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
De-Autocratization And Violent Outcomes: The Role  
Of Strategic Interaction And Information

presented by

Renee B. Agress

has been accepted towards fulfillment  
of the requirements for

Doctorate degree in Political Science



Major professor

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**DE-AUTOCRATIZATION AND VIOLENT OUTCOMES: THE ROLE OF  
STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND INFORMATION**

**By**

**Renee B. Agress**

**A DISSERTATION**

**Submitted to  
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **DE-AUTOCRATIZATION AND VIOLENT OUTCOMES: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND INFORMATION**

By

Renee B. Agress

The question posed in this research is a relatively straight forward question: when will de-autocratization lead to internal conflict. De-autocratization refers to the process by which an authoritarian regime transitions from its current regime type to a less restrictive regime type, whether the new regime is still authoritarian or embraces democracy. As such, the term de-autocratization encompasses the process of liberalization as well as democratization. Many scholars have focused on the process of democratization in an attempt to explain under what conditions democratization will succeed. In doing so, these scholars choose not to explore why democratization may fail. Additionally, research of this nature assumes that authoritarian regimes are interested in democratizing. In reality, many authoritarian regimes are willing to allow some degree of change but are not willing to democratize, at least not initially. The goal of this dissertation is to explore the process of de-autocratization in such a manner as to better understand when the process will lead to failure, specifically internal conflict.

In order to accomplish this goal, a series of game theoretic models are developed. These models focus on the strategic nature of the interaction

between various actors. A non-cooperative bargaining game is developed to explore the interaction between regime members. An incomplete and imperfect information model is developed in order to better understand how the regime interacts with civil society. It is vitally important to understand how the different actors interact with each other. It has long been argued that the regime is not a homogeneous collection of individuals but that the regime is composed of individuals with different goals and preferences. Yet the vast majority of the literature makes an implicit assumption that the regime acts as a single unit. If we are to understand how de-autocratization occurs, it is necessary to understand why the regime may choose to liberalize and how that decision is reached. It is equally important to develop a more complete understanding of how the regime interacts with civil society. The model developed in this research allows civil society to choose to demand liberalization even if the regime does not initially choose to open. This is necessary addition to past game theoretic work in the field of democratization as it more accurately represents how the process occurs.

The second half of the research develops an empirical model which explores the different outcomes of de-autocratization and the variables that influence these outcomes. A multi-nomial logit model is developed with the dependent variable broken into five categories: no conflict, coup, political unrest, minor conflict, and civil war. The outcome “no conflict” may include cases where liberalization, or even democratization, is successfully achieved.

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**For my parents**

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## **Chapter 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

While watching the evening news in recent years one would have to note the lack of militarized conflict between states. This lack of international conflict has led to questions from students and family members as to whether there is a need for scholars to continue to study war. The answer to this question is relatively easy. The lack of international war today does not mean that there will not be a war tomorrow.

Perhaps more importantly, while it may be the case that the international system has been devoid of interstate conflict in recent years, there has not been an absence of internal conflict in this time period. Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Russia, and Columbia are but a few examples of countries that have struggled with internal conflict in recent years.

The research question that this dissertation seeks to answer is: How does the process of democratization influence the likelihood of internal conflict in a given country?

A great deal of existing literature in the fields of comparative politics and international relations attempts to address the question of what causes internal conflict. Many of these studies focus on one type of internal conflict, such as civil war, coups, or everyday forms of resistance. It is rare that scholars explore how a country may find itself facing a civil war and not a military coup or political unrest, such as riots and violent protests. One of the goals of this research is to

demonstrate whether different domestic factors will influence what type of internal violence --a coup, political violence, or civil war-- a country may find itself facing.

While the question of internal conflict is in itself interesting, this research will focus on the outbreak of violence when a country attempts to democratize. Why? Nigeria, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Columbia, El Salvador, Russia, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Peru, Ecuador, and South Africa are but a few examples of countries that have attempted democratization and, because of this, have faced some type of internal conflict. It is not that the current literature fails to recognize that violent outcomes are possible, but that most of the literature is interested in explaining the cases of successful democratization, without considering how democratization may lead to internal conflict. Much of the literature dichotomizes democratization into cases where it succeeds and cases where it failed. In reality, failure occurs for many different reasons and in many different ways. If we are to understand why democratization fails, it is essential that we understand the different types of failure and how a country might find itself facing a coup, an increase in authoritarianism, or a civil war.

Additionally, there is an implicit assumption by many scholars and American decision-makers that democracy is the most desirable form of government. O'Donnell and Schmitter state, "The first general and shared theme is normative, namely, that the instaturation and eventual consolidation of political democracy constitutes per se a desirable goal." (1986, pg.3) This being the case, the approach taken to the study of democratization has been biased toward

understanding how democratization succeeds, with less emphasis placed on the question of how democratization fails.

While coups, increased repression, and civil war are all violent outcomes, they are different outcomes. A coup occurs when one part of the ruling regime, defined as the decision-makers who determine policy for the country, attempts to remove another part of the regime through the use of force. An increase of repression, or an increase in authoritarianism, occurs when the regime chooses to use force to silence or weaken some segment of civil society. Civil war occurs when there is armed conflict between different factions within a country and there are at least 1,000 battle deaths as a result of this conflict.

By paying attention to the difference in failures, we are forced to make more of an effort to understand how a country finds itself facing a civil war and not a coup. This focus forces us to develop a better understanding of why democratization fails, the different types of failures, and how internal conflict is one byproduct on this failure.

### **Democratization vs. De-autocratization**

I contend that the manner in which democratization-- in international relations and comparative politics-- is studied has led to a dichotomization of the outcomes. The very fact that the concept being studied is referred to as democratization leads to an emphasis on understanding how democracy develops. The study then focuses on democratization or not democratization as possible outcomes.

In his book, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), Huntington discusses waves of democratization and reverse waves of democratization. In his discussion of the reverse waves, Huntington lists countries where the reversal came through in the form of a coup, but he does not attempt to explain why some countries may find themselves facing a coup, others facing a civil war, and still others simply revert to an authoritarian regime without violence. The discussion of reverse waves can be found in pages 17-21 and 290-294, 10 pages in a book that is 316 pages long. Clearly, then, the emphasis is on explaining what, why, and how of democratization with a limited discussion about the causes of its failures. While Huntington is not the only scholar who writes on democratization, and this one book does not embody the entirety of his work or the entire literature, it serves as an example of how focused the democratization literature is on understanding success while assuming that failure is the opposite of success.

I believe that a part of the problem is the use of the term democratization. Huntington defines democratization as “the end of the nondemocratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and the consolidation of the democratic system.” (pg. 9) Huntington acknowledges that there is a difference between democratization and liberalization, “...a partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections.” (pg. 9) He also believes that it is difficult to determine if a leader or regime is initially interested in liberalization and democratization and includes cases such as South Africa in 1978 and the Soviet Union in 1985 in his research. (pg. 131-

134) Huntington is not the only scholar to make note of the difference between liberalization and democratization. O'Donnell and Schmitter and Przeworski also acknowledge this difference.

The debate between democratization and liberalization and how to tell when a country is liberalizing or democratizing could be solved if scholars were to focus on the overall process of de-autocratization. I define de-autocratization as the process by which a country finds itself decreasing the control of an authoritarian regime. The study of de-autocratization would allow for the including of countries that were liberalizing as well as countries that are democratizing.

Focusing on the process of de-autocratization would prevent scholars from falling into the trap of dichotomizing the outcome of the process. In much of the democratization literature the emphasis is placed on whether or not democratization succeeds, many times limiting the possible outcomes to democratization fails or democratization succeeds. If scholars were to focus on de-autocratization, the number and types of outcomes would change. The development of a consolidated democracy would be one outcome. Additional outcomes would include decreased authoritarian control and reversal of de-autocratization. Perhaps most important, de-autocratization would allow scholars to begin to unpack the many outcomes included in "failed democratization." Outcomes such as civil war, coups, political unrest, terrorism, and the like would receive equal time with the outcome of successful democratization.

Why is this important? Huntington includes the Soviet Union in 1985 in his discussion of the "Third Wave" of democratization. Since that time period, the



Soviet Union has ceased to exist with many of the Soviet republics becoming independent countries in their own right, a move initially resisted by the ruling regime headed by Gorbachev. More recently, violence has erupted in Chechnya, where a portion of the population has pursued the goal of autonomy from the Russian government. This violence can easily be attributed to the trials and tribulations that are part of the de-autocratization process. But Huntington's research does not discuss how to prevent civil war, only the steps needed to prevent the process of democratization from failing.

Does the re-occurring violence in Chechnya represent the failure of democratization in Russia? Regular elections have been held and the results have been honored. The elected legislature meets regularly and passes legislation. New political parties have been formed, and free speech is permitted. It is unclear to me how to code the case of Russia using Huntington's criteria: has it successfully democratized or not? The presence of internal conflict would indicate that some portion of civil society does not see the democratically elected officials in Moscow as legitimate, even in the presence of regular elections. The problem here is that the number of outcomes in the study of democratization has been limited.

The very nature of the study of de-autocratization requires that scholars are able to explain not only successful democratization or peaceful liberalization, such as in Iran, but also the violent outcomes such as coups, riots, terrorism, and civil war. Because of this research interest in violent outcomes, and wanting to insure that the research can accommodate liberalization as well as

democratization, the research question addressed will be: How does de-autocratization influence the likelihood of violent outcomes?

## **Chapter 2**

### **SYNTHESIZING THREE LITERATURES**

This research seeks to explain how the process of de-autocratization can lead to violent outcomes. To answer this question, it is necessary to review briefly the existing literature on democratization and internal conflict. A discussion of how this research differs from past research and what this research adds to the existing literature will follow the literature review. Finally, a review of the methods that will be employed while conducting this research and a chapter guide will be provided.

#### **Literature Review**

The research question under consideration in this work asks how does de-autocratization lead to violent outcomes? As such, the literature discussed below addresses some part of this question. While there are many scholars and volumes of literatures whose work could be included in this discussion, the author has limited the discussion to the peasant revolution literature, democratization, and game theoretic attempts to explain democratization. Additional literature will be discussed in future chapters as needed.

### ***Internal Conflict: Peasant Revolution***

One literature that focuses on the role of civil society in the face of political and economic change is the Peasant Revolution literature. This literature examines how peasants respond to change, what tools peasants have available, and how conflict arises in these societies. This literature is important to the study of de-autocratization as it focuses on the behavior of civil society in countries with an authoritarian regime. Additionally, it explores how economic shocks and changes can lead to internal conflict. The impact of economic change is one variable that scholars in the democratization literature agree influence the process of democratization. In reading the peasant revolution literature, we gain insight into civil societies ability to respond to change, which is vitally important, if we are to understand how de-autocratization can lead to internal conflict.

In The Moral Economy of the Peasant, James Scott explores why peasants resort to violence and why the violence rarely leads to change. Scott focuses on the role of the subsistence ethic in understanding peasant politics. He argues that peasants are primarily interested in survival and will resort to violence only when the village's survival is threatened. To survive, peasants have developed a "subsistence ethic" that includes the notion of reciprocity, forced generosity, communal land, and work sharing. (Scott, pg. 3) Landowners are expected not to collect rent if the peasant has been unable to produce enough to survive, to provide snacks to workers in the fields, and to provide food for struggling families.

Scott argues that the subsistence ethic clashes with capitalism and that this clash has led to increased conflict in pre-capitalist societies. As landowners begin to adopt capitalist practices, such forcing peasants as pay rent or preventing them from using communal land, the subsistence ethic is endangered. Yet these actions are not sufficient for rebellion. Scott states that a substantial shock is necessary for the peasant to rebel. (Scott, pg. 194)

Focusing on Southeast Asia, Scott points to three sources of income variability that can lead to rebellion: natural yield fluctuations, world market fluctuations, and mono-crop price fluctuations. Scott's research points to the role of economic change in pre-capitalist societies. When conditions are right, the regimes attempt to shift from a traditional economy to capitalist economy, which can lead to conflict. With the subsistence ethic under attack due to the developing capitalist economy, an economic shock can place peasants in a position where they are unable to survive. If the landowner is not willing to help the peasants, the peasants may choose to rebel. As such, it is the change in the economic regime combined with economic pressures outside the peasants' control of the peasants that can lead to internal conflict.

Benedict Kerkliet discusses the role of everyday forms of resistance in the Philippines. Everyday forms of resistance are defined as "considerable resistance by subordinate villages against the claims on them by wealthier people, capitalists, and the government and struggle for their own claims of what should be theirs." (Kerkliet, pg. 245) Kerkliet argues that this resistance is rarely

organized and attempts to remain hidden. Everyday resistance is important in four ways. First ...

“It may supplement what poor people have to live on... Second, it says that the absence of obvious discontent does not necessarily mean people are content or that stability prevails... Ordinary resistance is central to political discourse over the proper use and distribution of resources and how people should treat each other... Fourth, peoples’ subdued, unobtrusive discontent may also be the basis, in combination with other circumstances, for organized confrontational resistance” (Kerkliet, pg. 246-247).

Kerkliet looks at how the values of capitalism clash with the traditional values of the village. Capitalism appears to ignore two important values found in Philippine society-- that people with more should help people with less and that peoples basic needs must be satisfied. When these principles are ignored, conflict is likely. Like Scott, Kerkliet finds that peasant revolution rarely succeeds.

In Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World, Joel Migdal states “the twentieth century has been the century of peasant revolution” (Migdal, pg 226). Migdal focuses on how revolutionary organizations develop and garner support from peasants. He hypothesizes “that peasants participation in institutionalized revolutionary movements is an attempt on their part to solve certain individual and local problems through the immediate selective incentives offered by the revolutionary organization.” (Migdal, pg 227) Peasant support is gained with the promise of individual rewards. The peasants are faced with economic problems, normally stemming from an attempt to adopt a new economic system. To solve these problems, peasants may choose to join a revolutionary organization. If a political

leader is able to garner enough support from the peasants, then the leader may be successful in overthrowing the existing political regime, according to Migdal.

The peasant revolution literature stresses the role of economic change in order to explain why peasants might attempt to revolt. As a whole, the literature finds that most revolutions are localized, poorly organized, and fail. Migdal is one of the few scholars to attempt to discuss how peasants may become organized and how a revolutionary leader can keep peasants involved in the struggle against the current political regime. This literature is important if we are to understand how de-autocratization can lead to internal conflict as it focuses on the role of peasants, a large part of civil society in many non-democratic countries, and what it takes to mobilized them.

The democratization literature is essential to the study of de-autocratization. Democratization itself is one possible outcome of de-autocratization. Additionally, the democratization literature provides many valuable insights into what variables influence a regimes shift away from an authoritarian regime. As such, the discussion below will focus on two approaches to democratization. The first is the path-dependent approach. The second segment looks specifically at how game theory has been used in the study of democratization.

### *The Path-dependent Approach to Democratization*

To date, the majority of the research on this question has focused on de-autocratization as a path-dependent process. This means that focus has been

placed on the major events and what variables affect those events. While there has been a discussion of the actors involved in the process, it has been limited to interaction between civil society and the regime, leaving the interactions that occur within the regime and civil society largely untouched.

Przeworski (1991), Agress and Gates (1999), Huntington (1991), Rustow (1970), Dahl (1989), Bermeo (1992), and Casper and Taylor (1996), as well as others, view democratization in this manner. There is an initial struggle within the authoritarian regime; it can be violent or non-violent, which leads to the regime allowing increased political, economic, and social liberties. This in turn leads to civil society adjusting to the new openness of the regime and choosing to accept what is given to them or to seek additional liberties. The regime can choose to accept civil society's advances or it can choose to halt the process. Civil society can then choose to accept this, or to challenge the regime.

It is not that the path described above is inappropriate or inaccurate. I adopted this path while looking at the interaction between civil society and the regime. By focusing on the events and the variables that influence these events, we have limited our focus too dramatically. The body of literature to date has put forward a minimum of 27 variables believed to influence democratization, with many of the variables contradicting each other.<sup>1</sup> If we are able to move away from a path-dependent approach, then we can develop a more parsimonious model. The path-dependent approach implicitly assumes that a variables

---

<sup>1</sup> Huntington (1991) has compiled a list of the most common variables in the literature, which he presents in *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. A few of the variables listed are the absence of feudalism in society, a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society, communal homogeneity, and communal heterogeneity.



influence will last over the span of the entire process. In doing so, the impact of a given variable is most likely weakened. How so?

Economic variables are included in most studies of democratization. Huntington (1991) maintains that there are three ways that economic factors influence the process of democratization: economic crises undermined the authoritarian regimes, sufficiently high levels of economic development had been achieved allowing democratization, and rapid economic growth destabilized the authoritarian regime. Economic variables, then, behaved differently in many cases. Economic crisis, a sudden down turn in a country's economy, undermined the authoritarian regime, a negative relationship. The slow or rapid growth of the economy weakened the authoritarian regime, a positive relationship.

More important, the variable is looked at over the entire course of democratization. A sudden economic crisis or sudden economic growth serves as the initial catalyst starting the process. It influences the interaction of regime members among one another and it influences civil societies' internal interaction. A sudden crisis could be cause for the reformers taking control of the regime and beginning the process of de-autocratization as well as serving as the straw that broke civil society's backs and helped to unite some segments, at least temporarily. What happens if there is another change in the economy during the process? For example, there is a sudden improvement in the economy. Will the parts of civil society remain united or will some members choose to leave the movement because they have lost their reason for participating? Will the regime

stop making reforms because it feels that the crisis is passed and it no longer needs to placate civil society to remain in control? By focusing on a variable over the entire process of democratization, a variable's impact is weakened and not properly acknowledged. If the focus is turned to understanding the interaction between actors, we can allow the behavior of variables to alter, more accurately reflecting what influence the variables have.

Finally, the path-dependent approach looks at democratization as one continuous process, when in reality it is the culmination of a series of interactions over time. The regime and civil society do not interact one time; they interact on many occasions and over a variety of issues. Within the regime and civil society, there are discussions and actions taken that can influence the outcome. The outcomes from previous interactions will affect how each side behaves in later interactions. Did the regime back down on some issue? Does that mean it is weak and that civil society can exploit this? Did civil society push for some concession that caused the hard-liners in the regime to attempt an internal power struggle in order to halt the transition? By looking at de-autocratization as a series of repeated events, we are able to understand better how and why miscommunication between regime and civil society can occur, therefore understanding why the violent outcomes, such as civil wars, military coups, and increases in authoritarian control, can occur.

When we explore the process of authoritarian transition through the different types of strategic interactions, it becomes clear that the process is not path determined and that in looking at authoritarian transition in such a way, we

limit our understanding of the process and our ability to make predictions. By focusing research on these series of interactions, we will be able to understand better how the process of authoritarian transition works— while accounting for past experiences and the unique impact some variables will have on the role of various actors in the process.

If we assume that both the regime and civil society prefer to achieve their goals without the use of force, we would expect that de-autocratization would rarely be faced with a coup or civil war. The regime would only open when it knew that civil society would not challenge it. Civil society would only mobilize when it knew that the regime would not use force to stop the process. This requires that both the regime and civil society know how one will react to the other's next move, requiring complete and perfect information. The repeated interaction between members of the regime and civil society prevents this type of knowledge from existing, allowing for both actors to misjudge how the other will react to its decision. Civil society mobilizes believing that the regime will not respond with force and finds itself involved in a civil war because the regime is not willing to allow further liberalization.

The scholars who have studied democratization as a path-dependent approach have described many of the scenarios that I have laid out above, but none have attempted explicitly to model that interaction between the regime members and within civil society. By focusing on these sets of strategic interactions, as well as the actual interaction between civil society and the

regime, this research will help to develop a better understanding of how a country finds itself facing a civil war.

### *Authoritarian Transition Through the Eyes of Game Theorists*

Scholars have approached the question of democratization by attempting to identify the causes before understanding how the process works. Before we can begin to focus on the variables that affect the process, it is necessary that we develop an understanding of how the mechanism itself works. With that understanding, we will be able to understand better who and what is being influenced. Then we can address how they are being influenced. This research is intended to develop a blueprint of authoritarian transition by focusing on the strategic interactions within the regime, the collective action problem that civil society faces, and the strategic interaction between civil society and the regime. If successful, this will help scholars better understand why such divergent outcomes are common and how those outcomes are reached.

Przeworski (1991), Gates and Humes (1997), and Agress and Gates (1999) begin to formalize the process of de-autocratization, which allows us to explore the more specific interactions between actors. The focus of the above works is on the interaction between the authoritarian regime and civil society. Each of these works allows for different regime types, although all assume in their formal models that civil society is one large actor with aggregated preferences.

Przeworski's (1991) model is a first attempt at better understanding how authoritarian transitions proceed. Przeworski identifies different regime types,

noting that liberalizers will open while hard-liners will remain closed, and different types of civil society, differentiating between moderates and radicals. In his discussion on civil society, Przeworski allows a dialogue to occur among the different types within civil society. The regime will react based on what civil society chooses to do. Przeworski acknowledges that civil society is not one large entity. While he does not include different types of civil society in his game, his inclusion of multiple actors in the discussion signals the need to acknowledge civil society as a more complex actor. Przeworski's model lays a solid foundation for the use of game theoretic models in the study of authoritarian transitions and provides both a theoretic and game theoretic model for future work.

Przeworski's model is an early attempt to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the transition process. In allowing interaction between the regime and civil society, he explicitly models the strategic nature of authoritarian transition in order to derive a series of propositions about when the regime will choose to open and how civil society should react to the regime's decision.

Gates and Humes (1997) build on Przeworski's (1991) model by allowing for incomplete and imperfect information.<sup>2</sup> Using Przeworski's model, they are able to demonstrate that including incomplete and imperfect information in the model would strengthen his findings. Not only do the results improve, but also the inclusion of incomplete and imperfect information more accurately reflects the real world. Civil society does not know how strong the authoritarian regime is.

Civil society may be able to read signals sent by the regime, but it does not know with certainty how devoted the regime is to reform or the maintenance of the status quo. In addition, Gates and Humes add a nature node at the start of the game that determines if the state is more or less committed to liberalization. These changes allow Gates and Humes to develop Przeworski's model further while more closely reflecting how the process of democratization works. Like Przeworski, they do not model the interaction that occurs between members of the regime and the different segment of civil society.

Agress and Gates (1999) further develop the Przeworski model by allowing for nature to determine if the regime is weak or strong and then allowing civil society the opportunity to choose to mobilize-- even when the regime chooses to remain closed. Additionally, Agress and Gates model the initial decision to open or not open as a two sided incomplete information game, increasing the opportunity for both sides to erroneously judge the type of opponent they are facing. While this is the first model to allow civil society the opportunity to mobilize no matter what the regime does, civil society is still treated as an aggregated actor.

The above research fails to take into consideration that the transition from an authoritarian regime is not a path-dependent process, but that the interactions between actors occur repeatedly. The interaction between the regime and civil society is not a one-shot game but repeats itself as the two actors negotiate over

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that Gates and Humes are interested in demonstrating how game theoretic results are strengthened when including the appropriate types of information sets and not to develop a new theory of authoritarian transition.

many issues.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, these works do not take into consideration the struggle within the authoritarian regime or the collective action problems faced by civil society when modeling the process.

Additionally, many of the above works imply that, at various points along the way, the process of democratization can stall. If the country begins the process at a later date, it is treated as a separate event and the process is traced from this new start date to its conclusion, whatever that may be. While convenient for analytical purposes, the assumption that democratization is a linear process is an inaccurate one. None of these scholars dismisses the role of history in predicting whether democratization succeeds or fails. But the manner in which the process is approached greatly discounts the effects that past attempts at democratization have on more recent attempts. By viewing democratization as a series of interactions among many different actors, we can allow for multiple iteration of these interactions if needed which is a more accurate portrait of the process.

### **What is Gained from this Research?**

This research seeks to answer the question: How does de-autocratization lead to violent outcomes? To answer this, it is necessary to approach the question in a different manner than previous research. First, it is important to understand that de-autocratization is a process that involves many actors. This is not a point lost on any of the scholars whose work is discussed in the previous

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<sup>3</sup> Huntington (1991) identifies many issues that a transitional regime must consider. He spends considerable time on the problem of how to deal with former leaders who committed human rights violations, the military, and other such issues of consolidation.

section; all include a discussion of the regime and civil society. What has been missing from the literature is a discussion of the interaction among the different actors. Before the regime interacts with civil society, regime members must decide what they are willing to offer civil society. This process can be contentious and lead to a faction in the regime choosing to attempt to remove another faction through a coup. Yet the interaction between the regime members is something that is not fully explored in much of the democratization literature. Those who do, such as Casper and Taylor, fail to include the possibility of a coup.

This research will explore authoritarian transition by looking at two distinct sets of strategic interactions: the power struggle within the regime and bargaining between the regime and civil society.<sup>4</sup> Each of these strategic interactions will influence the outcome of the process of de-autocratization.

### **The Role of Strategic Interaction**

Why is this important? In treating past attempts at democratization as a separate variable, the path-dependent approach weakens the impact these experiences have on future attempts. If the initial attempt at authoritarian transition ends with a successful coup, future reformers will keep that in mind when contemplating transition or during a future transition attempt. There is a

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<sup>4</sup> The collective action problem facing civil society is an additional set of interactions that must be explored if we are to fully understand the nature of de-autocratization and how the process can lead to violent outcomes. The complexity of this collective action problem forces the author to address this particular set of interactions in future research.



direct impact on the reformer's perception of how the hard-liners will react to certain changes in the regime structure.

By focusing on strategic interactions, we can develop a better idea of what affect a coup will have on future attempts at democratization. Such an event will affect how strongly regime members believe their compatriots are motivated in maintaining an authoritarian regime or how far democratization can be allowed to proceed before part of the authoritarian regime becomes skittish. The impact on the regime members is accounted for directly in a model focusing on strategic interactions and allows for a better understanding of how the process is affected. By focusing on the types of strategic interactions that commonly occur during the process of authoritarian transition, we develop a better understanding for what variables will influence the different actors and in what way these variables will influence that actors.

Finally, focusing on strategic interactions permits us to account for repeated interaction between the actors. By taking into consideration multiple iterations, the research more closely models how authoritarian transitions occur. In reality, these different strategic interactions occur throughout an authoritarian transition; civil society and the regime negotiate over many different issues. The regime faces the possibility of internal power struggles throughout the process. Different segments of civil society can splinter and form new groups, forcing civil society to address the collective action problem again. While a case study approach to democratization allows for these possibilities to be explored, path-

dependent models make it much more difficult to understand what result multiple iterations may have on an authoritarian transition.

### *Strategic Interaction Within The Regime*

The first series of interactions that will be addressed is the interaction between members of the authoritarian regime. While it is common to think of the regime as one unified actor, this is not the case.<sup>5</sup> The regime is composed of individual decision-makers who head the various branches of government. Together these decision-makers determine and attempt to implement policy for the country. The number of regime members varies in each country. As rational actors, regime members have their own set of preferences, goals, and agendas, which do not always agree with one another.

For the purpose of this research, I argue that regime members are either reformers or hard-liners. A reformer is interested in liberalization. There can be varying degrees of interest in liberalization, ranging from the desire to allow a limited reform, such as granting language rights or allowing independent newspapers, to someone interested in democratization. While it is possible for reformers to have different interests, they share a desire to open the country to some degree. Before suggesting that reform be attempted, they reach some

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<sup>5</sup> Huntington (1991), O'Donnell and Schmitter, Agress and Gates, and Przeworski are a few examples of authors who assume that the regime is a unified actor. Huntington includes the regimes actions in his discussion of democratization but does not elaborate on the possibility of conflict within the regime. O'Donnell and Schmitter discuss the regimes decision to enter into a pact with civil society but do not discuss how the regime reaches the decision. Agress and Gates refer to the regime as effective and ineffective, based on their ability to maintain control in the country but do not discuss how this is directly affected by internal conflict. Przeworski discusses different regime types but he does not explore how the internal dynamics will affect the outcome

agreement on what type of reform they want. Reformers who are interested in democratization will be willing to ally themselves with other reformers in order to begin the process. As the regime continues to interact, reformers can become hard-liners if they feel that liberalization has gone far enough, while others may press for additional reforms.

Hard-liners are regime members who are not interested in liberalization. As with reformers, there can be varying degrees of hard-liners, ranging from those satisfied with the status quo to others interested in increasing their control over the country. Hard-liners do not have to share the same goals. If the reformers attempt to effect change, hard-liners will try to stop that change. Their success or failure will depend on what offices they hold in the regime. For example, military commanders will have a better chance of stopping change than the minister of agriculture. A second factor is how much influence they have in the regime. Hard-liners can become reformers. If the reformers are able to liberalize and the hard-liners do not see a significant decrease in power, then hard-liners may experience an increase in legitimacy, some hard-liners may choose to become reformers because they no longer feel threatened by liberalization.

In the case of de-autocratization, the internal struggle occurs between hard-liners and reformers, with the point of contention being relaxing the regimes' control in some political, social, or economic area. The reformers suggest some degree of liberalization, forcing the hard-liners to decide to accept or reject the

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of the game. Crescenzi does include different regime types in his model but he does not discuss how it is the reformers or hard-liners may come into power.

reformers' proposal. How this struggle occurs and the result of the struggle play a significant role in explaining the final outcome of the authoritarian transition. If the reformers gain control by a slim margin, then de-autocratization may begin. However, if this is the case, de-autocratization faces a greater probability of stalling, reversion, or civil war than if the reformers are able to gain outright control of the regime. The hard-liners may attempt a coup to remove the reformers if they have gained control over the regime, as has been seen in Russia and Nigeria. In Nigeria, the military coups replaced democratically elected governments while in Russia the coup attempted to remove Gorbachev from office before holding a referendum. The inability of the regime members to agree on a course of action is directly related to the use of military force against the regime.

Not only are the interactions among the regime members crucial in the initial stages of authoritarian transition, they can reappear at any point and can influence the process. If the hard-liners are willing to allow some degree of liberalization but are not willing to abide by a full transition to democracy, the likelihood that another internal struggle may occur will increase, if the hard-liners feel that the process has gotten out of hand. Additionally, reformers may push for increased control of the regime if they feel that they will be able to gain full control of the regime and force the transition to go further than the reformers originally believed they could. Therefore, it is important that we develop a better understanding of this struggle within the regime and how it affects the overall de-autocratization process.

What do we gain from exploring the strategic interaction within the regime? All the work on democratization and regime transition acknowledges the importance of the regime. The regime is the ruling body of a given country; it makes policy decisions and implements those decisions. It is an important actor that must be understood if we are to understand the de-autocratization process. By focusing on the interaction between regime members, we are able to gain additional insight into how and why the regime makes the choices it does, and how those choices directly influence the outcome of any attempt at de-autocratization.

Interaction within the regime will determine what type of regime civil society faces. Additionally, how the regime settles its differences on the issue of liberalization will play an important role in the outcome. It is possible that the reformers and hard-liners clash, creating a coup attempt that ends with the removal of the reformers or the hard-liners. So understanding how regime members interact becomes increasingly important in understanding how a country reaches the point it does in the de-autocratization process.

Przeworski (1991), Crescenzi (1998), and Agress and Gates (1999) all make references to the importance of regime type in their models.

Crescenzi and Agress and Gates allow nature to choose what type of regime civil society faces. They do not take the next step: an attempt to model the interaction between the regime members. While the use of a nature node to determine if the regime is composed of hard-liners or reformers is a reasonable proxy, it does not explore the actual interaction between the regime members.

By explicitly modeling the interaction between the regime members we are able to develop a better understanding of how this interaction will influence the outcome or de-autocratization. If reformers are able to take control of the regime by only a slim majority, then they are less likely to pursue dramatic reforms that may lead to democratization, than if they had greater control of the regime.

To explore the role of strategic interaction between regime members, Chapter Three will present a non-cooperative bargaining model. This model will demonstrate the variety of options available to hard-liners and reformers as well as the importance of information and the role of strategic decision-making throughout the process.

### *Strategic Interaction Between the Regime and Civil Society*

The second series of interactions to be explored is that of the regime and civil society. As was seen in the literature review on democratization, civil society is allowed to move only after the regime has chosen to liberalize. This is problematic for several reasons. First, it assumes that civil society cannot place pressure on the regime to liberalize. Second, assuming that civil society cannot mobilize until after the regime has chosen to liberalize assumes that civil society has no political power and is at the mercy of the regime. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa are three cases that clearly demonstrated that civil society can mobilize prior to the regime choosing to liberalize. In all three cases, civil society showed considerable political power, even after the leaders of the various movements were jailed, and in the case of South Africa, killed.

This is why, it is important to understand how civil society and the regime interact and the nature of that interaction. While it is clear that the regime holds a great deal of power, this does not preclude the possibility that civil society will challenge the regime. When will civil society choose to take this action? How will the regime respond to civil society's challenge?

Chapter Four seeks to address these questions. In order to do so, a game of incomplete and imperfect information is developed. This model will allow civil society to respond to the regime's decision to open or remain closed, which means that civil society can choose to mobilize no matter what the regime chooses to do. This differs greatly from previous models of democratization which allow civil society to move if the regime chooses to open. The model will allow the reader to develop a better understanding of the options available to both actors as well as demonstrate the importance of information during the process of de-autocratization.

Chapters Five and Six will use empirical methods in order to develop a better understanding of how specific variables will influence the outcome of the de-autocratization process. Although the variables that will be empirically tested are discussed in the theoretical chapters, they are not explicitly included in the game theoretic models; as such, the empirical tests are not a direct test of the game theoretic models. The variables under consideration: economic development, the degree to which civil society is fragmented, regime stability, and the degree of regime change attempted in the previous year, are used to explain how the regime or civil society may respond to the others move.

Chapter Four will explain how the variables are operationalized, the data sets employed in order to run the empirical tests, and a discussion of the overall data set. Chapter Five will contain a discussion of the hypotheses, the multinomial logit used to test the hypotheses, and the results.



## **Chapter 3**

### **Strategic Interaction Among Regime Members**

This research seeks to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms driving the process of de-autocratization. I argue that more focus must be placed on the interactions occurring among the various actors involved in the process. This chapter asks: When will the regime decide to open and how is that decision made? To accomplish this, the chapter is broken into the following sections; a discussion of what is meant by “regime”, a discussion of the economic and political dimensions that regime members will bargain over, the development of the model, and a discussion of implications drawn from the model.

Why does this chapter focus on the regime? The regime is composed of many actors, from the designated leader to the various heads of governmental branches. While some regime members will have more influence than others, all are involved in the decision making process that affect the day-to-day activities of the country and its population. As such, it is vitally important that we understand how the members of the regime interact with one another and how those interactions influence the process of de-autocratization.

Other scholars have discussed the importance of the regime, but few have attempted to delve into the issue at this level. In most cases, scholars focus on de-autocratization after the regime has made the decision to open. Przeworski (1991) develops a model that focuses on what might happen if the regime chooses to open. Huntington (1991) argues that the amount of control that the

regime has over transition will influence the outcome, but fails to explore the interaction among the regime members and how those interactions will influence the regime's ability to control the process. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) discuss the regime and why it enters into pacts with some segments of civil society. They do not explore how the regime finds itself in such a position or how the regime reaches that decision. In the previous work, the regime plays a large role in the de-autocratization process. Yet how the regime members interact internally and what impact that has on the regime's ability to interact with civil society is not discussed.

Liberalization can only occur when regime members choose to open or agree to open following the mobilization of civil society<sup>6</sup>. In order to understand how the regime reaches this decision, it is necessary to understand how the various factions in the regime interact with each other. The more divergent the goals of the hard-liners and reformers, the greater the chance of conflict within the regime. The different camps will be focused on attempting to advance their conflicting agendas, which can destabilize the regime. How the interaction among these camps occurs will be explored later in this chapter.

By developing an understanding of how and why the regime chooses to begin liberalization, we can better understand the final outcome of the transition attempt as we approach the question with more information. The goal of this chapter is to explore how the regime reaches the decision to liberalize and to develop a better understanding of how this interaction can lead to a coup as well as liberalization.

## **What is the Regime?**

There are many actors involved in the process of de-autocratization. The ideal research project would develop a model that takes each individual into consideration, thereby providing accurate predictions. In reality, such a model would be cumbersome and unparsimonious. As we shall see in the discussion below, the regime is an aggregation of a larger number of individuals. If we are to understand how it is that strategic interaction influences the outcome of a country involved in de-autocratization, then we have to develop a better understanding of who the actors are and why they behave in the manner they do.

By focusing on the interactions between regime members, we are forced to begin to unpack the various actors and examine their choices more carefully. In examining the interactions between regime members, we develop additional insight into why the regime chooses to liberalize as well as how the forces that drove that decision will influence the process's final outcome, whether that is continued liberalization or a civil war or a coup. In order to understand how the actors interact, it is first necessary to define what regime means.

The regime is composed of a multitude of individuals, and the number will vary from country to country. There is a designated leader, such as Castro in Cuba or Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, who is supported by the heads of government institutions, such as the military commanders, the head of police, the

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<sup>6</sup> Chapter 4 will contain a discussion of Civil Societies role in the process of de-autocratization.

head of intelligence, agriculture, and finance. Each branch of government will have varying degrees of influence over decisions reached by the regime. The regime members will have their own goals and ideas about where the country is heading and where they would like it to go. While there will be similarities in how regime members view government, there can also be a great deal of variance. It is this variance that can lead to a fragmented regime.

O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that "...there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners". (pg. 19, 1986) These divergent positions cannot only lead to a peaceful transition from one regime type to another, but also can lead to a coup attempt.

A recent example of conflicting ideologies can be found in Iran today. The Council of Clerics remains a conservative body opposed to increasing political liberties while the president of Iran, Khatami-Ardakani, is determined to increase the political liberties available to the population. One step taken in this direction was to allow a freer press. In 2000, newspapers and magazines were allowed to criticize the government. The Council of Clerics felt that the papers had been given too much freedom and insisted on a reversion to past policy. In this case, President Khatami-Ardakani backed down, ordering the closure of newspapers deemed too vocal and the arrest of the editors. Once President Khatami-Ardakani was re-elected in 2001, he began once again to allow newspapers to criticize the government. Clearly, the Council of Clerics and the president of Iran

are in disagreement over what type of political liberties should be granted to the population. If the gap between the two factions grows, so will the possibility of conflict.

As the distance between the two factions increases, the threat of a coup can increase. How much power will the hard-liners be willing to relinquish? How will the reformers know when they can no longer push for liberalization before the hard-liners react with force? O'Donnell and Schmitter point to these very questions.

“Once liberalization has been chosen – for whatever reason and under whatever degree of control by incumbents – one factor emerges which hangs like a sword of Damocles over the possible outcome. This is the fear of a coup that would not only cut short the transition but impose a regression to an even more restrictive and repressive mode of governance.” (pg. 23)

To address this question, the research presented here will focus on regime factions that are based on attitudes toward de-autocratization. Hard-liners are regime members who are not interested in liberalization. They are generally content with the status quo and in some cases are looking for opportunities to increase their power, in effect decreasing the liberties available to the population. Reformers are regime members who are interested in some degree of liberalization. This does not mean that reformers are interested in relinquishing all control, only that reformers are interested in allowing some increase in political, social, or economic liberties.

## **The Political and Economic Dimensions**

### *Why Open?*

The authoritarian regime holds a great deal of economic and political power, which the individual members can use for their own gain. The process of de-autocratization requires that regime members relinquish some degree of political control and the economic benefits that come from holding office. This forces anyone attempting to understand the process of de-autocratization to ask the question: Why reform? The model presented in this chapter will focus on the economic and political reasons that drive de-autocratization.

Casper and Taylor (1996), Collier and Collier (1991), and O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) agree that de-autocratization begins when the regime comes to a critical juncture. This critical juncture is a period of time where the authoritarian regime is in some way vulnerable and liberalization may be possible. These crises can take many faces: political protest, mass riots, and resignation of government leaders, as well as international conflict. When the regime is faced by such a crisis, the outcome is uncertain, allowing Reformers an opportunity to suggest liberalization.

O'Donnell and Schmitter go as far as to argue that at the heart of the political crisis are divisions between regime members and that the crisis itself exasperates these divisions. (1986, 19) The political crisis at hand gives the

reformers an opening in that it exposes the inherent legitimacy problem within an authoritarian regime.

“Opponents were stimulated to act because the failure was so obvious. Ruling groups, including the armed forces, were less and less confident of their own capacities, as well as deeply fragmented by recriminations over who was responsible for the regime’s failures. Mediators were no longer willing to arbitrate dissent and hold coalitions together. Faced with this, the authoritarian rulers sought a rapid ‘political outlet’. This gave ample room to the soft-liners, for whom it seemed less risky to launch the country into liberalization, and even democratization, than to continue struggling inflexibly and ineffectively against a rising tide of opposition, fed by defection from the regime’s ranks.” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 20)

Casper and Taylor argue that the critical juncture presents an opportunity that reformers can choose to take advantage of. Huntington would agree, arguing that one of the causal factors behind the third wave of democratization was the declining legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes. (1991) According to Huntington, the depth of the problem comes from the democratic experiences of many authoritarian regimes that had been overthrown by authoritarian regimes during a prior crisis. The authoritarian regime is able to temporarily solve the crisis, or give the appearance of solving the crisis. Over a period of time, the crisis can re-emerge or a new crisis arises that the authoritarian regime is unable to solve. When this occurs, the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime is called into question.

### *Political Dimension*

When this critical juncture is reached, the reformers can choose to propose a program of liberalization, or they can let the moment pass. If the

reformers choose to make an offer, it may include some type of political changes. The degree of change offered by the reformers will be based on their commitment to developing a new political regime, possibly a democracy, and what the reformers feel they can receive without losing their place in the regime. This can be thought of as a one-dimensional realm with a pure authoritarian regime set at a score of zero and a pure democracy set as a score of 1. The various points in between represent the different types of regimes that fall between an authoritarian regime and a democratic regime. The reformers offer will be something greater than the status quo position, but should not be so great as to threaten the hard-liners enough that they fear for their position and are willing to attempt a military coup to remove the reformers as regime members.

A wide variety of offers can be made along the political dimensions. Such offers may include some of the following political reforms. Reformers can demand the freedom of speech, the right of assembly, freedom of the press, language rights for a specific group in a country, the right to a public and fair trial, and suffrage for a specific group of people.

### *Economic Dimension*

O'Donnell and Schmitter emphasize political unrest as the underlying factor that causes de-autocratization. While political issues are at the root of many attempts to de-autocratize, they are by no means the only cause of regime transition. In addition to the political dimension, an equally important economic dimension must be taken into consideration.



Huntington (1991), Lipset (1959), Dahl (1971), Bollen and Jackman (1985), Morawetz (1977), and many others point to the importance of economic development in understanding the development of democratic regimes. In studying the countries involved in the Third Wave of democratization, Huntington found that the urban middle class led many of the countries involved in democratization. (pg.67, 1991) Huntington also points to the role of economic crises. Huntington argues that rapid economic growth and economic crises can undermine the authoritarian regime, in essence bringing about the critical juncture that allows reformers the opportunity to begin the process of de-autocratization. (pg 72, 1991)

Beyond the importance of economic development and economic crises in setting the stage on which de-autocratization will occur, regime members have an economic stake in maintaining control over the country. In many cases the regime members are receiving economic benefits from holding office. These benefits can take the form of pay, bribes from industry, and the like. By entering into de-autocratization, the regime members are relinquishing some of the economic benefits they have been receiving. As such, part of the negotiations among regime members will include a discussion of economic changes allowed in the country. As with the political dimension, this economic aspect of de-autocratization must be taken into consideration if we are to understand how the regime members interact with one another.

Like the political dimension, the economic dimension can be seen as a one-dimensional line. In the case of the economic dimension, zero represents a

system where the state controls the economy, and one represents a free market. The points in between represent a wide variety of hybrid systems.

### **The Game Theoretic Model**

The modeling technique used in this chapter is a bargaining game with outside options. The game pits two opposing factions, both factions coming from within the regime, against one another. There are two dimensions that the factions are bargaining over-- the economic and political. The faction to move first will make an offer that the second faction can choose to accept, make a counter offer, or attempt a coup. If the second faction chooses to make a counter offer, the first faction chooses between accepting the offer, rejecting the offer, or staging a coup.

This model differs from a standard bargaining model because it adds an additional element to the game that more accurately reflects the behavior of regime members. The outside option gives both factions the opportunity to leave the table and pursue a course of action that is not included in the set of outcomes discussed at the bargaining table. In the standard bargaining model, the Hard-liners and Reformers would have the option of making an offer, making a counter offer, and then bargaining over how much reform, if any, to allow. The possibility of a coup is not discussed at the bargaining table even though it is a choice available to both parties. This choice is available only if one faction chooses to leave the bargaining table. This will occur when one faction does not believe that its needs will be met through the bargaining process, and that it will win if it

attempts a coup. In essence, the presence of the outside option alters the bargaining space away from the good faith standard bargaining model.

This technique is an improvement over the standard bargaining model because it allows both factions the opportunity of choosing an outside option, military coup. The presence of the outside option of a coup changes the bargaining structure such that each faction must consider the possibility of a coup before making an offer. If a faction believes that it can gain more through a coup than bargaining, the outside option becomes a credible threat. This will influence the game's outcome in the following manner. As one faction's belief that the opposing faction is likely to resort to a military coup, it will become more willing to enter into negotiations and change its offer, in order to prevent a coup.

This is an improvement over previous modeling attempts by Przeworski (1991) and Casper and Taylor (1996). First, the focus on the interaction between regime members helps us to better understand how de-autocratization can lead to violent outcomes. The outcome of the interaction between regime members can derail the process of liberalization if the Hard-liners are able to remove the Reformers with a coup. It is also the case that liberalization will occur more quickly if the Reformers are able to remove the Hard-liners in a coup.

Przeworski's model does not take into consideration how the decision to liberalize occurs, but instead assumes that liberalization has been decided and proceeds from there. In doing so, Przeworski is unable to understand how de-autocratization can be derailed or sped up prior to the regime opening. The

model developed in this chapter will demonstrate the importance of understanding how regime members decide to liberalize.

Second, the inclusion of the outside option, coup, is an improvement over the work of Casper and Taylor (1991). Their model begins with the Reformers and Hard-liners negotiating over transition. While Casper and Taylor discuss the possibility of a civil war, they make no attempt to model such an option, instead arguing that such an action would redefine the game. The model developed in this chapter includes the possibility of a coup as it is a viable outcome that has been seen in many countries attempting de-autocratization, for example the Soviet Union in 1991 and Pakistan in 2000. If we are to understand how the process of de-autocratization works, then it is necessary to develop models that accurately reflect the variety of possible outcomes.

The model below is meant to focus only on the interactions between regime members. Later chapters will explore how the regime interacts with civil society. This is done in order to develop a better understanding of how the decision made by the regime members can influence the overall process of de-autocratization.

#### *Discussion of the Outside Option.*

The three outcomes that this research will focus on are the acceptance of an offer, maintenance of the status quo, and a coup attempt. Neither Przeworski nor Casper and Taylor allow for the possibility of a coup in their discussions of

democratization. Przeworski assumes that democratization starts with the liberalizers controlling the regime and deciding to offer to reform or not.

Casper and Taylor do not assume that this is the case. The first two stages of their game focus on the regime's decision to liberalize. In the first stage, the critical juncture stage, there is an event that offers the opportunity to liberalize. At this stage, the challenger must make the decision to challenge the current regime structure. The second stage consists of three steps, known as the sorting out stage. First, the challenger must identify him. Then the defenders and the challengers make some initial proposal about the type of regime want installed. Finally, the mass public is allowed to respond to the proposals. The sorting out stage is followed by the deal cutting stage, where a final outcome is reached. By combining all three stages, Casper and Taylor's game encompasses the entire process of democratization. In doing so, they negate the importance of the bargaining process within the regime. Additionally, coups are not included as a possible outcome of the game.

Casper and Taylor's model assumes implicitly that the challengers and the defenders are entering into good faith negotiations. As such, the threat of a coup is not possible. Yet in reality, the threat of a coup is something that every authoritarian regime faces. The dilemma that scholars are faced with is how to include the possibility of a coup into a model of de-autocratization. One answer to this question is to view coups as an outside option.

An outside option requires that players involved in bargaining are willing to walk away from the bargaining table so they can take advantage of an option that

is not found within the bargaining set. In the case of the model presented in this chapter, players are negotiating over the degree of political and/or economic reform. Each player can make an offer that can be accepted or rejected. Yet there is an option that is found outside of the normal bargaining set, an attempt to remove one part of the regime through a coup. According to Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985, 1989) and Scaramozzino (1991), the threat to resort to an outside option would only be implemented if it is deemed a credible threat. A threat is credible only when one player finds it is more profitable to accept the payoff from the outside option than to continue bargaining.

In the case of negotiations between hard-liners and reformers, both players have the option of making an offer, accepting or rejecting the other party's offer and making a counter offer, as is presented in Casper and Taylor's game. While these options are reasonable, recent events in Pakistan in 2000 demonstrate that there is another option that is available to members of the regime, that of a coup.

If we are to truly understand how the members of the regime interact with each other and how that can influence the outcome of de-autocratization, then there must be the possibility of an outside option of a coup. Regime members must know that they can leave the table and attempt a coup if they believe that their side will emerge victorious. Thus, the outside option of a coup adds another dimension to the model presented below that is not available in the models presented by Przeworski or Casper and Taylor.

### *The Factions*

Within an authoritarian regime, there are competing factions. I will refer to these factions as hard-liners, H, and reformers, R. Przeworski and Casper and Taylor assume that the reformers will always make the initial move in their transition games. While this research is focused on the process of de-autocratization, the game theoretic model in this chapter allows either faction to move first. This is an important departure from the previous models developed to understand de-autocratization because this model can help in explaining why countries that have begun the process find their progress reversed and even in understanding why some regimes become more autocratic. If, during the process of de-autocratization, the hard-liners become uncomfortable with the rate of liberalization or the direction that liberalization is taking, this model allows the hard-liners to make a proposal to the reformers. In the Przeworski and Casper and Taylor models, the hard-liners are forced to react to the reformers and are not allowed to take the initiative.

### *A Spatial Presentation of the Policy Space*

The factions are bargaining over desired policy positions in the political and/or economic arena. The Status Quo is indicated as position  $q$  in the figure below. Both factions have ideal points, represented as  $F_i$  and  $F_j$ . If either




Figure 3.1 Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game



faction was to find itself at its ideal point, there would be no need for that faction to enter into bargaining, or continue bargaining, as there would be no way to improve on its position.

In the example, Faction j would be comprised of Reformers as their ideal point indicates an improvement on both the political and economic dimensions. Faction i's ideal point indicates that the hard-liners would prefer to see the regime increase its control over the country, as it is located below the status quo point. The line connecting the ideal points of both factions is the contract curve. The circles represent the limits within which each faction can bargain; any offer made in this space can be accepted. The area where the two circles intersect is the bargaining space within which negotiation will occur. The ideal points for both factions fall outside of the bargaining space. The dark line in the bargaining space represents the possible location of the new status quo point.

The expected utility that either faction would receive from a policy position,  $x = (p_x, e_x)$ , is represented in the utility function found below.  $X$  is the offer made and  $i$  is the political and economic location of the faction.

$$U_i(x = p_x, e_x) = - [(p_x - p_i)^2 + (e_x - e_i)^2]$$

The utility function is a measure of distance between the policy point ( $x$ ) on the economic or political dimension and the ideal point for the faction in question. The offers made will not be found at the factions ideal point, this is indicated in the utility function by the negative sign. If the offer made is at the factions ideal point, the value will be  $-0$ , indicating that there is no movement from the ideal point.




Figure 3.2 A Spatial Representation of the Bargaining Area

### *Outcomes and Payoffs*

There are three possible outcomes, a faction can accept the opposing faction's offer, the status quo, and coup. There are no costs associated with the bargaining process, as such, the payoff for moving the status quo points is found using the utility function above. In the case of the status quo, the payoff is 0, as there has been no change.

This is not the case when the outcome is a coup. The faction that is able to defeat its opponent is able to move the status quo point to its ideal point. The greater the cost of fighting a coup, the smaller the payoff.

The payoff for a coup requires that the factions involved pay the cost of fighting,  $c$ . This cost includes the loss of life, the cost of purchasing guns, and the cost of paying people to fight for your faction. Additionally, there is a probability assigned to the coup outcome.  $P$  is the probability that  $F_i$  wins;  $(1-P)$  is the probability that  $F_j$  wins. The faction that wins the coup is able to set policy at its ideal point. Hence, the utilities for winning a coup are  $F_i - c$ , for  $F_i$ , and  $F_j - c$ , for  $F_j$ . The greater the probability that the faction believes it has to win a coup, the more credible the outside option of coup becomes. This will directly effect what type of offer each faction will make and the likelihood that either faction will exercise its outside option if it does not approve of the offer made by the opposition. An offer outside of the bargaining set will be made only if the faction making the offer believes that it can win if there is a coup.

### **Order of Play**

The first faction ( $F_i$ ) opens the game by making offer,  $(p_1, e_1)$  indicating its offer on the political and economic dimensions. The second faction ( $F_j$ ) can choose to accept the offer, make a counter offer, or act on its outside option and attempt a coup. If  $F_j$  accepts the offer made by  $F_i$ , then the game ends with the outcome of accept and the payoffs associated with of  $p_1, e_1$  for each faction. If  $F_j$  chooses to exercise its outside option and attempt a coup, the payoff for the winning faction is the ideal point minus the cost of fighting. If  $F_j$  chooses to make a counter offer,  $(p_2, e_2)$ ,  $F_i$  can choose to reject the offer, accept the offer, or

attempt a military coup of its own. If  $F_i$  rejects the counter offer, then the game ends with the status quo as the outcome.

### *Implications of the Model*

As was discussed earlier, this model differs greatly from other models of the process of de-autocratization. First, the model developed in this chapter allows either faction to move first. Secondly, this model allows for the use of military coups.

These features offer us the ability to understand not only when de-autocratization occurs but also the ability to understand why a country might become more authoritarian while more accurately reflecting all possible outcomes. Take for example a country that has begun the process of de-autocratization and where the hard-liners are concerned that liberalization is occurring too quickly or advancing beyond what they are comfortable with. In this case, the hard-liners can make an initial offer that would move the status quo point closer to an autocracy or controlled economy, effectively reversing what liberalization had occurred. The reformers are left to ask themselves if the hard-liners have the ability to win a coup, and if so, the reformers are more likely to agree to slow down or reverse the process of liberalization. Why?

If the hard-liners threat of a coup is credible, then the reformers will be accept the offer that the hard-liners put forth in order to maintain some presence in the regime. This is done with the hope that in the future, the reformers will be able to gain enough power that they can either withstand a coup or launch their

own coup and continue de-autocratization. This is not possible if the reformers are forced out of the regime through a coup. If the hard-liners threat of a coup is credible, then why negotiate? As the cost of fighting increases, the payoff for the coup option decreases, making negotiation a more attractive option. If the hard-liners are able to force a halt to de-autocratization, or even reverse the process, without fighting, the hard-liners can receive a greater pay off. This means that a coup will only be used as the last option by either the reformers or the hard-liners.

This seems to accurately portray the process of de-autocratization as it occurs in the real world. Of the one hundred and seventy-one cases of conflict in the Wallenstein and Sollenburg data set, there were only eight cases where the outcome was a coup<sup>7</sup>. While the Wallenstein and Sollenburg data set is not dedicated to identifying coups, it does include all cases of conflict where there were at least twenty-five battle dead. As such, countries where there was even a mildly violent coup would be included in the data set.

The Wallenstein and Sollenburg data set seems to indicate what the game theory model implies, that coups are a rarity. The model developed in this chapter demonstrates why coups are so rare. Coups should only occur when one faction in a regime believes that it will win and that the costs associated with a coup are small enough that negotiations are no longer feasible. At this time, the faction that believes that it can gain more through a coup will choose to coup.

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<sup>7</sup> I argue that political unrest and civil war require the participation of civil society. In order to understand how these outcomes are reached, I develop a game theoretic model in chapter three that explores the interaction between a regime and civil society. Chapter four explains how measures of violent outcomes are developed.

While it is important to understand why a faction within the regime may choose to coup, there are other forms of internal violence that can occur during the process of de-autocratization. This chapter focused on the possibility of internal violence based on the non-cooperative bargaining that occurs between regime members. As such, the violent outcome that is most likely is a coup. In order to understand all of the possible violent outcomes it is necessary to examine how the regime interacts with civil society, this is the topic of discussion in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Strategic Interaction Between the Authoritarian Regime and Civil Society**

The twentieth century has seen a large number of countries attempt some form of authoritarian transition, some succeed while many have failed. Why? It is the argument of this research that interaction between actors has a great deal of influence on the process of de-autocratization. In chapter three we saw the bargaining process used by the regime to determine if reform should be attempted, what degree of reform should be allowed, and how the bargaining process can lead to coups.

If we are to understand the interaction between the regime and civil society, it is necessary that we understand how the regime members interact amongst themselves. The decisions made by the regime in chapter three determine what type of regime civil society is facing, what types of reform the regime is comfortable allowing, and the strength of the different factions within the regime. As such, the model developed in chapter three ties into the model developed in this chapter.

It is the interaction between the regime and civil society that will guide a country to one of many outcomes. Democratization represents perhaps the ideal outcome of any transition process, as such it has received a great deal of attention in recent years, unfortunately, it is but one possible outcome. On the other end of the spectrum is civil war. Civil war brings with it the destruction of lives, property, roads, and, in extreme cases, the loss of a unique group of

people. Knowing that the cost of civil war is so great, why do we see this outcome occur throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century? This question can be answered by focusing on how the interaction between the regime and civil society occurs and the ramification of the interaction within the regime and civil society prior to entering into negotiation with one another.

I choose to use a game theoretic model in order to arrive at a better understanding of this process due to the nature of the process being both dynamic and strategic. The actors, the regime and civil society, have preferences associated with the possible outcome of authoritarian transition and will choose actions that they believe will allow them to achieve their goals. Additionally, game theory allows us to explore the different strategies available to the actors and the possible outcomes of those actions. The use of an asymmetric incomplete information game allows us to model the process while taking into consideration the actors lack of information about one another.

### **The Role of Civil Society**

Civil society's ability to address the collective action problem will determine its strength. Why is this important? The answer to this question is relatively simple yet its impact on the process of authoritarian transition can be rather dramatic. The stronger civil society is the more influence it will have when negotiating with the authoritarian regime. This can be demonstrated by briefly comparing the experiences of Czechoslovakia and Nigeria. Both countries have a history of authoritarian rule, Czechoslovakia was annexed and occupied by Germany during WWII and then occupied by the Soviet Union until 1989 while Nigeria was



a British colony which has seen three separate attempts at developing a democratic regime overthrown through military coups. Both countries have made attempts to remove the authoritarian regime on several occasions with varying degrees of success. Why the difference? I argue that civil societies role in the process of transition is one part of the answer.

### *Civil Society as Depicted in the Literature*

The idea of civil society playing a more active role in authoritarian transition is not a new one. The work of scholars such as Casper (1995), Cohen (1994), Hegre et al (1998), Huntington (1991), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), McAdam et al (1996), and Sutter (1995) have included civil society in their explanations. In many of these works, civil society is treated as a passive actor, able to react to the regimes decisions but not able to initiate the process of regime transition.<sup>8</sup>

In O'Donnell and Schmitter's 1986 work, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, it is argued that civil society can play an active role during the authoritarian transition through a process called pacting. Pacting is defined as:

"An explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select group of actors which seek to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of powers on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it" (1986, 37)

Pacting is used by the regime to control the degree of liberalization and occurs between a small group of people. Pacts can be based on military, political, and

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<sup>8</sup> Huntington and Przeworski acknowledge that civil society may initiate the attempt at transition. Przeworski argues that it is a rare enough event that it is reasonable to leave such cases out of his analysis of de-autocratization. Huntington does analyze cases where civil society is able to

economic issues.<sup>9</sup> The regime signals that it is willing to allow new freedoms, civil society begins to re-emerge, using the new liberties that the regime has granted it. O'Donnell and Schmitter's do not allow civil society to act until the regime chooses to open and the initial involvement is with a few segments of civil society, which the regime chooses. While civil societies role can increase, through what O'Donnell and Schmitter term a popular upsurge, civil society is still initially forced to react to the regime.

Przeworski, Crescenzi, Casper and Taylor, and Gates and Humes all use formal models to explain the initial stages of democratization and all include civil society but limit civil societies ability to act by allowing it to move only if the regime chooses to open. Agress and Gates make an attempt to address this issue by developing an asymmetric, two-sided incomplete information game that allows civil society to move even if the regime opts to remain closed. While these models allow for different regime types, none allow for different types of civil society. Przeworski acknowledges that there are different types of civil society, which he labels moderates and radicals, in his theoretical discussion and that the interaction between the different segments of civil society will influence how the regime responds to civil societies demands but he does not include this in his formal model.

Przeworski (1991) is the first to develop a formal model of democratization. In his model, civil society is relegated to moving only after the

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initiate the process and argues that the majority of these cases lead to civil war or some form of internal violence making this path a less acceptable path of transition.

<sup>9</sup> This is analogous to Przeworski's (1991) description of the incorporation of elements of civil society into a broad dictatorship.

regime has decided to open. This is intentional as Przeworski argues that civil society may choose to mobilize even if the regime does not choose to open but this rarely leads to the establishment of a democracy. While this may be the case, Huntington also argues that replacements are rarely successful for a number of reasons, it indicates one weakness in how the process of de-autocratization has been studied. The emphasis on democratization has lead scholars to approach the question in such a manner that making such simplifying assumptions as restricting civil society's opportunity to move has not been challenged. Civil society does not have to force democratization in order to play a role in the process. Civil society can place pressure on the regime through demonstrations, everyday forms of resistance, and armed conflict with the regime which eventually may force the regime to consider some degree of liberalization. How civil society influences the process of de-autocratization will only be known once we allow civil society to participate equally in the process. It is for this reason that the model presented in this chapter allows civil society to move even if the regime does not choose to open.

While these works include civil society as an important actor, only a few acknowledge that civil society can initiate the transition attempt and those that do fail to acknowledge that civil society is not a unified actor, and vice versa. If we are to develop a real understanding of how civil society interacts with the regime, it is important that the model reflect civil society's ability to initiate transition and the collective action problem civil society faces.

### *Civil Societies Type*

As was demonstrated in chapter 3, civil society can not be treated as an aggregated actor. In most countries civil society is composed of a multitude of groups that may be centered on issues of ethnicity, religion, language, and economic status. In treating civil society as a united actor, the above works neglect the diversity within civil society and weaken the predictive power of their models. The model presented in this chapter attempts to address this problem by allowing for civil society to be weak or strong, dependent on how united civil society is and allowing civil society to choose to mobilize even if the regime chooses to remain closed. Why is this important?

Ultimately, any regime's longevity is based on civil society's compliance with the rules by which the regime runs the country. Compliance does not require or even imply acceptance of the rules, only that the rules are followed. As such, compliance can be achieved through the use of force or the threat of force. In countries where civil society has an opportunity to voice their opinion with the belief that their opinion truly matters, compliance is easier to achieve and maintain.

In the case of authoritarian transitions, civil society is not likely to have a recognized voice or that voice will be limited and controlled by the regime. If civil society is to influence the process, it must find some way to be heard. The louder the voice, the greater its possible impacts on the process of de-autocratization. Achieving this voice is a difficult task, as Collier and Hoeffler demonstrate. The costs involved in rebelling are high, if the rebellion fails the

regime will punish the participants if the rebellion succeeds you have to trust that the leaders of the rebellion will act in the best interests of civil society. (pg.8)

These two factors increase the incentive to free ride. The more free riders, the more difficult it is to rebel or mobilize any type of campaign directed at challenging the regime.

Solving the collective action problem is essential if civil society is to play a role in regime transition. The larger the number of people involved, the more diverse the interests that are represented, the more seriously the regime have to take civil society. This is not to say that if ninety percent of civil society comes together to challenge the regime that their demands will be met. As we will see when we explore the game theoretic model presenting the interaction between civil society and the regime, even a tightly unified civil society can face the possibility of civil war. What this does mean is that that the likelihood that their voices are heard is greater and that their chance of affecting the process of de-autocratization will be greater if civil society is able to unify behind some common goal or cause.

### **The Role of the Regime**

In any country, it is the responsibility of the regime to establish the rules and norms by which the country is run. As such, the regime will play a large role in any attempt at authoritarian transition even if it does not initiate the transition attempt. The policies that the regime implements and how it reacts can alter the

manner in which transition occurs and the final outcome of any attempt at de-autocratization.

Once again turning to the example of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in 1989, the type of regime plays an important role in the divergent outcomes. In 1968, the communist regime knew that it had the support of the Soviet Union. When Dubcek took office and began to make reforms, the hard-liners were counting on the intervention of the Soviet Union to remove Dubcek and end his experiment. In 1989, the Soviet Union has been weakened and is beginning to make internal reforms of its own. The decline of the Soviet Union leaves the communist regime in Czechoslovakia weakened which succumbs to reform within a year of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Solidarity's victory in Poland signaled that the Soviet Union would not interfere with the satellite states internal affairs, thus weakening the position of the regime.

### *The Regime as Depicted in the Literature*

The vast majority of the literature found in international relations and comparative politics focuses on the regime and how it guides the process of de-autocratization. Huntington (1991) describes three paths that democratization can take and discusses what the regime's role in the transition is. He finds that democratic transitions which are driven by the regime, are more likely to be successful and peaceful. Casper and Taylor also identify three paths that democratization can take, although they differ from Huntington's. Like

Huntington, an emphasis is on how the regime directs the process of democratization.

Przeworski (1991) develops a game theoretic model which focuses on the regime's decision to open or not. The emphasis is placed on the regimes decision, with civil society moving only after the regime has decided to liberalize. He argues that there are two types of transitions, bottom up and top down, with the top down transition being more prevalent. For Przeworski, the question of why the regime "cracked" is the most interesting question.

Like Przeworski, O'Donnell and Schmitter place a greater emphasis on the role of the regime than they do on the role of civil society. The regime must send a signal that they are willing to liberalize by actually allowing some degree of opening. If civil society chooses to, they can attempt to negotiate with the regime. Civil society is included in the process but the emphasis remains on the role of the regime.

The model in this paper seeks to understand how the regime interacts with civil society and how the decisions made by each actor influences the final outcome. In accordance with the views of Przeworski, O'Donnell and Schmitter, and Huntington the regime is allowed to make the initial decision to open or not. This is done because it is an accurate reflection of the process of de-autocratization as the regime is responsible for the development of policy. Taking no action, ie not opening, is also a decision that civil society can react to. It is for this reason that I allow civil society to move even if the regime chooses to not open.

### *The Regimes Type*

In chapter three we saw that the regimes internal bargaining process will effect the regimes types and impact the overall process of regime transition. Hard-liners are less likely to open, and if they do the new liberties are likely to be very limited and will not threaten the regimes control of the country. Reformers are more likely to open and enter into some type of negotiation with civil society.

As with civil society, the type of regime matters. Is the regime composed of hard-liners or reformers? If civil society had this information the interaction between the two groups would be much less complicated. Civil society will be less likely to mobilize if the regime is composed of hard-liners then it is if the regime is composed of reformers. Why? Reformers are more likely to support some degree of increased liberties and are more likely to be willing to negotiate on what it will give to civil society. Hard-liners are less likely to allow an increase in civil liberties, if civil society is to mobilize against the hard-liners, civil society will have to be unified if it is to stand a chance of overthrowing the regime.

The regime has the benefit of controlling the military and police forces, which allows it to dictate policy. Who controls those forces, how in favor they are of reform, and how loyal the military and police forces are to the regime will play an important role in determining the strength of the regime. If the regime cannot count on the military or police forces to respond to commands to contain civil society, then the regime is greatly weakened.



## **Interaction Between the Regime and Civil Society**

Regime transition can occur with only one actor participating, but that is rare. Whether the interaction between the regime and civil society occurs through the use of force or repression against some segment of civil society or through voting, the regime and civil society interact with one another on a day to day basis. How this interaction occurs will dictate the final outcome of any attempt at de-autocratization.

While there are authors who have included civil society as an equal partner with the regime in the process of democratization, most do not. Przeworski (1991), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Crescenzi (1998) allow civil society to move only if the regime chooses to reform. Bermeo focuses on how the regime must experience some degree of political learning if democratization is to succeed but does not include a discussion of how civil society must also learn how to behave in a democratic society. Civil society is relegated to the level of a second tier actor when in reality, its actions are equally important as the decisions made by the regime.

Huntington (1991) uses a case study approach to explore the interaction between the regime and civil society. Huntington demonstrates that the multitude of ways that the interaction between the regime and civil society occurs explains why there are different paths to democratization. If the regime is willing to negotiate with some members of civil society, democratization can occur peacefully. In cases where the regime is forcibly removed by some segment of

civil society, democratization tends to be less successful because of possible conflicts within civil society and arguments over the development of new governmental institutions and rules. While Huntington does not develop a formal model of democratization or apply any econometric techniques to test his hypotheses, he is able to demonstrate that democratization involves both the regime and civil society.

As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to treat civil society and the regime as equals in the process of democratization. Even though it may be rare, as Przeworski claims, that civil society rises in rebellion and overthrows the regime it is still a possibility. More importantly, if we are to accurately model de-autocratization it is essential that the model reflect the fact that the process is an iterated one. It is rare that de-autocratization occurs overnight, especially if we are to focus on democracy as the final outcome. Due to the fact that de-autocratization is an iterated process, civil society must be treated as an equal.

If we examine the case of South Africa we see what role civil society plays in de-autocratization. Democratization came only after years of pressure had been applied internally through consistent protests and challenges of the government's authority by civil society. Those very protests are what brought the abuses of the Apartheid regime to the attention of people outside of South Africa and led to the external pressure placed on the regime. The final stages of de-autocratization were initiated by the Apartheid regime but only after the actions of civil society forced the regime to the bargaining table.

## **Potential Pitfalls on the Pathway: Exploring the Various Outcomes of Regime Transition**

The ideal outcome in any regime transition is a peaceful outcome, one where liberalization occurs with little fighting or loss of life. While ideal, de-autocratization rarely sees this outcome. Many times transition leads to coups, repression, civil war, or a reversion to a more controlling authoritarian regime. The question then, is how does a country find itself facing on of these violent outcomes?

We can assume that transition begins, for whatever reason, with a belief that whatever goals are set by the actors can be reached peacefully. Any time there is a violent outcome, both the regime and civil society will pay a high cost in the loss of life, the money that goes into a violent conflict, loss of economic production, and possibly the loss of power for the regime or eradication of some segment of civil society. Knowing that the costs associated with violence can be high, violence should only occur when the goals of the actors are too far apart to peacefully negotiate a solution that both sides approve of. If the above assumption is an accurate reflection of real world behavior, then the question that must be answered is why do we see any of these possible violent outcomes?

The very process of de-autocratization can cause the outbreak of violence. Mueller and Weede (1991) and Hegre et al (1998) agree that changes in the level of repression can cause violence. In countries where repression is high, rebellion is less likely to occur due to the high costs and slim chances of

success. In countries where repression is low, such as a democracy, rebellion is less likely because the opposition has a voice and need not fear retaliation. Civil society has peaceful avenues for voicing its disapproval making rebellion unnecessary. It is when repression is at a moderate level that conflict is more likely.

In countries where de-autocratization is occurring, repression is decreasing. Some segment of civil society has been granted additional liberties. If appropriate institutions have not been created in order to channel these new liberties then members of civil society are faced with increasing liberties and no formal method of exercising these new liberties. Additionally, Civil society may desire additional liberalization once it has been granted its new rights. If civil society chooses to press for additional liberalization the regime may see this behavior as a threat to its continued existence and choose to use force to silence civil society. In this case, de-autocratization leads to violence and not the peaceful outcome that both actors would prefer.

Even if civil society chooses non-violent methods to demand additional liberalization, regime members may see such demands as a challenge to its authority and use force to end the call for additional liberties. By increasing repression the regime could incite additional violence, leading to civil war. If there are regime members who are interested in siding with civil society in calling for increased liberalization, hard-liners in the regime may choose to remove the reformers through a military coup. How civil society reacts to decreases in repression and how the regime responds to civil society's new demands will

dictate whether the outcome of de-autocratization is peaceful or violent and what type of violence is seen.

Decreasing repression is not the only change in a country attempting de-autocratization; possible changes in the economic structure of the society can also influence the likelihood of a violent outcome. If the regime chooses to relinquish some control over economic production there is an increase in available resources, whether the resources are land or capital or both, for some segment of civil society. Collier and Hoeffler (1999) ask what motivates civil society to rebel: looting or justice seeking. Collier and Hoeffler develop two models, one for looting and one for justice seeking. In the looting model, Collier and Hoeffler argue that an increase in resources will lead to an increase in violence because there is more loot to be had. The regime's response, an increase in attempted deterrence, can lead to an escalation of civil violence. Additionally, the more profitable the looting is the longer a civil war will last so the more sweeping the economic changes the more likely de-autocratization will lead to a violent outcome and the violence will last longer. Again, relinquishing some control over civil society has the potential to end in violence.

The best intentions of the regime can serve as the impetus for a violent outcome. De-autocratization can lead civil society to believe that it can challenge the regime, leading to an increase in repression or civil war, or through providing an economic reason for internal violence by making more resources available to civil society.

## The Game Theoretic Model

In order to develop a better understanding of the interaction which occurs between the regime and civil society, I develop a game theoretic model. By its nature, game theory allows us to explore strategic interaction between actors in order to understand how different outcomes are reached. Additionally, game theory allows for different types of information, complete and incomplete, which will help in developing a more accurate understanding of de-autocratization as the model can be adjusted to more accurately represent the lack of information that the actors face in the real world. As such, game theory provides us with a powerful tool that can be used to answer the questions posed in this research.

### *The Game Tree*




Figure 4.1 Complete and Perfect Information Game

Abbreviation	Outcome
IV	Internal Violence
NT	Negotiated Transition
LT	Limited Transition
FT	Forced Transition
SQ	Status Quo

**Table 4.1 List of Abbreviations for the Complete and Perfect Information Game**

### ***The Actors***

The game tree above models the process of de-autocratization assuming complete and perfect information. The assumption of complete and perfect information is made here in order to better describe the game structure and will be dropped further in the chapter.

There are two actors involved in this game, the *regime* and *civil society*. The regime is composed of the primary decision makers within a given country. The number of regime members will vary from country to country. The regime is composed of *reformers* and *hard-liners*. Reformers are regime members who favor some degree of liberalization. Hard-liners are regime members who prefer to maintain the status quo and do not want to see liberalization occur. The internal struggle faced by regime members is discussed in Chapter 2 of this work.

Civil society is composed of various groups found within the country. These groups can be based on religion, ethnicity, economic status, or other factors that are deemed important within a country. Like the regime, there is no set number of groups that can exist within a given country. As was discussed in chapter 3, civil society must overcome the hurdles posed by a large scale collective action problem. The degree to which civil society is able to overcome the collective action problem indicates the strength of civil society. If civil society is able to unite, for example 100 %, then civil society is considered *strong*. The greater the level of disagreement within civil society, the more *weak* civil society and hence the more difficult it is for civil society to challenge the regime.

#### *The Order of Play*

The game begins with nature determining if the regime is composed of reformers or hard-liners. This is done in order to make the game more realistic. Civil society does not know if it is facing a regime composed of hard-liners or reformers. By allowing nature to determine if the regime is composed of hard-liners or reformers, the model is able to capture the uncertainty that comes with the lack of information and portray a more realistic model. Without a nature node at the beginning of the game, there is an assumption that civil society knows the regime's type.

The regime moves next, choosing to open or remain closed. As Przeworski (1991) acknowledges either actor can begin the process of de-autocratization but in most cases the regime makes the first move. Why is this the case? The regime controls the institutions of governance and the military and



police forces. De-autocratization occurs when additional liberties are granted to some segment of civil society, which only the regime is capable of allowing. Additionally, the military and police forces can be used against civil society if civil society attempts to force de-autocratization. For civil society to be able to force change it must be able to overthrow the regime or convince the regime that is strong enough to remove it from power. While there have been cases where civil society has been able to remove the regime and begin the process on its own, this is rare. Civil society can place pressure on the regime that eventually leads to de-autocratization occurring, as we saw in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa, even in these cases the regime eventually made the initial move to begin the process of regime transition. For this reason, the regime will make the initial decision to open or remain closed.

Once the regime has moved, civil society must choose between mobilizing or not mobilizing. Previous attempts at formalizing the process of de-autocratization by Przeworski (1991), Crescenzi (1998), Casper and Taylor (1997) have allowed civil society to move only if the regime chooses to open. This does not accurately reflect how de-autocratization occurs. In the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa each country had a history of civil society attempting to force de-autocratization, all of which were met with resistance by the regime leading to the imprisoning or death of the movements leadership. While the movements did not directly lead to de-autocratization taking place, the cumulative effects of civil society's efforts did play an important role in pressuring the regime into eventually beginning the process of de-

autocratization. This must be accounted for if we are to understand how the process of de-autocratization works and why these violent outcomes occur. The only way to account for these instances is to allow civil society the option to mobilize when the regime has decided to remain closed.

If the regime chooses to open and civil society chooses not to mobilize the games end with a limited transition as the outcome. If civil society chooses to mobilize, the regime is faced with a decision between reacting and not reacting. The regime can choose to negotiate by not reacting or it can choose to attempt to stop civil society's mobilization through the use of force. If the regime chooses to react after civil society chooses to mobilize, civil war is the outcome. Forced transition occurs when the regime does not choose to open, civil society mobilizes, and the regime does not react. In this case, the regime is removed from office by civil society.

### *The Outcomes*

There are five possible outcomes from this game; internal violence, status quo, forced liberalization, limited liberalization, and negotiated liberalization. These outcomes occur once both the regime and civil society have moved, allowing each an opportunity to react to the others decision. Since the research is guided by a desire to understand how a country finds itself embroiled in a civil war, I am not concerned with the final outcome, for example who wins the civil war. As such, there is not a nature node for probability of success for any of the outcomes.

*Internal Violence* occurs when the regime opens, civil society mobilizes, and the regime reacts and when the regime remains closed, civil society mobilizes, and the regime reacts. In both cases, conflict ensues due to civil societies choice to mobilize. The length and severity of conflict can vary from case to case, but always involves some clash between civil society and the regime.

It can be argued that Soviet Union began to de-autocratize in 1987 when Gorbachev announced his new policies of glasnost and perestroika. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, replaced by Russia and a series of independent Republics. In Russia, de-autocratization has led to the development of a democratic government that finds itself struggling with a wide variety of political and economic challenges. One such challenge has been the civil war in the Republic of Chechnya. In this case, the regime allowed democratization to occur, the Chechnyans responded with a demand for greater autonomy, which the regime denied. When the Chechnyan people began to use force in order to gain autonomy, the Russian regime responded in kind. In this case, the regime opened, civil society in Chechnya mobilized, and the regime responded with the use of force.

In South Africa, the regime choose to remain closed, civil society mobilized, and the regime responded with the use of force. While the regime eventually choose to open, it was only after decades of armed conflict with the Black population who had been demanding the end of Apartheid. Many of the Black leaders, such as Mandela and Biko, where imprisoned and killed in an

attempt to silence the population. When the Black population organized marches in protest of Apartheid the regime responded with deadly force. While the violence never reached the levels used by scholars to code the case as a civil war, there is no doubt that internal violence was occurring due to movement to end Apartheid.

The transition which occurred in Romania in 1989 is another example of internal violence, although an example which was a great deal more abrupt than the transitions in Russia and South Africa. In 1989 many of the Eastern Bloc countries were able to end the rule of the Communist regime because of the actions taken by civil society. Most of these cases proved to be non-violent transitions. In Romania the population began to call for the end of the communist regime through protest. The protest quickly transformed to a mob action which eventually led to the capture and execution of Nicolai Ceausescu.

The *Status Quo* occurs when the regime chooses to remain closed, civil society does not mobilize, and the regime does not react. This series of events leads to no changes in the country. Two of the Soviet Union's former republics, Latvia and Estonia, serve as examples of the status quo outcome. Between the years of 1991-1996, Estonia and Latvia saw no change in its regime score in the Polity 3d data set nor did either country experience any violence.

*Forced Transition* occurs when the regime remains closed, civil society chooses to mobilize, and the regime chooses not to react. Liberalization, an increase in some areas of political, social, or economic liberties, occurs but not

because the regime is interested in reform but because civil society forces it.

The regime may be replaced, if it is not it suffers a loss of power.

Czechoslovakia and Poland, serve as excellent examples of cases of a negotiated transition. In the Case of Czechoslovakia and Poland, there was a long history of struggle against the ruling Communist regime. The leaders of the movements, Dubcek, Havel, and Welesa among others, where jailed in an attempt to silence the movement. In the spring of 1968, an attempt to reorganize the Communist regime in Chezcoslovakia was ended when Warsaw Pact tanks arrived in Prague. In Poland, the labor movement organized strikes and protests as a way of demanding de-autocratization. While the intial pressures placed on the regime by civil society lead to arrests and no change, they set the stage for the events of 1989. In 1989, the people of Poland and Czechoslovakia saw that the regime was weakened and rose against the regime. The regimes in these countries choose to accept civil societies demand for de-autocratization and the change occurred in a peaceful manner.

*Limited Transition* occurs when the regime chooses to open, civil society chooses to not mobilize, and the regime chooses not to react. In this scenario, civil society is accepting the additional liberties that the regime is granting it and choosing not to ask for more by mobilizing. Iran is a good example of a country undergoing the process of de-autocratization that has led to a limited transition. The last two elections have led to victories for candidates interested in reform, including the President Khatami-Ardakani in 1987. Since his election, there has been an increase in the number of non-government publications, political parties,

and student groups. While there has been some reform, it is believed that Iran has not moved as quickly as the reformers would like to due to the presence of the Council of Clerics. The Council of Clerics is a great deal more conservative than the elected representatives and has such powers as approving political candidates. The presence of the Council of Clerics has led to a limited transition in Iraq.

*Negotiated Transition* occurs when the regime chooses to open, civil society chooses to mobilize, and the regime chooses not to react. In not reacting, the regime indicates a willingness to work with civil society, or some segment of civil society, and liberalization comes from negotiation between the regime and civil society.

While it may seem that the different types of transition, limited, negotiated, and forced, are really all the same thing, it is necessary to realize that the differences in these types of transitions is important. A limited transition allows for an increase in personal liberties for some segment of civil society that the regime wanted. There is no challenge to the regimes new policy. A negotiated transition occurs when the regime enters into some type of negotiation with civil society. In doing this, the regime sends a signal to civil society that can be interpreted in later iterations of the game. The regime is indicating that it is composed of mostly reformers who are willing to move ahead with de-autocratization or that the regime believes that civil war will be too costly or that they cannot win a civil war. Finally, a forced transition means that the regime is removed from office by civil society. While all these outcomes indicate some

form of transition, how transition occurs is different and will affect future iterations of the game.

Finally, it has been suggested that the above game does not allow for democratization to occur. This is not the case. Transition reflects movement towards a democracy even if democracy is not the final outcome. Democracy comes about through repeated interactions between the regime and civil society. This can be represented as an outcome derived from iterating the game presented in this chapter. This is a more accurate representation of how the process of de-autocratization works. Steps are taken that may lead to democracy but democracy is not a guarantee. By focusing on the steps, the game acknowledges the gradual nature, even though it is sometimes conflictual, of democratization.

### *Assumptions*

In order to develop cost terms and preference orderings, it is necessary to examine the assumptions that are used to build the model. Like all game theoretic models, it is necessary to assume a unitary actor. On its face, this assumption appears problematic for a model of strategic interaction between the regime and civil society. It is difficult to argue that civil society is a unitary actor. As was seen in chapter three, civil society can be divided and the depth of those divisions will influence civil society's behavior when interacting with the regime. In order to address this issue, chapter three develops a model which explores how civil society is able, or unable, to solve the collective action problem it faces. That information is used in this model in order to determine what actions civil

society will take when interacting with the regime. Civil society in this model then, is defined as a unitary actor in so far as it represents the final outcome reached when civil society attempts to solve its collective action problem as described in chapter three.

A similar argument can be made about the regime. The regime is not necessarily a homogeneous group. The model found in chapter two addresses this concern. The model depicts the interaction between regime members and feeds into the model found in this chapter. The regime knows its type based on the outcome of the interaction between regime members. It is because of the models developed earlier in this research that we can assume a unitary actor in this model.

Beyond the unitary actor assumption, there are a series of assumptions in regards to both actors. Let us first explore the assumptions that surround the regime.

1) Regime members prefer more control to less control.

1a) Hard-liners:  $U(SQ)=1$ ,  $U(LT)=g$ ,  $U(FT)=0$  where  $1>g>0$

1b) Reformers:  $U(LT)=1$ ,  $U(SQ)=s$ ,  $U(FT)=0$  where  $1>s>0$

2) The value of transition for Reformers is enhanced by  $\Sigma w > 0$  and  $\Sigma$  for hard-liners where  $w \in (0,1)$  therefore  $U_{HL}(LT)=g+\Sigma$  and  $U_R(FT)=0+\Sigma w$

3) Internal Violence is conflict over government control. The value of Internal Violence for the regime, Reformer or Hard-Liner, is based on the Expected Value of conflict:

Hard-liner:  $\{pU(SQ) + (1-p)U(FT)\}$



$$\text{Reformer: } \{pU(LT) + (1-p)U(FT)\}$$

minus the physical cost of the conflict,  $k > 0$ , where  $p(\text{Regime Wins})$

$$EV(\text{Civil War}|\text{Open}) = pg - k \text{ and } EV(\text{Civil War}|\sim\text{Open}) = p - k$$

4) Negotiated Transition is an outcome which the regime has shown a willingness to open. As a bargaining problem,  $EV(NT)$  for either regime type is  $\{pU(LT) + (1-p)U(CW)\}$ .  $EV_R(NT) = p1 + \Sigma w > EV_{HL}(NT) = pg + \Sigma$ .

### Costs

There are costs associated with any action taken by the regime and civil society. Both civil society and the regime faces costs associated with opening, mobilization, and fighting. The table below summarizes the costs and the Greek letters associated with each cost.

$\Sigma_r$	Cost of Opening for the Regime
$\Sigma w_r$	Weighted Cost of Opening when Regime is composed of Reformers
$\Sigma_{cs}$	Cost of Opening for Civil Society
$\cdot_r$	Cost of Mobilizing for the Regime
$\cdot_{cs}$	Cost of Mobilizing for Civil Society
$M_r$	Cost of Fighting for the Regime
$Mw_r$	Weighted Cost of Fighting when the Regime is composed of Hard-liners
$M_{cs}$	Cost of Fighting for Civil Society

**T**able 4.2 A List of Cost Terms

If the regime chooses to open, there is a cost incurred by both the regime and civil society. The regime incurs some loss of power but can gain additional legitimacy. This additional legitimacy can come in the form of a more satisfied civil society to an increase in funds received from other countries or international organizations. As such, the regime can receive a positive benefit for opening. Opening can also lead to a negative payoff for the regime when it does not work out as intended. If civil society attempts to force transition beyond where the regime is willing to go, opening can lead to coups and civil war. Additionally, Reformers pay a different cost for opening than hard-liners do. Reformers are interested in some degree of transition, so they receive a weighted cost when opening is selected. Civil society also incurs a positive benefit. The opening increases some political, social, or economic liberties. As the percentage of the population which benefits from the opening increases, so does the positive benefit incurred from opening.

If civil society chooses to mobilize both the regime and civil society incur a cost. Civil society must pay for costs as mundane as photo copying fliers, brochures, pamphlets that it may use to educate others or to rally people to the cause. Mobilization also brings with it the possible cost of imprisonment and providing arms to those willing to use physical force. These costs can be offset by the benefits received from successful mobilization, an increase in liberties or costs can increase if mobilization fails and the regime cracks down and reduces liberties. The regime also pays a cost if civil society mobilizes. It must provide for additional police or military force, if it attempts to end the mobilization with a

show of force as well as a loss of power that comes from the mobilization. As such, the regime never receives a positive payoff from mobilization while civil society can receive a positive or negative return.

Finally, both the regime and civil society incur costs if fighting occurs, if the regime chooses to react to civil society attempt at mobilization. Both sides will face casualties due to the fighting. The longer and more violent the conflict becomes, the greater the cost. Both actors must find a way to pay for arming those involved in the fighting as well as a loss of economic benefits for two reasons, 1) the destruction of the infrastructure 2) the loss of economic gain associated with production that could have occurred during the fighting. The costs increase for both actors if they lose. The regime loses power, control of the country, and most likely the members of the regime will be killed or imprisoned. Civil society faces the possibility of genocide, increased repression, and the loss of even more political, social, and economic liberties. The only time that the regime receives a positive payoff is when it uses force to increase its control over the country. Hard-liners receive a weighted cost for fighting. Since hard-liners are not devoted to reform on any level, they will pay a different cost if fighting is necessary then reformers would pay.

### *Preference Orderings*

One of game theories strongest assets is the ability to examine how different actors, and different types of actors, behave in an environment requiring strategic interaction and the resulting outcomes. The game presented in this chapter identifies two actors, civil society and the regime, with the regime having

Outcomes	Regime	Civil Society
Internal Violence	$-\Sigma w_r$ $-\dot{r}$ $-M_r$	$-\Sigma_{cs}$ $-\dot{c}_{cs}$ $-M_{cs}$
Internal Violence`	$-\Sigma_r$ $-\dot{r}$ $-Mw_r$	$-\Sigma_{cs}$ $-\dot{c}_{cs}$ $-M_{cs}$
Internal Violence w/ Regime Close	$-\dot{r}$ $-M_r$	$-\dot{c}_{cs}$ $-M_{cs}$
Internal Violencew/ Regime Close`	$-\dot{r}$ $-Mw_r$	$-\dot{c}_{cs}$ $-M_{cs}$
Forced Transition	$-\dot{r}$	$+\dot{c}_{cs}$
Forced Transition `	$-\dot{r}$	$+\dot{c}_{cs}$
Limited Transition	$+\Sigma w_r$	$+\Sigma_{cs}$
Limited Transition `	$+\Sigma_r$	$+\Sigma_{cs}$
Negotiated Transition	$+\Sigma w_r$ $-\dot{r}$	$+\Sigma_{cs}$ $+\dot{c}_{cs}$
Negotiated Transition `	$+\Sigma_r$ $-\dot{r}$	$+\Sigma_{cs}$ $+\dot{c}_{cs}$
Status Quo		

**Table 4.3 Establishing the Preference Orderings**

two types; reformers, hard-liners, . The different types of regime is based on the composition of each actor at the time the game begins. The regime is composed of reformers when the members dedicated to some form of liberalization are able to control the regimes actions. In the following paragraphs I define the preference orderings for the actors. As in all cases, there can be different preference orderings based on extreme cases, such as a regime which is composed of hard-liners but realizes that the reformers are close to taking power and wish to

cement their factions control by allowing some liberalization. The preference ordering developed for this research are meant to reflect what a “pure” hard-liner or reformer prefers.

Within the regime the reformers preference orderings reflect the desire for some type of liberalization. Reformers desire a change in the regimes policy, but they prefer to control the process of de-autocratization, as such they prefer Limited Transition over all outcomes. Negotiated Transition grants the regime some degree of control even though the regime is required to relinquish more control than it initially wanted to relinquish. Since negotiate transition allows some liberalization and grants the regime some control over how the liberalization is enacted it is preferred to the Status Quo. The Status Quo does not allow for any type of change in the regimes control over the population, which is contrary to the goals of a regime composed of reformers. Reformers prefer the status quo to forced transition because the regime would lose all control if they are forced from office. Since reformers want to maintain some control over civil society, even if they are willing to change the type of control that it has, removal from office is not a desired outcome. Yet forced transition is preferred to Civil War. Civil war comes with high costs, both in terms of human life and economic cost. Reformers are interested in allowing some type of change in the government not the devastation that civil war brings.

If the regime is composed of hard-liners, the preference orderings take on a entirely different shape. Hard-liners are interested in maintaining their position, if not increasing their power. They are not interested in de-autocratization. Hard-

liners prefer the Status Quo to all other outcomes. The status quo maintains their current level of control over the country, insuring continued benefits that regime members receive from holding office. If some type of transition is required, due to high levels of external pressure or the promise of rewards that would overcome the amount of power that is relinquished, hard-liners prefer Limited transition. Limited transition allows the hard-liners to control how much power the regime relinquishes. Civil war is preferred to the remaining forms of transition. The hard-liners are willing to relinquish some degree of control but are not willing to move beyond the liberties that they propose. If civil society challenges a hard line regime, then the hard-liners prefer civil war to any other outcome. Civil war allows the regime some chance of regaining complete control over civil society, and possibly increase its control if it wins. Negotiated Transition is preferred to Forced Transition. While the hard-line regime must relinquish more control than it was initially willing to, negotiated transition still allows the regime to maintain office and some degree of control over how the transition occurs while still receiving some benefits from remaining in office. Forced transition is the worst outcome for the hard-line regime as the regime is forced out of office and loses all control and any benefits it had been receiving while in office.

Civil society Negotiated Transition to all other outcomes. Negotiated transition allows civil society a voice in what type of liberties are granted and guarantees that some of the changes that are made in the government's behavior address issues that are important to civil society. Forced Transition is the next

most preferred outcome. Forced transition allows civil society to meet more of its goals than any other type of transition but requires some use of force and is more risky than negotiated transition. Preferring some degree of liberalization to none, civil society prefers Limited Transition to the Status Quo or Civil War as it allows some new liberties, even if those liberties are not the same as the ones that civil society might want to see granted. Due to the cost of Civil War, civil society prefers the Status Quo to Civil War. Civil war means that there is a possibility that the regime is able to eradicate or greatly weaken segments of civil society.

Reformers: *Limited Transition > Negotiated Transition > Status Quo > Civil War > Forced Transition* .

Hard-liners: *Status Quo > Limited Transition > Civil War > Negotiated Transition > Forced Transition*

Civil Society: *Negotiated Transition > Forced Transition > Limited Transition > Status Quo > Civil War*

### *Solve the Complete and Perfect Information game*

Before exploring what the outcome of the game is using incomplete information, it is necessary to identify equilibria assuming complete and perfect information. By assigning ordinal payoffs to the possible outcomes we can identify the equilibrium using backwards induction. Five represents the highest rated outcome and 1 the lowest rated outcome.

Actor	LT	NT	SQ	FT	IV
Reformers	5	4	3	2	1
Hard-liners	4	2	5	1	3
Civil Society	3	5	2	4	1

Table 4.4 Cardinal Payoffs for Each Actor. 5 is the best, 1 is the worst




Figure 4.2 Backwards Induction for the Complete and Perfect Information Game



The above outcomes are not surprising. If civil society knows that it is playing against reformers, it will choose to mobilize knowing that the reformers prefer some form of transition to none. The result is a Negotiated Transition which benefits both actors. When civil society knows that it is facing a hard-line regime, Status Quo is the outcome. Civil society is aware that the regime will not tolerate mobilization and the regime knows that if it opens, civil society will mobilize. As such, the regime chooses not to open and civil society chooses not to mobilize.

#### *Incomplete and Imperfect information Game*

Is it realistic to assume that civil society has complete and perfect information? Is it safe to assume that civil society knows the composition of the regime? I argue that it is not. In authoritarian regimes, access to information is restricted, how restricted will depend on the degree to which the regime is authoritarian, which decreases civil society's ability to determine what type of regime it is facing. As a regime becomes more open, the amount of information will increase, even this does not guarantee that civil society is fully informed as to the type of regime it faces.

In order to increase the models accuracy, it is necessary to assume that civil society does not have complete information. As mentioned above, the amount of information that civil society has will differ based on the regime and how strictly the regime controls access to information. This can be taken into consideration by altering how strongly civil society believes it knows the regime's

type. This is modeled using the game below, which adds an information set where civil society is faced with the decision to mobilize or not mobilize. The information set indicates that civil society is not sure what branch of the game tree they are on, are they playing against reformers or hard-liners? In order to solve the game, it is necessary to use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium analysis. Using the same ordinal preferences that were used in solving the complete and perfect information, we can demonstrate why the information sets are necessary. Recall that in the complete and perfect information game, the equilibrium outcomes were Negotiated Transition when playing against reformers and Status Quo when playing against hard-liners. What happens when civil society mistakes the regime's identity?




Figure 4.3 The Incomplete and Imperfect Information Game

If civil society believes that it is facing a hard-line regime when it is actually facing a reform regime, the outcome becomes Limited Transition. The reform regime opens but civil society does not mobilize fearing that if it does it will lead to civil war, its least preferred outcome. Compare this to the original outcome of **Negotiated Transition** in the complete and perfect information game. The reform regime prefers Limited Transition to Negotiated Transition but civil society prefers **Negotiated Transition** to Limited Transition. By misreading the regimes type, civil society fails to press for additional reforms and loses an opportunity to improve its position within the country.

If civil society believes that it is facing a reform regime when it is actually facing a hard-line regime, the outcome is Civil War. The regime does not open but civil society mobilizes. Hard-liners prefer Civil War to Forced Transition and so initiate the use of force leading to a civil war. Compare this to the Status Quo outcome found in the complete and perfect information game. Civil society would have been better off choosing not to mobilize, Status Quo is preferred to Civil War, by misreading the type of regime it is facing, civil society finds itself embroiled in a civil war that it did not want.

In both cases, the outcome changes when a lack of information is taken into consideration in the game theoretic model. This indicates that information is essential to the outcome of the game. Knowing this, it gives the regime reason to bluff. Reformers are interested in some degree of de-autocratization but prefer complete control over the degree of reform. Knowing that information is important, reformers have an incentive to pretend to be hard-liners as it could lead to an outcome of limited transition and not negotiated transition. Alternatively, hard-liners that are interested in increasing their control over the country may bluff and present themselves as reformers. In doing so, civil society may be baited into mobilizing giving the hard-liners reason to initiate conflict allowing them the possibility of removing trouble makers or groups that hard-liners feel threaten their power base.

### *Solving the Incomplete and Imperfect Information Game*

While the use of backwards induction demonstrates the importance of information in the cases where civil society and the regime interact strategically, there are more sophisticated equilibrium options that will enhance our understanding of the interaction between the regime and civil society. Due to the importance of information in this game, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium solution set is appropriate. Once the regime, which knows its type, moves, civil society must make a decision to mobilize or not mobilize. This decision is made, in part, based on civil society's belief that the regime is composed of reformers or hard-liners. The regime's move sends a signal to civil society that it must interpret when making its decision.

As was seen in the complete and perfect information game, reformers will open when hard-liners will not. If the regime chooses to open then, civil society may interpret this as a signal that the regime is composed of reformers. This is not known with certainty. Hard-liners prefer the Status Quo to any form of Transition but, as was seen in chapter two, there are reasons that will lead hard-liners to allow some degree of opening. If civil society misreads the actor it is playing against, then internal violence becomes a possibility.

$$p(A_i | B) = p(A_i)p(B | A_i) / p(A)p(B | A) + p(\sim A)p(B | \sim A)$$

Using Bayes Theorem, we are able to solve the game.

For the game presented here, the formula is as follows:

$$p(\text{Reform} | \text{Open}) = \frac{p(\text{Reformer})p(\text{Open} | \text{Reformer})}{p(\text{Reformer})p(\text{Open} | \text{Reformer}) + p(\text{Hard-liner})p(\text{Open} | \text{Hard-liner})}$$

$$p(\text{Reformer})p(\text{Open} | \text{Reformer}) + p(\text{Hard-liner})p(\text{Open} | \text{Hard-liner})$$

If the probability of Reformer is set to 1/2 then the probability of Hard-liner is also 1/2. Using the preference orderings found in prior discussion, we can assign ordinal values to the payoffs and solve for the equilibrium.

$$p(\text{Reformer}|\text{Open}) = \frac{1/2(1)}{1/2(1/2) + 1/2(1/2)} = \frac{1/2}{1/2 + 1/2} = 1/2$$

What the above finding means is that civil society will choose to mobilize fifty percent of the time and not to mobilize fifty percent of the time. This is due to the fact that civil society does not have enough information to determine what the regime type is.

## Conclusion

The game presented in this chapter can only take place after the regime determines its type, this is accomplished through the non-cooperative bargaining game in Chapter Three. Once the regime determines what type it is, it then will choose to open or not open. It is in the regimes best interest to hide its type from civil society, as demonstrated in the above example, civil society will not mobilize if they know the regime is comprised of Hard-liners and is more likely to mobilize if it determines that the regime is made of Reformers.

In addition, we have learned that internal violence is more likely to occur when civil society believes that the regime is comprised of Reformers when in reality the regime is made of Hard-liners. Based on their preference orderings, Hard-liners wish to maintain the status quo. If a Hard-line regime does open, it

**will not tolerate mobilization and internal violence will be the outcome. Internal violence will not occur when the regime is comprised of Reformers.**

## **Chapter 5**

### **OPERATIONALIZATION**

In Chapters Three and Four the argument is made that the interaction among regime members and between the regime and civil society during the process of de-autocratization will influence the likelihood of internal conflict. In the course of these chapters, it is argued that economic conditions, the degree to which civil society is fragmented, and the willingness of some regime members to liberalize will directly impact the course of de-autocratization. The following two chapters are dedicated to exploring the validity of the previous arguments using empirical methods.

#### **The Universe of Cases**

In order to include the variables that influence the likelihood of internal conflict in countries undergoing the process of de-autocratization, it is necessary to draw data from four unique data sets. The data sets used in this research are the Polity 3d data set, Wallensteen and Sollenbergs' *Data on Armed Conflict*, Ellingsens' *'Ethnic Witches' Brew* data set, and the World Bank Economic Indicators data set.

The nature of the research question requires that the countries included in the research were non-democracies in the years 1989-1996, the duration of that data set, and where there was an attempt to de-autocratize. The polity 3d data set was used to determine which cases which would be included in the data set.



The Polity 3d data set includes two variables, autocracy score and democracy score. Both variables are based on a scale of 0-10, with 0 representing a low degree of democracy or autocracy and 10 representing a high degree of democracy or autocracy. An index variable, titled *regime*, was created by first changing the autocracy score to a negative value and then adding the autocracy score and the democracy score. The regime variable was bounded between 10 and -10, with 10 representing a pure democracy and -10 representing a pure autocracy. The decision rule to include a country in the empirical research required that a country score a 6 or less in at least one year in 1989-1996. In order to determine if a country had de-autocratized, its regime score had to improve at least once between the years 1989-1996.

The Polity 3d data set was selected because of its inclusion of a variable that measures both democracy and autocracy. In doing so, the Polity data acknowledges that autocracy is not the mere absence of democracy and vice versa. As such, the measures provide an accurate depiction of a country's regime type, which is essential for this research.

In addition to identifying which countries to include in the data set, the Polity 3d data will be used to develop measure of regime change and regime stability. The Polity data set is regularly updated which allows for the data to reflect changes within a country's institutions of governance. How these variables are constructed will be discussed later in the chapter.

## **The Data Sets**

The Wallensteen and Sollenbergs' *Data on Armed Conflict* is used to identify which the countries where conflict occurred and in what years. The Wallensteen and Sollenberg data was selected for two reasons, the twenty-five battle dead threshold and the possibility of multiple conflicts within a country. The alternative to the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data set is Singer and Smalls' Correlates of War Civil War data set. Singer and Small establish one-thousand battle dead threshold for a case to be included in the data set. While this is a reasonable threshold to identify a Civil War, indeed it is the threshold that Wallensteen and Sollenberg use to identify a civil war within their own data set, it is not reasonable to assume that the only type of internal conflict that can occur during the process of de-autocratization is that of a civil war. Indeed, the models developed in chapters three and four of this dissertation identifies multiple possible outcomes; political unrest, coups, and civil war. In order to develop an empirical model that accurately represents the theory develop din the earlier chapters of this dissertation it is necessary to a data set that establishes a lower battle dead threshold for inclusion. The Wallensteen and Sollenberg data does just that. In including cases where there is a minimum of twenty-five battle dead, the Wallensteen and Sollenberg *Data of Armed Conflict*, allows for the inclusion of cases where a bloody coup occurred, riots, terrorism, violent protests, and other such outcomes.

Additionally the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data takes into consideration the possibility of multiple conflicts within a country in any given year. For

example, in Indonesia it distinguishes between the conflicts in East Timor and Aceh. Why is this important? Chapter four explores the influence that the interaction between the regime and civil society has on the process of de-autocratization and the possibility of internal conflict. It is argued that the degree to which civil society is fragmented will influence its ability to effectively mobilize. One possibility is that the more fragmented civil society is, the more likely that there can be multiple challenges to the regime. While the game theoretic model does not allow for this possibility, due to the intractability of the game once it becomes an N person game, there is no reason to limit the empirical model in the same manner. The Wallenstein and Sollenberg data allows for multiple conflicts to exist in a given country. Using this data then allows the empirical model power that is not found in the game theoretic model, which will strengthen the results of the empirical model.

The Wallenstein and Sollenberg data set is not without its weaknesses. Its greatest weakness is the time period for which data is available, 1989-1999. This limits the empirical research to the Post Cold War period, preventing the results from being generalized across time. While this is a weakness, the lack of a data set with a similarly low threshold for inclusion requires the use of the Wallenstein and Sollenberg data.

The third data set to be incorporated in this research is Ellingsens' *'Ethnic Witches' Brew* data set. In chapter four, the possibility of a fragmented civil society is raised. In order to reflect accurately the theoretical concepts in the empirical model it is necessary to include a measure of fragmentation within civil

society. The Ellingsen data provides these measures as she develops measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fragmentation within a country. The Ellingsen data set includes data from 1945-1994. This data is expanded to include the years 1995-1999. It is assumed that the number of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups will remain constant over time. In cases where there is a change in the number of groups in a country, the years 1995-1999 are coded as missing data.

The final data set used in this research is the World Bank Economic Indicators 1998 data set. This data provides measures of economic development for all countries in the international system through the year 1996. As discussed in chapters three and four, changes in a country's economic well being can be the catalyst for liberalization and violence. As such, it is necessary to include data that reflects the changes in a country's economic well being. The World Bank data set provides a wide variety of variables that can be used to measure economic change for all countries and years included in the data set.

Because the World Bank data was available through the year 1996, and the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data does not begin until 1989, that data set is limited to cases that include all authoritarian countries in the international system from the years 1989-1996. While the limited time period decreases the ability to generalize across time, it should not affect the models ability to demonstrate the necessity of unpacking the possible outcomes of de-autocratization and not simply focusing on democratize or not democratize as outcomes.

## **The Variables**

### *The Dependent Variable: Outcome*

The research question asked in this dissertation is when will the process of de-autocratization lead to violence? As such, the dependent variable identified in this research is the outcome of the process.

The preceding theoretical chapters argue that the study of de-autocratization has been done a disservice by dichotomizing the possible outcomes to "democratize" or "fail to democratize". The game theoretic models developed in chapters three and four allow for the following outcomes, limited de-autocratization with no violence, de-autocratization without violence, coups, and violence. The violence outcome is left ambiguous in the game theoretic models due to the difficulty of developing models that can clearly differentiate between when riots, terrorism, or civil war may be possible outcomes.

This same difficulty does not exist when creating the dependent variable for the empirical models. Wallensteen and Sollenbergs' data set provides the basis for building the dependent variable titled *Outcome*. Wallensteen and Sollenberg provide the years when conflict occurs for every country in the data set. Additionally the variable "intensity level"<sup>10</sup> indicated the number of battle dead per year for each conflict. While the intensity level measure was a good place to start, it did not accurately reflect the dependent variable.

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<sup>10</sup> Intensity Level: Found in the Wallensteen and Sollenburg data set.

0 – No conflict activity.

1 - Minor armed conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.

2 - Intermediate armed conflict: At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year.

3 – War: At least 1 000 battle-related deaths per year.

The Outcome variable must differentiate between the type of conflict, not simply the intensity of the conflict. In order to properly develop the Outcome variable, the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data as an indication of when conflict occurred and then conduct additional research in order to identify the nature of the conflict. For the purpose of this research, the Outcome variable was broken into five categories: no conflict, coups, political unrest, minor conflict, and civil war.

The outcome variable was created using information found in the Keesings Worldwide archives. The Keesings information was matched to each country in order to determine if the conflict was a coup, political unrest, minor conflict, or civil war.

A case was coded as a *coup* when the Keesings information indicated that the only conflict in a country, in a given year, had been coup. The number of battle deaths that occurred based on the coup was not taken into consideration. Based on the reports found in the Keesings archives the following cases were identified as coups: Paraguay in 1989, Azerbaijan in 1993, Liberia in 1989, Guatemala in 1989, Burundi in 1992, Liberia in 1989, and Sierra Leone in 1992 and 1993.<sup>11</sup>

Cases where a segment of civil society had participated in protests against the government and the government responded with the use of force were coded as *political unrest*. Additionally, for a case to be coded as political unrest, the conflict had to occur in one area and was not sustained. I defined sustained

conflict based on the conflict continuing beyond one week. Forty-four cases of political unrest were identified. According to Keesings, cases such as Nicaragua (1989) and Niger (1990-1994) were coded as political unrest. In both cases, there was conflict that did not last beyond a week and there were fewer than 1,000-battle deaths.

*Minor conflict* was defined as conflict between the government and some segment of civil society that occurs over an extended period of time and/or in multiple locations. In addition, the death toll had to fall below 1,000 dead. There were forty-five cases identified as minor conflict.

*Civil war* was coded as when conflict between the government and some segment of civil society that occurs over an extended period of time and/or in multiple locations and there were more than 1,000 battle deaths. Seventy-four cases were identified as civil wars.

In many cases, the type of conflict changed year from year, depending on the severity of the fighting. Most frequently, cases fluctuated between minor conflict and civil war. One example of such a case is Rwanda. In 1990, Keesings indicated that there was conflict through out the month of October with the death toll ranging some where 100-1,000 dead. Due to the fact that there is not a firm death toll reported, Rwanda in 1990 is coded as a minor conflict. From 1991-1994, Rwanda is considered a civil based on the amount of conflict and the death toll rising over 1,000 dead each year.

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<sup>11</sup> The only coups that are included in the data set are coups where there was a minimum of twenty-five battles dead. This is due to the nature of the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data. In the future, the data set will be expanded to include bloodless coups.

In coding the outcome variable, several problems arose. First, there were several instances where the Keesings archive did not provide evidence that conflict had occurred in the year indicated in the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data set. In these cases, I assumed that the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data was correct and I coded the case as political unrest. This problem arose most frequently in cases where there were conflicts in many different territories, for example Myanmar. Keesings would report conflict but would not always identify where the conflict was occurring. In all of these cases, Wallensteen and Sollenberg coded the death toll as falling between 25-999 battle deaths. I chose political unrest, as it was the lowest level of conflict that I allowed for. This allowed me to keep the cases in question in the data set but prevented me from being more specific in the type of conflict that had occurred.

Secondly, there were several cases where the Keesings archive indicated a death toll that was different from the death toll coded in the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data. In the case of Rwanda, Keesings reported fewer than 1,000-battle deaths, for many years Keesings indicated fewer than 300-battle deaths, while Wallensteen and Sollenberg indicated greater than 1,000 battle deaths. In these cases, the death toll reported by Wallensteen and Sollenberg was used. I chose to use the Wallensteen and Sollenberg data due to Keesings lack of a death toll in many of the cases.



## **The Independent Variables**

### ***Regime Type***

As was discussed earlier, a country's regime type was determined through the use of the Polity 3 data set. This data set provides a measure of democracy as well as autocracy, both ranging between 0-10 with 0 being the least democratic or autocratic and 10 being the most democratic or autocratic. Using these two variables I was able to develop an index variable of regime type. For the purpose of this research, any case scoring greater than a 6 was declared a democracy and removed from the universe of cases.

The cases that were left range for a score of 6 to -10, developing an ordinal measure for regime type that allows me to distinguish between countries that are on the verge of becoming a democracy and those that are highly autocratic. It should come as no surprise that there was a spike in the number of countries that transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime in 1989 following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Unions decision to allow its satellite countries determine what type of regime they wanted.

### ***Measures of Transition***

The goal of this research is to better understand when de-autocratization leads to violence. In chapters three and four, game theoretic models are developed that allow us to better understand how the process of de-autocratization occurs and how the process can lead to a violent outcome. If this research is to accurately develop an empirical model that enhances the findings

of the game theoretic models it is necessary to measure when how quickly de-autocratization occurs. The measures used in this research are titled *regime stability* and *regime change*. Both measures are developed based on the regime index variable developed from the Polity 3d data.

regime stability and regimes change are similar concepts yet the differences are very important. Regime change represents the degree to which the regime is willing to change its policy. Regime change, then, is an attempt to better identify the degree to which the regime is willing to open. The game theoretic model in chapter three demonstrates that the large the proposed regime change, the less likely the opposing faction will be to attempt a coup. As such, it is imperative that the empirical model includes a measure that indicates how much change occurred in a given year if we are to understand when coups may occur.

The Polity 3d regime score was used to develop the regime change variable. Regime change measures the amount of de-autocratization that takes place in a given country. Subtracting the score from one year to the next accomplishes this task. This variable measures the degree of transition in order to see what impact the amount of change has on transition outcome.

Regime stability refers to the amount of time between measurable changes in policy. Stability then, refers to how long a given regime, and that regimes policy initiatives, have controlled a given country. Regime stability is an important concept derived from the game theoretic model in chapter four. The model demonstrates that in a complete and perfect information setting, a violent

outcome is not possible even when the regime chooses to open. This is due to the fact that civil society is aware of how much change the regime will allow and will not challenge the regime. In the incomplete and imperfect information game, a violent outcome is possible. Why the difference? Without complete and perfect information, civil society may see the regimes attempt to open, i.e. change its regime score, as a sign that the regime is weakened and hence vulnerable. Regime stability, the length of time between policy changes, then can be seen as a signal to civil society as to how strong or weak the regime is.

Regime stability measures the number of years between transition attempt by counting the years between attempts at transition. This measure is developed using the Polity 3d data. The regime stability score was derived from the regime change score. Each year that the regime change score remains the stable, adds another year to the regime stability score.

### *Ethnic Fragmentation*

In Chapter Four I argue that civil society can play a very important role in the process of de-autocratization if it is able to unite and demand liberalization from the regime. One factor that must be taken into consideration is how unified is civil society? The more unified civil society is, the more pressure it can place on the regime. The more fragmented civil society the less pressure it can bring to bear. As such, the empirical model can ill afford to ignore the role of civil society in the process of de-autocratization. Yet measuring civil society is a task that

poses many challenges and concerns, some of which cannot be addressed by empirical measures that are available today.

Civil society is a difficult concept to measure for many reasons. First, the exact definition of civil society is elusive. Civil society can be thought of in many ways; as ethnic groups, economic classes, religious differences, or any combination of the above. To date no measure has been developed that addresses all of these components or the cross cutting nature of civil society. This makes measuring civil society challenging and means that any measure of civil society will be imperfect.

Additionally the degree to which one segment of civil society is willing to go in order to achieve its goals would be a more accurate measure of the depth of fragmentation. The fact that different groups exist within civil society is not as important as to how strongly those groups disagree and what actions they are willing to take in order to affect change. For example, the willingness of some white Americans to use force in order to halt civil rights changes in 2001 is very different than the willingness of similar groups in 1951. That is not to say that white supremacist groups in the United States do not exist in 2001 or that the depth of their feelings towards minorities have changed, only that their willingness to use violence to intimidate and halt the civil rights movement has changed. While the most appropriate measure of how fragmented civil society is should include a measure of willingness, this is not something easily conceptualized or measured. Due to these difficulties the measure used in this research does not include a measure of willingness.

For the sake of this research, I will use a measure of ethnic fragmentation developed by Tanja Ellingsen in the *'Ethnic Witches' Brew Data Set*. I choose a measure that relies on ethnic fragmentation because such a measure incorporates what appears to be the most divisive component of civil society, nationalism.

Ellingsen develops a measure of ethnic fractionalization that is a count of the number of ethnic groups found in a given country between the years 1945-1994. She uses data found in the *Handbook of the Nations* 1979, 1983, 1986, 1993, *Britannica Book of the Year* 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1993, and the *Demographic Yearbook* 1964, 1971, 1973, 1979, 1983, 1988. In order to insure that the various sources were compatible, and that the measure was reliable and valid, Ellingsen checked the correlation of the different measures against each other and found that the correlation was high allowing the creation of one composite variable for each of the different measures in her data set.<sup>12</sup>

As a test of the validity of my chosen measure of civil society, ethnic fragmentation, I will use the variable number of linguistic groups and number of religious groups also found in the Ellingsen data set.

### *Economic Indicators*

Economic development is one factor of de-autocratization that is discussed in chapters three and four. In chapter three, the game theoretic model

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<sup>12</sup> Ellingsen does develop a series of decision rules for when the correlation appeared to be weaker than she was comfortable with.

discusses the role of economics in influencing the regimes decision to open or not. One example of the importance of the economic dimension can be found in the Soviet Union in 1987 when Premier Gorbachev announces a series of economic policy changes under the umbrella of perestroika. In chapter four, the role of economic development is discussed as one variable that can motivate civil society to mobilize and attempt to pressure the regime to open.

Economic data was collected from the World Bank data set. The economic indicator chosen for this research is *Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (1987)*. GDP will measure changes in the economic performance for a given country. This data is gathered annually and is available for most countries.

### **Coding Rules**

While building the data set used for this dissertation, a multitude of decisions had to be made on how to code the data. What follows below is a discussion of the coding rules used to develop my data set.

When selecting the cases to be included in the data set, cases where the regime score was greater than six were not included. Adding the autocracy developed the regime score and democracy scores found in the Polity 3 data set. Both scores shared a range of 0-10, with 0 being the lowest score and 10 being the highest score. The Autocracy scores were translated into negative numbers and then added to the democracy scores producing an index variable with a range of -10 to 10.

There were cases in the Polity data set that did not have a regime score for each year. If a case did not have regime data available and there was no recorded conflict, the case was removed from the data set. If a case had no regime data available and there was a record of conflict the case a dummy variable was created to indicate that this was a new country. These cases are Croatia, Bosnia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Suriname, and Tajikistan. In the years that there was no regime data the cases were coded with a dummy variable where 1 indicated that it was a new country. The year were regime data became available the cases were coded as a 0, indicating that the regime data was now available. In order to include the cases in the data, the regime scores from the first year that the case had data available was copied for the years were no data was available.

Additionally, there were countries that had been involved in multiple conflicts between 1989-1994. In these cases the regime data was copied for each year that there contained multiple conflicts so to include all the conflicts. Finally, Ellingsens' ethnic, religious, and linguistic variables all allow for the possibility of fractions. This occurs because she creates an index variable for each, which combines the data from her three sources which leads tot he creation of fractions. In order to remove the fractions from the data set, the variables were re-coded such that any case where a fraction occurred was rounded down. I believe that whole numbers serve as a more accurate count of the number of religious, ethnic, or linguistic based groups there are in a country. By rounding down, the data has been altered in such a way that it is biased

against my position that the number of groups will increase the likelihood of conflict.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has served to introduce the reader to the data sets utilized to build the overall data that will be used to empirically test a series of hypotheses, found in chapters three and four. The reader has been introduced to the dependent and independent variables as well as how those variables are operationalized. Chapter six will use the measures developed in this chapter to empirically test the hypotheses derived in chapters three and four.



## **Chapter 6**

### **EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

The focus of this research is when will internal conflict be the result of the process of de-autocratization. The proceeding chapter established the universe of cases and discussed the operationalization of variables that will be used in this chapter. The game theoretic models in chapters three and four demonstrate the importance of information and strategic interaction in determining whether or not de-autocratization will occur peacefully, end with no change in a country's regime type, or end in violence. This chapter will develop a series of hypotheses, and empirically test said hypotheses, that will help us to better understand what factors will influence the type of violent outcome that countries under going the process of de-autocratization may fall prey to.

It is important to understand that the empirical model developed in this chapter are not explicit tests of the game theoretic models developed in chapters three and four. The game theoretic models demonstrate the importance of information as well as the wide variety of outcomes that are possible if de-autocratization is attempted. It is argued that economic growth, ethnic fragmentation, regime type, regime stability, and the degree of regime change will influence the decisions made by the actors, the regime members as well as civil society, and hence the outcome of the game. These variables are not explicitly modeled; hence the game theoretic models cannot be explicitly tested.

The empirical model presented in this chapter is meant to more closely exam the various types of internal conflict and which of the variables mentioned above influence the likelihood of each type of conflict. Instead of creating a dichotomous variable, no conflict or conflict, the outcome variable includes five categories; no conflict, coup, political unrest, minor conflict, and civil war. This is done in an effort to distinguish between the many types of internal conflict that a country may face and with the understanding that there are unique conditions that may cause a country to confront a wide variety of violent outcomes, each with its own unique costs. As such, this chapter seeks to unpack the different types of violent outcomes that may be associated with the process of de-autocratization.

## **Hypotheses**

The variables that are the focus of the empirical model presented in this chapter are outcome, economic development, regime type, regime change, regime stability, and ethnic fragmentation. The hypotheses derived below are based on the literature found in the fields of comparative politics and international relations. Each of the variables are discussed in chapters three and four as being important in influencing the decisions made by regime members, the regime as a whole, and civil society in the game theoretic models. In order to examine the influence that each of these variables has on the likelihood of each of the possible violent outcomes, it is necessary to develop hypotheses for each of the variables.

**Hypothesis 1: As economic development increases, the likelihood of internal conflict decreases**

**Hypothesis 2: The more democratic a regime is, the less likely it is to face internal conflict.**

**Hypothesis 3: The more quickly regime change occurs the less likely there will be internal conflict.**

**Hypothesis 4: The more stable a regime is the less likely there will be internal conflict.**

**Hypothesis 5: The greater the degree of ethnic fragmentation, the greater the chance of internal conflict.**

### **The Empirical Model**

The multi-nomial logit allows the development of a dependent variable with multiple categories, such as the dependent variable developed in this dissertation. As such, it is the most appropriate technique for testing the above hypotheses

### ***Data Analysis***

The universe of cases was all countries coded as an authoritarian regime in the Polity3d data and where the regime score indicates a decrease in the amount of authoritarian control. The results indicate that not all internal conflicts are the same; different variables will influence what outcome is reached

dependent on the internal conditions of a country undergoing the process of de-autocratization.

In chapter three, it is argued that a coup is possible only when one of the factions within the regime believes that it can win if it attempts a coup and if the offer made by the opposing faction is too far away from its ideal point. While the empirical results discussed here are not an empirical test of the game theoretic model, they do indicate that the variables that influence the likelihood of a coup occurring are related to regime stability and the degree of regime change. The two variables that are statistically significant when discussing the coup outcome are change and stability. A coup is more likely to occur if the regime attempts change at a more leisurely rate than if the regime attempts change more quickly. Additionally, the more stable a regime is the less likely a coup will occur.

Initially, the change results appear to be troubling. One would expect that the greater the amount of change that is attempted, the higher the probability of a coup. Why? The Hard-line faction is not interested in relinquishing a significant amount of power to the Liberalizers or civil society. The game theoretic model in chapter three argues the opposite. If the Liberalizers believe that they are strong enough to win if they attempt a coup, they will make the Hard-liners an offer that demonstrates that they believe that they will win. Such an offer would be close to the Liberalizers ideal point, meaning that the degree of change would most likely be large. As such, the findings of the empirical model match the expected results from the game theoretic model. As the degree of change increases, the likelihood of a coup decreases.

The stability variable is significant in the hypothesized direction for the case of a coup. The longer the regime maintains control over the country without attempting change, the less likely the regime will experience a coup.

Chapter four explores the interaction between regime members and civil society, emphasizing the importance of information. It is argued that economic development, or the lack thereof, can cause civil society to demand that the regime makes some type of change. The only outcome that the GDP variable is statistically significant is that of political unrest. Political unrest is defined as conflict with fewer than 1,000 deaths and that lasts for fewer than 7 days. For example, one time riots and violent protests are categorized as political unrest. It is not surprising that GDP is significant for this outcome. Economic shortfalls, which would lead to an increased likelihood of violence, will place a strain on the populations' ability to survive, angering the population.

The relationship between economic development and political unrest is one that has been discussed throughout the comparative politics literature. Scott and Kerkliet argue that changes in economic policies will lead to what he refers to as everyday forms of resistance in areas where the population is struggling to survive. In countries where the majority of the population is struggling to survive, any economic change that makes survival more difficult is going to be met with resistance.

The third category is that of minor conflict. Minor conflict was defined as conflict with fewer than 1,000 deaths but where the fighting was ongoing throughout the year. In this case, the variables that are statistically significant are regime

Outcome	Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Prob	Z Score
Coup	GDP	-0.0006864	0.0006507	.291	-1.055
	Regime	0.0671881	0.1222109	.582	-2.077
	Change	-0.2711104	0.1305523	.038	-2.077
	Stability	-2.444938	1.137451	.032	-2.149
	Religion	1.10286	0.9687836	.255	1.138
	Language	-0.2787374	0.340088	.411	-0.823
	Ethnicity	-0.8428139	0.5550551	.129	-1.518
Political Unrest	Constant	-1.211412	2.566286	.637	-0.472
	GDP	-0.0006172	0.0002881	.032	-2.142
	Regime	0.0324918	0.050682	.521	0.641
	Change	-0.0491589	0.0614078	.423	-0.801
	Stability	-0.40904	0.2486002	.100	-1.645
	Religion	-0.1046128	0.3756838	.781	-0.278
	Language	-1.2813155	0.1855424	.129	-1.516
Minor Conflict	Ethnicity	0.3320247	0.2307438	.150	1.439
	Constant	-1.166154	1.05379	.268	-1.107
	GDP	-0.0001661	0.0001608	.302	-1.033
	Regime	-0.1428116	0.0514735	.006	-2.774
	Change	0.1018272	0.0832962	.222	1.222
	Stability	0.273535	0.1785611	.126	1.532
	Religion	-0.7197764	0.3709144	.052	-1.941
Civil War	Language	-4.191694	0.2274781	.065	-1.843
	Ethnicity	0.4394824	0.267105	.103	1.629
	Constant	-1.747429	0.9838209	.081	-1.746
	GDP	0.0000752	0.0000796	.345	0.945
	Regime	-0.0472045	0.0525471	.369	-0.898
	Change	-0.1029414	0.0730008	.158	-1.410
	Stability	-0.5170044	0.2723333	.058	-1.898
	Religion	0.0706246	0.396255	.859	0.178
	Language	0.1366541	0.1810492	.450	0.755
	Ethnicity	-0.1726072	0.2280589	.449	-0.757
	Constant	-2.545669	0.9158389	.005	-2.780

No Conflict is the comparison group

**Table 6.1. Multi Nomial Logit Results for all cases where De-autocratization is attempted**

type and religion. The more autocratic a regime, the greater the probability the country is to face conflict throughout the year.

Religion is significant, although not in the hypothesized direction. The results indicate that as the number of religious groups found in a country increases there is a decline in the probability of minor conflict. Of all the measures provided in this research, the measures of ethnic fragmentation, including religion, are the most problematic. Religion is measured as the number of religious groups in a given country. This does not take into consideration important factors such as the presence of cross cutting cleavages within a country.

Finally, regime stability was the only variable statistically significant for the civil war outcome. These were cases where there was greater than 1,000 dead and the fighting occurred throughout the year. In this case, the more stable the regime, the less likely there was to be a civil war.

## **Conclusion**

What do we learn from the above results? It is clear that different variables influence what type of internal conflict a country may face when undergoing the process of de-autocratization. If we know that a country is struggling with economic development then there is an increased probability that said country will find itself having to deal with political unrest while a country that has seen many regime changes in the last few years is more likely to find itself involved in a civil war or facing a coup.

## **What Have We Learned?**

This research began with a deceptively simple question: when will de-autocratization lead to violence? With the focus of numerous scholars and policy makers on the study and promotion of democratization throughout the world, it was clear that this question must be addressed. Is it possible that democratization itself leads to violence? If so, is it not possible then that the promotion of democratization is something that policy makers should examine more carefully? It was clear that this question must be addressed.

Traditional research approached the subject of democratization with several assumptions. First, it was assumed that the goal of any regime transition attempted by an authoritarian regime was to develop a consolidated democratic regime. The very title “democratization” points to this assumption. Yet it has not been clearly demonstrated that this is the case. The number of “stalled” democratic transitions should clearly demonstrate that a democratic regime is not necessarily the goal of the regime. Perhaps those countries are not stalled at all but instead the regime was content with the degree of liberalization and halted the process.

Second, the process of democratization was treated as a linear, path-dependent process dictated by the whims of the regime. Many of the scholars whose work is discussed earlier in this document, state that democratization cannot begin unless the regime chooses to open.

The research presented in this paper approached the question only after disregarding these two assumptions. The term “de-autocratization” was adopted



in order to try and avoid the problems associated with the first assumption. De-autocratization includes all countries making some degree of transition away from a pure authoritarian regime, no matter how small the step may be.

Additionally, the term de-autocratization removes the implicit dichotomization of the final outcome. No longer is the final outcome successful or unsuccessful democratization. Instead the final outcomes include coups, political unrest, and civil war as well as democratization and limited liberalization.

The models developed in this research are a first step towards exploring de-autocratization as a non-linear process. The regime may return to the bargaining table on any number of occasions through out the course of the process in order to decide what should occur next. If the regime chooses to open and does so successfully, the regime will have to meet again to decide if it should allow further opening or not. Additionally, by moving from one model of de-autocratization, such as Casper and Taylor developed, and acknowledging the presence of multiple models in the overall process, the first step has been taken to understanding to non-linear nature of the process. This aspect of the process has not been fully developed in this research, it is a research project for the future.

The non-cooperative bargaining game, found in Chapter Three, explores how regime members interact with each other and how this interaction can lead to coups. The model demonstrates that the greater the demand made, the less likely a coup will occur. This is due to the belief that the faction making the demand has the ability to force the opposing faction from the regime. Rather

then being forced from the regime, the opposing faction chooses to accept the offer in order to maintain the benefits of office. This interaction demonstrates the importance of information. If either faction is incorrect in assessing its strength it can lead to a coup or to acquiescing to an offer when it was not necessary.

The incomplete and imperfect information game in Chapter Four reinforces the importance of information. Civil society will not choose to mobilize if it knows that the regime is comprised predominantly of Hard-Liners because civil society knows that Hard-Liners will not allow additional liberalization. As such, internal violence is avoided. If civil society believes that it is facing a regime lead by Reformers, when in reality the regime is lead by Hard-Liners, conflict will occur.

In addition, the model developed in Chapter Four allows civil society to mobilize even if the regime chooses not to open. This is an important addition to the research in this field as it more accurately reflects the real world. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and South Africa are but a few examples of countries where civil society mobilized and demanded liberalization when the regime was not willing to liberalize. In all three cases, members of civil society were willing to face imprisonment, violence, and even death in order to try and force a change in the type of regime. The model in Chapter Four allows for this possibility where past models did not.

Finally, the empirical model, found in this chapter, clearly demonstrates that different independent variables will influence not only the likelihood of violence but the type of violence we should expect to see. This is an important

finding as it reminds us that the factors that we believe necessary for successful democratization, such as economic development, can also lead to violence. The research developed in the last 120 pages has done a great deal to advance our knowledge of how the process of de-autocratization works, how violent outcomes can come from the process, and the role of information in the process. This is not the end of the research. Future research will focus attention on civil society and how civil society overcomes the collective action problem in order to mobilize as well as explore the role of multiple iterations of the games developed here in order to better understand how the long term process may lead to conflict.

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