the name of order and

stability. Bates’s argument on “urban bias”also reveals a fear of excessive pluralism; in

14

—_.

 

noting the bias toward the representation of urban interests in African polities, he shows
that the prevalence of a strong societal interest group can be deleterious to the state’s
ability to function and properly regulate the economy. These arguments all share
misgivings about the motivations and effects of specialized interests on the polity, and. a
healthy fear of unconstrained societal pressure on the state. However, none of these

critiques goes so far as to suggest the regulation of societal interests by the state.

Corporatism

For scholars concerned about both established democracies and the consolidation
of new democracies, the potential for states to become overwhelmed by societal interests,
or the possibility of “special interests” crowding out the representation Of less influential
interests, both present unacceptable dilemmas for governance. The solution for these
theorists lies in countering the ills of an overly voluntaristic pluralism with a purposive
compartmentalizing of the interest group system, an institutional arrangement known as
“corporatism.” Rakner notes that “in general, corporatists have taken a less benign view
of the democratic credentials of group politics than the pluralists. Corporatism sees
socioeconomic inequalities reflected in, and indeed reinforced by, the politics of organized
interests to an extent not adequately explored in pluralist discussions” (1 992:3 8).

Schmitter, the key proponent of the corporatist thesis for several decades now,
defines corporatism as “a system of interest representation in which groups are organized
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and
fimctionally differentiated organizations, under the direct purview of the state” (1974:94-

98). Goldthorpe makes the interesting point that, “in corporatist practice, interests are

15

 

 

 

clearly treated simply as sociological ‘givens’, and the function of representative
organizations is not merely to express, but actually to formulate interests” (quoted in
McNamara 1996:380). AS a body of theory, corporatism emerged in the 1970's with
Schmitter’s seminal article, “Still the Century of Corporatism?”, in which he contended
that the interest representation systems of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherland, Norway,
Denmark, Austria, Spain, Protugal, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Greece, Mexico, and Yugoslavia,
exhibited the patterns of corporatist, not pluralist, rule. In this article, Schmitter argues
that while corporatist systems function very differently than pluralist ones, they are
capable of achieving many of the most desirable outcomes, e.g. demand moderation,
negotiated solutions, leader accountability, “deideologization,” inclusive participation, and
countervalence of power (1974: 101).

Furthermore, as he argues fervently elsewhere, civil society makes greater
contributions to the consolidation of new democracies in corporatist systems, not pluralist
ones. This is because the monopolistic, nationally focused and hierarchically coordinated
associations of corporatist systems are better able to establish powerful, stable “partial
regimes” of interest mediation, than are the great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and
overlapping organizations found in pluralist systems. Interest groups or confederations in
corporatist systems possess what Schmitter refers to as “strategic capacity” (the ability to
define and sustain a course of action not dependent on the immediate preferences of their
members or upon the policies of outside parties) and “encompassing scope” (i.e. the
breadth of the interest domain represented)(l997:260); for Schmitter, these two factors
are integral to civil society being able to play a role in democratic consolidation.

To accompany the theoretical reasoning is empirical evidence that democracy and

corporatism “go together.” For example, scholars of Japan argue that the interest
representation system practiced there is one of ‘democratic corporatism,’ marked by
structured, long-term relationships in tripartite negotiations over adjustment and
interdependence in both policy formation and enforcement. According to Katzenstein,
there are three features of ‘democratic corporatism’ that are important: an ideology of
social partnership, preferably under the leadership of a powerful social democratic party
designing and monitoring the corporatist arrangements; the voluntary coordination of
conflicting objectives among labor; and continuing efforts by the state and capital to
establish “a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups among labor”
(McNamara 1996:380).

TO answer the question posed above, therefore: neither pluralist nor corporatist
institutional arrangements are necessarily more “democratic,” either can support the
practice of democracy. However, not all types Of pluralism, and corporatism especially,
are conducive to democratic governance. Theoretically and empirically, Schmitter notes
that there are two different sub-types of corporatism: societal corporatisma system of
interest representation which is autonomous and penetrative, and state corporatism, which
is dependent and penetrated by the state. Both types exhibit the characteristics of
corporatism given above, but they arrive at those characteristics differently. We here
outline these differences at length, in order to emphasize a critical point: societal
corporatism arises “from the bottom up” as a consequence of structured negotiations with
the state and with members over time, while state corporatism is imposed “from above,”
often in a Short period of time as the state seeks to establish control over society. This

point, and its development below, are important to understanding the unique deveIOpment

l7

 

 

of interest representation systems in Africa.

In general, societal corporatism is notable for: a limited number of groups due to
interassociational arrangement, Singular peak organizations due to competitve elimination,
compulsory memberships due to de facto contractual agreements, hierarchically ordered
organizational structures due to bureaucratic extension or incorporation, recognition by
the state granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public
officials, representational monopolies which have been “independently conquered,” and
control over leadership and interest articulation which are the product of reciprocal
consensus on procedures / goals. In sharp contrast, state corporatist regimes are marked
by: a limited number of groups due to deliberate government restriction, singular peak
organizations due to state-imposed eradication of multiple associations, compulsory
memberships due to de jure legal codes or other officially conceded authority,
hierarchically ordered organizational structures due to state-decreed centralization and
administrative dependence, recognition by the state granted from above by the state as a
condition for association formation and operation, representational monopolies which
have been dependently conceded, and control over leadership and interest articulation only
as the product of an assymetric imposition by the state (Schmitter 1974:103-4).

Both these types of corporatist arrangements correspond decisively to distinct
forms of political regime.6 Societal corporatism is “found imbedded in political systems

with relatively autonomous, multi-layered territorial units; open, competitive electoral

 

6 Robinson suggests that a more thorough typology of corporatism includes four forms: liberal,
populist, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and neo-traditional (1991 :2). She further makes the point that the
impetus for corporatist intermediation arises not from the nature of the state, but from crises in the
political economy.

18

 

processes and party systems; and ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive
authorities;” and its origins lie in the slow decay of advanced pluralism, where long-term
trends, incremental change, and cultural and institutional continuity permits the evolution
of its complex institutions of bargaining and restraint. On the other hand, state
corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are
tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are non-existent or
plebiscitary; and party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; ” its
origins lie in the rapid, highly visible demise of nascent pluralism, where impending
collapse, and a strong and repressive leadership hastily craft the control-oriented
institutions Of state corporatism (Schmitter 1974: 105-106).
2.1.2 State-society Relationships in Post-Independence Africa

Above, we’ve outlined three possible “ideal” institutional arrangements for interest
group systems. Observing that interest group systems are closely related to the nature of
the state and society in which they are embedded, we note that the most prevalent system
in post-independence Africa has been a variant of “state-corporatism.” In this section,
then, we examine the nature of the post-colonial African state, with an eye toward the
ways in which it channels, restrains, or represses the representation of societal interests.
Noting that many African countries at independence inherited pluralist system, why, and
how, did state-corporatism become the dominant system in much Of post-independence
Africa?
2.1.3 Theories of the African State

While it is difficult to speak in a singular sense of the type of state found in a

continent of 53 countries, it is nonetheless possible to discuss broad trends in the ways in

19

 

which politics is practiced and political institutions develop. This is largely due to the fact
that countries in sub—Saharan Africa share histories of colonization, State boundaries that
are not coterminous with national identities, and similar positions in the world economy.
While scholars may disagree over how best to capture the essence of the African state,
most make the assumption that there exists a generalizable proto-type (see, for example,
Jackson & Rosberg 1982, Sklar 1982, Callaghy 1988, Bayart, 1989, Chazan et. al. 1992,
Bratton & van de Walle 1997. Englebert 2000) . We first paint with broad strokes the
generalized outline of the African state, then focus more closely on the variants of regime-
types found within it.

The hallmark of the post-colonial African state has been an ever—increasing
concentration of political power and centralization of public administration. The impetus
for these developments lies with the attainment of independence from colonial rule; at that
time, most African states inherited centralized authoritarian government structures from
the departing colonial powers, along with a coterie of mobilized and exceedingly vocal
groups who had contributed to the anti-colonial struggle (e.g. workers unions, ex-
combatants, etc.) and expected the provision of social services “on a grand scale”:

In this situation, the choices confronting the political elites were very limited

indeed: they could either use their positions to fortify themselves politically, or

they could maintain existing arrangements and run the risk of alienating their
supporters. Almost without exception the new leaders opted to concentrate power

in their own hands” (Chazan et al 1992246).

The result was that the pluralist constitutions inherited by many African states at
independence were abandoned, and instead political competition was curtailed, dominant

political parties were fortified, administrative structures were expanded, and decision-

making was heavily centralized around the head of state and his cohorts. The various

20

components of the state, public administration, the coercive apparatus, the legal order,
political institutions were further molded by leaders through the 1960’s and 1970's (CC
1982). By the time of the political transitions in the early 1990's, the African state was
identifiable by the following properties: large public administrations marked by “an
overestablished but underbureaucratized civil service”(Aoyade 1987); expansive paras
sectors which bound the state to a host of economic enterprises; an increasingly large 2
influencial police and army corps; judiciaries and legislatures that, though resilient int
carrying out of their functions, lacked autonomy from the executive; and a variety of
control-oriented single-party systems.

In their analysis of regime transitions in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle find
political institutions in Africa can best be characterized by the concept of “neopatrimo

”7 As the “institutional hallmark” of politics in post-colonial Africa,

rule.
"neopatrimonialism” is marked by personalistic rule, coercion, and patron-client
relationships between the ruler and the ruled.8 It is identified by three key features: 1]
presidentialism (the tendency for political power to be concentrated in the hands of a
singular political “big man”-- the President-- an influence which reaches from the “hig

reaches of the Presidential palace to the humblest village assembly” (1997265);

2) systematic clientelism (the reliance of “strongmen” on the awarding of personal fav

 

7 For further discussions of “neopatrimonialism,” see also Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Callaghy
(1984), Sandbrook (1986), Joseph ( I987), Bayart (1993), Bratton and van de Walle (1994).

3 Lewis suggests that “at its essence, patrimonialism effaces the distinction between public and prix
interests and roles. Pervasive corruption, favoritism, and cronyism have undermined the very substanc
and neutrality of public power.” Furthermore, “low levels of state formation have impeded the
articulation of public authority and limited the inclusion of societal groups” (1998:146). The implicati
of the division between “public and private” arenas in Africa (see especially Ekeh’s discussion of the ‘
publics,”) for interest representation is also important.

21

e.g. public sector jobs, licenses, contracts, projects); 3) the use Of state resources for
political legitimation (i.e. public resources become private resources to be mobilized
the political needs of individuals). Overall, “the essence Of neopatrimonialism is the
award by public Officials of personal favors, both within the state and in society. In n
for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward
mark of deference to patrons" (Sandbrook 1993228).

Within pre-transition neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, Bratton and van de W
find that variations in political institutions existed based on the extent of political
competition and the degree of political participation. Measuring highest on both qual
are, of course, the pluralist multiparty systems of Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius,
Senegal, and Zimbabwe (at least, as of 1997). “Competitive” one-party systems, sucl
Zambia and Tanzania, are ranked “medium” on both of these characteristics, while
“plebiscitary” one-party systems are just as participatory but less competitive. Round
out the picture are military and settler oligarchies, both of which are marked by low I:
of participation. All of these regimes, no matter the level of participation or competit
were permeated by the relationships of neopatrimonial rule, and the unique patterns 0
state-society relationships they engender, to which we now turn.

2.1.4 The representation of interests in Africa

What does the theory of the neopatrimonial state and the empirical existence (
various political regime-types imply for interest group systems in African polities? A
noted above, at independence, most countries in Africa adopted the pluralist constitut
of their colonial predecessor, meaning that they inherited pluralist interest group syste

along with other democratic institutions such as parliaments and multi-party systems.

22

era of nationalism preceding independence had witnessed a broad popular mobilization
against colonial domination; consequently, in many of the newly-minted countries at
independence, a healthy associational flora emerged made up of trade unions, village
societies, youth groups, professional associations and syncretist churches (Lewis
19982147). However, due in part to ideological arguments by African leaders and
philosophers that liberal democracy was alien to African culture,9 and in part to the real
politik of post-independence pressures on the state, many African leaders soon abandoned
the pluralist form of government in favor of the one-party state.10 With the abolition of
multi-partyism went the demise of pluralist interest representation. In its place, leaders
chose increasingly centralized, authoritarian political forms which preempted autonomous
associations and excluded them from the public realm. These constraints on the
representation of societal interests, combined with the preponderance of authoritarian
rather than democratic political institutions, resulted in the emergence of interest
representation systems cast in the mold of “state corporatism.”

Shaw and N’yangoro (1989) find that state-centrism is in fact the defining
characteristic of an African corporatism. They argue that because control over the state
and its networks is highly valued, and because the costs of political exclusion are high in

the contexts of economic contraction and political departicipation common to Africa, the

 

9 One ofthe most notable proponents of this theory was President Julius Nyrere of Tanzania, who
argued that a multiparty system was both unnecessary and ethnically divisive. Political decision-making
in traditional society encouraged consensus, not competition; hence one—party democracy was preferable to
multi-partyism, because it could build on tradition by emphasizing unity, equality, and consensus
(Sandbrook 1991 :92; see also Nursey-Bray 1983).

'0 While one-party States were not the only regime-type to emerge, they were by far the most numerous.

We focus in this section solely on this type for brevity’s sake, as well as the fact that it is most pertinent to
a study of Zambia.

23

state-centrism of Africa’s political economy is a classic reference point for the corporatist
tendency to mold political and social behavior in society (198925). This well illustrates
Williamson’s conceptualization of corporatism, where “the State’s function is to establish
and maintain a particular economic and social order... In seeking to sustain (that) order,
the state’s performance of this function is not to be subject to effective challenge from
popular or particularistic demands. In this respect, therefore, the corporatist state is a
dominant state” (198528).

However, various factors of African political economy contribute to the argument
that Schmitter’s original conception of “state corporatism” does not perfectly describe an
African corporatism. In an earlier essay, Shaw sought to refine the concept of corporatism
in a comparative sense, with reference to Latin America rather than Europe. Finding first
that "the corporatist imperative is expressed in Africa in a variety of one-party states
which span the ideological Spectrum but share a concern for control and order"
(1982:255); he then suggested that the Latin American corporatist experience is especially
relevant to Africa in that the bureaucratic authoritarian and populist variants of the state-
corporatist model (developed by Collier, 1979)|| are applicable to African representation
systems— with the distinction that there has been a "greater incidence and success of
populist regimes within the corporatist tradition" in Africa. Taking another tack, other
theorists find that the “lack of fit” between traditional variants of pluralism / corporatism

and the African experience is best solved by introducing new variants into the lexicon.

 

” For discussion of the development of corporatist theory in Latin America, see Alfred Stepan (1978).
In this work, Stepan distinguishes between “exclusionary” and “inclusionary” varieties of corporatism,
which Shaw finds also applicable to the African experience. See also, Guillermo O’Donnell,
‘Corporatism and the Question of the State,” in Malloy (l 977).

24

Thus, Robinson makes the case that the military regime of Niger fits a model she defines
as “neotraditional corporatism,” a “mode of governance associated with conditions found
in many preindustrial, aid-dependent states” (1991 :4). Importantly, “neotraditional
corporatism” is associated with the Specific pattern of “neotraditional authority” that
defines the Nigerian state.

Other scholars interested in African interest representation systems dispel with the
traditional typology of interest representation altogether, arguing that neither pluralism
nor corporatism adequately captures the nuances of state-society relationships (Bratton
1994). Though both these models have previously guided research on Specific
associations in Africa (see Ronen 1986, Wiseman 1990, and Bratton 1989 for pluralist
interpretations of civil society, and Shaw 1982, Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989, Bianchi 1989
for corporatist accounts of state-society relations) the argument is that the reality of most
African settings denies both these logics. In this vein, Bratton argues that the model
doesn’t work on either the societal or state level. The pluralist vision of multiple,
voluntary, competitive, autonomous organizations generally doesn’t account for blocs
created by ethnic identities which are not conducive to the "cross-cutting ties" that
pluralism assumes, while the pluralist image of a liberal state does not fit the
neopatrimonial African state (1994; see also Bates 1990). At the same time, while
corporatism's image of compulsory, non-competitive, peak organizations closely allied
with the state seems a more accurate description Of state-society relations in Africa, it also
fails to capture important aspects of these relations (ibid). The gist of Bratton’s argument
is this: although state elites have indeed exhibited corporatist ambitions in their desire to

maintain control over resource allocations, their efforts have been frustrated by the state's

25

 

frailty and lack of organizational reach, and by the failure to establish a bureaucratic core
which bargains publicly with organized groups over public policy. Hence, the broad-based
governing coalitions between organized state and social blocs that mark corporatist rule
are absent in the African context:

"Leaders of postcolonial African countries may have pursued a corporatist strategy

to the extent that they promoted an organic ideology Of national unity and

attempted to direct political mobilization along controlled channels. But African
leaders have rarely used bureaucratic formulas to construct authoritative
institutions or granted subsidiary spheres of influence to occupational interest

groups within civil society" (Bratton and van de Walle 1994:45 8).

These numerous attempts to pose a “grand theory” of interest representation all
makeuseful contributions to our problematique: how the nature of the state and the
previous institutions of interest representation affect the prospects for the development Of
pluralism in Africa’s new democracies. These accounts suggest that the nature of the
neopatrimonial state in Africa results in the need for an often weak state to attempt
various methods of constraining the organized representation of societal and economic
interests. This requires a delicate balancing act, with the state simultaneously repressing
the unfettered cacophony of popular voices allowed by pluralist regimes while
experimenting with differing modes and levels of participation where it is necessary for
maintaining regime legitimacy. The resulting variations in strategies and tactics used by
African leaders to maintain control are best captured by Bianchi’s suggestion that many
interest representation systems are best described by a “heterogeneous” theory of interest
group systems.

Bianchi suggests that corporatism and pluralism are not necessarily antagonistic

when treating over-time the “persistently heterogeneous nature of many systems of

26

 

interest representation” (1986:512). He argues that, especially in the context of unstable
regimes and volatile economic conditions, “many authoritarian modemizers in the Middle
East and Asia have tried to use corporatism as a supplement to pluralism rather than as a
replacement for it” (1986:509). Shaw and N’yangoro make the point that this “synthetic
approach” is especially relevant to Africa. Even more appropriate to the case of interest
representation in Zambia, as this study will show, are Bianchi’s studies on corporatism in
Egypt and Turkey, where he finds examples of a “persistently heterogeneous system of
interest representation in which both pluralist and corporatist structures have played
enduring roles, but in which neither mode Of representation has attained anything
approaching universal or permanent hegemony” (1989:20). In addition, he argues that
within interest sectors,
“corporatization has occurred at different times, to different degrees, and for
different reasons. The periodic mixing and re-mixing of pluralist and corporatist
elements has resulted in three types of sectoral organization, each of which is the
product of a distinctive historical pattern of associational evolution”. Important
variations in group activity and influence are observable not only between these
three categories, but within them as well” (ibidz2l).
Bianchi’s most important theoretical contributions are his hypotheses about how
and why authoritarian state leaders wield pluralist and corporatist policies vis a vis society,
according to their needs to control and / or coopt different social and economic sectors.

Though corporatist policies are often thought to be the first choice for state leaders

interested in organizing / coordinating / coopting troublesome societal sectors, they can

 

 

‘2 These three types are: “corporatist sectors,” in which corporatism always has been the predominant
and often the exclusive mode of representation; “corporatized sectors,” in which originally spontaneous
and voluntary social movements came under increasing regulation to the point that they were effectively
corporatized, and “hybrid corporatist-pluralist sectors” in which both pluralist and corporatist structures
continue to coexist and compete for predominance.

27

 

 

 

too often provoke the very instability they seek to avoid. For instance, on the one hand
corporatism can become “too co-Optive and inclusionary, resulting in a partial surrendc
of policy-making to veto groups whose political support is necessary but costly;” while
the other hand, the aggrieved groups who are intentionally excluded from the corporati
arena may find this a catalyst to unite in opposition to the regime (24). The shrewd
authoritarian leader, however, recognizes that not all sectors need be brought under
corporatist ties to the state, for pluralist policies too can “operate not as catalysts for
disruptive participation and demand-making, but aS valuable instruments of social
control.” They can “help to support stable authoritarianism by maintaining facades of
voluntarism and respect for freedom of association, and serving as a powerful tactic of
disorganization and fragmentation by... promoting the proliferation of weak, financiall}
dependent and squabbling leaders who can be manipulated and discarded by govemme
(ibid). The resounding point is clear: corporatism is not always the Optimal policy cho:
rather the specific relationships between the African state and economic interest group:
are variably affected by the nature of the state and its need to control/coopt important

areas of the economy. It is to this issue we now turn.

2.1.5 Economic considerations: The effect of economic development,

decline and reform on state-society relations

An important point emerging from the above discussions is the dynamic nature
the development of state-society relations with respect to interest representation in Afri
Acknowledging the predominant logic of control in the way the post-independent Afrii

state attempts to structure its links to society, we are still left to specify the factors Whit

28

 

determine why and how different kinds of relationships develop between different

economic sectors and the state. Here we are best advised by the rich literature on African
political economy.

AS noted above, within a few Short years of independence, most African countries
had adopted authoritarian political systems, Of either a one-party state or military variety.
The move towards authoritarianism was justified by the argument that a strong,
centralized state was necessary for nation building and economic development (Rakner
1998, Diamond 1988, Healey and Robinson 1992). Concomitant with this political
centralization was a growing trend toward state-directed and controlled economies.
Rather than promoting economic development, however, many scholars concur that
authoritarianism had adverse consequences for African economies (Ake 1991, Bates 1981,
Callaghy 1990, Herbst 1990, Sandbrook 1985, and van de Walle 1994). In attempting to
drive economic growth by nationalizing and maintaining control over key sectors of
economy, African states attempted too much relative to their capacity; and by the 19803,
failing state enterprises and inefficient economic policies had produced widespread
economic crises. Scholars and other observers began to argue that the nature of the
African state was at fault in these crises, as economic stagnation and decline were the
inevitable result of the rent-seeking practices, patronage and corruption endemic to
neopatrimonial rule. Worse yet, these practices solidified identifiable sectors of support
for the regime among the population; and these groups proved all too capable of
organizing to block any economic reforms which might do away with their privileges.

Bates’ thesis on agricultural policy and “urban bias” in Africa is especially relevant

here. Bates (1981) argued that in many authoritarian states in Africa, governing elites

29

 

 

 

 

 

maintain power by catering to a coalition of urban interests who trade their political

support for economic rents and privileges provided by the state. In protecting and
responding to the demands of this mainly urban-based coalition of labor, business and
bureaucrats, however, rural agricultural interests in much of Africa take the hit via
artificially low producer prices for agricultural products. Though the outcome is
economically irrational (agricultural production and the economy at large suffers), it is
politically rational, in that authoritarian regimes secure the support necessary to maintain
power. Furthermore, Bates argues that the reason why urban interests are favored over
rural ones is in part due to the logic of collective action: the costs of organizing scattered
farmers to influence government policy is far higher than the costs of organizing urban
workers and civil servants, whose small numbers and close proximity to one another
facilitate group efforts to influence economic policy.

The implication is that interest group influence is “locked in” by the neopatrimonial
characteristics of the African state. Since urban interests are easier to organize, they enjoy
undue influence over government policy. Once this constituency becomes locked in to the
patronage network Of the regime, their dominant influence over economic policy, vis a vis
rural interests, proves difficult to shake. The implication of this reasoning is that under
state-centrist one-party rule, especially in cases where the state controls the industrial
sectors of the economy, we expect business, labor and bureaucratic organizations to
dominate over agricultural interests, and we expect the state to seek to control its
relationship to these societal actors through corporatist-like insititutions.

2.1.6 Dual reform and interest representation in Africa

The dual reform process of political liberalization and pluralist development,

30

 

 

 

coupled with profound economic adjustment and liberalization reforms, thus has important
implications for the development of state-society relations in Africa, especially for the case
of economic interest groups. Even while the arenas in which these interests operate are
becoming more open and amenable to pressure, the political position and resources that
individual sectors control are in flux. How will these combined processes of political and

economic reform affect the prospects for pluralist development in Africa?

2.2 Theoretical Hypotheses

Combining theories of pluralism, African state-corporatism, neopatrimonialism,
and heterogeneous interest group systems produces several propositions regarding the
prospects for the development of pluralist group systems in Africa. First are the
propositions we listed above representing the most basic assumptions of pluralist group
theory, i.e. that the introduction of multi-party, pluralist democracy should result in:

1. Increasing numbers of groups and increasing memberships as people flock to join
associations according to their likes and shared interests. and to pursue common goals
through their participation in such groups;

2. A corresponding increase in influence over government policy as increasing numbers
of interest groups pressure government;

Since interest group systems are fundamentally Shaped by the nature of the state in
which they are embedded, however, we must color the above propositions with
consideration of the nature of states and political institutions in Africa. Here, the theories
of state corporatism and neopatrimonialism are crucial. AS discussed above, since

independence political elites have been wary of the disruptive participation and demand-

making that accompanied initial pluralist experiments; deeply-rooted ideologies arose to

31

 

buttress the move toward state-centrism, and ideas die hard, especially when their
procurators switch hats to join the new regime. Similarly, as Bratton and van de Wal
(1997) note, institutions also die hard; though many states have taken on the trapping:
pluralist democracy, neopatrimonial practices— presidentialism, clientelism, and
prebendalism, continue to permeate the polity and administration.

If the new regime is to institute a state which operates as a neutral arbiter of

societal interests, responding passively to interest group pressure as predicted in plurz
political theory, existing patterns of clientelist exchange would have to break down. I
widespread phenomena of “blocked” and “stalled” attempts at democratic transition 2
consolidation in Africa indicate this is unlikely— as Bratton and van de Walle point 0
neopatrimonial politics persist after democratic transitions in Africa; “both by habit a
necessity, the victorious politicians will resort to clientelism to consolidate their own
power. Over time, these tendencies may well intensify” (1997:259). We thus might
expect leaders in Africa’s new democracies to harbor tendencies similar to the ancien
regimes in their desire to control key social and economic sectors, ostensibly in the in
of “political order” and “national unity,” but perhaps more darkly, in the quest for per
gain and control of patronage resources. In this light, Bianchi’s thesis serves well to
amend the above propositions:
3. The new regime’s support of pluralist development will favor some sectors over
others. Where pluralist policies do not infringe on the regime’s interests or need for
control, or threaten patronage-oriented bases of support, the above propositions will I.

Essentially, we are suggesting (ala Bianchi) that the impact of the adoption of

pluralist institutions on interest groups in Africa is mediated by historical patterns of 1

32

associational evolution between economic sectoral interests and the state. Where the 1
independence regime deemed it politically expedient to control economic and societal
interests, corporatist policies dominated state-society relations; and where such contro
was not crucial to the political calculus, more pluralist patterns of interest group
development formed. These former institutional arrangements are hypothesized to im
the development Of new relationships between the state and specific economic groups.
thus:

4. Pluralist arrangements will “take” better in groups which have experience with su
arrangements than groups which evolved under a corporatist logic.

We hypothesize further that the prospects for widespread pluralism taking holc
post-transition African countries will be affected by the continuing desire of essentiallj
neopatrimonial regimes to control the participation of key economic sectors in policy
making. Patterns in the mix Of pluralist and corporatist state-society relationships witl
individual countries might very well change, however, due to the consequences Of the

economic reforms being undertaken in many cases. Thus,

5. Where these reforms bring about shifts in the dominance of economic sectors, e. g.
private industry over state enterprises, we expect changes, realignments, and/or the
forging of new links in the representational relationship between the state and that
sector.

2.2.1 Establishing the Counterfactual
This last hypothesis is important because it suggests our main counterfactual, t

hypothesis that neither institutional arrangements nor varying economic position affec

33

relationship between the state and interest groups in Africa. Rather, this line Of argument
goes, structural characteristics of the economy determine the prospects for pluralism,
corporatism, or the disengagement altogether between the state and economic interest
groups. Coined “sectoral analysis,” this approach argues that:
a state’s capacity to get ahead depends on the attributes of the leading sector
through which it is tied to the international economy: light manufacturing, mineral
extraction, peasant cash crop production, or industrial plantation crop production.
Particular sectoral attributes result in distinct international market structures, each
of which rewards different kinds of actors, presents different opportunities and
risks, and demands a different strategy... (Sectoral attributes) also result in distinct
patterns of state institutional capabilities, and of interest groups with sectorally
determined interests and collective-action capabilities (Shafer 19943).13
From this perspective, neither the democratic transitions of the 1990's in Africa,
which sought to introduce more liberal and pluralistic political institutions, nor the
economic reforms that were adopted, which hurt some sectors and helped others, should
have impact on interest groups— on their relative influence over government policy, on
their organizational capabilities, on the incentives for individuals to participate as
members. Rather, these factors are almost pre-determined by the leading sector of the
domestic economy which ties it to the international economy. We will address this
argument more fully when we discuss the details of the Zambian case below.
2.3 The State and InterestRepresentation in Zambia
Above, we noted that Zambia provides a rich and relevant case in which to study

the issue of pluralist development in Africa. We here discuss the Zambian case with

respect to the factors above.

 

‘3 Shafer points out the genealogy of this argument lies in the works of: Alexander Gershenkron
(1962), James Kurth (1979), Jeffrey Paige (1975), Robert Brenner (1977), Peter Gourevitch (1986),
Ronald Rogowski (1989), Jeffrey Frieden (1991).

34

 

 

 

2.3.1 Development of the One-Party State

As discussed in the previous chapter, at independence in 1964 Zambia was similar
to other countries in Africa in that it inherited a multi—party system and democratic
constitution from the departing colonial regime. The system of government “was a hybrid
of Westminster parliamentarianism with a prime minister and cabinet, and presidentialism,
with large powers concentrated in the executive. The constitution provided for a unitary
state with a strong chief executive and a cabinet selected from, but not responsible to, the
national assembly” (Rakner 1998:46). Multi-party politics made it necessary for the new
African ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to shore up key
political constituencies among the African population. Most prominent among these were
mineworkers and urban residents, followed by a large and impoverished peasantry.

However, UNIP was never convinced of the usefulness Of pluralist institutions
toward either its developmental or political goals, and as early as 1964 was committed to
the one-party trend that characterized the politics of newly independent African states
(Gertzel, Baylies, Szeftel 1964). Zambia’s president, Kenneth Kaunda, agreed with other
African statesmen of the period in conceptualizing the state from a decidedly "organic"
perspective as opposed to a liberal-pluralist one. Thus, Kaunda envisioned integrating
Zambia’s “African democratic-socialist” state in an intimate manner with the existing
“mutual aid societies” through specific institutions which would allow the state to own
and / or control important parts of the economy (e. g. land, industry, the mines). The state
would thus actively coordinate development and improve social and economic welfare,
rather than passively arbitrating and regulating a plurality of social and economic interests.

In December 1972, the constitution of Zambia was consequently altered, banning all

35

I , _ ‘

political organizations except for UNIP and institutionalizing a one-party state.

Gertzel et. al.’s analysis of the transition from a multi- to a one-party system is
instructive in understanding the nature Of the post-independence state in Zambia. AS she
points out, early analyses of the one-party state were generally sympathetic to that system
“as an agency of national development and integration,” due to the colonial legacy of
bureaucratic authoritarianism, the political attitudes and behaviours of the elite, popular
participation, and the role of ideology (198421). However, by the mid-1960's, analysts
began to note that the Single-party system was empirically emerging as a response to the
threat of fragmentation among the political elite and the potential loss of control over the
state (ibid, see also Zolberg 1966). The Single-party state thus emerged in the context of
growing political factionalization, and with its Single dominant party revealed as a
“coalition of interests rather than a monolithic, hierarchical body” (ibidz2). In Zambia,
Gertzel et. al. find the notion of the one-party state as an attempt to achieve an
institutional balance between participation and control useful:

“immediately after independence, the Zambian leadership had emphasized the

importance of participation both as a pre-requisite for, and a consequence of,

development. Increased participation, however, at a time of tremendous popular
impatience for social and economic advance intensified political competition and
exacerbated a factional conflict in the ruling party (ibidz4).

2.3.2 State-Society Relations: Emerging Corporatism

This tension between allowing participation while establishing control also affected
the development of the interest representation system in the Second Republic. Again, as
detailed above, Zambia inherited at independence an active and pluralist interest group

system which had played an important part in the nationalist movement (though during

this era, important sectors had already begun to form “congress”—type organizational

36

 

 

structures). The implementation of the one-party state in 1972, however, marked the
transition from pluralist institutions to state-corporatism in state-society relations. State-
corporatism, in light of Gertzel et. al.’s analysis Of the one-party state, could be seen as a
mechanism to permit the participation of societal interests while at the same time exerting
national control over political and economic resources and their distribution, for
development as well as political purposes. However, there is an important distinction to
be made in the specific variant of state corporatism implemented in Zambia, indeed in all
one-party states, that has to do with the specific formula for establishing control: at the
time of the transition in 1972, the ideology supporting the one-party state called not only
for the assembly of “singular, hierarchically ordered peak associations,” it also called for
the absorption of many types of associations into the single-party structure. As Akwetey
notes, "state corporatism in Zambia took the form of a fusion of the institutions of the
state with the UNIP and civic and interest organizations” (1994:48).

Thus, the nature Of state corporatism in Zambia was one in which interest
organizations were not so much intended to be linked to the state, as to be absorbed by
the ruling party. Indeed, this might well be an identifying characteristic of corporatism in
neopatrimonial systems: as political power is centralized in the presidency and negotiated
through a clientelist network that Operates through the government’s control over state
resources, so societal power is sought to be centralized in the hands of a monolithic
representational institution (the Party) and negotiated through the same clientelist network

Operating through the distribution of state resources.

37

 

 

2.3.3 Zambia in Crisis: the Adoption of Dual Reform Processes

Similar to other countries in post-Independence Africa, the one-party state’s
attempt to centralize control of the economy in Zambia, principally through large-seal
nationalization of key industries but also through govemment control of markets, did
result in the desired developmental effects. According to Rakner’s account (1998:61)
during the decade following Independence, the economy expanded at a fair pace, with
GDP increasing at an average rate of 2.3 per cent annually in real terms (World Bank
1984). However, during the period from 1975 to 1990, Zambia experienced a 30 per
cent decline in real per capita growth (World Bank 1990). After 1974, copper prices :
sharply on the world market, coinciding with an enormous increase in oil prices.
Dependent on copper for 90 per cent of its exports and 40 per cent of its GDP througl
19703 and 19803, Zambia’s revenues fell Sharply. Without revenues from copper, eve
productive industries were unable to produce as foreign exchange to finance imports .
no longer generated. Government market controls and price limits, without copper to
support them, spelt Shortages and decreased production (Hawkins 1991; Bates 1981).
the years that followed, the Zambian economy essentially collapsed. GDP growth wa
either negative or weak for the period 1975-1980, reserves declined and the budget
balance was negative” (Rakner 1998:61).

During the period preceding the political transition in 1991, the Kaunda regirr
made several unsuccessful attempts to avert the economic crisis, starting with loans f]
the IMF in 1973. By 1978, the World Bank declared Zambia eligible for IDA funds.
began a series of aid packages given to Zambia through the 19703 and 19803 from

international donors; by 1990, Zambia’s external debt had risen to 7.2 USS million— 1

38

 

Of GDP for the same year. A major attempt at economic adjustment and reform was
undertaken in 1985: “in structure, depth and institutional character, the new reform
measures promised to challenge the centralised state controls and the developmentalist
state model developed in the post-independence period... (and subsequently) hurt the
government’s political base, the urban population and the large public bureaucracy within
UNIP and the state” (Rakner 1998270). In December 1986, government announced the
decontrol of maize prices, provoking a outburst of protest and rioting on the Copperbelt
which left 15 people dead. Profoundly Shaken, the UNIP regime brought the reform
attempt to a halt in May 1987.'4 With the New Economic Recovery Programme of 1987,
the government returned to reliance on state-controlled mechanisms, rather than
liberalisation, to address the economic crisis. Zambia’s international donors responded by
cutting all financial aid to the regime. Unsuccessful in its attempt to “go it alone”, by
1989, Zambia was back in negotiations with the IMF.

Important interests were against the move back toward liberalization, however.
Most prominent was the trade union movement, which publicly announced its opposition
to re-opening negotiations with the IMF. Increasingly, the effects of the economic crisis
and the UNIP regime’s inability to alleviate it precipitated calls for radical change: not just
the end of the UNIP reign, but a full-scale return to multi-party politics and a new
government. The Zambia Congress Of Trade Unions (ZCTU) led the charge in declaring
that the one-party state Should be abandoned. Soon, leading members of the business

community were echoing the same call. The economic crisis, it seems, had thoroughly

 

‘4 For analyses of Zambia’s failure to implement economic reforms during the 1985-87 period, see
Akwetey (1994), Bates and Collier (1993), (1995); Callaghy (1990); Gulhati (1989); Mwanza (1992);
West (1989), (1992); Loxley and Young (1990); Sandberg (1990).

39

 

—

discredited the notion of state-centrist, single-party rule; in response to its perceived fit
the model that was chosen to replace it was pluralist democracy. In the place of a
centralized state and Single party with corporatist-like ties to society, the reformers
envisioned a pluralist domain of competing political and economic interests, supported
a blossoming associational flora of political parties, interest groups, and civic associati
In that formula seemed to lie the answer to Zambia’s economic and political malaise. '
reformers won the day: Zambia held multi-party elections in 1991, drafted a new
constitution which removed the ruling party from its corporatist position and instituted
its place pluralist democracy, and embarked upon a strict, donor-endorsed programme
orthodox economic reform. The dual reform process had begun, and in earnest.

The issue this study thus seeks to address is this: how have these twin processe
political and economic reform affected the interest group system in Zambia? Given thl
above theoretical considerations, the following questions are of import:
1. Has political liberalization produced pluralist political institutions and a supporting
political ideology? Or has the legacy of the one-party state, that is, neopatrimonial
political institutions, left its imprint on Zambia’s new multi-party democracy, and
subsequently on state-society relations?
2. What impact do these results of dual reform have on the deveIOpment of a pluralist
system of interest representation? Are there discernible differences in the impact of d1
reform on the interest group system, or are all groups affected equally? If there is
variation, is it related to previous institutional relationships between the state and
economic interest groups?
2.4 Research Design and Methods

This dissertation is primarily a study of the interest group system in Zambia’s 1

Republic (1991-present), specifically how it has been affected by the transition from

corporatism to pluralism. A comparative case study approach is used; in most analyses

40

 

 

cases are the main interest groups active at the national level, in some cases, both they and
their local affiliates are considered. A Single-country, cross-group analysis is especially
useful for this inquiry because it controls for regime-type, population characteristics, and
economic conditions, all of which are constants for all the cases involved. Following Yin
(1994220), the research design has four components:

the study’s questions

propositions / hypotheses

description of unit(s) of analysis
explanation of the logic linking the data to the propositions.

99’3”!“

2.4.1 Main Research Questions:

The topic of interest in this study are economic interest groups in Zambia and how
they affect the prospects for the development of pluralism. Given the theoretical
discussion above, three levels of group activity are important: membership incentives,
organizational sustainability; and policy influence.

The three principle research questions Of this study are thus:

0 What are the key incentives for interest group membership in Zambia’s multi-
party democracy? Are they incentives that promote further pluralist development?

' How have interest groups adapted to the severing of corporatist ties to the state?
Are they maintaining and even improving organizational capacity?

0 What are the key strategies for interest groups in seeking influence in the new
system? Do groups perceive a more Open and plural political space in which to
lobby? Are they gaining increased influence over economic policy?

2.4.2 Main Propositions / Working Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are drawn from the discussion above of pluralist theory,

and the literature on state-society relations in Africa.

41

 

 

HYPOTHESIS 1: The number of economic interest groups and the number of members
within economic interest groups will increase. This will result from the prevalence of a
pluralist-type membership incentive; i.e. individuals will flock to join groups to express
Shared interests and pursue efforts at collective action.

HYPOTHESIS 2: There will be an increase in interest group influence over government
policy, or at least an increase in group participation in the policy process.

HYPOTHESIS 3: The organizational resources that economic interest groups command
will either stay constant, or increase with the improvement in autonomy from government.
Though this proposition is not derived directly from pluralist theory, Hypothesis 2 is a
necessary condition of Hypotheses 1 and 3, for if organizational resources decrease,
membership maintenance and the capacity for influence are threatened.

_I;I_0; There has been no change in state-society relations, copper remains the key export
commodity and subsequently shapes relevant political and economic institutions. The
mines, and the business and labor interests they involve, Should still dominate other
societal interests, with labor unions continuing to be the most vocal and influential lobby.
Membership and organizational considerations are merely derived from the expediencies
of copper production, they do not play a role in group activity and group policy influence.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS:

Above, we discussed several ways in which the practice of neopatrimonial politics
in Africa modifies the above expectations. In the next chapter, we will deal with the
particulars of the Zambian case at greater length so as to Specify the details Of the
following propositions.

PROPOSITION 1: The MMD regime’s stated support of pluralist development will
favor some sectors over others. Where pluralist policies do not infringe on the MMD’S
interests or need to control key economic sectors, or threaten patronage-oriented bases of
support, the above propositions will hold.

PROPOSITION 2: Pluralist arrangements will “take better in groups which have
experience with such arrangements than groups which evolved under a corporatist logic
in the Second Republic.

PROPOSITION 3: Where economic reforms bring about Shifts in the dominance of
economic sectors, e. g. private industry over state enterprises, we expect changes,
realignments, and/or the forging of new links in the representational relationship
between the state and that sector.

42

 

2.4.3 Expected Value added:

a) To contribute to the development of a typology of hybrid interest group systems
in Africa.

b) To demonstrate the interconnectedness of the three levels of analysis: macro,

mid, and micro. That is, influence at the macro level depends not only on policy

and elites, but on the day to day functioning of organizations, and the expectations

of group members.
2.5 Units of Analysis and Data Collection

The study has more than one unit of analysis, as often “occurs when, within a
single case (such as a study of economic interest groups in Zambia), attention is also given
to a subunit or subunits (such as influence strategies, organizational resources, and
membership incentives)” (Yin 1994241), When these subunits are “embedded” within the
larger case(s) (as they are here). the design is known as an “embedded case study design.”
Yin cites an infamous example of an embedded, single-case design: Lipset, Trow, and
Coleman’s Union Democracy (1956):

“The case study is about the inside politics of the International Typographical

Union and involves several units of analysis. The main unit was the organization

as a whole, the smallest unit was the individual member, and several intermediary

units also were important. At each level of analysis, different data collection

techniques were used, ranging from historical to survey analysis.” (1994:42).

The current study is slightly different than the above, however; it is an embedded
multiple-case study, “multiple ” because it examines the eight key national economic
interest groups in Zambia, “embedded ” because it gives attention to three sub-units of the
cases: influence strategies, power resources, and membership incentives. One illustrative
consequence of the “embedded” design is that, for instance, the results of the survey of

group members are not pooled across groups, but are analyzed comparatively for each

case. Thus:

43

 

1. Primary unit of analysis: “economic interest groups” (dependent variable)
a) contextual (or independent) variables: economic sector, political-institutional
parameters

2. Embedded units of analysis (sub-units of dependent variable):
a) membership incentives
b) organizational resources
c) policy influence

The kinds of data collected are correlated with the units of analysis in the table

below, giving the various analyses to be presented in the study:

44

 

 

 

Table 2.1: Data and Analysis

 

Total System

Groups

Members

 

Data Laws affecting interest Organizational Survey, Membership Survey,
group system, Economic Interviews with Interviews with
statistics, Policy issues, Leaders, Group members
Historical studies, Media documents, Media
Reports Reports

Unit being Analyses

Characterized

 

Group system

Structural, environmental

Relative Position of

Individual demands

 

as a Whole properties of group system Groups within the upon group system
System
Eight National Economic and institutional Organizational Distribution of
Apex Groups parameters, behavioral resources of groups individual
response (autonomy and membership
(influence strategies) capacity) incentives

across groups

 

Local Groups

Economic and institutional

Organizational

Distribution of

 

affiliated to parameters, behavioral resources of groups individual
the above response (autonomy and membership
groups (influence strategies) capacity) incentives
across groups
Members By inference, dominant By inference, dominant Reasons for Joining,

values and interests for
sectors and system (affects
influence)

values and interests for
groups (affects
organizational
maintenance)

Valuation of Group
Benefits, Background

 

 

2.5.1 Logic linking the data to the propositions

Due to the small number of cases, statistical tests of the above propositions and
hypotheses are not possible. Where applicable, a simple form of “pattern matching”
(Campbell 1975) will be employed in an attempt to logically link the data to the

propositions. “Pattern matching” is a technique whereby several pieces of information

45

from the case(s) may be related to the theoretical proposition, by specifying potential

patterns and then demonstrating that one matches the data better than the other.

2.6 Synopsis of Chapters

The questions raised above require a four-pronged analytical approach,
accomplished through the following arrangement of chapters:

In Chapter Three, the evolution of the interest group system in Zambia is described
and analyzed. We develop the concept of “economic society,” and define its particular
characteristics in Zambia. We next examine how different sectors within Zambia’s
economic society have historically been organized, paying special attention paid to the
details of the political and economic context in which they have evolved. Finally, we
examine the response of the state to the organization of economic interests, and how a
system of corporatist state-society relations emerged. The discussion makes the point that
the development of interest group systems depends both on the state’s goals in structuring
its relationship to society, as well as society’s responses. One of the main results of the
analysis in Chapter Three is the specification of the variable nature of the relationship
between interest groups and the state in the Second Republic. This variable, prior
institutional history, offers an important explanatory factor for the following analyses.

In Chapter Four, the further evolution of the interest group system in Zambia
Third Republic is addressed. Here, we develop the notion of the “ecology” of interest
group systems: “ecology” is a term borrowed from the biological sciences; it refers to the
study of the relationship between organisms and their environment. Using this

perspective, we are interested in how interest groups that emerged in the Second

46

 

 

Republic, as well as new groups emerging after 1991, are affected by and interact with the
new institutional environment of the Third Republic. We thus seek to analyze the ecology
of the new system by examining the interaction of the institutional environment and the
agency of the groups within it. This chapter provides the broad outlines of the new
interest group system that is emerging in the Third Republic.

In Chapter Five, we examine the incentives for interest group membership. The
prediction of pluralist theory, one which underlies all its other predictions concerning
interest group activity, is that individuals have a natural predilection to join groups, and
further efforts at collective action. Given the serious challenges to this thesis, it is useful
to empirically analyze if this motivation indeed exists, or if other inducements to join and
participate in business associations, trade unions, and farmers” groups are more important
to Zambians. Further, we explore whether incentives for membership differ between
groups, and whether the framework we developed in Chapter Three is useful in
understanding these differences. The unit of analysis here is hence the individual, but we
analyze individual responses at the group level.

In Chapter Six, we examine organizational resources. Groups essentially must
perform two tasks: on the one hand, memberships must be maintained— leaders must thus
find the optimal mix of benefits that members are looking for, and be able to support them.
Drawing from our analysis in Chapter Five, we will use the distinctive membership
incentives we found to draw propositions about how important autonomy and capacity are
as organizational resources. Are groups well organized, in terms of the imperative of
maintaining voluntary memberships? Why are some better groups than others? In

addition to the membership imperative, groups must be able to lobby government in a

47

 

 

pluralist system, another function requiring ample organizational resources. This chapter
thus analyzes groups themselves at the organizational level, in reference to their
sustainability potential, given the variable resources they control and the variable demands
made on them by their memberships.

In Chapter Seven, we examine group strategies for policy influence. In this
chapter, we examine how groups go about gaining access to government in the newly
pluralized environment, in order to represent group policy goals to government decision
makers. This is a fundamentally new activity for groups in the Third Republic; there were
virtually no opportunities for formal “lobbying” during the period of the one-party state.
Exploring how groups are adapting to this new opportunity, whether some are adapting
better than others, and what factors seem to explain these differences, is the goal of this
chapter. Thus, the main questions we seek to answer here are the following: Have the
opportunities for interest representation improved under the new institutions of the Third
Republic? What are the new “pathways to influence” over government policy? Have
groups been able to make use of these new channels to bend government policy in their
favor? To answer these questions, we analyze the opportunities available for influencing
policy and the empirical strategies that groups employ to gain access to those
Opportunities. A key concern here is whether some groups are gaining better access than
others, and whether real influence over government policy is realized.

In Chapter Eight, we conclude the study with by re-examining the prospects for

the development of pluralism in Zambia’s Third Republic.

48

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA’S SECOND REPUBLIC

3.1 Examining “Economic Society” in Zambia

In this chapter, the evolution of the interest group system in Zambia is described
and analyzed, with special attention paid to the details of the political and economic
context in which it has evolved. We begin with a discussion of what Linz and Stepan
(1999) refer to as economic society. Claiming that modern, pluralist democracy cannot
exist in either a pure-command or pure-market economy, these scholars argue that “a set
of sociopolitically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations— an “economic
society— that mediate between state and market” is necessary (1999:21). For this study,
consideration of Zambian “economic society” is especially important, for it is the realm of
interest politics, and the context in which associations that organize around specific
economic interests evolve and develop relationships with the state. The development of
economic society might be seen to reflect both characteristics of the economy (what types
of economic activity exist, what types of economic actors compose economic society?),

and the historical-institutional development Of the relationship between the state and

49

 

different economic sectors. We thus begin with discussion of the economy in Zambia.
followed by an account of the evolution of organizational efforts around economic
interests. This is followed by an analysis of the state’s response to the organizing of
economic interests during the Second Republic, and the outlines of the resulting interest
group system. In the conclusion to this chapter. the analysis of economic activity and the
relationship of the UNIP state to different economic groups are used to create a
theoretical framework for specifying the interest group system in the Second Republic, for
further analytical purposes.
3.1.1 Economic Activity

Any discussion of economic activity in Zambia must start with the mines. Zambia
possesses relatively immense mineral resources, and the most important and lucrative of
these is copper. In addition, Zambia enjoys a large quantity of land suitable for
agricultural production and cattle-raising. Thus, the setting is a dual economic system
consisting, one the one hand, of a modern sector based on mining production, largely
confined to the line of rail, and urban in orientation. and on the other, a rural, mostly
subsistence-based agricultural sector (Kaplan 1979: 161). In the modern sector, the
mining industry has traditionally been the one of the largest employers of wage labor as
well as the largest earner of foreign exchange: at independence, the mines accounted for
60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 53% of government revenues and 92
percent of export earnings, and employed 20 percent of those in formal jobs (Shafer
1994:49, Fry 1980:44, Republic onambia 1985z8).

Copper has always been the most important commodity, though gold, silver, zinc,

lead, cobalt and coal are also produced. The first major mines— Luanshya and Mufulira—

50

 

were founded in the early 1930s and operated by the Anglo American Corporation of
South Africa, and the Roan Selection Trust, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax of the
United States. Bustling urban communities subsequently developed around this area,
which became known as the “Copperbelt.” Between the Copperbelt in the north and
Livingstone in the south, spanning three provinces (Southern, Central, and the Copperbelt
Provinces) and passing through the only other major urban area in the country, the capital
city of Lusaka, ran the “line-of—rail,” around which most economic activity in the country
would come to center.

At independence, the economy was largely in private hands though highly
monopolistic, as “almost all industrial sub-sectors were dominated by one large (usually
ex-patriate) company” (Zambia Human Development Report 1997). However, in 1968
Kaunda announced the nationalization of the economy through the Mulungushi Accord;
subsequently, during the 1970's the modern sector became dominated by parastatals
(state-owned or controlled enterprises) that operated in sectors ranging from
manufacturing, mining, power, and transport, to agricultural marketing and services,
finance, wholesale and retail trade, and hotel and restaurant trade. By 1970 the
government had acquired Slpercent of the shares of both the mines through its Official
holding company, the Zambian Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). Only in
construction and agricultural production was the private sector dominant by the end of the
1970's.

Though official state ideology discouraged private sector activity during the
Second Republic (1972-1990), economic crisis and government requirements in the mid-

1970's brought government to accept the necessity of some level of private enterprise, and

51

 

 

 

 

in 1977 the Industrial Development Act was drafted to proclaim the economy a mixed
one. Nonetheless, govermnent-controlled copper was “king:” rich deposits, good
infrastructure, and favorable world market prices during the 1960's and early 1970's had
led to the illusion of endless wealth (Zambia Human Development Report 19972162), a
wealth which at first (and to a lesser degree after the economic crisis) was ostensibly used
to carry out UNIP’s substantial development objectives. Dependence on copper was
endemic to the UNIP regime; as noted in the First National Development Plan, “the
capital investment available to Government is determined almost entirely by revenue
obtained from copper” (GRZ 1966231). Funds from copper were used by the government
to subsidize imported agricultural products and hold down domestic food prices for the
urban population, which had the adverse effect of discouraging domestic agricultural
production (see Bates 1976, 1981). Drawing from copper revenues, the govemment was
able to keep the cost of capital low and permit steady increase in wages, resulting in the
development Of a capital-intensive industry at the expense of urban employment (Zambia
Human Development Report 1997, Bates and Collier 1992).

The economy entered the 1980's and 1990's still dependent on copper. In the
agricultural sector, productive activity was intentionally centered around government-
sponsored producer cooperatives, though private, large—scale farms were also encouraged.
However, unlike other southern African countries, where commercial farming was focused
on the production of primary goods for export, the commercial farming sector in Zambia
concentrated on the supplying of foodstuffs to the workforce in the Copperbelt. By the
late 1970's, the subsector had roughly 800 units occupied under leasehold from the state,

of which 2/3 were farmed by ex-patriates. On the other hand, the subsistence farming

52

subsector consisted of more than 600,000 households in the rural areas (Zambia Human
Development Report 1997: 169). Within this subsector, a small number of farmers carried
out commercial operations; this group of ‘emergent farmers’ developed largely along the
line of rail. In addition to agricultural cultivation, forestry and fishing were also locally-
important economic activities.

As noted above, government controlled production and marketing in the
agricultural sector as well as the industrial through a system of parastatals. For example,
the Tobacco Board of Zambia was established in 1967 to regulate marketing and promote
production of tobacco; the Nakambala Sugar Estate was established in Mazabuka, using
the Kafue River for irrigation, in 1964; the Cold Storage Board of Zambia (CSBZ) carried
out commercial slaughtering; and the National Agricultural Marketing Board
(NAMBOARD) acted as the government’s purchasing agent for agricultural products.

Zambia inherited a small manufacturing sector at independence, due to most
industrial investment having gone to Southern Rhodesia during the colonial era. From
1965-1970, government pursued an import—substitution policy that contributed to rapid
industrial development. By 1979, the government had majority holdings in, or complete
ownership of, almost all large manufacturing firms, through auspices of the Industrial
Development Corporation (INDECO), which was in turn controlled by the massive
conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). Though, as
noted above, the 1977 Industrial Development Act made clear the government’s
willingness to maintain a mixed economy, allowing both domestic and international private
capital to operate under well-defined regulations, the operations of Zambian businessmen

were confined to real estate, small—scale commerce and transport (Turok 1989).

53

 

This “mixed” economy that developed during the 1970's had important political
roots. Baylies and Szefiel (1984) have noted the rise of an indigenous business class
during this period, and convincingly argued that indigenous businessmen were both well-
placed as politicians due to their positions as local “notables”, and well-placed as
businessmen due to their subsequent gaining of high-level state positions and even
parliamentary seats (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2. next page). Half the Cabinet members from
1964 to 1976 had privately-held farms or businesses in 1976— and many acquired these
holdings after gaining public office (1984:71). This “indigenous business class” was
successful in several, though not all, efforts to keep at least some portion of the Zambian
economy out of the hands of the state and Open to private enterprise. Also quietly active
during this period was a growing Asian community engaged in privately-held small-scale
trading and commercial enterprises.

Thus, by the time of the transition in 1991, the foundations of Zambia’s economic
society had been laid. Economic activity in Zambia was driven by the mining sector,
which had important implications for the development of a strong— and unionizable—
workforce and an urban middle-class. In addition, moderate levels of economic activity
took place in the agricultural sector, where subsistence and small-scale farming took place
under the direction of a state-sponsored cooperative structure, side-by-side with a
relatively small, largely expatriate and privately held commercial farming sector. Also
contributing to the economy was an initially small but subsequently growing
manufacturing sector-- like the mines, an important source of managers and workers--
located predominantly along the line of rail and within the urban boundaries of the

Copperbelt. And finally, despite Kaunda’s plans for a socialist state and dirigiste

54

 

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55

economy, a small and politically relevant private business sector was also taking shape.
Table 3.1 below gives a summary listing of these economic interests, categorized by
economic sector (column 1). Column 11 provides an outline of the potential economic
interest groups in Zambia, given the evolution of economic activity detailed above.

Table 3.1
Zambia: The Development of Economic Interests, 1965-1991

 

 

I II
Sector Actors Involved in Sector
Agriculture Commercial Farmers

Emergent Farmers
Subsistence Farmers

 

 

Mining Workers (miners, etc)
Managers
Manufacturing Workers
Managers

Businessmen

 

Trade & Services Workers
Managers
Businessmen

 

 

3.1.2 Policy Relevance of Economic Sectors

Having thus sketched the shape of Zambia’s economic activities, the next question
to address is how and when the above economic activities might become politically
important to government’s economic policy calculations. As a proxy of the “policy
relevance” of economic sectors, we here refer to two statistics: sectoral contributions to
gross national product (GDP), and sectoral contributions to export earnings. The logic
behind using these proxies is that government will consider most important those sectors
which contribute most to the economy (especially foreign exchange), and hence most to

government coffers. The graphs demonstrate what we expect from the literature on

56

Zambian political economy: before the economic crisis of the mid-seventies, mining
dominated the economy, directly contributing 25% of GDP in 1972, with additional
contributions in manufacturing and construction (see Figure 3.2, next page). However,
after the crisis, mining output started to slip, falling to less than half (9%) its 1972-1eve1
contribution to GDP by 1990. Figure Three also demonstrates that agriculture is
moderately important in terms of contributions to GDP, and relatively stable through the
1970's and 1980's, until it began a moderate upswing in 1990 (see Figure 3.2d). What is
perhaps most striking about the data in Figure 3.2, however, is the contribution of
manufacturing— it contributed equally with agriculture to the domestic product in the
early seventies (14% and 13% respectively) and surpassed mining through the seventies
and eighties to the point where it contributed three times as much of GDP as did mining
by 1990 (32% to mining’s 9%, see Figure 3.2a and 3.2b. It should be noted that the
economy as a whole, at least in per capita terms, shrank over this period). Table 3.2
below gives the contributions to GDP of these three important sectors over the period

1980-1991.

Table 3.2
Gross Domestic Product by Type of Economic Activity, 1980-1991
(millions of constant 1977 kwacha)

 

Year: ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91

 

Agriculture 304 329 290 315 332 344 374 366 436 425 387 407

 

Mining 205 215 215 222 200 186 177 184 160 176 163 166

 

Manufacturing 384 430 415 384 389 421 425 463 547 544 587 524

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: World Bank

57

 

 

Figure 3.2: Zambia GDP Data, 1980-1990

Figure 3.2. a:
Contribution to GDP I972
Other
Real Estate 3% .
% Agriculture

 
  
 

Financial
3%

Services
1 5%

Construction

% Electrrcrty

2%

14%

Manufacturing

Figure 3.2.b:
Contribution to GDP 1990

Real Estate 7%

4% \
Financial

3%

  
  
 
 

 
 

Construction
4% . _
Elecmcrty

1%

Manufacturing
32%

Mining

  

 

1 Sector Totals
1 Primary 13% Secondary 49% Tertiary 39%

.
l
1

Figure 3.2.c: Contribution by Sector
100% .

 
 
    

ElOther
80%

ITertiary
60% 5
40% , 9'7? 4g ISecondary
20% ’f' _

. EPrImary

0% ,. a

 

 

 

1977 1986 1990

Source: IMF Statistics

i Sector Totals
‘ l Primary18% Secondary45% Tertiary 30%

Figure 3.2. d: Contribution by Activity
100%

 

 

 

 

E a El Services
80% :_:_ 4 ElTrade
, a;
60 /° C] Manufact
udng

40°/ . .

° I Mining
20% i ,

IAngcultu
' re
0%

    

1977 1986 1990

58

 

Figure 3.3: GDP by Economic Activity (millions ZK)
600

IIIIIII

500
400

 

300

2m’——”\

”~—

100

0
‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91

Agriculture — — - Mining
........ Manufacturing

While examination of contributions to GDP might put the agriculture and
manufacturing sectors on par with the mining sector, however, examination of
contribution to export earnings puts these sectors into better perspective, especially with
respect to the needs of an industrializing state like post-independence Zambia. Figure 3.3
(above) gives a times series comparison of the leading agricultural export— tobacco, and
the leading mining export— copper. Also included is the category “other goods,” which is
largely made up of manufactured goods. As the data in the table show, export revenues
from the leading agricultural export, tobacco, pales in comparison to the leading export
mineral, copper. Though manufactured goods contribute tenfold more to the export
revenue pie than tobacco earnings, they also pale in comparison to the copper mines.
Indeed, as several scholars have pointed out, copper revenues in Zambia so dominate the
economy and the filling of government coffers, they have acted to dull incentives to

develop alternative exports, as well as dampened any perceived need to develop

59

 

agriculture either to ensure adequate food supply or to produce for export (see Shafer

1994, Jansen 1988, Baylies 1978, Young 1973). In addition, revenue from copper has

served to stimulate the production of non-tradeables to the extent that “services. utilities,

construction, commerce, and transport... dominate the economy” (O’Neill et al. 1987:21).

This latter point implies that the data shown in Chart 3.2 can be misleading; though non-

copper sectors appear to be important to the economy in terms of their contributions to

GDP, their continuing health is dependent on the continued flow Of copper revenues— a

point well understood by the UNIP regime. For a government dependent on foreign

exchange for both debt service and the purchase of imports necessary to its highly capital

intensive industrial sector, stability in its main export earning sector was (and still is under

the MMD regime) understandably crucial. Indeed, it is a card the labor union movement

and other urban interests have played much to their advantage since the inception of the

one-party state.

Exports of Principal Commodities 1980-1991

Table 3.3

(Total is given in millions of current 1977 kwacha,

categories are given as percentage of Total)

 

 

 

 

 

‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91
Tobacco 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4
Copper 85 90 90 89 86 83 83 85 85 89 86 78
Other 3.1 2.5 4.3 2.0 5.2 9.2 7.5 6.0 5.4 3.1 4.7 8.5
Goods
Tom] 1021 929 953 1048 1200 1508 S367 8059 9786 18434 39143 67668

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SOurce: World Bank

60

 

 

 

Thus, where policy is concerned, it’s clear why the mining sector was of
considerable importance to government and Party policy in the 1960's and 1970's; as many
scholarly accounts have argued (Bates 1971, Bates and Collier 1993, Burdette 1988,
Epstein 1958, Rakner 1994), the mines drove the Party’s development program, and the
trade unions which organized the mineworkers thus presented a formidable counterforce
to the state. An interesting point that emerges from this data is the growing dominance of
the manufacturing sector in the economy, and the lack of development of a similar political
importance of the “captains of industry.” Indeed, this was at least partly a result of the
fact that these “captains” were not the owners of privately-held enterprises, but rather the
managers of state-owned industries. As we’ll see below, the first employers’ national
organization was founded in 1955, two decades after the first European worker’s union
was formed and seven years after the African mineworkers had formed the first union in
1949.

After the nationalization of the economy, most industries fell under state-control;
so that by the mid 19705, 80 per cent of the Zambian economy was owned and controlled
by the state, and 147 parastatals were operating— with 121 of them under a single holding
company, ZIMCO (Rakner 1998, Callaghy 1990) Consequently, most managers were
dependent on the state, or rather, the ruling party, for their position. Thus, while the
unions became important and powerful political players outside the state, the employers
were tightly wired in to the UNIP patronage machine. However, both were included in
policy discussions during the Second Republic through regularly-held “Tri-Partite”

meetings with the government.

61

 

3.1.3 Political Strength of Economic Sectors

An important implication of the “urban bias” thesis is that there is a direct link
between African governments’ dependence on industrial sectors of the economy and its
capitulation to “urban interests”(see Bates 1981); in Zambia, it has been argued that urban
constituencies gained favor over rural ones because they can potentially threaten the
power of the government (Hawkins 1991). The “urban bias” thesis rests on two
assumptions: the strength of numbers, and the costs of organizing. Thus, since workers in
the urban areas are both numerous and concentrated, they constitute a political
constituency to be reckoned with. Where are these workers located in the economy?
Which sectors might we expect to be politically relevant due to the numbers they can
organize and challenge the government? Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of the Zambian
population formally employed, from 1969 to the point of political change in 1990.

Figure 3.4a gives the breakdown of the formally employed by economic sector, as
Of 1989. Again we see the effects of Zambia’s relatively high level of urbanization and
industrialization: nearly half the formally employed workers in Zambia are employed in
the mining-driven industrial sector, be it the mines themselves, (20%) or manufacturing
(19%), or construction (8%). Again as a consequence of urbanization, we also see that
almost two-fifths of the formally employed are in the service sector, including trade (10%)
and transport (9%).

Figure 3.4b demonstrates that, as with our policy relevance measure, the picture is
not a static one. Note the plummeting of service sector and construction employment from
1986 to 1989, while employment in agriculture and the other industrial and service sectors

slowly inched upward. Most noticeable is the increase in manufacturing employment; by

62

——

Figure 3.4: Zambia Employment Data, 1980-1990

Figure 3. 4.61.‘ Formal Employment Levels, and T olal Population

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Th0usands Millions

400 — Total Formal Employment T 12
l

350 T 10
300 , ‘

250 T 8

200 . —l 5
a Cl

150 4
100 7A» ~A 7 fl

50 T 2

o i l o

 

1969 1972 1976 1986 1989

Figure 3. 4b: Formal Emploment Levels, by Sector

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

100% _ _
3}:— 13 Services
80% Trade
60% . El Construction
19
5 Manufacturing
40% E
Mining
20% 17
\_ E Agriculture
911:.
00/0 ‘ -‘—QV<X
1 969 1 972
Source: Central Statistical Office and International Labour Organization

—__4

63

1989 it almost equaled the mines in the percentage of the workforce it claimed.
3.1.4 Summary: The Shape of Economic Society

In sum, then, the economic importance of copper mining in Zambia since the turn
of the twentieth century brought about an early differentiation of the labor force and
resulted in a population uncharacteristically (for Africa) urbanized and formally employed.
In addition, the development of an “indigenous business class,” and the presence of a
moderate, mostly small-scale farming sector, means that there are many occupationally-
defined interest categories available for group mobilization in Zambia: formally—employed
workers of many stripes (government sector workers such as civil servants, teachers;
state-owned enterprise workers (in the seventies and eighties, this included the mines,
telecommunications, and utilities, among others), and private sector workers such as
workers in construction, manufacturing, and commercial agriculture. In addition to
formally employed labor, there are business owners and commercial / peasant farmers
interests. Rounding out the picture are traders and small-scale industry in the informal
sector.

Overall then, Zambia’s considerable economic diversity provides ample ground for
the formation of occupationally-based interest groups competing for influence with the
state; above we’ve seen the basis for three important sectoral interests: a labor lobby, a
business/employers lobby, and an agricultural lobby. In the next section, we’ll address
which of these “potential” groups had formed by the time of the critical period preceding
the 1991 dual transition.

3.2 Economic Interests, Organization, and Politics in Zambia’s 2“d Republic

Most of the economic sectors outlined above (agriculture, mining, trading and

64

—

commerce) has origins reaching back well into the colonial period. For most, voluntary
efforts at organzing producers in these sectors also pre-dates independence. Figure 3.5,
next page, shows the founding dates of Zambia’s major interest groups.

3.2.1. The Origins of Economic Organizing in Zambia

As the above figure shows, the story of formal economic organizing begins during
the colonial period in Zambia, and it begins with European organizations such as the
group that would later become the Commercial Farmers Bureau (CFB). The earliest
Europeans to arrive in the trans-Zambezi area were explorers and missionaries, who
established churches and productive enterprises well ahead of the colonial administration.
They were followed by the British South Africa Company, who had gained control of the
area by 1913 and subsequently convinced the British government to set up a minimal
administration over the territory (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979). Perhaps the most
important legacy of the BSAC era was the building of a railroad, envisioned by Cecil
Rhodes as part of the line “from Cape to Cairo,” from Victoria Falls in the south, north
across the territory into Katanga. This thin corridor of transportation, referred to as the
“line of rail,” would later become a lifeline around which urban centers and most economic
activity were developed.

During the colonial period, Europeans were in firm control of the economy; while
Africans were allowed to participate in labour markets supplying mineral mines
throughout the region, it was illegal for them to participate in business and commercial
farming. Thus, it was Europeans who formed the first formal farmers’ organization (in
1904) as well as the first Chamber of Commerce and Industry (in 1933), and it was skilled

Europeans who had come to the territory to work in the mines, the

65

 

Figure 3.5: Founding Dates of Selected Major Interest Groups in Zambia

 

 

 

 

1970:
ZUFIAW
Labour 1930's: 1948: 1965:
‘— EMU AMU AAWUZ
1946: 1964: 1975:
NUBEGW NUPAW CSUZ
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1991
1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Colonial Administration ' 1“
I I I I I I
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1991
Agriculture
1904: 1914: 1973:
CFB NWRFCS ZCF
Business 1933: 1950: 1972: 1980:
— LCCI CCCI BAZ ZAM
1954: 1955:
LAMC ZFE
AAWUZ Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia
AMU African Mineworkers Union
BAZ Bankers Association of Zambia
CCCI Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CFB Commercial Farmers’ Bureau (in 1992 became the ZN FU)
CSUZ Civil Servants Union of Zambia
EMU European Mineworkers Union
LAMC Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative
LCCI Lusaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MUZ Mineworkers Union of Zambia
NUBEGW National Union of Building Engineers and General Workers
NUPAW National Union of Public Administration Workers
NWRFCS North-West Rhodesian Farmer’s Cooperative Society
ZAM Zambia Association of Manufacturers
ZCF Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZFE Zambia Federation of Employers
ZUFIAW Zambia Union of Financial and Insurance Workers

66

 

 

 

railroads and other industries that formed the first trade unions. However, during this
same period African miners formed fraternal and mutual aid societies; and with assist:
from British trade unions, African trade unions had spread throughout the Copperbelt
the 1940's. In the next section, we examine the subsequent development of formal
organizations in each of the three economic sectors under study here.
3.2.2 The Colonial and Independence Period: Pluralism and Racial Divides
Labor

Copper production in the Copperbelt started in the 19305, but it wasn’t until th
postwar period that local labor organized a formal association in defense of its interes
(Bates 1971 :18). According to Bates. the association took the place of tribal modes 0:
organizing and the representation of mineworkers’ interests that had been instituted b:
mine authorities. “The companies had maintained a system Of labor relations based U]
tribal elders. Each tribal group. at the mines selected its elders; they represented the
interests of the workers before the companies and communicated company policy to tl
workers themselves” (ibidzl9). In 1935 and 1940, however, there were two major
disturbances on the Copperbelt in which miners challenged this form of labor relation
asserted distinctly class-based interests (Epstein 1958). During the ensuing decade, tl
structure of labor relations based on ethnic principles was slowly transformed to one
which was interest-based. At first, the Labor Department experimented with Boss BO
and Works Committees, but after WWII the colonial office urged the formation of
collective bargaining machinery for Africans and appointed a full-time Trade Union
Labour Officer, Mr. W. M. Comrie, to promote the formation of African trade unions

Bates suggests that the colonial government and the mining companies backec

67

initiative because the European Mineworkers Union (EMU) were growing interested in
organizing the African labor force, and the prospect of the power that a combined union
would wield was daunting (1971: 20). In addition, African miners had been calling for
their own trade union, distinct from the EMU, for nearly a decade, and they enjoyed
strong leadership for such an initiative in the person of Lawrence Katilungu (Gupta
1979:293). Comrie worked with the existing African associations (e.g. Welfare Societies,
Clerks’ Associations, and Boss Boy Committees) to transform interest and demand for
industrial representation into formally organized action. In 1947, the Nkana mineworkers
formed a union branch; they subsequently drafted a constitution, recruited members, and
set about promoting the formation of more union branches at the other mines. In 1949,
these branches combined to form an industry-wide union. The union’s national executive
committee negotiated a recognition agreement with the Chamber of Mines, and the
Afiican Mineworkers’ Union became the official representative of African labor in the
mining industry. In 1950, the AMU federated with unions in other industries to form the
Trade Unions Congress (TUC).

With independence in 1964, the coming to power of an African Government, and
the dismantling of the legal apartheid system the industrial situation changed markedly.
Miners and other workers could no longer be barred from types of employment due to
their race; associations no longer fell along the lines of the color-bar. In 1965, the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions was established by an act of Parliament, and the Trade Unions
and Trade Disputes Ordinance was amended to provide for obligatory affiliation to the
ZCTU of any trade union formed in the Republic of Zambia, thus limiting the extent of

associational pluralism in the labor sector.

68

 

Agriculture

As in the industrial sector, a dual economy emerged in the agricultural sector
during the colonial period. European settlers claimed access to the most fertile land,
where they established large-scale commercial farms. With the development of the
railroad, these farmers moved to take over the best lands along the line of rail where
access to markets was optimal; they were helped by government schemes which
encouraged European farmers to relocate.1 Meanwhile, restrictions abounded on most
African non-subsistance agricultural production. According to Bates, “the development
of African cash cropping was artificially restricted by the exclusion of African producers
from access to the best soils on the line of rail and by the attempts of European farmers to
prevent Africans from entering production so as to keep their farm wages
low”(1976:281.) Africans were thus largely (though not entirely) relegated to the less-
fertile areas of the country, and most engaged in subsistence level production.2

As there was dualism in the economy, there was also dualism in the associational
realm, with the Europeans organizing their interests via the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau
(CFB, founded in 1904), a relatively powerful pressure group vis a vis the colonial state;
and African producers joining locally-oriented welfare societies and cooperatives (the first
being the North-West Rhodesia Farmers' Cooperative Society Limited, registered in

1914), which enjoyed a much lower organizational capacity, and occupied a much less

 

' For instance, Hellen reports that “in 1962 a scheme was inaugurated by Northern Rhodesian and
Federal Governments which enabled the Europeans to voluntarily resettle on a farm-for-farm exchange
basis wither on the line of rail or at Mkushi in the Central Province...” (1968: 175)

2 “Largely,” for as Bates notes, some African farmers also responded to the market for produce on the
line of rail, growing and marketing crops to the industrial centers (1976223).

69

 

influential position vis a vis the colonial government.

The CFB (precursor to the present—day Zambia National Farmer's Union) was
founded in 1904 by European farmers in Zambia's Eastern Province. The Bureau had an
easy time of it during the pre-independence period; as an important source of support for
the colonial government, farmers were able to gain a pricing policy which resulted in a
level of production far in excess of national demand. The government assisted farmers in
selling the excess on external markets, offsetting the frequent losses with public revenues
(Bates 19762122). After 1964, however, commercial farmers lost this priveleged political
position and the policy influence that went with it.3

Independence brought a marked change for Africans as well, and especially for
their associations. The new UNIP government’s official policy was to coordinate rapid
development of the rural peasant agricultural sector through considerable state support.
The mechanism for the distribution of resources was to be a network of cooperative
societies, thus:

“The Northern News reported on 18 January that “the President called on all

unemployed in Zambia to form themselves into cooperative societies and to put

their various skills to work on the agriculutural and construction projects planned.”

President Kaunda declared: “The money is there and the know-how is there. You

can form these cooperative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall assist you in

getting on” (C. Stephen Lombard, quoted in Bateszl976, 111).

 

3 Thus, for instance, the UNIP government abandoned the above policy and implemented instead
policies which encouraged production only for the national market. This reduced the attractive price
farmers had previously enjoyed for maize production, and began the first of many changes the commercial
farming sector would make as it adjusted to the dictates of the new government, and its lack of influence
over its policies.

70

@

 

The predominant form of organization among peasant producers, it should be
noted that such cooperatives were not envisioned as autonomous groups with voluntary
memberships, as was the status of the commercial farmer’s associations— they thus had no
mandate to pressure government in favor of peasant farmer interests. Rather, the
cooperatives were from their beginnings in the First Republic organizations meant to
coordinate government agricultural development policy. Importantly, not all rural farmers
joined the cooperative schemes, some set themselves up as independent cash crOp farmers
(who were fortunate at first to enjoy the same supports as did members of the
cooperatives). Though not dependent on the cooperatives (and thus, on Kaunda’s UNIP
party) for these resources, these farmers were “equally the creations of politics... for the
majority of the farmers entered production by being selected, trained, and capitalized by
public servants of the new African government” (ibid: 116).

Business

African trade before the colonial period in Zambia played an important part in
some local economies, with a variety of goods and agricultural products being exchanged
in a set of trade links that extended from both the Atlantic and Indian oceans into the
interior (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979:34). However, European expansion into the
territory soon undermined the traditional pattern of trade and by 1910 most trade was
European hands. A notable exception, however, was Eastern Province, where the colonial
administration allowed Indian merchants to conduct trade with Africans. Eventually they
gained foothold in the rural areas of the South and finally along the line of rail to the
Copperbelt and Northern Province. Through the prewar period, African trade continued

to be marginalized due in part to increasing restrictions imposed by the colonial

71

 

 

government to protect European interests, and in part to competition from both European
and Asian traders. Thus, in the 19303 and 19403, most African commerce and trade took
place largely in rural villages, where it was least profitable, though there were a small
number of African businesses in the towns (ibid: 37). By the 1950's, several large markets
had emerged in Lusaka and the Copperbelt where Africans bought and sold the necessities
of everyday life, such as household goods, clothes, charcoal, produce, meats and fish.

In addition to enjoying a privileged market position through the colonial era,
Europeans were also free to form associations to protect those interests. The first
Chamber of Commerce in Zambia, the Lusaka Chamber, was founded in 1933. Other
chambers formed in various industrial and commercial centers in the country, until in 1938
the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCOM) was formed as an
umbrella organization to coordinate activities between the local chambers. ASCOM was
reborn as the Commercial and Industrial Association of Northern Rhodesia (COMINOR)
in 1957. By the 1950's, Africans market traders had also begun to organize cooperative
associations to further their collective interests, and in 1956 a substantial association to
protect African marketeers’ interests, the Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative Society
Limited, was founded.

Independence changed the economic arena considerably, while again leaving the
associational arena in the business sector intact. President Kaunda’s Mulungushi address
in 1968 began the nationalization Of large parts of the economy, not only making it legal
for Africans to engage in trade and commerce, but going so far as to limit certain
activities, such as building-material extraction and wholesale trade in smaller towns, to

only African involvement. The unsurprising result was the rapid growth of an African

72

 

business sector in the entire range of enterprises from small trader to large industrialist in
the late 19605.
3.2.3 Summary: Origins of Organizing

In all three sectors during the colonial period. then. circumstance and active
manipulations brought about a racially-defined dualism in both the economy and economic
society. In the industrial arena, there was a European Mineworkers Union (EMU) and an
African Mineworkers Union (AMU), with members of the former enjoying more skilled
positions and a much higher standard of living in the mines than the latter. In the
agricultural sector, there was a Commercial Farmers’ Bureau, representing the interests of
European farmers, and locally-oriented cooperative associations organized around African
peasant producers. Members of the former engaged in large-scale and lucrative
agricultural production while members of the latter engaged in small-scale subsistence
agriculture and were restricted from engaging in commercial production. The business
sector reflected this same divide; several well-organized Chambers of Commerce and
Industry organized and represented European businessmen, while locally-based market
cooperative societies brought together African traders and marketeers.

With independence in 1965, the economic situation changed markedly, with first
the dismantling of the color-bar and a few years later the nationalization of the economy
under the Mulungushi accords. However, since the new government and ruling party, the
United National Independence Party (UNIP), adopted a pluralist constitution, the
associational arena progressed into the First Republic largely intact, with the exception of
the UNIP government’s establishment of a new single apex organization for the trade

unions.

73

 

3.3 The State and the Organization of Interests: Institutional Analysis of State
Response

3.3.1 The Move to Corporatism Under the One-Party State

The implementation of the one-party state in 1972 had widespread repercussions
for interest organizations in Zambia, as it marked the transition from pluralist institutions
to state-corporatism in state-society relations. Most importantly, the ideology supporting
the one-party state called for the absorption of many types of associations into the Party
structure. As Akwetey notes, "state corporatism in Zambia took the form of a fusion of
the institutions of the state with the UNIP and civic and interest organisations (1994:48).
This was part of a general trend to centralize political control in the hands of the Party,
and more specifically, President Kaunda. For while Kaunda had governed in consultation
with his cabinet, party colleagues, and key civil servants, immediately following
Independence, during the 1970's a growing presidentialism in government and a
centralization of party power in Kaunda's hands (Gulhati 1989, 26-27) increasingly made
him the "big man" of Zambian politics (see also Gertzel 1984).

Independence in 1964 had made it necessary for the new African ruling party, the
United National Independence Party (UNIP), to shore up key political constituencies
among the African population. Most prominent among these were mineworkers and
urban residents, followed by a large and impoverished peasantry. It was thus critical for
UNIP to gain the allegiance of the trade unions and the cooperatives, and it was these that

the adoption Of corporatist institutions was meant to capture.4 Other groups (e.g. the

 

4 The banning of political organizations other than UNIP also aided the state in warding off a
dangerous politicization of interest associations, as for example when the Lusaka African Marketeers
Cooperative Society splintered into pro-UNIP groups and pro-ANC groups in mid-1964.

74

 

CF B and the ZNNCI) were allowed to maintain the autonomy they’d garnered during the
pluralist era, but this was non-threatening to the UNIP regime due to the relative political
irrelevance of their constituencies tO the developmental state. In the ensuing section, we
examine the key changes to associational activity in agriculture, labor, and business
brought on by the advent of the one-party state. As we’ll show, several of these
developments were critical in the aligning of interests to support the transition in 1991.
Agriculture in the One-Party State

The goal to subsume social and economic organizations and bend them to the
purpose of UNIP’s development agenda was perhaps best realised in the agricultural
cooperative movement, institutionalized by the Cooperative Act of 1970. ZCF was
formed in 1973 as a federal cooperative society to coordinate the activities of local
primary cooperatives. As an apex organization, ZCF gained prominence in the mid-
1970's, resulting in a move by the ruling party to coopt the organization and affiliate it to
the party as a "mass organization." UNIP's argument was that affiliation would give ZCF
an opportunity to influence policy decisions when they were drafted in the Central
Committee. However, the price paid was the loss of autonomy: ZCF was granted only
one out of 25 seats on the Committee, while the organization was obliged to abide by all
Committee decisions.

During the 1980's, the ZCF grew exponentially as increasing responsibilities in the
agricultural sector were assigned to it by the UNIP government: Provincial Cooperative
Unions (PCU's) were formed in every province, regardless of their viability and the drain
on ZCF resources; NAMBOARD was liquidated and all of its functions transferred to

ZCF, including the transfer of all rural marketing depots to ZCF's member Primary

75

 

Cooperative Societies; District Cooperative Unions (DCU's) were formed in any district
producing a specified amount of maize, essentially to carry out agricultural marketing
activities already assigned to the PCU's, thus draining resources further and creating an
additional level of bureaucracy. Government's plan was for primary societies to provide
credit, and DCUs and PCUs to provide marketing opportunities, all closely monitored by
government officials. Hence, before 1991, government gave pronouncements which
dictated projects and plans to the cooperatives. allowing no negotiation. The Department
of Marketing and Cooperatives, within the Department of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries,
signed the checks for fund disbursal to the cooperatives, and sent an official to all
meetings that were held (Nakaponda-Sakala, 1997). Importantly, these developments
were the result of government directives, resulting in the feeling among cooperative
members and the public that cooperatives were owned and operated by the government,
and obligated to provide resources to members (Nakaponda-Sakala 1996:8-9). And as a
consequence of the close relationship of the cooperative leadership with Party officials, the
ZCF came to be seen as a patronage channel for UNIP, delivering the support of the rural
constituency to the government in exchange for agricultural inputs and marketing
structures.

As for the persistently European-dominated CFB, while it was not coopted by
government in the same way the trade unions and cooperatives were, it was a key fixture
in government's control of the command economy. For example, it coordinated the
government's single channel market system (and was thereby able to collect levies on
production from its members, an important component of its substantial organizational

capacity), it was responsible for negotiating with government on farmers' behalf in the

76

 

fixing of agricultural prices, and membership in the organization was necessary to obtain
foreign exchange. Organizationally. the CFB benefitted from its position vis a vis the
UNIP government, though its members were ideologically against the economic policies
of the one—party state, and were ready to support movements toward economic if not
political reform.
The Labour Movement
Though commercial farmers and private business were significantly outside the
official organs of the one-party system, organized labors' position was somewhat more
ambiguous: the workers were part of the urban constituency that benefitted from UNIP's
patronage, but their leadership was Opposed to party dominance of the trade union
movement. The Labour and Industrial Act of 1971, which replaced the voluntarist
elements of labour policy with mandatory provisions, sought to centralize control over the
labour movement by instituting a "one industry, one union" principle, and amalgamating all
unions under an "apex" organization, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
(Akwetey 1994147, see also Meebelo 1986 and Rakner 1992). The UNIP government
envisaged this move as one which would extend its control through the branches of the
unions to workers throughout the country. While ZCTU was never formally affiliated to
UNIP as a "mass organization," under the UNIP Constitution it was given representation
on both the National Council and the General Conference. However, ZCTU was not
permitted representation on the Central Committee, where government policy was
deliberated and decided upon; for reasons Kaunda made clear in the following statement:
"The ZCTU as a people's organisation is responsible to the party and comes under
the discipline of the party. It is the duty of the ZCTU to pursue the Party's
programmes and to implement Party policies because the Party is supreme over the

ZCTU and other national institutions (Zambia Information Service, 10/10/75).

77

 

The election of two "youthful leaders” in 1974-75 thwarted this, the party's vision
for trade unionism. Akwetey argues the "election of these two youthful leaders together
with other young trade unionists, marked an important shift in leadership style and
orientation" (1974). Both Newstead Zimba, elected Secretary-General of ZCTU in 1974,
and Frederick Chiluba, elected Chairman-General in 1975, belonged to a new generation
of trade unionists, one that differed from the "old guard" in its lack of attachment to UNIP
and its goal to strengthen the ZCTU and trade unions against UNIP coercion. The trained
leadership of these trade unionists, together with an educated workforce, assured financial
position, and institutionalized decision-making framework, enhanced the organisational
capability of the ZCTU; and gave force to its bid for substantial autonomy from the party
combined with genuine participation in the policy-making process.

Throughout the 1980's, ZCTU's leadership consistently resisted UNIP's efforts to
coopt them into either defacto or dejure organs of the party. Rather than acquiescing to
wholescale implementation of UNIP policy, the ZCTU criticized policies they viewed as
deleterious to workers' interests, and continually took workers' side in demands for higher
wages and their recourse to illegal strike action. The import of this stance became
apparent in 1981, when 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 workers occurred, and Chiluba,
Zimba, and others were placed in detention for six months. This, together with Chiluba
and Zimba's refusal to serve on the Central Committee when appointed to it in 1989,
consolidated their stature as leaders of a growing opposition to UNIP and the one-party

state (Akwetey 1994, see also Bratton 1992).

78

Business

As noted above, the organizing of African business interests before independence
was mostly carried out by marketeers’ cooperative societies. However, with the
Mulungushi accords of 1968, access to business opportunities for Africans were
fundamentally improved. In addition, the election of 1973 marked the emergence of a
substantial number of Members of Parliament with business interests, thus marking a "rise
to political prominence of a Zambian business class" (Baylies and Szeftel 1984259). In this
election, at least a quarter of all new, non-incumbent candidates were "soley classifiable as

111

businessmen (see Figure 3.1), and data available for candidates in the 1978 election
suggests that these tendencies observed in 1973 had continued (ibidz67). The relationship
between property owners and the one-party state was a complex two-way process: on
one side, it involved the entry of businessmen into Parliament and local councils through
elections, while on the other it entailed the acquisition of business interests by those in
party and state positions, and exit from such positions into private enterprise (ibidz69-70).
Baylies and Szeftel note that this process resulted in a growing strength of the
indigenous business lobby, reinforced not only by the expanding business interests of high
level state Officials, but also by the strongly increased presence of businessmen within
Parliament. Alongside these developments, organizations of indigenous businessmen, in
particular the Zambia African Traders Association (ZATA) and later the Zambian National
Council of Commerce and Industry (ZNCCI), Zambia Builders Association (ZBA), and
the United Taxi Association, were gaining increased credibility through the 1970's. These

two developments together laid the groundwork for the development of a significant

indigenous business lobby. Though only half of the Lusaka and rural businessmen active

79

in Zambia at the time were members of these business groups, the more successful
businessmen joined in disproportionate numbers to the less successful. According to
Beveridrge and Oberschall, these groups actively lobbied government on at least three
issues: the attempt to persuade government to impose regulations which limited
opportunities in their sector to their members, the reversal of government policy on price
controls, and the improvement of funding together with a detailed program for the
takeover of ex-patriate businesses (19792266). Alongside the African ZNNCI, ex-patriate
groups continued to Operate and attempt to influence government, including the Chambers
of Commerce and local affiliates, the Association of Manufacturers (founded in the mid-
1980'5), the Motor Trades Association, and the Masterbuilders Association.S However,
both African and ex-patriate groups had limited influence over the socialist-oriented
policies Of the UNIP government, and remained well aware during this period of the
degree to which they were politically dependent on the party for access to the state.

The final group to be considered under this category is the Zambia Federation of
Employers (ZF E). Founded in 1955, the Association’s stated objective was to provide for
the “establishment, promotion, development and maintenance of good relations between
employers and employees throughout Zambia, and to promote productivity through
industrial peace.” The 1971 Industrial Relations Act made the organization the sole
umbrella group for employers' associations in Zambia and legally mandated the ZFE to
represent employers in negotiations with trade unions and government as part of the

Tripartite Council. During the Second Republic, ZFE's membership and hence leadership)

 

5Interestingly, Beveridge and Oberschall point to the fact that while no Europeans or Asians joined the
African associations during this period, several substantial African businessmen belonged to the expatriate
associations (19792258).

80

 

was primarily comprised Of employers from the parastatal sector; since these positions
were an important resource for the UNIP patronage machine, the organization and its
members were more closely tied to the interests of the government than the ZNCCI or the
local Chambers of Commerce.

3.4 Summary: The Effects of Corporatism on Economic Organizations

The advent of the one—party state brought important changes to the institutional
and political environment of Zambian interest groups. In the agricultural sector, both
peasant cooperatives and commercial farmers were brought into collaboration with the
state, though in different ways. Subsistence and small-scale African producers in the
cooperative schemes were brought into the patronage machine of the ruling party through
its control of productive inputs and marketing outlets. Commercial farmer organizations
(mostly ex-patriate) were beholden to the state for influence over pricing and the
distribution of foreign exchange. Though many individual small-scale farmers had
disagreements with the state over the lack of investment in the agricultural sector and the
corresponding lack of resources available to them, and though most commercial farmers
were ideologically against the socialist economic policies of the state, both of their
organizations had stakes in the maintenance of the one-party state.

Such was also the case with business associations. For African business
associations, the economic dirigisme practiced by the one-party state opened up
productive opportunities (such as ownership in the privately-run taxi sector, or
management of new government parastatals) never before realized. Individuals might
have had complaints with specific policies, and indeed the organization actively lobbied for

some policy positions which opposed official state policy, but the organizations themselves

81

 

benefitted from their position vis a vis the state.

Only in the industrial sector did organizations have the political power, reason, and
capacity necessary to actively maintain a separate and almost oppositional relationship
with the state. Repeated attempts of the UNIP regime to coopt the labor movement ran
headlong into the trade union movement’s capable organizational structure and well-

developed appreciation for autonomy from any govemment.

3.5 An Institutional Framework for Interest Representation in the Second
Republic

What is the most useful way to capture the economic and political distinctions
between the different interest groups which have emerged in Zambia? There are three
clear economic sectors in Zambia which represent distinct categories: agriculture, business
and labor. But there are also distinctions within these broad sectors which have
potentially important implications for all three characteristics of interest groups that are
the subject of this study, i.e. membership incentives, organizational resources, and policy
influence. The distinctions within economic sectors include such categories of economic
actors as: commercial farmers, peasant farmers, small traders, parastatal managers,
international corporations, miners, construction workers, and civil servants. Table 3.4
supplements Table 3.1 given above, to include categorization of the interest groups that
have emerged in the Second Republic (see column III), as discussed in the previous

section.

82

 

Table 3.4
Economic Sectors and their Interest Groups , 1965-1991

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I II [B
Sector Actors Involved in Sector Group Which
Represents Actors
Agriculture Commercial Farmers CF B
Emergent Farmers CFB / ZC F
Subsistence Farmers ZCF
Mining Workers (miners, etc) MUZ (ZCTU)
Managers ZF E
Manufacturing Workers ZCTU & Affiliates
Managers ZFE & Affiliates
Businessmen ZNCCI
Trade & Services Workers ZCTU & Affiliates
Managers ZF E & Affiliates
Businessmen ZNCCI

 

 

Note: CFB~Commercial Farmer ’s Bureau, ZCF~Zambia Cooperative F ederation,
MUZ~Mineworkers Union of Zambia, ZCTU~Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, ZFE~Zambia
Federation of Employers, ZNCCI~Zambia National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce
and Industry.

As Bianchi argues, interest groups are best understood and analyzed in the context
of “hybrid systems” of interest representation. He and other scholars find that the case is
often a mixing of pluralist with corporatist structures; we argue that in Zambia, the case is
primarily a mixing of neopatrimonial state corporatism with quasi-pluralism. The prefix
“quasi” is necessary here, because the pluralist form of interest representation requires a
pluralist regime, with the accompanying guarantees for civic and political rights, and the

existence of a healthy multi-party system" and autonomous legislature,7 which the interest

 

6 An integral part of Schmitter’s partial “electoral regime.”

7 An integral part of Schmitter’s partial “representational regime.”

83

 

representation system8 is able to make use Of in interactions with the state. Especially
important are the ways in which groups in pluralist systems are able to use multi-party
competition to their advantage when seeking influence over government policy; not only
can groups wield financial and political (i.e. their link to electoral constituencies) pull to
persuade policy makers, they can also turn to parties of similar ideological orientation for
support. Where these mechanisms are absent, it does not make sense to speak of
“pluralist” interest representation; groups may still form voluntarily, but will not gain
access to decision-makers except through channels controlled by the government;
especially in one-party regimes, the electoral and partisan incentives for government to
negotiate over key policy issues is crucially absent.

The term neopatrimonial state-corporatism is also necessary, as specific state-
society relationships are at least partially determined by the logic of politics, in this case,
neopatrimonialism. In Zambia, the practice of neopatrimonial politics in the Second
Republic gave shape to the particular corporatist and pluralist-like policies practiced by
the state. Kaunda’s highly centrist presidential rule, backed by his homemade-brand of
African socialism, Humanism, created a situation in which the UNIP-state actively sought
a corporatist—type control and monopolization Of social and economic groups. However,
as is characteristic in neopatrimonial regimes, the state did not have the administrative
capacity to achieve the full incorporation of societal groups into Party structures. Rent-
seeking opportunities and patronage rewards were used instead to cajole important

interests to toe the line Of UNIP’s development objectives and resulting economic policies.

 

8 An integral part of Schmitter’s partial “pressure regime”

84

 

The ideology of the one-party state in Zambia, as well as other post-colonial states
in Africa, implies that the state will at least attempt control over all societal interests and
groups; the spaces in which it does not succeed are defined by the capacity and ability of
that sector (or the groups within it) to successfully negotiate a conciliatory— but never
competitive— relationship with the state. In Zambia, three distinct types of relationships
can be seen to have developed during the Second Republic, based on two variables: a) the
perceived need of the state to control the economic sector, and b) the capacity / ability of
groups within the sector to resist incorporation. Where the state sought control,
neopatrimonial corporatist ties developed. In sectors which the state did not deem
important to its objectives. quasi-pluralism took root. Furthermore, within the
neocorporatist block, two types can be seen to have emerged: ”state-dominated
corporatism, ” in which groups did not evince the capacity / ability to resist control by the
state, and “state-negotiated corporatism,” in which groups were able to maintain a degree
of autonomy from the state. Economic interest groups in Zambia can be thus divided into
three categories, as illustrated by Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.6
Typology of Interest Representation System in Zambia’s Third Republic

State seeks control over sector?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Yes No
State-corporatist
I 111
Yes State-negotiated Quasi-pluralist
A utonomous Corporatism
Society
resists
control? 11 W _
N 0 State-dominated (Not appl icable)
C oopted C orporatism
8 5

The interest groups given in Table 3.4 can be categorized using the above schema.
We begin with consideration of the state-corporatist column (cells I & 11). As discussed in
Chapter Two, Schmitter makes the point that this sub-type of corporatism is “dependent
and penetrated by the state, imposed from above as the state seeks to establish control
over society.” Singular peak organizations arise due to state-imposed decrees,
organizational structures are hierarchical in response to state-decreed centralization and
administrative dependence, and state control over leadership and interest articulation
emerge as the product of an assymetric imposition by the state. With the exception of the
latter factor, state control over leadership and interest articulation, all of these
characteristics aptly describe the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).

The distinguishing point between the nature of the relationship between the ZCF
and the one-party state, and the ZCTU and ZFE and the one-party state, was the degree to
which the state was successful in coopting these organizations. In the case of the ZCF,
the account given in Section 3.3 above indicates that the state was fairly successful in its
ability to control the cooperative movement, to the point that many cooperators believed
the ZCF was a government agency. The relationship was thus a dominated state
corporatist one. This agricultural category of interest group was the only economic
group to fall into this type of relationship with the state; although other societal groups
could also be placed here, especially the UNIP’s “mass organizations” such as women and
youth groups. In the case of the ZCTU and ZFE, however, the state was not as successful;
especially in the case of the ZCTU, there is evidence that the organization enjoyed

substantial autonomy from state interests, and thus maintained a negotiated relationship

86

 

with the state during the Second Republic. This can also be argued to be the case for the
ZF E, although here the case is less clear. As pointed out above, although the employers in
the association depended on the parastatals (and thus the government) for their jobs, there
were several cases in which the Federation did not support official state policy at the I
Tripartite meetings.

The third category, quasi-pluralism, (cell 111) applies to cases where the
government did not seek to control the economic sector, and the organizations in that
sector thus enjoyed varying levels of autonomy from the state. This applies to the local
Chamber movement, as well as to the ZN CCI, due to Kaunda’s ambiguous stance toward
the private business sector and its organizations. Due to his suspicion of their anti-
Humanist tendencies, as well as to the position of important businessmen in the Party and
Legislature, the UNIP regime never really supported nor suppressed private business.

The same held true for commercial farmer associations affiliated to the CFB.
Here, the reason lay largely in the small size of the sector (800 commercial farmers to
600,000 peasant farmers at one point), and the fact that most commercial farmers (though
not all) were white, expatriate, or both. Thus, the population in this economic sector did
not pose much of a threat as a political constituency. The sector was economically of
interest to the state, as it did make meager contributions to export earnings, and more
importantly, produced the staple food crop which fed the population the regime was
interested in; the state therefore included the CFB in agricultural pricing negotiations and
control of foreign exchange for the sector. However, the internal workings of the
commercial farmer organizations were left to the organizations to manage. Hence,

business organizations and commercial farmer associations maintained a quasi-pluralist

87

relationship to the state; they were free to fomi. memberships were voluntary, they lacked

the government-imposed, hierarchical organizational pattern of the Cooperative

Federation and Congress of Trade Unions. and the UNIP regime seemed uninterested in

controlling their operations.

Table 3.5 summarizes these relationships. by economic sector, while Figure 3.3

places Zambia’s major interest groups in the schema developed above.

Table 3.5

A Political-Economic Theoretical Framework for the Development of Economic
Interests, 1965-1991

 

 

 

 

Businessmen

ZNCCI

I II III IV
Sector Actors Involved in Group Which Relationship of
Sector Represents Actors Group to State
Agriculture Commercial Farmers CFB Quasi—Pluralist
Emergent Farmers CFB / ZCF
Subsistence Farmers ZC F State-dominated Corporatist
Mining Workers MUZ (ZCTU) State-negotiated Corporatist
Managers ZFE State-negotiated Corporatist
Manufacturing Workers ZCTU & Affiliates State-negotiated Corporatist
Managers ZFE & Affiliates State—negotiated Corporatist

Quasi-Pluralist

 

Trade &
Services

 

 

Workers
Managers
Businessmen

 

ZCTU & Affiliates
ZFE & Affiliates
ZNCCI

 

State-negotiated Corporatist
State-negotiated Corporatist
Quasi-Pluralist

 

88

 

 

 

Figure 3.7
Categorizing the Interest Group System in Zambia’s Third Republic

State seeks control over sector?

 

 

Yes NO
State-corporatist
I 111
Yes State-negotiated Quasi-pluralist
Autonomous C orporatism ZNCCI
Society ZCTU CFB
resists ZFE
control?
11 1V
No State-dominated (Not applicable)
C oopted C orporatism
ZCF

 

 

 

 

3.6 Conclusion

There are at least two reasons why it is important to specify the type of interest
representation system when conducting a study of interest groups and the development of
pluralism. First, the literature on interest groups in Africa is quite thin compared to other
world regions, and good empirical work requires sound theorizing. Second, the dual
reform process underway in Zambia’s Third Republic portends to introduce political and
economic institutions which are significantly different than those of the Second Republic,
and which we hypothesize will have implications on interest group activity in Zambia.
Since we hypothesize that interest group activity in the pluralist Third Republic is affected
by two variables, economic sector and institutional history, it’s necessary to characterize
the variation found between interest groups in the Second Republic in terms of these
variables, in order to analyze their effects on membership incentives, on organizational

resources, and on influence strategies, in the Third Republic. Before turning to these

89

 

analyses, however, we first address the ecology Of the emerging interest group system in
the Third Republic. Which groups have survived and which new groups have emerged?
How do groups relate to one another in the new system? And, whose interests are

represented?

90

 

 

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECOLOGY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS
IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC

Ecology: 1. The study of the relationships of organisms to their physical environment and to
one another. The branch of biology dealing with the relations and interactions between organisms
and their environment, including other organisms. 2. Also called human ecology. the branch of
sociology concerned with the spacing and interdependence of people and institutions.

4.1 Introduction

The histories of the major economic interest groups in Zambia were introduced in
Chapter Three. We argued that the evolution of state-society relations in the Second
Republic produced three main types of relationships between the UNIP one-party state
and economic interest groups: state-dominated corporatism, state-negotiated corporatism,
and quasi-pluralism. We also argued that two factors explain why different groups
developed one of these three types of relationship to the state: a) the importance of the
economic sector to state interests, and b) the capacity for groups to resist state
cooptation. We now turn. to examine the development of these relationships in the Third

Republic. AS we pointed out in Chapter Two, the critical junction between the Second.

91

 

and Third Republics has been the adoption of dual reform processes; in the political arena,
the centrism of the one-party state has been replaced with the institutions of pluralism and
multi-party democracy, while in the economic arena, the state-owned sector and command
economy have been reformed by privatization and economic liberalization policies. The
questions we seek to address in this chapter are: How has the previous interest group
system in the Second Republic weathered the transition to the Third Republic— do the
same groups exist or have new ones emerged to challenge / take their place? How have
groups been affected by the political and economic changes of the early 1990's? What are
the broad outlines of the new system in terms of group coordination, competition, and the
inclusiveness of economic interests within the system? Finally, given that the political
reforms of the transition broke apart corporatist relations between the UNIP state and
economic interest groups, dejure across the board, how have different groups adapted—
and are they affected by their institutional legacy?

To address these questions, we here examine the universe, or “ecology,” of
interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic. This section provides description of the major
national groups within each sector, and analysis of the changing institutional environments
in which they operate. First, we describe the context in which state-society relations are
changing in the Third Republic. We then examine the ecology of the economic interest
group system, at the national level, and the individual groups within it. To highlight the
expected differences between groups’ former-institutional relationship to the state and
current developments in the Third Republic, we subdivide this section by the categories
developed in Chapter Three: state-dominated corporatism, state-negotiated corporatism,

and quasi-pluralism, followed by a section on new groups that have emerged. We then

92

 

look at the broad outlines of the new group system, in terms of inter—group coordination,
competition, and inclusiveness. We conclude with analysis of the group system in the

Third Republic, and the prospects for pluralist development it portends.

4.2 The political-economic context of interest group development

in the Third Republic

To summarize the thesis thus far, in Zambia's Second Republic, the
representational relationship between the state and society was mainly one of state
corporatism, involving the attempted merging of the institutions of the state with the
United National Independence Party (UNIP) and civic and interest organizations. Where
the UNIP state succeeded in its attempts to coopt and control, organizations in civil
society tended to lose their autonomy and independence; in some cases, they were even
compelled to take up affiliated membership in the ruling party. Such affiliation meant they
were brought under the control of the ruling party and government, and their activities
were required to conform to the Constitution and rules of the party (Mushota 1990231).
The transition to a liberalized polity and economy in 1991 formally brought about a more
pluralistic representational arena: specifically, it dissolved the corporative relationship
between the ruling party and civil society groups, and encouraged new groups to form
freely under constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech and association.

Ideologically, too, the new regime publicly espoused the philosophy of pluralist
democracy. The ideas for liberalization of the economy and release of government from
the single party's control were first articulated at the National Conference for Multi-Party

Option. At the Conference, a series of speakers decried the bankruptcy of the one-party

93

 

state and advocated liberalization of the economy and the development of truly plural and
democratic politics (see Mbikusita-Lewanika & Chitala 1990). Dr. Remmy Mushota (who
was to later become Minister for Legal Affairs for the MMD government) delivered an
important address in which he identified five means of institutionalizing democracy:
citizenship, the right to vote, the electoral system, political parties, and interest groups.
Remmy argued that in a democracy,

"it is essentially imperative that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with their
government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and
execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes do make it desirable that citizens be
allowed and encouraged through the law tojoin together in groups based on similar social and
economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its
activity touches these likes and interests" (Lewanika & Chitala 1990230).

This passage captures the spirit of the liberalized viewpoint of state-society
relations later enshrined in the MMD Manifesto. However, neither Mushota nor other
speakers at the Conference had a specific formula for ensuring that such groups would
indeed gain influence where government activity "touches (their) likes and interests."
Similarly, the MMD Campaign Manifesto does not address how the interface between the
private sector and the public / government sector is to actually take place. While the
economic policies to be promoted are laid down in broad strokes, with some sections
including reference to “facilitating regular institutional consultation between the
Chambers of Commerce, government and Labour leaders on various socio—economic
matters” (Manifesto 1996:8) or MMD's intention to "open its doors to the labor
movement as a legitimate and important partner in development" (Chanda 1992275), no
mention is made of establishing institutions to provide for the inclusion of stakeholders in
actual policy determination. It seems this omission is at least partially intentional; as an

officer in the Cabinet Office related, the government views the MMD Manifesto as the

94

basis for government policy... "when the people voted MMD into power, they (the MMD)
assumed that the manifesto represented what people want. The Party therefore wants to
implement the Manifesto. The government can't be over-influenced by interest groups in
this regard'”. However, he points out that the government is willing to compromise; as an
example, he gave the lowering of VAT in the 1997 budget from 20% to 17.5%, and
remarked, "to us, that indicates influence from the private sector" (ibid). Thus, groups can
hope for influence around the edges of the MMD’S main economic policies, but the basis,
the tenets of the Manifesto, are seemingly not open to debate.

These tenets of the Manifesto give the broad outlines of the MMD government’s .
economic reform program. Table 4.1 gives the main points of the Manifesto with respect
to economic policy, while Table 4.2 gives the Policy Framework Paper agreed to with the
World Bank in 1990 by the UNIP regime, and adopted by the MMD upon its election in

1991.

 

' Interview with Chresta Kaluba, 6/25/97.

95

Table 4.1

Main Points of the MMD Government’s Campaign Manifesto,

with Regard to Economic Policy

(from Section 3: Socio-Economic Perspectives)

 

 

Heading Key Points
“The MMD is determined to bring about a new era
a) “Enabling of opportunity of economic policy realism which
Environment” rewards and motivates individual initiative... The

MMD is committed to creating an enabling
environment for economic development in Zambia
by implementing a balanced structural adjustment
programme...

 

b) “Investor

“The MMD is committed to building investor

 

 

 

 

Confidence” confidence and credibility in our country...
“The MMD is committed to privatisation... the
c) current economic role of government as a central
“Privatisation” participant in business undertakings Shall cease.
Free market and not nationalization will become
the foundation stone...”
(1) “Monetary “The MMD will pursue policies which will
Policy” encourage savings and investments. The MMD’s
exchange rate policy favours natural depreciation
of the kwacha...”
“The MMD shall adopt strict financial management
and sound budgetary control. The chronic budget
e) “Budgetary deficits... shall be arrested by streamlining the
Issues” public service... adopting more effective methods

 

of tax collection; broadening the tax base; selling
off as many state-owned enterprises as possible;
selling excess stocks of government houses...

 

Source:

MMD Manifesto 1996: 8—9

96

 

Table 4.2
Main Economic Reforms, World Bank Policy Framework Paper, 1990

 

a Price decontrols of all products (except maize) and inputs

 

b Exchange rate adjustment in real terms and elimination of
exchange rate restrictions

 

c Liberalization of export and import trade, while providing
export incentives

 

d Fiscal austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit and
control inflation

 

 

e Monetary policy measures to adjust interest rates and tighten
monetary policy
f Reform of public investment program to focus on resource

allocation to priority sectors and programs

 

g Reform of civil service and parastatals to improve efficiency
and performance

 

 

 

 

h A privatization program
Source: World Bank, Public Expenditure Review of Zambia, 1 992:6, quoted in van de
Walle and Chiwele, 1997:27

 

Among these reforms, the MMD identified the attainment of macroeconomic
stabilization as its most immediate Objective (Rakner 1998:89, McPherson 1995). To
bring down inflation, the government instituted monetary and fiscal reforms to cut fiscal
deficits, reduce growth in the money supply, and decrease the budget deficit by cutting
government expenditures and increasing its revenues. This resulted in a sharp reduction in
government subsidies, the implementation of a cash-based budgeting system, improvement
of revenue collection, and a reduction in the international debt burden through renewed
agreements with the international donor community (Rakner 1989:89). According to
Rakner’s thesis, the MMD government was able to implement such potentially unpopular

policies such as the removal of subsidies (especially on maize, which in 1991 constituted

97

 

 

nearly 17 per cent of the government’s total budget), and the privatization of parastatal
industries2 in the first few years of its reign (the “honeymoon period”), due to the popular
mandate and electoral legitimacy it enjoyed from its victory in the 1991 election. In
Zambia, in fact, the new regime used the “honeymoon period” to rapidly implement a wide
range of reforms, with little or no consultation of economic interest groups, leading
Rakner to conclude: “the initial implementation of the economic reforms was carried out
in a rather autocratic fashion” (199821 18).

As van de Walle and Chiwele point out in their study of democratization and
economic reform in Zambia, these policies and the economic crisis they were meant to
address intrinsically have potential winners and losers. For instance, Zambia’s worsening
economic situation served to erode the strength of unions: “the high levels of
unemployment, the shaky balance of payments Situation and the unsustainable government
budget deficit all weaken organized labor’s bargaining position” (1994: 22). In addition,
the successful privatization of the majority of parastatal industries in Zambia has resulted
in increasing levels of unemployment as new owners streamline business operations and
inefficient companies go out of business altogether; a point which, again, weakens labor’s
position. In the business sector, certain reforms such as the cash budget and privatization
enjoy support from the entire community, but other reforms, such as trade liberalization,
split trading sector businesses and manufacturers (ibid)— both of whom are Often members
in the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. And in the farming sector, many commercial

farmers welcome market reforms, while many peasant farmers struggle with the cessation

 

2 In 1991, the parastatal sector accounted for 80% of GDP, with 160 public enterprises under
government ownership, employing some 140,000 staff” (van de Walle and Chiwele 1994:38).

98

of government subsidized inputs and govemment-coordinated marketing arrangements.3

Politically, too, interest groups face advantages and disadvantages in the new
environment of the Third Republic. Groups which had worked closely with the UNIP
regime, such as the Cooperative Federation, now find their former political patron in the
opposition; while groups which had supported the MMD regime, such as business
interests and the trade union movement, might be expected to find political allies in the
new government. Furthermore, the neopatrimonial nature Of politics in Zambia still
permeates its institutions; a strong presidency continues to dominate a weak legislature
and dependentjudiciary, the MMD gives lip service to the idea of encouraging political
competition in a pluralistic political arena while in practice it maneuvers to limit real
competition as much as possible, and the political elite rule through networks of personal
loyalty. In recognition, perhaps, that the political game hasn’t changed all that much, all
of the group leaders interviewed for this study insisted that their group was not only non-
partisan, but non-political— and thus, nothing resembling a potential threat to an overly-
sensitive government which often does not distinguish between the act of opposing a
particular policy and opposing the government who made it. As we’ll see below, this ruse
works for some groups better than others.

Thus, the institutional environment in the Third Republic is one which potentially
Offers economic interest groups new opportunities for organizing and influencing

government, even as economic reform measures shake up their standing and position in

 

3 “Most of all, the process of removing a set of, albeit poorly functioning state
monopolies, with decentralized private networks resulted tremendous dislocations for the large
majority of rural small scale producers. For this group, state subsidies for maize production had
become the only social welfare mechanism from the state” (Rakner 1998: 108).

99

the economy, vis-a-vis each other and the government. Throwing a large shadow over the
picture is the MMD government’s approach to implementing the many reform objectives it
has embarked upon. Our next question is thus: in this uncertain and continually-evolving
institutional environment, how is the interest group system shaping up?
4.3 The Ecology of National Economic Interest Groups in the Third Republic
The interest group system in the Third Republic displays signs of both continuity
and change. All of the national organizations discussed in Chapter Three have weathered
the transition, though some have emerged bearing different names and / or re-cast images.
In the business sector, the Zambia Association Of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI) has replaced the ZNNCI, while the CFB underwent a name change in 1992 to
become the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU). Though no longer a “mass
organization” of UNIP, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) remains the apex
organization of a vast, though diminishing, network of cooperatives. And in the industrial
relations sectors, both the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambia
Federation of Employers (ZF E) remain the apex organizations for their affiliated unions
and employers’ associations, and the government’s sole partners in the Tripartite Council.
As expected, the newly pluralist environment has encouraged the development of
new groups in addition to the old; in the agricultural sector, two new apex national
organizations have emerged to represent small farmers interests, and a move is underway
to create a national organization to coordinate the efforts Of emerging Provincial Business
Associations, which seek to organize small- and medium- scale commerce and industry.
In addition, the number of local affiliates of some of these groups (especially ZACCI and

ZNFU) is also increasing, drawing new populations and interests into the formal interest

100

group system. As stated above, we use our typology of the previous institutional
relationships of these groups to the state, to guide our analysis of the ecology of the new
group system.

4.3.1 State-Dominated Corporatist Groups

The Zambia Cooperative Federation (Z CF)

In the Third Republic, the ZCF has been most significantly impacted by the
Agricultural Strategic Investment Program (ASIP), initiated in June 1995 as the
Government’s official policy for liberalizing agricultural production and marketing, and the
revising of the Cooperative Act of 1970, which defined the UNIP regime’s policy toward
small-scale agriculture. Addressing the 1995 National Cooperative Convention, President
Chiluba made clear the differences between the former regime’s policy toward small-scale
agriculture and his own regime’s vision (reflected in ASIP) for the sector. According to
President Chiluba, the problems with the former cooperative movement were threefold:
first, they were “formed from the top as a mater of government policy and only after was
the membership recruited;” second, “and this is what bothers me most— the legal
framework gave excessive powers to government to intervene unnecessarily in the
management and operations of the cooperative enterprises;” and third, cooperatives were
formed “not because of felt member needs but as a result of felt government needs, and so
cooperatives were created to fulfill a government function and became a logical extension
of the government bureaucracy” (ZCF— 6th National Cooperative Convention Report,
1995215, emphasis added).

Ironically, President Chiluba complained that even as of 1995, not much had

changed because the cooperatives were still regulated by the “outdated command oriented

101

Cooperative Societies Act,” which he insisted needed to be changed (by his government,
no less) so that cooperatives could be left “totally in the hands of cooperators.” He hence
publicly instructed his Minister of Agriculture to “ensure the outdated Act is duly
amended” (ibid:16). To replace this dismal picture of the Second Republic’s cooperative
movement, Chiluba painted his vision of a cooperative movement “founded on the
principles of democracy and voluntary membership,” where cooperatives were able to
deliver goods and services to their members, in an environment in which government’s
role would be solely to “ensure provision of the basic infrastructure necessary for ensuring
smooth business operations... only going into those areas where the private sector cannot
go.” The flagship of his vision is the MMD’S ASIP policy, whose main objective is to
“stimulate accelerated development of the agricultural sector through the creation of a
strong private sector” (ibid).

Both the new policy and political environments have proven difficult, however, for
the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) to attain President Chiluba’s vision. With the
transition to the Third Republic in 1991, the cooperatives deaffiliated from UNIP and
sought establishment as an autonomous and independent movement. As articulated by
Cooperative Federation leaders, the Federation wanted to see the cooperative movement
move away from top-down directives issued from government under the Cooperative
Societies Act of 1970, and toward the genuine, member-based cooperative institutions
lauded by President Chiluba. However, though the MMD Government has articulated
Similar Objectives for the cooperative movement, the political will to change the
Cooperative Act was notably missing as of the mid-1990's. As of October 1996, the Bill

was still at Cabinet level for deliberation, and as of 1997, a final Draft Bill had yet to

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emerge.

For the Federation, the main issues were the removal of powers of the Registrar of
Societies, the cessation of Government involvement in cooperatives, and the revocation of
government’s unfettered powers to direct and dissolve cooperative boards. These points
were included in a proposal the Federation made, upon government’s request, to the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries. However. the Ministry rejected the proposal
as a “radical shift,” and instead hired an F.A.O consultant to produce a new, “more
acceptable” draft, which the Federation in turn rejected, as it retained the power of the
Registrar to monitor primary societies. In the words of an exasperated ZCF official,
“cooperatives must be private institutions, and should be allowed to run their affairs on
their own. Government claims it is protecting the rights of the members... but in fact, it
still has arbitrary power over the cooperatives” (Kajimanga 10/1/97).

From the perspective of ZCF officials, their previous affiliation to UNIP has
caused the MMD government to regard them as sympathetic to the political opposition;
government was thus unwilling to work with the ZCF'S national leaders. To illustrate, in
his welcoming speech at the 6th National Cooperative Convention in August 1995,
Chairman Chilala first thanked President Chiluba for addressing the conference, then
informed him that:

"We have on several occasions indicated to government that we feel very much

discriminated against as a cooperative sector. We are the only sector still

regulated by an outdated rather authoritative cooperative societies act... We have
on several occasions presented our proposals to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food,
and Fisheries, but no action seems to be taken towards amending the Act."

Chairman Chilala went on to report to the President that the Cooperative

Federation did not “appreciate” the government perpetuating a negative image of the

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cooperative movement and advising donors and investors not to deal with them, they felt
it unfair that ASIP rural investment fund announcements mentioned farmers' associations
but not cooperatives,4 and they also found it unfair that they had become the last to be
considered for government contracts. Indeed, the Federation's misgivings seemed to be
well-founded... in mid-June of 1996, the Swedish Cooperative Center withdrew more then
K600 million from the Cooperative Development Programme it ran jointly with the
Federation since 1982, and donor funds as of 1996 comprised only 1% Of the Federation's
funding. Of course, it doesn’t help their political image that the Federation’s President,
Mr. Benny Tetamashimba, is also the Member of Parliament from Solwezi West, and a
member of the National Party. Unfortunately, this political point outweighs the potential
benefit of having an MP for President: in January 1997, the Federation drafted a "Project
Proposal for a Workshop for Parliamentarians in Zambia," with the aim of dialoguing with
MP5 over the redrafting of the Cooperative Act. As of September 1997, however, they
were still waiting for Parliament to set a date for the Workshop to take place.

Despite the contentious environment they find in the Third Republic, however,
several leaders within the ZCF were still struggling to maintain the cooperative movement
for the benefit of small-scale farmers and other producers. In addition to the problems
above was the problem of membership: as mentioned on numerous occasions in official
ZCF policy documents, the corporatist relationship that the cooperatives had with the one-
party state in the Second Republic had created a “shallow membership incentive,” and

caused a "dependency syndrome" of cooperatives on government. As a result, despite the

 

4 The ASIP specifically names the farmers’ associations of the National Farmers’ Union, the
National Association of Peasant and Small-scale Farmers, and the Peasant Farmers” Union as
organizations to be represented in the DAC’S— but pointedly, not the cooperatives.

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fact that the MMD government had ceased funding the Federation, the perception that
joining a cooperative was simply a way to access government resources persisted among
farmers, foiling the attempt to transform cooperatives into private “business” institutions
(Nakaponda-Sakala, 1997). Finally, the ZCF faces accusations of widespread corruption
and scandals over its handling of cooperative resources. Hence, while the extensive
system of cooperative societies and sub-national units still existed on paper by the mid
1990's, many cooperatives had gone defunct and one of the most well-developed
organizational networks in the country had become. on paper at least, bankrupt.

4.3.2 State-Negotiated Corporatist Sector Groups

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCT U)

The story of the ZCTU’S experience in the Third Republic begins at the very
inception Of the regime , for the ZCTU played an integral role in the establishment of the
MMD. Derrick Chitala, who together with Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika
organized the campaign that later became the Movement for Multiparty Democracy,
writes:

"after concretizing the tentative operational framework of the Alliance for Democracy and
Development, the very first act in our campaign required that we link our efforts against
the one party state tyranny with other individuals and institutions that had shown a resolve
to campaign for multi-party democracy in our country. At the very onset, we identified the
ZCTU and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga as the most probable allies" (Mbikusita-Lewanika and
Chitala, 19902vi).

Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala subsequently met with Newstead Zimba and Frederick
Chiluba, who agreed to work with the Alliance to organize a National Conference.
Charged with the task of creating a "broad coalition of multi party democracy activities,"
the Conference was held in July 1990.

ZCTU was nominated to serve on the National Interim Committee of the

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Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, and was closely involved with mobilizing a

campaign for the MMD previous to the elections of 1991. The Union was engaged in the

following activities toward that end: the mobilization of all District Committees and all

national unions to provide logistical structural support, extensive campaigning tours of all

districts and Provincial Centers by ZCTU and national union leaders, and mass education

campaigns to educate workers on the importance of democratizing government. The fact

that the President as well as several other political leaders in the new MMD government

emerged from the trade union movement bears testimony to the role that the labour

movement played in promoting the advent of the MMD government. The following list

gives the individuals who transferred from the ranks Of the trade union movement to

prominent positions in the new MMD government:

F.T.J. Chiluba, Chairman General, ZCTU -> President of the Republic of Zambia

N.L. Zimba, Secretary General, ZCTU -> Minister of Labour and Social
Security

C.M. Sampa, Asst. Secretary General, ZCTU -> Minister of Home Affairs

H. Kabika National Chairman, CSUZ -> Deputy Minister of Home Affairs

K. G. Sheng/amo, General Secretary, MUZ -> Deputy Minister of Finance

G. Mandani, General Secretary, CSUZ -> Deputy Minister of Labour and
Social Security

One might expect that with so many trade unionists in the new government, the

ZCTU was in for an easy time. Since the transition in 1991, however, this has not been

the case; rather, the institutional environment in the industrial sector has been in a state Of

uncertainty due to wrangling between the MMD government and the ZCTU over the

provisions Of the Industrial Relations Act, a dispute which has its origin in the waning

years of the Second Republic. Since conflicts over the Act affect the position of the ZCTU

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and the ZFE as organizations representing the interests of workers and employers, we here
delve briefly into the details of this very political conflict.

At the time of the ZCTU’s founding in 1965, the Trade Unions and Trade
Disputes Ordinance was amended to provide for obligatory affiliation of any trade union
to the Congress. This provision was withheld when the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) was
enacted in 1971 (CAP 517 of the Laws of Zambia, amended 1973, 1990, and 1993),
setting the institutional environment of the industrial sector. The Act stipulates a one-
industry-one-union policy. allowing one umbrella organization to legally represent trade
unions (the ZCTU) and one organization to legally represent employers (the ZFE).
Affiliation of unions and employers' associations to the apex organizations is mandatory
under the Act; in addition, it stipulates a compulsory check-off system. By thus providing
the apex organizations with sure and plentiful funding, the statute has promoted the
development of strong organizational capacity for the trade union movement, especially
when compared to other interest sectors. The Act also institutionalizes access to labour
policy decision making for the apex organizations, through the auspices of the "Tripartite
Council." Again, this gives the unions better regular, formalized access to government
than organizations in the business and agricultural sectors, though as we’ll discuss in
Chapter Seven, “access” does not necessarily translate to “influence.”

Several studies (Liatto 1989, Rakner, 1993) point to the fact that by the early
1980's, the ZCTU had emerged as the closest thing to an organized opposition to UNIP
that the one-party state would allow. This was in marked contrast to the role that the
ZCTU had played in the seventies; according to Bates’s study, the ZCTU cooperated with

UNIP after independence in trying to bend the interests of members away from personal

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consumption to production for ‘national development’ (Rakner 1993). Rakner argues
that by the early 1980's, however, ZCTU had become “the focus of resistance to
government policies” (1993293), in effect echoing members’ objections to declining
economic conditions and the introduction of the Local Government Act.

The UNIP Government responded, in 1985, with a move to reign in the labor
movement: the passing of Statutory Instruments No 6 was meant to revoke the
compulsory check-off system which gave the apex associations steady income flows. This
was repelled by strong resistance from both the ZCTU and ZFE, resulting in Tripartite
Meetings rejecting proposed amendments to the IRA in 1985, 1988, and 1989. Finally, in
1989, the UNIP government acted unilaterally in sending the Draft Bill to the National
Assembly. This Bill later became the 1990 Industrial Relations Act, which allowed the
formation of more than one trade union in an industry-- a development which again, both
unions and employers were firmly against. The new Act abolished both mandatory
affiliation to the apex organizations and the mandatory check-Off system, and the Minister
Of Labour and Labour Commission were given considerable discretionary powers. Repeal
of the IRA (1990) became a main plank in ZCTU'S support for the Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy. Hence, when the MMD came to power in November 1991, the
tripartite partners agreed to revert to the policy of one union, one industry. The Industrial
Relations Act of 1990 was hence later repealed and replaced by the Industrial and Labour
Relations Act Of 1993.

Since that time, however, the ZCTU has become increasingly outspoken in its
criticism of the MMD governments' policies, resulting in a split in the leadership of the

apex organization in 1994 over the Congress's relationship with MMD, with the anti-

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government faction winning control of the ZCTU. Subsequently, the MMD government
has made clear its objective tO again abolish the one union, one industry provision, and to
do away with the ZCTU and ZFE's position as the only legal apex organizations. The
unions especially are finding it difficult to resist, for the "one industry, one union" principle
conflicts with two important lntemational Labour Organization conventions, NO. 87 and
No. 98, which the Zambian government ratified in 1994. While agreeing in principle with
the ILO mandate, both unions and employers are wary of allowing the representational
arena to fragment; for a multiplicity of groups means fewer members in each group, and
thus a decrease Of bargaining power and decline in funding for all groups.5

The political conflict between pro-MMD unions and unions critical of the MMD
has resulted in seismic shifts in the industrial interest arena. Principal among these was the
de-affiliation of four of the ZCTU’s largest members in 1994: the Mineworkers' Union of
Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW),
the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW) and Zambia National
Union of Teachers. At issue were the elections of the Executive Board at the Ninth
Quadrennial Congress, held in October 1994: ZCTU Chairman General Fackson
Shamenda and ZCTU General Secretary Alec Chirwa were faced by Francis Kunda from

MUZ and ZCTU Assistant Secretary General Geoffrey Alikipo in a "fierce challenge" for

 

5As of April 1997, the technical committee assigned by the Tripartite Council to assess the

proposed changes were proposing that the offending clause be modified to give the Labour Commissioner
(a civil servant, not a politician) power to limit the number of unions (interview with Hang'andu, 16/4/97).
This is to be accomplished by passing regulations which allow only organizations with 51% or more of
the total membership of a given industry to engage in collective bargaining. This would ostensibly create
a competitive arena for the representation of industrial interests; unions would have to fight for members
in a given industry, and an incentive to prevent over-fragmentation of groups would exist. Theoretically,
unions not possessing enough members to be the official "collective bargainer" would still be able to
provide worker's education and lobby government on behalf of their members. However, the incentive to
join and pay dues to a group outside the collective bargaining process is not a compelling one.

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control of the Congress. According to Mr. Shamenda, "government was instigating moves
to have him and Mr Chirwa removed from ZCTU in order to install "yes men" to head the
labour movement... the State was not happy with the position that ZCTU had taken on
SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) as the labour movement was persistently criticizing
Government for its wholesale acceptance of the IMF and World Bank tailored SAP"
("ZCTU Split: What Happened?":2). When Shamenda and Chirwa emerged the victors at
the Quadrennial Congress, Kunda charged that there was "irrefutable evidence that some
high-ranking politicians in the National Party had Sponsored some candidates in the ZCTU
elections... and that some government Ministers (specifically the Minister of Labour and
Social Security) had openly campaigned for these candidates" (ibidz6). Kunda
subsequently announced the de-affiliation of MUZ from the Congress, and was later joined
by the other unions named above. Some time later, the NUCIW reaffiliated to the
Congress, while the National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers
deaffiliated.

However, the issue has continued to plague the union movement, and highlights
the strained relationship that has developed between the MMD government and the
union’s main apex organization, the ZCTU. A headline in the government-owned Times
of Zambia proclaimed in 1997, “Splinter unions are mushrooming!” The article went on
to gush, “and it is power galore for those who are able to create positions for themselves.
Greed, abuse of office, misappropriation of members contributions, dictatorial tendencies
are said to be some of the major reasons for a myriad of splinters in the trade union
movement” (Times of Zambia, 3/10/97). It was reported that the vice-president of the

ZCTU was caught in a scandal, accused of abusing his Office and misappropriating

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members’ contributions in his position as general secretary of the Electrical and Allied
Workers Union (ZEAWU). One thousand ZEAWU members it was reported, had
petitioned to have him removed. ZCTU deputy general secretary Mr. Kasumbu was
quoted in the article, however, as saying that government was planting dissidents in their
organizations in a bid to weaken them... “Government doesn’t want a strong union. And
since it has money, it sponsors a few people to bring confusion into the union” (ibid). In
the same article, the president of ZCTU, Mr. Shamenda, was also quoted in an attack on
the government’s ratification of ILO conventions 87 and 98, claiming the new law to
allow a multiplicity Of trade unions was “oppressive.” Government-sponsored or not, the
splinter-phenomenon continued to rock the labor movement throughout the period, as
trade unions split, reformed, left the ZCTU, then came back to its fold.

At the Civil Servant’s Union annual conference in 1997, the issue came to a head.
ZCTU’S President Shamenda declared the honeymoon for unions with the government
was over. “If we are not careful, we shall be sidelined. Let us unite because these people
in leadership were once with us and know how to weaken us” (Times of Zambia,
1/26/97). Secretary General Chirwa chimed in that government was indirectly supporting
breakaway unions through its ratification of conventions that allow Splinter unions (i.e.
ILO conventions 89 and 97). “What else can one conclude when the same people who
once called for “One Union, One Industry” now allow divisions? Workers, just like the
union as a whole, who expected a lot from the MMD government now wonder why they
campaigned and voted for MMD in 1991 elections” (ibid). On the one hand, this bodes
well for the development of pluralism, for it demonstrates the ZCTU’s continued

willingness to exercise its autonomy and criticize government where it sees fit. On the

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other, however, the increasingly acrimonious relationship between the ZCTU and the
MMD government poses important problems for policy lobbying. This is a point that has
been noted by other civil society leaders. For example, Alfred Zulu, president of the
Zambia Independent Media (ZIMT), a well-respected civil society organization, accused
the ZCTU of failing to define its role and a meaningful policy in the Third Republic, and of
no longer being an organization which represented workers. Only a few leaders in the
unions, he charged, were still committed to the cause of the workers, but even these were
frustrated by those who were aspiring to attain government positions (The Post, 3/14/97).
The Post’s editor was less friendly:

“ZCTU is displaying a very serious lack Of leadership, spine and direction. These

weaknesses can be directly attributable to Shamenda’s failure to assert himself as a

leader. He appears either unwilling or incapable of standing up to his erstwhile

bosses and colleagues now in government. And Shamenda has not been helped by

Chirwa’s clear flirtation with, and concealed support for, the MMD... The ZCTU

is simply not ticking” (ibid).
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZF E)

The Congress’s counterpart in the industrial sector continues to be the Zambia
Federation of Employers (ZFE), founded in 1955. As with the trade unions, the 1971
Industrial Relations Act made the organization the sole umbrella group for employers'
associations in Zambia and legally mandated the ZFE to represent employers in
negotiations with trade unions and government as part of the Tripartite Council.

However, in sharp contrast with the Congress of Trade Unions, the Federation has
pointedly avoided any semblance of political conflict with the MMD government. During

the Second Republic, ZFE's membership was primarily comprised of employers from the

parastatal sector; however, with privatization this situation has changed in the Third

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Republic. The primary focus of the ZFE continues to be labour relations and collective
bargaining, although the organization has been working to expand its advocacy role
(Kroes 1994). While the ZFE hasjoined with the ZCTU in opposition to several
government policy positions, most notably the government’s proposed pension scheme,
the Federation has maintained a much more conciliatory position overall with the MMD
government. And unlike the trade union movement, the employer’s associations did not
begin to splinter and threaten to leave the Federation when the law ending its
representational monopoly was passed.

A good illustration of the amiable relationship between the ZFE and the MMD
government is ZF E President Simenda’s (who was the chairman of Zambia Postal
Corporation at the time, one of the few non-privatized parastatals left in the Third
Republic) pointed effort to publicly support the 35% gratuity that MPs had voted
themselves in 1997: “The 35% gratuity is welcome. We feel that MPs and Ministers do a
lot of work and deserve attractive gratuity. There is nothing wrong with attractive
packages as long as government can pay” (Times of Zambia, 3/31/97). The ZCTU and
Lawyers Association of Zambia, however, were incensed at the gratuity issue, complaining
that the government had other priorities that were more pressing. Just a month before, the
ZCTU had called for a reduction in Cabinet Ministers’ allowances “in conformity with the
need to reduce expenditures in the budget... belt-tightening should be extended to political
leaders who currently received hefty allowances... and are worth millions” (Times of

Zambia 2/1/97).

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4.3.3 Former Quasi-Pluralist Sector Groups
Zambia Asociation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)

Officially formed in 1991, and organizational successor to the Zambia National
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZNCCI), ZACCI is the first “apex” organization to
bring together local Chambers of Commerce from across the country. ZACCI’S main
constituency is large-scale and corporate business, though medium-scale businesses are
encouraged to gain membership through the several local chambers. The ZACCI
headquarter is located in the capital city of Lusaka, close to Parliament, and only a short
drive or telephone call from important Ministries. A relatively large secretariat provides
services to members and coordinates policy lobbying efforts; spokesmen from ZACCI
issues statements and participate in interviews, and thus appear often in the press and
sometime in the evening broadcast news.

As discussed in Chapter Two, key figures in the business sector played important
roles in supporting the transition to multi-party politics and the victory of the MMD. Not
surprisingly, the Association reports that the transition has had positive consequences for
the Association; as the ZACCI’S economic officer tells it: “From 1993 to 1994 MMD
really listened to business; (Ministers) Patel and Kasonde were especially relevant.”6
However, this supportive environment seems to rest to a great extent on the government
personnel involved; thus, Simemba went on to remark that “the new Minister (Penza) is
not as receptive. ZACCI’S increase with government has lately been decreasing, though

we still have an obvious imprint on the budget.”

 

° Interview with Moses Simemba, 25 October 1996.

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The reference to specific Ministers in assessing the relationship between the
government and associations belies the continuing importance of personal relationships in
the Third Republic (between ZACCI members and Ministers. the Bank Governor, the
ZRA, and Permanent Secretaries); according to a prominent Board member of ZACCI,
“we need to keep our friendships in good repair” (interview with Theo Bull 10/25/96).
Bull’s further comments at the ZACCI board meeting in January 1997, are instructive of
the importance of these personal relationships to the relationship between individual
groups and government. At the board meeting, it was learned that Kw9.5 billion had not
reached the roads board and so roadwork had stopped. The funds were apparently
unaccounted for— the money was presumed “stuck” somewhere in the Ministry of Finance.
Bull commented “this is the sort of thing that needs personal clout, letters don’t work.
Someone senior, such as Mr. Chabwera, needs to do something, needs to seek an
appointment directly with Minister Penza” (ibid). Whether such a meeting can be
arranged thus matters much to group’s attempt to lobby policy-makers.

On this note, ZACCI apparently has notable access to influential politicians in the
Third Republic. For example, the chairman of ZACCI, George Chabwera, reported at a
board meeting that he had spoke with and had written to the Minister of Labor and Social
Security, about ZACCI’S position on the National Pension Scheme. The Minister
responded with a request that ZACCI make an official submission for the amendment
process of the bill. On another occassion, several members of Parliament came to the
ZACCI board meeting to communicate with board members: Hon. Badat (Kafue), Hon.
Chewe (Kabwe), Hon. Vernon Mwanga (Roan), Hon. Mutukwa (Nyroro). An issue came

up over ZACCI’S attempt to make submissions to Parliament on the Pension Act. The

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Members responded with an invitation for ZACCI members to come and Observe
Parliamentary debates (though, as we’ll see below, there are serious obstacles to this
actually taking place). The Hon. Mwanga further pointed out to ZACCI board members
that “ in most legislation lately that creates boards, we include ZACCI” (see Table 4.3 for
list). In addition, ZACCI fairly regularly meets with various Ministers in “Inter-ministerial
meetings” arranged by the Association’s secretariat.

Table 4.3: ZACCI’S Representation on Boards and Committees (September 1997)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IBoard or Committee ZACCI Representative
IIZampost Caroline Linehan
lbecurities and Exchange Commission Muna Hantuba
Ikambia Privatization Agency Abel Mkandawire
jkambia Privatization Trust Fund David Matongo
“Environmental Council of Zambia Gerry George Chabwera
"Enterprise Development Fund Gerry George Chabwera
ltentral Board of Health Gerry Geroge Chabwera
"Export Board of Zambia R.J. Patel
Ikambia Trade Fair R.J. Patel
Itopperbelt University Council Tom Kamwendo
IIIOpperbelt University Council Murray Sanderson
jIndustrial Training Center Theo Bull

epartment of Technical Educaiton and Theo Bull

ocational Training
IISADC Mining Committee Theo Bull
[National Roads Board Heather Chalcraft
”Watching Grant Scheme Gaudenzio Rossi
”Zambia Railways R.B. Desai
Ikambia Competition Commission A. M. Sinyangwe
ligational Economic Advisory Committee ...... Mebelo Mutukwa

 

 

 

 

Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU)
The transition to multi-party politics and the dismantling of the command economy

have also had important implications for the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU or

116

 

NFU). During the Second Republic, the Union enjoyed a well-defined target population
and clear position in the political economy: it gave voice to a small, homogenous
population of commercial farmers and negotiated the place of this small private sector in
the larger command economy of the one-party state. AS a result of these two factors, the
Union wielded considerable incentives for membership: since it coordinated the
government's single channel market system for the crops its members produced, it was
able to collect levies on production directly from its members. In addition, it was
responsible for negotiating with government on farmers’ behalf in the fixing of agricultural
prices, and membership in the Union was necessary for commercial farmers to obtain
foreign exchange. The economic reforms accompanying the political transition did away
with this important membership incentive. At the same time, the political transition to a
pluralist, multi-party state was also of consequence. As an official Union policy statement
states:

“... it became clear that the Union would be called upon to play a much larger role in
lobbying for good agricultural policy than it had been allowed before, while the needs of
particularly the small scale sector for effective organization were now greater under a
liberalized regime than they had ever been in a command economy (ZN F U “Overview of
Policies, page 1).

The ZNFU thus implemented a “smallholder scheme” aimed at pulling this
important political constituency under its umbrella. The official Project Document states
the reasoning behind the move:

“The small scale farmer has no organization to speak for him at the National level.
Government policy over the last three years has tended towards the implementation Of a
Structural Adjustment Policy without consideration of its effects upon the individual small
scale farmer. It is vital that this Situation is revised. Until now, the ZNF U has spoken for
the small scale farmer by default — because there has been no other body to do so. The
lobbying capacity of the ZNFU in this respect is limited by the disproportionately small
number of small scale farmers in its membership. Once this balance is restored the Union

117

 

will have a very powerful voice with which to influence government policy to the benefit
of the small scale grower... Many small scale farmers have specific problems associated
with their district. This may be the lack of adequate banking facilities, a poor road
network, specific disease problems, or problems of land tenure... Lobbying on such
matters has always been of considerable benefit to commercial farmers. It is hoped that
through the proposed amendment of Union structure, these benefits may now also be
enjoyed by the small scale sector, who have until now lacked any coherent lobbying
capacity” (ZN FU Smallholder Development Project Document).

However, though recognizing the necessity of expanding its membership base— and
thus the scope of interests that it represents— the ZNFU makes clear there are boundaries
to that base. Thus,

“the Union is fundamentally concerned only with the well being of its members and
potential members. The ZN FU does not consider the activities of farmers who do not have
the capacity to pay membership subscriptions to be within its terms of reference. (How)
many farmers does this description currently cover? Of the 600,000 “farmers” noted by
Government, approximately 150,000 traditionally received credit, were able to use
fertiliser and could therefore produce a marketable surplus. The remainder— at least
400,000— have been effectively producing on a subsistence basis... (It is the former) who
will be able to pay a subscription to the Union that the Union can support and provide a
voice for. The Union must in the long term be sustainably run on membership
subscriptions and can only attempt to service those that it can cost effectively support.
Those who fall outside of this description must be looked after by Government or
Charities. The Union is not a Charity” (ZN FU “Overview of Policies,” emphasis mine).

The policy document goes on to make clear the ideology behind this stance: “
farmers are businessmen, who by and large espouse the principles of capitalism” (ZNF U
“Overview of Policies”). It is the ZNFU’S “capitalist” ideology which distinguishes it in
important ways from other organizations whose aim is to organize small-scale farmers.
The National Farmers’ Union’s attempts to target small-scale farmers in fact

illuminate two important by-products of the transition’s institutional changes: first, the re—
defining of political constituencies, and second, the re-introduction of competition in the
organizational arena. As the quote above suggests, the Union recognizes that the political

environment has changed, and hence the nature of its relationship to the state. In an

environment in which politicians are seeking to build solid majorities, the sliver of

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population the Union has historically represented is more a liability than an asset: “with a
total membership of less than half a percent of all farmers in the country, and a
disproportionate number of commercial farmer members, it is hard to be convincing. The
need to expand membership and make the Union more representative of the sector is
clear” (ZNFU Smallholder Development Project Policy Statement). While the ZN FU
benefits from its pro-economic reform stance in an economy that is avowedly
“liberalizing,” important political constituencies are against that reform, and they speak
with a broader, if less organized voice. Interestingly, the Union has realized a paradox:
while it now enjoys much improved opportunities for lobbying over the direction of
agricultural policy than was possible in the Second Republic, political liberalization has
made the lobbying arena much more competitive. In this arena, the Union has staked out
a position as a private-sector lobbyist for farmers who see farming as a “business,”7 and
as such, it runs headlong into those groups and politicians representing the interests of
farmers who still rely on state subsidies and market coordination.

The Union’s “capitalist” orientation at first won high points with the new MMD
government. Like ZACCI, the NF U initially had a cooperative relationship with the new
government, due in no small part to the first MMD Minister of Agriculture, Guy Scott,
being a prominent commercial farmer. However, the appointment of Edith Nawakwi to
the post in 1997 signaled a change in the Union’s fortunes. By the time of the Annual
Congress in April 1997, the Union’s President Vashee felt it prudent to strongly make the

point that the Union supported the Government but was not its lackey. In his welcoming

 

7 Direct quote from George Gray, executive director of the ZNFU.

119

 

 

address at the Annual Congress, April 1997, President of the association spoke directly to
President Chiluba (who was supposed to attend the meeting but at the last minute did not
pitch up) with three points, which boiled down to: 1) here’s what the ZNFU can and will
do for Zambia, here’s what the Union does not and will not do. and here’s what the Union
hoped Government would be able to do for farmers.” In a nutshell, according to the
President’s speech, the Union would support market liberalization and help smaller
farmers through it by providing them extension services, it would promote farmer-owned
marketing companies to deal with the gap left by the demise of NAMBOARD, it would
disseminate information to farmers via its radio program and publications, it would use its
ample capacity to help government formulate agricultural policy. However, it would
NOT support government in “unsustainable” “politicized” credit schemes, nor would it
“feed the nation.” This latter point was in response to a comment by Minister Nawakwi
shortly before the meeting, and Vashee stated the Union’s position quite strongly: “the
Union does not believe that Zambian Farmers have a duty to feed the Nation. Every
citizen must be prepared to pay the economic cost of food and it is unrealistic to expect
the farmer to subsidise the consumer or to grow food crops at a 1055. Instead, Sir, we
believe it is Government’s duty to create an environment in which the farmer wants and is
able to feed the Nation, because it is the most profitable thing to do. ” President’s
Chiluba’s absence from the meeting, however, was a good indicator of Government’s
response; it spoke volumes about the state of the government’s relationship with the
Union by the mid-1990's.

The NFU’S dampened relationship with the government is well-illustrated by the

unfolding events over the Agricultural Strategic Investment Program (ASIP). Given the

120

 

 

ASIP policy Objectives outlined by President Chiluba in his speech to the Cooperative
Federation in 1995, it would appear that the NFU’S organizational directives were right in
line with the Government’s. However, problems with the implementation of the plan
quickly emerged. Perhaps most importantly, according to the ZNFU’s analysis, 85% of
the US$350 million that was expected to be put into the program would be actually be
used for public sector expenditure (“i.e. it will be spent by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry”) and less than $50million would in reality flow to the private sector. The Union
articulated its concerns to government at the initiation of the plan in 1996. Government
responded positively by inviting the Union to assume the Vice Chair of the ASIP Steering
Committee. In that position, the Union worked to increase private sector representation
on the Committee and brought about the introduction of District Agricultural Committees,
which served to bring together farmers, extensions workers and Officials at the local level,
and channel their input to the Steering Committee, with the intent of ensuring that ASIP
funds reached the rural beneficiaries they were meant for. Despite this maneuvering, as
several local farmers’ associations reported at the ZNF U Annual Congress: “it is very
much feared that this most talked about program will only be a trickle when it reaches the
farmers” (Mr. Nymann-Jorgensen, Choma/Kalomo Farmers Association); and “up to date,
no meaningful benefits from ASIP has been achieved by my farmers” (Mr. Mwenya,
Kasama Farmers Association). In 1997, the Programme was taken off-line for “review,”
the Steering Committee and District Agricultural Committees were put on hold, and the
NF U lost an important channel through which to influence policy.

4.3.4 New Groups on the Scene

ZACCI faces a similar situation with respect to small and medium-scale commerce

121

 

and industry; its traditional membership is dominated by large-scale business and
international corporations and their representatives, but under multi-party politics (in
theory at least), numbers count. Though the ZACCI executive board recognizes the need
to speak for as much of the business community as possible, bringing non-traditional
members in has proven tricky. In response to the criticism that ZACCI does not represent
or support the interests of small-scale businesses, donors have stepped in to coordinate
coverage of small and medium- scale enterprises (SME’S). Perhaps the most prominent
program is that of USAID’S Human Resources Development Project (HRDP), which has
been trying to coordinate its efforts with ZACCI. The HRDP was established in 1993,
originally under the auspices of the National Commission for Development Planning. In
1994, the project was moved to the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI).
The Project focuses on Zambian owners and managers of small and medium-size
enterprises, Offering training in management and technical skills. Importantly, it does not
provide credit to its participants; rather, in keeping with its “private sector” orientation, it
assists entrepreneurs in applying for business loans from banks. The Project also liaises
with the Export Board of Zambia to provide courses in export marketing for Small and
Medium-scale Enterprises (SME’S).

In 1996, concerned that small entrepreneurs lacked a collective voice in lobbying
government for supportive policies, the HRDP initiated the creation of Provincial Business
Associations (PBA’s). The PBA’s were spun off of the Project’s training programs; thus,
a training workshop would be held in a provincial town, and the participants would be
encouraged to form an interest association. AS of 1997, all nine provinces had registered

a PBA with the MCTI. The Associations were meant to provide both a platform for the

122

articulation of the interests and concerns of small enterprises, as well as an organizational
base from which to organize further training seminars. Though relatively new, PBAs have
reported some success in attempts to lobby government: for example, the Southern
Province association reported a meeting with “sympathetic” MP, Dr. Simujayi, and were
trying to schedule further meetings with other MP5.8

The final organization relevant to the business sector (though it does not qualify as
a “pressure” group) is the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO). State
support to small-scale enterprises during the Second Republic was channeled through this
parastatal. Like the cooperative movement, however, the organization was state-formed
and state-directed; its purpose was to provide resources and training to small-scale
industry, not to represent small-scale industry. A debt-ridden, poorly-functioning dinosaur
of the Second Republic, it was Slated for an overhaul in the Third Republic via the
auspices of the Small-scale Enterprises Act, which had set up a new statutory body, the
Small-scale Enterprise Association (SSEA) complete with a Small-scale Enterprise
Directory, by 1997. The director of the PBA initiative, Max Sichula, perceives some Of
the incentives of this new act as encouraging for the prospect of organizing small-scale
entrepreneurs through the HRDA-sponsored Provincial Business Associations. Sichula
noted that the govemment-sponsored SSEA was struggling in its attempts to provide an
apex organization for local associations, and felt that the budding PBAs could form the
organizational basis to support a national organization from the ground up, one which

could later merge with ZACCI to represent the interests of large and small-scale business

8 Interview with Max Sichula, 6/24/97.

123

m.

 

interests. Importantly, though donor-sponsored. the PBAS represent at least an attempt at
a grass-roots mobilization of small-scale business enterprises.

In the agricultural sector, two groups have emerged to directly compete with the
ZNFU for small-scale farmer attention, the Peasant Farmers’ Union (PFU), founded in
1995, and the National Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers of Zambia
(NAPSF), founded in 1989 . The contrast between ZNFU ideology and that of the
Peasant Farmers' Union is well illustrated by the latter’s official goal: to address

"the need to have a common voice on the improvement of our rural infrastructure,

social and economic life in villages, (and to) remove the impediments to

Agriculture growth or development in order to improve our systems of

productions, on- Farm Storage, Transport and Marketing, through the use of our

family labour, capital and land which is our natural heritage" (PFU Constitution,

Preamble).

According to PFU President Kayeka, the PFU arose to organize small-scale
farmers because the ZNFU didn't want to ‘sensitize’ rural farmers to belong to a farmers'
trade union, and ZNF U representation was restricted to commercial farmers. Thus, when
donor grants were channeled through the ZNFU, they reached only commercial farmers,
and not farmers in the more remote areas. Kayeka argues that. unlike peasant farmers,
commercial farmers are well-informed, have sustainable storage facilities, and they know
production economics. "So our grievances and the grievances of the commercial farmers
are not the same. We have no storage facilities, our farmers grow crops in darkness.
Farmers in rural areas need to be educated on primary health-care, good food, good
water, sanitation, recreational facilities, which commercial farmers already have... We
must fight for overall quality of life. We are a trade union. We represent farmers as a
trade union" (Interview with Mr. Kayeka, 6/26/97).

In its targeting of peasant farmers, the PF U seeks to fill the gap left by the demise

124

 

 

 

of the cooperative societies at the local level; to the extent that PF U leadership has
publicly announced the organization will attempt to buy the bankrupt Lima Bank, which
during the Second Republic handled agricultural loans. Toward this end, the Union
started levying its members K60,000 (roughly US$50) each, with the promise that they
would hold a share in the Bank once it was Operating again. The idea behind the scheme
is that a Union-owned Lima Bank would be able to dole out agricultural loans on the same
terms as it did in the Second Republic, thus providing a solution to small-farmers inability
to gain access to needed production inputs (i.e. fertilizer and seed).

According to Kayeka, the PFU’s approach is to promote the understanding of
farming as an industry: "we tell our members that farming is an industry, a business, just
like mining is an industry. We tell our farmers we are no different from the miners,"
hence, the approach of the PFU to represent its members as a union (ibid). While the PF U
thus claims to see farming “as a business,” it seems a very different type of business than
that promoted by the ZNFU; the picture that emerges from discussions with PF U leaders
is that the PFU’s philosophy of “business” and “industry” is more akin to the parastatals of
the Second Republic than private business operating in a free market.

The final major contender for small-scale farmers’ allegiance is the National
Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers Of Zambia (N APSF), recently founded
in 1989, but becoming active in 1994, to represent the interests of peasant and small-scale
farmers (referred to hereafter as small farmers). Similar to the PFU, group leaders felt at
that time that the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (precursor of ZN FU) didn't cater to the
needs of peasant farmers, and that a separate organization was needed. In 1991, the

ZNFU moved to change this perception (see above), and approached the Association to

125

 

negotiate a merger between the two organizations. The latter refused, believing the
management style of the ZNFU to be inappropriate to the needs of their members;
specifically, they felt that the ZNFU'S member fee of 1% of production was not
appropriate for small farmers who have no record-keeping capacity. At present, they
maintain that there still exists a need for a separate association for representation of small
farmers, but that a merger between themselves and the ZNFU might be possible in the
future. According to Haachiinda:

"in the rural areas, there are elites who understand ZNF U management. But there

are others who don't. As of now the reach of the association is not to all comers.

We should merge when we've developed our links to the sector we're interested in.

With competition, we'll capture all members.”

The PFU has also approached NAPSSF to merge with its organization, but again,
Haachiinda reports the management styles of the two organizations are different; for
example, the President of the PFU didn't want to elect leaders of a merged association, but
to "go by tradition" and assign the oldest members to the top positions-- which would
mean that the PFU president became the president of a combined association. Also,
NAPSSF doesn't want to get involved in the PFU's pledge of providing fertilizer and credit
inputs to its members: "we won't make false promises... we don't want to toe the
appeasement line." Finally, the NAPSSF disagreed with the PFU's plan to encourage its
members to invest in the recently collapsed Lima Bank in order to make it solvent again.

Overall, the NAPSF articulates an ideology much closer to that of the ZN FU than the

PFU, though it’s doubtful they would declare themselves “capitalists.”

 

9 Interview with Jones Haachiinda, 6/23/97.

126

4.4

4.4.1

 

 

Coordination and Competition in the Interest Group System

Inter-group coordination

Some coordination in group efforts over similar policy goals can be seen,

especially between employers and labor during tripartite meetings, between the Federation

of Employers (ZFE) and the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry

(ZACCI) where business interests are concerned, and between the ZACCI and the

National Farmers’ Union (ZN FU), where commercial / corporate farming is concerned.

Also important are “affiliations,” for example, both the Employers (ZFE) and National

Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) are affiliated associates of the ZACCI; and the Farmers’ Union

(ZNF U) is also an affiliate of the Cooperative Federation (ZCF).

Specific examples of coordination in the Third Republic include the following

incidents:

4.4.2

0 Employers Associations (i.e. business) and trade unions teamed up against government
over the pensions scheme. Business and labor both agreed that they want choice over
pension schemes, but the Minister of Labour refused to convene a working group to draft
submissions for the final bill. An exasperated businessman commented: “this is going tO
end up like the Land Act, where Government acts completely autonomously from labor
and commercial interests... ZACCI needs to work closely with the ZFE against this...”'0

0 At a ZACCI executive board meeting, ZACCI Vice President Mukandawire remarked
(3/10/97) that the “Minster of Agriculture (Nawakwi) is messing up the Ministry,
something must be done. This lady is insulting commercial farmers— we must support
ZN FU.” The Executive Director of the NFU responded, “yes, farming must be
emphasized as a business. The Minister claims that ‘farmers must feed the nation.’ This
is a retrogressive position with lots of controls, bleak for farmers”ll

Inter- and intra- group competition

In addition to occasionally coordinating efforts with others, groups also find they

 

'0 Interview with Theo Bull, 2/13/97.

" Interview with George Grey, 3/10/97.

127

-——-—f .-.— ._' '

must compete for both membership and Official attention in the Third Republic. Such
competition is relevant in three areas: between-sector, between-group, and within-group.
We here consider group competition in that order.

The classic division between economic sectors in Zambia, made famous by several
works by Robert Bates (1983), is the urban consumer - rural producer divide. The
argument goes like this: Since UNIP’s most important— or at least most vocal— political
constituency was the urban middle-class, and since the primary policy objective Of that
class is the availability of cheap maize for consumption, the government’s economic policy
during the Second Republic was to subsidize consumption in the urban areas at the
expense of rural agricultural producers. From the perspective of the National Famiers’
Union (ZNFU), the MMD government’s position in the Third Republic runs in the same
direction. Citing the MMD government’s disruption of the maize market in at least two
ways, first through refusing to issue export permits for the first period Of the marketing
season, and second by issuing threats on several occasions to release stocks of maize or
import foreign supplies if prices went “too high,” the executive director of the National
Farmers’ Union (ZNF U) drew the conclusion in 1997 that “it would appear that there is
still a much greater concern to protect the interests of the consumer rather than those of
the maize producer” (Report Of the Executive Director at the Annual Congress, 4/97).

Importantly— and this is a point not expounded by Bates but relevant to this study—
the classic “urban bias” thesis posits a division between economic sectors in the abstract—
not between formal economic organizations. In this case, there is indeed organizational
muscle behind agriculture’s pro-producer-price position, but no organization to promote

the preferences of the urban consumer-- though the role that this group plays as an

128

 

 

 

 

electoral constituency and the group’s proven ability to engage in disruptive protests are
considerable. If it is indeed true that the MMD Government continues to be slave to the
“urban bias” in the Third Republic, it might be indication that formal organizational efforts
lack the degree of influence they carry in other interest representation systems.

Within sectors, perhaps the most competitive arena for groups is the agricultural
sector, where the issue of credit to small farmers is a rallying point for group leaders.
Firmly espousing their support for market liberalization, the NFU’S position is that it does
not “directly engage in the supply of agricultural credit or inputs... These are functions
which we believe should be best handled by commercial banks and other financial
institutions on the one hand, and the developing commercial trading sector on the other”
(Vashee, Annual Congress 1997). On the other hand, the organizers of the two national-
level small-scale farmers associations perceive the direct supply of agricultural credit or
inputs to farmers as their main policy-goal. Interestingly, the latter groups enjoy
something of an advantage in this game, for waging battle for the pOpulous and politically-
lucrative population of small-scale farmers involves substantial ideological maneuvering
for the “capitalist” ZNFU, while the small-scale farmers’ associations can rely on the pre-
existing “state-socialist” expectations of their audience, both the farmers they seek to
organize and the government officials from whom the resources must come.

Finally, it is important to note that “group interests” are not a monolithic whole—
interests compete for ascendancy within the group. An example Of this are the exports-
oriented firms which want zero duties/tariffs, while other companies (domestic producers,
farmers) want protective tariffs. Another example are conflicts over the definition of

products for tariff purposes. Zambezi Paper Mills, for instance, wants paper classified as a

129

 

 

 

 

 

“medium” product, but publishing companies in Zambia want to import high quality paper

for production, and thus want it to be classified with as a “raw” material. ZAMEFA wants
copper cables classified as “high”, Zamtel wants them classified as “medium.” Indian
dairies want to import buttermilk as a raw material while farmers want it classified as
medium to protect their dairy products. The ZACCI secretariat reports that they conduct
surveys of group members to ascertain how much support there is for policy, and that
official group policy thus represents a majority opinion (interview with Moses Simemba,
10/25/96). However, the struggle for ascendency is not always pretty. For instance, at
ZACCI board meeting in January 1997, the economic committee chairman, Meebelo
Mutukwa, reported that “it’s obvious that banks are ripping us off (with 30% interest
rates), doubling their profits every year. ZACCI as an organization needs to do
something— banks should be investing in the economy.” However, executive secretary
Phiri complained that the BAZ are members of the board...”How do you want to tackle
them?” Executive member Rossi remarked that there should be discussions between
members Of ZACCI, and executive member Bull recommended that there be a
“consultative meeting in a pleasant atmosphere between ZACCI, the BAZ, and the BOZ to
discuss the banking sector.”

A final issue is the inter-organizational bargaining which goes on within the
ZACCI board meetings, for instance in the dispute between the Shoprite corporation and
local producers over Shoprites’ refusal to use local produce and instead import produce
for its stores. The local Kabwe chamber stepped in to coordinate Zambian farmers’

efforts, then channel them up to ZACCI to discuss with the central Shoprite headquarters.

130

 

 

 

 

4.5 The Inclusion of Economic Interests

We have discussed above the current environment of the interest groups system
above; Figure 4.1 (next page) illustrates it historically, showing important patterns in the
developing ecology of the interest group system. The labor sector is marked by a steady
expansion of trade unions throughout Zambia’s history, beginning in the colonial era and
continuing through both the First and Second Republics. By the time of the transition in
1991, most industries had been unionized, and legal statutes barred the formation of more
than one union in any particular industry. A single apex organization, the ZCTU,
coordinates the demands of the individual trade unions to the government in a stable
institutional arrangement known as the Tripartite Council. The agricultural sector has a
variegated evolution, starting with the formation of voluntary white farmers’ groups and
African cooperatives forming during the colonial administration and the first republic.
With the advent of the one-party state, the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau (CF B) emerged
as the coordinating apex for local commercial farmer unions, while the Cooperative
Federation (ZCF) was mandated to coordinate and control the development of
cooperatives. Importantly, both types of groups remained “voluntary”-- members could
join and leave as they liked. However, for the potential members of both groups, there
were powerful economic and political incentives for membership created by the nature of
the command economy. We will return tO this issue in Chapter Five.

What is noteworthy is the proliferation of groups after the transition, after the
previous incentives for both commercial farmer unions and small-farmer cooperatives had
ended. Finally, in the private business sector, we see that there has been a continuous

trickle of development of business associations, from the local Chambers of Commerce

131

 

 

 

 

Figure 4.1: Founding Dates of Surveyed Interest Groups in Zambia

  

 

   

 

 

 

1964:
NUPA
AMU AAW
I946: 1955: 1970: I975:
NUBEG ZFE ZUFIA CSUZ
I900 1930 1940 I950 I960 I970 I980 I990 1995 2000
l I I . f . ._.-,~ :,...-. - 'N—x' w \ ' : arr: 4::2 a-i-".':='..-.- -..--.'
Colonial Administration I 1" Rep I2“ Rébiiblic’" 3rd Repub.
I I I l
I 900 1930 1940 1950 I960 I970 I980 1990 1995 2000
1904: I965: I973: I980: I993: KPFU:
CFB, CFA ZSPA ZCF MFA SFA I996
ZLFA BCS NAPI’SF EASF MDI’
I995:
PFU
Business 1931: 1950: I953: I972: I985: I990: I995:
NCC CCCI KCC BAZ ZAM ZCFA PBAS
1933: I954: 199?: I996:
LCCI LAMC ZACC LPBA
I955: I994: I997:
ZFE CCC LZCC
AAW: Airways and Allied Workers LPBA: Luapula Provincial Business Asc

AMU:

BAZ:
BCS:
CCC:
CFB:

CFA:

Union of Zambia

African Mineworkers Union
(later changed to MUZ~
Mineworkers Union of Zambia)
Bankers Association of Zambia
Bbata Cooperative Society
Chingola Chamber of Commerce
and Industry

Commercial Farmers’ Bureau
(in 1992 become the ZNFU)
Chipata Farmers’ Association

CSUZ: Civil Servants Union of Zambia

EASF:

EMU:
KCC:

Eastern Association of Small
and Medium-Scale Farmers
European Mineworkers Union
Kitwe Chamber of Commerce
and Industry

KPFU: Kabwe Peasant Farmers Union
LAMC: Lusaka African Marketeers

Cooperative

LCCI: Lusaka Chamber of Commerce

and Industry

MFA: Mumbwa Farmers’ Associatoin
MUZ: Mineworkers Union of Zambia
NAPPSF: National Association for
Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers
NCC: Ndola Chamber of Commerce
NUBEG: National Union of Building
Engineers and General Workers
National Union of Public
Administration Workers

NUPA:

PBA’S:
ZACC:

Provincial Business Associations
Zambia Chamber of Commerce
and Industry

ZAM: Zambia Association of
Manufacturers

ZCF: Zambia Cooperative Federation

ZC FA: Zambia Customs and Forwarding
Agents Association

ZFE: Zambia Federation of Employers

ZLCC: Zimba / Livingstone Chamber of
Commerce and Industry

ZUFIA: Zambia Union of Financial and
Insurance Workers

132

 

 

 

 

 

 

and Industry that developed in Lusaka and the mining towns, to the marketing
cooperatives of small-scale business men and women. The one-party state aggregated the
latter into the overall state-controlled cooperative structure, while the former struggled on
under a state ideology that actively disfavored, but still allowed, the Operation of private
business interests. The Third Republic has seen renewed growth in business associations,
with the newly-coordinated chamber movement (through the auspices of ZACCI) actively
encouraging new chambers to form, and the donor-sponsored HRDA program sponsoring
the formation of provincial associations for small-scale business in areas off the line of rail.
The point that Figure 4.1 illustrates is that of the inclusiveness of economic interests in
the group system in Zambia’s Third Republic.

As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, there has been a marked increase of interest groups in
the business and agricultural sectors in the Third Republic, but these are groups which are
not always recruiting organizational neophytes as members. There has been a strong
history of organization throughout Zambia’s history; though most of it was state-
Sponsored and state-controlled. What is different is that the groups which survive and are
born in the Third Republic are ones that can survive without state sponsorship, and this
has important implications for whose interests get represented in the policy process.
Relatively strong organizations have emerged and / or survived at the national level to
articulate the interests of business (the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
ZACCI), agriculture (the National Farmers’ Union, ZNFU), and industrial relations (the
two statutory groups representing the industrial sector, the Federation of Employers, ZFE,
and the Congress of Trade Unions, ZCTU), and two less-strong associations have arisen

to represent the interests of small-scale farmers to government (the PFU and NAPSSF).

133

 

 

 

 

 

 

The presence of these groups in the national arena, and the discussions above which

outline their targeted audiences, indicate that the following groups of economic producers
are represented by formal organizations which seek to influence government policy:

1. Owners of private businesses and representatives of corporations

2. Large-scale commercial and, to a lesser extent, small-scale farmers

3. Employers (i.e. private business owners or managers, and parastatal managers)

4. Workers who are formally employed.

On the flip side Of that coin, the following groups of economic producers are not
represented by formal organizations which seek to influence government policy:

1. Those employed or otherwise working in the informal sectors: tinkers,

traders, etc.

2. Peasant farmers who don’t produce a surplus.

It will be noted that the situation has not changed much in this regard, as the
informal economy was not formally organized in the Second Republic. However, as
indicated by Figure 4.2 and 4.3 (see next pages), and again by the discussion above, the
interest group system is well-developed for formally employed labor and their employers.
Unions and employers associations have existed for decades, actively involved in
institutionalized dialogue with the government. While these groups do not always succeed

in attaining their policy objectives, especially in the Third Republic their voice is organized
and represented in national policy-making discussions. In the case of business and
agriculture, large scale producers (i.e. corporations) are afforded greater presence in the
policy decision-making organs of these groups. Both of the key groups in these sectors,

the ZACCI and the ZNFU, recognize the importance of increasing the small-scale

component of their memberships, primarily for political reasons, but the organizational

134

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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135

Figure 4.3: Interest Groups in Zambia: Primary Units:

Business
Zambia Chambers of
Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI)
Provincial Business
Associations (PBA)

Agriculture
Zambia Cooperative Federation
(ZCF)
Zambia National Farmers Union
(ZNFU)

 

Labor

Zambia Federation of
Employers (ZFE)
Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU)

 

ZACCI

PBA

ZC F

ZNFU

 

Local
Chambers:

Chingola
Chipata
Kabwe

Kitwe
Lusaka
Livingstone
Ndola
Solwezi

 

 

 

Provincial
w

Central
Copperbelt
Eastern
Luapula
Lusaka
Northern
Northwest.
Southern
Western

 

 

Provincial
Unions:

Central
Copperbelt
Eastern
Luapula
Lusaka
Northern
Northwest.
Southern
Western

Local
Assoc ’s:

Chadiza
Chinsali
Chipata
Chisanga
Choma/Ka.
Chongwe R.
Copperb.
East
Copper.
West
Isoka
Kaoma
Kabompo
Kabwe
Kasama
Katete
Luapula
Lundazi
Lusaka
West
Mbala
Mkushi
Monze
Mpika
Mpongwe
Mumbwa
Nchelenge
Nyimba
Petauke
Samfya
Serenje
Solwezi
Ukwimi
Zambezi
Zimba

 

 

ZFE

ZCTU

 

 

 

 

 

C omganies:

215
companies

Trade
Unions:

AA WU
CSUZ
GUZ

HCWUZ
NUBEGW
NUCW
NUPAW
NUPSW
NUTAW
RWUZ
UZAWU
ZEAWU
ZN UHAW
ZTWU
ZULAWU

disaffiliated
MUZ
ZUClW
ZUFIAW
ZNUT

 

 

 

Note: the Peasant Farmers Union (PF U) and National Assoc. of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers
(NA PSSF) did not make available lists of their primary units.

136

 

structure of these groups implies a greater role for those who pay higher subscriptions. As
one chamber member put it: “he who pays the piper calls the tune.”

Where does this leave small-scale farmers and small-scale businesspeople? The
former are actually the potential membership for at least three groups, the Zambian
National Farmers Union, the National Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers Association, and
the Peasant Farmers Union. All of these groups are interested only in those farmers who
can produce a surplus, however; the ZN FU makes this point explicitly in policy
documents, while the point remains implicit with the other two groups: since they exist to
administer loans, it’s obvious that they can only work with farmers able to produce a
surplus and pay back the loan. Small-scale businesspeople are beginning to be organized
by the donor-driven PBA, which seeks to develop the movement through local
networking. This has the potential of not being freely inclusive, however.

Finally, where does this leave subsistence agricultural producers and the vast
informal sector? A last sector to consider briefly here in the context of the inclusiveness
of the interest group system is the lack of organization within perhaps the biggest
employment category in the country, peasant farmers and those who work in the informal
sector: traders, artisans, and other service providers, and the others who ply their trades
in the country’s numerous informal markets. Collective action for policy representation is
understandably especially difficult in an arena in which producers are not even legally
registered, and producers in this sector operate at such low margins it’s not surprising that
subscription-requiring groups haven’t formed. Furthermore, the major economic interest
groups in Zambia represent the interests of the minority of Zambians who participate in

the formal economy— a constituency made up primarily of urban and rural elites. The

137

majority of Zambians fall in the subsistence agriculture and informal sectors— and
organized or not, the weight of their sheer numbers are felt in the capital; for example, as a
result of several protests over the provisions of services in the informal markets in Lusaka
in 1997, the President set up a “desk” at State House to directly answer petitions from this
sector. As of the late 1990's, however, neither subsistence farmers nor the informal sector
had official organizational representation, i.e. no voice, at the policy level; a consequence
of which can be sometimes violent public protest, as in 1997, when the market traders
marched up Independence Avenue stoning cars. This is the dark-side of representation:

the consequences of the absence of legitimate channels for the articulation of interests.

4.6 Conclusion

In general terms, the contours of the interest group system in the Third Republic
weathered the transition nearly intact, but significantly altered. The corporatist ties
between the state and key groups were broken, and some of the supporting institutions
necessary for a pluralist interest group system were introduced. Confirming the
expectations of pluralist theory, though there has not been an explosion of new groups in
the system, there has been an increase, especially in local groups affiliated to the main
national groups. As discussed, however, these groups continue to represent elite
populations in the different economic sectors; the majority of peasant farmers and those
active in the informal sector continue to lack political representation in the Third Republic.
Patterns of interest-group coordination seem to accentuate elite ties, while patterns of
interest-group conflict sometimes mirror the schism. between groups representing the
economic elite, who are well-integrated into the formal economy, and the smaller, less

effective groups representing peasant agriculture.

138

 

Furthermore, as the analysis in this chapter demonstrates, the groups at the
national level have not all been affected in the same ways by the new environment of the
Third Republic. For example: while the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU) are embroiled in struggles with the MMD government over the
institutional arrangement defining their activities, the Association of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) and the National Farmers’ Union (ZNF U) seem more
able to focus their energies on their interactions with government over relevant economic
policies. Four factors emerge from the analysis above as useful in explaining variation in
the ecology of economic interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic: groups’ prior
institutional history, the effects of economic reform, and the continuation of
neopatrimonial rule.

Prior institutional history

The analysis of interest group activity above suggests that groups’ prior
relationship with government in the Second Republic does effect their relationship with
government, and subsequently the scope and success of their activities, in the Third
Republic. Thus, the Cooperative Federation has had difficulties both with the new regime
and with its own attempts to reform and reorganize the cooperative movement, at least in
part because it was formerly integrated into the former ruling party, and continues to
attract the attention of rent-seeking entrepreneurs and politicians. Having been
“dominated” by the state, it is especially tricky for this sector to negotiate a pluralist
arrangement with the state in the Third Republic. As we’ve seen, though the MMD
government speaks publicly about a free and unfettered cooperative movement, in practice

they seem reticent to change the rules that would make it so, and put an end the various

139

mechanisms that allow government to keep control over its operations. Though largely
bankrupt, the ZCF nonetheless remains the key organizational structure for the rural areas;
no other organization, including the government, has the agricultural infrastructure still
held by the cooperatives. As pointed out by van de Walle and Chiwele, the c00peratives’
“continuing role in input distribution to small farmers remains important enough, even if
on a smaller scale than at their peak a decade ago, to entice various rent seeking
entrepreneurs and politicians to try to maintain control of the sector” (1994:25).

Similarly, the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has been mired in a struggle with
government over the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), this time with the MMD government
on the side of instituting a plural trade union movement, and the Congress anxious to
keep the traditional “one union, one industry” practice. Having achieved a strong and
autonomous position through a “negotiated-corporatism” with the former UNIP regime,
the Congress— as well as the MMD— recognizes the advantages that this type of
corporatism brought. According to the claims of the labor movement, the government’s
intention in introducing the new legislation is to weaken the trade union movement, to
prevent it from emerging as the counterforce to state power it was in the Second
Republic. This is a poignant illustration of Bianchi’s point that pluralism can help to
support stable authoritarianism by allowing the regime to block development of coherent
organized interests; here, we see that the similar tactics can also help to support
continuing neopatrimonial rule. Whether through the strategy of maintaining legal control
over the cooperative movement, or through the forced-pluralization of the labor
movement, the objective of the current regime is reminiscent of the objectives of the one-

party state: to control economic and societal interests, and bend them to the development

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policies of the state: i.e. economic adjustment and liberalization.

As in the Second Republic, a key variable in the outcome of the relationship
between the MMD government and the ZCTU is the latter’s attempts to resist the
former’s policies. The ZFE represents a good illustration of the counterpoint: though the
employers’ associations will be affected in the same way as the trade unions by the new
legislation, the issue hasn’t soured interactions between the Federation and the
government.

The formerly quasi-pluralist groups face different obstacles than the state-
corporatist ones. Most prominently, they are not burdened with struggles over re-
negotiating their institutional ties to the state. Further, they have some experience with a
pluralist-type position vis-a-vis the state; they weren’t wired in to the corporatist structure
of the one-party state, any influence they had was gained from an autonomous bargaining
position. Now that the new environment encourages lobbying efforts, they can fully flex
that muscle. However, these groups face other constraints in their attempts to realize a
fully pluralist relationship to the state, as discussed below.

Economic reform

As with group’s prior institutional history, the economic reforms begun in the early
1990's are also useful in explaining the ecology of interest groups in the Third Republic.
Several of the cases above well illustrate this point. First is the Cooperative Federation
(ZCF). The c00perative movement was well-favored, relatively well-resourced and
organized during the Second Republic. With the liberalization of agricultural marketing,
the cooperatives no longer hold their former role in the economy, and no longer have

access to the same level of resources. With government and donors looking to other

141

organizations, principally the ZNFU, PFU, and NAPSF, to coordinate programs to assist
small and peasant farmers, the cooperatives’ apex, the ZCF, is in crisis.

The second case that illustrates the effects of economic reform is the trade union
movement. Whereas the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) wielded power in the
Second Republic, due to its ability to mobilize large urban constituencies against the
government’s policy, in the Third Republic, declining employment levels from the
continuing economic crisis and quickly implemented reform programs have weakened both
the resources and bargaining position of the unions and their apex, the ZCTU. While
workers’and their movement have suffered, however, other economic actors have been
made better off by the reform process. Principal among these is the business sector, our
third case. Given Kaunda’s profound distrust of businessmen and their motives, and the
fact that the UNIP regime’s economic policies hurt private business more than it helped
them, the MMD’s pledge to return the economy to the market and the hands of the private
business sector has produced new opportunities for businessmen and their organizations,
e.g. ZACCI. Within the business sector, not everyone is better off; for example, the
reform program initially favored commercial over manufacturing interests. Overall,
however, business interests are better off in the Third than the Second Republic; and
where they are not, frequent meetings with Ministers and MP’s offer the possibility for
fine-tuning the MMD’s already pro-business economic agenda.

The fourth case are the fanners’ groups. Here, it is not necessarily the nature of
the reforms so much as the implementation of them that is consequential. Thus,
liberalization might well be expected to help the “pro-business” oriented National

Farmer’s Union (ZNFU), except that the government’s lack of consistency in following

142

the program objectives (such as when it calls on the Union to “feed the nation”) draws 1
Union into bitters dispute with the government. In the peasant and small-scale sectors,
government sends out mixed signals to farmers, as when it ceased subsidies/credit for
agricultural inputs in line with liberalizing the market, then backtracked and provided
credit schemes which required groups to coordinate, and which have come to be the ma
resource bases for the PF U and the NAPSF in their organizing efforts. Demonstrating
how great is the influence of such reform policies is the fact that these groups would
potentially not survive if government pulled out of the market again.
Neopatrimonial politics

The third factor seen to affect the ecology of interest groups in the Third Repub}
is the continuing practice of neOpatrimonialism. As Bratton and van de Walle argue, th
institutional heritage of neopatrimonialism has shaped both the political transitions in
Africa in the early 1990's, as well as the regimes emerging from those transitions (1997
This is evidenced in the continuing practices of presidentialism, which promotes the
concentration of power in the executive; clientelism, the awarding of material rewards i
return for political support and deference, as well as the promotion of state intervention
the economy; and the use of state resources for political legitimation. In Zambia, these
characteristics are seen above to affect the ecology of the interest group system in the
following ways.

First, the continuing practice of presidentialism has resulted in a continuing
marginalization of the role that the legislature plays in policy making. Hence, groups
realize that policy influence efforts require the attention of the executive— State House «

the relevant Ministry. As demonstrated in the case of ZACCI and the ZN FU, the

143

possibility for influence thus relies at least in part on groups’-- specifically group leaders’-
- personal relationship to the holders of these offices. This presents special problems for
organizations like the Cooperative Federation, who have the ‘wrong’ personal
connections-- supporters in UNIP and even a president who is an MP and member of the
National Party, are not helpful in this context. Furthermore, the lack of development of a
real political opposition means that these groups have no card to play against recalcitrant
government officials; even while disagreeing with government’s economic policy agenda,
group leaders must “keep their friendships in good repair.”

Continuing practices of clientelism also mark the ecology of the interest group
system in the Third Republic. Though the MMD publicly expresses the intention to end
government’s control of the cooperative movement and its activities, the cooperatives’
vast rural infrastructure for agricultural input distribution and marketing continues to offer
attractive channels for developing MMD patronage networks, and thus little incentive to
implement institutional reform. Furthermore, the disrailment of the agricultural
liberalization program, according to the ZNFU, points in to the MMD’s intention to
continue UNIP’s practice of interfering in the economy for at least two clientelist-oriented
purposes: first, to ensure that rural constituencies receive needed agricultural inputs,
especially around election-time; and second, to ensure that urban consumers are pacified,
to the greatest extent possible, in their demands for low food prices.

In the next three chapters, we continue the analysis by examining the effects of the
dual reform process on three important characteristics of economic interest groups
themselves: membership incentives, organizational resources, and policy influence

strategies.

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CHAPTER FIVE

MOTIVATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP:
JOINING AND PARTICIPATING IN GROUP ACTIVITY

“It is often taken for granted, at least where economic objectives are involved, that groups
of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests.
Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their
common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their
personal interests.”

Mancur Olson,

The Logic of Collective Action

1961:]

5.1 Pluralism at the Micro-level: What motivates interest group members?

Some of the most fundamental assumptions of pluralism reside at the micro-level,
that is, in the space where individuals decide whether or not they want to join and
contribute to interest group activity. For example, the belief that groups arise on the basis
of common interests requires individuals with common interests to join together to pursue
the furtherance of those interests; and the position that groups are maintained through
members’ support of group policies requires that members contribute regularly to group

efforts. But what motivates individual citizens in pluralist systems (who often have a

145

myriad of other concerns and day-to-day tasks to address) to make the effort to participate
in such group activity? From a pluralist perspective, the motivation lies in a “natural
propensity among humankind to form and join associations?" The implication, therefore,
is that pluralism requires a population of people who seek out group activity, with the
objective of furthering both their personal interests and thus the group’s collective
interest— since by definition. others in the group share the same interests. The
implication, therefore, is that citizens join groups out of a desire to collectively further
their goals.

This assumption is crucial to the pluralist theory of interest representation, which
posits that groups actively lobby government on behalf of their members’ interests. Thus,
joining such associations implies individual members are seeking a collective political
goal, that is, the representation of their collective interests to government; and perhaps
more than that, success in influence over government policies. For economic interest
groups, policies of concern might include the lowering of a particular tax, the provision of
a needed subsidy, the regulation of a specific market. etc. The characteristic which these
policies share is that they represent collective goods; that is, once the tax or the subsidy is
won, it is applied to everyone, whether they contributed to the group effort or not. In
essence, then, pluralist theorists assume that the act of joining interest associations
represents the pursuit of a collective goal.

Thus. to address the question of the prospects for pluralism in Zambia, it is

necessary to address the micro-level problematique: why do Zambians join interest groups

 

' See Truman 1951, Bentley 1908.

146

L/_

 

like the Chambers of Commerce or farmer associations in the Third Republic? Do they
seek the furtherance of a collective goal they share with their fellow group members, e.g.
the ending of a regulation which constrains everyone’s business activities, or more
generally, the cessation of structural adjustment reform, for instance? Do they expect
their group to achieve this goal through efforts at lobbying government? Are there any
reasons we might expect that pluralist assumptions of membership incentives won’t hold?

To address the issue of why interest group members seek out group activity in
Zambia’s Third Republic, this chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, we
examine the theoretical case more closely... are there other reasons that people join
associations, and do these have adverse implications for the development of pluralism?
We then revisit our discussion in the last chapter, regarding Zambia’s interest group
environment, to analyze what the incentives for membership were under the Second
Republic, in order to set out some hypotheses for what they might be in the Third
Republic. Are there continuing incentives carried over from the Second Republic that
threaten the further development of pluralism? Are some groups more prone to these
incentive structures? If so, why?
5.2 Theories on the Incentives for Group Membership

A classic debate exists as to whether the above picture of membership incentives is
realistic. The presumed link between a pluralism of interests and a pluralism of groups,
referred to above, has to do with the motivational role of interests: when individuals find
that they have interests in common that can be advanced through collective action, it is
assumed that they will form groups on that basis. According to this theory, we should

expect that in the newly liberalized environment of Zambia’s Third Republic, a plenitude

147

of groups will organize around the variety of economic interests that exist (e.g. small-scale
farmers, commercial farmers, cooperative producers, small-scale traders, business owners,
mineworkers, civil service workers, to name just a few), adding to the numbers of groups
that already exist and filling in the spaces where they haven’t existed.

However, working within a rational choice framework, Mancur Olsen has shown
that there are some important problems with the idea that groups will spontaneously form
for collective action in any type of environment. The problems have to do with
motivations at the individual level and the recognition that there are costs to organizing;
hence, the question becomes, what are the incentives for individuals to contribute time and
resources to such efforts? The dominant approach to these questions is rooted in Olson’s
seminal work on collective action. Applying a simple rational model to an analysis of
interest groups, Olson demonstrated that:

"if the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal

welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless

there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct
from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members
of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens
involved in the achievement of the group objectives" (1965z2).

Olson's theory is especially relevant here, as it is best applied to specifically
economic interest groups. The argument is important, because it undermines the
presumed pluralist link between common interests and collective action, showing that

“political goals will not be sufficient to induce member support of interest group

activity..." rather, "selective incentives" are the crucial facilitators of group formation

148

(Moe 1980:4)2. As Moe argues, this has some important implications for the political
nature of group activity, for it suggests that there are obstacles to individual participation
that prevent the individual from “doing her part.” Olsen’s model implies that the only way
that large numbers of individuals can be induced to contribute their share to group activity
is to offer them something entirely different from the group’s collective or political goals.
This point calls into question a good part of the pluralist perspective on politics, for it
contradicts the notion that the effectiveness of a group is a function of its support in
society: “formal membership indicates that the group is successful at selling selective
incentives, not that it is politically popular” (1980:29-30).

Olson’s analysis, though logical, bodes poorly for the possibility that Zambians will
join together to further a common policy goal, unless they are coerced, or interest groups
themselves “buy” members’s support. This has important implications for the organization
of interests, for it suggests that groups must either a) be able to coerce individuals to join
their group, or b) be able to provide some form of “selective incentive,” which requires
resource expenditures. However, Terry Moe convincingly challenges this conclusion by
arguing that Olsen’s model is not the only way of constructing a rational theory of interest
groups. Moe stresses that: “behavioral expectations are contingent in specific ways upon
perceptions...,” thus, his revised model “implies that anyone can have an incentive to
contribute, depending upon his subjective estimates of the relevant quantities” (1980:32,
emphasis added). Thus, the individual’s perception that her contribution can make a

difference, in other words, a perception of personal efficacy, is a critical piece to the

 

2 Selective incentives are private benefits which, precisely because they are private rather than
collective in nature, can operate selectively on the membership as a whole: they can be conferred upon
those who contribute and withheld from those who do not.

149

puzzle, for “the efficacious individual can have a rational incentive to contribute whether
or not (her) efficacy is justified by the objective context” (ibid). If Zambians perceive that
their contributions to the group make a difference, then, they might join for reasons other
than coercion or direct economic benefits, and the resulting pattern might look very much
like what pluralists expect: people spontaneous joining group activity.

Another possible rational inducement to membership are “purposive incentives,”
which are “various kinds of intangible benefits that accrue to a person by virtue of his
support of causes, value systems, principles, or ends that he considers to be worthwhile”
(ibid). Importantly, according to Moe, purposive benefits can serve as selective incentives
when the individual derives a sense of satisfaction from the very act of contributing, as
when group goals reflect ideological, moral, or religious principles that a person feels a
responsibility to support. In these cases, it is the support and pursuit of worthwhile
benefits that represents the source of purposive benefits. In contrast to Olsen’s theory,
“collective goods can generate their own selective incentives because of the unique role
that purposive benefits play in connecting the two” (ibid: 118).

Prevailing theories on associational activity in Africa suggest that such “purposive
incentives” might be an important inducement to group activity. Though there is little
literature on the direct question of membership incentives, there is a substantial literature
on informal associations and, more broadly, state-society relations, that indirectly deals
with such incentives. The thesis that “African societies... have cohered according to
kinship ties and age groups rather than by bonds of impersonal interest” (Davis 1999210),
suggests that many associations in Africa tend to have ascriptive, rather then voluntary,

memberships. This thesis is perhaps best articulated by Goran Hyden’s theory of the

150

 

 

“economy of affection, the peculiar type of economy that is apparent in any society where
the peasant mode3 is still surviving” (1983). According to Hyden, this economy of
affection is fundamental for any understanding of indigenous forms of economic and social
organization in African societies, for among other things, it has immediate implications for
the consideration of the individual as decision-maker. Hyden argues that economic
decisions are embedded in social and other non-economic conditions, and are made with
reference to a network of groups connected by blood, kin, community, or other affinities
(1983:8—10).4 Thus, the incentive to join a group, even economic groups such as a local
cooperative or a farmers’ association, might be motivated more by one’s social
responsibilities to a broader network, than to a “natural” instinct to join associations
which pursue a common political goal.5 In addition, given the enormous importance of
social relationships that emerges in such contexts, group membership, even in economic
groups, might be explained by purely social motivations, e.g. the desire to interact with

others from the community. These latter two types of inducements to group activity,

 

3 Hyden defines the “peasant mode of production” as being “characterized by a
rudimentary division of labor. Each unit of production is small and because there is virtually no
product specialization, there is very little exchange between the various units of production...
producing the basic necessities and meeting the basic social needs are time-consuming tasks... It is
not difficult to see that this mode of production cannot easily give rise to a very elaborate
superstructure” ( l 983 :6)

4 “While this does not preclude the possibility that the African peasant is economically
rational, it is possible and logical that rational responses are used to enhance one’s role in the
economy of affection” (ibid: 10).

5 A further consideration here is the marginalization of rural areas in Africa. Often
unpenetrated by and unconnected to national government, there is little basis for the assumption
that individuals in these areas have a propensity to join groups which seek to lobby government
over policies that affect their production... in fact, as Hyden points out, for this sector, the state
appears as something “suspended in mid-air over society and not an integral mechanism of the day-
to-day productive activities of the society... it is not difficult to see that the peasant experiences any
public policy aimed at improving his agriculture as a ‘foreign’ intervention” (1983z7).

151

 

 

 

interestingly enough, fit within the rational choice framework, discussed above. “Feelings
of responsibility” can be thought of as “purposive incentives,” since membership in the
group provides the individually-realized benefit of fulfillment in satisfying one’s
obligations. Social motivations are captured by the fourth type of possible incentive: the
“solidary incentive.” Theoretically,

“Solidary incentives are “intangible values of a social nature, including such

rewards as friendship, conviviality, and status. Because these generally derive

from social interaction, members can generate their own solidary incentives by
becoming acquainted, enjoying each other’s company, and establishing social
relationships that yield psychic benefits of one kind or another. All these provide
selective incentives to the extent that the act of membership qualifies one for

taking advantage of them.” (Moe 1980:117).

Zambians who respond to purposive or solidary incentives may participate in
group activity for reasons that have nothing to do with politics, collective goals, or
economic goods; and since they act as a “selective incentive,” such inducements lead to
conclusions that are consistent with Olson’s theory.

Thus, classic pluralist theory informs us that individuals join groups to express
common interests in the policy process (Truman 1951, Bentley 1908); Olson's model of
rational action leads us to expect that individuals join interest groups because they are
either coerced or because they desire selective incentives that the group provides (Olson
1965); and recent work in the collective action literature delineates a variety of
inducements that include both political (representation), economic (material benefits), and

n6

"non-economic (solidary and purposive) incentives (Moe 1980). Figure 5.1 summarizes

 

6 Clark and Wilson (1961) distinguish two broad types of noneconomic inducements:
solidary and purposive. Solidary incentives are intangible values of a social nature, including such
rewards as friendship, conviviality, and status. (Moe argues that these can be considered "selective
incentives" to the extent that the act of membership qualifies one for taking advantage of

152

these different types of incentives. Predictably, however, individuals themselves will have
a variety of motivations for joining groups: only empirical analysis can inform us as to
what are the most important motivations in the context of Zambia’s Third Republic.

Figure 5.1
Possible Incentives for Interest Group Membership in the Third Republic

 

 

 

Type of Incentive “Rational” basis of incentive
political representation individual benefit,
(collective reward) through feelings of “efficacy”
economic goods and services individual economic gain

(individual reward)

 

solidary individual enjoyment
(social reward)

 

purposive individual sense of satisfaction
(feeling of responsibility)

 

 

Analysis of micro-level processes informs our larger question in two ways: first,
should we expect that groups will act to represent and articulate collective interests in the
Third Republic? We hypothesize that this is especially plausible if interest group members
join groups for the purpose of gaining political representation. Secondly, should we
expect that economic interest groups with voluntary memberships will survive / emerge in
the Third Republic? This, again, is plausible if all / any of the above incentives are present,
for according to the theoretical discussion above, they all provide rational inducements for

individuals to overcome the collective action problem inherent in group activity. In

 

them). Purposive incentives are various kinds of intangible benefits that accrue to a person by
virtue of his support of causes, value systems, principles, or ends that he considers to be worthwhile.
"Central significance attaches to the purposes toward which its funds and activities are directed
and the ends that they might indirectly affect" (Moe 1980:] 17).

153

 

 

addition, such analysis is useful because it informs us about organizational maintenance
issues, too: that is, pinpointing the specific type of incentive tells us about the nature of the
group itself, and the type of benefits it must provide to maintain its membership. We
might expect that groups whose members join for the purpose of gaining political
representation for their economic interests will have different organizational characteristics
than those whose members join to gain access to economic goods and services. We
address these latter issues in the next chapter.
5.3 The Institutional Context: Membership Incentives in the Second Republic

Before proceeding with our analysis, we here draw from the previous analysis in
Chapter Three to specify more specific hypotheses about how the institutional context of
interest representation, discussed in that chapter, relates to why Zambians sought
membership in different interest groups in the Second Republic, and how that might affect
their expectations for joining or maintaining their membership in groups in the Third
Republic. To summarize: during the period of the one-party state, the representational
relationship between the state and society approximated that of state corporatism: it
involved the merging of the institutions of the state with the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) and civic and interest organizations. However, the state did
not succeed in coopting all interest associations. The degree to which the state was
successful in formally incorporating groups, however, had implications for why Zambians
joined those groups.

An instructive example is provided by the case of the cooperative movement.
During the Second Republic, the initial formation of cooperative societies was affected by

several factors due to the corporatist aims of the one-party state: firstly, cooperatives

154

were affiliated as "mass organizations" to the Party under the UNIP constitution; thus,
representation of their economic interests had to be channeled through centralized Party
organs; secondly, cooperatives were formed not because of member mobilization, but as a
matter of government policy—- only after the cooperative had been formed was the
membership recruited; and finally, the legal framework of the Cooperative Act gave
excessive powers to the government to intervene in the management and daily operations
of cooperatives-- for example, government officials were made signatories to the accounts
of various cooperative organizations, and annual general meetings could not be held
without a government official present. Membership in such organizations was motivated
in part by the political needs of the state; that is, the state used such organizational
networks to distribute patronage rewards to important constituencies. Individuals thus
sought group membership for the access to government resources, e. g. agricultural credit
and inputs, and subsidized insurance, that it entailed (interview, Mr. Lungu, January 7,
1997)

In contrast, the UNIP regime did not try to incorporate the associations of
commercial farmers and businesspeople. The former were not viable as a political
constituency, due to their small numbers, and were relevant to the state more as an
economic than a political resource. The latter were both integrated into the Party and
government structures directly as Members of Parliament and other official positions
(Baylies and Szeftel 1984), and were organized by groups like the Lusaka and Ndola
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Incentives to belong to these organizations were
distinct from those of the cooperatives, although for commercial farmers, the incentives

were largely economic in a different way, i.e. access to foreign exchange and the price

155

negotiation process.

In considering the institutional history of interest groups in Zambia, we’ve thus
seen that the group system has exhibited both types of membership incentives predicted by
Olson, legal coercion and selective incentives. During the Second Republic, selective
incentives were especially important motivations for organization in Zambia; in addition to
the types of benefits that Olson deals with in the American, pluralist context (such as
insurance policies, news publications, and discounts on goods and services, which
members could obtain on the open market, but which the group can offer more cheaply
because of economies of scale), the control of the economy by the party-state introduced a
further dimension to the type of selective incentives available in Zambia: state-funded
economic goods and services which could only be had through membership in particular
groups. For example, cooperative membership was necessary for access to farming inputs
and marketing facilities; according to current officials, this “shallow incentive” was
essentially the only reason to join cooperatives, no matter how much President Kaunda
himself exhorted the ideological benefits of cooperative membership.

This intertwining of patronage politics with the interest group system created an
environment in which individuals "learned"7 that participation in particular groups could
result in access to state resources. Over time, expectations concerning the public, private,

and patronage benefits to be gained from group membership became an institutionalized

 

7 I use the term "learn" here in the context of the concept of "political learning" as it is
developing in the comparative literature (see Bermeo 1990 for definition of "political learning" and
van de Walle 1994 for application of "policy learning"). "Political learning" refers to a situation
where processes of change in political (and social) institutions involve cognitive changes in
individuals that are brought on by changes in the environment; that is, as actors in the political
process gain experience with how the system works, they "learn" how to adapt to the environment
and this learning affects how they respond to changing incentives.

156

part of the representation system: that is, individuals in some groups confronted
incentives to join based neither on an interest in pursuing a common goal nor "selective"
(in the Olsonian sense) incentives such as newsletters and discounts, but on expectations
to gain access to state resources as a result of participation in groups. It is this latter
consideration which makes the "collective action" problem in neopatrimonial contexts
such as Zambia different-- and consequential, for it suggests an extra wrinkle in the
analysis of group activity; it suggests that in cases of state-controlled economies, access to
state resources can be a further material incentive for joining groups.8

This brief discussion, and the larger analysis in Chapter Three, provides us with a
thumbnail sketch of the institutions which shaped the representation of economic interests
during the Second Republic, and the resulting incentive structure of different institutional

arrangements:

State-dominated corporatist sector: cooperatives

0 the affiliation of “mass organizations” such as cooperatives to the Party meant
that centralized Party structures maintained control over the articulation of small-
scale and peasant agricultural interests to the State;

0 membership in such organizations, although voluntary, was “recruited” according
to the Party’s needs;

0 the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took
place within legal frameworks drafted by the state with an eye to controlling the
organization’ 3 activities;

 

3 Of course, political economists have been discussing this idea, referred to as “rent-
seeking” behavior, for decades. In that literature, individuals don’t necessarily have to belong to
groups to gain access to state resources. But it can be seen that the availability of such economic
goods might be important to both entrepreneurs in their decision to form groups, as well as to
members in their decisions to join groups, and thus adds an extra dimension to analyses of
inducements for group activity in non-market-based economies.

157

 

- the motivation for membership in ccoperatives was primarily an economic one, to
gain access to resources such as agricultural credit and inputs.

State-negotiated corporatist sector: trade unions and employers associations

0 the refusal to affiliate as “mass organizations” to the Party was both cause and
consequence of labor’s autonomy from the state during the Second Republic.
Workers, their interests, and their unions thus escaped the wholescale cooptation
experienced by small-scale agriculture, industry and entrepreneurs;

0 due to mandatory check-off rules, however, union membership was not
voluntary: once a workplace was organized, all of its employees had to join the
union, and dues were automatically deducted from paychecks;

0 the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took
place within the legal framework of the Tripartite Council. While the state entered
this arrangement with an eye to controlling the unions’ activities and agenda, the
unions were able to maintain their autonomy from the goals of the state despite the
close institutional linkage;

° the motivation for membership in trade unions was non-voluntary; workers
became members automatically upon gaining employment. However, workers’
satisfaction with their leadership was dependent on their demonstrated success in
collective bargaining efforts.

Quasi-pluralist sector: business and commercial agricultural associations

° even more than the trade unions, private business and commercial agricultural
associations remained outside the purview of the state under the UNIP regime.
Both of these economic sectors were too small to be of great economic or
electoral significance to the regime, and both types of organizations had strong
foundations in the colonial period and First Republic, during which time they
adopted voluntary membership-based organizational structures;

- membership in such organizations was strictly voluntary, although for
commercial agriculture the economic opportunities offered by the association’s
role in the command economy presented specific material incentives;

0 the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took

place on an ad hoc basis, largely defined by personal relationships between group
leaders and members and government officials;

158

 

° the motivation for membership in these organizations could have conformed to
pluralist theory, with members joining out of desire for a collective voice, or it
might have been better explained by rational choice theory, with members joining
for the selective incentives offered. Importantly, since many of these groups were
formed before independence, they were founded and initially populated by white
farmers and businessmen, who sought to transplant European forms of collective
action to their new environment. After independence, membership in these groups
was to varying degrees racially integrated, but organizing principles and hence the
membership incentive appear to have stayed the same.

5.4 The Institutional Context in the Third Republic and Resulting Membership
Incentives
The transition to a liberalized polity and economy in 1991 formally brought about
a more pluralistic representational arena, allowing groups to form freely under
constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech and association, and dissolving the
corporative relationship between the ruling Party, the state, and social groups. Again, a
thumbnail sketch of these developments shows the marked change in the institutional
environment which shapes representation:
° social and economic groups are no longer required to be affiliated to a political
party or the state, they are free to form as opportunity arises;
- membership in organizations is left to the mobilization efforts of group leaders
(with the important exception of the trade union movement), and is not
accountable to (or driven by the expectation of privileges from) the one—party
state;
- the day-to-day relationship between economic interest groups and the
government continues to be structured by the Tripartite Council in the labor
sector, but for other sectors there is little central government planning or
coordination as to where the articulation of social and economic interests fits in the
policy decision process.

This new environment is the basis of a more pluralist system of interest

representation. As explicated above, pluralist theory holds that in a society in which

159

multiple interest bases exist groups will spontaneously emerge to aggregate and articulate
the interests of their members. Indeed, this seems to be what the founders of Zambia’s
Third Republic had in mind when deciding the shape of the new regime. At the historic
conference held in Lusaka in 1990 which gave birth to the current ruling party, the
Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Dr. Remmy Mushota delivered an important
address in which he identified five means of institutionalizing democracy: citizenship, the
right to vote, the electoral system, political parties, and interest groups. Mushota argued
that in a democracy,

"it is essentially imperative that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with

their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to

determine and execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes do make
it desirable that citizens be allowed and encouraged through the law to join
together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and
thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these
likes and interests ” (Lewanika & Chitala 1990:30, emphasis mine).

As discussed above, several types of inducements drew Zambians to membership
in interest groups in the Second Republic: state coercion (in sectors where the government
sought to incorporate politically important consituencies into the Party structure through
“mass organizations” and other arrangements); legal coercion (in the industrial sector,
where workers and employers were required to join the unions and associations,
respectively, in their workplaces) and selective incentives (in sectors where more
privileged populations, such as the indigenous business class and commercial farmers,
were permitted to form voluntary organizations). The former incentives have been made

obsolete in some cases by the institutional changes brought about by regime transition.

The question we seek to address here is what type of incentives are emerging in their

160

place, in the more pluralistic environment of the Third Republic.
5.5 Analyzing Membership Incentives: The 1997 Membership Survey

The groups included in the following analysis are the local level branches of the
eight major national-level interest groups, and the Mineworkers’ Union (which is
considered separately from the ZCTU due to its historical significance and the fact that it
is no longer affiliated to the ZCTU; this will be re-tooled in the rest of the analysis, and
discussed in the methods section. The term “apex organizations” will be used to refer to
the eight official apex groups and the MUZ for this analysis). The groups selected for the
study are: Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), Zambia
National Farmers’ Union (ZNF U), Provincial Business Association (PBA), National
Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF), Peasant Farmers’ Union
(PFU), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Federation of Employers

(ZFE).”

 

9 Moe excludes such groups from his study, due to the fact that membership in most
unions in the US. is mandatory, not voluntary. It is the same for the Zambian case, membership in
most unions is mandatory; however, the questions about membership were modified for union
members. These members were not asked why they joined, but they were asked if they would want
to stay in the group if either services or representation were ceased. The data that was collected on
these members provides interesting contrasts and similarities with the data from the other groups,
and so has been included here.

161

 

Figure 5.2
Membership levels of Groups included in the Study

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ZACCI: 310
ZNFU 3957 (1997)
ZCF: 2,462,291 (estimate, 1997)
NAPSSF 5,000 (estimate)
PFU 5,000 (estimate)
ZFE 10,000 (estimate, 1997)
ZCTU 270,000 (estimate, 1997)
MUZ 41,000 (estimate, 1997)

 

Sampling: While each of these national level groups were able to provide lists of local
branches, with the exception of the ZACCI and ZN F U, it was not possible to obtain lists
of all individual members of local groups. Given the lack of an exact population size and
the absence of a sampling frame, it was thus not possible to use a probability sampling
method to select subjects for interviews.

Instead, the sampling method used was a heterogeneous one which attempted to
use random sampling where possible, and to draw a purposive sample intended to capture
geographical and social diversity where a representative sample was not possible.
Sampling thus proceeded on two levels: where membership lists were available, a sample
was drawn using a systematic random process. These cases were then either approached
for an individual interview, or were sent a written questionnaire (in each of the cases
where lists were available, it was fair to assume that the respondent was literate and could
respond to such an instrument). For the other groups, the survey team traveled to major

towns in all nine of Zambia’s provinces, and approached the local branch of the national

162

organization for group lists from which to randomly choose members. However, such
lists were rarely available, and group leaders at the district-level often were the only
source for finding members to interview for the study. Hence, for these groups, the
sample is probably biased toward the more affluent and active members of such groups,
and toward those who live close to urban and peri—urban centers. Table 5.1 below gives

the frequency of respondents for each of the groups in the study.

 

Table 5.1
The Sample

 

ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ Total

 

 

Frequency 40 54 35 16 13 43 1 57 7 12 377
Percent
of Total 11% 14% 9% 4% 3% 1 1% 42% 2% 3% 100%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Questionnaire: The survey instrument was a questionnaire administered by myself (in
English) or a research assistant (in English or vernacular). In addition, as mentioned
above, mail questionnaires (English version) were sent to members of groups where
membership lists were available. This questionnaire was exactly the same as the
administered questionnaire, with the addition of a short introductory paragraph which
replicated the introduction that interviewers gave the respondents.
5.6 Analyzing Membership Incentives

As noted above, this analysis begins with the observation that the transition from
the one-party state to a multi-party state has as its corollary the adoption of pluralist
institutions in the place of the former corporatist ones. We are therefore primarily

interested here in the classic pluralist question, that is, given a pluralist environment, why

163

 

do individuals engage in group activity? We proceed by first addressing the question,
what are the mainincentives for membership in the major interest groups in Zambia’s
Third Republic?; and secondly addressing the question, do current motivational incentives
vary by the “institutional sector” categories developed in Chapter Three? The following
analysis partly replicates Moe’s impressive study on economic interest groups in the US.
(1980), which seeks to separate out the political and economic motivations for group
membership. However, where Moe focused on a small handful of local groups,10 we
maintain our focus on the distinction between the major apex organizations in Zambia’s
Third Republic, and draw from a purposive sample of members of the local groups of all
eight apex groups: Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI),
Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), Provincial Business Association (PBA),
National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (N APSSF), Peasant Farmers’
Union (PF U), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Federation of
Employers (ZFE).
5.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample

As detailed above, due to the lack of an acceptable sampling frame, the sample
design for the membership survey was purposive. We thus cannot make inferences to the
general population of interest group members with this sample. However, since it

wasdesigned to include members of all the sectors of groups in the study, and since it is

 

'0 Specifically, the Minnesota Farm Bureau , the Minnesota Farmers’ Union, the
Minnesota Retail Federation, the Minnesota-Dakotas Hardware Association, and the Printing
Industries of the Twin Cities.

164

geographically diverse, we can learn something from the variation we see in the sample
about the larger interest group system in Zambia’s Third Republic. Given that the data
was systematically and carefully collected, it adds much to the little research done to date
on these types of groups.

Table 5.2, next page, gives demographic details on the survey respondents.
Overall, the average age of these group members is much higher than that of the general
population; the average ranges from a low of 36 years for members of unions in the
ZCTU, to a high of 51 years for members of cooperatives in the ZCF; in contrast, 75% of
the general population was below the age of 30, as of the 1990 census. This is perhaps
not surprising, since participation in such activities is often the purview of older, more
stable and settled citizens in any country. It is striking, nonetheless, that members are so
old; in a context where the average life expectancy at birth is 45.5 years (1990 census), 51
years of age is considerably more than “middle—aged.” As we’ll see, this is one of several
corroborating indicators that the members of interest group are among the more “well-off”
(here, healthier and longer-lived) Zambians. This point is emphasized when we examine
the education levels of the group members in the sample; again, we see that they are far
above average. Whereas 33.4% of Zambians receive no education, only 12.9% reach the
10th to 12th grade level, and a paltry 0.1% receive post-secondary education, 61% of these
group members reported they had reached the 10-12th grade level, and 15% reported they
had post-secondary education. These members also report that they are much better—off in
terms of annual incomes than the population at large. Though we note that it is difficult to
use an individual “average income” for a comparison measure in this case, since much of

the population doesn’t earn a consistent cash income and those who do support extended

165

 

 

 

Table 5.2
Characteristics of the Sample

 

 

(% of respondents belonging tggroups within the given Apex organization)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ Total
Age 47 49 39 44 50 51 36 48 39 42
(mean)
Education
None 6 6 7 2
1-9 years 3 35 11 56 39 57 11 14 17 22
10-12 years 44 31 80 38 46 31 81 57 83 61
post-second 53 29 9 l 5 5 8 29 1 5
Income (per month)
0-K49,000 4 17 3 40 46 44 2 12
K50-100,000 17 3 7 12 30 18
K100-500,00 14 19 88 33 46 29 62 83 49
Vz-leil 11 25 3 13 8 10 5 29 17 10
oerKl mill. 71 21 3 7 5 1 71 12
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey
166

families, we can use as a benchmark the average income of the mineworkers in the sample,
who reported they made about K100,000 - K500,000 per month, as of 1997. If we use

this income level as a benchmark for the middle—class, we see from Table 5.2 that only
thirty percent of the sample fell below this level, fifty percent met the benchmark, and
twelve percent made considerably more-- over one million kwacha per month. Even given
the fact that the method of selection for respondents was biased to the more active and
better educated (discussed above), it seems reasonable to suggest that interest group
members differ from the average Zambian in being older, more educated, and perhaps at
least a bit wealthier; thus confirming our assertion in Chapter Three that interests groups
primarily represent an economic elite.

As Table 5.2 also shows, there are clear distinctions between groups. More than
half the respondents in business groups under the ZACCI aegis, and nearly a third of those
farmers affiliated to the ZNFU and those employers affiliated to the ZF E, have post-
secondary education, compared to 0.1% of the general population. Eighty percent or
more of respondents affiliated with the Provincial Business Association (PBA), the
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union (MUZ) have at least
some high school education if not a diploma. Two of the three groups representing small-
scale farmers have the lowest levels of education in the sample; 62% of the respondents
affiliated to the NAPSF and 64% of those affiliated to the ZCF reported they have attained
less than a 10th grade education. However, this still compares favorably to the general
population, where 86% have attained only that same level. And though the small number
of respondents must be paid heed, it is still noteworthy that the members of the PF U in the

sample are more educated than those of their counterparts, the NAPSF, and ZCF, with

167

61% having 10"1 grade or better education, compared to 38% and 36% of the other
groups, respectively.

Income levels show a similar trend; with a whopping 71% of the businesspeople
and employers affiliated to the ZACCI and ZFE making over Klmillion per month, nearly
a quarter of those in the ZNFU having made over a million kwacha per month and another
quarter having made between half and a full million kwacha per month. The respondents
affiliated to the Provincial Business Association reported more moderate incomes, 88% of
whom were on par with 62% of the members of the ZCTU’s trade unions and 83% of
members of the Mineworkers Union, who made K100,00-K500,000 per month. And
again the agricultural groups representing small-scale farmers brought up the rear, with
40-46% of the respondents from these groups reporting they made zero to K49,000
(about US$40) per month.

Overall, the data suggest that members affiliated to the Association of Chambers of
Commerce (ZACCI) and Federation of Employers (ZFE) are similar to one another in
educational attainment and income; members affiliated to the Provincial Business
Associations (PBA), Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Mineworkers Union (MUZ)
are also thus similar; and the Peasant Farmers Union (PFU), Cooperative Federation
(ZCF) and the Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (N APSF ) seem to draw
members of similar characteristics, i.e. low to medium income and education levels. The
National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) is distinctive for the fact that among the sample of
respondents, nearly equal proportions fell into each category of income and education;
there is thus a substantial proportion of members with very high income and educational

levels, and a large percentage of members with very low income and education levels,

168

which fits neatly with the discussion in chapter four concerning big and small members in
that organization and its affiliates.

Since we are interested in the political nature and motivations of groups and their
members, it is interesting to inquire into some of the political characteristics of the sample.
Looking at Table 5.3 (next page), we see that overall, group members appear to be more
knowledgeable about the people who hold important government positions than the
average Zambian citizen, with 81% able to name their MP (versus 62% for the general
population), 89% able to name the Minister of Finance (versus 32% for the general
population), 92% able to name the Vice President of Zambia (versus 54% of the general
population). There are slight difference between groups within the sample, with the most
noticeable being between the 98% of ZACCI respondents who can name the Minister of
Finance versus the 67% of COOperative members who can do the same. We also see that
60% of the members in the sample don’t have any partisan affiliations, versus 46% of the
population overall; however, there are important variations here, with 79% of respondents
from ZACCI not affiliated to any party, while only 17% of MU Z members report they
have not partisan attachments.

Also significant is difference between groups on which party most members
identify with; while the MMD is the modal response for all groups (as is the case with the
general population, where 42% of the population identifies with the ruling party), only
18% of ZACCI members versus 75% of the members from MUZ claim the MMD as their
party of choice. For other group members, support for the MD seems to fall around the
same level as the general population. Finally, group members overall seem to be

(paradoxically) more and less politically active than the general population: 82% of

169

 

Table 5.3
Political Characteristics of the Sam le

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ Total Pop*
(N=) (40) (54) (35) (16) (13) (43) (I57) (7) (12) (377)
Political Knowledge: as percentage of group total

Local 13 8 2 l 14 2 35
Councilor

MP 68 72 89 81 77 84 84 71 100 81 62
Minister 98 85 100 75 77 67 92 100 100 89 32
Finance

Vice 93 91 100 88 92 79 95 86 100 92 54
President

Partisan Identification: as percentage of total group members; parentheses enclose raw

numbers

MMD 18 39 34 44 46 37 37 (1) 75 36 42
UNIP (1) (l) 5 1 4
NP (3) 1 2
Lima (1) (3) (1) (1) (I) 2 ?
other (1) (1) 1
None 79 54 66 50 46 58 60 71 17 60 46
Electoral Participation: as percentage of total group members

Registered 48 70 77 100 92 93 89 71 100 82 61
Voted 1996 38 59 71 100 85 84 76 71 100 72 81
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Political Knowledge = percent who responded with the correct name of the person holding that

office

Partisan Identification: party to which respondent belongs (“none” = no party or didn’t respond)
Electoral Participation: percentage who responded they registered / voted in the 1996 election

P0p*: These percentages represent statistics for the general population for the items above,
adapted from Bratton, Alderfer, and Simutanyi 1997, “Political Participation in Zambia 1991-96."

170

members in the sample report they are registered voters, while only 61% of the population
report the same; while 72% of members report they voted in the 1996 elections, in
comparison to 51% of the population. In any case, it is noticeable that while the overall
sample appears to be politically active, the members from ZACCI appear to be the least
active, with only 38% reporting that they voted in 1996, compared to 100% of the
respondents from both the PFU and the MUZ.
5.6.2 The nature of organizational incentives

One way to begin the inquiry is to assert that the benefits that existing groups offer
have solved the problem for us; if we assume that functioning groups have solved the
question of what members want, as evidenced simply by the fact that they still exist, then a
cursory glance at what they offer might suffice. Indeed, this is the approach that Jack
Walker takes, arguing that “group leaders have been engaged in a form of trial and error
for years... they search for the best bundle of benefits that works for their potential
membership” (1991 :85). To address this issue, we draw from an item from the 1997
Organizational Survey, which asks group leaders to specify the benefits they provide to
members. Figure 5.3 gives the list of benefits that national interest groups in Zambia offer
to their members. The list demonstrates that a variety of benefits are believed to be

important to group members, and that these benefits fall into the categories described

99 ca 99 cc ”1]

above, “economic selective incentives, solidary incentives, purposive incentives.

 

" It’s important to note that the distinction between different types of incentives (e.g.
material and non-material, economic and non-economic, purposive and solidary) used here and in
the literature in general is not always clear. As Moe puts it, the problem “is intrinsic to the subject
matter... motivations are complex, and there is really no way to talk about the variety of human
motives and their behavioral consequences without putting up with a degree of conceptual
ambiguity” (1980:266).

l7l

 

Figure 5.3: List of Membership Benefits

Economic Selective Incentives

Publications or other informational services (magazines, newsletters)
Training, education, or technical assistance (seminars, workshops)
Conferences and meetings

Low-cost insurance

Organized tours or trips

Collective bargaining for wages and working conditions

Research

Discounts on consumer goods

Legal assistance

Coordination among organizations

Communication with professional peers or colleagues

Non-Economic Incentives: Solidary Incentives
Friendship or social relationship with other members

Non-Economic Ptmsive Benefits

Advocacy of values, ideas, or policies important to you
Representation of members' opinions before government
Opportunity for participation in public affairs

 

 

 

Note: the list of benefits used for both the 1997 Organizational and Membership Surveys was
derived from Walker’s (1985) questionnaire. In that study, he found the useful distinctions
between benefits to be ‘professional, ” “purposive, solidary, ‘personal material, ” and
“other benefits and services. ” For the current purpose of analyzing membership incentives,
we’ve collapsed these categories into the three discussed in the text: economic selective

incentives, solidary incentives, and purposive benefits.

)9 6‘ !! l

172

Table 5.4, next page, provides data on which benefits each group offers, and how
important group leaders or officials think that the incentive is for attracting members to
the group. Respondents to the 1997 Organizational Survey were asked to report on how
important, on a scale of one to four where one was “most important,” they believed each
of the benefits above was for attracting members to their group (for those benefits that
their group did not offer, respondents were instructed to answer “not applicable,” and they
were asked to write in any additional benefits offered by their group which were not
included in the list. Thus we have comprehensive benefit information for each of the
groups in the study).12 As shown in Table 5.4, averages taken for each benefit across
apex groups indicates that advocacy and representation— both of which are non-economic
purposive benefits— rank as the two benefits that group leaders believe are the most
important to group members.

Looking closer at the benefits which leaders reported are “most” or “very”
important to their memberships, we see in Table 5.5, next page, that it is only for the
small-businessperson and farmer groups that economic benefits are most important: for
the PBA, NAPSF, and ZCF, “training” (an economic selective incentive) is believed by
leaders to be one of the services that members value most. In addition, the Mineworkers’
Union reports that another economic benefit, “collective bargaining” for better wages and

working conditions, ranks beside “advocacy of values, ideas and policies” as the most

 

‘2 As noted earlier, union membership in Zambia is compulsory upon employment in a
unionized workplace, so union leaders don’t have to “attract” members in the same way that the
other groups do. However, not all workplaces are unionized, and part of the work of individual
trade unions within the larger apex organizations is to gather those shops that haven’t been
organized under the union’s umbrella. Thus, it is argued here that union leaders are at least as
concerned and knowledgeable about members’ perceptions of the benefits offered as are other
group leaders.

173

 

Table 5.4: Benefits Provided by Groups
(bold type indicates non-economic incentives)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPS PFU ZCF ZFE MUZ Avg. Rnk
F
Collective l 1 .00
Bargaining**
Advocacy 1 2 2 l l 2 l l 1.38 1
Representation 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 .43 2
Training 4 l 1 3 1 2 3 2.14 3
Coordination 4 2 2 1 2 2 2.17 4
Information 3 2 1 3 3 2 4 2.57 5
Legal Assist. 3 2 3 3 2 2.60 6
Discounts 3 4 l 2.67 7
Meetings 3 2 5 3 2 2 2 2.71 8
Public Affairs 3 3 3 2 3 3 2.83 9
Research 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2.86 1 0
Communication 4 4 2 2 3 4 2 3.00 1 1
Friendship 3 4 3 3 2 3.00 12
Insurance 2 4 3 .00 13
Trips or Tours 3 4 4 2 4 3 3.33 14

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey ** Applies only to unions and employers’ associations
Question: For each of the following factors, please indicate, using the scale provided, your best
estimate of the importance of that factor for attracting members to this organization:

 

 

 

Scale: 1 = most important, 2 = very important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = not very important, 5 = not
at all important (see Table Six for full description of benefits)
Table 5.5: Group Leaders’ Perception of Most Important Benefits
(Plain text = “Most Important”, Italics = “Ver Important)
ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZFE MUZ
Advocacy Represent Training Advocacy Advocacy Represent Represent Advocacy
Represent Represent Coordin. Training Coll Barg
Training Discounts
lnformat
Advocacy Advocacy Coordinat Represent Advocacy Training Represent
lnformat. Represent Legal A id Public A f. C oordinat Informal. Coordinat
Coordinat Commun. Trips Meetings Research Legal Aid
Commun. Insurance Meetings Research
Meetings Meetings
Friends.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

174

 

important benefit it offers to members. When we add the benefits that leaders report are
“very” important, we see that the range of benefits cited includes both economic,
purposive, and as well, solidary benefits. This would seem to lend some support the
pluralist notion that common interests might (at least partially) motivate individuals to
engage in group activity; the corollary being that under the new pluralist institutions,
groups should be popping up across the economic spectrum to represent collective goals.
The caveat, of course, is that this is not the case for all groups; it is significant that it is the
sectors who were organized under state-corporatist arrangements in the Second Republic,
small-scale farming and business", and the union, that still look to group activity for the
provision of economic benefits.

While the analysis of what group leaders perceive to be the most important
membership benefits is instructive, it is also problematic, for group leaders may or may not
have their finger on the pulse of member preferences. Like many other political
phenomena, motivational incentives are sticky: a member may have joined a group for the
provision of a certain benefit which is no longer provided, or even in hopes that an
unprovided-but-desired benefit might one-day materialize, and maintain that membership
under the assumption that the good days are right around the comer. Hence, benefits
which are provided by a group at time i may not precisely reflect members’ preferences for

the bundle of benefits worth the costs they pay to maintain their membership. Another

 

'3 Small-scale private business actually represents a unique case in this study; technically,
this sector was not organized in the Second Republic, as small-scale farmers were under the
Cooperative Federation. However, the govemment-run corporation, the Small Industries
Development Organization (SIDO) provided training, credit and services to this sector. It is thus
not surprising that members in the new small-scale business groups look to group activity for
further provision of goods and services.

175

and perhaps more accurate way to gauge what individuals seek from membership in the
group is, well, to ask them. Table 5.6, next page, gives data on what benefits respondents
in the sample informed us that they receive from their group, while Table 5.7 tells us
which benefits are most important to continuing their membership. All are broken down
by major apex group distinction, as it is sectoral/institutional differences we’re most
interested in.

The first important distinction to note is the different picture presented by the
group leaders’ impression of the provision and importance of membership benefits, and
group members’ actual experience in receiving them. For ZACCI, selective incentives
such as training, legal assistance, discounts, and social relationships are not benefits that
the apex believes are important enough (or maybe just not possible) to provide; however,
a handful of respondents report that they nonetheless receive them from their local groups.
First, this informs us that local groups underneath the apex are filling in the gaps left by
the national body, and second, it tells us that the apex might not be adequately aware or
able to fulfill member’s expectations. In contrast is the Federation of Employers, whose
representative reported that training and information were “very important” benefits
provided to members, and sure enough, four of the seven members in the survey reported
that they receive those benefits. Also noteworthy is the fact that while the small-farmer
groups, the ZCF, PF U and NAPSF, report that they provide selective benefits to their
members such as training, information, and research— and that they believe these items are
important to members— very few members report that they actually receive these benefits
(training: 44%, 23%, 6% respectively, information: 21%, 23%, 6% respectively, and

research services: 19%, 0%, 13% respectively). The ZNFU also reports that its provision

176

 

Table 5.6
Benefits Realized by Members
(% reporting they receive the benefitflom their group, organized by Apex organization)
(bold type indicates non-economic incentives)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI PBA ZNFU PFU NAPS ZCT ZFE ZCF MUZ Total
(N=) (40) (35) (54) (13) F U (7) (43) (12) (377)

(l 6) (l5 7)
Collective 86 71 75 (77) 1
Bargaining**
Representation 100 49 87 46 56 71 71 58 67 71 2
Friendship 35 74 82 39 88 69 29 86 42 68 3
Meetings 70 54 80 62 81 53 29 88 25 63 4
Public Affairs 50 49 61 54 69 55 43 58 25 54 5
Coordination 45 54 63 46 56 47 29 49 25 49 6
Advocacy 58 43 54 3 1 88 37 71 40 42 45 7
Communication 55 46 54 31 56 36 71 33 25 42 8
Training 20 89 39 23 6 36 57 44 58 40 9
Legal Assistance 5 9 32 31 57 14 26 42 35 10
Information 78 23 65 23 6 17 57 21 58 33 1 1
Research 13 11 19 13 15 29 19 33 16 12
Trips 28 9 26 8 25 8 21 25 15 13
Discounts 3 32 8 1 23 8 14
Insurance 3 2 3 5 17 3 15

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

** Applies only to unions and employers’ associations

177

of information, legal assistance, discounts and research services are important to members;
and at least some if not most members in the sample report they do receive them: 65%
receive information and publications, 32% legal assistance, 32% discounts on consumer
goods, and 19% receive research services from their group. The Mineworkers Union also
recognizes and successfiilly provides these type of benefits to members: 58% receive
information and publications, 58% training, 42% legal assistance, and 33% research
services.

Thus, economic inducements do seem to play a motivational role in group activity.
Overall, however, the data are startling in that the benefits that most respondents report
they actually receive from their group are non—economic in nature (with the exception of
collective bargaining for union members). Since it is only union members who are not
voluntary members of their groups, this would seem to challenge Olson’s hypothesis that
either coercion or the provision of selective economic incentives are necessary to inducing
group membership. That is, current group members are clearly maintaining their
membership in organizations that largely provide non-economic benefits. While we
demonstrated above that economic benefits are also important, there is reason to suspect
that neither type of benefit is critical to the decision to join; rather, the decision to
participate in group activity is more complex.

5.7 Analyzing the Factors Important to Membership Incentives

Does the fact that members are responding to non-economic incentives imply that
they are not acting rationally (in the economic sense), that pluralist theory is correct in
postulating that people will naturally join together in groups? According to Moe, the

answer is ‘not quite’-- for benefits other than strictly economic ones can qualify as rational

178

incentives. An example of this is the case of political incentives; though political goals
themselves often fit the description of collective goods and are thus subject to the free-
rider problem, the perception that one is contributing to the good and the personal
rewards thereby realized can operate as individually-realized benefits. As demonstrated by
Tables 5.4 and 5.6 (shown previously), group leaders and members clearly perceive that
the political dimension of group activity, i.e. representation and advocacy, is important;
thus, “the representation of members’ opinions before government” ranks as the most
widely-realized (71 % of respondents) benefit that members receive and the second most
important benefit that leaders believe they offer to members, while “the advocacy of
important values, ideas, and policies” is the most important benefit that group leaders
believe they offer to members. And as demonstrated by the data in Table 5.7, next page,
these factors are very important to respondents’ decisions to continue membership in their
group.

While for all respondents considered together, “representation” ranked first as the
most highly valued benefit when considering whether to maintain membership; even when
the sample was separated by group, “representation” remained among the top three
benefits for all groups in the sample (see Table 5.8, next page). Next most important
(again, with the important exception of collective bargaining in the case of the unions),
however, was the provision of “training, education, or technical assistance”-- an economic
benefit. And after two solidary benefits, “friendship” and “meetings,” more economic
inducements, “legal assistance” and “information,” again appear as important benefits.
5.7.1 Perceptual and Value Characteristics: the Role of Efficacy

Hence, while Olsen’s economic selective incentives, as well as solidary incentives,

179

 

Table 5.7

Most Important Benefits for Continuing Membership
(% reporting that the benefit is one of the three most important benefits they receive)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPS PFU ZCF ZCT ZFE MUZ Total
UV=) (40) (54) (35) F (13) (43) U (7) (12) (377)
(16) (15 7)
Representation 83 41 29 44 33 41 71 58 44
Collective 71 71 67 36
Bargaining
Training 8 28 80 19 15 26 18 43 42 26
Friendship 5 17 29 38 44 20 14 8 22
Meetings 18 32 ll 31 53 12 28 21
Legal Assist 17 7 36 17 17
Information 50 43 6 6 5 4 14 15
Advocacy 30 12 9 25 7 8 l4 17 12
Communication 25 7 31 13 7 7 14 8 12
Public Affairs 20 2 26 19 10 8 12
Coordination 15 1 1 14 6 l9 9 14 11
Research 7 3 6 5 3 17 4
Trips 5 2 6 7 2 8 3
Discounts 9 7 I 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: I 997 Membership Survey

 

 

 

Question: What are the most important benefits in terms of your decision to continue
your membership?
Table 5.8: Top Five Most Important Benefits for Continuing Membership
(in order of ggatest percentage of members reportin it to be important)
ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ
Repres. Inform. Training Repres. Coordin. Meeting Col.Bar. Col.Bar. Col.Bar.
Inform. Repres. Commu. Friends. Repres. Friends. Repres. Repres. Repres.
Advoc. Meeting Repres. Meeting Meeting Repres. Legal A. Training Training
Commu. Training Friends. Advoc. Training Training Friends. Meeting
Public A Friends. Inform. Training Friends. Public A Training
Legal A. Coordin.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

180

 

appear to be important reasons why the Zambians in the sample seek out membership in
economic associations, it is striking that the first-ranked response overall is
“representation to government,” a political benefit. Furthermore, we find evidence to
support Moe’s claim that such a finding fits a modified rational framework when we
examine respondents’ perceptions of their contribution to their group’s political success or
failure (see Table 5.9, next page). Over seventy percent of respondents reported that they
believe their financial contributions to their group made a difference to its success in
representing their interests, and eighty percent of respondents felt that their participation
in group activities contributed to the group’s success. This is strong evidence that across
the board, the Zambians in the sample are looking to group activity for political reasons—
they want their interests represented to government, and since they feel that their
contributions to their group have impact on its political success, they have an
“economically rational” incentive to contribute to group activity. These findings lean in
the direction of supporting further development of pluralism in Zambia, for it would
appear that there is at least a segment of the population that is ready to “join together in
groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence
government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests.”

When we break down the finding across different groups, we see the same large
majorities who believe their contributions make a difference: 65% of ZACCI members,
58% of ZNFU members, 77% of PBA members, 75% of NAPSF members, 69% of PF U
members, 65% of ZCF members, 78% of ZCTU members, and 92% of MUZ members.
The only exception are members affiliated to the Federation of Employers (ZFE), where 4

of the seven respondents reported that their dues make no difference, while the other three

181

 

Table 5.9
Effect of Contributions on Group’s Success or Failure
(% reporting level of the importance of their contribution)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ Total
W=l (40) (54) (31) (16) (13) (43) (157) (7) (12) (377)
Effect of Monetary Contribution: (percent of members)

No Effect 30 30 11 6 23 23 12 57 18
Noticeable 45 32 3 7 44 54 37 41 43 50 40
Effect

Big Effect 20 26 40 31 15 28 37 42 31
** 5 14 1 1 l9 8 I2 10 8 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Effect of Participation: (percent of members)

No Effect 10 9 6 6 15 12 7 14 8
Noticeable 68 39 40 38 39 51 43 57 75 46
Effect

Big Effect 18 37 40 38 31 26 40 29 17 34
** 5 13 I4 19 15 12 1 l 8 l 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1 997 Membership Survey

** no response or “don’t know”

Question: One of the goals of this group is to represent members ’ interest to government. Do
you believe that the money you pay in dues is important to this groups’ success in representing
its members’ interests to government? Do you believe that your activities with this group are

important to its success in representing its members ’ interests to government?

 

Table 5.10
Effect of Income Level on Efficacy
(% of respondents within income category)

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Annual Kw 20,000- Kw 200,000- Over Total
Tim; Kw 199,000 Kw 500,000 Kw 1 million
Effect of Dues:
No Effect 18 13 36 19
Noticeable Effect 39 53 44 45
Big Effect 42 34 21 36
Total 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey
Kendall’s tau-b: -0.123, significance level: 0.025

182

reported that they have a noticeable effect on group efforts. However, even for the ZFE,
all but one respondent reported that their participation had some if not a large impact; for
the rest of the groups, members reported overwhelmingly that their participation in their
group was important to its overall success in representing their interests to government:
86% of ZACCI members, 76% of ZNFU members, 80% of PBA members, 76% of
NAPSF members, 70% of PFU members, 77% of ZCF members, 83% of ZCTU members,
and 92% of MUZ members.

Surprisingly, these perceptions of efficacy seem to have nothing to do with how
much the individual actually contributes, since no relationship was found between the
subscription level that members pay and their perception of their effect on their group’s
political success (Kendall’s tau-b = -0.051, significance level = 0.31). However, there
does appear to be a relationship between a member’s level of income and their feelings of
efficacy, but again it is surprising, as it shows that individuals in the low to middle range of
our sample (Kw 20,000 to Kw 200,000 per month) feel more efficacious than their
wealthier counterparts in the Kw 200,000 to Kw 500,000 range, who are nonetheless still
more efficacious than their well-to-do counterparts who make over Kw 1 million per
month. Kendall’s tau-b shows a relationship between these two variables, income and level
of efficacy, of -0.l23, with a significance level of 0.025, see Table 5 .10 for details).

5.7.2 Purposive Incentives: Group Activity as a Responsibility

In addition to such political inducements as mentioned above, purposive incentives
also stand out as being important to membership motivations. To include such potential
incentives in the analysis, group members were asked if they remained in the group at least

partly because they felt a responsibility to do so. To reiterate from above: “feelings of

183

responsibility” can be thought of as “purposive incentives,” since membership in the group
provides the individually-realized benefit of fulfillment in satisfying one’s obligations. As
Table 5.11 demonstrates, a large majority of respondents (73%) report that they do stay in
the group at least partly from a feeling of responsibility, and overall, 64% of respondents
report that this feeling of responsibility is a very if not the most important reason why they

continue membership in the group.

 

Table 5.11
Responsibility as a Motivational Factor
(% reporting that “feeling oiresponsibility ” is reason for continuing their membership)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE Muz Total
UV=) (40) (54) (35) (l6) (13) (43) (I57) (7) (12) (377)
Importance:
None / 26 15 20 I9 8 9 25 43 25 2]
Not Very
Somewhat 20 13 6 8 5 7 l4 8 9
Very 43 48 57 75 54 54 44 43 58 49
Most 13 20 14 6 8 23 14 8 15
Total* 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 1997 Membership Survey * totals less than 100 are due to “no response”
Question: Do you remain in the group at least partly because you feel a responsibility to
do so? Is this responsibility a (insert level) important reason for remaining in
the group?

Though we did not probe the respondent for their subjective interpretation of
“feelings of responsibility,”i.e. who or what they feel responsible to, our discussion above
concerning associational activity in Africa suggests that responsibilities to larger social
networks is an important consideration in individual’s decision-making. Whatever
individual respondents were referring to, it’s reasonable to suggest that “responsibility”

offers another important selective incentive for interest group membership; that is, through

184

their group membership, these Zambians gain an individually-realized benefit that makes
their contribution to group activity worthwhile.

Indeed, in each of the groups in the study, 50 to 80% of respondents reported that
responsibility was a very or the most important reason for continuing membership in the
group, with the exception again of the ZFE, where four of the seven respondents replied
that responsibility was not that important to the reasons they maintained their membership.
It’s not surprising, given Hyden’s peasant-theses, that it is the two main farmers’ groups,
the ZCF and the ZNFU, that have the highest percentages of respondents who report this
is the most important reason to stay in the group. In a similar vein, friendship or social
relationships with other members— a solidary benefit— round out the picture of important
motivational inducements. In the sample, “friendship” was forth in the ranking of benefits
important to continuing membership (see Table 5.7), and it fell among the top five benefits
that members of all the agricultural groups found important.

5.7.3 Considering the Most Important Benefits to Group Membership

Clearly, there is a wide variety of incentives that are important to members, and the
data above suggest that many members do posses “perceptual and value characteristics
conducive to political action” (Moe 1980:209). Following Moe’s interpretation of his
very similar findings in the US, though economic selective incentives appear to be
important membership inducements, there is a rational basis for the inducement value of
group goals, such as the representation of the groups’ interests to government, as well.
Furthermore, it would seem that group leaders in the Third Republic are responding to
members’ desire for representation; as shown in Table 5.4, most leaders recognize that the

representation of interests and the advocacy of values and policies are important to

185

members, and indeed, most members (71%) feel that their group does represent their
interests to government. However, there exists an important disjunction between what
members actually receive as benefits, and what they consider important to maintaining
their membership. Looking back at Tables 5.6 and 5.7, we see that while, overall,
members report that the top seven benefits they receive are non-economic in nature, four
out of seven of the benefits they consider most important are indeed economic selective
incentives. Thus, while training, legal assistance, and information rank below non-
economic benefits on the list of what members receive, they rank above non-economic
benefits such as advocacy, communication, and participation in public affairs on the list of
what benefits members consider important.

Even more telling are members’ responses to the question, “are there any other
benefits that you would like to see your group provide?” As Shown in Table 5.12,
overwhelming majorities of members responded that there were other benefits they wanted
their group to provide in addition to the ones already supplied: 100% of NAPSF, 100% of
PFU, 97% of PBA, 93% of ZCF, 82% of ZNFU, 91% of ZCTU, and 83% of MUZ

members.

 

 

 

Table 5.12
Other Benefits
(% reporting they would like other benefits from their group in addition to those they receive)
Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ Total
(N=) (40) (54) (35) (16) (13) (43) (157) (7) (12) (377)
38 82 97 100 100 93 91 57 83 85

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Question:

Are there any other benefits that you would like to see your group provide?

186

The important distinction to make about this finding is the nature of the groups

that desire further benefits, and the nature of the goods and services they believe are

missing (see Figure 5.4, below).'4

 

Agricultural groups
NAPSF

Transportation

Services, fertilizers, money/loans, cows

Marketing of maize, fertilizers, and seed

Borehole, fertilizer, loans for cattle

Loans, inputs, seeds

Farming equipment, inputs, seeds, fertilizer

Medical/Health care

Training and education

Supply of water

Ability for association to meet all my needs—
inputs, marketing, legal help

Inputs, like they promised when they came.
Information is OK, but must be put into

ZCF

Training and advice, loans

Provision of seed

Fertilizer

Farm inputs

Cattle loan

Tractor, education, loans and other inputs
PF U

Fertilizer, loans

 

practice. We need workshops & seminars.

Figure 5.4: Responses to Open-Ended Question: What other benefits should group provide?

Trade Unions

ZCTU

Funeral Assistance: bags of meal and money
Housing

Medical allowances, health care

Education

Housing, tools allowance

More communication

Better working conditions, salaries, legal aid
Household loans and salary advances
Cushioning of economic hardships
Retirement package

Education benefits for children

Business Associations

PBA

Funds to improve business, e.g. revolving fund
Loans, tours and trips
Seminars, workshops, tours and trips

 

Source: 199 7 Membership Survey

 

Firstly, it is groups with “small members”-- small-scale farmers and small-scale
businesspeople, and trade union members who believe their group should provide further
benefits. For the former, the benefits are, for the most part, the productive inputs that
used to be supplied by the one-party state through the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and

the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO); for the latter, the benefits desired

 

'4 This question was an open-ended item on the survey instrument; thus respondents were able to
report exactly what they want from group membership, outside of the traditional incentive categories.

187

are largely about more successful bargaining for high wages and conditions of services.
Since the distribution of these benefits represented the use of state resources to solicit
support among rural constituencies for UNIP, we might think of these as a special type of
economic selective incentive, a “patronage incentive. ”

Figure 5.4 (above) gives illustrative responses. As shown, members of the
NAPSF, PFU, and ZCF report they continue to want very individual, very material
selective incentives-- what we’ve termed “patronage incentives”-- from their group:
agricultural inputs and credit predominate the list. Trade union members also want
economic benefits: higher wages, better working conditions, as well as health, education,
housing, and retirement benefits. Where government continues to own the firms that
employ these workers, provision of these benefits also represent patronage-type awards,
since workers are made aware of who supplies— and can stop supplying— them. This is
still an important factor for mineworkers— whose union, we saw above, broke off from the
Congress (ZCTU) over disagreements with the latter’s “anti-govemment” stance. The
identification of these “patronage benefits” is an important finding, for it demonstrates
the long reach of membership incentives present in the Second Republic to expectations of
group activity in the Third Republic.

For Zambians in the interest group system of the Second Republic, with its
centralized- state apparatus and command-type economy, membership incentives in key
interest groups— especially those that represented important political constituencies, the
cooperatives and trade unions— revolved around economic selective incentives,
specifically patronage-type rewards (and perhaps solidary ones too). The political system

did not permit open lobbying over economic interests, so political incentives for

188

membership were not of much importance to individual’s decision to join in collective
action through interest groups. The question to ask is, has the introduction of pluralist
institutions changed this? We’ve see above that there is reason to expect that in the Third
Republic, both economic and non-economic incentives are important, it is now time to see
if we can tell which is more important, and specifically, if the political incentive of gaining
representation to government has gained importance over the provision of material
benefits. To do this, we push the distinction between economic incentives and political
ones a bit further, beginning with the first decision that members make about group
activity: whether or not to join.
5.8 The decision to join

Olson’s theory predicts that individuals join groups for the selective incentives they
offer. Above, we made the case that there are other reasons that individuals might look to
group activity. To test these hypotheses, we asked members what was their primary
reason for joining their group" . Table 5.13 (next page) gives the results when
respondents were asked simply if the item was one of the reasons they joined their
association, and Table 5.14 (following page) shows respondents’ answers when they were

asked to choose the most important reason.

 

'5 Above, we first considered a similar issue, that is, how members value the benefits they
receive, in order to be able to include trade unions and employers associations in the analysis. Here, we
have to exclude them, because membership in these organizations is compulsory.

189

 

 

Table 5.13
Reasons for Joining
(% reporting that item was a reason or joining their group)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total
0H (40) (50) (33) (16) (13) (42) (194)
Goods and Services 43 80 61 94 100 91 74
Representation 95 82 85 94 85 74 85
Social Rewards 23 44 49 19 69 50 41
Expectation 10 38 33 50 39 33 3 1
Responsibility 53 68 67 94 85 64 67
Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e. g. no response, missing)

Question: I have a list of some of the other reasons for which people sometimes join groups. As I read
each one, I’d like you to tell me if it was one of the reasons why YOU decided to join this association?

As shown in Table 5.14, next page, when respondents were given five types of
reasons from which to choose, “representation to government” came out as most
important overall for all respondents, but there were noticeable differences between
groups. For the two business organizations, “representation” was the modal response
(ZACCI 88%, PBA 52%); while for all the farmer groups, “goods and services” was the
modal response (ZNFU 47%, NAPSF 53%, PFU 73%, ZCF 50%). For the latter, “a
sense of responsibility” was reported to be the most important reason for joining for 21%
of ZNFU respondents, and 19 % of PBA respondents; “social rewards” were also reported
to also be the most important reason forjoining for 11% of ZCF respondents. These
findings seem to indicate that political motivations are most important to business groups
in the Third Republic, while goods and services are most important to agricultural groups.
However, as we’ve noted above, just because selective incentives are important to
individuals’ decisions to join organizations doesn’t mean that they are the only important
reason that people decide to join in group activity. Since the argument that pluralism can
precipitate widespread citizen activity and policy advocacy at least partially rests on

190

whether people join in collective action for material or for political reasons, it’s important

to analyze this issue carefully.

 

Table 5.14
Most Important Reasons for Joining

(% reportingthat item was most important reason [or joining their group)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total
0V=l (34) (47) (31) (15) (ll) (36) (174)
Goods and Services 6 47 19 53 73 50 37
Representation 88 30 52 47 18 1 1 42
Social Rewards 3 2 3 l l 4
Responsibility 3 21 19 9 3 16
Other 7 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

*excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)
Question: Which was the most important reason for which you joined this association?

5.9 Separating Political from Economic: The Pivotal Role of Politics

To focus more closely on this issue, we asked respondents to choose between the
two incentives, “goods and services” or “representation to government,”and choose
which, for them, was the most important benefit, or if in fact they were equally important.
When members were forced to decide between just the two, it is only for ZACCI that
representation comes out in first place, with 68% reporting that “representation” was most
important, while “services” were more important for only 18% . However, the only group
for which there was a majority reporting that “services” was most important was the
Cooperative Federation. And furthermore, offering the choice of whether they are equally
important shows that even for some members who might put great value in the material
rewards of their membership, the political rewards have value too: half the respondents
from the PFU, a third from the ZCF and PBA, and a quarter from the ZNFU reported that
the two types are equally important.

191

Again we see that though these data offer support for the economic “selective
incentive” hypothesis, they also point to the importance of political motivations; as shown
in Table 5.15, even though 42% of respondents all together find economic services to be
the most important membership benefit, 32% put greater value in the political
representation the group offers, and 27% believe the two benefits are equal. In addition, it
is apparent that the relative importance of these incentives varies between groups; ZACCI
seems to be the most “political,” while the ZCF appears to be the most “economic,” with

the other groups falling somewhere in between.

 

Table 5.15
Most Important Benefit at Present
(% reporting that)

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total
(N=) (40) (53) (34) (16) (10) (42) (195)
Benefit
Goods & Services 18 42 47 50 40 57 42
Representation 68 34 18 38 10 10 32
Both are Equal 15 25 35 13 50 33 27
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

to government?

*excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)
Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and
it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests.
Which of these benefits is more important to you, the provision of goods and services, or representation

The ZN FU deserves special attention here. As we’ve discussed above, the National

Farmers’ Union has historically been a commercial farmers’ organization, with small-scale

farmers only being introduced into the ranks of membership in the past few years. We’ve

suggested that such “small / peasant farmers” differ from “large / commercial farmers” in

the benefits they look for from group involvement; this might mean that there is substantial

difference between members within the ZNFU as to whether services or representation is

more important. To test whether this is the case, we looked for a correlation between the

192

dues that a member pays,‘6 and their preference for the two types of benefit, and found
that there is indeed a significant relationship, with “large” farmers more likely to consider
representation the more important benefit, and “small” farmers more likely to find that
good and services are the most important benefit (Kendall’s tau-b = 0.389, significance
level = .005).

We’ve learned thus far that the while economic inducements are important in the
Third Republic, as we’ve argued in previous chapters that they were important in the
Second, there is a case to be made for the salience of political ones as well. Moe finds this
also to be the case in his study of interest groups in the United States, where “the
motivational roles of lobbying and of feelings of responsibility are not at all insignificant;
while they are hardly the crucial factors the pluralists make them out to be, they are
certainly more prevalent than Olson’s original analysis would lead us to expect.”

Indeed, we’ve found that non-economic factors are important for motivating group
members in Zambia as well, implying that the adoption of pluralist institutions is having a
similar effect in that country as it does in pluralist systems elsewhere; that is, that we find
people engaging in group activity in order to gain representation for their interests, as well
for the kind of purposive reasons that pluralist theorists are fond of, such as feelings of
responsibility and Shared values. Following Moe, however, it is possible to push the
matter still further through an inquiry into the “pivotal role of politics” as a determinant of

membership decisions (1980 :2 l 0).

 

‘6 This provides an indicator of “small” vs. “large” status, because small farmers pay
Kw20,000 in dues, and large farmers pay 1% of their annual profits. The categories are thus
Kw20,000 or less = “small farmer,” and Kw50,000 or more = “large farmer” (there were no
respondents who reported dues between Kw20,001 and Kw50,000).

193

To do this, we asked respondents to tell us how they would react in two
hypothetical situations: first, if their group stopped providing goods and services
altogether, and just lobbied government in pursuit of members’ interests; and second, if
their group stopped its attempts to represent members’ interests to government, and
insteadjust provided goods and services. Table 5.16 and 5.17 give the results.

We see from this data that large percentages would indeed drop out of the group in the
absence of service provision (50% of ZCF members, 44% of NAPSF members, 39% of
ZN F U members), while much smaller percentages would drop out if the group’s lobbying
activities were ceased (only 9% of PBA members, 11% of PFU members, 13% of ZCF
members). In most groups however, (with the exception of the ZCF), a majority of
members would stay in the group even if there were no goods and services oflered but the
group still lobbied government; this majority ranges, as we would expect it to from the
analysis thus far, from 85% of ZACCI members to 56% of NAPPSF members. And 50%

of ZACCI members in the sample would drop out if lobbying were no longer carried out.

 

Table 5.16: Reaction if Group Stopped Providing Services,
but Still Lobbied Government (%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total
(N =) (40) (54) (34) (I6) (9) (42) (195)
Reaction
Stay In 85 61 71 56 88 50 66
Drop Out 15 39 29 44 l I 50 34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: I 997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)

Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and
it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests.

How would you react if this group were to sop providing goods and services, but still lobbied
government? Would you stay in the group, or would you drop out?

194

 

Table 5.17: Reaction if Group Stopped Lobbying Government,
but Still Provided Services (%)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Apex Group: ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total
(N=) (40) (53) (34) (16) (9) (40) (192)
Reaction
Drop Out 50 21 9 19 l l 13 22
Stay In 50 79 91 81 89 87 78
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)

Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and
it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests.

How would you react if this group were to stop lobbying government, but still provided goods and
services? Would you stay in the group, or would you drop out?

By cross-tabulating these questions, members can be classified according to the
incentives that appear to be pivotal to their membership decision, as illustrated in Figure
5.5. (next page). As explained by Moe,

“Members in category I would remain in the group if it only lobbied, but also if it
only supplied goods and services. Either one is sufficient to justify membership,
while neither is necessary. For those in category H, lobbying is both necessary and
sufficient— these individuals would stay in if lobbying is offered, but drop out if it is
not. Members in category 111 give the opposite responses; for them, membership
pivots entirely on whether or not goods and services are provided. And, for
members in category IV, the combination of lobbying and direct member services
must be provided if membership is to be maintained. Olson’s theory implies that
virtually all group members should fall into category HI, “services only.” For each
of the other categories, politics plays a pivotal role in member decisions to stay in
the group” (Moe 1980221 1).'7

 

'7 This method of analysis was developed by Moe in the work cited, and is being replicated here
since it is a rich and innovative approach to solving the incentive puzzle.

195

Figure 5.5: Matrix of Incentives Pivotal to Membership Decisions

Stay in if group only provides goods and services?

 

 

Yes No
Stay in if group Yes Each sufficient (1) Representation only (11)
only provides
representation?
No Services only (111) Both necessary (IV)

 

 

 

 

Table 5.18 gives the results of the sample members’ responses.

 

Table 5.18
Classification of Members
Accordingto which Incentives are Pivotal to their Membership (%)

 

 

 

Incentives ZACCI ZNFU PBA NAPSF PFU ZCF Total

EITHER Services or 43 53 68 50 89 43 54

Representation

Representation Only 43 10 3 6 7 14

Services Only 7 27 24 31 45 25

BOTH Services and 7 1 l 6 13 l l 5 8

Representation

Sum

Services Only 7 27 24 31 0 45 25

Politics Somehow 93 73 76 69 100 55 75

Pivotal

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 i 100
(34) (47) (31) (15) (I l) (36) (174)

 

 

Source: 1 997 Membership Survey

196

The most striking finding is that, unlike the case in Moe’s study of US. interest group
members, there is no case in which a majority of respondents would stay in their group
only if it provided goods and services— i.e. economic incentives, and for only one case, the
ZCF, is the modal response “services only.” Quite different from the findings on members
in the US, the modal response in Zambia for all groups in the study (except the ZCF) and
all members overall, is that the provision of either services or representation is sufficient
reason to remain in their group. And for ZACCI, as many members (43%) reported that
they would only stay in their group if it represented their interests to government as
reported that either services or representation were sufficient (43%). For the agricultural
groups and the PBA, the percentage of members who reported that they would remain
only if goods and services were provided (27% for ZNFU, 24% for PBA, 31% for
NAPSF) was higher than the percentage who stated they would remain only if the group
lobbied government (10%, 3%, 6%, respectively), but even in those groups, the modal
response was that the provision of either services or representation was sufficient to
maintain membership.

These data suggest quite strongly that while economic incentives indeed appear to
be important to Zambians’ decision to join and remain in interest groups, political
considerations are also weighty. As shown by the summary data at the bottom of Table
5 .18, for 75% of the total group members in the sample, politics plays a pivotal role in
membership motivations. For the individual group/sectors, this varies quite widely, 93%
for ZACCI, 76% for PBA, 73% for ZNF U, 69% for NAPSF, and 55% for ZCF; but in all
cases, the majority of group members ascribe some if not considerable importance to the

role that their group plays in representing their interests to government.

197

5.10 Considering the Trade Unions

One last consideration deserves attention before summarizing the findings above.
As mentioned earlier, trade unions were left out of the above analysis because membership
is compulsory in these groups. Thus, workers don’t have the opportunity for “choice,”
that is, for joining / not joining and maintaining / not maintaining membership. However,
if we assume that unionists nonetheless have preferences over whether or not they’d like
to join and stay members of their union, then we can explore a bit further into the
incentives which are important to these members also. Thus, the survey questionnaires for
trade unionists had the relevant questions altered where necessary to make them applicable
to a compulsory membership situation; for example, union members were asked “if you
had the choice to stay in the group or drop out, how would you react if your union were
to stop providing goods and services...” Given that we learned above that “collective
bargaining for better wages and working conditions” and “representation to government”
are the most important benefits to workers, with bargaining ranking slightly higher than
representation (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8), we might expect that workers would report they
value “goods and services” about the same as “representation.”

And indeed that is the case; as Table 5.19 shows, the modal response (37%) is that
they are equally most important, with a. slightly higher percentage of workers reporting
that the provision of goods and services is most important (33%) than the percentage who
feel representation is most important (31%). However, when pushed a bit, a majority of
union members (63%) reported they would want to “stay in” their union if lobbying were
ceased, while a slight majority (52%) told us they would want to “drop out” if services

were stopped, indicating that the former is the more consequential inducement. This is

198

 

Table 5.19

Hypothetical Case ~ Union Members

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Which Benefit is More Important? (%)
Provision of Goods and Services 33
Representation to Government / Lobbying 31
Both are Equal 37
How Would You React if Services Stopped?

Drop Out 52
Stay In 48
How Would You React if Lobbying Stopped?

Drop Out 37
Stay In 63
Incentives Pivotal to Membership

EITHER Services or Representation 30
Representation Only 19
Services Only 34
BOTH Services and Representation 17
Sum

Services Only 34
Politics Somehow Pivotal 66
Total 100 (N=169)

 

Source: 1 997 Membership Survey

199

 

corroborated by the fact that when we calculate the incentives which are pivotal to
membership using the same framework as Table 5.18, we see that the modal category
(34%) is “services only”— that is, for 34% of the respondents who are members of trade
unions, their desire to stay in their union hinges only on the provision of goods and
services (e.g. higher wages won from collective bargaining, training and publications,
etc.).

Nonetheless, we also learn from Table 5.19 that for 66% of the trade union
members in the sample, politics also plays a pivotal role in membership considerations:
thus, 30% informed us that they would want to stay in their union if either services or
representation were provided, 17% reported that both services and representation were
necessary, and 19% told us that their desire to remain in their union hinged solely on their
union’s continued lobbying efforts. Union members in Zambia thus seem similar to
farmers in that while selective incentives are indeed important inducements, political
motivations— the desire to have some voice in the political process over policy decision

making— are also consequential.

5.11 Conclusion: Evaluating Membership Incentives in the Third Republic
General Findings

The empirical evidence and data analysis in this chapter suggests that Zambians
seem to join in collective action for both the material rewards to be gained and the
Opportunity to have their interests represented to govemment. However, for many
interest group members in Zambia’s Third Republic, political motivations are often as

important as economic motivations for members when considering whether to join and

200

continue in groups. Furthermore, while there exists a set of members who are primarily
concerned with the economic “selective incentives” that Olson hypothesized, there also
exists a set of members whose motivation for membership rests on the attainment of
collective, political goals through the lobbying of government. Importantly, we’ve found
that there might be distinctions between group/sectors on these matters; for instance,
members belonging to groups affiliated to the Association of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (ZACCI) seem to be the most “politically” motivated, while members belonging
to agricultural groups and the Provincial Business Associations (PBA) seem to be more
“economically” motivated. We’ll address these distinctions further below.

In general, then, we see again both change and continuity in the interest group
system in the Third Republic. There is change in that the “opening up” of government and
the possibility for lobbying government seems to be met with supporting expectations at
the micro-level: members of the interest groups above report that gaining representation
is important to them, and that in many cases, they do believe their group is representing
their interests to government. Furthermore, we’ve seen that for most groups, a majority
of members believe that their contributions to group activity do make a difference in their
groups’ success or failure in lobbying government; indicating another political incentive
for group membership. This indicates a motivation for membership in Zambia that could
bode well for the development of pluralism, for it would seem that at least these members
are turning to group activity at least in part to pursue collective political goals.

However, there is also evidence of continuity in the interest group system that
suggests continuing constraints to the development of pluralism. First of all, the interest

group system continues to include only a small proportion of the total population of

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economically active Zambians— a group who is older, wealthier, more educated, more
likely to have knowledge of politics and to participate in electoral politics (though less
likely to have a partisan affinity, or to support the ruling party)-- in effect, an economic
elite. Furthermore, the interests represented by are those in the formal economy; the much
larger informal economy, as well as the large population of subsistence farmers, continues
to be unorganized and poorly represented. Analyzing the members active in the groups in
the study, we again come to the conclusion that the interest group system in the Third
Republic is not very inclusive.

Secondly, we again see the continuing influence of neopatrimonial institutions.
The legacy begun in the Second Republic of using economic interest groups as distributors
of state patronage has left an indelible mark; especially for small-farmers and small-
businesses, the expectation that group membership brings access to government-
subsidized credit, inputs, and services has left a lasting imprint on the incentive to join
associations. This imprint has yet to be countered even in the Third Republic; as pointed
out in the last chapter, even though the MMD government initially set about liberalizing
agriculture, it proved all too willing to step back into the input market when the reforms
became problematic. Thus, Zambians see that the age of state-sponsored incentives hasn’t
ended, especially for important political constituencies; and the need for a perceptual shift
in the incentive to join associations is thwarted. For groups in these sectors, we
hypothesize that organizational maintenance efforts will be affected by this imperative.

Finally, it is important to note that there is a notable disjunction between what
group leaders report they provide to their memberships, and what group members a)

receive, and b) desire or expect. Since the groups in this study rely on voluntary

202

membership for their maintenance, this is a potentially important finding, and one that
we’ll return to in the next chapter. Briefly here, we’ve seen that group leaders at the
national level perceive that advocating for group values, ideas and policies, and
representing group policy interests to government, are the most important benefits they
provide to members. In addition, these groups also report that they provide several types
of economic selective incentives to members. However, few group members report that
they receive the latter benefits, but that they do realize non-economic benefits from their
memberships. Combining these findings with evidence that economic goods and services
are very important to many members in the sample, we realize that the sustainability of
these groups is questionable, for even if members do appreciate the political representation
and non-economic benefits they are receiving, they also expect their group to provide
certain goods and services. Groups with reasonable capacity will be better at doing this,
and thus more likely to attract members and keep members. This is a key issue we turn to
in Chapter Six.
Explaining Group Variation

Above, we’ve suggested that there is an important distinction between both
business and agricultural groups, as well as between small-scale and large-scale
businessmen and farmers, in the incentives they offer for group membership; the findings
here indicate that “small” businesspeople are more like “small” farmers in that the basis of
their membership rests on a particular type of economic incentive. Table 5.20 summarizes

the differences that have emerged in the analysis (see next page).

203

 

Table 5.20

EvaluatingMembership Incentives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INSTITUTIONAL SDC STATE-NEGOTIATED QUASI- NEW GROUPS

HISTORY: CORPORATISM PLURALISM

APEX GROUP: ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ ZACC ZNFU PBA PFU NAPS Total
(N=) (43) (I57) (7) (I2) (40) (54) (35) (l3) (I6) (377)
Variable

Benefits NEC EC EC EC POL POL EC NEC NEC POL*
Realized

Continue: NEC EC EC EC POL EC EC NEC POL POL
Most Important

Continue: NEC POL POL POL EC POL NEC POL NEC EC
Second Import.

Perception of 65 81 19 100 80 81 83 62 88 74
Efficacy (%)

Further PAT PAT NONE NONE NONE NONE PAT PAT PAT —
Benefits

Reason for EC — — — POL EC POL EC EC —
Joining

Most Important EC — —- — POL EC EC EC EQ —
Benefit

Politics Pivotal 55 ZCTU/MUZ— 66 93 73 76 100 69 75
to Membership

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Definitions of Measures Used:

Benefits Realized: (Most Realized Benefit)
Table 5.6, “Top Five Benefits Most Realized by

Members,”

POL: Political = Representation

EC: Economic = Collective Bargaining,
Training, Legal Assistance,
lnforrnation, Research, Trips, Discounts

NEC: Non-Economic = Friendship, Meetings,
Advocacy, Communication, Public
Affairs, Coordination

Continue:

Most Important (First Most Important Benefit)
Continue:

Second Import (Second Most Important Benefit)
Table 5.8, “Top Five Most Important Benefits for
Continuing Membership.” Benefits from Table Six-
B are categorized according to type, as above.

* with unions removed from sample

Perception of Efficacy Table 5.9,

“Effects of Contributions on Group’s Success or
Failure.” Figure given is the (average) percentage of
respondents who believe their monetary and
participatory contributions have an effect on group.
Further Benefits Figure 5.4,

“What other benefits should group provide?” PAT
indicates a “patronage incentive,” as described in
text.

Reason for Joining Table 5.13,

“Most Important Reason for Joining,”

POL: Political = Representation,

EC: Economic = Goods and Services

Most Important Benefit Table 5.15,

“Most Important Benefit at Present,” values as
above, EQ = Equal

Politics Pivotal to Membership Table 5.18,
“Classification of Members,” Percent of members
for whom politics is pivotal to membership

204

Political incentives seem most consistently important to members of the main
business organization, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry, for the
benefit that members both receive and consider most important, as well as the reason they
joined the association, is a political one: the representation of their policy interests to
government. Political incentives also seem important to the group that has historically
represented large and commercial farmers’ interests, the National Farmers’ Union
(ZNFU). For this group, policy representation is the benefit most often realized by
members, and it is the second most important consideration to continuing membership in
their group. However, while representation is important, farmers who belong to the
Union are similar to farmers in the other agricultural groups, the ZCF, PFU, and NAPSF,
in that when forced to choose which is more important to their decision calculus, a larger
percentage choose the economic benefits over the political; the provision of information
services and training are especially important to farmers.

However, there emerges a further important distinction between the groups
representing small-scale businessmen and farmers, i.e. the PBA, ZCF, PF U, and NAPSF,
and the groups representing predominantly large-scale interests, the ZACCI and ZNFU.
For the latter, the political, economic and non-economic benefits analyzed in this study
provide an inclusive list of motivations for membership; for the former, what we have
termed “patronage incentives,” i.e. formerly state-distributed patronage rewards, still
permeate the reasons why people look to join and stay in interest associations.

In the trade union sector, we see that member demands on their group are both
political and economic; that is, workers want to see their unions actively representing their

policy interests to government, but they also want their union to be successful in its

205

collective bargaining arrangements with their employers. As discussed above, membership
in this sector is non-voluntary, so analysis of the reason why workers join or continue in
their union is not relevant. However, union members’ perception of the benefits they
receive makes it possible to compare them to other groups on that account, and here we
find not surprisingly that the economic benefits associated with successful collective
bargaining are most important in the minds of trade unionists.

Furthermore, though our sample size is small, it is striking that only members of unions
affiliated with the ZCTU reported that they seek additional benefits to the ones given in
the standard list (see Figure 5.4). Examination of these additional benefits reveals items
that are probably not expected from their union, as the question asks, but from
government or their employer. Benefits like housing, health care, loans, retirement
packages, education benefits, were provided by government-owned enterprises in the
Second Republic, but have evaporated as these enterprises are privatized and government
attempts to reduce expenditures. Similar to the benefits mentioned by small-scale
businesspeople and farmers, we have labeled these benefits “patronage incentives,” since
that is the basis on which they were provided to urban constituencies in the Second
Republic.

Thus, as in the last chapter, group’s institutional histories again help to explain
variations we see between interest groups. In the formerly state-dominated corporatist
sector, that is small-scale and peasant farmers organized under the cooperative movement
(ZCF), the main benefits that are sought from group activity continue to be the
agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities provided by the one-party state. Among

members of the ZCF, political inducements to group activity are at their lowest when

206

compared to other sectors; cooperative members are among the most unlikely to feel that
their contribution makes a difference to their group’s ability to lobby government, and
neither the reason they joined the cooperative nor the benefits they value most from their
membership are political. Both the old (ZCF) and new (PFU and NAPSF) groups seeking
to represent farmers in this sector exhibit Similar economically-oriented membership
incentives. In the formerly state-negotiated corporatist sector, the trade union
membership incentive continues to be non-voluntary, although it seems that unionists still
expect the provision of benefits that were once the result of the one-party state’s
patronage system. In addition, however, union members also expect their unions to
successfully represent their policy interests to government, and thus their participation in
group activity might also be politically motivated. This point is encouraged by the finding
that members of both the ZCTU and the MUZ believe their contributions to their unions
make a difference in the union’s success at lobbying government.

In the formerly quasi-pluralist sector, we find the most politically-motivated
incentives for membership. For both the ZACCI and the ZNFU, gaining representation to
government is the most realized benefit of membership, and for ZACCI members, the
most important benefit in their decision to maintain their membership. For the ZNFU,
economic incentives prove more important to member-farmers than for the businessmen
belong to ZACCI, but ZNF U members did not express desire for the patronage-oriented
benefits that members of the other agricultural groups did. Rather, they seem to accept
the political representation and access to selective incentives like information services and
training workshops as the benefits to be realized from joining their association. Finally,

we find in the quasi-pluralist sector the most poltically-motivated membership in the study,

207

the businessmen belonging to ZACCI.
Comparative Inquiry: Implications of Replicating the Study

The analysis in this chapter in part represents a replication of Terry Moe’s seminal
re-tooling of the Olsen hypothesis. AS did his study of interest groups in Minnesota,
we’ve shown above that the pluralist assumption that individuals will contribute to
collective political goals can be accommodated using a rational framework. The fact that
few group members report that they receive the economic selective incentives that Olsen
argues are critical to voluntary membership decisions, but nevertheless stay in their group,
indicates that the non-economic benefits they receive are important. If Moe’s modified

rational-choice model is correct, non-economic benefits are serving as selective incentives.

208

CHAPTER SIx:

“ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES ~ INTEREST GROUP AUTONOMY AND CAPACITY”

6.1 Pluralism at the Intermediate Level: The Relevance of Organizational

Resources

In chapter five, we examined the motivations for membership in Zambia’s interest
groups, finding support for the argument that while economic inducements are Often
important to Zambians’ decision to join and stay in groups, at least some Zambians also
seem to be joining groups, at least in part, for political reasons: they value and expect the
political representation of their interests from their groups, and they believe that
contributions they make to group activity matter with regard to their group’s political
successes. This suggests that the pluralist assumptions developed by the classic group
theorists might be valid; that people really do voluntarily join together to forward
collective goals, in this instance, the goal of gaining the political representation of
particular economic interests.

At the same time, however, it is important to proceed cautiously; for the preceding

analysis also demonstrated that economic selective incentives, e.g. training and

209

workshops, information services, legal assistance, are important to the membership
decision— in fact, in some cases they are the most if not the only reason that members
voluntarilyjoin particular interest groups. Given the effects of one-party rule and
neopatrimonial practices for interest groups in the Second Republic, we noted that a
special type of economic incentive is especially relevant, that is, the “patronage incentive,”
whereby group membership provides access to state resources, e. g. subsidized credit and
agricultural inputs, in exchange for political support.

In addition to demonstrating the different incentives at work in Zambia’s interest
group system, we also began the work of finding explanatory patterns to different types of
incentives. A poignant point emerges from that analysis: businessmen, farmers, and
workers alike in Zambia have well-defined, if differing, preferences for the benefits they
expect from their association. Indeed, given that interest group membership in pluralist
systems is, by definition, voluntary,1 it is clear that the mobilization of groups in the Third
Republic thus requires adequate attention to the provision of such benefits, for in a
pluralist system, “interest groups cannot be organized successfully unless their leaders are
able to offer a mixture of benefits that attract members, and particularly patrons, to their
cause” (Walker 1991275).2 In this chapter, we address the question of organizational

resources from the direction of the membership imperative: we argue that benefit

 

' This applies to all groups in the Third Republic except for the trade unions, which as of 1996-
97, operated under “closed-shops.” However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the proposed Industrial
Relations Act does away with this provision, making membership even in the trade unions voluntary.
Nonetheless, the fact that leaders in the unions are elected by members means there is an incentive for
unions to also be sensitive to the “membership imperative,” i.e. the need for attention to benefit provision.

2 Walker argues that it is the support of political patrons, rather than the provision of selective

incentives or some psychological tendency to group activity, that solves the collective action problem and
explains the proliferation of interest groups in the United States (1991:102).

210

provision is necessary to group maintenance and thus partly determines the group’s need
for and pursuit of organizational resources.

Given the corporatist nature of the previous regime in Zambia and its effect on the
interest group system, we argue further that consideration of organizational resources
must address two variables: autonomy and capacity. To provide a mix of benefits
attractive to members, groups require the autonomy to follow an agenda which reflects
members’ (as opposed to some agent outside the group’s) interests, as well as the
capacity to procure and distribute benefits, whether those benefits be the political
representation of group goals in a pluralist arena, or the provision of economic goods such
as training and publications— or the coordination of patronage rewards.3 In the following
chapter, we employ a comparative analysis of the nine main groups in the study, as well as
twenty-one of their member organizations, with regard to these two types of
organizational resources, autonomy and capacity. First, we seek to establish whether
there exist notable differences in the levels of organizational resources wielded by interest
groups in the Third Republics. Then we analyze whether different membership incentives
seem to present different resource issues for groups. Finally, we consider the implications
that organizational resources might have for the topic of the next chapter, interest group
influence.

6.2 Theoretical Issues: Autonomy and Capacity from an African perspective

In focusing our discussion of organizational resources on the two types above,

group autonomy and group capacity, we are in good company with recent developments

 

3 Note this last type of benefit requires organizational capacity, but not necessarily autonomy; in
fact, the lack of autonomy produced by government (or other agent’s) cooptation is usually the
configuration found in patronage systems.

211

in the literature on African state-society relations. In Chapter Two, we discussed this
literature’s serious concern with the paradox in Africa of weak states which nonetheless
have sought to control the societies over which they govern. As Tripp points out, the
debate boils down to considerations of whether the African state has “too much”
autonomy and sits “suspended in ‘mid—air’ over society,” or whether it instead has “too
little autonomy” and is ruled by clientelistic networks based on clan, lineage, ethnicity,
religion and region (200022). Other analyses of state-society relations in Africa have
drawn attention to the point that societal autonomy and capacity are Similar in nature to
theSe properties in the state-- and equally important to analysis (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue
1994). Drawing from Bratton’s (1994) “power resources” framework, Tripp posits that
while autonomy implies the ability to make decisions independently of external forces,
capacity refers to the ability to implement those decisions. More specifically, societal
autonomy is defined as “the ability of non-state collectives to take decisions relatively
independently of the state, communal groups, foreign donors or other outside pressures.”
Two important points emerge from this discussion. First, societal autonomy is a
critical concern in systems which are in transition from a corporatist regime to a pluralist
one. AS discussed earlier, the brand of corporatism assumed in Africa in general and
Zambia in particular was one which sought to bring societal interests under the blanket of
single-party control. The price of control for groups themselves was the lack of autonomy
over their own agendas, a point most saliently brought out by the experience of those
involved in the Zambian cooperative movement. For these individuals, the cooperative
movement was an instrument of government directive and not accountable to “member-

felt needs,” resulting in these groups being perceived to be “owned by the government”

212

(Nakaponda-Sakala 199629). However, not all organizations in Zambia were coopted by
the one-party state; on a continuum of levels of autonomy ranging from no control at all
over the organization’s agenda to full group autonomy from government or other
pressures, we’ve seen that there was much variation between groups in different sectors.
Ostensibly, the transition to pluralism should have leveled the playing field, severing the
ties between the state / party and societal associations where they existed, and making all
groups formally autonomous from government. We seek here to assess whether groups in
the Third Republic have improved their autonomy from outside agents, under the
assumption that this will result in higher levels of responsiveness to members’ “felt-needs,”
and thus contribute to better benefit provision in the interests of organizational
maintenance.

These issues are of import, for, as Tripp argues, if the ability of interest groups to
influence policy requires that these groups are autonomous from the state and other
outside pressures, then evaluating group autonomy is integral to determining the group’s
potential for fulfilling the goal of political representation. Put another way, groups which
are beholden to the government’s interests can not be expected to attempt to influence
government policy on behalf of their members’ interests, and as we’ve seen in the last
chapter, this is a reward that many members expect from their contribution to group
activity. In evaluating individual group’s abilities to both provide this important benefit of
representation to their members and to be successful at their influence attempts, autonomy
is a necessary, though not sufficient, requisite in the new pluralist systems adopted across

Africa in the 1990'S— necessary in order to enable societal actors to gain leverage with

which to demand policy changes, to allow organizations to operate outside of state-based

213

 

patronage networks, and to create new norms of association that are distinct from the
patterns of participation associated with state-led institutions (Tripp 200016).

Secondly, though autonomy is thus critical to the organizational resources of
interest groups, autonomy alone is not sufficient; organizations must be able to act, to
implement the choices that group leaders make concerning benefit provision as well as
policy advocacy. And just as the state’s capacity to implement its decisions relies on the
technical, administrative, and human resources to “get things done,”so does the capacity
of societal groups (Bratton 1994:23 5). A tension exists, however, between a group’s
desire to maintain autonomy from interests outside its membership and the procurement of
these kinds of resource; the tension results from the fact that often, “those who pay the
piper wish to call the tune.”

This was most dramatically demonstrated for the cooperative movement during the
Second Republic; while the primary societies to which individual members belonged had
little discretion over the cooperative movement’s agenda, for a time in the early 1970's this
was mitigated by the fact that the newly-formed Cooperative Federation had ample
resources to spend on providing services to members. Over time, however, the lack of
member control over the goals of the organization became apparent as members grew less
content with how the leadership chose to wield the Federation’s considerable financial and
technical capacity. As state resources began to dwindle and the state’s capacity to support
the cooperatives began to decay, the issue of autonomy became increasingly more
important to cooperative members. But paradoxically, members seem to seek strong,
autonomous associations in order to insist that the government resume the former levels of

service provision that were realized when the one—party state initially coopted the

214

cooperative movement. Since cooperators are not the only Zambians who face this
Situation, we refer to this as a more general paradox of autonomy and capacity that
affects the Zambian interest group system as a whole, and individual group’s attempts to
secure organizational resources.

6.3 The Paradox of Autonomy and Capacity

What we call here the “paradox of autonomy and capacity” arises from the very
phenomena that corporatist strategies try to rectify; that is, given the problems associated
with organizing for collective action, membership-based groups face difficulties in raising
the resources (especially at first) necessary for the pursuit of group goals. For groups
with low or inadequate levels of organizational capacity, it can be attractive to trade a bit
of autonomy for the steady flow of resources possible from govemment (or some other
agent’s) involvement, either through the direct subsidization of the group or the creation /
changing of regulations that affect group activity. However, doing so creates a paradox:
for in increasing one organizational resource, capacity, the other resource, autonomy, is
adversely affected; the paradox emerges because though increased capacity is valued for
its role in aiding lobbying efforts and organizational maintenance, the very act of giving up
autonomy over the group’s affairs can obstruct those goals.

In Zambia’s Third Republic, the most salient concern in the paradox of autonomy
and capacity is the prevalence of donor assistance to many different, but importantly not
all, types of associations. Although donor resources can vastly improve a group’s ability
to “get things done,” the fact that donors seek to fund groups whose objectives they
support can have the effect of altering group agendas to fit what is perceived to be the

current donor fashion of the day (e.g. bringing small—scale producers into what have

215

 

historically been large—scale producer groups, etc.). In addition, donors sometimes insist
on direct involvement in the affairs of groups they support. Both of these factors can
threaten the autonomy and integrity of the group’s agenda— and thus the ability to achieve
group goals— even while the capacity of the group to fulfill that agenda is improved. In
addition, as demonstrated by the agricultural liberalization reversal in the mid-1990's, the
MMD government seems loathe to completely leave its role in the distribution of
agricultural resources to rural small-holders— especially around election time— and
continues to distribute its largesse through groups. Again, this increase in capacity, which
aids the provision of membership benefits. comes at the price of autonomy; groups which
toe the government’s line are more likely to receive its largesse.

This discussion of organizational resources suggests several pertinent propositions

for our study of interest groups in Zambia:

1) Associational autonomy is necessary to the pluralist vision of group activity. However,
in the African context, autonomy is a highly contested resource which cannot be taken for
granted, as pluralist theory tends to do. Associational autonomy is hence best considered
as a variable; and the relationship of organizational autonomy to the attainment of group
goals (e.g. benefit provision and policy influence) is a matter for empirical analysis. In
this chapter, we begin an effort to operationalize the theoretical concept of autonomy in a
manner that permits systematic analysis of these issues.

2) Organizational capacity is also an implicit assumption of the pluralist vision ofa
plethora of groups making demands upon the state in their members’ interests. AS
discussed above, group capacity is important to how well groups are able to “get things
done.” Where “getting things done” involves the provision of membership services and /
or the representation of members’ interests to government, we might expect that high levels
of this resource will result in an increased ability to attain these goals, enabling groups to
better provide benefits as well as improving their ability to engage the state over matters
that are important to members. In this chapter, we begin an effort to operationalize the
theoretical concept of capacity in a manner that permits systematic analysis of these issues.

To summarize, we are interested in these two types of organizational resources for
two reasons: first for a comparison of groups, toward the identification of variation in the

organizational resources groups command; and secondly, to determine if these differences

216

 

 

are related to the provision of both political and economic benefits. The immediate task at
hand is thus to operationalize these concepts, in order to provide empirical analysis of the
variation in organizational resources between the main groups in our study. Ultimately,
we would like to be able to empirically assess whether group’s organizational resources do
indeed impact their ability to further the goals important to organizational maintenance,
especially where those goals involve efforts at gaining influence, or “voice,” in the policy
process.

To begin our analysis, we first discuss our expectations for organizational
sustainability needs, based upon our discussion in the last chapter. That chapter
demonstrated that different groups have different expectations for what their group should
be able to provide. Thus, for the cooperatives, the provision of economic goods
(especially goods formerly distributed as “patronage rewards”) is especially important; for
the unions, both economic and political goods are important, as successful collective
bargaining is required to facilitate the provision of economic goods (higher wages, etc)
and unionists perceive this to depend on political representation; for the business and
large-scale farmers’ associations, political representation iS especially important, even
more so than the provision of economic goods. For the new groups emerging to represent
small-scale businesses and small-scale and peasant farmers, the expectation that the same
goods and services formally provided as “patronage rewards” to cooperatives in the
Second Republic, drives members’ incentive to join groups.

If we make the simple assumption that the direct provision of goods and services
often requires greater organizational resources than the provision of political

representation, we can outline some expectations about what level of organizational

217

 

 

resources will be required for group maintenance. Figure 6.1 presents our expectations

for groups’ necessary organizational capacity, given their primary membership incentive.

This is gauged primarily by the logic above; groups whose members have high

expectations for the material rewards of their membership will need greater capacity than

those whose members are mostly concerned with having “voice” in the policy process.

The expectations presented in Figure 6.1 will be evaluated below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 6.1

Expectations for Sustainable Levels of Organizational Capacity, by Sector
INSTITUTIONAL SDC STATE-NEGOTIATED QUASI- NEw GROUPS
HISTORY: * CORPORATISM PLURALISM
APEX GROUP: ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ ZACC ZNFU PBA PFU NAPS
Primary Membership EC/ EC/ EC/ EC/ POL POL/ EC/ EC/ EC/
Incentive PAT POL POL POL EC PAT PAT PAT
Expected Level of HIGH MED MED MED Low MED HIGH HIGH HIGH
Organizational Capacity

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*SDC~ state-dominated corporatism

We now turn first to the analysis of variations in organizational capacity between
the groups in our study, and then to analysis of variations in organizational autonomy
between the groups in our study, to determine the potential for organizational
sustainability for the different interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic.

6.4 Variations in Organizational Capacity

We are interested here in the capacity of groups, that is, the varying extent to
which groups have the means to gather and deploy resources, and a cadre of leaders and
even permanent staff to carry out group maintenance functions. We hence use two
indicators of capacity— financial resources, and human and technical resources— to

address the question, do interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic have the capacity to

218

provide the benefits members expect? Before proceeding with our analysis of financial
resources, however, we first pause to look at two variables important to revenue and
expenditure analysis: levels of membership and subscriptions (dues).

As Figure 6.2 Shows, the sheer number of members in most unions, as well as the
apex groups in general, dominates the memberships of other groups. For these groups
especially, members’ interests must be articulated up through often complex
organizational structures, whose hierarchical layers aggregate the concerns of sub-groups
of members. For these groups, then, the success of these mechanisms depends in no small
part on the organization’s resources. Logically. the costs of organizing increase with the
numbers of those organized; the corollary to this statement is that larger groups will
require greater resources to complete the goals of organizing, in this case, the aggregation
of members interests’ and the articulation of them to government. Thus, even though
groups may boast of high revenues, they must be compared to the number of members the
group needs to serve.

As Figure 6.2 makes clear, based solely upon membership Size, the aggregation of
members’ interests within groups is likely to be less costly in the business (e.g. BAZ, LCC,
CCC) and large-scale farmer organizations (e.g. CFA, ZLFA), than in the trade unions and
small-scale farmer associations. This implies that the former groups might require lower
levels of absolute resources than the latter in order to provide the benefits that members
demand. Notably, this hypothesis results in the same expectations as our hypothesis
concerning former membership incentives— i.e., not only do cooperative members require
resource-intensive material goods, but there are more of them to provide benefits to, and

the costs of organizing rural farmers are higher.

219

 

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220

6.4.1 Financial Resources
Analysis of expenditures

Financial resources are important for the reason that they enable groups to “get
things done”: things like hiring technical staff to evaluate government policy and its
impact on group interests, advertising group positions in local media, producing
informational publications that keep both government and members informed on what the
group is doing, holding meetings and communicating with members, and hiring staff to
coordinate member services. Table 6.1 shows the various expenditures of groups in the
sample, and provides a picture of the kinds of things groups in Zambia perceive they need
to do to “get things done.” As the data ShOW4, maintaining staffs and offices is a sizeable
expenditure for many of the groups in the study (averaging about 39% (staff) and 21%
(office expenses) of total expenditures for all groups reporting), but especially for
agricultural groups and unions, topping out at two-thirds to four-fifths of the total
expenditures for the Chipata and Livingstone/Zimba farmers’ associations, the Airline
Workers Union, and the Cooperative Federation.

The other main expenditure for groups is on meetings; five of the six groups with
the highest percentage expenditure on meetings are agricultural. Travel is also a small
portion of the expenditure budget for the national apex agricultural groups (PFU, ZNF U,
NAPPSF, AND ZCF), though it is a larger portion of the unions expenditures, and an
even larger portion of the PBA’s. Few groups spend resources on publications,
advertising, or legal services for their members; those who do tend to be the national apex

groups and especially business groups. The Association of Manufacturers is notable in

 

4 ZACCI and the ZFE did not respond to the this item and so is missing from the data.

221

Table 6.1: Expenditure Items

 

Percent of Total Expenditures Spent on Item

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3 i:

m =

a go a a w _

.2 -- *- — 0 0
Group Economic Exp. Amt 8g 3 § 2 go g ;
Abrev. Sector (x1000 Kw) :5 a z 3 3 o E: Other
ZACCI Business Apex
LCC Business Org 38000 50 10 15 20 5
ZAM Business Org 25000 40 20 40
KCC Business Org 13000 10 10 80
NCC Business Org 12500 5 5 20 remittances to ZACCI
BAZ Business Org 3600 100
ZCFA Business Org 2500 25 25 50
CCC Business Org 1200
LZCC Business Org
PBA Business Apex 18000 10 20 10 60
LPBA Business Org 10 60 10 20
EPBA Business Org 0
MUZ Labor Org 726000 20 1 12 1 5 2 59
NUBEGW Labor Org 90000 49 2 1 1 1
AAWUZ Labor Org 3300 73 13 6 8
CSUZ Labor Org
ZUFIAW Labor Org
NUPAW Labor Org
ZNFU Agric. Apex 370000 30 5 30 5 10 5 15
CFA Agric. Org. 490 20 80
ZLFA Agric. Org. 60 20 80 0
SFA Agric. Org. 20 100
MFA Agric. Org. 25 1 1 1
ZSPA Agric. Org.
ZCF Agric. Apex 2800000 65 3 10 2 5 15 7
BCS Agric. Org. 109000 30 41 1 3 15 5
PFU Agric. Apex 31965 10 36 2 26 18
KPF U Agric. Org.
NAPPSF Agric. Apex 2400 60 25 15
MDFA Agric. Org.

Source: I 997 Organizational Survey

222

 

 

this regard, as it spends 80% of its total expenditures on publications and advertising. The
final striking point about Table 6.1 is the fact that for local chambers of commerce, the
preponderance of their expenditures go to paying remittances to their national apex group,
the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
The expenditure pattern

Though the data for this issue is thin, there is a noticeable pattern that emerges.
The ZCF, local farmers associations, and the unions devote medium to large (35-80%)
portions of their budgets on operational expenses— staff and office expenses— while the
business associations and small farmer organizations spend much lower amounts (IO-25%,
with the exception of the LCC). This implies that there is a higher level of organizational
capacity necessary for the former’s operations than the latter’s; which is what we
hypothesized above, that the cooperatives, farmer’s associations, and unions would need
higher capacity than business associations to provide the benefits that members expect.
The notable exception is the small-scale business and farmer groups, who devote
relatively low portions of their budgets to operational expenses. How do they sustain
memberships who expect the provision of economic goods with such low capacity? We
will be returning to this question again as we explore further capacity data.
Analysis of Revenues

To maintain these expenditures (as well as other activities) in the pluralist arena of
the Third Republic, groups need to be able to raise and maintain steady revenue flows-- as

the government tap has ostensibly been turned off. Table 6.2 gives the annual revenues in

223

 

Table 6.2

Interest Groups and 1996 Revenues, in Descending Order

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Type Revenue Source 1996 Revenue Multiple of
Lowest Revenue
Donor Other Members
ZCF A-Apex X X X 2,500,000,000 83,333
MUZ L-Org X X 784,000,000 26,133
ZNFU A-Apex X X X 380,000,000 12,667
BCS A-Org X l 14,000000 3,800
MFA A-Org X 10,000,0000 3,333
NUBEGW L-Org X 86,000,000 2,867
ZACC l B-Apex X X X 53 ,000,000 1,767
LCC B-Org X X 35,000,000 1,167
PFU A-Apex X 3,3 000,000 1,100
ZAM B-Org X X 30,000,000 1,000
PBA B-Apex X X X 22,000,000 733
CSUZ L-Org X X X 14,500,000 483
NCC B-Org X X 14,000,000 467
ZSPA A-Org X X 14,000,000 467
KCC B-Org X X 13,000,000 433
ZCFA B-Org X 9,600,000 320
ZUFIAW L-Org X X 5,200,000 173
KPFU A-Org X 4,000,000 133
NUPAW L-Org 2,880,000 96
NAPPSF A-Apex X 2,800,000 93
BAZ B-Org X 1,800,000 60
CCC B-Org X 1,800,000 60
AAWUZ L-Org X 1 ,082,400 36
LZCC B-Org X 950,000 32
CFA A-Org X X 500,000 17
LPBA B-Org X 400,000 13
EPBA B-Org X 350,000 12
SFA A-Org X X 80,000 3
ZLFA A-Org X 80,000 3
MDFA A-Org X 30,000 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

224

 

 

1996 for the groups under study. The first necessary point is to call attention to the value
of the Zambian currency at the time of the study, during 1996 it was approximately
ZK1250 to one US. dollar.5 Thus, with the exception of the top revenue reported by the
ZCF, the dollar equivalent of the revenues in the table ranges from a high of US$ 627,000
to a low of twenty four US. dollars! Thus, for the groups under the bold line that divides
the table in half, annual revenues for 1996 were under US$ 10,000. Recognizing that
“high revenues” in this context is a releative term, it is still notable that of the five groups
with the highest revenues, four of them are agricultural groups: the ZCF, ZNFU, BCS,
and MFA, and the remaining group is the Mineworkers Union. Extending the net to
include the top ten groups with the highest revenue in 1996, we find that half are
agricultural groups, (the groups above as well as the PFU). Again, while we cannot make
specific inferences to the general population with this small sample, it does reveal some
intriguing features of the revenue picture.

Firstly, a single cooperative, the BCS, brings in nearly as much revenue from what
it describes as “fundraising” activities, as does the national apex organization for farmers,
the ZNFU. From an interview with the BC S chairman, it was learned that these
“fundraising activities” are mostly services that the co-op provides, such as its butchery
and small shop and restaurant, and agricultural input and produce marketing. The
butchery and shop are located just outside the capital, Lusaka, on the main highway, and
seemed to be doing good business indeed. Similar is the case of the ZCF, which reports

by far the highest revenue intake of all groups in the study, Kw2.5 billion, of which only

 

5 The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that the exchange rate for the Zambian Kwacha (ZK)
ranged from ZK1,200 to one US. dollar in mid-1996, to ZK1,270 by October 1996. This study uses
ZK1,250 as an approximate rate for 1996 (ElU Country Report, Zambia 1996-1997).

225

1% come from membership dues (though that is still a sizeable sum). This is in striking
contrast to the next largest fundraiser, the MUZ, whose 41 ,000 members provide 81% of
its substantial annual revenues, Kw784 million, even though they each contribute very
small sums. The third-ranking group, the ZNFU is a similar story: most of the 4,500
members contribute only Kw20,000 per annum, but the large scale farmers whose annual
subscriptions are up to leS million inflate the overall revenue tally of Kw380 million, as
do the several government and donor contracts that the ZN FU receives. The fifth most
well-financed group, the Mumbwa Farmers Association, like the MUZ, reported that it
collects its substantial revenues (Kw100,000,000) entirely from its membership, but as
shown in Table 6.3 (later in this chapter), this amount far exceeds what the potential
membership contribution, according to subscription rates and membership level. We’ll
return to this below.

Is there, then, a noticeable determinant of revenue capacity? Overall, as Table 6.2
indicates, a group’s economic sector does not have a noticeable effect: groups from all
three sectors are positioned throughout the ranking. The source of funding, however,
does seem to make a difference. As Table 6.2 demonstrates, it is the groups with
diversified sources of funding that achieve the highest revenues, with groups that receive
funding from sources outside their membership far more likely to fall in the top half of
income earners than groups that receive funding solely from membership dues. This is not
a point missed by group leaders; most of the respondents in the sample indicate they
would like to diversify their income sources, evident by the employment of other funding
strategies than membership drives alone (see below). Groups with small resource pools,

however, encounter a circular dilemma: having a diversified source of income is both a

226

cause of increased capacity, as well as a consequence of it, for the ability to generate
enough revenue surplus to keep at least part as an interest-earning endowment, and part
invested in productive activities, requires a fair amount of technical and financial capacity.

The data also make it clear that there are vast inequalities in the levels of funding
that groups have at their disposal, with the top organization in the sample wielding more
than 80,000 times the financial resources of the bottom. More interesting still are the
comparisons within sectors; in the highly competitive organizational arena of agriculture,
for example, the ZNFU enjoys 12 times the financial resources of the PFU, and 136 times
the resources of the NAPPSF. Not surprisingly, though the local chambers that belong to
the ZACCI are widely divergent in their incomes, with the largest, "the LCC, realizing 37
times the resources of the smallest, they still all outrank the revenue capacity of the local
Provincial Business Associations. Finally, it is noteworthy that the trade unions also vary
to great extent in their financial capacity, with the largest, the MUZ, having 724 times the
resources of the smallest in the sample, the AAWUZ.

At the national level, there are noticeable differences between the apex groups with
regard to economic sectors. As shown in Table 6.2, annual revenues for the principal
business lobby, ZACCI, fall in between the oldest agricultural groups, the Cooperative
Federation and the National Farmers’ Union at the top end of the scale, and the newest
groups seeking to represent small-scale producers, the NAPSF, PFU and PBAs, at the
bottom. The scenario is far from static, however. As shown in Table 6.3 (columns VIII
and IX, next page), there is a clear relationship between economic sector and recent
changes in revenue levels, with most groups in the business sector (6 out of the 8 which

responded) reporting that their total revenues over the past five years had increased,

227

Table 6.3: Analysis of Membership Dues and Revenues

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Group Sector Membership Dues Memb Memb Potential 1996 Rev
No. Chng Revenue Diff Revenues Chng
Same Sliding Sliding 1991- Dues (Low) 1991-
Amt Low High 1996 1996 * N umber 1996
ZACC l B-Apex 100,000 1,200,000 530 53,000,000 +
ZAM B-Org 600,000 120 72,000,000 — 30,000,000 -
CF A B-Org 400,000 24 + 9,600,000 0 9,600,000 +
AZ B-Org 1 8 + 1,800,000 0
LCC B-Org 120,000 500,000 95 + 1 1,400,000 + 35,000,000 ~
CC B-Org 150,000 10 + 1,500,000 + 1,800,000 —
KCC B-Org 80,000 200,000 100 o 8,000.000 + 13,000,000 +
NCC B-Org 100,000 95 + 9,500,000 + 14,000,000 +
LZCC B-Org 25,000 100,000 38 + 950,000
PBA B-Org 30,000 700 + 21 ,000,000 + 22,000,000
EPBA B-Org 10,000 3 5 — 350,000
LPBA B-Org 10,000 40 + 400,000
MUZ L-Org 4 1 ,000 — 784,000,000 —
CSUZ L-Org 500 1,500 29,000 — 14,500,000 -
ZUFIAW L-Org 800 2,000 6,500 — 5,200,000
AAWUZ L-Org 1,789 - 1,082,400 —
NUBEGW L-Org 900 1 1,162 12,500 — 1 1,250,000 + 86,000,000 +
NUPAW L-Org 240 2,000 12,000 — 2,880,000 —
NF U A-Apex 20,000 15,000,000 4,500 + 90,000,000 + 380,000,000 -
ZSPA A-Org 5000 120 — 600,000 + 14,000,000 -
SF A A-Org 5000 18 — 90,000 — 80,000 —
‘MFA A-Org 10000 304 + 3 ,040,000 + 100,000,000 +
CFA A-Org 5000 100 — 500,000 0 500,000 ~
ZLFA A-Org 20000 1900000 24 + 480,000 - 80,000 0
ZCF A-Apex 17 2.5 billion —
BCS A-Org 5 l o 1 14,000,000 +
FU A-Apex 20000 25,000 + 500,000,000 — 33,000,000 0
KPFU A-Org 10000 400 + 4,000,000
APPSF A-Apex 5000 5,000 + 25,000,000 - 2,800,000 +
DFA A-Org 20000 1,600 + 32,000,000 — 30000
Abbreviations used: Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey
Memb. N0. = Number of Members in 1996
Memb. Chng. = Change in Number of Members from I 99] to 1996
Diff. = Difference between Potential Revenue {calculated/ram (Number of Members) *(Member
Dues)} and Actual 1996 Revenues
Rev. Chng. = Change in Revenue between 1991 and I 996
Symbols used: + = greater than, -— = less than, 0 = equal to, ~ = fluctuates

(Blank cell indicates data unavailable, no response given on questionnaire)

228

fluctuated, or stayed the same; while four of the five trade unions responded that their
revenues had decreased.

For the agricultural groups, the picture was mixed: among those groups belonging
to the National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), half the groups in the sample reported that
revenues had increased, fluctuated, or stayed the same over the previous five years, while
half reported revenues had decreased (including the ZNFU itself). Meanwhile, the
Cooperative Federation reported that their quite notable revenue level actually represented
a decreasing trend in finances; the Peasant Farmers that their revenues were holding
steady, and the Association for Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers that their revenues were
on the rise. While, again, we cannot make inferences from this sample to the population
of groups in Zambia, the general point suggested by these findings points in the same
direction as other data. For example, in all these cases, revenue changes can be especially
linked to shifting membership levels, most especially in the case of the unions, where
retrenchments brought about by structural adjustments have led to serious declines in
union memberships (see Table 6.3, column V111 and 1X). However, this is not the whole
story, as demonstrated by the data in Table 6.3 (previous page).

Columns III -- VII in Table 6.3 gives the type and level of membership dues,
membership number in 1996, and the product of these two figures, which should give the
revenue intake, or “potential revenue,” from membership dues for that year. This figure
can be compared to overall 1996 revenues to determine:

a) for those groups who claim all revenues come from member dues, the capacity
of the group to collect, and the capacity of members to pay, annual dues;

b) for those groups with other funding sources, the level of funding which actually
comes from outside the amount collected from members.

229

For cases where all necessary data was provided (which unfortunately leaves out
most unions), interesting patterns emerge. In the business sector, data from the two
groups with fixed dues (CCC and NCC) shows that their reported revenues are
substantially higher than their calculated potential revenue; data from the two groups with
sliding dues (LCC and KCC) indicate that the group’s revenues exceed that of at least all
members paying the low subscription amount; while the ZCFA reports exactly the revenue
amount expected from the potential revenue calculation. Only the ZAM reports a revenue
level below that of the potential calculated amount. These data indicate there is a fair
amount of capacity (and willingness) to pay and collect dues in this sector. However, for
the agricultural groups, there is variation. The ZNFU does report substantially higher
revenues than what we would expect from the potential revenue calculation; nonetheless,
the fact that a high percentage of its income comes from “special projects” might indicate
that the capacity for full dues submissions is not fiilly realized. However, most of its
affiliated local groups (4 of 5 groups in the sample) do indicate revenue levels that nearly
or fully meet the expected potential; only the Zimba-Livingstone Association falls short.
For both the PFU and NAPSF, however, the capacity to collect dues, and/or for members
to pay them, seems lacking, as both groups fall far short of the revenues expected from the
membership and subscription amounts they reported.

The revenue pattern

In summary, group capacity, measured by revenue intake and expenditures, varies
both by economic sector and by the categories of prior institutional history discussed
above. In the former quasi-pluralist business sector, groups pay out large proportions of

their budgets to the national apex, in a sense contracting out their lobbying and

230

informational needs to make efforts at political representation more efficient. ZACCI in
turn provides publications, information services, policy analysis and lobbies government
on behalf of members’ interests. For the business sector, revenue intake to support such
activities appears ample and steady for both the apex and its local affiliates; most groups
meet or exceed their potential membership contributions, and several groups have
diversified their sources of funding past membership subscriptions.

In the former quasi-pluralist farming sector, the ZNFU (as well as the other
agricultural apex groups in the sample) pays out large proportions of its budget on
meetings and travel expenses, underlining the high costs of organizing for the agricultural
sector, especially for those groups that target small-scale farmers. As in the business
sector, the National Farmers’ Union also provides its members with publications,
informational services, policy analysis and lobbying; however, the pool that the NF U
serves is much larger than that of ZACCI, and much more dispersed through the
countryside. As hypothesized by the “membership imperative,” the ZN FU requires higher
resource capacity than does the ZACCI, given that members value both economic and
political benefits. Judging from its higher revenue intake and the greater proportion of
expenditure spent on staff and office expenses, it would seem that the ZN FU is meeting
these higher needs— at least at the time of data collection. And relative to the other groups
in the survey, given that the ZACCI has a relatively high revenue stream and is expected
to require less capacity than other groups given its membership incentive, the Association
appears to be in good shape. Two caveats are in order, however.

As Table 6.3 demonstrates, while revenues appear to be increasing for the ZACCI

and its member organizations, the story is mixed for the ZNFU. This is due to two

231

factors: first, the Union has been losing large-scale commercial farmer members because it
can no longer offer the benefits it did in the Second Republic (i.e. a monopoly on access to
foreign exchange and the single-channel marketing system) . Secondly, its effort to attract
small-scale farmers have depleted revenues, as these members can often require more in
the way of services than is covered by the low levels of dues they pay.6 These develop-
ments are offset by the fact that ZNFU revenues from both large and small contributions
from farmers are increasingly supplemented by service contracts with international donors,
but this introduces new problems we will address below. While both these situations bode
well for these apex organizations— they have some of the largest revenues in the sample—
their local affiliates are not always so well-off, as their revenue streams depend entirely on
the subscriptions that members pay. In groups like the Mumbwa Farmers’ Association,
the wealth of the commercial farmers who form its membership make this funding
situation work well; in groups like the Serenje Farmers Association, however, the paltry
contributions small-scale farmers are able to make seem barely able to support collective
action. Thus, while the prospects for ZACCI’s organizational sustainability in the new
pluralist system look relatively good, the potential for sustainability is less rosy for the
National Farmers’ Union, and much more variable by group.

For the rest of the agricultural sector, meeting revenue needs is accomplished in
different ways. For the former state-dominated corporatist Cooperative Federation, the
infrastructure left from its corporatist functions in the Second Republic allow it to

continue to accumulate high revenues from its commercial activities (e.g. insurance

 

6 Interview with George Gray, 2/13/97.

232

services, a transportation company); however, this provides a powerful incentive away
from developing strong membership associations at the local level. Furthermore, as the
Federation no longer distributes the agricultural inputs its members had come to expect,
the membership incentive for the small-scale and peasant-farmers in its ranks is not helped
by the Federation’s commercial activities, whose Kw2.5 billion contribution to revenues
were more than exhausted by the Kw2.8 billion the Federation spent in 1996— largely on
staff and office expenses (80%), with another 10 percent spent on meetings. While the
reform-minded cadre in the leadership of the cooperative movement hope that the mem-
bership structure can be re-built through donations of “share capital” from members in the
primary societies, the members of the cooperatives are adamant that they be provided with
inputs and marketing services whether or not they make contributions. Thus, though the
membership imperative of the cooperatives predicts that the cooperative movement needs
to command a large resource capacity— and analysis shows that it does, the top-heavy
structure of the organization (a remnant of its state-corporatist role in the Second
Republic) nonetheless threatens the organization’s sustainability due to the disjunction
between members’ expectations and the groups’ current activities.

The former state-negotiated corporatist trade union movement is similar to the
ZACCI and ZNFU in that its large membership roll and the mandatory check-off system it
inherited from the Second Republic create a steady and plentiful stream of revenues for
group activities. Not surprisingly, unions are among some of the most resource-rich
organizations in the country. However, as shown in Table 6.2, there is wide disparity
among the trade unions in terms of their financial capacity, with the Mineworkers Union

realizing revenues far above smaller unions like the Plantation and Agricultural Workers or

233

the Airline and Allied Workers. As discussed above, we hypothesized that trade unions
require a medium-level of organizational capacity; for while workers demand both
successful collective bargaining for economic goods (better wages, training and work-
shops) and successful political representation to government, their costs of organizing

(and lobbying) are less than that of the agricultural groups, as they and their members are
usually urban-based. Given the relatively high revenue streams of the large unions like the
Mineworkers Union (Kw784 million) and the Civil Servants Union (le4.5 million) in
1996, and the fact that the smaller unions are supported by a well-financed and well-
organized apex, the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the organizational sustainability
of this sector appears relatively stable, except for two recent developments.

The first of these is the economic reform process, which as discussed earlier has
led to substantial decreases in the ranks of the trade unions. The effect can be seen in the
revenues for this sector; most unions in the sample have suffered revenue losses between
the beginnings of reforms in 1991, and 1996. For the two unions that reported on their
expenditure, we saw that operating expenses consume large portions of these revenues;
thus, the unions’ previously substantial organizational capacity cannot be assumed to
survive unscathed the economic reforms of the 1990's, without locating other revenue
sources. According to Table 6.5, the larger unions (e.g. MUZ and CSUZ) have indeed
secured such extra-membership support, but the smaller unions (e.g. NUPAW and
AAWUZ) have not. The second, and perhaps more weighty development, are changes in
the impending labor legislation under the Labor and Industrial Relations Act. Important
here is the amendment that calls for the “removal of statutory collection of monthly

contributions in respect of workers’ organizations and instead opting for voluntary

234

collection of monthly contributions” (Zambia Federation of Employers 199724). As Olson
himself pointed out, “the large labor union, though not a part of the government, must be
coercive, if it attempts to fulfill its basic function and still survive. This is largely because
its basic function is to provide a collective good-— collective bargaining-- to a large
group...” (1971 :96). Thus, the organizational sustainability of the trade unions was also to
be potentially challenged by the “free rider problem,” the argument that individuals won’t
participate in producing collective goods but will rather choose to lob the costs on their
fellow members while availing themselves of whatever goods do result.

Among the new groups that have emerged in the Third Republic, the PFU and
NAPSF, are slightly better off than their counterpart, the ZCF, in that they have access to
the same donor and government contracts to provide services to small-farmers as does the
ZN F U— which the ZCF does not, due to its history with both government and donors.
However, outside of these contracts, the PFU and NAPSF must rely on the collection of
very small amounts (ZK20,000 and ZK5,000 per annum respectively) from many
individuals to fill the groups’ coffers. Since both of these groups face the same organiz-
ational difficulties specific to peasant agricultural groups described above— memberships
that are geographically dispersed and resource-poor— increasing memberships do not
necessarily translate to increased revenue and capacity because of the weight of soliciting
and collecting them. Furthermore, for both groups, potential revenue streams (i.e. the
amount to be realized if all members contribute) fall far short of realized revenues; for
example, as shown in Table 6.3, though the PFU reports a membership of 25,000, their
revenue intake paints a different picture: if, as reported, the ZK33 million was derived,

solely from membership dues of ZK20,000 each, the Union only collected dues from 1,650

235

members. Hence, the relatively low revenue streams both these groups report are not
encouraging for organizational sustainability, even before taking into account the econ-
omic benefits members expect from these groups in order to continue their membership.
Especially in comparison to the groups in the former quasi-pluralist sector, the sustain-
ability prospects for the PFU and the NAPSF in a pluralist system seem low indeed.

Overall, what the analysis of group funding suggests is, firstly, there are great
disparities in the financial capacity of different groups, and secondly, that combined with
consideration of what groups are expected to do to maintain their memberships, these
capacity disparities produce notable variation between groups in terms of their prospects
for sustainability in the new pluralist system. For many groups in Zambia, especially
small-scale agricultural groups and even some of the trade unions, revenue streams are not
high enough to support the expected services and lobbying activities needed for the
maintenance of autonomous, voluntary membership organizations in a pluralist system.
Below the apex level, the quality of collective action in the Third Republic relies at least in
part on the linkages between local groups and individual unions, and their much-better
funded apex organizations, the ZACCI, ZNFU, ZCF, PF U, NAPSSF, and ZCTU. But do
these organizations have the technical and administrative capacity to support their member
groups? And how do the member groups fare themselves with regard to such capacity?
We examine these issues in the next section.
6.4.2 Technical and Administrative Capacity

Along with financial resources, important indicator of organizational capacity is a
permanent staff who can manage and support group activities. As seen in Table 6.4 there

is large variation in staffing levels between groups, with nearly all business groups

236

Table 6.4: Organizational Staffs

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Staff Change Has staff held these
positions?
3
'3 E 3 5 ,_ %
Group Staff 2'; ‘5’ 8.; EE 8: g Expenditure
Abbrev. Sector No. Small Large 5 8 3'8 '5 g g 5 How is Staff on Staff
Hired?

ZACCI Business Apex 10 X No No No No Competitively

ZAM Business Org None

ZCFA Business Org None

BAZ Business Org None

LCC Business Org 1 same Competitively 50

CCC Business Org None

KCC Business Org None

NCC Business Org None

LZCC Business Org None

PBA Business Apex None

EPBA Business Org None

LPBA Business Org None

MUZ Labor Org 42 X Yes Yes Yes Yes Appointed by 20
other

CSUZ Labor Org 13 X Yes Yes Yes Yes Other

ZUFIAW LaborOrg 7 XX No No No No Other

AAWUZ Labor Org 2 same No No No No Competitively 73

NUBEGW LaborOrg 16 X No No No No Appointed by 49
other

NUPAW Labor Org 12 X No No No Yes Elections

ZNFU Agric. Apex 28 X No No Yes No Competitively 30

ZSPA Agric. Org. 2 X No No No No Appointed by
aBoard

SFA Agric. Org. None

MFA Agric. Org. 5 X No No No No Appointed by 25
aBoard

C FA Agric. Org. None

ZLFA Agric. Org. 1 same

ZCF Agric. Apex 76 XX No No No Appointed by 65
other

BCS Agric. Org. 32 X 30

PFU Agric. Apex 4 same No No No Yes Appointed by 10
aBoard

KPFU Agric. Org. None

NAPPSF Agric.Apex 5 X No No No No Other

MDFA Agric.OLg. 2

 

Source: 1 99 7 Organizational S urvey, N =3 0

237

reporting that they have no staff at all, while the trade unions all report relatively high
numbers of staff, and only a few farmers’s associations report having a few staff members.
Most striking indeed are the cooperatives, both for the number of staff members they have
and the enormous amount of resources they spend on them: in the Zambia Cooperative
Federation’s (ZCF) case, 65% of the Kw2.8 billion in yearly expenditures (or Kw1.82
billion) goes to pay a staff of seventy-six, while in the Bbata Cooperative Society (BCS),
30% of the leO9 million in yearly expenditures (Kw32.7 million) goes to pay a staff of
thirty-two. The same is true for the trade unions: though the smaller unions have fewer
resources than the large ones, they still support fairly large (in relation to the other group)
staffs, on which a considerable amount of their resources are spent (the two unions who
responded to these items report they spend 73% and 49% of their total expenditure on
staff salaries). Among the farmer groups, the groups that have staffs have ones that are
small in size, and a relatively small proportion of group expenditures are spent on them.

Among the business groups, the story is somewhat more complex, however.
Although most groups report they do not have a permanent staff, and thus spend no group
resources on staff salaries, group leaders informed me that they often use the secretarial
services of their (and other member’s) private businesses to handle organizational matters.
In at least some cases, this seemed to be a matter of pride among the group leadership—
that their members’ dues and other group resources were not used to support salaries, but
instead were used to provide member services and engage in lobbying activities (such as
the ZN F U taking out an advert in the Times of Zambia to state an official policy position).
This is also true for at least some of the farmers’ associations who don’t maintain

permanent staff; because some if not most members of these groups operate Commercial

238

ventures, they are able to volunteer secretarial services to the organization when needed.
We thus see another important distinction between groups representing large-scale
businesspeople and commercial farmers. and those representing small-scale entrepreneurs
and small or peasant farmers: the former are able to draw from the resources of their
memberships to supplement their own organizational capacity, while the memberships of
the latter are often like their group leaders in that they lack educational, technical, and
financial resources.

Two other important points also emerge from the data in Table 6.4. First, the only
groups to report that their permanent staff have held positions in government or the civil
service are two of the largest unions, the Mineworkers and the Civil Servants, and the only
groups to report that members of their staff have held positions in other associations are
those same two groups, along with the Plantation and Agricultural Workers’ Union and
the Peasant Farmers Union. Staff backgrounds can be important because they may
influence, “through remaining contacts and detailed knowledge of bureaucratic
intricacies,” the relationships the groups may have with political parties, Parliament, and
the Executive (Walker 1990269). However, with the exception of the Mineworkers and
Civil Servants, the groups in the sample do not report such connections; for these two
trade unions, however, we should count the presence of such “old hats” as potential
capacity-enhancers. The other point, that only four groups in the sample of thirty have
permanent staff who have worked in other organizations, points to another characteristic
of the interest group system: most groups who do have a permanent staff, do not have
staff who have experience working in interest organizations. Though staffers might have

experience in other types of organizations, such as parastatals or private businesses, the

239

system as a whole lacks a cadre of professionals who build its overall capacity by
transmitting skills and experience between groups. The four groups that do report having
staff members who’ve come from other organizations are notable in that they are trade
unions and agricultural groups; for the former, the lengthy prominence of the trade union
movement has understandably produced at least a few of these kinds of professionals, for
the latter, the prominence of the cooperative movement has done the same. It is perhaps

surprising that only four groups report employing such experienced staff.

The technical and administrative pattern

In summary, groups vary widely in their administrative and technical capacity, and
groups which seem to have the highest capacity in these terms are those from the
corporatist sector in the Second Republic, i.e. the cooperatives and trade unions. We’ve
learned, however, that a group doesn’t necessarily have to employ permanent staff for this
type of capacity— especially in the business sector and commercial agricultural sectors, the
skills and resources of group members can contribute to the groups overall capacity to
“get things done.” However, in those groups where members do not have the requisite
skills and education themselves, that is, in the small business groups and small-scale
farmers’ groups, the availability of technical. and administrative staff is necessarily more
important. This in part explains why the cooperatives stand far above the rest in the
number of staff they employ (although of course it’s not the whole story, as patronage
practices from the Second Republic plays a large part), and it highlights some of the key
obstacles to organizing faced by groups which seek to represent the small-scale business

person and farmer; at the same time as they have lower revenue streams to work with,

240

they have higher need for expensive staffs to support their organizational efforts.
Administrative and technical expertise is at its relative highest in the interest group system
for the trade unions, who enjoy steady revenue flows, permanent staffs, and the support of
a well-funded apex organization, the ZCTU. In addition, these groups are the most likely
to have staffers with organizing experience. However, the level of such capacity that
individual unions enjoy varies widely, with some like the Mineworkers clearly above the
resources of others, like the Airline and Allied Workers; for all unions, however, capacity

is diminishing.

Evaluating the link between Membership Incentives and Organizational Sustainability
We’ve suggested that the reasons that Zambians join and stay in interest groups in
the Third Republic should have an effect on the group’s resulting capacity level; for
example, since small-farmers seek resource-intense goods and services, groups in this
sector need high resource capacity to maintain those members; on the flip side of the coin,
since business members are mainly looking for lobbying efforts from their group, they
don’t need to build the level of resource capacity that the former groups do. We pursue
this line of inquiry, because we believe that the relationship between the expected level of
capacity needed, and the actual level attained, tells us something about the potential
sustainability of the group as it adjusts to the new pluralist environment of the Third
Republic. In other words, capacity is not absolute, greater financial and administrative
resources don’t necessarily equate to greater organizational sustainability. To tie the
above discussions together in order look more closely at these issues, Figure 6.3 below

summarizes the findings thus far.

241

 

Figure 6.3

Evaluatin the Potential for Organizational Capaci

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INSTITUTIONAL SDC STATE-NEGOTIATED QUASI- NEW GROUPS
HISTORY: * CORPORATISM PLURALISM

APEX GROUP: ZCF ZCTU ZFE MUZ ZACC ZNFU PBA PFU NAPS
Primary Membership EC/ EC/ EC/ EC/ POL POL/ EC/ EC/ EC/
Incentive PAT POL POL POL EC PAT PAT PAT
Expected Level of HIGH MED MED MED Low MED HIGH HIGH HIGH
Organizational

Capacity

Operational Expenses HIGH MED — MED LOW MED LOW LOW LOW
(staff and Office, 1996)

Revenue Level HIGH MED — HIGH MED HIGH MED MED LOW
(1996)

“Sustainability LOW MED — MED HIGH MED LOW LOW LOW
Pattern”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*SDC~ state-dominated corporatism

Operational Expenses: % expenditure on staff and office, multiplied by total expenditures
Revenue Level: Revenue for 1996: High = over ZK 10 billion, Med = ZK 10 million-10 billion, Low =

<10mi11ion

242

Discussion

To explain the findings given in the table for the variable, “sustainability pattern,”
we here consider each of the cases in the study separately (with the exception of the ZFE,
who did not respond to the necessary questions).
Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)— LOW

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the ZCF inherited from its state-
dominated corporatist relationship with the UNIP regime a membership incentive centered
on the provision of economic goods, specifically, the provision of patronage rewards to a
rural constituency. To fulfill its function, the organizational structure of the Federation
and its network of cooperatives blossomed in the Second Republic, with Provincial
Cooperative Unions in every province, District Cooperative Unions in every district,
creating the capacity necessary for the management of a wide agricultural marketing
network. The ZCF thus carried over two important factors to the Third Republic: its
economic membership incentive, and its substantial organizational capacity. Due to the
large rural infrastructure and commercial activities that it still controls, it is able to garner
high revenues and support a large staff with considerable operating expenses. The
paradox is that even with its considerable resource capacity, the potential for sustainability
in a pluralist system is LOW, due to its continuing membership incentive. As
demonstrated in Chapter Five, cooperative members are still looking for their cooperative
to distribute agricultural inputS— seed, fertilizer, tractors even— and on a subsidized-credit
basis. As a result, the cooperative structure is crumbling from the ground up; while its
top-heavy structure can still support a large administration, without the government

resources it once wielded to provide the inputs and credit, sustainability in the long term is

243

questionable.
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and Mineworkers Union of Zarnbia— MEDIUM

We argued previously that the membership incentive the trade unions inherited
from the Second Republic was once of coercion, i.e. members were required to join the
union active in their workplace, individual unions were required to join the single apex
union for their industry, and all industry-wide unions were required to be affiliated to the
ZCTU. Until the new labor legislation is passed, this situation remained the same in the
Third Republic. However, the fact that union leaders are elected, and must be somehow
responsive to member concerns, gave us a departing point to nonetheless query trade
unionists about the benefits they expect from their contributions to union activity. Not
surprisingly, we learned that Zambian workers value both the benefits from collective
bargaining, higher wages and better working conditions, but also the political
representation their group Offers through the Tripartite Council and its other informal
lobbying efforts. We thus assigned this sector an “economic-political” membership
incentive, and predicted that organizational sustainability requires at least a medium level
of resource capacity, not as large as the associations for small-scale farmer since workers
are concentrated, but large enough to maintain the administrative and technical capabilities
required to participate in the Council, bargain with employers, and provide members with
training, workshops and other information. Given the substantial resource capacity the
unions enjoy as a result of mandatory dues payment, but also considering the declining
membership levels and pending legislation that might upset union revenues, this sector is

evaluated as having a MEDIUM level of organizational sustainability.

244

 

 

 

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industg (ZACC1)— HIGH

ZACCI was argued to exhibit a quasi-pluralist relationship to the one-party state,
and its members found to exhibit a largely political membership incentive. Since the
provision of political representation is assumed to require fewer resources than the
maintenance of a countrywide agricultural distribution network or day-to-day collective
bargaining activities, and since ZACCI’S membership is concentrated in urban areas, we
expect that ZACCI’s necessary level of organizational capacity is LOW. From the analysis
above we learned that while the organization has relatively medium-high revenue levels
but low operating costs, we here evaluate ZACCI as having a fairly HIGH level of

potential organizational sustainability.

Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU)— MEDIUM

Like ZACCI, ZNFU maintained a quasi-pluralist relationship to the UNIP regime.
However, unlike ZACCI, the ZN FU faces the traditional dilemmas of agricultural
production and organization; thus, again unlike ZACCI, we find that the farmers who
belong to the National Farmers Union require economic as well as political goods in their
benefits basket. Specifically, information, meetings, and training were identified as
important benefits alongside political representation. We thus assigned the NFU a
“political-economic” membership incentive, Similar to the trade unions, and like the trade
unions we predicted that only a medium level of organizational capacity would prove
necessary, for the ZNF U has vocally made the point clear that they are not interested in
organizing peasant farmers. They thus don’t have to produce the organizational reach that

the small-farmer groups do. Since the revenue level of the ZNFU is relatively high and its

245

 

 

 

exhibits mid-level operating expenses, we here evaluate the Farmers’ Union as having a
MEDIUM level of organizational sustainability (not as high as the ZACCI, since their
membership base is stil quite disperse in comparision, and as discussed, their revenue level
is decreasing).

Provincial Business Associations (PBA), Peasant Farmers’ Union ( PF U),

National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSF)— LOW

These are the “new” kids on the block in the Third Republic. However, they seek
to organize a population of small-scale businessmen and farmers who were influenced by
the patronage network of the UNIP regime, acting through organizations like the ZCF and
SIDO. Thus we identify the membership incentive for these groups as “economic /
patronage,” and argue that high levels of organizational capacity would be necessary to
maintain the kinds of memberships that will be looking to these groups. However, none of
these groups has realized a very substantial revenue base, and their low operating costs are
actually a mark for concern given the resources they are expected to distribute. Thus, we
identify these groups having a LOW potential for organizational sustainability.

Why is it useful to categorize “organizational sustainability” in this way? Would
we be willing to bet on the above predictions, that the groups ranked highly sustainable
will somehow outlast those ranked “low”? The short answer is “probably not,” for the
rankings aren’t meant to be predictive, but rather to be used in better understanding the
autonomy / capacity paradox. All things equal, we argue that the groups ranked low in
organizational capacity will be more likely to “trade” autonomy, or their control over the
group’s agenda, for better resource capacity. It is to the weighty issue of autonomy that

we now turn.

246

 

 

6.5 Interest Group Autonomy

In operationalizing the concept of autonomy, we adopt Bratton’s (1994)
definition: “autonomy is the latitude of social actors to take political initiatives uncon-
strained by the claims of others... The notion of autonomy applies wherever the members
of any social organization attempt to define a protected realm within which to make
independent decisions. An organization is autonomous to the extent that the interests of
its members, in contrast to some external force, drive a distinctive program of political
action” (235, emphasis mine). Since the constitution of the Third Republic stipulates
essentially a pluralist system of representation, as discussed above, we should expect that
all groups in the Third Republic are now autonomous from the state. Specifically, the
demise of UNIP’s one-party state broke the ties that bound “mass organizations,” such as
the cooperative movement, to the Party, ostensibly granting them a new-found autonomy
to manage their own affairs. While the labour movement has maintained its corporatist
ties to the state through the auspices of the Tri-partite Council, it has also maintained its
historical autonomy over internal affairs in that members (or at least their elected leaders)
continue to “drive a distinctive program of political action.” And of course, the farmers’
groups and business associations that had maintained their autonomy from the state even
during the Second Republic, have largely maintained that position.

But have groups actually become truly autonomous, able to “drive a distinctive
program of political action”? We posit there are two essential threat to the autonomy of
interest groups in Zambia: the MMD government, and donors. Government intervention
manifests itself in continuing interventions in markets, while donor intervention is

manifested through the provision of resources to the “right” organizations.

247

 

 

 

 

6.5.1 External Control: Government, Donors, and Other Purse-String Holders

During the Second Republic, the needs and interests of the Party-state dominated
the agenda of many organizations either directly or indirectly, and either coercively or
through its control of the “purse-strings.” i.e. organizational funding. AS mentioned
above, those fomial ties are no more, but there are other agents in the political arena who,
while external to the organizations themselves, dominate their agendas in potent if indirect
ways. Two of the most important are the intercessions of international donor
organizations, and the continuing discretional control of government over access to key
state resources.

An important consideration in developing countries such as Zambia, and especially
in the last decades of the twentieth century, is the impact Of donors on the capacity of both
state and societal organizations. The concern is expressed that along with donor funds go
expectations for the meeting of donor objectives. Alongside such concerns is the
continuing discretional control that the government exercises over resources, most
prominently in Zambia’s agricultural sector, where lucrative contractual arrangements (for
the provision of government funds for agricultural credit) are important to the activities of
small-scale farmer groups. Not surprisingly, these group’s agendas continue to be
dominated by government directives on agricultural inputs and marketing.

Table 6.5 gives data on both initial and current funding sources for the groups in
the sample. For most groups, the only source of start-up funds were small contributions
from members themselves (though for ZACCI and ZAM, it should be remembered that
members include large corporations, which can play just as dominant a role in agenda-

setting as can government or donors). The same is true of ZNFU who reports receiving

248

Table 6. 5: Initial Financial Assistance and Current Funding Sources

 

Current Funding Sources

 

Initial Financial
Assistance

Donors

Interest &
Fundraising

Member Dues
(as % of total)

 

Donors

I
ZACCI
PBA
ZUFIAW
ZCF

II
MUZ
ZCF

III
ZACCI (33%)
PBA (70%)
MUZ (81%)
ZUFIAW (15%)
ZCF (1%)

 

Government

IV
ZCF

ZCF

VI
ZCF(I%)

 

Corporations

VII
ZACCI

VIII
ZAM

Ix
ZACCI (33%)
ZAM (95%)

 

Other Large
Contributions

ZACCI
PBA
ZNFU

XI
EPBA

XII
ZACCI (33%)
PBA (70%)
ZNFU (60%)

 

Membership Dues Only

 

 

XIII

 

XIV
LCC
KCC
NCC
CSUZ
ZSPA
CFA
BCS

 

xv
LCC (30%)
KCC (95%)
NCC (40%)

csuz (90%)

ZSPA (80%)
SFA (98%)
CFA (99%)

100% from Mew
Contributions
ZCFA
BAZ
CCC
LZCC
LPBA
AAWUZ
NUBEGW
MFA
ZLFA
PF U
KPFU
NAPSF
MDFA

 

*Groups in italics are National Apex Groups

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey, N =30

249

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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250

“large contributions” (from large-scale commercial farmers) at its inception. Two other
points are salient: the only group to receive international donor support for its initiation in
the 1990's is the business sector’s apex group, ZACCI. Trade unions and the Cooperative
Federation also enjoyed access to support from international social movements at their
inception in the 1960's and 1970's. However, most economic interest groups in Zambia
seem to get started on their own and stay functioning on their own, and seem to be
autonomous from at least financial control from outside their membership. Table 6.5
shows that in this sample, which includes all national apex organizations, thirteen of the
twenty groups (65%) which reported no initial contributions from sources outside the
membership, also reported that their only current source of funding (as of 1996) was dues
paid by members (see cell XIV). The other seven groups in this category (see cell XIV)
reported that in addition to membership dues, their funding is augmented by interest on
accounts and fundraising efforts. Most strikingly, with the exception of the ZNFU, the
only groups to receive donor funds in the interest group system as of 1996 were those
who received it initially, at their inception (see cell 1). Though this is too small and non-
random a sample to make inferences to the general population, these findings might
suggest that international donor agencies prefer those groups they help to start
themselves, implying that a confluence (if not cooptation) of interests between group and
donor is integral to donor support. The empty space of cell XIII points to the fact that
donor funding does not seem find its way to groups that began only with the small
contribution of founding members.

If donor funds thus make up a large proportion of a group’s funding, we might

expect that the donor has control over official policy positions of the group. While it is

251

 

 

 

difficult to identify precisely where group goals are affected by the demands of donors,
especially when donors choose groups with confluent interests, two notable cases
demonstrate the effects that donor interventions in interest groups can have. The
examples are the ZACCI and the ZNFU, whose decisions to expand membership roles to
include smaller businesspeople and farmers, respectively, are driven in part by the
availability of donor funds for those activities (in addition to a political incentive, which
will be discussed below). Such instances of donor support occasionally cause conflict
within organizations over those who support the added capacity that additional funding
brings, and those who are wary of the ties that accompany the funds. Two anecdotes well
illustrate the point. In the first, there was a continuing wrangle during ZACCI board
meetings at the beginning of 1997 over its sponsorship of the HRDA project, with the
secretariat of the group and a few of the older members'championing the cause of seeking
small and medium-scale members, while several of the corporate and local chamber
executives argued that they didn’t see why their dues should support such activities or
why the organization should be used by donor-aided projects. In the second example, the
National Farmers Union as of the mid-1990's was growing concerned at the dwindling
membership of large commercial farmers in the ZNFU. In an interview with one of these
farmers, I learned that there were at least two reasons; first, the Union no longer
controlled agricultural pricing, marketing and foreign exchange allocations as it had in the
Second Republic, so an important membership incentive was gone, and second, large
farmers didn’t support the push that the Union was making for increasing small—scale

farmer members, again under a donor-funded proj ect.7

 

7 Interview with George Gray, 3/26/97.

252

 

 

 

 

As the anecdote above suggests, funding from international donors can cause
conflicts where the assistance will aid a well-defined segment of the membership but not
the whole membership. In addition, however, funding and support from international
sister-organizations of national groups can also cause mischief, especially where shared
ideological precepts challenge existing power relationships. This is well-illustrated by the
Congress of Trade Union’s acceptance of the ILO’s commitment to free and autonomous

associations, and their subsequent ratification of ILO conventions 89 and 98. However,

 

the conventions threaten the “one union one industry” policy that have benefitted both
labor unions and employers’ associations, and have presented a legal conundrum for the
Congress as they attempt to comply with the convention and maintain their organizational
base at the same time.

The above discussion concerning group autonomy from donor funding might be
unfortunately overly-optimistic, however. In some respects, the data presented above tells
us who the donors and government actually target; that is, who are their preferred
recipients. However, the story is more complex, for the issue of autonomy is not only
affected by such supply-side considerations (i.e. who the donors choose to go to bat with),
it is also affected by demand-side ones (i.e. which groups step up to the plate, willing to
trade a bit of their autonomy for a higher level of organizational resources). Figure 6.4
tells a bit of this story. As it makes clear, many groups would like to be donor aid
recipients; 21 of the 30 groups in the sample report that contacting potential international
donors is a somewhat, very, or their most important strategy for securing financial
support, while as Table 6.5 illustrated, only 4 of these groups actually receive such aid.

Seeking government support is noticeably of continuing concern to the small-business and

253

 

 

 

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254

 

 

 

small-farmer groups, as well as the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and Airway and Allied
Workers Union (AAWUZ); again, as Table 6.5 demonstrated, only the ZCF actually
receives such aid. Perhaps most interesting is the finding that by far the most popular
strategy for securing financial support is attempting to increase membership levels. Also
intriguing is the frequency with which groups from all sectors report that contacting
private (as opposed to international) donors is an important funding strategy. Something
interesting is going on here: not many groups actually get money from donors and
government, yet they still consider it worth the resources it takes to approach these
organizations for support. Similarly, while most groups report that they get most if not all
of their revenues from their memberships, many of those groups also report that
contacting private patrons outside of the membership is an important strategy for securing
support. Why are these groups milking dry cows? Perhaps it’s a bit like the lotto,
membership work is steady but draining, while the return on winning a donor or
government contract can be a relative windfall.

In summary, most groups in the Third Republic are not directly funded by either
government or international donors, and their agendas are formally free from donor
influence. However, important contracts with the leading apex groups for business and
labor exist for the purpose of helping these groups increase their small-scale members, and
these contracts contribute significantly to group resources. Trade unions, especially the
MUZ and the ZCTU, receive support from international labor organizations; and the
Cooperative Federation until recently was the beneficiary of support from international
supporters of the cooperative movement. As discussed above, such linkages can provoke

schisms within the membership of these groups, as the funds available may privilege some

255

 

group members over others. In addition, the goals of the donor grant or program might
not coincide with all member’s interests, or what the group leaders believe is best for the
organization. The high degree to which groups report they consider soliciting
international donors to be important funding strategies implies that the interest group
system in Zambia’s Third Republic is either not able or not willing to pass up the
opportunities presented by the deep pockets of the donors.

6.6 Summary

To again compare the main economic sectors: In the business sector, we’ve seen
that groups here, as elsewhere, have gained autonomy from the dominance of a control-
oriented state, but are nonetheless challenged by considerations of who will control the
group’s agenda. In the business sector, this plays out in a struggle between large and
corporate members on the one hand, and other members on the other hand, who see value
in using donor resources to expand the group’s agenda to include smaller-scale business
interests. Though the struggle over the group’s agenda is on-going, business groups in
general enjoy financial and administrative capacity in getting things done, as they have
both steady revenue streams and relatively high administrative capability through the
resources of their members.

In the agricultural sector, a complex pattern emerges. With the economic reforms
brought about by the transition in 1991, the state no longer intervenes in the economy in
the way that it did in the Second Republic. This means that the Cooperative Federation is
no longer tied to the party-state apparatus, and the National Farmers Union no longer
performs the role in the command economy that it did in under the UNIP regime.

Autonomy from state interests has thus nominally improved for both these organizations,

256

 

in addition to which new organizations have emerged to compete for members allegiances.
For all of these groups, however, (i.e. the ZCF, ZNFU, PFU, NAPSF) agendas continue
to be affected by the needs and policies of the government, primarily because market
mechanisms for production and marketing are still in their infancy and the government
keeps stepping in to cushion the impact on small farmers.

This creates important incentives for agricultural groups to involve themselves in
the supply of credit, inputs, and marketing opportunities; in doing so many groups are
affected directly by the provision of government and donor contracts for these activities,
and indirectly by the desire to be granted these lucrative contracts. As we’ve seen above,
groups which depend solely on membership contributions for their revenues are the
poorest groups in the system; it is not surprising that they seem willing to adjust their
agenda in exchange for the bountiful resources of government and donors. The fact that
these resources are available, however, has seemed to improve the capacity to “get things
done” for agricultural groups, evidenced by the emergence of the two new groups, the
PFU and the NAPSF, which carry out operations throughout the countryside, and the
increasing presence and capacity of the ZNFU and its local affiliates.

For trade unions, the picture is even more complex, however. As discussed above,
these groups, especially the Mineworkers’ Union, retained a fair level of autonomy from
government interests throughout the Second Republic. This autonomy has not been so
much challenged by government in the Third Republic, as it has been affected by political
maneuverings among the trade union leadership (discussed in previous chapters). The
schism between the ZCTU and the MUZ reflects the tensions that the unions have

experienced vis-a-vis the government in attempting to set their agenda autonomously from

257

 

 

   

the MMD’s reform objectives. In addition, the autonomy of the unions over determining
their own policy on organizational matters has been affected by international conventions
that they would like to conform too, but that threaten organizational capacity. Further
depleting the organizational resources of the trade unions has been the fact that economic
reforms have brought about massive retrenchments in formal employment, seriously
diminishing the rolls of trade union membership. Though as we’ve seen, union revenue
flows still rank quite well respective to other interest groups, and they still maintain
relatively high levels of administrative and technical capacity, these levels mark an overall
decrease in the capacity of the trade union movement.

Overall, comparing economic sectors and the groups within them, organizational
resources seem to have improved for the business groups, improved to a lesser extent for
the agricultural groups, and decreased for the trade unions. However, looking at the
picture in a static sense, none of these groups has emerged as dominating the interest
group arena, as none outranks the others in the indicators we’ve examined. In general,
perhaps the biggest effect that the transition has had is that it has made more level the

playing field of the national apex groups.

6.7 Conclusion

Returning to the question posed above concerning autonomy: if giving up control
over the groups’ goals— and even policy positions— causes conflicts between the members
of organizations, or even threatens the health of the group itself, why do groups accept
donor and government grants and contracts? Looking again at Figure 6.3, it seems

reasonable why the ZCF, PBA, PFU, and NAPSF look to donors and the government for

258

 

aid: for the latter three, low revenues and low administrative capacity cry out for
additional resource input, while for the ZCF, support from the government and
international donors would not only assist with the failing primary societies, it would grant
the cooperative movement a renewed legitimacy, and this is crucial if they are to re-
organize the rural areas. The case of the unions is also fairly understandable; assistance
from the international labor organizations not only helps with declining membership levels,
it provides training and collaboration in the principle and practice of trade unionism that
might not otherwise be had. The puzzling cases are the ZACCI and ZNFU; why, given
the evidence that they are reasonably sustainable organizations without engaging in the
capacity-for-autonomy-trade, do they nonetheless solicit and receive donor aid? The
answer to this question lies in the political imperatives of the Third Republic, and the
requisites for political influence. In a pluralist environment, these groups are handicapped
by the small number and elite nature of their membership. To carry weight in a multi-party
electoral democracy, they see the imperative to increase their memberships, and doing so
requires extra-membership funding. It is to these type of political issues at the macro-level

that we now turn.

259

 

CHAPTER SEVEN:

INTEREST ARTICULATION AND PATHWAYS To INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Long live Zambia National Farmers’ Union!
Long live its 31 farmers’ associations!

LONG LIVE THE VOICE OF THE FARMERS!
Mr. J.E. Banda,
Chairman of Katete Farmer '5 Association

Introduction to Annual Conference Address,
24 April 1997

No one understands interest group representation in any African country particularly well
since it needs an accurate understanding of the political motivations of specific interest
groups and the process of lobbying which for elite organizations is not very public, (and)
rather informal...
J. Dunn,
“The Politics of Representation...”
1986:165.
7.1 Pluralism at the Macro-Level: Gaining Access to Government,
Learning to “Lobby”
In Chapter Five, we learned that political representation is much valued by the
members of interest groups in the Third Republic. Indeed, our analysis demonstrated that
for a full three-quarters of the current members in the sample, politics somehow played a

pivotal role in their decision to join. In this chapter, we examine how groups go about

gaining access to government in the newly pluralized enviromnent, in order to represent

260

 

group policy goals to government decision makers. The questions we seek to answer here
are the following: Have the opportunities for interest representation improved under the
new institutions of the Third Republic? What are the new “pathways to influence” over
government policy? Have groups been able to make use of these new channels to bend
government policy in their favor? To answer these questions, we analyze the
opportunities available for influencing policy and the empirical strategies that groups
employ to gain access to those opportunities. A key concern here is whether some groups
are gaining better access than others, and whether real influence over government policy is
realized.

7.2 Pathways to Influence in the Second Republic

One of the key themes of this study is the continuity as well as change in the nature
of interest representation and group influence in Zambia’s Third Republic. In order to
analyze the interest group system in the Third Republic, we thus need to better understand
the system it replaces, and how certain aspects have changed while other aspects remain
the same. We thus begin a study of the “pathways to influence” in Zambia’s policy
process with a discussion of the Second Republic.

Figure 7.1 (see next page) presents a schematic of the structure of government and
representation in Zambia’s Second Republic. As the diagram makes clear, power over
policy decision-making in the one-party state rested in two institutions: the Presidency and
the National Council of the United National Independence Party. These two institutions
did not wield equal power, however. As has been discussed previously, the one-party
State constitution had increased the powers of the President vis-a-vis all other institutions.

Though administrative decision-making was assigned to the Cabinet and overall policy

261

 

 

Figure 7.1: Structure of Government and Representation, Second Republic

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  
    
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE
appoints appoints
PRESIDENT KAUNDA
ACHIEF EXECUTIVE, PRESIDENIT OF PARTY, HEAD OF STATE
/ PARTY
SETS /____\
POL'CY UNIP Central
Committee:
—————— 1 Secretary r-----— —|
I National | General I General I
: Council: : 27 Elected : Conferenc :
I Secretary- I Members | Members I
CABINET : General l l : PARLIAMENT
l Prime l l l
f \\ | Minister : \ / I | /.._.._____._._.\
Prime Minister, l l 20 Elected I \ : : National
Ministers: . l Members I dejure, CC I I Assembly:
Number varies, : 3 : elects : : Speaker
from [0W teens I Nominated | 4 L__ .____J 10
to high twenties l ' members : Nominated *—
\ I ' defacto, lists are MP
\ / | I . . S
‘ J ———————— J deczded by Preszdent, 125 Elected
and endorsed MP
\ijm/
PARTY
Candidates
Administration l
""""""" Freedom House Series of
Committees

 

 

Intermediate: l/
District

Governors, \
Chiefs /

 

 

 

 

Party “Affiliates”:
Congress of Trade Unions,
Federation of Employers

 

 

  

Citizen’s Groups:
e.g. Commercial Farmers Bureau

 

 

 

/
f
I

Statutory “Mass Organizations”:
e.g. Cooperatives, Youth League

it?

J \_/ \____/

\_

A

Intermediate:
Rural and
Ward
Councils

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“Citizens” or “The Pe0ple”

 

 

Information Sources: Tordoff1980 (Introduction, & Bratton .' 212); Ollawa 1979:229-293

262

 

direction to the UNIP Central Committee, the President presided over both these bodies,
and acted in his own discretion on a wide range of issues (Tordoff 1980:10). This
arrangement had several deleterious results; as Tordoff notes:

“...the effects of (President Kaunda’s) intervention (had) far-reaching and

sometimes undesirable consequences for the conduct of government and

administration (in the Second Republic). His intervention helps to explain the
abrupt changes which have periodically been made in Zambia’s rural development
strategy... It also forces MPs and other critics to attack government policies on
most occasions through Ministers who are only nominally responsible for them and
who are powerless to change them. There is a marked, understandable, but
unhealthy reluctance to criticize policy proposals emanating from the President’s

Office...” (ibid).

As Figure 7.1 shows, “critics”— or for that matter, interest groups wishing to
influence government policy— had a circuitous route to navigate in attempting to affect the
direction of policy. Most groups had some level of interaction with the administration,
and through them on occasion Ministers themselves, but as the diagram indicates, this
branch of government was delegated the task of implementing policy, and had no
structural representation in the organs of policyformulation.I This latter function was the
purview of the President and Party itself, specifically the National Council. As the
diagram indicates, the National Council and General Conference together with the Central
Committee were the three major policy-making organs of the Party. The Central
Committee, however, was the most powerful of the three; the National Council was
mostly a platform used by the President for announcing policy decisions. Presidential

prerogative was further reflected in the fact that delegations to the National Council and

General Conference could be excluded at will by the President.

 

‘ Grindle and Thomas (1991) argue this is often the case in developing countries; since policy
formulation processes are often centralized and elite-dominated. societal interests seek influence at the
policy implementation stage.

263

 

Figure 7.1 also sketches in the place that interest groups occupied during the
Second Republic. Importantly, as “Party Affiliates,” the Congress of Trade Unions and
Federation of Employers did have representation on both the National Council and
General Conference, something not enjoyed by all economic groups; but as discussed
above, the nature of this access was not about representation or participation in the policy
process, but rather control of the state over societal interests. As a fixture in the state’s
control of the command economy, the National Farmer’s Union (then the Commercial
Farmer’s Bureau) had some interaction with the Ministry of Agriculture and some powers
in negotiation over very specific policies, but little or no influence over the government’s
general economic policy. The Cooperative Federation, as a “Mass Organization,” was
perhaps most tightly connected to the state, but since the cooperatives were designed to
carry government’s development plans and assistance to the countryside, this connection
was again, about state control, not the representation of peasant farmer’s interests to the
government.2 Finally, business interests, especially those of the ‘indigenous
entrepreneurial class,’ had noteworthy representation in Parliament via the private interests
of many MPs (as discussed in Chapter One), but no noteworthy organizational presence

due to the development objectives of Kaunda’s “Humanist” ideology.

 

2 As Bratton (1980:214-2 l 5) relates, the Zambian government at independence was ideologically
committed to mass participation and mass mobilization. “A ‘participatory-democratic’ rather than a
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ mode of penetration was favored in the quasi-socialist ideology of Zambian
humanism.” This ideology was translated into an organizational framework via the idea of a
‘development front,’ a “patchwork organization of government, party and traditional institutions.” This
Zambian ‘development front’ comprised at the district level the Office of the District Governor, field
agencies of central government, local authorities and co-operative unions, each of which had a particular
task for promoting the Government’s objectives of inducing mass participation and economic
mobilization. As Bratton’s analysis suggests, the co-operatives were thus an integral part of the
government’s penetration of the rural agricultural sector, and were not structured or expected to funnel
interests in the opposite direction, to allow for a penetration of the state and influence over its policies by
peasant interests.

264

Underpinning the institutional structure discussed above was a supporting ideology
which gave a laudable goal to UNIP’s centralization of power. In his analysis of labor
policy in the immediate post-colonial period, Bates (1971) argues that Zambia’s post-
colonial government policy had two main emphases: one developmental, and the other
promoting social justice. In order to implement the two policies, UNIP stipulated that the
labor unions must be transformed from units of consumption, focused on the interests of
members, to units of production, who were to be considered partners with government in
the struggle for rapid economic development. “It was conceived that trade unions would
no longer function as pluralist interest groups for the interest of the members, but rather as
associations of production, sharing the goals of the party (UNIP) for national economic
development” (Rakner 1992277). Thus the approach to labor policy was similar to that of
cooperative policy, which Bratton argues was intended to support govermnent’s
penetration of the rural areas rather than to encourage the funneling of peasant agricultural
interests back to the state (1980:215). Peasants too, from this perspective, were expected
to suppress their own individual interests in deference to the goals of “national economic
development.” This ideological foundation well-supported the development of state-
corporatist institutions in the place of previously pluralist ones, for it is in the vein of the
“organic” conception of the state, which stresses the ideas of political community and the
central role of the state in achieving the common good (Stepan 1978); as opposed to a
liberal conception which sees the state as neutral arbiter over economic and social activity
(Truman 1951; Dahl 1961, 1971).

Both the ideological and structural nature of state-society relations in the Second

Republic were thus such that interest groups did not have experience with, or indeed the

265

 

 

opportunity to, actively lobby government over the formulation of policy. Ideologically,
this was due to the call to suppress individual interests in favor of national economic
development. Structurally, this was largely due to the powers of the Presidency, the
structure of the single-party state and the Party’s control over policy formulation, and the
Party’s pre-occupation with centralized control at the expense of mass participation. As
Figure 7.2, next page, illustrates, however, the most noticeable distinction between the
Second Republic and the Third is the disappearance of the single-Party apparatus and its
domination of the political system. In the next section , we examine what this change

portends for interest group representation in the policy process.

7.3 Possible channels for influencing economic policy in the Third Republic

As Figure 7.2 illustrates, the Third Republic exhibits both continuities and
dissimiliarities with the policy formulation process of the Second Republic. Most striking
is the continuation of Presidential prerogative; in keeping the power to appoint key players
throughout the government, the Presidency continues to reflect the desire to centralize
power in the hands of one, at most a few, government leaders. Also striking is the hole
left by the dis—entanglement of the ruling party in the official government structure. This
does not, however, imply that the new ruling Party, the MMD, has given up the role of
dominant political organization, or that competition from the other parties shown in the
octagon (see Figure 7.2) is encouraged either in Parliament, the Cabinet, or society-at-
large. According to the Republic of Zambia Cabinet Handbook, the new state structure
in the multi-party Third Republic officially comprises three branches: the Executive,

headed by the President and consisting of the Vice-President, Ministers and Deputy

266

 

 

Figure 7 .2:

The Constitutional Regime

 

 

Structure of Government and Representation, Third Republic

 

   
     
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i
l
: Management Development
t Administration Division ;
; Gender in Development Divisions :

Mflku—.~~“uu_*w—~—_—_————_

 

 

 

Leader of the House:
Vice President
Speaker
150 Elected Membersgfl
8 Nominated Members

I‘ ............................. .. ..........................
i EXECUTIVE

i Cabinet

I t‘ “““““““““““““““““ I

i g I

l I President

; { HEAD or STATE,

i l COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

i i or ARMED FORCES JUDICATURE

i i Vice Formulate

E i President lm lfmen t Supreme Court
I f p High Court

i l T Ministers Influsmal

. I Relations Court
l i~- ______________ Subordinate,
l a . . Local and Lower
I I TDeputy MInIsters Courts

I I

i l l

l l Secretary to the g

: I + Cabinet i

l i who is also l LEGISLATURE
I l Head ofCivil Service

I l

. l .

I l ______________________ Parliament
- . . . . I .
i Cabinet Office: DIVISIons ; PRESIDENT,
; Policy Analysis & Coordination l NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
i

i

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
 

Interest Associations:
ZACCI, PBAs,
ZN FU, ZCF,
NAPPSF, PFU,
ZCTU, ZF E

W\

 

 

V Public Opinion

 

 

 

       
   
   
   
 

Political
Parties
MMD, UNIP
NP, AZ, NLP,

ZADECO, DP,

IDF MDP

 

V

 

 

Social Groups “Citizens” or “The People”

 

Individual Voters

 

267

 

 

 

   

Ministers, all of whom are Members of Parliament and thus popularly elected.

Among several functions that the President performs are the appointing of the
Vice-President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers (under Article 46 of the Constitution) and
the establishment and dissolution of Govermnent Ministries and Departments. Ministers
advise the President in the formulation and implementation of Government policy. Policy
formation is officially carried out by the Cabinet, which is comprised of the President as
Chairmen, the Vice-President and Cabinet Ministers; this Cabinet “formulates Government
policies and programmes in accordance with the priorities of the political Party in power,”
and it “advises the President with respect to the Policy of Government (Handbook
19963). Any matters which have major policy implications are also made the purview of
the Cabinet under Article 49 of the Constitution.

As Figure 7.2 also illustrates, the structural linkages between interest groups and
other organizations to the single Party state were abolished, and replaced by the absence
of formal state-society linkages (with the exception of the Tripartite Council), in keeping
with the new regime’s pluralist ideology. As Figure 7.2 (which corresponds to
Schmitter’s property space detailing the “whole and partial regimes” involved in the
consolidation of democracy), interests groups thus theoretically hold a place in the
political system similar to other “modern democracies”, that is, as a representational
institution on par with a multitude of political parties. In this new configuration, “The
People” and their organizations ostensibly have representation in the policy process via
their ability to freely elect the MPs that can later become Cabinet Ministers, and their right
to form organizations which can interact with the official bureau responsible for

responding to “stakeholder interests,” Cabinet Office’s Policy Analysis and Coordination

268

 

Division. Theoretically, interest associations in the Third Republic can also directly lobby
the Members of Parliament over legislation that affects their activities. And finally, with
the advent of a free and even oppositional press, the influencing of public opinion has
become a matter of key importance where policy is concerned, as we shall see below.

These are the broad outlines of the institutional changes which affect interest
representation in the Third Republic. Not unexpectedly, these changes have had important
consequences for the relationship between interest groups and the government over the
formulation and implementation of policy. In the next section, we examine these changes
more closely, in order to answer the question: empirically, is there space for interest
articulation under the new institutions of the Third Republic? If so, which groups are
most active?

7.3.1 The changing relationship between groups and government in the Third
Republic

The analysis in the following sections draw mainly from the results of the “1997
Organization Survey” (see Appendix 2). The cases analyzed are the eight national apexes
organizations and their local affiliates. The apex groups, whose acronyms are most used
in the following analysis, once again are the Zambia Association of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), the HRDA’s Provincial Business Associations (PBAs),3
the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZN FU),

the Peasant Farmers’ Union (PFU), the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale

 

3 Technically, the coordinating office for the PBA’S does not qualify as a nationally active
lobbying organization in the same way that ZACCI and the ZN F U do; however, since this organization is
the only one in the group arena that actively promotes the interests of small-scale business and industry,
and since the director of the organization is well-connected to government, we include data from this
organization where it is appropriate and where it demonstrates the differences between groups with
“large” members and groups with “small” members.

269

 

 

Farmers (NAPSSF), the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE), and the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)4. In this section, we mainly focus on the apex
organizations listed above", since they are the ones tasked with lobbying government on
behalf of individual and organizational members, although analysis of responses from the
local affiliates are used where appropriate.

As demonstrated above, the transition to the Third Republic introduced a very
different environment for interest representation, due to the fact that it ended one-party
rule and introduced multi-party politics, and it brought to a close the era of the command
economy, replacing it with a liberalized market. As we’ve seen, most of the interest
groups active in Zambia today either emerged from the Second Republic, or are seeking to
fill the gap left by the demise of certain organizations. Overall, when queried about the
general outcome of the dual transition for their group, most leaders report that the
consequences of political and economic liberalization “varies.” As Table 7.1 shows, this is
the case for the MUZ, the ZCF, the ZNFU, and the PBA. However, ZACCI and the
NAPSSF report that the transition has been “very good” and “good,” respectively, for
their group; while the PFU reports that the transition has had “very poor” consequences

for them.

 

4 Unfortunately, despite the researcher’s best efforts, a completed questionnaire was not obtained
from the ZCTU, though much other data and interviews were generously given. For this section of
analysis, the Mineworkers Union is used as a proxy for the Congress; though their responses will of course
not be identical to what the ZCTU’s would have been, we hold that the data are still useful in comparing
responses across economic sectors.

5 See the preceding two footnotes.

270

 

 

 

Table 7.1
Consequences of the political and economic reforms for the Association

 

PF U MUZ ZCF ZN FU PBA NAPSF ZACCI

 

Very Poor

 

It Varies It Varies It Varies lt Varies

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Very Good Very Good

 

To gauge more specifically leaders’ perceptions of the political transition’s
consequences, the leaders of the groups were asked how the changes in 1991 from the
one-party state to multi-party democracy affected the amount of cooperation and
consultation between their group and several government branches. Figure 7.3 (next
page) shows the results: while all groups report that there has either been an increase or
no change in cooperation with the Parliament and Local Councils, the Cooperative
Federation (ZCF) notes a moderate decrease in cooperation with the Ministries and the
President’s Office, and the Peasant Farmer’s Union (PF U) notes an important decrease in
cooperation with the President’s Office. Examining the groups themselves (see Figure
7.4), it is notable that the Mineworkers Union (MUZ) reports increases in cooperation
with Parliament, Ministers and the President, the National Association of Peasant and
Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF) reports increased cooperation with local councils,
Parliament, and Ministers, and the National Farmers’ Union (ZNF U) reports increased
cooperation with Ministers. Most striking, however, is the response of the Association of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), which reports either moderate or
important increases in cooperation with all four branches of government.

The analysis of these data make a strong point: while the effects of the transition

271

 

 

Figure 7.3 Change in Cooperation and Consultation after Transition

How did the change in I 991 from the one-party state to multi-party democracy
affect the amount of cooperation and consultation between this association
and the following government granches?

. with the President '5 Ofiice?

I MUZ
. ZCF
\\\:~;~:\\r\\.\\\\~>.z.- w. \0. - _____ PFU

‘ EIZACCI

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Decrease in Cooperation No Change Increase in Cooperation

with the Ministries?

l M UZ

NA P S S F
35335552"53:51:33“?3131355=31EI1:1:15:323iiiiziiizrz:Si::22:S1:22:55:::5,:::;;;:::;;;;:;:;:;,;: ZCF
i‘ai'si':::::~:":‘:‘x“ '_ ZN F U
“- “'35333153355135’- P FU
E ZACCI

Decrease in Cooperation No Change Increase in Cooperation

 

 

 

 

 

 

. with the Parliament?

 

I MUZ

l5 NAPSSF
PFU
IZACCI

 

 

 

 

No Change Increase in Cooperation

. with Local Councils?

NAPSSF
PFU
a ZACCI

 

 

 

 

No Change Increase in Cooperation

272

Figure 7.4: Change in Cooperation and Consultation after Transition,
by Group

How did the change in 1991 from the one-party state to multi-party democracy
aflect the amount of cooperation and consultation between this association
and the following government granches?

I
IZACCI

Local
Council
Parliament

El Ministers

[3 President

' ZCF

 

Decrease in Cooperation No Change Increase in

273

 

are mostly positive for most groups, as expressed by the amount of cooperation that
groups leaders perceive they enjoy with the new MMD government, they are not
monolithic: the effects of the transition have been different for different groups, and
different for different economic sectors. Business is the most striking in the clearly
positive consequences that the sector and its flagship organization has experienced
following the transition. Agriculture is more complex: the National Farmers Union
perceives an improved relationship with Ministries, but not much of a change in other
areas, while both the NAPSSF and PFU, representatives of small-scale agriculture, note
improvements in cooperation with both the Ministries, Parliament and their Local
Councils. The industrial sector is also complicated; while things would appear to be
looking up for the Mineworkers Union with the MMD government, the lack of data from
the ZCTU hides the troubles in that sector that many of the trade unions are experiencing
with the new government since the transition.
7.3.2 Institutional access to government in the Third Republic

One of the hallmarks of the political reforms of the early 1990's has been the
dismantling of the party-state apparatus and the building of new decision—making
institutions. Though the Presidency still holds much discretionary power over government
policy, gone are the Central Committee, National Council, and General Conference of the
ruling party; and in their place as the central policy-making organ is a reformed Cabinet
and the special Divisions of the Cabinet Office. The MMD government, espousing an
ideology of multi—party pluralism and a liberalized market economy, has pledged to make
the political process more open, responsive, and accountable, both to major

“stakeholders” and the general public. We know that the above institutions of the Second

274

 

Republic were neither designed to function nor indeed did function to permit the easy
participation of organizational interests. Has this changed in the Third Republic? One test
of whether key policy “stakeholders” such as interest groups are being allowed to
participate in a more “open and responsive” process is whether they are gaining any form
of routine access to the decision-making process. Two indicators of institutional access
are available from the 1997 survey: first, respondents were asked if their association
communicated, consulted, or interacted with agencies of the national and local
government, and if so, how often; and second, respondents were asked if their association
was regularly consulted by government agencies when it considered new legislation or
changes in policy.

Overall, the national apex groups are fairly active in their attempts to interact with
government. Figure 7.5 (next page) shows that all of the national apex organizations
respond that they do interact with both local and national government at least “sometimes”
if not “often.” Not surprisingly, the organizations that either had institutionalized (if not
effective) access to government during the Second Republic, as well as organizations that
currently represent large-scale producers such as corporations and commercial farmers,
report that they interact more often with national government than those organizations
which are new to the national policy arena and have less economically powerful
memberships, i.e. the two associations for peasant and small-scale farmers. However,
these latter organizations report that they interact more often than the former with the
departments and councils of local government. This might indicate that the latter two
groups experience greater opportunity to access policy implementors than policy—makers.

Figure 7.6 gives the additive frequency of the national groups’ interactions with

275

 

Figure 7.5: Apex Group's Communication, Consultation, and
Interaction with Government, by Group

Has this association communicated, consulted, or interacted with any
agencies of the national government during the last year? How often?

With which branches of government?

Frequency: 4 :often, 3 :sometimes, 2 :seldom, I =never Branch National

 

 

ZCF Minis, Parl.

ZFE Pres, Ministries

ZACCI Ministries

ZNFU Pres. Minis, Parl
MUZ Minis, Parl.

NAPSSF Ministries, Parl.

PF U 93:: ::::r.-. .21..~i's.;.:s=;.;3::3.252.: i . . _
l Ministries. Par].
0 2 4 6 8 1 0
7 "I_NationaTG6v't—.m - 5 Local Govt. }

 

 

Figure 7.6: Additive Analysis of Frequency of Interaction with Government

 

Local Govt.

National Govt.

 

 

 

 

 

22%;2MUZ IZNFU IZACCI DZFE IZCFj

 

 

 

El PFU NAPSSF

 

 

Data Source: I 997 Organizational Survey

276

 

government; from this we see that the groups interact with national government only

slightly more than local government.

From this data,it would appear that national apex groups are fairly active in their

attempts to interact and consult with the MMD government. This questionnaire item used

to collect this data was phrased to capture groups’ efforts to initiate contact;6 while a

further questionnaire item was phrased to capture the other side of the coin, the

government’s efforts to initiate contact.7 This latter item is perhaps a more consequential

indicator of institutional access, Table 7.2 shows that of the major apex groups, most

report that they are consulted by government about issues such as major policy changes.

Only the PFU8 reports that they are not regularly consulted by government.

 

Table 7.2
Groups, GovernmentAgencies, and Policy Issues

 

 

 

 

 

 

Group Agencies that interact most often with Policy issues over which government consults
that association with that association

ZACCI Government and quasi-govemment Budget, legislative, economic issues
agencies

ZN FU Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Budget, agricultural policy, fiscal policy
Fisheries

NAPSF Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural financing, credit deliveries, and
Fisheries marketing

ZCF Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperative Development
Fisheries

MUZ Ministry of Mines and Labor Privatization, wage policy, pensions and

 

 

national development

 

 

6 Questionnaire item: “Has this association communicated, consulted, or interacted with any
cabinet departments or independent agencies of the national government during the last year?”

7 Questionnaire item: “Is this association regularly consulted by government agencies when they

are considering new legislation or changes in policy?”

8 Data is missing on this item for ZFE.

277

Table 7.2 indicates that, at least from the perspective of group leaders, apex
associations in the Third Republic are gaining some level of routine access to the policy
decision-making processes, especially in Ministries relevant to their policy areas. Of
course, while access is not synonymous with influence over actual policy decisions, it is
reasonable to suggest that entrepreneurial leaders would not continue in their efforts to
interact and consult with government over policies that affect them and their members, if
these efforts continually proved fruitless. Given that groups and government do interact,
it is useful to enquire into the strategies that groups employ in efforts to influence
government policy, for two reasons. First, it is important to the issue of the “coverage” of
the interest group system to recognize if there are patterns to the different strategies that
groups use. If certain strategies are favored by specific institutional arrangements,
changes in those institutions could affect the coverage of interests. Second, we are
interested in which strategies are perceived to be most effective, and whether there are
predictors (such as group capacity) of which kinds of strategies will be adopted by
different groups. This latter question will be addressed when we look more carefully at
organizational capacity in the next chapter.9
7.3.3 Strategies for Influence

Following Walker’s study (1991), we distinguish between the four types of
“inside” policy influence strategies that correspond to conventional lobbying activities, and

two types of “outside” policy influence strategies that are meant to shape and mobilize

 

9 Of course, given the small sample size in this analysis, we cannot hope to make inferences
about interest groups in general in answering these questions. We can, however, use the additional
information possible with a small-N study to make some headway in understanding why there might be
differences between groups.

278

 

public opinion. “Inside activities are “designed to convince public officials to take some
form of action or to modify an established policy by means of close consultation with
political and administrative leaders” (19912103); the four types we include here as relevant
to Zambia are: lobbying government at the policy formulation stage, lobbying government
at the policy implementation stage, engaging in litigation, or participating in electoral
politics (e.g. contributing to a politician’s campaign). “Outside” activities may be “an
indirect effort to exert influence upon the outcome of a specific policy decision, but often
they are intended to build support within the general public for an entirely new set of
values” (Walker 1991:103); the two relevant types included here are using the media to
influence public opinion and organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests.
Figure 7.7 and 7.8 (next page) give the responses. All groups perceive the
lobbying of the policy formulation stage, that is, the Cabinet and Ministries, as the most
important strategy toward achieving their policy goals. Most, with the exception of the
ZNFU, also perceive that working with government agencies in policy implementation is
another important strategy toward meeting policy goals. Several groups consider
litigation a somewhat useful strategy, and most report that working to aid the election of

l.'0 The notable exception to

political leaders is a strategy “not very” or “not at all” usefu
this finding is the ZCF, who considers such electoral activities to be “very” important— but
this might largely be an artifact of having their President recently elected as an MP.

Interestingly, when comparing the additive importance of the influence strategies, working

to influence public opinion through publicity and the media emerges as one of the most

 

'0 This latter finding must be considered in conjunction with the finding that few groups will
openly admit to engaging in political activities in the Third Republic. This is an issue we will address
below.

279

 

   

Figure 7.7: The Additive Importance of Influence Stratgies

Associations may engage in a variety of activities in order to achieve
their policy goals. Using the scale below, please indicate your best
estimate of the importance of that activity for this organization.

T we of Influence Strategy.

 

El Protest E Media Cl Electoral fl Litigation III] Policy Implementation El Policy Formulation

ZNFU E1E2-1ilm211m: - : . 5:]
NAPSSF n . 3WIIEHIEZ5ZII

 

 

 

 

0 5 IO 15 20 25 30
Level of Importance: I = Not at all 2 = Not Very
3 = Somewhat 4 = Very 5 = Most Important

 

Figure 7. 8: Additive Importance of Influence Stratgies, by Type
Policy Form. @5M5: :2352: IIIIIIII :fllllllll tam»: 2:22:
Policy lmpl. $5 7‘th

 

 
 

  

 

Litigation§

Electoral §4§112323

 

 

 

- I I inside
Media @3M4 ..- 3m3III ”mu :1 ,
L I i a
Protest . . outsrde
l

 

 

O 5 10 15 20 25 3O 35 40

IZCF EPFU ElZFE IMUZ IDIZACCI ElNAPSSF BZNFU

Source: 1 997 Organizational Survey

280

 

important strategies for policy influence for three groups (the ZCF, ZF E, and ZACCI),
and one that is very or at least “sometimes” important for the PFU,the MUZ, and the
NAPPSF. Examining the groups themselves, it is noticeable that the two groups
representing business interests, ZACCI and the ZFE, report that public demonstrations
and protests are “not at all” important as an influence strategy, while the PFU and ZCF,
both of which represent similar rural interests, report that this strategy is at least
sometimes if not very important in forwarding policy goals. Indeed these latter two
groups stand out due to the wide variety of strategies they consider important to achieving
their policy goals.

These two patterns are instructive in what they tell us about the nature of interest
articulation in the Third Republic. First of all, all groups have responded to the
reformation of the policy process and the vesting of decision-making in the Cabinet with
considerable attempts at formally lobbying the Ministries, indicating that there is at least a
perception that influence over policy is possible at that stage. Thus, institutional changes
which make policy lobbying more open at the Ministerial level would seemingly improve
access for all groups. In addition, the finding that attempts to influence policy
implementation are also very important to group strategies implies that the outcome of
centrally-made policy decisions are still open to revision at the implementation level, that
is, at the junctures where the public administration executes policy decisions. Improving
access at these junctures as well would seem to benefit all groups, with the exception of
the ZNF U, who reports that this strategy is “not very useful.” Also important is the
finding that participating in electoral politics is not only a “non-important” strategy for all

groups except the ZCF, but that, as discussed above in Chapter One, several group leaders

281

 

actively eschew “partisan politics.” This is a complicated issue we will discuss further
below.

The finding that use of media in influencing public opinion is considered an
important strategy by nearly all groups is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that
there is no distinction between groups that employ “inside” as opposed to “outside”
strategies in the Third Republic; all groups, with the possible exception of the National
Farmers’ Union, find both types to be useful in gaining policy-makers attention. Secondly,
it implies that the improved freedom of the press in Zambia’s Third Republic benefits the
general articulation of interests; thus, further liberalization of the media (i.e. decreasing the
dominance of government media and decreasing the harassment of the individual press)
might increase the potential for collective efforts to influence policy. Finally, the finding
that groups seeking to represent peasant and small-scale farmers” (i.e. the rural sector)’s
interests to the government are the only ones that perceive public protest and
demonstration to be important strategies for influence is weighty. It indicates that though
these groups might also be engaged in formal lobbying, or “insider” strategies, they are
either frustrated in those attempts, or they perceive protest strategies, what Almond and
Powell refer to as “illegitimate or coercive access channels” (1996:76), to also be
successful in gaining government attention. This is evidence that though the political
process may be “opening up” to the representation of societal interests, and the process of
interest representation may be becoming more institutionalized, the strategy of mass
mobilization remains useful in some sectors.

Having examined the consequences of the transition on groups’ interaction with

government, let’s look more closely at the effects of the institutional change involved from

282

 

a system in which there is one major legitimate channel of access (i.e. UNIP) to a system
in which several channels might become possible. Specifically, we look at three types of
channels suggested by the institutional diagram presented in Figure 7.2 the government

and administration, the party system, and the media.

7.4 Government— ministries, parliament, boards and committees
Ministries

It is clear from the analysis above that it is the Ministries which are the main point
of access into government decision-making for interest groups in the Third Republic. This
is explained by the new institutional configuration of the Third Republic: Ministers are part
of the Cabinet, and as discussed above, under Article No. 18 of 1996, Section 50-53 of
the Constitution, it is specifically the Cabinet which formulates government policy.
Apparently, however, there is no formal submission process directly to the Cabinet or its
Secretary; according to a Permanent Secretary within the Cabinet Office, the Office
expects that it is the Ministries which will liase with “organizations in the private sector,”
and include their concerns when the Ministry makes policy submissions to the Cabinet
Office. As the bureau responsible for coordinating policy directives and submissions, the
Policy Analysis and Coordination Division at Cabinet Office ‘encourages’ individual
Ministries to consult with the private sector; however, they want consultations to be
carried out through the offices of the ministries, and will check to make sure this has been
done (interview with Mr. Kaluba, Permanent Secretary of the Division, June 25, 1997).

Mr Kaluba reports that while his office does not solicit formal submissions from

groups, he does occasionally inform groups at an informal level about policies which are

283

 

 

 

 

"in the pipeline": as an example, he might call up ZACCI and tell them to confer with the
appropriate Ministry regarding a certain policy. While he encourages such informal means
of contact, such as having members of his office "get to know" group leaders and "get
their input" at an informal level, he also reports that the government is trying to create
consultative institutions that offer more formalized channels of communication, such as
the arrangement with the Tripartitite Council in the labour sector. However, to this end,
he reports that government would find it preferable for each sector to be represented by
one organization that represents a broad membership as opposed to the voice of a few
individuals. As an example, he asserts that the fragmentation of the farming sector makes
it difficult for government to "know who's talking."

This desire to institute a limited number of singular, functionally differentiated
categories for the representation of interests is quite similar to the preference of the UNIP
regime for a corporative arrangement of societal interests. The continuity in the state’s
desire to incorporate society in an “organic” relationship, as opposed to competing with it
in a liberal one, is not surprising. However, it is difficult to tell whether this is entirely
driven by ideology or necessity; in fact, it is probably both. Observing the state of decay
of the administrative offices of the Permanent Secretary, it is understandable that the
Secretary expresses frustration with a potential onslaught of submissions from groups and
individuals outside of government that would require a great deal of secretarial capacity, if
nothing else, to properly handle.

However, it also makes sense that officials in the administration— many of who
first took their offices during the Second Republic— still believe in the concept of the

“developmental state,” that is, one which arbitrarily acts in the interests of society to

284

 

 

 

“develop the economy,” a state to which private interests make sacrifices, not submissions.
This ethos is especially apparent in the Cabinet, where societal interests are appreciated as
long as they are ‘properly’ channeled through the individual Ministries. It is to varying
degrees also present in the Ministries, where we find officials who are willing to
“consider” the interests of “stakeholders,” but where formal lines of communication
between the government and society have yet to fully develop.

Importantly, there is variation in the degree to which individual Ministries are
encouraging these linkages to develop; it is this difference between the main sectoral
Ministries to which we now turn.

Agriculture

Most important to the agricultural sector is the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries (MAFF). A formal linkage between the Ministry and interests in the agricultural
sector was indeed created following the transition; known as the Agricultural Sector
Investment Program (ASIP), it was implemented in 1996 but was suspended in 1997 to
“undergo serious revamping.” Under ASIP, private sector representation is arranged
through the membership of farmers' associations, cooperatives, and other NGO's, on the
ASIP steering committee and on local District Agricultural Committees. According to Dr.
Hantuba, MAF F Acting Deputy Director, the MAFF prefers to think of the members of
interest groups as "stakeholders" in agricultural policy; and the ASIP marks a sincere
attempt to restructure the MAP F to be responsive to such stakeholders, to generate
efficient, demand-driven policies and to employ a decentralized administration which "gets
out to the areas where the stakeholders are" (interview with Hantuba, 19/6/97). Ad hoc

linkages also exist between MAFF and its stakeholders: for instance, the MAFF

285

 

 

 

occasionally holds workshops which stakeholders‘ groups are invited to attend, and they
send official government representatives to workshops held by groups. According to Dr.
Hantuba, any stakeholder has the right to see the Minister or the Permanent Secretary, “as
these are public offices.” Stakeholders also have the right to influence govemment
opinion through the media. More formally, representation can also be had when the
Minister presents the annual agricultural budget to Parliament for discussion.

From the analysis above, we know that new opportunities such as this affect
groups differently: the NAPSSF reports there has been an important increase in
cooperation with the Ministries since the transition in 1991, the ZNFU and PFU report a
moderate increase in cooperation; and ZCF reports a moderate decrease in cooperation.
Interestingly, however, it is the ZC F that reports they communicate and interact with
Ministries “often,” while the NAPSSF and PFU, who perceive they are getting just as
much if not more cooperation from the new government as from the old, report that they
communicate and interact with government only “sometimes.” Since the ZN FU, while
reporting an increase in cooperation with the new regime, also reports that they
communicate and interact with the Ministries quite “often,” we might surmise that some
groups have to work harder than others to elicit cooperation, and for some groups,
cooperation just does not, and perhaps will not, depend on efforts to work with
government.

Furthermore, we should note that there are important differences between groups’s
interactions with different Ministries, a point which at least sometimes is dependent on the
person who actually sits in the Minister’s chair. A quote from the President of the ZN FU

at the Annual Congress in 1997 (after the ASIP was dissolved) makes this point well:

286

 

 

 

“Mr President, of late the relationship between the ZN FU and some parts of
Government have been less than perfect. It is our firm belief that we must improve
this relationship for the good of the agricultural sector. The ZNFU has no wish to
be seen as the automatic opposition to Government’s agricultural policy. Neither
however do we wish to relinquish our right to disagree with Government’s
agricultural policy when we think fit. There must be, and indeed there is a middle
ground which I can assure you we fully intend to work towards. We look for
Government’s co-operation on this.”
Importantly, this point did not extend to all of government, just the then-current Minister
of Agriculture, Edith Nawakwi, who had initiated a war-of-words in the press with the
ZNF U. As President Vashee continued, “we would like to commend the Minister of
Finance for providing a clear and distinct government policy statement regarding agricul-
ture marketing and inputs. This commitment and resolve of government to provide firm
guidelines is of fundamental importance to the development of the agricultural sector.”

As to how the specific introduction of the Strategic Investment Program impacted
groups’ ability to gain representation in the agricultural policy process (even though it was
short-lived), again groups have had different experiences. According to ZNFU (who at
one point held the vice-chairmanship of the committee), the ASIP steering committee
permitted valuable representation to its members— at least until its dissolution in February
1997. As for the District Agricultural Committees, groups had mixed reviews of their
experience with representation on these bodies. On the one hand, the District Agricultural
Office in Mansa reported that its D.A.C. met once a month and included representatives
from the Peasant F armers’ Union and F armers' Association, and the ZNFU reported that
its farmers have been quite active on committees in many of the districts. On. the other

hand, representatives from the Peasant Farmers Union in Kabwe complained that civil

servants were taking the lion's share of seats on D.A.C.'s, and members of an agricultural

287

 

 

cooperative in Nchelenge didn't seem to realize the DAC. existed.
Business

Most important to the business sector is the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and
Industry (MCTI), although particular sectors (e.g. transportation, tourism, etc.) deal more
often with their specific line Ministry. According to Jane Habongo, Deputy Director of
Planning and Research, there are no formal linkages between the Ministry and private

sector organizations (interview with Habongo, 19/6/97). However, since the transition in

 

1991, the Ministry has held many meetings with ZACCI, and recently, (since 1995) the
Ministry has begun to hold quarterly "dialogue" meetings with ZACCI, ZAM, and the
Textile Producers Association. At these meetings, chaired by the Permanent Secretary,
issues such as the national budget, tariffs, and other policies are discussed. Private sector
representation is also achieved through boards and commissions; for example, the Export
Board is a statutory body under the MCTI. lnformally, group members are "free to come
in to the Ministry with their concerns... we are looking for consultation at every stage, to
collect information from interest groups through committees and task forces" (ibid). The
Ministry's position was described thus: "Groups are encouraged to put in their ideas, but
the final decision is up to government. We try as much as possible to accommodate, but
businessmen will always complain. Groups need to know what they want... if they want to
work with government, they have to make positive contributions, give specific
instructions" (ibid).

From the perspective of the key interest group in the business sector, changes such
as these informal linkages with the MCTI have resulted in the perception of an important

increase in cooperation between the Ministries and the Association. ZACCI reports they

288

 

 

 

have gained greater formal access to Ministers and their staff; "dialogue meetings" are
scheduled (though not always held) every two months with the MCTI, and inter-
ministerial meetings with representatives and their staff from multiple Ministries are
scheduled quarterly. Present at the most recent of these meetings, held in March 1997 (a
month after the agricultural sector lost their connection to the MAFF through the
Strategic Investment Program), were the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Finance
and Economic Development, Works and Supply, Local Government and Housing,
Commerce Trade and Industry, and Agriculture Food and Fisheries, as well as high-level
officials from the National Roads Board and the Ministry of Communications and
Transport. Importantly, while these meetings indicate much improved and formalized
access to government decision-makers in the Third Republic, they are still not legally
mandated and thus depend on the discretion of the sitting Ministers. This is different from
both agriculture, where even nearly-institutionalized linkages failed before they became
functional, and labor, where legally mandated meetings between government, labor and
employers exists in the form of the Tripartite Council.
LEM

Most important to the labour sector is, of course, the Ministry of Labour and
Social Security. In addition to the Tripartite Council, which schedules and holds bi-annual
meetings, the Deputy Labor Minister, Mr. D.S. Nyambe, reports that it keeps an open
door to additional ad hoc meetings with unions and employers (interview with Nyambe,
14/2/97). For reasons given above in the discussion of the split between the Congress and
the Mineworkers et al., the degree to which the unions perceive the MMD Minister of

Labour, as well as the other Ministries in the Third Republic, to be more “cooperative”

289

 

than their Second Republic counterparts, depends on which national union one refers to.
We know that the MUZ reports they have experienced an “important increase” in
cooperation with Ministries in the Third Republic, and that they report that they often
communicate and interact with government; though we don’t have comparable data for
the ZCTU, interviews with groups leaders as well as media reports would indicate they are
more similar to the Cooperative Federation; that is, though they may struggle to frequently
communicate with government, it is most likely they would report that cooperation with
the Ministries in the Third Republic has not improved. Indeed, both the AAWUZ and the
NUPAW reported a “moderate decrease” in their cooperation with Ministries, and that
they only sometimes consult with them. The Employers Federation (ZFE), on the other
hand, reports that it has experienced positive relations with government in the Third
Republic, finding ministers to be more receptive and policy consultations to be more
frequent, although influence over final policy decisions is not always forthcoming.
Parliament

In developed democracies, legislatures are often a key focus of interest group
activity, as legislation as well as executive policy often has profound effects on the
interests of group members. However, for legislative lobbying to produce returns that
merit their costs, there must be a perception that a) there is potential for influence over
lawmaker’s decisions, b) there is access to the deliberative process that the legislature
engages in, and c) that the legislature has a meaningful role in policy making. Studies on
the Zambian National Assembly suggest that none of these assumptions hold. First,
although the reputation of the National Assembly as a rubber stamp on executive decisions

is not entirely accurate (Alderfer 1997), the fact remains that the Assembly is subject to

290

 

 

executive co-optation. As Alderfer found in his study, “Most members (of Parliament)
believe that executive agencies , especially the president and district councils, bear the
primary responsibility to provide government services and do not believe the assembly
should take a more prominent position in this process” (19972255). In addition, the

Speaker of the Assembly “maintains a traditional perspective on the role of the National
Assembly, namely that parliament’s primary responsibility is to approve legislation brought

to it by the government” (ibidz2l 1). As a result, it is not surprising to find that most

 

groups are most focused on attempting to exert influence at the Ministerial level, as
discussed above.

Second, the Assembly is a difficult institution for associations to gain access to.
Perched on the top of a hill and clad in copper, the building itself, as well as the lodgings
of the Members, are guarded, and permission for entry is difficult to obtain. Furthermore,
the parliamentary committee system is deliberately weakened by the Speaker of the
Assembly (ibid 1997); while one of the groups (NAPPSF) reported to me that they had
been contacted and asked to provide a report to a parliamentary committee on
Agriculture, they also remarked that they had never been notified of the resulting
legislative outcome, and were unaware of the effects, if any, of their submission. The
situation in which both parliament and interest groups would like to communicate more
but are frustrated by institutional— or as Alderfer points out, individual (i.e. the Speaker
himself)-- constraints, is perhaps best captured by an exchange between ZACCI Board
members and several pro-business MPs who were guests at a Board meeting (Badat-
Kafue, Chewe-Kabwe, Mutukwa-Nyroro, and Vernon Mwanga-Roan, a former Trustee

of ZACCI). During discussion, ZACCI’s attempt to make submissions on the Pension Act

291

 

 

was raised. ZACCI’s official position is that they do not want government to have a

monopoly over the provision of pension schemes. When asked why they had not made a

submission to Parliament to express this position, the following exchange ensued:

ZACCI President,
George Chabwera:

Hon. Mwanga:

Chabwera:

Hon. Mwanga:

Hon. Mutukwa:

ZACCI board member:

Hon. Mwanga:

ZACCI Vice President
Mukandawire:

Hon. Mwanga:

“We were not invited to make submissions.”

“But you could have distributed it at Parliament or at the
National Motel where we stay.”

“We tried, but we were stopped (by guards)”

 

“Well, efforts must be made to get to us individually. This
is one of the few countries where MPs are not lobbied at all.
It’s ridiculous. House should have private select committee
which can deal with private sector concerns.”

“We need to be more like states with lots of interest groups
lobbying. Maybe you could give us a fact sheet which
explains your point and the consequences.”

“The best way to communicate with MP5 is when they’re in
Parliament; is there any way ZACCI can meet with MPs in
parliament?”

“Our mornings are free. You could have workshops then
and have MPs show up. As backbenchers, we’re able to
influence government.”

“Bills going late to Parliament is a product of the 2nd
Republic. With a multi-party state, bills should flow to
interest groups and others.”

“Yes, but the problem is that the Speaker doesn’t allow any
reform in standing orders committee.”

An invitation was then extended to ZACCI members to come and observe

Parliamentary debates. It was remarked that there needed to be a ZACCI sub-committee

to go to the parliamentary motel, where Members reside while in session, and lobby the

MP3 directly.

292

 

 

Government Boards and Committees

Boards and Committees of public organizations, which allow interest
representation from various sectors of society and the economy, seem to be a diverse
group of institutions, some stipulated in the original Laws of Zambia, some created by ad
hoc statutory instruments, some formed at a Minister’s whim. Some are well-established,
regulated by clear legislation which stipulates election of membership, duties and
responsibilities of the Board, etc. An example of this is the Zambia Privatization Board,
whose members, once put forth officially by the group they are to represent, are ratified by
Parliament. Others are more loosely defined; regulations concerning membership are
amorphous (allegations of patronage often surround the assignment members on this type
of board), and their function (outside of providing sitting allowances) seems ambiguous.
The fact that these bodies do provide sometimes substantial sitting allowances (a sit-in on
the ZPA board brings in K300,000, or about US$240) makes assignment to them an
attractive opportunity among members of interest group executive boards.

Of issue is the manner in which group representatives are assigned to the boards,
and the extent to which they represent group, rather than individual, interests when they
take their seat. ZACCI, for example, chooses representatives to boards and commissions
through elections at executive board meetings. The representative is then asked to report
to the executive board monthly, and take comments from the executive board back to their
board or committee meetings (see Table 4.3, Chapter Four). ZNFU generally assigns
members of the secretariat (i.e. full time staff) to these bodies, and requires staff members

to relinquish their sitting allowance to the main office.

293

 

 

Political Parties and Electoral Politics

As noted above, groups generally do not consider electoral politics a useful
pathway to influence. As shown in Figure 7.7, of five possible influence strategies,
“working to aid the election of political leaders” tied with “engaging in public protests” as
the least important strategy for the national apex groups. Examining the groups
individually, both MUZ and ZN FU stated that such an electoral strategy was “not very”
important in achieving their policy goals, while the PFU, ZFE, MUZ, ZACCI, and
NAPPSF stated the strategy was “not at all important.” The notable exception to this
trend is the Cooperative Federation, whose response that an electoral strategy is “very”
important to policy goals is quite striking. Examining another item in the 1997 Survey,
we see the same pattern when the question “What, if any, political activities does this
group engage in?” Table 7.3 gives the open-ended responses, noticably blunt in most
cases: “none.” Since we know that these groups do engage in the political wrangling that
is endemic to participating in economic policy decision-making, we interpret these
responses to reference specifically partisan politics, as alluded to by the PFU in their

comment: “members are free to participate in politics (i.e. parties) of their choice.”

 

Table 7.3: Group Political Activity,

 

 

 

 

 

 

Open—ended Responses to “What Political Activities does Group Engage In?”
ZACCI NONE
ZNFU NONE -ZNF U does not engage in any political activities
NAPSF NONE-non-political
PF U NONE ~the union has no political agenda but individual members are free to
participate in politics of their choice
ZCF lobbying
MUZ [industrial political activity and general political activity

 

 

294

 

The exception is again, the Cooperative Federation, who claims “lobbying” as a political
activity the group engages in, and the Mineworkers Union, who responded it “engages
mainly in industrial political activity and general political activity.” For the former, the
engagement in politics appears to have had deleterious effects on their relationship with
government; while for the latter, their open political support of the MMD government
during and after the transition has apparently paid off . Given the penalties for choosing
the “wrong” party vis-a-vis the government in power, the other groups have apparently
decided to hedge their bets, preferring to stay well away from any semblance of partisan
involvement, or associated in any way with a particular political party. A good example of
the fine line between policy advocacy and political activity that groups must walk is the
ZNFU’s official statement of “political neutrality,” as given by the President of the
Association at the Annual Congress, April 1997:
“First, the ZNFU does not engage in, or allow itself to be influenced by, party
politics. The ZNFU has always avoided aligning itself with any one political party
in resolving agricultural matters. It would be unwise and short term opportunism
for the Union to espouse any one particular party, especially since we draw our
members from every shade of the political spectrum. It is for this reason that the
Union has a strict policy requiring office bearers to resign their positions upon
entering national politics, so as to ensure the political neutrality of the
organization. The Union has always been willing to work constructively with the
Government of the day for the improvement of agriculture.”
The avoidance of any partisan or political ties bodes poorly for the development of

party-interest group networks, which reinforce interest blocks in true multi-party systems.

It also starves the party system of stable sources of support and contributions.

295

 

 

Public Opinion: Advertising and the Media

Media and advertising, as mechanisms useful in the shaping of public opinion, are
important pathways to influence in political systems where government leaders depend on
the support of the mass public to rule. Since the demise of the one-party state, Zambia has
seen a revival of the independent press under the new institutions of the multi-party state,
so there are new channels which interest groups in Zambia can and do use to sway public
opinion. However, while the Constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the
press, the Penal Code lists various prohibited activities that may be broadly interpreted and
in effect restrict freedom of expression and the press (USIS 1995 Human Rights Report).
Thus, while the government generally respects freedom of expression, it is able to invoke
these restrictive laws in selected cases, and limit that expression it does not care to hear. In
addition, the Government continues to own the two most widely circulated newspapers, as
well as the sole television station, ZNBC, and one of only two radio stations (the other is a
Christian missionary affiliated station). While the government thus still has great influence
over the information that reaches the public, a number of independent newspapers which
actively question government actions and policies and circulate without government
interference also continue to operate, rounding out the space available for shaping public
opinion.

As our data show, interest groups in the Third Republic do perceive that using the
media to influence public opinion is an important strategy for policy influence. This is
true especially of the Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Federation of Employers (ZFE),
and the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), who reported it to

be among the most important influence strategies they employ, while the PFU, MUZ, and

296

 

NAPSF also counted it important (see figure 7.5). In fact, as figure 7.9ll (next page)
shows, the number of times that the national-level interest groups have appeared in the
leading official daily (The Times of Zambia) has increased for all groups, except for the
ZCF, for whom it has stayed the same. Most notable is the rise in exposure for the
Congress of Trade Unions, from 14 times in 1989 to 43 times in 1996. Also important is
the jump in recognition of the ZN F U, which went from not being mentioned at all in the
leading government daily in 1989, to appearing in the public eye more often than any other
non-union apex group. However, even though it has increased, the total number of times
in a year that group affairs and positions are covered is rather slim; the intentional use of
media as a strategy for influence in the Third Republic seems still in its infancy.
Nonetheless, as shown in Table 7.4 below, it is usually the case that the group
covered in the news article is given “voice,” i.e. a spokesman is quoted, giving the group a
chance to speak out on the issue. Whether this “voice” is solicited by a news-hungry
journalist, or is provided via the initiative of the group spokesman making a call to the
local paper, is impossible to tell. However, as shown in Table 7.4, most of the groups that
are mentioned reported in our survey that they consider the use of media an important
influence strategy; demonstrating that such voice is valued for its political purposes, even
if not the result of the group’s initiative. As the information in Table shows, groups use
these opportunities for a public voice not only for political purposes, such as criticizing the

MMD or the government, or taking a public position on a policy (e.g. “income tax”), they

 

” This data is derived from the author’s “media database,” which comprises a systematic
collection of all mentions of interest groups in the Times of Zambia newspaper for the years 1989-1996
(see Appendix 2). Articles are coded for date, groups involved, issue addressed, action taken, and
government involvement.

297

 

 

 

Figure 7.9:

Frequency of Mention in the Times of Zambia

 

 

45 -
30 -
15 4
0 . . . . ... ;.
ZACCI ZCF ZNFU ZFE ZCTU MUZ
[ 1989 I 1996

 

Data Source: Media Database

298

 

 

 

also use the opportunity to report on corruption (“watchdog”), on services they are

providing their members (“services provided”), to announce a workshop or other public

affair (public relations), or to comment on data and statistics that are relevant to their

members. In addition, coverage includes issues of inter- and intra- group cooperation and

conflict (e.g. “problem in group”).

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.4
Analysis of Covegge in the Times of Zambia
APEX GROUP: ZC F ZC TU ZF E M UZ ZAC C ZNF U PF U
Frequency of 4 43 5 l7 8 l4 3
Mention
Frequency of 4 41 5 l3 6 l4 3
“Voice”
Types Of Data/ income Tax, Pension Public Service Criticism of Critique of Public
Statistics, Regulatory Scheme, Reform Policy MMD, Agricultural Relations,
lSSUCS Policy, Policy
Addressed Problem in Elections, Data/ Privatization Criticism of Data/
in Articles Group Suuport for Statistics Policy, Govt. Criticism of Statistics
Democracy, Govt.
Partisan Problem Data/ Public
Issues, with Other Statistics Relations, Criticism of
Support Group Local Govt.
MMD, Group Watchdog,
Public Services Elections Public
Relations, Provided Held, Services Relations
Data/ Provided,
Statistics, Split with Data/
Watchdog, ZCTU Issues Group Statistics
Disupute Problem
Elections, Services Elections
Services Provided Held
Provided,
Industrial Problem in
Relations Group

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.4.1 Summary: Pathways to Influence in the Third Republic

During the Second Republic, the UNIP regime’s adoption of corporatist-like

representional institutions resulted in a exclusive and highly centralized policy process,

with little room and few mechanisms for societal input. Upon coming to power, the

MMD promised to promote the tenets of pluralism: a competitive political arena, a more

299

 

 

open and inclusive decision-making process receptive to interest group lobbying, the
freedom to organize independent of government control. Through increased consultation
and cooperation with government ministers and their administrations at both the policy-
making and policy implementation levels, as well as through regularly-held public
seminars, workshops and symposiums to publicly debate key economic policies, interest
groups in Zambia are making use of the “opening up” of government under the MMD
regime. We’ve shown that the point of influence groups perceive to be most useful are the
Ministries, and that most of the key national apex groups report increases in cooperation
and consultation with their relevant ministry. However, we’ve also seen evidence of
government officials’ preference for the less cacophonous environment of the Second
Republic, their nostalgia for the corporatist controls of that time. As well, the MMD
believes its policy agenda has an electoral mandate, and has exhibited little inclination to
change course. The question, then, is whether increased lobbying efforts and greater
access to government has produced any real influence over policy. Since this is a difficult
subject to analyze, and almost impossible to analyze on a general level, we’ll first examine
which policy areas are especially important to the groups in the study, and then address
their ability to influence those policies.
7.5 Policy interests

Figures 7.10 and 7.1 1 (next page) provide detailed information about group
preferences for the provision of government services and the level of government
regulation in specific policy areas. As is clear from Figure 7.10, national apex group
leaders in all economic sectors overwhelmingly want to see the government provide

increased services, in policy areas specific to their economic activity (employment,

300

 

 

Figure 7.10: Provision of Service in Policy Areas

For each of the folloiwng policy areas, please use the following scale to indicate

this asssociation’s perspecitve on the level of services that should
be provided by the government in that particular policy area:

 

Much more

More

Neutral

Education Agriculture

Less ’ ' ' ’ ' ' W "’

MuchLess * 2 7 7 572 25577222777

 

  
    

 

Business

 

 

EZACCI DPBA El PFU IZNFU IZCF

EMUZ j

 

E Education

Housing
Business

a .

El Employment

E Agriculture

Econ Devpt -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Much Less Less Neutral

Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

301

Much more

 

 

agriculture) as well as general areas like economic development, education and housing.
There are only two notable exceptions to this trend, most importantly the ZACCI, who
want to see many fewer services provided by government in the area of business and
commerce (i.e. like businessmen worldwide, they want government out of the business
arena), and the PFU, who expressed that there should be less provision of government
housing, understandable since this service is provided mostly to urban, not rural, residents.
Not surprisingly, comparing the groups themselves, the Cooperative Federation (ZCF)
comes up first in wanting to see much more provision of government services, as does the
PFU in most areas (N APSSF did not respond to these items).

Figure 7.11 shows that in the area of government regulation, however, many
groups would like to see the government impose fewer conditions and requirements in the
above policy areas. Leading this trend, of course, is the representative of business, the
ZACCI, who wants “much less” regulation in all policy areas, except of course
international trade, where they want to see government much more involved. Given that
the ZCF wants to see large increases in the amount of government services provided, it is
interesting to note that they want nonetheless to see less government regulation in every
policy area. Consistent with their market-oriented position on most policy matters, the
ZNF U is satisfied with levels of government regulation in most areas, except in
international trade, where they join ZACCI in a preference for much more government
regulation to protect Zambian industries and agricultural products.

In general, then, the major national interest associations in Zambia have
remarkably convergent policy preferences in one arena; that is, nearly all want more

government services, in nearly all policy areas. Groups start to differ when it comes to

302

 

Figure 7.11: Level of Regulation in Policy Areas

For each of the folloiwng policy areas, please use the following scale to
indicate this asssociation's perspecitve on the level of services that should
be provided by the government in that particular policy area:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

  

    

 

 

 

Economic Devpt.

Much more " if: -

More — —

Neutral 5 A i * ,4, i 5

Less "T 77 7 i “ ’ 3
Much Less 7 22 7 - 2. 5-7. 3, - 2,7 - I . m
lntl. Trade Agriculture Employment Business
EJZACCI DPBA ElPFU EZNFU IZCF IMUZ

 

Business

Economic Devt

 

 

Employment
El Agriculture
El lntl. Trade

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

More Much more

Data Source: 1 997 Organizational Survey

303

 

 

 

 

government involvement in the economy, however; for example, the large-scale business
sector wants government out, while small-scale agriculture and small-scale business want
government in. Not surprisingly, when we asked groups what their main policy objectives
were, we found quite a bit of variation.

Figure 7.12 gives the policy objectives of the national apex group leaders as they
articulated them in both loosely-structured interviews, and the 1997 organizational survey.
The figure shows important convergences over policy direction in some areas, and
important divergence in others. Thus, for example, both the ZACCI and ZNFU express
policy goals which are in line with market liberalization; that is, these groups are
concerned with influencing the margins of private sector production, e.g. tax laws, VAT
provisions, export and import duties, etc. Groups which deal with small-scale producers,
the PFU and NAPSSF, express policy concerns which, though couched in market terms,
are really about government intervention in the market. These groups want to see
government continue to provide-- not just regulate-- agricultural inputs and markets for
rural farmers. While these groups agree (at least in principle if not in practice) that such
provision should be on a market basis through credit and lending mechanisms, they don’t
believe such mechanisms should be entirely liberalized. Finally, in the industrial sector,
while both labor unions and employer’s associations are supportive of policies like
privatization (for the unions, as long as employment levels don’t suffer), they are wary of
trade liberalization and agree that Zambia’s local industry should be protected. They also
converge in wanting to see less government involvement in the economy in areas like
pension schemes, and they agree that there needs to be a reduction in government’s

recurrent expenditures.

304

 

 

Figure 7.12: Table of Policy Objectives

 

 

 

ZACCI

specific policy areas: V.A.T. provisions, duty rates, income tax, and commodity classification issues

general policy goals: “to make help available to the members an economic space that is friendly to
business”

ZNFU

 

specific policy areas: Agricultural policy, the annual budget, and fiscal policy; Agricultural Credit
Act "tightened up;" Government to ‘encourage’ commercial banks to change
conservative approach to agricultural lending

general policy goals: Market liberalization, agricultural trade policy, development of export
markets, security of land tenure. “Improve the profitability of farming and to
improve the agricultural environment in which farmers operate "

 

 

 

 

ZC F

specific policy areas: New Cooperative Act: government involvement in the cooperative movement
abolished in favor of the establishment of private cooperatives;

general policy goals: “to advance the living standards of all its members through the practice of
cooperation and mutual self-help ”

NAPPSF

specific policy areas: Development of lending institutions that offer rates lower than current

commercial banks and target funding to agricultural investments such as irrigation systems; improved
agricultural extension services that encourage non-traditional crops; facilitation of marketing and export
arrangements through improvements to road infrastructure.

“Where government and donor aid is needed, for example in the facilitation of agricultural inputs to the
rural areas, assistance should be channeled through local associations for delivery to individuals, so as to
ensure loan repayment.”

 

 

 

 

general policy goals: “sourcefor inputs for farmers ”

PFU

specific policy areas: "central policy objective is to meet the PF U constitutional requirement to
source inputs for their members”

ZCTU

specific policy areas: "clear-cut" policies in employment and productivity that utilize incentive

schemes, differential interest rates in the productive sector, protection of local industry, control of waste
and fraud in foreign exchange allocations, avoidance of wage freezes and retrenchments, the
establishment and enforcement of a "living wage," a reduction in government defense and recurrent
expenditure, addequately funded A.S.l.P.

 

ZFE

 

specific policy areas: Drafting of 1997 Industrial Relations Act to limit trade union and employer
association splinter groups; Redrafting of the National Provident Fund Act, so that pension schemes are
left to a competitive market), Employment Act, Budget recommendations: monetary and fiscal policy,
import and export duties, agricultural sector development and small-scale industry, infrastructure, health,
taxation, and privatization

 

 

 

 

305

 

7.6 Policy Influence

These specific objectives provide a springboard from which to begin an analysis of
policy influence. As stated above, this is difficult to address in a general sense, for there
are a multitude of policies that affect economic interests, and on which groups can
subsequently focus their lobbying strategies. Each policy issue, of course, exists in a
different political and economic context, with a varying cast of protagonists, winners and
losers. Groups can therefore be successful on certain policies and decidedly not so on
others. In this section, we examine three important economic policies that are important
to different groups; these policies were chosen to highlight the interconnectedness of the
three facets of interest organizations— members, organizational resources, influence
strategies. They are: for the business sector, the annual budget; for labor, the
privatization of state-owned industries. The latter, it will be noted, are policies on the

economic reform agenda.

7.6.1 The Annual Budget: the Effects of Organizational Resources

Interest groups like ZACCI can have a fair degree of influence in certain policy
arenas. An example of this is the annual budget process, where submissions from groups
are solicited by the Ministry of Finance, and seem to have a moderate impact on the
resulting budget. As the Permanent Secretary for the Policy Analysis and Coordination
Division at Cabinet Office pointed out, the MMD government is willing to compromise on
some policy issues; as an example, he gave the lowering of VAT in the 1997 budget from
20% to 17.5%. Analysis of the 1996 and 1997 budget demonstrates that the budget

reflected several tax proposals put forth by groups, including an increase in the personal

306

 

 

income tax threshold, the lowering of the VAT rate from 20% to 17.5%, and changes in
import and export duties intended to benefit business and agriculture. Furthermore, as the
analysis above showed, group leaders report that they are fairly satisfied with their policy
influence efforts.

Lobbying Government Ministries:

The Ministry of Finance and Taxation Issues in the Annual Budget

"As part of opening the budget process, the Ministry of Finance is pleased to announce the
formation of a budget task force. The government is concerned with restoring the fiscal
health of the country's finances. As part of the process of examining options this task
force invites written submissions from business, labour, and professional organizations
and also from individuals."

J.M. Mtonga, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
Press Release, 1996

Among the varied committees of the Ministry of Finance, there exists a "tax policy
task force." Each year, this body requests submissions from interest groups and others as
to their preferences for the next year's budget, analyzes the feasibility and budget
repercussions of these preferences, and makes recommendations to the Minister based
upon these considerations (note: while groups are asked for submissions, there are no
interest groups or other non-govemmental representatives in these review groups). This is
thus an area in which groups have a distinct interest, and which they have a clear channel
to the relevant decision-makers.

Who takes advantage of such opportunities? Below is a list (provided by a
member of the task force) of interest groups and others which made a submission to the
Ministry of Finance in 1995, in response to the publicly-released Permanent Secretary's

request:

307

 

 

 

Groups
Export Board of Zambia
Leather Industries Association of Zambia
Textile Producers of Zambia
Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZN FU)
Zambia Episcopal Conference
Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZF E)
Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce
and

Industry (ZACCI)
Zambia Export Growers Association (ZEGA)

Companies

Anglo American Corporation
Barclay's Bank

Dunlop Tyres

E.R.Z. Holdings

Enalo Limited

Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Company, Zambia Ltd.

Mukuba Pensions Trustees Limited
Phelps Dodge

Tata Zambia Limited

Zambia Bottlers Limited

Other Ministries
Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

This list shows that four of the nine groups this report focused on in this report

made submissions to the task force: ZACCI and ZAM, representing the business sector,

ZNFU representing the agricultural sector, and ZFE representing the labour sector.

Absent are submissions from the ZCF, the PFU, the NAPSSF, and the ZCTU (as the PBA

was just formed and still lacks an elected national committee, this is not surprising).

Interestingly, the Ministry did not have the ZCTU's submission ‘on file’ when the

submission file was made available to the researcher. Furthermore, a "summary of income

tax submissions"-- a matter of key interest to labours' representatives-- did not mention

ZCTU. Profit Magazine included ZCTU's budget preferences in their report on the

submissions made to the Ministry (see ZCTU profile, previous section)-- but none of these

submissions concern taxation issues.

The major tax proposals for 1996 fall into 5 main areas:

0 Direct taxes: PAYE, company income tax, withholding tax
0 VAT: agriculture, mining, food

0 Customs: tariffs

Excise taxes: rates, motor vehicles
Nontax revenue: fees and fines

 

 

Table 7.13 below gives each of the group's position on these taxes, and gives the

relevant results of the resultant budgets. For both years, the budget announced by the

Minister of Finance reflected changes sought by the groups in some areas, and did not

reflect their submissions in others:

 

196

ZACCl, ZAM

ZACCl, ZAM
introduced
ZACCl, ZAM

ZFE
ZACCl, ZAM, ZFE

ZACCl, ZAM, ZFE
ZACCl, ZAM

ZFE

ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE
ZACCI

ZAM, ZNFU

ZAM, ZFE

ZACCI

ZAM
ZAM
ZACCl, ZAM

1997:

ZN FU
ZNFU
ZNFU
ZNFU
ZNFU
ZNFU

Table 7.13:

The 1996 and 1997 Budget Processes

Submission

-increase PAYE threshold to K500,000
-introduce more tax bands
-retain company tax rate of 35%

-reduce " to 25%
-abolish withholding tax rate

-broaden tax base

-control for inflation

—50% allowance tax abatement
-lower VAT, 20 to 15%

-VAT refund on Zamtel
-zero-rate agricultural products

-remove import duty on raw materials

-reduce customs duties to uniform l0°/o

-flat rate import duty, no exempt
-abolish SGS inspection monopoly
-duty on salaula

Submission

-rebate of fuel levy for farmers
-livestock tax deferred

-corporate income tax the same, i.e. l5%
-duty exemption for agr. machinery
-countervailing duties

-abolish SGS monopoly

=>

Budget Result

threshold increased to
K600,000
=> wider tax bands

company tax: reduced to
30% for

LuSE companies
withholding tax lowered,
25 to 15%

basic agricultural
products, zero-rated, duty
on agricultural machinery
reduced, 20% to 0

no changes, duty-free raw
materials

import duties lowered
across the board, but not
made uniform

Budget

corporate tax, 15%

 

309

 

 

 

Analysis

Generally, it appears that where there aren't important political pressures (e. g. the
issue of taxing informal sector vendors and the like) , or inflexible macroeconomic
considerations (e.g. the cash budget), groups have some influence in the outcome of the
budget process. As it is the MMD government's goal to strengthen the private sector, it
behooves them to solicit this sector for advice on what kinds of policies are necessary for
growth in this area-- a point reflected by the Ministry of Finance's "Budget Task Force"
statement. Though thus solicited, however, interest groups clearly don't hold the reins in
the Ministry of Finance, evidenced by the fact that a good portion if not a majority of their
submissions go unmet.

Examining again the groups that submitted proposals to the budget process, we
note that only groups with high or medium levels of “organizational sustainability” made
submissions. Notably, revenue and staff levels don’t seem to be positively related to this
ability— it is striking, for instance, that the group with the highest revenues and staff levels,
i.e. the ZCF, did not attempt to influence the budget, even though it has clear impact on
farmers, as ZNFU’s submissions make clear. This supports our argument that it is not just
an “absolute” level of organizational resources that makes a difference in policy influence;
we claim that our concept of “organizational sustainability is more accurate because it
takes into account the competing claims on organizational resources. To put it simply, not
every “rich” organization will be effective or even engaged, in policy lobbying.
Furthermore, we see the shadow of institutional history here again: the ZNFU and ZACCI
are both former quasi-pluralist groups; our argument that these groups adapt better to a

pluralist lobbying arena seems to hold water.

310

 

7.6.2 Privatization Policy: the Inflexibility of Economic Reform

As discussed in Chapter Three, part of the legacy of the one-party state was an
economy whose ownership was largely in the hands of government. As noted, in 1991 the
sector was responsible for 80 percent of GDP in 1991, with 160 public enterprises
employing 140,000 staff (van de Walle and Chiwele, 1994238: see also Callaghy 1993,
Hawkins 1991, and Bates and Collier for discussions of the interference in management
and rent-seeking problems experienced in this sector). Pressure to privatize this loss-
making sector began in the Second Republic, but there was little political will to sustain it,
as UNIP benefitted from the patronage opportunites offered by its control over these
companies and their employment decisions. In the MMD electoral manifesto, privatization
is one of the major planks in its economic reform program (see Chapter Four); upon
taking power, it pledged to privatize some 160 firms within 5 years. Despite a lack of
consensus among the MMD cabinet, the commitment of a small group of key ministers,
and the determination of donors, resulted in the Privatization Bill being presented and
quickly pushed through the National Assembly (Rakner 1998: l 00).

The Privatization Act of June 1992 transformed the former Privatization
Committee (instituted by the UNIP regime in May 1990) into a quasi-autonomous agency,
the ZPA, which was given the task of full privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOE’s)
within 10 years. Initially bogged down by a combination of political, administrative, and
technical problems, privatization did not proceed very far, until funding for the operation
of the ZPA was allocated in the 1993 Budget. The pace picked up considerably after that,
and as shown in Table 7.5 (below), the government had surpassed its goal by the end of

1996. Privatization has been cited as one of the government’s key successes in its

311

 

economic reform program.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.5
Privatization in Zambia
Progress Date Companies privatized
J une-December 30 1992 Privatization Act passed in
parliament, information of
programme carried out,
establishment of ZPA
January - June 30 1993 2
July - December 30 1993 4
January - June30 1994 6
July - December 30 1994 3
January - June 30 1995 3
July - December 30 1995 27
September 30 1996 108
November 30 1996 166
December 30, 1997 224

 

 

Source: Zambia Privatization Agency, adapted from Rakner 19982101.

Though the labor movement has supported some need for privatization, they have
expressed concern with the impact of privatization on employment and the lack of safety
net provisions for the unemployed. The position of the ZCTU, especially at first, was that
the pace was too fast, and profit-making firms were being privatized alongside loss-
making ones. As discussed earlier, the disagreement between the Mineworkers Union,
who eventually perceived that privatization would improve conditions in their sector, and
the ZCTU was at least partially due to ZCTU’s vociferous opposition to the specifics of
the privatization program. However, the case provides a good illustration of the lack of
policy influence possible in cases where there is strong government support for policy
change. Even though the ZCTU had, especially before its split with MUZ and the other

unions, quite a formidable level of organizational resources— revenues, staff, and well as

312

 

“sustainability,” this example serves to illustrate that not all policy arenas are open to

influence.

7.7 Conclusion

From this brief analysis of policy influence in two separate policy arenas, the
budget and privatization, we see that a wide range of factor affect the direction of policy,
including the preferences of policy elites within government, pressure from interest
groups, international donor pressure, and economic constraints. Which factors are most
important in determining policy direction, we’ve argued, depends on the specific policy
arena. It is thus difficult, if not inaccurate, to say that one group is “stronger” than
another, for different policy arenas require strength in different resources from interest
groups. However, our analysis makes two points: first, that where there are “influence
openings,” organizational sustainability (i.e. financial and technical resources minus
membership or other demands) can determine which groups will be able to make use of
them to further their group’s policy goals. Second, prior institutional relationships matter:
in the budget example, it might be argued that ZACCI and ZNF U are the ones making
regular submissions to government due to their previous experience as quasi-pluralist
organizations— i.e. they are adapting better to working outside formal institutional
relationships to government than the former corporatist organizations. According to this
logic, one of the ZCTU’s problems in effecting influence over any part of the privatization
program might be that it is having difficulty adjusting to its new relationship with the
MMD government, which does not favor labor’s interests as the UNIP did during the

Second Republic.

 

 

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION:
THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM IN ZAMBIA’S THIRD REPUBLIC

This study began with the observation that the economic and political transitions
that began in Zambia in 1991 with the coming to power of the MMD and the initiation of
the “Third Republic,” had potentially wide—reaching repercussions for state-society
relations. This led us to begin our inquiry by posing several questions: what effects
would these reforms have on the formerly corporatist-like relationships between key
economic groups and the state? Would we see a more pluralist interest group system
evolve, one with a multitude of groups competing with one another for influence over
economic policy, groups with voluntary memberships flocking to their ranks to support
and contribute to their group’s policy goals? Would we see groups in this system taking
advantage of the new “openness” of government to lobby and exert influence over
government policy— and would they be successful?

8.1 Change and Continuity
In general, we have found that the political and economic reforms of the Third

Republic have produced a mixed bag of results where the continuing development of the

314

 

interest group system is concerned. Not surprisingly, (given the “stickiness” of
institutions, and the fact that the political and economic behaviors they engender change
more slowly than the rules themselves change), we find that there is both change and
continuity in the interest group system in the Third Republic. The principal changes noted

in previous chapters are the following:

0 The emergence of new groups: This iS true especially in the agricultural sector, where
the demise of the cooperatives has precipitated the formation of other new and
independent farmers’ associations. New groups have also emerged in the business sector,
especially local chambers of commerce and national trade associations which are affiliated
to the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI). The
emergence of new groups in the labor sector was at first blocked by the continuing policy
of “one union, one industry” in the early 1990's; however, with the adoption of ILO
conventions mandating freedom of association, new trade unions are also emerging to
challenge the existing ones. On this front, the emerging interest group system in the Third
Republic thus matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory. Whether these emerging
groups are organizationally sustainable, however, is questionable; as demonstrated in
Chapter Six, groups in some sectors have greater prospects for sustainability than groups
in other sectors. The question of whether the pattern predicted by pluralist theory will still

be evident in the future, therefore, remains to be seen.

0 The development of new types of institutional access to government decision makers:

On this front also, the political system as well as the interest group system formally

315

 

matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory, though in actual practice there are
important caveats. With the demise of one-party rule, the policy-locus has moved from

the closed committees and councils of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to
an executive whose members are directly chosen in competitive elections. Both in the
Cabinet Office and in the Ministries themselves, new points of access are being created
which allow societal input into policy decision making, such as the Cabinet Office’s Policy
Analysis and Coordination Division. However, while these points of access are new, they
are not necessarily effective; much still depends on the ruling party’s official policy

agenda, and the preferences of particular government officials.

- Increased interaction between groups and government: With more groups in the
system and new points of institutional access emerging, the interest group system appears
to match the pattern predicted by pluralist theory on this front as well. Here, the
introduction of the multi-party system did result in an improved incentive for leaders to
heed societal influences and begin attempts at improving social dialogue. Numerous
public fora for the discussion of public policy issues have been held, especially in the early
years of the Third Republic. Compared to the Second Republic, most groups reported

that their interaction with government has increased, and in Specific areas such as the
government’s annual budget process, we’ve seen that the major national apex groups have

taken advantage of government requests for the submission of their policy preferences.

0 Increased lobbying of government over policy issues: The re-orienting of the policy-

making locus from party organs to the executive has not only created new points of access

316

 

to decision makers, it has also produced a new flurry of lobbying activity by economic
interest groups. This development too matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory.

It also marks a noticeable change from the Second Republic, since the one-party state was
not designed to permit direct lobbying activities. Group leaders report that in the Third
Republic, their lobbying activities are aimed predominantly at Ministers and their
administrations, and to a lesser extent, at Members Of Parliament. As with several of the
points above, however, there are important caveats to a continued development of this
trend. It is reasonable to predict that groups will not continue to support the cost of
current lobbying activities if government decision makers prove unresponsive. The
increasing suppression of political competition in the Third Republic bodes poorly for one

of the primary incentives for responsive government, i.e. electoral consequences.

In addition to these changes in the interest group system, we’ve also found several
continuities between the interest group system in the Second Republic and that emerging

in the Third Republic. Primary among such continuities are the following:

0 The continuation of neopatrimonial rule, i. e. a powerful presidency and inflated
cabinet, a legislature with a weak role in policy making, and a lack of if not repression
of, serious political competition. All three factors constrain the points at which interest
groups can lobby to gain support for policy goals. Though the lobbying of government
decision makers has increased in the Third Republic, further development of this type of
pluralist activity is predicated on continued opportunities for policy influence. The
continuity in these political factors, reminiscent as they are of the one-party state, bodes

poorly for continuing pluralist development in the interest group system.

317

 

 
 

.IiirllllIlIV ill l l .I

0 A nostalgia among government administrators for corporatist-type arrangements which
limit the demands made upon government. By their nature, pluralist systems are
“messier” than corporatist ones; there are more groups with a greater variety of demands,
and their attempts at influence poke government at many different points, sometimes in a
very public manner. These characteristics prove uncomfortable to officials accustomed to
the formality of corporatist arrangements; and since they are the ones responsible for
creating and promoting better channels of access through which groups can act to gain
influence, the lingering dominance of politicians and administrators who cut their teeth
during the one-party state also bodes poorly for continued pluralist development.

Overall, though there have been developments in the Third Republic that match the
patterns of interest group activity predicted by pluralist theory, we argue that the above
continuities with the Second Republic bode poorly for further pluralist development in the
interest group system. Several scholars and numerous observers have noted that the
regime in Zambia’s Third Republic is increasingly steering away from the path toward
pluralist democracy that it embarked upon in 1991 (e.g. Baylies and Szeftel 1997,
Simutanyi 1997, Rakner 1998). We contribute to this literature by offering one
empirically based explanation for why elite manipulation is deleterious to the development
of pluralism, in one sector of civil society. In brief, “hangovers” from the Second
Republic, i.e. neopatrimonial rule and a preference for corporatist state—society relations,
pose constraints to the development of further pluralism in the interest group sector by
preventing the development of the economic and political characteristics necessary to
pluralist interest representation (principally, a competitive political and economic

environment, and a liberal state), and by creating incentives for collective action that

318

 

 

further mitigate against the development of a pluralist political environment. Such
political and representational vestiges of the previous regime have specific effects on
interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic— on their membership incentives,
organizational resources, and influence strategies; and these effects are best understood by
analyzing the impact of institutional history in these three interlocking areas. It is to these

findings we now turn.

8.2 Effects of Prior Institutional History on Interest Groups in Dual Transitions
In Chapter Three, we introduced an institutional framework for analyzing the
interest group system in Zambia’s Second Republic. This framework posits in three
possible relationships between the state and interest groups, depending on a) whether the
group belongs to a sector that the state actively seeks to control, and b) whether the group
tries to resist that control in order to maintain political autonomy. The three possible
relationships that emerged in our analysis of interest groups under the Second Republic
were: state-negotiated corporatism, state-dominated corporatism, and quasi-pluralism. By
creating a typology of possible relationships between groups and the state in Zambia, we
have shown that we can explain some of the variation we see in the reasons that
individuals participate in group activity, the organizational resources and more
importantly, sustainability, that groups realize, and their influence strategies and potentials
for policy influence. Furthermore, we’ve found some support for the proposition that
these three areas are linked, for example, an organization’s sustainability in part depends
on what members expect in return for their contributions to, and participation in, group

activity. These findings fall into three broad areas:

319

 

 

 

 

Membership incentives

Institutional history helps to explain the variations we’ve seen in membership
incentives among different economic interest groups in Zambia’s Third Republic. In
Chapter Five, the categories above proved useful in understanding the different incentives
at work in Zambians’ decision to join and/or participate in group activity. Thus, in the
formerly state-dominated corporatist sector, where small-scale and peasant farmers were
organized under the cooperative movement (the Zambia Cooperative Federation, or ZCF),
the main benefits that are sought from group activity continue to be the agricultural inputs
and marketing opportunities that were once provided by the one-party state. Membership
incentives for the cooperatives which continue to fall under the ZCF and the new groups
that seek to organize former cooperative members, the Peasant Farmers Union (PFU) and
the National Association of Peasant and Small-scale Farmers (NAPSSF), thus continue to
be predominantly economic in nature.

Meanwhile, in the formerly state-negotiated corporatist sector, though
membership in the trade unions under the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
continues to be non-voluntary, unionists expect from their contributions to group activity
both the provision of direct economic benefits (higher wages, better working conditions),
as well as successful policy representation to government over key economic reforms,
such as privatization and tax issues. Here, the membership incentive is both economic in
nature, as well as political.

We find the most politically-motivated incentives for membership in the formerly
quasi-pluralist sector. For both the ZACCI and the ZNFU, gaining representation to

government is the benefit members realize most from their contribution to group activity,

320

 

 

 

 

and for ZACCI members, it is the most important benefit in their decision to maintain their
membership. Economic incentives such as information services and training workshops
prove more important to member-farmers in the ZNFU than for the businessmen who
belong to ZACCI; the latter turn out to be the most politically-motivated members in the

study.

Organizational Sustainability

Institutional history also affects organizational sustainability, through the
mechanism of membership incentives. Arguing that groups in a pluralist system must find
a benefits package to sustain their membership, we see the link between the objective
measure, organizational resources, and the subjective measure, organizational
sustainability. Thus, groups with high revenue streams and staffs, like the Zambia
Cooperative Federation (ZCF), can be less hardy than groups with only moderate
revenues and staffs, like the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI); the argument being that the former is pressed to provide a more resource-
intense benefit (i.e. economic and patronage rewards in the form of state-subsidized
agricultural inputs and credit) to attract members than the is latter, whose members are
mostly concerned with policy lobbying and an occasional newsletter.

We also showed how the concept of organizational sustainability is helpful in
understanding the different reasons that groups “trade-off” autonomy for increased
capacity. In essence, there are at least two reasons why groups accept and solicit donor
and government grants and contracts, the first economic, and the second, political. The

first explains why groups like the ZCF, the Provincial Business Association (PBA), the

321

 

 

 

Peasant Farmers’ Union (PFU), and the National Association of Peasant and Small-scale
Farmers (N APSF) look to donors and the government for financial and technical
assistance. For the PBA, the PFU, and the NAPSF, low revenues and low administrative
capacity make the deep pockets of donors irresistibly attractive; while for the ZCF,
support from the government and international donors potentially offers a renewed
legitimacy as well as the resources necessary to re-organize the rural areas. In the case of
the unions, assistance from international labor organizations not only helps replace the
financial resources lost to declining membership levels, it provides training and
collaboration in internationally accepted principles and practices of trade unionism.

On the other hand, reasons which are more political than economic in nature help
to explain why the ZACCI and the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) also seek
resources from government and donors, even though organizationally they are fairly
sustainable without them. Though both groups can amply support the needs of their
large-members, who are small in number and generous in their contributions, political
legitimacy in the multi-party system rests on the inclusion of large numbers of small-
members, who generally require more resources than they are able to contribute. Donor
assistance is valued for these organizational needs; but the consequent conditions that

come with such assistance are not always appreciated, most especially by large-members.

Policy Lobbying Effects
Finally, we showed that prior institutional history also has an effect on policy
lobbying efforts, both through the intermediary of organizational sustainability, and

through its implications for experience in interactions with the state. Thus, groups like the

322

 

 

 

 

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), the Zambia
National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) are
poised to take advantage of policy influence openings with sophisticated policy responses,
because they have considerable levels of organizational capacity, and possess the
combination of resources-matched-to-needs that results in organizational sustainability.
And, groups like ZACCI might be better than groups like the ZCTU and ZCF at lobbying
government in a plural environment, because the Association has no prior experience with
close corporatist ties to the state (and as a consequence, no vast, hierarchically layered
structures to support and maintain); in other words, formerly quasi—pluralist groups don’t

have to “unleam” previously developed policy strategies and influence expectations.

8.3 Concluding Remarks

For the interest group system in Zambia’s Third Republic, the general prospects
for the further development of a pluralist interest group system have dimmed since the
early years of the transition. Though many of the formal institutional arrangements which
buttress pluralist rule remain in place, continuing neopatrimonial practices limit the extent
to which pluralist organizational efforts can be sustained. However, within this broad
picture, important distinctions do exist; this study has Shown that some groups are
adapting more successfully and adopting more pluralist-like maintenance and influence
strategies than other groups. Overall, the effect of the dual reform process on interest
group activity is variable; this study has identified several important factors which help to
explain this variation, among which are prior institutional history, particular effects of

economic reform policies, and continuing neopatrimonial practices.

323

 

 

 

 

Perhaps most importantly, this study demonstrates that the interest group system
emerging in Zambia’s Third Republic is complex; as the corporatist system which
developed during the Second Republic deviated from the theoretical ideal, so does the
pluralist system which was adopted in the Third Republic. The Zambian case shows that
even groups within a single system can experience different institutional relationships with
the state, as well as different membership incentives and different organizational and

influence strategies. Further research into explaining these variations can help us to better

 

understand the unique types of interest representation systems that are developing in

Africa’s new democracies.

324

 

Apex Groups

NAPSF
PFU
ZACCI
ZCF
ZFE
ZCTU
ZNFU

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN ZAMBIA

National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmers

Peasant Farmers’ Union

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Zambia Cooperative Federation

Zambia Federation of Employers

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

Zambia National Farmer's Union

Local and Other Affiliated Groups (italics indicates affiliation)

AAWUZ
ABCEC
BA
BAZ
BCPAZ
CAIAZ
CEFU
CFB
CiaFU
CinF U
CipF U
CiSFU
CnCC
ComFU
ConF U
CpCC
CSUZ
CWFU
ECAZ

F ZRH
GCZ
GUZ
HCWUZ
IBDF

IF U
KabF U

Airways and Allied Workers Union ZCTU
Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors ZA CC]
Bakers Association

Bankers Association of Zambia ZACC]

Beef Cattle Producer's Association of Zambia ZNF U
Clothing and Allied Industries Association of Zambia
Copperbelt East F armer's Union ZNF U
Commercial Farmers Bureau (defunct)

Chadiza Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chinsali Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chippata Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chisamba Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chingola Chamber of Commerce ZA CC]

Choma / Kaloma Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chongwe River Farmer's Union ZNF U

Chipata Chamber of Commerce ZAC C1

Civil Servants Union Zambia ZC TU

Copperbelt West Farmer's Union ZNF U
Environmental Conservation Assoc. ZNF U
Federation of Zambia Road Hauliers ZA CC]
Gemstones Corporation Zambia

Guards Union of Zambia ZCT U

Hotel Catering Workers Union of Zambia ZCTU
Indigenous Business Development Foundation

Isoka Farmer's Union ZNF U

Kabompo Farmer's Union ZNF U

325

 

 

Local and Other Affiliated Groups (cont) (italics indicates affiliation)

Kawa U
KaCC
KaoFU
KasFU
KatF U
KiCC
LCC
LIAZ
LuaFU
LunF U
LWFU
MaFU
MbFU
MkFU
MOFU
MpiFU
MPNPAZ
MpoF U
MTAZ
MuFU
MUZ
NCC
NcFU
NUBEGW
NUCIW
NUCW
NUPAW
NUPSW
NUTAW
NyFU
PFU
RWUZ
SaF U
SAZ
SCC
SeFU
SIDO
SOFU
SSEPL
SSIAZ
TAAZ
TAZ
TOAZ

Kabwe Farmer's Union ZNF U

Kabwe Chamber of Commerce ZA CC]

Kaoma Farmer's Union ZNF U

Kasama Farmer's Union ZNF U

Katete Farmer's Union ZNF U

Kitwe Chamber of Commerce ZACC]

Lusaka Chamber of Commerce ZA CC]

Leather Industries Association of Zambia

Luapula Farmer's Union ZNF U

Lundazi Farmer's Union ZNF U

Lusaka West Farmer's Union ZNF U

Mazabuka Farmer's Union ZNF U

Mbala Farmer's UnionZNF U

Mkushi Farmer's Union ZNF U

Monze / Pemba Farmer's Union ZNF U

Mpika Farmer's Union ZNF U

Master Printers and Newspaper Proprietors Association of Zambia
Mpongwe F armer's Union ZNF U

Motor Traders Association of Zambia

Mumbwa Farmer's Union ZNF U

Mineworkers Union of Zambia

Ndola Chamber of Commerce ZACC]

Nchelenge Farmer's Union ZNF U

National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers ZC T U
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
National Union of Communication Workers ZC TU
National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers
National Union of Public Service Workers ZCTU
National Union of Transport and Allied Workers ZC TU
Nyimba Farmer's Union ZNF U

Petauke Farmer's Union ZNF U

Railway Worker's Union of Zambia ZC TU

Samfya Farmer's Union ZNF U

Seed Association ZNF U

Solwezi Chamber Of Commerce

Serenje Farmer's Union

Small Industries Development Organization

Solwezi Farmer's Union ZNF U

Small Scale Enterprises Promotion Limited

Small Scale Industries Association of Zambia

Travel Agents Association of Zambia

Tobacco Association of Zambia ZNF U

Tour Operators Association of Zambia

326

 

Local and Other Affiliated Groups (cont) (italics indicates afliliation)

TPZ

UF A
UZAWU
VIS
WAZ

ZAM
ZCF
ZCFA
ZCGA
ZCTU
ZEAWU
ZEF
ZEGA
ZFCS
ZFEA
ZILAWU
ZLF U
ZNCCI
ZN PA
ZNUHAW
ZNU T
ZNV AC
ZTWU
ZUCIW
ZUFIAW

Textile Producers of Zambia ZACC]

Ukwimi Farmer's Association ZNF U

University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union ZC T U
Village Industry Service

Wildlife Association of Zambia ZNF U

Women Entrepreneurs in Industry and Business

Youth Entrepreneurs Association of Zambia

Young Farmer's Association ZNF U

Zambia Association of Manufacturers ZACC]

Zambia Cooperative Federation

Zambia Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association ZA C C]
Zambia Coffee Growers' Association ZNF U

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union ZC T U
Zambia Federation of Employers

Zambia Export Grower's Assoc. ZNF U

Zambia Farmer's Cooperative Society

Zambia Farm Employees' Assoc. ZNF U

Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union ZC TU
Zimba/ Livingstone Farmer's Union ZNF U

Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry (defunct)
Zambia National Pensioner Association

Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers ZCT U
Zambia National Union of Teachers

Zambia National Visual Arts Council

Zambia Typographical Worker's Union ZC T U

Zambia Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers ZCTU
Zambia Union of Financial lnstit's and Allied Workers

327

 

 

APPENDIX 2

METHODOLOGY NOTES

Interviews

Participant Observation
Organizational Survey
Media Survey
Membership Survey

.U‘PE’JPI‘

1. Interviews

Over 50 loosely-structured, intensive interviews were conducted over the period
October 1996 - September 1997 with leaders and staff members of interest groups, and
members of government who interact with such groups. These interviews ranged from
1/2 hour to 2 hours, and covered topics such as: organizational structure, finance issues,
lobbying strategies, and current policy concerns (for group representatives); formal and
informal linkages between groups and government, changes in policy making institutions
since the Second Republic, and desired activities for interest group sector (for government

officials). Bibliography gives a list of interviews conducted.

2. Participant Observation

Data was gathered on interest group agendas and intra-organizational relationships
between group leaders and principal members through participant observation at group
meetings. Researcher made her official presence as an academic researcher known at
these meetings. Since not all groups permitted the researcher to attend meetings, and

since researcher was not available for the dates of all meetings, it was only possible to

328

 

 

collect data for some of the groups under study. Since this data is not complete, it cannot
be systematically compared across groups, but the experience provided the researcher with
important impressions and insights that are reflected in the study. Groups permitting

access to meetings, and those not permitting access to meetings, are given below:

Permitted access to Board and Executive Meetings: ZACCI, ZAM, CRFA,
CCCI, CWF A

Permitted access to Annual General Meetings: ZACCI, ZNFU

Invited as guest to Tripartite Council Meeting: ZCTU

Schedule conflicts prevented invited attendance: MUZ, NASSPF

Not permitted access to Executive and Board Meetings: ZFE, ZCF

3. Organizational Survey
Survey Instrument

The survey questionnaire was based upon work done by Professor Jack Walker on
interest group mobilization in the United States. Walker's study of organizational issues
and policy influence strategies was used as a model for the Zambian study because it is
insightful and sophisticated, and generates many interesting hypotheses that prove useful
to test in different political and economic environments.

A modified questionnaire was developed to make the survey instrument applicable
to the Zambian case; changes included soliciting information on group perspectives of the
regime change in 1991, and exploring the relationship between groups and the specific
governing institutions of Zambia's Third Republic. The resulting questionnaire was
discussed with the economist of a leading national interest group in Zambia to determine

the suitability of the questions for Zambian interest groups, but the questionnaire was not

329

 

tested on specific groups, as this would have reduced an already small pool of
respondents.

The survey instrument comprised 41 questions, with 5 open-ended response
questions meant to gather qualitative data on group goals, benefits, political activities, and
effectiveness, and 36 predominantly close-ended response questions meant to gather
quantitative data that would be comparable across groups. For the latter, questions
reflected several issue areas. The first dealt with organizational issues such as meeting
schedules, leadership structure, membership, and staff. Following sections dealt with
benefits provided by the group, funding and financial issues, intergroup coordination /
competition, policy interests, lobbying strategies, and issues of group- government
interaction. As the questionnaire was distributed only to groups with leaders active at the
national level, where English is the Official language, it was administered in English only.
Sampling Frame

The sampling frame used for the survey was drawn from several sources. The
primary source is the Registrar of Societies, a statutory body with which all social groups
in Zambia must register. From the official Registry, names of groups organized around an
economic interest were separated, and added to a general list. Also added to the list were
the associational members of the primary apex organizations. Appendix 1 gives this final
list, with apex-affiliation given in parentheses. As this final list comprises only about 100
organizations, it was decided that the questionnaire would be administered to the whole
population of active, voluntary, member-based organizations, rather than to a select
sample of groups. Groups which fit this description and were therefore delivered a

questionnaire are marked by an asterix (reason for non-inclusion is given in italics). By

330

 

delivering and following up questionnaire completion in person, the goal was for a full
response rate to be achieved. However, to date this is not the case: only a partial, self-

selected subset has returned the questionnaire. The response rate to date is given below:

 

 

 

Type of Group Total Delivered Total responses Response rate
Business 12 6 50 %
Agriculture* 41 8 20 %
Labour 22 8 36 %
Total 75 23 30

 

*the low response rate here is due to many of these associations being in areas far outside the capital city
of Lusaka; collection of completed questionnaires was thus difficult. However, all national organizations
in Lusaka did return a completed questionnaire, with the exception of the ZCTU.

4. Media Report Content Analysis: data collection assisted by Show George Makaha
Description

The govemment-owned Times of Zambia (T OZ) daily newpaper was
comprehensively reviewed for the years 1990, 1991, and 1996, and a random sample of
the daily editions were reviewed for the years 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995.
(The Times of Zambia was chosen because a quantitative review of the Times of Zambia,
the Daily Mail, and the Post newspapers of October 1996 - April 1997 showed that the
Time of Zambia wrote articles mentioning interest groups most frequently). This
systematic review was conducted utilizing the National Archives collection of the Times of
Zambia, which is missing several editions. For the TOZ newspapers reviewed, all articles
which mentioned one of the groups under study (see Appendix 1) had the date of
publication, the headline of the article, the issue addressed by the article, and any action
taken by the parties involved, recorded into a primary database. This database was then

used as a source for analyzing the contents of the article as to the nature of the issue

331

 

 

reported. Possible issues were categorized into a secondary database, which was distinct

for each sector.

5. Membership Survey

The membership presents a broad-based survey of the individual members of the
groups in the study. The purpose of the survey is to complete the picture of interest-
groups in Zambia, by querying the individual members of the groups under study as to
their perspectives group activity. The survey began in August with a small number of
focus-group interviews to gather information for constructing an efficient and accurate
survey instrument. The survey was conducted during the months of October and
November, 1997.

The groups included in the survey were: Zambia Association of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNF U), Provincial
Business Association (PBA), National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers
(NAPSSF), Peasant Farmers’ Union (PFU), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia

(MUZ), Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE), and their local affiliates.

Sampling: While each of these national level groups were able to provide lists of local
branches, with the exception of the ZACCI and ZNFU, it was not possible to obtain lists
of all individual members of local groups. Given the lack of an exact population size and
the absence of a sampling frame, it was thus not possible to use a probability sampling

method to select subjects for interviews.

332

Instead, the sampling method used was a heterogeneous one which attempted to
use random sampling where possible, and to draw a purposive sample intended to capture
geographical and social diversity where a representative sample was not possible.
Sampling thus proceeded on two levels: where membership lists were available, a sample
was drawn using a systematic random process. These cases were then either approached
for an individual interview, or were sent a written questionnaire (in each of the cases
where lists were available, it was fair to assume that the respondent was literate and could
respond to such an instrument). For the other groups, the survey team traveled to major
towns in all nine of Zambia’s provinces, and approached the local branch of the national
organization for group lists from which to randomly choose members. However, such
lists were rarely available, and group leaders at the district-level Often were the only
source for finding members to interview for the study. Hence, for these groups, the
sample is probably biased toward the more affluent and active members of such groups,

and toward those who live close to urban and peri-urban centers.

Questionnaire: The survey instrument was a questionnaire administered by myself (in
English) or a research assistant (in English or vernacular). In addition, as mentioned
above, mail questionnaires (English version) were sent to members of groups where
membership lists were available. This questionnaire was exactly the same as the
administered questionnaire, with the addition of a short introductory paragraph which

replicated the introduction that interviewers gave the respondents.

333

 

 

 

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Zambia Daily Mail (daily newspaper: Lusaka)
National Mirror (weekly newspaper: Lusaka)
The Post (daily newspaper)

Profit Magazine (Lusaka)

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348

Interviews

Date

25 October 1996
25 October 1996

4 November 1996
12 November 1996
12 November 1996
15 November 1996
18 December 1996
19 December 1996
7 January 1997

9 January 1997

9 January 1997

10 January 1997
16 January 1997
30 January 1997

3 February 1997
13 February 1997
14 February 1997
13 March 1997

18 March 1997

21 March 1997

15 April 1997

15 April 1997

30 April 1997

16 June 1997

19 June 1997

19 June1997

20 June 1997

23 June 1997

24 June 1997

29 June 1997

30 June 1997

30 June 1997

21 July 1997

Name

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
. Catherine Hill, (HIID) Advisor at Ministry of Finance

. Mulenga, Dir. Organization and Foreign Relations, ZCTU
. Thomas Beckett, M Farms, Choma, ZNFU

. Wotela, Assistant Director, ZNFU

. Mukela Mutukwa, Economist, Zambia Farmer Cooperative

Theo Bull, Member of ZACCI Executive Board
Moses Simemba, ZACCI Chief Economist; also 12/23/96
S. Mark O'Donnell, Chairman, ZAM

. Lungu, Assistant Managing Director, ZCF

. Bethel Nakaponda-Sakala, Development Services, ZCF

. Geoffrey Shipolyonga, Assistant Developmnt Services, ZCF
. C. Kajimanga, Former Legal Counsel for ZCF

. Tom Kamwendo, Executive Board, KCCI; also 2/13/97

. Charles Muchimba, Dir. of Research, MUZ; also 4/14/97

. Alex Chirwa, General Secretary, ZCTU; also 4/14/97

. George Gray, Executive Director, ZNFU; also 3/26/97

. D.S. Nyambe, Deputy Labour Commissioner, MOLSS

. Gideon Phiri, Executive Director, ZACCI; also 9/5/97

. J .B. Noonde, Deputy Executive Director, ZFE

. Hang'andu, Legal Advisor, ZCTU; also 4/16/97

. Austin Muneko, Research Economist, ZCTU

. Mike Purslow, Vice President, ZAM

. Margaret, ZNUT

. Bridget Chilala, Dep. Dir, Dept. Trade and Industry, MCTI
Ms.

Jane Haboongo, Dep. Dir. of Planning and Industry, MCTI

Dr. Hantuba, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Chresta Kaluba, Perm. Sec., Policy Analysis, Cabinet Office
Musepa, Donor Coordinator, MAF F

Max Sichula, Director, Human Resources Development
Kayeka, President, PFU

Charles Zandala, President, NASSPF

Jones Haachiinda, General Secretary, NASSPF

Mrs. Judith Gonde, Secretary, Central Provincial Business

349

24 July 1997
24 July 1997

5 August 1997
12 August 1997
12 August 1997
29 August 1997

Meetings Attended

Date

Mr. Godfrey Mulubwa, Vice Chairman, Luapula PBA
Mr. Frank Chola, Secretary, Luapula PBA

Mr. Zyambo, National Coordinator, ZN FU

Mr. Mutuna, Secretary, Law Association of Zambia
Mr. Wakumelo. Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Ms. Esther Maane, ZCF

Meeting

 

September 1996

October 1996

7 February 1997

28 February 1997

16 April 1997

18 April 1997

24 April 1997

16 August 1997

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI) Annual General Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka

ZACCI Executive Board Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka
(also November 1996, December 1996, 16 January 1997, 13
February 1997, 10 March 1997, 10 April 1997, 15 May 1997,
12 June 1997, 17 July 1997, 14 August 1997, 11 September
1997)

ZACCI Dialogue Meeting with Ministers of Parliament,
Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka

Tripartite Council Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center,
Lusaka

Chongwe River Farmers' Association Board Meeting,
Agriculture Commercial Society, Showgrounds, Lusaka

Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Executive Board
Meeting, RAOF Clubhouse, Chingola

Copperbelt West Farmers' Association, Monthly Meeting,
Border Farmers' Society, Kitwe

Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZN FU) Annual General
Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center, Lusaka

Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM), Executive Board
Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Lusaka

350

 

 

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.