,1. LIBRARY _ Ea‘iichigan stag:- University w This is to certify that the dissertation entitled MICHIGAN IRON ORE MINING SAFETY: POLICIES AND FATALITIES, 1880-1979 presented by Anne Elizabeth Wilson has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph .1) . degreein Wevelopment WW (/1 ajor professor Date—July 16. 2001 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE .1 v i 11?} M 9197‘ ’ 6/01 c:/ClFiC/DateDuo.p65-p. 15 MICHIGAN IRON ORE MINING SAFETY; POLICIES AND FATALITIES, 1880-1979 By Anne Elizabeth Wilson A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Resource Development 2001 ABSTRACT MICHIGAN IRON ORE MINING SAFETY; POLICIES AND FATALITIES, 1880-1979 By Anne Elizabeth Wilson The mining of Michigan iron ore was one of the industries essential to the transformation of America from an agricultural to an industrial nation. The iron ore mines of Michigan’s Marquette Iron Range were uniquely important during the early period of industrialization because they provided an ore with the proper composition to produce the strongest steel possible at the time. Although greatly enhancing America’s growing industrial prowess, this ore was produced at a very high social cost—the lives of hundreds of mine workers. The underground era of mining, from 1880 to 1979, on the Marquette Iron Range claimed 957 lives. And in the late 19‘h and early 20'h centuries the fatality rate (deaths per 1,000 employed) in the mines was one of the highest in the industrialized World. After 1920, however, the underground fatality rate dropped suddenly, finally approaching that which industrialized European countries had achieved by the mid- 1800s. To assess the social cost of underground mining on the Marquette Range, the causes of fatal mining injuries were first determined. The factors that decreased the fatality rate were then examined. A steady decline in fatality rate is attributable to the gradual improvement in mining skill and ability to speak English of the largely immigrant workforce, advances in technology, and changes in the contract mining system and mining methods. However, the sudden drop in fatality rate seen in the 19205 results from managerial response to stimuli for change that developed outside of the mining district itself: Management felt the necessity to combat strikes and unionism, anti-trust legislation, changes in the employer’s liability system and the introduction of Workmen’s Compensation legislation, and intense public scrutiny promoted by popular journalism. These movements and policies forced employers to improve working conditions by promoting safety and thus decreasing the number of fatal accidents. To be successful, the methods used to achieve these goals had to be promoted by owners and managers and were the essence of what was called the Safety First Movement. The decreased death rate seen in the data and the increasingly frequent references to the Safety Movement and its role in reducing the fatality rate found in the Lake Superior Mining Institute Proceedings are evidence of its introduction and success on the Marquette Iron Range. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of Resource DeveIOpment of Michigan State University for the opportunities and considerations extended to me throughout my doctoral studies. I would also like to express my gratitude to the members of my graduate committee: Dr. Peter Kakela (Chair), Dr. Paul Nickel, Dr. Tony Bauer, and Dr. John Bartholic for their patience and guidance. Also, a special thank you is extended to Ms. Linda Panian of the John M. Longyear Research Library, Marquette, Michigan, for her invaluable assistance in acquiring the data for this study. Lastly, a note of thanks is extended to my friends: Mr. Milt Gere of the Michigan Geological Survey for providing many valuable contacts in my quest for data. Dr. Susan McFall, my veterinarian, and her staff, for the peace of mind needed to complete this dissertation provided by their special care of my cats, especially Smokey. Mr. Rick DeGroot for his helpful and timely computer assistance. Dr. James Trow (MSU Department of Geology, retired) who I now realize, after a period of eleven years, was correct in what he told me. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ......................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES .......................................... ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Background of the Research ................................ 1 The Social Cost of American Industrialization .................... 4 The Social Cost of Iron Ore Mining ........................... 5 Comparison of Related Industries ............................ 7 Objectives of the Research ................................. 9 Significance of the Research ............................... 11 CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY Source of the Data ..................................... 13 14 Presentation and Analysis of the Data ........................ CHAPTER 3 HISTORY OF THE USE AND MANUFACTURE OF IRON AND STEEL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MINING INDUSTRY Introduction ........................................ 18 Iron: The Essential Metal ................................ 18 History of the Use and Manufacture of Iron .................... 20 History of the Use and Manufacture of Steel .................... 25 The Bessemer Process .............................. 26 The Significance of Michigan Iron Ore in the Steel Making Process ................................... 28 The Significance of Other Steel Manufacturing Processes to the Michigan Iron Ore Industry ................................. 30 Evaluation of Mining as a Critical Industry ..................... 32 The Social Benefits and Costs of Mining ....................... 34 CHAPTER 4 DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE Overview of the Region ................................. 37 Discovery of Iron Ore on the Marquette Iron Range ............... 40 Initial Development of the Iron Ore Deposits .................... 41 Mining on the Marquette Range: Overcoming Adversity ............ 43 The Fledgling Industry .................................. 49 The Effects of the Civil War on the Mining Industry ............... 50 The Effects of the Panic of 1873 ............................ 52 The Post-Panic Years ................................... 53 The Effects of Competition ............................... 55 U. famous-na- L?“ The Effects of the Panic of 1893 ............................ 56 CHAPTER 5 LITERATURE REVIEW OF FATAL WORKPLACE ACCIDENT RECORDING AND REPORTING Introduction ........................................ 59 Fatality Statistics: Reporting and Recording .................... 59 CHAPTER 6 DOCUMENTING UNDERGROUND FATALITIES ON THE MARQUETT E IRON RANGE . Documentation of Pre-1888 Fatalities ......................... 66 Documentation of Post-1888 Fatalities ........................ 71 Selection of a Method for Comparison of Fatalities Over Time ........ 72 CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO AND INDICATIVE OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF FATAL MINE ACCIDENTS ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE Introduction ........................................ 83 Influence of Living and Working Conditions of Reactions to Fatal Accidents ...................................... 84 Newspaper Fatality Reporting as a Way to Assess Attitudes About Death in the Mines .................................... 91 Other Indicators of Fatality Related Concerns ................... 93 Incidence of Strikes as an Indicator of Acceptance of Mining Related Fatalities on the Marquette Iron Range ................... 97 Supporting Evidence for the Coal Mining Industry ................ 103 CHAPTER 8 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH FATALIT Y RATES ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE Introduction ........................................ 107 Examination of Factors Contributing to Fatal Accidents on the Marquette Iron Range ..................................... 107 Laxity in Mine Discipline and Lack of Managerial Control of the Mines and Mine Operation ........................... 110 The Contract Mining System .................... 110 Lack of Skilled Management ..................... 113 Push for Production .......................... 114 Demand for Labor Greater Than Supply Resulting in the Use of Inexperienced Labor .......................... 116 Absence of Laws to Provide Inspection, Train Miners and Ensure Safe Working Conditions ............... 120 The State Mine Inspector Law .................... 121 Report of the Bureau of Labor Concerning Laws and Regulations ................................ 127 Lack of Any Laws Forcing Compensation for Fatalities by the Employer ................................. 129 vi Inability of the Majority of Employees to Speak English or Understand the Orders and Direction Given them ............... 134 Carelessness or Recklessness on the Part of Many of the Men Employed ................................. 140 Technology: Old Technology that had Become Dangerous or New Technology that Provided New and Unfamiliar Dangers . . . 142 Unavoidable “Acts of God” or Accidents that Cannot be Prevented in Any Way ................................. 149 CHAPTER 9 THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL EVENTS ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE FATALITIES: STIMULI FOR CHANGE Introduction ........................................ 152 The Role of Economics of the Iron Ore Industry ................. 153 The Effect of Strikes ................................... 155 The Role of National Politics and Legislation ................... 158 The Role of the Legal System .............................. 160 CHAPTER 10 THE SAFETY FIRST MOVEMENT ON THE MARQUET TE IRON RANGE Introduction ........................................ 166 Origins of the Safety First Movement ......................... 167 Literature Analysis of Articles Pertaining to Safety in the LSMI Proceedings ................................ 169 Necessity of Management Involvement in Fatal Accident Reduction ..... 179 Necessity of Worker Involvement in Fatal Accident Reduction ........ 184 CHAPTER 11 ANALYSIS OF THE FATALITY DATA Introduction ........................................ 187 1889 to 1919 Inclusive: The Era of High Fatality Rates ............. 188 1920 to 1959 Inclusive: Accounting for the Substantial Decrease in Fatality Rate .................................... 194 1961 to 1979 Inclusive: Significance of Five Final Fatalities on the Marquette Iron Range .............................. 204 Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study .............. 206 APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL QUOTATIONS ....................... 212 LITERATURE CITED ....................................... 218 vii Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure 9. Figure 10. Figure 11. LIST OF FIGURES Regional Map of the Lake Superior Iron Ore District and Selected Ports. Number of Deaths per Year in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1880-1979. Fatality Rate (Fatalities per 1,000 Employed) per Year in the Underground Iron Ore Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1888-1979. Tons of Ore Mined per Fatality per Year in the Underground Iron Ore Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1880-1979. Comparison of 10-Year Average Fatality Rates Among Underground Iron Ore Miners on the Marquette Range, Trainmen, Selected Metal Miners, Workers in Selected Industries, and Coal Miners: 1890-1939. Total Number of Fatalities By Decade in Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range. Number of Underground Fatalities vs. Production of Iron Ore on the Marquette Iron Range: 1880-1979. Number of Articles Pertaining to Safety, Fatal Accidents, or Fatal Accident Reduction Found in Proceedings of the Lake Superior Mining Institute (LSMI): 1893-1939. Average Employment By Decade and Total Number of Deaths in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1890-1979. Approximate Linear Relationship Between Employment and the Number of Deaths in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1890-1979. Average Employment and Average Death Rate per Decade in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1890-1979. viii Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. Table 9. Table 10. Table 11. Table 12. Table 13. LIST OF TABLES Fatality Data for Selected European Metal Ore Mining Districts. Average Death Rate (Deaths per 1,000 Employed) per Decade in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range. Average Fatality Rates per Decade in Michigan Copper Mines, Marquette Iron Range Mines, U.S. Bituminous and Anthracite Coal Mines, and for Trainmen: 1870-1930. Marquette Iron Range Data; Annual Fatalities, Employment, and Production: 1880-1979. Comparison of Annual and 10-year Average Fatality Rates Among Underground Iron Ore Miners on the Marquette Range, Trainmen, Selected Metal Miners, Workers in Selected Industries, and Coal Miners: 1890-1939. Percent of Foreign-Born Male Employees in Each Specified Occupation Before Coming to the United States, by Nationality (191 1). Proportion of Various Nationalities Employed in 1898 and 1909 in a Representative Mining Company on the Marquette Iron Range. Percent of Male Employees in Michigan Iron Ore Mines Who Read and Write, by Nationality. Proportion of Foreign-Born Male Employees of Non—English Speaking Nationalities Who Were Able to Speak English. Causes of Fatalities, by Decade, in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range: 1880-1979. Ranking of Mine Production vs. Number of Fatal Accidents in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range, by Decade: 1879- 1919. Fatalities by Age and Nationality in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range, by Decade: 1880-1979. Percent of Foreign-Born Male Employees Who Speak English by Years in the United States and Nationality. ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Background of the Research This study attempts to estimate a portion of the social cost associated with industrial progress in the United States. A significant portion of this social cost can be attributed to the mining industry. Mining was the basic industry that provided the metal ores and fuels necessary for the technological progress and rapid industrialization which occurred in America in the late 19‘h and early 20‘h centuries. And in mining, America led the way in workplace deaths. Located in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, were valuable deposits of iron ore: The mining of these ores claimed the lives of hundreds of mine workers. In the 100 years of ore production on the Marquette Iron Range studied here, 957 underground mine workers died providing a total of 309,423,209 tons of ore.1 This gives an average production of 323,326 tons/ fatality. Before 1920, when a remarkable decrease in fatality rate is seen, 818 fatalities occurred in the production of 109,921,399 tons of ore, an average rate of 134,387 tons per fatality. After 1920, 199,501,810 tons of ore were produced with 139 fatal accidents, an average of 1,435,265 tons per fatality. Although there were three locations in Michigan where iron ore was mined (termed Iron Ranges) this research was limited to the Marquette Iron Range for two 1The production and shipment of iron ore is measured in long tons (It) = 2,240 lbs. However, historically. the sources of data refer to the amounts of ore produced and shipped simply as tons. This convention will be followed in reporting production and shipment data for this research. The data should, however, be considered to represent long tons. 0.. (u an - Z<._ 0:2 mw3OJ. 113?“? 1y ‘i‘ L DES. zO wyvd . M @ z_mz...m_>> L 053% 20 «in A . ."nVI'Z'." *4‘1‘3‘}. «3.3.99 31'“ Z<0.IU_$_ 1.3!...53 a?! HE, b- : III! 1— a a 255 .1 9:0 33 one cog oma ova 0.6.2 ONE 2 3 83 cam— omfi mr—LEPC L?.LF_LELP_LP__L_~L~_p._l_hb_1_hbl__~_bb.r[FF__h[1P [P.l.1~.»b.L..l—L . a; :57 < . {Ln 2 on 1mm a ,4 a on mm ow mv .33 .. .53 "ow-:5 =9: 8.25.32 of .8 852 engage—ED 2: E 53> ..2. ufiaoa no REE—.2 .N 9:.th ow SHLV'SKI 80 can; owe one 83 3% ova ommfi omfl 33 com" oawfi 83 L L _ _ o 3% . 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It will explain why men were willing to live in a primitive, isolated area and work in mines that were admittedly dangerous. It will also explain why little attention was given to the fatal accidents that occurred in the early mining days. Attitudes toward life and death are difficult to assess more than 100 years after the fact and conclusions drawn are necessarily interpretive. The best documentation remains quotes from individuals involved. This chapter relies on quotes from the following sources; the mine workers themselves, which are few; the local newspaper, the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore should serve as a window into the thoughts and lives of pe0ple in the area. However, as will be show, the paper was influenced at least to some degree by the rrrining industry; the Proceedings of the LSMI, a professional meeting of mining men from the Lake Superior region. This meeting was attended by all levels of management from presidents of companies through managers to foremen. As such, the proceedings from the Institute provide a good window into the thoughts of 83 these men as they presented their concerns in a relatively private atmosphere; the Bureau of Labor, a state organization concerned with employees and conditions of employment in industries throughout the state. Influence of Living and Working Conditions on Reactions to Fatal Accidents Histories of mining communities throughout the United States generally include a discussion of the large number of foreign-born who came to work in the mines. In such places as Butte, Montana; Cherry Creek, Colorado; and Silver City, Nevada, the foreign-born comprised from one-third to one-half of the total population. The Marquette Iron Range was unique in that immigrants made up an even larger percentage of the population. According to the Census of 1870, 71% of the population of Ishpeming township was foreign-born, with smaller proportions found in the other townships: Chocolay (63%), Negaunee (55%) and Marquette (53%) (Alanen, 1991, p. 5). By 1909 the population consisted of 47.2% foreign-born and 40.5 % native-born of foreign parents (Moulton, 1909, p. 86). By the end of the 19‘h and into the early 20‘h centuries, the Marquette Range iron mining companies had employed thousands of immigrants in dirty and dangerous jobs. Although tremendous advantage was taken of their labor, the men and their families were seemingly content. Why was this true? In the 19‘h century, little working-class consciousness existed in communities subdivided into various ethnic elements. Since the 18405 the country had counted on immigrants to dig canals, lay railroad tracks, build cities, fill the ranks of unskilled factory workers, and mine the metal ores essential to the growing economy. Much of the first wave of immigration came from the industrial districts of northern Europe, and 84 with them they brought skills crucial for the developing industrial economy. They served as the teachers of American labor and had a shaping influence on working-class culture and institutions. But during the latter part of the century, northern immigration was supplanted by a high number of lower—class immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. This new wave almost wholly lacked industrial skills and became the low paid, bottom ranks of workers that constituted a windfall to American industry. Neither wage rates, working conditions, nor living standards figured crucially in these immigrants’ calculations, but rather the job itself. Faced with decline into the dependent, propertyless, servant class as the village subsistence economy of their own countries was undermined, a few years of hardship seemed a cheap price to pay for savings with which they could return home. “America,” a Polish worker wrote home, “is a golden land as long as there is work, but when there is none the country is worth nothing” (Brody, 1993, p. 17). Difficult and dangerous working conditions meant little to these immigrants. Their hardships were part of the bargain. Quotes from the Iron Country affirm the unimportance of existing conditions to the immigrant. An old man related the following: I came to this country from Bulgaria in 1913, I came here with the intention to stay for a couple of years and if I made $200 I could go back there by the village. The money was different, I’d be a rich man. I started digging ditches at the mine. It was hard, I didn’t know English (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). Another echoed similar sentiments; I came to this country to get a job, to earn money. . .When I came to this country I never figured to stay. IfI had the money, I would have gone right back (Bernhardt, 1975). Asked about discontent among the immigrants, he continued; 85 No, you didn’t hear a lot of discontent about working conditions in the mines. I think these immigrants came here and maybe they didn’t find gold in the streets, but at least they had a job. The standard of living was much improved from what they had in the foreign country (Bernhardt, 1975). The living conditions for the men and their families were much better on the Marquette Range than in other mining regions. There were no smelters, as in Butte, Montana, to poison the air with thick smogs of sulfur, arsenic and other heavy metals. And although the red dust from the ore created its share of problems, the area was not dreary and blackened with coal dust and smoke as were the coal-mining towns of the east. The air was fresh and clean and the pure water of Lake Superior provided a source of fish and recreation as well as transportation. Additionally, the working population was not robbed of their hard-earned income by the company store system that existed in the eastern coal and western mining regions. A wide variety of goods and services were provided by independent merchants who were attracted to the growing area. It was not a romantic writer for a tourist agency, but the Michigan Commissioner of Mineral Statistics who wrote in his 1877-78 report: The City (Marquette) abounds in evidence of prosperity, intelligence and cultivated taste. It’s large and elegant high school building constructed of handsome brownstone from the quarries in the city, roofed with the dark blue slate from Huron Bay; it’s fine church edifices, hotels, business blocks, and private dwellings,...it’s clean, well-paved and shaded streets, the pure water drawn from the cool depths of Lake Superror; the streets and dwellings lighted with gas; the ample facilities for transportation and communication, afforded by railway, hues of steamboats, vessels and telegraph, place it among the most favored cities...(Hatcher, 1950, pp. 121-122). 86 On the Iron Range itself, Ishpeming had become the largest town in the Upper Peninsula. It was the business center for the largest mines. It had a new school building, large blocks of stores, and foundries and machine shops. It boasted the best hotel in the region and the most attractive dwellings in the mining district. The enormous demand for ore had transformed the region from one of the most remote frontiers to that of a thriving business center. Extremely important to the type of long-term mining venture unfolding was a skilled and stable workforce. This necessitated finding and keeping experienced men to work the mines. Finding them was one thing, because immigrants flocked to the area, but keeping them in the remote region was another. The companies found it both advantageous and necessary to provide amenities for the miner and his family, as well as good wages, to help offset the rigorous nature of life and work in the iron region. As the area grew, extensive paternalism developed in which the mining companies became not only landlords, building and maintaining housing, but also providers of medical care, and a variety of social and public services. The companies were noteworthy for their fairness and there was little conflict between labor and management. “There is something interesting about this mine community at the time before the union.” An old woman related, They paid small wages but they also provided you with a house, very cheap rent—for instance, our house had four rooms down and four rooms up, and was five dollars a month rent. There was a big garden around it already fenced. We paid a dollar for our lights, a dollar for the water, and a dollar for the doctor. Eight dollars a month was all it cost us for all of them. They call it paternalism now, the unions call it paternalism. But to us, we are quite satisfied with it (Bernhardt, 1975). 87 In the late 19’h century the Iron Agitator/Ore wrote proudly of the living conditions, the exceptions being encouraged to change and Charles Lawton, in The Michigan Miner, noted the good relationship between companies and men. Many pieces of evidence were found in the literature that support the claim that the men were generally satisfied with the conditions under which they lived and worked on the Marquette Range. A few examples are quoted below, and more can be found in the Appendix. Several boys are going to Leadville, they think to acquire fortunes. But, if the boys will only consider the real difference between the Leadville country and this iron center they will see a more vast opportunity for the workingman to live happier and better here (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, January 2, 1882). All houses belonging to the Humbolt Iron Company are being shingled and undergoing other repairs. It is an improvement in our appearance (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, July 29, 1882). Dust is terrible when the wind blows. . .dust don’t (sic) add to our attraction as a summer resort and it ought to be quieted in every possible way (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, June 9, 1888). When the mine whistle blows it means that our mines are in operation, our miners employed, the town prosperous. It means just what it says “business” (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, October 13, 1888). Are putting quartzite on the roads in Ishpeming. . .this will make the best roads in the area (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, October 19, 1889). A new mine hospital is planned by Cleveland Iron Mining Company and Pittsburgh-Lake Angeline Iron Company. It will be brick, heated by steam and have incandescent lights (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, November 7, 1891). At American Mine the Health Officer has given some residents 24 hours to clean up the filth around their homes and the road in front (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, July 23, 1892). 88 As a rule there is a good degree of confidence and right feeling prevailing between the employees and the employers in our Lake Superior Mines. In no other section of the country, I opine, where the laboring population so greatly predominates, is there less discontent or complaint. The miners are in a position of independence. They are reasonably sure of fair treatment and of good wages (Lawton, 1903, p. 1 1). Even though the living conditions were considered to be much better on the Marquette Range than those existing in other United States mining regions or in the countries the immigrants left, the working conditions in the mines were nevertheless dangerous and difficult. Temperatures in the mines were generally warm and men worked coated with the red iron ore dust which was particularly bad after the introduction of power drills. They also often worked soaking wet. Initially, sanitary conditions in the mines were primitive, waste from mules and men fouled the air, and rats made the mine tunnels their homes. Both the red dust and the mine sanitary conditions may have affected the health of the miners but little has been written about health effects. Typhoid fever often plagued the area and is a disease now known to be related to unsanitary conditions. However, the mines were not exceedingly hot and the importance of good ventilation was recognized very early as the mines moved underground. This was not the case in most western underground mines. In mines on the Comstock Lode, for example, underground temperatures commonly reached 105 to 110 degrees. These western mines were also plagued with large amounts of scalding hot water that would unexpectedly be released and cascade down upon the miners. Also, drilling the quartz-rich rock in many western mines resulted in rampant silicosis. In the coal mines, black lung disease reached epidemic proportions. 89 The following excerpts, in the words of the Michigan iron country miners, are given as examples of the working conditions they endured and why they stayed (see Appendix for additional quotes): Remember when they used to go up in the raises without hard hats: I used to have a powder box so it fit on top of my head and covered my ears. I’d wear that box on top of my head in case a chunk came and hit. You had to climb up this chimney way, the raise. You’d be maybe one hundred feet up on poles. Then they give you a machine to drill with. You’d balance on one plank across this chimney way and you’d balance the machine on another. The machine would be pounding and dust would be falling all over. You couldn’t breathe because it was a gas hole. Most of the time you wouldn’t even use a ladder to climb up, you’d climb up those stage poles like a monkey (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). The company wouldn’t put fathers and sons working together, because if something happen, both get killed. But if he work with somebody else, maybe I get killed, but my son is saved (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). ...the only way out was the mine shaft, which is literally a vertical hole more than two thousand feet straight up and the row of muddy and wet ladders within it for climbing. Many times, I thought of running away but, as I will repeat, the fear of running into something worse, like unemployment, kept me coming back. Besides, it didn’t do any good to dwell in morbid thoughts. In those circumstances, work was the best available antidote to depression (Etelamaki, 1998, p. 85). After drilling and blasting, then of all the problems a miner had to cope with, the worse was the lingering noxious gas created by exploding dynamite. . .When the lungs were soaked with those fumes, it was a sure fire way to bring on the mother of all headaches. There was no escaping that acrid stench. It clung to the work clothes. At times, the head pain was so severe, I could actually hear blood coursing through my carotid arteries (Etelamaki, 1998, pp. 92-93). Why didn’t I leave here? To tell the truth, I was living a little bit in fear. I couldn’t speak the language very good, I got married and had four kids. With the family, where could I go if I lost my job? I ain’t got the education. What could I start doing? I was afraid (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination) . 90 Although this is a small city (Negaunee, Michigan) here are 16 mines. . .rare is the day that someone is not hurt in my time here several men have died in the mines. I have worked in the mines for three months and I know the work and well what it is like (Penti-Vidutes, 1978, p. 26). Newspaper Fatality Reporting as a Way to Assess Attitudes About Death in the Mines Relatively good wages, living conditions and working conditions kept the miners content. They were able to accept the dangers of their job as a matter of fact as long as the other factors were satisfactory. Also, in the late 19’h and early 20’h centuries death, not only in the workplace, but everywhere was not uncommon. A few deaths more or less didn’t draw much attention. In 1891 the following deaths were reported by the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore: August l—several deaths due to pleuro-pneumonia, also whooping cough and brain fever; August 15—four infants died of summer complaint; August 29, September 5—nine more infants died; September 19—one death each from croup, typhoid, pneumonia, and a shooting; October lO—four typhoid deaths, two infants died; October 31—one man died when stepped on by a horse, one consumption, one stroke, and one typhoid, a young boy was killed by railroad cars while playing; November 7~three typhoid deaths; November 14—a sewer worker carrying bricks across the railroad tracks was killed by a train, five typhoid deaths; January 2—a ten year old was killed when run over by a team, a train accident killed two, a man died of a cut wrist while wiping glasses in a saloon. 91 In 1888 the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore published a record of deaths provided by the City Assessor (June 8, 1888). The total number of deaths was 192 and was comprised of the following: 18 men who were killed by various causes (including mining but not listed separately as a cause of death) and ranged in age from 30 to 55; 90 infants less than one year old; 12 people who died of consumption, 10 of bronchitis, one of typhoid, nine of heart disease, five of diphtheria; 21 people between the ages of 50 to 85 died of “old age”; additionally there were two suicides, one drowning, and one burned. It is easy to understand how one or two workplace deaths in the mines every now and then failed to stir much interest or concern. The deaths in the mines were simply reported without comment along with news of other fatalities. The following excerpts were found in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore in the same columns, in the same type style, with nothing to distinguish one from the other in terms of importance Many of these short notices can be found. A few are given in the test as examples, more can be found in the Appendix. An unnamed miner died of a fractured skull caused by falling rock at Saginaw Mine (January 10, 1880). Burt Vaugh, aged 18, reached for the bell rope and feel 65 feet down the shaft at Michigamme Mine. He was killed (January 31, 1880). Erick Erickson was killed by a blast at the Cleveland Mine (January 1, 1881). 35 deaths due to sunstroke in Cincinnati on Wednesday; and Wm. Snell, aged 36, was killed when crushed by a falling rock he was barring down at Jackson Mine. Careless as he disobeyed orders (July 16, 1881). A streetcar brawl in Negaunee killed one miner (April 1, 1882). The Vulcan, Norway, and other mines near Norway 0f the Cambria Iron and Steel Company will be partially closed due to the destruction of the plant by the Johnstown flood 10 day ago. (author’s note: over 2,000 people were estimated to have died in this flood) (June 8, 1889). 92 31 deaths from typhoid in Ishpeming last year (January 16, 1892). A miner was killed today, probably electrocuted. Another died in a blast; and A streetcar ran over a dog Tuesday killing the animal instantly (March 2, 1902). Although in 1883 (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, October 14, 1883) one report by the newspaper called an accident “shocking”——“Two men and two boys (16 and 14) met instant death in a “shocking accident” at the Republic Mine. . . ”—There is no indication that these Iron Range mining fatalities raised any special concerns. They, in fact, involved far fewer individuals than tragic events (both natural and man-made) that occurred in the rest of the country and throughout the world. Newspaper analysis indicates that the fatalities were no more noteworthy than reports of all the other risks associated with daily life in the late 19‘h and early 20th centuries. Other Indicators of Fatality Related Concerns In 1883 the New Jersey Bureau of Labor surveyed working people about the conditions of their lives. Many of those surveyed were engaged in dangerous and unhealthy trades—carpenters, iron miners, iron molders, machinists, glassworkers, textile workers, and batters. They complained about poverty, the power of capital, and long hours. Some worried that they would be displaced by machinery or convict labor or about the alcohol addiction of their co-workers. Many urged the need for compulsory education. Yet, except for the cigar makers who complained about tobacco dust, no one commented on the unhealthy or dangerous nature of their work (pp. 113- 115). 93 “That poor people are used to trouble is a commonplace,” (p. 225) observed Crystal Eastman in 1910, suggesting that lack of worker concern over work accidents simply reflected the realities of working-class life. Death, injury, and illness on the job were matters of fact, just as the death of a child or spouse from a host of diseases like diphtheria, typhoid, or TB that thrived under working—class living conditions. Eastman observed that most workers and their families spoke of work injuries and other misfortunes as a “matter of course” (p. 225). Work accidents were to be endured. Although from the Copper Country, the following quote validates Eastman’s observations: Seven months after our first child was born, my left arm was badly fractured at the elbow. . .From that day my forearm and hand was entirely useless and hung helplessly at my side. The question of compensation or liability was unknown. We accepted injury as an unfortunate experience and the consequent burden was personally assumed (Jarve, 1998, p. 24). An indicator, however, of the fact that the miners did feel their job was dangerous was found in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore which reported that as early as 1882 some type of accident insurance was carried by many of the men. ...killed by a fall of rock at the Spurr Mine. He had a $500 insurance policy (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, December 2, 1882). Gustaf M. Ceyllen was killed when hit in the back by falling rock at Winthrop Mine. He had a Travelers insurance policy (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, July 26, 1884). John Murphy was killed when he fell down the shaft at Champion Mine. He was insured with Travelers Insurance Company (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, November 1, 1884). Many men also paid into “miners funds or clubs” where small contributions from their weekly wages went into a fund for their widows and children in case of their 94 death or injury. The general custom was that the company collected 25 cents to 50 cents each month from each employee, to which total sum the employer (in most cases) added an equal amount. This money was distributed to injured men or to the widows of men who were killed (Mather, 1898). Stephen Sellwood died from a bad cut to his head at the Cleveland Mine. He had club insurance (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/ Ore, April 5, 1884). Miner Fred Engman was killed by a falling rock at Lake Superior Mine. . .He had a $500 Travelers Insurance policy and will receive $400 from the miners fund (Ishpeming Iron Agitator, Ore/ March 13, 1886). The men at the mine and the company also contributed to a widow in the event of a man’s death. It was agreed between the company and the men that they would work up to the afternoon of the funeral each giving $1.00 of the earnings to the widow and the company contributing a like amount. This will give the widow of each man approximately $500 (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/ Ore, October 2, 1886). Certainly the insurance companies viewed the work as dangerous. From the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/ Ore of October 2, 1886; Accident insurance companies complain of their risks in the mining regions and threaten to raise the rate of insurance. The Travelers sometime since did this and others will be forced to follow. The companies claim they have lost money in this field. In addition to the fact that death was common everywhere and death and injury were considered an unavoidable part of the miner’s occupation, another factor contributed to the apparent acceptance of the high number of fatalities in the mines. That was the fact that although the cumulative number of deaths was large, only with rare exception did the mine fatalities number more than one or two at a time. This was not true of American coal mines where more than 300 men might be killed in a single 95 accident. The result was that the people of the iron country did not view the mines to be as dangerous as those of coal nor was iron mining considered any more, and perhaps less, dangerous than railroading or a host of other occupations or natural events. Three editorials found in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/ Ore support this conclusion: While we read with sorrow the accounts of the killings, by accident of these sturdy men of our region, we can at the same time feel pleased that we are visited by no such appalling calamities as are constantly occurring in the coal mines of the east where men’s lives are sacrificed by the hundreds through gas explosions and other causes (March 20, 1886, p. 5). While there are many men killed and injured in the iron and copper mines of this district, yet the percentage is much less than shown in the coal fields of this country. Every few days the papers bring to us the news of some terrible explosion, that carried away from ten to a hundred lives. We have none of the explosive damps of the coal mines, that are a constant menace to the safety of the miner (January 10, 1891, p. 5). There seems no way of preventing these distressing casualties despite utmost caution that is observed. Mining is a dangerous avocation and accidents must be expected as long as it is kept in force. Nearly every paper brings to our gaze the story of some fatality. In the coal mines of this country and Europe hundreds are often killed at once by gas explosions. We fortunately have not to deal with that terrible enemy here. The railroads annually kill a great many men, the Great Lakes and oceans swallow up thousands every year. Cyclones and conflagrations, blizzards and floods, plagues and wars all claim their share and there seems to be no remedy (March 17, 1888). It can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 5 that while railroading was certainly more dangerous than iron mining, iron versus coal was a different story. Looking at the average fatality rates for the first decade of underground iron mining on the Marquette Range it can be seen that the fatality rate was actually higher for iron than for bituminous coal and only a little lower than that for anthracite coal. 96 Int 1hr 07. Incidence of Strikes as an Indicator of Acceptance of Mining Related Fatalities on the Marquette Iron Range The apparent acceptance of dangers associated with their jobs is also supported by the fact that initially the iron miners and, in fact, all workers did very little to improve working conditions for themselves. The US. Commissioner of Labor report on the causes of strikes by industry from 1881 through 1900 indicates that even in the most dangerous industries, safety was almost never the main motive for a strike. For example, in the coal and coke industry, the Commissioner reported 14,575 strikes attributed to more than 300 causes. Of these there were 6 strikes for better ventilation, one against an unsafe mining machine, one to enforce a state law governing timbering, and one to get a new safety catch on an elevator cage. There were also five strikes opposing the introduction of a new safety lamp and one to allow smoking in the mine during lunch (U.S. Commissioner of Labor, 1900, Table 10). Although work in the iron mines on the Marquette Range was certainly viewed as a very dangerous job, the first strikes that occurred were not over working conditions either. The first significant strike on the Marquette Iron Range occurred in 1874, before the era of underground mining began, when the iron mines felt the impact of the Panic of 1873. 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RE bdd ew.e ed; we. mod ndd dde med wod on; edfl N3. 9e 3: we. mom mam e3 3d Ed 8. 82 mwd odd Fe odd e; we.“ om. db. bed end omd moe owd nod ndd wwd ddd 34 K; edd edfi dee nee eed we. wwd mod wdd 2d _ed odd dd? *5 e. .wE e .wse e .wse e .wE e .use e. .9e es .wE e. a; e. a: d 5H ImMcU 4:4,. Rev .HE .5800 33m :NEA maize, :9: .5930 553$. GEO: IOO 932; “8.50 - . 9 - - ESE _§ml.o| 9:52 oENéwoq - .I. .I 9:52 535-200 Ill wEEE co: . . Q . - wag—2 $300+ mag: 38 assailxl wig: :80 305635 . q. - 8555 . 0302 lol 23> I a a ole % H m % paKOIdma 0001 Jed awn qmaq oBMaAV 183A ual .adfi - ca: 8.852 :30 ES $2.—BEE— ..883m 3 Eng—33 .2032 .302 nose—om .uoEEEH 633— 0323.32 2: .5 E052 9.0 E:— uuscuwuoenb ”38¢. 33% bmfiuah «manage 28> 5h 2: ..o 55.3%:ch .m «Sufi 101 In October 1890, another strike occurred which lasted two weeks. This strike was over hours (miners wanted an 8-hour day) and the desire by the miners not to work Saturday night but still receive pay for six full days. During the strike, there were objections by many men who wanted to return to work, citing their need for the job (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, 1890, October 11, p. 5). They say that they have no objection to men quitting who want to, but such men should not say to them that they must also go out thus robbing themselves and families of wages they could earn and of which they are in need (1890, October 11, p. 5). The strike ended when the men quietly returned to work. The Ishpeming Iron Agitator/ Ore commented, There certainly should be a kindly feeling between the men and their employers. . .Upon the success of the one depend the prosperity of the other. Labor and capital are partners in this mining business... (1890, October 18, p. 5). Short lived strikes at individual mines over such things as late delivery of pay or increased working hours occurred sporadically, however, on July 13, 1895, miners walked out of the Lillie and Cambria mines on the Marquette Range in protest of low wages caused by the general depression suffered by the country in 1893 (they were earning $1.80 per day and demanded $2.00). This strike quickly spread to other mines on the Marquette Range and the miners organized a union to conduct their operations. The union demands included a standard wage paid in all mines, a wage increase, and union recognition. Again, this strike, which lasted nine weeks, was not over the dangerous conditions in the mines. Working conditions were not as important an issue to the miners as wages were. Although dangerous, the conclusion that working 102 conditions were not as important as wags to miners is supported by strike histories in the eastern coal fields. Supporting Evidence From the Coal Mining Industry The same strike patterns can be recognized in the coal mining industry which has long been acknowledged as one of the most dangerous industries in the United States. Although the data (see Table 5) indicate that underground iron ore mining was at least as or more dangerous than coal mining. This similarity in danger was not recognized as such by the iron miners themselves. Coal mining has long been acknowledged as the most dangerous industry in the United States. When the United Mine Workers of America was formed in the coal fields in 1890, the main problems for the union were maintenance of membership, recognition of the union, opposition of employers, low wages, and unfair labor conditions. Safety was a peripheral concern and took a back seat to attempts to abolish company stores, the screen coal system, to obtaining checkmen, weekly paychecks, and compensation for dead work. Analyses of the disputes under contract in the Illinois and southwestern anthracite coal fields reveal that miners seldom used the formal grievance mechanism to complain of, or attempt to remedy, dangerous working conditions within the mines. The grievance system was more often used by miners to secure the reinstatement of workers dismissed for safety violations than to protest an unsafe condition. Before and after the establishment of collective bargaining in 1898 in the coal mines, the issues of strikes reflected the fundamentally economic values of the union and its membership. Safety often appeared as an auxiliary issue in a strike. In the 103 Anthracite Strike of 1902, hazardous working conditions appeared not as one of the miner demands for remedy but as justification for the miners’ call for a 20% wage increase. Safety legislation was also a cause of strikes in the coal mines. In 1909 the Technologic Branch of the US. Geological Survey, which had supervision of the federal government’s limited effort in coal mining safety, established a list of “permissible” explosives. These were explosives that were tested by the Technologic Branch and were determined to be much safer than black powder, explosions of which often killed hundreds of coal miners at a time. In the same year, opposition of Ohio miners to a piece of legislation which would have prohibited the use of black powder was based primarily on the higher cost of the substitute explosives. Miners in Pennsylvania staged a major strike when they learned that the permissible explosives chosen by the Operations would reduce earnings by shattering the coal much more than black powder did. As late as 1922, the “permissible” explosives accounted for only 18% of the explosives in use in coal mines (Graebner, 1976, p. 48). The Red Ash explosion in 1900 prompted the United Mine Worker Journal to note, “West Virginia is noted in the mining world for her insufficiency of proper laws for the insurance and protection of her miners” (Graebner, 1976, p. 73). This critical evaluation elicited a reply by West Virginia Governor G. W. Atkinson, “It is but the natural course of mining events that men should be injured and killed by accidents” (Graebner, 1976, p. 73). It can be seen from the data below that this negativism about mine safety in the coal regions was reflected in a very high number of fatalities. 104 1900—1 disaster; Winter Quarter Mine, Utah; 210 died 1906—17 disasters; 235 died 1907—1 disaster; Monongah, West Virginia; 361 died 1907—18 disasters; 918 died 1908—11 disasters;348 died 1909—19 disasters; 498 died 1910—(the year Congress created the Bureau of Mines to help make coal mining less dangerous)—-l9 disasters; 485 died (Graebner, 1976, p. 3) Although the fatality rates (deaths per thousand employed underground) were about the same for coal mining and iron mining on the Marquette Range for the 1900 to 1910 decade, it can be seen that the number killed per accident was much larger in the coal mines than in the Marquette iron mines. This is the reason that coal mining was perceived to be so dangerous relative to iron mining and it is what drew public attention to the dangers associated with mining as journalists wrote about the numerous large coal mine disasters which occurred prior to 1910. However, except for the Dawson, New Mexico, explosion in 1913 which killed 233 there were no large coal mining disasters after 1910 and pressure for reform decreased. The general public and media, inured to death as a common occurrence in the late 19th and 20‘h centuries, took no notice of the small number of mine fatalities that occurred on the Marquette Iron Range. In fact, before the Bureau of Mines was created in 1910 to investigate and help reduce coal mining accidents, earlier bills to establish a bureau or department of mines that were presented in the House and Senate did not mention mine safety—coal or metal. Their purpose was to promote and encourage mining and metallurgy, and to aid in the development of the nation’s mineral resources. 105 Even after the Bureau of mines was founded, many envisioned it as a conservation agency. The state of the nation’s natural resources was a concern of the times and occasionally, the natural resource aspect of conservation was linked to the mine safety issue. Unsafe mining techniques were attacked as wasteful of the natural resources as well as lives. Funding for the Bureau of Mines to study mine safety met many roadblocks. In 1914, Seattle attorney Maurice Leehey noted that the appropriations for the Bureau of Mines “just equaled the amount appropriated by Congress for investigations in the treatment of hog cholera...” (Graebner, 1976, p. 51). By 1914 the Bureau’s priorities in coal mining safety and health problems began to decline. World War I accentuated this relative decline in interest in coal mining safety and an increased interest in a variety of other areas; smelter smoke, the production of radium, and the manufacture of gasoline, benzol, and toluol from petroleum. Continuing indifference to coal mine safety on both the part of the government, the coal miners, and the mine owners is reflected in the continuation of high fatality rates in coal relative to iron mining in which a significant and permanent decline began in 1912. In fact, after 1920 the underground fatalities per year on the Marquette Range never reached double digits again (Barnes-Hecker omitted). But as dangerous as it was acknowledged to be, iron mining was undoubtedly viewed as the salvation of the area and of the people who came to work in the mines. Mining provided jobs and necessary income and of course iron ore for the growing economy. 106 CHAPTER 8 ANALYSIS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH FATALITY RATES IN UNDERGROUND MINES ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE Introduction In order to determine the factors involved in decreasing the social cost of iron ore mining on the Marquette Iron Range, it is first necessary to examine the fatality rates (the proxy of social cost) for the Range and explain why, initially, they were so high. Examination of the data in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 2, 3 and 6 shows that the number of known fatalities and the fatality rate increased slowly for the first three decades of underground mining. Then in 1920 a decrease of 75 % in the average number of fatalities from the previous decade is noted (a 59% decrease in fatality rate). It can be determined from Figure 6 that approximately 86% of the fatalities on the Marquette Range occurred before 1920. Examination of Factors Contributing to Fatal Accidents on the Marquette Iron Range Eight factors that were considered to be contributors to the high fatality rate were listed in the Introduction and are reiterated here: 1. Laxity in mine discipline and lack of managerial control of the miners and mine operation. 2. Demand for labor greater than supply resulting in the employment of inexperienced labor. 107 Figure 6. Total Number of Fatalities by Decade in the Underground Mines 0n the Marquette Iron Range: 1880 - 1979. E 3‘ 300 250 e: o o o o o m o m N F‘ '— acuumed Jo .laqmnN 108 6L61 ' 0L61 6961 ‘ 0961 6961 ' 0961 61761 ' 01761 6861 ' 0861 6261 ' 0361 6161 '0161 6061 ' 0061 6681 ' 0681 6881 ' 0881 Years 8. Absence of any laws forcing the companies to employ only trained miners in the responsible and dangerous occupations or to provide inspection of mines or mine equipment to ensure safe working conditions. Lack of any laws forcing compensation for fatalities by the employer. Inability of the majority of employees to speak English or understand the orders and directions given them. Carelessness or recklessness on the part of many of the men employed. Old technologies or mining methods used by a multitude of small companies or, on the other hand, new technologies that provided new and unfamiliar dangers. Unavoidable “acts of God.” The high fatality rate in the first three decades of underground mining on the Marquette Iron Range cannot be attributed to one factor alone. Many factors played a role in allowing some of the highest fatality rates in the mining industry to be achieved in the Marquette Iron Range underground mines. Although it is not possible to determine the proportional contribution of each factor to the high fatality rate, it is important to examine them so that their relative importance in lowering the fatality rate can be assessed. Logic suggests that changes in one or more of these factors were responsible for lowering the fatality rate beginning in 1912. The lower rate became even more marked beginning in 1920. 109 Laxity in Mine Discipline and Lack of Managerial Control of the Miners and Mine Operation The laxity in mine discipline and lack of managerial control of the miners and mine operation that was found during the early decades of mining stemmed from three factors; the use of the contract mining system, mine operators’ lack of knowledge of how to run a mining operation, and the push for production as demand for ore rapidly increased. The Contract Mining System The first mining on the Marquette Range was accomplished by Cornish miners who migrated to the area as economic conditions and declining mines in their own country forced them to look for better opportunities. These men brought with them mining skill and the contract mining system. The contract mining system defined key relationships between miners and managers that reduced managerial control of the miners and the mine operation. The lack of control fostered by the contract mining system resulted in conditions that contributed to the high fatality rate. A miner in the capacity of a contractor would bargain with the mine captain as to the price for a specific job. He received “tribute” or a share in the value produced when working on ore bearing rock, and so much per foot (or fathom) when performing “dead work,” that work necessary to remove rock which produced no ore. Sometimes the men were not paid for the dead work. Often this work was done hurriedly and carelessly because there was no profit to be realized. “In booming times,” reported the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics in 1896, “contract miners on iron ore may 110 make as high as $4 or $5 per day in case they strike a favorable condition underground” (p. 331). The gangs of men worked under the direction of a mining captain or superintendent, whose duty it was to see that the work was done according to contract, and to have the ground secured properly. Generally, however, the contract miners labored largely as they pleased. Timbering, track laying, drilling, and blasting were only loosely supervised by the company. Some of the larger mines had separate gangs that were especially skilled to do the blasting while in others the miners did their own blasting. Usually the contract miners were relatively independent and worked with a minimum of supervision, often rejecting orders of the captain and rules of the company. The contract miner was essentially a skilled and autonomous craftsman who worked at his own pace in his own way. Although he was an employee subject to company rules, custom gave him the status of an independent contractor. As such he also supplied his own tools and sometimes hired a boy or laborer to help him who was not even listed as a company employee. Contract mining in the iron mines was much like that in the coal mines where, as described by David Brody in Workers in Industrial America: The miner provided his own tools, knocked off early when he chose, worked at his own pace, and exercised his own judgment in his ‘room’ (or ‘contract’) at the coal face. That was one of the greatest satisfactions that a miner had that he was his own boss within his work place. And he took pride in his craft (Brody, 1993, p. 4). However, the system of contract mining often led to dangers that could only be alleviated with more managerial control. The ambiguity over whether miners were 111 employees or independent operators carried over into matters of safety, and the men’s freedom to determine work practices often led to tragedy. It also blurred responsibility. Because danger usually resulted from a combination of work practices and working conditions, it allowed operators to blame accidents on the “careless” behavior of the men. Miners, on the other had, tended to see the chances they took as their own business and blamed all other dangers on the operators. Thus, each group saw safety as the responsibility of the other. The mining companies on the Marquette Range used both contract miners and miners who were paid a daily wage. In 1898 the Bureau of Labor (15‘h Annual Report) reported 1,750 contract miners and 343 miners on company account working on the Marquette Range (p. 286). But even then the companies were limiting miners’ work by contract to each earning only a certain amount per shift. “ . . .and in cases where they overreach this limited figure they are compelled to stand a reduction on the next months contract” (Bureau of Labor, 1898, p. 284). By the first decade of the 20‘h century, the necessity for efficiency engineering and rigorous cost control began to erode the contract miner’s status. The miners earned what the company wanted to pay regardless of the terminology and true contract mining had largely disappeared. Although many miners continued to use the term “contract miner, ” between 1900 and 1910 most of them punched daily time cards for the first time. By 1904 the Bureau of Labor reported 1,842 miners on contract and 811 on company account earning a wage of $3.22 to $1.55 per day. The miners work “by contract” was limited to each earning a certain amount per day or shift (Bureau of Labor, 1904, p. 128). 112 The major effect of contract mining on mine discipline and control and its contribution to fatal accidents decreased gradually throughout the late 18003 and early 1900S. There was no sudden change in the system that would cause the large decrease in fatal accidents and fatal accident rate seen in 1920. Lack of Skilled Management During the period when the iron mining fatality rate was the highest, there were many mines owned and run by many small operators. Many managers simply lacked the knowledge and skill to run safe mines. Operators’ lack of skill resulted in part from the shared belief that the miner was responsible for his own safety, and in part from the low cost of accidents for the Operator. Also, in the early years the mining proceeded without a defined plan Of Operation. When ore was discovered the idea was to remove as much as possible quickly and cheaply. There were no development plans and the best methods to use to remove the ore had to be learned as the Operation progressed. Nor was the mine considered to be a long—term Operation. The presence of much rich ore and the rapidly growing demand for it hindered the learning process necessary to run a safe mining Operation. The cost and complexity involved in obtaining ore from the rapidly deepening mines forced improvement in the management and operation of the mines and thus in the skill level of managers and operators. This happened quite rapidly throughout the latter part of the 1800s, and its effects on accidents would have occurred long before 1920. Also, a sudden decrease in deaths due to this factor would not occur because there were differences in management and operation among many mines. 113 Push for Production Additionally, the demand for ore throughout much of the early mining period was great. The mines worked day and night and the shift bosses Often competed with each other as to how much ore their shift could produce. At the LSMI meeting in 1913 Edwin Higgins noted, “The demand for over production might come from the management or officials, or, as is often the case it might result from the spirit of rivalry that exists between some captains or shift bosses” (p. 64). Also prevalent was the belief that the man’s worth was gaged by the amount of ore he could produce: Everybody was hard working. Everybody wanted to show what they could do. There was a better spirit for that. Even if you were working with a shovel, you wanted to show what you could do. There was nobody that tried to lag behind. I don’t know what created the purpose, but each crew, each shift, would try to beat the other. At the Baltic there were 350 skips of ore the first night I was there. When one crew got a few more, the other tried to tie that up. That is the spirit of the time (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). Forcing the production of more ore than could be produced under normal working conditions contributed to the high fatality rate. Higgins summarized the situation in 1913; “When working places are overcrowded with men and machinery and the mine equipment is being worked beyond its capacity, there is a tendency for the work to go with s slam and a bang that allows little chance for anyone who happens to get in the way” (p. 64). The push to get the most production possible, for whatever reason, also fostered the lack of discipline and control necessary to prevent fatal accidents from occurring. Overall, the relationship between fatalities and production is slightly negative (see Figure 7). High production is associated with a lower number of fatalities. This is 114 53933...— 8+me 8+m.m 8+5. 8+3 8+m.~ 8+3 8+m.o . . o o o 30. «o. o o ioluoafliolqlo'ulllslllla lol 0 ” ” 0 O lllllOllllillllllfi m 0 lDl O -bll'lllllll'l. Lilllilly o— 0. o co 9 e 4?. lllnllllll- mg 0 O 0 JP? 9 e linlOIQlolllllllll- on e o e o e _ 0 llllllll- dd 9 e o. l r O O l ll l ll . ,o l-.. l - l4 lla 11. cm lll I l l - I» +l tll l ll: 1111 ll llll illl- dd 0 1... ll , ll i ll- ill ll llllll -.. oe 0 me cm at: - cww— ”ow—.3— 5.: 3.2.332 2: no 95 :9: he 5:835...— .m> 83:85— enseeweoeub me 34:52 H 95»:— sumo 115 due to the fact that in the later years of mining improvements in machinery and mining methods allowed a much greater production of ore, by fewer workers, than had ever been possible before. The actual effect of a push for production can be seen in 1942 when 5,692,542 tons Of ore, the largest tonnage in the history Of the Range, was produced. The death rate rose to 3.27, the highest it had been in a decade. Part of this increased rate is possibly attributable to the fact that the overall skill level Of the workforce was diminished by the massive increase in armed forces at the beginning of World War II. The contract mining system, lack Of managerial skill, and the push for production contributed to the high fatality rate. Although changes in these factors would help lower the rate slowly over time, their involvement in a sudden decrease in rate would be negligible. Demand for Labor Greater Than Supply Resulting in the Use of Inexperienced Labor This factor played a role in the occurrence of fatal accidents on the Marquette Iron Range several times throughout its history. In 1913 Edwin Higgins told the LSMI: A scarcity of labor means that there are a correspondingly smaller number of experienced men available. It follows that green men must be employed in the mines and that incompetent men must be kept at work when they should be discharged. Such conditions are productive of accidents. Where an entire district is effected by a shortage of . experienced labor, as it may be when production rates are very rapid, accidents tend to increase (p. 65). The Marquette Range was the first of the Lake Superior iron ore districts to be discovered and initially drew highly skilled Cornish miners from the declining mines Of their own country. These men held positions of authority in the mines as skilled 116 (to in miners, bosses, and captains. They were highly valued by the mining companies for their mining skill. The opening of new iron ranges in Michigan and Minnesota, the Menominee in 1876, the Gogebic in 1884, and the Vermilion and Mesabi in the late 18803 and early 18903 provided new opportunities for these skilled miners and during this period many left the Marquette Range for the new ranges which were believed to Offer better Opportunities, both with regard to advancement and working conditions. Also, somewhat later many went west to Colorado, Montana, and Nevada. Strikes (especially the strike of 1895), unsettled economic conditions and lowering of wages, especially in the 18903 associated with the Panic of 1893, increased the migration of skilled workers out of the Marquette Iron Range. This migration, the slowing of immigration from England, and the constant expansion of the mining industry created a demand for new workers. Helpers and other laborers were promoted to fill the vacancies. Although the skill level necessary was gong down due to mechanization, still in all the “new miners” had little mining experience in their background. After 1895 there was a great increase in the employment of new immigrants. Finns, Italians, Belgians, Poles, Montenegrins, and Slovaks gradually replaced the skilled English (Cornish) miners. This shift put the unskilled in positions of responsibility and played a role in range fatalities. By 1911 the Finns were employed in greater numbers than any race. Of all the immigrants, the Finns represented those with the least amount of prior mining experience. Only 0.4% of the Finns employed in the iron mines in 1911 had prior experience in mining (see Table 6). In fact, only a small percentage of all new immigrants to the Iron Range were employed in mining before 117 coming to the United States: 9.8 % were employed in mining and 75.5% in farming, farm labor, and general labor (see Table 6). Table 6. Percent of Foreign-Born Male Employees in Each Specified Occupation Before Coming to the United States, By Nationality. Number General Hand Nationality Reporting Mining Mfg. Farming Labor Trades Trade Other Croatian 81 13.6 0.0 59.3 23.5 1.2 0.0 2.5 Finnish 522 0.4 1.7 68.8 22.8 5.0 0.0 1.3 Italian, N. 435 14.5 3.4 49.0 22.3 7.6 .7 2.5 Polish 302 9.9 3.0 57.3 21.9 5.0 0.0 3.0 Slovak 113 6.2 6.2 67.3 14.2 4.4 0.0 1.8 Swedish 129 10.1 9.3 48.8 13.2 8.5 1.6 8.5 Total 1,940 9.8 3.6 56.0 19.7 6.6 .4 3.9 Note: From Immigrants in Industries, Part 18: Iron Ore Mining, 1911, Table 148, p. 413. The effect of the unskilled miner with respect to production was offset by great progress from 1880 to 1900 in techniques of mining and handling ore. About the middle of this period, mining machines were introduced which simplified removal Of the ore and in addition to requiring less skill, greatly increased the output of the miner. This was not true, however, with respect to the occurrence of fatal accidents. From Table 5 it can be seen that the three decades from 1890 to 1920 had the highest average fatality rates in the history of the Range. The effect of employment of the unskilled was a major contributing factor to these high rates. In 1909, John T. Quine of Ishpeming told the LSMI: 118 The labor question is the most serious one we have to contend with at the present time. Skilled labor is getting scarcer every year in our mines due in part to the greater demand from new properties which are being opened. Quine continued, I mean that almost every man that is out Of employment looks for a position as a miner and it takes the constant care of the men in charge of underground work to keep these men from meeting with accident while at their work. . .Furthermore, in the copper and iron districts of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, for some years past, the immigrants have mostly been non-English speaking people. This is a serious drawback in teaching them quickly (p. 72). Analysis Of death notices in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore also supports the conclusion that inexperience was a factor in fatal accidents. The examples given below indicate that these fatalities were caused by lack of experience, language barriers, or often both (see Appendix for additional quotes). John P. Frieburg, a Swede, was hit and killed by a falling rock at the Cleveland Mine. He had worked there one week (May 22, 1880). Charles Johnson, a Swede, aged 45, was killed at Lake Superior Mine when he fell down the shaft. He had worked there five months after coming to the USA. (October 2, 1880). Edward Sprage, an Englishman, aged 25 was killed by falling ore at the Saginaw Mine. He had worked there 6 months (November 27, 1880). John Brewer a miner at Lake Angeline Mine was instantly killed Tuesday. He was 24. He arrived here 4 weeks ago and was killed his first shift at the mine (March 6, 1886). Charles Setterlund was killed at East New York Mine Monday last. It was his first day on the job. He went to secure a light for his candle, while waiting to go into the mine, from a companion and walked directly into the shaft. He fell 150 feet (January 18, 1890). It can be argued that the natural course of mining accidents will be one of initial increase and then slow decrease over time as both miners and managers gain 119 experience. Although increase in skill and competence Of the workforce was a factor in the overall decrease in death rate over time, it alone cannot explain the drop seen after 1919. Absence of Laws to Provide Inspection, Train Miners and Ensure Safe Working Conditions The absence of state laws pertaining to the training Of miners or requiring inspection of mines and mine equipment has always been the case with respect to underground metal ore mines in Michigan (State of Michigan, Department of Labor, 1962, p. 19). Experience was the teacher of both the miners and the mine operators but there were no formal requirements for apprenticeship or certification. While the mine captain may have had experience there was no test given to assess whether he knew more or had better judgment than the men under his direction. Also it was the Operator’s responsibility to oversee the condition of equipment and general safety of the mine. There was no input from anyone outside of the mining operation. Recall from the discussion of the contract mining system that although the mine captain oversaw the fulfillment of the contract and was supposed to see that the ground was properly secured, the miners worked mainly as they pleased. In most mines they did all of the necessary work without much supervision and often with disregard of any existing company rules. There were no legal penalties for disobeying company rules that did exist, personal safety was the responsibility of the individual miner. As use of the contract mining system declined, jobs became more specialized. The miners, however, were still inclined to take chances that resulted in fatal accidents. 120 As noted by the 21" Annual Report Of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics (1904): It is the duty Of the mining captain or shift boss to examine the breasts Of all drifts and crosscuts and all stopes, note the progress and examine into the condition of the hanging. The timber men who attend to the securing of such openings are not so often the victims of accident as the miners, who are frequently inclined to take great and unnecessary risks in such places (p. 105). In 1909 John Quine, addressing the LSMI, stressed the causes of most accidents and the need for laws. Quine noted that failure to follow orders was a problem to mining captains and stated that: Our fatalities largely occur through carelessness or from disobeying orders. He concluded, I firmly believe that the time is not far distant, if not already here, when the employers Of labor, or the law makers of our country will have to adopt more stringent measures or laws governing the mining industry, that will make it punishable by fine, imprisonment, or instant dismissal from the employment in cases of this kind (i.e., disobeying orders) (p. 73). The State Mine Inspector Law As early as 1886 there was agitation in the Upper Peninsula for the appointment of a mine inspector. The stimulus was the large number of tragic accidents and fatalities that occurred in the mines and the precedent was the appointment of state mine inspectors in the Pennsylvania coal mines. The agitation for a mine inspector did not appear to arise in the iron mines but rather in the copper country where journalists of the Hancock Herald were the first to take up the issue. The idea was also supported by the Marquette Mining Journal but the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, in the center of 121 the iron mining district, was skeptical Of it. Citing the expense and questioning the effectiveness of the law requiring a mine inspector, the Iron Agitator/Ore stated: It would require at least a force of 20 men to take care of the mining districts. . .Three for the copper mines, 10 for the Ishpeming field, 5 for the Menominee and 2 for the Gogebic. This would require an outlay of at least $50,000 per year and what benefit would the mines derive (April 3, 1886). Each mining company had its own inspectors and the question was; Could an appointed state inspector do more toward preventing accidents than was already done? The Iron Agitator/Ore wrote: The facts are well known to the miners and they are the best judges of the case. The formations of the iron mines of this region are treacherous, and the question Of how to prevent accidents is being as eagerly studied by the mine owner as by the (Hancock) Herald (April 3, 1886). These two quotes provide good examples of the strong company viewpoint held by the Ishpeming newspaper. But in spite of any doubt that may have been promoted by the Iron Agitator/Ore, a bill to provide for the appointment of a mine inspector and defining his power and duties was introduced by Senator Hubbell (Senate Bill, no. 161) on February 16, 1887. The original bill provided that the governor of the state of Michigan would appoint an inspector of mines. The inspector or his deputy would inspect a mine every three months and would have the power to close the mine and require repairs if unsafe conditions were reported. Additionally, the mine superintendent or manager or captain or company Official Of the mine would be held personally liable for any loss of life or property if he neglected such repairs as required by the mine inspector. The Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore had this to say: There is nothing wrong in the appointment of such an inspector provided one competent to take charge of the duties of the position could be 122 secured. On the selection all would rest. . .One inspector would have more than he could do, but as the companies generally take every needed precaution in the operation of their properties it would be useless to incur greater expense to the taxpayer than the paying of the salary of a single inspector. It might do to combine the office with that of mineral statistician (February 26, 1887, p. 1). When the time to actually choose an inspector arrived, the proposed law had been changed considerably. The Marquette County Board Of Supervisors now had the responsibility of filling the Office and the Iron Agitator/Ore warned: “There are at the present time several applicants for the position who should not possess it upon any account. They being well know disturbers, whose chief aim would be to worry the companies rather than promote the welfare of the miners” (September 3, 1887, p. 1). It is interesting that there is no mention of the influence that had the effect of significantly decreasing the objectivity of the original proposal. There is a considerable difference between a law, the legislative goal of which is to promote the safety of the miner, in which the mine inspector is appointed by the governor and one in which he is appointed by the Board of Supervisors of the county in which the mines operate. This has the potential, at least, of notably affecting the inspector’s susceptibility to local influence and pressure. The strong mining industry philosophy of the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore can also be seen in the quotes taken from the newspaper that pertain to the Mine Inspector. Whether it is the personal philosophy of the editor or direct influence, by some means, Of the mining companies on the editor is impossible to know now. It is evident, however, from these quotes and Others than will be given, that the newspaper was strongly supportive of the mining industry. 123 Nowhere in the newspaper was there found any suggestion of opposition to the proposed mine inspector bill by the mining companies. Reportedly, their only desire was that since such an inspector was to be chosen, he would be free from any outside influences; dependent only upon his knowledge of mining affairs to direct his decisions The Iron Agitator/Ore noted: “As far as our observations has been (sic) the companies endeavor to keep their mines in condition to prevent accidents.” They continued, perhaps without realization of the full significance of their words, “Mines that are dangerous to life also threaten capital” (September 3, 1887, p. 1). No stated accusation of company influence of the mine inspector was found. Their lack of Opposition to the law, as suggested by the newspaper, along with statements on later reports of the Mine Inspector indicate that whether he was directly influenced by the companies or not, he was at least sympathetic to their problems. From the reports of the Marquette County mine inspector, 1890 and 1905 respectively; Having examined every mine of the county this last year carefully, I am especially gratified to be able to state that there has been no failure on the part of any mining company or mine owner in supplying any demand that might in the least contribute to the safety or healthful condition of the respective mines. Without being able to report cases of neglect or of making suggestions of importance this report is respectfully submitted Anthony Broad, Inspector of Mines. And from the report of John T. Quine; In all of my official visits I have received the usual courtesies from the officials and they have worked in unison with me in taking all precautions that were necessary to prevent accidents and I assure you that the men in charge of the different properties throughout the county are very careful of their men and try at all times to avoid accidents and particularly those of a fatal nature. There is nothing more discouraging to them than to have men lose their lives in or around their mines. 124 The Board Of Supervisors Offered a salary of $2,000 for the position of mine inspector which was deemed insufficient by the Iron Agitator/Ore. Fearing that a competent man could not be secured for less than $4,000 to $5,000 they made the following statement: The Board should pay a good man what he is worth. The majority of the tax to pay the salary comes from the pockets of the mining companies and they are desirous of securing a responsible man. . .it would be little less than an insult odd Offer him but $2,000 a year. The county can afford an intelligent officer and ought to have one (September 17, 1887, p. 5). At the Board meeting of September 24, 1887, Mr. Anthony Broad was chosen as the first mine inspector Of Marquette County. Charged with inspecting all mines every 60 days, he was to receive an annual salary of $2,000, deputies furnished by the county, and 4 cents per mile traveling expenses. The Iron Agitator/Ore concluded: “Regarding the value Of the service of such a position there are different Opinions expressed. A trial will demonstrate it more satisfactorily, however” (September 24, 1887, p. 5). As it evolved, the first mine inspector law was toothless. No power was given the inspector either to begin or recommend the beginning of actions against anyone. That the law was ineffective in reducing fatal accidents can be seen in the fact that the death rate did not decrease after the law was put into effect (see Table 4). In 1895 J. Park Charming, addressing the LSMI, reviewed the duties Of the mine inspector and assessed his effectiveness. By analyzing the mine inspector’s reports for 1887 to 1894, Channing found that the underground fatality rate for all of the Michigan iron ranges averaged 5.670 per 1,000 workers. For Marquette County (1888 125 to 1894) the underground fatality averaged 4.768 per 1,000 workers (p. 38). Charming criticized the superficial nature of the law and the method of appointing the mine inspector and concluded that a better law was needed: It will be seen that the results are not to be commended. . .Taking all the figures into consideration the conclusion seems irresistible that the present mining law has not been a great success. The trouble with the law is that it is of a most superficial character and hardly can be dignified by the name of a mine regulation act. The method of appointing the mine inspector by the county board of supervisors, is Open to criticism. This board is usually composed of mine managers or Officials, and except by popular election, I can conceive no worse way of selecting a man. The salaries paid are small and as a consequence the best men do not seek the places (pp. 46-47). By the time the fatality rate declined significantly, the office Of mine inspector had been in existence for over 30 years (see Table 4). At the time the most significant decrease in fatality rate is observed, other than the mine inspector law, there was no state or federal regulation or inspection of the mining industry. The stimulus for the reduction had some other source. In addition to the criticism Of the new mine inspector law, there are several points in Channing’s 1895 address to the LSMI that allude to the fatal accident problem. In a recap of the past year’s Presidential address to the institute he stated; In his (the past president) address we saw the wonderful increase in efficiency of labor due to increased economical devices and the utilization of power. The question presents itself—Have we in the rush and push of the last 50 years’ struggle for material prosperity, devoted a proper amount of attention to the life, health, and comfort of the miner? (p. 34). As ineffective as the new law was in reducing fatal accidents in the mines, it was at least causing the companies to acknowledge the problem. One of the duties of the inspector was to record and report the number and causes of all fatal and non-fatal 126 accidents that occurred throughout the year. Although he rarely found the companies to blame for the accidents and they had very little liability, the fact that they were being recorded was important. Charming noted: The mere fact that every fatal accident is sure to be investigated and the occurrence published, has had a moral effect upon mine Officials and although the status of the inspector is indeterminate and his actual authority nothing, his presence and suggestions have for these reasons considerable weight (p. 47). In closing is address to the group, Charming encouraged all of them to consider the fatal accident question and also pushed for a new mining law: The time has come in Michigan when it is desirable that we take this question (fatal mine accidents) in hand and put our state in the fore. Our mining practice is the best, our machinery and our mills the largest and our shafts the deepest in the world. We should not be without a mining law commensurate in its completeness with our material success. I beg that the members of the Institute, and that the mine managers and their employees will carefully consider the figures and suggestions I have made and COOperate in checking this unnecessary loss of life (p. 48). Report of the Bureau of Labor Concerning Laws and Regulations Although encouraged by Charming, changes in the existing law did not take place for many years. In 1898 the Bureau of Labor noted the lack of inspection in the mines and non-compliance with the existing mine inspector law. The following excerpts are from the Bureau’s 1898 report: While I am aware that a large majority Of our mine managers are doing all in their power to prevent accidents and protect the lives of their employees, yet an impartial observer can but see that there are opportunities for valuable improvements in this line yet to be made (p. 200). It is indeed startling to consider the many accidents that are constantly happening from falling ore, or vein rock, which could be materially reduced in number by proper means of protection and more careful inspection. . .the experience of the mine inspector of New York. . .shows 127 that the Empire state, by improved inspection and protection to the miners, has reduced the number Of accidents more than 75 percent in the last few years (p. 201). Another matter of great importance is that the Operator should provide automatic means for stopping the “men cages” at any moment. . .In such accidents where the machinery is not stopped in time, the parting of the cable permits the cage with its human freight to fall hundreds of feet with nothing to check it until it strikes the bottom. To any mechanic or person familiar with the safety appliances required by the State Factory Inspection Laws, such accidents can only be considered as the result of criminal negligence, when it is easy to provide an automatic trip or lock near the level of the surface, which in the event of an accident would totally check and stop the downward fall Of the cage, and in such instances save the lives of all. We are cognizant of more than one fatal accident where several have lost their lives for the want of some simple device, which in a factory would be ordered immediately (p. 281). In my opinion the machinery of the mines and the question of proper guarding of all devices, shafts and well-holes should be incorporated in the Sate Factory Inspection Laws, similar to those of other states, where such mine inspection has proven most satisfactory and been attended by the greatest results (p. 281). ...I wish to kindly remind the mine operators of the fact that the Session Laws of 1897, in a section of the act creating the Office of mine inspectors, provides for the construction Of a partition between the ladder or cageway in the main shafts, to prevent accidents by falling rock or ore form the skips, which law I notice is not strictly observed in some of the mining districts (p. 281). Although not directly stated by the Bureau of Labor report, the suggestion remains that even though modern mining equipment was introduced quickly, in order to obtain the most ore for the lowest cost, devices required specifically for the protection Of the miners, such as safety catches on cages and partitions to protect them from falling rock, were Obsolete or not provided. The following quote supports this suggestion: There was no written code, rules or regulations so far as the men were concerned. We had the County Mine Inspector elected by the people. 128 But he was always playing the game with the mining company and with the men to get elected (Black Rock and Roses, no pagination). The data supports the conclusion that lack of or disregard of laws providing inspection or ensuring safe working conditions contributed to the high fatality rate in the first three decades of mining on the Marquette Iron Range. Lack of Any Laws Forcing Compensation for Fatalities by the Employer Because of the legal doctrine of the time regarding liability for workplace accidents, there was little need for company concern, other than humanitarian, about the high death rate in the mines. Prior to the enactment of workmen’s compensation legislation, employers’ liability laws governed the liability of employers for accidents. The court held that the employer was to provide a safe place for employment, safe tools and equipment, competent fellow workers, and adequate supervision. If he did these things he was free from the responsibility of accidents arising from the worker’s carelessness, the negligence of his fellow workers, the ordinary risks Of the occupation, and the extraordinary danger of the job. All of these conditions were assumed to be known to the worker when he took the job. An injured employee’s only resource was to sue his employer in court. If the employer could prove that he had taken any one of the necessary precautions, the injured worker or his family had little chance of receiving any compensation. The defenses available to the employer were such that only an estimated 15% of injured employees ever recovered damages, even though 70% Of industrial accidents were estimated to be the result of the nature of the work or of employer negligence (Weinstein, 1967, p. 157). With little hope of winning a lawsuit, most injured workers 129 elected not to sue at all. David Brody has estimated that a steelworker’s chances Of recovering losses was less than two in one—hundred (1993, p. 92). Those who did sue and win usually received only small amounts of money, much of which was taken up by legal fees, after long delays and coerced settlements. In Michigan in 1910, 7,116 fatally and non—fatally injured workers for 466 industrial employers (not including mines and railroads) received an average of $10.91 in compensation and an additional $4.39 in medical benefits. Fatal accidents in these firms averaged a total recovery of $388.53 in compensation and relief (Rosner and Markowitz, 1987, p. 44). Germany abandoned the employer’s liability system in 1885, Austria-Hungary in 1897, France and Italy in 1898, and Great Britain in 1906. In Michigan, worker’s compensation legislation ended the employer’s liability system in 1913. The contract mining system made the employer’s defenses extremely easy to uphold. The newspaper and the mine inspector’s reports provided constant reminders of the legal defenses that freed the employer from liability and the Bureau of Labor also added validity to these legal concepts. The following quotes reveal how easy it was to uphold the employers’ defenses: On August 2, 1884, the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore wrote in an article about the republic mine: Mining is a dangerous vocation. In the prosecution of such work there are constantly hidden perils that the utmost caution cannot prevent. There is ground that has all the appearance of being solid when in reality it is not a death trap. Holes and fire, and skips jump the track, and miners themselves grow reckless of surrounding dangers and often seem to court accident. The Republic, while it had had a few bad cases this year, is in reality, no exception to mines in general. The management use (sic) all possible care to protect the men from dangerous places but 130 cannot, no more than other mine overseers, prevent occasional accidents (p. 5). On March 20, 1886, another editorial in the Iron Agitator/Ore expressed essentially the same viewpoint: “Just as long as mining is conducted sad fatalities will probably occur. We know the companies do all in their power to protect their employees from injury” (p. 5). In 1891, a newspaper article stated: “Accidents are bound to happen in mining as long as the latter are wrought” (January 10, 1891, p. 5). Death notices taken from the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore also contain statements that help confirm the employer’s legal defenses against liability for accidents. That the newspaper presented a strong company viewpoint to its readers has already been noted (see Appendix for additional quotes). John Barkle, an Englishman, was killed by a fall of rock at the Salisbury Mine. He had been warned about this several times that day (April 23, 1881). John F. Johnson, a Norwegian, and Peter Elwin, a Canadian, were both killed when they carelessly fell down the shaft at Champion Mine (July 30, 1881). John Roberts, an Englishman, who just got here was killed when he fell off the cage. . .they have naught to blame but their own carelessness (February 18, 1881). 3 men were killed at Winthrop Mine by a fall of rock. No one was responsible (October 2, 1886). Wm. Thomas was killed at the Lake Superior Mine by a loaded bucket of ore falling down the shaft. . .No one is to blame (March 2, 1889). Matt Sari was killed by a fall of ground at Cleveland #3. . .The accident was not due to the negligence of the company (October 3, 1891). 131 Olaf Swanson, a miner at Nelson Mine, was killed instantly when he attempted to step into a bucket. He missed and fell 100 feet down the shaft. NO one is to blame (February 27, 1892). Carl Mattson a miner on the third level of B Shaft of Cliff Shaft Mine was killed. . .he didn’t look out for his own safety (January 19, 1901). The Bureau of Labor report of 1896 also reinforced the legal defenses for the employer. The Bureau acknowledged the extraordinary dangers of mining and expressed the opinion that accidents happened in spite of the greatest care taken by the mining companies. Additionally, they assigned fault to the miner rather than to the mine owner or manager. “Mining is a dangerous vocation, and accidents continue to happen despite the greatest care that can be observed. TOO Often the accidents are due to carelessness of the men themselves...” (p. 332). Again, in 1904 and 1909 the Bureau of Labor stressed the dangers of the industry. By placing most of the blame for accidents squarely on the miner, they lifted the burden of liability and the fear of lawsuits from the mining companies. The 21“ Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor stated: The principal cause of accidents, fatal and otherwise, in the iron and COpper mines, is carelessness on the part of the workmen themselves, just as is the case on the surface. Men can and do become habituated to any dangers common to their employment, too often to their undoing. . .(p. 105). And from the 26‘h Annual Report: The underground workers of the iron and copper mines of Michigan each day face dangers that those employed in other vocation hardly know even by name. A great many of the accidents that occur, however, are due to the carelessness and ignorance of the workers themselves. Men who are surrounded by danger each day become hardened to them and finally, perhaps subconsciously, they think themselves immune. They take risks that are absolutely unnecessary, and which are discountenanced by the management of the mines. . .The mine horrors in 132 which there is a wholesale slaughter are thus frequently due to the carelessness of the workers...the miner feels a zest in the constant race with death, and the narrower the escape the greater the interest in his work. For this reason, instead of scrupulously avoiding danger, he courts it, often with fatal results (pp. 44-45). Analysis of mine inspector reports shows that as late as 1913 not only the mine inspector but also juries were helping to uphold the liability defenses of the employer. From the Mine Inspector report of 1911: ...Samuel Dozzi was asphyxiated in the Smith Mine. . .this death was due to his own carelessness. ...Eugene Labeau came to his death by accident...This jury exonerates the officers of the Republic Iron CO. from all blame. The verdict of the jury was Frank Isaac Ruohoniemi came to his death by walking into a raise accidently. . .and that the company be exonerated from all blame. From the Mine Inspector report of 1913: ...Was accidental death by his own neglect. ...Abram Waara came to his death by accident at the Republic Mine; the mine officials exempt from all blame. While it is not possible to know today if the statements were made intentionally to help support the employer’s liability defenses for the mining companies they were certainly sufficient to do so. NO lawsuits were initiated as a result of the accidents and therefore they cost the company nothing. There was no legal stimulus for lowering the accident rate and the lack of responsibility on the part of the mining companies contributed to the high death rate in the first three decades of mining on the Marquette Iron Range. 133 Inability of the Majority of Employees to Speak English or Understand the Orders and Directions Given Them The eventual success of the Marquette Iron Range lie in the nature and quality of the men involved in the mining venture. These men comprised two distinct groups: First, the entrepreneurs who planned, organized, and financed the fledgling industry. With heavy odds against their success any serious mistake in judgment would have brought failure. Second, the men who worked in the mines and hauled and loaded the ore. Without them the ore in the ground was useless and all of the organization, capital, and judgment in the world would not have produced any ore. These men only mined the ore but, in fact, built and populated the entire area. Their success along with the success of the mining venture lie in their own hands. Initially, nearly all of these men were innnigrants. “The history of immigration to the Marquette Range is practically a history of the development of the iron mining industry within that territory” (p. 391), stated the Report of the US. Immigration Commission in 1911. Although eventually the immigrants to the Marquette Range would represent more than 40 different countries, the first generation to arrive and to whom the iron range owes its initial development were the English, Irish, and French Canadians. Most of the English and Irish immigrated to the Range between 1856 and 1885. The English came to the Upper Peninsula directly from the declining mines of Cornwall and were experienced miners. Only a small number of the Irish had experience in mining and most were employed as unskilled laborers. The French Canadians, who began arriving around 1870, did much of the surface work, particularly logging, to provide the huge quantity of timber used in the mines. By 134 1911, only 10% of the French Canadians employed around the mines were miners (Immigrants in Industries, 1911, p, 392). Initially all work in the mines was done by hand. The output per man was low but the rate of compensation was high. In 1870, common labor received $1.80 per day and miners around $2.12 per day (Hatcher, 1950, p. 117). The high pay was a factor that attracted experienced men to the region. In 1850 there were only 136 inhabitants in what was then Marquette County which embraced the entire iron range. The population grew steadily and by 1870 the county contained 14,235 people. Slightly over 60% of the entire population was foreign-born (Alanen, 1991, pp. 2, 4). Because of the severe climate, summer was the only time of year that ore could be shipped from the region. As the demand for ore grew, more laborers were needed to load surplus stock during the shipping season. To fill this need, the Scandinavians were brought to the area in the spring of 1874. This was the beginning Of the Swedish and Norwegian immigration to the range. After the shipping season, most of them went into the mines to work. From 1880 to 1890 great progress was made in mining and handling the ore. About the middle of this period, mining machines were introduced which simplified mining and in addition to requiring less skill, greatly increased the output of the miner. In 1889 steam shovels were introduced to load ore from the stockpiles which reduced the number of laborers needed. However, as immigration from England and Ireland slowed and many experienced miners left the Marquette Range in pursuit of better Opportunities, it became necessary to employ more new immigrant 3 who were 135 unskilled in mining. In 1883 the Finnish were brought to the Iron Range for the first time and initially were employed as laborers in loading ore from the stockpiles. The first Italians came to the Range around 1887 and were also employed as unskilled laborers. After the strike Of 1895 many more English, Irish, and Scandinavians left the Range and each year after that there was in increase in the number of the more recent immigrant races employed; Belgians, Poles, Montenegrins, and Slovaks. A general idea of the changing nature of immigrants employed in the Marquette Range mines is shown in Table 7. Table 7. Proportion of Various Nationalities Employed in 1898 and 1909 in a Representative Mining Co. on the Marquette Iron Range Nationality 1898 1909 American 5.6 6.4 Scotch ' .7 .9 Italian 5.3 17.9 French 7.8 5.9 German .5 1.3 Irish 6.1 3.3 Finnish 17.0 24.9 Scandinavian 31.9 19.5 English 25.0 13.5 Polish — 1.43 Austrian — 2.07 Danish — 1.03 Belgian — 1.01 Montenegrin — .23 Total 1 100.0 100.0 Note: From Immigrants in Industries, 1911, p. 411. 136 Of the later immigrant groups, the Finns took the hardest jobs with the lowest pay in the mines, generally being employed as trammers. They would later become the nucleus of discontent among workers on the iron range and be instrumental in changing the longstanding amicable employer/employee relationship. By 1911 the Finns were employed in greater numbers than any race according to a 1911 study by the Immigration Department. Although extremely literate in their own language, 97.6% of the foreign-born Finns could read and write Finnish (see Table 8); only 60.5% could speak English. In fact, Of all foreign-born employees, only 57.3 % could speak English. All of the French Canadian surveyed spoke English. With this exception, the proportion of surveyed employees who spoke English was largest for the Swedes (89.4%) followed by the Slovaks (81.9%). The Croatians had the fewest English speakers, 32.3 % (See Table 9). Crystal Eastman found that from 1906 to 1910, the accident rate for non- English-speaking employees of the South Work Steel mill was double the average of the English-speaking employees. Almost one-quarter of the recent immigrants working in the mill were killed or injured each year, 3.273 in five years (Eastman, 1969, p. 14). Death notices found in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore substantiate the fact that the language barrier was a factor in the high fatality rates before 1920. Giovanni, an Italian, was killed by rock falling from the hanging wall at the McComber Mine. He had been in the country 2 weeks (August 12, 1882). August Anderson was instantly killed when he stepped from a bucket at the surface and fell down the shaft at the Detroit Mme. He had worked at the mine only a few days and spoke no English (February 6, 1886). 137 Table 8. Percent of Male Employees in Michigan Iron Ore Mines Who Read and Write, by Nationality. Number Percent Percent Who Nativity Reporting Who Read Read and Write Native born of native father, white 51 100.0 100.0 Native born of foreign father, father’s country England 56 100.0 100.0 Sweden 46 100.0 100.0 Foreign born French-Canadian 44 86.4 86.4 Croatian 156 98. 1 98. 1 English 135 99.3 98.5 Finnish 656 98.8 97.6 Italian, North 529 94.7 94.5 Italian, South 54 90.7 87.0 Polish 385 85.2 84.4 Slovak 123 88.6 87.8 Slovenian 70 98.6, 98.6 Swedish 160 100.0 99.4 Total 2,800 94.9 94. 1 Total native born of foreign father 215 99.5 99.1 Total native born 268 99.6 99.3 Total foreign born 2,532 94-4 93-6 Note: From Immigrants in Industries, 1911, Table 152, p. 417. In 1909, John Quine told the LSMI, “There can no question as to the necessity of rules and there seems to be no suitable method of reaching the men of various nationalities without printing these rules in numerous languages” (p. 73). And in 1912, William Conibear described the new Safety Department at CCI to the LSMI. He noted, “...the Company published a book of rules and regulations. The rules for the workers were printed in Finnish, Italian and Polish and each employee received a set of rules... 138 His signature for the same and agreement to study and live up to it is filed at the central office of the Company” (p. 96). Table 9. Proportion of Foreign-born Male Employees of Non-English Speaking Nationalities Who Were Able to Speak English. Number Percent Who Nationality Reporting Speak English French Canadian 46 100.0 Croatian 158 32.3 Finnish 661 60.5 Italian, North 541 45.3 Italian, South 54 48.1 Polish 393 51.1 Slovak 127 81.9 Slovenian 65 50.8 Swedish 160 89.4 Total 2,408 57.3 Note: From Immigrants in Industries, 1911, Table 161, p. 426 . Obviously, at least one mining company on the Iron Range felt that the language barrier was a contributor to the high accident rate. As with experience, however, the fatality rate would be expected to decline rather slowly and uniformly over time as the men learned English and successive generations worked in the mines. No sudden ability to understand English can be associated with the period between 1912 and 1920. Additionally, the ethnicity of the population, including use of native tongue, was maintained well beyond 1920. In fact, even until the present time. 139 Carelessness or Recklessness on the Part of Many of the Men Employed Although the claim of carelessness may have been used to protect the employers from liability for accidents, it must also be considered that perhaps the men actually were careless or reckless and that their behavior resulted in fatal accidents. In her 1906 and 1907 study of workplace deaths in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Crystal Eastman attempted to determine, (1) to what extent carelessness of the worker entered into the causes of industrial accidents and additionally (2) what did “careless” mean in the analysis of workplace deaths. To Eastman fatalities resulted not from “carelessness,” but “from a long list of human weaknesses, some common to us all, some resulting from special environments, some from which the man himself is not responsible, and some for which he is” (Eastman, 1969, p. 87). To Eastman, “ignorance” covered a large share of the cases studied and she included in this category those who were “green” at their job—young boys and new immigrants with no experience in the job or environment in which they found themselves, and also those who spoke no English. In the case of the Marquette Iron Range, examples have already been given that reveal many fatalities involved young men, those who had been in the country only a short time, and those with no prior experience in mining. Eastman found that “heedless,” “inattentive,” and “rash” were also synonyms that the dictionary applied to “carelessness.” Among these terms she defined subtle but important differences when they were applied to the cause of fatal work accidents. For “heedlessness” she found no excuse. “Exasperating and hopeless, but fortunately rare” 140 act that no thinking man would do (p. 90). This notice from the Iron Agitator/Ore provides some insight into “heedlessness”; At the 34 pit of Jackson Mine James Cavanagh opened the lid of a box of giant powder with a pipe in his mouth. Fire from the pipe dropped in, igniting the powder. 50 to 60 feet of the skip road was demolished and the pump connection to the pit was broken. Mr. Cavanagh died (June 17, 1882). “Inattention” she found to be different, and not a fault of the worker. In a mine (or mill) the worker must always have an alert mind and keep his attention focused on his surroundings. Nothing must divert his attention from the dangers around him. However, there is much in such an environment that does weaken the power of attention—noise, heat, hard physical labor, tiredness, perhaps even illness—and accidents occur. Eastman was also willing to forgive “rashness” or “recklessness,” the deliberate failure to take precautions, as a fault of the worker. Feeling that the chief element here was haste, the desire of the worker to save some time, Eastman noted: “Their occupation involves constant necessary risk so unnecessary risk is inevitable but can hardly be considered a fault of the workman” (p. 93). Again the Iron Agitator/Ore provides an example: Five men at Cleveland Mine were blown into eternity without a moments warning. . .They were charging a hole with giant powder and couldn’t find a wooden tamping rod long enough. They used a steel pipe and friction probably created a spark. Haste probably got the better of their judgment—they were experienced men...men grow careless from constant handling Of (giant powder), as is natural with those in all kinds of dangerous employment (March 10, 1888). The charge of “carelessness” was difficult to disprove. Coroner’s records were meager and inquest testimony was given by the dead man’s fellow workers who Often 141 didn’t even witness the accident, and/or the mine superintendent, captain, or shift boss. These men were employees of the company and it was in their best interest to clear themselves of responsibility. Many miners probably feared the loss of their job if they gave testimony implicating the company or their superiors. The safest thing to do, in all cases, was to blame the dead man. Inquest testimonies form Mine Inspector reports show that in nearly all cases either the miner, through “his own carelessness” or “disobeying orders,” or “no one” was to blame. In 321 Mine Inspector reports in which blame was assigned, seven stated that the company may have contributed to the fatalities and 314 stated that the worker was “careless,” “disobedient,” or that “no one was at fault.” Undoubtedly “carelessness” was the cause of many fatalities but it cannot, fairly, be attributed to a personal fault of the miner in all cases. When put in the correct perspective, it diminishes as the sole cause of fatal accidents. However, what was earlier interpreted as “carelessness” was very difficult to combat. A man cannot simply be made to be careful, his cooperation is necessary also and to achieve that cooperation a change in the entire philosophy of the mining venture was necessary. All participants in the mining business, from miners to owners, had to adopt a new viewpoint with regard to “carelessness” and when that happened fatal accidents decreased dramatically. Technology: Old Technology That Had Become Unsafe or New Technology That Provided New and Unfamiliar Dangers The contribution of technology, Old or new, to the fatal accidents on the Marquette Iron Range is difficult to assess. The effects of technology on the mining fatality rate have been discussed by several authors. Mark Wyman, in Hard Rock Epic: 142 Western Miners and the Industrial Revolution, 1860-1910, argued that advances in technology increased the hazards of mining and therefore as advancements occurred, at least initially, an increase in fatality rate occurred (pp. 116—117). On the other hand, Ronald Brown, in Hard-Rock Miners: The Intermountain West, 1860-1920, argued that organizational structure and characteristics of the workers were more important factors and Offset the technology fatality relationship (p. 81). Lankton and Martin analyzed the two views in terms of company size for underground fatalities in Michigan copper mines. Equating size with technological advancement (larger mines could afford more advanced technology) they found that the larger mines had a lower fatality rate than the smaller mines. If the relationship between size and technological advance is valid then advances in technology appear to have decreased the dangers of mining for the workers. However, it is also true that the larger mines may have had a different type or organizational structure that influenced the accident picture. Additionally, a better class of worker may have been attracted to the larger or more technologically advanced mines. It is interesting to note that in 1912 the US. Bureau of Mines found that, taking all US. metal mines into consideration, the fatality rate in small mines was 7.05 per 1,000 men working a 300-day year. Whereas in larger mines it was 4.02 per 1,000 men working a 300—day year (Fay, 1913, p. 13). It was found on the Marquette Range that individual mines, even of the largest companies did not always employ the same technology or use the same equipment, some were much better than Others. As late as 1925, Charles Stakel, then superintendent of the North Lake district found marked differences among the mines; 143 I also discovered that most of the equipment, tools, drills, motors, etc., underground were second hand discards from other mines. The Barnes- Hecker could not complete with other CCI mines for two reasons—poor equipment and rather poor man-power. Good miners never asked to be transferred to the Barnes-Hecker (p. 99).7 The mines of the Marquette Iron Range adopted new technologies very early due to pressures from new developments in Michigan and Minnesota. Steam power was introduced in 1878, electric lights in 1880, the caving method of mining in 1881, steam—powered machines in 1885, the steam shovel in 1889, and electric haulage in 1892. Also, after the Financial Panic of 1893 much consolidation of ownership took place. The mines became very capital intensive and new technology was rapidly introduced so that the Marquette Range mines could reduce costs and maintain a competitive advantage. A very good place to look at changes in technology is in the machinery used in the mines (cages, skips, trams) and in electricity. The fatalities that occurred as electricity or various new pieces of machinery or electricity were introduced into the mines should reveal how advances in at least some technology affected the fatality rate. First, it must be assumed that, on the average, the introduction of new technologies into the mines can be equated with advances in time. T ramming, for example, changed 7The Barnes-Hecker Mine was an ill-fated operation and the site of the most tragic accident on the Marquette Iron Range. On November 3, 1926 a cave-in occurred more than 700 feet below the surface when miners blasted into a vug or open fissure on the second sub-level below the first level. In a period of 15 minutes the workings of the entire mine were filled with sand and water to a point about 100 feet from the surface. Wilfred Wills was the only survivor of this disaster in which 51 men died. The Barnes- Hecker was not included in the fatality data for this research because it was a statistical oddity and as such would have had too great of an influence on the data. The fatal accidents on the Marquette Range were random occurrences, usually 1 or 2 at a time, and only these “normal” accidents were used in the data from which the conclusions were drawn. 144 over time from hand trarnming, to mules, to endless cables, to electric motors over time. Examination of Table 10 shows that in the first four decades of mining (1880- 1920) the overall trend was an increase in fatalities related to machinery. The exception is fatalities related to cages which showed a marked decrease in the fourth decade (1910-1919). If the assumption made above is valid, then it can be concluded from this data that advances in technology related to machinery increased the dangers of the workplace and therefore the fatality rate. There are not enough fatalities due to the use of electricity to establish a trend. However, the single electrocution in the first four decades did occur early in the electrification of the mines and might signify unfamiliarity with the technology. The sudden decrease in fatalities due to machinery in 1920 cannot be accounted for by any significant advances in the technology of mining machinery. New equipment had been introduced from the 18803 on and, as in the case of the Barnes-Becker, Old equipment was still in use. After 1920, modern technology and machinery continued to be introduced into the mines as it was developed and probably old machinery remained in use also. However, there are no trends with respect to fatalities related to machinery that can be observed in the data after 1920. 145 oww ed d wd2 be 3 me e dd dwd an d2 :35. 2 o o o o o o o o o o 8R2: a o o o d o o 2 d d o mer dd d o d e o o c o S d o 832 an N o e 2. o 2 N 2. 222 N o 832 8 2 2 m m o o N 22 m o 8821 e o o n e o d d dd 2 o medfl de2 m o 2 d2 e2 e w e eh b S 352 9.22 N. o nd d2 d2 2 d e me 5d 0 mooa ee2 n 2 ad n d2 3 e e de a o Woow2 edd d2 0 he 02 ed l 02 82 ed d meww2 .33. EEO 286:9 £3.2— .8< doe. .8< v.20 do 3830 zoom :Emcixm 2E weave: éueuo—m 89:. 2.3m owao £23— wafiah mum—.23 firefiewwilowgm 28.: 882—Em: 2: 25 852 easeuwluoeab 5 .3809 .mm imam—5m..— .‘e 8250 A: oEfiH 146 From the data in Table 10, it can be concluded that technology, as represented by machinery, did contribute to the high fatality rate before 1920. However, it is not possible to assign fault to either Old or new technology without reservation. The slight increase in fatality rate related to machinery throughout the first four decades of mining is a possible indicator that new technology may have increased the hazards of mining. It must be remembered, however, that new technology allowed the use of less skilled workers, a factor which also contributed to the high fatality rate. The fatal accidents that occurred in specific mines were also analyzed with respect to production for the first four decades of mining (see Table 11). In this case, production was used as a proxy of mine size and technological advancement; the biggest producers were the largest mines with the most advanced technology. The mines were ranked according to the number of tons produced per fatality. It can be seen from the data that only once did the largest producer rank first in the number of tons produced per fatality. The remainder of the time the largest producer ranked second or lower. Several factors could account for this: (1) the smaller producers may have had a smaller workforce and there was, therefore, less exposure of the miners to the hazards of the job, (2) even though small, a producer may have used more modern technology than a larger producer, (3) the smaller producers may have employed a more highly skilled workforce, (4) as suggested by Brown, the management of a smaller producer may have had something in its organizational structure that promoted safety . 147 Table 11. Ranking of Mine Production vs. Number of Fatal Accidents in the Underground Mines on the Marquette Iron Range, By Decade; 1879-1919. 1879-1889 Lake Superior 2,667,951 17 156,927 T/D 1 Republic 2,505 ,1 17 22 1 13 ,869 2 Champion 1,673 ,620 19 88,085 7 Lake Angeline 1,073,488 11 97,590 4 Michigamme 492,527 5 98,505 3 Cambria 486,073 6 81,012 9 Salibury 467 ,1 10 6 77 ,852 10 Milwaukee 350,888 4 87,722 8 Barnum 275 , 159 3 91 ,720 6 Lillie 186,570 2 93,285 5 1890-1899 CCI 4,559,427 34 134,101 T/D 8 Lake Superior 4,216,196 24 168,648 6 Lake Angeline 3,579,040 12 298,253 2 Queen 2,816,358 14 201,168 4 Republic 1 ,452 ,223 17 85 .424 9 Champion 1 ,309,055 22 54,502 12 Negaunee 1 ,264,013 6 201,669 3 Winthrop 984,856 6 164,143 7 Lillie 909,438 5 181,887 5 Cambria 709,176 1 709,176 1 Davis 77,867 1 77,867 10 Platt 73 ,844 1 73 ,844 1 1 1900-1909 CCI 9,366,577 35 267,616 T/D 2 Lake Superior 6,021,254 37 162,737 4 Lake Angeline 3,175,643 6 529,273 1 Negaunee 2,169,233 27 80,342 8 Hart Ford 1,751,323 11 159,211 5 Republic 1,415 .344 12 117,945 7 Cambria 819,691 4 204,923 3 Champion 791 ,618 15 52,745 10 Lillie 627,905 5 125,581 6 Maag 220,611 4 55,153 9 1910-4919 CCI 18,005,803 66 272,815 2 Republic 1,977,952 19 104,103 5 Oliver 1,922,901 13 147,915 3 Am. Boston 1,396,414 16 87,275 7 J&L 1,089,747 8 136,218 4 Lake Angeline 814,439 1 814,439 1 Breitung 666,872 6 I 1 1,145 6 148 Although information was limited, the Lake Angeline Mine was studied in as much detail as possible to try to assess the above factors. The Lake Angeline Mine was not the largest mine on the Range nor was it owned by one of the larger corporations. However, this mine consistently had high production per fatality for the first four decades of mining (rank = 4, 2, 1, 1, respectively). The Lake Angeline Mine was one of the first on the Marquette Range to introduce electric haulage and have electric lighting underground. Additionally, by 1891 this mine was using the caving method of mining, the safest of the methods (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, September 12, 1891). This suggests that new technology not only increased production but also decreased the hazards of mining for the individual worker. Even more significant is the fact that in October of 1892 Lake Angeline Mine introduced the 8-hour shift for the first time in the history of the region (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, October 1, 1892). This was tried for three months and was retained after the trial period because it was found that the production per man was larger than ever before in the history of the property (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, December 24, 1892). This suggests that Brown was correct when he stated that technology was not as important as the organization of the mine and the characteristics of individual workmen when it came to reducing fatal accidents. Unavoidable Acts of God or Accidents that Cannot be Prevented in Any Way Because mining was such an inherently dangerous occupation, many miners and mine managers felt that fatal accidents could not be prevented. A March 20, 1886, editorial in the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore stated; “There are a hundred ways whereby a miner may meet his death. His occupation is one of constant peril and what 149 is worse there seems to be no remedy for him.” This idea was reinforced by numerous notices of fatalities such as this one from the 1887 Iron Agitator/Ore; “A miner, Thomas Brewer, was blown to atoms at the Lake Angeline Mine by giant powder he was carrying. . .Maybe his candle set it off, don’t know. This was an unfortunate accident that can’t be prevented” (December 24, 1887). In January 1891, an article entitled “Mine Accidents” in the Ishpeming Iron Ore noted: ...for it (the mining trade) certainly is dangerous no matter how great care may be exercised by miners and companies. Often when the hanging appears to be the firmest there will come a treacherous slip that may bring death or disabling injury, a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, as it were; dynamite sometimes fails to explode when the fuse is lighted and the failure of the men to know this has led to many deaths; skips have been precipitated to the bottom of the shaft by the breaking of a r0pe that everyone thought solid and strong, and a misstep upon a ladder may be the means of serious injury (January 10, 1891). The Mine inspector’s reports also contributed to the concept of the unavoidable accident. Following a fatal accident the findings of the Mine Inspector or the coroner’s jury were routinely reported as “accidental death,” “accidental,” “no blame attached to anyone,” or “an unavoidable accident” (from 1907 and 1905 Mine Inspector’s reports). The concept of the “unavoidable accident” contributed to the high fatality rate because if it was felt that fatal accidents were something that could not be prevented then no one had to do anything about them. However, to consider these accidents as “unavoidable” or perhaps “acts of God” only relieved those who could control the occurrence of the accidents of their responsibility. It can be seen from the data discussed how the eight factors listed contributed to the high fatality rate in the early decades of mining on the Marquette Range. The next 150 chapter will focus on how the factors changed in order to lower the fatality rate and the stimuli for those changes. 151 CHAPTER 9 THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL EVENTS ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE FATALITIES: STIMULI FOR CHANGE Introduction While everything was proceeding well for the Iron Range companies, in spite of the high fatality rate among the miners, many changes were taking place that were to have a great impact on the concept of handling fatal accidents in the mines. These changes were impelled along by events that were occurring not on the Marquette Iron Range, but elsewhere in the country but would direct the mining company philosophy toward the idea of reducing fatalities. These changes would also stimulate an interest by the mining companies in all aspects of the safety of their employees. Significantly, these changes began to appear in the 18903 and the first one-and-a-half decades of the 1900 when the fatality rates were the highest experienced on the iron range. Between 1880 and the first decade of the 1900s, violent strikes, rising unionism, changes in employers’ liability, the threat of Socialism and Populism, economics, and anti-trust laws combined to change the way in which companies viewed work accidents. Work safety began to improve significantly and became a defined movement within large corporations, namely the steel corporations. The mines, closely associated with the steel industry, were included in this movement. Each of the above factors was evaluated in terms of how it affected the eight conditions to which the high fatality rate was attributed in an attempt to define the most important factors involved in deceasing the fatality rate and the stimuli for change. 152 The Role of Economics of the Iron Ore Industry Faced with rising costs, as the mines went deeper and deeper, and increasing competition from the cheaply obtainable ores of the Mesabi Range, the Marquette mining corporations were forced to try to control fixed costs while increasing production. Also, after the Panic of 1893 the price of ore dropped sharply at the mills. The mining companies had to produce more ore at a lower cost in order to make a profit. The greatest expense on the Marquette Range was wages. William Mather told the LSMI in 1898: Now, the main factor in producing ore is labor, averaging about 70% of the total cost on cars at the mines. Therefore, to operate steadily and economically it is of importance to understand what conditions will give a sufficiency of efficient and competent men, and how to keep those we have now, and how to make them more capable. Some of the conditions are good health, intelligence, contentment, and industry, and these should be encouraged while sickness, accidents, ignorance, and restlessness should be overcome as soon as possible. Relief and pension funds, health service, good housing, workingmen’s life insurance associations, co-operative distribution of stores, schools of all kinds, schemes of recreation, and other benefits have been fostered in a wonderful degree by some employers principally in Europe to further the good and prevent the bad conditions above named (p. 12). While Mather concluded that the condition of people in the Lake Superior mining region was far above the average for other mining regions and “many of our employers are alive to their responsibilities,” his survey of operating company accident relief funds showed that the main interest of most employers was saving money for themselves. Contributions for hospital fees were paid mainly by the employee but administered by the employer and more revealing, all of the Marquette Range mines 153 required a formal release of company liability upon payment from the fund in case of accident or death. Although, personally, Mather’s concern may have been humanitarian it appears that he was fully aware of the fact that only profit would catch the interest of most employers. With respect to the cost of illness or injury to the employer, Mather had . done a careful accounting; For example, if the average product for the whole force per man per day is 3 tons for 10 hours, and his wages are $2.00, and if each ton nets a profit of $0.25, then for each hours work he gets $0.20 and produces about one-third of a ton of ore which nets a profit of about $0.08. Now then, if he gets paid by the day, and owing to some of these conditions he only gives 9 hours of good work, you are losing $0.08 a day. Work this out on a basis of 500 to 1,000 men and the result will be a respectable sum. Remember, also, that every ton of daily product lost increases the fixed charge cost on the remainder of the product (LSMI, 1898, p. 18). Still appealing to the economic side of better working conditions Mather continued; The above thoughts have been set forth solely on the supposition that it might pay mining companies and employers in these days of large operation to pursue more thoroughly some of these methods from purely a selfish and pecuniary point of view (LSMI, 1898, p. 19). Mather himself, however, appeared to feel more than a monetary obligation; I would not like to close, however, without hearing witness to the feeling that upon us who have been more favored by education and opportunity for attaining success in the struggle of life than has been vouchsafed to many of our employees, there rests that obligation so well expressed by the words ‘noblesse oblige’ (LSMI, 1898, p. 20). In an attempt to fulfill their obligations and provide better conditions for their employees the mining companies became very paternalistic. Paternalism was not new to the mining regions of the Upper Peninsula and it had many faces. At first, due to the nearly complete isolation of the area, it was necessary for the companies to provide 154 living quarters and a few other essentials in order to attract and hold workers. Later as the amenities provided became more lavish—theaters, libraries, YMCAs, pools and bathing facilities—paternalism was promoted as an open—handed goodwill gesture. The main benefits it provided, however, went to the companies. Paternalism gave the companies a good image with the public and helped attract and hold a much better class of worker. Its cost to the companies was far outweighed by the economic efficiency provided. The Effect of Strikes Violent strikes, nearly 22,000 of them between 1880 and 1900, affected more than 17,000 businesses (Hanger, 1904, p. 1099). Particularly significant to the Marquette Iron Range was what was happening in the steel industry and in other mining areas. In 1872, Michigan’s copper district experienced its first major strike which followed some local activity of members of the International Workingmen’s Association (Thurner, 1984, p. 33). Around 1886 the Knights of Labor became active in the Copper Country and after the Haymarket Square Riot in Chicago, stemming from a strike by iron molders at McCormick Harvester, mine operators in that area became particularly leery of unions. Alexander Agassi, president of Calumet and Hecla, the largest copper mining company, pronounced; “Nothing more thoroughly un- American in practice and principle can well be conceived of then trade unionism” (Thurner, 1984, p. 33). The copper companies, especially Calumet and Hecla, became devoted to keeping the unions out of their mines. 155 Although experiencing little organized union activity themselves, the managers of the Marquette Range iron ore mines were very cognizant of the labor trouble in the Copper Country as well as that in the iron ore shipping industry. Union activity in the lakes shipping industry was a source of longstanding conflict. The first organization of lakes sailors occurred in 1863 and by 1880 the vessel owners had decided to retaliate against the growing union movement. They formed the Cleveland Vessel Owner’s Association whose main goal was to destroy the unions. However, largely due to unpleasant working conditions on the steamboats, the unions gained strength. While many unions battled to represent the men and negotiate contracts, the Pittsburgh Steamship Company (formed in 1901, a subsidiary of US. Steel) came under the leadership of Harry Coulby who quickly went to battle with the unions; “Mr. Coulby has never been noted for his tact, and it is said that the labor unions will find a hearty warrior when they come up against him,” observed the Duluth Evening Herald in 1904 (Miller, 1999, p. 54). Coulby quickly had the unions on the defensive, but not until many weeks of bitter strikes had ensued. Mine managers on the Iron Range also desired to suppress union activity and did so by discouraging, but not forbidding, membership activities. After some short, minor strikes in 1874, 1883, and 1890, mainly for higher wages, the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics commented about the Iron Range; No region was more prosperous or contented, and the almost entire absence of strikes or labor dissentions is conclusive proof that the relation between employer and employe (sic) was agreeable even unto cordiality. No other region in the country employing a like amount of labor can show a better record in this respect (1894, p. 427). 156 However, the relatively high wages that had kept peace in the Iron Country disappeared on the heels of the Panic of 1893. In 1894 there was a six-week strike on the Gogebic Range and in 1895 the Marquette Iron Range experienced the biggest strike in its history. Area miners organized a local, independent union to conduct operations, the Marquette Area Mine Worker’s Union, which grew rapidly. The mining companies requested the Governor to call out the National Guard and the strike collapsed after nine weeks. This strike was non-violent and not over working conditions, but over wages. The miners wanted a wage increase, standard wages paid in all mines, and union recognition (Brinks, 1966, p. 298). Although non-violent the strike clearly represented increasing conflict between employers and employees and convinced corporate mine management that steps had to be taken to restore good relationships between labor and management. The Marquette Iron Range strike of 1895 closely followed the 1892 Pennsylvania Homestead Strike of the Homestead Steel Company owned by Andrew Carnegie and the great Pullman Strike of 1894. Never before had labor and capital been engaged in such organized private warfare as developed at Homestead nor had the public ever become more alarmed over the dangers of industrial strife than during the Pullman strike. The general discontent with their lot in life among industrial workers was reflected in these strikes which occurred in years of depression, unemployment, low wags, and some of the worst working conditions in the industrialized world. The Homestead Strike had to be especially alarming to the companies that Operated mines 157 on the Marquette Range because their mines supplied ore directly to the Carnegie steel mills. Metal miners at Coeur d’Alene Idaho and coal miners in Tennessee also provided a number of violent strikes that undoubtedly drew the attention of the Marquette Range mining companies. The iron mining corporations recognized that what was happening in the isolated Upper Peninsula was a reflection of what was happening throughout the country and hoped to alleviate the situation by improving working conditions and reducing fatal and non-fatal accidents. Although, today, the unions are usually credited with improving working conditions in the mines, making them much safer by reducing the hazard of the job, this is true only in a negative sense. Initially it was the threat of unionization rather than the unions themselves that resulted in a reduction of work hazards and therefore fatal accidents. There was no group that hated unions more than the iron, steel, and copper industry leaders. “We must make it certain that men in our employ are treated as well as, if not a little better than, those who are working for people who deal and contract with unions,” stated U.S. Steel’s Elbert Gary (Wilhelm, 1914, p. 1007). The bitter steel strike of 1919 undoubtedly increased the efforts of the companies to improve working conditions and relationships with their employees. The Role of National Politics and Legislation Added to the woes of the iron and steel industry was the wave of Populism sweeping the country. Rooted in unrest among the nation’s farmers, Populism also strongly appealed to miners of metal ores and coal. The movement was a threat to corporations because it challenged the whole concept of government by organized 158 wealth. The PeOple’s or Populist party, formally organized in 1892, accepted as its basic premise the idea that wealth belonged to those who produced it and strove to recover for workers that political power that was felt to have been usurped by big business. This was just the opposite of what was happening in the iron mines as jobs evaporated and wage rates sank in the Depression of 1893. In addition to the popular political movement, legislation also provided a stimulus for change. In 1890, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed. This act outlawed trusts, combinations of large companies into one that could control an entire market. Examples of such combinations were Standard Oil in 1891, US. Steel in 1901, International Harvester in 1902, and on a somewhat smaller scale Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company in 1891. The anti-trust legislation was toothless but still the trusts that formed wanted to make an attractive image to dispel public apprehension. The Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore tried to allay local distrust of the newly formed CCI in 1891. An editorial entitled “A Corporation: Some Idea As To What The Monster Is, A Brief Description,” after alluding to, “A long time ago...when there was nothing but a few bands of roving Indians, many red deer, and a few black crows,” went on to describe the men who were essential to the utilization of the rich iron ore deposits; Hundreds of thousands of dollars were expended in getting the mines started, and, like the men of the copper district, they were nonresidents of Negaunee and Ishpeming, for the reason that there were no capitalist residents of the wilderness. They provided the money, bought large tracts of land, and paved the way for others to follow them. By their pluck and money they have secured to the country one of its most important industries. . .It was hard work and expensive. . .but success did come, finally, and the path was opened for other companies, and for the miner and the merchants. . .It took millions of dollars to prepare for this 159 and the corporation had to be formed to make it possible. . .That mining corporations can make money and conduct a business that permits them to pay good wages, and promptly, is of greatest benefit to the miner, merchant, and all concerned. . .There is nothing so dangerous in the Corporation (March 28, 1891). With the support of such favorable journalism to improve their image, the mining companies also tried to give the appearance of great social responsibility. One solution offered by some was welfare capitalism. This was exhibited by the development of extensive paternalism in the Marquette iron district. Company-built homes, hospitals, libraries, schools, recreation centers, and even model towns such as Gwinn dotted the area. Paternalism, however, was not an openhanded gesture of goodwill. For the corporations, it had a specific purpose; to appease the workers and keep the unions out. As costs rose and prices declined, the corporations abandoned paternalism quickly. In the long run, it served to alienate certain factions among the workers more than it appeased them. The Role of the Legal System Another factor stimulated interest in accident reduction and better working conditions. This was the fact that the longstanding employer liability laws were failing to protect companies from lawsuits over worker deaths and injuries. By 1907, limitations of employer liability laws were instituted in 26 states and while many judges threw personal injury cases out of court, new liberal judges were letting these cases go to juries. Jurors began to overlook the law and the facts if they got in the way of fairness. and more and more often sided with the injured worker. Additionally, attorneys were appearing in the mining locations who sought out injury (or fatality) 160 cases and urged the worker or his spouse to sue rather than accept out-of-court settlements from the companies. Out-of-court settlements typically cost the companies between $250 to $2,000. For example, in 1904, Olinto Rocchi settled with Quincy Copper Mining Company for $1,000 after losing both legs below the knee in a skip riding accident (Lankton, 1991, p. 136). On the Iron range the settlements were even lower unless the case went to court or a lawyer forced a larger settlement. A woman from the iron country recounted the following; Suppose you lost your husband, lost your son. You go ask the company, ‘How much you gonna give me for my son? You killed him.’ Maybe a hundred dollars. Maybe a couple hundred dollars. You don’t want that, you get nothing. But then people started getting smart. They find a lawyer from Minnesota. In my day I remember that. This fella, the lawyer, was for the worker and not for the company. Because lots of lawyer, the company they buy the man. They give him a thousand, two thousand dollars and you get nothing. But this lawyer, the working man always profit. One man lost an eye. The lawyer make him wise. He say, ‘listen, how much the company gonna give you for that eye?’ ‘Couple hundred dollars.’ ‘Couple hundred dollars: Please don’t sign to pay me. I call that my pay.’ So they sued the company and the time come when they had to go to court, have a trial. So he said, ‘How much do you want to pay that man?’ The company told him, ‘Two hundred, three hundred.’ ‘You want to pay the man seven thousand dollars?’ ‘Oh, my God, no, that’s too much money.’ The lawyer took out his purse, took out seven thousand dollars, put him on the table in court. He said, ‘Come here.’ To the company man, see. . .He pulled a little knife out of his pocket. ‘T hat’s your seven thousand dollars. Come on, I’ll pull one eye off.’ ‘Oh,no,oh,no!’ ‘Well, he said, ‘pay that man. He lost hlS eye. You no want to lose no eye for seven thousand dollars. That poor fella don’t either, so you pay him.’ So he had to pay seven thousand dollars. You bet (Black Rock and Roses, 1975, no pagination). Sympathetic juries often granted an injured employee or his spouse large awards also. These awards created unpredictable and often very large expenses for the companies involved. As early as 1886, a verdict of $5,000 against Cleveland Iron 161 Company was granted in the death of a miner named Husby (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, December 25, 1986). And in 1912, a jury gave a verdict against Michigan’s Quincy Copper Mining Company of $17,500 in a non-fatal accident suit (Lankton, 1991, p. 131). Court decisions began to swing in the worker’s favor and employers began, for the first time, to bear the burden of industrial accidents. Illinois appellate court decisions between 1905 and 1910 were two to one in favor of injured workers (Castrovinci, 1976, p. 67). In 1908 and 1909, the Minnesota supreme court favored the injured worker in 73 % of its decisions, while supreme courts in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa recorded 43 %, 46%, 53 %, and 63 % favorable decisions respectively (Asher, 1974, p. 422-423). In Ohio, from 1906 to 1908, 80% of the verdicts in non-fatal accident cases were decided in favor of the injured worker (Rosner and Markowitz, 1987, p. xii). These rewards greatly increased employer’s liability insurance. Premiums paid by employers rose rapidly going from $103,132 in 1887 to $7,129,444 in 1900, rising to $15,767,818 in 1905, and almost doubling in the next three years to $27,938,311 in 1908. In 1911 employers’ liability insurance premiums reached $35 million nationwide. States varied in the increase of their employers’ liability insurance burden on employers depending on their legal practices, legal environment, industrial mix, and industrial growth. In Massachusetts, between 1901 and 1910 premiums rose 140%. Figures from New York, Minnesota, and Washington show premium increases of 355%, 410%, and 885% respectively (Rosner and Markowitz, 1987). In Minnesota, increases in employer liability losses were so rapid that premiums could not keep pace. Between 1903 and 1907, Minnesota employers’ liability insurers paid out 58% of the premiums. 162 However, in 1908 the figure jumped to 68% and in 1909 rose to 78% (Asher, 1974, pp. 422-423). At the LSMI meeting in 1909, Murray M. Duncan discussed the unjustness of the employer liability system in the US. He noted that the system placed the entire burden of accidents on the employee and, furthermore, that it had been discarded in every industrial country in the world except in the United States and Canada. “Such a system is throughly bad, legally and morally. It creates distrust of the courts and constant irritation between employer and employee” (p. 48). It is clear from Duncan’s paper that underlying the new moral concern about the legal system and compensation for accidents was an economic consideration. Economy, holding down the costs of the mining operation to the lowest possible level, was the real motivation for concern and although veiled, it can be seen that the big problem for the companies with injuries to their employees was not the “unjustness of the employer liability system” but the unknown amount they might have to compensate the employee upon an unfavorable jury decision. “I wish the emphasize the point that compensation to the employee, rather than punishment of the employer, is the correct basis for whatever system is adopted” (Duncan, 1909, p. 50), urged Duncan, speaking in favor of a uniform system for compensation for accidents. I know that the large employers of labor are earnestly striving to protect and safeguard their employees from injuries. The theory of negligence upon which verdicts are rendered is in most cases a mere legal fiction. Juries act upon sympathetic motives rather than because of any conviction that the employer has been really negligent (p. 50). 163 It can also be seen from Duncan’s paper that the iron ore mining industries were in favor of a system of workmen’s compensation, which was yet to become law in Michigan. Duncan stated: But in spite of all precaution, accidents and even deaths are unavoidable in every industry. The principle of compensation is that each industry shall pay in such cases some just and adequate amount, not as damages collected from some alleged negligent employer, but as a method of fairly distributing the extraordinary risks of civilization (pp. 50-51). Although such a system would ensure that the injured party would receive compensation without controversy, which Duncan deemed “a matter of common justice,” it is apparent that such a system would be far more beneficial to the employer. It would keep the cost per accident low for the individual employer and eliminate the possibility of an unpredictably large jury award to the injured party. “Such payments,” Duncan concluded, “become a part of the cost of production, like expenditures for broken down or worn out machinery, and if required by law, so as to place all producers on the same basis, would not be detrimental to the employer (p. 51). In 1912 the State of Michigan enacted a Workmen’s Compensation Law which was the result of a movement initiated by a member of the LSMI (Conibear, 1912, p. 95). This law limited the liability of the mining companies (and others) for injuries to employees to that prescribed by the law and was fully supported by them. The new compensation law furthered efforts to reduce accidents because the fewer accidents that had to be compensated the lower the rate companies paid for the compensation insurance. The factors presented here had the cumulative effect of prodding the companies to improve working conditions for their employees. A major stimulus was provided by 164 the loss of protection from existing employer liability laws. The companies lost their ability to avoid compensation for accidents and it became necessary to protect employees from injury or death in order to protect profit. The companies now had to consider how the remaining conditions that resulted in fatal accidents could be changed to lower the accident rate. 165 CHAPTER 10 THE SAFETY FIRST MOVEMENT ON THE MARQUETTE IRON RANGE Introduction As the 20‘h century began there seemed to be no abatement in the industrial accident rate. PeOple began to compare the workplace with war as coal mine cave-ins and explosions, blast furnace, railroad, and manufacturing accidents claimed thousands of workers’ lives. From 1900 to 1905, for example, the Marquette Iron Range recorded some of its highest death rates; 4.83, 7 .43, 6.52, 4.44, and 5.27 respectively. A group of journalists and writers of this period, called the “muckrakers,” vividly portrayed the dangers of the workplace. An editorial in one popular magazine, The Outlook, demanded the extent of industrial accidents be documented; “in order that the people of the United States may face the situation and understand how cheap human life has become under American conditions” (Slaughter By Accident, October 8, 1904, p.359) Perhaps most significant for the iron miners on the Marquette Range was a 1904 article in Everybody ’s Magazine by muckraker William Hard who described working conditions in the south Chicago plant of US. Steel. Everybody ’5 three million readers were appalled by Hard’s description of men who dropped into vats of molten metal or were showered with steel by sudden explosions in the blast furnaces and the failure of the company to provide safeguards to protect their workers (Hard, 1907, pp. 579-592). This article and others similar to it served not only to unveil the horrid working 166 conditions of labor to the public, but also turned public opinion against the huge steel corporations. The steel industry was pushed to put forth great effort to counter these attacks by improving working and living conditions for their employees. In fact, John Fitch, another popular writer of the period, suggested that Hard’s article spurred US. Steel to begin a campaign to improve safety and reduce accidents (Fitch, 1911, p. 1149). Since the iron ore mines and the steel companies were directly linked by product as well as control, improvements were seen in working conditions in the mines also. Origins of the Safety First Movement Although most safety “experts” claimed that worker carelessness was responsible for 70 to 80% of all injuries, many also understood that to encourage safer work habits the workplace had to be made safe also. Therefore, a central feature of the new safety campaigns had to be their integration into a management function. The incorporation of accident prevention and work safety as a responsibility of management marked the beginning of what is known today as the Safety Movement or Safety First Movement. At this time work accidents ceased being viewed as routine matters of individual carelessness and instead were seen as reflections of management failure. Companies took the responsibility for the safety of their employees. Management interest was essential to reducing the fatal accident rate on the Marquette Iron Range. Although carelessness or lack of knowledge on the part of the miners themselves may have been an important cause of accidents, there was not much of a way to change this until accident reduction became a management priority. In 1913 E. B. Wilson, editor of the Colliery Engineer, told the LSMI: “It is undoubtedly true that the number of accidents may be decreased by united efforts to teach the miners to 167 care for themselves and by using strict disciplinary measures to regulate carelessness and evasion of rules” (Wilson, 1913, p. 111). Safety First generated rules for everyone in every phase of mining the ore and management enforcement made the rules effective. The movement became more and more widely discussed. There was an attempt to spread the idea to everyone because it appeared to have a positive effect on accident reduction. What is considered to be the first modern safety organization was developed at the south Chicago works of Illinois Steel by Robert J. Young between 1906 and 1908 (Aldrich, 1997). Young, who was manager of the plant’s department of safety and relief, organized committees of workers, foremen, and “important officials” to make inspections, investigate accidents, and make recommendations for improvements in work conditions and practices. In 1908, US. Steel adopted Young’s structure and pioneered its own safety program. As the world’s largest corporation, US. Steel had been subject to almost continuous public attack since it was formed in 1901 and needed to improve its image. In March 1908, Chairman of the Board Elbert H. Gary told the company’s managers, “Any requisition which is made for the expenditure of money to install equipment to protect our people will be honored” (Aldrich, 1997, p. 91). By 1900 most of the mining companies on the Marquette Iron Range (except CCI) were owned by the large steel companies and therefore quickly began to organize safety programs also. W. H. Moulton of Ishpeming told the LSMI in 1909, “Special commendation should be given to the Steel Corporation for the study that they have given to promote the safety of its employees” (p. 93). Oliver Mining Company, a US. 168 Steel subsidiary, set up the first safety organization of the Marquette Range in 1910. CCI, the only independent company on the Range, followed in 1911. Literature Analysis of Articles Pertaining to Safety in the LSMI Proceedings The importance of safety and the spread of the Safety Movement throughout the iron ore mining industry can be followed by analyzing the LSMI proceedings. The LSMI began to meet and publish its proceedings in 1893. From then until 1900 four papers (9.7% of the total number of papers) pertaining to some aspect of safe working conditions and/or accident reduction were published. In the next decade safety, and the cause and method of reduction of accidents, was the topic of eight papers (8.8% of the papers for the decade) and from 1911 to 1917 the number jumped to 18 (17.4% of the total papers published) (see Figure 8). It is apparent that by about 1909 the subject of mine safety and accident reduction had become an important topic of discussion. The reason these papers are seen to increase at this time is because of the growing safety movement in the steel and iron ore mining industries. Safety continued to be a topic of discussion at the LSMI and gained in importance. Interest in the promotion of safety resulted in the organization of the Lake Superior Mining Section of the National Safety Council in 1919. I69 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I mm “m mm “m mm “m Au ,0 AV ,0 Au ,0 Au ,0 Au ,0 Au ,0 Au ,0 mm mm mm mm Z Z Z Z Z Z It [I I I I ..I. I 0 0 0 0 m 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 8 9 S C.» z 9 S .V Co Z I O 6 8 9 S E Z O 8 9 S F p _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ i _ _ 1768 I .3: - ma: "9%.: 335.: was: new—2:6 8:5 2: a: mag—332m 2: 5 2:5..— .Sfloaeom 25393.. .35— .S .3528< .35— .bouam 3 wEEav—om 8.92.2 .3 Ban—=2 .w 95$..— salon-Iv JO Iaqmnn 170 noted, In 1909, John T. Quine of Ishpeming, in his paper entitled “Mine Accidents” The accident question in and about the mines is a very serious one and one that commands the attention of all employers of labor. . .It is a question that we have always had with us and will continue with us as long as we are engaged in the mining industry. The question at the present time is receiving more attention from the employer than at any time in the past and a good deal more is being done by the mining companies to prevent accidents and loss of life. In the mines of Marquette county there has been a constant improvement in methods tending to the prevention of accidents. I mean there have been more safeguards thrown around the men at all of our mines (p. 71). It is apparent that Quine supported as causes of accidents both the lack of skilled labor and the high percentage of non-English speaking labor. He noted the movement of experienced miners to the new mining regions and the influx of immigrants to the area. He also felt that carelessness and disobeying orders on the part of the men were major contributors to fatalities. After making a comparison of death rates in coal mines among various countries (United Kingdom = 1.31, British Empire = 1.33, Austria = 1.27, Belgium = 1.04, France = 1.10, Germany = 2.55, United States: 4.66), Quine summarized the data as it affected the overall productivity of labor; Granting that the underlying conditions are often quite different and that many of our industrial accidents are the result of ignorance, recklessness, indifference, disobedience, or carelessness the fact remains that a vast amount of injury is done to health and strength. . .which has a very considerable economic value to the nation as a whole (p. 76). It is also apparent that economic value to the mining companies was also an important consideration in the new movement toward accident reduction. Quine discussed a peculiar custom associated with fatal accidents in the mines of the iron country which had considerable economic impact. 171 The custom at nearly all of our mines in case of fatal accident, is that the men quit work until after the funeral, thereby causing a considerable loss of money in wages to themselves, an average possibly of about $2.30 per day per man, and to the company operating the mine, an average of $500 for fixed charges for every fatal accident that occurs. This has become so deeply rooted that it is almost impossible to overcome it, so that it behooves the mining companies and the men in charge of the different properties to use every precaution in order to try to overcome the accident question (p. 73). Prior to this time economic considerations had excluded any concern for the welfare of the miners. Now the industry recognized that the welfare of the employee had become an important economic factor also. Admitting the earlier philosophy of the mining industry with regard to accidents, W. H. Moulton of Ishpeming addressed the LSMI in 1909; The mining industry must be considered as having one paramount purpose, that of producing ore at the least possible cost and disposing of it at the highest price. . .In the early days of mining there was little thought given to anything but the physical aspects and to how the ores might be extracted and disposed of at the highest price. . .There was too little concern about the man or his family. He was a factor in production and the main question was a sufficient supply of him to produce the required output. Moulton continued, These accidents should demand a most careful study not only for the reduction in economic loss and the added cost of production, but the effect upon the men employed (pp. 82, 83). Many things done by the companies did actually help the employees but the gain for the company was always present. “The mining companies have always stood for good schools,” Moulton told his audience in 1909, “and have been very generous in the question of taxation for school purposes, and the amount of money expended for buildings, equipment, and salaries.” But he concluded, “We should see that. . .the 172 school teaching be so presented that our young men may consider it worth their while to look for their future work in our mines” (Moulton, 1909, p. 87). The companies erected club houses for the men in some areas and CCI and the Lake Angeline Company helped the local people establish a YMCA at Ishpeming. CCI also erected a YMCA at Gwinn, the model town which they built on the Marquette Range. Although not bad for anyone involved the reason is again spelled out by Moulton; If the broad YMCA plan should be introduced in all of the various mining localities. . .much might be done in solving the problem of how to assimilate the large numbers of men coming to our communities not acquainted with our customs, habits of living and ideals of government (p. 92). CCI also adopted a pension system in 1909 (Moulton, 1909, p. 95). As with other welfare programs many of the benefits derived accrued to the employer. A pension plan provided a way to attract and hold employees. One problem the mine operators had faced for a long time was a constant movement away from the Marquette Iron Range of skilled employees in search of better opportunities. The unskilled who replaced these men created a liability in terms of accidents, raised fixed costs through their inefficiency and were, because of their political beliefs, highly susceptible to the overtures of the unions. A pension plan would bind the employee more closely to the company and since unions were, in effect, competitors for the loyalty of workers the plans would serve to undermine them also. As public distrust of large companies grew, mainly through the efforts of the “muckraker” journalists, pension plans also helped them create a favorable public image. 173 Now what are we going to do with these men (the aged employee)? asked an employer in 1928. It is easy to say that we owe them nothing and that when we are through with them we will simply cast them adrift. But you know and I know that we don’t do anything of the kind—not if we are running a large company or one that is much under public scrutiny... (Brandes, 1976, p. 103). In 1911 Elbert Gary stressed that management had a duty not only to themselves but also to the public and to the company’s workers. Safe and healthful working conditions were, he stressed, both “right” and “of advantage to employers” (Aldrich, 1997, p. 92). In 1912 US. Steel spent $750,000 per year in accident prevention and saved over $1.4 million in injury payments (Aldrich, 1997, p. 92). It is easy to see that management was transforming safety work from humanitarianism into a truly profitable activity. From 1911 on, the influence of the “Safety First” movement in the iron ore mines is very markedly reflected in the LSMI proceedings. At the 1911 meeting, Alex M. Gow of Duluth, Minnesota, in his paper describing some safety devices of the Oliver Iron Mining Company made direct reference to the safety program of US. Steel: The Oliver Iron Mining company, which is the ore-producing subsidiary of the US. Steel Corporation has been diligently working along lines suggested by the general safety committee (of US. Steel). . .to formulate plans for the safeguarding of employees (p. 159). In the same year, in his paper entitled “Social Surrounding of the Mine Employee,” Charles E. Lawrence of Iron Mountain made reference to the “Safety First” movement as he discussed how safety work could be carried out in the mines. The safety committee, composed of from 3 to 5 employees of average intelligence, at each mine, could easily criticise (sic) all dangerous places, and have them properly fixed to save injury. Their report of 174 criticism could be gone over by a meeting of bosses and employees, say once a month, and in this way, spread the general information of “Safety First,” which makes a vital, live subject in which each and all are interested (p. 123). However, he left no doubt about the economic side of the issue. He, in fact, made it the primary concern. After he noted that the labor cost in mining was from two-thirds to three-fourths of the cost of production Lawrence concluded: The suggestions offered seem warranted and demanded, first, because of financial returns and second on civic humane grounds, also to change the small distorted ideas of the foreign laborer towards his employer to one of mutual respect and confidence, all of which will give a cheaper cost in the ore produced. . .(p. 125). In 1912 William Conibear of Ishpeming began his paper detailing the system of safety inspection of the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company; “Conservation of human life is the slogan of the industrial world today. Recognizing that it is of prime importance to prevent injury, not alone from a humanitarian standpoint but also because it pays as a business proposition...” (p. 94). The economic advantage to be gained from accident reduction remained a prime consideration of the Safety Movement on the Iron Range. At a meeting of the Lake Superior Mine Safety Conference in 1923 George Martinson, the Range Safety Inspector for Pickands-Mather Company, used an economic comparison to illustrate the advances in safety work that had been made; Arthur H. Young...states that the US. Steel Corporation, during the period from January 1, 1912 to September 30, 1922, spent in safety work $9,763,063. Using the cost of accidents to the International Harvester Company as a basis for figuring the total saving, (Young) found that $16,541,240 had been saved. This figure is based on the assumption that the frequency rate (of accidents) would have continued to be the same as in 1906, if no effort had been made to reduce 175 accidents. Thus it can be seen that an investment of $9,763,063 saved an expenditure of $16,542,240 or a net savings of $5,779,177 (p. 64). Martinson concluded; In closing I wish to thank you for your past cooperation and ask you to continue to assist us in our efforts to eliminate in so far as possible the terrible economic waste resulting from industrial accidents (p. 67). In 1912, William Conibear admitted that economic considerations had been more important than the accident problem and that the high fatality rate could have been prevented. The economic phase of mining, however, has been paramount and perhaps there has not been the amount of attention devoted to safety that it is justly entitled to. As a consequence the fatality rate has not shown a marked reduction nor does it compare favorably with the fatality rate in other mining districts of the country (p. 95). Conibear went on to describe CCI’s safety rules and regulations printed in English, Finnish, and Italian, which each workman received. Additionally, he discussed the system of safety inspection and safety committees, provision for first aid at the mine (started under the instruction of the US. Bureau of Mines), and the company’s mine rescue stations. In 1914 the first annual first-aid contest was held at Ishpeming, sponsored by the LSMI. The Institute had appointed a committee on the Practice for the Prevention of Accidents in 1912. This committee represented the first active interest of the Institute in safety work (Stevenson, 1914, pp. 269-270). The report of the contest, given at the 1914 meeting, credited the Safety Movement for stimulating the interest in first aid to the injured in the mines. After noting that the inception of first aid work in the Lake Superior mines had followed its development in other districts, but was 176 undergoing rapid development at the time, C. S. Stevenson, the contest announcer, made the following observation; “The development of the idea of safety in mining has perhaps resulted largely from the tremendous “Safety First” movement which had invaded all industries throughout America within the past 10 years” (p. 269). That the mine itself represented a safety problem in the early days of mining is a fact. Nothing was lighted, protected, or even kept in an orderly fashion. The mine was often a trash heap of sorts that reflected the prevailing attitude of get the ore out quickly and cheaply. A mine is, by its nature, not a permanent feature and it was treated as such. At the 1923 Lake Superior Safety Conference, J. H. Hearding, assistant general manager of the Oliver Iron Mining Company in Duluth, provided some reflections from the earlier days of mining that pointed out how much progress had been made in making mining a safer operation. You men will be surprised to know that at that time there was not a shaft or raise that had a rail around the collar and there were no regulations making it necessary (p. 119). He related the case of a Cousin Jack mining captain who was standing at the bottom of a raise at the moment that a miner fell through and landed at his feet. The Captain said, “Ere, ‘ere, my son, wot art a don’ ‘theer,” and the miner replied, “Damme, captain, l was walkin’ along and got to the raise and jus’ as I was goan’ across, I stepped on a plank, and the plank wasn’t theer, and down I come plank and all” (p. 122). And in his memoirs, Charles Stakel, CCI Mining Engineer recounted a 1928 trip to Iron Mountain to observe a mine which consistently went a whole year without a 177 lost time accident. The striking thing about the mine was the extreme cleanliness and orderliness. Everything was well lit and white washed. Steel gates protected all openings that a man could fall through and all of the miners wore goggles and hard- toed boots. Upon his return, Stakel and the mine captain in the Morris-Lloyd Mine at North Lake undertook an extensive house cleaning campaign. Stakel related that in addition to the house cleaning, We also adopted a set of rules and regulations to make sure that every miner was doing his work in an orderly fashion in the proper way, with the idea that if a miner and all other employees were performing their occupations in the proper manner they would not only be more efficient, but there would also be no accidents (Nelson, Nelson, and Williams, 1994, pp. 113-114). And it worked recalled Stakel, “The Morris-Lloyd Mine ran 465 days or about a year and one-third without a lost time accident” (p. 114). This occurrence precipitated the first CCI sponsored safety picnic, on Labor Day, September 2, 1929, for the employees of all CCI mines, as well as those of the Morris-Lloyd, and their families. The idea was to spread the news of this outstanding accomplishment and the method through which it was accomplished. William Conibear said of the company sponsored picnic, What I have in mind is that I want the other mines to know what the Morris-Lloyd mine has accomplished, and I think perhaps we can shame them into having a better safety record (Nelson, Nelson, and Williams, 1994, p. 114). William Mather, then president of CCI, also wanted to be present. ...I want to congratulate the employees of the Morris-Lloyd Mine for having made this wonderful no lost time record for 465 days, something that has never happened before in the annals of the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company (Nelson, Nelson, and Williams, 1994, p. 115). 178 This unique event occurred nearly 30 years after CCI was formed, 46 years after the main groups of non-English speaking immigrants had arrived to work in the mines, 42 years after the office of Mine Inspector was instituted, and after nearly 50 years of technological development and improvement. The reduction in accidents that resulted in the first safety picnic was possible only after it had become apparent that the accident problem did have a solution. Previously, no solution had been sought simply because there was no need to find one. But to lower the accident rate, both fatal and non-fatal, had become economically, legally, and politically advantageous for the mining and steel corporations. In order to protect their pocketbook, the managers and owners of the large companies had to take an interest in accident reduction and safety, and the sincerity of that interest had to be communicated to the men by visible improvements and, above all, enforcement of rules and regulations. Accident reduction had to become everybody’s business. Necessity of Management Involvement in Fatal Accident Reduction There are plentiful examples from the analysis of LSMI proceedings that point to the fact that the fatal accident rate could not be reduced until it became a management priority. The cooperation of the men was certainly necessary but that could only be gained through enforcement of safety rules that originated at management level. Safety did not begin in the mine, it began in the office. In 1913 Edwin Higgins, District engineer of the US. Bureau of Mines, had noted, “The seed of ‘Safety First’ sowed some years ago on the iron ranges has become firmly rooted”(p. 63). After enumerating the types and successes of various safety devices and measures, Higgins discussed the accident problem and its solution; “The 179 average miner resents suggestions for his safety,” Higgins noted. “He will take care of his dinner pail and he will be careful to get all that is coming to him from his contract, but he will not take the necessary precautions to safeguard his life” (p. 81). Higgins then arrived at the root of the problem as he saw it; Safety devices are good and they are absolutely essential for protecting the miner; if they could be coupled with a mine full of men whose thoughts were for their safety, then conditions would begin to approach the ideal. The method of securing this cooperation is the problem of management. . .(pp. 81-82). In other words, management had to have an interest in safety and could make it effective through enforcement of rules from the top down. Unless the mine official is of the firm belief that safety pays, little may be expected from the men under him. The best results seem to be forthcoming from the mines where the slogan ‘safety first’ is strong with the officials, and by them is made to permeate every department until it finally reaches. . .the men behind the drill, the pick and the shovel (p. 81). Realizing the necessity of securing the interest of top management in order to make the safety idea effective, Higgins closed his paper with an allusion to the economic side of the issue: “The protection of our fellowman is a duty that we owe to ourselves and to mankind. If there is no appeal in the humane side of the question, study it from a standpoint of dollars and cents, for safety in mines pays, first, last and all the time” (p. 84). At the LSMI meeting in 1929, it is apparent that the idea of accident prevention as a management function was well established. First stating that 95% of all accidents were preventable, D. R. Henderson, Chief of the Accident Prevention Division of the Industrial Commission of Labor of Minnesota, went on to explain that; 180 The cause of these accidents was the carelessness of somebody. There is where accident prevention science has its greatest battle to fight—eliminating carelessness and destroying the false sense of security in the minds of employers, foremen and workers of the rank and file of industry (p. 139). He continued, Only continuous pounding and repetition by safety engineers on the value and means of avoiding accidents can permanently establish the habit of safety and self-preservation in the imperfect human brain (p. 140). Safety work must be organized. This can only be accomplished through safety organizations. The efficient safety organization starts at the top—the owner, a manager of the plant must be sold to the idea of safety. . .A safety organization without an enthusiastic management back of it is a failure (p. 141). Henderson also acknowledged that many efforts were not sincere, Too many organizations are started with the sole purpose of securing a reduction in insurance rates. . .or that the employer feels he has to or is required by law to provide safeguards to protect his employees (p. 141). An interesting statement made by William Conibear, safety inspector for CCI, to the LSMI in 1925, illustrates the role of operators in reducing fatalities: In 1911 a number of Lake Superior mine operators decided that in order to reduce accidents it was essential to provide safer working conditions and that employees should be shown that their safety was a prime and fundamental consideration. With this object in view, safety departments were organized and campaigns for the reduction of accidents were inaugurated. Interest in this phase of mining has increased since 1911, and today practically all operators, recognizing their responsibility for the prevention of injuries and accidental deaths, are concentrating their best effort on plans for the elimination of the hazards of the industry. No longer is the economic phase of mining regarded as paramount. Equal in importance has become the slogan ‘Safety First’ (p. 314). D. Harrington, Chief of the Safety Division, US. Bureau of Mines, reinforced the idea of the necessity of management involvement in safety in his address to the LSMI in 1930. He stated: 181 The exact form of the safety organization is not nearly as essential as is the necessity to have a definite organization looking toward forwarding mine safety and with the correct spirit behind the organization. One of the essentials without which it is nearly impossible to get real results in mine accident prevention work is that the mine officials, not only the lower operating ones but, fully as important, those in higher positions, should be in full accord with the vital importance of mine safety. . .It is significant that where in a few isolated cases, the ‘higher ups’ are really interested in safety, their mines almost invariably have good safety conditions and good safety records (pp. 300-301). According to Harrington, although important, interest by the “higher ups’ was rare. This was in metal mines in general in the United States, not specifically the Marquette Range Iron mines, where management interest in safety was generally high. The idea that safety was something that must be backed by rules and regulations was also brought out in Harrington’s paper, “ . . .by far the most important factor is education and by far the best method to provide widespread education among employees in and around the mine. . .is the very effective combination of intensive intelligent supervision and careful, rigid discipline” (p. 303). Also, it appears that the idea of working safely was difficult to ingrain, “It has been said that safety can be secured and maintained only by everlastingly keeping at it, and this is most certainly true; any relaxation in ‘keeping at it’ is practically sure to result in at least a relative increase in accidents” (pp. 302-303). But it wasn’t just the idea of working safely or just “safety” that finally made the greatest inroads into reducing the number of fatal accidents and all accidents in general in the mines. It was the recognition by the owners and operators that there had to be a fixed and uniform set of rules or standards to follow in every phase of the mining operation, and it was the responsibility of the employer to see that these 182 standards were enforced. The standards, as defined by William Meyers, Superintendent of Holmes and Tilden mines, were basically safe work practices which he defined as simply the best methods to carry out the mining Operation that could be devised at the time they were adopted. Meyers told the LSMI in 1930: “The significance of the safety movement will not be understood or appreciated where doubts exist or opinions differ as to what really constitutes safe practices” (p. 149). These work standards would be designed by the mine officials and enforced by the foremen. The information for setting the standards by which men work would be gleaned from those who carry out the work or whose duty it was to see that the work is done. Management must use this information to force men to observe safe practices. What it boiled down to, according to Meyers, was discipline; “Formulating or prescribing a code of safety standards for the various operation. . .will not of itself stop accidents” (p. 152). What must be had was the cooperation of all employees, infraction of rules or regulations could not be condoned. “Disciplinary leniency will not direct the serious attention of men to the object and purpose to be derived from the observance of standards” (p. 152). Supervision, discipline, and management involvement were the important factors in accident prevention according to Meyers. “Safety in industry is now acknowledged as an executive matter. Present day advanced safety practices in industry places the responsibility for accidents and their prevention directly upon the employer” (p. 148). In 1930 William Conibear gave a talk to the LSMI outlining the success of CCI’s safety program. He noted that failure to conform to well defined safety standards 183 on the part of both supervisory force and the men in the mines was the direct cause of 75% of all non-fatal injuries that had occurred in the past 40 years. As experience showed that the causes of many accidents were traceable to unsafe ways of doing work, negligence, and indifference, standardization of mine equipment and mine operations became imperative. . .and it has resulted in the desired effect of reducing accidents (p. 182). Necessity of Worker Involvement in Fatal Accident Reduction As management became involved in reducing workplace fatalities, a myriad of warnings, printed rules and regulations, and accounts of mine accidents with illustrations showing how men were injured came into existence as methods of securing the cooperation of the miner to take precautions for his safety. Inspection committees and personal contact of employees with officials, captains, and shift bosses were also thought to be effective. But according to Higgins in 1913; “These methods are more or less productive of results, but there still exists a woeful lack of willing cooperation among the miners. Just how this condition may be improved is a problem, the solution of which will do much for the cause of safety in the mines” (p. 83). Higgins suggested that all of a company’s safety devices, rules, and regulations were essential for protecting the miner but, “Far more good may be accomplished by securing the cooperation of the man underground than by the use of safety devices or measures of any other kind” (p. 81)- In a message directed to the Lake Superior Mine Operators at the Lake Superior Safety Conference of 1923, J. H. Hearding, Assistant General Manager of the Oliver Mining Company, noted that education was the best policy for reducing accrdents. 184 Mechanical contrivances can be used to limit the dangers and great work has been accomplished in making devices which will produce safer conditions for the man working in and about the mines. But the better method is. . .the education of the men in regard to their own safety, and the safety of their fellow men. That education has done, and will do, more than anything else to conserve life, limb, and property (p. 121). Hearding pointed out that safety work had reduced the accidents to approximately one-half and in closing remarked; “That record is a very remarkable one and is due, as I said in the first part of this address, to the education of the men to perform their work in a safe manner” (p. 123). In the same year, B. D. Shove, Safety Engineer for the Oliver Mining Company, stressed an ingredient necessary to the success of any safety program—cooperation; In order that we may get the best results out of our campaign to prevent accidents it is absolutely necessary that all concerned worked wrth greater unity and closer cooperation (1923, p. 123). He continued, The workman enters into this cooperation plan to a very large degree. The greatest part of his personal safety is up to the man himself. When our men are educated to the extent of feeling ashamed of themselves when injured because it reflects on their workmanship and efficiency, then we will get far better results (1923, p. 125). Also, at the 1925 meeting Frank O. Botsford, District Manager of Pickands-Mather Company of Hibbing, Minnesota, looked back to the earlier days of mining and the creation of various safety departments by the iron ore mining companies. He recalled the following: As I look back to those days I can see that our first efforts to further the promotion of safety were very crude. We had never given the question much thought; we believed that our mines were as safe as anyone could reasonably expect them to be; we felt that we were taking every 185 precaution to insure the safety of all employees. We see today, after years of thinking and analyzing from a safety standpoint, that many conditions that we believed to be safe then were actually hazardous to a high degree. This clearer vision was not developed by any change in our ideas as to the value of human life, but was brought about by the thinking along safety lines by safety engineers, mine Operators, and by the men themselves. The power of thought is unlimited and when a large number of men are thinking on one subject the dark corners become bright. They see more, they see more accurately. Where before we saw the obvious now we see all sides and even beyond the object or condition viewed, and discover the hidden danger which would not have been visible to us if we had depended on our eyesight alone. It is the thinking of many men that is responsible for the great progress in safety work, and our future advancement will depend entirely on how clearly we think (pp. 290-291). The major decrease in fatality rate seen in 1920 resulted from a combination of the events that occurred in the decade before 1920, the pressure of national events, public pressure, and most importantly the effects of the Safety First Movement. 186 CHAPTER 11 ANALYSIS OF F ATALITY DATA Introduction Analysis of the fatality data generated by the present research indicates that the period of underground mining for which fatality rates can be calculated (1889-1979) can be divided into three distinct segments on the basis of a major change in the average fatality rate:8 (1) 1889 tO 1919, a 31-year period in which, with only one exception, the annual fatality rate was greater than 4/1,000 underground workers. The average fatality rate for the period was 4.87/1 ,000. (2) 1920 to 1960, a 40-year period in which the annual fatality rate dropped to substantially less than 3.0 fatalities per 1,000 underground employees. In this 40-year period, there were only four years in which the underground fatality rate rose above 3.0/1,000. The average fatality rate for the period was 1.48/1,000. (3) A period beginning in 1960 in which there were several consecutive years where no fatalities among the underground employees were reported. In this 20-year period there were only four years in which fatalities occurred. The average fatality rate for the period was 0.56/1,000. 8The first decade Of underground mining on the Marquette Range has been omitted from the final analysis because no fatality rates can be calculated and therefore the basis for comparison is lost. The likelihood that this decade was one with a very high number of fatalities has already been discussed. It is also very likely that the fatality rate was high because at that time in the evolution Of the iron ore mining industry production was highly dependent on manpower. 187 1889 to 1919 Inclusive: The Era of High Fatality Rates It is not difficult to explain the high fatality rates in the period before 1919. They resulted from the mix of social, technological, political, legal, and economic factors discussed in the previous chapters. The list of eight factors believed tO have been responsible for the high fatality rate compiled by others and presented in Chapter 2 covers the causes well. There are no solid data that point to one factor as a greater contributor to the high fatality rate than any of the others. They all combined to make the fatality rates in the iron ore mines Of the Marquette Range some of the highest in the world in mining at that time. The conditions that existed on the Marquette Range during the 1889 to 1919 period were conducive tO both the occurrence and acceptance of a high number of fatalities in the mines. The mines were being rapidly developed because Of increasing demand for their product in an isolated region in which a largely non-English speaking, immigrant workforce, consisting of relatively young, inexperienced laborers toiled in the absence of supervisory control and protective laws. The contract mining system which treated miners as private contractors, prohibited any effective managerial control of the miners underground, and dulled supervisory interest in safety. This was legally reinforced by employer liability laws which made accidents cheap, or even free, for the mine Operators. “Carelessness,” generally considered the main contributor to fatal accidents, was diminished as a cause by Crystal Eastrnan’s study. Widely publicized as the cause of fatalities, it was also one of the primary defenses that employers had to protect themselves from liability for accidents. Coupling the known hazards of the industry, 188 also widely publicized, with the fact that the fatalities were considered to be non- preventable ensured the employer of winning any lawsuits that might arise. Undoubtedly some men were simply careless when they should have known better but, as Eastman found, most “careless” acts could be attributed to concrete causes. It was easy to attribute accidents to the carelessness of the man who died, the result, of course, was that the real causes remained undefined. To reduce or prevent fatalities, however, the real causes needed to be identified. In 1989, US. Bureau Of Mines research showed that more than 80 percent Of all coal mining accidents, in some way, involved human error. A Bureau researcher stated, “Inadequate or inappropriate performance is often dismissed as the individual’s human error, but when individuals commit errors, there are causes for these mistakes. We must seek to discover these causes” (Ary, 1989, p. 10). Lack of mining skill was also a contributor to the high number of fatalities during the first four decades of mining. Between 1880 and 1896 a large number of skilled miners left the Marquette Range for better opportunities elsewhere. Unsettled conditions and numerous strikes, especially the Strike Of 1895, also contributed to the loss of skilled labor. The skilled miners were replaced by men who had little prior mining experience, mainly the Finnish beginning in 1883 and the Italians beginning in 1887. As the unskilled replaced the skilled the fatality rate went up (see Figure 5). During this period, the greatest number of deaths occurred among men in their 205 (see Table 12). There are no data from which the age of the entire mining workforce at a given time can be determined but it is logical to assume that, as a whole, the mine workers were relatively young. The high number Of men in their 203 189 killed is an indication of this as a fact. Additional factors related to age that could contribute to the likelihood of a fatal accident are inexperience and the fact that men in this age group are more daring and possibly not as responsible as their Older counterparts. An account of the death of Frank Hooper supports this suggestion; “Frank Cooper met death in the Republic Mine when in disregard of orders he tried to jump on a moving skip, slipped and fell 120 feet. He was 18 (Mine Inspector’s Report, Daily Mining Journal, October 17, 1896). The lack of enforceable rules and supervision was also an important contributor to these fatalities. The data also shows that the largest number of men killed were Finnish (see Table 12). The Finnish came to represent the largest proportion Of the underground workforce on the Marquette Range (see Table 7). It is logical that they would have the highest exposure to the hazards that existed. Additionally, as already noted, they were not skilled miners, and many did not speak English. It would be expected that men who could not understand the language of their boss or supervisor, which was English, or could not understand each others language while on the job, would be more apt to encounter accidents. Their inability to understand specific directions or to heed warnings from fellow workers would leave them extremely vulnerable. By 1909 the US. Immigration Report shows that only 57.3% of the mine workers spoke English (see Table 9). Up to 1910, Of the deaths reported in the Ishpeming Iron A gitator/Ore and the Mine Inspector Reports where it was possible to determine nationality, it was found that 257 men died whose native tongue was not English and 99 died whose native tongue was English. These numbers 190 Ill .88 BEE— fio> ... E G 4N : S RN 5 a S 4.4 OS 4.: SN 44 434.4 I. H l. .I i I. ..I monafi I a m 4 _ I I W82 1 I m n I w l mama N m m l I w _ I N 4 w o m I momfl m o m N a 2 4 I N 4 a 2 m I 8% .2 mm a m N. mm mm H H S cm pm on 0 2:3 2 mm N N on w» :4 l N E Om 04 N» 2 moomfi o 4 m 2 2 w4 4 I I m 2 MN 2 4 83: Q 2 _ _ 2 c m l l M c o "N o .483“ a SEQ: =3t2=< .2..— ovotm Ami—Eh Amzwnm m2. 3m. 3m 3w mom men Each. 985. 53.33 348.5 S Jud—am .8..— 88332 2: no 852 “engage—=5 2: 5 522.382 can ow< .3 85.5.3 .S 2an 191 could reflect a higher propensity for those who did not speak English to be involved in fatal accidents or simply the higher number Of foreign workers employed. The effects of technology on the high fatality rate before 1912 have also already been discussed. There is not a lot of data from which to draw that pertain to the exact timing of the introduction of new technology on the Marquette Range. However, it is known that both new technology and mining methods were introduced relatively early in the history of the underground mining (beginning in the early 18805). It is also known that all mines did not employ the same technology and that some were not far removed from being scrap heaps. There is also an indication that in order to control fixed costs, which was a major problem on the Marquette Range due to intense competition, especially in times of recession or depression, equipment may have been run to its limit before it was replaced. In 1900, President of the LSMI William Kelly recounted the many ways in which individual mine operators cut costs after the Panic Of 1893: When the Panic came and the mines curtailed Operations there was a surplus of mining material of different kinds which was drawn on until exhausted. . .this ‘skinning’ process could only be for a time and when expansion came again, replacements were all the greater (p. 22). Kelly also noted: Under the necessity for retrenchment, the duties of every position were carefully scrutinized and readjusted. Thus, a skip tender was dispensed with at one level by putting in a speaking tube to the next, or a skip tender was intrusted with the care Of the pump, or a dry-house man required to look after the oils or an oil man to make wedges. Those who had held the abolished places were not necessarily dismissed, but when possible, were added to the forces more actively engaged in increasing production (p. 20). 192 Men, put into a job for which they lacked experience or knowledge and using worn equipment and supplies, could easily be involved in fatal accidents. This is particularly true during the 1890 decade after 1893. The Bureau of Labor report of 1898 suggested that accidents were not necessarily due to the use of Old or new technology, but instead were related to the lack of inspection of existing equipment and the lack Of installation, on equipment, of safety devices that existed and were required by the State Factory Inspection Laws with which the mines did not have to comply. The lack of compliance with even those safety features required by the Mine Inspector Law was also noted by the Bureau of Labor. Examination of the data in Table 10 shows that before 1912 the leading cause Of death in the mines was falls of rock from the back or hanging. This was an accident factor that was very difficult to control. It diminished significantly after 1920 but remained the leading killer throughout the underground history of the Range. This factor was the least controllable by technology. It was a random occurrence that had to be guarded against by taking extreme care and Observing the best mining practices and mine safety procedures. Education and skill of the miners was the best protection against this type of accident because, basically, the men had to protect themselves from this hazard. Until they were induced to become extremely careful, this cause Of death remained high. There were 317 deaths due to falling rock and 137 deaths that could be attributed to technology (new or Old machinery and electricity) from 1880 to 1920. After 1920 falling rock caused 75 fatalities and technology caused 22. The suggestion that a change in mining method may have saved many lives was also found in the LSMI Proceedings. Stating that a considerable decrease in the loss of 193 life due to falling rock occurred when the principal method of ore extraction was changed from Open stoping to top-slicing and sub-level caving, J . H. Hearding recounted these improvements at the 1923 Lake Superior Safety Conference; At that time we were using what was called an Open stope. . .the Open stope disappeared long ago with the improvement of mining and the adaptation of new methods. The Open stope was a large room as big as this room, and the miners had to continually trim the back, and occasionally it would break loose and come down, severely injuring and sometimes killing the miners. The Open stopes were replaced with a practice coming from Nevada where there were large ore bodies. This new method was called the square set. The square sets were discarded and the top slicing method adopted...then we went from the square set to the present “sub” system (sub-level caving)...All of those conditions have been continually changing for the better, producing greater safety for all employees, and particularly for the man who is doing the work in the mine (p. 120). Whether or not sub-level caving was eventually used in all mines on the Marquette Range is not known, nor is the exact date of introduction. The method was, however, introduced into the Lake Angeline Mine in 1891. It can be seen in Table 10 that the number of fatalities caused by rock falls from the back decreased from 109 in the 18803 to 63 in the 18903 but then slowly increased until 1920 when it showed a substantial decrease. If the decrease in fatalities in the 18903 was related to the change in mining method then it was responsible for saving a large number of lives. 1920 to 1959 Inclusive: Accounting for the Substantial Decrease in Fatality Rate Examination of the data in Table 4 and Figure 2 shows a sharp, substantial decline in the fatality rate in 1920. From that time on the fatality rate rose about 3.0/1,000 in only four years. Answering the question Of why, for example, from 1910 to 1919 did approximately four out Of every 1,000 underground mine employees die 194 whereas from 1920 to 1929 only 1.7 out of every 1,000 died is a major Objective of the research. It can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 2 that the raw number of fatal accidents also declined sharply in 1920. For example, the total number of deaths from 1910 to 1919 was 159 and the total number from 1920 to 1929 was 39. This decrease in the raw number of fatalities is partially related tO a decrease in employment which also occurred beginning about 1920 (see Table 4 and Figure 4). This trend would be expected. It must be remembered that it is the exposure of men to the hazards (risks) of the job that determines the likelihood Of fatal accidents occurring. The more men employed the higher the exposure and the higher the number of fatalities and vice versa. In an attempt to obtain some information on the precision and linearity of the relationship between the number employed and the number of fatalities that occurred, a scatterplot was constructed (see Figure 10). It is obvious from the scatterplot that the relationship between the two sets of data is approximately linear. A regression line (a = —6.47, b = 0006+) was determined using the least squares criterion and drawn on the scatterplot. Again, the approximate linearity of the relationship is Obvious. The fact that all of the points do not lie along one line indicates that, in addition to employment, other factors were involved in the determination of the number of deaths that occurred. The correlation coefficient (r = 0.91) suggests a strong but, again, not perfect relationship between employment numbers and the number Of deaths. At least a portion Of the variability in the actual versus the predicted numbers Of deaths 195 iuamfioldmg fl «aofimeEEM—Iol 2:30: 3m 8nd .3qu D 6061 " 0061 6681 ' 0681 61.61 '0L61 6Z61’0Z61 6161'0161 E 6961 " 0961 com I ooo— I oom— l O O O N l r comm % 89:. 1 comm r cog4 % 0034 .4 I I I I 6 6 S .7 .0 n.u I I I 6 6 6 S .7 Co 6 6 6 fi— —# _ .“_ — —_ d a « II [ -4 om J r o3 Ll om— 14 com 25m .33 - :3 "mafia: E:— ozoseaaz 95 .8 852 2.523353 2: E 332— ..e non—:52 .35. ES 3389 3 EoE?EEH 03.5.34 .a charm own “[3330 196 oooo Enamel—um ooow ooon oooo ooom oooo4 ooom ooom 83 090 we“. 0 8 6 + o o o o o o co 8 o o 0 0» o u 0i 0 o o o o o o ”foo u R ..x . n» 5 2:89 .3 3:8: Z 2: ES ...oEmeEEH 5950m— oEnaomua—om 26:3 enaEfiEaaz .on 2am:— éa - ca: 325. .5: 0:25.52 2: E. 8:22 1:59.302: 2: o~ 2 on mm on mm ov mv om 9113330 197 is not related to employment. Generally, after 1920, the regression overestimates the number of deaths. Obviously, the substantial drop in fatality rate seen in 1920 is not related to employment numbers (see Figure 3 and Figure 11). Explanation of this Observed decline and of the approximate rather than perfect linearity of the relationship between the number of fatalities and employment is a major objective of this research. It is difficult to correlate the 1920 decrease in fatalities and fatality rate with new innovations in mining technology (machinery) or methods. The use of the safer, sub-level caving method of mining was well established by this time and apparently widely used by 1920 (Hearding, 1923, p. 120). Around 1912 ventilation by mechanical control was started and used in all deep mines (Conibear, 1936, p. 183). The need to supply fresh air in underground working places was pointed out by the US. Bureau of Mines as necessary to preserving health and increasing labor efficiency but not as a method Of reducing the fatality rate. Although certainly contributing to a better (and therefore perhaps safer) working environment, this innovation would hardly be expected to produce such a quick and marked decrease in the fatality rate. It is not known how many mines used this new technique of ventilation. Additionally, ventilation, using compressed air, had been used in the mines for many years previously. 198 inamfiqdmg acacia”: I 03qu uom 8mm :89 ”U was»; I I I I I I I I I 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 L 9 S .V E z I 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I I I I I I I I 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 L 9 S .V Cu z I 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 I ooo~ L I oooN - O O O M l 1 ooow4 I I ooom I oooo 1 1 ooob 1 .4. :4 .1 (06501de 0001 13a sumo) l I v 4 I. V) ooow .33 - oafi News: E:— 38332 2: .3 852 ESP—whoona 2: E 2339 no: 83— 5.8: own—954 on: Enamsofim «aw—9.54 .2 95mg mu llama 199 Undoubtedly, up to 1920 there had been a continual improvement in the capability and efficiency of mining machinery Of all types which contributed to a safer work environment. However, no mention was found Of an innovation around 1920 that would have contributed to the large decrease in fatality rate seen then. The most likely scenario, suggested by the limited past history of the introduction Of technology on the Marquette Range, is that new technologies and methods were gradually introduced with 1 some mines changing and some holding on to the Old ways. This would produce a steady decline in fatality rate but not the sudden one Observed. The mining workforce was aging which may have made them more cautious. Also the unskilled workers who replaced the skilled workers who left the Marquette Range in the late 18003 were, by this time, more familiar with their jobs. The same is also true for the status Of immigrants and their ability to speak and understand English. The percent of immigrants who spoke English increased markedly with their years in the United States. 95.3% Of all races who had been in the US. ten years or more could speak English according to the US. Immigration Report of 1911 (see Table 13). Additionally, by 1911 many Of the miners must have been second generation. The effects of age, skill, and proficiency in English would have produced a gradual decline in the fatality rate. At this point in time, these changes would not have been of sufficient impact to lower the fatality rate so quickly and as much as is observed. They would contribute to a steady, gradual decrease. 200 Table 13. Percent of Foreign-Born Male Employees Who Speak English, By Years in the US. and Nationalig. Percent Who Speak English, by Years in Number Nationality United States Reporting Under 5 5 to 9 10 or More Total Croatian 16.5 65.2 85.0 32.3 158 Finnish 30.9 76.1 93.3 60.5 661 Italian, N. 32.6 80.0 94.0 45.3 541 Polish 30.5 77.1 90.2 51.1 393 Slovak 62.1 97.9 100.0 81.9 127 Swedish 63.6 96.3 100.0 89.4 160 Total 33.3 80.4 95.3 57.3 2,408 Note: From Immigrants in Industries, 1911, p. 428. There were three occurrences before 1920 which could help explain at least a portion of the decrease in fatality rate and the number Of fatalities seen then; (1) In 1911 the Michigan Legislature passed a bill whereby the County Mine Inspector would be elected by popular vote rather than appointed by the appropriate county board Of supervisors as he had been since 1887 (Michigan Public Acts, 1911, pp. 263-267). A previous bill also required the inspector to visit each mine in his district every 60 days rather than once a year (Michigan Public Acts, 1897, pp. 140- 141). This changed the role of the Mine Inspector in the eyes of the mining companies. The inspector still had no enforcement powers but his selection by popular vote could not guarantee to the companies that the man in the job would be sympathetic to their views. Previous statements in annual Mine Inspector Reports indicate that at least some companies (or mine managers) played to the Mine Inspector’s self-importance, “extending him every courtesy” and he, in turn, assured that the companies were 201 “doing everything in their power to make their mines safe and reduce the number of accidents.” But with a person of unknown sympathy around every 60 days and the specter of the published annual report, it became advantageous for the companies to actually improve working conditions and therefore safety in their mines. (2) In 1912, Michigan adopted a system of Workmen’s Compensation. Workmen’s Compensation made companies give specified monetary awards to injured employees who were out of work for a certain length of time and to dependents of fatal accident victims. The mining companies desired to participate in Workmen’s Compensation because they gained a cap on the amount an employee or his dependents could receive. It ended the uncertainty about large jury settlements and the companies could budget the amount needed to cover accident expenses per year. However, to keep their rating good and their insurance expenses low, it was necessary to actually reduce the number Of fatal and lost-time injury accidents. Safe working conditions in the mines became of prime importance. (3) In March of 1911, CCI founded a safety department and appointed the company’s first safety inspector, William Conibear. The safety department published a booklet of rules and regulations in English, Finnish, and Italian for all of their mines and established penalties for disobedience, set up local mine safety committees which reported to a central committee, instituted first-aid training and established five mine rescue stations. They also started a safety bonus for mine foremen to encourage them to place safety on the same level Of importance with production (Conibear, 1912, pp. 96- 102). Later data indicated that in CCl~Owned mines the fatality rate per 1,000 men was 4.9 from 1906 to 1910 and in the five years following the founding Of the safety 202 department in 1911, the rate dropped to 2.8/1,000. In fact, in only 18 months a decrease of 16% to 20% in minor accidents was noticed (Conibear, 1912, p. 110). Although this data covers only CCI-owned mines, CCI was the largest producer and employer on the Range and therefore their decrease in fatalities could easily affect the overall average. The impending Workmen’s Compensation Law and the new amendments to the Mine Inspector Law induced CCI to attempt to make their mines safer places to work. It was becoming economically important for them to do so. Also, already discussed in detail were several factors that, even though they were outside Of the mines and the Marquette Range, had a marked effect upon the ways in which the mining companies viewed their employees and the conditions in the mines. In the late 18‘h and early 19‘h centuries employers, not only in the Marquette Range mines, but all over the country moved to combat strikes and unionism, the threat of Populism and Socialism, anti-trust legislation and changes in the employer’s liability system. The companies also needed to “look good” because they had become under intense public scrutiny as the result of articles about the horrid working conditions endured by laborers which were published in popular magazines by the “muckraker” journalists. The growing distrust of the large corporations and disgust over the treatment of labor was reflected to them through jury decisions. They suddenly found themselves paying large settlements for workplace accidents and deaths. The companies needed to move in such a way that they could continue to make large profits but also appear interested in the welfare of their employees and their employees’ families. The stimuli and resultant necessity for change culminated in methods Of improving working 203 conditions to promote safety and decrease the number Of accidents. These proved to be cost effective techniques and were the essence of the Safety First Movement. It was this Safety Movement that was ultimately responsible for the decrease in the fatality rate initially seen in 1920. The frequent references to the Safety Movement and its success in reducing fatalities found in the LSMI Proceedings are also supporting evidence Of its introduction and effectiveness. 1961 to 1979; Significance of Five Final Fatalities on the Marquette Iron Range The last period chosen again shows a remarkable decease in fatality rate. After 1961 there were several consecutive years in which the fatality rate was zero. Between 1961 and 1979 there were only five years in which fatal accidents occurred. The only year with more than one fatal accident was 1967 in which five fatalities occurred. The fatalities that occurred in this year are very instructive in terms Of the hypothesis that it was the Safety Movement, the rules and regulations set forth by management, that resulted in the major decrease in fatality rate seen in 1920. The probability that five fatal accidents would occur in 1967 is less than 0.001. Analysis of the causes of these very low probability fatalities indicates that they follow the exact pattern Of those that occurred in the earlier years. Two were attributable to machinery, two were the result of a blasting accident, and one involved a man who was knocked down a raise by a large timber that was being lowered. One of the machinery accidents involved the failure of a bolt. A diagram and the circumstances of the accident were submitted to the US. Bureau of Mines for further study in hopes that in the future accidents of this type could be prevented. The other machinery accident occurred when a motorman failed to activate the warning 204 signals as required. The explosive accident occurred as two men set off a blast which detonated a cache of ammonium nitrate, dynamite, and electric blasting caps that was improperly stored and they did not know was there. The timberman was knocked down the raise because he was not wearing a safety belt. The technology was up-tO-date, the men experienced, skilled, and able to speak and understand English. Also, the employment (1,008) was far below the value that would produce five fatalities (2,004). In four of the accidents (the exception is the broken bolt), it could be said the men killed (or their fellow workers) were “careless” but their carelessness constituted not following the stated safety rules and regulations of the mining company. This unfortunate, multiple fatality year is an excellent illustration Of the essence of the philosophy Of the Safety First Movement. Four of the five accidents illustrate that the fatality rate in the iron ore mines would have remained high had it not been for the Safety Movement. Adherence to the existing safety rules could have prevented them from occurring. With respect to blasting accidents, but applicable to all accidents, William Conibear had stated in 1936: We found that well-defined standards for the handling. . .Of detonators and dynamite are guides pointing the way to freedom from many accidents. . .Of course, like all standards, their effectiveness depends upon leaving no leeway for deviation from safe practice (p. 183). Each piece of equipment could be thoroughly guarded, all dangerous places fenced off, and every conceivable hazard covered by a rule or regulation but, ultimately, accidents could continue to occur and lives could still be lost in the recovery of the iron ore. It is apparent that progress in the prevention Of accidents could be made only by getting the individual to think safety. 205 As early as 1925, Frank O. Botsford had addressed the importance of individual attention to safety at the Lake Superior Safety Conference: Our first thoughts were wrong, ‘stated Botsford.’ Before writing our rules we should have sold the idea of safety to the men. We should have stimulated in the men the desire for a few rules to insure safe Operations. We attempted to force the idea of safety on the man without taking into consideration his thought, or better, his lack of thought in the matter. Our miners in the pioneer days Of safety could not see the need for safety rules and for this reason refused to accept them and abide by them (p. 291). Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study What was the social cost of underground iron ore production on the Marquette Iron Range? Expressed in numbers alone, 309,423,209 tons of ore were produced and 957 lives were lost. Every 323,326 tons Of ore cost one life. Of course, the total social cost extends much further; the loss of productivity, the economic and emotional impact on the immediate family and the impact on relatives and local organizations Often called upon for support of orphaned children and widows who could not work. This, multiplied by thousands of workers in other industries across the country, raises the total social cost of early industrialization significantly. Looking back at the factors that were proposed as the causes Of fatal accidents on the Marquette Iron Range it can be seen that changes in three of them produced the most favorable results with respect to decreasing the fatal accident rate: (1) Laxity in mine discipline and lack Of managerial control of the miners and mine Operation, (2) Absence of any laws forcing the companies to employ only trained miners in the responsible and dangerous occupations or to provide inspection of mines or mine equipment to ensure safe working conditions, and (3) Lack of any laws forcing 206 compensation for fatalities by the employer. Changes in these factors, brought about by conditions that stimulated the Safety First Movement, saved the lives Of many miners. If the average fatality rate had continued to be what it was in the first three decades of mining during which a rate could be calculated, then 344 more miners would have died, a total of 1,301 rather than 957. This represents a substantial decease in the social cost of mining on the Marquette Iron Range. Considering the stimuli for the Safety Movement three things stand out clearly: (1) In our society ultimate control of the conditions of employment, including working conditions, rests with the employers. Therefore the fatality rate did not drop significantly until the owners and operator of the mines, the management, took an interest in reducing it. Only then could the importance of safety be communicated to the workers. (2) The human element is a major factor in accidents and therefore the cooperation of the workers was necessary for the Safety Movement to become effective. How this cooperation was to be gained constituted a significant part Of the safety problem. This is illustrated today in the Ukraine which has the world’s highest coal industry death rate. The death rate is mainly blamed on two factors, (1) miners’ neglect of safety rules, and (2) outdated equipment (Flint Journal, Tuesday, May 25, 1999). The existence of industry standards, rules and regulations, and state or federal laws does not guarantee that they will be obeyed by the workers. Therefore, enforcement and discipline are part of the preventative process. 207 (3) Constant vigilance is necessary in order to maintain the successes of preventative practices. This can be seen from the five fatalities that occurred in 1967 on the Marquette Iron Range. In 1992 the first Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries was implemented in all 50 states and the District of Columbia (Toscano and Windau, 1993, p. 41). The Census reported 6,083 fatal occupational injuries (Toscano and Windau, p. 45). In 1997 the BLS Census reported 6,218 fatal occupational injuries (Jacobs, 1999, p. 348). These figures represent a vast improvement over Frederick Hoffman’s estimate of 25,000 workplace deaths in 1915. However, regardless Of the policies designed to prevent them, over 6,000 fatal workplace injuries probably occur in the United States each year and between 1992 and 1997 there was actually an increase Of 135 fatal accidents per year. The reason that this number Of fatal accidents continues to occur is related to the lack of information on the causes and is best summarized by Toscano and Windau; It has been stated that policy can be made without data but that a better policy can be made with data. Indeed, data are part of the solution for injury prevention. Many safety experts regard fatal work injuries as sentinel events in that their occurrence indicates a failure in preventive practices. Unfortunately, the safety and health community has lacked the basic information needed to assess the full sc0pe of these tragic events (pp.44— 45). For this reason, a study of the causes and remedies Of fatal mine accidents is essential. Even though they occurred decades ago, an analysis of their causes adds to the empirical basis from which basic information needed for prevention can still be drawn. 208 The accumulation of data pertaining to the causes and remedies of fatal accidents becomes even more pertinent as President Bush and Senate Republicans overturn Clinton administration rules that protected workers against injuries from repetitive motion. While these are not fatal injuries, the move by the present administration is a step in the wrong direction and in itself will create an increased social cost that society has to bear. This research has shown that it is the lack Of exactly these types of rules that result in an increase in workplace accidents, non-fatal and eventually fatal. This study has concentrated on fatal mine accidents on the Marquette Iron Range. There has been no comparison among the three Michigan Ranges. Valuable information could be obtained by comparing the Marquette Range fatal mine accident history with that of the Gogebic and Menominee Ranges. This would help to; (1) refine the data pertaining to the causes and remedies of fatal mine accidents in Michigan, and (2) further assess the role of the Safety First Movement in making the mines safer. A comparison of the Marquette Range fatal mine accident history with that of a different mining industry over the same period of time but in a different social setting would provide further information on the causes and remedies of fatal accidents. It would also aid in analyzing the connection between the Safety Movement in the steel industry and that in the iron mining industry. It would provide interesting data pertaining to the spread Of the Safety Movement into those mining industries not connected to the steel industry. A study of the fatal accident history in two different industries, iron mining and railroading in Michigan, for example, would reveal whether the same or different 209 causes and remedies of fatal accidents were involved. This would be more difficult because the physical conditions of the workplace would have to be normalized in some way. However, the information gleaned would have more general application in the prevention of fatal work accidents. With respect to the Marquette Iron Range alone, an in~depth study Of just one mine throughout its working life would be valuable. The type of technology and the timing of its introduction, the mining method(s) used, detailed employment data (number employed, age, nationality, days worked, wages), history and timing of unionization, and fatality data could be analyzed to produce a clearer picture Of some of the relationships noted in the present research. 210 APPENDIX 211 APPENDIX ADDITIONAL QUOTATIONS Chapter 7 Pages 88-89 “The Republic Mine is one of the safest in the peninsula, taking its’ size into consideration (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, July 29, 1882). Champion is one of the handsomest and most delightful mining locations in the upper peninsula. The school houses, churches, townhall, and library are a credit to a city Of 10,000. Clean, nice places, two well kept hotels, and a well built sidewalk longer than one mile (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, June 29, 1889). There is a new hospital at Barnum Mine (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, October 19, 1889). The alleys here are filth laden—boxes are used for vegetable matter—slops; need a sewerage system (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, June 14, 1890). Residents of American Mine are throwing leps and garbage into the county road in front of their homes. This is illegal (Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore, December 12, 1891). While there are a few complaints heard from the men who work in the mines, the companies will give them a just share of the gain, and this they will do of their own accord, a rule they have ever practiced in this mining region, and one which is a credit to their sense of justice and fairness. . .This region is blessed with a good class of labor which ought to be maintained according tO their capacity, and it also has one Of the most liberal lot of mining companies to be found anywhere. . .This is a region of many advantages in the way of public schools, churches, municipal benefits, libraries, water, lighting, highways, and numerous other features which add to the comforts Of home and its surroundings, which elevate the mind, educate the rising generation and give a true insight into American independence... (Michigan Miner, 1900, p. 22). 212 Pages 90-91 It’s unbelievable the way lighting changed in the mines. First there was candles with a spur on it so you could take it out of your hat and stick it on a post or timber. . .If you were in a drafty place you had a hard time keeping them burning. You had to go down the tunnel backwards so the wind wouldn’t blow out your light. They were afraid Of fire so they had torches in very few places. . .there isn’t any place in the world where it is such total darkness... (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). When I was a kid. . .I used to help the old dry man give out sunshine balls. The lamp looked just like a coffee pot hanging from your hat, but smaller. Sunshine came in big balls and you put it in hot water so it would get soft like lard, then you’d take a cup and put it in the lamp with a little cover on it. After that came carbide lamps and finally electric lights which lasted for twelve hours before you put them back on the charging station. In the Old days, though, it was just as well that you couldn’t see (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). ...The dry was a building where the men changed, because when they came up they would be soaking wet with iron ore water. . .You could always tell a miner’s home because of the red underwear. It started out white but it ended up being red even after it was washed. In fact all Of the clothes they wore underground would be dyed that hematite color (Bernhardt, 1975, no pagination). There was a strangely subdued almost funeral quietness in the room. This was noticeable whenever there has (sic) been news of an accidental death at one of the company properties. In folk lore, it portended God- awful consequences because accidental deaths. . .are suppose (sic) to happen one following closely behind the next and in clusters of three. The spooky question is, who will be the next to go? As I remember, it was the day when two men working at the Mather A Mine...were literally evaporated when boxes of dynamite accidentally detonated... (Etelamaki, 1998, p. 85). ...what about the man who takes a job which requires him to drop thousands of feet down into a dark hole while packed into a metal box like sardines in a can and at the other end in the engine house some distance away another mistake prone imperfect human like yourself has the levers in his hands that control destiny while (you) ride down to (your) work place deep within the bowels of the earth. Otherwise, if it wasn’t for the lure of money, only a half wit would take that ride (Etelamaki, 1998, p. 89). 213 In my experience, driving rock drift (making a tunnel in rock) was the most hellish Of all places to work. . .Compared to any other job the primary attraction of working in a rock drift was the opportunity to earn bonus pay. . .It was the night-marish conditions with the rock drift that now brings (sic) me to write about it. . .While drilling a pattern of holes preparing for the blast, one had to contend with the deafening racket made by two large pneumatic drilling machines. . .Then there was the fog like mist mixed with oil which spewed from the exhaust of the machines and like working in a dense fog vision was limited. The heavy oil necessary to lubricate the drilling machines. . .clogged the dust p. collecting pads in respirators. It made no sense tO change pads because they would clog up in a short time. Usually the respirator was a nuisance even when it did what it was intended to do. The company issued two piece wet suits that shed the water coming in from the outside but it also kept the sweat inside. Safety goggles were mandatory, but in that fog and mist,...they were practically more a threat to the miners safety than they were as it protection of his eyes (Etelamaki, 1998, pp.91-93). What condemns man to work in these conditions. First, there is the matter of a paycheck. Second, there is the matter Of the paycheck. ~ Third, no doubt many miners, like myself, thought of running away but the lure Of money and being the bread winners in the family, the whip of necessity kept us coming back. . .Finally, most miners will agree, in these parts the mines were not the worse place to work (Etelamaki, 1998, p. 93). Down in the mine, one was made consciously aware Of his mortality. I quickly add, not to the extreme of being frozen stiff with fear. The thought seemed to lurk a hair below the consciousness level. With a little experience like a combat veteran, one learned not to fight reality but to make adjustments to deal with it. In truth it wasn’t the most hazardous occupation in the world. Regardless, it took a little more courage to grab hold of the lunch pail at home and go to work in the mine than it was (sic) to go to a two martini lunch with a group of white collar workers (Etelamaki, 1998, p. ). 214 Pages 92-93 From the Ishpeming Iron agitator/Ore.- Edward Lamrew, age 40, an Englishman, was killed by a fall Of ore at Milwaukee Mine (February 7, 1880). David Little, aged 40, was killed at the New York Mine after being hit by a rock falling from the roof (May 1, 1880). Joseph Belandley, a French Canadian, was killed by a fall from a platform at the Winthrop Mine (May 22, 1880). 11 died when Lake Superior Powder Company blew up (September 10, 1881). More than 2,000 railroad workers were killed and 1,230 crippled last year for lack Of a safe coupler (November 18, 1882). The volcanoes have killed 100,000 people in the last month (September 15, 1883). More than 100 men and boys killed in hunting accidents in the last six weeks (January 7, 1882). A miner died of smallpox (January 14, 1882). A man age 22 died of scarlet fever (April 8, 1882). Chapter 8 Page 119 From the Ishpeming Iron Agitator/Ore: Ole Olsen, a Swede, aged 26, was killed at Lake Superior Mine by a fall of rock. He worked there 3 or 4 months (November 20, 1880). Thomas Ryan, aged 21, was killed when he fell in a stope at the Cleveland Mine. He had worked there a short time after coming from Vermont (January 15, 1881). Alfred Hopstadt died at Cleveland Lake Shaft. He walked into the shaft. He had worked there two weeks (September 19, 1891). 215 Charles Freethy was killed at the Salisbury on Monday by a fall of ground. He was 19 and had worked there 3 months (December 17, 1892). Pages 131-132 From the Ishpeming Iron A gitator/Ore: William Snell, aged 36, was killed when crushed by falling rock he was baring down at Jackson Mine. . .carelessness as he disobeyed orders (July 16, 1881). John Magnuson, age 40, was killed when hit by a falling plank at Barnum Mine due to carelessness of himself (March 31, 1883). 3 men were killed riding in the skip—they knew it was against the rules, there are signs in the shaft house that state the rules but riding 530 feet is easier than walking. Men gain nothing by riding skips, it is forbidden; they risk their lives merely to avoid descending ladders as do hundreds of men daily (August 13, 1887). Ed Olilla, age 18, was caught by a fall of rock at Cleveland Mine...and instantly killed. Work wasn’t finished baring down ground—all knew it but he went there anyway. No one blames anyone (April 7, 1888). 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