ha... t
1r

3......
an Awkward“.

ms”; inium. .

L .l‘. 9.34.5"
V I.

2. time.

”3-?
a rd
3,“ ....

an a... an.»
.4.» £3. 2. +5.. ..
.112. .t “by: J
11" a:- i

.. 2. t1?!

. S
u...
53...;

.5313

3!...- 5.:

‘53: ...i..\
s. . I.

1 .i
.«L-f (I)
I: 7.. y.
.. 13.

 

llBRARY
Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
Senator J. William Fulbright's
Attempted Suppression Of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

presented by
Van Kalbach

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master M3 degree in —_His.t.o:c¥_

Ume/e

Major professor /

Date December 7, 2001

0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

PLACE IN REFURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINE return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE

DATE DUE

DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6/01 cJCIRC/DateDuepGSp. 15

 

SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT’S
ATTEMPTED SUPPRESSION OF
RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

By

Van Kalbach

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History

200]

ABSTRACT
SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT’S
ATTEMPTED SUPPRESSION OF
RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY
By

Van Kalbach

Senator J. William Fulbright played the dissenter‘s role after 1965 with regard to
foreign policy until he lost his attempt for a sixth term in the Senate in 1974. His
biographers have paid little attention to his attempt, from 1971 to 1973, to shut down
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The issue of bringing these operations under
regular governmental funding was raised in 1971, although for several years many in
Washington might have guessed that they were receiving funding throgh the CIA. To
create legislation to deal with these entities, Congressional discussion in committee was
required, and these got underway first in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Already during the Johnson presidency_Fulbright considered that the executive branch
had been conducting foreign policy by itself, largely circumventing Congress. Fulbright
was unyielding in his opposition in committee for three years before the Radios got a
solid legislative basis, and the delay was in large part due to F ulbright’s campaign to end
them. Finally, though, he failed to keep the SCFR with him on the issue. His failure

points up the decrease in his powers of political brokering late in his career.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I appreciate the hours of reviewing and many suggestions by Professor John Coogan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Part II. Taking on the Radios ............................................................................................. 5
Part III. Postscript ............................................................................................................ 70
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 73
General References ........................................................................................................... 77
Notes ............................................................................................................................... 80

Part I. Introduction

On January 25. 1971. Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ), speaking on the floor of the
Senate, made official what many in Washington had long had reason to believe: Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty. the “freedom radios” that originated in the 19505 and broadcast
to Bulgaria. Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the USSR, had been
covertly funded through the CIA. He maintained that, if they were doing work beneficial to
the US. national interest, it was time for them to emerge from the shadows and get their
funding through normal Congressional authorization and appropriations processes, thereby
becoming subject to Congressional oversight. Inclined to believe the Radios were deserving,
he proposed in a bill, Senate Resolution 18. that the State Department administer their
funding for the next year (FY 72).'

J. William Fulbright (D-AK), as Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations (SCFR). was responsible for determining the details of the necessary first step.
SCFR hearings, on the proposed legislation. His opposition to Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty was linked both to long-standing principles he espoused and to more recent views. It
derived from his complex set of beliefs about international affairs, US. foreign policy.
executive branch powers, and the US. intelligence agencies. The political purpose of his
opposition was in part to generate the Congressional will to send a message to the executive
branch regarding trespasses against the legislative branch in its exercise of power. His
challenge was to convert general Congressional awareness of the Radios' C IA-dependent
past. and the known antipathy of the Soviet-bloc regimes to them in a period in which East-
West détente was advancing. into a Senate mandate to discontinue them completely.

Fulbright. by I971 sixty-six and considering retirement at the end of his term in

1974. saw a chance to leave his mark on US. handling of foreign policy and on the
prospects for workable peace. That mark would comprise a number of elements: restoring
to Congress an effective role in the foreign policy decision-making process; educating
Congress and the public more about the world and the United States role within the
world; restoring the United States to its fundamental domestic base and being an example
of a functioning democracy, while at the same time acknowledging that the US. had a
role to play nearly everywhere in the world. Fulbright endorsed East-West detente,
policies that would limit the threat of nuclear holocaust, meaningful disarmament, and
extensive trade along with cultural and scientific exchange with the Communist
countries. He promoted the importance of differentiating among Communist regimes and
engaging positively with those that were more favorable to links with the West.

Fulbright made foreign affairs his particular area of expertise and had made his
counsel on them essential to Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon
Johnson. He was never a rubber-stamp for administrations. In the mid-19603, however,
he became a consistent dissenter, as his views on the nature of the Communist threat and
the dangers to world peace of US. foreign interventions clashed with those of the
Johnson administration. His foreign policy dissent initially was a minority position, but
gradually, as the Vietnam War escalated, he found allies in his committee in the second
half of the 19605. The SCFR became a key platform of dissent from the administration.
In this political context he judged, once Case raised the matter of public funding for the
Radios, that it was an auspicious moment to mount opposition to them.

The Radios were an issue that Fulbright took up with vigor. Fearing American

imperial-tinged conduct abroad, he also saw dangers to democracy at home. He felt that

the long-standing Cold War served to concentrate the powers of the executive branch.
acting increasingly in a secretive manner, which Congress seemed impotent to stop. The
intelligence agencies. in particular. played a key role in the conduct of the US. foreign
policy. yet eluded scrutiny by Congress.2 His assault on the Radios was considered:
selection of a target that was attainable would result in a jolt for the executive branch on a
matter that it was considerably interested in. By denying funding, Congress would be
asserting its prerogatives to influence foreign policy, in effect telling the executive that
Congress must be made a participant if the executive expected to have its cooperation,
and that it must be dealt with openly and honestly.

The Radios drew the SCFR Chair’s attention for several reasons. First, the executive
branch had been responsible for their initial creation and subsequent covert funding .
without notifying Congress. Second, their executives had lied about their governmental
nature. claiming to be private. Third, even when their cover was blown, nobody in the
administration, neither President Richard Nixon nor other principals, was willing to
acknowledge publicly a CIA connection with them. The administration sought the needed
funding from Congress as if the matter did not need airing.3

Fulbright spent thirty months trying to kill the Radios between 1971 and 1973.
taking the main opposition role in a contest decided during Senate and House committee
hearings and debates in full session and influenced by outside studies that both he and
Nixon ordered. He lost his SCFR bloc in his struggle to convince the committee of the
wisdom of denying funding for them. failing even to keep the support of fellow
Democrats. He persisted in contesting support for them, losing contact with his

committee in the process.

Ending governmental support for the Radios was not a touchstone issue for
F ulbright‘s career. His biographers do not even mention it. However, it occupied him
during three different sessions of Congress. He presided over three sets of hearings
during which the committee decisions reached progressively moved away from what he
desired. During this period, he seemed determined to shape the outcome, regardless of
what it did to his prestige. The unfolding of what was ultimately a defeat marks a waning
in his political powers. His tenacity, despite the political risks involved in insisting on a
minority position. was typical of him, but also reveals some loss of judgment. At least
some of his determination not to yield must be attributed to other issues that bore on this
one. Through a years-long process, he had developed and clarified his positions that all

now pointed towards ending government funding.

Part II. Taking on the Radios

In 1967, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach stated during SCFR
hearings that Article 1 of the Constitution, insofar as it limited executive power in
conducting foreign policy, was obsolete.4 Executive branch handling of matters
surrounding the Radios was part of a pattern, which Fulbright deplored, of secrecy,
invocation of executive privilege, and skirting of Congress.5 Both Johnson and Nixon
were involved in allowing the Radios to receive covert funding even after Johnson had
publicly forswom funding for private organizations through the CIA. Fulbright in 1971
was angered by five administrations' deception, and that of the Radios themselves, about
their connection to the United States government.

Fulbright’s irritation with the issue of continuing executive secrecy with respect
to the Radios is illustrated by an interchange at the 1972 SCF R hearings he began with
Undersecretary for Political Affairs of the Department of State U. Alexis Johnson. "I
have requested studies that have been made by the Executive on both Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty and also the country programs of USIA [United States Information
Agency]. My requests have all been refused." Parrying the accusation, Johnson replied:
"Now, as far as the documents that have not been made available to you thus far, they are
not State Department documents." Fulbright irritably answered, "...Assistant Secretary
[David] Abshire stated that the executive branch has conducted various studies on the
radios. but since they were done under the auspices of the National Security Council, they
are not available to the committee."6 His answer revealed his frustration at the way in
which the executive branch resorted to legal and semantic technicalities. It claimed it was

cooperating with Congress with full candor, then made exceptions for matters relating to

the National Security Council, the intelligence agencies, and other executive bodies
involved in foreign relations.

The views that inspired Fulbright's opposition in 1971 were not altogether ones of
long standing. He had reversed his positions completely on some issues between his
participation in the cold war consensus in the late 19505 and his increasingly frequent
dissent starting in late 1964. To a large degree, his attitude towards the Radios was
conditioned by his support for détente, and the terms under which he held détente would
be viable. By the mid-19605, he felt it was wisest to accept the hold of the world's
Communist regimes on their peoples. He had come to consider Eastern Europe within the
Soviets' legitimate sphere of interest, though he still used the term "the unhappy peoples
of Eastern Europe" in 1963,7 and though as recently as 1959 he had seen as unacceptable
"’any proposition designed to formalize the subjugation of the once free satellite
peoples.”8

Fulbright felt the US. government had made insufficient use of social science
expertise in framing its foreign policy. As a result, he believed the US. government
lacked a proper understanding of the psychology and changing nature of foreign peoples
and their regimes and of the effect its policy was having on attitudes of Communist
regimes. particularly towards detente. The US. government was insufficiently taking into
account that continuation of the Radios, clearly perceived by Soviet bloc regimes as a
threat, was counter-productive to any viable basis for mutual understanding between East
and West. He had been probing the limitation in governmental awareness of the findings

of social science in hearings for several years prior to 1971. The implication was that, in a

changing world, a Cold War mentality in the 19405 inspired by suspicion of Josef Stalin

was insufficiently nuanced to guide policy decades later. The United States government
was not in touch with current motivations of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes.

Related to the lack of nuance in a Cold War mentality was what Fulbright
considered undue willingness by the executive branch to endorse or cooperate with
repressive regimes which supported the US. against the Communist bloc. He brought
this up in the 1973 hearings, asking Kenneth Rush. Acting Secretary of State, to justify
agreements made by the Radios with Spain and Taiwan to locate relay sites there for
broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the USSR, when their own governments placed strict
controls on internal media.9 Fulbright saw that demands arising from nationalism bred by
colonialism and including "the demand for human dignity, material and moral, and for an
approach to equality with the privileged community of the West," were being made by
groups around the world, often "with little possibility of achieving this transformation
through the methods of Western political democracy." '0 The United States should be
ready to pay them heed, rather than turn away from them on the presumption that any
Communist participation in them was tantamount to Communist control.l '

A long-standing sticking point for Fulbright was his dislike of propaganda, as
well as of covert activities. He was unhappy with any official use of propaganda in the
United States. He had cast the sole Senate vote in early 1954 in opposition to funds for
Senator Joseph McCarthy's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and consistently
opposed the later propagandistic conduct of McCarthy-like ideologues. '2 He had actively
made an issue of the inherent dangers to civilian control of the military in the US. from
political activism by the military in the early 19605 and again in the late 19605, both in

regards to propaganda activities in military training and in appearance of active military

personnel at events on political issues.'3

Fulbright disapproved of attempts to make other countries' systems over in the
image of the United States. He considered that, whatever the Radios claimed about
working for constructive change, since they received funds from the US. government.
they were not sufficiently detached to truly represent the interests of the Soviet-bloc
peoples. In 1963, he considered that "it is neither possible nor desirable under the
conditions of our time to impose by direct action the ideas and values of Western
democracy on the Communist world or even on the turbulent emerging societies of Asia.

Africa. and Latin America."'4

He further queried, "are we really certain that we have the
incalculable qualitative resources of wisdom, vision, and compassion with which to
reconstruct the world according to the absolute specifications of morality?"'5

Fulbright was convinced in the early 19705 that Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty would remain instruments of propaganda. in keeping with their covert origins and
persisting Cold War attitudes. In the 1973 Hearings, he revisited the prior years’ hearings
and the Radios’ broadcasting policy, made poignant by revelations about Watergate. “(l)n
our hearings, in questioning some of the people who operate these radios, one of the
principle [sic] items which they broadcast are official government statements. There
seemed to be a tendency to equate whatever is. . .offered to the public by the government
as the truth. . .””’ He considered propaganda. especially in an era of detente, to be
inconsistent with American values. He felt democracy, working at its optimum, without
granting favors to special interests such as the military-industrial complex or engaging in

subterfuge, would attract the world by example. In 1963 he wrote, "If the issue [between

the systems of the East and West] is ultimately resolved in favor of the democratic values

of the West. it will be because we, more successfully than our adversaries, have created
an economic system that provides material abundance, a political system based on justice
and freedom and human dignity. and an educational system that cultivates individual
excellence and spiritual fulfillment."l7

Fulbright was echoing a point of view that Gaylord Harnwell, representing the
American Council of Education and Related Organizations, had expressed two years
earlier at SCFR hearings on the “Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act” which
Fulbright had written and introduced before the Senate. Harnwell had said, “We in the
United States have much to learn about other countries, not only those of Western
Europe. . .(I)t is. . .important to provide as broad channels as possible through which
Americans can learn about other countries. . .”'8 Fulbright’s long-standing belief in the
importance of exchange was as much about learning from other countries as it was
teaching other countries about the United States. The importance he gave to reciprocity
reflected his sense that the truest American national interest would be achieved through
whatever created optimal international conditions.

Fulbright's position was consistently that, with regard to the rest of the world, the
United States must be prepared to let peoples make their choices independent of what the
United States thought was good for them. With reference to South Africa, he wrote in a
letter in 1964, "(W)e should be guided in the main by the practices of foreign countries in
which we have embassies..."l9 In 1965, on the floor of the Senate, he said, "The first step
toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation
of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free...to establish new

arrangements...in which the United States would not participate."20

F ulbright's dislike of the Radios was partially founded on what he saw as their
nature as unilateral instruments of United States foreign policy. Harking back to his
hopes in 1943 for the establishment of an international organization to which all nations
would entrust peace-keeping. he was a long-time proponent of multilateralism. Even
during the period in which he saw the United States as the world's necessary defender
against Soviet imperialism, he had supported multilateral mechanisms for giving aid to
developing nations for whom social problems might make Communism attractive. The
unilateral alternative. he had concluded, tended to involve the United States in other
nations‘ internal affairs more than it should.2| He had written in 1963, "The unification of
Western aid programs [to underdeveloped nations] will have meaning and effect only if
every member of the Atlantic community accepts its fair share of the burden."22

However, his sponsorship of multilateralism was not only premised on sharing of
financial burdens. Since his earliest days in Congress, he had believed that the ultimate
key to non-lethal international relationships lay in establishing checks to unilateral
actions, framed by political interests, undertaken by nations. In the 19705, Fulbright made
the appeal to multilateralism in his rejection of the US. government's continued funding
for the Radios. In his view, their sole support by the United States was undesirable
because it allowed one government, that of the US, to control their intervention in
internal affairs elsewhere. This was a scenario for US. irresponsibility on the
international scene. The fact that Radio Free Europe had established a Western European
Advisory Committee (WEAC) made up of European dignitaries which met yearlywas.
he implied, more of a boondoggle to keep Europeans acquiescent in the continued

presence of the Radios' facilities in their countries than real multilateralism.23 He felt the

acid test of multilateralism was whether one country alone was paying for them. and so in
a position to determine their policies.

Fulbright listened to the Radios' executives and administration figures maintain in
the SC FR hearings that their operation was consistent with the US. national interest,
while at the same time autonomous. Having come to feel that the United States, in
pursuing its policies in Indochina. was behaving in an imperialistic fashion, he would
have welcomed the Radios’ autonomy, but he distrusted that the executive branch would
keep its hands off. He could reflect on concerns about government propaganda that had
surfaced in the 1967 Informational Media Guaranty Program hearings. Executive branch
representatives’ language then seemed almost a dress rehearsal for the language used four
years later by the administration.

The Guaranty Program, administered under the United States Information Agency
(USIA), converted to dollars the receipts of US. businesses selling informational and
educational media like books and films abroad to countries which would pay for them in
local currency. Richard Schmidt of the USIA advanced the "importance of the vast
cultural and educational riches contained in the output of American private enterprise
publishers and producers of other media in advancing US. interests in many areas of the
world."24 Schmidt cited as eligibility requirements for firms to participate in the program
that their "publications and films must make a positive contribution to US. policy
objectives and reflect favorably upon the United States."25 Another USIA official
speaking on behalf of the guaranty program stated that beneficiaries must show that they
“make a positive contribution in support of some US. objective [abroad and]...to

eliminate anything which would be patently harmful to the United States."26 Fulbright

was suspicious that the businesses USIA would approve would be those generating
propagandistic educational materials. He believed that the abstract language used by the
USIA in these hearings very likely had been adopted for that reason.

Fulbright had a basis for these misgivings. He had heard about three books
commissioned by the USIA in late 1965. Actually. it came out during the hearings that
the USIA had subsidized the publication of eight books in 1965 and 1966, including one
book about the US. participation in the Dominican Republic and three others on Vietnam
and the US. involvement there. These books were produced and distributed in the US.
by commercial firms without the USIA commission for them being identified. He said.
"...(T)o...conceal the fact that this was not a product, as you say, of our private enterprise
system seems to me to be doubly subversive of our system."27 While in one sense the
competitive marketplace was involved in eligible finns' business activities in countries
where the guaranty program operated, the US. government's influence in the fate of
seeming private enterprise products was outrageous. He also contested the USIA's
payment of travel costs of foreign journalists going to Vietnam, implying that this was an
additional form of inappropriate government propagandizing.28

F ulbright, just as later at the hearings on the Radios, was not alone at this juncture
within the SC PR in speaking out strongly against US. government deceit. Wayne Morse
(D-OR) also showed his contempt for the USIA's commissioning books for domestic
distribution: "I think USIA is approaching being as dangerous to the dissemination of
truth in this country as the ClA...(S)ome obvious public activites of the USIA have to be
brought under most stringent control, in the interest of truth getting to the American

people rather than USIA propaganda."29 However, prefiguring F ulbright's failure to

sustain an SCF R majority in his opposition to the Radios in the 19705, two Democratic
SCF R members, Claiborne Pell (RI) and Joseph Clark (PA), went on record during the
hearings as supporting the guaranty program.3O

Within Communist Europe. USIA officials indicated that they currently were
guaranteeing US. dollars for approved US. businesses supplying media to Poland and
Yugoslavia. Despite Fulbright's opposition, he could not have had one objection to the
guaranty program that was applicable to the Radios: only those foreign governments.
among them Poland and Yugoslavia, that chose to participate allowed materials into their
country under these guaranty agreements. He had consistently taken the position that
cultural and educational exchange was a superior instrument in the pursuit of
international understanding. Reciprocity was a key aspect of such exchange, going back
to the Fulbright Exchange Program set up in 1946. As his statements at the 1960 Florence
treaty hearings on lowered tariffs for educational materials showed, when reciprocity was
included, he readily lent his support to measures that, as the administration claimed then.
“demonstrated to the world US. support for international collaboration and for the
principle of free flow of information and ideas.”3 '

Fulbright’s antipathy to the Radios. based in part on their misrepresentation of
themselves as products of the United States’ free enterprise system, was reminiscent of
his condemnation at the Media Guaranty Program hearings of USIA conduct. For twenty
years Radio Free Europe had made the false claim, stated by such public luminaries as
General Lucius Clay, former Govemor-General of the US. occupation forces in

Germany, that it was the enterprise of civic-minded, non-govemmental Americans.

Fulbright also had financial reasons for his opposition to the Radios. He realized that the

worsening economic position of the United States arising after several years of
supporting a large military effort in Indochina might be useful in making a case against
them. After the mid-19605. Fulbright saw America as sorely needing to attend to matters
at home.32

Publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 added credence to Fulbright’s
allegations of deception by the Johnson administration of Congress and the public with
regard to Vietnam. Revelations in 1973 about Watergate indicated further problems at
home. With its own domestic crises, for the United States-sponsored Radios to seek to
cast doubt on Communist regimes' handling of their people's needs seemed to him
hypocritical. The issue of supporting the Radios always seemed to hearken back to his rift
with the Executive branch. “It seems to me a little ironic that in view of the current
revelations of our own Executive Government branch’s concept or [sic] the truth and
veracity that we should presume to broadcast what this same executive branch is pleased
to call the truth to foreign countries.”33

An important aspect of the discrediting of the Radios in Fulbright's eyes was the
history of covert CIA ties to and financial support for them. This was particularly
objectionable to him because the CIA's covert activities resembled the practices of
certain Communist regimes the United States deplored. The CIA and the executive
branch had acted in a way that Fulbright considered made dupes of the American people
and Congress. As far back as 1966, he had probed for information about CIA infiltration
of the exchange program, which especially enraged him.“

The CIA’s activities, like those of the other intelligence communities, were not

readily scrutinized by Congress. Under the shield of "national security". the CIA reported

only to the President. and had no direct responsibility to the Department of State. Since
the CIA received “black” funding (taken from funds ostensibly to be used for non-C IA
purposes), Congress’ authority to make authorizations and allocations of funds were not
effective mechanisms of CIA oversight.

Fulbright was tired of the sham engaged in by five administrations, as Radio Free
Europe had led private citizens to believe their donations were vital simply to provide a
cover for its covert, government-sponsored nature. Most of the problems he had with the
Radios came back to a single source in 1971: an Executive branch that considered itself
accountable to no outside power. These radio operations were obsolete institutions that
the Nixon administration clung to at the same time it countenanced greater ties with the
East. They were tainted with their history of Executive branch duplicity and high-
handedness toward Congress and the public.

Fulbright's objective for a greater Congressional role in foreign policy that was
intemationalist in character predicated educating Congress on the kind of linkages that
led to a responsible US. role in the world. To some extent, this brought him into line
with what the executive branch was initiating with the Soviets and then China, but he
wished to encourage Congress to push for a meaningful role together with the executive
branch in its overtures to normalize relations with the Communist powers. President
Johnson and then Nixon and National Security Adviser (later Secretary of State) Henry
Kissinger were bolder than Congress itself in establishing linkages with Communist
regimes.

Foreign policy expert and former ambassador in Moscow George Kennan had

already implied in 1967 SCFR hearings that outwom Cold War attitudes were responsible

for Congress's reluctance to let Johnson extend more normal trade terms to the USSR.
Fulbright sensed the truth of Kennan's testimony: "Our policies toward the communist

"35 With regard to the Radios in the

bloc today are full of contradictions and hesitancies.
early 19705, Fulbright thought that the executive branch wish to extend them exhibited
such contradictions, and he tried to encourage Congress to shed its Cold War attitudes
and legislate to end them.

The SCFR hearings on the Radios came several years after Fulbright had opened
up SCFR hearings far more than had previously been the case, both in their scope and by
arranging that some key hearings be televised. When he became chair of the Committee
in 1959, he declared the importance of its educative function,36 a function that he
implemented in full measure starting in 1965. He felt the public was not well informed on
foreign policy matters of great importance, but it should be. In hearings, the SCFR
solicited opinions from a range of knowledgeable people, in accord with his 1959
enunciation of his desire for more connection between the SCF R and university experts37
and a restatement emphasizing the importance of such connections in 1967.38 Setting up
more hearings, he hoped, would lead to an expansion in the amount of important business
emerging from the SCF R, and perhaps bring informed public opinion to bear on official
foreign-policy decision—making.39 Not all hearings bore a direct relationship to any
pending legislation, as with 1966 hearings on China's relationship with the West.

In December 1966, Fulbright had spoken for a reshaping of the role of the SCFR.
making clear that there was in his mind a tie between its hearings and its ability to play an
adequate role in foreign policy decisions. "For many years...(u)nquestioningly, the

Committee accepted Executive Branch judgments on what should be kept secret...The

inquiring attitude was lacking...(M)any of our current [national] difficulties might have
been avoided if we had taken time to stop, look, and listen...” He spoke of again making
. .the Senate...an institution in which the judgements of nonelected foreign policy and
military leaders have been tested in free debate..."""

Fulbright's arguments against the Radios at SCF R hearings in the 19705 were
intended. in part, as a means to do a thorough. publicly educative. examination of these
enterprises whose activities had been misrepresented to the public from the start.
Hearings. though standard committee procedure afier Case's introduction of his bill in the
Senate in January 1971, were also a convenient way for Fulbright to continue to explore
issues that the SCFR had been delving into in the past several years. SCFR hearings had
become fora for challenging some "received truths" guiding contemporary foreign policy:
America was obligated to be freedom's bulwark in the whole world; Communism was
essentially monolithic; use of power by America was by itself a convincing means to gain
desired international goals. He was eager to explore the contributions the social sciences.
including psychology, could make to the conduct of foreign policy. Seeking to foster
within the government more recognition of the truths of cultural relativism, he underlined
the importance of the United States’ taking into account the psychological impact its
actions have on international opinion. Hearings such as "The Communist World in 1967"
(1967) and "Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy" (1969) were aimed at changing
mind-sets rather than specific policies or legislation.

Fulbright's task in hearings on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in 1971-

1973 was multi-faceted. He sought to rally a majority of SCFR members behind him.

which he had been quite successful in doing on some issues in the late 19605. If he

succeeded in preventing a favorable vote on legislation to preserve these operations, it
would not be reported out to the full Senate, and they would be effectively ended. If he
failed to block reporting out of some measure, perhaps he could be persuasive enough
that the SCF R would limit its authorization of funding to a single year. This would at
least render the Radios subject to yearly scrutiny and perhaps future termination. Further,
he opposed giving them a separate institutional standing, as this would tend to work
toward their permanency.

The Radios were first publicly challenged in 1957-58 by a critic from the right,
Fulton Lewis, Jr."' A 1963 book, while in full support of them, again raised the question:
"(T)he [Free Europe] Committee managed to receive initial financing (it is not exactly
clear how and from whom)...(W)hether these [Crusade for Freedom public fund-raising
campaign] contributions actually pay most of the bills for the massive enterprise...
remains anyone's guess.""2

Further allegations of CIA involvement in private and educational organizations
surfaced again in 1964, 1966, and 1967.43 In January, 1966 Senator Eugene McCarthy
(D-MN) introduced legislation that would have fiJnded an SCFR probe of the degree to
which the CIA was influencing US. foreign policy. By April, this had been amended to a
resolution. proposed by F ulbright, for establishment of more effective Congressional
oversight of the CIA. The defeat of this resolution in the Senate foreshadowed Fulbright’s
difficulty in marshalling support several years later to shackle the administration in its
desire for open government funding for the Radios.

In 1967 allegations against the CIA's infiltration of educational and private

organizations appeared involving the Radios, among other groups and institutions. The

revelation developed in the greatest detail came when senior officers of the National
Student Association indicated CIA penetration since the early 19505. The New York
Times and Washington Post reported that a number of other private, voluntary, or
educational organizations had also received CIA funding. including labor unions. press
organizations, and teachers' organizations."4 As part of these revelations, CIA
sponsorship of the Radios was alleged in a 1967 CBS documentary "In the Pay of the
CIA: An American Dilemma.""S

Such was the public uproar at home and abroad in the wake of the 1967
revelations that, in the interests of quieting the issue, President Johnson publicly
appointed a three-man commission, including Katzenbach, Health and Welfare Secretary
John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms, to study the situation and make
recommendations."6 For F ulbright, who in an April 23 New York Times article, written
after the Katzenbach Committee had completed its recommendations, asserted that if "the
President is restrained only by those whom he appoints...there is no check at all,"47 the
make-up of the Katzenbach Committee, all of them members of the executive branch.
was not reassuring. In the House, John Monagan (D-CT) and in the Senate, Ralph
Yarborough (D-TX) introduced bills that provided machinery for getting funds to the
types of organizations the CIA had been funding.Yarborough stated the inappropriateness
of the prior CIA activity, and the need for Congressional oversight of the CIA."8

The Katzenbach Committee's recommendation to the President to discontinue any
government financing of voluntary organizations through the C IA, except where urgent

matters of national security were concerned,"9 was fairly straightforward. and the

President stated in March that the Government would implement it. Nevertheless. a

19

disclaimer clause in the recommendation that pertained to matters of urgent national
security. along with the claim that the Radios had, because of their government funding.
never properly been private organizations, provided the loopholes for the Johnson and
later, Nixon administrations to fund them through the CIA as before.50 Helms discussed
things with Senators Richard Russell (D-GA) and Milton Young (R-ND) and
recommended to the President continuation of their covert funding.5 ' Some former CIA
fund recipients obtained alternate means of funding, others found none.

Fulbright saw these exposures of CIA covert funding as evidence of the CIA'S
central but hidden role in enactment of foreign policy. Acting behind the scenes, the
agency further concentrated the executive branch’s independence from and lack of
accountability to Congress, and specifically to the SCFR and the Senate.52 The result was
bound to be some degree of executive branch duplicity, deception, and outright lying.

Fulbright’s April 1967 New York Times essay emphasized the threat to democratic
values that occurred when government penetrated purportedly free institutions. and the
greater likelihood of this occurring in a period of international crisis. "The tremendous
pressures imposed upon our policy-makers by the cold war, by the worldwide
commitments of the United States and by the permanent, terrifying possibility of the
destruction of our country by nuclear weapons have had a corrosive...effect on the very
values we are trying to defend."53 He also mentioned his dislike for assuming that
intervention, now thrust on America because of its global reach, is inherently good.
"...American isolationism was a very wise policy in its time [prior to World War
I]...lndeed, the term 'isolationism'. insofar as it connotes minding one's own business. still

makes a good deal of sense in a good many places."54

20

Fulbright considered problems of CIA manipulation of private organizations to be
a serious instance of unchecked executive power. inconsistent with traditional American
values. He hoped that this larger issue could be brought out in connection with the
Radios’ genesis. CIA sponsorship was part of a pattern of US. governmental conduct he
had deplored in 1967. Then, he had spoken of “certain practices associated with a police
state - secret policy making, unchecked executive power, subversion of foreign
governments...All this...for the express purpose of defending ourselves against an enemy
who is our enemy precisely because he engages in all of these practices..." 55 Lack of
effective Congressional restraints on the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy led
to its insupportable resort to expediency. Further evidence that, prior to the early 19705.
he was intent on investigating the US. government’s use of information dissemination
was his 1968 call for appointment of a commission to devise organizational changes that
would improve the conduct of US. foreign policy.56

In 1968 the prominent Washington Post columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak indicated that, in the case of the Radios, the recommendations of the Katzenbach
Committee had not been followed.57 At the 1971 SCFR hearings, Fulbright implied that
he knew of their getting CIA funds even before the 1967 revelations. "I did not know
about it really until 5, 6, or 7 years ago...We just found it out by some mysterious process
of osmosis."58 Whatever doubts he had in general concerning Lyndon Johnson's veracity.
he did not choose, from 1967 to 1970. to follow up with SCFR hearings the revelations of
CIA infiltrations of private organizations to ensure that all the CIA-supported voluntary
organizations had been turned loose. His prior knowledge of CIA funding of the Radios,

and inactivity before 1971. support the contention that in 1971 he was seizing on the

issue of ending them to make a larger point about curbing Executive branch power. With
the unpopularity of the Nixon policy in Vietnam, and disregard of Congress in
constructing that policy, there was some prospect for gaining support for a pointed
Congressional reprisal of the executive branch.

Part of the prelude. for Fulbright in 1971, to the issue of "unchecked executive
power" was the SCFR'S difficulties, in 1966 and 1967, in getting Secretary of State Dean
Rusk to appear before it in public session with regard to policy in Vietnam. Rusk
appeared in executive (secret) session but refused to meet the SCF R's request to appear in
public session. F ulbright, and others on the SCFR such as Albert Gore (D-TN) and
Morse, assessed this response as typical of the pattern of conduct by which the Executive
branch inhibited the SCF R from performing its proper educative role and eluded real
accountability to the public. At last, Rusk agreed to public hearings, which lasted two
days. before the SCFR in early 1968.

The SCFR's questioning of Rusk was disbelieving and unsympathetic. A spirit of
support for the Secretary of State and the Johnson administration's purposes in Vietnam
erupted within the House. Fulbright, leading the charge against Rusk, encountered a wave
of hostility in the House. Not only was Rusk defended and praised by numerous
Congressmen. Fulbright was castigated as being close to dishonorable and defeatist, and
certainly as manipulative in his handling of the hearings.59 This hostility, primarily
concerned with his attitude, came out in the House again in 1972, focusing on his alleged
procedural misdeeds with regard to distribution of reports on the Radios."O His name, as
in the earlier case, was spoken there with bitterness.

After Case's Senate speech in January 1971, Fulbright's general orientation on the

22

matter of excessive executive power found a specific target. In his January, 1971 speech
on the floor of the Senate proposing Senate Resolution 18, Case said that it was
regrettable that secret funding had gone on for so long. Noting that they had received
some $200 million during their lifetimes without the knowledge of the public or
Congress. Case called for Congressional consideration of open funding. He proposed a
year’s grant of $30 million, to be administered by the State Department."| Fulbright,
setting in motion the process leading up to SCF R hearings, wrote the State Department
within a week asking for “coordinated Executive branch comments” on the proposed
legislation."2 He acted quickly, clearly believing he would succeed in bringing the SCF R
around to his position.

Nothing was forthcoming from the executive branch for some weeks. Fulbright
again contacted the administration, in early March, to suggest that hearings be held in late
April. Finally. an official got back to Fulbright, almost on the eve of his suggested
hearings date, to request a delay of a month on their commencement."3 Evidently the
administration was considering its options before deciding on any cooperation with
C ase’s effort to put the Radios on a new institutional footing.

Between Case’s speech and the late May date requested by the administration for
hearings. he had been in touch with the Nixon administration, to whom he had “made it
clear that my purpose was to find any suitable mechanism which would bring the stations
out from under CIA.”6" Case next came back to the administration with a modification
that would establish a public corporation in charge of the Radios. The administration
countered with its own proposal, for a non-governmental corporation, an American

Council for lntemational Broadcasting, to oversee them. Case agreed. with provisos. and

23

introduced the bill as S. 1936 to the Senate on May 24, the same day that the SC F R
hearings began. He gave the Nixon administration credit for agreeing to let the Radios
become publicly funded.65

Other aspects of Case’s agreement to support S. 1936 did not bode well for
F ulbright’s rapid success in ending Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. S. 1936 made
their operations an autonomous governmental institution, not under the State Department.
and hence. more permanent and less subject to the Congressional vagaries in its annual
authorizations and appropriations for the State Department. Evidently, he was not going
to hold the Radios’ CIA past against them or the Executive Branch, which would make
more difficult F ulbright’s attempt to discredit them and achieve an SCFR mandate to end
them.

‘ Fulbright. hoping that he would be able to bring the whole Committee around to
his views, did not attempt to put off hearings on the issue in 1971 until so late that getting
legislation on them would have to wait another year. He would attempt to be persuasive
once hearings got underway. If he could get the Committee and the Senate to write a
restrictive bill, that alone would demoralize the Radios’ personnel during the current
year. Evidently understanding during the 1971 SCF R public hearings and subsequent
hearings in executive session that shutting the operations down was not going to be done
in a single session, he got the SCFR to agree on a bill that gave only a year’s funding, and
did not attempt to use his position to put off a vote. He would take advantage of the
Committee Report on the Hearings to cast some aspersions on the Radios and on the
executive branch’s conduct regarding them. There would be other chances to woo the

SCFR to his position against them.

24

In terms of legislative procedure, consideration of authorizing open governmental
funding for the Radios had to begin within the appropriate committees, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The
SCFR in 1971 consisted of nine Democrats and seven Republicans. In addition to
Fulbright, Pell. and Case, its members were John Sparkman (D-AL), Mike Mansfield (D-
MT), Frank Church (D-ID), Stuart Symington (D-MO), Gale W. McGee (D-WY),
Edmund Muskie (D-ME), William Spong (D-VA), George Aiken (R-VT), Karl Mundt
(R-SD), John Sherman Cooper (R-KY). Jacob Javits (R-NY), Hugh Scott (R-PA). and
James Pearson (R-KS).

Fulbright conducted the hearings during 1971, 1972, and 1973 according to dual
strategies previously developed in his conduct of SCF R hearings on foreign policy with
which he disagreed: to invite certain establishment figures who could be probed and
whose position could be contested, and to treat the proceedings as a forum for advancing
his own set of ideas. The Committee entertained testimony from only three witnesses
during its 1971 public hearings, which were held on a single day. This appears to be due
to an effort by Fulbright to limit the amount of favorable testimony.

Paul Bartlett, one of the witnesses and formerly president of one of the only
privately owned international broadcasting operations in the US, was quite dubious
about the likelihood that the Radios could conduct themselves free of direction by the
administration under any form of operation that relied on government money. Thus, with
Fulbright casting doubt on the suitability of government funding, and Bartlett reinforcing
this view, the limited scope of the SCFR Hearings did not showcase favorable expert

opinion. In particular, no émigre’s from East Europe or the USSR, who could have spoken

25

on the impact of the Radios in their homelands, were invited as witnesses. Only the
administration representative Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin
Hillenbrand. along with various testimonial letters submitted by the Radios' executives,
showed unequivocal support. The same executives submitted documents in support of
their operations for the full Senate and House debates as well. Fulbright could no doubt
have obtained many of the same favorable witnesses who appeared in the House
Committee hearings shortly afterwards, but he did not choose to.

Showing interest in keeping an executive branch role in the Radios’ future, the
Nixon administration let Rep. Ogden Reid (R-NY), who had sponsored the House version
of S. 18. know that "it did not want to move totally away from the government area" in
the future administration of the Radios.“6 Hillenbrand, during his testimony, when
questioned by both Fulbright and Aiken, repeatedly stated that he would disclose some
information in executive session but not in the public hearings. Given Fulbright's
problems earlier in getting Rusk to appear in public hearings, Hillenbrand's attitude
understandably antagonized the Senator, who felt that the administration was not even
being candid about matters concerning the Radios’ past whose general outline was
already common knowledge."7 He took Hillenbrand's posture as yet another instance in
which the Executive branch adopted secrecy irrespective of necessity. The
administration’s refusal to be forthcoming undermined, as Rusk had earlier, the ability of
the SCF R to fulfill its educative function. F ulbright's testy interactions with Hillenbrand
at the 1971 Hearings were to typify the way he responded to a number of advocates for
the Radios for the next three years of hearings.

At the SCFR May hearings. Case agreed with Fulbright’s caveat that the Radios'

26

continued existence needed to be subjected to SCF R scrutiny. In addition, at the SCFR
Hearings, Case, though he was submitting for consideration the administration’s S. 1936.
mentioned aspects of it that he considered would be better if amended. His provisos
included consideration of a more open process of appointment of the corporation’s board,
rather than the President appointing them all, as in S. 1936. In particular, he suggested
that there might be two appointments made by Congressional authority (specifically by
the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate,) and possibly one
each by the directors of the Smithsonian and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
He also recommended that the legislation require the Council to make a yearly request to
Congress for authorizations in addition to appropriations; in S. 1936, the Council would
only be required to request appropriations annually. He also commented, “The Council
should not be used as a means of expanding Government participation in the
dissemination of information overseas.”68

Fulbright was inclined to accept the testimony at the hearings by Bartlett, who
said,"...(T)he Soviet Union is following the policy of the czars, which is that Russians
ought to hear what the government thinks they ought to hear..."69 The chairman felt the
Soviets were reacting understandably in their anger about RF E and RL broadcasting. For
him, the Radios’ attempt to function as a surrogate domestic broadcasting operation,
modeled on Western broadcasting, constituted internal interference.

At the 1971 hearings, Fulbright questioned the justification of international
broadcasting of news about internal affairs into countries whose regimes had not
themselves asked for it. He felt such broadcasting, instead of deserving praise for

increasing the free flow of information, constituted a failure to recognize the right of

27

various nations to have their own system. "If it has been good for the Russians, why have
they spent six times as much as Radio Liberty's annual budget to jam the broadcasts?"70
He made the point again a year later. "Do the countries of Eastern Europe agree to
receive Radio Free Europe information?...(T)hese people do not quite agree to receive

"7' He bridled at what he saw as

this information, which you say is so useful to them.
interference. It fit into the overall pattern of US. behavior he had described in The
Arrogance of Power.

In the 1971 SCFR hearings, Fulbright expressed disapproval of the recently-
reported broadcasting practice by Radio Free Europe of "cuddling,” or transmission, in
what amounted to jamming, on a closely adjacent frequency to that used by Radio
Moscow for broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Such jamming, Bartlett contended, was more
negative than the Soviets’ own jamming of the Radios, since the Radio Free Europe
cuddling was jamming the Soviets’ attempt to communicate within their own bloc. The
proper path under détente. for Fulbright, was expansion of trade and various forms of
exchange that would serve to increase familiarity of the great powers with one another
and lessen tensions. The Radios were having precisely the opposite effect. Bartlett
reported that when he had visited Moscow Radio and met with one of the committee
members who controlled broadcasting in the Soviet Union, he heard that "they hoped to
drive them [the Radios] out of Germany."72

Fulbright was not inclined to take the administration at its word regarding the
“new system” without a CIA link that governed the Radios. He made it clear that he

believed the executive branch would continue its supervision and in some measure

direction of their programming. if the proposal for public funding together with creation

28

of a supervisory board was enacted.73 His animus had some personal, as well as
principled, roots. Jousting with Hillenbrand, he cited committee records that showed the
most ambassadors considered that the cultural exchange program made no contribution to
cold war animosities. while he implied that the broadcasting operations certainly did."
Beginning in the 1971 hearings. Fulbright considered different means that, even
should some broadcasting like that currently done by the Radios continue, would deprive
them of their identity. He raised the possibility that the work they did could be handled
by the equipment currently operated by the Voice of America (VOA) international
broadcasting operation, pointing to the savings that could be realized. He asked Bartlett
whether this was feasible.75 Another option he brought up for consideration was merging
RFE and RL's operations. He expected their resistance to such proposals. In 1972, in
response to documentation by Radio executives intended to prove their useful purpose. he
countered with the argument that bureaucracies inevitably act to perpetuate themselves.76
In the 1971 hearings. Bartlett had prefigured Fulbright's point: "...using any corporation
or foundation or any other device as a funnel through which to pour millions of dollars
into something which may or may not need to exist...automatically concerns me a very
great deal."77
The lines were clearly drawn between the basis for Fulbright's opposition and the
justification for the Radios by many of its supporters: the latter maintained that the people
of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were being denied information by their regimes
for reasons that were good for them but bad for the people. For many of the Radios'
supporters. the Soviet bloc regimes were more dangerous to the West when they were

free to enhance their peoples’ suspicion of the West by the slanted and filtered

29

information that they received from their regimes. While from the outset the majority of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held this position, it took new developments for
it to emerge as the clear majority view in the SCFR.

On May 14. the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out to both Houses
House Joint Resolution 742.78 a general continuing appropriations bill which stipulated.
among other things. that the Radios would receive interim funding at the current rate
without mentioning that their funds were coming through the CIA. The resolution noted
the expectation that both houses of Congress would enact legislation authorizing funds
for them as soon as possible for FY 72.

Testimony at the public SC FR hearings suggested that the broadcasting operations
would not survive if Congress, influenced by the argument that maybe they could gather
sufficient funds through contributions. did not vote to provide funding for the current
year. There was evidence that starting the same operations up again in the future would
be far more costly. Had Fulbright been able to block any authorization whatever, as he
wished. they would likely have been doomed in a short period. Even a one-year period of
non-funding would essentially have knocked them out of operation at least until a great
deal more money was allocated to cover new start-up costs.

Notwithstanding these arguments, the Committee, heeding F ulbri ght’s
misgivings, did not want to commit itself to a long-term future for the Radios without
studies. and was not moved by testimony at the hearings that morale at the Radios would
suffer if the Radios’ future was kept on an uncertain basis. The Committee, meeting in
Executive Session on June 7, adopted a wait-and-see approach, far different from the

mood in the Committee on Foreign Affairs hearings which were held several months

30

later. The SCF R Executive Session was the occasion for the marking up of legislation on
the Radios that would be forwarded to the full Senate.

Fulbright was successful in convincing his fellow members that the merits of the
Radios in the current climate between the West and the Soviet bloc had not been
conclusively demonstrated. and thus that, at the least. more information was needed
before authorizing permanent funding. Though he clearly showed himself during the
public hearings to be against any further state support, he was unable to convince his
committee during the 1971 hearings that they should be terminated. Rather, the
Committee as a whole believed that they should be supported on a minimal basis (just for
the current fiscal year), pending commissioned studies by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress that
would help it decide if support was justified.

The legislation reported out by the SCFR held the Radios' long-term future in
limbo. While the legislation raised the sum authorized by H]. Res. 742 for FY72 through
continuing appropriations from $30 million to $35 million, the SCFR had rejected by
voice vote on July 21 a slightly modified version of the administration-sponsored S.
1936 that would have created a permanent new administrative basis. Making its
recommendations to the Senate, the SCF R Report had stated that it "views Senate bill 18
as stopgap legislation - designed primarily to bring into the open the Government's role in

"79 This was Fulbright’s view. The

financing both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
amended S. 18 that was reported out. which put them under the State Department’s

supervision and authorized funds for only one year, was clearly a temporary arrangement.

The SCFR Report, which Fulbright submitted to the Senate, stated that the

31

majority of the SCFR wished to give the Radios the benefit of the doubt. He incorporated
several of his objections to the Radios and the larger issue of executive branch conduct:
the way the executive branch secrecy seemed to be implicit in the Radios’ operation; the
amount of funds they soaked up; US. governmental hypocrisy; the question of whether

they were doing meaningful work.

...Executive Branch officials refuse publicly to acknowledge the Agency's [CIA's]
participation or role in maintaining the two radios...The Department declined to
supply additional financial data for this report on Government funding of RFE
and RL. . .RFE's and RL's combined budget of $36.2 million may be compared to
the Voice of America's budget of $41 million...F or further comparison, an
estimated $37 million was spent in FY 71 on official educational and cultural

0
exchange programs...8

...lt is regrettable that the Executive Branch of Government under five
administrations deceived the taxpayers with respect to the expenditure of these
public funds. The connivance of both public and private officials to lead the
American public to believe this fantasy is to be regretted...How ironical...it is that
such practices have been used in the name of getting 'the truth through to the

peoples behind the Iron Curtain! . . .8'

Fulbright mentioned that there was “serious doubt [of the Radios’ worth] in view

of the public’s repeated reluctance. . to contribute the bulk of their needs. Pell. in a

supplemental view printed in the report, while stating he was himself in favor of Radio
Free Europe. was unenthusiastic about Radio Liberty. “questionable as its basic objective
is the removal of an indigenous, stabile [sic] and apparently fairly permanent regime.”82
In the Report’s Appendix, the text of Case’s remarks to the Senate May 24 introducing S.
1936, an asterisked comment indicates that “Senator Javits wishes to associate himself
with these remarks in support of S. 1936.”83

On June 8. the day after the Committee’s hearings in Executive Session, Fulbright
sent letters to the Comptroller General and the Head of the Congressional Research
Service requesting studies on the Radios. While the intention to do this was noted in the
SCFR Report. it is not clear whether the origins of the request lay with other, more
neutral, SC FR members, or with Fulbright himself. His initial request to the Comptroller
General for action by early fall suggests that he thought the GAO report, in particular,
might help him build a case during the current session. He called upon the GAO to report
back on the degree to which the Radios were making effective use of funds. The CRS
reports were to be more broad-based investigations of their performance, and assessments
of their relevance in the current atmosphere of détente.

Fulbright had reason to be hopeful that the reports commissioned from GAO and
CRS would be helpful to his cause. In fact, earlier in 1971, he had had the SC FR staff
produce, and then publish as a Committee print, United States Economic and Military
Foreign Assistance Programs. A Compilation ofGeneraI Accounting Office Report
Findings and Recommendations. In the Foreword, he showed both his disenchantment

with administration foreign policy and his sense that the GAO was cooperating in his

requests that it investigate, and report on, sensitive information damaging to the

33

administration. He said, “In recent years, the Committee on Foreign Relations has
become increasingtly skeptical of the manner and methods used to implement this
country’s foreign aid program. . .Taken together,. ..[the GAO compilation report’s]
findings and recommendations tell a tale of bureauratic woe. mismanagement. and
inefficiency. . .More than this, the GAO’s compilation tells a tale of disregard for
congressional intent. . 3’84 A GAO accounting of the Radios’ past finances, presumably.
would at the least specify the CIA channel by which funds were made available as well as
the amount of the funds, never approved by Congress.

Fulbright would also have anticipated some assistance to his cause from whatever
was brought to light by the CRS reports. During the early 19705 the SCFR, sometimes
along with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, commissioned a number of reports
from the Congressional Research Service. In 1971 the SCFR commissioned the CRS to
investigate two other topics that reflected a concern with executive branch infringements
on Congress or failure to facilitate its appropriate oversight. The CRS reports for both of
these inquiries appeared as Committee Prints, titled "Senate Role in Foreign Affairs
Appointments" and "Security Classification as a Problem in the Congressional Role in
Foreign Policy.""5 When Fulbright contacted the director of CRS in June, 1971, he did
not make any recommendation on who he would prefer to write the reports.

Who on his committee might Fulbright have hoped to side with him against the
Radios? Despite Case’s proposal for a funding mechanism for the Radios, there was
apparently at least a possibility that he would conclude, as Fulbright hoped to convince
all the Committee. that they were invalid government operations. At the 1971 hearings.

Case said. "...(W)e are moving in the direction of getting a handle on the RF E-RL

34

question. so that if they are undesirable they can be altered or terminated."'“’ In July, 1971
Case introduced a bill, passed into law in December, which would forbid funds for US.
paramilitary activity in Cambodia, an indication that he was no stooge for the Nixon
administration.87 In SCF R hearings in early March, 1972, Case, like Fulbright, challenged
the USIA program for its dissemination of propaganda. Another SC F R member who had
a personal motivation to question government subsidies for the Radios was Frank
Church. Church had served as a fund-raiser in Idaho for the Crusade for Freedom under
the illusion that Radio Free Europe relied on donations, and he was outraged at being
manipulated.88

The Senate and House approved House Joint Resolution 742 in July. Meanwhile,
the Senate had before it the SCFR’s amended S. 18, which was specific legislation for
allocating funds for the Radios for FY 72. On August 2, 1971, it conducted a discussion
of S. 18. and with no debate about the wisdom of continuing funding for a year, it simply
followed along after the SCFR’s recommendation, not inclined to push for a more
comprehensive plan. It voted on August 2, 1971 in favor of S. 18 (no vote count given).89
On August 5, since authorization of the Radios’ FY 72 budget had already been approved
by the full Senate. Fulbright again contacted the Comptroller General, stating that haste
was no longer necessary and thoroughness should be given priority."0

Concurrently with the start of the SCFR hearings, Reid introduced H.R.9330.
which had been put before the Senate as S. 1936. The House Committee on Foreign
Affairs held its public hearings on the Radios on two days in September 1971. The
Chairman of the Committee, Thomas Morgan (D-PA), introduced a bill, HR. 9637, that

Reid called a “companion” to his HR. 9330. Morgan said that he was introducing HR.

35

9637 “at the Executive’s request. . .based entirely on the request made by the State
Department.”9| The House also gave consideration to S. 18 as approved by the Senate,
and to another bill by John Monagan (D-CT), H.R. 10590.

Saying he thought it was appropriate to defer a final decision on the Radios.
Dante Fascell (D-F L) proposed a study commission, which had already been floated as a
possibility by the Nixon administration. His proposal, after revision by the Committee.
emerged in an amended S. 18 as a Commission on lntemational Broadcasting. Composed
of nine members. it would include four members of Congress appointed by the Speaker
of the House and Senate President and three eminent private persons in fields such as
mass publications. The commission would administer funds for the Radios through the
end of its existence on June 30, 1973. It would comprehensively study them to try to
determine whether they were meritorious and serving the national interest, and what level
of government funding they should have. The commission would provide two fiscal years
(FY 72 and FY 73) of funding.

Support for the Radios, and cooperation with the Nixon administration’s desire to
keep them going. was robust and, as was evident since committee chair Morgan proposed
supportive legislation, bipartisan in the House Committee. Morgan’s cooperation with the
administration is an indication of the degree to which the House tended to concur with
executive branch initiatives, and was. unlike the Senate, no breeding ground for
reassertion of Congressional powers. The mood in the House Committee was that the
Radios’ covert past was no reason to deny them a means to continue their essential work.
Peter Freylinghuysen (R-NJ) said, "I hope it [the mechanism for overt funding and

administration] does not lead to meddling on the part of Congress in what has been done

36

in a responsible way.”2

Democrats as well as Republicans who spoke during the public hearings favored
legislation that would set up a permanent basis for governmental funding. They alluded to
the different reception given the Radios in the Senate, and debated how to formulate a FY
72 bill that could ultimately achieve their purpose without antagonizing the Senate. Rep.
J. Herbert Burke (R-FL) was the lone voice questioning, like F ulbright. "why it is the
responsibility of the American taxpayer now [in a time of relaxation of East-West
tensions] to continue to inform...Communist countries, what the truth is‘?""3

Seven witnesses (one of whom, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University
Professor and Polish e'migré, was unable to attend and sent a statement) testified. Of these
seven. not a single one cast doubt on the purpose of the Radios or on the wisdom of
government funding. Three witnesses at the House Hearings were émigre's from the
Soviet bloc. and an additional witness represented the Polish—American Congress.
Further, Morgan. as chair of the House Committee, included in the record “a
representative sampling” of correspondence received from scholars, journalists, and
Soviet and East European specialists uniformly supporting the Radios.

The House Committee knew that legislation securing funding, whatever the
institutional framework, would be a sign to personnel at the Radios that they had some
security. at least for the present. Understanding that it would be better to preserve a
semblance of identity with the Senate’s amended S. 18, the House Committee chose not
to couch its substantially different provisions as wholly separate legislation, retaining the
Senate bill’s designation as it reported out to the full House its version of S. 18, 23-1 .94

On the day of the full House vote, November 19, 1971, sixteen members of both

37

parties, including several from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, spoke in behalf of the
bill. Morgan explained to the House that his committee had “amended the Senate bill to
provide for a far-ranging study by a body that included Members of Congress as well as
outside experts.”95 Fascell noted: “Our committee has considered the possibility of using
the State Department route [for making grants to the Radios prior to the completion of a
commission study]...This is no time to shove them on the Department of State. The
administration does not want it: the State Department does not want it. . 3’96 The tone of
all testimony was markedly supportive of the Radios, and no one questioned that they
were doing an important service. The amended S. 18 passed in the House 271-12.

Because of the two differing forms of S. 18 approved by Senate and House, the
matter was referred to a conference committee, composed of representatives of the SC FR
and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs selected by the presiding officer in each
house. Standard practice was that only persons recommended by the two committee
chairs would be included.97 This sign-off gave Fulbright substantial leverage in
influencing the bill coming out of the conference committee. He used his influence to
have Symington, Church, Case and Aiken, members of the SCFR with some doubts about
the Radios, appointed to the Conference Committee. The House Committee’s delegation
was Frelinghuysen. Morgan, Fascell, Clement Zablocki (D-WI), Wayne Hays (D-OH),
William Mailliard (R-CA), , and William Broomfield (R-MI).

The Conference Committee became a battleground. The closest Fulbright came to
his goal was these protracted deliberations. Though he had hoped to enlist members of
the SC FR against the Radios from the outset, he was aware that his ends would be served

as effectively if the conference committee was unable to agree on legislation. since even

38

temporary suspension of funding would lead to fragmentation of the employee apparatus.
Because private and corporate donations had never accounted for the bulk of RF E's
operating costs (below 10% as the GAO report would reveal), and virtually none of RL's
costs, even one year without funding would essentially have knocked them out of
operation. The employee termination costs and reversion of its equipment in Spain to the
government there would have been devastating.

Disagreement between the SCF R and House Committee members delayed writing
of compromise legislation that could be reported out to the Senate and House for
approval until March, 1972. As the Senate Report No. 691 on the conference committee.
submitted by Aiken, stated, “the House conferees were insistent that the radios be
authorized for 2 years during which time their utility could be studied. . .The Senate
conferees were adamant in their belief that the radios should be continued only for the
balance of the current fiscal year. ..Some felt that the future of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty should be considered within the context of periodic State Department or
USIA authorization legislation.”98 The latter provision was in line with the idea that their
broadcasting operations could be merged with VOA, and that policy making for all three
should originate in a single source. Though apparently neither side wanted to give.
ultimately the SCFR delegation won its purpose of limiting the authorization. If the
House Committee delegation would not agree to limitations specified by the SC FR
delegation. they would get nothing at all.

The conference committee reported out legislation on March 15, 1972, that
stipulated funding limited to FY 72. So the new round of legislation required for FY 73

would need to commence within two and-a-half months. The Conference Committee.

39

held hostage by its SC FR members. had discomfited the Radios by delaying funding an
additional period of five months. The whole idea of a year-long study commission had to
be thrown over. since its mandate would extend beyond the current fiscal year. Given that
hearings for the following year’s funding for the Radios would need to begin within a
few months. the Radios and their State Department managers would soon need to
summarize their FY 72 operation and show reason for continued funding. In the
bipartisan SCFR conference committee delegation’s adamant stand against giving the
Radios more than a limited purchase on the future. things appeared to bode quite well for
Fulbright’s chances to erode the Senate’s support for government funding for the Radios
in deliberations. soon to begin. for FY 73.

When Fulbright received the GAO report, its thumbnail histories of the Radios
did not mention the C IA's connection to them, and rather stated that "Free Europe was
established...as a nonprofit organization" and "RLC [Radio Liberty Committee] was
incorporated...as...a nonstock, nonprofit organization."99 Further, the GAO report. in
citing in some detail a study done by Free Europe on the need for modernization and its
estimated costs, along with estimates of enhancements RLC sought, was giving the
Radios a platform to justify these requests. The GAO report, concluding the sections for
each of the Radios. stated identically "that the public monies have been reasonably
accounted for. that the administration of expenditures has been reasonably effective, and

"'0" Overall, it seemed to

that the expenditures have been applied for the stated purposes...
be an endorsement of the Radios.

The GAO report did give figures for the overall government contributions to the

committees operating the Radios from their inception: for RF E, $306 million (plus $16

40

million for the fund-raising Crusades for Freedom), and for RL. $158 million.'0 '

Fulbright saw these as major outlays showing that the scope of the deception of the
American taxpayers was that much greater.

Fulbright excerpted several findings from the GAO report in the 1972 Hearings.
One was Radio Liberty Committee’s statement on its aims: to “influence. . .intemal trends
in the USSR. in directions favorable to the interests of the US. and the free world.” He
considered this an open admission of intent to interfere in another nation’s internal
affairs")2 The report showed that the Radios had “extensive plans” to modernize. which
clearly would make their future budget requests go up dramatically.'03 Radio Free Europe
was conducting extensive distribution of its research to scholars, an activity which was
remote from the US. national interest.'0"

The GAO report's analysis showed that expenses for a Western European Advisor
Council (WEAC) annual conference were paid by RF E. Fulbright implied that, instead
of Europeans anteing up to help support the Radios, prominent Europeans were being

'05 One GAO recommendation was that the Radios could be

treated to a boondoggle.
consolidated and "some or all of their activities...merged." Its report "did not consider the
possibility of merging the radio activities of Radio Free Europe and RLC with the Voice
of America because of the stated differences in their basic reporting objectives." "'6 but
Fulbright considered this a better option than funding them all separately. '07

Other information in the GAO report was counter-productive for Fulbright. It
stated that. according to the committees, liquidation of Free Europe, Inc., would cost

$59.8 million and that of Radio Liberty Committee, $21.5 million.'08 That information

indirectly aided the Radios' cause by undermining the argument that the US. should

41

attend to its domestic concerns since the Radios, if really necessary, could be readily re-
started later. The GAO report "concentrated our evaluation of the administrative
effectiveness of the Radios in terms of expenditures...as distinguished from evaluation of
their effectiveness in accomplishing their objectives. Our efforts were coordinated with
the Library of Congress so that the respective reports would complement, rather than
duplicate. each other. "'09 Fulbright, once the inoffensive nature of all the reports became
clear. could not have been pleased by this coordination between CRS and GAO. The
GAO indicated it "discussed the factual contents of this report with principal officials of
Free Europe and RLC," and evidently fell in with the Radios' ongoing refusal to confirm
the past CIA connection. With such sanitizing, the chairman did not gain the destructive
ammunition he had sought through the GAO.

Individual details in the report were maddening to Fulbright. Hefty fees were
being paid Portugal for RF E's use of a site there for retransmission, along with reversion
of ownership of all installations to the Portuguese government in 1973. Radio Liberty
Committee was making large payments to the Spanish government for the use of Spain as
a relay site. Radio Liberty Committee’s agreement with Spain had already led to
reversion of ownership to Spain of property installed there. The benefit to the Spanish
government would have been especially offensive to Fulbright, who was not sympathetic
to Spanish dictator Francisco Franco and had raised contentious public debate in 1969
about US. military bases in Spain while the Nixon administration was keeping the
agreement secret from Congress.' '0 Fulbright bore these details in mind when he
challenged the lack of European contribution to the Radios in the 1972 hearings.

Notably missing from the GAO report was a breakdown of expenditures on

activities of the Radios in a way that allowed teasing out a figure for the substantial
research and publication activities of the Radios. Also missing was any mention of the
community facilities built in the interest of public relations by Radio Liberty Committee
in Gloria. Portugal, where its relay equipment was sited. which Fulbright might have
seized on to question Radio expenditures.' "

While the GAO report revealed the substantial extent that the Free Europe
Committee. and to a lesser degree Radio Liberty Committee, had financially supported
individual émigrés and émigré group activities,l '2 Fulbright did not seize on this as
evidence of the extent to which government monies had been spent for dubious ends.
Emigré groups had been known to be contentious among themselves and, in some cases.
in favor of return to monarchical rule or linked to former Nazi participation, and he
missed a chance to question the wisdom of exile-related expenditures. In fact, after
Congress had approved legislation that set the Radios on a new institutional footing,
some partisan e'migré programming on Radio Liberty became an issue. Though "Radio
Liberty's regulations would seem to rule out such broadcasts [because they

"' '3 the Russian-language broadcasting of

are]...committed to the principles of democracy,
Radio Liberty during the Carter years suffered from partisan programming by Russian
nationalists. ' '4

Two different authors wrote the separate CRS reports on Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty. Joseph Whelan, the sole person listed as a specialist on Russian and East
European studies in the Congressional Directory for 1971 or 1972, wrote the report on

Radio Liberty. James Price, who was not listed as a CRS specialist in any subject area in

the Congressional Directory for those years. was stated in an annex to the CRS report he

43

wrote to have been appointed an analyst in National Defense at CRS in 1971.l '5 As
Fulbright learned from the annex to the CRS report, Price had at one time been a CIA
employee.

Both CRS reports failed to present any negative assessments, though the CIA
connection was specified in the RFE Report.I '6 The authors quoted liberally from internal
documents and statements supplied by executives of the Radios. In addition, they referred
to the operations collectively, for example in the statement, "RL believes that its listeners
will be interested in hearing..." its broadcasts of songs by Soviet artists not played by the
state radio.' '7 Such passages revealed that, to a considerable degree, the reports' authors
were simply incorporating written statements supplied by executives of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty into their narratives. In places statements issued by them were
included as quotations, always furthering the general impression that they were well run
and doing a valuable service that was appreciated by both the peoples of their target
countries and by the Western European leaderships.' '8 The CRS reports, though skillfully
written, considered no arguments against the Radios. CRS research was considered
impartial, and the approbation given by the researchers involved was decisive in securing
support among both Senate and House Committees in 1972.

The report on RL by Whelan particularly stressed the contribution of the Radio
Liberty in broadcasting samizdat (mimeographed opposition materials initially passed
hand-to-hand to avoid detection) back to the Soviet Union, in effect serving as a sounding
board for dissent that originated within the Soviet Union.l '9 Congress also interested
itself in the role of RL in samizdat. A statement by prominent Soviet human rights

activist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, that whatever Soviet citizens knew of their country was

44

through Radio Liberty. became a kind of rallying cry for Congressional advocates of the
Radios.

Though many statements in the C RS reports contributed to painting a favorable.
detailed portrait of the Radios. Price made sure it was clear he was not explicitly
endorsing passage by the Congress of continued funding. While this degree of objectivity
was only to be expected in a report commissioned from C RS, the wording he used was
carefully considered. "It could be argued," he wrote in his report's summary, "that even if
RFE were extraordinarily well-managed, efficient and accurate in its research, balanced
in its commentaries. and well-received by its audience, the US. national interest might
yet require a change in control or the liquidation of the Radio...This study does not reach
any conclusions as to what role, if any, RFE might play within the broad context of

”'2" Such a disavowal undermined the power of Fulbright’s argument that

foreign policy.
the report was essentially a product of the executive branch.

Having sought the CRS reports, Fulbright acted strangely once they were received
by his office. He let them sit, neither distributing them nor notifying the Congress at large
that they had been completed. In February. 1972, House members, knowing that the
reports had been ordered, learned they had been sent to Fulbright some time before.
Reacting to the ensuing uproar, especially in the House and taken up by the press,
Fulbright defended his conduct, maintaining that he had not tried to withhold the reports
and stating that members of Congress were free to come by his staff's offices to examine
them. But this non-standard way of handling the reports showed his reluctance to

acknowledge their contents. In any event, critics in the House were not satisfied. They

felt that Fulbright was slighting the House in its role in foreign affairs, preferring to keep

45

prerogatives with the SCFR as much as he could. House members demanded open
distribution of the Reports. Fulbright finally had them inserted in their entirety in the
Congressional Record. Unlike other CRS commissioned reports, he never had those on
the Radios issued publicly as committee prints. Feeling they were written to support the
administration's position. he implied that the CIA had at some point sent Price, author of
the Radio Free Europe Report. to work at the CRS.'2' He had his biography, including
information about his former employment in the CIA. introduced into the record of the
1972 Hearings.'22

Events were shaping to put Fulbright’s back to the wall regarding the Radios.
though the gravity of his situation was not immediately apparent. His uncharacteristic
hi gh-handedness in sitting on the CRS reports, though they were not outright
endorsements for open government funding. bore witness to their highly favorable tone.
His conduct also suggests that he sensed widespread receptivity in Congress to the kinds
of arguments supplied by the Radios that were contained in the reports: they allowed
internal dissidents a voice; there was effective supervision and monitoring of program
content; they did not broadcast strident calls for uprisings; they called for evolution
within Soviet bloc societies. Additionally, the fact that the reports carried the imprimatur
of the C RS lent them authority within the SCFR. Fulbright failed in the 1972 hearings to
develop a point that he had himself made before, and that was notably absent in the CRS
reports. Borrowing phrasing supplied by the Radios themselves, the CRS reports skirted
whether the United States had a right to busy itself in the internal affairs of other nations.
in the sense of a constant stream of detailed reporting on, and critical analysis of. regime

practices and decisions to their populations.

46

In February, 1972, President Nixon made a historic visit to Peking. In May, he
visited Moscow and concluded agreements on Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems and certain
offensive weapons. In Moscow, Nixon stated that "'We believe in the right of each nation
to chart its own course, to choose its own system. to go its own way without interference
from other nations.” ' 23

On May 10. 1972, Nixon issued a statement in support of the Radios that stole the
ground from under Fulbright. Skirting the antagonism to the Radios by regimes within
the Soviet-bloc. the issue of the Radios’ clandestine past, and of the rancorous political
debate that had taken place on them earlier in the year within the conference committee.
he stated that the Radios "'are expressions of our profound conviction that a...free press
plays an indispensable part in the social and political processes...” The thrust of his
remarks was that the Radios were ensuring the free flow of information. a principle of
long-standing within the United States and consistent with the national interest.

Nixon stated that he was appointing a Commission on lntemational Broadcasting
to study the viability of government support for the Radios and to make
recommendations on long-term provisions for them by the following February. This
requested submission date would make the report available as Congress considered
legislation for FY 1974. The commission, headed by Milton Eisenhower. would assess
the Radios' value in the context of current international political realities. As was true
earlier with the Katzenbach Committee, the Presidential Commission was made up of
people who were in one way or another affiliated with the executive branch: besides the

former President's brother. it included Edward Barrett, who had served as an Assistant

Secretary of State for Public Affairs. John Gronouski. former ambassador to Poland.

47

Edward Gullion, a former Foreign Service Career Minister, and John Roche, a former
special consultant to the President. Gronouski had been a witness in favor of the Radios
at the 1971 House Hearings.

While. unlike the Commission specified in 1971 in the House version of S. 18.
this one would have no funding authority, it was charged with the same study
responsibilities. However. the President’s board would not include such features of that
measure as a tripartite board, consisting of administration officials, members of Congress.
and experts in the field of telecommunications. and as such left the initiative entirely in
the hands of the executive branch. Further, because Nixon asked the commission to make
its report by February 1973, it would only have nine months to gather its information,
instead of the twelve months the earlier proposal had allowed. The shortened time frame
would make for a more cursory report.

By allowing further deliberation, Nixon avoided prejudicing Congress before it
had adequate information. By appointing a commission, he could ensure that its members
would be respected in Congress and yet, from his perspective, “safe” in their views that
international broadcasting was consistent with the US. national interest. By asking the
Commission to make its report by F ebruary, 1973, Nixon was demonstrating patience.
accepting that the current session of Congress would again give the Radios temporary
funding. in its expectation that a more conclusive decision should await the
Commission’s findings. The wait would raise their profile when they became available. It
was almost certain that the report would recommend, as Nixon wished, long-term

124

government funding with an institutional basis outside the State Department. He would

gain from the agreement of the new report with the positive tenor of the GAO and

48

Congressional Research Service reports.

The SCF R chairman brought up Nixon’s May 10 statement at the 1972 SCF R
Hearings. He implied that the President was, by supporting the Radios, contradicting the
very diplomatic achievements just made with the Soviet Union and China. Fulbright
alleged inconsistency between Nixon’s statement in Moscow in February. 1972, “We
believe in the right of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go
its own way without interference from other nations,”'25 and his support for the Radios.
Fulbright questioned the convergence of Nixon's statements: "I don't quite see how it
[Radio Free Europe's and Radio Liberty's broadcasting] is consistent with the President's
statement of principles of what he is apparently trying to achieve in both Russia [sic] and
China. It seems to me inconsistent with it. even if it isn't propaganda, if for no other
reason than the assumption that we are dealing with benighted people who are so ignorant
and backward we have to enlighten them even on daily news events..."'26 In the 1971
hearings Fulbright had already drawn the same conclusion: "I think to continue to try to
stir up trouble in Eastern Europe and in Russia is contrary to the President's own policy."
He then referred to the "daily insults" issuing from the Radios'27

In 1972 both the House and the Senate forestalled a repetition of the prior year's
delays that jeopardized passage of the necessary legislation to keep the Radios afloat for
the coming year by passing bills making appropriations for them. The normal sequence of
legislation, which starts with authorizations. was not adhered to.'28 The makeup of the
SCFR in 1972 was the same as in 1971, except that Charles Percy (R-IL) had replaced
fellow Republican Scott. Percy immediately made his presence felt, arguing for US.

governmental support of the Radios. In the June 6 and 7 hearings U. Alexis Johnson

49

appeared as an administration witness. Fulbright's attitude had not improved. His
perception of the Radios as contaminated by past administrations' duplicity was only
reinforced by the Nixon administration's continuing silence on the CIA's prior funding of
the Radios. Past duplicity convinced him that more of the same was at work. He had
already negatively impressed the Undersecretary during the latter's confirmation hearings
in 1969, in which Johnson "sat. feeling rather like a criminal defendant...I have never
felt...under more unfriendly pressure."'29 Fulbright no doubt had some disapproval of
Johnson as the former deputy ambassador in Vietnam and participant in the "nation—
building" project there from 1964.

The Undersecretary, at the hearings on the Radios, again felt under attack by the
"perpetually hostile Chairman Fulbright,"I30 though Johnson held his composure.
Responding to the question whether "there are no Government people...present in the
operations of these Radios today?", he answered: “(A)s of today, as of the present time.
there are no US. Government employees, and that includes employees of the CIA
employed or engaged in the operations..." Fulbright considered that this must be parsing
words and pressed further: "Well. does this mean that there are no employees presently
there who were in the CIA but have been transferred--their pay--to Radio Free Europe?...l
don't see why we get bogged down in this kind of a controversy because you know very
well that other reports that we have had clearly state that there are such people giving
guidance." ' 3 '

Fulbright did not feel that there was a valid human rights role for the Radios,

despite their dissemination of samizdat. It is not clear whether he would have been in

favor of private individuals in the West publicizing samizdat materials both in the West

50

and back to the East. but he did not favor a US. government mission to do so. He was
convinced that détente was threatened by what he perceived as the Radios' interference in
the internal affairs of other countries. Because of what he had come to see as the
immorality of US. arrogance of power, he was determined in the early 19705 to look
critically on how the US. implemented its human rights' goals elsewhere in the world.

Facing F ulbright, who had not budged in his opposition to the Radios, Percy
emerged in the 1972 hearings as the dominant advocate within the SCFR. Fulbright
labored. at times disjointedly, and not in the methodical. rhetorically adept style that
characterized his writing. The Illinois Senator was able to parry Fulbright’s objections
and mount a cohesive argument. He was not tangled emotionally, while Fulbright saw the
administration about to have its way yet again, despite the Radios’ clandestine past and
the overall tendency of Nixon, like past Presidents of both parties, to skirt Congress on
foreign policy.

After the 1972 public hearings and mark-up session. the SCFR voted 10-3 to
approve legislation that provided an additional year's funding for the Radios. This
decision appeared in the Committee report, written this time not by Fulbright but by
Percy.The bill again placed them under the aegis of the State Department, pending the
delivery by February 1973 of the report of the Presidential Study Commission to help
determine if they merited permanent continuation, and if so, what form of long-term
administrative apparatus for them was best. The three SCFR members who voted against
the bill were Fulbright, Mansfield and Symington.”2

The Presidential Commission on lntemational Broadcasting delivered its long-

awaited report in February 1973. It was the decisive blow to Fulbright’s cause. Its

51

recommendations carried considerable weight, despite their predictability, due to the
authority conferred by the President’s appointments to it. Also, the idea that such a study
by a commission was needed before Congress could make an informed decision on the
long-term future of the Radios had been considered (though rejected) in the 1971
hearings. To a great extent, the President’s appointment of his Commission in May 1972
allowed the argument in 1972 hearings. as in the previous year, that no permanent step
should be taken until receipt of its report. Such reasoning led to Congress’ again limiting
the Radios to funding for one additional year, again under the State Department’s
administration as a temporary measure. Now that the report was in, it was as if the logjam
had been broken. The two-year period of disagreement and temporizing could yield as
Congress let a supposedly objective body give its supposedly authoritative judgments.
The report fulfilled Nixon’s expectations that the Commission would recommend
establishing a long-term governmental funding mechanism. The great majority of the
Commission’s recommendations would simply be carried over to Senate Resolution
1914, administration-generated legislation introduced into the 1973 hearings. It was
negative regarding options that had been proposed during the past two years that would
have limited the broadcasting operations’ autonomy, including continuation of
supervision by the State Department. It contended that “(t)he Commission does not
believe the stations could maintain their professional independence if directly linked to
the Department of State or USIA. A merger with the Voice of America would practically
eliminate the stations; and an agency status would likewise endanger their independence
while eradicating their corporate identity and thus threatening their license agreements”

in the countries where they had broadcast and transmission facilities.'33 The report

52

recommended the establishment of a Board for lntemational Broadcasting to take over
supervision and detach the Radios. strictly speaking, from the government. The language
justifying elimination of other options was reminiscent of that already employed by their
executives themselves in written and in-person testimony to Congress, and suggested
that. just as in earlier reports, the Commission’s report incorporated statements supplied
to it. Surely intended to bolster the case for support. the report made no mention of the
former C IA involvement.

As the administration had proposed in 1971, the Commission recommended that
the President select all members of the board. The US. should continue, it maintained, to
be the sole source for the Radios’ operating funds. This assertion stemmed from its
determination that politics would likely interfere if various nations, having contributed
funds. sought to influence programming. The Commission’s unwillingness to push
burden-sharing for the Radios upon Western European nations was a major blow for
Fulbright’s case. He had been arguing that if these were worthy operations, the West
European nations, themselves pursuing détente with the East, could and should be major
contributors. He judged that if the Western European nations would not make major
contributions, a likelihood at least in the near term, it would reinforce his contention that
the Radios were in no way essential to achievement of viable détente, and in fact very
likely would obstruct it. The report indicated that in the Commission’s View, the world
situation would not be such as to reduce East-West tensions for some while into the
future. The Commission wrote that it considered broadcasting to the Soviet Union would
be necessary for the foreseeable future, while operations to Eastern Europe were less

predictable.

53

In arguing the desirability of the Radios, the Commission’s report drew on
conclusions from all the prior reports. In this way the SCFR, with Fulbright at its head,
had. by ordering the earlier reports, provided valuable evidence for supporters of the
Radios’ continuation. It must have been particularly galling to him that the new report. to
reinforce its conclusions, cited in support statements made at one time or another by one
Republican SCF R member and two Democrats, including Fulbright himself. from his
1963 book Prospects for the West.'34 On May 7, 1973, Nixon issued a statement that his
administration was adopting the Commission’s recommendations and sponsoring
legislation incorporating them. The administration sought full endorsement of a long-
range future for the Radios.

The makeup of the 1973 SCF R included former vice-president Hubert Humphrey
(D-MN), who proceeded to draft, along with Percy, S. 1914, to execute the
administration’s wishes for the Radios. Humphrey thus showed himself ready to contest
their future with Fulbright, despite the closeness of their positions on other matters. The
first witness was Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, who gave a strong
endorsement to the Commission's report. Supporting its conclusions as definitive and
disinterested allowed the administration to remain immune to potential charges that it was
attempting to dictate to Congress. Rush echoed the Commission's conclusion that the
US. should continue paying by itself for the Radios' operating costs, as soliciting other
govemments' contributions for any operations outside of their research reports would
likely entail participation in the management of the stations.'35 He cited the
Commission’s report that, given the situation within the USSR and Eastern Europe, for

the near term there was no expectation that the need for broadcasting services promoting

54

the free flow of information within the Soviet bloc would end. This estimate in particular
lent credence to the administration’s position that legislation for a long-term institutional
basis for the Radios was needed.

Percy emerged as the most engaged Committee member at the hearings,
interacting often with the witnesses. Summing up at the close of the hearings’ first day,
he spoke of how. the prior year, “(W)e did get 67 colleagues to join in support of the
stations. . .I am determined to see that the radios. . .receive their fair allocation. because of
the tremendous importance I place upon their work.”'36 He gave obeisance to the
scholarship and convictions of the chairman. “whose views in many areas I have such a
high regard for. . .”'3' By adopting such a tone, he astutely managed things so that while
Fulbright might vote against the Radios, he was partially mollified and, facing legislation
that would give them a permanent lease on life, made no desperate attempt to block it.
Percy was confident enough to state, in passing, “We will be putting about $30 million
into Radio Free Europe...” even while the Hearings were still ongoing.'38

Fulbright had entered the hearings in a foul mood. having seen copies of
purportedly official RFE correspondence from the RFE Polish desk chief to Polish
publication editors in the US, which portrayed Fulbright, and to a lesser extent Case, in
a very derogatory light. He was not readily placated by State Department officials and, at
least on the first day of the hearings. was less the master of the proceedings than in either
of the prior two years’ hearings.

The extent to which Fulbright had yielded to the inevitability of the bill getting
out of the SCFR is apparent. He left it to Percy to sum up the first day’s hearings with a

statement of support for the Radios. On the second day, immediately after the chairman’s

55

introductory statement. Percy congratulated him in a way that suggested his near-docility.
“I would like to state that the chairman has been extremely fair in conducting the
hearings, and all sides and points of view are being brought forward. I was very pleased
yesterday that, though he disagreed with the outcome, through his persuasive powers we
managed to get a quorum to adopt authorizing legislation for a supplemental for the
radios to ameliorate the impact of the unforeseen devaluation in fiscal year l973...on

”'39 Percy then continued with yet another statement of support for the Radios.

time.
speaking of their producing a “steady flow of objective reporting for the people of these
countries whose own media is so restricted and censored.”I40 Later, when Fulbright had
to leave the session. he turned it over to Percy, as co—author of S. 1914, to chair.

Milton Eisenhower was the second witness at the hearings. Reinforcing his strong
support for the Radios, he gave the Commission’s findings the added authority of the
appearance before the SCFR of a distinguished non-governmental person. Interchanges
with the committee, especially Percy. allowed Eisenhower and other commission
members who accompanied him ample opportunity to give an account of the process
through which they had reached their conclusions. From the commissioners and radio
executives. the Committee heard testimony on behalf of the Commission’s impartiality.
the nature of Soviet broadcasting, and the objectivity of the Radios’ reports. Typical of
Percy’s encouraging phrasing is the following, directed to RF E President William
Durkee: “I would like. . .to be as sure as I can be that what we are doing is in accord with
American foreign policy. ..Do you think that by your reporting accurately and fully. . .that
you are exerting a certain amount of pressure on the official radio of Poland [for

example] to catch up somehow?'4'

56

The hearings allowed the commissioners a forum to assert the importance of the
Radios’ role in percolating samizdat materials back into the USSR. as well as into
Eastern Europe. A point that dealt with the specific US. national interest appeared in
Eisenhower’s written statement. included in the record. “(W)e would fear a situation in
which the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe knew only what their rigidly-
controlled mass media permitted them to know. A misinformed or partially-informed
people could be pawns in the hands of party and governmental leaders.”I42

At the hearings, Eisenhower took up the issue of burden-sharing, which he noted
was a major concern raised by Congressmen that the commission had met. The “failure
of the European nations to meet fully their obligations in support of Western security”
was at issue. He felt it was unfortunate that because of this larger issue. Congressmen
inevitably linked their thinking about financing the Radios with the desire to get
European help in paying the costs of security-related enterprises whose benefits were
general. His conviction was that the Radios served the US. national interest and the
United States should continue to pay for them, so that their timely reporting would not
suffer from multiple masters. “(I)t would. . .practically kill the stations if they had to seek
consensus on everything they were going to say.”"'3

Fulbright raised the issue of the unanimity of the State Department and
Presidential Commission views. He pointed out that Barrett had been Assistant Secretary
of State for Public Affairs and head of the USIA. “He was sort of brought up on the idea
that government propaganda is a good thing. Mr. Gronouski. . .was former Ambassador to

Poland. . .”"'" He asked Rush if there was “anything in the Commission report with which

you disagree?” Rush replying negatively. he continued, “It is purely a coincidence. of

57

99 5
course. H

The chairman raised questions about duplication of US. information
dissemination efforts to the Soviet bloc. Referring to VOA, RF E and RL. he asked, “Do
they have to have three times the repetition solely from America. . .7” He said he would
probably agree that RFE and RL were needed if they were the only broadcasters giving
the US. point of view. He cited the number of European countries whose broadcasts
were also available to Eastern Europeans. “Are we to assume that the Germans. French,
Italians. and British broadcasts are not reasonably consistent with ours in the presence
[sic] of the truth?” He was concerned that the Commission’s support of the Radios in
their plans for modernization and increased transmission power indicated a resurgence of
East-West competition, which Fulbright hoped recent developments with the Communist
regimes would have lessened. He said to Eisenhower: “You yourself pointed out the
tremendous growth [of the number and power of international broadcasts of all
sorts]. . .Competing, you say. Therefore, you say, give us better facilities so we can
outcompete them.”'46

On the second day of hearings, Fulbright came back to the purported uniqueness
of the Radios. and whether they threatened détente. He claimed that “about 90
percent. . .whose main objective is to return to the old form of government” comprised the
Radios’ broadcasting staffs.I47 In the past, they could “make statements that we wouldn’t
want to be responsible for officially in the State Department, because they are offensive
to the respective government. . .It was all a fraud, but, nevertheless, that is the excuse. ..If
it is going to be now an official fully funded government operation, it is certainly going

to be responsible to the guidance and restraints of the government. . .”"'8 That meant the

58

Radios’ operation would not provide anything different from VOA broadcasts. He also
felt that the nature of Radio Liberty’s broadcasting “raises the question of sincerity of our

”'49 Fulbright continued to

Government in these gestures of reconciliation with Russia.
wrangle with supporters. using arguments that were not always consistent with one
another.

Javits applauded during the Hearings the work the Radios were doing by giving
Soviet bloc citizens information on the taxes levied on Soviet emigrants as an

”'50 He did not conceal the United States’ own

“expression of our humanitarian interest.
“troubles about openness...secrecy, Watergates, and other things...”, but he felt that the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were far behind the United States in governmental
transparency.'5 ' In the second day of hearings, the Watergate troubles at home came up
again, but Javits saw no inconsistency between knowing that government lies were
occurring at home and believing that the Radios were doing responsible reporting.'52
Aiken was perhaps the best hope Fulbright had to gain an additional negative vote
on the SCF R. He was still making up his mind on whether the US. should continue the
Radios, if it meant it would foot the great majority of the costs. He recollected that during
the previous year’s hearings, the SCF R had stated that its future continuation of support
for the Radios would rely on their soliciting some of its funds elsewhere. But, he fumed.
“They have not done one thing that the committee asked to have done during that
time.”'53 Nor had RF E been willing to make publicly available information about which
US. corporations had made contributions. He also wanted to see exploration of getting

contributions from European companies with American subsidiary plants.

Arthur Goldberg. a former UN. Commissioner on Human Rights, testified that in

59

his view the Radios no longer served their purpose. since the truth could as adequately be
gotten out by the Voice of America. Paul Bartlett. again a witness as he had been at the
1971 SCF R hearings. argued against retaining the Radios as they now existed. He
considered that the Presidential Commission’s members did not have the background to
appraise the Radios. and that its report had rubber-stamped previous executive branch
wishes. He brought a comprehensive plan to the hearings.'54 Citing a remark of
Humphrey’s. that commercials outdid blatant propaganda, he proposed folding all the
US. overseas broadcasting operations into one corporation, which would have a
requirement to continue service to the same countries, and would be required to move
toward functioning on a commercial basis.

For the first time in the three years of SCFR hearings, émigrés were present to
give testimony in behalf of the Radios, a further sign that Fulbright was yielding in the
use of his influence to try to affect their fate. One of two e’migré witnesses, Roman Karst.
had also testified at the 1971 House Committee hearings. The émigré witnesses painted a
picture of the extent to which the intellectual elite in the USSR and the general
population in Eastern Europe relied on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe for
encouragement.

Percy submitted the SCF R’s report after its 10-3 vote in favor of S. 1914. The
three negative votes were the same members who had cast negative votes in 1972:
Fulbright, Mansfield. and Symington.'SS The Board for lntemational Broadcasting’s
members. selected for staggered six year terms, would be Presidential appointees from
civilian life. The SCFR report authorized $50 million for FY 74 for the Radios. The third

set of hearings gave them 67% more than they had received after the first year’s hearings.

60

In addition, as recommended by the Presidential Commission's report, there was to be
sole U.S. government-based support for the Radios' operations, without any attempt to
procure contributions for operations from Western European sources. Again, Fulbright's
principle of multilateralism and burden-sharing had been overridden by Congressional
agreement to the executive branch's interest in an undiluted radio message. In the last two
years of the hearings, Fulbright was only able to get two other Democratic members, and
no Republicans, to agree that the Radios had outlived their purpose, or that there was too
great a hazard that they would not serve the national interest. Most fundamentally, his
attempt to make them an issue over which to curb Presidential power had been
unsuccessful.

Fulbright articulated his points of opposition to US. government support,
especially sole support, for the Radios one last time in the “Additional Views” section of
the SCFR report. Much more masterfully than during the public hearings, he went over
the ground that he had been working to establish in the Senate since 1971.

In F ulbright's last full year in the Senate, 1974, the SCFR again held hearings on
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, now as the Board for lntemational Broadcasting.
Fulbright did not attend. The Radios' continued existence was no longer in doubt. With
the prior year's SCFR, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate. and House
confirmation of the desirability of a Board for lntemational Broadcasting, the 1974 SCFR
hearings had a less contentious quality. They mapped out the financial needs of the
Radios for the coming year, provided the Board the opportunity to catalog their activities
in the past year, and considered the possible merger of some of their functions. The latter

is likely a legacy of the process through which Fulbright required justification for the

61

Radios' continuation and looked for duplication within the US. international
broadcasting effort. It was the only success Fulbright's quest against them achieved.
Why, during the period 1971-1973, was Fulbright unable to convert the base for
limiting executive power he enjoyed on the SCFR to a consensus to discontinue U.S.
govemmental funding of the Radios? The administration's representatives who appeared
before the Senate and House hearings made a case that the new institutional basis for
these broadcasting operations would be non-governmental. and would include prominent
private persons "chosen for their knowledge of foreign affairs, their experience in the
news media field. and their ability to insure that the grants are disbursed in the national
interest...(M)embers that were appointed to the [Radios' administrative board]...would be
nongovernmental personnel."'56 This argument, seemingly guaranteeing the independent
voice of the Radios, lulled members of the SCF R into authorizing a future for them.

The favorable contents of the GAO and CRS reports also limited the opposition
Fulbright could garner. The deliberative process, by which Nixon appointed his
Presidential Study Commission which then reported favorably, was designed to show that
enough patient consideration had been given to verify the Radios would not go off half-
cocked in ways detrimental to US. interests or détente. The lengthy process he accepted
in gaining the desired international broadcasting board to oversee them was also an
instance of the President engaging the Senate fully in its "advice and consent" role. Thus.
executive branch secrecy and its tendency to act without informing Congress, so
prominent in the history of the Radios, which brought Fulbright to oppose them, had
given way to a different approach by the executive branch. The President, who was a

canny politician. chose this way to solicit approval for them. while at the same time

62

continuing to act independently in a number of other areas. Particularly in light of the
past concealment of the broadcasting operations’ covert past by administrations of both
parties. Congress was more grateful for the collaborative approach of the President than
critical of him for his participation, until forced to proceed openly, in the deception.

The authority of the Presidential Commission report's conclusions played a
considerable role. Taking its cue from that report, the 1973 SCF R Committee Report
recommended that the US. continue as the sole supporter of the Radios' operations,
despite the previous concern among a number of SCFR members that there should be
burden-sharing. The furor in the press and House about F ulbright's tactics to suppress the
CRS reports dampened SCFR members' willingness to take any political risk to help
block funding when there appeared to be considerable Senatorial, House and public
support for them.

Emigre’ advocates argued effectively at various hearings. Speaking of their own
experience and that of people they knew well, they described the impact the Radios had
on keeping hope for change alive in the Soviet bloc. They were effective in suggesting
that it would be poor economizing to sacrifice the prestige the United States. as the
sponsor, had among the peoples of Eastern Europe and among Russian dissident elites.
They emphasized the plight of people hungry for accurate news of their own nation and
the broader world. but restricted to a highly filtered presentation of events. The
reasonable tone of the e'migré witnesses served to disarm Fulbright’s contention that the
émigré broadcasters would inevitably serve their own aims.

The Radios spoke effectively on their own behalf. Their presidents went before

the Committees. Accounts they collected internally and submitted for the record were

63

proof that their staffs had the capability to comprehensively dissect an issue and consider
it fully. That strategy was effective in gaining the respect of, and support from. Congress.

Unlike Fulbright, most members of the SCF R and the Senate did not view the
Radios as a legitimate or necessary platform on which to challenge the executive branch.
For Fulbright the issue of support was a matter of principle, maintaining curbs on the
executive branch. and an emotional issue, since beginning during the Johnson
administration he had challenged the Presidents about acts of duplicity. Other members
of the SC FR were not emotionally involved in the outcome of the struggle over the
Radios. There were other concurrent issues on which the SCFR could register its
intention to insist on more of its advice and consent role and oversight function in US.
foreign policy, many of which the SCFR reported out to the Senate. Other members of
the SC FR saw the dissemination of information to the Soviet bloc peoples about their
internal affairs as a justifiable precaution against regimes stirring up hatred against the
West. Fulbright saw it as a failure to move toward greater respect between East and West
that could improve the prospects for peace in the world.

Congress, though during these years it had been roused to challenge executive
branch conduct on specific issues, did not find the history of the covert governmental
relationship with the Radios a compelling reason for abandoning them. The 1973 draft
legislation stated that their funding was now to be done through Congressional approval.
the Senate would have to confirm the Presidential appointees to the BIB, and the BIB
would come to Congress to report annually. The general mood of Congress was that these
provisions ensured it would have a desirable amount of input into the Radios’ conduct.

Fulbright differed from many Senators in the lesser importance he gave to

64

continuing to go on record against Soviet bloc human rights abuses. He was deaf to
arguments on behalf of the Radios that ascribed to them a significant role in guaranteeing
human rights internationally, while this was a matter that registered strongly among
fellow Committee members, Democratic or Republican. The majority of the SCFR. and
of the Senate as a whole, valued the part the Radios had assumed in giving activities and
statements of Soviet human rights activists greater circulation in the Soviet bloc. The
majority of the SCFR believed that the Radios could play a pragmatic role in moving the
Soviet bloc regimes towards greater accountability to their own people.

Fulbright spoke to Milton Eisenhower at the 1973 hearings of what he considered
the very great potential for détente in 1960 that foundered due to the U-2 incident.'5' His
remark demonstrated that he felt a considerable degree of accommodation to Soviet
power was in the US. national interest. Due to his long-standing combative posture
against right-wing propaganda in the United States, it seemed to him important to oppose
the Radios as a means to block U.S. dissemination of propaganda abroad. Other SCFR
members appeared less suspicious. and accepted their claims that they were there to
convey objective information to peoples who were deprived of it, at little true cost to the
West's ability to conduct détente with the Soviet bloc. While Fulbright maintained that
the Radios sought to shake Eastern Europe and the USSR. free of Communism, there
were many Senators who felt that information about the conditions in Communist
countries supplied to the Soviet and Eastern European peoples by international
broadcasting served the US. national interest. Fulbright equated the true US national
interest with respect for differences in how other nations conducted their affairs, a posture

which he judged conducive to peace in the world.

65

While Fulbright was not successful in getting Congress to follow him on the issue
of the Radios. concerns that motivated him in his opposition to them absorbed the SCFR
around the same time. SCF R Committee Reports during the early 19705 show that a very
considerable proportion of bills reported out of the SCF R involved assertion of
Congressional authority, suggesting that he was influential in rousing the Committee to
act. The assertion of Congress’ authority in tandem with the executive branch in foreign
affairs extended far beyond the specifics of the war in Indochina. A bill to repeal the
Formosa Resolution was reported out favorably in 1971, marking a retrospective
limitation on a specific authority previously granted by Congress to the President's" The
SCF R, in its report "Providing Foreign Military and Related Assistance Authorization for
1972." required "that the President submit a country-by-country list of foreign aid
allocations and notify Congress in advance of any increases beyond 10 per
cent...(p)rohibition of waiving by President of the ceilings on military aid and sales to
Latin America and Africa [and] (r)equirement of advance notice to Congress before
Presidential use of transfer, waiver, and certain other special authorities.”'59

The SCF R report "Providing Foreign Economic and Humanitarian Assistance
Authorization, 1972," also recommended a check on Presidential prerogatives to
impound funds appropriated for domestic programs by mandating that, in order for
foreign aid and military sales funds to be released, the impounded funds should be
released.'60 This report’s call for restriction of authorizations of the USIA (and thus of its
VOA international broadcasting operation) to a year-by-year basis ran parallel with
Fulbright's strategy of restricting the Radios to a single year of funds for FY 72 and FY

73. Besides indicating there would be no carte blanche for future expenditures, the SCFR

66

implied. through its 1972 hearings, that it would be looking closely, in the next round of
funding. at the viability of international broadcasting in the current world political
climate. The report further stipulated shifting economic aid to a multilateral basis, [and]

"'6' A call for a multilateral basis for

phasing out [of the] bilateral loan program.
economic aid was reminiscent of Fulbright's insistence on gaining substantial
contributions from Western European allies for the Radios if they were to continue.

In another curb to the executive branch, the War Powers Act, first considered in
the SCFR in 1971, and passed by Congress in 1973, served to define the extent to which
the President had the authority, independent of Congress, to commit US. troops to
military action. Legislation to curb Nixon’s ability to bomb Cambodia was being
considered concurrently with the 1973 SCFR hearings on the Radios, and in fact at the
hearings SCFR members made clear their wish to brake the President on the matter. The
issue of executive branch accountability, though not one that the SCFR majority viewed
as fundamental to their decision on supporting the Radios, would be taken up by the
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (Church Committee) of the United States Senate in 1975.'62 Fulbright shared
the concern with other members of Congress about a reassertion of its role, and Congress
as a whole proved ready to act on it.

Fulbright got away from his SCFR consensus with regard to the Radios because
he painted with too broad a brush when assigning them the full weight of executive
branch dishonesty and its heedlessness of Congress. In the face of close collaboration.

beginning in 1971, between their executives and the State Department as they sought to

gain Congressional support for public funding, Fulbright in general struggled with how to

67

provide SCF R leadership in foreign affairs while unable to believe in the honesty of the
executive branch.

Of the nine Democrats and seven Republicans on the SCF R in 1971, only
Democrats Fulbright. Sparkman, and Spong. and Republicans Aiken and Case, attended
the public hearings on the Radios. The low turnout continued for the 1972 and 1973
hearings when. combining Democratic and Republican members, only seven and six
SCFR members, respectively, attended. In 1972, the new attendees were Symington.
Javits. McGee and Percy (himself a new member of the SCFR.) In 1973, the only
member attending who had not also been present at the 1972 Hearings was Humphrey.
The low numbers attending were characteristic of SCF R hearings.

There were six Democrats and four Republicans who attended at least one of the
public hearings, though in 1971 and 1972 there were two more Democrats than
Republicans on the SCFR, and in 1973 three more. Some SCFR members failed to attend
the public hearings on the Radios consistently all three years (Democrats Mansfield.
Church, Pell, and Muskie; Republicans Scott and Pearson) and of other members for any
of the hearings during which they were SCF R members (Democrats George McGovem-l
(D-SD); Republicans Mundt-l , Cooper-2, and Robert Griffin-l (R-MI)). In 1971, there
were three Democrats attending the public hearings compared to two Republicans. In
1972. the number of attendees were four Democrats and three Republicans. In 1973. the
decisive year for the Radios when the hearings considered, and reported out, a bill that
gave the Radios a new, permanent institutional basis. three Democrats and three
Republicans attended.

Mansfield and Symington. the only members who voted with Fulbright against

68

funding for the Radios in 1972 and 1973. differed in that Symington attended in 1972,
while Mansfield did not attend any of the public hearings. A number of Democrats who
did not attend any of the public hearings voted to fund the Radios in both 1972 and 1973:
Church. Pell. McGee. and Muskie. Sparkman attended all three years and voted in each
year to give funding to the Radios. Besides Fulbright and Sparkman, the only member to
attend all three public hearings was Aiken. the senior Republican on the SCFR, while
Percy attended public hearings in 1972, the year he became a member of the Committee.
and 1973. Democrats Humphrey and McGovern became members of the Committee in
1973. but only the former attended that year’s public hearings. The record of attendance.
while difficult to interpret. shows that there was not any clear demarcation between
Democrats and Republicans. This was reflected by the bipartisan support for continued

funding for the Radios that emerged after 1971.

69

Part III. Postscript

Events showed that Fulbright's concerns about future US. government (especially
executive branch) influence on the Radios were not entirely without foundation. He was
convinced throughout the hearings that, despite claims to the contrary, the executive
branch was not going to keep its hands off them if they were continued. He considered
that their autonomy would continue to be an illusion as long as the government paid their
expenses. There is no evidence that he knew what was later revealed. that even at the
time covert CIA funds were denied to the Radios. the C IA’s contact person with the
Radios since 1950, Cord Meyer, was generating together with the State Department
legislation that the administration would submit to Congress as a substitute for Case’s
proposal.I63 But he would not have been surprised.

Part of the rationale for Congress’ supporting the Radios was that Nixon. at the
time S. 1914 was introduced by Percy and Humphrey, indicated he would select the
members of the Board for lntemational Broadcasting (BIB), which would supervise the
Radios, from fields related to foreign policy and mass communications.""' The BIB, as it
emerged, was neither representative of the cross-section of people prominent in the
various realms of civic and professional life. as the administration’s 1971 S. 1936
provision for a American Council for lntemational Broadcasting had set forth, nor chosen
from specialists in mass communications. but showed an unmistakeable executive branch
complexion.

Fulbright had maintained from the 1971 hearings that the executive branch would
be unwilling to let the Radios be autonomous, and the personnel of the BIB certainly

allowed for persisting executive branch influence. Its first president was David Abshire,

70

Nixon's former Assistant Secretary of State and Special Assistant for Congressional
Relations. Serving as another of its initial three board members was F oy Kohler, former
ambassador to the Soviet Union and former director of the VOA, the official US.
government radio mouthpiece. By the Reagan years, Frank Shakespeare, former head of
the U.S.I.A.. the parent organization for the VOA under Nixon, became head of the BIB.
Further cementing the ongoing linkage between the executive branch and the Radios was
the continuing tenure as president of Radio Liberty Committee for two years after 1973
of Howland Sargeant, who was assistant secretary of state during the Truman
administration, and who as RL president had been working under direct CIA supervision
for years. '65

Fulbright was in the political vanguard in his dissent to the Vietnam War,
overweening executive branch power, and overextension of American capabilities in the
world. On each of these issues, Congress, in general with public support, in time adopted
a position resembling his and in so doing, vindicated him. In the early 19705, any curbs
set in motion by Congress to the Executive's hegemony would have had to originate in
the Senate. Using the Radios as a test case, he saw the opportunity to get the SC FR and
the Senate as a whole to act to restrict the Executive's overweening influence. The House
during the second half of the 19605 had remained tractable to executive branch wishes
regarding foreign policy. Even with a Republican President in 1969, the House remained
largely pliant.

F ulbright, better informed about the nature of a communist threat than many other
officials, and feeling by 1971 that US. foreign policy was discredited. was against US

participation in any form of propaganda and suspicious when told that institutions that

71

had been employed for propaganda purposes in the past might be reformed. He felt that
the U.S.'s misuse of its power dictated that the balance must be swung hard in the
opposite direction. abjuring involvements that might tempt further misuse by the US.
The Radios. even if they were given formal autonomy, would surely continue to be
responsive to the wishes of the US. government. The same fervor that prompted him to
look beneath the professed intent of US. actions such as giving military aid to
governments that were opposed to Communism, even when they themselves were
dictatorial. led him to be wary of being misled into support for any venture that could be
construed as emanating from a wish by the US. to better its position relative to the
Communist regimes. The issue of the Radios represents a case in which Congressional

action in keeping with his position was not belatedly taken.

72

BIBLIOGRAPHY

----- . CIS Index to Publications of the United States Congress. Washington, DC:
Congressional Information Service. 1971.

----- , Declassified Documents Reference System [microform], Washington, DC:
Carrollton Press, 1975.

----- , Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1965- .

Berman. William C. William Fulbright and the Vietnam War The Dissent of a Political
Realist. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988.

Binder. David. "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role." in New York Times 15
March, 1971, p. 10.

Chester, Eric Thomas. Covert Network, Progressives. the International Rescue
Committee, and the CIA. Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe, 1995.

Comptroller General of the United States and Radio Liberty. Report to the Committee on
Foreign Relations. US Senate. US. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972.

F ulbright, J .W. The Arrogance of Power. New York: Random House, 1966.

Fulbright, J .W. "Our Responsibilities in World Affairs. The Role of the Senate" in Vital
Speeches, XXV No. 17 (1959).

Fulbright, J .W. Prospects for the West. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Gordon, George N., Irving Falk, and William Hodapp. The Idea Invaders. New York:
Hastings House, 1963.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs. “Providing Assistance to Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty” (Report No. 541) in House Reports 92nd Congress 1 st Session Volume I-
4. Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US. Government Printing
Office. 1971.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings.
Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1971.

lntemational Information Education and Cultural Relations Committee (Stanton
Committee). International Information Education and Cultural Relations

73

Recommendations for the Future. Washington. DC. Center for Strategic and
lntemational Studies, 1975.

Jeffreys-Jones. Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy, 2nd edition. New Haven. CT:
Yale University Press. 1989.

Johnson. Haynes and Bernard M. Gwertzman. Fulbright The Dissenter. Garden City.
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968.

Johnson. U. Alexis with Jef Olivarius McAllister. The Right Hand ofPower. Englewood
Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984.

Lynn. Naomi B. and Arthur F. McClure. The Fulbright Premise: Senator J. William
Fulbright 's Views on Presidential Power. Lewisburg. PA: Bucknell University Press.
1973.

Mickelson. Sig. America 's Other Voice. The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty. New York: Praeger. 1983.

Price. James R. Radio Free Europe A Survey and Analysis. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 1972.

Puddington, Arch. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

Rositzke, Harry August. The CIA 's Secret Operations : espionage, counterespionage. and
covert action. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977.

Senate Appropriations Committee. Report No. 240 "Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty" in Senate Reports 92nd Congress 1 st Session Volume 1—2. Miscellaneous
Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information on the Committee on
Foreign Relations United States Senate (2nd Revised Edition). Washington, DC: US.
Government Printing Office, 1971.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Grants to Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty: conference report” (Report No. 691) in Senate Reports 92nd Congress 2nd
Session Volume l-l Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US.
Government Printing Office, 1972.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Importation of Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Materials. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1960.

74

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act
Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1961.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty" (Report
No. 319) in Senate Reports 92nd Congress 1 st Session Volume 1-3. Miscellaneous
Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty" (Report
No. 851) in Senate Reports 92nd Congress 2nd Session Volume 1-4 Miscellaneous
Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US. Government Printing Office. 1972.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings.
Washington. DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: report
together with supplemental views" (Report No. 356) in Senate Reports 93nd Congress 1 st
Session Volume 1-5 Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills. Washington DC: US.
Government Printing Office, 1973.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Economic and Military Foreign
Assistance Programs. A Compilation of General Accounting Oflice Report Findings and
Recommendations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program
Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1967.

Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers Part I
Hearings. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967.

Shanor, Donald. Behind the Lines. The Private War Against Soviet Censorship. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Sosin, Gene. Sparks of Liberty. An Insider 's Memoir of Radio Liberty. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

Tweraser, Kurt. “The Advice and Dissent of Senator Fulbright: A Longitudinal Analysis
of His Images of lntemational Politics and His Political Role Conceptions”, Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, American University, Washington, DC, 1971.

United States Congress. Official Congressional Directory. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1888- .

75

United States Congress. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the
Congress. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1874- .

United States Presidential Study CommissiOn on lntemational Radio Broadcasting. The
Right to Know: Report of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio

Broadcasting. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Whelan. Joseph G. Radio Liberty--A Study of its Origins, Structure. Policy, Programming
and Effectiveness. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1972.

Woods. Randall Bennett. Fulbright. A Biography. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995.

76

GENERAL REFERENCES

Abshire, David M. International Broadcasting. A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy.
Beverly Hills. CA: Sage Publications, 1976.

Alexeyeva. Ludmila. U.S. Broadcasting to the Soviet Union. New York: Helsinki Watch.
1986.

Brown. Eugene. .I. William Fulbright Advice and Dissent. Iowa City: University of Iowa
Press, 1985.

C one, Stacey. "Presuming a right to deceive: Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty, the C IA,
and the news media." in Journalism History 24 No. 4 (Winter 1998/ 1999), 148-156.

C ritchlow. James. Radio Hole-in-the-Head/Radio Liberty An Insider's Story of Cold War
Broadcasting. Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1995.

Downs, Calvin Wharton. “A Thematic Analysis of Speeches on Foreign Policy of
Senator J .W. Fulbright”, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, I963.

Famsworth. David N. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Illinois Studies in the
Social Sciences. Volume 49 Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

Fenno. Richard F. Jr. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
1973.

Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband. Foreign Policy by Congress. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979.

Fulbright, J .W. The Crippled Giant. American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic
Consequences. New York: Random House, 1972

Fulbright, J .W. The Pentagon Propaganda Machine. New York: Liveright, 1970.

Gordon. George N and F alk, Irving A The War of Ideas. America '5 International Identity
Crisis. New York: Hastings House, 1973.

Graebner, Norman. ed Ideas and Diplomacy Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of
American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. 1965.

Hale, Julian. Radio Power. Propaganda and International Broadcasting London: P. Elek,
1975.

77

Hayes. Louis D. "The Relationship of Problem Perception to Policy Making for Members
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations" in International Review of History and
Political Science IV No. 2 (1967).

Herlick, Gary. "J .W. Fulbright Democratic Senator from Arkansas" in Citizens Look at
Congress, ed. Ralph Nader Congress Project Vol. 1. Washington, DC. Grossman
Publishers. c1972.

Hinckley, Barbara. The Seniority System in Congress. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1971.

Hixson. Walter L. Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, C ulture, and the Cold War, I 945-
1961. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Holt. Robert T. and van de Velde, Robert W. Strategic Psychological Operations and
American Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings.
Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1973.

Kovrig, Bennett. Of Walls and Bridges. The United States and Eastern Europe. New
York: New York University Press, 1991.

Krugler, David F. The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-
1953. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2000.

Lehman, John. The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy Studies of the Nixon
Administration. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.

Lucas, Scott. Freedom '5 War The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union. New
York: New York University Press, 1999.

Mansfield, Harvey C. Sr., ed. Congress Against the President. New York: Praeger, 1975.

Meyer, Cord. Facing Reality From World Federalism to the CIA. New York: Harper and
Row, 1980.

Michie. Allan A. Voices Through the Iron Curtain. The Radio Free Europe Story. New
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963.

Morrow, William L. Congressional Committees. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
1969.

Nelson, Michael. War of the Black Heavens. the Battles of Western Broadcasting in the
Cold War. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997.

78

Powell, Lee Riley. J. William Fulbright and His Time. Memphis, Guild Bindery Press,
1996.

Rowson, Richard C. "The American Commitment to Private International Political
Communications: A View of Free Europe, Inc." in Clark C. Havighurst, ed. International
Control of Propaganda. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1967.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Expanded International Information and
Education Program Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office,
1950.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy
Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1969.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
Authorization Hearings. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1974.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The State of World Communism Hearings.
Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Shanor. Donald. “The New Voice of Radio Free Europe.” Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism, Unpublished Research Memorandum GSJ-68-l. (n.d. - approx.
date 1968).

Tyson, James. L. US. International Broadcasting and National Security. New York:
Ramapo Press, 1983.

Urban, George. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy. My War within the
Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997

Wettig, Gerhard. Broadcasting and Detente Eastern Policies and their Implicationfor
East- West Relations. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977.

Whitton. John 8., ed. Propaganda and the Cold War A Princeton University Symposium.
Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963.

79

NOTES

I. U. S. Congressional Record (CR hereafter) (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1874- ), 268.

2. CR 1966. 15673.

3. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR hereafter), Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty" (Report 319) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 2;
David Binder, "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role", New York Times, 15 March
1971 , p.10.

4. William Berman. William Fulbright and the Vietnam War. The Dissent of a
Political Realist (Kent. Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1967), 88.

5. Naomi B. Lynn and Arthur F. McClure The Fulbright Premise: Senator .I.
William Fulbright 's Views on Presidential Power (Lewisburg. PA: Bucknell University
Press. 1973), 150-151.

6. SC FR, Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings (Washington.
DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1972), 58.

7. J .W. Fulbright, Prospects for the West (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University
Press. 1963). 63.

8. Kurt Tweraser, “The Advice and Dissent of Senator Fulbright: A Longitudinal
Analysis of his Images of lntemational Politics and His Political Role Conceptions”
(Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1971), 256.

9. SCFR. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings (Washington, DC: US.
Government Printing Office. 1973), 25.

IO. Fulbright. Prospects for the West, 24, 66, 70.

I I. Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright. A Biography (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 335; Haynes Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman. Fulbright
The Dissenter (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968), 92; Tweraser, “The
Advice and Dissent of Senator Fulbright: A Longitudinal Analysis of his Images of
lntemational Politics and His Political Role Conceptions”, 598.

I2. Woods. Fulbright. A Biography, 178-191.

I3. Johnson and Gwerzman, Fulbright The Dissenter, 180; Woods. Fulbright. A
Biography, 506; CR 1961, 14433-39.

I4. Fulbright. Prospects for the West, viii.

15. ibid.. 33.

I6. SC FR, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 98.

I7. Fulbright, Prospects for the West, 36-3 7.

I8. SC FR. Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act Hearings (Washington.
DC: US. Government Printing Office. 1961), 13.

I9. Woods. Fulbright. A Biography, 332.

20. C R, 23861.

2 I. Lynn and McClure, The Fulbright Premise: Senator J. William Fulbright 's Views
on Presidential Power, 87, 92.

22. Fulbright. Prospects for the West, 71.

23. SCFR, Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings. 17.

80

24. SC FR, (1.8. Informational Media Guaranty Program Hearings (Washington,
DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1967), 9.

25. ibid., 49.

26. ibid., 14.

27. ibid., 10-11; 14.

28. ibid.. 14.

29. ibid., 15.

30. ibid., 44, 51. ~

3 I. SCFR. Materials Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials

Hearings. (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1960), 3.

32. SCFR, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 98.

33. ibid., 97.

34. CR. 17463; SCFR, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 124.

35. SCFR, U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program Hearings Hearings, 16, 11.
36. J .W. Fulbright, "Our Responsibilities in World Affairs The Role of the Senate" in
Vital Speeches, XXV No. 17 (1959), 531.

37. ibid.

38. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
Hearings. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 52.

39. Lynn and McLure, The Fulbright Premise: Senator J. William Fulbright 's Views
on Presidential Power, 156.

40. SCFR. Background Information on the Committee on Foreign Relations, v-vi.

4 I. Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky), 86-87.

42. Gordon, F alk, and Hodapp. The Idea Invaders (New York: Hastings House,
1963), 167.

43. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1989), 145, 153, 156-164.

44. ibid., 157-58.

45. Gene Sosin, Sparks of Liberty An Insider's Memoir of Radio Liberty, (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 132.

46. Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 160; Harry Rositzke. The
CIA 's secret operations .' espionage, counterespionage, and covert action (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1977), 161.

47. CR 1967, 10566.

48. ibid., 3332.

49. ibid., 12589.

50. Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 163-4, 186.

SI. Declassified Documents Reference System (Washington, DC: Carrollton Press,
1975- ). 1996 No. 1267.

52. CR 1967, 10567.

53. ibid., 10565.

54. ibid.

55. ibid., 10565-66.

81

56. lntemational Information Education and Cultural Relations Committee,
International Information Education and Cultural Relations Recommendationsfor the
Future (Washington, DC. Center for Strategic and lntemational Studies, 1975), 74.

57. Sosin, Sparks of Liberty An Insider's Memoir of Radio Liberty, 133-34.

58. SC FR. Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings. 70.

59. CR 1968. 6259-61.

60. CR. 5725.

61. CR 327.

62. SC F R, “Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty” Report 319. 3.

63. ibid.

64. CR 16592.

65. ibid.

66. House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA hereafter). Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty Hearings (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,1971),5.

67. ibid., l 14- 15.

68. CR 16593.

69. SC FR, Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 124.
70. ibid.. 51.

7 I. SC FR. Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, I6.

72. SCFR, Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings. 123.
73. ibid.. 36-39.

74. ibid.. I 10.

75. ibid., 121-22.

76. SC F R, Funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 122.

77. SCFR Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings p.123.
78. Senate Appropriations Committee, "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty"
(Report No. 240) (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1971), 1.

79. SCFR, "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty" Report No. 319. 4.

80. ibid., 2.

8 I. ibid., 4.
82. ibid.. 6.
83. ibid.. 17.

84. SC F R, United States Economic and Military Foreign Assistance Programs. A
Compilation ofGeneral Accounting Office, Report Findings and Recommendations
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), iii.

85. CIS Index to Publications of the United States Congress (Washington, DC:
Congressional Information Service, 1970- ) 1971, 509-510.

86. SCFR, Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 122.
87. Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 185.

88. ibid.. 186.

89. CR, 28675.

90. Comptroller General of the United States. US. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
US. Senate (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), Appendix I, 71.
72-73.

91. SC FR. Public Financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings. 1.

82

92. HCFA, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings 1971, 18.

93. ibid., 49.

94. HCFA, “Providing Assistance to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty” Report
No. 541 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 3-4.

95. CR, 42211.

96. CR, 42214.

97. William L. Morrow, Congressional Committees (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons. 1969), 105.

98. SC FR, "Grants to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: conference report”
Report No. 691 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972). 2.

99. Comptroller General of the United States. US. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 7, 38.

100. ibid., 37, 61.

101. ibid., 14, 45.

102. SCFR, I972 Hearings, 19.

103. ibid., 21.
104. ibid.. 23.
105. ibid.. 17.

106. Comptroller General of the United States, U. S. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 62-63.

107. SCFR, 1973 Hearings, 122.

108. Comptroller General of the United States, U. S. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 69-70.

109. Comptroller General of the United States, US. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 5.

I 10. Woods. Fulbright. A Biography, 509-12.

111. Sig Mickelson. America 's Other Voice. The story of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), 47.

112. Comptroller General of the United States, US. Government Monies Provided to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 15-17, 29-30, 59.

113. Donald Shanor, Behind the Lines. The Private War Against Soviet Censorship
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 139.

114. ibid.. 136-137, 139-141.

115. United States Congress, Official Congressional Directory (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1888- ); James Price, Radio Free Europe A Survey and
Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1972), Annex 10.

116. James Price, Radio Free Europe A Survey and Analysis, 37.

117. Joseph Whelan, Radio Liberty--A Study of its Origins, Structure, Policy,
Programming and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
1972). 182.

118. James Price, Radio Free Europe A Survey and Analysis, 177-180.

119. Joseph Whalen, Radio Liberty--A Study of its Origins, Structure, Policy,
Programming and Eflectiveness, xx, 82-83 168-175 177-78, 186, 213-214.

120. James Price, Radio Free Europe A Survey and Analysis, 177.

121. SC FR, Funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings. 67.

122. ibid., 41-43.

83

123. ibid.. 2.

124. “Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents ----- , Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington DC:
Government Printing Office, 1965- ), 8 No. 20 (1972), 849—850; “Presidential Study
Commission on lntemational Broadcasting” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 8
No.33 (1973), 1221.

125. SC FR, F undingfor Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 2.

126. ibid., 70.

127. SC FR, Public Financing for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings.1 l 1.
128. CR, 27119.

129. U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius McAllister. The Right Hand of Power
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 517.

130. ibid.. 526.

131. SC FR, F undingfor Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings Hearings, 59.
132. SCFR, "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty" Report No. 851 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 5.

133. United States Presidential Study Commission on lntemational Radio
Broadcasting. The Right to Know: Report of the Presidential Study Commission on
International Radio Broadcasting (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office,
1973). 3.

134. ibid., 10-11.

135. SCFR, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 3].

136. ibid., 77-78.

137. ibid., 77.
I38. ibid., 141.
139. ibid.. 80.
140. ibid.

141. ibid., 36-37.
142. ibid., 65.
143. ibid.. 63.
144. ibid., 20.
145. ibid.. 55.
146. ibid.. 71.

147. ibid., 122.
I48. ibid., 108.
149. ibid.,109.

150. ibid., 55.
151. ibid.. 69.
152. ibid., 123.
153. ibid., 99.

154. ibid., 132-33.

155. SCFR. "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: report together with supplemental
views" Report No. 356 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973). 4-5.

156. HCFA, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings 1971, 11.

157. SC FR. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Hearings, 70.

158. CIS Index to Publications of the United States Congress 1971, 510.

159. ibid., 510-511.

84

160. ibid., 511.

161. ibid.,511.

162. CR 1433-4.

163. Sig Mickelson. America '5' Other Voice. The story of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty. 131-32.

164. CR, 28566.
165. Sosin, Gene, Sparks of Liberty. An Insider's Memoir of Radio Liberty (University

Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 185; Eric Chester, Covert Network.
Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA (Armonk, NY: ME.

Sharpe. 1995). 35.

85