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RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OPINION: AN ANALYSIS OF NATION AND RACE IN HARWOOD CHILDS' PRINCETON PUBLIC OPINION SYLLABUS, 1886 TO 1933

BY

KATHERINE ANNE BRADSHAW

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ABSTRACT

RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OPINION: AN ANALYSIS OF NATION AND RACEIN HARWOOD CHILDS' PRINCETON PUBLIC OPINION SYLLABUS, 1886 TO 1933

BY

KATHERINE ANNE BRADSHAW

This dissertation is a close reading of a selection of articles from Harwood Childs' Princeton University syllabus published in 1934. Childs founded *Public Opinion Quarterly* and taught one of the first university classes in the public opinion. His syllabus is considered the canon of the emerging field. The public opinion literature is recounted as a narrative called the Received Tradition of Public Opinion. Critics of polling are reviewed. The content of the articles are read through the lenses of historical understanding, and recent race and nation scholarship.

Today, the dominant understanding of the concept of public opinion is that public opinion is what polls measure in a manner similar to one-person, one vote. Most people see public opinion polls as a way for people to make their views known to lawmakers and to each other. The literature places the beginning of the study of public opinion in 1936 and 1937. In November 1936, George Gallup correctly predicted Franklin D. Roosevelt's election as president and the *Literary Digest* did not. In January 1937, *Public Opinion Quarterly* first was published.

Those who recount the story of the field emphasize the democratic potential of polling. They tell a progress story culminating with Gallup's (and others) polling on social issues. The common men responding to polls are wise. However, those who have explained the history of public opinion as polling have overlooked or misunderstood the literature written before the claimed founding..

This analysis of the canon of public opinion shows the common man is not wise. The common man needed instruction by his betters in order to save democracy. The common man was seen as dangerous or irrational and as easily led.

At the least, this dissertation gives support to the critic's claims that public opinion polling diminishes dissent. The image of a homogeneous united nation of equal responding individual citizens in poll results is at odds with the perception of the nation and its citizens before 1936. Race still matters, even if we have forgotten the assumption of stratification of human beings by nationality as when the term nation was inflected with race. Thinking of public opinion as poll results makes it more difficult to see social stratification and interests that make material differences to people. The success of public opinion as polling and the pollsters' claims to serve democracy covers relations of power previously visible. The authors of the articles published 1886 to 1934 had no doubts that a few should lead because the many were incompetent. This dissertation suggests Gallup's claim to make the voice of the common man heard was perhaps not an advocacy of democratic practice, but rather a clever use of "popular dogma" to promote his polls to newspapers and readers.

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To my family of friends, especially

Kathy Walker

Cathy Zimmer

Leslie Aguillard

Teresa Mastin

Nancy Whitmore

Don Bishop

and the memory of my mother

Marilyn Jane Park

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND NATION.....1
Mainstream public opinion is poll results.....1
Democracy and Public Opinion Polls 1
Public Opinion and Nation Emerge 3
Nation, Race, and Citizen 4
Rank Order by Race 6
Objective.....7
Analysis of the Syllabus.....8
Markers of Public Opinion as Poll Results 9
Harwood Childs, POQ Founder 10
Syllabus as Canon.....11
Chroniclers of the Received Tradition.....13
Analysis of the Articles in the Canon.....14
Why look at the canon of public opinion in 1934.....15
Chapter Two: The received tradition.....17
Chapter Three: Nation and Nationalism.....18
Chapters Four and Five: The Articles.....18
Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusions.....19

CHAPTER 2
THE RECEIVED TRADITION OF THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OPINION.....22
Introduction to the Received Tradition.....22
Eighteenth Century Beginnings 25
James Bryce and an expansion of interest in Public Opinion.....30
The Early Decades of the Twentieth Century.....33
Nineteenth Century Straw Polls Continue into the Twentieth Century.....34
Social Surveys.....35
Survey.....37
Sampling.....38
Advertising and Marketing.....41
The Twenties.....44
The Thirties.....45
Harwood Childs and *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48
George Gallup.....53
Alternative Views of Public Opinion: Critics of the Polls.....64
Reconsidered: Received Tradition of Public Opinion Polling as Progress Story...68

CHAPTER 3
NATIONALISM AND NATION.....71
Gellner.....77
Hobsbawm.....88
Gellner and Hobsbawm.....102
Racial Theories in the United States of America.....103
Verdery.....107

CHAPTER 4
HARWOOD CHILDS' PUBLIC OPINION SYLLABUS ARTICLES FROM 1886 TO 1919.....114
W.T. Stead, "Government by Journalism,"
in *Contemporary Review* in 1886.....119
J.W. Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion,"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1985.....122
E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion,"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1898.....125
Walter C. Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes,"
in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1901.....127
Edward Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1910.....128
Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1910.....129
F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at presidential elections"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1912.....133
Sydney G. Fisher, "The Legendary and Myth Making Process in Histories of the American Revolution"
in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge* in 1912.....134
George Kibbe Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion"
in *McClure's Magazine* in 1912.....138
Philip Marshall Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy"
in *North American Review* in 1916.....138
William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes"
in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1916.....142
Arthur Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1917.....143
Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1919.....145

CHAPTER 5
HARWOOD CHILDS' PUBLIC OPINION SYLLABUS ARTICLES FROM 1920 TO 1933.....150
Paul Rohrbach, "German Reflections"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1920.....155
Joseph Roy Geiger, "The Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young" in *International Journal of Ethics* in 1923.....156
A. Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I" and "On Methods in the Study of Politics II"
in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1923 and 1924.....158
William Ernest Hocking, "Leaders and Led"
in The Yale Review in 1924.....160
Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins" and "Measuring Social Distance"
in *Journal of Applied Sociology* in 1924 and 1925.....162
Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "The measurement and motivation of atypical opinion in a certain group"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925.....171
William Seal Carpenter, "Methods of Political Reasoning"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1925.....173
Arthur N. Holcombe, "Round Table on Political Statistics: The Measurement of Public Opinion"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925.....174
Norman C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1925.....179
W.T. Root, "The Psychology of Radicalism"
in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1925.....185
George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion"
in *Social Forces* in 1926.....187
William B. Munro, "The Worst Fundamentalism"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1926.....189
Charles Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War"
in *American Mercury* in 1927.....194
Frederick Bausman, "Under Which Flag"
in *American Mercury* in 1927.....195
Harold Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1927.....197
William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics"
in *Yale Review* in 1927.....198
William Orton, "News and Opinion"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1927.....203

Donald Young, "Some effects of a course in American race problems on the race prejudice of 450 undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania"
in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1927.....205
Robert C. Binkley, "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences"
in *Social Forces* in 1928.....207
Lowell Juillard Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept"
in *Sociology and Social Research* in 1928.....211
Richard T. Lapiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England"
in *Social Forces* in 1928.....212
James Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling"
in *The Survey* in 1928.....217
L.L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* 1928.....219
Edward S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1929.....222
Oliver McKee, "Lobbying for Good or Evil"
in *The North American Review* in 1929.....224
Frank R. Kent, "The Great Lobby Hunt"
in *Scribner's* in 1930.....225
George A. Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1930.....227
Charles E. Merriam, "Research Problems in the Field of Parties, Elections, and Leadership"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1930.....231
George B. Vetter, "The Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes and the Related Personality Factors"
in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology in 1930.....233
D. D. Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1931.....237
Harold D. Lasswell, "The Measurement of Public Opinion"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1931.....238
Roscoe C. Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study"
in *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* in 1933.....241
Francis G. Wilson, "Concepts of Public Opinion"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1933.....242

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....245

Contribution to the Literature on Public Opinion.....256
Importance of this study.....258
Meaning.....258
Suggestions for Future Research.....260

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....262

Mainstream

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Chapter One

Introduction: The Changing Concepts of Public Opinion and Nation

Mainstream public opinion is poll results

It is widely agreed that the term "public opinion" means the aggregation of individual opinions in a style of one person, one vote. In the minds of politicians, citizens, and most scholars, the concept of public opinion is equated with poll results.[1] A concept is a general idea. The common sense understanding of public opinion is that it is poll results. Common sense is knowledge about a concept that is widely and generally taken-for-granted as what everyone knows to be true. The strength of this mainstream understanding of public opinion as poll results was noted by many scholars. Former director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and co-author of *The American Voter, Elections and the Political Order*, Philip E. Converse, noted in 1987 that the tally of opinions reported by polls and surveys had become the understanding of public opinion around the world.[2]

Democracy and Public Opinion Polls

Pollster George Gallup successfully promoted the conception of public opinion as what polls measure from 1935 to 1984. Respected sociologist and media scholar Michael Schudson recently pointed out in his book, *The Good Citizen*, that Gallup's

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[1] Philip E. Converse, "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the political process," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S12-13.

[2] Converse, P. "Changing Conceptions," S14.

conception of public opinion expressed in polls and linked to democracy has been a success in spite of many criticisms from social psychology and democratic theory.[3] Schudson wrote, "Polling, in contrast [to the critiques of public opinion as polling], on its own terms must be judged a monumental success. Both as a critique of other imperfect measures of 'what the common man thinks' and as a positive resource for democracy, the legacy of George Gallup is great."[4] Additionally, many scholars have noted the close link between Gallup's concept of public opinion and democracy.[5] Public opinion polls are thought of as a way for citizens to communicate their thoughts to those who govern.[6] The strength of the dominant understanding of public opinion as poll results is further revealed by its tenacity in spite of repeated and varied critiques.[7] The current common sense notion of equating the concept of public opinion

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[3] Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A history of American civic life* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 228.

[4] Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen,* 228.

[5] Jean M. Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 123-127; Harwood Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. VanNostrand Company, Inc., 1965), 30-31; Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 44-45, 69-70; Philip E. Converse, "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion," S12-S24; Harold F. Gosnell, "The Polls and other Mechanisms of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 4 (1940):414-424; John C. Ranney, "Do the Polls Serve Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (1946):349-360; L. John Martin, "The Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 472 (1984):12-23.

[6] Charles T. Salmon and Theodore L. Glasser, "The Politics of Polling and the Limits of Consent," in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent* eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford, 1995).

[7] For examples of the criticisms see: Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon, *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995); Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion — Our Social Skin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Herbst, *Numbered Voices*; Pierre Bourdieu, "Public Opinion Does Not Exist" in *Communication and Class Struggle* eds. Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub (New York: International General, 1979): 124-130; Herbert Blummer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," *American Sociological Review* 13 (1948): 542-554; Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); Michael Wheeler, *Lies, damn lies, and statistics: The manipulation of public opinion in America* (New York: Dell, 1976); Benjamin Ginsberg, The *Captive*

with poll results began to take hold in the middle of the 1930s. As Converse noted, before about 1937 there were many different meanings for the concept of public opinion. He wrote, "A variety of meanings abounded, some of them in the same heads."[8]

Public Opinion and Nation Emerge

While the idea of public opinion meaning poll results started to take hold of the imaginations of citizens, politicians and scholars in the late 1930s, the idea of some kind of public opinion started to emerge for intellectuals about the time of the revolutions in what would become the United States of America and France.[9] The concept of "nation" emerged about the same time.

Similar to public opinion, nation and nationalism have had different meanings at different times. The concepts of public opinion and nation share a historical beginning linked to the idea of self-governing that grew out of the Enlightenment.

Public (New York: Basic Books, 1986); John Durham Peters, "Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion" in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 3-32. Jurgen Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere*, trans. T. Burer and F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989); Clifford G. Christians, "Propaganda and the Technological System," in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 156-174; James W. Carey, "The Press, Public Opinion and Public Discourse," in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 373-402.

[8] Converse, P. "Changing Conceptions," S13.

[9] Other scholars have examined the term public opinion by separating the two words and tracing them to more remote historical times. Most recently see: Koji Fuse, "Ideological Constraints of Public Opinion Polls: History, Legitimation, and Effects on Democracy," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The University of Texas at Austin, 2000). See also: Slavko Splichal, *Public Opinion: Developments and controversies in the twentieth century* (Lanham, Maryland and Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999)

Public opinion, no matter how it was defined, could not have existed prior to the break in which European people no longer were mere subjects but could be conceived by some as individuals. Nationalism is important to understand because of the political power it grew to have during the nineteenth century and its link to public opinion.

Slowly, the absolutism of empires was transformed into nation-states as the models of the French and U. S. revolutions were taken up in other places in various ways, Cornell University's Aaron L. Binekorb Professor of International Studies, Benedict Anderson wrote.[10] By 1914, the concept of nation had become common sense, and the world could be imagined as naturally divided up among them.

Nation, Race, and Citizen

Katherine Verdery's suggestions about ways to consider nationalism can be used to incorporate "race" based assumptions from the turn of the century.[11] Verdery takes "nation" as an operator in a social classification system that establishes grounds for authority and legitimacy through the categories it makes seem natural. "Nation" has had many different meanings, and all of them have been used to sort people, however, the criteria for sorting changes with time and location. The symbol—nation —links subjects to states and distinguishes between them. According to Verdery,

[10] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1995), 47-65; John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, "Introduction," in *Nationalism* eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-4.

[11] Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism' in *Mapping the Nation*, Gopal Balakrishnan ed. (London: Verso, 1996), 226-234.

nationalism is both the political use of the symbol and the sentiment that draws people to respond to the symbol. She wrote, "Nationalism is a quintessentially homogenizing, differentiating, or classifying discourse: one that aims its appeals at people presumed to have certain things in common as against people thought not to have any mutual connections."[12] Nationalism has operated in two major meanings: citizenship and ethnicity. In the first sense, the nation is a collective sovereignty involving individual citizens' political participation. In the second sense, of ethnicity, the nation is a collective of individuals who share a belief in a common, culture, history, language , and perhaps other defining material attachments.[13] She pointed out two ways to imagine the identity in national identity. One meaning is the individual's sense of self as separately having or being a certain type of national. A second meaning is a particular collective in relation to similar others. Verdery wrote, "National identity thus exists at two levels: the individual's sense of self as national, and the identity of the collective whole in relation to others of like kind."[14] There is a paradox of meaning. The identity in national identity means both the same, identical, alike *and* unique, special and only. These meanings can simultaneously work to homogenize and differentiate.[15]

[12]Verdery, "Whither," 227.
[13]Verdery, "Whither," 227.
[14]Verdery, "Whither," 229.
[15]Verdery, "Whither," 229.

Rank Order by Race

During the nineteenth century, ideas of race and nation became interlinked and people were thought to be differently abled to govern themselves and to reason, based on their race. The assertions made in this dissertation regarding race rely primarily on the scholarship about race conducted by Reginald Horsman, Nell Irvin Painter, Richard Slotkin and Robert Young.[16] The use by Reginald Horsman of the terms racialist and racialism are used instead of racist and racism to continually remind the reader that the nineteenth and early twentieth century understanding of race was much different than the way the terms are understood today.

A variety of race theories dominated the common sense in popular culture and some held major ground in academic thinking. The race theories were based on assumptions about human beings in which they were rank ordered in their ability to govern themselves. Rank ordered means going from the highest to the lowest, thus some people were believed to have the greatest ability to reason and govern themselves and others were believed to have little or no ability to reason and govern themselves. Those with what was believed to be the highest ability to reason and govern were thought of as the most civilized. The Constitution of the United States was thought to be the highest ranked form of government. Civilization was defined by

[16] Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981); Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987); Richard Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of The Frontier in the Age of Industrialization* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994); and Robert J.C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

the sophisticated nature of the form of government, and the American form was widely perceived as the most advanced and growing out of and improving on a British model. These racial theories included a hierarchy of qualities that made the Anglo-Saxon-Teuton people most fit to rule. This common-sense view was reflected by historians and was apparent in politics, literature, popular periodicals, and schoolbooks in the United States. Scientists provided legitimacy and credibility for racial theories, and political debates were waged in racial terms. It was widely assumed that the Anglo-Saxon-Teuton would eventually replace all inferior races.[17]

The label nation-race is used for reference to nation or nationalism that is understood by any author of an article in the public opinion canon as being a stratification of human beings in many ways but especially in their ability to reason and govern themselves. This is an immense simplification, but a useful one for this study. The stratification of human beings included more than this. A broad-based cultural understanding of nationality was inflected with racial understanding around the turn of the twentieth century.

Objective

The objective of this dissertation is to discover the relationship between the concepts of public opinion and nation in elite academic articles written between 1886 and 1933. In discovering the relationship between the concepts of public opinion and

[17]Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*; Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*; Young, *Colonial Desire*; Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of The Frontier*.

nation, this dissertation will show what complexities of meaning of the concept of public opinion was covered over and forgotten when public opinion became widely understood as poll results. Further, this dissertation will suggest what might it mean that the multiplicity of conceptions of public opinion were neglected for the dominant idea of polling as public opinion. This dissertation is important because it contributes a beginning for a reconsideration of the history of the concept of public opinion, and provides one alternative, enriched understanding of the changes in the meaning of public opinion in the early part of the twentieth century.

Analysis of the Syllabus

This dissertation analyzed the articles from academic journals and mass circulation periodicals that formed a portion of a 1934 Princeton University syllabus for one of the first classes in Public Opinion. A close textual reading of the articles was performed to understand the authors' use of, and the relationship between, the concepts of public opinion and nation. Additionally the authors' concepts of race, democracy, the common man, and references to governing were examined as they related to public opinion and nation. The close reading of the syllabus articles was completed so that the authors' assumptions about the concepts of public opinion and nation, might be compared to the assumptions in the origins story, or received tradition, of public opinion polling about public opinion and nation, as well as race,

democracy, and the common man.

An "origins story" is the explanation within a group about how the group was derived. In other words, for any group, an origins story answers questions such as, "How did we get here?" or "Why do we do what we do now?" It is the group's "received tradition," or the story the members tell themselves, about their shared past. The terms "origins story" or "received tradition" are used to distinguish the narrative from a history. While the received tradition of public opinion as polling tells a story about what happened in the past, it does not tell the story with the methods and theories that scholars commonly call a history.

In this dissertation, the group is composed of the people in business and scholars in academe who have been participating in public opinion polling. The dissertation recounts the origins story the practitioners of public opinion polling have been telling among themselves, and reviews the criticisms of public opinion as polling. The mainstream understanding of the received tradition of public opinion and polling will be compared to the use of the concepts of public opinion and nation in the public opinion canon just before what is now called the founding of the field of public opinion by mainstream academic and business pollsters.

Markers of Public Opinion as Poll Results

The articles from the Princeton syllabus form the public opinion canon just before the time that was frequently claimed in the origins story as the founding of the field of study of public opinion polling in late1936 and early 1937. In November

1936, pollster George Gallup successfully predicted the election of Franklin Roosevelt as President of the United States. In January 1937 the prestigious, academic journal, *Public Opinion Quarterly* was first published. The term canon is used in its everyday meaning as forming the standard, accepted knowledge of a field at a specific time. Thus, the public opinion canon of 1934 is contained in the syllabus of Princeton political science Professor Harwood Childs.

Harwood Childs, POQ Founder

Childs was one of the most important men in the field of public opinion in its early years. His immense contribution to the field included co-founding and editing its leading journal, writing textbooks and histories, and publishing his public opinion syllabus just as public opinion classes were beginning to be taught in universities.

Childs syllabus', *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, was published as a small book in 1934 with some unspecified type of assistance from public relations founder Edward Bernays.[18] The syllabus was from one of the first university classes in public opinion. He wrote a public opinion textbook, *An Introduction to Public Opinion,* in 1940. Before publication, he reviewed a manuscript of *The Pulse of Democracy,* written by George Gallup and his colleague Saul Forbes Rae.[19] A history of the public opinion field is in Childs' *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role* written in 1965. Childs proposed, co-founded, and was one of the first editors of *Public Opinion Quarterly.* He received financial and staff

[18] Harwood Childs, *A Reference Guide to Public Opinion* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1934): dust jacket.

support from Princeton to publish *Public Opinion Quarterly*.[20] During the early years, most of the time, the articles were not peer reviewed; however, according to an article by former *Public Opinion Quarterly* editor W. Phillips Davison, the lack of peer review was not a problem because Childs had a comprehensive view of the people studying public opinion.[21]

Syllabus as Canon

For this dissertation, the articles contained in Childs' 1934 Princeton public opinion syllabus are labeled as the public opinion canon before the founding of the field. His syllabus is different from those commonly in use today in universities. Childs Syllabus was published as a small book. Spread open, two pages fill an 81/2 x 11 inch piece of paper. Edward L. Bernays introduction to the volume talked about the necessity of wide dissemination of knowledge. Not surprisingly, Bernarys viewed public opinion as something to be managed. He wrote, "Professor Harwood L. Childs has placed under debt to him all those who come in contact with the field of public opinion management, whether they are students or concerned with practical work."[22] In his introduction, Childs explained that the course followed a logical presentation of the field. He began with "the phenomenon of opinion management," moved to means of dissemination, and then to "strategies and devices used to manage opinion," and

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[19] George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How it Works* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940) vii.

[20] Harwood Childs, "The First Editor Looks Back," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 7-13.

[21] W. Phillips Davison, " A Story of the POQ's Fifty-year Odyssey," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S8.

then to the nature of public opinion and how to identify public opinion, then he moved to "factors and processes that condition public opinion at a given moment and over a period of time."[23] His emphasis was always on the political, he wrote. The students in the class were free to select from his twenty-two categories. Childs provided a list of books and articles for each topic area. There is a great deal of duplication of books and articles under each topic area. For example, James Bryce's *American Commonwealth* appears in several topic areas.

The articles from Childs' Princeton syllabus are the primary sources analyzed in this dissertation. The articles are from academic journals and more widely circulating periodicals. The earliest article in the syllabus was published in 1886, and the most recent article in 1933. The articles from Childs' syllabus form an elite and influential body of work. Within the norms and practices of the then developing quantitative social science, these articles were the foundation for the field that would be built over the ensuing decades. Analysis of these articles provides one way to begin a partial reconsideration of the history of the concept of public opinion and the history of the field of public opinion as polling. The completion of the analysis of the articles in Childs' syllabus will create an alternative to the learned history of public opinion and its relationship to nation. The received tradition of public opinion—the origins story—retold in Chapter Two, summarizes the current mainstream

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[22] Childs, *Reference Guide*, iii.
[23] Childs, *Reference Guide*, 2-3.

understanding. The origins story is retold so that it can be compared to the analysis of the articles in Childs' syllabus. This retelling relies on several major sources and many fragments.

Chroniclers of the Received Tradition

This received tradition is based on Childs' history from *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*; survey researcher Jean Converse's history of the growth of survey research, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960*; and scholar Paul Palmer's Harvard Ph.D. dissertation from 1934, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory."[24] Palmer's dissertation was used by others in their telling of the history of public opinion. Childs was among those who relied on Palmer as well as his own experience in the field. Converse gave George Gallup's polling fame credit for giving academic researchers a boost. It was a boost they, for the most part, failed to acknowledge.[25] Northwestern University social scientist and the author of *Numbered Voices*, Susan Herbst took the mainstream story of public opinion, contributed to its substance, and then looked at the story using a theoretical

[24] Paul A. Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936); Harwood Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965); Jean Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots & Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987).

[25] Converse, J. *Survey Research*, 114-116.

frame based on the thinking of social theorist Max Weber and power theorist Michel Foucault. With her long historical view, she associated the changing meanings of public opinion with changes in technology.[26]

Analysis of the Articles in the Canon

To examine the canon, the articles were collected and photographic copies of the original articles were made. The articles from Childs' syllabus, *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion* were placed in chronological order and read. The 156 articles were from academic journals and publications with wider circulation. Some of the articles were then omitted from further analysis. Articles containing tabulation of student's opinions, if there was no justification for the process, no mention of public opinion, nation, race, governing, or democracy were omitted. Statistical methods articles that proposed ways to construct indices and scales, if they did not contain any reference to public opinion, nation, race, governing, or democracy, were omitted. Biographies were omitted. Most of the justifications or criticisms of lobbying were omitted, unless the argument contained discussions of public opinion or nation, and so were reports on topics that did not make any reference to public opinion, nation, race, governing, or democracy. From the total 156 articles, 46 were included in further analysis.

The articles that comprised Childs' syllabus showed a reduction in the discussion of public opinion, nation, race, governing, and democracy and an increase

[26] Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

in the discussion of statistics as the years passed from 1886 to 1933. Thus, more articles were omitted from further analysis as the years increased to 1933. This change in emphasis, resulting in an increasing number of articles having some concern with statistical analysis, is fully fitting with the changes in social science generally and the stature and position Childs held in the political science and public opinion field. He was one of the advocates of bringing statistical analysis to the study of public opinion. His stature in the field today, dominated as it is by numerical thinking, has been created, in part, by his advocacy of the victorious approach of statistical analysis.

Mindful of the public opinion origins story, nationalism, and race theory, various conceptions of the time period, and semiotics, this researcher read the articles looking for the overt use of the key concepts and the unstated assumptions revealed in the text about the key concepts.

Why look at the canon of public opinion in 1934

This study, aimed at discovering the relationship between the concepts of public opinion and nation between 1886 and 1933 in the public opinion canon, was prompted by the observation of a contradiction. There was a fundamental contradiction between the way the nature of human beings was represented in the received tradition of public opinion polling and work by cultural studies scholars. Polling advocates associated their endeavor with democracy and celebrated the

wisdom of the common man. Cultural studies scholars focusing on race revealed a rank ordering of human beings.

If it is axiomatic that human beings are ordered by rank based on their nation-race, and that rank order determines their degree of ability to govern themselves—and it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—then it is not possible to argue that the common man is wise unless all of the people are of the same nation-race. Neither does it make sense to argue that public opinion polls, or journalism, can further democratic participation because the argument relied on roughly equal, and all reasoning, individuals fit to govern themselves.

Looking at the articles in Childs' syllabus through the lens of assumptions that existed about nation-race at the time the articles were published should make it possible to see the relationship between the concept of nation-race and the concept of public opinion.

Looking at the articles though a social science lens provides an alternative view. Social science standards of practice require incorporation or refutation of previous work. From a social science perspective, it *should be* possible to find in the public opinion canon the foundation of the ideas about public opinion polling that were to become pollings' common sense, the connection between the wise common man, polling, and democracy.

This dissertation reveals the complexity of the relationship between the

concepts of public opinion and nation as the concepts are used in elite academic articles from the periodicals that formed the public opinion cannon in 1934.

Of course, the whole story has not been, and could not be, told about the concept of public opinion. Not because the field is so immense, but because no history is complete. It is this researcher's hope that by singling out the topic of the meaning of public opinion in relation to nation for analysis, the common-sense understanding of public opinion as poll results and polls as serving democracy might be slightly dislodged, thus making it possible to think about alternative ways of understanding public opinion.

Chapter Two: The received tradition

The mainstream origins story of public opinion and polling is reviewed in chapter two. This is the history as it was told by and to the people in the public opinion field. This version of the history of public opinion—the received tradition—and polling relies on several major sources and many fragments. It is based on Childs' history from *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*; Jean Converse's history of the growth of survey research, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890- 1960*; and Paul Palmer's Harvard Ph.D. dissertation from 1934,

"The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory."[27] The history is reviewed in order to display their thinking about what they did and from where they came. It is their origins story. Just as their definition of public opinion has a firm hold on common-sense understanding, the history they wrote is the mainstream history of the field. The received tradition is presented in order in order to use it as a foundation. It is against this foundation that the meanings of the articles in the public opinion canon will be compared. Additionally, important critics of the current common-sense understanding of public opinion as poll results also are reviewed.

Chapter Three: Nation and Nationalism

A synthesis of theories of nationalism and theories of race are described in chapter three. Nationalism is important to understand because of the political power it grew to have during the nineteenth century and because of its link to public opinion. Chapter three provides the necessary foundation to fully understand that ideas of race in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were quite different from what they are today. Nation and race were overlapping terms in the period from 1886 to 1933. Understanding nation and race allows for a richer understanding of public opinion.

Chapters Four and Five: The Articles

The articles from Childs' Princeton syllabus are the primary sources analyzed

[27] Paul A. Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936); Harwood Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965); Jean Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots & Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987.

in this dissertation. These articles comprising the public opinion canon before the time most often understood as the founding of the field of study—1936/1937—and Gallup's subsequent, successful promotion of polling as public opinion are analyzed chronologically in chapters four and five. The earliest article in the syllabus was published in 1886, and the most recent article was published in 1933. The articles are quoted generously. The researcher intends for the voices of the authors and their understandings to be directly available to the reader.

Chapter Six: Conclusions

The dissertation contributes a richer understanding of the concepts of nation and public opinion as the concepts are used by the authors of the articles in the public opinion canon. These elite men, for the most part, thought of the world as comprised of human beings stratified by their race in their ability to govern themselves. The concept nation was used interchangeably with race. Because humans were stratified by nation-race, the common man was not thought of as wise but rather he was thought of as dangerous. The contest over the definition of public opinion is revealed.

While journalism may take its justification from serving the polity by informing all citizens, the press has not always been thought of as contributing to this mission. This research shows that the idea of a dangerous, unreasoning common man was in wide circulation in elite publications and academic publications and thus must have been widely understood as commonsense among elite persons who read and wrote the articles. The received tradition of public opinion and polling has covered over the shift in the understanding of the common person.

Since nation and race are seen to overlap in meaning, it is important to note that the use of a nationality only to refer to individuals, covers over the understanding of nation as race. The received tradition of public opinion as polling, which tells a progress story of the development of polling is found to be, in part, at odds with these findings. Instead of progress toward consensus, there is a wide diversity of points of view about what constitutes public opinion.

Further, it is shown that the idea of public opinion as poll results could not have sprung full-blown from George Gallup's imagination. The foundation for polling is there in the canon where election results are discussed as equivalent to public opinion, or as one way to measure public opinion.

Democracy is discussed in the articles in the canon. However, for democracy to work, the few need to lead the many because most people are irrational or easily led. What Gallup seems to have invented is the link between the argument for the wisdom of the common man and polling; how polls make the voice of the common man heard, and thus serve democracy. He may have taken the justification for the freedom of the press—to inform citizens so that they might participate in governing themselves—and applied the same logic to the measurement of individual opinions on social issues in polls. However, there is no public opinion social science foundation for his argument in 1933 or earlier.

This dissertation only begins to open to understanding the received tradition of public opinion and polling. Future scholars may wish to look at the concept of public opinion in a wide range of publications. They could discover the way the term is used in context before 1936 in government documents, newspaper editorials, or university textbooks, for example.

If in 1933 the common man was dangerous in part because of his nation-race, when did the idea of a wise common man triumph in academic writing or the mass circulation press about public opinion?

The individuals who led the emerging field of public opinion would all be excellent subjects for biographies.

Chapter Two:

The Received Tradition of the Concept of Public Opinion

Chapter two presents the conception of public opinion that is generally understood and repeated today by public opinion polling practitioners in business and the academy. It is called the "received tradition" because it is the commonly held knowledge of the background of the field of public opinion as told primarily by three scholars; Paul Palmer, Harwood Childs and Jean Converse. Within the presentation of the received tradition, chapter two presents a review of the major literature of the history of the concept of public opinion. Additionally this chapter includes a review of the work of the scholars who challenged the definition of the concept of public opinion as poll results.

Introduction to the Received Tradition

The history of public opinion and polling has been told in fragments, and the concept of public opinion has changed meaning over time. In past times authors have used the term public opinion with many meanings different from poll results. The stories of public opinion and polling sometimes included links between the shifting meaning of the concept and the current practice of public opinion polling. Today the most widespread understanding of public opinion is polling, and polling is understood as an aggregation of individual opinions. Public opinion now is conceived as a

reflection of what the public thinks about public issues, and poll results are widely seen as a way for citizens to communicate their views to government.[1]

Only one attempt at a comprehensive historical treatment of "public opinion" exists: Paul A. Palmer's *The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory*, an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard in 1934. Palmer pointed out that historians of political theory have ignored public opinion. He wrote, "American scholars, with but few exceptions, appear to believe that the treatises of [A. Lawrence] Lowell and of [Walter] Lippmann are at once the first and the last word on the subject. It is time to dispel this parochial, unhistorical illusion."[2]

Harwood Childs, a Princeton political science professor and founder of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, wrote *Public Opinion: Nature Formation and Role* in 1965. Part of the book retells the history of public opinion. Childs relied on Palmer's history. For the portion of Childs' history of public opinion that does not rely on Palmer,

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[1]Charles T. Salmon and Theodore L. Glasser, "The Politics of Polling and the Limits of Consent," in Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon eds. *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, (New York: Guilford, 1995).

[2]Paul A. Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1936), 231. Palmer referred to A. Lawrence Lowell and Walter Lippmann because they were the biggest names dealing with the concept of public opinion at the time. Lowell's position was that a few of the elite should lead the many. Lippmann's position was that an educated elite of specialists should lead the many. Both Lippmann and Lowell held anti-democratic positions. Additionally, Palmer pointed out that Harwood Childs relied exclusively on sources written in English for his *Reference Guide to Public Opinion*. He commended Harold Lasswell for using French and German sources effectively. The major analytical work of Lasswell's that Palmer recommends, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* deals with the topic entirely from a control perspective. Other scholars have traced the background of the two words – public and opinion – to earlier times, however, my concern is primarily with the transition of the concepts of public opinion to the concept of public opinion as poll results.

Childs appears to have relied on his own life in the field of academic public opinion research. Childs told the story as the concept of public opinion progressing to the current dominant meaning of public opinion meaning poll results.

Jean Converse, a University of Michigan professor and survey researcher, wrote a history of survey research that placed public opinion polling as a precursor to academic survey research. Converse made a convincing case for the connections between marketing, advertising, and public opinion polling. She folded the history of public opinion polling into a chronology of the development of survey research. She presented a story of progress in which early public opinion polling contributed to the development of survey research. However, she did not address the multiple meanings of public opinion before 1936.

Supplemented by additional fragments from others who have used the history of public opinion, this account of the commonly understood "received tradition" relies on Palmer, Childs, and Converse. The received tradition is presented to review what is generally understood within the field about its origins.

Commonly, the story starts in the eighteenth century with the term public opinion, its popularization, and the debates surrounding the concept during the nineteenth century. As the story moves to the early decades of the twentieth century, scholars from multiple fields engaged the concept of public opinion. The story then joins the polling industry and the journal *Public Opinion Quarterly*. In telling this story of the concepts of public opinion, it is sometimes necessary to take brief side

trips in order to explain the changing definitions of key terms. Many of the concepts we use today as if they were axiomatic have had a range of different meanings in the past.

Eighteenth Century Beginnings

This section presents a brief overview of the emergence and spread of the concept of public opinion from the middle of the eighteenth century through the late nineteenth century.

The origins of the concept of public opinion—as something that came from people outside of the monarchy, who did not belong to the aristocratic ruling class, but had a desire to alter the monarchy's policies—was traced back to eighteenth-century, pre-revolutionary France during the reign of Louis XVI, 1774-92.[3] The concept referred to an able few who were not by birth involved in government.[4] A widespread recognition existed "of the divine, mysterious origin and validity of opinion"[5] by the middle of the eighteenth century. Near the end of the eighteenth century, the general

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[3]Paul A. Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory," in *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication,* eds. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), 3; Hans Speier, "Historical Development of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 55 (1950): 377; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Public Opinion and the Classical Tradition," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 21 (1957): 39; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Impact of Public Opinion Research On Our Society," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 33-38; Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 53-55.

[4]Herbst, *Numbered Voices*, 55; Vincent Price, *Communication Concepts 4: Public Opinion* (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1992), 11; Keith M. Baker, "Public Opinion as a Political Invention," in *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 167-199; Marie Ozouf, "'Public Opinion' at the End of the Old Regime," *Journal of Modern History* 60 (1988): S6-7, S11-12.

[5]Palmer, "The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory," 4.

assumptions in political literature were that public opinion was created by the enlightened few and was a potent social force that could bring on revolution or make a politician a success.[6] It was "the chief check on the holders of power."[7] Hans Speier of the Rand Corporation wrote that public opinion was, at that time, "opinions on matters of concern to the nation freely and publicly expressed by men outside the government."[8] Speier wrote that public opinion came into existence, along with the rise of the middle class, as printing and literacy expanded and democratic political institutions were being established.[9] These would have continued to be an elite few. The vast majority of people living in what is today called France would have been peasants.[10]

Jean-Jacques Rousseau coined the term *l'opinion publique*, but Jacques Necker was credited with popularizing it in the 1780s. As the French court's minister of finance, Necker pushed the crown to publish financial accounts. Necker hoped thereby to appease creditors and pacify the public opinion of those few who had lent money to the court of Louis XVI.[11] In writings from 1773 to 1804, Necker analyzed public opinion as a factor in governing and thought of public opinion as something

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[6]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 7.

[7]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 7.

[8]Spier, "Historical Development," 376.

[9]Spier, "Historical Development," 379; Lazarsfeld, "Public Opinion and the Classical Tradition," 39, 41; Harwood Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), 27.

[10] Harvey Chisick, *The Limits of Reform in the Enlightenment: Attitudes toward the Education of the Lower Classes in Eighteenth-Century France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) 5.

coming from an elite few. He was primarily concerned with the opinion of an elite bourgeoisie, which included the people visiting his wife's salon. Salons were places, usually private homes, where the elite bourgeoisie gathered to discuss ideas that might later become essays or books.[12] Necker's analysis placed various types of government in relation to public opinion. For example, he declared that public opinion did not exist under a despot. While in a republic, he argued, men feel so strongly about the independence of their individual opinions that it is difficult for public opinion to arise. He saw no distinctive character of public opinion in a democracy, and he thought a limited monarchy was the type of government under which public opinion was effective and wholesome in its influence on a governing monarch.[13] A limited monarchy referred to a monarch that was not an absolute monarch. An absolute monarch would rule without being questioned because his or her power came directly from God. A limited monarchy could take many forms, in each there would be some form of control or influence on decisions made by the monarch. The argument over form of monarchy continued in Western Europe through the period between the world wars.

Following the French Revolution of 1789, public opinion was discussed in

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[11]Childs, "Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role," 27; Speier, "Historical Development," 379; Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 5.

[12] Herbst, "Numbered Voices," 53-57; and Speier, "Historical Development," 381-382. However, as Kurt W. Back points out in "Metaphors for Public Opinion in Literature," the elite of the period were conflicted about the ideal citizen in theory and the mobs they saw in the streets, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52 (1988): 284.

[13]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 5-6.

Germany and England as ideas sparked by the Revolution spread. As Childs wrote, the framers of the U.S. Constitution would have been aware of these writings.[14] They were participants in the discussion of Enlightenment ideals. German theorists nearly always acknowledged their debt to the writers of the French Revolution.[15]

During the early decades of the nineteenth century the debate about the nature of public opinion was concerned with the degree of virtue and competence of public opinion.[16] Englishman Jeremy Bentham asked that all official acts be made public and saw an enlightened public opinion uniting the wisdom in the nation. Writing at a time when monarchy still maintained control, he thought public opinion was a cure for misrule by a government. Without explaining specifically how it would work, Bentham believed a public opinion tribunal in a representative democracy supported democracy and should be considered a law from the people. A law from the people was a natural law and an alternative to a law that came from God through the monarchy. He said that the dictates of public opinion coincided with the principle of greatest happiness, and he thought the newspaper was the most important factor in forming and expressing public opinion.[17] Still these thinkers conceived of public opinion as located among an elite because the lower orders were incapable of reason.

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[14]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 28.
[15]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 7.
[16]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 28.
[17]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 7-8.

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Within the discussion concerning the competence of public opinion, supporters of democracy usually argued for its virtue as protection against misrule and an agent of progress. Critics of democracy were suspicious of public opinion and thought it should be limited by the state.[18] The debate was that public opinion might be a force for salvation emerging from the enlightened middle class or it could be dangerous and in need of control.[19] Either way, by 1825, according to Palmer, "the concept of public opinion had entered the main current of political theory."[20] Supporters and critics of democracy discussed the role of the press in the formation and expression of public opinion.[21] Elites would have written and read the debate in newspapers. In the United States, it would have been a part of the discussion of extending suffrage.

Within each of these discussions of public opinion, the concept was not extended to include everyone. Speier wrote, "In nineteenth century Europe public opinion was a synonym of opinions expressed by the political representatives of the electorate, by newspapers and by prominent members or organizations of the middle class."[22]

There had been shifts in the meaning of the term public opinion from the time it emerged in the eighteenth century just before the French Revolution; however,

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[18]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 9.
[19]Price, *Communication Concepts 4*," 15.
[20]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 9.
[21]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 9.

public opinion continued to mean the views of some subset of elites and did not mean all of the people.

James Bryce and an expansion of interest in Public Opinion

At the end of the nineteenth-century a book by an internationally known historian marked a turning point in the history of public opinion because many scholars consider it the first formualtion of public opinion as an aggregate.[23] *The American Commonwealth* was written by James Bryce and published in New York and London in 1888 and into the early decades of the 1900s. Because of Bryce's description of one man forming an opinion, Harwood Childs called the book, "one of the most remarkable treatments of public opinion,"[24] and for the same reason he believed one section of the book—the public opinion chapters—was still valuable reading in 1965.[25]

One cannot overstate the importance of James Bryce to the people who would later write about the concept of public opinion as poll results. Pollster George Gallup wrote, "Those of us who launched this effort to measure public opinion by sampling methods did not regard public opinion as a mysterious force which manifested itself in

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[22]Speier, "Historical Development," 385.

[23]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 29-30; George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How it Works* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940),16-33; George Gallup, "The Changing Climate for Public Opinion Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21 (1957): 23; Herbst, *Numbered Voices*, 59; L. John Martin, "The Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 472 (1984): 15; Albert E. Gollin, "In Search of a Useable Past," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (1985): 416.

[24]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 29.

[25]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 29-30.

unknown ways. To us, as to James Bryce, public opinion was the 'aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community.'"[26] Paul Lazarsfeld, an influential communication scholar, called Bryce the patron saint of modern public opinion research.[27] Bryce has been widely credited with suggesting public opinion was an aggregate that could be measured in a way similar to one-person, one-vote as one-person, one-opinion.[28] Writing in 1984, John L. Martin said the now commonsense understanding of public opinion began around the turn of the century.[29]

In Western European discussions of democracy, the tyranny of the majority had been part of the discussion of democracy during the nineteenth century. Some thinkers were concerned that if political issues were decided by a majority then the minority points of view would be silenced. Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, written in 1835, is the classic work expressing this concern. He worried

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[26]Gallup, "Changing Climate," 23.

[27]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "The Obligations of the 1950 Pollster to the 1984 Historian" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14 (1950): 617-638.

[28]Herbst, *Numbered Voices*, 59; Gollin, "Useable Past," 416; Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation*, and role, 29; Gallup, "Changing Climate," 23; Gallup and Rae, *Pulse of Democracy*, 16; John Ranney, "Do The Polls Serve Democracy? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10 (1946): 351. Susan Herbst has a more complex understanding of Bryce and his understanding of public opinion. Further, in her book *Reading Public Opinion: How political actors view the democratic process*(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), Herbst claims Bryce understood public opinion as a group phenomenon. However, she gives no justification for this change from the usual understanding of Bryce as advocating public opinion as an aggregate. On page 6 and page 61 she places Bryce with other scholars who understood public opinion to be something associated with groups.

[29]Martin, "Genealogy,"15.

about subtle working of oppression of minority views rather than brute suppression of minority views.[30]

To understand how broadly the concept of public opinion would be stretched, it is important to have an idea of the different ways the term began to be used. What had been primarily the domain of those who wrote about politics and governments was broadened around the turn of the century to include sociologists and social psychologists. Some of them focused primarily on the emotional and irrational nature of public opinion. For example, Gabrielle Tarde's *Opinion and the Crowd*, published in 1901 in French and Graham Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics* in 1909, both had as their topics the non-rational, emotional factors at work in public opinion.[31] Tarde's *The Laws of Imitation* in 1890 and Gustov LeBon's *The Crowd* in 1895, explored "imitative behavior and emotional 'contagion' in crowds."[32] Other scholars examined the role organized groups play in public opinion. Arthur F. Bentley's *The Process of Government* in 1908 was seen as a precursor to the study of pressure groups in relation to public opinion and policy.[33] Bentley was critical of Dicey's *Law and Public Opinion* for its lack of precision, and that Bentley wanted to measure public opinion in terms of groups contributing to its formation.[34]

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[30] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer (New York: Perennial Library, 1988), 61-70.

[31] Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 30-31; Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 11-12.

[32] Price, *Communication Concepts 4*, 15.

[33] Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 31.

[34] Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 11.

The Early Decades of the Twentieth Century

More scholars joined the discussion. The study of public opinion had been dominated by political writers, but social scientists were beginning to look at the concept. Journalists began to look at the press as an opinion molder and mirror. Advertising agencies had come of age. Public relations and press agents worked to create opinion, while the field of marketing was just beginning.[35]

Developments in other fields in the early years of the twentieth century would later contribute to defining the concept of public opinion more precisely and eventually lead to the individual-based quantified definition that is now the mainstream view, according to Childs and Converse. Social surveys,[36] marketing and advertising,[37] educational testing and measurement,[38] customer surveys and reader interest studies[39] and the straw polls from the nineteenth century—especially the one begun in 1916 by the Literary Digest to predict election results[40]—would all provide foundational work for public opinion pollsters, Childs, Converse and Herbst wrote. As Childs wrote, these developments must be kept in mind, "to understand the

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[35]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* p. 31.

[36]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 69; Jean Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots & Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987): 11-53.

[37]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70; Converse, *Survey Research,* 87-127.

[38]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 71.

[39]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 33; Converse, *Survey Research,* 87-127.

[40]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70; Converse, *Survey Research,* 111-127; Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 69-87.

confluence of factors which produced nation-wide polls."[41]

Nineteenth Century Straw Polls Continue into the Twentieth Century

During much of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, newspapers and other periodicals published pre-election straw polls conducted by readers, politicians, party workers and journalists.[42] *The Literary Digest* began in 1916 and continued for two decades to ask its readers across the United States how they would vote in presidential primaries and elections and how they felt about prohibition, bonus legislation and other policy issues.[43] It was elections, however, that were the ongoing focus of straw polls. A person—other than a journalist as well as journalists—might be at an event before an election and tell the newspaper how many people there supported each of the candidates.[44] The information in the straw vote exclusively concerned who people questioned favored in the upcoming election.[45] A journalist might conduct a straw poll of passengers on a commuter train,[46] and straw polls were given to and taken by people in stores, students on campus, and workers in factories.[47] Jean Converse believed newspapers published straw polls to feed on the excitement of

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[41]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 71.

[42]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70; Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 69. There were slightly different forms of straw polls. Generally a straw poll consisted of any group of people being asked about their voting intentions. It was called a straw vote to distinguish it from an actual vote and might also be about a policy issue.

[43]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70.

[44]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 69-70.

[45]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 77.

[46]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 76.

[47]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 79.

political campaigns and increase circulation.[48] The increase in polls taken by professional polling organizations seems to have reduced the use of straw polls by newspapers, according to Herbst. She described the change, "Although straws conducted by common citizens were extremely popular from the mid-nineteenth century through the first two decades of the twentieth, they no longer appeared after the 1930s."[49] Many public opinion polling accounts view the straw poll as the immediate, and sometimes exclusive, precursor to current public opinion polls.[50]

Before continuing with the chronological account of the received tradition of public opinion and polling, it is necessary to briefly explain the background of some of the concepts that have come to be commonplace in the study of public opinion and social science research generally. These terms—social survey, survey research, and sampling—have all gone through changes in understanding during the last century. Social survey, the first considered, is no longer in common use.

Social Surveys

Stimulated by a variety of motives, and frequently aiming at improving some social condition, efforts to collect information about large numbers of people began in the United States and in England before the turn of the century and continued into the early 1920s.[51] As Jean Converse wrote,

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[48]Converse, *Survey Research,* 88.
[49]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 83.
[50]Converse, *Survey Research,* 116-117; Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 69.
[51]Converse, *Survey Research,* 13.

> The English social survey and its American counterpart were the 'factualizing' branch of a broad social movement that spanned the Atlantic roughly from the 1880s to World War I. In late Victorian England, a congeries of wealthy philanthropists, charity workers, Marxists, single-taxers, trade unionists, Fabian socialists, liberals, workers of the new settlement houses, physicians and health workers, evangelists of the new Salvation Army all reflected their various concerns about the plight of the poor and fear of their revolutionary threat. Solutions were cast in fervent programs for Christian evangelism and in fervent debate about the rival prescriptions of capitalism and socialism.[52]

Those involved collected information in the communities and talked to people to obtain an overview of a specific problem as it existed in specific areas. They gathered a huge amount of detail based on individual cases. Sometimes they summarized the detail by counting cases.[53] Converse wrote that these were the characteristics that would be shared by, "the American survey research that took shape thirty to forty years later."[54]

Schools, housing, crime, nutrition, sanitation, and recreation might be studied separately or in combinations. The aim was to change the way people thought and behaved. The professionals involved, often social workers, believed the people who lived in the community should participate in the study. It was thought that by their

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[52]Converse, *Survey Research,* 13.
[53]Converse, *Survey Research,* 21.
[54]Converse, *Survey Research,* 21.

participation in gathering information and publicizing findings about problems, people would be motivated to change themselves and show others how to change.[55] The Pittsburgh Survey in 1909, directed by Paul Kellogg, was one of the first of the social surveys intended as community reform.[56] In the 1910s and 1920s, agriculture scientists in colleges and experiment stations gathered survey data in an effort to "sustain the rural community and improve farm life."[57] By the 1920s, the idea of a survey of the whole population was widespread.[58] The term "survey," however, would not come to have a fixed meaning for several decades.

Survey

The term "survey" was used to refer to many different activities at different times during the early decades of the twentieth century, and it is important to be aware of the shifting meaning of the idea. At any particular time and depending on who was using the term it held changing meanings.[59]

Indeed, the term "survey" was not used with precision by social researchers

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[55]Converse, *Survey Research*, 25.

[56]Converse, *Survey Research*, 25; Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role*, 69.

[57]Converse, *Survey Research*, 26.

[58]Converse, *Survey Research*, 28.

[59] The *Oxford English Dictionary* puts the roots of survey in the 14th century as an examination or inspection. In the 1920s survey could mean something similar to current meaning. "A systematic collection and analysis of the attitudes, living conditions, opinions, etc., of a population, usually taken from a representative sample of the later; freq=poll." 309, OED dates poll from the 11th century meaning head and common everywhere. 36. Poll was short for poll tax from 1684 to 1884, and poll meant the counting of votes in 1625 and the numerical result of voting in 1853. The OED credits Gallup with, "A poll taken to estimate public opinion on a specific issue by questioning a sample intended to be representative of the whole people. 37.

working under the Franklin Roosevelt administration throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s.[60] Into the 1930s, the word "survey" might be used to mean a review of existing records, new information collected on a questionnaire or in an interview, or a combination of methods.[61] A reference to a survey did not necessarily imply any sort of sample. A survey might include a reference to research in general, so there could be survey research, a survey study, and a survey investigation. Survey might also refer to various ways of gathering information. It might refer to aggregated data in existing records or to individual data from the field. Additionally, survey could mean a preliminary overview of either the social or the physical environment of a community, or both. Survey also might refer to specific information about individuals written on separate cards.[62] It was only after the widespread use of probability theory, that survey came to have its current commonsense meaning in social science research as gathering data from a random sample of individual respondents either by mail, telephone or in person, and it only began to take on the current meaning in the late 1930s.[63] Sampling is the final term explored in this chapter. However, it is important to note these changes in the way scholars used the term sampling because meaning is time bound, even in social science.

Sampling

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[60]Converse, *Survey Research*, 38-39.

[61]Converse, *Survey Research*, 428-429, n. 100. While there are still multiple uses of the word survey today (such as a survey class which looks broadly at a field), within social science research the term has now lost the broad range of meanings it once had for those organizing information.

[62]Converse, *Survey Research*, 39.

[63]Converse, *Survey Research*, 41.

Today the term "sampling," if it is unqualified, is most likely to mean a random sample based on probability theory. The term sampling might be qualified by the terms quota or random. Today, social scientists, market researchers, and pollsters use a randomly drawn number of a specific population in order to make generalizations to the entire population and to estimate error.[64] There was, however, no widespread consensus on using a random sample based on probability theory in 1936 and the value of using a random sample was not taken for granted in the late 1950s, the way it is today.[65] Those who work in the public opinion field mark 1948 as the year when quota sampling fell into disrepute, and quota sampling was blamed for the incorrect prediction that Harry S Truman would loose the presidential election.[66]

It took several decades for random samples to replace purposive samples as the standard for social scientists in universities and government.[67] Purposive samples are samples, or groups of individuals or things, selected because of some shared characteristic.

Early market researchers used a variety of ways to contact their customers. The *Chicago Tribune* sent out questionnaires in 1913 to find out why people bought

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[64] When social scientists conduct survey research or polls, first they must determine a universe about which they wish to make predictions. For example, during an election the universe might consist of all registered voters. Scientists then devise a method by which the are able to randomly select a portion of all registered voters. That portion is called a sample. Based on probability theory, the scientist can then predict what all of the voters will do based on what the members of the sample say they will do.

[65] Frederick F. Stephan, "Advances in Survey Methods and Measurement Techniques" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21 (1957): 79-90.

[66] Charles W. Roll and Albert H. Cantril, *Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics*, Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press, 1980, 66-67; Moore, *Superpollsters*, 70-71.

[67] Converse, *Survey Research*, 90.

certain food items.[68] A Milwaukee paper, beginning in 1922, annually selected every third house to study consumer purchases.[69] An early market researcher who would later become famous for predicting Franklin Roosevelt's 1936 election victory, Archibald Crossley, did telephone interviews of radio listeners for advertisers in the early 1930s.[70] Market researchers used a range of ways to select people to represent the larger population, including selecting groups of people who were questioned several times, selecting areas by income level, and selecting homes based on income; as they worked on various kinds of quota samples that could be repeated in several cities.[71] Quota sampling involves drawing the same number of representatives from groupings with the shared characteristics. Market researchers were working out ways to select samples, not probability samples, well before researchers in other fields. They hoped that by asking a few selected people questions, they would be able to predict what all of the people who were similar to those selected would say or do.

In 1926, Crossley opened his own market research firm with offices in New York City and Princeton, New Jersey, and by 1936, he used interviews of a national sample of about 30,000 people every two weeks.[72] In 1924, Henry A. Wallace was among the founders of the Statistical Laboratory at Iowa State University. The lab

[68]Converse, *Survey Research*, 90.
[69]Converse, *Survey Research*, 90.
[70]Converse, *Survey Research*, 90.
[71]Converse, *Survey Research*, 91-93.
[72]Converse, *Survey Research*, 112.

applied the area sampling of agriculture to people. As Converse described, "Area sampling of human populations assumed that people could be sampled in something of the same fashion by associating each person with a unique space or area."[73] In 1935-36, when Wallace was Secretary of Agriculture, he set up an interviewing office. His plan was to interview farmers to discover how they might be persuaded to cooperate with government programs.[74] Even in 1935, however, among those using sophisticated statistical methods, the purposive selection had not yet been replaced by random selection of samples.[75] United States federal government agencies began using probability sampling for research that included the entire nation by the late 1930s, and only in the 1940s did government social scientists push for probability sampling.[76] There had been little criticism of quota sampling until the middle of the 1940s.[77] The government scientists pushed for probability sampling because they believed it would provide more accurate predictions. Businesses were looking for ways to use the emerging social sciences to sell products.

Advertising and Marketing

Businesses and advertisers began looking for ways to test advertising messages

[73]Converse, *Survey Research*, 46.
[74]Converse, *Survey Research*, 50.
[75]Converse, *Survey Research*, 48.
[76]Converse, *Survey Research*, 94.
[77]Converse, *Survey Research*, 124.

and also discover what consumers wanted. This led them to begin questioning customers in the early years of the twentieth century, around the time that specialized marketing research agencies were first seen.[78] The men who would become famous as pollsters by correctly predicting the result of the 1936 presidential election had extensive backgrounds in market research and were more involved with market research than with polling for most of their lives.[79] The method of the 1936 polls had been developed in market research based in business, psychology, economics and statistics.[80] Early consumer research tried to find out if advertising was prompting people to buy.[81] Converse wrote,

> The earliest consumer research focused on consumer's reactions to products and to advertising, especially advertising in magazines, newspapers and billboards, and direct mail. Leading publishing houses undertook research to demonstrate to their potential advertisers who and where their readership was and what products these readers would be likely to buy.[82]

The professionalization of advertising and marketing in the early years of the century is apparent from early academic status and the flourishing of associations and journals.

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[78]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70.

[79]Converse, *Survey Research,* 87. As early as the 1890s research on consumer preferences was under way.

[80]Converse, *Survey Research,* 87.

[81]Converse, *Survey Research,* 90.

[82]Converse, *Survey Research,* 90.

The Association of National Advertisers was formed in 1910. The Audit Bureau of Circulation was formed in 1914. The American Association of Advertising Agencies was created in 1917. Also in 1917, the *Journal of Applied Psychology* began publishing articles using consumer research data from surveys and experiments on topics including industrial psychology, counseling, and vocational and mental testing.[83]

Harvard University founded its Graduate School of Business and established the Bureau of Business Research in 1911. The school was involved in work on the psychological aspects of market research.[84] Consumer researcher Paul T. Cherington taught at Harvard from 1916 until 1919.[85] Cherington followed Walter Dill Scott as president of an organization of advertising professionals and marketing teachers formed in 1915. The organization would become the American Marketing Association and publish the *Journal of Marketing*.[86] In 1934, Cherington would become partners with Elmo Roper in a market research company.[87]

World War I provided an opportunity for psychologists to try out the testing tools on which they had been working. They had developed scholastic and vocational aptitude, reading ability, and intelligence tests. Soldiers were tested in large

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[83]Converse, *Survey Research*, 90.
[84]Converse, *Survey Research*, 89.
[85]Converse, *Survey Research*, 89.
[86]Converse, *Survey Research*, 89-90.
[87]Converse, *Survey Research*, 113-114.

numbers.[88] While the processing of soldiers allowed psychologists to practice their methods on large numbers of people, the larger experience of the war increased an emphasis on the non-rational, on the manipulation of public opinion, and promoted widespread skepticism about democracy and the competence of public opinion.[89] For example, George Creel and others bragged about their success in manipulating the opinions of many people in the United States and Europe. Traditional democratic theory was attacked by Walter Lippmann. He argued that all individual citizens were not capable or lacked the resources to participate in governing as demanded by traditional direct democracy theories. The successful manipulation of public opinion during the war caused many to feel that public opinion was in need of control by politicians.[90]

The Twenties

While some scholars pointed to 1888 and James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* for the idea of an aggregated public opinion, Harwood Childs recommended the 1920s as marking the start of the current commonsense understanding of public opinion. The current generally shared idea of public opinion as an aggregate of individual opinions began then.[91] During the 1920s, a great deal of interest in customer surveys and reader interest studies existed.[92] The testing of soldiers during World War I led to improvements in questionnaire techniques.

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[88]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 70-71.
[89]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 12.
[90]Palmer, "Public Opinion in Political Theory," 12.
[91]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 32.

Machines had been developed that could tabulate and summarize large amounts of data at high speed. According to Childs, "This explains in part the growth during the twenties of widespread interest in statistical studies of public opinion and in attempts to measure opinion, and the emphasis placed upon quantitative methods."[93] As an example of how extensive the efforts were in the 1920s to influence public opinion, he pointed out the Federal Trade Commission's "famous report on the public opinion activities of gas and electric light interests in 1927."[94] Businesses were trying to influence public opinion, questionnaires were being used in testing, and customers and readers were being asked for their opinions.

The Thirties

Various factors contributed to the study of public opinion in the 1930s. The first university classes on public opinion were taught. George Gallup began syndication of a weekly column of public opinion poll results in 1935 and successfully predicted the outcome of the 1936 presidential election. The soon-to-become prestigious academic journal *Public Opinion Quarterly* began publication in 1937.

There were other changes as well. The New Deal and the need for public support of United States government policy, along with the use of propaganda by dictators in Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan, contributed to the increasing

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[92]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 33.
[93]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 32.
[94]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 33.

interest in public opinion early in the decade.[95] National organizations promoting business interests were increasing their use of publicity campaigns. Childs wrote, "To counter the New Deal, business turned more and more to professional public relations agencies for support in fighting 'that man in the White House' and preserving 'the American Way.'"[96] The press became more interested in what the masses thought about public policy, and more columnists were discussing public policy issues. Business people, advertisers, and marketers had used sampling on large numbers of people, and surveys had been used to discover reader interest.[97]

The stage was set for Gallup's 1936 leap to notoriety when the pollster created his own sampling formula and a way to sell the results, according to Childs. "He conceived the idea of selling a syndicated column to newspapers reporting the results of nation-wide surveys of public opinion on public policy issues."[98] As Childs wrote,

> What distinguished the Gallup, Roper, and Crossley polls from preceding public opinion surveys was their alleged use of scientific methods of sampling which assured their accuracy to within a few percentage points of the public opinion sampled. These sampling methods had been used for a number of years by market researchers, and were now to be applied to a survey of nation-wide opinion on political, economic, and social issues.[99]

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[95]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 34. Russia is Childs' choice.
[96]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 34.
[97]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 71.
[98]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 71.
[99]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 35-36.

By the end of the decade the Gallup poll had become an institutional fixture in the United States, England, and other countries.[100] Gallup's successful prediction of the results of the 1936 presidential election made him famous. Gallup had directly challenged the long running success at predicting presidential elections of the mass circulation magazine, *The Literary Digest*. The incorrect prediction by *The Literary Digest* in 1936 made Gallup's successful prediction all the more surprising.

In a *Public Opinion Quarterly* article in 1985, public opinion scholar Albert Gollin pinpointed the moment when a common understanding of the definition of public opinion as poll results was fixed.[101] In an article titled, "In Search of a Useable Past," he placed the moment between Gallup's correct prediction of Franklin Roosevelt's election as president of the United States and the founding of the academic journal that would represent the new field when he wrote, "If one seeks a more precise watershed for this recognition, I would nominate the two month period between November 1936 and January 1937."[102]

Scholar Hadley Cantril, in 1940, summarized what was known in the field of public opinion about public opinion polls. The history of polls linked the practice of polling in 1940 backward from the early polling by political parties—the straw polls—through some refinement by market researchers. Polls could accurately predict

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[100]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 36.

[101] It is important to note that as recently as 1985 *Public Opinion Quarterly* supported the idea of a watershed in the understanding of the meaning of the concept of public opinion.

[102]Gollin, "In Search of a Useable Past," 414-424.

elections. It was the difference in sampling methods that allowed the pollsters to successfully predict Roosevelt's victory while the unscientific methods of *The Literary Digest* poll had failed to do so. Polls, according to Cantril's writing in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, were better than elections because not everyone who wanted to vote could get to the voting booth, while a poll would more accurately represent all views, even if the holder of the view did not get to vote. Meanwhile, an election was the only way to test the accuracy of a public opinion poll. Polls should be taken seriously since they accurately predicted elections. Cantril argued polls re-established the kind of democracy lost when the United States grew too large for decisions to be made in town meetings. Still, there were recognized problems with polling to be overcome. It was not yet clear if people were wise or incompetent. It was not yet clear if polls could debunk pressure groups. There was concern about who should conduct polls and if polls should be in the hands of social scientists or practical men.[103] If people were incompetent, then they could not give reasoned answers to policy questions. There was widespread concern that pressure groups created opinions and thus the opinion given to a pollster by an individual was not one based on reason, and a reasoned opinion was called for by traditional democratic theory. Who should control the polls was Cantril's final concern. There were people who advocated that the government, instead of businesses such as Gallup's, control polling on policy issues and elections.

Harwood Childs and *Public Opinion Quarterly*

[103]Hadley Cantril, "The Public Opinion Polls: Dr. Jekyll or Mr. Hyde?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 4 (1940): 212-217.

W. Phillips Davison, editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly* from 1948 to 1951 and from 1968 to 1972, called Harwood Childs the moving spirit behind the journal *Public Opinion Quarterly.*[104] Childs graduated from Dartmouth College and completed his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago.[105] He joined the faculty at Princeton University in 1931. During the 1933-1934 school year at Princeton, he taught one of the first university courses on public opinion.[106] *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, the course syllabus, was published as a small book in 1934, and Edward L. Bernays, one of the founders of public relations, provided a forward.[107] Bernays wrote, "Professor Harwood L. Childs has placed under debt to him all those who come in contact with the field of public opinion management, whether they are students or concerned with practical work."[108] Childs thanked Bernays for suggesting that the course material be more widely distributed and for "facilitating the publication"[109] of the book. Nine of the twenty-two sections were concerned with opinion management.[110]

In the fall of 1935, Childs, then an associate professor of politics, proposed a new journal to study public opinion by sending a memo to DeWitt Clinton Poole,

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[104]W. Phillips Davison, "POQ's Fifty-Year Odyssey" *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 51(1987): S5.
[105]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* dust jacket.
[106]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 4, n. 1.
[107]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* ii.
[108]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* ii.
[109]Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* v.
[110] The book reproduced the class syllabus. For each section of the syllabus, there was a brief narrative introduction followed by a list of books and articles. Individual books and articles sometimes

director of the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. In suggesting the school support a new journal, Childs described the range of the interdisciplinary work on public opinion under way at the time. "Public Opinion in all its political, psychological, economic, sociological, statistical, historical, and even future aspects was to be the field of interest," he wrote.[111] Childs' proposal was discussed at a Nassau Club dinner on October 22, 1935, and shortly after was approved by the president of Princeton.[112]

This was just days after George Gallup's poll of opinion results had appeared in newspaper syndication.

As Childs remembered 20 years later, first a "score or more of friends"[113] of each man, all involved in public opinion in some way, was asked to contribute. There was enough interest in the study of public opinion to prompt contributors to underwrite and subscriptions to a new journal. Between ten and twenty people provided the seed money of $250 to $500 per year for three years, and 1,000 to 1,500 people were counted on for subscriptions.[114] Poole was the first editor. Childs had a half-time appointment as managing editor. Childs had a secretary, Mary Mott Regan, and his part time editorial assistant, Datus Smith, Jr., had been the editor of *Princeton Alumni Weekly*.[115] Childs headed the section on public relations. Hadley Cantril at

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were listed in more than one section. The content of the syllabus vividly displays the multiple influences on the emerging field of public opinion.

[111]Harwood L. Childs, "The First Editor Looks Back" *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 21 (1957): 7-13, 8.

[112]Childs, "The First Editor," 7.

[113]Childs, "The First Editor," 9.

[114]Childs, "The First Editor," 9.

[115]Childs, "The First Editor," 9.

Columbia University headed the section on methods,[116] E. Pendleton Herring at Harvard University headed the section on interest groups, Harold Lasswell at the University of Chicago headed the section on government, and Oscar W. Riegle at Washington and Lee University headed the section on communications. In addition to Princeton, Harvard, the University of Chicago and Columbia, public opinion research was under way at Ohio State University, the University of Illinois and the University of Minnesota.[117]

The first issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly* carried the still well-known article by Floyd Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion." In the article, he defined public opinion while at the same time he dismissed alternative definitions and methods as "fictions and blind alleys."[118] Allport's definition of public opinion required that the issues being considered were public issues and involved a decision about public issues. Defining public opinion and public issues he wrote,

> The term public opinion is given its meaning with reference to a multi-individual situation in which individuals are expressing themselves, or can be called upon to express themselves, as favoring or supporting (or else disfavoring or opposing) some definite condition, person, or proposal of

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[116] W. Phillips Davison, "POQs fifty-year odyssey," Public Opinion Quarterly 51 (1987) S4. Davis placed Cantril at Princeton when the journal began. See note below.

[117]Childs, "The First Editor," 9. The *Public Opinion Quarterly* origin stories are quite similar, however, where there were differences, I used Child's version. His is the richest, and he was there. To my knowledge, no one has examined any founding documents, if they exist.

[118]Gordon Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1 (1937): 7-23, 7.

> widespread importance, in such a proportion of number, intensity, and constancy, as to give rise to the probability of affecting action, directly or indirectly, toward the object concerned.[119]

Allport was one of the people pioneering quantitative methods. Quantitative work by Allport, Harold Gosnell, and L.L. Thurstone was summarized by Stuart A. Rice in *Quantitative Methods in Politics* in 1928 and George A. Lundberg in *Social Research* in 1929.[120]

There were close, personal connections among the early public opinion researchers. Gallup and Cantril were friends. Crossley lived in Princeton, New Jersey. Lazarsfeld was at Princeton University for a time, and so was Cantril.[121] According to W. Phillips Davison, as a result of the strong personal network among those doing public opinion research, there was not a formal refereeing process for articles through the 1940s. In 1987, former *Public Opinion Quarterly* editor Davison explained, "The decision making process was, however, not so arbitrary as it might now appear. At the outset, Harwood Childs, together with his remarkable group of Associate Editors (Cantril, Herring, Lasswell, and Riegel) had a fairly comprehensive view of who was doing what, and how well they were doing it."[122] *Public Opinion Quarterly* was started by academics but in a few years the editorial board included

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[119]Allport, "Toward a Science," 23.
[120]Stephan, "Survey Methods and Measurement Techniques," 79.
[121]Davison, "POQ's Fifty-year Odyssey," S8.
[122]Davison, "POQ's Fifty-year Odyssey" S8

members from businesses such as publishing, advertising, public relations and opinion research.[123] Child's class in public opinion, Princeton's willingness to support a new journal, and the financial support provided by individual scholars all point to the conclusion that the study of public opinion was well under way in several fields and in several universities by 1935.

George Gallup

George Gallup was widely credited with promoting the public opinion industry and the current dominant definition of public opinion.[124] The name George Gallup and The Gallup Poll have been nearly synonymous for more than 50 years with public opinion poll in much of the world.[125] As was written in *Time* magazine in the fall of 1948, "But George Gallup's four-a-week releases to 126 U.S. newspapers have made the 'Gallup Poll' a household word and Gallup the Babe Ruth of the polling profession."[126] He not only took credit for nearly single handedly inventing public

[123]Davison, "POQ's Fifty-year Odyssey" S5.

[124]Albert H. Cantril, "In Memoriam: George Horace Gallup, Sr. 1901-1984" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (1984): 807-808; John E. Drewry, *Post Biographies of Famous Journalists* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1942), viii; J. Michael Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," *Communication Monographs* 64 (1997): 161-179, 162; David W. Moore, *The Superpollsters: How They Measure and Manipulate Public Opinion in America* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1992), 56, 229; Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 3 n.1.; Charles T. Salmon and Theodore L. Glasser, "The Politics of Polling and the Limits of Consent," 439-441.

[125]Cantril, "In Memoriam: George Horace Gallup, Sr. 1901-1984" 808; Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161-162. It may be that Gallup and polling have become synonymous and his first name forgotten. In the course of doing this dissertation, I encountered several people who were unaware Gallup was the name of a person.

[126]"Opinion: The Black and White Beans" *Time*, 3 May 1948, 21.

opinion polling; he served as historian and promoter of the industry that could bring science to the straw polls.[127] As social scientist Lindsay Rogers wrote:

> If I refer to Dr. Gallup more often than to any of his colleagues in the polling fraternity, he will not mind, because he has written widely and spoken frequently to explain the 'new science' to the public. He has been more assiduous than any other pollster in publicizing his undertaking and himself, has been immortalized by a skit, 'Please Leave My Pulse Alone,' in the revue, Inside U.S.A., and has broadcast his measurements of public opinion in television-- 'The George Gallup Show'--presenting 'views and trends of the national in politics and public affairs.'[128]

Gallup's life was coterminous with the twentieth century, his businesses with the growth of quantitative social science in universities and the exponential expansion of advertising and marketing research.

Gallup's biography was told consistently, beginning with an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1939 by Williston Rich and most recently by Jean Converse in her book *Survey Research in the United States* in 1987: Gallup was born in 1901 in Jefferson, Iowa, a town of 4,000. His father was a school teacher and land speculator, and the family was doing well at the century's turn, well enough to afford a nurse who

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[127]Converse, *Survey Research,* 115, 116; Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161, 163.

[128]Rogers, *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership,* 3, n. 1.

nicknamed the child Ted because she so admired—and Gallup's father hated—Theodore Roosevelt. Gallup went to college at the University of Iowa in Iowa City where he served as editor of the college paper. Gallup began graduate school while he taught journalism at his alma mater and earned a masters degree in 1925 and a doctorate in Psychology in 1928.[129] In the summer of 1922, Gallup interviewed people by going door to door and asking them about the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* newspaper.[130] It was during that summer he decided he could come up with a better way to find out what readers liked, and that eventually led to his dissertation, "An Objective Method for Determining Reader Interest in the Content of a Newspaper." His dissertation was financed by the Des Moines newspaper publisher and founder of *Look* magazine, Gardner Cowles, Jr.[131] In 1928, Gallup went to Drake University in Des Moines to head the journalism department. In 1931, Lever Brothers company signed Gallup as an advertising consultant. In 1932, the advertising agency Young and Rubicam hired Gallup as research director.[132] In 1935, with the help of Chicago-based newspaper feature syndicator Harold R. Anderson, he opened the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) in New York. The AIPO office was moved to Princeton, New Jersey, shortly after because Gallup thought the Princeton postmark would add prestige to his business.[133]

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[129]Converse, *Survey Research,* 114; Williston Rich, Jr. "The Human Yardstick," *Post Biographies of Famous Journalists* ed. John E. Drewry (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1942), 112-118.

[130]Converse, *Survey Research,* 114.

[131]Converse, *Survey Research,* 115.

[132]Converse, *Survey Research,* 115.

[133]Rich, Jr. "The Human Yardstick," 116, 119, 125.

Gallup was publishing articles in business, journalism and advertising periodicals in the late twenties and early thirties. They included, "Traits of Successful Retail Salespeople" in the *Journal of Personnel Research* in 1926; "A Scientific Method for Determining Reader Interest" in *Journalism Quarterly* in 1930; two articles in *Editor & Publisher*, "Guesswork Eliminated in New Method for Determining Reader Interest" in 1930 and "Survey Shows Radio Advertisers Reach But Small Portion of Public" in 1931; and "What Do Newspaper Readers Read?" in *Advertising & Selling* in 1932. Not only was he authoring articles in academic and trade publications, but others were writing about his work in trade magazines. The articles about Gallup's work in 1932 included "How Advertising Techniques Are Rated by Gallup Survey," in *Printers' Ink*; "Research Shows Reader Preference" and "Telephone Surveys Puncture Radio Claims to Intensive Coverage," in *Editor & Publisher*; "The Gallup Method of Advertising Research," in *Advertising and Selling*; "Gallup Survey Paves Way for Stronger Copy," in *Advertising Age*; and "Research: Gallup" in *Tide*. Additionally, in 1932, Gallup had what he later described as the inspiration that led to the creation of public opinion polling. As written in *Time* magazine, "By 1932 Pollster Gallup was an up-&-coming expert at finding out who read what kind of toothpaste ads and why. One day he said to himself: 'If it works for toothpaste, why not for politics.'"[134]

In 1932, without an election campaign, his Democrat mother-in-law was elected secretary of state in solidly Republican Iowa. This made Gallup curious.

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[134]"Opinion: The Black and White Beans" *Time* 3 May 1948, 22-23.

After compiling the voting records for all the counties in the United States, in late 1933, he sent out a mail survey on congressional races. He later claimed to have been within one percent when he compared his results to the 1934 election results. According to Gallup, his training in the methods of applied psychology, his interest in journalism and this encounter with electoral politics led him to public opinion polling and his weekly column of poll results.[135] Through the Publishers Syndicate, a business that sold the same newspaper content to multiple newspapers, Gallup's weekly column of poll results was published in 1935 in forty-five newspapers that paid between $500 and $25,000 per year. The fees were based on circulation. Those fees covered the cost of the polling for the "America Speaks" column.[136] The newly formed American Institute of Public Opinion conducted the polls.[137] Gallup immediately began what would become a life-long effort promoting his polls as scientific and objective.[138] At the same time, he linked the polls to a democratic vision from the past[139] that in effect "bottled the air of democracy."[140]

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[135]Converse, *Survey Research,* 114-121; Rich, Jr. "The Human Yardstick" 116.

[136] Moore, *Superpollsters,* 32.

[137]"Editors Asset in Naming List of Poll Queries," *The Washington Post*, 20 October, 1935, 3, 1; "Gallup Says Measuring Public Opinion Opens Up New Political Reporting Field," *Editor & Publisher*, (November, 1936), 14; R. G. Hubler, "George Horace Gallup: Oracle in Tweeds," *Forum*, (February, 1940, 94; J. J. O' Malley, "Black Beans and White Beans," *The New Yorker,* (March 2, 1940), 23.

[138]Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161-179; George Gallup, "Measuring Public Opinion" *Vital Speeches of the Day* 9 March 9, 1936, 372; "Gallup Directs Institute Polls for the Public," *The Washington Post*, 20 October,1935, S 3, 1.

[139]"Bryce Named Poll as Best Opinion Test," *The Washington Post,* 20 October, 1935, S 3, 1; George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How it Works* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 16-33.

[140]Richard Reeves, "George Gallup's Nation of Numbers" *Esquire*, 100 (December, 1983): 91-94, 96, 92.

The column "America Speaks" was first published on October 20, 1935. The headline on page one of section three in *The Washington Post* read: "Does the Forgotten Man Still Feel Forgotten? He Answers for Himself in the Weekly Poll." The poll, and not F.D.R., would speak for everyone in the United States. Gallup was making a special effort to reach people in the lower income strata, or who lived in the country or on small farms.[141] In addition to hiring a blimp to fly over the Washington D.C.,[142] the paper promoted the new column on the front page of the paper and repeated the selling points of science, objectivity and listening to the common man.

> The Post, among other important papers of the country, presents today--exclusively in the Nation's capitol--a national poll of public opinion on the question of relief. What of our expenditures to bear this burden? Too great? Too little? About right? The poll, conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion, an impartial group, reached a cross-section of the Nation for the answer. It has been an exact, scientific poll. It obtained the views of the exalted and the lowly. The poll in this Sunday's Post-- Page 1, Section III--introduces the series of polls which will appear each Sunday. The most vital questions of the moment will be put to the Nation at large.[143]

Gallup's column appeared in newspapers across the country. Its prominent placement in the *Washington Post* made it visible to legislators. These factors and his prolific

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[141]"Polling America" *Business Week* 30 November, 1935, 26-27.
[142]Rich Jr. "The Human Yardstick," 117.
[143]"America Speaks" *The Washington Post* 20 October, 1935, S 1, 1.

writing in a wide range of publications made him chronicler of the field.[144] Polling was his invention.[145] As Gallup wrote: "When the first poll of public opinion appeared in the fall of 1935, politicians viewed them with suspicion. Political scientists and social scientists generally ignored them. And Washington correspondents and columnists openly attacked them."[146] Praising the publishers who had purchased his column of poll results, Gallup noted that only a few had enough confidence to print them. By 1948, Gallup's election predictions and poll results went to 126 newspapers four times a week.[147] While he was not the only one with a public opinion polling business, he had been its biggest promoter for a dozen years.[148] Gallup actively promoted public opinion polling as integral to democracy [149] and a modernization of the straw polls using scientific methods for greater accuracy.[150] He claimed predicting election results was critical to having lawmakers trust the poll results on social issues.[151] Cantril wrote in 1991, "George Gallup was the fiercest advocate of the polls

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[144]Converse, *Survey Research,* 115.

[145]George Gallup, "The Changing Climate for Public Opinion Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 23-27; Rich, Jr., "The Human Yardstick"; Reeves, "George Gallup's Nation of Numbers"; "The pollster—right or wrong" *Newsweek*, 20 August, 1956, 31-34.

[146]Gallup, "The Changing Climate," 23.

[147]"Opinion: The Black and White Beans" 21.

[148]Moore, *Superpollsters,* 57; Converse, *Survey Research,* 116; Rogers, *The Pollsters,* 3, n. 1.

[149]Moore, *Superpollsters,* 57; Converse, *Survey Research,*114-124; Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 84; Gallup and Rae, *Pulse of Democracy*, 14-15; Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy." 173-175.

[150]Converse, *Survey Research,* 116.

[151]George Gallup, *The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide* (Ephrata, Pennsylvania: Science Press, 1972), 124.

as an instrument of democracy."[152] David Moore wrote that Gallup called himself an "evangelist for democracy."[153]

The link between public opinion polling and democratic politics has been noted by many.[154] For example, Jean Converse wrote, "In the new public opinion research that succeeded the *Literary Digest*, there was not only the appeal of scientific work but also the attraction of purposeful, public spirited work in the context of political optimism and democratic idealism."[155] Philip Converse described the early pollsters, Gallup, Roper and Crossley, as well as those working on polling in the United States Department of Agriculture, Renis Likert and Henry Wallace, as "strong on democratic principles and pleased to provide a means that the voice of the people might be more clearly heard."[156] Gallup successfully linked science and democracy as he promoted his polls.[157]

George Gallup's promotion of public opinion polling claimed that polling brought science to democracy by making the views of the common man known. His common man was wise, sometimes individually and at other times as part of a wise majority. For example, Gallup and Rae's book-long explanation of public opinion

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[152]Albert Cantril, *The Opinion Connection: Polling, Politics, and the Press* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 10.

[153]Moore, *Superpollsters,* 56.

[154]Converse, *Survey Research,* 123-127; Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 30-31; Price, *Communication Concepts 4*, 34; Herbst, *Numbered Voices,*; Philip E. Converse, "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S12-S24; Harold F. Gosnell, "The Polls and other Mechanisms of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 4 (1940): 414-424; John C. Ranney, "Do the Polls Serve Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (1946): 349-360; Martin, "The Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling."

[155]Converse, *Survey Research,* 121.

[156]Converse, P. "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process" S15.

polls, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public-Opinion Poll and How It Works,* began by wondering in the forward about what was in the mind of the common man. He wrote, "What is the common man thinking? The life history of democracy can be traced as an unceasing search for an answer to this vital question."[158] Public opinion polls provided the answer. Gallup continued, "They [the pages of *The Pulse of Democracy*] tell the story of a new instrument—the public opinion poll—and describe how it works to provide a continuous chart of the opinions of the man in the street."[159] Gallup went on to describe the common people in the first pages of the first chapter. He wrote that the stock broker and the farmer were both chance cogs in the "machine that samples public opinion."[160] Farmers in Maine, thresher operators in Kansas, tenement or Park Avenue dwellers in New York City, industrialists and the old ladies who mopped their floors were all asked for an opinion.[161]

Gallup argued that the survival of democracy depended on the voice of the common people being heard because in his view, the common people were often wiser than the elite leaders. For example, the common people were not all people, but rather workers in opposition to owners or professionals. While the polls were conducted of all people, Gallup thought of the polls as the only way to make the voice of the common person heard by those in power. Polls could make the common person as

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[157]Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy."
[158]Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, v.
[159]Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, v.
[160] Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, 3.
[161] Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, 4.

articulate as the educated elite. He wrote, "If government with the consent of the governed is to be preserved and strengthened, then the common man, the farmer, the industrial worker, the stenographer, the clerk, and the factory hand must become as politically articulate as the professional man, the businessman and the banker."[162] While Gallup conceded that there could be some small amount of ignorance or apathy among the common people, he argued that those were exceptions. He wrote, "The serious observer of public opinion on scores of issues cannot fail to come away with a feeling of intense admiration for the honesty and common sense with which an enormous number of ordinary people in all walks of life and at all levels of the economic scale have continued to meet their responsibilities as citizens."[163] According to Gallup, the common people were so wise that public opinion polls revealed that the majority of people were in favor of some type of legislation prior to the legislation being passed by lawmakers. Gallup wrote, "Almost always the public is ahead of its legislators. This is perhaps natural and desirable in a democracy. Be that as it may, many examples can be cited to show how majority opinion has preceded legislative action in recent years."[164]

For many public opinion scholars—Hadley Cantril, Albert Gollin, W. Phillips Davison, Eleanor Singer, and William Albig to name a few—1936 marks the beginning of the study of public opinion. However, the point is moot. Bernard

[162] Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, 31.
[163] Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, 287.
[164] Gallup and Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy*, 9.

Berelson and Morris Janowitz wrote in the 1953 *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*: "Contrary to popular notions and even to the ideas of some practitioners in the field, the study of public opinion did not spring full-panoplied from the brow of George Gallup in the 1930s."[165] Still, Gallup's promotion had been a success. In spite of some dispute, there is a great deal of support for the idea that the study of public opinion began when public opinion had been quantified in a one-person, one-vote type of summary. Just as that has become the common sense understanding of the meaning of the concept,[166] so is it widely asserted that the middle years of the 1930s mark the beginning of the field of study.[167] As William Albig wrote, "These two decades [1936-1956] span almost exactly the history of polling."[168] Or as Eleanor Singer wrote in 1987, "And the field is really coterminous with the journal [*Public Opinion Quarterly*]."[169] Though there has been continual debate, the widespread success of the public opinion polling industry is credited with sustaining the world-wide commonsense view of public opinion as poll results.[170]

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[165]Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), 1.

[166]Herbst, *Numbered Voices,* 12, 43, 63, 153; Converse "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion," S13.

[167]Charles K. Atkin and James Gaudino, "The Impact of Polling on the Mass Media," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 472 (1984): 119-128; Leo Bogart, *Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1972), 14; Gollin, "In Search of a Usable Past," 416; Gallup "The Changing Climate," 23.

[168]William Albig, "Two Decades of Opinion Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 14.

[169]Eleanor Singer, "Editor's Introduction" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987):S2.

[170]Converse, P. "Public Opinion in the Political Process," S13, S17-S18.

While there is widespread consensus that the dominant view of public opinion is the results of polls today, it is not a seamless view, as an ongoing scholarly debate has continued to challenge mainstream assumptions.[171]

Alternative Views of Public Opinion: Critics of the Polls

Polls as defining public opinion have been contested in spite of their financial success and domination of commonsense understanding. In one of the earliest and best known critiques, the sociologist Herbert Blumer claimed that in focusing on the development of methods, those involved in public opinion research had failed to define what they were measuring and were not testing general propositions or making generalizations. Blumer went on to describe an alternative view of public opinion as the functioning of groups. Public opinion was something that emanated from society and was formed and expressed by unequal groups who sought to influence people who made political decisions. He sought to make a distinction between voters, who have equal weight when they cast a ballot, and the many different ways individuals behave and have influence on public opinion in society. As he concluded:

> I would repeat that the formation and expression of public opinion giving rise to effective public opinion is not an action of a population of disparate

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[171]Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon, *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995); Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion — Our Social Skin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Herbst, *Numbered Voices*; Pierre Bourdieu, "Public Opinion Does Not Exist" in *Communication and Class Struggle* eds., Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub(New York: International General, 1979): 124-130; Herbert Blummer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," *American Sociological Review* 13 (1948): 542-554; Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters,*; Michael Wheeler, *Lies, damn lies, and statistics: The manipulation of*

> individuals having equal weight, but is a function of a structured society, differentiated into a network of different kinds of groups and individuals having different weight and influence and occupying different strategic positions. Accordingly, to my mind, the success attending polling in the prediction of elections gives no validity to the method as a means of studying, recording or measuring public opinion as it forms and functions in our society.[172]

Some opinion pollsters remain sensitive to Blumer's criticism of their method. For example, as Charles Salmon and Theodore Glasser noted, *Public Opinion Quarterly* editor Eleanor Singer began the introduction to the journal's fiftieth anniversary supplement by taking a shot at the sociologist who had spoken just after the journal's tenth anniversary.[173] She wrote, "Blumer was wrong."[174]

Political scientist Lindsay Rogers compared those conducting polls to hucksters. He was implying they were crooks when he titled his critique of polling *The Pollsters*. Rogers' book was published just after the failure of the polls to accurately predict the 1948 election of Harry S Truman as President of the United States. Primarily from a political science perspective, Rogers expanded his critique from the way democratic claims are used to include an explanation of measurement

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public opinion in America (New York: Dell, 1976); Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

[172]Herbert Blumer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," *American Sociological Review*, 13 (1948): 547.

[173] Charles T. Salmon and Theodore L. Glasser, "The Politics of Polling and the Limits of Consent," 438.

[174]Eleanor Singer, "Editor's Introduction" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S1.

that is still useful. Rogers showed in detail that pollsters had not defined what they were studying. His criticisms are many and well argued. His major concern was with the way in which poll results were claimed to be useful to a democratic society. He questioned whether the polls served the public interest and concluded they did not.[175]

Scholar Benjamin Ginsberg criticized polling as a manipulation of the public by powerful elites. In his view, polling diverted attention from groups—who might act on their interests—to individual opinion and at the same time has dampened spontaneous expressions of opinion.[176] He argued that poll results allow government officials to "anticipate, regulate and manipulate popular attitudes."[177] Several scholars from various perspectives have expressed concern with the ways in which the widespread acceptance of polls as measures of public opinion are dangerous or damaging to democracy, especially to the debate required by the classical idea of democracy. Public opinion scholar John Peters worried about the absence of discussion of political issues,[178] and theorist Jurgen Habermas referred to public opinion as a fiction.[179] Scholar Clifford Christians saw polls as propaganda that

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[175]Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

[176]Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

[177]Ginsberg, *The Captive Public*, 85

[178]John Durham Peters, "Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion" in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 3-32.

[179]Jurgen Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere*, trans. T. Burer and F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).

limited discussion.[180] Researcher James Carey considered polling, in cooperation with journalism, as part of a process that prevents public opinion from forming.[181]

In an argument that conceived polling as a ritual, theorist Lisbeth Lipari saw polls constructing social solidarity since polls ritually control dissent and allow for the affirmation of unity in spite of differences.[182] She argued polling domesticated disagreement: "In polling ritual, the symbols of public and nation serve to stress unity and similarity and minimize discord and differences."[183]

Susan Herbst took a long historical view of public opinion. Using Max Weber's theories about the rationalization of industrial society, as well as the thinking of Michel Foucault, Herbst showed the way in which polls conducted by professional polling organizations replaced other forms of communicating opinion and thus limited the intensity of political expressions, and also acted as a form of surveillance. She argued for a shifting concept of public opinion that is contingent on technology, communication, and social climate.[184] When she turned her attention to political actors' understanding of public opinion, she took James Bryce as a supporter of the idea that public opinion was the opinion of groups. She wrote: "Alexis de

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[180]Clifford G. Christians, "Propaganda and the Technological System," in *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 156-174.

[181]James W. Carey, "The Press, Public Opinion and Public Discourse," *in Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, eds. Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 373-402.

[182]Lisbeth Lipari, "Polling as Ritual," *Journal of Communication* 49 (1999):83-102

[183]Lipari, "Polling as Ritual" 95.

[184]Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Tocqueville, James Bryce, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, Herbert Blumer, and other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observers of American politics believed that group opinion and public opinion were one and the same."[185] Herbst did not directly oppose the idea of public opinion meaning poll results, but rather connected the understandings of public opinion to different technologies as it has changed over time.

As has been shown, there have been critics of defining public opinion as polling since public opinion polling burst to success in the mid-1930s. The criticisms of the pollsters continues today, even though the term pollster now lacks the critical edge with which its use was initially intended by Rogers.

Reconsidered: Received Tradition of Public Opinion Polling as Progress Story

What I have called the received tradition of public opinion polling is nearly always told as a story of progress through the development of polling. Herbst asked readers to attend to the different technologies used in relation to determining public opinion, and she points out what was lost when the technology changed. Gallup was tremendously successful in spreading not only the business practice of polling, but also the definition of public opinion as polling and linking that definition to democratic government while he emphasized his poll as the scientific successor to straw polls. Gallup's version was a story of progress and the success of science. His assumptions were apparent in both the major historical treatments and the fragments of

[185]Susan Herbst, *Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View the Democratic Process*

history used to explain the emergence and success of public opinion polling.

However, it is Lipari's vision of polling as ritual practice that points the way to re-thinking the success of public opinion as polling. Lipari argued the symbols of public and nation, linked in polling, serve to stress unity and minimize difference. She sees polls as creating, sustaining and renewing a sense of the sacredness of the demos in current national political culture.[186] She wrote, "Each time we turn to our newspaper, computer, radio, or television and are updated with the latest poll results, we are not just reminded that a national public and its opinions exists, but are hailed as charter members of the congregation."[187] Or, in other words, people are hailed as subjects of the state in the church of the nation-state. She is concerned with the way in which polling as ritual "appropriates discord and thereby creates a vision of empowering community."[188] She continued, "What is constructed with polling ritual is not public policy, but apparent social solidarity. That is, regardless of the divisions and cleavages presented in poll results, the symbols of our unity burn on as a photographic afterimage."[189]

If, as Philip Converse claimed in *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1987, a variety of meanings of public opinion abounded before 1936, and some people used multiple meanings of the concept simultaneously,[190] then Lipari's conclusions prompt other

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(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) 6.

[186]Lipari, "Polling as Ritual."

[187]Lipari, "Polling as Ritual," 97.

[188]Lipari, "Polling as Ritual," 99.

[189]Lipari, "Polling as Ritual," 99.

[190]Philip E. Converse "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 51 (1987) S13.

questions. They are questions not addressed in the progress tale of polling where alternative definitions of public opinion are usually ignored, given short shrift, or ridiculed, and the meaning of nation is not addressed at all. Yet Gallup's common man was a citizen of something.

Before the success of polling fixed the meaning of the concept of public opinion as poll results, what were the relationships between public opinion and nation in the academic literature that was the foundation of the field of public opinion? If Gallup argued for a wise common man who was the citizen of the nation, what was the conception of the common man in public opinion canon? How, if at all, do the articles that comprise Child's syllabus for his public opinion class use the concept of nation? These questions are important because their answers will provide a richer understanding of the past. The answers will provide a richer context for the story that now is the received tradition of the field of public opinion polling. The answers may reveal the way in which important parts of the past are covered over, or forgotten, making it more difficult to understand the present. Following a discussion of the nation and nationalism in the next chapter, those questions are approached in the analysis of the texts of the public opinion canon between 1886 and 1934.

Chapter Three

Nationalism and Nation

Scholars have used multiple disciplinary lenses, including history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political economy, and literary criticism, to study the concepts of nationalism and nation. Nationalism has played a role in world politics for at least two centuries without the benefit of a widely accepted definition. Key thinkers of modernity—Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, and Gramsci—have had little to say about it. A range of scholars and political actors disagree whether nationalism springs from antiquity or modernity, whether it began in the New World or the Old, whether it is rooted in nature or intellect, whether it results from structural forces or changing perceptions of time and space. These broad strokes, however, barely suggest the depth of the disagreement or the elaborated alternatives.[1]

Several suggestions have emerged about ways to understand nationalism as a modern phenomenon that political nationalists nonetheless believe is antique. These suggestions provide answers to the question; Why do some people believe nationalism is rooted in the distant past when it is actually a phenomenon that has emerged historically only in the last few hundred years? And despite a lack of attention from the best-known social theorists—Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, and Gramsci—nationalism has exerted a great deal of political muscle.

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[1] Benedict Anderson, "Introduction," in *Mapping the Nation,* ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 1-16.

Similarly to the concept of public opinion and related to it, the concept of nation has had multiple meanings since the idea emerged in time. The idea of nation had no political clout in the early 1800s, but by 1914 politicians could assume the naturalness of a world divided among nations. This dissertation is concerned primarily with the way the key concepts—public opinion, nation, democracy and the common man—are understood by elite authors in the public opinion canon up until 1933. Nation played a key political role around the turn of the century and it is necessary to understand nationalism in order to understand these authors use of nationalism and public opinion.

This chapter sketches the scholarly conversation about nationalism and details several theorists' contributions. This review lays a foundation for analyzing "nationalism" and "nation" in relation to "public opinion" in the articles that comprise Harwood Child's Princeton syllabus. Because the concepts of public opinion and nation emerged historically at about the same time and are related to each other, it is necessary to have an overview of the development of nation and nationalism. Scholar Ernest Gellner gives a historical, sociological, and structural account of the formation of nationalism and nations. Historian Eric J. Hobsbawm describes nationalism and its nineteenth-century transformations in Europe. Katherine Verdery takes nation as a symbol. Gellner, Hobsbawm and Verdery are used here, among many who have written about nation and nationalism, because together they provide a wide view of the concept. This wide view of nationalism, provides a foundation for thinking about the relationship between public opinion and nation.

"Nation" is sometimes treated as a form of identity, such as class, gender, race, region, or religion. National loyalty or identity often exerts a power over individuals of a certain class, race, and gender, despite a continuing difference of opinion about the definition of the concept of nation. Furthermore, scholars' discussions do not represent a consensus of opinion about ethnic (as opposed to political) components of the concept of nation, the subjective elements such as memory, and the objective elements such as language or territory.[2] Nationalists give imperative aspects for "the people"—variously defined—in the name of nationalism. The people must be free from external constraint, must be united, and must be gathered together in a historic territory. They must determine their own destiny, dissolve internal divisions, control their resources, obey their inner voice, have legal equality, and share a single culture. They must also have a historic identity in a homeland and a culture passed down through the generations—where the culture was an expression of their national identity.[3]

Events that mark of the advent of nationalism include the Partition of Poland in 1775, the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789 and 1792, and Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* in 1807. These events took place during a period soaked in neo-classicism —a revival of

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[2] John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, "Introduction" in *Nationalism*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-4.

[3] Hutchinson and Smith, "Introduction," 4.

the patriotism of Sparta, Athens, and republican Rome, including the exemplars of the public and heroic virtues and were visible in arts, letters, and politics.[4]

The French Revolution and the U.S. War of Independence expressed the radical politics that emerged from eighteenth-century social, political, and intellectual developments—some of which drew on neo-classical, Romantic, Puritan, and technological antecedents. The result transformed absolutism into the nation-state, as the models of the United States and France were taken up in various ways.[5] The transformation took more than a century, yet by 1914, nation, language, and race had become nearly synonymous, and the concept of the nation was considered to be natural and a matter of common sense.

Ernest Gellner, followed by Eric Hobsbawm, defined nationalism thusly: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."[6] Gellner added to the assumption that the unit should have leaders who were of the same nation. He wrote the following about the nationalist attitude: "It not only defines the limits of the unit, but assumes that the unit has an institutional leadership ('the state'), and its main concern is that the positions in this institutional power centre be manned by members of the 'national' culture, the one which defines the unit. To put it in simple language: no foreigners may rule us!"[7]

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[4] Hutchinson and Smith, "Introduction," 5.

[5] Hutchinson and Smith, "Introduction," 7. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1995), 47-65.

[6] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 1; Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9.

[7] Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson), 6.

Hobsbawm added that the basic principle also implies a political duty of the individual to the polity, which trumps other obligations.[8]

The "nation" belongs to a recent historical period and refers to a modern territorial state, the nation-state, which was a creation or invention of nationalism. "Nations" follow "nationalism."[9] Nationalism arises from a combination of changing social forces including the development of standard print language and administrative, technical, political, and economic change.[10] Nations primarily are constructed by leaders. Nations are elite phenomena that must be understood from the perspective of ordinary people.[11]

Hobsbawm urged his reader to avoid making mistakes about the feelings of ordinary persons. He described how historians had been mistaken about public opinion. He differentiated among governments, the activists of nationalist movements, and "the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda."[12] He wrote that social historians who have investigated the history of ideas have made clear distinctions: "We are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, editorials in select newspapers with public opinion."[13] National

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[8] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 9. Hobsbawm further distinguishes modern nationalism from the less demanding form of national or group identification.

[9] Gellner, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 48-9; Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 10.

[10] Gellner, "*Nationalism*"; Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 10.

[11] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 10. I agree with him on the necessity of understanding the phenomena of nationalism from below and the difficulty of doing so. This work does not address the views of nationalism or public opinion from below, the view of ordinary people. It is concerned with the way the elite academics imagined the ordinary person, public opinion and nation when they wrote to each other in academic journals.

[12] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 11.

[13] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 11.

consciousness develops unevenly across regions and among social groups, and the masses of ordinary people are the last to be affected by it.[14] The development of national consciousness involves a change in individual consciousness evoked from changing perceptions of time, space, and the narrative created to cover over those changing perceptions, Benedict Anderson wrote.[15]

Gellner clarifies how the social forces of industrial transformation created the conditions for nationalism, which in turn created nations.[16] Hobsbawm described in more detail what happened as nationalist programs gained mass support.[17] Cornell Professor Benedict Anderson explained how the people came to believe in an antique nation; that is a national identity with roots much deeper in history than evidence supports. The fiction of an antique nation, stemming from a shift in concepts of time and space, became part of the people's perceived national history, or narrative.[18] Anderson described the way in which bureaucrats from countries with colonies unintentionally engendered nationalism. Anderson's analysis concluded that bureaucrats sent to administer the colonies unwittingly fostered nationalism. Bureaucrats counted and sorted indigenous people by the bureaucrats' own perception of differences among the indigenous people where they were groups geographically. When bureaucrats took a census, they sorted responses according to those perceived differences. When they drew maps, the maps reflected how they saw population

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[14] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*," 12

[15] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1995) 163-187.

[16] Gellner, "*Nations and Nationalism*" and "*Nationalism.*"

[17] Hobsbawm, "*Nations and Nationalism*"

distribution according to the groups that they had labeled. Indigenous people who saw the maps came to think of themselves according to the labels on the maps and in the census. He also theorized that nationalists found it necessary to believe in an antique nation; it was the nationalists' perceived history, or narrative, that rose to popular acceptance as other historical accounts and evidence of the indigenous people's history fell out of favor. In effect, the new narrative became the foundation for the new "national awareness."[19] Nationalism arose from changes in government, economics, and education. Nationalism relied on print literacy and involved changes in how people thought of themselves. Sometimes the changes were unintentional consequences of other actors. Sometimes the changes were intentionally engineered by government.

Gellner

To explain the historical emergence of nationalism, Gellner takes a middle position between necessary and contingent. Nationalism is necessary for the formation of nations in some cultural conditions, but those conditions are not present at all times and in all places; thus the notion that nationalism is contingent. Neither nationalism nor states are universal. Nationalism took root in the modern industrial world, and its origin is from the features of the modern world.[20] Gellner maintains it is nationalism that creates nations.

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[18] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1995), 163-206.

[19] Anderson, "*Imagined Communities*," 163-206.

[20] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 13.

Homogeneity of culture is the basic requirement of citizenship, according to Gellner. Nationalism is explained by the principal that homogeneity of culture forms the basis of a political bond and the ability to participate in and be accepted in a given culture. Knowing the language and other skills of the culture is the basic requirement of social, political, and economic citizenship. Those who do *not* master the dominant culture must either accept second-class citizenship or subservience, leave, try to learn the culture, or seek change under the political control of those similar to themselves. This principal has operated in many places for the last three centuries, continues to operate, and has a powerful hold on those under its influence—most of whom do not understand it.[21]

Cultural conditions turn some people into nationalists, according to Gellner. They believe that their nationalist feelings are natural, which they are, if "natural" simply means resulting from those cultural conditions. Gellner wrote that the nationalist sentiment in politics has roots in our modern lifestyle. Within any one political unit, one finds a homogeneous, single high culture. Its nationalist sentiment condemns those who have not mastered the political units culture, or who are unacceptable to it, to a humiliating, painful second-class status.[22] Nationalism takes similarity of culture as the basic social bond that legitimizes membership in the group. "In its extreme version, similarity of culture becomes both the necessary and the sufficient condition of legitimate membership: *only* members of the appropriate culture may join the unit in question, and *all of them* must do so (emphasis in

[21] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 29-30.

original)."[23] Gellner's definition of nationalism tightly links organization and culture. The emotive aspect of this link defines the limits of the organizational unit and assumes that the organizational unit had an institutional leadership. Nationalism assumes an institutional leadership—the state—and is mainly concerned that positions in the institution are held only by members of the culture.[24] As Gellner wrote, "To put it in simple language: no foreigners may rule us!"[25] "Us," in "no foreigners may rule us," refers to members of the same culture. This may seem obvious, however, when the characteristics that are believed to define culture in a specific time and place—language, religion, traditions, and physical attributes—are contested, sorting out the foreigners is not always easy, especially from a distance.

Gellner defined culture as "a shared style of expression in words, facial expression, body language, style of clothing, preparation and consumption of food and so forth."[26] Culture allows for the transmission of traits between generations, greater diversity, and faster change than would happen with genetic transmission. Culture is a bank of acquired traits with enormous possibility for diversity and rapid change. People with a shared culture occupy social positions with attendant expectations of rights and obligations.[27]

Culture played a different role in the pre-industrial, agrarian world than it does now. In the agrarian age, the division of labor and of social organization became

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[22] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 102-103.
[23] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 102-103.
[24] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 6.
[25] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 6.
[26] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 2.

increasingly complex. Along with economic specialization came specialists in violence and coercion and salvation and ritual as political centralization became more common. Society became more complex, hierarchical, and was technologically stable.[28] Culture functions in an agrarian society "to reinforce, underwrite, and render visible and authoritative, the hierarchical status system of that social order."[29] Culture then cannot also mark boundaries of the polity. Nationalism could not operate in an agrarian society because culture was fulfilling the function of maintaining hierarchical status. Culture could not be used to mark political boundaries before the hierarchy was displaced.[30] Political bonds were not necessarily formed from cultural similarity, and political bonds did not necessarily flow from cultural similarity. Some aspects of the agrarian world, however, could contribute to the rise of nationalism—for example, bureaucratic centralization and Protestant-type religions, Gellner wrote. Alone, they were not enough to cause a break out of the inherently Malthusian agrarian world in which population growth was likely to lead to famine.[31]

As opposed to agrarian stability, economic and scientific growth forms the foundation of the industrialized world and is—with nationalism—a basis of political legitimacy.[32] Economic and scientific growth imposed a social mobility that led to a slow shift from social hierarchy toward equality. Gellner clarified it this way: "We are

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[27] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 3.
[28] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 15-16.
[29] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 20.
[30] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 21.
[31] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 17, 23-24.
[32] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 25

not mobile because we are egalitarians, we are egalitarians because we are mobile."[33] If there is economic and scientific growth, new kinds of jobs will form as old types of jobs vanish. The constant turnover in the kinds of tasks performed, created by growth, requires a kind of equality.[34] As Gellner wrote: "Growth entails innovation, the use of new techniques, hence the creation of new jobs and the relinquishing of old ones. A society which lives by growth, which bribes its members into acquiescing by giving them a confident and justified expectation of moral improvement, rather than by the old method of terror and superstition, cannot conceivably have a stable occupational structure."[35] Differences in wealth exist, as would be expected, along a continuum. Unshackled by law or custom to enforce rank stratification, people have the possibility of mobility along the wealth and power continuum.[36]

Industrialism brought growth where there had been stability. Growth required mobility and occupational change, and mobility required equality, Gellner wrote. Mobility and equality brought anonymity and a necessary meritocracy. This happened in the context of the necessity of literacy. The mobile, anonymous individual must be able to read "context-free" messages.[37]

Work was transformed from a basis of muscle and local context to a basis of mind and shared language across local, physical contexts. The ability to understand context-free messages requires lengthy schooling. Because work is primarily

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[33] Gellner, *Nationalism,* 26.
[34] Gellner, *Nationalism,* 26.
[35] Gellner, *Nationalism,* 26.
[36] Gellner, *Nationalism,* 27-28.
[37] Gellner, *Nationalism,* 28-29.

communication, a functioning society requires that everyone participate in a language culture that primarily uses anonymous, context-free messages.[38] Gellner wrote, "It is a corollary to the manner in which society functions: precision of articulation, such as enables a message to transmit meaning by its own internal resources, without making use of context—a skill possessed in the past by at the most a few specialised scribes — is now a precondition of employability and social participation and acceptability."[39] The process of nationalization has happened—and is happening—unevenly in time. The shift toward nationalization moved from a stable, agrarian social order in which cultural differences supported a hierarchical system of statuses without creating boundaries for political organizational units, to a mobile, merit-based order, in which anonymous individuals share a literate culture linked to political boundaries.[40]

A few cultures emerged to achieve political boundedness—France and Spain for example. The liberal view that individual pursuit of self-interest in the market should result in the well-being of all has not diminished nationalism's hold, and neither has the Marxist's view that the world working class would restore the proper natural essence of humankind, Gellner wrote. From the immense diversity of the agrarian age to the present, only some cultures have established a political organization. Nationalism has developed unevenly as the nationalizing cultures have

[38] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 28-29.
[39] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 29.
[40] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 29.

absorbed multiple local cultures. Some groups got there first. A few cultures have become nations while others still hope or fight to become nations.[41]

The shifting of assumptions during the nineteenth century becomes vivid when the situation in 1815 and 1914 are compared, Gellner explained. How recent the conversion of a political organization into a nation is can be seen in the political divisions established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. There, the map of Europe was redrawn following twenty-five years of the Napoleonic wars. Territory was divided among Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman. No consideration was given to culture, ethnicity, or language similarities—they were politically irrelevant. Europe was carved up according to principles of empire, kingdom, and estate, with little or no objection.[42] Nationalism was thoroughly ignored in 1815, yet taken for granted in 1914. But in the course of one hundred years, nationalism had become dominant in the political and literary imagination, even if it had not accomplished much politically. By World War I, nationalism had achieved the status of a fundamental and natural role in politics. As Gellner wrote, "Come 1918, the crucial standing of nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy is as self evident as it had been irrelevant in 1815. The moral victory of the principle was nearly complete: very few dared raise their voices against it."[43] Although the system of states drawn without political regard for

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[41] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 31-36.
[42] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 40
[43] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 43.

culture existed for nearly one hundred years, the system drawn at Versailles in 1918 with a concern for national, political self-determination collapsed in a generation.[44]

Gellner proposed three stages of human morality corresponding to changes in thinking about nationalism: "my station and its duties," "universalistic individualism" and "roots." Stage one, "my station and its duties," corresponds to the non-national period in human history during which identity is linked to a place in a stable, hierarchical social order marked by suspicion and oppression. During this period culture did not determine political organizational units.[45] This ancient regime was overturned by the ethic of universalistic individualism in—stage two of human morality—an egalitarian Enlightenment marked by reason. Obligations and fulfillment came from shared humanity and not from status.[46] The Enlightenment argument over whether shared humanity rests on a capability of sympathy with other's pain and pleasure as sentient humans, or on shared reason, is blind to culture. Philosopher David Hume's formulation of the argument casts humans as sharing sensitivity while philosopher Immanuel Kant's formulation is reason. The arguments of the Enlightenment in support of a universalistic individualism helped to upstage, but not to completely defeat, the ethic of "my station and its duties."[47] The third stage of morality, "roots," comes from the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment.[48]

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[44] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 43.
[45] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 63.
[46] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 63.
[47] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 64.
[48] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 65.

Romanticism began in literature as a reaction to the intrusion of reason into personal love and sexuality. Romanticism puts an emphasis on feelings, the imagination and the uniqueness of individuals and the cultural groups to which they belong. Romanticism differentiates among people by specific cultural differences. During the course of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, Romanticism spread into scholarship and from private concerns to political concerns.[49] The Enlightenment arguments value universal human reason. For Kant, the ability to reason differentiates human beings from other living things, breaking the assumption of hierarchy and forming the basis of morality. For Hume, the feelings of an impartial observer form the basis of morality and universal humanity.[50] The Romantic reaction to the egalitarian, cosmopolitan Enlightenment values feeling and cultural specificity and links emotions to specific cultural communities where sentiments are shared by members of the culture, but not by those outside.[51] The reason of the Enlightenment did not and could not create borders. The sentiment of Romanticism could not help but create borders. As Gellner explained, "Rationality cannot, simply cannot, define the membership of exclusive clubs: feelings *can*. Nations, unlike the brotherhood of man favoured by the Enlightenment, are exclusive clubs."[52]

Philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder is exemplary of this Romantic reaction. In Herder's view, humanity is composed of nation/cultures and the essence and value

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[49] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 68.
[50] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 66.
[51] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 67.
[52] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 68.

of a nation/culture grows out of their specificity.[53] The Herderian cult, praising diversity and opposing the one singular universal reasoning human, was modest in the beginning. It resisted French cultural imperialism and British commercialism and empiricism. The inclusion of Darwin into the Romantic scholarship and science gave it a boost, because if man is merely another animal, then it is difficult to suggest reason as a differentiating factor.[54]

Philosopher Immanuel Nietzche took up the issues drawing on biological and Romantic work. Gellner explained, "The community was to be not merely cultural, but also biologically distinctive: it was not merely to defend and protect its own cultural specificity; it was to affirm it politically with an aggressiveness which was more of an end than a means, which was the expression and precondition of true vitality."[55] The explosive potential of Nietzche's work lay in the message of a biologically distinct culture in need of defense from universalism, a secular form of the old religion, coinciding with the peak of the economic distress produced by advancing industrialism/capitalism. The reaction to the distress, against the universalism, turned to agrarian martial values equating wealth and land, and nationalism had a powerful appeal.[56] As Gellner wrote:

> There was a groundswell against this distress and against the universalist ideology claiming to validate it, a reaction which turned toward the old agrarian martial values, and which retained the agrarian equation of wealth and

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[53] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 69.
[54] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 69.
[55] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 69.

land (Lebensraum). In such a context the appeal of nationalism was powerful indeed. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the simultaneous presence of all these factors and, indeed, their political expression.[57]

Cultures define and create nations. Cultures have nations and not the reverse, as nationalists proclaim. A culture and homogeneity replaces a diversity of cultures and then becomes significant politically.[58] The emotional linkage of land and wealth in Romantic literature spread, confronted the actual, miserable conditions, and provided a political solution. The answer for those in distressing conditions was to form their own nation, occupy their own land and form their own state, so as to have the wealth to alleviate their distress. At the same time they returned to their roots to find genuine fulfillment.

Instead of an awakening to an awareness of a similarity long dormant and deep in the psyche, which demanded that like kind be with like kind of human being to explain nationalism, Gellner proposed a theory of nationalism that includes the inevitability of certain social conditions. His theory shows an awareness of the contingencies connected to those social conditions.

A huge multiplicity of local cultures in an agrarian society was replaced by one literate high culture. A stable, hierarchical social organization was disrupted. The one literate high culture controlled bureaucracy and technological growth. This culture was transmitted through an education system made necessary by the changing nature

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[56] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 71.
[57] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 71.
[58] Gellner, *Nationalism*, 69.

of work brought about by technological change. Changes in work required occupational mobility, and mobility demanded a kind of equality. Enlightenment's reason required universal individualism, and the Romantic reaction to it insisted that fulfillment came from feeling, and that feeling was shared within a culture. In effect, cultural similarity created a place in the world that provided personal meaning through shared feelings. Loyalty to, and identification with, like kind in a nation fell between either universal reason or universal religion and the huge multiplicity of the agrarian past. Changes from stability to growth, the rise of centralized bureaucracies, changes in the nature of work, and the demand for a centralized education system—to sustain a literate high culture able to communicate in a context-free script language that was necessary for work—made nationalism for some cultures inevitable and doomed it for others.

Hobsbawm

Historian Eric Hobsbawm traced the origins of the term "nation" to discover how recent the terminology of equating nation, culture, and state was. He found that the 1908 *New English Dictionary* pointed out that the older meaning of the word nation focused on an ethnic unit, and that recent use (in 1908) stressed "the notion of political unity and independence."[59] The political use of the term began to have coherence a third of the way into the nineteenth century. As Hobsbawm noted, "the people" and "nation" were being used in a way that recalled the revolutions in what would become the United States and France. He wrote, "The primary meaning of

[59] *Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. vii, cited s.v. in Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18

'nation', and the one most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political. It equated 'the people' and the state in the manner of the American and French Revolutions."[60]

In the political discussion in the North American colonies and then in discussions of the whole political body in the United States, the preferred terminology was, Hobsbawm wrote, "the public, the people, the union, public welfare, or the community, in order to avoid the term 'nation' against the rights of the federated states."[61] In the French usage it became "one and indivisible"—a body of sovereign citizens forming a state that was linked to territory. The equation quickly became nation = state = people in a bounded territory and implied a multiple number of such units. It did not yet carry the charge of a shared birth into ethnicity or language.[62] In revolutionary terms, the use of nation was a democratic one, although learning French was one way to become French.

Two different uses of the concept of nation were at play during the middle of the nineteenth century. One concept of nation was revolutionary and democratic and emerged from the revolutions. The second concept of nation was nationalist. As Hobsbawm explained, the same word, "nation," referred to both revolutionary and democratic, and nationalist, in the equation of state = nation = people. For Nationalists a prior cultural community differentiated one unit from another. In the revolutionary and democratic view, the central point is the sovereign citizen.

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[60] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18.
[61] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18.
[62] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18-19-20.

It was Freidrich List who clearly formulated the liberal idea of the nation that was usually taken for granted, and it involved a size threshold. Only Federalist Alexander Hamilton, who provided List with inspiration, had discussed the links among nation, state, and economy. For Hamilton, the term "nation" referred only to the economy and he pushed for a national bank, debt, tariffs, and excise. List argued that a nation must have a large enough and exclusive territory be of a sufficient size, a large population, and natural resources.[63]

Nations were expected to arise from expansion and unification as a step along the path to universal human unity—from family to tribe to country to region to nation to global.[64] It was also widely accepted that nations would be heterogeneous. Hobsbawm suggests that the lack of discussion of nationalism in the liberal era can be attributed to the absence of electoral politics. He wrote, "Observers like [John Stuart] Mill and [Ernest] Renan were relaxed enough about the elements which made up 'national sentiment'—ethnicity—in spite of the Victorians' passionate preoccupation with 'race'—language, religion, territory, history, culture and the rest—because politically it did not matter much, as yet, whether one or the other among these was regarded as more important than the rest."[65] Many of the core assumptions about nationalism of the liberal age, 1830-1880, would change drastically by the First World War, in part because of the rise of national slogans to masses of supporters of political movements, Hobsbawm explained.

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[63] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 30. Hobsbawm relied on Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy* (London, 1885), 174-176

[64] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 32-33.

Hobsbawm pointed out that the various ways in which people might have thought of themselves as part of communities larger than a local one were not necessarily related to a unit of land politically organized as a nation is understood today. A shared language came to be considered a unifying factor more recently than today's nationalists believe. In fact, national languages are the opposite of what the nationalists' suppose them to be: They are artificial constructs and not the primordial basis of the national mind and culture. A national language usually is one idiom chosen as the standard and homogenizing language from many that are spoken within the national boundary. Thus, language could not be the criterion for nation. Even for the literate few, it was necessary to choose a vernacular over a holy classical language that was adequate for small elites to use in administrative bureaucracies, literature, and intellectual or public debate.[66]

The argument for the unifying character of language was invented by intellectuals and did not, according to Hobsbawm, rise up from the common folk. He wrote, "In fact, the mystical identification of nationality with a sort of platonic idea of the language, existing behind and above all its variant and imperfect versions, is much more characteristic of the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet, than of the actual grassroots users of the idiom. It is a literary and not an existential concept."[67]

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[65] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 43.

[66] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 47, 54-56.

[67] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57.

Even though language, in a Herderian sense, would indirectly become central to the modern definitions of nationalists and to popular perceptions of nationalism, in fact, it did not actually become so important the way nationalists have claimed. Rather, the language's use by a small number of elite administrators, the use by printers, and the use in public education made the chosen tongue the language of the nation-state. According to Hobsbawm, this is what happened to most European languages between the late eighteenth and early twentieth century. He follows Benedict Anderson's reasoning to argue that language was a unifying cultural element that created a community of intercommunicating elite, and it did not matter whether this was a minority if they had political clout. The official language of the elite became the actual language of the nation through public education.[68]

Among the characteristics claimed by nationalists to support an up-from-the-bottom nationalism—language, territory and ethnicity—none has been shown to be sufficient for the formation of a nation. The often-repeated conclusion is that states precede nations. As Hobsbawm points out, the United States of America is one of the premier examples of that claim. "The USA and Australia are obvious examples of nation-states *all* of whose specific national characteristics and criteria of nationhood have been established since the late eighteenth century, and indeed could not have existed before the foundation of the respective state and country."[69]

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[68] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 59-63. As an example, he points out that in 1789 only about half the people in France spoke French, only 12% or so spoke it correctly, and almost no one spoke it in the north or the south. 60.

[69] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 78.

There was a novelty to the modern state, the states formed in the wake of the United States and French revolutions. Hobsbawm wrote, "It was defined as a (preferably continuous and unbroken) territory over all of whose inhabitants it ruled, and separated by clearly distinct frontiers of borders from other such territories."[70] The inhabitants were ruled directly, and agents of the state reached out to the most remote village, the most humble resident. Hobsbawm continued, "And increasingly it found itself having to take notice of the opinions of its subjects or citizens, because the state needed their practical consent or activity in other ways, e.g. as tax-payers or potential conscript soldiers."[71] Throughout the nineteenth century, contact between government and individuals increased, linking them daily as never before via mail carriers, police officers, school teachers, census-takers and those who registered births, deaths, and marriages.

Two political problems faced the new governments in the era of revolution, liberalism, democracy, and the rise of working class movements and nationalism. One problem was administrative. The establishment of a machine of administration raised the issue of a written and spoken language. The second problem concerned the loyalty of those being administered by the state and their identification with the state. The state and ruling classes found it necessary to compete with rivals for the support of the lower orders in a time of increasingly unlimited electoralization. Hobsbawm wrote,

> It became equally obvious, at least from the 1880s, that wherever the common man was given the most nominal participation in politics as a citizen—with the

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[70] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 80.

> rarest exception the common woman remained excluded—he could no longer be relied on to give automatic loyalty and support to his betters or to the state. Especially when the classes to which he belonged were historically novel, and hence lacked a traditional place in the scheme of things.[72]

Hobsbawm noted the idea of patriotism was state-based rather than nationalist in the revolutionary popular idea of patriotism because it related to the sovereign people. That is, the state exercising power in the name of its people. Historic continuity, ethnicity, and language were irrelevant. The Americans, the Dutch in 1783 and the makers of the French Revolution all used patriot to refer to people who loved their country and wanted to renew it by revolution. Their loyalty was thought to be to a nation created by choice. The higher loyalty became the loyalty to the chosen, politically created unit.[73] Hobsbawm explained, "The revolutionary concept of the nation as constituted by the deliberate political option of its potential citizens is, of course, still preserved in a pure form in the USA. Americans are those who wish to be."[74]

Turning subjects into citizens, "democratizing politics" in Hobsbawm's phrase, seems to have spawned populism. He wrote, "For if 'the country' is in some way 'mine.' then it is more readily seen as preferable to those of foreigners, especially if these lack the rights and freedoms of the true citizen."[75] The extension of the

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[71] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 80.
[72] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 83.
[73] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 87.
[74] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 88.
[75] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 88.

franchise also could contribute to the legitimacy of the state and could reinforce or even create state patriotism.

At the same time, nationalisms were developing that were opponents of state patriotism.[76] During the nineteenth century, some European governments approached nationalism as a political force separate from the state and state patriotism. At the same time, nationalism could become an asset if it would merge with state patriotism and lend it an emotional note.[77]

States and regimes had every reason to reinforce, if they could, state patriotism with the sentiments and symbols of community (however they may have arisen) and to concentrate them upon themselves. As it happened, the time when the democratization of politics made it essential to 'educate our masters,' to 'make Italians,' to turn 'peasants into Frenchmen,' and attach all to nation and flag, was also the time when popular national superiority preached by the new pseudo-science of racism became easier to mobilize. For the period from 1880 to 1914 was also that of the greatest mass migration within and between states yet known, of imperialism and of growing international rivalries ending in world war.[78]

The nationalisms that were to dominate world politics and serve as a foundation for two world wars emerged toward the end of the century. Although the nationalisms were sometimes attached to state-patriotism—a chosen nation of rights of individuals—they had striking dissimilarities because their loyalty was not to the

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[76] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 89.
[77] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 90.
[78] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 91.

chosen nation/country but to a different version of that country.[79] Bureaucratic organization and technical developments required the standardization of people and included a need for literacy that led to education and a national language.[80] For the promoters of the changing nationalism, language was an increasingly crucial component of nationality.

From 1840, language differences had played an international political role, and language was something that could be counted.[81] When bureaucratic states asked the language question on censuses, everyone was forced to choose a linguistic nationality. Hobsbawm wrote,

> The Hapsburgs put off the language question until after national tempers, so visibly overheated in the 1860s, had, as they thought, cooled down. They would start counting in 1880. What nobody quite appreciated was that asking such a question would itself generate linguistic nationalism. Each census was to become a battlefield between nationalities, and the increasingly elaborate attempts of the authorities to satisfy the contending parties failed to do so.[82]

From historic emergence in Western Europe and the United States of America, Nationalism expanded and transformed during the nineteenth century. The nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century, for the most part, had a minimal size of country in mind when it spoke of the new nation-state and looked to 1789 as a model. Whereas early in the century, nationalism had been based among communities of the

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[79] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 93

[80] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 95.

[81] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 98.

educated that crossed political boundaries, nationalism began stressing cultural and linguistic community, and it had a sense of historic mission.[83] The form of nationalism that dominated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century abandoned the threshold principle, which required a certain size territory for the nation state. Ethnicity and language gained tremendous importance as a basis of the new nation seeking a state. A shift in sentiment followed within the existing nation-states that cemented nation and flag with the political right. Hobsbawm wrote there was "a sharp shift to the political right of nation and flag, for which the term 'nationalism' was actually invented in the last decade(s) of the nineteenth century."[84] This drift in the imaginings of nationalists was accompanied by a transformation in the concept of race, huge migrations of people, and increasing democratization of politics.

German Romanticism had a tremendous influence in Europe beginning in the late eighteenth century.[85] Hobsbawm wrote, "Europe had been swept by the romantic passion for the pure, simple and uncorrupted peasantry, and for this folkloric rediscovery of 'the people', the vernacular languages it spoke were crucial."[86] However, this emphasis on the common folk was usually carried out by the elite and was not part of the political thinking until the end of the century.[87] A large number of national movements stressed language and cultural similarity as a foundation for

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[82] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 100.

[83] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 100-102.

[84] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 102.

[85] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 103.

[86] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 103. The elite white Protestant males of the United States were sent to German universities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and would have been influenced by this thinking

nation. This rationale for seeking a state was widely seen in 1914, but it barely existed among some groups or did not exist at all among other groups in 1870. The nationalists movements of the period included Armenians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Zionist Jews, non-Zionist Jews, Macedonians, Albanians, Ruthenians, Croats, Basques, Catalans, Welsh, and Flemish.[88] These movements were aided by huge migrations, theories of evolution, social Darwinism and changing conceptions of race.[89]

During the nineteenth century, the concept of race was transformed. A complex stratification of human beings based on physical characteristics with a foundation in skin coloration was elaborated by social scientists[90] and in popular culture as the migrations brought people who were different together. Race, language and nation were in various combinations commensurate. One important way race and language interacted was in the overlapping emphasis on the importance of the purity of language with the purity of the race.[91] By 1904, language was widely seen as having a political effect, and in practice the concepts "nation" and "race" were used as synonyms. Hobsbawm wrote, "Thus before the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904, a French writer observed, agreement between the two countries had been dismissed as impossible because of the 'hereditary enmity' between the two races."[92]

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[87] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 104.

[88] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 105-106.

[89] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 107-108.

[90] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 108.

[91] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 108.

[92] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 108-109. The development of racialist historical theories in English and German universities furthered the legitimacy of the equation of race and nation.

He goes on to describe the links between the developing *fin de siècle* social strata and the importance of language to "the lesser examination passing classes."[93]

Hobsbawm detailed the links among class, race and nation that came together near the end of the nineteenth century.[94] Language —written public language — in Europe, provided a practical advantage to those who mastered it. The language used at work and taught in school was important to the life chances of the expansion of the middle classes from the bottom. (Hobsbawm calls these the middle strata, the lower middle class, and the lesser examination-passing classes.) The elite would have learned the not-yet-official language, the language of business and government, and possibly a local language as well. The manual workers and the lowest strata of peasants spoke a local dialect and had no need of a written language.[95] However, those people who had achieved a modest elevation from the level of workers and peasants—an achievement based on schooling—were those who fought for linguistic nationalism. Hobsbawm explained, "The battle-lines of linguistic nationalism were manned by provincial journalists, schoolteachers and aspiring subaltern officials."[96]

The transition involved one vernacular language becoming the language used in schools and bureaucracies. The process and the struggle were different in different

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Hobsbawm calls this a fashion of the times to wildly generalize about and equate race and nation, but it did have an elite academic foundation in the racialist historical theories. Additionally, American popular cultural developed and spread race and nation equivalencies during the nineteenth century. See Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981): Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, (New York: Routledge, 1995).

[93] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 118.

[94] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 112-130.

[95] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 114-115.

places; however, the insecure social status of the lower-middle strata made political protection for a specific vernacular in the form of nationalist claims appealing.[97] At the same time, claims of racial and linguistic purity gave a combined boost to nationalist claims.[98] If language were understood as reflecting the race, then the purity of the race and language must be protected from mixing with any others.

Hobsbawm places these claims in the lower-middle strata, the petty-bourgeois radical right, which based its superiority on racial purity, demonstrated by a unique language.[99] Hobsbawm wrote,

> Uncertainty about their status and definition, the insecurity of large strata situated between the unquestionable sons and daughters of manual toil and the unquestioned members of the upper and middle classes, overcompensation by claims to uniqueness and superiority threatened by someone or other – these provided links between the modest middle strata and a militant nationalism, which may almost be definable as a response to such threats – from workers, from foreign states and individuals, from immigrants, from the capitalists and financiers so readily identifiable with the Jews, who were also seen as the revolutionary agitators. For these middle strata saw themselves as embattled and endangered.[100]

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[96] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 117.
[97] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 118-119.
[98] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 120.
[99] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 120.
[100] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 120-121.

Hobsbawm did not specify a precise class level where discontent would be found. He did claim that in the politicization of the lower middle class, nationalism became a chauvinistic, imperialist and xenophobic movement of the radical right. Previously, nationalism had been associated with the liberal left.[101]

In other words, class interests combined with race and language claims. Certainly, the powerful elite in the established nation-states welcomed the enthusiasm from the middle, because the state was competing with other states. However, the passions of the middle were not necessarily to be manipulated from above. Hobsbawm wrote, "Few governments, even before 1914, were as chauvinist as the nationalist ultras who urged them on. And, as yet, there were no governments which had been created by the ultras."[102]

Although the lower-middle-class, discontented ultra-nationalists did not control government and government did not control the ultra-nationalists, the lesser middle classes still needed a state. If they lacked a state, they aspired to one comprised of their own kind. If they lived in a nation-state, nationalism gave them a social identity, which Hobsbawm saw as similar to proletarian class identity. He wrote,

> One might suggest that the self-definition of the lower middle classes—both that section which was helpless as artisans and small shop-keepers and social strata which were largely as novel as the workers, given the unprecedented expansion of higher education white collar and professional occupations—was

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[101] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 121.

not so much as a class, but as the body of the most zealous and loyal, as well as the most 'respectable' sons and daughters of the fatherland.[103]

However, people could have more than one sort of identification and could be simultaneously attached to class, religion, and nationality. Class politics could lead to nationalistic pursuits, and social and national demands could be linked together in the desire for change.[104] The relationship between social movements and national movements is full of overlapping claims and calls to the mass of people as members of a nation and as members of a social strata.[105] National feeling can often be expressed as an aspect of the conflict between rich and poor, and the themes of social change were not separate from those of nationalism as they became dominant.[106] In other words, national consciousness cannot be neatly separated from class consciousness, and the development of national consciousness is not necessarily at the expense of social consciousness.[107]

Gellner and Hobsbawm

Gellner placed the relationship among race/ethnicity, class and nationalism slightly differently. He put a sharper point on the necessity of the combination of class and cultural differences to become politically successful. Ethnic groups did not become nationalist in a stable agrarian system, and classes did not overturn government when they did not define themselves by ethnicity and culture. Gellner

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[102] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 122.
[103] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 122.
[104] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 125.
[105] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 124-126.
[106] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 128-129.

wrote, "Only when a nation became a class, a visible and unequally distributed category in an otherwise mobile system, did it become political conscious and activist. Only when a class happened to be (more or less) a 'nation' did it turn from being a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself, or a nation-for-itself. Neither nations nor classes seem to be political catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations are such."[108]

Neither Gellner nor Hobsbawm deal substantively with the specifics of race theories; however, both rested portions of their arguments on ethnically-based claims in which ethnicity and culture are interdependent bases for nationalism. In Gellner's analysis, class and culturally defined nationalism is a political catalyst. Hobsbawm detailed a two-way relationship between class status and language use, where language was linked to ethnicity. Social scientists in Europe and the United States, and the popular mass-produced printed material circulating in the United States, participated in the construction of race during the nineteenth century.

Racial Theories in the United States of America

Racialist theories dominated common sense in the late nineteenth century. These theories included a hierarchy of qualities that made the Anglo-Saxon-Teuton people most fit to rule. This commonsense view was reflected by historians and was apparent in politics, literature, popular periodicals and schoolbooks in the United States. Scientists provided legitimacy and credibility for racial theories, and political debates were waged in racial terms. It was widely assumed that the Anglo-Saxon-

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[107] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 130.

[108] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 121.

Teuton would eventually replace all inferior races.[109] Scholar Reginald Horsman explained, "The Anglo-Saxonism of the last half of the [nineteenth] century was no benign expansionism, though it used the rhetoric of redemption, for it assumed that one race was destined to lead, others to serve—one race to flourish, many to die. The world was to be transformed not only by the strength of better ideas but by the power of a superior race."[110]

Jumbled and contested conceptions of the links among language, race and nation during the nineteenth century resulted in a dominant understanding by the start of the twentieth. Many historians in the United States in the 1880s were adherents to Teutonic-germ theory. It held that a vigorous race of people had come from Central Asia in ancient time, literally carrying an institutional germ in their blood to the German forests, where they had shown a unique spirit of freedom. The migration of the Teutonic tribes to Britain in the fifth and sixth century provided the seed for Anglo-Saxon political institutions to flourish following Norman feudalism. Not fully developed, the seed was regenerated after being transported to what would become the United States and grew anew as the New England town meeting.[111] However, the germ carrying the ability to create republican institutions had not always been completely developed. Rather, it matured over time and through experience, to be

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[109] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*; Painter, *Standing at Armageddon;* Young, *Colonial Desire*; Richard Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of The Frontier in the Age of Industrialization* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994).

[110] Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny, 303.

[111] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*; Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of

fully developed for the first time with the establishment of the United States. The theory allowed for the possibility that other races might catch up, but it would take a long time.[112] These racial theories provided the basis for political discussion.

Scholar Reginald Horsman explained, "The identity of race and language was taken for granted, and race was exalted as the basis of nation."[113] Horsman continued, "And the Americans were able to take pride in a westward advance which had passed beyond England across the Atlantic to press on relentlessly across the American Continent, eventually to complete the grand trek by bringing civilization back to the Asian homeland."[114] Enlightenment American revolutionary ideals had changed from hope for the progress of the human race into dreams of racial destiny for one superior race to advance civilization, and nature had decreed it, Horsman wrote.[115]

Anglo-Saxonist historians began a body of work that rewrote the foundations of the American Revolution, expressing in a variety of ways regret over the split between Anglo-Saxon race brothers in the United States and England.[116] The hold of racial destiny as an explanation for American institutions was modified by the work of Frederick Jackson Turner. His frontier theory suggested that the availability of free land was part of the explanation for the exceptional nature of American institutions.[117] Herbert Baxter Adams, a Johns Hopkins historian, was a supporter of Teutonic-germ

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Cambridge, 1995); Young, *Colonial Desire;* Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment*; Painter, *Standing at Armageddon.*

[112] Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 151-152.

[113] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 35.

[114] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 38.

[115] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 62,67.

[116] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 81-82.

theory, and his reputation among professional historians sank as Turner's frontier thesis rose.[118] However, while academic historians were beginning to incorporate Turner's thinking, in the 1890s and beyond, popular culture and politics maintained racial assumptions.[119]

Racial assumptions were the norm among the elite and were not uncommon in any arena. John Hay, President McKinley's secretary of state, and Elihu Root, President Taft's secretary of war, were among many who came to see the world in terms of a global biological struggle. Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Republican Teddy Roosevelt were not alone in urging Anglo-Saxons to have children in order for the race to maintain leadership.[120] Wilson believed government worked best when the qualified few were running it.[121] In a manifestation of class fear, James Lowell, Henry Baxter Adams and *Nation* editor E. L. Godkin called for the members of the so-called better classes to return to political leadership. Godkin suggested doubling the size of the standing Army to meet the threat of what he called the dangerous classes. During the 1880s and 1890s, businessmen helped finance armories and the National Guard so cities could be protected from mobs of strikers.[122]

Reflecting the assumptions of the upper classes, John Hay's popular 1884 novel *The Bread Winners* preached civil service reform—government by the educated.

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[117] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 88; Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment*.

[118] Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 88.

[119] Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 141-169; Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment*; Lears, *Fables of Abundance*.

[120] Alan Dawley, *Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belnap Press of Harvard University, 1991), 107-109.

[121] Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 259.

In his novel, Hay portrayed the need for the white elite Anglo-Saxon upper class to regain control of the government from the corrupt Irish and German immigrants who pandered to the lower classes. Hay also blamed outsiders for labor problems and threatened that the poor would invade homes. Implicitly, *The Bread Winners* carried the message that the naturally superior rich should make all of the decisions for society.[123]

From politicians to novelists, in school rooms and scientific laboratories, in popular magazines as well as academic writing, it was widely assumed around the turn of the century in the United States that one superior race would eventually govern everywhere and replace the inferior races. Katherine Verdery's suggestions about ways to consider nationalism[124] can more thoroughly incorporate the racialist assumptions of the turn of the century into the thinking about nationalism.

Verdery

Scholar Katherine Verdery took "nation" as an operator in a social classification system that established grounds for authority and legitimacy through the categories it makes seem natural. "Nation" has had many different meanings and all of them have been used to sort people, she wrote. The criteria for sorting, however, changes with time and location. The symbol—nation—links subjects to states and distinguishes between them, she wrote. It works as a symbol because its meaning has been ambiguous and it invokes sentiments that have been formed during decades of

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[122] Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 10, 21-23.

[123] Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 27.

use. Verdery said that nationalism is both a political use of the symbol and the sentiment that draws people to respond to the symbol. She wrote, "Nationalism is a quintessentially homogenizing, differentiating, or classifying discourse: one that aims its appeals at people presumed to have certain things in common as against people thought not to have any mutual connections."[125] It has operated in two major meanings: citizenship and ethnicity. In the first sense, the nation is a collective sovereignty involving individual citizen's political participation. In the second sense—ethnicity—the nation is a collective of individuals who share a belief in a common language, culture, history, and perhaps other defining material attachments.[126]

Verdery suggested the importance of determining which sense of the concept was being used.[127] Additionally, shared ethnicity and citizenship, though frequently used, should not be assumed. Her advice was threefold:

1) Determine the meaning of the construct nation from the context of its use.

2) Treat nation as a symbol within a social context in which groups compete to control its meaning.

3) Examine the assumptions of meaning for the terms that have been claimed to define nation and nationalism.[128]

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[124] Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism' in *Mapping the Nation*, Gopal Balakrishnan ed. (London: Verso, 1996) 226-234.

[125] Verdery, "Whither," 227.

[126] Verdery, "Whither," 227.

[127] Verdery, "Whither," 227. From a historian's perspective this would be the avoidance of what is called present mindedness. That is, taking a current meaning and projecting it back into the past.

[128] Verdery, "Whither," 227-228.

When national identity is discussed, the second term—identity—is usually left unexamined, Verdery wrote. Identity, however, can be assumed in many ways and national identity can be understood on at least on two levels. One meaning level is the individual's sense of self as separately having or being a certain type of national. A second meaning level is a particular collective whole in relation to similar others. Verdery wrote, "National identity thus exists at two levels: the individual's sense of self as national, and the identity of the collective whole in relation to others of like kind."[129] There is a paradox of meaning. Verdery wrote that the identity in national identity can mean both the same, identical, alike and unique, special and only. These meanings can simultaneously work to homogenize and differentiate.[130]

Verdery's thinking is made clearer with a more complex understanding of the concept of individual. Before identity, which individuals possess, there were individuals. Individuals have only come to have identities of any kind since the historical occurrence of the idea of an individual, at which time the individual was conceived as having the ability to possess himself.

It is the status of owning one's own labor that allows the move to become an individual. According to scholar C. B. Macpherson, the idea of possessive individualism is part of the emergence of the idea of the individual. The individual was one who was able to buy, and therefore possess, his own labor. He could own himself and therefore was an individual. Additionally, because the individual's own labor is his property, an individual's accumulation of property does not necessarily

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[129] Verdery, "Whither," 229.

entail a social responsibility. Further, it was only those few who were rational who could possess property because it was rational to accumulate.[131] In his analysis of John Locke, Macpherson wrote, "The man without property in things loses that full proprietorship of his own person which was the basis of his equal natural rights. . . . Civil society is established to protect unequal possessions, which have already in a state of nature given rise to unequal rights."[132]

Nations, as well as individuals, are considered to have identities. Nations are discussed as individuals. As Verdery pointed out, at least since Johann Gottfried von Herder, nations have been conceived as being like individuals with souls, wills, missions, births, lineages, and cycles that are contained in territorial bodies.[133] How then, Verdery asks, does the homology between the nation and the individual become natural?[134] One way to think about this process is by defining nationalism as the sentiments that take the nation as an object of devotion, and to take the concept of nationness as the daily practices that produces a feeling of belonging, so that the variety of practices in time build up devotion.[135]

The representations in the mass media can serve as this type of practice. An individual participates in the practice as he or she interacts with the symbol and is then

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[130] Verdery, "Whither," 229.

[131] C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962): Louis Dumont, "Religion, Politics, and Society in the Individualistic Universe," *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (London, 1970), p. 31-45; For elaboration on and disagreement with Macpherson see Joseph H. Carens (ed.) *Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993).

[132] Macpherson, "Possessive Individualism," 231.

[133] Verdery, "Whither," 229.

interpolated as either an included or an excluded member of the nation, as it is being defined at a particular mediated moment.

Verdery urges scholars to see the nation as a symbol that has taken on different meanings at different times and contexts and is used by different groups who have different intents. This opens the way for examining the intentions of different groups and their conflicts over national character, cultural heritage, the true mission of the nation, and their contrasting ideas about authenticity. It allows for seeing nation as a construct whose meaning shifts with the changing balance of social forces. It is possible to ask what kind of leverage the construct of nation has afforded certain groups and how ideas about nation and identity are produced and reproduced as central elements in a political struggle. Additionally, this process of national symbolization includes a process of rendering invisible some social groups while others are made visible.[136] The violent process includes such things as ethnic cleansing, however, there are also symbolic ways in which difference is foregrounded and then obliterated. Verdery notes, " Notions of purity and contamination, of blood as a carrier of culture, or of pollution are fundamental to the projects of nation-making."[137]

This process is necessary to implement the push toward homogenization, and the process must be continual. Nations are not only built; they must be continually built, and part of this process of rebuilding involves the maintenance of the legitimacy

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[134] Verdery, "Whither," 229.
[135] Verdery, "Whither," 229.
[136] Verdery, "Whither," 230.
[137] Verdery, "Whither," 230.

of the state. It is because the claims of nationalists have gaps in their connection to material reality that it is necessary to have a continual rebuilding and relegitimizing.

The homogenizing process of state-making, described by Gellner's theory, provides the foundation to see the state as the frame within which symbolic conventions are contested and homogenization as basic to the states form of rule. The state is seen, Verdery wrote, as the, "frame within which symbolic conventions are established and fought over, legitimacies striven for, group relations and the distributions associated with them fixed."[138] It is from within the frame that visibility is produced. It is the state-making process that "motivates difference as it inscribes boundaries, demarcating inside from outside, self from other."[139] The press toward homogeneity is also a process of exclusion and defining. Institutionalized commonalty, even as an outcome of an unintentional process, renders visible and deviant those who do not possess the common feature. When the state institutionalizes a normative commonalty as a process of state-building, the process creates politically, materially, significant differences by defining difference in relation to homogenizing commonalty.[140]

With the foundation provided by this chapter from the theorists and historians of nationalism it will be possible to look for the ways in which nation and nationalism might be used in the texts of the social scientists from diverse disciplines in the universities in the United States of America. Rather than a template with which to

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[138] Verdery, "Whither," 231.
[139] Verdery, "Whither," 231
[140] Verdery, "Whither," 231.

compare each article in the Public Opinion canon, this foundation provides clues to determine, from the context of the texts, the meanings of nation, nationalism, and public opinion.

It includes watching for the meaning of nation as a collective sovereignty, in what Hobsbawm called the revolutionary democratic meaning of the term nation. In this sense, individual citizens are political participants in a nation formed by choice of individuals and reason. It may still maintain the meaning first attributed to it in the United States by Hobsbawm as multiple surrogate terms, sensitive to the individual states rights. Hobsbawm wrote: "the public, the people, the union, public welfare, or the community, in order to avoid the term 'nation' against the rights of the federated states."[141] However, with the shifting meaning of race and nation during the nineteenth century, it will be necessary to watch for ethnic or race assumptions or both, class assumptions, and gender assumptions along with the meaning of the nation as a collective sovereignty. It is possible that shared traits, shared historical circumstance, national character, or something else might be used to define the individuals who are also considered sovereign citizens. As Verdery warned, the conceptions are paradoxical.

Using these clues—derived from the theorists of nationalism—the journal articles from Harwood Childs' Public Opinion class that form the public opinion canon are examined chronologically in the following chapters.

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[141] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18.

Chapter Four

Harwood Childs' Public Opinion Syllabus Articles from 1886 to1919

In this chapter, following an overview, the articles from Harwood Childs' Public Opinion class syllabus published between 1886 and 1919 are chronologically presented and analyzed as they would have appeared to scholars and a more general and literate reading public. This is not the way in which they were presented to Childs' Princeton students in the middle of the 1930s, just as the study of public opinion was getting under way at universities. The students would have read the articles by topic areas to which they were assigned by Childs based on his understanding of the field of public opinion.[1] The articles are presented chronologically because this will allow the opportunity to see time related changes in the discussion of key terms—public opinion, nation, race, democracy. The grouping of articles was in part based on the end of World War I. While the final article in this section was written in 1919, the topic is war related. Additionally, other scholars have seen World War I as marking a social divide.[2]

The dissention over the meaning of the term "public opinion" is evident from the earliest articles in Harwood Childs' syllabus. The articles reveal multiple uses of the concept of public opinion and its intertwining with nation and race. The articles from Child's syllabus were split nearly equally between general circulation magazines

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[1] Harwood Childs, A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1934).

[2] Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

and academic publications. The common man was not portrayed as wise. Nation and race are used interchangeably.

These articles revealed a palpable underlying worry about the way the world worked and what could be done to make it work better. Democracy was not working, although, the press could make democracy work if it were in the hands of the right sort of men, according to W. T. Stead in 1886. He believed that the newspaper could guide public opinion.[3] The common people were not reasoning or thinking. Therefore, because public opinion was based on sentiment or prejudice when it should be based on reason, a few thoughtful men needed to use their influence to promote thinking by the people, Jeremiah Jenks opined in 1895.[4] Democracy might be unfixable and the majority of people unable to be led to reason because of the complexity of the modern world. It was only a few years after Stead and Jenks wrote that E. L. Godkin held out no hope of improving public opinion, in part because the newspapers were no longer up to the job.[5]

Godkin defined two kinds of public opinion. One kind, inherited public opinion, did not concern him. The important public opinion, according to Godkin, was the consensus public opinion that acted as a political force. He wrote, "The kind I am now talking of is the public opinion, or consensus of opinion, among large bodies of persons, which acts as a political force, imposing on those in authority certain

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[3] W. T. Stead, "Government by Journalism," *Contemporary Review* 49 (May 1886): 653-674.

[4] Jeremiah Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 1 (1895-96): 158-169.

[5] E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," *The Atlantic Monthly* 131 (January 1898): 1-15.

enactments, or certain lines of policy."[6] There were no challenges to the assumption that the Anglo-Saxons had a lead in the progression from barbarity to civilization. In 1910, Walter Shepard predicted the certainty of rule by public opinion in civilized Anglo-Saxon countries and proposed to settle the definition that public opinion was a bond agreed on by members of a group. He saw multiple publics.[7] It was apparent from Shepard's argument that there was an ongoing disagreement about the meaning of public opinion at the turn of the century. Then there was a turn from worry about who would or could control the unreasoning public opinion of the mass of recently enfranchised members of the public to a worry about who was improperly influencing public opinion.

George Turner worried about the money spent to manufacture public opinion in a political campaign.[8] In 1916, Philip Brown pointed out the chasm between direct democracy and representative democracy that needed consideration in the discussion of public opinion.[9] Based on the articles published between 1886 and 1919, there was both something wrong with democracy that could be fixed and an optimism about the progress being made, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, which were civilized, in contrast to un-named savage countries. Additionally, guiding public opinion was both urged and decried. If public opinion could be directed by good men, that was hopeful

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[6] Godkin, "Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," 1.

[7] Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 15 (1909-10): 32-60.

[8] George Kibbe Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion: The New Art of Making Presidents by Press Bureau," *McClures's Magazine* 39 (1912): 36-372.

[9] Philip Marshall Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," *North American Review* 204 (1916): 691-704.

for democracy and the future.[10] However, if instead of natural public opinion, public opinion was manufactured, that was a worry, according to Turner.[11] Then again, Charles Merriam wrote, if public opinion were manufactured to save democracy, that was a reason to be proud.[12]

Nation and nationalism, like public opinion, lacking fixed definition or theory, were richly represented in the articles in Childs' syllabus and were tied to blood-linked traits, civilization, and sacrifice. Stead saw the press as representing the national mind.[13] Godkin wrote that the only way to understand another nation was to read its newspapers.[14] According to Brown, diplomats needed to be representative of their nation. He was urging, not that they represent their nation, but rather that the character of the individual diplomat be representative of the character of the nation. He worried the American diplomat might become cosmopolitan and therefore devitalized. In 1918, in tune with the widespread racialist assumptions of the time, Melville described Germans as being born with Teutonic traits, however, similarly to Brown's devitalized American, the German could lose his nationality if he settled in another country.[15]

Race was intertwined with nation in the articles. The link of race was to nation and not color, and race was a blood connection. For example, Arthur Bullard saw the Germans, in Germany and in America, as enemies of civilization and Germans in

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[10] Stead, "Government by Journalism;" Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion;" Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion."

[11] Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion."

[12] Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy," *The American Political Science Review* 13 (November 1919): 541-555.

[13] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 654.

[14] Godkin, "Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," 6.

America carrying political sympathy in their blood that would ally them with the German nation.[16] He called the British and the Americans Anglo-Saxon cousins.[17] In 1901, in a study of election returns, Walter Hamm reassured his readers that there would be no future threat to the purity of the ballot because there would not be another dilution of the electorate.[18] It was the Anglo-Saxon countries that were on the verge of having rule by public opinion.[19] Anglo-Saxon was used casually by Edward Porritt in 1910.[20] There was an underlying assumption of the progress of the race in F. Stuart Chapin's argument for measurement in 1912.[21] The idea of racial progress was based on an assumption of racial hierarchies. William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson said the presence of different racial groups made governing difficult.[22]

The articles from Childs' syllabus published between 1886 and 1919 reveal multiple meanings of the concepts of public opinion and nation, as well as race bound with the idea of nation. They reveal assumptions about the social order and individual citizens. The authors' overriding concern was with control. Sometimes control was urged by the authors'. Other times the authors' worried about who was doing the controlling. *Almost always,* the common persons, the mass of citizens, were presumed to be unreasoning or too easily led.

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[15] Lewis Melville, "German Propaganda Societies," *Quarterly Review* 230 (1918): 70-88.

[16] Arthur Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," *Atlantic Monthly* 119 (April 1917): 495.

[17] Bullard, " Democracy and Diplomacy," 497.

[18] Walter C. Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," *Political Science Quarterly* 16 (1901): 50-67.

[19] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 60.

[20] Edward Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials," *Atlantic Monthly* 105 (January 1910): 62-67.

[21] F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at Presidential Elections," *American Journal of Sociology* 18 (1912): 222-240.

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W.T. Stead, "Government by Journalism,"

in *Contemporary Review* in 1886

A few good men of the right sort, acting like ministers or monarchs in their role as editors, could properly guide public opinion and restore democracy, and journalism could make government work, according to W.T. Stead in *Contemporary Review* in 1886.[23] Stead believed the press, and only the press, could make democracy work if it were in the hands of the right sort of men who saw it as their duty to perform the job of educating public opinion. His argument compared the editor to a minister and a monarch. The editor could, and should, through the newspaper generate, educate, and guide public opinion, the greatest force in politics, according to Stead.[24] Stead wrote,

> In a democratic age, in the midst of a population which is able to read, no position is comparable for permanent influence and far reaching power to that of an editor who understands his vocation. In him are vested almost all the attributes of real sovereignty. His has almost exclusive rights of initiative; he retains a permanent right of direction; and above all he better than any man is able to generate that steam, known as public opinion, which is the greatest force in politics.[25]

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[22] William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly* 31 (1916): 300-317.

[23] W.T. Stead, "Government by Journalism," *Contemporary Review* 4 (May 1886): 653-674.

[24] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 663, 664, 667.

[25] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 661.

Journalism, in the form of a daily newspaper, could save democracy, and it should, according to Stead's prescriptive piece. It was a call to improve the press and to position the press as the only method of saving democracy. Stead wrote, "Even as it now is, with all its disabilities and all its limitations, the Press is almost the most effective instrument for discharging many of the functions of government now left us."[26]

Stead's Jeremiad placed the editor in the role of the minister who must explain the higher road to his congregation of backsliding readers. There was a danger of losing democracy and self-government, but the proper men becoming editors and journalists, who behave in the proper way and educate the readers, could avert that danger.

Great Britain in the distant past was more democratic than the United States in the 1880s because people talked to each other in Great Britain in the distant past, however, more recently the British had been unable to talk to each other, thus endangering democracy, Stead wrote. A technological solution was found; technology conquered the distance that threatened democracy, according to Stead. He wrote, "The telegraph and the printing-press have converted Great Britain into a vast agora, or assembly of the whole community, in which the discussion of the affairs of State is carried on from day to day in the hearing of the whole people."[27]

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[26] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 674.

[27] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 654.

Stead assumed hearing about affairs of state was equivalent to participating in a discussion of the affairs of state. Hearing substituted for speaking. Further, this is an example of the necessity of remembering to forget.[28] The British past, of course, was comprised of several hierarchically organized monarchies.

Stead portrayed existing government as a barrier between the people of the nation and self-rule. Still, he was optimistic since progress was taking the government closer to the people, according to Stead. He wrote, "Nations become more and more impatient of the intermediaries between themselves and the exercise of power."[29] For Stead, the nation equaled a people who were citizens who ruled themselves, and the people as individual citizens made up the nation. The English were a people, a nation, as were the Germans, according to Stead. While editors should educate, and the press should form public opinion, at the same time Stead thought that the press was a gauge of public opinion.[30]

The need for the editors to act was based on Stead's fear of a threat to the social order if the public were left uneducated. In a sacred demos, the editor was to be the minister.

Stead's article revealed multiple conceptions of the world. The person was simultaneously a citizen, a member of the flock to whom the minister and editor would preach and educate, and a consumer who voted with a coin. Stead equated the act of paying for a newspaper to voting for the paper. He wrote, "The editor's mandate is

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[28] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso 1995): 187-206.

[29] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 653.

renewed day by day, and his electors register their vote by a voluntary payment of the daily pence."[31] Stead's sinner consumer needed to be led by the newspaper into being a rational participant in democracy because he was not capable on his own.

J.W. Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," in *American Journal of Sociology* in 1895

J. W. Jenks shared Stead's view that a few men should lead and educate public opinion, which was badly in need of guidance. Where Stead prescribed the editor and independent journalists to guide public opinion, Jenks spread the role of guidance wider. He wrote, "The duty, in consequence, lies not merely on our politicians, but it lies on all intelligent, moral men who have the welfare of the country at heart, to rouse, guide, shape public opinion."[32] Jenks argued that although public opinion should be based on thoughtful judgment and reasoned consideration, it was not. Rather, public opinion was based on sentiment, prejudice or political party influence, he wrote. Therefore, Jenks wrote, it was the duty of a few thoughtful men to openly discuss the facts and use their influence to promote thinking and judgment by the people.[33]

Public opinion was not what it needed to be in order to guide government because public opinion was not being properly guided, according to Jenks. He thought newspapers corrupted because they must cater to advertisers. Jenks believed legislators only followed what they thought voters wanted and did not lead public

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[30] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 658.
[31] Stead, "Government by Journalism," 655.
[32] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 164.
[33] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 169.

opinion as they should. Jenks' concern with the necessity of the proper guidance of public opinion grew from his understanding of the relationship between public opinion and government. He wrote, "The fact that there is a widespread belief that the ruling power in public affairs, as well as in social life, is public opinion, makes it desirable that the nature of public opinion itself—how it is constituted, who forms it, the way in which its influence is manifested, the ways in which it may be guided—be carefully studied."[34]

Jenks knew individuals had opinions, however, he was concerned about the way those opinions were formed. He believed that only a few people based their opinions on reason. He wrote, "It is probably not too much to say that not 25 per cent. of our adult [men] voting population have deliberately made up an opinion on a public question after anything like a reasonably full and fair study of the facts in the case."[35] Jenks described all of the other ways individuals might come to have opinions that were of less value than those opinions reached through reason. Individuals might be under the sway of a few influential men, base their opinion on others who were are as unreasoning as themselves, follow the opinions of newspapers, or follow prejudices.[36] He thought newspapers suspect because they relied on advertising. He wrote, "Public opinion, then, seems to be a mixture of sense and nonsense, of sentiment, of prejudice, of more or less clearly defined feelings coming from influences of various kinds that

[34] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 158.
[35] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 160.
[36] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 159-160.

have been brought to bear upon the citizens, these influences perhaps being mostly those of sentiment rather than those acting upon the judgement."[37]

Concerned that so few men were reasoning human beings, Jenks went on to suggest the ways a few of the right sort of men could influence public opinion so public opinion would have the correct effect on legislation. He encouraged influential individuals to "chat up" a few men of influence in different business and social classes. He encouraged the use of churches, public lectures, university extension classes, and meetings of all kinds.[38] Jenks' concern was for the quality of opinion and the need to lead the mass of people so they could vote. He thought it would take some time to prepare the majority and thus a few men should work to improve the general state of public opinion. Still he showed faith in progress. He wrote, "While the people cannot soon be ready to vote intelligently on complicated questions, they can so vote on simple fundamental questions, if they will; and they can, far better than they now do, put men in power who will faithfully work for the public good."[39]

Jenks' article on the need for a few men concerned with the good of the country to guide public opinion was in the first issue of *the American Journal of Sociology*, published in 1895-1896, indicating an existing concern with the quality of public opinion and the relationship of public opinion to the ability to cast an informed vote. Jenks was concerned that the norm should be a reasoning citizen when as he believed the norm was a citizen who was thinking from sentiment or prejudice. He

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[37] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 160.
[38] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 165.

saw the masses of voters, men, as incompetent because they were not using reason to form their opinions. With time, however, the unreasoning citizen might be guided to competence, he wrote.

E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion" in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1898

E. L. Godkin offered no solutions to the problems with public opinion he described in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1898. Godkin described two kinds of public opinion. The first was a belief in conformity to standards and was unchanging because Godkin believed some views were inherited as the result of being English or American or Roman, for example. According to Godkin, the second type of public opinion was a political form, and the political form of public opinion should be expressed in elections and in newspapers. Unfortunately, there were many ways in which ways newspapers were inadequate for the job, Godkin wrote. His main concern, however, was the lack of ability of most men to form opinions on subjects that needed judgments and decisions. He concluded that the excess of influences on modern man, along with a huge lessening of the influence of authority, had resulted in there being no way to guide public opinion. Furthermore, how public opinion was formed had become a mystery because there were so many influences on modern man, who, Godkin thought, sought only comfort from legislation.[40]

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[39] Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," 169.

[40] E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 131 (January 1898): 1-15.

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The problems Godkin saw with understanding public opinion as a political force modified by events are the same ones that would be struggled with during the twentieth century. He wrote, "The kind I am now talking of is the public opinion, or consensus of opinion, among large bodies of persons, which acts as a political force, imposing on those in authority certain enactments, or certain lines of policy."[41] He asked these questions: How does public opinion exercise control over affairs? Is there a way to know public opinion other than an election and without listening to those in power? He pointed out that definite issues are not submitted to the public in an election. He also noted no one knows why people vote as they do. He said most people follow their party, and votes are not definite expressions on a subject.

Godkin commented on the nature of newspapers; he turned to newspapers because he believed elections could not explain public opinion. He dismissed newspapers because he claimed they were less and less organs of public opinion because of increased reliance on advertising, and he dismissed the members of the general public because of their lessening capacity for continuous attention. After all, he wrote, they read fast-paced novels. Godkin saw the nation reflected in the newspapers none-the-less, but he took this stand because he said newspapers were the only alternative. Newspapers were the only way for one nation to know another nation. He wrote, "To the outsider the newspaper press is the nation talking about itself. Nations are known to other nations mainly through their press."[42]

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[41] Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," 1.

[42] Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," 6.

Walter C. Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes,"

in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1901

Walter Hamm studied presidential elections and talked about how to encourage voting. He conceived of voting as a duty of citizenship. He wrote, "There have been encouraging indications in recent years that this interest was increasing and that a better understanding of the duties of citizenship in a free government was being gained."[43] After comparing the voter turnout to the total population, he discussed ways to encourage voting and suggested ways to make voting easier.

Hamm was confident that the future would not bring another "dilution of the electorate"[44] caused by immigration and the enfranchisement of former slaves. He concluded his analysis in a tone hopeful for the future. He wrote, "The strongest force, however, towards, increasing the exercise of the suffrage is a public sentiment fully informed, sanely healthful and constantly alert. The progress toward such a condition of public sentiment, while not so rapid as could be desired, is marked enough to encourage further effort."[45] Hamm was encouraged that little harm had been done by allowing those he deemed a threat to vote. He continued, "In the past these masses of new voters have constituted the chief sources of corruption and of danger to the purity of the ballot. That no more harm resulted than we have actually experienced from these causes is a reason for confidence in the generally healthy condition of the

[43] Walter C. Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," *Political Science Quarterly* 16 (1901) 50.
[44] Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," 67.
[45] Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," 67.

body politic."[46] Hamm was confident only those prepared to vote would be permitted to vote in the future.

The immigration into the United States, and the perception of the immigrants' national status as a racial marker that carried differing mental abilities and political views, led Hamm to see the American electorate as diluted by the influx. His racial assumptions allowed him to be hopeful because of the strength of the polity, and its political system, to survive the dilution. He knew his reader would understand the harm that had been experienced because he assumed his reader shared his view of the dilution caused by immigration and the enfranchisement of former slaves.

These four men, Stead, Jenks, Godkin and Hamm, were all concerned with the status of democracy. While they worried about democracy they were hopeful, except for Godkin. Stead looked to newspaper editors, Jenks to moral men and Hamm to the rightness of the system itself to fix democracy by seeing that public opinion was properly led. The common man was in need of education by newspaper editors or moral men. Hamm did not specify a solution but confidently predicted the continued health of the body politic in spite of the lessening of the substance of the voters. Taken as a whole, they believed people in general needed to be led, and should be led, to participate rationally in the political process. Godkin lacked hope because he believed that the newspapers were no longer up to doing the job of leading people.

Edward Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1910

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[46] Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," 67.

Edward Porritt was concerned with the efficacy of political editorials in newspapers in a 1910 *Atlantic Monthly* article. He assumed that an Anglo-Saxon world was comprised of England, the United States and Canada. He found different reasons for what he perceived to be the lack of effect of newspaper articles on voters in different countries. Unfortunately, according to Porritt, as the number of people who could vote increased, so too did the propaganda efforts by English politicians. According to Porritt, political propagandists behaved like preachers, since the politician stood on street corners, village greens, and in the market place to reach voters. Porritt contended that this direct appeal to voters by politicians reduced the influence of newspaper editorials. He was especially concerned with an increase in propaganda during the early years of the twentieth century.[47]

The decade turned, and so did the attitude about influence. Although the concern with the need to lead the common man would continue and dominate, there began to be worry by some writers of syllabus articles about the wrong sort of people influencing the common man.

Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1910

In an article richly revealing of the breadth of thinking about public opinion in 1910, Walter J. Shepard argued for an individual conception of the concept of public opinion—each individual having an opinion—and multiple publics, and he predicted certain rule by public opinion in civilized Anglo-Saxon countries as legislative bodies

[47] Edward Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials," *Atlantic Monthly* 105 (1910): 62-67.

withered away.[48] He reviewed multiple meanings of public opinion that included the following: Public opinion equals opinions on which all persons in a country are agreed;[49] public opinion is the will of God;[50] public opinion is the sum total of opinions on any subject; public opinion is the opinion of the educated classes;[51] public opinion is social conscience;[52] and public opinion is not the result of elections or what was written in the newspapers and is often confused with one of its organs, the press or the electorate.[53]

> In 1910, the concept of public opinion was in wide circulation. Shepard wrote, There are few terms used more frequently or with more assurance than Public Opinion. It is constantly upon our tongues to explain the most ordinary social and political occurrences. Every newspaper employs it on an average several times in each issue; every politician and statesman refers to it in nearly every speech. Were it to be lost from our daily vocabulary it would be quite impossible to make ourselves understood in any discussion or conversation about political matters.[54]

The idea that public opinion governed in what Shepard called civilized countries also was widespread, he wrote.[55] Shepard wanted to explain how public opinion actually

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[48] Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 15 (1909-1910):32-60. The reference to legislative bodies withering away is not explained in the text.

[49] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 41.

[50] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 43.

[51] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 42.

[52] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 43.

[53] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 44.

[54] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 32.

[55] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 32.

worked, and he wrote, "But how this intangible, inexplicable force operates on the machinery of governments; how it makes itself felt by rulers, and what are the sanctions which compel obedience to its mandates are problems little understood and subjects of much disagreement."[56]

Shepard argued for social action based on individual action, and he argued against what he called an organic conception of society and used Italian nationalism as his example. He wrote, "We speak of Italy awakening to 'national consciousness.' This is certainly a very convenient and expressive phrase, but it conveys the idea that the nation, Italy itself, awoke out of something comparable to a long trance."[57]

In fact, a long trance was just what the nationalist would assume. The awakening would have been by the mass of individuals to a realization of an eternal bond, and the bond would have been conceived in various ways. Nationalists had imagined an eternal bond, before a nation existed.[58] It was in some ways a part of the response to the Enlightenment's cosmopolitan egalitarianism, as was explained in chapter three.

Shepard made a modest correction to the idea of awakening. He retained the idea of a new awareness of an existing relationship, but he shifted the identity of the awakeners. He accepted the awakening and changed the awakener from a reference to the whole to the individuals comprising the whole. Shepard wrote,

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[56] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 32.

[57] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 33.

[58] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism.* (New York: Verso, 1995): 187-206.

> Unless we happen to be adherents of the organic theory of the state we would prefer to explain the phenomena otherwise—the citizens of Italy became conscious of a bond of union between them all in the fact that they belonged to the same nation. The individualist would certainly maintain that it was an awakening of the citizens to this realization, and nothing more, that constituted "national consciousness;" that there is certainly no consciousness in the nation apart from the individuals.[59]

Shepard was careful to place boundaries around his terms. Nation, crowd, and society were, for Shepard, groups of individuals. He wrote, "They are not separate entities or organisms incapable of analysis into the individuals of which they are composed. Social phenomenon are nothing but individual action performed under special conditions which give it a special character."[60] He defined public opinion and wrote, "So a public opinion must be an opinion to which the members of a public agree, not in a merely accidental fashion, but in full cognizance that this opinion constitutes a bond of union between the individuals holding it."[61] He defined a public, "Any unorganized association of individuals bound together by common opinions, sentiments, or desires and too numerous for each to maintain personal relations with the others constitutes a public in the broadest sense of the term."[62]

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[59] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 33.
[60] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 34.
[61] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 35.
[62] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 36.

Shepard set opinion in opposition to sentiment. Sentiment was emotional and therefore could not be an opinion.[63] Although sentiments were the product of prejudice, heredity, or tradition, he thought public opinion was shared reason.[64] Shepard insisted that there are many publics, individuals bound by common sentiment but not maintaining relations with each other, that gather around public opinion on issues. Shepard thought that each of those the publics has an opposition public on the same issue. Therefore, there is no one public opinion on an issue, according to Shepard, however, there was a ruling opinion. By ruling opinion, he meant dominant opinion.

Following his careful effort to define public opinion on political questions as expressed in journalism and elections, Shepard was ready to say that legislative bodies were on the verge of being obsolete in the Anglo-Saxon countries, defined as the United States and England.[65] He wrote, "Keen political observers declare that no tendency is so universal or significant in all countries today as that which marks the decline of legislative bodies. These have proved unamenable to public opinion and other more serviceable organs are being created—especially the popular initiative and referendum."[66]

F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at presidential elections" in *American Journal of Sociology* in 1912

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[63] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 39.

[64] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 40.

[65] Porritt had included Canada in his list of Anglo-Saxon countries. Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials."

[66] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 59.

That all citizens were not casting votes based on reason was F. Stuart Chapin's assumption in 1912 writing in the *American Journal of Sociology*. He followed Franklin H. Giddings in viewing a political majority as being comprised of a few on the margins who are intelligent and capable of voting independently through several gradations to the stupid at the center of the mass of voters.[67] There could be no doubt about the continuing suspicion of the quality of the mass of voters, according to Chapin. The intelligent were few, marginal and capable of independent reasoning. His analysis of voting patterns, however, gave him hope because there appeared to be an increase in the number of intelligent, independent voters. He wrote, "Intelligent political action seems to be on the increase in approximately the ratio shown by the increasing variabilities of the popular vote at presidential elections."[68] Increased variability in voting meant, to Chapin, increased rationality. He used statistical analysis of votes for the president, compiled for the first time, and found that the voters were growing more rational.

Sydney G. Fisher, "The Legendary and Myth Making Process in Histories of the American Revolution"

in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge* in 1912

In 1912, in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge*, Sydney Fisher issued a call for the

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[67] F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at Presidential elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, 18 (1912): 222-240.

facts of the American Revolution to be more widely known. Fisher explained how the usual events of the time had been misrepresented. The article offered an excellent example of the way in which nation was conceived.

According to Fisher, the facts of the American Revolution, and the dissention in the country at the time, were left out of the history of the period. He wrote that this was because the earliest, authoritative source was a Whig view and because Americans found it necessary to cover up dissent in order to build the nation. Fisher claimed that the author burned the actual earliest and most authoritative source, and that the existing earliest and most authoritative source was the *Annual Register*. As Fisher explained, the *Register* was written by Edmund Burke and therefore carried the minority Whig point of view. Fisher believed this Whig view argued for the unity of the colonies with Britain and a conciliatory policy by the British in order to placate the colonists. The fault of the Revolutionary War was placed with a few misguided men, whereas most of the people living in the colonies did not want to start a separate country, according to Fisher. Most of the subsequent histories relied on the *Register*, he wrote. Fisher explained that Reverend Mason L. Weems wrote the first popular version of the Revolution, and Weems wrote immensely popular biographies of Washington, Franklin, and Marion. Fisher detailed the multiple problems with all of

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[68] F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at presidential elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, 18 (1912): 240.

the histories and argued from the position that new facts mean new history should be written and disseminated.[69]

Fisher wanted it widely known that there was internal dissention at the time of the American Revolution. For example, he wrote, the loyalists were hunted down and driven out of the new country, then treated badly in England.[70] According to Fisher, America was a disunited country after the war and its constitution was regarded as an experiment, one that might not succeed.[71] He wrote, "Our democratic ideas and manners were despised and our newness and crudeness contrasted with the settled comfort and refinement of the old nations. We all felt this keenly. Our writers and able men struggled might and main to unite our people and build up a nation."[72]

This is a striking example of the influence of romantic nationalism and the narrative created in its wake. It could also be seen as an instance of present-mindedness in Fisher's historical account. Fisher's assumptions about nation were clearly revealed. Fisher explained that immediately following the War for Independence the United States was contrasted with older nations. He wrote, "Our democratic ideas and manners were despised and our newness and crudeness contrasted with the settled comfort and refinement of the old nations."[73] He did not see the United States or France as the first nation following the revolutions against

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[69] Sydney G. Fisher, "The Legendary and Myth-Making Process in Histories of the American Revolution," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge*, 51 (April-June 1912): 53-75.

[70] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 54-55.

[71] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 55.

[72] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 55.

[73] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 55.

monarchy and absolutism as described in chapter three. He accepted the nationalist claim of an eternal nation and saw the United States as new while at the same time other nations were old, refined and settled. The United States was new in the world in the sense of an experiment and a new form of government, and he compared it to the old nations. There is no alternative, other than romantic nationalism, for seeing other nations—which were in fact behaving quite like empire and monarchy—as old and refined.[74] The older nations to which Fisher compared the United States in its newness, could only be nation in a sense of shared culture or shared blood-linked character, because the forms of bureaucratic organization prior to the revolutions were monarchy and empire. Fisher apparently thought of nation as some kind of eternal bond. Fisher's next sentence revealed a contrasting view of nation as he described the reaction to the comparison being made. "We all felt this keenly. Our writers and able men struggled might and main to unite our people and build up a nation."[75] The covering up of dissent at the origins of the nation allowed for the building up of the nation, which in part was accomplished by telling a story lacking dissention. Fisher wrote, "So they described a Revolution that never happened and never could happen. A whoop and hurrah boys! All spontaneous, all united; merciful noble, perfect; all virtue and grand ideas on one side, all vice, wickedness, effeteness and degeneration

[74] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5, 47-65.

[75] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 55.

on the other."[76] Fisher revealed the way in which the beginnings must be forgotten in order to remember to build unity.[77]

George Kibbe Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion" in *McClure's Magazine* in 1912

George Kibbe Turner, writing in *McClure's*, railed against the practice of "Manufacturing Public Opinion: The New Art of Making Presidents by Press Bureau" and concluded laws would soon be passed to limit the amount of money spent on political campaigns.[78] Turner detailed the individual contributors to several campaigns and the then huge amount of money spent to influence press coverage. His assumptions were as follows: Press bureaus created news and supplied it to newspapers; this costs a great deal of money; because so much money was spent, the system was corrupted; the newspaper created public opinion.

Turner assumed that the public could be manipulated. He was concerned not with *how* the public might be manipulated but rather that too much manipulation was in the hands of the few with money. His common man was not wise.

Philip Marshall Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy" in *North American Review* 1916

Writing in *North American Review* in 1916, Philip Marshall Brown argued against any kind of widespread participation in foreign affairs, such as a referendum or

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[76] Fisher, "Legendary and Myth-Making Process," 56.

[77] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 187-206.

[78] George Kibbe Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion: The New Art of Making Presidents by Press Bureau," *McClure's Magazine*, 39 (1912): 316-327.

initiative, except to vote the policy makers in or out of office.[79] In his refutation of the argument for the democratization of diplomacy conducted in the marketplace, Brown claimed people in general were not competent. He wanted men for diplomats who were representative of American ideals.[80] Brown supported the diplomat who was not a policy maker but rather an agent who responded to the statesman at the head of the nation. Moreover, Brown believed the particular type of man suited to being a diplomat was the same in each nation. He wrote, "It requires the same knowledge of men, the same keenness of insight, the same power of discussion, of persuasion; in sum, the same tact, or what we are accustomed to denote generally as common-sense."[81]

What set diplomats apart from one nation to another was the degree to which they were most representative of their nation, according to Brown. For Brown, American diplomats needed to be real Americans. He wrote, "The qualities which made them successful as men of affairs at home were the very qualities essential for the duties of American diplomats. To these qualities of mind, heart and personality, must be added the distinction of being, on the whole, truly representative Americans."[82] The truly representative American diplomat who had been chosen to protect national interests also was expected to judge the interests of international society, according to Brown. He wrote, "And the ready, courageous recognition of

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[79] Philip Marshall Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," *North American Review* 204 (1916): 691-704.

[80] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 700-701.

[81] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 693.

[82] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 693.

national duty must necessarily lie in the hands of those charged with supreme responsibility, who are best able to judge the exact situation, of the measures required for the protection of national interests, and the interests of international society in general."[83]

Brown worried that even the best and most representative American diplomat was in danger of becoming devitalized through becoming more cosmopolitan because when that happened, the diplomat ceased being able to represent America. He wrote,

> Another great objection to a permanent, classified diplomatic service is the danger to which diplomats are exposed—and for some inexplicable reason, American diplomats in particular—of becoming denationalized to a certain extent, of becoming cosmopolitan to such a devitalizing degree that they cease to be thoroughly representative of their country in its varied interests, its national characteristics, its feelings, sympathies, and even its ideals. The prime requisite in a diplomat is that he should be absolutely representative, the faithful interpreter of his fellow-countrymen, of their ideas, ideals, and highest interests.[84]

Brown's argument revealed much of what was then the current upper class common sense. Specifically, his argument was with Norman Angell, G. Lowes Dickinson, and Walter Lippmann, who stated his case in the book, *The Stakes of*

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[83] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 699.
[84] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 700-701.

Diplomacy, set in the context of determining the causes of World War One.[85] In making the argument, Brown assumed that the nation was on a path of progress toward improvement.[86] Brown masculinized the nation. The test to the nation was cast as a test of manhood. Brown pointed out how many what he called "mysterious challenges"[87] could arise to form the destiny of a nation, including, "the sudden storms that arise, the dangers, the tests of manhood, the appeals to honor, the sense of duty."[88] Additionally, he called the loss of representativeness of American ideals a devitalization resulting from becoming too cosmopolitan.

When Brown equated becoming cosmopolitan with being devitalized and less representative of the real Americans he showed the way in which romanticism and reaction to Enlightenment reason underlie his thinking. If the nation were to be distinct, its uniquenes was to be found in its character, sentiment, and traditions, according to Brown. This was contrary to Hobsbawm's notion of the nation as freely chosen by its members.[89] Brown assumed that his assertions about the devitalizing effects of cosmopolitanism were commonsense. The fact of American susceptibility to becoming cosmopolitan and the resultant devitalization and thus lack of ability to uphold American ideals and interests could be used as an argument in opposition to a permanent diplomatic corps without explanation. Brown's readers' would have understood his argument.

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[85] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 691.
[86] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 704.
[87] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 699.
[88] Brown, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 699.

William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes" in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1916

William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson used votes on 103 referenda to measure class differences in Oregon. They concluded that there was probably more worry about class war than there needed to be because the capitalist, middle, and labor classes were not that far apart on issues. Ogburn and Peterson relied on Herbert Spencer and Franklin Giddings for theoretical justification.[90]

Ogburn and Peterson take Giddings "consciousness-of-kind" to mean agreement on the referenda issues they measure. Additionally, many aspects of heterogeneity were discussed as leading to difficulty governing and the vote by classes was measured. They saw groups of people in New York City and Austria-Hungary as being different races. They wrote, "One reason why good government is difficult in New York City is the great heterogeneity of its population. In Austria-Hungary, also, a great hindrance to the success of government is the great number of widely differing racial groups."[91] This reference to different races was based on what we would now call nationalities. Ogburn and Peterson linked language and nationality to arrive at different races. They measured classes because of the threat of a social revolution and cited what they called industrial disturbances—these were strikes—in five states to

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[89] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 2nd. Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 18-20.

[90] William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly* 31 (1916): 300-317.

[91] Ogburn and Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," 301.

give credibility to the concern. They wrote, "To some these differences appear so great that a social revolution and a class war are quite freely predicted."[92]

Arthur Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy" in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1917

Arthur Bullard argued for the democratization of foreign affairs in the widely circulating *Atlantic Monthly* magazine in 1917. He argued that America should make diplomacy democratic as a contribution to world peace.[93] The article provided definitions of and revealed assumptions about key terms in this analysis. He referred to the nation as "we, the nation" and meant all of the people.[94] Publicity was used to mean out in the open, out in public and was set in opposition to acts performed in secret, according to Bullard.[95] He believed that publicity was good and served the cause of increasing democracy. Additionally, publicity was part of the progress of revealing secrets and thereby making improvements, and democracy made progress by fighting secrecy with publicity.

Common people were the same in all countries and were all striving for a better democracy, Bullard wrote.[96] He believed that the will of the nation, of all of the people, concerning issues of foreign affairs was difficult for any president to determine because there was no machinery available with which to take a referendum on

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[92] Ogburn and Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," 301.
[93] Arthur Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," *Atlantic Monthly*, 119 (April 1917): 491-499.
[94] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 491.
[95] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 492.
[96] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 492.

diplomatic issues.[97] According to Bullard, there was no public opinion on the United States relations with South American countries because the masses of people did not know the facts. He wrote, "But there is nothing which deserves to be called public opinion on the subject. The democracy has not been trusted with the essential facts."[98] Bullard assumed that if the mass of people had access to facts they could reason and decide an opinion.[99] Censorship of the press and mail was equated with control of public opinion, and in Britain, public opinion had been successfully controlled.[100]

Bullard thought Germans were the "enemies of civilization."[101] He believed bloodlines carried political sympathies. He wrote, "Any American who does not fit into this pattern [of longing to fight on the side of the British] is suspected of German blood or a sinful desire to run contraband."[102] Civilized people were British, French, and American. He wrote, "The result of following the traditional protocol of diplomacy is that, while the people of the United States and Britain and France have every reason to cooperate in the general work of civilization, their governments are snarling at each other."[103] The British he considered cousins to Americans. He wrote, "The great mass of our people want cordial relations with our Anglo-Saxon cousins."[104] Bullard advocated going directly to the people of another nation. He

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[97] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 493.
[98] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 493.
[99] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 493.
[100] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 495.
[101] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 495.
[102] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 495.
[103] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 496.
[104] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 497.

wrote, "If we find the Foreign Office of any country standing in the way of cordial friendship, we must go over their heads, directly to the people. It is the popular friendship more than the good-will of the rulers of the moment which we seek."[105]

He sought to enlighten public opinion in the United States and to discover direct ways to communicate between the mass of people in one nation and those in another nation. Bullard thought making diplomacy more democratic would make a great contribution to the future peace of the world and, therefore, would be of great benefit to the race. His referent was the Anglo-Saxon race.[106] He wrote, "The solution of the problem would be the greatest contribution which any nation could make toward the welfare of the race."[107] Bullard's views reflect the assumptions of the progress of civilization led by the progress of the Anglo-Saxon race. Some races were more civilized than others. This thinking was overlaid by a belief in democracy furthered by openness about facts. The people were somehow better than their leaders. Public opinion was formed by the press and inherited ideas passed along in blood. Bullard was the only advocate of the wisdom of the common people, however, his racialist assumptions about civilization would have led to a rank order of nations by ability. One possible way to bring these ideas together would be to read him as advocating the wisdom of a people within a nation.

Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1919

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[105] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 499.
[106] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 499.

The renowned Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago recounted his work as the head of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) in Italy in *The American Political Science Review* in November 1919.[108] According to Merriam, it was only a few months after the beginning of the efforts by the Creel Commission in the United States that branch offices were set up in thirty-two foreign countries. The purpose, he wrote, was to explain the war aims of the United States.[109] Merriam explained that the CPI branches were charged with countering anti-war propaganda with truth by using newspapers, journalists, speakers, movies, and postcards. After acknowledging the initial superiority of the Central Powers use of propaganda, Merriam claimed the Allies had caught up and surpassed their ability.[110] Merriam called propaganda a weapon and defined it as, "the psychological working on the war will of the enemy."[111] Publicity was the spreading of truthful facts to counter the lies of propaganda.[112] The CPI efforts were justified because untruths were being spread, according to Merriam. He wrote, "It was to meet these arguments [that America was unwilling to enter the war, had no army and couldn't raise one, even if any army was raised, it could not be transported due to shortages, and even if transported it couldn't

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[107] Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," 499.

[108] Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy," *The American Political Science Review*, 13 (November 1919): 541-555.

[109] Merriam, "American Publicity," 541. The reporter Will Irwin and later Edward Lisson were in charge of the CPI's foreign offices.

[110] Merriam, "American Publicity," 541.

[111] Merriam, "American Publicity," 541.

[112] Merriam, "American Publicity," 554.

fight because of inexperienced soldiers] that the office of the Committee on Public Information was established."[113]

Merriam recognized the credibility of Italian war veterans and the legitimacy their sacrifice for the nation gave to their point of view. The CPI in Italy organized celebrations—for May 24th to commemorate Italy's entrance into the war and for the Fourth of July—and crowds of tens of thousands gathered in major Italian cities. Injured Italian veterans gave speeches that were greeted enthusiastically, according to Merriam. He wrote, "They [the Mutilati] were one of the most effective pro-war organizations in the country, for they spoke on behalf of thousands who had shed their blood for the Italian cause, and who could speak from the basis of a definite sacrifice."[114] Merriam noted the evidence that the message of the CPI in Italy was getting across.

> One of the practical and amusing tests of our work occurred in Florence. Professor Altrocchi was listening one day to a street speaker who offered to talk on any subject, and at the close of his little speech would take up a collection. Professor Altrocchi asked him to speak on the United States and the war, whereupon he proceeded with an eloquent discourse using the standard facts and figures of the Committee on Public Information.[115]

In a passage that reflected Merriam's idealism, he claimed Italy was won, not only by facts, but also with American idealism. He wrote,

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[113] Merriam, "American Publicity," 544.
[114] Merriam, "American Publicity," 552.

> They were doubly impressed by the fact that America, so far distant from the seat of war, so prosperous as a neutral, with nothing to gain in the way of territory, was willing to undertake, across three thousand miles of sea, an assault upon militarism and autocracy in an attempt to make the world safe for democracy and to organize the world in a League of Nations for a permanent peace. To them this appealed more strongly than the dollars or the supplies or the soldiers of America, and its effect upon the morale of the struggling and somewhat discouraged people cannot be denied.[116]

He closed with an appeal for the scientific study of international misunderstandings in order to keep the world peaceful and prosperous. Merriam was certain of the truth of his message. His own idealism and belief in truth shined through in the article. He was brimming with hope for science and truth. He was proud of the effort in Italy because it was based on what he believed to be the truth. While he carefully detailed the views of those who opposed participation in the war, he appeared to believe they could be convinced with truth.

Merriam assumed nation was natural, however, in one instance he pulled an individual from a series in order to categorize him by race. Merriam was describing the Italian coalition government and the individual members of the coalition. Merriam described only one of the four by race. He wrote, "The minister of foreign affairs was

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[115] Merriam, "American Publicity," 549.
[116] Merriam, "American Publicity," 555.

Baron Sonnino, an active factor in the building of modern Italy—English, Jewish and Italian in race, conservative in tendency and skilled in diplomacy."[117]

The content of the articles published between 1886 and 1919 that comprised a portion of Harwood Childs' Princeton Public Opinion class syllabus reveal the authors' assumptions about the common man, public opinion and nation-race. The major focus of the authors was with control of the common man. The common man was seen as unreasoning and in need of guidance by those who knew best. Race was seen as nation by the authors. Nationality meant a blood link among members. They worried about the failure of democracy, and they saw the guidance of the common man as necessary to make democracy a success.

In the next chapter, the articles from Childs' syllabus that were published following World War I are described and analyzed.

[117] Merriam, "American Publicity," 545.

Chapter Five

Harwood Childs' Public Opinion Syllabus Articles from 1920 to 1933

The call for a few good men to lead, the assumption of the need to control the masses and the intertwining of nation and race continued to dominate the thinking of the people who wrote the articles in Childs' syllabus published between 1920 and 1933. In the articles, the meaning of public opinion was contested, and sometimes opinion was possessed by an individual. The common man was portrayed as unreasoning or dangerous. The common man was not portrayed as wise. Although the idea that race determines inherited characteristics dominated the articles, a few authors contested the idea.

Many scholars believed that a few good men were needed to lead the unreasoning masses of unwise common men. William Hocking thought that the best leaders were bred. Additionally, he believed the mass of men needed to do a better job choosing their leaders, as he told his readers in a *Yale Review* article in 1924.[1] William Orton was certain that mass opinion was dangerous.[2] He wrote, "There are, in fact, few if any matters on which mass opinion can act rather than dangerously."[3] Writing in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1927, Orton was repeating the call for a few to lead that was present in the earliest articles from Childs' syllabus.

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[1] William Ernest Hocking, "Leaders and Led," *The Yale Review*, 13 (July 1924): 625-641.
[2] William Orton, "News and Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 38 (1927): 80-93.
[3] Orton, "News and Opinion," 93.

In 1929, Edward Corwin wanted to see academics as leaders of public opinion. He indicated that the educated few could use science to advocate for a common good.[4] The call for a few good men to lead reflected a belief that the great mass of citizens lacked the ability to live up to the democratic ideal of an informed and reasoning citizenry. Norman Meier was pessimistic about the common man's reasoning ability, and he thought that the common will was better understood as mass suggestion. Even if the individual believed that he was reasoning, he was not, according to Meier.[5]

William Munro argued for more science in political science and argued against what he called the democratic dogma of citizen participation.[6] He wrote, "The closer we get to a government by the multitude the nearer we get to chaos."[7] He continued, "The principle of political equality, when pressed to its logical conclusion, carries us straight to anarchy."[8] Munro did not see a wise common man in 1927.

Nation and race were most often used interchangeably and occasionally as separate categories in the articles in Childs' syllabus published between 1920 and 1933. During that period the overlapping meaning of the concepts was only slightly contested and did not disappear. The late nineteenth century meaning had taken race and nation as interchangeable. The emerging conception of race in the early twentieth century was based on skin color and geographic region, however, the ideas of nation as race and a hierarchy of races dominated the articles from the public opinion canon.

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[4] Edward S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 23 (1929): 569-592.

[5] Norman C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 31 (September 1925): 199-212.

[6] William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," *Yale Review* 16 (1927): 723-738.

[7] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 730-31.

In a 1920 *Atlantic Monthly* article, Paul Rohrbach described a shared national character carrying inherited traits.[9] Races evolved, according to Joseph Geiger.[10] In explaining the way in which nation should not be race-based, A. Gordon Dewey revealed that it was commonplace to think of nation as race-based in 1924.[11] Articles written by Emory Bogardus in the *Journal of Applied Sociology* vividly display the intertwining of the conceptions of race, language, and nation, together with college students' attitudes toward specific races.[12] It is apparent from Floyd Allport's work in 1925 that race and nation were on the social issues agenda.[13] In "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," L. L. Thurstone used nationality and race interchangeably,[14]and in 1927, William Munro assumed racial determinism was natural.[15] He wrote, "The determinism of racial heritage, at any rate, is a factor which all intelligent students of comparative politics are accustomed to take into their reckonings."[16]

Opinion was most frequently considered to be something that an individual possesses, and something that needs direction or control. The nature of *public* opinion

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[8] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 731.

[9] Paul Rohrbach, "German Reflections," *Atlantic Monthly*, 125 (1920): 688-699.

[10] Joseph Roy Geiger, "The Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young," International *Journal of Ethics*, 34 (October 1923): 69-83.

[11] A. Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I," *Political Science Quarterly*, 38 (1923): 636-651; "On Methods in the Study of Politics II" *Political Science Quarterly*, 39 (1924): 218-233.

[12] Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9 (January –February 1924/1925): 216-226; "Measuring Social Distance, "*Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (March-April 1924/1925): 299-308.

[13] Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "The measurement and motivation of atypical opinion in a certain group" *The American Political Science Review* 19 (1925): 735-760.

[14] L.L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *Journal of General Psychology* 1 (1928): 405-423.

[15] William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," *Yale Review* 16 (1927): 723-738.

was widely discussed and rarely agreed on. In a *Political Science Quarterly* article, A. Gordon Dewey argued for the intertwined formation and expression of public opinion and pointed out the error of separating the two. Further, Dewey saw the need to understand public opinion as something made, and not something discovered.[17] According to Emory Bogardus, public opinion was the opinion of individuals—an aggregate sum—and he believed that if individuals' opinions could be changed, then public opinion changed, but slowly.[18]

Although *opinion* was seen as something that individuals had, political scientists were unable to define *public opinion* and decided to forgo the effort and focused instead on measuring individual opinions, according to Arthur Holcombe's report on the discussion of the roundtable on political statistics presented in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925. The group recommended avoiding use of the term public opinion because it was difficult to define.[19] Nevertheless, the group found a way to characterize opinion. Holcombe wrote, "(1) opinion need not be the result of a rational process; (2) it need not include an awareness of choice; and (3) it must be sufficiently clear or definite to create a disposition to act upon it under favorable circumstances."[20] Note, an opinion lacking rationality and without

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[16] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 728.

[17] A. Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I," *Political Science Quarterly*, 38 (1923): 636-651; "On Methods in the Study of Politics II" *Political Science Quarterly*, 39 (1924): 218-233.

[18] Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9 (January –February 1924/1925): 216-226; "Measuring Social Distance, "*Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (March-April 1924/1925): 299-308.

[19] Arthur N. Holcombe, "Round Table on Political Statistics: The Measurement of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review* 19 (1925): 123-126.

[20] Holcombe, "Round Table," 123.

awareness of choice separates opinion from Enlightenment reason and the idea of self-governance as well as press responsibility.

The idea that the newspaper forms public opinion that results in a specific vote was tested by George Lundberg, who took the idea to test this traditional assumption from Robert Park. Lundberg equated vote results with public opinion,[21] whereas for William Munro, the idea that public opinion somehow governs was merely dogma in need of destruction.[22] Munro wrote that political science needed more science to debunk what then was the current commonsense understanding of public opinion as self rule, because that did not square with the facts—there is a tendency toward government by the few.[23] Robert Binkley described multiple meanings of public opinion in 1928,[24] and so did other scholars.[25] Clearly, there were few shared definitions of public opinion in 1930 as George Lundberg described the contested concept in *The American Journal of Sociology*.[26] Social scientists should get to work on improving the practice of predicting elections, according to Charles Merriam.[27] In other words, he wanted to see the social sciences' measuring methods advance journalism's gathering of straw votes. In an *American Political Science Review* article

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[21] George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," *Social Forces* 4 (1926): 709-715.

[22] William B. Munro, "The Worst Fundamentalism," *Atlantic Monthly* 138 (1926): 451-459.

[23] William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," *Yale Review* 16 (1927): 723-738.

[24] Robert C. Binkley, "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences," *Social Forces* 6 (1928): 389-396.

[25] D. D. Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 37 (1931): 410-423; Lowell Juilliard Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept," *Sociology and Social Research* 13 (1928): 18-29.

[26] George A. Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," *The American Journal of Sociology* 36 (1930): 387 – 405.

[27] Charles E. Merriam, "Research Problems in the Field of Parties, Elections, and Leadership," *The American Political Science Review* 24 (1930): 36-38.

in 1931, Harold Lasswell suggested that the definition of concepts should come before the measurement of concepts.[28]

The Articles

Paul Rohrbach, "German Reflections" in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1920

In an article in an elite magazine explaining conditions in Germany to readers in the United States, Paul Rohrbach wrote about nation as having a consciousness and a will, and opinion as being something shared among members of the nation because of shared national character. Rohrbach's article in *Atlantic Monthly* described the changing allegiances of German political factions during and after the war. He argued for the necessity of lifting the harsh economic measures imposed by the Versailles Treaty if democracy were to survive in post-war Germany.[29]

Rohrbach discussed the unity of German public opinion and the ways in which the unity was fractured as he described the existing threat to democracy from radicals of both the right and left. He claimed that the only way opinion could have supported the war was if the war were defensive, because the German national character would not have tolerated war under any other circumstance. He wrote, "The only effective and salutary measure for warding off the impending catastrophe would have been to remember the old truth that Germany could not fight a war which was not supported by the united public opinion of the nation, and that no war could have this support, in

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[28] Harold D. Lasswell, " The Measurement of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review* 25 (1931): 311-326.

[29] Paul Rohrbach, "German Reflections," *Atlantic Monthly*, 125 (1920): 688-699.

view of the national character and the influence of universal service, unless it were a war of defense."[30]

In addition to his reliance on German national character to make his argument, Rohrbach assumed that national traits were inherited. He was worried about the weakening of the entire nation as a result of the blockade. He thought the undernourishment of the parents would result in weakness that would be transmitted to their descendants.[31]

Joseph Roy Geiger, "The Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young" in *International Journal of Ethics* in 1923

Joseph Geiger called attention to the multiple dangers that movies might present to young people, and then concluded that movie producers appeared to be trying to develop more of a group consciousness among themselves, to control their product, much as the press had already done.[32] His article details the dangers of the abnormal and unnatural aspects of movies. Geiger believed that visual impressions were more vivid and lasting than those gained from reading or listening and that people were under the spell of the movies. In the process of describing the problems stemming from watching movies, Geiger revealed multiple assumptions. He conceived of race as an aspect of evolution.

Geiger found movies unhealthy in many ways. Watching movies might awaken instincts prematurely, over stimulate the imagination, incline a child toward

[30] Rohrbach, "German Reflections," 690.
[31] Rohrbach, "German Reflections," 691.

antisocial behavior, and produce eyestrain and nervous excitement. Further, the air in the dark theater was stale and, therefore, unhealthy. The content in movies supplied the "germs of nervous and mental disorders."[33] Geiger used events he could observe in the world to back his assertions about the movies' harmful effects. He wrote,

> Evidence of the demoralizing and degrading effects of the sex-inspired picture on the youth of the land is seen on every hand. Immodest clothes, indecent dancing, promiscuous drinking parties, midnight joy rides—these things are not superficial and isolated evils to be railed at and combated one by one. They are rather an expression of the spirit of the times, a spirit of immodesty and irreverence and lawlessness generated in part, at least, by the unparalleled assault which, for a decade or more, has been made, through the motion picture, on society's most valuable assets, namely, its innocency and its youth.[34]

In addition to showing concern about the influence of the movies on society, Geiger's article reveals what were considered to be the commonsense presumptions of the time. These presumptions include: 1) races are at different points of evolution; 2) evolution of races occurs in stages; 3) youth is innocent; 4) people develop in stages and have instincts appropriate to their age. Furthermore, he thought that *suggestion* (believing something to be true in the absence of logic) was a threat to the innocence

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[32] Joseph Roy Geiger, "The Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young," *International Journal of Ethics*, 34 (October 1923): 69-83.

[33] Geiger, "Effects of Motion Picture," 73.

[34] Geiger, "Effects of Motion Picture," 79.

of youth. Geiger believed that the young were out of control because of the influence of the movies.

A Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I" and "On Methods in the Study of Politics II"

in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1923 and 1924

In two *Political Science Quarterly* articles in 1923 and 1924, A. Gordon Dewey argued against common will, existing national interest, and the influence of most individuals while arguing for a public opinion of intertwined formation and expression.[35] Dewey presented an intricate description of a vast network of political activity. He carefully defined his terms and the relationships among various factors in political action. He wrote,

> 'Public opinion' grows by a process of accretion, expression of opinion by individuals and groups helping to form, in fact as a rule being deliberately intended to form, the opinions of others. Thus it is incorrect to segregate consideration of the 'formation' from that of the 'expression' of public opinion. At the same time, expressions of opinion provoke contrary opinions; hence, save in times of crisis, we have turmoil and conflict, rather than 'common will'.[36]

Essential participants in this slow formation and expression of public opinion are those sharing common interests who join to influence the government, Dewey wrote. He

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[35] A. Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I," *Political Science Quarterly*, 38 (1923): 636-651; "On Methods in the Study of Politics II" *Political Science Quarterly*, 39 (1924): 218-233.

accounts for a few elite individuals who count as an interest group by themselves and contrasts their influence with that of most individuals. He wrote, "Incidentally, we should note that although the weight of the average individual in the community is almost negligible, yet certain persons, by virtue of their prestige and strategic situation, may be considered virtually as interest groups in themselves."[37]

Dewey wrote the most intricate description of the process of forming public opinion among the articles in Childs' syllabus covered so far. He argued that his study method, though complex, was necessarily so. He saw interest groups as the critical force for change, and observed that some were active in seeking to have their interest installed in the law. In pursuing their goal, Dewey wrote, interest groups created the public opinion that others wanted to measure. Dewey saw the need to understand public opinion as something made, and not something discovered. He wrote,

> Here we are dealing with the problem of initiative in political action, the dynamic elements in the formation of effective opinion. This is a stimulating evolution from our previous passive treatment, which looked upon 'Public Opinion', 'the Common Will,' as something to be *discovered* rather than something which is *made*, as a homogeneous mass rather than a heterogeneous complex of ingredients (emphasis in original).[38]

Dewey saw nationalism as a subsidiary study. He began with a conception of nationalism as a state of mind and an aspect of public opinion rather than a matter of

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[36] Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics," 649-650.
[37] Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics," 640.
[38] Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics," 651.

race or legal status, showing us that nationalism was usually a matter of race or legal status. For Dewey, studying nationalism is the same as determining and studying national interests. Dewey wrote, "The problem then becomes one of identifying interests nation-wide in scope, as opposed to others merely sectional, and studying their activities."[39] It is important to note the change in the consideration of nationalism. In addition to the shift from considering nationalism to be a matter of race or legal status to considering it to be a matter of national interests (which were groups), nationalism was severed from the idea of a common will. There could be nothing like a common will for Dewey. His method, through his definitions, precluded it.

William Ernest Hocking, "Leaders and Led"
in The Yale Review in 1924

A few good leaders from the best blood lines were needed to lead the mass of people who were lacking, or democracy might be forced off of the stage of history, according to William Ernest Hocking, writing in *The Yale Review* in 1924.[40] He reviewed the ways in which political leaders were chosen and the pitfalls inherent in the process of choosing. He explained, "The sum of it is—and this is perhaps the most hopeful thing that can be said—that the level of our choices is still far below the level of our possibilities."[41]

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[39] Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics II," 229.
[40] William Ernest Hocking, "Leaders and Led," *The Yale Review*, 13 (July 1924): 625-641.
[41] Hocking, "Leaders and Led," 641.

Hocking believed that race and nation were passed along in the blood, and he used the language of breeding to make several points, including leadership. He wrote, "For aught that the facts can show, the emergence of leaders of the first rank has nothing to do with forms of government and election: it may be a matter of the virility of the national stock—its power to beget men of gauge and temper to govern, and of every thousand or so bred to give one or two training that does not spoil them on the way."[42] Nationality was conceived as being bred and therefore race-based. Hocking reflected one of Gellner's principles of nationalism when he wrote about co-nationality and the desirability of having the genus of the group in the leader. Hocking wrote, "A certain sort of likeness in its leaders the public does indeed demand—such likeness as is implied in co-nationality. This is true precisely because some curbing or driving is implied in all governing; and in a democratic state it is necessary that when the leader controls, the people shall be able to conceive that they control themselves—which is possible in so far as they see their genus reproduced in him."[43]

Hocking acknowledged the strong tie of race and class interests, and he hoped for a visionary leader who could rise above separate interests. He wrote,

> And the time must come when we shall also demand representatives who will represent more than their locality as they represent more than their party. Each one of them must under take to represent the whole nation, and the nation as part of humanity. For he who sets his country above humanity will set his locality about his country, and will end by setting himself on top of the pile.

[42] Hocking, "Leaders and Led," 627.

The cure of this situation lies at all times in the hands of the voters; but it implies some improvement in their wills, and not alone in their intellects.[44]

Comparing nationalities to breeds was commonplace in nineteenth-century racialist thinking.[45] The metaphor depended on an assumption that different qualities were linked to a specific race and nationality. Hocking also used nation with an unusual connotation, linking it to all of humanity, and thus contradicting most uses of nation as a unique subset.

Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins" and "Measuring Social Distance"

in *Journal of Applied Sociology* in 1924 and 1925

Emory S. Bogardus was the leading scholar researching the concept of social distance, and his work from the mid-1920s appeared in Childs' syllabus. Two articles in the *Journal of Applied Sociology* describe data he collected from college students, businessmen, and teachers. These articles are remarkable for their direct treatment of race and the way in which they reveal the intertwining of the conceptions of race, language, and nation.[46]

Bogardus had two-hundred forty-eight graduate and upper-division social psychology students rank-order twenty-four races into three lists based on the students' feelings of friendliness, neutrality, or antipathy toward the group. Then each

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[43] Hocking, "Leaders and Led," 632.
[44] Hocking, "Leaders and Led," 639.
[45] Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).

of the students selected the group for which he or she felt the most antipathy and wrote a description of the circumstance under which the feeling originated and developed. Bogardus explained that half of the students' descriptions devoted half of the amount written to a "generalization and denunciation"[47] that he had instructed the students to avoid.

Bogardus took the definition of social distance and the idea for his study from Robert E. Park.[48] Citing Park, he wrote, "Social distance refers to 'the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize pre-social and social relations generally.' The following experiments were conducted to find out just how and why these grades of understanding and intimacy vary."[49]

He listed the self-described twenty-four racial descents of the parents of the students doing the ranking and expressed surprise that many students were uncertain about their racial decent.[50] Bogardus called it a surprising low ebb in racial consciousness because many of the students were uncertain of their "racial descent."[51] The students' lists were dominated by what many people might now call Northern Europeans. Six-hundred-four descent lines were listed from the English (174), Scotch(sic) (120), Irish (109), German (86), French (65) and Dutch (50). Fifty-eight racial descent lines were mentioned eight or fewer times, and they contain a wider

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[46] Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9 (January – February 1924/1925): 216-226; "Measuring Social Distance, "*Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (March-April 1924/1925): 299-308.

[47] Bogardus, "Social Distance and its Origin," 226.

[48] Bogardus, "Social Distance and its Origin," 216, f. 1 & 2.

[49] Bogardus, "Social Distance and its Origin," 216.

[50] Bogardus, "Social Distance and its Origin," 217.

[51] Bogardus, "Social Distance and its Origins," 217.

selection of descent from Canadian (8), Spanish (8), Swedish (8), Dane (4), Chinese (6), Italian (4), Jew-German (4), Jew-Russian (3), Japanese (3), Hungarian (2), Mulatto (2), Negro (2), Norwegian (2), Russian (2), Armenian (1), Bulgarian (1), French-Canadian (1), and Filippino (sic) (1).

This list, of the races from which the college students in the mid-1920s thought they had descended, vividly displayed the common sense of the time. Additionally, it showed the mainstream, intellectual, academic common sense as evidenced by Bogardus' surprise at the low ebb in racial consciousness, along with the students' high feelings of antipathy toward other races. Race was thoroughly confounded with nation, language, or religion, and this conception of race was believed to be associated with positive and negative feelings. The categories of Jew-German and Jew-Russian are particularly telling. In this case, nation or language separated religious and kinship ties. Mulatto was a distinctive mix of two races.

In addition to the self-described descent races, Bogardus added a dozen more races to make his list of racial groups for scoring by the experimental subjects. They were Armenian, Bulgarian, Bohemian, Canadian, Chinese, Czecho-Slovak, Dane, Dutch, English, French, French-Canadian, Finn, German, Greek, Hindu, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Jew-German, Jew-Russian, Mexican, Mullatto, Negro, Norwegian, Portuguese, Filipino, Polish, Roumanian, Russian, Servian, Scotch(sic), Spanish, Syrian, Swedish, and Turk.[52]

[52] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 216.

At the top of the list of races toward which the most students felt the greatest antipathy were the Turks, who were most disliked by 119 students; followed by Negro by 79; Mulatto, 75; Japanese, 61; Hindu, 44; Jew-German, 42; Mexican, 41; Jew-Russian, 41; German, 38; and Chinese, 30. No students felt antipathy toward several so-called races. They were Canadian, Dane, Dutch, French-Canadian, Norwegian, and Scotch(sic). The remainder of the races on the list of "Races Against which the Greatest Antipathy was Expressed" were ranked between 19 and 2.[53] Seven of the ten most disliked groups were represented in the class.

Bogardus found four main categories into which the written responses of the students describing their greatest antipathy could be grouped. The largest group relied on what Bogardus called traditions and accepted opinion. He wrote, "It is clear after reading the data that hearsay evidence coming from both one's personal friends and from relative strangers in one's own 'universe of discourse' who possess prestige in one's own eyes are widely influential in creating social distance."[54] The students took their antipathy from parents, teachers, and returned missionaries. Bogardus thought the students who relied on "second-hand and hearsay racial reports"[55] had "entered imaginatively"[56] into the experience and the experience had become the student's own.[57] Bogardus was extremely skeptical about these reports relying on second-hand

[53] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 218.
[54] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 219.
[55] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 219.
[56] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 219.
[57] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 219.

information. He worried that they could be incorrect. He assumed that it was somehow possible to have correct reasons for racial antipathy

Bogardus thought there could be antipathy toward a specific race based on personal experience alone. His second category was "frightening childhood experiences with another race." He wrote, "Unpleasant racial sense impressions, *personally experienced* in the early years of life are many. Sometimes *fear* is aroused; again, *disgust*. In either case there is a sensory image that is often described as 'horrifying.' This fact that these images were experienced in childhood gives them a more or less permanent character (emphasis in original)."[58] The third category of personal experience was a childhood experience of disgust or disgust combined with fear.

Bogardus found that fear and disgust were prevalent among those reporting experiences with another race as adults. He believed general antipathy toward a race was a generalization of a personal experience. In describing the category of adult experiences, Bogardus showed his assumption of the development of a race and the way in which individual members of a race might be at different stages of development. He wrote, "Unpleasant race impressions *experienced* in *adulthood* are also common. As a rule these anti-racial attitudes represent a generalization of experiences with one or a few individuals of the given race. Although there may be a recognition that the given experiences have been related to the less socially developed members of the race in question or from non-typical individuals the aversion is likely

[58] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 221.

to spread to the whole race (emphasis in original)."[59] Bogardus assumed that there is a rank ordering of races, and within that order, a further ordering of the members of those races in terms of social development.

In a second article on social distance appearing in the next issue of *The Journal of Applied Sociology,* Bogardus asked businessmen and public school teachers to tell him to which activities they would admit members of each race. Again, nation, race, language, and religion were confounded as racial descent. Moreover, he was unable to determine whether feelings toward other races were inherited.

One-hundred-ten young businessmen and public school teachers claimed a variety of racial descent including English (60), German (31), Irish (28), French (24), Scotch (sic) (22), Dutch (15), Scotch-Irish (17), Welsh (6), Canadian (4), Chinese (3), Swedish (3), Norwegian (3), Japanese (2), Jew-German (2), Spanish (2), Jew-Russian (1), Filipino (1), Pole (1), and Indian (1).[60]

The subjects were asked to mark a form indicating to which degree of social intimacy they would allow each of the groups. The social distance list included seven steps: "To close kinship by marriage," "To my club as personal chums," "To my street as neighbors," "To employment in my occupation in my country," "To citizenship in my country," "As visitors only to my country," and "Would exclude from my country."[61]

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[59] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 224.
[60] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 299. These are Bogardus' descriptions of races.
[61] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 301.

Bogardus thought admission to more intimate groups provided wider social contact and more opportunities for assimilation.[62] He discovered the raters allowed those like themselves into the most intimate social contact of kinship by marriage. Additionally he found the same type of rating among what he called the "high" races.[63] High races were those from what would now be called Northern European. He explained, "A significant correlation is at once obvious between racial membership of the raters and the extent of social contact range is to be noted in Table III. Where the racial membership is low and the range high, as in the case of the Canadians, the relationship of the Canadians to the English and other 'high' races among the raters is the chief explanation."[64]

Bogardus prepared several types of indices from his data. The teachers allowed closer contact to more groups than did the businessmen. Gender distinctions were not made. It was not possible to determine if all of the businessmen were actually men, although it seems likely. No gender designation was given for the teachers. The groups with the most allowed intimacy were the Canadians, Scotch-Irish, English, Scotch (sic) and Irish. Those with the least amount of intimacy, or the furthest social distance as a group, were the Turks, Hindus, Mulattoes, Koreans, and Negroes.[65]

In a third article in the same volume of the *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Bogardus asked respondents to tell him about the changes in their opinions about

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[62] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 302.
[63] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 300.
[64] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 300.

social distance in the intervening decade. His respondents maintained their opinions. Those they saw as foreigners were dirty, ugly, stupid, and immoral and were born that way, but some of the foreigners might be able to overcome inborn shortcomings. His respondents believed racial traits were inherited.[66]

Bogardus was the editor of the *Journal of Applied Sociology* in the mid-1920s, and his articles about social distance, and those of his graduate students at the University of Southern California, consistently appeared in its pages. The three articles from volume nine reveal a great deal about the commonsense understandings of the upper class of the time. A number of assumptions are apparent. Public opinion was individual opinion and something that could be determined by asking people about their opinion. Bogardus assumed that there would be differences in feelings between races. In setting out to determine the how and why of these differences, he would have assumed that there would be feelings and that those feelings would vary among respondents. He and his respondents primarily defined race by nation.

Race, defined as national origin in most cases, was assumed to be important. First, Bogardus was studying the feelings of one race for another. Second, he was surprised at the students' lack of "racial consciousness." Third, he remarked on the relationship between the students' lack of their own racial consciousness and the vehemence of their dislike for certain other races. Fourth, Bogardus and his respondents assumed a rank order of racial development and the desirability of

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[65] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 307.

[66] Emory Bogardus, "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (1923-1924): 373-381.

assimilation. They also assumed that some individual members of a particular race might not be as highly developed as other members of the race.

Previously, we saw an assumption that actions came from character, and character came from being a particular national. Bogardus' articles show him making the same assumptions about race-nation differences and looking for the ways in which individuals learned their assumptions about race-nation differences. At least in part, he appears to have broken with the assumption that race-nation differences are inborn, while at the same time he maintained the idea of a rank ordering of race by social development. The assumptions of an inborn feeling and a feeling learned through experience are included in the articles. He wrote, "Moreover, this generalization habit was usually on the basis, first of tradition and opinion [others opinions], and second, of experiences with a few individuals from the lower levels of a "despised race," or with a few better class individuals showing their worst natures to their 'enemies'—something not necessarily peculiar to any race." He continued, "While there are definite feeling bases of an inherited nature that lead naturally to race antipathies, unscientific generalizations upon a few personal outstanding adverse experiences or upon many adverse traditions is an outstanding datum."[67]

Bogardus conceived of public opinion as being individually based. He was examining the opinions of individuals toward members of other races. He believed that changes in individual opinion as they accumulated constitute a change in public opinion. He thought that individual opinion toward members of a race could change

[67] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," 226.

only slowly from unfavorable to favorable, yet individual opinion could change quickly from favorable to unfavorable. A similar process was at work concerning public opinion. He wrote,

> Changes in public opinion seem to operate similarly. It takes many proofs and a long time element to change public opinion from an unfavorable to a favorable basis, while in a few instances, perhaps no more than one, will shift public opinion into unfavorable reactions of a relatively lasting nature. These few instances, looming large in one's personal life, or played up in the newspapers, blind one to the thousand and one favorable traits of a the given race.[68]

The experience related in a newspaper story is equated to a personal experience.

The articles by Bogardus reveal the continuing presence of racial assumptions and vividly display the jumbled nature of the concept of nation with race, language, religion, and skin color at the time. Public opinion might have been inherited and could be changed by experience. Public opinion about specific race-nation members could be changed as individuals changed their views through experience.

Floyd H. Allport and D.A. Hartman, "The measurement and motivation of atypical opinion in a certain group"

in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925

Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman explored a method aimed at discovering whether psychological characteristics produce a radical trend in an individual's

[68] Bogardus, "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," 380.

political and social convictions.[69] They were searching for the traits and motives of an individual personality that might result in radical opinions. Writing in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925, they dismissed the use of yes-and-no questions on social issues and provided a method to measure the strength of an individual respondent's opinion.

The questions to which students gave their opinion and indicated the strength of that opinion included: The League of Nations Question, The Question of the Qualifications of President Coolidge, The Question of Distribution of Wealth, The Question of Legislative Control Over the Supreme Court, The Prohibition Question, The Ku Klux Klan Question, and The Question of Graft in Politics.[70] The extreme answers to the League of Nations question were, "We should uphold the Monroe Doctrine and our traditional policy of isolation from all foreign entanglements. We should stay out of the League of Nations," and "We should not only join the League, but should work toward the ideal of doing away with the sovereignty of separate nations, and of establishing a super-government, or world-State." The extreme answers to the Ku Klux Klan question were, "The Klan is wrong in principles and methods and should be denounced by political parties; steps to suppress it should be taken by the government," and "The Klan is absolutely correct in principles and methods."

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[69] Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "The measurement and motivation of atypical opinion in a certain group" *The American Political Science Review* 19 (1925): 735-760.

[70] Allport and Hartman, "Measurement and Motivation," 750-754.

For Allport and Hartman, the issues were social and controversial. They were looking for the motives in a personality that lead to an extreme view held by an individual—an individual opinion. The controversial nature of the social issues selected for testing was assumed. Race and nation were both on the social issue agenda in 1925. The range of their questions reveals a wide range of possible opinions on these issues about nation and race. Opinion was individual opinion. They show the range of beliefs (at least as far ranging as Allport and Hartman could imagine them) current at the time.

William Seal Carpenter, "Methods of Political Reasoning" in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1925

William Seal Carpenter argued for the primacy of the field of sociology and its task of making students in all social sciences understand each other.[71] His argument for the importance of sociology was echoed by Bernard in the same volume of *The American Journal of Sociology*.[72] Carpenter assumed that national character, race, and color were three separate factors in politics.[73] He wrote, "National character has a substratum of prejudices which are readily exploited by demagogue and jingoist. Differences of race and color are therefore made the justification for internecine struggles which in each age become more devastating."[74]

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[71] William Seal Carpenter, "Methods of Political Reasoning" *The American Journal of Sociology* 31 (1925): 213-226.

[72] L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress" *The American Journal of Sociology* 31 (July 1925):1-18.

[73] Carpenter, "Methods of Political Reasoning," 214.

[74] Carpenter, "Methods of Political Reasoning," 214.

Arthur N. Holcombe, "Round Table on Political Statistics: The Measurement of Public Opinion"

in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925

Writing in *The American Political Science Review* in 1925, Arthur Holcombe reported on the discussion of the roundtable on political statistics.[75] The roundtable's topic was the measurement of public opinion. Even before the discussion began, the roundtable members were faced with strong disagreements. He wrote, "Some members of the round table believed that there is no such thing as public opinion; others believed in its existence but doubted their ability to define it with sufficient precision for scientific purposes. Others again, more sanguine or perhaps more credulous, believed that the term could be defined, but were of different minds concerning the kind of definition that should be adopted."[76] Faced with the disagreement, the group decided to focus on the nature of opinion. They hoped that a common understanding of public opinion might result from that discussion. Following a discussion, the definition of opinion was found to have three essential points: "(1) opinion need not be the result of a rational process; (2) it need not include an awareness of choice; and (3) it must be sufficiently clear or definite to create a disposition to act upon it under favorable circumstances."[77] The group was unable to decide when an opinion was public, and it had several points of disagreement. The points of disagreement were the following: "(1) whether there is and must of necessity

[75] Arthur N. Holcombe, "Round Table on Political Statistics: The Measurement of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review* 19 (1925):123-126.

[76] Holcombe, "Round Table," 123.

be a single public opinion, or whether there may be a number of public opinions upon a given question; (2) whether opinion is public because of the subject-matter to which it relates or of the kind of persons who hold it; (3) what part of the public must concur in an opinion to make it a public opinion; and (4) must there be acquiescence by those who do not concur."[78]

The roundtable members decided to work on figuring out the technical means to measure individual opinion before deciding on the exact definition of public opinion. Holcombe described their thinking,

> After some discussion of these points, it was agreed that an exact definition of public opinion might not be needed until after the technical problem of measuring the opinions of individual members of the public had been disposed of. It was decided therefore that the round table might well proceed to consider the problem of measuring opinion, especially that relating to political matters, and avoid the use of the term public opinion, if possible.[79]

The disagreements among the members of the roundtable revealed the multifaceted inflections of the use of the term public opinion. For public opinion to reflect a collective sovereignty, there could be only one public opinion. If it is necessary for all or most of the public to hold an opinion to make it public opinion, the meaning may retain its connection to sovereignty and nation. If opinion is public because of the subject matter, then it is related to issues presumed to affect all of the

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[77] Holcombe, "Round Table," 123.
[78] Holcombe, "Round Table," 123.
[79] Holcombe, "Round Table," 123-124.

people. The question of what part of the public must concur and whether acquiescence by those who do not concur is necessary reflects the fuzzy line of conflict between idealized nationalism and actual functioning politics in nation-states. If the people made the nation because of shared characteristics, traditions, culture, and history, then the degrees of difference that can be allowed within the whole can become a problem. Just the beginning of the discussion of public opinion measurement by the committee members at the National Conference on the Science of Politics reveals how loaded was the term and how multiple its meanings were in the mid 1920s. The group divided twenty-three methods of measuring opinion into four categories: (1) official election returns, (2) deliberately, but unofficially, gathered samples of bodies of opinion, (3) voluntary or spontaneous expressions of opinion, and (4) data from legislative bodies and acts of public officials possessing representative character.[80]

Votes on issues and candidates were seen as the most comprehensive and accurate way to measure opinion. This had the added benefit of providing records useful for statistical analysis. Holcombe wrote, "It is the only method which has been used in such a way as to furnish records readily available for statistical analysis, and it is the only one which considers the whole adult population."[81] In other words, the method that worked best was the one that met standards of measurement. Still without an agreed definition they began to look for the best way to measure. Election returns provided individual opinions on candidates and issues, at least in a yes/no way. As Holcombe wrote, the group was aware of some of the limitations of their method. The

[80] Holcombe, "Round Table," 124.

limitations were the following: (1) a misleading simplicity, (2) failure to measure intensity of opinion, (3) takes no account of non-voters.[82]

"The second group of methods for measuring opinion includes particularly the taking of straw votes and the use of questionnaires," Holcombe wrote. The discussion by the members of the roundtable focused on questionnaire problems that included: (1) "over-representation of the interested, the literate and the well-to-do," (2) "the fairness of phrasing," (3) "the possibility of plural voting," (4) "the presence or absence of discussion," (5) "the maturity of the answer," (6) "the durability of the opinions so measured," and (7) "the desirability of secrecy."[83] To social scientists today, most of these problems might be divided into sampling problems, question problems, and unmeasured differences among respondents. The list of problems revealed an awareness of the multiple layers of meaning attached to the concept of opinion, in politics especially. The presence of discussion was directly tied to a reasoning citizen, and if the nation was presumed to be made up of individuals who are members of the nation by choice, as Hobsbawm would have it,[84] then they must talk to each other.

The third group of methods included spontaneous expressions and propagandist organizations. Spontaneous expressions included public hearings, voluntary party enrollment, campaign contributions, speeches of public men, lobbying, petitions, circulation of the press, editorials, letters to the press, public meetings, private research groups, and the behavior of crowds. The round table found some of

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[81] Holcombe, "Round Table," 124.
[82] Holcombe, "Round Table," 124.
[83] Holcombe ,"Round Table," 125.

the spontaneous expressions of opinion were not important because they could not be measured. Holcombe wrote, "It was found that certain of these, for example, letters to the press and private research groups, are of little importance, as being at best incapable of exact measurement."[85]

Time limited the opportunity of the members of the roundtable to discuss types of spontaneous expression of opinion they found important and measurable, and they decided to focus on propaganda organizations. Holcombe wrote, "Their rapidity of growth, and their distribution, while susceptible of measurement, are of varying significance."[86] They were interested in ways of figuring out just how much a propaganda organization could cause individuals to act. They agreed that it was important to know the facts about an organization with the objective of influencing opinion on public issues. Holcombe wrote, "The round table was unanimously of the opinion that the public should know the facts concerning the membership and finances of all organizations designed to influence opinion on public questions."[87]

Shining through the entire report on the roundtable discussion of statistics was an assumption of the value of measurement, and equally strong was an awareness of the expressions of opinion that were not measurable. The alternatives to opinion that could be measured were not yet dismissed. Holcombe's article reveals how difficult it was to cover over the multiple meanings of public opinion to facilitate bringing the matter of measuring individual opinion to the foreground and to give measurement

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[84] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 18.
[85] Holcombe "Round Table," 125.
[86] Holcombe "Round Table," 125.

privilege over other meanings. Most telling, one entire category was given over to spontaneous expressions of opinion, and the list reveals many ways of thinking about opinion.

Norman C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1925

Norman C. Meier set out to test the assumption that the common will is based on reasoned judgements about an individual or an issue and is expressed as public opinion in an election. He believed that he had discovered that the common will was better understood as the consummation of mass suggestion. He equated an election campaign to an advertising campaign and saw the newspaper as the most effective propaganda tool. In his closely argued and thoroughly referenced article filled with precise definitions of terms, he offered no careful explanation for fellow feeling or like-mindedness.[88] Meier wanted to test the assumption that democracy rests on the consent of the governed. He thought it was necessary to find out how consent was gained. He believed that only a professional campaigner would have some experiential knowledge of how their candidates won. Meier equated an election victory to an expression of public opinion, and he saw his work as a beginning to the study of the mechanisms of public opinion.

Meier asked people to evaluate campaign messages. The campaign messages, as the candidate presented them, were listed for each of three candidates. He gave

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[87] Holcombe "Round Table," 126.

[88] Norman C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 31 (September 1925): 199-212.

three pieces of paper, each containing a list of the messages from one candidate, to more than 1,000 people including advanced undergraduate students and professional people in five states. Additionally, the respondents were asked to list reasons for their vote. Each campaign message was later labeled with one or more motivation. Meier relied on Floyd Allport for four categories of motivation with which to label the candidates' messages and the reasons given by voters. Motivational labels included self-interest, mutual understanding, fear, and safety.

Self- interest is, he wrote, "the dictum that one is more concerned about things which affect himself than any others. Man acts in accord with what he thinks his interest to be, whether from sound premises or otherwise."[89] Mutual understanding or sympathy was not well-understood according to Meier. He wrote, "This term in social psychology is variously defined as 'consciousness of kind,' 'fellow-feeling,' and 'solidarity.' There is in this sense no connotation of pity or compassion but merely the feeling of unity, oneness, like-mindedness or mutual understanding which members of the same group have for one another, expressible in the phrase, 'one of us'."[90] Meier did not explain the concept of mutual understanding any further, though he did offer an example based in a city-country dichotomy. He wrote, "Farmers favor that candidate who is or is believed to be a genuine 'dirt farmer''; the candidate who is not a farmer himself but who would have the farmer vote visits the old homestead, dons overalls, and rides around on the old hayrack, fully exposed to the sun and a battery of

[89] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 201.
[90] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 201.

movie cameras."[91] Considering his elaborate definition of common will, motivations, and public opinion, he would have believed that his readers would have a shared understanding of like-mindedness. (Writing in another sociology journal, Bogardus used like-kind with a nation-race connotation.[92])

Safety and fear are linked motives, according to Meier. Fear is the third motive for analysis, and Meier equated current-day fear to fear of lack of income through being out of work. Safety, the final motive, is an interpretation of the fear response. Safety, according to Meier, is evoked to convince the voter that a cherished institution is endangered by the opposing candidate's victory.

Meier defined the mechanism of public opinion formation in the political area. He wrote, "The psychological mechanisms are suggestion, imitation, and propaganda, defining the latter as complex systematic suggestions directed toward some ulterior end. Suggestion and imitation—cardinal principles of French social psychology—explains how the average person comes into possession of the bulk of his beliefs." He was relying on Le Bon's *The Crowd*, Tarde's *L'opinion et la foule*, and Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd.* The process of opinion formation is unconscious, Meier wrote, although the individual would attribute the outcome to his or her own reasoning. In other words, an individual might believe that he or she was reasoning and say that he or she had reasons, but his or her opinion actually would be the result of suggestion and imitation. Meier's common man was anything but wise. The theoretical foundation on which Meier relied precluded the possibility of a reasoning citizen.

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[91] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 201.

Meier equated the processes of an advertising campaign with that of a national election. For Meier, customers and voters are equivalent, and both are unreasoning. Advertisers use certain techniques to control the behavior of customers, to persuade them to buy products. Therefore, if political campaigns were to employ the same techniques, they could control the behavior of voters and persuade them to vote for a candidate. He wrote, "Certainly it is evident that if affirmation and repetition of simple ideas produces contagion and wholesale acceptance in advertising campaigns, the same out-come should be expected in political campaigns when the same methods are used in the same channels and on the same people."[93] That was a critical "if" for democratic theory.

Meier claimed that the newspaper is "the most effective agency of suggestion."[94] According to Meier, the newspaper is effective because it is daily and therefore repetitious. The same ideas are presented over and over in the paper in different forms. He wrote that the newspaper fulfills the requirements of propaganda. He continued, "Among which are a period of time; daily presentation, affording opportunity for repetition of the same idea in varying forms; translation into graphic form (cartoon, portrayal of idealized character and distortion of opponent's); 'statistical studies' carefully doctored to make the desired point; and paid political material appearing as news items."[95]

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[92] Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins."
[93] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 203-204.
[94] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 204.
[95] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 204.

Apparently, it was assumed by Meier and his readers that there was something questionable about the use of statistics in newspaper articles. It could have been that Meier believed that the statistics were below the standard applied to academic writing, or he might have believed that studies were deliberately placed by a campaign to give the credibility of numbers to a campaign claim. Whatever the precise reason, Meier was skeptical of the use of statistics in political stories in the newspaper. In addition, the position of the newspaper was shifted by Meier from the positive agent of control it had been for earlier scholars—Bullard, Stead and Shepard for example—to an excellent medium for propaganda. Meier concluded, "The successful campaign was the one which dealt least with rational motives and most with simple appeals directed toward the arousal of specific instinctive, emotional, and habit pattern-responses."[96] In referring to the significance of his data he wrote that it "lay open to question anew the fundamental assumption of democracy that there be accorded every member of the electorate adequate and relatively unbiased information for his guidance in considering men and issues."[97]

Meier also noted a difference in the appeals made by the campaigns. Successful campaigns made appeals that are readily classifiable into psychological categories. Additionally, groupings of similar reasons were given by the successful candidate's supporters. Meier found it necessary to define public opinion as an expression of common will, however, he did not find it necessary to explain his assumption that the results of an election were synonymous with an expression of

[96] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 210.

public opinion. He could assume that public opinion was equated with an election result. Meier worried that the common will was based on emotional appeals that were engineered by those who could spend enough money to influence the press, and he assumed that the press had tremendous influence on voters because of the repetition of the candidate's message. Finally, he did not mention nationality or race. He may be alluding to it, however, because one of four categories of motivation that he used was "sympathy or mutual understanding." The example he gave for a feeling of being "one of us," involves a politician seeking the vote of farmers and puts him in the rural scene for the benefit of movie cameras. He also described the similarity of views held by men and women among his respondents.

Meier was overtly concerned about the lack of reasoning done by voters. Specifically, he was concerned that money spent on a consistent psychologically powerful message would pervert the democratic system. In the last line of his article he wrote, "May we suppose that so long as huge sums are expended in creating attitudes and issues dwindle to leading people to have affection for a candidate, the one-party system will prevail, and for such time as interested individuals contribute the necessary funds?"[98] It is only in this last sentence that Meier reveals his own concern.

He had followed the protocol of social science until this final line. He had relied upon theorists who had a dark and pessimistic view of individual human beings to test an idea based on a hopeful and optimistic view of human reason. It would be

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[97] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 212.

impossible to find that individuals were reasoning, if the theoretical foundation for their reasons were taken from theorists who expected a herd-like response.

Meier's article also can be seen as a prescription for promotion. The successful message, either from a candidate or for a product, must rely on repetition, recency, and emotional reinforcement. Meier is the first author in Childs' syllabus to compare an advertising campaign for a product to a political campaign. Although he is discouraged about the future of democracy by the outcome of his research, a person who wanted to promote a candidate could read the article as scientifically based advice. In fact, looking at the launch of the syndicated public opinion poll in newspapers in 1935 by George Gallup, it is easy to see the similarities to Meier's criticisms. Gallup's poll results were presented several times per week. Newspapers carried poll results in graphic and varying forms. Gallup determined the issues that would receive the repetitious treatment.

W.T. Root, "The Psychology of Radicalism"
in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1925

In an address to the Hungary Club in Pittsburgh in 1924, W. T. Root talked about the psychology of radicalism. He discussed definitions of radicalism and conservatism and placed those definitions in a historical context.[99] During his talk, he characterized his own historical period. He said, "By chance alone, we would anticipate that a certain number [of radicals] would become emotionalized over

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[98] Meier, "Motives in Voting," 212.

[99] W.T. Root, "The Psychology of Radicalism," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 19 (1925): 341-356.

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
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economic, racial, and *national problems*. But here are three fields in which social prestige is clearly and drastically established. At present, acute national fervor has replaced religious fanaticism: the credo is precisely defined, and any infringement brings violent protest, with severest legal and mob action (emphasis in original)."[100]

Nationalism and race came into Root's speech again as he discussed the radical nature of science. He said, "Another thoroughly radical scientific concept is the habitual practice of *discounting the validity of all ideas that relate to the ego and the emotions,* either in ourselves or in others. Love, hate, fear, anger, jealousy, grief, nationalism, race hatred, religious fervor, sexual complexes!—how they do make the stream of thought, reason playing but a faint *obligato* (sic)(emphasis in the original text)."[101]

Root portrayed public opinion as a majority consensus, and he saw public opinion as powerful and difficult to resist. He equated going against public opinion with extreme physical threat and found resistance to public opinion the more difficult. He was describing the effort necessary to have the courage of one's convictions when he wrote, "The most daring physical courage in the front-line trenches WITH ONE'S FELLOWMEN WITH HIM is comparatively easy, measured by the psychic courage required to champion a cause with public opinion and the mediums for making and arousing public opinion against one (emphasis in original)."[102] Root said few have any idea of the pain of going against public opinion. He said, "Social ostracism is the

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[100] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 344-345.
[101] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 353.
[102] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 346.

most brutal of all tortures and some of its subtle refined aspects are more dreaded than the fury of mob violence of a physical nature."[103]

Root concluded by telling his listeners and readers that he believed all views that were presented with a pragmatic attitude should be heard. He provided a list of authors who met his standard. He said, "In each case they show integrity of thought, and give evidences of relative freedom from emotional bias. It is needless to add that a variety of contending views are presented and the acceptance of one would discard others."[104] Included among his list of books and authors were Charles Beard, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Lloyd George, John Dewey, Thorsten Veblen, Trotsky and James Bryce.[105] Root must have been speaking at a time when alternative points of view were not much tolerated. His article gives insight to the continuing importance of race at the same time nationalism was an intense social issue.

George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion" in *Social Forces* in 1926

For George Lundberg, race was relegated to a footnote in the first article claiming the first use of data to test the assumption that a powerful press creates public opinion and therefore votes on issues.[106] Lundberg summarized the traditional assumption that, in a direct causal chain, the newspaper influences public opinion, and public opinion causes a specific vote on a specific issue. He wrote, "One of the conclusions very generally agreed on by writers in the field is the conclusion that the

[103] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 346.
[104] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 356.
[105] Root, "Psychology of Radicalism," 356.

most powerful, if not the all important factor in influencing public opinion, and consequently the votes of a community, is the newspaper."[107] He never questioned the idea that public opinion results in votes. He cited Robert Park for the suggestion that newspapers might not have the influence traditionally assumed.

In spite of the traditional claims of the power of the press to influence public opinion and therefore influence votes, Lundberg pointed out that the claim had not been supported with data. He wrote,

> So far as the present writer has been able to discover there are no scientific data on the subject. The most that can be found is a considerable number of opinions, many of them eloquently expressed. But brilliant style and great learning will not permanently serve as a substitute for data. It is the purpose of the present paper to approach quantitatively, one aspect of this problem, namely, the question of the direct influence of newspapers on public opinion on certain specific public issues."[108]

He asked a random sample of people in Seattle their views on four social issues and which paper they read. He then compared their answers on the issues to the stand on the same issues taken by the newspaper. He concluded that the newspaper had little influence on the opinions of readers on public issues and that the paper was more

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[106] George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," *Social Forces* 4 (1926): 709-715.

[107] Lundberg, "Newspaper and Public Opinion," 709. His citations are as follows: V.S. Yarros, "The press and Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* (November 1899): 32; E.C. Hayes, "The Formation of Public Opinion," *Journal of Applied Sociology* (September/October 1925; E.R. Groves, "Social Problems and Education" 380 [complete reference]; W. Irvin, "The American Newspaper." *Colliers* (January 21, 1911): 18.

[108] Lundberg, "Newspaper and Public Opinion," 710.

likely to reflect opinion than to make opinion. Public opinion was not defined, nor was the link between public opinion and voting made explicit.

In a footnote to his method, he explained that the sample he drew was compared to the white population of the city. He wrote, "The sample was compared with the general adult white population of the city (according to the census of 1920) with respect to nativity, citizenship, and occupations, and was found not to vary from the general population in these characteristics, by more than 14 percent in any one respect."[109] He gave no details about the selection of individuals to fit the "white" category or his other categories.

William B. Munro, "The Worst Fundamentalism"
in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1926

In an *Atlantic Monthly* article in 1926, William B. Munro argued for an attack on the maxims that Americans believed embodied the principals of democratic government.[110] In closing his article he wrote, "What we most need, therefore, is that the oncoming generation shall make war on fundamentalism in politics, just as scholars of the past generation have assailed fundamentalism in religion. That is one of the many herculean tasks that we pass along to the college graduates of to-day."[111]

Munro began with a list of phrases and slogans that he said had been handed down through the literature of patriotism and had become somewhat like a biological inheritance. A biological inheritance would not be subject to questioning. He wrote,

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[109] Lundberg, "Newspaper and Public Opinion," 710 footnote 7.
[110] William B. Munro, "The Worst Fundamentalism," *Atlantic Monthly* 138 (1926): 451-459.
[111] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 459

"Let me put together, in skeleton form, the political creed of the average American citizen, the dogmas which he accepts as fundamental truths notwithstanding their repugnance to the dictates of reason and to the teachings of experience. 'Government must rest on the consent of the governed.' 'Democracy is government by the whole people.'"[112] After several more examples, he continued listing accepted fundamental truths. He wrote, "'The rule of public opinion.' 'Political parties are groups of voters who think alike and have a common program.' And last but not least, 'The equality of all citizens before the law.'"[113]

After explaining how few eligible voters actually vote, Munro further explored several of the "propositions" in his "fundamentalist decalogue."[114] For example, he wrote, "Government must rest on the consent of the governed."[115] He continued, "This rule, of course, does not apply to aliens, Negroes, Filipinos, or inhabitants of the District of Columbia. The consent of the governed is a synonym for the will of the majority, and the will of the majority is expressed by a plurality of those who take the trouble to vote."[116]

He considered public opinion to be merely—and obviously—the result of persuasion by the politicians. He wrote, "What passes for public opinion, in perhaps the majority of cases, is simply the outcome of propaganda and counter-propaganda working upon the traditions, prejudices, aversions or inertia of the people." He said

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[112] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 452.
[113] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 452.
[114] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 454.
[115] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 454.
[116] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 454.

that he was not using the word propaganda in a derogatory way. He also believed that most people saw the world through stereotypes.

He told his readers what public opinion was not, and he eliminated quite a few of the uses in the body of work examined in this study. He wrote,

> Public opinion does not exude spontaneously from the cogitiations of the multitude. It does not employ the rational conclusions of what psychologists call 'the group mind.' In large measure it is a manufactured product, prepared for the purpose of selling it to the people and marketed to them in the accustomed way. We are prone to forget that you can sell an idea to the people in the same way that you sell them any other commodity, from a Liberty Bond to a breakfast food, and our politicians are the brokers who put through the sale.[117]

Munro began with the doctrine of human equality. He attacked it with biology, education, and then the inequality of taxation. Munro turned to the consent of the governed and pointed out some were not included. He also pointed out that the consent of the governed was equated with the will of the majority. As he detailed it, elections were decided by a plurality of the politically active. He explained,

> Taking our state and municipal elections and averaging them for the country as a whole, the figures show that the will of the people is regularly expressed by less than twenty percent of our adult citizenship, or about ten per cent of the population. What we have in fact, therefore, is not a government by the whole

[117] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 455.

people, or by a majority of the people, or even by a majority of the registered voters, but government by a mere plurality of the politically active.[118]

Munro wrote, " We are asked to believe that public opinion rules in the United States. It is the ultimate sovereign, the supreme law of the land."[119] Munro addressed the source of the opinion that was expressed. He discounted reason; rather it was the selling of ideas—or a campaign of education.

Munro made two major arguments about people and government. First, the system of government does not actually function in accordance with political fundamentalist ideology. Second, people are in few ways alike and in no way behave as they need to behave for political fundamentalist ideology to be literally true. He ended on a hopeful note and asked for a re-examination of "these maxims and postulates and aphorisms which are believed to embody true principles of democratic government."[120] He thought it necessary to rest government on a rational basis. He continued, "Our first task is to rationalize it in the minds of our own people."[121] Thus Munro's call was exactly the opposite of Gallup's 50-year effort to promote public opinion polling, the wisdom of the common man, and the scientific advance polling provided for democracy.

Munro ridiculed the eighteenth-century ideology that George Gallup would exalt in the tremendous success of his promotion of public opinion polling. In comparing the slogans of his political fundamentalist decalogue to the actual

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[118] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism," 454.
[119] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism," 454.
[120] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism," 459.

functioning of democratic government, Munro's article lacked the grace and depth of Lindsay Rogers' critique of polling in 1949, but the essential argument was the same: The actual operation of the government in the United States bore little relation to what he called the fundamentalist decalogue. Less than a decade later, George Gallup would come along and promote his polls in *The Washington Post* as allowing the common man to speak. Gallup would claim to reveal the will of the majority through what he called scientific opinion polls. Human equality for Gallup came in the form of a deification of the claimed wisdom of the common man.

Munro's article, especially in combination with Meier's article, could be read as directions for Gallup's design to appeal to newspaper readers. Munro ridiculed the idea of a ruling public opinion. He wrote, "We are asked to believe that public opinion rules in the United States. It is the ultimate sovereign, the supreme law of the land."[122] Munro discounted reason; rather it was the selling of ideas—or a campaign of education. He assumed that common men could be easily led or educated. Gallup's message would celebrate the rule of public opinion and the wisdom of the common man. At the same time, Gallup was seen as selling an idea. Gallup would be described as comparing voters to consumers of toothpaste when a *Time* magazine reporter wrote, "By 1932 Pollster Gallup was an up-&-coming expert at finding out who read what kind of toothpaste ads and why. One day he said to himself: 'If it works for toothpaste, why not for politics'."[123]

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[121] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism," 459.
[122] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism," 454.
[123] "Opinion: The Black and White Beans" *Time* 3 May 1948, 22-23.

Charles Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War"

in *American Mercury* in 1927

In an attack on 100 percent Americanism before and during World War I, Angoff named the university presidents and professors who fired people, or caused people to be fired, because of their lack of enthusiasm for America's participation in WWI.[124] He wrote, "And so it was throughout all the other great colleges and universities of the country. The higher learning came to a standstill. Bacteriologists, physicists and chemist vied with philosophers, philologians (sic) and botanists in shouting maledictions upon the Hun and thousands took to snooping upon such of their brethren as entertained the least doubt about the sanctity of the war"[125] Angoff also described the efforts by professors to stir enthusiasm for the war. He wrote, "The professors, in the meantime, were rushing off their writing tables one book after another and one article after another, presenting before the still stolid American public the devilish machinations of the German learned world and of the Potsdam military gang to strangle civilization, to trample pure womanhood in the gutter, and to annihilate all the blessings which Christianity had bestowed upon mankind."[126]

He provided examples of pamphlets, speeches, and books from a wide range of universities and disciplines. In the examples, nation was assumed as natural and the members of the nation had certain traits because they were a certain nationality. In a widely circulating pamphlet titled, "Germany versus Civilization," William Roscoe

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[124] Charles Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War" *American Mercury* 11 (June 1927): 177-191.
[125] Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War," 178.
[126] Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War," 180.

Thayer argued for the historical basis of the present-day German behavior. For Thayer, the twentieth-century German was a modern day Hun. The German behaved the way he did because his ancestors had traits such as dissoluteness, barbarity, excessive drinking, and lying, to name just a few.[127] All of Civilization was set against the savage, and Germany was the savage, according to Angoff. In some examples, nation was equated with race. The concept of civilization implied a continuum of people from savage to civilized. Throughout the nineteenth century, the difference between savage and civilized had been racialized: consider for example, the way in which civilized settlers and the savage Indian were portrayed in popular literature.[128] Civilization was tied to progress as a few select Anglo Saxon people became ever more civilized as time passed.

Frederick Bausman, "Under Which Flag"

in *American Mercury* in 1927

Frederick Bausman argued that the British were controlling public opinion in the United States to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the United States and its citizens.[129] He wrote, "It is a sorry day for a country when the control of its public opinion falls into the hands of foreigners."[130] He criticized the people who revered the British and who sought the approval of the members of the British aristocracy. "The trouble is that we have among us an appalling number of our own citizens who, aside

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[127] Angoff, "Higher Learning Goes to War," 179.

[128] Richard Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994).

[129] Frederick Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" *American Mercury* 12 (1927): 195-203.

[130] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 195.

from any pecuniary interest they may have, regard it as a sort of impiety to criticise (sic) these very successful islanders, and who do not realize that the overwhelming mass of the British people thoroughly dislike Americans."[131] Bausman argued that Britain was still the most powerful nation in the world. He was opposed to the policy of forgiving the British war debt to the United States. He made a distinction between the English and the Scots, and he used race and nation interchangeably. He wrote, "Since the days of Rome no nation has ever had a more deep-seated contempt for all other races than the English have today, singularly differing in this respect from the Scotch."[132] He assumed the power of public opinion, and he assumed public opinion could be controlled. He continued, "There are two ways in which you can conquer a country, one by armed force, the other by controlling its public opinion, and he must be blind indeed who does not see that in an infinite number of ways the English are doing the latter to America."[133]

Bausman saw the few in control of public opinion and therefore in control of policy. He wrote, "Meanwhile the British possess in this country a large share of our most influential press, our leading bankers, in seaport towns our leading lawyers, and in fashionable circles the bulk of those persons who most influence public opinion and abash opposition."[134] Propaganda was used to mean an intentional influence of public opinion and Bausman closed his article in *American Mercury* by reminding his readers of the British propaganda effort during World War I. He wrote,

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[131] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 195-196.
[132] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 199.
[133] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 199.

> In conclusion, let us remember the charming description given by Sir Gilbert Parker of the manner in which the British executed their propaganda to draw us into the war—how every class among us, journalist, pedagogue, librarian, legislator, banker, clergyman, and petty capitalist, was catalogued, ticketed, put on a mailing list and deluged with literature conceived in England. It was a stupendous and successful propaganda, and every observing person can see that it is now being repeated with the great advantage of its being done in large part by American agents.[135]

The criticism of the British, who had been referred to as cousins to Americans, was unusual. The British relation as cousins to Americans had been race-based. Race and nation maintained overlapping references, and there was an assumption that public opinion could be controlled by a few. Thus, the common man would not be wise if he were being controlled.

Harold Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1927

Harold Lasswell provided an alternative way to view propaganda in a short article in *The American Political Science Review* in 1927. In a beautifully written and closely argued discussion, he drew definitional boundaries around propaganda and explained the concept.[136] He wrote, "Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word attitude is taken to

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[134] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 202.
[135] Bausman, "Under Which Flag?" 203.

mean a tendency to act according to certain patterns of valuation."[137] He continued, "The idea of a 'collective attitude' is not that of a super-organic extra-natural entity. Collective phenomena have too often been treated as if they were on a plane apart from individual action. Confusion has arisen principally because students have been slow to invent a word able to bear the connotation of uniformity without implying a biological or metaphysical unity."[138] For Lasswell, collective attitudes could be altered, and propaganda was used to create or change the valuation of a disposition or attitude.

The students in Childs' public opinion class at Princeton would have read starkly differing views of propaganda. For example, the popular press was said to present propaganda as lies, whereas, the academic journal was said to present a road map on how to accomplish the desired ends using propaganda. The concern was with both discovering and implementing propaganda. Control might be good—or it could be a threat.

William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics"
in *Yale Review* in 1927

In an article in *Yale Review*, William Bennett Munro called for the application of science to politics to discover the laws of politics. He used analogies of weather and disease to make his point. He also described the known laws of determination in politics, those of geographic and racial determinism together with a tendency toward

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[136] Harold Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda," *The American Political Science Review* 21 (1927): 627-631.

[137] Lasswell, "Theory of Political Propaganda," 627.

government by the few.[139] Munro began with an attack on the idea that individuals had influence in forming political policies. He wrote,

> The sovereignty of the people is said to be the basis of democracy. Everywhere, in our day, the people take it for granted that they are or ought to be, masters of their own political destiny. This omnipotence is implied in the current terminology of popular government—in such expressions as the rule of public opinion, the consent of the governed, and the choice of the people. In a word, the democratic dogma assumes that the form and the spirit of a government are matters of human plan or programme (sic), subject to no forces which are beyond the power of the electorate to control.[140]

Munro took issue with the then current assumption of the rule of public opinion and the sovereignty of the people and wrote, "It does not square with the facts of our political life, either past or present."[141] Munro urged the application of science to the study of politics and pointed out the move toward conservatism following the war. He wrote, "Should men of scientific mentality rest satisfied with the explanation that this extraordinary political phenomenon, so exactly synchronized over so much of the earth's surface despite great differences in geographical environment, in race, and in political traditions—that this extraordinary phenomenon is merely the outcome of unco-ordinated (sic) and capricious volition on the part of the half dozen nations

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[138] Lasswell, "Theory of Political Propaganda," 627-628.
[139] William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," *Yale Review* 16 (1927): 723-738.
[140] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 723.
[141] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 723.

concerned?"[142] In his question, he revealed the categories that were considered determiners of events: geography, race, and tradition. He continued, "Does it not rather appear, on the face of things, that what we call the 'will of the people' in all these countries has been subject to some world-wide constraining influence and that popular sovereignty has become the obedient creature of time and circumstance?"[143]

Munro argued that natural law could explain so much, that it seemed unlikely there were no natural laws in politics. He wrote, "Are we to believe that there are no controlling forces governing the course of public affairs in a world which is everywhere else controlled by law? Shall we continue to say that man as a political agent is born free, and remains free, because we have not yet uncovered the laws of politics which he consistently obeys? Science has been a discoverer of laws, and political science ought to be."[144] Munro's article in the *Yale Review* shows his belief in science and the ability of science to explain and predict political phenomenon.

According to Munro, there were recognized laws of politics such as geographic determinism and racial determinism. He placed racial determinism as almost as important as geographic determinism. He wrote, "Racial determinism is of almost equal importance. Some races have more political genius than others. It is, therefore, possible for them to pursue a course of political evolution which would be quite impracticable in the case of those less happily endowed. No race of men on earth believes itself to be inferior in political genius to any other, yet the wide disparity is as

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[142] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 723-724.
[143] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 724.
[144] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 725.

self-evident as any social fact can be."[145] He went on to explain how transplanted political institutions often cannot survive, and the way in which a member of a race is perceived to be different in a different environment. He continued, "The determinism of racial heritage, at any rate, is a factor which all intelligent students of comparative politics are accustomed to take into their reckonings."[146]

Munro used the difference between North America and South America to make his point about racial determinism. He wrote, "It is racial determinism that explains, in large measure, the higher and more stable plane upon which the political system of the northern continent has moved. Systems of government depend, for their success or failure, upon qualities and conditions which they do not create but only obey."[147] That race influenced politics was common sense to Munro, and presumably to the readers of *Yale Review* in the middle 1920s.

In addition to the determining natural laws emerging from geography and race, Munro pointed out the tendency toward autocracy. He wrote, "Another elementary law of politics is the one to which Lord Bryce gave new emphasis a few years ago, namely, the inevitable tendency of all government of autocracy. Every government, whatsoever its form, and howsoever safeguarded, tends to become a government of the Few."[148] Munro insisted that in spite of efforts to expand government into the hands of many, political power invariably drifts into the hands of a single class: by birth, wealth, military service or politics. He continued, "Nothing, indeed, is more

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[145] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 728.
[146] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 728.
[147] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 729.

impressive in all human history than the relative ease with which under any and every form of government the classes have managed to strip from the masses the substance of power while leaving them the outward forms of it. They take the cash and let the credit go. It must inevitably turn out this way. The closer we get to a government by the multitude the nearer we get to chaos."[149] And further he wrote, "The principle of political equality, when pressed to its logical conclusion, carries us straight to anarchy."[150] This was not a description of a wise common man, and science would not lead to the support of what Munro called dogma.

Munro insisted voters only vote against.[151] He pointed out that majority sentiment does not rule. He wrote, "Two and two do not make four in politics. Majority sentiment does not always rule. Elections are determined, not by the opinions of the whole people, but by the preponderating sentiment of those who go to the polls. And this is largely dependent upon the intensity of the [negative] feeling that has been created among the electorate."[152]

It is clear how commonplace were the references to the rule of public opinion, the sovereignty of the people, and the consent of the governed (what he called, democratic dogma) at the time. He was arguing against these commonplace sentiments. To support his call for a search for other "laws," he used geography and race as two examples of something resembling natural laws in determining political

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[148] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 730.
[149] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 730-31.
[150] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 731.
[151] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 733-734.
[152] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 734.

events. The assumption of racial determinism must also have been commonsense at the time. He also used what he called "facts" to dispute what he called the "democratic dogma" of the rule of public opinion when he reported who actually went to the polls.

William Orton, "News and Opinion"

in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1927

In the course of discussing the difficulty of reporting facts, William Orton concluded that the determination of policy by public opinion—if public opinion meant mass opinion—was highly undesirable. He thought mass opinion was dangerous.[153] He saw the development of special publics as hopeful, however, and he wrote,

> But when all is said and done, there is little reason to believe that a more complete determination of capital issues, especially international issues, by public opinion will ever be desirable—so long as by public opinion we mean mass opinion. There are, in fact, few if any matters on which mass opinion can act other than dangerously. There is need of a new conception, not only of public opinion, but of democracy itself, which shall rescue society from the sterile alternatives of the warfare of group interests on the one hand and the banalities of mass action on the other.[154]

Orton saw promise in the development of special publics as a professional public of eminent persons, suggested by Lippmann.

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[153] William Orton, "News and Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 38 (1927): 80-93.
[154] Orton, "News and Opinion," 93.

Orton exhibited an overtly elite view as he discussed his concern about the massification of newspapers. He called the rotary press "revolutionary."[155] In addition, he made reference to the older tradition of those elite few who were the main readers of newspapers in the past. He wrote, "Most old journalists, and many other people, look back somewhat regretfully on the days when newspapers catered primarily to a restricted, and almost entirely male, clientele, that took them, as they took it, with a certain high seriousness totally absent from the situation of today."[156]

Orton blamed the rotary press for transforming political relationships. He wrote, "The physical possibilities of circulation have altered the relations of proprietors to editors, of management to labor, of editorial and business departments, of newspapers to politicians, and of the whole concern to the public."[157] According to Orton, the older traditions were overwhelmed by the push by newspapers for circulation and of the "interests"[158] for publicity. He argued that because the paper catered to mass readership, it could no longer perform its previous service of informing the serious elite few. Orton's argument was not with whether or not some type of newspaper might continue to serve an elite few. Rather, he was concerned about whether the newspaper could inform public opinion. He wrote, "And that larger problem challenges both the general validity of democratic axioms and the

[155] Orton, "News and Opinion," 80.
[156] Orton, "News and Opinion," 93.
[157] Orton, "News and Opinion," 81.
[158] Orton, "News and Opinion," 81.

particular assumption that public opinion is safely or satisfactorily informed by news in a newspaper."[159]

Orton saw public opinion as being in need of leadership by an elite few. This was the same call that had been made for at least the prior 40 years. The common man was not wise, according to Orton, and the newspaper was unable to provide leadership because of the influence of advertising.

Donald Young, "Some effects of a course in American race problems on the race prejudice of 450 undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania" in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1927

Donald Young's article provided a marker for the thinking about race and nation in 1927. He explained that there might be differences between the races, but not all of the facts were in. More importantly, Young defined races as being red, yellow, white, and black. From his point of view, it was foolish to consider making distinctions between the Chinese and Japanese or between English and Swedish. Race was taking on the meaning of color and losing its nineteenth-century connection to nationality and language.[160]

The article begins with examples of what Young put in quotes as 'broadmindedness.' These were examples of the behavior of people who were trained in the social sciences to judge human individuals on their merit. Young explained that one instructor boasted of having lunch in public with a negro (sic), and another said he

[159] Orton, "News and Opinion," 81.

gave his Jewish students the same opportunities as the 'white' men. Young wrote, "Illustrations could be multiplied without end, where men trained in the social sciences academically insist that human beings must be judged on their individual merits and must not be brushed aside as inferior because their skin is dark or their hair is kinky, but who in their personal relations with members of other races show that their academic preachings are no more than lip service to logic."[161]

Young studied a group of students before and after they took a class in race relations. The class content provided facts about the differences between the races. Before taking the course of study, students were asked to rank-order races, or to say that there was no difference that could be rank ordered. After the class, students again either said there was no difference between races or rank-ordered the races. The students created the designations for the races. Young explained that at a high point, 14 percent of the students said races could not be rank-ordered in their abilities. At the bottom of the students' rank order in all cases were Mexican, Negro, Chinese, Turk and Yellow, while at the top of the order were White, American, Nordic, English, German, and French. For many students, Jew was ranked in the top ten.

Young carefully and strongly made a point of distinguishing nation as race from skin color as race. After he acknowledged that there could be differences between the races, he claimed that it was foolish to consider nationality labels as racial difference. He wrote, "It is not to be denied that there may be important

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[160] Donald Young, "Some effects of a course in American race problems on the race prejudice of 450 undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 22 (1927): 235-242.

inherent mental differences between, say the white, yellow, red and black races, though the final evidence is still lacking. It is foolish, however, to attempt to distinguish between Swede and Englishman, Chinese and Japanese." He continued, "Individuals of any nationality or color may be the equals of individuals of any other nationality or color. Facts such as these were constantly illustrated and emphasized throughout both terms, yet an analysis of the results of the tests shows no fundamental change in opinion on the part of those who attended the lectures and class discussion and presumably studied the assignments."[162] Race and nationality were not differentiated by the instructor because, Young wrote, it would have confused the students.[163]

Comparing this article to the social distance articles by Bogardus, two things are apparent. First, there had been a shift in the definition of concepts in at least part of academe. Second, there had been little change in the way undergraduates saw the concept of race and nation. For the students, color was not the primary method of rank-ordering people. They maintained the primacy of nation as a race when they made the lists that appeared foolish to their professor.

Robert C. Binkley, "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences" in *Social Forces* in 1928

Robert C. Binkley described multiple understandings of the concept of public opinion, detailed the conflicts among scholars concerning the term in 1928, and

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[161] Young, "American race problems," 235.
[162] Young, "American race problems," 240-241.
[163] Young, "American race problems," 241.

concluded by declaring public opinion paradoxical with multiple meanings.[164] He wrote, "Public opinion in connection with the problem of the will of the State is a *quantity of will*; in connection with the problem of the social process it is a *consensus*; in connection with the problem of history it is a *summary*."[165] He defined quantity of will as an election model. A consensus, according to Binkley, was a consensus on stereotypes.

A quantity of will, in Binkley's argument, meant a majority in the model of an election. He took nation and state for granted and projected elections backward in time. His own quantitative and psychological training provided a strong influence on his reasoning. He wrote,

> Perhaps the oldest problem which involves the conception of public opinion is that which Rousseau stated as the problem of the General Will. The terms of this problem were set without much regard to the actual psychological facts of human life. It was assumed there were Peoples or Nations made up of citizens who made it a practice, each in his own freedom, to arrive at logical conclusions with reference to matters of public concern. The question was then propounded: how can the sum of the separate wills of the citizens be commuted into a 'general will,' the Will of the Nation? Political theory took over this problem and called it the problem of public opinion.[166]

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[164] Robert C. Binkley, "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences," Social Forces 6 (1928): 389-396.

[165] Binkley, "Concept of Public Opinion," 396.

[166] Binkley, "Concept of Public Opinion," 391. Binkley explains his theory is built on A. Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, New York, 1913. Lowell was a proponent of

Binkley continued and cited A. Lawrence Lowell, "*Opinion* in this context was necessarily conceived as a determination of the will, 'the acceptance of one among two or more inconsistent views which are capable of being accepted by a rational mind . . . . if only one view can be accepted, it is not an opinion but the result of a demonstration'."[167] According to Binkley there were two ways to explain a nation having a will, and they corresponded to the two ways opinion could be shared. One he called a "mystical notion of a super-individual mind of the Nation."[168] The second he called "the mathematical notion of a majority vote of the people." The first of these explanations, he said, was used in German state-worshiping theories, and the second was used in democratic or Liberal theories. Binkley maintained that liberal thought had an affinity for the mathematical conception of public opinion and found that it exemplified in the machinery of election.[169] According to Binkley, all liberals believed the results of a fair election were, in effect, the public opinion upon the issue of the election. Therefore, Binkley wrote, the "practical machinery" of an election furnished a pattern for a conception of public opinion.

Binkley pointed out there was a great deal of discussion about whether the source of public opinion was predominantly emotion or intellect. He saw this division as unbridgeable and based on foundational and contradictory presumptions.

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measurement in social science and government. He also was a proponent of a few wise men ruling the incompetent

[167]Binkley, "Concept of Public Opinion," 391. His reference is to A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public opinion in war and peace*. Cambridge, 1923. 12-13.

[168] Binkley, "Concept of Public Opinion," 391.

[169] Binkley, "Concept of Public Opinion," 391.

Binkley showed the complexity and conflict within the discussion of public opinion by social scientists. There was no consensus on the meaning of public opinion; rather, there were lively disagreements. Additionally, he linked democratic or liberal thought to quantification of public opinion. According to Binkley, one conflict was based, in part, on the democratic/liberal assumption of a reasoning citizen with the assumption of an emotion-based member of the mass who did not reason, but rather formed stereotypes. By placing a mystical super-individual mind of the nation opposite a reasoning individual and then associating the mystical with German state worship and reason with democratic or liberal theory, Binkley moves to link liberal and mathematical, however, he does not explain further or provide a foundation for the move.

There are important implications from Binkley's meta-theoretical article. First, there was a lively and ongoing discussion of the meaning of public opinion in 1928. Second, there were several scholarly positions within the discussion of the meaning of public opinion. Third, each of the competing definitions carried different assumptions, and Binkley, who was working with some of his own presumptions, was able to dissect the differing assumptions. Fourth, based on Binkley's 1928 *Social Forces* article, the link between democratic theory and an election equaling public opinion, or in other words, equating public opinion with an idealized election, was already being done. Different meanings of public opinion were circulating, but there was no indication that quantification had bested the alternatives. The multiple definitions were useful and provided differing understanding.

Binkley provided an example of what Benedict Anderson called the necessity of forgetting in order to remember; the actual events of the past must be forgotten to remember the new narrative.[170] Binkley would have his reader forget (not intentionally) the long time it took to change subjects into citizens; forget that reason is an individual and universal conception, whereas nation is bounded. His reasoning citizens are already within a nation. He divided the holder of a stereotype from the reasoning citizen. In Binkley's view, the liberal conception of public opinion expressed in a model election quantifies public opinion and requires the holder of public opinion to be reasoning, while it is the non-rational citizen who acts based on stereotypes.

Lowell Juillard Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept"
in *Sociology and Social Research* in 1928

Carr marked the First World War as a turning point in interest in the concept of public opinion. He cited a list of the brightest lights in sociology and social psychology, mostly from the 1920s, to define public opinion as the content of men's minds and then argued for research on public opinion as a process of accommodation to change in groups.[171] He wrote, "Renewed interest in public opinion since the war has brought out an ambiguity in the reference of the term that sociologists would do well to clear up. Most writers mean by the term the content of men's minds considered collectively. Such usage ignores the phenomena of the psycho-social

[170] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1995).
[171] Lowell Juilliard Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept," *Sociology and Social Research* 13 (1928): 18-29.

process by which groups of people readjust to changes."[172] Carr focused on the disparity between the progress made by those who focused on individual opinion as opposed to the lack of progress made by those who were trying to study social processes.

It is apparent from Binkley and Carr that the concept of public opinion in the late 1920s was contested, and the contest was of interest to academic journal editors. Public opinion had been written about by a wide range of scholars. Although the idea of measuring individual opinions and calling that public opinion was in wide circulation, the idea was not dominant, and many were aware of the limitations of such a definition. Furthermore, the aggregate sum of individual opinions could be thought of both as an election model and as being different from an election. Additionally, the scholars who had written about public opinion without a quantitative assumption or theory were being cited by others as though they had thought of public opinion in a model of an election.

Richard T. Lapiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England"
in *Social Forces* in 1928

Richard Lapiere referred to the experience of the American Negro soldiers in France during the First World War as justification to study the difference between racial attitudes in England and France. He was looking for evidence of the source of racial prejudice and questioning the assumption of a biological cause of racial prejudice. Lapiere discovered a difference and reported that it seemed unlikely that

[172] Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept," 29.

race prejudice was natural or biologically based.[173] He wrote, "One fact stands out from this present study which has a general application to the problem of racial prejudice. Since the French people have no general antagonism to, or distaste for skin color, that fact definitely precludes any concept of race prejudice as arising from or on an inherent psychological valuation of white skin by the whites, and a 'natural' revulsion for dark or black skinned peoples."[174] The article reveals multiple assumptions (current in the late 1920s) about race as nation and race as skin color.

Lapiere began by explaining the delight of American Negro soldiers who were treated as equals by the French, to the consternation of the American white soldiers. He wrote, "They could eat in any café, sit in any station, ride in any part of the train, and talk to the same girls who talked to the white soldiers. They could do these things just so long as their white brothers would let them. These white brothers were, of course, thoroughly disgusted with the spectacle of Negroes associating with what appeared to be decent French people, a situation which they could not justify or comprehend."[175] The Negro soldiers, Lapiere reported, enjoyed the experience. He continued, "They became intolerably arrogant and remarkably successful in the competition for the good graces of the French, or so it seemed to the white troops."[176] Lapiere said the white soldiers came up with explanations for French treatment of the Negro soldiers. The main explanation concurred with that given by American and English travelers in Paris. He wrote, "Consequently their conclusion was that the

[173] Richard T. Lapiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England," *Social Forces* 7 (1928): 102 – 111.
[174] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 111.
[175] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 102.

French must be inferior to Americans who, to their minds, correctly recognize the Negro's real character."[177] Lapiere then said that the explanation was shallow.

It was unclear why the white soldiers would be referred to as brothers. It does not seem ironic from the context. Moreover, it appears from the text that it would have been acceptable to the white soldiers for the Negro soldiers to socialize with "indecent" French people, so the comment has a combined race and class load. The description of the Negro soldier's behavior as "intolerably arrogant" was from a white perspective. Then Lapiere seemed to reverse himself when he described the explanation of the French as inferior and shallow. He moved on to urge the necessity of discovering the source of the non-existence of racial prejudice in France. For him to suggest looking for the reason something is not there implies that he had assummed that race prejudice is normal. In other words, in Lapiere's search for the reason of the non-existence of racial prejudice, there was the assumption of the naturalness or normalcy of racial prejudice.

Lapiere traveled in England and France in 1927, and in casual conversations he surreptitiously, he said, asked about racial attitudes. He described the systematic approach to his questioning. He categorized his answers by geographic location, gender, and class. He showed a sophisticated knowledge of statistical sampling because he described the shortcomings of his approach. In addition to asking individuals how they felt about associating with Negroes or colored people, he also

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[176] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 102.
[177] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 102.

asked hotel owners in both countries whether they permitted dark-skinned people as guests.

He discovered a lack of racial antipathy among the French people, including hotel owners. He discovered a great deal of racial antipathy among the English people, including hotel owners.[178] He also discovered that the English had less contact with non-white people than the French had. He found that the English did not perceive a difference between Africans and Indians. He wrote,

> The English have had even less direct contact with colored peoples than have the French. The colored population is negligible and consists chiefly of East Indians. Many of those are students in London most of whom are well educated in the customs of the English, economically independent, and evidence no cultural differences which, in themselves, would lead to antagonisms." He continued, "As far as attitude or prejudice is concerned, the English seldom discriminate between the African and the Indian natives.[179]

Although the race prejudice of the English caused some discomfort for the Indian elite attending school in England, Lapiere reported that the problem was different from the race problem in America. He wrote, "There is little of that open, active, dislike which makes our own problem in America so difficult."[180] As he explained the distinctions among nations and race antipathy, he also revealed a suspicious attitude toward race labels that were not specifically derived from skin

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[178] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 108.
[179] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 109.
[180] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 110.

color. He indicated his lack of confidence by using quotation marks around certain terms. He wrote,

> It has been suggested that the present lack of color antipathy in France is due to the historical tendency of the 'Latin Races' to look upon Africans with less racial antagonism than the 'Nordic' do. In other words, that the French recognize, because of earlier historical contacts, a closer blood relationship with these blacks than to the so-called Anglo-Saxons. It would not be denied that the early contact of the French with North Africa has been greater, but it is questionable whether such early contacts can in anyway account for present attitudes and wholly deniable that those contacts have led the French to consider themselves less white than do the English.[181]

For Lapiere, white skin color was a broader category than nation as race. He went on to explain that the French did not place a lower valuation on white skin. He wrote that it would be impossible to mistake a light-skinned person from India for a native Frenchman. He then pointed out that the English and the French are physically similar.

Lapiere's reasoning tells him that the French should have more racial antipathy than the English. He wrote, "The French should have, assuming race prejudice to arise from inherent psychological dislike of difference and on a basis of direct contact, the strongest anti-color feeling."[182]

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[181] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 110.
[182] Lapiere, "Race Prejudice," 110.

Multiple currents of influence as to how people should be sorted are at play in Lapiere's article. Race as a skin color, race as a problem, and the cause of racial antipathy are all important to Lapiere. He challenged the current assumption of a biological cause for racial prejudice and failed to find a social cause to substitute. He was able to show the difference between the English and the French in the level of racial antipathy. He also demonstrated an overlapping of terms. Lapiere used race and skin color interchangeably. He referred to dark-skinned people and colored people. A Negro and someone from India were both colored. He disparaged the older term of Anglo-Saxon, however, and treated the terms Nordic and Latin with suspicion. This article shows the new conception of race as skin color.

James Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling"
in *The Survey* in 1928

James Reinhardt compared the views of university students in a West Virginia school and a North Dakota school. He discovered stronger prejudice against Negroes in North Dakota than in West Virginia, and he found other races or nationalities were more disliked than the Negro by some students.[183]

Reinhardt followed Bogardus and provided a list to students for rank ordering. Bogardus called all of the entries on his list races. Reinhardt, however, used a different categorization for his list. On the table in the article, the list was labeled "Race or Nationality." In the text Reinhardt wrote, "Fourteen different cultural and

[183] James M. Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," *The Survey* 61 (November 15, 1928): 239-240.

racial groups were used: Russian, Jew, Italian, Scotch(sic), English, Irish, Chinese, French, Japanese, German, Negro, Turk, Hindu and Scandinavian."[184]

Reinhardt was surprised when his subjects found Russians to be less desirable than Negroes. He wrote, "Strangely enough, exactly 50 percent of those comprising group A indicated that the Negro was more desirable as a fellow citizen than the Russian and while the Negro was given one third place and two fifth places among fourteen races and nationalities, no student placed the Russian above fifth place and he was given that position but once."[185] He continued, "It is noteworthy that as a citizen and as a neighbor the Negro appears to be more desirable in the students of Group A than any one of four other cultural and racial groups out of fourteen."[186]

He also reported the reasons the students gave for their dislike of Negroes. He wrote, "Nine of the students in the A group stated or implied low intelligence and natural inferiority as the most undesirable characteristic of the Negro."[187] Other students said they could not tolerate the Negro. Some said they feared race mixing. He wrote, "Several of the students in both groups did not think that the Negro was naturally inferior, but felt that the intermixture would result in an inferior race."[188]

The terms race, nationality, and cultural group were use interchangeably by Reinhardt. The article relies on Bogardus, however, the author expanded the terms used to categorize people. Reinhardt showed his surprise that there could be more

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[184] Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," 239.
[185] Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," 239.
[186] Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," 240.
[187] Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," 240.
[188] Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," 240.

antipathy toward any group greater than the antipathy toward the Negro. This indicates his assumption that the Negro would be the subject of the greatest antipathy.

L.L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured"
in *The American Journal of Sociology* 1928

In 1928, opinion, attitude, nationality, and race were contested concepts, and L.L.Thurstone wrote beautiful cases for measurement methods. In, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Thurstone defined attitude and opinion. He defined opinion as the verbal expression of an attitude. An attitude was described as more complex.[189] He wrote, "The concept 'attitude' will be used here to denote the sum total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specified topic. Thus, a man's attitude about pacifism means here all that he feels and thinks about peace and war. It is admittedly a subjective and personal affair."[190] That he needed to make the distinction shows that neither term had acquired a fixed meaning. That Thurstone used so many words to explain the distinction between the two terms and that he constructed elaborate indices and scales to measure opinion provide more evidence of the contested nature of both terms at the time.

In a second measurement methods article, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," in *Journal of General Psychology*, Thurstone proposed a way to use a comparative method of measuring physical items to instead measure

[189] L.L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *The American Journal of Sociology* 33 (1928): 529-554.

[190] Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," 531.

people's preferences for people of specific nationalities.[191] He used nationality and race interchangeably. The title of the article used nationality, and the first sub head was: "An experimental study of racial attitudes."[192] He asked students to make preference choices between pairs of nation/race labels. On the list from which all possible pairs were made were the following: American, Armenian, Chinaman (sic), Englishman (sic), Frenchman (sic), German, Greek, Hindu, Irishman (sic), Italian, Japanese, Jew, Mexican, Negro, Pole, Russian, Scotchman (sic), Spaniard, South American, Swede, and Turk.[193]

Thurstone did not reference his list of nations and races, which was somewhat different from Bogardus'. Thurstone made some of Bogardus' non-masculine terms masculine. These are the changes, with the terms used by Bogardus listed first, and Thurstone's second: English/Englishman, French/Frenchman, Irish/Irishman, Scotch/Scotchman. Not included on Thurstone's list, but appearing on the Bogardus list, were Scotch-Irish, Canadian, Dutch, Welch, Norwegian and Filipino. Although Thurstone's list has Negro and Jew, he did not include the further distinction made by Bogardus of Jew-German and Jew-Russian. Bogardus, in 1924, had consistently used race to describe groups of people. His list primarily included country names, but it

[191] L.L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *Journal of General Psychology* 1 (1928): 405-423.

[192] Thurstone, "Nationality Preference," 406.

[193] Thurstone, "Nationality Preference," 408. Emory S. Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (March-April 1924/1925): 299-308.

also included the name of a religion and and the term Negro as well.[194] Additionally, Bogardus listed the term Mulatto among his choices involving social distance.[195] .

Thurstone made a connection between nation and opinion. He assumed that opinion is based in nationality, and that psychological normalcy derives from homogeneous nationality and/or race. He wrote,

> To transfer the application of the law from lifted weights to nationality preferences introduces new factors into the judgements. The nationality preferences are saturated with prejudice and bias, with religious affiliations, and with wide differences in knowledge and familiarity. In addition to these variable factors, the group of 239 subjects was also intentionally left as heterogeneous as it was found to be among undergraduates at the University of Chicago. It is clear that with large portions of Jews, Catholics, Negroes, Protestants, and students whose parents are foreign-born, it may be very questionable whether the distribution of attitude toward any one of the twenty nationalities is in any sense normal on the psychological continuum.[196]

Normal, then, was defined within a nationality or race.

He anticipated, but did not find, difficulty in measuring his University of Chicago students because they were heterogeneous. His method worked in spite of what he thought of as the extreme heterogeneity of his subjects. He reported: "The group of 239 subjects was intentionally heterogeneous in that 40 percent or more of

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[194] Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," 299.

[195] Emory Bogardus, "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," *Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (1924-1925):373-381.

the parents and grandparents were foreign-born, 15 percent were Jews, 64 percent were Protestants, and 10 percent were Catholics."[197] That the heterogeneity was represented by nationalities of same skin color is apparent from the chart he provided of the natal countries of the foreign-born. The principal ancestral countries of Thurstone's 249 subjects were Canada, England, Germany, Ireland, and Russia. Among those countries, or what Thurstone thought of as nationalities, only Russia exceeded 10 percent among parents of subjects, and only Russia and Germany exceeded 10 percent among grandparents.

For Thurstone, nationalities were gendered, race and nationality were interchangeable, and the range of nationalities described had diminished from earlier uses. Distinctions among Jews by national origin no longer were made, and the colonial euphemism Scotch-Irish had been dropped, as had Mulatto. The confounding of race and nation are visible in the work of one of the major innovators and proponents of quantification in social science.

Edward S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science" in *The American Political Science Review* in 1929

Edward Corwin argued that academically trained political scientists should fill the role of expert leaders of public opinion. He believed an educated few should use their scientific skills to advocate the greater good. He wanted political science to maintain its role as crusader and he was certain that all men were not rational and were not particularly interested in public affairs. The remedy he suggested would have political

[196] Thurstone, "Nationality Preferences," 406.

scientists create symbols to counter the symbols created by the politicians, interests, and advertisers.[198] The common man was not wise. The common man needed experts to be advocates for the common good.

Corwin was worried by the ability of politicians and advertisers to control the great mass of people, but he was not without hope. He found hope in the potential of political scientists to be crusaders. Although he believed the eighteenth-century ideal of a rational man in the mass must be abandoned, he criticized the behaviorist approach to political science, not because of the method, but because of the attention spent on irrelevancies. Behaviorist political scientists, according to Corwin, had missed the critical issue of the necessity of the civic-minded few taking charge. The civic-minded few needed to step up and lead the masses who had come to be perceived as irrational as a result of Darwin's discrediting of rationality, behaviorism, and the social changes in the world since World War I. He wrote, "What, let it be asked therefore, is the outstanding lesson of political behaviorism—a lesson supplemented by that of war propaganda, of modern advertising methods, or the thing called vogue, and in a dozen other ways? Is it not the lesson of the indefinite educability, and even re-educability, of the masses?"[199] Corwin wanted the best to do the best they could despite the reality of how men behaved. He wanted the few good men, political scientists, to take charge, to crusade, and to advance democracy. He continued, "Is it not the lesson that if those who are best qualified by good will, lack of bias, trained

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[197] Thurstone, "Nationality Preferences," 422.

[198] Edward S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 23 (1929):569-592.

minds, and precise methods to do this work as it should be done, and for proper ends, do not do it, others will—indeed are doing it at this moment—and for selfish ends? Is it not, in short, that the real rulers of the race are those who educate it—who, in the word of Mr. Lippmann, 'create consent'?"[200]

Corwin wanted the political scientists to crusade for their own set of symbols. He wanted political science to retain a goal of popular education. He thought a few arbiters of social values should know and use scholarly method for the greater good, just as so many were using it for selfish ends. Corwin wanted to know: "Why should the political scientist spend his time measuring stereotypes planted in the public mind by other people when he could be planting some of his own?"[201] Corwin wanted political scientists to act in a way similar to the behavior of the experts Lippmann had called for in *Public Opinion*. Corwin's experts, however, would be extra-governmental. They would fulfill the role expected of all men in a democracy by the eighteenth-century rationalists and democratic dogma. These few experts would crusade using their own symbols to counter the symbols of propagandists, politicians, and advertisers. Their symbols would be used to lead the members of the irrational mass to the greatest good, the public good.

Oliver McKee, "Lobbying for Good or Evil"

in *The North American Review* in 1929

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[199] Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 589.
[200] Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 589.
[201] Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 590.

In an article in *The North American Review*, Oliver McKee argued that lobbying is beneficial.[202] He urged individuals to find the lobby that represents their interests. He wrote,

> The individual citizen, in himself, is virtually without representation on Capitol Hill. Except in the imagination of the political philosopher, the 'natural man', as such, does not exist. For each citizen is tied to a particular economic interest, whether he be a farmer, a banker, a college professor, or an exporter of razors or shaving cream. Lobbies give these economic groups a representation in the Nation's Capital, and thus help to broaden the bases of our democracy.[203]

Becoming part of a lobby, according to McKee, was the only possible way for an individual to have any voice in national affairs. He said the citizen must then watch his own lobbyist. He wrote, "Vigilance is the price of safety even here. He must watch his lobbyist, just as a good citizen calls the mayor of his city from time to time for an account of his stewardship. A careful watch of this kind will drive parasites from their soft retreats, and do much to prevent the abuses and evils which may characterize lobbies today, as in the past."[204]

Frank R. Kent, "The Great Lobby Hunt"

in *Scribner's* in 1930

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[202] Oliver McKee, Jr. "Lobbying for Good or Evil," *The North American Review* 227 (1929):343-352.

[203] McKee, "Lobbying for Good or Evil," 352.

[204] McKee, "Lobbying for Good or Evil," 352.

Writing in the mass circulation magazine *Scribner's*, Frank Kent discriminated between good and bad lobbyists and argued that times had changed. He said, that although lobbyists once were terrible, now they did good work.[205] He wrote,

> Finally, I think the committee has performed a considerable service in concentrating attention upon the extraordinary development of lobbying in this generation, the vast difference between the lobby of the past and the lobby of the present and the amazing degree to which lobbyist activities have come to dictate legislative action in the country—not in a sinister sense but recognized as entirely legitimate and participated in by millions of people. Though entirely unofficial they have become a more powerful force in the government than the legislative branch itself.[206]

Kent drew a distinction between past lobbyists who bribed members of Congress, and the lobbyists of 1930 who used propaganda. He wrote,

> The direct purchase is a thing of the past. The change in the methods of the lobbyist has kept pace with the times. As Ex-Senator Thomas of Colorado not long ago declared, ' The men who seek special favors in Congress today do not bribe. They rely almost exclusively upon the manipulation of public sentiment.' In brief, the prime weapon of the old-time lobbyist was money; the prime weapon of the modern lobbyist is propaganda.[207]

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[205] Frank R. Kent, "The Great Lobby Hunt," *Scribner's* 87 (1930): 500-506.
[206] Kent, "Lobby Hunt," 503.
[207] Kent, "Lobby Hunt," 504.

The use of propaganda, according to Kent, began during World War I and had developed into a flood put out by publicity departments and press agents representing all kinds of businesses and organizations. The purpose of the flood of propaganda was to create public opinion. He wrote, "All of this is designed to manufacture and manipulate public sentiment. That has become the great national pastime—and millions play at it."[208] He detailed the activities of a few of the most powerful organizations, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Association Against Prohibition. According to Kent, their activities included more than propaganda. Big organizations also supported candidates in election campaigns and mobilized voters to pressure Congress, he wrote. Kent believed that the new-style, good lobbyist researched and wrote legislation.

In Kent's view, the propaganda efforts of the big organizations were good because they represented the interests of many people. Kent and many of his readers could have seen this control as useful; especially if others were being controlled.

George A. Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint" in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1930

The complexity and long duration of the debate over the meaning of public opinion and the growing authority of statistical analysis were apparent in George Lundberg's argument that behaviorism's methods should be applied to sociology. He argued that sociology should follow psychology and, in so doing, find a way out of what he called a lack of shared definitions of terms and apply a more rigorous

[208] Kent, "Lobby Hunt," 505.

scientific method. The article showed the lack of agreement on the meaning of the term public opinion and the way in which behavioristic definitions masked the historical political context of the term.[209]

Lundberg's 1930 article in *The American Journal of Sociology* reveals that the definition of public opinion was contested for a long time and that agreement on a definition was not even close in 1930. It is also clear that the idea of measuring individual opinions had been around for some time. He wrote, "The controversy between the adherents of these two positions has been long and learned, with as yet, no conclusive result."[210] His citations in connection with a definition of public opinion as an aggregate sum of individual opinions included James Bryce from a 1910 edition of *The American Commonwealth*, Floyd H. Allport from his book *Social Psychology* in 1924, and Charles H. Cooley refuting the definition of public opinion as an aggregate sum of individual opinions in 1916 in *Social Organization*. Lundberg found the sum of opinions difficult because he assumed that a summation was not possible. He wrote, "The first class of definitions is difficult to understand or to use because they raise the question as to what a 'collection' or 'aggregate' of individual opinions could be. The words imply algebraic summation, but in a practical or mathematical sense such summation is not possible."[211]

Lundberg detailed the major points of controversy over the term public opinion. The controversy included the following questions: Was public opinion only

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[209] George A. Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," *The American Journal of Sociology* 36 (1930): 387 – 405.

[210] Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," 389.

unanimous or was it synonymous with majority opinion?; if a minority was also public opinion, just how small a minority could it be?; why was there so much vagueness in the definition of public?; were there rapid changes in public opinion?; and is the group opinion superior to the opinion of individuals in the group? Before addressing those issues, Lundberg described the range of meanings in the discussion of public opinion. What Lundberg called the current uses of the term public opinion were, 1) the opinions in which all agree, 2) the opinion in which the majority agree, 3) the sum of all opinions—the whole mass of human thought on a subject, 4) the views of the organs of opinion—the press, electoral results, etc., 5) the opinion of the educated or those in authority, and 6) the collective judgement of a group regarded as an entity.[212]

Although some of the major scholars of public opinion—Bryce, Lowell, Shepard—were quoted in the article, Lundberg ignored or misunderstood these scholars' foundational assumptions. For Lundberg, nation and state became geographic variables and ways to sort people into groups. No link remained between public opinion and nation, public opinion and democracy, or public opinion and any possible link to governance. For example, Shepard's argument, as well as Bryce's, was linked to the relationship of public opinion to governing. In 1910, Shepard wrote about the alternatives of the conception of public opinion, the debate over the newspaper (journalism) as a molder or reflector of public opinion, and the variety of

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[211] Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," 389.

[212] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (new rev. ed., 1910) 251; Lowell Juilliard Carr, "Public Opinion as a Dynamic Concept" *Sociology and Social Research* 13 (1928): 18-19; Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 15 (1909-10): 32-60 (especially pages 4-44) as cited by Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," 388 footnote 1.

ways public opinion could be formed. He followed Henry Jephson in tracing the historical development of alternative organs (vehicles of expression) of public opinion in England. The organs, grouped as the Platform, include all ways by which publics try to gain adherents *and pressure government*. They include: public speaking, public assemblies, passing resolutions, petitions, delegations sent to government authorities, political organizations and demonstrations. Shepard linked these alternative organs to the press, saying that their power was increased when their activity was reported. Moreover, Shepard was hopeful that public opinion could actually rule. He wrote, "Political prophecy is hazardous, but if the trend of government evolution which the last decade has disclosed in both the Anglo-Saxon countries continues, may we not confidently expect the actual realization of government by public opinion without the interposition of representative bodies other than very extended electorates?"[213] Race and nation were tightly linked for Shepard, and public opinion was a force that ruled government.

Lundberg's behavioristic lens blinded him to the authors' time- and context-based meaning. Whatever the reason, Lundberg seems to have missed or ignored the ties of public opinion to governing. It is clear the debate over the meaning of public opinion, and the concept of an aggregate wiser than the individuals (along with the idea of measuring public opinion) continued to be disputed by academics from a range of disciplines in 1930.

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[213] Walter J. Shepard, "Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 15 (1909-10): 60.

Charles E. Merriam, "Research Problems in the Field of Parties, Elections, and Leadership"

in *The American Political Science Review* in 1930

In a prescription for future research in *The American Political Science Review*, Charles Merriam listed types of research he believed must be done to understand political parties and elections. Merriam wanted more science applied to the study of politics.[214] Merriam hoped to see social scientists improve on the practice of predicting elections. In other words, he wanted to see the social sciences' measuring methods advance journalism's gathering of straw votes. Merriam wrote,

One of the tests of science is the ability to predict. Political scientists have left the prediction of election results to newspaper men and journalists who have usually no special training in statistics and in the accurate handling of data. The success of the rough and ready methods of the journalists in the field should be encouraging to the political scientists. A definite attempt should be made to systematize the procedure for the taking of straw votes. As a preliminary to this work, all the known methods of sampling should be applied to a great variety of existing election returns. Different techniques should be tried out at a number of different elections.[215]

Additionally, Merriam suggested studying campaigning efforts. He wrote, "Among the campaign devices that could be studied are the house to house canvass, the printed circular sent through the mails, the radio address, and the public meeting. Changes in

[214] Charles E. Merriam, "Research Problems in the Field of Parties, Elections, and Leadership," *The American Political Science Review* 24 (1930): 36-38.

[215] Merriam, "Research Problems," 34.

attitude could be recorded by the use of scales similar to those devised by Thurstone, Allport, and others."[216] He thought literacy tests, residential requirements, and systems for selecting electors also might be studied. He was interested in discovering in what ways systems disfranchised some citizens. He urged scholars to study convention nominations and the direct primary.[217]

Merriam suggested a wide range of ideas on how votes might be analyzed, and he thought race, and nationalities were critical ways votes should be analyzed.. He thought it would be possible to compare votes by political parties in urban and rural areas. However, other variables were more elusive. He wrote, "The analysis of the importance of sex, religion, race, nationality, occupation, and similar factors in the determination of party affiliations would be harder to make, but there is much to do in this field."[218] He continued with suggestions for ways to overcome the difficulties in the projects. He wrote, "Precinct returns could be used in the large cities for the analysis of the importance of nationality." He continued, "Another important problem would be the analysis of the negro (sic) vote. In the border states between the North and South, the negro (sic) vote is of great importance to the two major parties, and the negro (sic) vote is also of growing significance in the Northern cities."[219]
Merriam's concern was with improving on measurement and prediction. Although he included race and nation in his discussion, he did not define his terms, and the references in the text do not reveal meaning. In addition to what appears to be a direct

[216] Merriam, "Research Problems," 34.
[217] Merriam, "Research Problems," 35.
[218] Merriam, "Research Problems," 36.

description of what George Gallup would later claim and do—bring science to straw polls and use academic sampling methods to predict elections—the article is remarkable for its wide range of suggestions, and from those many suggestions comes the vividness of the unformed quality of the quantitative study of politics.

George B. Vetter, "The Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes and the Related Personality Factors"

in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1930

Multiple understandings of race and nation were visible in George Vetter's 1930 article. In trying to link personality to political attitudes, he revealed a rich range of overlapping meanings of race and nation. Additionally, Vetter's article provides a look at the social issues of the late 1920s. Vetter looked at several years of journals of political and social opinion to find social issues of the day. He did not specify which ones or for precisely how long. In addition to finding the issues, he also looked for positions on the issues. He found fifty questions upon which there were varying opinions. Vetter reduced those fifty to thirty-six, and he scaled the opinions on each in five steps.[220]

The thirty-six issues in the order in which they appeared on his questionnaire were: Government ownership, the confiscation of wealth, protective tariff, hereditary wealth, the subway fare, social limitations in mating, question of birth control, legality of abortions, question of divorce, attitude toward incest, attitude toward attempts at

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[219] Merriam, "Research Problems," 36.

[220] George B. Vetter, "The Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes and the Related Personality Factors," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 25 (1930): 149-181.

social progress, the prohibition question, academic freedom, freedom of speech, conscription for military service, gambling, socialization of medical care, minimum wage laws, equality of income and taxation, compulsory education, powers of the supreme court, religion and science, the American constitution, respect for tradition, the church, the powers of labor organizations, Hoover's qualifications, recognition of Russia, naval armament, the Fascist government, miscegnation (sic)—interbreeding of races, our Latin-American policy, immigration, international alliances, white supremacy, and the Nordic race.[221] The questions about miscegenation, immigration, white supremacy, and the Nordic race are each particularly applicable to the investigation of public opinion and nation.

Race and nation appear to be both the same and different in the following immigration statements. "1. We had better preserve our lands and heritage for our own offspring by shutting out all immigrants."[222] It is impossible to tell from the statement alone to which "we"[223] and "our"[224] refer. However it is labeled as the "reactionary" response, and based on the subsequent questions, it seems "we"[225] and "our"[226] was a reference to white American Protestants.

> 2. Immigrants should be strictly limited to small numbers of the white race and of cultures similar to our own, and then only those of a certain high standard of culture or intelligence. 3. Immigration should be limited to small and definite

[221] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 153-162.
[222] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.
[223] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.
[224] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.
[225] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.
[226] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.

racial or national quotas based on the number of that group already here and thoroughly assimilated. The individuals admitted should be of a fair standard of physical and mental excellence.[227]

Answers two and three are labeled the conservative answer by Vetter and his panel of academics. Race as white comprise several cultures, unless the reference would have been understood to apply only to people of British decent. Statement three makes a distinction between race and nation. Statement four and five are labeled liberal, and in statement five the reference is only to race. In the social issue of immigration in 1930, race and nation were important categories by which to sort people. Some group was understood by statement makers and rankers to mean "us," and others were to be excluded by race or nation.

The statements to be selected by college students under the classification "White Supremacy" carry a rich cultural load. The statements were:

1. The white race should continue its past and present program of subjugating and exploiting the darker or inferior races of the earth. 2. Modern civilization is almost entirely a product of the white race. With this evidence of superiority, we are justified in doing our best to maintain the white race in its position of unquestioned supremacy. 3. All the races are of very nearly equal worth, each making its own peculiar contribution to civilization. No race should assume itself to be the elect. 4. The white race today is merely a dog having its day, as history shows other races to have had. It might well be some

[227] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.

other race's turn next. Certainly the white race has done nothing on which to base clams of permanent leadership. 5. The ruthlessness and barbarism the white race has persistently shown in its relations with other races justifies the other races in combing to exterminate the common enemy the whites or beat them into submission.[228]

Nineteenth-century racialist assumptions are present in the statements; including the inferiority of darker races. Yet, race mutated to white sometime during the 1920s, at least from Vetter's point of view or in the press treatment from which the issues had been culled. White had become a racial category, and the author apparently believed it would be understood by his reader, who most likely would have been included in the category of white. The nineteenth-century racialist theorists would not have found the overlay of white congruent with their theories. They made much finer distinctions among groups and used historical arguments for their evidence.

Apparently not all of the members of what was then called the white race were equal under one category as evidenced by the next set of statements under the heading, "The Nordic Race." They were:

1. The Nordics have never been more than rather successful and acquisitive pirates, plunderers, and traders. 2. The Nordics have contributed relatively less to progress and civilization than some other types of races. 3. The peoples loosely referred to as the Nordics have been neither more nor less inventive or progressive than other races. 4. The Nordic race has contributed a

[228] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.

relatively large share to progress and civilization. 5. The Nordic race has been the source of all fundamental progress and civilization.[229]

In both sets of statements about social issues, there is an assumption of civilization and progress. Both terms, civilization and progress, had been theoretically linked to race by nineteenth-century writers. For example, progress was the advancement of civilization, and civilization was the advancement of the British/American culture because it was believed by academics and other elites to be the most advanced form of civilization.

D. D. Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion" in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1931

D. D. Droba used method of construction as his category of classifying investigations of public opinions. In the introduction to his literature review, he pointed out that there was a lack of agreement on the definition of opinion and attitude.[230] He wrote, "The methods chosen for review will somewhat depend on the definition of opinion or attitude. Unfortunately, however, there is wide disagreement as to what opinions and attitudes are."[231] Moreover, he did not provide a discussion of the alternatives. He continued: "However, in order to avoid too much misunderstanding, the writer will limit himself to opinions on public issues or public opinion. Only methods used for measuring opinions on such topics as prohibition, nationalities and races, war, politics,

[229] Vetter, "Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes" 162.

[230] D.D. Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology* 37 (1931): 410-423.

[231] Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion," 410.

will be considered in this paper."[232] Here then, he decided (without defending his decision), that the concept of public opinion concerned public issues, choosing his literature for review based on the topics. Therefore, in 1931, according to Droba, there was no agreed-on definition of, or method for, studying public opinion. His logic shows what he believed were public issues.

Harold D. Lasswell, "The Measurement of Public Opinion"
in *The American Political Science Review* in 1931

Harold Lasswell proposed taking stock of the status of the study of public opinion and suggested some core concepts.[233] Lasswell wrote, "Since the last decade has witnessed an unparalleled outlay of energy in discussing public opinion, and in inventing devices intended to add precision to the discussion, it is not untimely to take stock of our present position in the matter."[234] Lasswell gently rebuked those who had suggested using measurement as a way to discover the definition of public opinion. Lasswell thought a set of core concepts was necessary to bring more precision to the study of public opinion.

He defined public opinion within a larger set of concepts. First, he defined political movement as political change involving many people. Complex political movement involved alternative, debatable points of view. He wrote, "We may say that the complex political movement originated in unrest, passed through a phase of symbolization and discussion, and proceeded through enactment to a relatively

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[232] Droba, "Methods Used for Measuring Public Opinion," 410.

[233] Harold D. Lasswell, " The Measurement of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review* 25 (1931): 311-326.

permanent change in the political pattern."[235] He acknowledged that sometimes change does not result and that instead, debate might break off as continuing disagreement sometimes led to an exchange of bullets or some other type of coercion. Then he used a reference to public opinion to, in turn, refer to the phase of a complex political movement during debate. He wrote, "It [public opinion] is used to refer to that phase of a complex political movement which is characterized by debatable demands for action. It is essential for the concept of public opinion that one recognize that differences are pertinent only when they involve antagonisms."[236] He continued, "No less fundamental for the concept is the idea of demands whose fate is to be subjected to discussion and to some deciding procedure short of coercion."[237]

Lasswell suggested some possible ways of deciding what could be measured within his limiting core concepts. His public was limited by time—days, weeks, months, years—and participation in the debate needed to be defined by some minimal amount of time. He wrote,

Since participation involves not only the total numbers who participate, but the intensity of their participation, we must decide how to weigh so much voting against so much expenditure of money and time. One possibility would be to translate time spent into political earning power, and include voting, canvassing, speaking, attending committee and mass meetings, and the like, in the time account.[238]

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[234] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 311.
[235] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 312.
[236] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 313.
[237] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 313.
[238] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 314.

Lasswell then placed his definition of the public within another set of concepts. A public may arise out of an attention group, and an attention group was comprised of those people who pay attention to the course of events related to some political issue, he wrote. Then he connected public to a sentiment group, placing the public as a subset to nationality. The public was within the sentiment group. He wrote, There remains the task of designating the connection between the public and the sentiment group, which is composed of those who are emotionally identified through a collective symbol, like nationalists, patriots, proletarians, and partisans. Identification involves the inclusion of a symbol of the other into the personality of an individual. Identification can occur with respect to those who are spatially remote through the perception of a common relation to an inclusive symbol, like a flag emblem, or a name.[239]

According to Lasswell, the debate on an issue was constrained by a consensus—participants had to agree to have a debate. He thought it necessary to have those who disagreed on the political situation agree that the situation was debatable. He wrote, "Public opinion proceeds within a framework of the non-debatable."[240] He continued, "Demands are debatable so long as they do not transgress the moral consensus; when they do, the public dissolves, debate ceases, intolerance begins, and joint coercion is in readiness."[241] In other words, some issues could be debated and other issues were beyond discussion.

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[239] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 316.
[240] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 316.
[241] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 316.

After drawing careful boundaries around the concept of public opinion, Lasswell asked a series of questions about how to proceed with the study of public opinion before he suggested again that precise definition must come before measurement. For example, he asked: 1) How can the effect of public opinion upon other political processes be appraised? 2) How can it be determined if public opinion was present or absent in connection with policy changes? 3) If present, what were the dimensions of public opinion? 4) How have group demands been modified because they were debated publicly? 5) What is the extent to which policies are modified because of consideration of how the public might react?[242]

Lasswell closed by explaining the necessity for precise definitions. He wrote, "I have sought to indicate how certain general ways of thinking about public opinion would place some measuring tentatives in perspective and show where effort has not thus far been directed successfully. The goal is precise statements about the extent, duration, intensity, effect, and formative factors in public opinion."[243] The idea of measure first and then define was being refuted by Lasswell.

Roscoe C. Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study" in *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* in 1933

Roscoe Martin used comparative summary statistics when he examined election returns. Although he urged researchers to use more election returns, he noted they were sometimes difficult to obtain. He gently urged the use of objective quantitative methods. He assumed that the failure to exercise the franchise was a

[242] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 326

problem. In addition, he assumed that each "native White American" would behave the same way at the polls and that other racial groups would distinguish themselves from whites and each other.[244] He wrote, "Of all the problems which arise from consideration of the electorate, none commands more instant attention than that of race, nor are many more deserving of study. Since democracy is looked upon by most as an institution indigenous to American soil, it is assumed that native white Americans the country over will react in about the same way, quantitatively at least, to the stimuli of our democratic way of existence."[245] He continued: "It is assumed further that other racial groups will react to the same stimuli in ways which will distinguish them from the native whites and from each other."[246] And then he acknowledged the contested nature of his assumptions when he wrote, "While the validity of these assumptions, and more particularly of the first, may of course be questioned, for present purposes let us suppose them to be valid."[247]

In 1933, the continuing assumption of racial differences that are expected to appear in quantitative measures was clear. The use of quantitative measures was still struggling.

Francis G.Wilson, "Concepts of Public Opinion"

in *The American Political Science Review* in 1933

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[243] Lasswell, "Measurement of Public Opinion," 326.

[244] Roscoe C. Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 14 (1933): 193-237.

[245] Martin, "Municipal Electorate," 229.

[246] Martin, "Municipal Electorate," 229.

[247] Martin, "Municipal Electorate," 229.

In a rich theoretical discussion, Francis Wilson explored the meanings of the concept of public opinion. He wrote from a historical political background. The logic of his discussion led him to the possibility that democracy may be only a momentary fluctuation in political history.[248] He wrote,

> Today the need of experts and technicians in finding a basis of action is recognized. If we develop means of getting at what may be spoken of as relative truth, opinion will be left as the ruler of a functionless kingdom. If opinion may only support, and if it has no right to resist, the experts, the value of democracy is clearly in question. If the technique of finding and acting on facts is to be restricted to experts, popular government, except as a means of obtaining obedience from the masses, may well be only one short phase in the history of politics.[249]

Wilson stated clearly what was the conclusion of many social scientists in the first decades of the twentieth century. Just as there was increasing participation through the extension of the franchise, the chaos of industrial life that began before the turn of the century followed by the shock of the World War and the backlash against the war propaganda that focused so much attention on public opinion in the 1920s meant that there could be no other conclusion from a historical-political perspective except that the time had come to release the presumption of a participatory government. Democracy had had its day.

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[248] Francis G. Wilson, "Concepts of Public Opinion," *The American Political Science Review* 27 (1933): 371-392.

[249] Wilson, "Concepts of Public Opinion," 380.

That race is equivalent to nation continued to represent the thinking of most of the authors numbered in the public opinion canon when either race or nation was mentioned. For some, nation as race was of critical importance. For others, the issue was one of many on a social issue agenda. It is impossible to find a wise common man portrayed by the authors. Instead, the common man was at best educable by an elite few and at worst dangerous and in need of control. And although many who thought opinion was something an individual possessed, there was no agreement on how to define public opinion when all of the articles comprising Childs' syllabus are considered.

Chapter Six

Summary and Conclusions

The origins story of public opinion marked the advent of the modern study of public opinion with the pollsters' accurate prediction of Franklin Roosevelt's presidential victory in November 1936 and the founding of the prestigeous academic journal *Public Opinion Quarterly* in January 1937. The highly successful meaning of the concept of public opinion is what polls measure, according to Michael Schudson, Susan Herbst and Phillip Converse.[1] Scholars argue that the middle 1930s mark the beginning of the field of study of public opinion.[2] William Albig wrote, "These two decades [1936-1956] span almost exactly the history of polling."[3] Eleanor Singer wrote in 1987, "And the field is really coterminous with the journal [*Public Opinion Quarterly*]."[4]

George Gallup was widely credited with promoting the public opinion industry and the current dominant definition of public opinion as being what polls measure.[5]

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[1]Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American civic life* (New York: The Free Press, 1998): 228; Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 12, 43, 63, 153; Phillip E. Converse "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987) S13.

[2]Charles K. Atkin and James Gaudino, "The Impact of Polling on the Mass Media," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 472 (1984): 119-128; Leo Bogart, *Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1972), 14; Albert Gollin, "In Search of a Usable Past," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (1985): 416; George Gallup "The Changing Climate for Public Opinion Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21 (1957): 23.

[3]William Albig, "Two Decades of Opinion Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 14.

[4]Eleanor Singer, "Editor's Introduction" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S2.

[5]Albert H. Cantril, "In Memoriam: George Horace Gallup, Sr. 1901-1984" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (1984): 807-808; John E. Drewry, *Post Biographies of Famous Journalists* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1942), viii; J. Michael Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," *Communication Monographs* 64 (1997): 161-179, 162; David W. Moore, *The*

The name George Gallup and The Gallup Poll are now nearly synonymous with the public opinion poll in much of the world and have been for more than 50 years.[6] Gallup's promotion of the idea that public opinion is reflected by poll results began with a syndicated weekly column of poll results in 1935.[7] He not only took credit for nearly single-handedly inventing public opinion polling, he served as historian and promoter of the industry that could bring science to the straw polls.[8] Gallup's lifelong effort combined promoting his polls as scientific and objective.[9] At the same time, he linked the polls to a democratic vision from the past[10] that in effect "bottled the air of democracy," Richard Reeves wrote in *Esquire* magazine in 1983, just before Gallup died.[11] Many scholars have noted the link between public opinion polling and democratic politics.[12] Gallup argued that the common man was wise and that the polls

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Superpollsters: How They Measure and Manipulate Public Opinion in America (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1992) 56, 229; Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters: Public Opinion, Politics, and Democratic Leadership* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 3 n.1.; Charles T. Salmon and Theodore L. Glasser, "The Politics of Polling and the Limits of Consent," 439-441; and Jean Converse, *Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987): 114-117.

[6]Cantril, "In Memoriam: George Horace Gallup, Sr. 1901-1984" 808; Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161-162.

[7]"America Speaks," *Washington Post* 20 October 1935, sec. 1,1 and sec 3, 1.

[8]Converse, *Survey Research,* 115, 116; Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161, 163.

[9]Hogan, "George Gallup and the Rhetoric of Scientific Democracy," 161-179; George Gallup, "Measuring Public Opinion" *Vital Speeches of the Day* 9 March 9, 1936, 372; "Gallup Directs Institute Polls for the Public," *The Washington Post*, 20 October,1935, S 3, 1.

[10]"Bryce Named Poll as Best Opinion Test," *The Washington Post,* 20 October, 1935, S 3, 1; George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How it Works* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 16-33.

[11]Richard Reeves, "George Gallup's Nation of Numbers" *Esquire*, 100 (December, 1983): 91-94, 96, 92.

[12]Converse, *Survey Research,* 123-127; Childs, *Public Opinion: nature, formation, and role,* 30-31; Price, *Communication Concepts 4*, 34; Herbst, *Numbered Voices,*; Philip E. Converse, "Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (1987): S12-S24; Harold F. Gosnell, "The Polls and other Mechanisms of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 4 (1940): 414-424; John C. Ranney, "Do the Polls Serve Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10

used science and brought the views of the wise common man to the attention of lawmakers and other participants in democracy. The public opinion poll could, he wrote, "provide a continuous chart of the opinions of the man in the street."[13]

What this dissertation has shown, however, is that a far different conception of the common man dominated the articles that comprised Harwood Childs' Princeton University syllabus, *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, which was from one of the first university classes in public opinion. It was published in 1934, just before the time so many scholars call the founding of the field of public opinion.[14] The common man is *not* portrayed as wise and able to reason. Instead, the authors of the articles in Childs' syllabus portrayed a common man who needed guidance from his betters and who was sometimes dangerous. It is unlikely that a common man could have been perceived any other way by the elite men who wrote the syllabus articles between 1886 and 1933. The authors views were structured by racialist assumptions about the nature of human beings whom they saw as rank-ordered by their nation-race with respect to their ability to govern themselves. If men are thought to be rank-ordered in their ability based on the inheritance of their race-nation, and if a government unit is made up of individuals from different race-nations, then it is impossible to think of all members of the government unit as equal in their ability to reason. The authors moved between the meanings of race-nation as unifying and race-

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(1946): 349-360; John L. Martin, "The Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 472 (1984): 12-23.

[13]George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Opinion Poll and How It Works* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940) v. See also pages 3, 4, 9, 287.

nation as dividing. They were inheritors of the idea of an ideal nation formed by choices made by reasoning individuals—nation as citizenship—and a century of thinking about race that inflected national differences as racial—nation as race. Their opening to move from their trap between the meanings—nation as citizenship and nation as race—was to find a way to change the political nature of others to resemble themselves by guiding them, leading them, educating them.

Nearly all of the authors found the common man lacking and prescribed paths for his improvement. In some cases, democracy depended on the improvement of the common man. A few good editors could properly guide public opinion, restore democracy and make government work, according to W.T. Stead, who wrote in *Contemporary Review* in 1886.[15] Stead assumed that democracy needed saving. He believed that his readers would have understood the threat to democracy from the social changes around them. Jeremiah Jenks thought that a few good men could guide public opinion, which he thought should be based on reason but, unfortunately, was not. His common man was not wise; he needed guidance. Jenks wrote, "The duty, in consequence, lies not merely on our politicians, but it lies on all intelligent, moral men who have the welfare of the country at heart, to rouse, guide, shape public opinion."[16] Jenks thought unreasoning citizens could be guided to competence, however, not all authors were so optimistic. Stead, Jenks and *Nation* Editor E. L. Godkin saw a

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[14] Harwood Childs, *A Reference Guide to Public Opinion* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1934).

[15] W.T. Stead, "Government by Journalism," *Contemporary Review* 4 (May 1886): 653-674.

[16] Jeremiah W. Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 1 (1895-96): 164.

common man, unwise and needing of guidance. In the late 1890s, Godkin thought the job of guiding the vast majority of common men could not be accomplished because of the wide range of influences on people who had no capacity for continuous attention.[17] Godkin vividly portrayed the impression of momentous social change as being barely survivable. In 1912, F. Stuart Chapin assumed that most voters did not cast votes based on reason, and that only a few on the margins were intelligent and capable of voting independently.[18] He was optimistic about the trend for the future, despite his fundamental assumption that only a few were intelligent. George Kibbe Turner believed that the masses of voters were easily led, and he was concerned that the money spent to influence elections was corrupting the political system.[19] Charles Merriam celebrated the ability of his Committee on Public Information staff to lead opinion in Italy during World War I. When he detailed his experiences in *The American Political Science Review* in 1919, he emphasized that they were able to lead opinion because facts were used to counter lies.[20]

The concern with the way democracy functioned, the need for a few men to lead the common men, and the lack of a chorus of support for the wisdom of the common man continued in the articles comprising Childs syllabus that were published following World War I. Race-nation assumptions were more visible; however, they

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[17] E. L. Godkin, "The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 131 (January 1898): 1-15.

[18] F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at Presidential elections," *American Journal of Sociology*, 18 (1912): 222-240.

[19] George Kibbe Turner, "Manufacturing Public Opinion: The New Art of Making Presidents by Press Bureau," *McClure's Magazine*, 39 (1912): 316-327.

[20] Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy," *The American Political Science Review*, 13 (November 1919): 541-555.

were slightly challenged by a changing conception of race. William Ernest Hocking assumed that the majority needs leading and urged that better leaders be chosen. A few good leaders from the best bloodlines were needed to lead the mass of people who were not wise, or democracy might be threatened, Hocking wrote in *The Yale Review* in 1924.[21] The common will was understood to be consummation of mass suggestion wrote Norman C. Meier in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1925 after he tested the idea that the common will was based on reason.[22]

William Munro attacked the creed that George Gallup would promote only a decade later when he wrote "The Worst Fundamentalism" in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1926.[23] Munro too maintained that citizens are unreasoning, and he urged an attack on the dogma that asserts the public rules. He wrote, "Let me put together, in skeleton form, the political creed of the average American citizen, the dogmas which he accepts as fundamental truths notwithstanding their repugnance to the dictates of reason and to the teachings of experience."[24] Munro attacked the consent of the governed, government by the whole people, the rule of public opinion, and equality before the law.[25] William Orton told readers of *The American Journal of Sociology* that mass opinion was dangerous, and he called for a few good men to lead the unreasoning many.[26] Edward Corwin was certain not all men were rational, and he argued for

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[21] William Ernest Hocking, "Leaders and Led," *The Yale Review*, 13 (July 1924): 625-641.
[22] Norman C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 31 (September 1925): 199-212.
[23] William B. Munro, "The Worst Fundamentalism," *Atlantic Monthly* 138 (1926): 451-459.
[24] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 452.
[25] Munro, "Worst Fundamentalism" 452.
[26] William Orton, "News and Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* 38 (1927): 80-93.

educated political scientists to fill the needed role of expert leaders in an article in *The American Political Science Review* in 1929.[27] He assumed that people could be led, and he worried that the wrong sort were doing the leading. Corwin wrote, "Is it not the lesson that if those who are best qualified by good will, lack of bias, trained minds, and precise methods to do this work as it should be done, and for proper ends, do not do it, others will—indeed are doing it at this moment—and for selfish ends? Is it not, in short, that the real rulers of the race are those who educate it—who, in the word of Mr. Lippmann, 'create consent'?"[28]

The elite male authors thought the common people were unwise, unreasoning, unclean and sometimes dangerous because they thought of them as members of different nationalities, and nationality was inflected with racialist stratification. The authors made assumptions about nationality and race, and nationalism was a matter of race. The meanings of the terms were so intertwined that labels distinguishing a particular national from another national carried with them assumptions about the individuals' abilities. The authors also assumed important differences were transmitted by blood, that ability and view were inherited. Arthur Bullard portrayed Germans as enemies of civilization, and he thought Germans in America carried political sympathy for the German war cause in their blood.[29] He referred to the British and the Americans as Anglo-Saxon cousins.[30] Walter Hamm revealed his

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[27] Edward S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and the Future of Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 23 (1929): 569-592.

[28] Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 589.

[29] Arthur Bullard, "Democracy and Diplomacy," *Atlantic Monthly* 119 (April 1917): 495.

[30] Bullard, " Democracy and Diplomacy," 497.

assumption that the migration of the previous century might have polluted the polity when he reassured his readers that there would be no future threat to the purity of the ballot because there would be no further dilution of the electorate.[31] The Anglo-Saxon countries were England, Canada, and the United States, and Edward Porritt casually used the terminology in 1910, because his reader would understand.[32] The Anglo-Saxon countries were on the verge of having rule by public opinion, Shepard wrote.[33] It was the Anglo-Saxon countries that contained people who were capable of reaching an advanced stage of development in their type of government. There was an underlying assumption of the progress of the race in F. Stuart Chapin's argument for measurement in 1912.[34] William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson linked language to race, called the differences by national labels, and thought that a great deal of difference—meaning people from many different race-nations—made it difficult to govern.[35] They wrote, "One reason why good government is difficult in New York City is the great heterogeneity of its population. In Austria-Hungary, also, a great hindrance to the success of government is the great number of widely differing racial groups."[36] Charles Merriam revealed the naturalness of nation and the intertwining of the concept of nation and race when he described one member of a coalition. Merriam wrote, "The minister of foreign affairs was Baron Sonnino, an active factor in the

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[31] Walter C. Hamm, "A Study of Presidential Votes," *Political Science Quarterly* 16 (1901): 50-67.
[32] Edward Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials," *Atlantic Monthly* 105 (January 1910): 62-67.
[33] Shepard, "Public Opinion," 60.
[34] F. Stuart Chapin, "The variability of the popular vote at Presidential Elections," *American Journal of Sociology* 18 (1912): 222-240.
[35] William F. Ogburn and Delvin Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly* (1916): 300-317.

building of modern Italy—English, Jewish and Italian in race, conservative in tendency and skilled in diplomacy."[37]

The intertwining of the concepts of race and nation continued following the first world war in the articles that comprised Childs' Princeton syllabus. Race-nation became more prominent, and the commonplace assumption of the overlapping of the concepts race and nation was gently contested. In a 1920 *Atlantic Monthly* article, Paul Rohrbach described a shared national character carrying inherited traits and explained that opinion was shared among members of a nation because they shared a national character.[38] Joseph Geiger portrayed races as evolving.[39] In explaining the way in which nation should not be based on race, A. Gordon Dewey revealed how commonplace it was to think of nation as race-based in 1924.[40] The work on social distance done by Emory Bogardus revealed the intertwining of nation and race by his students and displayed the college students' feelings of antipathy toward members of rank-ordered race-nations.[41] Floyd Allport's work in 1925 shows that race and nation were on the social issues agenda.[42] Race and nation are used interchangeably by L. L.

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[36] Ogburn and Peterson, "Political Thought of Social Classes," 301.

[37] Merriam, "American Publicity," 545.

[38] Paul Rohrbach, "German Reflections," *Atlantic Monthly*, 125 (1920): 688-699.

[39] Joseph Roy Geiger, "The Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young," International *Journal of Ethics*, 34 (October 1923): 69-83.

[40] A. Gordon Dewey, "On Methods in the Study of Politics I," *Political Science Quarterly*, 38 (1923): 636-651; "On Methods in the Study of Politics II" *Political Science Quarterly*, 39 (1924): 218-233.

[41] Emory S. Bogardus, "Social Distance and Its Origins," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9 (January – February 1924/1925): 216-226; "Measuring Social Distance, "*Journal of Applied Sociology* 9 (March-April 1924/1925): 299-308.

[42] Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "The measurement and motivation of atypical opinion in a certain group" *The American Political Science Review* 19 (1925): 735-760.

Thurstone in "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences."[43] In 1927, William Munro confirmed the commonplace assumption of racial determinism as natural.[44] He wrote, "The determinism of racial heritage, at any rate, is a factor which all intelligent students of comparative politics are accustomed to take into their reckonings."[45]

The first suggestion that race and nationality might be better thought of as different from one another came in a 1927 article published in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* by Donald Young who found it foolish to think of making distinctions between the English and the Swedish person.[46] He wrote, "It is not to be denied that there may be important inherent mental differences between, say the white, yellow, red and black races, though the final evidence is still lacking. It is foolish, however, to attempt to distinguish between Swede and Englishman, Chinese and Japanese."[47] He continued, "Individuals of any nationality or color may be the equals of individuals of any other nationality or color."[48] Young was discouraged because his students continued to think of race as nation, rather than, as he was advocating, thinking of race as color. His students were comfortable in rank-ordering other nationalities. It is apparent that the standard assumption of the 1920s in academic articles concerned with public opinion was the assumption Young was criticizing. He had help from Richard Lapiere, who was looking for sources of race

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[43] L.L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *Journal of General Psychology* 1 (1928): 405-423.

[44] William Bennett Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," *Yale Review* 16 (1927): 723-738.

[45] Munro, "Modern Science and Politics," 728.

[46] Donald Young, "Some effects of a course in American race problems on the race prejudice of 450 undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 22 (1927): 235-242.

prejudice and who concluded that it was unlikely race prejudice was natural or biologically based.[49] Lapiere used race and skin color interchangeably and treated the terms Anglo-Saxon and Nordic with suspicion.

In a study of prejudice, James Reinhardt was surprised when his subjects found other races or nationalities were more disliked than the Negro.[50] Thurstone proposed a way to use a comparative method of measuring preferences for people of specific nationalities in "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," in *The Journal of General Psychology*.[51] He used nationality and race interchangeably. For Thurstone, nationalities were gendered, and the range of nationalities described had diminished from earlier articles by other scholars. Distinctions were no longer drawn among Jews by nation of origin. Previously they had been described as Jew-Russian and Jew-German—and the colonial euphemism Scotch-Irish had disappeared, as did Mulatto.

The common man could not be wise in a world that saw human beings stratified by race-nationality. The authors of the articles in Childs' syllabus worried about democracy and unreasoning citizens because they perceived some citizens as foreign nationals who were less able to reason than they were themselves. They knew the foreign nationals were less able to reason because race-nation rank-ordered human beings in their abilities. The treatment of the common man and race-nationality in these articles supports Eric Hobsbawn's characterization of the times as one in which

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[47] Young, "American race problems," 240-241.
[48] Young, "American race problems," 240-241.
[49] Richard T. Lapiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England," *Social Forces* 7 (1928): 102 – 111.
[50] James M. Reinhardt, "Students and Race Feeling," *The Survey* 61 (November 15, 1928): 239-240.

popular national superiority was easier to mobilize following years of migration.[52] Movements of national superiority were aided by theories of evolution, social Darwinism and changing conceptions of race, Hobsbawm wrote.[53]

The authors of the articles lived during a time when the idea of race as structuring the social and political order was axiomatic. Reginald Horsman and other scholars explained that it was widely assumed that the Anglo-Saxon-Teuton would eventually replace all inferior races.[54] Horsman wrote, "The Anglo-Saxonism of the last half of the [nineteenth] century was no benign expansionism, though it used the rhetoric of redemption, for it assumed that one race was destined to lead, others to serve--one race to flourish, many to die. The world was to be transformed not only by the strength of better ideas but by the power of a superior race."[55]

Contribution to the Literature on Public Opinion

This dissertation contributes a reconsideration of the foundation documents of the field of public opinion and polling research. This reconsideration provides an alternative to the conventional wisdom in the story of progress in the public opinion field. This addition to the account of the concept of public opinion contributes a disruption of the story of progress in the public opinion field. This dissertation contributes by revealing that the strongest currents of the mainstream were those

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[51] L.L. Thurstone, "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *Journal of General Psychology* 1 (1928): 405-423.

[52] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 91.

[53] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 107-108.

[54] Horseman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*; Painter, *Standing at Armageddon;* Young, *Colonial Desire*; Richard Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of The Frontier in the Age of Industrialization* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994).

currents seeking to control the common man rather than to increase his participation in governing.

This dissertation reveals a lack of congruence in meaning between the received tradition and the documents of the canon. The origins story of public opinion presented what has been the commonsense understanding of public opinion and polling as the result of the progress made in a variety of areas over several decades. Yet between the origins story of progress, Gallup's promotion of public opinion as equivalent to poll results, and the articles in Childs' 1934 syllabus there exists a chasm in meaning. The literature of the canon portrays at worst a dangerous, unclean common man, and at best an unreasoning, easily persuaded common man. The authors' use of nation-race reveals the authors' assumptions of difference based on highly stratified conceptions of discreet differences between people. This understanding of the authors' meanings is only possible when their work is read through the lens of recent scholarship on nationalism and race.

There were many uses of public opinion before 1936 in the articles that comprised the public opinion canon. As public opinion was discussed in the articles, it was apparent that, whatever the use of the term, those who were thought of as leading public opinion filled a vital role because the great majority was unable to reason. The common man was not wise. The common man was not wise because he was not of a particular nation-race. The nation-race of a person was believed to determine his or her abilities.

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[55]Horseman, Race and Manifest Destiny, 303.

The pollsters' praise of the democratic potential for polling, especially Gallup's claim of the wisdom of the common man, could not have been based on the public opinion social science of the time.

Importance of this study

Revealing the contradiction between the story that has been told and what was actually in the documents as viewed through the understanding of race at the time opens the entire story to reconsideration. Since the common man was not portrayed as wise in the articles in Childs' syllabus, it is possible to question any claim about the relationship of polling to democratic participation. This analysis of the contents of the public opinion canon makes it clear that the social relations of power were more visible then than they are in the current received tradition.

When the current dominant idea of public opinion as equivalent to poll results eclipsed all other meanings of public opinion, it became more difficult to remember the ways in which human beings had been assumed to be stratified. With the existing origins story placing the beginnings of the field with the beginnings of the journal *Public Opinion Quarterly*, it seemed unnecessary to explore the understandings of the concept before that time. This study has done extensive work on the history of public opinion and found a meaning very different from today's interpretation of public opinion.

Meaning. . .

What was lost is the memory of the common sense of the stratification of human beings by nation-race, and the institutional memory of the call for a few to save

democracy by controlling public opinion. Understanding the theories of nationalism and race makes it possible to see the way in which individuals were viewed by the wider elite culture and the authors of the articles in Childs' syllabus. Knowing that nationalism is not something natural, and that nationalism and nation have changed meanings, makes it possible to have a richer understanding of public opinion. It is possible to see that there were relations of power covered by the story of the progress of public opinion. The received tradition of public opinion polling plays a part in covering over a historical understanding of race, thus making it more difficult to understand the present.

At the least, this dissertation gives support to the critic's claims that public opinion polling diminishes dissent. The image of a homogeneous united nation of equal responding individual citizens in poll results is at odds with the perception of the nation and its citizens before 1936. Race still matters, even if we have forgotten the assumption of stratification of human beings by nationality as when the term nation was inflected with race. Thinking of public opinion as poll results makes it more difficult to see social stratification and interests that make material differences to people. At the most, the success of public opinion as polling and the pollsters' claims to serve democracy covers relations of power that were previously visible. The authors of the articles had no doubts that a few should lead because the many were incompetent. Further, the results of this dissertation suggest that Gallup's claim to make the voice of the common man heard was perhaps not an advocacy of democratic

practice, but rather a clever use of "popular dogma"—as Munro described it—to promote his polls to the newspapers.

It is important to remember that the story of the development of public opinion into polling is not seamless. Pollsters and survey researchers interested in political issues have benefited from an evolutionary description of the field. In one sense, the seamless story can be viewed as merely an outcome of social scientists' efforts to conform their methods to those of natural science. However, whether or not intentional, the outcome has been to erase a richer understanding of the past.

Suggestions for Future Research

The history of the concept of public opinion in the early twentieth century has only just begun to be explored by scholars, and this dissertation prompts additional questions about the field.

How was nation-race portrayed in the articles in *Public Opinion Quarterly* during the first two decades of the journal from 1937-1957?

Is it possible to determine if Gallup intended the promotion of polls as allowing the common man to speak as a method to promote his polls to newspapers? A frequently asked question is, "What did Gallup really believe?" The AIPO papers from the early years were lost in a fire and are not available to consult. However, the question could be approached by looking at Gallup's correspondence with the newspapers that ran his poll results in 1935. The same material might reveal if Gallup directed, or designed the promotion of the polls for the newspapers.

An analysis of elite newspaper editorials from 1886 to 1933 could be examined to see if the same construction of nation-race is used.

An additional suggestion for future research would be to examine the lives of the founders of *Public Opinion Quarterly* and their role in the emergence of quantitative social science. Biographies of each of them would be a contribution to the field.

It is hoped that by this review and analysis of the articles in the public opinion canon before 1936, future researchers will not be so limited in their interpretation of the term but will include the full ramifications of its multiple meanings.

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