THESIS
4
2001

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM:
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION
IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

presented by

Kimberly L. Ludwig

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Political Science

Michael Bratton
Major professor

Date 2/15/01

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE

6/01 c:/CIRC/DateDue.p65-p.15

PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM: ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

By

Kimberly Lynn Ludwig

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2001

ABSTRACT

PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM:
ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS AND DUAL TRANSITION
IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

By

Kimberly Lynn Ludwig

This dissertation takes as its starting point the observation that economic interest groups, as agents of civil society, played important roles in the wave of democratic transitions that swept the African continent in the early 1990's. What have been the consequences of political transition, and in addition economic reform, for the groups that took part in these movements to pluralist democracy? Focusing on the case of Zambia, a cross-temporal and cross-case approach is used to ascertain the effects of institutional change on three types of economic interest groups: labor unions, business associations, and farmers' groups. Analyzing the institutional change resulting from the transition from a one-party, quasi-corporatist state to a multi-party, pluralist state, the dissertation evaluates the prospects for the development of pluralism in Zambia. It concludes that, in general, several developments predicted by pluralist theory have indeed occurred: there has been an increase in the number of new groups, new types of institutional access to government decision makers have appeared, and there is increased direct lobbying of government over policy issues. However, the continuation of neopatrimonial rule and a nostalgia for corporatist-type arrangements which limit demands upon government, bode poorly for further pluralist development.

The body of the dissertation examines groups from a comparative perspective, and analyzes the variation found in the way that the dual reform process has impacted different groups. By analyzing these groups' membership incentives, organizational resources, and influence strategies, the study finds that an important variable explaining the variation between groups along these dimensions is consideration of the groups' prior institutional relationship to the state. This relationship impacts why individuals joined and continue to belong to these groups; it affects factors relating to organizational sustainability, and it affects the strategies and successes (or lack thereof) that groups have in attempting to influence policy in the new regime. These findings indicate an important institutional path-dependency in the interest group system between the previous regime and the current one, which helps to explain continuing constraints to pluralist development.

Copyright by
KIMBERLY LYNN LUDWIG
2001

For my parents,
Claudia Lynn Jantz
and
James Myron Ludwig

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many heartfelt thanks are in order to the numerous people who contributed to the successful completion of this dissertation. I would especially like to thank my committee chair, Professor Michael Bratton, for his steady support and insightful comments throughout the life of the project, from proposal to fieldwork to the final product. I am also grateful to Professor Nicolas van de Walle for his avid interest in and astute critiques of the study. Both Professor Bratton's and van de Walle's long experience with studying political change in Africa were invaluable as I sought to understand the complex processes unfolding in Zambia during my field work and writing. I would also like to thank my "non-Africanist" advisor, Professor Michael Mintrom, for sharing his insights on theories of interest group activity and organization, and directing me to several innovative studies which informed some of the methodologies used in this project; Professor Robert Lowry also deserves thanks in this regard. Special recognition is also due to Professor Brian Silver, for joining the committee when need arose, and for arranging support for the final stages. In addition, much appreciation is due to the faculty, staff, and my graduate student colleagues at Michigan State University's Political Science Department, for the considerable support and encouragement afforded me during my doctoral studies and the completion of my dissertation.

The research for this dissertation was funded by the United States Agency for International Development under its Zambia Democratic Governance Project. I would like to thank the USAID/Zambia mission for both its support and hospitality while I was in Zambia; most especially, many thanks are due to Democracy and Governance Officers Jim

Polhemus and Miles Toder for their assistance and generous exchange of information and opinions. I am also most grateful to several others at the mission who helped my work to proceed as smoothly as it possibly could, most especially Cynthia Bryant, Toni Enraca, Henry Kalwani, Mambepa Kalwani, and Jeffrey Miyanda.

Though the people who assisted and befriended me during my research stay in Zambia number far too many to include everyone here, there are several who deserve special mention. I am enormously grateful to Show George Makaha and Chris Simuyemba, whose assistance with fieldwork, translation and data processing, and especially with the extensive travel and long hours of the membership survey, was invaluable. I would also like to express my gratitude for the assistance provided by the Institute for African Studies (renamed the Institute for Social and Economic Research); here, special thanks are due to Dr. Ilsa Mwanza and Dr. Oliver Saasa. Also, I would particularly like to thank Jim and Michelle Polhemus, whose hospitality and many kindnesses were invaluable to my introduction to Zambia. I am also infinitely grateful to Rose and Gladstone Ngwira, and their wonderful, generous family, who always succeeded in making me feel right at home during my stays in the Copperbelt, and who made my time there so rewarding. I also owe a special note of gratitude to Toni and Anthony Enraca, for making me feel right at home during my stays in Lusaka. And many thanks to the other wonderful Zambians, Americans and others who shared their homes, families, friends and hearts with me during my stay in Zambia.

I would also like to acknowledge, with much appreciation, several of organizations I worked with most frequently during the course of my research: the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia; the Zambian Association of Chambers

of Commerce and Industry, the Zambia Association of Manufacturers, the Zambia National Farmers' Union; the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers; the Zambia Cooperative Federation, and the Provincial Business Associations Project. I am most grateful to the staff and members of all the organizations I came into contact with, many of whom can be found in the list of interviews in the appendix, for contributing so much to this study. For participating patiently in lengthy interviews, and contributing their knowledge, expertise and opinions to this project, I would especially like to express my gratitude to Austin Muneko, Charles Muchimba, Gideon Phiri, Moses Simemba, Theo Bull, Mark O'Donnell, George Grey, Kambidima Wotela, Charles Zandala, Jones Haachinda, Beverly Nakaponda-Sakala, and special thanks to "Uncle" Max Sichula. Many thanks also to the many other staff and members of these organizations, too numerous to mention, whose hospitality, time and generosity made this dissertation possible. I'd like to also express my gratitude to the National Archives and the Zambia Consolidated Cooper Mines' Archives for sharing their impressive collections. It should be pointed out that while the above-mentioned persons and institutions generously shared their knowledge and time, any errors in the data or analysis presented are wholly mine.

Finally, I would like to thank the people back here at home whose friendship and support were so essential to the final stages of this project: thanks to John Metzler for his generosity of spirit, endless kindness and wise counsel; thanks to my friends and family, especially to my sister Heidi Hopkins and mother Claudia Jantz, for continuous expressions of love, motivation and support; thanks to Barbara Cooper-Haas for always being there, and to Ron Mason for daily walks and help with the bibliography; and very, very special thanks to Patrick Lydon, for lighting the way.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES xi

LIST OF FIGURES xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xv

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION .....

CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 8
2.1 Theoretical Issues 8
2.1.1 Institutional Frameworks: Pluralist and Corporatist Models 10
2.1.2 State-society Relationships in Post-Independence Africa 19
2.1.3 Theories of the African State 19
2.1.4 The Representation of Interests in Africa 22
2.1.5 Economic Considerations: Effects of Development and Reform 28
2.1.6 Dual reform and Interest Representation in Africa 30
2.2 Theoretical Hypotheses 31
2.2.1 Establishing the Counterfactual 31
2.3 The State and Interest Representation in Zambia 34
2.3.1 Development of the One Party State 35
2.3.2 State-Society Relations: Emerging Corporatism. 36
2.3.3 Zambia in Crisis: the Adoption of Dual Reform. 38
2.4 Research Design and Methods 40
2.4.1 Main Research Questions 41
2.4.2 Main Propositions / Working Hypotheses 41
2.4.3 Expected Value-Added 42
2.5 Units of Analysis and Data Collection 42
2.5.1 Logic linking the data to the propositions 43
2.6 Synopses of Chapters 46

CHAPTER THREE:
THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC 49
3.1 Examining "Economic Society" in Zambia 49
3.1.1 Economic Activity 50
3.1.2 Policy Relevance of Economic Sectors 56
3.1.3 Political Strength of Economic Sectors 62
3.1.4 Summary: The Shape of Economic Society 64
3.2 Economic Interests, Organization, and Politics in Zambia's 2nd Republic 64
3.2.1. The Origins of Economic Organizing in Zambia 65
3.2.2: The Colonial and Independence Period: Pluralism and Racial Divides ... 67

3.2.3 Summary: Origins of Organizing
3.3 The State and the Organization of Interests: Institutional Analysis
3.3.1 The Move to Corporatism Under the One-Party State
3.4 Summary: The Effects of Corporatism on Economic Organizations in Zambia
3.5 An Institutional Framework for Interest Representation in the Second Republic.
3.6 Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ECOLOGY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Political-Economic Context of Interest Group Development
4.3 The Ecology of National Economic Interest Groups in the Third Republic 1
4.3.1 State-Dominated Corporatist Groups 1
The Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)
4.3.2 State-Negotiated Corporatist Sector Groups 1
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)
4.3.3 Former Quasi-Pluralist Sector Groups 1
Zambia Asociation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)
Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU)
4.3.4 New Groups on the Scene 1
4.4 Coordination and Competition in the Interest Group System. 1
4.4.1 Inter-group Coordination 1
4.4.2 Inter- and Intra- Group Competition 1
4.5 The Inclusion of Economic Interests 1
4.6 Conclusion 1

CHAPTER FIVE:
MOTIVATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP: JOINING AND PARTICIPATING IN GROUP ACTIVITY 1
5.1 Pluralism at the Micro-level: What Motivates Interest Group Members? 1
5.2 Theories on the Incentives for Group Membership 1
5.3 The Institutional Context: Membership Incentives in the Second Republic 1
5.4 The Institutional Context in the Third Republic and Resulting Membership Incentives 1
5.5 Analyzing Membership Incentives: The 1997 Membership Survey 1
5.6 Analyzing Membership Incentives 1
5.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample 1
5.6.2 The Nature of Organizational Incentives 1
5.7 Analyzing the Factors Important to Membership Incentives 1
5.7.1 Perceptual and Value Characteristics: the Role of Efficacy 1
5.7.2 Purposive Incentives: Group Activity as a Responsibility 1
5.7.3 Considering the Most Important Benefits to Group Membership 1
5.8 The Decision to Join 1
5.9 Separating Political from Economic: The Pivotal Role of Politics 1
5.10 Considering the Trade Unions 1
5.11 Conclusion: Evaluating Membership Incentives in the Third Republic 2

CHAPTER SIX:
"ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES ~ INTEREST GROUP AUTONOMY AND CAPACITY" 209
6.1 Pluralism at the Intermediate Level: The Relevance of Resources 209
6.2 Theoretical Issues: Autonomy and Capacity from an African Perspective 211
6.3 The Paradox of Autonomy and Capacity 215
6.4 Variations in Organizational Capacity 218
6.4.1 Financial Resources: Revenues and Expenditures 221
6.4.2 Technical and Administrative Capacity 236
6.5 Interest Group Autonomy 247
6.5.1 External Control: Government, Donors, and Others 248
6.6 Summary 256
6.7 Conclusion 258

CHAPTER SEVEN:
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND PATHWAYS TO INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC 260
7.1 Pluralism at the Macro-Level: Gaining Access to Government 260
7.2 Pathways to Influence in the Second Republic 261
7.3 Possible Channels for Influencing Economic Policy in the Third Republic 266
7.3.1 The Changing Relationship Between Groups and Government 269
7.3.2 Institutional Access to Government in the Third Republic 274
7.3.3 Strategies for Influence 278
7.4 Government– Ministries, Parliament, Public Boards and Committees 283
7.4.1 Summary: Pathways to Influence in the Third Republic 299
7.5 Policy Interests 300
7.6 Policy Influence 306
7.6.1 The Annual Budget: the Effects of Organizational Resources 306
7.6.2 Privatization Policy: the Inflexibility of Economic Reform 311
7.7 Conclusion 313

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC 314
8.1 Change and Continuity 314
8.2 Effects of Prior Institutional History 319
8.3 Concluding Remarks 323

APPENDIX 1: List of Economic Interest Groups 325

APPENDIX 2: Methodology Notes 328

BIBLIOGRAPHY 334

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Data and Analysis 4

Table 3.1 Zambia: The Development of Economic Interests, 1965-1991 5

Table 3.2 GDP by Type of Economic Activity, 1980-1991 5

Table 3.3 Exports of Principle Commodities 6

Table 3.4 Economic Sectors and their Interest Groups, 1965-1991 8

Table 3.5 Theoretical Framework for Development of Economic Interests 8

Table 4.1 Main Points of MMD Campaign Manifesto 9

Table 4.2 Main Economic Reforms 9

Table 4.3 Representation on Boards and Committees 11

Table 5.1 The 1997 Membership Survey Sample 16

Table 5.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 16

Table 5.3 Political Characteristics of the Sample 17

Table 5.4 Benefits Provided by Group 17

Table 5.5 Group Leaders Perceptions 17

Table 5.6 Benefits Realized by Members 17

Table 5.7 Most Important Benefits to Continuing Membership 18

Table 5.8 Top Five Most Important Benefits 18

Table 5.9 Effect of Contributions on Group's Success or Failure 18

Table 5.10 Effect of Income Level on Efficacy 18

Table 5.11 Responsibility as Motivational Factor 18

Table 5.12 Other Benefits .....
Table 5.13 Reasons for Joining .....
Table 5.14 Most Important Reason for Joining .....
Table 5.15 Most Important Benefit at Present .....
Table 5.16 Reaction if Group Stopped Services .....
Table 5.17 Reaction if Group Stopped Lobbying .....
Table 5.18 Classification of Members .....
Table 5.19 Hypothetical Case ~ Union Members .....
Table 5.20 Evaluating Member Incentives .....
Table 6.1 Expenditure Items .....
Table 6.2 1996 Revenues .....
Table 6.3 Analysis of Membership Dues and Revenues .....
Table 6.4 Organizational Staffs .....
Table 6.5 Initial and Current Funding Sources .....
Table 6.6 Initial and Current Funding Sources, by Sector .....
Table 7.1 Consequences of Transition .....
Table 7.2 Groups, Government Agencies, and Policy Issues .....
Table 7.3 Group Political Activity .....
Table 7.4 Analysis of Coverage in Times of Zambia .....
Table 7.5 Privatization in Zambia .....

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1 Business Interests after Zambia's 1973 Election 55

Figure 3.2 Zambia: GDP Data 1980-1990 58

Figure 3.3 GDP by Economic Activity, 1980-1991 59

Figure 3.4 Zambia Employment Data, 1980-1990 63

Figure 3.5 Founding Dates of Major Interest Groups 66

Figure 3.6 Typology of Interest Representation System 85

Figure 3.7 Categorizing the Interest Group System 89

Figure 4.1 Founding Dates of Surveyed Interest Groups..... 132

Figure 4.2 The Structure of the Interest Group System in Zambia 135

Figure 4.3 Interest Groups in Zambia, Primary Units 136

Figure 5.1 Possible Incentives for Interest Group Membership 153

Figure 5.2 Membership level of Groups in Sample 162

Figure 5.3 List of Membership Benefits 172

Figure 5.4 Responses to Open-Ended Question: Other Benefits 187

Figure 5.5 Matrix of Incentives 196

Figure 6.1 Expectations for Sustainable Levels of Organizational Capacity 218

Figure 6.2 Membership Levels and Subscriptions 220

Figure 6.3 Evaluating the Potential for Organizational Capacity 242

Figure 6.4 Importance of Funding Strategies 254

Figure 7.1 Structure of Government and Representation 262

Figure 7.2 Structure of Government and Representation 267

Figure 7.3 Change in Cooperation After the Transition 272
Figure 7.4 Change in Cooperation, by Group 273
Figure 7.5 Analysis of Frequency of Interaction with Government 276
Figure 7.6 Analysis of Frequency of Interaction with Government, by Group 276
Figure 7.7 Influence Strategies 280
Figure 7.8 Influence Strategies, by Type of Strategy 280
Figure 7.9 Frequency of Mention in Times of Zambia 298
Figure 7.10 Provision of Service in Policy Areas 301
Figure 7.11 Level of Regulation in Policy Areas 303
Figure 7.12 Table of Policy Objectives 305
Figure 7.13 The 1996 and 1997 Budget Processes 309

ABBREVIATIONS

National Apex Groups

NASSF	National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmers
PFU	Peasant Farmers' Union
ZACCI	Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmer's Union

Local and Other Affiliated Groups*(see Appendix One)*

Other Groups and Policies

ASIP	Agricultural Sector Investment Program
BOZ	Bank of Zambia
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DAC	District Agricultural Committee
EAZ	Economic Association of Zambia
ILO	International Labor Office
IRA	Industrial Relations Act
ZK	Zambian Kwacha (local currency)
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
MCTI	Ministary of Commerce, Trade and Industry
ML	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MP	Members of Parliament
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Program
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZPA	Zambia Privatization Industry
ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Uupamfiwe, e ulwa ne cibi"

Literally translated, "the anxious person fights with the door." This Bemba proverb counsels people to take initiative when facing a problem. "People with problems should take the initiative to get them solved. Normally (the proverb is) used to advise someone with a big problem to take some measures towards its solution in order to encourage others to come to his aid."

Nyambe Sumbwa, "Zambian proverbs,"
Lusaka: Multimedia Publiciations, 1993, pp. 10.

"...it became apparent to us that the struggle for multi-party democracy in our country could not be won through the currently monopolized and personalized structures... a new movement for plural democracy was not only required to be formed but was a historical necessity. We drew up an operational programme (which included) the creation of a broad-based steering committee for multi-party democracy, as a coalition of all forces– *workers, intellectuals, students, farmers, unemployed people, religious organization and the business community*– opposed to the one party dictatorship in Zambia... The very first act in our campaign required that we link our efforts against the one party state tyranny with other individuals and institutions that had shown a resolve to campaign for multi-party democracy in our country. At the very onset we identified *the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga (a prominent businessman)* as the most probable allies.

Derrick Chitala,
Preface to "The Hour has Come!" pp. iv-vi,
(*emphasis mine).*

"It is essentially imperative in a democracy that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes make it desirable that citizens be allowed and encouraged through the law to join together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests. Trade unions and other pressure groups exist for this purpose or need.

Dr. Remy Mushota,
"The Hour has Come!" pp. 30.

Zambia was the first English-speaking country in Africa to complete a peaceful democratic transition, and one of the first in a "wave of democracy" that swept much of the continent in the early 1990's. Zambian participants in the "Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD),"as well as international observers of African affairs, had high hopes at that heady time for the potential of Zambia's fledgling democracy. It was a moment of historical importance, a time to take initiative and struggle against the closing door of Zambia's political and economic malaise. Many Zambians eagerly rose to the challenge. Leading the charge, providing the organizational resources and financial grease that permitted a conference of democracy supporters to become a bonafide political party, were representatives of the business community and the trade union movement. Perhaps most important, the charge was about more than a transfer of power from one party to another, the charge was about fundamental institutional change: the transformation of one-party, state-corporatist rule to a pluralist democracy.

Much has been written about Zambia's historic transition in 1991, especially about the role of civil society in the transition and the effects of the transition on political and electoral institutions. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this growing literature, indeed to the increasing literature on democratic transition in Africa in general, by focusing on a less-often addressed topic, the role of economic interest groups in democratic transition processes. The attempted transition to democratic pluralism, whether or not successful, marks an important change in the development of state-society relations across the continent since independence. With independence from colonial rule in the 1960's, many African states adopted the quasi-pluralist institutions of the colonial

administration, including multi-party competition and associational pluralism. However, these arrangements soon gave way to different political ideologies and pressing political exigencies. The tenets of "African socialism" rationalized the imposition of political uniformity via single-party rule and highlighted the primacy of the political, paving the way for the adoption of command economies. Whether populist-socialist or merely politically pragmatic, the worldviews adopted across Africa after independence were statist in orientation; the expansion of the state and the centralization of power in the hands of its elite operated as a dominant political logic.

In tandem with these developments, state-society relations were marked by attempts at state-corporatism, in which the state sought to incorporate key sectors of the economy and existing social organizations into the state/ruling party apparatus. The transition to multi-party democracy across Africa in the 1990's, and Zambia's transition in particular, thus marks a potential watershed in the development of state-society relations. As these new regimes adopt the ideology, or at least the rhetoric, of pluralist democracy and market economies, what is happening to the former corporatist relationships between key economic groups and the state? More broadly, what are the prospects for, and the constraints to, the development of pluralism in state-society relations in Africa?

Key to this inquiry is the issue of "dual reform" in Africa, i.e. cases in which structural economic adjustment and reform is undertaken simultaneously with political reform. Economic interest groups such as trade unions and business associations are similar to other associations in civil society in the role they played during the political reform processes of the early 1990's. Like human rights groups, women and youth groups, and church groups, they helped to organize the popular protest against standing

authoritarian regimes that precipitated democratic transition processes across the continent (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). And similar to these other groups, they have since been affected by the break-down of corporatist state-society relations and the realization of new rights and freedoms. Economic interest groups differ from other agents in civil society, however, in the role that they simultaneously play in economic reform; that is, how both members and organizations affect and are affected by structural adjustment and economic liberalization. Even as the advent of more pluralistic politics opens the arena of activity across the board for civil society organizations, economic interest groups are differentially affected by their changing role in the economy and vis-a-vis the state. The development of pluralism in this arena is thus affected both by changes in political institutions as well as by structural and institutional changes in the economy arising from economic reforms.

This dissertation explores theoretical issues concerning the development of pluralism in Africa's new democracies through a comparative analysis of economic interest groups in one African country, Zambia. Zambia offers an especially relevant case for this inquiry for several reasons. First, immediately following independence, the pluralist institutions of the former British colonial administration were maintained up until 1972, when an official one-party state was declared and the government began to move to nationalize key sectors of the economy and incorporate the organizations that represented them into the ruling party apparatus. This institutional structure was abruptly altered in 1991 with the transition to multi-party rule, when these ties were formally broken and political and associational pluralism re-adopted. Zambia thus provides a rich case in which the effects of the transition from state-corporatism to pluralism can be studied. Second,

the new MMD government in 1991 firmly committed itself to structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies. Zambia thus provides a clear case of a "dual reform" process. And finally, as one of the most industrialized countries in Africa, Zambia has well-differentiated economic interests, including one of the strongest trade union movements in the region, numerous business associations located throughout the nine provinces, and a plethora of different varieties of farmer's organizations.

In examining the adoption of pluralism and the subsequent effects of dual political and economic reform processes on interest groups in Zambia, this study focuses on three principal interest group elements: their memberships, their strategies for organizational maintenance, and their strategies for gaining policy influence. Pluralist theory offers broad hypotheses as to expectations for the former and latter; where memberships are concerned, we expect that people will flock to join a burgeoning number of associations according to their like and shared interests, and to pursue common goals through their participation in such groups; where policy influence is concerned, we expect that groups will experience a more open, competitive, and plural political space, and a corresponding increase in influence over government policy. In between the levels of individual members and interaction with the state lies the issue of organizational resources; an implicit assumption of a pluralist view of politics is the assumption of sustainable organizations, necessary if governments are to be effectively lobbied and members are to be drawn voluntarily to join group activity. Corporatist systems solve this problem by incorporating groups into government structures and providing them directly (if not always adequately) with resources, or at least regulated access to steady resources. In order for groups to draw members and exert influence under the newly pluralist system, we must expect that

they will maintain, if not increase, their organizational capacity.

The three principle research questions of this study are thus:

- What are the key incentives for interest group membership in Zambia's multi-party democracy? Are they incentives that promote further pluralist developmen

- How have interest groups adapted to the severing of corporatist ties to the state? Are they maintaining and even improving organizational capacity?

- What are the key strategies for interest groups in seeking influence in the new system? Do groups perceive a more open and plural political space in which to lobby? Are they gaining increased influence over economic policy?

In addressing the questions above, this study seeks to make contributions to several literatures. First, it deepens the literature on democratization and civil society (which has been criticized as often being too diffuse) by focusing on a specific "partial regime" within the larger polity, that is, the "pressure regime" (Schmitter 1997:245) and on a specific type of civil society organizations-- interest groups-- and analyzing the diverse and complex effects of reform on this narrow sector. Second, it contributes to th literature on state-society relations in Africa by disaggregating the hypothesized effects c the adoption of pluralism in a former one-party, state-corporatist system, and identifying the changes as well as the continuities. And finally, it adds to the rich literature on how dual reform processes are affected by organized economic interests, with a detailed empirical analysis of how these processes in turn affect the groups involved.

Chapter Two fleshes out the theoretical points highlighted above, focusing on the issue of post-independence state-society relations in Africa. As we are concerned with specifically economic interest groups, the concepts of corporatist versus pluralist relationships between the state and organized interests is pertinent, and dealt with in deta The particular brand of corporatism adopted by Africa's one-party states during this

period is discussed and analyzed with respect to its effects on the development of state-society relationships, and its relationship to the economic deterioration experienced by many African states in the 1970s and 1980s is examined. Widespread economic and political crises resulting from mismanagement and the deteriorating legitimacy of the state ushered in a wave of democratic transitions in the 1990s, resulting in systemic change from corporatist to pluralist institutions mediating the relationship between the African state and organized interests in the broader society. The specifics of these developments in Zambia are reviewed, and hypotheses are formulated concerning the effects of the adoption of pluralism on Zambia's interest group system. Finally, the research design and methods of analysis for the study are discussed, and a synopsis of the remaining chapters given.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

> "How different are the problems of public policy-making in a society where there are no effective mechanisms for the articulation of political demands, from one in which there is an elaborate set of structures for the formulation of demands, and the transmission of these demands into the party and governmental systems. The kinds of interest groups which are present in a society, the specificity or diffuseness of their demands, their conception of the political arena and of the "rules of the game," the ethos which they bring with them into the political process--these are the raw materials of politics-- the unaggregated demands-- which some set of mechanisms must transform into political personnel and public policy."
>
> Gabriel Almond, 1958: 271

2.1 Theoretical Issues

At the time of Zambia's historic transition, the founders of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy had clear ideas about the outlines of the pluralist democracy they desired. Under the heading, "Interest Groups" in his treatise on the constitutional framework of the new system (see quote, page one), Dr. Mushota painted a traditional pluralist vision of group politics. What are the basic prerequisites and institutions of such a system, and how do they differ from the previous state-corporatist system that came before?

To explore the basic assumptions that underlie understandings of interest representation and interest group activity, it's useful to turn to the structural-functionalist literature. Almond and Powell observe that "every political system has some way of formulating and responding to demands... the simplest form of *interest articulation* (in which citizens make requests, demands and pleas for policies) is the individual making a request to a city council member, tax officer, village head or tribal chieftain" (1996:70). According to pluralist theory, as political societies have grown larger and such face to face interactions become less possible and less effective, individuals turn to acting collectively with others who share their interests, and interest groups are born. In some cases, however, the state or some other authority steps in to form groups "from the top down." Over time, "systematic connections" develop, or are legally created, between these groups, and between groups and government; these "systematic connections" are directly or indirectly influenced by the nature of the state. According to Almond and Powell, "the differences in types of connections allow us to talk of different 'interest group systems,'" (1996:74), or what Schmitter refers to as "distinctive subsystems within the polity" (1992:157). Schmitter also makes the important point that the interface between such "group systems" and government is one of representation: "These groups-- their solidarities and their conflicts-- make independent contributions to determining political outcomes... Representation is the key (but not the exclusive) relationship between such groups and the making of authoritative decisions" (ibid). In light of the ascendency of "neo-institutionalist" frameworks over Almond and Powell's "structural-functionalist"

framework, we can consider "interest group systems," as representational institutions[1], that is the informal and formal rules and constraints through which groups represent, and governments receive, the articulation of specific interests. Scholars note that there are theoretically and empirically different ways in which such systems develop and operate.

2.1.1 Institutional Frameworks: Pluralist and Corporatist Models of Interest Representation

Modern interest group theory distinguishes most often between two "ideal types" of interest group systems: pluralism and corporatism.[2] Interest group systems do not emerge out of the ether; rather, the nature of specific interest representation systems are intricately linked to the nature of the state, both in the way in which the state structures relations with and within civil society, and in how it exercises domination and authority over those relations (Stepan 1978). Thus, pluralist representation systems follow the logic of liberal democracies (principally the United States), while corporatist systems can be found in regimes that announce "organic-statist" principles, that is, a body of ideas stressing the political community, the concession theory of association, and the central role of the state in achieving the common good" (found principally in Latin America and the Iberian peninsula). While pluralism is argued by some to be the only type of interest representation system compatible with democracy (Diamond 1999:232), others argue that

[1] "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction... Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life... they define and limit the set of choices of individuals... they are therefore the framework in which human interaction takes place..." Douglas North, 1990.

[2] To these, Schmitter (1974) would add "monist" and "syndicalism" as two further types of interest representation. Almond and Powell (1996) distinguish between three types: "pluralist," "democratic corporatist," and "controlled" interest group systems. I here refer just to "pluralism" and "corporatism," since they are most pertinent and since most of the other typologies have been developed to pin down different types of corporatist regimes which are not critical to the Zambian case.

certain types of corporatism are better suited to producing the stable "partial regimes" of interest mediation necessary to democracy (Schmitter 1992). As noted above, the founders of Zambia's new democracy envisioned a pluralist interest group system to replace the variant of corporatism that had come to dominate state-society relations. How are the two different? Pertinent to the question of Zambia's transition, is one necessarily more *democratic* than the other?

Pluralism

In general, the pluralist interest group system is one comprised of "multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined organizations operating outside the immediate control of the state" (Schmitter 1974:94-98). Several assumptions underpin this type of group system and are necessary, if not sufficient, to its stability. First, such systems assume the institutional environment of liberal democracy, where well-protected individual and group freedoms permit and encourage associations to form, and where the spheres of civil society and private life exist autonomous and insulated from state control. According to Diamond, the parameters of such an environment are: first, the absence of reserved domains of power for actors not accountable to the electorate; second, the horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another, primarily to constrain executive power; third, extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism as well as individual and group freedoms, so that "contending interests and values may be expressed and compete through ongoing processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic elections." A fourth requisite is the existence of the "rule of law," through which freedom and pluralism is secured (1999:10).

The theory of pluralist interest group systems also implicitly makes several socio-psycho-economic assumptions. First and foremost is the assumption that such groups have common interests: thus, "there is no group without its interest"(Bentley 1908), and "every group has its interest" (Cattell 1955:15). In addition, traditional "group theory" assumes that there exists a natural propensity among humankind to form and join associations.[3] Among those early theorists who eschew this initial assumption of an innate "tendency" to join, there can instead be found the assumption that it is the evolution of modern, industrial societies out of "primitive" societies that produces the proliferation of present-day groups.[4] This line of argument assumes that the economic / structural differentiation in developing societies results in the emergence of new associations which take on some of the functions that familial and kinship groups had previously undertaken. However, as Olson points out, this line of reasoning must also either rest on the "tendency to join" assumption, or assume that small and large groups attract members for the same reason– to perform a function, further a demand, or meet a need for a group of people (1965:20)– which ultimately brings about a "collective action problem." For Olson, the solution to this problem is that groups exist and flourish where they are able to provide selective incentives to group members. Olson's work in this area thus points to a further assumption underlying pluralist interest group systems– that is, that groups (especially large groups) in pluralist systems are able to provide some kind of selective incentive to

---

[3] See Truman (1951), Bentley (1908). Though this "joining tendency" was perhaps most pronounced in the United States, it had cross-cultural adherents: for example, the famous Italian philosopher Gaetano Mosca has argued, "men have an 'instinct' for 'herding together and fighting with other herds...,'" while Georg Simmel, in one of the classics of sociological literature, emphasized a "ubiquitous and inevitable character of group affiliation in Germany" (Olson, 1971: 17).

[4] See MacIver (1932:147), for discussion. See also Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (1955: 9).

group members, in order to overcome the collective action problem.

Recently, democratization theorists have suggested that such pluralist group systems not only arise from democratic environments, but can in fact assist in the establishment of democracy in polities once under authoritarian rule. This line of reasoning has especially been of interest in sub-Saharan Africa, where in a wide range of countries (including Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and even Zaire) "the initial impetus for democratic change emanated from a vast panoply of autonomous actors in civil society," among which were trade unions, producer groups, and professional associations (Diamond, 1999:236, see especially Bratton and van de Walle 1997).[5] Theorists in this vein often begin with DeToqueville's observation that an active associational realm encourages the participation of citizens and the constraints on the state necessary for democracy to thrive: "according to de Toqueville, the state should be overseen and checked by the "independent eye of society," made up of a "*plurality* of interacting, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil associations" whose functions are to nurture basic rights, to advocate popular claims, and to educate citizens in the democratic arts of tolerance and accommodation." (quoted in Bratton 1994:54, emphasis mine). This quote makes an important point: theorists in this tradition (usually implicitly) specifically associate the participatory and state-constraining benefits of civil society with *pluralism*.

---

[5] The topic of civil society in Africa is receiving increasing attention; the following works give the reader a small sample of the issues in this growing literature: Peter Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa"; Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Development Challenge"; Naomi Chazan, "Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy," Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa"; Michael Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa," and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Associational Life, Civil Society, and Democratization in Ghana," E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Civil Society in Africa."

Not all theorists agree, however, that the active associational realm envisioned by pluralists encourage democracy. In his classic work on the factors behind "the rise and decline of nations," Olson makes a persuasive argument that pluralist interest group systems in developed economies actually impede economic efficiency and implicitly threaten democracy. As his argument is important to laying the assumptions of hypotheses to be discussed in this study, it is worth looking at in closer detail. Olson's line of reasoning is as follows: because some of the groups in any interest group system will necessarily be more influential than others, "the attainment of a *symmetrical* organization of all groups with a common interest is not possible. Members of small groups will have disproportionate organizational power for collective action; thus, their interests will be more privileged than others'. Furthermore, pluralism's splintering of the associational realm into a plethora of special interest groups has the effect of making political life more divisive. The motivation of organizational leaders to preserve group effectiveness ensures that few organizations will dissolve, so these societies accumulate narrow special-interest, collusion blocks over time. Since such organizations have powerful incentives to seek a larger share of the national income, the distributional coalitions they form will "create barriers to entry in the marketplace, reduce an economy's dynamism and rate of growth, and increase regulation, bureaucracy, and political intervention in markets." (1965:74-75).

Huntington (1968) also has reservations, although of a different nature, about the impact of strong societal interests on the polity-- political inclusiveness is indeed desirable, but only if proper institutions exist to constrain participation in the name of order and stability. Bates's argument on "urban bias"also reveals a fear of excessive pluralism; in

noting the bias toward the representation of urban interests in African polities, he shows that the prevalence of a strong societal interest group can be deleterious to the state's ability to function and properly regulate the economy. These arguments all share misgivings about the motivations and effects of specialized interests on the polity, and a healthy fear of *unconstrained* societal pressure on the state. However, none of these critiques goes so far as to suggest the regulation of societal interests by the state.

Corporatism

For scholars concerned about both established democracies and the consolidation of new democracies, the potential for states to become overwhelmed by societal interests, or the possibility of "special interests" crowding out the representation of less influential interests, both present unacceptable dilemmas for governance. The solution for these theorists lies in countering the ills of an overly voluntaristic pluralism with a purposive compartmentalizing of the interest group system, an institutional arrangement known as "corporatism." Rakner notes that "in general, corporatists have taken a less benign view of the democratic credentials of group politics than the pluralists. Corporatism sees socioeconomic inequalities reflected in, and indeed reinforced by, the politics of organized interests to an extent not adequately explored in pluralist discussions" (1992:38).

Schmitter, the key proponent of the corporatist thesis for several decades now, defines *corporatism* as "a system of interest representation in which groups are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated organizations, under the direct purview of the state" (1974:94-98). Goldthorpe makes the interesting point that, "in corporatist practice, interests are

clearly treated simply as sociological 'givens', and the function of representative organizations is not merely to express, but actually to formulate interests" (quoted in McNamara 1996:380). As a body of theory, *corporatism* emerged in the 1970's with Schmitter's seminal article, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", in which he contended that the interest representation systems of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Spain, Protugal, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Greece, Mexico, and Yugoslavia, exhibited the patterns of corporatist, not pluralist, rule. In this article, Schmitter argues that while corporatist systems function very differently than pluralist ones, they are capable of achieving many of the most desirable outcomes, e.g. demand moderation, negotiated solutions, leader accountability, "deideologization," inclusive participation, and countervalence of power (1974:101).

Furthermore, as he argues fervently elsewhere, civil society makes greater contributions to the consolidation of new democracies in *corporatist systems*, not *pluralist* ones. This is because the monopolistic, nationally focused and hierarchically coordinated associations of corporatist systems are better able to establish powerful, stable "partial regimes" of interest mediation, than are the great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations found in pluralist systems. Interest groups or confederations in corporatist systems possess what Schmitter refers to as "strategic capacity" (the ability to define and sustain a course of action not dependent on the immediate preferences of their members or upon the policies of outside parties) and "encompassing scope" (i.e. the breadth of the interest domain represented)(1997:260); for Schmitter, these two factors are integral to civil society being able to play a role in democratic consolidation.

To accompany the theoretical reasoning is empirical evidence that democracy and

corporatism "go together." For example, scholars of Japan argue that the interest representation system practiced there is one of 'democratic corporatism,' marked by structured, long-term relationships in tripartite negotiations over adjustment and interdependence in both policy formation and enforcement. According to Katzenstein, there are three features of 'democratic corporatism' that are important: an ideology of social partnership, preferably under the leadership of a powerful social democratic party designing and monitoring the corporatist arrangements; the voluntary coordination of conflicting objectives among labor; and continuing efforts by the state and capital to establish "a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups among labor" (McNamara 1996:380).

To answer the question posed above, therefore: neither pluralist nor corporatist institutional arrangements are necessarily more "democratic," either can support the practice of democracy. However, not all types of pluralism, and corporatism especially, are conducive to democratic governance. Theoretically and empirically, Schmitter notes that there are two different sub-types of corporatism: *societal corporatism,* a system of interest representation which is autonomous and penetrative, and *state corporatism*, which is dependent and penetrated by the state. Both types exhibit the characteristics of corporatism given above, but they arrive at those characteristics differently. We here outline these differences at length, in order to emphasize a critical point: societal corporatism arises "from the bottom up" as a consequence of structured negotiations with the state and with members over time, while state corporatism is imposed "from above," often in a short period of time as the state seeks to establish control over society. This point, and its development below, are important to understanding the unique development

of interest representation systems in Africa.

In general, societal corporatism is notable for: a limited number of groups due to interassociational arrangement, singular peak organizations due to competitve elimination, compulsory memberships due to de facto contractual agreements, hierarchically ordered organizational structures due to bureaucratic extension or incorporation, recognition by the state granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public officials, representational monopolies which have been "independently conquered," and control over leadership and interest articulation which are the product of reciprocal consensus on procedures / goals. In sharp contrast, state corporatist regimes are marked by: a limited number of groups due to deliberate government restriction, singular peak organizations due to state-imposed eradication of multiple associations, compulsory memberships due to de jure legal codes or other officially conceded authority, hierarchically ordered organizational structures due to state-decreed centralization and administrative dependence, recognition by the state granted from above by the state as a condition for association formation and operation, representational monopolies which have been dependently conceded, and control over leadership and interest articulation only as the product of an assymetric imposition by the state (Schmitter 1974:103-4).

Both these types of corporatist arrangements correspond decisively to distinct forms of political regime.[6] *Societal corporatism* is "found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multi-layered territorial units; open, competitive electoral

[6] Robinson suggests that a more thorough typology of corporatism includes four forms: liberal, populist, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and neo-traditional (1991:2). She further makes the point that the impetus for corporatist intermediation arises not from the nature of the state, but from crises in the political economy.

processes and party systems; and ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities;" and its origins lie in the slow decay of advanced pluralism, where long-term trends, incremental change, and cultural and institutional continuity permits the evolution of its complex institutions of bargaining and restraint. On the other hand, *state corporatism* tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are non-existent or plebiscitary; and party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party;" its origins lie in the rapid, highly visible *demise* of nascent pluralism, where impending collapse, and a strong and repressive leadership hastily craft the control-oriented institutions of state corporatism (Schmitter 1974: 105-106).

2.1.2 State-society Relationships in Post-Independence Africa

Above, we've outlined three possible "ideal" institutional arrangements for interest group systems. Observing that interest group systems are closely related to the nature of the state and society in which they are embedded, we note that the most prevalent system in post-independence Africa has been a variant of "state-corporatism." In this section, then, we examine the nature of the post-colonial African state, with an eye toward the ways in which it channels, restrains, or represses the representation of societal interests. Noting that many African countries at independence inherited pluralist system, why, and how, did state-corporatism become the dominant system in much of post-independence Africa?

2.1.3 Theories of the African State

While it is difficult to speak in a singular sense of the type of state found in a continent of 53 countries, it is nonetheless possible to discuss broad trends in the ways in

which politics is practiced and political institutions develop. This is largely due to the fact that countries in sub-Saharan Africa share histories of colonization, state boundaries that are not coterminous with national identities, and similar positions in the world economy. While scholars may disagree over how best to capture the essence of the African state, most make the assumption that there exists a generalizable proto-type (see, for example, Jackson & Rosberg 1982, Sklar 1982, Callaghy 1988, Bayart, 1989, Chazan et. al. 1992, Bratton & van de Walle 1997, Englebert 2000) . We first paint with broad strokes the generalized outline of the African state, then focus more closely on the variants of regime-types found within it.

The hallmark of the post-colonial African state has been an ever-increasing concentration of political power and centralization of public administration. The impetus for these developments lies with the attainment of independence from colonial rule; at that time, most African states inherited centralized authoritarian government structures from the departing colonial powers, along with a coterie of mobilized and exceedingly vocal groups who had contributed to the anti-colonial struggle (e.g. workers unions, ex-combatants, etc.) and expected the provision of social services "on a grand scale":

> In this situation, the choices confronting the political elites were very limited indeed: they could either use their positions to fortify themselves politically, or they could maintain existing arrangements and run the risk of alienating their supporters. Almost without exception the new leaders opted to concentrate power in their own hands" (Chazan et al 1992:46).

The result was that the pluralist constitutions inherited by many African states at independence were abandoned, and instead political competition was curtailed, dominant political parties were fortified, administrative structures were expanded, and decision-making was heavily centralized around the head of state and his cohorts. The various

components of the state, public administration, the coercive apparatus, the legal order, political institutions were further molded by leaders through the 1960's and 1970's (Co 1982). By the time of the political transitions in the early 1990's, the African state was identifiable by the following properties: large public administrations marked by "an overestablished but underbureaucratized civil service"(Aoyade 1987); expansive paras sectors which bound the state to a host of economic enterprises; an increasingly large a influencial police and army corps; judiciaries and legislatures that, though resilient in t carrying out of their functions, lacked autonomy from the executive; and a variety of control-oriented single-party systems.

In their analysis of regime transitions in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle find political institutions in Africa can best be characterized by the concept of "neopatrimo rule."[7] As the "institutional hallmark" of politics in post-colonial Africa, "neopatrimonialism" is marked by personalistic rule, coercion, and patron-client relationships between the ruler and the ruled.[8] It is identified by three key features: 1) presidentialism (the tendency for political power to be concentrated in the hands of a singular political "big man"-- the President-- an influence which reaches from the "hig reaches of the Presidential palace to the humblest village assembly" (1997:65); 2) systematic clientelism (the reliance of "strongmen" on the awarding of personal fav

[7] For further discussions of "neopatrimonialism," see also Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Callaghy (1984), Sandbrook (1986), Joseph (1987), Bayart (1993), Bratton and van de Walle (1994).

[8] Lewis suggests that "at its essence, patrimonialism effaces the distinction between public and priv interests and roles. Pervasive corruption, favoritism, and cronyism have undermined the very substanc and neutrality of public power." Furthermore, "low levels of state formation have impeded the articulation of public authority and limited the inclusion of societal groups" (1998:146). The implicati of the division between "public and private" arenas in Africa (see especially Ekeh's discussion of the ' publics,") for interest representation is also important.

e.g. public sector jobs, licenses, contracts, projects); 3) the use of state resources for political legitimation (i.e. public resources become private resources to be mobilized the political needs of individuals). Overall, " the essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state and in society. In r for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward mark of deference to patrons" (Sandbrook 1993:28).

Within pre-transition neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, Bratton and van de W find that variations in political institutions existed based on the extent of political competition and the degree of political participation. Measuring highest on both qual are, of course, the pluralist multiparty systems of Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe (at least, as of 1997). "Competitive" one-party systems, such Zambia and Tanzania, are ranked "medium" on both of these characteristics, while "plebiscitary" one-party systems are just as participatory but less competitive. Round out the picture are military and settler oligarchies, both of which are marked by low le of participation. All of these regimes, no matter the level of participation or competit were permeated by the relationships of neopatrimonial rule, and the unique patterns o state-society relationships they engender, to which we now turn.

2.1.4 The representation of interests in Africa

What does the theory of the neopatrimonial state and the empirical existence o various political regime-types imply for interest group systems in African polities? A noted above, at independence, most countries in Africa adopted the pluralist constitut of their colonial predecessor, meaning that they inherited pluralist interest group syste along with other democratic institutions such as parliaments and multi-party systems.

era of nationalism preceding independence had witnessed a broad popular mobilization against colonial domination; consequently, in many of the newly-minted countries at independence, a healthy associational flora emerged made up of trade unions, village societies, youth groups, professional associations and syncretist churches (Lewis 1998:147). However, due in part to ideological arguments by African leaders and philosophers that liberal democracy was alien to African culture,[9] and in part to the *real politik* of post-independence pressures on the state, many African leaders soon abandoned the pluralist form of government in favor of the one-party state.[10] With the abolition of multi-partyism went the demise of pluralist interest representation. In its place, leaders chose increasingly centralized, authoritarian political forms which preempted autonomous associations and excluded them from the public realm. These constraints on the representation of societal interests, combined with the preponderance of authoritarian rather than democratic political institutions, resulted in the emergence of interest representation systems cast in the mold of "state corporatism."

Shaw and N'yangoro (1989) find that state-centrism is in fact the defining characteristic of an African corporatism. They argue that because control over the state and its networks is highly valued, and because the costs of political exclusion are high in the contexts of economic contraction and political departicipation common to Africa, the

---

[9] One of the most notable proponents of this theory was President Julius Nyrere of Tanzania, who argued that a multiparty system was both unnecessary and ethnically divisive. Political decision-making in traditional society encouraged consensus, not competition; hence one-party democracy was preferable to multi-partyism, because it could build on tradition by emphasizing unity, equality, and consensus (Sandbrook 1991:92; see also Nursey-Bray 1983).

[10] While one-party states were not the only regime-type to emerge, they were by far the most numerous. We focus in this section solely on this type for brevity's sake, as well as the fact that it is most pertinent to a study of Zambia.

state-centrism of Africa's political economy is a classic reference point for the corporatist tendency to mold political and social behavior in society (1989:5). This well illustrates Williamson's conceptualization of corporatism, where "the state's function is to establish and maintain a particular economic and social order... In seeking to sustain (that) order, the state's performance of this function is not to be subject to effective challenge from popular or particularistic demands. In this respect, therefore, the corporatist state is a dominant state" (1985:8).

However, various factors of African political economy contribute to the argument that Schmitter's original conception of "state corporatism" does not perfectly describe an African corporatism. In an earlier essay, Shaw sought to refine the concept of corporatism in a comparative sense, with reference to Latin America rather than Europe. Finding first that "the corporatist imperative is expressed in Africa in a variety of one-party states which span the ideological spectrum but share a concern for control and order" (1982:255); he then suggested that the Latin American corporatist experience is especially relevant to Africa in that the *bureaucratic authoritarian* and *populist* variants of the state-corporatist model (developed by Collier, 1979)[11] are applicable to African representation systems– with the distinction that there has been a "greater incidence and success of populist regimes within the corporatist tradition" in Africa. Taking another tack, other theorists find that the "lack of fit" between traditional variants of pluralism / corporatism and the African experience is best solved by introducing new variants into the lexicon.

[11] For discussion of the development of corporatist theory in Latin America, see Alfred Stepan (1978). In this work, Stepan distinguishes between "exclusionary" and "inclusionary" varieties of corporatism, which Shaw finds also applicable to the African experience. See also, Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Corporatism and the Question of the State," in Malloy (1977).

Thus, Robinson makes the case that the military regime of Niger fits a model she defines as "neotraditional corporatism," a "mode of governance associated with conditions found in many preindustrial, aid-dependent states" (1991:4). Importantly, "neotraditional corporatism" is associated with the specific pattern of "neotraditional authority" that defines the Nigerian state.

Other scholars interested in African interest representation systems dispel with the traditional typology of interest representation altogether, arguing that *neither* pluralism *nor* corporatism adequately captures the nuances of state-society relationships (Bratton 1994). Though both these models have previously guided research on specific associations in Africa (see Ronen 1986, Wiseman 1990, and Bratton 1989 for pluralist interpretations of civil society, and Shaw 1982, Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989, Bianchi 1989 for corporatist accounts of state-society relations) the argument is that the reality of most African settings denies both these logics. In this vein, Bratton argues that the model doesn't work on either the societal or state level. The pluralist vision of multiple, voluntary, competitive, autonomous organizations generally doesn't account for blocs created by ethnic identities which are not conducive to the "cross-cutting ties" that pluralism assumes, while the pluralist image of a liberal state does not fit the neopatrimonial African state (1994; see also Bates 1990). At the same time, while corporatism's image of compulsory, non-competitive, peak organizations closely allied with the state seems a more accurate description of state-society relations in Africa, it also fails to capture important aspects of these relations (ibid). The gist of Bratton's argument is this: although state elites have indeed exhibited corporatist ambitions in their desire to maintain control over resource allocations, their efforts have been frustrated by the state's

frailty and lack of organizational reach, and by the failure to establish a bureaucratic core which bargains publicly with organized groups over public policy. Hence, the broad-based governing coalitions between organized state and social blocs that mark corporatist rule are absent in the African context:

> "Leaders of postcolonial African countries may have pursued a corporatist strategy to the extent that they promoted an organic ideology of national unity and attempted to direct political mobilization along controlled channels. But African leaders have rarely used bureaucratic formulas to construct authoritative institutions or granted subsidiary spheres of influence to occupational interest groups within civil society" (Bratton and van de Walle 1994:458).

These numerous attempts to pose a "grand theory" of interest representation all make useful contributions to our problematique: how the nature of the state and the previous institutions of interest representation affect the prospects for the development of pluralism in Africa's new democracies. These accounts suggest that the nature of the neopatrimonial state in Africa results in the need for an often weak state to attempt various methods of constraining the organized representation of societal and economic interests. This requires a delicate balancing act, with the state simultaneously repressing the unfettered cacophony of popular voices allowed by pluralist regimes while experimenting with differing modes and levels of participation where it is necessary for maintaining regime legitimacy. The resulting variations in strategies and tactics used by African leaders to maintain control are best captured by Bianchi's suggestion that many interest representation systems are best described by a "heterogeneous" theory of interest group systems.

Bianchi suggests that corporatism and pluralism are not necessarily antagonistic when treating over-time the "persistently heterogeneous nature of many systems of

interest representation" (1986:512). He argues that, especially in the context of unstable regimes and volatile economic conditions, "many authoritarian modernizers in the Middle East and Asia have tried to use corporatism as a *supplement* to pluralism rather than as a replacement for it" (1986:509). Shaw and N'yangoro make the point that this "synthetic approach" is especially relevant to Africa. Even more appropriate to the case of interest representation in Zambia, as this study will show, are Bianchi's studies on corporatism in Egypt and Turkey, where he finds examples of a "persistently heterogeneous system of interest representation in which both pluralist and corporatist structures have played enduring roles, but in which neither mode of representation has attained anything approaching universal or permanent hegemony" (1989:20). In addition, he argues that within interest sectors,

> "corporatization has occurred at different times, to different degrees, and for different reasons. The periodic mixing and re-mixing of pluralist and corporatist elements has resulted in three types of sectoral organization, each of which is the product of a distinctive historical pattern of associational evolution[12]. Important variations in group activity and influence are observable not only between these three categories, but within them as well" (ibid:21).

Bianchi's most important theoretical contributions are his hypotheses about how and why authoritarian state leaders wield pluralist and corporatist policies vis a vis society, *according to their needs to control and / or coopt different social and economic sectors.* Though corporatist policies are often thought to be the first choice for state leaders interested in organizing / coordinating / coopting troublesome societal sectors, they can

[12] These three types are: "corporatist sectors," in which corporatism always has been the predominant and often the exclusive mode of representation; "corporatized sectors," in which originally spontaneous and voluntary social movements came under increasing regulation to the point that they were effectively corporatized, and "hybrid corporatist-pluralist sectors" in which both pluralist and corporatist structures continue to coexist and compete for predominance.

too often provoke the very instability they seek to avoid. For instance, on the one hand corporatism can become "*too* co-optive and inclusionary, resulting in a partial surrende of policy-making to veto groups whose political support is necessary but costly;" while the other hand, the aggrieved groups who are intentionally excluded from the corporati arena may find this a catalyst to unite in opposition to the regime (24). The shrewd authoritarian leader, however, recognizes that not all sectors need be brought under corporatist ties to the state, for pluralist policies too can "operate not as catalysts for disruptive participation and demand-making, but as valuable instruments of social control." They can "help to support stable authoritarianism by maintaining facades of voluntarism and respect for freedom of association, and serving as a powerful tactic of disorganization and fragmentation by... promoting the proliferation of weak, financially dependent and squabbling leaders who can be manipulated and discarded by governme (ibid). The resounding point is clear: corporatism is not always the optimal policy cho rather the specific relationships between the African state and economic interest groups are variably affected by the nature of the state and its need to control/coopt important areas of the economy. It is to this issue we now turn.

2.1.5 Economic considerations: The effect of economic development, decline and reform on state-society relations

An important point emerging from the above discussions is the dynamic nature the development of state-society relations with respect to interest representation in Afri Acknowledging the predominant logic of *control* in the way the post-independent Afri state attempts to structure its links to society, we are still left to specify the factors whi

determine why and how different kinds of relationships develop between different economic sectors and the state. Here we are best advised by the rich literature on African political economy.

As noted above, within a few short years of independence, most African countries had adopted authoritarian political systems, of either a one-party state or military variety. The move towards authoritarianism was justified by the argument that a strong, centralized state was necessary for nation building and economic development (Rakner 1998, Diamond 1988, Healey and Robinson 1992). Concomitant with this political centralization was a growing trend toward state-directed and controlled economies. Rather than promoting economic development, however, many scholars concur that authoritarianism had adverse consequences for African economies (Ake 1991, Bates 1981, Callaghy 1990, Herbst 1990, Sandbrook 1985, and van de Walle 1994). In attempting to drive economic growth by nationalizing and maintaining control over key sectors of economy, African states attempted too much relative to their capacity; and by the 1980s, failing state enterprises and inefficient economic policies had produced widespread economic crises. Scholars and other observers began to argue that the nature of the African state was at fault in these crises, as economic stagnation and decline were the inevitable result of the rent-seeking practices, patronage and corruption endemic to neopatrimonial rule. Worse yet, these practices solidified identifiable sectors of support for the regime among the population; and these groups proved all too capable of organizing to block any economic reforms which might do away with their privileges.

Bates' thesis on agricultural policy and "urban bias" in Africa is especially relevant here. Bates (1981) argued that in many authoritarian states in Africa, governing elites

maintain power by catering to a coalition of urban interests who trade their political support for economic rents and privileges provided by the state. In protecting and responding to the demands of this mainly urban-based coalition of labor, business and bureaucrats, however, rural agricultural interests in much of Africa take the hit via artificially low producer prices for agricultural products. Though the outcome is *economically irrational* (agricultural production and the economy at large suffers), it is *politically rational*, in that authoritarian regimes secure the support necessary to maintain power. Furthermore, Bates argues that the reason why urban interests are favored over rural ones is in part due to the logic of collective action: the costs of organizing scattered farmers to influence government policy is far higher than the costs of organizing urban workers and civil servants, whose small numbers and close proximity to one another facilitate group efforts to influence economic policy.

The implication is that interest group influence is "locked in" by the neopatrimonial characteristics of the African state. Since urban interests are easier to organize, they enjoy undue influence over government policy. Once this constituency becomes locked in to the patronage network of the regime, their dominant influence over economic policy, vis a vis rural interests, proves difficult to shake. The implication of this reasoning is that under state-centrist one-party rule, especially in cases where the state controls the industrial sectors of the economy, we expect business, labor and bureaucratic organizations to dominate over agricultural interests, and we expect the state to seek to control its relationship to these societal actors through corporatist-like insititutions.

2.1.6 Dual reform and interest representation in Africa

The dual reform process of political liberalization and pluralist development,

coupled with profound economic adjustment and liberalization reforms, thus has important implications for the development of state-society relations in Africa, especially for the case of economic interest groups. Even while the arenas in which these interests operate are becoming more open and amenable to pressure, the political position and resources that individual sectors control are in flux. How will these combined processes of political and economic reform affect the prospects for pluralist development in Africa?

2.2 Theoretical Hypotheses

Combining theories of pluralism, African state-corporatism, neopatrimonialism, and heterogeneous interest group systems produces several propositions regarding the prospects for the development of pluralist group systems in Africa. First are the propositions we listed above representing the most basic assumptions of pluralist group theory, i.e. that the introduction of multi-party, pluralist democracy should result in:

1. *Increasing numbers of groups and increasing memberships* as people flock to join associations according to their likes and shared interests, and to pursue common goals through their participation in such groups;

2. *A corresponding increase in influence over government policy* as increasing numbers of interest groups pressure government;

Since interest group systems are fundamentally shaped by the nature of the state in which they are embedded, however, we must color the above propositions with consideration of the nature of states and political institutions in Africa. Here, the theories of state corporatism and neopatrimonialism are crucial. As discussed above, since independence political elites have been wary of the disruptive participation and demand-making that accompanied initial pluralist experiments; deeply-rooted ideologies arose to

buttress the move toward state-centrism, and ideas die hard, especially when their procurators switch hats to join the new regime. Similarly, as Bratton and van de Wal (1997) note, institutions also die hard; though many states have taken on the trapping pluralist democracy, neopatrimonial practices– presidentialism, clientelism, and prebendalism, continue to permeate the polity and administration.

If the new regime is to institute a state which operates as a neutral arbiter of societal interests, responding passively to interest group pressure as predicted in plura political theory, existing patterns of clientelist exchange would have to break down. T widespread phenomena of "blocked" and "stalled" attempts at democratic transition a consolidation in Africa indicate this is unlikely– as Bratton and van de Walle point o neopatrimonial politics persist after democratic transitions in Africa; "both by habit a necessity, the victorious politicians will resort to clientelism to consolidate their own power. Over time, these tendencies may well intensify" (1997:259). We thus might expect leaders in Africa's new democracies to harbor tendencies similar to the ancien regimes in their desire to control key social and economic sectors, ostensibly in the in of "political order" and "national unity," but perhaps more darkly, in the quest for per gain and control of patronage resources. In this light, Bianchi's thesis serves well to amend the above propositions:

3. *The new regime's support of pluralist development will favor some sectors over others.* Where pluralist policies do not infringe on the regime's interests or need for control, or threaten patronage-oriented bases of support, the above propositions will h

Essentially, we are suggesting (ala Bianchi) that the impact of the adoption of pluralist institutions on interest groups in Africa is mediated by historical patterns of t

associational evolution between economic sectoral interests and the state. Where the p
independence regime deemed it politically expedient to control economic and societal
interests, corporatist policies dominated state-society relations; and where such contro
was not crucial to the political calculus, more pluralist patterns of interest group
development formed. These former institutional arrangements are hypothesized to im
the development of new relationships between the state and specific economic groups,
thus:

4. *Pluralist arrangements will "take" better in groups which have experience with su*
arrangements than groups which evolved under a corporatist logic.

We hypothesize further that the prospects for widespread pluralism taking hold
post-transition African countries will be affected by the continuing desire of essentiall
neopatrimonial regimes to control the participation of key economic sectors in policy
making. Patterns in the mix of pluralist and corporatist state-society relationships with
individual countries might very well change, however, due to the consequences of the
economic reforms being undertaken in many cases. Thus,

5. Where these reforms bring about shifts in the dominance of economic sectors, e.g.
private industry over state enterprises, *we expect changes, realignments, and/or the*
forging of new links in the representational relationship between the state and that
sector.

2.2.1 Establishing the Counterfactual

This last hypothesis is important because it suggests our main counterfactual, t
hypothesis that neither institutional arrangements nor varying economic position affec

relationship between the state and interest groups in Africa. Rather, this line of argument goes, structural characteristics of the economy determine the prospects for pluralism, corporatism, or the disengagement altogether between the state and economic interest groups. Coined "sectoral analysis," this approach argues that:

> a state's capacity to get ahead depends on the attributes of the leading sector through which it is tied to the international economy: light manufacturing, mineral extraction, peasant cash crop production, or industrial plantation crop production. Particular sectoral attributes result in distinct international market structures, each of which rewards different kinds of actors, presents different opportunities and risks, and demands a different strategy... (Sectoral attributes) also result in distinct patterns of state institutional capabilities, and of interest groups with sectorally determined interests and collective-action capabilities (Shafer 1994:3).[13]

From this perspective, neither the democratic transitions of the 1990's in Africa, which sought to introduce more liberal and pluralistic political institutions, nor the economic reforms that were adopted, which hurt some sectors and helped others, should have impact on interest groups– on their relative influence over government policy, on their organizational capabilities, on the incentives for individuals to participate as members. Rather, these factors are almost *pre-determined* by the leading sector of the domestic economy which ties it to the international economy. We will address this argument more fully when we discuss the details of the Zambian case below.

2.3 The State and Interest Representation in Zambia

Above, we noted that Zambia provides a rich and relevant case in which to study the issue of pluralist development in Africa. We here discuss the Zambian case with respect to the factors above.

---

[13] Shafer points out the genealogy of this argument lies in the works of: Alexander Gershenkron (1962), James Kurth (1979), Jeffrey Paige (1975), Robert Brenner (1977), Peter Gourevitch (1986), Ronald Rogowski (1989), Jeffrey Frieden (1991).

2.3.1 Development of the One-Party State

As discussed in the previous chapter, at independence in 1964 Zambia was similar to other countries in Africa in that it inherited a multi-party system and democratic constitution from the departing colonial regime. The system of government "was a hybrid of Westminster parliamentarianism with a prime minister and cabinet, and presidentialism, with large powers concentrated in the executive. The constitution provided for a unitary state with a strong chief executive and a cabinet selected from, but not responsible to, the national assembly" (Rakner 1998:46). Multi-party politics made it necessary for the new African ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to shore up key political constituencies among the African population. Most prominent among these were mineworkers and urban residents, followed by a large and impoverished peasantry.

However, UNIP was never convinced of the usefulness of pluralist institutions toward either its developmental or political goals, and as early as 1964 was committed to the one-party trend that characterized the politics of newly independent African states (Gertzel, Baylies, Szeftel 1964). Zambia's president, Kenneth Kaunda, agreed with other African statesmen of the period in conceptualizing the state from a decidedly "organic" perspective as opposed to a liberal-pluralist one. Thus, Kaunda envisioned integrating Zambia's "African democratic-socialist" state in an intimate manner with the existing "mutual aid societies" through specific institutions which would allow the state to own and / or control important parts of the economy (e.g. land, industry, the mines). The state would thus actively coordinate development and improve social and economic welfare, rather than passively arbitrating and regulating a plurality of social and economic interests. In December 1972, the constitution of Zambia was consequently altered, banning all

political organizations except for UNIP and institutionalizing a one-party state.

Gertzel et. al.'s analysis of the transition from a multi- to a one-party system is instructive in understanding the nature of the post-independence state in Zambia. As she points out, early analyses of the one-party state were generally sympathetic to that system "as an agency of national development and integration," due to the colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the political attitudes and behaviours of the elite, popular participation, and the role of ideology (1984:1). However, by the mid-1960's, analysts began to note that the single-party system was empirically emerging as a response to the threat of fragmentation among the political elite and the potential loss of control over the state (ibid, see also Zolberg 1966). The single-party state thus emerged in the context of growing political factionalization, and with its single dominant party revealed as a "coalition of interests rather than a monolithic, hierarchical body" (ibid:2). In Zambia, Gertzel et. al. find the notion of the one-party state as an attempt to achieve an institutional balance between participation and control useful:

> "immediately after independence, the Zambian leadership had emphasized the importance of participation both as a pre-requisite for, and a consequence of, development. Increased participation, however, at a time of tremendous popular impatience for social and economic advance intensified political competition and exacerbated a factional conflict in the ruling party (ibid:4).

2.3.2 State-Society Relations: Emerging Corporatism

This tension between allowing participation while establishing control also affected the development of the interest representation system in the Second Republic. Again, as detailed above, Zambia inherited at independence an active and pluralist interest group system which had played an important part in the nationalist movement (though during this era, important sectors had already begun to form "congress"-type organizational

structures). The implementation of the one-party state in 1972, however, marked the transition from pluralist institutions to state-corporatism in state-society relations. State-corporatism, in light of Gertzel et. al.'s analysis of the one-party state, could be seen as a mechanism to permit the participation of societal interests while at the same time exerting national control over political and economic resources and their distribution, for development as well as political purposes. However, there is an important distinction to be made in the specific variant of state corporatism implemented in Zambia, indeed in all one-party states, that has to do with the specific formula for establishing control: at the time of the transition in 1972, the ideology supporting the one-party state called not only for the assembly of "singular, hierarchically ordered peak associations," it also called for the absorption of many types of associations into the single-party structure. As Akwetey notes, "state corporatism in Zambia took the form of a fusion of the institutions of the state with the UNIP and civic and interest organizations" (1994:48).

Thus, the nature of state corporatism in Zambia was one in which interest organizations were not so much intended to be linked to the state, as to be absorbed by the ruling party. Indeed, this might well be an identifying characteristic of corporatism in neopatrimonial systems: as political power is centralized in the presidency and negotiated through a clientelist network that operates through the government's control over state resources, so societal power is sought to be centralized in the hands of a monolithic representational institution (the Party) and negotiated through the same clientelist network operating through the distribution of state resources.

2.3.3 Zambia in Crisis: the Adoption of Dual Reform Processes

Similar to other countries in post-Independence Africa, the one-party state's attempt to centralize control of the economy in Zambia, principally through large-scal nationalization of key industries but also through government control of markets, did result in the desired developmental effects. According to Rakner's account (1998:61) during the decade following Independence, the economy expanded at a fair pace, with GDP increasing at an average rate of 2.3 per cent annually in real terms (World Bank 1984). However, during the period from 1975 to 1990, Zambia experienced a 30 per cent decline in real per capita growth (World Bank 1990). After 1974, copper prices sharply on the world market, coinciding with an enormous increase in oil prices. Dependent on copper for 90 per cent of its exports and 40 per cent of its GDP through 1970s and 1980s, Zambia's revenues fell sharply. Without revenues from copper, eve productive industries were unable to produce as foreign exchange to finance imports no longer generated. Government market controls and price limits, without copper to support them, spelt shortages and decreased production (Hawkins 1991; Bates 1981). the years that followed, the Zambian economy essentially collapsed. GDP growth wa either negative or weak for the period 1975-1980, reserves declined and the budget balance was negative" (Rakner 1998:61).

During the period preceding the political transition in 1991, the Kaunda regim made several unsuccessful attempts to avert the economic crisis, starting with loans fi the IMF in 1973. By 1978, the World Bank declared Zambia eligible for IDA funds. began a series of aid packages given to Zambia through the 1970s and 1980s from international donors; by 1990, Zambia's external debt had risen to 7.2 US$ million–

of GDP for the same year. A major attempt at economic adjustment and reform was undertaken in 1985: "in structure, depth and institutional character, the new reform measures promised to challenge the centralised state controls and the developmentalist state model developed in the post-independence period... (and subsequently) hurt the government's political base, the urban population and the large public bureaucracy within UNIP and the state" (Rakner 1998:70). In December 1986, government announced the decontrol of maize prices, provoking a outburst of protest and rioting on the Copperbelt which left 15 people dead. Profoundly shaken, the UNIP regime brought the reform attempt to a halt in May 1987.[14] With the New Economic Recovery Programme of 1987, the government returned to reliance on state-controlled mechanisms, rather than liberalisation, to address the economic crisis. Zambia's international donors responded by cutting all financial aid to the regime. Unsuccessful in its attempt to "go it alone", by 1989, Zambia was back in negotiations with the IMF.

Important interests were against the move back toward liberalization, however. Most prominent was the trade union movement, which publicly announced its opposition to re-opening negotiations with the IMF. Increasingly, the effects of the economic crisis and the UNIP regime's inability to alleviate it precipitated calls for radical change: not just the end of the UNIP reign, but a full-scale return to multi-party politics and a new government. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) led the charge in declaring that the one-party state should be abandoned. Soon, leading members of the business community were echoing the same call. The economic crisis, it seems, had thoroughly

[14] For analyses of Zambia's failure to implement economic reforms during the 1985-87 period, see Akwetey (1994), Bates and Collier (1993), (1995); Callaghy (1990); Gulhati (1989); Mwanza (1992); West (1989), (1992); Loxley and Young (1990); Sandberg (1990).

discredited the notion of state-centrist, single-party rule; in response to its perceived fl the model that was chosen to replace it was pluralist democracy. In the place of a centralized state and single party with corporatist-like ties to society, the reformers envisioned a pluralist domain of competing political and economic interests, supporte a blossoming associational flora of political parties, interest groups, and civic associati In that formula seemed to lie the answer to Zambia's economic and political malaise. reformers won the day: Zambia held multi-party elections in 1991, drafted a new constitution which removed the ruling party from its corporatist position and instituted its place pluralist democracy, and embarked upon a strict, donor-endorsed programme orthodox economic reform. The dual reform process had begun, and in earnest.

The issue this study thus seeks to address is this: how have these twin processe political and economic reform affected the interest group system in Zambia? Given th above theoretical considerations, the following questions are of import:

1. Has political liberalization produced pluralist political institutions and a supporting political ideology? Or has the legacy of the one-party state, that is, neopatrimonial political institutions, left its imprint on Zambia's new multi-party democracy, and subsequently on state-society relations?

2. What impact do these results of dual reform have on the development of a pluralist system of interest representation? Are there discernible differences in the impact of du reform on the interest group system, or are all groups affected equally? If there is variation, is it related to previous institutional relationships between the state and economic interest groups?

2.4 Research Design and Methods

This dissertation is primarily a study of the interest group system in Zambia's T Republic (1991-present), specifically how it has been affected by the transition from corporatism to pluralism. A comparative case study approach is used; in most analyses

cases are the main interest groups active at the national level, in some cases, both they and their local affiliates are considered. A single-country, cross-group analysis is especially useful for this inquiry because it controls for regime-type, population characteristics, and economic conditions, all of which are constants for all the cases involved. Following Yin (1994:20), the research design has four components:

1. the study's questions
2. propositions / hypotheses
3. description of unit(s) of analysis
4. explanation of the logic linking the data to the propositions.

2.4.1 Main Research Questions:

The topic of interest in this study are economic interest groups in Zambia and how they affect the prospects for the development of pluralism. Given the theoretical discussion above, three levels of group activity are important: membership incentives, organizational sustainability; and policy influence.

The three principle research questions of this study are thus:

- What are the key incentives for interest group membership in Zambia's multi-party democracy? Are they incentives that promote further pluralist development?

- How have interest groups adapted to the severing of corporatist ties to the state? Are they maintaining and even improving organizational capacity?

- What are the key strategies for interest groups in seeking influence in the new system? Do groups perceive a more open and plural political space in which to lobby? Are they gaining increased influence over economic policy?

2.4.2 Main Propositions / Working Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are drawn from the discussion above of pluralist theory, and the literature on state-society relations in Africa.

HYPOTHESIS 1: The number of economic interest groups and the number of members within economic interest groups will increase. This will result from the prevalence of a pluralist-type membership incentive; i.e. individuals will flock to join groups to express shared interests and pursue efforts at collective action.

HYPOTHESIS 2: There will be an increase in interest group influence over government policy, or at least an increase in group participation in the policy process.

HYPOTHESIS 3: The organizational resources that economic interest groups command will either stay constant, or increase with the improvement in autonomy from government. Though this proposition is not derived directly from pluralist theory, Hypothesis 2 is a necessary condition of Hypotheses 1 and 3, for if organizational resources decrease, membership maintenance and the capacity for influence are threatened.

H_0: There has been no change in state-society relations, copper remains the key export commodity and subsequently shapes relevant political and economic institutions. The mines, and the business and labor interests they involve, should still dominate other societal interests, with labor unions continuing to be the most vocal and influential lobby. Membership and organizational considerations are merely derived from the expediencies of copper production, they do not play a role in group activity and group policy influence.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS:

Above, we discussed several ways in which the practice of neopatrimonial politics in Africa modifies the above expectations. In the next chapter, we will deal with the particulars of the Zambian case at greater length so as to specify the details of the following propositions.

PROPOSITION 1: *The MMD regime's stated support of pluralist development will favor some sectors over others.* Where pluralist policies do not infringe on the MMD's interests or need to control key economic sectors, or threaten patronage-oriented bases of support, the above propositions will hold.

PROPOSITION 2: *Pluralist arrangements will "take" better in groups which have experience with such arrangements* than groups which evolved under a corporatist logic in the Second Republic.

PROPOSITION 3: Where economic reforms bring about shifts in the dominance of economic sectors, e.g. private industry over state enterprises, *we expect changes, realignments, and/or the forging of new links in the representational relationship between the state and that sector.*

2.4.3 Expected Value added:

a) To contribute to the development of a typology of hybrid interest group systems in Africa.

b) To demonstrate the interconnectedness of the three levels of analysis: macro, mid, and micro. That is, influence at the macro level depends not only on policy and elites, but on the day to day functioning of organizations, and the expectations of group members.

2.5 Units of Analysis and Data Collection

The study has more than one unit of analysis, as often "occurs when, within a single case (such as a study of economic interest groups in Zambia), attention is also given to a subunit or subunits (such as influence strategies, organizational resources, and membership incentives)" (Yin 1994:41), When these subunits are "embedded" within the larger case(s) (as they are here), the design is known as an "embedded case study design." Yin cites an infamous example of an embedded, single-case design: Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's *Union Democracy* (1956):

> "The case study is about the inside politics of the International Typographical Union and involves *several* units of analysis. The main unit was the organization as a whole, the smallest unit was the individual member, and several intermediary units also were important. At each level of analysis, different data collection techniques were used, ranging from historical to survey analysis." (1994:42).

The current study is slightly different than the above, however; it is an *embedded multiple-case study, "multiple"* because it examines the eight key national economic interest groups in Zambia, *"embedded"* because it gives attention to three sub-units of the cases: influence strategies, power resources, and membership incentives. One illustrative consequence of the "embedded" design is that, for instance, the results of the survey of group members are not pooled across groups, but are analyzed comparatively for each case. Thus:

1. Primary unit of analysis: "economic interest groups" (dependent variable)
    a) contextual (or independent) variables: economic sector, political-institutional parameters

2. Embedded units of analysis (sub-units of dependent variable):
    a) membership incentives
    b) organizational resources
    c) policy influence

The kinds of data collected are correlated with the units of analysis in the table below, giving the various analyses to be presented in the study:

Table 2.1: Data and Analysis

	Total System	Groups	Members
Data	Laws affecting interest group system, Economic statistics, Policy issues, Historical studies, Media Reports	Organizational Survey, Interviews with Leaders, Group documents, Media Reports	Membership Survey, Interviews with members
Unit being Characterized		*Analyses*	
Group system as a Whole	Structural, environmental properties of group system	Relative Position of Groups within the System	Individual demands upon group system
Eight National Apex Groups	Economic and institutional parameters, behavioral response (influence strategies)	Organizational resources of groups (autonomy and capacity)	Distribution of individual membership incentives across groups
Local Groups affiliated to the above groups	Economic and institutional parameters, behavioral response (influence strategies)	Organizational resources of groups (autonomy and capacity)	Distribution of individual membership incentives across groups
Members	By inference, dominant values and interests for sectors and system (affects influence)	By inference, dominant values and interests for groups (affects organizational maintenance)	Reasons for Joining, Valuation of Group Benefits, Background

2.5.1 Logic linking the data to the propositions

Due to the small number of cases, statistical tests of the above propositions and hypotheses are not possible. Where applicable, a simple form of "pattern matching" (Campbell 1975) will be employed in an attempt to logically link the data to the propositions. "Pattern matching" is a technique whereby several pieces of information

from the case(s) may be related to the theoretical proposition, by specifying potential patterns and then demonstrating that one matches the data better than the other.

2.6 Synopsis of Chapters

The questions raised above require a four-pronged analytical approach, accomplished through the following arrangement of chapters:

In Chapter Three, the evolution of the interest group system in Zambia is described and analyzed. We develop the concept of "economic society," and define its particular characteristics in Zambia. We next examine how different sectors within Zambia's economic society have historically been organized, paying special attention paid to the details of the political and economic context in which they have evolved. Finally, we examine the response of the state to the organization of economic interests, and how a system of *corporatist* state-society relations emerged. The discussion makes the point that the development of interest group systems depends both on the state's goals in structuring its relationship to society, as well as society's responses. One of the main results of the analysis in Chapter Three is the specification of the variable nature of the relationship between interest groups and the state in the Second Republic. This variable, *prior institutional history*, offers an important explanatory factor for the following analyses.

In Chapter Four, the further evolution of the interest group system in Zambia Third Republic is addressed. Here, we develop the notion of the "ecology" of interest group systems: "ecology" is a term borrowed from the biological sciences; it refers to the study of the *relationship* between organisms and their environment. Using this perspective, we are interested in how interest groups that emerged in the Second

Republic, as well as new groups emerging after 1991, are affected by and interact with the new institutional environment of the Third Republic. We thus seek to analyze the *ecology* of the new system by examining the interaction of the institutional environment and the agency of the groups within it. This chapter provides the broad outlines of the new interest group system that is emerging in the Third Republic.

In Chapter Five, we examine the incentives for interest group membership. The prediction of pluralist theory, one which underlies all its other predictions concerning interest group activity, is that individuals have a natural predilection to join groups, and further efforts at collective action. Given the serious challenges to this thesis, it is useful to empirically analyze if this motivation indeed exists, or if other inducements to join and participate in business associations, trade unions, and farmers' groups are more important to Zambians. Further, we explore whether incentives for membership differ between groups, and whether the framework we developed in Chapter Three is useful in understanding these differences. The unit of analysis here is hence the individual, but we analyze individual responses at the group level.

In Chapter Six, we examine organizational resources. Groups essentially must perform two tasks: on the one hand, memberships must be maintained– leaders must thus find the optimal mix of benefits that members are looking for, and be able to support them. Drawing from our analysis in Chapter Five, we will use the distinctive membership incentives we found to draw propositions about how important autonomy and capacity are as organizational resources. Are groups well organized, in terms of the imperative of maintaining voluntary memberships? Why are some better groups than others? In addition to the membership imperative, groups must be able to lobby government in a

pluralist system, another function requiring ample organizational resources. This chapter thus analyzes groups themselves at the organizational level, in reference to their *sustainability* potential, given the variable resources they control and the variable demands made on them by their memberships.

In Chapter Seven, we examine group strategies for policy influence. In this chapter, we examine how groups go about gaining access to government in the newly pluralized environment, in order to represent group policy goals to government decision makers. This is a fundamentally new activity for groups in the Third Republic; there were virtually no opportunities for formal "lobbying" during the period of the one-party state. Exploring how groups are adapting to this new opportunity, whether some are adapting better than others, and what factors seem to explain these differences, is the goal of this chapter. Thus, the main questions we seek to answer here are the following: Have the opportunities for interest representation improved under the new institutions of the Third Republic? What are the new "pathways to influence" over government policy? Have groups been able to make use of these new channels to bend government policy in their favor? To answer these questions, we analyze the opportunities available for influencing policy and the empirical strategies that groups employ to gain access to those opportunities. A key concern here is whether some groups are gaining better access than others, and whether real influence over government policy is realized.

In Chapter Eight, we conclude the study with by re-examining the prospects for the development of pluralism in Zambia's Third Republic.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC

3.1 Examining "Economic Society" in Zambia

In this chapter, the evolution of the interest group system in Zambia is described and analyzed, with special attention paid to the details of the political and economic context in which it has evolved. We begin with a discussion of what Linz and Stepan (1999) refer to as *economic society.* Claiming that modern, pluralist democracy cannot exist in either a pure-command or pure-market economy, these scholars argue that "a set of sociopolitically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations– an "economic society– that mediate between state and market" is necessary (1999:21). For this study, consideration of Zambian "economic society" is especially important, for it is the realm of interest politics, and the context in which associations that organize around specific economic interests evolve and develop relationships with the state. The development of economic society might be seen to reflect both characteristics of the economy (what types of economic activity exist, what types of economic actors compose economic society?), and the historical-institutional development of the relationship between the state and

different economic sectors. We thus begin with discussion of the economy in Zambia, followed by an account of the evolution of organizational efforts around economic interests. This is followed by an analysis of the state's response to the organizing of economic interests during the Second Republic, and the outlines of the resulting interest group system. In the conclusion to this chapter, the analysis of economic activity and the relationship of the UNIP state to different economic groups are used to create a theoretical framework for specifying the interest group system in the Second Republic, for further analytical purposes.

3.1.1 Economic Activity

Any discussion of economic activity in Zambia must start with the mines. Zambia possesses relatively immense mineral resources, and the most important and lucrative of these is copper. In addition, Zambia enjoys a large quantity of land suitable for agricultural production and cattle-raising. Thus, the setting is a dual economic system consisting, one the one hand, of a modern sector based on mining production, largely confined to the line of rail, and urban in orientation, and on the other, a rural, mostly subsistence-based agricultural sector (Kaplan 1979: 161). In the modern sector, the mining industry has traditionally been the one of the largest employers of wage labor as well as the largest earner of foreign exchange: at independence, the mines accounted for 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 53% of government revenues and 92 percent of export earnings, and employed 20 percent of those in formal jobs (Shafer 1994:49, Fry 1980:44, Republic of Zambia 1985:8).

Copper has always been the most important commodity, though gold, silver, zinc, lead, cobalt and coal are also produced. The first major mines– Luanshya and Mufulira–

were founded in the early 1930s and operated by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, and the Roan Selection Trust, a subsidiary of American Metal Climax of the United States. Bustling urban communities subsequently developed around this area, which became known as the "Copperbelt." Between the Copperbelt in the north and Livingstone in the south, spanning three provinces (Southern, Central, and the Copperbelt Provinces) and passing through the only other major urban area in the country, the capital city of Lusaka, ran the "line-of-rail," around which most economic activity in the country would come to center.

At independence, the economy was largely in private hands though highly monopolistic, as "almost all industrial sub-sectors were dominated by one large (usually ex-patriate) company" (Zambia Human Development Report 1997). However, in 1968 Kaunda announced the nationalization of the economy through the Mulungushi Accord; subsequently, during the 1970's the modern sector became dominated by parastatals (state-owned or controlled enterprises) that operated in sectors ranging from manufacturing, mining, power, and transport, to agricultural marketing and services, finance, wholesale and retail trade, and hotel and restaurant trade. By 1970 the government had acquired 51percent of the shares of both the mines through its official holding company, the Zambian Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). Only in construction and agricultural production was the private sector dominant by the end of the 1970's.

Though official state ideology discouraged private sector activity during the Second Republic (1972-1990), economic crisis and government requirements in the mid-1970's brought government to accept the necessity of some level of private enterprise, and

in 1977 the Industrial Development Act was drafted to proclaim the economy a mixed one. Nonetheless, government-controlled copper was "king:" rich deposits, good infrastructure, and favorable world market prices during the 1960's and early 1970's had led to the illusion of endless wealth (Zambia Human Development Report 1997:162), a wealth which at first (and to a lesser degree after the economic crisis) was ostensibly used to carry out UNIP's substantial development objectives. Dependence on copper was endemic to the UNIP regime; as noted in the *First National Development Plan,* "the capital investment available to Government .... is determined almost entirely by revenue obtained from copper" (GRZ 1966:31). Funds from copper were used by the government to subsidize imported agricultural products and hold down domestic food prices for the urban population, which had the adverse effect of discouraging domestic agricultural production (see Bates 1976, 1981). Drawing from copper revenues, the government was able to keep the cost of capital low and permit steady increase in wages, resulting in the development of a capital-intensive industry at the expense of urban employment (Zambia Human Development Report 1997, Bates and Collier 1992).

The economy entered the 1980's and 1990's still dependent on copper. In the agricultural sector, productive activity was intentionally centered around government-sponsored producer cooperatives, though private, large-scale farms were also encouraged. However, unlike other southern African countries, where commercial farming was focused on the production of primary goods for export, the commercial farming sector in Zambia concentrated on the supplying of foodstuffs to the workforce in the Copperbelt. By the late 1970's, the subsector had roughly 800 units occupied under leasehold from the state, of which 2/3 were farmed by ex-patriates. On the other hand, the subsistence farming

subsector consisted of more than 600,000 households in the rural areas (Zambia Human Development Report 1997: 169). Within this subsector, a small number of farmers carried out commercial operations; this group of 'emergent farmers' developed largely along the line of rail. In addition to agricultural cultivation, forestry and fishing were also locally-important economic activities.

As noted above, government controlled production and marketing in the agricultural sector as well as the industrial through a system of parastatals. For example, the Tobacco Board of Zambia was established in 1967 to regulate marketing and promote production of tobacco; the Nakambala Sugar Estate was established in Mazabuka, using the Kafue River for irrigation, in 1964; the Cold Storage Board of Zambia (CSBZ) carried out commercial slaughtering; and the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) acted as the government's purchasing agent for agricultural products.

Zambia inherited a small manufacturing sector at independence, due to most industrial investment having gone to Southern Rhodesia during the colonial era. From 1965-1970, government pursued an import-substitution policy that contributed to rapid industrial development. By 1979, the government had majority holdings in, or complete ownership of, almost all large manufacturing firms, through auspices of the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), which was in turn controlled by the massive conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). Though, as noted above, the 1977 Industrial Development Act made clear the government's willingness to maintain a mixed economy, allowing both domestic and international private capital to operate under well-defined regulations, the operations of Zambian businessmen were confined to real estate, small-scale commerce and transport (Turok 1989).

This "mixed" economy that developed during the 1970's had important political roots. Baylies and Szeftel (1984) have noted the rise of an indigenous business class during this period, and convincingly argued that indigenous businessmen were both well-placed as politicians due to their positions as local "notables", and well-placed as businessmen due to their subsequent gaining of high-level state positions and even parliamentary seats (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2, next page). Half the Cabinet members from 1964 to 1976 had privately-held farms or businesses in 1976– and many acquired these holdings after gaining public office (1984:71). This "indigenous business class" was successful in several, though not all, efforts to keep at least some portion of the Zambian economy out of the hands of the state and open to private enterprise. Also quietly active during this period was a growing Asian community engaged in privately-held small-scale trading and commercial enterprises.

Thus, by the time of the transition in 1991, the foundations of Zambia's economic society had been laid. Economic activity in Zambia was driven by the mining sector, which had important implications for the development of a strong– and unionizable– workforce and an urban middle-class. In addition, moderate levels of economic activity took place in the agricultural sector, where subsistence and small-scale farming took place under the direction of a state-sponsored cooperative structure, side-by-side with a relatively small, largely expatriate and privately held commercial farming sector. Also contributing to the economy was an initially small but subsequently growing manufacturing sector-- like the mines, an important source of managers and workers-- located predominantly along the line of rail and within the urban boundaries of the Copperbelt. And finally, despite Kaunda's plans for a socialist state and dirigiste

Figure 3.1: Business Interests after Zambia's 1973 Election

Figure 3.1.a Occupation/Position of M.P.'s



Figure 3.1.b M.P's with Business Interests



Source: Baylies and Szeftel, 1984

economy, a small and politically relevant private business sector was also taking shape. Table 3.1 below gives a summary listing of these economic interests, categorized by economic sector (column I). Column II provides an outline of the potential economic interest groups in Zambia, given the evolution of economic activity detailed above.

Table 3.1
Zambia: The Development of Economic Interests, 1965-1991

I Sector	II Actors Involved in Sector
Agriculture	Commercial Farmers Emergent Farmers Subsistence Farmers
Mining	Workers (miners, etc) Managers
Manufacturing	Workers Managers Businessmen
Trade & Services	Workers Managers Businessmen

3.1.2 Policy Relevance of Economic Sectors

Having thus sketched the shape of Zambia's economic activities, the next question to address is how and when the above economic activities might become politically important to government's economic policy calculations. As a proxy of the "policy relevance" of economic sectors, we here refer to two statistics: sectoral contributions to gross national product (GDP), and sectoral contributions to export earnings. The logic behind using these proxies is that government will consider most important those sectors which contribute most to the economy (especially foreign exchange), and hence most to government coffers. The graphs demonstrate what we expect from the literature on

Zambian political economy: before the economic crisis of the mid-seventies, mining dominated the economy, directly contributing 25% of GDP in 1972, with additional contributions in manufacturing and construction (see Figure 3.2, next page). However, after the crisis, mining output started to slip, falling to less than half (9%) its 1972-level contribution to GDP by 1990. Figure Three also demonstrates that agriculture is moderately important in terms of contributions to GDP, and relatively stable through the 1970's and 1980's, until it began a moderate upswing in 1990 (see Figure 3.2d). What is perhaps most striking about the data in Figure 3.2, however, is the contribution of manufacturing– it contributed equally with agriculture to the domestic product in the early seventies (14% and 13% respectively) and surpassed mining through the seventies and eighties to the point where it contributed three times as much of GDP as did mining by 1990 (32% to mining's 9%, see Figure 3.2a and 3.2b. It should be noted that the economy as a whole, at least in per capita terms, shrank over this period). Table 3.2 below gives the contributions to GDP of these three important sectors over the period 1980-1991.

Table 3.2
Gross Domestic Product by Type of Economic Activity, 1980-1991
(millions of constant 1977 kwacha)

Year:	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	'90	'91
Agriculture	304	329	290	315	332	344	374	366	436	425	387	407
Mining	205	215	215	222	200	186	177	184	160	176	163	166
Manufacturing	384	430	415	384	389	421	425	463	547	544	587	524

Source: World Bank

Figure 3.2: Zambia GDP Data, 1980-1990

Figure 3.2.a: Contribution to GDP 1972



Sector Totals		
Primary 13%	Secondary 49%	Tertiary 39%

Figure 3.2.b: Contribution to GDP 1990



Sector Totals		
Primary 18%	Secondary 45 %	Tertiary 30%

Figure 3.2.c: Contribution by Sector



Figure 3.2.d: Contribution by Activity



Source: IMF Statistics

Figure 3.3: GDP by Economic Activity (millions ZK)



While examination of contributions to GDP might put the agriculture and manufacturing sectors on par with the mining sector, however, examination of contribution to export earnings puts these sectors into better perspective, especially with respect to the needs of an industrializing state like post-independence Zambia. Figure 3.3 (above) gives a times series comparison of the leading agricultural export– tobacco, and the leading mining export– copper. Also included is the category "other goods," which is largely made up of manufactured goods. As the data in the table show, export revenues from the leading agricultural export, tobacco, pales in comparison to the leading export mineral, copper. Though manufactured goods contribute tenfold more to the export revenue pie than tobacco earnings, they also pale in comparison to the copper mines. Indeed, as several scholars have pointed out, copper revenues in Zambia so dominate the economy and the filling of government coffers, they have acted to dull incentives to develop alternative exports, as well as dampened any perceived need to develop

agriculture either to ensure adequate food supply or to produce for export (see Shafer 1994, Jansen 1988, Baylies 1978, Young 1973). In addition, revenue from copper has served to stimulate the production of non-tradeables to the extent that "services, utilities, construction, commerce, and transport... dominate the economy" (O'Neill et al. 1987:21). This latter point implies that the data shown in Chart 3.2 can be misleading; though non-copper sectors appear to be important to the economy in terms of their contributions to GDP, their continuing health is dependent on the continued flow of copper revenues– a point well understood by the UNIP regime. For a government dependent on foreign exchange for both debt service and the purchase of imports necessary to its highly capital intensive industrial sector, stability in its main export earning sector was (and still is under the MMD regime) understandably crucial. Indeed, it is a card the labor union movement and other urban interests have played much to their advantage since the inception of the one-party state.

Table 3.3
Exports of Principal Commodities 1980-1991
(Total is given in millions of current 1977 kwacha,
categories are given as percentage of Total)

	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	'90	'91
Tobacco	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.4
Copper	85	90	90	89	86	83	83	85	85	89	86	78
Other Goods	3.1	2.5	4.3	2.0	5.2	9.2	7.5	6.0	5.4	3.1	4.7	8.5
Total	1021	929	953	1048	1200	1508	5367	8059	9786	18434	39143	67668

Source: World Bank

Thus, where policy is concerned, it's clear why the mining sector was of considerable importance to government and Party policy in the 1960's and 1970's; as many scholarly accounts have argued (Bates 1971, Bates and Collier 1993, Burdette 1988, Epstein 1958, Rakner 1994), the mines drove the Party's development program, and the trade unions which organized the mineworkers thus presented a formidable counterforce to the state. An interesting point that emerges from this data is the growing dominance of the manufacturing sector in the economy, and the lack of development of a similar political importance of the "captains of industry." Indeed, this was at least partly a result of the fact that these "captains" were not the owners of privately-held enterprises, but rather the managers of state-owned industries. As we'll see below, the first employers' national organization was founded in 1955, two decades after the first European worker's union was formed and seven years after the African mineworkers had formed the first union in 1949.

After the nationalization of the economy, most industries fell under state-control; so that by the mid 1970s, 80 per cent of the Zambian economy was owned and controlled by the state, and 147 parastatals were operating– with 121 of them under a single holding company, ZIMCO (Rakner 1998, Callaghy 1990) Consequently, most managers were dependent on the state, or rather, the ruling party, for their position. Thus, while the unions became important and powerful political players outside the state, the employers were tightly wired in to the UNIP patronage machine. However, both were included in policy discussions during the Second Republic through regularly-held "Tri-Partite" meetings with the government.

3.1.3 Political Strength of Economic Sectors

An important implication of the "urban bias" thesis is that there is a direct link between African governments' dependence on industrial sectors of the economy and its capitulation to "urban interests"(see Bates 1981); in Zambia, it has been argued that urban constituencies gained favor over rural ones because they can potentially threaten the power of the government (Hawkins 1991). The "urban bias" thesis rests on two assumptions: the strength of numbers, and the costs of organizing. Thus, since workers in the urban areas are both numerous and concentrated, they constitute a political constituency to be reckoned with. Where are these workers located in the economy? Which sectors might we expect to be politically relevant due to the numbers they can organize and challenge the government? Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of the Zambian population formally employed, from 1969 to the point of political change in 1990.

Figure 3.4a gives the breakdown of the formally employed by economic sector, as of 1989. Again we see the effects of Zambia's relatively high level of urbanization and industrialization: nearly half the formally employed workers in Zambia are employed in the mining-driven industrial sector, be it the mines themselves, (20%) or manufacturing (19%), or construction (8%). Again as a consequence of urbanization, we also see that almost two-fifths of the formally employed are in the service sector, including trade (10%) and transport (9%).

Figure 3.4b demonstrates that, as with our policy relevance measure, the picture is not a static one. Note the plummeting of service sector and construction employment from 1986 to 1989, while employment in agriculture and the other industrial and service sectors slowly inched upward. Most noticeable is the increase in manufacturing employment; by

Figure 3.4: Zambia Employment Data, 1980-1990

Figure 3.4.a: Formal Employment Levels, and Total Population



Figure 3.4.b: Formal Emploment Levels, by Sector



Source: Central Statistical Office and International Labour Organization

1989 it almost equaled the mines in the percentage of the workforce it claimed.

3.1.4 Summary: The Shape of Economic Society

In sum, then, the economic importance of copper mining in Zambia since the turn of the twentieth century brought about an early differentiation of the labor force and resulted in a population uncharacteristically (for Africa) urbanized and formally employed. In addition, the development of an "indigenous business class," and the presence of a moderate, mostly small-scale farming sector, means that there are many occupationally-defined interest categories available for group mobilization in Zambia: formally-employed workers of many stripes (government sector workers such as civil servants, teachers; state-owned enterprise workers (in the seventies and eighties, this included the mines, telecommunications, and utilities, among others), and private sector workers such as workers in construction, manufacturing, and commercial agriculture. In addition to formally employed labor, there are business owners and commercial / peasant farmers interests. Rounding out the picture are traders and small-scale industry in the informal sector.

Overall then, Zambia's considerable economic diversity provides ample ground for the formation of occupationally-based interest groups competing for influence with the state; above we've seen the basis for three important sectoral interests: a labor lobby, a business/employers lobby, and an agricultural lobby. In the next section, we'll address which of these "potential" groups had formed by the time of the critical period preceding the 1991 dual transition.

3.2 Economic Interests, Organization, and Politics in Zambia's 2nd Republic

Most of the economic sectors outlined above (agriculture, mining, trading and

commerce) has origins reaching back well into the colonial period. For most, voluntary efforts at organzing producers in these sectors also pre-dates independence. Figure 3.5, next page, shows the founding dates of Zambia's major interest groups.

3.2.1. The Origins of Economic Organizing in Zambia

As the above figure shows, the story of formal economic organizing begins during the colonial period in Zambia, and it begins with European organizations such as the group that would later become the Commercial Farmers Bureau (CFB). The earliest Europeans to arrive in the trans-Zambezi area were explorers and missionaries, who established churches and productive enterprises well ahead of the colonial administration. They were followed by the British South Africa Company, who had gained control of the area by 1913 and subsequently convinced the British government to set up a minimal administration over the territory (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979). Perhaps the most important legacy of the BSAC era was the building of a railroad, envisioned by Cecil Rhodes as part of the line "from Cape to Cairo," from Victoria Falls in the south, north across the territory into Katanga. This thin corridor of transportation, referred to as the "line of rail," would later become a lifeline around which urban centers and most economic activity were developed.

During the colonial period, Europeans were in firm control of the economy; while Africans were allowed to participate in labour markets supplying mineral mines throughout the region, it was illegal for them to participate in business and commercial farming. Thus, it was Europeans who formed the first formal farmers' organization (in 1904) as well as the first Chamber of Commerce and Industry (in 1933), and it was skilled Europeans who had come to the territory to work in the mines, the

Figure 3.5: Founding Dates of Selected Major Interest Groups in Zambia



AAWUZ	Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia
AMU	African Mineworkers Union
BAZ	Bankers Association of Zambia
CCCI	Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CFB	Commercial Farmers' Bureau (in 1992 became the ZNFU)
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union of Zambia
EMU	European Mineworkers Union
LAMC	Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative
LCCI	Lusaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
NUBEGW	National Union of Building Engineers and General Workers
NUPAW	National Union of Public Administration Workers
NWRFCS	North-West Rhodesian Farmer's Cooperative Society
ZAM	Zambia Association of Manufacturers
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial and Insurance Workers

railroads and other industries that formed the first trade unions. However, during this same period African miners formed fraternal and mutual aid societies; and with assist from British trade unions, African trade unions had spread throughout the Copperbelt the 1940's. In the next section, we examine the subsequent development of formal organizations in each of the three economic sectors under study here.

3.2.2 The Colonial and Independence Period: Pluralism and Racial Divides

Labor

Copper production in the Copperbelt started in the 1930s, but it wasn't until th postwar period that local labor organized a formal association in defense of its interes (Bates 1971:18). According to Bates, the association took the place of tribal modes o organizing and the representation of mineworkers' interests that had been instituted b mine authorities. "The companies had maintained a system of labor relations based u tribal elders. Each tribal group at the mines selected its elders; they represented the interests of the workers before the companies and communicated company policy to t workers themselves" (ibid:19). In 1935 and 1940, however, there were two major disturbances on the Copperbelt in which miners challenged this form of labor relation asserted distinctly class-based interests (Epstein 1958). During the ensuing decade, t structure of labor relations based on ethnic principles was slowly transformed to one which was interest-based. At first, the Labor Department experimented with Boss Bo and Works Committees, but after WWII the colonial office urged the formation of collective bargaining machinery for Africans and appointed a full-time Trade Union Labour Officer, Mr. W. M. Comrie, to promote the formation of African trade unions

Bates suggests that the colonial government and the mining companies backe

initiative because the European Mineworkers Union (EMU) were growing interested in organizing the African labor force, and the prospect of the power that a combined union would wield was daunting (1971: 20). In addition, African miners had been calling for their own trade union, distinct from the EMU, for nearly a decade, and they enjoyed strong leadership for such an initiative in the person of Lawrence Katilungu (Gupta 1979:293). Comrie worked with the existing African associations (e.g. Welfare Societies, Clerks' Associations, and Boss Boy Committees) to transform interest and demand for industrial representation into formally organized action. In 1947, the Nkana mineworkers formed a union branch; they subsequently drafted a constitution, recruited members, and set about promoting the formation of more union branches at the other mines. In 1949, these branches combined to form an industry-wide union. The union's national executive committee negotiated a recognition agreement with the Chamber of Mines, and the African Mineworkers' Union became the official representative of African labor in the mining industry. In 1950, the AMU federated with unions in other industries to form the Trade Unions Congress (TUC).

With independence in 1964, the coming to power of an African Government, and the dismantling of the legal apartheid system the industrial situation changed markedly. Miners and other workers could no longer be barred from types of employment due to their race; associations no longer fell along the lines of the color-bar. In 1965, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions was established by an act of Parliament, and the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance was amended to provide for obligatory affiliation to the ZCTU of any trade union formed in the Republic of Zambia, thus limiting the extent of associational pluralism in the labor sector.

Agriculture

As in the industrial sector, a dual economy emerged in the agricultural sector during the colonial period. European settlers claimed access to the most fertile land, where they established large-scale commercial farms. With the development of the railroad, these farmers moved to take over the best lands along the line of rail where access to markets was optimal; they were helped by government schemes which encouraged European farmers to relocate.[1] Meanwhile, restrictions abounded on most African non-subsistance agricultural production. According to Bates, "the development of African cash cropping was artificially restricted by the exclusion of African producers from access to the best soils on the line of rail and by the attempts of European farmers to prevent Africans from entering production so as to keep their farm wages low"(1976:281.) Africans were thus largely (though not entirely) relegated to the less-fertile areas of the country, and most engaged in subsistence level production.[2]

As there was dualism in the economy, there was also dualism in the associational realm, with the Europeans organizing their interests via the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (CFB, founded in 1904), a relatively powerful pressure group vis a vis the colonial state; and African producers joining locally-oriented welfare societies and cooperatives (the first being the North-West Rhodesia Farmers' Cooperative Society Limited, registered in 1914), which enjoyed a much lower organizational capacity, and occupied a much less

---

[1] For instance, Hellen reports that "in 1962 a scheme was inaugurated by Northern Rhodesian and Federal Governments which enabled the Europeans to voluntarily resettle on a farm-for-farm exchange basis wither on the line of rail or at Mkushi in the Central Province..." (1968: 175)

[2] "Largely," for as Bates notes, some African farmers also responded to the market for produce on the line of rail, growing and marketing crops to the industrial centers (1976:23).

influential position vis a vis the colonial government.

The CFB (precursor to the present-day Zambia National Farmer's Union) was founded in 1904 by European farmers in Zambia's Eastern Province. The Bureau had an easy time of it during the pre-independence period; as an important source of support for the colonial government, farmers were able to gain a pricing policy which resulted in a level of production far in excess of national demand. The government assisted farmers in selling the excess on external markets, offsetting the frequent losses with public revenues (Bates 1976:122). After 1964, however, commercial farmers lost this priveleged political position and the policy influence that went with it.[3]

Independence brought a marked change for Africans as well, and especially for their associations. The new UNIP government's official policy was to coordinate rapid development of the rural peasant agricultural sector through considerable state support. The mechanism for the distribution of resources was to be a network of cooperative societies, thus:

> "The *Northern News* reported on 18 January that "the President called on all unemployed in Zambia to form themselves into cooperative societies and to put their various skills to work on the agriculutural and construction projects planned." President Kaunda declared: "The money is there and the know-how is there. You can form these cooperative societies anywhere in Zambia and we shall assist you in getting on" (C. Stephen Lombard, quoted in Bates:1976, 111).

---

[3] Thus, for instance, the UNIP government abandoned the above policy and implemented instead policies which encouraged production only for the national market. This reduced the attractive price farmers had previously enjoyed for maize production, and began the first of many changes the commercial farming sector would make as it adjusted to the dictates of the new government, and its lack of influence over its policies.

The predominant form of organization among peasant producers, it should be noted that such cooperatives were not envisioned as autonomous groups with voluntary memberships, as was the status of the commercial farmer's associations– they thus had no mandate to pressure government in favor of peasant farmer interests. Rather, the cooperatives were from their beginnings in the First Republic organizations meant to coordinate government agricultural development policy. Importantly, not all rural farmers joined the cooperative schemes, some set themselves up as independent cash crop farmers (who were fortunate at first to enjoy the same supports as did members of the cooperatives). Though not dependent on the cooperatives (and thus, on Kaunda's UNIP party) for these resources, these farmers were "equally the creations of politics... for the majority of the farmers entered production by being selected, trained, and capitalized by public servants of the new African government" (ibid: 116).

Business

African trade before the colonial period in Zambia played an important part in some local economies, with a variety of goods and agricultural products being exchanged in a set of trade links that extended from both the Atlantic and Indian oceans into the interior (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979:34). However, European expansion into the territory soon undermined the traditional pattern of trade and by 1910 most trade was European hands. A notable exception, however, was Eastern Province, where the colonial administration allowed Indian merchants to conduct trade with Africans. Eventually they gained foothold in the rural areas of the South and finally along the line of rail to the Copperbelt and Northern Province. Through the prewar period, African trade continued to be marginalized due in part to increasing restrictions imposed by the colonial

government to protect European interests, and in part to competition from both European and Asian traders. Thus, in the 1930s and 1940s, most African commerce and trade took place largely in rural villages, where it was least profitable, though there were a small number of African businesses in the towns (ibid: 37). By the 1950's, several large markets had emerged in Lusaka and the Copperbelt where Africans bought and sold the necessities of everyday life, such as household goods, clothes, charcoal, produce, meats and fish.

In addition to enjoying a privileged market position through the colonial era, Europeans were also free to form associations to protect those interests. The first Chamber of Commerce in Zambia, the Lusaka Chamber, was founded in 1933. Other chambers formed in various industrial and commercial centers in the country, until in 1938 the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCOM) was formed as an umbrella organization to coordinate activities between the local chambers. ASCOM was reborn as the Commercial and Industrial Association of Northern Rhodesia (COMINOR) in 1957. By the 1950's, Africans market traders had also begun to organize cooperative associations to further their collective interests, and in 1956 a substantial association to protect African marketeers' interests, the Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative Society Limited, was founded.

Independence changed the economic arena considerably, while again leaving the associational arena in the business sector intact. President Kaunda's Mulungushi address in 1968 began the nationalization of large parts of the economy, not only making it legal for Africans to engage in trade and commerce, but going so far as to limit certain activities, such as building-material extraction and wholesale trade in smaller towns, to only African involvement. The unsurprising result was the rapid growth of an African

business sector in the entire range of enterprises from small trader to large industrialist in the late 1960s.

3.2.3 Summary: Origins of Organizing

In all three sectors during the colonial period, then, circumstance and active manipulations brought about a racially-defined dualism in both the economy and economic society. In the industrial arena, there was a European Mineworkers Union (EMU) and an African Mineworkers Union (AMU), with members of the former enjoying more skilled positions and a much higher standard of living in the mines than the latter. In the agricultural sector, there was a Commercial Farmers' Bureau, representing the interests of European farmers, and locally-oriented cooperative associations organized around African peasant producers. Members of the former engaged in large-scale and lucrative agricultural production while members of the latter engaged in small-scale subsistence agriculture and were restricted from engaging in commercial production. The business sector reflected this same divide; several well-organized Chambers of Commerce and Industry organized and represented European businessmen, while locally-based market cooperative societies brought together African traders and marketeers.

With independence in 1965, the economic situation changed markedly, with first the dismantling of the color-bar and a few years later the nationalization of the economy under the Mulungushi accords. However, since the new government and ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), adopted a pluralist constitution, the associational arena progressed into the First Republic largely intact, with the exception of the UNIP government's establishment of a new single apex organization for the trade unions.

3.3 The State and the Organization of Interests: Institutional Analysis of State Response

3.3.1 The Move to Corporatism Under the One-Party State

The implementation of the one-party state in 1972 had widespread repercussions for interest organizations in Zambia, as it marked the transition from pluralist institutions to state-corporatism in state-society relations. Most importantly, the ideology supporting the one-party state called for the absorption of many types of associations into the Party structure. As Akwetey notes, "state corporatism in Zambia took the form of a fusion of the institutions of the state with the UNIP and civic and interest organisations (1994:48). This was part of a general trend to centralize political control in the hands of the Party, and more specifically, President Kaunda. For while Kaunda had governed in consultation with his cabinet, party colleagues, and key civil servants, immediately following Independence, during the 1970's a growing presidentialism in government and a centralization of party power in Kaunda's hands (Gulhati 1989, 26-27) increasingly made him the "big man" of Zambian politics (see also Gertzel 1984).

Independence in 1964 had made it necessary for the new African ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to shore up key political constituencies among the African population. Most prominent among these were mineworkers and urban residents, followed by a large and impoverished peasantry. It was thus critical for UNIP to gain the allegiance of the trade unions and the cooperatives, and it was these that the adoption of corporatist institutions was meant to capture.[4] Other groups (e.g. the

[4] The banning of political organizations other than UNIP also aided the state in warding off a dangerous politicization of interest associations, as for example when the Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative Society splintered into pro-UNIP groups and pro-ANC groups in mid-1964.

CFB and the ZNNCI) were allowed to maintain the autonomy they'd garnered during the pluralist era, but this was non-threatening to the UNIP regime due to the relative political irrelevance of their constituencies to the developmental state. In the ensuing section, we examine the key changes to associational activity in agriculture, labor, and business brought on by the advent of the one-party state. As we'll show, several of these developments were critical in the aligning of interests to support the transition in 1991.

Agriculture in the One-Party State

The goal to subsume social and economic organizations and bend them to the purpose of UNIP's development agenda was perhaps best realised in the agricultural cooperative movement, institutionalized by the Cooperative Act of 1970. ZCF was formed in 1973 as a federal cooperative society to coordinate the activities of local primary cooperatives. As an apex organization, ZCF gained prominence in the mid-1970's, resulting in a move by the ruling party to coopt the organization and affiliate it to the party as a "mass organization." UNIP's argument was that affiliation would give ZCF an opportunity to influence policy decisions when they were drafted in the Central Committee. However, the price paid was the loss of autonomy: ZCF was granted only one out of 25 seats on the Committee, while the organization was obliged to abide by all Committee decisions.

During the 1980's, the ZCF grew exponentially as increasing responsibilities in the agricultural sector were assigned to it by the UNIP government: Provincial Cooperative Unions (PCU's) were formed in every province, regardless of their viability and the drain on ZCF resources; NAMBOARD was liquidated and all of its functions transferred to ZCF, including the transfer of all rural marketing depots to ZCF's member Primary

Cooperative Societies; District Cooperative Unions (DCU's) were formed in any district producing a specified amount of maize, essentially to carry out agricultural marketing activities already assigned to the PCU's, thus draining resources further and creating an additional level of bureaucracy. Government's plan was for primary societies to provide credit, and DCUs and PCUs to provide marketing opportunities, all closely monitored by government officials. Hence, before 1991, government gave pronouncements which dictated projects and plans to the cooperatives, allowing no negotiation. The Department of Marketing and Cooperatives, within the Department of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries, signed the checks for fund disbursal to the cooperatives, and sent an official to all meetings that were held (Nakaponda-Sakala, 1997). Importantly, these developments were the result of government directives, resulting in the feeling among cooperative members and the public that cooperatives were owned and operated by the government, and obligated to provide resources to members (Nakaponda-Sakala 1996:8-9). And as a consequence of the close relationship of the cooperative leadership with Party officials, the ZCF came to be seen as a patronage channel for UNIP, delivering the support of the rural constituency to the government in exchange for agricultural inputs and marketing structures.

As for the persistently European-dominated CFB, while it was not coopted by government in the same way the trade unions and cooperatives were, it was a key fixture in government's control of the command economy. For example, it coordinated the government's single channel market system (and was thereby able to collect levies on production from its members, an important component of its substantial organizational capacity), it was responsible for negotiating with government on farmers' behalf in the

fixing of agricultural prices, and membership in the organization was necessary to obtain foreign exchange. Organizationally, the CFB benefitted from its position vis a vis the UNIP government, though its members were ideologically against the economic policies of the one-party state, and were ready to support movements toward economic if not political reform.

The Labour Movement

Though commercial farmers and private business were significantly outside the official organs of the one-party system, organized labors' position was somewhat more ambiguous: the workers were part of the urban constituency that benefitted from UNIP's patronage, but their leadership was opposed to party dominance of the trade union movement. The Labour and Industrial Act of 1971, which replaced the voluntarist elements of labour policy with mandatory provisions, sought to centralize control over the labour movement by instituting a "one industry, one union" principle, and amalgamating all unions under an "apex" organization, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Akwetey 1994:47, see also Meebelo 1986 and Rakner 1992). The UNIP government envisaged this move as one which would extend its control through the branches of the unions to workers throughout the country. While ZCTU was never formally affiliated to UNIP as a "mass organization," under the UNIP Constitution it was given representation on both the National Council and the General Conference. However, ZCTU was not permitted representation on the Central Committee, where government policy was deliberated and decided upon; for reasons Kaunda made clear in the following statement:

> "The ZCTU as a people's organisation is responsible to the party and comes under the discipline of the party. It is the duty of the ZCTU to pursue the Party's programmes and to implement Party policies because the Party is supreme over the ZCTU and other national institutions (*Zambia Information Service,* 10/10/75).

The election of two "youthful leaders" in 1974-75 thwarted this, the party's vision for trade unionism. Akwetey argues the "election of these two youthful leaders together with other young trade unionists, marked an important shift in leadership style and orientation" (1974). Both Newstead Zimba, elected Secretary-General of ZCTU in 1974, and Frederick Chiluba, elected Chairman-General in 1975, belonged to a new generation of trade unionists, one that differed from the "old guard" in its lack of attachment to UNIP and its goal to strengthen the ZCTU and trade unions against UNIP coercion. The trained leadership of these trade unionists, together with an educated workforce, assured financial position, and institutionalized decision-making framework, enhanced the organisational capability of the ZCTU; and gave force to its bid for substantial autonomy from the party combined with genuine participation in the policy-making process.

Throughout the 1980's, ZCTU's leadership consistently resisted UNIP's efforts to coopt them into either *de facto* or *de jure* organs of the party. Rather than acquiescing to wholescale implementation of UNIP policy, the ZCTU criticized policies they viewed as deleterious to workers' interests, and continually took workers' side in demands for higher wages and their recourse to illegal strike action. The import of this stance became apparent in 1981, when 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 workers occurred, and Chiluba, Zimba, and others were placed in detention for six months. This, together with Chiluba and Zimba's refusal to serve on the Central Committee when appointed to it in 1989, consolidated their stature as leaders of a growing opposition to UNIP and the one-party state (Akwetey 1994, see also Bratton 1992).

Business

As noted above, the organizing of African business interests before independence was mostly carried out by marketeers' cooperative societies. However, with the Mulungushi accords of 1968, access to business opportunities for Africans were fundamentally improved. In addition, the election of 1973 marked the emergence of a substantial number of Members of Parliament with business interests, thus marking a "rise to political prominence of a Zambian business class" (Baylies and Szeftel 1984:59). In this election, at least a quarter of all new, non-incumbent candidates were "soley classifiable as businessmen[1]" (see Figure 3.1), and data available for candidates in the 1978 election suggests that these tendencies observed in 1973 had continued (ibid:67). The relationship between property owners and the one-party state was a complex two-way process: on one side, it involved the entry of businessmen into Parliament and local councils through elections, while on the other it entailed the acquisition of business interests by those in party and state positions, and exit from such positions into private enterprise (ibid:69-70).

Baylies and Szeftel note that this process resulted in a growing strength of the indigenous business lobby, reinforced not only by the expanding business interests of high level state officials, but also by the strongly increased presence of businessmen within Parliament. Alongside these developments, organizations of indigenous businessmen, in particular the Zambia African Traders Association (ZATA) and later the Zambian National Council of Commerce and Industry (ZNCCI), Zambia Builders Association (ZBA), and the United Taxi Association, were gaining increased credibility through the 1970's. These two developments together laid the groundwork for the development of a significant indigenous business lobby. Though only half of the Lusaka and rural businessmen active

in Zambia at the time were members of these business groups, the more successful businessmen joined in disproportionate numbers to the less successful. According to Beveridrge and Oberschall, these groups actively lobbied government on at least three issues: the attempt to persuade government to impose regulations which limited opportunities in their sector to their members, the reversal of government policy on price controls, and the improvement of funding together with a detailed program for the takeover of ex-patriate businesses (1979:266). Alongside the African ZNNCI, ex-patriate groups continued to operate and attempt to influence government, including the Chambers of Commerce and local affiliates, the Association of Manufacturers (founded in the mid-1980's), the Motor Trades Association, and the Masterbuilders Association.[5] However, both African and ex-patriate groups had limited influence over the socialist-oriented policies of the UNIP government, and remained well aware during this period of the degree to which they were politically dependent on the party for access to the state.

The final group to be considered under this category is the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE). Founded in 1955, the Association's stated objective was to provide for the "establishment, promotion, development and maintenance of good relations between employers and employees throughout Zambia, and to promote productivity through industrial peace." The 1971 Industrial Relations Act made the organization the sole umbrella group for employers' associations in Zambia and legally mandated the ZFE to represent employers in negotiations with trade unions and government as part of the Tripartite Council. During the Second Republic, ZFE's membership and hence leadership)

[5]Interestingly, Beveridge and Oberschall point to the fact that while no Europeans or Asians joined the African associations during this period, several substantial African businessmen belonged to the expatriate associations (1979:258).

was primarily comprised of employers from the parastatal sector; since these positions were an important resource for the UNIP patronage machine, the organization and its members were more closely tied to the interests of the government than the ZNCCI or the local Chambers of Commerce.

3.4 Summary: The Effects of Corporatism on Economic Organizations

The advent of the one-party state brought important changes to the institutional and political environment of Zambian interest groups. In the agricultural sector, both peasant cooperatives and commercial farmers were brought into collaboration with the state, though in different ways. Subsistence and small-scale African producers in the cooperative schemes were brought into the patronage machine of the ruling party through its control of productive inputs and marketing outlets. Commercial farmer organizations (mostly ex-patriate) were beholden to the state for influence over pricing and the distribution of foreign exchange. Though many individual small-scale farmers had disagreements with the state over the lack of investment in the agricultural sector and the corresponding lack of resources available to them, and though most commercial farmers were ideologically against the socialist economic policies of the state, both of their organizations had stakes in the maintenance of the one-party state.

Such was also the case with business associations. For African business associations, the economic dirigisme practiced by the one-party state opened up productive opportunities (such as ownership in the privately-run taxi sector, or management of new government parastatals) never before realized. Individuals might have had complaints with specific policies, and indeed the organization actively lobbied for some policy positions which opposed official state policy, but the organizations themselves

benefitted from their position vis a vis the state.

Only in the industrial sector did organizations have the political power, reason, and capacity necessary to actively maintain a separate and almost oppositional relationship with the state. Repeated attempts of the UNIP regime to coopt the labor movement ran headlong into the trade union movement's capable organizational structure and well-developed appreciation for autonomy from *any* government.

3.5 An Institutional Framework for Interest Representation in the Second Republic

What is the most useful way to capture the economic and political distinctions between the different interest groups which have emerged in Zambia? There are three clear economic sectors in Zambia which represent distinct categories: agriculture, business and labor. But there are also distinctions within these broad sectors which have potentially important implications for all three characteristics of interest groups that are the subject of this study, i.e. membership incentives, organizational resources, and policy influence. The distinctions within economic sectors include such categories of economic actors as: commercial farmers, peasant farmers, small traders, parastatal managers, international corporations, miners, construction workers, and civil servants. Table 3.4 supplements Table 3.1 given above, to include categorization of the interest groups that have emerged in the Second Republic (see column III), as discussed in the previous section.

Table 3.4
Economic Sectors and their Interest Groups , 1965-1991

I Sector	II Actors Involved in Sector	III Group Which Represents Actors
Agriculture	Commercial Farmers Emergent Farmers Subsistence Farmers	CFB CFB / ZCF ZCF
Mining	Workers (miners, etc) Managers	MUZ (ZCTU) ZFE
Manufacturing	Workers Managers Businessmen	ZCTU & Affiliates ZFE & Affiliates ZNCCI
Trade & Services	Workers Managers Businessmen	ZCTU & Affiliates ZFE & Affiliates ZNCCI

Note: CFB~Commercial Farmer's Bureau, ZCF~Zambia Cooperative Federation, MUZ~Mineworkers Union of Zambia, ZCTU~Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, ZFE~Zambia Federation of Employers, ZNCCI~Zambia National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

As Bianchi argues, interest groups are best understood and analyzed in the context of "hybrid systems" of interest representation. He and other scholars find that the case is often a mixing of pluralist with corporatist structures; we argue that in Zambia, the case is primarily a mixing of *neopatrimonial state corporatism* with *quasi-pluralism.* The prefix "quasi" is necessary here, because the pluralist form of interest representation requires a *pluralist* regime, with the accompanying guarantees for civic and political rights, and the existence of a healthy multi-party system[6] and autonomous legislature,[7] which the interest

[6] An integral part of Schmitter's partial "electoral regime."

[7] An integral part of Schmitter's partial "representational regime."

representation system[8] is able to make use of in interactions with the state. Especially important are the ways in which groups in pluralist systems are able to use multi-party competition to their advantage when seeking influence over government policy; not only can groups wield financial and political (i.e. their link to electoral constituencies) pull to persuade policy makers, they can also turn to parties of similar ideological orientation for support. Where these mechanisms are absent, it does not make sense to speak of "pluralist" interest representation; groups may still form voluntarily, but will not gain access to decision-makers except through channels controlled by the government; especially in one-party regimes, the electoral and partisan incentives for government to negotiate over key policy issues is crucially absent.

The term *neopatrimonial state-corporatism* is also necessary, as specific state-society relationships are at least partially determined by the logic of politics, in this case, neopatrimonialism. In Zambia, the practice of neopatrimonial politics in the Second Republic gave shape to the particular corporatist and pluralist-like policies practiced by the state. Kaunda's highly centrist presidential rule, backed by his homemade-brand of African socialism, Humanism, created a situation in which the UNIP-state actively sought a corporatist-type control and monopolization of social and economic groups. However, as is characteristic in neopatrimonial regimes, the state did not have the administrative capacity to achieve the full incorporation of societal groups into Party structures. Rent-seeking opportunities and patronage rewards were used instead to cajole important interests to toe the line of UNIP's development objectives and resulting economic policies.

---

[8] An integral part of Schmitter's partial "pressure regime"

The ideology of the one-party state in Zambia, as well as other post-colonial states in Africa, implies that the state will at least *attempt* control over *all* societal interests and groups; the spaces in which it does not succeed are defined by the capacity and ability of that sector (or the groups within it) to successfully negotiate a conciliatory– but never *competitive*– relationship with the state. In Zambia, three distinct types of relationships can be seen to have developed during the Second Republic, based on two variables: a) the perceived need of the state to control the economic sector, and b) the capacity / ability of groups within the sector to resist incorporation. Where the state sought control, *neopatrimonial corporatist* ties developed. In sectors which the state did not deem important to its objectives, *quasi-pluralism* took root. Furthermore, within the *neocorporatist block,* two types can be seen to have emerged: *"state-dominated corporatism,"* in which groups did not evince the capacity / ability to resist control by the state, and *"state-negotiated corporatism,"* in which groups were able to maintain a degree of autonomy from the state. Economic interest groups in Zambia can be thus divided into three categories, as illustrated by Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.6
Typology of Interest Representation System in Zambia's Third Republic

		State seeks control over sector?	
		Yes *State-corporatist*	No
Society resists control?	Yes *Autonomous*	I *State-negotiated Corporatism*	III *Quasi-pluralist*
	No *Coopted*	II *State-dominated Corporatism*	IV (Not applicable)

The interest groups given in Table 3.4 can be categorized using the above schema. We begin with consideration of the state-corporatist column (cells I & II). As discussed in Chapter Two, Schmitter makes the point that this sub-type of corporatism is "dependent and penetrated by the state, imposed from above as the state seeks to establish control over society." Singular peak organizations arise due to state-imposed decrees, organizational structures are hierarchical in response to state-decreed centralization and administrative dependence, and state control over leadership and interest articulation emerge as the product of an assymetric imposition by the state. With the exception of the latter factor, *state control over leadership and interest articulation,* all of these characteristics aptly describe the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).

The distinguishing point between the nature of the relationship between the ZCF and the one-party state, and the ZCTU and ZFE and the one-party state, was the degree to which the state was successful in coopting these organizations. In the case of the ZCF, the account given in Section 3.3 above indicates that the state was fairly successful in its ability to control the cooperative movement, to the point that many cooperators believed the ZCF was a government agency. The relationship was thus a *dominated* state corporatist one. This agricultural category of interest group was the only economic group to fall into this type of relationship with the state; although other societal groups could also be placed here, especially the UNIP's "mass organizations" such as women and youth groups. In the case of the ZCTU and ZFE, however, the state was not as successful; especially in the case of the ZCTU, there is evidence that the organization enjoyed substantial autonomy from state interests, and thus maintained a *negotiated* relationship

with the state during the Second Republic. This can also be argued to be the case for the ZFE, although here the case is less clear. As pointed out above, although the employers in the association depended on the parastatals (and thus the government) for their jobs, there were several cases in which the Federation did not support official state policy at the Tripartite meetings.

The third category, *quasi-pluralism*, (cell III) applies to cases where the government did not seek to control the economic sector, and the organizations in that sector thus enjoyed varying levels of autonomy from the state. This applies to the local Chamber movement, as well as to the ZNCCI, due to Kaunda's ambiguous stance toward the private business sector and its organizations. Due to his suspicion of their anti-Humanist tendencies, as well as to the position of important businessmen in the Party and Legislature, the UNIP regime never really supported nor suppressed private business.

The same held true for commercial farmer associations affiliated to the CFB. Here, the reason lay largely in the small size of the sector (800 commercial farmers to 600,000 peasant farmers at one point), and the fact that most commercial farmers (though not all) were white, expatriate, or both. Thus, the population in this economic sector did not pose much of a threat as a political constituency. The sector was *economically* of interest to the state, as it did make meager contributions to export earnings, and more importantly, produced the staple food crop which fed the population the regime *was* interested in; the state therefore included the CFB in agricultural pricing negotiations and control of foreign exchange for the sector. However, the internal workings of the commercial farmer organizations were left to the organizations to manage. Hence, business organizations and commercial farmer associations maintained a quasi-pluralist

relationship to the state; they were free to form, memberships were voluntary, they lacked the government-imposed, hierarchical organizational pattern of the Cooperative Federation and Congress of Trade Unions, and the UNIP regime seemed uninterested in controlling their operations.

Table 3.5 summarizes these relationships, by economic sector, while Figure 3.3 places Zambia's major interest groups in the schema developed above.

Table 3.5
A Political-Economic Theoretical Framework for the Development of Economic Interests, 1965-1991

I Sector	II Actors Involved in Sector	III Group Which Represents Actors	IV Relationship of Group to State
Agriculture	Commercial Farmers Emergent Farmers Subsistence Farmers	CFB CFB / ZCF ZCF	Quasi-Pluralist State-dominated Corporatist
Mining	Workers Managers	MUZ (ZCTU) ZFE	State-negotiated Corporatist State-negotiated Corporatist
Manufacturing	Workers Managers Businessmen	ZCTU & Affiliates ZFE & Affiliates ZNCCI	State-negotiated Corporatist State-negotiated Corporatist Quasi-Pluralist
Trade & Services	Workers Managers Businessmen	ZCTU & Affiliates ZFE & Affiliates ZNCCI	State-negotiated Corporatist State-negotiated Corporatist Quasi-Pluralist

Figure 3.7
Categorizing the Interest Group System in Zambia's Third Republic

Society resists control?	State seeks control over sector? Yes *State-corporatist*	No
Yes *Autonomous*	I *State-negotiated Corporatism* **ZCTU** **ZFE**	III *Quasi-pluralist* **ZNCCI** **CFB**
No *Coopted*	II *State-dominated Corporatism* **ZCF**	IV (Not applicable)

3.6 Conclusion

There are at least two reasons why it is important to specify the type of interest representation system when conducting a study of interest groups and the development of pluralism. First, the literature on interest groups in Africa is quite thin compared to other world regions, and good empirical work requires sound theorizing. Second, the dual reform process underway in Zambia's Third Republic portends to introduce political and economic institutions which are significantly different than those of the Second Republic, and which we hypothesize will have implications on interest group activity in Zambia. Since we hypothesize that interest group activity in the pluralist Third Republic is affected by two variables, economic sector and institutional history, it's necessary to characterize the variation found between interest groups in the Second Republic in terms of these variables, in order to analyze their effects on membership incentives, on organizational resources, and on influence strategies, in the Third Republic. Before turning to these

analyses, however, we first address the ecology of the emerging interest group system in the Third Republic. Which groups have survived and which new groups have emerged? How do groups relate to one another in the new system? And, whose interests are represented?

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECOLOGY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

Ecology: 1. The study of the relationships of organisms to their physical environment and to one another. The branch of biology dealing with the relations and interactions between organisms and their environment, including other organisms. 2. Also called human ecology. the branch of sociology concerned with the spacing and interdependence of people and institutions.

4.1 Introduction

The histories of the major economic interest groups in Zambia were introduced in Chapter Three. We argued that the evolution of state-society relations in the Second Republic produced three main types of relationships between the UNIP one-party state and economic interest groups: state-dominated corporatism, state-negotiated corporatism, and quasi-pluralism. We also argued that two factors explain why different groups developed one of these three types of relationship to the state: a) the importance of the economic sector to state interests, and b) the capacity for groups to resist state cooptation. We now turn to examine the development of these relationships in the Third Republic. As we pointed out in Chapter Two, the critical junction between the Second

and Third Republics has been the adoption of dual reform processes; in the political arena, the centrism of the one-party state has been replaced with the institutions of pluralism and multi-party democracy, while in the economic arena, the state-owned sector and command economy have been reformed by privatization and economic liberalization policies. The questions we seek to address in this chapter are: How has the previous interest group system in the Second Republic weathered the transition to the Third Republic– do the same groups exist or have new ones emerged to challenge / take their place? How have groups been affected by the political and economic changes of the early 1990's? What are the broad outlines of the new system in terms of group coordination, competition, and the inclusiveness of economic interests within the system? Finally, given that the political reforms of the transition broke apart corporatist relations between the UNIP state and economic interest groups, *de jure across the board,* how have different groups adapted– and are they affected by their institutional legacy?

To address these questions, we here examine the universe, or "ecology," of interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic. This section provides description of the major national groups within each sector, and analysis of the changing institutional environments in which they operate. First, we describe the context in which state-society relations are changing in the Third Republic. We then examine the ecology of the economic interest group system, at the national level, and the individual groups within it. To highlight the expected differences between groups' former-institutional relationship to the state and current developments in the Third Republic, we subdivide this section by the categories developed in Chapter Three: state-dominated corporatism, state-negotiated corporatism, and quasi-pluralism, followed by a section on new groups that have emerged. We then

look at the broad outlines of the new group system, in terms of inter-group coordination, competition, and inclusiveness. We conclude with analysis of the group system in the Third Republic, and the prospects for pluralist development it portends.

4.2 The political-economic context of interest group development in the Third Republic

To summarize the thesis thus far, in Zambia's Second Republic, the representational relationship between the state and society was mainly one of state corporatism, involving the attempted merging of the institutions of the state with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and civic and interest organizations. Where the UNIP state succeeded in its attempts to coopt and control, organizations in civil society tended to lose their autonomy and independence; in some cases, they were even compelled to take up affiliated membership in the ruling party. Such affiliation meant they were brought under the control of the ruling party and government, and their activities were required to conform to the Constitution and rules of the party (Mushota 1990:31). The transition to a liberalized polity and economy in 1991 formally brought about a more pluralistic representational arena: specifically, it dissolved the corporative relationship between the ruling party and civil society groups, and encouraged new groups to form freely under constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech and association.

Ideologically, too, the new regime publicly espoused the philosophy of pluralist democracy. The ideas for liberalization of the economy and release of government from the single party's control were first articulated at the National Conference for Multi-Party Option. At the Conference, a series of speakers decried the bankruptcy of the one-party

state and advocated liberalization of the economy and the development of truly plural and democratic politics (see Mbikusita-Lewanika & Chitala 1990). Dr. Remmy Mushota (who was to later become Minister for Legal Affairs for the MMD government) delivered an important address in which he identified five means of institutionalizing democracy: citizenship, the right to vote, the electoral system, political parties, and interest groups. Remmy argued that in a democracy,

> "it is essentially imperative that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes do make it desirable that citizens be allowed and encouraged through the law to join together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests" (Lewanika & Chitala 1990:30).

This passage captures the spirit of the liberalized viewpoint of state-society relations later enshrined in the MMD Manifesto. However, neither Mushota nor other speakers at the Conference had a specific formula for ensuring that such groups would indeed gain influence where government activity "touches (their) likes and interests." Similarly, the MMD Campaign Manifesto does not address how the interface between the private sector and the public / government sector is to actually take place. While the economic policies to be promoted are laid down in broad strokes, with some sections including reference to "facilitating regular institutional consultation between the Chambers of Commerce, government and Labour leaders on various socio-economic matters" (Manifesto 1996:8) or MMD's intention to "open its doors to the labor movement as a legitimate and important partner in development" (Chanda 1992:75), no mention is made of establishing institutions to provide for the inclusion of stakeholders in actual policy determination. It seems this omission is at least partially intentional; as an officer in the Cabinet Office related, the government views the MMD Manifesto as the

basis for government policy... "when the people voted MMD into power, they (the MMD) assumed that the manifesto represented what people want. The Party therefore wants to implement the Manifesto. The government can't be over-influenced by interest groups in this regard"[1]. However, he points out that the government is willing to compromise; as an example, he gave the lowering of VAT in the 1997 budget from 20% to 17.5%, and remarked, "to us, that indicates influence from the private sector" (ibid). Thus, groups can hope for influence around the edges of the MMD's main economic policies, but the basis, the tenets of the Manifesto, are seemingly not open to debate.

These tenets of the Manifesto give the broad outlines of the MMD government's economic reform program. Table 4.1 gives the main points of the Manifesto with respect to economic policy, while Table 4.2 gives the Policy Framework Paper agreed to with the World Bank in 1990 by the UNIP regime, and adopted by the MMD upon its election in 1991.

[1] Interview with Chresta Kaluba, 6/25/97.

Table 4.1
Main Points of the MMD Government's Campaign Manifesto, with Regard to Economic Policy
(from Section 3: Socio-Economic Perspectives)

Heading	Key Points
a) "Enabling Environment"	"The MMD is determined to bring about a new era of opportunity of economic policy realism which rewards and motivates individual initiative... The MMD is committed to creating an enabling environment for economic development in Zambia by implementing a balanced structural adjustment programme...
b) "Investor Confidence"	"The MMD is committed to building investor confidence and credibility in our country...
c) "Privatisation"	"The MMD is committed to privatisation... the current economic role of government as a central participant in business undertakings shall cease. Free market and not nationalization will become the foundation stone..."
d) "Monetary Policy"	"The MMD will pursue policies which will encourage savings and investments. The MMD's exchange rate policy favours natural depreciation of the kwacha..."
e) "Budgetary Issues"	"The MMD shall adopt strict financial management and sound budgetary control. The chronic budget deficits... shall be arrested by streamlining the public service... adopting more effective methods of tax collection; broadening the tax base; selling off as many state-owned enterprises as possible; selling excess stocks of government houses...

Source: MMD Manifesto 1996: 8-9

Table 4.2
Main Economic Reforms, World Bank Policy Framework Paper, 1990

a	Price decontrols of all products (except maize) and inputs
b	Exchange rate adjustment in real terms and elimination of exchange rate restrictions
c	Liberalization of export and import trade, while providing export incentives
d	Fiscal austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit and control inflation
e	Monetary policy measures to adjust interest rates and tighten monetary policy
f	Reform of public investment program to focus on resource allocation to priority sectors and programs
g	Reform of civil service and parastatals to improve efficiency and performance
h	A privatization program

Source: World Bank, Public Expenditure Review of Zambia,1992:6, quoted in van de Walle and Chiwele, 1997:27

Among these reforms, the MMD identified the attainment of macroeconomic stabilization as its most immediate objective (Rakner 1998:89, McPherson 1995). To bring down inflation, the government instituted monetary and fiscal reforms to cut fiscal deficits, reduce growth in the money supply, and decrease the budget deficit by cutting government expenditures and increasing its revenues. This resulted in a sharp reduction in government subsidies, the implementation of a cash-based budgeting system, improvement of revenue collection, and a reduction in the international debt burden through renewed agreements with the international donor community (Rakner 1989:89). According to Rakner's thesis, the MMD government was able to implement such potentially unpopular policies such as the removal of subsidies (especially on maize, which in 1991 constituted

nearly 17 per cent of the government's total budget), and the privatization of parastatal industries[2] in the first few years of its reign (the "honeymoon period"), due to the popular mandate and electoral legitimacy it enjoyed from its victory in the 1991 election. In Zambia, in fact, the new regime used the "honeymoon period" to rapidly implement a wide range of reforms, with little or no consultation of economic interest groups, leading Rakner to conclude: "the initial implementation of the economic reforms was carried out in a rather autocratic fashion" (1998:118).

As van de Walle and Chiwele point out in their study of democratization and economic reform in Zambia, these policies and the economic crisis they were meant to address intrinsically have potential winners and losers. For instance, Zambia's worsening economic situation served to erode the strength of unions: "the high levels of unemployment, the shaky balance of payments situation and the unsustainable government budget deficit all weaken organized labor's bargaining position" (1994: 22). In addition, the successful privatization of the majority of parastatal industries in Zambia has resulted in increasing levels of unemployment as new owners streamline business operations and inefficient companies go out of business altogether; a point which, again, weakens labor's position. In the business sector, certain reforms such as the cash budget and privatization enjoy support from the entire community, but other reforms, such as trade liberalization, split trading sector businesses and manufacturers (ibid)– both of whom are often members in the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. And in the farming sector, many commercial farmers welcome market reforms, while many peasant farmers struggle with the cessation

[2] In 1991, the parastatal sector accounted for 80% of GDP, with 160 public enterprises under government ownership, employing some 140,000 staff" (van de Walle and Chiwele 1994:38).

of government subsidized inputs and government-coordinated marketing arrangements.[3]

Politically, too, interest groups face advantages and disadvantages in the new environment of the Third Republic. Groups which had worked closely with the UNIP regime, such as the Cooperative Federation, now find their former political patron in the opposition; while groups which had supported the MMD regime, such as business interests and the trade union movement, might be expected to find political allies in the new government. Furthermore, the neopatrimonial nature of politics in Zambia still permeates its institutions; a strong presidency continues to dominate a weak legislature and dependent judiciary, the MMD gives lip service to the *idea* of encouraging political competition in a pluralistic political arena while in practice it maneuvers to limit real competition as much as possible, and the political elite rule through networks of personal loyalty. In recognition, perhaps, that the political game hasn't changed all that much, all of the group leaders interviewed for this study insisted that their group was not only *non-partisan*, but *non-political*– and thus, nothing resembling a potential threat to an overly-sensitive government which often does not distinguish between the act of opposing a particular policy and opposing the government who made it. As we'll see below, this ruse works for some groups better than others.

Thus, the institutional environment in the Third Republic is one which potentially offers economic interest groups new opportunities for organizing and influencing government, even as economic reform measures shake up their standing and position in

---

[3] "Most of all, the process of removing a set of, albeit poorly functioning state monopolies, with decentralized private networks resulted tremendous dislocations for the large majority of rural small scale producers. For this group, state subsidies for maize production had become the only social welfare mechanism from the state" (Rakner 1998:108).

the economy, vis-a-vis each other and the government. Throwing a large shadow over the picture is the MMD government's approach to implementing the many reform objectives it has embarked upon. Our next question is thus: in this uncertain and continually-evolving institutional environment, how is the interest group system shaping up?

4.3 The Ecology of National Economic Interest Groups in the Third Republic

The interest group system in the Third Republic displays signs of both continuity and change. All of the national organizations discussed in Chapter Three have weathered the transition, though some have emerged bearing different names and / or re-cast images. In the business sector, the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) has replaced the ZNNCI, while the CFB underwent a name change in 1992 to become the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU). Though no longer a "mass organization" of UNIP, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) remains the apex organization of a vast, though diminishing, network of cooperatives. And in the industrial relations sectors, both the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE) remain the apex organizations for their affiliated unions and employers' associations, and the government's sole partners in the Tripartite Council.

As expected, the newly pluralist environment has encouraged the development of new groups in addition to the old; in the agricultural sector, two new apex national organizations have emerged to represent small farmers interests, and a move is underway to create a national organization to coordinate the efforts of emerging Provincial Business Associations, which seek to organize small- and medium- scale commerce and industry. In addition, the number of local affiliates of some of these groups (especially ZACCI and ZNFU) is also increasing, drawing new populations and interests into the formal interest

group system. As stated above, we use our typology of the previous institutional relationships of these groups to the state, to guide our analysis of the ecology of the new group system.

4.3.1 State-Dominated Corporatist Groups

The Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)

In the Third Republic, the ZCF has been most significantly impacted by the Agricultural Strategic Investment Program (ASIP), initiated in June 1995 as the Government's official policy for liberalizing agricultural production and marketing, and the revising of the Cooperative Act of 1970, which defined the UNIP regime's policy toward small-scale agriculture. Addressing the 1995 National Cooperative Convention, President Chiluba made clear the differences between the former regime's policy toward small-scale agriculture and his own regime's vision (reflected in ASIP) for the sector. According to President Chiluba, the problems with the former cooperative movement were threefold: first, they were "formed from the top as a mater of government policy and only after was the membership recruited;" second, "and *this is what bothers me most*– the legal framework gave excessive powers to government to intervene unnecessarily in the management and operations of the cooperative enterprises;" and third, cooperatives were formed "not because of felt member needs but as a result of felt government needs, and so cooperatives were created to fulfill a government function and became a logical extension of the government bureaucracy" (ZCF– 6th National Cooperative Convention Report, 1995:15, emphasis added).

Ironically, President Chiluba complained that even as of 1995, not much had changed because the cooperatives were still regulated by the "outdated command oriented

Cooperative Societies Act," which he insisted needed to be changed (by his government, no less) so that cooperatives could be left "totally in the hands of cooperators." He hence publicly instructed his Minister of Agriculture to "ensure the outdated Act is duly amended" (ibid:16). To replace this dismal picture of the Second Republic's cooperative movement, Chiluba painted his vision of a cooperative movement "founded on the principles of democracy and voluntary membership," where cooperatives were able to deliver goods and services to their members, in an environment in which government's role would be solely to "ensure provision of the basic infrastructure necessary for ensuring smooth business operations... only going into those areas where the private sector cannot go." The flagship of his vision is the MMD's ASIP policy, whose main objective is to "stimulate accelerated development of the agricultural sector through the creation of a strong private sector" (ibid).

Both the new policy and political environments have proven difficult, however, for the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) to attain President Chiluba's vision. With the transition to the Third Republic in 1991, the cooperatives deaffiliated from UNIP and sought establishment as an autonomous and independent movement. As articulated by Cooperative Federation leaders, the Federation wanted to see the cooperative movement move away from top-down directives issued from government under the Cooperative Societies Act of 1970, and toward the genuine, member-based cooperative institutions lauded by President Chiluba. However, though the MMD Government has articulated similar objectives for the cooperative movement, the political will to change the Cooperative Act was notably missing as of the mid-1990's. As of October 1996, the Bill was still at Cabinet level for deliberation, and as of 1997, a final Draft Bill had yet to

emerge.

For the Federation, the main issues were the removal of powers of the Registrar of Societies, the cessation of Government involvement in cooperatives, and the revocation of government's unfettered powers to direct and dissolve cooperative boards. These points were included in a proposal the Federation made, upon government's request, to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries. However, the Ministry rejected the proposal as a "radical shift," and instead hired an F.A.O consultant to produce a new, "more acceptable" draft, which the Federation in turn rejected, as it retained the power of the Registrar to monitor primary societies. In the words of an exasperated ZCF official, "cooperatives must be private institutions, and should be allowed to run their affairs on their own. Government claims it is protecting the rights of the members... but in fact, it still has arbitrary power over the cooperatives" (Kajimanga 10/1/97).

From the perspective of ZCF officials, their previous affiliation to UNIP has caused the MMD government to regard them as sympathetic to the political opposition; government was thus unwilling to work with the ZCF's national leaders. To illustrate, in his welcoming speech at the 6th National Cooperative Convention in August 1995, Chairman Chilala first thanked President Chiluba for addressing the conference, then informed him that:

> "We have on several occasions indicated to government that we feel very much discriminated against as a cooperative sector. We are the only sector still regulated by an outdated rather authoritative cooperative societies act... We have on several occasions presented our proposals to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries, but no action seems to be taken towards amending the Act."

Chairman Chilala went on to report to the President that the Cooperative Federation did not "appreciate" the government perpetuating a negative image of the

cooperative movement and advising donors and investors not to deal with them, they felt it unfair that ASIP rural investment fund announcements mentioned farmers' associations but not cooperatives,[4] and they also found it unfair that they had become the last to be considered for government contracts. Indeed, the Federation's misgivings seemed to be well-founded... in mid-June of 1996, the Swedish Cooperative Center withdrew more then K600 million from the Cooperative Development Programme it ran jointly with the Federation since 1982, and donor funds as of 1996 comprised only 1% of the Federation's funding. Of course, it doesn't help their political image that the Federation's President, Mr. Benny Tetamashimba, is also the Member of Parliament from Solwezi West, and a member of the National Party. Unfortunately, this political point outweighs the potential benefit of having an MP for President: in January 1997, the Federation drafted a "Project Proposal for a Workshop for Parliamentarians in Zambia," with the aim of dialoguing with MPs over the redrafting of the Cooperative Act. As of September 1997, however, they were still waiting for Parliament to set a date for the Workshop to take place.

Despite the contentious environment they find in the Third Republic, however, several leaders within the ZCF were still struggling to maintain the cooperative movement for the benefit of small-scale farmers and other producers. In addition to the problems above was the problem of membership: as mentioned on numerous occasions in official ZCF policy documents, the corporatist relationship that the cooperatives had with the one-party state in the Second Republic had created a "shallow membership incentive," and caused a "dependency syndrome" of cooperatives on government. As a result, despite the

[4] The ASIP specifically names the farmers' associations of the National Farmers' Union, the National Association of Peasant and Small-scale Farmers, and the Peasant Farmers' Union as organizations to be represented in the DAC's– but pointedly, not the cooperatives.

fact that the MMD government had ceased funding the Federation, the perception that joining a cooperative was simply a way to access government resources persisted among farmers, foiling the attempt to transform cooperatives into private "business" institutions (Nakaponda-Sakala, 1997). Finally, the ZCF faces accusations of widespread corruption and scandals over its handling of cooperative resources. Hence, while the extensive system of cooperative societies and sub-national units still existed on paper by the mid 1990's, many cooperatives had gone defunct and one of the most well-developed organizational networks in the country had become, on paper at least, bankrupt.

4.3.2 State-Negotiated Corporatist Sector Groups

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)

The story of the ZCTU's experience in the Third Republic begins at the very inception of the regime , for the ZCTU played an integral role in the establishment of the MMD. Derrick Chitala, who together with Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika organized the campaign that later became the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, writes:

> "after concretizing the tentative operational framework of the Alliance for Democracy and Development, the very first act in our campaign required that we link our efforts against the one party state tyranny with other individuals and institutions that had shown a resolve to campaign for multi-party democracy in our country. At the very onset, we identified the ZCTU and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga as the most probable allies" (Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala, 1990:vi).

Mbikusita-Lewanika and Chitala subsequently met with Newstead Zimba and Frederick Chiluba, who agreed to work with the Alliance to organize a National Conference. Charged with the task of creating a "broad coalition of multi party democracy activities," the Conference was held in July 1990.

ZCTU was nominated to serve on the National Interim Committee of the

Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, and was closely involved with mobilizing a campaign for the MMD previous to the elections of 1991. The Union was engaged in the following activities toward that end: the mobilization of all District Committees and all national unions to provide logistical structural support, extensive campaigning tours of all districts and Provincial Centers by ZCTU and national union leaders, and mass education campaigns to educate workers on the importance of democratizing government. The fact that the President as well as several other political leaders in the new MMD government emerged from the trade union movement bears testimony to the role that the labour movement played in promoting the advent of the MMD government. The following list gives the individuals who transferred from the ranks of the trade union movement to prominent positions in the new MMD government:

F.T.J. Chiluba,	Chairman General, ZCTU ->	President of the Republic of Zambia
N.L. Zimba,	Secretary General, ZCTU ->	Minister of Labour and Social Security
C.M. Sampa,	Asst. Secretary General, ZCTU ->	Minister of Home Affairs
H. Kabika	National Chairman, CSUZ ->	Deputy Minister of Home Affairs
K. G. Sheng/amo,	General Secretary, MUZ ->	Deputy Minister of Finance
G. Mandani,	General Secretary, CSUZ ->	Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Security

One might expect that with so many trade unionists in the new government, the ZCTU was in for an easy time. Since the transition in 1991, however, this has not been the case; rather, the institutional environment in the industrial sector has been in a state of uncertainty due to wrangling between the MMD government and the ZCTU over the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, a dispute which has its origin in the waning years of the Second Republic. Since conflicts over the Act affect the position of the ZCTU

and the ZFE as organizations representing the interests of workers and employers, we here delve briefly into the details of this very political conflict.

At the time of the ZCTU's founding in 1965, the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance was amended to provide for obligatory affiliation of any trade union to the Congress. This provision was withheld when the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) was enacted in 1971 (CAP 517 of the Laws of Zambia, amended 1973, 1990, and 1993), setting the institutional environment of the industrial sector. The Act stipulates a one-industry-one-union policy, allowing one umbrella organization to legally represent trade unions (the ZCTU) and one organization to legally represent employers (the ZFE). Affiliation of unions and employers' associations to the apex organizations is mandatory under the Act; in addition, it stipulates a compulsory check-off system. By thus providing the apex organizations with sure and plentiful funding, the statute has promoted the development of strong organizational capacity for the trade union movement, especially when compared to other interest sectors. The Act also institutionalizes access to labour policy decision making for the apex organizations, through the auspices of the "Tripartite Council." Again, this gives the unions better regular, formalized access to government than organizations in the business and agricultural sectors, though as we'll discuss in Chapter Seven, "access" does not necessarily translate to "influence."

Several studies (Liatto 1989, Rakner, 1993) point to the fact that by the early 1980's, the ZCTU had emerged as the closest thing to an organized opposition to UNIP that the one-party state would allow. This was in marked contrast to the role that the ZCTU had played in the seventies; according to Bates's study, the ZCTU cooperated with UNIP after independence in trying to bend the interests of members away from personal

consumption to production for 'national development' (Rakner 1993). Rakner argues that by the early 1980's, however, ZCTU had become "the focus of resistance to government policies" (1993:93), in effect echoing members' objections to declining economic conditions and the introduction of the Local Government Act.

The UNIP Government responded, in 1985, with a move to reign in the labor movement: the passing of *Statutory Instruments No 6* was meant to revoke the compulsory check-off system which gave the apex associations steady income flows. This was repelled by strong resistance from both the ZCTU and ZFE, resulting in Tripartite Meetings rejecting proposed amendments to the IRA in 1985, 1988, and 1989. Finally, in 1989, the UNIP government acted unilaterally in sending the Draft Bill to the National Assembly. This Bill later became the 1990 Industrial Relations Act, which allowed the formation of more than one trade union in an industry-- a development which again, both unions and employers were firmly against. The new Act abolished both mandatory affiliation to the apex organizations and the mandatory check-off system, and the Minister of Labour and Labour Commission were given considerable discretionary powers. Repeal of the IRA (1990) became a main plank in ZCTU's support for the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. Hence, when the MMD came to power in November 1991, the tripartite partners agreed to revert to the policy of one union, one industry. The Industrial Relations Act of 1990 was hence later repealed and replaced by the Industrial and Labour Relations Act of 1993.

Since that time, however, the ZCTU has become increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the MMD governments' policies, resulting in a split in the leadership of the apex organization in 1994 over the Congress's relationship with MMD, with the anti-

government faction winning control of the ZCTU. Subsequently, the MMD government has made clear its objective to again abolish the one union, one industry provision, and to do away with the ZCTU and ZFE's position as the only legal apex organizations. The unions especially are finding it difficult to resist, for the "one industry, one union" principle conflicts with two important International Labour Organization conventions, No. 87 and No. 98, which the Zambian government ratified in 1994. While agreeing in principle with the ILO mandate, both unions and employers are wary of allowing the representational arena to fragment; for a multiplicity of groups means fewer members in each group, and thus a decrease of bargaining power and decline in funding for all groups.[5]

The political conflict between pro-MMD unions and unions critical of the MMD has resulted in seismic shifts in the industrial interest arena. Principal among these was the de-affiliation of four of the ZCTU's largest members in 1994: the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW) and Zambia National Union of Teachers. At issue were the elections of the Executive Board at the Ninth Quadrennial Congress, held in October 1994: ZCTU Chairman General Fackson Shamenda and ZCTU General Secretary Alec Chirwa were faced by Francis Kunda from MUZ and ZCTU Assistant Secretary General Geoffrey Alikipo in a "fierce challenge" for

---

[5]As of April 1997, the technical committee assigned by the Tripartite Council to assess the proposed changes were proposing that the offending clause be modified to give the Labour Commissioner (a civil servant, not a politician) power to limit the number of unions (interview with Hang'andu, 16/4/97). This is to be accomplished by passing regulations which allow only organizations with 51% or more of the total membership of a given industry to engage in collective bargaining. This would ostensibly create a competitive arena for the representation of industrial interests; unions would have to fight for members in a given industry, and an incentive to prevent over-fragmentation of groups would exist. Theoretically, unions not possessing enough members to be the official "collective bargainer" would still be able to provide worker's education and lobby government on behalf of their members. However, the incentive to join and pay dues to a group outside the collective bargaining process is not a compelling one.

control of the Congress. According to Mr. Shamenda, "government was instigating moves to have him and Mr Chirwa removed from ZCTU in order to install "yes men" to head the labour movement... the State was not happy with the position that ZCTU had taken on SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) as the labour movement was persistently criticizing Government for its wholesale acceptance of the IMF and World Bank tailored SAP" ("ZCTU Split: What Happened?":2). When Shamenda and Chirwa emerged the victors at the Quadrennial Congress, Kunda charged that there was "irrefutable evidence that some high-ranking politicians in the National Party had sponsored some candidates in the ZCTU elections.... and that some government Ministers (specifically the Minister of Labour and Social Security) had openly campaigned for these candidates" (ibid:6). Kunda subsequently announced the de-affiliation of MUZ from the Congress, and was later joined by the other unions named above. Some time later, the NUCIW reaffiliated to the Congress, while the National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers deaffiliated.

However, the issue has continued to plague the union movement, and highlights the strained relationship that has developed between the MMD government and the union's main apex organization, the ZCTU. A headline in the government-owned Times of Zambia proclaimed in 1997, "Splinter unions are mushrooming!" The article went on to gush, "and it is power galore for those who are able to create positions for themselves. Greed, abuse of office, misappropriation of members contributions, dictatorial tendencies are said to be some of the major reasons for a myriad of splinters in the trade union movement" (Times of Zambia, 3/10/97). It was reported that the vice-president of the ZCTU was caught in a scandal, accused of abusing his office and misappropriating

members' contributions in his position as general secretary of the Electrical and Allied Workers Union (ZEAWU). One thousand ZEAWU members it was reported, had petitioned to have him removed. ZCTU deputy general secretary Mr. Kasumbu was quoted in the article, however, as saying that government was planting dissidents in their organizations in a bid to weaken them... "Government doesn't want a strong union. And since it has money, it sponsors a few people to bring confusion into the union" (ibid). In the same article, the president of ZCTU, Mr. Shamenda, was also quoted in an attack on the government's ratification of ILO conventions 87 and 98, claiming the new law to allow a multiplicity of trade unions was "oppressive." Government-sponsored or not, the splinter-phenomenon continued to rock the labor movement throughout the period, as trade unions split, reformed, left the ZCTU, then came back to its fold.

At the Civil Servant's Union annual conference in 1997, the issue came to a head. ZCTU's President Shamenda declared the honeymoon for unions with the government was over. "If we are not careful, we shall be sidelined. Let us unite because these people in leadership were once with us and know how to weaken us" (Times of Zambia, 1/26/97). Secretary General Chirwa chimed in that government was indirectly supporting breakaway unions through its ratification of conventions that allow splinter unions (i.e. ILO conventions 89 and 97). "What else can one conclude when the same people who once called for "One Union, One Industry" now allow divisions? Workers, just like the union as a whole, who expected a lot from the MMD government now wonder why they campaigned and voted for MMD in 1991 elections" (ibid). On the one hand, this bodes well for the development of pluralism, for it demonstrates the ZCTU's continued willingness to exercise its autonomy and criticize government where it sees fit. On the

other, however, the increasingly acrimonious relationship between the ZCTU and the MMD government poses important problems for policy lobbying. This is a point that has been noted by other civil society leaders. For example, Alfred Zulu, president of the Zambia Independent Media (ZIMT), a well-respected civil society organization, accused the ZCTU of failing to define its role and a meaningful policy in the Third Republic, and of no longer being an organization which represented workers. Only a few leaders in the unions, he charged, were still committed to the cause of the workers, but even these were frustrated by those who were aspiring to attain government positions (The Post, 3/14/97). The Post's editor was less friendly:

> "ZCTU is displaying a very serious lack of leadership, spine and direction. These weaknesses can be directly attributable to Shamenda's failure to assert himself as a leader. He appears either unwilling or incapable of standing up to his erstwhile bosses and colleagues now in government. And Shamenda has not been helped by Chirwa's clear flirtation with, and concealed support for, the MMD... The ZCTU is simply not ticking" (ibid).

Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)

The Congress's counterpart in the industrial sector continues to be the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE), founded in 1955. As with the trade unions, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act made the organization the sole umbrella group for employers' associations in Zambia and legally mandated the ZFE to represent employers in negotiations with trade unions and government as part of the Tripartite Council. However, in sharp contrast with the Congress of Trade Unions, the Federation has pointedly avoided any semblance of political conflict with the MMD government. During the Second Republic, ZFE's membership was primarily comprised of employers from the parastatal sector; however, with privatization this situation has changed in the Third

Republic. The primary focus of the ZFE continues to be labour relations and collective bargaining, although the organization has been working to expand its advocacy role (Kroes 1994). While the ZFE has joined with the ZCTU in opposition to several government policy positions, most notably the government's proposed pension scheme, the Federation has maintained a much more conciliatory position overall with the MMD government. And unlike the trade union movement, the employer's associations did not begin to splinter and threaten to leave the Federation when the law ending its representational monopoly was passed.

A good illustration of the amiable relationship between the ZFE and the MMD government is ZFE President Simenda's (who was the chairman of Zambia Postal Corporation at the time, one of the few non-privatized parastatals left in the Third Republic) pointed effort to publicly support the 35% gratuity that MPs had voted themselves in 1997: "The 35% gratuity is welcome. We feel that MPs and Ministers do a lot of work and deserve attractive gratuity. There is nothing wrong with attractive packages as long as government can pay" (Times of Zambia, 3/31/97). The ZCTU and Lawyers Association of Zambia, however, were incensed at the gratuity issue, complaining that the government had other priorities that were more pressing. Just a month before, the ZCTU had called for a reduction in Cabinet Ministers' allowances "in conformity with the need to reduce expenditures in the budget... belt-tightening should be extended to political leaders who currently received hefty allowances... and are worth millions" (Times of Zambia 2/1/97).

4.3.3 Former Quasi-Pluralist Sector Groups

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)

Officially formed in 1991, and organizational successor to the Zambia National Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZNCCI), ZACCI is the first "apex" organization to bring together local Chambers of Commerce from across the country. ZACCI's main constituency is large-scale and corporate business, though medium-scale businesses are encouraged to gain membership through the several local chambers. The ZACCI headquarter is located in the capital city of Lusaka, close to Parliament, and only a short drive or telephone call from important Ministries. A relatively large secretariat provides services to members and coordinates policy lobbying efforts; spokesmen from ZACCI issues statements and participate in interviews, and thus appear often in the press and sometime in the evening broadcast news.

As discussed in Chapter Two, key figures in the business sector played important roles in supporting the transition to multi-party politics and the victory of the MMD. Not surprisingly, the Association reports that the transition has had positive consequences for the Association; as the ZACCI's economic officer tells it: "From 1993 to 1994 MMD really listened to business; (Ministers) Patel and Kasonde were especially relevant."[6] However, this supportive environment seems to rest to a great extent on the government personnel involved; thus, Simemba went on to remark that "the new Minister (Penza) is not as receptive. ZACCI's increase with government has lately been decreasing, though we still have an obvious imprint on the budget."

---

[6] Interview with Moses Simemba, 25 October 1996.

The reference to specific Ministers in assessing the relationship between the government and associations belies the continuing importance of personal relationships in the Third Republic (between ZACCI members and Ministers, the Bank Governor, the ZRA, and Permanent Secretaries); according to a prominent Board member of ZACCI, "we need to keep our friendships in good repair" (interview with Theo Bull 10/25/96). Bull's further comments at the ZACCI board meeting in January 1997, are instructive of the importance of these personal relationships to the relationship between individual groups and government. At the board meeting, it was learned that Kw9.5 billion had not reached the roads board and so roadwork had stopped. The funds were apparently unaccounted for– the money was presumed "stuck" somewhere in the Ministry of Finance. Bull commented "this is the sort of thing that needs personal clout, letters don't work. Someone senior, such as Mr. Chabwera, needs to do something, needs to seek an appointment directly with Minister Penza" (ibid). Whether such a meeting can be arranged thus matters much to group's attempt to lobby policy-makers.

On this note, ZACCI apparently has notable access to influential politicians in the Third Republic. For example, the chairman of ZACCI, George Chabwera, reported at a board meeting that he had spoke with and had written to the Minister of Labor and Social Security, about ZACCI's position on the National Pension Scheme. The Minister responded with a request that ZACCI make an official submission for the amendment process of the bill. On another occassion, several members of Parliament came to the ZACCI board meeting to communicate with board members: Hon. Badat (Kafue), Hon. Chewe (Kabwe), Hon. Vernon Mwanga (Roan), Hon. Mutukwa (Nyroro). An issue came up over ZACCI's attempt to make submissions to Parliament on the Pension Act. The

Members responded with an invitation for ZACCI members to come and observe Parliamentary debates (though, as we'll see below, there are serious obstacles to this actually taking place). The Hon. Mwanga further pointed out to ZACCI board members that " in most legislation lately that creates boards, we include ZACCI" (see Table 4.3 for list). In addition, ZACCI fairly regularly meets with various Ministers in "Inter-ministerial meetings" arranged by the Association's secretariat.

Table 4.3: ZACCI's Representation on Boards and Committees *(September 1997)*

Board or Committee	**ZACCI Representative**
Zampost	Caroline Linehan
Securities and Exchange Commission	Muna Hantuba
Zambia Privatization Agency	Abel Mkandawire
Zambia Privatization Trust Fund	David Matongo
Environmental Council of Zambia	Gerry George Chabwera
Enterprise Development Fund	Gerry George Chabwera
Central Board of Health	Gerry Geroge Chabwera
Export Board of Zambia	R.J. Patel
Zambia Trade Fair	R.J. Patel
Copperbelt University Council	Tom Kamwendo
Copperbelt University Council	Murray Sanderson
Industrial Training Center	Theo Bull
Department of Technical Educaiton and Vocational Training	Theo Bull
SADC Mining Committee	Theo Bull
National Roads Board	Heather Chalcraft
Matching Grant Scheme	Gaudenzio Rossi
Zambia Railways	R.B. Desai
Zambia Competition Commission	A. M. Sinyangwe
National Economic Advisory Committee	Mebelo Mutukwa

Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU)

The transition to multi-party politics and the dismantling of the command economy have also had important implications for the Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU or

NFU). During the Second Republic, the Union enjoyed a well-defined target population and clear position in the political economy: it gave voice to a small, homogenous population of commercial farmers and negotiated the place of this small private sector in the larger command economy of the one-party state. As a result of these two factors, the Union wielded considerable incentives for membership: since it coordinated the government's single channel market system for the crops its members produced, it was able to collect levies on production directly from its members. In addition, it was responsible for negotiating with government on farmers' behalf in the fixing of agricultural prices, and membership in the Union was necessary for commercial farmers to obtain foreign exchange. The economic reforms accompanying the political transition did away with this important membership incentive. At the same time, the political transition to a pluralist, multi-party state was also of consequence. As an official Union policy statement states:

> "... it became clear that the Union would be called upon to play a much larger role in lobbying for good agricultural policy than it had been allowed before, while the needs of particularly the small scale sector for effective organization were now greater under a liberalized regime than they had ever been in a command economy (ZNFU "Overview of Policies, page 1).

The ZNFU thus implemented a "smallholder scheme" aimed at pulling this important political constituency under its umbrella. The official Project Document states the reasoning behind the move:

> "The small scale farmer has no organization to speak for him at the National level. Government policy over the last three years has tended towards the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Policy without consideration of its effects upon the individual small scale farmer. It is vital that this situation is revised. Until now, the ZNFU has spoken for the small scale farmer by default – because there has been no other body to do so. The lobbying capacity of the ZNFU in this respect is limited by the disproportionately small number of small scale farmers in its membership. Once this balance is restored the Union

> will have a very powerful voice with which to influence government policy to the benefit of the small scale grower... Many small scale farmers have specific problems associated with their district. This may be the lack of adequate banking facilities, a poor road network, specific disease problems, or problems of land tenure... Lobbying on such matters has always been of considerable benefit to commercial farmers. It is hoped that through the proposed amendment of Union structure, these benefits may now also be enjoyed by the small scale sector, who have until now lacked any coherent lobbying capacity" (ZNFU Smallholder Development Project Document).

However, though recognizing the necessity of expanding its membership base– and thus the scope of interests that it represents– the ZNFU makes clear there are boundaries to that base. Thus,

> "the Union is fundamentally concerned only with the well being of its members and potential members. The ZNFU does not consider the activities of farmers who do not have the capacity to pay membership subscriptions to be within its terms of reference. (How) many farmers does this description currently cover? Of the 600,000 "farmers" noted by Government, approximately 150,000 traditionally received credit, were able to use fertiliser and could therefore produce a marketable surplus. The remainder– at least 400,000– have been effectively producing on a subsistence basis... (It is the former) who will be able to pay a subscription to the Union that the Union can support and provide a voice for. The Union must in the long term be sustainably run on membership subscriptions and can only attempt to service those that it can cost effectively support. Those who fall outside of this description must be looked after by Government or Charities. *The Union is not a Charity*" (ZNFU "Overview of Policies," emphasis mine).

The policy document goes on to make clear the ideology behind this stance: "... farmers are businessmen, who by and large espouse the principles of capitalism" (ZNFU "Overview of Policies"). It is the ZNFU's "capitalist" ideology which distinguishes it in important ways from other organizations whose aim is to organize small-scale farmers.

The National Farmers' Union's attempts to target small-scale farmers in fact illuminate two important by-products of the transition's institutional changes: first, the re-defining of political constituencies, and second, the re-introduction of competition in the organizational arena. As the quote above suggests, the Union recognizes that the political environment has changed, and hence the nature of its relationship to the state. In an environment in which politicians are seeking to build solid majorities, the sliver of

population the Union has historically represented is more a liability than an asset: "with a total membership of less than half a percent of all farmers in the country, and a disproportionate number of commercial farmer members, it is hard to be convincing. The need to expand membership and make the Union more representative of the sector is clear" (ZNFU Smallholder Development Project Policy Statement). While the ZNFU benefits from its pro-economic reform stance in an economy that is avowedly "liberalizing," important political constituencies are against that reform, and they speak with a broader, if less organized voice. Interestingly, the Union has realized a paradox: while it now enjoys much improved opportunities for lobbying over the direction of agricultural policy than was possible in the Second Republic, political liberalization has made the lobbying arena much more competitive. In this arena, the Union has staked out a position as a private-sector lobbyist for farmers *who see farming as a "business,"*[7] and as such, it runs headlong into those groups and politicians representing the interests of farmers who still rely on state subsidies and market coordination.

The Union's "capitalist" orientation at first won high points with the new MMD government. Like ZACCI, the NFU initially had a cooperative relationship with the new government, due in no small part to the first MMD Minister of Agriculture, Guy Scott, being a prominent commercial farmer. However, the appointment of Edith Nawakwi to the post in 1997 signaled a change in the Union's fortunes. By the time of the Annual Congress in April 1997, the Union's President Vashee felt it prudent to strongly make the point that the Union supported the Government but was not its lackey. In his welcoming

[7] Direct quote from George Gray, executive director of the ZNFU.

address at the Annual Congress, April 1997, President of the association spoke directly to President Chiluba (who was supposed to attend the meeting but at the last minute did not pitch up) with three points, which boiled down to: 1) here's what the ZNFU *can and will* do for Zambia, here's what the Union *does not and will not do*, and here's what the Union hoped Government would be able to do for farmers." In a nutshell, according to the President's speech, the Union would support market liberalization and help smaller farmers through it by providing them extension services, it would promote farmer-owned marketing companies to deal with the gap left by the demise of NAMBOARD, it would disseminate information to farmers via its radio program and publications, it would use its ample capacity to help government formulate agricultural policy. However, it would NOT support government in "unsustainable" "politicized" credit schemes, nor would it "feed the nation." This latter point was in response to a comment by Minister Nawakwi shortly before the meeting, and Vashee stated the Union's position quite strongly: "the Union does not believe that Zambian Farmers have a duty to feed the Nation. Every citizen must be prepared to pay the economic cost of food and it is unrealistic to expect the farmer to subsidise the consumer or to grow food crops at a loss. Instead, Sir, we believe it is Government's duty to create an environment in which the farmer *wants and is able* to feed the Nation, *because it is the most profitable thing to do.*" President's Chiluba's absence from the meeting, however, was a good indicator of Government's response; it spoke volumes about the state of the government's relationship with the Union by the mid-1990's.

The NFU's dampened relationship with the government is well-illustrated by the unfolding events over the Agricultural Strategic Investment Program (ASIP). Given the

ASIP policy objectives outlined by President Chiluba in his speech to the Cooperative Federation in 1995, it would appear that the NFU's organizational directives were right in line with the Government's. However, problems with the implementation of the plan quickly emerged. Perhaps most importantly, according to the ZNFU's analysis, 85% of the US$350 million that was expected to be put into the program would be actually be used for public sector expenditure ("i.e. it will be spent by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry") and less than $50million would in reality flow to the private sector. The Union articulated its concerns to government at the initiation of the plan in 1996. Government responded positively by inviting the Union to assume the Vice Chair of the ASIP Steering Committee. In that position, the Union worked to increase private sector representation on the Committee and brought about the introduction of District Agricultural Committees, which served to bring together farmers, extensions workers and officials at the local level, and channel their input to the Steering Committee, with the intent of ensuring that ASIP funds reached the rural beneficiaries they were meant for. Despite this maneuvering, as several local farmers' associations reported at the ZNFU Annual Congress: "it is very much feared that this most talked about program will only be a trickle when it reaches the farmers" (Mr. Nymann-Jorgensen, Choma/Kalomo Farmers Association); and "up to date, no meaningful benefits from ASIP has been achieved by my farmers" (Mr. Mwenya, Kasama Farmers Association). In 1997, the Programme was taken off-line for "review," the Steering Committee and District Agricultural Committees were put on hold, and the NFU lost an important channel through which to influence policy.

4.3.4 New Groups on the Scene

ZACCI faces a similar situation with respect to small and medium-scale commerce

and industry; its traditional membership is dominated by large-scale business and international corporations and their representatives, but under multi-party politics (in theory at least), numbers count. Though the ZACCI executive board recognizes the need to speak for as much of the business community as possible, bringing non-traditional members in has proven tricky. In response to the criticism that ZACCI does not represent or support the interests of small-scale businesses, donors have stepped in to coordinate coverage of small and medium- scale enterprises (SME's). Perhaps the most prominent program is that of USAID's Human Resources Development Project (HRDP), which has been trying to coordinate its efforts with ZACCI. The HRDP was established in 1993, originally under the auspices of the National Commission for Development Planning. In 1994, the project was moved to the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI). The Project focuses on Zambian owners and managers of small and medium-size enterprises, offering training in management and technical skills. Importantly, it does not provide credit to its participants; rather, in keeping with its "private sector" orientation, it assists entrepreneurs in applying for business loans from banks. The Project also liaises with the Export Board of Zambia to provide courses in export marketing for Small and Medium-scale Enterprises (SME's).

In 1996, concerned that small entrepreneurs lacked a collective voice in lobbying government for supportive policies, the HRDP initiated the creation of Provincial Business Associations (PBA's). The PBA's were spun off of the Project's training programs; thus, a training workshop would be held in a provincial town, and the participants would be encouraged to form an interest association. As of 1997, all nine provinces had registered a PBA with the MCTI. The Associations were meant to provide both a platform for the

articulation of the interests and concerns of small enterprises, as well as an organizational base from which to organize further training seminars. Though relatively new, PBAs have reported some success in attempts to lobby government: for example, the Southern Province association reported a meeting with "sympathetic" MP, Dr. Simujayi, and were trying to schedule further meetings with other MPs.[8]

The final organization relevant to the business sector (though it does not qualify as a "pressure" group) is the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO). State support to small-scale enterprises during the Second Republic was channeled through this parastatal. Like the cooperative movement, however, the organization was state-formed and state-directed; its purpose was to provide resources and training to small-scale industry, not to represent small-scale industry. A debt-ridden, poorly-functioning dinosaur of the Second Republic, it was slated for an overhaul in the Third Republic via the auspices of the Small-scale Enterprises Act, which had set up a new statutory body, the Small-scale Enterprise Association (SSEA) complete with a Small-scale Enterprise Directory, by 1997. The director of the PBA initiative, Max Sichula, perceives some of the incentives of this new act as encouraging for the prospect of organizing small-scale entrepreneurs through the HRDA-sponsored Provincial Business Associations. Sichula noted that the government-sponsored SSEA was struggling in its attempts to provide an apex organization for local associations, and felt that the budding PBAs could form the organizational basis to support a national organization from the ground up, one which could later merge with ZACCI to represent the interests of large and small-scale business

[8] Interview with Max Sichula, 6/24/97.

interests. Importantly, though donor-sponsored, the PBAs represent at least an attempt at a grass-roots mobilization of small-scale business enterprises.

In the agricultural sector, two groups have emerged to directly compete with the ZNFU for small-scale farmer attention, the Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), founded in 1995, and the National Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers of Zambia (NAPSF), founded in 1989 . The contrast between ZNFU ideology and that of the Peasant Farmers' Union is well illustrated by the latter's official goal: to address

> "the need to have a common voice on the improvement of our rural infrastructure, social and economic life in villages, (and to) remove the impediments to Agriculture growth or development in order to improve our systems of productions, on- Farm Storage, Transport and Marketing, through the use of our family labour, capital and land which is our natural heritage" (PFU Constitution, Preamble).

According to PFU President Kayeka, the PFU arose to organize small-scale farmers because the ZNFU didn't want to 'sensitize' rural farmers to belong to a farmers' trade union, and ZNFU representation was restricted to commercial farmers. Thus, when donor grants were channeled through the ZNFU, they reached only commercial farmers, and not farmers in the more remote areas. Kayeka argues that, unlike peasant farmers, commercial farmers are well-informed, have sustainable storage facilities, and they know production economics. "So our grievances and the grievances of the commercial farmers are not the same. We have no storage facilities, our farmers grow crops in darkness. Farmers in rural areas need to be educated on primary health-care, good food, good water, sanitation, recreational facilities, which commercial farmers already have... We must fight for overall quality of life. We are a trade union. We represent farmers as a trade union" (Interview with Mr. Kayeka, 6/26/97).

In its targeting of peasant farmers, the PFU seeks to fill the gap left by the demise

of the cooperative societies at the local level; to the extent that PFU leadership has publicly announced the organization will attempt to buy the bankrupt Lima Bank, which during the Second Republic handled agricultural loans. Toward this end, the Union started levying its members K60,000 (roughly US$50) each, with the promise that they would hold a share in the Bank once it was operating again. The idea behind the scheme is that a Union-owned Lima Bank would be able to dole out agricultural loans on the same terms as it did in the Second Republic, thus providing a solution to small-farmers inability to gain access to needed production inputs (i.e. fertilizer and seed).

According to Kayeka, the PFU's approach is to promote the understanding of farming *as an industry:* "we tell our members that farming is an industry, a business, just like mining is an industry. We tell our farmers we are no different from the miners," hence, the approach of the PFU to represent its members as a *union* (ibid). While the PFU thus claims to see farming "as a business," it seems a very different type of business than that promoted by the ZNFU; the picture that emerges from discussions with PFU leaders is that the PFU's philosophy of "business" and "industry" is more akin to the parastatals of the Second Republic than private business operating in a free market.

The final major contender for small-scale farmers' allegiance is the National Association for Peasants and Small-scale Farmers of Zambia (NAPSF), recently founded in 1989, but becoming active in 1994, to represent the interests of peasant and small-scale farmers (referred to hereafter as small farmers). Similar to the PFU, group leaders felt at that time that the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (precursor of ZNFU) didn't cater to the needs of peasant farmers, and that a separate organization was needed. In 1991, the ZNFU moved to change this perception (see above), and approached the Association to

negotiate a merger between the two organizations. The latter refused, believing the management style of the ZNFU to be inappropriate to the needs of their members; specifically, they felt that the ZNFU's member fee of 1% of production was not appropriate for small farmers who have no record-keeping capacity. At present, they maintain that there still exists a need for a separate association for representation of small farmers, but that a merger between themselves and the ZNFU might be possible in the future. According to Haachiinda:

> "in the rural areas, there are elites who understand ZNFU management. But there are others who don't. As of now the reach of the association is not to all corners. We should merge when we've developed our links to the sector we're interested in. With competition, we'll capture all members."[9]

The PFU has also approached NAPSSF to merge with its organization, but again, Haachiinda reports the management styles of the two organizations are different; for example, the President of the PFU didn't want to elect leaders of a merged association, but to "go by tradition" and assign the oldest members to the top positions-- which would mean that the PFU president became the president of a combined association. Also, NAPSSF doesn't want to get involved in the PFU's pledge of providing fertilizer and credit inputs to its members: "we won't make false promises... we don't want to toe the appeasement line." Finally, the NAPSSF disagreed with the PFU's plan to encourage its members to invest in the recently collapsed Lima Bank in order to make it solvent again. Overall, the NAPSF articulates an ideology much closer to that of the ZNFU than the PFU, though it's doubtful they would declare themselves "capitalists."

---

[9] Interview with Jones Haachiinda, 6/23/97.

4.4 Coordination and Competition in the Interest Group System

4.4.1 Inter-group coordination

Some coordination in group efforts over similar policy goals can be seen, especially between employers and labor during tripartite meetings, between the Federation of Employers (ZFE) and the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) where business interests are concerned, and between the ZACCI and the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), where commercial / corporate farming is concerned. Also important are "affiliations," for example, both the Employers (ZFE) and National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) are affiliated associates of the ZACCI; and the Farmers' Union (ZNFU) is also an affiliate of the Cooperative Federation (ZCF).

Specific examples of coordination in the Third Republic include the following incidents:

> • Employers Associations (i.e. business) and trade unions teamed up against government over the pensions scheme. Business and labor both agreed that they want choice over pension schemes, but the Minister of Labour refused to convene a working group to draft submissions for the final bill. An exasperated businessman commented: "this is going to end up like the Land Act, where Government acts completely autonomously from labor and commercial interests... ZACCI needs to work closely with the ZFE against this..."[10]

> • At a ZACCI executive board meeting, ZACCI Vice President Mukandawire remarked (3/10/97) that the "Minster of Agriculture (Nawakwi) is messing up the Ministry, something must be done. This lady is insulting commercial farmers– we must support ZNFU." The Executive Director of the NFU responded, "yes, farming must be emphasized as a business. The Minister claims that 'farmers must feed the nation.' This is a retrogressive position with lots of controls, bleak for farmers"[11]

4.4.2 Inter- and intra- group competition

In addition to occasionally coordinating efforts with others, groups also find they

---

[10] Interview with Theo Bull, 2/13/97.

[11] Interview with George Grey, 3/10/97.

must compete for both membership and official attention in the Third Republic. Such competition is relevant in three areas: between-sector, between-group, and within-group. We here consider group competition in that order.

The classic division between economic sectors in Zambia, made famous by several works by Robert Bates (1983), is the urban consumer - rural producer divide. The argument goes like this: since UNIP's most important– or at least most vocal– political constituency was the urban middle-class, and since the primary policy objective of that class is the availability of cheap maize for consumption, the government's economic policy during the Second Republic was to subsidize consumption in the urban areas at the expense of rural agricultural producers. From the perspective of the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), the MMD government's position in the Third Republic runs in the same direction. Citing the MMD government's disruption of the maize market in at least two ways, first through refusing to issue export permits for the first period of the marketing season, and second by issuing threats on several occasions to release stocks of maize or import foreign supplies if prices went "too high," the executive director of the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) drew the conclusion in 1997 that "it would appear that there is still a much greater concern to protect the interests of the consumer rather than those of the maize producer" (Report of the Executive Director at the Annual Congress, 4/97).

Importantly– and this is a point not expounded by Bates but relevant to this study– the classic "urban bias" thesis posits a division between economic sectors in the abstract– not between formal economic organizations. In this case, there is indeed organizational muscle behind agriculture's pro-producer-price position, but no organization to promote the preferences of the urban consumer-- though the role that this group plays as an

electoral constituency and the group's proven ability to engage in disruptive protests are considerable. If it is indeed true that the MMD Government continues to be slave to the "urban bias" in the Third Republic, it might be indication that formal organizational efforts lack the degree of influence they carry in other interest representation systems.

Within sectors, perhaps the most competitive arena for groups is the agricultural sector, where the issue of credit to small farmers is a rallying point for group leaders. Firmly espousing their support for market liberalization, the NFU's position is that it does not "directly engage in the supply of agricultural credit or inputs... These are functions which we believe should be best handled by commercial banks and other financial institutions on the one hand, and the developing commercial trading sector on the other" (Vashee, Annual Congress 1997). On the other hand, the organizers of the two national-level small-scale farmers associations perceive the direct supply of agricultural credit or inputs to farmers as their main policy-goal. Interestingly, the latter groups enjoy something of an advantage in this game, for waging battle for the populous and politically-lucrative population of small-scale farmers involves substantial ideological maneuvering for the "capitalist" ZNFU, while the small-scale farmers' associations can rely on the pre-existing "state-socialist" expectations of their audience, both the farmers they seek to organize and the government officials from whom the resources must come.

Finally, it is important to note that "group interests" are not a monolithic whole– interests compete for ascendancy within the group. An example of this are the exports-oriented firms which want zero duties/tariffs, while other companies (domestic producers, farmers) want protective tariffs. Another example are conflicts over the definition of products for tariff purposes. Zambezi Paper Mills, for instance, wants paper classified as a

"medium" product, but publishing companies in Zambia want to import high quality paper for production, and thus want it to be classified with as a "raw" material. ZAMEFA wants copper cables classified as "high", Zamtel wants them classified as "medium." Indian dairies want to import buttermilk as a raw material while farmers want it classified as medium to protect their dairy products. The ZACCI secretariat reports that they conduct surveys of group members to ascertain how much support there is for policy, and that official group policy thus represents a majority opinion (interview with Moses Simemba, 10/25/96). However, the struggle for ascendency is not always pretty. For instance, at ZACCI board meeting in January 1997, the economic committee chairman, Meebelo Mutukwa, reported that "it's obvious that banks are ripping us off (with 30% interest rates), doubling their profits every year. ZACCI as an organization needs to do something– banks should be investing in the economy." However, executive secretary Phiri complained that the BAZ are members of the board..."How do you want to tackle them?" Executive member Rossi remarked that there should be discussions between members of ZACCI, and executive member Bull recommended that there be a "consultative meeting in a pleasant atmosphere between ZACCI, the BAZ, and the BoZ to discuss the banking sector."

A final issue is the inter-organizational bargaining which goes on within the ZACCI board meetings, for instance in the dispute between the Shoprite corporation and local producers over Shoprites' refusal to use local produce and instead import produce for its stores. The local Kabwe chamber stepped in to coordinate Zambian farmers' efforts, then channel them up to ZACCI to discuss with the central Shoprite headquarters.

4.5 The Inclusion of Economic Interests

We have discussed above the current environment of the interest groups system above; Figure 4.1 (next page) illustrates it historically, showing important patterns in the developing ecology of the interest group system. The labor sector is marked by a steady expansion of trade unions throughout Zambia's history, beginning in the colonial era and continuing through both the First and Second Republics. By the time of the transition in 1991, most industries had been unionized, and legal statutes barred the formation of more than one union in any particular industry. A single apex organization, the ZCTU, coordinates the demands of the individual trade unions to the government in a stable institutional arrangement known as the Tripartite Council. The agricultural sector has a variegated evolution, starting with the formation of voluntary white farmers' groups and African cooperatives forming during the colonial administration and the first republic. With the advent of the one-party state, the Commercial Farmers' Bureau (CFB) emerged as the coordinating apex for local commercial farmer unions, while the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) was mandated to coordinate and control the development of cooperatives. Importantly, both types of groups remained "voluntary"-- members could join and leave as they liked. However, for the potential members of both groups, there were powerful economic and political incentives for membership created by the nature of the command economy. We will return to this issue in Chapter Five.

What is noteworthy is the proliferation of groups after the transition, after the previous incentives for both commercial farmer unions and small-farmer cooperatives had ended. Finally, in the private business sector, we see that there has been a continuous trickle of development of business associations, from the local Chambers of Commerce

Figure 4.1: Founding Dates of Surveyed Interest Groups in Zambia



AAW: Airways and Allied Workers Union of Zambia
AMU: African Mineworkers Union (later changed to MUZ~ Mineworkers Union of Zambia)
BAZ: Bankers Association of Zambia
BCS: Bbata Cooperative Society
CCC: Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CFB: Commercial Farmers' Bureau (in 1992 become the ZNFU)
CFA: Chipata Farmers' Association
CSUZ: Civil Servants Union of Zambia
EASF: Eastern Association of Small and Medium-Scale Farmers
EMU: European Mineworkers Union
KCC: Kitwe Chamber of Commerce and Industry
KPFU: Kabwe Peasant Farmers Union
LAMC: Lusaka African Marketeers Cooperative
LCCI: Lusaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry
LPBA: Luapula Provincial Business Asc
MFA: Mumbwa Farmers' Associatoin
MUZ: Mineworkers Union of Zambia
NAPPSF: National Association for Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers
NCC: Ndola Chamber of Commerce
NUBEG: National Union of Building Engineers and General Workers
NUPA: National Union of Public Administration Workers
PBA's: Provincial Business Associations
ZACC: Zambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ZAM: Zambia Association of Manufacturers
ZCF: Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZCFA: Zambia Customs and Forwarding Agents Association
ZFE: Zambia Federation of Employers
ZLCC: Zimba / Livingstone Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ZUFIA: Zambia Union of Financial and Insurance Workers

and Industry that developed in Lusaka and the mining towns, to the marketing cooperatives of small-scale business men and women. The one-party state aggregated the latter into the overall state-controlled cooperative structure, while the former struggled on under a state ideology that actively disfavored, but still allowed, the operation of private business interests. The Third Republic has seen renewed growth in business associations, with the newly-coordinated chamber movement (through the auspices of ZACCI) actively encouraging new chambers to form, and the donor-sponsored HRDA program sponsoring the formation of provincial associations for small-scale business in areas off the line of rail. The point that Figure 4.1 illustrates is that of the inclusiveness of economic interests in the group system in Zambia's Third Republic.

As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, there has been a marked increase of interest groups in the business and agricultural sectors in the Third Republic, but these are groups which are not always recruiting organizational neophytes as members. There has been a strong history of organization throughout Zambia's history; though most of it was state-sponsored and state-controlled. What is different is that the groups which survive and are born in the Third Republic are ones that can survive without state sponsorship, and this has important implications for whose interests get represented in the policy process. Relatively strong organizations have emerged and / or survived at the national level to articulate the interests of business (the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry, ZACCI), agriculture (the National Farmers' Union, ZNFU), and industrial relations (the two statutory groups representing the industrial sector, the Federation of Employers, ZFE, and the Congress of Trade Unions, ZCTU), and two less-strong associations have arisen to represent the interests of small-scale farmers to government (the PFU and NAPSSF).

The presence of these groups in the national arena, and the discussions above which outline their targeted audiences, indicate that the following groups of economic producers are represented by formal organizations which seek to influence government policy:

1. Owners of private businesses and representatives of corporations
2. Large-scale commercial and, to a lesser extent, small-scale farmers
3. Employers (i.e. private business owners or managers, and parastatal managers)
4. Workers who are formally employed.

On the flip side of that coin, the following groups of economic producers are not represented by formal organizations which seek to influence government policy:

1. Those employed or otherwise working in the informal sectors: tinkers, traders, etc.
2. Peasant farmers who don't produce a surplus.

It will be noted that the situation has not changed much in this regard, as the informal economy was not formally organized in the Second Republic. However, as indicated by Figure 4.2 and 4.3 (see next pages), and again by the discussion above, the interest group system is well-developed for formally employed labor and their employers. Unions and employers associations have existed for decades, actively involved in institutionalized dialogue with the government. While these groups do not always succeed in attaining their policy objectives, especially in the Third Republic their voice is organized and represented in national policy-making discussions. In the case of business and agriculture, large scale producers (i.e. corporations) are afforded greater presence in the policy decision-making organs of these groups. Both of the key groups in these sectors, the ZACCI and the ZNFU, recognize the importance of increasing the small-scale component of their memberships, primarily for political reasons, but the organizational

Figure 4.2: The Structure of the Economic Interest Group System in Zambia



Figure 4.3: Interest Groups in Zambia: Primary Units:

Business
Zambia Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)
Provincial Business Associations (PBA)

Agriculture
Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)
Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU)

Labor
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)

ZACCI	**PBA**	**ZCF**	**ZNFU**	**ZFE**	**ZCTU**
Local Chambers:	*Provincial Assoc's:*	*Provincial Unions:*	*Local Assoc's:*	*Companies:*	*Trade Unions:*
Chingola	Central	Central	Chadiza	215	AAWU
Chipata	Copperbelt	Copperbelt	Chinsali	companies	CSUZ
Kabwe	Eastern	Eastern	Chipata		GUZ
Kitwe	Luapula	Luapula	Chisanga		HCWUZ
Lusaka	Lusaka	Lusaka	Choma/Ka.		NUBEGW
Livingstone	Northern	Northern	Chongwe R.		NUCW
Ndola	Northwest.	Northwest.	Copperb.		NUPAW
Solwezi	Southern	Southern	East		NUPSW
	Western	Western	Copper.		NUTAW
			West		RWUZ
			Isoka		UZAWU
			Kaoma		ZEAWU
			Kabompo		ZNUHAW
			Kabwe		ZTWU
			Kasama		ZULAWU
			Katete		
			Luapula		
			Lundazi		*disaffiliated*
			Lusaka		MUZ
			West		ZUCIW
			Mbala		ZUFIAW
			Mkushi		ZNUT
			Monze		
			Mpika		
			Mpongwe		
			Mumbwa		
			Nchelenge		
			Nyimba		
			Petauke		
			Samfya		
			Serenje		
			Solwezi		
			Ukwimi		
			Zambezi		
			Zimba		

Note: the Peasant Farmers Union (PFU) and National Assoc. of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF) did not make available lists of their primary units.

structure of these groups implies a greater role for those who pay higher subscriptions. As one chamber member put it: "he who pays the piper calls the tune."

Where does this leave small-scale farmers and small-scale businesspeople? The former are actually the potential membership for at least three groups, the Zambian National Farmers Union, the National Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers Association, and the Peasant Farmers Union. All of these groups are interested only in those farmers who can produce a surplus, however; the ZNFU makes this point explicitly in policy documents, while the point remains implicit with the other two groups: since they exist to administer loans, it's obvious that they can only work with farmers able to produce a surplus and pay back the loan. Small-scale businesspeople are beginning to be organized by the donor-driven PBA, which seeks to develop the movement through local networking. This has the potential of not being freely inclusive, however.

Finally, where does this leave subsistence agricultural producers and the vast informal sector? A last sector to consider briefly here in the context of the inclusiveness of the interest group system is the lack of organization within perhaps the biggest employment category in the country, peasant farmers and those who work in the informal sector: traders, artisans, and other service providers, and the others who ply their trades in the country's numerous informal markets. Collective action for policy representation is understandably especially difficult in an arena in which producers are not even legally registered, and producers in this sector operate at such low margins it's not surprising that subscription-requiring groups haven't formed. Furthermore, the major economic interest groups in Zambia represent the interests of the minority of Zambians who participate in the formal economy– a constituency made up primarily of urban and rural elites. The

majority of Zambians fall in the subsistence agriculture and informal sectors– and organized or not, the weight of their sheer numbers are felt in the capital; for example, as a result of several protests over the provisions of services in the informal markets in Lusaka in 1997, the President set up a "desk" at State House to directly answer petitions from this sector. As of the late 1990's, however, neither subsistence farmers nor the informal sector had official organizational representation, i.e. no voice, at the policy level; a consequence of which can be sometimes violent public protest, as in 1997, when the market traders marched up Independence Avenue stoning cars. This is the dark-side of representation: the consequences of the absence of legitimate channels for the articulation of interests.

4.6 Conclusion

In general terms, the contours of the interest group system in the Third Republic weathered the transition nearly intact, but significantly altered. The corporatist ties between the state and key groups were broken, and some of the supporting institutions necessary for a pluralist interest group system were introduced. Confirming the expectations of pluralist theory, though there has not been an explosion of new groups in the system, there has been an increase, especially in local groups affiliated to the main national groups. As discussed, however, these groups continue to represent elite populations in the different economic sectors; the majority of peasant farmers and those active in the informal sector continue to lack political representation in the Third Republic. Patterns of interest-group coordination seem to accentuate elite ties, while patterns of interest-group conflict sometimes mirror the schism between groups representing the economic elite, who are well-integrated into the formal economy, and the smaller, less effective groups representing peasant agriculture.

Furthermore, as the analysis in this chapter demonstrates, the groups at the national level have not all been affected in the same ways by the new environment of the Third Republic. For example: while the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) are embroiled in struggles with the MMD government over the institutional arrangement defining their activities, the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) and the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) seem more able to focus their energies on their interactions with government over relevant economic policies. Four factors emerge from the analysis above as useful in explaining variation in the ecology of economic interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic: groups' prior institutional history, the effects of economic reform, and the continuation of neopatrimonial rule.

Prior institutional history

The analysis of interest group activity above suggests that groups' prior relationship with government in the Second Republic does effect their relationship with government, and subsequently the scope and success of their activities, in the Third Republic. Thus, the Cooperative Federation has had difficulties both with the new regime and with its own attempts to reform and reorganize the cooperative movement, at least in part because it was formerly integrated into the former ruling party, and continues to attract the attention of rent-seeking entrepreneurs and politicians. Having been "dominated" by the state, it is especially tricky for this sector to negotiate a pluralist arrangement with the state in the Third Republic. As we've seen, though the MMD government speaks publicly about a free and unfettered cooperative movement, in practice they seem reticent to change the rules that would make it so, and put an end the various

mechanisms that allow government to keep control over its operations. Though largely bankrupt, the ZCF nonetheless remains the key organizational structure for the rural areas; no other organization, including the government, has the agricultural infrastructure still held by the cooperatives. As pointed out by van de Walle and Chiwele, the cooperatives' "continuing role in input distribution to small farmers remains important enough, even if on a smaller scale than at their peak a decade ago, to entice various rent seeking entrepreneurs and politicians to try to maintain control of the sector" (1994:25).

Similarly, the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has been mired in a struggle with government over the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), this time with the MMD government on the side of instituting a *plural* trade union movement, and the Congress anxious to keep the traditional "one union, one industry" practice. Having achieved a strong and autonomous position through a "negotiated-corporatism" with the former UNIP regime, the Congress– as well as the MMD– recognizes the advantages that this type of corporatism brought. According to the claims of the labor movement, the government's intention in introducing the new legislation is to weaken the trade union movement, to prevent it from emerging as the counterforce to state power it was in the Second Republic. This is a poignant illustration of Bianchi's point that pluralism can help to support stable authoritarianism by allowing the regime to block development of coherent organized interests; here, we see that the similar tactics can also help to support continuing neopatrimonial rule. Whether through the strategy of maintaining legal control over the cooperative movement, or through the forced-pluralization of the labor movement, the objective of the current regime is reminiscent of the objectives of the one-party state: to control economic and societal interests, and bend them to the development

policies of the state: i.e. economic adjustment and liberalization.

As in the Second Republic, a key variable in the outcome of the relationship between the MMD government and the ZCTU is the latter's attempts to resist the former's policies. The ZFE represents a good illustration of the counterpoint: though the employers' associations will be affected in the same way as the trade unions by the new legislation, the issue hasn't soured interactions between the Federation and the government.

The formerly *quasi-pluralist* groups face different obstacles than the state-corporatist ones. Most prominently, they are not burdened with struggles over re-negotiating their institutional ties to the state. Further, they have some experience with a pluralist-type position vis-a-vis the state; they weren't wired in to the corporatist structure of the one-party state, any influence they had was gained from an autonomous bargaining position. Now that the new environment encourages lobbying efforts, they can fully flex that muscle. However, these groups face other constraints in their attempts to realize a fully pluralist relationship to the state, as discussed below.

Economic reform

As with group's prior institutional history, the economic reforms begun in the early 1990's are also useful in explaining the ecology of interest groups in the Third Republic. Several of the cases above well illustrate this point. First is the Cooperative Federation (ZCF). The cooperative movement was well-favored, relatively well-resourced and organized during the Second Republic. With the liberalization of agricultural marketing, the cooperatives no longer hold their former role in the economy, and no longer have access to the same level of resources. With government and donors looking to other

organizations, principally the ZNFU, PFU, and NAPSF, to coordinate programs to assist small and peasant farmers, the cooperatives' apex, the ZCF, is in crisis.

The second case that illustrates the effects of economic reform is the trade union movement. Whereas the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) wielded power in the Second Republic, due to its ability to mobilize large urban constituencies against the government's policy, in the Third Republic, declining employment levels from the continuing economic crisis and quickly implemented reform programs have weakened both the resources and bargaining position of the unions and their apex, the ZCTU. While workers'and their movement have suffered, however, other economic actors have been made better off by the reform process. Principal among these is the business sector, our third case. Given Kaunda's profound distrust of businessmen and their motives, and the fact that the UNIP regime's economic policies hurt private business more than it helped them, the MMD's pledge to return the economy to the market and the hands of the private business sector has produced new opportunities for businessmen and their organizations, e.g. ZACCI. Within the business sector, not everyone is better off; for example, the reform program initially favored commercial over manufacturing interests. Overall, however, business interests are better off in the Third than the Second Republic; and where they are not, frequent meetings with Ministers and MP's offer the possibility for fine-tuning the MMD's already pro-business economic agenda.

The fourth case are the farmers' groups. Here, it is not necessarily the *nature* of the reforms so much as the *implementation* of them that is consequential. Thus, liberalization might well be expected to help the "pro-business" oriented National Farmer's Union (ZNFU), except that the government's lack of consistency in following

the program objectives (such as when it calls on the Union to "feed the nation") draws t Union into bitters dispute with the government. In the peasant and small-scale sectors, government sends out mixed signals to farmers, as when it ceased subsidies/credit for agricultural inputs in line with liberalizing the market, then backtracked and provided credit schemes which required groups to coordinate, and which have come to be the ma resource bases for the PFU and the NAPSF in their organizing efforts. Demonstrating how great is the influence of such reform policies is the fact that these groups would potentially not survive if government pulled out of the market again.

Neopatrimonial politics

The third factor seen to affect the ecology of interest groups in the Third Republ is the continuing practice of neopatrimonialism. As Bratton and van de Walle argue, th institutional heritage of neopatrimonialism has shaped both the political transitions in Africa in the early 1990's, as well as the regimes emerging from those transitions (1997 This is evidenced in the continuing practices of presidentialism, which promotes the concentration of power in the executive; clientelism, the awarding of material rewards i return for political support and deference, as well as the promotion of state intervention the economy; and the use of state resources for political legitimation. In Zambia, these characteristics are seen above to affect the ecology of the interest group system in the following ways.

First, the continuing practice of presidentialism has resulted in a continuing marginalization of the role that the legislature plays in policy making. Hence, groups realize that policy influence efforts require the attention of the executive– State House the relevant Ministry. As demonstrated in the case of ZACCI and the ZNFU, the

possibility for influence thus relies at least in part on groups'-- specifically group leaders'-- personal relationship to the holders of these offices. This presents special problems for organizations like the Cooperative Federation, who have the 'wrong' personal connections-- supporters in UNIP and even a president who is an MP and member of the National Party, are not helpful in this context. Furthermore, the lack of development of a real political opposition means that these groups have no card to play against recalcitrant government officials; even while disagreeing with government's economic policy agenda, group leaders must "keep their friendships in good repair."

Continuing practices of clientelism also mark the ecology of the interest group system in the Third Republic. Though the MMD publicly expresses the intention to end government's control of the cooperative movement and its activities, the cooperatives' vast rural infrastructure for agricultural input distribution and marketing continues to offer attractive channels for developing MMD patronage networks, and thus little incentive to implement institutional reform. Furthermore, the disrailment of the agricultural liberalization program, according to the ZNFU, points in to the MMD's intention to continue UNIP's practice of interfering in the economy for at least two clientelist-oriented purposes: first, to ensure that rural constituencies receive needed agricultural inputs, especially around election-time; and second, to ensure that urban consumers are pacified, to the greatest extent possible, in their demands for low food prices.

In the next three chapters, we continue the analysis by examining the effects of the dual reform process on three important characteristics of economic interest groups themselves: membership incentives, organizational resources, and policy influence strategies.

CHAPTER FIVE

MOTIVATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP: JOINING AND PARTICIPATING IN GROUP ACTIVITY

> "It is often taken for granted, at least where economic objectives are involved, that groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests. Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their personal interests."
>
> Mancur Olson,
> *The Logic of Collective Action*
> 1961:1

5.1 Pluralism at the Micro-level: What motivates interest group members?

Some of the most fundamental assumptions of pluralism reside at the micro-level, that is, in the space where individuals decide whether or not they want to join and contribute to interest group activity. For example, the belief that groups arise on the basis of common interests requires individuals with common interests to join together to pursue the furtherance of those interests; and the position that groups are maintained through members' support of group policies requires that members contribute regularly to group efforts. But what motivates individual citizens in pluralist systems (who often have a

myriad of other concerns and day-to-day tasks to address) to make the effort to participate in such group activity? From a pluralist perspective, the motivation lies in a "natural propensity among humankind to form and join associations."[1] The implication, therefore, is that pluralism requires a population of people who seek out group activity, with the objective of furthering both their personal interests and thus the group's collective interest– since by definition, others in the group share the same interests. The implication, therefore, is that citizens join groups out of a desire to collectively further their goals.

This assumption is crucial to the pluralist theory of interest representation, which posits that groups actively lobby government on behalf of their members' interests. Thus, joining such associations implies individual members are seeking a collective *political* goal, that is, the representation of their collective interests to government; and perhaps more than that, success in influence over government policies. For economic interest groups, policies of concern might include the lowering of a particular tax, the provision of a needed subsidy, the regulation of a specific market, etc. The characteristic which these policies share is that they represent *collective* goods; that is, once the tax or the subsidy is won, it is applied to everyone, whether they contributed to the group effort or not. In essence, then, pluralist theorists assume that the act of joining interest associations represents the pursuit of a collective goal.

Thus, to address the question of the prospects for pluralism in Zambia, it is necessary to address the micro-level problematique: why do Zambians join interest groups

[1] See Truman 1951, Bentley 1908.

like the Chambers of Commerce or farmer associations in the Third Republic? Do they seek the furtherance of a collective goal they share with their fellow group members, e.g. the ending of a regulation which constrains everyone's business activities, or more generally, the cessation of structural adjustment reform, for instance? Do they expect their group to achieve this goal through efforts at lobbying government? Are there any reasons we might expect that pluralist assumptions of membership incentives won't hold?

To address the issue of why interest group members seek out group activity in Zambia's Third Republic, this chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, we examine the theoretical case more closely... are there other reasons that people join associations, and do these have adverse implications for the development of pluralism? We then revisit our discussion in the last chapter, regarding Zambia's interest group environment, to analyze what the incentives for membership were under the Second Republic, in order to set out some hypotheses for what they might be in the Third Republic. Are there continuing incentives carried over from the Second Republic that threaten the further development of pluralism? Are some groups more prone to these incentive structures? If so, why?

5.2 Theories on the Incentives for Group Membership

A classic debate exists as to whether the above picture of membership incentives is realistic. The presumed link between a pluralism of interests and a pluralism of groups, referred to above, has to do with the *motivational role of interests*: when individuals find that they have interests in common that can be advanced through collective action, it is assumed that they will form groups on that basis. According to this theory, we should expect that in the newly liberalized environment of Zambia's Third Republic, a plenitude

of groups will organize around the variety of economic interests that exist (e.g. small-scale farmers, commercial farmers, cooperative producers, small-scale traders, business owners, mineworkers, civil service workers, to name just a few), adding to the numbers of groups that already exist and filling in the spaces where they haven't existed.

However, working within a rational choice framework, Mancur Olsen has shown that there are some important problems with the idea that groups will spontaneously form for collective action in *any* type of environment. The problems have to do with motivations at the individual level and the recognition that there are costs to organizing; hence, the question becomes, what are the incentives for individuals to contribute time and resources to such efforts? The dominant approach to these questions is rooted in Olson's seminal work on collective action. Applying a simple rational model to an analysis of interest groups, Olson demonstrated that:

> "if the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives" (1965:2).

Olson's theory is especially relevant here, as it is best applied to specifically *economic* interest groups. The argument is important, because it undermines the presumed pluralist link between common interests and collective action, showing that "political goals will not be sufficient to induce member support of interest group activity..." rather, "selective incentives" are the crucial facilitators of group formation

(Moe 1980:4)[2]. As Moe argues, this has some important implications for the political nature of group activity, for it suggests that there are obstacles to individual participation that prevent the individual from "doing her part." Olsen's model implies that the only way that large numbers of individuals can be induced to contribute their share to group activity is to offer them something entirely different from the group's collective or political goals. This point calls into question a good part of the pluralist perspective on politics, for it contradicts the notion that the effectiveness of a group is a function of its support in society: "formal membership indicates that the group is successful at selling selective incentives, not that it is politically popular" (1980:29-30).

Olson's analysis, though logical, bodes poorly for the possibility that Zambians will join together to further a common policy goal, unless they are coerced, or interest groups themselves "buy" members's support. This has important implications for the organization of interests, for it suggests that groups must either a) be able to coerce individuals to join their group, or b) be able to provide some form of "selective incentive," which requires resource expenditures. However, Terry Moe convincingly challenges this conclusion by arguing that Olsen's model is not the only way of constructing a rational theory of interest groups. Moe stresses that: "behavioral expectations are contingent in specific ways upon perceptions...," thus, his revised model "implies that anyone can have an incentive to contribute, depending upon his *subjective estimates* of the relevant quantities" (1980:32, emphasis added). Thus, the individual's perception that her contribution can make a difference, in other words, a *perception of personal efficacy*, is a critical piece to the

---

[2] Selective incentives are private benefits which, precisely because they are private rather than collective in nature, can operate selectively on the membership as a whole: they can be conferred upon those who contribute and withheld from those who do not.

puzzle, for "the efficacious individual can have a rational incentive to contribute whether or not (her) efficacy is justified by the objective context" (ibid). If Zambians *perceive* that their contributions to the group make a difference, then, they might join for reasons other than coercion or direct economic benefits, and the resulting pattern might look very much like what pluralists expect: people spontaneous joining group activity.

Another possible rational inducement to membership are "purposive incentives," which are "various kinds of intangible benefits that accrue to a person by virtue of his support of causes, value systems, principles, or ends that he considers to be worthwhile" (ibid). Importantly, according to Moe, purposive benefits can serve as selective incentives when the individual derives a sense of satisfaction from the very act of contributing, as when group goals reflect ideological, moral, or religious principles that a person feels a responsibility to support. In these cases, it is the support and pursuit of worthwhile benefits that represents the source of purposive benefits. In contrast to Olsen's theory, "collective goods can generate their own selective incentives because of the unique role that purposive benefits play in connecting the two" (ibid: 118).

Prevailing theories on associational activity in Africa suggest that such "purposive incentives" might be an important inducement to group activity. Though there is little literature on the direct question of membership incentives, there is a substantial literature on informal associations and, more broadly, state-society relations, that indirectly deals with such incentives. The thesis that "African societies... have cohered according to kinship ties and age groups rather than by bonds of impersonal interest" (Davis 1999:10), suggests that many associations in Africa tend to have ascriptive, rather then voluntary, memberships. This thesis is perhaps best articulated by Goran Hyden's theory of the

"economy of affection, the peculiar type of economy that is apparent in any society where the peasant mode[3] is still surviving" (1983). According to Hyden, this economy of affection is fundamental for any understanding of indigenous forms of economic and social organization in African societies, for among other things, it has immediate implications for the consideration of the individual as decision-maker. Hyden argues that economic decisions are embedded in social and other non-economic conditions, and are made with reference to a network of groups connected by blood, kin, community, or other affinities (1983:8-10).[4] Thus, the incentive to join a group, even economic groups such as a local cooperative or a farmers' association, might be motivated more by one's social responsibilities to a broader network, than to a "natural" instinct to join associations which pursue a common political goal.[5] In addition, given the enormous importance of social relationships that emerges in such contexts, group membership, even in economic groups, might be explained by purely social motivations, e.g. the desire to interact with others from the community. These latter two types of inducements to group activity,

---

[3] Hyden defines the "peasant mode of production" as being "characterized by a rudimentary division of labor. Each unit of production is small and because there is virtually no product specialization, there is very little exchange between the various units of production... producing the basic necessities and meeting the basic social needs are time-consuming tasks... It is not difficult to see that this mode of production cannot easily give rise to a very elaborate superstructure" (1983:6)

[4] "While this does not preclude the possibility that the African peasant is economically rational, it is possible and logical that rational responses are used to enhance one's role in the economy of affection" (ibid:10).

[5] A further consideration here is the marginalization of rural areas in Africa. Often unpenetrated by and unconnected to national government, there is little basis for the assumption that individuals in these areas have a propensity to join groups which seek to lobby government over policies that affect their production... in fact, as Hyden points out, for this sector, the state appears as something "suspended in mid-air over society and not an integral mechanism of the day-to-day productive activities of the society... it is not difficult to see that the peasant experiences any public policy aimed at improving his agriculture as a 'foreign' intervention" (1983:7).

interestingly enough, fit within the rational choice framework, discussed above. "Feelings of responsibility" can be thought of as "purposive incentives," since membership in the group provides the individually-realized benefit of fulfillment in satisfying one's obligations. Social motivations are captured by the fourth type of possible incentive: the "solidary incentive." Theoretically,

> "Solidary incentives are "intangible values of a social nature, including such rewards as friendship, conviviality, and status. Because these generally derive from social interaction, members can generate their own solidary incentives by becoming acquainted, enjoying each other's company, and establishing social relationships that yield psychic benefits of one kind or another. All these provide selective incentives to the extent that the act of membership qualifies one for taking advantage of them." (Moe 1980:117).

Zambians who respond to purposive or solidary incentives may participate in group activity for reasons that have nothing to do with politics, collective goals, or economic goods; and since they act as a "selective incentive," such inducements lead to conclusions that are consistent with Olson's theory.

Thus, classic pluralist theory informs us that individuals join groups to express common interests in the policy process (Truman 1951, Bentley 1908); Olson's model of rational action leads us to expect that individuals join interest groups because they are either coerced or because they desire selective incentives that the group provides (Olson 1965); and recent work in the collective action literature delineates a variety of inducements that include both political (representation), economic (material benefits), and "non-economic"[6] (solidary and purposive) incentives (Moe 1980). Figure 5.1 summarizes

---

[6] Clark and Wilson (1961) distinguish two broad types of noneconomic inducements: solidary and purposive. Solidary incentives are intangible values of a social nature, including such rewards as friendship, conviviality, and status. (Moe argues that these can be considered "selective incentives" to the extent that the act of membership qualifies one for taking advantage of

these different types of incentives. Predictably, however, individuals themselves will have a variety of motivations for joining groups: only empirical analysis can inform us as to what are the most important motivations in the context of Zambia's Third Republic.

Figure 5.1
Possible Incentives for Interest Group Membership in the Third Republic

Type of Incentive	"Rational" basis of incentive
political representation (collective reward)	individual benefit, through feelings of "efficacy"
economic goods and services (individual reward)	individual economic gain
solidary (social reward)	individual enjoyment
purposive (feeling of responsibility)	individual sense of satisfaction

Analysis of micro-level processes informs our larger question in two ways: first, should we expect that groups will act to represent and articulate collective interests in the Third Republic? We hypothesize that this is especially plausible if interest group members join groups for the purpose of gaining political representation. Secondly, should we expect that economic interest groups with voluntary memberships will survive / emerge in the Third Republic? This, again, is plausible if all / any of the above incentives are present, for according to the theoretical discussion above, they all provide rational inducements for individuals to overcome the collective action problem inherent in group activity. In

---

them). Purposive incentives are various kinds of intangible benefits that accrue to a person by virtue of his support of causes, value systems, principles, or ends that he considers to be worthwhile. "Central significance attaches to the purposes toward which its funds and activities are directed and the ends that they might indirectly affect" (Moe 1980:117).

addition, such analysis is useful because it informs us about organizational maintenance issues, too: that is, pinpointing the specific type of incentive tells us about the nature of the group itself, and the type of benefits it must provide to maintain its membership. We might expect that groups whose members join for the purpose of gaining political representation for their economic interests will have different organizational characteristics than those whose members join to gain access to economic goods and services. We address these latter issues in the next chapter.

5.3 The Institutional Context: Membership Incentives in the Second Republic

Before proceeding with our analysis, we here draw from the previous analysis in Chapter Three to specify more specific hypotheses about how the institutional context of interest representation, discussed in that chapter, relates to why Zambians sought membership in different interest groups in the Second Republic, and how that might affect their expectations for joining or maintaining their membership in groups in the Third Republic. To summarize: during the period of the one-party state, the representational relationship between the state and society approximated that of state corporatism: it involved the merging of the institutions of the state with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and civic and interest organizations. However, the state did not succeed in coopting all interest associations. The degree to which the state was successful in formally incorporating groups, however, had implications for why Zambians joined those groups.

An instructive example is provided by the case of the cooperative movement. During the Second Republic, the initial formation of cooperative societies was affected by several factors due to the corporatist aims of the one-party state: firstly, cooperatives

were affiliated as "mass organizations" to the Party under the UNIP constitution; thus, representation of their economic interests had to be channeled through centralized *Party* organs; secondly, cooperatives were formed not because of member mobilization, but as a matter of government policy-- only after the cooperative had been formed was the membership recruited; and finally, the legal framework of the Cooperative Act gave excessive powers to the government to intervene in the management and daily operations of cooperatives-- for example, government officials were made signatories to the accounts of various cooperative organizations, and annual general meetings could not be held without a government official present. Membership in such organizations was motivated in part by the political needs of the state; that is, the state used such organizational networks to distribute patronage rewards to important constituencies. Individuals thus sought group membership for the access to government resources, e.g. agricultural credit and inputs, and subsidized insurance, that it entailed (interview, Mr. Lungu, January 7, 1997).

In contrast, the UNIP regime did not try to incorporate the associations of commercial farmers and businesspeople. The former were not viable as a political constituency, due to their small numbers, and were relevant to the state more as an economic than a political resource. The latter were both integrated into the Party and government structures directly as Members of Parliament and other official positions (Baylies and Szeftel 1984), and were organized by groups like the Lusaka and Ndola Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Incentives to belong to these organizations were distinct from those of the cooperatives, although for commercial farmers, the incentives were largely economic in a different way, i.e. access to foreign exchange and the price

negotiation process.

In considering the institutional history of interest groups in Zambia, we've thus seen that the group system has exhibited both types of membership incentives predicted by Olson, legal coercion and selective incentives. During the Second Republic, selective incentives were especially important motivations for organization in Zambia; in addition to the types of benefits that Olson deals with in the American, pluralist context (such as insurance policies, news publications, and discounts on goods and services, which members could obtain on the open market, but which the group can offer more cheaply because of economies of scale), the control of the economy by the party-state introduced a further dimension to the type of selective incentives available in Zambia: state-funded economic goods and services which could only be had through membership in particular groups. For example, cooperative membership was necessary for access to farming inputs and marketing facilities; according to current officials, this "shallow incentive" was essentially the only reason to join cooperatives, no matter how much President Kaunda himself exhorted the ideological benefits of cooperative membership.

This intertwining of patronage politics with the interest group system created an environment in which individuals "learned"[7] that participation in particular groups could result in access to state resources. Over time, expectations concerning the public, private, and patronage benefits to be gained from group membership became an institutionalized

---

[7] I use the term "learn" here in the context of the concept of "political learning" as it is developing in the comparative literature (see Bermeo 1990 for definition of "political learning" and van de Walle 1994 for application of "policy learning"). "Political learning" refers to a situation where processes of change in political (and social) institutions involve cognitive changes in individuals that are brought on by changes in the environment; that is, as actors in the political process gain experience with how the system works, they "learn" how to adapt to the environment and this learning affects how they respond to changing incentives.

part of the representation system: that is, individuals in some groups confronted incentives to join based neither on an interest in pursuing a common goal nor "selective" (in the Olsonian sense) incentives such as newsletters and discounts, but on expectations to gain access to state resources as a result of participation in groups. It is this latter consideration which makes the "collective action" problem in neopatrimonial contexts such as Zambia different-- and consequential, for it suggests an extra wrinkle in the analysis of group activity; it suggests that in cases of state-controlled economies, access to state resources can be a further material incentive for joining groups.[8]

This brief discussion, and the larger analysis in Chapter Three, provides us with a thumbnail sketch of the institutions which shaped the representation of economic interests during the Second Republic, and the resulting incentive structure of different institutional arrangements:

State-dominated corporatist sector: cooperatives

- the affiliation of "mass organizations" such as cooperatives to the Party meant that centralized Party structures maintained control over the articulation of small-scale and peasant agricultural interests to the State;

- membership in such organizations, although voluntary, was "recruited" according to the Party's needs;

- the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took place within legal frameworks drafted by the state with an eye to controlling the organization's activities;

---

[8] Of course, political economists have been discussing this idea, referred to as "rent-seeking" behavior, for decades. In that literature, individuals don't necessarily have to belong to groups to gain access to state resources. But it can be seen that the availability of such economic goods might be important to both entrepreneurs in their decision to form groups, as well as to members in their decisions to join groups, and thus adds an extra dimension to analyses of inducements for group activity in *non-market-based economies*.

• the motivation for membership in ccoperatives was primarily an economic one, to gain access to resources such as agricultural credit and inputs.

State-negotiated corporatist sector: trade unions and employers associations

• the refusal to affiliate as "mass organizations" to the Party was both cause and consequence of labor's autonomy from the state during the Second Republic. Workers, their interests, and their unions thus escaped the wholescale cooptation experienced by small-scale agriculture, industry and entrepreneurs;

• due to mandatory check-off rules, however, union membership was not voluntary: once a workplace was organized, all of its employees had to join the union, and dues were automatically deducted from paychecks;

• the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took place within the legal framework of the Tripartite Council. While the state entered this arrangement with an eye to controlling the unions' activities and agenda, the unions were able to maintain their autonomy from the goals of the state despite the close institutional linkage;

• the motivation for membership in trade unions was non-voluntary; workers became members automatically upon gaining employment. However, workers' satisfaction with their leadership was dependent on their demonstrated success in collective bargaining efforts.

Quasi-pluralist sector: business and commercial agricultural associations

• even more than the trade unions, private business and commercial agricultural associations remained outside the purview of the state under the UNIP regime. Both of these economic sectors were too small to be of great economic or electoral significance to the regime, and both types of organizations had strong foundations in the colonial period and First Republic, during which time they adopted voluntary membership-based organizational structures;

• membership in such organizations was strictly voluntary, although for commercial agriculture the economic opportunities offered by the association's role in the command economy presented specific material incentives;

• the day-to-day relationship between such organizations and the government took place on an ad hoc basis, largely defined by personal relationships between group leaders and members and government officials;

• the motivation for membership in these organizations could have conformed to pluralist theory, with members joining out of desire for a collective voice, or it might have been better explained by rational choice theory, with members joining for the selective incentives offered. Importantly, since many of these groups were formed before independence, they were founded and initially populated by white farmers and businessmen, who sought to transplant European forms of collective action to their new environment. After independence, membership in these groups was to varying degrees racially integrated, but organizing principles and hence the membership incentive appear to have stayed the same.

5.4 The Institutional Context in the Third Republic and Resulting Membership Incentives

The transition to a liberalized polity and economy in 1991 formally brought about a more pluralistic representational arena, allowing groups to form freely under constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech and association, and dissolving the corporative relationship between the ruling Party, the state, and social groups. Again, a thumbnail sketch of these developments shows the marked change in the institutional environment which shapes representation:

• social and economic groups are no longer required to be affiliated to a political party or the state, they are free to form as opportunity arises;

• membership in organizations is left to the mobilization efforts of group leaders (with the important exception of the trade union movement), and is not accountable to (or driven by the expectation of privileges from) the one-party state;

• the day-to-day relationship between economic interest groups and the government continues to be structured by the Tripartite Council in the labor sector, but for other sectors there is little central government planning or coordination as to where the articulation of social and economic interests fits in the policy decision process.

This new environment is the basis of a more pluralist system of interest representation. As explicated above, pluralist theory holds that in a society in which

multiple interest bases exist groups will spontaneously emerge to aggregate and articulate the interests of their members. Indeed, this seems to be what the founders of Zambia's Third Republic had in mind when deciding the shape of the new regime. At the historic conference held in Lusaka in 1990 which gave birth to the current ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, Dr. Remmy Mushota delivered an important address in which he identified five means of institutionalizing democracy: citizenship, the right to vote, the electoral system, political parties, and *interest groups*. Mushota argued that in a democracy,

> "it is essentially imperative that citizens be able to keep in continuous touch with their government and to influence it at every step along the way as it undertakes to determine and execute policy... the dictates of broader political processes do make it desirable that *citizens be allowed and encouraged through the law to join together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests"* (Lewanika & Chitala 1990:30, emphasis mine).

As discussed above, several types of inducements drew Zambians to membership in interest groups in the Second Republic: state coercion (in sectors where the government sought to incorporate politically important consituencies into the Party structure through "mass organizations" and other arrangements); legal coercion (in the industrial sector, where workers and employers were required to join the unions and associations, respectively, in their workplaces) and selective incentives (in sectors where more privileged populations, such as the indigenous business class and commercial farmers, were permitted to form voluntary organizations). The former incentives have been made obsolete in some cases by the institutional changes brought about by regime transition. The question we seek to address here is what type of incentives are emerging in their

place, in the more pluralistic environment of the Third Republic.

5.5 Analyzing Membership Incentives: The 1997 Membership Survey

The groups included in the following analysis are the local level branches of the eight major national-level interest groups, and the Mineworkers' Union (which is considered separately from the ZCTU due to its historical significance and the fact that it is no longer affiliated to the ZCTU; this will be re-tooled in the rest of the analysis, and discussed in the methods section. The term "apex organizations" will be used to refer to the eight official apex groups *and* the MUZ for this analysis). The groups selected for the study are: Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), Provincial Business Association (PBA), National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF), Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).[9]

[9] Moe excludes such groups from his study, due to the fact that membership in most unions in the U.S. is mandatory, not voluntary. It is the same for the Zambian case, membership in most unions is mandatory; however, the questions about membership were modified for union members. These members were not asked why they joined, but they were asked if they would want to stay in the group if either services or representation were ceased. The data that was collected on these members provides interesting contrasts and similarities with the data from the other groups, and so has been included here.

Figure 5.2
Membership levels of Groups included in the Study

ZACCI:	310
ZNFU	3957 (1997)
ZCF:	2,462,291 (estimate, 1997)
NAPSSF	5,000 (estimate)
PFU	5,000 (estimate)
ZFE	10,000 (estimate, 1997)
ZCTU	270,000 (estimate, 1997)
MUZ	41,000 (estimate, 1997)

Sampling: While each of these national level groups were able to provide lists of local branches, with the exception of the ZACCI and ZNFU, it was not possible to obtain lists of all individual members of local groups. Given the lack of an exact population size and the absence of a sampling frame, it was thus not possible to use a probability sampling method to select subjects for interviews.

Instead, the sampling method used was a heterogeneous one which attempted to use random sampling where possible, and to draw a purposive sample intended to capture geographical and social diversity where a representative sample was not possible. Sampling thus proceeded on two levels: where membership lists were available, a sample was drawn using a systematic random process. These cases were then either approached for an individual interview, or were sent a written questionnaire (in each of the cases where lists were available, it was fair to assume that the respondent was literate and could respond to such an instrument). For the other groups, the survey team traveled to major towns in all nine of Zambia's provinces, and approached the local branch of the national

organization for group lists from which to randomly choose members. However, such lists were rarely available, and group leaders at the district-level often were the only source for finding members to interview for the study. Hence, for these groups, the sample is probably biased toward the more affluent and active members of such groups, and toward those who live close to urban and peri-urban centers. Table 5.1 below gives the frequency of respondents for each of the groups in the study.

Table 5.1
The Sample

	ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	ZCTU	ZFE	MUZ	**Total**
Frequency	40	54	35	16	13	43	157	7	12	377
Percent of Total	11%	14%	9%	4%	3%	11%	42%	2%	3%	100%

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Questionnaire: The survey instrument was a questionnaire administered by myself (in English) or a research assistant (in English or vernacular). In addition, as mentioned above, mail questionnaires (English version) were sent to members of groups where membership lists were available. This questionnaire was exactly the same as the administered questionnaire, with the addition of a short introductory paragraph which replicated the introduction that interviewers gave the respondents.

5.6 Analyzing Membership Incentives

As noted above, this analysis begins with the observation that the transition from the one-party state to a multi-party state has as its corollary the adoption of pluralist institutions in the place of the former corporatist ones. We are therefore primarily interested here in the classic pluralist question, that is, given a pluralist environment, *why*

do individuals engage in group activity? We proceed by first addressing the question, what are the main incentives for membership in the major interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic?; and secondly addressing the question, do current motivational incentives vary by the "institutional sector" categories developed in Chapter Three? The following analysis partly replicates Moe's impressive study on economic interest groups in the U.S. (1980), which seeks to separate out the political and economic motivations for group membership. However, where Moe focused on a small handful of local groups,[10] we maintain our focus on the distinction between the major apex organizations in Zambia's Third Republic, and draw from a purposive sample of members of the local groups of all eight apex groups: Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), Provincial Business Association (PBA), National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF), Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE).

5.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample

As detailed above, due to the lack of an acceptable sampling frame, the sample design for the membership survey was purposive. We thus cannot make inferences to the general population of interest group members with this sample. However, since it wasdesigned to include members of all the sectors of groups in the study, and since it is

[10] Specifically, the Minnesota Farm Bureau , the Minnesota Farmers' Union, the Minnesota Retail Federation, the Minnesota-Dakotas Hardware Association, and the Printing Industries of the Twin Cities.

geographically diverse, we can learn something from the variation we see in the sample about the larger interest group system in Zambia's Third Republic. Given that the data was systematically and carefully collected, it adds much to the little research done to date on these types of groups.

Table 5.2, next page, gives demographic details on the survey respondents. Overall, the average age of these group members is much higher than that of the general population; the average ranges from a low of 36 years for members of unions in the ZCTU, to a high of 51 years for members of cooperatives in the ZCF; in contrast, 75% of the general population was below the age of 30, as of the 1990 census. This is perhaps not surprising, since participation in such activities is often the purview of older, more stable and settled citizens in any country. It is striking, nonetheless, that members are *so* old; in a context where the average life expectancy at birth is 45.5 years (1990 census), 51 years of age is considerably more than "middle-aged." As we'll see, this is one of several corroborating indicators that the members of interest group are among the more "well-off" (here, healthier and longer-lived) Zambians. This point is emphasized when we examine the education levels of the group members in the sample; again, we see that they are far above average. Whereas 33.4% of Zambians receive no education, only 12.9% reach the 10^{th} to 12^{th} grade level, and a paltry 0.1% receive post-secondary education, *61%* of these group members reported they had reached the 10-12th grade level, and *15%* reported they had post-secondary education. These members also report that they are much better-off in terms of annual incomes than the population at large. Though we note that it is difficult to use an individual "average income" for a comparison measure in this case, since much of the population doesn't earn a consistent cash income and those who do support extended

Table 5.2
Characteristics of the Sample
(% of respondents belonging to groups within the given Apex organization)

	ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	ZCTU	ZFE	MUZ	**Total**
Age (mean)	47	49	39	44	50	51	36	48	39	42
Education										
None		6		6		7				2
1-9 years	3	35	11	56	39	57	11	14	17	22
10-12 years	44	31	80	38	46	31	81	57	83	61
post-second	53	29	9		15	5	8	29		15
Income (per month)										
0-K49,000	4	17	3	40	46	44	2			12
K50-100,000		17	3	7		12	30			18
K100-500,00	14	19	88	33	46	29	62		83	49
½ - 1K mil	11	25	3	13	8	10	5	29	17	10
oer K1 mill.	71	21	3	7		5	1	71		12
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

families, we can use as a benchmark the average income of the mineworkers in the sample, who reported they made about K100,000 - K500,000 per month, as of 1997. If we use this income level as a benchmark for the middle-class, we see from Table 5.2 that only thirty percent of the sample fell below this level, fifty percent met the benchmark, and twelve percent made considerably more-- over one million kwacha per month. Even given the fact that the method of selection for respondents was biased to the more active and better educated (discussed above), it seems reasonable to suggest that interest group members differ from the average Zambian in being older, more educated, and perhaps at least a bit wealthier; thus confirming our assertion in Chapter Three that interests groups primarily represent an economic elite.

As Table 5.2 also shows, there are clear distinctions between groups. More than half the respondents in business groups under the ZACCI aegis, and nearly a third of those farmers affiliated to the ZNFU and those employers affiliated to the ZFE, have post-secondary education, compared to 0.1% of the general population. Eighty percent or more of respondents affiliated with the Provincial Business Association (PBA), the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union (MUZ) have at least some high school education if not a diploma. Two of the three groups representing small-scale farmers have the lowest levels of education in the sample; 62% of the respondents affiliated to the NAPSF and 64% of those affiliated to the ZCF reported they have attained less than a 10^{th} grade education. However, this still compares favorably to the general population, where 86% have attained only that same level. And though the small number of respondents must be paid heed, it is still noteworthy that the members of the PFU in the sample are more educated than those of their counterparts, the NAPSF, and ZCF, with

61% having 10th grade or better education, compared to 38% and 36% of the other groups, respectively.

Income levels show a similar trend; with a whopping 71% of the businesspeople and employers affiliated to the ZACCI and ZFE making over K1million per month, nearly a quarter of those in the ZNFU having made over a million kwacha per month and another quarter having made between half and a full million kwacha per month. The respondents affiliated to the Provincial Business Association reported more moderate incomes, 88% of whom were on par with 62% of the members of the ZCTU's trade unions and 83% of members of the Mineworkers Union, who made K100,00-K500,000 per month. And again the agricultural groups representing small-scale farmers brought up the rear, with 40-46% of the respondents from these groups reporting they made zero to K49,000 (about US$40) per month.

Overall, the data suggest that members affiliated to the Association of Chambers of Commerce (ZACCI) and Federation of Employers (ZFE) are similar to one another in educational attainment and income; members affiliated to the Provincial Business Associations (PBA), Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Mineworkers Union (MUZ) are also thus similar; and the Peasant Farmers Union (PFU), Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and the Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSF) seem to draw members of similar characteristics, i.e. low to medium income and education levels. The National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) is distinctive for the fact that among the sample of respondents, nearly equal proportions fell into each category of income and education; there is thus a substantial proportion of members with very *high* income and educational levels, and a large percentage of members with very *low* income and education levels,

which fits neatly with the discussion in chapter four concerning big and small members in that organization and its affiliates.

Since we are interested in the political nature and motivations of groups and their members, it is interesting to inquire into some of the political characteristics of the sample. Looking at Table 5.3 (next page), we see that overall, group members appear to be more knowledgeable about the people who hold important government positions than the average Zambian citizen, with 81% able to name their MP (versus 62% for the general population), 89% able to name the Minister of Finance (versus 32% for the general population), 92% able to name the Vice President of Zambia (versus 54% of the general population). There are slight difference between groups within the sample, with the most noticeable being between the 98% of ZACCI respondents who can name the Minister of Finance versus the 67% of Cooperative members who can do the same. We also see that 60% of the members in the sample don't have any partisan affiliations, versus 46% of the population overall; however, there are important variations here, with 79% of respondents from ZACCI not affiliated to any party, while only 17% of MUZ members report they have not partisan attachments.

Also significant is difference between groups on which party most members identify with; while the MMD is the modal response for all groups (as is the case with the general population, where 42% of the population identifies with the ruling party), only 18% of ZACCI members versus 75% of the members from MUZ claim the MMD as their party of choice. For other group members, support for the MMD seems to fall around the same level as the general population. Finally, group members overall seem to be (paradoxically) more and less politically active than the general population: 82% of

Table 5.3
Political Characteristics of the Sample

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(35)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*	**Pop***
Political Knowledge: as percentage of group total											
Local Councilor	13				8	2	1	14		2	35
MP	68	72	89	81	77	84	84	71	100	81	62
Minister Finance	98	85	100	75	77	67	92	100	100	89	32
Vice President	93	91	100	88	92	79	95	86	100	92	54
Partisan Identification: as percentage of total group members; parentheses enclose raw numbers											
MMD	18	39	34	44	46	37	37	(1)	75	36	42
UNIP		(1)		(1)		5				1	4
NP							(3)			1	2
Lima	(1)	(3)			(1)			(1)	(1)	2	?
other							(1)			(1)	1
None	79	54	66	50	46	58	60	71	17	60	46
Electoral Participation: as percentage of total group members											
Registered	48	70	77	100	92	93	89	71	100	82	61
Voted 1996	38	59	71	100	85	84	76	71	100	72	81
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Political Knowledge = percent who responded with the correct name of the person holding that office
Partisan Identification= party to which respondent belongs ("none" = no party or didn't respond)
Electoral Participation= percentage who responded they registered / voted in the 1996 election

Pop*: These percentages represent statistics for the general population for the items above, adapted from Bratton, Alderfer, and Simutanyi 1997, "Political Participation in Zambia 1991-96."

members in the sample report they are registered voters, while only 61% of the population report the same; while 72% of members report they voted in the 1996 elections, in comparison to 51% of the population. In any case, it is noticeable that while the overall sample appears to be politically active, the members from ZACCI appear to be the least active, with only 38% reporting that they voted in 1996, compared to 100% of the respondents from both the PFU and the MUZ.

5.6.2 The nature of organizational incentives

One way to begin the inquiry is to assert that the benefits that existing groups offer have solved the problem for us; if we assume that functioning groups have solved the question of what members want, as evidenced simply by the fact that they still exist, then a cursory glance at what they offer might suffice. Indeed, this is the approach that Jack Walker takes, arguing that "group leaders have been engaged in a form of trial and error for years... they search for the best bundle of benefits that works for their potential membership" (1991:85). To address this issue, we draw from an item from the 1997 Organizational Survey, which asks group leaders to specify the benefits they provide to members. Figure 5.3 gives the list of benefits that national interest groups in Zambia offer to their members. The list demonstrates that a variety of benefits are believed to be important to group members, and that these benefits fall into the categories described above, "economic selective incentives," "solidary incentives," "purposive incentives."[11]

---

[11] It's important to note that the distinction between different types of incentives (e.g. material and non-material, economic and non-economic, purposive and solidary) used here and in the literature in general is not always clear. As Moe puts it, the problem "is intrinsic to the subject matter... motivations are complex, and there is really no way to talk about the variety of human motives and their behavioral consequences without putting up with a degree of conceptual ambiguity" (1980:266).

Figure 5.3: List of Membership Benefits

Economic Selective Incentives
Publications or other informational services (magazines, newsletters)
Training, education, or technical assistance (seminars, workshops)
Conferences and meetings
Low-cost insurance
Organized tours or trips
Collective bargaining for wages and working conditions
Research
Discounts on consumer goods
Legal assistance
Coordination among organizations
Communication with professional peers or colleagues

Non-Economic Incentives: Solidary Incentives
Friendship or social relationship with other members

Non-Economic Purposive Benefits
Advocacy of values, ideas, or policies important to you
Representation of members' opinions before government
Opportunity for participation in public affairs

Note: the list of benefits used for both the 1997 Organizational and Membership Surveys was derived from Walker's (1985) questionnaire. In that study, he found the useful distinctions between benefits to be "professional," "purposive," "solidary," "personal material," and "other benefits and services." For the current purpose of analyzing membership incentives, we've collapsed these categories into the three discussed in the text: economic selective incentives, solidary incentives, and purposive benefits.

Table 5.4, next page, provides data on which benefits each group offers, and how important group leaders or officials think that the incentive is for attracting members to the group. Respondents to the 1997 Organizational Survey were asked to report on how important, on a scale of one to four where one was "most important," they believed each of the benefits above was for attracting members to their group (for those benefits that their group did not offer, respondents were instructed to answer "not applicable," and they were asked to write in any additional benefits offered by their group which were not included in the list. Thus we have comprehensive benefit information for each of the groups in the study).[12] As shown in Table 5.4, averages taken for each benefit across apex groups indicates that advocacy and representation– both of which are *non-economic* purposive benefits– rank as the two benefits that group leaders believe are the most important to group members.

Looking closer at the benefits which leaders reported are "most" or "very" important to their memberships, we see in Table 5.5, next page, that it is only for the small-businessperson and farmer groups that economic benefits are most important: for the PBA, NAPSF, and ZCF, "training" (an economic selective incentive) is believed by leaders to be one of the services that members value most. In addition, the Mineworkers' Union reports that another economic benefit, "collective bargaining" for better wages and working conditions, ranks beside "advocacy of values, ideas and policies" as the most

---

[12] As noted earlier, union membership in Zambia is compulsory upon employment in a unionized workplace, so union leaders don't have to "attract" members in the same way that the other groups do. However, not all workplaces are unionized, and part of the work of individual trade unions within the larger apex organizations is to gather those shops that haven't been organized under the union's umbrella. Thus, it is argued here that union leaders are at least as concerned and knowledgeable about members' perceptions of the benefits offered as are other group leaders.

Table 5.4: Benefits Provided by Groups
(bold type indicates non-economic incentives)

Apex Group:	ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	ZFE	MUZ	**Avg.**	Rnk
Collective Bargaining**								1	1.00	
Advocacy	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1.38	1
Representation	1	1	2	1	2	1		2	1.43	2
Training		4	1	1	3	1	2	3	2.14	3
Coordination	4		2	2	1	2		2	2.17	4
Information	3	2		1	3	3	2	4	2.57	5
Legal Assist.		3		2	3	3		2	2.60	6
Discounts		3			4	1			2.67	7
Meetings	3		2	5	3	2	2	2	2.71	8
Public Affairs	3		3	3	2	3		3	2.83	9
Research	4	3		3	3	3	2	2	2.86	10
Communication	4	4	2	2	3	4		2	3.00	11
Friendship			3	4	3	3		2	3.00	12
Insurance					2	4			3.00	13
Trips or Tours	3	4		4	2	4		3	3.33	14

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey ** Applies only to unions and employers' associations

Question: For each of the following factors, please indicate, using the scale provided, your best estimate of the importance of that factor for attracting members to this organization:

Scale: 1 = most important, 2 = very important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = not very important, 5 = not at all important *(see Table Six for full description of benefits)*

Table 5.5: Group Leaders' Perception of Most Important Benefits
(Plain text = "Most Important", Italics = "Very Important)

ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	ZFE	MUZ
Advocacy Represent	Represent *Advocacy* *Informat.*	Training *Advocacy* *Represent* *Coordinat* *Commun.* *Meetings*	Advocacy Represent Training Informat *Coordinat* *Legal Aid* *Commun.*	Advocacy Coordin. *Represent* *Public Af.* *Trips* *Insurance*	Represent Training Discounts *Advocacy* *Coordinat* *Meetings*	Represent *Training* *Informat.* *Research* *Meetings*	Advocacy Coll Barg *Represent* Coordinat *Legal Aid* *Research* *Meetings* *Friends.*

important benefit it offers to members. When we add the benefits that leaders report are "very" important, we see that the range of benefits cited includes both economic, purposive, and as well, solidary benefits. This would seem to lend some support the pluralist notion that common interests might (at least partially) motivate individuals to engage in group activity; the corollary being that under the new pluralist institutions, groups should be popping up across the economic spectrum to represent collective goals. The caveat, of course, is that this is not the case for *all* groups; it is significant that it is the sectors who were organized under state-corporatist arrangements in the Second Republic, small-scale farming and business[13], and the union, that still look to group activity for the provision of economic benefits.

While the analysis of what group leaders *perceive* to be the most important membership benefits is instructive, it is also problematic, for group leaders may or may not have their finger on the pulse of member preferences. Like many other political phenomena, motivational incentives are *sticky*: a member may have joined a group for the provision of a certain benefit which is no longer provided, or even in hopes that an unprovided-but-desired benefit might one-day materialize, and maintain that membership under the assumption that the good days are right around the corner. Hence, benefits which are provided by a group at time *t* may not precisely reflect members' preferences for the bundle of benefits worth the costs they pay to maintain their membership. Another

---

[13] Small-scale private business actually represents a unique case in this study; technically, this sector was not organized in the Second Republic, as small-scale farmers were under the Cooperative Federation. However, the government-run corporation, the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) provided training, credit and services to this sector. It is thus not surprising that members in the new small-scale business groups look to group activity for further provision of goods and services.

and perhaps more accurate way to gauge what individuals seek from membership in the group is, well, to ask them. Table 5.6, next page, gives data on what benefits respondents in the sample informed us that they *receive* from their group, while Table 5.7 tells us which benefits are *most important* to continuing their membership. All are broken down by major apex group distinction, as it is sectoral/institutional differences we're most interested in.

The first important distinction to note is the different picture presented by the group *leaders'* impression of the provision and importance of membership benefits, and group *members'* actual experience in receiving them. For ZACCI, selective incentives such as training, legal assistance, discounts, and social relationships are not benefits that the apex believes are important enough (or maybe just not possible) to provide; however, a handful of respondents report that they nonetheless receive them from their local groups. First, this informs us that local groups underneath the apex are filling in the gaps left by the national body, and second, it tells us that the apex might not be adequately aware or able to fulfill member's expectations. In contrast is the Federation of Employers, whose representative reported that training and information were "very important" benefits provided to members, and sure enough, four of the seven members in the survey reported that they receive those benefits. Also noteworthy is the fact that while the small-farmer groups, the ZCF, PFU and NAPSF, report that they provide selective benefits to their members such as training, information, and research– and that they believe these items are important to members– very few members report that they actually receive these benefits (training: 44%, 23%, 6% respectively, information: 21%, 23%, 6% respectively, and research services: 19%, 0%, 13% respectively). The ZNFU also reports that its provision

Table 5.6
Benefits Realized by Members
(% reporting they receive the benefit from their group, organized by Apex organization)
(bold type indicates non-economic incentives)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	PBA *(35)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PFU *(13)*	NAPSF *(16)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	ZCF *(43)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*	
Collective Bargaining**						86	71		75	(77)	1
Representation	100	49	87	46	56	71	71	58	67	71	2
Friendship	35	74	82	39	88	69	29	86	42	68	3
Meetings	70	54	80	62	81	53	29	88	25	63	4
Public Affairs	50	49	61	54	69	55	43	58	25	54	5
Coordination	45	54	63	46	56	47	29	49	25	49	6
Advocacy	58	43	54	31	88	37	71	40	42	45	7
Communication	55	46	54	31	56	36	71	33	25	42	8
Training	20	89	39	23	6	36	57	44	58	40	9
Legal Assistance	5	9	32	31		57	14	26	42	35	10
Information	78	23	65	23	6	17	57	21	58	33	11
Research	13	11	19		13	15	29	19	33	16	12
Trips	28	9	26	8	25	8		21	25	15	13
Discounts	3		32	8		1		23		8	14
Insurance		3	2			3		5	17	3	15

Source: 1997 Membership Survey ** Applies only to unions and employers' associations

of information, legal assistance, discounts and research services are important to members; and at least some if not most members in the sample report they do receive them: 65% receive information and publications, 32% legal assistance, 32% discounts on consumer goods, and 19% receive research services from their group. The Mineworkers Union also recognizes and successfully provides these type of benefits to members: 58% receive information and publications, 58% training, 42% legal assistance, and 33% research services.

Thus, economic inducements do seem to play a motivational role in group activity. Overall, however, the data are startling in that the benefits that *most* respondents report they actually receive from their group are *non-economic* in nature (with the exception of collective bargaining for union members). Since it is only union members who are not voluntary members of their groups, this would seem to challenge Olson's hypothesis that either coercion or the provision of selective economic incentives are necessary to inducing group membership. That is, current group members are clearly maintaining their membership in organizations that largely provide non-economic benefits. While we demonstrated above that economic benefits are also important, there is reason to suspect that neither type of benefit is critical to the decision to join; rather, the decision to participate in group activity is more complex.

5.7 Analyzing the Factors Important to Membership Incentives

Does the fact that members are responding to non-economic incentives imply that they are not acting rationally (in the economic sense), that pluralist theory is correct in postulating that people will naturally join together in groups? According to Moe, the answer is 'not quite'-- for benefits other than strictly economic ones can qualify as rational

incentives. An example of this is the case of political incentives; though political goals themselves often fit the description of collective goods and are thus subject to the free-rider problem, the *perception* that one is contributing to the good and the personal rewards thereby realized can operate as individually-realized benefits. As demonstrated by Tables 5.4 and 5.6 (shown previously), group leaders and members clearly perceive that the political dimension of group activity, i.e. representation and advocacy, is important; thus, "the representation of members' opinions before government" ranks as the most widely-realized (71% of respondents) benefit that members receive and the second most important benefit that leaders believe they offer to members, while "the advocacy of important values, ideas, and policies" is the most important benefit that group leaders believe they offer to members. And as demonstrated by the data in Table 5.7, next page, these factors are very important to respondents' decisions to continue membership in their group.

While for all respondents considered together, "representation" ranked first as the most highly valued benefit when considering whether to maintain membership; even when the sample was separated by group, "representation" remained among the top three benefits for all groups in the sample (see Table 5.8, next page). Next most important (again, with the important exception of collective bargaining in the case of the unions), however, was the provision of "training, education, or technical assistance"-- an economic benefit. And after two solidary benefits, "friendship" and "meetings," more economic inducements, "legal assistance" and "information," again appear as important benefits.

5.7.1 Perceptual and Value Characteristics: the Role of Efficacy

Hence, while Olsen's economic selective incentives, as well as solidary incentives,

Table 5.7
Most Important Benefits for Continuing Membership
(% reporting that the benefit is one of the three most important benefits they receive)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(35)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*
Representation	83	41	29	44	38	33	41	71	58	44
Collective Bargaining							71	71	67	36
Training	8	28	80	19	15	26	18	43	42	26
Friendship	5	17	29	38	15	44	20	14	8	22
Meetings	18	32	11	31	23	53	12	28		21
Legal Assist		17				7	36		17	17
Information	50	43	6	6		5	4	14		15
Advocacy	30	12	9	25	8	7	8	14	17	12
Communication	25	7	31	13	8	7	7	14	8	12
Public Affairs	20	2	26		8	19	10		8	12
Coordination	15	11	14	6	46	19	9	14		11
Research		7	3	6		5	3		17	4
Trips	5	2		6		7	2		8	3
Discounts		9				7	1			2

Source: 1997 Membership Survey
Question: ***What are the most important benefits in terms of your decision to continue your membership?***

Table 5.8: Top Five Most Important Benefits for Continuing Membership
(in order of greatest percentage of members reporting it to be important)

ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	ZCTU	ZFE	MUZ
Repres. Inform. Advoc. Commu. Public A	Inform. Repres. Meeting Training Friends. Legal A.	Training Commu. Repres. Friends. Inform.	Repres. Friends. Meeting Advoc. Training	Coordin. Repres. Meeting Training Friends.	Meeting Friends. Repres. Training Public A Coordin.	Col.Bar. Repres. Legal A. Friends. Training	Col.Bar. Repres. Training Meeting	Col.Bar. Repres. Training

appear to be important reasons why the Zambians in the sample seek out membership in economic associations, it is striking that the first-ranked response overall is "representation to government," a political benefit. Furthermore, we find evidence to support Moe's claim that such a finding fits a modified rational framework when we examine respondents' perceptions of their contribution to their group's political success or failure (see Table 5.9, next page). Over seventy percent of respondents reported that they believe their financial contributions to their group made a difference to its success in representing their interests, and eighty percent of respondents felt that their participation in group activities contributed to the group's success. This is strong evidence that across the board, the Zambians in the sample are looking to group activity for political reasons– they want their interests represented to government, and since they feel that their contributions to their group have impact on its political success, they have an "economically rational" incentive to contribute to group activity. These findings lean in the direction of supporting further development of pluralism in Zambia, for it would appear that there is at least a segment of the population that is ready to "*join together in groups based on similar social and economic likes and interests and thereby to influence government at those points where its activity touches these likes and interests.*"

When we break down the finding across different groups, we see the same large majorities who believe their contributions make a difference: 65% of ZACCI members, 58% of ZNFU members, 77% of PBA members, 75% of NAPSF members, 69% of PFU members, 65% of ZCF members, 78% of ZCTU members, and 92% of MUZ members. The only exception are members affiliated to the Federation of Employers (ZFE), where 4 of the seven respondents reported that their dues make no difference, while the other three

Table 5.9
Effect of Contributions on Group's Success or Failure
(% reporting level of the importance of their contribution)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(31)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*
Effect of Monetary Contribution: (percent of members)										
No Effect	30	30	11	6	23	23	12	57		18
Noticeable Effect	45	32	37	44	54	37	41	43	50	40
Big Effect	20	26	40	31	15	28	37		42	31
**	5	14	11	19	8	12	10		8	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Effect of Participation: (percent of members)										
No Effect	10	9	6	6	15	12	7	14		8
Noticeable Effect	68	39	40	38	39	51	43	57	75	46
Big Effect	18	37	40	38	31	26	40	29	17	34
**	5	13	14	19	15	12	11		8	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey ** no response or "don't know"

Question: One of the goals of this group is to represent members' interest to government. Do you believe that the money you pay in dues is important to this groups' success in representing its members' interests to government? Do you believe that your activities with this group are important to its success in representing its members' interests to government?

Table 5.10
Effect of Income Level on Efficacy
(% of respondents within income category)

Level of Annual Income: / **Effect of Dues:**	Kw 20,000-Kw 199,000	Kw 200,000-Kw 500,000	Over Kw 1 million	Total
No Effect	18	13	36	19
Noticeable Effect	39	53	44	45
Big Effect	42	34	21	36
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey
Kendall's tau-b: -0.123, significance level: 0.025

reported that they have a noticeable effect on group efforts. However, even for the ZFE, all but one respondent reported that their participation had some if not a large impact; for the rest of the groups, members reported overwhelmingly that their participation in their group was important to its overall success in representing their interests to government: 86% of ZACCI members, 76% of ZNFU members, 80% of PBA members, 76% of NAPSF members, 70% of PFU members, 77% of ZCF members, 83% of ZCTU members, and 92% of MUZ members.

Surprisingly, these perceptions of efficacy seem to have nothing to do with how much the individual actually contributes, since no relationship was found between the subscription level that members pay and their perception of their effect on their group's political success (Kendall's tau-b = -0.051, significance level = 0.31). However, there *does* appear to be a relationship between a member's level of income and their feelings of efficacy, but again it is surprising, as it shows that individuals in the low to middle range of our sample (Kw 20,000 to Kw 200,000 per month) feel more efficacious than their wealthier counterparts in the Kw 200,000 to Kw 500,000 range, who are nonetheless still more efficacious than their well-to-do counterparts who make over Kw 1 million per month. Kendall's tau-b shows a relationship between these two variables, income and level of efficacy, of -0.123, with a significance level of 0.025, see Table 5.10 for details).

5.7.2 Purposive Incentives: Group Activity as a Responsibility

In addition to such political inducements as mentioned above, purposive incentives also stand out as being important to membership motivations. To include such potential incentives in the analysis, group members were asked if they remained in the group at least partly because they felt a responsibility to do so. To reiterate from above: "feelings of

responsibility" can be thought of as "purposive incentives," since membership in the group provides the individually-realized benefit of fulfillment in satisfying one's obligations. As Table 5.11 demonstrates, a large majority of respondents (73%) report that they do stay in the group at least partly from a feeling of responsibility, and overall, 64% of respondents report that this feeling of responsibility is a very if not the most important reason why they continue membership in the group.

Table 5.11
Responsibility as a Motivational Factor
(% reporting that "feeling of responsibility" is reason for continuing their membership)

Apex Group: *(N=)* **Importance**:	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(35)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*
None / Not Very	26	15	20	19	8	9	25	43	25	21
Somewhat	20	13	6		8	5	7	14	8	9
Very	43	48	57	75	54	54	44	43	58	49
Most	13	20	14	6	8	23	14		8	15
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey * totals less than 100 are due to "no response"

Question: ***Do you remain in the group at least partly because you feel a responsibility to do so? Is this responsibility a (insert level) important reason for remaining in the group?***

Though we did not probe the respondent for their subjective interpretation of "feelings of responsibility,"i.e. who or what they feel responsible to, our discussion above concerning associational activity in Africa suggests that responsibilities to larger social networks is an important consideration in individual's decision-making. Whatever individual respondents were referring to, it's reasonable to suggest that "responsibility" offers another important selective incentive for interest group membership; that is, through

their group membership, these Zambians gain an individually-realized benefit that makes their contribution to group activity worthwhile.

Indeed, in each of the groups in the study, 50 to 80% of respondents reported that responsibility was a very or the most important reason for continuing membership in the group, with the exception again of the ZFE, where four of the seven respondents replied that responsibility was not that important to the reasons they maintained their membership. It's not surprising, given Hyden's peasant-theses, that it is the two main farmers' groups, the ZCF and the ZNFU, that have the highest percentages of respondents who report this is the most important reason to stay in the group. In a similar vein, friendship or social relationships with other members– a solidary benefit– round out the picture of important motivational inducements. In the sample, "friendship" was forth in the ranking of benefits important to continuing membership (see Table 5.7), and it fell among the top five benefits that members of all the agricultural groups found important.

5.7.3 Considering the Most Important Benefits to Group Membership

Clearly, there is a wide variety of incentives that are important to members, and the data above suggest that many members do posses "perceptual and value characteristics conducive to political action" (Moe 1980:209). Following Moe's interpretation of his very similar findings in the U.S., though economic selective incentives appear to be important membership inducements, there is a rational basis for the inducement value of group goals, such as the representation of the groups' interests to government, as well. Furthermore, it would seem that group leaders in the Third Republic are responding to members' desire for representation; as shown in Table 5.4, most leaders recognize that the representation of interests and the advocacy of values and policies are important to

members, and indeed, most members (71%) feel that their group does represent their interests to government. However, there exists an important disjunction between what members actually receive as benefits, and what they consider important to maintaining their membership. Looking back at Tables 5.6 and 5.7, we see that while, overall, members report that the top seven benefits they receive are *non-economic* in nature, four out of seven of the benefits they consider most important are indeed economic selective incentives. Thus, while training, legal assistance, and information rank *below* non-economic benefits on the list of what members receive, they rank *above* non-economic benefits such as advocacy, communication, and participation in public affairs on the list of what benefits members consider important.

Even more telling are members' responses to the question, "are there any other benefits that you would like to see your group provide?" As shown in Table 5.12, overwhelming majorities of members responded that there were other benefits they wanted their group to provide in addition to the ones already supplied: 100% of NAPSF, 100% of PFU, 97% of PBA, 93% of ZCF, 82% of ZNFU, 91% of ZCTU, and 83% of MUZ members.

Table 5.12
Other Benefits
(% reporting they would like other benefits from their group in addition to those they receive)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(35)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	**Total** *(377)*
	38	82	97	100	100	93	91	57	83	85

Source: 1997 Membership Survey
Question: ***Are there any other benefits that you would like to see your group provide?***

The important distinction to make about this finding is the nature of the groups that desire further benefits, and the nature of the goods and services they believe are missing (see Figure 5.4, below).[14]

Figure 5.4: Responses to Open-Ended Question: What other benefits should group provide?

Agricultural groups	Trade Unions
NAPSF	ZCTU
Transportation	Funeral Assistance: bags of meal and money
Services, fertilizers, money/loans, cows	Housing
Marketing of maize, fertilizers, and seed	Medical allowances, health care
Borehole, fertilizer, loans for cattle	Education
Loans, inputs, seeds	Housing, tools allowance
Farming equipment, inputs, seeds, fertilizer	More communication
Medical/Health care	Better working conditions, salaries, legal aid
Training and education	Household loans and salary advances
Supply of water	Cushioning of economic hardships
Ability for association to meet all my needs– inputs, marketing, legal help	Retirement package
Inputs, like they promised when they came. Information is OK, but must be put into practice. We need workshops & seminars.	Education benefits for children
ZCF	**Business Associations**
Training and advice, loans	PBA
Provision of seed	Funds to improve business, e.g. revolving fund
Fertilizer	Loans, tours and trips
Farm inputs	Seminars, workshops, tours and trips
Cattle loan	
Tractor, education, loans and other inputs	
PFU	
Fertilizer, loans	

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

Firstly, it is groups with "small members"-- small-scale farmers and small-scale businesspeople, and trade union members who believe their group should provide further benefits. For the former, the benefits are, for the most part, the productive inputs that used to be supplied by the one-party state through the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO); for the latter, the benefits desired

[14] This question was an open-ended item on the survey instrument; thus respondents were able to report exactly what they want from group membership, outside of the traditional incentive categories.

are largely about more successful bargaining for high wages and conditions of services. Since the distribution of these benefits represented the use of state resources to solicit support among rural constituencies for UNIP, we might think of these as a special type of economic selective incentive, a *"patronage incentive."*

Figure 5.4 (above) gives illustrative responses. As shown, members of the NAPSF, PFU, and ZCF report they continue to want very individual, very material selective incentives-- what we've termed "patronage incentives"-- from their group: agricultural inputs and credit predominate the list. Trade union members also want economic benefits: higher wages, better working conditions, as well as health, education, housing, and retirement benefits. Where government continues to own the firms that employ these workers, provision of these benefits also represent patronage-type awards, since workers are made aware of who supplies– and can stop supplying– them. This is still an important factor for mineworkers– whose union, we saw above, broke off from the Congress (ZCTU) over disagreements with the latter's "anti-government" stance. The identification of these *"patronage benefits"* is an important finding, for it demonstrates the long reach of membership incentives present in the Second Republic to expectations of group activity in the Third Republic.

For Zambians in the interest group system of the Second Republic, with its centralized- state apparatus and command-type economy, membership incentives in key interest groups– especially those that represented important political constituencies, the cooperatives and trade unions– revolved around economic selective incentives, specifically patronage-type rewards (and perhaps solidary ones too). The political system did not permit open lobbying over economic interests, so political incentives for

membership were not of much importance to individual's decision to join in collective action through interest groups. The question to ask is, has the introduction of pluralist institutions changed this? We've see above that there is reason to expect that in the Third Republic, both economic and non-economic incentives are important, it is now time to see if we can tell which is *more* important, and specifically, if the political incentive of gaining representation to government has gained importance over the provision of material benefits. To do this, we push the distinction between economic incentives and political ones a bit further, beginning with the first decision that members make about group activity: whether or not to join.

5.8 The decision to join

Olson's theory predicts that individuals join groups for the selective incentives they offer. Above, we made the case that there are other reasons that individuals might look to group activity. To test these hypotheses, we asked members what was their primary reason for joining their group[15]. Table 5.13 (next page) gives the results when respondents were asked simply if the item was one of the reasons they joined their association, and Table 5.14 (following page) shows respondents' answers when they were asked to choose the most important reason.

[15] Above, we first considered a similar issue, that is, how members value the benefits they receive, in order to be able to include trade unions and employers associations in the analysis. Here, we have to exclude them, because membership in these organizations is compulsory.

Table 5.13
Reasons for Joining
(% reporting that item was a reason for joining their group)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(50)*	PBA *(33)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(13)*	ZCF *(42)*	**Total** *(194)*
Goods and Services	43	80	61	94	100	91	74
Representation	95	82	85	94	85	74	85
Social Rewards	23	44	49	19	69	50	41
Expectation	10	38	33	50	39	33	31
Responsibility	53	68	67	94	85	64	67

Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)
Question: I have a list of some of the other reasons for which people sometimes join groups. As I read each one, I'd like you to tell me if it was one of the reasons why YOU decided to join this association?

As shown in Table 5.14, next page, when respondents were given five types of reasons from which to choose, "representation to government" came out as most important overall for all respondents, but there were noticeable differences between groups. For the two business organizations, "representation" was the modal response (ZACCI 88%, PBA 52%); while for all the farmer groups, "goods and services" was the modal response (ZNFU 47%, NAPSF 53%, PFU 73%, ZCF 50%). For the latter, "a sense of responsibility" was reported to be the most important reason for joining for 21% of ZNFU respondents, and 19 % of PBA respondents; "social rewards" were also reported to also be the most important reason for joining for 11% of ZCF respondents. These findings seem to indicate that political motivations are most important to business groups in the Third Republic, while goods and services are most important to agricultural groups. However, as we've noted above, just because selective incentives *are* important to individuals' decisions to join organizations doesn't mean that they are the *only* important reason that people decide to join in group activity. Since the argument that pluralism can precipitate widespread citizen activity and policy advocacy at least partially rests on

whether people join in collective action for material or for political reasons, it's important to analyze this issue carefully.

Table 5.14
Most Important Reasons for Joining
(% reporting that item was most important reason for joining their group)

Apex Group: *(N=)*	ZACCI *(34)*	ZNFU *(47)*	PBA *(31)*	NAPSF *(15)*	PFU *(11)*	ZCF *(36)*	**Total** *(174)*
Goods and Services	6	47	19	53	73	50	37
Representation	88	30	52	47	18	11	42
Social Rewards	3	2	3			11	4
Responsibility	3	21	19		9	3	16
Other			7				2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)
Question: Which was the most important reason for which you joined this association?

5.9 Separating Political from Economic: The Pivotal Role of Politics

To focus more closely on this issue, we asked respondents to choose between the two incentives, "goods and services" or "representation to government,"and choose which, for them, was the most important benefit, or if in fact they were equally important. When members were forced to decide between just the two, it is only for ZACCI that representation comes out in first place, with 68% reporting that "representation" was most important, while "services" were more important for only 18% . However, the only group for which there was a majority reporting that "services" was most important was the Cooperative Federation. And furthermore, offering the choice of whether they are equally important shows that even for some members who might put great value in the material rewards of their membership, the political rewards have value too: half the respondents from the PFU, a third from the ZCF and PBA, and a quarter from the ZNFU reported that the two types are equally important.

Again we see that though these data offer support for the economic "selective incentive" hypothesis, they also point to the importance of political motivations; as shown in Table 5.15, even though 42% of respondents all together find economic services to be the most important membership benefit, 32% put greater value in the political representation the group offers, and 27% believe the two benefits are equal. In addition, it is apparent that the relative importance of these incentives varies between groups; ZACCI seems to be the most "political," while the ZCF appears to be the most "economic," with the other groups falling somewhere in between.

Table 5.15
Most Important Benefit at Present
(% reporting that)

Apex Group: *(N=)* / ***Benefit***	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(53)*	PBA *(34)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(10)*	ZCF *(42)*	**Total** *(195)*
Goods & Services	18	42	47	50	40	57	42
Representation	68	34	18	38	10	10	32
Both are Equal	15	25	35	13	50	33	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)
Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests. Which of these benefits is more important to you, the provision of goods and services, or representation to government?

The ZNFU deserves special attention here. As we've discussed above, the National Farmers' Union has historically been a commercial farmers' organization, with small-scale farmers only being introduced into the ranks of membership in the past few years. We've suggested that such "small / peasant farmers" differ from "large / commercial farmers" in the benefits they look for from group involvement; this might mean that there is substantial difference between members within the ZNFU as to whether services or representation is more important. To test whether this is the case, we looked for a correlation between the

dues that a member pays,[16] and their preference for the two types of benefit, and found that there is indeed a significant relationship, with "large" farmers more likely to consider representation the more important benefit, and "small" farmers more likely to find that good and services are the most important benefit (Kendall's tau-b = 0.389, significance level = .005).

We've learned thus far that the while economic inducements are important in the Third Republic, as we've argued in previous chapters that they were important in the Second, there is a case to be made for the salience of political ones as well. Moe finds this also to be the case in his study of interest groups in the United States, where "the motivational roles of lobbying and of feelings of responsibility are not at all insignificant; while they are hardly the crucial factors the pluralists make them out to be, they are certainly more prevalent than Olson's original analysis would lead us to expect."

Indeed, we've found that non-economic factors are important for motivating group members in Zambia as well, implying that the adoption of pluralist institutions is having a similar effect in that country as it does in pluralist systems elsewhere; that is, that we find people engaging in group activity in order to gain representation for their interests, as well for the kind of purposive reasons that pluralist theorists are fond of, such as feelings of responsibility and shared values. Following Moe, however, it is possible to push the matter still further through an inquiry into the "pivotal role of politics" as a determinant of membership decisions (1980:210).

---

[16] This provides an indicator of "small" vs. "large" status, because small farmers pay Kw20,000 in dues, and large farmers pay 1% of their annual profits. The categories are thus Kw20,000 or less = "small farmer," and Kw50,000 or more = "large farmer" (there were no respondents who reported dues between Kw20,001 and Kw50,000).

To do this, we asked respondents to tell us how they would react in two hypothetical situations: first, if their group stopped providing goods and services altogether, and just lobbied government in pursuit of members' interests; and second, if their group stopped its attempts to represent members' interests to government, and instead just provided goods and services. Table 5.16 and 5.17 give the results.

We see from this data that large percentages would indeed drop out of the group in the absence of service provision (50% of ZCF members, 44% of NAPSF members, 39% of ZNFU members), while much smaller percentages would drop out if the group's lobbying activities were ceased (only 9% of PBA members, 11% of PFU members, 13% of ZCF members). In most groups however, (with the exception of the ZCF), a *majority of members would stay in the group even if there were no goods and services offered* but the group still lobbied government; this majority ranges, as we would expect it to from the analysis thus far, from 85% of ZACCI members to 56% of NAPPSF members. And 50% of ZACCI members in the sample would drop out if lobbying were no longer carried out.

Table 5.16: Reaction if Group Stopped Providing Services, but Still Lobbied Government *(%)*

Apex Group: *(N=)* ***Reaction***	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(34)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(9)*	ZCF *(42)*	**Total** *(195)*
Stay In	85	61	71	56	88	50	66
Drop Out	15	39	29	44	11	50	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)

Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests. How would you react if this group were to sop providing goods and services, but still lobbied government? Would you stay in the group, or would you drop out?

Table 5.17: Reaction if Group Stopped Lobbying Government, but Still Provided Services *(%)*

Apex Group: *(N=)* ***Reaction***	ZACCI *(40)*	ZNFU *(53)*	PBA *(34)*	NAPSF *(16)*	PFU *(9)*	ZCF *(40)*	**Total** *(192)*
Drop Out	50	21	9	19	11	13	22
Stay In	50	79	91	81	89	87	78
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: 1997 Membership Survey *excludes cases in other categories (e.g. no response, missing)

Question: Your group provides two kinds of benefits: it provides goods and services to its members, and it lobbies (or pressures) government in order to represent its members and promote their interests. How would you react if this group were to stop lobbying government, but still provided goods and services? Would you stay in the group, or would you drop out?

By cross-tabulating these questions, members can be classified according to the incentives that appear to be pivotal to their membership decision, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. (next page). As explained by Moe,

> "Members in category I would remain in the group if it only lobbied, but also if it only supplied goods and services. Either one is sufficient to justify membership, while neither is necessary. For those in category II, lobbying is both necessary and sufficient– these individuals would stay in if lobbying is offered, but drop out if it is not. Members in category III give the opposite responses; for them, membership pivots entirely on whether or not goods and services are provided. And, for members in category IV, the combination of lobbying and direct member services must be provided if membership is to be maintained. Olson's theory implies that virtually all group members should fall into category III, "services only." For each of the other categories, politics plays a pivotal role in member decisions to stay in the group" (Moe 1980:211).[17]

[17] This method of analysis was developed by Moe in the work cited, and is being replicated here since it is a rich and innovative approach to solving the incentive puzzle.

Figure 5.5: Matrix of Incentives Pivotal to Membership Decisions

		Stay in if group only provides goods and services?	
		Yes	No
Stay in if group only provides representation?	Yes	Each sufficient (I)	Representation only (II)
	No	Services only (III)	Both necessary (IV)

Table 5.18 gives the results of the sample members' responses.

Table 5.18
Classification of Members
According to which Incentives are Pivotal to their Membership *(%)*

Incentives	ZACCI	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	PFU	ZCF	**Total**
EITHER Services or Representation	43	53	68	50	89	43	54
Representation Only	43	10	3	6		7	14
Services Only	7	27	24	31		45	25
BOTH Services and Representation	7	11	6	13	11	5	8
Sum							
Services Only	7	27	24	31	0	45	25
Politics Somehow Pivotal	93	73	76	69	100	55	75
Total	100 (34)	100 (47)	100 (31)	100 (15)	100 (11)	100 (36)	100 (174)

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

The most striking finding is that, unlike the case in Moe's study of U.S. interest group members, there is no case in which a majority of respondents would stay in their group only if it provided goods and services– i.e. economic incentives, and for only one case, the ZCF, is the modal response "services only." Quite different from the findings on members in the U.S., the modal response in Zambia for all groups in the study (except the ZCF) and all members overall, is that the provision of *either* services *or* representation is sufficient reason to remain in their group. And for ZACCI, as many members (43%) reported that they would *only* stay in their group if it represented their interests to government as reported that either services or representation were sufficient (43%). For the agricultural groups and the PBA, the percentage of members who reported that they would remain only if goods and services were provided (27% for ZNFU, 24% for PBA, 31% for NAPSF) was higher than the percentage who stated they would remain only if the group lobbied government (10%, 3%, 6%, respectively), but even in those groups, the modal response was that the provision of *either* services or representation was sufficient to maintain membership.

These data suggest quite strongly that while economic incentives indeed appear to be important to Zambians' decision to join and remain in interest groups, political considerations are also weighty. As shown by the summary data at the bottom of Table 5.18, for 75% of the total group members in the sample, politics plays a pivotal role in membership motivations. For the individual group/sectors, this varies quite widely, 93% for ZACCI, 76% for PBA, 73% for ZNFU, 69% for NAPSF, and 55% for ZCF; but in all cases, the majority of group members ascribe *some* if not *considerable* importance to the role that their group plays in representing their interests to government.

5.10 Considering the Trade Unions

One last consideration deserves attention before summarizing the findings above. As mentioned earlier, trade unions were left out of the above analysis because membership is compulsory in these groups. Thus, workers don't have the opportunity for "choice," that is, for joining / not joining and maintaining / not maintaining membership. However, if we assume that unionists nonetheless have preferences over whether or not they'd *like* to join and stay members of their union, then we can explore a bit further into the incentives which are important to these members also. Thus, the survey questionnaires for trade unionists had the relevant questions altered where necessary to make them applicable to a compulsory membership situation; for example, union members were asked "*if you had the choice* to stay in the group or drop out, how would you react if your union were to stop providing goods and services..." Given that we learned above that "collective bargaining for better wages and working conditions" and "representation to government" are the most important benefits to workers, with bargaining ranking slightly higher than representation (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8), we might expect that workers would report they value "goods and services" about the same as "representation."

And indeed that is the case; as Table 5.19 shows, the modal response (37%) is that they are equally most important, with a slightly higher percentage of workers reporting that the provision of goods and services is most important (33%) than the percentage who feel representation is most important (31%). However, when pushed a bit, a majority of union members (63%) reported they would want to "stay in" their union if lobbying were ceased, while a slight majority (52%) told us they would want to "drop out" if services were stopped, indicating that the former is the more consequential inducement. This is

Table 5.19
Hypothetical Case ~ Union Members

Which Benefit is More Important?	(%)
Provision of Goods and Services	33
Representation to Government / Lobbying	31
Both are Equal	37
How Would You React if Services Stopped?	
Drop Out	52
Stay In	48
How Would You React if Lobbying Stopped?	
Drop Out	37
Stay In	63
Incentives Pivotal to Membership	
EITHER Services or Representation	30
Representation Only	19
Services Only	34
BOTH Services and Representation	17
Sum	
Services Only	34
Politics Somehow Pivotal	66
Total	**100 (N=169)**

Source: 1997 Membership Survey

corroborated by the fact that when we calculate the incentives which are pivotal to membership using the same framework as Table 5.18, we see that the modal category (34%) is "services only"– that is, for 34% of the respondents who are members of trade unions, their desire to stay in their union hinges only on the provision of goods and services (e.g. higher wages won from collective bargaining, training and publications, etc.).

Nonetheless, we also learn from Table 5.19 that for 66% of the trade union members in the sample, politics also plays a pivotal role in membership considerations: thus, 30% informed us that they would want to stay in their union if *either* services or representation were provided, 17% reported that *both* services and representation were necessary, and 19% told us that their desire to remain in their union hinged *solely* on their union's continued lobbying efforts. Union members in Zambia thus seem similar to farmers in that while selective incentives are indeed important inducements, political motivations– the desire to have some voice in the political process over policy decision making– are also consequential.

5.11 Conclusion: Evaluating Membership Incentives in the Third Republic

General Findings

The empirical evidence and data analysis in this chapter suggests that Zambians seem to join in collective action for *both* the material rewards to be gained *and* the opportunity to have their interests represented to government. However, for many interest group members in Zambia's Third Republic, political motivations are often as important as economic motivations for members when considering whether to join and

continue in groups. Furthermore, while there exists a set of members who are primarily concerned with the economic "selective incentives" that Olson hypothesized, there also exists a set of members whose motivation for membership rests on the attainment of collective, political goals through the lobbying of government. Importantly, we've found that there might be distinctions between group/sectors on these matters; for instance, members belonging to groups affiliated to the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) seem to be the most "politically" motivated, while members belonging to agricultural groups and the Provincial Business Associations (PBA) seem to be more "economically" motivated. We'll address these distinctions further below.

In general, then, we see again both change and continuity in the interest group system in the Third Republic. There is change in that the "opening up" of government and the possibility for lobbying government seems to be met with supporting expectations at the micro-level: members of the interest groups above report that gaining representation is important to them, and that in many cases, they do believe their group is representing their interests to government. Furthermore, we've seen that for most groups, a majority of members believe that their contributions to group activity do make a difference in their groups' success or failure in lobbying government; indicating another political incentive for group membership. This indicates a motivation for membership in Zambia that could bode well for the development of pluralism, for it would seem that at least these members are turning to group activity at least in part to pursue collective political goals.

However, there is also evidence of continuity in the interest group system that suggests continuing constraints to the development of pluralism. First of all, the interest group system continues to include only a small proportion of the total population of

economically active Zambians– a group who is older, wealthier, more educated, more likely to have knowledge of politics and to participate in electoral politics (though less likely to have a partisan affinity, or to support the ruling party)-- in effect, an economic elite. Furthermore, the interests represented by are those in the formal economy; the much larger informal economy, as well as the large population of subsistence farmers, continues to be unorganized and poorly represented. Analyzing the members active in the groups in the study, we again come to the conclusion that the interest group system in the Third Republic is not very inclusive.

Secondly, we again see the continuing influence of neopatrimonial institutions. The legacy begun in the Second Republic of using economic interest groups as distributors of state patronage has left an indelible mark; especially for small-farmers and small-businesses, the expectation that group membership brings access to government-subsidized credit, inputs, and services has left a lasting imprint on the incentive to join associations. This imprint has yet to be countered even in the Third Republic; as pointed out in the last chapter, even though the MMD government initially set about liberalizing agriculture, it proved all too willing to step back into the input market when the reforms became problematic. Thus, Zambians see that the age of state-sponsored incentives hasn't ended, especially for important political constituencies; and the need for a perceptual shift in the incentive to join associations is thwarted. For groups in these sectors, we hypothesize that organizational maintenance efforts will be affected by this imperative.

Finally, it is important to note that there is a notable disjunction between what group leaders report they provide to their memberships, and what group members a) receive, and b) desire or expect. Since the groups in this study rely on voluntary

membership for their maintenance, this is a potentially important finding, and one that we'll return to in the next chapter. Briefly here, we've seen that group leaders at the national level perceive that advocating for group values, ideas and policies, and representing group policy interests to government, are the most important benefits they provide to members. In addition, these groups also report that they provide several types of economic selective incentives to members. However, few group members report that they receive the latter benefits, but that they do realize non-economic benefits from their memberships. Combining these findings with evidence that economic goods and services are very important to many members in the sample, we realize that the sustainability of these groups is questionable, for even if members do appreciate the political representation and non-economic benefits they are receiving, they also expect their group to provide certain goods and services. Groups with reasonable capacity will be better at doing this, and thus more likely to attract members and keep members. This is a key issue we turn to in Chapter Six.

Explaining Group Variation

Above, we've suggested that there is an important distinction between both business and agricultural groups, as well as between small-scale and large-scale businessmen and farmers, in the incentives they offer for group membership; the findings here indicate that "small" businesspeople are more like "small" farmers in that the basis of their membership rests on a particular type of economic incentive. Table 5.20 summarizes the differences that have emerged in the analysis (see next page).

Table 5.20
Evaluating Membership Incentives

INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:	SDC	STATE-NEGOTIATED CORPORATISM			QUASI-PLURALISM		NEW GROUPS			
APEX GROUP: *(N=)*	ZCF *(43)*	ZCTU *(157)*	ZFE *(7)*	MUZ *(12)*	ZACC *(40)*	ZNFU *(54)*	PBA *(35)*	PFU *(13)*	NAPS *(16)*	**Total** *(377)*
Variable										
Benefits Realized	NEC	EC	EC	EC	POL	POL	EC	NEC	NEC	POL*
Continue: Most Important	NEC	EC	EC	EC	POL	EC	EC	NEC	POL	POL
Continue: Second Import.	NEC	POL	POL	POL	EC	POL	NEC	POL	NEC	EC
Perception of Efficacy (%)	65	81	19	100	80	81	83	62	88	74
Further Benefits	PAT	PAT	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	PAT	PAT	PAT	–
Reason for Joining	EC	–	–	–	POL	EC	POL	EC	EC	–
Most Important Benefit	EC	–	–	–	POL	EC	EC	EC	EQ	–
Politics Pivotal to Membership	55	ZCTU/MUZ– 66			93	73	76	100	69	75

* with unions removed from sample

Definitions of Measures Used:

Benefits Realized: *(Most Realized Benefit)*
Table 5.6, "Top Five Benefits Most Realized by Members,"
POL: Political = Representation
EC: Economic = Collective Bargaining, Training, Legal Assistance, Information, Research, Trips, Discounts
NEC: Non-Economic = Friendship, Meetings, Advocacy, Communication, Public Affairs, Coordination

Continue:
Most Important *(First Most Important Benefit)*
Continue:
Second Import *(Second Most Important Benefit)*
Table 5.8, "Top Five Most Important Benefits for Continuing Membership." Benefits from Table Six-B are categorized according to type, as above.

Perception of Efficacy Table 5.9, "Effects of Contributions on Group's Success or Failure." Figure given is the (average) percentage of respondents who believe their monetary and participatory contributions have an effect on group.
Further Benefits Figure 5.4, "What other benefits should group provide?" PAT indicates a "patronage incentive," as described in text.
Reason for Joining Table 5.13, "Most Important Reason for Joining,"
POL: Political = Representation,
EC: Economic = Goods and Services
Most Important Benefit Table 5.15, "Most Important Benefit at Present," values as above, EQ = Equal
Politics Pivotal to Membership Table 5.18, "Classification of Members," Percent of members for whom politics is pivotal to membership

Political incentives seem most consistently important to members of the main business organization, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry, for the benefit that members both receive and consider most important, as well as the reason they joined the association, is a political one: the representation of their policy interests to government. Political incentives also seem important to the group that has historically represented large and commercial farmers' interests, the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU). For this group, policy representation is the benefit most often realized by members, and it is the second most important consideration to continuing membership in their group. However, while representation is important, farmers who belong to the Union are similar to farmers in the other agricultural groups, the ZCF, PFU, and NAPSF, in that when forced to choose which is more important to their decision calculus, a larger percentage choose the economic benefits over the political; the provision of information services and training are especially important to farmers.

However, there emerges a further important distinction between the groups representing small-scale businessmen and farmers, i.e. the PBA, ZCF, PFU, and NAPSF, and the groups representing predominantly large-scale interests, the ZACCI and ZNFU. For the latter, the political, economic and non-economic benefits analyzed in this study provide an inclusive list of motivations for membership; for the former, what we have termed "patronage incentives," i.e. formerly state-distributed patronage rewards, still permeate the reasons why people look to join and stay in interest associations.

In the trade union sector, we see that member demands on their group are both political and economic; that is, workers want to see their unions actively representing their policy interests to government, but they also want their union to be successful in its

collective bargaining arrangements with their employers. As discussed above, membership in this sector is non-voluntary, so analysis of the reason why workers join or continue in their union is not relevant. However, union members' perception of the benefits they receive makes it possible to compare them to other groups on that account, and here we find not surprisingly that the economic benefits associated with successful collective bargaining are most important in the minds of trade unionists.

Furthermore, though our sample size is small, it is striking that only members of unions affiliated with the ZCTU reported that they seek additional benefits to the ones given in the standard list (see Figure 5.4). Examination of these additional benefits reveals items that are probably not expected from their union, as the question asks, but from government or their employer. Benefits like housing, health care, loans, retirement packages, education benefits, were provided by government-owned enterprises in the Second Republic, but have evaporated as these enterprises are privatized and government attempts to reduce expenditures. Similar to the benefits mentioned by small-scale businesspeople and farmers, we have labeled these benefits "patronage incentives," since that is the basis on which they were provided to urban constituencies in the Second Republic.

Thus, as in the last chapter, group's institutional histories again help to explain variations we see between interest groups. In the formerly *state-dominated corporatist* sector, that is small-scale and peasant farmers organized under the cooperative movement (ZCF), the main benefits that are sought from group activity continue to be the agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities provided by the one-party state. Among members of the ZCF, political inducements to group activity are at their lowest when

compared to other sectors; cooperative members are among the most unlikely to feel that their contribution makes a difference to their group's ability to lobby government, and neither the reason they joined the cooperative nor the benefits they value most from their membership are political. Both the old (ZCF) and new (PFU and NAPSF) groups seeking to represent farmers in this sector exhibit similar economically-oriented membership incentives. In the formerly *state-negotiated corporatist* sector, the trade union membership incentive continues to be non-voluntary, although it seems that unionists still expect the provision of benefits that were once the result of the one-party state's patronage system. In addition, however, union members also expect their unions to successfully represent their policy interests to government, and thus their participation in group activity might also be politically motivated. This point is encouraged by the finding that members of both the ZCTU and the MUZ believe their contributions to their unions make a difference in the union's success at lobbying government.

In the formerly *quasi-pluralist* sector, we find the most politically-motivated incentives for membership. For both the ZACCI and the ZNFU, gaining representation to government is the most realized benefit of membership, and for ZACCI members, the most important benefit in their decision to maintain their membership. For the ZNFU, economic incentives prove more important to member-farmers than for the businessmen belong to ZACCI, but ZNFU members did not express desire for the patronage-oriented benefits that members of the other agricultural groups did. Rather, they seem to accept the political representation and access to selective incentives like information services and training workshops as the benefits to be realized from joining their association. Finally, we find in the quasi-pluralist sector the most poltically-motivated membership in the study,

the businessmen belonging to ZACCI.

Comparative Inquiry: Implications of Replicating the Study

The analysis in this chapter in part represents a replication of Terry Moe's seminal re-tooling of the Olsen hypothesis. As did his study of interest groups in Minnesota, we've shown above that the pluralist assumption that individuals will contribute to collective political goals can be accommodated using a rational framework. The fact that few group members report that they receive the economic selective incentives that Olsen argues are critical to voluntary membership decisions, but nevertheless stay in their group, indicates that the non-economic benefits they receive are important. If Moe's modified rational-choice model is correct, non-economic benefits are serving as selective incentives.

CHAPTER SIX:

"ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES ~ INTEREST GROUP AUTONOMY AND CAPACITY"

6.1 Pluralism at the Intermediate Level: The Relevance of Organizational Resources

In chapter five, we examined the motivations for membership in Zambia's interest groups, finding support for the argument that while economic inducements are often important to Zambians' decision to join and stay in groups, at least some Zambians also seem to be joining groups, at least in part, for political reasons: they value and expect the political representation of their interests from their groups, and they believe that contributions they make to group activity matter with regard to their group's political successes. This suggests that the pluralist assumptions developed by the classic group theorists might be valid; that people really do voluntarily join together to forward collective goals, in this instance, the goal of gaining the political representation of particular economic interests.

At the same time, however, it is important to proceed cautiously; for the preceding analysis also demonstrated that economic selective incentives, e.g. training and

workshops, information services, legal assistance, are important to the membership decision– in fact, in some cases they are the most if not the only reason that members voluntarily join particular interest groups. Given the effects of one-party rule and neopatrimonial practices for interest groups in the Second Republic, we noted that a special type of economic incentive is especially relevant, that is, the "patronage incentive," whereby group membership provides access to state resources, e.g. subsidized credit and agricultural inputs, in exchange for political support.

In addition to demonstrating the different incentives at work in Zambia's interest group system, we also began the work of finding explanatory patterns to different types of incentives. A poignant point emerges from that analysis: businessmen, farmers, and workers alike in Zambia have well-defined, if differing, preferences for the benefits they expect from their association. Indeed, given that interest group membership in pluralist systems is, by definition, voluntary,[1] it is clear that the mobilization of groups in the Third Republic thus requires adequate attention to the provision of such benefits, for in a pluralist system, "interest groups cannot be organized successfully unless their leaders are able to offer a mixture of benefits that attract members, and particularly patrons, to their cause" (Walker 1991:75).[2] In this chapter, we address the question of organizational resources from the direction of the membership imperative: we argue that benefit

---

[1] This applies to all groups in the Third Republic except for the trade unions, which as of 1996-97, operated under "closed-shops." However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the proposed Industrial Relations Act does away with this provision, making membership even in the trade unions voluntary. Nonetheless, the fact that leaders in the unions are elected by members means there is an incentive for unions to also be sensitive to the "membership imperative," i.e. the need for attention to benefit provision.

[2] Walker argues that it is the support of political patrons, rather than the provision of selective incentives or some psychological tendency to group activity, that solves the collective action problem and explains the proliferation of interest groups in the United States (1991:102).

provision is necessary to group maintenance and thus partly determines the group's need for and pursuit of organizational resources.

Given the corporatist nature of the previous regime in Zambia and its effect on the interest group system, we argue further that consideration of organizational resources must address two variables: autonomy and capacity. To provide a mix of benefits attractive to members, groups require the *autonomy* to follow an agenda which reflects members' (as opposed to some agent outside the group's) interests, as well as the *capacity* to procure and distribute benefits, whether those benefits be the political representation of group goals in a pluralist arena, or the provision of economic goods such as training and publications– or the coordination of patronage rewards.[3] In the following chapter, we employ a comparative analysis of the nine main groups in the study, as well as twenty-one of their member organizations, with regard to these two types of organizational resources, autonomy and capacity. First, we seek to establish whether there exist notable differences in the levels of organizational resources wielded by interest groups in the Third Republics. Then we analyze whether different membership incentives seem to present different resource issues for groups. Finally, we consider the implications that organizational resources might have for the topic of the next chapter, interest group influence.

6.2 Theoretical Issues: Autonomy and Capacity from an African perspective

In focusing our discussion of organizational resources on the two types above, group autonomy and group capacity, we are in good company with recent developments

[3] Note this last type of benefit requires organizational capacity, but not necessarily autonomy; in fact, the lack of autonomy produced by government (or other agent's) cooptation is usually the configuration found in patronage systems.

in the literature on African state-society relations. In Chapter Two, we discussed this literature's serious concern with the paradox in Africa of *weak states* which nonetheless have sought to *control the societies* over which they govern. As Tripp points out, the debate boils down to considerations of whether the African state has "too much" autonomy and sits "suspended in 'mid-air' over society," or whether it instead has "too little autonomy" and is ruled by clientelistic networks based on clan, lineage, ethnicity, religion and region (2000:2). Other analyses of state-society relations in Africa have drawn attention to the point that *societal* autonomy and capacity are similar in nature to these properties in the state-- and equally important to analysis (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994). Drawing from Bratton's (1994) "power resources" framework, Tripp posits that while autonomy implies the ability to make decisions independently of external forces, capacity refers to the ability to implement those decisions. More specifically, *societal autonomy* is defined as "the ability of non-state collectives to take decisions relatively independently of the state, communal groups, foreign donors or other outside pressures."

Two important points emerge from this discussion. First, societal autonomy is a critical concern in systems which are in transition from a corporatist regime to a pluralist one. As discussed earlier, the brand of corporatism assumed in Africa in general and Zambia in particular was one which sought to bring societal interests under the blanket of single-party control. The price of control for groups themselves was the lack of autonomy over their own agendas, a point most saliently brought out by the experience of those involved in the Zambian cooperative movement. For these individuals, the cooperative movement was an instrument of government directive and not accountable to "member-felt needs," resulting in these groups being perceived to be "owned by the government"

(Nakaponda-Sakala 1996:9). However, not all organizations in Zambia were coopted by the one-party state; on a continuum of levels of autonomy ranging from no control at all over the organization's agenda to full group autonomy from government or other pressures, we've seen that there was much variation between groups in different sectors. Ostensibly, the transition to pluralism *should* have leveled the playing field, severing the ties between the state / party and societal associations where they existed, and making all groups formally autonomous from government. We seek here to assess whether groups in the Third Republic have improved their autonomy from outside agents, under the assumption that this will result in higher levels of responsiveness to members' "felt-needs," and thus contribute to better benefit provision in the interests of organizational maintenance.

These issues are of import, for, as Tripp argues, if the ability of interest groups to influence policy requires that these groups are autonomous from the state and other outside pressures, then evaluating group autonomy is integral to determining the group's potential for fulfilling the goal of political representation. Put another way, groups which are beholden to the government's interests can not be expected to attempt to influence government policy on behalf of their members' interests, and as we've seen in the last chapter, this is a reward that many members expect from their contribution to group activity. In evaluating individual group's abilities to both provide this important benefit of representation to their members and to be successful at their influence attempts, autonomy is a necessary, though not sufficient, requisite in the new pluralist systems adopted across Africa in the 1990's– necessary in order to enable societal actors to gain leverage with which to demand policy changes, to allow organizations to operate outside of state-based

patronage networks, and to create new norms of association that are distinct from the patterns of participation associated with state-led institutions (Tripp 2000:6).

Secondly, though autonomy is thus critical to the organizational resources of interest groups, autonomy alone is not sufficient; organizations must be able to act, to implement the choices that group leaders make concerning benefit provision as well as policy advocacy. And just as the state's capacity to implement its decisions relies on the technical, administrative, and human resources to "get things done,"so does the capacity of societal groups (Bratton 1994:235). A tension exists, however, between a group's desire to maintain autonomy from interests outside its membership and the procurement of these kinds of resource; the tension results from the fact that often, "those who pay the piper wish to call the tune."

This was most dramatically demonstrated for the cooperative movement during the Second Republic; while the primary societies to which individual members belonged had little discretion over the cooperative movement's agenda, for a time in the early 1970's this was mitigated by the fact that the newly-formed Cooperative Federation had ample resources to spend on providing services to members. Over time, however, the lack of member control over the goals of the organization became apparent as members grew less content with how the leadership chose to wield the Federation's considerable financial and technical capacity. As state resources began to dwindle and the state's capacity to support the cooperatives began to decay, the issue of autonomy became increasingly more important to cooperative members. But paradoxically, members seem to seek strong, autonomous associations in order to insist that the government resume the former levels of service provision that were realized when the one-party state initially coopted the

cooperative movement. Since cooperators are not the only Zambians who face this situation, we refer to this as a more general *paradox of autonomy and capacity* that affects the Zambian interest group system as a whole, and individual group's attempts to secure organizational resources.

6.3 The Paradox of Autonomy and Capacity

What we call here the "paradox of autonomy and capacity" arises from the very phenomena that corporatist strategies try to rectify; that is, given the problems associated with organizing for collective action, membership-based groups face difficulties in raising the resources (especially at first) necessary for the pursuit of group goals. For groups with low or inadequate levels of organizational capacity, it can be attractive to trade a bit of autonomy for the steady flow of resources possible from government (or some other agent's) involvement, either through the direct subsidization of the group or the creation / changing of regulations that affect group activity. However, doing so creates a paradox: for in increasing one organizational resource, capacity, the other resource, autonomy, is adversely affected; the paradox emerges because though increased capacity is valued for its role in aiding lobbying efforts and organizational maintenance, the very act of giving up autonomy over the group's affairs can obstruct those goals.

In Zambia's Third Republic, the most salient concern in the paradox of autonomy and capacity is the prevalence of donor assistance to many different, but importantly not all, types of associations. Although donor resources can vastly improve a group's ability to "get things done," the fact that donors seek to fund groups whose objectives they support can have the effect of altering group agendas to fit what is perceived to be the current donor fashion of the day (e.g. bringing small-scale producers into what have

historically been large-scale producer groups, etc.). In addition, donors sometimes insist on direct involvement in the affairs of groups they support. Both of these factors can threaten the autonomy and integrity of the group's agenda– and thus the ability to achieve group goals– even while the capacity of the group to fulfill that agenda is improved. In addition, as demonstrated by the agricultural liberalization reversal in the mid-1990's, the MMD government seems loathe to completely leave its role in the distribution of agricultural resources to rural small-holders– especially around election time– and continues to distribute its largesse through groups. Again, this increase in capacity, which aids the provision of membership benefits, comes at the price of autonomy; groups which toe the government's line are more likely to receive its largesse.

This discussion of organizational resources suggests several pertinent propositions for our study of interest groups in Zambia:

> 1) Associational autonomy is necessary to the pluralist vision of group activity. However, in the African context, autonomy is a highly contested resource which cannot be taken for granted, as pluralist theory tends to do. Associational autonomy is hence best considered as a variable; and the relationship of organizational autonomy to the attainment of group goals (e.g. benefit provision and policy influence) is a matter for empirical analysis. In this chapter, we begin an effort to operationalize the theoretical concept of autonomy in a manner that permits systematic analysis of these issues.
>
> 2) Organizational capacity is also an implicit assumption of the pluralist vision of a plethora of groups making demands upon the state in their members' interests. As discussed above, group capacity is important to how well groups are able to "get things done." Where "getting things done" involves the provision of membership services and / or the representation of members' interests to government, we might expect that high levels of this resource will result in an increased ability to attain these goals, enabling groups to better provide benefits as well as improving their ability to engage the state over matters that are important to members. In this chapter, we begin an effort to operationalize the theoretical concept of capacity in a manner that permits systematic analysis of these issues.

To summarize, we are interested in these two types of organizational resources for two reasons: first for a comparison of groups, toward the identification of variation in the organizational resources groups command; and secondly, to determine if these differences

are related to the provision of both political and economic benefits. The immediate task at hand is thus to operationalize these concepts, in order to provide empirical analysis of the variation in organizational resources between the main groups in our study. Ultimately, we would like to be able to empirically assess whether group's organizational resources do indeed impact their ability to further the goals important to organizational maintenance, especially where those goals involve efforts at gaining influence, or "voice," in the policy process.

To begin our analysis, we first discuss our expectations for organizational sustainability needs, based upon our discussion in the last chapter. That chapter demonstrated that different groups have different expectations for what their group should be able to provide. Thus, for the cooperatives, the provision of economic goods (especially goods formerly distributed as "patronage rewards") is especially important; for the unions, both economic and political goods are important, as successful collective bargaining is required to facilitate the provision of economic goods (higher wages, etc) and unionists perceive this to depend on political representation; for the business and large-scale farmers' associations, political representation is especially important, even more so than the provision of economic goods. For the new groups emerging to represent small-scale businesses and small-scale and peasant farmers, the expectation that the same goods and services formally provided as "patronage rewards" to cooperatives in the Second Republic, drives members' incentive to join groups.

If we make the simple assumption that the direct provision of goods and services often requires greater organizational resources than the provision of political representation, we can outline some expectations about what level of organizational

resources will be required for group maintenance. Figure 6.1 presents our expectations for groups' necessary organizational capacity, given their primary membership incentive. This is gauged primarily by the logic above; groups whose members have high expectations for the material rewards of their membership will need greater capacity than those whose members are mostly concerned with having "voice" in the policy process. The expectations presented in Figure 6.1 will be evaluated below.

Figure 6.1
Expectations for Sustainable Levels of Organizational Capacity, by Sector

INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:	SDC *	STATE-NEGOTIATED CORPORATISM			QUASI-PLURALISM		NEW GROUPS		
APEX GROUP:	*ZCF*	*ZCTU*	*ZFE*	*MUZ*	*ZACC*	*ZNFU*	*PBA*	*PFU*	*NAPS*
Primary Membership Incentive	EC/ PAT	EC/ POL	EC/ POL	EC/ POL	POL	POL/ EC	EC/ PAT	EC/ PAT	EC/ PAT
Expected Level of Organizational Capacity	HIGH	MED	MED	MED	LOW	MED	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH

*SDC~ state-dominated corporatism

We now turn first to the analysis of variations in organizational capacity between the groups in our study, and then to analysis of variations in organizational autonomy between the groups in our study, to determine the potential for organizational sustainability for the different interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic.

6.4 Variations in Organizational Capacity

We are interested here in the capacity of groups, that is, the varying extent to which groups have the means to gather and deploy resources, and a cadre of leaders and even permanent staff to carry out group maintenance functions. We hence use two indicators of capacity– financial resources, and human and technical resources– to address the question, do interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic have the capacity to

provide the benefits members expect? Before proceeding with our analysis of financial resources, however, we first pause to look at two variables important to revenue and expenditure analysis: levels of membership and subscriptions (dues).

As Figure 6.2 shows, the sheer number of members in most unions, as well as the apex groups in general, dominates the memberships of other groups. For these groups especially, members' interests must be articulated up through often complex organizational structures, whose hierarchical layers aggregate the concerns of sub-groups of members. For these groups, then, the success of these mechanisms depends in no small part on the organization's resources. Logically, the costs of organizing increase with the numbers of those organized; the corollary to this statement is that larger groups will require greater resources to complete the goals of organizing, in this case, the aggregation of members interests' and the articulation of them to government. Thus, even though groups may boast of high revenues, they must be compared to the number of members the group needs to serve.

As Figure 6.2 makes clear, based solely upon membership size, the aggregation of members' interests within groups is likely to be less costly in the business (e.g. BAZ, LCC, CCC) and large-scale farmer organizations (e.g. CFA, ZLFA), than in the trade unions and small-scale farmer associations. This implies that the former groups might require lower levels of *absolute* resources than the latter in order to provide the benefits that members demand. Notably, this hypothesis results in the same expectations as our hypothesis concerning former membership incentives– i.e., not only do cooperative members require resource-intensive material goods, but there are more of them to provide benefits to, and the costs of organizing *rural* farmers are higher.

Figure 6.2 Membership Levels and Subscriptions



6.4.1 Financial Resources

Analysis of expenditures

Financial resources are important for the reason that they enable groups to "get things done": things like hiring technical staff to evaluate government policy and its impact on group interests, advertising group positions in local media, producing informational publications that keep both government and members informed on what the group is doing, holding meetings and communicating with members, and hiring staff to coordinate member services. Table 6.1 shows the various expenditures of groups in the sample, and provides a picture of the kinds of things groups in Zambia perceive they need to do to "get things done." As the data show[4], maintaining staffs and offices is a sizeable expenditure for many of the groups in the study (averaging about 39% (staff) and 21% (office expenses) of total expenditures for all groups reporting), but especially for agricultural groups and unions, topping out at two-thirds to four-fifths of the total expenditures for the Chipata and Livingstone/Zimba farmers' associations, the Airline Workers Union, and the Cooperative Federation.

The other main expenditure for groups is on meetings; five of the six groups with the highest percentage expenditure on meetings are agricultural. Travel is also a small portion of the expenditure budget for the national apex agricultural groups (PFU, ZNFU, NAPPSF, AND ZCF), though it is a larger portion of the unions expenditures, and an even larger portion of the PBA's. Few groups spend resources on publications, advertising, or legal services for their members; those who do tend to be the national apex groups and especially business groups. The Association of Manufacturers is notable in

[4] ZACCI and the ZFE did not respond to the this item and so is missing from the data.

Table 6.1: Expenditure Items

			Percent of Total Expenditures Spent on Item							
Group Abrev.	Economic Sector	Exp. Amt (x 1000 Kw)	Staff	Publications	Meetings	Advertising	Legal Services	Office Expenses	Travel	Other
ZACCI	Business Apex									
LCC	Business Org	38000	50		10	15		20	5	
ZAM	Business Org	25000		40	20	40				
KCC	Business Org	13000			10			10		80
NCC	Business Org	12500			5	5		20		remittances to ZACCI
BAZ	Business Org	3600								100
ZCFA	Business Org	2500				25		25		50
CCC	Business Org	1200								
LZCC	Business Org									
PBA	Business Apex	18000			10	20		10	60	
LPBA	Business Org			10	60			10	20	
EPBA	Business Org									0
MUZ	Labor Org	726000	20	1	12		1	5	2	59
NUBEGW	Labor Org	90000	49		4		2	1	11	
AAWUZ	Labor Org	3300	73		13			6	8	
CSUZ	Labor Org									
ZUFIAW	Labor Org									
NUPAW	Labor Org									
ZNFU	Agric. Apex	370000	30	5	30	5	10	5	15	
CFA	Agric. Org.	490			20			80		
ZLFA	Agric. Org.	60			20			80		0
SFA	Agric. Org.	20			100					
MFA	Agric. Org.		25		1			1	1	
ZSPA	Agric. Org.									
ZCF	Agric. Apex	2800000	65	3	10	2	5	15	7	
BCS	Agric. Org.	109000	30		41	1	3	15	5	
PFU	Agric. Apex	31965	10		36		2	26	18	
KPFU	Agric. Org.									
NAPPSF	Agric. Apex	2400			60			25	15	
MDFA	Agric. Org.									

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

this regard, as it spends 80% of its total expenditures on publications and advertising. The final striking point about Table 6.1 is the fact that for local chambers of commerce, the preponderance of their expenditures go to paying remittances to their national apex group, the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

The expenditure pattern

Though the data for this issue is thin, there is a noticeable pattern that emerges. The ZCF, local farmers associations, and the unions devote medium to large (35-80%) portions of their budgets on operational expenses– staff and office expenses– while the business associations and small farmer organizations spend much lower amounts (10-25%, with the exception of the LCC). This implies that there is a higher level of organizational capacity necessary for the former's operations than the latter's; which is what we hypothesized above, that the cooperatives, farmer's associations, and unions would need higher capacity than business associations to provide the benefits that members expect. The notable exception is the small-scale business and farmer groups, who devote relatively low portions of their budgets to operational expenses. How do they sustain memberships who expect the provision of economic goods with such low capacity? We will be returning to this question again as we explore further capacity data.

Analysis of Revenues

To maintain these expenditures (as well as other activities) in the pluralist arena of the Third Republic, groups need to be able to raise and maintain steady revenue flows-- as the government tap has ostensibly been turned off. Table 6.2 gives the annual revenues in

Table 6.2
Interest Groups and 1996 Revenues, in Descending Order

	Type	Revenue Source			1996 Revenue	Multiple of Lowest Revenue
		Donor	Other	Members		
ZCF	A-Apex	X	X	X	2,500,000,000	83,333
MUZ	L-Org		X	X	784,000,000	26,133
ZNFU	A-Apex	X	X	X	380,000,000	12,667
BCS	A-Org		X		114,000000	3,800
MFA	A-Org			X	10,000,0000	3,333
NUBEGW	L-Org			X	86,000,000	2,867
ZACCI	B-Apex	X	X	X	53,000,000	1,767
LCC	B-Org		X	X	35,000,000	1,167
PFU	A-Apex			X	3,3000,000	1,100
ZAM	B-Org		X	X	30,000,000	1,000
PBA	B-Apex	X	X	X	22,000,000	733
CSUZ	L-Org	X	X	X	14,500,000	483
NCC	B-Org		X	X	14,000,000	467
ZSPA	A-Org		X	X	14,000,000	467
KCC	B-Org		X	X	13,000,000	433
ZCFA	B-Org			X	9,600,000	320
ZUFIAW	L-Org	X		X	5,200,000	173
KPFU	A-Org			X	4,000,000	133
NUPAW	L-Org				2,880,000	96
NAPPSF	A-Apex			X	2,800,000	93
BAZ	B-Org			X	1,800,000	60
CCC	B-Org			X	1,800,000	60
AAWUZ	L-Org			X	1,082,400	36
LZCC	B-Org			X	950,000	32
CFA	A-Org		X	X	500,000	17
LPBA	B-Org			X	400,000	13
EPBA	B-Org			X	350,000	12
SFA	A-Org		X	X	80,000	3
ZLFA	A-Org			X	80,000	3
MDFA	A-Org			X	30,000	1

1996 for the groups under study. The first necessary point is to call attention to the value of the Zambian currency at the time of the study, during 1996 it was approximately ZK1250 to one U.S. dollar.[5] Thus, with the exception of the top revenue reported by the ZCF, the dollar equivalent of the revenues in the table ranges from a high of US$ 627,000 to a low of twenty four U.S. dollars! Thus, for the groups under the bold line that divides the table in half, annual revenues for 1996 were under US$ 10,000. Recognizing that "high revenues" in this context is a releative term, it is still notable that of the five groups with the highest revenues, four of them are agricultural groups: the ZCF, ZNFU, BCS, and MFA, and the remaining group is the Mineworkers Union. Extending the net to include the top ten groups with the highest revenue in 1996, we find that half are agricultural groups, (the groups above as well as the PFU). Again, while we cannot make specific inferences to the general population with this small sample, it does reveal some intriguing features of the revenue picture.

Firstly, a single cooperative, the BCS, brings in nearly as much revenue from what it describes as "fundraising" activities, as does the national apex organization for farmers, the ZNFU. From an interview with the BCS chairman, it was learned that these "fundraising activities" are mostly services that the co-op provides, such as its butchery and small shop and restaurant, and agricultural input and produce marketing. The butchery and shop are located just outside the capital, Lusaka, on the main highway, and seemed to be doing good business indeed. Similar is the case of the ZCF, which reports by far the highest revenue intake of all groups in the study, Kw2.5 billion, of which only

[5] The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that the exchange rate for the Zambian Kwacha (ZK) ranged from ZK1,200 to one U.S. dollar in mid-1996, to ZK1,270 by October 1996. This study uses ZK1,250 as an approximate rate for 1996 (EIU Country Report, Zambia 1996-1997).

1% come from membership dues (though that is still a sizeable sum). This is in striking contrast to the next largest fundraiser, the MUZ, whose 41,000 members provide 81% of its substantial annual revenues, Kw784 million, even though they each contribute very small sums. The third-ranking group, the ZNFU is a similar story: most of the 4,500 members contribute only Kw20,000 per annum, but the large scale farmers whose annual subscriptions are up to Kw15 million inflate the overall revenue tally of Kw380 million, as do the several government and donor contracts that the ZNFU receives. The fifth most well-financed group, the Mumbwa Farmers Association, like the MUZ, reported that it collects its substantial revenues (Kw100,000,000) entirely from its membership, but as shown in Table 6.3 (later in this chapter), this amount far exceeds what the potential membership contribution, according to subscription rates and membership level. We'll return to this below.

Is there, then, a noticeable determinant of revenue capacity? Overall, as Table 6.2 indicates, a group's economic sector does not have a noticeable effect: groups from all three sectors are positioned throughout the ranking. The *source* of funding, however, does seem to make a difference. As Table 6.2 demonstrates, it is the groups with diversified sources of funding that achieve the highest revenues, with groups that receive funding from sources outside their membership far more likely to fall in the top half of income earners than groups that receive funding solely from membership dues. This is not a point missed by group leaders; most of the respondents in the sample indicate they would *like* to diversify their income sources, evident by the employment of other funding strategies than membership drives alone (see below). Groups with small resource pools, however, encounter a circular dilemma: having a diversified source of income is both a

cause of increased capacity, as well as a *consequence* of it, for the ability to generate enough revenue surplus to keep at least part as an interest-earning endowment, and part invested in productive activities, requires a fair amount of technical and financial capacity.

The data also make it clear that there are vast inequalities in the levels of funding that groups have at their disposal, with the top organization in the sample wielding more than 80,000 times the financial resources of the bottom. More interesting still are the comparisons within sectors; in the highly competitive organizational arena of agriculture, for example, the ZNFU enjoys 12 times the financial resources of the PFU, and 136 times the resources of the NAPPSF. Not surprisingly, though the local chambers that belong to the ZACCI are widely divergent in their incomes, with the largest, the LCC, realizing 37 times the resources of the smallest, they still all outrank the revenue capacity of the local Provincial Business Associations. Finally, it is noteworthy that the trade unions also vary to great extent in their financial capacity, with the largest, the MUZ, having 724 times the resources of the smallest in the sample, the AAWUZ.

At the national level, there are noticeable differences between the apex groups with regard to economic sectors. As shown in Table 6.2, annual revenues for the principal business lobby, ZACCI, fall in between the oldest agricultural groups, the Cooperative Federation and the National Farmers' Union at the top end of the scale, and the newest groups seeking to represent small-scale producers, the NAPSF, PFU and PBAs, at the bottom. The scenario is far from static, however. As shown in Table 6.3 (columns VIII and IX, next page), there is a clear relationship between economic sector and recent changes in revenue levels, with most groups in the business sector (6 out of the 8 which responded) reporting that their total revenues over the past five years had increased,

Table 6.3: Analysis of Membership Dues and Revenues

I	II	III			IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Group	**Sector**	**Membership Dues**			**Memb No.**	**Memb Chng**	**Potential Revenue**	**Diff**	**1996 Revenues**	**Rev Chng**
		Same Amt	***Sliding Low***	***Sliding High***	**1996**	**1991-1996**	**Dues *(Low)* *Number**			**1991-1996**
ZACCI	B-Apex		100,000	1,200,000	530		53,000,000			+
ZAM	B-Org	600,000			120		72,000,000	–	30,000,000	–
ZCFA	B-Org	400,000			24	+	9,600,000	o	9,600,000	+
BAZ	B-Org				18	+			1,800,000	o
LCC	B-Org		120,000	500,000	95	+	11,400,000	+	35,000,000	~
CCC	B-Org	150,000			10	+	1,500,000	+	1,800,000	–
KCC	B-Org		80,000	200,000	100	o	8,000,000	+	13,000,000	+
NCC	B-Org	100,000			95	+	9,500,000	+	14,000,000	+
LZCC	B-Org		25,000	100,000	38	+	950,000			
PBA	B-Org	30,000			700	+	21,000,000	+	22,000,000	
EPBA	B-Org	10,000			35	–	350,000			
LPBA	B-Org	10,000			40	+	400,000			
MUZ	L-Org				41,000	–			784,000,000	–
CSUZ	L-Org		500	1,500	29,000	–	14,500,000			–
ZUFIAW	L-Org		800	2,000	6,500	–	5,200,000			
AAWUZ	L-Org				1,789	–			1,082,400	–
NUBEGW	L-Org		900	11,162	12,500	–	11,250,000	+	86,000,000	+
NUPAW	L-Org		240	2,000	12,000	–	2,880,000			–
ZNFU	A-Apex		20,000	15,000,000	4,500	+	90,000,000	+	380,000,000	–
ZSPA	A-Org	5000			120	–	600,000	+	14,000,000	–
SFA	A-Org	5000			18	–	90,000	–	80,000	–
MFA	A-Org	10000			304	+	3,040,000	+	100,000,000	+
CFA	A-Org	5000			100	–	500,000	o	500,000	~
ZLFA	A-Org		20000	1900000	24	+	480,000	–	80,000	o
ZCF	A-Apex				17	o			2.5 billion	–
BCS	A-Org				51	o			114,000,000	+
PFU	A-Apex	20000			25,000	+	500,000,000	–	33,000,000	o
KPFU	A-Org	10000			400	+	4,000,000			
NAPPSF	A-Apex	5000			5,000	+	25,000,000	–	2,800,000	+
MDFA	A-Org	20000			1,600	+	32,000,000	–	30000	

Abbreviations used: *Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey*

Memb. No. = Number of Members in 1996

Memb. Chng. = Change in Number of Members from 1991 to 1996

Diff. = Difference between Potential Revenue {calculated from (Number of Members)(Member Dues)} and Actual 1996 Revenues*

Rev. Chng. = Change in Revenue between 1991 and 1996

Symbols used: + = greater than, – = less than, o = equal to, ~ = fluctuates

(Blank cell indicates data unavailable, no response given on questionnaire)

fluctuated, or stayed the same; while four of the five trade unions responded that their revenues had decreased.

For the agricultural groups, the picture was mixed: among those groups belonging to the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), half the groups in the sample reported that revenues had increased, fluctuated, or stayed the same over the previous five years, while half reported revenues had decreased (including the ZNFU itself). Meanwhile, the Cooperative Federation reported that their quite notable revenue level actually represented a *decreasing* trend in finances; the Peasant Farmers that their revenues were holding steady, and the Association for Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers that their revenues were on the rise. While, again, we cannot make inferences from this sample to the population of groups in Zambia, the general point suggested by these findings points in the same direction as other data. For example, in all these cases, revenue changes can be especially linked to shifting membership levels, most especially in the case of the unions, where retrenchments brought about by structural adjustments have led to serious declines in union memberships (see Table 6.3, column VIII and IX). However, this is not the whole story, as demonstrated by the data in Table 6.3 (previous page).

Columns III -- VII in Table 6.3 gives the type and level of membership dues, membership number in 1996, and the product of these two figures, which should give the revenue intake, or "potential revenue," from membership dues for that year. This figure can be compared to overall 1996 revenues to determine:

> a) for those groups who claim all revenues come from member dues, the capacity of the group to collect, and the capacity of members to pay, annual dues;
>
> b) for those groups with other funding sources, the level of funding which actually comes from outside the amount collected from members.

For cases where all necessary data was provided (which unfortunately leaves out most unions), interesting patterns emerge. In the business sector, data from the two groups with fixed dues (CCC and NCC) shows that their reported revenues are substantially higher than their calculated potential revenue; data from the two groups with sliding dues (LCC and KCC) indicate that the group's revenues exceed that of at least all members paying the low subscription amount; while the ZCFA reports exactly the revenue amount expected from the potential revenue calculation. Only the ZAM reports a revenue level below that of the potential calculated amount. These data indicate there is a fair amount of capacity (and willingness) to pay and collect dues in this sector. However, for the agricultural groups, there is variation. The ZNFU does report substantially higher revenues than what we would expect from the potential revenue calculation; nonetheless, the fact that a high percentage of its income comes from "special projects" might indicate that the capacity for full dues submissions is not fully realized. However, most of its affiliated local groups (4 of 5 groups in the sample) do indicate revenue levels that nearly or fully meet the expected potential; only the Zimba-Livingstone Association falls short. For both the PFU and NAPSF, however, the capacity to collect dues, and/or for members to pay them, seems lacking, as both groups fall far short of the revenues expected from the membership and subscription amounts they reported.

The revenue pattern

In summary, group capacity, measured by revenue intake and expenditures, varies both by economic sector and by the categories of prior institutional history discussed above. In the former q*uasi-pluralist* business sector, groups pay out large proportions of their budgets to the national apex, in a sense contracting out their lobbying and

informational needs to make efforts at political representation more efficient. ZACCI in turn provides publications, information services, policy analysis and lobbies government on behalf of members' interests. For the business sector, revenue intake to support such activities appears ample and steady for both the apex and its local affiliates; most groups meet or exceed their potential membership contributions, and several groups have diversified their sources of funding past membership subscriptions.

In the former *quasi-pluralist* farming sector, the ZNFU (as well as the other agricultural apex groups in the sample) pays out large proportions of its budget on meetings and travel expenses, underlining the high costs of organizing for the agricultural sector, especially for those groups that target small-scale farmers. As in the business sector, the National Farmers' Union also provides its members with publications, informational services, policy analysis and lobbying; however, the pool that the NFU serves is much larger than that of ZACCI, and much more dispersed through the countryside. As hypothesized by the "membership imperative," the ZNFU requires higher resource capacity than does the ZACCI, given that members value both economic and political benefits. Judging from its higher revenue intake and the greater proportion of expenditure spent on staff and office expenses, it would seem that the ZNFU is meeting these higher needs– at least at the time of data collection. And relative to the other groups in the survey, given that the ZACCI has a relatively high revenue stream and is expected to require less capacity than other groups given its membership incentive, the Association appears to be in good shape. Two caveats are in order, however.

As Table 6.3 demonstrates, while revenues appear to be increasing for the ZACCI and its member organizations, the story is mixed for the ZNFU. This is due to two

factors: first, the Union has been losing large-scale commercial farmer members because it can no longer offer the benefits it did in the Second Republic (i.e. a monopoly on access to foreign exchange and the single-channel marketing system) . Secondly, its effort to attract small-scale farmers have depleted revenues, as these members can often require more in the way of services than is covered by the low levels of dues they pay.[6] These developments are offset by the fact that ZNFU revenues from both large and small contributions from farmers are increasingly supplemented by service contracts with international donors, but this introduces new problems we will address below. While both these situations bode well for these apex organizations– they have some of the largest revenues in the sample– their local affiliates are not always so well-off, as their revenue streams depend entirely on the subscriptions that members pay. In groups like the Mumbwa Farmers' Association, the wealth of the commercial farmers who form its membership make this funding situation work well; in groups like the Serenje Farmers Association, however, the paltry contributions small-scale farmers are able to make seem barely able to support collective action. Thus, while the prospects for ZACCI's organizational sustainability in the new pluralist system look relatively good, the potential for sustainability is less rosy for the National Farmers' Union, and much more variable by group.

For the rest of the agricultural sector, meeting revenue needs is accomplished in different ways. For the former *state-dominated corporatist* Cooperative Federation, the infrastructure left from its corporatist functions in the Second Republic allow it to continue to accumulate high revenues from its commercial activities (e.g. insurance

---

[6] Interview with George Gray, 2/13/97.

services, a transportation company); however, this provides a powerful incentive away from developing strong membership associations at the local level. Furthermore, as the Federation no longer distributes the agricultural inputs its members had come to expect, the membership incentive for the small-scale and peasant-farmers in its ranks is not helped by the Federation's commercial activities, whose Kw2.5 billion contribution to revenues were more than exhausted by the Kw2.8 billion the Federation spent in 1996– largely on staff and office expenses (80%), with another 10 percent spent on meetings. While the reform-minded cadre in the leadership of the cooperative movement hope that the membership structure can be re-built through donations of "share capital" from members in the primary societies, the members of the cooperatives are adamant that they be provided with inputs and marketing services whether or not they make contributions. Thus, though the membership imperative of the cooperatives predicts that the cooperative movement needs to command a large resource capacity– and analysis shows that it does, the top-heavy structure of the organization (a remnant of its state-corporatist role in the Second Republic) nonetheless threatens the organization's sustainability due to the disjunction between members' expectations and the groups' current activities.

The former *state-negotiated corporatist* trade union movement is similar to the ZACCI and ZNFU in that its large membership roll and the mandatory check-off system it inherited from the Second Republic create a steady and plentiful stream of revenues for group activities. Not surprisingly, unions are among some of the most resource-rich organizations in the country. However, as shown in Table 6.2, there is wide disparity among the trade unions in terms of their financial capacity, with the Mineworkers Union realizing revenues far above smaller unions like the Plantation and Agricultural Workers or

the Airline and Allied Workers. As discussed above, we hypothesized that trade unions require a medium-level of organizational capacity; for while workers demand both successful collective bargaining for economic goods (better wages, training and work-shops) and successful political representation to government, their costs of organizing (and lobbying) are less than that of the agricultural groups, as they and their members are usually urban-based. Given the *relatively* high revenue streams of the large unions like the Mineworkers Union (Kw784 million) and the Civil Servants Union (Kw14.5 million) in 1996, and the fact that the smaller unions are supported by a well-financed and well-organized apex, the Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the organizational sustainability of this sector appears relatively stable, except for two recent developments.

The first of these is the economic reform process, which as discussed earlier has led to substantial decreases in the ranks of the trade unions. The effect can be seen in the revenues for this sector; most unions in the sample have suffered revenue losses between the beginnings of reforms in 1991, and 1996. For the two unions that reported on their expenditure, we saw that operating expenses consume large portions of these revenues; thus, the unions' previously substantial organizational capacity cannot be assumed to survive unscathed the economic reforms of the 1990's, without locating other revenue sources. According to Table 6.5, the larger unions (e.g. MUZ and CSUZ) have indeed secured such extra-membership support, but the smaller unions (e.g. NUPAW and AAWUZ) have not. The second, and perhaps more weighty development, are changes in the impending labor legislation under the Labor and Industrial Relations Act. Important here is the amendment that calls for the "removal of statutory collection of monthly contributions in respect of workers' organizations and instead opting for voluntary

collection of monthly contributions" (Zambia Federation of Employers 1997:4). As Olson himself pointed out, "the large labor union, though not a part of the government, must be coercive, if it attempts to fulfill its basic function and still survive. This is largely because its basic function is to provide a collective good-- collective bargaining-- to a large group..." (1971:96). Thus, the organizational sustainability of the trade unions was also to be potentially challenged by the "free rider problem," the argument that individuals won't participate in producing collective goods but will rather choose to lob the costs on their fellow members while availing themselves of whatever goods do result.

Among the new groups that have emerged in the Third Republic, the PFU and NAPSF, are slightly better off than their counterpart, the ZCF, in that they have access to the same donor and government contracts to provide services to small-farmers as does the ZNFU– which the ZCF does not, due to its history with both government and donors. However, outside of these contracts, the PFU and NAPSF must rely on the collection of very small amounts (ZK20,000 and ZK5,000 per annum respectively) from many individuals to fill the groups' coffers. Since both of these groups face the same organizational difficulties specific to peasant agricultural groups described above– memberships that are geographically dispersed and resource-poor– increasing memberships do not necessarily translate to increased revenue and capacity because of the weight of soliciting and collecting them. Furthermore, for both groups, potential revenue streams (i.e. the amount to be realized if all members contribute) fall far short of realized revenues; for example, as shown in Table 6.3, though the PFU reports a membership of 25,000, their revenue intake paints a different picture: if, as reported, the ZK33 million was derived solely from membership dues of ZK20,000 each, the Union only collected dues from 1,650

members. Hence, the relatively low revenue streams both these groups report are not encouraging for organizational sustainability, even before taking into account the economic benefits members expect from these groups in order to continue their membership. Especially in comparison to the groups in the former quasi-pluralist sector, the sustainability prospects for the PFU and the NAPSF in a *pluralist* system seem low indeed.

Overall, what the analysis of group funding suggests is, firstly, there are great disparities in the financial capacity of different groups, and secondly, that combined with consideration of what groups are expected to do to maintain their memberships, these capacity disparities produce notable variation between groups in terms of their prospects for sustainability in the new pluralist system. For many groups in Zambia, especially small-scale agricultural groups and even some of the trade unions, revenue streams are not high enough to support the expected services and lobbying activities needed for the maintenance of autonomous, voluntary membership organizations in a pluralist system. Below the apex level, the quality of collective action in the Third Republic relies at least in part on the linkages between local groups and individual unions, and their much-better funded apex organizations, the ZACCI, ZNFU, ZCF, PFU, NAPSSF, and ZCTU. But do these organizations have the technical and administrative capacity to support their member groups? And how do the member groups fare themselves with regard to such capacity? We examine these issues in the next section.

6.4.2 Technical and Administrative Capacity

Along with financial resources, important indicator of organizational capacity is a permanent staff who can manage and support group activities. As seen in Table 6.4 there is large variation in staffing levels between groups, with nearly all business groups

Table 6.4: Organizational Staffs

			Staff Change		Has staff held these positions?					
Group Abbrev.	Sector	Staff No.	Small	Large	Elected Govt	Appointed Govt	Civil Service	Staff on Other	How is Staff Hired?	% Expenditure on Staff
ZACCI	Business Apex	10		X	No	No	No	No	Competitively	
ZAM	Business Org	None								
ZCFA	Business Org	None								
BAZ	Business Org	None								
LCC	Business Org	1	same						Competitively	50
CCC	Business Org	None								
KCC	Business Org	None								
NCC	Business Org	None								
LZCC	Business Org	None								
PBA	Business Apex	None								
EPBA	Business Org	None								
LPBA	Business Org	None								
MUZ	Labor Org	42	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Appointed by other	20
CSUZ	Labor Org	13	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Other	
ZUFIAW	Labor Org	7	XX		No	No	No	No	Other	
AAWUZ	Labor Org	2	same		No	No	No	No	Competitively	73
NUBEGW	Labor Org	16	X		No	No	No	No	Appointed by other	49
NUPAW	Labor Org	12	X		No	No	No	Yes	Elections	
ZNFU	Agric. Apex	28		X	No	No	Yes	No	Competitively	30
ZSPA	Agric. Org.	2	X		No	No	No	No	Appointed by a Board	
SFA	Agric. Org.	None								
MFA	Agric. Org.	5		X	No	No	No	No	Appointed by a Board	25
CFA	Agric. Org.	None								
ZLFA	Agric. Org.	1	same							
ZCF	Agric. Apex	76	XX		No	No	No		Appointed by other	65
BCS	Agric. Org.	32	X							30
PFU	Agric. Apex	4	same		No	No	No	Yes	Appointed by a Board	10
KPFU	Agric. Org.	None								
NAPPSF	Agric. Apex	5	X		No	No	No	No	Other	
MDFA	Agric. Org.	2								

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey, N=30

reporting that they have no staff at all, while the trade unions all report relatively high numbers of staff, and only a few farmers's associations report having a few staff members. Most striking indeed are the cooperatives, both for the number of staff members they have and the enormous amount of resources they spend on them: in the Zambia Cooperative Federation's (ZCF) case, 65% of the Kw2.8 billion in yearly expenditures (or Kw1.82 billion) goes to pay a staff of seventy-six, while in the Bbata Cooperative Society (BCS), 30% of the Kw109 million in yearly expenditures (Kw32.7 million) goes to pay a staff of thirty-two. The same is true for the trade unions: though the smaller unions have fewer resources than the large ones, they still support fairly large (in relation to the other group) staffs, on which a considerable amount of their resources are spent (the two unions who responded to these items report they spend 73% and 49% of their total expenditure on staff salaries). Among the farmer groups, the groups that have staffs have ones that are small in size, and a relatively small proportion of group expenditures are spent on them.

Among the business groups, the story is somewhat more complex, however. Although most groups report they do not have a permanent staff, and thus spend no *group* resources on staff salaries, group leaders informed me that they often use the secretarial services of their (and other member's) private businesses to handle organizational matters. In at least some cases, this seemed to be a matter of pride among the group leadership– that their members' dues and other group resources were not used to support salaries, but instead were used to provide member services and engage in lobbying activities (such as the ZNFU taking out an advert in the *Times of Zambia* to state an official policy position). This is also true for at least some of the farmers' associations who don't maintain permanent staff; because some if not most members of these groups operate commercial

ventures, they are able to volunteer secretarial services to the organization when needed. We thus see another important distinction between groups representing large-scale businesspeople and commercial farmers, and those representing small-scale entrepreneurs and small or peasant farmers: the former are able to draw from the resources of their memberships to supplement their own organizational capacity, while the memberships of the latter are often like their group leaders in that they lack educational, technical, and financial resources.

Two other important points also emerge from the data in Table 6.4. First, the only groups to report that their permanent staff have held positions in government or the civil service are two of the largest unions, the Mineworkers and the Civil Servants, and the only groups to report that members of their staff have held positions in other associations are those same two groups, along with the Plantation and Agricultural Workers' Union and the Peasant Farmers Union. Staff backgrounds can be important because they may influence, "through remaining contacts and detailed knowledge of bureaucratic intricacies," the relationships the groups may have with political parties, Parliament, and the Executive (Walker 1990:69). However, with the exception of the Mineworkers and Civil Servants, the groups in the sample do not report such connections; for these two trade unions, however, we should count the presence of such "old hats" as potential capacity-enhancers. The other point, that only four groups in the sample of thirty have permanent staff who have worked in other organizations, points to another characteristic of the interest group system: most groups who do have a permanent staff, do not have staff who have experience working in interest organizations. Though staffers might have experience in other types of organizations, such as parastatals or private businesses, the

system as a whole lacks a cadre of professionals who build its overall capacity by transmitting skills and experience between groups. The four groups that do report having staff members who've come from other organizations are notable in that they are trade unions and agricultural groups; for the former, the lengthy prominence of the trade union movement has understandably produced at least a few of these kinds of professionals, for the latter, the prominence of the cooperative movement has done the same. It is perhaps surprising that only four groups report employing such experienced staff.

The technical and administrative pattern

In summary, groups vary widely in their administrative and technical capacity, and groups which seem to have the highest capacity in these terms are those from the *corporatist* sector in the Second Republic, i.e. the cooperatives and trade unions. We've learned, however, that a group doesn't necessarily have to employ permanent staff for this type of capacity– especially in the business sector and commercial agricultural sectors, the skills and resources of group members can contribute to the groups overall capacity to "get things done." However, in those groups where members do not have the requisite skills and education themselves, that is, in the small business groups and small-scale farmers' groups, the availability of technical and administrative staff is necessarily more important. This in part explains why the cooperatives stand far above the rest in the number of staff they employ (although of course it's not the whole story, as patronage practices from the Second Republic plays a large part), and it highlights some of the key obstacles to organizing faced by groups which seek to represent the small-scale business person and farmer; at the same time as they have lower revenue streams to work with,

they have higher need for expensive staffs to support their organizational efforts. Administrative and technical expertise is at its relative highest in the interest group system for the trade unions, who enjoy steady revenue flows, permanent staffs, and the support of a well-funded apex organization, the ZCTU. In addition, these groups are the most likely to have staffers with organizing experience. However, the level of such capacity that individual unions enjoy varies widely, with some like the Mineworkers clearly above the resources of others, like the Airline and Allied Workers; for all unions, however, capacity is diminishing.

Evaluating the link between Membership Incentives and Organizational Sustainability

We've suggested that the reasons that Zambians join and stay in interest groups in the Third Republic should have an effect on the group's resulting capacity level; for example, since small-farmers seek resource-intense goods and services, groups in this sector need high resource capacity to maintain those members; on the flip side of the coin, since business members are mainly looking for lobbying efforts from their group, they don't need to build the level of resource capacity that the former groups do. We pursue this line of inquiry, because we believe that the relationship between the expected level of capacity needed, and the actual level attained, tells us something about the potential *sustainability* of the group as it adjusts to the new pluralist environment of the Third Republic. In other words, capacity is not *absolute,* greater financial and administrative resources don't necessarily equate to greater organizational sustainability. To tie the above discussions together in order look more closely at these issues, Figure 6.3 below summarizes the findings thus far.

Figure 6.3
Evaluating the Potential for Organizational Capacity

INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:	SDC *	STATE-NEGOTIATED CORPORATISM			QUASI-PLURALISM		NEW GROUPS		
APEX GROUP:	*ZCF*	*ZCTU*	*ZFE*	*MUZ*	*ZACC*	*ZNFU*	*PBA*	*PFU*	*NAPS*
Primary Membership Incentive	EC/ PAT	EC/ POL	EC/ POL	EC/ POL	POL	POL/ EC	EC/ PAT	EC/ PAT	EC/ PAT
Expected Level of Organizational Capacity	HIGH	MED	MED	MED	LOW	MED	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Operational Expenses (staff and office, 1996)	HIGH	MED	–	MED	LOW	MED	LOW	LOW	LOW
Revenue Level (1996)	HIGH	MED	–	HIGH	MED	HIGH	MED	MED	LOW
"Sustainability Pattern"	LOW	MED	–	MED	HIGH	MED	LOW	LOW	LOW

*SDC~ state-dominated corporatism

Operational Expenses: % expenditure on staff and office, multiplied by total expenditures
Revenue Level: Revenue for 1996: High = over ZK 10 billion, Med = ZK 10 million-10 billion, Low = <10million

Discussion

To explain the findings given in the table for the variable, "sustainability pattern," we here consider each of the cases in the study separately (with the exception of the ZFE, who did not respond to the necessary questions).

Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF)– *LOW*

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the ZCF inherited from its *state-dominated corporatist* relationship with the UNIP regime a membership incentive centered on the provision of economic goods, specifically, the provision of patronage rewards to a rural constituency. To fulfill its function, the organizational structure of the Federation and its network of cooperatives blossomed in the Second Republic, with Provincial Cooperative Unions in every province, District Cooperative Unions in every district, creating the capacity necessary for the management of a wide agricultural marketing network. The ZCF thus carried over two important factors to the Third Republic: its economic membership incentive, and its substantial organizational capacity. Due to the large rural infrastructure and commercial activities that it still controls, it is able to garner high revenues and support a large staff with considerable operating expenses. The paradox is that even with its considerable resource capacity, the potential for sustainability in a pluralist system is *LOW*, due to its continuing membership incentive. As demonstrated in Chapter Five, cooperative members are still looking for their cooperative to distribute agricultural inputs– seed, fertilizer, tractors even– and on a subsidized-credit basis. As a result, the cooperative structure is crumbling from the ground up; while its top-heavy structure can still support a large administration, without the government resources it once wielded to provide the inputs and credit, sustainability in the long term is

questionable.

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and Mineworkers Union of Zambia– *MEDIUM*

We argued previously that the membership incentive the trade unions inherited from the Second Republic was once of *coercion*, i.e. members were required to join the union active in their workplace, individual unions were required to join the single apex union for their industry, and all industry-wide unions were required to be affiliated to the ZCTU. Until the new labor legislation is passed, this situation remained the same in the Third Republic. However, the fact that union leaders are elected, and must be somehow responsive to member concerns, gave us a departing point to nonetheless query trade unionists about the benefits they expect from their contributions to union activity. Not surprisingly, we learned that Zambian workers value both the benefits from collective bargaining, higher wages and better working conditions, but also the political representation their group offers through the Tripartite Council and its other informal lobbying efforts. We thus assigned this sector an "economic-political" membership incentive, and predicted that organizational sustainability requires at least a medium level of resource capacity, not as large as the associations for small-scale farmer since workers are concentrated, but large enough to maintain the administrative and technical capabilities required to participate in the Council, bargain with employers, and provide members with training, workshops and other information. Given the substantial resource capacity the unions enjoy as a result of mandatory dues payment, but also considering the declining membership levels and pending legislation that might upset union revenues, this sector is evaluated as having a *MEDIUM* level of organizational sustainability.

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)– *HIGH*

ZACCI was argued to exhibit a *quasi-pluralist* relationship to the one-party state, and its members found to exhibit a largely *political* membership incentive. Since the provision of political representation is assumed to require fewer resources than the maintenance of a countrywide agricultural distribution network or day-to-day collective bargaining activities, and since ZACCI's membership is concentrated in urban areas, we expect that ZACCI's necessary level of organizational capacity is *LOW*. From the analysis above we learned that while the organization has relatively medium-high revenue levels but low operating costs, we here evaluate ZACCI as having a fairly *HIGH* level of potential organizational sustainability.

Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU)– *MEDIUM*

Like ZACCI, ZNFU maintained a *quasi-pluralist* relationship to the UNIP regime. However, unlike ZACCI, the ZNFU faces the traditional dilemmas of agricultural production and organization; thus, again unlike ZACCI, we find that the farmers who belong to the National Farmers Union require economic as well as political goods in their benefits basket. Specifically, information, meetings, and training were identified as important benefits alongside political representation. We thus assigned the NFU a "political-economic" membership incentive, similar to the trade unions, and like the trade unions we predicted that only a medium level of organizational capacity would prove necessary, for the ZNFU has vocally made the point clear that they are not interested in organizing peasant farmers. They thus don't have to produce the organizational reach that the small-farmer groups do. Since the revenue level of the ZNFU is relatively high and its

exhibits mid-level operating expenses, we here evaluate the Farmers' Union as having a *MEDIUM* level of organizational sustainability (not as high as the ZACCI, since their membership base is stil quite disperse in comparision, and as discussed, their revenue level is decreasing).

Provincial Business Associations (PBA), Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSF)– *LOW*

These are the "new" kids on the block in the Third Republic. However, they seek to organize a population of small-scale businessmen and farmers who were influenced by the patronage network of the UNIP regime, acting through organizations like the ZCF and SIDO. Thus we identify the membership incentive for these groups as "economic / patronage," and argue that high levels of organizational capacity would be necessary to maintain the kinds of memberships that will be looking to these groups. However, none of these groups has realized a very substantial revenue base, and their low operating costs are actually a mark for concern given the resources they are expected to distribute. Thus, we identify these groups having a *LOW* potential for organizational sustainability.

Why is it useful to categorize "organizational sustainability" in this way? Would we be willing to bet on the above predictions, that the groups ranked highly sustainable will somehow outlast those ranked "low"? The short answer is "probably not," for the rankings aren't meant to be predictive, but rather to be used in better understanding the autonomy / capacity paradox. All things equal, we argue that the groups ranked *low* in organizational capacity will be more likely to "trade" autonomy, or their control over the group's agenda, for better resource capacity. It is to the weighty issue of autonomy that we now turn.

6.5 Interest Group Autonomy

In operationalizing the concept of autonomy, we adopt Bratton's (1994) definition: "autonomy is the latitude of social actors to take political initiatives uncon-strained by the claims of others... The notion of autonomy applies wherever the members of any social organization attempt to define a protected realm within which to make independent decisions. *An organization is autonomous to the extent that the interests of its members, in contrast to some external force, drive a distinctive program of political action*" (235, emphasis mine). Since the constitution of the Third Republic stipulates essentially a pluralist system of representation, as discussed above, we should expect that all groups in the Third Republic are now autonomous from the state. Specifically, the demise of UNIP's one-party state broke the ties that bound "mass organizations," such as the cooperative movement, to the Party, ostensibly granting them a new-found autonomy to manage their own affairs. While the labour movement has maintained its corporatist ties to the state through the auspices of the Tri-partite Council, it has also maintained its historical autonomy over internal affairs in that members (or at least their elected leaders) continue to "drive a distinctive program of political action." And of course, the farmers' groups and business associations that had maintained their autonomy from the state even during the Second Republic, have largely maintained that position.

But have groups actually become truly autonomous, able to "drive a distinctive program of political action"? We posit there are two essential threat to the autonomy of interest groups in Zambia: the MMD government, and donors. Government intervention manifests itself in continuing interventions in markets, while donor intervention is manifested through the provision of resources to the "right" organizations.

6.5.1 External Control: Government, Donors, and Other Purse-String Holders

During the Second Republic, the needs and interests of the Party-state dominated the agenda of many organizations either directly or indirectly, and either coercively or through its control of the "purse-strings," i.e. organizational funding. As mentioned above, those formal ties are no more, but there are other agents in the political arena who, while external to the organizations themselves, dominate their agendas in potent if indirect ways. Two of the most important are the intercessions of international donor organizations, and the continuing discretional control of government over access to key state resources.

An important consideration in developing countries such as Zambia, and especially in the last decades of the twentieth century, is the impact of donors on the capacity of both state and societal organizations. The concern is expressed that along with donor funds go expectations for the meeting of donor objectives. Alongside such concerns is the continuing discretional control that the government exercises over resources, most prominently in Zambia's agricultural sector, where lucrative contractual arrangements (for the provision of government funds for agricultural credit) are important to the activities of small-scale farmer groups. Not surprisingly, these group's agendas continue to be dominated by government directives on agricultural inputs and marketing.

Table 6.5 gives data on both initial and current funding sources for the groups in the sample. For most groups, the only source of start-up funds were small contributions from members themselves (though for ZACCI and ZAM, it should be remembered that members include large corporations, which can play just as dominant a role in agenda-setting as can government or donors). The same is true of ZNFU who reports receiving

Table 6.5: Initial Financial Assistance and Current Funding Sources

	Current Funding Sources		
Initial Financial Assistance	**Donors**	**Interest & Fundraising**	**Member Dues (as % of total)**
Donors	**I** *ZACCI* *PBA* ZUFIAW *ZCF*	**II** MUZ *ZCF*	**III** *ZACCI (33%)* *PBA (70%)* MUZ (81%) ZUFIAW (15%) *ZCF (1%)*
Government	**IV** *ZCF*	**V** *ZCF*	**VI** *ZCF (1%)*
Corporations	**VII** *ZACCI*	**VIII** ZAM	**IX** *ZACCI (33%)* ZAM (95%)
Other Large Contributions	**X** *ZACCI* *PBA* *ZNFU*	**XI** EPBA	**XII** *ZACCI (33%)* *PBA (70%)* *ZNFU (60%)*
Membership Dues Only	**XIII**	**XIV** LCC KCC NCC CSUZ ZSPA CFA BCS	**XV** LCC (80%) KCC (95%) NCC (40%) CSUZ (90%) ZSPA (80%) SFA (98%) CFA (99%) **100% from Member Contributions** ZCFA BAZ CCC LZCC LPBA AAWUZ NUBEGW MFA ZLFA *PFU* KPFU *NAPSF* MDFA

*Groups in italics are National Apex Groups

Source: 1997 Organizational Survey, N=30

Table 6.6: Initital and Current Funding Sources

Group	Sector	Initial Financial Assitance	Current Funding Sources		
ZACCI	B-Apex	Donors, Corporations, Large Contributions	Donors (66%)	Member Dues (33%)	
ZAM	B-Org	Corporations		Member Dues (95%)	Interest (5%)
ZCFA	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
BAZ	B-Org	"Self-Funding"		Member Dues (100%)	
LCC	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (80%)	Fundraise (20%)
CCC	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
KCC	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (95%)	Fundraise (5%)
NCC	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (40%)	Interest 60%
LZCC	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
PBA	B-Apex	Donors, Large Contributions	Donors (20%)	Member Dues (70%)	Fundraise 10%
EPBA	B-Org	Large Contributions		Member Dues (100%)	
LPBA	B-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
MUZ	L-Org	Donors		Member Dues (81%)	Interest (4%) Fundraise (15%)
CSUZ	L-Org	*none*		Member Dues (90%)	Interest (5%) Fundraise (5%)
ZUFIAW	L-Org	Donors Membership Dues	Donors (75%)	Member Dues (15%)	
AAWUZ	L-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
NUBEGW	L-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
NUPAW	L-Org	Donors UTUC			
ZNFU	A-Apex	Large Contributions		Member Dues (60%)	Special Projects (40%)
ZSPA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (80%)	Interest (20%) Other (1%)
SFA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (98%)	Interest (2%)
MFA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
CFA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (99%)	Interest (1%)
ZLFA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
MFA	A-Org	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	
ZCF	A-Apex	Donors, Government		Member Dues (1%)	Interest (3%) Trading (97%)
BCS	A-Org	*none*			"Fundraising" 100%
PFU	A-Apex	*none*		Member Dues (100%)	

"large contributions" (from large-scale commercial farmers) at its inception. Two other points are salient: the only group to receive international donor support for its initiation in the 1990's is the business sector's apex group, ZACCI. Trade unions and the Cooperative Federation also enjoyed access to support from international social movements at their inception in the 1960's and 1970's. However, most economic interest groups in Zambia seem to get started on their own and stay functioning on their own, and seem to be autonomous from at least financial control from outside their membership. Table 6.5 shows that in this sample, which includes all national apex organizations, thirteen of the twenty groups (65%) which reported no initial contributions from sources outside the membership, also reported that their only current source of funding (as of 1996) was dues paid by members (see cell XIV). The other seven groups in this category (see cell XIV) reported that in addition to membership dues, their funding is augmented by interest on accounts and fundraising efforts. Most strikingly, with the exception of the ZNFU, the only groups to receive donor funds in the interest group system as of 1996 were those who received it initially, at their inception (see cell I). Though this is too small and non-random a sample to make inferences to the general population, these findings might suggest that international donor agencies prefer those groups they help to start themselves, implying that a confluence (if not cooptation) of interests between group and donor is integral to donor support. The empty space of cell XIII points to the fact that donor funding does not seem find its way to groups that began only with the small contribution of founding members.

If donor funds thus make up a large proportion of a group's funding, we might expect that the donor has control over official policy positions of the group. While it is

difficult to identify precisely where group goals are affected by the demands of donors, especially when donors choose groups with confluent interests, two notable cases demonstrate the effects that donor interventions in interest groups can have. The examples are the ZACCI and the ZNFU, whose decisions to expand membership roles to include smaller businesspeople and farmers, respectively, are driven in part by the availability of donor funds for those activities (in addition to a political incentive, which will be discussed below). Such instances of donor support occasionally cause conflict within organizations over those who support the added capacity that additional funding brings, and those who are wary of the ties that accompany the funds. Two anecdotes well illustrate the point. In the first, there was a continuing wrangle during ZACCI board meetings at the beginning of 1997 over its sponsorship of the HRDA project, with the secretariat of the group and a few of the older members championing the cause of seeking small and medium-scale members, while several of the corporate and local chamber executives argued that they didn't see why their dues should support such activities or why the organization should be used by donor-aided projects. In the second example, the National Farmers Union as of the mid-1990's was growing concerned at the dwindling membership of large commercial farmers in the ZNFU. In an interview with one of these farmers, I learned that there were at least two reasons; first, the Union no longer controlled agricultural pricing, marketing and foreign exchange allocations as it had in the Second Republic, so an important membership incentive was gone, and second, large farmers didn't support the push that the Union was making for increasing small-scale farmer members, again under a donor-funded project.[7]

---

[7] Interview with George Gray, 3/26/97.

As the anecdote above suggests, funding from international donors can cause conflicts where the assistance will aid a well-defined segment of the membership but not the whole membership. In addition, however, funding and support from international sister-organizations of national groups can also cause mischief, especially where shared ideological precepts challenge existing power relationships. This is well-illustrated by the Congress of Trade Union's acceptance of the ILO's commitment to free and autonomous associations, and their subsequent ratification of ILO conventions 89 and 98. However, the conventions threaten the "one union one industry" policy that have benefitted both labor unions and employers' associations, and have presented a legal conundrum for the Congress as they attempt to comply with the convention and maintain their organizational base at the same time.

The above discussion concerning group autonomy from donor funding might be unfortunately overly-optimistic, however. In some respects, the data presented above tells us who the donors and government actually target; that is, who are their preferred recipients. However, the story is more complex, for the issue of autonomy is not only affected by such supply-side considerations (i.e. who the donors choose to go to bat with), it is also affected by demand-side ones (i.e. which groups step up to the plate, willing to trade a bit of their autonomy for a higher level of organizational resources). Figure 6.4 tells a bit of this story. As it makes clear, many groups would *like* to be donor aid recipients; 21 of the 30 groups in the sample report that contacting potential international donors is a somewhat, very, or their most important strategy for securing financial support, while as Table 6.5 illustrated, only 4 of these groups actually receive such aid. Seeking government support is noticeably of continuing concern to the small-business and

Figure 6.4: Importance of Funding Strategies



small-farmer groups, as well as the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) and Airway and Allied Workers Union (AAWUZ); again, as Table 6.5 demonstrated, only the ZCF actually receives such aid. Perhaps most interesting is the finding that by far the most popular strategy for securing financial support is attempting to increase membership levels. Also intriguing is the frequency with which groups from all sectors report that contacting private (as opposed to international) donors is an important funding strategy. Something interesting is going on here: not many groups actually get money from donors and government, yet they still consider it worth the resources it takes to approach these organizations for support. Similarly, while most groups report that they get most if not all of their revenues from their memberships, many of those groups also report that contacting private patrons outside of the membership is an important strategy for securing support. Why are these groups milking dry cows? Perhaps it's a bit like the lotto, membership work is steady but draining, while the return on winning a donor or government contract can be a relative windfall.

In summary, most groups in the Third Republic are not directly funded by either government or international donors, and their agendas are formally free from donor influence. However, important contracts with the leading apex groups for business and labor exist for the purpose of helping these groups increase their small-scale members, and these contracts contribute significantly to group resources. Trade unions, especially the MUZ and the ZCTU, receive support from international labor organizations; and the Cooperative Federation until recently was the beneficiary of support from international supporters of the cooperative movement. As discussed above, such linkages can provoke schisms within the membership of these groups, as the funds available may privilege some

group members over others. In addition, the goals of the donor grant or program might not coincide with all member's interests, or what the group leaders believe is best for the organization. The high degree to which groups report they consider soliciting international donors to be important funding strategies implies that the interest group system in Zambia's Third Republic is either not able or not willing to pass up the opportunities presented by the deep pockets of the donors.

6.6 Summary

To again compare the main economic sectors: In the business sector, we've seen that groups here, as elsewhere, have gained autonomy from the dominance of a control-oriented state, but are nonetheless challenged by considerations of who will control the group's agenda. In the business sector, this plays out in a struggle between large and corporate members on the one hand, and other members on the other hand, who see value in using donor resources to expand the group's agenda to include smaller-scale business interests. Though the struggle over the group's agenda is on-going, business groups in general enjoy financial and administrative capacity in getting things done, as they have both steady revenue streams and relatively high administrative capability through the resources of their members.

In the agricultural sector, a complex pattern emerges. With the economic reforms brought about by the transition in 1991, the state no longer intervenes in the economy in the way that it did in the Second Republic. This means that the Cooperative Federation is no longer tied to the party-state apparatus, and the National Farmers Union no longer performs the role in the command economy that it did in under the UNIP regime. Autonomy from state interests has thus nominally improved for both these organizations,

in addition to which new organizations have emerged to compete for members allegiances. For all of these groups, however, (i.e. the ZCF, ZNFU, PFU, NAPSF) agendas continue to be affected by the needs and policies of the government, primarily because market mechanisms for production and marketing are still in their infancy and the government keeps stepping in to cushion the impact on small farmers.

This creates important incentives for agricultural groups to involve themselves in the supply of credit, inputs, and marketing opportunities; in doing so many groups are affected directly by the provision of government and donor contracts for these activities, and indirectly by the desire to be granted these lucrative contracts. As we've seen above, groups which depend solely on membership contributions for their revenues are the poorest groups in the system; it is not surprising that they seem willing to adjust their agenda in exchange for the bountiful resources of government and donors. The fact that these resources are available, however, has seemed to improve the capacity to "get things done" for agricultural groups, evidenced by the emergence of the two new groups, the PFU and the NAPSF, which carry out operations throughout the countryside, and the increasing presence and capacity of the ZNFU and its local affiliates.

For trade unions, the picture is even more complex, however. As discussed above, these groups, especially the Mineworkers' Union, retained a fair level of autonomy from government interests throughout the Second Republic. This autonomy has not been so much challenged by government in the Third Republic, as it has been affected by political maneuverings among the trade union leadership (discussed in previous chapters). The schism between the ZCTU and the MUZ reflects the tensions that the unions have experienced vis-a-vis the government in attempting to set their agenda autonomously from

the MMD's reform objectives. In addition, the autonomy of the unions over determining their own policy on organizational matters has been affected by international conventions that they would like to conform too, but that threaten organizational capacity. Further depleting the organizational resources of the trade unions has been the fact that economic reforms have brought about massive retrenchments in formal employment, seriously diminishing the rolls of trade union membership. Though as we've seen, union revenue flows still rank quite well respective to other interest groups, and they still maintain relatively high levels of administrative and technical capacity, these levels mark an overall *decrease* in the capacity of the trade union movement.

Overall, comparing economic sectors and the groups within them, organizational resources seem to have improved for the business groups, improved to a lesser extent for the agricultural groups, and decreased for the trade unions. However, looking at the picture in a static sense, none of these groups has emerged as dominating the interest group arena, as none outranks the others in the indicators we've examined. In general, perhaps the biggest effect that the transition has had is that it has made more level the playing field of the national apex groups.

6.7 Conclusion

Returning to the question posed above concerning autonomy: if giving up control over the groups' goals– and even policy positions– causes conflicts between the members of organizations, or even threatens the health of the group itself, *why* do groups accept donor and government grants and contracts? Looking again at Figure 6.3, it seems reasonable why the ZCF, PBA, PFU, and NAPSF look to donors and the government for

aid: for the latter three, low revenues and low administrative capacity cry out for additional resource input, while for the ZCF, support from the government and international donors would not only assist with the failing primary societies, it would grant the cooperative movement a renewed legitimacy, and this is crucial if they are to re-organize the rural areas. The case of the unions is also fairly understandable; assistance from the international labor organizations not only helps with declining membership levels, it provides training and collaboration in the principle and practice of trade unionism that might not otherwise be had. The puzzling cases are the ZACCI and ZNFU; why, given the evidence that they are reasonably sustainable organizations without engaging in the capacity-for-autonomy-trade, do they nonetheless solicit and receive donor aid? The answer to this question lies in the political imperatives of the Third Republic, and the requisites for political influence. In a pluralist environment, these groups are handicapped by the small number and elite nature of their membership. To carry weight in a multi-party electoral democracy, they see the imperative to increase their memberships, and doing so requires extra-membership funding. It is to these type of political issues at the macro-level that we now turn.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

INTEREST ARTICULATION AND PATHWAYS TO INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Long live Zambia National Farmers' Union!
Long live its 31 farmers' associations!
LONG LIVE THE VOICE OF THE FARMERS!

Mr. J.E. Banda,
Chairman of Katete Farmer's Association
Introduction to Annual Conference Address,
24 April 1997

> No one understands interest group representation in any African country particularly well since it needs an accurate understanding of the political motivations of specific interest groups and the process of lobbying which for elite organizations is not very public, (and) rather informal...
>
> J. Dunn,
> "The Politics of Representation..."
> 1986:165.

7.1 Pluralism at the Macro-Level: Gaining Access to Government, Learning to "Lobby"

In Chapter Five, we learned that political representation is much valued by the members of interest groups in the Third Republic. Indeed, our analysis demonstrated that for a full three-quarters of the current members in the sample, politics somehow played a pivotal role in their decision to join. In this chapter, we examine how groups go about gaining access to government in the newly pluralized environment, in order to represent

group policy goals to government decision makers. The questions we seek to answer here are the following: Have the opportunities for interest representation improved under the new institutions of the Third Republic? What are the new "pathways to influence" over government policy? Have groups been able to make use of these new channels to bend government policy in their favor? To answer these questions, we analyze the opportunities available for influencing policy and the empirical strategies that groups employ to gain access to those opportunities. A key concern here is whether some groups are gaining better access than others, and whether real influence over government policy is realized.

7.2 Pathways to Influence in the Second Republic

One of the key themes of this study is the continuity as well as change in the nature of interest representation and group influence in Zambia's Third Republic. In order to analyze the interest group system in the Third Republic, we thus need to better understand the system it replaces, and how certain aspects have changed while other aspects remain the same. We thus begin a study of the "pathways to influence" in Zambia's policy process with a discussion of the Second Republic.

Figure 7.1 (see next page) presents a schematic of the structure of government and representation in Zambia's Second Republic. As the diagram makes clear, power over policy decision-making in the one-party state rested in two institutions: the Presidency and the National Council of the United National Independence Party. These two institutions did not wield equal power, however. As has been discussed previously, the one-party State constitution had increased the powers of the President vis-a-vis all other institutions. Though administrative decision-making was assigned to the Cabinet and overall policy

Figure 7.1: Structure of Government and Representation, Second Republic



Information Sources: Tordoff 1980 (Introduction,, & Bratton : 212); Ollawa 1979:229-293

direction to the UNIP Central Committee, the President presided over both these bodies, and acted in his own discretion on a wide range of issues (Tordoff 1980:10). This arrangement had several deleterious results; as Tordoff notes:

> "...the effects of (President Kaunda's) intervention (had) far-reaching and sometimes undesirable consequences for the conduct of government and administration (in the Second Republic). His intervention helps to explain the abrupt changes which have periodically been made in Zambia's rural development strategy... It also forces MPs and other critics to attack government policies on most occasions through Ministers who are only nominally responsible for them and who are powerless to change them. There is a marked, understandable, but unhealthy reluctance to criticize policy proposals emanating from the President's Office..." (ibid).

As Figure 7.1 shows, "critics"– or for that matter, interest groups wishing to influence government policy– had a circuitous route to navigate in attempting to affect the direction of policy. Most groups had some level of interaction with the administration, and through them on occasion Ministers themselves, but as the diagram indicates, this branch of government was delegated the task of *implementing* policy, and had no structural representation in the organs of policy *formulation.*[1] This latter function was the purview of the President and Party itself, specifically the National Council. As the diagram indicates, the National Council and General Conference together with the Central Committee were the three major policy-making organs of the Party. The Central Committee, however, was the most powerful of the three; the National Council was mostly a platform used by the President for announcing policy decisions. Presidential prerogative was further reflected in the fact that delegations to the National Council and General Conference could be excluded at will by the President.

---

[1] Grindle and Thomas (1991) argue this is often the case in developing countries; since policy formulation processes are often centralized and elite-dominated, societal interests seek influence at the policy implementation stage.

Figure 7.1 also sketches in the place that interest groups occupied during the Second Republic. Importantly, as "Party Affiliates," the Congress of Trade Unions and Federation of Employers did have representation on both the National Council and General Conference, something not enjoyed by all economic groups; but as discussed above, the nature of this access was not about representation or participation in the policy process, but rather control of the state over societal interests. As a fixture in the state's control of the command economy, the National Farmer's Union (then the Commercial Farmer's Bureau) had some interaction with the Ministry of Agriculture and some powers in negotiation over very specific policies, but little or no influence over the government's general economic policy. The Cooperative Federation, as a "Mass Organization," was perhaps most tightly connected to the state, but since the cooperatives were designed to carry government's development plans and assistance to the countryside, this connection was again, about state control, not the representation of peasant farmer's interests to the government.[2] Finally, business interests, especially those of the 'indigenous entrepreneurial class,' had noteworthy representation in Parliament via the private interests of many MPs (as discussed in Chapter One), but no noteworthy organizational presence due to the development objectives of Kaunda's "Humanist" ideology.

---

[2] As Bratton (1980:214-215) relates, the Zambian government at independence was ideologically committed to mass participation and mass mobilization. "A 'participatory-democratic' rather than a 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' mode of penetration was favored in the quasi-socialist ideology of Zambian humanism." This ideology was translated into an organizational framework via the idea of a 'development front,' a "patchwork organization of government, party and traditional institutions." This Zambian 'development front' comprised at the district level the Office of the District Governor, field agencies of central government, local authorities and co-operative unions, each of which had a particular task for promoting the Government's objectives of inducing mass participation and economic mobilization. As Bratton's analysis suggests, the co-operatives were thus an integral part of the government's penetration of the rural agricultural sector, and were not structured or expected to funnel interests in the opposite direction, to allow for a penetration of the state and influence over its policies by peasant interests.

Underpinning the institutional structure discussed above was a supporting ideology which gave a laudable goal to UNIP's centralization of power. In his analysis of labor policy in the immediate post-colonial period, Bates (1971) argues that Zambia's post-colonial government policy had two main emphases: one developmental, and the other promoting social justice. In order to implement the two policies, UNIP stipulated that the labor unions must be transformed from units of *consumption,* focused on the interests of members, to units of *production*, who were to be considered partners with government in the struggle for rapid economic development. "It was conceived that trade unions would no longer function as pluralist interest groups for the interest of the members, but rather as associations of production, sharing the goals of the party (UNIP) for national economic development" (Rakner 1992:77). Thus the approach to labor policy was similar to that of cooperative policy, which Bratton argues was intended to support government's penetration of the rural areas rather than to encourage the funneling of peasant agricultural interests back to the state (1980:215). Peasants too, from this perspective, were expected to suppress their own individual interests in deference to the goals of "national economic development." This ideological foundation well-supported the development of state-corporatist institutions in the place of previously pluralist ones, for it is in the vein of the "organic" conception of the state, which stresses the ideas of political community and the central role of the state in achieving the common good (Stepan 1978); as opposed to a liberal conception which sees the state as neutral arbiter over economic and social activity (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961, 1971).

Both the ideological and structural nature of state-society relations in the Second Republic were thus such that interest groups did not have experience with, or indeed the

opportunity to, actively lobby government over the formulation of policy. Ideologically, this was due to the call to suppress individual interests in favor of national economic development. Structurally, this was largely due to the powers of the Presidency, the structure of the single-party state and the Party's control over policy formulation, and the Party's pre-occupation with centralized control at the expense of mass participation. As Figure 7.2, next page, illustrates, however, the most noticeable distinction between the Second Republic and the Third is the disappearance of the single-Party apparatus and its domination of the political system. In the next section , we examine what this change portends for interest group representation in the policy process.

7.3 Possible channels for influencing economic policy in the Third Republic

As Figure 7.2 illustrates, the Third Republic exhibits both continuities and dissimiliarities with the policy formulation process of the Second Republic. Most striking is the continuation of Presidential prerogative; in keeping the power to appoint key players throughout the government, the Presidency continues to reflect the desire to centralize power in the hands of one, at most a few, government leaders. Also striking is the hole left by the dis-entanglement of the ruling party in the official government structure. This does not, however, imply that the new ruling Party, the MMD, has given up the role of dominant political organization, or that competition from the other parties shown in the octagon (see Figure 7.2) is encouraged either in Parliament, the Cabinet, or society-at-large. According to the *Republic of Zambia Cabinet Handbook*, the new state structure in the multi-party Third Republic officially comprises three branches: the Executive, headed by the President and consisting of the Vice-President, Ministers and Deputy

Figure 7.2: Structure of Government and Representation, Third Republic



Ministers, all of whom are Members of Parliament and thus popularly elected.

Among several functions that the President performs are the appointing of the Vice-President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers (under Article 46 of the Constitution) and the establishment and dissolution of Government Ministries and Departments. Ministers advise the President in the formulation and implementation of Government policy. Policy formation is officially carried out by the Cabinet, which is comprised of the President as Chairmen, the Vice-President and Cabinet Ministers; this Cabinet "formulates Government policies and programmes in accordance with the priorities of the political Party in power," and it "advises the President with respect to the Policy of Government (Handbook 1996:3). Any matters which have major policy implications are also made the purview of the Cabinet under Article 49 of the Constitution.

As Figure 7.2 also illustrates, the structural linkages between interest groups and other organizations to the single Party state were abolished, and replaced by the *absence* of formal state-society linkages (with the exception of the Tripartite Council), in keeping with the new regime's pluralist ideology. As Figure 7.2 (which corresponds to Schmitter's property space detailing the "whole and partial regimes" involved in the consolidation of democracy), interests groups thus *theoretically* hold a place in the political system similar to other "modern democracies", that is, as a representational institution on par with a multitude of political parties. In this new configuration, "The People" and their organizations ostensibly have representation in the policy process via their ability to freely elect the MPs that can later become Cabinet Ministers, and their right to form organizations which can interact with the official bureau responsible for responding to "stakeholder interests," Cabinet Office's Policy Analysis and Coordination

Division. Theoretically, interest associations in the Third Republic can also directly lobby the Members of Parliament over legislation that affects their activities. And finally, with the advent of a free and even oppositional press, the influencing of public opinion has become a matter of key importance where policy is concerned, as we shall see below.

These are the broad outlines of the institutional changes which affect interest representation in the Third Republic. Not unexpectedly, these changes have had important consequences for the relationship between interest groups and the government over the formulation and implementation of policy. In the next section, we examine these changes more closely, in order to answer the question: empirically, is there space for interest articulation under the new institutions of the Third Republic? If so, which groups are most active?

7.3.1 The changing relationship between groups and government in the Third Republic

The analysis in the following sections draw mainly from the results of the "1997 Organization Survey" (see Appendix 2). The cases analyzed are the eight national apexes organizations and their local affiliates. The apex groups, whose acronyms are most used in the following analysis, once again are the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), the HRDA's Provincial Business Associations (PBAs),[3] the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), the Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale

[3] Technically, the coordinating office for the PBA's does not qualify as a nationally active lobbying organization in the same way that ZACCI and the ZNFU do; however, since this organization is the only one in the group arena that actively promotes the interests of small-scale business and industry, and since the director of the organization is well-connected to government, we include data from this organization where it is appropriate and where it demonstrates the differences between groups with "large" members and groups with "small" members.

Farmers (NAPSSF), the Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE), and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)[4]. In this section, we mainly focus on the apex organizations listed above[5], since they are the ones tasked with lobbying government on behalf of individual and organizational members, although analysis of responses from the local affiliates are used where appropriate.

As demonstrated above, the transition to the Third Republic introduced a very different environment for interest representation, due to the fact that it ended one-party rule and introduced multi-party politics, and it brought to a close the era of the command economy, replacing it with a liberalized market. As we've seen, most of the interest groups active in Zambia today either emerged from the Second Republic, or are seeking to fill the gap left by the demise of certain organizations. Overall, when queried about the general outcome of the dual transition for their group, most leaders report that the consequences of political and economic liberalization "varies." As Table 7.1 shows, this is the case for the MUZ, the ZCF, the ZNFU, and the PBA. However, ZACCI and the NAPSSF report that the transition has been "very good" and "good," respectively, for their group; while the PFU reports that the transition has had "very poor" consequences for them.

---

[4] Unfortunately, despite the researcher's best efforts, a completed questionnaire was not obtained from the ZCTU, though much other data and interviews were generously given. For this section of analysis, the Mineworkers Union is used as a proxy for the Congress; though their responses will of course not be identical to what the ZCTU's would have been, we hold that the data are still useful in comparing responses across economic sectors.

[5] See the preceding two footnotes.

Table 7.1
Consequences of the political and economic reforms for the Association

PFU	MUZ	ZCF	ZNFU	PBA	NAPSF	ZACCI
Very Poor						
	It Varies	It Varies	It Varies	It Varies		
					Very Good	Very Good

To gauge more specifically leaders' perceptions of the political transition's consequences, the leaders of the groups were asked how the changes in 1991 from the one-party state to multi-party democracy affected the amount of cooperation and consultation between their group and several government branches. Figure 7.3 (next page) shows the results: while all groups report that there has either been an increase or no change in cooperation with the Parliament and Local Councils, the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) notes a moderate decrease in cooperation with the Ministries and the President's Office, and the Peasant Farmer's Union (PFU) notes an important decrease in cooperation with the President's Office. Examining the groups themselves (see Figure 7.4), it is notable that the Mineworkers Union (MUZ) reports increases in cooperation with Parliament, Ministers and the President, the National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF) reports increased cooperation with local councils, Parliament, and Ministers, and the National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) reports increased cooperation with Ministers. Most striking, however, is the response of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), which reports either moderate or important increases in cooperation with all four branches of government.

The analysis of these data make a strong point: while the effects of the transition

Figure 7.3 Change in Cooperation and Consultation after Transition

How did the change in 1991 from the one-party state to multi-party democracy affect the amount of cooperation and consultation between this association and the following government granches?

... with the President's Office?



Decrease in Cooperation *No Change* *Increase in Cooperation*

... with the Ministries?



Decrease in Cooperation *No Change* *Increase in Cooperation*

... with the Parliament?



No Change *Increase in Cooperation*

... with Local Councils?



No Change *Increase in Cooperation*

Figure 7.4: Change in Cooperation and Consultation after Transition, by Group

How did the change in 1991 from the one-party state to multi-party democracy affect the amount of cooperation and consultation between this association and the following government granches?



are mostly positive for most groups, as expressed by the amount of cooperation that groups leaders perceive they enjoy with the new MMD government, they are not monolithic: the effects of the transition have been different for different groups, and different for different economic sectors. Business is the most striking in the clearly positive consequences that the sector and its flagship organization has experienced following the transition. Agriculture is more complex: the National Farmers Union perceives an improved relationship with Ministries, but not much of a change in other areas, while both the NAPSSF and PFU, representatives of small-scale agriculture, note improvements in cooperation with both the Ministries, Parliament and their Local Councils. The industrial sector is also complicated; while things would appear to be looking up for the Mineworkers Union with the MMD government, the lack of data from the ZCTU hides the troubles in that sector that many of the trade unions are experiencing with the new government since the transition.

7.3.2 Institutional access to government in the Third Republic

One of the hallmarks of the political reforms of the early 1990's has been the dismantling of the party-state apparatus and the building of new decision-making institutions. Though the Presidency still holds much discretionary power over government policy, gone are the Central Committee, National Council, and General Conference of the ruling party; and in their place as the central policy-making organ is a reformed Cabinet and the special Divisions of the Cabinet Office. The MMD government, espousing an ideology of multi-party pluralism and a liberalized market economy, has pledged to make the political process more open, responsive, and accountable, both to major "stakeholders" and the general public. We know that the above institutions of the Second

Republic were neither designed to function nor indeed did function to permit the easy participation of organizational interests. Has this changed in the Third Republic? One test of whether key policy "stakeholders" such as interest groups are being allowed to participate in a more "open and responsive" process is whether they are gaining any form of routine access to the decision-making process. Two indicators of institutional access are available from the 1997 survey: first, respondents were asked if their association communicated, consulted, or interacted with agencies of the national and local government, and if so, how often; and second, respondents were asked if their association was regularly consulted by government agencies when it considered new legislation or changes in policy.

Overall, the national apex groups are fairly active in their attempts to interact with government. Figure 7.5 (next page) shows that all of the national apex organizations respond that they do interact with both local and national government at least "sometimes" if not "often." Not surprisingly, the organizations that either had institutionalized (if not effective) access to government during the Second Republic, as well as organizations that currently represent large-scale producers such as corporations and commercial farmers, report that they interact more often with *national* government than those organizations which are new to the national policy arena and have less economically powerful memberships, i.e. the two associations for peasant and small-scale farmers. However, these latter organizations report that they interact more often than the former with the departments and councils of local government. This might indicate that the latter two groups experience greater opportunity to access policy implementors than policy-makers. Figure 7.6 gives the additive frequency of the national groups' interactions with

Figure 7.5: Apex Group's Communication, Consultation, and Interaction with Government, by Group

Has this association communicated, consulted, or interacted with any agencies of the national government during the last year? How often? With which branches of government?



Figure 7.6: Additive Analysis of Frequency of Interaction with Government



Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

government; from this we see that the groups interact with national government only slightly more than local government.

From this data,it would appear that national apex groups are fairly active in their attempts to interact and consult with the MMD government. This questionnaire item used to collect this data was phrased to capture groups' efforts to initiate contact;[6] while a further questionnaire item was phrased to capture the other side of the coin, the government's efforts to initiate contact.[7] This latter item is perhaps a more consequential indicator of institutional access, Table 7.2 shows that of the major apex groups, most report that they are consulted by government about issues such as major policy changes. Only the PFU[8] reports that they are not regularly consulted by government.

Table 7.2
Groups, Government Agencies, and Policy Issues

Group	Agencies that interact most often with that association	Policy issues over which government consults with that association
ZACCI	Government and quasi-government agencies	Budget, legislative, economic issues
ZNFU	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries	Budget, agricultural policy, fiscal policy
NAPSF	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries	Agricultural financing, credit deliveries, and marketing
ZCF	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries	Cooperative Development
MUZ	Ministry of Mines and Labor	Privatization, wage policy, pensions and national development

[6] Questionnaire item: "Has this association communicated, consulted, or interacted with any cabinet departments or independent agencies of the national government during the last year?"

[7] Questionnaire item: "Is this association regularly consulted by government agencies when they are considering new legislation or changes in policy?"

[8] Data is missing on this item for ZFE.

Table 7.2 indicates that, at least from the perspective of group leaders, apex associations in the Third Republic are gaining some level of routine access to the policy decision-making processes, especially in Ministries relevant to their policy areas. Of course, while access is not synonymous with influence over actual policy decisions, it is reasonable to suggest that entrepreneurial leaders would not continue in their efforts to interact and consult with government over policies that affect them and their members, if these efforts continually proved fruitless. Given that groups and government *do* interact, it is useful to enquire into the strategies that groups employ in efforts to influence government policy, for two reasons. First, it is important to the issue of the "coverage" of the interest group system to recognize if there are patterns to the different strategies that groups use. If certain strategies are favored by specific institutional arrangements, changes in those institutions could affect the coverage of interests. Second, we are interested in which strategies are perceived to be most effective, and whether there are predictors (such as group capacity) of which kinds of strategies will be adopted by different groups. This latter question will be addressed when we look more carefully at organizational capacity in the next chapter.[9]

7.3.3 Strategies for Influence

Following Walker's study (1991), we distinguish between the four types of "inside" policy influence strategies that correspond to conventional lobbying activities, and two types of "outside" policy influence strategies that are meant to shape and mobilize

[9] Of course, given the small sample size in this analysis, we cannot hope to make inferences about interest groups in general in answering these questions. We can, however, use the additional information possible with a small-N study to make some headway in understanding *why* there might be differences between groups.

public opinion. "Inside activities are "designed to convince public officials to take some form of action or to modify an established policy by means of close consultation with political and administrative leaders" (1991:103); the four types we include here as relevant to Zambia are: lobbying government at the policy formulation stage, lobbying government at the policy implementation stage, engaging in litigation, or participating in electoral politics (e.g. contributing to a politician's campaign). "Outside" activities may be "an indirect effort to exert influence upon the outcome of a specific policy decision, but often they are intended to build support within the general public for an entirely new set of values" (Walker 1991:103); the two relevant types included here are using the media to influence public opinion and organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests.

Figure 7.7 and 7.8 (next page) give the responses. All groups perceive the lobbying of the policy formulation stage, that is, the Cabinet and Ministries, as the most important strategy toward achieving their policy goals. Most, with the exception of the ZNFU, also perceive that working with government agencies in policy implementation is another important strategy toward meeting policy goals. Several groups consider litigation a somewhat useful strategy, and most report that working to aid the election of political leaders is a strategy "not very" or "not at all" useful.[10] The notable exception to this finding is the ZCF, who considers such electoral activities to be "very" important– but this might largely be an artifact of having their President recently elected as an MP. Interestingly, when comparing the additive importance of the influence strategies, working to influence public opinion through publicity and the media emerges as one of the most

[10] This latter finding must be considered in conjunction with the finding that few groups will openly admit to engaging in *political* activities in the Third Republic. This is an issue we will address below.

Figure 7.7: The Additive Importance of Influence Stratgies

Associations may engage in a variety of activities in order to achieve their policy goals. Using the scale below, please indicate your best estimate of the importance of that activity for this organization.

Type of Influence Strategy:



Level of Importance: 1 = Not at all 2 = Not Very
3 = Somewhat 4 = Very 5 = Most Important

Figure 7.8: Additive Importance of Influence Stratgies, by Type



Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

important strategies for policy influence for three groups (the ZCF, ZFE, and ZACCI), and one that is very or at least "sometimes" important for the PFU,the MUZ, and the NAPPSF. Examining the groups themselves, it is noticeable that the two groups representing business interests, ZACCI and the ZFE, report that public demonstrations and protests are "not at all" important as an influence strategy, while the PFU and ZCF, both of which represent similar rural interests, report that this strategy is at least sometimes if not very important in forwarding policy goals. Indeed these latter two groups stand out due to the wide variety of strategies they consider important to achieving their policy goals.

These two patterns are instructive in what they tell us about the nature of interest articulation in the Third Republic. First of all, all groups have responded to the reformation of the policy process and the vesting of decision-making in the Cabinet with considerable attempts at formally lobbying the Ministries, indicating that there is at least a perception that influence over policy is possible at that stage. Thus, institutional changes which make policy lobbying more open at the Ministerial level would seemingly improve access for all groups. In addition, the finding that attempts to influence policy implementation are also very important to group strategies implies that the outcome of centrally-made policy decisions are still open to revision at the implementation level, that is, at the junctures where the public administration executes policy decisions. Improving access at these junctures as well would seem to benefit all groups, with the exception of the ZNFU, who reports that this strategy is "not very useful." Also important is the finding that participating in electoral politics is not only a "non-important" strategy for all groups except the ZCF, but that, as discussed above in Chapter One, several group leaders

actively eschew "partisan politics." This is a complicated issue we will discuss further below.

The finding that use of media in influencing public opinion is considered an important strategy by nearly all groups is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that there is no distinction between groups that employ "inside" as opposed to "outside" strategies in the Third Republic; all groups, with the possible exception of the National Farmers' Union, find both types to be useful in gaining policy-makers attention. Secondly, it implies that the improved freedom of the press in Zambia's Third Republic benefits the general articulation of interests; thus, further liberalization of the media (i.e. decreasing the dominance of government media and decreasing the harassment of the individual press) might increase the potential for collective efforts to influence policy. Finally, the finding that groups seeking to represent peasant and small-scale farmers' (i.e. the rural sector)'s interests to the government are the only ones that perceive public protest and demonstration to be important strategies for influence is weighty. It indicates that though these groups might also be engaged in formal lobbying, or "insider" strategies, they are either frustrated in those attempts, or they perceive protest strategies, what Almond and Powell refer to as "illegitimate or coercive access channels" (1996:76), to also be successful in gaining government attention. This is evidence that though the political process may be "opening up" to the representation of societal interests, and the process of interest representation may be becoming more institutionalized, the strategy of mass mobilization remains useful in some sectors.

Having examined the consequences of the transition on groups' interaction with government, let's look more closely at the effects of the institutional change involved from

a system in which there is one major legitimate channel of access (i.e. UNIP) to a system in which several channels might become possible. Specifically, we look at three types of channels suggested by the institutional diagram presented in Figure 7.2 the government and administration, the party system, and the media.

7.4 Government– ministries, parliament, boards and committees

Ministries

It is clear from the analysis above that it is the Ministries which are the main point of access into government decision-making for interest groups in the Third Republic. This is explained by the new institutional configuration of the Third Republic: Ministers are part of the Cabinet, and as discussed above, under Article No. 18 of 1996, Section 50-53 of the Constitution, it is specifically the Cabinet which formulates government policy. Apparently, however, there is no formal submission process directly to the Cabinet or its Secretary; according to a Permanent Secretary within the Cabinet Office, the Office expects that it is the Ministries which will liase with "organizations in the private sector," and include their concerns when the Ministry makes policy submissions to the Cabinet Office. As the bureau responsible for coordinating policy directives and submissions, the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division at Cabinet Office 'encourages' individual Ministries to consult with the private sector; however, they want consultations to be carried out *through* the offices of the ministries, and will check to make sure this has been done (interview with Mr. Kaluba, Permanent Secretary of the Division, June 25, 1997).

Mr Kaluba reports that while his office does not solicit formal submissions from groups, he does occasionally inform groups at an informal level about policies which are

"in the pipeline": as an example, he might call up ZACCI and tell them to confer with the appropriate Ministry regarding a certain policy. While he encourages such informal means of contact, such as having members of his office "get to know" group leaders and "get their input" at an informal level, he also reports that the government is trying to create consultative institutions that offer more formalized channels of communication, such as the arrangement with the Tripartitite Council in the labour sector. However, to this end, he reports that government would find it preferable for each sector to be represented by one organization that represents a broad membership as opposed to the voice of a few individuals. As an example, he asserts that the fragmentation of the farming sector makes it difficult for government to "know who's talking."

This desire to institute a limited number of singular, functionally differentiated categories for the representation of interests is quite similar to the preference of the UNIP regime for a corporative arrangement of societal interests. The continuity in the state's desire to incorporate society in an "organic" relationship, as opposed to competing with it in a liberal one, is not surprising. However, it is difficult to tell whether this is entirely driven by ideology or necessity; in fact, it is probably both. Observing the state of decay of the administrative offices of the Permanent Secretary, it is understandable that the Secretary expresses frustration with a potential onslaught of submissions from groups and individuals outside of government that would require a great deal of secretarial capacity, if nothing else, to properly handle.

However, it also makes sense that officials in the administration– many of who first took their offices during the Second Republic– still believe in the concept of the "developmental state," that is, one which arbitrarily acts in the interests of society to

"develop the economy," a state to which private interests make sacrifices, not submissions. This ethos is especially apparent in the Cabinet, where societal interests are appreciated as long as they are 'properly' channeled through the individual Ministries. It is to varying degrees also present in the Ministries, where we find officials who are willing to "consider" the interests of "stakeholders," but where formal lines of communication between the government and society have yet to fully develop.

Importantly, there is variation in the degree to which individual Ministries are encouraging these linkages to develop; it is this difference between the main sectoral Ministries to which we now turn.

Agriculture

Most important to the agricultural sector is the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF). A formal linkage between the Ministry and interests in the agricultural sector was indeed created following the transition; known as the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP), it was implemented in 1996 but was suspended in 1997 to "undergo serious revamping." Under ASIP, private sector representation is arranged through the membership of farmers' associations, cooperatives, and other NGO's, on the ASIP steering committee and on local District Agricultural Committees. According to Dr. Hantuba, MAFF Acting Deputy Director, the MAFF prefers to think of the members of interest groups as "stakeholders" in agricultural policy; and the ASIP marks a sincere attempt to restructure the MAFF to be responsive to such stakeholders, to generate efficient, demand-driven policies and to employ a decentralized administration which "gets out to the areas where the stakeholders are" (interview with Hantuba, 19/6/97). Ad hoc linkages also exist between MAFF and its stakeholders: for instance, the MAFF

occasionally holds workshops which stakeholders' groups are invited to attend, and they send official government representatives to workshops held by groups. According to Dr. Hantuba, any stakeholder has the right to see the Minister or the Permanent Secretary, "as these are public offices." Stakeholders also have the right to influence government opinion through the media. More formally, representation can also be had when the Minister presents the annual agricultural budget to Parliament for discussion.

From the analysis above, we know that new opportunities such as this affect groups differently: the NAPSSF reports there has been an important increase in cooperation with the Ministries since the transition in 1991, the ZNFU and PFU report a moderate increase in cooperation; and ZCF reports a moderate decrease in cooperation. Interestingly, however, it is the ZCF that reports they communicate and interact with Ministries "often," while the NAPSSF and PFU, who perceive they are getting just as much if not more cooperation from the new government as from the old, report that they communicate and interact with government only "sometimes." Since the ZNFU, while reporting an increase in cooperation with the new regime, also reports that they communicate and interact with the Ministries quite "often," we might surmise that some groups have to work harder than others to elicit cooperation, and for some groups, cooperation just does not, and perhaps will not, depend on efforts to work with government.

Furthermore, we should note that there are important differences between groups's interactions with different Ministries, a point which at least sometimes is dependent on the person who actually sits in the Minister's chair. A quote from the President of the ZNFU at the Annual Congress in 1997 (after the ASIP was dissolved) makes this point well:

> "Mr President, of late the relationship between the ZNFU and some parts of Government have been less than perfect. It is our firm belief that we must improve this relationship for the good of the agricultural sector. The ZNFU has no wish to be seen as the automatic opposition to Government's agricultural policy. Neither however do we wish to relinquish our right to disagree with Government's agricultural policy when we think fit. There must be, and indeed there is a middle ground which I can assure you we fully intend to work towards. We look for Government's co-operation on this."

Importantly, this point did not extend to *all* of government, just the then-current Minister of Agriculture, Edith Nawakwi, who had initiated a war-of-words in the press with the ZNFU. As President Vashee continued, "we would like to commend the Minister of Finance for providing a clear and distinct government policy statement regarding agriculture marketing and inputs. This commitment and resolve of government to provide firm guidelines is of fundamental importance to the development of the agricultural sector."

As to how the specific introduction of the Strategic Investment Program impacted groups' ability to gain representation in the agricultural policy process (even though it was short-lived), again groups have had different experiences. According to ZNFU (who at one point held the vice-chairmanship of the committee), the ASIP steering committee permitted valuable representation to its members– at least until its dissolution in February 1997. As for the District Agricultural Committees, groups had mixed reviews of their experience with representation on these bodies. On the one hand, the District Agricultural Office in Mansa reported that its D.A.C. met once a month and included representatives from the Peasant Farmers' Union and Farmers' Association, and the ZNFU reported that its farmers have been quite active on committees in many of the districts. On the other hand, representatives from the Peasant Farmers Union in Kabwe complained that civil servants were taking the lion's share of seats on D.A.C.'s, and members of an agricultural

cooperative in Nchelenge didn't seem to realize the D.A.C. existed.

Business

Most important to the business sector is the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI), although particular sectors (e.g. transportation, tourism, etc.) deal more often with their specific line Ministry. According to Jane Habongo, Deputy Director of Planning and Research, there are no formal linkages between the Ministry and private sector organizations (interview with Habongo, 19/6/97). However, since the transition in 1991, the Ministry has held many meetings with ZACCI, and recently, (since 1995) the Ministry has begun to hold quarterly "dialogue" meetings with ZACCI, ZAM, and the Textile Producers Association. At these meetings, chaired by the Permanent Secretary, issues such as the national budget, tariffs, and other policies are discussed. Private sector representation is also achieved through boards and commissions; for example, the Export Board is a statutory body under the MCTI. Informally, group members are "free to come in to the Ministry with their concerns... we are looking for consultation at every stage, to collect information from interest groups through committees and task forces" (ibid). The Ministry's position was described thus: "Groups are encouraged to put in their ideas, but the final decision is up to government. We try as much as possible to accommodate, but businessmen will always complain. Groups need to know what they want... if they want to work with government, they have to make positive contributions, give specific instructions" (ibid).

From the perspective of the key interest group in the business sector, changes such as these informal linkages with the MCTI have resulted in the perception of an important increase in cooperation between the Ministries and the Association. ZACCI reports they

have gained greater formal access to Ministers and their staff; "dialogue meetings" are scheduled (though not always held) every two months with the MCTI, and inter-ministerial meetings with representatives and their staff from multiple Ministries are scheduled quarterly. Present at the most recent of these meetings, held in March 1997 (a month after the agricultural sector lost their connection to the MAFF through the Strategic Investment Program), were the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Finance and Economic Development, Works and Supply, Local Government and Housing, Commerce Trade and Industry, and Agriculture Food and Fisheries, as well as high-level officials from the National Roads Board and the Ministry of Communications and Transport. Importantly, while these meetings indicate much improved and formalized access to government decision-makers in the Third Republic, they are still not legally mandated and thus depend on the discretion of the sitting Ministers. This is different from both agriculture, where even nearly-institutionalized linkages failed before they became functional, and labor, where legally mandated meetings between government, labor and employers exists in the form of the Tripartite Council.

Labor

Most important to the labour sector is, of course, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. In addition to the Tripartite Council, which schedules and holds bi-annual meetings, the Deputy Labor Minister, Mr. D.S. Nyambe, reports that it keeps an open door to additional ad hoc meetings with unions and employers (interview with Nyambe, 14/2/97). For reasons given above in the discussion of the split between the Congress and the Mineworkers et al., the degree to which the unions perceive the MMD Minister of Labour, as well as the other Ministries in the Third Republic, to be more "cooperative"

than their Second Republic counterparts, depends on which national union one refers to. We know that the MUZ reports they have experienced an "important increase" in cooperation with Ministries in the Third Republic, and that they report that they often communicate and interact with government; though we don't have comparable data for the ZCTU, interviews with groups leaders as well as media reports would indicate they are more similar to the Cooperative Federation; that is, though they may struggle to frequently communicate with government, it is most likely they would report that cooperation with the Ministries in the Third Republic has not improved. Indeed, both the AAWUZ and the NUPAW reported a "moderate decrease" in their cooperation with Ministries, and that they only sometimes consult with them. The Employers Federation (ZFE), on the other hand, reports that it has experienced positive relations with government in the Third Republic, finding ministers to be more receptive and policy consultations to be more frequent, although influence over final policy decisions is not always forthcoming.

Parliament

In developed democracies, legislatures are often a key focus of interest group activity, as legislation as well as executive policy often has profound effects on the interests of group members. However, for legislative lobbying to produce returns that merit their costs, there must be a perception that a) there is potential for influence over lawmaker's decisions, b) there is access to the deliberative process that the legislature engages in, and c) that the legislature has a meaningful role in policy making. Studies on the Zambian National Assembly suggest that none of these assumptions hold. First, although the reputation of the National Assembly as a rubber stamp on executive decisions is not entirely accurate (Alderfer 1997), the fact remains that the Assembly is subject to

executive co-optation. As Alderfer found in his study, "Most members (of Parliament) believe that executive agencies , especially the president and district councils, bear the primary responsibility to provide government services and do not believe the assembly should take a more prominent position in this process" (1997:255). In addition, the Speaker of the Assembly "maintains a traditional perspective on the role of the National Assembly, namely that parliament's primary responsibility is to approve legislation brought to it by the government" (ibid:211). As a result, it is not surprising to find that most groups are most focused on attempting to exert influence at the Ministerial level, as discussed above.

Second, the Assembly is a difficult institution for associations to gain access to. Perched on the top of a hill and clad in copper, the building itself, as well as the lodgings of the Members, are guarded, and permission for entry is difficult to obtain. Furthermore, the parliamentary committee system is deliberately weakened by the Speaker of the Assembly (ibid 1997); while one of the groups (NAPPSF) reported to me that they had been contacted and asked to provide a report to a parliamentary committee on Agriculture, they also remarked that they had never been notified of the resulting legislative outcome, and were unaware of the effects, if any, of their submission. The situation in which both parliament and interest groups would like to communicate more but are frustrated by institutional– or as Alderfer points out, individual (i.e. the Speaker himself)-- constraints, is perhaps best captured by an exchange between ZACCI Board members and several pro-business MPs who were guests at a Board meeting (Badat-Kafue, Chewe-Kabwe, Mutukwa-Nyroro, and Vernon Mwanga-Roan, a former Trustee of ZACCI). During discussion, ZACCI's attempt to make submissions on the Pension Act

was raised. ZACCI's official position is that they do not want government to have a monopoly over the provision of pension schemes. When asked why they had not made a submission to Parliament to express this position, the following exchange ensued:

ZACCI President, George Chabwera:	"We were not invited to make submissions."
Hon. Mwanga:	"But you could have distributed it at Parliament or at the National Motel where we stay."
Chabwera:	"We tried, but we were stopped (by guards)."
Hon. Mwanga:	"Well, efforts must be made to get to us individually. This is one of the few countries where MPs are not lobbied at all. It's ridiculous. House should have private select committee which can deal with private sector concerns."
Hon. Mutukwa:	"We need to be more like states with lots of interest groups lobbying. Maybe you could give us a fact sheet which explains your point and the consequences."
ZACCI board member:	"The best way to communicate with MPs is when they're in Parliament; is there any way ZACCI can meet with MPs in parliament?"
Hon. Mwanga:	"Our mornings are free. You could have workshops then and have MPs show up. As backbenchers, we're able to influence government."
ZACCI Vice President Mukandawire:	"Bills going late to Parliament is a product of the 2nd Republic. With a multi-party state, bills should flow to interest groups and others."
Hon. Mwanga:	"Yes, but the problem is that the Speaker doesn't allow any reform in standing orders committee."

An invitation was then extended to ZACCI members to come and observe Parliamentary debates. It was remarked that there needed to be a ZACCI sub-committee to go to the parliamentary motel, where Members reside while in session, and lobby the MPs directly.

Government Boards and Committees

Boards and Committees of public organizations, which allow interest representation from various sectors of society and the economy, seem to be a diverse group of institutions, some stipulated in the original Laws of Zambia, some created by *ad hoc* statutory instruments, some formed at a Minister's whim. Some are well-established, regulated by clear legislation which stipulates election of membership, duties and responsibilities of the Board, etc. An example of this is the Zambia Privatization Board, whose members, once put forth officially by the group they are to represent, are ratified by Parliament. Others are more loosely defined; regulations concerning membership are amorphous (allegations of patronage often surround the assignment members on this type of board), and their function (outside of providing sitting allowances) seems ambiguous. The fact that these bodies do provide sometimes substantial sitting allowances (a sit-in on the ZPA board brings in K300,000, or about US$240) makes assignment to them an attractive opportunity among members of interest group executive boards.

Of issue is the manner in which group representatives are assigned to the boards, and the extent to which they represent group, rather than individual, interests when they take their seat. ZACCI, for example, chooses representatives to boards and commissions through elections at executive board meetings. The representative is then asked to report to the executive board monthly, and take comments from the executive board back to their board or committee meetings (see Table 4.3, Chapter Four). ZNFU generally assigns members of the secretariat (i.e. full time staff) to these bodies, and requires staff members to relinquish their sitting allowance to the main office.

Political Parties and Electoral Politics

As noted above, groups generally do not consider electoral politics a useful pathway to influence. As shown in Figure 7.7, of five possible influence strategies, "working to aid the election of political leaders" tied with "engaging in public protests" as the least important strategy for the national apex groups. Examining the groups individually, both MUZ and ZNFU stated that such an electoral strategy was "not very" important in achieving their policy goals, while the PFU, ZFE, MUZ, ZACCI, and NAPPSF stated the strategy was "not at all important." The notable exception to this trend is the Cooperative Federation, whose response that an electoral strategy is "very" important to policy goals is quite striking. Examining another item in the 1997 Survey, we see the same pattern when the question "What, if any, political activities does this group engage in?" Table 7.3 gives the open-ended responses, noticably blunt in most cases: "none." Since we know that these groups *do* engage in the political wrangling that is endemic to participating in economic policy decision-making, we interpret these responses to reference specifically *partisan* politics, as alluded to by the PFU in their comment: "members are free to participate in *politics* (i.e. parties) of their choice."

Table 7.3: Group Political Activity,
Open-ended Responses to "What Political Activities does Group Engage In?"

ZACCI	NONE
ZNFU	NONE -ZNFU does not engage in any political activities
NAPSF	NONE-non-political
PFU	NONE -the union has no political agenda but individual members are free to participate in politics of their choice
ZCF	lobbying
MUZ	industrial political activity and general political activity

The exception is again, the Cooperative Federation, who claims "lobbying" as a political activity the group engages in, and the Mineworkers Union, who responded it "engages mainly in industrial political activity and general political activity." For the former, the engagement in politics appears to have had deleterious effects on their relationship with government; while for the latter, their open political support of the MMD government during and after the transition has apparently paid off. Given the penalties for choosing the "wrong" party vis-a-vis the government in power, the other groups have apparently decided to hedge their bets, preferring to stay well away from any semblance of partisan involvement, or associated in any way with a particular political party. A good example of the fine line between policy advocacy and political activity that groups must walk is the ZNFU's official statement of "political neutrality," as given by the President of the Association at the Annual Congress, April 1997:

> "First, the ZNFU does not engage in, or allow itself to be influenced by, party politics. The ZNFU has always avoided aligning itself with any one political party in resolving agricultural matters. It would be unwise and short term opportunism for the Union to espouse any one particular party, especially since we draw our members from every shade of the political spectrum. It is for this reason that the Union has a strict policy requiring office bearers to resign their positions upon entering national politics, so as to ensure the political neutrality of the organization. The Union has always been willing to work constructively with the Government of the day for the improvement of agriculture."

The avoidance of any partisan or political ties bodes poorly for the development of party-interest group networks, which reinforce interest blocks in true multi-party systems. It also starves the party system of stable sources of support and contributions.

Public Opinion: Advertising and the Media

Media and advertising, as mechanisms useful in the shaping of public opinion, are important pathways to influence in political systems where government leaders depend on the support of the mass public to rule. Since the demise of the one-party state, Zambia has seen a revival of the independent press under the new institutions of the multi-party state, so there are new channels which interest groups in Zambia can and do use to sway public opinion. However, while the Constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the press, the Penal Code lists various prohibited activities that may be broadly interpreted and in effect restrict freedom of expression and the press (USIS 1995 Human Rights Report). Thus, while the government generally respects freedom of expression, it is able to invoke these restrictive laws in selected cases, and limit that expression it does not care to hear. In addition, the Government continues to own the two most widely circulated newspapers, as well as the sole television station, ZNBC, and one of only two radio stations (the other is a Christian missionary affiliated station). While the government thus still has great influence over the information that reaches the public, a number of independent newspapers which actively question government actions and policies and circulate without government interference also continue to operate, rounding out the space available for shaping public opinion.

As our data show, interest groups in the Third Republic do perceive that using the media to influence public opinion is an important strategy for policy influence. This is true especially of the Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Federation of Employers (ZFE), and the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), who reported it to be among the most important influence strategies they employ, while the PFU, MUZ, and

NAPSF also counted it important (see figure 7.5). In fact, as figure 7.9[11] (next page) shows, the number of times that the national-level interest groups have appeared in the leading official daily (The Times of Zambia) has increased for all groups, except for the ZCF, for whom it has stayed the same. Most notable is the rise in exposure for the Congress of Trade Unions, from 14 times in 1989 to 43 times in 1996. Also important is the jump in recognition of the ZNFU, which went from not being mentioned at all in the leading government daily in 1989, to appearing in the public eye more often than any other non-union apex group. However, even though it has increased, the total number of times in a year that group affairs and positions are covered is rather slim; the intentional use of media as a strategy for influence in the Third Republic seems still in its infancy.

Nonetheless, as shown in Table 7.4 below, it is usually the case that the group covered in the news article is given "voice," i.e. a spokesman is quoted, giving the group a chance to speak out on the issue. Whether this "voice" is solicited by a news-hungry journalist, or is provided via the initiative of the group spokesman making a call to the local paper, is impossible to tell. However, as shown in Table 7.4, most of the groups that are mentioned reported in our survey that they consider the use of media an important influence strategy; demonstrating that such voice is valued for its political purposes, even if not the result of the group's initiative. As the information in Table shows, groups use these opportunities for a public voice not only for political purposes, such as criticizing the MMD or the government, or taking a public position on a policy (e.g. "income tax"), they

[11] This data is derived from the author's "media database," which comprises a systematic collection of all mentions of interest groups in the Times of Zambia newspaper for the years 1989-1996 (see Appendix 2). Articles are coded for date, groups involved, issue addressed, action taken, and government involvement.

Figure 7.9: Frequency of Mention in the Times of Zambia



Data Source: Media Database

also use the opportunity to report on corruption ("watchdog"), on services they are providing their members ("services provided"), to announce a workshop or other public affair (public relations), or to comment on data and statistics that are relevant to their members. In addition, coverage includes issues of inter- and intra- group cooperation and conflict (e.g. "problem in group").

Table 7.4
Analysis of Coverage in the Times of Zambia

APEX GROUP:	*ZCF*	*ZCTU*	*ZFE*	*MUZ*	*ZACC*	*ZNFU*	*PFU*
Frequency of Mention	4	43	5	17	8	14	3
Frequency of "Voice"	4	41	5	13	6	14	3
Types of Issues Addressed in Articles	Data/ Statistics, Problem in Group	Income Tax, Regulatory Policy, Elections, Suuport for Democracy, Partisan Issues, Support MMD, Public Relations, Data/ Statistics, Watchdog, Disupute Elections, Services Provided, Industrial Relations	Pension Scheme, Data/ Statistics Problem with Other Group Services Provided	Public Service Reform Policy Privatization Policy, Data/ Statistics Group Elections Held, Split with ZCTU Issues Services Provided Problem in Group	Criticism of MMD, Criticism of Govt., Public Relations, Watchdog, Services Provided, Group Problem	Critique of Agricultural Policy Criticism of Govt. Criticism of Local Govt. Public Relations Data/ Statistics Elections Held	Public Relations, Data/ Statistics

7.4.1 Summary: Pathways to Influence in the Third Republic

During the Second Republic, the UNIP regime's adoption of corporatist-like representional institutions resulted in a exclusive and highly centralized policy process, with little room and few mechanisms for societal input. Upon coming to power, the MMD promised to promote the tenets of pluralism: a competitive political arena, a more

open and inclusive decision-making process receptive to interest group lobbying, the freedom to organize independent of government control. Through increased consultation and cooperation with government ministers and their administrations at both the policy-making and policy implementation levels, as well as through regularly-held public seminars, workshops and symposiums to publicly debate key economic policies, interest groups in Zambia are making use of the "opening up" of government under the MMD regime. We've shown that the point of influence groups perceive to be most useful are the Ministries, and that most of the key national apex groups report increases in cooperation and consultation with their relevant ministry. However, we've also seen evidence of government officials' preference for the less cacophonous environment of the Second Republic, their nostalgia for the corporatist controls of that time. As well, the MMD believes its policy agenda has an electoral mandate, and has exhibited little inclination to change course. The question, then, is whether increased lobbying efforts and greater access to government has produced any real *influence* over policy. Since this is a difficult subject to analyze, and almost impossible to analyze on a general level, we'll first examine which policy areas are especially important to the groups in the study, and then address their ability to influence those policies.

7.5 Policy interests

Figures 7.10 and 7.11 (next page) provide detailed information about group preferences for the provision of government services and the level of government regulation in specific policy areas. As is clear from Figure 7.10, national apex group leaders in all economic sectors overwhelmingly want to see the government provide increased services, in policy areas specific to their economic activity (employment,

Figure 7.10: Provision of Service in Policy Areas

For each of the folloiwng policy areas, please use the following scale to indicate this asssociation's perspecitve on the level of services that should be provided by the government in that particular policy area:





Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

agriculture) as well as general areas like economic development, education and housing. There are only two notable exceptions to this trend, most importantly the ZACCI, who want to see many fewer services provided by government in the area of business and commerce (i.e. like businessmen worldwide, they want government *out* of the business arena), and the PFU, who expressed that there should be less provision of government housing, understandable since this service is provided mostly to urban, not rural, residents. Not surprisingly, comparing the groups themselves, the Cooperative Federation (ZCF) comes up first in wanting to see much more provision of government services, as does the PFU in most areas (NAPSSF did not respond to these items).

Figure 7.11 shows that in the area of government regulation, however, many groups would like to see the government impose fewer conditions and requirements in the above policy areas. Leading this trend, of course, is the representative of business, the ZACCI, who wants "much less" regulation in all policy areas, except of course international trade, where they want to see government much more involved. Given that the ZCF wants to see large increases in the amount of government services provided, it is interesting to note that they want nonetheless to see less government regulation in every policy area. Consistent with their market-oriented position on most policy matters, the ZNFU is satisfied with levels of government regulation in most areas, except in international trade, where they join ZACCI in a preference for much more government regulation to protect Zambian industries and agricultural products.

In general, then, the major national interest associations in Zambia have remarkably convergent policy preferences in one arena; that is, nearly all want more government services, in nearly all policy areas. Groups start to differ when it comes to

Figure 7.11: Level of Regulation in Policy Areas

For each of the folloiwng policy areas, please use the following scale to indicate this asssociation's perspecitve on the level of services that should be provided by the government in that particular policy area:





Data Source: 1997 Organizational Survey

government involvement in the economy, however; for example, the large-scale business sector wants government out, while small-scale agriculture and small-scale business want government in. Not surprisingly, when we asked groups what their main policy objectives were, we found quite a bit of variation.

Figure 7.12 gives the policy objectives of the national apex group leaders as they articulated them in both loosely-structured interviews, and the 1997 organizational survey. The figure shows important convergences over policy direction in some areas, and important divergence in others. Thus, for example, both the ZACCI and ZNFU express policy goals which are in line with market liberalization; that is, these groups are concerned with influencing the margins of private sector production, e.g. tax laws, VAT provisions, export and import duties, etc. Groups which deal with small-scale producers, the PFU and NAPSSF, express policy concerns which, though couched in market terms, are really about government intervention in the market. These groups want to see government continue to provide-- not just regulate-- agricultural inputs and markets for rural farmers. While these groups agree (at least in principle if not in practice) that such provision should be on a market basis through credit and lending mechanisms, they don't believe such mechanisms should be entirely liberalized. Finally, in the industrial sector, while both labor unions and employer's associations are supportive of policies like privatization (for the unions, as long as employment levels don't suffer), they are wary of trade liberalization and agree that Zambia's local industry should be protected. They also converge in wanting to see less government involvement in the economy in areas like pension schemes, and they agree that there needs to be a reduction in government's recurrent expenditures.

Figure 7.12: Table of Policy Objectives

ZACCI	
specific policy areas:	V.A.T. provisions, duty rates, income tax, and commodity classification issues
general policy goals:	*"to make help available to the members an economic space that is friendly to business"*
ZNFU	
specific policy areas:	Agricultural policy, the annual budget, and fiscal policy; Agricultural Credit Act "tightened up;" Government to 'encourage' commercial banks to change conservative approach to agricultural lending
general policy goals:	Market liberalization, agricultural trade policy, development of export markets, security of land tenure. *"Improve the profitability of farming and to improve the agricultural environment in which farmers operate"*
ZCF	
specific policy areas:	New Cooperative Act: government involvement in the cooperative movement abolished in favor of the establishment of private cooperatives;
general policy goals:	*"to advance the living standards of all its members through the practice of cooperation and mutual self-help"*
NAPPSF	
specific policy areas:	Development of lending institutions that offer rates lower than current commercial banks and target funding to agricultural investments such as irrigation systems; improved agricultural extension services that encourage non-traditional crops; facilitation of marketing and export arrangements through improvements to road infrastructure. "Where government and donor aid is needed, for example in the facilitation of agricultural inputs to the rural areas, assistance should be channeled through local associations for delivery to individuals, so as to ensure loan repayment."
general policy goals:	*"source for inputs for farmers"*
PFU	
specific policy areas:	*"central policy objective is to meet the PFU constitutional requirement to source inputs for their members"*
ZCTU	
specific policy areas:	"clear-cut" policies in employment and productivity that utilize incentive schemes, differential interest rates in the productive sector, protection of local industry, control of waste and fraud in foreign exchange allocations, avoidance of wage freezes and retrenchments, the establishment and enforcement of a "living wage," a reduction in government defense and recurrent expenditure, addequately funded A.S.I.P.
ZFE	
specific policy areas:	Drafting of 1997 Industrial Relations Act to limit trade union and employer association splinter groups; Redrafting of the National Provident Fund Act, so that pension schemes are left to a competitive market), Employment Act, Budget recommendations: monetary and fiscal policy, import and export duties, agricultural sector development and small-scale industry, infrastructure, health, taxation, and privatization

7.6 Policy Influence

These specific objectives provide a springboard from which to begin an analysis of policy influence. As stated above, this is difficult to address in a general sense, for there are a multitude of policies that affect economic interests, and on which groups can subsequently focus their lobbying strategies. Each policy issue, of course, exists in a different political and economic context, with a varying cast of protagonists, winners and losers. Groups can therefore be successful on certain policies and decidedly not so on others. In this section, we examine three important economic policies that are important to different groups; these policies were chosen to highlight the interconnectedness of the three facets of interest organizations– members, organizational resources, influence strategies. They are: for the business sector, the annual budget; for labor, the privatization of state-owned industries. The latter, it will be noted, are policies on the economic reform agenda.

7.6.1 The Annual Budget: the Effects of Organizational Resources

Interest groups like ZACCI can have a fair degree of influence in certain policy arenas. An example of this is the annual budget process, where submissions from groups are solicited by the Ministry of Finance, and seem to have a moderate impact on the resulting budget. As the Permanent Secretary for the Policy Analysis and Coordination Division at Cabinet Office pointed out, the MMD government is willing to compromise on some policy issues; as an example, he gave the lowering of VAT in the 1997 budget from 20% to 17.5%. Analysis of the 1996 and 1997 budget demonstrates that the budget reflected several tax proposals put forth by groups, including an increase in the personal

income tax threshold, the lowering of the VAT rate from 20% to 17.5%, and changes in import and export duties intended to benefit business and agriculture. Furthermore, as the analysis above showed, group leaders report that they are fairly satisfied with their policy influence efforts.

Lobbying Government Ministries:

The Ministry of Finance and Taxation Issues in the Annual Budget

> "As part of opening the budget process, the Ministry of Finance is pleased to announce the formation of a budget task force. The government is concerned with restoring the fiscal health of the country's finances. As part of the process of examining options this task force invites written submissions from business, labour, and professional organizations and also from individuals."
>
> J.M. Mtonga, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
> Press Release, 1996

Among the varied committees of the Ministry of Finance, there exists a "tax policy task force." Each year, this body requests submissions from interest groups and others as to their preferences for the next year's budget, analyzes the feasibility and budget repercussions of these preferences, and makes recommendations to the Minister based upon these considerations (note: while groups are asked for submissions, there are no interest groups or other non-governmental representatives in these review groups). This is thus an area in which groups have a distinct interest, and which they have a clear channel to the relevant decision-makers.

Who takes advantage of such opportunities? Below is a list (provided by a member of the task force) of interest groups and others which made a submission to the Ministry of Finance in 1995, in response to the publicly-released Permanent Secretary's request:

Groups
Export Board of Zambia
Leather Industries Association of Zambia
Textile Producers of Zambia
Zambia National Farmer's Union (ZNFU)
Zambia Episcopal Conference
Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM)
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE)
Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (ZACCI)
Zambia Export Growers Association (ZEGA)

Companies
Anglo American Corporation
Barclay's Bank
Dunlop Tyres
E.R.Z. Holdings
Enalo Limited
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, Zambia Ltd.
Mukuba Pensions Trustees Limited
Phelps Dodge
Tata Zambia Limited
Zambia Bottlers Limited

Other Ministries
Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

This list shows that four of the nine groups this report focused on in this report made submissions to the task force: ZACCI and ZAM, representing the business sector, ZNFU representing the agricultural sector, and ZFE representing the labour sector. Absent are submissions from the ZCF, the PFU, the NAPSSF, and the ZCTU (as the PBA was just formed and still lacks an elected national committee, this is not surprising). Interestingly, the Ministry did not have the ZCTU's submission 'on file' when the submission file was made available to the researcher. Furthermore, a "summary of income tax submissions"-- a matter of key interest to labours' representatives-- did not mention ZCTU. *Profit Magazine* included ZCTU's budget preferences in their report on the submissions made to the Ministry (see ZCTU profile, previous section)-- but none of these submissions concern taxation issues.

The major tax proposals for 1996 fall into 5 main areas:

- Direct taxes: PAYE, company income tax, withholding tax
- VAT: agriculture, mining, food
- Customs: tariffs
- Excise taxes: rates, motor vehicles
- Nontax revenue: fees and fines



Table 7.13 below gives each of the group's position on these taxes, and gives the relevant results of the resultant budgets. For both years, the budget announced by the Minister of Finance reflected changes sought by the groups in some areas, and did not reflect their submissions in others:

Table 7.13:
The 1996 and 1997 Budget Processes

1996	Submission	=>	Budget Result
ZACCI, ZAM	-increase PAYE threshold to K500,000	=>	threshold increased to K600,000
ZACCI, ZAM	-introduce more tax bands	=>	wider tax bands introduced
ZACCI, ZAM	-retain company tax rate of 35%	=>	company tax: reduced to 30% for
ZFE	-reduce " to 25%	=>	LuSE companies
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-abolish withholding tax rate	=>	withholding tax lowered, 25 to 15%
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-broaden tax base	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM	-control for inflation	=>	--
ZFE	-50% allowance tax abatement	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM, ZFE	-lower VAT, 20 to 15%	=>	--
ZACCI	-VAT refund on Zamtel	=>	--
ZAM, ZNFU	-zero-rate agricultural products	=>	basic agricultural products, zero-rated, duty on agricultural machinery reduced, 20% to 0
ZAM, ZFE	-remove import duty on raw materials	=>	no changes, duty-free raw materials
ZACCI	-reduce customs duties to uniform 10%	=>	import duties lowered across the board, but not made uniform
ZAM	-flat rate import duty, no exempt		
ZAM	-abolish SGS inspection monopoly	=>	--
ZACCI, ZAM	-duty on salaula	=>	--
1997:	Submission	=>	Budget
ZNFU	-rebate of fuel levy for farmers	=>	
ZNFU	-livestock tax deferred	=>	
ZNFU	-corporate income tax the same, i.e. 15%	=>	corporate tax, 15%
ZNFU	-duty exemption for agr. machinery	=>	
ZNFU	-countervailing duties	=>	
ZNFU	-abolish SGS monopoly	=>	

Analysis

Generally, it appears that where there aren't important political pressures (e.g. the issue of taxing informal sector vendors and the like) , or inflexible macroeconomic considerations (e.g. the cash budget), groups have some influence in the outcome of the budget process. As it is the MMD government's goal to strengthen the private sector, it behooves them to solicit this sector for advice on what kinds of policies are necessary for growth in this area-- a point reflected by the Ministry of Finance's "Budget Task Force" statement. Though thus solicited, however, interest groups clearly don't hold the reins in the Ministry of Finance, evidenced by the fact that a good portion if not a majority of their submissions go unmet.

Examining again the groups that submitted proposals to the budget process, we note that only groups with high or medium levels of "organizational sustainability" made submissions. Notably, revenue and staff levels don't seem to be positively related to this ability– it is striking, for instance, that the group with the highest revenues and staff levels, i.e. the ZCF, did not attempt to influence the budget, even though it has clear impact on farmers, as ZNFU's submissions make clear. This supports our argument that it is not just an "absolute" level of organizational resources that makes a difference in policy influence; we claim that our concept of "organizational sustainability is more accurate because it takes into account the competing claims on organizational resources. To put it simply, not every "rich" organization will be effective or even engaged, in policy lobbying. Furthermore, we see the shadow of institutional history here again: the ZNFU and ZACCI are both former *quasi-pluralist* groups; our argument that these groups adapt better to a pluralist lobbying arena seems to hold water.

7.6.2 Privatization Policy: the Inflexibility of Economic Reform

As discussed in Chapter Three, part of the legacy of the one-party state was an economy whose ownership was largely in the hands of government. As noted, in 1991 the sector was responsible for 80 percent of GDP in 1991, with 160 public enterprises employing 140,000 staff (van de Walle and Chiwele, 1994:38: see also Callaghy 1993, Hawkins 1991, and Bates and Collier for discussions of the interference in management and rent-seeking problems experienced in this sector). Pressure to privatize this loss-making sector began in the Second Republic, but there was little political will to sustain it, as UNIP benefitted from the patronage opportunites offered by its control over these companies and their employment decisions. In the MMD electoral manifesto, privatization is one of the major planks in its economic reform program (see Chapter Four); upon taking power, it pledged to privatize some 160 firms within 5 years. Despite a lack of consensus among the MMD cabinet, the commitment of a small group of key ministers, and the determination of donors, resulted in the Privatization Bill being presented and quickly pushed through the National Assembly (Rakner 1998:100).

The Privatization Act of June 1992 transformed the former Privatization Committee (instituted by the UNIP regime in May 1990) into a quasi-autonomous agency, the ZPA, which was given the task of full privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOE's) within 10 years. Initially bogged down by a combination of political, administrative, and technical problems, privatization did not proceed very far, until funding for the operation of the ZPA was allocated in the 1993 Budget. The pace picked up considerably after that, and as shown in Table 7.5 (below), the government had surpassed its goal by the end of 1996. Privatization has been cited as one of the government's key successes in its

economic reform program.

Table 7.5
Privatization in Zambia

Progress Date	Companies privatized
June-December 30 1992	Privatization Act passed in parliament, information of programme carried out, establishment of ZPA
January - June 30 1993	2
July - December 30 1993	4
January - June30 1994	6
July - December 30 1994	3
January - June 30 1995	3
July - December 30 1995	27
September 30 1996	108
November 30 1996	166
December 30, 1997	224

Source: Zambia Privatization Agency, adapted from Rakner 1998:101.

Though the labor movement has supported some need for privatization, they have expressed concern with the impact of privatization on employment and the lack of safety net provisions for the unemployed. The position of the ZCTU, especially at first, was that the pace was too fast, and profit-making firms were being privatized alongside loss-making ones. As discussed earlier, the disagreement between the Mineworkers Union, who eventually perceived that privatization would improve conditions in their sector, and the ZCTU was at least partially due to ZCTU's vociferous opposition to the specifics of the privatization program. However, the case provides a good illustration of the lack of policy influence possible in cases where there is strong government support for policy change. Even though the ZCTU had, especially before its split with MUZ and the other unions, quite a formidable level of organizational resources– revenues, staff, and well as

"sustainability," this example serves to illustrate that not all policy arenas are open to influence.

7.7 Conclusion

From this brief analysis of policy influence in two separate policy arenas, the budget and privatization, we see that a wide range of factor affect the direction of policy, including the preferences of policy elites within government, pressure from interest groups, international donor pressure, and economic constraints. Which factors are most important in determining policy direction, we've argued, depends on the specific policy arena. It is thus difficult, if not inaccurate, to say that one group is "stronger" than another, for different policy arenas require strength in different resources from interest groups. However, our analysis makes two points: first, that where there are "influence openings," organizational sustainability (i.e. financial and technical resources minus membership or other demands) can determine which groups will be able to make use of them to further their group's policy goals. Second, prior institutional relationships matter: in the budget example, it might be argued that ZACCI and ZNFU are the ones making regular submissions to government due to their previous experience as *quasi-pluralist* organizations– i.e. they are adapting better to working outside formal institutional relationships to government than the former *corporatist* organizations. According to this logic, one of the ZCTU's problems in effecting influence over any part of the privatization program might be that it is having difficulty adjusting to its new relationship with the MMD government, which does not favor labor's interests as the UNIP did during the Second Republic.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION:
THE PROSPECTS FOR PLURALISM IN ZAMBIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC

This study began with the observation that the economic and political transitions that began in Zambia in 1991 with the coming to power of the MMD and the initiation of the "Third Republic," had potentially wide-reaching repercussions for state-society relations. This led us to begin our inquiry by posing several questions: what effects would these reforms have on the formerly corporatist-like relationships between key economic groups and the state? Would we see a more pluralist interest group system evolve, one with a multitude of groups competing with one another for influence over economic policy, groups with voluntary memberships flocking to their ranks to support and contribute to their group's policy goals? Would we see groups in this system taking advantage of the new "openness" of government to lobby and exert influence over government policy– and would they be successful?

8.1 Change and Continuity

In general, we have found that the political and economic reforms of the Third Republic have produced a mixed bag of results where the continuing development of the



interest group system is concerned. Not surprisingly, (given the "stickiness" of institutions, and the fact that the political and economic behaviors they engender change more slowly than the rules themselves change), we find that there is both change and continuity in the interest group system in the Third Republic. The principal changes noted in previous chapters are the following:

• *The emergence of new groups:* This is true especially in the agricultural sector, where the demise of the cooperatives has precipitated the formation of other new and independent farmers' associations. New groups have also emerged in the business sector, especially local chambers of commerce and national trade associations which are affiliated to the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI). The emergence of new groups in the labor sector was at first blocked by the continuing policy of "one union, one industry" in the early 1990's; however, with the adoption of ILO conventions mandating freedom of association, new trade unions are also emerging to challenge the existing ones. On this front, the emerging interest group system in the Third Republic thus matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory. Whether these emerging groups are organizationally sustainable, however, is questionable; as demonstrated in Chapter Six, groups in some sectors have greater prospects for sustainability than groups in other sectors. The question of whether the pattern predicted by pluralist theory will still be evident in the future, therefore, remains to be seen.

• *The development of new types of institutional access to government decision makers:* On this front also, the political system as well as the interest group system formally

matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory, though in actual practice there are important caveats. With the demise of one-party rule, the policy-locus has moved from the closed committees and councils of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to an executive whose members are directly chosen in competitive elections. Both in the Cabinet Office and in the Ministries themselves, new points of access are being created which allow societal input into policy decision making, such as the Cabinet Office's Policy Analysis and Coordination Division. However, while these points of access are new, they are not necessarily effective; much still depends on the ruling party's official policy agenda, and the preferences of particular government officials.

• *Increased interaction between groups and government:* With more groups in the system and new points of institutional access emerging, the interest group system appears to match the pattern predicted by pluralist theory on this front as well. Here, the introduction of the multi-party system did result in an improved incentive for leaders to heed societal influences and begin attempts at improving social dialogue. Numerous public fora for the discussion of public policy issues have been held, especially in the early years of the Third Republic. Compared to the Second Republic, most groups reported that their interaction with government has increased, and in specific areas such as the government's annual budget process, we've seen that the major national apex groups have taken advantage of government requests for the submission of their policy preferences.

• *Increased lobbying of government over policy issues:* The re-orienting of the policy-making locus from party organs to the executive has not only created new points of access

to decision makers, it has also produced a new flurry of lobbying activity by economic interest groups. This development too matches the pattern predicted by pluralist theory. It also marks a noticeable change from the Second Republic, since the one-party state was not designed to permit direct lobbying activities. Group leaders report that in the Third Republic, their lobbying activities are aimed predominantly at Ministers and their administrations, and to a lesser extent, at Members of Parliament. As with several of the points above, however, there are important caveats to a continued development of this trend. It is reasonable to predict that groups will not continue to support the cost of current lobbying activities if government decision makers prove unresponsive. The increasing suppression of political competition in the Third Republic bodes poorly for one of the primary incentives for responsive government, i.e. electoral consequences.

In addition to these changes in the interest group system, we've also found several continuities between the interest group system in the Second Republic and that emerging in the Third Republic. Primary among such continuities are the following:

• *The continuation of neopatrimonial rule, i.e. a powerful presidency and inflated cabinet, a legislature with a weak role in policy making, and a lack of, if not repression of, serious political competition.* All three factors constrain the points at which interest groups can lobby to gain support for policy goals. Though the lobbying of government decision makers has increased in the Third Republic, further development of this type of pluralist activity is predicated on continued opportunities for policy influence. The continuity in these political factors, reminiscent as they are of the one-party state, bodes poorly for continuing pluralist development in the interest group system..



• *A nostalgia among government administrators for corporatist-type arrangements which limit the demands made upon government.* By their nature, pluralist systems are "messier" than corporatist ones; there are more groups with a greater variety of demands, and their attempts at influence poke government at many different points, sometimes in a very public manner. These characteristics prove uncomfortable to officials accustomed to the formality of corporatist arrangements; and since they are the ones responsible for creating and promoting better channels of access through which groups can act to gain influence, the lingering dominance of politicians and administrators who cut their teeth during the one-party state also bodes poorly for continued pluralist development.

Overall, though there have been developments in the Third Republic that match the patterns of interest group activity predicted by pluralist theory, we argue that the above continuities with the Second Republic bode poorly for further pluralist development in the interest group system. Several scholars and numerous observers have noted that the regime in Zambia's Third Republic is increasingly steering away from the path toward pluralist democracy that it embarked upon in 1991 (e.g. Baylies and Szeftel 1997, Simutanyi 1997, Rakner 1998). We contribute to this literature by offering one empirically based explanation for *why* elite manipulation is deleterious to the development of pluralism, in one sector of civil society. In brief, "hangovers" from the Second Republic, i.e. neopatrimonial rule and a preference for corporatist state-society relations, pose constraints to the development of further pluralism in the interest group sector by preventing the development of the economic and political characteristics necessary to pluralist interest representation (principally, a competitive political and economic environment, and a liberal state), and by creating incentives for collective action that

further mitigate against the development of a pluralist political environment. Such political and representational vestiges of the previous regime have specific effects on interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic– on their membership incentives, organizational resources, and influence strategies; and these effects are best understood by analyzing the impact of institutional history in these three interlocking areas. It is to these findings we now turn.

8.2 Effects of Prior Institutional History on Interest Groups in Dual Transitions

In Chapter Three, we introduced an institutional framework for analyzing the interest group system in Zambia's Second Republic. This framework posits in three possible relationships between the state and interest groups, depending on a) whether the group belongs to a sector that the state actively seeks to control, and b) whether the group tries to resist that control in order to maintain political autonomy. The three possible relationships that emerged in our analysis of interest groups under the Second Republic were: state-negotiated corporatism, state-dominated corporatism, and quasi-pluralism. By creating a typology of possible relationships *between* groups and the state in Zambia, we have shown that we can explain some of the variation we see in the reasons that individuals participate in group activity, the organizational resources and more importantly, sustainability, that groups realize, and their influence strategies and potentials for policy influence. Furthermore, we've found some support for the proposition that these three areas are linked, for example, an organization's sustainability in part depends on what members expect in return for their contributions to, and participation in, group activity. These findings fall into three broad areas:

Membership incentives

Institutional history helps to explain the variations we've seen in membership incentives among different economic interest groups in Zambia's Third Republic. In Chapter Five, the categories above proved useful in understanding the different incentives at work in Zambians' decision to join and/or participate in group activity. Thus, in the formerly *state-dominated corporatist* sector, where small-scale and peasant farmers were organized under the cooperative movement (the Zambia Cooperative Federation, or ZCF), the main benefits that are sought from group activity continue to be the agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities that were once provided by the one-party state. Membership incentives for the cooperatives which continue to fall under the ZCF and the new groups that seek to organize former cooperative members, the Peasant Farmers Union (PFU) and the National Association of Peasant and Small-scale Farmers (NAPSSF), thus continue to be predominantly economic in nature.

Meanwhile, in the formerly *state-negotiated corporatist* sector, though membership in the trade unions under the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) continues to be non-voluntary, unionists expect from their contributions to group activity both the provision of direct economic benefits (higher wages, better working conditions), as well as successful policy representation to government over key economic reforms, such as privatization and tax issues. Here, the membership incentive is both economic in nature, as well as political.

We find the most politically-motivated incentives for membership in the formerly *quasi-pluralist* sector. For both the ZACCI and the ZNFU, gaining representation to government is the benefit members realize most from their contribution to group activity,

and for ZACCI members, it is the most important benefit in their decision to maintain their membership. Economic incentives such as information services and training workshops prove more important to member-farmers in the ZNFU than for the businessmen who belong to ZACCI; the latter turn out to be the most politically-motivated members in the study.

Organizational Sustainability

Institutional history also affects organizational sustainability, through the mechanism of membership incentives. Arguing that groups in a pluralist system must find a benefits package to sustain their membership, we see the link between the objective measure, organizational resources, and the subjective measure, organizational sustainability. Thus, groups with high revenue streams and staffs, like the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), can be less hardy than groups with only moderate revenues and staffs, like the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI); the argument being that the former is pressed to provide a more resource-intense benefit (i.e. economic and patronage rewards in the form of state-subsidized agricultural inputs and credit) to attract members than the is latter, whose members are mostly concerned with policy lobbying and an occasional newsletter.

We also showed how the concept of organizational sustainability is helpful in understanding the different reasons that groups "trade-off" autonomy for increased capacity. In essence, there are at least two reasons why groups accept and solicit donor and government grants and contracts, the first economic, and the second, political. The first explains why groups like the ZCF, the Provincial Business Association (PBA), the

Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), and the National Association of Peasant and Small-scale Farmers (NAPSF) look to donors and the government for financial and technical assistance. For the PBA, the PFU, and the NAPSF, low revenues and low administrative capacity make the deep pockets of donors irresistibly attractive; while for the ZCF, support from the government and international donors potentially offers a renewed legitimacy as well as the resources necessary to re-organize the rural areas. In the case of the unions, assistance from international labor organizations not only helps replace the financial resources lost to declining membership levels, it provides training and collaboration in internationally accepted principles and practices of trade unionism.

On the other hand, reasons which are more political than economic in nature help to explain why the ZACCI and the Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) also seek resources from government and donors, even though organizationally they are fairly sustainable without them. Though both groups can amply support the needs of their large-members, who are small in number and generous in their contributions, political legitimacy in the multi-party system rests on the inclusion of large numbers of small-members, who generally require more resources than they are able to contribute. Donor assistance is valued for these organizational needs; but the consequent conditions that come with such assistance are not always appreciated, most especially by large-members.

Policy Lobbying Effects

Finally, we showed that prior institutional history also has an effect on policy lobbying efforts, both through the intermediary of organizational sustainability, and through its implications for experience in interactions with the state. Thus, groups like the

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), the Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) are poised to take advantage of policy influence openings with sophisticated policy responses, because they have considerable levels of organizational capacity, and possess the combination of resources-matched-to-needs that results in organizational sustainability. And, groups like ZACCI might be better than groups like the ZCTU and ZCF at lobbying government in a plural environment, because the Association has no prior experience with close corporatist ties to the state (and as a consequence, no vast, hierarchically layered structures to support and maintain); in other words, formerly quasi-pluralist groups don't have to "unlearn" previously developed policy strategies and influence expectations.

8.3 Concluding Remarks

For the interest group system in Zambia's Third Republic, the general prospects for the further development of a pluralist interest group system have dimmed since the early years of the transition. Though many of the formal institutional arrangements which buttress pluralist rule remain in place, continuing neopatrimonial practices limit the extent to which pluralist organizational efforts can be sustained. However, within this broad picture, important distinctions do exist; this study has shown that some groups are adapting more successfully and adopting more pluralist-like maintenance and influence strategies than other groups. Overall, the effect of the dual reform process on interest group activity is variable; this study has identified several important factors which help to explain this variation, among which are prior institutional history, particular effects of economic reform policies, and continuing neopatrimonial practices.

Perhaps most importantly, this study demonstrates that the interest group system emerging in Zambia's Third Republic is complex; as the corporatist system which developed during the Second Republic deviated from the theoretical ideal, so does the pluralist system which was adopted in the Third Republic. The Zambian case shows that even groups within a single system can experience different institutional relationships with the state, as well as different membership incentives and different organizational and influence strategies. Further research into explaining these variations can help us to better understand the unique types of interest representation systems that are developing in Africa's new democracies.

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN ZAMBIA

Apex Groups

NAPSF	National Association of Peasant & Small-Scale Farmers
PFU	Peasant Farmers' Union
ZACCI	Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmer's Union

Local and Other Affiliated Groups *(italics indicates affiliation)*

AAWUZ	Airways and Allied Workers Union *ZCTU*
ABCEC	Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors *ZACCI*
BA	Bakers Association
BAZ	Bankers Association of Zambia *ZACCI*
BCPAZ	Beef Cattle Producer's Association of Zambia *ZNFU*
CAIAZ	Clothing and Allied Industries Association of Zambia
CEFU	Copperbelt East Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CFB	Commercial Farmers Bureau (defunct)
CiaFU	Chadiza Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CinFU	Chinsali Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CipFU	Chippata Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CisFU	Chisamba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CnCC	Chingola Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
ComFU	Choma / Kaloma Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
ConFU	Chongwe River Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
CpCC	Chipata Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
CSUZ	Civil Servants Union Zambia *ZCTU*
CWFU	Copperbelt West Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
ECAZ	Environmental Conservation Assoc. *ZNFU*
FZRH	Federation of Zambia Road Hauliers *ZACCI*
GCZ	Gemstones Corporation Zambia
GUZ	Guards Union of Zambia *ZCTU*
HCWUZ	Hotel Catering Workers Union of Zambia *ZCTU*
IBDF	Indigenous Business Development Foundation
IFU	Isoka Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
KabFU	Kabompo Farmer's Union *ZNFU*

Local and Other Affiliated Groups (cont.) *(italics indicates affiliation)*

KabwFU	Kabwe Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
KaCC	Kabwe Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
KaoFU	Kaoma Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
KasFU	Kasama Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
KatFU	Katete Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
KiCC	Kitwe Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
LCC	Lusaka Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
LIAZ	Leather Industries Association of Zambia
LuaFU	Luapula Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
LunFU	Lundazi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
LWFU	Lusaka West Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MaFU	Mazabuka Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MbFU	Mbala Farmer's Union*ZNFU*
MkFU	Mkushi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MoFU	Monze / Pemba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MpiFU	Mpika Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MPNPAZ	Master Printers and Newspaper Proprietors Association of Zambia
MpoFU	Mpongwe Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MTAZ	Motor Traders Association of Zambia
MuFU	Mumbwa Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
NCC	Ndola Chamber of Commerce *ZACCI*
NcFU	Nchelenge Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
NUBEGW	National Union of Building, Engineering, and General Workers *ZCTU*
NUCIW	National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers
NUCW	National Union of Communication Workers *ZCTU*
NUPAW	National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers
NUPSW	National Union of Public Service Workers *ZCTU*
NUTAW	National Union of Transport and Allied Workers *ZCTU*
NyFU	Nyimba Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
PFU	Petauke Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
RWUZ	Railway Worker's Union of Zambia *ZCTU*
SaFU	Samfya Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
SAZ	Seed Association *ZNFU*
SCC	Solwezi Chamber of Commerce
SeFU	Serenje Farmer's Union
SIDO	Small Industries Development Organization
SoFU	Solwezi Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
SSEPL	Small Scale Enterprises Promotion Limited
SSIAZ	Small Scale Industries Association of Zambia
TAAZ	Travel Agents Association of Zambia
TAZ	Tobacco Association of Zambia *ZNFU*
TOAZ	Tour Operators Association of Zambia

Local and Other Affiliated Groups (cont.) *(italics indicates affiliation)*

TPZ	Textile Producers of Zambia *ZACCI*
UFA	Ukwimi Farmer's Association *ZNFU*
UZAWU	University of Zambia and Allied Workers Union *ZCTU*
VIS	Village Industry Service
WAZ	Wildlife Association of Zambia *ZNFU*
WEIB	Women Entrepreneurs in Industry and Business
YEAZ	Youth Entrepreneurs Association of Zambia
YFA	Young Farmer's Association *ZNFU*
ZAM	Zambia Association of Manufacturers *ZACCI*
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZCFA	Zambia Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association *ZACCI*
ZCGA	Zambia Coffee Growers' Association *ZNFU*
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZEAWU	Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union *ZCTU*
ZEF	Zambia Federation of Employers
ZEGA	Zambia Export Grower's Assoc. *ZNFU*
ZFCS	Zambia Farmer's Cooperative Society
ZFEA	Zambia Farm Employees' Assoc. *ZNFU*
ZILAWU	Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union *ZCTU*
ZLFU	Zimba / Livingstone Farmer's Union *ZNFU*
ZNCCI	Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry (defunct)
ZNPA	Zambia National Pensioner Association
ZNUHAW	Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers *ZCTU*
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers
ZNVAC	Zambia National Visual Arts Council
ZTWU	Zambia Typographical Worker's Union *ZCTU*
ZUCIW	Zambia Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers *ZCTU*
ZUFIAW	Zambia Union of Financial Instit's and Allied Workers

APPENDIX 2

METHODOLOGY NOTES

1. Interviews
2. Participant Observation
3. Organizational Survey
4. Media Survey
5. Membership Survey

1. Interviews

Over 50 loosely-structured, intensive interviews were conducted over the period October 1996 - September 1997 with leaders and staff members of interest groups, and members of government who interact with such groups. These interviews ranged from 1/2 hour to 2 hours, and covered topics such as: organizational structure, finance issues, lobbying strategies, and current policy concerns (for group representatives); formal and informal linkages between groups and government, changes in policy making institutions since the Second Republic, and desired activities for interest group sector (for government officials). Bibliography gives a list of interviews conducted.

2. Participant Observation

Data was gathered on interest group agendas and intra-organizational relationships between group leaders and principal members through participant observation at group meetings. Researcher made her official presence as an academic researcher known at these meetings. Since not all groups permitted the researcher to attend meetings, and since researcher was not available for the dates of all meetings, it was only possible to

collect data for *some* of the groups under study. Since this data is not complete, it cannot be systematically compared across groups, but the experience provided the researcher with important impressions and insights that are reflected in the study. Groups permitting access to meetings, and those not permitting access to meetings, are given below:

Permitted access to Board and Executive Meetings:	ZACCI, ZAM, CRFA, CCCI, CWFA
Permitted access to Annual General Meetings:	ZACCI, ZNFU
Invited as guest to Tripartite Council Meeting:	ZCTU
Schedule conflicts prevented invited attendance:	MUZ, NASSPF
Not permitted access to Executive and Board Meetings:	ZFE, ZCF

3. Organizational Survey

Survey Instrument

The survey questionnaire was based upon work done by Professor Jack Walker on interest group mobilization in the United States. Walker's study of organizational issues and policy influence strategies was used as a model for the Zambian study because it is insightful and sophisticated, and generates many interesting hypotheses that prove useful to test in different political and economic environments.

A modified questionnaire was developed to make the survey instrument applicable to the Zambian case; changes included soliciting information on group perspectives of the regime change in 1991, and exploring the relationship between groups and the specific governing institutions of Zambia's Third Republic. The resulting questionnaire was discussed with the economist of a leading national interest group in Zambia to determine the suitability of the questions for Zambian interest groups, but the questionnaire was not

tested on specific groups, as this would have reduced an already small pool of respondents.

The survey instrument comprised 41 questions, with 5 open-ended response questions meant to gather qualitative data on group goals, benefits, political activities, and effectiveness, and 36 predominantly close-ended response questions meant to gather quantitative data that would be comparable across groups. For the latter, questions reflected several issue areas. The first dealt with organizational issues such as meeting schedules, leadership structure, membership, and staff. Following sections dealt with benefits provided by the group, funding and financial issues, intergroup coordination / competition, policy interests, lobbying strategies, and issues of group- government interaction. As the questionnaire was distributed only to groups with leaders active at the national level, where English is the official language, it was administered in English only.

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame used for the survey was drawn from several sources. The primary source is the Registrar of Societies, a statutory body with which all social groups in Zambia must register. From the official Registry, names of groups organized around an economic interest were separated, and added to a general list. Also added to the list were the associational members of the primary apex organizations. Appendix 1 gives this final list, with apex-affiliation given in parentheses. As this final list comprises only about 100 organizations, it was decided that the questionnaire would be administered to the whole population of active, voluntary, member-based organizations, rather than to a select sample of groups. Groups which fit this description and were therefore delivered a questionnaire are marked by an asterix (reason for non-inclusion is given in italics). By

delivering and following up questionnaire completion in person, the goal was for a full response rate to be achieved. However, to date this is not the case: only a partial, self-selected subset has returned the questionnaire. The response rate to date is given below:

Type of Group	Total Delivered	Total responses	Response rate
Business	12	6	50 %
Agriculture*	41	8	20 %
Labour	22	8	36 %
Total	75	23	30

*the low response rate here is due to many of these associations being in areas far outside the capital city of Lusaka; collection of completed questionnaires was thus difficult. However, all national organizations in Lusaka did return a completed questionnaire, with the exception of the ZCTU.

4. Media Report Content Analysis: *data collection assisted by Show George Makaha*

Description

The government-owned *Times of Zambia (TOZ)* daily newpaper was comprehensively reviewed for the years 1990, 1991, and 1996, and a random sample of the daily editions were reviewed for the years 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. (The *Times of Zambia* was chosen because a quantitative review of the *Times of Zambia, the Daily Mail, and the Post* newspapers of October 1996 - April 1997 showed that the *Time of Zambia* wrote articles mentioning interest groups most frequently). This systematic review was conducted utilizing the National Archives collection of the *Times of Zambia*, which is missing several editions. For the TOZ newspapers reviewed, all articles which mentioned one of the groups under study (see Appendix 1) had the date of publication, the headline of the article, the issue addressed by the article, and any action taken by the parties involved, recorded into a primary database. This database was then used as a source for analyzing the contents of the article as to the nature of the issue

reported. Possible issues were categorized into a secondary database, which was distinct for each sector.

5. Membership Survey

The membership presents a broad-based survey of the individual members of the groups in the study. The purpose of the survey is to complete the picture of interest-groups in Zambia, by querying the individual members of the groups under study as to *their* perspectives group activity. The survey began in August with a small number of focus-group interviews to gather information for constructing an efficient and accurate survey instrument. The survey was conducted during the months of October and November, 1997.

The groups included in the survey were: Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU), Provincial Business Association (PBA), National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers (NAPSSF), Peasant Farmers' Union (PFU), Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFE), and their local affiliates.

Sampling: While each of these national level groups were able to provide lists of local branches, with the exception of the ZACCI and ZNFU, it was not possible to obtain lists of all individual members of local groups. Given the lack of an exact population size and the absence of a sampling frame, it was thus not possible to use a probability sampling method to select subjects for interviews.

Instead, the sampling method used was a heterogeneous one which attempted to use random sampling where possible, and to draw a purposive sample intended to capture geographical and social diversity where a representative sample was not possible. Sampling thus proceeded on two levels: where membership lists were available, a sample was drawn using a systematic random process. These cases were then either approached for an individual interview, or were sent a written questionnaire (in each of the cases where lists were available, it was fair to assume that the respondent was literate and could respond to such an instrument). For the other groups, the survey team traveled to major towns in all nine of Zambia's provinces, and approached the local branch of the national organization for group lists from which to randomly choose members. However, such lists were rarely available, and group leaders at the district-level often were the only source for finding members to interview for the study. Hence, for these groups, the sample is probably biased toward the more affluent and active members of such groups, and toward those who live close to urban and peri-urban centers.

Questionnaire: The survey instrument was a questionnaire administered by myself (in English) or a research assistant (in English or vernacular). In addition, as mentioned above, mail questionnaires (English version) were sent to members of groups where membership lists were available. This questionnaire was exactly the same as the administered questionnaire, with the addition of a short introductory paragraph which replicated the introduction that interviewers gave the respondents.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

Adam, Christopher. 1995. "Fiscal Adjustment, Financial Liberalization, and the Dynamics of Influence: Some Evidence from Zambia," *World Development,* 23:5.

Akashambwata Mbikusita-Lewanika and Derrick Chitala. 1990. "Proceedings of the National Conference on Multi-Party Option," Lusaka: Zambia Research Foundation.

Ake, Claude. 1991. "Rethinking African Democracy," *Journal of Democracy,* 2:1.

Allen, Chris., Michael S. Radu, Keith Somerville and Joan Baxter. 1988. *Benin, The Congo, Burkina Faso*. London, UK.: Pinter Publishers.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1958. "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review,* 52.

Almond, Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1996. "Comparative Politics Today: A World View." New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.

Apthorpe, Raymond. 1972. *Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa: an Analytical Overview*. Geneva, Switzerland.: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Ayoade, John. 1987. "States without citizens, an emerging African phenomenon," in Rothchild and Chazan, *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Westview 1988.

Azarya, Victor. 1994. "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society, and the State in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Babbie, Earl. 1990. *Survey Research Methods*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.

Bianchi, Robert. 1989. *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bianchi, Robert. 1984. *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bates, Robert. 1999. "The Economic Bases of Democratization," in Richard Joseph, ed, *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bates, Robert. 1990a. "Macropolitical Economy in the field of Development," in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds), *Perspective on Positive Political Economy.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bates, Robert H. 1990b. "The Political Framework for Agricultural Policy Decisions." In Carl Eicher and John Staatz, eds. *Agricultural Development in the Third World,* 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 154-159.

Bates, Robert. 1988. "Governments and agricultural markets in Africa," in Robert Bates (ed.) *Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bates, Robert H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bates, Robert H. 1976. *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bates, Robert H. 1971. *Unions, Parties, and Political Development: A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia.* New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

Bates, Robert and Paul Collier. 1993. "The politics and economic of policy reform in Zambia," in Robert Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.) *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform.* Oxford and Cambridge: Basil and Blackwell.

Bates, Robert H., and Michael F. Lofchie. 1980. *Agricultural Development in Africa: Issues of Public Policy.* New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly.* New York: Longman Publishing.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1986. "Civil Society in Africa," in Patrick Chabal, ed., *Political Domination In Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Becker, Charles M., Andrew M. Hammer, and Andrew R. Morrison. *Beyond Urban Bias in Africa: Urbanization in an Era of Structural Adjustment.* Portsmouth, NH.: Heinemann, 1994.

Brenner, Robert. 1977. "The Origins of Capitalist Development," *New Left Review.*

Burdette, Marcia M. 1988. *Zambia: Between Two Worlds.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bentley, Arthur. 1908. *The Process of Government.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berger, Suzanne, ed. 1981. *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics*. New York : Cambridge University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy. 1992. "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," *Comparative Politics.* April:273-291.

Bermeo, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking Regime Change," *Comparative Politics*, 22/4.

Berry, Jeffrey M. 1984. *The Interest Group Society.* Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company.

Beveridge, Andrew and Anthony Oberschall. 1979. *African Businessmen and Development in Zambia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bratton, Michael. 1994a. "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (eds). *Civil Society and the State in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.

Bratton, Michael. 1994b. "Micro-Democracy? The Merger of Farmer Unions in Zimbabwe." *African Studies Review,* 37/1.

Bratton, Michael. 1992. "Zambia starts over," *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 3:2.

Bratton, Michael. 1989. "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics*, 41/3.

Bratton, Michael and Philip Alderfer and Neo Simutanyi. 1997. "Political Participation in Zambia, 1991-1996: Trends, Determinants and USAID program implications." *Zambia Democratic Governance Project* Special Study No. 5. East Lansing, Michigan State University.

Bratton, Michael and Beatrice Liatto-Katundu. 1994. "Political Culture in Zambia, a Pilot Survey." *MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa.* East Lansing, MI, Michigan State University.

Bratton, Michael and Daniel Posner. 1998. "A first look at second elections in Africa with illustration from Zambia" in Richard Joseph (ed.) *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Press.

Bratton, Michael and Nicoloas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1994. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. *World Politics,* 46/4.

Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1992a. "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics,* 46/4.

Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1992b. "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Response," in *Governance and Politics in Africa,* edited by Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.

Browne, William P. 1990. "Organizational Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain." *Journal of Politics,* 52/2.

Callaghy, Thomas. 1990. "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana," in Joan Nelson, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Callaghy, Thomas. 1984. *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Cattell, Raymond. 1955. "Concepts and Methods in the Measurement of Group Syntality," in A. Paul Hare, Edgard F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (eds.), *Small Groups*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Cawson, Alan, ed. 1985. *Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism*. London, UK.: SAGE Publications.

Patrick Chabal. 1986. *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chanda, Derrick. 1992. *Democracy in Zambia: Key Speeches of President Chiluba.* Associated Printers Ltd., Lusaka.

Chazan, Naomi. 1994. "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Migdal et al, *State Power and Social Forces.* Cambridge University Press. "Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures and Democracy," in Governance and Politics 1994...

Chazan, Naomi. 1992. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa.* Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers.

Chazan, Naomi, and Donald Rothchild. 1989. "Corporatism and Political Transactions: Some Ruminations on the Ghanaian Experience," in Julius Nyang'oro and Timothy Shaw, *Corporatism in Africa.*

Clapham, Christopher. 1985. *Private Patronage and Public Power.* London: Frances Pinter.

Dahl, Robert. 1992. "The Problem of Civic Competence." *Journal of Democracy,* 3/4.

Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.* New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1966. *Democracy in America,* edited by J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner. New York: Harper.

Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 1994. "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy,* 5/3.

Diamond, Larry. ed., 1993. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry. 1992. "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 35.

Diamond, Larry., Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. (eds). 1988. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 1994. *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy.* Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 1993. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited.* Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dunn, J. 1986. "The Politics of Representation and Good Government in Post-Colonial Africa," in Patrick Chabal, *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ehrmann, Henry W. (ed). *Interest Groups on Four Continents.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958.

Eisenstadt, Samuel N. 1972. *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism.* London: Sage Publishers.

Fatton, Robert Jr., *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

Gershenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gertzel, Cherry, Carolyn Baylies, and Morris Szeftel. 1984. *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Grant, Wyn. 1985. *The Political Economy of Corporatism.* London, UK.: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Grindle, Merilee S., and John W. Thomas. 1991. *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Grindle, Merilee S. (ed). 1980. *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Universty Press,.

Gulhati, Ravi. 1989. Impasse in Zambia: The Economics and Politics of Reform. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. 1994. "Associational Life, Civil Society, and Democratization in Ghana," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (eds). *Civil Society and the State in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. "Civil Society in Africa," *Journal of Democracy,* 7/2 (1996): 118-32.

Harbeson, John W., Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds). 1994. *Civil Society and the State in Africa.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Heilbrunn, John R. 1996. *Markets, Profits and Power: The Politics of Business in Benin and Togo.* Bordeaux.: Centre D'etude D'afrique Noire.

Hellen, John A. 1968. Rural Economic Development in Zambia, 1890-1964. Müünchen: Weltforum Verlag.

Herbst, Jeffrey.1993. *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Herbst, Jeffrey. 1990. *State Politics in Zimbabwe.* Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.* Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman, OK.: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hyden, Goran. 1983. *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Inkeles, Alex. ed. 1991. *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants.* New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers.

Jackson, Robert and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. *Personal Rule in Black Africa.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

Jansen, Doris J., and Andrew Rukovo. 1992. *Agriculture and the Policy Environment: Zambia and Zimbabwe: Political Dreams and Policy Nightmares.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Jansen Dodge, Doris. 1977. *Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia: History, Prospects, and Proposals for Change.* Berkeley : Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Joseph, Richard (ed). 1999. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Joseph, Richard. 1987. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kaunda, Kenneth D. 1967. *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation.* Lusaka: Government Printer.

Kester, Gerard and Ousmane Oumarou Sidibe, eds., 1997. *Trade Unions and Sustainable Democracy in Africa.* Aldershot, UK.: Ashgate Publishing Company.

King, Gary., Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Kitscheldt, M. 1989. *Reinventing the Party: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West-Germany.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

James Kurth, 1979, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle," *International Organization* 33 (Winter 1979);

Lewis, Peter (ed). 1998. *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.

Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy,* 1/4.

Lipset, Seymour M., T. Trow and J.S. Coleman. 1956. *Union Democracy.* Glencoe: Free Press.

Lombard, C. Stephen. *The Growth of Cooperatives in Zambia, 1914-71.* Zambian Papers No. 6., Institute for African Studies, Lusaka.

Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. *The End of Liberalism,* 2d ed. New York: Norton.

MacIver, Robert M. 1932. "Interests," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* New York, MacMillan Publishers.

MacKenzie, W.J.M. 1955. "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," *Political Studies,* III:247.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America.* Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott., Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds). 1992. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective.* Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Malloy, James M. 1977. "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press,.

Mann, M. 1973. *Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class.* New York: Macmillan.

Marks, Gary and Larry Diamond. 1992. *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset.* Newbury Park, CA.: Sage Publications Ltd.

Martin, R. 1989. *Trade Unionism: Purposes and Form.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Michels, R. 1959 (first published in German in 1911). *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.* New York: Dover.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.* Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue. 1994. *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World.* Cambridge, UK.: The Cambridge University Press.

Moe, Terry. 1994. "Integrating Politics and Organizations: Positive Theory and Public Administration," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 4:17-25.

Moe, Terry. 1980. *The Organization of Interests.* Chicago University Press.

Mulford, David C. 1967. *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964.* Oxford, UK.: Oxford University Press.

Mwanakatwe, John M. 1994. *End of Kaunda Era.* Lusaka, Zambia: Multimedia Publications.

Nelson, Joan M. (ed). 1990. *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Nelson, Joan M. and Stephanie J. Eglinton. 1993. *Global Goals, Contentious Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality.* Washington DC.: Overseas Development Council.

North, Douglas. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nyang'oro, Julius E., and Timothy M. Shaw, (eds). 1989. *Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice.* Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.* Baltimore, MD.: The John Hopkins University Press.

Ollawa, Patrick E. 1979. *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development.* Elms Court, UK.: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd.

Olsen, Marvin E. 1982. *Participatory Pluralism: Political Participation and Influence in the United States and Sweden.* Chicago, IL.: Nelson-Hall Inc.

Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations.* New Haven, Yale University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Osaghae, Eghosa (ed). 1994. *Between State and Civil Society in Africa: Perspectives on Development.* Senegal: Codesria.

Ozlak, Oscar. 1984. "Public Politics and Political Regimes in Latin America, " *Working Papers of the Latin American Program,* 139. Washington D.C.: Wilson Center.

Paige, Jeffrey. 1975. *Agrarian Revolution.* New York: Free Press.

Parsons, Talcott, and Robert F. Bales. 1955. *Family.* Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.

Pateman, C. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perez-Diaz, Victor M. 1993. *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Powdermaker, Hortense. 1962. *Copper Town: Changing Africa.* New York, NY.: Harper & Row, Publishers.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Rakner, Lise. 1992. *Trade Unions in Processes of Democratization: A Study of Party Labor Relations in Zambia.* Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Remmer, Karen. 1989. "Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1987." *Comparative Politics* 21/2.

Rimanelli, Marco (ed). 1999. *Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-Party-Dominant Countries.* New York, NY.: St. Martin's Press.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ronen, Dov (ed). 1986. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa.* Boulder CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Rothchild, Donald and Naomi Chazan. 1988. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Rothchild, Donald and Robert L. Curry, Jr. 1978. *Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa.* Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich., Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy.* Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press.

Sandbrook, Richard. 1993. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandbrook, Richard. 1986. *The Politics of African Economic Stagnation.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, Andreas., Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies.* Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds), *The New Corporatism,* Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1971. *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Shafer, D. Michael. 1994. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sklar, Richard. 1982. "Democracy in Africa," in R.C. Macridis and B.E. Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics Notes and Readings* (Sixth Edition). Chicago: The Dorsey Press.

Sklar, Richard. 1975. *Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Somjee, A.H. 1984. *Political Society in Developing Countries.* London, UK.: Macmillan Press.

Stepan, Alfred. 1978. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective.* Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Theobold, Robin. 1982. "Patrimonialism," *World Politics,* 34.

Tordoff, William. 1984. *Government and Politics in Africa.* Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press.

Tordoff, William. 1980. *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tordoff, William. 1974. *Politics in Zambia.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tripp, Aili Mari. 2000. *Women & Politics.* Madison, WI.: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

van de Walle, Nicolas, and Dennis Chiwele. 1994a. "Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia." Zambia Democratic Governance Project: Monitoring and Evaluation Studies.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 1994b. "Economic Reform and the Consolidation of Democratic Rule: Three African Case Studies," (paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 annual meeting s of the American Political Science Association, New York, April 1994).

Walker, Jr., Jack L. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements.* Ann Arbor, MI.: The University of Michigan Press.

Widner, Jennifer A. (ed). 1994. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Widner, Jennifer A. 1992. "Constructing a Civil Society: Farmers and Political Life in Cote D'Ivoire." Paper presented at a conference on Civil Society in Africa, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Wiseman, John. 1990. *Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival.* New York: Paragon House.

Yin, Robert K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Young, Crawford. 1996. "Africa: an Interim Balance Sheet." *Journal of Democracy,* 7/3 (July): 53-68.

Young, Crawford. 1994. "Democratization in Africa: The Contradictions of a Political Imperative." In Widner (ed.), *Economic Change.*

Young, Crawford. 1976. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism.* Madison, WI.: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Zolberg, Aristide. 1966. *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa.* Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Theses and Other Unpublished Manuscripts

Alderfer, Philip. 1997. *Institutional Development in a New Democracy: The Zambian National Assembly, 1964 to 1996.* PhD Dissertation thesis, Michigan State University.

Bergen, Geoffrey. 1994. *Unions in Senegal: A Perspective on National Development in Africa.* University of California, Los Angeles.

Davis, John. 1999. *A Single Finger Cannot Life a Stone: Local Organizations and Democracy in Mali.* PhD Dissertation thesis, Michigan State University.

Nordlund, Per, 1996. *Organizing the Political Agora. Domination and Democratization in Zambia and Zimbabwe.* PhD Dissertation thesis, University of Uppsala.

Rakner, Lise. 1998. *Reform as a matter of political survival: Political and economic liberalization in Zambia 1991-1996.* PhD Dissertation Thesis. University of Bergen, Norway.

Printed Primary Sources

Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ)

1. Cabinet Office, Policy analysis and Coordination Division. 1996. "Cabinet Handbook, Fifth Edition," Unpublished manuscript.

2. Cabinet Office, Policy Analysis and Coordination Division. 1995. "Record of the Proceedings of the Induction Workshop for Cabinet Liaison Officers," paper present at the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA).

3. Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry. 1994. Industrial, Commercial and Trade Policy." IN-house publication.

4. Ministry of Finance. 1997. "Budget Address, by the Hon. R.D.S. Penza," Government Printer, Lusaka.

5. Ministry of Finance. 1996. "Budget Address, by the Hon. R.D.S. Penza," Government Printer, Lusaka.

6. Ministry of Finance. 1995. "Budget Address, by the Hon. R.D.S. Penza," Government Printer, Lusaka.

7. Ministry of Finance, Budget Section. 1992. "Tax Policy Task force, Final Report presented to the Minister of Finance, Hon. E.G. Kasonde," in-house pulbication.

Laws of Zambia

1. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1971, Lusaka: Government Printers.

2. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1990, Lusaka: Government Printers.

3. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1993, Lusaka: Government Printers.

4. Chapter 517, Industrial Relations Act of 1997 (draft bill).

5. Chapter 689, Cooperative Act of 1971, Lusaka: Government Printers.

6. Chapter 105, Societies Act, Lusaka: Government Printers.

7. Chapter 1, Constitution of Zambia, 1991, Part III, Protection of the Rights of the Indivdual. Lusaka: Government Printers.

National Association of Small-scale and Peasant Farmers

1. Haachiindah, Jones. "Paper on History Role and Current Performance of the Association in Zambia," paper presented at Workshop for Smallholder Farmers' Unions, Malawi, March 25, 1997.

2. "Memorandum to Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture, Land and Cooperatives: The Credit Policy of the Association."

3. "Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting held at the INDECO Boardroom," February 15, 1997.

Mineworkers Union of Zambia

1. "Union's View on Management Privatizaiton Brief No. 1." 1996. In-house report provided by MUZ.

2. "1996 Bi-Ennial Conference, Livingstone: Adopted Policy Resolutions."

3. Constitution of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia.

Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry

1. "Five Year Business Plan, 1996-2000," in -house report prepared January 1996.

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions

1. Report to the Secretary General to the 9th Quadrennial Congress." 1994. October.

2. "ZCTU Split: What Happened?", document provided by ZCTU.

3. "Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Structure." 1983. Department of Organization and International Affairs.

Zambia Cooperative Federation

1. Kajimanga, Charles. "The Cooperative Law," paper presented to ZCF Limited In-House Workshop, 15/10/96.

2. Nakaponda-Sakala, Bethel. 1996. "Historical and Current Perspectives of Cooperatives in Zambia." paper presented at the In-House Workshop on "Cooperative Organization and Management," Lusaka, October.

3. Zambia Cooperative Federation. 1997. "A Project Proposal for a Workshop for Parliamentarians in Zambia," paper drafted January.

4. "Co Op News: A Commitment to Development." Bi-monthly publication of the ZCF Development Services Division. Issue No. 3, July/August 1995 – issue No. 8, November / December 1996 (publication ceased at this date, due to closure of the Development Services Division.

5. "Resolutions, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Sixth National Cooperative Convention held at Mulungushi International Conference Center, 1st to 3rd August 1995."

6. "6th National Cooperative Convention: The Chairman's Welcoming Speech," 1995.

7. Lungu. "Cooperatives in Liberalised Market Economy," paper provided by ZCF.

Zambia National Farmers' Union

1. Reports to Congress," report presented at 92nd Annual Congress of the National Farmers Union, held 24 April 1997.

Periodicals

Financial Mail (weekly newspaper: Lusaka)
Zambia Daily Mail (daily newspaper: Lusaka)
National Mirror (weekly newspaper: Lusaka)
The Post (daily newspaper)
Profit Magazine (Lusaka)
Times of Zambia (daily newspaper: Lusaka)
The Zambian Farmer (monthly magazine)
ZACCI Businessline (Lusaka)

Interviews

Date	*Name*
25 October 1996	Mr. Theo Bull, Member of ZACCI Executive Board
25 October 1996	Mr. Moses Simemba, ZACCI Chief Economist; also 12/23/96
4 November 1996	Mr. S. Mark O'Donnell, Chairman, ZAM
12 November 1996	Ms. Catherine Hill, (HIID) Advisor at Ministry of Finance
12 November 1996	Mr. Mulenga, Dir. Organization and Foreign Relations, ZCTU
15 November 1996	Mr. Thomas Beckett, M Farms, Choma, ZNFU
18 December 1996	Mr. Wotela, Assistant Director, ZNFU
19 December 1996	Mr. Mukela Mutukwa, Economist, Zambia Farmer Cooperative
7 January 1997	Mr. Lungu, Assistant Managing Director, ZCF
9 January 1997	Ms. Bethel Nakaponda-Sakala, Development Services, ZCF
9 January 1997	Mr. Geoffrey Shipolyonga, Assistant Developmnt Services, ZCF
10 January 1997	Mr. C. Kajimanga, Former Legal Counsel for ZCF
16 January 1997	Mr. Tom Kamwendo, Executive Board, KCCI; also 2/13/97
30 January 1997	Mr. Charles Muchimba, Dir. of Research, MUZ; also 4/14/97
3 February 1997	Mr. Alex Chirwa, General Secretary, ZCTU; also 4/14/97
13 February 1997	Mr. George Gray, Executive Director, ZNFU; also 3/26/97
14 February 1997	Mr. D.S. Nyambe, Deputy Labour Commissioner, MOLSS
13 March 1997	Mr. Gideon Phiri, Executive Director, ZACCI; also 9/5/97
18 March 1997	Ms. J.B. Noonde, Deputy Executive Director, ZFE
21 March 1997	Mr. Hang'andu, Legal Advisor, ZCTU; also 4/16/97
15 April 1997	Mr. Austin Muneko, Research Economist, ZCTU
15 April 1997	Mr. Mike Purslow, Vice President, ZAM
30 April 1997	Ms. Margaret, ZNUT
16 June 1997	Ms. Bridget Chilala, Dep. Dir, Dept. Trade and Industry, MCTI
19 June 1997	Ms. Jane Haboongo, Dep. Dir. of Planning and Industry, MCTI
19 June1997	Dr. Hantuba, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries
20 June 1997	Mr. Chresta Kaluba, Perm. Sec., Policy Analysis, Cabinet Office
23 June 1997	Mr. Musepa, Donor Coordinator, MAFF
24 June 1997	Mr. Max Sichula, Director, Human Resources Development
29 June 1997	Mr. Kayeka, President, PFU
30 June 1997	Mr. Charles Zandala, President, NASSPF
30 June 1997	Mr. Jones Haachiinda, General Secretary, NASSPF
21 July 1997	Mrs. Judith Gonde, Secretary, Central Provincial Business

24 July 1997	Mr. Godfrey Mulubwa, Vice Chairman, Luapula PBA
24 July 1997	Mr. Frank Chola, Secretary, Luapula PBA
5 August 1997	Mr. Zyambo, National Coordinator, ZNFU
12 August 1997	Mr. Mutuna, Secretary, Law Association of Zambia
12 August 1997	Mr. Wakumelo. Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
29 August 1997	Ms. Esther Maane, ZCF

Meetings Attended

Date	*Meeting*
September 1996	Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) Annual General Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka
October 1996	ZACCI Executive Board Meeting, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka (also November 1996, December 1996, 16 January 1997, 13 February 1997, 10 March 1997, 10 April 1997, 15 May 1997, 12 June 1997, 17 July 1997, 14 August 1997, 11 September 1997)
	ZACCI Dialogue Meeting with Ministers of Parliament, Pamodzi Hotel, Lusaka
7 February 1997	Tripartite Council Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center, Lusaka
28 February 1997	Chongwe River Farmers' Association Board Meeting, Agriculture Commercial Society, Showgrounds, Lusaka
16 April 1997	Chingola Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Executive Board Meeting, RAOF Clubhouse, Chingola
18 April 1997	Copperbelt West Farmers' Association, Monthly Meeting, Border Farmers' Society, Kitwe
24 April 1997	Zambia National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) Annual General Meeting, Mulungushi Conference Center, Lusaka
16 August 1997	Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM), Executive Board Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Lusaka

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
3 1293 02125 9050