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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
ACHIEVING ATTITUDE CHANGE BY
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ALLEVIATING THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: ACHIEVING ATTITUDE CHANGE BY INVOKING ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS

By

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ABSTRACT

ALLEVIATING THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:

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In spite of the laudable goals of affirmative action and affirmative action programs, they have met with considerable opposition, even from those whom they are designed to help. One of the sources of such opposition, and other unintended outcomes, is the fact that affirmative action is often seen as unfair, unjust, or unethical. This study attempts to clarify the relationship between individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action and their ethics and justice frameworks. It also attempts to reduce the negative attitudes associated with affirmative action by altering the ethical frameworks with which individuals evaluate the initiative.

The study revealed a link between attitude toward affirmative action and subjects' ethics frameworks. Specifically, individuals using a more consequentialist ethics approach were more negatively disposed toward affirmative action. This supports and clarifies some of the anecdotal evidence about the source of opposition to affirmative action.

Although the experimental manipulation did not have a significant effect on subjects' attitudes toward affirmative action it holds promise for future research. The

findings suggest that such an ethics training manipulation may impact some individuals, depending on their previously held ethics frameworks. Based on the study's findings, changes in individuals' ethics frameworks can be expected to impact their attitudes toward affirmative action.

This study also revealed some interesting findings about the relationship between the consequentialism and nonconsequentialism ethical frameworks. These two ethical frameworks were found to be best represented as opposite ends of a continuum. The existing measures of the constructs were rejected in favor of a single, unidimensional consequentialism-nonconsequentialism measure.

Finally, the study showed a clear relationship between attitudes toward affirmative action and the Religious Conviction and Categorical Imperative ethical frameworks.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

> ...I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content. I know both how to be abased, and I know how to abound: every where and in all things I am instructed both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need. I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me (Philippians 4:11-13, KJV).

This passage was one that I put up on the wall of my office during one of the more trying periods of my career as a doctoral student. I suppose this dissertation marks the tangible proof of its truth. However, since I know the Author of the passage, I didn't really need proof. His publications need no references, no human subjects approval and His conclusions are always correct, even when the editors disagree. I am extremely and eternally thankful to the Lord Jesus for making it all possible.

I wish to acknowledge my chair, John Hollenbeck, who has been a role model, teacher, advisor and supporter for over a decade. Thanks for your patience. Thanks to my committee members – Georgia Chao, Michael Lambert, and Ray Noe for great ideas, constructive feedback and more patience. Thanks to the other faculty members who in one way or the other propped up my faltering sense of self confidence. Thanks also to my fellow doctoral students, especially Kok Yee Ng – you were an answer to prayer.

I would like to thank my friends, family and church family for prayerful support and encouragement – you had more confidence in me than I had in myself. Special thanks to Rev. Melvin T. Jones for the unwavering support and to Dr. Ernest Fubara for setting the example.

I thank my three sons Abiye', Priye' and Adonye' for giving up time with Daddy. Finally, thanks to LaVerne, for making my life better. I love you so much.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

Simply defined, affirmative action refers to the general concept of proactive efforts to achieve equal employment opportunity. The general concept is implemented in organizations through a variety of specific affirmative action programs. These and other identity-conscious[1] organizational initiatives are arguably, the most challenging, controversial, and conflict-ridden facets of work in organizations (Chang, 1996; Opotow, 1996). They provide difficult challenges for a variety of organizational stakeholders including employees, managers, researchers, regulators, and even society at large. In spite of their intentions and perceived benefits, affirmative action efforts attract fierce opposition even from those who are expected to benefit from them.

As with any other organizational initiative, affirmative action programs (AAPs) have their shortcomings. However, unlike other organizational efforts (such as training and development, benefits administration, or wellness and safety campaigns) affirmative action and other identity-conscious programs are associated with a significant number of unintended, often negative consequences. These consequences tend to generate a level of conflict and controversy not often associated with other human resource management initiatives (Chang, 1996; Opotow, 1996; Tierney, 1997).

The current study serves as the foundation for a program of research on alleviating these unintended consequences. As delineated below, a number of unintended consequences have been linked to affirmative action, either through empirical study or conceptual propositions. The consequences are said to impact multiple parties, including

[1]The term "identity-conscious" refers to activities that explicitly consider the demographic characteristics of organizational members (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995). The term is described in more detail later in this chapter.

the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action efforts, those who perceive themselves to have been denied opportunities as a result of these initiatives, and more neutral observers. The consequences also span a range of outcomes including attitudes, behavior, and results.

This study addresses the attitudinal bases that undergird other aspects of individuals' reactions to affirmative action and affirmative action programs. The underlying assumption is that individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action are rooted in conceptions of whether or not affirmative action is normatively right or fair. I attempt to change individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action by presenting them with an alternative framework for distinguishing right from wrong. I expect that this alternative framework will foster more positive attitudinal reactions to affirmative action (see Figures 1 & 3). This change in attitude serves as a foundation for more extensive changes in reactions and behavior. Thus, this study serves as a foundation for future research and potentially, organizational policies directed toward reducing the negative outcomes associated with affirmative action[2].

[2] This study does not attempt to make a normative statement regarding the use or non-use of affirmative action or affirmative action programs. Rather, it is a theory-based attempt to address a very real concern facing contemporary organizations. In spite of some vocal opposition, affirmative action and related identity conscious efforts are expected to remain a part of the American organizational landscape for some time to come (Kravitz & Platania, 1993).

Chapter 1

ALLEVIATING THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Unintended consequences of affirmative action

In her 1994 review, Madeline Heilman provides an excellent summary of both conceptual and empirical work on the unintended consequences of affirmative action programs. These unintended consequences are predominantly seen as negative, or counterproductive, and often represent a significant challenge for managers. They include reduced self assessment of competence among affirmative action beneficiaries; counterproductive work behavior; adverse reactions to others in the work setting; adverse reactions to the work setting itself; a perception that selection processes are unfair; stress; negative affect; stigmas of incompetence (ascribed to affirmative action beneficiaries by their observers); negative characterizations of affirmative action beneficiaries (non-competence related characterizations); negative perceptions of the jobs in which affirmative action beneficiaries work; and perceptions of injustice on the part of those not selected.

Although Heilman's work focuses on women, affirmative action programs tend to be quite similar, regardless of whether they are directed toward women, or members of various racial/ethnic minority groups (referred to from here on as minorities). However, programs directed toward the handicapped tend to take on a different form, and thus to evoke unique attitudinal and behavioral responses, even though they are also designed to promote equality of employment for a group of persons. Most equal employment opportunity efforts directed toward the handicapped are based on the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1992. The key difference between these and other equal employment opportunity programs is that employers may have legitimate, objective concerns about the abilities of individuals with certain disabilities to perform specific jobs (Klimoski & Palmer, 1994). Thus, one aspect of EEO initiatives for the disabled is that they often involve the elimination of barriers (physical or otherwise), modifications to jobs, and/or the provision of specific accommodations for individual persons, rather than a class of persons per se. As mentioned previously, programs for the handicapped do not generally evoke the same kind of attitudinal reactions as those directed toward women and minorities. Likewise, the reactions to veterans' employment preferences rarely produce the adverse unintended consequences outlined earlier. These distinctions are significant enough that they suggest distinct streams of inquiry. Affirmative action efforts directed toward veterans and the handicapped are outside of the focus of this investigation. No further mention will be made of them.

In spite of the similarity between affirmative action efforts directed toward women and those targeting minority group members, the affective and behavioral reactions to programs directed toward these different groups are not identical. Some studies have uncovered similar reactions to programs directed at these different groups (Heilman, Block & Lucas, 1992 [Study 2]), others have stressed differences. Fletcher and Chalmers (1991), for example focus on the effects of contextual factors in determining attitudes toward affirmative action. Their study, conducted in Canada, found that support for affirmative action programs was influenced by the beneficiary group in question. Programs directed toward women received greater support than those directed toward French Canadians (an ethnic minority) and Native Canadians (a racial and ethnic

minority). This result held true for both men and women. Note, however, that French Canadians demonstrated equal support for programs directed toward the Francophone minority and those directed toward women. Overall, their study provides further justification for research designed to focus on affirmative action efforts directed toward minority group members. These and other studies (Parker, Baltes, & Christiansen, 1997) suggest that there is a need to further investigate the underlying processes associated with programs directed toward different beneficiary groups. In fact, some scholars have explicitly recommended that more research attention be directed toward minority group members (Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz & Platania, 1993).

In spite of some very vocal opposition, including that of many prominent political figures, affirmative action programs are expected to exist in one form or another in American organizations for some time to come. Both the history of the American workplace, and the contemporary dynamics of the workforce suggest that affirmative action programs have not outlived their usefulness (Johnston & Packer, 1987; Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz & Platania, 1993). Affirmative Action and related initiatives also have potential application in a number of countries outside of the United States where multiculturalism and racial reconciliation are important issues. The breadth and impact of these efforts indicates that their study is an important problem both for scholars and practicing managers -- a problem that merits considerable and careful investigation. Given that these programs are expected to exist for some time to come, it is logical for the research agenda to include the investigation of ways to make them more palatable to those affected by them. This concern is the primary justification for the current study.

Alleviating the unintended consequences -- focus on attitudes

As introduced above, the emphasis of the current study is on impacting individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action. These attitudinal reactions are expected to underlie and predict the behavioral consequences discussed above. The study also focuses on affirmative action as a concept, rather than specific affirmative action programs. A number of existing studies have already examined individuals' differential reactions to various specific affirmative action programs (Heilman, Battle, Keller, & Lee, 1998, Kravitz, 1995; Summers, 1995; Taylor-Carter, Doverspike, & Cook, 1995). However, other investigators have shown that individuals tend to enact their own pictures of what affirmative action entails. As such, their reactions are not necessarily directed at the specific, actual programs in operation in their organizations but at their personal conceptions of what the policies entail. Often, these conceptions are quite erroneous, including in them program elements that are impracticable, or illegal. In general, there is significant confusion about what affirmative action entails (Tomasson, Crosby, & Herzberger, 1996).

The confusion among employees, is often compounded by the fact that employers may do a poor job of implementing affirmative action programs. Thus, employees may have a clear understanding of their organizations' affirmative action programs and still be negatively disposed toward them. For example, in spite of the fact that they are, in most cases, illegal, many organizations still use some form of quota in affirmative action decision making. Employees observing such a practice may assume that this is a normal component of affirmative action and thus extend their negative attitudes toward their organizations' specific programs to the general concept of affirmative action.

The limited emphasis of this study is also valuable in that it may provide theoretical support for the investigation of other related organizational programs. In some instances, reactions to affirmative action may generalize to other identity-conscious organizational efforts, such as equal employment opportunity programs, or management of diversity.

Extant research has attributed negative responses to affirmative action to a number of psychological explanations, many of which are rooted in deep-seated individual values, including modern racism, belief in the dominant ideology of opportunity, and simple self-interest (Kluegel & Smith, 1983); fairness judgments (Nacoste, 1990); and ethics (Blackstone & Heslep, 1977). The current study focuses on two possible causal explanations for these negative reactions to affirmative action, and in turn, attempts to use these explanations as approaches to altering individuals' reactions.

The first approach to addressing individuals' responses to affirmative action is rooted in the domain of ethics. A rich tradition of ethics research has produced a typology of ethical frameworks or theories with which individuals make determinations regarding right and wrong. The second analytical perspective, is drawn from the organizational justice literature. Here, individuals' justice frameworks or theories-in-use determine how they determine what is fair or unfair. Each analytical approach is used as a predictor of attitudes toward affirmative action. Additionally the ethics frameworks serve as the foundation for an attempt to alter individuals' negative affective reactions. Note that these analytical tools do not necessarily determine the normative outcomes of individuals' judgments. They do however affect the processes through which individuals arrive at normative conclusions.

One of the initial challenges facing this study is that it is an attempt to manipulate perspectives and attitudes, which are often deeply ingrained and difficult to alter. Both the independent variables (ethics and justice frameworks) and the dependent variable (attitude toward affirmative action) are deep-seated, value-laden characteristics and are resistant to change. However, research on both ethics and justice indicates that within-person differences may be observed for the various frameworks/perspectives. In other words, there are situational and temporal considerations that affect individuals' dominant frameworks. There are also indications that these frameworks respond to training and educational interventions. For example Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos (1993) conducted a study examining the malleability of individuals' ethical frameworks. In this study, a training manipulation was used to attempt to move subjects toward the autonomous moral function, that is, toward addressing moral problems using concrete, situation-specific information, rather than abstract moral principles.[3] The dependent variable was the moral function or ethical phase revealed through the explanations given by individuals for their solutions to business ethics problems. The educational manipulation had a robust effect on individuals' moral functions, moving most subjects from one phase to another.

Similarly, the direct malleability of affirmative action attitudes has also been demonstrated: Taylor-Carter, Doverspike, and Alexander (1995) assessed the effect of pro- versus anti-affirmative action organizational communications on individuals' fairness perceptions. In this context, fairness perceptions were taken to be a form of attitude, with the potential to predict behavioral responses. This study, which focused on the reactions of women toward programs designed to benefit women, demonstrated a

[3]Note that in some theoretical traditions, this form of moral reasoning is seen as more advanced and more

significant impact of organizational communication on fairness perceptions. Fairness perceptions were also significantly influenced by individuals' cognitive responses: this refers to the number of positive, negative, or neutral affirmative action-related thoughts the individuals generated and recalled, immediately following their exposure to the organizational communication.

Change in attitudes toward affirmative action has also been demonstrated by Fletcher and Chalmers (1991). They directly manipulated individuals' attitudes towards affirmative action, asking them to reconsider their previously held views. Unfortunately, this approach has the potential to introduce a very powerful priming effect and is unlikely to induce, and in turn assess the potential for long-term change. Further it was conducted in Canada, where affirmative action is an accepted and institutionalized means of redressing historic discrimination. In that context, prevention of future discrimination and remedying of past discrimination are seen as inextricably intertwined. Thus, Fletcher and Chalmers' study provides further justification for the indirect approach of the current paper, particularly for the use of deeply held frameworks as levers for inducing change. In their words: "there is room for persuasion, however, and this lies not only at the level of policy preference but also at the level of deeply held values" (Fletcher & Chalmers, 1991:91).

In contrast, other research indicates that attitudes about race in general are less malleable. In a longitudinal study, Kinder and Rhodebeck (1982) examined changes in Whites' support for racial equality (operationalized in terms of their acceptance of changes in the racial status quo, racial integration of neighborhoods and busing).

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effective. However, such considerations are outside of the domain of this study.

Specifically, they examined the effects of personal economic conditions, exposure to crime and violence, and the perception that African-Americans threaten their private interests. The most powerful effect was for exposure to crime and violence. However, none of these effects was of practical significance. The most striking result of the study was that racial opinions appear to be quite consistent over time, regardless of experience. These findings also lend support to the approach of this study, that is focusing on more deeply seated individual differences as predictors of responses to affirmative action.

Again, my intention in this study is to capitalize on within-person differences in ethics/justice frameworks, and related within-person differences in attitudes toward affirmative action. Admittedly, these are difficult manipulations to accomplish; however, in such a setting even small effects are practically important (Prentice & Miller, 1992).

Defining key concepts

At this stage, it will be meaningful to provide a brief explication of some of the central concepts used in this study:

Affirmative action and affirmative action programs. Affirmative action is one of the central concepts of this study and as such will be defined in much greater detail in the next chapter. However, one legal definition of affirmative action is contained in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (U.G.E.S.P., 1978). The Guidelines define affirmative action as "those actions appropriate to overcome the effects of past or present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment opportunity (29 CFR part 1608 section 1C) ."

Affirmative action was originally conceived for use by Federal contractors, who were instructed to make good faith efforts toward achieving equal employment

opportunity for women and members of ethnic minority groups. As mentioned earlier, the definition, along with the history and scope of affirmative action will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. However, it is valuable at this point to make the distinction between affirmative action and affirmative action programs: affirmative action refers to the general concept of proactive efforts to achieve equal employment opportunity. Affirmative action programs, on the other hand, are specific organizational initiatives designed to implement affirmative action policy. Much of the existing research on attitudes toward affirmative action has focused on reactions to specific programs as opposed to the general concept. As discussed earlier, the distinction between these two approaches is consequential for both research and practice.

Identity-conscious organizational programs. Also referred to as identity conscious management programs refers to organizational initiatives that explicitly consider the demographic status of organization members (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995). The most commonly used demographic characteristics are race, gender, and disability. Programs that do not explicitly consider these characteristics are referred to as identity-blind. Although this study is primarily focused on affirmative action, where appropriate I will also investigate reactions to other identity-conscious organizational efforts.

Program beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries. The term "program beneficiary" or simply "beneficiary," refers to the organization members whom the organizational programs are designed to assist. Identity-conscious programs are intended to promote the well being of specific, protected demographic sub-groups within the organization, primarily women, and members of ethnic minority (non-Caucasian) groups.

Similarly, "non-beneficiaries" of identity-conscious programs are those who are

not members of the programs' target groups. However, the term non-beneficiary may be somewhat misleading in that many identity-conscious programs are expected to promote the benefit of all organization members, as well as that of the organization itself (U.G.E.S.P., 1978). For example, as part of an affirmative action program, an organization may require that all job opportunities be advertised through public postings. Thus, the true benefits of these programs are not limited to their immediate, or direct beneficiaries.

It should be noted again that these rather simplistic descriptions of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of affirmative action focus on the intended outcomes of these programs. However, in later sections of this study, I distinguish between the intentions of affirmative action's designers and the perceptions of affected individuals. A significant body of behavioral research has demonstrated that these perceptions and attributions may be more powerful motivators than an initiative's "official" goals and objectives. These distinctions underscore the inappropriateness of assuming that demographic status is inherently predictive of reactions to, or support of affirmative action (which unfortunately, is often done). For research purposes, it will be more important to assess individuals' perceptions of whether or not they stand to benefit from affirmative action.

Equal employment opportunity. Equal opportunity in employment means not discriminating against a particular group because of that group's race, sex, religion, ethnicity, disability, or veteran status (Holloway, 1989). Equal opportunity is generally a more reactive, passive approach to preventing discrimination than affirmative action. It focuses on and provides sanctions for individual acts of discrimination, assuming that in

the absence of such, organizations will function fairly. Equal opportunity in effect, "seeks to make the organization blind to difference, whereas affirmative action accentuates difference (Tierney, 1997, p. 173)."

Equal opportunity programs prohibit intentional discrimination but they do not require organizations to assess whether their practices unintentionally harm any groups (Crosby & Cordova, 1996; Stout & Buffum, 1993). One important distinction between equal opportunity and affirmative action is that individuals do not have to be discriminated against, complain about such discrimination, and subsequently prove that it occurred before affirmative action can be initiated. Affirmative action provides for mechanisms to monitor discrimination at the aggregate level, which is easier to detect and rectify (Crosby & Cordova, 1996).

History of affirmative action

Affirmative action is distinct among human resource management initiatives in the degree to which it is rooted in the American historical, legal, and social context. Thus, any discussion of affirmative action is incomplete without a review of its history and origins. This review is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of affirmative action and related issues. It focuses on the most pivotal and relevant issues, and in so doing provides a framework for the subsequent conceptual discussion. Similarly, the historical discussion of affirmative action must, of necessity, consider matters of legislation and jurisprudence. In both cases, more detailed analyses of these issues are available from other sources (e.g. Greene, 1989; Newman, 1989; Taylor, 1991; Turner, 1990).

The historical roots for affirmative action and indeed, for other identity-conscious

programs may be traced to the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 which provided for economic opportunities for African-Americans, who were for the most part newly freed slaves or the immediate descendants of slaves. This Act illustrates the nation's recognition of a need to provide economic parity for those who had heretofore been systematically and legally oppressed (Jones, 1985).

A second legal and historical milestone is the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Again, this Act was directed toward African-Americans and designed to alleviate the desperate economic conditions of former slaves and their descendants. The Act provided that all citizens were "entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges" of public conveyances, theaters and places of public amusement (Jones, 1985). However, this Act was declared unconstitutional through a series of Supreme Court cases. Such political and legal opposition to equality of opportunity characterized the American experience until 1954 when the Supreme Court heard *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas* (Turner, 1990). Despite the fact that this case was not employment related, it served as a foundation for future identity-conscious initiatives.

The first usage of the phrase "affirmative action" in the legal context is found in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA gave the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) the charge of rectifying unfair labor practices and the authority to issue cease and desist, reinstatement, and back pay orders, and to order affirmative action (NLRA, 1935). Although this authority was limited to the enforcement of the provisions of the NLRA, this statute is an example of the government's willingness to intervene in employment situations to rectify past wrongs (Turner, 1990).

Executive Order 8802 of 1941 is one of the first legal statutes directed specifically at the prevention of employment discrimination. The Order prohibited employment discrimination (based on race, creed, color, or national origin) and mandated the use of affirmative action in employment. Although the order did not use the phrase affirmative action, it did "provide for the full equitable participation of all workers in defense industries without discrimination (Jones, 1985)."

As indicated earlier, a critical turning point in the history of remedial identity-conscious activity was the *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court decision of 1954. This decision, holding that segregation in public schooling was unconstitutional, provided for legal relief for those affected by past discrimination (Turner, 1990).

The first use of the phrase affirmative action in the specific context of employment discrimination is found in Executive Order 10925 (1963). This order required government contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants....and employees....are treated....without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin (Section 301)." This order also established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the organization charged with oversight of employment discrimination law. The EEOC's regulatory power was later extended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. This Act gave the commission the power to oversee all employers and unions with over fifteen members as well as all state, local, and federal government employees. The 1972 bill also expanded the scope of employment discrimination to encompass not only specific instances of discrimination but also institutional patterns of exclusion (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).

One of the most significant legislative events in the history of affirmative action

was the passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which regulates equal employment opportunity. Title VII explicitly declares that it is " an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Section 703 (a) (1))." Title VII also provides for the use of affirmative action, including reinstatement and hiring, as a remedy for unlawful employment discrimination (Section 706 (g)).

Another legislative milestone is the 1965 Executive Order 11246, which specifically regulates the employment practices of government contractors. It requires them to avoid discrimination against members of protected groups and to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and treated during their employment without regard to their protected status (Section 202 (1))."

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is another pivotal piece of legislative history affecting equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. This Act, which amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, served to codify and clarify issues uncovered in various Supreme Court decisions, particularly *Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio (490 U.S. 642, 1989).* With specific reference to affirmative action, the 1991 Act prohibited the use of test score adjustment as a means of implementing affirmative action.

Because of the peculiar history of, and systematic discrimination perpetrated against African-Americans, early affirmative action initiatives were primarily directed toward African-Americans. They were later extended to other racial minorities, and to women. However, a number of affirmative action efforts exist which are directed toward

the advancement of other groups in the workplace. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 forbids discrimination based on age. The Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 requires employers to take affirmative action to employ and advance qualified Vietnam-era veterans. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires government contractors to take affirmative action for qualified workers with disabilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 forbids discrimination on the basis of disability. Although affirmative action efforts targeting individuals with disabilities often involve the development of specific affirmative action programs, these AAPs tend to focus on employment processes and good faith efforts, not on documentation and utilization analyses. They are less controversial, and have received less empirical attention, than AAPs directed at women and ethnic minorities (Kravitz et. al, 1996).

Definition of affirmative action

As indicated in the preceding section, early affirmative action programs applied to organizations that had contracts with the federal government. As a condition of working with the government, contractors were required to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Executive Order 11246)." The Order further specified that affirmative action is widely applicable to recruitment, training, selection, promotion, and compensation decisions (Holloway, 1989).

Although the Order requires federal contractors to engage in affirmative action, the definition of affirmative action, provided in the preceding section, is found in the OFCCP manual. A similar definition is contained in Title 41 of Chapter 60 of the Code

of Federal Regulations. This document specifically defines an affirmative action program as:

> "....a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits itself to apply every good faith effort. The objective of those procedures plus such efforts is equal employment opportunity (subsection 2.10)."

Holloway (1989) provides a somewhat different perspective on affirmative action. She indicates that affirmative action promotes equality of opportunity in that it affects the subjectivity inherent in the judgments of organizational decision-makers. These judgments are often influenced by personal experiences and prejudices concerning the abilities of members of target groups. Affirmative action, according to Holloway, is designed to alert people to the previously unobserved abilities of members of targeted groups.

Kravitz and Platania (1993) offer a more intuitive definition of affirmative action. They define affirmative action as actions taken to increase the numbers of an underrepresented demographic group in an organization. The goal of these programs is specifically to redress past discrimination. Although affirmative action is generically defined in terms of equality of opportunity and compensating for past discrimination, the majority of employment discrimination in the United States has affected specific, identifiable groups. It is these groups that are currently considered the "target groups" for affirmative action efforts.

Crosby and Cordova (1996) contrast the classical definition of affirmative action with its contemporary meaning. They trace the classical definition of affirmative action to the 1965 Executive Order 11246 and describe it as occurring "whenever people go out

of their way (take positive action) to increase the likelihood of true equality for individuals of differing categories. Whenever an organization expends energy to make sure that women and men, people of color and White people, or disabled and fully-abled workers have the same chances to be hired, retained, or promoted, then the organization has a policy of affirmative action in employment (pp. 34-35)." This classical approach to affirmative action is operationalized by federal contractors in the requirement that they track the rate of utilization of members of target groups in their organizations, and exert efforts to ensure that the rate of utilization matches the availability of persons in the relevant labor market. In instances where members of the targeted groups are underutilized, the contractors must set goals for increasing the proportion of target group members in their workforces, and develop documentable plans for reaching these goals. These plans might include special recruitment efforts, closer scrutiny of organizational practices to exclude those that might result in adverse impact, or the temporary use of set asides (Crosby & Cordova, 1996).

Classical affirmative action, as introduced by Executive Order 11246 simply requires organizations to ensure that their utilization of protected groups matches the availability of such groups in the relevant labor market. In the absence of such a match, the groups are required to establish goals and timetables for rectifying the discrepancy (Tomasson et al, 1996).

In more recent times, affirmative action has taken on a more controversial meaning. It has come to mean quotas, unjustified set-asides or preferential treatment, including the hiring and promotion of unqualified individuals (Crosby & Cordova, 1996; Heilman, McCullough, & Gilbert, 1996; Kravitz & Platania, 1993). However, such

practices are, for the most part, illegal, and studies reveal that they are not practiced with any significant frequency (Crosby & Cordova, 1996). The pervasiveness of this contemporary view of affirmative action further undergirds the value of assessing the attitudinal responses of individuals to the general concept of affirmative action. Again, this approach allows one to assess individuals' reactions to their personal conceptions of affirmative action without attempting to reconcile their differential understandings of what it entails.

Note that the term "affirmative action" may also be accurately used to refer to set-aside programs in education and contracting, in which a certain number of positions, or percentage of the sub-contracting budget respectively is designated for the use of women, or minorities. Although such programs are conceptually similar to those governing employment, they are outside of the scope of this study.

Affirmative action target groups

Early forms of contemporary affirmative action directed redemptive efforts toward two demographic groups: women and members of ethnic minority groups (Holloway, 1989). Generally, recognized ethnic minority groups are American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; African-American, not of Hispanic Origin; and Hispanic. Later efforts expanded these protections, making them available to the handicapped and veterans.

Operationalizing affirmative action -- affirmative action programs

Although the concept of affirmative action tends to arouse controversy, the practice of affirmative action is even more controversial. As with other aspects of the topic, the execution of affirmative action is rooted in a complex network of history, legal

statutes, and case law. As such, no attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive review of affirmative action program components/practices.

A classical means of implementing affirmative action may be traced back to Executive Order 11246 (1965). This order, enforced by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) requires federal contractors and subcontractors to monitor the utilization of members of target groups within their workforces. Covered employers are required to track the extent to which their workforces mirror the composition of the relevant pools of potential employees. When the employers' workforces fall short (for example, if the number of African-American engineers in the organization is smaller than the number of qualified African-American engineers in the labor force) the employer is required to draw up plans for rectifying the imbalance. The OFCCP requires contractors to engage in documented good faith efforts to meet their targets (see Crosby & Cordova, 1996 for a more detailed discussion).

One of the most divisive practices associated with affirmative action programs is the use of quotas. The issue of quotas may be traced to the 1971 Griggs v. Duke Power Company case, which introduced the use of statistical analyses into the investigation of employment discrimination[4]. Based on the Griggs standard, employers were prohibited from engaging in neutral appearing business practices, if those practices "operate[d] to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices (Griggs v. Duke Power, 1971)." The Griggs standard is quantified in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (EEOC, 1978). These guidelines introduced the four-

[4] Although this was not the primary contribution of the *Griggs* case, the case did focus attention on statistical analyses in that it shifted focus to evidence of discrimination in the absence of discriminatory intent.

fifths rule, requiring that the selection ratio of protected groups be at least 80% of that of the demographic group with the largest selection ratio.

Unfortunately, one of the most expedient ways for organizations to satisfy the Griggs standard is to impose strict numerical quotas, and to use preferential treatment practices to fulfill these quotas (Crosby and Cordova, 1996). Following the Griggs case, and in anticipation of the proliferation of quotas, the U.S. Supreme Court developed standards, requiring plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases to provide more compelling a priori evidence of discrimination. In effect, the court required the identification of specific unlawful business practices, rather than just the disparate statistical evidence which may have resulted from these practices (Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 1988). This standard was later codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which implicitly outlawed the use of quotas. Other government documents echo the unacceptability of quotas. The U.S. Department of Labor for example, has expressly stated that "affirmative action is not preferential treatment. It does not mean that unqualified persons should be hired or promoted over other people. What affirmative action does mean is that positive steps must be taken to ensure equal opportunity for traditionally disadvantaged groups (U.S. Department of Labor, 1995, p.1, underlining in original).

Except under the most extreme conditions, Supreme Court decisions have forbidden strong preferential treatment (hiring unqualified women and minorities rather than qualified men and non-minorities) and strict quotas (Bennett-Alexander, 1990). It is permissible, however, for organizations to assign some unspecified weight to gender or race when making employment decisions (Guttman, 1993).

In addition to the legal prohibitions against quotas, public opinion suggests that they are the least appealing identity-conscious employment mechanism. The popular disapproval is compounded by the fact that quotas, of necessity, require organizations to engage in preferential treatment of some individuals, based on their group membership. A 1995 Gallup Poll indicates that these practices are disapproved of by a majority of Americans (63% oppose quotas; 84% oppose preferential treatment; Roberts, 1995).

Another way in which affirmative action has been operationalized in the American workplace is through various forms of pre-employment test score adjustment. Typical among these techniques are race-norming (more broadly referred to as within-group norming) and banding. Within-group norming is a practice in which employment test scores are converted from raw or overall percentile scores to percentile scores based on applicants' sub-group membership (Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Commonly these scores are then reported as percentile scores without any mention of this adjustment. Thus, job candidates with very different raw test scores, may receive similar reported percentile scores, if they are members of different sub-groups (usually, different races). A similar approach to within-group norming is simply to use different cutoff scores for different groups, or to add bonus points to the scores of members of a group (a technique which is often used to give preferences to veterans, Sackett & Wilk, 1994). It should be noted that these forms of score adjustment were explicitly outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Section 106).

Banding is a conceptually distinct form of score adjustment in which individuals within a specific score range or band are regarded as having equivalent scores (Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Band width may be arbitrarily selected, or may be based on the properties

of the test (a band may be equal to the standard error of the test, or a multiple thereof, depending on the desired significance level). In the context of affirmative action, banding may be used to equate individuals' test scores before factoring group membership, and/or other factors into the employment decision. A hybrid score adjustment approach is the sliding band, in which the bandwidth remains constant, but it's upper boundary is continually adjusted downward (Cascio, Outtz, Zedeck, & Goldstein, 1991). After individuals have been selected from the top band, the band is moved downward to allow for more lower scoring individuals (usually minority group members) to be compared with higher scoring individuals. This approach has been severely criticized for violating the assumptions of banding (that is, that scores falling within the same band are equivalent to one another; see Sackett & Wilk, 1994; Schmidt, 1991). In many cases, depending on the performance of a specific sample, banding and sliding band approaches may produce outcomes equivalent to those produced by the less sophisticated means of score adjustment described above. However, banding approaches appear to be more acceptable to the judicial system considering the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Sackett & Wilk, 1994). In general, score adjustments appear to be more acceptable in the context of more aggressive court ordered affirmative action plans in which group preferences are legally acceptable.

It is ironic that some of the more expedient and easily developed practices (quotas, preferential treatment, and score adjustments described above) are both illegal, and generally unacceptable. However, there are affirmative action efforts which, although less directly tied to results, are intended to bring about equality of opportunity. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, for example advises employers to engage in

"special efforts in outreach, recruitment, training, and other areas [to] help members of protected groups compete for jobs and promotions on equal footing with other applicants and employees (OFCCP, 1979; p. 7)."

Based on recent Supreme Court rulings, the U.S. government appears to have shifted back toward a more judicious use of race as a factor in employment-related decision making. Two cases serve as landmarks: In City of Richmond v. Croson (1989) the court required that the city government employ a standard of strict scrutiny in incorporating race into decisions on awarding contracts. Specifically, it required the City to demonstrate a direct causal link between the paucity of ethnic minority construction contractors, and previous policies of racial discrimination. Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) resulted in similar outcomes, applied to the Federal government.

Although both of these cases apply to government contracting, which is distinct from the focus of the current study, they nevertheless have served as *de facto* precedents for the manner in which the use of race will be acceptable in contemporary employment-related organizational decision-making.

The preceding discussion serves as an overview of the practice of affirmative action. However, the focus of this study is on deeper, psychological issues associated with affirmative action. Subsequent sections reflect this emphasis.

Attitudes toward affirmative action

As stated in the introduction section, the current study was primarily motivated by an interest in alleviating the unintended, negative, behavioral consequences associated with affirmative action. However, it was necessary to begin with the conceptual precursor to these behavioral consequences, that is, the attitudinal responses to

affirmative action. It is clear from a variety of writings, both popular and scholarly, that Americans, especially White Americans, tend to have negative reactions to, and attitudes toward affirmative action (Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989; Kluegel & Smith, 1983). Individuals respond negatively to these programs, largely because they view them as being "unfair" (Chang, 1996; Opotow, 1996). A number of social science scholars have asserted that these fairness judgments are rooted in underlying personal predispositions such as aversive racism (Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989); economic self-interest, racial affect, and stratification beliefs (Kluegel & Smith, 1983).

One of the more extensive models examining attitudes toward affirmative action was developed by David Kravitz (1995). His model focuses on attitudes toward specific affirmative action programs, which are attributed to both structural and individual difference factors. Structural factors include the judged fairness of the programs, ratings of threat to personal interest, and collective self interest (the potential harm the programs may cause to members of one's group). Each of these factors is hypothesized to be affected by the weighting assigned to group membership in the affirmative action program. Kravitz's individual difference factors included racism, self-interest in general, and belief in the dominant ideology, a notion that everyone has the opportunity to succeed and that thus, failure is a result of individual shortcomings (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). According to the model, attitudes toward specific affirmative action programs are moderated by attitudes toward affirmative action in general.

Stout and Buffum (1993) operationalize attitudes toward affirmative action in terms of support for, or commitment to affirmative action principles. Their study of Texas social workers found that commitment to affirmative action was predicted by

positive and negative experiences with it. Contrary to Kravitz & Platania (1993) they found no relationship between knowledge of affirmative action and commitment to it.

A few studies have examined the malleability of affirmative action attitudes. Bell (1996) used positive, negative, and neutral information about affirmative action programs to attempt to change subjects' attitudes toward them. The effects were in the hypothesized direction only for White subjects. Interestingly, negative information either strengthened or had no effect on the already positive attitudes of Asians, Hispanics, and African-Americans.

As introduced earlier, Taylor-Carter, Doverspike and Alexander (1995) employed a similar approach, providing subjects with pro- and anti-affirmative action messages, and assessing the impact of these messages on the perceived fairness of affirmative action programs (described specifically as preferential treatment). Subjects reported their attitudes toward weak preferential treatment programs, were exposed to the message, recorded their thoughts about the message, predicted the importance of affirmative action for their lives, and rated the fairness of the program. Message polarity influenced the number of positive thoughts in the predicted direction, but did not affect the number of negative thoughts. Fairness ratings were related, as hypothesized, to initial attitude, message polarity, number of positive thoughts, and number of negative thoughts. This indicates that the perceived fairness of preferential treatment can be affected by pro- or anti- affirmative action messages. One might expect this effect to also apply to other forms of affirmative action, and similar initiatives.

As introduced earlier, affirmative action may also lead to negative characterizations of those who are perceived to have benefited from them. Minorities

may be judged to be less competent if the organization has an affirmative action program (Garcia, Erskine, Hawn & Casmay, 1981); women leaders are responded to more negatively, when subordinates believe that leader selection is sex-based rather than merit-based (Jacobson & Koch, 1977).

A study by Dietz-Uhler & Murrell (1993) suggests that attitudes toward affirmative action moderate the relationships between other organizational factors, and individuals' attitudes toward their female colleagues who may have benefited from affirmative action. This finding is also relevant to the thrust of the current study. As indicated previously, the current study focuses on attitudes toward affirmative action, with the underlying assumption that these attitudes will predict other outcomes. The rest of this analysis examines ways of achieving just such attitude change.

Alleviating negative attitudes -- using alternative ethical frameworks

Anecdotal evidence indicates that one of the reasons for the widespread opposition to affirmative action programs is that they are considered to be unethical or immoral (Madkins, 1989). One of the aims of this study is to take this assertion beyond mere opinion, and to analyze affirmative action in the light of established research on ethics and morality.

For well over a thousand years, philosophers and other scholars have investigated issues of morality and ethics. Ethics refers to "inquiry into the nature and grounds of morality where the term morality is taken to mean the moral judgments, standards, and rules of conduct (Taylor, 1975, p.1)." By extension, ethical behavior refers to "that which is shown to be objectively morally correct (permissible, obligatory, or desirable) action and that it is 'ethical' precisely because it is the behavior which is required by the theory

(Bommer, et al., 1987, p. 267)." Note that although the terms "ethics" and "morality" are often used interchangeably, there is a technical distinction between the two: Morals and morality refer to conduct itself, whereas ethics refers to the study of this behavior (Tsalikis & Fritzsche, 1989).

The substantial body of research on ethics has resulted in a number of competing theories or frameworks which individuals and societies are said to use in making judgments concerning right and wrong. For most acts, there are no universal standards for judging their inherent rightness or wrongness. Rather, different individuals will arrive at different ethical conclusions, depending on the analytical perspectives they use. Additionally, individuals are capable of applying varying ethical frameworks to different situations (i.e., there is within-person variation in predominant ethical framework). One of the key propositions of this study is that individuals will react differently to affirmative action based on their judgments of the morality of the policy. In turn, this moral judgment will be contingent on the dominant ethical frameworks-in-use that guide their judgments. The study further investigates the possibility of impacting individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action by altering the ethical frameworks through which they examine these programs.

Several of the more influential ethical frameworks are described below. These frameworks or theories may be separated into two broad classifications -- teleological and deontological ethical frameworks (DeGeorge, 1982; 1990; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; McDonald & Pak, 1996).

Teleological ethical frameworks

Teleology or consequentialism is an ethical approach that focuses on the outcomes

or ends associated with an act or decision. Based on this framework, whether an action is ethical or unethical depends on the final consequences of that action. In the management context, teleological approaches consider consequences from the perspectives of a variety of organizational stakeholders (Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Three teleological ethical frameworks are included in this study -- self-interest, utilitarianism, and light of day.

Self-interest or egoism is an ethical framework which indicates that actions are moral to the extent that they promote one's long term self-interest, or personal satisfaction. Wood, Longenecker, McKinney, & Moore (1988) describe it as a lower level of moral reasoning which focuses on the furtherance of one's own interest with little regard for higher level, more abstract moral principles. Individuals guided by this framework would only be expected to help others in situations where they derive a net benefit from such help. Paradoxically, this framework would not advise pure selfishness, as this may prove detrimental to one's self in the longer term (Sorrell & Hendry, 1994). Note that this discussion refers to ethical egoism which dictates that individuals should do what is in their personal best interest. It is distinct from psychological egoism, or simple self-interest, which suggests that individuals are motivated by self-interest (Blackburn, 1994).

Placing this ethical framework within the focus of the present study, one would expect that self-interest would lead non-beneficiaries of affirmative action (predominantly White males) to react negatively to these programs. However, there may be a small proportion of individuals who view these programs from a broader, societal perspective and thus see them as being indirectly self-beneficial. These individuals would be expected to react less negatively.

It is even more difficult to predict the reactions of the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action based on the self-interest ethical perspective. Although a simplistic analysis of affirmative action would assume that they would react positively, many members of the affirmative action target groups see affirmative action as being, ultimately, counterproductive to them (Becker, 1995; Chacko, 1992; Gleckman et al, 1991; Heilman, 1994), and as such would react negatively. The self-interest perspective makes salient a larger issue in predicting reactions to affirmative action (introduced in the Key Definitions section of chapter 1). Individuals' reactions to affirmative action will be contingent on both their status as intended beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries of the programs and their assessments of the long-term consequences of the programs (their perceptions of whether or not they benefit from the programs).

> Hypothesis 1: Individuals' scores on the self-interest ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action among individuals who consider themselves to be beneficiaries of these programs.

Note should be taken that this hypotheses appears to be quite obvious if one looks at self interest from a motivational perspective rather than an ethical perspective. The latter serves as a normative standard, judging the rightness or fairness of an action based on it's potential to benefit oneself. Past research has tended to assume that members of affirmative action target groups are directed by self-interest to be supportive of affirmative action (Ozawa, Crosby, & Crosby, 1996; Tougas, Crosby, Joly, & Peichat, 1995). However, the results of these studies have led to inconsistent conclusions regarding self-interest (Veilleux & Tougas, 1989). One concern is that many of these studies have operationalized self-interest in terms of immediate individual gain. However, self interest may be much more broadly conceptualized. Self interest may also

be used to evaluate the treatment of various groups with which one identifies. A further complication is introduced in contexts in which individuals respond altruistically, showing concern for the members of other groups. In such situations, simple self-interest serves as a very inappropriate predictor of reactions to affirmative action (Veilleux & Tougas, 1989).

The current study examines self-interest as an ethical framework rather than a simple motivational concept. This analytical perspective is supported by studies which indicate that individuals' expected personal consequences are poor predictors of their attitudes toward social policies (Kinder & Rhodebeck, 1982; Sears & Allen, 1984). Self-interest, particularly in the context of attitudes toward affirmative action, may be a more complex phenomenon than meets the eye. Dietz-Uhler and Murrell (1993), attempted to analyze this connection more thoroughly, by operationalizing self-interest in terms of the extent to which an affirmative action policy had the potential to disrupt one's own institution. Although they did not find significant results for this evaluation, their work provides further impetus for the current assessment of self interest (from an ethical perspective).

Utilitarianism is the premiere theory within the broader set of teleological or consequentialist ethical approaches. It involves the balancing of good and bad in such a way that ethical acts are those which maximize net good, or maximize utility. Utilitarianism advises decision makers to act so as to produce the greatest ratio of net good over bad for everyone affected by the decision (McDonald & Pak, 1996). It also requires decision makers to assess the impact of their decisions on all concerned parties. Utilitarianism is often expressed in terms of "the greatest good for the greatest number of

people."

Although utilitarianism dominates the ethical training and reasoning of Western business persons (Fritzsche, 1984; McDonald & Pak, 1996; Peachment, McNeil, Soutar, & Molster, 1995), it possesses a number of shortcomings. One that is particularly relevant to this discussion is that although utilitarianism maximizes net benefit, it does not consider the more specific distribution of costs and benefits. As such, an act which is moral based on utilitarianism may be extremely harmful to a relatively small number of individuals (Takala & Uusitalo, 1995). Analyzing affirmative action, it is again difficult to predict the utilitarian judgment because the overall consequences (costs and benefits) of affirmative action are difficult to assess, and are the subject of considerable dispute.

In general, utilitarianism is expected to produce negative reactions to affirmative action. In spite of the actual numbers of persons with the potential to be affected by affirmative action, there is some perception that affirmative action is targeted toward a relatively small number of individuals. Thus, it is likely that utilitarian judgments will compare the benefits accruing to this group, to the potential adverse consequences for the larger, non-beneficiary group, and conclude that on the whole, affirmative action is of more harm than good. Of course, since the relative level of harm versus good attributed to affirmative action, and the potential number of persons affected are open to speculation, a variety of individual differences are likely to influence these results. Analyses of these finer distinctions are reserved for future study. Overall:

> Hypothesis 2: Individuals' scores on the utilitarianism ethical perspective will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action.

The final teleological framework is known as the light of day principle. This is a

very practical approach to ethics in which the primary consideration of the decision-maker is the consequences associated with a public revelation of the act. Based on this approach, acts/decisions are unethical if they would be embarrassing to the decision maker if reported to the public, including the decision maker's family, friends, and associates. Once again, the reactions of individuals who are led by the light of day ethical framework are hard to predict. Since this framework is primarily concerned with the reactions of others, the evaluation of the morality of affirmative action for persons guided by the light of day framework will be contingent on their assessments of the societal evaluation of affirmative action.

> Hypothesis 3: Scores on the light of day ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action among individuals who believe that society in general, views affirmative action positively.

It might appear that individuals would respond uniformly in their assessments of the societal view of affirmative action, in that affirmative action is designed to provide help and support for those in need. In fact, some writers have assumed that our social climate, which opposes discrimination and racism, will lead to support for affirmative action, at least at the level of individuals' public expressions (Veilleux & Tougas, 1989). However, this assumption may not hold true in contemporary America, in light of the heated, ongoing public debate on affirmative action.

Deontological Ethical Frameworks

Deontology (or nonconsequentialism) refers to a collection of ethical theories which dictate that some actions are moral, or right, in and of themselves, independent of their consequences. These theories result in a collection of rights and obligations which are based on humanity, general use, and societal consensus. Included in these are

obligations to help others, to remedy injustice, and to promote human welfare.

Four deontological ethical frameworks are applied in this study -- categorical imperative, duty, neutralization, and religious conviction. The categorical imperative based on the work of Immanuel Kant, is comprised of a number of rules or forms, two of which predominate. The universal rule is based on the question of whether the decision maker would be willing to have his/her decision reversed or universalized. For a decision to be ethical, the decision maker would have to be willing to have others reciprocate his/her decisions, or for the decision rule to become universal law.

The means-end rule is concerned with whether individuals are being treated as "ends" in themselves (respected and possessing inherent rights) or as "means" to achieve some other objective (McDonald & Pak, 1996).

The categorical imperative results in absolute pronouncements on what individuals should do, regardless of the consequences. It is contrasted with the hypothetical imperative which results in if-then statements. In other words, the pronouncements of the hypothetical imperative only apply to persons who are interested in certain ends. Those of the categorical imperative apply to all persons (Blackburn, 1994).

Individuals guided by the categorical imperative will be expected to react positively to affirmative action. Affirmative action is designed to help individuals who have, in one way or another, been harmed or disadvantaged. In spite of the evidence suggesting that it has been less than successful, affirmative action's goals are benevolent and consistent with the categorical imperative. Thus:

Hypothesis 4: Individuals' scores on the categorical imperative ethical

perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

The deontological theory of duty asserts that some actions are inherently right or moral because of the duty that one possesses. Duty may result from obligations such as promises made, or from relationships, such as that between parent and child (Honderich, 1995). Duty has even been broadly interpreted by some philosophers as an obligation owed to all human beings by virtue of their humanness (Blackburn, 1994). It becomes obvious that these notions are somewhat vague and encompass a broad range of possible responsibilities. In the more specific organizational context, managers' possess a set of generic roles which carry with them a number of duties (Mintzberg, 1973). Based on the duty perspective, fulfilling the requirements of these roles constitutes ethical behavior (McDonald & Pak, 1996).

In the context of this study, duty will be related to positive attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that have either an explicit policy, or set of norms favoring affirmative action and related efforts (such as management of diversity). I however, do not expect duty to be related to negative attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that are not supportive of affirmative action (I do not expect organization members to develop an obligation to oppose affirmative action).

> Hypothesis 5: Individuals' scores on the duty ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that are supportive of affirmative action and similar policies.

Neutralization, more formally referred to as "the techniques of neutralization" is a relatively new and under-investigated ethical approach (McDonald & Pak, 1996). Vitell and Grove (1987) describe this ethical framework as "a learned vocabulary of motives for misconduct, used to protect one from self-blame (p. 434)." Individuals learn to call upon

a set of subconscious, unverbalized values as a means of diminishing their personal culpability for socially disapproved acts. These values are learned and socially reinforced counters to more accepted and proclaimed normative moral standards.

As the formal name implies Neutralization is comprised of multiple techniques, including denial of responsibility; denial of injury; denial of victim; condemning the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

According to this theory, unethical activities are legitimated by an abandonment of previously held ethical convictions. Ethical norms are, after all, seen as "qualified guides for action (Sykes & Matza, 1957:666)" rather than imperatives. Individuals in these cases feel that the norms they are violating do not, or should not apply to particular times, places, persons, or social circumstances (McDonald & Pak, 1996; Sykes & Matza, 1957; Vitell & Grove, 1987).

Once again, I expect that because affirmative action was designed to consider the needs of historically oppressed/deprived individuals, most individuals will consider these initiatives as generally good or right things to do. Thus, I expect that neutralization will lead individuals to abandon their concerns for others and as such, react negatively to "helping" programs. However, as with the duty perspective, I do not expect this effect to be reversed in organizations that are not supportive of affirmative action.

> Hypothesis 6: Individuals' scores on the neutralization ethical perspective will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that are supportive of affirmative action and similar policies.

Religious or philosophical conviction leads decision makers to refer to their religious beliefs or the dictates of their faith for direction on ethical questions. Since most religious/philosophical systems advocate kindness toward others, selflessness, and

giving, I expect that the religious conviction ethical perspective will be related to positive attitudes toward affirmative action[5].

> Hypothesis 7: Individuals' scores on the religious/philosophical conviction ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

It will be possible to investigate the preceding hypotheses using correlational analyses of the pre- and post-test data. However, the focus of the study is on the use of theory-based manipulations to change individuals' attitudinal reactions to affirmative action. In the ethics manipulation, individuals will be exposed to alternative ethical frameworks (independently of the affirmative action context) and their reactions to affirmative action/affirmative action programs will again be assessed (see chapter 3 for a detailed description of the experimental methods).

Because of the complexity of the ethics theories outlined above, and to keep the experiment practicable, the ethics manipulation will be simplified to focus on the two general forms of ethics frameworks. The manipulations, which will take the form of a video-taped training program, will attempt to influence individuals to move from consequentialist to non-consequentialist perspectives. Based on an overall analysis of hypotheses 1 through 7, it is expected that:

> Hypothesis 8: Individuals' scores on consequentialist (teleological) ethical perspectives will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action.

Similarly,

> Hypothesis 9a: Individuals' scores on non-consequentialist (deontological)

[5] Although there is vocal opposition to affirmative action from groups associated with religion (the "Religious Right," and "Moral Majority") I do not see these largely political perspectives as equivalent to, or even correlated with the religious conviction ethical framework. This conservative religious/political position represents a fraction of those who are led by deeply held religious or philosophical convictions.

ethical perspectives will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

Additionally,

Hypothesis 9b: Making non-consequentialist (deontological) ethical perspectives more salient to individuals will lead them to adopt more positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

Alleviating negative attitudes -- The role of justice and fairness norms

The previous section describes an anticipated direct effect of ethical frameworks on attitudes toward affirmative action. In addition to this direct effect, it is likely that justice or fairness norms may play a mediating effect in the relationship between ethics and attitudes toward affirmative action. Although some authors have described fairness and ethics as equivalent constructs (Schminke, Ambrose, & Noel, 1997), I see them as related but distinct. Fairness may be viewed as a particular form of ethics, focusing on right and wrong in the context of social exchange. Nonetheless, the two constructs, and by extension the disciplines of organizational justice and business ethics are closely related, though most often studied in isolation from one another. The study by Schminke and colleagues is one of the first to examine the relationship between them (Schminke, et al, 1997). The current section provides an overview of the well established literature on organizational justice, focusing on the justice frameworks with the potential to influence individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action.

Research on justice and fairness indicates that there are multiple perspectives with which individuals appraise situations, in order to make a decision as to whether those situations are fair or just[6]. Issues of fairness and justice arise of necessity within social

[6] For the purpose of this discussion, "fair" and "just" are considered synonymous.

exchange processes and the social interactions within organizations are no exceptions. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that fairness is one of the considerations used by individuals to evaluate affirmative action (Heilman & Herlihy, 1984; Tougas, et al., 1995).

In the organizational context, issues of fairness and justice, and their resultant behavioral and performance consequences make up the organizational justice domain (a term coined by Greenberg, 1987). For the purposes of this study, I will not attempt a comprehensive review of this literature but will discuss seminal works, especially those that pertain to the issue of affirmative action (for comprehensive reviews of the organizational justice literature, see Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1990a).

Distributive justice

The literature on organizational justice has its genesis in the study of equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). According to equity theory, individuals intuitively arrive at a ratio of the outputs, or benefits they derive from the organization (such as pay, benefits, social status, positive affect) to the inputs they put into the organization (effort, ability, qualifications, experience). They then compare this ratio to their perceptions of what this ratio is for other (referent) organization members. If the ratios are unequal, the person with the higher ratio is said to be overpaid and is expected to feel guilty, whereas the person with the lower ratio is considered underpaid and expected to feel angry.

These affective reactions are consistent with the predictions of cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance theory asserts that persons in such situations whose experiences do not match their expectations, experience dissonance. This is

accompanied by feelings of tension, proportional to the magnitude of the perceived gap or inequity. The tension motivates individuals to act to eliminate or reduce the inequity. Again, the motivation to act is proportional to the degree of perceived inequity. Drawing on cognitive dissonance theory, Adams (1965) advanced a number of specific means for reducing this inequity.In general, individuals may act to alter their perceptions of the relative value of the inputs or outputs of themselves or their comparison others (Adams, 1965; Greenberg, 1984). This may be accomplished using either psychological adjustments such as devaluing the outcomes received by themselves or another individual, or by behavioral changes such as leaving work early, or stealing from the organization (Greenberg, 1990a; Greenberg, 1990b). In situations where individuals' perceived input-output ratios are equal to those of their comparison others, a certain equilibrium exists and the parties consider the situation to be fair or equitable.

The postulations of equity theory have been quite thoroughly tested empirically, and a number of revisions have been made to the early conceptualizations of the theory. However, the theory has held up quite well under this scrutiny and is today "a well accepted midrange theory of organizational behavior (Weick, 1966:439)."

Equity theory focuses in part, on fairness or justice judgments based on the outcomes individuals receive as a part of their organizational experience. This focus on outcomes is the basis for research in distributive justice (Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976). Although the original concept of distributive justice (Homans, 1961) predates equity theory, equity theory is one of the first theories to apply these ideas in the organizational context (which is the focus for the remainder of this discussion).

An important facet of the issue of distributive justice is that individuals do not

evaluate the fairness of their work outcomes in isolation, but compare their outcomes to those of others in the organization. Thus, one's absolute organizational outcomes may not contain much information in terms of fairness or justice until they are compared to the outcomes obtained by referent others. Indeed, empirical studies demonstrate that considerable variance in individuals' satisfaction with their work outcomes is influenced by these comparisons, over and above the variance explained by the actual magnitude of the outcomes (Sweeney, McFarlin, & Inderrieden, 1990). Research also indicates that the referents that individuals use in making distributive justice comparisons are not stable, but may change under certain conditions (Stepina & Perrewe, 1991). Similarly, distributive justice assessments are influenced by national culture and changes in that culture (Chen, 1995).

The importance of distributive justice has been supported by several empirical studies. For example, some researchers have shown that it can have a robust effect on a variety of important behaviors in organizations including job performance, and withdrawal behavior such as turnover and absenteeism. For example, Greenberg (1990b) found a connection between distributive justice and employee theft rates. He found that employees in two plants where across-the-board pay cuts were introduced, stole more than demographically similar employees in another plant where there were no pay cuts.

Although equity is a very prevalent distributive justice norm, it is not the only one. Equity theory and the discussion above, assume that individuals are basing their justice considerations on a concern for allocating rewards to individuals in proportion to their inputs. This assumes an equity or merit-based norm of distributive justice, also referred to as a contributions rule (Leventhal, 1980). Decision makers use different allocation

norms based on the instrumental value of these allocation rules. In other words, different distributive justice norms are expected to produce different responses from affected individuals (Leventhal, 1976).

The equity norm described above is used to foster high levels of task performance (Leventhal, 1976). By reinforcing beneficial inputs, the decision maker is expecting individuals to contribute increasing amounts of such inputs to the organization. An alternative distributive justice norm is equality, in which all participants receive the same outcomes, regardless of their individual performance levels. This norm is used to minimize dissatisfaction and reduce the incidence of disruptive, antagonistic behavior on the part of those who might be dissatisfied under an equity allocation rule (Leventhal, 1976).

A third, relatively common distributive justice norm (or allocation rule) is that of need. This is a norm in which outcomes or rewards are distributed to those who have the greatest need for them. This distributive justice norm emphasizes a concern for social responsibility and mutual responsiveness. It is particularly prevalent in situations where the allocator feels a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the individuals affected by his or her decisions. Like the equality norm, use of the need norm may also have the effect of reducing antagonism and conflict, and thus maintaining harmony. The need norm may also have the practical benefit of reducing waste by allocating resources only to those who are most likely to use them (Leventhal, 1976). The difference between these norms of distributive justice takes on special significance in the analysis of individuals' responses to organizational initiatives such as affirmative action. Although all three norms are legitimate and lead to "fair" allocation decisions (Leventhal, 1976), one would

expect individuals to react quite differently to such an initiative depending on which norm they employ to analyze the policy. This concern is discussed in greater detail below.

Procedural justice

In addition to the evaluation of the fairness of outcome distribution, individuals also assess the degree to which the processes through which social exchanges occur (the processes used to determine the outcomes) are fair. This assessment is described as a concern for procedural justice (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Procedural justice issues include such specific concerns as the degree of participation or voice exercised in the decision process (Deutsch, 1975; Hirschman, 1970), and the perceived fairness of the rules, procedures, and values that guided the process (Folger, 1977). In turn, the perceived fairness of procedures is determined by resource distributions that are consistent across persons and over time, free from bias, based on accurate information, correctable, representative of all recipients' concerns, and based on prevailing moral and ethical standards (Leventhal, 1976, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980). Subsequently, a number of scholars (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987) have specifically applied this concept to the organizational context (for a review, see Greenberg, 1990a).

The effects of procedural justice in affecting fairness judgments are postulated to stem from two possible models. The self-interest, or instrumental model (Tyler, 1987) suggests that individuals seek control over processes with the assumption that they can influence the outcomes. Alternatively, the group value, or relational model suggests that people attach value to the opportunity to express their beliefs, even when those beliefs do

not necessarily influence the decision outcomes (Lind, 1995; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). According to this model, people value long-term relationships with groups and often see group membership as a source of self-esteem and social status. This leads them to value procedures that promote group solidarity.

A number of empirical studies have supported these standards for assessing procedural justice. Specifically testing the group value model, Tyler (1989) found that a large proportion of variance in individuals' procedural justice assessments (specifically, assessments of the Chicago legal authorities) was determined by non-outcome related factors. He found that perceptions of neutrality of treatment, trust in the authorities, and indicators of social standing (such as respectful treatment) explained more variance than the perception of perceived control over the process. In other words, "pure" procedural considerations outweighed those procedural concerns that were tied to outcomes. Similar support for such an emphasis on procedures has been obtained by other researchers both in the lab (Cropanzano & Randall, 1995) and in the field (Conlon, 1993).

Other empirical studies have demonstrated that justice concerns have robust effects on a variety of organizational outcomes. For example, procedurally fair treatment has been shown to make individuals more accepting of smoking bans (Greenberg, 1994), and less likely to steal from their employers in the event of a pay cut (Greenberg, 1990b). Impressions of procedural fairness have also been shown to make employees more accepting of strategic organizational changes (Novelli, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 1995), and behavioral reactions to a workplace drug screening program (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991). Similarly, procedurally just explanations of workforce diversity programs have

been shown to improve the assumptions program beneficiaries make about the attitudes of their co-workers toward them (Richard, Fubara & Castillo, 2000).

Procedural fairness may also influence the way in which individuals develop overall attributions of their organizations. Such considerations may influence their loyalty to the organization, and their willingness to exert effort on its behalf (Tyler & Lind, 1992). However, this is a very complex relationship -- two other studies by Brockner and colleagues (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992, Studies 1 and 2) suggest that relational concerns are contingent on previously held commitments to the organization. Individuals who are more committed to the organization are more likely to become upset over procedural violations. Thus, the effect of procedural justice on other organizational outcomes is moderated by individuals' commitment to the organization. This notion has been supported empirically (Brockner, et al., 1992).

A distinct attribute of procedural justice research is research on the social aspects of procedural justice. This domain, also referred to as interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) examines individuals' reactions to the interpersonal treatment they receive from decision makers (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). This form of procedural justice is further subdivided into concerns of social sensitivity -- the extent to which people believe they have been treated with dignity and respect; and informational justification -- the extent to which people believe they have adequate information about the procedures affecting them (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1993; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Since interactional justice considerations are not directly relevant to this work, they will not be discussed in any further detail (for a more detailed discussion, see Bies & Moag, 1986; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1993; Tyler & Bies, 1990).

One of the contemporary concerns of organizational justice researchers is the relationship between distributive and procedural justice, particularly in terms of their distinct effects on various organizational outcomes. One approach (the two factor model) postulates that procedural justice concerns are expected to primarily affect satisfaction with organizational systems, whereas distributive concerns affect organizational outputs (Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993; Tyler & Lind, 1992).

An alternative model (known as the interaction model) proposes that there is an interactive relationship between the two, in which procedural justice has a stronger effect on work related attitudes when outcomes are low than when they are high. Conversely, this same perspective suggests that outcomes are more strongly related to work attitudes when procedures are unfair (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997).

Organizational justice and affirmative action

As introduced earlier, justice is an important concern in analyzing various issues surrounding affirmative action, particularly, individual reactions to affirmative action and affirmative action programs. According to Ozawa and colleagues "some people's reaction to affirmative action may be based on their understanding of how the programs support or violate aspects of distributive and procedural justice" (Ozawa, Crosby, & Crosby, 1996, p. 1140). Similarly, Kravitz (1995) discovered that the effect of an affirmative action program manipulation was completely mediated by judgments of fairness. In other words, although some individuals are opposed to affirmative action based on political, racist, or simple self-interest motives, there may also be an influence of genuine justice concerns.

Apparently, the primary justice norm used in analyses of affirmative action is equity (Nacoste, 1990) which reflects an emphasis on outcomes (distributive justice). Equity theory analyses lead to negative attitudes toward affirmative action, in that sex, ethnicity, and other non job-related variables are used as inputs in the equity formula, in affirmative action situations. Both beneficiaries and observers of affirmative action devalue these inputs in their equity comparisons. As a result, they develop feelings of inequity (Nacoste, 1990; Stout & Buffum, 1993). On the contrary, one might expect that equality or need norms of distributive justice would lead to more accepting attitudes.

Nacoste (1990) identifies three reasons why equity theory may be inappropriate for analyzing affirmative action. First, non-performance criteria are often used in equity comparisons, but the theory does not provide any *a priori* specification as to when they are acceptable. Secondly, equity theory does not account for the weight assigned to non-performance related factors which varies quite significantly from one policy to another. Third, equity theory, being a static model of motivation, focuses only on the final outcome distributions, with no consideration of the dynamic processes used to arrive at these outcomes.

The conflict between equity and non-equity norms is discussed in the context of affirmative action by Weining Chang (1996). She argues that although equality is a central concern of the American collective consciousness, public efforts to promote equality have encountered opposition. The nation's need for equality has come into conflict with its equally dominant need for equity or meritocracy, which Chang (1996) describes as "the favored principle for the distribution of wealth and resources (p.94)." In the context of affirmative action, individuals resolve this conflict by evaluating the

overall perceived fairness of the policy. This evaluation is influenced by subjective individual differences in the weights assigned to equality and equity. Again, in the specific context of affirmative action, the overall fairness judgment is influenced by the extent to which affirmative action serves to highlight group differences, and individuals' perceptions of the scarcity of organizational resources. Individuals who view organizational resources as fixed in capacity will tend to see affirmative action as a zero-sum game, leading them to oppose the policy.

Veilleux and Tougas (1989) interpret the equity-equality conflict in terms of support for two different kinds of organizational programs. Equity concerns lead to opposition to programs which involve any form of preferential treatment. On the other hand, equality concerns lead to support for equal employment opportunity and equal employment opportunity programs.

Susan Opotow (1996) also frames reactions to affirmative action in terms of justice concerns. She discusses both distributive and procedural justice issues as pivotal questions in the affirmative action debate. One distributive justice issue involves which groups of individuals fall into one's justice framework. There are established boundaries for determining whom one considers in one's justice comparisons, and thus, for determining which individuals deserve to be treated justly. For example, groups that are considered beneficial; groups whose conflict with the focal individuals' groups are seen as not being severe; and groups of persons considered to be similar to the members of the focal group (under conditions of low conflict) are generally included in one's scope of justice. One of the ironic effects of affirmative action is to bring different groups into closer proximity. Under these conditions, the conflict between groups is likely to be seen

as more severe and the affirmative action beneficiaries are then excluded from the focal individuals' scope of justice.

In addition to the concern for which individuals are allowed into one's scope of justice, there is an additional question of whether the means for accommodating those who have been included are fair. In Opotow's model of procedural justice, there are thus, two hurdles in judging the fairness of affirmative action.

At least theoretically, the one thing that all affirmative action programs and policies have in common is that they give some positive weight to membership in the target group so as to increase opportunities for members of these groups. This positive weight may be applied at various points in the employment process, from recruitment to selection and promotion. The issue of greatest contention is how much weight is, or should be, ascribed to group membership (Nacoste, 1990). In procedural justice terms, this is a question of voice. As introduced in the general discussion of procedural justice (above), voice refers to the degree of participation individuals are able to exercise in the decision process (Deutsch, 1975; Hirschman, 1970).

Another analysis of the role of procedural justice in affirmative action decision making was conducted by Nacoste (1994). He expands upon his earlier work (Nacoste, 1990) which established that procedures used to enact affirmative action have significant effects on the reactions of individuals to the policy. Over the course of a number of studies, he has investigated in some detail, the mechanisms, through which procedural concerns impact individuals' reactions to affirmative action. Nacoste's analyses are discussed briefly below.

In one of these studies, Nacoste (1993) developed the theory of procedural

interdependence. This theory focuses on the effect of affirmative action procedures on the patterns of triadic interdependence between organizational interest groups. The three focal groups are generally the agency enacting the policy, the target group members, and the non-target group members. Individuals tend to prefer procedures which serve to preserve existing intergroup relationships and encourage continued interaction among the groups (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). High voice procedures, which, as discussed earlier, are seen as more procedurally just, are considered to be more effective in preserving the pattern of procedural interdependence (Tyler, 1990).

Nacoste (1994) describes affirmative action programs as providing individuals with varying levels of voice, depending on the degree to which group membership is considered in the decision process. Technical credentials are seen as high-voice inputs into the decision making process because individuals have a relatively significant degree of control over them. On the other hand, group membership is generally beyond the control of the individual. As such, organizational decisions which take group membership into consideration reduce voice and thus, reduce conceptions of procedural justice.

Nacoste also asserts that individuals' reactions to affirmative action stem from a more complex analysis of three different factors: The first involves a comparison of the (real or perceived) policy to one which gives too much weight to group membership. The second is a comparison between the policy and the set of better alternatives that the observer considers to be realistically available. The third analysis assesses the extent to which the overall effect of the policy places target group members at an advantage, on par, or at a disadvantage, compared to non-target group members (Nacoste, 1994).

Bobocel and Farrell (1996) conducted two experiments assessing White men's reactions to the explanations (accounts) given for promoting a woman over an equally qualified man. The experiments specifically assessed the role of the adequacy and fairness of the accounts on subjects' ratings of interactional fairness. The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that providing a clear, ideologically based account (a social and moral argument for parity) for the preferential treatment was seen as considerably fairer and more adequate than one which abdicated responsibility for the decision. This account was also seen as fairer than, but equally adequate as no justification at all.

Experiment 2 was designed to assess one of the weaknesses of the first study, the lack of distinction in the ideological account between the responsibility for the decision, and the justification or reason for the decision. In the responsibility manipulation, subjects were provided with scenarios in which the decision maker either assumed or denied responsibility for the decision. The justification manipulation provided either a redressing-discrimination justification, an increasing-diversity justification, or no justification at all. The findings revealed that justification rather than responsibility influenced subjects' judgments of interactional fairness, regardless of the particular justification used. Additionally, the effect of justification was completely mediated by the perceived adequacy of the justifications.

Rosen & Mericle (1979) found that weak and strong affirmative action statements were equally effective in counteracting sex bias in selection decisions. They conducted an experiment in which subjects played the role of hiring managers in an organization with an affirmative action policy. Although the weak and strong policies were equally effective in counteracting sex bias, comparatively lower starting salaries were

recommended for females in the strong preferential treatment condition. This outcome was explained in the context of reactance theory, that is, the subjects (hiring managers) were exercising their authority over these candidates as a reaction to the lack of authority imposed by the strong preferential treatment policy.

Matheson, Echenberg, Taylor, Rivers and Chow (1994) took a unique approach in examining (Canadian) women's reactions to sex-based affirmative action. They examined the effect of the level of perceived discrimination in the organization on women's attitudes toward a range of programs. The levels of discrimination varied in terms of the extent to which women were disadvantaged (mistreated) by the organization. The affirmative action programs varied in the extent to which women were advantaged (preferentially treated) by the organization. Contrary to the hypotheses, women's support for affirmative action programs was solely contingent on the nature of the program. They expressed no support for any form of preferential treatment, regardless of the organization's prior history of discrimination (Study 1). This finding was replicated in a second study (Matheson, et al., 1994, Study 2) even when the subjects were limited to women who expressed a personal value for social equality. A third study (Matheson, et al., 1994, Study 3) indicated that women who were more personally threatened by discrimination were more likely to endorse preferential treatment. Interestingly, their support for various forms of action did not differ with the strength of the remedy.

In an experimental study designed to assess the reactions of non-beneficiaries of affirmative action programs, Heilman, McCullough, and Gilbert (1996) studied the reactions of a group of males to a leadership task in which females were selected to serve as leaders. Their study examined reactions to the task itself, reactions to the female

leaders, and the participants' willingness to engage in additional pro-social behavior. The study's results indicated that the procedural aspects of an affirmative action policy were irrelevant to non-target group members (in terms of their task-related reactions) as long as they received their deserved outcomes. Non-target group members who believed they had been treated in accord with their qualifications reacted similarly whether a merit-based or preferential treatment selection process were used. However, in cases where the non-target group members believed that they deserved the positions under consideration, procedural manipulations had a significant impact on their task-related reactions. Interestingly, a similar reaction was observed in cases where the bypassed non-target group members were unaware of their relative qualifications. Their responses were equivalent to those of persons with superior qualifications.

Additionally, it was found that the preferential treatment manipulation uniformly reduced participants' willingness to engage in pro-social behavior. This result persisted, regardless of how the participants perceived their task-related ability. This finding suggests that although individuals overall justice perceptions are affected by both distributive and procedural concerns, that these dimensions may have differential impacts on the core and peripheral work domains.

The presence of mitigating justifications for preferential selection had a very limited impact on participants' reactions. The presence or absence of an explanation only affected participants work-related reactions' in situations where they understood that they were equally qualified with the preferentially selected target-group members. The final category of reactions investigated in this study was reactions to the selected target group member herself. Interestingly, neither distributive nor procedural justice manipulations

affected the likeability ratings of the female leader. In each case, she was seen as highly likable.

Both observers and members of the target groups may question their qualifications and performance (Nacoste, 1989). Nacoste refers to this devaluing of the performance of individuals perceived to be affirmative action beneficiaries as stigma (Nacoste, 1990). Individuals who view affirmative action (operationalized as preferential treatment) as an unfair policy, and who see themselves as possible affirmative action beneficiaries also tend to reduce their assessments of their own performance. Those who view affirmative action as fair also reduce their assessment of their own performance if they feel that they may have been selected on the basis of affirmative action. However, this effect is much less severe (and not statistically significant) for those who consider affirmative action to be fair (Nacoste, 1989). Interestingly, the individuals in this study who evaluated themselves the most negatively were also the highest performers on the experimental task. Nacoste's work (1989; 1990) places an emphasis on the fact that affirmative action is not inherently stigmatizing but that important procedural concerns influence the extent to which beneficiaries are stigmatized. From an applied perspective, it is thus vitally important for managers to structure programs in such a way that they appear to be procedurally fair and that they make the nature of these initiatives widely known throughout the organization.

The common theme of the aforementioned studies is that justice concerns are of pivotal importance in influencing individuals' reactions to affirmative action. Both distributive and procedural justice concerns have been shown to have a robust effect. Most of these studies though, have focused on specific affirmative action programs and

the differential reactions resulting from hard and soft preferential treatment. Unlike these studies, the current study focuses on the different reactions to affirmative action associated with different individual justice frameworks as opposed to different forms of affirmative action program. In fact, rather than present differing affirmative action programs to subjects, they will be presented simply with the concept of affirmative action and allowed to enact their own schema for what the policy entails.

Three justice frameworks are examined in terms of their relationship to attitudes toward affirmative action. The first two, equity and non-equity are both distributive justice concerns. Note that rather than contrast equity with equality, the comparison is broadened: the non-equity norm would include norms of need (described above) and other less common distributive justice norms (such as reciprocity). The third justice concern is procedural justice. In the model of attitudes toward affirmative action presented below, these justice norms serve as possible intervening variables between individuals' ethical frameworks and their attitudes toward affirmative action.

The relatively gross comparison of equity versus non-equity for examining distributive justice is primarily adopted for the sake of simplicity and practicality. In addition to the practical research advantages of this approach, it is also reasonable in that equity is such a dominant perspective in American society. Contrasting the effects of equity and non-equity will thus provide useful information. Formally:

> Hypothesis 10: Individuals' scores on equity (versus non-equity) norms of distributive justice will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action.

Some scholars have also suggested that affirmative action would be more palatable if organization members (including affirmative action beneficiaries) focused on

procedural rather than distributive justice concerns (Nacoste, 1990). The pivotal procedural justice issue involved in individuals' reactions to affirmative action appears to be the extent to which group membership is factored into organizational decision making. For example, it has been shown that affirmative action programs that include an emphasis on merit (a procedural concern) are perceived as more acceptable (Kravitz & Platania, 1994; Tougas, et al., 1995). Similarly, Veilleux & Tougas (1989) found that affirmative action programs involving preferential treatment, elicited more negative responses than those involving helping strategies (a more passive, equal opportunity approach), even when the programs had the same goals.

Other procedural justice related manipulations have been shown to positively impact individuals' reactions to affirmative action and similar programs (Richard, Fubara & Castillo, 2000).

Opposition to affirmative action may be reduced by minimizing threats to the self interest of organization members, and by ensuring that they do not violate norms of procedural fairness. Kravitz (1995) emphasizes structuring programs in such a way that they satisfy these conditions. I am approaching the same issue from a slightly different direction: in many cases, managers have little leeway in restructuring organizational programs (because of legal restrictions, cost, or organizational inertia). Similarly, organization members may respond to the very existence of affirmative action, rather than specific initiatives. In such cases organizational decision makers may be able to alleviate negative responses by addressing the fairness norms used by organization members in responding to affirmative action.

Procedural justice research has demonstrated that an emphasis on procedural

justice can ease the negative feelings associated with personal hardship (Folger & Bies, 1989; Greenberg, 1990c). In other words, even though individuals may see themselves as having been disadvantaged by an organizational initiative, their negative reactions may be alleviated if they focus on the procedural, rather than distributive aspects of the initiative. In the case of affirmative action:

> Hypothesis 11: Individuals' scores on procedural (versus distributive) justice will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

As introduced earlier, organizational justice concerns serve as possible mediating variables in my model of attitudes toward affirmative action (below). The work of Schminke and colleagues (Schminke et al., 1997) is foundational in establishing this relationship.

Schminke at al (1997) use simplified taxonomies for examining both justice frameworks and normative ethics frameworks and then postulate an integrated model. Their model of justice contrasts distributive and procedural justice, while their model of ethics compares formalism to utilitarianism. These terms are used synonymously with deontology (nonconsequentialism) and teleology (consequentialism) respectively, as described earlier in this chapter (see also Brady, 1990). Although these two theoretical traditions are usually studied in isolation from one another, they both exhibit similar emphases on process versus outcome. Individuals' ethical predispositions focus them on process or outcome aspects of situations, making them more attentive to one or the other in organizational interactions. Experimental analysis supported the proposed relationship: ethical frameworks served as lenses through which individuals evaluated organizational decisions and influenced how they reacted to those decisions. Individuals

who were higher on utilitarianism (consequentialism) were more sensitive to distributive justice concerns (outcomes). Those who were higher on formalism (nonconsequentialism) were more sensitive to procedural justice concerns. The authors encourage further investigation of the effect of individual ethical predispositions on reactions to various organizational events.

Summary and Conceptual Model

This chapter has provided a review of the more significant research on affirmative action, and affirmative action programs, primarily their psychological aspects. It also included a brief overview of relevant historical and legal issues associated with the practice. Based on additional research findings from the ethics and organizational justice disciplines, a number of avenues have been suggested for analyzing and altering individuals' attitudinal reactions to affirmative action, and affirmative action programs. These have been summarized into a number of formal, testable hypotheses (see Table 1). The associated experimental manipulations are not only of academic interest, but also hold practical, real-world implications for alleviating the many adverse reactions to/consequences of affirmative action. Below, a model is presented, linking the various theoretical constructs outlined above. The next chapter describes means of testing these hypotheses using both within- and between- person approaches.

Table 1 - Summary of Hypotheses

1	Individuals' scores on the self-interest ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action among individuals who consider themselves to be beneficiaries of these programs.
2	Individuals' scores on the utilitarianism ethical perspective will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action.
3	Scores on the light of day ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action among individuals who believe that society in general, views affirmative action positively.
4	Individuals' scores on the categorical imperative ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action
5	Individuals' scores on the duty ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that are supportive of affirmative action and similar policies
6	Individuals' scores on the neutralization ethical perspective will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action in organizations that are supportive of affirmative action and similar policies
7	Individuals' scores on the religious/philosophical conviction ethical perspective will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action
8	Individuals' scores on consequentialist (teleological) ethical perspectives will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action
9a	Individuals' scores on non-consequentialist (deontological) ethical perspectives will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action
9b	Making non-consequentialist (deontological) ethical perspectives more salient to individuals will lead them to adopt more positive attitudes toward affirmative action
10	Individuals' scores on equity (versus non-equity) norms of distributive justice will relate to negative attitudes toward affirmative action
11	Individuals' scores on procedural (versus distributive) justice will relate to positive attitudes toward affirmative action



Figure 1: Model of Attitudes toward Affirmative Action

Chapter 2

METHOD

Sample

Study participants were upper level undergraduate students from a large midwestern university. The students were enrolled in a business policy course and participated in the experiment in order to obtain course credit.

Of approximately 600 subjects who began participation in the study, 523 completed the requirements. The sample was approximately 53% male. It was 63% White, 4% Black, 4% Asian, 1.6% Asian-American, 0.7% Hispanic, and 2.8% of the subjects classified themselves as "Other." The remaining 23.9% of the sample did not indicate their race/ethnicity.

Power Analysis

As stated earlier, the variables under study in this analysis represent deep-seated values that are not easily manipulable. Thus I expected that the effect sizes would be limited. Cohen and colleagues (Cohen, 1977; Cohen & Cohen, 1983), provide guidance for estimating statistical power. Their conventions for small and medium effect sizes are $r = .10$ and $r = .30$ respectively. Conventional alpha levels and power levels are .05 and .80 respectively. Together, these conventions suggest a required sample size (n*) of 200 to 783. My sample size fell into this range.

Study design

The basic study design was a 2 x 2 pretest-posttest experimental design with control (Solomon 4-group, Kerlinger, 1986; Solomon, 1949) design. As indicated earlier, both within- and between-person effects were investigated. Subjects were randomly

assigned to one of four conditions. Depending on condition they were presented with a pretest, "trained" in ethical nonconsequentialism, and tested again (see table 2 and figures 2 & 3). The tests and the training manipulation are described in greater detail below. They are included in their entirety in Appendixes B and D respectively.

The Solomon 4-group design is unique in that it accounts for possible priming effects by the pretest, and for other extraneous influences that might impact the results. This is accomplished by the addition of two additional "control" groups to the traditional two-group design. One of these groups received the training without the pretest; the other received only the posttest (see figure 2 and table 2).

	TRAINING	**NO TRAINING**
PRETEST	CONDITION 1	CONDITION 2
NO PRETEST	CONDITION 3	CONDITION 4

Figure 2 - Study Design

Table 2 - Study Conditions

CONDITION 1	Pretest	Nonconsequentialism training	Post Test
CONDITION 2	Pretest		Post Test
CONDITION 3		Nonconsequentialism training	Post Test
CONDITION 4			Post Test

Pretest

The pretest was a questionnaire assessing subjects': attitudes toward affirmative action as a concept, and toward specific affirmative action programs; perceptions of whether affirmative action is a net benefit or detriment to them personally; the attitudinal and behavioral responses that they might exhibit, or have exhibited, as a result of being a beneficiary of an affirmative action program; and attitudinal and behavioral responses directed toward colleagues who (at least in the respondents' perception) may have benefited from an affirmative action program. The instrument also assessed subjects' perspectives on general societal perceptions of affirmative action, and of their employing organizations' support for such efforts; subjects' ethical frameworks-in-use (independent of the affirmative action context); and their organizational justice models-in-use (also independent of the affirmative action context).

Finally, relevant subject demographic (sex, race, ethnicity, and age) and personality data (collectivism) were collected. The pretest measures are described in more detail below. Complete pre-test measures are included in Appendix B. Additional details about the reliability and validity of these scales are also located in Appendix C.

Attitudes toward affirmative action

The subjects' attitudes toward affirmative action were assessed using a modified version of the paper and pencil measure developed by Kravitz (1995). This is a 6-item test with a 5-point, Likert type response scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). In previous studies, this scale has demonstrated an internal consistency reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of .80 - .86 (Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz & Platania, 1993).

Attitudinal and behavioral outcomes associated with affirmative action

This portion of the pretest asked subjects to think about affirmative action in terms of actual persons with whom they have worked, who may have been beneficiaries of affirmative action. This instrument is modeled after Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992, Study 2. The subjects were asked to respond to items assessing their attitudes (assessments of their competence, the extent to which they deserve their position, interpersonal attraction), and behavior (collaborating, helping, general social interaction) toward such person(s). Subjects who did not have any relevant work experience were requested to complete this portion of the study in reference to a group member from a class project, or a hypothetical co-worker. Note that subjects should not have difficulty identifying such reference persons: when an organization has an affirmative action policy, both members and non-members of the target groups tend to assume that target group members benefited, at least to some extent from the affirmative action policy (Garcia et al, 1981; Heilman & Herlihy, 1984; Nacoste, 1989; 1990).

An additional section of this questionnaire was addressed to those who felt that they may have been beneficiaries of affirmative action programs. They were asked about attitudes and behaviors that may be associated with being a part of these programs (feelings of incompetence, withdrawal from difficult tasks, effects on social interaction). These responses were chosen because they reflect the unintended consequences of affirmative action described and demonstrated in previous research (Heilman, 1994; Kravitz, et al., 1996).

Ethical frameworks

The ethical frameworks pretest was modeled after the two-part questionnaire

developed by McDonald and Pak (1996). Subjects were presented with 15 scenarios derived from organizational/business situations in which the subjects were placed in a position of having made decisions involving ethical considerations. For each scenario, subjects were required to rate the degree to which they agreed with the decision using a 5-point, Likert type scale. The second portion of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the extent to which different considerations (representing different ethical frameworks or theories) guided them in their decision making on the scenarios. The questions in this second portion of the ethics questionnaire represent a direct query approach to assessing subjects' ethical frameworks. As discussed in chapter 2, the study focused on 3 teleological (self-interest, utilitarianism, light of day) and 4 deontological (categorical imperative, duty, neutralization, religious conviction) ethical frameworks.

McDonald and Pak (1996) also incorporated a policy-capturing component to their analysis of subjects' ethical frameworks. They conducted a regression analysis comparing the subjects' espoused ethical frameworks, to a subset of responses to the scenarios presented earlier.[7] The regression analysis revealed differences between the subjects' espoused ethical frameworks, and their actual frameworks-in-use. A similar approach was used in the current study.

Additional data on subjects' ethical frameworks were collected using the character trait version of the Measure of Ethical Viewpoints (MEV) developed by Brady and Wheeler (1996). This instrument assesses respondents' predispositions toward utilitarianism (consequentialism) and formalism (nonconsequentialism). Respondents

[7]The subset of scenario responses was identified using an exploratory factor analysis of the subjects' responses to the first portion of the questionnaire. One of the more robust factors from the scenario questions was a factor labeled "deceptive practices" comprising items such as deceptive gaining of

rate the importance of various character traits (1 = not important to me, 7 = very important to me). The scale has demonstrated reliability (Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Schminke et al., 1997) of .85 - .86 (utilitarianism), and .75 (formalism).

Justice frameworks

A multifaceted approach was taken in assessing subjects' justice norms. In traditional empirical justice research, subjects are queried about various aspects of actual organizational situations. Subjects' perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness are then compared with other organizational variables, such as organizational commitment (Folger & Konovsky, 1989 is one example). These approaches are inappropriate for the current study in that they confound individual differences in preferences for, or sensitivity to justice norms with the components, or perceived components of the actual situation.

The first approach for assessing individuals' justice norms is an individual differences approach, a measure of *equity sensitivity*. The equity sensitivity construct suggests that individuals react differently to perceived equity or inequity because they have differing preferences for (are differentially sensitive to) equity (Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1985; 1987). Based on this construct, individuals' preferences range on a continuum from *Benevolents* to *Entitleds*. Benevolents are those who prefer for their outcome/input ratios to be less than those of their comparison others. Entitleds prefer that their outcome/input ratios be greater than those of their comparison others. *Equity Sensitives* are in the middle, opting for the traditional norm of an outcome/input ratio that is equal to those of their comparison others.

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competitor information, insider trading, and international bribery.

Given that equity sensitivity is an assessment of individuals' preferences for equity, it follows that subjects' equity sensitivity score may serve as a measure of the degree to which equity serves as their dominant justice norm. Thus one of the measures used in this study to assess subjects' justice norms was the Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI; Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1985). This instrument has been shown to reliably measure equity sensitivity (Cronbach's alpha = .79 - .88), and to be empirically distinct from other, related constructs (King & Miles, 1994).

In addition to this individual differences approach to assessing subjects' justice norms, they were also assessed using direct queries and policy capturing. In the policy capturing approach, subjects were asked to review, and respond to scenarios in which they have the option of focusing on norms of equity, non-equity distributive justice, and/or procedural justice concerns.

Training Manipulations

The experimental manipulation took the form of a training program, in which subjects were trained in the use of the nonconsequentialist ethical framework. The training was conducted within the context of various organizational problem scenarios, unrelated to affirmative action. The training was conducted using a videotaped presentation of alternative ethical frameworks augmented by printed handouts. It included opportunities for subjects to apply the various ethical frameworks to find solutions to realistic (identity-blind) organizational problems.

The training was administered to subjects either individually or in groups, based on scheduling convenience. Subjects worked alone regardless of the training setting. The experimenter gave all subjects time to complete the practice and application requirements

of the training. An outline and complete script of the training is included in Appendix D.

Kavathatzopoulos (1993) demonstrated that this kind of scenario-based training within a realistic organizational context can effectively induce a shift in subjects' ethical problem solving approaches. In addition, the scenario-based approach was demonstrated to be more effective than more traditional approaches employing lectures on ethical principles. In the Kavathatzopoulos (1993) study subjects' were induced to adopt an autonomous moral function, a pattern of moral reasoning very similar to consequentialist ethics.

This approach is also supported by studies based on the seminal work of Kohlberg and his colleagues (such as Kohlberg, 1969; 1977). These studies (Goldman & Arbuthnot, 1979 is one example) have shown that it is possible to use scenario-based training to move individuals to higher stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg's work is based on the notion that individuals progress through stages of moral development that parallel their intellectual development. Individuals move from simple to more complex patterns of moral reasoning as they progress from one stage, to the next. At simpler and more child-like levels, individuals use simple reasoning patterns focusing for example, on self-interest or the consequences of their actions as indicators of morality. At more advanced stages, moral reasoning becomes more complex and moral decisions are informed by more abstract concepts such as individual rights and universal moral principles. Note that these stages bear some resemblance to consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical frameworks respectively. It follows then that a similar scenario-based approach is appropriate for the training manipulation used in the present study.



Figure 3 - Basic Experimental Design

Data Analysis

All of the data analyses for this study were conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Hypotheses 1 through 9a were investigated using analyses of both pre- and post-test data. Between-person effects were assessed using pre- and post-test data as separate samples. For both data sets, attitudes toward affirmative action served as the primary dependent variable. A variety of regressions were conducted assessing the main effects of subjects' (espoused and demonstrated) ethical frameworks (see Table 5). For hypothesis 1 subjects' assessments of whether or not they expect to benefit from affirmative action served as moderator. For hypotheses 3 subjects' assessments of society's perspective on affirmative action served as moderator. For hypotheses 5 and 6 subjects' assessments of their organizations' support of affirmative action served as moderator.

Hypothesis 9b is the primary experimental hypothesis. The effect of the experiment was assessed using regression. Subjects' attitudes toward affirmative action again, served as dependent variable. This within-person analysis will address attitudes before and after the manipulation.

The analyses of hypotheses 10 and 11 took on a similar form as those for hypotheses 2 and 4.

Table 3 - Variable List

1	dpscale	Deceptive practices
2	doscale	Disadvantaging others
3	sescale	Sexual equity
4	siscale	Self interest
5	nscale	Neutralization
6	dtyscale	Duty
7	jscale	Justice
8	rcscale	Religious conviction
9	ldscale	Light of day
10	uscale	Utilitarianism
11	ciscale	Categorical imperative
12	conscale	Consequentialism
13	nonscale	Nonconsequentialism
14	attscale	Attitude toward affirmative action
15	famscale	Familiarity with affirmative action
16	orgscale	Employer's support of affirmative action/ Importance of affirmative action to my organization
17	impscale	Perceived potential impact of affirmative action on my job
18	benscale	Likelihood that I will benefit from affirmative action
19	hrmscale	Likelihood that I will be harmed by affirmative action
20	dstscale	Concern for distributive justice
21	proscale	Concern for procedural justice
22	eqlscale	Concern for equality
23	neescale	Concern for need
24	eqscale	Concern for equity
25	colscale	Collectivism
26	rolscale	Role of affirmative action in selection of coworker
27	pcscale	Perceived competence of affirmative action coworker
28	rl2scale	Role of affirmative action in my career
29	pc2scale	Perceived competence – myself
30	blkscale	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans

Chapter 3

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The means, standard deviations, range of scores and number of respondents are shown in Table 4. A total of 30 variables were measured. Table 4a provides descriptive statistics for the pretest, and Table 4b for the posttest. Neither set of data presents any unusual findings. The total sample size for the pretest was 272, and for the posttest it was 523. In addition, a complete correlation matrix is shown in Table 5. Table 5a shows zero-order intercorrelations for the pretest data, Table 5b for the posttest data. The effect of the pretest was assessed using a dummy coded variable added to the posttest data. However, due to the nature of the hypotheses and the lack of an observable priming effect from the pretest, no further analyses were conducted on the pretest data. The analyses and results discussed below were all conducted on the posttest data.

Internal consistency reliabilities (coefficient alphas) are shown in Table 6. Of the thirty variables that were measured 11 displayed internal consistency reliabilities of .70 or greater (alpha = .70 - .96). Another eight had reliabilities ranging from .50 - .69. Six of the variables were one-item scales so no reliabilities could be computed. The remaining five had internal consistency estimates ranging from .28 to .49.

Factor Analysis of Dependent Variables

In order to further assess the internal consistency of the primary dependent variables (those assessing subjects' attitude toward affirmative action) factor analyses were conducted (see Table 7). Using orthogonal rotation and a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0, four factors emerged among the items that were designed to assess these variables.

Items were assigned to the factors where they displayed the highest loading, with a minimum factor loading of .30. Seven of the eight items designed to measure Attitude toward Affirmative Action loaded on the same factor. All five of the items designed to measure Perceived Competence loaded on the same factor. Five of the six items designed to measure Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African-Americans loaded on the same factor. See Table 7 for further details.

Based on the factor analysis, two new Attitude scales were developed. The Attitude items that did not load as expected were removed from the Attitude toward Affirmative Action and Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African Americans scales. Their internal consistency reliabilities and correlations with other variables were assessed and compared with those of the original variables. The results were not meaningfully different, so no further analyses were conducted using these variables. See Table 6 and Table 9b for additional details.

Table 4a - Pretest Descriptives

		M	SD	Minimum	Maximum	N
(1)	Deceptive practices	3.21	.61	1.50	4.83	272
(2)	Disadvantaging others	2.31	.66	1.00	4.67	272
(3)	Sexual equality	1.90	.98	1.00	5.00	272
(4)	Self interest ethical framework	3.26	.67	1.00	5.50	270
(5)	Neutralization	2.60	.73	1.00	4.75	270
(6)	Duty ethical framework	3.55	.76	1.00	5.00	270
(7)	Justice ethical framework	3.85	.69	1.00	5.00	270
(8)	Religious conviction	2.65	1.05	1.00	5.00	270
(9)	Light of day	2.76	.90	1.00	5.00	270
(10)	Utilitarianism	3.37	.66	1.00	5.00	270
(11)	Categorical imperative	3.89	.78	1.00	5.00	270
(12)	Consequentialism	5.55	.91	1.50	7.00	272
(13)	Nonconsequentialism	5.68	.92	1.70	7.10	272
(14)	Attitude toward affirmative action	4.13	1.27	1.13	6.75	271
(15)	Familiarity with affirmative action	5.25	1.30	1.00	7.00	269
(16)	Subject's organization's support for affirmative action	3.32	.96	1.00	5.00	265
(17)	Potential impact of affirmative action on subject's career	4.80	1.57	1.00	8.00	271
(18)	Likelihood that subject will benefit from affirmative action	2.89	1.82	1.00	7.00	271
(19)	Likelihood that subject will be harmed by affirmative action	4.07	1.63	1.00	7.00	271
(20)	Concern for distributive justice	2.86	.85	1.00	4.50	271
(21)	Concern for procedural justice	3.01	.82	1.00	5.50	272
(22)	Equality-based distributive justice standard	2.73	.90	1.00	5.00	272
(23)	Need-based distributive justice standard	2.62	.75	1.00	4.67	272
(24)	Equity-based distributive justice standard	4.08	.58	1.25	5.25	272
(25)	Collectivism	3.27	.44	1.73	4.73	272
(26)	Role of affirmative action in co-worker's career	3.32	1.84	1.00	7.00	195
(27)	Perceived competence of co-worker	5.13	1.27	1.00	7.00	193

Table 4a - Pretest Descriptives (cont'd).

(28)	Role of affirmative action in my career	2.04	1.59	1.00	7.00	271
(29)	Perceived competence of self	5.98	.94	2.20	7.00	272
(30)	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans	3.44	.88	.00	5.00	271

Table 4b - Posttest Descriptives

		M	SD	Minimum	Maximum	N
(1)	Deceptive practices	3.10	.67	1.00	4.83	523
(2)	Disadvantaging others	2.32	.65	1.00	4.67	523
(3)	Sexual equality	1.93	.96	1.00	5.00	522
(4)	Self interest ethical framework	3.21	.67	1.00	4.75	521
(5)	Neutralization	2.65	.75	1.00	4.50	520
(6)	Duty ethical framework	3.50	.72	1.25	5.00	521
(7)	Justice ethical framework	3.83	.63	1.50	5.00	522
(8)	Religious conviction	2.69	.99	1.00	5.00	521
(9)	Light of day	2.86	.81	1.00	5.00	522
(10)	Utilitarianism	3.31	.66	1.00	5.00	522
(11)	Categorical imperative	3.89	.72	1.50	5.25	521
(12)	Consequentialism	5.36	1.11	1.00	7.00	522
(13)	Nonconsequentialism	5.51	1.18	1.00	7.00	522
(14)	Attitude toward affirmative action	4.13	1.23	1.00	6.88	522
(15)	Familiarity with affirmative action	5.04	1.36	1.00	7.00	521
(16)	Subject's organization's support for affirmative action	3.27	.91	1.00	5.00	512
(17)	Potential impact of affirmative action on subject's career	4.62	1.69	1.00	7.00	520
(18)	Likelihood that subject will benefit from affirmative action	3.08	1.82	1.00	7.00	519
(19)	Likelihood that subject will be harmed by affirmative action	4.00	1.53	1.00	7.00	511
(20)	Concern for distributive justice	3.00	.85	1.00	5.00	519
(21)	Concern for procedural justice	3.00	.82	1.00	5.00	522
(22)	Equality-based distributive justice standard	2.77	.81	1.00	4.75	522
(23)	Need-based distributive justice standard	2.68	.74	1.00	5.00	522
(24)	Equity-based distributive justice standard	3.98	.67	1.50	5.50	522
(25)	Collectivism	3.23	.42	1.73	4.55	522
(26)	Role of affirmative action in co-worker's career	3.53	1.79	1.00	7.00	373
(27)	Perceived competence of co-worker	5.02	1.25	1.00	7.00	371

Table 4b - Posttest Descriptives (cont'd).

(28)	Role of affirmative action in my career	2.19	1.66	1.00	7.00	517
(29)	Perceived competence of self	5.89	.93	1.60	7.00	517
(30)	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans	3.45	.85	1.00	5.00	516

Table 5a - Pretest Correlations

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1)	dpscale									
(2)	doscale	.30*								
(3)	sescale	.27*	.40*							
(4)	siscale	.30*	.14*	.19*						
(5)	nscale	.36*	.44*	.46*	.38*					
(6)	dtyscale	.19*	-.03	-.01	.42*	.16*				
(7)	jscale	-.17*	-.18*	-.28*	.31*	-.12t	.35*			
(8)	rcscale	-.21*	.02	.11t	.00	.03	-.13*	.15*		
(9)	ldscale	.01	.30*	.13*	.25*	.25*	-.00	.06	.28*	
(10)	uscale	.19	.07	.14*	.47*	.33*	.45*	.45*	.03	.14*
(11)	ciscale	-.26*	-.24*	-.19*	.15*	-.17*	.27*	.66*	.29*	.13*
(12)	conscale	-.09	-.09	-.06	.14*	-.08	.18*	.18*	.10t	-.02
(13)	nonscale	-.25*	-.20*	-.23*	.03	-.22*	.11t	.32*	.15*	-.01
(14)	attscale	-.16*	-.02	-.25*	-.09	-.10	-.02	.13*	.17*	.02
(15)	famscale	-.05	-.11t	-.01	.00	-.07	-.02	.06	-.00	.02
(16)	orgscale	-.15*	-.07	-.18*	-.04	-.19*	-.03	.16*	.02	.00
(17)	impscale	.00	-.03	.06	.01	.05	.04	-.02	-.03	.08
(18)	benscale	-.15*	-.01	-.11t	-.01	-.06	-.05	.04	.17*	.09
(19)	hrmscale	.10t	.09	.25*	.10t	.21*	.07	-.09	-.12t	.02
(20)	dstscale	.05	.28	.26*	.20*	.30*	.11t	.04	.09	.08
(21)	proscale	-.11t	-.04	.03	.09	.01	.04	.14*	.12t	.09
(22)	eqlscale	-.16*	.14*	-.03	.06	.12*	.07	.09	.10t	.15*
(23)	neescale	.09	.29*	.26*	.17*	.28*	.13*	-.01	.23*	.15*
(24)	eqscale	.07	-.06	-.01	.15*	.01	.21*	.27*	-.06	-.02
(25)	colscale	-.04	-.15*	-.16*	-.03	-.12*	.11t	.16*	.09	-.00
(26)	rolscale	-.10	.09	.10	-.05	.13t	.01	.01	-.10	.02
(27)	pcscale	.12	-.15*	-.16*	-.01	-.14t	-.05	.04	.11	-.01
(28)	rl2scale	-.05	.21*	.18*	.04	.20*	-.04	-.10	.19*	.08
(29)	pc2scale	-.12*	-.29*	-.25*	.05	-.22*	.09	.19*	.01	-.01
(30)	blkscale	-.20*	-.13*	-.39*	-.20*	-.25*	-.06	.17*	.16*	-.09

N = 272. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5a, (cont'd). - Pretest Correlations

		(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
(10)	uscale									
(11)	ciscale	.29*								
(12)	conscale	.17*	.16*							
(13)	nonscale	.15*	.35*	.81*						
(14)	attscale	-.08	.06	.16*	.21*					
(15)	famscale	.02	.06	.11t	.10t	-.10				
(16)	orgscale	-.03	.10	.10	.17*	.25*	.20*			
(17)	impscale	.06	-.06	.07	-.00	-.01	.05	.09		
(18)	benscale	-.06	-.01	.12*	.12*	.44*	-.14*	.11t	.28*	
(19)	hrmscale	.16*	-.08	-.01	-.07	-.37*	.14*	-.08	.34*	-.35*
(20)	dstscale	.20*	.06	.06	-.06	-.08	-.00	-.08	-.04	-.05
(21)	proscale	.08	.24*	.07	.09	.00	-.04	.00	.07	.03
(22)	eqlscale	.10	.14*	-.07	-.02	.20*	-.03	-.03	-.03	.14*
(23)	neescale	.12*	.03	-.08	-.12t	-.01	-.03	-16*	-.03	.04
(24)	eqscale	.24*	.18*	.16*	.12t	.02	.05	.16*	-.02	-.14*
(25)	colscale	.05	.20*	.06	.13*	.12t	.02	.11t	.02	.01
(26)	rolscale	.11	-.00	-.02	-.05	-.09	-.00	.10	.08	.02
(27)	pcscale	-.10	.07	.06	.06	.12t	.01	.03	-.13t	.06
(28)	rl2scale	.02	-.07	-.07	-.12*	.12*	-.13*	.02	.12t	.33*
(29)	pc2scale	-.00	.24*	.18*	.18*	-.04	.20*	.13*	.02	.00
(30)	blkscale	-.12*	.13*	.19*	.27*	.74*	-.01	.27*	-.02	.38*

N = 272. ^{t} $p < .10$; * $p < .05$.

Table 5a, (cont'd). - Pretest Correlations

		(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
(19)	hrmscale									
(20)	dstscale	.12t								
(21)	proscale	.08	.08							
(22)	eqlscale	-.11t	.10	.19*						
(23)	neescale	.03	.25*	.16*	.29*					
(24)	eqscale	.04	.09	.05	-.09	-.06				
(25)	colscale	-.02	-.05	.01	-.02	-.07	.10			
(26)	rolscale	.12t	.14t	.06	-.04	-.05	-.12t	-.15*		
(27)	pcscale	-.22*	-.10	-.03	.05	.09	.01	.13t	-.54*	
(28)	rl2scale	-.11t	.13*	.02	.08	.17*	-.11t	-.07	.24*	.01
(29)	pc2scale	-.03	-.07	-.00	-.09	-.17*	.16*	.09	-.13t	.19*
(30)	blkscale	-.37*	-.08	.01	.14*	-.03	.08	.15*	-.14t	.19*

N = 272. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5a, (cont'd). - Pretest Correlations

		(28)	(29)	(30)
(28)	rl2scale			
(29)	pc2scale	-.25*		
(30)	blkscale	.12t	.03	

N = 272. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5b - Posttest Correlations

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1)	dpscale									
(2)	doscale	.37*								
(3)	sescale	.27*	.49*							
(4)	siscale	.42*	.31*	.25*						
(5)	nscale	.43*	.47*	.41*	.47*					
(6)	dtyscale	.23*	.01	.03	.44*	.13*				
(7)	jscale	-.15*	-.40*	-.37*	.02	-.25*	.26*			
(8)	rcscale	-.25*	-.09*	-.02	-.14*	-.13*	-.08t	.14*		
(9)	ldscale	.01	-.07t	.07t	.24*	.13*	.06	.03	.21*	
(10)	uscale	.29*	.09*	.10*	.40*	.29*	.39*	.22*	-.05	.15*
(11)	ciscale	-.13*	-.37*	-.27*	-.01	-.25*	.18*	.60*	.30*	.15*
(12)	conscale	.08t	-.06	-.04	.17*	.04	.31*	.24*	.04	-.01
(13)	nonscale	-.05	-.22*	-.20*	.02	-.15*	.23*	.40*	.14*	-.06
(14)	attscale	-.17*	-07t	-.22*	-.06	-.09*	.02	.12*	.19*	.06
(15)	famscale	.03	-.15*	-.03	.00	-.05	-.04	.10*	.02	-.06
(16)	orgscale	-.14*	-.18*	-.13*	-.11*	-.19*	-.04	.15*	-.00	-.04
(17)	impscale	.02	-.03	-.02	.10*	.10*	.11*	.05	.07t	.13*
(18)	benscale	-.10*	.08t	-.05	-.01	.01	-.06	-.06	.11*	.10*
(19)	hrmscale	.12*	.02	.12*	.09*	.12*	.14*	-.02	-.01	.09t
(20)	dstscale	.20*	.22*	.20*	.24*	.29*	.06	-.16*	-.06	.03
(21)	proscale	-.00	.04	.12*	.04	-.05	-.03	-.03	.13*	.05
(22)	eqlscale	-.08t	.11*	-.02	-.01	.07	-.02	-.04	.14*	.04
(23)	neescale	.11*	.21*	.19*	.12*	.27*	-.04	-.16*	.09*	.07t
(24)	eqscale	.06	-.24*	-.15*	.11*	-.10*	.18*	.33*	-.01	-.09*
(25)	colscale	.06	-.17*	-.21*	-.09*	-.14*	.11*	.18*	.01	-.11*
(26)	rolscale	.01	.14*	.14*	.06	.17*	-.06	-.12*	.05	.06
(27)	pcscale	-.08	-.20*	-.26*	-.10t	-.17*	.03	.16*	-.01	-.11*
(28)	rl2scale	-.07	.19*	.17*	.02	.15*	-.13*	-.20*	.13*	.08t
(29)	pc2scale	.07t	-.20*	-.18*	.06	-.14*	.17*	.26*	-.07	-.10*
(30)	blkscale	-.13*	-.16*	-.27*	-.12*	-.15*	-.02	.16*	.15*	-.04

N = 523. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5b, (cont'd). - Posttest Correlations

		(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
(10)	uscale									
(11)	ciscale	.17*								
(12)	conscale	.21*	.24*							
(13)	nonscale	.13*	.40*	.85*						
(14)	attscale	.01	.13*	.17*	.21*					
(15)	famscale	.07t	.06	.03	.06	-.08t				
(16)	orgscale	-.01	.11*	.04	.08t	.18*	.24*			
(17)	impscale	.11*	.10*	.11*	.08t	.12*	.03	.08t		
(18)	benscale	-.04	-.01	.01	-.01	.40*	-.17*	.05	.32*	
(19)	hrmscale	.09t	.04	.07	.03	-.35*	-.02	-.10*	.23*	-.29*
(20)	dstscale	.10*	-.11*	-.02	-.09*	-.06	-.01	-.12*	-.02	.00
(21)	proscale	.05	.10*	.01	.02	.05	.04	-.01	-.03	.00
(22)	eqlscale	-.05	.06	.01	.02	.14*	-.06	-.05	.07t	.16*
(23)	neescale	.02	-.06	.05	-.02	-.02	-.08t	-.17*	.04	.19*
(24)	eqscale	.19*	.31*	.27*	.31*	.08t	.16*	.10*	.02	-.08t
(25)	colscale	.08t	.15*	.11*	.18*	.04	.05	.07	.05	-.10*
(26)	rolscale	-.02	-.14*	-.08	-.11*	-.13*	-.03	-.13*	.08	.03
(27)	pcscale	-.04	.14*	.06	.09t	.19*	.08	.20*	-.08	.02
(28)	rl2scale	-.05	-.14*	-.15*	-.15*	.20*	-.16*	-.13*	.12*	.43*
(29)	pc2scale	.11*	.19*	.17*	.20*	-.01	.24*	.27*	.02	-.19*
(30)	blkscale	-.01	.17*	.14*	.22*	.73*	.06	.26*	.08t	.29*

N = 523. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5b, (cont'd). - Posttest Correlations

		(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
(19)	hrmscale									
(20)	dstscale	.09*								
(21)	proscale	-.03	-.05							
(22)	eqlscale	-.04	.08t	.20*						
(23)	neescale	.05	.20*	.10*	.31*					
(24)	eqscale	.02	.07t	.03	-.13*	-.08t				
(25)	colscale	.06	-.12*	.02	-.13*	-.15*	.16*			
(26)	rolscale	.07	.09t	-.07	-.02	.08	-.10*	-.12*		
(27)	pcscale	-.11*	-.04	-.03	.00	-.08	.10t	.14*	-.37*	
(28)	rl2scale	-.19*	.08t	.02	.13*	.21*	-.20*	-.15*	.32*	-.07
(29)	pc2scale	-.00	-.13*	-.02	-.17*	-.24*	.25*	.24*	-.18*	.34*
(30)	blkscale	-.29*	-.07t	.04	.03	-.03	.17*	.14*	-.16*	.24*

N = 523. ^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 5b, (cont'd). - Posttest Correlations

		(28)	(29)	(30)
(28)	rl2scale			
(29)	pc2scale	-.30*		
(30)	blkscale	.07	.08t	

^{t} p <.10; * p < .05.

Table 6 - Scale Reliabilities (Internal Consistency Estimates)

(1)	Deceptive practices	dpscale	.64
(2)	Disadvantaging others	doscale	.61
(3)	Sexual equity	sescale	.59
(4)	Self interest	siscale	.46
(5)	Neutralization	nscale	.60
(6)	Duty	dtyscale	.71
(7)	Justice	jscale	.53
(8)	Religious conviction	rcscale	.86
(9)	Light of day	ldscale	.70
(10)	Utilitarianism	uscale	.56
(11)	Categorical imperative	ciscale	.68
(12)	Consequentialism	conscale	.93
(13)	Nonconsequentialism	nonscale	.95
(14)	Attitude toward affirmative action	attscale	.92
	Attitude toward affirmative action (modified)	attscal2	.96
(15)	Familiarity with affirmative action	famscale	--
(16)	Employer's support of affirmative action/ Importance of affirmative action to my organization	orgscale	.72
(17)	Perceived potential impact of affirmative action on my job	impscale	--
(18)	Likelihood that I will benefit from affirmative action	benscale	--
(19)	Likelihood that I will be harmed by affirmative action	hrmscale	--
(20)	Concern for distributive justice	dstscale	.28
(21)	Concern for procedural justice	proscale	.30
(22)	Concern for equality	eqlscale	.67
(23)	Concern for need	neescale	.42
(24)	Concern for equity	eqscale	.71
(25)	Collectivism	colscale	.49
(26)	Role of affirmative action in selection of coworker	rolscale	--
(27)	Perceived competence of affirmative action coworker	pcscale	.88
(28)	Role of affirmative action in my career	rl2scale	--
(29)	Perceived competence – myself	pc2scale	.73
(30)	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans	blkscale	.85
	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans (modified)	blkscal2	.83

Note. Reliabilities were assessed based on internal consistency (coefficient alpha). Scales where reliabilities are not recorded are one-item scales.

Table 7 - Rotated Factor Matrix – Dependent Variables

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
71	.87	.10	.20	.05
69	.87	.08	.30	.01
73	.86	.09	.29	-.00
70	.86	.06	.32	.02
72	.86	.06	.25	.04
68	.85	.03	.34	.04
125	.63	.07	.51	.14
74	.61	.02	.08	.44
114[r]	.03	.88	.17	.03
115[r]	.06	.88	.15	.07
117[r]	.11	.85	.04	-.07
118[r]	.16	.84	.07	.03
116[r]	-.03	.68	-.00	.01
126[r]	.23	.15	.72	.05
129	.25	.09	.72	-.07
127	.29	.06	.72	-.08
130[r]	.25	.11	.65	.28
128	.28	.02	.62	.09
75[r]	.07	.03	.08	.93

[r] Reverse coded items

Note. Actual items are shown in Appendix B.
Factor 1 corresponds to the attitude toward affirmative action scale.
Factor 2 corresponds to the perceived competence scale.
Factor 3 corresponds to the attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans scale.
Factor 4 is a single item assessing the subjects' view of the societal perception of affirmative action. It was designed to serve as an indirect measure of the subjects' attitudes but did not load on the attitude scale.

Hypotheses Tests

All of the hypotheses in this dissertation were directed toward assessing individuals' attitudes toward affirmative action. Three dependent variables were used to assess this construct. Two of these were direct measures of subjects' attitudes (the Attitude toward Affirmative Action and Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African Americans variables). The Perceived Competence variable served as an indirect measure of attitude. It was expected that subjects' affective reactions to affirmative action would be reflected in their assessments of the competence level of individuals they perceive to have benefited from these initiatives (see Heilman, 1994; Nacoste, 1990).

Seven of the eleven hypotheses were conceived as simple linear relationships between variables. As such they were assessed based on the zero-order correlations between them. The other four hypotheses were conceived as conditional relationships and therefore assessed using moderated regression. The results of the tests for the linear relationships are shown in Table 8. The moderated regressions are shown in Tables 9-11.

Table 8a - Hypotheses Tests (Zero-Order Intercorrelations)[8]

Hyp.		Attitude toward Affirmative Action	Perceived Competence	Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African Americans
1	Self Interest	-.06	-.10t	-.12*
2	Utilitarianism (-)	.01	-.04	-.01
3	Light of Day[9]	.06	-.11*	-.04
4	Categorical Imperative	.13*	.14*	.17*
5	Duty	.02	.03	-.02
6	Neutralization (-)	-.09*	-.17*	-.15*
7	Religious Conviction	.19*	-.01	.15*
8	Consequentialism (-)	.17*	.06	.14*
9a	Non-Consequentialism	.21*	.09t	.22*
9b	Video	-.05	.06	-.03
10	Equity (-)	.08t	.10t	.17*
11	Procedural Justice	.05	-.03	.04

N = 523. ^{t} $p < .10$; * $p < .05$.

[8] The results for hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 6 are not substantively meaningful here because the hypotheses were conceived with moderators.

[9] Hypothesis 3 was developed with the societal view of affirmative action as a moderator. However the hypothesis cannot be assessed because the societal view of affirmative action was not measured.

Table 8b - Hypotheses Tests (Zero-Order Intercorrelations) with Revised Dependent Variables[10]

Hyp.		Attitude toward Affirmative Action	Perceived Competence	Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African Americans
1	Self Interest	-.08t	-.10t	-.11*
2	Utilitarianism (-)	-.01	-.04	-.02
3	Light of Day[11]	.06	-.11*	-.05
4	Categorical Imperative	.14*	.14*	.17*
5	Duty	.01	.03	-.03
6	Neutralization (-)	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*
7	Religious Conviction	.21*	-.01	.16*
8	Consequentialism (-)	.15*	.06	.13*
9a	Non-Consequentialism	.20*	.09t	.20*
9b	Video	-.04	.06	-.04
10	Equity (-)	.08t	.10t	.15*
11	Procedural Justice	.04	-.03	.05

N = 523. ^{t} $p < .10$; * $p < .05$.

Hypothesis 1 assessed the relationship between the self-interest ethical framework and attitude toward affirmative action. It predicted that subjects' scores on the self-interest variable would be positively related to their attitudes toward affirmative action if they considered themselves to be potential beneficiaries of affirmative action efforts. This relationship was assessed using multiple regression, with the Likelihood that I will Benefit from Affirmative Action variable as the moderator. Both the interaction (Beta = .42; $p < .05$) and the overall model (Adj. $R^2 = .16$; $p < .05$) were significant for the

[10] The Attitude toward Affirmative Action and Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African-Americans variables were modified based on the factor analyses. Items that did not load on the scales were removed. The change had a negligible effect on the variables in terms of their reliabilities and their relationships with the predictors. No further analyses were conducted with these revised dependent variables.

[11] Hypothesis 3 was developed with the societal view of affirmative action as a moderator. However the hypothesis cannot be assessed because the societal view of affirmative action was not measured.

Attitude toward Affirmative Action measure (see Table 8). Although significant results were not obtained for Perceived Competence or Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African-Americans because of the robustness of the general Attitude variable, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1.

Table 9 - Moderated Hypotheses Tests – Hypothesis 1

Step		Attitude toward AA	Perceived Competence	Attitude toward AA for African-Americans
1	Benefit			
	Beta	.39	.02	.28
	T	9.72	.46	6.70
	Sig T	.00	.65	.00
	R^2	.16	.01	.09
	Adj. R^2	.16	.01	.09
2	Self Interest			
	Beta	-.06	-.10	-.12
	T	-1.52	-2.99	-2.76
	Sig T	.13	.48	.01
	R^2	.16	.01	.09
	Adj. R^2	.16	.01	.09
3	Self Interest x Benefit			
	Beta	.42	.28	.02
	T	2.20	1.20	.13
	Sig T	.03	.23	.90
	R^2	.17	.02	.09
	Adj. R^2	.16	.01	.09
	Overall F	34.13*	1.86	17.56*

Note. $^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the Utilitarianism ethical perspective would be negatively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. This relationship was assessed using the zero order correlation between the utilitarianism variable and the three dependent variables. The correlations ranged from r = -.04 to r = .01 and were not

significant (see Table 8a). Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that the Light of Day ethical perspective would be positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action for subjects who perceive that society has a positive perception of affirmative action. Unfortunately, the societal perception variable was not properly measured. This hypothesis could not be tested.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that the Categorical Imperative ethical perspective would be positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. The zero-order correlations for this relationship ranged from $r = .13$ to $r = .17$ and were all significant ($p < .05$; see table 8a). Hypothesis 4 was supported.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that the Duty ethical perspective would be positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action for subjects who perceive that their organizations are supportive of affirmative action. This relationship was assessed using multiple regression, with the Employer's Support of Affirmative Action variable as the moderator. The adjusted R^2 for this model ranged from .03 to .06 for the three dependent variables (see Table 10). The Betas for the interaction term were not significant for either of the direct attitude measures. The relationship with Perceived Competence was significant (Beta = -.50; $p < .10$) but in the wrong direction. Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Table 10 - Moderated Hypotheses Tests – Hypothesis 5

Step		Attitude toward AA	Perceived Competence	Attitude toward AA for African-Americans
1	Organizational Support			
	Beta	.18	.20	.25
	T	4.07	3.82	5.87
	Sig T	.00	.00	.00
	R^2	.03	.04	.06
	Adj. R^2	.03	.03	.06
2	Duty			
	Beta	.03	.04	-.01
	T	.60	.72	-.32
	Sig T	.55	.48	.75
	R^2	.03	.04	.06
	Adj. R^2	.03	.03	.06
3	Duty x Org. Support			
	Beta	.03	-.50	.24
	T	.15	-1.84	1.03
	Sig T	.88	.07	.30
	R^2	.03	.05	.07
	Adj. R^2	.03	.04	.06
	Overall F	5.58*	6.16*	11.95*

Note. $^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$

Hypothesis 6 predicted that the Neutralization ethical perspective would be negatively related to attitudes toward affirmative action for subjects who perceive that their organizations are supportive of affirmative action. Like hypothesis 5, this relationship was also assessed using multiple regression, with the Employer's Support of Affirmative Action variable as the moderator. The adjusted R^2 for this model ranged from .03 to .07 for the three dependent variables (see Table 11). The Betas for the interaction term were not significant for any of the dependent variables. Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Table 11 - Moderated Hypotheses Tests – Hypothesis 6

Step		Attitude toward AA	Perceived Competence	Attitude toward AA for African-Americans
1	Organizational Support			
	Beta	.17	.17	.24
	T	3.79	3.21	5.45
	Sig T	.00	.00	.00
	R^2	.04	.06	.07
	Adj. R^2	.03	.05	.07
2	Neutralization			
	Beta	-.06	-.13	-.09
	T	-1.30	-2.54	-2.04
	Sig T	.19	.01	.04
	R^2	.04	.06	.07
	Adj. R^2	.03	.05	.07
3	Neutralization x Org.			
	Support	.05	.18	.30
	Beta	.27	.79	1.54
	T	.79	.43	.13
	Sig T	.04	.06	.08
	R^2	.03	.05	.07
	Adj. R^2			
	Overall F	6.19*	7.12*	13.98*

Note. $^{t}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$

Hypothesis 7 predicted that the Religious Conviction ethical perspective would be positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. This hypothesis was conceived as another simple linear relationship with the three dependent variables. Correlation coefficients for both of the direct attitude measures were significant ($p < .05$) and in the expected direction ($r = .15$ and $.19$). The correlation with the Perceived Competence measure was not significant (see Table 8a). These results provide support for Hypothesis 7.

Hypothesis 8 predicted that the Consequentialism ethical perspective would be negatively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. This relationship was assessed using the zero-order correlations with the dependent variables. The relationship with perceived competence ($r = .06$) was not significant. Interestingly, the relationship between Consequentialism and both of the direct attitude measures was significant but positive ($r = .17$ and $.18$; see Table 8a). This unexpected finding will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.

Hypothesis 9 was the focus of the dissertation experiment. It was predicted that the Nonconsequentialism ethical perspective would be positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action (Hypothesis 9a). In addition it was expected that the experimental manipulation would move subjects to adopt more of a nonconsequentialist ethical perspective and as such, become more positively disposed toward affirmative action (Hypothesis 9b). The zero order correlation between nonconsequentialism and the two attitude measures was significant and relatively robust ($r = .21$ and $.22$; $p < .05$). In addition there was a less robust relationship with perceived competence ($r = .09$; $p < .10$). These results show strong support for Hypothesis 9a (see Table 8a).

In spite of the strong relationship between nonconsequentialism and attitudes toward affirmative action, the experimental manipulation did not have the expected effect. The experiment was designed to induce higher scores on nonconsequentialism. Instead, it had a marginally significant negative relationship with nonconsequentialism ($r = -.08$, $p < .10$; see Table 12). Interestingly the video manipulation also had a significant negative relationship with consequentialism ($r = -.09$, $p < .05$) and utilitarianism ($r = -.09$, $p < .05$). Although not predicted, this relationship is consistent with the theoretical framework. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The video manipulation variable did not have a significant relationship with attitudes toward affirmative action. As such, Hypothesis 9b was not supported

Table 12 - Effect of Video Manipulation (Zero-Order Intercorrelations)

		Correlation with Video Manipulation
(1)	Deceptive practices	-.12*
(2)	Disadvantaging others	-.04
(3)	Sexual equality	-.04
(4)	Self interest ethical framework	-.06
(5)	Neutralization	.01
(6)	Duty ethical framework	-.07
(7)	Justice ethical framework	.01
(8)	Religious conviction	.05
(9)	Light of day	.03
(10)	Utilitarianism	-.09*
(11)	Categorical imperative	-.00
(12)	Consequentialism	-.09*
(13)	Nonconsequentialism	-.08t
(14)	Attitude toward affirmative action	-.05
(15)	Familiarity with affirmative action	-.01
(16)	Subject's organization's support for affirmative action	.05
(17)	Potential impact of affirmative action on subject's career	.03
(18)	Likelihood that subject will benefit from affirmative action	-.01
(19)	Likelihood that subject will be harmed by affirmative action	.08t
(20)	Concern for distributive justice	-.04
(21)	Concern for procedural justice	.03
(22)	Equality-based distributive justice standard	.08t
(23)	Need-based distributive justice standard	.03
(24)	Equity-based distributive justice standard	-.05
(25)	Collectivism	-.01
(26)	Role of affirmative action in co-worker's career	-.02
(27)	Perceived competence of co-worker	.06
(28)	Role of affirmative action in my career	-.02
(29)	Perceived competence of self	-.06
(30)	Attitude toward affirmative action for African-Americans	-.03

Note. $^{t}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$

Video manipulation was designed to have a positive effect on nonconsequentialism, and in turn, on attitudes toward affirmative action.

Hypothesis 10 predicted that the Equity distributive justice norm would be negatively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. Interestingly, the results were significant but in the opposite direction from that hypothesized (see Table 8a). The correlation with the Attitudes toward Affirmative Action and Perceived Competence variables ($r = .08$ and $r = .10$ respectively) were both significant at the $p < .10$ level. The correlation with the Attitudes toward Affirmative Action for African Americans variable ($r = .17$) was significant at $p < .05$. These results do not support Hypothesis 10.

The final hypothesis (H. 11) predicted that subjects' scores on the Procedural Justice variable would be positively related to their attitudes toward affirmative action. The results were not significant for any of the dependent variables. Correlations ranged from $r = -.03$ to $r = .05$. Hypothesis 11 was not supported.

Supplemental Analyses

The ability to effectively and accurately test the hypotheses outlined above was to some extent limited by the measures that were used. The initial statistics suggested that some of the scales may not have been accurate measures of the intended constructs. For example a number of the scales displayed relatively poor internal consistency (see Table 6); others related to each other in unexpected ways. As such, supplemental analyses and hypotheses tests were conducted in order to better assess the findings.

The greatest initial concern came from the consequentialism and nonconsequentialism scales. These two scales were expected to be distinct from, and possibly orthogonal to each other, as they represent two alternative ethical frameworks. The video manipulation was designed to move individuals toward a nonconsequentialist ethic with the underlying assumption that they would move away from a consequentialist

ethic. Instead, the video manipulation was significantly negatively related to both the nonconsequentialism and consequentialism scales. Contrary to expectation, the two scales related in the same direction to the video manipulation and showed a relatively high positive correlation between each other ($r = .85$, $p < .05$).

In order to further investigate this concern, factor analyses were conducted of all the items designed to measure ethical frameworks. Using orthogonal rotation and a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0, five factors emerged among the items that were designed to assess these variables. Items were assigned to the factors where they displayed the highest loading, with a minimum factor loading of .30. This analysis yielded very interesting results. The items designed to measure consequentialism and nonconsequentialism (which were taken from the Brady & Wheeler, 1996) scale all loaded on the same factor. There is some indication that the subjects responded to the form of the items over and above the content. The other items designed to measure the individual ethics frameworks (self interest, neutralization, duty, justice, religious conviction, light of day, utilitarianism and categorical imperative) showed greater discrimination (see Table 13).

Table 13 - Factor Matrix – Ethics Framework Items

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
62	.86	.11	-.16		
53	.86		-.18		
51	.85		-.12		
63	.84		-.10		
55	.84		-.18		
54	.83	.16	-.14		
61	.81				
52	.80	.15	-.12		
49	.80	-.16			
64	.79		-.13		
59	.78			.12	
66	.77	-.12			
56	.75	.24		.15	
58	.75		-.17	.12	
48	.74	.18			
57	.72	.14			.10
60	.71	.20			
65	.68	.24	-.15	.12	
50	.58			.11	
67	.56	.30		.17	
31	.43	-.41	.31	-.32	
42	-17	.64		.26	.15
16		.61	.15	.22	
28	-20	.54		.37	
38	-11	.51		.23	.17
18	.11	.47	.27		
37	.31	-.41	.34		-.11
39		.40	.27	.10	-.15
40	.12	.39	.35	-.11	.11
23	.26	-.39		-.26	-.11
15	.13	.38	.28	-.30	
44	.29	-.36	.22	-.34	
41		.32	.29		.24

Table 13 - Factor Matrix – Ethics Framework Items (cont'd).

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
25	.11	-.14	.57	.22	-.36
27	.17	.14	.56		-.33
26	.26	.14	.49	-.29	
29	.34	.25	.42	-.38	.11
30	.31	-.38	.39		-.17
33	.33	.14	.36	-.33	.15
19	.28	-.28	.32	-.14	
35		-.44	.30	.59	.32
20		-.38	.28	.53	.35
45	.14	-.43	.39	.48	.36
24	.15	-.47	.32	.47	.35
46		.17	.32	.46	-.34

Note. Actual items are shown in Appendix B.
Factor 1 corresponds to the Brady & Wheeler (1996) consequentialism and nonconsequentialism scales.
Factor 2 is comprised of individual ethics framework items, most of which are consequentialist.
Factor 3 is comprised of individual ethics framework items, most of which are nonconsequentialist.
Factors 4 & 5 are both predominantly comprised of religious conviction items.

Based on the factor loading patterns of these items and a review of their content, the ethical framework measurement was re-conceptualized. The initial consequentialism and nonconsequentialism measures (Brady & Wheeler, 1996) were discarded and the emphasis placed instead on the other ethics items (designed to measure the individual sub-frameworks). The loadings and content of these items suggested that they could appropriately be placed along a continuum from nonconsequentialism to consequentialism. In other words, the data suggest that consequentialism and nonconsequentialism ought to be viewed as opposite ends of the same scale rather than as

distinct entities.

In order to develop this single scale, the items originally designed to measure nonconsequentialism were reverse-coded and combined with the consequentialism items. The internal consistency reliability of the resulting 14-item consequentialism scale (on2scale) proved to be within the acceptable range (alpha = .76). The items were again subjected to factor analysis. Once again, I used orthogonal rotation and a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0. Based on this criterion three factors emerged among the items that were designed to assess these variables. Based on the previously set rule-of-thumb (items were assigned to the factors where they displayed the highest loading, with a minimum factor loading of .30) most of these items loaded as expected (see Tables 14 & 15). This new consequentialism scale was used for further hypothesis testing (below).

Table 14 - Factor Matrix – New Consequentialism Scale Items

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
42	.75	.05	-.03
16	.69	.20	-.16
28	.67	-.00	-.30
38	.62	.02	-.07
18	.42	.47	.09
39	.40	.37	-.39
40	.35	.52	.03
15	.24	.44	.59
41	.36	.36	.31
37[r]	.44	-.51	.31
23[r]	.52	-.25	.04
44[r]	.49	-.40	-.19
30[r]	.44	-.46	.42
19[r]	.37	-.51	-.06

[r] Reverse coded items

Table 15 - New Consequentialism Scale

Item Number	
42	That it is the outcome that is important not the means by which it is achieved.
16	That as long as no-one gets hurt an action is OK.
28	That an unethical action is OK if it is directed at someone, or an organization, that also acts unethically.
38	It is wasted energy worrying about the effect that an action may have, one should just get on with what one has to do.
18	In today's business world one must look after oneself and one's interests.
39	Whether any inherent harm in an action is outweighed by the good.
40	That as long as the consequences of the decision affect the majority in a positive way.
15	What was best either for myself or for my company.
41	That one can't be expected to be responsible for everyone and everything.
37[r]	Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
23[r]	One should not treat people as merely a means to an end.
44[r]	It is important that discriminatory practices be avoided.
30[r]	How I would feel if someone did that to me.
19[r]	That it is important that justice is seen to be done.

Note: The items were preceded with the phrase "When deciding on the cases I generally considered."
Responses were based on a Lickert scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree
These questions were follow-up questions to ethics dilemma scenarios. See Appendix B.

Hypotheses 8 and 9 were re-tested with the new unidimensional consequentialism scale. Since the hypotheses were conceived as simple linear relationships, they were tested using bivariate correlation. The new consequentialism scale was expected to be negatively related to attitude toward affirmative action. The video manipulation was expected to predict lower scores on this scale. The results are shown in Table 16.

Table 16 – Revised Hypothesis Test (Zero-Order Intercorrelations) with Unidimensional Consequentialism Scale

		Attitude toward A. A.	Attitude toward A. A. for African-Americans	Perceived Competence
Hyp. 8	Consequentialism (-)	-.15*	-.23*	-.22*

Note. $^{t}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$

As Table 16 shows, the revised consequentialism variable is significantly negatively correlated with all three measures of attitude toward affirmative action. This provides support for Hypothesis 8. It also provides indirect support for Hypothesis 9a. Given that consequentialism and nonconsequentialism have been conceived as opposite ends of a continuum, the negative relationship between consequentialism and attitudes toward affirmative action suggests a positive relationship between attitudes and nonconsequentialism.

In addition to the revised hypothesis test, the relationship between the video manipulation and the new consequentialism measure was also assessed (Hypothesis 9b). It was expected to be negative. It was negative but not significant (r = -.05). Further analysis showed that this effect was more pronounced for subjects who scored in the mid-range on the new consequentialism variable. The correlation for subjects in the middle third (ranked by their scores on the new consequentialism variable) between the video manipulation and the new consequentialism measure was r = -.12 (N = 79). However, it

was not significant. This finding though not statistically significant is quite encouraging given the small sample size. It can be expected that with a larger sample this manipulation may be effective in moving people to adopt more of a nonconsequentialist ethics framework.

Chapter 4

DISCUSSION

In spite of the vast changes that have taken place on the political and organizational landscape over the last few years, affirmative action continues to be a controversial and important issue for the American work place. Research that adds to the understanding of these and similar efforts holds the potential to alleviate much of the conflict and difficulty surrounding various identity conscious organizational efforts. Although a number of studies have examined the role of various factors in predicting individuals' affective and behavioral responses to affirmative action, this dissertation is unique in attempting to alter individuals' reactions. Thus, in spite of the mixed results, it makes a significant contribution to the literature on identity conscious organizational initiatives.

Discussion of the Effects of Ethics Variables on Attitudes toward Affirmative Action

The primary thrust of this dissertation was that affective reactions to affirmative action can be predicted by individuals' ethics and justice frameworks, and that by manipulating individuals' justice frameworks their attitudes toward affirmative action could also be altered. More specifically, it was expected that nonconsequentialist ethical perspectives would predict positive attitudes toward affirmative action, and that consequentialist ethical perspectives would predict negative attitudes. Additionally it was expected that individuals who focus on equity norms of distributive justice would have more negative attitudes toward affirmative action and that persons who focus on procedural (versus distributive) justice would exhibit more positive attitudes toward affirmative action.

The initial findings suggested that opposition to affirmative action is not rooted in individuals' predominant ethical perspectives. It appeared that both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethics were positively related to attitudes toward affirmative action. This suggested, though not conclusively, that negative reactions to affirmative action are predicted by other individual differences. Scholars have suggested a variety of predictors including aversive racism (Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989); economic self-interest, racial affect, and stratification beliefs (Kluegel & Smith, 1983).

These initial findings are however, questionable. As explained in the previous chapter, the pattern of results suggested that the original consequentialism and nonconsequentialism measures did not effectively represent the underlying constructs. One of the unexpected outcomes of this study is thus, a reanalysis of the ethics constructs and their measurement. This will be addressed in additional detail in a later section of this chapter.

Given the reconceptualization of the ethics framework measures and reanalysis of the relevant hypotheses, the most robust finding of this dissertation was that consequentialist ethics norms are predictive of negative attitudes toward affirmative action. In other words persons who determine the difference between right and wrong based on the potential outcomes or consequences of a decision or action are less likely to support these efforts. This finding supports the popular anecdotal assertion that opposition to affirmative action is rooted in judgments that the policy is unethical or immoral (Madkins, 1989). However, these judgments are limited by the ethical frameworks that these persons are applying. Based on our findings, we would expect that persons who apply nonconsequentialist ethical approaches to their analysis of affirmative

action would be positively disposed toward it.

The reanalysis of the ethics data also lent support to the continued use of the Religious Conviction variable. The items designed to measure Religious Conviction all hung together in the factor analysis. This variable showed a robust positive relationship with the Attitude toward Affirmative Action ($r = .19$, $p < .05$) and the Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African-Americans ($r = .15$, $p < .05$) measures. This finding provides added support for the overall thrust of this dissertation since the Religious Conviction variable is conceptually, very closely related to the nonconsequentialist ethical perspective.

Discussion of the Effects of Justice Variables on Attitudes toward Affirmative Action

As stated in the previous section, it was expected that individuals who focus on equity norms of distributive justice would have more negative attitudes toward affirmative action and that persons who focus more on procedural (versus distributive) justice would exhibit more positive attitudes toward affirmative action. Neither one of these propositions was supported by the data. Unfortunately, it is somewhat difficult to substantively interpret these findings. The justice measures were all new scales that were developed specifically for this study. They were not extensively piloted prior to the study. With the exception of the equity variable these variables all exhibited unacceptably low reliabilities (internal consistency estimates ranged from alpha = .28 to .67) and cannot appropriately be used for any analyses.

Interestingly, the only significant finding for the justice-based independent variables was for the equity variable and it was in the opposite direction from that expected. Scores on the equity variable predicted positive scores on the Attitude toward

Affirmative Action ($r = .08$, $p < .10$) and Attitude toward Affirmative Action for African-Americans ($r = .17$, $p < .05$) measures. These findings are contrary to the hypothesized relationship and contradictory to the findings described above for the ethics variables. Equity, like consequentialism, is concerned with the outcomes or consequences of decisions and actions over and above the procedures or principles used to obtain them. This outcome must be subjected to additional research.

Reexamining Ethics Measurement

One of the interesting though unexpected outcomes of this study was the reanalysis and reconceptualization of the ethics measures. Previous studies have treated consequentialism and nonconsequentialism as distinct ethical frameworks but have not clarified the relationship between these constructs. It has been asserted that individuals work out of multiple ethical frameworks at the same time (Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Others have posited that a multidimensional approach to ethical challenges is more appropriate for dealing with the complex situations managers face (Peachment et al, 1995). In general the empirical studies of ethics frameworks have been descriptive, examining the propensity of managers in various fields/geographical areas to apply different theories to their ethical decision making (e.g. Vitell, Singhapakdi & Thomas, 2001). Again, these studies do not investigate the relationship between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism.

A potential source of additional understanding of the relationship between these ethics frameworks may be derived from the domain of moral maturity. The research of Lawrence Kohlberg (1977) describes stages in moral reasoning corresponding to the stages of human chronological development. Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6 bear considerable

similarity to consequentialism and nonconsequentialism respectively. The substantial body of research on moral maturity holds promise for additional understanding of the nature of ethical frameworks.

Limitations and Future Research

The first challenge for additional research is to replicate the study of the relationship between consequentialism and affirmative action. Although it is in the expected direction, it was only found after supplemental analyses of the data. The findings and conclusions can only be tentatively accepted until they have been replicated.

The experimental manipulation did not have the desired effect on attitudes toward affirmative action or on the focal ethics variables. It was not significantly related to any of these measures. The apparent challenge is to develop a more robust manipulation. Given the relationship between consequentialism and attitudes toward affirmative action, it is likely that an effective nonconsequentialism manipulation will have an effect on attitudes. However, this manipulation was ineffective in doing so. The reason for this lack of effect is difficult to assess. It is interesting to note that the manipulation had a significant effect on the Deceptive Practices ethical variable ($r = -.12$, $p < .05$). Additionally, as outlined in the previous chapter, the video manipulation could be expected to exert a significant effect on nonconsequentialism, at least for some subjects.

As with all laboratory experiments, especially those using undergraduate subjects, there is a concern for the generalizability of the study findings. There is also a question of how meaningful the questions and scenarios used in the study were to the subjects. For example, subjects with limited work experience may have had difficulty accurately assessing the perceived competence of their colleagues or accurately answering questions

about their organizations' policies on affirmative action. In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate to test hypotheses 5 and 6 on this sample. Future efforts should include attempts to conduct similar studies in field settings and/or studies with subjects who have more work experience. Subjects' work experience should also be measured, so that its effects can be directly assessed.

On the other hand, the limitations of the lab setting are in many ways offset by the advantages of this design. This study was primarily designed to investigate the possibility of obtaining an alleviating effect, that is, to demonstrate that an effect can happen. Such a study would be much more difficult to observe in a field setting. In spite of the limitations, the study serves as a valuable starting point for future controlled studies in this vein. Future studies might be conducted in quasi-experimental and/or field settings. They might also be conducted using more mature subjects (those with more work experience and/or more exposure to affirmative action).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a number of measurement problems arose in the course of the study. The Societal Perception of Affirmative Action was not properly assessed, which precluded the testing of Hypothesis 3. The subjects may have had limited work experience. As such, it may have been inappropriate to test Hypotheses 5 and 6 using this sample. Additionally, the scoring system (optically scanned "bubble sheets") did not support the scoring scheme for the Equity Sensitivity scale (King & Miles, 1994; Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985; see Appendix B). As such, this scale could not be used in additional analyses. Fortunately, some redundance of measurement was built into the study plan. For example subjects' propensity for the equity distributive justice norm was measured with an original scale in addition to the Equity Sensitivity scale. There

were also several hypotheses assessing the relationship between subjects' ethical frameworks and their attitudes toward affirmative action. As such, the measurement problems did not prevent the discovery of meaningful findings.

As indicated above, there is a need to further clarify the relationship between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. This will require improvements in the measurement of these constructs and further empirical analysis of their relationships in multiple contexts. Such analysis has the potential ultimately to contribute to several fields of study in which ethical decisions are critical including education, public administration, medicine and criminal justice.

In addition to the immediate future studies suggested by this dissertation a number of other directions for future study are evident. The initial driver behind this study was the unanticipated behavioral consequences of affirmative action. However the study focused on attitudes and attitude change. A natural next step will be investigation of behavior and behavior change. It will also be interesting to replicate this study in the context of specific affirmative action beneficiary groups (e.g. Hispanic, Asian or Arab Americans).

Finally, all research on identity-conscious organizational initiatives has the potential for international application. There are nations outside of the United States that are much earlier in the process of dealing with the challenges of equal employment opportunity. Countries like Afghanistan and South Africa are currently grappling with issues of multiculturalism and racial reconciliation on the political level. It follows that these issues will eventually become prominent in the organizational context. One of the directions for future research is thus investigation in the international context.

APPENDIX A

Consent Form

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT

This study is designed to investigate your opinions and attitudes about a variety of organizational and public policy issues. If you choose to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires, and possibly to participate in a brief training program. Your participation should take a maximum of two hours. In exchange for this, you will receive credit for having participated in the study. In addition, you will be entered into a lottery to receive cash prizes ($100, $50, or $20). Other credit alternatives may be available from your instructor if you decide not to participate in this study.

Later in the semester (after all data has been collected) your instructor will provide you with a thorough debriefing (including a more detailed description of the purpose and preliminary results of the study). In addition, further information, including group level data reports may be obtained from the experimenters upon request.

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary; you are free to decline any questionnaire items, or to terminate your participation at any time without penalty. All of your responses to the surveys and data collected will be kept confidential. Your name will only be used to ensure that you receive credit for participating. All analyses will be conducted using subject numbers. Data will only be reported in summary form, but will never be broken down in any way that will allow for the identification of individual persons or responses.

If you have any questions regarding the research, you may contact Edward Fubara in the Management Department at 353-6435. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Dr. David E. Wright, MSU Institutional Research Board chair, at 355-2180.

Statement of Agreement

I agree to participate in this study on Organizational and Public Policy as described to me. I understand that I will be asked to complete a questionnaire, and possibly to participate in a training program. I also understand that my participation is voluntary, that I may discontinue at any time without penalty, and that all my responses will be kept confidential so that no reports released will associate the data with my particular responses.

Signature: _____

Name (please print): _____

Date: _____

MSU PID Number: _____

Address: _____

_____

Phone Number: _____

Social Security # _____
(for University purposes only)

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:

Age: _____ Gender: _____ GPA: _____

Ethnicity (please circle one): White/Caucasian African-American Hispanic
Native American Asian Asian American Multiracial Other

APPENDIX B

Measurement Instruments

Name _____ Section____ TA _____

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE II

On the pages that follow there are questions about you and about your thoughts/attitudes on a variety of organizational and public policy issues. The questions are designed to give us a picture of how people in general respond to various policies and practices used in contemporary American society, especially in organizations.

If we eventually publish this research it is possible that the results will influence organizational/public policy decision making. Thus it is very important that you respond as honestly as you can. The results of this research will only be reported at a group level, such that individual responses cannot be identified. All information collected will be handled with strict confidentiality.

You may have completed a very similar questionnaire in the last few weeks. Please ignore any redundancy and honestly answer these questions. Do not try to recall earlier answers, but respond based on your true, current reactions and opinions.

There are no right or wrong answers; the only "right" answer is an accurate statement of your beliefs. Please express your personal opinions, not those that you think are popular or expected.

PLEASE BE SURE TO PUT YOUR NAME, SECTION NUMBER AND TA'S NAME ON THE TOP OF YOUR BUBBLE SHEET. **DO NOT FILL IN THE BUBBLES FOR YOUR NAME, PID, OR SECTION NUMBER.**

Section 1: Please use the following scale to respond to questions 1-14. In each case, your answer refers to the extent to which you agree with a proposal, decision, or action. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Moderately Agree
5 = Strongly agree

1. You have heard that a competitor has a new product feature that will make a big difference in sales. The competitor plans to have a hospitality suite at the annual trade show and unveil this feature at a party thrown for dealers. You propose sending someone to this meeting hiding the fact they work for you and pretending to be a potential client in order to gain valuable information.

2. At your personal recommendation, your company/client invests considerable resources in a creative new production process. Later you discover that the new process was by no means as effective or cost efficient as you originally anticipated. The error is easily recognized as yours, but if brought to the attention of others, further losses could be avoided. You propose to say nothing and hope that the error is not recognized.

3. The research and development department has modernized one of your products. It is not really new and improved but you know that putting this statement on the packaging and in current advertising will increase sales. To this proposal do you:

4. Your Organization employs a large number of women and there is a sympathetic understanding that the needs of the home or family may, on occasions, take precedence over their jobs. To compensate for temporary absences for personal reasons the women are, on average, paid 15% lower than their male counterparts in the same job. Do you:

5. You work for a mineral exploration company and you are currently in negotiation with a property owner for the purchase of a sizable piece of land. One-third of the land is in mountainous terrain and is of little value and the owner has merely included it in the total package in order to increase the price. Preliminary research results have discovered valuable deposits which would put the real value of the property at twice the asking price. You are now considering what offer you should make to the owner and you are proposing to pay the asking price with no consideration for the added value of the property.

6. You are interested in working for a multi-national and you have sent out a number of resumes. The recruitment process has now proceeded to the point where you have been invited to New York for an interview by two different companies, both of which

offer to pay your expenses. You propose to take one trip but to bill both companies for the **full** expense of the trip which you justify to yourself on the grounds that both companies were willing to pay if you did, in fact, make two trips.

7. There is a suggestion, as yet unconfirmed, that one batch of your consumer products may be contaminated. The source of the contamination is not known but you do know that the result is probable gastric illness. You propose waiting until further cases are reported.

8. You are a senior executive with an American company that produces bicycles. All efforts to enter the very lucrative market of a large Asian country have been frustrated. The company could expect to make substantial profits from sales if it could penetrate the market. Last week an influential individual from this country contacted you and stated that he could smooth the way for the company to sell in his country for a price. The price is equivalent to 5% of expected profit for the first year of sales. Your company has no policy to guide you in this situation, however, you plan to go ahead with the arrangement.

9. You are a production supervisor in a company which provides household electrical appliances such as ovens and washing machines. You have recently become aware that one of the products produced by your firm is defective and unsafe. You have already brought this to the attention of management but they have done nothing to remove the defect. You were considering reporting the matter to external authorities but have decided against this as in all likelihood it would cost you your job.

10. You are the owner and managing director of a trading company that is involved with import/export primarily with European markets. As the third generation manager of this company you are very proud of what your family has built up over the years although as you are approaching retirement next year, you are anxious about the question of a successor. Your eldest son is presently in the United States completing an MBA degree but is an unknown factor when it comes to practical experience. Alternatively, you have one other individual in mind who is in his forties, has fifteen years' experience with the company, and is presently at management level. For reasons of tradition, you propose to appoint your son as your successor.

11. You are the financial controller for a listed company. Your company has a long established policy of buying up its own shares for its treasury stock, pension portfolio, and for executive stock options. The directors know that the value of the stock will rise dramatically when certain discoveries and innovations are announced to the public. You propose buying up as much stock as possible prior to the announcement.

12. A member of your sales team has recently revealed that he is a practicing homosexual. He is involved in considerable client contact in an industry which has a particularly masculine culture. You are afraid that his homosexuality might affect your business. You propose to release this individual from your company some time over the next

few months.

13. You work in a branch office of a multi-national company. Your head office has quite specific rules about the giving of money or gifts to potential customers. However, you perceive that it will be difficult to conclude business in your area without giving something to those with whom you negotiate. Subsequently, you are considering appointing a sub-agent in order to assist in market development and also to let the agent handle any of the "under the table" activities.

14. You work for a large construction company. In keeping with the industry, your company experiences a high staff turnover. Recently, you have discovered that one of your most experienced employees has been cutting down pipes for resale. Your initial reaction was to report this employee but you know that he will probably be fired. This employee is, however, extremely valuable to you at work and the profit he makes from the pipes is not significant. It is unlikely that you will take action in this case.

Section 2: Questions 15-47 refer to the process that you went through in answering the first 14 questions. Please use the following scale and shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Moderately Agree
5 = Strongly agree

When deciding on the cases I generally considered:

15. What was best either for myself or for my company.

16. That as long as no-one gets hurt an action is OK.

17. That as a manager my first responsibility and ultimate duty is to my company and its shareholders.

18. In today's business world one must look after oneself and one's interests.

19. That it is important that justice is seen to be done.

20. What my spiritual advisor might do or recommend.

21. 1 would feel embarrassed if people found out what I had decided to do.

22. That sacrifices are often needed in order to ensure the greatest good for the greatest

number.

23. One should not treat people as merely a means to an end.

24. What is the right thing to do in the light of my religious beliefs.

25. What might be the reaction I would get from my family and friends if the details relating to this action were revealed.

26. Whether the outcome of my decision produces the greatest net value to all parties involved.

27. What effect the action might have on my personal reputation and career.

28. That an unethical action is OK if it is directed at someone, or an organization, that also acts unethically.

29. What would be the most efficient and effective outcome that as a manager I can achieve for the company.

30. How I would feel if someone did that to me.

31. That people must be treated fairly.

32. What would be the most equitable decision.

33. That ultimately one should ask whether actions are consistent with organizational goals and do what is good for the organization.

34. That many actions which are described as unethical are in reality common business practices.

35. What advice is available from a religious or philosophical source.

36. Would I lose face if my involvement in this decision was publicized.

37. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

38. It is wasted energy worrying about the effect that an action may have, one should just get on with what one has to do.

39. Whether any inherent harm in an action is outweighed by the good.

40. That as long as the consequences of the decision affect the majority in a positive way.

41. That one can't be expected to be responsible for everyone and everything.

42. That it is the outcome that is important not the means by which it is achieved.

43. My first priority and duty should be in fulfilling my company obligations.

44. It is important that discriminatory practices be avoided.

45. My religious faith would not permit such an action.

46. I would not want knowledge of my actions to be known by others.

47. Some things in life are definitely right or wrong regardless of the consequences of the decision.

Section 3: Questions 48-67 ask about personal characteristics that may be important for you to have. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. **What matters are your individual choices.** Please use the following scale and shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Extremely unimportant
2 = Very unimportant
3 = Somewhat unimportant
4 = Neither important nor unimportant
5 = Somewhat important
6 = Very important
7 = Extremely important

How important is it to you to be:

48. Innovative
49. Principled
50. Benevolent
51. Dependable
52. Resourceful
53. Trustworthy
54. Effective
55. Honest
56. Influential
57. Dutiful
58. Independent
59. Dedicated to cause
60. Results-oriented
61. Good-intentioned
62. Productive
63. Noted for integrity
64. Compassionate
65. Financially secure
66. Law-abiding
67. A winner

Section 4: Questions 68-78 assess your opinions about various organizational and social policies. Once again, **we are interested in your personal opinion, not what is popular or politically correct.** Each question has its own response options. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

68. Affirmative action is....

1 = Extremely bad
2 = Quite bad
3 = Slightly bad
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly good
6 = Quite good
7 = Extremely good

69. Affirmative action is....

1 = Extremely worthless
2 = Quite worthless
3 = Slightly worthless
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly valuable
6 = Quite valuable
7 = Extremely valuable

70. Overall affirmative action is.....

1 = Extremely foolish
2 = Quite foolish
3 = Slightly foolish
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly wise
6 = Quite wise
7 = Extremely wise

71. In my opinion, affirmative action is.....

1 = Extremely unfair
2 = Quite unfair
3 = Slightly unfair
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly fair
6 = Quite fair
7 = Extremely fair

72. In my opinion, affirmative action is.....

1 = Extremely unjust
2 = Quite unjust
3 = Slightly unjust
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly just
6 = Quite just
7 = Extremely just

73. In my opinion, affirmative action is _____ to the United States.

1 = Extremely harmful
2 = Quite harmful
3 = Slightly harmful
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly beneficial
6 = Quite beneficial
7 = Extremely beneficial

74. In my opinion, affirmative action is _____ to most Americans.

1 = Extremely unacceptable
2 = Quite unacceptable
3 = Slightly unacceptable
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly acceptable
6 = Quite acceptable
7 = Extremely acceptable

75. In general, people in the United States view affirmative action:

1 = Extremely positively
2 = Quite positively
3 = Slightly positively
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly negatively
6 = Quite negatively
7 = Extremely negatively

76. Overall, how familiar are you with affirmative action?

1 = Extremely familiar
2 = Quite familiar
3 = Slightly familiar
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly unfamiliar
6 = Quite unfamiliar
7 = Extremely unfamiliar

77. How supportive is your current employer of affirmative action?

1 = Extremely supportive
2 = Slightly supportive
3 = Neutral
4 = Slightly unsupportive
5 = Extremely unsupportive

78. How important is affirmative action to your current organization?

1 = Extremely important
2 = Slightly important
3 = Neutral
4 = Slightly unimportant
5 = Extremely unimportant

Section 5: Please use the following scale for questions 79-81. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Extremely unlikely
2 = Quite unlikely
3 = Slightly unlikely
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly likely
6 = Quite likely
7 = Extremely likely

79. How likely is it that affirmative action will have an impact on your employment opportunities at some point in your life?

80. How likely is it that you will benefit from affirmative action?

81. How likely is it that you will be harmed by affirmative action?

Section 6: The questions below (82-86) ask what you'd like for your relationship to be with *any* organization for which you might work. On each question, *divide* 10 points between the two choices (choice A and choice B) by giving the *most* points to the choice that is *most* like you and *fewest* points to the choice that is *least* like you. You can, if you'd like, give the same number of points to both choices (that is, 5 points to choice A, and 5 points to choice B). You can use zeros if you'd like.

Just be sure to allocate all 10 points per question between each pair of possible responses. **Please write your responses in on this sheet.**

82. It would be more important for me to:

____ A. Get from the organization
____ B. Give to the organization

83. It would be more important for me to:

____ A. Help others
____ B. Watch out for my own good

84. I would be more concerned about:

____ A. What I received from the organization
____ B. What I contributed to the organization

85. The hard work I would do should:

____ A. Benefit the organization
____ B. Benefit me

86. My personal philosophy in dealing with the organization would be:

____ A. If I don't look out for myself, nobody else will
____ B. It's better for me to give than to receive

Section 7: Please use the following scale to respond to questions 87-112. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Moderately Agree
5 = Strongly agree

87. The outcomes of the decisions that my supervisors at work/professors in school use to make decisions are more important to me than the processes that led to those decisions.

88. The actual compensation that employees receive on their jobs is not very important as long as their employers use fair methods for determining it.

89. The processes that my supervisors at work/professors in school use to make decisions are more important to me than the actual outcomes of their decisions.

90. In the organization where I work, I would like it if everyone on the same level received the same pay.

91. When people at work are given projects in groups or teams, everyone in the group should receive the same pay.

92. Schools and employers should do more to reduce competition and help people feel equal.

93. It is important to me for people to receive equal outcomes in life.

94. In giving pay raises supervisors should consider how employees' personal circumstances may have influenced their work and adjust their raises accordingly.

95. In giving grades, instructors should make adjustments to benefit students who need to meet certain GPA requirements (e.g. to graduate, or get a scholarship).

96. As long as students get grades that accurately reflect their ability, it doesn't matter how instructors determine the grades.

97. It is important to me for people to receive what they need.

98. Employees' compensation (salary and benefits) should be directly proportional to the amount of effort they put into their jobs.

99. Better workers in an organization should get higher salaries than worse ones.

100. It is OK for some students to pass a class and others to fail, as long as their scores reflect their effort and ability.

101. It is important to me for people to receive outcomes in life in proportion to their contributions.

102. It is inappropriate for a supervisor to ask subordinates about their personal life (such as, where they plan to go on vacation).

103. When I am among my colleagues/classmates, I do my own thing without really thinking about them.

104. One needs to return a favor if a colleague lends a helping hand.

105. I would not loan a camera or coat to a colleague or classmate.

106. We ought to develop more independence among students so that they do not have to rely on others' help in their schoolwork.

107. A group of people at their workplace were discussing where to eat. A popular choice was a restaurant which had recently opened. However, someone in the group had discovered that the food there was unpalatable. Yet the group disregarded the person's objection and insisted on trying it out. There were only two alternatives for the person who objected: either to go, or not to go with the others. In this situation, *not* going with the others is a better choice.

108. There is everything to gain and nothing to lose for employees to work together in groups.

109. Classmates' assistance is very valuable for getting good grades in school.

110. I would help if a colleague at work told me that he/she needed money to pay a utility bill.

111. In most cases, to cooperate with someone whose ability is lower than one's own is not as desirable as doing something alone.

112. Do you agree with the proverb "too many cooks spoil the broth"?

Section 8: In many kinds of organizations and occupations, women, and members of various ethnic minority groups have traditionally not been employed in significant numbers. In the last 20 years or so, that situation has changed, and more women/people of color have been hired into such jobs.

Please take a few seconds to think of a specific co-worker, one who has joined your unit in the past few years and is a member of a group who in the past did not typically have your type of job. For example, if you work in a male dominated environment, you might consider a female colleague. This person should be someone who is either at or close to your organizational level.

Please answer the following questions (113-118) about him or her. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet. If you are not currently employed, please skip this section and proceed to question 119.

113. To what extent do you think this individual was given this position because of affirmative action?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

114. All in all, how competently does this individual perform the job?

1 = Very competently
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all competently

115. In your estimation, how effectively does he or she get the work done?

1 = Very effectively
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Very ineffectively

116. How likely is it that this individual will move up in the organization?

1 = Very likely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all likely

117. To what extent was this person hired because of his or her qualifications to do the job well?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

118. To what extent did you think this person was qualified to do the job well, when he or she was hired?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

Section 9: Questions 119-124 assess your personal reactions to benefiting from affirmative action. Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

119. To what extent do you think affirmative action played a role in helping you obtain your present or most recent position?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

120. How competent do you think you are/were in performing your current/most recent job?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

121. How effectively do you get the work done?

1 = Very effectively
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Very ineffectively

122. In your opinion, how likely is it that you will move up in the organization?

1 = Very likely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all likely

123. To what extent do you think you were hired because of your qualifications to do the job well?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

124. In hindsight, to what extent did you think you were qualified to do the job well, when you were hired?

1 = Completely
2 =
3 =
4 = Neutral
5 =
6 =
7 = Not at all

Section 10:. Please tell us about your attitude toward **race-based** affirmative action plans in the work place. **We are specifically interested in affirmative action plans designed to improve the situation of Black or African-American applicants and employees.**

Again, there are no right or wrong answers, **all that matters is <u>your</u> opinion.** Please shade the number corresponding to your answer on the bubble sheet.

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Moderately Agree
5 = Strongly agree

125. Affirmative action is a good policy.
126. I would <u>not</u> like to work at an organization with an affirmative action plan.
127. The goals of affirmative action are good.
128. Employees should be actively involved in attempts to improve the affirmative action conditions at their place of employment.
129. I would be willing to work at an organization with an affirmative action plan.
130. All in all, I oppose affirmative action plans in industry for Blacks.

APPENDIX C

Scale Sources, Reliability And Validity

Scale Sources, Reliability And Validity[12]

Sections 1 & 2: Ethical Frameworks
McDonald & Pak, 1996
.73

Scale Validity: This is a new scale original to these authors. As a part of the pretesting of the scale, the authors had 23 subjects sort the questions back into the scales that they came from. This task supports the content or face validity of the items. Factor analysis also placed all but one of the items into its correct scale.

Section 3: Ethical Predisposition - Character Traits
Brady & Wheeler, 1996
.73 (utilitarianism)
.74 (formalism)

Scale Validity: Again, the validation of these items focused on their content, and whether or not the statements reflected the perspectives that they were designed to. This "content validation" (a sorting task actually) was conducted by 9 graduate students with training in ethics. 94% of their judgments were correct.

Sections 4 - 5: Attitude toward Affirmative Action[13]
Taylor-Carter, Doverspike, & Alexander, 1995
Initial attitude toward preferential treatment .92
Perceived justice of preferential treatment .92
Familiarity with preferential treatment .72

Scale Validity: As with the two previous scales, the scales in this section are new and have not been formally validated. They were however, developed based on prior research in a variety of disciplines. The attitude measures were simple semantic differential scales (good-bad, favorable-unfavorable, valuable-worthless, wise-foolish). The authors assert that these specific attitudes were chosen to capture the evaluative dimension of attitudes [they cite Osgood & Suci, 1969].

The fairness scale takes a similar approach, asking respondents whether the affirmative action initiatives were fair-unfair, just-unjust, beneficial-harmful, and acceptable-unacceptable. The authors provide no additional justification for using these items. However, they appear to be simple queries of individual responses/attitudes rather than measures of a unique construct. The same may be said for the measures of ego pre-

[12] The secondary citations in this section are included only to provide general direction to the reader. Complete citations and further discussion may be found in the articles that my scales were adapted from. In each case, the validity of the scales is supported by the fact that they scales appear in published reports of studies that produced significant results. For the purposes of this study I did not deem it necessary to review the studies that informed the development of these scales.
[13] The authors primarily used the term "preferential treatment" in the questionnaire items, tending to equate it with affirmative action. I have substituted the term "affirmative action" throughout.

occupation, familiarity with preferential treatment, and past/present behavioral involvement.

Two survey questions assess respondents' perceptions of their organizations' support of affirmative action and their perceptions of its importance to the organization respectively. These items are direct queries of subjects' perceptions and serve as moderators for hypotheses 5 and 6.

Questions 78-80 are similar direct queries, assessing subjects' perceptions of the potential effects of affirmative action on their careers. They serve as moderator for hypothesis 1.

Section 6: Equity Sensitivity

King & Miles, 1994
Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985[14]
.79 - .88

Scale Validity: The King and Miles (1994) study is a validation study of the construct of equity sensitivity. Evidence from five samples (N = 2399) is assembled, comparing equity sensitivity to 16 other variables. Equity sensitivity is shown to be distinct from these other variables, demonstrating an acceptable pattern of discriminant and convergent validity.

Section 7: Justice Norms & Collectivism
These are my original items. They have not yet been pretested.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
EQUALITY
NEED
EQUITY

COLLECTIVISM
Hui, 1988 (co-worker subscale)
.52 - .71

Section 8: Characterizations of Persons Who May Have Benefited from Affirmative Action
Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992
The authors assess individuals' ratings of the competence, potency, activity, and various interpersonal characteristics of "paper people," some of whom were described as affirmative action hirees (Study 1). In Study 2, employed persons completed the same

[14] Huseman and colleagues converted the scores on this instrument into a nominal scale, labeling individuals as *benevolents*, *sensitives*, or *entitleds*. I will use a deviation score (away from the midpoint) as a measure of preference for non-equity versus equity.

assessments of real co-workers. In this study, the subjects were also asked to assess the extent to which affirmative action played a role in the hiring decisions of these colleagues.[15] This relationship between affirmative action status and various performance-related variables may serve as a proxy for subjects' attitudes toward affirmative action. Subjects who have relatively positive attitudes toward affirmative action are likely to have more positive assessments of their colleagues, who may have benefited from the policy.

Perceived competence	.95
Activity (hardworking, persistent, energetic)	.85
Potency (strong, forceful, tough)	.78
Interpersonal characteristics (responsible, helpful, cooperative, trustworthy, good co-worker)	.91

Scale Validity: Once again, the items in this scale do not appear to be measures of unique constructs but rather are direct queries, asking the subjects' opinions about their co-workers. They are designed to assess subjects' *perceptions* and do so in a direct manner.

Section 9: Personal reactions to benefiting from affirmative action.

These are original items based on Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992 (Study 2). They have yet been pretested.

Section 10: Attitude toward AA in general

Kravitz, 1995
.80

Scale Validity: These items are simple attitudinal reactions to affirmative action. Kravitz mentions that they are drawn from multiple sources but provides no additional validation information. Again, the items appear to be straightforward assessments of respondents' attitudes toward affirmative action for African-Americans.

[15] In the actual administration of the questionnaire, the affirmative action questions and the competency questions were separated from each other by other, inconsequential questions about the individual.

APPENDIX D

Training Script

ETHICS PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Hello, my name is Scot Yoder. I'm a philosopher, specializing in applied ethics. I'd like to talk to you for a few minutes about *ethics.* Ethics focuses on the age-old question of "What is right?" How can I tell the difference between right and wrong? How do other people make decisions about right and wrong? How do their decision-making patterns affect mine? Are there any standards or guidelines that I can refer to for telling the difference between right and wrong? Does the difference depend on time and place? These are questions that have puzzled philosophers, decision-makers, managers, and leaders of all sorts for hundreds of years. The following presentation seeks to help answer these difficult questions. It provides you with a set of standards or principles for determining the difference between right and wrong.

Many people determine what is right or ethical by assessing the potential consequences of a decision or action. People ask themselves a series of "what if" question. However, in this mini-course we want to present you with an ethical decision making model that transcends the consequences of decisions, and is rooted in stable, universally applicable principles. Here are a few examples. Please refer to page 1 of your booklet.

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

> In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper, or let him pay later. But the druggist said "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

In this story, one could easily say that Heinz should steal the drug in order to save his wife. Although most of us would not steal, in this case we might assert that the end justifies the means. In other words, stealing is not wrong in this particular case because of the circumstances. However, some things (such as stealing) are <u>inherently wrong</u>. In other words, they are wrong in and of themselves. These standards of right and wrong are almost universally acceptable among reasonable individuals. Based on this reasoning, stealing is wrong, regardless of the circumstances. Thus, we might advise Heinz to continue to find ways to get the money to pay for the drug (for example, by selling his personal property).

ESCAPED PRISONER

> A man has been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

In this example, the basic ethical question is whether or not Mr. Thompson should have to go back to jail. Once again, if we take a means-ends approach to the question, we would say that putting Mr. Thompson back in jail will not serve any societal good, and that he is obviously not a danger to anyone. Here again though, the bigger principle is that crimes require punishment. Disconnecting crime and punishment is inherently wrong. Thus, based on our principled approach to ethics, the answer to the ethical question is that Mr. Thompson should have to go back to jail.

ROLLFAST BICYCLES

> The collusive efforts of local manufacturers have barred the Rollfast Bicycle Company from entering a large third world market. Rollfast management expects to net 5 million dollars annually from bicycle sales if it could penetrate the market. Last week a businessman from the country contacted Rollfast management and assured them that he could smooth the way for the company to sell in his country for a "grease" fee of $500,000.

If you were the manager at Rollfast with the final decision-making authority on this issue, would you pay the bribe or so-called grease fee? If you said "no" then you are getting the hang of the principled ethical reasoning approach. Once again, the bigger principle at stake here is that bribery is a bad thing, even in cases where "everyone is doing it."

OTHER PRINCIPLES

From the scenarios above, we see a number of principles emerging. Some actions (like stealing and bribery) are inherently wrong, others (such as abiding by the law) are inherently right. There are a number of other principles that stem from this same ethical approach. Can you pick them out of the list below?

[READ ALOUD THROUGH THESE]

1. Persons who have been harmed should receive restitution or compensation for their harm.
2. People should always be treated as ends in themselves, never as means to an end.
3. The focus of ethical inquiry should be on decisions or behavior itself, not on the outcomes of the decisions, or consequences of the behavior.
4. Sometimes the rights of one person have to be sacrificed for the good of the many.
5. Ethical decision making principles must be reversible -- a person making a decision about someone else would want others to use the same standard for decisions that affect him or her.
6. Ethical decision making principles must be universalizable -- any single individual would not mind if the decision making principle were used by anyone or everyone else in the world.
7. In order to avoid offending others, people should adapt their ethics to match the customs of the cultures in which they live or work.

[BRIEF PAUSE FOR STUDENTS TO COME UP WITH ANSWERS]

Answer: The consistent ethical principles are 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6. Statement number 1 is similar to the Escaped Prisoner situation described above. Generally speaking, crimes should be punished and persons who have been victimized should restored. Statement 2 may be considered to be the foundation of the others. It reminds us that people are to be treated with respect and dignity, and not to be counted as mere components in economic comparisons.

Statement 3 is also foundational. Although wrong actions can often produce positive outcomes, the focus is on the actions themselves. Statements 5 and 6 serve as ethics tests or measures. Principled ethics result in standards that are acceptable to all persons regardless of their social standing or ideological position.

Contrast these statements with the other 2. Statement number 5 denies individuals of their rights and holds the potential to treat a person as a means to an end. Statement number 7 reflects a situational ethics which, again, might allow for the trammeling of the rights of an individual and/or the violation of a larger ethical principle given the right environment.

APPLICATIONS OF THIS PRINCIPLE-CENTERED APPROACH TO SITUATIONS

Here's one more chance to apply our ethics approach. Consider how you would respond to the following. Pay special attention to the reasoning behind your decisions, not just the decisions themselves. Write down your decisions and the rationale for them in the space on the worksheet.

SELL THE CAR

> You are trying to sell your car because you need money, but at the annual car inspection a few days ago, you were informed that the car's motor is going to break down soon. You were also informed that it would cost you

$3,500 to repair it. The car looks all right though, and a man has offered you $5,000 for it after he took a short test drive.

FAITHLESSNESS

You are the general manager of a big company, which cooperates, with a small specialist company to develop a component that is basic to one of your products. The small company works with great enthusiasm on the project, since they believe that they will get the order to supply you with the component though no agreement was made. However, when the project is finished, it is shown that a company in Southeast Asia is able to produce the component at a considerably lower price than the company you had previously cooperated with.

[FADE - PAUSE THE TAPE]

By now you should be able to apply the principled ethical approach quite easily. In the "Sell the Car" scenario you would inform the man of the problems with the car and give him the choice of purchasing it or not. This scenario is a particularly good illustration of Principle number 6 above. If you were in the buyer's position it would be pretty clear to you which decision is right.

The final scenario illustrates a situation in which an implied commitment has been made. The right thing to do is to honor it, even though it was neither legal nor official. Again put yourself in the place of the managers/employees of the smaller firm. From a practical standpoint, it may be possible to work cooperatively with the smaller firm to reduce costs, rather than to abandon it.

CONCLUSION

This presentation provides you with a framework for principled, consistent, and generally acceptable model for determining the difference between right and wrong. It has practical relevance for both organizational and personal decision making and behavior. It is particularly valuable because, in the long run, it makes for a safer and more stable society. An added benefit is that in spite of its long term and principled focus, it often leads to shorter-term benefits. For example organizational research has demonstrated tangible connections between firm's ethical conduct and their financial performance.

Notes:

1. *Heinz*, and *Escaped Prisoner* scenarios adapted from Rest, J. (1986). Manual for the Defining Issues Test 3rd edition. Minneapolis: Center for the study of Ethical Development, University of Minnesota.
2. *Rollfast Bicycles* scenario adapted from Premeaux, S. R., & Mondy, R. W. (1993). Linking management behavior to ethical philosophy. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 349-357.
3. *Sell the Car* and *Faithlessness* scenarios adapted from Kavathatzopoulos, I. (1993). Development of a cognitive skill in solving business ethics problems: the effect of instruction. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 379-386.

Scenarios were selected so as to be general and relevant/applicable to all subjects. Scenarios that included content on topics such as racism, abortion, or homosexuality were avoided to prevent possible confounds.

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