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
IN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

presented by

JUNHAN LEE

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

PH.D. degree in POLITICAL SCIENCE



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ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

By

Junhan Lee

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

By

Junhan Lee

This study undertakes a two-fold task. First, I probe the relationship between economic conditions and voter turnout at the national level elections in South Korea and Taiwan after the democratic transition in the mid-1980s. Second, I investigate the association between economic conditions and electoral support in the two countries' national elections in the 1990s. This study is based on the assumption that voters in these countries are not likely to be mobilized any longer as they have been under authoritarian regimes.

Nonetheless, long lasting regional conflicts between Cholla province and Kyungsang province still have a significant impact on the decisions of who to vote for in South Korea. In Taiwan, traditional ethnic conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders have significantly affected voters' choices. Regional and ethnic conflicts have been frequently utilized and manipulated by political leaders in maximizing their vote returns in the two nations. In this research project, I compare the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior with those of old regional (or ethnic) cleavages in each country. Also, I investigate the impacts of the socioeconomic factors, the social psychological factors, the political mobilization factors, and the party identification factors on voting behavior.

I utilize the survey data sets from the Institute for Korean Election Studies (IKES) and the National Chengchi University (NCU). The IKES provides survey data for the 1992 and 1996 National Assembly elections and the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections. The NCU conducted surveys for the 1992 and 1995 Legislative Yuan elections and the 1996 Presidential election. South Korea's National Assembly is equivalent to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. In analyzing the survey data, I employ probit for the two-way choices, for instance, voters' choice between vote and abstention or between two parties (or candidates). For the three-way choices, I employ multinomial logit.

The main findings of the study are as follows: First, economic conditions appear to have had nothing to do with voter turnout in South Korea and Taiwan. Second, regional and ethnic cleavages were not significant for voter participation in South Korea and Taiwan, respectively. Third, genuine economic voting was evident in the most recent elections (the 1997 South Korean race and the 1996 Taiwanese election). Fourth, regionalism was consistently significant throughout the South Korean elections under study, while ethnic cleavages did not have a consistent impact on vote returns in Taiwan.

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I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents. I cannot thank them enough for their love and support. My sister and brothers deserve my deepest thanks for their love and support, too. They also took good care of my parents while I was studying in the U.S. I am also very grateful to my adviser, Professor Brian D. Silver, for his guidance throughout my graduate years and his comments on the drafts of this dissertation at various stages. His thoughtful advice always improved the quality of this research project. Professors Dennis P. Patterson, Jeffrey M. Riedinger, and David W. Rohde (in alphabetical order) also provided me with ideas and encouragement whenever I came across problems in writing this dissertation.

My thanks also go to those who greatly encouraged and helped me to complete my study in many ways: Sangwoo Han, Seungwon Kim, Nam-young Lee, Taesup Lee, and Chan Wook Park (in alphabetical order). In addition, I should list all the names who nurtured me during my life at Michigan State University. However, the list may exceed the length of the “Literature Cited” section at the end of this dissertation. So, I just note the four very special names, Beobmo Koo, Hoa Sun Lee, Yonghee Lee, and Chansu Park (in alphabetical order). I know for certain that they will always be in my wonderful memories at Michigan State University for the rest of my life. Finally, I praise God for guiding me all the way to this moment and making everything possible, as I believe he will continue to do.

When I started to think about my dissertation many years ago (alas!), I decided to write about electoral politics in Asia including my mother country, South Korea. The

question struck me, “Do Asian people also vote according to their perceptions about economic conditions under democratic governments, as the voters do in other democracies?” At the beginning, I wanted to cover all the democratic countries in Asia but I realized that South Korea and Taiwan were the countries that had survey data available and comparable to each other. When I conducted the statistical analyses, I was frustrated to find the surveys unsystematic and inconsistent, unlike U.S. National Election Study surveys. Sometimes, the surveys do not use exactly the same survey questions with the same codes. Other times, Taiwan’s surveys lack some survey questions compatible to those of South Korea’s surveys or vice versa. Nonetheless, without the survey data sets, it would have been impossible for me to even start this study. Whereas I am solely responsible for the analyses and interpretation of the survey data sets, I wish to extend my thanks to the researchers at the IKES and the NCU.

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

CJY: Chung Ju Young

CPS: the Center for Political Studies

CSDP: the Chinese Social Democratic Party

DJP: the Democratic Justice Party

DLP: the Democratic Liberal Party

DP: the Democratic Party

DPP: the Democratic Progressive Party

GNP: the Grand National Party

IKES: the Institute for Korean Election Studies

IND: Independents

KDJ: Kim Dae Jung

KMT: the Kuomintang

KYS: Kim Young Sam

LHC: Lee Hoe Chang

LIJ: Lee In Je

LTH: Lee Teng-hui

LYK: Lin Yang-kang

NCNP: the National Congress for New Politics

NCU: the National Chengchi University

NDRP: the New Democratic Republican Party

NES: the National Election Studies

NKP: the New Korea Party

NP: the Chinese New Party

NPRP: the New Political Reform Party

PCJ: Park Chan Jong

PDP: the Peace and Democratic Party

PMM: Peng Ming-min

RDP: the Reunification Democratic Party

SRC: the Survey Research Center

ULD: the United Liberal Democrats

UPP: the United People's Party

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Hypotheses of the Dissertation

I launch an investigation into the relationship between economics and elections in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea and Taiwan have undergone a genuine transition to democracy. By democracy, I mean a political system where rulers are chosen in free and fair elections, which are regularly held and participated in by people with considerable political rights and civil liberties.¹ Democracy rests on the premise that no citizens compete for power in anything other than elections or are excluded from participating in the selection of leaders. In these democratic societies, individuals are more likely to vote for the party that may maximize their interests.

Since the democratic transition in the mid-1980s, elections in the two countries are generally considered free, fair, and competitive. Compared to previous elections under authoritarianism, voters also exhibited different behavior. In South Korea, for instance, a peaceful power transfer from the ruling party to an opposition party took place for the first time in its history in 1997. Considering a long electoral history, the power

¹ This study is based on Schumpeter's electoral definition of democracy, instead of Diamond's liberal definition of democracy. The bottom line is that there is no democracy without elections. Schumpeter's notion of electoral democracy, however, has been criticized because elections can be held with the systematic abuses of political rights and civil liberties (Diamond 1996; Karl 1995). In contrast, the liberal definition of democracy does not allow us to find many democracies in the real world. Thus, I emphasize the new practice of "free, fair, and competitive" elections in defining a democratic society.

alternation was a miraculous event.² This power transfer was not possible without political actors' willingness to abide by the democratic rules of the game. Additionally, it was as late as 1988 when the Taiwanese began to vote for the candidates who they liked to support in the context of competing parties. Prior to the 1987 lifting of martial law, there had been no legal opposition parties other than the satellite parties of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in the political arena.³ Voter decisions became even more complicated when a dissident group of the KMT came out to build the Chinese New Party (NP) in 1993. Since then, there were three major parties (the KMT, the DPP, and the NP) in Taiwan's electoral politics. Furthermore, Taiwan also embraced a power transfer in the 2000 Presidential election.

In this research project, I attempt to answer the following questions: What are the features of the new voting behavior in South Korea and Taiwan after the democratic transition? As in other democracies, do voters in these two countries cast their ballots for the party that promotes their economic interests? More specifically, do economic factors have an impact on voters' choices? If so, to what extent are voters affected by economic conditions? If not, why? The effects of economic conditions on elections can be two-fold. In other words, economic circumstances have impacts on both the decisions of whether people vote and how they vote. Consequently, I examine how the state of the

² The first general election in South Korea was held on May 10, 1948.

³ It was in the 1977 local election that the Tangwai (meaning outside the [KMT] party) became the main opposition by winning 35% of the seats in the Provincial Assembly and 20% of the county magistrates. The Tangwai movement was transformed into a political party (the Democratic Progressive Party: DPP) in September 1986. Although martial law was lifted in July 1987, it was not until April of 1988 that the KMT regime officially legalized the DPP. The satellite parties were, for example, the China Youth Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party in the 1970s and 1980s (Tien 1989, 85).

economy affects voter turnout as well as the fate of the incumbent party in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s.

First, my hypothesis on voter turnout follows Rosenstone's theory (1982) that if the state of economic affairs is worse than before, voter turnout is likely to be lower. Conversely, if the state of the economy is better than before, voter turnout is likely to be higher. Because people with economic adversity cannot afford time and effort to manage anything other than their daily lives, they are less likely to go to the polling places. Similarly, when economic difficulties prevail in a society, voter turnout is likely to drop.

Second, my hypothesis about voter choice is that if economic conditions are worse than before, individuals are less likely to vote for the incumbent party. Conversely, if economic conditions are better than before, individuals are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. According to Mueller (1970, 34), when the economy is in trouble, people are likely to vote for an opposition party in order to punish the incumbent party; which is responsible for the bad economy (the responsibility hypothesis, see also Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Thus, it is more often than not observed that the incumbent party tries to prevent an economic downturn or improve the state of the economy before the election campaign starts. This will not jeopardize electoral victory of the incumbent party.

2. Electoral Studies in South Korea and Taiwan

In South Korea, some previous studies have suggested that mobilization factors have a significant impact on voter participation. According to the mobilization theory,

voter mobilization was more likely to occur among rural residents, older people, and less educated people than their urban, young, and educated counterparts. Mo, Brady, and Ro (1991, 21-2) attempt to solve the puzzle that although urban voters were likely to have higher education and more income than rural voters, urban residents voted less than rural residents.⁴ The 1988 National Assembly election survey by the Korea Gallup revealed that rural voters were more likely to be mobilized to the polling booths than their urban counterparts. Also, Park (1993b, 7) finds that younger people and more educated people were unlikely to vote in the 1992 National Assembly election. On the other hand, according to Lee (1993, 44-5), interest in election, age, political efficacy, and occupation were the significant variables in explaining voter turnout in the 1992 National Assembly election.

With survey data from the 1997 Presidential election, Kim (1998, 210) resolves the discrepancies of the socioeconomic effects on voter participation. He emphasizes the different impacts of the socioeconomic and mobilization factors on different voters. Among voluntary voters, individuals with higher education and income were more likely to go to the polling booths than individuals with lower education and income. In contrast, voter mobilization occurred more frequently among people with lower education and income than among people with higher education and income. Because the number of people with lower education and income exceeded the number of people with higher education and income, the former marked a higher turnout rate than the latter.⁵

⁴ These findings contradict the socioeconomic model of voter turnout that will be presented in Chapter II.

⁵ There is no English-written research done on voter turnout in Taiwan. The literature reviewed in this section covers all that I have located in English-language academic journals thus far. I also cite a couple of South Korean articles published in Korean.

Regarding the determinants of South Korean voters' choices, regionalism has been identified as the most significant factor (Lee 1993; Morriss 1996; Park 1993a, 1993b). By regionalism, I mean that voters are likely to cast their ballots for the party that is led by the leaders from the same home province as the voters.⁶ Political leaders have built their parties based heavily on their home province and have personalized their parties. In addition, because political leaders merged and split their party so often and changed their party's name so frequently, there may have not been enough time for voters to develop genuine party identification, as the voters have developed in the U.S.⁷ Instead, voters have developed a strong attachment to their regional leader.

After the democratic transition in South Korea, the ruling party could no longer mobilize voters, as it had under the military-backed authoritarian regimes, although regionalism is still reported to have played a pivotal role in the recent elections. While Park (1993a, 453) reaffirms the significance of regionalism, he also finds the impact of issue voting with a statistical analysis of survey data from the 1992 Presidential election. Voters took into account their retrospective evaluations and the campaign issues of the candidates. Based on the statistical analyses of survey data, however, Kim (1993, 117-18) uncovers an insignificant relationship between economic conditions and electoral returns in the 1992 Presidential election.

⁶ Since the 1960s, the former presidents (Park Jung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young Sam) were originally from Kyungsang province (southeast area) and they overdeveloped the economy in Kyungsang province compared to the economy in Cholla province (southwest area). The current president (Kim Dae Jung) is from Cholla province and the other political leader (Kim Jong Pil) is based on Choongchung province (central area). They were elected president by voters from their home province, with the exception of Kim Jong Pil. He has not been elected president yet. The regional conflicts occur most seriously between Cholla and Kyungsang provinces.

⁷ Perhaps no other countries have experienced party mergers and splits more frequently than South Korea. Between January 1963 and January 2000, 82 parties have been formed. This means that about 2.2 parties

While Lee (1998) observes the significance of regionalism again in an analysis of survey data from the 1997 Presidential election, he sheds new light on economic voting in South Korea. Voters cast their ballots with sociotropic considerations and voted in accordance with both retrospective evaluations and prospective promises of the presidential candidates. In addition, Kim (1998) reports that economic voting was significant in the regions where regionalism was weak in the 1997 Presidential election.

In Taiwan, ethnic divisions have played a critical role in electoral politics, as regionalism has done in South Korea. The Chinese Mainlanders (the KMT) moved to Taiwan in 1949 when they were defeated by the communist party. The KMT built a new capital in Taipei in 1949 and ruled in Taiwan until 1999. The term “Mainlanders” refers to those who came to the island after 1949, while the term “Taiwanese” means those who came before the Japanese colonization of the island in 1895. While the KMT is based on the Mainlanders, the DPP’s support mainly comes from the native Taiwanese islanders. Such ethnic divisions have encouraged individuals to vote on the basis of their origin and ethnic voting has characterized Taiwanese voting behavior (Cheng 1995, 1-2). The ethnic divisions are also tightly connected to the issues of national identity (or unification). The KMT is viewed as pro-unification, whereas the DPP is pro-independence. The NP shares the Mainlanders’ votes with the KMT and is considered to be ultra pro-unification.

Taiwan’s citizens recently decided for whom to vote often with respect to their issue preferences. This is partly because of the fact that as the old generation from the

have been built every year (The Korea Central Daily January 21, 2000). Yet, the parties are not totally new. They simply change their names while excluding or including some politicians.

mainland diminishes, so does ethnic voting. With a survey data analysis of the 1993 local elections, Hsieh and Niou (N.d., 23) observe that issues (the economy, national identity, the environment, social stability, local public works, and anti-corruption) affected voter choice. In the 1994 local elections, Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou (1996, 69) also find that “the economy can be every bit as important as Taiwan independence and national security issues.” Voters were affected by both retrospective and prospective evaluations.

Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou (N.d., 20) find that the economy had a significant impact on the 1996 Presidential election with a survey data analysis. Voters were prospective rather than retrospective. Hsieh and Niou (1996, 546-47) also find that while national identity was still the most significant variable, constitutional reform, the candidate’s honesty and integrity, and religion were other significant issues in the 1996 Presidential election. Hwang, however, finds an insignificant relationship between economic conditions and voting decisions in a Legislative Yuan election (Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou N.d., 7).

This review suggests that there is an increase in scholarly attention to economic voting in South Korea and Taiwan. Yet, economic voting research has presented contradictory findings, which I attempt to resolve in this research project. The confirmation of economic voting in South Korea and Taiwan would enhance the explanatory power of the economic voting model in the worldwide setting. Many scholars of voting behavior have observed that the state of the economy affects voter turnout as well as the electoral fortunes of the incumbent party, although there are still

disagreements over some specific issues of economic voting behavior. The literature of economic voting has dealt mostly with old industrial democracies, especially the U.S.⁸

Outside the U.S., there are many studies done in old democracies such as Australia (Carlsen 2000; Schneider and Pommerehne 1980), Britain (Carlsen 2000; Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 2000; Clarke and Whitely 1990; Frey and Schneider 1978; Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Hibbs and Vasilatos 1981; Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato 1996; Pissarides 1980; Price and Sanders 1993; Sanders 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000; Whitely 1980), Canada (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Black 1978; Carlsen 2000; Clarke and Stewart 1994; Happy 1992; Monroe and Erickson 1986), Denmark (Nannestad and Paldam 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Paldam and Nannestad 2000), France (Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993; Hibbs with the assistance of Vasilatos 1981; Jerome and Jerome-Speziari 2000; Jerome and Lewis-Beck 1999; Lewis-Beck 1980, 1983, 1984, 1993, 1996, 1997, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Bellucci 1982; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2000; Rosa 1980; see also Frey and Schneider 1975; Miller and Mackie 1973; Pissarides 1980), Germany (Alford and Legge 1984; Feld and Kirchgassner 2000; Frey and Schneider 1980; Goergen and Norpoth 1991; Kirchgassner 1985, 1986, 1991; Rattinger 1991), Israel (Guttman and Shachmurove 1990); Italy (Bellucci 1984, 1991; Lewis-Beck and Bellucci 1982), Japan (Inoguchi 1980; Reed and Brunk 1984), Norway (Miller and Listhaug 1985), Spain (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1986), Sweden (Douglas 1978; Jonung 1981; Jonung and Laidler 1988; Jonung and Wadensjo 1979; Lybeck 1985; Madsen

⁸ See Chapter II for the detailed literature review on U.S. economic voting.

1980), and Switzerland (Schneider, Pommerehne, and Frey 1981).⁹ Anderson (2000), Anderson and Ward (1996), Chappell and Veiga (2000), Kiewiet (2000), Lewis-Beck (1986, 1988a), and Whitten and Palmer (1999) conduct cross-national analyses and find significant economic voting in the advanced economies of European countries, which include most of the above nations.

The economic voting model has recently been extended to developing countries or new democracies. Remmer (1991) asserts that economic crisis introduced electoral turnover in Latin America during the 1980s, analyzing 21 Presidential elections of 12 Latin American countries. Paldam (1987) also reviews the relationship between inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries between 1946 and 1983. Seligson and Gomez (1989) observe significant economic voting in Costa Rica. Panzer and Paredes (1991) analyze the Chilean referendum focusing on the effect of economic issues on elections. Rius (1993) also probes the political economy of elections in Uruguay. Stokes (1996) investigates the relationship between economic reform and public opinion in Peru between 1990 and 1995. Dominguez and McCann (1996) examine the impact of the economic health on voter intent in the 1988 and 1991 Mexican elections.

⁹ See Paldam (1981) for a good review of the economic voting literature in industrial countries. His conclusion (1981, 194; emphasis in original) is that “*The very existence of the VP-function [vote-popularity function] should no longer be doubted ...* The main exceptions to the responsibility pattern occur for weak and unstable governments in multi-party systems, and when external events clearly underlie economic problems.” Paldam’s first review of the economic voting literature reflects the instability of economic voting across the world. On the other hand, Lewis-Beck and Bellucci (1982, 102-3) assert that economic voting is evident “in the multiparty systems of France and Italy.” However, Whiteley (1980) finds no economic voting in Britain and Madsen (1980) observes negligible economic effects on voting in Denmark and Norway. Peretz (1981) and Rattiner (1991) find no economic voting in Germany. In contrast, Paldam’s second literature review (Nannestad and Paldam [1994]) suggests positive results of economic voting studies. See also Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000).

In addition to the Latin American cases, Pacek and Radcliff (1995) note that economic adversity impeded electoral success of the incumbent parties in the developing countries such as Botswana, Costa Rica, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Moreover, Pacek (1994) moves on to Bulgaria, the former Czech and Slovak Federated Republic, and Poland. Fidrmuc (2000) also analyzes the impact of economic reforms on the electoral support in post-communist Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland in the 1990s. From the same perspective, Przeworski (1996) focuses on the Polish public support for economic reforms. In addition, Bell (1997) observes that unemployment had an effect on the Polish elections between 1990 and 1995. On the other hand, Silder (1994) and Colton (1996) find economic voting in Russia's 1993 and 1995 elections. White, Rose, and McAllister (1997) also confirm economic voting behavior in Russia. Lafay (1981) even observes the interactions between the economy and politics in Eastern European countries under the old system.¹⁰ Wilkin, Haller, and Norpoth's (1997) ambitious piece does not make a strong case for economic voting in the worldwide setting. Nonetheless, the economic voting model has gained supportive evidence from both old and new democracies.

3. Scope of the Dissertation

The scope of this study is to examine the political effects of economic conditions on the national level elections in South Korea and Taiwan after the democratic transition.

¹⁰ On the other hand, Harper (2000, 1191) argues that "country-specific studies of electoral behavior in Eastern Europe that observe that the return to parliamentary power of ex-communist parties in these societies was not simply a function of economic voting."

In other words, I investigate economic voting at the level of the Presidential elections and the parliamentary (South Korea's National Assembly and Taiwan's Legislative Yuan) elections under democratic governments. A new democratic era in the two countries was marked by a "founding election." Founding election is defined as the race that occurs "for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 57).

There are five conditions for a founding election. First, a founding election should be held "after an authoritarian regime." To be more precise, the timing should be after political liberalization. Since political liberalization eloquently suggests that there is a general "relaxation of official controls on basic civil rights" (Bratton 1997, 74), the election held after political liberalization is quite different from the elections under authoritarianism. For instance, opposition parties are legalized or opposition leaders are allowed to run for offices. In South Korea, political liberalization occurred with the "June 29 Declaration" in 1987, which embraced most of the democratic demands from the political opposition including direct Presidential elections. On July 15, 1987, the lifting of martial law introduced political liberalization into Taiwan.

Second, a founding election should be contested for "nationally significant positions." People should form a new government by choosing a President or a Prime Minister through a new parliament. A founding election is not necessarily a Presidential election. Since a new Prime Minister is chosen or a new government is formed after a parliamentary election, the parliamentary election can be a founding election as well. In contrast, local level elections and elections for an electoral college are not races for

“nationally significant positions.” Additionally, a plebiscite for a new constitution is not a founding election for the same reason.

Third, a founding election should be a free, fair, and competitive race. A founding election should be held under fairly democratic conditions. Parties and candidates are not to be prohibited from running for elections. If severe election-related violence or coercion occurs, it is difficult to call the election democratic. Political parties should have substantial access to the media and the weight of each vote should be the same. There should be no electoral fraud. In reality, however, vote buying or other forms of electoral fraud may have occurred in founding elections. Nonetheless, what is more important is that the electoral fraud and violence were tolerable compared with the historical standards built in the past in each country. It is an undeniable trend that election fraud has decreased lately. As a result, a founding election should reflect the will of its citizens as accurately as possible.

Fourth, there should be no election boycott and election results should be accepted by candidates and their followers. Opposition parties may boycott an election, due to the ruling party’s manipulation of the electoral laws or schedules. The manipulative actions by the ruling party undermine the very “democraticness” of the election. Also, as Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 194) adequately assert, losers’ willingness to accept the electoral outcomes signifies a consensus on the democratic rules of the game. This is one of the most important conditions for democracy. Whoever loses should accept the results of the people’s choice. As mentioned at the onset of this study, democracy rests on the premise that no citizens compete for power in anything other than elections or by vetoing democratically elected leaders.

Finally, a founding election does not necessarily require a shift in power. In a founding election, the old authoritarian leader can be reelected. This indeed casts shadows over the new political system after the transition. The new government may be a “hybrid” democracy still filtered by traces of authoritarianism (Karl 1995). Thus, it may be claimed that the nature of the new political system is “soft authoritarianism.” However, if the democratic rules of the game have been kept during the election, the results should be respected by the citizens.

South Korea’s founding election was the Presidential race on December 16, 1987. This election was first held after political liberalization in June 1987. The 1987 election was monitored by international watchdog groups and South Korea’s civil society, who assessed it as free and fair. The election was generally considered clean, fair, and competitive. Some opposition groups claimed the election to be fraudulent but the opposition parties accepted the results. Therefore, the new President was inaugurated as scheduled.¹¹ The South Korean opposition did not win the direct Presidential election because of the split bid of the opposition leaders. A former general, Roh Tae Woo (the ruling Democratic Justice Party: DJP) won the first-past-the-post election by receiving 36.6% of the popular vote, while opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam (the Reunification Democratic Party: RDP) and Kim Dae Jung (the Peace and Democracy Party: PDP) earned 28.0% and 27.1% of the popular vote, respectively. Table 1-1 displays all

¹¹ For example, a group of students and citizens who monitored the vote counting process at the Kuro Ward Office, Seoul, believed some absentee ballot boxes to be suspicious. They demanded a serious investigation by protesting in the office building. However, riot police stormed the office building two days after the election.

elections held in South Korea after political liberalization. There have been three direct Presidential elections and four National Assembly elections.

Table 1-1. Dates of National Elections in South Korea since Political Liberalization

	Presidential Elections	National Assembly Elections
1	December 16, 1987	
2		April 26, 1988
3		<u>March 24, 1992</u>
4	<u>December 18, 1992</u>	
5		<u>April 11, 1996</u>
6	<u>December 18, 1997</u>	
7		April 13, 2000

Note: Founding election is in bold. Underlined elections are under investigation.

In contrast, it is not easy to identify a founding election in Taiwan. The first possibility for being a founding election is the 1989 Legislative Yuan election, the first national election after political liberalization (see Table 1-2). Martial law was lifted two years earlier (July 15, 1987) and opposition parties participated in the election. The election was free and fair. The KMT won 70% of the contested seats and the DPP became the major opposition party. However, the number of seats open for the election was less than half of the total number of parliamentary seats. The Legislative Yuan members elected in Taiwan was only 35.2% (101 out of 287) in 1989 (Domes 1999, 52). The Mainlanders were over-represented in the Legislative Yuan.

The second possibility is the 1990 Presidential election. However, the election was an indirect race by the KMT controlled-National Assembly (electoral college). Consequently, the people's choice could not be adequately reflected. The National

Assembly was formed in 1946 and only a small number of the National Assembly members have been replaced several times afterwards.

Table 1-2. Dates of National Elections in Taiwan since Political Liberalization

	Presidential Elections	National Assembly Elections	Legislative Yuan Elections
1			December 2, 1989
2	March 21, 1990		
3		December 21, 1991	
4			<u>December 19, 1992</u>
5			<u>December 2, 1995</u>
6	<u>March 23, 1996</u>	March 23, 1996	
7			December 5, 1998
8	March 18, 2000		

Note: Founding election is in bold. Underlined elections are under investigation.

The third possibility is the 1991 National Assembly election. This was the first full-scale election in Taiwan's history. Many lifelong members were replaced by Taiwanese residents. However, elections for the electoral college are not contests for nationally significant positions. Additionally, the mission of the new National Assembly was to reform the constitution.

The fourth possibility for a founding election is the 1992 Legislative Yuan election. The election was not only a full-scale election, but also the first race for nationally significant positions held under free and fair conditions. There was no dispute over the election results. Thus, the 1992 Legislative Yuan election is defined as the founding election in Taiwan (Chu 1996, 71; Tien and Chu 1996, 1141; Tien and Cheng 1997, 21). After the founding election, Taiwan has held two direct Presidential elections and three Legislative Yuan elections.

Since a founding election may contain the direct impact of democratization, the founding election itself cannot be used for the estimation of usual voting patterns (Pacek and Radcliff 1995, 749). Also, a new democracy can revert to a non-democratic form of government after the founding election. Yet, the two countries regularly held national level elections after the founding election and the uninterrupted elections reflect individuals' ordinary voting behavior. This enables me to examine the normal voting patterns in the newly democratized countries.

Unfortunately, the elections to be investigated in this research project are limited by the data availability. Since aggregate data often commit the "ecological fallacy," survey data have been more commonly employed in electoral studies (Niemi and Weisberg 1993a, 2). Individual voting behavior is best analyzed by individual level survey data. The Institute for Korean Election Studies (IKES) has conducted nationwide surveys since the 1992 National Assembly election. Thus, this study deals with the 1992 and 1996 National Assembly elections and the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections. For Taiwan, I use survey data collected by the National Chengchi University (NCU) in the 1992 and 1995 Legislative Yuan elections and the 1996 Presidential election (see Appendices A and B for more about survey data).¹² Because survey data are not available at the time of this writing, the elections held in 1998 and 2000 are beyond the scope of this research.

¹² The survey data sets to be used in this research do not include the survey for the founding election in South Korea. In Taiwan, the democratic transition occurred in a very incremental way. So, this study is not affected by the direct impact of democratization.

4. Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven Chapters. Chapter I provides the introduction. In Chapter II, I review the economic voting literature in the U.S. and other democratic countries. The purpose of Chapter II is to examine the factors determining voter turnout and to define the concepts of economic voting. Also, Chapter II leads to the development of statistical models to be tested in the following Chapters, III through VI. In Chapter III, I investigate the relationship between economic conditions and voter turnout in South Korea. I also test the different models of voter turnout: a socioeconomic model, a social psychological model, a political mobilization model, and a close election model.¹³ As a consequence, I identify the factors that have had an effect on voter turnout. Chapter IV examines the relationship between economic conditions and voter turnout in Taiwan. I also make a comparison among the effects on voter turnout of an economic condition model, a socioeconomic model, a social psychological model, and a political mobilization model.

In Chapter V, I probe the effects of economic circumstances on voter choice in South Korea in the 1990s. Once economic voting is detected, I identify the nature of economic voting. Are voters concerned about the national economic condition (sociotropic voting) or their personal economic well-being (pocketbook voting)? Do citizens vote according to retrospective evaluations (retrospective voting) or prospective

¹³ In addition to these models, there would be an institutional model. The institutional model focuses on electoral laws and institutional arrangements that determine voter turnout. However, there are not many differences in the two countries' institutional arrangements. Thus, I do not include the institutional model in the list of the models under investigation. The only major difference is that the Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV) System is used for the Legislative Yuan elections.

expectations (prospective voting)? I also compare economic voting between the Presidential races and the National Assembly elections. Additionally, I compare the effects of economic voting on voter choice with those of regionalism. If there is no economic voting, I explain why this is so. Chapter VI examines the nature of economic voting in Taiwan in the 1990s. Basically, the process of Chapter VI is the same as in Chapter V. Yet, Chapter VI makes a comparison between the effects of economic voting and ethnic voting on voter choice. Chapter VII makes conclusions about the main findings of the study and compares the nature and magnitude of economic voting in the two countries.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL BUILDING

1. Models of Voter Turnout

A. Economic Condition Model

The economic condition model focuses on the economic situation that discourages or encourages voter turnout. The first theory is that economic adversity discourages voter turnout. According to Brody and Sniderman (1977, 344), people with economic hardships are more likely to be preoccupied with their economic concerns than people without economic grievances. The poor and the unemployed tend to spend most of their time surviving. They are not expected to actively participate in political activities including elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 25-9). With statistical tests at both the individual and aggregate levels, Rosenstone (1982, 41) concludes that “Turnout is lower when short-term unemployment is high, prices are unstable, and a large proportion of the population experience financial difficulties.”

In the comparative perspective, Radcliff (1992, 444; 1996, 718) contends that turnout rates in industrial countries are affected by the state of the economy and that economic adversity has different impacts on voter participation depending upon the welfare level in a country. His multivariate regression reaffirms Rosenstone’s finding that economic hardships in the U.S. discourage voter participation. In contrast, economic adversity in developing countries encourages individuals to go to the polling booths.

The second theory is that economic adversity encourages electoral participation. This theory helps us to understand a positive relationship between economic hardship and voter turnout in developing countries, which is suggested by Radcliff. As Lipset (1960, 192) has originally asserted, people under economic pressure are “expected to turn to government action as a solution and to show a high voting average.” A surge of voter turnout in the 1982 Congressional election in the U.S. amidst economic downturn may be a case for this theory. Southwell (1988, 273) suggests that the increased voter participation “among blacks, working class and the unemployed” attributed to the surge of electoral participation in 1982.

This theory is partly supported by the “negative voting” theory. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) contend that people are more sensitive to negative information than positive information. Consequently, “As long as public affairs go well, there is little to motivate the electorate to connect events of the wider environment with the actors of politics ... [However] An economic or military or other forms of calamity can force events across the threshold of political awareness” (Campbell et al. 1960, 556). Therefore, individuals are more likely to go to the polling places in order to punish the incumbent candidates for their mistakes than to reward the incumbent candidates for their successes.

In explaining the decline in support for the incumbent party in midterm Congressional elections, Kernell (1977, 44) also observes that voters’ motivation of political punishment is greater than that of political reward. Moreover, Lau proposes another negativity that affects voter decisions, utilizing data from the 1968, 1972, 1974, 1978, and 1980 Center for Political Science (CPS) National Election Studies (NES). The

motivational “cost orientation” negativity is that “people are more strongly motivated to avoid costs than to approach gains” (Lau 1985, 132). Feldman (1982, 452) finds a similar result with the 1972 CPS data. Furthermore, Fiorina and Shepsle (1989, 438) assert that negative voting occurs among supporters with strong opinions about politics. Incumbent candidates are more likely to have supporters with strong opinions about politics than their challengers. Thus, negative voting occurs more frequently among in-party incumbent seeking reelections.

The third theory is that economic adversity has nothing to do with voter participation. Lane (1959, 330) proposes that voter turnout in Presidential elections is not affected by economic downturns or upturns. Analyzing aggregate data from Congressional elections between 1896 and 1970, Arcelus and Meltzer (1975, 1237-238) also find an insignificant relationship between Congressional elections and the economic variables of real compensation, unemployment, and inflation. In addition, using survey data from the Survey Research Center (SRC) Election Studies between 1956 and 1974, Fiorina (1978, 439) does not find “any systematic effect of economic conditions on turnout.”

B. Socioeconomic Model¹⁴

The socioeconomic model emphasizes the role of social structures as determinants of electoral participation. Verba and Nie (1972, 125) have suggested that those who have

¹⁴ The socioeconomic (or sociological) model has mainly been developed by a Columbia University research team (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet [1944]). They have provided an explanation for the 1940 election, “relating voters’ socioeconomic status (education, income, and class), religion, and place of residence (urban or rural) to their vote” (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b, 8).

higher social and economic status are more likely to take part in politics than people with lower social and economic status. In other words, people who have higher income, education, and occupational status, living in urban areas tend to participate in elections more than those with lower income, education, and occupational status, living in rural areas. They have more resources to maintain their political activities than their counterparts.

The educational factor, however, produces a puzzle. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 102) point out, “personal qualities that raise the probability of voting are the skills that make learning about politics easier and more gratifying and reduce the difficulties of voting.” Nonetheless, the increased level of educational attainment is not accompanied by an increase in voter turnout (Brody 1978, 296). Since the educational factor alone cannot explain electoral turnout, the “puzzle” may be solved by relating the decline in electoral participation not to the educational factor but to other socioeconomic factors.¹⁵ As far as the educational factor is concerned, higher educational attainment is expected to produce a higher rate of voter turnout, other things being equal.

There is also a positive relationship between age and voter turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 102-3). Older people feel a sense of responsibility for their society more than the younger generation. After a certain age, however, voter turnout is depressed among older voters due to the cost and inaccessibility of the polling places. Women are observed to participate in elections less than men (Fiorina 1978; Wolfinger

¹⁵ For instance, Bennett (1990, 51) reports that “White grade schoolers outvoted those with some high school ... elderly citizens, who vote at relatively high rates, are increasingly disproportionately represented in the grade school category, and ... young Whites who are high school dropouts have very low turnout records.”

and Rosenstone 1980). Since women may be less interested in elections than men, female suffrage has had a significant negative impact on voter turnout rates in twenty industrial democracies (Blais and Carty 1990, 176).

C. Social Psychological Model¹⁶

The social psychological model is based on the premise that voters' decisions of who to vote for are largely affected by psychological factors. The social psychological model emphasizes three attitudes: voters' psychological orientation toward parties, issues, and candidates. Among the three attitudes, the concept of party identification is considered as the most important factor in accounting for the voting patterns in U.S. elections, even though voting is affected by various factors through a "funnel of causality" (Campbell et al. 1960). Party identification refers to a psychological link, "which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support" (Campbell et al. 1960, 121).

With respect to voter turnout, Campbell and his colleagues assert that a strong psychological attachment to a party fosters electoral participation. Some of the important conceptual devices are "political efficacy, sense of civic duty, strength of partisan attachment, interest in politics, concern about the outcome of the election, and trust in government" (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985, 497). From the political psychological perspective, Abramson and Aldrich (1982, 502) suggest that the decline in U.S. voter turnout is likely to result from the erosion of party loyalty and "external"

political efficacy.¹⁷ In contrast, because “internal” political efficacy, sense of civic duty, interest in politics, and concern about the outcome of elections did not dwindle during the 1960s and 1970s, they cannot directly explain the turnout decline (Abramson 1983, 293-94). Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1995, 118) find that the combined attitudinal variables of party loyalty and external political efficacy can explain 91% of the decline in voter turnout between 1960 and 1992.

Furthermore, Aldrich (1993, 271-74) demonstrates the compatibility between the two social psychological variables (party loyalty and political efficacy) and the rational choice model.¹⁸ The basic function of voting in the rational choice model is

$$R = PB - C + D,$$

where R is net rewards to voting; P is the probability that citizens will affect the outcome; B is the extent to which an individual feels that one candidate will benefit the voter more than another; C is the cost of voting; and D is civic duty.

The B term is equivalent to political efficacy. The low efficacy refers to the situation that the government in power is not willing or able to respond to voters’ demands and to solve various problems. The erosion of efficacy explicitly means that

¹⁶ A group of the University of Michigan researchers (Campbell et al. [1960]) was the pioneer of the social psychological model. They find that “A person’s identification with a party became the core of the model. It, in turn, affected the person’s attitude toward candidates and issues” (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b, 8).

¹⁷ External efficacy refers to “views of system responsiveness” and internal efficacy means “an individual’s belief about his or her own political abilities” (Timpone 1998, 148).

¹⁸ During the 1970s, a research group from Rochester University developed the rational choice model. According to Niemi and Weisberg (1993b, 9), “voters decide whether or not to vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis, usually on the basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits.”

there is no big difference in the expected benefit from voting for a party versus other parties. Pattie and Johnston (1998, 279) also provide a similar interpretation with the British election data during the 1980s and 1990s.

On the other hand, the D term has been extended to include the expression of party affiliation by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Fiorina (1976) (Aldrich 1993). Particularly, Fiorina develops the concept of partisanship with the D term in the rational choice model. The election specific variable employed in the voting formula that has decreased with voter turnout is the question that asks voters how strongly they are concerned about which party wins the election. This is claimed to be largely linked with the decline in party attachment.

D. Political Mobilization Model

The political mobilization model mainly deals with the relationship between campaign mobilization and voter participation. In research on gubernatorial elections, Patterson and Caldeira find the influences of campaign activities and partisan competitions to be good factors for electoral participation (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985, 500). Analyzing the 1978 Congressional election, Caldeira and his associates (1985, 507) also conclude that “accountings for participation in elections which omit political mobilization are partial ... Active political mobilization can enlarge and enrich participation in elections.”

In general, the total amount of campaign funds is a good indicator of the political mobilization model. Campaign spending has a positive relationship with voter turnout. Larger campaign funds enable candidates to buy advertisement spaces in newspapers and

time on TV and radio. Candidates can also employ more campaign staff with larger contributions and campaign workers mobilize voters with repeated contacts. Consequently, the candidates become more visible to voters during the campaign, which may lead to higher rates of turnout.

In addition, Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991, 176) assert that a president's campaign appearances helped a candidate to mobilize voters in Senate races between 1966 and 1986. Exploring various alternative explanations for the voter turnout increase in the 1988 and 1992 Presidential elections with survey data and state level data, Knack partly tests the political mobilization model. Among others, MTV's "Rock the Vote" registration campaign was anticipated to attract more electoral participation of the young generation. Also, the introduction of a "motor voter" bill was expected to foster voter participation. However, they collectively explain "only a fraction of 1 percentage point of the turnout increase" (Knack 1996, 30). The abrupt turnout increase of six percentage points in 1992 may be partially explained by the fact that "the low turnout of 1988 is at least as great an anomaly as the high turnout of 1992" (Knack 1996, 17).

E. Close Election Model

The close election model theorizes the impacts of the closeness of races on voter turnout. A close election enhances the political interest of voters and voters are more likely to turn out at the polls than in a landslide campaign (Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). In a similar vein, Powell (1980, 19) asserts that when one of the two U.S. parties dominates, political interests of citizens will decrease and voter turnout is expected to decline. After reviewing the literature, Grofman (1993, 103)

asserts that the close election model does quite well in accounting for “change at the margin.” Cox and Munger (1989, 217) also observe that a close election had an impact on electoral participation at the levels of both the mass and elite in the 1982 House election.¹⁹ Election closeness fosters campaign spending, which requires more campaign contributions especially from the elite level and ultimately stimulates voter turnout (Cox and Munger 1989, 226). Using data from the 1972 and 1976 NES Panel Study and Vote Validation Survey in Presidential elections, Moon (1992, 136) also concludes that “Not only can closeness of the election impact on turnout but the fact that the expected benefit differential is important to some would-be voters suggests that the subjective probability of affecting the election outcome is significantly greater than zero for at least some voters.”

According to Shaffer (1981, 74), however, because voters’ perception of the closeness is related to the individual election, the closeness of elections is not an important determinant of voter turnout. Foster (1984) also finds the results of the close election model limited, using a cross-sectional approach between 1968 and 1980. In the comparative context, Powell (1993, 60) investigates the close election model in 12 industrial countries in the 1970s and finds no significant relationship between close elections and voter turnout. Pattie and Johnston (1998, 278) draw a similar conclusion from the British elections during the 1980s and 1990s.

Thus, it is difficult to define the relationship between the closeness of elections and voter turnout. The difficulty is partly embedded in the “paradox” of not voting as the

¹⁹ See Cox and Munger (1989, 217-18) and Grofman (1993) for the literature review in the area of the close election model.

rational choice model may suggest. The probability of turnout affecting the outcome (the P term) lies at the center of the paradox. If a citizen feels an election is a landslide, the citizen may not go to vote. If a citizen believes an election is close, the citizen is more likely to go to the polling places. However, the problem arises when “very few contests for public office are *so* close that they come down to a single vote. An individual citizen i must usually expect that the probability of a preferred candidate winning is only infinitesimally larger when he or she votes” (Uhlener 1989, 394; emphasis in original).

According to Moon (1992, 125), one of the solutions to the paradox of not voting is to show that the P term is neither normally zero nor relevant to the voting decision. However, although there is no exact value of the P term, it appears to be close to zero (Miller 1986, 7). Riker and Ordeshook (1968) attempt to reformulate the P term to take into account the individual’s perceived closeness of elections. While Ferejohn and Fiorina also admit that individuals have difficulties in evaluating the magnitude of the P term, they suggest that voters are concerned about other situations: “My god, what if I didn’t vote and my preferred candidate lost by one vote? I’d feel like killing myself” (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 535). The notion of minimax regret emphasizes the relative magnitudes of the B term and the C term. Some voters perceive that the benefit of voting is bigger than the cost of voting, thus voting is rational. Consequently, “minor changes in the margin of either can affect turnout decisions, so get-out-the-vote drives can be effective in increasing turnout” (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b, 17).

2. Models of Economic Voting

A. Economic Voting Model

At the heart of economic voting lies the premise that “as the economy worsens, the government loses votes” (Lewis-Beck 1988a, 8). This is because “voters hold the government responsible for economic events” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000, 114). Voters are responsive to the environments surrounding them and act upon their self-interests. In the economic voting model, voters are assumed to be rational. A rational actor is defined as an individual whose behavior is motivated by the actor’s self-interests and conscious choices.²⁰ Voters can compare one party with another and assess the expected utility of a party’s winning elections.

According to Riker (1990), the rational actor assumption requires only that individuals make a choice in order to maximize their expected utility with the available information about circumstances and consequences. Although individuals are assumed to be self-interested, “the content of the self-interest” is not specified in the rational choice model.²¹ Moreover, a rational actor sometimes makes mistakes in assessing and choosing alternatives. It is also possible for a rational actor to take an action that makes it difficult to accomplish the individual’s primary goals. In addition, a rational actor makes a choice that would be different from what the actor would choose with more information.

²⁰ Campbell and his colleagues (1960) have asserted that only 2-3% of the electorate think ideologically. Individuals are also depicted to be unaware of government policies and the differences in party positions (Campbell et al. 1960). This negative view of voters dominated in the 1950s and early 1960s. Research including *The Changing American Voter* (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979) has documented that voters became sophisticated during the 1970s. Having said that, V. O. Key (1966) is the pioneer of the positive view of voters. He assumes that individuals are not fools, so that they can vote with respect to their issue preferences.

Therefore, a rational actor does not necessarily need an extensive set of information, a solid system of preferences, or the sophisticated skills of calculation in order to make the best choice among the available alternatives. Nor does the economic voting model require voters to have the ability to conduct a sophisticated analysis of economic situations or to be able to identify subtle differences in economic policies. In an experiment, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985, 55-8) demonstrate that although many voters are not well informed about parties, candidates, or issues, they vote as if they had full information. In addition, candidates do not fully know voters' utility functions but they act as if they knew everything.²²

In fact, individuals are not willing to take pains to be completely informed about anything. They acquire some information only if the benefits of the information are greater than the costs of its acquisition (Ferejohn 1990, 12-4). Then, they will use the information as a cue to make decisions in voting. From this perspective, food prices are the best predictor of presidential approval ratings among other economic indicators (Beck 1991, 95). The ordinary citizens who go grocery shopping can easily get the information about economic conditions. Virtually all individuals who have passed voting age have access to such information. Even more, the costs of the informational acquisition and process are quite low. Such information does not necessarily prevent individuals from making reasoned decisions in voting (Aidt 2000; Lucas and Sargent 1981; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

²¹ A rational actor may take even altruistic or moral actions when the costs of such actions are small.

²² Bartels (1996, 194; emphasis in original) does not agree that uninformed voters cast their ballots "*as if* they were fully informed." See also Lau and Redlawsk (1997) for their objection to the "fully informed" voter assumption.

Sanders (2000) also argues that, in Britain, voters' overall feelings of economic upturns or downturns are considerably acute even with their partial knowledge about the economy. Nonetheless, individuals' general senses about economic health matter most in making voter decisions. He documents that it is voters' subjective perceptions about the economy that matter at the polling booths, instead of their objective knowledge about the indicators of inflation or unemployment. From a similar vein, Paldam and Nannestad (2000, 388-89) report that Danish voters know more than expected and are more sensitive to unemployment compared to any other economic indicators. In contrast, Danish voters are ignorant of detailed information, for instance, on budget deficits but they make their decisions in voting according to their economic evaluations.

It is Mueller who has set the direction for the study of economic voting in U.S. Presidential elections. According to Mueller (1970, 34), "an economy in slump harms a President's popularity but an economy boom does not help his rating." Mueller's dependent variable is the rates of presidential popularity by the Gallup Poll during the 24 years from President Truman to President Johnson. The economic slump variable is one of his independent variables including "the length of time the incumbent has been in office ... the influence on his rating of major international events ... and war" (Mueller 1970, 18). Mueller also views that presidential popularity generally erodes during the term ("the coalition of minorities" [the length of time the incumbent has been in office] variable).

Focusing on the general decline in presidential popularity, Stimson (1976) develops the "expectation/disillusionment cycle" model. According to Stimson, new Presidents take advantage of broad support from the citizens. The high approval rates

during the honeymoon period are based on expectations unaccompanied by the Presidents' performance and they gradually decrease as time progresses. Finally, disillusioned people show some of their prior support at the end of the Presidents' terms. The parabolic pattern of presidential popularity during the term is also developed by using the Gallup Poll data from President Truman to President Nixon (first term).

According to Stimson, however, other independent variables added by Mueller (rally effects, economic slump, and war) into his expectation/disillusionment cycle model do not significantly increase the multiple correlation. Thus, while Stimson puts much significance on the general cycle of presidential popularity, he disproves the importance of economic effects on presidential popularity. From the same vein, Campbell (1966, 61) has asserted that the cycle of surge and decline accounts for the midterm loss of the incumbent party's seats in Congress. Erikson (1988, 1027) also views the midterm loss as the cyclical punishment of the incumbent party (see also Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Born 1990, 642-43). In addition, Frey and Schneider (1978), Miller and Mackie (1973), and Pissarides (1980) commonly support the electoral cycle model in Britain.

Norpoth takes issue with Stimson in explaining the erosion of presidential popularity during the term. The inauguration effect boosts the presidential approval rate by some 20 percentage points after the election, which is so high that the decline in the approval rate is inevitable. Instead, Norpoth (1985, 184) observes that "Only if poor economic performance, an unpopular war, or a scandal compound the erosion does electoral defeat become likely." By examining the effects of economic conditions on presidential popularity between 1961 and 1980, Norpoth (1985, 182) finds significant economic voting.

With survey data analyses, Fiorina (1981), Kiewiet (1983), and Lewis-Beck (1988b) also observe significant economic voting in U.S. Presidential elections. Especially, Lewis-Beck (1988a, 133-35) uncovers a clear association between voters' choices and their perception of the economy in the 1984 Presidential election. Respondents who believed the incumbent party was good at fighting unemployment and inflation were 44% more likely to cast their ballots for President Reagan than those who perceived the government was not good enough, regardless of their socioeconomic status and party affiliation. In the 1984 Presidential election, Kiewiet and Rivers (1985) and Lipset (1985) draw a similar conclusion with different data sets. They commonly detect a positive relationship between an individual's economic evaluation and voter decisions.

Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992, 47) develop a multivariate model including the variables of percentage point change in real GNP over six months prior to Presidential elections and approval rates for Presidents in July of election years. They find a significant impact of the two variables on voters' choices. Later, Lewis-Beck and Rice incorporate the new variables of party strength and candidate appeal into the previous model, so that they provide a more fully specified model for Presidential elections. With the same set of data for 1948-88, they conclude again that all four variables have the correct directions and have a statistically significant impact on voter decisions (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992, 52).

Concerning R^2 , Abramowitz's (1988a) model stands out. Abramowitz utilizes the three independent variables of the incumbent President's popularity, economic condition, and the length of time the incumbent has been in office. According to Abramowitz (1988a, 844), "the longer a party has been in power, the more likely the public is to feel

that 'it's time for a change.'" Abramowitz finds that all three variables are statistically significant and display the expected directions, using data for the Presidential elections from 1948 to 1984. His model has an adjusted R^2 of .98. In addition, Fair (1978) and Frey and Schneider (1980) have successfully demonstrated interaction between the economy and the vote in U.S. Presidential elections.

At the level of U.S. Congressional elections, Kramer has inaugurated the main line of research. He offers an explanation about the effect of short-term economic fluctuations on Congressional elections between 1896 and 1964 with aggregate time series analysis (excluding the controversial years of 1912, 1918, 1942, and 1944). His independent variables include unemployment, income, inflation, incumbency, and presidential coattails. Kramer (1971, 140-41) finds that "Economic fluctuations, in particular, are important influences on congressional elections, with economic upturn helping the congressional candidates of the incumbent party, and economic decline benefiting the opposition." Among others, real personal income appears to be the most important economic variable. In contrast, there is no significant impact of the changes in unemployment and inflation on Congressional elections (Kramer 1971, 141).

Kiewiet defines Kramer's model as an incumbency-oriented hypothesis and alternatively develops a policy-oriented hypothesis. In the policy-oriented hypothesis, voter decisions are observed to be made with respect to economic problems, especially the issues of unemployment and inflation (Kiewiet 1981, 448). He examines the hypothesis with survey data from the CPS NES between 1956 and 1978. Kiewiet finds important differences between unemployment and inflation. According to Kiewiet (1981, 458-59), "There were large differences between racial and occupational groups in

respondents' propensity to name unemployment their most pressing personal problem." The same differences exist at the national level. Yet, these group differences do not exist in the issue of inflation both at the personal level and the national level. In addition, individuals who are concerned about unemployment tend to vote for the Democratic Party, whereas voters who are concerned about inflation have the propensity to vote for the Republican Party. However, the inflation factor attracts weaker support than the unemployment factor does (Kiewiet 1981, 451-58).

On the other hand, Stigler (1973, 167) generally disproves the economic voting theory with a statistical analysis of the Congressional elections between 1896 and 1970. While Stigler reaffirms an insignificant relationship between the fluctuations in unemployment and electoral support, he rebuts Kramer's claim that real personal income has a significant impact on electoral decisions. Arcelus and Meltzer (1975, 16) also detect very little significance in the relationship between the short-term effects of unemployment (and income) and Congressional elections. In response to Stigler's claims, Goodman and Kramer (1975, 1264) uncover that all three variables (real personal income, inflation, and unemployment) are statistically significant in explaining Congressional elections.

Tufte (1975) views that midterm Congressional elections are referenda on the incumbent party's performance. Voters are expected to respond to both economic and political issues. The economic issue is operationalized by real disposable income per capita. The impact of political issues is measured by the presidential approval rates provided by the Gallup Poll just before elections. On the other hand, Marra, Ostrom, and Simon (1990), Ostrom and Simon (1985, 1989), Ostrom and Smith (1992), Simon and

Ostrom (1988), and Nickelsburg and Norpoth (2000) investigate presidential popularity with the variables of the economy and foreign policy. In addition, Atkeson and Partin (1995, 104) confirm referendum voting but not economic voting in Congressional elections.

Contrary to Tufte, however, Hibbs (1982, 410) reaffirms economic voting behavior with a statistical test of midterm Congressional elections from 1946 to 1978. Hibbing and Alford also observe that the fate of the incumbent party was most likely affected by the fluctuations of the economy, utilizing the 1978 Congressional election survey data. Furthermore, Hibbing and Alford (1981, 433-38) identify how voters link economic fluctuations with candidates in different kinds of districts: “(1) an in-party incumbent seeking reelection, (2) an out-party incumbent seeking reelection, or (3) no incumbent seeking reelection.” They find that senior incumbents are more likely to be related to the current economic conditions than junior incumbents in in-party incumbent seeking reelections. In contrast, personal economic conditions have no significant impact on electoral choices in the districts of out-party incumbent seeking reelections and no incumbent seeking reelections.

Furthermore, Lewis-Beck and Rice revise Tufte’s referendum voting model. They examine 18 Congressional elections from 1950 to 1984. According to Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985), the net seat changes of the incumbent party in the House are affected by economic growth rates, presidential approval rates, and the electoral calendar (midterm election or not). Additionally, Campbell (1986), Jacobson and Kernell (1983), Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992), and Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman (1986) observe significant economic voting in House elections.

Regarding the magnitudes of economic voting between Presidential elections and Congressional elections in the U.S., Kramer (1971, 141) asserts Presidential elections to be less responsive to economic conditions than Congressional elections. In contrast to Kramer, many scholars of economic voting have reported that the electoral effects of economic conditions are far greater in Presidential elections than Congressional elections (see especially Feldman 1982, 454; Kiewiet 1981, 445; Lewis-Beck and Eulau 1985, 4). Even more, Erikson (1990, 397-98) has found no significant impact of economic conditions on midterm Congressional elections between 1946 and 1986, whereas he uncovers a compelling relationship between economic conditions and Presidential elections. The rationale behind this is that Presidents are believed to have more responsibility for the national economy than the members of Congress. In addition, Presidential races are more visible and competitive than Congressional elections.

A similar relationship is seen between Senate elections and House elections. In other words, the electoral effects of economic conditions are stronger in Senate than House elections (Abramowitz 1988b, 385; Kuklinski 1981, 445; Westlye 1984, 253-54). From a slightly different angle, Atkeson and Partin (1995, 105) observe that Senate elections were affected by the President's popularity, whereas gubernatorial elections were influenced by the status of the state's economy, with data from the 1986 NES and 1990 Senate Election Study (see also Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995).

In France between 1993 and 1995, voters punished or rewarded the Prime Minister not the President, depending upon the state of the economy. It was the Prime Minister who managed the national economy in France (Lewis-Beck 1997, 321). The same was observed in France between 1960 and 1978 (Lewis-Beck 1980, 320).

According to Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2000, 181), French economic voting “appears strongest under unified government, in Presidential elections where an incumbent is running for reelection.” In contrast, economic voting is weaker in legislative elections and elections held under “cohabitation governments.” In Germany, Chancellors appear to hold responsibility for economic conditions under the same logic (Alford and Legge 1984, 1179).

Party systems also affect voter decisions. In the two party system, the responsibility hypothesis nicely explains economic voting. In multiparty systems or coalition governments, however, it is not always easy for voters to identify the sources of responsibility for certain economic problems and punish them accordingly. Powell and Whitten (1993), Whitten and Palmer (1999), and Kiewiet (2000) classify many coalition governments depending upon the clarity of government responsibility and find a connection between economic voting and the clarity of government. In addition, Anderson (2000) observes that “when it is clear who the target is, when the target is sizable, and when voters have only a limited number of viable alternatives to throw their support to,” economic voting is enhanced in 13 European democracies. Carlsen (2000) also finds a significant relationship between party ideology, economic policies, and electoral support. In addition, rightist governments are more sensitive to changes in the level of inflation, whereas leftist governments are more responsive to the issue of unemployment.

On the other hand, following Mueller (1970), Bloom and Price (1975, 1244) assert that “economic conditions have a strong asymmetric impact on the congressional vote. Political parties are ‘punished’ by the voters for economic downturns but are not

‘rewarded’ accordingly for prosperity,” with an aggregate level data analysis between 1896 and 1970.²³ In contrast, Kiewiet (1983, 49) contends that the asymmetry of economic effects is not supported by the individual level CPS survey data. In the comparative perspective, Lewis-Beck (1988a, 78) shows that the asymmetry hypothesis does hold in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. This is evident regardless of the institutional and cultural differences in these countries. After reviewing the economic voting literature in European countries, Paldam (1981, 194) reaches the same conclusion. The responsibility hypothesis works asymmetrically for parties based on different ideological backgrounds. For instance, there is a party that cares most about the inflation policy. The “clienteles hypothesis” suggests that voters support the party if the inflation condition deteriorates. The “saliency hypothesis,” on the other hand, says that voters punish the incumbent party if the inflation condition gets worse. Carlsen (2000) observes that the clienteles hypothesis works better than the saliency hypothesis and rightist governments are seen to be supportive of the clienteles hypothesis.

B. Sociotropic Voting and Pocketbook Voting

One of the important issues of economic voting is whether voters are sociotropic or pocketbook (or egocentric). Sociotropic voters are “influenced most of all by the *nation’s* economic condition” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 132; emphasis in original). Sociotropic voters support the candidates who further national economic interest. In contrast, pocketbook voters are “swayed most of all by the immediate and tangible

²³ The asymmetry of economic voting is closely related to negative voting introduced in the previous Chapter.

circumstances of their private lives” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 130). Thus, pocketbook voters support the candidates who promote their personal economic well-being. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) use the term of egotropic voters, which has the exact same meaning as pocketbook voters. Both a sociotropic voter and a pocketbook voter are not necessarily a sophisticated analyst of the economy.

According to Kinder and Kiewiet (1981, 132), the differences between sociotropic and pocketbook voting are not the same as the differences between an altruistic and a self-interested choice in voting. The motive behind both sociotropic and pocketbook voting is self-interest. Sociotropic voters may emphasize concerns for national economic conditions more than personal economic circumstances. Yet, they believe that the national economic conditions are closely connected with their own economic interests. The distinctions between sociotropic and pocketbook voting are not based on different motivations but on different information. As Kinder and Kiewiet (1981, 132) note, “Pocketbook voting reflects the circumstances and predicaments of personal economic life; sociotropic voting reflects the circumstances and predicaments of national economic life.”

With survey data from 1956 to 1976, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 504) observe that the personal experiences of financial difficulties or unemployment did not affect Congressional election outcomes. Instead, there was a statistically significant relationship between sociotropic voting and Congressional elections (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 141). Their main point is “not that personal experiences are generally unimportant but that they are, or seem to be, politically unimportant” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 522).

According to them, such sociotropic voting was evident in the 1972 and 1976 Presidential elections (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 148).

Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 728) also assert that sociotropic voting, instead of pocketbook voting, had a statistically significant impact on voter decisions in the 1992 Presidential election. On the other hand, Kramer (1983, 106) asserts that there are no “purely personal favors or benefits from office holders,” thus the measurements of and the distinctions between pocketbook and sociotropic voting are artifactual. In sharp contrast, Lewis-Beck (1985, 355) concludes that pocketbook voting was not artifactual with the quasiexperimental research of the 1956-82 CPS SRC election surveys. In the comparative context, Lewis-Beck (1988a; see also Lewis-Beck and Lockerbie 1989, 160) finds no pocketbook voting in legislative elections in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Furthermore, Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) enhance the sociotropic voting model, with the CPS NES data in the 1984 Presidential election. In addition to sociotropic and pocketbook voting, Kinder and his associates (1989) newly develop the “group voting” hypothesis that individuals are influenced by the information on their group’s economic conditions. Kinder and his colleagues (1989, 502) find that voters make a good distinction among the three levels of economic concerns. Moreover, it is their contention that sociotropic voting is the most important determinant (Kinder et al. 1989, 512). On the other hand, with an analysis of pooled survey data from Presidential elections, Markus (1988, 151-52) finds significant sociotropic and pocketbook voting between 1956 and 1984. In addition, Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh find pocketbook voting as a significant factor in the 1984 Presidential election. Abramowitz and his co-

authors (1988, 860-61) claim that pocketbook voting prevails when the economy is bad, especially when the media blames the government for economic downturns. In contrast, when the economy is good, voters tend to take credit from economic upturns.

In the comparative setting, Lewis-Beck (1986, 342) finds weak pocketbook voting in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1986, 665) also uncover weak pocketbook voting in Spain. The same is observed in Germany (Alford and Legge 1984, 1179) and Japan (Reed and Brunk 1984, 62). In contrast, Nannestad and Paldam (2000, 134) find significant pocketbook voting in Denmark.

C. Retrospective Voting and Prospective Voting

The other issue of economic voting hinges upon voters' time frame. Do they vote with regard to retrospective evaluations or prospective promises? Most of the above-mentioned studies are based on retrospective economic voting. The retrospective voting model is traced back to V. O. Key. Since voters are "a rational god of vengeance and reward," voters are viewed to be involved in a punishment and reward system depending upon the incumbent party's economic performances (Key 1964, 567). The traditional retrospective voting model is based on the assumption that voters are more concerned about actual policy outcomes than policies themselves (Fiorina 1981, 8).

While V. O. Key does not view the past as a gauge for the future, Downs emphasizes the expected utility of future policies (Chappell and Keech 1985, 11). The Downsian theory of retrospective voting relies on a motivational ground. Retrospective voting is a cost-saving cue for their decisions in voting. It may cost a lot less to acquire information about past performances than future policies. In addition, past records are

more reliable to be evaluated than future promises. To Downs, “the citizen simply uses the past as a guide to the policies the parties would implement in the future” (Fiorina 1981, 12). Thus, the Downsian retrospective voting theory is connected with prospective voting. Fiorina (1981, 13) notes, “The Downsian citizen compares the challenger’s and the incumbent’s platforms, interpreting the latter in light of the incumbent’s past performance.”

It is Fiorina who takes issue with simple retrospective voting. Utilizing survey data from the SRC Election Studies between 1956 and 1974, Fiorina (1978, 434) finds that voter decisions were influenced by the health of the economy in Presidential elections. In Congressional elections, however, the relationship was positive until 1960 but became negative afterwards (Fiorina 1978, 435). Therefore, Fiorina (1981) develops a mixed model of retrospective and prospective voting with data from the 1976 Presidential election and the 1974-76 Congressional elections.

Miller and Wattenberg also test the voter’s time perspective by using survey data from Presidential elections between 1952 and 1980 and draw a similar conclusion. They make a distinction among the four dimensions of retrospective performance, prospective performance, personal retrospective evaluations, and prospective policy considerations. As a result, Miller and Wattenberg (1985, 370) find that voters are not necessarily retrospective or prospective. Voters are able to assess the incumbent’s past performances and are also concerned about the future of policy promises.

Furthermore, Miller and Wattenberg (1985, 370) assert that respective emphasis that was given by V. O. Key, Downs, and Fiorina can provide better explanations under different circumstances. V. O. Key’s stress on “retrospective performance” may account

well for the elections where the incumbent is running for reelection. In contrast, Downsian retrospective voting based on the policies (the platform of the party) may explain well how challengers interact with voters. Fiorina's emphasis on "prospective performance" may best fit elections where candidates are running in open seat races. To summarize, "the public appears to act in a highly responsible fashion, basing their evaluations on the most reliable and concrete information available" (Miller and Wattenberg 1985, 367). On the other hand, Conover, Feldman, and Knight (1986) assert that voters are more sensitive to unemployment than inflation issues in evaluating past economic performance.

Compared to research done on retrospective voting, prospective voting has not been studied as much. According to Chappell and Keech (1985, 11), Rabinowitz and Zechman test the prospective voting theory in Presidential elections by employing actual changes in income "during the year following the elections as an unbiased proxy for expectations of future performance." Rabinowitz and Zechman also argue that "individuals apparently do have reasonably accurate expectations about short-term fluctuations in the performance of the economy and they act upon these expectations" (Chappell and Keech 1985, 11). Chappell (1983) and Chappell and Keech (1995) also argue that voters are not naive but sophisticated and prospective.

Monroe and Levi (1983) also examine the prospective voting model in light of presidential popularity. Survey data of leading businessmen and economists are used in their model for the measurements of future economic growth and inflation. In addition, Kuklinski (1981) observes that economic voting implies a relationship between future financial conditions and voter choice. However, they find only weak prospective voting.

At the level of Congressional elections, Abramowitz (1985) contends that prospective voting affected the 1974, 1978, and 1982 Congressional elections more than retrospective voting did. Lockerbie presents a similar result, utilizing the NES survey data from the 1956-88 Congressional elections. According to Lockerbie (1991, 256), “Expectations of economic prosperity ... have a consistently stronger influence on voter choice than do evaluations of past performance.”

Some survey data analyses indicate the prospectiveness of voters’ evaluations. By employing data from the 1984 Surveys of Consumer Attitude, Lewis-Beck (1988b, 19) concludes that “the prospective economic evaluations weigh at least as heavily as the retrospective.” With an analysis of consumer survey data in 1960-91, Haller and Norpoth’s (1994, 646) conclusion is that voters are “remarkable economic forecasters.” However, Clarke and Stewart (1994, 1118) claim that the dominance of prospective voting is problematic (see also Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986). From a slightly different perspective, Jacobson finds a consistent connection among national economic conditions, candidate quality, and electoral outcomes. He suggests that “A party expected to have a good year because of the economy fulfills expectations partly because it recruits better challengers, which in itself produces more victories” (Jacobson 1991, 46).

Additionally, from a broader angle, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992, 597) define a “peasant” as a retrospective pocketbook voter and a “banker” as a prospective sociotropic voter. Between 1954 and 1988, presidential approval ratings appeared to be a function of voters’ collective evaluations of the prospective national economy. Thus, MacKuen and his associates (1992, 606) conclude that “The electorate responds with the

sophistication of the banker.” From the extended data between 1954 and 1996, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2000) reaffirm their banker theory. In contrast, Nickelsburg and Norpoth (2000, 320) rebut the banker theory.

Using the 1984 Euro-Barometer public opinion surveys, Lewis-Beck (1988a, 64) uncovers that “none is statistically more secure than the prospective item.” The prospective voting variable is statistically significant in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Later, Lewis-Beck and Lockerbie (1989) maintain the same conclusion as the Euro-Barometer public opinion surveys conducted in later years. Canadian retrospective voting is also observed by Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler (2000). In some post-communist countries, prospective expectations about economic reforms have a significant impact on voter decisions (Fidrmuc 2000, 215).

CHAPTER III

VOTER TURNOUT IN SOUTH KOREA

1. Model Specification and Methodology

In this Chapter, I examine the effects of economic conditions on voter turnout in South Korea. I also compare the impacts of economic conditions on voter turnout with those of many other factors (socioeconomic, social psychological, political mobilization, and anticipated closeness). In addition, I probe the effect of the unique factor (regionalism) on voter turnout in South Korea. The dependent variable of the statistical models to be tested is voter turnout. Voter turnout is coded 1 if a self-reported voter; otherwise 0. Since the dependent variable is binary, I utilize probit. The coefficient estimates are the probabilities of voting. The independent variables of the basic (or restricted) model include the measurements of economic conditions, socioeconomic factors, social psychological factors, political mobilization factors, and the close election factor. The combined (or unrestricted) model includes the basic model, home province, and individual election specific events. The combined model tests the effect of regionalism on voter turnout. In order to compare the power of the combined model with the basic model, I utilize likelihood ratio tests.

To test the economic condition hypothesis, I employ the independent variables of national economic conditions, inflation, personal economic conditions, and unemployment. The translated or recoded survey questions are in Appendix C. If a respondent perceived the national economy as being worse than before, the respondent

was less likely to vote. The 1992 National Assembly election survey does not have the national economic condition survey item. Instead, the national economic conditions in 1992 are indirectly measured by the dummy variable of inflation. The survey asked, “What is the most important problem that the country is facing?” If a respondent considered inflation to be the nation’s most important problem, the respondent was less likely to vote. The inflation item is also available in the two Presidential election surveys but not in the 1996 National Assembly election survey.

In 1997, since South Korea was placed under the most serious economic crisis in its history, the survey did not ask the usual question, “How would you evaluate national economic conditions during the past couple of years?” Instead, the survey used the question, “Which political party did you think was mainly responsible for the current economic crisis [the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout]?”²⁴ In this study, I utilize this survey question for the national economic condition variable. If a respondent answered that the ruling party was responsible for the financial crisis, the respondent correctly understood the crisis was less likely to vote. In addition, I utilize the personal economic condition and unemployment variables in all the elections. If a respondent answered that personal economic condition was worse than before or that the individual was unemployed, the respondent was less likely to vote.

For the socioeconomic hypothesis, I utilize the variables of residential area, age, gender, and educational attainment. Individuals living in urban areas and with higher

²⁴ Unfortunately, there is no sociotropic voting item that directly asks the national economic situations in 1997. Thus, a researcher (Lee 1998) also employs this survey question for his economic voting model in South Korea. 4.3% of the respondents believed the incumbent party to be responsible for the financial crisis, while 2.8% (1.2%) of the respondents thought the first (second) opposition party to be responsible for the crisis. 41.8% of the respondents answered “don’t know.”

education are expected to vote more than individuals living in rural areas and with lower education. In this research project, I recode the age variable as 1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, and 4 = 50 and older.²⁵ Older people are more likely to vote than the younger generation. In addition, I use the dummy variable of gender (male) in order to capture a positive relationship between men and voter turnout, with women being the excluded category.

For the measurement of the social psychological factors, I employ only party identifier and election interest. A party identifier is indicated by a self-reported supporter for a party. South Korea's surveys have a straightforward question asking voters' election interest (How interested were you in the election?). The two social psychological variables are expected to have a positive impact on voter turnout. South Korea's surveys often lack survey questions for political efficacy or political trust.

For political mobilization, I use the frequencies of participating in campaign rallies (or watching TV advertisements) and campaign contacts. TV campaigns were legalized in the Presidential elections since 1992, thus the TV advertisement variable is used for the Presidential elections, instead of the frequencies of participating in campaign rallies. The more frequently the political mobilization occurred, the higher the expected voter turnout.

²⁵ As I noted in Chapter II, voter turnout may be depressed after a certain age due to the cost and inaccessibility of the polling places. Nonetheless, the category of 4 includes the wide age range of voters in their 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and over. Thus, there is no dramatic decrease in voter turnout across the categories. In addition, this kind of code is more appropriate for the voter choice hypothesis in the following Chapters V and VI (Alvarez and Nagler 1995).

In addition, voters' anticipated election closeness was asked only in South Korea's Presidential election surveys. As an individual perceives the results of the election as being close, the voter is more likely to vote.

In order to evaluate the impact of South Korea's regionalism on voter turnout, I first employ respondents' home province as dummy variables (Cholla province and Kyungsang province), leaving the other provinces as the omitted category. Regionalism is the most serious between these two provinces. In the 1997 Presidential election, for instance, Kim Dae Jung from South Cholla province received 94.6% of the votes from South Cholla province and 92.3% from the North Cholla province, while he garnered 11.0% of votes from South Kyungsang province and 13.7% from North Kyungsang province. His rival Lee Hoe Chang based on Kyungsang province picked up 55.1% of votes from South Kyungsang province and 61.9% from North Kyungsang province, whereas he collected 3.2% of votes from South Cholla province and 4.5% from North Kyungsang province. Regionalism is expected to have a positive impact on voter participation. If regionalism is strong, individuals are more likely to go to the polling places to cast their votes for their regional party.

South Korea's regionalism is also measured by the individual election specific event of a party merger (or coalition).²⁶ The mergers were made by political leaders' calculations mainly based on regional differences and drew support from their followers, by stimulating regional sentiments. Thus, a merger was preferred by certain people and they were more likely to vote. So, dummy variables (coalition supporters and coalition non-supporters) are utilized in the statistical models, leaving "don't know" as the base

category. The 1996 National Assembly election survey did not ask about the preference over a party merger.

It is immediately noticed that the above mentioned hypotheses are involved with more than one parameter, with the exceptions of the close election hypothesis. Thus, I need to conduct joint hypothesis tests to see whether the group of variables jointly has a significant effect on voter turnout. If the group of variables turns out to be jointly significant, I conclude that the hypothesis is significant at the 95% (or 90%) level. Even though a single variable of a hypothesis appears to be significant, the joint hypothesis test may disprove the hypothesis because of the other insignificant variables. On the other hand, even if joint test confirms the significance of the hypothesis, it is still possible that every single variable of the group is not significant (Wooldridge 2000, 144-45). Therefore, joint tests are required to confirm the significance of the hypothesis under investigation.

2. Statistical Models

A basic voter turnout function and a combined voter turnout function are, respectively, as follows:

$$P(VT_0=1|x) = \Phi(E, SOE, PSY, \text{ and } M [\text{and } C]) \text{ and} \quad (1)$$

$$P(VT_1=1|x) = \Phi(E, SOE, PSY, M [\text{and } C], HP, \text{ and } IE), \quad (2)$$

²⁶ The dynamics and backgrounds of party merger will be explained in detail in Chapter V.

where VT_0 and VT_1 are voter turnout; E is economic conditions; SOE is socioeconomic factors; PSY is social psychological factors; M is political mobilization factors; C is anticipated election closeness in the Presidential elections; HP is home province; and IE is the individual election specific event.

The basic model is transformed as follows:

$$P(VT_0=1|x) = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + \beta_8 X_8 + \beta_9 X_9 + \beta_{10} X_{10} + \beta_{11} X_{11} + \beta_{12} X_{12} + \beta_{13} X_{13} + U_i), \quad (3)$$

where VT_0 = voter turnout; β_0 = intercept; X_1 = national economic conditions (N/A in the 1992 National Assembly election); X_2 = inflation (N/A in the 1996 National Assembly election); X_3 = personal economic conditions; X_4 = unemployment; X_5 = residential area; X_6 = age; X_7 = gender (male); X_8 = educational attainment; X_9 = party identifier; X_{10} = election interest; X_{11} = participating in campaign rallies (or watching TV advertisements in the Presidential elections); X_{12} = campaign contact; X_{13} = anticipated closeness (in the Presidential elections); and U_i = error term.

The combined model estimates the impact of regionalism on South Korea's voter turnout.

$$P(VT_1=1|x) = \Phi(\beta_{100} + \beta_{101} X_{101} + \beta_{102} X_{102} + \beta_{103} X_{103} + \beta_{104} X_{104} + \beta_{105} X_{105} + \beta_{106} X_{106} + \beta_{107} X_{107} + \beta_{108} X_{108} + \beta_{109} X_{109} + \beta_{110} X_{110} + \beta_{111} X_{111} + \beta_{112} X_{112} + \beta_{113} X_{113} + \beta_{114} X_{114} + \beta_{115} X_{115} + \beta_{116} X_{116} + \beta_{117} X_{117} + U_i), \quad (4)$$

where VT_i = voter turnout; β_{100} = intercept; X_{101} = national economic conditions (N/A in the 1992 National Assembly election); X_{102} = inflation (N/A in the 1996 National Assembly election); X_{103} = personal economic conditions; X_{104} = unemployment; X_{105} = residential area; X_{106} = age; X_{107} = gender (male); X_{108} = educational attainment; X_{109} = party identifier; X_{110} = election interest; X_{111} = participating in campaign rallies (or watching TV advertisements in the Presidential elections); X_{112} = campaign contact; X_{113} = anticipated closeness (in the Presidential elections); X_{114} = home province (Cholla); X_{115} = home province (Kyungsang); X_{116} = coalition (Support); X_{117} = coalition (Not Support); and U_i = error term.

3. Voter Turnout in South Korea

A. The National Assembly Elections

The estimates of probit models for the National Assembly elections (the Presidential races) are presented in Table 3-1 (Table 3-3). The left two columns next to the independent variable column are for the 1992 National Assembly election (the 1992 Presidential race) and the right two columns are for the 1996 National Assembly election (the 1997 Presidential race). The left column of each election displays the parameter estimates of the basic model. The right column of each election has the coefficient estimates of the combined model. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Table 3-1. Probit Estimates for Voter Turnout: The National Assembly Elections, South Korea

Independent Variables	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1996 Basic	1996 Combined
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	N/A	N/A	-.02 (.08)	-.02 (.08)
Inflation	-.16 (.11)	-.17 (.11)	N/A	N/A
Personal economy	.12 (.08)	.10 (.08)	-.03 (.08)	-.02 (.08)
Unemployment	N/A ^a	N/A ^a	.16 (.22)	.15 (.22)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	-.19* (.08)	-.18* (.08)	-.16* (.08)	-.17* (.08)
Age	.28* (.06)	.28* (.06)	.28* (.05)	.28* (.05)
Gender (Male)	-.09 (.11)	-.07 (.12)	.06 (.10)	.05 (.10)
Educational attainment	.03 (.07)	.05 (.07)	-.09** (.05)	-.09** (.05)
<i>Psychological</i>				
Party identifier	.02 (.11)	.04 (.11)	-.04 (.10)	-.04 (.10)
Election interest	.62* (.07)	.63* (.07)	.64* (.06)	.64* (.06)
<i>Mobilization</i>				
Campaign rallies	.45* (.16)	.46* (.16)	.26** (.14)	.24** (.14)
Campaign contact	.07 (.12)	.09 (.12)	.07 (.10)	.03 (.10)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)		.17 (.15)		.04 (.13)
Home province (Kyungsang)		.12 (.13)		.21** (.11)
Coalition (Support)		.00 (.19)	N/A	N/A
Coalition (Not Support)		-.17 (.14)	N/A	N/A
Intercept	-1.68* (.46)	-1.81* (.48)	-1.10* (.40)	-1.09* (.40)
Log Likelihood	-348.19	-343.59	-463.06	-461.23
Prob > chi ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.20
Number of obs.	991	977	1197	1197

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

^a unemployment is dropped out. It predicts self-reported voter perfectly.

The March 1992 National Assembly Election. As the estimates of the basic model suggest, economic conditions did not affect voter turnout (see Table 3-1). Of the four socioeconomic factors, only residential area and age affected the decisions of whether an individual voted or not. Contrary to the hypothesis, rural voters were more likely to vote, *ceteris paribus*. Yet, age had the anticipated impact on voter turnout in that older people appear to have been more likely to go to the polling booths. Also, election interest, a social psychological factor, affected voter turnout. The more interested in the election an individual was, the more likely it was that the person went to the polling places. In addition, voters' mobilization into campaign rallies fostered voter turnout, as expected.

The coefficient estimates of the combined model illustrate almost the same estimations as in the basic model. Rural residents and older people were more likely to vote, controlling all other factors. In addition, election interest and campaign rallies were positively related with voter turnout. However, the combined model indicates that the province and party merger variables did not have significant influences on voter turnout, *ceteris paribus*.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 9.2, df = 4]$) tests reject, at a .1 level of significance, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model. Instead, the tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model. In other words, the addition of the regionalism variables into the basic model generates more power in explaining voter turnout in 1992. Yet, the better model (the combined model) suggests that the economic

condition hypothesis and the regionalism hypotheses, respectively, are not jointly significant (see Table 3-2). On the other hand, the results of joint tests confirm that all the hypotheses in the basic model are jointly significant.²⁷

Table 3-2. Joint Test Results of the Probit Estimates: The National Assembly Elections, South Korea

Hypothesis	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1996 Basic	1996 Combined
Economic conditions	.098**	.11	.83	.87
Socioeconomic	.00*	.00*	.00*	.00*
Social psychological	.00*	.00*	.00*	.00*
Political mobilization	.02*	.01*	.13	.21
Regionalism		.45		.16

Note: Prob > χ^2

* (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The April 1996 National Assembly Election. The estimates of the basic model for the 1996 election reveal that none of the economic condition factors reached statistical significance (see Table 3-1). Among the socioeconomic factors, residential area, age, and educational attainment appear to be significant but only the sign of age is in the hypothesized direction. Older people were more likely to vote. In contrast, urban residents and the educated were less likely to vote. Nonetheless, the signs of the residential area and educational coefficients are consistent with the conclusions of prior research (Kim and Park 1991; Mo, Brady, and Ro 1991; Park 1993b). A social

²⁷ Mostly, the economic condition hypothesis and the regionalism hypothesis (or the ethnic voting hypothesis) are not jointly significant, with respect to voter turnout. Moreover, the variables of these

psychological factor, election interest appears to have the anticipated effect on voter turnout. Also, the participation in campaign rallies was positively correlated with voter turnout, which suggests voter mobilization occurred in 1996.

The coefficients of the combined model are very similar to those of the basic model. The residential area, age, educational attainment, election interest, and campaign rally variables had a significant impact on voter participation. They are either in the expected directions (the age, election interest, and campaign rally variables) or correctly reflect the characteristics of South Korea's electoral politics (the residential area and educational attainment variables). In addition, home province played an important role in the decisions of whether to vote or not. Kyungsang people were more likely to go to the polling booths.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 3.66, df = 2]$) tests approve the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model. On the other hand, joint tests confirm the joint significance of the socioeconomic hypothesis and the social psychological hypothesis, respectively (see Table 3-2). Joint tests disprove the joint significance of the economic condition hypothesis and the political mobilization hypothesis, respectively. These are true both in the basic and combined models. Also, the regionalism hypothesis in the combined model appears not to be jointly significant.

hypotheses are not, frequently, significant. Thus, it is not meaningful to calculate "first differences," as in Chapters V and VI.

B. Presidential Elections

The December 1992 Presidential Election. The estimates of the basic model for the 1992 Presidential election suggest that economic conditions did not have significant influences on voter turnout (see Table 3-3). Among the four socioeconomic factors, only residential area and age made a significant difference in deciding whether to vote or not. Rural residents and older voters tended to vote, all other things being equal. Election interest was the only social psychological factor that had a significant impact on voter turnout. Election interest was positively correlated with electoral participation. In contrast, the political mobilization factors did not reach statistical significance. The anticipated closeness of the election also affected voter turnout. However, the election was far from a close race. The election ended up with a comfort margin of approximately eight percentage points between the first two contenders.

Table 3-3. Probit Estimates for Voter Turnout: Presidential Elections, South Korea

Independent Variables	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1997 Basic	1997 Combined
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.13 (.11)	.13 (.11)	-.03 (.14)	-.02 (.15)
Inflation	N/A ^a	N/A ^a	.01 (.14)	.02 (.15)
Personal economy	-.03 (.10)	-.04 (.10)	.08 (.13)	.13 (.13)
Unemployment	.23 (.22)	.26 (.22)	-.32 (.33)	-.32 (.35)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	-.14** (.08)	-.11 (.08)	-.02 (.10)	-.06 (.10)
Age	.18* (.07)	.18* (.07)	.25* (.07)	.25* (.08)
Gender (Male)	.04 (.13)	.01 (.13)	.09 (.14)	.12 (.14)
Educational attainment	.03 (.08)	.02 (.09)	-.04 (.10)	.01 (.10)
<i>Psychological</i>				
Party identifier	-.08 (.14)	-.15 (.15)	.24** (.14)	.30* (.15)
Election interest	.60* (.08)	.59* (.08)	.64* (.08)	.70* (.09)
<i>Mobilization</i>				
TV advertisements	.10 (.14)	.08 (.14)	.37 (.33)	.35 (.34)
Campaign contact	.17 (.18)	.15 (.18)	-.43* (.16)	-.40* (.17)
<i>Closeness</i>				
Anticipated closeness	.15** (.09)	.16** (.09)	.12 (.11)	.13 (.12)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)		.46* (.21)		.25 (.22)
Home province (Kyungsang)		-.03 (.14)		.33** (.17)
Coalition (Support)		.31** (.17)		-.28 (.21)
Coalition (Not Support)		.20 (.16)		-.26 (.17)
Intercept	-1.23** (.65)	-1.29** (.67)	-1.95* (.86)	-2.35* (.88)
Log Likelihood	-243.42	-238.89	-209.95	-201.73
Prob > chi ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.14	0.15	0.21	0.23
Number of obs.	1177	1175	1051	1044

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

^ainflation is automatically dropped out. It predicts self-reported voter perfectly.

The story does not differ much in the combined model. No economic condition factors played a significant role in the citizens' decisions of whether to vote or not. Age was the only socioeconomic factor that reached statistical significance for voter turnout. As expected, older people were more likely to vote. Election interest, among the social psychological factors, did matter in deciding whether to go to polling booths or not. Election interest was positively connected with voter turnout, controlling all other things. Also, the close election variable had a positive impact on voter participation.

Moreover, a province factor was significant for voter turnout. Cholla people tended to go to the voting places. The individual election specific event of the three party merger also affected the decisions of whether to vote or not. Supporters for the three party merger were more likely to vote. It is also worth noting that preferences over the party merger may have been affected by respondents' home provinces, particularly Cholla or Kyungsang province. However, the preference was examined among voters from other regions of the country, thus there are no serious multicollinearity problems between the two variables in the model.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 9.06, df = 4]$) tests approve, at a .1 level of significance, the alternative rival hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the basic model and the combined model. In addition, the more powerful combined model suggests that the economic condition hypothesis and the political mobilization hypothesis, respectively, are not jointly significant. In contrast, each of the socioeconomic hypothesis, the social psychological hypothesis, the close election hypothesis, and the regionalism hypothesis appears to be jointly significant (see Table 3-

4). The socioeconomic hypothesis, the social psychological hypothesis, and the close election hypothesis, respectively, are also jointly significant in the basic model.

Table 3-4. Joint Test Results of the Probit Estimates: Presidential Elections, South Korea

Hypothesis	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1997 Basic	1997 Combined
Economic conditions	.47	.44	.84	.76
Socioeconomic	.02*	.04*	.00*	.01*
Social psychological	.00*	.00*	.00*	.00*
Political mobilization	.50	.62	.02*	.04*
Close Election	.09**	.09**	.29	.25
Regionalism		.08**		.11

Note: Prob > χ^2

* (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The December 1997 Presidential Election. On the decisions of whether to vote in the 1997 Presidential election, economic conditions in the basic model did not generate any significant impacts (see Table 3-3). Also, age was the only socioeconomic factor that reached statistical significance for voter participation. Older people were more likely to vote, as hypothesized. Party identifier and election interest, the two social psychological variables, had significant influences on voter turnout. As expected, the two variables were positively connected to voter turnout. Contrary to the hypothesis and the reality, the anticipated closeness of the election did not produce any difference in voter participation. This is interesting because the election was a neck-and-neck race. The first two candidates ended up with a 1.6 percentage point difference.

Among the mobilization factors, the campaign contact variable reached statistical significance. However, the sign of the coefficient displays the direction opposite to the hypothesis, which suggests the negative relationship between campaign contact and voter turnout. This is partly because of the widespread disrespect and disbelief towards politics and politicians in South Korea. Presidents were omnipotent but had spent more time in political maneuvering than political reform and economic development even after the democratic transition. Their families and senior staff members were frequently linked to various corruption cases and scandals. Party leaders fought each other over personal causes and this sometimes paralyzed the democratic process of political bargaining or negotiation. The dominance of the presidency in South Korean politics often jeopardized the autonomy and stability of the National Assembly. The members of the National Assembly also used up their effort for political maneuver in order to back up their regional leader, instead of legislative bills and policy matters (Park 1996). Election campaigns were often marred by name calling and finger pointing.

The 1992 National Assembly election survey indicates to what extent the disbelief toward politicians was spread. The vast majority of the respondents (77.4%) had negative evaluations of politicians. Also, about the same portion of the respondents (74.2%) had negative evaluations of the members of the National Assembly. In addition, the 1992 Presidential election survey illustrates that the majority of the respondents (68.5%) disapproved of the way the government had been handling its job. Moreover, 75.5% of the respondents had negative evaluations of politicians. In the 1996 National Assembly election survey, 32.8% of the respondents believed that their vote had no impact or a negligible impact on the National Assembly elections. Nearly a quarter

(25.7%) believed that their vote had no impact or a negligible impact on Presidential elections. In the 1997 Presidential election survey, 86.7% of the respondents believed that politicians were only interested in how many votes they received.²⁸

The combined model reveals almost the same results as the basic model. Older people were more likely to participate in the election. The party identifier and election interest variables appear to have been positively connected to voter turnout, *ceteris paribus*. Also, the campaign contact variable has a negative impact on voter turnout. Voters' home provinces were significant for voter participation. Kyungsang people tended to go to the polling booths. Yet, the strategic coalition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil did not attract voter participation.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 16.44, df = 4]$) tests approve, at a .005 level of significance, the alternative rival hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the basic model and the combined model. As the results of joint tests for the combined model display, however, neither the economic condition hypothesis, nor the regionalism hypothesis and the close election hypothesis, respectively, are jointly significant (see Table 3-4). In contrast, the socioeconomic hypothesis, the social psychological hypothesis, and the political mobilization hypothesis, respectively, appear to have joint significance both in the basic and combined models.

²⁸ Because the surveys did not always ask the same question, I cannot analyze the changes in a particular voter perception throughout the elections. But voters usually held a negative image about politics and politicians.

4. Conclusions

From the above statistical analyses, I draw the following conclusions. First, the most striking new pattern of voter turnout is that the mobilization effect appears to have dwindled. Although the political mobilization effect did not decrease overnight after the democratic transition, the political mobilization hypothesis lost joint significance after the 1992 National Assembly election. The negative relationship between campaign contact and voter turnout in 1997 suggests that the joint significance of the political mobilization hypothesis cannot verify the traditional voter mobilization.

As a result, official voter turnout rates in the elections under study have gradually decreased, compared to those in past elections. For instance, the first direct Presidential election in 1987 after about two-decade-long military controlled authoritarian elections marked record high 89.2%. Since then, voter turnout rates in the Presidential elections dropped to 81.9% (1992) and again to 80.6% (1997). Decrease in voter turnout is more dramatic in the National Assembly elections than in the Presidential elections. In the National Assembly elections, voter turnout rates were 78.4% (1981) and 84.6% (1985) but they dropped to 75.7% (1988), 71.9% (1992), and again to 63.9% (1996).

During the South Korean authoritarian era, mobilized voters were more likely to be older people, women, less educated people, and rural residents (Kim 1980). Rapid economic development in the 1960s and 1970s had many young and educated male workforces move from their home to urban industrial areas. As a result, the ruling party won among rural areas where older people, females, and less educated people were more likely to live, while opposition parties won among urban areas where younger people,

males, and more educated people were more likely to live. The term of “*yeo chon ya do*” (the ruling party based on rural areas, opposition parties based on urban areas) succinctly captured the traditional relationship between parties and supporters between the 1960s and the early 1980s.

In the 1990s, the older generation, rural residents, and less educated people still tended to vote more than their young, urban, and educated counterparts. Nevertheless, this must have had little to do with the traditional voter mobilization. Previously, voter mobilization occurred with wide spread vote buying, implicit or explicit coercion, and the like. After the democratic transition, elections became remarkably free and fair and election laws became tighter against various electoral fraud than ever. Although this does not imply that the electoral fraud did not exist in the 1990, elections in the 1990s have certainly been cleaner than past elections. Thus, traditional voter mobilization was challenged by the people and the new democratic governments as well. Moreover, the power transition between the ruling party to an opposition party orderly took place for the first time in its history as the result of the 1997 Presidential election. Therefore, the history-long “*yeo chon ya do*” division could no longer be applied to electoral politics. Then, why did the older generation, rural residents, and less educated people still tend to vote more than their counterparts?

The younger generation’s lower turnout is associated with generational differences in South Korea. As hypothesized at the beginning of this Chapter, the older generation felt responsibility for the society more than the younger generation did, thus the older generation was more likely to vote. According to Inglehart and Abramson (1994; 349), the difference between the values of young and old in South Korea with

differing rates of economic growth (1950-90) is the strongest among their twenty cases. Consequently, the younger generation was more concerned about postmaterialist values, such as “freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” than traditional materialistic politics (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; 336).

On the other hand, the younger generation’s lower turnout seems not to be correlated to political distrust or disbelief in South Korea. It was said that political cynicism induced the decrease in the younger generation’s voting participation. However, there is no political cynicism survey item. Thus, political cynicism is indirectly indicated by the political distrust and disbelief items. Gamma test value (-.260) between age and disbelief toward politicians suggests that there was a weak correlation between them in the 1992 National Assembly election. Gamma test values between age and the similar perceptions in different elections indicate a weak or no correlation between them. The examples of Gamma test values are the following: the disbelief about the members of the National Assembly (-.092) in the 1992 National Assembly election survey; the belief that their vote had no impact or a negligible impact on the National Assembly elections (.073), the belief that their vote had no impact or a negligible impact on Presidential elections (.002) in the 1996 National Assembly election survey; the evaluations of politicians (-.247) in the 1992 Presidential election survey; and the belief that politicians were only interested in how many votes they received (-.106).

In addition, the traditional voter mobilization, if any, occurred less frequently among rural residents and less educated people in the 1990s’ elections than in previous elections. The residential area variable was significant only in the two National Assembly elections and the educational attainment variable was significant only in the

1996 National Assembly election. Also, political distrust or disbelief (political cynicism) did not affect voting behavior with regard to residential area and educational attainment. Gamma tests suggest a weak or no correlation between residential area (and educational attainment) and the above mentioned survey items. Voters generally had negative feelings about politicians and politics regardless of their residential area and educational attainment. Nonetheless, the negative evaluation did not create a pattern about the vote participation.

The second conclusion is that voters' economic evaluation has not affected their decisions of whether to vote or not in South Korea. Surprisingly enough, even the most significant economic crisis in South Korea (the IMF bailout in November 1997) did not significantly change voter turnout in the December 1997 Presidential election. The official turnout rate of the 1992 Presidential election was 81.9%, while the actual voter turnout of the 1997 Presidential election was 80.6%. This conclusion a bit contradicts Radcliff's findings (1992; 1996). According to him, turnout rates in industrial countries are affected by the state of the economy and that economic adversity has different impacts on voter participation depending upon the welfare level in a country. His multivariate regression reaffirms Rosenstone's finding that economic hardships in the U.S. discourage voter participation. In contrast, economic adversity in developing countries encourages individuals to go to the polling booths.

Third, regionalism had no significant impact on voter turnout in South Korea. Joint tests suggest that the regionalism hypothesis is not jointly significant, with the sole exception of the 1992 Presidential election. There is no systematic pattern between voter's home province and election participation.

Fourth, the socioeconomic hypothesis is jointly significant across the elections. Particularly, the age variable reached statistical significance throughout the elections. The age variable was also in the anticipated direction. On the other hand, urban residents and the educated were less likely to vote, which disproves the hypothesis.

Fifth, the social psychological hypothesis is also jointly significant for voter participation throughout the elections. Particularly, the election interest variable reached statistical significance across the elections. Election interest was positively correlated with voter participation. This is consistent with Lee's (1993) analysis on a National Assembly election. In addition, party supporters were more likely to vote than independent voters.

CHAPTER IV

VOTER TURNOUT IN TAIWAN

1. Model Specification and Methodology

In Chapter IV, I investigate the impacts of economic conditions on voter turnout in Taiwan. I also compare the effects of economic conditions on voter turnout with those of the socioeconomic, social psychological, and political mobilization factors. The comparisons will, in part, be made with joint significant tests. There is no survey item in Taiwan's surveys that asks voters' anticipated election closeness unlike in South Korea's surveys. Moreover, I examine the effect of ethnic voting inherent in Taiwan on voter turnout. As in Chapter III, the dependent variable of the statistical models to be tested is the binary variable of voter turnout. Thus, I employ probit. The independent variables of the basic model include the measurements of economic conditions, socioeconomic factors, social psychological factors, and a political mobilization factor. The combined model includes the basic model, ethnic background, and the individual election specific event (tension between Taiwan and China). The combined model is designed to explain the relationship between ethnic background and voter turnout.

In general, the hypotheses and the coding systems are the same as the South Korean counterparts in Chapter III. Otherwise, I specify the differences. The translated or recoded Taiwanese survey questions are also in Appendix C. The economic condition hypothesis is tested with the variables of national economic conditions, personal economic conditions, and unemployment. The state of the national and personal

economies are positively correlated with voter turnout, while unemployment is negatively related to voter turnout. Taiwanese data lack the survey item for inflation.

The socioeconomic factors are age, gender, and educational attainment. These three variables have exactly the same coding system as in Chapter III and they are hypothesized to have a positive relationship with voter turnout. Taiwanese surveys do not have the residential area item that is compatible with South Korean surveys.

Also, the measurements of the social psychological factors include party identifier and election interest. A party identifier is indicated by a self-reported supporter for a party. Because Taiwan's surveys do not have a straightforward question about election interest, I employ the survey question, "How interested were you in the election-related articles in newspapers?" The interest in the election-related articles is assumed to be related to election interest. These two social psychological variables are expected to have a positive impact on voter turnout. Taiwan's surveys lack questions for political efficacy or political trust.

For the variables of political mobilization, I use the frequencies of contact with party campaign staffers. The frequencies are also positively related to voter turnout. On the other hand, although TV commercials were also legalized for the first time in 1992, Taiwan surveys do not have survey questions for TV advertisements.

Ethnic voting is specified by voters' ethnic background. Ethnic background is measured by the dummy variables of the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, with the other choices being the excluded category. If ethnic voting is strong, then voter turnout is more likely to increase. Citizens are willing to go to the polling booths to show their support for their ethnic party. In addition, the tension variable is included in the 1995 and 1996

elections. Encountering the military threat from outside (the mainland), citizens were more likely to vote in order to demonstrate their support for the ruling party. The 1995 election survey asked, “How do you think current cross-strait relations are going?” If a respondent perceived the relations as improved (this is interpreted as support for the ruling party), the respondent was more likely to vote. If a respondent disagreed with the 1996 survey question (this is also interpreted as support for the ruling party), “Did Lee Teng-hui provoke the current cross-strait tension?” the respondent was more likely to go to the polling booths.

2. Statistical Models

A basic voter turnout function and a combined voter turnout function are, respectively, as follows:

$$P(VT_2=1|x) = \Phi(E, SOE, PSY, \text{ and } M) \text{ and} \quad (5)$$

$$P(VT_3=1|x) = \Phi(E, SOE, PSY, M, ETH, \text{ and } IE), \quad (6)$$

where VT_2 and VT_3 are voter turnout; E is economic conditions; SOE is socioeconomic factors; PSY is social psychological factors; M is a political mobilization factor; ETH is ethnic background; and IE is the individual election specific event.

The basic probit model is transformed into as follows:

$$P(VT_2=1|x) = \Phi(\beta_{200} + \beta_{201}X_{201} + \beta_{202}X_{202} + \beta_{203}X_{203} + \beta_{204}X_{204} + \beta_{205}X_{205} \\ + \beta_{206}X_{206} + \beta_{207}X_{207} + \beta_{208}X_{208} + \beta_{209}X_{209} + U_i), \quad (7)$$

where VT_2 = voter turnout; β_{200} = intercept; X_{201} = national economic conditions; X_{202} = personal economic conditions; X_{203} = unemployment; X_{204} = age; X_{205} = gender (male); X_{206} = educational attainment; X_{207} = party identifier; X_{208} = election interest; X_{209} = campaign contact; and U_i = error term.

The combined model estimates the impact of ethnic cleavages on Taiwan's voter turnout.

$$P(VT_3=1|x) = \Phi(\beta_{300} + \beta_{301}X_{301} + \beta_{302}X_{302} + \beta_{303}X_{303} + \beta_{304}X_{304} \\ + \beta_{305}X_{305} + \beta_{306}X_{306} + \beta_{307}X_{307} + \beta_{308}X_{308} + \beta_{309}X_{309} \\ + \beta_{310}X_{310} + \beta_{311}X_{311} + \beta_{312}X_{312} + U_i), \quad (8)$$

where VT_3 = voter turnout; β_{300} = intercept; X_{301} = national economic conditions; X_{302} = personal economic conditions; X_{303} = unemployment; X_{304} = age; X_{305} = gender (male); X_{306} = educational attainment; X_{307} = party identifier; X_{308} = election interest; X_{309} = campaign contact; X_{310} = ethnic background (Taiwanese); X_{311} = ethnic background (Mainlander); X_{312} = tension (N/A in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election); and U_i = error term.

3. Voter Turnout in Taiwan

A. The Legislative Yuan Elections

The estimates of the probit models for the Legislative Yuan elections are presented in Table 4-1. The left two columns next to the independent variable column are for the 1992 election and the right two columns are for the 1995 election. The left column of each election displays the parameter estimates of the basic model. The right column of each election has the coefficient estimates of the combined model. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

The December 1992 Legislative Yuan Election. The estimates of the basic model for the 1992 election suggest that economic conditions reached statistical significance for voter turnout (see Table 4-1). However, the effects of the national economic conditions and personal economic conditions on voter participation contradicted each other. The state of the national economy was positively related to voter turnout, while the state of the personal economy was negatively associated with electoral participation. Age is the only socioeconomic factor that had a significant impact on voter turnout. Older people were more likely to vote. Among the social psychological variables, election interest played a significant role in electoral participation. The more interested an individual was, the more likely it was that the person went to the polling places. Since the campaign contact variable did not reach statistical significance, voter mobilization was not likely to have occurred in 1992.

Table 4-1. Probit Estimates for Voter Turnout: The Legislative Yuan Elections, Taiwan

Independent Variables	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1995 Basic	1995 Combined
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.18* (.08)	.20* (.08)	.08 (.09)	.06 (.10)
Personal economy	-.18** (.10)	-.19** (.10)	.20* (.09)	.19** (.10)
Unemployment	-.31 (.46)	-.33 (.45)	.40 (.33)	.25 (.37)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Age	.39* (.06)	.41* (.07)	.31* (.06)	.30* (.07)
Gender (Male)	.01 (.11)	.03 (.11)	-.02 (.11)	-.03 (.12)
Educational attainment	-.04 (.06)	-.00 (.06)	-.03 (.06)	-.02 (.07)
<i>Psychological</i>				
Party identifier	.10 (.11)	.10 (.12)	.19 (.12)	.27* (.13)
Election interest	.11* (.05)	.11* (.05)	.07 (.05)	.08 (.05)
<i>Mobilization</i>				
Campaign contact	.18 (.13)	.16 (.13)	.33 (.21)	.33 (.21)
<i>Ethnic</i>				
Taiwanese		.27 (.17)		.00 (.13)
Mainlander		-.10 (.13)		-.02 (.15)
Tension	N/A	N/A		-.05 (.07)
Intercept	-.19 (.37)	-.33 (.39)	-1.58* (.77)	-1.37 (.88)
Log Likelihood	-321.32	-312.37	-346.10	-307.44
Prob > chi ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.08
Number of obs.	1104	1075	1129	944

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The combined model presents more or less the same estimations. The national economic situation positively affected voter turnout, while the personal economic situation negatively affected voter participation. Older people tended to vote but gender and education were not the determining factors. Election interest was the only social psychological factor that reached statistical significance. As expected, election interest was positively associated with electoral participation, all other things being equal. Contact with party campaign workers did not generate differences in voter participation. In addition, the ethnic cleavage variables did not reach statistical significance for voter turnout.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 17.9, df = 2]$) tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model at a .005 level of significance. Additionally, the results of joint tests for the statistical models confirm that the economic condition hypothesis, the socioeconomic hypothesis, and the social psychological hypothesis, respectively, are jointly significant (see Table 4-2). Yet, the political mobilization hypothesis and the ethnic cleavage hypothesis, respectively, are not jointly significant. However, since the signs of the national economy and the personal economy are opposite to each other, the joint significance of the economic hypothesis does not confirm any meaningful relationship between the economic conditions and voter turnout.

Table 4-2. Joint Test Results of the Probit Estimates: The Legislative Yuan Elections, Taiwan

Hypothesis	1992 Basic	1992 Combined	1995 Basic	1995 Combined
Economic conditions	.07**	.04*	.03*	.12
Socioeconomic	.00*	.00*	.00*	.00*
Social psychological	.06**	.07**	.08**	.03*
Political mobilization	.16	.21	.11	.12
Ethnic		.15		.90

Note: Prob > χ^2

* (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The December 1995 Legislative Yuan Election. The estimates of the basic model for the 1995 election indicate that the coefficient for the personal economic condition variable reached statistical significance for electoral participation (see Table 4-1). Personal economic condition appears to have had a positive impact on voter turnout. Among the socioeconomic variables, only age had a significant influence on voter participation. Consistent with expectations, older people were more likely to participate in the election, *ceteris paribus*. In 1995, neither the social psychological factors, nor the political mobilization factors worked as significant variables.

The combined model exhibits almost the same pattern as the basic model. Personal economic conditions and age were positively associated with voter participation. In addition, party identifiers were more likely to go to the polling places. On the other hand, the ethnic background and tension variables did not induce any differences in voter participation.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 77.32, df = 3]$) tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the basic model and the combined model at a .005 level of significance. Joint tests for the combined model disprove the joint significance of the economic condition hypothesis and the ethnic voting hypothesis, respectively (see Table 4-2). In the basic model, the results of joint tests confirm the joint significance of the economic condition hypothesis. Both in the basic and combined models, the socioeconomic hypothesis and the social psychological hypothesis, respectively, are jointly significant, while the political mobilization hypothesis is not jointly significant.

B. Presidential Election

The March 1996 Presidential Election. Table 4-3 illustrates the probit estimations for the 1996 Presidential election. The middle column displays the parameter estimates for the basic model. The right column illustrates the coefficients estimates for the combined model. The national economy was significant among the economic condition variables (see Table 4-3). Of the socioeconomic factors, age and gender had significant impacts on voter turnout. Older people were more likely to vote. Yet, contrary to the hypothesis, females were also more likely to vote in the 1996 election. In addition, the party identifier and election interest variables had positive effects on voter participation. In contrast, voter mobilization appears not to have occurred, which is suggested by the insignificant campaign contact variable.

Table 4-3. Probit Estimates for Voter Turnout: Presidential Election, Taiwan

Independent Variables	1996 Basic	1996 Combined
<i>Economics</i>		
National economy	.19** (.10)	.16 (.11)
Personal economy	.02 (.10)	.08 (.11)
Unemployment	-.35 (.28)	-.46 (.31)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>		
Age	.25* (.06)	.21* (.07)
Gender (Male)	-.31* (.12)	-.30* (.14)
Educational attainment	.09 (.07)	.10 (.07)
<i>Psychological</i>		
Party identifier	.34* (.13)	.39* (.15)
Election interest	.15* (.05)	.13* (.06)
<i>Mobilization</i>		
Campaign contact	.12 (.26)	.12 (.27)
<i>Ethnic</i>		
Taiwanese		.30** (.16)
Mainlander		.06 (.18)
Tension		.00 (.08)
Intercept	-.75 (.48)	-.86 (.58)
Log Likelihood	-264.35	-213.61
Prob > χ^2	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.08
Number of obs.	1100	927

Note: *(**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The combined model reveals that the economic condition variables are not significant, however. The age and gender variables reached statistical significance for voter turnout. As in the basic model, the sign of the age variable is in the expected direction, whereas the sign of the gender variable is not in the expected direction. The social psychological variables, party identifier and election interest, had significant impacts on voter turnout. Moreover, an ethnic variable reached statistical significance for the first time in the Taiwan's survey data. Native Taiwanese were more likely to vote in 1996.

Table 4-4. Joint Test Results of the Probit Estimates: Presidential Election, Taiwan

Hypothesis	1996 Basic	1996 Combined
Economic conditions	.18	.18
Socioeconomic	.00*	.01*
Social psychological	.00*	.00*
Political mobilization	.66	.66
Ethnic		.31

Note: Prob > χ^2

* indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 101.48, df = 3]$) tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model at a .005 level of significance. Joint tests for the two models confirm that the socioeconomic hypothesis and the social psychological hypothesis, respectively, are jointly significant

(see Table 4-4). In contrast, the economic condition hypothesis, the political mobilization hypothesis, and the ethnic voting hypothesis, respectively, are not jointly significant.

4. Conclusions

The statistical analyses of the probit models for Taiwan's voter turnout lead to the following conclusions. First, the economic condition hypothesis does not have a consistent impact on voter turnout. Joint tests confirm that the economic condition hypothesis is jointly significant in 1992 and 1995. However, the economic condition hypothesis appears to have had an contradictory impact on voter turnout in 1992. The national economic condition variable and the personal economic condition variable have the signs opposite to each other. In 1995, only the personal economic condition variable in the basic model had the expected impact on voter turnout. In 1996, the national economy variable had a statistical impact on voter participation but did not produce the joint significance of the economic condition hypothesis.

Second, likelihood ratio tests suggest that the combined model is better than the basic model across the elections. However, joint tests suggest that the ethnic voting hypothesis appears not to be jointly significant throughout the elections under investigation. Only the dummy variable of the Taiwanese ethnicity in 1996 reached statistical significance for electoral turnout.

Third, the socioeconomic hypothesis is the one that had a consistent impact on voter turnout throughout the elections. Also, age is the only variable that has had a consistent effect on voter participation in Taiwan. The sign of the age variable is also in

the expected direction. In addition, females were more likely to vote than males in Taiwan in 1996, which is opposite to the hypothesis. This may be one of the characteristics of Taiwan's electoral politics.

Fourth, the social psychological hypothesis also appears to be jointly significant for voter turnout. Election interest was significant in 1992 and 1996. In addition, party attachment was significant in 1995 (the combined model) and 1996. The signs of these variables are also in the expected directions. In contrast, the political mobilization hypothesis never reached statistical significance.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC VOTING IN SOUTH KOREA

1. Model Specification and Methodology

In this Chapter, I investigate the relationship between economic conditions and voter choice in South Korea. I also make a comparison among the impacts of economic conditions, socioeconomic factors, party identification, and regionalism on voter choice. Thus, the dependent variable is self-reported voter choice. As in Table 5-1, there have always been three main parties (or candidates) in South Korea's elections under study.

Table 5-1. Vote Distribution in the South Korean Elections

	Vote Share			
	National Assembly Elections		Presidential Elections	
	1992	1996	1992	1997
1st Party	DLP-38.5%	GNP-34.5%	KYS-42.0%	LHC-38.7%
2nd Party	DP-29.2%	NCNP-25.3%	KDJ-33.8%	KDJ-40.3%
3rd Party	UPP-17.4%	ULD-16.2%	CJY-16.3%	LIJ-19.2%
4th Party	NPRP-1.8%	DP-11.2%	PCJ-6.4%	
5th Party	IND-11.5%	IND-12.9%		
Total*	85.1%	76.0%	92.1%	98.2%

Note: * The percentages in the bottom cells are the total vote shares of the first three parties.

Sources: *Asian Survey* (various issues) and *Journal of Democracy* (various issues).

The dependent variable has three unordered possibilities. Such three-way races prevent me from using an ordered probit (or logit) technique. Consequently, I use a multinomial logit method for the three-way races, normalizing coefficients for the ruling party (or candidate) to zero. The coefficients for the two opposition parties in the

estimates are the impact of each variable on voter choice, relative to a vote for the ruling party. When the sign of a coefficient is negative, respondents are interpreted to vote for the ruling party. Otherwise, respondents are interpreted to opt for one of the opposition parties.

However, Alvarez and Nagler take issue with multinomial logit for the three-way races. First, they point out that multinomial logit “is computing estimates of *precisely* the same parameters as is binomial logit” (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 85; emphasis in original). Second, they assert that “if one is interested in more strategic questions about politics ... then multinomial logit is the wrong model to use” (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 85). Third, “multinomial logit ... [is] all quite limited in that they impose the IIA restriction upon voters” (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 85). The IIA condition refers to the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on individual voters, which implies that “the ratio of the probability of choosing one party to the probability of choosing a second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third party enters the race” (Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 57). Therefore, they suggest that multinomial probit works better with more than three choices than multinomial logit.

However, the multinomial logit methodology provides almost the same parameter estimates as Alvarez and Nagler’s alternative and thus, is utilized for analyzing three-way elections (Dominguez and McCann 1996; Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou N. D.; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Lee 1998). This research project is also focused on self-reported voter choices in post-election surveys rather than the issue movements by parties. In other words, this study does not probe issue voting in the spatial context. Instead, I investigate the relationship mainly between economic conditions (or regionalism) and voter choice.

Therefore, I utilize multinomial logit that provides greater efficiency than multinomial probit.

The independent variables of the basic model include the measurements of sociotropic voting, pocketbook voting, retrospective voting, prospective voting, socioeconomic factors, and party identification. The combined model consists of the basic model, home province, and the individual election specific event of a party merger (or coalition). This combined model measures the impact of regionalism on voter choice.

To measure sociotropic voting, I employ the national economic condition and inflation variables, depending upon the data availability. If a respondent perceived the national economy as being worse than a couple of years earlier, the respondent was more likely to support an opposition party. The 1992 National Assembly election survey does not have the national economic condition item. To indirectly measure the national economic condition for the election, I employ the dummy variable of inflation. The survey asked, “What is the most important problem that the country is facing?” If a respondent considered inflation to be the nation’s most important problem, the respondent was more likely to opt for an opposition party. The inflation item is also available in the two Presidential election surveys but not in the 1996 National Assembly election survey.

Also, South Korea experienced its most serious economic crisis during the 1997 election campaign, so the survey did not ask the usual question, “How would you evaluate national economic conditions during the past couple of years?” For the national economic condition in 1997, I use the question, “Which political party did you think was mainly responsible for the current economic crisis [the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) bailout]?” If a respondent answered that the ruling party was responsible for the IMF bailout, the respondent was expected to support an opposition party.

For pocketbook voting, I use the personal economic condition and unemployment variables in all the elections. If a respondent answered that the personal economic condition was worse than earlier or that the individual was unemployed, the respondent was expected to prefer an opposition party. These sociotropic and pocketbook voting variables are, in nature, the retrospective economic voting survey items. Additionally, there is a retrospective question, “How well do you think the government has been running things?” which does not exactly capture retrospective economic voting. Rather, the question deals with the evaluations of Presidents’ overall performances. However, “Perceptions of presidential performance in economic policy ... had strong relationships with more general evaluations of the president” (Edwards 1992, 140). Thus, it is reasonable to employ the question as retrospective economic voting. If a respondent answered negatively to the question, the person was more likely to vote for an opposition party.

The IKES had not included prospective survey items until the 1997 Presidential election. The 1997 survey asked, “Who do you think will best be able to resolve the current national problems?” There would be very few respondents able to understand the current national problems as anything other than the IMF bailout. Since the candidates (Lee Hoe Chang, Kim Dae Jung, and Lee In Je) are nominal, I treat them as dummy variables, leaving other minor candidates as the excluded category. Respondents were more likely to opt for the candidate who would best be able to handle the economic crisis.

In order to measure the impact of the socioeconomic factors on voter choice, I use the variables of residential area, age, gender, and educational attainment. Because individuals living in urban areas and more educated people are more likely to be liberal compared to their rural and less educated counterparts, they are expected to choose an opposition party over the ruling party. Because the younger generations are more receptive to change and the new democratic values than older people, they are also more likely to support an opposition party than the ruling party. I recode the age variable as 1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, and 4 = 50 and older (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). Since men are likely to be more liberal than women, men are expected to vote for an opposition party. I use gender (male) as a dummy variable.

I also include party identification as a factor of voter choice. Party identification in South Korea is equivalent to a categorical attachment to the ruling party versus opposition parties. The IKES has the survey item asking if the respondents were close to the ruling party or opposition parties. I treat party identification as dummy variables (the ruling party and opposition parties), with independents being the omitted category.

To evaluate the impact of regionalism on voter choice, I first employ respondents' home provinces as dummy variables (Cholla province and Kyungsang province), leaving other provinces as the omitted category. Regionalism is expected to have a positive impact on voter choice. If a respondent was born in the same province as the party's leader, the respondent is more likely to vote for this leader's party. Also, regionalism affects the individual election specific event of a party merger. Party leaders orchestrated party mergers in order to win the election and a certain merger was supported by certain regional voters. So, dummy variables (coalition supporters and coalition non-supporters)

are used in the statistical tests, with “don’t know” being the excluded category. The 1996 election survey did not ask about the preference over a party merger. There had been no party merger during the 1996 election campaign.

2. Statistical Models

A basic voter choice function and a combined voter choice function are, respectively, as follows:

$$VC_0 = f(S, P, RETRO, PRO, SOE, \text{ and } PID) \text{ and} \quad (9)$$

$$VC_1 = f(S, P, RETRO, PRO, SOE, PID, HP, \text{ and } IE), \quad (10)$$

where VC_0 and VC_1 are voter choice;²⁹ S is sociotropic voting; P is pocketbook voting; RETRO is retrospective voting; PRO is prospective voting; SOE is socioeconomic factors; PID is party identification; HP is home province; and IE is the individual election specific event. Function f is assumed to be polychotomous.

The combined model, for example, is transformed into the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} VC_1 = f & (\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + \beta_8 X_8 \\ & + \beta_9 X_9 + \beta_{10} X_{10} + \beta_{11} X_{11} + \beta_{12} X_{12} + \beta_{13} X_{13} + \beta_{14} X_{14} + \beta_{15} X_{15} \\ & + \beta_{16} X_{16} + \beta_{17} X_{17} + \beta_{18} X_{18} + U_i), \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

²⁹ VC_0 is the brief form of $P(Y_i = j)/P(Y_i = k)$, where Y_i is voter i 's vote, k is the base party (or candidate), and j is each of other two parties (or candidates).

where VC_1 = voter choice; β_0 = intercept; X_1 = national economic condition (N/A in the 1992 National Assembly election); X_2 = inflation (N/A in the 1996 National Assembly election); X_3 = personal economic condition; X_4 = unemployment; X_5 = retrospective evaluation; [X_6 = prospective evaluation (Lee Hoe Chang); X_7 = prospective evaluation (Kim Dae Jung); X_8 = prospective evaluation (Lee In Je) in the 1997 Presidential election]; X_9 = residential area; X_{10} = age; X_{11} = gender (male); X_{12} = educational attainment; X_{13} = party identification (the ruling party); X_{14} = party identification (opposition parties); X_{15} = home province (Cholla); X_{16} = home province (Kyungsang); [X_{17} = merger (support); X_{18} = merger (not support) (N/A in the 1996 National Assembly election)]; and U_i = error term. The basic model has only X_1 through X_{14} .

3. Economic Voting in South Korea

A. The National Assembly Elections

The March 1992 National Assembly Election. In the 1992 National Assembly election, there were three leading parties competing for seats, Kim Young Sam's ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Kim Dae Jung's Democratic Party (DP), and Chung Ju Young's United People's Party (UPP). The estimates for the multinomial logit models are in Table 5-2. The left two columns next to the independent variable column are the basic model and the right two columns are the combined model. The left column of each model displays the coefficient estimates for the first opposition party relative to the ruling

party. The right column of each model illustrates the parameter estimates for the second opposition party relative to the ruling party. Standard errors are in parentheses. The following Tables 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 have the same format as Table 5-2.

The basic model suggests that voters were sociotropic. Contrary to expectations, those who perceived inflation as being the most important national problem were more likely to vote for the ruling DLP than the opposition DP. This contradicts the hypothesis and keeps appearing in the estimates for the 1996 National Assembly and the 1992 Presidential races. The analyses of this discrepancy will be presented in the 1992 Presidential election section. Also, voters appear to have voted retrospectively. The retrospective evaluation had a significant impact on voter choice between the DP and the DLP. As expected, the citizens with the favorable evaluations of the ruling party were more likely to opt for the ruling DLP. Between the UPP and the DLP, only the retrospective evaluation of the government, among the economic condition variables, had a significant effect on voter choice. The favorable evaluations of the incumbent government led to support for the incumbent DLP.

Table 5-2. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Party Race: The 1992 National Assembly Election (Coefficients for DLP's Normalized to Zero), South Korea

Independent Variables	Basic DP	Basic UPP	Combined DP	Combined UPP
<i>Economics</i>				
Inflation	-.56* (.21)	-.14 (.24)	-.42** (.23)	-.14 (.25)
Personal economy	.08 (.15)	.04 (.18)	.17 (.17)	.02 (.19)
Unemployment	-.59 (.57)	-.51 (.71)	-.26 (.60)	-.55 (.70)
Retrospective evaluation	-.65* (.25)	-1.07* (.32)	-.36 (.29)	-.93* (.35)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	.19 (.14)	-.29** (.16)	.59* (.17)	-.27 (.18)
Age	-.26* (.12)	.10 (.13)	-.50* (.13)	.14 (.14)
Gender (Male)	-.17 (.22)	-.20 (.25)	-.24 (.24)	-.34 (.26)
Educational attainment	-.07 (.13)	.63* (.16)	-.22 (.15)	.54* (.17)
<i>PID</i>				
Ruling Party	-1.53* (.28)	-1.16* (.32)	-1.23* (.31)	-1.23* (.33)
Opposition	2.83* (.29)	1.91* (.32)	2.40* (.31)	1.76* (.34)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)			1.81* (.31)	-1.38* (.46)
Home province (Kyungsang)			-.83* (.28)	-1.11* (.29)
Merger (Support)			.19 (.37)	.41 (.40)
Merger (Not Support)			1.09* (.30)	.78* (.34)
Intercept	1.01 (.74)	-.85 (.86)	-.42 (.86)	-.85 (.93)
Log Likelihood		-601.73		-511.29
Prob > chi ²		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.26		0.36
Number of obs.		788		776

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

Among the four socioeconomic variables in the basic model, only age had significant influences on voter choice between the DP and the DLP. Older people were more likely to support the ruling DLP than the DP. For the choice between the UPP and the DLP, residential area and educational attainment reached statistical significance. Rural residents and the educated were more likely to support the opposition UPP than the DLP. Additionally, party identification turns out to have played a significant role in voter decisions. For the DP versus DLP comparison, the ruling party supporters tended to vote for the DLP and the opposition party sympathizers were more likely to support the DP. On the other hand, between the UPP and the DLP, the ruling party identifiers tended to opt for the DLP and the opposition party identifiers were more likely to prefer the UPP. These are all consistent with the hypothesis.

The combined model indicates that sociotropic voting occurred in the DP versus DLP comparison. Those who perceived inflation as being the nation's most serious problem were more likely to opt for the ruling DLP than the DP. Between the UPP and the DLP, only retrospective voting was significant. The individuals with the good evaluations of the Kim Young Sam government were more likely to support the incumbent DLP than the opposition UPP.

Additionally, residential area and age of the four socioeconomic factors had significant effects on voter choice between the DP and DLP. The DP appealed to urban residents and younger voters more than the DLP, *ceteris paribus*. Also, the UPP did better among educated people than the DLP. Party identification appears to have had the anticipated effects on voter choice. Between the DP and the DLP, the ruling party identifiers were more likely to vote for the DLP and the opposition party supporters were

more likely to opt for the DP. Also, between the UPP and the DLP, the ruling party sympathizers tended to support the DLP and the opposition party identifiers were more likely to opt for the UPP.

Regionalism also had the expected influences on voter choice. Cholla people were more likely to vote for Cholla province-based DP than Kyungsang province-based DLP, whereas Kyungsang people were more likely to vote for their DLP than the DP. Moreover, the merger variables also turn out to be significant for voter choice. The voters who disliked the three party merger supported Kim Dae Jung's DP. Between the UPP and the DLP, Kyungsang people were more likely to cast their votes for their regional DLP than the UPP. Yet, Cholla people tended to support the rival DLP rather than the UPP. The coefficients are the relative probability only between the DLP and the UPP. Chung Ju Young is from a North Korean area so that he could attract neither Kyungsang nor Cholla voters.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 180.88, df = 4]$) tests reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model. In other words, the tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model at a .005 level of significance. Joint tests for the combined model suggest that the regionalism hypothesis turns out to be jointly significant for voter choice in the combined model (see Table 5-3). In the combined model, however, the economic voting hypothesis is not jointly significant for the DP versus DLP comparison, while the hypothesis is jointly significant for the UPP versus DLP competition. As the results of joint tests suggest, the economic voting hypothesis is also jointly significant in

making voter decisions in the basic model. In addition, the party identification hypothesis is jointly significant throughout the models.

Table 5-3. Joint Test Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimates, South Korea

Election	Hypothesis	Basic Model	Basic Model	Combined Model	Combined Model
1992		DP/DLP	UPP/DLP	DP/DLP	UPP/DLP
National	Economics	0.01*	0.02*	0.23	0.08**
Assembly	Regionalism			0.00*	0.00*
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
1996		NCNP/NKP	ULD/NKP	NCNP/NKP	ULD/NKP
National	Economics	0.00*	0.097**	0.00*	0.07**
Assembly	Regionalism			0.00*	0.47
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
1992		KDJ/KYS	CJY/KYS	KDJ/KYS	CJY/KYS
Presidential	Economics	0.00*	0.57	0.00*	0.68
	Regionalism			0.00*	0.00*
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
1997		KDJ/LHC	LIJ/LHC	KDJ/LHC	LIJ/LHC
Presidential	Economics	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*
	Regionalism			0.00*	0.01*
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*

Note: Prob > χ^2

* (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

The April 1996 National Assembly Election. The election was held under President Kim Young Sam. He led Kyungsang province's New Korea Party (NKP). Kim Dae Jung's Cholla province-based National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) and Kim Jong Pil's Choongchung province-based United Liberal Democrats (ULD) were the next leading parties in the race. The estimates of the multinomial logit models for the 1996 election are presented in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Party Race: The 1996 National Assembly Election (Coefficients for NKP's Normalized to Zero), South Korea

Independent Variables	Basic NCNP	Basic ULD	Combined NCNP	Combined ULD
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.83* (.21)	.60* (.25)	.73* (.23)	.67* (.26)
Personal economy	.22 (.22)	.08 (.27)	.08 (.25)	.03 (.27)
Unemployment	.17 (.55)	.06 (.84)	.45 (.66)	.19 (.86)
Retrospective evaluation	-.59* (.27)	-.33 (.35)	-.29 (.30)	-.27 (.36)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	.68* (.19)	1.01* (.27)	1.12* (.22)	1.12* (.28)
Age	-.27* (.12)	-.49* (.15)	-.29* (.13)	-.48* (.16)
Gender (Male)	-.22 (.24)	-.27 (.31)	.02 (.27)	-.26 (.31)
Educational attainment	-.23 (.14)	.16 (.16)	-.09 (.16)	.14 (.16)
<i>PID</i>				
Ruling Party	-1.42* (.34)	-.84* (.42)	-1.36* (.37)	-.92* (.42)
Opposition	2.93* (.29)	2.38* (.38)	2.44* (.33)	2.28* (.38)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)			2.06* (.33)	.56 (.46)
Home province (Kyungsang)			-1.74* (.42)	.04 (.34)
Intercept	-2.58* (.87)	-4.26* (1.17)	-4.21* (1.01)	-4.71* (1.21)
Log Likelihood		-407.08		-354.20
Prob > chi ²		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.30		0.39
Number of obs.		622		622

Note: * indicates an estimate significant at the p < .05 level.

The basic model reveals that voters were more likely to be concerned about the sociotropic economy than the pocketbook economy. Contrary to expectations, the signs of the national economic condition are positive, which indicates that the good evaluations of the national economic condition led to support for the opposition parties (the NCNP and the ULD). In addition, retrospective voting occurred in the NCNP versus NKP competition. As expected, the good evaluations of the government's past performance were related to support for the ruling NKP rather than the NCNP, controlling all other factors. The other economic voting variables appear to have had no effects on the choice.

The socioeconomic coefficients indicate that the NCNP and the ULD did better among urban residents and the younger generation than the ruling NKP, *ceteris paribus*. The other socioeconomic variables did not have any influences on voter choice. On the other hand, party identification had the expected impacts on voter choice. The ruling party identifiers were more likely to vote for the ruling NKP than the two opposition parties, whereas the opposition party sympathizers were more likely to vote for one of the two opposition parties than the NKP.

In the combined model, the economic voting, socioeconomic, and party identification factors had similar effects on voter choice as their counterparts in the basic model had, with the exception of the retrospective evaluation coefficient. The retrospective evaluation factor did not reach statistical significance for voter choice between the NCNP and ULD competition.

With regard to regionalism, Cholla people were more likely to vote for Cholla province-based NCNP than the NKP, whereas Kyungsang people were more likely to vote for Kyungsang province-based NKP than the NCNP. In contrast, the regionalism

coefficients indicate no significant influences on the choice between the ULD and the NKP. The ULD was based on the third region of Choongchung province. These coefficient estimates may confirm that regional conflicts were most serious between Cholla and Kyungsang provinces.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 105.76, df = 2]$) tests reject, at a .005 level of significance, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model. Joint tests for the combined model suggest that the economic voting hypothesis and the party identification hypothesis, respectively, are jointly significant for voter choice (see Table 5-3). On the other hand, the regionalism hypothesis is jointly significant for the NCNP versus NKP comparison, whereas this is not the case for the ULD and NKP comparison.

B. Presidential Elections

The December 1992 Presidential Election. In the 1992 Presidential race, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Chung Ju Young competed for office. The two Kims were prominent opposition leaders but Kim Young Sam became the ruling party candidate after the three party merger in 1990.³⁰ Chung Ju Young was an entrepreneur turned-politician, who owned Hyundai.

³⁰ Kim is the most common last name in Korea.

Table 5-5. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Candidate Race: The 1992 Presidential Election (Coefficients for KYS's Normalized to Zero), South Korea

Independent Variables	Basic KDJ	Basic CJY	Combined KDJ	Combined CJY
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.51* (.16)	.21 (.18)	.63* (.20)	.15 (.19)
Inflation	-.80* (.21)	-.14 (.23)	-.80* (.26)	-.15 (.24)
Personal economy	-.42* (.16)	.08 (.18)	-.43* (.20)	.07 (.19)
Unemployment	-.50 (.35)	-.19 (.41)	-.76** (.43)	-.27 (.42)
Retrospective evaluation	-.38 (.24)	-.40 (.27)	-.16 (.31)	-.38 (.28)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	-.22** (.13)	.05 (.15)	-.20 (.16)	.02 (.15)
Age	-.15 (.11)	-.19 (.12)	-.39* (.13)	-.19 (.13)
Gender (Male)	-.41* (.20)	-.08 (.23)	-.31 (.25)	-.10 (.24)
Educational attainment	-.02 (.12)	.23 (.14)	.13 (.15)	.21 (.15)
<i>PID</i>				
Ruling Party	-1.70* (.27)	-.77* (.27)	-1.36* (.33)	-.63* (.28)
Opposition	2.77* (.25)	1.63* (.30)	2.07* (.30)	1.44* (.31)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)			3.20* (.37)	-1.80** (1.05)
Home province (Kyungsang)			-1.03* (.29)	-.73* (.25)
Merger (Support)			-1.05* (.35)	-.39 (.30)
Merger (Not Support)			.89* (.31)	.38 (.31)
Intercept	1.09 (.73)	-1.57** (.86)	.33 (.96)	-.99 (.91)
Log Likelihood		-645.24		-497.30
Prob > chi ²		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.30		0.45
Number of obs.		966		962

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the p < .05 level (p < .10 level).

The basic multinomial logit estimates indicate that the 1992 Presidential election was affected by sociotropic voting as well as pocketbook voting (see Table 5-5). The sociotropic variables (national economic condition and inflation) had significant impacts on voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. The signs of the two sociotropic voting coefficients, however, are opposite to the hypothesis. The favorable evaluations of the national economy were associated with support for the opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung. If individuals perceived inflation as the nation's most important problem, they tended to vote for the incumbent party's Kim Young Sam, instead of Kim Dae Jung. In contrast, voters correctly cast their ballots with respect to their personal economic considerations. This also indirectly suggests that individuals cast their votes retrospectively. On the other hand, the economic voting factors appear to have had no effects on voter choice between Chung Ju Young and Kim Young Sam.

Among the four socioeconomic variables, residential area and gender reached statistical significance for voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. Urban residents and men tended to support the ruling party's candidate, Kim Young Sam. Kim Dae Jung had been accused of no military records during the Korean War and thereafter. Because the military service is mandatory for men in South Korea, males tended to dislike Kim Dae Jung. In contrast, the party identification coefficients had the expected impacts on voter choice. Opposition party identifiers were more likely to opt for Kim Dae Jung, while the ruling party sympathizers were more likely to vote for Kim Young Sam. For the choice between Chung Ju Young and Kim Young Sam, party identification was the only coefficient that reached statistical significance. Kim Young

Sam appealed to the ruling party supporters, whereas Chung Ju Young appealed to the opposition party sympathizers.

In the combined model of the 1992 Presidential race, sociotropic and pocketbook voting appear to have had significant influences on voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. Again, the signs of the two sociotropic voting variables are in the unexpected direction, while the signs of the two pocketbook voting variables are in the conflicting directions. The unemployed appeared to have voted for the ruling party's Kim Young Sam.

Let's move on to the origins of the odd signs of the national economic condition, inflation, and unemployment coefficients that persist in the elections held between 1992 and 1996. To understand such statistical results, I suggest to take into consideration the roles of the ruling party that played in South Korea's economic development. Because the miraculous economic development had been orchestrated by the ruling party since the 1960s, voters may have considered the ruling party as the manager of the economy, despite their authoritarian nature. In sharp contrast, opposition parties had never had a chance to show their abilities to manage the economy. They also lacked human resources with economic specialties and bureaucratic experience. Thus, voters may have thought that the ruling party would be better than opposition parties in handling the inflation and unemployment problems.

Moreover, the South Korean elections had been a place where the politicians struggled against each other centering on the issues of democratic reform, without the realistic chance of a power alternation until 1997. Thus, the opposition leaders had felt relatively low demand for identifying themselves as an attractive alternative from an

economic perspective. Instead, they had conducted campaigns focused on political issues. Although South Korea embraced the democratic transition in 1987, such decades-long perceptions needed more time and momentum in order to be changed. The momentum was finally provided in the 1997 Presidential election.

Of the four socioeconomic variables, only age had a significant impact on voter choice. As expected, Kim Young Sam did better than Kim Dae Jung among older people. The party identification factors appear to have had the expected influences on voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. The party identification factor was the only coefficient that reached statistical significance for the Chung Ju Young versus Kim Young Sam comparison. The signs of the party identification variables are also in the expected direction.

Clearly, regionalism significantly affected voter choice in the 1992 Presidential election. Between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, Cholla people were more likely to opt for their regional leader Kim Dae Jung, while Kyungsang people were more likely to support their regional leader Kim Young Sam. Additionally, those who preferred the three party merger supported Kim Young Sam, while Kim Dae Jung did better than Kim Young Sam among those who did not like the three party merger. This is consistent with the expectations. In the Chung Ju Young versus Kim Young Sam comparison, Cholla people turn out to have supported Kim Young Sam more than Chung Ju Young. The exact same thing was observed in the 1992 National Assembly election. As expected, Kim Young Sam appealed to his Kyungsang people more than Chung Ju Young.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 295.88, df = 4]$) tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model at a .005 level of significance. Joint tests for the combined model suggest that economic voting was significant for the voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam (see Table 5-3). In contrast, the regionalism and party identification factors played a distinct role in voting decisions across the three leading contenders. This is the same in the basic model.

The estimates of the multinomial logit models for the 1992 Presidential race suggest that the party merger worked as a significant factor determining voter choice particularly between Kim Young Sam (DLP) and Kim Dae Jung (DP). The merger was created by political actors' calculations to win the elections. In order to ensure the future security of their military group, President Roh Tae Woo and his Democratic Justice Party (DJP, 125 seats) attempted to change the political system from presidentialism to parliamentarism in 1989. In addition, they hoped to let old politicians (including Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil: the three Kims) share the political power through a parliamentary system and then, have them retire from politics. They wanted to make a generational change in the political arena. However, the DJP fell far short of the two-thirds of the 299 National Assembly seats, which is required to change the constitution.

The goal of the opposition leaders, Kim Dae Jung (the Peace and Democratic Party: PDP, 71 seats), Kim Young Sam (the Reunification Democratic Party: RDP, 59 seats), and Kim Jong Pil (the New Democratic Republican Party: NDRP, 35 seats), was

to win the presidency. However, the three Kims were well aware of the fact that there was no realistic chance of winning alone. If a parliamentary system would increase their chances of sharing (or winning) power, they were willing to adopt a parliamentary system. Since Kim Dae Jung's image was the most progressive and the least compromising among the three Kims, Roh Tae Woo formed the DLP, merging his DJP with Kim Young Sam's RDP and Kim Jong Pil's NDRP in 1990. The merger was based on the pact of parliamentarism. As a result, Roh Tae Woo was able to hold more than two-thirds of the National Assembly. However, the DLP failed to manage the "over two-thirds" status in the 1992 National Assembly election. The DLP secured only 49.8% of the seats, while the DP and the UPP held 32.4% and 10.4% of the seats, respectively.

After winning a series of inner party struggles, however, Kim Young Sam nullified the pact of adopting a parliamentary system and became the candidate of the ruling DLP for the 1992 Presidential race. In fact, his ultimate interest was to not share power with others. He knew that there was no figure with President caliber in the DJP and that the military legacy would hurt its chances of winning another election. Therefore, he took the chance of becoming the presidential candidate of the ruling party and was elected president with 42.0% of the vote. Kim Dae Jung and Chung Ju Young garnered 33.8% and 16.3% of the vote, respectively.³¹

It was the party merger that secured Kim Young Sam's 8.2 percentage point margin of victory. Previously, Kim Young Sam (28.0%) and Kim Dae Jung (27.1%) received almost the same electoral returns in the 1987 Presidential election. In addition,

³¹ The actual processes and detailed story are documented in Oh (1995). In addition, Kim (1997) gives an interesting analysis about the party merger process based on the rational choice model.

Kim Young Sam's RDP (23.8%) received slightly more votes than Kim Dae Jung's PDP (19.3%) in the 1988 National Assembly election.

The December 1997 Presidential Election. The 1997 Presidential election was also a three-way race among Lee Hoe Chang (the Grand Nation Party, GNP), Kim Dae Jung (the National Congress for New Politics, NCNP), and Lee In Je (the New Party for the People). The election was quite different from previous elections in many ways. Above all, the election was held during a severe financial crisis, which constituted the worst economic situation in South Korea's history. The ruling party's Lee Hoe Chang experienced a very difficult campaign due mainly to President Kim Young Sam's mismanagement of the economy. Economic issues became one of the most salient issues. Citizens were seriously concerned about the future of the economy amidst the IMF bailout (November 21, 1997). Under these circumstances, the election survey included prospective voting items for the first time. The 1997 survey provides a new opportunity to assess more comprehensive economic voting behavior than ever.

The 1997 election was characterized by sociotropic voting (see Table 5-6). As the coefficients of the national economic condition indicate, those who perceived the ruling party as being responsible for the IMF bailout were more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung than Lee Hoe Chang, which also indirectly confirms retrospective voting. Yet, people appear to have voted prospectively as well. Those who believed Lee Hoe Chang would best be able to resolve the current national problems were more likely to vote for him than Kim Dae Jung. Additionally, individuals with good expectations for Kim Dae Jung tended to opt for him.

Table 5-6. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Candidate Race: The 1997 Presidential Election (Coefficients for LHC's Normalized to Zero), South Korea

Independent Variables	Basic KDJ	Basic LIJ	Combined KDJ	Combined LIJ
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	1.11* (.28)	.96* (.32)	.78* (.31)	.79* (.33)
Inflation	-.31 (.27)	-.33 (.30)	-.20 (.30)	-.41 (.32)
Personal economy	.12 (.24)	-.27 (.27)	.33 (.27)	-.11 (.29)
Unemployment	-.89 (.70)	-1.06 (.83)	-.72 (.78)	-1.08 (.86)
Retrospective evaluation	.33 (.28)	.49 (.31)	.38 (.32)	.50 (.32)
Prospective (LHC)	-3.14* (.79)	-2.60* (.73)	-3.10* (.84)	-2.67* (.74)
Prospective (KDJ)	1.84* (.53)	.52 (.55)	1.54* (.57)	.19 (.57)
Prospective (LIJ)	.57 (.68)	3.17* (.62)	.88 (.72)	3.20* (.63)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Residential area	-.09 (.20)	-.27 (.22)	-.09 (.21)	-.30 (.22)
Age	.08 (.14)	-.13 (.15)	.01 (.15)	-.14 (.16)
Gender (Male)	.08 (.27)	-.160 (.30)	.09 (.30)	-.10 (.31)
Educational attainment	.02 (.17)	.14 (.19)	.04 (.19)	.15 (.20)
<i>PID</i>				
Ruling Party	-1.88* (.35)	-1.54* (.39)	-1.91* (.39)	-1.47* (.39)
Opposition	1.85* (.33)	1.44* (.37)	1.34* (.36)	1.30* (.39)
<i>Regionalism</i>				
Home province (Cholla)			2.05* (.63)	1.53* (.67)
Home province (Kyungsang)			-1.62* (.34)	-.33 (.33)
Merger (Support)			.77* (.39)	.13 (.42)
Merger (Not Support)			-.36 (.36)	-.69** (.37)
Intercept	-1.83** (1.07)	-.86 (1.16)	-1.60 (1.18)	-.44 (1.21)
Log Likelihood		-459.99		-414.74
Prob > chi ²		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.52		0.56
Number of obs.		918		912

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

Kim Dae Jung's economic policies had been considered too radical against the *chaebol* (conglomerates), which may have worked against him in previous elections. In 1997, however, his reform-minded economic policies became very attractive to voters. People believed that the *chaebol*-oriented economic system of South Korea caused the financial crisis. Kim Dae Jung took advantage of his image as the pioneer of democracy and economic reform as well. His publications on the economy also appealed to voters but neither Lee Hoe Chang, nor Lee In Je could show their economic specialties. In brief, the economic crisis caused people to draw a different evaluation for Kim Dae Jung.

The same pattern seen in voter choice between Kim Dae Jung and Lee Hoe Chang is observed in the Lee In Je versus Lee Hoe Chang competition. The national economic condition and prospective voting variables reached statistical significance for voter choice between them. The directions of the coefficients also turn out to be correct.

In contrast, no socioeconomic coefficients appear to have made differences in voter decisions across the three leading candidates. On the other hand, party identification played a significant role in voter choice. The ruling party sympathizers were more likely to vote for the incumbent party's Lee Hoe Chang, while the opposition party identifiers were more likely to support the opposition contenders.

The combined model exhibits almost the same effects of economic voting, socioeconomic factors, and party identification, as in the basic model. In addition, the combined model confirms that regionalism had a statistically significant influence on voter choice. Kim Dae Jung did better than Lee Hoe Chang among Cholla people, while Lee Hoe Chang did better than Kim Dae Jung among Kyungsang people. Lee Hoe Chang was the presidential candidate of Kyungsang province-based ruling party. Between Lee

Hoe Chang and Lee In Je, Cholla people were more likely to opt for Lee In Je than Lee Hoe Chang but Kyungsang people's support for Lee Hoe Chang was not significant. In other words, while Cholla people's regionalism-induced voting behavior persisted, Kyungsang people's support for the ruling party became insignificant. This is one of the main causes of Lee Hoe Chang's defeat. Also, those who supported the coalition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil tended to vote for Kim Dae Jung, instead of Lee Hoe Chang. Those who disliked the strategic alliance cast their votes for Lee Hoe Chang rather than Lee In Je.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 90.5, df = 4]$) tests reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model at a .005 level of significance. The results of joint tests indicate a substantial effect of economic voting throughout the models (see Table 5-3). Also, the regionalism hypothesis and the party identification hypothesis, respectively, were jointly significant in making voter decisions.

In understanding the dynamics of the 1997 election, it is necessary to consider the impact of the strategic coalition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil. The alliance between the two candidates during the campaign was also motivated by their desire to win. Since the constitution prohibits Presidents from running for a second term, the situations became very favorable to Kim Dae Jung. His life long rival Kim Young Sam was not allowed to run for office again and the ruling party chose Lee Hoe Chang as its presidential candidate. Although he was just a beginner in politics after serving as a chief Supreme Court justice, Lee Hoe Chang had enormous advantages as the ruling party's (GNP) presidential candidate. The financial crisis, however, backfired on him. To make

matters worse, Lee In Je defected from the GNP after he had lost the primary election and he formed his own party. The election campaign became a neck-and-neck race between Lee Hoe Chang and Kim Dae Jung.

Under these circumstances, a party merger or coalition with other candidates was most wanted by Lee Hoe Chang and Kim Dae Jung. In contrast, Kim Jong Pil had no realistic chance of winning but could manage to be in the position of tipping the balance in favor of one of the two leading contenders. Kim Jong Pil garnered 8.1% of the popular vote in the 1987 Presidential election and his parties earned 15.6-16.2% of the vote in previous National Assembly elections. Kim Jong Pil left Kim Young Sam's DLP in 1995, thus it was not easy for him to join the ruling party again. Also, Lee Hoe Chang was not interested in a coalition with an old generation politician like Kim Jong Pil. Instead, he made a coalition with Cho Soon, a Seoul National University Economics professor who later became a politician. He had a good reputation as a professor and was considered adept at handling the economic crisis.

On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung was more than willing to do anything to win the election. Since he was over seventy, the 1997 election was likely to be his last chance to run for the presidency. He chose to form a coalition with Kim Jong Pil. This was ironic because Kim Jong Pil, a former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, even attempted to kill Kim Dae Jung decades earlier. Moreover, Kim Dae Jung (an advocate of presidentialism) agreed with Kim Jong Pil (a proponent of parliamentarism) to adopt a parliamentary system during his tenure in office, if elected. The constitutional change would give Kim Jong Pil the Prime Minister position in the coming years. The strategic alliance with Kim Jong Pil was viewed favorably by Kim Dae Jung because this would

also help him to dampen his progressive image. These were the best payoffs the two politicians could offer one another.

Kim Dae Jung finally won the presidency with 40.3% of the vote after failing three campaigns. Lee Hoe Chang and Lee In Je received 38.7%, and 19.2% of the vote, respectively. The razor-thin difference between the two front-runners' electoral returns suggests that if there had been no coalition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil, Kim Dae Jung would have lost again. Kim Jong Pil also became the Prime Minister under Kim Dae Jung. Nevertheless, the promise of parliamentarism has not been kept thus far.

4. Economic Voting and Regionalism

I make a comparison between the magnitudes of economic voting and regionalism in South Korea's elections. Since the multinomial logit model is curvilinear, the effect of a coefficient depends upon other coefficients. The magnitude of the marginal impact of an independent variable is indicated by "first differences." With all other variables being held constant, first differences are calculated by the value changes of the interested coefficient from one end of the code to the other. I use the program, *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) in order to efficiently calculate first differences. I set this program to calculate the change in the simulated probabilities, given a change in an interested variable from its lowest code to its highest code (see Appendix C). Tables 5-7 and 5-8 display first differences of electoral returns for each party (or candidate). The far left column of Tables 5-7 and 5-8 illustrates the independent variables of interest. The

next three columns illustrate first differences of support for each of the three parties in the 1992 National Assembly election (Table 5-7) and the 1992 Presidential election (Table 5-8). The last three columns contain first differences of support for each of the three parties in the 1996 National Assembly election (Table 5-7) and the 1997 Presidential election (Table 5-8).

First differences enable us to understand the probability that a hypothetical individual would vote for each of the three parties with regard to a certain variable. The hypothetical individual, here, is the average respondent in the South Korean surveys. The person is a male in his thirties who has graduated from high school and lives in an urban area. In the 1992 National Assembly election, for example, the hypothetical individual had a .42 probability of voting for the ruling DLP, a .40 probability of voting for the DP, and a .18 probability of voting for the UPP (see Table 5-7). If the hypothetical voter moved from the perception that the personal economy worsened to the perception that it improved over the years, the voter's probability of supporting the ruling DLP and the opposition UPP would have increased by 6% and 2%, respectively. His probability of voting for the genuine opposition DP would have decreased by 8%.

Table 5-7. First Differences of Economic Voting, Party Identification, and Regionalism in the National Assembly Elections, South Korea

	1992 DLP	DP	UPP	1996 NKP	NCNP	ULD
Baseline Prob.	.42	.40	.18	.67	.21	.12
<i>Economics</i>						
National economy	N/A	N/A	N/A	.30	-.20	-.10
Inflation	.08	-.09	.01	N/A	N/A	N/A
Personal economy	.06	-.08	.02	.03	-.02	.00
Unemployment	.07	-.01	-.06	-.10	.10	.00
Retro-spective	-.13	.03	.10	-.06	.04	.02
<i>PID</i>						
Ruling	.30	-.20	-.09	.23	-.17	-.06
Opposition	-.46	.41	.06	-.52	.35	.17
<i>Regionalism</i>						
Cholla	-.24	.48	-.24	-.37	.38	-.01
Kyungsang	.22	-.13	-.10	.18	-.22	.04
Merger (Support)	-.07	.02	.05	N/A	N/A	N/A
Merger (No Support)	-.24	.20	.04	N/A	N/A	N/A

Note: I use *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) in calculating first differences.

The magnitudes of economic voting's marginal effects are meager and the signs of first differences of inflation, unemployment, and retrospective evaluation are not in the expected directions. In sharp contrast, first differences of regionalism stand out. To be more specific, Cholla people were more likely to be driven by regionalism. If the hypothetical voter was from Cholla province, he was 24% less likely to vote for Kyungsang province-based DLP and the UPP, respectively. Yet, he was 48% more likely to vote for his DP. If the hypothetical voter was from Kyungsang province, he was 22%

more likely to support his DLP. Yet, he was 13% and 10% less likely to support Cholla province-based DP and the UPP, respectively. Also, the changes in his perceptions regarding the three party merger generated a decline in support for the ruling DLP and an increase in support for the opposition parties, which contradicts the hypotheses. Nonetheless, this may not be problematic because the three party merger was not unanimously favored by their regional voters. Some may have disliked the merger because of their unique preferences about other regional parties. Also, the survey was conducted from all around the country except the Island of Jeju.

Additionally, party identification had a very large marginal effect. If the hypothetical voter became a ruling party sympathizer, his probability of supporting the ruling DLP would have increased by 30%. His probability of supporting the opposition DP and UPP would have dropped by 20% and 9%, respectively. If the voter became an opposition party sympathizer, he was 41% and 6% more likely to vote for the DP and the UPP, respectively, whereas he was 46% less likely to vote for the ruling DLP.

This pattern remains similar in the 1996 National Assembly election (see Table 5-7). First differences of the economic voting variables are smaller than those of the regionalism and party identification variables. Also, the signs of the economic voting variables are not always in the expected directions. The sign of the retrospective voting variable is in the wrong direction but the regionalism and party identification variables have the expected signs. Moreover, Cholla people were more likely to be affected by regionalism than Kyungsang people.

Table 5-8. First Difference of Economic Voting, Party Identification, and Regionalism in the Presidential Elections, South Korea

	1992 KYS	KDJ	CJY	1997 LHC	KDJ	LIJ
Baseline Prob.	.59	.28	.13	.33	.40	.27
<i>Economics</i>						
National economy	.24	-.26	.02	-.17	.10	.07
Inflation	.14	-.15	.01	.06	.00	-.06
Personal economy	-.12	.17	-.05	.06	-.17	.11
Unemployment	.12	-.11	-.01	.19	-.06	-.13
Retrospective	-.05	.02	.04	.15	-.05	-.11
Prospective (LHC)	N/A	N/A	N/A	.60	-.38	-.22
Prospective (KDJ)	N/A	N/A	N/A	-.20	.32	-.12
Prospective (LIJ)	N/A	N/A	N/A	-.32	-.25	.57
<i>PID</i>						
Ruling	.25	-.23	-.02	.39	-.27	-.11
Opposition	-.43	.36	.07	-.28	.17	.11
<i>Regionalism</i>						
Cholla	-.48	.69	-.21	-.32	.28	.03
Kyungsang	.21	-.17	-.05	.23	-.31	.08
Merger (Support)	.19	-.18	-.01	-.11	.17	-.06
Merger (No Support)	-.18	.17	.01	.11	-.01	-.10

Note: I use *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) in calculating first differences.

As in the National Assembly elections, first differences of the economic voting variables in the 1992 Presidential election are smaller than those of the regionalism and party identification variables (see Table 5-8). The signs of some economic voting variables (inflation, the personal economy, unemployment, and retrospective voting) are not in the expected directions. On the other hand, if the hypothetical voter came from

Cholla province, he was 48% less likely to vote for Kim Young Sam and 69% more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung. These high percentage points suggest not only that regionalism was one of the strongest factors but also that Cholla people were more likely to be regionalism-driven voters. If he came from Kyungsang province, he was 21% more likely to vote for Kim Young Sam and 17% less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung. Also, the three party merger factors generate the anticipated effects. If the hypothetical voter supported the three party merger, he was 19% more likely to vote for the merged party's Kim Young Sam and 18% less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung. If he did not support the merger, he was 18% less likely to vote for Kim Young Sam and 17% more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung. Additionally, the party identification variables have very large first differences, which are also in the expected directions.

The same pattern appears in the 1997 Presidential race (see Table 5-8). First differences of the economic voting variables are smaller than those of the regionalism and party identification variables. The exception to this is first differences of prospective economic voting. If the hypothetical voter changed his perception from Lee Hoe Chang as being the worst candidate for resolving the economic crisis to the opposite, he was 60% more likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang. He was also 38% and 22% less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung and Lee In Je, respectively. In addition, the same change in his perceptions toward Kim Dae Jung would have generated a 32% increase in Kim Dae Jung's support. In this case, there would be a 20% and a 12% decrease in Lee Hoe Chang's and Lee In Je's support, respectively. On the other hand, first differences of other economic voting are smaller and sometimes have the wrong signs (the national economic condition, inflation, and unemployment variables). In contrast, as expected, if

the hypothetical voter had the perception that the ruling party was responsible for the economic crisis, he was 17% less likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang. He also 10% more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung and 7% more likely to vote for Lee In Je.

As in other elections, Cholla people were slightly more regionalism-induced voters than their Kyungsang counterparts in 1997. If the hypothetical voter came from Cholla province, he was 28% more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung, while he was 32% less likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang. In contrast, if he was from Kyungsang province, he was 23% more likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang and 31% less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung. The merger variables had weaker impacts than the home providence variables. The signs of merger variables' first differences are also in the hypothesized directions. If the hypothetical voter supported the alliance between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil, he was 17% more likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung and 11% less likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang. Otherwise, he was 1% less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung and 11% more likely to vote for Lee Hoe Chang. In addition, party identification had a strong and consistent impact.

5. Conclusions

The statistical analyses lead me to the following conclusions. First, economic voting seems to have occurred throughout the elections under study. In the elections held between 1992 and 1996, however, the signs of the economic voting coefficients sometimes have the directions opposite to the hypotheses. This is because of voters' perceptions regarding the ruling party's roles that were played in South Korea's economic

development. They perceived that the ruling party was more capable of managing the economy and resolving economic problems. In other words, economic voting occurred with voters' limited rationality between 1992 and 1996. Also, joint tests does not approve of the economic voting hypothesis in some elections, for instance, the 1992 National Assembly election (the DP versus DLP comparison in the combined model) and the 1992 Presidential election (the Chung Ju Young versus Kim Young Sam competition in the basic and combined models). However, genuine economic voting is observed in 1997. This confirms Lee's (1998) conclusions about economic voting in 1997. All the coefficients are in the expected directions and the economic condition hypothesis is jointly significant on voter choice among the candidates. In brief, voters held the ruling party responsible for the financial crisis in 1997.

Second, sociotropic voting was more likely to occur than pocketbook voting throughout the elections under investigation. Pocketbook voting is observed only in the 1992 Presidential election. On the other hand, retrospective voting is directly and indirectly found in the elections under investigation. Moreover, prospective voting is significant in 1997. These findings are also consistent with Lee's (1998) conclusions about the nature of economic voting in 1997.

Third, it is not safe to say that economic voting was stronger in Presidential race than National Assembly elections. There are no significant differences in the joint test chi square values. In contrast, economic voting may have been stronger between the ruling party versus the first opposition party competition than otherwise. Two out of the three insignificant joint test results regarding the economic voting hypothesis are observed in the competition between the ruling party and the second opposition party.

Fourth, regionalism was stronger and more consistent than economic voting. This conclusion is more or less the same as in previous research (Lee 1993; Morriss 1996; Park 1993a, 1993b). First differences of the regionalism variables are bigger than those of economic voting across the elections. The signs of the home province and party merger variables are not in unexpected directions. Kim Dae Jung or his parties collected Cholla voters' support more than the candidates from Kyungsang province collected Kyungsang voters' support throughout the elections. In addition, joint tests for the regionalism hypothesis are not significant only between the NKP (Kyungsang province) and the ULD (Choongchung province) in the 1996 National Assembly election. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests suggest that the combined model is significantly better than the basic model across the elections.

Finally, party identification also induced a consistent impact on voter choice, while the socioeconomic factors did not generate such effects. Although South Korea's party identification is not similar to genuine party identification as in other countries, the identification between the ruling party versus opposition parties appears to have always worked as a significant cue for voter decisions. In contrast, different socioeconomic factors were significant in different elections.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC VOTING IN TAIWAN

1. Model Specification and Methodology

Chapter VI investigates economic voting in Taiwan. In addition, this Chapter compares the impact of economic voting on voter choice with that of ethnic voting. The dependent variable of the statistical models is voter choice. As can be seen in Table 6-1, there were only two major parties (the KMT and the DPP) in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election. I use probit for this election. The choice for the ruling KMT is coded as 1 and the opposition DPP is coded as 0. The coefficient estimates are viewed to be the probabilities of voting for the KMT. When the sign of a coefficient is negative, respondents are interpreted to vote for the DPP. When the sign of a coefficient is positive, respondents are interpreted to vote for the KMT. On the other hand, I use multinomial logit for the three-way races in 1995 and 1996, normalizing coefficients for the ruling party (the KMT) to zero. The coefficients for the two opposition parties in the estimates are the impact of each variable on voter choice, relative to a vote for the ruling party. When the sign of a coefficient is negative, respondents are interpreted to vote for the ruling party. Otherwise, respondents are interpreted to support one of the opposition parties.

The independent variables of the basic model include the measurements of sociotropic voting, pocketbook voting, retrospective voting, prospective voting, socioeconomic factors, and party identification. The combined model consists of the

basic model, ethnic background, and the individual election specific event (tension between Taiwan and China). This combined model probes the impact of ethnic voting on voter choice.

Table 6-1. Vote Distribution in the Taiwanese Elections

	Vote Share		
	Legislative Yuan Elections 1992	1995	Presidential Election 1996
1st Party	KMT-53.0%	KMT-46.1%	LTH-54.0%
2nd Party	DPP-31.0%	DPP-33.2%	PMM-21.1%
3rd Party	CSDP-1.3%	NP-13.0%	LYK-14.9%
4th Party	IND-5.6%	IND-7.8%	CLA-10.0%
Total*	84.0%	92.3%	90.0%

Note: * The first percentages in the bottom cells are the total vote shares of the first two (three) parties (or candidates) in 1992 (1995 and 1996).

Sources: *Asian Survey* (various issues) and *Journal of Democracy* (various issues).

To measure sociotropic voting, I employ the national economic condition variable. If a respondent perceived the national economy as being worse than before, the respondent was more likely to support an opposition party. For pocketbook voting, I use the personal economic condition and unemployment variables. If a respondent answered that the personal economic condition was worse than before or that the individual was unemployed, the respondent was expected to prefer an opposition party. These sociotropic and pocketbook voting variables are, in nature, the retrospective economic voting survey items.

The NCU surveys first included the prospective economic voting question in the 1995 Legislative Yuan election survey. So, for the 1992 election, I use the question, "Is the democratic development in Taiwanese politics promising?" to indirectly measure

prospective economic voting by asking the prospective expectation of the government's general performance. On the other hand, the prospective voting questions for the 1995 Legislative Yuan election aim at the two levels of sociotropic and pocketbook voting, "How do you think national (or household) economic conditions are going to be in one year?" For the 1996 Presidential race, I utilize the question, "Who do you think will best be able to generate economic development?" I treat the three candidates (Lee Teng-hui, Peng Ming-min, and Lin Yang-kang) as dummy variables, leaving the other choices as the omitted category.

In order to measure the impact of the socioeconomic factors on voter choice, I use the variables of age, gender, and educational attainment. Since more educated people are more likely to be liberal than their less educated counterparts, they are expected to choose an opposition party over the ruling party. Since the younger generations are more receptive to change and the new democratic values than older people, they are more likely to support an opposition party than the ruling party. I recode the age variable as 1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, and 4 = 50 and older. Since men are more likely to be liberal than women, men are expected to vote for an opposition party. I use gender (male) as a dummy variable. I also include party identification, treating party identification (the KMT, the DPP, and the NP) as dummy variables, leaving the other choices as the base category.

Ethnic voting is measured by the dummy variables of the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, with the other choices being the omitted category. If a respondent shares the same ethnic background as the party (or the leader), the respondent is expected to vote for this party. The individual election specific event is the cross-strait tension, which is

included in the statistical model for the 1996 election. The military threat from the Mainland would generate citizens' support for the ruling party. This is the "rally behind the flag effect," which was originally named by Mueller (1970). The opponents of a government turn to the government if there is an imminent crisis involving foreign affairs. If a respondent answered "disagree" to the 1996 survey question, "Did [incumbent] Lee Teng-hui provoke the current cross-strait tension?" the respondent was more likely to opt for him than his opponents. The answer was regarded as support for the ruling party. If a respondent answered "agree" to the question, the respondent was less likely to vote for him than his opponents.

2. Statistical Models

A basic probit function and a combined probit function for the two-way 1992 election are, respectively, as follows:

$$P (VC_2=1|x) = \Phi (S, P, PRO, SOE, \text{ and } PID) \text{ and} \quad (12)$$

$$P (VC_3=1|x) = \Phi (S, P, PRO, SOE, PID, ETH, \text{ and } IE), \quad (13)$$

where VC_1 and VC_2 are voter choice; S is sociotropic voting; P is pocketbook voting; PRO is prospective voting; SOE is socioeconomic factors; PID is party identification; ETH is ethnic background; and IE is the individual election specific event.

The combined probit model, for example, is written as the following equation:

$$P(VC_3=1|x) = \Phi(\beta_{300} + \beta_{301}X_{301} + \beta_{302}X_{302} + \beta_{303}X_{303} + \beta_{304}X_{304} + \beta_{305}X_{305} \\ + \beta_{306}X_{306} + \beta_{307}X_{307} + \beta_{308}X_{308} + \beta_{309}X_{309} + \beta_{310}X_{310} + \beta_{311}X_{311} + U_i), \quad (14)$$

where VC_3 = voter choice; β_{300} = intercept; X_{301} = national economic condition; X_{302} = personal economic condition; X_{303} = unemployment; X_{304} = prospective evaluation; X_{305} = age; X_{306} = gender (male); X_{307} = educational attainment; X_{308} = party identification (the KMT); X_{309} = party identification (the DPP); X_{310} = ethnic background (Taiwanese); X_{311} = ethnic background (Mainlander); and U_i = error term. The basic model includes only X_{301} through X_{309} .

A basic multinomial logit function and a combined multinomial logit function for the three-way race in 1995 and 1996 are, respectively,

$$VC_4 = f(S, P, PRO, SOE, \text{ and } PID) \text{ and} \quad (15)$$

$$VC_5 = f(S, P, PRO, SOE, PID, ETH, \text{ and } IE), \quad (16)$$

where VC_4 and VC_5 are voter choice; S is sociotropic voting; P is pocketbook voting; PRO is prospective voting; SOE is socioeconomic factors; PID is party identification; ETH is ethnic background; and IE is the individual election specific event. Function f is assumed to be polychotomous.

The combined model, for example, is transformed into the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
VC_5 = f & (\beta_{500} + \beta_{501}X_{501} + \beta_{502}X_{502} + \beta_{503}X_{503} + \beta_{504}X_{504} + \beta_{505}X_{505} \\
& + \beta_{506}X_{506} + \beta_{507}X_{507} + \beta_{508}X_{508} + \beta_{509}X_{509} + \beta_{510}X_{510} + \beta_{511}X_{511} \\
& + \beta_{512}X_{512} + \beta_{513}X_{513} + \beta_{514}X_{514} + \beta_{515}X_{515} + U_i), \tag{17}
\end{aligned}$$

where VC_5 = voter choice; β_{500} = intercept; X_{501} = national economic condition; X_{502} = personal economic condition; X_{503} = unemployment; [X_{504} = the prospective evaluation of national economic condition; X_{505} = the prospective evaluation of personal economic condition in the 1995 election]; [X_{504} = prospective evaluation (Lee Teng-hui); X_{505} = prospective evaluation (Peng Ming-min); X_{506} = prospective evaluation (Lin Yang-kang) in the 1996 election]; X_{507} = age; X_{508} = gender (male); X_{509} = educational attainment; X_{510} = party identification (the KMT); X_{511} = party identification (the DPP); X_{512} = party identification (the NP); X_{513} = ethnic (Taiwanese); X_{514} = ethnic (Mainlander); [X_{515} = tension in the 1996 election]; and U_i = error term. The basic model includes only X_{501} through X_{512} .

3. Economic Voting in Taiwan

A. The Legislative Yuan Elections

The December 1992 Legislative Yuan Election. The probit estimates for the 1992 Legislative Yuan election are presented in Table 6-2. The center column displays the coefficient estimates for the basic model and the right column displays the parameter estimates for the combined model. Standard errors are in parentheses.

The basic model indicates that no economic voting coefficients have made significant differences in choosing the KMT. Of the three socioeconomic factors, only age had a significant influence on voter choice for the KMT. As expected, older people were more likely to vote for the ruling KMT than the DPP, *ceteris paribus*. Also, party identification generated the expected impact on voter choice. KMT supporters were more likely to opt for the KMT than the DPP. DPP sympathizers were less likely to vote for the KMT than the DPP.

The estimates for the combined model suggest a similar pattern as seen in the basic model. The economic voting variables do not have a significant impact on the choice between the KMT and the DPP. Older people were more likely to vote for the ruling KMT than the opposition DPP. In addition, party identification had the anticipated influence on voter choice, *ceteris paribus*. KMT supporters were more likely to vote for the KMT than the DPP. DPP identifiers were less likely to support the KMT than the DPP. On the other hand, ethnic cleavages did not play a significant role in 1992 in deciding which party to vote for, which does not confirm the hypothesis.

Table 6-2. Probit Estimates for the Two-Party Race: The 1992 Legislative Yuan Election, Taiwan

Independent Variables	1992 Basic	1992 Combined
<i>Economics</i>		
National economy	.15 (.09)	.15 (.09)
Personal economy	-.11 (.12)	-.09 (.12)
Unemployment	.26 (.45)	.23 (.45)
Prospective evaluation	-.07 (.10)	-.07 (.10)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>		
Age	.18* (.07)	.19* (.07)
Gender (Male)	.01 (.14)	.01 (.14)
Educational attainment	.10 (.07)	.09 (.07)
<i>PID</i>		
KMT	1.60* (.16)	1.57* (.16)
DPP	-1.70* (.19)	-1.71* (.20)
<i>Ethnic</i>		
Taiwanese		-.08 (.19)
Mainlander		-.05 (.16)
Intercept	-.23 (.42)	-.22 (.44)
Log Likelihood	-220.77	-216.23
Prob > χ^2	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R^2	0.49	0.49
Number of obs.	717	707

Note: * indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 9.08, df = 2]$) tests approve, at a .05 level of significance, the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model (see Table 6-3). Joint test results for the combined model display that the economic voting hypothesis and the ethnic voting hypothesis, respectively, are not jointly significant. Also, the joint effect of economic voting was not significant in the basic model. In contrast, the party identification hypothesis appears to be jointly significant throughout the models.

Table 6-3. Joint Test Results of the Probit Estimates: The 1992 Legislative Yuan Election, Taiwan

Hypothesis	Basic KMT	Combined DPP
Economics	0.50	0.57
Ethnic		0.90
Party ID	0.00*	0.00*

Note: Prob > χ^2

* indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level.

The December 1995 Legislative Yuan Election. The multinomial logit estimates for the 1995 Legislative Yuan election are in Table 6-4. It should be noted, however, that the 1995 survey data may be problematic. Although the total number of the respondents is 1485, 964 of the interviewees did not answer their voter choice. Moreover, the valid responses were only 89 and 87 in the basic model and the combined model, respectively. The format of Table 6-4 (and 6-5) are the same as the multinomial logit estimates for the three-way races in South Korea.

The estimates of the basic multinomial logit model indicate that voters were not affected by the economic conditions (see Table 6-4). No economic voting factors reached statistical significance for voter choice. In addition, no socioeconomic factors appear to have had a significant influence on voter choice, with the exception of educational attainment. The opposition NP did better than the ruling KMT among educated people. In fact, the NP came out of the KMT in 1993 and was based on voters with higher education.³²

The party identification variables were significant for voter choice. Between the DPP and the KMT, KMT sympathizers were expected to vote for the KMT and DPP identifiers were more likely to support the DPP. For the NP versus KMT comparison, the NP received support from their NP identifiers, as expected. Nonetheless, the results of joint tests suggest that the economic voting hypothesis in the basic model is jointly significant for the NP versus KMT competition, while this is not the case for the DPP versus KMT comparison (see Table 6-5).

³² The NP “has drawn more support from the metropolitan areas ... college-educated people ... the younger generation ... female ... the middle class [than the KMT]” (Tien and Chu 1996, 1159).

Table 6-4. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Party Race: The 1995 Legislative Yuan Election (Coefficients for the KMT's Normalized to Zero), Taiwan

Independent Variables	Basic DPP	Basic NP	Combined DPP	Combined NP
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.23 (1.21)	22.80 (7456.66)	.07 (1.57)	34.25 (7432.78)
Personal economy	-.98 (.94)	-33.44 (.)	-.92 (1.15)	-44.35 (.)
Unemployment	-2.67 (2.16)	-54.76 (3728.36)	-3.60 (2.44)	-74.81 (3716.42)
Prospective National	-.66 (.80)	-4.47 (4.55)	-.96 (1.01)	-4.39 (4.69)
Prospective Personal	-.17 (.86)	6.16 (7.54)	-.40 (1.04)	6.32 (7.66)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Age	-.66 (.68)	.41 (1.53)	-.52 (.82)	.59 (1.56)
Gender (Male)	.39 (.99)	3.96 (4.47)	.06 (1.12)	3.77 (4.56)
Educational attainment	.19 (.71)	36.31* (3.40)	.84 (.84)	47.56* (3.43)
<i>PID</i>				
KMT	-3.75* (1.36)	-5.79 (5.89)	-3.65* (1.41)	-5.87 (5.99)
DPP	3.23* (1.35)	-71.79 (2.29e+09)	4.13* (1.71)	-63.51 (1.95e+08)
NP	.59 (1.60)	39.08* (5.58)	-40.42 (9.57e+08)	49.62* (5.63)
<i>Ethnic</i>				
Taiwanese			1.57 (1.19)	-11.84 (7433.01)
Mainlander			-.97 (2.82)	.01 (2.50)
Intercept	8.40 (5.94)	.19 (.)	8.84 (6.83)	5.10 (.)
Log Likelihood		-25.57		-22.02
Prob > χ^2		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.63		0.67
Number of obs.		89		87

Note: * indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level.

The estimates of the combined model are almost the same as those of the basic model. The combined model suggests that no economic condition factors reached statistical significance for voter choice. Yet, joint tests of the economic condition hypothesis confirm its joint significance for the NP versus KMT comparison (see Table 6-5). Educational attainment was the only socioeconomic variable that had a statistically significant impact on voter choice. For the choice between the NP and the KMT, the NP did better among educated people. In addition, the party identification variables were significant for voter choice. As expected, KMT identifiers were more likely to vote for the KMT than the DPP. DPP supporters were more likely to opt for the DPP than the KMT. Between the NP and the KMT, NP sympathizers were more likely to support the NP than the KMT.

Table 6-5. Joint Test Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimates: The 1995 Legislative Yuan and the 1996 Presidential Elections, Taiwan

Election	Hypothesis	Basic Model	Basic Model	Combined Model	Combined Model
1995		DPP/KMT	NP/KMT	DPP/KMT	NP/KMT
Legislative Yuan	Economics	0.58	0.00*	0.51	0.00*
	Ethnic			0.38	1.00
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.01*	0.00*
1996		PMM/LTH	LYK/LTH	PMM/LTH	LYK/LTH
Presidential	Economics	0.00*	0.00*	0.01*	0.00*
	Ethnic			0.08**	0.00*
	Party ID	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*

Note: Prob > χ^2

* (**) indicates an estimate significant at the $p < .05$ level ($p < .10$ level).

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 7.1, df = 2]$) tests approve the alternative rival hypothesis that the combined model is significantly different from the basic model at a

.05 level of significance. Contrary to the expectations, the estimates of the combined model indicate the insignificant impact of the ethnic cleavage hypothesis on voter choice (see Table 6-5). In contrast, the party identification hypothesis reached joint significance.

In accounting for the 1995 election, however, the individual specific event of the cross-strait tension deserves more emphasis.³³ The cross-strait tension between Taiwan and China has resulted from a rather long historical relationship between the two governments. Ever since Chang Kai-shek moved to Taiwan from the Mainland in 1949, Taiwan has proclaimed to recover the Mainland and restore the previous ruling system over the nation's old territory. On the other hand, China continues to claim to be the only legitimate government of the Mainland. China has constantly pursued the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened to use military force, if Taiwan seeks formal independence. In contrast, Taiwan did everything to maintain international ties with other countries in the world.

The irreconcilable conflicts between the two governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait began to abate after 1987. Starting in October 1987, the Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan in the 1940s were allowed to meet their families on the Mainland. There had been an enormous increase in trade, tourism, family visits, and official contacts as well as sports and cultural exchanges between the two governments. Moreover, China's President Jang Zemin called for a meeting to negotiate an end to the conflicts in January 1995. Nevertheless, the peaceful atmosphere broke down when Lee Teng-hui went to the U.S. in June of 1995.

³³ The inclusion of the tension variable generates strange estimates (see Appendix D). Thus, I take out the variable from the combined model.

Although Lee Teng-hui, born in Taiwan, appeared to be sympathetic of the notion of Taiwan's independence, he could not outspokenly pursue independence as the leader of the Mainlander-based KMT. Yet, he felt the need to ease pressure from the DPP's independence policy by taking a more aggressive stance toward independence than the traditional position taken by the KMT. In June 1995, he attempted to enhance Taiwan's international visibility by visiting the U.S. As a result, China feared that he would declare independence based on the increasing U.S. sympathy toward Taiwan after his visit. Moreover, China suspected that "Washington had shifted to a policy of 'containing' China and playing the Taiwan card" (Tien 1996, 36). Thus, China tried to disrupt Taiwanese ethnic Lee Teng-hui's reelection by a military threat.

The People's Liberation Army of China began to conduct a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait between July and November of 1995. The cross-strait relationship seriously worsened after the visit. Nevertheless, those who supported Lee Teng-hui's KMT did not complain about the increased tension. Instead, his supporters may have shown their backing of the leader and supported his inter-China policies. Contrary to China's expectations, Lee Teng-hui's popularity went up and the KMT mustered the majority of seats (85 seats out of 164) in the 1995 December Legislative Yuan election (see Table 6-1). In contrast, the DPP won 54 seats and the NP earned 21 seats.

Table 6-1 indicates that there was a decline in support of the KMT between 1992 and 1995. Yet, the decline was affected by the formation of the NP in 1993, not by the decrease in support for Lee Teng-hui. The base of the NP used to be that of the KMT. The NP garnered its support from the old Mainlanders who believed that Lee Teng-hui

was leading the country on a path toward war and away from unification. Considering that the vote and seat shares of the DPP remained almost the same between 1992 and 1995, the NP's vote share of 13 percentage points may have come from the KMT's supporters (see Table 6-1). Thus, the seven percentage point decline in the KMT support may not be serious.

B. Presidential Election

The March 1996 Presidential Election. As a result of the 1992 constitutional reform, a direct Presidential election was held for the first time in Taiwan's history in 1996. There were three leading contenders in the race. Lee Teng-hui was the successor of the late President Chang Ching-kuo in 1988 and took over the presidency through an indirect election in the National Assembly in 1993. Peng Ming-min was known for his life long pursuit of Taiwan's independence and returned home in 1992 after a more than two decade exile. He became the presidential candidate of the DPP. Lin Yang-kang had been the vice chairperson of the KMT but left the party to run against the incumbent Lee Teng-hui in 1995. Chen Li-an also came out of the KMT and attacked Lee Teng-hui's cross-strait policies. However, the NP endorsed Lin Yang-kang as the party's presidential candidate, instead of Chen Li-an.

The multinomial logit estimates of the basic model demonstrate that voters cast their votes according to their sociotropic concerns (see Table 6-6). Between Lin Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui, the national economic condition worked as a positive factor for Lee Teng-hui. Those who perceived that the national economy was better than before were more likely to vote for the incumbent Lee Teng-hui than Lin Yang-kang. In

addition to such retrospective evaluations, individuals were also concerned about the prospective promises of the candidates. Those who believed that Lee Teng-hui would best be able to generate economic development tended to choose him over his opponents. On the other hand, the other economic voting coefficients did not reach statistical significance for voter choice.

Age and educational attainment were the socioeconomic factors that had significant effects on voter choice. Lee Teng-hui appealed to older people more than Peng Ming-min, as expected. Also, the two opposition candidates did better than the incumbent candidate among educated voters, which is consistent with the expectations. Party identification also played a significant role in choosing candidates. KMT identifiers were more likely to vote for Lee Teng-hui and DPP supporters were more likely to choose Peng Ming-min, between the two candidates. Also, NP supporters were more likely to vote for Lin Yang-kang than Lee Teng-hui, with all other things being equal.

Table 6-6. Multinomial Logit Estimates for the Three-Candidate Race: The 1996 Presidential Election (Coefficients for LTH's Normalized to Zero), Taiwan

Independent Variables	Basic PMM	Basic LYK	Combined PMM	Combined LYK
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	-.25 (.24)	-1.13* (.37)	-.08 (.27)	-1.03* (.40)
Personal economy	-.36 (.24)	.22 (.32)	-.49** (.26)	.35 (.33)
Unemployment	-1.20 (.90)	-.94 (1.27)	-.51 (1.06)	-1.05 (1.45)
Prospective (LTH)	-1.16* (.36)	-1.78* (.45)	-1.38* (.40)	-1.64* (.51)
Prospective (PMM)	.05 (.58)	.12 (.92)	-.42 (.60)	-.74 (.97)
Prospective (LYK)	-.71 (1.23)	1.43 (.90)	-.85 (1.22)	.67 (.94)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Age	-.31* (.16)	-.12 (.20)	-.37* (.17)	-.18 (.22)
Gender (Male)	.40 (.31)	.57 (.39)	.27 (.33)	.49 (.42)
Educational attainment	.43* (.15)	.41* (.19)	.31** (.16)	.14 (.22)
<i>PID</i>				
KMT	-3.14* (.76)	-.69 (.47)	-3.20* (.78)	-.84 (.52)
DPP	2.52* (.34)	-.21 (.65)	2.22* (.39)	-.20 (.68)
NP	-.04 (1.11)	4.45* (.61)	-.04 (1.14)	4.00* (.66)
<i>Ethnic</i>				
Taiwanese			.75* (.36)	-.35 (.50)
Mainlander			-.37 (.63)	-.60 (.56)
Tension			.17 (.18)	.97* (.23)
Intercept	-.79 (.87)	-1.50 (1.07)	-.46 (1.03)	-2.75* (1.29)
Log Likelihood		-271.18		-229.20
Prob > chi ²		0.00		0.00
Pseudo R ²		0.56		0.58
Number of obs.		852		712

Note: * (**) indicates an estimate significant at the p < .05 level (p < .10 level).

The economic voting factors in the combined model have almost the same effects on voter choice as observed in the basic model. In addition, the personal economic condition variable reached statistical significance. The favorable evaluations of the personal economic condition led to support for Lee Teng-hui more than Peng Ming-min. This is consistent with the expectations. Also, sociotropic voting is observed between the Lin Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui competition. The sign of sociotropic voting is in the anticipated direction. In contrast, educational attainment loses its statistical significance for the Lin Yang-kang versus Lee Teng-hui comparison, as opposed to the basic model. Otherwise, the socioeconomic factors have the same effects on voter choice in the combined model as their counterparts in the basic model. Party identification factors induced almost the same effects on voter choice as in the basic model.

Clearly, ethnic cleavages had a significant impact on voter choice. The Taiwanese were more likely to prefer Peng Ming-min (the DPP) than Lee Teng-hui (the KMT). Moreover, the cross-strait tension induced a significant impact on voter choice. The tension between Taiwan and China became more serious when China even conducted missile tests near Taiwan, as the Presidential election day was getting closer. As expected, those who blamed Lee Teng-hui for the 1996 cross-strait crisis would vote for Lin Yang-kang more likely than him. Lin Yang-kang's supporters perceived that Lee Teng-hui provoked the crisis and as a result, there would be a war between the two governments.

Likelihood ratio ($\Pr [R \geq 83.96, df = 3]$) tests reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the basic model and the combined model at a .005 level of

significance. Joint tests for the combined model confirm the joint significance of the economic voting hypothesis, the ethnic voting hypothesis, and the party identification hypothesis, respectively (see Table 6-5). In addition, this is the same in the basic model.

Despite the military intimidation, Lee Teng-hui won a landslide victory by receiving 54.0% of the popular vote in the 1996 Presidential election (see Table 6-1). Peng Ming-min and Lin Yang-kang earned 21.1% and 14.9% of the vote, respectively. As Table 6-1 displays, Lee Teng-hui's vote share of 54.0% was the highest. China's missile tests in the Taiwan Strait generated a rally behind the flag effect. Also, Lee Teng-hui's independence approach may have attracted some of the DPP's traditional supporters. It was the DPP (Peng Ming-min) that experienced a decline in support in 1996. On the other hand, the NP's vote share (Lin Yang-kang) did not decrease.

4. Economic Voting and Ethnic Voting

First differences of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election indicate that the marginal effects of economic voting and ethnic voting were meager, while those of party identification were substantial (see Table 6-7). Also, the signs of party identification's first differences are in the correct direction but some signs of economic and ethnic voting are in the wrong directions. In other words, first differences of the personal economy, unemployment, prospective evaluation, and Mainlander variables display in the directions opposite to the hypotheses.

Table 6-7. First Differences of Economic Voting, Party Identification, and Ethnic Background in the Legislative Yuan Elections, Taiwan

	1992 KMT	DPP	1995 KMT	DPP	NP
Baseline			1.00	.00	.00
Prob.					
<i>Economics</i>					
National economy	.08	-.08	.00	.00	.00
Personal economy	-.04	.04	.00	.00	.00
Unemployment	.03	-.03	.00	.00	.00
Prospective*	-.04	.04	.00	.00	.00
National					
Prospective	N/A	N/A	.00	.00	.00
Personal					
<i>PID</i>					
KMT	.37	-.37	.00	.00	.00
DPP	-.55	.55	-.05	.00	.05
NP	N/A	N/A	-.15	.15	.00
<i>Ethnic</i>					
Taiwanese	-.02	.02	.00	.00	.00
Mainlander	-.01	.01	.00	.00	.00

Note: I use *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) in calculating first differences.

* prospective evaluation for the 1992 Legislative Yuan election.

First differences of the 1995 Legislative Yuan election suggest that economic voting and ethnic voting did not generate marginal effects on voter decisions at all (see Table 6-7). In contrast, party identification had some marginal impacts on voter choice. If the hypothetical voter changed his party loyalty to the DPP, he was 5% less likely to vote for the KMT and 5% more likely to vote for the NP. The hypothetical individual is also a male in his thirties who has graduated from high school and lives in an urban area, as in the South Korean case. Additionally, if he changed his loyalty to the NP, he was 15% less likely to vote for the KMT and 15% more likely to opt for the DPP with no

change in the NP's support. So, these marginal effects may not well reflect the party identification hypothesis. Overall, first differences of the 1995 Legislative Yuan election exhibit odd results. The hypothetical individual has a 1.00 probability of voting for the ruling KMT, while he had a .00 probability of voting for the two opposition parties. Again, this may come from the low number of valid responses.

First differences of the 1996 Presidential election may also be problematic. The signs of many first differences are not in the expected directions. Only first differences of unemployment and prospective voting (Peng Ming-min) display the anticipated sign (see Table 6-8). If the respondent became unemployed, he was 4% less likely to vote for Lee Teng-hui and 4% more likely to support Lin Yang-kang. If he perceived that Peng Ming-min would best be able to manage the economy, he was 1% more likely to vote for him and 4% less likely to opt for Lee Teng-hui.

Also, if he believed that Lee Teng-hui provoked the tension between Taiwan and China, he was 27% more likely to opt for Lee Teng-hui and 1% (26%) less likely to vote for Peng Ming-min (Lin Yang-kang). However, these first differences do not have the anticipated signs. Party identification had much stronger marginal effects on voter choice than economic voting and ethnic voting did. Nonetheless, the signs of party identification's first differences are not in the expected directions.

Table 6-8. First Difference of Economic Voting, Party Identification, and Ethnic Background in the 1996 Presidential Election, Taiwan

	LTH	PMM	LYK
Baseline	.89	.05	.05
Prob.			
<i>Economics</i>			
National	-.07	.00	.07
economy			
Personal	-.01	.05	-.04
economy			
Unemployment	-.04	.00	.04
Prospective	-.20	.09	.11
(LTH)			
Prospective	-.04	.01	.03
(PMM)			
Prospective	.03	.02	-.05
(LYK)			
<i>PID</i>			
KMT	-.24	.21	.03
DPP	.19	-.21	.02
NP	.61	.03	-.64
<i>Ethnic</i>			
Taiwanese	.02	-.04	.02
Mainlander	-.04	.01	.03
Tension	.27	-.01	-.26

Note: I use *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1999) in calculating first differences.

5. Conclusions

The above statistical analyses enable me to draw the following conclusions. First, economic voting is observed in the 1995 Legislative Yuan and 1996 Presidential elections. In 1995, the economic voting hypothesis is jointly significant between the NP and KMT competition in the basic and combined models. Yet, no single economic voting variable is confirmed to be individually significant. Thus, it is impossible to tell

whether the responsibility hypothesis is confirmed or not. The statistical analyses of the 1995 election are also limited by the number of valid respondents. In contrast, genuine economic voting occurred in the 1996 election. Joint tests confirm that the economic voting hypothesis is jointly significant across the models in 1996. This is consistent with the findings about the 1996 election by Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou (N.d.) and Hsieh and Niou (1996). Nonetheless, it is not safe to conclude that economic voting was more likely to occur in the Presidential elections than the Legislative Yuan elections. The number of elections under study is too small to draw a meaningful generalization.

Second, voters have been affected by their concerns about the sociotropic economy and the pocketbook economy in 1996. The national economic conditions affected voter choice between Lin Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui in the basic model as well as the combined model. In addition, the personal economic conditions had a significant impact on voter choice between Peng Ming-min and Lee Teng-hui in the combined model.

Third, individuals cast their votes retrospectively as well as prospectively in 1996. On the contrary to Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou (N.d.), retrospective voting is also observed in 1996. The national economic condition and the personal economic condition variables are, by definition, the retrospective economic voting survey items and the variables appear to have a significant impact on voter choice. Also, voters were consistent in connecting the good prospective expectation of Lee Teng-hui with electoral support. Lee Teng-hui had continuously managed economic prosperity and stability until 1996.

Fourth, ethnic cleavages played at least as significant role as economic voting did in 1996. Joint test results suggest that the joint test chi square values of ethnic voting are

about the same as those of economic voting. Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the addition of the ethnic cleavage variables into the basic model appear to be more powerful than the basic model across the elections.

Fifth, party identification consistently played a significant role in voter decisions, whereas the socioeconomic factors did not have a consistent effect on voter choice. In fact, party identification is the only consistent factor determining voter choice across the elections under investigation. In contrast, different socioeconomic factors had different impacts on voter choice.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined, on the one hand, the association between economic conditions and voter turnout, and on the other hand, the relationship between economic conditions and electoral support in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. In other words, I have investigated the new voting behavior at the level of the national elections held after the democratic transition in these Asian nations, from a political economic perspective. Under democratic governments, what would determine voter participation and electoral returns in South Korea and Taiwan? Are there differences in South Korea's and Taiwan's voting behavior between when they were under authoritarianism and after the democratic transition? History-long regional conflicts between Cholla and Kyungsang provinces had been a die-hard determinant for voters' decisions in South Korea. Does this still hold for the recent democratic elections? Also, how did the Taiwanese begin to vote under the new circumstances of the two (or three) party system? In fact, there had been only one party (the KMT) until the mid-1980s. Did ethnic conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders play a significant role in electoral politics? Or did people in South Korea and Taiwan begin to be more concerned about economic conditions when they were at the polling booths, as voters were in many other democracies?

My hypothesis on voter turnout is that if voters perceive the state of the economy as being worse than before, voter turnout is likely to decrease (Rosenstone 1982). Conversely, if voters perceive the state of the economy as being better than before, voter turnout is likely to increase. I have also tested the hypothesis about voter choice that if

people perceive economic conditions as being worse than before, they are less likely to vote for the incumbent party. Voters hold the incumbent party responsible for the economic downturns (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Conversely, if people perceive economic conditions as being better than before, they are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. In addition to the economic condition variables, I build the basic (or restricted) model including socioeconomic factors, social psychological factors, political mobilization factors, the close election factor, and party identification into the statistical models, if available. The combined (or unrestricted) model consists of the basic model and regionalism (or ethnic) factors. The combined model tests the impact of regional or ethnic conflicts on voter decisions.

I have used the survey data sets collected by the IKES (the Institute for Korean Election Studies) and the NCU (the National Chengchi University). Since the democratic transitions in the mid-1980s, South Korea has held three (1987, 1992, and 1997) direct Presidential elections and four (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000) National Assembly elections and Taiwan has held two (1996 and 2000) direct Presidential elections and three (1992, 1995, and 1998) Legislative Yuan elections. However, the IKES has conducted the nationwide surveys since the 1992 National Assembly election and the 2000 National Assembly election survey data are not available at the time of this writing. Thus, this study inevitably deals with the 1992 and 1996 National Assembly elections and the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections. The NCU has conducted the election surveys in the 1990s but the NCU did not make the survey data available to the public since the 1998 Legislative Yuan election. Thus, only the 1992 and 1995 Legislative Yuan elections and the 1996 Presidential elections are under investigation.

For the methodology of this research project, first, I have employed probit. The probit model is used for the two-way choices as in the decisions between vote and not-vote or the decisions between two candidates. Second, I have also employed multinomial logit. The multinomial logit model is utilized for the three-way choices as in the decisions among three candidates. I have conducted likelihood ratio tests to see which model is better between the basic model and the combined model. Additionally, joint hypothesis tests are used to see if a group of variables for a hypothesis is jointly significant.

Table 7-1. Summary of Voter Turnout in South Korea and Taiwan

Hypothesis	South Korea				Taiwan		
	1992 N	1996 N	1992 P	1997 P	1992 L	1995 L	1996 P
Economic conditions					S		
Socioeconomic	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Social psychological	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Political mobilization	S			S			
Close election	N/A	N/A	S		N/A	N/A	
Regionalism or Ethnic			S				

Note: N - National Assembly election, P - Presidential election, L - Legislative Yuan election, and S - jointly significant in the combined model

As a result, I have found some similarities and differences of voter turnout in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. Table 7-1 summarizes the results of statistical tests, with respect to voter turnout. Above all, economic conditions are likely to have

nothing to do with voter turnout in South Korea and Taiwan. This is consistent with Fiorina's (1978) findings, rather than Lipset's (1960) and Rosenstone's (1982) conclusions in the U.S. context. Rosenstone suggests that there is a positive association between economic conditions and voter turnout. Economically deprived people are viewed to be preoccupied with their daily lives. They are unlikely to be involved in political actions, for instance, voting (Rosenstone 1982). In contrast, Lipset has speculated that a high voting average is more likely to be associated with the bad economy. Economic depression drives people to turn to the government through various political activities (Lipset 1960). Furthermore, although Radcliff (1992; 1996) concludes that economic adversity encourages electoral participation in developing countries, which appears not be the case in South Korea and Taiwan.

While joint tests disapprove of the joint significance of economic condition hypothesis in the combined model in South Korea, joint tests approve the joint significance of the economic condition hypothesis on voter turnout only in the 1992 National Assembly election in the basic model. Nonetheless, no single economic condition variable reached statistical significance. Thus, I cannot confirm whether good economic conditions or bad economic conditions generated the significant impact on voter turnout. In Taiwan, joint tests suggest that the economic condition hypothesis on voter turnout is jointly significant in 1992 (the basic and combined models) and 1995 (the basic model). However, the signs of the national and personal economic condition variables are in contradiction in 1992. Only personal economic conditions had the hypothesized impact on voter turnout in 1995.

Second, traditional regionalism and ethnic conflicts are not significant for voter participation in South Korea and Taiwan, respectively. Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the combined model is better than the basic model in explaining voter turnout in South Korea, with the exception of the 1996 election. The more powerful combined model approves the joint significance of the regionalism hypothesis only in the 1992 Presidential election. There was no systematic pattern in the relationship between home provinces and voter turnout in South Korea. Voters' home provinces were not significant in the 1992 National Assembly election, whereas Kyungsang people tended to participate more in the 1996 National Assembly election. In the 1992 Presidential election, Cholla people were more likely to vote, whereas Kyungsang people were more likely to vote in the 1997 Presidential election. On the other hand, the election specific party merger variable was significant for electoral participation only in the 1992 Presidential election.

In Taiwan, likelihood ratio tests suggest that the combined model is better than the basic model in explaining voter turnout. The more powerful combined model disproves the joint significance of the ethnic voting hypothesis across the elections. Also, there was no pattern between voters' ethnic backgrounds and voter turnout. Only those Taiwanese origin were more likely to vote in 1996.

Third, as can be seen in Table 7-1, the socioeconomic hypothesis appears to be jointly significant across the elections in South Korea and Taiwan. Surprisingly enough, it is age that commonly reached statistical significance throughout the elections in the two countries. Older voters were more likely to show up at the polling places.

Fourth, the social psychological hypothesis is also jointly significant for voter participation throughout the elections in South Korea and Taiwan (see Table 7-1).

Specifically, it is election interest that had a statistically significant impact on voter turnout commonly in these two countries. The only exception for this is Taiwan's 1995 election. Election interest was positively correlated with voter participation.

Fifth, the effects of the political mobilization factors were not the same as in previous elections in the 1970s and 1980s where authoritarian leaders mobilized voters to the polling booths in South Korea. As a result, official voter turnout rates have consistently decreased in the 1990s. Similarly, the mobilization hypothesis never reached statistical significance in Taiwan. Previously, the KMT regime did not have to mobilize voters to win elections unlike the old regimes in South Korea because there used to be just one party until the mid-1980s. Also, there is no clear tendency in official voter turnout rates. The voter turnout rates were 72% (1992), 69.8% (1995), and 76.0% (1996). After the democratic transition, elections became remarkably free and fair in Taiwan, compared to the standards of past elections. Also, the new TV commercials did not have a significant impact on voter participation in the South Korean Presidential elections, which disproves the hypothesis about the positive relation between the TV advertisements and electoral participation.

There are also some differences in voter participation between South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. First, it is unique in South Korea that urban residents and the educated are less likely to vote. In Taiwan, females were more likely to vote than males in 1996. These are all opposite to the hypothesis.

Second, the close election hypothesis in South Korea exhibits odd results. The close campaign in the 1997 Presidential election, which ended up with a razor-thin 1.6 percentage point difference, did not attract voter participation but the decent margin

campaign in the 1992 Presidential race, which ended up with a 8.2 percentage point difference, appears to have fostered voter turnout. In contrast, there is no compatible survey question to test the close election hypothesis in Taiwan.

Table 7-2. Summary of Voter Choice in South Korea and Taiwan

	South Korea				Taiwan		
Hypothesis	1992 N	1996 N	1992 P	1997 P	1992 L	1995 L	1996 P
Economic conditions	/S	S/S	S/	S/S		/S	S/S
PID	S/S	S/S	S/S	S/S	S	S/S	S/S
Regionalism or Ethnic	S/S	S/	S/S	S/S			S/S

Note: N - National Assembly election, P - Presidential election, L - Legislative Yuan election, (the incumbent party v. the first opposition party)/(the incumbent party v. the second opposition party), and S - jointly significant in the combined model

Next, South Korea and Taiwan share some interesting features regarding economic voting in the 1990s. Table 7-2 summarizes the statistical test results of economic voting behavior. First, genuine economic voting was evident in the 1997 South Korean and the 1996 Taiwanese elections. These two elections were the last Presidential races held in the 1990s. Particularly, in South Korea, the worst economic crisis occurred in 1997 and voters held the incumbent party accountable for the crisis in the presidential election. As a result, South Korea embraced a power transfer for the first time in its history. However, similar economic voting is not observed in other elections. As Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000, 119) adequately note, the instability of the economic voting

model has been a discouraging factor for researchers. Results differ from nation to nation and from time to time.

In South Korea's earlier elections held between 1992 and 1996, economic voting is observed to have occurred with voters' "limited rationality." In other words, the signs of the economic voting coefficients sometimes display in the directions opposite to the hypotheses. Voters believed that the ruling party played an enormous role in South Korea's rapid economic development. Because the miraculous economic development had been orchestrated by the ruling party since the early 1960s, voters may have considered the ruling party as the only manager of the economy, despite their authoritarian nature. In sharp contrast, opposition parties had never had a chance to show their abilities to manage the national economy. Opposition parties also lacked human resources with economic specialties and bureaucratic experiences. Voters may have thought that the ruling party would be better than opposition parties in handling the national economy and resolving the unemployment or inflation problems. Therefore, if people perceived inflation and unemployment as being worse, they were more likely to vote for the ruling party.

In Taiwan, economic voting did not occur in 1992 and the statistical analyses of the 1995 election are limited by the small number of valid respondents. In contrast, joint tests approve the joint significance of the economic voting hypothesis in the 1996 election.

Second, sociotropic voting was more likely to occur than pocketbook voting in South Korea's 1997 race and Taiwan's 1996 election. This conclusion is the same as that of Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) and many others in the U.S. context. At the same time,

individuals cast their vote retrospectively as well as prospectively in these two elections. Sociotropic and pocketbook voting are also retrospective voting survey items in this study. Prospective survey questionnaires were employed for the first time in these elections and prospective voting was loud and clear.³⁴

Third, as shown in Table 7-2, joint tests suggest that the party identification hypothesis is one of the strongest hypotheses throughout the elections in South Korea and Taiwan. The party identification variables are always in the hypothesized directions. Because 82 parties have been formed between January 1963 and January 2000, it was not easy for South Korea's voters to form a genuine party identification, as voters do in other countries. Nonetheless, there had been no power alternation until the 1997 election, thus the identification between the ruling party versus opposition parties appears to have always worked as a significant cue for decisions in voting. In contrast, Taiwan's stable party system may have established party identification stronger than that of South Korea. The KMT had ruled in Taiwan until 2000. The DPP emerged as a genuine opposition party in the mid-1980s and the NP was formed by those who left the KMT in 1993.

Fourth, the socioeconomic factors did not have a consistent effect on voter choice in South Korea and Taiwan. Different socioeconomic factors were significant in the different elections.

There are also notable differences in economic voting between South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. First, it is not safe to say that economic voting was stronger in the Presidential races than the parliamentary elections. In South Korea, there are no

³⁴ It is not safe to conclude that the two countries' voters were "bankers" who were prospective and sociotropic at the same time (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).

significant differences in the joint test chi square values of economic voting between the Presidential races and the National Assembly elections. Nonetheless, economic voting may have been stronger between the ruling party and the first opposition party than between the ruling party and the second opposition party. The competition between the ruling party and the first opposition party may be more visible and significant than the competition between the ruling party and the second opposition party. Such a pattern was not observed in Taiwan's elections.

Second, regionalism was stronger and more consistent than economic voting in South Korea but ethnic conflicts were as significant as economic voting in Taiwan in 1996. Likelihood ratio tests approve that the combined model in each country is better than the basic model in accounting for economic voting. In South Korea, joint tests approve that the regionalism hypothesis is jointly significant throughout the elections, while the economic voting hypothesis is not jointly significant in the 1996 National Assembly election (the combined model). Also, first differences of the regionalism variables are bigger than those of economic voting across the elections. The home province and party merger variables are not in the unexpected directions. Furthermore, Cholla origin Kim Dae Jung or his parties collected Cholla voters' support more than the candidates from Kyungsang province collected Kyungsang voters' support throughout the elections.

In Taiwan, joint test results suggest that the joint significance of ethnic voting is about the same as those of economic voting in the 1996 election. First differences are not significantly varied between economic voting and ethnic voting.

To summarize, new voting behavior certainly emerged in the two countries in the 1990s. With regard to voter turnout, the traditional mobilization factors were not as significant as in previous authoritarian elections. Age and election interest were the factors that had significant impacts on voter turnout throughout the elections in the two countries. Economic conditions and regionalism (or ethnic cleavages) were not significant for voter participation. Economic voting became significant in the decision processes of who to vote for in the last presidential elections in each country in the 1990s. Voters were sociotropic as well as retrospective and prospective. At the same time, regional or ethnic cleavages remained as a significant factor for voter decisions in South Korea and Taiwan. In the near future, as survey data sets from more recent elections in the two countries become available, I will be able to extend the number of cases. This will improve the external validity of the conclusions of the research project. Also, as economic issues become more important than ever in the two countries, I will be able to see if there is a tendency of economic voting behavior with the increased number of cases.

APPENDIX A

SOUTH KOREAN SURVEY DATA

The South Korean survey data were collected by the Institute for Korean Election Studies (IKES). The IKES conducted the nationwide election surveys (except the Jeju Island) under the auspices of the Central Election Management Commission and other funding organizations in South Korea. The IKES employed the face-to-face interview method by visiting every household drawn.

Survey data for the two National Assembly elections were collected by the multistage probability sampling method. The 1992 election survey (N=1206) was conducted between March 26 and 30 after the election on March 24, 1992. The 1992 National Assembly election survey is the first survey project done by the IKES. The 1996 election survey (N=1200) took place between April 11 and 18 after the election on April 11, 1996. At the first stage, the total sample size of 1200 was drawn with probability proportionate to the electorate of the cities and communities throughout the nation. At the second stage, electoral constituencies within which thirty eligible voters would be drawn were selected.

The sample for the 1992 Presidential election survey (N=1200) was also drawn on the basis of the multistage probability sampling method. The interviews took place between December 19 and 27 after the election on December 18, 1992. The sampling method for the 1997 Presidential election survey (N=1179) was the quota sampling. At the first stage, the total sample size of 1200 was drawn with probability proportionate to

the electorate of the cities and communities. At the second stage, samples were drawn according to the ratio of sex and age, with regional characteristics taken into consideration. At the third stage, fifteen eligible voters per two polling areas were randomly selected to represent a constituency. The IKES interviewed respondents between December 19 and 22 after the election on December 18, 1997.

In the 1992 National Assembly election survey, 44.6%, 38.4%, and 16.9% of the respondents answered to have voted for the DLP, the DP, and the UPP, respectively, and 86.0% of the respondents reported to have participated in the election. The actual vote returns are in Table 5-1 and the official turnout was 71.9%. The NKP, the NCNP, and the ULD mustered 56.3%, 32.8%, and 10.9% of the respondents, respectively, in the 1996 National Assembly election survey. Also, 81.2% of the respondents reported to have voted. The official turnout rate was 63.9%.

The 1992 Presidential election survey indicates that Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Chung Ju Young received support from 45.3%, 27.3%, and 9.6 % of the respondents, respectively, among the 93.4% self-reported voters. The official turnout rate was 81.9%. In addition, the 1997 election survey displays that Kim Dae Jung, Lee Hoe Chang, and Lee In Je received support from 37.0%, 33.5%, and 15.7% of the respondents, respectively, among the 92.5% self-reported voters. The actual voter turnout was 80.6%.

APPENDIX B

TAIWANESE SURVEY DATA

The Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University (NCU) has conducted nationwide surveys since the 1986 Legislative Yuan elections. The surveys employed the face-to-face interview method like South Korea's surveys. The NCU used the multistage stratified sampling method. The population was divided into four strata (Taipei City, Kaohsiung City, Provincial Cities, and Counties) and quotas for each stratum were drawn with probability proportionate to the electorate of the cities and districts. The NCU conducted pre-election surveys and post-election surveys throughout the elections under investigation. I use only the post-election surveys, which are equivalent to the South Korean surveys. The sizes of the samples are 1523 (the 1992 Legislative Yuan election), 1485 (the 1995 Legislative Yuan election), and 1396 (the 1996 Presidential election).

In the 1992 Legislative Yuan election survey, the KMT and the DPP earned 71.0% and 29.0% of the respondents, respectively, and 89.3% of the respondents reported to have voted in the election. The actual vote returns are in Table 6-1 and voter turnout was 72.0%. In the 1995 Legislative Yuan election survey, the KMT, the DPP, and the NP collected 69.9%, 24.1%, and 6.0% of the respondents, respectively. 87.3% of the respondents answered to have participated in the election but the official voter turnout was 69.8%.

In the 1996 Presidential election, Lee Teng-hui, Peng Ming-min, and Lin Yang-kang received 74.9%, 14.5%, and 10.5% of respondents, respectively, and 91.8% of the respondents reported to have voted in the election. The official voter turnout was 76.0%

APPENDIX C

SURVEY QUESTIONS³⁵

<Vote> Did you vote in the election?

(0) no (1) yes [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

<Whom to Vote> Whom (which party) did you vote for?

(1) the Democratic Justice Party (2) the Democratic Party (3) the United People's Party

[A]

(1) the New Korea Party (2) the National Congress for New Politics (3) the United

Liberal Democrats [B]

(1) Kim Young Sam (2) Kim Dae Jung (3) Chung Ju Young [C]

(1) Lee Hoe Chang (2) Kim Dae Jung (3) Lee In Je [D]

(0) the Democratic Progressive Party (1) the Kuomintang [E]

(1) the Kuomintang (2) the Democratic Progressive Party (3) the New Party [F]

(1) Lee Teng-hui (2) Peng Ming-min (3) Lin Yang-kang [G]

<National Economy> How would you evaluate national economic conditions during the past few years?

(1) worsened (2) about the same (3) improved [B] [C] [E] [F] [G]

³⁵ The following questionnaires are translated from Korean and Chinese. They are sometimes reworded and recoded. [A], the 1992 South Korean National Assembly election; [B], the 1996 South Korean National Assembly election; [C], the 1992 South Korean Presidential election; [D], the 1997 South Korean Presidential election; [E], the 1992 Taiwanese Legislative Yuan election; [F], the 1995 Taiwanese Legislative Yuan election; and [G], the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential election.

<National Economy in 1997> Which political party do you think was mainly responsible for the current economic crisis (the IMF bailout)? [D]

(0) other parties (1) the ruling party (the Grand National Party)

<Personal Economy> How do you feel about household economic conditions during the past few years?

(1) worsened (2) about the same (3) improved [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F][G]

<Inflation> What is the most important problem that the country is facing?³⁶

(0) others (1) consumer price [A] [C] [D]

<Unemployment> Are you employed?

(0) yes (1) no [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

<Retrospective Evaluation> How well do you think the government has been running things?

(1) poorly (2) well [A] [C]

(1) disapprove (2) approve [B]

(1) disapprove (2) neither approve nor disapprove (3) approve [D]³⁷

<Prospective Evaluation> Who do you think will best be able to resolve the current national problems?

Lee Hoe Chang, Kim Dae Jung, and Lee In Je are dummies [D]

(1) not promising at all (2) a bit promising

³⁶ The original question in the 1992 National Assembly election survey is "What do you think are the most important problems that this country is facing? Please choose two in the order of importance." For the 1992 and 1997 presidential election surveys, "Which issue do you have in mind as the most important thing in selecting the candidate? Please choose two." I consider the first choice as the most serious national problems.

³⁷ The original question for [B] and [D] is "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way the Kim Young Sam government has been running things?"

(3) somewhat promising (4) absolutely promising [E]³⁸

(1) will be worsened (2) will be about the same (3) will be improved [F]³⁹

Lee Teng-hui, Peng Ming-min, and Lin Yang-kang are dummies [G]⁴⁰

<Residential Area> Where do you live?

(1) rural area (2) suburban (3) urban area [A] [B] [C] [D]

<Age> How old are you?

(1) 20-29 (2) 30-39 (3) 40-49 (4) 50 and older [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

<Educational Attainment> What is your education level ?

(1) elementary school graduation and below (2) middle school graduation and below

(3) high school graduation and below (4) college education and more

[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

<Party Identifier> Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political party?

(1) no (2) yes [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]

<Election Interest> How interested were you in the election?

(1) not interested at all (2) not so much interested

(3) somewhat interested (4) very much interested [A] [B] [C] [D]

(1) not interested at all (2) not so much interested

(3) it depends (4) somewhat interested (5) very much interested [E] [F] [G]⁴¹

<Campaign Rallies> Have you ever been to a campaign rally?

(1) no (2) yes [A] [B] [E]

³⁸ The original question is "Is the democratic development in Taiwanese politics promising?"

³⁹ The question is "How do you think national (household) economic conditions are going to be in one year?"

⁴⁰ The original question is "Who do you think will best be able to generate economic development?"

⁴¹ The original question is "How interested were you in election-related articles in newspapers?"

<TV Advertisement> Have you seen candidates' TV advertisements during the campaign?

(1) no (2) yes [C] [D]

<Campaign Contact> Did anyone talk to you about supporting specific candidates in this last election?

(1) no (2) yes [A] [B] [C] [D]

(1) no (2) yes [E] [F] [G]⁴²

<Anticipated Election Closeness> Before the election, how did you forecast the election outcome?

(1) one candidate winning by a big margin

(2) a fairly close race

(3) too close to forecast [C] [D]

<Coalition> Do you like the recent party merger? [A] [C] [D]

<Tension: Cross-Strait Relations> How do you think the current cross-strait relations are?

(1) worsened (2) about the same (3) improved [E]

(1) disagree (2) agree [F]⁴³

⁴² The original question is "Have any party campaign staffers talked to you about supporting specific candidates in this last election?"

⁴³ The question is "Do you agree with the opinion that Lee Teng-hui provoked the current cross-strait tension?"

APPENDIX D

MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE THREE-PARTY RACE:

THE 1995 LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTION, TAIWAN

(COEFFICIENTS FOR THE KMT'S NORMALIZED TO ZERO)

Independent Variables	Basic DPP	Basic NP	Combined DPP	Combined NP
<i>Economics</i>				
National economy	.2288744 (1.211)	22.79843 (7456.66)	-3239.172 (.)	2.44e+16 (.)
Personal economy	-.9841409 (.935)	-33.43616 (.)	2260.409 (.)	-1.54e+18 (.)
Unemployment	-2.672969 (2.157)	-54.76324 (3728.364)	10341.58 (.)	-2204.579 (.)
Prospective National	-.6609297 (.795)	-4.473525 (4.548)	1.28e+13 (.)	1.37e+18 (.)
Prospective Personal	-.1747721 (.856)	6.164358 (7.540)	-5214.458 (.)	-9.65e+17 (.)
<i>Socioeconomic</i>				
Age	-.6617601 (.681)	.4143291 (1.530)	-8.94e+12 (.)	-1.35e+18 (.)
Gender (Male)	.390294 (.989)	3.958573 (4.466)	-1.28e+13 (.)	-679.9748 (.)
Educational attainment	.1904859 (.709)	36.31153* (3.397)	1.28e+12 (.)	2.25e+17 (.)
<i>PID</i>				
KMT	-3.747806* (1.358)	-5.785387 (5.888)	2762.068 (.)	1.87e+18 (.)
DPP	3.231433* (1.348)	-71.79447 (2.29e+09)	-1939.051 (.)	-71.93991 (.)
NP	.5862797 (1.602)	39.07793* (5.557)	-46.68033 (.)	7.52e+18 (.)
<i>Ethnic</i>				
Taiwanese			-1497.538 (.)	4.64e+18 (.)
Mainlander			-4.86e+11 (.)	-2.46e+18 (.)
Tension			55.95962 (.)	2.20e+18 (.)
Intercept	8.399248 (5.935)	.1920403 (.)	-32.2036 (.)	408.0936 (.)
Prob > chi ²		0.0000		(.)
Pseudo R ²		0.6337		i.nf0e-01
Number of obs.		89		74

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