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NIE'IZSCHE AND THE “FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF ‘MAN AND WOMAN’”
By
Elizabeth Rebecca Kaufer

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requiremnts for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science

2001

ABSTRACT
NIE'IZSCHE AND THE “FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF ‘MAN AND WOMAN’”
By
Elizabeth Rebecca Kaufer

This study is an attempt to understand Friedrich Nietzsche, perhaps the most unabashed
critic of liberalism, and the modern condition by examining Nietzsche’s insistence on
maintaining a differentiation of the sexes. Over a century ago Nietzsche warned that the
egalitarian and feminist movements threatened to homogenize society--a prospect that
horrified him to no end. Nietzsche’s underlying critique of egalitarianism is too serious to
ignore. Nietzsche recognizes that establishing the proper the relations between the sexes
constitutes a cardinal problem--for man, for woman, and for society at large. Although the
dissertation is critical of Nietzsche’s prescriptions in several instances (such as his
suggestion that women ought to be heated as concubines), Nietzsche’s criticisms are
nevertheless worthy of serious scrutiny. Anyone who cares seriously about the future
relations between the sexes, the equal treatment of man and woman, the fight for equal
access to education, the condition of the family, or the possibility of fulfilling love between
the sexes would be well-advised to engage Nietzsche’s critique of the modern condition.
The ultimate purpose of reading Nietzsche, the opponent of egalitarianism par excellence, is
to formulate a defense of women’s liberation and find a responsible notion of equal rights.
Nevertheless, it may not be possible to find such a defense in his thought, since Nietzsche
is no liberal democrat. The effort yields some intriguing results. Though Nietzsche does
not offer much hope for the liberated woman, the dissertation concludes by making some
suggestions for ennobling liberal democratic politics. My suggestions arise from

considering the problems that Nietzsche helps to raise.

Copyright by
ELIZABETH REBECCA KAUFER
2001

To Dr. William Shapiro,
my teacher and friend

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend a special thanks to William Shapiro without whose help this
dissertation would not have been completed. I am grateful for his friendship. For their
patient proofing, suggestions, and unconditional support, I would like to thank Ginny
Kaufer and Nathan Busch. Thanks to my father, sisters, and brothers for their love and
encouragement. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the advice of Werner Dannhauser,

Arthur Melzer, Richard Zinman, and Jerry Weinberger.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO NIETZSCHE ON WOMEN

Why are Nietzsche’s Comments on Woman Worth Considering? .............................. 1
Why Scholars Have Neglected Nietzsche’s Teaching on Woman .............................. 4
The Use and Abuse of Nietzsche by Feminists ................................................... 9
Myths and Deconstruction ......................................................................... l7
Freudian Psychobabble: Nietzsche’s Mother and Sister ........................................ 19
Baubo and other Myths Exaggerated to Epic Proportions ...................................... 21
Woman, Women, and the Feminine ..................................... . ........................ 23

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALIZING NIE'I'ZSCHE’S COMMENTS ON WOMAN

Criticism of Woman’s “Liberation” ............................................................... 26
How to read Nietzsche .............................................................................. 31
The Four Components of the Nietzschean System .............................................. 35
God is Dead ................................................................................. 35
U bermensch ................................................................................. 36
Will to Power ............................................................................... 42
Eternal Return of the Same ................................................................ 43
Is Nietzsche Guilty of a Metaphysical Relapse? ................................................. 45
CHAPTER 3: NIE'IZSCHE’S REVALUATION OF NIHILISM
The Fundamental Fact of Modernity .............................................................. 48
Problem of Communicating and Communicability .............................................. 51
Truth as Woman ............................................................................ 53
The Substantive Meaning of the Death of God .................................................. 60
The Implications of the Death of God ............................................................. 63
How the Historical Sense Killed God ............................................................ 64
Is All Truth Perspectival? ........................................................................... 67
Critique of Sterile Historians, Objectivity, and Modern Scholars ............................ 70
The Tension Between Life and Knowledge ............................................. 77
The Fertile Genius ................................................................................... 78
The Female Scholar: A Paradox .................................. - ........................ 8 0
Why Man Is “The Sterile Animal” ........................................................ 84
Nietzsche’s Standard to Replace the Historical Sense .......................................... 85
CHAPTER 4: THE UBERMENSCH
Return to Nature ..................................................................................... 89
Ubermensch versus Ubermenschen ............................................................... 93
What is the Ubermensch? .......................................................................... 98
Has There Ever Been an Ubermensch? ......................................................... 102
Creative Evolution ................................................................................. 106
Malleability of Humans .................................................................. 108
The First Human Ideal ................................................................... 109
Nietzsche’s Focus on the Body .................................................................. 111
Should Biology Matter? .................................................................. 114
The Relationship Between Physiology and Psychology ............................. 117
The Ubermensch as the Ideal to Counter the Last Man ........................................ 120
The Significance of the Ubermensch’ 8 Sex ................................................... .122
The Ubermensch as a Child and Mother ........................................... .123

The Respective Roles of Man and Woman in the Creating of the Ubermensch... 124

CHAPTER 5: WILL TO POWER

Why the Ubermensch Must Be Willed .......................................................... 133
What is the Will to Power? ....................................................................... 134
The Relation Between Will to Power and Instinct .................................... 137
The Masculine and The Feminine Drive ................................................ 139
Life as the Will to Power ................................................................. 142
Commanding and Obeying ....................................................................... 146
Ressentiment and Willing ................................................................ 148
Will and Willingness ..................................................................... 150
Why Women Have Not Created Ideals, Values, or Moralities ...................... 165
Love as Will to Power ............................................................................. 170
The Will to Truth (Philosophy) ......................................................... 171
Sexual Love .......................................................... ' ..................... 174
The Relationship Between the Body and Will .......................... - ........................ 178
CHAPTER 6: ETERNAL RECURRENCE
The Eternal Return of the Same as a Scientific Fact ........................................... 180
Willing versus Affirming ................................................................ 182
What is the Eternal Recurrence of the Same? ................................................... 183
The Eagle and the Serpent--a Metaphor for Eternal Recurrence ..................... 188
The Implications of the Eternal Recurrence ..................................................... 191
Is the Eternal Recurrence a New Metaphysics? ....................................... 196
Lowith’ s Criticism ........................................................................ 198
The Greatest Weight or the Highest Affirmation of Life? ............................ 202
What Happens to the Will to Power and the Ubermensch Doctrines? ....................... 209
Prerequisites For Acceptance of the Eternal Recurrence ...................................... 210
The Relationship Between the Eternal Recurrence and the Eternal Dichotomy of the
“Masculine” and “Feminine” ..................................................................... 212
Eternally Hostile War Between the Sexes .............................................. 213
CHAPTER 7: NIETZSCHE’S “TRUTHS” ABOUT WOMAN
Do Nietzsche’s Observations Warrant a Privileged Status? ................................... 216
Critique of Universal Education .................................................................. 219
What Does the “Enlightened” Woman Abandon? ..................................... 226
Criticism of Feminism .............................................. . ...................... 234
What is Feminine? ................................................................................. 244
Equality and Sameness ...................................................... ' ...................... 247
Why an Aristocracy is Needed: The “Pathos of Distance” ........................... 248
Transvaluation of Neighbor love and Christian Friendship .......................... 249
Love and Duality ................................................................................... 253
Nietzsche’s New Definition of Marriage ............................................... 260
An Alternative: Solitude .................................................................. 264
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Which Sex is Superior? ........................................................................... 268
Are Man and Woman Different By Nature or By Nietzsche’s Nature? ............. 275
Is Nietzsche’s Standard of Nature a Fixed, Eternal Truth? .......................... 280
Can Liberal Democrats Find a Practical Teaching 1n Nietzsche’s Thought? ................ 282
Can Feminists Learn From Nietzsche? .......................................................... 287
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 290

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why are Nietzsche’s Comments on Woman Worth Considering?

Since the outset of the feminist movement, women “have been claiming the right to
be members of society and citizens of the state on an equal level with men” (Okin, 4). And
women have made progress toward this goal. For example, Gail Evans notes that women
now make up over 46% of the total work force in the US. Yet in spite of these strides
toward complete equality between the sexes, many women are left feeling isolated,
depressed, or disenchanted both at work and at home. This disillusionment probably
should not surprise us. Our contemporaries write polemic after polemic demanding equal
rights for women in all aspects of life while disregarding any potential repercussions such
rights might entail (for the individual woman, for the family, for women, for society at
large). No longer is it considered relevant or even permissible to question the legitimacy of
sexual equality as a goal; instead, the task is to devise ways to achieve that goal ever more
quickly. Our “ardent, insatiable, eternal, and invincible” passion for equality (Tocqueville,
506) will not be quenched until society has become completely color-blind, gender-blind,
sex-blind--in short, blind. Yet there is no clear evidence that the social conventions today
are an improvement over those of previous generations. Predictably, the failure to question
the validity of this pursuit has led to our inability to manage (or even acknowledge) the
deleterious consequences of women’s liberation such as anxiety, divorce, declining social
connectedness, and isolation experienced by women. But contemporary American
feminists rarely acknowledge that these issues are even problems for women. At most,
they would have us believe that the root of the dissatisfaction experienced by so many
women lies in our inability to receive equal treatment in the workplace.

Gail Evans’ recently published and well-received book Play like a Man, Win Like a
Woman represents the culmination of this trend and epitomizes the thinking so typical in
contemporary American political thought. Feminists like Evans would have us believe that

the root of the isolation and dissatisfaction experienced by a multitude of women today is

the failure of achieving real equality.1 Evans, like Okin and many other contemporary
feminists, implicitly measures real equality “in terms of characteristics traditionally valued
in citizens, such as education, economic independence, or occupational status” (Okin,
287). Without questioning those traditionally valued bourgeois goals, Evans seeks to help
other women achieve those goals more easily. Evans, therefore, offers women a
handbook of rules that will guide them to such success in the workplace. Her solution to
this problem is to teach women to “play like men” instead of women. But playing like a
man does not simply mean following Evans’s list of hitherto unwritten business rules; it
actually means fighting women’s feminine inclinations, habituating women into having
masculine emotions, masculine reactions, and most importantly, masculine goals.2
Friedrich Nietzsche, perhaps the most unabashed critic of liberalism, feminism and
egalitarianism, warns us to be aware of this direction in which we are heading. Over a
century ago Nietzsche warned that the feminist movement threatened to turn women into

men--a prospect that horrified him. The foundation of his rejection of feminism is his

1Evans recognizes women are discontent, but misconstrues the reasons why. She, for example,
notes that “Many of us [women] aren’t always clear about what we want from this thing called a career. We
anguish over whether it will be a career at all, or just a job to provide supplementary income. We obsess
about whether it will have any real meaning to us, or whether we are doing it solely to please our family.
We have incessant internal discussions over where we are going, and the route never seems to be as direct as
we thought ...We live in what I call divine discontent” (Evans, 25). Her explanation for why men do not
experience the same type of discontent is due to the fact that “For most men, the actual job content isn’t
crucial. The trappings of success, such as title, prestige, and/or money am ameliorate the boring,
unpleasant daily grind.” (ibid.). Evans implicitly acknowledges that women may be constituted differently
from men by nature and therefore may seek different goals at work, but Evans nevertheless tries to find
ways for women to “succeed” in the workplace by becoming CEOs like men. Evans fails to make the
necessary connection that women may not seek the prestige, title, or money to the same degree as men and
this may explain why women do not become CEOs of the top corporations-not discrimination and not
women’s misunderstanding of man’s business rules.

2Here are some examples of woman playing like a man in Evans’ game. She begins by telling
women not to be modest--instead they should toot their own horn, speak up, grab the best seat at the
conference table. She tells women not to expect to make friends at work (Evans, 79). Friends are not the
goal, money, title, prestige, and office space are worthy goals at work. It escapes Evans concern that
making friends may be a reason that women seek employment. She tells women to take the big central
office even if she is more comfortable in a smaller, cozier one (ibid., 91). She suggests women place
themselves in a sexually neutral environment (ibid., 12A). If one is not yet convinced that Evans intends to
desex women, she adds that men can have sex with co-workers (i.e., he can maintain his masculinity and
sexuality), but women cannot (ibid., 124-125).

disagreement with the very core of democratic morality, which is based on the notion of
universal equal rights. His criticisms of extending equal rights to women fall into three
general categories. First, he challenges the goal of establishing complete equality because it
implies heating unequals as equals. In practice, this means attempting to ignore even the
most obvious physical differences between man and woman. Nietzsche predicts that
promoting this ignorance will make man and woman more and more alike. He reviles
against the disappearance of separate roles for man and woman, not because it is
“unnatural” and not because he wants to subordinate woman to man, but because this
homogenization is evidence of a decaying human species. Second, feminists and other
egalitarians actively seek to teach woman to be like man, which, Nietzsche argues, is the
surest road to her enslavement, not her empowerment. Woman’s so-called equal rights
destroy the uniquely feminine attributes that should serve as her source of liberty and
strength. Third, Nietzsche suggests that woman lacks genuine self-understanding--she
does not really want to be man’s equal (i.e., identical to man). Women may not find
fulfillment in the same activities, occupations, or rewards as men.

In light of current social trends, the plausibility of Nietzsche’s assessment is
startling. Nietzsche would provide as evidence that the isolation and dissatisfaction that so
many women are experiencing in the workplace and in the family is a direct consequence of
woman’s lack of self-understanding. Although Nietzsche is not primarily concerned with
woman’s fulfillment, his challenges to feminism provide an explanation for why women
today are unhappy. If Nietzsche is correct that the emancipation of women inevitably leads
to homogenization and that homogenization leads necessarily to her mediocrity and
dissatisfaction, scholars would be wise to consider what can be done to correct these flaws.
Nietzsche suggests that teaching women to play like men (which in effect means to
“become men”) is the very source of society’s problems today. His underlying critique of
the homogenization of society is too serious for feminists, contemporary scholars, and

women generally to ignore.

Why Scholars Have Neglected Nietzsche’s Teaching on Woman

Nevertheless, contemporary Nietzsche scholarship has ignored this fundamental
aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, most scholarship on Nietzsche’s discussion of
women does not recognize the issue of homogenization as the core of Nietzsche’s thought
on women. The scholarship on this subject falls into four general categories. First, there
are those who read Nietzsche as an unabashed misogynist and simply dismiss him as
undemocratic. These writers refuse to scrutinize his comments and dismiss them out of
hand. Second, some scholars attempt to turn him into some type of leftist or feminist
because they understand his perspectivism as source of inspiration for their egalitarianism.
These apologists for Nietzsche attempt to assimilate what they consider to be the favorable
aspects of Nietzsche’s thought as a way to equalize the sexes, which Nietzsche
wholeheartedly opposed. Third, others focus entirely on Nietzsche’s use of myth. This
group tends to duck the political ramifications of Nietzsche’s teaching on the sexes and
instead focus on style and poetics. Finally, some scholars try to explain Nietzsche’s
discussion of women through Freudian psychoanalysis of Nietzsche’s relationship with his
mother and his sister. None of the modern scholarship takes the issue of sexual
homogenization seriously enough. As a result, scholars misunderstand Nietzsche’s
teaching on the sexes and fail to heed his wanrings. Furthermore, democratic prejudices
have corrupted virtually all scholarship on Nietzsche and women. The result is that those
who study Nietzsche tend to take one of two extreme positions. Either they dismiss him
altogether because he is not democratic, or they mold him for some liberal democratic use.
Still others attempt to reinvent Nietzsche’s teachings for the sake of some unclear
egalitarian goal, without any attempt to understand him.

Traditionally, scholars have avoided the issue of women in Nietzsche’s writings
because it offends their liberal democratic sensibilities. For instance, Nietzsche’s notorious
comments about women have led Walter Kaufmann to dismiss him as a misogynist.

Burgard attributes the general avoidance and misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s teaching on

the sexes in contemporary scholarship to Kaufmann’s dismissal of the teaching (Burgard,
2). But Burgard fails to notice that Kaufmann is simply voicing the deeply held opinion of
most contemporary scholars. Since they cannot excuse Nietzsche’s so-called misogynistic
words, Kaufmann and others argue that they are “philosophically irrelevant” aspects of
Nietzsche’s thought that are not even worthy of our attention (Kaufmann, 84).

Kaufrnann’s translations are replete with foourotes that simply dismiss Nietzsche’s
arguments as random, inconect, misogynistic assertions. In reference to Nietzsche’s
insistence that those who fail to understand the problem of “man and woman” are too
shallow for all fundamental problems of life (BGE, 238),3 Kaufmann snidely notes in a
footnote, “Fortunately for Nietzsche, this is surely wrong. But it is worth asking which, if
any, of his other ideas are of a piece with his secondhand wisdom about ‘woman’ ...At
these points Nietzsche’s deliberate ‘untimeliness’ now seems time-bound, dated, and as
shallow as what he attacked” (BGE, 238, n. 31).4 Of course, Kaufmann offers no
contextual analysis of Nietzsche’s “time-bound” statements in his footnotes. On the
contrary, Kaufrnann’s and others’ dismissal of Nietzsche’s writings on the sexes is time-
bound itself because their objections are inextricably rooted in liberal democratic prejudices.

Hastily dismissing the relevance of Nietzsche’s posturings on woman enables Kaufmann to

3All subsequent references to Beyond Good and Evil and The Gay Science will cite the aphorism
only. References to On the Genealogy of Morals will cite to the essay number and aphorism. I will cite
the volume and aphorism nrnnber of references to Human all-too-Human. References to the rest of
Nietzsche’s texts (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, The Use
and Abuse of History, and Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche) will cite the page number of the
reference. References to The Will to Power will cite the fragment number as listed in Kaufrnann’s edition.
With the exception of R]. Hollingdale’s translation of Human all—too-Human, Middleton’s Selected Letters
of Friedrich Nietzsche, and Adrian Collins’ edition of The Use and Abuse of History, all references will cite
the Kaufmann editions.

An additional note about the 1989 n'anslation of Beyond Good and Evil is needed here. Apparently
in publishing the 1989 edition of Beyond Good and Evil, Kaufmann made some changes in the translation.
However, Kaufmann makes no note in the 1989 edition that he has updated the translation. Consequently,
certain passages cited from the 1989 edition of this text may be different from the same sections in the
previous Kaufmann editions.

4Other examples include: BGE, 232, n. 23; GS, 72, n. 9.

defend Nietzsche’s philosophy. Bruce Detwiler falls into the same trap. He notes that
Nietzsche’s “views on women need no comment except to say they are probably the most
thoroughly discredited aspects of his thought” (Detwiler, 193). Although Detwiller gives a
thorough discussion of the other aspects of Nietzsche’s politics, he still goes to great
lengths to distance himself from the “unabashed misogynist” (Detwiler, 15).

In sum, rather than consider whether Nietzsche really understood women, most
Nietzsche scholars, including such notable examples as Kaufmann and Detwiler, have
ignored or simply overlooked this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought altogether. Nietzsche’s
views on women are discredited because they are adverse to liberal democratic ears and
they are ignored because they are discredited. Many modern intellectuals do not embrace
(or even consider seriously) Nietzsche’s politics because he is an outspoken opponent of
feminism and egalitarianism. But the fact that Nietzsche’s words initially seem to be
chauvinistic does not justify ignoring his teaching on the sexes altogether. As Ophelia
Schutte rightly argues, “the weeding out of the least attractive elements in Nietzsche’s work
amounts to either self-deceit or censorship, and ...this practice keeps us from
understanding the whole of Nietzsche’s vision” (Schutte, 1984, 186). At the very least,
Nietzsche scholars need to explain why he discusses women at all. Given the hasty
dismissal of such a discussion, an examination of Nietzsche’s teaching becomes singularly
important.

One reason why Kaufmann fails to give the proper attention to Nietzsche’s
discussion of woman is because he interprets Nietzsche as an anti-political or apolitical

proponent of individual creativity.5 Kaufmann does not fully appreciate the extent to which

5For a critique of the anti-political interpretations of Nietzsche, consult Detwiller’s book Nietzsche
and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism. Although Detwiler offers a balanced account of Nietzsche’s
aristocratic leanings, he still ducks the issue of women. Similarly, Bergmann’s Nietzsche, “the Last
Antipolitical German ” explores Nietzsche’s thought within the context of the politics of his time. The fact
that Nietzsche called himself “antipolitieal” does not imply that he has no political teaching, according to
Bergmann. Bergmann argues that both the apologists and critics of Nietzsche fail “to consider Nietzsche’s
politics as a whole” (Bergmann, 1). Although Bergmann attempts to fill in this gap in the research, he also
does not systematically analyze the subject of women and its implications for the Nietzschean system.
Though this is not his main purpose in writing the book, a complete understanding of Nietzsche’s politics

Nietzsche’s revaluation of values is an inherently political act. Nietzsche’s reevaluation
consists mainly of transcending Christianity, which also includes an overturning of liberal
democratic politics and the enlightenment project. And since his revaluation is overtly
political, Nietzsche’s sexual politics are relevant in at least two respects. First, the initial
step in Nietzsche’s task is to desuoy the remnants of current democratic regime which
promotes feminist ideology and egalitarian sexual relations. And as Joel Schwartz notes,
“the manner in which sexual relationships are conducted is relative to (and relevant for the
understanding of the preservation, transformation, and destruction of) the political regimes
in which they occur” (Schwartz, 5). Second, Nietzsche intends to “posit a goal and mold
facts according to it” (WP, 605).6 Achieving this new goal (i.e., the Ubermensch) will
generate an entirely new politics. And the radical order of rank (the “pathos of distance”)
he proposes requires a new arrangement of sexual relations (an eternally hostile war
between the sexes) which Nietzsche indicates is of fundamental importance. Nietzsche’s
prescriptions for sexual relations are essential elements of a revaluation of democratic
values (in particular, equal rights and freedom from suffering) and a positing of a new goal
for humanity (the Ubermensch). But even more importantly, his discussion of why
masculinity and femininity ought to be preserved, and his recognition of the threat of their
complete erosion make Nietzsche’s insights relevant for men and women today.

Martha Nussbaum goes a step further than Kaufmann and Detwiler. Without any
sustained analysis of his political teachings on woman, she dismisses Nietzsche as a

misogynist and consequently concludes that Nietzsche is not a political thinker at all, for,

requires an examination of his views on women as they relate to his politieal goals.

6A note of eaution on the use of Ecce Homo and Will to Power is needed here. Nietzsche wrote
Ecce Homo when his mental health was failing and it is not clear how much of this work is colored by his
insanity. There has been a considerable amount of controversy regarding the relevance of The Will to
Power because it was unfinished and published after Nietzsche’s death under the supervision of Nietzsche’s
sister. Strictly speaking, the work consists of fragments, not polished aphorisms. When I consider Ecce
Homo and The Will to Power, I do so to elaborate or highlight Nietzsche’s arguments in his other works.
For a fuller discussion of the status of The Will to Power and a list of relevant sources on the controversy,
see 11. 9 of Dannhauser’s Nietzsche ’s View of Socrates (Dannhauser, 1974, 18-19).

she implies, no serious political thinker could reach his anti-egalitarian, anti-feminist, anti-
woman conclusions. She asserts:
There is nothing in Nietzsche on the topic of women and the family-~a topic
to which he devotes a good deal of space, and conceming which he is
inordinately proud of his insights--that is any more than the silly posturings
of an inexperienced vain adolescent male. His musings on women’s guile,
stupidity, sensuality, and mendacity are like little extracts from Rousseau
without the argument or the subtlety (Nussbaum, 5, emphasis added).
Nussbaum continues by listing some of Nietzsche’s prescriptions:
He proposes the elimination of marriages founded upon love... He
proposes the reintroduction of socially approved concubinage.... He is
adamantly opposed, repeatedly and without argument, to women’s
suffrage. He opposes measures to extend higher education equally to
women, offering in argument only the consideration that the exceptional
woman cannot prove her exceptional character except by surrnounting
adversities... These proposals and others like them, as Nietzsche articulates
them--that is to say, without any analysis or sustained argument--are not
even worth getting irritated about. Twelve-year-old boys say many silly
things about sex, and on this topic Nietzsche is a twelve-year-old boy
(Nussbaum, 5-6, emphasis added).
Nussbaum’s egalitarian and feminist inclinations lead her to the ridiculous declaration that
Nietzsche has no argument behind his prescriptions. And N ussbaum is not alone in
making this faulty assertion. Linda Singer also insists that Nietzsche rarely supplies
arguments to support his remarks on women: “When referring to women he tends to favor
the aphorism, and many of his statements take the form of passing asides, often invoking
women for contrast. He relies heavily on pejorative insults and one-liners” (Singer, 1998,
174). Contrary to these bald assertions by Nussbaum and Singer, Nietzsche actually does
present a powerful and coherent argument against liberal democracy, homogenization, and
feminism. Serious scholars must scrutinize whether his argument is persuasive, rather than
merely rejecting it out of hand. And whereas Singer is correct to note that Nietzsche
presents many of his comments on woman in aphorisms, she is wrong to imply that
Nietzsche reserves this form for his observations on women and thereby intends to
undermine women. Nietzsche employs aphorisms (as well as enigmatic forms such as
poems, speeches, and songs) throughout his texts on all topics. But because he writes in

aphorisms, it is more difficult to understand the subtleties in his arguments. As with any

topic in Nietzsche, it requires patience and careful reading to tease out the intricacies of his
reasoning. His discussion of woman, the feminine, and feminism is no exception. In
Zarathustra, Nietzsche explains the proper method of reading aphorisms: “Whoever writes
in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read but to be learned by heart. In the
mountains the shortest way is from peak to peak: but for that one must have long legs.
Aphorisms should be peaks-~and those who are addressed, tall and lofty” (Z, 152). In the
Preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explains in more plain terms:
An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been “deciphered”
when it has simply been read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for
which is required an art of exegesis. I have offered in the third essay of the
present book an example of what I regard as “exegesis” in such a case--an
aphorism is prefixed to this essay, the essay itself is a commentary on it.
To be sure, one thing is necessary above all if one is to practice reading as
an art in this way, something that has been unleamed most thoroughly
nowadays--and therefore it will be some time before my writings are
“readable”--something for which one has almost to be a cow and in any case
not a “modern man”: rumination (GM, Preface, 8).
Nietzsche does not intend his assertions to be easily understood and expects that most
readers will not take the time to piece together his meanings. One must ponder and
ruminate over each aphorism--and the context in which each occurs--before one grasps
Nietzsche’s arguments (which is something for which modern academics eagerly seeking
publications or tenure have little patience). Just because Nussbaum and Singer do not find
a coherent argument in Nietzsche does not mean that there is none to be found. In the same
passage of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche suggests that courage is also needed--
the courage that allows one to transcend the shallow opinions of one’s time and challenge
deeply felt illusions at the mountaintop. One is forced to wonder whether some scholars’
indignation might not actually arise from an unwillingness to address Nietzsche’s
arguments for fear that Nietzsche may be correct, or at least not completely wrong.
The Use and Abuse of Nietzsche by Feminists
What is worse than the general dismissal and ignorance of Nietzsche’s arguments is
some scholars’ attempts to transform Nietzsche into a proponent of everything he opposes.

Appel also notices among Nietzsche scholars “a claim being made with increasing

confidence and frequency” that an “embrace of Nietzsche’s emancipatory message is easily
reconcilable with a steadfast commitment to egalitarian ideals” (Appel, 2). Many of the
scholars who examine Nietzsche find him useful for forwarding any political platforms
they please, including leftist liberalism7 and feminism. Partisans of the political left and
right are hasty “to proclaim the irrelevance of Nietzsche’s illiberalism and
antiegalitarianism” (Appel, 3). The worst damage is done by the feminist interpretations
who ignore the condemnations of feminism that are right before their eyes. One of the most
recent books to tackle the subject of Nietzsche and women is Feminist Interpretations of
Nietzsche. As one might guess from its title, this book has a political agenda--containing
essays interpreted from the perspective of the feminist--and as such gives scholars reason
to question how objective its interpretations are. And, it turns out, over half of the book is

devoted to feminists’ use of Nietzsche as a springboard for femirrism.8 One of the

7Lawrence Hatab’s A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy attempts to turn Nietzsche into a leftist
liberal. Hatab “redescrrbe[5] democracy without some its traditional baggage, to see if democracy (an
express even some of Nietzsche’s own predilections” (Hatab, 53). His purpose is not to understand
Nietzsche, but to contort Nietzsche’s ideas into Hatab’s own liberal democratic ideal. Indeed, Hatab admits
that his intention is not to interpret Nietzsche as Nietzsche understood himself; “if the reader is looking for
clear answers about which interpretation of Nietzsche’s political remarks is the right one, or how we might
interpret particular passages properly, I must say that I have no idea how to provide this” (Hatab, 53). This
is an amazing admission to make at the beginning of his book. Hatab attempts to use Nietzsche as a
defense for democracy despite his admission that he does not intend to interpret Nietzsche’s writings
properly. One must wonder why Hatab reads Nietzsche at all. Hatab’s misappropriation of Nietzsche forces
the reader to overlook Nietzsche’s criticisms of the foundations of liberal democracy. Even a cursory glance
at sections 232-239 of BGE would demonstrate Nietzsche’s opposition to Hatab’s goals.

3The essays in the second section include: Linda Singer, “Nietzschean Mythologies: The
Inversion of Value and the War Against Women”; Maudmarie Clark, “Nietzsche’s Misogyny”; Lynne
Trrrell, “Sexual Dualism and Women’s Self-Creation20n the Advantages and Disadvantages of Reading
Nietzsche for Feminists”; Debra B. Bergoffen, “Nietzsche Was No Feminist”; Kathleen J . Winniger,
“Nietzsche’s Women and Women’s Nietzsche”; Daniel W. Conway, “'lhe Slave Revolt in Epistemology”;
Ofelia Schutte, “Nietzsche’s Politics”; and David Owen, “Nietzsche’s Squandered Seductions: Feminism,
the Body, and the Politics of Genealogy.” Tasmin Lorraine’s “Nietzsche and Feminism: Transvaluing
Women in Thus Spoke Zarathustra” should also be included in this group because she attempts to mold
Nietzsche’s writings to suit her own perspectival feminism.

In grouping these essays, I do not wish to imply that all of these essays corrupt Nietzsche’s
thought, nor do those who turn Nietzschean politics into some shallow for of feminist ideology corrupt his
writing to the same degree. For example, both Clark (1998) and Schutte (1998) give some fine analysis.
Clark should be commended for her close textual reading of section 7 of Beyond Good and Evil. However
Clark reaches a conclusion that it is possible to construct a Nietzschean feminism which does not fit with
much of that textual analysis that she cites. Regarding Schutte, though I do not agree with all of her

10

contributing authors boldly asserts; “We all know that Nietzsche is no feminist” (Lorraine,
119); yet this recognition does not prevent her and other scholars in the volume from trying
to turn him into one. For instance, the explicit purpose of Lorraine’s essay “Nietzsche and
Feminism: Transvaluing Women in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” is to see what feminists can
get from Nietzsche’s discussion. In particular she proposes “a feminist style of listening
and speaking, reading and writing, drawn from Nietzsche’s texts” (Lorraine, 120). Instead
of scrutinizing the implications of Nietzsche's difficult passages (namely the unflattering
assertions of Zarathustra in “On Old and Young Little Women”)9 she tries to reconcile the
sections she finds appealing with her hope for a non-oppressive society. But this
approach, in effect, is merely to ignore the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that do not “fit”
with her feminist aspirations. She explains; “Going through the positions offered me in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I don’t have to reject any of them out of hand. Instead, I can
affirm them all as providing material for my own future, material that I sort through, taking
the flavors and aromas I need to conjure up the image dearest to me” (Lorraine, 127). But
in doing so, she seizes on the “scents and aromas” that would smell most disgusting to
Nietzsche. As part of her project, she proceeds to create her own feminine Zarathustra.
Though a creative spirit might quite plausibly be feminine,10 though this too must be
questioned, to pick and choose the material that she personally finds affirming is to
misunderstand Nietzsche and his perspectivism. Most likely Lorraine herself would object

to others corrupting her own texts in this manner. One wonders why she reads Nietzsche

conclusions, her basic premise that it is necessary to see “how his political views apply to our present and
future well-being” is sound (Schutte, 1998, 283).

9Zarathustra’s speech on woman is entitled “Vorn alten und jungen Weiblein.” Kaufmann
translates the title as “On Little Old and Young Women,” but this does not emphasize the fact that “little”
modifies both “young” and “old” women. I will refer to the speech as “On Old and Young Little Women.”

10For my discussion of the feminine traits of the Ubermensch and the question of whether the
Ubermensch could be a woman, see the section entitled "Ihe Ubermensch as Child and Mother" in
chapter 4.

11

at all if she wants him to say something other than he does.

A number of others attempt similar misappropriations of Nietzsche’s thought.
Linda Singer asks a very serious question, “Given how wrong he is about women, how
seriously can we take Nietzsche’s remarks about human existence in general?” (Singer,
183). This is similar to Maudmarie Clark’s question of how Nietzsche’s “Seven Epigrams
on Woman” could be so unlike anything else he wrote (Clark, 1998, 189). Nietzsche’s
analyses of nihilism, the death of God, and perspectivism is so compelling to Clark that she
simply cannot understand Nietzsche’s tone when it comes to women. Both scholars have
difficulty understanding why his view of women and the feminine diverges from their own
views. But if he is so wrong on the topic of woman, there is no reason to be upset about
anything he says on the topic of women. But both scholars protest too much because each
takes Nietzsche very seriously. Singer reduces Nietzsche’s “prom-masculine ethic”
(Singer, 185) to mere reflections of his historical setting.ll Interestingly she chastises
other scholars who dismiss Nietzsche’s sexism as peripheral, but then she decides herself
to take from Nietzsche only the empowering aspects of his thought (will to power) to create
a feminine ethic. Similarly, Maudmarie Clark tries to reconcile Nietzsche’s “overt
antifeminism” with what she calls “a feminism that is beyond good and evil.” In
“Nietzsche’s Misogyny,” she presents a line by line textual analysis of Nietzsche’s
Epigrams on woman by reading them as Nietzsche’s demonstration of the virtue of
honesty. But honesty is not the fundamental virtue of the free spirit nor is it the virtue he
intends to demonstrate in this section. Clark therefore falsely concludes that Nietzsche
simply does not believe that what he says about women is true (Clark, 1998, 192). How

honest is this, then? While her close textual analysis does present some helpful insights, it

11See the sections entitled “Critique of Sterile Historians, Objectivity, and Modern Scholars” and
“Scholars Are Themselves Democrats” in chapter 3 for Nietzsche’s critique of this practice by modern
scholars.

l2

suffers from a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s basic intention in this section.12 Clark
concludes by asserting that Nietzsche would be a feminist if “a feminism beyond good and
evil” could be found. But she does not tell us what this type of feminism would be, since it
is grounded on the faulty suggestion that Nietzsche does not mean what he says about
woman. Instead of scrutinizing Nietzsche’s arguments, Singer and Clark look for a way to
discredit them from the outset. Both scholars need to provide an explanation of how
Nietzsche could transcend his time in so many other ways, and yet fail to do so when it
comes to women. Of course this is completely absent.

Lynne Tinell, on the other hand, is puzzled that Nietzsche does not eliminate the
hierarchical arrangement with respect to the sexes. She correctly notes that Nietzsche does
not take sexual dualism to be an unalterable fact about the world, but incorrectly concludes
from this that what is missing from Nietzsche is an attack on the man/woman duality
(Tirrell, 206). Nietzsche, in fact, had specific reasons for maintaining and cultivating
sexual dualism . He insists that this duality is the key to preventing a movement toward
complete egalitarianism. He intended to promote this duality, not because the differences
between the sexes are fixed necessities, but for the opposite reason. Nietzsche’s fear that
this duality will disappear and humanity will become last men is the precise reason that he
tries to maintain the duality. Nevertheless, Tirrell uses Nietzsche’s more general arguments
against metaphysical dualism to make the argument he “should have made” against sexual
dualism (Tirrell, 206). Thus, because she overlooks how Nietzsche’s discussion of
women fits into his project as a whole, she does not consider what Nietzsche’s very
serious reasons might be for not articulating an argument against sexual dualism (or the
master/slave dualism for that matter).13

128cc my own textual analysis of “Our Virtues” in the section entitled “Do Nietzsche’s
Observations Warrant a Privileged Status?“ in chapter 7.

13Tirrell also contends that Nietzsche should have made an argument against master/slave relations
given his wider rejection of metaphysical dualities. Tirrell completely misses Nietzsche's central theme that
a rigorous order of rank is conducive to a noble society. This means that Nietzsche was most assuredly a

13

Tirrell’s essay, perhaps more than any other, gives striking evidence of the
measures scholars will take in order to protect their democratic ideologies.l4 But one must
be careful not to let one’s own timely prejudices blind the scholar from interpreting
Nietzsche properly. Schutte, for instance, is correct that the reason one should read
Nietzsche is to see how his insights can contribute to our well being (Schutte, 1998, 283).
But, before putting Nietzsche on the path of liberal democracy, we must explain properly
his rejection of the enlightenment of women, feminism, and egalitarianism in the context in
which Nietzsche presents it. My goal is therefore to read Nietzsche on his own terms,
which means reading the clusters of aphorisms on woman as they relate to the Nietzschean
system as a whole. Only then can one assess the feasibility and desirability of his
prescriptions. If Nietzsche is correct that sexual homogenization is evidence of
degeneration, perhaps liberal democrats can find a way to maintain that difference within
the framework of a mutually respectful society. But one should not harbor any false
hopes.

A few common threads run through this second group of scholars. First one
notices their knee-jerk reaction that a genius like Nietzsche surely could not think these
things about woman; consequently, he must not mean them. There also seems to be a deep

misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. As Clark points out elsewhere, Nietzsche

proponent of conventional slavery (cf. BGE 257-260).

14Several other examples of the use and abuse of Nietzsche can be found. Here are a few others:
David Owen’s “Nietzsche’s Squandered Seductions: Feminism, the Body and the Politics of Genealogy”;
Daniel Conway’s “Das Weib an Sich: The Slave Revolt in Epistemology”; Kathleen Winiger’s
“Nietzsche’s Women and Women’s Nietzsche”; and Kathleen Higgins, “Gender in The Gay Science.” Notice
that Higgins focuses only on a pre-Zarathustra text, as several other premature studies do. Though Book V
of The Gay Science was written after Zarathustra, most of her analysis focuses on the earlier aphorisnrs in
the text. Though The Gay Science is the least objectionable early text because it was written so close to
Zarathustra, the attempt to fmd Nietzsche’s full teaching on woman in his immature texts is an improper
procedure. As will be discussed in chapter 6, without considering Nietzsche’s later development of the
eternal retum of the same, such analysis fail to probe into the intricacies of the entire Nietzschean system.
They thus fail to appreciate Nietzsche’s profundity.

14

0‘

 

 

 

 

 

is no shallow nihilist. 15 That he recognizes knowledge as perspectival does not mean that
Nietzsche’s writings can mean whatever the scholar wants them to mean. In general, little
or no attempt is made to read Nietzsche’s texts properly, that is, attempt to understand
Nietzsche’s words as he understood them himself. Their preference is to read Nietzsche
through their own narrow human-all-too-human or feminist-all-too feminist perspective.
Although they would like to maintain perspectivism because they find it to be potentially
empowering to a feminine perspective, underneath their own perspectivism lies a shallow
relativism or nihilism that says that all perspectives are valid (except, of course, a
misogynistic one).

Inherent in other analyses is the prejudice that a male philosopher cannot possibly
unveil the truth about woman, nor can a man possess feminine qualities himself.16 Ansell-
Pearson (indeed, a male himself) voices this opinion in his essay “Nietzsche, Woman, and
Political Theory.” Ansell-Pearson is deeply offended that Derrida and Nietzsche (as men)
think they can speak authoritatively about woman and the feminine. “To claim, as he
[Derrida] does, that Nietzsche writes with the hand of woman17 or that his philosophy
speaks of the ‘feminine’, is to run the risk of adding insult to injury by adding further to
philosophy’s insidious silencing of women” (Ansell-Pearson, 35). Ansell-Pearson
reiterates Oliver’s concern: “For if male philosophers such as Nietzsche or Derrida can

write with the hand of woman, what is the role and purpose of female philosophers?”

15See Maudmarie Clark’s book, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, especially chapters 3—6,
pp. 63-125.

15Luce Irigaray’s Marine Lover of Nietzsche voices a similar prejudice. She contends that male
philosophers leave women out of their philosophic scheme and a woman like herself is needed to find or
speak for the feminine. Iriguay “proposes to uncover silenced femininity by ‘romancing the philosophers’”
(Oliver and Pearsall, 8). She takes for granted that these male philosophers cannot and do not speak to or
about women. This mentality denigrates what the philosopher stands for and misunderstands what
meaningful philosophy is.

1"In Postponements: Women, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche, David Farrell Krell also argues
that Nietzsche “writes with the hand of woman” (Krell, 1986, 10).

15

(Ansell-Pearson, 35-36)?18 This question is most disturbing. Ansell-Pearson, Oliver, and
others rule out the possibility that a genius could transcend his or her time, historical
conditions, and gender. To assume from the start that man can understand nothing about
woman is closed-minded, sexist, and dogmatic, to say the least. The converse, that
woman can understand nothing about man, would also have to be conceded by this line of
argument. It is dubious that the scholars who deny man’s ability to understand anything
about woman would also denounce woman’s ability to understand anything about man.
The real test is whether male writers can explain the emotions, thoughts, desires,
and actions of women as women themselves experience them. Many male scholars, artists,
and novelists (including Plato, Rousseau, Goethe, Shakespeare, Stendhal, to name a few)
have successfully and beautifully tapped into the feminine soul and have written
compellingly and persuasively on various aspects of the subject of woman, the feminine,
and sexual relations. Whereas I do not here endorse any specific one of these men, aspects
of their writings contain key insights that are worthy of woman’s concern. Women have
much to learn from these geniuses as do men. Discrediting male writers like Nietzsche
simply because they are male ensures that scholars like Ansell-Pearson will not learn from
them. To be sure, many women misunderstand woman--what women want and what
women are-as is demonstrated by the fundamental disagreements among feminists.
Opinions range from those who contend that all women want to be lesbians to others who
insist that women want to be mothers and housewives.l9 Every few years feminists
redefine themselves because they are not quite sure what the essence of woman is.
Perhaps, to contrast with today’s typical scholars, the greatest minds are able to transcend

their own gender, but scholars like Ansell-Pearson cannot see this possibility.

13Kelly Oliver (1988) also makes this point in her essay “Nietzsche’s Woman: the
Poststructuralist Attempt to Do Away with Women.”

19Lyman Tower Sergeant gives a helpful description and bibliography of the various types of
feminism in his book Contemporary Political Ideologies.

l6

OI

 

 

 

Myths and Deconstruction

Another group of Nietzsche scholars, including Jacques Derrida and others, attempt
to understand Nietzsche’s writings on women through the all-too-narrow lens of Freudian
psychoanalytic theory.20 Derrida finds the question of Nietzsche’s style more compelling
than his insights into the modern condition. Derrida uses a psychoanalytic decoding to
interpret Nietzsche’s style in terms of a “hymen’s graphic” (Derrida, 99). Oliver and
Pearsall explain Derrida’s procedure: “Within the graphics of the hymen there is always
something in excess of any attempts to create a neat system of categories. Hymen signifies
marriage (fusion) and the membrane that stretches across the Opening of the vagina (in-
between inside and outside). Derrida suggests that Nietzsche’s texts set up a graphics
of the hymen, of the in-between” (Oliver and Pearsall, 7). Nowhere in the texts
themselves--that is, in the aphorisms read in their intended context--is there reason to
believe that Nietzsche intends the hymen graphic as a metaphor for woman. The supposed
analysis is more confusing than are Nietzsche’s texts themselves. Derrida’s book is not
only “highly disingenuous” (Ansell-Pearson, 33), but dense, impenetrable, and singularly
closed to providing any illumination of Nietzsche’s discussion. Moreover, Derrida’s
analysis lacks a grounding in the context of the sections on women. Indeed, Derrida
admits that he often interprets Nietzsche’s discussion of women in terms of castration
without ever attaching it to a text of Nietzsche (Derrida, 73). Such an amazing analysis is
possible because Derrida asserts that “there is no such thing as the truth of Nietzsche, or of
Nietzsche’s text” (ibid., 103). The purpose of such an analysis is not to understand

Nietzsche, but to see how far psychoanalytic theory can go. And here, it does not go

20Examples include Sara Kofman’s “A Fantastical Genealogy: Nietzsche’s Family Romance”;
Kelly Oliver’s “Nietzsche’s Abjection”; Susan Bernstein “Fear of Music? Nietzsche’s Double Vision of the
‘Musieal—Ferninine”; Alan D. Schrift’s “On the Gynecology of morals: Nietzsche and Cixous on the Logic
of the Gift”; and David Farrell Krell’s reading of Iriguay in “To the Orange Grove at the Edge of the Sea."

17

anywhere. Derrida castrates woman, not Nietzsche.21

Kelly Oliver follows on the heels of Derrida. She imposes Derrida’s triad
categorization of woman (as castrated, castrating, and as affirming)22 on Nietzsche’s
metaphor of woman as truth (BGE, Preface; GS, preface).23 Oliver contends that when
reading Nietzsche with her triad in mind, the woman (philosopher or scholar) who seeks
the truth is castrated while the woman (artist) who creatively interprets the truth and hides it
under illusions is castrating. The analysis is problematic for several reasons. First, Oliver
confounds woman and truth in her discussion. She does not deal with the fact that
Nietzsche suggests conceiving of truth as woman. Nor does Oliver offer a clear distinction

between female scholars on the one hand, and philosophers and artists on the other.

21Ansell-Pearson similarly argues, “it is not feminism which castrates woman, but Derrida”
(Ansell-Pearson, 34). Nietzsche, however, actually does argue that feminism castrates women (and men).

22Oliver’s analysis is rooted in the following passage:

This inability to assimilate-even among themselves-~the aphorisms and the rest-«perhaps it must
simply be admitted that Nietzsche himself did not see his way too clearly there. Not could he, in
the instantaneous blink of an eye. Rather a regular, rhythmic blindness takes place in the text.
One will never have done with it. Nietzsche too is a little lost there. But that there is a loss, that
anyway is ascertainable, as soon as there is hymen. Nietzsche might well be a little lost in the
web of his text, lost much as a spider who finds he is unequal to the web he has spun. Much as a
spider indeed, several spiders even. Nietzsche’s spider. Lautreamont’s, that of Mallarrne, those of
Freud and Abraham He was, he dreaded this castrated woman. He was, he dreaded this castrating
woman. He was, he loved this afi’r'rrning woman. At once, simultaneously or successively,
depending on the position of his body and the situation of his story, Nietzsche was all of these.
Within himself, outside of himself, Nietzsche dealt with so many women. Like in Basel where he
held council (Derrida, 101, emphasis added).

231n “Nietzsche Was No Feminist...,” Debra Bergoffen also focuses on the question “What if truth
is a woman?” By overemphasizing this single aphorism, this type of study tends to obscure the context.
Bergoffen suggests that the question of woman lies close to the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy and
philosophy generally. She proceeds to use Freud to understand the several uses of truth as woman. Her
conclusion is that “Women, speaking their own voices, owe nothing to the name given them by others”
(Bergoffen, 234). In other words, she asserts that Nietzsche’s metaphor of truth as a woman need not mean
anything to women. Bergoffen thus implies that Nietzsche’s designation of truth as a woman is completely
arbitrary and negligible. In a single sentence she undermines her own analysis. If understanding
Nietzsche’s metaphor is not worthwhile, the reader is forced to wonder why Bergoffen wastes her time
writing an article on the subject.

18

Second, Oliver admits that she uses this triad as a way to create truth-mot in order to
understand Nietzsche’s truths: “On possible way we theoretians (or artists) can interpret,
create, truth/woman is the triad we have developed out of Nietzsche’s writings” (Oliver,
1998, 78). Consequently, her response to Nietzsche’s characterization of female scholars
as sterile is inadequate. Oliver refuses to judge whether women should “play like men” or
not. But this is the key issue for Nietzsche and so Oliver cannot offer any serious response
to the heart of Nietzsche’s criticism. This essay give serious scholars reason to wonder
whether Nietzsche might not be correct to say that truth is repugnant to woman.

Most astounding is Koelb’s essay “Castration Envy: Nietzsche and the Figure of
Woman.” There is little to say on the essay beyond the title. To say that a man is envious
of one who is castrated defies all logic. Koelb explains the notion of castration envy: ”The
potency of the penis is negligible in comparison to the irresistible might figured by its
absence. Castration is the trope that stands for the ultimate power, an object as much of
envy as of fear” (Koelb, 80). First, woman is not essentially a castrated being, nor did
Nietzsche understand her to be. A feminine woman is far from castrated, though Nietzsche
does consider certain types of women as sterile. And even if women were essentially
castrated, Nietzsche certainly would not have wanted to be castrated himself-~especially
given his criticism of sterility--nor would any sane human being. Koelb’s analysis even
misses the very surface meaning of Nietzsche’s teaching. Analyses like Koelb’s attempt to
interpret Nietzsche through very time-bound Freudian analyses. These scholars may
understand Nietzsche’s writings as castrated because their own work is castrated.

Freudian Psychobabble: Nietzsche’s Mother and Sister

Others follow Koelb’s attempt to psychoanalyze Nietzsche by looking at his life
experience with women. Some of these scholars argue that Nietzsche had little experience
with women and so is not an authority on the subject of woman. Others focus on a single

aphorism (or two) about Nietzsche’s mother (out of context) and attempt to read his entire

19

philosophy through its narrow 1ens.24 Such silly reductionist analyses are almost not
worth responding to; however, because the scholarly community continues to produce
them, a word or two is needed here. In “A Fantastical Genealogy,” Sara Kofman studies
two versions of section 3 of Ecce Homo ’3 “Why I am So Wise” to find the source of
Nietzsche’s disenchantment with women--his mother. She puts too much emphasis on the
suggestion in Ecce Homo that Nietzsche is like his mother.25 Moreover, her focus on this
single passage from Ecce Homo, a source of dubious reliability, as a “prolegomenon to any
further reflection on the position of women in Nietzsche’s work” (Kofman, 1994, 35)
leads to scholarship that is of dubious reliability itself. These scholars apply a sexually
charged theory of psychoanalytic jargon that holds no intrinsic validity. Not only is the
method inappropriate, but it is difficult to prove what Nietzsche’s feelings toward his
mother actually were (Picart, 12). Lou Andreas-Salome agrees that following his
biographical information is an incorrect method of interpreting Nietzsche’s thought. She
explains; “Whoever wishes to proceed differently and view Nietzsche’s exterior
experiences in order to grasp the inner, would at best hold only an empty shell from which
the spirit has escaped” (Andreas-Salome, 5).26 This analysis does not focus on
Nietzsche’s infrequent relationships with women, nor will it discuss the women in his life.
24Examples of such studies include: Sara Kofman, “A Fantastical Genealogy: Nietzsche’s Family
Romance” (1994); Sara Kofman, “Baubo: Theologieal Perversion and Fetishism” (1998); Kelly Oliver,

“Nietzsche’s Abjection”; Lawrence A. Rickels, “Insurance for and against women: From Nietzsche to
Psychotherapy"; 311d Jean Graybeal, “Ecce Homo: Abjection and ‘the Feminine.”’

25Jean Graybeal’s essay is similarly flawed. He focuses singlemindedly on what he calls the riddle
of Nietzsche’s origin posed at the beginning of Ecce Homo. Nietzsche declares:

The good forttme of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in
the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming
old. This dual descent, as it were, both from the highest and the lowest rung on the ladder of life,
at the same time a decadent and a beginning-«his, if anything, explains that neutrality, that
freedom from all partiality in relation to the total problem of life, that perhaps distinguishes me. I
have a subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and decline than any other human being before
me; I am the teacher par excellence for this-J know both, I am both (EH, 222).

26Picart also cites this passage (Picart, 11).

20

Nietzsche’s teaching on man and woman is worthy of examination because he offers
insights into the unintended consequences of the enlightenment project.27
Baubo and other Myths Exaggerated to Epic Proportions
A wide range of the literature focuses on the purpose of myth and metaphor in
Nietzsche, much of which is also replete with psychoanalytic jargon.28 For example,

6‘

Iriguay’s pseudo-poetic musings as Nietzsche’s marine lover’ ’ which have spawned a
great deal of research, focuses on Nietzsche’s style and his brief references to mythological
figures in his earlier texts. Rather than read Nietzsche contextually, Oliver and Pearsall
describe Iriguay’s goal as an attempt to “seduce” Nietzsche to “uncover silenced
femininity” in his writings (Oliver and Pearsall, 8). Loosely rooted in Nietzsche’s pre-
Zarathustra texts, she attempts to construct what women might have to say in response to
Nietzsche’s arguments. Iriguay makes no effort to distinguish between the immature
Nietzsche and the mature Nietzsche. The consequence of this is Iriguay’s adolescent and
obscure text. Kofman, no less obscure than Iriguay, focuses on one of the most frequently
cited myths--Baubo. Kofman hesitates to mention that Nietzsche mentions Baubo once--
and only in the revised version of the preface to The Gay Science. Surely this reference is
interesting, but to make it the heart of the Nietzschean system is misguided. This particular
mythological reference has stirred the imagination of Nietzsche readers for two reasons.
First, Baubo is a personification of the female genitals. Second, a weak link can be made

between Baubo and Dionysus (who is obviously an important figure in Nietzsche’s

thought). Unfortunately, Kofman’s essay begins with an obscure reference and ignores

27For a discussion of the women in the life of Nietzsche, consult Carol Diethe’s Nietzsche ’s
Women, Beyond the Whip. Not only does Diethe discuss Nietzsche’s relationship with his mother, his
sister, and notorious others like Lou Andreas-Salome and Cosima Wager, but in the closing chapters she
also considers Nietzsche’s reaction to contemporary feminists.

28Examples of such studies include: Sara Kofinan’s “Baubo: Theologieal Perversion and
Fetishism"; Luce Iriguay’s Marine Lover of Nietzsche; “The Medusa’s Bars: The Question of Nietzsche,
the Question of Gender, and Transformations of Theory” by Arkady Plotnitsky; and Clayton Koelb’s
“Castration Envy: Nietzsche and the Figure of Woman.”

21

the very obvious surface meanings of Nietzsche’s writings. In such an analysis, it
generally is sensible to move from the obvious to the less obvious. Such attempts to
explain the less obscure (his outspoken assertions about woman) by beginning from the
more obscure (namely a single reference to Baubo and a questionable link to Dionysus) are
not helpful. The most common feature of the essays in this group are that they are opaque
and impenetrable.

The most recent attempt to understand Nietzsche’s use of myth is Joan Picart’s
recent book Resentment and the “Feminine ” in Nietzsche ’s Politico-Aesthetics. Although
Picart focuses on the role of myth in Nietzsche’s writings, she sets herself apart from all of
the scholars listed above. The primary distinction between Picart and the others is that she
attempts to contextualize her study by focusing on the three phases of Nietzsche’s thought
(pm-Zarathustra, Zarathustra, and post-Zarathustra). She attempts to stay true to the
context; however, her subject matter and purpose make this a difficult feat. Rather than
focus on “the degree of offensiveness of Nietzsche’s ambivalent pronouncements on the
‘feminine’ and ‘women,”’ she attempts to “examine what this misogyny means for his
political philosophy as a whole” (Picart, 3). She studies his misogyny as expressed
through the use of myth throughout his texts. But in so doing, Picart, like so many others,
makes the error of imposing her own scheme (her belief of the primary importance of
mythology as it relates to the Nietzschean project) upon Nietzsche’s thought Picart
obfuscates matters because she places too heavy an emphasis on Nietzsche’s use of myth
and metaphor. Perhaps the reason she does this is to give her book a continuity that is
absent from Nietzsche’s own writings. Although she notes that Nietzsche’s use of myth
diminishes in his post-Zarathustra stage, she overemphasizes the role that myth plays in
that stage.

It is true that strictly and grammatically speaking, Nietzsche uses figures
and tropes rather than mythic deities or figures here. But he essentially uses
these figures/tropes to fill in for the mythic deities he seems to
banish....Nietzsche precisely appears to downplay the role of mythology

exoterically, only to result in an even more subtle esoteric mythology
disguised as a nonmythology (Picart, 143).

22

Picart also operates under the assumption that Nietzsche was indeed a misogynist because
she focuses less on the surface statements and searches too deeply for a profound meaning
in myth. In other words, Picart skips past some of the exoteric assertions (and clear
surface meanings) of Nietzsche in order to find a more profound esoteric Nietzsche that fits
with her analysis. Nietzsche’s use of myth may diminish because he becomes the
philosopher with the hammer. The use of myth alone is not the key to understanding
Nietzsche’s view of women or why he discusses women so frequently. Nietzsche’s
outspoken condemnations of feminism and egalitarianism is a more reasonable place to
begin such an analysis. In this manner, consideration of the surface meanings of his
arguments will not be missed. Picart’s focus on Nietzsche’s entire genealogy and the
development of his use of myth is on the right track. In part because she makes Nietzsche
more esoteric than he is and because she focuses too heavily on his use of myth, Picart fails
to explain why Nietzsche needs to discuss women at all, which appears to be a gap in all of
the research considered to this point.
Woman, Women, and the Feminine

Another common feature of most of the scholars discussed above is their failure to
distinguish consistently between Nietzsche’s metaphors and his discussions of actual
women. Lack of clarity in the secondary literature also arises from the failure to draw a
clear distinction between Nietzsche’s use of the terms “woman” (“Weib” or “Frau”) and the
“feminine” (weiblich). Picart 29 attempts to distinguish between the concepts “woman,”
“womanly,” and the “feminine” (Picart, 7), but her distinction is ambiguous and difficult to
follow through her book. Although Nietzsche’s distinction between “woman” and the

“feminine” is not without its ambiguities, he certainly means two distinct concepts in his

29l‘irrell mentions the difference between being a female and being a woman, but does not make
clear what that difference is. Tirrell only notes that Nietzsche does not follow the contemporary distinction
between sex and gender (Tirrell, 1998, 206). Clark mistakenly argues that “woman as such” (Das Weib an
sich) is synonymous with the Eternal Feminine (Clark, 1998, 192). This false association leads her to
conclude that the Eternal Feminine is an ideal that no woman could attain.

23

use of the terms “Weib” and “weiblich.” When Nietzsche speaks of woman (“Weib”), he is
referring to an idea that is changeable over time. So for instance, his critical remarks about
woman in section seven of Beyond Good and Evil refer to bourgeois Women of the
twentieth century who seek emancipation. He is describing the traits and instincts that the
women of his time have, but also recognizes that those traits are not fixed in any permanent
sense. As a free spirit who recognizes the implications of God’s death, Nietzsche
acknowledges the amazing power that social conditioning has. Nietzsche notes that the
women of the twentieth century are not particularly feminine (“weiblich”) because a
defeminization (“Entweiblichung”) is taking place. In contrast, Nietzsche uses the term
“feminine” to refer to traits that tend to fit best with woman, but that may also apply to
man. The concept “feminine” may not be changeable over time. The “feminine” is a
concept that transcends time, place, and historical conditioning. Maternal love is one of the
most prominent aspects of femininity, according to Nietzsche. A particular woman may or
may not be maternal, but a maternal quality will always be an aspect of femininity.
Similarly, the terms “man” (“Mann”) and “masculine” (“miinnlich”) are not the same
concepts. Man may be manly or emasculated. Incidentally, Nietzsche notes that in the
twentieth century, manliness (“Mannhaftigkeit”) is no longer cultivated at all. Defeminized
women and emasculated men are the men and women that modernity overwhelmingly tends
to produce. Incidentally, Picart’s conception of effeminate (sterile) males and defeminized
(sterile) women is not quite right. She understands effeminate males to be males who have
incorporated the unattractive feminine qualities (Picart, 145). Efferrrinate men are primarily
those males who have shed their manly qualities. The fact that they may also acquire the
weakly feminine traits is of secondary importance. However, for a man to incorporate the
praiseworthy feminine traits is a very good thing. Picart also associates woman’s seeking
self-reliance with the abortive females to which Nietzsche refers (ibid.). This too is a
misconception. An abortive female is one who sheds her feminine qualities, not one who

seeks empowerment. The thought of a race of sterile humans fills Nietzsche with

24

revulsion. On the other hand, a feminine male or a masculine (manly) woman may be a
very good thing for Nietzsche.

Scholars have so far fixated on the question of whether or not Nietzsche was a
misogynist. The question of Nietzsche’s misogyny is not as important as why Nietzsche
needs to discuss woman at all. A careful examination of Nietzsche’s teaching on the sexes
calls his so—called misogyny into question anyway. Nietzsche challenges the supposed
superiority of man over woman by prescribing an eternally hostile war of the sexes.
Apparently Nietzsche sees woman as a worthy opponent for man. Her attributes, while
different from man’s, still rival his. And since man and woman are not equal, it is worth
considering which sex Nietzsche considers to be superior. Nietzsche leaves this question
open. This a surprisingly difficult question to answer, but the effort yields intriguing

results.

25

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALIZING NIETZSCHE’S
COMMENTS ON WOMAN

Criticism of Woman’s “Liberation”

“‘You are going to women? Do not forget the whipl’” spoke the little old woman to
Zarathustra (Z, 179).30 This Nietzschean proclamation appears to be a traditional example
of male chauvinism. Yet this notorious piece of advice may actually be the key to
combating the greatest defects of modernity. Nietzsche suggests that understanding the
distinct natures of man and woman can help cure humanity of the sickness of the modern
condition. Nietzsche argues that cultivating the proper relationship between the sexes can
recapture moderrrity’s lack of vitality, which is why he devotes so much time to analyzing
the differences between man and woman. Nietzsche even argues that the failure to
comprehend the “fundamental problem of ‘man and woman’” makes one “too ‘short’ for all
fundamental problems of life, of the life yet to come, too, and incapable of attaining any
depth” (BGE, 238). The frequency of Nietzsche’s discussions of woman and the
“feminine,” as well as his insistence that the relations between the sexes constitutes a
fundamental issue, suggest that his insights into the nature of woman and the “feminine”
occupy a central role in his philosophy. Establishing the proper relationship between man
and woman is a key component of Nietzsche’s attempt to transcend nihilism.

Further, Nietzsche teaches that usually31 something is sexually wrong with a

woman with scholarly inclinations (BGE, 144). He also mentions that woman’s “great art

30Few studies even mention the fact that a woman, not a man, makes this claim. Paul Patton
notes this in the introduction to his book Nietzsche, The Feminine and Political Theory, but does not
explain its significance (Patton, xi). Not only does a woman rrrake this famous assertion, but a little old
woman. Nietzsche most likely does not believe that a little old woman could offer any key insight into the
essence of women or femininity (cf. HAH I: 419). Carol Diethe suggests that the fact that this statement is
uttered by a woman gives the statement more credence. Because so few female voices are heard in
Nietzsche, when they do speak they carry more significance (cf. Diethe, 63-66). But in Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche indicates that intelligent women will not speak about women (BGE, 232). Perhaps the
most wise women will not reveal their truths about women to men.

31 See my discussion of “The Female Scholar--A Paradox” in chapter 2 for a comparison of
BGE 144 with section 894 of Will to Power.

26

 

 

 

rc

 

. unllbrl Bl.» .

W

 

is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty” (BGE, 232). Moreover,
Zarathustra assures us that the riddle that is woman “has one solution: that is pregnancy”
(Z, 178). Such comments make Nietzsche sound like little else than a chauvinist who
would like to see all women barefoot and pregnant. But to read these comments as the
ranting of a shallow misogynist is to ignore the context of these assertions. Nietzsche’s
apparent degradation of woman is a commentary on modernity and not simply an assault on
the entire female sex or on femininity.32 Nietzsche’s acceptance of the general tenets of
historicism precludes his understanding the differences between the sexes as fixed,
objective, absolute, unconditional truths. Nietzsche considers all thought (including his
own) to be time-bound. According to Nietzsche, the particular social and historical
conditions in which one lives shape one’s ideas: “You can explain the past only by what is
most powerfid in the present” (H, 40). Any perception (or understanding) of man or
woman is historical, including Nietzsche’s own view. And since Nietzsche’s philosophy
is an attempt to transcend the crisis of the modem condition, his comments on woman are a
reflection of that project. In particular, his comments on woman are a reaction against the
gradual homogenization of democratic societies. His apparently nasty suggestions do not
indicate a hatred of the female sex, but a rejection of and an attempt to overturn the
deleterious effects of the Enlightenment on woman. He argues that modernity tums
woman into something less than she could be.

Nietzsche’s comments on women do not necessarily indicate misogyny. Indeed,
one must also keep in mind that he makes derogatory remarks about man. After all, males
have become the “scholarly asses” Nietzsche criticizes in the opening of Beyond Good and
Evil (BGE, 239; cf. BGE, preface). These males, Nietzsche contends, prefer ugly truths

to life-affirming illusions. So if woman is the creator of lies, man is to blame for honoring

32Ofelia Schutte suggests that Nietzsche’s critique of marriage is an attack of modem marriage and
not an attack of the institution itself (Schutte, 1984, 181-185). Similarly, Nietzsche’s condemnation of
woman is a criticism of the bourgeois woman of the twentieth centrrry and not all women of all historical
epochs.

27

and loving “precisely this art and this instinct in woman” (BGE, 232). Furthermore,
assertions that appear degrading to women from the liberal democratic perspective may be
praiseworthy from the Nietzschean perspective. In Nietzsche’s view, not only does man
benefit from woman’s ability to create lies (and inspire others to believe those lies), but this
ability is a great superiority of woman over man. If there are no permanent truths, as
Nietzsche contends (i.e., all gods are dead), there is a need to create in humans the belief
that some irnperrnanent truths are permanent. Lacking any gods or absolute ideals to which
to dedicate oneself, human esteeming and willing may cease (Z, 129). Woman’s concern
with appearance and beautiful illusions demonsuates her close connection to life, her desire
to make life worth living. In fact, woman’s ability to create life-affirming illusions (as
opposed to ugly truths) enables man to cling to life instead of judging this life as no good
(cf. T1, 473).

In short, Nietzsche does not condemn all women, nor does he hate femininity itself;
rather, he rebels against the gradual elimination of separate and distinct feminine and
masculine wills which is characteristic of democracies. Nietzsche predicts that as
democracies inevitably move toward ever more equality, the corresponding trend will be to
create homogeneity. His interpretation of equality “as a certain factual increase in

9”

similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory of ‘equal rights has its roots in the
German language (T1, 540). “Gleich,” the German term for “equal,” also means “same”
and “identical.” Although German also has another term, “selbe,” that means “same,” the
fact that “gleich” translates both as “equal” and “same” means that the German language
does not explicitly differentiate between the concepts of equality and sameness. In English
as well, although the two terms can have slightly different connotations, the concept of
equality is often employed in the same way as the concept of sameness is used.

Treating man and woman (two distinct types) the same leads to the “defeminization”
of woman and the emasculation of man--both of which Nietzsche wholeheartedly opposes

(BGE, 239). Nietzsche intends to maintain distinct masculine and feminine perspectives

28

and to heighten the tension between the sexes beyond what it has ever been. Although
Nietzsche hopes to promote a distinct feminine perspective, he adamantly opposes
woman’s “liberation.” But to say Nietzsche is no feminist is tantamount to suggesting that
Nietzsche is no egalitarian. What liberal democrats term “progress,” that is, evolving
toward complete social and political equality, Nietzsche calls “degeneration.” Nietzsche
instead praises suffering and slavery as necessary facts of life because human beings “‘are
not equal.’ Nor shall they become equal!” (Z, 213; cf. BGE, 44, 239, 257, 259). Overly
anxious to condemn Nietzsche’s conception of femininity as chauvinistic and time-bound,
scholars have continually failed to consider whether Nietzsche’s conception of femininity
may be necessary in order to promote sexual dichotomy.

Nietzsche considers sexual homogenization to be an especially uoubling
consequence of egalitarianism; consequently, establishing the pr0per relationship between
man and woman may be the key to transcending modern degeneration. Nietzsche
understands the fight to establish equality between the sexes as the fight to eliminate the last
basic (eternal) difference that has provided the potential for struggle and inspiration (a
pathos of distance) throughout history. And certainly the war between the sexes has
always been a tempestuous one. The conflict between different types of people has created
the greatest political orders, the most magnificent pieces of music, and the most inspiring
religions. But in their pursuit of equal rights, some feminists intend “to abolish sufiering”
altogether (BGE, 225). And they perceive any type of struggle as a precursor of
unnecessary suffering. For Nietzsche, an end to suffering and struggle means an end to a
basic condition of life that is prerequisite for greatness. If the war between the sexes can
no longer provide any longing or inspiration, perhaps nothing else can. Nietzsche predicts
that without struggle, creativity and profound goals will cease altogether (Z, 129). As man
and woman become more indistinguishable from one another (in appearance, in roles, in
occupations, in weakness, etc...) the thought of universal homogenization becomes more

and more plausible. Worse than war for Nietzsche would be for humanity to degenerate to

29

a condition in which people no longer fight any wars and the only goal is comfortable self-
preservation, i.e., the condition of the last man. Insofar as a non-oppressive,
homogenous, egalitarian society is part of the feminist ideal, Nietzsche necessarily opposes
the feminists.

To a large degree Nietzsche reduces feminism to egalitarianism. Against both
democratic ideologies, Nietzsche argues that man and woman should be as different from
one another as possible. In order to maintain separate roles for man and woman, he
recommends treating the sexes differently from one another (BGE, 238). This means that
Nietzsche is a natural enemy of any woman who seeks rights equal to those of man.33
Nietzsche urges that “an eternally hostile tension” between the sexes may be the only way
to overcome the homogenization of humanity, the prevalence of herd morality, and the
shallowness of bourgeois passivity (BGE, 238). Heightening the tension between the
sexes beyond what it has ever been can potentially uplift both man and woman. Ultimately
this sexual tension may a necessary prerequisite to Nietzsche’s attempt to create a
transcendent goal for the human species. Intensifying this mutual hostility necessitates
cultivating a feminine perspective as a distinct and separate rival to a masculine one.

This study is an attempt to understand Nietzsche and the modern condition, not to
endorse his teachings. Our deeper understanding of Nietzsche can be gained by examining
one aspect of Nietzsche’s thought-his insistence on maintaining a separation of the sexes,
which is a concern that pervades all periods of his thought. Turning to Nietzsche to learn

about femininity and the proper roles of man and woman might seem odd since he is a

33Not all feminists recommend treating man and woman the same. Wolgast’s Equality and the
Rights of Women presents a useful discussion of what it means to treat man and woman as equals. This
book distinguishes the goal of equality from the goal of treating man and woman the same. Scholars often
confound these distinct goals. But, she contends, sexual difference is in a different class than racial, ethnic,
or religious differences. Biology as such is not irrelevant in the particular case of sex and gender, and ought
to be given serious consideration. Because equality and sameness are two separate ideals, some feminists
argue that man and woman should not be treated the same.

Carol Gilligan’s In a Drflerent Voice also considers the signifieance of masculine and feminine
differences. She recommends that the educational system ought to promote both the masculine and
feminine types of creativity. The failure to affirm (or ignorance of) the distinct feminine perspective has
1nd deleterious consequences for women, men, and edueation.

30

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

natural enemy of any woman who seeks rights equal to those of man. But Nietzsche
recognizes that establishing the proper relations between the sexes constitutes a
fundamental problem--for man, for woman, and for society at large. To defend the
integrity of modern scholarship and reopen the serious issues of sex, gender, and sexual
relations, Nietzsche’s insights must be reexamined. The democratic prejudice and
shallowness that infests modern scholarship makes most of the current defenses of
women’s liberation and liberalism shallow and unsound. Anyone who cares seriously
about the future relations between the sexes, the equal treatment of man and woman, the
fight for equal access to education, the condition of the family, or the possibility of
fulfilling love between the sexes would be well—advised to engage Nietzsche’s critique of
the modern condition. The ultimate purpose of reading Nietzsche, the opponent of
egalitarianism par excellence, is to formulate a defense of women’s liberation and find a
responsible notion of equal rights, if it is possible to do so, since Nietzsche is no liberal
democrat.
How to Read Nietzsche

Although focusing only on the discussions of women, woman, the feminine, and
sexual relations will not unlock everything there is to know about Nietzsche, a careful
consideration of this neglected topic will surely tell us more about Nietzsche and
modernity. Scholars’ refusal to read Nietzsche’s comments on women in the manner in
which he intended himself to be read has prevented them from understanding Nietzsche as
he understood himself. Because he is a genius, one should read his works with a great
deal of respect and care. Nietzsche insists that the “reader from whom I expect something
must have three characteristics. He must be tranquil and read without haste. He must not
always interpose himself and his ‘education.’ Finally, at the end he must not expect new
tablets as a result” (Werke, 3: 272; quoted in Dannhauser, 1974, 17). In the Preface of On
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche notes that particular care must be exhibited in reading

his masterpiece Zarathustra. He explains:

31

If this book [On the Genealogy of Morals] is incomprehensible to anyone
and jars on his ears, the fault, it seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is
clear enough, assuming, as I do assume, that one has first read my earlier
writings and has not spared some trouble in doing so: for they are indeed,
not easy to penetrate. Regarding my Zarathustra, for example, I do not
allow that anyone knows that book who has not at some time been
profoundly wounded and at some time profoundly delighted by every word
in it; for only then may he enjoy the privilege of reverentially sharing in the
halcyon element out of which that book was born and in its sunlight clarity,
remoteness, breadth, and certainty. In other cases, people find difficulty
with the aphoristic form: this arises from the fact that today this form is not
taken seriously enough (GM, Preface, 8).

What was true in Nietzsche’s time is even more true today. Nobody writes in aphorisms
anymore and most people are not able to understand them. This means that when scholars
today reject his teaching, they often condemn a phantom of Nietzsche and do not confront
this actual thought. Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not seek objective readers, but
thoughtful ones. Nietzsche explains in a letter to Carl Fuchs how he expects others to read
his words:

If you should ever come round to writing about me (you lack the time for
this, my valued friend! 1), be sensible enough--as nobody has been till now—
-to characterize me, to “describe”--but not to “evaluate.” This gives a
pleasant neutrality: it seems to me that in this way one can put aside one’s
own passionate emphasis, and that it offers all the more to the more subtle
minds. I have never been characterized, either as a psychologist, or as a
writer (including poet), or as the inventor of a new kind of pessimism (a
Dionysian pessimism, born of strength, which takes pleasure in seizing the
problem of existence by the horns), or as an Immoralist (the highest form,
till now, of “intellectual rectitude,” which is permitted to treat morality as
illusion, having itself become instinct and inevitability). It is not necessary
at all--not even desirable-that you should argue in my favor; on the
contrary, a dose of curiosity, as in the presence of a foreign plant, with an
ironic resistance, would seem to me an incomparably more intelligent
attitude. Forgive me! I have written several naive things here-a little
prescription for extracting oneself successfully from an impossible
situation... (LET, 305).

Nietzsche is not suggesting that the reader ought to read his words objectively, as if that
were possible; rather, he demands that his reader understand him before the reader attempts
to use him. A proper reading might uncover some key insights into the relationship
between the sexes.

In order to follow Nietzsche’s advice, this dissertation will not reduce Nietzsche to

his historical context, nor will it reduce his genius to biographical information. Such

32

information will only be noted in response to other scholars who attempt to read Nietzsche
in this manner. The fact that Nietzsche understood his considerations on woman and the
feminine, as well as his prescriptions regarding relationship between the sexes, to be
closely related to his project provides reason enough to read Nietzsche’s discussions on
women. Nietzsche was proud of his insights on woman, characterizing himself as the
“first psychologist of the eternally feminine” (EH, 266). Because Nietzsche highlights this
as a fundamental concern of his, one must question whether Nietzsche understood women
and what bearing his understanding has on his overall project.

Nietzsche wrote so voluminuously that it is not possible here to study everything.
Instead, this dissertation focuses primarily on Thus Spoke Zarathustra34 and Beyond Good
and Evil. The existing scholarship focuses too heavily on the immature phases of
Nietzsche’s development. Focusing the study on these two works is sensible because
these two works contain the most important of Nietzsche’s thoughts. Lowith provides a
useful division of Nietzsche’s writings into three periods. The first stage includes his early
works including The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations. This is the immature
phase of Nietzsche’s career in which Nietzsche hoped to revive German culture.
Dannhauser describes this stage as “an attempt to see and justify life as an aesthetic
phenomenon” (Dannhauser, 1974, 19). The second phase includes Human-all-too-
Human, The Dawn of Day, and the first four books of The Gay Science. Nietzsche’s
mature position is presented in Zarathustra and the books following it. Lowith’s division
fits with the division that Nietzsche himself suggests in Zarathustra’s speech “On the Three
Metamorphoses” (cf. Liiwith, 21-26; Dannhauser, 1974, 19-20).35

34Instead of citing the complete title, all subsequent textual references to the book Thus Spoke
Zarathustra refer to the book as Zarathustra

35Picart fmds it useful to divide Nietzsche’s texts into the Pre-Zarathustra, Zarathustra, and
post-Zarathustra phases (Picart, 1). This division is not as accurate as LOwith’s beeause Picart’s does not
align with “Of the Three Metamorphoses.” Her division may suit her study of myth to a greater degree than
does Lewith’s.

33

Liiwith suggests that all writings written after Zarathustra are to be understood as
commentaries on it (Liiwith, 19). He correctly notes that in erathustra, Nietzsche posits
or at least intimates all of his fundamental ideas. Nietzsche’s later texts elaborate or make
more explicit the key components of the Nietzschean system. In articulating the meaning of
the death of God, special consideration of Nietzsche’s remarks in The Use and Abuse of
History is also warranted. Though this work is in the early period of his thought, he never
denounced the ideas in the history essay and they are consistent with his final position.
Other works will be used supplementally in order to elaborate sections of Zarathustra and
Beyond Good and Evil. The Gay Science is helpful for this purpose as it is the last text of
the middle period which immediately precedes Erathustra. The final aphorism of the
original edition of The Gay Science is almost identical to Zarathustra’s “Prologue” (GS,
342, n. 72). When these and other earlier texts are referenced, close attention is paid to
their context as they relate to his mature thought.

By exploring the relationship between the need to maintain sexual difference and
Nietzsche’s goal of transcending nihilism, this dissertation conects the errors of those who
have neglected the context of Nietzsche’s comments on woman. The secondary texts that
offer such a systematic discussion of the Nietzschean system, like Lampert’s Nietzsche ’s
Teaching or Kaufmann’s Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, fail to
illuminate how Nietzsche’s discussions of women are consistent with his fundamental
teachings of the will to power and the eternal recurrence. In fact, given the
comprehensiveness of the works of Kaufmann and Lampert, their failure to address
Nietzsche’s discussion of woman is quite striking. A brief consideration of the key
components36 of the Nietzschean system (i.e., the death of god, the Ubermensch, the will

36Many noteworthy scholars focus their research on these key components. There are several
examples of such comprehensive studies, but I will list only a few. Heidegger’s four volumes present the
most comprehensive analysis of Nietzsche’s thought in its entirety. Consult L6with’s Nietzsche’s
Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Sanre for an in-depth analysis of the etemal recurrence. For a
thorough analysis of the Nietzschean system as revealed through a close reading of Zarathustra, see

Lampert’s Nietzsche ’s Teaching and Rosen’s The Mask of Enlightenment. Kaufmann’s Nietzsche:
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist is a useful resource on the Nietzschean system as a whole.

34

 

to power and the eternal recurrence) as presented in Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil
demonstrates the centrality of his concern with the homogenization of the sexes.
The Four Components of the Nietzschean System
God is Dead

An obvious place to begin this analysis is with Nietzsche’s beginning. His project
begins with the assertion that God is dead (Z, 124). This means that belief in the Christian
God has become untenable (WP, 5). On a deeper level, the death of God signifies that all
gods are dead, including “science,” “nature,” and “truth”37 as standards (Z, 191). One
result of the death of God is radical relativism, the belief that all truth varies depending on
cultural, historical, and social circumstance. This relativism, taken to its logical extension,
leads to nihilism, the belief in nothing. Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God is the
reason he is considered the father of the relativism that characterizes our intellectual age. A
comprehensive understanding of the modern condition (what Nietzsche calls modern
“degeneration”) cannot be achieved without confronting significance of the relativism with
which Nietzsche is credited. Nietzsche attempted to transcend nihilism; the issue is
whether or not he succeeded. Clearly Nietzsche is no shallow relativist. He does not take
a relativist’s position regarding the respective roles of man and woman, for the erosion of
sexual difference is indicative of the crisis of modernity. Scholars have not generally
acknowledged the relationship between Nietzsche’s maintenance of the dichotomy of the
sexes and his attempt to transcend nihilism. His promotion of the separation of the sexes is
not an insignificant misstep on Nietzsche’s part, but a central insight of Nietzsche’s. Any
real understanding of Nietzsche’s working through nihilism must explain why Nietzsche

insists that man and woman should not become alike. A clear explanation of how

371 have placed quotation marks around the terms “science,” “nature,” and “truth” to indicate that
these standards are dead. In general, I place quotation marks around the term “truth" when it refers to the
kind of fixed, essential, unchanging truth that the death of God specifically rules out. I utilize the quotation
marks in the instances that I wish to highlight the fact that the standard has died I do not put quotation
marks around the term “truth” when it refers to Nietzsche’s own subjective truths because he means his
truths to be for the future; his truths are not yet dead. I follow the same practice with the term “nature."

35

Nietzsche’s insistence on sexual differentiation relates to his rejection of the last man will
shed light on the alternate goal Nietzsche posits.
Ubermensch

The actualization of the Ubermensch is the proper goal toward which Man must
now turn. Nietzsche uses the term “Ubermensch” to refer to the horizon of the future to be
willed. Grasping the term “Ubermensch” in German is a challenging task in itself, but the
effort will yield results. First, one should note that conceptually English and German are
not very different; English is a Germanic language. However, the German term “fiber” is
used differently in German than it is in English. The term “fiber” usually means “over,”
“above,” “exceeding,” and “more than.” German uses the word “fiber” as a prefix.38
Typically the “fiber" ’ as Nietzsche employs it in the term “Ubermensch” translates into the
English words “over,” “higher,” or “super.”

The second half of the term, “Mensch,” is more problematic for our purposes
because there is no precise English connotative equivalent for the German term “Mensch.”
In German the masculine term “der Mann” signifies man. Additionally, the feminine term
“die Frau” is the term typically used to refer to woman in German. “Der Mensch,”
however, is a masculine term which does not specifically connote either gender or sex.
Although it is a masculine term (i.e., has the definite article “der”), the meaning of
“Mensch” is really neutral or neutered. The most precise translations of the word
“Mensch” are “human,” “human being,” or “person,” yet it is not clear whether these
English terms capture the meaning of “Mensch” as Nietzsche uses it in the term
“Ubermensch.” But since Nietzsche uses “Mensch” instead of “Mann” or “Weib,” clearly
the term “Ubermensch” does not specifically connote either a male or a female. In general,

the term can be understood to mean an extraordinary type of individual who transcends the

38There are innumerable examples of this usage. For instance, the word “Uberschwemmung”
signifies inrmdation, flood or deluge while “Schwemmen” signifies to wash, to soak, or to carry away. An
“Ubersetzer” is a translator, while a “Setzer” is a compositor. “Uberwachung” signifies superintendence or
supervision, while “wachen” signifies to be awake or to guard.

36

human being (Mensch). Since there are two types of humans-men and women--the
Ubermensch transcends both types. Nietzsche does not state that the Ubermensch will be a
man or a woman; however, as discussed later, he does indicate that the Ubermensch may
more likely be a male.

Walter Kaufmann argues that the best translation of the term Ubermensch is
“overman” for two main reasons. First he argues that he wants to disassociate the term
“ovennan” from the term “superman” which has been associated with the comical and the
sarcastic (Z, editor’s note, 115). But it is doubtful that this association should disrupt the
serious Nietzsche scholar. More importantly, Kaufmann argues that the term “overrnan”
helps “to bring out the close relation between Nietzsche’s conceptions of the overrnan and
self-overcoming, and to recapture something of his rhapsodical play on the words ‘over’
and ‘under’” (ibid.). But as Detwiler notes, there are just as many “fiber” adjectives that
require the English equivalent “super” as there are adjectives requiring “over” (Detwiler,
48). While capturing Nietzsche’s play on words is certainly important, it is also true the
prefix “fiber” has more than one English equivalent. And the term “super” captures the
flavor of transcendence or overcoming just as well as (if not better than) the prefix “over.”

Additionally, Kaufmann’s term “overrnan” is simply too awkward as an adjective
(cf. Detwiler, 48-9, 208). Not only do the terms “overrnanish” and “overrnanly” sound
awkward, but they also corrupt the meaning of the second half of the terrn--“Mensch.”
These two adjectives imply maleness while the adjective “fibennenschlich” does not Even
Kaufmann concedes that the adjective “overrnanly” is no good by utilizing the adjective
“superhuman” for the adjective “fibermenschlich”.

If one chooses to translate the noun, there are a few possibilities superior to
Kaufmann’s choice. First, one may choose the literal translation “super-human being.”
But this sounds awkward. The two remaining options are “superhuman” and “superman.”
Since “superhuman” sounds more like an adjective than a noun and because “superman”

sounds more pleasant, I prefer “superman” as a translation. Traditionally the terms “men”

37

and “man” refer to humanity as a whole; therefore, the term “superman” preserves the
possibility of a male or female Ubermensch.

One way to sidestep some of these translation difficulties is to leave the term
“Ubermensch” untranslated as Bemd Magnus does (cf. Magnus, 32-38). The topic of this
dissertation makes this method most appropriate. The German term captures the
ambiguous sexuality of the Ubermensch better than any other English translation.
However, it is not necessary to keep the adjective “fibennenschlich” in the German. The
term “superhuman” which can imply either maleness or femaleness is an adequate
translation of the adjective.

Nietzsche never speaks of an “Ubermann,” “Uberfrau” or “Uberweib”, but only an
Ubermensch The Ubermensch may represent a transcendence of the “human all-too-
human,” but not an overcoming of masculinity and femininity. Since “Mensch” is the term
Nietzsche uses to refer to the “human-all-too-human,” some scrutiny of the difference
between the term “Mensch” (a mere human) and the terms “Mann,” “Weib,” and “Frau” is
necessary. In addition to his use of the generic term “Mensch” in his concept
“Ubermensch,” throughout his texts Nietzsche frequently discusses man and woman by
utilizing the masculine term “Mann” and the feminine terms “Weib,” “Weibchen,”
“Weiblein,” and “Frau.” These terms signify man and woman respectively, as opposed to a
human being. Nietzsche purposely distinguishes between what is characteristic of man,
what is typical of woman, and what is merely human. Nietzsche’s coined phrase
“menschliches, allzumenschliches” which translates into “human-all-too-human,” suggests
something lacking or incomplete about the Mensch. To contrast, Nietzsche never uses the
parallel terms “masculine-all-too—masculine” or “feminine-all—too—feminine.”

The term itself does not settle the question of the sex of the Ubermensch. Because
Nietzsche does not explicitly state the sex of the Ubermensch, most scholars assume that
the Ubermensch, like Nietzsche, is male. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that

Nietzsche occasionally refers to a particular male as superhuman, but he never applies the

38

term to a woman (cf. WP, 983; BGE 200, 207).39 Many scholars find this consideration
to be decisive from the outset, yet Nietzsche never states that the Ubermensch must be
male. Hasty assumptions are made on the other side of the fence as well. Carol Diethe
notes that many women who were “creative or active in the intellectual arena during
Nietzsche’s generation” assumed that Nietzsche included women in his prescriptions for
the Ubermensch (Diethe, 7). Perhaps the best way to understand the Ubermensch is as a
male who transcends man and woman, or as a female who transcends man and woman.
The decisive question is whether a female or a male would more likely possess the requisite
traits to transcend the human-all-too-human.

Not only does translating the term “Ubermensch” cause difficulties, but each of the
terms Nietzsche uses to refer to woman carries connotations which are easily lost when
translated into English. He most frequently uses the German term “Weib.” This is a
noteworthy peculiarity since the term is rarely used today except as a slang term. The term
“Frau” is the typical everyday term. “Weib” used to be the common term for woman, but
some time before the nineteenth century the term took on negative connotations. At that
point, “Frau” instead became the common term for woman. Even in Nietzsche’s time the
term “Weib” would have been considered archaic.

But Nietzsche uses both terms-- “Weib” and “Frau,” though he uses “Weib” much
more frequently. The difference between the two terms (“Frau” and “Weib”) is initially
unclear. His discussion appears to be unsystematic and his use of these two terms seems
to be even more random. But Nietzsche is too careful to alternate randomly between two
terms for the same concept. There must be some deliberate reason for his distinguishing
between “Weib” and “Frau.” Although a cognate of the English word “wife,” “Weib” is
most frequently translated as woman or female. The term “Weib” is still commonly used in

certain expressions, like the phrase “Weib und Kind” which translates as “Woman and

39See the section “Has There Ever Been an Ubermensch” in chapter 3 for a more complete
discussion of the sex of the Ubermensch.

39

Child.” Nietzsche may employ the term “Weib” instead of “Frau” to point to the maternal
quality of woman. After all, Nietzsche titled a section of Human-All-Too-Human “Weib
und Kind” (HAH I: 377-437), which provides a stark contrast to his sections on man
(“Mann”) entitled “Man in Society’ ’ (HAH I: 293-376) and “Man Alone With Himself”
(HAH I: 483-638). Unlike woman, man is to be active in society (business, politics, and
industry) or by himself (artist, poet, or philosopher). Nietzsche dedicates a great deal of
discussion to the crucial importance of woman’s ability to give birth. Perhaps Nietzsche
uses the term “Weib” to highlight the importance of this traditional maternal role, a role
which ties woman to man. He may intend to stress that woman should understand herself
to be intimately connected to this role. The term “Weib” implicitly challenges those women
seeking emancipation--women whom Nietzsche would consider to be incomplete females.

Nietzsche also frequently uses the diminutives “Weibchen” and “Weiblein” which
are diminutive terms for “W eib”. In some contexts these diminutives are generally meant to
be condescending terms. “Weibchen” is the typical term for a female animal and
“Weiblein” may also be translated as such. One way to attempt to capture the connotations
of these terms is by using the adjectives “little” or “small.” Often these diminutives refer to
women who are no longer able to give birth (like the old lady in Zarathustra).

The other term Nietzsche uses for woman, “Frau,” signifies woman, wife, or lady.
This is the term usually used to refer to woman today. One might say that “Frau” is the
opposite of “Mann.” As Nietzsche uses the term, “Frau” seems to carry the implication of
a lady, or a woman tied to society. Perhaps a woman characterized by a noble upbringing.
But this is a bit of an oversirnplification because German has a separate term, “Dame,”
which connotes a lady. In contrast to “Fran” and “Dame,” “Weib” seems to connote the
brute, animal, sexual, passionate, instincts of woman. A Weib would embody the
unpredictable aspects of woman that Nietzsche hopes to promote—her changeability,
mysteriousness, and animality (cf. BGE, 239; Z, 220). On the other hand, a “Frau”

would be more refined than the “Weib.” The Frau’s sensibilities are too refined to accord

40

with the vulgarity of modern science (BGE, 127, 207).

Kaufmann suggests that Nietzsche’s use of the term “W eib” follows the lead of
Schopenhauer’s use in his essay “Ueber die Weiber” (GS, 71, n. 7). Kaufmann notes
Schopenhauer’s suggestion that the more respectful term “Frau” ought only be used in the
sense of “wife.” Kaufmann suggests that Schopenhauer was aware that “Weib” sounded
disrespectful and this was his motivation for the selection of the term. Nietzsche too may
intend to carry a tinge of disrespect in his voice. Much of his writing of women consists of
an attack of modern women. Initially, Nietzsche does not seem to respect so-called
“liberated” or “enlightened” woman. Perhaps he reserves the term “Frau” for the more
traditional woman who fulfills the traditionally feminine roles like wife and mother.

The very term Nietzsche selects to signify the goal of the future begs the question of
whether the Ubermensch is masculine, feminine, or both. Establishing what sex the
Ubermensch is will shed light on the Ubermensch itself. The sex of the Ubermensch may
be a central component of what the Ubermensch is. Given Nietzsche’s focus on sexuality,
lust, and love, transcending humanity does not mean eliminating sexual difference. Even if
transcending sexuality were possible, it would not be desirable.

To see that the erosion of sexual differences is not part of Nietzsche’s project, one
need only consider the antithesis of the Ubermensch. The term Nietzsche uses for the
antithesis of the Ubermensch is the last Mensch. The last Mensch is also of an ambiguous
sexuality. Nietzsche never speaks of a “last Frau,” “last Weib,” or “last Mann.” His use
of the term “Mensch” here indicates the sterility of the “human-all-too-human.” The last
Mensch represents the erosion of sexuality, lust, passion, love, and both the masculine and
the feminine perspectives. Nietzsche’s description of the last Mensch (2, 129-130) sheds
light on why Nietzsche does not use the terms “last woman” or “last man.” The terms
“Frau,” “Weib” and “Mann” indicate a degree of sexuality that is absent from the last
Mensch. Maleness or femaleness does not define the last Mensch--it is a mere (sexually

neutral) human being. Nietzsche finds it unnecessary to express a sexuality of the last

41

Mensch because he intends the term “Mensch” to capture something akin to objectivity or
neutrality--the denial of both masculine and feminine sexuality. Although the last Mensch
may have either female, male, herrnaphroditic, or the absence of sex organs, the last
Mensch is in no way a man or a woman--nor is the last Mensch manly or feminine.

Because the term “Mensch” as employed in the concept “letzte Mensch” indicates
sterility of the soul, translating the term does not pose the same difficulties as the term
“Ubermensch” does. Since it is not necessary to determine the sexuality of the last Mensch
(the sexuality of the last Mensch does not bear witness to who the last Mensch is), the
appropriate translation of this term is “last man.” The alternative, “last human being,”
simply sounds too awkward. So the threat Nietzsche sees is that the distinct male and
female perspectives will be wiped away and the last man will be the result.

Will to Power

There is no guarantee that the Ubermensch will be created; Nietzsche must teach
individuals how to will consciously so that the Ubermensch can be actualized.
Consequently, Nietzsche teaches that the basic characteristic of life is the will to power. He
explains this in a most definitive statement: “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its
strength--life itself is will to power” (BGE, 13). The most fundamental, universal fact,
says Nietzsche, is that all life is a striving for power, a craving to alter the world
Consideration of what the will to power is leads to the question of whether man and
woman possess essentially different wills from each other. The initial answer seems to be
no. If there is no fundamental distinction between human beings and animals because all
life is characterized by the will to power, it is unlikely that man and woman would have
different wills. But in describing what ought to be woman’s role, Nietzsche indicates that
women will experience an accumulation of power from different objects than men, that her
will is essentially different than his.

Nietzsche’s discussion of separate masculine and feminine wills may indicate that

man and woman are different by nature. Nietzsche may be employing the traditional Greek

42

understanding of nature as physis-—a fixed unchanging essence that is not altered by
conventions. But employing nature (or physis) as a fixed standard to distinguish the
essence of man from woman is problematic in light of Nietzsche’s assertion that all gods
are dead. The death of God means that nature as a fixed standard has been devalued.
Nietzsche’s two notions, the death of God (which implies the impossibility of an absolute
or fixed truth) and his apparent use of a natural standard (which seems to mean a
presumption of an absolute truth), taken together are problematic. On the surface the
Nietzschean system appears inherently contradictory. This is why any careful study of
Nietzsche’s thought requires an examination of this tension. A close scrutiny of
Nietzsche’s perspectives toward man and woman, respectively, can help resolve this
tension.
Eternal Return of the Same
The problem of Nietzsche’s use of nature as a standard is intensified further by his

doctrine of the etemal return of the same. Next to nothing has been written on Nietzsche’s
eternal recurrence doctrine as it relates to his promotion of sexual dichotomy. The
Nietzschean system is incomprehensible without considering the doctrine of the eternal
return of the same. If nature as a standard has been devalued, it is not clear why Nietzsche
insists that it is necessary to preserve man and woman as distinct types. It is also not clear
how Nietzsche can preserve the fundamental distinction between man and woman and the
masculine and the feminine perspectives. Moreover, Nietzsche’s rejection of the last man
in favor of a completely new type of ideal, the Ubermensch, seems to be arbitrary as well.
The eternal return of the same is Nietzsche’s solution to these and other problems. In a
nutshell, the eternal recurrence means:

Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being.

Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of

being. Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same

house of being is built. Everything parts, everything greets every other

thing again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every

Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is
everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity. (Z, 329-330).

43

This teaching that everything recurs an infinite number of times assures the eternal
existence of man and woman as fundamental types. But this doctrine also means that the
“eunuch” historians whom Nietzsche condemns will recur eternally. Analyzing the eternal
recurrence can help explain how the preservation of the two distinct sexes and their separate
types of willing relate to his rejection of the last man.

Moreover, there also seems to be a tension between Nietzsche’s characterization of
life as will to power and his characterization of the world as recurring eternally. The will to
power means that all living things strive to leave an imprint on the world. The eternal
recurrence means that whether individuals accept it or not, all past events will recur
infinitely. Since everything that has happened will happen again an infinite number of
times, all willing seems to be in vain. Affirming the eternal recurrence means that one is
able to accept everything that has happened so far. Acceptance of this fundamental fact is
the sign of a strong soul according to Nietzsche. But Nietzsche’s indignant condemnations
of the last man indicate that he does not simply affirm all that was and is. Nietzsche has
some unarticulated standard of evaluation that distinguishes the high (what he wants to
promote) and the low. Considering why Nietzsche must preserve those things against
which he rebels will shed light on the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s description of the
idea of eternal recurrence can help clarify the status of the will to power and the masculine
and feminine types of willing.

Nietzsche’s frequent use of feminine metaphors also indicates a connection between
his man/ woman teaching and the eternal return doctrine. The eternal return assures that the
masculine and feminine perspectives will recur through eternity. This explains why
Nietzsche speaks of the “Eternal Feminine,” the “Etemally Masculine” and the “Eternally
Objective” perspectives. A complete understanding of the eternal recurrence must account
for why Nietzsche deems it necessary that both the masculine and the feminine perspectives
recur eternally. If the distinctions between man and woman were fixed truths (or biological

inevitabilities), Nietzsche would not need to insist on preserving these two distinct types.

Is Nietzsche Guilty of a Metaphysical Relapse?

Heidegger accuses Nietzsche of making the same mistakes with which Nietzsche
charges previous philosophers; he charges Nietzsche with creating a new metaphysical
system. Heidegger defines metaphysics as “the truth of beings as such and as a whole”
(Heidegger, III: 187).40 He argues that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence doctrine describes
the character of all being. Nietzsche’s presentation of the eternal return of the same,
according to Heidegger, explains “the way in which beings as a whole are, the existentia of
beings,” that is, the fixed order of beings as a whole (ibid.). He similarly understands
Nietzsche’s term “will to power” as “the word for the being of beings as such, the essentia
of beings” (ibid.). Heidegger argues that by positing the eternal recurrence and the will to
power, Nietzsche stamps becoming (willing) with the character of Being (a fixed,
unchangeable essence). In other words, Heidegger understands the will to power as
Nietzsche’s description of the nature of living beings, a nature which cannot and will not be
altered. This means that Nietzsche, too, bows down to a fixed standard or eternal truth by
which he judges humanity. If Heidegger is correct, Nietzsche’s project may have been a
failure since Nietzsche’s perspective simply cannot logically include a fixed absolute truth.
This is perplexing because it seems impossible to have something “fixed” or unchangeable
in a world that is characterized by will to power and the absence of all gods. Heidegger
therefore charges him with being no different from the other metaphysicians Nietzsche
berates.

Nietzsche intends to preserve the masculine/feminine dichotomy, i.e., the
separation of the sexes into two distinct types. This seems to indicate separate masculine
and feminine natures. Likewise, Nietzsche distinguishes between high and low
individuals, noble and base, or masters and slaves. Again, Nietzsche does not clarify the

basis for drawing such distinctions. Nietzsche hopes to maintain the fundamental

40All subsequent references to Heidegger’s four volumes on Nietzsche will cite the volume and
page nrrrnber. References to his essay "Ihe Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is dead’” will cite page number only.

45

distinctions between high and low, and the masculine and feminine, in order to keep
humanity from deteriorating into a race of last men who draw no distinctions. That
Nietzsche maintains these two dichotomies suggests a connection between the masculine!
feminine and the master/ slave dichotomies. Correlating woman with the slave and man
with the master is oversimplified. First, most men and women are currently weak,
according to Nietzsche’s analysis. If both man and woman can be weakened by slave
morality, might the opposite not be possible in the case of a master morality? Second, the
assumption that women are to be slaves also seems inaccurate, given the reverence
Nietzsche has for certain traits that woman possesses. Nietzsche may admire some of the
slaves’ traits (such as loyalty or reverence toward those who are their obvious superiors)
while still relegating them to the rank of slave. Still, Nietzsche does not explain whether
conventional slavery is merely desirable temporarily, necessary perpetually, or warranted
because it is natural. Before one assumes that “woman” is synonymous with “slave,” such
ambiguities must be considered. Articulating Nietzsche’s foundation for distinguishing the
proper roles of man and woman should illuminate the basis upon which Nietzsche
distinguishes between the high and the low.

If Nietzsche is not a metaphysician as Heidegger charges, perhaps he is a radical
relativist. But if Nietzsche were a true relativist, the elimination of sexual differentiation
should not pose a problem for him. However, his condemnation of sterility, objectivity,
emasculation, and defeminization indicate that the masculine! feminine dichotomy ought not
be eliminated. Since all goals or ideals are temporary human creations, Nietzsche’s horizon
must be as well. So Nietzsche’s perspective does not seem to take precedence over any
others. The Nietzschean standard of evaluation may be a radical new frame of reference
which transcends both absolute and relative truths, or simply a position that cannot be
sustained logically. Since it initially appears to rest on nothing more than his own personal
preference, Nietzsche’s project almost appears as a game that Nietzsche’s playful will sets

in motion for the sake of his own amusement. But a thorough understanding of

46

Nietzsche’s perspectives toward man and woman, respectively, can help reveal the
relationship he sees between absolute and relative truth. His discussions of man and
woman call Nietzsche’s so-called “relativism” into question. Nietzsche claims to have
found a way of transcending nihilism. Any examination of Nietzsche’s confrontation with
nihilism and his rejection of the various forms of modern morality is incomplete without

opening the issues of the sexes.

47

CHAPTER 3: NIETZSCHE’S REVALUATION OF NIHILISM
The Fundamental Fact of Modernity

Nietzsche begins his project with the assertion “God is dead!” (Z, 124). A root of
the contemporary misreading of Nietzsche is a misunderstanding of his perspectivism,
which stems from Nietzsche’s realization that God has died Contemporary scholars go
astray because they fail to accept the consequences that the death of God imposes on
liberalism, egalitarianism, Judeo-Christian beliefs, and feminism. Nietzsche’s
interpretation of death of God41 opens up the possibility of creating a new human ideal as
opposed to a divine one. According to Nietzsche, the death of God is a culmination of a
variety of factors, one of which is an excess of scientific research. Consequently,
Nietzsche’s task involves the rejection of the sterility and objectivity characteristic of
modern scholars and a revival of masculinity, femininity and man and woman as distinct
perspectives and types. For Nietzsche, the death of God announces the importance of
subjective interpretations of the world. Because God’s death reveals the irnplausibility of
any absolute “huth,” Nietzsche sees the creation of subjective truths, the only possible
kinds of truth, as the most fruitful way to cultivate human life. He rejects the objective
perspective in favor of viewing history from a masculine and! or a feminine perspective.
Nietzsche’s insistence that the death of God must not result in sterility and objectivity is
puzzling. His explanation of what the death of God means to him illuminates why the
masculine and feminine perspectives are preferable to an objective one.

Nietzsche presents the death of God as a discovered fact rather than as an argument,
proposition, or theory. Unlike a theory, which suggests what may be or is likely to be the
case, this fact is a real event that Nietzsche does not need to prove. Nietzsche asserts that

41Kaufmann capitalizes the term “God” in the phrase “God is dead." For the sake of clarity, I
follow this practice in such phrases as “God is dead,” “the death of God,” and "God’s death.” I also
capitalize the term “God” when it specifically refers to the Christian God. I do not capitalize the term when
referring toatypeofgodotherthantheChristianGodortheideaofagodasatype ofideal thatisno
longer possible for hrrrnan beings. This procedure is appropriate because the death of God also means the

death of all gods. In German, all nouns are capitalized so Nietzsche obviously does not make this
distinction.

48

God is dead without providing proof because his main concern is to assess its
consequences. Nietzsche expects that some individuals already know that God has died,
while others soon will become aware of this fact. In the “Prologue” of Zarathustra, the fact
that the saint has not yet realized that God has died surprises Zarathustra because he expects
that religious people like the saint already know this has happened. Ultimately all of
humanity will be effected by the fact that God is dead and will need to come to terms with
this event as a fundamental fact of modernity. Zarathustra therefore does not teach anyone
of the death of God, for the free spirits already know this and others soon will; rather, he
teaches the implications of the death of God.42 Similarly, Nietzsche’s task begins with
teaching others who recognize the seriousness and meaning of the death of God.
Nietzsche’s goal is to interpret this fact in such a way that it will promote what he considers
to be an ascending type of life. Nietzsche’s goal is not to “empower” everyone equally, but
to breed a certain type of extraordinary individual who is most assuredly not liberal
democrat. Nietzsche attempts to turn God’s death, a potentially devastating event, into a
meaningful opportunity for creative spirits like himself.

According to Nietzsche, the importance of any fact (including the death of God)
does not lay in the so-called fact itself, but in the interpretation of it. Facts are necessarily
tied to values and to the human beings who interpret them. All facts (including the fact that
God is dead) are eternally open to an infinite number of interpretations. Although
ultimately everyone will discover that God has died, this event will mean different things to
different people. Those who are strong enough (like Nietzsche and Zarathustra) will
experience the death of God as liberating, while others (like the madman) will feel enslaved
by the news. How one interprets the death of God depends on one’s courage and strength,
on the individual’s profundity and nobility (cf. BGE, 39). Only other free spirits like

Nietzsche will understand his interpretation of the death of God. It may be possible for

42Lampert also stresses the point that Zarathustra does not teach others that God has dieduonly the
significance of the event (Iampert, 17).

49

Nietzsche or other creative spirits, however, to influence the masses in other ways.
According to Nietzsche, the common man will only be able to interpret the death of God
from a shallow, sterile perspective. This is precisely why Nietzsche sees the modern
condition as a crisis: it is extremely likely that when the knowledge that God has died
becomes universal, most people (if not all) will interpret it as an indication that life has no
meaning at all. And given the prevalence of shallow relativism in democratic societies
nowadays, Nietzsche may simply be correct here. Modern scholarship is merely the
reflection (and the promotion of) the shallow, nihilistic perspective of most people.
Nietzsche rejects the so-called objective perspective as reductionistic and deadly.

Although Nietzsche spoke the phrase “God is dead” first in The Gay Science (cf.
GS, 125),43 the most complete presentation of the death of God occurs in Thus Spoke
brathustra--“A Book For All and None.” Nietzsche’s (Zarathustra’s) interpretation of the
death of God is first offered to all of humanity, then to a few disciples, and ultimately to no
one but himself. Presenting a teaching both for all and for no one seems paradoxical, but
this title does make some sense. Nietzsche’s teachings are for all because he is interpreting
the facts of modernity that touch the lives of everyone. With his books, Nietzsche intends
to posit a goal that will shape all of humanity--all men and women. If his readers take his
teachings to heart and carry out his suggestions, humanity will be ennobled. Of course,
Nietzsche has a unique understanding of what it would mean to ennoble humanity. He
does not mean to protect and preserve all human beings; instead, he means to create
conditions that are conducive to the production of self-sufficient, authoritative, creative
individuals (cf. BGE, 206). Those who understand Nietzsche’s (Zarathustra’s) concerns

will turn toward the goal of creating the Ubermensch instead of becoming last men.

43Nietzsche is not the first to speak of a dying god. In Christianity, God dies. In his essay “The
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is dead,’” Heidegger traces Nietzsche’s notion of gods that can die back to the time
of The Birth of Tragedy. Heidegger quotes one of Nietzsche’s notes in which he states, “I believe in the
ancient German saying: ‘All gods must die.”’ Moreover, the death of gods was familiar to Nietzsche in
youth from reading Hegel although Nietzsche indieates that his understanding of dying gods is different than
Hegel’s (Heidegger, 58-59).

50

Nietzsche also addresses his teaching to no one. Although he means to transform
all of humanity with his teaching, as Zarathustra learns in the “Prologue,” the multitude will
not understand or accept it (Z, 130; cf. GM: preface, 8; EH, 259). Modems are so
decadent that they lack the courage to dedicate themselves to the type of ideal Zarathustra
heralds. He addresses his teaching to no one because no one yet exists who can
comprehend the book or Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche’s writings express his radical
individuality that no other individual shares (or can share) with him. He explains, “nobody
can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks
access to from experience one will have no ear” (EH, 261; cf. BGE, 231). He also notes
that “in the end, one experiences only oneself” (Z, 264). No other person can completely
understand (the experiences, values, or goals of) another. Nietzsche’s experience of the
death of God and its consequences is so personal that he expects them to be
incomprehensible to anyone else-and perhaps even to himself. Indeed, the most difficult
task for Nietzsche may be understanding his own thoughts and attaining self-knowledge:
“For whatever is his own is well concealed from the owner; and of all treasures, it is our
own that we dig up last” (Z, 305). Zarathustra tells the story of Zarathustra’s path toward
his own ideal just as Nietzsche’s books taken together tell Nietzsche’s story. All
individuals must find their own way to cope with God’s death since “the way... does not
exist” (Z, 307).

Problem of Communicating and Communicability

The subtitle of Zarathustra introduces a problem of communicating and
communicability as such. Nietzsche introduces this issue by suessing that his writings
contain only his truths (BGE, 231). Nietzsche’s disclaimer indicates a problem of
communicability, a problem which has two dimensions. First, Nietzsche’s disclaimer
indicates the limitation of language, dialectics, and conversation. Very few individuals, if
any, can grasp Nietzsche’s truths in the sense that he means them because he submits to

language, a universal phenomenon, in order to communicate them. Nietzsche explains the

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limit of discussing one’s ideas: “One no longer loves one’s insight enough once one
communicates it” because the thought is altered in the process of communication (BGE
160). To put ideas into words is to force them to submit to the rules of grammar and
language-rules that tend to distort the ideas. Words themselves are generalizations. Once
one puts one’s thoughts into language, the thoughts look almost perverted. For example,
consider the word “Gleich.” The word “Gleich” means both “equal” and “same.” As noted
in chapter two, that this word has these two meanings can easily lead one to confound the
two significations. Equality means sameness in part due to the language. Equality could
certainly be interpreted differently, but German speakers would unlikely understand
equality to be a separate idea from sameness. Just as language itself can lead one to
confound these two meanings, communication can lead to similar confusions. What one
individual understands a word to mean, another may interpret in a different way.

Second, the death of God means that there is no one “truth” applicable to all, but
rather innumerable truths. Throughout his works, Nietzsche stresses the fact that these are
only his truths to highlight the difference between truths of noble origin (such as
Nietzsche’s) and slavish truths. He contrasts his truths with modem democratic morality
which professes to be “unegoistic”:

Every unegoistic morality that takes itself for unconditional and addresses
itself to all does not only sin against taste: it is a provocation to sins of
omission, one more seduction under the mask of philanthropy--and
precisely a seduction and injury for the higher, rarer, privileged. Moralities
must be forced to bow first of all before the order of rank; their presumption
must be brought home to their conscience-until they finally reach agreement

that it is inrmoral to say: “what is right for one is fair for the other” (BGE,
22 1 ).

Nietzsche’s truths are distinguished from modern “truths” because they are untimely, life-
affinning, and above all, noble. He shares his truths only with others who are like him,
whom he describes as “We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we firstborn of the
twentieth century....we last Europeans with a good conscience” (BGE, 214). A truth that
is intended for everyone is necessarily low. Nietzsche’s truths are untimely and will not be

embraced by the masses because “the vast majority of the things that interest and attract

52

choosier and more refined tastes and every higher nature seem to the average man totally
‘uninteresting’” (BGE, 220). Nietzsche expects that most would try to turn him into an
advocate of universal truth. The authentic individual does not seek dogmatic truths for the
whole world; instead he should love his truths as uniquely his own. Zarathustra explains:
“if you have a virtue and she is your virtue, then you have her in common with nobody”
(Z, 148). This notion is in direct opposition to conventional democratic wisdom which
says that if the majority believes it, most likely it is correct. Nietzsche is inclined in the
opposite direction. The authentic individual should love his truths as he loves a woman
whom he would never want to share with anyone else. Zarathustra continues:
May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names: and if you must
speak of her,44 then do not be ashamed to stammer of her. Then speak and
stammer, “This is my good; this I love; it pleases me wholly; thus alone do I
want the good. I do not want it as divine law; I do not want it as human
statute and need: it shall not be a signpost for me to overearths and
paradises. It is an earthly virtue that I love: there is little prudence in it, and
least of all the reason of all men. But this bird built its nest with me:
therefore I love and caress it; now it dwells with me, siting on its golden
eggs.” Thus you shall stammer and praise your virtue (Z, 148).
No one could respect, love, or revere a woman who all men share and this is also the case
with virtue and truths. Others may see his woman, but no other can really understand her
as he does. To communicate one’s insights is to degrade one’s thoughts into something
common and ordinary. Liberal democratic scholars cannot accept Nietzsche’s notion of the
exclusive virtue and, therefore, insist on pushing it into a universal egalitarian framework.
Nietzsche suggests that understanding truth as a woman can help break this pattern.
Truth as Woman

Recognition of this problem of communicability and the subjectivity of truth helps

explain why Nietzsche suggests that it is appropriate to consider truth as a woman.45

44The German word for virtue (die Tugend) is a feminine noun. This is the reason Kaufmann
translates as “her” instead of “it.”

“The German word for truth (die Warhheit) is also a feminine noun. Nietzsche’s metaphor of
truth as a woman is rooted in the German language just as is his interpretation of equality (Gleichheit) as
synonymous with sameness.

53

Beyond Good and Evil opens with the supposition: “Supposing truth is a woman--what
then?” (BGE, preface). This is a supposition, a metaphor Nietzsche uses to demonstrate
the wrong manner in which dogmatic philosophers have approached truth so far. These
males look for truth without regard for whether the truth is ugly or not. They prostrate
themselves to the truth and force the truth on everyone (including themselves) even if it is
painful or dangerous. The final mistake is that they attempt to make this truth accessible to
all and applicable to all. Instead, truth should be intimate testimony of who the individual
alone is. Nietzsche suggests that “One should have more respect for the bashfulness with
which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a
woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is--to speak
Greek--Baubo?” (GS, preface, 38). Nietzsche contends that a modest woman is more
beautiful than an outspoken one, and the same can be said of the truth when stripped of all
illusions and veils. Unlimited access to the truth may be dangerous or deadly; it may lead
one to nihilism.

The philosopher should chase after truth as he does a beautiful woman, win her
heart, and make her a possession that is uniquely his own. Truth is therefore a kind of
extension of the philosopher--his beloved. Once in his possession, he should shape his
own truth just as he would like to mold woman to suit himself.46 Nietzsche’s metaphor
makes sense in a world in which God is dead. The philosopher should desire to have his
very own woman whom he will share with no one else. While different men have a
different understanding of what it means to possess truth or whatever particular good the
man seeks, when a man loves a woman, he seeks sole possession of her (cf. BGE, 194;
GS, 14). Nietzsche explains:

The difference among men becomes manifest not only in the
difference between their tablets of goods--in the fact that they consider

different goods worth striving for and also disagree about what is more and
less valuable, about the order of rank of the goods they recognize in

468cc the section entitled “Will and Willingness” in chapter 5 for a discussion of the extent to
which man molds woman and woman molds herself.

54

common-~it becomes manifest even more in what they take for really having
and possessing something good.

Regarding a woman, for example, those men who are more modest
consider the mere use of the body and sexual gratification a sufficient and
satisfying sign of “having,” of possession. Another type, with a more
suspicious and demanding thirst for possession, sees the “question mark,”
the illusory quality of such “having” and wants subtler tests, above all in
order to know whether the woman does not only give herself to him but
also gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have: only then
does she seem to him “possessed.” A third type, however, does not reach
the end of his mistrust and desire for having even so: he asks himself
whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not
possibly do this for a phantom of him. He wants to be known deep down,
abysmally deep down, before he is capable of being loved at all; he dares to
let himself be fathomed. He feels that his beloved is fully in his possession
only when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him
just as much for his devilry and hidden insatiability as for his graciousness,
patience, and spirituality (BGE, 194).

Different types of men lust after different types of women (i.e., have different tablets of
goods) and have different conceptions of what it means to possess a woman (posses the
truth). The philosopher should be in command of the truth instead of laying prostrate
before it. Dogmatic, universal, democratic truths no longer have any power to improve
human life. Nietzsche’s metaphor means that unlike those sterile, dead truths, the truth
should be beautiful, feisty, passionate, dangerous, but also life-affirming. Truth should be
so personal that it is not intended for and could not be apprehended by everyone. Truth
should also be fertile; it should inspire human creativity. Finally, the path to creating the
truth is not a passive, easy search, but an intense, dangerous struggle. The philosopher
should lust for his truth just as man lusts for his woman.

Picart interprets the metaphor of truth as a woman not yet won by dogmatic
philosophers as a positive conception of woman and the feminine (Picart, 145). But
Nietzsche is criticizing dogmatists, not necessarily praising woman or the feminine in the
passage. To characterize the metaphor as “good” or “bad” for women is to step out of its
context. The metaphor itself is neither clearly positive nor clearly negative. Picart
continues: “In the figure of the will-to-truth as a Sphinx, the ‘feminine’ is ambiguous. In
the figure of the Sphinx-Circe that the skeptic worships, the ‘feminine’ is negative. Yet the

overall trend seems to be an increasingly negative valuation of ‘woman’ and the ‘feminine’

55

in Nietzsche’s political world” (ibid.). Picart’s analysis goes beyond the surface meaning
of Nietzsche’s argument because she misconstrues the role of the sphinx/ Circe
metaphor.47 It is not so clear that Circe represents a negative image of woman to
Nietzsche. He also associates Circe with “cruelty,” the virtue of the free, very free spirits
(BGE, 229). In the two passages in which he cites Circe, Nietzsche speaks of the desire to
revel in uncertainty, masks, and seduction. Again, the drive to uncertainty, ignorance, and
masks is not so clearly positive or negative-but one that is a manifestation of the will to
power. Nietzsche also mentions that every courageous thinker will recognize this drive in
himself (BGE, 229). Of course, the courageous thinker attempts to push down that drive;
but, nonetheless, the drive exists in him. Skeptics may conceive of the will to truth
wrongly, but this does not constitute a negative assessment of woman, but a negative
assessment of the skeptics.

Truth understood as a woman may be either positive or negative because the truth
may be ugly to one but beautiful to another. However, one should not embrace an ugly
truth, according to Nietzsche. Thus it would seem that the metaphor of truth as a woman
means that woman should be beautiful. Whether the metaphor is positive or negative, in
constructing this image, Nietzsche maintains a separate concept of woman from man. This
metaphor of truth as a woman is only meaningful in a world in which sex difference still
exists. Regardless of whether Nietzsche sees the image as ugly, old, and sterile, or young,
beautiful, and vibrant, if Nietzsche’s concerns are not heeded, this metaphor may soon
have no meaning whatsoever.

This image of woman as a metaphor for truth comes from a man’s perspective.
Women do not generally seek to possess other women. Nietzsche’s metaphor places

woman as the object rather than the subject of the pursuit. Since Nietzsche portrays

47In Homer, Ciree seduces Odysseus’ men and her powerful magic to turn them into swine. The
sphinx was originally a mythologieal monster with a lion’s body and a human head. It was originally
known as a king to Syrians, Phoenicians, and Mycenean Greeks. In the Near East and in Greek literatrue, it
was known as a female. The sphinx is known, especially in Greek literature, for posing riddles and killing
those who cannot answer (Hammond and Scullard, 1009).

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woman as the object of the philosopher’s pursuit, Nietzsche’s metaphor initially seems to
take for granted that the philosophical dogrnatists to which he refers in the Preface of
Beyond Good and Evil are male. Nietzsche addresses this particular comment to past
philosophers to condemn them for their inability to understand the truth properly.
Nietzsche is speaking to men because men have made the error of depersonalizing the truth.
Oliver neglects to mention the problem that Nietzsche’s image does not seem to imply
woman seeking woman (Oliver, 1998, 68-72).48 It is unlikely that Nietzsche recommends
a lesbian pursuit with this metaphor. Nietzsche does not say anything of homosexual love
in his texts, and the absence is striking. He may leave out a consideration of
homosexuality as a choice because his first concern is to promote the further
dichotomization of the sexes. But because Nietzsche did not say anything explicit on the
topic of homosexuality, one can only make inferences from the conspicuous absence.
Although much of the evidence suggests that the philosophers to which Nietzsche
refers are male, he also mentions two potential female philosophers in the passage to which
Picart refers above (BGE, 208). Nietzsche states the Skeptic’s belief that the “uncertain has
its charms, too; the sphinx, too, is a Circe; Circe, too, was a philosopher.” Since these are
the words of a skeptic, it is possible that Nietzsche does not understand Circe as a
philosopher. Nevertheless, Nietzsche recognizes that he was at one point a skeptic and that
he may remain one (BGE, 211). Nietzsche does not say that the sphinx was a philosopher
herself, though the passage can be interpreted to include her. Still, both potential
references to female philosophers are questionable. The significance of the characterization
of Circe as a philosopher is also ambiguous since Circe is a mythological goddess. Circe,
it should also be noted, bore Odysseus two sons (Hammond and Scullard, 242). Not only
does Nietzsche characterize her as a philosopher, but according to mythology, she was

fertile in the physical sense as well. Nietzsche recognizes the possibility of a female

4301iver’s title “Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writings” is a nrisnomer because she does not

actually examine the meaning of the metaphor of truth as woman. She focuses on woman as the pursuer,
not the pursued.

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philosopher, though these two references do not constitute proof that Nietzsche believes
there will be female philosophers in the future.

Nietzsche’s perspective is primarily a masculine one, but this does not mean that he
has no feminine traits, nor does it rule out the possibility that Nietzsche may speak to an
extraordinary type of women as well. His teaching is a “prelude to a philosophy of the
future,”49 which means that he calls for an entirely new type of philosopher. Since all
philosophers (in fact) have been males, the call for a new type of philosopher may leave
open the possibility of a female philosopher. Perhaps a woman seeking the truth would not
make the same mistake that sterile scholars and dogmatists have made. But one wonders
what the corresponding image for truth would be for a woman. One would expect
Nietzsche to say that a woman should love truth as her child whom she molds to suit her.
That the world has not yet seen a female philosopher does not necessarily imply that a
woman could not become one; yet, it might mean that a female philosopher is extremely
rare (or perhaps even impossible), or that a female philosopher would consist of an entirely
different contemplative type than a male one. Because Nietzsche praises various aspects of
femininity, traits which fit best with woman, it is conceivable that an extraordinary woman
of unique ability may be up to the task. Granted, it is unlikely that a woman would be
similarly conditioned as Nietzsche, one must note the unlikelihood that anyone (man or
woman) could understand Nietzsche and carry out his task. Because both man and woman
are affected by the death of God, both have the possibility of interpreting the death of God
properly (i.e., in the manner that Nietzsche does).

Understanding truth as a woman sheds light on Nietzsche’s perspective,
perspectivism, and the death of God. The metaphor maintains the man/ woman (lover/
beloved) dichotomy. The perspective of the seeker after knowledge should be the
perspective of a lover who attempts to win the heart of his truth (woman). Finally, that

truth is to be understood as a woman influences the manner in which one should

49’Ihis is the subtitle of Beyond Good and Evil.

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understand the death of God The death of God should not be an ugly truth, but should be
molded in a manner that makes it beautiful The death of God can be a potentially
devastating truth. Nietzsche insists on making it beautiful and life-affirming. That
individuals can interpret the death of God in a variety of ways also begs the question of
whether man and woman interpret God’s death in fundamentally differently ways. One
might suspect that one’s sex would influence the type of experiences and social
conditioning that one receives, yet sex in and of itself does not determine one’s ability to
understand Nietzsche. Nietzsche never rules out the possibility that a woman may be able
to understand him. The higher type of individuals to whom Nietzsche’s truths resonate
may be either male or female.

Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity and sterility suggests that erosion of sexuality
only occurs in a defective human being. This means that a sterile human being could not
understand Nietzsche. At the very least, a masculine or feminine understanding of the
death of God would have to be more life-promoting than the sterile, objective perspective
offered by modern scholars and historians. Since Nietzsche rejects objectivity, it is worth
considering whether Nietzsche understands his own perspective to be masculine, feminine,
or some combination of the two. Nietzsche is a man, so it seems likely that the masculine
perspective resonates closely with his own. His description of himself as the annihilator of
morality, his philosophic interests, and his love of knowledge indicate a kinship with the
masculine perspective. He calls himself a new type of philosopher, and all of the previous
philosophers and philosophical laborers that he cites are men (cf. BGE, 204, 211).
Nevertheless, he also indicates an affinity with the feminine in the several metaphors he
employs to describe himself. The contemplative type like himself is “closely related to the
feminine character: it consists of male mothers” (GS, 72). This passage suggests that the
sex of the contemplative type is male. But Nietzsche also compares himself to a pregnant
elephant (EH, 295) and his own mother (EH, 222). These two passages suggest that he is

“related to” or has much in common with the feminine perspective. If the future creative

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geniuses are male, they must posses the highest aspects of the feminine character as well.
And this fact opens up another possibility. Since the future creators are to have these
feminine qualities, perhaps a woman could acquire the requisite masculine traits needed.
She would then be a combination of the highest aspects of both perspectives. Nietzsche
himself imagines this possibility (cf. GS, 70).
All human beings interpret the world from a limited perspective, but some
perspectives are life-enhancing while others are life-denying. Interpreting the death of God
from an objective perspective (which as we will see below is merely a democratic or
utilitarian perspective), as opposed to a masculine or feminine one, leads to nihilism. The
meaning that Nietzsche atuibutes to the death of God comes from his own unique
perspective, which combines both the masculine and feminine traits. Nietzsche’s concern
with annihilating all remnants of metaphysics reflects his masculine nature, his courageous
lion that wants to destroy. Nietzsche’s concern with interpreting the death of God in a way
that serves life, however, reflects a feminine aspect of his nature. These two perspectives
are in continual tension with one another. The first forces Nietzsche to acknowledge the
destruction of meaning (and thus the threat of nihilism) inherent in the death of God, while
the latter impels him to serve life (i.e., give birth to something that will replace God).
The Substantive Meaning of the Death of God
Nietzsche is no typical atheist who believes that God never existed; rather, God
actually did exist until the historical sense killed him. The Christian God existed to the
extent that humans believed in him and modeled their lives on the basis of their belief in
him. The phrase “God is dead” signifies first and foremost, “that the belief in the Christian
god has become unbelievable” (GS, 343). Nietzsche is indicating that the attachment to
God has become weak and sterile. This is not to say that there are no more believers; in
fact, most people still believe in God (or a god) (GS, 343; cf. GS, 125). But now that

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God is dead, no intellectually honest 50 human being can continue to believe in the
traditional Christian god any longer (GS, 357). Intellectual honesty forces the recognition
that the Christian God is nothing other than a transient illusion created by humans (cf. T1,
467). The fact that “God is dead” reveals that God was never what humans thought him to
be, namely immortal. God once had been a powerful, life-giving force that directed
humanity until the historical moment when he died. God gave humans “ways of affirming
their lives, or finding them worth living, when no alternative was available” (Clark, 1990,
163). The death of this ideal means that the Christian God has lost the power to shape the

lives of most people.
The inability to render unconditioned faith in the Christian God is only the surface

meaning of the death of God. When Nietzsche declares that “God is dead ’ he is also
indicating the death of all gods, including the death of “nature,” the death of modern
science, the death of history, and the death of liberalism (Z, 191). Truths, ideals, and
gods are historically determined, and as such, are inherently relative. In “The Word of
Nietzsche: ‘God is dead,”’ Heidegger explains the full meaning of the death of God: “the
terms ‘God’ and ‘Christian god’ in Nietzsche’s thinking are used to designate the
suprasensory world in general. God is the name for the realm of Ideas and ideals”
(Heidegger, 61). A god is an ideal that limits one’s perspective by providing a world view
within which humans can orient their lives. All previous ideals set up a “pure” or “true” or
“real” world by which to judge the inferiority of the world given to humans by their senses.
These ideals or gods have provided humans with a horizon, an anchor by which to judge
their lives. Humans have believed in many different types of gods; in fact, a thousand
varieties of gods have existed thus far (Z, 170-172). What makes a horizon powerful (or
meaningful) is the fact that people accept the assumptions that form its foundation as the
absolute, unquestionable truth (cf. Dannhauser, 1972, 831). A horizon is only powerful if
50According to Nietzsche, most human beings are neither intellectual nor honest. Those who tend

to be intellectual do not tend to be honest because their own work biases them (cf. GS, 366 and 373).
Likewise, those who tend to be honest (or believe in honesty) are not intellectual.

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the organism is unaware of its historical origins and limitations. When God dies, the
foundation for such horizons dies with him.

So when Nietzsche’s Zarathustra declares “God is dead,” he implicitly states not
only that the Christian God has been devalued, but also that all transcendent ideals have
died (Z, 191). Christianity is merely the culmination of the historical process that began
when Plato invented the “pure spirit,” that is, the belief in unchanging “Ideas.” Nietzsche
explains: “that Christian faith ...was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth
is divine” (GS, 344). Since Plato’s creation, humans have turned to a variety of fixed
“otherworldly? ideals from which they have evaluated the real world. Christianity
vulgarized Plato’s teaching; it is “Platonism for ‘the people’” (BGE, preface). Following
Plato’s erroneous creation of the “pure spirit” and the “good as such,” Christianity offers
an omnipotent God in order to justify all that is mysterious, unjust, and unintelligible in the
world. The Christian God is accessible to all and intends to serve (i.e., protect) all of
humanity.

Nietzsche argues that even liberalism and modern science are forms of the Christian
tradition. In other words, both liberalism and modern science are secularized forms of
Christianity (BGE, 202).51 Whereas Plato had faith in the “pure spirit” and the Christian
had faith in God, the liberal turns to faith in rationality while the scientist has faith that the
“truth” is graspable by all and applicable to all (cf. BGE, 186). For both liberalism and
modern science, reason becomes a new god that can alleviate all human suffering. But
Nietzsche recognizes that the death of God uproots even this faith in reason. The
universality of Christianity, modern science, and liberalism makes the death of God so
catastrophic. As Dannhauser explains, “with the death of the Christian God all other gods
die also. With the exposure of man’s most universal horizon as mere horizon, all belief in

eternal truths and beings becomes impossible” (Dannhauser, 1972, 839).

518ee Nietzsche ’s Existential Imperative for a discussion of the democratic and socialist
movements as secularized Christianity (Magnus, 17-21).

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The Implications of the Death of God

The death of God signifies the end of all metaphysics, the death of the belief in a
suprasensory or “ideal” world. Human history comes to light as the history of
metaphysics--the dedication to suprasensory gods that do not exist. Although there have
been a thousand gods so far, all of these gods have been one form or another of what
Nietzsche terms “the ascetic ideal,” the “belief that the best human life is one of self-denial”
(Clark, 1990, 160). Humans have learned to deny the only world there is for the sake of
some “god” or “ideal” that does not really exist. This means that humans have denied who
they are by trying to emulate some illusory “god” or “ideal.” But as weak as the ascetic
ideal is, it is still an ideal. The death of God removes even the ascetic ideal as a source of
meaning. The result of this ideal of self-denial is that man has learned to turn away from
his wants, desires, and needs for the sake of serving the “nothing.” Humans ultimately
force themselves to embrace the ugly truth that there is no transcendent ideal, that there is
nothing worth striving to achieve. This is why Nietzsche characterizes the ascetic ideal as
“the harmful ideal par excellence, a will to the end, an ideal of decadence” (EH, 312).52
The consequence of Man’s self denial is that Man is left aimless, in need of something
worthy of his dedication, but unable to find anything worth esteeming.

Therefore, the death of God is a fact which means “Nihilism stands at the door”
(WP, 1). That is, Man experiences what Heidegger describes as the “absence of a
suprasensory, obligatory world” (Heidegger, 61-62). If there is no God, there is no basis
upon which the individual is obligated to do anything, nor is there any answer to Man’s
question of why. As Dannhauser explains, “The formula for nihilism is: nothing is true,
everything is permitted. Since all aspirations and ideals have proved meaningless, men
cannot devote themselves to a cause: they have no future to will” (Dannhauser, 197 2, 842).

Human dedication appears to be mere stupidity; esteeming seems to be pointless and all

52See chapter 6 of Clark’s Nietzsche 0n Truth and Philosophy for a helpful discussion of what the
ascetic ideal is and the purposes that the ascetic ideal has provided for humanity.

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human history seems to be in vain. This is the condition of the passive last man who fills
Nietzsche with revulsion. But most egalitarians view the last man as an ideal type (Z, 130;
BGE, 203). Nietzsche sees the likelihood of becoming the last man to be a result of a
sickly and shallow reaction to the death of God. The prospect of a nihilistic humanity, a
humanity without the possibility of producing even one creative spirit, fills Nietzsche with
disgust. Nietzsche protests the advent of the last man by creating a way that leads not only
himself, but other free spirits, and, potentially, all of humanity, out of the abyss of
nihilism.

To transform the death of God from a life-enervating truth into a life-affirming
truth, Nietzsche first must become the annihilator who destroys all remnants of the slavish
morality that has led to God’s death (including Christianity, utilitarianism, and
egalitarianism). Here he demonstrates that democratic morality is the morality of a sick
type. The culmination of this sickness takes place when the sterile historian kills God.
These scholars who claim to understand everything that has ever happened do not even
understand themselves. Finally, Nietzsche uses the news of God’s death as a springboard
for a new type of life-affirming truth. In sum, the death of God should be understood as
an opportunity to pave a new path for humanity.

How the Historical Sense Killed God

Nietzsche’s most explicit attacks on modern scholarship occur in his essay The Use
and Abuse of History, in the section “On Scholars” in Zarathustra, and in part six of
Beyond Good and Evil entitled “We Scholars.” The heading “We Scholars” indicates that
Nietzsche includes himself among these scholars; he is familiar with their type. Nietzsche
feels a kinship with the scientific scholars’ quest for knowledge. The most bitter pill to
swallow regarding God’s death is that individuals who are not much different from himself
are responsible for the death of God. The madman declares: “All of us are his murderers.
But how did we do this?” (GS, 125). The madman is not referring to scholars nowadays--
we merely help pound the final nail in the already dead God’s coffin. God began dying

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when the Enlightenment took hold. Ultimately, the Christian faith in honesty combined
with the “will to truth” of historians and scientists, killed God. These scholars suffered
from having accumulated too much knowledge.

Modern historians turn the study of history into a science. They want to discover
everything that has ever happened and continue accumulating knowledge regardless of
what the consequences of that knowledge will be. Lacking any real connection to life,
these sterile historicists unwillingly “discover” the most dangerous knowledge of all: the
origin of the belief in God. They uncover the fact that human beings created all “gods,”
“truths,” “ideals,” and “Ideas.” As they examine the history of humans, they find that there
is no divine order or purpose that dictates human life. Instead, the particular needs and
cultural circumstances of a people determine the kind of God (or ideal) that a people will
revere as good, noble, and just. History (one’s time and place) overwhelmingly
determines the type of god in which one believes. That is, a god is only relevant from the
perspective of the particular needs and circumstances that gave birth to it. Their historical
knowledge destroys the possibility of unconditional faith in a divine being or ideal.

The following passage from The Use and Abuse of History helps explain the
manner in which scholars and historians killed God.

A historical phenomenon, completely understood and reduced to an item of
knowledge, is, in relation to the man who knows it, dead; for he has found
out its madness, its injustice, its blind passion, and especially the earthly
and darkened horizon that was the source of its power for history. This
power has now become, for him who has recognized it, powerless; not yet,
perhaps, for him who is alive (H, 11-12).
When they unveil all divine ideals as groundless illusions, they destroy the power of those
ideals to bring meaning to human life. Historical scholars did not literally kill God, but by
“discovering” too much about God they killed the idea of God as an ideal. They have
reduced God to a mere “item of knowledge.” Once one reduces anything to a historical fact

in such a manner, that fact has little value for human life. Since anything can, in principle,

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be reduced in such a manner, historicism erases the possibility of any permanent ideals.53
In other words, modern scholars and historians have eliminated the possibility of belief in
any transcendent ideals.

The awareness that arbitrary circumstances or tastes are the root of all ideals creates
a sickness in humans that makes whole-hearted devotion virtually impossible. Nietzsche
explains: “This can be studied in everything that has life. For it ceases to have life if it be
perfectly dissected, and lives in pain and anguish as soon as the historical dissection
begins” (H, 43). Man is the esteemer who needs to believe in absolute ideals, but as “the
shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to have lost value,
seems ‘meaningless’” (WP, 7). Their “malignant historical fever” destroys the ability to
esteem anything (H, 4). This is the reason Nietzsche considers the modems to be the most
decadent humans who ever lived. If humanity cannot find a way to believe in some
irnperrnanent ideal as if it were permanent, Nietzsche predicts the time will come when
“man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man” (Z, 129; cf. BGE,
preface). As the unconditional faith in absolute truths disappears from the human
experience, so too does the possibility of a noble life dedicated to something beyond petty
pleasures and physical security.

Nietzsche describes the murder of God as a great stupidity because the historicist
willingly sacrifices God for the sake of nothingness. Nietzsche believes that this
knowledge of God’s death can and must be used to enrich life, to make man’s future the
foundation of a “higher history than all history hitherto” (GS, 125). Although all gods are

dead, Nietzsche insists that he must transcend nihilism instead of embracing it.

53This is the manner in which scholars like Kofman (“A Fantastical Genealogy") and Oliver
(“Nietzsche’s Abjection") attempt to undermine Nietzsche’s understanding of women. They reduce his
comments on women to the reaction of frustrated child against his mother. Consequently, Nietzsche’s
insights are killed; they have no power left to influence those who subscribe to this type of analysis.

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Is All Truth Perspectival?

Nietzsche’s rejection of nihilism might mean that he understands there may be some
fixed standard by which he determines that he can transcend nihilism. Either there is
nothing in which to believe (nihilism) or there is something. Since Nietzsche does not
understand himself to be a nihilist, Heidegger might be correct to call Nietzsche a
metaphysician. But Nietzsche also suggests that all truth is relative, that all knowledge is
perspectival. By proclaiming “God is dead” Nietzsche posits the impossibility of absolute
truth; he implicitly teaches that “[a]ll the permanent...is only a parable” (Z, 198). In other
words, the assertion “God is dead” implies the absence of any fixed truth or universal
perspective that is applicable to all. The death of God means that all knowledge is
perspectival, that is, one’s perspective (one’s character, one’s historical, or social
conditions) necessarily colors one’s interpretation of reality. Different circumstances
produce different truths and different types of people will devote themselves to different
truths. This perspectivism also means that masculine truths are fundamentally distinct from
feminine truths.

But the assertion that all knowledge is perspectival is itself problematic because it
leaves unclear what the status of Nietzsche’s assertion that “God is dead” is. If the
assertion “God is dead” (which implies that all knowledge is perspectival) is an absolute
truth, this means that all truth is relative including this truth. Therefore the fact of God’s
death cannot be an objective truth the way that previous philosophers and metaphysicians
understood “truth.” Considering that Nietzsche admits God existed as a transcendent ideal
in previous times, the assertion “God is dead” cannot be true in all times and places: it is a
historical fact in the sense that it happened at a particular historical moment. And yet,
Nietzsche implies that the truth of perspectivism is universal (i.e., applicable to all and
significant for all of humanity). But if Nietzsche understands perspectivism or relativism to
be a fixed truth about the world, why does he insist that all gods are dead, that there is no
fixed “truth?”

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Maudmarie Clark gives a helpful explanation of the paradox of Nietzsche’s
perspectivism.54 She suggests that Nietzsche concedes the possibility of facts, but that all
knowledge of these facts is necessarily perspectival.

Calling knowing perspectival suggests that how things will look to us
intellectually in any situation--how we are justified in interpreting them--
depends on “where we’re at,” that is, on what we already believe. To
consider knowledge nonperspectival would be to insist that it must be
grounded in a set of foundational beliefs, beliefs all rational beings must
accept no matter what else they believe, beliefs that could therefore
constitute a neutral comer from which the justifiability of other beliefs might
be assessed. In calling nonperspectival knowledge “an absurdity and a
nonsense,” Nietzsche suggests the impossibility of such self-justifying
foundations for knowledge (Clark, 1990, 130; cf. GM III, 12).
Nietzsche denies the possibility of foundational beliefs accepted by all rational beings.
Besides the fact that the human is not simply a rational being, an individual’s beliefs result
from his limited perspective. Thus, according to Nietzsche, there is no such thing as
nonperspectival knowledge. As Nietzsche explicitly states, “facts is precisely what there is
not, only interpretations” (WP, 481). It is nonsensical to speak of fixed “truth,” or a
completely objective perspective apart from the human beings who apprehend the
knowledge (GM III: 12). This means that Nietzsche sees no fundamental distinction
between facts and values. One’s perspective determines the value of the fact, and the facts
exist and have power only to the extent to which human beings value them. Therefore,
“God is dead” is not purely an objective, graspable fact. The significance of God’s death
lies in its interpretation. Nietzsche interprets the death of God as a liberating opportunity to
create a subjective, personal goal for hirnself--an opportunity to create new truths.
Nietzsche’s truths are experimental; they are intended for the future. He is the great

attempter who intends to produce a “life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving,

perhaps even species-cultivating” goal for humanity (BGE, 4). Nietzsche attempts to make

54The fact that Clark understands some crucial aspects of Nietzsche’s perspectivism makes her
faulty reading of Nietzsche’s “misogyny” unusual and interesting. She recognizes that Nietzsche is not a
nihilist and that he thus does not embrace all perspectives. However when it comes to his view of women,
she wrongly forces him into the liberal democratic notion of virtue, mainly honesty. Doing so allows
Clark to reconcile her faith that a profound thinker like Nietzsche could not believe such nasty things about
women with her reverence for his genius in diagnosing the crisis of modernity.

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his interpretation become true. That is, he hopes to make his interpretation of the death of
God the most influential one in order that the most promising individuals, and humanity as
a whole, will not become a race of last men. Because Nietzsche’s truths are future-
directed, they are, in a sense, fixed. If people accept his truths and his truths consequently
alter human life in the future, there is some truth to them (or more importantly, some value
to them). Thus, the pronouncement “God is dead” is a truth for the fixture, but not the past.
Insofar as it is applicable to and will mold future generations, the assertion is true. The
assertion is not true for the past, which cannot be altered. One can, however, interpret past
events in light of the news of God’s death. In other words, the truth of the assertion “God
is dead” is determined by whether it fundamentally alters human life (for better or for
worse). Moreover, the truth of this assertion may not be true for all future generations. It
will be true within the horizon in which it is posited (the horizon of the Ubermensch) for as
long as that horizon influences human life.

Nietzsche promotes an interpretation of the death of God which affirms life as it is.
But it is only possible to affirm life in this manner if one knows what life is really like.55
Nietzsche explains, “the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of
the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure--or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would
require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified” (BGE, 39). The
extent to which one is able to affirm life (instead of continuing to believe in false gods)
determines not only how strong the individual is, but also how noble the individual is
(BGE, 287). But how is Nietzsche’s impure will able to recognize life as it is? How is he
able to grasp the truth of perspectivism without being colored by his own perspective or
historical circumstances? He cannot. This is why Nietzsche continually stresses that his
books contain nothing more than “my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have

colors, ...you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved--wicked

55Clark claims that John Wilcox (Wilcox, 190) makes this point quite forcefully
(Clark, 1990, 200).

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thoughts!” (BGE, 296).

Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not mean that all interpretations are equal. To judge
the truth (or power) of a particular interpretation of perspectivism, one needs to examine the
life that posited (i.e., created) it. Thus far, the most prevalent and dangerous interpretation
of God’s death has been that of the objective historians and scientific scholars. Their
disinterested accumulation of “knowledge” killed God and ultimately put humanity in its
dangerous position. Nietzsche hopes to keep humanity from degenerating further.
Although Nietzsche admits that he is also a scholar,56 he rejects the historicist’s sterile
perspective because it helps create the probability of the last man. The ultimate test of
Nietzsche’s perspective is to see whether his predictions resonate with reality. The
homogenization of democracies (the erosion of the distinction between all types of
individuals) against which he fights, appears to be happening before our eyes.

Critique of Sterile Historians, Objectivity, and Modern Scholars

Nietzsche’s philosophic project is an attempt to transcend the limited perspective of
the historicist who killed God. Nietzsche teaches that the deadly truth of perspectivism
need not result in universal nihilism. He finds serious reasons to doubt whether modern
scientists understand life at all. His analysis of them contains essentially three criticisms.
Nietzsche’s first criticism is that these objective scientists are not really objective at all.
They are shallow democrats who are afraid of suffering. Secondly, he argues that even if
they were able to succeed in achieving complete objectivity (which is impossible), such a
perspective would not be desirable. Finally, he suggests that their sterile perspective not
only degrades the scholars themselves, but also promotes the shallow nihilism that may
make humanity as a whole sterile and weak.

Historians instead attempt to “discover” everything that has ever happened by
attempting to grasp history “objectively.” By “objective,” Nietzsche means “a certain

standpoint in the historian who sees the procession of motive and consequence too clearly

56Part six of Beyond Good and Evil is titled “We Scholars.”

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for it to have an effect on his own personality” (H, 37). It is a “detachment from all
personal concern” (ibid.). These academics do not have privileged access to truth,
according to Nietzsche. Instead, their concern with truth is disconnected, shallow, and
dispassionate. Because they know so many facts, they harbor the misconception that they
have learned everything. “One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened: so
there is no end of derision” (Z, 130). Some of these scholars may know which events
have happened and what previous thinkers have said, but they do not understand history or
the men who have made history. The “pursuit” (actually the creation) of knowledge is
anything but an impersonal matter and should be celebrated as perspectival and
experimental. Nietzsche explains:
How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether
existence has any other character than this; whether existence without
interpretation, without “sense,” does not become “nonsense”; whether, on
the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in
interpretation--that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most
scrupulously conscientious analysis and self- examination of the intellect;
for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing
itself in its own perspectives, and only in these (GS, 374).
The belief that one can be a neutral observer of the truth is a fallacy. Since all knowledge is
perspectival, the perspective of the objective historians is limited as well. These so-called
“objective” scientists delude themselves by thinking that they can be completely objective or
nonperspectival themselves.

According to Nietzsche, the particular historical and social conditions of the time
mold all human beings, and scholars are not exceptions to this rule. But today’s scholars
lack self-awareness; in particular, they take the goodness of democratic, Christian, and
utilitarian principals for granted. Essentially, Nietzsche demonstrates that today’s scholars
do not seek serious intellectual inquiry; they seek universal equal rights and “Freedom from
all masters!” They attain this freedom by debunking the greatest philosophers. Molded by
their democratic prejudices, these scholars seek nothing higher than comfort and security.

Nietzsche explains the root of the mediocrity of modern scientists:

The scholar’s declaration of independence, his emancipation from

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phi1030phy, is one of the more refined effects of the democratic order--and
disorder: the self- glorification and self-exaltation of scholars now stand in
full bloom, in their finest spring, everywhere--which is not meant to imply
that in this case self-praise smells pleasant. “Freedom from all masters!”
that is what the instinct of the rabble wants in this case, too; and after
science has most happily rid itself of theology whose “handmaid” it was too
long, it now aims with an excess of high spirits and a lack of understanding
to lay down laws for philosophy and to play the “master” herself--what am I
saying? the philosopher (BGE, 204).
Today’s scholars reflect the “softhearted and effeminate taste of a democratic century”
(BGE, 210). To be effeminate is to have the manly or courageous qualities torn away.
The attempt to turn scholarship into a science is nothing more than an effeminate attempt to
flee them from any masters. Nietzsche elaborates:
What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal
green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort,
and an easier life for everyone; the two songs and doctrines which they
repeat most often are “equality of rights” and “sympathy for all that
suffers”-and suffering itself they take for something that must be abolished
(BGE, 44).
Objectivity is the tool they use to achieve this goal. If they succeed in uprooting the
greatest minds that ever lived by reducing their creations to reflections of time and
circumstance, they may succeed in sterilizing all potentially great minds in the future as
well. But their objectivity is a sham used to cover their secret hope and desire motivated by
the recognition of their own mediocrity. Because the scholar recognizes his own
limitations, his vanity irnpels him to stifle “the uncommon man” who dares to challenge
democratic prejudices (BGE, 206). Their purpose is to make the world safe and
comfortable by making humans equal (the same). They are only weak souls who are afraid
that the talented few will enslave them.

Complete objectivity (in a man or a woman) would amount to a castration of the
intellect (GM III: 12). As Nietzsche advises, if “the personality is once emptied of its
subjectivity, and comes to what men call an ‘objective’ condition, nothing can have any
more effect on it. Something good and true may be done, in action, poetry or music; but
the hollow culture of the day will look beyond the work and ask the history of the author”

(H, 33). Determining the fashion sense, dietary habits, shoe size, upbringing, dating or

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sleeping patterns of a man is not going to reveal the deep mysterious passion that stimulated
his work. These trivial details will never capture the profundity of his genius. Being
shallow themselves, historicists are unable to understand genius. By degrading the
inexplicable, mysterious nature of these geniuses’ work, the historian drains the life-
enhancing force inherent in great philosophy, art, or poetry.

Nietzsche uses metaphors of sterility to indicate the historians’ lack of genuine
concern with their object of study and their inability to create history themselves; instead
they read, reorganize, and codify the actions and thoughts of others. These “objective”
historians are eunuchs who “are themselves neither man nor woman, nor even
hermaphrodite, but mere neuters, or, in more philosophic language, the Eternal Objective”
(H, 33). There is something flat about the souls of these historians who are not genuinely
devoted to anything. Such a detached observation could never understand the impulses that
move the philosopher’s thoughts, the painter’s brush, the sculptor’s hands, or the
composer’s pen. As neuters, they see only the shallow shell of the life rather than the heart
of life. But according to Nietzsche, “it is only a superstition to say that the picture given to
such a man by the object really shows the truth of things. Unless it be that objects are
expected in such moments to paint or photograph themselves by their own activity on a
purely passive medium!” (H, 37). No fact can be grasped in a purely objective manner, as
human beings are the subjects who decipher and communicate these facts. Colored by their
shallow perspective, scientific scholars try to make the world objective, ordered, and safe
when it is really a dangerous, questionable, subjective, perspectival world.

Because they focus on the trivial, ordinary aspects of history (being unable to see
anything other than those since they are ordinary themselves), Nietzsche characterizes these
scholars as incomplete (castrated) males. Not only do these “objective” historians fail to
understand the great geniuses who drove the historical process thus far, but they are also
neuters. They “are a race of eunuchs; and to the eunuch one woman is the same as another,

merely a woman, ‘woman in herself,’ the Ever-unapproachable.” (H, 32). To the eunuch

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who lacks experience with women, all women are alike and any woman is as good as the
next. Similarly for scientific scholars, “it is indifferent what they study, if history itself
always remains beautifully ‘objective’ to them, as men, in fact, who could never make
history themselves. And since the Eternal Feminine57 could never ‘draw you upward,’
you draw it down to you and, being neuter yourselves, regard history as neuter also” (H,
32). The “Eternal Feminine” is higher than the neutral or neutered perspective. Having
had no experience with women himself, the eunuch cannot possibly understand the exalted
experience of love. The eunuch reduces love to physiological drives and hormones, the
biological processes, the psychological stimuli which cannot touch on what it means to be
enveloped by love, consumed by it, and fundamentally changed by it. And because he
does not know what it means to be in love, he cannot inspire the love of others, which
means that he is incapable of creating anything profound. Since he lacks a sex drive, the
eunuch scholar is indifferent about woman. And because the eunuch lacks the sexual
appetites and drives that produce great passion, he simply does not experience an exalted
sense of longing. Nietzsche explains;
If love and hatred are wanted from him--I mean love and hatred as God,
woman, and animal understand them--he will do what he can and give what
he can. But one should not be surprised if it is not much--if just here he
proves inauthentic, fragile, questionable, and worm-eaten. His love is
forced, his hatred artificial and rather an tour de force, a little vanity and
exaggeration. After all, he is genuine only insofar as he may be objective:
only in his cheerful “totalism” he is still “nature” and “natural.” His mirror
soul, eternally smoothing itself out, no longer knows how to affirm or
negate; he does not command, neither does he destroy” (BGE, 207).
These eunuch historians approach their subjects from the outside; therefore, they miss the
fundamental experience altogether. The eunuch will never make history himself.
In the above passage, Nietzsche notes a kinship in the respective understandings

that God, woman, and animal have of love. They experience something that the scientific

”Kaufmann notes that Nietzsche’s use of the concept “Eternal Feminine” is an allusion to
Goethe’s reference to the Eternal Feminine in the penultimate line of Faust (BGE, 232, n. 22). In the
play, the Eternal Feminine is the salvation of man--it is what redeems Faust. Nietzsche’s argument above
resembles Goethe’s in the sense that man needs woman to be feminine in order to be inspired himself.

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scholar cannot comprehend. All three expect complete devotion, reckless abandon, and
complete consumption from love (cf. BGE, 67, 139). The extraordinary expectations
inherent in woman’s love make her love more genuine and real than is the scholar’ s, which
is forced and feigned. Scholars would do well to recapture the blind passion that a woman
experiences and expects from another when she loves. The great male philosophers
experienced a great deal of sublimated sexual passion that the eunuch scholar lacks (cf.
GM: ID, 8). But the scholar is neither erotic himself, nor is he passionate about his work.
Nietzsche prefers the barbarous love of womanly types and the daring creativity of the male
philosophers to the objective perspective (produced by males), which is incapable of both
love and creativity. Because woman experiences what love is, she may have a greater
potential to understand life‘s most serious problems than does the objective scholar. This
is because
All great problems demand great love, and of that only strong, round,
secure spirits who have a firm grip on themselves are capable. It makes the
most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his
problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest
happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning that he can do no better than to
gorse: them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought (GS,
The scientific scholar can only study the effect of love from a distance. But because he is
unable to experience love first-hand, he cannot grasp the fundamental problems of human
life.

But Nietzsche’s most serious criticism of modern scholars is not that they are neuter
themselves, but that they sterilize other human beings. They teach that nothing is worth
genuine devotion and affection. Since they only see the world through the lens of a
limited, “objective” perspective, they do not understand how to inspire others, nor can they
be inspired by others. Nietzsche suggests that the reaction of the most inspired individuals
is anything but objective:

[I]magine a man swayed and driven by a strong passion, whether for a
woman or a theory. His world is quite altered. He is blind to everything

behind him, new sounds are muffled and meaningless though his
perceptions were never so intimately felt in all their color, light, and music,

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and he seems to grasp them with his five senses together. All his

judgements of value are changed for the worse; there is much he can no

longer value, as he can scarcely feel it: he wonders that he has so long been

the sport of strange words and opinions, that his recollections have run

round in one unwearying circle and are yet too weak and weary to make a

single step away from it (H, 8-9).
Passionate frenzy is simply alien to the neuter’s world and so his analyses of world history
is as defective and incomplete as the eunuch’s experience with women. Although woman
has an amazing power to evoke strong passion in man and to alter his world, the eunuch
scholar is unmoved by her or anything else. In his attempt to be objective, he misses the
fact that the greatest individuals have always been anything but objective. Individuals who
believed in the nobility and eternal truth of their ideas are responsible for the greatest
events. As one without any real purpose except dissection, the scholar reduces all nobility
to the superficiality with which he is familiar. In so doing, the scholar helps create the
conditions so that the production of a creative philosopher is close to impossible. Those
free spirits who might be inclined in this direction are told again and again that nothing is
worth their reverence.

The dangerous truth of historical relativism is nothing more than a eunuch’s truth, a

“base, impoverished interpretation of the past” (Dannhauser, 1972, 834). Historical
relativism “robs existing things of the only atmosphere in which they can live” and it
destroys the “mysterious mist” needed to inspire belief in transcendent ideals (H, 42). And
like the eunuch, this perspective is sterile because it takes away from humans the ability
(the will) to create new truths. Nietzsche explains: “For man is creative only through love
and in the shadow of love’s illusions, only through the unconditional belief in perfection
and righteousness” (H, 42). The scholar shows us the error of the belief in unconditional
truth Nietzsche intentionally chooses the analogy of the eunuch, since creating is very
close to loving (cf. BGE, 206; Z, 176). Interpreting history should be understood as a
creative act. Motivated by a desire to make the world safe, i.e., free from anything

distressful, the eunuch scholar promotes an understanding of life that irnpoverishes human

beings. Historical scholars destroy the forces that gave birth to the highest values hitherto.

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They almost completely strip humans of the ability to esteem and to create goals. They do
not free humans from suffering, but create a more insidious form of suffering.
The Tension Between Life and Knowledge
Nietzsche’s criticism of the historical sense and modern scholarship reveals an

“opposition between life and wisdom” (H, 11). Knowledge has the power to alter life for
the better (toward the invention of the Ubermensch) or worse (in the direction of the last
man), but the modern scholar is a martyr for knowledge at all costs.58 Improving life
would mean creating conditions that make the production and the survival of the last man
difficult, or ideally, impossible. But the scholars’ desire to uncover life-promoting
illusions as mere illusions makes these scholars guilty of “preparing poison” for the rest of
humanity (Z, 237). Nietzsche cautions that providing too much information about reath
has the potential to destroy life: “Something might be true while being harmful and
dangerous in the highest degree. Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of existence that
those who would know it completely would perish” (BGE, 39). Living requires a limited
understanding of the world. A fundamental fact about human beings is that they simply
need illusions if they are going to thrive. Nietzsche explains:

This is a universal law: a living thing can only be healthy, strong, and

productive within a certain horizon; if it is incapable of drawing one round

itself, or too selfish to lose its own view in another’s, it will come to an

untimely end. Cheerfulness, a good conscience, belief in the future, the

joyful deed--all depend, in the individual as well as the nation, on there

being a line that divides the visible and clear from the vague and shadowy;

we must know the right time to forget as well as the right time to remember,

and instinctively see when it is necessary to feel historically and when

unhistorically. (H, 7—8)
The crisis of modernity is in part a result of too much knowledge. Without a “veil of
illusion” humanity fails to revere anything. Nietzsche explains;

Every people, every man even, who would become ripe, needs such a veil
of illusion, such a protecting cloud. But now men hate to become ripe, for

53Singer claims that Nietzsche discredits woman because in her he recognizes “the will to untruth”
(Singer, 1998, 178). This is an oversimplified interpretation given the opposition of life and wisdom. If
the truth is ugly or deadly. woman should be praised for her aversion to the truth. Likewise, the eunuch
scholars are blamed for embracing an ugly, deadly truth.

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they honor history above life. They cry in triumph that “science is now
beginning to rule life.” Possibly it might; but a life thus ruled is not of much
value. It is not such true life, and promises much less for the future than the
life that used to be guided not by science, but by instincts and powerful
illusions (H, 44).
Modern scholars, however, “honor history above life” (H, 44). They have attempted to
make the world thinkable and in doing so they have reduced all mystery, beauty, and
divinity to small, explainable, “human-all-too-human” facts. They remove the masks that
humanity needs if it is to ascend rather than degenerate.

For Nietzsche, the only worthwhile kind of knowledge is the type that promotes
ascending life. But these objective scholars lack any concern with the future of humanity.
Their disconnected, shallow interpretation of the past makes it virtually impossible for
others to create new horizons and reinstate that “veil of illusion” needed by thriving
individuals. Nietzsche characterizes these scholars and historians as both neuter (as
opposed to masculine or feminine) and sterile (rather than fertile). By neuter, Nietzsche
refers to their inability to be inspired, moved, or driven by a passion. Nietzsche has a
double meaning in mind when he describes scholars as sterile. First, like physical sterility,
there is metaphorical sterility which is an inability to beget or give birth to ideas.
Metaphorical sterility is also an inability to create goals for oneself or to inspire others to
create. Because sterile scholars cannot create ideas, they expose the entrails of the most
mysterious phenomena to make them tlrinkable. They sterilize ideals which were once life-
giving and inspirational. And second, those who are most devoted to this kind of
knowledge are least likely to devote themselves to the other type of fertility--creating human
beings. So a physical sterility is linked to the metaphorical sterility. These eunuch scholars
cling to their work, which is really the work of others. If they produce children, they will
likely exhibit a similar detached concern regarding their rearing.

The Fertile Genius

Nietzsche characterizes the sterile scholar as a eunuch to provide a stark contrast

with the fertile philosopher. The eunuch is not a feminine male, but a human stripped of

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masculinity. A man (unlike a eunuch) does not have a disconnected concern for woman,
but a passionate drive to win, possess, and mold her. As discussed above in the case of
the philosophers, Nietzsche’s analogy seems to indicate that the scholarly asses he criticizes
are male. He notes that these sterile scholars are “nothing for women” (BGE, 207 ). But
Nietzsche also compares the scientific average man to an infertile woman, more
specifically, to an old maid:

Compared to a genius-that is, to one who either begets or gives birth,
taking both terms in their most elevated sense-the scholar, the scientific
average man, always rather resembles an old maid: like her he is not
conversant with the two most valuable functions of man. Indeed, one even
concedes to both, to the scholars and to old maids, as it were by way of a
compensation, that they are respectable-one stresses their respectability--
and yet feels annoyed all over at having to make this concession” (BGE,
206).

Nietzsche employs a masculine and a feminine metaphor for sterile scholars which means
that they may be either men or women--but in both cases they are sterile (emasculated/
castrated men or defeminized/ infertile women). The sterile woman is not castrated in the
sense of missing a penis: she is castrated in the sense of failing to embrace the highest
aspects of her femininity.

Similarly, Nietzsche describes a masculine and a feminine type of genius. A genius
is never objective, nor does he or she strive to be. Fertility describes the creative genius
just as sterility characterizes the shallow scholars. Nietzsche elaborates:

There are two types of genius: one which above all begets and wants to
beget, and another which prefers being fertilized and giving birth. Just so,
there are among peoples of genius those to whom the woman’s problem of
pregnancy and the secret task of forming, maturing, and perfecting has been
allotted--the Greeks, for example, were a people of this type; also the
French--and others who must fertilize and become the causes of new orders
of life-like the Jews, the Romans, and, asking this in all modesty, the
Germans? Peoples, tormented and enchanted by unknown fevers and
irresistibly pressed beyond themselves, in love and lusting after foreign
races (after those who like “being fertilized”), and at the same time
domineering like all that knows itself to be full of creative powers and hence
“by the grace of God.” These two types of genius seek each other, like man
and woman; but they also misunderstand each other--like man and woman
(BGE, 248).

Nietzsche hopes to promote two types of genius and two types of creating----a masculine

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begetting (providing inspiration) and a feminine giving birth (creating). The “elevated
sense” of these fimctions is a metaphorical begetting and giving birth, that is, causing and
actually creating goals, truths, and value systems. Like an artist who uses his wisdom to
mold human beings, the creative genius enhances life; he does not denigrate it.

That Nietzsche highlights both begetting and giving birth as serious types of
creating indicates that Nietzsche recognizes the need for both the masculine and feminine
perspectives. Because man cannot give birth, nothing is created without woman. But
Nietzsche also realizes that woman cannot give birth without a fertile man. The feminine
perspective without the masculine is like the perspective of the old maid, while the
masculine perspective without the feminine perspective is like the eunuch’s. If the
distinction between masculine and feminine ways of creating is not maintained and
cultivated, humanity moves closer to becoming a race of eunuchs and old maids, or, to use
Nietzschean terminology, last men. With these analogies of sterility and fertility, Nietzsche
indicates that since sexuality is a crucial instinct, perhaps the most important instinct; hence,
the creation of knowledge is directly linked to one’s sexuality. This is why Nietzsche
characterizes historians as eunuchs who are incomplete sexually--their dulled sexual drive
makes them unable to create or understand anything worth revering.

The Female Scholar: A Paradox

Similarly, a female scholar appears to Nietzsche as a paradox: “When a woman has
scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually. Sterility itself
disposes one toward a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile
animal’” (BGE, 144). Nietzsche states that man is more inclined toward sterility than is
woman. The feminine perspective may be more fertile and life-enhancing than the
masculine perspective because “women are so much more personal than they are objective”
(HAH I: 419). Woman has within her body an intrinsic connection to the life process
since human life springs forth from her. Women “are so accustomed to loving” that “they

are less interested in causes, more interested in persons” (HAH I: 416). Indeed, according

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to Nietzsche, in woman there is (and should be) an innate antipathy to scholarly pursuits
which is connected to her sexuality, her femininity. Thus, when she turns away from her
feminine instincts for the sake of scholarship, it seems strange, unnatural, and ugly.
Choosing to be a scholar means that her most feminine instincts have degenerated. That is,
her maternal instinct, her instinct to procreate, her instinct to give birth have all eroded.
Nietzsche means this both metaphorically and literally. A female scholar ceases to be
creative by blindly increasing the stockpile of knowledge, information which may be
dangerous to life. Also, when woman devotes herself to science or knowledge, she turns
away from the goal of producing strong offspring. Nietzsche would not expect to see a
vibrant, fertile woman clothed in the sterile white garb of the scientist.

But one should also compare this aphorism (BGE, 144) with section 894 of Will to
Power where Nietzsche states: “What I fight against: that an exceptional type should make
war on the rule-instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the
precondition for the value of the exception. For example, the ladies who, instead of feeling
their abnormal thirst for scholarship as a distinction, want to disrupt the status of woman in
general.” Here Nietzsche indicates that while a woman’s thirst for scholarship may be
uncommon and degenerative in most cases, a scholarly inclination in woman is not
necessarily indicative that something is awry sexually. An individual woman who enjoys
scholarly pursuits should consider herself to be an exceptional type. Most often Nietzsche
would consider the female scholar sterile, just as most male scholars are sterile; however,
in a few instances the female scholar may actually be extraordinary. Nietzsche only says
that female scholars usually have something wrong with them sexually-mot always.
Nietzsche would argue that many female scholars have also demonstrated that women can
become as sterile and degenerate as male scholars can. Nietzsche therefore challenges the
attempt of feminists and advocates of affirmative action to make all women scholars, even
those who do not experience the thirst for scholarship (which would be most of them).

Women improve themselves when set against amazing constraints and forces, not when

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granted rights protection. More desirable, is a woman who must overcome obstacles on
the way to her scholarship. If she still frnds her thirst for scholarship unquenchable, and
understands herself to be an exception, perhaps Nietzsche would not consider her to be
sexually defective.

To be sure, many female scholars are not sexually defective, yet some sense can
still be made of Nietzsche’s assessment of female scholars. When Nietzsche asserts that
most female scholars are sexually defective, he means that women who are fertile and
(desire to) bear children are not likely to have the same thirst for scholarship as men
generally do. Because they have the possibility of giving birth, women must decide
whether to take advantage of this capacity or not. In contrast, a woman who cannot bear
children (either because she is infertile, or cannot find a man by whom she would like to be
impregnated) may turn outside of herself for fulfillment.

Because the rearing of children is anything but objective, the maternal/ fertile
woman generally wants nothing to do with scientific objectivity or “truth.” Nietzsche
highlights the tension between women and science by saying, “Science offends the
modesty of all real women. It makes them feel as if one wanted to peep under their skin--
yet worse, under their dress and fmery” (BGE, 127). The best women “even harbour in
their bosom a secret contempt for it, as though they were in some way superior to it” (HAH
I: 416). This passage could indicate a superiority of woman’s abilities over scientific
pursuits. Nietzsche does not believe that women should become scientists because their
feminine instincts and embarrassment impel them to reject science: “‘Oh, this dreadful
science!’ sigh their [Frauen] instinct and embarrassment; ‘it always gets to the bottom of
things!”’ (BGE, 204). This aphorism is the first aphorism in the section “We Scholars.”
Nietzsche contrasts “we scholars” to the Frauen who reject science. The womanly instinct
is to be embarrassed in the face of science. Nietzsche considers this embarrassment to be a
feminine instinct instead of a masculine one for several reasons. First, science undermines

the mystery behind feminine modesty and womanly abilities. For instance, consider what

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scientific knowledge has done to the idea of woman as birth- giver. Science has reduced
pregnancy to a biological function. Scientists teach that the changes in her body are due to
hormones that can be manipulated with medicine and surgical procedures. Nietzsche’s
argument, that too much scientific knowledge undermines woman’s modesty and can be
embarrassing to her, is quite plausible. Modesty is difficult to maintain in a medicalized
society that advertises remedy upon remedy for woman’s biological functions--functions
that scientists generally consider problems and inconveniences.

Nietzsche’s suggestion that woman has an antipathy to science may have some
merit if a close connection to life would make one apathetic to science. Nietzsche explains
that some women may choose science because women generally have mixed feelings about
science-- “something compounded of envy and sentimentality” (HAH II: 265). Woman’s
sentimentality arises from the fact that she has the potential to give birth. Indeed, even
women who engage in scientific pursuits tend to connect their pursuit to life in one way or
another; they see in science something that can be used in the service of life. For instance,
women who enter the medical profession specialize in family practice and pediatrics in
overwhehning numbers. While some would argue that this is due to the continued
discrimination in the workplace, the more plausible explanation is that women self select
into specialties that enable them to help children and possibly leave open the possibility of
having their own children.

Woman’s envy, on the other hand, may be a reaction against the blind respect and
reverence men have for the pursuit--perhaps she would like to be the object of affection and
devotion. She may also view his selfless devotion to scientific “objective” truth as
senseless and useless. Perhaps she also envies the power that science seems to have over
human life. A real woman does not want to become an objectified specimen. Her
resistance to the scientist’s objective “truth” indicates a superiority to man’s tendency to
accumulate knowledge at all costs. The crisis of modernity is in part a result of too much

knowledge. Males have attempted to make the world completely thinkable. In doing so,

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they have reduced all mystery, beauty, and divinity to small, explainable facts. While
every mother instinctively knows (has faith) that her child is uniquely beautiful and
inspiring (even if her child is physically ugly), modern scholarship generalizes and erases
the subtleties that distinguish one individual from the next. Moreover, science can never
understand the mysterious bond of a mother to child or probe the depth of woman’s love.
Deep love can be the spark for many kinds of creativity (cf. H, 42).

Why Man Is “The Sterile Animal”

Nietzsche’s suggestion that female scholars are sexually defective certainly applies
to mam-perhaps to an even greater degree. Nietzsche characterizes man as “the sterile
animal.” Man has a different relationship to life since he does not physically create life.
Though Nietzsche does not present a full elaboration of why man is sterile and woman is
not, Rousseau offers a reason that is consistent with Nietzsche’s assessment. In the Emile,
Rousseau argues that “The male is male only at certain moments. The female is female her
whole life or at least during her whole youth. Everything constantly recalls her sex to her;
and, to fulfill its functions well, she needs a constitution which corresponds to it”
(Rousseau, 361). Whether the woman gives birth or not, the capacity to do so is a function
that the woman never forgets, at least not in her childbearing years. Man, on the other
hand, has no such corresponding function inside his body. Because birth process is
external to him, he does not have the concern present to his mind at all moments of life,
even though he may be capable of impregnating a woman for many more years than
woman is able to bear children. Man may more easily forget his manhood than woman and
search for ideals external to him to which he may dedicate himself. Man cannot impact life
through physical birth; consequently, he seeks to understand (or change) the world through
thinking. This explains why males have created goals and ideals.

But if great men have created the most extraordinary gods, truths, and values that
have existed thus far, what sense does it make to characterize man as a sterile animal?

Nietzsche means that man, more than woman, has a tendency to organize what is unclear,

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to impose order where there is none, to understand life from the outside by attempting to
grasp it objectively. In the hands of men, the pursuit of knowledge has become
disconnected from life. These males devote themselves to uncovering even the most ugly
truths and yet have no clear reason why they do this. Nietzsche calls man by “nature” the
“sterile animal” because males disconnected modern scientific research from philoSophy.
Thus men, more than women, have been the most ascetic sterile scholars and objective
asses. Because males have created the current horizon of natural science, Nietzsche
characterizes history as the “Eternal Masculine” (H, 33). Nietzsche may be indicating a
defect in the male animal, an inherent masculinity that pushes man away from the necessary
illusions upon which human life has hitherto thrived. Males willingly become martyrs for
the sake of knowledge, regardless of what that knowledge may be. History is in danger of
becoming the “Eternal Objective” in the hands of males (H, 33).
Nietzsche’s Standard to Replace the Historical Sense
Nietzsche rejects the sterile scholar’s notion of history because it robs life of its

beauty and mystery. Utilizing masculine and feminine metaphors to describe the creative
genius indicates a superiority of these two fundamental perspectives over the “Eternal
Objective” position of the eunuch scholar. The objective scholar is

no complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified, no

termination--and still less a beginning, a begetting and first cause, nothing

tough, powerful, self-reliant that wants to be master--rather only a delicate,

carefully dusted, fine, mobile pot for forms that still has to wait for some

content and substance in order to “shape” itself accordingly--for the most

part, a man without substance and content, a “selfless” man (BGE, 207).
Nietzsche’s choice of masculine and feminine perspectives over the scholar’s objective
perspective is still strange in light of the fact that all gods are dead. Nietzsche’s rejection of
objectivity indicates that he still finds some standard by which to judge the worth of various
perspectives.

Nietzsche’s condemnation of objectivity also reveals a few things about the

Nietzschean standard of evaluation. First, since nothing is true “in-itself,” there is no

“truth” apart from the human life that creates it, interprets it, and is influenced by it The

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world is better understood in terms of degrees of truth and provisional perspectives rather
than absolutes. Nietzsche’s perspective, which he considers to be the highest perspective
so far, is both masculine and feminine-only such a combination can give birth to the
horizon of the future. Second, human beings are not “objective” unchanging things “in-
themselves”; consequently, an objective standard is an inappropriate means of evaluating
human life. Rather than impose a fixed standard from the outside, Nietzsche looks to the
inside of humans as the source of a new ideal. Truth should be just as mysterious,
perspectival, and passionate as human beings can be. Third, Nietzsche’s goal is necessarily
linked with a concern for promoting life above wisdom. Deep down, it is life that
Nietzsche loves, not wisdom (Z, 221). This is not Nietzsche’s final word on the subject,
but he never demotes the importance of life. He evaluates the worth of a truth based on
whether it promotes an ascending or a descending kind of life. Nietzsche’s task is to create
a new truth that is not only consistent with, but also transcends, historical relativism by
promoting life.

Nietzsche favors life over wisdom, but he does not want to cultivate just any life.
If he did not distinguish among types, he would be giving in to nihilism. But this begs the
question of what distinguishes one type of life from another. Nietzsche distinguishes
among sick, degenerative types of life and healthy, strong, noble lives, and between
masculine and feminine types. Despite his perspectivism which undermines metaphysical
dichotomies, Nietzsche preserves the masculine/feminine dichotomy. Nietzsche indicates
that the feminine perspective is separate and distinct from the masculine one. It appears that
Nietzsche is describing some type of fixed distinction between these two fundamental
perspectives--one which has the capacity to beget and one which has the potential to give
birth. Furthermore, when Nietzsche characterizes man as the sterile animal and woman as
instinctively antipathetic toward scientific pursuits, Nietzsche describes what sound like
natural differences between the sexes. Nietzsche’s rejection of the sterile scholar’s

objectivity may be due to his tunring to nature as a standard of evaluation.

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But the death of God undermines “nature” as a basis for distinguishing between
man and woman. Ultimately, the question of the different “natures” of man and woman
may not be the fundamental issue for Nietzsche. Nietzsche attempts to maintain separate
masculine and feminine perspectives as alternatives. He is not concerned with the origin of
two perspectives, nor is he primarily concerned with the cause of the differences between
the sexes. Nietzsche’s overriding interest is the cultivation of a life-affirming horizon of
the future. Nietzsche’s discussions of the differences between man and woman and his
insistence on promoting the masculine and feminine perspectives must be understood in
light of his goal. Nietzsche does not submit to a fixed standard of “nature” to determine
what his goal should be; rather, he understands man and woman, as well as the masculine
and feminine perspectives, in light of his task to overcome nihilism.

However, the fact that there is a tension between life and wisdom does not settle the
question of why Nietzsche favors one type of life over another. Perhaps there would be no
life-affirming wisdom without the particular type of extraordinary individual Nietzsche
promotes. Nietzsche does not articulate the specific standard by which he determines
which types of individuals are worth promoting. His desire to promote a certain kind of
life also does not explain his need to preserve both the masculine (begetting) and the
feminine (giving birth) forms of creativity. Nietzsche insists that the erosion of the
masculine and ferrrinine instincts is a form of degeneration. He indicates a close connection
between transcending nihilism and the two types (masculine and feminine) of creating.

Nietzsche understands the death of God to be the springboard for his new truth and
the horizon of the future. He explains:

Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that
“the old god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows
with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the
horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last
our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the
daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies
open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea.”-- (GS

343)

This event gives human beings “the freedom over the created and uncreated” (Z, 334).

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Nietzsche’s personal agenda, his positive goal toward which he wants to orient humanity,
colors his understanding of the fact that “God is dead.” Turning to humanity’s two
alternatives, the Ubermensch and the last man, will help shed light on the Nietzschean

project and on the role of the masculine and feminine perspectives within it.

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CHAPTER 4: THE UBERMENSCH
Return to Nature

Nietzsche’s rejection of modern scholarship comes from the perspective of one who
attempts to improve the human species by creating a “natural humanity” (WP, 120).
Nietzsche explains that he must “translate man back into nature” (BGE, 230). The
“domestication (the ‘culture’) of man does not go deep-- Where it does go deep it at once
becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The ‘savage’ (or, in moral terms, the evil man)
is a return to nature-and in a certain sense his recovery, his cure from ‘culture’--” (WP,
684). Creating a natural humanity means to foster “all those instincts of wild, free,
prowling man” (GM 11: 16) and to recapture “a powerful physicality, a flourishing,
abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war,
adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free,
joyful activity” (GM 1: 7). These animal instincts contrast starkly with the herd instincts of
self-preservation and equal rights encouraged by democrats, Christians, and other nihilists
(cf. EH, 261). If human beings are to be natural again, masculinity and femininity must be
cultivated. Translating Man back into nature means that man and woman must remain
separate distinct types who recognize themselves as such. Nietzsche hopes to return Man
to a more animal nature similar to what men and women were like prior to Christianity and
the Enlightenment.

Woman is closer to these animal passions and instincts than man is. Despite efforts
to domesticate her, she has maintained her brutish inclinations. Her ability to sustain her
animal instincts means that she resists modern degeneration (passivity, sterility, and
nihilistic tendencies of modernity) more strongly than man does. Nietzsche describes
woman’s nature as “more ‘natural’ than man’s” which means that woman is more savage
than man (BGE, 239), until the Enlightenment taught her to suppress her instincts.
Woman’s ability to maintain these animal traits is an amazing superiority over modern man.

Males have much to learn from females who hold on to that pre-Christian nature more

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strongly. In particular, males need to retum to a more manly nature; the nature of the

aristocratic Greeks:
go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant
monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgusting procession of murder,
arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were
no more than a students’ prank, ...One cannot fail to see at the bottom of all
these noble races the beast of prey, the splendid blond beast prowling about
avidly in search of spoil an victory; this hidden core needs to erupt from
time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness
(GM 1:11).

Males need to become like those “Human beings whose nature was still natural, barbarians

in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey who were still in possession of unbroken

strength of will and lust for power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more civilized, more

peaceful races” (BGE, 257).

Nietzsche is no conservative or reactionary for “there has never yet been a natural
humanity ...man reaches nature only after a long struggle-he never ‘retums”’ (WP, 120).
Indeed, Nietzsche attempts to reach two contradictory goals--to “return to nature” and to
create something new (a natural humanity). In an unpublished manuscript, Shapiro
resolves the contradiction by explaining that Nietzsche proposes to take one evolutionary
step backward in order to take two steps forward. Taking a step backward in the chain of
human development is the precondition for transcending the modern “sickness of the will”
(BGE, 208). He explains that this sickness only “disappears to the extent to which the
‘barbarian’ still--or again-claims his rights under the loose garments of Western culture”
(ibid., emphasis added). Modems are so corrupt, passive, and weak that they cannot
overcome themselves as they are. Man cannot simply return to what he was before
Christianity and democracy took hold, but perhaps he can approximate or recapture certain
qualities that were once responsible for his accomplishments. They must retrrm to the pre-
Christian, pre-Enlightenment, pre-nihilistic animal instincts (i.e., take a step backward and
become barbarian again) so that they can take two steps forward beyond modern decadence
to become natural. Strauss explains that Nietzsche’s understanding of nature here is similar

to Aristotle’s conception of nature as a completion. Aristotle explains; “nature is an end:

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what each thing is--for example, a human being, a horse, or a household--when its coming
into being is complete is, we assert, the nature of that thing” (Aristotle, 1985, 1252b 32-
34). Nature is a peak and fulfillment that few individuals can achieve. According to
Nietzsche, the barbarian nature that once characterized Man is a prerequisite for achieving
an entirely new, higher nature. In other words, nature is not a spontaneous happening, but
a willed goal.

With the exception of Strauss and Shapiro, secondary literature has inadequately
dealt with contradiction between his notion of translating Man back into nature and
Nietzsche’s assertion that there has never yet been a natural humanity. Thus, scholars
have had great difficulty explaining why Nietzsche must maintain sexual difference and
whether his insistence is due to a natrrral necessity or not. They fail to recognize
Nietzsche’s intention of creating something entirely new (i.e., a natural humanity) and,
therefore, they cannot explain why Nietzsche relegates woman to a separate role from
man.59 The Ubermensch, a counter-ideal to the ascetic one, has the potential to inspire
humanity to transcend modem degeneration. By changing the type of goal that humanity
reveres from an ascetic, life-denying, nihilistic one, to the Ubermensch, Nietzsche
fundamentally alters humanity. A natural humanity is one that dedicates itself to a human
goal as opposed to a supematural goal or god. Nietzsche’s assertion that there has never
been a natural humanity could mean that human beings have not yet been shaped by the
type of goal that Nietzsche envisages--a human goal, an earthly goal.

But most humans will not aspire to be, nor are most able to become Ubermenschen

59For instance, Koelb does not even mention this contradiction in Nietzsche’s conception of
nature and so his analysis of Nietzsche’s metaphors is rather shallow. The only conclusion Koelb can reach
is that “Nietzsche’s rhetoric binds together the notions of woman, truth, nature, and revulsion into a single
idea” (Koelb, 79). But Nietzsche does not find all truth, nature, and women to be simply repulsive. Truth,
nature, woman, and femininity are all seductive to him. This oversimplification is a result of Koelb’s
limiting himself primarily to Nietzsche’s early texts (mainly The Birth of Tragedy and The Gay Science).
His focus on the texts written before Nietzsche’s full maturation as a philosopher can only give an
incomplete pictrrre of his view regarding nature, truth, and woman. Koelb cannot clarify whether Nietzsche
uses nature as a fixed standard or a changeable one. Because he does not fully understand the centrality and
the problem of nature as a standard for Nietzsche, Koelb simply cannot rnrderstand the connection between
Nietzsche’s view of nature and his insistence that sexual dichotomy ought to be maintained.

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(natural). Nietzsche may also mean that humanity as a whole never has been and never will
be natural (though a pre-Christian, aristocratic humanity may be more natural than a
modem one). If nature is a peak, most humans will never reachtheir natural condition, and
herds of men will never be natural according to Nietzschean standards. A more natural
humanity is one that lives according to conditions that make the extraordinary individuals
more likely. Only a few exceptional individuals (if any) can become natural. Man must
return to the brute qualities and recognize the need for suffering if he is the make the
“ascent--up into the high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness” (TI, 552). Humanity
can be strong or weak, but only the individual can make the ascent to nature. He explains;
“The great human being is a finale; the great age-the Renaissance, for example-is a finale.
...The instinct of self-preservation is suspended, as it were; the overpowering pressure of
outflowing forces forbids him any such care or caution” (TT, 548). Since only a few
individuals ever make the ascent, one must also question first whether woman can make the
ascent at all, and second, whether her ascent would be different from man’s. Nietzsche’s
insistence that man and woman are separate types should mean that woman has a different
peak than man. In other words, a natural woman is a different type from a natural man.60
The individual genius (who begets or gives birth) is a piece of nature. A more natural
humanity that is oriented toward a goal beyond comfortable self-preservation may have a
greater likelihood of producing such geniuses.

The historical situation following the death of God opens new possibilities and
introduces more freedom than mankind has ever known. This radical freedom not only
gives human beings the opportunity for improvement, but also the possibility of
irreversible degeneration. Because of the possibility of irreversible degeneration
(including the erosion of sexual distinctions), extraordinary types like Nietzsche must

decide what human natrrre shall be in the future. Nature itself does not decide in which

60111 the section “Should Biology Matter?” below, I discuss the relationship between woman’s
body and her completeness.

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direction it should go because there is no such thing as “nature in-itself;” instead, Nietzsche
must make this choice. Because all gods, including “nature” as a standard, are dead, what
Man’s future will be is an open question. A few errors brought man to his current
degenerative condition, so perhaps Nietzsche’s truths can help humanity climb out of their
domestication. In a section entitled “Truth as Circe” he asks: “Error has transformed
animals into men; is truth perhaps capable of changing man back into an animal?” (HAH I:
519). To translate man back into nature Nietzsche’s truths must be like Circe: seductive,
sweet-sounding and smelling, life-affirming and life-promoting, but also potentially
dangerous, ferocious, and brutal.61

Rather than allowing humanity to become a race of shallow nihilists, Nietzsche
teaches humanity (both men and women) to esteem the Ubermensch. As a conscious
creation of human beings (specifically, of Nietzsche), the Ubermensch is not a universal,
fixed ideal, like the traditional “God”, “truth”, or even “nature.” Rather it is a new type of
ideal for humanity at the endpoint of Western metaphysics, when ascetic ideals no longer
have power to shape human life. And since Nietzsche must turn to human beings
themselves as the source of this new goal, he must consider the possible roles of both man
and woman in the actualization of this task. Nietzsche will shape man and woman by
turning them toward the first non-ascetic, life-affirming, human goal.

Ubermensch versus Ubermenschen

Nietzsche’s poetic masterpiece Zarathustra represents the kind of creative history
that Nietzsche calls for in “The Use and Abuse of History.” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
teaches that the death of God means that humanity can no longer stay merely human. He
presents humanity with only two options: (1) evolve into the last man, the most despicable
kind of man, or (2) transcend the human-all-too-human, that is, become more than human.

Though Zarathustra discusses the higher man in part four, which appears to be a third

61See the section entitled "I‘ruth as Woman” in chapter 3 for others reasons why truth should be
understood as a woman.

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option for humans, as he declares the situation in the prologue, humanity must choose
between these two options. After the first italicized assertion of Zarathustra’s Prologue
(“God is dead”) follows the second set of italics which posits the new ideal to replace God:
“I teach you the overman” (Z, 124). Zarathustra declares; “Behold, I teach you the
overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall
be the meaning of the earth!” (Z, 125). To understand this teaching, one must look at the
teacher, Zarathustra, and his goals. Because Zarathustra is a teacher who presents his
teaching through his speeches and deeds, one should always consider the audience to
whom he speaks. Initially, Zarathustra presents this teaching to all humanity, but later he
teaches only his companions (fellow creators and harvesters (Z, 136)), and finally, only
himself in solitude.62 His apparent intention is to instill a new belief in mankind, to present
a new (created) purpose, “a world-governing spirit, a destiny,” a new goal for which
human beings can strive (EH, 304).

Nietzsche gives some clues as to what this new ideal will look like. But before
attempting to discern what precisely the Ubermensch is, one should recognize that what
Zarathustra teaches and what Nietzsche teaches may not be the same, although Nietzsche
asserts that Zarathustra and he have the same task (cf. EH, 308). Nietzsche rarely
mentions the term “Ubermensch” outside of Zarathustra (cf. Lampert, 314, n. 9), and
when he does, he frequently uses quotation marks or employs the term as a metaphor for a
type and not an actual person or entityfi3 Zarathustra typically employs the term as a
singular noun meant to designate a supreme achievement on the part of humanity, a new
human ideal. However, in a single instance (Z, 240), he speaks of “Ubermenschen” in the

62The Ubermensch doctrine is first taught by Zarathustra, though Nietzsche does mention the term

“overman” prior to this (GS, 143). He also uses the adjective “superhuman” twice in Human-All-Too-
Human (143, 164).

63For example, GS 143 refers to overmen of all kinds; GM 1.16 mentions superhuman as an
adjective; T'I 538 and AC 571 refer to a kind of overman; EH 305, EH 261, and WP 866 refer to the word or
concept “overnrarr” in quotations; EH 331, WP 804, and WP 1060 mention the overman; and Nietzsche
italicizes overman in WP 1001.

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plural. Nietzsche may not be using the singular term “Ubermensch” and the plural
“Ubermenschen” in the same way. As Zarathustra uses “Ubermensch,” the term does not
simply mean an Ubermensch, but more specifically, the Ubennensch--a specific, unique
individual (or ideal). But the plural term is less specific, since both Nietzsche (GS, 143)
and Zarathustra (Z, 240) associate “Ubermenschen” with other gods (who are all now
dead), creations of poets like heroes, and mythic creations.
[Flor all gods are poets’ parables, poets’ prevarications. Verily, it always
lifts us higher--specifically, to the realm of the clouds: upon these we place
our motley bastards and call them gods and overmen. For they are just light
enough for these chairs--all these gods and overmen (Z, 240).
Nietzsche’s use of the plural term here indicates the advent of a new type, rather than a
single individual (cf. Rosen, 39). Moreover, Nietzsche indicates here that there is a
kinship between gods and Ubermenschen. Just as all gods proved to be mortal rather than
etemal--as the lying poets had promised--so too will all Ubermenschen be temporary.

For most humans (men and women) the Ubermensch teaching may be a political
myth or a noble lie (cf. Z, 239-240). This is because, as Zarathustra indicates, the masses
do not comprehend his teaching (Z, 135). Although most will fail to understand the goal
properly and are simply unable to reach this pinnacle, those who do not understand
Zarathustra’s teaching may still be able to have faith in the Ubermensch as an ideal.
Zarathustra begins by teaching the Ubermensch to the masses, but as the story continues,
he goes his own way to becoming the Ubermensch-something the masses cannot do. This
is why Zarathustra ultimately presents his teaching only to himself and recommends
solitude to other creative spirits. Zarathustra hopes to cultivate in humans the ability to
esteem again, even though all gods are dead. For those who actually understand what the
Ubermensch is, the teaching is not a myth, but an achievable goal. Nietzsche describes

what the term “Ubermensch” means to these individuals:

a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to “modern” men, to “good”
men, to Christians and other nihilists--a word that in the mouth of a

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Zarathustrafi4 the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive wor --
has been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the
sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to
represent--that is, as an “idealistic” type of a higher kind of man, half
“saint,” half “genius” (EH, 261).65
The collective term “Ubermenschen” refers to all life-affirmin g ideals like Zarathustra’s
Ubermensch. An Ubermensch is defined as an exceptional case, an exception to the rule.
Zarathustra does not tell the multitude to become, but to believe in the Ubermensch as the
meaning of the earth (Z, 124-125).

The description above does not rule out the possibility of male and female
Ubermenschen. Throughout history peoples have worshiped both female goddesses and
female saints. Though a male Ubermensch would be a different type from a female
Ubermensch, they will have some fundamental qualities in common. As Nietzsche makes
clear in the above passage (EH, 261) no Ubermensch (whether male or female) would be a
democrat or a Christian. If woman cannot break free of Christianity, feminism, or
egalitarianism then she would not be able to be an Uberrnensch.66

Nietzsche does not promote one fixed interpretation of this ideal because he wants
to posit a new kind of ideal of which there may be many different, specific types.
Nietzsche might compare the difference between “Ubermensch” and “Ubermenschen” with

the difference between God (the Christian God) and other gods (of various kinds but still
the same type of divine ideal). Just as the Christian God is one specific type of the many

64Nietzsche speaks of “a Zarathustra” here indicating that Zarathustra, like the Ubemrensch,
represents a type oflruman. There may be others like Zarathustra (though not exactly the same) just as
there may be other Ubermenschen.

65Nietzsche characterizes Christians as nihilists in this passage. This characterization seems
strange since Christians believe in the Christian God and orient their actions in light of that God.
However, Nietzsche is likely referring to the fact that the flight from reality that characterizes Christianity
is a virulent type of nihilism. These people think that they believe in something, but instead they worship
a false ideal. They are rmable to affirm the only world that exists and are in that sense nihilistic.

65Lorraine’s feminine Zarathustra, who stands for a non-oppressive society, is not the type of
individual that Nietzsche has in mind.

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gods that have existed, so too is the Ubermensch one of many types of Ubermenschen.
Just as the Christian God is a universal ideal for all mankind, so too will the Ubermensch
be a goal for all of humanity.

The singular term “Ubermensch” is not explicitly associated with mythic creations;
however, it is most frequently utilized in Nietzsche’s poetic work Zarathustra. Strangely,
there is not a single reference to the Ubermensch in Beyond Good and Evil, the book that
directly follows Zarathustra.67 In a letter to Jacob Burckhardt. Nietzsche states that
Beyond Good and Evil “says the same things as my Zarathustra, but differently, very
differently” (BGE, translator’s preface, x). And if these two books say “the same things,”
it is strange that Nietzsche would not mention such a central idea. Perhaps the reason
Nietzsche does not mention the Ubermensch is that Beyond Good and Evil is the “No-
saying, No-doing part” of Nietzsche’s task, the “revaluation of our values so far” (EH,
310). Nietzsche must destroy and transcend all previous values before he can present the
Ubermensch (the most Yes-saying, affirrnation of life) as a goal. Although he does not use
the term “Ubermensch,” in Beyond Good and Evil he does, however, refer to the
“complementary man” and the “genius of the heart,” which bear a striking resemblance to
Zarathustra’s Ubermensch. But Nietzsche only mentions the “genius of the heart” in the
penultimate aphorism of the text, after he has completed the revaluation of values
(BGE, 295).

The Ubermensch will not be a permanent ideal because it will be an actual life.
Because this ideal will be connected to a mortal body, it will be temporary in three senses.
The Ubermensch is an actual (super)human life (rather than an incorporeal spirit), which
means that it will eventually die and decompose. Second, because this new ideal is such a

personal creation, the Ubermensch will, in a certain sense, die along with Nietzsche,

67Nietzsche also does not explicitly mention the last man or the eternal recurrence in Beyond Good
and Evil either. He alludes to the eternal retrrm of the same in aphorism 56 and in aphorism 203, he gives
a description of “the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims,” a description which sounds like the last man.
Although Nietzsche does not employ the term “last man” in aphorism 203, in aphorism 225, he uses the
German term “Untergang.”

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because no one else will understand the ideal precisely as Nietzsche does. Nietzsche’s
most personal, subjective interpretation of the Ubermensch dies with him. When
Zarathustra speaks of the Ubermensch (the singular term he uses in the “Prologue”) he is
referring to his own subjective ideal, the ideal that Zarathustra himself envisions.
Nietzsche’s hope is that other individuals like himself will create other ideal types
(Ubermenschen). Third, although this ideal is personal, it will eternally be open to
interpretation by others. So the Ubermensch is temporary in the sense that different
interpretations may predominate in different historical epochs. But like many humans, the
Ubermensch can continue to have influence after it dies. Since Nietzsche irnmortalizes the
concept of the Ubermensch in a book, the idea will exist as long as people read his books
and are shaped by them. After Nietzsche puts his idea in a book, from that point on, it is
possible that the Ubermensch will never die.

What is the Ubermensch?

Humanity is at a point when there is no way to affirm life without an Ubermensch
to fill the void that the death of God has left. Nietzsche italicizes Zarathustra’s two
pronouncements “God is dead” and “I teach you the overman” because these two doctrines
are intertwined: God’s death creates in humanity the need for the Ubermensch teaching (Z,
124). In the “Prologue,” Zarathustra presents three images of the Ubennenschfi8 He first
describes the Ubermensch as the goal of Man’s evolution. As such, he is the first human
goal and the “meaning of the earth” (Z, 125). Next, he describes Man as a “polluted
stream” and the Ubermensch is the sea in which man’s “great contempt can go under”
(ibid.). If humanity tums toward this ideal, modem degeneration will not have been
meaningless--humanity can be purified. Finally, he is “lightening” and “frenzy” (Z, 126).
The Ubermensch should inspire an exalted sense of longing. But these metaphors do not
tell us what the Ubermensch is like substantively, nor do they explain in what way(s) it is

different from all previous ideals. Nor do these metaphors indicate the connection between

63in Nietzsche’s Teaching, Lampcrt offers a helpful discussion of these images (lampert, 18-21).

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this new goal and Nietzsche’s insistence on sexual dichotomy.

The Ubermensch teaching fulfills a purpose similar to the one that the ascetic ideal
once did. Nietzsche is not unambiguously hostile towards asceticism. The ascetic ideal
actually saved humanity at a time when “existence on earth contained no goal; ‘why man at
all?’--was a question without an answer; the will for man and earth was lacking; behind
every great human destiny there sounded as a refrain a yet greater ‘in vain!”’ (GM III, 28).
Clark explains that during this time the ascetic ideal “gave these beings ways of affirming
their lives, of finding them worth living, when no alternative was available. While it may
have done this in different ways for different groups,” (Clark, 1990, 163) there does not
appear to be any “evidence that Nietzsche thinks some groups could have done without it”
(ibid.). The Ubermensch must fulfill a similar purpose. Zarathustra does not clarify
precisely what the Ubermensch will be like because creative individuals like himself will
determine what the Ubermensch will be. Different groups may need different things from
this ideal, but not all interpretations will be equal, according to Nietzsche (BGE, 228). The
Ubermensch will exist the extent that human beings can believe.

Zarathustra initially presents the Ubermensch as a project that will involve all of
humanity, not just a specific people. Christianity teaches that there is only one (type of)
God; therefore, Christian morality has been taken to be the whole of morality. This god is
male, but an emasculated male, “the anti-natural castration of a god, to make him a god of
the good alone, would here be contrary to everything desirable” (AC, 582-583).

Nietzsche considers the Christian conception of God to be a castration because he “knew
nothing of wrath, revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, and violence” (AC, 583). The absence
of these traits, some of which Nietzsche associates with masculinity and others with
femininity, constitutes castration. Not only did Christianity castrate God, but it destroyed
polytheism. Christianity (along with the democratic spirit, historicism, and modern
science) creates in humanity the need for a universal goal (GS, 143). Nietzsche explains,

Monotlreism, this rigid consequence of the doctrine of one normal
human type-the faith in one normal god beside whom there are only

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pseudo-gods--was perhaps the greatest danger that has yet confronted
humanity. It threatened us with the premature stagnation that, as far as we
can see, most other species have long reached; for all of them believe in one
normal type and ideal for their species, and they have translated the morality
of mores definitively into their own flesh and blood (GS, 143).
Before Christianity, the one-thousand goals had been understood in terms of “clans,
commmrities, tribes, peoples, states, churches” and families, while Christianity teaches that
there is only one group-humanity as a whole (BGE, 199). The Christian God formerly
“represented a people, the strength of a people, everything aggressive and power-thirsty in
the soul of a people; now he is merely the good god” (AC, 583). When the Christian God
became the only God, he lost the manly qualities Nietzsche reveres. Even though man has
no eternal horizons, a universal goal still must be created. Despite the fact that there have
been a thousand goals hitherto, Zarathustra argues that humanity still lacks a goal (Z, 172).
Interestingly, Nietzsche states, “Not ‘mankind’ but overman is the goal!” in section 1001
of The Will to Power. The Ubermensch is the goal for humanity as a species; it is the
thousand-and-first goal. But this goal will affirm manliness, play, sexuality, cunning
unlike the Christian God.

Although all of humanity will be transformed by the goal, Nietzsche’s primary
concern is not with the well-being of the masses of men. Nietzsche’s overriding goal is to
promote the production of other extraordinary individuals like himself. And these
individuals are ends themselves; they are not to be understood in terms of utility. Nietzsche
explains that “one misunderstands great human beings if one views them from the
miserable perspective of some public use. That one cannot put them to any use, that in
itself may belong to greatness” (TT, 555). Different individuals will have different roles in
bringing about this ideal. In his declarations of love which are reminiscent of the

Beatitudes, Zarathustra dictates the various roles that he hopes people will take in the
actualization of the Ubermensch (Z, 127-128). In the “Prologue,” Zarathustra does not

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differentiate the roles of man and woman in achieving this task, though he does later.69
Some individuals may try to approximate (or become) the Ubermensch themselves, while
others (most) will sacrifice themselves for the sake of the Ubermensch (ie, “go under”).
Those who are unable to help bring about or to become this new ideal type will be
commanded by the Ubermensch. The masses are to the Ubermensch what the horse is to
Man. Humans understand a good horse as one that serves humans well. The desire for
transportation, pets, recreation, and war have led to the manner in which horses have been
bred and cultivated. Similarly, the Ubermensch understands humans in terms of how they
may serve the Ubermensch. Just as horses are altered by the goals of humans so too will
humans be molded to fit the goals of the Ubermensch. They will believe in the Ubermensch
as a goal that is worthy of their devotion and admiration.

Zarathustra attempts to instill this new faith in humanity. In a world where god is
dead, such a faith requires the art of self-deception--an art that woman seems to have
mastered."0 Nietzsche asserts that woman is better equipped to instill such a faith in
herself and others than man is. He states; “Seducing one’s neighbor to a good opinion and
afterwards believing piously in this opinion--who could equal women in this art?--” (BGE,
148). The initial tone of the passage is critical and condescending. Nevertheless, this
quality is necessary and one might therefore expect Nietzsche to praise this womanly
ability. But in another passage he argues that this art of seduction may be a slave’s quality,
which accentuates the negative tone of Nietzsche’s assertion here. “It is ‘the slave’ in the
blood of the vain person, a residue of the slave’s craftiness—-and how much ‘slave’ is still
residual in woman, for example!--that seeks to seduce him to good opinions about himself;

698cc Zarathustra’s speeches “On Old and Young Little Women” (Z, 177-179) and “On Child and
Marriage” (Z, 181-183).

70For a consideration of the possibility of human beings as the center of the world, consult .
Michael Grenke’s essay “Man in the Middle.” In it, Grenke suggests that human being is not one thing, but
two (i.e., man and woman). He uses this observation as a springboard for considering Nietzsche’s cryptic
use of double aphorisnrs in Beyond Good and Evil. Grenke points out that it may not be possible to have a
world with a center other than God without some type of self-deception (Grenke, 4-5).

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it is also the slave who afterwards immediately prostrates himself before these opinions as
if he had not called them forth” (BGE, 261). Still, if self-deception is needed, it is unusual
that Nietzsche would characterize this quality as slavish. Although it is possible that
Nietzsche might recognize qualities as lowly but nevertheless needed, a closer look at BGE
261 indicates that Nietzsche actually criticizes vanity, not the art of deceiving others and
oneself. The first quotation (BGE, 148) does not specify that the person is vain or that the
opinions are about oneself. Perhaps such deception is only slavish if the opinion itself is
ignoble, slavish, or unwarranted. When woman directs this seduction toward the proper
goal (the Ubermensch) this art is most praiseworthy and may not be slavish at all.

With the former passage (BGE, 148), Nietzsche indicates that a woman is better
equipped to inspire faith in others than is man. Nietzsche does not indicate whether a man
could practice this art, though his descriptions of Zarathustra (EH, 220) and the “genius 'of
the heart” as seducers (BGE, 295) indicates that males can acquire this trait. Apparently a
man, namely a Zarathustra or a Socrates, can acquire this ability as well. Perhaps these
men can equal woman in the art of seduction. If woman is more masterful at this art,
Nietzsche’s choice of a man (Zarathustra) as the herald and seducer is a bit strange.
Nietzsche would reply that Zarathustra and the “genius of the heart” must also be creators
of ideals. Women may lack this ability or be less likely to develop this skill in Nietzsche’s
view. It may be that only man can achieve the creativity, the masterful ability to rule, and
the seductive ability to inspire others to believe.

Has There Ever Been an Ubermensch?

Zarathustra teaches that there never has been an Ubermensch, but it could be created
(Z, 197, 205). But Nietzsche lists a few individuals who fit descriptions similar to the
Ubermensch and those passages imply that there may have been Ubermenschen. All of the
examples he lists are male with one exception (Napoleon’s mother). He also makes a direct
connection between an actual man and the Ubermensch (Napoleon). All of these

extraordinary types have arisen only by accident: “success in individual cases is constantly

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encountered in the most widely different places and cultures: here we really do find a higher
type, which is, in relation to mankind as a whole, a kind of overrrran. Such fortunate
accidents of great success have always been possible and will perhaps always be possible”
(AC, 571). The Ubermensch will be different because he will not be an accident, but the
purpose of man’s evolution. This is one reason why Nietzsche calls these fortunate
accidents a kind of Ubermensch instead of the Ubermensch.

Some examples he gives of the “more profound and comprehensive men
[Menschen]” of his century include Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich
Heine, Schopenhauer, and Wagner (BGE, 256). These men are not simply the most
comprehensive males of the time, but the most comprehensive human beings--they
transcend the men and women of their time. He later adds that Caesar, Homer,
Aristophanes, Leonardo, and Goethe possess “slackness, skepticism, ‘immorality,’ the
right to throw off a faith,” which all “belong to greatness” (WP, 380). While most of these
men are artists or poets, he praises some key political figures as well-~Caesar, Alcibiades

(BGE, 200), and Napoleon (GM 1: 16).71 Consider the following passage:

But when the opposition and war in such a nature have the effect of one more
charm and incentive of life-and if, moreover, in addition to his powerful and
irreconcilable drives, a real mastery and subtlety in waging war against oneself, in
other words, self-control, self-outwitting, has been inherited or cultivated, too--
then those magical, incomprehensible, and unfathomable ones arise, those
enigmatic men predestined for victory and seduction, whose most beautiful
expression is found in Alcibiades and Caesar (to whose company I should like to
add that first European after my taste, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II), and among
artists perhaps Leonardo da Vinci (BGE, 200).

The qualities he attributes to the above men characterize the Ubermensch as well. He
idealizes the notion of a “Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul” (WP, 983) and recognizes that
the “brief spell of beauty, of genius, of Caesar, is sui generis: such things are not inherited.

The type is hereditary; a type is nothing extreme, no ‘1ucky stroke’--” (WP, 684). Perhaps

71Nehamas argues that all of the figures that Nietzsche reveres are literary artists and poets
(Nehamas, 227). He even includes Napoleon in this group because Nietzsche describe him as “steeped in
world literature.” However, I agree with Detwiler that this argument is unconvincing as Nietzsche praises
political figures as well. Nietzsche also praises Napoleon, Caesar, Napoleon’s mother, and Cesare Borgia--
all of whom are political figures (Detwiler, 47-50).

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what Nietzsche means when he asserts that there has never been an Ubermensch that there
has never been a “type” of Ubermensch that was consciously cultivated. All of these men
possess “irreconcilable” masculine and feminine drives. Even though all of these are
males, Nietzsche understands the characteristics of these men as both masculine (waging
war against oneself, self-control, predestined for victory over others) and feminine
(magical, incomprehensible, enigmatic, and seductive).

Nietzsche specifically uses the term Ubermensch with respect to Napoleon who he
referred to as a “synthesis of the inhuman and superhuman” (GM I: 16). However,
Nietzsche also describes the “higher man” as “inhuman and superhuman” (WP, 1027). As
part four of Zarathustra indicates, the higher men are not Ubermenschen. These two
passages together suggests that Napoleon is a higher man, but perhaps not the
Ubermensch. He possesses superhuman qualities, but may not fulfill all of the
requirements of Nietzsche’s ideal. However, in two instances in Twilight of the Idols,
Nietzsche also uses the phrase “retum to nature” to describe Goethe and Napoleon. As
discussed above, “return to nature” is another description of his task of creating the
Ubermensch. Of all the figures he discusses, perhaps there is most evidence that Napoleon
was an Ubermensch. In this regard he describes Goethe as

a magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by a return to
nature, by an ascent to the naturalness of the Renaissance--a kind of self-
overcoming on the part of that century. He bore its strongest instincts
within himself: the sensibility, the idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the
idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary... he surrounded himself with
limited horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the midst of
it; ...,he created himself.

In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, Goethe was a
convinced realist: he said Yes to everything that was related to him in this
respect--and he had no greater experience than that ens realissimum called
Napoleon. Goethe conceived a human being who would be strong, highly
educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward
himself, and who might dare to afford the whole range and wealth of being
natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not
from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to use to his
advantage, even that from which the average nature would perish; the man
for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden--unless it be
weakness, whether called vice or virtue (TI, 553-554).

“Napoleon was a piece of ‘return to nature’” (TI, 552) who “commands unconditionally”

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as one of the most “valuable human beings and moments” (BGE, 199). Napoleon
possesses qualities that Nietzsche considers superhuman qualities, but because the world is
a different place than it was when Napoleon lived, a new type of Ubermensch is required.

Nietzsche does not specifically associate the concept Ubermensch with any
particular woman, however he does characterize one woman as powerful and praiseworthy
by his standards --Napoleon’s mother. She is one of “the most powerful and influential
women [Frauen] of the world” who owed their “power and ascendancy over men
[Miinner]” to the force of her will (BGE, 239). What he reveres in her is obvious--she
gave birth to a strong child. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Nietzsche addresses her as
Napoleon’s mother. Napoleon is center stage while his mother seems to remain in the
background as the mother of greatness. Yet, as Grenke notes, it is difficult to envision
Napoleon’s mother as “a stay-at-home baby-machine” (Grenke, 10). The only
extraordinary woman that Nietzsche cites in Beyond Good and Evil is the mother of the
only man to which Nietzsche specifically associates superhuman qualities. Perhaps
Nietzsche holds her responsible for Napoleon’s greatness. Napoleon is the canvas upon
which his mother paints her will. Nietzsche may recognize Napoleon’s mother as the true
puppet-master. Perhaps she is responsible for Napoleon’s being and doing what she
willed. She physically shapes him in her body and with this close connection, she molds
him into the type of human being she desires him to be. Nietzsche’s praise of Napoleon’s
mother casts some doubt on the assumption that the Ubermensch could only be male.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not use the term Ubermensch in conjunction with Napoleon’s
mother, so Nietzsche probably did not consider her to be an Ubermensch.

Zarathustra’s statement that there has never yet been an Ubermensch may mean that
although some men and one woman posses some of the qualities, they do not fit
Zarathustra’s description of the Ubermensch. Altemately, Zarathustra's words may be
rhetoric intended to spark the creativity of the disciples. Zarathustra is a teacher and a poet

who admits he lies too much (Z, 239). He hopes to inspire the most promising individuals

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to go their own way to their solitude and become Ubermensch. So far the most

extraordinary types have only arisen by accident. “The accidental, the law of absurdity in

the whole economy 0f mankind, manifests itself most horribly in its destructive effect on

the higher men whose complicated conditions of life can only be calculated with great

subtlety and difficulty” (BGE, 62). Passively allowing evolution to continue will

ultimately lead to a time when there will be no more extraordinary individuals or events.
Creative Evolution

Instead of allowing these strokes of luck to come about accidentally, Zarathustra
teaches that humans can create the Ubermensch consciously. Zarathustra further teaches
that the entire historical process has been a preparation for the Ubermensch. The death of
God leaves man in a precarious position: “Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman--
a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-
back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping” (Z, 126). Man is at a midpoint, stuck
between degenerating into something subhuman or turning toward the Ubermensch as a
new goal. Man must decide in which direction he will go.

Zarathustra’s opening proclamation of the Ubermensch replaces Darwin’s
evolutionary theory of survival of the fittest (a deadly truth) with the theory of creative
evolution (a life-affirming truth).72 Zarathustra explains the difference between Man and
the Ubermensch with an analogy: Man will be to the Ubermensch what the ape has been to
Man.

All beings so far have created something beyond themselves; and do you
want to be the ebb of this great flood and even go back to the beasts rather
than overcome man? What is the ape to man? A laughingstock or a painful
embarrassment. And man shall be just that for the overman: a
laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. You have made your way from
worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and
even now, too, man is more ape than any ape (Z, 124).

Zarathustra does not clarify whether the Ubermensch will look physically different from

humans, nor does he characterize the Ubermensch sexually. But looking at the

72Henri Bergson coined the term “creative evolution.”

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evolutionary chain that Zarathustra cites (worm-->ape-->man-->Ubermensch), it appears
that the Ubermensch will of a new species altogether. This new species will be as different
from Man as is the ape. Regarding the question of the sex of the Ubermensch, it is
noteworthy that only the lowest rung of the evolutionary chain, the worm, does not exhibit
sexual differentiation. Most worms are herrnaphrodites. Zarathustra stresses that much in
Man is still worm, which signifies lowly, despicable qualities, perhaps the sterility of
objective scholars or the mediocrity of the masses. On the metaphorical level, perhaps the
lack of sexual differentiation of the lowest rung indicates a lack of passion, love, and
creativity in modern man. The second phase, the ape, is a step up from the worm. Apes
have higher intellectual capacities, advanced abilities, and more possibilities than worms.
Although apes look physically different from humans, sexual differentiation still exists.
Males and females have different roles for the protection of the species. Of the three
species above, sexual differentiation in human beings is most pronounced as man and
woman are visibly different from one another. Moreover, humans interpret the physical
differences between man and woman as significant intellectually, psychologically, and
morally. Certainly male and female apes look different from one another because male and
female apes have different genitalia. But apes do not translate their physical differences
into psychological differences the way that humans do. The progression in Zarathustra’s
analogy indicates that the Ubermensch will have a sex, since only the lowest rung, the
worm, is without clear sexuality.

The analogy above suggests that Ubermenschen are a new species, a new type, and
as such will procreate. Nietzsche explains how a species originates: “A species comes to
be, a type becomes fixed and strong, through the long fight with essentially constant
unfavorable conditions” (BGE, 262). Zarathustra does not articulate how different from
Man the Ubermensch will be. Nor does he list the specific differences between the species
Man and the species Ubermensch. Zarathustra indicates that when he saw the greatest and

smallest human naked, they appeared “all-too-similar to each other, even the greatest all-

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too-human. All-too-small, the greatest!” (Z, 331). This statement suggests that the
Ubermensch will look different from Man, but as a new type of species, will be
differentiated into males and females.

On the surface Zarathustra’s teaching sounds like Darwin’s here because he argues
that a new species will evolve from Man just as the worm evolved into the ape and the ape
into Man. But in Ecce Homo Nietzsche cautions against this incorrect reading (EH, 261).
Creating the Ubermensch is not a simple, mechanical process. Human beings must decide
to create the Ubermensch through an act of volition. Zarathustra teaches that with the
power of his mind, Man can recreate himself into a different kind of being. Of course
thinking alone is not all that is required here. Man must will himself to be different. An
elaborate eugenics program is also required. Humans must mold themselves into the new
species of Ubermensch-just as the worm created the idea of the ape, the ape created the
idea of a human. The Ubermensch will be as different from Man as Man is different from
the ape. Zarathustra teaches that “Man is something that shall be overcome,” and that it is
within Man’s own power to transcend himself (Z, 124).

Malleability of Humans

All other animal species have a fixed type or essence: that is, they cannot choose
one way of life over another. No one says to the cat, “Become who you are!” But since
no idea], truth, or goal is permanent for humans, the content of human nature has no fixity.
Human beings are altered by the types of goals they esteem. Of all living things, only Man
has a changeable nature and this is because “man alone among all the animals has no eternal
horizons and perspectives” (GS, 143). The creative power of the human mind combined
with the extraordinary freedom he experiences by being free of all gods enables Man (and
only Man) to transform human instincts over time. Only Man can decide whether his
species ought to be sexually differentiated or not. Man’s malleability also means that there
is no clear beginning or end to human development. Contrary to Hegelian philosophy,

Nietzsche teaches that there is no predetermined endpoint toward which humans progress.

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There is, however, an endpoint toward which humans degenerate-the last man. Man is the
“as yet undetermined animal, the rare exception” (BGE, 62). Zarathustra wants to affirm
this fluidity of Man’s nature as a kind of majestic freedom and responsibility.

If Man is not-yet-determined, either he will consciously shape his own nature and
in so doing determine what human nature will become (WP, 953), or he can allow external
circumstances like the historical environment, people, and events (like the death of God)--
in short, chance-determine who he will be. Allowing the human species to continue
evolving in its current direction will produce a creature who lives longest, but who is the
embodiment of mediocrity. This would mean the complete acceptance of nihilism.
Creating the Ubermensch represents a true improvement of the human species. Those who
believe in the Ubermensch will be improved by their reverence for this new kind of ideal.

Since the Ubermensch is the goal toward which humans strive, the sex of the
Ubermensch will have significance for the human beings who revere the Ubermensch. In
determining the sex of the Ubermensch at least three questions must be considered. First,
are human beings (men and women) capable of revering a male and/ or a female
Ubermensch? Human experience does not rule out the possibility of bowing down to a
feminine ideals (like goddesses). Second, could woman acquire the necessary masculine
traits needed and would a woman even want to be an Ubermensch? And third, would it be
easier for a man to acquire the requisite feminine traits than for a woman to acquire the
requisite masculine traits? Some extraordinary men have given birth metaphorically and
have at least achieved the status of higher men. Addressing these issues requires a
consideration of whether the different biologies of the sexes rule out the possibility of either
one becoming an Ubermensch.

The First Human Ideal
Zarathustra stresses the importance of the body with the second command which
appears in italics; “let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I
beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak

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to you of otherworldly hopes!” (Z, 125). All other ideals have been associated with
“otherworlds” rather than the earth. Zarathustra notes that “All beings so far have created
something beyond themselves” by which they have judged the inferiority of the earth (Z,
124). Unable to affrrrn the earth, peoples have only been able to create eternal ideals (i.e.,
gods). All gods are false ideals because they pretend to be something they are not, namely
eternal. The realization that the Christian God is not immortal is perhaps the most
disturbing recognition humanity has ever known. Christianity implicitly preaches that no
meaning can be found on this earth without God to provide the meaning. But now that all
gods have died, it is no longer possible to believe in such “otherworldly” ideals. Instead of
turning to divine, incorporeal ideals, Zarathustra teaches humanity to affirm the earth, to
embrace a tangible, achievable goal.

Turning to a faith in the earth means turning away from the “mendacious and false”
heavenly realm that “has so far been the curse on reality” (EH, 218). The heavenly realm
represents a “curse on reality” because it creates in humans a hope that cannot be fulfilled
and fills humans with despair when they realize this fact Because all previous ideals have
denigrated the human realm, the earth, humanity has never yet been oriented toward a
human ideal. Zarathustra’s hope is “that everything be changed into what is thinkable for
man, visible for man, feelable by man” (Z, 198). To love the earth means to focus on what
humans can actually achieve. The Ubermensch is to be the first life-affirming human goal
that, unlike previous gods, is actually achievable by humans (Z, 197). The Ubermensch is
life-afiirming because it is based on the earth. Also, the Ubermensch is a human ideal
because it affirms Man as the real creator. Zarathustra compares the Ubermensch as a goal
to God:

God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach
beyond your creative will. Could you create a god? Then do not speak to
me of any gods. But you could well create the overman. Perhaps not you
yourselves, my brothers. But into fathers and forefathers of the overman
you could re—create yourselves: and let this be your best creation (Z, 197-

198).

When humans accept themselves as the most powerful and creative beings of the earth,

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humans can originate their own purpose. Humans mistakenly believed that God was the

source of their being and purpose. Nietzsche describes the flaw of this way of thinking:
As soon as we imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and
thus, etc. (God, nature),73 and therefore attribute to him the intention that
we should exist and be happy or wretched, we corrupt for ourselves the
innocence of becoming. We then have someone who wants to achieve
something through us and with us (WP, 552).

It is striking that Nietzsche pairs God with nature here as a false ideal. When humans turn

to a god, or believe in some other type of fixed purpose (like nature), they deny their own

potential strength and creativity.

But modernity has so corrupted the instincts that humans today may not yet be
prepared to create the Ubermensch. This is why Zarathustra must be the herald of the
Ubermensch. Humans should believe it to be within their capability to bring about the
Ubermensch. Zarathustra relays his own recognition that there cannot be gods but only
Ubermenschen. He declares: “if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god!
Hence there are no gods. Though I drew this conclusion, now it draws me” (Z, 198). One
can substitute the term “Ubermensch” in the place of “gods” in Zarathustra’s statement.
Man should ask himself, “If there were Ubermenschen, how could I endure not to be an
Ubermensch!” In other words, humans should recognize this goal as an achievable one.
That humans can achieve this goal means that the Ubermensch represents a type of mortal
body rather than an incorporeal, divine spirit (like a god). The Ubermensch represents an
extraordinary type of being which Man can create, emulate, and perhaps also become.

Nietzsche’s Focus on the Body

Creating a human ideal necessitates starting with what is tangible, what is closest,

and what is undeniable-the body. For each individual human being, the body is a

73This admission that nature as a fixed standard is dead is especially strange given Nietzsche’s own
apparent use of a natural standard. As mentioned above, he speaks of a “return to nature”and the goal of
creating a “natural hmnanity.” Either Nietzsche is creating a new understanding of what nature is (or the
kind of truth that natrne is) or he is guilty of a metaphysical relapse. For an analysis of the problem that
nature poses for Nietzsche, see Strauss’s essay “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil,”
especially pp. 189-190.

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beginning, a means, and an end. Moreover, because no two bodies are alike, a renewed
focus on the body preserves a means of distinguishing among different types of
individuals. This focus also maintains the differentiation between man and woman.
Zarathustra tums toward the wisdom of the body as the only possible root of human
evaluation and esteeming: “lead back to the earth the virtue that flew away, as I do--back to
the body, back to life, that it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning.” (Z, 188).
One’s body is one’s most secure as well as the most personal, idiosyncratic possession any
human being can own. Nietzsche teaches that “soul is only a word for something about the
body” because he is replacing the faith in metaphysical dualities (Z, 146). In contrast,
Christianity preaches the denial of body for the sake of the “soul.” Against the self-
sacrificing asceticism of Christianity, Nietzsche promotes egoism, an affirmation of one’s
idiosyncratic self. Nietzsche teaches Man to see all things as emanations of the body so
that he can transcend the faith in incorporeal spirits.

The body is not permanent or unchanging and is therefore an appropriate model for
the new kind of ideal needed in a world where all gods are dead. “The body is a great
reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd” (Z, 146). As
the body ages, it changes and so over time the person continually becomes who he is. The
body also limits what an individual can become and therefore also limits the types of ideals
appropriate to humans. Just as some things (like food, proper nutrition, and drink) are
appropriate for a healthy body, certain ideals can strengthen Man (make him healthy), while
others can destroy or cause him to degenerate (make him sick or pervert his instincts).
Bodies are mortal and temporary just like all human ideas (ideals). And the Ubermensch
can give birth to or pave the way for other new ideals, just as individual bodies can.

It is not clear how the body (and consequently the mind) of the Ubermensch will be
superior to the human body. Nietzsche suggests that the Ubermensch or Ubermenschen
will have the “courage to side with their physis and to heed its demands down to the

subtlest nuances. Their aesthetic and moral judgements are among these ‘subtlest nuances’

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of the physis” (GS, 39). The soul of the Ubermensch will be the “most comprehensive
soul, ...the soul which, having being, dives into becoming; the soul which has, but wants
to want and will; ...the soul which loves itself most” (Z, 320-321). The
comprehensiveness of the Ubermensch’s character may indicate a different type of body, or
at least an extraordinarily healthy body. And since the soul is inseparable from the body,
the sexuality of the Ubermensch will be a fundamental part of what this new ideal is.

Given Nietzsche’s critique of sterility, the Ubermensch will certainly not be objective,
sterile, or neuter. As an individual, the Ubermensch’s sex will influence his goals or at
least color the way he orients himself toward the world.

Two difficulties arise from Nietzsche’s focus on the body as the foundation for a
new ideal. First, when tunring to the body, one notices that there are two types of human
bodies--male and female. Nietzsche does not destroy and cannot deny this dichotomy.
One wonders what it could mean to have a human ideal that affirms the earth when there are
two types of humans. It is possible that there are two types of Ubermensch-one male and
one female. There may be a type of Ubermensch that a female would create and revere,
while a male would esteem a different type. But since the Ubermensch transcends all
humans, it is likely that the Ubermensch is to be revered by both men and women.
Moreover, since Nietzsche intends the Ubermensch to be a new species, both male and
female Ubermenschen seem to be necessary. It is unlikely that this new species could
survive without both sexes. Breeding Ubermenschen with non-Ubermenschen (i.e.,
mixing two different species), would seem to make the production of future Ubermenschen
less likely. Since Nietzsche’s goal is to produce a race of Ubermenschen, female
Ubermenschen would seem to aid that task. But, alternatively, the Ubermensch may have
no mate at all. The Ubermensch sublimates his or her sexuality in activities of higher
order. Perhaps the Ubermensch does not procreate. If this is the case, the question of
whether the Ubermensch is a woman would come down to the question of whether

woman’s peak (her ascent to nature) could mean denying her ability to give birth.

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Nietzsche’s praise of Napoleon’s mother indicates that woman’s greatness takes a different
form from man’s. But the question of whether a woman could be the Ubermensch cannot
be addressed until a second difficulty is considered.

Should Biology Matter?

The second difficulty is that Nietzsche’s focus on the body appears to be an
impermissible reliance on physis-mature as a fixed standard.74 The malleability of human
nature begs the question of whether human biology ought to matter. Individuals can
transcend the limitation of their bodies, but in a sense, Nietzsche insists that they must not
do so. An essential element of his argument is a renewed focus on breeding a powerful
physicality that is prerequisite for the Ubermensch. This goal is the reason Nietzsche
focuses on the body. Nietzsche argues that this renewed focus is necessary to combat the
demotion of passion, sexuality, and sensuality that has resulted from Christianity and the
Enlightenment.

To a great degree, the classical justifications for equality (and equality between the
sexes) are responsible for the denigration of the importance of the body and biological
differences. A rational proof that men and women are of equal worth must be based on
some species characteristics that all human beings share (since their obvious physical
differences can be seen). In other words, the justification for such equality must be based
on what is common between the sexes (which may in the end be what is least important
about humans). These are the characteristics of Locke’s defense of political equality. He
argues in the Second Treatise that “nothing [is] more evident than that creatures of the same
species and rank, promiscuously born to all the some advantages of nature and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection...” (Locke, 4, emphasis added). He argues that human beings are equal because

as members of the same species all have the same faculties (inherent powers or abilities).

74The problem of Nietzsche’s potential use of physis as a standard has been touched on above.
See pp. 4142; 87-89.

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The development of those faculties is not politically relevant, according to Locke. But even
putting aside the unequal development of the faculties, Locke’s argument for natural
equality is not quite sound since man and woman have different bodies and physical
capabilities that correspond to those sexual differences. Man cannot nurse a baby, for
example. Man and woman do not share all of the same faculties, but only most of them.
And on the basis of their similarities, they ought to be treated the same according to
liberalism. Their differences, physical or otherwise, should be politically irrelevant. And
so we accentuate our commonalities, faithfully believing that only what humans share is
significant.

If everyone is to be treated as equals, it becomes necessary to convince ourselves
that the physical differences that humans see before their very eyes are inconsequential.
This means humans must become blind. Of course the question of whether sex differences
matter would not be an issue at all if the differences between the sexes were really
insignificant or trivial. But there are differences, or we would not be struggling to ignore
that they exist. Wolgast describes what the “mere biology” argument wrongly asserts:

Consider this argument: Sex, like skin color and other features of
race, is a merely biological characteristic. It is an aspect of a person’s
physical composition like the chemical constituents of cells, and has nothing
to do with the person as a moral entity. The sex of a person, like these
other characteristics, should have no influence on how she or he is treated.
I call this the “mere biology” argument.

It is true that skin color is an unimportant difference and should not
affect a person’s rights. But it is not unimportant for the reason that it is
biological. The difference between men and apes is merely biological too,
as is the difference between men and fishes; yet these differences rightly
lead to different treatment. Who says we must treat all biological forms
alike? Indeed, among humans some biological differences justify
differences of treatment, as helping a blind person and caring for a baby
clearly show. The “mere biology” argument is therefore a bad one
(W olgast, 22).

It is absurd to argue that the biological differences between the ape and the human are
negligible. It would also be ridiculous to discount the biological differences between an
Ubermensch and a Mensch. Wolgast is correct to point out that the differences between

species is biological and that men and women accept those differences as meaningful.

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However, she does show that differentiation within the species is crucially important. Still,
she is correct to point out that in some cases we take biology to be important as well as
evidence that differential treatment is required. In other cases we insist that biology should
not matter at all. Liberal democrats are of two minds regarding the importance of biological
differences-especially with respect to sex.75 An argument is still needed to explain why
sexual differentiation within a species ought to be maintained and ought to be defnritive.
Nietzsche’s explanation of the connection between physiology and psychology offers the
beginning of a justification for treating the sexes differently. Those differences are not
important because they are biological (and natural), but because the elimination of those
differences would result in an “uglification” of human life (BGE, 232).

Nussbaum rejects Nietzsche’s focus on the body as the foundation of treating the
sexes differently because he does not present a “serious account of the body and its needs”
(Nussbaum, 11). In fact, Nietzsche does present a serious account, but he accentuates
different aspects of the body and its needs than Nussbaum does. Nussbaum’s primary
concern is condortable self-preservation for all humans, while Nietzsche’s is the breeding
of the most extraordinary creative types. Nietzsche wants to improve the species by
turning human concerns away from mere survival. His goal turns him away from a focus
on alleviating hunger, physical pain, and other types of bodily ailments. In contrast,
Nietzsche declares “What does not destroy me, makes me stronger” (T1, 467). This
declaration is problematic since, in many cases, what does not physically kill one makes the
body weaker. Heart attacks, cancer, malnutrition, and poverty (which is Nussbaum’s

concern) cause great weakening of the body. But Nietzsche’s statement, if understood

751a defense of the eradication of sexual dualism based on biological differences between the sexes,
Tirrell notes that 5% of the population is born with ambiguous genitalia. This means to Tirrell that the
claim that there are two genders is normative (Tirrell, 206). Parents of this 5% immediately impose a
gender on their child Moreover, she claims that most people display some masculine and feminine traits
regardless of whether in a nrale or a female body. But Tirrell misses the reason why parents impose a
gender on their child. Gender distinctions are desirable and give a person a sense of self. If sexuality is an
inrportant aspect of who a human being is, then one’s sex and gender should be recognized as important,
not irrelevant.

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metaphorically, makes some sense. He argues that a battle (with health, in war, against
oneself) can enliven and strengthen the will. Nietzsche is also referring to himself, his
relationship with his own body, and his self-knowledge. He is not describing all humans,
although all humans should rely on the wisdom of the body. For most, a weakening of the
body leads to a corresponding weakening of the spirit. Nussbaum focuses on the needs
and desires that humans as humans (last men) have but completely disregards the
potentially noble human needs for children, love, and goals beyond themselves.
Nussbaum’s focus on conrfortable self-preservation demonstrates her close ties to liberal
democratic morality, the very morality against which Nietzsche fights.

The Relationship Between Physiology and Psychology

Nietzsche recognizes the intimate connection between one’s body and the type of
ideal which one can believe. A weak body seeks comfort while a strong body seeks
challenges and danger. Zarathustra presents the human body as the source of all gods, all
ideals, and all types of Ubermenschen (Z, 147). In fact, he argues that psychological
experiences are merely interpretations of physiological situations. The source of
psychological pain is some basic physiological fact like an injury or lack (like hunger or
exhaustion) (cf. GM III: 16). Nietzsche even defines valuations as “physiological demands
for the preservation of a certain type of life” (BGE, 3). He considers whether an ascending
life or a weak, degenerative life created the idea Nietzsche does not love all life equally,
but wants to promote a certain type of life-affirming human.

Different types of bodies are animated by different ideas. The idiosyncratic traits of
the body push an individual’s thoughts down the individual’s own path. What the mind is
capable of doing is directly linked to what the body is capable of doing. What is thinkable
for a strong body may be inconceivable to a sick or weak body. One does not desire the
same things when sick as one does when in good health. A healthy body does not imply a
healthy mind, as Nussbaum’s argument insinuates. In fact it may be just the opposite. In

order to experience the health of creating, one may need to endure a great deal of suffering.

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It may be that sickness makes one aware of what health can be. Becoming healthy is a
convalescing (cf. Z, 327-333). Suffering people who denied the wisdom and instincts of
the body created the life-denying values that corrupt modern man. Zarathustra explains:
It was the sick and decaying who despised body and earth and invented the
heavenly realm and the redemptive drops of blood: but they took even these
sweet and gloomy poisons from body and earth. They wanted to escape
their own misery, and the stars were too far for them. So they sighed:
“Would that there were heavenly ways to sneak into another state of being
and happiness!” Thus they invented their sneaky ruses and bloody potions.
Ungrateful, these peeple deemed themselves transported from their bodies
and this earth. But to whom did they owe the convulsions and raptures of
their transport? To their bodies and this earth (Z, 144-145, cf. EH,
334).
Sick bodies gave birth to the otherworldly ideals that forced human evolution in the
direction of nihilism. A sick body belongs to an individual who is unable to esteem
anything human, an individual who suffers and cannot affirm life. Man must learn to love
his body as the foundation of a new goal. And the new goal is to be a very personal,
idiosyncratic one. Since no two bodies are exactly alike, no two ideals, goals, or virtues
are exactly alike. Nietzsche even links the evolution of ideas to the evolution of human
bodies: “the entire evolution of the spirit is a question of the body; it is the history of the
development of a higher body that emerges into our sensibility” (WP, 676).

Nietzsche’s argument that physiology is the root of certain psychological
differences among men is quite plausible. He is simply correct to note that all humans love
their body as uniquely their own. An individual may be dissatisfied with his body--he may
prefer a taller, slimmer, stronger body; however, every individual is necessarily attached to
the body into which he is born. When an individual loses a leg or an arm, he somehow
feels incomplete, as if a piece of him is missing, even though the soul remains in tact.
Dissatisfaction with one’s body certainly leads to psychological consequences. The body
is something that cannot be shared with another completely. N 0 other individual can
experience the precise sensations of another’s body. Recognition of the importance of the

body grounds one’s love in an egoism, and this helps Man remain faithful to the earth.
Different bodies will have different goals because the physiology of the individual

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will determine the way in which one comports oneself towards the world. A physically
weak individual will likely try to “fit” with the world while a physically strong individual
would be more rash, more likely to try to conquer the world. These are not inevitable, but
likely because “All actions must first be made possible mechanically before they are willed.
Or: the ‘purpose’ usually76 comes into the mind only after everything has been prepared for
its execution” (WP, 671). One would expect an individual with a strong body to be more
physically daring than a weak, feeble one. Considering man and woman, Nietzsche notes
several biological differences: physical size, physical beauty, pregnancy, strength, and

will. Those physical differences manifest themselves psychologically.

Not only does the body produce psychological conditions, but a psychological
weakness can lead to the production of a certain type of physiology. Nietzsche recognizes
the ignorance of the importance of bodily differences is producing a serious physiological
effect in Europe:

Behind all the moral and political foregrounds to which such formulas
point, a tremendous physiological process is taking place and gaining
momentum. The Europeans are becoming more similar to each other; they
become more and more detached from the conditions under which races
originate that are tied to some climate or class; they become increasingly
independent of any determinate milieu that would like to inscribe itself for
centuries in body and soul with the same demands. Thus an essentially
supra-national nomadic type of man is gradually coming up, a type that
possesses, physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art and power of
adaptation as its typical distinction (BGE, 242).
The democratization of the population and the predominance of herd morality creates a type
of body that can live in many types of climates. As comfortable self-preservation is the
only goal, the body is cultivated so as to allow humans to live longest. Before one can
select the proper path for the future, one must recognize the repercussions of failing to
acknowledge the body. Nietzsche turns to the body because the consequences of allowing

a homogenous race of neuters overrun the earth is so nauseating. This path is not only

possible, but extremely likely. Nietzsche’s focus on biology is important for liberal

76Nietzsche italicizes the word “usually.” Perhaps the exceptional individuals are the ones who
create a purpose prior to the mechanical requirements being met.

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democrats to consider because he accurately predicts the path down which liberal democrats
are currently heading.
The Ubermensch as the Ideal to Counter the Last Man

Humanity already is headed toward “what is most contemptible: but that is the last
man” (Z, 129). The concept “last man” signifies the most domesticated animal, the lowest
type of human imaginable. The possibility of “this degeneration and diminution of man
into the perfect herd animal” is the precise reason why humanity needs the Ubermensch
(BGE, 203). Zarathustra explains that “only the highest form, the most dangerous, the
one that was most seductive in its No to life, provokes its [life’s] highest affirmation” (EH,
appendix, 343). Only after Nietzsche recognizes the nauseating threat that the last man
represents, does he feel impelled to create the Ubermensch. The Ubermensch is the
alternative to the last man.

Zarathustra’s description of the last man is a bit more concrete than his description
of the Ubermensch. The term “last man” is a metaphor for a sterile type of individual who
no longer esteems anything. The last man is no longer able to despise himself which
means that he also does not experience an exalted sense of longing. An essential part of
what the last man is includes the complete erosion of passion, sexuality, and fertility (i.e.,
the absence of ability to love, aspire, or create): “‘What is love? What is creation? What is
longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the last man, and he blinks” (Z, 129). The term “last
man,” which utilizes the gender neutral term “Mensch,” indicates the erosion of both
masculine and feminine perspectives into a completely objectified, sterile life. Nietzsche’s
description of the sterile scholars comes to mind when considering the sexuality (or lack
thereof) of the last man. Just like the sterile scholars, last men are neuters (H, 33). The last
man is the logical extension of the sterile scholar, the shallow Christian, the utilitarian, and
the democrat. None of these types is specifically defined by any type of fertility or
sexuality because they lack the ability to create anything meaningful.

The last man also hides from genuine experiences, fails to strive for anything, and

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focuses solely on self-preservation. Because the last man seeks nothing more than physical
safety, Ire lives longest. To call the last man sterile does not mean that the last man cannot
procreate. He has his “little pleasure for the day” and his “little pleasure for the night” and
that is all that he requires (Z, 130). He is a human life stripped of all struggle, tension,
ideals and goals. The last man mistakenly believes that human happiness rests in
complacency and repose of the body and mind. Nietzsche’s focus on the body does not
mean that the proper human goal is mere physical comfort and pleasures. Nietzsche is
attempting to renew Man’s focus on an egoism that can generate an exalted love of the
Ubermensch as a higher goal.

The Ubermensch is anything but complacent, or “wretchedly content.” This does
not mean that the Ubermensch is a tortured soul or a mess of chaotic impulses and
destructive drives as is the modern; rather, it means that the Ubermensch experiences an
exalted animation of striving and struggle. To long for greatness, to strive toward
achieving an authentic goal, means to fight great battles against worthy opposition.

He [the Ubermensch] needs the opposition of the masses, of the “leveled,”
a feeling of distance from them! He77 stands on them, he lives off them.
This higher form of aristocracy is that of the future.--Morally speaking, this
overall machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a maximum in the
exploitation of man; but it presupposes those on whose account this
exploitation has meaning. Otherwise it would really be nothing but an
overall diminution, a value diminution of the type man--a regressive
phenomenon in the grand style (WP, 866).
The Ubermensch is introduced with, and is inseparable from, the notion of the last man.
This is because a new ideal “needs enemies more than friends: in opposition alone does it
feel itself necessary, in opposition alone does it become necessary” (T1, 488). Nietzsche
explains that Zarathustra’s “relatively superhrnnan type. is superhuman precisely in its
relation to the good--that the good and the just would call his overman devil” (EH, 331).
Nietzsche maintains the differences between the sexes due to this need for opposition. The

power of the nation-state is eroding, the significance of race is disintegrating, and the hold

77Kaufmann does not capitalize the beginning of the sentence here, but I do.

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of religion is dying. Nietzsche searches for a tension--such as the struggle between the
sexes--that can produce a creative spark to replace the past struggles that no longer seem to
be worthwhile. Moreover, sexual difference is based on the body, and a focus on this
difference fulfills the need to remain loyal to the earth.

The Significance of the Ubermensch’s Sex

The very possibility of an Ubermensch’s existing at all requires the proper
understanding of sex which Zarathustra characterizes as “the happiness that is the great
parable of a higher happiness and the highest hope” (Z, 300). Nietzsche does not clearly
express what the sexuality of the Ubermensch will be, and this is strange given the crucial
importance of the body and fertility. Nietzsche may be ambiguous regarding this essential
quality of the Ubermensch because the Ubermensch is Nietzsche’s (Zarathustra’s) own
personal goal. Nietzsche does not need to describe it because others of his type will be
oriented toward the same type of goal. He does not want to produce shallow believers but
creators: “I want to have fences around my thoughts and even around my words, lest swine
and swooners break into my garden!” (Z, 301). A second reason for this ambiguity is that
Nietzsche hopes that others will create their own type of Ubermensch. Nietzsche
challenges others to find, or better yet, create their own idiosyncratic and respective paths.
But the final reason that the Ubermensch is so ambiguous is that the Ubermensch needs
both masculine and feminine traits and experiences a tension between them.

Whether the Ubermensch is male or female may not be as crucial as the fact that the
Ubermensch is not merely “objective.” The opposing enemies that are needed externally
must also be experienced inside the soul of the superhuman type. The character of the
Ubermensch consists of “powerful and irreconcilable drives” (BGE, 200). He is child and
mother (Z, 199); the seduced and a seducer; an end and an opposition to ends; a lover of
wisdom and a lover of life (Z, 220-221); victorious (BGE, 200) and tolerant (TI, 554);
rash, but also delicate (BGE, 295) and subtle (BGE, 200); a lover and a creator; and

finally, a philosopher and a poet. The Ubermensch experiences an internal struggle due to

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the war between the masculine and the feminine aspects of his character: “Our attitude to the
‘intemal enemy’ is no different; here too we have spiritualized hostility; here too we have
come to appreciate its value. The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition;
one remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace” (T1,
488). This statement by itself does not indicate what the nature of the internal opposition
is. However, since tempestuous opposition between the masculine and the feminine
perspectives is an enduring and changeable opposition, and because all other types of
opposition are currently eroding, this is the struggle in which Nietzsche places his faith for
the future. The physical manifestation of this tension is the struggle between man and
woman. Not only will there always be a physical distinction between the sexes; there will
also be an eternally masculine and an eternally feminine perspective because of the
connection between physiology and psychology. The significance of the two types of
bodies and the two fundamental perspectives varies over time and place.
The Ubermensch as a Child and Mother

The fact that the Ubermensch is a human ideal reveals quite a bit about what this
being is like. As a human ideal, the Ubermensch will be mortal, which means that
eventually the Ubermensch will die. This goal is the first human ideal that humans will
acknowledge as temporary. Like the charismatic individual, as long as the Ubermensch
lives, he has the possibility of providing meaning to the earth. After the Ubermensch dies,
humanity will need either another type of Ubermensch or another type of ideal. Also as a
mortal being, a woman will give birth to and a man will beget the Ubermensch. Man and
woman together will create the Ubermensch. Recognizing the necessary roles of man and
woman in the physical creation of the Ubermensch explains Nietzsche’s affirmation of the
importance of sexuality, selfishness, and the lust to rule (cf. Z, 298-303). These three
“evil” passions draw man and woman together and hopefully will spark the production of
the Ubermensch. Woman will give birth to the Ubermensch as a new hope for the future,

just as a child (potentially) represents to its parents a new beginning and hope.

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Nietzsche does not characterize the Ubermensch specifically as a male or female,
but instead as the child who “is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-
propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘Yes.’ For the game of creation, my brothers,
a sacred ‘Yes’ is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the
world now conquers his own world” (Z, 139). A child may be either a male or a female
and it is noteworthy that again Nietzsche is vague here. Elsewhere Nietzsche describes
man as “more childlike than woman” (Z, 178). By childlike, Nietzsche means an ability to
create one’s own goal without needing a purpose external to oneself. The child “wills his
own will” instead of searching for some external ideal (Z, 139). Children do not know
how to be other than they are until parents educate them to suppress the passions and
instincts. The child asserts himself because he cannot do otherwise. This description of
the Ubermensch as a child indicates that a male Ubermensch is most likely.

The Respective Roles of Man and Woman
in the Creating of the Ubermensch

In the speech “On Old and Young Little Women,” Zarathustra prescribes the
respective roles of the ordinary men and women in the creating of the Ubermensch.
Zarathustra uses the term “Weiblein” in the speech, which is a diminutive term meant to
belittle women.78 This connection indicates that Zarathustra is not describing the most
extraordinary women in this section, but small women, that is, ordinary or typical women.
He may prescribe a different role for small women (those who are not beautiful) than he
does for noble women (Frauen).

Zarathustra explains that man may be more childlike, but woman “understands
children better than man does” which means that woman understands man better than man

does (Z, 178). In fact, she understands both men and women better than man does.

73Sirnilarly, in The Gay Science Nietzsche even describes little women (W eibchen) as a third sex
(GS, 75). Nietzsche connects this statement to Aristotle’s suggestion that small people cannot be
beautiful, though they may be well-proportioned. Aristotle states; “For high-mindedness implies greatness,
just as beauty implies statrrre in body: small people may have charm and proportion but not beauty”
(Aristotle, 1962, 1123b 7-9).

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Zarathustra explains; “one is deceived about many things in man because many a shell is
shabby and sad and altogether too much shell. Much hidden graciousness and strength is
never guessed; the most exquisite delicacies find no tasters. Women [Frauen] know this--
the most exquisite do: ...Man [Mensch] is hard to discover-hardest of all for himself” (Z,
306). Since she understands man, woman knows what man needs in order to thrive.

Nietzsche may be correct to say that woman understands men, children, and human
beings generally better than man does. Woman’s small size and weakness physically may
explain why she understands man better. Because she is physically weaker than man, if
she wants or needs something from a man (like physical protection), she cannot simply
physically force man to help her. More useful to her would be an ability to seduce him into
serving her, to make the man want to give her what she seeks. If woman wants something
different than what man wants to give her, she needs to find a way to make man want to
fulfill her needs. She has to learn what he likes and lure him into believing that he desires
to fulfill her needs. She must watch, learn, and notice the subtle details in his behaviors so
that she can mold her behavior to him. Because she does not have physical strength at her
disposal, she must be cunning. Still, to say that all women really know what men want is
surely an exaggeration. Many women simply do not know how to mold men into the
manly men they crave. But there is some sense to Nietzsche’s suggestion that (due to her
physical weakness relative to man) woman understands man better than man understands
woman. When applied to women who actually do understand men and children,
Nietzsche’s argument that her body is the root of her better understanding of children and
man is sound.

But understanding the creator and being one are two separate concepts altogether.
Never does Zarathustra command woman to become the Ubermensch. Instead, Zarathustra
commands women; “Let your hope be: May I give birth to the overman!” (Z, 178). He
goes even further by suggesting that “Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything

about woman has one solution: that is pregnancy. Man is for woman a means: the end is

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always the child” (Z, 178). But one must keep in mind that Zarathustra. a man, makes this
assertion. And Zarathustra is relaying his story to a companion, presumably a male as
well. Woman seems to be a mystery bmause man does not understand her. It is certainly
possible that man sees woman as a mysterious riddle whom he continually misunderstands.

But Nietzsche’s suggestion that pregnancy is the only solution for woman sounds
reactionary and chauvinistic, which is why so many scholars refuse to take Nietzsche
seriously on this point. But to determine how shallow or misguided this assertion may be,
one must determine what riddle Zarathustra intends to solve. Nietzsche is attempting to
find a way to teach all humans to revere a human ideal, one that affrrrns the creative power
of humans. Woman’s body is a source of her own physical creations. Teaching woman to
revere her child as the new ideal prepares her to affirm a new ideal that is loyal to the earth.
Bearing a child is the act that affirms the female body to the highest degree. In the child
woman sees a physical manifestation of her will. If the child becomes her ideal, she serves
something that was once in her body that she understands as an extension of herself.
Because she cannot give birth to a child without man to fertilize her, this goal also makes
her dependent on man. Her completion ties her to man and child.

Nietzsche sees pregnancy as the ultimate affirmation of woman’s body. If woman
is to affirm her body, she must also affirm that man is different from her, and the root of
that difference is indeed the body. Woman affirms her own body when she is faithful to
man because she needs man as a means to the child. Of course man would have to be
worthy of woman’s reverence for her to be fulfilled in this manner. But Zarathustra is
wrong to characterize man only as a means to the child. Many women perceive men in this
way, but many do not. Zarathustra is also wrong if he suggests here that all women ought
to be mothers. Woman’s ability to give birth may give her a predisposition to desire a

child--a predisposition that--man does not have,79 but this does not make all women

79See the section entitled “Will and Willingness” in chapter 5 for a comparison of the ways in
which men and women desire the child.

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naturally qualified to have children. Nietzsche acknowledges this point in his speech “On
Child and Marriage.” Only “the victorious one, the self-conqueror, the commander of your
senses, the master of your virtues” is entitled to wish for a child (Z, 181). The child
should not be sought due to loneliness or “lack of peace” with oneself (ibid.). Affirmation
of the body and recognition of his radical freedom should motivate the individual to create
the child.

Nietzsche’s suggestion that pregnancy is woman’s solution may have some worth
since a renewed emphasis on the importance of pregnancy and children (as opposed to
occupation, money, or other petty bourgeois goals) may result in the cultivation of stronger
children, women, and families. This suggestion focuses on the beneficial effects that
woman’s focus on children could have on the species. He sees pregnancy as the solution
to woman’s degeneration because having a child provides woman with a longing for
something beyond herself, but a goal that is loyal to the earth. Yet this longing might also
tend to make woman more pious, looking to God or the gods, to protect her child.80 Her
heightened love of the child may make her utterly aware of her vulnerability, which may
awaken her desire for (divine) protection. Nietzsche also suggests that woman ought to be
pious and this suggestion may be due to the fact that she is the bearer of children.
Nietzsche argues that “a woman without piety” would “seem utterly obnoxious and
ridiculous to a profound and godless man” (BGE, 239). Nietzsche does not indicate
toward what woman ought to be pious, but the direction of his project indicates that woman
is to be dedicated to the Ubermensch. Having the child can help to cultivate this pious
dedication in her. Pregnancy maintains her femininity, but also cultivates a passionate
spiritedness. Having a child also forces woman to recognize a difference (between herself,
her child, and others) and encourages an egoistic love of herself and the child. The desire
to become pregnant gives her a predilection for a strong man--the type of man Nietzsche

hopes to cultivate.

8OPlato explicitly makes this point in The Laws (cf. Plato, 1980, 418b).

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Nietzsche does not articulate whether man’s ability to be childlike or woman’s
ability to understand the child is a more valuable quality. With respect to creating the
Ubermensch, both are needed. Man’s childlike quality demonstrates the kinship he has
with the Ubermensch. Man, more than woman, works with the seriousness that a child
exhibits while playing. But woman (as mother) has a better understanding of what is
needed to unleash that childlike quality. Woman has the ability to set the groundwork for
the Ubermensch to come about. Zarathustra’s point, it seems, is that woman is quite
capable of giving birth to this extraordinary type.

This means that woman may not be capable of becoming the Ubermensch herself.
Nietzsche does not expect that a woman could become the Ubermensch. Indeed, he never
refers to woman or any specific woman as superhuman. Instead, Nietzsche, Napoleon,
Zarathustra, and the shepherd from “On the Vision and the Riddle” (Z, 271-272)--all of
whom display some superhuman traits--are male. Yet both the shepherd and Zarathustra
are fictional characters whom Nietzsche never specifically calls the Ubermensch. In fact,
nowhere does Zarathustra command man to become the Ubermensch, nor does he
command any individual man to become the Ubermensch. Nor does Zarathustra say to
man, “Let your hope be: May I beget the overman!” Rather, he tells Man to fight wars on
behalf of the Ubermensch and adds that the commands are to come from Zarathustra rather
than themselves. Zarathustra does not define man in terms of his procreative capacity. He
instead gives man the following command; “Your nobility should be obedience. Your very
commanding should be an obeying. To a good warrior ‘thou shalt’ sounds more agreeable
than ‘I will.’ And everything you like you should first let yourself be commanded to do”
(Z, 160). Men will be warriors who fight so that the Ubermensch may one day live, which
means that they are not Ubermenschen themselves. So it is still not at all clear that the
Ubermensch must be a male since man is to live a “life of obedience and war” (ibid.).

Man’s role in the preparation for the Ubermensch is to fight wars, the likes of

which have never been seen before. A “real man,” we are told, seeks danger (Z, 178).

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Man’s greater physical strength in comparison to woman explains why Zarathustra asserts
that “Man should be educated for war” (ibid.). Man imposes himself on the world by
trying to alter the world. Man’s physical strength also makes him more naturally suited to
inflict physical suffering. And Nietzsche describes this ability to inflict suffering as a trait
of greatness.
What belongs to greamess.--Who will attain anything great if he does not
find in himself the strength and the will to inflict great suffering? Being able
to suffer is the least thing; weak women and even slaves often achieve
virtuosity in that. But not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when
one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering-~that is great,
that belongs to greatness (GS, 325).
Man’s physical courage may make him more able to be the Ubermensch. Though it is
certainly possible to have a leader who is physically weak, Nietzsche seems correct to say
that a physical courage may be mimicked in the soul as a psychological courage to
command (oneself or others).
Woman’s biology also provides reasons why she would not be the best warrior.
In addition to her physical weakness and small size, the fact that woman gives birth may
give her a natural antipathy to war just as it makes her antipathetic to science. Because she
has the unique ability to form life in her body, woman may be more likely to see mere life
as a precious gift that ought not be destroyed. This does not mean that she could not learn
to love war, but her body does incline her away from an ardent love of violence and war.
If she would be less likely to feel an exhilaration and delight in war, she may serve better in
another role. Woman should instead be educated for the recreation of the warrior.
Furthermore, she should be man’s dangerous playtlring. Though Zarathustra’s tone again
appears to be condescending and demeaning, some sense can be made of the argument
when considered in light of woman’s antipathy to such pursuits.
Like woman, the Ubermensch also knows how to seduce and seem. Consider the
description of the “genius of the heart”:
The genius of the heart, as that great concealed one possesses it, the tempter

god and born pied piper of consciences whose voice knows how to descend
into the netherworld of every soul; who does not say a word or cast a glance

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in which there is no consideration and ulterior enticement; whose mastery
includes the knowledge of how to seem-mot what he is but what is to those
who follow him one more constraint to press ever closer to him in order to
follow him ever more inwardly and thoroughly--the genius of the heart who
silences all that is loud and self-satisfied, teaching it to listen; who smooths
rough souls and lets them taste a new desire-to lie still as a mirror, that the
deep sky may mirror itself in them--the genius of the heart who teaches the
doltish and rash hand to hesitate and reach out more delicately; who guesses
the concealed and forgotten treasure, the drop of graciousness and sweet
spirituality under dim and thick ice, and is a divining rod for every grain of
gold that has long lain buried in the dungeon of much mud and sand; the
genius of the heart from whose touch everyone walks away richer, not
having received grace and surprised, not as blessed and oppressed by alien
goods, but richer in himself, newer to himself than before, broken open,
blown at and sounded out by a thawing wind, perhaps more unsure,
tenderer, more fragile, more broken, but full of hopes that as yet have no
name, full of new will and currents, full of new dissatisfaction and
undertows--- (BGE, 295).

This description incorporates the feminine qualities that Nietzsche attaches to woman,
including seduction, secrecy, and deception. When Zarathustra asserts that woman
understands children better than man does (Z, 178), he is referring to this ability to provide
the appearance that is needed by others. Woman has an uncanny ability to decipher what is
needed in others and to create the illusions needed. The Ubermensch possesses the
feminine ability to create life-affirming hopes and illusions. Nietzsche also suggests that
the genius of the heart is more beautiful than others. Although Nietzsche laments the fact,
woman is the more beautiful sex of the human species (GS, 72).

Kaufmann suggests that the genius of the heart is Socrates, who obviously is a
male (BGE, 295, n. 43). It should be noted, however, that Socrates was notoriously ugly.
Despite his physical flaws, an individual man, namely Socrates, is able to acquire the
requisite feminine traits. The next question is whether a woman could acquire the
necessary courage, self-mastery, and strength to become the Ubermensch. Nietzsche
envisions the possibility of a woman embodying his ideal. Here Nietzsche imagines the
perfect female master:

A deep and powerful alto voice of the kind one sometimes hears in the
theater can suddenly raise the curtain upon possibilities in which we usually
do not believe. All at once we believe that somewhere in the world there

could be women with lofty, heroic, and royal souls, capable of and ready
for grandiose responses, resolutions, and sacrifices, capable of and ready

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for rule over men because in them the best elements of man apart from his
sex have become an incarnate ideal. The intention of the theater, to be sure,
is not at all that such voices should create this notion of women; what they
are supposed to represent is usually the ideal male lover such as Romeo.
But to judge by my experience, the theater regularly miscalculates at this
point, as does the composer who expects that kind of effect from such a
voice. Such lovers are unconvincing: such voices always retain some
motherly and housewifely coloration--most of all when they make one think
of love (GS, 70).
Nietzsche admits that he typically does not believe in women who are capable of ruling
over men. But the beauty of an alto voice can conjure such an image--a woman who is a
combination of the best feminine qualities with the best masculine qualities. Two aspects
of the woman he envisions are motherly and housewifely coloration. This focus is
consistent with Zarathustra’s solution of pregnancy to the riddle that is woman; the perfect
woman is motherly and housewifely. He does not state the masculine qualities of such a
woman, but he likely means the traditional manly qualities of courage, resolve, command,
and an ability to fight. Though he does not name a woman Ubermensch, he imagines this
as a possible ideal.

Nietzsche stresses, though, that woman may be less likely than man to understand
herself as the goal--as a potential Ubermensch. This may make her less likely to be an
Ubermensch. Woman’s greater connection to mere life inclines her toward democratic and
Christian moralities. Her compassion for mere life may make her unable to stand seeing
others suffer. However, having a child could be a cure to this as well. Her passionate love
of her own child may make her most willing to inflict suffering on others, that is, anyone
who dares threaten the child.

Nietzsche suggests that the proper reading of him will spawn opposition. That
Nietzsche does not expect there to be a female Ubermensch does not mean that woman
could not prove him wrong. Therefore, the Ubermensch will either be a male with the
most praiseworthy feminine attributes or a female who has attained masculine attributes.

Since Nietzsche relegates woman to a secondary role, it is most likely that the Ubermensch

will be a man (with feminine attributes), though Nietzsche does not rule out the possibility

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that the Ubermensch could be a woman (with masculine attributes). “To be the child who
is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of
the birth-giver” (Z, 199). The creator-motlrer gives birth to children (ideas) who in their

innocence produce (or are the impetus for the creation of) new ideals themselves.

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CHAPTER 5: WILL TO POWER
Why the Ubermensch Must Be Willed

Feminists like Tirrell, Lorraine, and Singer incorrectly interpret the will to power as
the will to the empowerment of woman. Their particular misreading results from the failure
to recognize the purpose Nietzsche attaches to the will to power. For example, Singer
incorrectly concludes that Nietzsche’s “emphasis on the power of individuals to create
themselves through a process of commitment and will offers one road past an essentialist
conception of masculinity and femininity, and its reproduction as an arbitrary system of
privilege in both the social and philosophical spheres” (Singer, 185). But this
interpretation is cloaked in Singer’s feminist ideals. Nietzsche does not encourage every
individual to follow the path of the creator, but only the tiniest minority will be able to
accomplish the greatest transcendence. As a means of preparing humanity for the
Ubermensch, Nietzsche understands his will to power doctrine to encourage the promotion
of the Eternal Feminine and the Eternal Masculine as distinct types. In fact, Nietzsche
promotes separate masculine and feminine wills in order to institute the very system of
privilege and hierarchy that Singer hopes to abolish.

Nietzsche teaches that active willing by human beings is the only possible means of
creating the horizon of the future. Men and women must learn to conceive of themselves in
a new way--they must learn that their fundamental drive is the will to power. Zarathustra
teaches his disciples to will in a new way. “A new will I teach men: to will this way which
man has walked blindly, and to affirm it, and no longer to sneak away from it like the sick
and decaying” (Z, 144). Humans must acknowledge and affirm the will to power as the
root of human action. Regardless of whether the sexes have different ways of willing from
one another, both man and woman must believe that “life itself is will to power” (BGE, 13)
because willing is the means of actrralizing the Ubermensch. Triumphing over nihilism
requires initially, the proper understanding of the meaning of God’s death (i.e.,

Nietzsche’s transvaluation); second, an acceptance of the new human goal (the

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Ubermensch) as the light of the future; and third, the means of achieving that goal, that is,
knowledge of how to will creatively.

As with the Ubermensch teaching, one does well to remember the context in which
Nietzsche (or Zarathustra) presents the will to power, the specific audience he teaches, and
what his intentions as a teacher might be. The will to power doctrine is Nietzsche ’s
proposition and, as such, does not, nor does it claim to, have the status of a traditional tmth
(of course, no “truth” can have such a status in light of the death of God). The will to
power doctrine appears in Zarathustra but the doctrine occupies a central role in Nietzsche’s
later works as well. Unlike the Ubermensch teaching which Zarathustra initially tries to
teach the multitude (but later only to brothers), Zarathustra presents the will to power
doctrine, not to the masses, but to his brothers and comrades. Though the will to power
describes the basic condition of all living things, neither Nietzsche nor Zarathustra
addresses the teaching to all life, or even all human beings. In Beyond Good and Evil,
Nietzsche presents the doctrine to those who share similar experiences with him, i.e., “we
free spirits,” “we good Europeans,” and “we scholars.” Nietzsche hopes this doctrine will
enable individuals to overcome philosophy, religion, and modern science. But he also
presents a simplified explanation of life (as the will to power) to see if that explanation has
the power to improve humanity (BGE, 24).

What is the Will to Power?

Nietzsche teaches that the will to power is the origin of all moralities, ideals,
mistakes, and triumphs. Humans have failed to recognize the will to power as the
fundamental drive of Man and the root of all organic functions until Nietzsche reveals it as
such. The will to power teaching reveals that individual wills are the only possible
foundation for goals, ideals, or gods. These moralities, ideals, and gods originally served
the purpose of preserving humans: “Verily, men gave themselves all their good and evil.
Verily, they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from

heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve himself-he alone created a meaning

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for things, a human meaning” (Z, 171). Because different ideals are conducive to the
preservation of different types of individuals, a thousand different “truths” have been
created so far. No divine entity created morality, purpose, or meaning for humanity--
various human beings did. This means that even philosophy, the so-called “will to truth,”
is nothing but a form of the will to power according to Nietzsche (WP, 583; BGE, 3, 9).
Human life as it exists is really the unconscious creation of a few (male) geniuses who
transformed human nature (and the world) without realizing they were doing it.

Nietzsche teaches the will to power doctrine in order to turn humans away from
what they are becoming. As an explanation for all human action, the entire purpose of
teaching the will to power doctrine is to transform human beings--men and women. In
order to achieve this transformation, Nietzsche teaches that all previous philosophers
misunderstood themselves, human beings, and life in general. Without being aware of it,
these philosophers (as well as priests, scholars, scientists, etc...) were actually exerting 8
their will to power, attempting to master the world by interpreting it in a variety of ways.
All philosophers “want to create the world before which [they] can kneel: that is [their]
ultimate hope and intoxication” (Z, 225). Nietzsche teaches that the root of all philosophic
thought, and, even the most rational conceptual thinking, is nothing more than an instinct, a
guess, or a hunch. Philosophers necessarily interpret the world in a way that served their
own physiological or psychological needs. Philosophy “always creates the world in its
own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most
spiritual will to power, to the ‘creation of the world,’ to the causa prima” (BGE, 9).
Philosophers do not want simply to understand the world, but to invent the world. Prior to
Nietzsche, philosophers incorrectly thought that they had an innate drive for knowledge, a
drive to uncover the “true world,” a fixed essence, an objective truth about reality (WP,
593). Nevertheless, Nietzsche teaches, they really tyrannized nature, unconsciously made
nature bend to their will, to their belief that all beings should be thinkable (Z, 225).

Nietzsche, too, is a philosopher and as such he is not an exception to this rule. But

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Nietzsche recognizes himself as a fundamentally different species of philosopher because
he is the fust to acknowledge the will to power as the source of ideals.

Nietzsche’s will to power teaching seems on the surface to be just as life-denying as
the historicists’ revelation that all truth is historically conditioned. There is no fixed
standard above individual human wills by which to judge one set of ideas against the next.
There are as many wills as there are people-and no way to judge among their perspectives.
Nietzsche, however, intends the will to power doctrine (in the context of the death of God
and the eternal return of the same) to free Man, to liberate Man from his “bondage under
Purpose” (Z, 278). The recognition that “no ‘eternal will’ wills” (Z, 278) frees Man to
determine his own destiny. This is not to say that all human beings are (or should be) the
creators of ideals, nor does it mean that creating ideals is the only way to express one’s
will. Nietzsche means that humans are responsible for all of the accomplishments that they
falsely attributed to divine gods.

With his introduction of the will to power as the basic motivation of all human
action, Nietzsche is creatively reinterpreting history. When considering what gods are
through the lens of the will to power, they come to light as nothing more than false ideals
and mistakes made by humans. Since Nietzsche is the creator of the will to power doctrine
(i.e., he has “discovered” the will to power), one may view him as the first consciously
artistic philosopher who transcends all false ideals. According to Nietzsche, Man must
become aware of the will to power because Man’s failure to understand himself properly
created all forms of the ascetic ideal. Zarathustra commands, “what you have called world,
that shall be created only by you: your reason, your image, your will, your love shall thus
be realized” (Z, 198). By making the will to power conscious, Nietzsche presents to
humans the means of creating a new human goal. Awareness of the will to power
fundamentally alters human nature-both male and female natures. An individual who
recognizes this power is fundamentally different than one who turns outside of himself to

find meaning in life. In other words, a human who wills unconsciously has a different

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nature than a human who wills creatively. A human who understands himself to be
essentially will to power is a different type of being than a human who has never learned of
the will. By teaching humans to will consciously, Nietzsche unleashes a great creative
potential in Man to reinvent himself.

Once Nietzsche reveals the root of morality, new philosophers must exert the will in
ways it has never been exerted before. New philosophers will also be “commanders and
legislators” (BGE, 203) who create “the yoke for the thousand necks,” the goal for
humanity that justifies the past--the Ubermensch (Z, 172). But the fact that man and
woman have separate roles in the creating of the Ubermensch begs the question of whether
they will in fundamentally different ways from one another. In other words, is a fixed
distinction between a masculine and feminine will the reason why Nietzsche insists on
preserving these two wills? If human beings are not-yet-deterrnined, it is possible to alter
man and woman. As already noted, there is no necessary reason why the new philosopher
ought to maintain separate roles for man and woman unless his subjective will deems it
preferable. Nietzsche’s desire to maintain distinct male and female wills initially appears as
nothing more than his subjective preference, for all human choices are subjective
preferences. Examining the respective instincts of man and woman and the corresponding
relationship between will to power and instinct helps explain the need for sexual duality.

The Relation Between Will to Power and Instinct

The will to power is an expression for a process, a striving that cannot be
understood in isolation from the individual who wills. Nietzsche translates all organic
functions back to the will to power; this form of the will is the explanation for everything
that Man (as well as all other life) does. Heidegger deciphers no difference between “will”
and “will to power” in Nietzsche. He asks, “What does ‘will’ mean? What does ‘will to
power’ mean? For Nietzsche these two questions are but one. For in his view will is
nothing else than will to power, and power nothing else than the essence of will. Hence,

will to power is will to will, which is to say, willing is self-willing” (Heidegger, I: 37).

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But Heidegger’s thesis is not entirely correct Nietzsche’s thesis posits “our entire
instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will-namely,
of the will to power” in order to “find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and
nourishment” (BGE, 36). Nietzsche suggests that there is more than one form of the will;
he traces all of our instincts back to one form of the will. The passage suggests that there
may be other forms of the will, though he does not enumerate them here. Elsewhere he
mentions other forms of the will--the “will to truth” (Z, 227), the “will to ignorance”
(BGE, 24, 59), the “basic will of the spirit” (BGE, 230), the “will to stupidity” (BGE,
107), the “will to the denial of life” (BGE, 259), and he also speaks of a “double will” (Z,
254). He hopes to demonstrate that it is possible to understand all of these forrrrs of the
will and all of our drives in terms of the will to power--the delight and striving for an
increase in the feeling of power.

The will to power is not an instinct itself, but the development and ramification of
our instinctive life. Willing is connected to the instincts because humans will what their
instincts propel them to will. Nietzsche describes the will to power as the development of
our instinctive life because our instincts developed the ability to will consciously. It is now
possible for humans to become consciously willing beings. Which instincts will develop
over time no longer has to be based on chance; now the human will can determine the
direction the instincts will develop. Nietzsche also describes the will to power also as the
ramification of our instinctive life. The ability to will consciously is the consequence of the
current development of the human instincts. The current direction of human instincts is led
by sick individuals, but new philosophers can decide to develop the instincts in a different
direction. The new philosophers creatively will so that Man can incorporate different
habituations into human instincts.

With the will to power doctrine, Nietzsche teaches humans to rely on the wisdom of
the instincts: “‘instinct’ is of all the kinds of intelligence that have been discovered so far--

the most intelligent” (BGE 218). In particular, Nietzsche reminds Man to rely on the wild,

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playful, “self-enjoying” instincts like sex, the lust to rule, and selfishness (cf. Z, 299-
303). Nietzsche offers a comprehensive understanding of the power of the instincts by
explaining; “by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among
instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking” (BGE 3). Nietzsche
intends the will to power to explain all human behavior, even instincts that contradict one
another. Most notably, Nietzsche teaches that reason is not the opposite of instinct, but
merely one interpretation of the world that the instincts produce.81 And because it is only
one interpretation among many, a rational interpretation does not necessarily warrant a
privileged status over other types of interpretation. Ironically, Nietzsche challenges the
faith in reason in order to teach humans to rely on the instincts, yet the crucial type of
willing for Man is the willing of ideas and ideals--an act necessarily linked to his reasoning
capacity (BGE, 285). But this is no inconsistency since the instincts drive the thoughts.
Nietzsche notes the typical “misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were
an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and
desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason--” (WP, 387). The
instincts even animate the philosopher, as Nietzsche explains: “most of the conscious
thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his
instincts” (BGE, 3). Reason is a tool of the will that enables Man to act upon or to
sublimate his passions. Nietzsche is not simply hostile to reason, but he attacks the faith in
reason alone, the insistence on rationality at any price (cf. T1, 478). Nietzsche places a
renewed emphasis on instinct and passion as opposed to theoretical reasoning.
The Masculine and The Feminine Drive
Instincts can conflict with one another, so the order of rank of the instincts

determines what the individual wills. The difference between wills is the order of rank of

81This teaching is similar to Hobbes’ teaching that reason has no power to decide what is good;
instead, the passions decide. Reason does not control the passions; it serves them by sending out scouts
and spies to attain what the passions desire (Hobbes, 139). Reason is not the opposite of passions, but a
tool of them. Man will even use his reason to develop moralities that serve the passions.

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the instincts. But man and woman have different instincts from one another. While both
man and woman have an instinct to procreate, due to their different reproductive
capabilities, this instinct takes a different form in man than it does in woman. Man and
woman desire sex in different ways as well. The woman is well aware that sex can result
in pregnancy, while the man does not have to concern himself with the result to the same
degree. At the very least, man has an instinct to beget or not to beget, while woman has an
instinct to give birth or not to give birth. Birth control does alter the influence of the
possibility of pregnancy to a degree, but woman is still generally more mindful than the
man of this possible result. Their respective instincts shape their relationship with one
another and with other human beings. Since man and woman have different instincts,
Nietzsche’s defmition of the will to power as the development and ramification of the
instincts implies that man and woman have different wills. And since they have different
wills, the perfection of man would be different than the perfection of woman.

Furthermore, Zarathustra describes the will to power as “the unexhausted
procreative will of life” (Z, 226). By describing the will as procreative rather than creative,
Nietzsche suggests that there are two fundamental wills of life-~a masculine and a feminine
one. Together, the respective wills of man and woman procreate. In other words, the
choice of the term “procreative” indicates that there is a masculine type of willing that is
distinct from the feminine type of willing. Nietzsche suggests that life needs both types of
creativity or there will be no procreation--physically or metaphorically.

Willing means a desire to cause a change. A dissatisfaction (with oneself, with
others, with conditions) often provides the spark to will. To corroborate the suggestion
that Nietzsche conceives of a separate feminine will from a masculine one, Nietzsche
speaks of two types of dissatisfaction (that impel one to will)--a quasi feminine type that
consists of primarily feminine qualities and a masculine type that consists of primarily
masculine qualities.

The weak and quasi feminine type of the dissatisfied has a sensitivity for
making life more beautiful and profound; the strong or masculine type, to

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stick to this metaphor, has a sensitivity for making life better and safer. The
former type manifests its weakness and femininity by gladly being deceived
occasionally and settling for a little intoxication and effusive enthusiasm,
although it can never be satisfied altogether and suffers from the incurability
of its dissatisfaction. Moreover, this type promotes all those who know
how to provide opiates and narcotic consolations, and it resents all who
esteem physicians above priests: thus it assures the continuation of real
misery. If this type had not been superabundant in Europe since the Middle
Ages, the celebrated European capacity for constant change might never
have come into existence, for the requirements of the strong among the
dissatisfied are too crude and at bottom so undemanding that eventually they
can surely be brought to rest (GS, 24).

Dissatisfaction (in particular, contempt) can animate an individual’s will. Dissatisfaction
with oneself (or others) can lead to corruption or it can enable the individual to transcend
himself. In his description of the quasi feminine type, Nietzsche argues that the more
physically beautiful sex has a (feminine) inclination to enhance life by attempting to
beautify it. Woman is biologically suited to this role; this is the proper development of the
quasi feminine dissatisfaction. Due to man’s greater physical strength (relative to woman),
the proper development of masculine dissatisfaction is to strive to make life better and
safer. Man’s biology makes him more suitable as a protector and warrior.

The initial impression of this passage is that Nietzsche castigates the quasi feminine
type because it is weak while he hopes to promote the masculine type because it is strong.
But both of these inclinations have the possibility of serving descending life.

China, for example, is a country in which large-scale dissatisfaction and the
capacity for change have become extinct centuries ago; and the socialists and
state idolaters of Europe with their measures for making life better and safer
might easily establish in Europe, too, Chinese conditions and a Chinese
“happiness,” if only they could first extirpate the sicklier, tenderer, more
feminine dissatisfaction and romanticism that at present are still
superabundant here. Europe is sick but owes the utmost gratitude to her
incurability and to the eternal changes in her affliction: these constantly new
conditions and these no less constantly new dangers, pains, and media of
information have finally generated an intellectual irritability that almost
amounts to genius and is in any case the mother of all genius (GS, 24).
The masculine type of dissatisfaction settles for nothing more than comfort and
complacency without the presence of the opposing quasi feminine dissatisfaction. The
quasi feminine type is desirable as the foundation for the strong masculine type that

Nietzsche hopes to cultivate. Thus, the quasi feminine dissatisfaction is necessary, though

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not necessarily noble or praiseworthy on its own. The inability of the quasi feminine type
to be satisfied can create new dangers and pains that animate the masculine type of
dissatisfaction. The masculine type of dissatisfaction may lead to the production of the last
man (i.e., shallow complacency) without the challenge of the quasi feminine type. The
tension produced by these two types of dissatisfaction has the potential to produce genius,
with which Nietzsche is most concerned. Nietzsche also associates the quasi feminine type
with the “celebrated European capacity for constant change.” The capacity for change is
desirable and necessary as one must alter oneself in order to deal with the problems of
one’s time. This trait Nietzsche recognizes in himself in his poem “From High
Mountains”32 where he states that “One has to change to stay akin to me.” Nietzsche’s
own character, like the character of the contemplative type, maintains a quasi feminine
character.83

Nietzsche uses the term “quasi feminine” instead of “feminine” type to describe the
contemplative. In other words, he notes a masculine type of dissatisfaction and a only a
quasi feminine one. What could the fenrinine type of dissatisfaction look like? Perhaps the
genuinely feminine dissatisfaction results from a longing of the female body. The feminine
type of dissatisfaction manifests itself in its longing to produce beauty physically through
the birth process. The quasi feminine type of dissatisfaction seeks to beautify the world
through certain types of consoling illusions. Only a woman could experience feminine
dissatisfaction, while Nietzsche and other contemplatives only approximate her physical
longing.

Life as the Will to Power
Nietzsche says that all life is will to power, not just human life. Life is “essentially

appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness,

82This poem can be found at the end of the text of Beyond Good and Evil.

33Kaufmann also makes this argument in n. 22 on p. 99 of his translation of The Gay Science.

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imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation”
(BGE, 259). This seems to eliminate the distinction among types, for what motivates the
lion also drives the tree, and the human. But notice the Nietzsche italicizes the word
“essentially.” Life may be more complex than Nietzsche’s characterization here.
Nietzsche’s most definitive statement about the will to power occurs in Beyond Good and
Evil: “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power,
self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (BGE, 13).
Although self-preservation is an instinct of life, the inclination to preserve oneself is not the
primary drive in organisms. One’s inclination to accumulate and discharge one’s strength
is the most fundamental drive of life. All organisms crave the feeling of increased strength
and exhilaration. Life is choiceworthy as a prerequisite for the exercise of the will but it is
the feeling of power that makes life desirable. Zarathustra’s wild wisdom says to him,
“You will, you want, you love-that is the only reason why you praise life” (Z, 220). In
this passage Zarathustra indicates that his love of willing and suiving are deeper than his
love of life.34 Zarathustra’s love of life is certainly not a love of all life indiscriminately.
Nor does he love mere life, but life as struggling to increase the exhilaration of power. The
last man, in contrast, exists merely to exist comfortably.

The will to power is characteristic of Man, animals, and all living organisms; in
fact, “there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this” (W P, 688). So the
will to power is a comprehensive phenomenon (it explains all actions) and a universal one
as well (it is applicable to all living things). This characterization seems to rule out
distinction among different types of beings and categories. But Nietzsche’s will does

distinguish between different types-between Man and the other animals and between man

84But Zarathustra seems to deny his love of life as a prerequisite for willing when he explains
later, “Deeply I love only life-and verily, most of all when I hate life. But that I am well disposed toward
wisdom, and often too well, that is because she reminds me so much of life" (Z, 221). Now this is not
Zarathustra’s final word on the subject, but he indicates that he has a love of life over a love of wisdom and
perhaps a love of life above all else. But this speech also occurs before Zarathustra offers his full
articulation of the will to power (Z, 225-228; cf. BGE 9, 19, 230, 231). The exchange here indicates the
difficulty Zarathustra has articulating the relationship between willing and living.

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and woman. The distinction is not that some will while others do not because living things
will what their instincts impel them to will. The order of rank of those instincts
distinguishes one individual from the next. Human beings are different from animals
because they can be (or become) cognizant of the fact that they will, and this cognizance
opens up great opportunities for Man. Only human beings can choose what to will, which
goals to pursue.

Although Nietzsche’s characterization of all life as will to power makes some
sense, one wonders whether animals actually experience a feeling of power, let alone
blades of grass. Much of Nietzsche’s description of willing and what it means for a living
thing to will applies only to humans. Nietzsche argues that “it is only in intellectual beings
that pleasure, displeasure, and will are to be found; the vast majority of organisms has
nothing of the sort” (GS, 127). Animals do not strive to transcend themselves, nor do they
love, philosophize, or create gods. The commonality between animal and human wills is a
type of striving, a spiritedness. and a desire to grow. Every living thing continually
strives to become more than it is already. Biology and instinct determine the direction in
which plants and animals develop. But humans can transcend their physical limitations and
their instincts, at least to a degree. Yet the intimate connection between will and instinct
also suggests that humans cannot completely transcend their drives.

Zarathustra describes life as “that which must always overcome itself’ (Z, 227). To
live does not mean to rest, or to be content, safe, or satisfied. Willing means affecting a
change, striving to leave an imprint on the world, pushing against opposing forces,
wanting to be different. Zarathustra explains how life as will to power always seeks to
overcome itself: “Whatever I create and however much I love it--soon I must oppose it and
my love; thus my will wills it.” (Z, 227). Just as an individual achieves a goal
(accumulates a certain sum of power), the individual strives to go beyond what he has just
achieved. One transcends oneself by seeking that which is weak and alien to oneself and

striving to suppress it. “Life is not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer ones, but

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will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and subdues more and more of
that which is ‘outside’” (WP, 681). And because man and woman have different bodies,
this means that they will experience an accumulation of power in different objects. What is
“alien” to a female body may not be “alien” to a male body. Living means seeking out
things or people over which one can establish dominion and thus accumulate power. And
this means that one must do “to other bodies what [one]...refrain[s] from doing to
[oneself]. ...striv[ing] to grow, spread, seize, become predominant--not from any morality
or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power” (BGE, 259).
By mastering more and more of what is alien to oneself, one experiences a feeling of
exhilaration and enhances one’s strength. Their different physiologies may mean that they
seek dominion in different ways from one another. However, this description of the will
to power seems to affirm the masculine will (as a powerful physicality) more strongly than
the feminine will.

Willing sounds like “wanting”; however, Nietzsche clarifies that willing “is not
‘desiring,’ striving, demanding: it is distinguished from these by the affect of commanding.
There is no such thing as ‘willing,’ but only a willing something: one must not remove the
aim from the total condition-as epistemologists do” (WP, 668). Willing is
indistinguishable from that which is willed, the goal toward which the organism strives.
What an individual wills depends on the type of person that individual is, the physiological
needs of that individual. The term “will to power” tempts one to conclude that power is the
end goal common to all living things. But Nietzsche is not saying that humans
conceptualize “power” as a goal and devise different means of attaining it. Humans create
goals because the will to power impels them to do so. The will to power does not originate
in a feeling of a lack that needs to be filled by “power”; the will is better understood as an
internal striving to be more than one already is. An organism may feel an accumulation of
power by fixing on a variety of goals, i.e., “power” can mean a variety of things (cf.

Hobbes, 150-160). By suggesting that the masculine will and the feminine will are

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different from one another, Nietzsche suggests that power means something different to
woman than it does to man. To try to understand willing apart from its goal or apart from
the body that is its source is to misunderstand the will.
Commanding and Obeying
The will to power always manifests itself in commanding and obeying. Zarathustra
explains: “Where I found the living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of
those who serve I found the will to be master (Z, 226). It is possible to experience an
accumulation of power even in heeding the commands of others. In submitting to the
stronger force, the weaker individuals assert their power over those who are weaker still.
For example, a physically weak individual may even experience an empowerment by
submitting to another. Consider the child who submits to the father. The child’s
submission is an exertion of the will to power because the child envisions one weaker than
himself over whom he can establish dominion. Nietzsche explains:
That the weaker should serve the stronger, to that it is persuaded by its own
will, which would be master over what is weaker still: this is the one
pleasure it does not want to renounce. And as the smaller yields to the
greater that it may have pleasure and power over the smallest, thus even the
greatest still yields, and for the sake of power risks life. That is the yielding
33%6 greatest: it is hazard and danger and casting dice for death (Z, 226—
The weak do not submit to the strong out of a fear of death or a desire to preserve life, but
primarily due to an internal striving for the feeling of strength. The term “weak” does not
necessarily refer to physical weakness, but weakness of the will. It is not uncommon for a
physically strong individual to submit to a physically weak one (cf. BGE, 21). The fact
that women as a sex are generally physically weaker than men does not necessarily indicate
that women will always obey men. It is quite possible for a male to submit to a female, just
as it is quite possible for a parent to submit to their physically weaker child.
All willing requires some type of submission since willing is simultaneously a
commanding and obeying. Nietzsche clarifies this idea by explaining that each individual is

“at the same time the commanding and the obeying [party], and as the obeying party we

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know the sensations of constraint, irnpulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion” (BGE,
19). Within each human being there are drives that push against one another struggling to
tyrannize the others. What distinguishes one human being from another is the order of
their instincts (cf. BGE, 6). When the individual heeds a command from the outside or
from one of his drives, all of the other drives obey at that moment. So. every will to power
is a duality, a commanding and obeying, although “we are accustomed to disregard this
duality” (BGE, 19).

Additionally, willing can be directed inward or outward (that is, it can be passive or
active). When an individual is incapable of commanding himself, others will command
him. Commanding is more difficult than obeying; therefore, there will always be a few
extraordinary individuals who create the values that the others obey. The many lack the
courage to command themselves. There has always been “a great many people who
obeyed, compared with the small number of those commanding” (BGE, 199). But these
creators of ideals are disappearing from the human race.

The will to power is an egoistic type of striving that originates in one’s love of self.
This is why Zarathustra teaches that one “must learn to love oneself...with a wholesome
and healthy love, so that one can bear to be with oneself and need not roam” (Z, 305).
Even what has been understood to be a sacrifice (for another, for an ideal, etc.) is actually
an attempt by an individual to achieve mastery. Self-love impels one to make so-called
sacrifices. For example, one sacrifices one’s life for one’s country because of the belief
that one will be rewarded in the afterlife. The individual seeks mastery over death by
“sacrificing” his life. Both weak and strong individuals will; however, a weak individual
(a slave) will experience strength through submission while a strong individual (a master)
experiences strength by commanding. Similarly, a feminine will experiences the
accumulation of power differently than a masculine will does. In a woman the feminine
drives rule, while in a man the masculine drives rule. Different individuals also experience

different degrees of tension in their souls.

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Ressentiment and Willing
Nietzsche describes the history of the West as the history of the creation of nihilistic

values which promote a weak, sick type of life, a weak type of will. Just as there are two
types of wills, there are two types of moralities produced by those wills: “There are master
morality and slave morality” (BGE, 260). The slave revolt in morality begins when those
who are weak (physically, morally, and psychologically) declare life to be unfair. Since
they lack the strength to affirm war, chaos, cruelty, slavery and struggle as necessary parts
of life, they declare those things sins. The motivation of the slaves is ressentiment, which
“becomes creative and gives birth to values” (GM 1:10). Because they lack the courage and
strength (of body and soul) to react in a physical way against their enemies (by fighting,
enslaving, or killing them), slaves attempt to enslave all others to their valuation. Nietzsche
explains;

While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself,

slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is

“different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative deed. This

inversion of the value-positing eye-this need to direct one’s view outward

instead of back to oneself--is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to

exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs,

physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all--its action is

fundamentally reaction (GM 1: 10).
Because they feel cheated by life, they create perfect ideals outside of this world. They
hope these ideals will justify their suffering. The fact that Nietzsche intends to maintain
both the master and slave and the masculine and feminine dichotomies suggests a
relationship between the two. One wonders if the weaker sex necessarily relies on the
same type of reactive measure as the slave. To determine the relationship between the two
dichotomies, further consideration of the difference between master and slave morality is
required.

The difference between master and slave morality is not that one is creative while

the other is not; both masters and slaves create. Masters are different from slaves because

masters love and affirm themselves through their spontaneous creation. Slaves create

because they cannot affirm themselves. While slaves may be creative, they are essentially

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reactive, sneaky, and sly. Their instinct to preserve themselves impels them to reject those
who are strong. They demand that strength “should not express itself as strength, that it
should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to' become master, a
thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs” (GM 1:13). Rather than create
spontaneously of themselves, they react to external stimuli. Slave morality springs from
and supports sick life. Those who cannot accept the real nature of the world (its lack of
purpose, its malleability, its immorality) are characterized by ressentiment. Christianity is
the result of the creativity of slaves; in fact, ressentiment has been the most creative force so
far. Nietzsche sees the history of the West as the history of the replacement of master
morality with slave morality. The two aspects of slave morality that have become instinct
in man are compassion and herd morality. The ascetic ideal is the result of ressentiment
and its cunning will to create. But humans cannot rely on ressentiment any longer. The
only direction ressentiment has left to go is toward the complete acceptance of nihilism.
Nietzsche is not unambiguously hostile toward slaves, slave morality, and the slave
revolt. Slaves are praiseworthy because their loyalty to the masters is needed. Slaves are
necessary, for there would be no masters if the masses were not slavish. Nietzsche’s
insistence on maintaining the sexual dichotomy may relate to this phenomenon. Perhaps
Nietzsche wishes to keep woman “in her place,” i.e., uneducated and relegated to the
private sphere, in order to allow males to be masterful. In other words, the purpose of
maintaining sexual dichotomy could be to perpetuate the superiority of males over females.
If this is the case, females take the role of the slaves while males take the role of the
masters. After all, woman’s role is secondary to man’s. If Nietzsche understands
woman’s role to be praiseworthy only insofar as she serves as inspiration for men, she
may simply be a slave in Nietzsche’s view. But this is an oversimplification because the
mass majority of males and females are slaves. Most human beings are to be servants to
the Ubermensch. Since a correlation between “woman” and “slave” is not self-evident, it is

necessary to determine if woman herself benefits from Nietzsche’s maintenance of sexual

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dichotomy. Is woman an essentially submissive and reactive being or does the sexual
dichotomy serve to enhance her own accumulation (or feeling of) power? Nietzsche
suggests that the sexual dichotomy (and the corresponding role he prescribes to woman)
benefits not only man, but woman as well. Indeed, the human species-as a whole benefits
from this dichotomy. Although he prescribes a secondary role for woman, this role is not
essentially a submissive and reactive role.
Will and Willingness

Since all willing is a commanding and obeying, most scholars have assumed that
women (who are feminine) live the life of obedience (slaves), while men (who are
masculine) live the life of the commanding master. For example, in reference to
Zarathustra’s speech “On Old and Young Little Women,” Lorraine voices this typical
reaction to Nietzsche’s anti-democratic prescriptions: “In Zarathustra’s ranking of rule and
obedience, it would seem that women, simply by virtue of being women, are fit only for
obeying” (Lorraine, 1998, 121). One must consider, however, whether the drives that
Nietzsche considers to be feminine are essentially submissive and reactive, while the
masculine drives are commanding and self-affirming. Lorraine’s assessment that woman is
a slave by virtue of the fact that she is a woman cannot be correct for at least two reasons.
First, what constitutes “woman as such” can be transformed. Women (and men, for that
matter) can be bred to be strong or weak Nietzsche insists that defeminized women are
weaker and more slavish than feminine women, and these feminine women may in fact not
be slavish at all. Second, because all willing is simultaneously a commanding and
obeying, it cannot be the case that women are simply obedient. All humans command and
obey simultaneously (BGE, 19). As a physically stronger type than woman, man may
have a predilection for commanding other humans, but this does not necessarily mean that
man more than woman affirms himself through commanding others.

A close examination of aphorisms 60-75 of The Gay Science can help demonstrate

that “woman” is not simply synonymous with “slave.” Although this work precedes

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Zarathustra, this section is consistent with the separate roles he ascribes to man and woman
in his later works. This section on women opens with a consideration of the topic of
nature:
We artists.--When we love a woman, we easily conceive a hatred for nature
on account of all the repulsive natural functions to which every woman is
subject. We prefer not to think of all this; but when our soul touches on
these matters for once, it shrugs as it were and looks contemptuously at
nature: we feel insulted; nature seems to encroach on our possessions, and
with the profanest hands at that. Then we refuse to pay any heed to
physiology and decree secretly: “I want to hear nothing about the fact that a
human being is something more than soul and form.” “The human being
under the s ' ” is for all lovers a horror and unthinkable, a blasphemy
against God and love (GS, 59).
Woman’s natural functions ought to be hidden or veiled because artists consider those
functions to be repugnant. Nietzsche includes himself in this group of artists in love who
are repulsed by the sight of woman’s natural functions. A couple of possible reasons come
to mind why loving artists hate the natural functions to which every woman is subject.
First, these functions (labor pain, menstruation, hot flashes, menopause, and various other
bodily functions), though natural, are not simply beautiful or desirable in themselves.
Second, the artist is not necessarily a philosopher or knowledge-seeker. The artist may not
adequately (and may not wish to) understand those functions or the power those natural
functions have over woman. He is in love with the illusion, with the idea of woman that he
wants to mold as his own possession. Nietzsche continues; “We artists! We ignore what
is natural. We are moonstruck and God-struck. We wander, still as death, unwearied, on
heights that we do not see as heights but as plains, as our safety” (GS, 59). Initially this
repulsion and desire to ignore nature seems to be inconsistent with Nietzsche’s renewed
emphasis on the importance of the body and physiology. But this inconsistency can be
resolved by realizing that the above passage was written by the pen of Nietzsche as artist
(one aspect of his personality) rather than as a philosopher of the future. Nietzsche surely
considers himself to be more than just an artist, but creativity is an essential trait of the

philosopher of the future. Moreover, that he recognizes the importance of the body does

not mean that all physiological functions must be beautiful to Nietzsche. He can recognize

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their necessity without embracing them as beautiful goals. Nor does Nietzsche sirnply
consider women to be ugly, just as he does not consider the truth to be simply ugly. The
complete denial or the attempt to eradicate woman’s natural functions (and man’s) would
constitute a further uglification of the human species. Humanity moves a step closer to
“The greatest danger’ ’85 by failing to recognize the differences between the sexes (GS, 76).
If Nietzsche understands woman to be an essentially resentful creature, one would
expect woman to view her own body as a prison that she wants to flee; But Nietzsche
suggests that women actually can use their biology to enhance their strength. He explains
this in aphorism 66 which is entitled “The strength of the weak”:
All women are subtle in exaggerating their weaknesses; they are inventive
when it comes to weaknesses in order to appear as utterly fragile ornaments
who are hurt even by a speck of dust. Their existence is supposed to make
men feel clumsy, and guilty on that score. Thus they defend themselves
against the strong and “the law of the jungle” (GS, 66).
Because Nietzsche describes women as weak and manipulative, the tone of this aphorism
seems to reflect a hatred of women. However, a closer analysis reveals another possibility.
By exaggerating their weaknesses, by making men believe that they are weaker than they
actually are, women enhance their strength. Nietzsche describes this as a quality of all
women. Although he does not specify whether these weaknesses are physical, moral,
psychological, or political, Nietzsche most likely refers to woman’s physical weakness and
apparent fragility relative to man. Nietzsche counsels woman to convince man “that
woman must be maintained, taken care of, protected, and indulged like a more delicate,
strangely wild, and often pleasant domestic animal” (BGE, 239). And when man is able to
perceive woman as this delicate flower, he respects her and will likely be afraid to hurt or
otherwise corrupt her. In short, he will serve her. If woman can convince man that she

needs him, he will want to protect and stay loyal to her and also their future children.

But not all women are physically weaker than all men. Nietzsche therefore seems

85Appropriately, the aphorism that follows this cluster of aphorisms on woman is titled “The
greatest danger” (GS, 76).

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to exaggerate when he states that all woman have this ability to exaggerate their
weaknesses. This generalization may indicate, however, that Nietzsche is referring to more
than mere physical weaknesses. Moreover, Nietzsche does not specify that woman
exaggerates the ways in which she is weaker than man, but rather makes the more general
statement that she exaggerates her weaknesses. He argues that whatever particular
weakness a woman may have, she has a keen ability to exaggerate it. Woman makes
others (especially men) bend to her will (i.e., achieve mastery over men) by appearing to be
weaker than she actually is. Exaggerating her weaknesses does not make woman
submissive to man, but conversely is more likely to make man serve and protect her.
However, one may imagine that such an exaggeration of women’s weaknesses would
likely perpetuate the idea that women are weaker than they in fact are. Paradoxically,
Nietzsche teaches that it is in woman’s interest to promote the belief that she is weak
Whereas Nietzsche is correct that this type of manipulation may be a useful tool,
many women today refuse to put on such airs. Instead they prefer to be seen as equal to
man. But their refusal to use manipulative tools does not undermine the plausibility of
Nietzsche’s assertion that a physically weaker sex may need to find ways to achieve
strength and power in a non-physical way. Nietzsche would argue that today’s high
divorce and child abandonment rate is, in part, due to woman’s refusal to make man feel as
a needed protector. Nietzsche suggests that woman would have more power over men if
she continued to exaggerate her weaknesses instead of trying to exaggerate her strengths.
When women use their bodies to exaggerate their weaknesses, they actually affirm their
bodies and exert a strength of the feminine will. And perhaps more importantly from
Nietzsche’s perspective, this art enables man to affirm his own masculinity as well.
Woman’s clever defense is surely sneaky and sly, but Nietzsche does not say that it
is necessarily motivated by ressentiment. Whether or not this cleverness is slavish depends
upon the goal of the individual woman. Whereas all women exaggerate their weaknesses,

not all women are sick women. Sick women may be the most vengeful creatures possible,

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but this does not mean that all women are motivated by ressentiment. Nietzsche describes
the human of ressentiment:
The man [human] of ressentiment is neither upright nor naive nor honest
and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding
places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his
world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent,
how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating
and humble. A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become
eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far
greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance;
while with noble men cleverness can easily acquire a subtle flavor of luxury
and subtlety (GM 1: 10).
The slave demands that strength “should not express itself as strength, that it should not be
a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for
enemies and resistances and triumphs,” (GM 1:13). The slave believes that the strong
should pay retribution for their strength. Slave morality is a celebration of weakness by the
weak and is created out of ressentiment against the strong, noble, and beautiful. What the
masters embody and call good, the slaves call evil and sinful.

Woman’s exaggerating her weaknesses is not necessarily a denial that the strong
should be strong, nor does it necessarily imply a woman’s dishonesty with herself. The
slave says strength is bad simply. The situation that Nietzsche describes here is a bit
different. The slave does not say, “I can be crushed like a speck of dust.” The slave insists
that all crushing is bad and creates laws and universal rights to support this assessment.
Women who exaggerate their weaknesses are not saying that domination simply is bad.
They say, “Serve me because I’m fragile, beautiful, and delicate.” Woman’s exaggerating
her weaknesses and calling for man to protect her leaves open the possibility that man can
be strong. It is compatible to say “don’t crush me,” as woman does, but crush some other
individual or another society or group. Pretending to be fragile and vulnerable calls man to
be strong and manly. Man’s protection of woman is compatible with the crushing of other
groups. More slavish would be for woman to deny the fact that women are physically

weaker, to redefine physical weakness. Using her physical weakness to her advantage is

an affirmation of woman’s body. She invents a way to use her body in a way that makes

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men bow to her whims. In so doing she develops “a subtle flavor of luxury and subtlety”
(GM I: 10). Woman would need to have a strong will to get man to react in the way she
desires. Of course, she would also need a measure of beauty (like an ornament (GS, 66))
to be able to seduce man. Perhaps women who lack both physical strength and beauty
would have the likelihood of becoming resentful. Nietzsche seems to suggest that without
physical strength, the woman needs beauty, subtlety, and fragility. The implication may be
that without beauty, woman has few or no tools left. Clevemess without the subtlety and
seduction of beauty would need to be quite insidious to achieve any power over man.
Nietzsche suggests in the next aphorism that women are weaker than men in a way
other than merely physically--her will is reactive to man’s. As Nietzsche states, “Someone
took a youth to a sage and said: ‘Look, he is being corrupted by women.’ The sage shook
his head and smiled. ‘It is men,’ said he, ‘tlrat corrupt women; and all'the failings of
women should be atoned by and improved in men. For it is man who creates for himself
the image of woman, and woman forms herself according to this image’” (GS, 68). Men
corrupt women with the education they give women. Nietzsche suggests that men take the
more active role in determining how men and women are molded. Women simply
accommodate themselves to the role that men prescribe to them. The sage continues; “Will
is the manner of men; willingness that of women. That is the law of the sexes--truly, a
hard law for women” (GS, 68). This is similar to Zarathustra’s assertion that woman is
submissive to man’s will. Zarathustra declares; “The happiness of man is: I will. The
happiness of woman is: he wills” (Z, 179). Zarathustra likely means that woman is happy
when her man wills, not when any man wills. Her happiness depends, it seems, on her
taking an obedient role. Woman’s will is excited when man exercises his masculine
power. He suggests that woman is characterized by willingness to follow man’s will
instead of her own self-affirrning will; somehow woman feels an accumulation of power
when her man wills. By this, Nietzsche suggests that woman actually prefers man to

establish dominion, perhaps over her. But Nietzsche does not mean that woman does not

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will, for all life is will to power.

In the same speech, a little old woman advises Zarathustra; “You are going to
women [Frauen]? Do not forget the whip!” (Z, 179). Consistent with the above
suggestion, the little old woman suggests that women prefer men to hold the physical
power (the whip). Women like manly men who are strong enough to “keep them in their
place,” to whip them into submission. He also may mean that men need a whip to keep
woman in line or that woman should want man to be capable of putting her in her place (as
his servant?) Man needs a whip because he is no longer strong enough on his own to
inspire fear in others. The notorious whip comment does not necessarily mean that woman
is simply man’s slave, since the speech does not clarify who is to wield the whip.36 After
all, Nietzsche posed in a picture with Ree and Salome in which Lou holds the whip. This
portrait indicates that woman may well be the possessor of the whip. Woman may be
dangerous to man because he may never know when she might pull out a whip against
him. Some women may be capable of wielding the whip against man, while others are not.
Nietzsche suggests that even those women who might be capable of possessing the whip,
should exaggerate their weaknesses in order to make men believe that they (women)
occupy a subordinate role. For the others, man is the possessor of the whip. Nietzsche
suggests that women are more womanly when they take the role of a reactor to man’s will.

Nietzsche describes this secondary role as “a hard law for women” because man’s
active willing shapes the kind of being that woman becomes. Moreover, when man fails to
be strong, woman is harmed as well. Woman’s fulfillment and power is connected to
man’s being a real man. But man cannot feel manly if he knows that he is dominated by
woman, or anyone else, for that matter. Woman is dependent upon man’s active willing
for her completeness and man’s fulfillment is dependent upon woman’s affirmation of his

willing. To say that all women are masochistic is a gross exaggeration and generalization,

86Carol Diethe also correctly notes that Nietzsche does not identify who possesses the whip
(Diethe. 63-66)-

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yet Nietzsche makes a serious point with this assertion. Women prefer strong men (of
body, soul, and/or spirit) to weak men. And though there are exceptions, this statement
seems to be accurate.

But it is difficult to determine who initially creates the image that molds woman.
Although Nietzsche suggest that all women mold themselves according to an image that
man presents to them, not all women do--however much men would like to think that they
have this power over women. Indeed, it might actually have been women who created this
image in their efforts to mold their men according to their respective ideals of man. For
example, the chivalrous notion of woman as an object of perfection worth fighting and
dying for, may have been an image that man created. But woman could have easily planted
in man the notion that she is a delicate creature in need of his protection. There are reasons
to believe that woman may have wanted man to view her this way. For if he does, he
might treat her with more respect, gentleness, and devotion. And as we have seen, the
desires for protection or respect or admiration are reasons why woman may exaggerate her
weaknesses. Determining who planted the seed first would be quite difficult, if not
impossible to determine. The question of who constructed the current image of women is
not decisive for Nietzsche anyway. Nietzsche is concerned with the qualities that one
should cultivate in woman now. He intends to breed the qualities that are conducive to the
cultivation of an ascending type of woman (who actively wills) instead of a degenerating
one (who wills reactively). He insists that woman should have the secondary role, but in
Nietzsche’s view, this does not mean that she is a weak slave, but that she is a stronger
woman in this role.87 Still, Nietzsche does consider the male role, his own role, to be the
more choiceworthy position of the two.

If men are responsible for the corruption of woman, or if women come to believe

that they are, one would expect women to be full of ressentiment. Nevertheless, the

87This point is consistent with my rejection of Lorraine’s criticism that remaining faithful to man
forces woman to deny herself. See pp. 127-128 above.

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manner in which women defend themselves against men is not necessarily motivated out of
ressentiment. Women need to have a method of defense if man holds an image of woman
that she could not (or refuses to) fulfill. It is no surprise that the manner in which woman
defends or avenges herself is by constructing an image that creates in man a need for her.
Nietzsche explains:
If someone cannot defend himself and therefore does not want to, we do not
consider this a disgrace; but we have little respect for anyone who lacks
both the capacity and the good will for revenge-regardless of whether it is a
man or a woman. Would a woman be able to hold us (or, as they say,
“enthrall” us) if we did not consider it quite possible that under certain
circumstances she could wield a dagger (any kind of dagger) against us? Or
against herself--which in certain cases would be a crueler revenge (Chinese
revenge) (GS, 69).
Woman, it appears, is not really slavish at all but is quite capable of defending herself and
gaining revenge against man. She has the power to inflict the most cruel revenge of all on
men--taking herself away from him. The fact that Nietzsche understands this as the
cruelest revenge means that man very deeply wants and/or needs woman. Women are
amazing in that they appear to be submissive and weak, but they actually hold a great deal
of power over men. They “enthrall” men. And because of this power, they have a great
ability to master men. This ability to enthrall men does not appear to be the quality of a
slavish woman. A slave is an individual who wants revenge but lacks the resolve to
instigate it. Nietzsche places most humans in this category. As indicated here, woman’s
delight in man’s active willing does not necessarily indicate a rejection of her own will or a
denial of her own strengths.

Next, 33 Nietzsche examines the riddle of female chastity (GS,71). Woman’s
paradoxical situation is that she is supposed to be modest and ignorant regarding sex, yet
her existence is to a great degree determined by the fact that she will one day have (or fail to
have) a child. Nietzsche suggests that her ignorance of sexual matters can lead to a great
disappointment on her wedding night. He argues that women “need children and wish for

33I have skipped the previous aphorism which is appropriately titled “Women who master the
masters” (GS, 70). This aphorism has already been discussed in chapter 4.

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them in a way that is altogether different from that in which a man may wish for children”
(GS, 71). Men and women seek children for different reasons. Nietzsche does not outline
the reasons why women’s need for children is more fundamental than man’s, but given his
focus on the wisdom of the body, one can surmise that the disparity in their needs for
children emanates from their bodily differences. And because woman’s desire for children
stems from her body, the desire itself is not necessarily motivated by ressentiment; this
desire can be an egoistic affirmation of her own body. However, a disenchantment with
sex or love may make a woman resentful (just as it might do the same to a man). But the
failure (or inability) to satisfy this need to produce offspring can make woman’s
ressentiment much deeper than man’s since her need for the child runs deeper.

In the same passage (GS, 71), Nietzsche asserts that women “easily experience
their husbands as a question mark concerning their honor, and their children as an apology
or atonement.” He suggests that the deeper need and desire women have for children is as
a compensation or excuse for their pathetic husbands. Women do not feel that their
husbands are worthy of themselves or society. Nietzsche may be correct to note that some
women seek a child to compensate for their slavish husbands, yet this is not the primary
reason that most women want children. Many women want children simply because they
can have them. Women may understand the birth process as the ultimate affirmation of
herself. They may further consider this ability as evidence of female superiority over men.
This type of a desire for the child would not be a slavish or resentful motivation. Women
may also consider the child as a way to beautify their own individual lives or life generally.
But perhaps the most serious reason women want the child or children, which Nietzsche
does not discuss, is to gain a piece of immortality, for mothers believe that a piece of them
lives on in the child. Nietzsche is correct to note that women see in their children a
reflection of their own honor, but to suggest that having children is merely an excuse for
their husbands is reductionistic. Nietzsche also does not explain the way in which men

wish for children, but he asserts that the male desire for offspring is different. In this

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aphorism, Nietzsche overlooks the fact that both woman and man seek immortality in their
children. The desire to imprint one’s will (on others, on the world), i.e., the will to power,
would be Nietzsche’s answer to the desire for immortality. I

Appropriately, the next section discusses the different ways that mothers and
fathers love, which may explain the manner in which men wish for the child. One might
expect man’s posture toward the child to be potentially more resentful than woman’s. He
has no choice but to watch the birth process from the sidelines. In fact, Nietzsche’s own
description of the natural functions of woman as repulsive may in part be motivated by
ressentiment. However, it could also be the case that his inability to bear children would
necessarily foster a weak desire to do so in man, or at least much weaker desire than
woman’s. If this is the case, man would not be jealous of woman’s capability. In either
case, man’s view of woman is shaped by his view of pregnancy, which is something that
his body is not capable of experiencing. Nietzsche suggests that man does not put as high
an estimation on the ability to bear children as animals do. Nietzsche explains, “Animals
do not think about females as men do; they consider the female the productive being” (GS,
72). Nietzsche asserts that in a given species one sex is productive while the other is
beautiful, and animals89 consider females to be productive and males to be beautiful. The
inference is that the opposite is the case in the human species. Woman is the more beautiful
sex, but man is the more productive one. Nietzsche asserts that generally “woman would
not have the genius for fmery if she did not have an instinct for a secondary role” (BGE,
145). Woman’s physical weakness and beauty gives woman an instinct for a secondary
role in the public realm.

According to Nietzsche, men do not consider women to be productive beings; men
consider themselves as the producers. Nietzsche means that man is (and should be

considered to be) more productive in the industrial, military, social and political realms.

39Actually, humans (instead of animals) view female animals as the productive beings and males
as the beautiful ones. Animals likely do not categorize themselves as beautiful or productive-these are
human categories.

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Although women today make up almost half of the work force, to a great degree, men still
consider themselves to be more productive than women. Men, Nietzsche concluded,
define productivity in terms of the public realm. Men would note that women still take
longer maternity leave and focus on children to a greater degree than career. Indeed,
society considers males to be more productive despite the fact that more and more women
choose to have a career and to raise children. Evidence of the continued stereotype is the
fact that traditional female occupations (like nurses, day care workers, secretaries, etc.)
have a lower status and lower income than traditional male occupations.

Women are not less productive in the public realm than men. In fact, women
actually outnumber the number of males in college (Hoff Sommers, 14).90 And if women
oumumber men in college, it is entirely possible that they will eventually outnumber men
on the job market, perhaps eventually outnumber men in the most prestigious occupations.
Yet even if woman maintained the traditional role of mother as Nietzsche counsels, this
would not make her less productive than man if one considers that raising children properly
requires a great amount of skill, time, patience, and wisdom. In other words, one could
question whether the private realm truly is of secondary importance. Domesticity is
secondary when measured by the standard of publicity, but this need not undermine its
significance or its difficulty. Indeed, it is difficult to measure the greatness of Napoleon’s
mother in comparison to the greatness of Napoleon whom she created. There would be no
Napoleon without Napoleon’s morn. Certainly giving birth to children and raising them is
as demanding as working in the public realm, yet society tends to demOte the importance of
this role, so much so that as women enter the work force, less and less care is given to the
question of who will raise the children.

Perhaps man has traditionally sought to be productive in the public sphere in order

to compensate for the fact that he does not give birth and he is not the beautiful sex.

90Hoff Summers notes that in 1997, full-time college enrollments were 55 percent female and 45
percent male. The US. Department of Education predicts that the ratio of boys’ entering college will
continue to decrease over time.

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Paternal love does not exist among them; merely something like love for the
children of a beloved and a kind of getting used to them. The females find
in their children satisfaction for their desire to dominate, a possession, an
occupation, something that is wholly intelligible to them and can be
chartered with: the sum of all this is what mother love is; it is to be
compared with an artist’s love for his work. Pregnancy has made women
kinder, more patient, more timid, more pleased to submit; and just so does
spiritual pregnancy produce the character of the contemplative type, which
is closely related to the feminine character: it consists of male mothers. --
Among animals the male sex is considered the beautiful sex (GS, 72).
This passage suggests that man’s desire for the child may be weaker than woman’s. The
weakened desire for the child (relative to woman’s desire) impels him to imprint his will on
the world through his work rather than through his children. Before Nietzsche suggested
that creative females could exist (GS, 70). Certainly many women have become scholars,
scientists, artists, and writers. Yet here he implies that only men are contemplative; only
men are philosophers (male mothers). Indeed, this role may have been taken by man due
to the fact that he takes a secondary role and has a weaker desire than woman to partake in
the rearing of children. And the great noble philosophers, far from being full of
ressentiment, have affirmed themselves though their master moralities.

Nietzsche understands this production (willing) of noble ideals (i.e., master
moralities, not human beings) to be the greatest human events. So far this task has been
the exclusive domain of the most extraordinary males (who also posses the most
praiseworthy feminine qualities). Initially, one might understand Nietzsche’s praise of
metaphorical birth as superior to physical birth to be the perspective of a man who resents
the fact that he cannot bear children. Furthermore, one might understand the creation of
ideas itself to be the result of man’s revenge against the fact that he cannot bear children.
Man must settle for metaphorical birth and metaphorical children of his own. But not all
moralities are slave moralities; not all moralities are created out of ressentiment. And the
genius of the greatest philosophers (creators of master morality) enabled them to transcend
ressentiment. Their ability to give birth metaphorically to ideas, ideals, and moralities can

also be understood as the affirmation of the male body. These men are responsible for

creating the most life-affirming noble moralities. While will to power characterizes women

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as well, thus far women have not exercised their will through the creation of values. That
these values originate in the male will is not an insignificant fact. The greatest males seek
to tyrannize the world by creating the gods before which they will kneel. But woman seeks
mastery as well since all life is will to power. Both man and woman continually seek to
transcend themselves by making the world bend to their respective wills. This means that
woman may be able to create values (or ideals or gods) even though she is not inclined to
do so. The fact that males have been the only creators of values so far does not mean that
males will always be the creator of values, though this is likely the case in Nietzsche’s
view. Nietzsche therefore implies that man should be considered the more beautiful sex,
for he has given humans ideals to revere.

Since women have not created values, one might conclude that woman is more
slavish, that is, more inclined to obey than man. Women devote themselves to the ideals
created by male philosophers. The reason why women have not created values is due to
their instinct for a secondary role which manifests itself in the desire for the child and the
desire for a manly man, according to Nietzsche. And Nietzsche prescribes the maintenance
of this role for woman. But a secondary role is not synonymous with-a submissive,
passive, or slavish role of obedience. Woman’s body gives her a potential means of
fulfilling her creative impulse; she can leave an imprint on the world by giving birth to and
rearing of children. Rearing children is creative because a woman can change the world by
the type of child she produces. Nietzsche compares a woman’s love of her child with the
artist’s love of his painting: “The females find in their children satisfaction for their desire
to dominate, a possession, an occupation, something that is wholly intelligible to them and
can be chattered with: the sum of all this is what mother love is; it is to be compared with an
artist’s love for his wor ” (GS, 72). By teaching her child how to think, by stamping the
child with her own ideas and goals, by imprinting her own will upon the child, woman
molds the child’s character. If this creative outlet is intrinsically fulfilling to most women,

dedication to some pursuit ideal outside of herself would be unlikely. But a woman who

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fears she will never experience the feeling of being a mother, or believe that they would be
incompetent or unhappy as a mother, may turn to such a pursuit.

Nietzsche asserts that underneath woman’s refined surface lies a wild, changeable,
mysterious beast (cf. BGE, 238; Z, 220). All women are not slaves, nor do all women
possess an innate inclination to be obedient to men. Nietzsche is quite aware that there
have been women rulers, but these are not in the same category as the creators of values.
Though Nietzsche chooses not to use women rulers as his examples for his ideal of the
Ubermensch, an individual female will is not necessarily more submissive than an
individual male will. Woman can master others by giving birth to children who become the
rulers, philosophers, and future creators. Woman can master men by exaggerating her
weaknesses and by seducing him with her beauty. Now these suggestions may sound
distasteful, but if all life wants power, then this is praiseworthy from Nietzsche’s
perspective. Though he expects that she will have, and hopes to encourage, woman’s
predilection for a secondary role, woman can achieve mastery over man in this role. The
woman behind the man may be responsible to some extent for some of the ideals produced
by men. Of course it would be difficult to provide evidence of this, because women in a
secondary role may not speak openly of their strength over man.

In sum, Nietzsche’s prescribing woman to a secondary role is somewhat
reductionistic but does not necessarily imply that woman is essentially slavish. Women do
not have to be constituted by willingness, but Nietzsche insists that this secondary role is
desirable for women. Women do not necessarily reject all expressions of mastery and
strength. Women prefer manly men,but when women take the primary public role, men
lose their masculinity. Women suffer as a result. But Nietzsche goes even further than
this. According to him, women like to serve manly men. Now, Nietzsche is simply
wrong to imply that all women desire to serve men; however, his suggestion that women
prefer to serve strong men to feeble ones is plausible. Unfortunately, he also suggests that

most modern men do not fit this description.

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Woman obviously does not need to be relegated to the private realm and she can
quite capably fulfill other roles. Still, Nietzsche insists that woman must be in a secondary
role relative to man. Nevertheless, Lorraine is incorrect to conclude from this that “One
could dismiss this aspect of Zarathustra’s teaching as a cultural by-product; surely if
Nietzsche had been writing now, Zarathustra would have taught something different.
Surely Zarathustra would not have made a gender distinction between those who could and
should attempt his path and those who shouldn’t” (Lorraine, 121). But the homogenization
of the sexes and its deleterious consequences remain serious issues today. Nietzsche’s
concern with maintaining the dichotomy of the sexes addresses this problem. He insists
that if woman does not take this secondary role, the dichotomy of the sexes cannot be
maintained. If woman does not occupy this role, she takes on man’s role and becomes
more like man. Surely it would be convenient for feminists to dismiss Nietzsche’s
comments here as mere “cultural by-products,” but unfortunately there is some truth to
some of his assertions. A secondary role could mean appearing to be obedient, appearing
to be modest, appearing to be sacrificial. Nietzsche even says that “the state of nature, the
eternal war between the sexes, gives her by far the first rank” (EH, 267). Woman’s
physical weakness does not make her man’s slave because a woman’s will may be stronger
than a man’s.

Why Women Have Not Created Ideals, Values, or Moralities

The source of the most debilitating values so far is ressentiment. In particular, the
ressentiment of males has created the most life-denying values in all human history. Males
created Christianity, liberal democracy, and all forms of asceticism. Picart wrongly
associates slave revolt with feminine revolt (Picart, 145). The slave revolt in morality is
perhaps better described and an effeminate or emasculated revolt. The erosion of
masculinity, the lack of resolve for fighting genuine wars, led to the desire for comfort and
security above all else. The manifestation of male ressentiment in the creation of values

would seem to indicate that man is capable of a deeper type of ressentiment than woman.

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But Nietzsche says that “In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man”
(BGE, 139). Woman’s barbarous capacity for revenge seems to indicate a deep strength of
ressentiment, perhaps deeper than man’s. But woman has not been the dominant creator of
life-denying values. Perhaps her inability to create values out of her ressentiment makes
her more slavish than man. Or, alternately, woman’s ability to love in a barbarous way has
kept her from creating life-denying values (cf. BGE, 238). Her sense of what men need
(cf. Z, 178) has kept her from creating the decadent type of modern ideals.
Woman hates in a more dangerous way than man does:
In a state of hatred women are more dangerous than men; first and foremost
because, once their hostility has been aroused, they are hampered by no
considerations of fairness but allow their hatred to grow undisturbed to its
ultimate consequences; then because they are practiced in discovering the
wounded places everyone, every party possesses and striking at them: to
which end their dagger-pointed intellect renders them excellent service
(whereas at the sight of wounds men become restrained and often inclined
to reconciliation and generosity) (HAH I: 414).
While this description sounds discordant to liberal democratic sensibilities, for Nietzsche,
an ability to transcend the rules of fairness is praiseworthy. Woman’s ability to strike like a
ferocious animal is a desirable quality. A great many of modemity’s defects result from
bourgeois passivity. Nietzsche holds males responsible for this widespread “wretched
contentment.” Woman has been able to maintain a ferocious love and hate despite this
tendency of man. Recall that Nietzsche had described woman’s capacity for revenge as
much stronger and more insidious than man’s (cf. GS, 69). Woman has the capacity to
defend herself against man and may be more cruel than man when seeking revenge (BGE,
139). This capacity for cruelty is one of the traits of the free, very free spirit. But, it
should be noted, that woman’s deeper desire for revenge (relative to man) would also be
more difficult for her to transcend.

Woman’s deeper vengefulness is one reason why Nietzsche argues that woman

cannot be a friend (to other women or to men). Whether or not one can be the type of

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friend that Nietzsche reveres depends upon one’s will (whether it is slavish or masterful)?1

Nietzsche draws a connection between slave, tyrant, and woman:

Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a friend. Are you a tyrant? Then you
cannot have friends. All-too-long have a slave and a tyrant been concealed
in woman. Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knows

only love.
Woman’s love involves injustice and blindness against everything
that she does not love. And even in the knowing love of a woman there are

still assault and lightening and night alongside light.
Woman is not yet capable of friendship: women are still cats and

birds. Or at best, cows.
Woman is not yet capable of friendship. But tell me, you men, who

among you is capable of friendship?” (Z, 169).

Nietzsche’s point is that woman is a lover; she wants man only as a lover, not as a friend.
And this desire for man makes her incapable of friendship with men and women. She is a
tyrant with respect to other women and a slave to her desire for children. If woman wants
man merely as a means to a child, she would see other women as competition toward that
end. A childless (or barren) woman would also be resentful and envious of other women
who already have the husband and child that she seeks. Nietzsche would probably say that
women with children cannot be friends with women without children because of this
jealousy. Women cannot be friends with men because the sexual tension (her tyrannical
desire for the child) destroys the potential bonds of friendship. However a single man is
certainly capable of impregnating several women. Women prefer to possess a particular
man, her man, not any man. And given this fact, Nietzsche is wrong to say that man is
merely a means to the child; she seeks the man for other reasons as well. Woman wants
man’s full attention, not to be one among many. Women want love and protection as well,
but not friendship. Before marriage every man is viewed as a potential father, protector,
and lover.

Women are notorious for being more catty (which is why Zarathustra refers to

women as cats) than men in their competition for a lover and this may have some truth to it

911n Zarathustra, the speech “On the Friend” precedes the first mention of will to power in “On
the Thousand and One Goals” (or, as it is better translated, “On the Thousand and on One Goal”)

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if Nietzsche is conect that woman’s deepest desire is for the child. But not all women
desire children and not all women are catty. Nietzsche also does not speak about lesbians--
whether they may be capable of friendship or not. Not much else needs to be said about
these stereotypes. Women are certainly capable of seeing men as more than sperm donors
and many women have achieved fulfrlling friendships with other women and with men.
However, Nietzsche is correct to imply that a friendship between a man and a woman
would have very different character than a friendship between two men or two women.
Nietzsche’s condemnation of female friendships is really a critique of a bourgeois notion of
friendship and marriage, which is merely an institutionalized shallow friendship. He leaves
open the possibility that a woman might one day be able to be a friend-~something that is
not yet possible. Although Nietzsche implies that men can be true friends with one another
while women cannot, he does not think that anyone is capable of friendship in his day.
Woman’s dependency on man to beget her child may make her his slave. Bourgeois
women likely resent the fact that they need a man for pregnancy (and this may explain the
growing number of sperm banks nowadays). If they are supposed to be man’s equal (in
the workplace), they feel as if they should not need man in any respect. A genuine friend
cannot be slavish or tyrannical because the wills of the individuals must be of similar
strength and longing. Shallow bourgeois goals cannot be shared with another just as
lovers cannot be shared. But Nietzsche’s assessment of woman’s inability to be friends
also demonstrates his comments on women to be more than cultural by products.
Nietzsche here criticizes bourgeois woman, but his argument rests on traits that have
characterized women in all historical epochs so far--her biology and the psychological
consequences of that biology. To be sure, technology could alter her biology, or she could
be socialized to ignore her biology altogether, but those two possibilities aside, Nietzsche’s
argument transcends his time.
Woman’s ressentiment keeps her from being genuine friends with other women.

He says that a slave and a tyrant have been concealed in woman for too long. One day

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these may no longer be concealed and perhaps at that point woman could be a friend.

Nietzsche’s understanding of the friend is something that transcends the bourgeois notions

of love and friendship. He defines the friend in terms of his goal and as a means to that

goal. Thus, the genuine friendship to which Nietzsche refers is born out of a thirst and

striving for self-transcendence and the Ubermensch. He explains; “Here and there on earth
we may encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this possessive craving of two
people for each other gives way to a new desire and lust for possession--a shared higher
thirst for an ideal above them. But who knows such love? Who has experienced it? Its

right name is friendship” (GS, 14). He suspects that no woman or man has yet

encountered this type of friendship, though it may one day be possible. Suffering,

struggle, fighting, tension, pain, are all prerequisites for this type of friendship: “If one
wants to have a friend one must also want to wage war for him: and to wage war, one must
be capable of being an enemy” (Z, 168). Pity, the root of modern notions of friendship
and neighbor love, is a sterile foundation of friendship, for pity leads to little else than
comfort and security. Zarathustra preaches that “It is the good war that hallows any cause.
War and courage have accomplished more great firings than love of neighbor. Not your
pity but your courage has so far saved the unfortunate” (Z, 159). Woman, he contends, is
not capable of having this type of friendship with another woman. This friendship
emanates from struggle and strife against the mutual friend/ enemy. Awareness of the
strength and masterful quality of the friend engenders reverence. But Nietzsche insists that

such respect is not to be eroded into a shallow self- gratification. Friends respect one

another as enemies who could kill them.
Most assuredly, a sick woman (i.e., a woman with a sick will) cannot be a friend.

According to Nietzsche, vengefulness is particularly pronounced in the sick woman: “no
one can excel her in the wiles to dominate, oppress, and tyrannize. The sick woman spares
nothing, living or dead; she will dig up the most deeply buried things” (GM III: 14). If

woman is more vengeful and even more cruel than man in the type of revenge she seeks,

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one might expect her to sublimate her vengeance through the creation of values. When she
is vengeful, woman is more clever than man. In fact, Nietzsche concedes that woman is
more clever than man generally (HAH I: 411). And if she is more clever than man, the sick
woman would pose the greatest danger to the production of healthy noble types. The sick
woman’s deeper vengefulness would have to be more difficult for her to overcome than
man’s is. If the sick woman is more corrupted than the sickest man, perhaps if woman
were able to overcome ressentiment she would be able to transcend herself and man.
Nietzsche supports this interpretation with his assertion that the perfect woman is a higher
type than the perfect man (HAH I: 377).92 i
Love as Will to Power

According to Nietzsche, love (eros) is nothing more than a manifestation of the will
to power. Two of the highest expressions of eros are philosophy (“the most spiritual will
to power” (BGE, 9)) and sexual love. Will to power is similar to eros in that it involves a
striving, a longing to overcome oneself. But to a large degree Nietzsche’s descriptions of
the will to power reduce eros to thymos, which leads to a somewhat reductionistic view of

philosophy and erotic love. Thymos93 is a Greek term that means an “unbeatable spirit”

that enables one to protect one’s own (Plato, 1991, 375a). Thymos is an egoistic
defensiveness that compels one to protect oneself and one’s own. But thymos can also
cause one to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of a cause, ideal, or goal. It is the root of
anger and vengeance, the love of victory, protection of one’s own, and the desire to
punish. Thymos gives the patriotic man the feeling of invincibility when he courageously

risks his life in battle. It is the spirit that enables the mother to protect her child in the face

92In the section entitled “Which Sex is Superior?” of concluding chapter, I examine the
meaning(s) and implications of the word “perfect” in HAH I: 377. There I consider whether a perfect

woman could be a female Ubermensch.

93For an understanding of what constitutes thymos. consult the following passages from Plato’s
Republic: 375a-e, 376e, 410b, 410d, 411a-e, 435e, 436a, 439e-441c, 441e, 442e, 456a, 465a, 467e, 536e,

5476, 548C, 550b, 553c-d, 5723. 580d, 5813, 5860-d, 590b, and 606d.

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of life-threatening danger. Even an animal displays thymotic spiritedness when defending
its young. Consider Nietzsche’s characterization of noble men who possess “a certain
imprudence, perhaps a bold recklessness whether in the face of danger or of the enemy, or
that enthusiastic irnpulsiveness in anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge by which

noble souls have at all times recognized one another” (GM I: 10). Nietzsche’s descriptions

of the will to power are quite similar to Plato’s description of thymos.
The Will to Truth (Philosophy)

Plato teaches that through the erotic pursuit of the “truth” one can sublimate
(overcome) one’s thymotic impulses. Wise individuals are not particularly thymotic
according to Plato. Nietzsche considers modern degeneration to be an unfortunate
consequence of this teaching. Consequently, Nietzsche describes the drive to philosophize
as a thymotic passion itself--as a form of the will to power. This most spiritual activity has
been the domain of males. According to Nietzsche, the philosopher is a tyrant. He does
not seek to understand the world, but to make nature bend to his will; to imprint his spirit
on nature itself (BGE, 9). The peak of tyrannizing the world is creating the center of the
world around which it is to evolve. The philosopher is erotic in the sense that he wants to
create a world, a god, or an ideal that is greater than himself. However, Nietzsche focuses
on philosophy as thymotic because philosophy has become a sterile scientific pursuit. The

philosopher who bends nature to his own will is to replace the sterile scholar who is a

martyr to the “truth” at all costs.
Nietzsche’s calls attention to the tension in the soul of the seeker after knowledge.

This discussion is helpful because it clarifies the difference between the will to truth (a form
of the will to power) and the will to power. The two fundamental drives of the basic will

correspond to a masculine and a feminine way of willing which appear as contradictions

and yet have their source in the same drive-the drive for the feeling of power and growth.
The basic will which “unceasingly strives” for power or the feeling of increased power, is

synonymous with the will to power (BGE, 229). Nietzsche explains: .

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That commanding something which the people call “the spirit” wants to be
master in and around its own house and wants to feel that it is master; it has
the will from multiplicity to simplicity, a will that ties up, tames, and is
domineering and truly masterful. Its needs and capacities are so far the
same as those which physiologists post for everything that lives, grows,
and multiplies. The spirit’s power to appropriate the foreign stands revealed
in its inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold,
and to overlook or repulse whatever is totally contradictory-- just as it
involuntarily emphasizes certain features and lines in what is foreign, in
every piece of the “external world,” retouching and falsifying the whole to
suit itself. Its intent in all this is to incorporate new “experiences,” to file
new things in old files-growth, in a word--or, more precisely, the feeling

of growth, the feeling of increased power (BGE, 230).
Like all living things, the seeker after knowledge desires to impose his will on the world in
order to experience the feeling of increased power. The philosopher does this by creating
new explanations of the world, new truths that prescribe to nature what it ought to be. The
desire for the increased feeling of power is focused on conquering what is foreign to
oneself and incorporating what is outside of it. This drive encourages the individual to
command (internally and externally) whatever contradicts the individual’s inclinations.
This drive pushes the individual to simplify the world (explain it) in a manner that fits with
his will. This means that the philosopher desires to “falsify the whole world to suit
himself.” The degree to which one can incorporate new experiences distinguishes one
individual from another. This description of the first drive sounds similar to the traits
Nietzsche associates with a real man (the warrior who fights to conquer others for the sake

of some form of power or the feeling of power).

Nietzsche then describes an opposing drive that appears to push the individual in an

entirely different direction:

An apparently opposite drive serves this same will: a suddenly
erupting decision in favor of ignorance, of deliberate exclusion, a shutting
of one’s windows, an internal No to this or that thing, a refusal to let things
approach, a kind of state of defense against much that is knowable, a
satisfaction with the dark, with the limiting horizon, a Yea and Amen to
i gnorance--all of which is necessary in proportion to a spirit’s power to
appropriate, its “digestive capacity,” to speak metaphorically--and actually
“the spirit” is relatively most similar to a stomach.

Here belongs also the occasional will of the spirit to let itself be
deceived, perhaps with a capricious intimation of the fact that such and such
is not the case, that one merely accepts such and such a delight in all
uncertainty and ambiguity, a jubilant self-enjoyment in the arbitrary

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narrowness and secrecy of some nook, in the all too near, in the
foreground, in what is enlarged, diminished, displaced, beautified, a self-

enjoyment in the caprice of all these expressions of power.
Here belongs also, finally, that by no means unproblematic
readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissirnulate in front of
them, that continual urge and surge of a creative, form-giving, changeable
force: in this spirit enjoys the multiplicity and craftiness of its masks, it also
enjoys the feeling of its security behind them: after all, it is surely its
Protean arts that defend and conceal it best (ibid.).

This latter drive to illusion is only “apparently opposite” to the former. Surprisingly, even
the seeker after knowledge seeks refuge in ignorance, illusion, and a limiting horizon. The
latter drive, a “kind of state of defense against much that is knowable, a satisfaction with

the dark, with the limiting horizon,” is opposite in the sense that it contradicts the fust drive
“tres up, tames, and is domineering and truly masterful.” The first drive pushes the
individual to take in new experiences through the lens of his will to power. This latter

drive encourages the individual to close his eyes to much of the text of the world, much that

is krrowable. These two drives are only apparently opposite to one another because both

are manifestations of the will to power.
The forms of power that animate this second drive are deception, craftiness, and

multiplicity. These are the traits that Nietzsche identifies with femininity. According to
Nietzsche, the “readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits” is feminine, yet the
contemplative type, the male mother, also exhibits this trait. The satisfaction with the
limiting horizon which is the precondition for health is also a feminine trait in Nietzsche’s
view. Also the enjoyment in the craftiness of masks with the feminine. In fact, Zarathustra
suggests that woman is nothing but these masks: “Surface is the disposition of woman: a
mobile, stormy film over shallow water” (Z, 179). But if masks help make life beautiful
one might expect Nietzsche to praise her instead of insisting her soul is shallow. This

seems to be an unwarranted criticism of woman. Obviously women are not, by virtue of

being women, shallow.
One drive impels the seeker after knowledge to cling to the illusions necessary for

life (the feminine side), while the other impels him to search for ideals above Man to

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impose order on the world (the masculine side). The philosophers of the future will also
experience the constant struggle and tension in the soul between the feminine drive that
impels toward loving life and the masculine drive that seeks to conquer life and make it as
profound as his will imagines it could be. In discussing the origin of values Zarathustra
explains; “Good and evil have always been created by lovers and creators. The fire of love
glows in the names of all the virtues, and the fire of wrath” (Z, 172, emphasis added).
Which method of creating (exerting the will to power) is more valuable cannot be
estimated. He continues; “For from the depths one loves only one’s child [the creation of
woman] and work [the creation of man]; and where there is great love of oneself it is the
sign of pregnancy: thus I found it to be” (Z, 273). Woman (as the lover) has a different
role than man (as the creator) has in the origin of values. Zarathustra must preserve both
types of creating (willing): “Thus I want man and woman: the one fit for war, the other fit
to give birth, but both fit to dance with head and limbs” (Z, 322, emphasis added). Both
types of individuals (lovers and creators) and types of willing (the masculine and feminine
types) are prerequisites of the creation of the Ubermensch. Without the two types, the will
lacks the agitation that is necessary to spark creativity, fighting, and struggle. The last
man, by contrast, is characterized by the absence of any strong desire for or against
knowledge, beauty, or profundity.
Sexual love

Sexual love is also a manifestation of the will to power. The importance of the
body makes sexual differentiation one of the most obvious and crucial expressions of the
will to power. Consider the sex act itself. Each party commands and obeys at the same
time. Additionally, at the peak of the sex act, each individual forgets or loses himself, but
at the same time, affirms himself. Each individual enjoys the loss of his individuality in the
union, but simultaneously each individual asserts himself over the other. Although the
experience is common to an extent, one can never share one’s body completely with

another. One party will never experience the same exact sensations as the other. Just as

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the philosopher seeks world mastery, the lover seeks to dominate the beloved, to possess
the beloved, to make the beloved completely submit to his will. Nietzsche explains:
Sexual love betrays itself most clearly as a lust for possession: the lover
desires unconditional and sole possession of the person for whom he longs;
he desires equally unconditional power over the soul and over the body of
the beloved; he alone wants to be loved and desires to live and rule in the
other soul as supreme and supremely desirable (GS, 14).
Nietzsche asks; “Has my definition of love been heard? It is the only one worthy of a
philosopher. Love-in its means, war; at bottom, the deadly hatred of the sexes” (EH,
267). Love is a battle, a struggle between two wills--eaeh seeking mastery. This is why
love and hatred are so closely related to one another. Both are expressions of the desire for
dominance.

Nietzsche offers a simplified explanation of erotic love and philosophy in order to
eliminate all other dualities. Love and hate are not opposites, but different manifestations
of the same will. He explains; “Avarice and love: what different feelings these two terms
evoke! Nevertheless it could be the same instinct that has two names” (GS, 14). All
actions are essentially the same in that they are animated by the will to power. Nietzsche
focuses on the thymotic aspect of love because this egoistic element of love is dying. He
states, “love as passion...simply must be of noble origin” (BGE, 260, end). As an
expression of the will to power, love is essentially egoistic, not selfless, sterile, or directed
towards everyone equally. Nietzsche describes the lover:

[H]e alone wants to be loved and desires to live and rule in the other soul as
supreme and supremely desirable. If one considers that this means nothing
less than excluding the whole world from a precious good, from happiness
and enjoyment; ...the lover aims at the impoverishment and deprivation of

all competitors and would like to become the dragon guarding his golden
hoard as the most inconsiderate and selfish of all “conquerors” and

exploiters (GS, 14)
When in love, the lover experiences the most egoistic of all emotions. The (male) lover
actually strives to possess the beloved exclusively and completely. Love is “the most

ingenious expression of egoism” (ibid.) because it masks itself as self-sacrifice. Nietzsche

teaches that love is nothing but the desire for the “impoverishment and deprivation of all

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competitors” for the sake of the lover’s lust being fulfilled (ibid.). This is why “love of
one is barbarism; for it is exercised at the expense of all others” (BGE, 67). Such single-
minded devotion cannot be shared with everyone universally. The lover denies all others’
ability to share in the precious beloved. And since possession means “changing something
new into ourselves” this means that the lover seeks to make the beloved like himself. The
desire to spread one’s own influence animates the lover.

And, according to Nietzsche, even parental love is a manifestation of the thymotic
desire to dominate others (cf. GS, 72; BGE, 194). Nietzsche explains that the “tremendous
importance the individual accords to the sexual instinct is not a result of its importance for
the species, but arises because procreation is the real achievement of the individual and
consequently his highest interest, his highest expression of power (not judged from the
consciousness but from the center of the whole individuation)” (WP, 680). Giving birth to
and begetting the child is an expression of the will to power. Parents attempt to stamp the
child with their own virtues. But often having a child achieves precisely the opposite; the
child can actually make one feel quite powerless. Because the child has his own will, the
parent may not be able to shape the child. The desire for power alone does not explain the
attachment of a parent to the child.

Because this doctrine can explain both love and philosophy, the will to power
characterizes more types of activities than any previous theory. The will to power can
explain previous ideas and ideals, but those ideas cannot account for the will to power.
However, Nietzsche’s descriptions of love and philosophy seem somewhat reductionistic.
Real love is more than a thirst to possess another. His description of friendship sounds
closer to a true, meaningful love than his description of the love between man and woman--
an eternally hostile war. Nietzsche attributes much of what is involved in an erotic
attachment to thymotic impulses. The will to power originates in an egoistic self-love
which expresses itself in a conquest of the world and of human beings. Many of

Nietzsche’s descriptions of the will to power miss the erotic component of the

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philosopher’s love of the truth. He admits that in the philosopher there is a great deal of
erotic tension, but many of his descriptions of the will to power do not'fully capture this
aspect of the philosopher. Nietzsche’s description of the genius of the heart, however,
does involve an erotic element, more so than his descriptions of the will to power.
Nietzsche’s genius of the heart is more than an individual who seeks to conquer the world;

he is characterized by an erotic quality and nobility.

Although the will to power may adequately describe much of what is involved in

the love conquest, Nietzsche’s description misses a some of the dimensions of love.
Nietzsche’s description completely misses the pleasure and fun involved in love and sex.
Any pleasure involved in love seems insignificant to Nietzsche. Certainly there is a
struggle of wills involved in the capturing and the keeping of the beloved. But love is more
than a thymotic chase and struggle. If the desire for power were the only root of the great
love affairs, it is difficult to see what is so desirable about the emotion 'of love. Why do
human beings attach themselves to one another if power is the only thing they want?
Moreover, if woman is simply a lying, clever, vindictive creature, it is difficult to see why
man should be so enthralled by her. Nietzsche does not explain the attraction between the
sexes completely. Nietzsche describes love as a painful, difficult battle of the wills. In

fact, sex, women, and marriage are distractions from which the most authentic individuals

abstain (cf. GM III: 7). Woman may actually be a distraction to man’s pursuing more
sublime goals.

Nietzsche also does not discuss whether man could be inspiration for man and
women for women, nor does he address the possibility of the mutual attraction of man to

man and woman to woman. Also surprisingly absent is any discussion of homosexuality.

Nietzsche’s will to power theory does not account for the sexual instinct or the love

homosexuals experience. Because homosexuality cannot produce the child, the sex act is

not a means to the child. Nor does homosexuality appear to be a means to the end of

empowerment. Without including the possibility of homosexual love in his explanation of

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love, his will to power theory is incomplete. Nevertheless, the will to power doctrine does
go a great distance in describing human activity. Perhaps Nietzsche focuses on the
thymotic aspect of the will to power because he finds it necessary to rebufld a kind of
thymos in humans to combat the passivity of bourgeois man. Furthermore, the relationship
between thymos and eros is a complicated one. It may be necessary to strengthen thymos
before any hope of a deeper eros could arise. However, in his effort to reinvigorate man.
Nietzsche offers a somewhat limited description of erotic love.
The Relationship Between the Body and Will

Biology is not the sole basis on which Nietzsche distinguishes the wills of man and
woman. Nietzsche also distinguishes high (ascending) and low (descending) types of
humans, that is, masters (who are noble and healthy) and slaves (who are weak or sick).
The difference between a master and a slave cannot be reduced to biological determinism.
Masters feel an accumulation of power in commanding while a slave will feel more power
through serving others. The distinction between masters and slaves introduces the same
difficulty that the differentiation between man and woman does. Nietzsche seems to utilize
a fixed standard; namely, “nature,” to distinguish between master and slave wills and to
differentiate masculine and feminine wills. If Nietzsche submits to such a standard, the
Nietzschean system may be simply one more metaphysical system as Heidegger contended.

The will to power teaching provides the means to create the Ubermensch; however,
this doctrine alone does not provide Nietzsche with a means of transcending nihilism. The
will to power as an explanation of all human activity does not answer the question of why
one should will or what one should will. The doctrine merely attempts to explain what
humans do. The will to power, along with the Ubermensch, present an alternative to the
life of the last man. Now Nietzsche must justify why one must choose the Ubermensch.
Nietzsche cannot transcend nihilism without some fixity or a solid foundation for this goal.
He must maintain the distinction between high and low, masters and slaves, and man and

woman because such distinctions help create conditions that are conducive to the

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Ubermensch’s being willed. Nietzsche must still provide a reason to will--a reason to will
the Ubermensch instead of willing nothing. If all the permanent is merely a parable, there
is no necessary reason why anyone should bother to will at all. Nietzsche’s elaboration of
the eternal recurrence of the same completes the Nietzschean project. Indeed, the eternal
return of the same explains why Nietzsche sees the Ubermensch as the only choiceworthy
future. The eternal recurrence also helps resolve the possible contradictions in Nietzsche’s

attempt to present a fixed method of evaluation as well as a changeable one.

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CHAPTER 6: ETERNAL RECURRENCE
The Eternal Return of the Same as a Scientific Fact
The eternal return of the same provides the reason why Nietzsche must will the
separation of the sexes. The assumption has been that this strange cosmological theory,
which no one actually believes anyway, has no bearing on the status of Nietzsche’s
assessment of woman. This is patently false. Nietzsche’s comments on woman have no
grounding without the eternal return of the same. Without consideration of the role of the
eternal recurrence as a fundamental aspect of his system, Nietzsche’s posturings on woman
necessarily appear inconsequential and random. The failure find the connection between
this most incomprehensible and dense aspect of the Nietzschean system with his
discussions of woman explains the perpetually inadequate defenses of Nietzsche’s
perspectivism, the unfounded attacks of Nietzsche’s so-called misogyny, and the
ungroundable defenses of Nietzsche’s supposed egalitarianism. Nietzsche’s teaching on
woman simply cannot be understood without consideration of the eternal return of the same
as the final unifying part of the Nietzschean system.

Nietzsche offers his most comprehensive presentation of the eternal return of the
same in Zarathustra, but his first mention of the doctrine appears in Gay Science 341 and
he refers to this doctrine in his later texts as well.94 Nietzsche understands the eternal
recurrence to be a description of reality. He describes the eternal recurrence as “the most
scientific of all possible hypotheses” (WP, 55). The eternal return is Nietzsche’s
hypothesis; it is a tentative explanation of the cosmos. As Lampert notes, textual evidence
“from as early as 1881 and as late as 1888 contain arguments for the cosmological truth of
eternal return” (Lampert, 258). To Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence is as “true” as

evolution, the theory of gravity, or any other scientific fact. The eternal retum of the same

94 Cf. EH, 258, 273, 295, 305; WP 55, 417, 462, 617, 1041, 1050, 1053-1067.

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is a fact, but as is the case with all facts, its significance is in its interpretation.95 This fact
can be interpreted as the most life-enervating of all facts or as the highest affirmation of life
possible. Nietzsche promotes a scientific interpretation of the eternal recurrence, which
provides him with the motivation to transcend nihilism.

The content of the eternal recurrence doctrine cannot be separated from the meaning
that this doctrine has for Nietzsche. He does not intend this teaching for everyone’s ears.96
Zarathustra presents the doctrine, not to the masses, but to Zarathustra himself, the dwarf
(Z, 269-272), and the animals (Z, 329-333).97 Most people will not understand the eternal
recurrence and its implications. In fact, Zarathustra’s animals understand the eternal
recurrence better than humans (of, Z, 329-333). Zarathustra learned in the prologue that
he is not a teacher of the masses, he quickly learns that he is not the mouth for their ears.
These masses already want to become last men. Zarathustra tries to find companions like
himself, but learns that he may be the only one who understands his teaching.

Companions the creator once sought, and children of his hope; and behold,
it turned out that he could not find them, unless he fust created them
himself. Thus I am in the middle of my work, going to my children and
retunring from them: for his children’s sake, Zarathustra must perfect
himself. For from the depths one loves only one’s child and work; and
where there is great love of oneself it is the sign of pregnancy: thus I found
it to be (Z, 273).
Zarathustra is concerned with his children; the “children of his hope” whom he creates (Z,
275). Nietzsche’s children are those in the present and future generations who will become
the creators of values--the free spirits (BGE 44, 227), attempters (BGE, 42), immoralists
(BGE 32, 226), scholars (BGE 204-213) , good Europeans (BGE 241), fearless ones (GS

343-383), and premature births (GS 382). The eternal recurrence is a teaching for these

95See chapter 3, pp. 47-48 for a discussion of the inseparability of text and interpretation.
96Cf., Z 152-153; BGE, 27, 30, 40, 43, 231, 253, 268, 289-290; EH, 260-261, 265, 308.

97The animals themselves articulate the doctrine of eternal recrnrence to Zarathustra in
this section.

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- fig“,- v—n - ’-

 

individuals who recognize the seriousness of God’s death and who consequently see in
themselves the ability to will new ideals for the future.

Nietzsche attempts to instill in his children a life-affrrrning interpretation of reality.
Nietzsche’s understanding of the eternal recurrence provides a possibility of overcoming

the paralysis that God’s death left in human beings:
The strength to build becomes paralyzed; the courage to make plans that

encompass the distant future is discouraged; those with a genius for

organization become scarce: who would still dare to undertake projects that

would require thousands of years for their completion? For what is dying

out is the fundamental faith that would enable us to calculate, to promise, to

anticipate the future in plans of such scope, and to sacrifice the future to

them--namely, the faith that man has value and meaning only insofar as he

is a stone in a great edifice; and to that end he must be solid first of all, a

“stone”--and above all not an actor!” (GS, 356).
If these individuals fail to create a new goal for Man “the last man” will come to reign and
all human history will have been in vain. With the proper understanding of the eternal
recurrence, the motive to create new ideals is actualized.

Willing versus Affirnring
Although the eternal recurrence is a fact, Nietzsche speaks of the need, not only to

afi‘irm the doctrine, but also to will the eternal recurrence. Affirming the eternal return of
the same means accepting the doctrine as an explanation of the world. “This is an
acceptance of eternal recurrence as a fact in the same way that the frndings of modern
natural science are accepted as facts. It is possible to recognize that the world recurs
eternally without desiring the world to be an eternally recurring one. Thus, Nietzsche
speaks also of the need to will his life-affinning interpretation of eternal recurrence even
though it is a fact. In light of God’s death, the eternal recurrence doctrine can be
interpreted as the gravest of all facts and as proof of the meaninglessness of human life.
Even Zarathustra cannot immediately embrace the doctrine. Zarathustra has to overcome
his greatest danger, his nausea over the “rabble,” before he can will the eternal recurrence.

The theory of evolution, a theory already accepted as a modern scientific fact. offers a

useful example of what Nietzsche means by willing a fact To will the doctrine of

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evolution means to select and promote a particular interpretation of the doctrine. Like the
eternal recurrence, evolutionary theory can be interpreted in a life-denying manner, i.e., the
way Darwin presents the doctrine, or, in a life-affirming manner, i.e., as Nietzsche
(re)interprets it. The significance of evolutionary theory lies in the interpretation of it. To
will the theory of evolution means to desire that evolutionary theory be the predominant
explanation of the world. Similarly, willing the eternal return means the ability
(willingness, or desire) to see all existence as eternally recurring. Willing the doctrine
means to desire this to be the way of the world, to see the eternal recurrence as fixed unity
or cosmos. Willing the doctrine is an act of volition. This willing means also that the
individual wishes all of the implications of the eternal recurrence to be true. Nietzsche does
not merely affirm, but wills the eternal retum in a specific sense. Nietzsche posits the
eternal return as a hypothesis, a possible explanation that he wants (wills) to be true. This
doctrine enables Nietzsche to transcend nihilism, for if it is true, it means that what he wills
is eternally fixed. The eternal recurrence overcomes the problem that humans are temporal
beings while time is infinite.

What is the Eternal Recurrence of the Same?

Nietzsche is not the first thinker to espouse the eternal recurrence, though he is the
first to present a scientific interpretation of the eternal recurrence. According to Kaufmann,
Nietzsche did not claim to be its originator. Nietzsche himself states that the “doctrine of
the ‘eternal recurrence,’ ...might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. At
least the Stoa has traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions
from Heraclitus” (EH, 27 3-274). Kaufmann also cites a description of the eternal
recurrence which was written by Heinrich Heine, “whom Nietzsche admired fervently”
(Kaufmann, 317). Heine’s description is quite similar to Nietzsche’s and Nietzsche did in
fact own Heine’s book (ibid.).98 Since Nietzsche was familiar with Heine’s rendition of

98Heine’s book is entitled, “Letzte Gedichte und Gedanken von H. Heine, ed. Adolf Strodtrnann,

Hamburg 1869. See 11. 18 of Kaufmann’s introduction to The Gay Science for further discussion of Heine
and his book. Here Kaufmann discusses the controversy regarding whether Nietzsche had actually read

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the eternal return of the same, it is possible that Nietzsche shaped his own interpretation
after Heine’s. Despite the similarity to Heine’s articulation of the doctrine, Nietzsche
presents an original interpretation of the eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche offers a relatively simple description of the eternal retum of the same. As
a scientific fact, it is not a self-contained truth, free of presuppositions, for there is not truth
“in-itself” free of presuppositions (cf. GS, 344). Time is infmite,but there are only a
limited number of human possibilities. Given that the limited number of combinations
occur within the span of an infinite amount of time, Nietzsche concludes that every
combination will repeat itself infinitely. In other words, every event, possibility, or
combination that has already happened will happen again an infinite number of times. He
introduces this idea in The Gay Science:
This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but
every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the
same succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between
the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of
existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of
dust! (GS, 341).
No individual is ever aware that he is living his life over again and therefore he does not
change progressively each time the life plays itself again. Each time the cycle repeats itself,
the sands inside the hourglass remain eternally the same. Zarathustra describes the
recognition that events etemally recur:
Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not

whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by
before? And if everything has been there before-what do you think...of
this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are
not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all
that is to come? Therefore-itself too? For whatever can walk--in this long

lane out there too, it must walk once more.
(Z, 270).

His description of the eternal recurrence becomes even clearer in a later passage of

Zarathustra:
Heine’s book or not. Kaufmann concludes that Nietzsche did have knowledge of Heine’s argument

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[A]ll things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and that we have already
existed an eternal number of times, and all things with us. You teach that
there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great year, which must,
like an hourglass, turn over again and again so that it may run down and run
out again; and all these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is
smallest; and we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest
as in what is smallest (Z, 332).99

The eternal recurrence means that human history cannot be understood as a straight line that
progresses to a perfected end. As Zarathustra describes it, “All truth is crooked; time itself
is a circle” (Z, 270). As a circle, time has no clear beginning or endpoint. Life is an eternal
repetition of everything that has already happened.

Nietzsche’s interpretation of the eternal recurrence presents an alternative to Heine’s
understanding of the doctrine. Heine explains:

And she answered with a tender voice: “Let us be good friends.”--But what
I have told you here, dear reader, that is not an event of yesterday or the day
before. ...For time is infinite, but the things in time, the concrete bodies, are
finite. They may indeed disperse into the smallest particles; but these
particles, the atoms, have their determinate number, and the number of the
configurations that, all of themselves, are formed out of them is also
determinate. Now, however long a time may pass, according to the eternal
laws governing the combinations of this eternal play of repetition, all
configurations that have previously existed on this earth must yet meet,
attract, repulse, kiss, and corrupt each other again. ...And thus it will
happen one day that a man will be born again, just like me, and a woman
will be born, just like Mary-only that it is to be hoped that the head of this
man may contain a little less foolishness--and in a better land they will meet
and contemplate each other a long time; and finally the woman will give her
hand to the man and say with a tender voice: “let us be good friends”
(Kaufmann, 318-319).100

Heine’s passage contains two subtle, yet significant, differences from Nietzsche’s eternal
recurrence doctrine. First, Heine suggests that when the cycle repeats itself, another
individual “just like” the narrator and a woman “just like Mary” will be born. Nietzsche
instead suggests that the narrator, Mary, and indeed all human beings will exist again

exactly as they did in the past. To Nietzsche, recognition of the eternal recurrence means

99Zarathustra’s animals, not Zarathustra himself, give this description.

. 1(”Kaufmann offers a detailed accormt of the origin of the passage and Nietzsche’s familiarity with
It in n. 9, p. 318 of his book Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.

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an individual’s awareness that he will live his own life again an infinite number of times.
Second, Heine suggests that each time the cycle repeats itself, the narrator, Mary, and all
humans have the possibility of learning from the previous cycle(s). Heine similarly
suggests the possibility that a “better land” and a man with “a little less foolishness” will
come about in the future. Nietzsche’s interpretation, however, does not allow for such
progressive learning. Nietzsche does not think that we learn from the previous cycles.
Events and people repeat themselves exactly as they occuned previously.

Although there is a fixed number of events that will recur eternally exactly as they
happened the first time, no individual is aware of what those events are. The individual can
only know what has happened in the past and that those things will recur. And those past
events can be interpreted in an unlimited number of ways: “Rather has the world become
‘infinite’ for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may
include infinite interpretations.” (GS, 374). So there is a finite number of events, but
potentially an infinite number of interpretations of those events. How one interprets the
past influences what the future will be. Ignorant of what the future holds, human beings
can create new “worlds” through (re)interpreting the events that have already occurred.
The eternal recurrence means that although everything recurs, the repetition is in no way
monotonous or redundant. When the world repeats a previous cycle, no one is aware of
what has happened in that previous cycle. The individual is only aware of the events that
make up the current cycle.

Kaufmann suggests that Heine’s description is more playful than is Nietzsche’s. In
a sense, he is correct. Heine’s vignette of this typical exchange of a man and a woman is
charming and witty, while Nietzsche’s initial presentation of the eternal recurrence is as the
gravest of all events (GS, 341). To those free spirits who lack the will to create and who
cannot affirm a world without a god, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence doctrine appears to
offer proof of nihilism. Yet Kaufmann is incorrect in another sense. Nietzsche’s

articulation of the eternal recurrence also allows for the highest affirmation of life that is at

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all possible. Nietzsche’s account allows for a playful creativity that enables one to
determine the future, a creativity that is immortal. While Nietzsche’s initial description of
the eternal recurrence may appear to be rather grave, his interpretation of the doctrine opens
up possibilities that are just as, if not more, playful than Heine’s. Nietzsche’s
interpretation offers humans a great ability to mold what their future will be and offers them
an immortality to their willing.

Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence doctrine is therefore consistent with what Nietzsche
has taught about the will to power in a specific sense. Human beings strive to leave an
imprint on the world through interpreting it. Their willing (or interpreting) does not change
the past events that are already destined 'to recur; however, willing determines the
significance and meaning of those past events. Although the number of human possibilities
is limited and individuals cannot undo past events, humans can alter the future (of which
they are ignorant) by creating new ways to look at past events. And this creation gives the
individual an increased strength and power. The eternal recurrence makes willing crucially
important because it means that what one wills will not only happen once, but an infinite
number of times. Because we do not know what the future will be, we must decide what
to make of it. Although the events of the future have already occurred an infinite number of
times, at the moment the individual acts, he is unaware of what those future events have
been (will be). In this sense the individual does determine the future. Unaware of what the
future holds, by deciding to act in a certain way, he determines what will be. The
individual can thus find the motivation to will.

This link between willing and the eternal recurrence also sheds light on why
Nietzsche considers Beyond Good and Evil to be a “prelude to a philosophy of the future.”
The book presents a reinterpretation of history, a revaluation of democratic and Christian
prejudices. Nietzsche interprets these events as he does in order to create the possibility of
his ideal, the Ubermensch. That past events can be interpreted in a variety of ways reveals

a new role for the philosopher. All past philosophers have had to contend with history,

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i.e., with past events that cannot be altered (as will all future philosophers). The new
philosopher will instead “prepare great ventures and over-all attempts of discipline and
cultivation by way of putting an end to that gruesome dominion of nonsense and accident
that has so far been called ‘history’” (BGE, 203). Human willing, that is, creatively
interpreting the past, enables humans to mold the future. New philosophers bear the
responsibility of determining what the future of Man will be. Without these new
philosophers, the last man is sure to populate the earth.

The Eagle and the Serpent--a Metaphor for Eternal Recurrence

A recurring image of the eternal recurrence that appears in Zarathustra is of an eagle
soaring in wide circles with a serpent hanging around its neck. As Lampert and Rosen
both suggest, this image represents the circularity of time and the meaning of the eternal
recurrence (Rosen, 75, Lampert, 29). With this image, Nietzsche presents the types of
traits necessary to overcome nihilism: pride and cleverness. The eagle is the “proudest
animal under the sun,” while the serpent represents the most clever animal under the sun
(Z, 137).101 Free spirits must be both clever and proud if they are to find the strength to
create new goals in a godless world.

Particularly noteworthy about the metaphor of the eagle and the serpent is that this
very image preserves the distinction between the masculine and feminine perspectives and
suggests a need for both of these perspectives. The German term for eagle is a masculine
term while the term for serpent is feminine. Nietzsche selects the serpent as one of
Zarathustra’s companions because it clings to the earth and because of the contrast with
biblical teachings. The serpent’s closeness to the earth suggests that the feminine
perspective is closely tied to the earth. That is, the feminine perspective is closer to a

human or earthly interpretation and a love of life than the masculine perspective. The

lo1Kaufrnann translates the term” kluger” as “wiser” which Rosen argues, and I agree, is not the
right word here (Rosen, 77). I choose to use the word “cleverer.” Another alternative is “prudent. However,
a serpent does not traditionally conjure images of wisdom, reverence, or prudence. Rather, the serpent is a
clever, sly, sneaky creature.

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ability to give birth offers woman a more intimate relationship to life than man can have.
She is more likely to cling to mere life than man. Because she is the source of life in a very
real sense, she is closer to the earth and therefore she is more likely than man to affirm life
as it is (in all its forms). In “Genesis” the serpent was condemned to crawl on the earth to
be far from God. But this distance from God (or otherworldly things) indicates a closeness
to the earth, a love of the earth. The cleverness that the serpent represents is a trait
Nietzsche associates with the feminine perspective (cf. BGE, 239; HAH I: 411). As Rosen
points out, the serpent has to convince the eagle to return to the earth to pick her up (Rosen,
77). This is similar to Nietzsche’s argument that woman needs to coax man into creating
ideals. Nietzsche also uses a snake as a symbol of the spirit of gravity and the spirit of
ressentiment (cf. Z, 268472). Since the serpent seems to represent the feminine,
Nietzsche’s image may also indicate that woman is more resentful than man.102

The eagle, on the other hand, flies above the earth. This image represents an
overcoming, a striving to get beyond the mere earth. That he flies represents a
transcendence of the human-all-too-human. The eagle has the pride (egoism) and courage
to fly to unknown heights. The eagle represents the masculine traits needed by the creator.
Males have created the ascetic ideals that taught humans to look above the earth for
meaning. The image of an eagle lifting the serpent into the air suggests that the cleverness
which gave birth to the life-denying ascetic idea] can be ennobled to create a new life-
affirming goal. This goal will enable Man to esteem again, but an earthly goal instead of a
divine one.

Nietzsche sees masculine pride and feminine cleverness as virtues because they are
the traits that the creator needs to transcend nihilism. Nietzsche’s cleverness enables him to

create a new type of ideal in light of the fact that God is dead and everything recurs

1028ee the section entitled “Ressentiment and Willing” in chapter 4 for a discussion of woman and
ressentiment. In that section I suggest that woman is not resentful in her essence. Nevertheless, Nietzsche
does suggest that some traits of woman may incline her more strongly toward feelings of ressentiment than
man.

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eternally. Although cleverness is needed, pride should ennoble cleverness. Pride (a form
of self-love) enables the creator to overcome ressentiment. Without an affirmation of
oneself, one may never be able to free oneself from the ressentiment over the past. The
creator needs to forget that all ideals are temporary and that he too as a mortal human is
merely temporary. Clevemess enables one to trick oneself and others into that temporary
forgetfulness that is needed for the creation of values. And, I would argue, Nietzsche’s
own doctrine of the eternal return of the same may be a product of his cleverness and pride.
Humans must forget that ideals are only temporary if they are to be able to esteem.
Zarathustra (and Nietzsche) becomes the teacher of the eternal retum of the same because it
gives humans the forgetfulness that is needed for the creation of a human goal. This will
be explained below. The combination of masculine pride and feminine cleverness can
together create a life-affirming ideal, a human ideal that celebrates the earth. The eternal
return does not rely on a divine other worldly entity to verify its truth, in fact, the truth of
the eternal recurrence may not be verifiable at all. In the “Prologue” Zarathustra wishes he
were more clever, like the serpent. It is not coincidental that Zarathustra (a male) finds
himself lacking the trait that Nietzsche associates with the feminine. Woman, or the
feminine perspective, gives man a reason to love the earth. The creator needs to learn to
esteem (to fly above the human-all—too-human) even though he is aware that God has died.
Woman reminds man not to fly away, but to look to the earth for meaning. Together the
masculine and feminine perspectives create the Ubermensch. This ideal enables Man to
continue suiving to transcend himself, while at the same time, affirm the earth.

The eagle and the serpent, although traditional foes, are friendly towards one
another (Lampert, 29). Zarathustra describes the image: “An eagle soared through the sky
in wide circles, and on him there hung a serpent, not like prey but like a friend: for she kept
herself wound around his neck” (Z, 137). While man and woman are not necessarily
enemies, Nietzsche promotes an eternally hostile antagonism between the sexes (BGE,

238) and describes the “state of nature” as “the eternal war between the sexes” (EH, 267).

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The symbolic presentation of the etemal recurrence suggests a need for both the masculine
and feminine perspectives. The new world view that Nietzsche is creating (i.e., the will to
power) involves a tension between two eternal perspectives--what Nietzsche calls the
“Eternal Feminine” and the “Eternal Masculine.” This is not the only struggle that
Nietzsche insists on maintaining, but nonetheless, it is one of them. Man and woman are
to be friends, like Zarathustra’s serpent and eagle. But Nietzsche obfuscates the distinction
between friends and enemies. The eagle and the serpent have a mutual need for one
another, but they also have the potential to destroy one another. Without the serpent, the
eagle flies away from the earth. This is the danger of not remaining loyal to the earth. The
eagle may be unable to affrrrn an earthly goal and may become nihilistic. On the other
hand, without the eagle, the serpent is bound by gravity and is likely unable to transcend
herself. This is the danger of falling prey to the ressentiment that makes one unable to
create a new ideal in a godless world. So, as Lampert and Rosen also argue, the eagle with
the serpent around its neck represents the type of world view needed. The eternal return of
the same is the new world view that Nietzsche creates.

Nietzsche does not abolish the man/woman or masculine! feminine dualisms when
he posits the eternal recurrence. Rather, the eternal return of the same provides Nietzsche
with the motivation to cultivate the differences between the sexes. The erosion of sexual
tension brings humans one step closer to becoming last men. Nietzsche’s new ideal,
represented by the eagle and the serpent, combines the highest parts of the masculine and
feminine perspectives respectively. The pride of the warrior is masculine. The cleverness
to create a new ideal in light of god’s death is feminine.

The Implications of the Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsche interprets the eternal recurrence as a replacement of all previous life-
denying metaphysical interpretations of the earth. This means that the eternal recurrence
replaces Darwinism, Christianity, and Hegelian faith in progress. Nietzsche does not want

to perrrrit the continuation of human evolution in its current direction (i.e., toward the

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actualization of the last man). His recognition of the death of God means that Nietzsche
denies any predetermined divine purpose for human beings. And, Nietzsche argues,
human ideas do not necessarily progress. Modernity itself represents degeneration, not
progress. Nietzsche’s argument presupposes a notion of progress, but Nietzsche’s notion
is entirely different from modemity’s backward sense of progress. Nietzsche challenges
modemity’s faith in human progress:
Mankind does not represent a development toward something better or
stronger or higher in the sense accepted today. “Progress” is merely a
modern idea, that is, a false idea. The European of today is vastly inferior
in value to the European of the Renaissance: further development is
altogether not according to any necessity in the direction of elevation,
enhancement, or strength (AC, 571).
Instead of a linear progression, the development of Man is circular. Human ideals and
ideas are connected to one another in the sense that they are born out of particular historical
and social circumstances, but there is no clear or unclear beginning or ending to the creation
of ideas. Time is a circle of achievements, mistakes, exploitations, advancements, and
regressions. Human development “hesitates, takes so long, often turns back, and moves in
circles” (BGE, 199). Nietzsche’s reference to circles here brings to mind the eternal
recurrence. The reason that there is no linear progression
is due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is inherited best, and at
the expense of the art of commanding. If we imagine this instinct
progressing for once to its ultimate excesses, then those who command and
are independent would eventually be lacking altogether;- or they would
secretly suffer from a bad conscience and would find it necessary to deceive
themselves before they could commanduas if they, too, merely obeyed”
(ibid.).
The weak outnumber the few exceptional individuals. When the weak organize
themselves, the strong will always be in grave danger, due to the fact that “the strongest
and most fortunate are weak when opposed by organized herd instincts, by the timidity of
the weak, by the vast majority (WP, 685). In other words, there is no necessary reason to
expect the future will be in any way superior to the present or the past. If the future is to

transcend the past, this will take a conscious creative act of the will. If the future is to be

any better than the present or the past, individuals must make it be so instead of passively

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waiting for some future improvement to appear spontaneously.

The eternal recurrence, in presenting time as a circle, seems to undermine the
notion of causation, or, at least, seems to make it irrelevant The eternal recurrence denies
(or makes irrelevant) a particular point in time when life began. Or, if that point in time
existed, the eternal return doctrine means that it would be impossible to determine what that
beginning point was. If time is a circle, Man cannot determine which events caused which
events originally. Acceptance of the etemal recurrence means acceptance of the fact that the
events simply happened as they did for no clear reason and without a discemable fust
cause. Chance may be the only explanation of why a past event occurred at a particular
moment in time. There is no fixed mechanical process, no Nature, and certainly no
omnipotent God that causes the movement of time. Nietzsche teaches that if anything
exists at all as a cause, it is will to power which pushes history in one direction or another.
The will to power cannot erase past events, nor can it keep past events form recurring; but,
the will can “redeem those who lived in the past” and “recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I
willed it’” through creatively interpreting the past (2, 251). As Nietzsche understands the
doctrine, the eternal recurrence provides free spirits like himself with the motivation to will
creatively.

Creative willing by such extraordinary individuals can alter the type of human being
who will be produced in the future. Real progress would mean the production of the
highest types, the “production of the most powerful individuals, who will use the great
mass of people as their tools (and indeed the most intelligent and most pliable tools).” (WP,
660). If mankind were left to evolve by itself, it would evolve into a massive,
homogenous, passive herd of men. The greatest individuals can alter history by willing.
They should will because what they will is going to be repeated eternally, just as the past
events that they did not will are repeated for eternity. They cannot alter the fact that all
events (what they choose to will and what they do not will) will eternally recur, nor can

they alter the events that have already occurred. Moreover, their will to power does not

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actually “push time,” which keeps rolling and rolling and recurring and recuning. The will
to power describes the process by which these individuals can consciously improve
themselves or allow themselves to degenerate further.

Because humans cannot physically alter past events, the will first appears to Man as
a prisoner rather than the “liberator and joy-bringer” that Nietzsche recognizes it to be (Z.
251). So far, Man has felt trapped by the passage of time:

That time does not run backwards, that is his wrath; “that which was” is the
name of the stone he cannot move. And so he moves stones out of wrath
and displeasure, and he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath
and displeasure as he does. The will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on
all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards.
This, indeed this alone, is what revenge is: the will’s ill will against time
and its “it was” (Z, 251-252).
Such revenge gave birth to the ascetic ideal whose current form may turn the most creative
spirits, the most exceptional individuals, into nihilists. Nietzsche teaches these free spirits
that they can affirm themselves by creatively willing: “‘The will is a creator.’ All ‘it was’ is
a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident--until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I willed
it.’ Until the creative will says to it, ‘But this I will it; thus shall I will it’” (Z, 253). How
these individuals understand the past will determine what the future will be. These
individuals can reinterpret what was once understood as the result of accident and chance as
a necessary step that leads toward their future goal.

Nietzsche does not offer a set reason why all things recur. To Nietzsche, the
eternal return of the same is simply a cosmological fact. Because there is no divine entity
by which Man can anchor his life, the eternal recurrence forces humans to look to
themselves for meaning. The eternal recurrence provides the foundation for any meaning
that Man could create. This is why Heidegger charges Nietzsche with creating a new
metaphysics. For Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence replaces Christianity, the most recent
form of the ascetic ideal. The eternal recurrence shifts human focus from otherworldly

realms to the human realm of the here and now. The eternal recurrence does not deny or

undermine the power that the Christian doctrine has had in the past, but recognizes its

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limitations and reveals that we can no longer search for that type of ideal or the type of
immortality offered by an omnipotent God. By teaching that the Ubermensch is the ideal of
the future, that the will to power is the means of creating the Ubermensch, and that the
eternal recurrence provides the motivation to will, Nietzsche gives Man a possibility of
mastering the earth. Though no individual can erase past events or alter the order in which
they have already occured, the individual can become master by re-intepreting all events
through the lens of his own will. Human will replaces the will of a false god. The
individual will becomes, in a sense, the god. He can feel himself master all history as he
creates his Own purpose. The will can now be Man’s liberator rather than a revenge-
seeker. Recognition of the eternal recurrence gives Man the opportunity and the motivation
to create his own destiny.

The eternal recurrence gives a kind of fixity to irnperrnanence or becoming. It
makes the impermanent, in a way, permanent. Although human beings are mortal, the fact
that their lives will infinitely repeat themselves, exactly as they have lived them, gives a
type of fixity and a kind of immortality to their irnperrnanence. In other words, humans do
not and cannot have immortality in the sense of never dying because death is a fundamental
fact of human life. However, the eternal recurrence gives a type of immortality to human
action because all human action will happen again in the future. So, although the death of
God undermines the Christian type of immortality, a new type of fixity is offered by the
eternal return doctrine. The fixity it offers is important because all humans, including the
highest types of humans, want immortality. The desire for immortality is the reason that
Man has created and bowed down to metaphysics for centuries. The quest for immortality
impels the philosopher to create truths and the mother to have children. And if
“immortality” is possible, human life appears to be inherently meaningful. The human
quest for eternal meaning and eternal life has created all gods and all otherworldly ideals.
But when all gods die, the possibility of meaning for human life seems to die with them.

The eternal recurrence offers a possibility of overcoming the nihilistic consequence of the

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death of God. The frxity offered by the eternal recurrence gives a significance to every
action an individual takes. Not only do one’s actions influence the current moment in time,
but they repeatedly leave an impact every time they recur. The awareness that one’s life
eternally recurs can lead to the realization that one’s choices have an etemal impact. Most
people will not understand what the eternal recurrence means, but Nietzsche recognizes this
consequence of the eternal recurrence, and teaches the other free spirits (who will be the
philosophers of the future) to embrace his understanding of the eternal return of the same.
Is the Eternal Recurrence a New Metaphysics?

As Nietzsche understands himself, he is not presenting another metaphysical
system; he is a “godless anti-metaphysician” (GS, 344). He understands the eternal
recurrence as an etemalization of this world, not the positing of an alternate world by which
to judge this one. Yet Nietzsche cannot rule out the possibility that others will interpret the
eternal recurrence differently than he does. The meaning of the eternal recurrence depends
on the individual who wills the doctrine. There are potentially as many interpretations of
the eternal recurrence as there are human beings. As discussed above, Nietzsche is not the
originator of the eternal recunence doctrine. The doctrine had existed for centuries prior to
Nietzsche and had been understood quite differently. And because the meaning of the
eternal recurrence lacks fixity, there is no guarantee that in future generations the eternal
recurrence will provide the same significance that it offers Nietzsche and the other free
spirits. There is no necessary reason why anyone should believe Nietzsche’s articulation
of the doctrine. If the eternal return of the same describes a type of fixed order to nature,
that ordering is eternally open to various interpretations. To Nietzsche, the fixed order is
not terribly relevant; what matters is the implication of that fixed order. Heidegger’s
rendition of the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical system is simply one possible
perspectival understanding of the doctrine.

But Heidegger’s understanding of the eternal return of the same is different from

Nietzsche’s and has different consequences. Nietzsche recognizes that an interpretation

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like Heidegger's is possible, but still Nietzsche wills his own scientific understanding of
the doctrine. And, since Nietzsche does understand himself to be explaining a cosmos that
will ground the will to power, Heidegger’s criticism is difficult to derail; indeed, it is a
salient criticism. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s rendition of the eternal return of the same
provides Nietzsche (and hopefully other free spirits) with the impetus to create the
Ubermensch. This means that Nietzsche recognizes the necessity of self-delusion on the
part of the creators of the future. Nietzsche must forget that the eternal recurrence doctrine
can be interpreted as nothing more than another metaphysical system. He must view the
doctrine in light of the possibilities it creates. Nietzsche admits that occasionally he
experiences a drive to illusion himself (BGE, 230). Perhaps “the occasional will of
[Nietzsche’s] spirit to let itself be deceived” enables Nietzsche to will the Ubermensch
(ibid.).

Because Nietzsche recognizes that the eternal recunence gives a fixity to human
irnperrnanence, the eternal return could also give fixity to Nietzsche’s understanding of the
world as will to power. To be sure, Nietzsche does not understand the will to power to be
merely one among many doctrines. Prior to Nietzsche humans were not understood as will
to power and consequently chancel accident has so far determined all that has happened.
Even as Nietzsche articulates the will to power doctrine, this teaching has not yet been
universally accepted, and it may never be accepted. When God died the “free spirits” like
Nietzsche experienced freedom from all “though shalts.” However, without a god there is
no goal for which the individual should seek freedom. No one knows'anymore why one
should will. The eternal recurrence does not provide an explicit answer to the question of
why one should will. However, if the individual longs for eternity and if the individual
cares that his actions will recur, he will want to will.

Thus, the eternal recurrence does not undermine the will to power. When
Nietzsche recognizes that his actions will be repeated an infinite number of times, he finds

the motivation to will. The eternal recurrence doctrine teaches that human beings,

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:- ...--_-—I-'“'

 

Nietzsche and other free spirits like him, have the potential to determine what Man will be.
Because he recognizes himself as a consciously willing individual, Nietzsche understands
himself as a “self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘Yes”’ (Z, 139). As
Nietzsche sees it, without God, the only thing left is the will. Nietzsche must choose to
will instead of falling into the abyss of nothingness. Nietzsche must take this path because
he recognizes that the choice he makes will recur eternally. Since the thought of the last
man is unpalatable and even nauseating to Nietzsche, he must select the option that impedes
the production of the last man.
Lowith’s Criticism
Lowith would not agree that it is possible the salvage the will to power in light of
the eternal retum of the same. Lowith instead suggests that the very image Nietzsche
constructs to represent the eternal return of the same reveals the irnpotence of willing.
Lowith dichotomizes the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. He argues that Nietzsche
presents both a cosmological theory and an ethical doctrine. Yet, Lowith argues, the
eternal recurrence cannot be interpreted both ways simultaneously. He claims that
Nietzsche’s system falls apart because the cosmic necessity of the eternal return undermines
any potential power the will to power has to change the world. He argues that the
Nietzschean system falls apart when the will to power and the eternal recurrence are
considered together. Lowith demonstrates the flaw in the system by scrutinizing the very
image Nietzsche uses to represent the eternal return of the same:
In the curious configuration of the snake wound around the neck of the
eagle, there already comes to light the forced contrivance of Nietzsche’s
whole teaching of a willing of the cosmic revolving. For how is that
“friendship”between the proudest animal of the heights and the most
sagacious animal of the earth (the friendship simulated by the double image
of the animals) supposed to last if the eagle embodies the proud will to soar
up into the heights, and the earthbound snake (which, however, is also
wound around the sun) embodies the eternal recurrence of the sarne?--
unless the eternal recurrence of the same could be willed with the wings of
pride because this individual willing complies with the cosmic will. The
“self-willing” of the ring of the eternal recurrence, however, is as little
proud willing as the circling of the eagle makes it into a being wound

around itself. The one word “will” obscures the irreconcilability of “being
thus and not different” with a willed “turn of necessity.” And did not

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Zarathustra himself have a sound presentiment, expressed in the last
sentence of the Prologue, that one day the sagacity of the snake could
abandon him, and then his pride will fly with folly? In Zarathustra’s very
last speech, the talk is no longer of a snake but only of Zarathustra’s eagle
and of a laughing lion. The lion, as a predator, symbolizes the
metamorphosis from “Thou shalt” to “I will” in the first speech, and thus
precisely does not bring the redemptive solution, of the proclamation of
Eat/2131511 is the often-interrupted but lasting them of Zarathustra (Lewith, 185-
Lowith contends that if everything has already happened an infinite number of times, the
individual must deceive himself into the illusion that he is not merely playing out a life that
has already been determined. If the eternal recurrence describes a cosmic necessity as
Nietzsche suggests, the motivation to impose oneself pridefully on a world that has already
been determined an infinite number of times would be lacking. If everything that will
happen has already happened innumerable times, Nietzsche may be delusional to think that
willing matters. Willing the eternal recurrence is simply a compliance with the cosmic
necessity of the eternal recurrence, according to deith. When he wills, the individual
needs to seduce himself into believing that his willing has not actually already happened an
infinite number of times.

Perhaps this problem can be solved by considering that in addition to the ignorance
regarding what the future will hold, Nietzsche also does not know if these events have
already occurred. In theory, they could have already occurred a million times. However, it
is also possible that this particular moment is the first time that the cycle has ever occurred.
There was, after all, a first moment in which the cycle began. We may be unable to
determine whether the world always existed or whether it came about at one particular
moment, however, if there is a finite number of events that eternally recur, there must have
been a fust time that those events happened. And, if this is the first time that events are
occurring, for obvious reasons, willing matters. The individual who wills knows that the
first time he willed that his will actually mattered. Ignorance of the position in the cycle
makes the will important However, Nietzsche’s articulation of the doctrine implies that the

events have already occurred an infinite number of times. If it is possible to determine that

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the individual is living in a cycle that merely repeats the previous cycles, then willing would
be delusional.

Lowith sums up this difficulty by explaining that “a teaching about man is
groundless if it does not have as a supporting basis either a metaphysical God or the Physis
of the world; for man does not exist through his own powers. And because for Nietzsche
the transworldly God was dead, he had to ask anew the old cosmological question about
the eternity of the world, as opposed to its single creation” (Lowith, 187). Man cannot will
himself into being. Man can will interpretations of the world, but he cannot will himself.
He cannot will the fact that he is to be a willing being. Nietzsche uies to make Man the
ground of his teaching about man, or more precisely, an imagined possibility, the
Ubermensch. The eternal recurrence is the physis of the world, but it is man (Nietzsche in
particular) who determines that ground and gives it his interpretation. Only man’s will can
determine the physis of the world. The order of the world as an eternally recurring one
may be a cosmic necessity, but the interpretation of that cosmic necessity is within man’s
power. Additionally, only man can determine what role god or gods will play in this
world.

But even if the cycle has already occurred an infinite number of times, Nietzsche
would insist that the individual still has the power to determine the future. The key to
Nietzsche’s theory is the ignorance of the future. It is irrelevant that the future has already
occurred if humans have no way of knowing which particular events constitute the future.
So while it may be true that in a way the individual is not determining the future (because
the eternal recurrence is a cosmic necessity), Nietzsche would say that it is also true that in
a way the individual is determining the future (because he is ignorant of the content of the
future). Humans must decide what to will. This means that humans who actively will
gods and ideals will feel as if they are creating the future. Through this creating they will
experience an amazing feeling of power. Even though this requires self-delusion, it may

simply be the case that delusion is a necessary aspect of human life, according to

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Nietzsche.

An additional difficulty to which Lowith refers, is the fact that the eternal recurrence
doctrine is “absurd to all modern (natural-scientific, historical, and existential) thought”
(Lowith, 187). Lewith contends that there is little or no reason to believe this rendition of
reality. Bemd Magnus similarly suggests that another strange feature of Nietzsche’s
doctrine is that it is not verifiable. Magnus explains:

One puzzle is, that recurrence theory appears to be unverifiable in principle.
If cosmic episodes are said to recur in completely identical fashion, how
could one know that? What evidence could one adduce? Any attempt to
verify the theory at one instant would be a repetition of the identical attempt
to verify it at a previous (earlier) instant. Any evidence adduced in one
cosmic episode which is designed to show that it is a recurrence has an
identical counterpart in the same earlier configuration, according to the
theory. But that is as much as to say that there is nothing shown. Rather
we must assume that an item of evidence at instant t is identical to that very
item of evidence at instant t3, etc. The theory cannot be verified. It must be
assumed. But if assumed, how can it be known?” (Magnus, 66-67).
This unverifiability is part of Nietzsche’s genius. He attempted to construct a theory, or
myth, that could solve the problem of nihilism. Nietzsche created a theory for a world in
which scientific theory and physics reigns. Notice that the theory does not settle whether
the world has always existed or whether it came to be at a particular moment It makes that
question almost irrelevant. The theory is not falsifiable, but it is based on an assumption--
as are all theories, according to Nietzsche. He has managed to create a theory that offers
eternity, though perhaps not the etemity for which we long. Nietzsche hoped that this
understanding of the world would become the dominant one; he obviously misjudged.
Whether the world always existed as an eternally recurring one or whether the world came
about at some point and came to be characterized by the eternal recunence is not verifiable
by scientific knowledge alone. Indeed, Nietzsche’s explanation of his recognition that all
life eternally recurs sounds closer to a diviner of oracles than a philosopher seeking the

truth. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence must be accepted on faith

instead of complete knowledge.

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The Greatest Weight or the Highest Affirmation of Life?

Given these implications, Nietzsche suggests that free spirits may grasp the eternal
recurrence in one of two fundamental ways. First, the individual who is free of all gods
may view the doctrine as the ultimate affirmation of life, or secondly, as the greatest weight
imaginable. Nietzsche explains to other free spirits;

If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or
perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, “Do you desire
this once more and innumerable times more?” would lie upon your actions
as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to
yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal
confirmation and seal?
(GS, 341).
The effect that the eternal recurrence has depends on the strength of individual who
perceives it. The first possibility is that the eternal recurrence changes the godless
individual (the free spirit). Acknowledging that the world eternally recurs will transform
the free spirit because the doctrine provides the utmost significance to human life. The
eternal return of the same means that the free spirit must reconcile himself with the fact that
every action he takes will be repeated etemally. The theory adds gravity to the individual’s
actions in the sense that he will be destined to repeat his actions infinitely. His choices are
immortal; they are duly important because they have an eternal impact on history.
Nietzsche does not understand the eternal recurrence as dismal. In fact, Nietzsche
describes the eternal recurrence as the “highest formula of affirmation that is at all
attainable” (EH, 295).

The danger, however, is that the awareness of the eternal recurrence will crush the
free spirit, that is, it can lead to the belief in the utter meaningless of life and a confirmation
of atheism. The free spirit who grasps the implications of the death of God is like the
madman left without a light to lead his way (GS, 125). If such an individual cannot muster
Up the strength within himself, he will become the nihilistic lion who does nothing more
than destroy old tablets of values. In this case, the free spirit cannot affirm the eternal

return of the same. Such an individual lacks the will to create playfully like the child (2.

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138-139). His fate is a burden that he suffers. This type of individual understands the
eternal recurrence to mean that he really cannot and does not control his own destiny. Who
he is, what he has been, and what he will be may have already been determined and has
happened an infinite number of times. This very free spirit is unable to revere any type of
ideal and feels inconsequential, like a speck of dust in a chaotic world. Everything that has
ever happened seems to be meaningless. Those free spirits who are unable or have not yet
created a new ideal to esteem may fall prey to this nihilistic interpretation of the eternal
recurrence.

When viewed in this way, the eternal recurrence can be seen as proof of the utter
meaninglessness of human life because it uncovers a limit to the will to power which is
simply unbearable to some free spirits. The eternal recurrence seems to nullify the
significance of the will to power. One cannot choose the historical and social conditions
into which one is born. Those conditions shape who one is. Nor can the individual alter
even a single incident that happened in the past. This fact reveals a great limit to the will--it
cannot will backwards. And if all events are predetermined and will recur, human willing
appears to have no impact on the world; willing appears to be unable to change the world.
Everything that happens has already happened an infinite number of times in the past. The
individual has already been what he can be. A similar feeling of helplessness led to the
creation of the ascetic ideal. Dannhauser explains; “Nietzsche thinks of previous
philosophies as the will’s reaction to its own impotence before the passing of time, the
revenge of the will to power on time by the creation of fictitious eternal beings”
(Dannhauser, 1972, 846; cf. Z, 251-253). But these free spirits are free of the ascetic
ideal because all gods are dead. They are no longer able to esteem a god, yet are
completely incapable of finding any type of meaning.

In “The Soothsayer,” Zarathustra discusses the danger of this negative (nihilistic)
interpretation of his eternal return teaching. Zarathustra heard a soothsayer speak:

A doctrine appeared, accompanied by a faith: “All is empty, all is the same,

all has been!” And from all the hills it echoed: “All is empty, all is the same.

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all has been!” Indeed we have harvested: but why did all our fruit turn rotten
and brown? What fell down from the evil moon last night? In vain was all
our work; our wine has turned to poison; an evil eye has seared our fields
and hearts (Z, 245). '
The eternal recurrence is the doctrine to which Zarathustra refers. All that has been before.
every pattern, every choice, every event will repeat itself. The accompanying faith that
Zarathustra predicts is nihilism, that is, the faith that everything is in vain and life simply
has no meaning. If everything is bound to recur so that the present has already occuned an
infinite number of times, everything has already been predetermined. The danger of the
eternal recurrence teaching is that the individuals who are free from all metaphysical ideals
will have nothing to esteem and will be unable to create a new estimable goal to revere.
That is, the gravest danger is that these free spirits, who have the most potential and
creative spirit to transcend themselves, may become last men. This threat is real since “the
basic fact of the human will” is that “it needs a goal--and it will rather will nothingness than
not will” (GM: III: 1). Nietzsche fears that the free spirits will remain completely free of
the ascetic ideal without anything for which to live.

Even the strongest individuals may be unable to bear the thought of the eternal
recurrence because they lack the strength, character, courage, and nobility to create values
in light of the death of God. They need something to believe in to replace their belief in
nothing. In the absence of God, free spirits still experience a spiritual need that must be
met. Nietzsche explains that “the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing
powerfully--but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion” (BGE, 53). This
religious instinct to esteem a higher being as a justification for existence is ingrained in
humans due to the centuries of human obedience to gods. Humans even sacrificed their
love of self, their anirnalistic nature, in order to revere these false gods. Nietzsche notes
that “during the moral epoch of mankind, one sacrificed to one’s god one’s own strongest
instincts, one’s ‘nature’: this festive joy lights up the cruel eyes of the ascetic, the ‘anti-
natural’ enthusiast” (BGE, 55). But free spirits can no longer find satisfaction in esteemin g

a god because they recognize that the foundation of all gods have been uprooted. They

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force themselves to accept that their self-denial was nothing more than folly. They still
need to esteem something, but they know that all gods are false ideals. So they dedicate
themselves to uncovering even the most ugly truths, the ungroundable nature of all goals,
ideals, and gods. Nihilism may become the faith of these most promising individuals.
Nietzsche explains why this is the path now open:

Finally-~what remained to be sacrificed. At long last, did one not have to
sacrifice for once whatever is comforting, holy, healing; all hope, all faith in
hidden harmony, in future blesses and justices? Didn’t103 one have to
sacrifice God himself and, from cruelty against oneself, worship the stone,
stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing? To sacrifice God for the nothingnthis
paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty was reserved for the generation that
is now coming up: all of us already know something of this.--(BGE, 55)

Recognition of the eternal recurrence could lead to nihilism, but Nietzsche teaches that it
should lead to the Ubermensch who has faith in himself. Nietzsche teaches the free spirit
to have faith in himself instead of faith in the nothing. When the free spirit learns to turn to
himself instead of searching for a god that does not exist he can become the new
philosopher who creates a new goal to fill the void that the death of god has left. Those
who cannot create their own goals should follow Nietzsche and have faith in the
Ubermensch as the new ideal. The belief in the Ubermensch as the goal and the will to
power as the means to that goal is the faith that is to accompany the eternal return doctrine.
Lowith offers a helpful description of the dual nature of the eternal recurrence.
The metaphor of the eternal recurrence is therefore equatable with something
twofold: on the one hand, with an “ethical gravity” by means of which
human existence that has become goalless obtains a goal again, beyond
itself; and on the other hand, with a natural-scientific “fact” in the goalless
self-contained existence of the world of forces. Consequently, the teaching
of the recurrence presents itself first as the fixing of an ideal goal for the
willing man--and then it replaces the Christian belief in immortality with the
will to self—eternalization--and second as the ascertainment of a physical fact
in the unwilled being—flrus-and-not—different of the physical world. With the
latter, the teaching replaces ancient cosmology with modern physics
(Lowith. 83).
This dichotomy helps explain why the doctrine can be interpreted as the greatest weight or

the highest affirmation imaginable. First, the eternal recunence provides Nietzsche (and

103Kaufmann does not capitalize this sentence in his translation, but I do.

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perhaps other free spirits with) a reason to create a new set of values, a new goal for
himself and humanity. The eternal recunence replaces God, or all “creation” stories,” all of
which depend on some kind of God, or gods, or a first cause or prime mover. Because
time is a circle according to the eternal recurrence doctrine, the beginning of time becomes
indistinguishable. Only human beings can determine what the future will be. The eternal
recurrence does not supply a specific code of ethics itself; rather, it makes possible a faith
that is not based on a god, but on human will. The eternal recurrence is the replacement for
religion, or one might say, it makes possible the only type of faith in a world where God is
dead. The doctrine opens the possibility of a religion of self-glorification, a celebration of
oneself. The free spirit, the future new philosopher, has faith in himself and in his will as
the sole source of the future goals that humanity will revere. The recognition that his
actions and his life will recur an infinite number of times gives him an immortality and
consequently a crucial importance to each decision made. Awareness of the consequences
of the eternal return could lead such an individual to the ultimate affirmation of life. The
highest affumation is the Yes to have everything that was and is to be repeated into all
eternity. This means an affirmation of every horrible event that has been determined by
chance. The ultimate affirmation of life is to will the eternal recurrence in the manner in
which Nietzsche does.

But Lewith drinks the system falls apart at this point because the eternal recurrence
is also a cosmological fact L'dwith contends that if the future has already been determined
by a series of past necessities, the human will has no power to alter the future. The
individuals who have courage and self-awareness will affirm the eternal recurrence. They
will accept the cosmological necessity of eternal recurrence, which means they affirm every
chance, necessity, or accident as it was and desire nothing to be different. However,
Nietzsche does not seem to agree that the system falls apart. Nietzsche insists that the
strongest individuals will follow their egoism; they will as an expression of their ownmost

self. The only way that they can will is to delude themselves into thinking that they actually

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are changing the future. They will in order to achieve the “self-etemalization” to which
Lowith refers above. Their willing is an imprinting of themselves on the future that will
recur. Creation is a type of game for these individuals. No set code of ethics prompts their
willing; rather, their egoism prompts the creation of values. Their desire to create the type
of life that they would want to live infinitely inspires their willing. If one is authentic, one
will find the eternal recunence exhilarating. This is why Nietzsche describes the eternal
return as the “ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life” which
“represents not only the highest insight but also the deepest, that which is most strictly
confirmed and born out by truth and science. Nothing in existence may be subtracted,
nothing is dispensable” (EH, 272). The authentic individual lives in such a way that he
wants and craves that every action be repeated. He chooses each action in full awareness
of the fact that the action will infinitely recur. Although he cannot alter the physical facts
that have occurred, nor the fact that they will infinitely recur, he does not condemn the past.
He clings to the past because it has helped to mold him into the creative, willing being that
he is and because it leads to the future he envisages. The recognition of the eternal
recunence opens up the possibility of individuals living authentic lives. The authentic
individual lives without regrets.

The eternal return does not present an ethical metaphysics in the manner of
Christianity; rather, the doctrine offers the recognition that every action, choice,
contemplation in some way contributes to who an individual is. Zarathustra explains;
“What returns, what finally comes home to me, is my own self and what of myself has
long been in strange lands and scattered among all things and accidents” (Z, 264). The
authentic individual knows Who he is and what he wants to be (which is the same as who
he is). Nietzsche adds; “Not the intensity but the duration of high feelings makes high
men” (BGE, 72). The reason the authentic individual must consider whether he will want
this experience to recur is that it is part of his cumulative self. Thus, his choices matter. If

he loves himself, he must love all his actions including his mistakes. But if he cannot bear

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the thought of his experiences recurring, if he cannot will the eternal return of the same,
this means he suffers life.

Nietzsche does not interpret the etemal recurrence as a fixed ethical or metaphysical
doctrine. Nietzsche would not say that one should live an authentic life, but the free spirits
who recognize the implications of their actions will necessarily live authentic lives.
Nietzsche recognizes that there is no free will, only strong and weak wills. Those who
understand the degeneration that could come feel a great responsibility 'to the future.
Nietzsche explains:

[A]nyone who has the rare eye for the over-all danger that “man” himself
degenerates; anyone who, like us, has recognized the monstrous fortuity
that has so far had its way and play regarding the future of man--a game in
which no hand, and not even a finger, of God took part as a player; anyone
who fathoms the calamity that lies concealed in the absurd guilelessness and
blind confidence of “modern ideas” and even more in the whole Christian-
European morality--suffers from an anxiety that is past all comparisons.
With a single glance he sees what, given a favorable accumulation and
increase of forces and tasks, might yet be made of man; he knows with all
the knowledge of his conscience how man is still unexhausted for the
greatest possibilities and how often the type “man” has already confronted
enigmatic decisions and new paths-he knows still better from his most
painful memories what wretched things have so far usually broken a being
of the highest rank that was in the process of becoming, so that it broke,
sank, and became contemptible.

The over-all degeneration of man is possible, there is no doubt of
it. Anyone who has once thought through this possibility to the end knows
one kind of nausea that other men don’t know--but perhaps also a new
task!-- (BGE 203) .

But is the eternal recurrence at all involved in this? Unaware of whether such degeneration
will occur, Nietzsche motivates himself to will humanity toward the Ubermensch instead.
He is aware that what will happen in the future has already happened a number of times;
however, he has the motivation to will because he can see a danger that he cannot allow to
happen, even if the last man has already arisen in the future. At the moment he decides to
will a new task for humanity, Nietzsche must forget that the future has already occurred.
Nietzsche’s ability to envisage what the type “Man” could be impels him to reject the path
that leads to the production of the last man and also to create the path that leads to the

Ubermensch. In a sense, Nietzsche has no choice but to rebel against the possibility of the

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last man ruling the earth.
The eternal recurrence, combined with the awareness of the will to power and the
malleable nature of human beings, means that the free spirit can become a new type of
philosopher who molds human beings in one direction or another. But without God, the
fiee spirit is also left without an answer to the question of why he should bother to create in
one direction or another. Nietzsche does not provide a set answer to that question. Willing
does not alter the fact that life will eternally recur, but through willing the individual can
interpret the past in a new way. In this manner the individual creates meaning for himself
(and perhaps others as well). The individual who loves himself wills in order to promote
himself. Nietzsche explains what willing means to the noble individual:
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not
need approval; it judges, “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”; it
knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-
creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such a morality is
self—glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of
power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the
consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human
being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but
prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power. The noble human
being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power
over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being
severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness (BGE,
260).

The noble individual wills because of a creative overflow. His willing is a gift to himself

and to the future generations who benefit from his life-affirming will (of. Z, 186-188).

What Happens to the Will to Power and the Ubermensch Doctrines?

Nietzsche teaches that the eternal recunence should not lead to faith in nihilism, but
to a triumph over nihilism. For Nietzsche, the eternal return of the same does not nullify
the significance of willing, nor does it undermine the crucial importance of creating the
Ubermensch. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the eternal recurrence as “the highest
formula of affirmation that is at all attainable” (EH, emphasis added). The doctrine is a
formula for affirmation; it is not the highest thing that one can affirm, for that is the

Ubermensch. One will not select the Ubermensch without some motivation to do so. The

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eternal recurrence of the same provides the formula or the framework for that affirmation.
The will to power is the means of creating the Ubermensch and accepting (affirming) the
eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence provides the motivation to will, while the
Ubermensch is the goal toward which one can now turn, the goal that is to be willed.
Nietzsche intends to create the possibility of other free spirits becoming
the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not
only come to terms and leamed to get along with whatever was and is, but
who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting
insatiably da capo--not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle,
and not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this
spectacle--and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs
himself--and makes himself necessary-—-- (BGE 56).
Nietzsche hopes that such individuals will create a future that enables them to affirm every
detail, every accident, every minutia that has so far occurred. Humans are ignorant of what
the future will be even though the future has already happened an infinite number of times.
Due to that ignorance, human willing matters. Nietzsche does not know if the last man will
arise or not, but the nauseating possibility that a race of last men probably will arise
inspires Nietzsche’s task to create the conditions so that a different kind of being will come
about--the Ubermensch. Nietzsche can only affirm everything that was and is if he creates
this new goal. Because Nietzsche loves life, loves willing, and loves himself and other
creative spirits, he must create this new goal for humanity.
Prerequisites For Acceptance of the Eternal Recurrence
To be able to will the eternal recurrence as Nietzsche understands it, the free spirit
can no longer believe in metaphysical goals. Nietzsche explains,

To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from
morality; new means against the fact of pain (pain conceived as a tool, as the
father of pleasure; there is no cumulative consciousness of displeasure); the
enjoyment of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism, as a counterweight
to this extreme fatalism; abolition of the concept of necessity; abolition of
the “will”; abolition of “knowledge-in-itself.”

Greatest elevation of the consciousness of strength in man, as he
creates the overman (WP, 1060).

The destruction of all gods and otherworldly ideals is the “No-saying, No-doing part” of

Nietzsche’s task (EH, 310). Zarathustra uses the image of the destroying lion for this

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phase of the task (Z, 138-139). Nietzsche and the other free spirits recognize that the
fundamental basis for the existence of Christianity has already been undermined, but before
they can accept the eternal retum of the same they must free their hearts from the need for
such ideals. These false goals denigrate the creative capacity of human willing. Only
when Nietzsche becomes “deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers” can he
“become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations
that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura”
(BGE, 230).

This freedom from all past metaphysics enables the free spirit to be authentic, that
is, it gives him the opportunity to will his own personal goal. Nietzsche describes the
egoism of the noble individual as “that unshakable faith that to a being such as ‘we are’
other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves. The noble
soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question mark” (BGE, 265). Such an
individual can only bear the gravity of the etemal recunence if he has faith in himself and
love of himself as a creator of values. The free spirits who are no longer bound by God,
but who are unable to esteem anything else, will become nihilists. Because these
individuals are unable to create, they prefer to will nothingness instead .of willing the eternal
recurrence. The authentic individual, on the other hand, sees himself as the ordering finger
of the law because he chooses what his goal shall be. He is “the judge, the avenger, and
the victim of [his] own law” (Z, 226). He determines what of the past is worth preserving
and uses that past to shape the future. So, in the end, Nietzsche remains consistent with
his most salient teaching of “The Use and Abuse of History.”

The ability to will the eternal recurrence means the ability to love one’s fate.
Nietzsche defines greatness as “amor fati”: “My formula for greatness in a human being is
amorfati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all
eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it--all idealism is

mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary--but love it” (EH, 258). The eternal

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recurrence means that who an individual is has already been determined an infinite number
of times. So far, chance or fate has determined the character of human beings. Arnor fati
is the ability to love the circumstances and personality into which one is thrown even
though he has no control over the past, or over the fact that the past events will recur
eternally.

The authentic individual, like the child, “has nothing yet of the past to disown and
plays in a happy blindness between the walls of the past and the future” (H, 6). The child
has a forgetfulness that adults lack. The child follows his egoistic impulses because he has
not yet learned to suppress the instincts. The child does not know how to act other than out
of love for himself. This is not a conscious love either. It is an unconscious impulse to
make the world bend to whatever game he is playing.

The Relationship Between the Eternal Recurrence and the
Eternal Dichotomy of the “Masculine” and “Feminine”

The eternal return of the same provides the reason why Nietzsche insists on
maintaining the dichotomy of the sexes. There will no longer be any extraordinary
individuals if this dichotomy is not maintained. Even though everything recurs, Nietzsche
stresses the necessity of the “Eternal Feminine,” and of something “Etemally—and-
Necessarily-Feminine” (BGE, 239). Nietzsche describes himself as the “first psychologist
of the eternally feminine” (EH, 266). He also speaks of the “Eternal Masculine” and the
“Eternally Objective,” but he focuses on the “Eternal Feminine” more directly.
Furthermore, he describes eternity (Z, 340-343), life (Z, 220-222), truth (BGE, preface),
wisdom (Z, 221), and happiness as women, respectively. But what the future will be like
is unknown by Nietzsche, though he has a pretty good idea of where it is headed, at least in
its broad outlines. Nietzsche currently sees the continuing erosion of the feminine
perspective at the hands of Christianity and liberal democracy (BGE, 239). If sex can no
longer exert a powerful influence over human life, Nietzsche does not see what will be left
to inspire human willing. Nietzsche sees the feminine as “eternal” and “necessary” because

without this fundamental perspective, Nietzsche’s ideal cannot be actualized.

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Eternally Hostile War Between the Sexes

Nietzsche also claims that the relationship between man and woman involves (and
should always be characterized by) an eternally antagonistic misunderstanding of one
another. Their mutual misunderstanding is the root of the perpetual antagonism between
man and woman that has been the prime motivation for masculine and feminine willing.
Even though the antagonisms that have characterized sexual relations in the past will
eternally recur, Nietzsche promotes the continuation of this tension in the future. Nietzsche
recognizes that the relationship between man and woman does not have to be an eternally
hostile tension, but he wills that it should be. Modernity differs from all other epochs in
that it threatens to erode this antagonism completely. Indeed, modernity is quickly creating
a condition where the roles of man and woman are interchangeable. Manliness is no longer
cultivated as a masculine virtue; it is considered either a male vice or a trait that women too
can acquire. Femininity is seen as the enslavement of woman rather than as the cultivation
of womanly character. To Nietzsche, this erosion of sexual distinctions between man and
woman is the clearest evidence possible of the coming of the last man. And the plausibility
of this view, when considered in the light of our present reality, is startling.

Nietzsche hopes to overturn the Enlightenment’s faith in the equality of the sexes in
the interests of establishing a hierarchy, or “pathos of distance,” in society. He discusses
the goal of establishing a hierarchical arrangement in BGE 257. But this aphorism does not
mention women at all. The antagonism between the sexes is merely one prerequisite for the
hierarchy that Nietzsche intends to cultivate. Nietzsche encourages an eternally hostile war
of the sexes because it will create the conditions that are less hostile to the Ubermensch.

He also advocates conventional slavery. Previous philosophers had to contend with the
degenerative effects of democracy. Socrates too had to poke and prod the sluggish,
decadent horse of Athens (Plato, 1984, 30c). But there is one fundamental difference
between the democracies with which previous philosophers had to contend and the post-

Enlightenment democracies that Nietzsche faces. Prior to Nietzsche’s time, different roles

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were ascribed to man and woman. And those different roles cultivated distinct masculine
and feminine “natures,” each with their own attributes which were very different from the
other. These distinct creative energies promoted struggle, passion, love, and drama. In
previous forms of democracy, sexual difference was at least a vestige of the “pathos of
distance” that all democracies eventually destroy. Nietzsche considers the cultivation of
distinct masculine and feminine energies as absolutely crucial to the future of humanity.

Those of us who understand that Nietzsche is not some fanatic, or lunatic, or both,
find Nietzsche’s condemnation of egalitarianism especially troubling. We hope to find a
way to use Nietzsche’s provocative suggestions to ennoble liberal democratic politics.
Some of us might ask how we can maintain the tension that vitalizes masculine and
feminine creativity while promoting mutual respect and equality between the sexes. But
Nietzsche insists that liberal democrats cannot have it both ways--we cannot “have our cake
and eat it too.” Democratic societies necessarily become homogenous societies. The focus
on equal rights protection has a leveling effect on both sexes, and society is thus altered for
the worse. As Shapiro eloquently states; “Nietzsche’s thoughts remain ‘out of season.’
They are just easier for us to praise and respect when the season is in our past, rather than
in our lives.”104

Nietzsche adamantly opposes egalitarianism and especially the modern attempt to
establish complete equality of the sexes. Nietzsche is concerned with the structure of
society because his project is an attempt to bring about the creative genius. Only from a
clash among a wealth of types can the Ubermensch be achieved; therefore, Nietzsche must
preserve distinction, opposition, suffering and struggle. Nietzsche insists that the tension
between the sexes must be the root of that opposition. Unfortunately, that tension cannot
be adequately cultivated and promoted in an egalitarian, tolerant, liberal democratic society.
And Nietzsche warns that without that tension, humanity is bound to become a race of last

men. Nietzsche cannot will the eternal recurrence if the last man becomes the destiny of

104This quotation is taken from Shapiro’s unpublished manuscript.

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Mankind. The necessity of an eternally hostile war between the sexes can only be
adequately understood in terms of the eternal recurrence of the same.

Without an adequate understanding of the eternal recurrence, there is no clear
reason why one ought to will, nor is there any urgency in determining what one should
will. The failure of scholars to articulate the eternal recurrence as Nietzsche presents it
accounts for why so many strange analyses of his comments on women exist. The eternal
recurrence gives a coherence to the Nietzschean system. As Heidegger and Lowith
indicate, there are some serious difficulties with the doctrine. However, without the eternal
recurrence to give some continuity and grounding to the system, Nietzsche’s own truths
about women simply do not matter--they would be nothing more than a random posturing.
The eternal recurrence is a doctrine that is intended to give people the motivation to select
the Ubermensch. It is simply not possible to appreciate his prescription for the sexes and
the urgency of promoting femininity and masculinity without acknowledging the way in
which each part of the N ietzschean system fits together. Of course, Nietzsche was simply
incorrect that it would have the effect that he hoped. Very few people understand the
doctrine. If they cannot understand the doctrine, they cannot understand Nietzsche’s vision

and his goal will not be attained.

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CHAPTER 7: NIETZSCHE’S “TRUTHS” ABOUT WOMAN
Do Nietzsche’s Observations Warrant a Privileged Status?
Nietzsche discusses what the relationship between the sexes should be in chapter
seven of Beyond Good and Evil, which is entitled “Our Virtues.” This is one of two
sections in the book that utilizes the first person. The transcendent virtues Nietzsche
prescribes include, above all, the proper disposition toward the problem of man and
woman. One’s virtue can be demonstrated by the manner in which the drinker understands
the fundamental differences between the sexes. Prescribing what the respective roles of
man and woman should be constitutes a “cardinal problem” for Nietzsche (BGE, 231).
“Our Virtues” focuses on the need to alter woman’s nature from what it is becoming. The
defects of modernity announce themselves to Nietzsche most pointedly when he sees what
women are actually becoming-men.
Just as Nietzsche is about to articulate his truths about women he makes a personal
confession regarding the truths about woman that he is about to enumerate. He explains:
Learning changes us; it does what all nourishment does which also does not
merely “preserve”--as physiologists know. But at the bottom of us, really
“deep down,” there is, of course, something unreachable, some granite of
spiritual fatum, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined
selected questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks
an unchangeable “this is I”; about man and woman, for example, a thinker
cannot relearn but only finish learning-only discover ultimately how this is
“settled in him.” At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire
strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their “convictions.” Later-~we
see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are-—
rather, to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual fatum, to what is
unreachable very “deep down” (BGE, 231).
Nietzsche refers to “an unchangeable ‘this is I;’” some fixed “spiritual fatum” about each
individual that cannot be altered by education. The unchangeable quality is the will as
Zarathustra explains: “Indeed, in me there is something invulnerable and unburiable,
something that explodes rock: that is my will. Silent and unchanged it strides through the
years. It would walk its way on my feet, my old will, and its mind is hard of heart and
invulnerable” (Z, 224). And an essential component of each individual’s will is its

particular understanding of sexual difference. In the discussion that follows (BGE, 232-

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239), Nietzsche distinguishes what the roles of each sex ought to be. Nietzsche’s
disclaimer draws attention to his perspectivism. Immediately before exploring the topic of
women, he introduces, indeed he highlights, a serious problem: the status of these “truths”
Nietzsche is about to articulate“)5

By admitting that these are only his truths, that they reveal the great stupidity he is,
Nietzsche contrasts himself with all previous philosophers:

They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions
through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic
(as opposed to the mystics of every rank, who are more honest and doltish--
and talk of “inspiration”); while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch,
indeed a kind of “inspiration”--most often a desire of the heart that has been
filtered and made abstract--that they defend with reasons they have sought
after the fact. They are all advocates who resent the name, and for the most
part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize “truths” --
and very far from having the courage of the conscience that admits this,
precisely this, to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage
which also lets this be known, whether to warn an enemy or friend, or,
from exuberance, to mock itself (BGE, 5).

Nietzsche, unlike previous philosophers, admits that whenever a cardinal problem is at
stake, a deep conviction--a “this is I” in every thinker determines how the individual will
understand himself and the world. For example, every individual canies in himself a
notion of what man is and a notion about what woman is and this inclination cannot be
altered by education.106 Nietzsche’s truths about woman are not absolute “truths,” but are
based on his “this is I,” a gut feeling, an inclination, or unchangeable disposition.

Indeed, all truths are based on some unchangeable quality deep down in the individual.

105Recall that Nietzsche also introduced the problem of nature in The Gay Science just as he was
about to discuss woman (GS, 59).

10601iver (1994) and Kofman (1994) suggest that the “this is I” about woman comes from the
individual’s relationship with his or her mother. This interpretation stems from Nietzsche’s comment that
“Everyone bears within him a picture of woman derived from his mother: it is this which determines
whether, in his dealings with women, he respects them or despises them or is in general indifferent to
them” (HAH I: 380). Oliver further suggests that one never overcomes one’s relationship with one’s
mother, that one’s view of woman is inevitably determined by this relationship. But this is an unfounded
assumption in light of Nietzsche’s comments here. In BGE 231, Nietzsche suggests that there is an
unteachable gut inclination regarding man and woman. He suggests that education, even the rearing by the
mother, cannot alter one’s inclination toward or against women. Nietzsche suggests the will is
unchangeable.

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Apparently, this unchangeable quality and not “evident and universally valid insights” is
“the ground of all worthwhile understanding or knowledge” (Strauss, 190). Nietzsche
explains further; “we shall presumably have only virtues which have learned to get along
best with our most secret and cordial inclinations, with our most ardent needs” (BGE,
214).107 And Nietzsche’s most ardent need is to prevent the actualization of the last man.
Nietzsche’s truths represent the solution to such fundamental problems that “we free, very
free spirits” (BGE, 230) face. He continues: “At times we find solutions of problems that
inspire strong faith in us.” (BGE, 231). Others who are disposed to believe Nietzsche’s
truths about man and woman (presumably because they are similarly constituted to
Nietzsche) will call these truths their convictions. In actuality, these truths reveal who
Nietzsche is. These truths are steps to self-knowledge for Nietzsche and this is his purpose
in enumerating them.

Nietzsche’s personal confession begs the question of whether Nietzsche
understands himself to be describing woman’s unchangeable essence. Nietzsche admits
that these truths express his idiosyncratic will; however, that his truths are subjective
expressions of his will does not discredit them. “Truths” are “former positings of values,
creations of value which have become dominant” (BGE, 211). He recognizes that “truths”
are temporary values created by humans in order to provide meaning to humans for a fixed
period of time. This definition is consistent with Nietzsche’s eternal recunence teaching.
“Truths” are fixed temporarily, but will ultimately be transcended by the creative geniuses
who will replace old, degenerating ones. Although “truths” are not permanent in the sense
of never dying, all positings of value that become “truths” are fixed in the sense that they

eternally recur. Nietzsche’s truths, however, are not yet dominant; hence, they have not

107Nietzsche’s disclaimer is not a mere demonstration of the virtue of honesty as Clark contends,
nor is it an attempt to redeem his anti-egalitarian comments on woman as Kaufmann contends. Kaufmann
states; “The embarrassing contrast with Nietzsche’s own remarks in section 230, toward the end of the
paragraph..., speaks for itself. If anything redeems section 232, and much of the remainder of Part VII, it is
surely the disclaimer in 231. (BGE, 232, N. 23). Most likely he discusses the virtue of intellectual
probity, or cruelty turned against oneself (cf. Strauss, 188-189; cf. BGE, 230).

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yet been undermined. Notice that Nietzsche does not put quotations marks around the term
“truths” when he refers to his own truths. This is because his truths are not yet dead. In
“Our Virtues” Nietzsche discusses what he considers to be the proper role of women; he is
prescribing to nature what it should be, just as the noble Stoics did (BGE, 9). Nietzsche
would like his understanding of the sexes to become the dominant truth about man and
woman. That is, Nietzsche creates these truths; they are not fixed, predetermined truths
that Nietzsche “discovers.” If they were, Nietzsche would have no urgency in articulating
and defending them.

Nietzsche only uses the word “nature” in one aphorism (BGE, 239) of “Our
Virtues.” And he only uses it outside of quotation marks once in this aphorism. When
Nietzsche uses quotation marks around the term he is not referring to his understanding of
nature that he hopes to cultivate, but the understanding of nature that had previously had
power but is now dead. Nietzsche presents his transvaluation of the current “nature” of
(nineteenth century, bourgeois, liberal feminist) woman. Nietzsche offers pointers toward
a more noble type of woman who properly embodies the feminine will. What woman has
learned from the Enlightenment has degraded her, and consequently man as well. But
with the proper teachings, i.e., Nietzsche's teachings, both man and woman can be
improved and ennobled. Nietzsche accurately predicts a dangerous path toward
homogenization. He intends to overturn the Enlightenment project, the consequence of
which would be to establish complete equality between the sexes.

Critique of Universal Education

Nietzsche argues for unequal distribution of education and political rights. Over
half of the population is female and that half should not have the same access to education
as man. This is because education intended for everyone is necessarily defective.
Nietzsche explains; “That everyone may learn to read, in the long run connpts not only
writing but also thinking” (Z, 152). If everyone receives the same education, books will be

written on a lower level to accommodate the common, ordinary, and less subtle minds. In

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the end the overall level of education will be lowered. Furthermore, when men and women
receive the same education, they will generally have to refer to a level of experience that all
human beings as human beings share. This means that universal education will focus on
the lowest aspects of humans, meaning the basic human needs for comfort, security, food,
and drink, i.e., satisfaction of the most basic biological functions. Ironically, although the
focus is on these biological needs, such an education necessarily denigrates what Nietzsche
considers to be the most important aspects of human biology--those traits that distinguish
one human from the next. Because the education can only address their commonalities, it
must remain on a neutral “objective” level.

The goal of such an education is not to teach the greatest minds to think about the
most important questions, but to be fair, to give all people the same tools with which to
compete with one another. Universal education flattens the souls of those who receive it
because it is necessarily sterile and uninspiring. “‘Higher education’ and huge numbers-—
that is a contradiction to start widl. All higher education belongs only to the exception: one
must be privileged to have a right to so high a privilege. All great, all beautiful things can
never be common property” (T1, 510). Most people are not noble, most do not possess
genius. Attempting to teach the entire population as if all had the same potential degrades
the greatest minds. Such universal education debases literature, art, and thinking because
only the clash of differences, idiosyncracies, and personal droughts unleash the creative
potential of human beings. The struggle between the masculine and feminine ways of
thinking is a potential source of tremendous passion and extraordinary creations. And
since one’s sexuality is so much a part of who one is, to drain masculine and feminine
subjectivity out of the educational process is to corrupt drose who receive it. Failing to
educate the distinct needs and predilections drat sex and sexuality impose on man and
woman causes the influence and passion of drose drives to dwindle.

Nietzsche’s argument merely refers to the leveling effects of universal education.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not recommend educating only the smartest, most talented

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individuals regardless of whedrer they are male or female.103 Nietzsche does not explore
this option. He recommends excluding women altogether. Nietzsche argues drat even if
women are capable of such an education, which today is undeniable, they should be denied
access to it. And the only type of education he prescribes is finishing school for girls
(BGE, 234). Nietzsche’s rejection of universal education for women is more than a
condemnation of modern education. Nowhere does Nietzsche say drat women are
incapable of learning a more genuine type of education than modernity has to offer“, indeed,
they are. The difficulty to which Nietzsche points is not that women are incapable of
enlightenment, but drat they are all too capable of it. When women receive education equal
to that received by men, the dichotomy of the sexes cannot survive. When educated
women enter the work force and prove dremselves to be quite capable of these pursuits (as
drey are), very few are left to focus primarily on the cultivation of strong children. Society
suffers, children suffer, and man suffers from the extension of education to women. The
effects of such an education are especially denigrating to women, insists Nietzsche.

In the end, such education produces the businessman, the scientist, the scholar, the
educated individual, but not a woman. Nietzsche illustrates the contradiction produced in
the soul of the literary female: “The literary female: unsatisfied, excited, her heart and
entrails void, ever listening, full of painful curiosity, to the imperative, which whispers
from the depths of her organism, ‘aut liberi aut libri’ [‘Eidrer children or books.’]” (T1,
531). Granting equal education to woman radically alters the life choices drat woman
faces. Nietzsche illustrates this with the juxtaposition of two of her most important

alternatives: children or books. Book writing is only one example of a type of career

108m an essay entitled “Modern Man and his Categories of Thought,” CS Lewis offers a reason
why it may not be desirable to teach the most promising males and females in the same classroom. Lewis
notes that the mixing of the sexes in the classroom “reduces the amount of serious argument about ideas"
(Lewis, 62-63). Not only is the general level of education lowered when it is offered rmiversally to all, but
when the sexes are taught together in the classroom. the character of scholarship is altered. Both sexes
become too concerned with impressing one another rather than with enlightening themselves. Nietzsche
would agree with Lewis that single-sex education is preferable to urixed classes, though Nietzsche is clearly
not a proponent of universal education in general.

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woman may obtain, but Nietzsche’s argument would apply to other careers as well.

History offers several fine examples of women who have quite capably allowed
their literary genius to flower. Virginia Woolf, George Sand, Simone DeBeauvior, and
Jane Austen are a few examples. Nietzsche would quickly point out drat none of these
women bore children. Virginia Woolf voices a similar point in her analysis of the lives of
George Eliot, Jane Austen, and the Bronte Sisters. In her attempt to determine what made
drese women capable of producing great novels, Woolf notes drat “four more incongruous
characters could not have met together in a room” (Woolf, 66). Woolf immediately adds
“Save for the possibly relevant fact that not one of them had a child” (ibid. ). In fact,
Virginia Woolf also had no children. Woolf raises the question that Nietzsche introduces,
namely, are literary females sterile? To say that drese women could not have children
because drey were sterile is a hasty generalization. For instance, Simone DeBeauvior was
quite capable of bearing. Nevertheless, it is striking that none of drese women had
children. Their creative outlet was literature, not the production of the child. Nietzsche
would argue that one could someer find a woman who does both well, and history has
born out this notion.

Nietzsche implies that woman placing emphasis on intellectual pursuits is
contradictory for woman, but not for man (T1, 531). A real woman does not choose
between children and books, according to Nietzsche. There is no choice for the real
woman. The child is her goal. Nietzsche fails to note drat many great men have failed to
produce children. Though Socrates had children, his family life was far from fulfilling.
Moreover, Socrates’s children were radrer mediocre. Nietzsche himself had no children.
Nietzsche surely does not consider Socrates, the genius of the heart, or himself sterile.
Consequently, Nietzsche is on very shaky ground when he asserts that woman should not
attempt to allow dreir creative genius to flower. Working mothers today clearly
demonstrate that it is possible to have a career and a child. But Nietzsche’s argument drat

one may not reach the peak in both areas simultaneously has some merit.

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Nietzsche correctly suggests drat woman’s receiving the same educational
opportunities as men demotes the importance of the child. Children are no longer self-
evidently of primary importance for woman, nor are drey necessarily of any importance to
her, according to Nietzsche. Once she is granted the same access to education and careers
as man, woman must now decide whether family or career should be her focus. Nietzsche
presents the issue as an eidrer/or scenario. In part, Nietzsche has historical evidence to
support his point Nietzsche would add that deep down all women know drat this is an
either/or choice, even if women today are likely to want to do it all. Her heart will be in
one more than the other if she chooses bodl. She will either do a mediocre job widr bodr,
or she will give one precedence over the other. The educated woman is faced widr no
attractive alternatives. If woman chooses the career, she denies her maternal inclinations,
and if she chooses to be a modrer, she fails to live up to her intellectual potential. Over
time, as woman is taught to choose career (as she is taught today), her desire for the child
grows weaker. Nietzsche fears that the ultimate consequence of the emancipation of
woman is the erosion of the strong need and desire of women to cultivate children.
Woman’s notion of the family-centered life is fading away, if she sees it as an option at all.

Nietzsche’s argument rules out the possibility of a woman like. J .K. Rowling who
manages both to be a single modrer and write best-selling children’s books. Surely this
woman is a living example of a woman who can have a successful career and be a good
mother to her children. But J .K. Rowling is not a typical woman and her situation is rare.
Often the career undermines the rearing of children, as we see quite clearly today. Many
children of dual-income families are now raised in day care centers instead of at home.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche does not grant that some careers are conducive to the rearing of
children, and interestingly, writing books may be one of them. Nietzsche correctly notes
drat the denigration of raising a family to one option among many for woman carries
psychological consequences drat transforms woman’s essence. If woman does not have to

be driven by the desire to have children, if woman is intellectually, morally, and socially

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capable of pursuing other avenues of interest, feminists see no necessary reason why
woman ought to be bound to domesticity. Woman no longer understands herself as having
a destiny or purpose because she is a woman, she now forces herself to make the choice
between career and family. Nietzsche contends drat the necessity of making this choice
today changes women-—for the worse. Yet Nietzsche would argue that even if she could be
“liberated” from this deep need and desire for the child, to do so would be dangerous
because it turns woman into a slavish and resentful being. Whereas the availability of more
options is supposed to be liberating and empowering, their availability puts women in a
precarious position. As many, who find themselves stuck in the very position drat
Nietzsche describes, feel they should not have to choose between family and career (or, as
Nietzsche sees it, between femininity and sterility), ressentiment ensues. Woman becomes
angry at her feminine inclinations so she tries to repress them in one way or anodler.
Nietzsche understands her choice of career to be the active denial of femininity.

Nietzsche is wrong to imply drat having children must be woman’s only role.
because not all women want to have children, even if women have a biological
predisposition to have children. Nor should all women have children, for the fact drat
women can have children does not mean drat drey all make good mothers. Most will not
produce the type of children that Nietzsche hopes to cultivate anyway. Moreover, he does
not discuss the fact that many women may feel resentful if forced into the role of modrer
and wife. Nietzsche would respond as Rousseau does: “Women, you say, do not always
produce children? No, but their proper purpose is to produce them” (Rousseau, 362).
Nietzsche argues drat woman can be cultivated in such a way as to desire the child more
strongly because with the proper enforcement, woman could have a greater likelihood of
producing a stronger baby. Women are resentful of having to fulfill this role because she
has been taught by feminists to be resentful. This is the immediate consequence of
universal education opening up drese possibilities for woman. One wouldexpect Nietzsche

to add that their ressentiment is the result of a particular prejudice, namely, the belief that

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family is a burden and industry, politics, and an active life in the public realm are
choicewordry for dreir own sake. A final criticism of Nietzsche’s prescription is that it is
quite possible for a woman to be feminine without having a child. Nietzsche understands
femininity as woman’s means to the child, but it is possible that women might enjoy their
femininity for its own sake.

Not only does universal education erode the unique talents, drives, and instincts
that distinguish woman from man, but such education teaches her to make the same
mistakes males are accustomed to making. Nietzsche’s argument is plausible because
education began as an effort to teach males. Universal education is nodring more drat
expanding drat teaching to women. Woman learns to participate in the intellectual pursuits
of the sterile (male) scholars. George Sand, whom Nietzsche understands as an indictment
against universal education, took the name and the attire of man and failed to produce any
children (cf. BGE, 233). Nietzsche laments drat “drere are enough irnbecilic friends and
corrupters of woman among the scholarly asses of the male sex who advise woman to
defeminize herself in this way and to imitate all the stupidities with which ‘man’ in Europe,
European ‘manliness,’ is sick: they would like to reduce woman to the level of ‘general
education’” (BGE, 239). Providing woman with this type of education “reduces” her, drat
is, makes her less than she could (should) be. At the prompting of man, woman begins to
examine herself scientifically, drat is, she studies “woman as such” as a historical
phenomenon. She drops her veils and learns to treat her instincts and her femininity as
products of historical and social conditions to be denounced, rather than as inexplicable
impulses that deserve respect. In so doing she uncovers the feminine secrets drat have
always been the source of her greatest strength. What man has always perceived as
incomprehensible and admirable about woman she reveals as nodring more than a socially
constructed illusion, an illusion that can be changed. By uncovering the origin of her roles,
she kills man’s idealization of woman. She also kills her own self-idealization. The power

of woman dies just like any other historical phenomenon when it is completely understood.

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Democratic enlightenment amounts to “the breaking of woman’s magic spell” over man
(BGE, 239). The scientific probing of woman by woman reduces the feminine attributes to
what is thinkable rationally. When she reveals her hidden desires and cravings, she
weakens her ability to inspire man.

Aldrough Nietzsche does not make the suggestion, a potential solution to the
problem Nietzsche faces (the potential erosion of femininity) would be to educate men and
women in separate classrooms. But a serious difficult would still remain. Who would
decide what women are taught--men or women? It is not clear in what specific ways
Nietzsche would want to educate woman beyond maternal duties. He would still
recommend drat she stay at home, so the education would be little else than a finishing
school. It would be difficult to determine a basis for differentiating the “appropriate”
teachings for woman from those that are appropriate for man.

What Does the “Enlightened” Woman Abandon?

Nietzsche sees no difficulty in excluding women from education altogether, for
women do not really want to be educated. Nietzsche questions in all seriousness “whedrer
woman really wants enlightenment about herself--whether she can will it” (BGE, 232). He
implies that woman is simply not intellectually curious, she does not want to understand
herself, and that it may not be in her best interest to follow such scholarly pursuits.
Nietzsche is wrong to imply drat all women lack intellectual curiosity, and he is further
incorrect to suggest an incongruity between intellectual curiosity and femininity. But again,
an important teaching that is worthy of our attention stems from drese assertions.
Intellectual pursuits are incompatible widr feminine modesty because too much self-
knowledge undermines femininity. Nietzsche does not outline the reasons why, but
perhaps it is possible to speculate based upon what we have already seen. When woman
learns that intellectually she can achieve the same things as man, she sees drat she can
protect herself (economically) just as well as man can. She also has medical technology

(like birth control, hormone therapy, abortion) at her disposal to control or tame her

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physical longings and make her body bend toward her new goal. It becomes less clear to
her why she needs a man (unless she happens to want a child). She has no reason to
appear to be modest or feminine at all, because, after all, modesty does not get one a job.
And if her need for a man becomes weaker, so too does her desire to be feminine. She no
longer needs to be a woman because in the social and political world she finds it more
useful to be considered merely as a person.

Woman should be the woman behind the man and the modrer behind the children
who exerts her power behind the scenes. She needs to cultivate modesty, the feminine
virtue par excellence which has always been woman’s key virtue, in order to take this role.
Without modesty, only the ugly raw qualities and functions stand. Nietzsche explains:

Woman has much reason for shame; so much pedantry, superficiality,
schoolmarmishness, petty presumption, petty licentiouSness and immodesty
lies concealed in woman-—one only needs to study her behavior with
children!--and so far all this was at bottom best repressed and kept under
control by fear of man. Woe when “the eternally boring in woman”109 --
she is rich in that!—-is permitted to venture forth! When she begins to
unlearn droroughly and on principle her prudence and art--of grace, of play,
of chasing away worries, of lightening burdens and taking things lighdy--
and her subtle aptitude for agreeable desires! (BGE, 232).
When woman becomes educated (which to Nietzsche means immodest), she loses the
ability to fear man in any profound sense, for presumably she knows what he does.
Woman learns to act like men, to be outspoken and bold in placing even the most
superficial demands. Consequently, woman loses her feminine traits which include the arts
of grace, play, and chasing away worries--all of which lighten man’s burdens. Woman’s
modesty is a mask, though it is an agreeable one. Her use of illusion, masks, and play
increases man’s drive to be masterful, domineering, and conquering. Nietzsche suggests
here that woman ought to be modest because her immodesty is potentially dangerous to
man ’s disposition. Her modesty helps to lighten man’s load as it enables him to fantasize

about her and what he would like woman to be. Beneadr the surface, woman is

PFBSUIIIptuous, immodest, and shameful. Though this is far from a flattering assessment,

109See note 57 above.

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men do not fare much better in Nietzsche’s perspective. She delights in her power over
children, a power that she never doubts is fundamentally hers: “Deep in her heart, no
modrer doubts that the child she has borne is her property” (BGE, 194). In BGE 232,
Nietzsche stresses woman’s behavior with children because woman’s highlighting this
power in particular has the potential to break man’s spirits. Woman may not doubt the
child is her own, but man may very well doubt drat he is the child’s father. Formerly
woman needed to convince man drat the child was in fact his. Man needs to create parental
rights in order to have influence over the child, whereas woman, by virtue of carrying the
child in her own body, does not need any rights. She experiences her authority over the
child in housing and nourishing the fetus for nine months. Thus man needs woman to be
modest (and appear to take a secondary role) in order to mask his own potential inferiority
complex so that he can accentuate his masterful qualities. And when woman succeeds in
her modesty, “no father contests his own right to subject it [the child] to his concepts and
valuations. Indeed, formerly it seemed fair for fathers (among the ancient Germans, for
example) to decide on the life or death of the newborn as they saw fit” (BGE, 194). The
father makes the child his own by exerting his brute strengdr and possibly artificial
authority over the child. He becomes the de facto master of the child in this way. But
because his authority rests on woman’s assuming a secondary role, the modest woman
actually has power over man.
Nietzsche’s next paragraph elaborates what woman ought to be modest about:
Even now female voices are heard which-holy Aristophanes!--are
frightening: drey drreaten with medical explicitness what woman wants from
man, first and last. Is it not in the worst taste when woman sets about
becoming scientific that way? So far enlightenment of this sort was
fortunately man’s affair, man’s lot--we remained “among ourselves” in this;
and whatever women write about “woman,” we may in the end reserve a
healthy suspicion whedrer woman really wants enlightenment about herself-
-whether she can will it-- (BGE, 232).
This advice to women comes from Nietzsche’s concern for man’s well being, that is, for

man’s achieving the maximum accumulation of power. Nietzsche notes (what Allan Bloom

describes as) woman’s “scientific concentration on the coarse material facts of sex--sex, not

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eros or love” (Bloom, 1993, 40).110 She changes from the lover with her “art of
enchantrnent” to the scientific human with her “method of disenchantment” (ibid.). Bloom,
like Nietzsche, criticizes this demystification. Nietzsche is correct to notice that women
who shed their modesty move to the opposite extreme; drey become medically explicit in
expressing dreir sexual needs. This Openness is the inevitable result of the sexual
revolution of the sixties and seventies. Woman’s outspoken quest becomes a search for the
perfect orgasm or sperm donor. More and more women make clear that men are only
useful to them insofar as they are bank accounts, sex toys, or sperm donors. In fact, being
a single parent has become an ideal for some.

One danger of woman’s sexual liberation is the elimination of the lover for the sake
of (multiple) sexual parmers. Her explicitness also enables males to get sex widrout
commitment, but man loses more than he gains when woman becomes the object of lust
instead of the object of love, admiration, and devotion. Nietzsche does not explicitly make
this point, drough it is a logical extension of assertions he does make. Even the last man
has sex, but this sex is only a little pleasure, not inspired or meaningful in any way (cf. Z,
130). Such sex is of no use to Nietzsche. As Zarathustra indicates in his speech “On
Chastity,” the rarest individuals are characterized by chastity, but dreir chastity is not a
repression of shallow lust. The chastity, in which only the most extraordinary spirits
should partake, unleashes a heightened creative tension in the soul of man and woman.

Man needs woman to be enthralled with him. Her sexual explicitness makes him an
unimportant or insignificant means to fulfilling her appetites. Man can no longer see
woman as the sublime object of admiration drat he needs her to be. Nietzsche continues:

Unless a woman seeks a new adornment for herself that way--I do drink
adorning herself is part of the Etemal-Feminine?--she surely wants to
inspire fear of herself--perhaps she seeks mastery. But she does not want

truth: what is truth to woman? From the beginning, nothing has been more
alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth--her great art is the lie, her

110Bloom is not discussing Nietzsche or Nietzsche’s view of women in this passage, but eros.

He scrutinizes the modern degradation of true erotic longing for the sake of raw sex. Nevertheless, Bloom’s
description of the focus on coarse raw sex certainly helps elaborate Nietzsche’s point in BGE 232.

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highest concern is mere appearance and beauty. Let us men confess it: we
honor and love precisely this art and this instinct in woman--we who have a
hard time and for our relief like to associate with beings under whose
hands, eyes, and tender follies our seriousness, our gravity and profundity
almost appear to us like folly (BGE, 232).
There is some sense in Nietzsche’s describing woman’s adorning herself as part of the
Eternal Feminine. She is the fairer sex and as such may be inclined to enhance drat beauty
and/ or spread beauty outside of herself. By beautifying herself, she makes herself a
pleasant distraction for man. Her adornment gives profound men the strength to continue
striving; she keeps drese men from losing dremselves in the profundity or gravity of their
pursuits. This is the same reason drat Zarathustra counsels woman; “Go to it, women
[Frauen], discover the child in man!” (Z, 178). The child is “hidden” in man and will not
come out widrout woman. Apparently, man may not be able to cultivate his childlike
creativity widrout woman. And woman’s adornment not only provides beneficial
aspirations in man, but this skill is the key to woman’s gaining ascendancy over men.
Nietzsche recognizes drat in seeking adomments for herself, woman seeks mastery.
Nietzsche does not say what she masters, drough the clear implication is that woman
masters man in this manner.

Nietzsche also suggests that woman needs this adornment because the truth is so
repugnant to her. Woman does not seek knowledge--she does not have the deep desire to
know as some profound men do. Nietzsche does not explain which truth or trudrs are so
disagreeable to woman, nor does he elaborate why truth is so repugnant to woman.
Furthermore, Nietzsche does not make clear whedrer woman lies primarily to herself, to
others, or to both. From what has already been discussed, we know that woman must hide
from men her trudrs beneath her beautiful surface (i.e., her natural functions) because these
are truths that men do not see as beautiful (cf. GS, 66). And man’s assessment may
convince her drat she is ugly beneath the surface. If this is the case, she would want to

hide woman’s trudrs, or in most extreme cases, deny her natural functions altogether. But

this suggestion does not seem to be consistent with Nietzsche’s other assertions that

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woman longs for the child and wants the child in a more profound way than does man.
Still, there is no clear reason why woman would want to flee from trudr into illusion more
readily than man would. Are man’s natural functions any more attractive? Nietzsche does
not discuss them, perhaps because man is not primarily determined by his natural functions
in the way that woman is. Woman may be more prone than man to cling to comforting
illusions because her physical vulnerability or vulnerability to rape, but this is not so clear.
Nietzsche does not present this argument eidrer. A drird possibility is that Nietzsche means
drat trudr is repugnant to woman because she actually needs illusion in order to attain
power. Woman does not empower herself by uncovering her hidden secrets. A later
aphorism entitled “Among women” provides solid evidence of this third possibility:
“Truth? Oh, you don’t know trudr! Is it not an attempt to assassinate all our pudeurs?”
(TT, 468).111 Interestingly, she would need to understand something about man in order
to manipulate him with her coquetry. Whereas some men seek mastery by understanding
the world, woman should focus on people; she must know men and make sure that man
does not understand her. If trudr is so repugnant to woman, one wonders how she ever
gains enough understanding of man to be able to manipulate him in the ways Nietzsche
recommends.

Nietzsche has suggested already that if woman were to recognize the deleterious
consequences of becoming a reductionistic “truth”-seeker like man, she could never
intentionally choose this path (cf. BGE, 232). She unleams her feminine ability to create
the beautiful illusion that sparks the imagination of males (and herself). Man, it seems, is
incapable of conjuring the illusions drat he needs without woman. And when woman
ceases to be cunning, creative, seductive, she becomes unable to enliven his affection and
passion. But man should overestimate and misunderstand woman’s capabilities, for this
animates a longing in man’s soul. Her mystery excites his most masculine qualities-his

creative curiosity, his sexual passion, and his desire to protect, rule, and dominate. Her

11 1The French term “pudeur” means “modesty.”

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beautiful mysteriousness implies to him an inherent (and profound) meaning to life--a
meaning that he creates and she represents. Moreover, Nietzsche explains; “There is an
innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause” (BGE, 180). Her ability to
lie is indicative of a much needed faidr and Nietzsche’s project is an attempt to cultivate
faidr toward a worthy goal. When woman’s incomprehensible feminine quality erodes,
when her ability to adorn herself is abandoned, so too does man’s masculinity wither
away. And this deleterious sterilization of man harms woman insofar as women need
(desire) masculine or manly men. When man overestimates woman, she correspondingly
overestimates man.
Women, on the odrer hand, have always underestimated and will continue to
underestimate odrer women. Nietzsche asks:
has ever a woman conceded profundity to a woman’s head, or justice to a
woman’s heart? And is it not true drat on the whole “woman” has so far
been despised most by woman herself--and by no means by us?

We men wish drat woman should not go on compromising herself
drrough enlightenment--just as it was man’s droughtfulness and
consideration for woman drat found expression in the church decree: mulier
taceat in ecclesial. It was for woman’s good when Napoleon gave the all
too eloquent Madame de Stael to understand: mulier taceat in politicis! And
I drink it is a real friend of women that counsels drem today: mulier taceat de
muliere! 112 (BGE, 232).

Woman does not consider other women profound or just because she understands their
motivations. Perhaps she sees the truths beneadr the surface of woman and she too judges
drem to be unattractive qualities; she understands how women manipulate others. This
inability to consider other women profound or just provides an additional reason why
women cannot be friends.113 Woman understands other women too well. Obviously
112The three italicized phrases in this aphorism translate as follows: “Woman should be silent in

church” (BGE, 232, n. 24); “Woman should be silent when it comes to politics” (BGE, 232, n. 25);
“Woman should be silent about woman” (BGE, 232, n. 26).

113The either/or choice between career or family has created a new reason why women have
difficulty being friends with other women. Working mothers and stay-at-lrome mothers experience a great
deal of ressentiment toward one another. Both groups feel as if the other negatively judges them and this
makes the two types of women incapable of befriending one another. Nietzsche does not discuss this point,
though he would not be surprised by this phenomenon.

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women can befriend other women, however Nietzsche may be correct to note that a distrust
or fear of manipulation may wound female friendships.

Nietzsche does not make clear whether woman is capable of seeing man as
profound. If too much understanding undermines one’s ability to admire and aspire, one
would expect the fact that woman understands man better than man does (cf. Z, 17 8) to
undermine her ability to perceive man as profound. Woman would have to be terribly
clever to convince man drat she perceives him as such, for she must pretend to overestimate
him. Perhaps Nietzsche implies drat woman may be able to perceive man as profound
because man is indeed more profound than woman in Nietzsche’s view. But Nietzsche
states that woman judges woman too harshly; men may not do so to the same degree.114
He drus leaves open the possibility drat a man could judge woman to be profound. This
possibility is confirmed in Twilight of the Idols where be state; “Women are considered
profound. Why? Because one never fathoms dreir depths. Women aren’t even shallow”
(TI, 470). Man’s failure to comprehend woman makes him able to see her as profound,
drough the implication of this statement is that woman would not seem so profound if man
truly understood her. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra counsels; “About woman one should speak
only to men” to keep open the possibility of admiring woman (Z, 177). Nietzsche advises
woman to be silent about women because she has nothing positive to say (BGE, 232).
Men are more capable of defending women than are women. Nevertheless, man has the
potential of seeing woman as profound, but woman does not. If Nietzsche is correct, this
is a strong indictment against the feminist movement, for he denies the possibility of
sisterhood. This is also an astounding statement given the degree of harshness in
Nietzsche’s own discussion of woman. By keeping woman silent, man is free to

construct what ever image of femininity drat he would like to make. Incidentally, allowing

114Incidentally, Nietzsche also leaves open the possibility that man may judge other men as

profound. Nietzsche himself judges other men like Napoleon to be profound. The reason could be the
fact that man does not understand other men to the same degree that woman understands other women

(cf. 2. I78).

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only men to speak of women will also give men the power to mold woman’s character.
Woman’s silence makes her a profound, mysterious delight, whereas her berating other
women can only hurt the position of woman in the public realm, in the private sphere, and
most importantly from Nietzsche’s perspective, in the hearts of men.

Nietzsche suggests drat woman’s mastery, which is to be attained drrough her
femininity, is not completely self-reliant He teaches her that feminine mastery depends on
her making man serve her and she must construct the proper image in order to achieve this.
But he correspondingly teaches that man needs to rely on woman as well. Man must
believe drat she needs his protection, whedrer she in fact needs drat protection or not.
Woman seeking self—reliance is not in itself a bad thing in Nietzsche’s assessment, but the
consequent erosion of masculinity and femininity is dangerous. Destroying femininity (and
inevitably masculinity as well) means destroying woman’s (and thus man’s) strength.

Criticism of Fenrinism
The goals of the feminist movement are therefore backwards because woman loses
more (power) than she gains in attaining equal rights. Nietzsche notes:
Since the French Revolution, woman’s influence in Europe has decreased
proportionately as her rights and claims have increased; and the
“emancipation of woman,” insofar as drat is demanded and promoted by
women themselves (and not merely by shallow males) is drus seen to be an
odd symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the most feminine
instincts (BGE, 239).
In attaining rights protection woman forfeits her real strengdr (feminine wiles and subtlety)
(cf. HAH I: 425).115 Woman no longer feels the need to cultivate her feminine strengdr,
for she has rights protection, which is a mediocre tool at best Rather than strengdlening
woman’s ability to command others, the feminist fight for equal rights achieves just the

opposite. Nietzsche continues; “Woman wants to become self-reliant--and for drat reason

she is beginning to enlighten men about ‘woman as such’: this is one of the worst
1151n Feminism Without Illusions, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese criticizes feminists for focusing too
heavfly on attaining individual rights that are the same as men. The unintended result has been that the

community of women is ignored. Thus, women are not really freer when they attain equal rights, they are
Simply bound by a new set of expectations.

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developments of the general uglification of Europe” (BGE, 232). Because woman wants
financial self-reliance she drinks that she must prove to man that she is quite capable of
protecting herself. She must demonstrate drat she does not need man. Nietzsche does not
criticize woman’s seeking an amount of self-reliance, but the manner in which she seeks it.
Woman necessarily seeks mastery and power because she “is living and because life simply
is will to power” (BGE, 259). When woman asserts herself in the realm of political rights,
she reveals too much about herself to man. She steals from man his ability to idealize her.
Teaching man that “woman as such” does not need his protection is not the road to
mastery, but the road to enslavement Competing with man for the same jobs and
education causes woman to
lose the sense for the ground on which [she] is most certain of victory; to
neglect practice widr [her] proper weapons; to let [her]self go before men,
perhaps even “to the point of writing a boo ,” when formerly [she]
disciplined [her]self to subtle and cunning humility; to work widr virtuous
audacity against men’s faith in a basically different ideal that he takes to be
concealed in woman, somedrin g Etemally-and-Necessarily-Feminine--
(BGE, 239).
Woman teaches man that she is something less than he expects her to be, drat she can be
just like him. The power of woman has never come from cultivating the commonalities she
shares with man, but from man’s failure to understand her. When woman is most different
from man, she is able to influence him the most. But when she becomes more like man (or
a human being who happens to have ovaries) she transforms herself into just another
obstacle to man. He is no longer able to see her as rare or precious or even wordr his
admiration and attention because she constantly reminds him eidrer that she is just like him,
or that she does not need or want him. Her influence has always been rooted in those
aspects drat distinguish her from man. These traits have made men able to look outside of
themselves and look upward toward some distant goal. But when woman ventures into the
public realm, the differences between the sexes gradually disappear, and neidrer man nor

woman continue to search for those distant stars.

Feminism may even be the most denigrating and debilitating form of slave morality

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on the scene today. The resentful herd of women (and men as well) declares the biological
differences between the sexes to be unfair or unjust. They argue that women should not be
made to suffer more than men or even suffer at all due to their biology, nor should women
have different opportunities than men. Rights protection undermines those differences.
Hoff Sommers suggests drat these feminists perpetuate the “myth of the fragile gir ” in
order to attain these rights (Hoff Sommers, 17-20). Despite the fact that girls and women
by the early 1990s were “flourishing in unprecedented ways,” that is, drey were attaining
more rights and opportunities that ever before, Hoff Sommers contends drat the feminists
continued and continue to exaggerate the sufferings and weaknesses of young women
today (ibid., 20). Feminists perpetuated the “mydr of the fragile girl” in order to elicit
special protections from the rest of society. Notice that as Hoff Sommers describes them,
feminists actually do what Nietzsche suggests all women do; they exaggerate dreir
weaknesses (GS, 66). Whereas exaggeration is not in itself bad, this particular
exaggeration of weakness is not an affirmation of the female body, of femininity, or of
woman. In fact, drese feminists do not affirm anything in Nietzsche’s view. Feminism, as
Nietzsche explicitly suggests and as Hoff Sommers seems to imply, is a renunciation of
femininity. The purpose of the movement is to present femininity as an unnecessary
burden. These feminists want to minimize the influence of femininity and the female body.
Ultimately they want the body to be completely unimportant

Moreover, feminism is a rejection of masculine strength. Nietzsche would say that
the domination of society by feminism and feminist dreories is a result of the emasculation
of males. Men treat women with too much so-called “respect” because drey lack the
courage and strengdr to express real manliness as men once did in aristocratic times (BGE,
239). Men’s shallow deference is not respectful of woman in Nietzsche’s view. True
respect would be to insist drat women remain feminine and ladylike by facilitating her
unequal rights. Chivalrous deeds would be one way man could demonstrate respect of

woman. Even the enslavement of woman by means of concubinage would constitute

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I'"-—_

 

 

genuine respect, according to Nietzsche. Instead, drese emasculated males demonstrate that
masculine inclinations are evil and ought to be eliminated altogether. Nietzsche is sirnply
correct to notice this trend that began early in the feminist movement but continues today
through the rhetoric of such well-known feminists as Carol Gilligan and Gloria Steinem.
Hoff Summers criticizes these views in her book The War Against Boys:
The belief that boys are being wrongly “masculirrized” is inspiring a
movement to “construct boyhood” in ways that will render boys less
competitive, more emotionally expressive, more nurturing--more, in short,
like girls. Gloria Steinem summarizes the views of many in the boys-
should-be-changed camp when she says, “We need to raise boys like we
raise girls”116 (Hoff Summers, 44).
Feminists thus encourage both women and men to shed their sexuality. Sex as such is an
obstacle to the attainment of equal rights. These feminists expect men to reject masculinity
in exchange for universal equal rights. This open rejection of manliness is simply one of
the means to the end they seek--the elimination of strong individuals altogedrer.

Nietzsche perceives woman’s fight for equal rights as an attempt to become like
man, or more accurately, a sterile representation of man. Seeking to be treated as man’s
equal really means attempting to be (treated) like a man (or a shallow image of a man)
instead of a woman. They desire to be treated as society has thus far treated males, which
means drat they actively seek to become like these males. This is because, drey argue, men
have been given unfair precedence and women want the benefits that males have received
from drat treatment. In the interests of demonstrating herself to be man’s equal, woman
must prove herself to be quite capable of shedding her feminine qualities in order to be
domineering, ambitious, economically independent and self-reliant. So according to
Nietzsche, women dremselves condemn femininity in favor of a watered-down semblance
of masculinity. Nietzsche teaches drat if woman genuinely understood herself, she would
cling to her femininity and would most assuredly never fight for “equal rights” or complete
independence from man. She would never want to be treated like man because she is

116Hoff Summers quotes Steinem’s comments from an ABC News Special entitled “Men,
Women and the Sex Difference” which aired on February 1, 1995.

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fundamentally different from him. According to Nietzsche, not only can woman only be an
imperfect copy of man, but man is not even a wordly model for emulation (BGE, 239).
Unexpectedly, the erosion of femininity harms woman even more than it harms
man. Nietzsche explains:
That woman ventures fordl when the aspect of man that inspires fear--let us
say more precisely, when the man in man is no longer desired and
cultivated-that is fair enough, also comprehensible enough. What is harder
to comprehend is drat, by the same token--woman degenerates. This is
Eggs happening today: let us not deceive ourselves about that (BGE,
Feminism teaches women first and foremost to be self-reliant and independent, that drey do
not need a man to be complete. The “enlightened” woman thus seeks financial stability
and the right to get a job.117 But as Nietzsche sees it, this amounts to little more than
attaining “economic and legal self-reliance of a clerk: ‘woman as clerk’ is inscribed on the
gate to the modern society that is taking shape now” (BGE, 239). The “liberated” woman
mistakenly believes that pursuing the same utilitarian goals as males will give her the
strengdr to achieve mastery (over others, over man, and perhaps over her fears). Woman
wants to become cultivated’ and, as is said, make the weaker sex strong through culture-
-as if history did not teach us as impressively as possible that making men ‘cultivated’ and
making the weak--weakening, splintering, and sicklying over the force of the will--have
always kept pace” (BGE, 239). Ultimately, she wants to become man’s equal, which
means that she seeks the same education, the same rights, and the same careers as man.
Nietzsche argues that both man and woman degenerate when drey are treated the
same because drey become the same. Becoming the same does not mean drat men attain
feminine attributes and women attain the manly virtues. Pursuing man’s goals forces
woman to ignore the fact drat she has a different body and drerefore has different needs,

drives, and inclinations than man. “As she thus takes possession of new rights, aspires to

become ‘master’ and writes the progress of woman upon her standards and banners, the

117This is the precise goal of Gail Evans’ book and, given the positive reception her book has
received, it is reasonable to conclude drat many women hold this same view.

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opposite development is taking place with terrible clarity: woman is retrogressing” (BGE,
239). It is impossible to fulfill desires and inclinations that one refuses to admit exist. A
defeminized woman fails to affirm her inclinations and consequently is a weak, unsatisfied,
and shallow woman. If mastery and power is her goal, as Nietzsche contends that it is, she
is failing in this regard. Woman is regressing from the goal that Nietzsche thinks she
should help produce--the Ubermensch.
One might expect woman to blossom when freed from the bonds of male
dominance, but Nietzsche suggests drat the exact opposite is the case. He concludes drat
woman should maintain her secondary role, not only for the sake of man and for the sake
of society as we have discussed, but for her own sake. When man no longer worships and
protects her, woman begins to underestimate herself as well. Woman becomes
disenchanted widr herself as she disenchants men. And because the self-reliant woman no
longer needs man’s protection, i.e., she no longer needs man to be manly (aldrough she
may truly prefer a manly man), he becomes weak. As men become more “objective” and
less passionate, feminine women are no longer cultivated (BGE, 239). Nietzsche explains
in a reference to Goedre’s Faust.
As a very discerning scholar has remarked, the educated men of present-day
Germany resemble a cross between Mephistopheles and Wagner, but
certainly do not resemble Fausts, whom dreir grandfathers (in their youth at
least) felt rumbling widlin drem. For two reasons, therefore-to continue
this proposition --Gretchens are no longer suited to them. And because they
are no longer desired they are, it seems, dying out (HAH I: 408).

Men, being weak dremselves, no longer seek strong women. Nietzsche finds it especially

disturbing that women fall prey to this masculine stupidity.

The knee-jerk reaction against this Nietzschean criticism is to find a way for woman
to pursue the same goals as men and affirm her femininity. Nietzsche says no. He argues
drat woman necessarily abandons her body, which means she also abandons her traditional
feminine, maternal, and wifely duties, in order to cling to her newly acquired rights. These

new rights, really entitlements in the feminist view, become more important to woman than

any duty. Woman can now be anything she wants to be and she has little concern for what

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she ought to be. Sex becomes merely one trait among many, one fact drat can easily be
overcome or controlled. New medicines and technologies come to woman’s beck and call
ensuring her triumph over her body. Equal rights and equal respect from men on behalf of
those rights replace love, devotion, duty, and protection. When woman asserts herself in
the public sphere she necessarily deprives man of his traditional role as her protector.
Feminists refuse to acknowledge that attaining these rights actually transform
women and men. Oliver insists (without argument) drat Nietzsche is wrong to argue that
the feminist “denies her sexuality, castrates herself in order to imitate man” (Oliver, 1998,
68-69). Oliver boldly retorts; “I drink Nietzsche’s opinion is unjustified because clearly
not all feminists imitate men. There are multitudes of feminisms (as evidenced by the
different essays of this volume)” (ibid., 79, n. 8, emphasis added). Clearly, by Oliver’s
own admission, some feminists imitate men and these are the feminists Nietzsche
berates.113 Furthermore, one wonders how many feminists follow this path (A few?
Many? Most?). Oliver does not (cannot) respond to Nietzsche’s assessment of those
feminists who do imitate men. She cannot deny drat these women renounce dreir
femininity . These feminists may indeed be the real misogynists themselves because drey
deny that woman’s perfection takes a different form than man’s. Furthermore, Freudian
analyses of Nietzsche’s rejection of feminism are also unsound. Nietzsche does not
present the that all women secretly desire to have what is missing, namely a penis.
Nietzsche actually argues that women who genuinely understand themselves do not want to
be men at all. Defeminized women are not the same as men widrout penises. And woman

as woman is not essentially castrated. Defeminized, egalitarian, feminist, “enlightened,”

1131n a section entitled “They [men] ean have sex, you [women] can’t,” Evans suggests that the
working woman ought to castrate herself, though she does not use those terms (Evans, 2000, 124-126). A
key rule for the professional woman is to leave the sexuality out of the workplace. That is, she must shed
her femininity for at least 50% of her day, but probably more. The inherent assumption is that a woman’s
sexuality is an insignificant aspect of her that she would willingly sacrifice if she knew that title,
promotion, or a raise would be her reward. While this may be necessary for earning the key to executive
board roorrr, denying feminine inclinations most likely leads woman to a much greater dissatisfaction than
the failure to get that raise or promotion could ever leave.

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“liberated” woman is castrated.
Nietzsche’s critique of feminism is an extension of his critiques of equality.
objectivity, and historicism. Nietzsche explains:

To go wrong on the fundamental problem of “man and woman,” to deny the
most abysmal antagonism between drem and the necessity of an eternally
hostile tension, to dream perhaps of equal rights, equal education, equal
claims and obligations-drat is a typical sign of shallowness, and a drinker
who has proved shallow in this dangerous place-shallow in his instinct--
may be considered altogether suspicious, even more-betrayed, exposed:
probably be will be too “short” for all fundamental problems of life, of the
life yet to come, too, and incapable of attaining any depth. A man [Mann],
on the other hand, who has depth, in his spirit as well as in his desires,
including drat depdr of benevolence which is capable of severity and
hardness and easily mistaken for them, must always think about woman as
Orientals do: he must conceive of woman as a possession, as property that
can be locked, as somedring predestined for service and achieving her
perfection in that Here he must base himself on the tremendous reason of
Asia, on Asia’s superiority in the instincts, as the Greeks did formerly, who
were Asia’s best heirs and students: as is well known, from Homer’s time
to the age of Pericles, as their culture increased along widr the range of dreir
powers, drey also gradually became more severe, in brief, more Oriental,
against woman. How necessary, how logical, how humanely desirable
even, this was-—is worth pondering (BGE, 238).

Nietzsche makes the archaic suggestion that deep and serious men should conceive of
women as concubines, that is, view women as slaves, with few or no rights, who live to
service men. Even those of us who reject this prescription should neverdreless consider
Nietzsche’s reasoning behind it He does not say that all men should view women this
way, but only drat profound men should ponder how necessary, logical, and desirable it is
to treat women severely. In other words, the men upon whom Nietzsche relies to build a
new future for humanity must conceive of women in this way. It should also be said that
this harsh treatment is not only reserved for women; Nietzsche suggests all kinds of
conventional slavery as instrumental in strengthening culture. The greatest individuals are
necessarily “Nourished on innocent things” (Z, 304), but the potential profundity and
greatness of these few individuals who offer hope for the future far outweighs the innocent
and weak men and women who must be sacrificed for their sake.

With this in mind, let us consider why Nietzsche might consider this particular

conception of woman as necessary for himself and odrer profound spirits. Understanding

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woman as intended for the role of concubine may protect these men from too heavy a focus
on trying to win a woman’s heart They are not to lose themselves in worthless human
love or lust but will harness dreir sexual energy in order to orient themselves toward higher
pursuits. Viewing women as servants would create the image of women as pretty little
ornaments or playthings intended for the delight of men (cf. Z, 17 8). Conceiving women
as drese beautiful and delicate servants can provide these men with an escape from the
danger or gravity of dreir thoughts (BGE, 232). They are a resting place for the creative
spirits from the weight of their droughts. These men experience the ever-present danger of
viewing earth and life as an ailment drey suffer, from which they seek an escape (Z, 304).
The beauty and sweetness of young concubines rescues these men from dreir heavy
weight Nietzsche explains; “Heavy, heavy-spirited people become lighter precisely
drrough what makes odrers heavier, drrough hatred and love” (BGE, 90). Although
Nietzsche has a new conception of what love is and the role that love should play in the life
of the most profound spirits, he recognizes drat drese men need women in this specific
sense.

In the aphorism just preceding his suggestion of this treatment for women
Nietzsche explains that so far men have so far viewed women as intended to fill dlis
subservient role: “Men have so far treated women like birds who had strayed to them from
some height: as something more refined and vulnerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, and
more soulful--but as somedring one has to lock up lest it fly away” (BGE, 237a). He
likens women to birds, just as Zarathustra does (cf. Z, 169). And as birds who are light,
drey fly, drey defy the “spirit of gravity” that constantly dogs drese men. Even Zaradrustra
delights in the sight of the dancing young girls dancing with each odrer. In “The Dancing
Song” Zaradrustra speaks to them; “Do not cease dancing, you lovely girls! No killjoy has
come to you with evil eyes, no enemy of girls. God’s advocate am I before the devil: but
the devil is the spirit of gravity. How could I, you lightfoooted ones, be an enemy of

godlike dances” Or of girls’ feet with pretty ankles?” (Z, 219-220). This speech comes

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between “The Night Song” in which Zaradrustra laments and “The Tomb Song” in which
Zarathustra becomes sorrowful at the thought of past mistakes and future dangers.
Dancing girls are a vacation from his heavy thoughts that tear to pieces. To repeat, these
men need women.

Enslaving women to the most profound men is logical to Nietzsche because
societies widr this arrangement have achieved the desired effect, namely, a strong culture.
Nietzsche argues that treatment of women and suong culture are not merely correlated, but
the proper cultivation of the female will is a means of instituting the necessary changes.
Aldrough profound men are to delight in the beauty of the women, they are not to lose
dremselves in a love of woman. They have grander pursuits that transcend human love.
Finally, the arrangement is desirable insofar as Nietzsche’s goal of the Ubermensch is
desirable. If his ideal is to be achieved, a hierarchy is needed which involves harsh
treatment and even unjust treatment of multitudes of people. Nietzsche here suggests drat
conceiving women as subordinates may be desirable so drat males who have depdr and
profundity can serve or become the Ubermensch. Of course if one is not convinced that the
last man is a danger and the Ubermensch must be created, there would be no necessary.
logical, or desirable reason to institute the enslavement of women.

The reigning orthodoxy today argues drat culture can only be strong when women
are granted equal treatment with men. Nietzsche argues drat the converse is the case-—a
weak culture is too humane toward women. And the man who wishes to cultivate a strong
culture must consider woman as a possession intended to serve him. Nietzsche’s
discussion here seems to take for granted that the profound individuals are male. He does
not discuss how a woman of profound spirit ought to conceive other men. Instead,
Nietzsche contrasts the type of man who seeks equal rights for women with the man of
depth in his spirit and desires (BGE, 238). A shallow and sterile pity for woman lies
underneath the movement for her equal rights, according to Nietzsche, and profound men

must transcend this lowly passion. Nietzsche does not say that woman will reach her

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perfection in providing this service to man; he simply says drat man must conceive of her
this way. Nietzsche also does not say drat women should settle for this type of treatment,
though he does assert that woman wants to be possessed by man (GS, 363). Since he
hopes to cultivate an abysmally hostile tension between the sexes, her willful refusal to
consider herself as man’s servant would help enliven such a tension. Caging woman as a
rare and precious bird makes (what Nietzsche considers to be) the most attractive feminine
qualities necessary, for these are her only protection against man’s will. Her femininity is
not only a powerful protective device; it is also a strong offensive weapon widr which she
can make man bend to her will (if her will is a strong will). Still, this feminine power over
man does not really make woman self-reliant Her mastery depends upon man serving her
(and her appearing to serve him).

What is Feminine?

Modesty is the tool par excellence of femininity. Nietzsche promotes a renewed
emphasis on this virtue because it empowers woman (and man) by promoting the
differentiation of the sexes. Any side effects are coincidental and not Nietzsche’s concern.
Modesty is crucial because it awakens a longing for somedring beyond immediate self-
gratification and yet does not necessarily repress the passions. Modesty can lead to a more
meaningful fulfillment of those very passions. However, Nietzsche does not argue that
modesty is the key to woman’s fulfillment, nor does he present a full explanation for why
this virtue is decisive. He also leaves out a thorough description of the psychological
consequences of this virtue. Allan Bloom, however, eloquently describes the influence of
modesty on sexual differentiation. Bloom explains:

Modesty in the old dispensation was the female virtue, because it governed
the powerful desire drat related men to women, providing a gratification in
harmony with the procreation and rearing of children, the risk and
responsibility of which fell naturally--that is, biologically-—on women.
Although modesty impeded sexual intercourse, its result was to make such
gratification central to a serious life and to enhance the delicate interplay
between the sexes, which makes acquiescence of the will as important as
possession of the body. Diminution or suppression of modesty certainly

makes attaining the end of desire easier-~which was the intention of the
sexual revolution--but it also dismandes the structure of involvement and

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attachment, reducing sex to the dring-in-itself. This is where feminism
enters.

Female modesty extends sexual differentiation from the sexual act to
the whole of life. It makes men and women always men and women. The
consciousness of directedness toward one another, and its attractions and
inhibitions, inform every common deed. As long as modesty operates, men
and women together are never just lawyers or pilots togedrer. They have
somedring else, always potentially very important, in common--ultimate
ends, or as drey say, “life goals.” Is winning the case or landing this plane
what is most important, or is it love and family? As lawyers or pilots, men
and women are the same, subservient to the one goal. As lovers or parents
they are very different, but inwardly related by sharing the naturally given
end of continuing the species. Yet dreir working togedrer immediately
poses the questions of “roles” and, hence, “priorities,” in a way that men
working together or women working together does not. Modesty is a
constant reminder of their peculiar relatedness and its outer forms and inner
sentiments, which impede the self 3 free creation or capitalism’s technical
division of labor. It is a voice constantly repeating drat a man and a woman
have a work to do together drat is far different from that found in the
marketplace, and of a far greater importance” (Bloom, 101-102, emphasis
added)

Aspects of Bloom’s argument are consistent with many of Nietzsche’s concerns. Bloom
explains the way in which woman’s modesty makes women want to be women and men
want to be men, a desire in both sexes that Nietzsche warns is dying. Modesty keeps both
man and woman from ever becoming purely objective humans because, Bloom argues, it
reminds them of their complementarity. Modesty reminds bodr men and women drat
woman is vulnerable to pregnancy (and rape) and teaches drem not to belittle its
consequences. This vulnerability means drat woman, whedrer just or unjust, bears more
responsibility for protecting herself and for creating the type of child drat needs to be
produced. She must make sure drat man does not violate her (or the child) and her
femininity serves as a tool to keep man’s passions (and her own) from becoming
tyrannical. To man, woman’s vulnerability means that woman needs a protector, drat she
is in danger and incomplete without him. Modesty protects (against unwanted pregnancy,
rape and sexually transmitted diseases) because it transforms man’s sexual urges into
feelings of love, devotion, and admiration. Man sees woman as woman and feels a desire
to protect her as a delicate creature. The man who can easily be sexually gratified sees

woman as a sex object (a means to an end), but the man who must earn her can learn to

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idealize woman. Today many women rebel against this idealization because drey argue it
leads to expectations that she cannot or does not want to fulfill. However, by shedding her
modesty completely, she sheds the possibility of a fulfilling or meaningful relationship,
according to Bloom. Modesty awakens and enlivens the imagination. The erosion of
modesty corresponds with the erosion of the belief in eternal love, the debasement of
marriage, and the end of healdly illusions.

Nietzsche would likely agree with Bloom’s assessment of the powerful influence
drat modesty has on maniage even though maintaining the romance of marriage is not
Nietzsche’s concern. Aldrough Nietzsche intends to redefine marriage and family, like
Bloom, he is concerned with the stability of marriage and the need for a solid foundation.
Bloom explains drat the foundation of marriage has been the fact drat man and woman have
relegated dremselves to different parental roles and responsibilities. Eliminating drose
different roles has the effect of debasing the family. “As lawyers or pilots, men and
women are the same, subservient to the one goal. As lovers or parents they are very
different, but inwardly related by sharing the naturally given end of continuing the species.
Yet dreir working together immediately poses the questions of “roles” and, hence,
“priorities,” in a way drat men working togedrer or women working together does not”
(Bloom, ibid.). Interestingly, Nietzsche wants them to be oriented toward the same goal,
the Ubermensch, but to have different roles in its actualization and each may conceive of
the Ubermensch differently. Anodler difference is that Nietzsche, unlike Bloom, does not
understand the end of continuing the species as “naturally given.” Nietzsche has selected
what drat meaning of procreation shall be. But bodr Bloom and Nietzsche are concerned
with recapturing some meaning beyond mere bodily pleasures and raw sex. Both agree
that the struggle between man and woman should call forth hopes “and the glance of
eternity” (Z, 169). Unlike Bloom, Nietzsche focuses too heavily on the power dimension

of the relationship.

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Equality and Sameness

Establishing concubinage as a means to the Nietzschean goal is yet anodrer
unacceptable prescription. Instead of treating man and woman the same, which levels both
sexes, Nietzsche recommends a reversal in the treatment of women: treat women as pets.
Nietzsche is not the first to warn of the homogenization of society, though he does go
further than other thinkers in his prescriptions for woman. Tocqueville, like Nietzsche,
warned; “The ills produced by extreme equality only become apparent little by little; they
gradually insinuate themselves into the body social; drey are only occasionally noticed, and
when they do become excessive, habit has already made drem pass unfelt” (Tocqueville,
505). Indeed, as liberal democracy “progresses” toward a more egalitarian society which
treats people the same, everyone becomes alike even in dreir thinking: “Everybody wants
the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse”
(Z, 130).119 And this practice leads to the belief drat all human beings are not merely
equals, but drat drere are no essential distinctions among individuals drat ought to be
maintained.120 This elimination of the differentiation into different human types is the
reason that Nietzsche considers the doctrine of equality to be the most “poisonous poison
anywhere” (T1, 553). Nietzsche explains: “Democracy represents the disbelief in great
human beings and an elite society: ‘Everyone is equal to everyone else.’ ‘At bottom we are
one and all self-seeking cattle and mob.”’ (WP, 752). There soon will be no more great

119Tocqueville calls this phenomenon the “theory of equality applied to brains” (Tocqueville,
247). The result of providing everyone with equal access to edueation is “So few ignorant and so few
learned” (Tocqueville, 55). In general, universal education results in a greater number of people who are

educated, but educated at a mediocre level. The cultivation of genius is extraordinarily rare in such
circumstances.

12(’Nussbaum insists that Nietzsche is simply wrong to suggest that liberal egalitarians seek to
ignore all differences. She argues; “But of course liberal egalitarians don’t deny that differences among
people exist in abundance, including differences of achievement. What they hold is that many of these
differences, if not all, should be irrelevant for the purposes of the distribution of basic resources"
(Nussbaum, 11). Nietzsche’s point is that most differences should be relevant because pretending that they
are as irrelevant actually helps those differences disappear. When one longer believes that such differences
matter, they become less pronounced and ultimately are eliminated. But nobody wants a woman who is
indistinguishable from a man, or a man who is indistinguishable from a woman.

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men or great women, but only vulgar, ordinary, common human beings. To protect the
most extraordinary individuals from extinction, Nietzsche recommends treating equals as
equals, but unequals as unequals (i.e., differently from one anodrer): “‘Equal to the equal,
unequal to the unequal’ «that would be the hue slogan of justice; and also its corollary:
‘Never make equal what is unequal.”’ (T1, 553).
Why an Aristocracy is Needed: The “Pathos of Distance”

Nietzsche concludes that the structure of society must be altered radically.
Democracy has nowhere to go but toward the last man. Nietzsche must “create conditions
that require stronger men who for their part need, and consequently will have, a morality
(more clearly: a physical-spiritual discipline) that makes them strong!’ ’(W P, 981).
Nietzsche teaches that only when drere has been a aristocratic hierarchy has Man improved
himself. He explains;

Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an
aristocratic society--and it will be so again and again--a society that believes
in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man
and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or odrer. Without drat
pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between
strata-«when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon
subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and
command, keeping down and keeping at a distance-drat odrer, more
mysterious pathos could not have grown up eidrer—-d1e craving for an ever
new widening of distances widrin the soul itself, the development of ever
higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states--
in brief, simply the enhancement of the type “man,” the continual “self-
overcoming of man,” to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense” (BGE,
257).

And in Twilight of the idols, he gives anodrer useful description:
The cleavage between man and man, status and status, the plurality of
types, the will to be oneself, to stand out--what I call the pathos of distance,
that is characteristic of every strong age. The strengdr to withstand tension,
the widdr of the tensions between extremes, becomes ever smaller today;
finally, the extremes themselves become blurred to the point of similarity
(T1, 540).

He hopes to reestablish a hierarchy, or in Nietzsche’s words a “padros of distance” in

society so drat the few human beings widr potential can become stronger. “The order of

castes, the order of rank, merely formulates the highest law of life; the separation of

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...types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make possible the higher and the
highest types. The inequality of rights is the first condition for the existence of any rights
at all” (AC, 57, 646). In addition to unequal rights, Nietzsche presents several ways he
hopes to cultivate the “pathos of distance,” including promoting aristocracy, a rigorous
order of rank, conventional slavery, and, most important for our purposes, an eternally
hostile war between the sexes. The structure of the soul’s internal longing mimics the
structure of society. Nietzsche does not mention the eternally hostile war between the
sexes in BGE 257 or in AC 57; however, a logical extension of his comments in these two
passages imply that the mutual misunderstanding of the sexes will create the conditions that
make the production of the creative type possible. Love (understood as the will to power),
sex (for procreation), and (unromantic) marriage are all prescribed in order to recapture the
“pathos of distance.”
Transvaluation of Neighbor love and Christian Friendship

To combat the leveling effect that egalitarianism has had, man and woman must be
as different from one anodrer as possible. Man should take a primary role in the public
realm of business, industry, and politics, while woman should focus on service to the
family. This way they can achieve the proper kind of love which is not characterized by
“equal rights” because in love, “these do not exist” (GS, 363). The lover does not want to
be the beloved’s equal, but her lover. Man and woman (or the lover and the beloved) are
different and as such are incommensurable. When man and woman are different from each
other, their relationship is characterized by struggle and not a state of repose or a peaceful
contentment of the heart Such passive love reflects the bourgeois passivity drat Nietzsche
combats. The sterile Christian teaching of neighbor love robs sexual love of its passion,
struggle, striving, longing, and creativity. Radrer than an active striving to improve
oneself, neighbor love is a passive, impotent compassion (BGE 104).

To have compassion for others is to accept drem as drey are; it is to see the ugly

flaws and embrace them anyway. Nietzsche counsels instead; “Your compassion should

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be a guess--to know first whether your friend wants compassion. ...Compassion for the
friend should conceal itself under a hard shell, and you should break a toodr on it. That
way it will have delicacy and sweetness” (Z, 169). Friends and lovers are not to be
characterized by the degree to which they make the odrer comfortable and peaceful, but to
the degree drat they inspire. Friendship is to be difficult just as love is. They are to be hard
toward one another, to act harshly when warranted. Neighbor love, on the other hand,
weakens the courage to improve oneself and protects the weak who fail to love themselves.
Consequently, companionship is sought for physical comfort, and little else beyond that.
“One still loves one’s neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warrndr” (Z, 129).
Modems no longer experience what real passionate love entails—-an exclusive devotion
toward somedring or someone wordry of drat devotion. But this love can only be cultivated
if someone or somedring is created that will be deserving of it. The love drat Nietzsche
proposes is similar to, if not identical with the type of friendship he proposes:

I teach you not the neighbor, but the friend. The friend should be
the festival of the earth to you and an anticipation of the overman. I teach
you the friend and his overflowing heart. But one must learn to be a sponge
if one wants to be loved by hearts drat overflow. I teach you the friend in
whom the world stands completed, a bowl of goodness--the creating friend
who always has a completed world to give away. And as the world rolled
apart for him, it rolls together again in circles for him,...

Let the future and the fardrest be for you the sauce of our today: in
your friend you shall love the overman as your cause.

My brodrers, love of the neighbor I do not recommend to you: I
recommend to you love of the farthest (Z, 173-174).

Such a friend/ enemy inspires a longing for the Ubermensch. Similarly, the unique fit of
the lover and the beloved should glorify the individuality of each partner as it animates drem
to devote dremselves toward a transcendent goal.

Similar to his counsel that the best friend is also one’s worst enemy, love should be
understood as “the deadly haued of the sexes” (EH, 267).121 With this definition,

121Rousseau agrees with Nietzsche that man and woman should be as different from one another
as possible. However, Rousseau promotes their differences in order to achieve a hamronious rmity rather
than a struggle. He states; “In the harmony which reigns between them, everything tends to the common

end; they do not know who contributes more. Each follows the prompting of the other; each obeys, and
both are masters” (Rousseau, 377). Rousseau aims to promote the differences so that a compatibility

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Nietzsche obscures the distinction between love and hate. The love he hopes to promote is
a continual striving, pushing, and longing; it does not consist in peaceful rest or repose of
mind. This description of love is very close to his understanding of the will to power, “the
unexhausted procreative will of life” (Z, 226).122 As the sexes’ love/hate impels drem to
master one anodrer, their love/hate “brings the high and concealed characteristics of the
lover into the light--what is rare and exceptional in him” (BGE, 163). Struggle unleashes
an individual’s strength and depth of his character. Uncovering the rare qualities of the
beloved motivates the lover to overcome or transcend himself. Man and woman are to be
in a type of rivalry with one another--both striving to be better than they already are (and
better than each other) (of. BGE, 102). The hatred for one another also enables each to
overcome the contentment characteristic of the last man.

Man and woman as lovers are to be each other’s enemies, but in “a friend one
should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him with your heart when you
resist him” (Z, 168). Challenging one another is a sign of respect, not contempt
Zaradrustra explains; “You may have only enemies whom you can hate, not enemies you
despise. You must be proud of your enemy: then the successes of your enemy are your
successes too” (Z, 160). A real enemy is not a weak or inconsequential person. If a
woman is to be a man’s true enemy, her strength of will must be comparable to his. In his
description of woman as man’s eternally hostile enemy, Nietzsche indicates that he could
hate her as an enemy of whom he could be proud; he sees woman as a potentially worthy
opponent for man. This does not mean drat Nietzsche considers all men and all women to
be equal, but it is possible drat an individual woman could be equal (that is, exhibit a
similar strengdr of will) to an individual man. When man and woman perfect dreir

respective natures, each is characterized by a force of will drat rivals the other’s. That the

between the sexes will result.

122Cf. pp. 142-145 above.

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respective wills of man and woman can be of a comparable strength stems from
Nietzsche’s suggestion that man and woman are to hate, but not to despise one another.
He explains; “One does not hate as long as one still despises, but only those whom one
esteems equal or higher” (BGE, 173, emphasis added). In loving (hating) each odrer, the
sexes esteem themselves and each odrer. If one of the lovers (one’s opponent) is pitiful or
an unworthy opponent, then no genuine battle exists. And if no genuine battle exists, it
does not seem that the eternally hostile tension could be strong enough to give birth to the
Ubermensch. Nietzsche explains:
Being able to be an enemy, being an enemy--perhaps that presupposes a
strong nature; in any case, it belongs to every strong nature. It needs
objects of resistance; hence it looks for what resists: the aggressive padros
belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to
weakness. Woman, for example, is vengeful: drat is due to her weakness,
as much as is her susceptibility to the distress of others.

The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the
opposition drey require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty
opponent--or problem; for a warlike philosopher challenges problems, too,
to single combat The task is not simply to master what happens to resist,
but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill-
-opponents that are our equals.

Equality before the enemy: the first presupposition of an honest
duel. Where one feels contempt, one cannot wage war; where one
commands, where one sees somedring beneath oneself, one has no business
waging war (EH, 231-232).

One needs to have a strong will if one is to be a worthy opponent, but democracy tends to
weaken rather than strengthen the individual. Woman is not to be strong in the way drat
liberal democrats understand strengdr (i.e., due to wealdr, occupation, or public honors).
Nietzsche wants woman to become stronger because when she is strong, man is forced to
become stronger as well. In the eternally hostile war between the sexes, in which bodr
sexes strive to transcend themselves and the other, the power struggle will shift from time
to time. It is difficult to envision a genuine struggle in which woman clearly would be the
slave and man clearly would be the master. Such a contest would not seem capable of
producing the turmoil and tension necessary.

But this sounds dangerously close to egalitarianism and as we have taken great

pains to establish, Nietzsche is not an egalitarian. Women are to be women and men are to

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be men; only in this way can eidrer hope to attain any strength. An individual man and
woman as enemies are to be equals, but not similar to one another. Nietzsche intends man
and woman for different purposes. As enemies, the force of their respective wills rivals
one another, but woman has a feminine will while man has masculine strengdr. A woman
can only be a worthy opponent to a man if she exhibits a different type of strength than
man.
Love and Duality

If Nietzsche is to cultivate the type of love needed, a duality of the sexes must be
maintained. In a section entitled “love and duality” Nietzsche asks; “What is love but
understanding and rejoicing at the fact that another lives, feels and acts in a way different
from and opposite to ours? If love is to bridge these antitheses through joy it may not deny
or seek to abolish drem. «Even self-love presupposes an unblendable duality (or
multiplicity) in one person” (HAH II: 75). Masculinity and femininity are not to be
blended into some type of universal androgyny; radrer, drey are to be cultivated as rival
forces. Even the individual is to be understood as a cauldron of contrasting forces. To be
manly is to challenge one’s feminine inclinations and promote the masculine ones, while to
be feminine is to master the masculine inclinations and affirm the feminine ones. To love
oneself means to know oneself and to affirm those aspects that rule, but to rule oneself
means to force obedience from the odrer traits. The love between man and woman should
be understood in a similar manner. Each partner, animated by a longing for somedring
beyond the merely human, tyrannizes the other partner. In seeking to glorify and eternalize
themselves, each partner battles the other in hopes of producing the new distant goal. If the
profound love between man and woman is to be possible, the differences between the
sexes must be as great as possible. The greater the differences between the two, the deeper

their antagonistic love will be. “Difference engenders hatrea”,123 which explains why the

1231a the German manuscript and in Kaufmann’s translation, this quote appears in French:
“Dyfférence engendre har'ne” (BGE, 263).

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democratic movement seeks to make everyone alike (BGE, 263). In hopes of creating
perpetual peace, democrats, Christians, and other egalitarians unconsciously seek to
homogenize the human species. On the contrary, Nietzsche teaches drat the tension
between the masculine and the feminine perspectives can improve the human species, drat
is, create a greater likelihood of producing the Ubermensch.

Due to their different perspectives, man and woman perpetually misunderstand (and
drerefore hate) one another. Nietzsche explains: “The same affects in man and woman are
yet different in tempo: drerefore man and woman do not cease to misunderstand each
odrer.” (BGE, 85). He adds drat the “sexes deceive themselves about each odrer--because
at bottom drey honor and love only dremselves (or their own ideal, to put it more
pleasantly). Thus man likes woman peaceful--but woman is essentially unpeaceful, like a
cat, however well she may have trained herself to seem peaceable” (BGE, 131). The
failure to understand one another accentuates the unique attributes of each sex. Genius in
man or woman can only be cultivated drrough the promotion of masculinity and femininity,
according to Nietzsche.

The dynamics of the opposition of man and woman are similar to the forces that
gave birth to the great peoples of the world. The extraordinary feature of an individual’s
will is its ability to distinguish itself from other wills. The egocentrism and ethnocentrism
of the greatest nations have kept those nations from understanding one anodrer.
Zarathustra explains, “Never did one neighbor understand the odrer: ever was his soul
amazed at the neighbor’s delusion and wickedness” (Z, 170). The failure to understand
one anodrer and the desire to distinguish oneself as a people from the neighbor together
created great peoples. The selfish pride of these nations is responsible for any strength and
mastery those nations achieved. Ethnocentrism is the real root of any people’s strength,
according to Nietzsche. Similarly, egoism is the root of the love/ hate between man and
woman. But the democratic and Christian movements destroy any real distinction among

peoples. In fact, the desire to distinguish oneself is a prideful sin according to Christian

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morality. Nietzsche patterns the relationship between man and woman after the
relationships among the great peoples. What made the Greeks, the Jews, the Persians and
the Germans great were their differences, not their similarities (Z, 171). Now one must
create individuals with the strength to find more meaningful goals. The willingness to fight
against one anodrer as enemies in the interests of glorifying and strengthening oneself is
what Nietzsche hopes to promote in the individual man and woman.

The failure of the sexes to understand one another leads each sex to fear the other.
This fear is instrumental in producing reverence in the hearts of man and woman,
respectively. The fear also impels each to hide their unattractive or lowly qualities (cf.
BGE, 232). The reluctance to rely on compulsion or fear in favor of compassion is
indicative of democratic decadence. Nietzsche notices that in “no age has the weaker sex
been treated widr as much respect by men as in ours: that belongs to the democratic
inclination and basic taste” (BGE, 239). When man “respects” woman by giving her equal
rights, woman “unleams her fear of man: but the woman who ‘unleams fear’ surrenders
her most womanly instincts” (BGE, 239). Fear of man is an essential element of
femininity. Fear is essential to the feminine character due to woman’s comparable
weakness and vulnerability to rape. Insofar as woman understands her purpose to be
intimately connect to the production of a child, she would fear being raped by any man who
is not worthy of the task. Modesty, which can make man desire to protect rather than harm
woman, is her best tool against rape. Although woman’s modesty and fear seem to be in
service of man, if woman desires a child, or if she seeks protection against rape, these traits
actually serve her own needs.

Nietzsche’s advice drat woman should be manipulative and cunning toward man is
more than a distasteful or degrading suggestion. Nietzsche is explaining to woman how
she may best influence man:

What, in spite of all fear, elicits pity for this dangerous and beautiful cat
“woman” is that she appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in

need of love, and more condemned to disappointment than any other
animal. Fear and pity: with drese feelings man has so far confronted

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woman, always with one foot in tragedy which tears to pieces as it enchants
(BGE, 239).

As Nietzsche understands it, when woman approaches man in this manner she gains the
upper hand. Of course, woman can challenge man by competing to fill the same roles as
him. But woman does not constitute a genuine enemy to man in this role. Sharpening her
femininity makes her much more powerful against man. Nietzsche teaches the woman who
wants real power to highlight her physical vulnerability.

Woman’s physical vulnerability also helps produce a reverence for man’s strength.
Man possesses the physical strengdr she needs. She can imagine man as her protector and
as the child’s protector. She can esteem one who has the physical strength to rape, but
who would never condescend to committing such an act. And she is quite aware drat she
must use her feminine wiles to deter man from committing violence against her. She can
admire his willingness to fight in order to protect her. Nietzsche laments the fact that man
is no longer worthy of her fear because “European ‘manliness,’ is sick” (BGE, 239).
Nietzsche puts the term “manliness” in quotes because modernity has so weakened man by
eroding his masculinity that “manliness” is a quality of the past The democratic spirit has
killed the faith in “manliness” (and modesty) as a virtue.124 A major part of Nietzsche’s
criticism of modernity is woman’s inability to fear man and man’s inability to fear woman.
She no longer fears him because she no longer respects him. The converse is likewise the
case. Zarathustra explains this in a parable: “Whom does woman hate most? Thus spoke
the iron to the magnet: ‘I hate you most because you attract, but you are not strong enough

9”

to pull me to you (Z, 178). Man’s masculine qualities, his physical strength, his daring
courage, his ability to fight and protect, in short, his manliness, attract woman to him.

Nietzsche does not encourage the enslavement of all women to men, but woman should

124This is the central theme of Hoff Sommers’ book The War Against Boys. She suggests, for

example, that what was once called “rough and tumble” play is now considered aggression. And this, she
argues, has led to the elimination of recess (Hoff Summers, 94-95).

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fear man’s manliness. Woman can only cultivate her feminine strengdr when she fears and
respects man.

If woman is to be a worthy match for man, he must fear her. Nietzsche does not
simply subordinate woman to man in counseling her to fear him because he also tells man
to fear her. Zaradrustra declares; “Let man fear woman when she loves: then she makes
any sacrifice, and everydring else seems without value to her. Let man fear woman when
she hates: for deep down in his soul man is merely evil, while woman is bad” (Z, 178).
Man fears woman when she loves and hates because he cannot understand the forms drese
passions take in her: “man and woman have different conceptions of love; and it is one of
the conditions of love in both sexes drat neither sex presupposes the same feeling and the
same concept of ‘love’ in the odrer” (GS, 363). Nietzsche continues:

A woman’s passion in its unconditional renunciation of rights of her own
presupposes precisely that on the other side there is no equal pathos, no
equal will to renunciation; for if bodr partners felt impelled by love to
renounce themselves, we should then get--I do not know what; perhaps an
empty space? (ibid.).
Nietzsche is correct to note that man and woman understand love differently from one
another, and that woman in love does not concern herself with rights, but with love.
Because man and woman love differently from one another, drere is a tendency to create
tension in the relationship and Nietzsche would like to intensify drat struggle. The lovers
misunderstanding of one another can lead to an unsettling fear, a fear that the lover may not
return one’s affection. This fear is instrumental in creating longing and devotion from the
partners. Nietzsche explains: “Discovering drat one is loved in return really ought to
disenchant the lover widr the beloved. ‘What? this person is modest enough to love even
you? Or stupid enough? Or--or--’”(BGE, 102). The relationship to be cultivated is to be
disconcerting to bodr lovers.
The root of man’s fear in love also stems from the limitations of his body. Man

fears what he cannot understand; he fears any experience that he cannot reduce into

“human-all-too-human” facts. Woman is the embodiment of the chaotic impulses that

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challenge man’s orientation toward the world. She is not easy to tame. Man’s inability to
control woman impels his desire to control the world. Because his drives are different than
hers, he can never fully comprehend woman. Thus he should remain in awe and fear of
her: “What inspires respect for woman, and often enough even fear, is'her nature, which is
more ‘natural’ than man’s, the genuine, cunning suppleness of a beast of prey, the tiger’s
claw under the glove, the nai'vete of her egoism, her uneducability and inner wildness, the
incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues--” (BGE, 239). But
what is it about woman that makes her egoism naive, her inner wildness spring forth, and
her desires appear as incomprehensible to men? Woman’s ability to impose herself on the
world by giving birth arouses in woman an amazingly ferocious thymotic passion. When
her child is threatened, she can become a savage beast who is prepared to kill or sacrifice
her life for the sake of her child (who is an extension of herself). Woman’s naive egoism
consists in the fact drat she may not even recognize that the sacrifices she makes for the
child are motivated by her selfish desire for power. Man is puzzled by the fact that just as
woman appears as a beast of prey prepared to defend her child, she can also appear to be a
helpless, suffering creature in need of his strength and love. Woman’s strange
combination of weakness, beauty, and amazing strength befuddles man. So while on the
one hand man perceives woman as a delicate bird in need of his protection because of her
physical weakness, he also fears her because she is inexplicable. His deep fear of her
attaches man to woman most strongly (GS, 69).
Perhaps the only tool he has to subordinate her is his physical strengdr (cf. BGE
238). Nietzsche teaches profound men to subordinate women because:
Woman wants to be taken and accepted as a possession, wants to be
absorbed into the concept of possession, possessed. Consequently, she
wants someone who takes, who does not give himself or give himself
away; on the contrary, he is supposed to become richer in “himself ’--
through the accretion of strength, happiness, and faith given him by the
woman who gives herself. Woman gives herself away, man acquires more-
-I do not see how one can get around this natural opposition by means of
social contracts or widr the best will in the world to be just, desirable as it

may be not to remind oneself constantly how harsh, terrible, enigmatic, and
immoral this antagonism is (GS, 363).

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This passage leads Appel to the conclusion drat “However much of a challenge they may
pose to dreir male partners, healdry women are said to find dreir deepest fulfillment in
service to deserving men” (Appel, 95). The decisive word in Appel’s description is
“deserving.” Most men will not be worthy of the love of a real woman. Appel’s
conclusion is thus for the most part correct, yet one should keep in mind that Nietzsche also
admires woman’s naive egoism. Her willful sacrifices in love need not be understood as
slavish devotion. Woman can empower and glorify herself by finding a man worthy of
her, and by producing an extraordinary child with whom she can change the world.
Additionally, Appel’s discussion seems to leave out the consideration of Napoleon’s
mother as Napoleon’s master.125

Appel contends that woman’s way of loving is inferior to the way that man loves.
This is the reason, Appel argues, that feminist commentators have shied away from
discussing his description of feminine love accurately. Feminist scholars patently reject the
idea drat woman belongs in a submissive role. To demonstrate that Nietzsche understands
feminine love to be inferior to masculine love, Appel cites Nietzsche’s assertion that “A
man who loves like a woman becomes a slave; while a woman who loves like a woman
becomes a more perfect woman” (GS, 363). But it is not so clear that this type of feminine
love is simply inferior, as Appel argues. Nietzsche is arguing drat there are two different
types of love that ought to be maintained and ought to challenge one another. Man should
love like a man and woman should love like a woman. Their respective strengdls come
from their different ways of loving. A man who loves like a woman is unmanly and
drerefore slavish. In light of the goal drat Nietzsche aims to achieve, the womanly type of
loving is absolutely necessary. Such reverence is difficult to maintain because it must be
spawned by a person, object, or ideal drat is worthy of it This means that the lover must

be creative; the lover may have to construct a person, object, or ideal drat is worthy of love,

125See my discussion of Napoleon’s mother on pp. 102, 104-105, 114, 133.

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just as Napoleon’s modrer did and as Zarathustra attempts to do.

Furthermore, in a letter to Peter Gast Nietzsche writes; “one ceases to love oneself
aright when one ceases to give oneself exercise in loving others, wherefore the latter (the
ceasing) is to be strongly advised against (from my own experience)” (Let, 1880, 173).
Man’s way of loving (understood as taking for oneself) is incomplete, just as is woman’s
way (understood as giving oneself). A fundamental duality is needed to create the proper
type of profound love drat Nietzsche envisions. There must be an inward and an outward
love. Love of self is the foundation for the ability to give anything worthwhile to another.
The creative spirit is a giver and a taker. His “gift-giving virtue is the highest virtue” (Z,
186). Zarathustra explains;

Verily, I have found you out, my disciples: you strive, as I do, for the gift-
giving virtue. What would you have in common with cats and wolves?
This is your drirst: to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves; and that is
why you drirst to pile up all the riches in your soul. Insatiably your soul
strives for treasures and gems, because your virtue is insatiable in wanting
to give. You force all things to and into yourself that they may flow back
out of your well as the gifts of your love. Verily, such a gift-giving love
must approach all values as a robber“, but whole and holy I call this
selfishness (Z, 186-187).
The noble selfishness of the creative spirit is a combination of femininity which knows
how to give, and masculinity which knows how to take. The virtue combines the highest
elements of the masculine and the feminine ways of loving to produce a noble type of
longing.
Nietzsche’s New Definition of Marriage

When the sexes are differentiated from one another and are able to fear one another,
drey also honor each other and crave one anodrer. Man and woman have reverence for the
respective masculine or feminine traits that they lack dremselves or that drey do not
understand. Man should believe drat the “Etemal-Feminine attracts us higher” while every
nobler woman “believes the same thing about the Etemal-Masculine-” (BGE, 236).
Woman is to believe that the admirable traits of the Eternal Masculine can draw her higher.

She is to view man as profound because she cannot view woman as profound. Man is to

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believe drat the desirable qualities of the Eternal Feminine can draw him higher by making
him dream, hope, and ultimately conquer. On the contrary, Ophelia Schutte contends drat
Nietzsche reverses the picture. She claims drat Nietzsche reverses Goedre’s “The eternal
feminine draws us higher” (Schutte, 1984, 187). Schutte’s suggestion that Nietzsche
relegates woman to the low is misguided. Schutte’s suggestion misses the implication of
an eternally hostile war of the sexes. Nietzsche’s characterization of a book by Lou
Andreas-Salome in a letter to Franz Overbeck in 1885 supports this interpretation. He
states; “What a contrast between the girlish and sentimental form and the strong-willed and
knowledgeable content! There is loftiness in it; and even if it is not really the eternal
feminine which draws this pseudo-maiden ever onward, then perhaps it is--dre eternal
masculine. And drere are a hundred echoes of our Tautenburg conversations in it” (let,
1885, 249). Though his comment seems to imply that she should be drawn upward by the
Eternal Feminine, he suggests drat the Eternal Masculine is her inspiration. The result is
her strong will and insight combined with girlish qualities. Salomé’s reverence for the
Eternal Masculine produces a work drat is worthy of Nietzsche’s admiration. Man and
woman being the same (i.e., any type of egalitarian relationship between drem) precludes
this type of reverence.

Human beings revere and admire what they cannot be or what they hope to become.
And since “To esteem is to create” (Z, 171), the mutual reverence lays the ground for the
creation of the Ubermensch. Their love/hate and fear/reverence for one another arouses
deep passion in each paMer. The passion created from their mutual fear makes possible
dreir esteemin g and creating a mutual goal. Zaradrustra describes the proper marriage as
“the will of two to create the one drat is more than drose who created it Reverence for each
other, as for those willing with such a will, is what I name marriage” (Z, 182). He
continues, “Over and beyond yourselves you shall love one day. Thus learn first to
love....Bittemess lies in the cup of even the best love: drus it arouses longing for the

overman; drus it arouses your thirst, creator. Thirst for the creator, an arrow and longing

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for the overman...” (Z, 183). There is bitterness in the love between man and woman
because this love makes each of drem long to overcome themselves. Each experiences
contempt for their own respective unimproved states. But drere is also creative potential in
dreir love and an exhilarating drirst for what each of drem could become. Bodr experience a
longing inspired by the odrer. Man and woman should direct their longing toward the
creation of a new type that is to transcend each of them--the Ubermensch.
Nietzsche’s understanding of what a maniage between man and woman should be
is to replace the modern understanding of maniage. One might expect Nietzsche to present
a type of egalitarian marriage if the partners’ strength is to rival one another in the manner I
have suggested. Nietzsche’s understanding of marriage is far from the romantic egalitarian
type that prevails nowadays. “Modern marriage has lost its mearring--consequendy one
abolishes it” (TT, 544). What purpose does marriage serve? This is no longer an easy
question for man or woman to answer. When man and woman become independent
entities, who strictly speaking do not need one anodrer, the reason for marriage becomes
unclear. The purpose behind marriage was always connected to the drive and/or the need
to produce children. He defines the flaw in modern marriage:
Never, absolutely never, can an institution be founded on an idiosyncrasy;
one cannot, as I have said, found marriage on “love”--it can be founded on
the sex strive, on the property drive (wife and child as property), on the
drive to dominate, which continually organizes for itself the smallest
structure of domination, the family, and which needs children and heirs to
hold fast--physiologically too--to an attained measure of power, influence,
and wealth, in order to prepare for long-range tasks, for a solidarity of
instinct between the centuries. Marriage as an institution involves the
affirmation of the largest and most enduring form of organization: when
society cannot affirm itself as a whole, down to the most distant
generations, then maniage has altogedrer no meaning” (T1, 544).

The astounding number of divorces today is solid evidence of the weakness of romanticism

as the foundation of any type of goal. Bloom provides a helpful explanation of the specific

way in which modern marriage has degenerated. He attributes the weak state of modern

marriage to the “inharrnoniousness” of each partner’s respective goals in maniage:

The inharrnoniousness of final ends finds its most concrete expression in
the female career, which is now precisely the same as the male career.

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There are two equal careers in almost every household composed of
educated persons under drirty-five. And those careers are not mere means
to family ends. They are personal fulfilhnents. In this nomadic country it is
more than likely drat one of the partners will be forced, or have the
opportunity, to take a job in a city other than the one where his or her
spouse works. What to do? They can stay togedrer with one partner
sacrificing his career to the odrer, they can commute, or drey can separate.
None of these solutions is satisfactory. More important, what is going to
happen is unpredictable. Is it the marriage or the career drat will count
most? ...The result is that both marriage and career are devalued (Bloom,
127).

Nietzsche does not refer to woman’s career as a problem in his assessment of marriage,
and he would not be terribly troubled by the possibility of bourgeois careers being
devalued. However, Nietzsche would agree with Bloom’s assessment of marriage, in a
specific sense. The decision to marry and have a family becomes merely one option among
many for woman and man. To Nietzsche, “that which the all-too-many, the superfluous,
call marriage-alas, what shall I name drat? Alas, this poverty of the soul in pair! Alas, this
filth of the soul in pair! Alas, this wretched contentment in pair!” (Z, 182). People no
longer know the real meaning of marriage, especially now that couples no longer
understand marriage as a prerequisite for children, or children as a prerequisite for
marriage. Consequently, Nietzsche asks of the cases where the child is produced; “What
child would not have cause to weep over its parents?” (ibid.).

Ultimately, Nietzsche hopes to breed a kind of love drat transcends the quest for
possession; a higher type of love. This type of maniage, friendship, requires a certain
distance between partners. Schutte provides a ofideal description of this distance:

Nietzsche’s order of rank is the attempted institutionalization and
objectification of a highly distanced and alienated view of human relations.
A compulsive distance among individuals (even among those of the highest
rank) is required. Even friends must obey the rules of distance dictated by
the order of rank. Nietzsche’s Zaradrustra teaches drat the friend must
always be regarded as standing at a height He counsels drat one must
never reveal one’s true nature to one’s friend. The point of the disguise is
to cover up all of the weaknesses that make one human, as well as to
exclude the possibility of love and compassion from the friendship. Men
who do not live up to Zaradrustra’s model of friendship are devalued to the
status of women and animals. (Schutte, 1984, 184-185).

Strictly speaking, one cannot be a friend with someone of a different rank. One should

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only befriend one’s (conventional and natural) equal. But drere is even a type of distance
between two genuine friends. A friend must be regarded as standing from a height because
only a person whom one could admire is worthy of friendship. The lover too must be
regarded as standing at a height Bodr partners must maintain this looking upward, for if
they do not inspire one another to look up, drey will look down. Schutte is wrong that
those incapable of this friendship are “devalued to the status of women and animals.” Not
all women, though perhaps most, are of such a low status in Nietzsche’s view. But
Schutte’s implicit criticism that the pleasure of friendship seems to be missing is strong.

This relationship should draw one out of oneself, but should not violate one’s
individuality. The distance required between friends (or partners) is a natural result of
Nietzsche’s focus on radical individuality. One’s body cannot be shared completely with
another, and neither, Nietzsche contends, can one’s personal thoughts and ideals.
Nietzsche would say that the distance is needed so that neidrer parmer underestimates
himself or loses himself in the odrer. The tendency to exaggerate the worth of the friend or
lover may lead one to lose oneself. Nietzsche correctly notes the tendency of the friend or
lover to overestimate odrers to the detriment of himself. This is the result of the lovers’
heightened imagination. For this reason, Nietzsche counsels solitude to the most profound
and creative types drat are to be bred.

An Alternative: Solitude

The greatest individuals must ultimately flee from the herd for “Where solitude
ceases the market place begins; and where the market place begins the noise of the great
actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too” (Z, 163). But that Nietzsche
counsels solitude to the greatest begs the question of the extent to which the creator need
friends or lovers. Solitude allows one to convalesce from the banality of the many. On the
contrary, friendship (in the Nietzschean sense) keeps one from suffering in solitude. Love
and friendship are merely resting places for the creators.

Zarathustra’s journey begins when he leaves his solitude which he had enjoyed for

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ten years. But “a change came over his heart” and he leaves his home to “go down” to
speak to the people (Z, 121). He explains his task; “To lure many away from the herd, for
drat I have come. The people and the herd shall be angry with me: Zaradrustra wants to be
called a robber by the shepherds” (Z, 135). Solitude is needed because “the individual
himself is still the most recent invention” (Z, 171). The individual must be nurtured, which
is why Zaradrustra “shall sing [his] song” to hermits, “to the lonesome and the twosome;
and whoever still has ears for the unheard-of--his heart shall become heavy with my
happiness” (Z, 136). And to these hermits Zarathustra says; “Flee my friend into solitude.”
(Z, 163).
Solitude can become a dangerous suffering for the hermit. Zarathustra warns:
Today you are still suffering from the many, being one: today your courage
and your hopes are still whole. But the time will come when solitude will
make you weary, when your pride will double up and your courage gnash
its teedr. And you will cry, “I am alone!” The time will come when drat
which seems high to you will no longer be in sight, and drat which seems
low will be all-too-near; even what seems sublime to you will frighten you
like a ghost. And you will cry, “All is false!” (Z, 175).
Aldrough drere is a healdry type of solitude that gives the creator relief from the lowness of
the masses, drere is also a dangerous type of solitude from which the hermit suffers. Its
origin is “bad love of yourselves [which] turns your solitude into a prison” (Z, 173).
Nietzsche recognizes the radical aloneness of this solitude in a letter to Franz Overbeck in
1888: “The perpetual lack of really refreshing and healing human love, the absurd isolation
which it entails, making almost any residue of a connection widr people merely somedring
that wounds one-that is all very bad indeed and right only in itself, having the right to be
necessary” (Let, 1888, 282). If the hermit is unable to give himself his own good and evil,
to “hang [his] own will over [him]self as a law” (Z, 175), he will suffer from his
loneliness. Zaradrustra describes the dangers of this loneliness:
Lonely one, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads
past yourself and your seven devils. You will be a heretic to yourself and a
witch and soodrsayer and fool and doubter and unholy one and a villain.
You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could you

wish to become new unless you had first become ashes!
Lonely one, you are going the way of the creator: you would create

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a god for yourself out of your seven devils.
Lonely one, you are going the way of the lover: yourself you love,
and therefore you despise yourself, as only lovers despise. The lover
would create because he despises. What does he know- of love who did not
have to despise precisely what he loved!
Go into your loneliness widr our love and with your creation, my
brodrer; and only much later will justice limp after you.
With tears go into your loneliness, my brother. I love him who
wants to create over and beyond himself and drus perishes (Z, 176-177).
He advises the creator to escape into solitude so that he learn to love and despise himself.
In his solitude he creates a goal for himself, his way. It may be impossible to be true to
oneself when immersed in the everyday shallowness of the masses. These profound spirits
must escape, indeed they must flee, into their solitude. The fact drat this speech precedes
the speech “On Old and Young Little Women” and follows the speech on “On Love of the
Neighbor” begs the question of the role of love and friendship for the creative spirit Love
and friendship are only means of relieving the spirit from the dangers of solitude.
The great danger of solitude is that one becomes lonely and due to this loneliness,
one love indiscriminately. Zaradrustra explains; “Love is the danger of the loneliest; love of
everything if only it is alive. Laughable, verily, are my folly and my modesty in love” (Z,
267). He adds later; “‘Now everything redounds to my best, now I love every destiny--
who feels like being my destiny?”’ (BGE, 103). The absence of c0mpanions may cause
one to lose rather than find himself. The friend is merely a signpost on the padr to one’s
own goal. Zarathustra implies that these “fellow creators and harvesters” who are capable
of solitude are male. He explains:
My virile nourishment, the savor and strengdr of my words, are taking
effect; and verily, I did not feed drem bloating vegetables, but warriors’
nourishment, conquerors’ nourishment: I wakened new desires. ...Such
nourishment, to be sure, may not be suitable for children or for nostalgic
old and young little females. Their entrails are persuaded in a different way;
I am not their physician and teacher” (Z, 423).

None of Zarathustra’s strange companions are women. It seems that man may be more

capable of independence, solitude, and true liberty than is woman. Yet, Appel’s

assessment drat “solitude is meant to be a temporary, transitional state” is correct (Appel,

86). Nietzsche’s teaching on friendship and love demonstrates that even the most creative

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spirits are not completely solitary. The fact drat Nietzsche offers a political teaching that he
must give to odrers demonstrates his own reliance on odrers. He needs his children to
bring the Ubermensch to fruition. He may have diagnosed the problem and revealed the
urgency of this choice, but it is up to odrers to carry out his plan. One last point: Nietzsche
says that his teaching “may not” be suitable for old and young little females. He does not

know if a woman could have ears for his teaching. He leaves open the possibility.

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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Which Sex is Superior?

Nietzsche’s imposition of different roles and responsibilities on the sexes begs the
question of which sex is superior. Second, his discussion raises the issue of whedrer these
different roles reflect different natures. Regarding the superiority question, reading
Nietzsche superficially indicates that man is obviously superior from Nietzsche’s
perspective. But the complexities discussed in chapter 7 demonstrate that male superiority
is not self-evident. And because it is not self-evident, contemporary efforts to rescue
women from the clutches of Nietzsche’s so-called misogyny have missed the most
important aspects of Nietzsche’s teaching on woman. Nietzsche affirms aspects of
masculinity and femininity. Moreover, he insists drat bodr perspectives are absolutely
necessary if the Ubermensch is to be actualized.

Affirming the need for both perspectives could imply drat man and woman are
different, but on balance they are equal (or equally important). The relations between the
sexes would thus be understood as a type of equilibrium in which each contributes equally,
but differently. According to Nietzsche, the only way to achieve such a balance and make
the sexes equal is to make drem the same, which amounts to the complete elimination of
sexuality. Nietzsche intends to create a war between the sexes that never achieves balance.
Humans need to dismiss the desire to couch all human attributes in terms of equality and
focus on the cultivation of strong individuals, according to Nietzsche. Even drough both
sexes are needed, Nietzsche does not necessarily imply drat man and woman are equally
praisewordry, or drat they are equally dependent on one another. Even the most despicable
vermin are necessary, but this certainly does not indicate anydring praiseworthy about
them.

The superiority of the sexes must be considered as it relates to the actualization of
Nietzsche’s goal, but this question can be approached in a number of ways. One way is to

consider whedrer man or woman is more likely to become the last man. The sex that more

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readily falls prey to the degenerating process would be the inferior one. Man, the “sterile
animal,” degenerates more quickly than woman. Not only are males responsible for dreir
own degeneration, but also for causing the retrogression of women. To be sure, both man
and woman are degenerating because woman’s destiny is intimately tied to the destiny of
man. First, woman molds her character according to an image created by man, according
to Nietzsche. Moreover, because she needs him in order to get pregnant, her spiritual fate
is necessarily entwined with his. So the more quickly man degenerates, the more rapidly
woman degenerates as well. The initial danger of this degeneration is stronger in the male
than it is in the female. Further, the types of drings (namely, people) that woman tends to
esteem are more closely linked to the earth than are the objects of mens’ affections. In
general, woman does not become domesticated as readily as man does. However, men and
women have both demonstrated drat they can degenerate to the same degree. Thus, looking
at the speed of modern degeneration does not answer the question of sexual superiority.
Man may initially degenerate more readily, but woman can learn to make the same mistakes
of man.

An alternate medrod of determining sexual superiority is to ask whedrer man or
woman contributes more readily to the coming about of the Ubermensch. The means drat
woman must employ sound slavish. She must be cunning and sly as she clings to her
illusions, while the genuine master is bold and authoritative and has the courage to live with
the truth. Women are to gain power from behind the scenes drrough her child, while man
is the child who asserts himself explicitly. But Nietzsche does not quite say this; only
those who are worthy of having children ought to procreate. Nietzsche does not say what
is to be done widr slavish women who are not worthy of having children. Sterile males,
we are told, can be philosophic laborers, drough most males will be neidrer Ubermenschen
nor philosophic laborers. But if women are to stay in the domestic role, it is not clear what
is to be done with drose incapable of having children or drose who are unworthy of having

drem in Nietzsche’s view. Most likely Nietzsche would say that they should be the slaves

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of the more creative types. So while drere is a role for the lower males that seems more
directly related to Nietzsche’s goal, unworthy women do not seem to be good for any
purpose. And among the unworthy humans, Nietzsche counsels men to rule women,
aldrough both are slaves.

In addition, there is some evidence that woman would be more in need of others
than man. Her physical weakness relative to man makes her more vulnerable. If woman’s
deepest desire is for the child, by definition she is less solitary than man. Woman’s
stronger longing for a child would be more difficult to transcend, which is why he suggests
that she should not try to overcome the desire, but should embrace it. But this means that
woman’s greatness is necessarily dependent upon others, namely, her child and the man
widr whom she creates the child. Woman, it seems, would not and should not seek
solitude to the extent that man does. Woman is less self-reliant than man. Aldrough man
may need woman to provide him widr the impetus to do so, man can be the creator who
actively makes drings happen. If solitary self-sufficiency is the goal, Nietzsche would say
drat man has a greater ability to achieve this as well.

Overall, Nietzsche seems to favor man’s role (as his own), but this does not mean
drat women are simply inferior to men in all respects. In her cunning creativity and her
ability to affum life despite what she learns, she is superior to man. Nietzsche does not
intend the question of male or female superiority to be answered easily. If the superiority
of one sex was unambiguously clear, a genuine, eternally hostile war between the sexes
could not endure. If woman were so clearly inferior to man, he would have to be an utter
fool to fight to possess or rule someone so inferior. Man would have to be second-rate
himself to need woman so strongly. But when both sexes experience a heightened need of
one another and potential admiration of the odrer, judging one’s superiority is difficult.

Since Nietzsche’s goal is the creation of the Ubermensch, the most fruitful way to

answer the question of masculine or feminine superiority is to consider whedrer the

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Ubermensch could be a woman or a man.126 To answer this we need to consider first
whedrer man or woman could acquire the (masculine and feminine) traits drat are needed,
and secondly which sex acquires drem more readily. First, does man more readily acquire
the feminine traits that are needed or does woman more easily acquire the masculine
attributes? The role Nietzsche prescribes to woman suggests that her purpose is to
produce, not to be the Ubermensch. But it is still necessary to consider whedrer woman
could transcend this role. Man is capable of acquiring the most desirable feminine qualities
(cf. GS, 72; EH, 295), just as woman can acquire the best aspects of the masculine
character (of, GS, 70). Nietzsche does not discuss whether man is more able to acquire
the needed feminine traits or whether woman more easily attains the masculine attributes.
But Nietzsche does admire several male philosophers, artists, and rulers who have the
needed feminine traits. Males have demonstrated their abilities as creators and artists,
whereas women do not seem to have achieved the same standing, according to Nietzsche.
This provides additional evidence that men are capable of being the Ubermensch, but for
woman the question remains open. For Nietzsche, the Ubermensch is a male. And this
must mean that Nietzsche sees man as superior because men have realized the highest
accomplishments and demonstrated the greatest potential so far. Nietzsche understands
himself (and Zarathustra) to have the requisite femininity needed to create a new goal for
himself. His experience is that of a male. Nietzsche is not a woman and does not have the
experience of a woman, drough he recognizes the feminine aspects of his character. Thus,
he does not simply reject femininity, but embraces only the highest aspects of it.

The possibility of a female Ubermensch is never explicitly ruled out by Nietzsche.
Nevertheless, he does not expect the Ubermensch to be a woman. To say that a female
Ubermensch is possible even drough there has never yet been one is a huge assumption.
The infrequent praise of actual women leads to the conclusion that he is seeking to educate

males. Nietzsche even goes so far as to define a people in terms of their ability to produce

1261 also discuss the possibility of a male or female Ubermensch on pp. 121-139.

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such great men (as opposed to women): “A people is a detour of nature to get six of seven
great men [Miinner]. --Yes, and dren to get around drem” (BGE, 126). So it seems that
the character he hopes to produce is more likely to occur in a male, as Nietzsche’s
experiences have indicated. Though such greatness is rare in a male, it is much more
unlikely that a woman would attain the necessary traits. And since the type of genius
needed is more rare in a woman, this would lead Nietzsche to conclude that man is superior
to woman.

But there is the matter of Nietzsche’s earlier statement drat the “perfect woman is a
higher type of human being than the perfect man” (HAH I: 377), which seems to indicate
that the “perfect woman” is superior to man. Nietzsche adds that the perfect woman “is
also somedring much rarer” (ibid.). This statement again supports the conclusion that man
is superior in the sense drat he is more likely to possess the traits that Nietzsche hopes to
cultivate. However, the meaning of Nietzsche’s assertion deserves closer scrutiny. Its
significance rests on the meaning of “perfect.” If a perfect woman is a female
Ubermensch, then this assertion may indicate not only that a female Ubermensch is
possible, but drat a female Ubermensch is superior to a male Ubermensch. Perhaps by
“perfect” Nietzsche means that as a woman, she is more complete or fulfilled than man can
be as a man. Her feminine will experiences the highest degree of power. The ideal type of
woman maintains the modrerly quality. Most women may not find satisfaction in the
rearing of children because one never knows what type of child one will get Alternatively,
Nietzsche may mean drat widr respect to the task at hand-~which is the creation of the
Ubermensch-woman is better prepared. The perfect woman is able to devote herself
completely to this type of goal. Woman’s ability to love makes her better equipped to serve
life than is man. The perfect woman is higher than the perfect man because she more
completely embraces (and devotes herself to) life than man.

Woman’s perfection constitutes a different type than man’s. Though woman’s

perfection occurs less frequently, when (and if) it does occur, the perfect women is higher

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than the perfect man. But the fact that the cultivation of the perfect woman is so unlikely
explains why Nietzsche puts his faidr in men primarily. As doubtful as is a male
Ubermensch, Nietzsche finds the possibility that a female one will ever come to be even
more dubious. The danger of the Ubennensch’s development is so vast drat it is sensible
to Nietzsche to place his hopes in the more likely candidate-die male. But this conclusion
is based on the assumption drat the perfect woman would be an Ubermensch. The question
still remains whedrer the “perfect woman” is Ubermensch material. One would expect
Napoleon’s mother to come closest to the perfect woman Nietzsche describes. Perhaps the
mother of an Ubermensch, who molds her child in her own image, toward the type of
transcendent goal Nietzsche envisions, would be a female Ubermensch. A female
Ubermensch would be essentially different from a male one. Moreover, because the female
Ubermensch rules from behind the scenes, this also means that it is entirely likely for a
female Ubermensch to come about widrout anyone (with the exception of her own child)
recognizing her strengdr. The child becomes the public commander, while the perfect
woman orchestrates his commands.

Nietzsche’s assessment drat man is superior to woman is based on two serious
assumptions. The first assumption is drat the frequency of the event makes it superior. In
odrer words, he assesses that man is superior because man is more likely to be an
Ubermensch. But this conclusion does not seem to be consistent with Nietzsche’s praise
of rarity. Additionally, one might criticize Nietzsche by saying that women have been
oppressed for so many centuries that one could not expect her to break'free from that
oppression to achieve the things that males have. For example, Virginia Woolf argues drat
woman’s oppression has understandably made woman angry.127 This anger, Woolf
contends, has impeded woman’s genius. To contrast, in a great man like Shakespeare,

All desire to protest, to preach, to proclaim an injury, to pay off a score, to

make the world witness of some hardship or grievance was fired out of him
and consumed. Therefore his poetry flows from him free and unimpeded.

127My comments on Virginia Woolf have been shaped by lectures give by Willliam Shapiro.

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I’m-‘—

 

If ever a human being got his work expressed completely, it was

Shakespeare. If ever a mind was incandescent, unimpeded, ...it was

Shakespeare’s mind” (Woolf, 56-57).
Woolf would agree with Nietzsche drat men have been the greatest artists and philosophers
in the sixteendr and seventeenth centuries. Woman’s anger impedes her from reaching the
heights drat men have attained in the arts, according to Woolf. Women writers, motivated
in part out of anger, desire to “set the record straight” by showing men what drey can
achieve. Woolf contends that women’s literature will not aspire to the heights of men’s
until woman lets go of her anger and ressentiment Woolf concludes that women can only
hope to ascend to the heights of men when they are freed from oppression by men, because
this freedom will enable women to overcome their ressentiment. It is also crucial to
woman’s development drat she become financially self-reliant, as was Woolf herself.

Nietzsche would respond by saying that greatness is displayed in fighting
opposition. Moreover, egalitarian societies do not tend to produce worthy enemies and are
drerefore less likely to produce the great art, literature, and philosophy. This is a very
persuasive point. Furdrermore, some women have overcome oppression to achieve great
drings. Women have become powerful rulers (Cadrerine the Great) and very good
novelists (Jane Austen). But Nietzsche would say that women have not yet become the
greatest artists, nor have they been philosophers.

Second, Nietzsche’s conclusion of male superiority assumes that being or
becoming a creator of values is more praiseworthy than giving birth to and creating a
creator. Nietzsche’s conclusion that the creator is superior results from his view of the
particular needs of a degenerating society. But if the Ubermensch is really the recognition
of the modrer’s will, this fact would seem to make woman the superior individual. This
type of woman would have transcended the need for recognition from the masses because
she never experienced recognition. She knows who she is and receives her satisfaction
from the child she creates. Of course, her fulfillment will rest on the accomplishments of

the child, and this makes her dependent on his will. However, her transcendence of the

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need to be recognized publicly seems to be a potential superiority of woman over man. In
this respect, woman may be more capable of transcending the democratic spirit than is man,
though this escapes Nietzsche’s notice. If man is to be the active political figure, he will
rely on the masses in a way that woman will not. Woman, on the odrer hand, relies on her
own individual child (i.e., her own flesh and blood whom she has created physically,
morally and spiritually) more so drat man relies on any single human being.

Are Man and Woman Different By Nature or By Nietzsche ’s Nature?

But the question of superiority of the sexes seems to rest on the assumption that

man and woman have different natures. As a drinker writing of the death of god and the
death of all stable forms of evaluation, feminists see Nietzsche as opening the door for
woman’s redefining herself in non-traditional ways. They argue that women can and
should achieve the same things as men. But despite God’s death, Nietzsche prescribes
strict roles for woman. This raises a serious issue of whedrer Nietzsche invokes nature as
a standard of evaluation in the discussion. Essentially, the difficulty is in determining
whedrer the differences between man and woman drat Nietzsche sees are determined by
nature; or, are they are historically determined and consequently changeable, i.e., socially
constructed by human beings? As Strauss describes the situation, nature “has become a
problem for Nietzsche and yet he cannot do widrout nature. Nature, we may say, has
become a problem owing to the fact that man is conquering nature and drere are no
assignable limits to that conquest As a consequence, people have come to drink of
abolishing suffering and inequality” (Strauss, 183). Man does not know whedrer or how
to continue molding his own nature. Humans now consider destroying two elements that
Nietzsche contends are absolutely prerequisite for greatness--suffering and inequality. The
treatment of women that Nietzsche prescribes represents a return to suffering and inequality
in sexual relations. Nietzsche’s discussions of man and woman highlight the problem that
nature poses for the N ietzschean system. It is drrough those comments drat the solution to

this problem must be found. Any solution must be consistent with what Nietzsche has said

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regarding the deadl of God, the Ubermensch, the will to power, and the eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche’s project begins widr the death of God. The crisis of modernity is a
result of this fact and Nietzsche’s project is an attempt to redeem this event. All aspects of
Nietzsche’s philosophic system, including his comments on woman, must be understood
in the context of the death of God. But the death of God precludes the possibility of
believing in any fixed, unchanging, eternal truths. God’s death means that there is no
longer any basis for believing in fixed or absolute truths, even drough humans need to
believe in such truths. Based solely on his assertion of the death of God, Nietzsche could
not understand nature as a fixed metaphysical uuth. Considering his understanding of the
death of God alone, Nietzsche would have to say that the differences between the sexes are
socially constructed human conventions.

But the story does not end widr God’s death; Nietzsche’s proposed solution is the
creation of the Ubermensch; this is the nature, the peak, that should be molded. Nietzsche
teaches drat the Ubermensch must become the new human goal, otherwise the destiny of
Man is to become a race of last men. The very possibility of an Ubermensch is based on
the eternal differences between the sexes. However, Nietzsche’s proposal implies that this
“eternally” hostile war between the sexes is based on a “fixed” and “unchanging” trudr
about man and woman respectively, namely, nature. And here is the problem. His system
cannot logically accommodate such a fixed nature or permanent distinction between man
and woman, and yet widrout this eternal tension the Ubermensch will not be actualized.

A superficial reading of Nietzsche’s texts suggests that Nietzsche is a proponent of
biological determinism. Nietzsche emphasizes the significance of the body and he certainly
distinguishes man and woman based on their bodily differences. Pregnancy, both physical
and metaphorical, is a central issue for Nietzsche. Woman has this possibility because of
biology. But the differences between man and woman go beyond mere biology. Nietzsche
argues drat man and woman are different and should be treated differently because of his

goal, not because of their respective biologies. Individual women and men can transcend

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the limitations of dreir bodies, respectively. Nietzsche recognizes drat woman can quite
capably become man because of the extraordinary power of social determinism. He states;
“In three or four civilized countries of Europe women can drrough a few centuries of
education be made into anything, even into men: not in the sexual sense, to be sure, but in
every odrer sense” (HAH I: 425). Aldrough Nietzsche was not familiar widr the
technology available today, technologies including cloning and other types of genetic
engineering demonstrate drat now more than ever, biology does not fix the respective
destiny of man and woman in any permanent way. Due to medical technology, man and
woman can even be altered sexually today. Biological determinism is inconsistent with
Nietzsche’s view of human beings as the malleable, undetermined animals. Nietzsche
recognizes drat human beings can actually change human nature (for better or for worse)
and drerefore must decide what type of nature to cultivate.

Nietzsche does not base his trudrs about “woman as such” on biological difference
alone because human beings simply are not bound by their biology. Biology can be
altered, ignored, or interpreted as completely inelevant. Nietzsche still insists drat the
distinctions between male and female bodies matter. He must have some other basis for his
conclusion drat man and woman are different and ought to be different for all eternity.
Perhaps his doctrine of the will to power is the basis for maintaining the distinctions. One
of the fundamental distinctions among individuals is the strength of the will. However, the
body in and of itself does not determine how strong one’s will is. Strength of will is
determined by the instincts and passions of the individual, as well as the social and
historical conditioning drat shape drose instincts. While Nietzsche would concede drat man
and woman respectively have different instincts due to their different bodies, the
significance of the differences between male and female bodies and male and female wills
are not simply unalterable facts. Nietzsche recognizes the amazing power of Man to alter
such traits; consequently, he must decide first, whether to maintain differences between

man and woman and which differences to promote; and second, what the significance of

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the cultivated differences shall be. If male and female natures were fixed, unalterable
trudrs, Nietzsche would not need to discuss drem, nor would he need to try to widen the
tension between drem. In other words, if the differences between man and woman were
biologically determined and that biology could not be altered, Nietzsche would not need to
insist on maintaining those differences. But the modern situation demonstrates quite
frighteningly that it is possible to deny the importance of sexual difference. And if humans
continue to ignore the differences between man and woman in their customs, laws, and
education, ultimately drose differences will be eliminated and forgotten. Society would
become an ugly place if man and woman were indistinguishable from one another.

Comparing the differences between the sexes with the death of God-which
Nietzsche considers to be a fundamental fact--demonstrates drat the differences between
man and woman discussed in “Our Virtues” are not fixed facts for Nietzsche. The death of
God is a fact, an incident drat occuned at a historical moment Nietzsche does not defend
or prove drat God died because eventually any intellectually honest individual will
recognize this fact (cf. Z, 124). Only a few intellectually honest individuals recognize this
fact. Nevertheless, the deadr of God is a fact because it happened.

Similarly, biological differences between man and woman are facts which can be
either ignored or cultivated. Man and woman have different bodies. Democrats,
Christians, and other egalitarians insist drat drose biological differences are insignificant
and ought to be ignored. Consequently, the roles of man and woman become the same.
And as this homogenization continues, the non-biological differences between the sexes are
eroded as well. Nietzsche, however, interprets dreir biological differences as significant
because they are fuel for his goal.

Strauss’s explanation is consistent widr this interpretation. He argues that “for
Nietzsche there cannot be a natural or rational morality because he denies drat drere is a
nature of man: the denial of any cardinal difference between man and brute is a truth, if a

deadly trudr; hence there cannot be natural ends of man as man: all values are human

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creations” (Strauss, 185). Human beings should not understand themselves in terms of
their origins, but in terms of their possible conclusions. Man needs a goal; he is not his
beginning, but has always understood himself in terms of what he could be or what he
could achieve.

Strauss’ explanation also sheds light on why Nietzsche does not simply say drat
woman is more “natural” than man, but that her nature is more “natural.” The absence of
quotation marks around the term nature could mean drat it is a newly created standard or a
standard that is not undermined by the deadr of God, or, perhaps both.’ The only type of
standard drat is not undermined by the death of God is a consciously created standard by an
individual who understands that a created standard is a temporary standard. The term
nature outside of quotations is Nietzsche’s own understanding of what woman’s nature can
and should be. This standard of nature (that Nietzsche’s will fixes) should become the
truth about woman in the future; his understanding of nature ought to be cultivated and
become reality.

To make man natural means “to become master over the many vain and overly
enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted
over that eternal basic text of homo natura’ (BGE, 230). One masters all previous
interpretations of the world by willing a new interpretation that can account for all others.
Man has the power to alter his own instincts and the entire species through creative willing.
Not only can be master the past by interpreting it in a life-affirming manner, but the
audrentic individual can free himself from the power that chance/accident has had over his
life by creating a new goal for himself. In this manner one can “gain power over nature
and in addition a certain power over oneself” (WP, 430). In particular, the most
extraordinary human beings shape their own nature and are shaped by the goals, ideals,
and moralities drat drey create. Nietzsche gives Man the possibility of improving himself by
selecting the Ubermensch as his goal.

The eternal war between the sexes, separate male and female natures, and the

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Ubermensch are in no way guaranteed. If man and woman are not taught drat they are
fundamentally different from one another, drey will become more and more alike. The
deadr of God and the fact that all of events eternally recur form the foundation of
Nietzsche’s preference for the Ubermensch as the human goal. Nietzsche interprets those
facts to mean drat Nietzsche must will what the future of Man should be. Nietzsche selects
the type of nature he would like to cultivate, for if he fails to do so, the most disgusting
creature imaginable will arise. His subjective preference for the Ubermensch as opposed to
the last man dictates that choice.

Nietzsche’s prescriptions for woman are not determined by woman’s biology, but
by his goal. His goal imposes a particular interpretation on the biological differences
between man and woman. Nietzsche highlights the significance of their respective because
it is possible to interpret the body as evidence of the other differences between them.
Nietzsche promotes those differences drat have elevated tension and struggle. Hopefully
those distinctions (which were understood to be rooted in biology) will generate in the
future an eternal war and hostility between man and woman. The sexual tension and
passion created by man and woman struggling widr one another prepares the soil out of
which the Ubermensch may grow. To repeat, if the eternally hostile war between the sexes
were an inevitable fact, Nietzsche would not need to go to such great lengdrs to preserve it.
Nietzsche interprets the different bodies of man and woman to be significant because of his
task of creating the Ubermensch, the goal drat enables Nietzsche to transcend nihilism.

Is Nietzsche’s Standard of Nature a Fixed, Eternal Truth?

The fact drat Nietzsche does not recommend a return to a fixed essence leads
feminists to the conclusion that Nietzsche does not understand his “trudrs about ‘woman as
such’ to be true in any fixed sense. And, they contend, since Nietzsche is not a proponent
of any fixed essence or nature, there is also no fixed way or “correct” way to interpret his
teachings eidrer. Just as Nietzsche understands woman drrough the lens of his subjective

preferences, so, too, do the feminists read Nietzsche drrough the lens of their goals. These

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feminists, therefore, see Nietzsche’s teachings as opening the door for women to transcend
all previous definitions of femininity, and in particular, to overcome “mere biology.”
Although Nietzsche is not a proponent of biological determinism, this interpretation is not
accurate because Nietzsche obviously takes cues from the biological differences. Nietzsche
creates meaning out of their biological differences due to his subjective preference for the
Ubermensch and his rejection of egalitarian goals.

However, these feminists are correct to note drat drere is no predetermined necessity
drat dictates that the differences between the sexes ought to be maintained. The differences
between man and woman are not based on a fixed, unchanging metaphysical “truth” for
two reasons. First, drese “truths about ‘woman as such’” are only Nietzsche’s truths; they
are products of his subjective will. Second, these traits are changeable. over time. It is
quite possible, indeed likely, drat the last man will arise and drat the differences between the
sexes will be obliterated. Nietzsche cannot bear the drought of this despicable creature
recurring eternally. Nietzsche would absolutely reject the feminist renunciation of “mere
biology” because this interpretation creates a greater likelihood of the last man arising.

While the hostile relationship between man and woman is not “true” in the
metaphysical sense, there are two senses in which the male! female dichotomy will be both
fixed and eternal. First, once Nietzsche’s will fixes these sexual differences, i.e., once
they are accepted as trudrs, they will eternally recur. Aldrough Nietzsche’s truths about
men and women have not always been “due” in a metaphysical sense, if Nietzsche
succeeds in promoting and widening the differences between the sexes, his truths will
become fixed for a period of time. And the eternal recurrence of the same means that
Nietzsche’s trudrs are eternal in the sense that drey will recur.

There is anodrer sense in which the dichotomy of the sexes could be eternal due to
the fact drat the complete homogenization of the sexes has not yet occuned If Nietzsche is
able to keep the war between the sexes alive, and if odrers like him keep that tension alive

in the future, perhaps the war between the sexes will never die. Nietzsche’s will alone

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cannot make this possibility come true. Only through an act of volition on the part of
Nietzsche and odrers like him in the future can an eternally hostile war between the sexes be
cultivated. This war between the sexes will likely exist in a variety of forms. Of course,
the maintenance of sexual differentiation, passion, and struggle will not be possible if the
democratization of the world continues unencumbered.

The only nature to which Nietzsche submits is his own idiosyncratic will. All drat
has happened so far has been a “trial...-a long trial; and what it tries to ’fmd is the
commander” (Z, 324). Nietzsche understands himself as that commander who must
change human nature by his teaching of the will to power, the eternal recurrence, and the
Ubermensch. And he hopes to create conditions so that other commanders will arise and
continue to shape man’s nature. What Nietzsche wills matters because the world eternally
recurs and he would like to create a life drat he would be willing to relive. The foundation
for Nietzsche’s truths is his love of himself and his love of his friends (present and future
creators). His creation of a new goal is an act of self-glorification as well as an act of
friendship. He hoped to leave his mark eternally, but he also hoped that others would
challenge him and create new goals in the future.

Can Liberal Democrats Find a Practical Teaching in Nietzsche’s Thought?

Nietzsche does not speak to feminists, egalitarians, or liberal democrats, but this

does not mitigate the possibility of drese groups learning something from him. It should be
noted from the outset that Nietzsche would not approve of liberal democrats using his work
in this manner. Not only will liberal democrats fail to understand him; but, Nietzsche’s
goal cannot be reached within the framework of a liberal democratic society. Still,
Nietzsche’s condemnation of liberal democracy is worth studying in the manner that
Tocqueville proposes to study democracy. Though he is not a partisan of the regime,
Tocqueville suggests drat we should, at the very least, seek to understand democracy’s
“good instincts as well as its evil inclinations, uy to restrain the latter and promote the

former” (Tocqueville, 245).

282

Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the gradual homogenization of the species is a plausible
danger; however, his solution to this problem is not feasible. Schutte attacks Nietzsche’s
prescribing exploitation and slavery because “the ‘necessity’ of violence is used only to
justify aristocratic control over the masses” (Schutte, 1984, 171). She is correct to note
that protection of the masses is not Nietzsche’s goal, but Schutte is wrong to imply drat
Nietzsche institutes aristocracy for its own sake. When one alters the goal, as does
Nietzsche, one must also alter the means. Because Nietzsche defines the purpose of
society in terms of the exceptional individual, he must reject democratic government.
Tocqueville voices a similar point in Democracy in America by raising the following

questions:

Do you wish to raise mankind to an elevated and generous view of
the drings of this world? Do you want to inspire men with a certain scorn of
material goods? Do you hope to engender deep convictions and prepare the
way for acts of profound devotion?

Are you concerned with refining mores, elevating manners, and
causing the arts to blossom? Do you desire poetry, renown, and glory?

Do you set out to organize a nation so drat it will have a powerful
influence over all others? Do you expect it to attempt great enterprises and,
whatever be the result of its efforts, to leave a great mark on history?

If in your view drat should be the main object of men in society, do
not support democratic government; it surely will not lead you to that goal.

But if you drink it profitable to turn man’s intellectual and moral
activity toward the necessities of physical life and use drem to produce well-
being, if you think that reason is more use to men than genius, if your
object is not to create heroic virtues but rather tranquil habits, if you would
rather contemplate vices than crimes and prefer fewer transgressions at the
cost of fewer splendid deeds, if in place of a brilliant society you are content
to live in one drat is prosperous, and finally, if in your view the main object
of government is not to achieve the greatest strengdr or glory for the nation
as a whole but to provide for every individual therein the utmost well-being,
protecting him as far as possible form all afflictions, then it is good to make
conditions equal and to establish a democratic government (Tocqueville,
245).

Tocqueville’s point is that one’s partisanship depends upon one’s goal. In Nietzsche’s
view, the love that matters is the love of the creator of values, therefore the wordry culture
only needs to respond to the needs of the creator. Schutte’s criticism of Nietzsche boils

down to a difference of emphasis. Schutte’s main concern is the well-being of each

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individual, while Nietzsche’s is the improvement of the species. Moreover, Schutte, like
Nussbaum, measures well-being in terms of a particular standard of living for each
individual. In contrast, Nietzsche would not be distressed if the majority of people have to
be sacrificed for the sake of a single Ubermensch.

If one finds the erosion of sexual differentiation disturbing, but Nietzsche’s remedy
of institutionalized slavery and the subordination of woman unpalatable, a new cure is
needed for this democratic disease. First, Nietzsche’s analysis provides reason to consider
single sex education more seriously. Educating the sexes separately could help promote the
modesty that transforms sexual relations to somedring beyond mere comfort and
satisfaction of bodily needs. Physically separating the two sexes into two distinct
classrooms could help foster an awareness of the unique significance of sexual differences.
In this way, men will not be forced to be educated like women, and women will not be
forced to become men. The separation of the sexes could also awaken a passion and desire
to affirm drat sexual differentiation. Aldrough Nietzsche would not advocate girls and boys
or men and women receiving the same education; perhaps, separating them into different
classes could help maintain, or at least stall, the homogenization of the sexes. But this
solution is nodring more than a band-aid on the problem drat Nietzsche derides. If men and
women receive the same education, they will be molded in a way that makes the have
similar, mediocre desires. Furthermore, requiring separate types of education for men and
women may be inconsistent with egalitarianism. If men and women are equal in the most
important senses, what is the reason to maintain drose differences, differences that are to be
irrelevant politically? Egalitarians cannot answer this question, according to Nietzsche. In
odrer words, it is not clear how a separate education for men and women could be
established and promoted in an egalitarian society. It seems highly unlikely that a liberal
democracy could impose single-sex education upon its citizens.

Second, scientists should reconsider the flagrant use of medical technologies. For

example, current genetic research attempts to isolate the gene drat causes aggression in

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men. The obvious motivation behind the study is to see how one might eliminate this
aggressive quality. The assumption behind the research, drat (male) aggression dangerous
and ought to be eradicated, may not be sound. These scientists need to consider what the
consequences of the elimination of this gene would be, and how it may impact upon man,
woman, the relationship between the sexes, the family, and society at large. Nietzsche
persuasively argues drat women will not desire men who are completely passive, gentle,
and safe. Neverdreless, this is the type of man that primary schools now aim to produce.
Feminists have successfully tyrannized the male dominance in the schools. It is now
fashionable to denounce competition, aggressiveness, and ambition for the sake of
feminine perspectives. But women should consider whedrer they could be satisfied
without some of drose qualities in men. Bloom, for instance, suggests that stripping men
of dreir ability to dominate alters the nature of relationships, love, sex, family, and marriage
(cf. Bloom, 88-137). The elimination of masculinity may result in sterile “relationships”
rather than passionate, feisty love affairs.

Furdrer, the peculiarly modern faidr in progress needs to be given further scrutiny.
As new medications are developed, scientists lack a clear understanding of whedrer such
medicines and procedures should be employed. Consider the extent to. which current
medical technology enables, and even encourages, us to medicate away the differences
between man and woman. Women are now told that drey can eliminate the menstruation
cycle through a continual use of active birth control pills. Doctors are currently on a
mission to make the day-after-pill and the abortion pill as easily obtainable as the birth
control pill. If the menstruation cycle is essentially eliminated, and the consequences of
careless sex (pregnancy) neutralized, woman will place less emphasis on her ability to give
birth. Without menstruation, woman would no longer have the constant monthly reminder
of the possibility of pregnancy. The availability of pills, which essentially reverse the
effects of conception after the fact, alters the meaning of pregnancy and sex. Indeed, the

initial introduction of contraception radically changed the way men and women relate to one

285

another. For many women and men, pregnancy may become an unnecessary nuisance drat
can be eliminated widrout much drought or care. Before carelessly eliminating the
particularities of woman’s body, one must consider the social and political consequences
drat may result Eliminating menstruation because of its inconvenience makes woman
closer to being a man figuratively, if not biologically. The question of why she should be a
woman, mother, or wife no longer has any clear answer.

Third, if the family is wordr preserving, perhaps separate roles for man and woman
are also worth preserving. Without a doubt, women’s liberation movement has effectively
altered the family and marriage. But is the change in family for better or for worse?
Indeed, modern egalitarian societies are moving closer to the communism of women and
children drat Socrates recommended in the Republic.128 Socrates considers what happens
when women get what drey want and are treated exactly the same as men. Complete
communism of sexual relations and children is required. Though this extreme result of
complete communism of women and children proves to be undesirable and impossible,
today’s continual weakening of the family demonstrates a movement toward the ridiculous
city envisioned by Plato. The withering away of the family is evidenced by high divorce
rates, the rearing of children in day care centers, single parent homes, the high number of

teenage pregnancies, and dead beat dads.

123m Book V of Plato’s Republic, the interlocutors attempt to create complete equality between
the sexes in the city in speech. In practice this means giving man and woman the exact same education and
roles in the city. Plato presents a disturbing picture of reforms needed to equalize the sexes. These include
raising children in pens, sex by lot, incest, the elimination of enduring love in marriage, and the abolition
of family. The result of Plato’s experiment is that all serious commitment is destroyed, private loyalties
disappear, human dedication and dignity is lost, and life appears flat and hollow. The ugly picture of what
complete equality would look like suggests that maintaining some inequalities is healthy both for the
individual and for society.

The disturbing consequence of complete elimination of sexual inequality explains why Socrates
preserves the family and the different roles of man and woman respectively in the Laws. More is to be
gained by maintaining the differences. Plato has serious reasons why man and woman should not be
completely equal; drose reasons do not include a chauvinistic desire to justify the subordination of woman
as Okin suggests (Okin, 276-277). Plato would argue that complete equality of the sexes is unnatural and
therefore not desirable for the city or for the individual. While Nietzsche’s argument may not rest on nature
as Plato’s does, he would certainly agree drat the maintenance of separate roles for man and woman is
absolutely crucial.

286

Not only has the family become weaker, but Putnam contends that women’s
liberation is one factor that has helped to “diminish civic engagement and social
connectedness” generally (Putnam, 72). Putnam explains:

many millions of American women have moved out of the home into paid
employment. This is the primary, drough not the sole, reason why the
weekly working hours of the average American have increased significantly
during these years. It seems highly plausible drat this social revolution
should have reduced the time and energy available for building social
capital. For certain organizations, such as the PTA, the League of Women
Voters, the Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the Red Cross, this is

almost certainly an important part of the story. The sharpest decline in
women’s civic participation seems to have come in the 19703; membership

9”

in such “women s organizations as drese has been virtually halved since
the late 1960s. By contrast, most of the decline in participation in men’s
organizations occuned about ten years later; the total decline to date has
been approximately 25 percent for the typical organization. On the odrer
hand, the survey data imply that the aggregate declines for men and virtually
as great as those for women. It is logically possible, of course, that the
male declines might represent the knock-on effect of women’s liberation, as
dishwashing crowded out the lodge, ...(Putnam, 72-73).
The implications of women’s liberation extend well beyond the domestic and erotic
spheres. Certainly a decline in social connectedness was not sought by feminists. but since
it has resulted, one must consider if there is any way to halt the process.
Can Feminists Learn From Nietzsche?

Two assumptions have been inherent in women’s liberation since its birth. One is
that society will be stronger if women are afforded the same opportunities as men. The
second is that women and men can be fulfilled by pursuing the same padrs. Both
assumptions are currently being questioned. Even pop culture television programs like
“Ally McBeal” and “Sex in the City” are beginning to question what women actually gain
from dreir so-called “liberation.” The recognition that women’s liberation may not be all
good does not necessitate the enslavement of women. Only by confronting drese difficult
questions will it be possible to find a responsible notion of human rights. Nietzsche helps
diagnose the problem clearly. Though I would not endorse his solution, one should still

consider the motivation behind his concern. Nietzsche’s goal is most certainly not an

attempt to create sisterhood or help all women equally; nevertheless, it would be

287

 

appropriate for feminists to read his diagnosis of the problem. But, drese feminists must
learn to read Nietzsche without any illusions, for he is not a feminist, which means that he
certainly does not hope to promote feminism.

Regarding the second assumption, instead of focusing so heavily on what would
equalize the sexes, perhaps the focus should be on determining what would fulfill woman
and what would fulfill man. The goal of the feminist movement is to make individual men
and individual women self-sufficient. But in this movement, perhaps the social needs
individuals are neglected. A society of self-sufficient similar individuals loses important
elements of community, as Putnam discusses. We should not assume that woman wants
the same things as man, but should instead consider the different predilections of man and
woman. In this way, we can take cues from their differences instead of trying to ignore
what we see before our very eyes. For example, the fact that women are not occupying the
highest positions in the top corporations may mean drat women do not have the same type
of ambition as men. Perhaps ambitious women, in contrast to ambitious men, want it all--
family and career. Men, because they do not bear children, may more easily focus solely
on career.

Nietzsche’s concern of maintaining the dichotomy between the sexes speaks to a
fundamental tension in the feminist movement drat has been implicit since the beginning of
the movement. One side would like to promote femininity as its own power. This group
argues drat femininity has not influenced society to the degree that these feminist would like
it to do so. Feminists like Carol Gilligan hope affirm feminine and masculine ways of
thinking. This strand has found its expression in educational reforms. However, it seems
drat feminists have moved beyond the desire to affirm the power of femininity, toward the
goal of tyrannizing or eliminating masculinity for the sake of femininity. As Hoff
Summers demonstrates in The War Against Boys, men are now forced to learn (and
become) like women, instead of the other way around. This trend, if continued, will harm

women as much as it harms men. Forcing both sexes to pattern themselves after only one

288

sex, not only denies the attributes of each sex, but necessarily causes the relations between
the sexes to degenerate.

The odrer side strand of feminism argues that the differences between the sexes are
irrelevant because humans are socially constructed. This means (as Nietzsche teaches), that
the original natures of the sexes may never be found again. This second type of feminism,
which I will call “historicist feminism,” would argue that it is unnecessary to look back to
the original meaning of our biological differences because drat biology can be altered.
Thus, feminists like Harriet Taylor Mill and Gail Evans argue drat women should be treated
just like men. To liberate woman means to permit, indeed to encourage, her to pursue the
same padr as man. This, by the way, is the type of feminism drat Nietzsche chastises most
harshly. These historicist feminists insist on ignoring any sexual difference, and this
ultimately weakens the family, erodes the importance and purpose of marriage, and
corrodes social connectedness. Feminists cannot have it both ways. Either sexual
differences are completely unimportant, or drey are relevant and dreir cultivation is
desirable. To make this decision, feminists must be honest about the current direction
liberal democracy is headed. This tension in feminism may never be resolved, but the
sobering effect of Nietzsche’s warnings may allow both types of feminists to gain some
insight into the fallacies of the women’s liberation movement Incidentally, Nietzsche
would be concerned that some day feminists may reconcile themselves. Nietzsche might

say that the tension within the movement offers hope that all is not lost

289

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Works by Nietzsche

Parendletical references to Nietzsche’s works use the abbreviations listed below.

AC The Antichrist

BGE Beyond Good and Evil

ET The Birth of Tragedy

EH Ecce Homo

H The Use and Abuse of History
HAH Human-all-too-Human

GM 0n the Genealogy of Morals
GS The Gay Science

TI Twilight of the Idols

Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra

WP The Will to Power

LEI Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche .

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