THE FORMATION OF THE SELF IN THE NOVELS OF MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO: A KIERKEGAARDIAN READING

By

Jan E. Evans

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ABSTRACT

THE FORMATION OF THE SELF IN THE NOVELS OF MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO: A KIERKEGAARDIAN READING

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This study makes two important contributions to Unamuno/Kierkegaard scholarship based on careful examination of Unamuno's copy of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker*, housed in the Casa Museo Unamuno in Salamanca. The first has to do with the recurring question of the degree of Kierkegaard's influence on Unamuno. This question is clarified by carefully differentiating between works ascribed to Kierkegaard's pseudonyms and works written under his own name. After showing the problems caused by inaccurate attributions of the pseudonyms to Kierkegaard, the dissertation focuses on Unamuno's use of "indirect communication" derived from his reading of Johannes Climacus' *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*

The second important contribution to Unamuno/Kierkegaard scholarship is to show how the concept of the self as achievement is conceived and worked out in both authors. Both see the self as endowed with the ability for self-reflection and the ability to choose authentic existence. The content of the choices for authentic existence found in Kierkegaard's three existence spheres--the esthetic, the ethical and the religious--are traced in *Niebla*, *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, and *Abel Sánchez.* These novels of Unamuno were chosen for their wide availability to Kierkegaard and Unamuno scholars alike. The protagonists of each novel are

seen as disquieted folk who are in the process of defining their own authentic existence, each living out one of Kierkegaard's existence spheres, though the form of the religious life in *Abel Sánchez* in understood as a "paso," a step in the process of acquiring faith rather that the achievement of faith.

Two conclusions are drawn: 1) Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works had a profound and widespread influence on Unamuno. What is newly demonstrated is that the creative stuff of the Kierkegaardian existence spheres did contribute to Unamuno's own imaginative mind as he created the remarkable protagonists of these novels. 2) The second conclusion deals with Unamuno's claim of "spiritual brotherhood" with Kierkegaard. The dissertation argues that although Unamuno and Kierkegaard share a fundamental view of the self as substantially self-reflective and capable of making choices for an authentic existence, the goal for those choices is very different for the two authors. Since they do not share ultimate values, the claim of "spiritual brotherhood" between the authors is unwarranted.

To Stephen

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I am indebted to the staff of the Casa Museo Unamuno in Salamanca who welcomed me warmly and made Unamuno's copies of Kierkegaard's works readily available to me in February of 2001.

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NOTE ON DOCUMENTATION

Parenthetical references in the text to Unamuno's works are by volume and page number to the *Obras Completas* edited by Manuel García Blanco and published by Escelicer (Vols. 1-9, Madrid: 1966-1971). Translations of Spanish quotations in the text are mine.

Parenthetical references in the text to Kierkegaard are to the English translations by Howard and Edna Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980-1999). The only exception is the *Journals and Papers*, also translated by the Hongs but published by Indiana University Press, (Bloomington: 1967-1978). The sigla used for the various titles are those used by the *International Kierkegaard Comentary* edited by Robert Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987-2000):

CUP *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 'Philosophical Fragments'*
EO, 1 *Either/Or* I
EO, 2 *Either/Or* II
EUD *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*
JFY *Judge for Yourself!*
JP *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*
PC *Practice in Christianity*
PF *Philosophical Fragments*
PV *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*
R *Repetition*
SLW *Stages on Life's Way*
SUD *The Sickness Unto Death*
UDVS *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*
WL *Works of Love*

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the nineteenth century Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard and the early twentieth century Spanish philosopher, poet and novelist Miguel de Unamuno has fascinated scholars since existentialist thought and its evolution came to prominence in the 1950's.[1] That Unamuno read Kierkegaard is indisputable. The fourteen volumes of the 1901 first edition of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker* that Unamuno underlined and annotated are still extant in the Casa Museo Unamuno.[2]

We also know from a letter that Unamuno wrote to Clarín in 1900 that he was beginning to read Kierkegaard at that time, early in his career.[3] How did he

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[1] With regard to the evolution of existentialism, the works of Unamuno are of interest to both philosophers and literary critics. In 1956 David Levi, in the philosophical journal *Ethics*, writes "The Quixotic Quest for Being," in which he says, "The existentialism of Unamuno is the transitional link between the generation of Kierkegaard and that of Heidegger, but its sympathies lie altogether with the former. Uninterested in essence, it is entirely concerned with man's existence" (135). He further explains the trajectory of existentialism when he says, "The founders [Kierkegaard and Nietzsche] are in reality the great critics of the nineteenth century, and their protests against rationalism are kept alive by the transitional efforts of Bergson and Unamuno to become the foundations upon which Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre may build" (136). Paul Ilie, in his *Unamuno: An Existential View of the Self and Society*, echoes Levi when he points to the "spiritual fervor of Kierkegaard" and the "raging humanity of Nietzsche" as the beginnings of existentialism and then underscores Unamuno's contribution when he says, ". . the issues that he [Unamuno] raised concerning consciousness, anguish, death, transcendence and personality anticipate the more systematic—and less vital—analyses of Heidegger, Buber, Jaspers and Sartre" (4).

[2] In his Introduction to *An Unamuno Source Book*, Mario Valdés indicates that Unamuno purchased each of the volumes of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker* published by A.B. Drachmann and J. L. Heiberg as they were published between 1901 and 1906. All of the volumes are marked with underlining and notes except Volumes V and VIII (xx, n7). Volume V contains *Prefaces* and *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions.* Volume VIII contains *Two Ages.*

[3] Jesús-Antonio Collado points out that the much quoted letter to Clarín (*Menéndez y Palayo 82)* cannot be used to definitely pinpoint the year in which Unamuno began to read Kierkegaard because the letter's date of April 3, 1900 precedes the publication of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker* in 1901. What Unamuno was sure to have read before the appearance of the *Samlede Værker* was the book by Brandes about Ibsen, published in 1898, which introduced Unamuno to the Danish philosopher (388-389). Whether Unamuno started reading Kierkegaard in 1900 or 1901 makes no difference for the purposes of this dissertation. What is important is that all of the novels dealt with here, as well as Unamuno's most important philosophical work, *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*, are published after those dates.

come upon this Danish author that very few Europeans would have known about in 1900? Unamuno explains in his 1907 essay, "Ibsen and Kierkegaard", "Fue el crítico de Ibsen, Brandes, quien me llevó a conocer a Kierkegaard, y si empecé a aprender el danés traduciendo antes que otra cosa el *Brand* ibseniano, han sido las obras de Kierkegaard, su padre espiritual, las que sobre todo me han hecho felicitarme de haberlo aprendido" (OC III 10). (It was Brandes, the critic of Ibsen who introduced me to Kierkegaard, and if I began to learn Danish in order to translate more than anything else Ibsen's *Brand*, it has been the works of Kierkegaard, his spiritual father, which have made me glad to have learned it.)

Though the fact of Unamuno's reading Kierkegaard is indisputable, determining what influence Kierkegaard had on Unamuno's thought has occasioned lively debate. The question most early scholarship tried to answer is, "How much influence did Kierkegaard have on Unamuno?" The conclusions have varied greatly from hints of outright plagiarism[4] of Kierkegaard on Unamuno's part to a dismissal of any substantive link at all.[5] The earliest

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[4] Antonio Sánchez Barbudo mentions twice that Unamuno should have cited Kierkegaard more in *Estudios sobre Unamuno y Machado*. In the section on "Unamuno and Kierkegaard" Sánchez Barbudo points to a group of writers that Unamuno read after 1900 who affected his work. Among those he underscores Kierkegaard, "[. . .] de quien se pueden encontrar reminiscencias evidentes ya en los ensayos de Unamuno de los años 1903 y 1904, en los cuales a veces incluso le cita, aunque tal vez menos de lo que debiera [. . .]" (65). ("[. . .] about whom evident references are found already in Unamuno's essays in the years of 1903 and 1904, and in which he sometimes quotes him [Kierkegaard], although perhaps less than he should have [. . .].") Later in a section called, "Diferencia entre Unamuno y Kierkegaard" Sánchez Barbudo quotes from the fourth chapter of *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* and inserts, "[. . .] donde varias veces nombra 'al hermano Kierkegaard', y le cita; y piensa otras veces en él, aunque no le cite [. . .]" (191). ("[. . .] where several times he names 'brother Kierkegaard' and he quotes him, and other times he thinks about him, although he doesn't quote him [. . .].")

[5] See Oscar A. Fasel, "Observations on Unamuno and Kierkegaard." The thesis of this author is that Unamuno and Kierkegaard are so thoroughly different that one cannot say that Unamuno was influenced by Kierkegaard despite what Unamuno says about the Danish philosopher being his brother. Fasel rests his case on the two thinkers' divergent views of Christianity and the religious life. Fasel misreads Kierkegaard as an extreme individualist who has no interest in the church or other human beings. He says that Kierkegaard is only interested

comparisons of Unamuno and Kierkegaard to which most other studies refer is that of François Meyer entitled "Kierkegaard et Unamuno" published in 1955 and his *La ontología de Miguel de Unamuno* published in 1962. It is Meyer's contention that Unamuno read Kierkegaard superficially and that Unamuno's thought was well established before he started reading Kierkegaard. Jesús-Antonio Collado affirms the party line established by Sánchez Barbudo and Meyer when he says, "Unamuno busca sobre todo en la lengua de Kierkegaard una nueva expresión de sus propias concepciones" (15). ("Unamuno above all looks for a new expression of his own concepts in the language of Kierkegaard.") However, Collado's incredibly detailed study belies that assertion, made in the introduction of his *Unamuno y Kierkegaard* (15). More recent scholars like Gemma Roberts and Pedro Cerezo Galán have dismissed Meyer's view, stressing greater commonality in the two writers.[6] These last scholars have

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in his own private experience of God and that he holds the monastic life as an ideal, which is not true. Kierkegaard only saw the monastic life as preferable to the middle class conformist Christianity of nineteenth century Denmark. His pseudonym Johannes de Silentio rejects the monastic life as the highest form of the religious life in *Fear and Trembling*, and Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, comments that while the monastic life takes seriously the life of inwardness, it is wrong to idealize it because inwardness can't be expressed through a specific act.

[6] See Gemma Roberts' *Unamuno: Afinidades y coincidencias kierkegaardianas*, where she quotes Meyer "ne touche qu'à la surface de cette pensée, obsédé qu'il demeure par sa problématique propre, sensiblement différente, dans sa source, de celle de Kierkegaard" and then says, "Discrepo de esta opinión del profesor Meyer en cuanto a la superficialidad de la interpretación de Kierkegaard por Unamuno, la cual me parece sumamente penetrante y profunda, si bien le interesaba sobre todo a don Miguel desarrollar sus propias preocupaciones--u obsesiones, como Meyer las llama. . ." (21 n9). ("I disagree with the opinion of Professor Meyer with regard to the superficiality of the interpretation of Kierkegaard by Unamuno, which seems to me extremely penetrating and profound, even if Don Miguel was more interested in developing his own concerns—or obsessions, as Meyer calls them.")

See also Pedro Cerezo Galán's *Las máscaras de lo trágico*, where he says, "Discrepo de la opinión de F. Meyer de que la influencia de Kierkegaard en Unamuno se produjo tardíamente y cuando ya estaba fraguado inequívocamente su pensamiento. . . Por el contrario, esta influencia se produjo en la primera década del siglo, cuando cristalizaba el pensamiento maduro de Unamuno en torno al síndrome trágico, y dejó por tanto profundas huellas en su obra; entre otras, en el tema de la fe, inflexionando la primera influencia del protestantismo liberal" (369 n.

embraced the view of R. F. Batchelor who says, "A consideration of the influence Kierkegaard exercised on Unamuno does not seem very profitable, but what is beneficial, I think, as with Nietzsche, is the establishing of striking similarities" (37)

But whether looking for influences or similarities, scholars are not able to agree. Let us take as prime examples the two most extensive studies to date, those of Collado (1962) and Roberts (1986). Collado's goal is "[. . .] primero exponer la concepción religioso-existencial del hombre en Søren Kierkegaard; segundo, investigar la posible influencia de tal concepción en el pensamiento de Miguel de Unamuno" (9). ([. . .] first to present the existential religious concept of man in Søren Kierkegaard; second to investigate the possible influence of that concept in the thought of Miguel de Unamuno.) Though this comparative study is over forty years old, it remains a definitive work on the concordance or lack thereof between the two authors with regard to the philosophical problem of human existence, with specific references to knowledge, despair, anxiety, sin and faith. It is held in high esteem by other commentators on the two authors because of its detail, depth, and use of the actual Kierkegaardian texts that were in Unamuno's hands.[7] Nevertheless, Collado's assertion that, though the two

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35). (I disagree with the opinion of F. Meyer that the influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno was produced belatedly, when his thought was unmistakably forged. [. . .] Rather, this influence was produced in the first decade of the century when the mature thought of Unamuno with regard to the tragic syndrome was crystallized, and it left, therefore, profound traces in his work; among others, in the theme of faith, inflecting the first influence of liberal Protestantism.")

[7] To my knowledge, Collado is the only previous author commenting on the relationship of Unamuno and Kierkegaard who has actually consulted the Danish texts that were annotated by Unamuno. He is also the only one who could easily translate the Danish into Spanish. Other critics like Jorge Uscatescu would have benefited from consulting those texts. Uscatescu could have then avoided promoting the erroneous view that Unamuno learned more about Kierkegaard from reading Ibsen's plays than by reading Kierkegaard directly (290).

authors are spiritual brothers in their "planteamiento general del problema existencial humano," (16) ("general approach to the problem of human existence,") they diverge more than they resonate on important concepts such as anxiety, sin, faith and God, is called into question by Gemma Roberts, a more recent critic who sees more commonality between Unamuno and Kierkegaard.

Roberts' book, *Unamuno: Afinidades y coincidencias kierkegaardianas* (1986), presents a detailed look at how the themes of *Either/Or* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* are woven into Unamuno's *Niebla,* as well as the "huellas" 'tracks' of *Sickness Unto Death* and *The Concept of Anxiety* in *Abel Sánchez.* She builds on work by Ruth House Webber who first wrote in 1964 about the influence of *Either/Or* on the structure or plan of *Niebla.* Both Webber and Roberts take pains to assure the reader that though there are wonderful points of comparison in the work of the two authors, Unamuno is not an "imitator" but rather makes use of Kierkegaardian texts in a highly personal and unique way.

How is it that Roberts can say unequivocally, "Que Kierkegaard influyó sobre el pensamiento de Unamuno, sobre todo en la etapa más tardía de su producción ensayística y artística, es algo que me parece indiscutible," (68) (That Kierkegaard influenced the thought of Unamuno, especially in the later stage of his artistic production and his essays is something that seems to me to be indisputable,) and Collado can say, "Es cierto que todo el pensamiento de Unamuno se cruza muchas veces con el de Kierkegaard, pero, tanto los orígenes, como la evolución, como la temática esencial, es en ambos distinta y aun a veces contrapuesta" (389)? ("It is certain that the thought of Unamuno

crosses many times with that of Kierkegaard, but both the origins, the evolution and the essential theme are distinct in both [authors] and at times are contradictory.") Both Collado and Roberts have carefully detailed studies to back them up.

I would like to propose a mediating ground, a way to explain how these two literary critics can both be correct (and wrong) in their observations. The problem lies in how the entire Kierkegaard corpus is read. Neither Roberts nor Collado takes seriously the way in which Kierkegaard asked that his authorship be read. This is not surprising since in over a hundred years of writing about Kierkegaard, not many scholars have taken Kierkegaard's request seriously until the last quarter century. In "The First and Last Explanation" which Kierkegaard under his own name appends to his pseudonymous *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, he acknowledges that all of his pseudonyms are his responsibility but he declares his independence from them:

> What has been written then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creat*ing*, poetically actual individuality in his mouth, for my relation is even more remote than that of a poet, who *poetizes* characters and yet in the preface is *himself* the *author*. That is, I am impersonally or personally in the third person a *souffleur* [prompter] who has poetically produced the *authors*, whose *prefaces* in turn are their productions, as their names are also. Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. (CUP 625-626)

Kierkegaard makes this specific plea, "Therefore, if it should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular passage from the books, it is my wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the respective pseudonymous author's name, not mine [. . .]" (CUP 627).

Roger Poole, in his article "'My wish, my prayer': Keeping the Pseudonyms Apart," demonstrates the hermeneutical importance of taking the pseudonyms seriously by comparing the meanings of key terms like the ethical, sin, and despair in the various pseudonymous works. According to Poole, "The same term may have a different *subjective value* for different pseudonymous authors. By using the play of what Derrida would call 'difference' across his texts, Kierkegaard manages to avoid the fate of univocal meaning" (162). For Poole, the "weight" of a word like "despair" must be taken in context, and the contexts of Judge William in *Either/Or* and Anti-Climacus in *The Sickness Unto Death* are entirely different. Judge William enjoins the young man "A" to despair as a way of showing him the limits of the esthetic life, his own soul and thought, and promises him something much more beautiful--the ethical. But when Anti-Climacus talks of despair, it is the opposite of "choosing oneself". Despair is sin, and the consequences of not "choosing oneself" are existential suicide. The subjective context for the same Danish word in the two pseudonymous authors must be taken seriously.

The reason for the elaborate set of pseudonyms is best understood in the context of "indirect communication", a concept that is set forth by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (72-80, 251-300) but that is also

claimed by Kierkegaard in his *Journals and Papers* (267-308) and further elucidated as the "maieutic ideal" in *Works of Love* (264-279).[8] The idea at the root of "indirect communication" is that there are some types of knowledge that are factual and scientific, and can be conveyed directly to a hearer, while there are other types of knowledge that have to do with self-knowledge and existence which can only be communicated indirectly. In order for the second type of knowledge to be conveyed, the individual must receive it in a way in which she can appropriate it for herself. In *Works of Love* Kierkegaard points to Socrates as the model for this indirect communication in his attempt to be the midwife, the person who helps the other to give birth (276).

The pseudonyms help Kierkegaard to accomplish this maieutic ideal. They also allow him to pose artfully and forcefully many contradictory points of view that he could not communicate if he were writing under his own name. Again in "A First and Last Explanation" Kierkegaard says,

> My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an *accidental* basis in my *person* . . .but an *essential* basis in the *production* itself, which for the sake of the lines and of the psychologically varied differences of the individualities, poetically required an indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil, broken heartedness and gaiety, despair and overconfidence, suffering and elation, etc., which is ideally limited only by psychological consistency, which no factually actual person dares to allow himself

[8] For the importance of the "maieutic ideal" to the whole of Kierkegaard's work see Paul Müller's *Kierkegaard's Works of Love, Christian Ethics and the Maieutic Ideal*, Trans. and eds. C. Stephen

or can want to allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality. (625)

Kierkegaard, then, attempts to withdraw and let his individual reader see and appropriate for herself the truths that he wishes to convey about human existence. However, in 1851, after all of the pseudonymous works had been published, Kierkegaard begins to question the effectiveness of the pseudonymity as a device to realize this "maieutic ideal" because his ultimate purpose in writing has been misunderstood. In order to explain the intricate machinery of his work, Kierkegaard writes *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, in which he states to his single individual reader, "[. . .] that I am and was a religious author, that my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: becoming a Christian, with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous illusion, Christendom, or the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of sorts" (23).

Chapter One will deal with the importance of reading Kierkegaard as he wanted to be read for the assessment of Kierkegaard's influence on Unamuno. The first problem to be explored is separating Kierkegaard's voice from that of his pseudonyms. A strategy for doing that suggested by Kierkegaard scholar Sylvia Walsh is adopted and employed, as the concept of indirect communication for existential truth is traced through the pseudonyms and Kierkegaard's own signed writings. After establishing the importance of indirect communication for interpreting all of Kierkegaard, the consequences of ignoring that concept will be shown in specific commentators on the relationship between Unamuno and Kierkegaard. Finally, the question of whether or not Unamuno understood the

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and Jan Evans, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1993.

use of indirect communication in Kierkegaard will be explored. Based on Unamuno's commentary on the writing process and his own purpose(s) in writing, it will be suggested that Unamuno understood the importance of indirect communication for the expression of existential truth and that he participated in the maieutic ideal espoused by Kierkegaard in his own novels. However, it will be shown that Unamuno did not respect the pseudonyms himself and that it is highly unlikely that he understood Kierkegaard's overall purpose to "reintroduce Christianity to Christendom."

Chapter Two will focus on the theory of the formation of the self in Kierkegaard and Unamuno. Kierkegaard has a great deal to say about the formation of the self, while Unamuno's view is much more difficult to discern. Unamuno constantly resisted any attempts to regularize his thought into any sort of "philosophy" during his lifetime and his penchant for contradictions is legendary.[9] In order to be able to compare the two authors the chapter will begin by exploring two different ways of understanding the self that we see in

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[9] Mario J. Valdés, in the Introduction of his *An Unamuno source book*, tries to do for Unamuno what he resisted all of his literary career—define a coherent philosophy from which to interpret all of Unamuno. Valdés, along with his wife María Elena de Valdés, have poured over all of the notes made in the margins of the books which Unamuno read which are housed in the Casa Museo Unamuno and as a result, he has put together a theory of "enquiry" based on Unamuno's interaction with the texts that he read. Based in large part on Hegel and Unamuno's reading of Hegel, Valdés claims that Unamuno's penchant for contradiction is not fuzzy thinking but highly intentional "opposite, correlative and dichotomous" contradictions, the import of which is, "Unamuno is not stating that either one of the opposites is true at any given moment, but rather that they are both true, and that they are true only when they are present together" (xxviii). The theory of "enquiry"—Unamuno's way of reading—is "a dialectical method that changes the reader's ideas by forcing him to battle with the author's structural presence. It is also a methodology that is in itself a direct expression of the ontology of being as struggle" (xxxi).
Frances Wyers would totally disagree. For her, Unamuno's desire not to be systematized is genuine, as born out in the "chaos of paradoxical affirmations and negations" in which "[. . .] all the conceptual shifts and turns obey principles that are never enunciated. Nothing can be taken at face value and we must search for an undisclosed fabric of meaning that the author seems to be almost purposely obfuscating" (xvi). Although Wyer's book was published in 1976, three years

Western culture.[10] One view is that the self is some sort of substance, a given entity. An alternative view of the self is to see it not as a fully formed substance, but as an achievement, something that the person becomes through credible, responsible choice. Though both Kierkegaard and Unamuno will be seen to hold elements of both of these concepts, it is in the view that the self is an achievement that Unamuno and Kierkegaard can most readily be seen to be in concert.

Paul Ilie underscores the difference between *ser* and *serse* in Unamuno's view. *Ser* is to exist as an animal exists. *Serse* is "[. . .] full being in the existentialist sense of a meaningful human condition" (9). The beginning of *serse* is self-awareness. The ability for self-reflection is fundamental for both Kierkegaard and Unamuno and part of the substance of the self that is given. However, the two authors diverge in their understanding of the self as substance. For Kierkegaard, selfhood is something one becomes, but the self one ought to become is a self before God, the self that God intended at creation and which is present as a potentiality in the actual created self. Unamuno does not share this view, but rather sees multiple possibilities for authentic existence.

Chapter Two ends with a discussion of Kierkegaard's three spheres of existence, the author's guide to becoming a self. Though the idea of the existence spheres of the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious are artfully

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after the Valdés' book, Wyers does not include it in her bibliography nor does she deal with Valdés' theory.

[10] In this section I make extensive use of the account of Kierkegaard's anthropology as developed by C. Stephen Evans in his article, "Who is the Other in *The Sickness Unto Death*: God and Human Relations in the Constitution of the Self."

drawn in the pseudonymous works of *Either/Or* and *Stages on Life's Way* and are explained in depth by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, it can be seen from his *Journals and Papers* that Kierkegaard embraced this theory as a fundamental way of viewing existence. The aesthetic sphere is where everyone begins. Its essence is "the moment" that the esthete searches for in infinite variety. When a person realizes that all of her "moments" make her a slave to the external world, she may despair. She may realize that she lacks a self and seek to become one. To really exist as a self, the self must choose; it must develop enduring passions. The enduring passions unify the self so that it can become something definite. The passion that is the key is the passion for the "eternal" which will produce the ethical life. The ethical life is a life lived with eternal values that give the self eternal significance.

When the ethicist realizes that she cannot achieve the ethical life, that her battle to do the good is fraught with failure, then the self is ready to pass into the religious sphere. In this sphere, the individual sees her guilt and her need for God. This religious life comes in two different forms: A and B. Religiousness A is a religion of immanence, the kind of religiousness that presupposes only natural, human religious experience. Religiousness B assumes a kind of God that reveals himself in history, the kind of God found in Christianity.

The existence spheres as outlined above, then, will provide the basis for a Kierkegaardian reading of *Niebla*, *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, and *Abel Sánchez* in Chapter Three. It is suggested that a Kierkegaardian reading can shed light on critical problems in reading the novels as well as provide rich sources for

Unamuno's creative genius from the Danish philosopher's work. Extensive reference will be made to passages that are underscored in Unamuno's copies of the Danish *Samlede Værker* of Kierkegaard. These novels have been chosen because of their place within the Unamuno canon. They are the most frequently read of Unamuno's novels in the world at large and ones that those who are interested in the relationship between Unamuno and Kierkegaard will most likely know. It is Unamuno's fictional characters that demonstrate the view of the self as achievement. Ferrater Mora states of Unamuno's characters, "Todos son hombres, y mujeres, de contradicciones que tienen como fin de su vida 'hacerse un alma'" (48). ("All are men and women of contradictions who have as their end in life to 'make of themselves souls.'")

We will see the protagonists, Augusto Pérez, Joaquín Monegro and Don Manuel as Unamuno's fictional renderings of Kierkegaard's stages of existence. Augusto is emblematic of the esthetic stage. I will disagree with other commentators who see Augusto as progressing through all of Kierkegaard's stages. Rather, Augusto will be seen as a person who awakes from a somnambulant pre-existence to choose the life of a passionate esthete. The problem of whether Augusto's death was, in fact, a suicide will be discussed in the context of the problem of free will and how it bears on the ability of one to make meaningful choices. Don Manuel will be seen as embodying the sphere of the ethical. Reading the character in this way will help resolve the discomfort many readers of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* have in squaring this work with the rest of Unamuno's writing. It will be seen that Don Manuel's lack of faith and his

promoting the illusion that there is life after death are difficulties that can best be addressed within the context of indirect communication. Finally, Joaquín will be seen as the closest of Unamuno's characters to being in the religious sphere. In order to understand how that can be the case, it will be necessary to understand the nature of despair as it is laid out in *The Sickness Unto Death.* Specific passages underlined by Unamuno in this text will help substantiate the claim that Anti-Climacus contributed much to the creation of this Unamunian character.

Unamuno, then, will be seen to use the Kierkegaardian existence spheres to experiment fictionally with stages in the development of the self as achievement. Through this study we will see how Unamuno uses indirect communication to convey his own version of existential truth to his individual reader. For Kierkegaard, for a self to become the self that God intended, there is movement through these spheres toward Religiousness B. The movement is by no means automatic or natural. Passing from one sphere to the other is a daily matter of choice, but there is definitely a *telos* to which one is moving through the spheres. Unamuno does not share Kierkegaard's view that there is a *telos* for these existence spheres Unamuno sees a rich array of possibilities in the existence spheres for multiple forms of authentic existence and he uses them for his own purposes. Unamuno draws characters who exemplify specific existential decisions, but there is no *telos* to which his characters are growing. There is no benevolent creator before whom a self becomes a self. Rather,

Unamuno prefigures the self of Camus and Sartre that is defined by the choices it makes and the passion with which the choices are made.

The dissertation concludes that an understanding of the pseudonymous character of Kierkegaard's writings is essential to understanding the influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno. It is necessary to attribute ideas found in Kierkegaardian pseudonyms to those pseudonyms and not to Kierkegaard, as he asked at the end of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.* In order to give a full Kierkegaardian reading to Unamuno, one must recognize when Unamuno is using a pseudonymous work. One can recognize correspondence and deviation competently in the two authors only if this is kept in mind. As a clear correspondence one can confidently point to the purpose and the use of indirect communication by both authors. Through it Kierkegaard and Unamuno achieve the maiuetic ideal for the conveying of existential truth.

However, claiming "spiritual brotherhood" for Kierkegaard and Unamuno is more problematic since their views on ultimate values differ radically. Unamuno leaves us no *Point of View* to guide us to **the** truth--the purpose for the indirect communication--beyond waking the somnambulant reader to authentic existence. Kierkegaard's purpose is to "reintroduce Christianity to Christendom." Unamuno's purpose is to leave us with multiple truths, even contradictory ones.

CHAPTER ONE

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

The Difficulty of Determining "What Kierkegaard Said"

This chapter will attempt to explain the discrepancies in the scholarly literature about the influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno, whether that is stated as an outright cause/effect or, more modestly, as a similarity in the two authors. The source of the widely varied opinions of the scholars on Kierkegaard and Unamuno, as I see it, is a problem in interpreting Kierkegaard. As noted in the Introduction, because of the many pseudonyms Kierkegaard used, it is difficult to determine what Kierkegaard is purported to have said on any one subject. Just the "authors" of *Either/Or* are a bewildering array. The editor of the two volume work is Victor Eremita (Victor the Hermit), who says that he found the papers that make up the volumes in an antique desk. The papers that make up the bulk of *Either/Or* I are by an author whom Victor calls A. But the author of the "Diary of the Seducer" at the end of the first volume is put into question by A's claim that he did not write the diary; he stole it from the desk of a friend. Still, Victor intimates that the author may be A. *Either/Or* II is by yet another person whom Victor calls B but whom we later find out is called Judge William, and who also includes a sermon that he attributes to a priest.

In "A First and Last Explanation," signed by Kierkegaard himself at the end of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript,* the author asks his reader not only to take the pseudonyms seriously, but to attribute to them and not to him the positions and ideas of those pseudonyms. Kierkegaard emphasizes that the use

of the pseudonyms is not an accident but rather provides an "essential basis in the production itself" (625). He says that each of the widely divergent pseudonymous authors has a unique and consistent psychological make-up that "no factual actual person dares to allow himself or can want to allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality" (625). Does that mean that the pseudonyms do not in any way represent what Kierkegaard thought to be true? Where is Kierkegaard's voice in all of this?

Sylvia Walsh suggests in her book, *Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential Aesthetics*, that to discern the relation of Kierkegaard's thought to that of his pseudonyms one must look at the texts that Kierkegaard signed with his own name which include, "1) several direct explanations of the nature and purpose of the authorship, 2) a number of religious writings and devotional discourses as well as several pieces of aesthetic criticism, and 3) the voluminous unpublished journals spanning his university years to the last year of his life" (11). She says that, like any author, Kierkegaard's thought changes and grows through the years, but that these writings under his own name can be taken as a guide to his own viewpoints. She underscores the importance of the task by saying,

> To discern the viewpoints of the author and his pseudonyms on a particular subject [. . .] requires a dynamic approach to his writings, looking upon them as a progressive unfolding of thought and staying alert to differences and modifications as well as similarities and continuities between Kierkegaard and the pseudonyms as well

> as between the pseudonyms themselves. Otherwise, one may end up with a shortsighted interpretation that does not do justice to the total perspective of the authorship. (10)

It is my contention that some commentators about the relationship of Unamuno and Kierkegaard have misread that relationship because they have not respected the pseudonyms as Kierkegaard asked his readers to do and because those commentators have not taken the "dynamic approach" advocated by Sylvia Walsh, comparing the pseudonyms to Kierkegaard's signed writings. As a result those commentators have perpetuated a "shortsighted interpretation" that has led to conflicting opinions and confusion about the relationship between Kierkegaard and Unamuno.

Existential Truth and Indirect Communication

Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms is linked to his concept of "indirect communication," and it is the nature and purpose of indirect communication that many commentators on Unamuno and Kierkegaard have missed or disregarded. Taking my cue from Sylvia Walsh's suggested procedure above, I will first look at what Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus has to say about indirect communication in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and then compare that to what Kierkegaard says about his purposes in using indirect communication in *The Point of View on My Work as An Author* and several entries from his *Journals and Papers.*

Johannes Climacus outlines the importance of indirect communication for the communication of existential truth in a chapter entitled "Possible and Actual Theses by Lessing," a chapter in which the famous "leap" attributed to Kierkegaard also appears.[1] There are three important aspects of indirect communication as outlined by Climacus. They are 1) the maieutic ideal, 2) the artistic nature of indirect communication, and 3) the lack of certainty about existential truth requiring indirect communication, which results in constant and infinite striving. Each of these is explained below.

To begin, an existential truth is one that is "doubly reflected" in the subjective thinker as she first hears the truth in a "universal" sense and then appropriates it for herself in "inwardness" (CUP 73). The appropriation of the truth is not something that can be coerced in any way. It is something that is done in secret—the result must not be known to the communicator, or no real appropriation has taken place. Accordingly, the communication of such truth must be indirect.

> The secret of communication specifically hinges on setting the other free, and for that very reason he must not communicate himself directly; indeed, it is even irreligious to do so. This latter applies in proportion to the essentiality of the subjective and consequently applies first and foremost with the religious domain,

[1] Kierkegaard uses the name of an historic personage who lived in the sixth and seventh centuries for his pseudonym. The real Johannes was a monk who wrote *Scala paradisi*, Jacobs ladder, which was a "how to" book of thirty steps to spiritual perfection. Niels Thulstrup claims that Kierkegaard did not know the actual work of Johannes Climacus but he says, "When Kierkegaard uses the pseudonym Climacus (and later Anti-Climacus) he has in mind essentially the meaning 'climax,' ascent and ascending, both as logical progression upwards and as the steadily rising emphasis upon the Christian categories as distinctive from others" (148-9).

> that is, if the communicator is not God himself or does not presume to appeal to the miraculous authority of an apostle but is just a human being and also cares to have meaning in what he says and what he does. (CUP 74)

Existential truth must be communicated, then, as Socrates did, with no concern for the "result." This is the maieutic ideal, that the communicator serves as a midwife for the truth to be born in the individual. For Socrates that truth can be recollected because the truth is within the person.

Secondly, the form of the communication is just as important as communicating existential truth maieutically. "Wherever the subjective is of importance in knowledge and appropriation is therefore the main point, communication is a work of art" (CUP 79). Climacus goes so far as to say, "The more art, the more inwardness" (CUP 77). That the form of the indirect communication be artistic is essential because it may then "vary inexhaustibly, just as inwardness is inexhaustible" (CUP 77).

Thirdly, indirect communication must be used for the communication of existential truth because existential truth is not fixed and precise, but rather a constant becoming. Here Climacus underscores the limitations of objective, "positive" thinking for the existing individual. What is objective, "positive" thinking? It is whatever the person believes gives her certainty in this world, whether it be "sensate certainty," "historical knowledge," or "speculative result" (CUP 81). Climacus says that sensate certainty is a "delusion," historical knowledge is an "illusion" and speculative results are a "phantom" because they

do not bear on how one deals with existing as a person (CUP 81). History may tell a person something about the world, but it tells her nothing about herself.

Climacus states that the only thing that is certain is the *infinite* and the *eternal* that resides within each individual, but having the infinite and the eternal existing within the temporal subject is a "prodigious contradiction" that cannot be "rendered" in direct utterance. Why? "Because in the direct utterance the illusiveness is left out, and consequently the form of the communication interferes [. .]" (CUP 82). It is direct communication that requires certainty, "but certainty is impossible for a person in the process of becoming, and it is indeed a deception" (CUP 74n).

The uncertainty of existential truth produces a constant striving that is the "becoming" noted above. Climacus is careful to note that there is no end point to this striving. There is no "goal" which once attained completes the process. The "genuine subjective existing thinker" who would communicate existential truth to others is described in the following way:

> He is cognizant of the negativity of the infinite in existence [*Tilværelse*]; he always keeps open the wound of negativity, which at times is a saving factor (the others let the wound close and become positive—deceived); in his communication, he expresses the same thing.[2] He is, therefore, never a teacher, but a learner,

[2] In Unamuno's copy of the Danish edition of *Postscript* he glosses the Danish word *saar* in this passage with the Spanish *herida, llaga*. The metaphor of keeping the wound open will appear in *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho Panza*, (3: 241).

and if he is continually just as negative as positive, he is continually striving. (CUP 85)

A little later in *Postscript* Johannes Climacus comments on all the pseudonymous works written before *Postscript*, and he then claims that they are the sort of indirect communication that he has been advocating. He says that the fact that there is no conclusion in the two volumes of *Either/Or* shows that the book "is an indirect expression for truth as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge" (CUP 252).

Climacus points to the lack of a single, known author of the work as a "means of distancing." Climacus applauds the use of the "imaginary psychological construction" in *Repetition* by Constantin Constantius for its ability to establish "a chasmic gap between reader and author" that "fixes the separation of inwardness between them" (CUP 263).[3] He believes that the method of communication is purposeful. "The imaginary construction is the conscious, teasing revocation of the communication, which is always of importance to an existing person who writes for existing persons" (CUP 263). On Climacus' view, all the pseudonymous authors "continually aimed at *existing* and in this way sustained an indirect polemic against speculative thought" (CUP 264).

So we have the clear testimony of one of the pseudonymous authors that all of the others have participated in indirect communication as a means to explain existential truth. This is one part of the "dynamic" approach advocated

[3] The Hongs have chosen to translate the Danish word *eksperiment* with the unwieldy and slightly inaccurate phrase, "imaginary psychological construction." The sense of the text is more accurately rendered "imaginative experiment," taking away the element of the fantastic in the use of the word "imaginary."

by Sylvia Walsh that is needed to ascertain Kierkegaard's own view of "indirect communication." But what remains is to look at what Kierkegaard wrote about indirect communication under his own name in *Point of View* in order to fully understand the importance of this concept to Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard's Purpose in Using Indirect Communication

Already quoted in the Introduction is Kierkegaard's famous declaration of his intentions for his entire authorship found in *The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Direct Communication Report to History* where he states that he is a religious author: "that my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: becoming a Christian with direct and indirect polemical aim at the enormous illusion, Christendom, or the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of sorts" (23). He is aware that the major interest in his work has been in his esthetic writing. He complains that *Either/Or* made a great splash, but no one noticed the *Two Upbuilding Discourses* published at the same time. He goes to great pains to show that his authorship has proceeded in an even-handed way, first a piece of esthetic writing, written by a pseudonym and then a religious one under his own name. But his readers have not understood the whole, the plan, and he is willing to say that not even he understood the whole, the plan from the start. But he is sure at this point in his authorship that "Governance" has guided the entire effort, and he wants to explain himself clearly (PV 77).

Kierkegaard says that indirect communication, the esthetic writings, and the use of the pseudonyms were the only way to remove the illusion that all were

Christians. He observes that, "Every once in a while a religious enthusiast appears. He makes an assault on Christendom; he makes a big noise, denounces nearly all as not being Christians—and he accomplishes nothing. He does not take into account that an illusion is not so easy to remove" (PV 42). Kierkegaard is careful to say over and over again that he is not claiming that he is a Christian and others are not. He says what he says "without authority," acknowledging his defects as a Christian and at times claiming not to be one. What he knows is what Christianity is. In order to convey that truth, it must be conveyed indirectly. How? By "establishing rapport" and "beginning with an esthetic piece" (PV 44). The esthetic piece will then show the person who lives in the illusion that she is a Christian that she really lives in the category of the "esthetic, or at most, the esthetic-ethical" (PV 43). He knows that he cannot compel anyone to "an opinion, a conviction, a belief" (PV 50). All he can do is make a person *aware*.

The maieutic ideal established by Socrates and endorsed by Johannes Climacus is embraced by Kierkegaard in the use of the indirect method for removing the illusion that all are Christians. Kierkegaard calls for "gentle treatment" in the removal of the illusion and rejects any presumption of a "face to face" confession. Any sort of confession must be made in secret as an existential truth must be appropriated in secret.

> The latter [confession in secret] is achieved by the indirect method, which in the service of the love of truth dialectically arranges everything for the one ensnared and then, modest as love always

> is, avoids being witness to the confession that he makes alone before God, the confession that he has been living in an illusion. (PV 43-44)

Even the issue which Kierkegaard calls the turning point of his authorship is taken up by a pseudonym, Johannes Climacus. Kierkegaard says of *Postscript*, "This work deals with and poses *the issue*, the issue of the entire work as an author: becoming a Christian" (PV 31). Kierkegaard notes that Climacus comments on all the other pseudonyms, but that Climacus himself could not know the purpose for the whole. As an outsider, Climacus can observe what it means to be a Christian more objectively than one who is on the inside. Climacus makes no claims to faith. Kierkegaard does. For Kierkegaard to exist authentically is to become a Christian. Kierkegaard describes his own strategy in this way:

> My strategy was: with the help of God to utilize everything to make clear what in truth Christianity's requirement is—even if not one single person would accept it.
>
> In another sense, it is an exaggeration only when the requirement alone is presented and grace is not introduced at all. Christianity is taken in vain, however, when the *infinite* requirement is made finite [. . .] or when it is even left out completely and *grace* is introduced *as a matter of course*, which, after all, means that it is taken in vain.

> What I have wanted has been to contribute [. . .] to bringing, if possible, into these incomplete lives as we lead them a little more truth (in the direction of being persons of ethical and ethical-religious character, of renouncing worldly sagacity, of being willing to suffer for the truth, etc.), which indeed is always something and in any case is the first condition for beginning to exist more capably. (PV 16-17)

Kierkegaard is fully aware, as he explains himself in this disclosure about his authorship, that he has given up indirect communication and in some ways, the maieutic ideal. He is also aware that he will even become "uninteresting" to many when they know clearly what his purpose has been all along. Some of his readers will say, "That what it means to become a Christian should *actually* be the fundamental idea in the whole authorship—how boring!" (PV 92). But he has come to see that there is a time to remain silent and a time to speak, and this is the time to speak. He explains in his journals,

> Yet the communication of the essentially Christian must end finally in "witnessing." The maieutic cannot be the final form, because, Christianly understood, the truth does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in a revelation that must be proclaimed.
>
> It is very proper that the maieutic be used in Christendom, simply because the majority actually live in the fancy that they are

> Christians. But since Christianity still is Christianity, the one who uses the maieutic must become a witness.
>
> Ultimately the user of the maieutic will be unable to bear the responsibility, since the maieutic approach still remains rooted in human sagacity, however sanctified and dedicated in fear and trembling this may be. God becomes too powerful for the maieutic practitioner and then he is a witness, different from the direct witness only in what he has gone through to become a witness. (JP, 2: 1957)

And so while the concept of indirect communication is the key to the understanding of Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms and his authorship as a whole, in the end he sees the need for a "direct witness." After September of 1850, when *Practice in Christianity* was published under the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus, the rest of his production was published under his own name as a "direct witness"—no less than ten more books. Kierkegaard agonized over publishing anything about himself and his authorship, not wishing to claim anything for himself that was the doing of Governance, but he was acutely aware of how the pseudonyms were already being put to uses that were the opposite of his intentions. In 1851 he allowed *On My Work as an Author*, a shortened version of *The Point of View*, to be published, but the fuller version was not published until 1859, after his death.

It is not surprising in an authorship as varied and lengthy as Kierkegaard's that there would be misinterpretation in making sense of the whole of his work. Kierkegaard foresaw that this could happen and warned against it in his journal,

> It is easy to see that anyone wanting to have a literary mark merely needs to take some quotations higgledy-piggledy from "The Seducer," then from Johannes Climacus, then from me, etc., print them together as if they were all my words, show how they contradict each other, and create a very chaotic impression, as if the author were a kind of lunatic. Hurrah! That can be done. In my opinion anyone who exploits the poetic in me by quoting the writings in a confusing way is more or less a charlatan or a literary toper. (Supplement PV 288)

There are also postmodern interpreters of Kierkegaard who have seen the claims of the *Point of View* as totally ironic, as part of Kierkegaard's total scheme to deceive the public and himself about the purpose of the esthetic writings and his role as a religious writer.[4] I believe, along with Sylvia Walsh and a host of other Kierkegaard scholars that would include Howard and Edna Hong, the foremost translators of Kierkegaard, that the best way of interpreting his authorship is to take at face value how the author himself asked that he be read,

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[4] Among the postmodern interpreters of Kierkegaard are Henning Fenger, *Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins: Studies in the Kierkegaardian Papers*, Joakim Garff, "The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View and Points of View with Respect to Kierkegaard's 'Activity as an Author', " and Roger Poole, *Kierkegaard, The Indirect Communication*. Sylvia Walsh rejects Fenger's and Garff's view in her *Living Poetically* by saying that Fenger's reasons for non- acceptance of Kierkegaard's claim that he was a religious author are "flimsy" and that "Garff's argument rests on about as much flimsy evidence as Fenger's [. . .]" (13n). For a full reading of her rebuttal to the postmodernists see pp. 11-15.

as well as his understanding of the purpose of his production.[5] However, postmodern interpreters of Kierkegaard like Roger Poole would agree with Walsh that to read the pseudonyms as though they were Kierkegaard would be a big mistake.[6] This is crucial if we are to say anything credible about "what *Kierkegaard* said" about a particular topic.

Indirect Communication and Unamuno/Kierkegaard Scholarship

With regard to scholarship on Unamuno and Kierkegaard it is my view that 1) many critics have assumed that the pseudonyms are equivalent to Kierkegaard, and 2) many critics have not understood the use of the pseudonyms in the whole project of indirect communication as outlined above. I

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[5] Among scholars that accept at face value Kierkegaard's claim that he was from first to last a religious author are: Robert Perkins, the editor of the *International Kierkegaard Commentary*, Stephen Dunning, *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness*, C. Stephen Evans, *Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus*, Jamie Ferreira, *Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith*, and Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's "Concluding Unscientific Postscript."* Westphal is unique among these as he is more appreciative of the contribution postmodern writers such as Derrida, Foucault and Barthes can make to understanding Kierkegaard, particularly in their emphasis on the "death of the author." That an author has no privilege in relation to his text Westphal sees as Kierkegaard's position with regard to his own writing when he claims to write "without authority," not as an apostle but as a learner. However, Westphal is careful to note the similarities as well as the differences between Kierkegaard and the postmodern thinkers. "There is a similar humility in our three French writers, but it is also very different. In both cases the author refuses to play God. But there is all the difference in the world between saying, 'There is no God, so I am not God,' and saying 'There is a God, so I am not God.' We shall have to ask whether this theological difference plays a role when Kierkegaard, as emphatically as either Gadamer or the French, denies that the intention of the author governs the meaning of the text. For him this is in the first instance an autobiographical discovery. In *The Point of View* [. . .] Kierkegaard argues that his authorship as a whole, not just this book or that one, has the character of being written by an author. In spite of its obvious diversity, it is a religious authorship from start to finish, and it has a coherent, unified meaning. But he is not its origin. He insists repeatedly that he did not have the full meaning of his authorship in view at the outset but only came to see it in retrospect, and he attributes the coherence of his writings to governance or providence" (13).

[6] See "'My wish my prayer': Keeping the Pseudonyms Apart," where he says, "The problems set up by taking a quotation for example, from Vigilius Haufniensis on 'sin', modifying it by one on what appears to be the same thing, 'sin', in Anti-Climacus, and then adding in a word or two from

shall discuss problems in the interpretation of Kierkegaard in the work of four commentators on the relationship between Unamuno and Kierkegaard: Jesús Antonio Collado, Gemma Roberts, Ronald Batchelor and David Palmer. However, the misinterpretations found in these critics are not unique to them, but reflect common misconceptions in the critical literature on the relationship of the two authors, which will be noted in due course.

1) As mentioned in the Introduction, Jesús-Antonio Collado's book *Kierkegaard y Unamuno: La Existencia religiosa* is considered to be a foundational work in the comparison of the two authors. It is the most extensive study of the philosophical "systems" of the two authors and is the only study based on the Danish works themselves that were annotated by Unamuno. Nevertheless, Collado is not cognizant of the pseudonyms and at times says jarring things like the following: "Es notable la fascinación que ejerció sobre la fantasía de Kierkegaard la figura de Don Juan, de cuya magia diabólica quedó prendado a través del encanto seductor de la música de Mozart. Kierkegaard admira en Don Juan la genialidad sensual como seducción" (217n). ("It is notable the fascination exercised by the figure of Don Juan over the fantasy of Kierkegaard, of whose diabolical magic he fell captive through the seductive charm of the music of Mozart. Kierkegaard admires in Don Juan his sensual genius as seduction.") Collado cites as his reference *Either/Or* I, and, of course, he is referring to the proclivities and sensibilities of A, its author, the esthete, and not to Kierkegaard. Collado is not the first nor the last to make that mistake.

Judge Vilhelm on the necessity of despairing, are not only vastly in excess of what they need to be, they are in fact irresolvable, *a priori*" (157).

Merold Westphal notes that Mozart's biographer, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, bases his claim that Kierkegaard "wanted to start a sect to revere Mozart, not above others, but exclusively" on the same text in *Either/Or I* (8). Westphal comments, "To attribute to Kierkegaard the enthusiasm for Mozart expressed by A is like confusing Fyodor Dostoyevski with Raskolnikov or Arthur Miller with Willy Loman" (9).

2) The title of the first chapter of Gemma Roberts' book *Unamuno: Afinidades y Coincidencias Kierkegaardianas* is promising: "Los tres estadios de la dialéctica Kierkegaardiana en *Niebla*" (The Three Stages of the Kierkegaardian Dialectic in *Niebla*). What Roberts promises to do is to further the study begun by Ruth House Webber on the influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno in the writing of *Niebla*. Unfortunately, Roberts does not follow Webber's lead in the structure of her argument.

Webber is careful to show how the characters and the form of *Either/Or* affect many facets of *Niebla*. She is careful not to attribute to Kierkegaard the ideas of his characters. Bringing her article to a close, she quotes Kierkegaard's "Declaration" at the end of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* about the poetical individuality of the pseudonyms and his request not to attribute to him the life-views of his pseudonyms. Webber then makes the following conclusion, "Here we have a precedent for, not only Víctor Goti, a character in *Niebla* who is also the book's prologuizer, but also for the more fundamental idea which pervades all of Unamuno's work, that of the independent life of an author's creations" (134).

Although we shall see that Unamuno probably did not read this part of the *Postscript,* and therefore it is doubtful that this particular passage had anything to do with the creation of Víctor Goti, Webber's conclusion, that there is a marked distance between Unamuno's sense of authorship and his creation, is a valid one resting on a sensitive understanding of the pseudonyms and their importance in the work of Kierkegaard. On the other hand, Roberts proceeds to point out similarities between the protagonist of *Niebla* and the characters of *Either/Or* I and II, as well as the characters of pseudonymous works like *Stages on Life's Way* and then she concludes that these similarities "demuestran una profunda comunidad de espíritu entre los dos autores" 'demonstrate a profound community of spirit between the two authors' (25). For example, Roberts identifies Kierkegaard with Judge William, calling him Kierkegaard's *alter ego.* The problem is that Judge William is a fictional rendering of the ethical stage of existence. From Kierkegaard's point of view, Judge William is living in the *illusion* that he is a Christian. The Judge is fulfilling the duties of a good citizen in Christendom. Marriage does not exemplify the highest form of the existence for Kierkegaard. For the Judge, everyone should marry because in so doing one makes the commitments that are necessary to make life meaningful. Kierkegaard maintains in *Works of Love* that the highest form of existence is to love your neighbor; whether you marry is not important. Neighbor love transforms all other loves, including the marriage relationship.[7] Roberts points out many interesting parallels between Judge William's view of marriage and

[7] See *Works of Love* pp. 135-147 in particular where the importance of the God-relationship to erotic love and marriage is discussed.

Unamuno's view of marriage, but she cannot conclude from those similarities the "community of spirit" she claims between Kierkegaard and Unamuno.

Roberts shows that she does not understand the nature and purpose of indirect communication when she says that both Unamuno and Kierkegaard set out deliberate obstacles to those who would try to exegete their texts. She says, "He tropezado con las dificultades que el mismo Unamuno y también Kierkegaard se empeñaron en fomentar para obstaculizar la labor de sus exégetas" (19). ("I have stumbled over the difficulties that Unamuno and also Kierkegaard strove to develop so as to hinder the work of their interpreters.") That Unamuno reveled in contradiction is well known, and the reasons for his celebration of contradiction will be explored in the next chapter. Kierkegaard was aware that if his pseudonyms were not taken seriously and if readers attributed to him the various and sometimes contradictory ideas of his pseudonyms, there would be great confusion. He therefore took great pains to make his intentions clear by writing the "Declaration" at the end of *Postscript* and by writing *The Point of View for My Work as an Author*, where he expands on and embraces the essentials of indirect communication outlined by Climacus in *Postscript*.

This is not to deny that the sheer size and variety of Kierkegaard's work is not daunting, nor is it to claim that his prose is transparent. But Kierkegaard did not set out to put obstacles in the way of the reader, though he warned that his text would be difficult for the "hasty and curious" reader (WL 3). He cherished "that single individual" and believed that his intention in writing could be clearly seen, if the reader wanted to see it, "The authorship, regarded as a *totality*, is

religious from first to last, something anyone who can see, if he wants to see, must also see" (PV 6). He claimed that there was a movement from the "interesting" to the "simple" because of the authorship's religious character.

> Christianly, one does not proceed from the simple in order then to become interesting, witty, profound, a poet, a philosopher, etc. No, it is just the opposite; *here* one begins, and then becomes more and more simple, arrives at the simple. This, in "Christendom," is *Christianly* the movement of reflection; one does not reflect oneself into Christianity but reflects oneself out of something else and becomes more and more simple, a Christian. (PV 7)

3) Ronald Batchelor in his book, *Unamuno Novelist, A European Perspective*, gives voice to a common misconception that Kierkegaard and Unamuno are spiritual brothers based on their embracing of doubt as a way of life and/or their agonic view of life.[8] Batchelor claims that for both authors, "Existence is synonymous with doubt or anxiety" (38).[9] Batchelor quotes a

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[8] A highly regarded Unamuno scholar, Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, in his article "De Nicodemo a Don Quijote" contributes to this misconception when in supposedly quoting Kierkegaard, he quotes A in *Either/Or I* as saying "Suicídate y te arrepentirás, no te suicides y te arrepentirás" (qtd. in Blanco Aguinana 77) ("Kill yourself and you will regret it; don't kill yourself and you will regret it."). Blanco Aguinaga thus attributes the nihilism of the esthete A to Kierkegaard. The context is Blanco Aguinaga's discussion of how Unamuno would answer the question "¿Qué hacer?" 'What to do?" during and after his crisis of 1897. Blanco Aguinaga states that Unamuno would have responded to his vision of La Nada (nothingness) differently if he had read Kierkegaard in 1897. Fortunately, from his point of view, Unamuno did not read Kierkegaard until after his wife, Concha, had brought him back from the brink. But to intimate that Kierkegaard would somehow be responsible for Unamuno's demise had Unamuno identified with Kierkegaard's pseudonym A is unwarranted.

[9] In a completely different context Blanco Aguinaga in his book, *El Unamuno Contemplativo*, tries to counter the "agonic" legend that Unamuno carries with what Blanco Aguinaga calls his "contemplative" side seen in his first productions. The author recognizes that it is impossible to disregard the agonic legend, particularly in the Unamuno writings from 1905 on. Nevertheless, he tries to temper "la angustia" (the anguish) with some of Unamuno's poetry and prose texts such as *Por tierras de Portugal y España* and *Andanzas y visiones* which show a more peaceful

pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, the author of *Fear and Trembling*, who says, "Anxiety and dread are the only conceivable justification that can be thought" (qtd. in Batchelor 38). The context for the quote is an explanation of the difference between the "knight of faith" and the "tragic hero," using Abraham as an example of the knight of faith and Agamemnon as an example of the tragic hero. The heart of Silentio's exploration of the meaning of faith in *Fear and Trembling* is a retelling (actually several imaginative retellings) of the story from Genesis 22 of Abraham's being called by God to sacrifice his beloved son, Isaac, on distant Mount Moriah, of Abraham's obedience to God's command, and of God's sparing Isaac and returning him to his father.

Silentio explains that the tragic hero, while he has given up himself and everything that is his for the universal, nonetheless has had the chance to stand up for himself, to speak. The anxiety and dread that is felt by the knight of faith in his loneliness before the Absolute is something quite different.[10] What Abraham cannot do is explain the taking of the life of his son so that someone else could understand his action. In the paragraph after the quote above Silentio explains, "Abraham remains silent—but he *cannot* speak. Therein lies the distress and anxiety" (PF 113). The quote singled out by Batchelor to justify Kierkegaard's equating existence with doubt and dread does nothing of the kind. The passage that Batchelor quotes refers to the anxiety and dread of the knight of faith in the moment of testing, but does not characterize the existence of the knight of faith

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Unamuno, content to abandon himself to "la quietud y la eternidad de la vida" 'the quietness and eternity of life' (113).

[10] The Danish word *Nøden,* translated in Batchelor's quote of Kierkegaard as 'anxiety', is translated 'distress' in newer translations. It has the sense of being in deep, troubling need.

on the whole. In the movement of faith, there is "consolation" as well, not merely anxiety and dread.

In the passage cited by Batchelor, Silentio is explaining Abraham's two movements, the first of which is the infinite movement of resignation in giving up Isaac. He wants the reader to understand the anxiety and loneliness of that decision. But Silentio goes on to describe the second movement, the movement of faith which is Abraham's "consolation." Abraham believes, though it is absurd, that God will give him a new Isaac. What is the role of doubt in all of this? Silentio explains the role of doubt in this way,

> But if the doubter can become the single individual who as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, then he can get authorization for his silence. In that case, he must make his doubt into guilt. In that case, he is within the paradox, but then his doubt is healed, even if he may have another doubt. (PF 111)

It is true that for Kierkegaard anxiety and despair are part of coming to authentic existence, but they are by no means the state in which one remains if one is to be an authentic self. Much more will be said about the means to selfhood in the next chapter. For now it is important to emphasize that while Kierkegaard embraced uncertainty in limiting the efficacy of objective, "positive" reason for existential truth, he is critical of doubt and considered it as rooted in an act of the will. The cure for doubt is faith, and faith requires a decision—a leap in the terms of Johannes Climacus—a decision in Kierkegaard's own terms.

Climacus explains in *Fragments* that "belief is not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of the will" (83). More specifically to the point, "Belief and doubt are not two kinds of knowledge that can be defined in continuity with each other, for neither of them is a cognitive act, and they are opposite passions. Belief is a sense for coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against any conclusion that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and immediate knowledge" (84). We can suggest that Climacus' view is closer to Kierkegaard's than other pseudonyms because Kierkegaard added his own name as editor to *Fragments* and *Postscript*. We can confirm that idea when we read the following in *Works of Love*. Here, *doubt* is replaced with *mistrust*.

> Mistrustingly to *believe* nothing at all . . .and lovingly to *believe* all things are not a cognition, nor a cognitive conclusion, but a choice that occurs when knowledge has placed the opposite possibilities in equilibrium; and in this choice, which to be sure, is in the form of a judgment of others, the one judging becomes disclosed. That light-mindedness, inexperience, and naiveté believe all things is a cognition, that is, a fatuous cognition; *lovingly to believe* all things is a choice on the basis of love. (234-5)

What is the proper role of doubt in the life of faith? Kierkegaard answers that question in *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*:

> While the eyes of faith, then, steadfastly continue to be set on that which is above, quietly see heaven open, the apostle would now allow, indeed encourage, the single individual to use doubt in the

> right way, not to doubt what stands firm and will stand firm forever in its eternal clarity, but to doubt that which in itself is transitory, which will more and more vanish, to doubt himself, his own capacity and competence, so that it becomes an incapacity that is discarded more and more. False doubt doubts everything except itself; with the help of faith, the doubt that saves doubts only itself. (137)

To be fair, Batchelor cites as his justification of the claim that Unamuno found in Kierkegaard "a kinsman in doubt" Unamuno's own essay, "Ibsen y Kierkegaard." In that essay Unamuno calls Kierkegaard an "alma congojosa" 'anguished soul', and says that Kierkegaard was seized with "una desesperación resignada" 'a resigned despair' his entire life (3: 289). Unamuno does not tell us on which works of Kierkegaard he bases that description, but the volumes that he quotes in the essay are both pseudonymous works: *Either/Or I* and *Stages on Life's Way.*

Unamuno says that Kierkegaard's doctrines on the relationship between the sexes is found in these two books. We have already noted the multiplicity of authors of *Either/Or. Stages on Life's Way* is formed in much the same way with an editor, multiple speech makers in the first long essay, "In Vino Veritas," another essay in defense of marriage by Judge William, and the writer of a diary, "Guilty?/ Not Guilty?" which is edited by still another person. It is impossible to say what Kierkegaard thinks about love and marriage from these texts. It would also be impossible to judge whether Kierkegaard suffered resigned despair for his entire life. The fourteen volumes of the first edition of Kierkegaard's *Samlede*

Værker were published between 1901 and 1906. Unamuno can be forgiven if he had not read all fourteen volumes before writing his essay on "Ibsen y Kierkegaard" in 1907. Batchelor has the benefit of all of Kierkegaard's authorship but ignores the non-pseudonymous works.

Reflecting a more holistic approach, Pedro Cerezo Galán in his book, *Las máscaras de lo trágico* (1996), comments on the grouping of Unamuno and Kierkegaard, as well as Hegel, as agonic or tragic thinkers and outlines their important differences. He says,

> Propiamente hablando ni Hegel ni Kierkegaard son pensadores trágicos. Al primero lo salva el presupuesto metafísico de la identidad; y al segundo su fe religiosa en la trascendencia. Mediación dialéctica y salto en paradoja constituyen experiencias que abren camino, por arduo que sea éste y aun bordeando el abismo. Pero Unamuno se queda en la agonía, esto es, en el fondo del abismo. Y en la agonía sólo florece la incertidumbre creadora o la creación desesperada. (399)

> Speaking precisely, neither Hegel nor Kierkegaard are tragic thinkers. The first is saved through the metaphysical assumption of identity; the second through his religious faith in transcendence. Dialectical mediation and the leap into the paradox constitute experiences that open the way, even though that way be arduous and still close to the abyss. But Unamuno remains in agony, that

is, in the bottom of the abyss. And in agony only creative uncertainty or desperate creation can flourish.

4) There are many more examples of how critics have cited pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard and concluded erroneously what "Kierkegaard says" from those pseudonymous authors, but I will include just one more because the confusion produced by not citing the pseudonym results in claiming more harmony between Kierkegaard and Unamuno than is warranted. There are many scholars who have equated the "knight of faith" found in *Fear and Trembling* by Johannes De Silentio and Unamuno's version of Cervantes' hero, Don Quijote.[11] There is no doubt that Silentio's book *Fear and Trembling* influenced Unamuno as he wrote his *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*, as Donald Palmer claims in his article, "Unamuno's Don Quijote and Kierkegaard's Abraham," but there are important differences between Unamuno's Don Quijote and Silentio's Abraham that point to real discrepancies between Kierkegaard's and Unamuno's understanding of the Cervantine character.

The first and most important difference between Don Quijote and Silentio's Abraham, the knight of faith, is acknowledged by Palmer. After having discussed the "divine madness" that Palmer says links the two characters he says, "But Quijote's divine madness is much less convincing than Abraham's, for the simple reason that Abraham's task is much more horrible than Quijote's. In spite of everything, Quijote's mission 'remains within the ethical,' as Kierkegaard would

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[11] Sánchez Barbudo, in his section on "Unamuno y Kierkegaard" in "Una experiencia decisiva: la crisis de 1897" claims that Kierkegaard's "Caballero de la fe" (Knight of Faith) is Unamuno's Don Quijote. "Ese «Caballero de la Fe» es el mismo romántico Quijote de Unamuno" (112n). ("That «Knight of Faith» is the same romantic Quijote of Unamuno.")

say" (304). Palmer is right to say that Don Quijote's task remains within the ethical, though it was Silentio he should have quoted, not Kierkegaard.

In order to understand the place of *Fear and Trembling* within the Kierkegaardian authorship, one needs to understand the spheres of existence—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—which are explained and given life in the pseudonymous works. A detailed exploration of the existence spheres is given in the next chapter, but it is necessary to make the point now that one of the major concerns of *Fear and Trembling* is to show how the religious sphere is *more* than the ethical life. The religious stage requires an absolute relation to the absolute that goes beyond the ethical boundaries of a particular society or group. This is so because otherwise the good would be equated with the social constructs of an extant society and could never be questioned. Silentio underscores the difference between the tragic hero, Agamemnon, and the knight of faith by showing that Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter, though enormous, is understandable by his society because it can be seen that the sacrifice of his child is decreed for the good of the state. Agamemnon only fulfills the values of his society. Abraham, on the other hand, is required to go beyond the ethical, beyond the norms of his society. Agamemnon was also able to explain himself in the face of opposition, as we noted above, and that brings us to another difference between the knight of faith and Unamuno's Don Quijote which has to do with the ability of another to understand the mission of the knight. While Don Quijote is also not able to explain his mission of restoring the

Golden Age to the dull and unbelieving goatherds, Unamuno makes much of some of the "rational" people around him becoming "quixotized."

Unamuno calls Don Quijote a "knight of faith" while discussing the episode in the *Quijote* where the dispute over whether the barber's basin is indeed Mambrino's helmet extends to Don Fernando and Cardenio physically struggling with the Holy Brotherhood to defend Don Quijote's point of view. Unamuno says, "En torno a caballeros de la fe se arredilan carneros humanos" (*Vida* 3:139). ("Human sheep flock around Knights of Faith.") The human sheep become convinced of the case by dint of Don Quijote's heroism, though they really believe in their own minds that the helmet is a basin. "Ved, pues, a los burladores de Don Quijote burlados de él, quijotizados a su despecho mismo, y metidos en pendencia y luchando a brazo partido por defender la fe del Caballero, aun sin compartirla" (*Vida* 3:139). ("See, then, the mockers of Don Quixote mocked by him, quixotized despite themselves, engaged in a struggle and fighting with all their might to defend the Knight's faith, even without believing in it.") From the point of view of *Fear and Trembling*, it is impossible for the knight of faith to communicate his action. He is utterly alone before the absolute. He does not have anyone flock around him. Silentio says of Abraham, "Speak he cannot; he speaks no human language. And even if he understood all the languages of the world, even if those he loved also understood them, he still could not speak" (114).

There is no question that Unamuno equates Abraham and Don Quijote. It seems plausible that he had *Fear and Trembling* in mind when he wrote *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho* as we see in the following:

> Cosa tan grande como terrible la de tener una misión de que sólo es sabedor el que la tiene y no puede a los demás hacerles creer en ella: la de haber oído en las reconditeces del alma la voz silenciosa de Dios, que dice: "tienes que hacer esto," mientras no les dice a los demás: "este mi hijo que aquí veis, tiene esto que hacer." Cosa terrible haber oído: "haz eso; haz eso que tus hermanos, juzgando por la ley general que os rijo, estimarán desvarío o quebrantamiento de la ley misma; hazlo porque la ley suprema soy Yo, que te lo ordeno." . . . . ¿No recordáis al héroe de la fe a Abraham, en el monte Moria? (3: 80-81)
>
> It is just as terrible as it is great to have a mission which is known only to the person who has it and in which that person cannot make others believe: to have heard in the depths of your soul the quiet voice of God who says, "You must do this," while he does not say to the rest: "My son whom you see here must do this." It is a terrible thing to have heard, "Do that, do that which your brothers, judging from the laws which govern you, will deem as delirium or a breaking of that same law; do it because I am the supreme law and it is I who ordains it." Don't you remember the hero of the faith, Abraham, on Mount Moriah?

Abraham and Don Quijote believe that they have a mission they alone have been given. Both behave in ways that invite ridicule for their acts and appear crazy to others. But Unamuno's knight of faith and the knight of faith of Silentio part company immediately after this affinity between Don Quijote and Abraham is declared.

Unamuno goes on to explain that because of his intimate relationship to God, Quijote can say, "Yo sé quién soy!" (*Vida* 3: 82). ("I know who I am!") Even though that is a presumptuous thing to say, Unamuno defends Don Quijote and says what the knight means by that is that he knows who he wants to be, and that is the only thing that matters. Unamuno says, "Te debe importar poco lo que eres; lo cardinal para ti es lo que quieras ser. El ser que eres no es más que un ser caduco y perecedero, que come de la tierra y al que la tierra se lo comerá un día; el que quieres ser es tu idea en Dios, Conciencia del Universo" (*Vida* 3: 82). ("What you are should be of little concern; of cardinal importance is what you want to be. What you are is no more than a spent and perishable being who eats of the earth and whom the earth will one day eat; what you want to be is the idea of you in God, the Conscience of the Universe.") On the face of it, this quote sounds like Anti-Climacus' view of the self in *Sickness Unto Death* (which is Kierkegaard's view, as well): The self I should choose to be before God is the self God intended me to be from all eternity. But there is a striking difference here between Unamuno's view of finitude and that of Johannes de Silentio. Unamuno's knight of faith has resigned everything for the sake of something

higher, something eternal. Silentio's knight also resigns everything, but has a different relationship to the finite.

Silentio makes a clear distinction between the "knight of infinite resignation" and the "knight of faith." Silentio says explicitly, "The act of resignation does not require faith, for what I gain in resignation is my eternal consciousness" (48). The movement of faith is different.

> By faith I do not renounce anything; on the contrary I receive everything exactly in the sense in which it is said that one who has faith like a mustard seed can move mountains. It takes a purely human courage to renounce the whole temporal realm in order to gain eternity, but this I do gain and in all eternity can never renounce—it is a self-contradiction. But it takes a paradoxical and humble courage to grasp the whole temporal realm now by virtue of the absurd, and this is the courage of faith. By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac. (48-49)

The author of *Fear and Trembling* emphasizes that the knight of faith accepts his finitude and even embraces it precisely because it is given to him through faith. Paradoxically, Silentio says that the knight of faith "belongs entirely to the world" (39). Unamuno's knight is entirely otherworldly, depreciating the finitude that Silentio's knight of faith welcomes.

Palmer claims that "Kierkegaard's panegyric upon Abraham might well be read as a panegyric upon the Cervantine Don Quijote" (301). It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that Palmer's claim is not supported by the text.

What we have seen is that in comparison to the knight of faith described in *Fear and Trembling,* 1) Don Quijote's task remains within the ethical while Abraham's task requires movement beyond the ethical, 2) Don Quijote does have his followers that have been won over to his cause while Abraham cannot even speak in order to defend himself and 3) Don Quijote resigns everything for his task, but he has not made a movement of faith that would allow him to accept his finitude. All of these contrasting comparisons are not drawn from Kierkegaard's work as a whole, but rather are confined to the discrepancies between the knight of faith of *Fear and Trembling* and Unamuno's Don Quijote. It is a fair but different question to ask, "What do we know about Kierkegaard's view of Don Quijote?"

An article by Eric J. Ziolkowski, "Don Quixote and Kierkegaard's Understanding of the Single Individual," carefully outlines what is known about Kierkegaard's view of Cervantes' character. Ziolkowski points out that Kierkegaard owned both a Danish and a German copy of the *Quijote* and that while there are a few allusions to its main character in the pseudonymous writings, there are more than twenty entries in Kierkegaard's *Journals and Papers* that deal with Cervantes' knight. Ziolkowski states that while others have equated the knight of faith of *Fear and Trembling* and Don Quijote, "It should not be forgotten or overlooked [. . .] that nowhere in *Fear and Trembling* is Don Quixote mentioned by name and that nowhere in Kierkegaard's other writings—including, as far as I am aware, all his published works, private journals, and papers—is Don Quijote called a 'knight of faith' or vice versa" (132).

Ziolkowski notes that there is a change in Kierkegaard's attitude toward Cervantes' character recorded over the span of his entries in his journals from 1835 to 1854. In the early journal entries between 1835 and 1844 Kierkegaard takes Don Quijote as an example of what a Christian should *not* be. Don Quijote represents a person of religious conviction who has a "fixed idea" and who withdraws from the world, refusing to entertain any intellectual challenges to his faith. This person who is "spiritually deaf in one ear" is likened to Don Quijote who "takes on the appearance of happy madness," who too easily "discovered that it must have been the evil demons who always followed on his heels, [as] when, for example, he mistakenly took windmills for giants" (qtd in Ziolkowski 134). In 1844 Kierkegaard wrote, "For a long time now rigid letter-of-the law orthodoxy has reverted to being a counterpart to Don Quixote, whose ridiculous hair-splitting sophistries will provide excellent analogies" (JP, 3: 3047). It is important to note that *Fear and Trembling* was written during this early period and published in October of 1843. It is fair to conclude that Kierkegaard himself made no connection between Cervantes' Don Quijote and Abraham at this time, nor would he have entertained Don Quijote as a knight of faith.

Ziolkowski maintains that the character of Don Quijote is too rich and too complex to confine him to one of Kierkegaard's existence spheres and he states, "Kierkegaard did not conceive of Cervantes' knight as occupying any one particular stage of existence" (135). He points out that in his quest for fame and glory (much applauded by Unamuno) Don Quijote is identified with the esthetic stage. This is where Johannes Climacus situates Don Quijote in *Concluding*

Unscientific Postscript. Climacus calls the knight errant one of those individuals who "forget themselves over their great importance in history" (CUP 140). Ziolkowski observes that the knight errant would then be judged an esthete, "since forgetting oneself is a primary symptom of aesthetic existence" (136). In Don Quijote's upholding of the chivalric code, he could be seen (as noted by Palmer above) as occupying the ethical stage.

Ziolkowski then outlines the shift in Kierkegaard's thinking through entries in his journals from 1846 on. After the publication of *Postscript* there is a definite change in Kierkegaard's attitude toward Don Quijote. More and more Kierkegaard identifies with Don Quijote as his own struggle against Christendom becomes more explicit, and his sense of being persecuted increases. In what Ziolkowski takes to be the first instance of an analogy being made between Christ and Don Quijote in 1848 Kierkegaard writes,

> When secular sensibleness has permeated the whole world as it has now begun to do, then the only remaining conception of what it is to be Christian will be the portrayal of Christ, the disciples, and others as comic figures. They will be counterparts of Don Quixote, a man who had a firm notion that the world is evil, that what the world honors is mediocrity or even worse. (JP, 1:317).

In 1849 Kierkegaard continues the attack,

> Christianity does not really exist. Christendom is waiting for a comic poet *à la* Cervantes, who will create a counterpart of Don Quixote out of the essentially Christian.

> The only difference will be that no poetic exaggerations will be required at all, as in Don Quixote—no, all he needs to do is to take any essentially true Christian life, not to mention simply taking Christ or an apostle. The comic element arises because the age has changed so enormously that it regards this as comic. (JP, 2: 1762)

What caused the change in Kierkegaard's perception of Cervantes' knight? We might well ask the same question of Unamuno, who excoriated the legacy of Don Quijote in his early writings and then apologized profusely for doing so in *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*. We could suggest that both authors have a common source for their exalted view of Don Quijote in the German Romantics. But why the change in their later years? Both authors have found the Cervantine character to embody themes that they wanted to illustrate, and those themes changed throughout their authorship.

What is important for this study is to see that while Unamuno may have linked Don Quijote and the Abraham of *Fear and Trembling* and anointed *his* Don Quijote with the label "knight of faith," Johannes de Silentio's understanding of the knight of faith was far from Unamuno's. Further, while it may be interesting to note that both Kierkegaard and Unamuno in their later years identify to some extent with the Cervantine character themselves and applaud Don Quijote's heroic courage against the opposition of a dull and inhospitable society, there is no reason to suggest that Unamuno was influenced by *Kierkegaard* in his understanding of Don Quijote as a knight of faith. Kierkegaard did not conceive

of Don Quijote as a knight of faith at the time of the writing of *Fear and Trembling* and only came to see him as a Christian figure later in his life. In addition, the only references to Don Quijote as a Christian figure are found in Kierkegaard's *Journals and Papers* which Unamuno did not have as part of the first edition of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker.*

Unamuno's Understanding and Use of Indirect Communication

The foregoing discussion of Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms in indirect communication has served to explain some of the discrepancies in the opinions of the commentators on the relationship between Unamuno and Kierkegaard. It is clear that many commentators do not respect the pseudonyms and attribute to Kierkegaard the ideas and positions of the pseudonyms. A different, but crucial question to ask is, "What did Unamuno understand of the indirect method and Kierkegaard's purposes in using it?" I believe that Unamuno embraced the maieutic ideal for the communication of existential truth described by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and used it himself in the writing of his novels. However, I contend that Unamuno did not understand Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms nor the religious character of Kierkegaard's entire authorship. Unamuno seems to be unaware of Kierkegaard's overall purpose in using the indirect method to disabuse nineteenth century Danes of the illusion that they were all Christians. These ideas are confirmed through a close scrutiny of the first edition of the *Samlede Værker* in Unamuno's personal library as well as Unamuno's own disclosures

about the goals and processes of his writings. The fruit of Unamuno's use of the maieutic ideal in his novels will be outlined in detail in Chapter Three.

Mario J. Valdés, in the Introduction to his *An Unamuno Sourcebook,* makes much of the fact that Unamuno interacted with texts by writing marginal notes in them. In his exhaustive bibliography of Unamuno's personal library, he notes that all but two of the fourteen volumes of the first edition of Kierkegaard's *Samlede Værker* are annotated by Unamuno. It should be said at the outset that the marginal notes in the *Samlede Værker* are not the type of notes that Valdés says fills every book that Unamuno read. The marginal notes are not interactions with the text but are all glosses on Danish words, given in German and Spanish. On a very few occasions there are summary sentences of a chapter or section. The vocabulary glosses are, however, invaluable in judging what Unamuno read and what he did not read, as well as what he read with care and what he read somewhat more cursorily. This can be judged by the extent of the gloss. Of course, one must take into consideration that Unamuno would have had to gloss more words at the beginning of his reading in *Either/Or,* the first volumes, when he had just begun to read Danish, than in the later volumes when his Danish was presumably better. Nevertheless, when there are copious glosses in Vol. VII, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript,* a book midway in the authorship, one can reasonably conclude that the text was of particular interest to the reader.

Another indication of careful reading on Unamuno's part is his marginal markings of specific sentences and passages. These are the equivalent of underscoring, and they come in the form of a short, single horizontal line marking

a sentence or single, or double and triple vertical lines that mark passages. The volumes that contain the most of these sorts of marginal markings are Volumes I and II, *Either/Or I* and *II*, Volume VI, *Stages on Life's Way* and Volume XII, *Practice in Christianity*.

The two volumes which have no notes in them at all are Volume V, which has *Four Upbuilding Discourses* and *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions*, and Volume VIII which has *A Literary Review* and *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*. All the rest of the volumes have some annotations in them, but it is important to look carefully to see where Unamuno stopped reading in some of the volumes as well.

This chapter began with an explanation of indirect communication for the communication of existential truth found in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* by Johannes Climacus. It is there that 1) the maieutic ideal, 2) the necessarily artful form of indirect communication, and 3) the "negative" (or uncertain) quality of existence that calls for indirect communication in its inexhaustible variety are discussed. It is clear that Unamuno carefully read all of Section I (of Part Two), "Something about Lessing," in which these concepts are detailed. This can be determined by the number of Danish words that are glossed in the margins, which in this case are many. But is there evidence of these ideas in the works of Unamuno? We have already noted Ruth House Webber's insight that Unamuno and Kierkegaard share a distancing from their written creations, the conviction that their texts have an independent life of their own. Unamuno practices this "death of the author" literary analysis as well as promoting it for his own texts. In

interpreting the *Quijote* he says in *Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida* that it matters not to him what Cervantes intended to put into the text. "Lo vivo es lo que yo allí descubro, pusiéralo o no Cervantes, lo que yo allí pongo y sobrepongo y sotopongo, y lo que ponemos allí todos" (7: 210). ("What is living in it is what I myself discover in it, whether Cervantes put it there or not, what I myself put into and under and over it, and what we all put into it.")

The distance created by the author in his own text allows the reader to appropriate its truth more readily. In the Prologue to *Cómo se hace una novela* Unamuno says,

> En cuanto un pensamiento nuestro queda fijado por la escritura, expresado, cristalizado, queda ya muerto, y no es más nuestro que será un día bajo tierra nuestro esqueleto. La historia, lo único vivo, es el presente eterno, el momento huidero que se queda pasando, que pasa quedándose, y la literatura no es más que la muerte. Muerte de que otros pueden tomar vida. Porque el que lee una novela puede vivirla—y quien dice una novela dice una historia—, y el que lee un poema, una criatura—poema es criatura y poesía creación—puede re-crearlo. Entre ellos el autor mismo. (8: 709-10)
>
> As soon as our thought is fixed by writing it down, expressed, crystallized, it is already dead, and it is no more ours than our skeleton will be one day, under the earth. History, the only thing living, is the eternal present, the fleeting moment that keeps on happening, and happens as it remains. Literature is no more than

> death. Death from which others can take life. Because he who reads a novel can live it, and whoever dictates a novel tells a story and he who reads a poem, a creature—a poem is a creature and poetry creation—can recreate it. Among them [the readers and recreators] is the author himself.

Further, Unamuno speaks about the maieutic ideal in *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*. In his discussion of the "galeotes espirituales" 'spiritual galley slaves' based on the passage of *Don Quijote* where the knight is stoned by the galley slaves whom he had freed, Unamuno says, "El más acendrado beneficio es el que se hace al que no nos lo reconoce por tal. [. . .] Libértale, y luego que te apedree por haberle libertado y ejercite así sus brazos libres, empezará a desear la libertad" (3: 235). ("The purest service is the one that is done such that a man does not recognize it for what it is. [. . .] Free him, and after you have been stoned for freeing him and he has had a chance to exercise his newly freed arms, he will begin to desire liberty.") The "not recognizing it for what it is" is accomplished through indirect communication. Johannes Climacus says, "[. . .] the secret of communication specifically hinges on setting the other free, and for that very reason he must not communicate himself directly; indeed, it is even irreligious to do so" (CUP 74).

Unamuno continues in that same passage in *Vida de Don Quijote* with an example of "objective thinking" that he rejects, whose metaphor may have been inspired by Johannes Climacus. Climacus says in a passage underscored by Unamuno,

> Without risk, no faith. Faith is the contradiction between infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith, but because I cannot do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am "out on 70,000 fathoms of water" and still have faith. (CUP 204)

Unamuno tells of trying to help break the shackles of one spiritual galley slave friend who insists on believing in hell because without it the friend believes that he would behave immorally. The spiritual galley slave says that he needs hell as an "objective foundation" on which to base his conduct and calls it his "plank" on which he depends in the middle of the ocean. Unamuno counters that his friend is the plank and that God is the ocean. "¿Fundamento objetivo, dices? ¿Y qué es eso? ¿Quieres más objeto de ti que tú mismo? [. . .] ¿Tienes tan poca confianza en Dios, que estando en El, en quien vivimos, nos movemos y somos (*Hechos,* XVII, 28), necesitas tabla a qué agarrarte? El te sostendrá sin tabla" (3: 235). ("Objective foundation, you say? What's that? Do you need more of an object than yourself? [. . .] Have you so little confidence in God that though you are in Him in who we live and have our being (Acts 27:28), you still need a plank to hang on to? He will keep you afloat, without any plank.") Though his friend may feel like he is drowning in anguish, tribulations and doubt, Unamuno says that he needs to drown and soak up the ocean like a sponge and then float back up to the surface. His friends says that he would then be dead. Unamuno

replies "No, resucitado y más vivo que nunca" (3: 236). ("No, resurrected and more alive than ever.")

This is a common example of how the reading of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* works in the mind of Unamuno and makes its way into the Unamuno text. But notice a very important difference in the two texts, as well. Unamuno embraces Climacus' view that without risk there is no faith, but for Unamuno the "objective uncertainty" that must be maintained is equated with "congojas, tribulaciones y dudas" 'anguish, tribulations and doubts' which one must succumb to in order to become alive. Climacus' point, however, is that faith is defined as believing in the unseen while passionately in inwardness making the leap *in spite of* the anguish, tribulations and doubts. It should also be noted that Unamuno would in no way be unhappy about the clear discrepancy between Climacus and himself. In the "Comentario" at the beginning of *Cómo se hace una novela* Unamuno says, "Pero, ¿Y para qué tiene el lector que ponerse de acuerdo con lo que el escritor le dice? Por mi parte, cuando me pongo a leer a otro no es para ponerme de acuerdo con él. Ni le pido semejante cosa" (8: 724). (But why should a reader be in agreement with what a writer says to him? For my part, when I set out to read another author, it is not to agree with him. Neither do I ask him to agree with me.")

Another example of the maieutic ideal in Unamuno is found in that same "Comentario" that precedes *Cómo se hace una novela.* It reflects the concern of the author that his reader be about making her own existence authentic. Unamuno says,

> Y así cuando les cuento cómo se hace una novela, o sea, cómo estoy haciendo la novela de mi vida, mi historia, les llevo a que se vayan haciendo su propia novela, la novela que es la vida de cada uno de ellos. Y desgraciados, si no tienen novela. Si tu vida, lector, no es una novela, una ficción divina, un ensueño de eternidad, entonces deja estas páginas, no me sigas leyendo. No me sigas leyendo porque te indigestaré y tendrás que vomitarme sin provecho ni para mí ni para ti. (8: 726)
>
> And thus, when I tell them how a novel should be made, or rather, how I am making the novel of my life, my story, I do so in order that they go about making their own novel, the novel that is the life of each one of them. And unfortunate you are if you do not have a novel. If your life, reader, is not a novel, a divine fiction, an eternal fantasy, then leave these pages and do not continue to read me. Do not continue to read me because I will give you indigestion and you will have to vomit me without any benefit to me or you.

The thrust of this quote corresponds well with the goals of indirect communication as outlined by Johannes Climacus. The overall project is clearly about life, existence, being in this world. But the means of communication about that existence will be an art form, the novel. And the only really important thing is that the reader appropriate the existential truths set forth therein for herself and make her own novel, her own authentic existence. If the reader is uninterested in that sort of existence, there is no point in even beginning to read. At the end of

Cómo se hace una novela Unamuno reiterates the responsibility of the reader to be active and make herself the author of the novel. "Y todo lector que sea hombre de dentro, humano, es, lector, autor de lo que lee y está leyendo. Esto que ahora lees aquí, lector, te lo estás diciendo tú a ti mismo y es tan tuyo como mío. Y si no es así es que ni lo lees" (8: 761). ("And every reader who is a man of depth, human, is a reader, an author of what he reads, of what he is reading. What you are now reading here, reader, you are saying it to yourself and it is as much yours as it is mine. If it's not that way, you are not reading.")

It seems clear that what Johannes Climacus says about the indirect method used to communicate existential truth resonates well with Unamuno in his own embracing of the maieutic ideal, the artistic nature of indirect communication and the impossibility of certainty when it comes to existential truth. What is just as clear is that Unamuno did not understand the overall purpose of the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms nor Kierkegaard's "direct witness" that is contained in *The Point of View*. The first published explanation of how the pseudonyms should be read is found at the end of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* where Kierkegaard appends "A First and Last Explanation" to Johannes Climacus' text, but this time he signs his own name. It is there that Kierkegaard asks that the opinions and ideas of the pseudonyms not be attributed to him but to the individual authors. A careful perusal of Unamuno's copy of *Postscript* shows that he stopped reading on page 494, leaving fifty-five pages unread. On p. 546 "A First and Last Explanation" appears. We can

conclude that it is unlikely that Unamuno knows of Kierkegaard's request with regard to the pseudonyms.

More importantly, it appears that Unamuno did not read *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* in which Kierkegaard explains the use of indirect communication and the esthetic pseudonyms as the only way to remove the illusion that all nineteenth century Danes were Christians. It is here that Kierkegaard states his clear purpose as a religious author from first until last and claims that, though he did not understand the scope of his authorship from the beginning, Governance did. He says, "The first division of books is esthetic writing; the last division of books is exclusively religious writing—between these lies *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* as the *turning point*. This work deals with and poses *the issue*, the issue of the entire work as an author: becoming a Christian" (PV 31).

The Danish volume in which *The Point of View* appears begins with some newspaper articles which Unamuno stopped reading on page eighteen. The articles have to do with nineteenth century Danish issues, and it is not surprising that the articles did not maintain Unamuno's interest. Thereafter in the volume are *From the Papers of One Still Living* and *The Concept of Irony* both of which have significant amounts of vocabulary glosses, showing a careful reading. After *The Concept of Irony* the newspaper articles begin again and it is clear that Unamuno stopped reading on page 429, understandably bored with the content. Having stopped on page 429, Unamuno also did not read "About my Authorship," "The Point of View" or "The Individual."

The difficulty of saying precisely what Kierkegaard believes about any one issue given the use of the pseudonyms and the indirect method of communication was explored at the beginning of this chapter. It was suggested that a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the Kierkegaardian texts be taken in order to give a credible account of what Kierkegaard says. Sylvia Walsh's criteria for such a dynamic approach was adopted, i.e., that in order to know what Kierkegaard himself thought, one must read 1) the works which to which he signed his own name, 2) the specific declarations he wrote as to his purposes and 3) his journals and papers which reveal much of his thinking as he wrote.

Unamuno did read many of the specifically religious writings like *Practice in Christianity* by the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus, and *Works of Love* which Kierkegaard signed with his own name. Both texts are heavily glossed. However, it seems that the works that had the greatest impact on his own writing were the pseudonymous books, *Either/Or* I and II, *Stages on Life's Way*, and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Since it appears that he did not read "A First and Last Declaration" nor *The Point of View* it is likely that Unamuno had little or no understanding of Kierkegaard's plan in using the pseudonyms nor about Kierkegaard's ultimate purpose for his entire authorship. Unamuno also did not have access to the *Papirer* (the *Journals and Papers*) which were published later. Given Unamuno's belief that a text is independent of its author, his having missed "A First and Last Declaration" or *The Point of View* would have been no loss from his point of view.

However, if one wants accurately to answer the question "How did Kierkegaard influence Unamuno?" it is crucial to say that Unamuno found much in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings that corresponded resoundingly with his own thinking and that provided grist for his creative mind. For the purposes of this dissertation, the most important similarity in the two authors is their use of the maieutic ideal and indirect communication to reveal existential truth. But it is more difficult to claim the "spiritual brotherhood" between Kierkegaard and Unamuno that many critics have voiced (along with Unamuno himself) when Unamuno did not read the texts which are key to understanding what Kierkegaard, rather than his pseudonyms believed. Kierkegaard declares that there is only one significant question, "How do I become a Christian?" He does not ever try to prove the truth of the Christian message. He demonstrates what Christianity is and what it is not. But for him, there are only two choices, to become a Christian or not. For Unamuno, there are multiple choices and none of them are privileged, except the choice to care passionately about one's existence.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FORMATION OF THE SELF IN KIERKEGAARD AND UNAMUNO

The Self as Substance and the Self as Achievement

In order to explore the formation of the self in Kierkegaard and Unamuno I want to lay a groundwork by examining two different ways of understanding the self that have been present in western culture.[1] The first of these is an understanding of the self that sees the self as a *substance*, an entity. There may be many ways to describe the kind of entity that the self is, but the common thread among all of them is that the entity is seen as an enduring thing with a given identity. The second view sees the self as an *achievement*, a characterization of the self that it possesses by virtue of the roles it fulfills. Here, "Being a self is not being a special type of entity, but rather it is a matter of having a special status, a status that is linked to social relationships" (Evans, "Who is the Other?" 2). On this view, being a human, part of the *homo sapiens* species, does not necessarily qualify one as having a self. A human being may become a self or may cease to be a self, depending on his/her status.

We will look first at some concrete examples from the history of western philosophy. If it is true, as Alfred North Whitehead claims, that all of western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, it seems that Plato would be a good place to begin looking at the self as substance or achievement.

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[1] The categories used here are developed by C. Stephen Evans in his article on Kierkegaard's anthropology entitled, "Who is the Other in *The Sickness Unto Death*?: God and Human Relations in the Constitution of the Self."

First of all, we need to clarify that the "self" comes under the guise of "soul" in Plato. For Plato, the soul is an entity that preexists the body and that survives the body after death. The character of the soul is tripartite. In the *Republic* Plato has Socrates explain the three parts of the soul:

> One part, we say is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms, we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name, but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element; for we called it the appetitive part because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love [. . .]. (371)

Our ability to reason may war with our competitive, assertive nature, as well as our appetites, but all three parts are found within every person. This tri-part entity is universal and a given.

Aristotle's view of a human being is fundamentally the same as Plato's in its dependence on the category of substance. However, Aristotle does not, as Plato does, clearly teach that the soul is a substance on its own that can exist apart from the body. Rather, for him a human being is a unity of body and soul, a composite substance in which the soul is the "form" of the body. He describes the human soul's distinctive properties as cognitive capacities, but both body and soul are seen as being part of what it means to be human. In the Medieval period, Thomas Aquinas continues to employ Aristotle's view of a human being, although as a Christian, he allows the soul to survive the death of the body. Of course for Aquinas, human beings, like all finite substances, are created by God,

a necessary being. Still, for Aquinas a human being is a "composite substance" composed of body and soul, which is the "form" of that body.

In the early modern period Descartes defended his own existence as a "thinking being" against the skeptical doubt he used to judge the rest of the world. The makeup of the soul is *res cogitans* or thinking substance, which is apart from and independent from the material body. The intellect that is capable of "clear and distinct" perceptions that are free from error is a gift from God.

Many classical substance theories of the self are tied to a religious world-view, but contemporary versions of the substance view of self are found in the form of scientific materialism for which a creator is entirely absent. On this view, the self is still a given entity, but it is entirely made up of matter—configured by a complex set of genes—that is naturally occurring and evolving and that needs no "first cause" explanation. Evans points to Richard Dawkins as a prime example of this view ("Who is the Other?" 2). Dawkins calls the genes that are the basis of selfhood "selfish" because they are programmed to survive, and they are all that we need to explain the concept of self in the contemporary world.[2]

The view of the self as achievement, as having a special status or relationship, has become a dominant phenomenon of the twentieth century. Chief proponents of this view can be found in the existentialist camp. In attempting to define an "existentialist," in order to defend the term from the imprecision that he perceived in the wider culture, Sartre begins by stating that what both Christian and atheistic existentialists "have in common is simply the fact that they believe that *existence* comes before *essence*—or, if you will, that

we must begin from the subjective" (289). On this view there is no "human nature," nothing given. Rather, "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself" (291). How does man "make" himself? By choosing for himself and in so doing choosing for all of humankind. This is a radical choosing for which there are no *a priori* standards or values other than freedom itself.

For Sartre, the authentic self is in no way given, but must be achieved. "Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is" (300). Sartre defends his view saying that it avoids the reductionism of materialism and that it avoids the radical individual subjectivism of Descartes because one recognizes that the "other" is a thinking individual as well. This is the relational side of the achievement theory. Sartre says, "The other is indispensable to my existence and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me" (303). Still, in all, I am ultimately responsible for creating my *essence* by my commitments. Sartre claims that existentialism, far from being the philosophy of despair that it is accused of being, is actually optimistic because it is a "doctrine of action" (311).

Charles Taylor, a Canadian philosopher and historian of modernity, rejects materialistic and scientific paradigms as a basis to understand what it means to be human, and has sought to redefine man as a "self interpreting animal." Emotions such as shame and remorse or the élan of aspiration are what

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[2] See Dawkins', *The Selfish Gene.*

differentiate the human from the animal. Such emotions are contingent on "a certain articulation of our situation" which is dependent upon language (63). (These emotions are carefully chosen because those such as fear do seem to be shared by animals.) Taylor says,

> This is what is involved in seeing man as a self-interpreting animal. It means that he cannot be understood simply as an object among objects, for his life incorporates an interpretation, an expression of what cannot exist unexpressed, because the self that is to be interpreted is essentially that of a being who self interprets. (75)

It is impossible to interpret without language, and so on this view the self is dependent on its ability to articulate its situation through language. The import of this view is that the self is no longer an object with properties to be observed, but rather "our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are" (47).

Peter Singer, the Princeton ethicist, provides yet another illustration of the self as an achievement. Singer does not privilege humans because of their *homo sapiens* species, their feelings, or their language. Instead of using the term "human," which he equates with the species, he chooses to use the term "person" when he refers to what we have been talking about as "self" or "soul." The distinction between a human and a person is important for the ethical considerations of abortion and euthanasia. Merely being part of the human species does not provide a right to life. Persons are the only ones who possess such a right. For Singer a person is "a self-conscious being who is aware of itself

as a distinct entity, with a past and future" (90). Since both an unborn fetus and an infant do not have this self-awareness, Singer claims that there is no morally relevant difference between them. Both may be killed if there are compelling reasons to do so. Further, some non-human animals *can* be considered to be persons. Though he calls it "speculation," Singer seriously entertains the idea that chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, dogs, cats, and mammals normally used for food could all be considered persons on the criterion stated above.

Our motive in looking at these concrete examples from Plato to Singer has been to see the difference between a view of the self as a substance and a view of the self as an achievement. Though each of the views has various manifestations, the common threads within each type make it possible to identify the different conceptions of the self and some of the implications of those views for living in this world. While the substance that is the self may be tripartite in Plato, a thinking substance for Descartes, and a complex of genes for the scientific materialist, the import of this view is that the self is an entity whose nature is more or less fixed and given. What the varying theories of the self as achievement have in common is that being born a *homo sapiens* does not guarantee that the human being is a self but rather selfhood is a status that is acquired over time. In the case of Sartre, the choices one makes determine what the self is. In the case of Taylor, the self is dependent on the ability to articulate emotion through language. For Singer, a self can only be seen as a person when she is aware of herself as a person and has a sense of her past and future.

The Self as Achievement in Kierkegaard and Unamuno

I want to argue that there is a fundamental similarity in the way Unamuno and Kierkegaard view the self. Both authors can be seen to hold elements of the two ways of viewing the self that I have outlined here. Both see the self as substantial, but not only as substantial. For both, the achievement character of the self is of fundamental importance, and I shall focus first on this aspect of their views.[3] Both authors are keen to look at the self as an existing subject, one that has choices that will make it what it is. Kierkegaard says in an entry of 1847 in his *Journals*,

> Even though I achieve nothing else, I nevertheless hope to leave very accurate and experientially based observations concerning the conditions of existence [*Tilværelsens*]. [. . .] Genuine decision never happens to a man; one has to enter into decision. [. . .] Using my diagram, a young person should be able to see very accurately beforehand, just as on a price list: if you venture this far out, then the conditions are thus and so, this to win and this to lose; and if you venture out this far, these are the conditions, etc. (JP, 1:1046)

Unamuno writes in *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho,* "Sólo es hombre hecho y derecho el hombre cuando quiere ser más que hombre" (3: 82). ("A man is only

[3] It is my intention to look at the similarities between Unamuno's and Kierkegaard's view of self without regard to the "influence" of Kierkegaard on Unamuno in this fundamental part of their thought. It seems wise to follow the advice of Batchelor on this point since some of what Unamuno has to say on the nature of the self was written before he read Kierkegaard. The explicit influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno will be seen in the fictional rendering of the self as an achievement in the novels he wrote after having read Kierkegaard.

fully a man when he wants to be more than a man.") Later in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* he says, "Me dicen que he venido a realizar no sé qué final social; pero yo siento que yo, lo mismo que cada uno de mis hermanos, he venido a realizarme, a vivir" (7: 116). ("They tell me I have come to realize I know not what social end; but I feel that I, like each one of my brothers, have come to realize myself, to live.")

Furthermore, since both authors believe that a person is responsible for becoming a self, their authorship is an attempt to awaken their readers to that responsibility. Kierkegaard addresses his authorship to "the single individual."

> *The single individual* is the category through which, in a religious sense, the age, history, the human race must go. And the one who stood at Thermopylae was not so secure as I, who have stood, in order at least to bring about an awareness of it, at this narrow pass, *the single individual.* His particular task was to keep the hordes from pressing through the narrow pass; if they pressed through he would have lost. My task at least exposes me far less to the danger of being trampled down, since it was as a lowly servant (but, as I have said from the beginning and repeat again and again, *without authority*) to prompt, if possible, to invite, to induce the many to press through this narrow pass, *the single individual*, through which, please note, no one presses except by becoming the single individual; the opposite is indeed a categorical impossibility. (PV 118)

Each of the *Upbuilding Discourses* includes a dedication to this single individual "whom I with joy and gratitude call *my* reader." But in *The Point of View* Kierkegaard is careful to explain that 1) the single individual is present in every one of the pseudonymous books as well as the upbuilding ones and 2) that the term does not exclude anyone. "*The single individual* can mean the most unique of all, and *the single individual* can mean everyone" (115). What Kierkegaard emphatically wants to contrast with the single individual is "the crowd" that "is untruth" (110). The crowd here is what we might term the "herd" that is unthinkingly persuaded of the "truth" of a matter by the numbers of people holding that "truth."[4]

Inducing his reader to "press through this narrow pass" was not an easy sell in Kierkegaard's nineteenth century Denmark. Kierkegaard has Johannes Climacus proclaim in *Postscript,*

> The immorality of our age is perhaps not lust and pleasure and sensuality, but rather a pantheistic, debauched contempt for individual human beings. In the midst of the jubilation over our age and the nineteenth century there sounds a secret contempt for being a human being—in the midst of the importance of the generation there is a despair over being a human being. Everything, everything must be together; people want to delude themselves world-historically in the totality; no one wants to be an individual existing human being. (355)

[4] Here Kierkegaard says that when he talks about truth he means *eternal truth*. So that, "politics etc. has nothing to do with *eternal truth*" (PV 109-110).

Again in *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho* Unamuno says of his purpose in writing, "Hay que inquietar los espíritus y enfusar en ellos [los prójimos] fuertes anhelos, aun a sabiendas de que no han de alcanzar nunca lo anhelado" (3:155). ("One must disquiet the spirits [of one's neighbors] and infuse in them powerful longings, even in the knowledge that they will never achieve what they long for.") Later in the same book Unamuno also narrows the general purpose to the individual. "Mira lector, aunque no te conozco, te quiero tanto que si pudiese tenerte en mis manos, te abriría el pecho y en el cogollo del corazón te rasgaría una llaga y te pondría allí vinagre y sal para que no pudieses descansar nunca y vivieras en perpetua zozobra y en anhelo inacabable" (3: 241). ("Look, reader, though I do not know you, I love you so much that if I could hold you in my hands, I would open up your breast and in the center of your heart I would make a wound and into it I would put vinegar and salt, so that you might never rest again, and would live in continual anguish and endless longing.")[5] In "Soledad," Unamuno rejects the crowd as Kierkegaard did.

> Nunca he sentido el deseo de conmover a una muchadumbre y de influir sobre una masa de personas—que pierden su personalidad al amasarse—, yo he sentido, en cambio, siempre furioso anhelo de inquietar el corazón de cada hombre y de influir sobre cada uno de mis hermanos en humanidad. Cuando he hablado en público he procurado casi siempre hacer oratoria lírica,

[5] The first lines of this address of Unamuno to his reader echo Kierkegaard in *The Point of View*, "I do not know who you are; I do not know where you are; I do not know your name. Yet you are my hope, my joy, my pride, and covertly my honor" (105).

> y me he esforzado por forjarme la ilusión de que hablaba a uno solo de mis oyentes, a uno cualquiera, a cualquiera de ellos, a cada uno, no a todos en conjunto. (1: 1255)
>
> I have never felt a desire to move a crowd of people or to influence a mass of people who lose their personality by being part of the crowd. I have felt, on the other hand, a furious longing to disquiet the heart of each man and to influence each one of my brothers in humanity. When I have spoken in public, I have almost always endeavored to produce lyric oratory, and I have tried to form for myself the illusion that I was talking with only one of my hearers, to any one of them, to each one, not to all of them together.

The task of awakening was no less difficult from Unamuno's point of view than was the case for Kierkegaard in the nineteenth century. In speaking of his countrymen Unamuno says, "Para ellos no hay quemantes lágrimas vertidas en silencio, en el silencio del misterio, porque esos bárbaros se lo creen tener todo resuelto; para ellos no hay inquietud del alma, pues se creen nacidos en posesión de la verdad absoluta" (*Vida* 3: 226). ("For them there are no burning tears shed in silence, in the silence of the mystery, because these barbarians think they have resolved everything. For them there is no restlessness of the soul, for they think that they are born in possession of the absolute truth.")

Before each author's view of the self as achievement is explained in depth, I must qualify the word "achievement." For both Unamuno and Kierkegaard, becoming a self is a task that is never fully "achieved." As Merold

Westphal has it, "[. . .] selfhood is the goal rather than the presupposition of my existence" (ix). But the "becoming" that Kiekegaard speaks of and the "longing" that Unamuno speaks of are what make existence authentic. Kierkegaard's "becoming" and Unamuno's "longing" are complex, multifaceted concepts that demand separate, careful explanation.

Kierkegaard's View of the Self

Since the content of what is involved in becoming a self in Kierkegaard's view is fleshed out in his pseudonymous works, particularly *Either/Or*, *The Sickness Unto Death,* and *Concluding Unscientific Postcript*, we must first answer the question, "How can we assume this view is Kierkegaard's when he has asked us to ascribe only to the pseudonyms what they have written?" To answer this question fully one must refer back to the discussion of indirect communication and its importance to the whole Kierkegaardian corpus in the previous chapter. *Either/Or* is the imaginative rendering of the aesthetic and ethical existence spheres. The existence spheres will be explained in detail later in this chapter, but it is important to note here that Kierkegaard claims them as his own in the quote above from his *Journal* about his "accurate and experientially based observations concerning the conditions of existence" being a "diagram" which a young person could use in order to "see very accurately beforehand, just as on a price list if you venture this far out, the conditions as thus and so, this is to win, and that to lose [. . .]" (JP, 1:1046). What is at stake in winning or losing is one's selfhood. That sort of existential truth cannot be given

as a "result," but must be communicated indirectly so that the existing individual may appropriate the truth or not, depending on how much one sees of oneself in the characters' lives as depicted in *Either/Or*. The truth of the existence spheres and the need to choose between them is Kierkegaard's. The content of A's aesthetic existence, the conduct of the Seducer and Judge William's emphasis on marriage as the ultimate ethical task, are all lively examples of options for existence which are not to be confused with Kierkegaard's own preferences.

The relationship between Kierkegaard and the pseudonyms for *Sickness Unto Death* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is more intimate. Since the relationship of Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus, the author of *Sickness Unto Death*, is more straightforward, we will deal with it first. Anti-Climacus is different from all of the other pseudonyms in that he is a self-professed Christian. Kierkegaard considered Anti-Climacus one of the "higher" pseudonyms. We know through Kierkegaard's *Journals* that he had intended to put his own name as the author of *Sickness Unto Death* until the very last minute. At the hour of turning the manuscript into the publisher, Kierkegaard became convinced of his own personal failure to live up to the ideal of the Christian life described in the text (JP, 6:6446). He therefore invented the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus as the author and listed his own name as the editor of the book. He explains the relationship between Anti-Climacus, Johannes Climacus (the author of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*), and himself in the following way:

> Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common; but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus

> places himself so low that he even says that he himself is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he considers himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level. [. . .] I would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus.[6] (JP, 6:6433)

We can safely assume, then, that we can ascribe to Kierkegaard the views of Anti-Climacus in *Sickness Unto Death*, though Kierkegaard would not want us to think that he had achieved the lofty goals of which Anti-Climacus speaks. Kierkegaard writes explicitly to the point in his explanation of why a pseudonym had to be used for *Sickness Unto Death* in the following *Journal* entry:

> It is absolutely right—a pseudonym had to be used.
>
> When the demands of ideality are to be presented at their maximum, then one must take extreme care not to be confused with them himself, as if he himself were the ideal.
>
> Protestations could be used to avoid this. But the only sure way is this redoubling.
>
> The difference from the earlier pseudonyms is simply but essentially this, that I do not retract the whole thing humorously but identify myself as one who is striving. (JP, 6:6446)

The previous quote from Kierkegaard's *Journal* tells us that Johannes Climacus is not a Christian, so more care needs to be taken when attributing to

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[6] Howard and Edna Hong point out in their introduction to *Sickness Unto Death* that the "Anti" of Anti-Climacus should not be considered "against" but rather "before" in the sense of rank (xxii). Niels Thulstrup sees Anti-Climacus as more of an opposite to Johannes because of his Christian commitment which Johannes doesn't share (149).

Kierkegaard what the writer of *Postscript* holds. In *Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript*, C. Stephen Evans explains the following three functions that this pseudonym serves that will remain important only if the distinction between Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus is maintained (51-53). The first has to do with the frame of the work as a polemic against the Hegelian view of Christianity. Since Climacus is not a Christian, he can be seen as more of a neutral observer, one who seeks to delineate clearly the difference between the Hegelian view and the Christian view without being a partisan of either. The second function that Climacus serves as a non-Christian is to point convincingly to the difficulty of the Christian life. As we have noted elsewhere, Kierkegaard's goal is to "reintroduce Christianity to Christendom." In order to do that, the "illusion" of Danish Christendom—that everyone is a Christian—had to be confronted. But as Evans notes, "It is no good to thunder at people and affirm that they are not true Christians (thereby affirming that you are)" (52). Rather, "One must take people's word if they say they are Christians, and then, by humbly confessing that you personally are not a Christian, since it is so difficult, lead them to the perception of the truth. This is what Johannes Climacus realizes" (52). The third function that Climacus serves is that of all the pseudonyms—indirect communication. By withdrawing as an author, Kierkegaard allows the reader the freedom to accept or reject Climacus' distinction between Hegelianism and Christianity.

So how should we evaluate what Climacus has to say in light of Kierkegaard's own views? That must be done on an issue by issue basis. But it

is clear that what Climacus says about Christianity must be seen as an "outsider's" view. He cannot be Kierkegaard's "definitive spokesman for Christianity" because Kierkegaard is definitely an "insider." The outsider can still have some very important things to say about Christianity, but the truth that he points to is never appropriated existentially. "He understands what faith is, but he does not understand what faith means to the believer" (Evans, *Kierkegaard's Fragments* 53).

Having established the relationship between Kierkegaard and his pseudonym Anti-Climacus, we can begin our exploration of Kierkegaard's view of the self with the definition that Anti-Climacus gives of the self in the first page of *Sickness Unto Death*, being confident that it is also how Kierkegaard views the self. The answer that Anti-Climacus gives to the question, "What is a self?" is legendary in its opacity. "The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but the relation's relating itself to itself" (13). Before one tries to unpack the meaning here, it is helpful to go on immediately in the text to what Anti-Climacus considers to be a human being and how that is different from being a self. He says, "A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self" (13).

Here Anti-Climacus recognizes something fundamental about our human experience. We are made of incongruous elements. That part of us that is infinite, eternal and free is our consciousness of possibilities, of dreams of what

could be. The part of us that is finite, temporal and necessary limits those dreams by our bodily character. Anti-Climacus affirms both aspects of our humanness and calls for a synthesis. But how is that possible? What is needed to make this relation between the temporal and the eternal in a self is "the positive third." This "positive third" relates to both the temporal and the eternal and to the relation between them. Furthermore, the "positive third" relates to "that which established the entire relation" (13). Anti-Climacus concludes, "The human self is such a derived, established relation, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another" (13-14). The "other" in this equation is God. What does all this mean?

As a human being I am first and foremost defined by relations. A self cannot be understood in isolation. I am not made up of multiple selves, but rather I must relate different elements of myself—the self that I am and the self I can become—through a "positive third" that relates itself to God. God is the fundamental relation that both gives me the substance of what I am and gives me the freedom to choose whether or not I will relate myself to Him and become the self He intends for me to be. "God, who constituted man a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were" (16).

A self is both a given and a becoming. Here we see that the view of the self as a substance is just as integral to Kierkegaard's view of the self as is the view of the self as an achievement. In Kierkegaard's view, human beings do have an essence. Their essence is created by God and that essence is to be

"responsible choosers."[7] *What* we choose is just as important as *that* we choose because if we choose to relate to something that is less than God, we will not become our true selves. The fact that God intends for me to become a particular self does not negate my freedom in choosing to be that self. Rather, it makes my ability to choose meaningful. Kierkegaard says in *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, "But this I do believe . . .that at every person's birth there comes into existence an eternal purpose for that person, for that person in particular. Faithfulness to oneself with respect to this is the highest thing a person can do, and as that most profound poet has said, 'Worse than self love is self contempt'" (93).

Unamuno's View of the Self

There is much more to be said about the implications of Kierkegaard's view of the self, but before going on to those, we would do well to see the similarities and differences in an initial exploration of Unamuno's view of the self. "Exploration" is a word carefully chosen that does not assume that there is unanimity on just what Unamuno's view of the self is. Collado insists that Unamuno has no articulated view of "sí mismo" as found in the pages of Kierkegaard's *Sickness Unto Death*.[8] Other scholars have found plenty to say on the subject, but each takes a particular slant, depending on which texts are used. Frances Wyers says, "Indeed, nowhere does he fully describe for his readers the

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[7] This term is used by C. Stephen Evans in *Søren Kierkegaard's Christian Psychology*, p. 55.
[8] Collado makes a distinction between "sí mismo" and "yo" which he identifies with consciousness. See p. 31.

notion of the inner self; one must piece it together on the basis of passages scattered throughout his work" (xviii). And since Wyers makes much of the fact that Unamuno contradicts himself not only from essay to essay, but also within a given essay, coming up with a definitive view of the self from Unamuno's essays is problematic from the start. Let us see if we can make some sense of what three well-known Unamuno scholars have said about Unamuno's view of the self: Frances Wyers, Paul Ilie, and Carlos Blanco Aguinaga.

All three of these scholars would accept, at least as a beginning, what Wyers calls the "two man theory" in Unamuno. This theory sees the self as having two warring parts, but what these two warring parts are called differs from scholar to scholar. The overarching duality is explained by Blanco Aguinaga in his essay, "Interioridad y exterioridad en Unamuno." This scholar sees inwardness or interiority as what Unamuno emphasized in the first part of his work. According to Blanco Aguinaga, a recognition of the importance of the external or exteriority does not come until the later works of Unamuno. The tension between the external and the internal is between all that makes up the inner life, the eternal, and the accidents of life, the temporal or historic.

On Blanco Aguinaga's view, Unamuno rejected the external and prized the inner in his early works, using neologisms like *intra-historia*, *intra-filosofía*, and *intracuantitativo* to point to the true, the authentic center that everything, even science has. As this author has it, "No se da, pues, importancia al fenómeno. . .sino al número; estamos ante lo esencial eterno; lo accidental queda reducido a su esencia; la realidad es la íntima" (688). ("Importance is not

given to the phenomenon but to the noumenon; we stand before what is essential eternally; the accidental is reduced to its essence; reality is that which is intimate.") This critic maintains that although Unamuno stated the duality in many different ways, e. g., "substantial y accidental; personalidad e individualidad; cultura y civilización; eternidad y tiempo; espíritu y materia; alma y cuerpo; espíritu y razón; locura y cordura [. . .]" ("substantial and accidental; personality and individuality; culture and civilization; eternity and time; spirit and matter; soul and body; spirit and reason; madness and sanity [. . .]") until the end of his work, Unamuno made a conscious *choice* of the first of all of these dualities, thus rejecting any possibility of a "unity" in the contradictions (693). But, Blanco Aguinaga says that after Unamuno's exile he was forced to accept his participation in time, in history. At the writing of *Como se hace una novela* Unamuno then sees "[. . .]la verdad que la agonía consiste en aceptar los contrarios en *unidad* de guerra" (695). ("[. . .] the truth that the agony consists in accepting the contradictions in *unity* of war.") Because of the realization of his "role" outside of Spain and the legend that had become Miguel de Unamuno, Unamuno must face in reality what he had previously rejected: that a self is also the accidents of its history and not only inner, intra and "adentro" 'inside'. Blanco Aguinaga says, "No es que el mundo de fuera sea igual al dentro, es que los dos son una indestructible unidad contradictoria; los dos en contradición me hacen hombre concreto [. . .]" (699). ("It's not that the external world is the same as the inner world, it is that the two are an indestructible contradictory unity; the two in contradiction make me a concrete man [. . .].")

Frances Wyers sees no discernable progression in the thought of Unamuno on what constitutes the self. At the beginning of the first chapter of *Miguel de Unamuno, The Contrary Self*, she quotes three early works of Unamuno in which he clearly questions the validity of the inner self and seems to choose the external self, thus negating Blanco Alguinaga's theory of a uniform emphasis on the interior life in the early Unamunian texts. The quotes are worth repeating here:

> There is no direct intuition of the self that is worth anything; the eye cannot see itself except in a mirror and the mirror of moral man is found in his works, of which he is the offspring. (*En torno al casticismo*, 1895)
>
> A man does not know himself except in the same way that he knows others. He sees himself act and . . .deduces what he is like . . .No one, in reality, knows himself a priori, before he acts; all of us know ourselves in our own actions, which are often enough foreign to us. ("De la enseñanza superior en España", 1899)
>
> Introspection is very deceptive and, carried to an extreme, produces a true void in consciousness. . .Because a state of consciousness that would consist purely and simply in consciousness contemplating itself, would not, for lack of content, be any kind of consciousness at all . . . We learn to know ourselves

> in the same way that we learn to know others: by observing our actions. ("El individualismo español", 1902) (qtd. in Wyers 3)

Wyers sees, as many critics do, that Unamuno is searching for his own substantial self throughout his authorship (xviii). Wyers would agree with the importance of the interiority/exteriority dichotomy as developed by Blanco Aguinaga, explaining those as the inner self and the outer self. The inner self is the intimate self of *intrahistoria*, the true self that cannot be known by the other, the onlooker. Society only sees the external self, the outside shell of the person. When Unamuno insists that the real self is the one invisible from the eyes of the world, Unamuno is protecting his own self from the prying eyes of his public (7). However, Unamuno needs and consciously seeks the approval of his readers--fame--as a means of assuring his own immortality. At other times he decries the baseness of such a need.

The inner self and the external self are further explained in relation to the polarities of isolation and action. Unamuno's praise of solitude as the only place where one can know oneself and one's neighbor in "Soledad" is contrasted with Unamuno's call for action in "Sobre la soberbia" as the only way to "know" yourself. In "Sobre la soberbia," "Unamuno tells us that we should not torment ourselves with the agonies of self-discovery but try to learn only what we can do" (27). These are examples of the contradictions that Wyers says constitute the "contrary self" that Unamuno is. She sees no unity in their contradiction as does Blanco Aguinaga. Wyers states, "Unamuno's works do not show us an 'agonic' writer [. . .] but a person who veers ceaselessly between mutually exclusive and

ultimately self-defeating aims" (xxi). Wyers would disagree with Blanco Aguinaga that there is any power in maintaining the tension in the polarities because for her the contradictions dissolve. "Contraries are resolved, not in paradox, which would preserve the antithetical nature of each, but in verbal coalescence: you call one thing by the name of its opposite. These reversals of affirmation and negation characterize everything that Unamuno wrote about the self" (4).

Blanco Aguinaga and Wyers can agree on Unamuno's need for autonomy and freedom that is the hallmark of the existentialist way of life. Though Blanco Aguinaga wants to posit a unity in the contradictions toward the end of Unamuno's authorship which Wyers rejects, there is no doubting that there is a process going on in which choice is of paramount importance. Paul Ilie sees the same "two men" in Unamuno, but he describes their relationship in yet a different way from the first two scholars.

According Paul Ilie's book, *Unamuno: an Existential View of Self and Society*, Unamuno's view of the self is relational, much like the relational self of *Sickness Unto Death,* but the relation is always in tension and never has the goal of synthesis as it does in Kierkegaard. The self is seen as a society unto itself. Its fragments are like individual people talking to each other. The multiple fragments or "selves" can observe each other, though there is one part of the self that is not knowable, and that is the part that is doing the actual contemplation. What Ilie terms the "cogito" is a divisive agent, causing the various selves, the contemplative self and the social self, to doubt each other. This is the same as what Unamuno calls the "satanic" self that demoralizes all the selves as it

questions their authenticity, thus alienating the fragments of self from each other. The "satanic self" is absolutely necessary because without it, there would be no challenge to our different selves and there would be no growth in self-consciousness.

There are implications in Unamuno's view for relating to the "other" outside of the self. Ilie explains Unamuno's "monodialogue" in this way. "The self divides into two separate selves, one of which is objectified as an "other" person. The situation is also a form of alienation, with a psychic distance forming between the interlocutors. Thus, each fragmentary self can discourse with the other as if they were fellow men, and gain insight into each other with remarkable lucidity and sincerity" (55). The only way this can happen, however, is for the person to be alone, at least for a while. Solitude is an essential element for becoming a self. Unamuno says "No hay más diálogo verdadero que el diálogo que entablas contigo mismo, y este diálogo sólo puedes entablarlo estando a solas. En la soledad, y sólo en la soledad, puedes conocerte a ti mismo como prójimo; y mientras no te conozcas a ti mismo como a prójimo, no podrás llegar a ver en tus prójimos otros yos" ("Soledad," 3: 1252). ("There is no other real dialogue than the dialogue that you undertake with yourself, and this you can only undertake by being alone. In solitude and only in solitude can you know yourself as your neighbor, and as long as you do not know yourself as a neighbor, you will be unable to see other selves in your neighbors.") So in order to relate to society as a whole, one must have related to the inner society that is the self. My neighbor is an "other" just like the "other" I observe in my

fragmented selves, which makes sense of the commandment to love the other as you love yourself.

But lest we think that this inner society of fragmented selves is some sort of utopia, it must be stressed that in the objectification of the "other" the self is alienated from itself. If a person is not self-reflective she will not experience these many self fragments. Unamuno calls such a non-reflective person's identity "fullness of self," but with a pejorative twist. Ilie states, "[. . .] as soon as consciousness begins to operate reflexively, the loss of self is immediate"(92). This will not sound so odd to those who are used to hearing "In order to save your life you must lose it," but Unamuno does not have in mind losing oneself in the Universal Consciousness any more that he advocates losing oneself in Christ. He wants to create himself through the interaction of the fragmented selves. "[. . .] el hombre más real, *realis* , más *res*, más cosa, es decir, más causa—sólo existe lo que obra—, es el que quiere ser o el que quiere no ser, el creador" ("Prólogo" a *Tres novelas y un prólogo* 2: 974). ("[. . .] the man who is most real, *realis*, most *res*, most a thing, that is, most a cause—only he who acts exists—is the one who wants to be or who wants not to be: the creator.")

So what is it that Unamuno wants? Illie says, "For Unamuno, the right to behave inconsistently is the most fundamental prerogative" (114). Here we are back to the freedom and autonomy of the self, also recognized in Unamuno by Blanco Aguinaga and Wyers. Ilie claims that there can be harmony in the multiple selves in maintaining the paradoxes—much as Blanco Aguinaga saw unity in the contradictions. Ilie says, "[. . .] paradoxes become cohesive forces

that assemble disharmonious elements into one identifiable human condition" (215). Wyers would only see that identifiable human condition as permanently conflicted and ultimately self-destructive.

The emphasis here in Unamuno's view of the self has been on the importance of "becoming," of acquiring self-consciousness through the interaction of the fragmented selves. Is there any way in which we could say that Unamuno's view of the self includes a substance view of the self, in addition to the achievement view, as we saw was the case with Kierkegaard? Ilie says that Unamuno holds to a basic self that is given the ability for self reflection and "basic emotional patterns" that are used in self reflection (111). In "Sobre la consecuencia, la sinceridad" Unamuno says, "[. . .] cada uno de nosotros lleva dentro de sí muchos hombres, mas por lo menos dos: un yo profundo, radical, permanente, el yo que llaman ahora muchos *subliminal*—de debajo del *limen* o nivel de la conciencia—, y otro yo superficial, pegadizo y pasajero, el *supraliminal*" (3: 897). ("Each one of us carries within himself many men, or at least two: a profound self, radical and permanent, the self that many now call subliminal—under the threshold or level of consciousness—and another superficial self, catchy and fleeting, the supraliminal.") It is in the interaction of these two that self-reflection occurs, and that interaction is at least a potentiality in all. In "Civilización y cultura" Unamuno sorts out how this works. "Yo y el mundo nos hacemos mutuamente. Y de este juego de acciones y reacciones mutuas brota en mí la conciencia de mi yo, *mi yo* antes de llegar a ser seca y limpiamente yo, yo puro. Es la conciencia de mí mismo el núcleo del recíproco

juego entre mi mundo exterior y mi mundo interior" (1: 992). ("I and the world, we make each other mutually. And from this interplay of mutual actions and reactions there rises in me the consciousness of my self, *my self*, before becoming my pure self, sharply and cleanly. The center of the reciprocal interplay between my exterior world and my interior world is the consciousness of my self.") Unamuno here indicates that there is a given part of ourselves, a part that makes self-reflection possible, that produces a sense that I am a separate self. It precedes my "pure self." My "pure self" is the self that I achieve over a lifetime as consciousness deepens through the struggle between the contemplative self and the social self that is incited by the "satanic yo" described above by Ilie.

Harmony and Dissonance in Kierkegaard's and Unamuno's View of the Self

In what way can the substantial self in Kierkegaard and Unamuno be compared? What is the "deposit" that both authors say is given to a person to begin with? Both would say that freedom and the ability to choose oneself are essential parts of what it means to be human. The ability to chose oneself is predicated on there being a self-reflective quality in every person as a given. But the difference between Kierkegaard and Unamuno is the importance of *what* is chosen. For Kierkegaard what I am to choose as responsible creation of God is to be the self that God intended that I be. To relate to anything less than the absolute, the eternal, is not to be my true self. For Unamuno, as for Sartre and Camus after him, one choice is not privileged above another. Whether we take

Blanco Aguinaga and Ilie's view that there is unity in Unamuno's contradictions or Wyer's view that all of the contradictions collapse into "mutually exclusive and ultimately self-defeating aims" there is no doubt that Unamuno declares himself to be an autonomous chooser who will not be tied to one view or classified as promoting one philosophy above another.

In *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* Unamuno quotes Walt Whitman as his own mantra. "[. . .] os encargo que no se funde escuela o teoría sobre mi" (7: 184). ("I charge that there be no theory or school founded out of me.") Most critics point to Unamuno's fear of dogmatism as the root of this desire not to be categorized. Wyers claims that for Unamuno to be categorized would be to lose a part of himself. She says, "He wanted to hide from the summary opinion that would, to his mind, steal his self from him," and then she quotes Unamuno as saying "Let them search for you and do not let them find you because the day that they find you, you are no longer yourself" (qtd. in Wyers 7).

It should be noted, again, that though Kierkegaard sees the true self as the self given by God and the one that I am to choose to become as a responsible creation of God, this choosing is by no means easy or immediately done, once and for all. Although Anti-Climacus, in the passage quoted above at the beginning of *Sickness Unto Death*, calls for there to be a synthesis of the "infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity," the synthesis is a life long task that is never really accomplished in this life. In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Climacus says,

> But the genuine subjective existing thinker is always just as negative as he is positive and vice versa: he is always that as long as he exists, not once and for all in a chimerical mediation. [. . .] He is cognizant of the negativity of the infinite in existence [*Tilværelse*]; he always keeps open the wound of negativity, which at all times is a saving factor (the others let the wound close and become positive—deceived); [. . .]. He is, therefore, never a teacher, but a learner, and if he is continually just as negative as positive, he is continually striving. (CUP 85)

Here "negativity" is the eternal, and what we have is a warning about any smugness about having arrived at the synthesis. This sounds remarkably like Unamuno's desire, quoted above, to keep open the *llaga* 'wound', full of vinegar and salt, so that the anguish and longing would be endless. It is in the struggle, in the tension, in the "becoming" that Unamuno and Kierkegaard resonate so well. The authors also sound remarkably alike, at least on the face of it, when they relate that "becoming" or "longing" to the "eternal." Unamuno would wake his readers to the longing not to die. In *Del sentimiento trágico* he says, "Quererse, ¿no es quererse eterno, es decir, no querer morirse? (7:130) ("To will oneself, is it not to wish oneself eternal—that is to say, not to wish to die?") In *Either/Or*, Judge William tries to persuade the young esthete, A, to move from the esthetic into the ethical. The move is made possible by becoming aware of the eternal. Judge William says, "[. . .] to become conscious in one's eternal

validity is a moment that is more significant than everything else in the world" (206).

But one must ask what the goal of the "becoming" is, and it is here that the authors are not at all in agreement. For Kierkegaard there is a self that a personal, benevolent God wants me to become. For Unamuno there is no such assurance. For Unamuno, God is posited because we need to believe that he exists so that we can go on existing eternally. Without our believing in Him, he would not exist. He says in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*, "Creer en Dios es anhelar que le haya y es, además, conducirse como si le hubiera; es vivir de ese anhelo y hacer de él nuestro íntimo resorte de acción" (7: 219). ("To believe in God is to long that he exists, and further, it is to conduct oneself as if he existed; it is to live by this longing and to make it the inner spring of our action."). But as Sánchez Barbudo says, "Era un *deseo* de Dios, un querer creer que no puede ser confundido con una verdadera creencia" (98).[9] ("It was a *desire* for God, a wanting to believe that can't be confused with true belief.")

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[9] It is Sánchez Barbudo's theory that during the "crisis" of 1897, Unamuno attempted to reclaim the faith of his childhood and failed and was forced to look full into the jaws of nothingness. Without religion as a basis for the immortality he desired, he substituted the writing of literature as his means of attaining immortality. Sánchez Barbudo says that though the decision was made to follow the path of literature, Unamuno was tormented by the call of religion and was pulled between the two paths for the rest of his productive life. "Al parecer, a raíz de su crisis, vaciló entre religión y literatura, pues le impulsaban, atrayéndole hacia caminos distintos, ansia de fama y ansia de salvación: dos polos de su personalidad del mismo afán de sobrevivir como él mismo luego repitió. Falto de fe verdadera, habría de escoger literatura, pero ésta aparecería, después de su decisión, teñida de espíritu religioso" (102). (It would seem that at the root of his crisis he vacillated between religion and literature since they propelled him, attracting him to different paths, desire for fame and desire for salvation: two poles of his personality but from the same desire to survive, as he himself then repeated. Lacking a true faith, he would have to choose literature but this literature would appear marked by his religious spirit after his decision.) There are dissenters to Sánchez Barbudo's view, among them Armando Zubizarreta. For a fuller discussion of religious belief in Unamuno see Armand Baker, "Unamuno and the Religion of Uncertainty."

The longing that characterizes the authentic self in Unamuno is a longing for immortality that the heart desperately seeks and that reason says is impossible. Heart and reason are essential manifestations of the "two men" or "two selves" within each of us. They are *both* essential. "Razón y fe son dos enemigos que no pueden sostenerse el uno sin el otro" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 175). ("Reason and faith are two enemies that cannot sustain themselves, one without the other.") Since neither can be fully satisfied, the end result is skepticism and uncertainty. Unamuno says, "El escepticismo, la incertidumbre, [. . .] es el fundamento sobre que la desesperación del sentimiento vital ha de fundar su esperanza" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 172). ("Skepticism, uncertainty, [. . .] is the foundation upon which the despair of the heart must build its hope.") Not only are the two selves to be kept in tension one with the other; they are to be at war with each other. "La paz entre estas dos potencias se hace imposible, y hay que vivir de su guerra. Y hacer de ésta, de la guerra misma, condición de nuestra vida espiritual"(*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 172).[10] ("Peace between these two powers is made impossible and we must live by their war. We must make of this war, of war itself, the condition of our spiritual life.") And so it should not be at all surprising to us as readers of Unamuno that his writings are the living out of that internal war. Unamuno takes up the cause of reason and of desire, of the internal and the external, of the temporal and the eternal, and he argues for all of

[10] Later Unamuno says, "[. . .] y por mi parte no quiero poner paz entre mi corazón y mi cabeza, entre mi fe y mi razón; quiero más bien que se peleen entre sí" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 180). ("For my part I do not wish to make peace between my heart and my head, between my faith and my reason—I wish rather that they struggle and fight between them!")

them.[11] He will not shrink from speaking the unspeakable. "Creo que es menester decir una y otra vez lo que no debe decirse" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 185). ("I believe that it is necessary to speak the thing which must not be spoken once and then again.") And he will not worry that someone else has said what he has to say before him. "[. .] cuando una idea vuelve a repetirse es que, en rigor, no fué de veras refutada" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 184). ("[. . .] when an idea is repeated, it implies that it was not really refuted.")

Kierkegaard's Guide for Becoming a Self: The Existence Spheres

For Kierkegaard existence is about becoming a self. The primary guide for becoming a self is the "spheres" or "stages" of existence. It is important to remember, that though the content of the existence spheres of the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious are artfully drawn in the pseudonymous works of *Either/Or* and *Stages on Life's Way* and are explained in depth by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, it can be seen from his *Journals and Papers* that Kierkegaard embraced this theory as a fundamental way of viewing existence. Unamuno saw in Kierkegaard's spheres of existence a wealth of possibilities that demonstrate multiple ways of existing, all of them worthy of careful consideration and further artistic rendering. Chapter Three will be

[11] Unamuno sees the irony of taking up the cause of the irrational by using reason. "Como sólo es inteligible, de veras inteligible, lo racional, como lo absurdo está condenado, careciendo como carece de sentido, a ser intrasmisible, veréis que cuando algo que parece irracional o absurdo logra uno expresarlo y que se lo entiendan, se resuelve con algo racional siempre, aunque sea en la negación de lo que se afirma" (*Del sentimiento trágico* 7: 184). ("Since only the rational is intelligible, really intelligible, and since the absurd, lacking in sense, is condemned to be incommunicable, you will find that whenever something that seems irrational or absurd is successfully expressed so that it can be understood, it is resolved with something rational, although that may be the negation of that which is affirmed.")

devoted to showing specifically how Unamuno plumbed the depths of Kierkegaard's existence spheres and used them for his own purposes. For now, it is important to have a full picture of Kierkegaard's spheres of existence before one can appreciate how Unamuno has used them for his own creative advantage.

The esthetic sphere is where every person begins. Its complexities are explored by A in *Either/Or* I. (Victor Eremita is the editor of the volume who supposedly finds a collection of unorganized papers and ascribes the title A to the unknown author.) A desires life to be a collection of pleasurable moments that can be enjoyed in their immediacy. A considers Don Juan to be the archetypal practitioner of this sort of "pure," unreflective, sensual life, and a great deal of print is spilled on justifying why *Don Giovanni* is not only a great opera but the greatest classical work of art of all time.[12] But A realizes that while immediacy is possible in a fictional character, it is unattainable in real life. Once you see that your goal is immediacy, you have lost your ability to attain it. One cannot self-consciously eliminate self-consciousness. Immediacy is something that just happens. Don Juan is no more than an abstraction.

A reasons that if immediacy is impossible, esthetic appreciation is not, and he sets about to make his life a work of art that can be appreciated esthetically just as a painting can thus be appreciated. The threat to the aesthetic appreciation of life is boredom, and so A writes a complicated guide to the

[12] See "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic" in *Either/Or* I pp. 47-135.

evasion of boredom called "Rotation of Crops."[13] In it he uses the categories of *interesting* vs. *boring* to judge all aspects of life. There is actually an esthetic *way* of keeping one's life varied . A disparages a person who tries to evade boredom by changing his circumstances—whether he lives in the country or the city, America or Europe, whether he eats off of porcelain or silver. These are all called "inartistic" methods and are likened to a farmer's changing the fields for his crops. What A advocates is a change in the method of *cultivation* which in practice means a change in one's perception through the art of *recollecting* and *forgetting*. This is a means of distancing oneself, of never getting too involved or too affected by what is going on around you. A states, "No part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any moment he wants to; on the other hand, every single part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he can remember it at any moment" (EO, 1: 293). Later he further explains, "[. .] if a person notices that enjoyment or a part of life is carrying him away too forcefully, he stops for a moment and recollects. [. . .] From the beginning, one curbs the enjoyment and does not hoist full sail for any decision; one indulges with a certain mistrust" (EO, 1: 293). Properly *recollecting* and *forgetting*, one can select the interesting and bring it to mind.

Freedom is essential. Any entangling commitments that might ultimately condemn one to boredom are to be avoided. The reader is cautioned to avoid friendship, marriage and any official post, though acquaintances, affairs and

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[13] A says, "Boredom is the root of all evil. . . This can be traced back to the very beginning of the world. The gods were bored; therefore they created human beings. Adam was bored because he was alone; therefore Eve was created. Since that moment, boredom entered the world and grew in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of the population" (EO, 1: 285-286).

passionate aimlessness are encouraged. The goal is to be in control at all times. "Arbitrariness is the whole secret" (EO, 1: 299). Even if one is forced to talk to a boring person, one can concentrate on the drip of perspiration coming off of the end of his nose and be endlessly amused. It's all in how you go about "rotating the crops."

The prime example given of the sort of life that results from this sort of disinterested distancing of life that spurns normal human relationships, but uses them for sport, is found in "The Seducer's Diary." Its authorship is in question since A says that he stole the diary from the desk of an acquaintance whose life "[. . .] has been an attempt to accomplish the task of living poetically" (EO,1: 304). A claims to know the victim of the seducer, Cordelia, as an actual person. But the editor, Victor Eremita, intimates that A is the real author.

There are many parallels to be drawn between the "Diary" and the beginning of Unamuno's *Niebla* which will be seen in due course in Chapter Three. For now, it should be noted that the seduction described in the "Diary" is all of a psychological and not of a physical sort. The seduction is a mind game played by the reflective esthete to the ultimate degree of enjoyment, described as having two stages by A. "In the first case, he personally enjoyed the esthetic; in the second case, he esthetically enjoyed his personality" (EO, 1: 305). In other words, he enjoyed all of the machinations required to bring about the seduction and then glowed with the knowledge that he could accomplish such a thing. The actual consummation of the seduction is not what matters to this esthete. There is hardly a mention of it happening. It is the grand scheme to perpetrate the

seduction that fascinates the seducer, so that once it is accomplished, the woman holds no interest for him whatsoever. The seducer says, "Now all resistance is impossible, and to love is beautiful only as long as resistance is present; as soon as it ceases, to love is weakness and habit. I do not want to be reminded of my relationship with her; she has lost her fragrance" (EO, 1: 445). This is the only sort of love that is interesting to the reflective esthete, and he even thinks that he has done the young woman a favor by making her life more interesting as well. The Seducer has only one value to which he adheres. "Has the interesting been preserved at all times?" (EO, 1: 437-38).

Either/Or I ends with "The Seducer's Diary" and it marks one of the boundaries of the esthetic life in its highly reflective character. The other was set at the start with the paeans of praise given to Don Juan as the archetypal practitioner of immediacy. Whether the esthete is content with the immediate pleasures of life or has a more refined sense of reflection, his life is a succession of moments with no continuity, no unified *self*. This is the topic of *Either/Or* II, as B, the name given to the author by the editor, writes a series of letters to his friend A to persuade him of the folly of his existence and to show him a better way, the ethical. Later we learn that B has a name, Judge William, and that the Judge is a public official and a married man.

The first criticism given by the Judge of A and his esthetic view of life is that he has not chosen it consciously. A has allowed circumstance to rule his life. To prove this to A, Judge William outlines the stages of the esthetic as he sees them, so that A will see their futility. These range from the immediate to the

highly reflective and include 1) the life-view that health and beauty are the ultimate good, 2) the life-view that life is to be enjoyed according to wealth, honor, and noble birth, 3) the life-view that seeks satisfaction in the development of a talent, and 4) the life-view that says "enjoy life and live for your desire" at the start. All of these life-views are shown to depend on something completely transient such as physical beauty or something beyond the control of the individual, such as noble birth or an inborn talent to develop. All are external and do not bring satisfaction or happiness. The prime example given for the bankruptcy of living for desire is that of Nero whose power allowed him to obtain pleasures at will, but whose desperation to grasp at his desire took him to the extreme of the burning of Rome. In other words, the person who believes himself in control is actually controlled by the vagaries of life and is held prisoner by them.

The Judge, however, knows that his friend A has moved on from these life-views to yet a different level of estheticism. A knows that all of the first mentioned life-views are vanity and has gone on to despair, but it is a despair that is enjoyed. It is a cynical, distanced despair that laughs at those who are so simple as to run after the ephemeral and which embraces sorrow over the pointlessness of life. But, the judge says, "[. . .] for such an esthetic sorrow existence is just as empty as it is for every other esthetic life-view; if a person cannot sorrow more profoundly than that, then there is truth in my saying that sorrow passes away just as well as joy, for everything that is only finite passes away" (EO, 2: 204).

What the Judge wants is for A to choose and thereby take responsibility for his despair, rather than viewing his despair as an esthetic experience. Such a chosen despair is not of the particular, the external or the "multiplicity outside himself," and it is not "[. . .] a state in which you are to remain, but [. . .] an act that takes all the power and earnestness and concentration of the soul" (EO, 1: 208). The choice of despair will move A to become a meaningful chooser. The Judge says,

> Your choice is an esthetic choice, but an esthetic choice is no choice. On the whole, to choose is an intrinsic and stringent term for the ethical. Wherever in the stricter sense there is a question of an Either/Or, one can always be sure that the ethical has something to do with it. The only absolute Either/Or is the choice between good and evil, but this is also absolutely ethical. (EO, 2: 166-167).

This sounds like the Judge is equating the ethical with good and the esthetic with evil. That is not necessarily the case. What the Judge wants is for good and evil to be the basis on which A chooses, to be the categories that guide his life, rather than the esthetic, which is, he claims, "indifferent." The Judge is also careful to say that the esthetic is not negated in the choice of the ethical. It remains, but it remains as a relative value and not an absolute one.[14] As he

[14] The Judge says, "[. . .] it by no means follows that the esthetic is excluded. [. . .] the esthetic is absolutely excluded as the absolute, but relatively it is continually present. In choosing itself, the personality chooses itself ethically and absolutely excludes the esthetic; but since he nevertheless chooses himself and does not become another being by choosing himself, all the esthetic returns in its relativity" (EO, 2: 177).

shows in his essay, "The Esthetic Validity of Marriage," even in marriage the immediate pleasures are "by no means repudiated but ennobled" (EO, 2: 61).

Choosing is critical. Not to choose is to allow others or circumstance to choose for you. And there is a point beyond which real choice becomes more difficult and even impossible if one remains in the indifferent, in the esthetic for too long. The Judge uses the analogy of a captain of a ship that is told to alter his course, and who knows that there is "but a single moment when it is inconsequential whether he does this or does that" (EO, 2: 164). Since the ship is in motion and continues in motion there is point beyond which the ship cannot be turned. By choosing the ethical the person neither creates himself nor does he become a different person. The self the person needs to acquire is chosen from the "hand of God" through repentance. But continuity is essential. "He does not become someone other than he was before, but he becomes himself" (EO, 2: 177).

The Judge chooses to contrast the models of Don Juan and the reflective Seducer with marriage as his paradigm for the ethical life. In marriage one chooses to commit to the person one loves. The Judge rejects the external view of love as something that just "happens" to a person when he "falls in love."[15] The ethical person wills to continue to love his bride. To choose to love as an act of will is actually to choose oneself, to be the sort of person who has continuity in one's life. To choose to love in marriage is not an overnight phenomenon that occurs when the minister pronounces the couple "man and wife." The persons

[15] The male pronoun is appropriate here since the Judge works from a decidedly male perspective.

so committed are on a path to becoming a self. The ultimate distinction between the esthetic and the ethical is explained by the Judge like this, "The esthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and immediately is what he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes" (EO, 2: 178).

What the Judge does not seem to see, however, is the difficulty of the ethical life to which he is calling A. The Judge seems to be quite content in his middle-class, "upstanding citizen" life. With his apparently happy marriage, he has imbued all of the values of Copenhagen's cultural and civic life and presents himself as the model. He has equated the ethical life with his life. Another of the pseudonyms, Frater Taciturnus tells us in *Stages on Life's Way* that the ethical is "[. . .] the sphere of requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt)" (476). When one realizes one's inability to meet the requirements of the ethical life, one is ready to move into the religious sphere. It would be a misunderstanding, however, to think that religious conviction is not part of the ethical life. The ethical person stands before the Eternal and chooses the ethical as she chooses herself. According to Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, a God-relationship is always part of the ethical life. Having begun the path of *inwardness*, God becomes part of the picture naturally (CUP 243).

The difference between the ethical and the religious is the difference in how this God-relationship is perceived. The ethical person sees the ethical task as his duty before God and believes that he is at least in some way able to fulfill that task. The religious person sees herself differently. The religious person

sees the enormity of the task and her inability to fulfill the demands of the ethical. Her relationship to God is not achieved by actualizing the ethical demands of life, but rather her relationship to God is one of dependence, of asking God to give her the ability to meet the demands of the ethical which she lacks on her own. The religious life is one of repentance, but the character of this repentance is not just the repudiation of the dissipation of the esthetic life as the Judge encouraged A to do. This repentance is a realization of basic inadequacy and a petition to God to remake the person in such as way as to make obedience to the ethical task possible. This remaking is difficult and painful. That is why Climacus characterizes the religious life as one of suffering.

The religious sphere has two stages itself and Johannes Climacus claims that one must first pass through Religiousness A, the pathos-filled existence described above, before going on to Religiousness B (CUP 556). The difference between Religiousness A and Religiousness B is the source of the knowledge of God and the way in which that knowledge impacts the individual. To take up ways of "knowing" God may seem odd for those who have always heard "faith" and "the absurd" in the same breath when talking about Kierkegaardian categories. It is a commonplace that Kierkegaard is "anti-rational" and it is said that this anti-reason stance is the most striking similarity between Unamuno and Kierkegaard. It is important, therefore, to take a moment to discuss these perceptions of Kierkegaard which are only partially true and in so doing, we will understand better the relationship between Religiousness A and B.

It is true that Johannes Climacus holds no stock in logical arguments, especially logical arguments that purport to prove the existence of God. He says in *Fragments* that a logical argument is only useful to "develop the consequences of a concept" (49). That Climacus himself puts logical argument to *that* use, i.e., to show that the logical consequences of the Hegelian view of Christianity reveal that it is not Christianity at all, demonstrates clearly that Climacus does not dismiss reason altogether. What he rejects is the notion that the truth of the premises of any argument about existence can proven by logic. Whether a person accepts the truth of the premises of an argument for the existence of God is something that cannot be coerced by reason. Climacus even suggests that proofs for God's existence stand in the way of real belief (PF 53).

Climacus sees the knowledge of God as coming through knowledge of one's moral obligations. This view of how one knows God is also affirmed by Kierkegaard in *Edifying Discourses.*[16] God is the foundation of morality. He uses the Platonic idea of "recollection" to explain how one can be aware of the Eternal and the Eternal's claim on the person to become a self. This is a wholly natural process that is inborn in every person. This is the immanent God one knows and stands before in Religiousness A. Where does the leap into the absurd of faith come, then? This comes in Religiousness B, in which the knowledge of God is not dependent on inner "recollection," but on a transcendent God, a God who has made himself known history.

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[16] See "To Need God Is a Human Being's Highest Perfection," in *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses.*

Religiousness A is characterized by a recognition of guilt in relation to an "eternal happiness" that is the highest good. Since there is also an innate need to deal with guilt, the person living in Religiousness A sets about to make her shortcomings right through whatever means possible—penance, restitution, self-denial, and self-sacrifice. There is a need to make up for that guilt, and in views of guilt that are "lower" than the religious life, it is assumed that we can do so. Climacus calls this sort of effort to deal with guilt "childishness." He also says that this sort of effort to deal with guilt makes guilt "finite" (CUP 550). Religiousness A is not childish in this way because it involves an energetic struggle with the problem of guilt. Yet Climacus suggests that Religiousness A also fails to take guilt with complete seriousness. Religiousness A "[. .] is oriented toward the purely human in such a way that it must be assumed that every human being, viewed essentially, participates in this eternal happiness and finally becomes eternally happy" (CUP 581).

Religiousness B is different because it views guilt as sin. It is the person who has understood the depth of her guilt who is at the point where she can see her guilt as sin, sin that cannot be dealt with from within. This person is then open to the transcendent God, the God/man of history that is the essence of Christianity. Climacus calls this God who is also man "the paradox," that which is beyond human understanding. In order to believe in such a God, a leap is necessary precisely because the paradox is beyond human reason.

But the leap for which Climacus calls is not the blind leap into absurdity that so many have described. Climacus wants the exister to know what she is

getting herself into. His entire book has been an attempt to define Christianity precisely and to differentiate it from Hegelian speculation as well as from being a good, upstanding citizen. He also has carefully brought the exister to see the essential reason for making the leap, her guilt perceived as sin. The leap is a choice, a personal choice that must be made in passion and with freedom. Faith is absurd, but it is absurd from the perspective of human understanding that cannot conceive of an eternal God becoming incarnate in time nor that this God in history is the means by which the temporal human being becomes eternal. To embrace this paradox one must have faith, not undisputed historical documents or logical arguments.

In order to understand the nature of faith, one may go to *Fear and Trembling* by Johannes de Silentio. Here we are shown what it means to live beyond the ethical in the retelling of the Abraham and Isaac story. As an Old Testament story, the object of faith is the Jewish God, not the Christ of the New Testament, but the transcendence of God, that fact that God comes not from within, but is a personal being without, is what is important.

Abraham upheld all of the social norms of his day; he was living the life of the ethical according to human knowledge. But Abraham is called by God to suspend the ethical in order to obey him. Abraham is asked to kill his son. There is no greater societal good that will be accomplished by this act. If there were such a social good, this would be the act of a "Tragic Hero," such as Agamemnon. Rather, it is an act of the "Knight of Faith" that calls for more than compliance with social norms. Abraham's task represents the "teleological

suspension of the ethical" for the sake of the religious. Abraham's obedience is an act of faith, not just of resignation. He is not a "Knight of Infinite Resignation" who stoically turns his back on all natural desires and loves. He does not cease to love his son. His faith believes that he may love his son and his God at the same time. Faith claims the temporal and the eternal at the same time. Remember that at the beginning of the discussion about what a self is, from Anti-Climacus' point of view, it is this synthesis between the temporal and the eternal that is desired.

The Knight of Faith, therefore, is not otherworldly. He has not simply resigned the physical and the temporal as has the Knight of Infinite Resignation. De Silentio says that the Knight of Faith looks just like a tax collector and that he belongs entirely to the world.

> And yet this man has made and at every moment is making the movement of infinity. He drains the deep sadness of life in infinite resignation, he knows the blessedness of infinity, he has felt the pain of renouncing everything, the most precious thing in the world, and yet the finite tastes just as good to him as one who never knew anything higher [. . .]" (PF 40).

The difference between the Knight of Faith and others lies in *inwardness*. It is extremely hard to understand, much less to fulfill the demands of that sort of faith, and Johannes de Silentio is in awe of it. He sees that such a faith is much more than what the Hegelian philosophers believe to be faith when they seek to "go further" than faith. But it remains for others of the pseudonymous writers to

explain more fully what that inwardness entails, especially as it is understood by Christianity.

Johannes Climacus regards Religiousness A highly. He says, "In my opinion, Religiousness A (within the boundaries of which I have my existence) is so strenuous for a human being that there is always a sufficient task in it" (CUP 557). However, he goes on to say, "My intention is to make it difficult to become a Christian, yet not more difficult than it is, and not difficult for the obtuse and easy for the brainy, but qualitatively and essentially difficult for every human being" (CUP 557). Why is it so difficult to become a Christian? Because at the heart of it lies "the offense"—that I am self-deceived in my attempts to deal with my own guilt and that I am in need of the God outside myself to reveal to me that my guilt is actually sin. Climacus says,

> The individual is therefore unable to gain the consciousness of sin by himself, which is the case with guilt-consciousness, because in guilt-consciousness the subject's self-identity is preserved, and guilt-consciousness is a change of the subject within the subject himself. The consciousness of sin, however, is a change of the subject himself, which shows that outside the individual there must be the power than makes clear to him that he has become a person other than he was by coming into existence, that he has become a sinner. This power is the god in time. (CUP 584)

It takes yet another book by yet another pseudonym to make clear how this "coming into existence" happens and what role the recognition of sin has in

becoming a self. We conclude this chapter where we began, in Kierkegaard's view of the self in *The Sickness Unto Death*, where we learn that sin is despair. This is not despair in the common sense that is used everyday in which one despairs over circumstances beyond one's control. Anti-Climacus says that all despair is rooted in a failure to become a self. Since many of the characters we will see in Unamuno's novels are in various modes of despair, it is worthwhile to look carefully at this concept in *Sickness Unto Death.*

When talking about conscious despair there are two types. The first is not to will to be the self God intends for me to be. The second is to will to be the self I am in defiance of what God wants me to be. The first is passive; the second is active. The passive sort is the despair of weakness, of either not caring enough to even begin the task of becoming a self or allowing earthly cares to put oneself into despair. The active sort of despair is the one in which the self in despair claims to be the creator of himself. Anti-Climacus says that in the despair of defiance,

> [. . .] the self in despair wants to be the master of itself or create itself, to make his self into the self he wants to be, to determine what he will have or not have in his concrete self. [. . .] In other words, he wants to begin a little earlier than do other men, not at and with the beginning, but "in the beginning," he does not want to put on his own self, does not want to see his given self as his task—he himself wants to compose his self by means of being the infinite form. (SUD 68)

One of the manifestations of this sort of despair is an "unwillingness to be comforted by and healed by the eternal" (SUD 70). In this case whatever "thorn in the flesh" a person must bare is embraced and almost celebrated because it is the excuse the person who despairs in defiance uses to be offended by existence itself. He thus, "wills to be himself with it, takes it along, almost flouting his agony" (SUD 71). The more consciously a person wills himself to be himself in defiance, the closer he comes to the demonic.

It is here that Anti-Climacus gives the famous example that many believe was an inspiration to Unamuno, an example of the lengths to which one goes who despairs by willing to be himself in defiance:

> Figuratively speaking, it is as if an error slipped into an author's writing and the error became conscious of itself as an error—perhaps it actually was not a mistake but in a much higher sense an essential part of the whole production—and now this error wants to mutiny against the author, out of hatred toward him, forbidding him to correct it and in maniacal defiance saying to him: No, I refuse to be erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness that you are a second-rate author. (SUD 74)

Is this the inspiration for the famous visit of Augusto Pérez to his author Miguel de Unamuno in *Niebla*? It is clear from Unamuno's markings in the Danish text that he read this passage, but it is impossible to say for certain that this passage is a precedent for Augusto's rebellion. For now, what is important is to see the Kierkegaardian existence spheres clearly. As Johannes Climacus says in

summary, "Whereas esthetic existence is essentially enjoyment and ethical existence is essentially struggle and victory, religious existence is suffering, and not as a transient element but as a continual accompaniment" (CUP 288).

Climacus, in his review of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works, is proud of the fact that there is no "conclusion" given to these various modes of existence. *Either/Or* ends without knowing whether A takes the Judge's advice or not. *Fear and Trembling* extols the virtues of the Knight of Faith, but Johannes de Silentio is quite clear about his not being a person of faith. Johannes Climacus says of his own work that as an "imaginary construction" it

> [. . .] does not take as its starting point a later moment in time and relate a remarkable conflict as something past, nor does it slacken the tension of the conflict in a reassuring conclusion, but by means of its teaching form makes the reader even more contemporary than he is able to become by way of a contemporary actuality and leaves him stuck in it by not giving a conclusion. (CUP 289)

Each of the pseudonymous authors depicts an existence possibility and advocates it, though Climacus has the advantage of commenting on all the earlier ones. Nevertheless, within the pseudonyms there is no conclusion. There is certainly no natural or necessary progression in the spheres.

On the other hand, through Anti-Climacus' *The Sickness Unto Death* and the non-pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard makes it very clear that there is a *telos* to which the spheres point, the goal of becoming a self before God. The goal of indirect communication requires adherence to the maieutic ideal--that the

speaker be only a mid-wife for the hearer to discover the truth on her own--but for Kierkegaard, there *is* an ultimate truth. For Unamuno, these existence possibilities provide a vehicle to express multiple and even contradictory truths about the self and about the struggle that leads to authentic existence. How the existence spheres find their way into Unamuno's work is the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE KIERKEGAARDIAN STAGES OF EXISTENCE IN UNAMUNO'S NOVELS

The Need to Live Disquieted Lives

There are two key passages in *Either/Or* II underscored by Unamuno that provide a framework for seeing the protagonists of *Niebla*, *Abel Sánchez*, and *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* as selves in the process of choosing their own authentic existence. The first explains the importance of "the moment of choice."

> Then the soul has seen the highest, which no mortal eye can see and which can never be forgotten; then the personality receives the accolade of knighthood that ennobles it for an eternity. He does not become someone other than he was before, but he becomes himself. The consciousness integrates, and he is himself. Just as an heir, even if he were heir to the treasures of the whole world, does not possess them before he has come of age, so the richest personality is nothing before he has chosen himself; and on the other hand even what might be called the poorest personality is everything when he has chosen himself. (EO, 2: 177)

What is the content of this choice? The second underscored passage gives two of the three Kierkegaardian options for existence that Unamuno develops in the protagonists of these three novels—the esthetic and the ethical--and reiterates the need to choose. The passage also links the lack of choosing to an unconcern about one's end in life.

> [. . .] the ethical, although it modestly places itself on the same level as the esthetic, nevertheless is essentially that which makes a choice a choice.
>
> And this is what is sad when one contemplates human life, that so many live out their lives in quiet lostness; they outlive themselves, not in the sense that life's content successively unfolds and is now possessed in this unfolding, but they live, as it were, away from themselves and vanish like shadows. Their immortal souls are blown away, and they are not disquieted by the question of its immortality, because they already disintegrated before they die. They do not live esthetically, but neither has the ethical become manifest to them in its wholeness; nor have they actually rejected it, and therefore they are not sinning either, except insofar as it is a sin to be neither one thing nor the other. (EO, 2: 168-69)

We have seen at the conclusion of both Chapters One and Two that one key difference between Unamuno and Kierkegaard is the fact that Unamuno does not privilege one existence sphere over another as Kierkegaard does, but the one standard to which Unamuno holds all people is that they care about their existence and that they choose a self with respect to the ultimate question of their mortality. More than likely, Unamuno had formed this ultimate value before reading *Either/Or*. However, when he came across these two passages, they arrested his attention enough that he not only underscored them, but he double underscored the sentence that says, "Their immortal souls are blown away, and

they are not disquieted by the question of its immortality, because they are already disintegrated before they die" (EO, 2: 168-169).

The closest thing that a reader of Unamuno has to the equivalent of Kierkegaard's *Point of View for My Work as an Author* is Unamuno's statement in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*,

> Pero es que mi obra—iba a decir mi misión—es quebrantar la fe de unos y de otros y de los terceros, la fe en la afirmación, la fe en la negación y la fe en la abstención y esto por fe en la fe misma; es combatir a todos los que se resignan, sea al catolicismo, sea al racionalismo, sea al agnosticismo; es hacer que vivan todos inquietos y anhelantes. (7: 297-98)
>
> But it is the fact that my work, I was going to say my mission, is to break the faith of some, and of others, and of still more, faith in the affirmation, faith in the negation, faith in abstention from faith, and this for the sake of faith in faith itself; it is to combat all those who resign themselves to anything, be it Catholicism, rationalism, or agnosticism; it is to make all people live in longing and disquiet.

We can suggest that the words of Judge William, underscored by Unamuno and quoted above, were an affirmation to Unamuno to continue to do the work of disquieting. We can justifiably look for the value of authentic existence (or lack thereof) to be lived out in the characters of Unamuno's novels.

There is no question but that the main protagonists of *Niebla*, *Abel Sanchez*, and *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, are disquieting folk, but Augusto Pérez,

Joaquín Montegro and Don Manuel all are on journeys to authentic existence. Augusto Pérez will be seen as a person who at the beginning of the story is settled into "quiet lostness" and whose immortal soul is in danger of being "blown away." His transformation will not be seen as Gemma Roberts would have it, as journeying through all of the Kierkegaardian spheres of existence from the esthetic to the religious. Rather, Augusto will be seen as a person who initially isn't even living esthetically, who moves from "quiet lostness" to living passionately within the esthetic. Don Manuel Bueno will be viewed as exemplifying the ethical life with its commitments that make life meaningful, but without the need for religious faith. Joaquín Montegro will be seen as a person whose spiritual development is close to the religious sphere of existence. That is, he is the person closest to Religiousness A or B, but he diverts his well developed passions from faith to self destruction. We begin with *Niebla* and Augusto Pérez.

Niebla: A Study in the Esthetic Life

Undoubtedly, a central theme of *Niebla* is existence. What does it mean to exist? How does one know that one exists? It is clear that Augusto questions his own existence. Does he grow and acquire authentic existence through the course of the novel? Most commentators have affirmed Augusto's own declarations that he awakens to real life through falling in love and through the

suffering experienced through losing that love.[1] This is certainly the case of Gemma Roberts who interprets Augusto's journey to authentic existence as significant travel through the Kierkegaardian spheres of the esthetic in the beginning of the novel, the ethical as he decides to marry Eugenia, and the religious as he faces his own death. Frances Wyers, however, sees no maturation in the character. Reacting to a quote from Blanco Aguinaga, Wyers says, "Aside from the character's own assertions, there is no evidence whatsoever of any 'well-earned acquisition of consciousness'" (102).

I think that neither Roberts nor Wyers are entirely right in their estimation of the character of Augusto. There is maturation; there is clear change in Augusto. However, he does not reach authentic existence in the Kierkegaardian sense, because what Augusto awakens to is the esthetic life. He never really progresses past the esthetic life to the ethical and the religious, but he does acquire passion in Unamuno's sense of the term, and esthetic passions, though not enduring passions in Kierkegaard's understanding of the term. From Unamuno's point of view, acquiring passion is enough to know what it means to exist. Unamuno is concerned about the many who "live out their lives in quiet lostness," who are "shadows" in danger of having their immortal souls blown away. It is as a shadow in quiet lostness that Augusto begins in this novel. On the very first page the narrator explains Augusto's indecision about going right or going left as he leaves his house by saying, "Augusto no era un caminante, sino

[1] Among these would be Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, Geoffrey Ribbans and Gonzalo Corona Marzol who use the Kierkegaardian existence spheres to mark Augusto's progress, just as Gemma Roberts does.

un paseante de la vida" (2: 557). ("Augusto was not a walker through life but rather, a stroller.")

Reflecting on his life since his mother died Augusto says, "Pues, el caso es que he estado aburriéndome sin saberlo, y dos mortales años. . ., desde que murió mi santa madre. [. . .] La niebla de la vida rezuma un dulce aburrimiento, licor agridulce" (2: 568). ("Well, it is the case that I have been boring myself to death without knowing it—and for two mortal years, ever since my sainted mother died. [. . .] The mist of life oozes a sweet boredom, a bitter-sweet liquor.") Here the metaphor for his life is the title of the book, *niebla,* or mist. In another place, talking to Rosario, Augusto likens his life to sleep-walking. "Así he vivido desde que se murió mi madre, conmigo mismo, nada más que conmigo; es decir, dormido" (2: 595). ("It is the way I have lived since my mother died, by myself, always by myself; that is to say, asleep.") Looking back, after his affair with Eugenia ends tragically, Augusto says, "Empecé, Víctor, como una sombra, como una ficción: durante años he vagado como un fantasma, como un muñeco de niebla, sin creer en mi propia existencia [. . .]" (2: 663). ("I began, Victor, by being a kind of shadow, a fiction; for years I have wandered about like a ghost, like a manikin formed out of mist, without believing in my own existence [. . .].")

In "Unamuno's Niebla: Existence and the Game of Fiction," Carlos Blanco Aguinaga calls Augusto, "[. . .] a man who does not seem to be made of flesh and bones; a being from the never-never world where man is somewhere

between statue and ghost" (190). Geoffrey Ribbans says that Augusto is one of Unamuno's viviparous births.

> Instead of creating a mature character who is already determined by what has gone before, who is "ovíparo," born as it were into full chickenhood, he [Unamuno] presents someone fully grown but spiritually and ethically undetermined—a non-entity, a non-character who will grow into a character (that is to say, a being with passion) during the narration. (399)

It is my contention that all of these descriptions, from Augusto's self description to the comments of the critics, are accounts of a man who has not even reached the level of the esthetic. One might think that this is impossible. The esthetic sphere is the state to which we are born, it is not something to be chosen. Children are perfect esthetes, requiring their needs and desires to be met immediately with little reflection. In general, that is the way that the esthetic sphere is understood throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus. But in this one place, which catches the attention of Unamuno, Judge William uses the term "esthetic" in a somewhat special way. Here the esthetic refers to a project that a person can adopt, the project of living artistically. Obviously in this sense the esthetic is something that can be chosen and that one can fail to reach. Hence, the Judge talks about the sadness of those who do not even live esthetically, who live their lives in "quiet lostness" and "vanish like shadows" and who are never "disquieted by the question of immortality" (EO, 2: 168-69). In this special

sense Unamuno sees the esthetic sphere as a move toward authentic existence and a real choice.

Take, for example, Gemma Robert's contention that Augusto is operating at the level of the esthetic because of the boredom which he says characterizes his life after his mother's death, as quoted above. Roberts misunderstands the role of boredom in the life of the esthete, though she quotes from "Rotation of Crops" in *Either/Or* I. According to A, "Boredom is the root of all evil" (EO, 1: 285). It is to be avoided at all costs. The effective esthete is the one who knows how to deflect and defeat boredom artistically. At the beginning of the novel, Augusto has no desires that are even worth satisfying. An esthete refines his desires and spontaneously lives to satisfy them in the moment. Unamuno read "Rotation of Crops" carefully and underlined three key passages.[2] I believe that Unamuno would have seen boredom as a negative characteristic of the pre-existence that he gives to Augusto. We will see Augusto move into the "proper" response to boredom when he moves into the esthetic. There is no doubt but that the chance encounter with Eugenia wakes Augusto from his stupor and boredom, but his experience with the transforming power of "love" can be understood entirely within the context of the esthetic.

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[2] They are: "The gods were bored; therefore they created human beings. Adam was bored because he was alone; therefore Eve was created. Since that moment, boredom entered the world and grew in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of population" (EO, 1: 286). "In olden days, whoever eulogized the deceased most handsomely became the king. In our age, the king ought to be the one who provides the occasion for the best witticism" (EO, 1: 288). "The word 'boring' can designate just as well a person who bores others as someone who bores himself. Those who bore others are the plebians, the crowd, the endless train of humanity in general; those who bore themselves are the chosen ones, the nobility. How remarkable it is that those who do not bore themselves generally bore others, those, however, who bore themselves entertain others. Generally, those who do not bore themselves are busy in the world in one way

There are several critics who have already commented on the debt Unamuno owes to the writers of *Either/Or* and *Stages on Life's Way* for inspiring scenes and characters in *Niebla*. Ruth House Webber outlines the similarities between "The Seducer's Diary" found at the end of *Either/Or I* and the first part of *Niebla* in her article, "Kierkegaard and the Elaboration of Unamuno's *Niebla*." She notes that both works begin with the protagonist on the street, alone with his thoughts in the midst of a multitude of people. Both Johannes (the Seducer) and Augusto come upon the woman who mesmerizes them completely by chance. However, when the vision has vanished before their eyes and each wants to recreate the woman in his mind's eye, neither can remember just what she looked like. Johannes says, "Have I become blind? Has the inner eye of the soul lost its power? I have seen her, but it is as if I had seen a heavenly revelation—so completely has her image vanished again for me" (EO, 1: 323). Augusto says, "¿Se borrará su imagen de mi memoria? Pero ¿cómo es? ¿Cómo es la dulce Eugenia? Sólo me acuerdo de unos ojos." (2: 559). ("Will your image be erased from my memory? But what does she look like? How is the sweet Eugenia? I only remember the eyes.") Both Johannes and Augusto are fascinated with the name of their beloved. Both Eugenia and Cordelia are orphans, living with aunts whom both suitors know they must win over before the desired relationship can proceed. Both Johannes and Augusto have no trouble in gaining the confidence of the aunts (Webber 121-122).

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or another, but for that very reason they are, of all people, the most boring of all, the most unbearable" (EO, 1: 288).

Perhaps more important than these beginning steps in the winning of the woman are the ways in which Johannes and Augusto approach life in general. Webber points out that both live poetically and at the command of chance (Webber 123-124). It is said of Johannes, "His life has been an attempt to accomplish the task of living poetically" (EO, 1: 304). Augusto says of himself in his first letter to Eugenia, "Perdóneme la lírica. Yo vivo en perpetua lírica infinitesimal" (2: 562). ("Pardon the poetic here. I live in perpetual, infinitesimal lyricism.") Johannes on occasion curses chance but he revels in it as much as Augusto praises it. They both depend on chance. In a passage that Unamuno underlines, Johannes just wants fate to work again as it has before when he says, "Cursed chance! Never have I cursed you because you made your appearance; I curse you because you do not make your appearance at all" (EO, 1: 326).

We see chance at work from the opening scene of *Niebla* when Augusto wants a dog to come by in order to show him whether he should walk to the right or to the left, but more importantly, fate has brought him Eugenia. Augusto says, "Mi Eugenia [. . .] ¿Aparición fortuita? ¿Y qué aparición no lo es? ¿Cuál es la lógica de las apariciones? [. . .] ¡El azar! El azar es el íntimo ritmo del mundo, el azar es el alma de la poesía" (2: 561). ("My Eugenia. A fortuitous apparition? And what apparition is not fortuitous? What is the logic of apparitions? Chance! Chance is the intimate rhythm of the world, chance is the soul of poetry.") Webber is right to notice the importance that chance plays in the life of the two characters, and she is also right to point to the passage about chance in

Either/Or I because it is underlined by Unamuno in his Danish *Either/Or*. Clearly Unamuno saw the esthetic life as one that depended on and enjoyed the vagaries of chance. Chance makes life more interesting, and to be interesting is the esthete's highest value.

Webber comments on two other similarities in "The Seducer's Diary" and *Niebla* that are less convincing as stated. The first is the existence of the interpolated stories in both texts, the stories within the story that at times seem to have nothing to do with main protagonist and his quest. Webber points out that there are no fewer than eleven such stories in "The Seducer's Diary" and that while they are delivered with "deceptive casualness," as are Unamuno's in his manner of "lo que salga," 'whatever comes,' they are actually in both cases "the result of a carefully contrived plan" (131). I don't doubt that both Unamuno and the author of "The Seducer's Diary" carefully crafted their narratives and included the interpolated stories for significant reasons which will be explored later, but the more obvious model for such interpolated stories for the Spanish novelist would be, of course, Cervantes.

The second doubtful similarity is that of Johannes and Augusto being keenly interested in every woman they see, not just the one they are pursuing. Webber quotes several passages from both works to show that both men have an ability for "selective observation" of the minute actions of women. This "similarity" is not remarkable in itself, it seems to me, because taking in the feminine scenery is something very common to males in general. However, there may be something significant in the theory that Augusto gets from the

outrageously satirized Spanish academic, Antolín S. Paparrigópulos, who says that the reason that Augusto is falling in love with every woman is that all women have a collective soul. "Cada hombre tiene su alma, las mujeres todas no tienen sino una sola y misma alma, un alma colectiva. [. . .] Las mujeres, dice este escritor, se parecen entre sí mucho más que los hombres y es porque todas son una sola y misma mujer. . ." (2: 642). ("Each man has his soul, all women have but one and the same soul, a collective soul. Women, this author says, resemble one another much more than men and that is because they are all one and the same woman . . .")

Paparrigópulos was supposedly quoting an obscure seventeenth century Dutch writer whom he had discovered and whom he wants no one else to know about until he has published his findings. Gonzalo Corona Marzol believes that Unamuno may have been thinking about an obscure Danish writer in reality—Kierkegaard. In his article, "Unamuno y Kierkegaard. La mujer y el amor en *Niebla*," Corona Marzol says that the idea of women sharing one soul comes from the speech of Johannes the Seducer in the banquet scene in *Stages on Life's Way*. Corona Marzol underscores Johannes' speech in "In Vino Veritas":

> The idea of woman, however, is a generality that is not exhausted by any woman. [. . .] She is finiteness; thus she is a collective noun; the one woman is the many. Only the devotee of erotic love understands this, and that is why he knows how to love many, is never deceived, but imbibes all the sensual pleasures the cunning gods managed to prepare. (SLW 76)

Since *Stages on Life's Way* is one of the books that is most copiously annotated by Unamuno, it seems plausible that Paparrigópulos' source may have been Danish rather than Dutch. However, there is a passage in "The Seducer's Diary," also in the voice of Johannes the Seducer, that Unamuno underlined that may also have been part of his thinking when he gave Augusto this ability to love not just one but many women.

> But the god of love is blind, and if one is clever, he can surely be fooled. The art is to be as receptive as possible to impressions, to know what impression one is making and what impression one has of each girl. In that way, one can be in love with many girls at the same time, because one is in love in a different way with each one. To love one girl is too little; to love all is superficiality; to know oneself and to love as many as possible, to let one's soul conceal all the powers of love inside itself so that each receives its specific nourishment while the consciousness nevertheless embraces the whole—that is enjoyment, that is living. (EO, 1: 361)

Since both the passage from *Stages* and the passage from *Either/Or* I, are by the same Kierkegaardian character, Johannes the Seducer, it is easy to see that Unamuno's Augusto shares with Johannes the theoretical basis and practical consequence of that theory in his behavior with women. Johannes is the esthete's esthete. Someone may object that there is a significant difference between Johannes and Augusto in that Johannes means only to seduce the woman, whereas Augusto intends to marry. It is my opinion that Augusto's

inability to concentrate for more than a few seconds on any one woman shows that though he professes to want to marry Eugenia, he is just as much of an esthete as Johannes.

Corona Marzol makes another interesting comparison between Augusto and a different speaker at the banquet of "In Vino Veritas," the first part of *Stages On Life's Way*. He says that the first speaker, the Young Man, parallels Augusto in his fear of love and his desire to make a study of women before making a commitment. The Young Man sees the foolish antics of those who have said that they have fallen in love, and does not want to appear as ridiculous as they do, and so has refused to fall in love. When Augusto asks Liduvina how to tell if a person is in love, she answers by saying that you know when a man is in love by the foolish things he does. At this point Augusto has already been smitten by Eugenia, but he doesn't think he has done anything foolish as yet. The foolish behavior is reserved for his encounters with Rosario. After Rosario leaves him the second time, Augusto says to himself, "Me desprecia, indudablemente me desprecia; he estado ridículo, ridículo, ridículo. . ." (2: 646). ("She despises me. Undoubtedly she despises me. I have been ridiculous, utterly, utterly ridiculous.") So Augusto proves the Young Man's point.

But more important, it seems to me, is Corona Marzol's second point: the fact that both theYoung Man and Augusto make Woman the object of study so that they can avoid commitment or any decisive action. The Young Man says, "Since I do not know what the lovable is, I simply cannot know how I am to conduct myself in order to avoid this danger. [. . .] I shall not love anyone before

I have exhausted the idea of erotic love" (SLW 38). Augusto forms the resolve to make a study of Woman when he finds himself equally attracted to Eugenia and Rosario and is further confounded by a flitter in his heart for Liduvina, his married housekeeper. So he first proposes two monographs dedicated to Eugenia and Rosario, but when Paparrigópulos says that a psychological experiment with two women would never do, Augusto decides to add Liduvina. Eugenia appeals to his head, Rosario to his heart, and Liduvina to his stomach. So each will be the object of this psychological experiment which is supposed to help him get clear what it is that he is supposed to do. But the objects of the experiments turn Augusto, the experimenter, into the "frog," and Augusto is left not only directionless, but totally despondent. The attempts to study Woman do not bring either the Young Man or Augusto closer to commitment. The Young Man is left in endless speculation. Augusto is left with the disastrous consequences of not being able to choose. Both are full-blown examples of the esthetic life.

In my mind, the Young Man is most like the pre-Eugenia Augusto when the Young Man is described as a person who "had had nothing to do with the world, had been neither awakened and inflamed nor disquieted and disturbed. Like a sleepwalker, he carried the law for his behavior within himself" (SLW 25). When the sleepwalking Young Man by chance falls in with the other banquet members and is called on to make a speech about erotic love, the speech is entirely in the abstract because he has never loved. He is still an esthete because he retains action in the realm of possibility and has never chosen one of those possibilities over another. When the sleepwalking Augusto by chance

meets Eugenia, he goes after her, but is ultimately confused by his many loves and does not really choose one over another either. His one decisive act is to take care of the mortgage on Eugenia's house, but the text plays with whether that is a selfish or selfless act.

Augusto's proposal of marriage to Eugenia is the experiment which Paparrigópulos inspired and Víctor tells him he must do if he is to gain any "real" knowledge about the psychology of a woman. Is the desire to gain knowledge about the psychology of a woman the same as ethically choosing to commit to another in love? Víctor is not talking about ethical choice here, because he's still talking about a relationship with a woman as an experiment. And whom should Augusto make the marriage offer to? Víctor says, "Cásate, pues, cásate con una cualquiera de las ene de que estás enamorado, con la que tengas más a mano. Y sin pensarlo demasiado" (2: 648). ("Marry. Marry any of the *n* women with whom you are in love. Marry the one that comes handiest. And don't think too much about it.")

Gemma Roberts believes that, in the conversation just cited with Víctor Goti, Unamuno points up the "metaphysical" nature of love to the single man and contrasts that with the "ethical" nature of love in marriage. The difference between the two is that marriage is something that you can't reverse. Víctor says, "El que no se casa jamás podrá experimentar psicológicamente el alma de la Mujer. El único laboratorio de psicología femenina o de ginepsicología es el matrimonio" (2: 648). ("He who does not marry will never be able to experiment with the soul of the Woman. The only laboratory of feminine psychology or of

gynecopsychology is marriage."[3]) Roberts says that one finds in both Unamuno and Judge William, "[. . .] el contraste entre un tipo de amor que mantiene la individualidad al margen de la vida, y otro tipo de amor que compromete la existencia toda del individuo. Es decir, entre la soltería estetizante que se entretiene en experimentos eróticos y el amor conyugal como una forma de existencia ética" (49). ("[. . .] the contrast between a type of love that maintains individuality at the margin of life and another kind of love that commits one's total existence to another. That is to say, between esthetic singleness that entertains itself in erotic experiments and the conjugal love as a form of ethical existence.") But choosing woman *x* or *y* arbitrarily as the object of a psychological experiment can hardly be equated with the "kind of love that commits one's total existence to another." This is not the sort of marriage that Judge William has in mind in *Either/Or* II or the essay "Reflections on Marriage" in *Stages on Life's Way.* The Judge says, "To poetize an actual human relationship by means of distancing [. . .] is neither more nor less than to falsify the ethical in it and to give it a false stamp as an event and an intellectual pursuit" (SLW 155). The contrast between marriage that defines the ethical life and the marriage proposal that Augusto makes is so great as to be comic, which is what I believe Unamuno intended.

Unamuno is well aware of Judge William's view of marriage and how much of what is called marriage falls far short of the ethical life. Geoffrey Ribbans interprets many of the interpolated stories in *Niebla* as exemplary tales of how marriage can go wrong. Their function is to warn Augusto against

[3] The word *experimentar* could also be translated "to experience" but given the entire context of the passage I believe that "to experiment with" is also warranted.

marriage to Eugenia. In the story of Don Avito Carrascal, the protagonist of *Amor y pedagogía* admits that he did not love his wife upon marrying her and only has come to love her after the tragic loss of their son. Don Avito's advice to Augusto is to marry the girl who loves him, i.e., Rosario, and not the girl whom he loves but does not love him in return, Eugenia. Judge William would agree that in order for marriage to be an ethical, life-changing choice the two partners need to love each other and purposefully choose each other. The Judge says, "Marriage is the deepest, highest, and most beautiful expression of love. Love is the gift of the god, but in the resolution of marriage the lovers make themselves worthy of receiving it" (SLW 148).

The story of Don Eloíno Rodríguez and the widow who marries him to get the pension that he would provide her at his imminent death is the cautionary tale against making economics the basis of a marriage. The parallel to Augusto and Eugenia is clear. If Eugenia marries Augusto because of his ability to pay off her mortgage and to be able to give up her piano students, this is a marriage of convenience, not a true marriage. The Judge says that a marriage of convenience is a marriage based on calculation. "A marriage based on calculation is to be regarded as a capitulation of sorts that the exigencies of life make necessary. [. . .] Consequently, the eternal, which belongs to every marriage, is not really present here, for a commonsensical calculation is always temporal. Therefore, such a connection is at the same time immoral and fragile" (EO, 2: 27).

Ribbans says the story of the man with two wives, Don Antonio, foreshadows the humiliating end of Augusto's attempt to get married. Don Antonio has "two wives" because his lawful wife ran off with another man who was also married. The other aggrieved partner and Don Antonio come together to console each other and to make a family for the child who was left. "Augusto, like Don Antonio, has been abandoned by the woman who was pledged to him, and Mauricio, in eloping with Eugenia, left Rosario to Augusto as the seducer's wife had been left for Don Antonio" (402). Ribbans says that Augusto should have seen the possibility for disaster in his own situation.

Again, Ribban's point is that Unamuno uses these interpolated stories to underscore what marriage is not. What then, is true marriage for Unamuno? It has already been noted that there is much in common with Unamuno's view of marriage and that of Judge William. According the Judge, marriage is certainly not merely the erotic love that characterizes Augusto throughout *Niebla*. What is the relationship of erotic love and marriage? The Judge says, "The difficulty is this: erotic love or falling in love is altogether immediate; marriage is a resolution; yet falling in love must be taken up into marriage or into the resolution: to will to marry" (SLW 102). The question is does Augusto really resolve to marry or is he just carried along with the events as they unfold? I think the text leads us to believe that Augusto is the "victim" of the proposal to marry as much as he is the victim of Eugenia's treachery in running off with Mauricio. Augusto himself wonders before he goes to Eugenia's house to proceed with his psychological experiment how he will feel if Eugenia accepts his proposal rather than rejecting

him. "Y si mi acepta?, digo. ¡Me fastidia! ¡Me pesca con mi propio anzuelo! ¡Eso sí que sería el pescador pescado! " (2: 644). ("And what if she accepts me? That would mess things up. What if she catches me with my own hook! That would surely be the fisherman becoming his own prey.") When Eugenia does accept him and the aunt and uncle seem to accept the news as a matter of course, Augusto does not feel elated, he feels trapped. Augusto thinks, "¡Rana, rana completa! Y me han pescado entre todos" (2: 652). ("Frog, complete frog! They have trapped me out between all of them.")

This is hardly the picture of a man who has resolved to will to love one woman for the rest of his life and who in so doing has moved into the ethical sphere, into choosing his own existence. Even Roberts, who believes that Augusto makes a decisive choice to marry Eugenia, points out that his life is not really changed by the proposal of marriage and its acceptance. The very next sentence in the novel after the one quoted above, where Augusto laments his being made the frog in this experiment, says "Empezó entonces para Augusto una nueva vida. Casi todo el día se lo pasaba en casa de su novia y estudiando, no psicología sino estética" (2: 652). ("A new life began, then, for Augusto. He spent almost the whole day in the house of his fiancée studying not psychology but esthetics.") The statement about his life being new is clearly ironic. Augusto has been studying the esthetic life all along.

If Augusto has not even achieved the level of the ethical, as I believe, what are we to make of his own assertions to Víctor Goti about his coming into existence through the suffering he has experienced at the hand of Eugenia?

Augusto says that the experience with Eugenia has made him father of himself. "¡Sí, de mí mismo! Con esto creo haber nacido de veras. Y para sufrir, para morir" (2: 662). ("Yes, of myself! With all of this [affair with Eugenia] I believe that I have really been born. And born in order to suffer, in order to die.") The words of Víctor that come on the heals of this declaration would appear to echo the stance of Unamuno in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* when Víctor says, "Sí, el segundo nacimiento, el verdadero, es nacer por el dolor a la conciencia de la muerte incesante, de que estamos siempre muriendo" (2: 662). ("Yes, the second birth, the true one, is to be born through the pain of consciousness of ongoing death, of which we are always dying.") But Augusto's awakening to the reality of death does not then translate into the vitality of the struggle to live that Unamuno advocates in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*. Augusto's suffering remains in the realm of the esthetic.

Augusto admits that his entire conversation with Víctor is, in fact, entertaining, though it irritates him to say so. Víctor's judgement is that through his suffering Augusto has become more interesting to himself. "¿Te has encontrado nunca a tus propios ojos más interesante que ahora? ¿Cómo sabe uno que tiene un miembro si no le duele?" (2: 663). ("Have you ever been more interesting to your own eyes than you are now? How does one know if he has a limb if it doesn't hurt him?") The category of the interesting, we will remember from the "Rotation of Crops" essay and "The Seducer's Diary," is the ultimate for the esthete. His motto is, "Has the interesting been preserved at all times?" (EO,

1: 438). Víctor is congratulating Augusto for his maturation in the process of becoming interesting, a far cry from coming into authentic ethical existence.

In *Either/Or* II Judge William gives a detailed account of the various life views of the esthetic ranging from the immediate to the reflective. This range is established in *Either/Or* I which begins with the immediacy of Don Juan and ends with the highly reflective author of "The Seducer's Diary." In the immediate category are the esthetic life views that value health and beauty, wealth and noble birth, enjoying life and satisfying all desires. The Judge knows that A has moved on from such pedestrian forms of estheticism to the more cerebral, those described in "Rotation of Crops," and most importantly he has gone on to enjoy his own despair over the fact that the immediate views of the esthetic life are vanity. The Judge in addressing A says, "This may be the place to discuss briefly a life-view that is so very pleasing to you [. . .]. It amounts to nothing less than this, that to sorrow is indeed the real meaning of life, and to be the unhappiest one is the supreme happiness" (EO, 2: 232). The Judge explains that for A, "sorrow in and by itself is at least as interesting as joy" (EO, 2: 233).

Augusto states, "Después de lo que me han hecho, después de esta burla, de esta ferocidad de burla, ¡ahora, sí, ahora me siento, ahora me palpo, ahora no dudo de mi existencia real!" (2: 664). ("After what they have done to me, after this joke, this cruel joke, now I feel myself, now I touch myself, now I don't doubt my true existence.") What sort of existence has Augusto awakened to? There is no doubt but that Augusto has come a very long way from his somnambulant days, but the Judge would say that Augusto has not attained the

ethical, even though he has come to know suffering. "At first sight, this view does not seem to be an esthetic view of life, because enjoyment surely cannot really be its watchword. But it is not ethical either; it is situated at the perilous point at which the esthetic is to pass over into the ethical, where the soul is so easily entangled in some formulation of a theory of predestination" (EO, 2: 232). The proof that A's (and Augusto's) sorrow has not brought them into the ethical is what they do with their sorrow. Real sorrow leads to repentance and the hope of forgiveness. A is fascinated by the idea of the world's unhappiest man, and perhaps he thinks he is this person, enjoying his odd superiority over other men. Augusto sees no hope and believes his only alternative is to kill himself. From the Judge's point of view, Augusto has not chosen himself, has not come into real existence.

> But can the person who has chosen himself infinitely say: Now I possess myself; I ask for no more, and I meet all the ups and downs of the world with the proud thought: I am the person I am? But no means! [. . .] His basic error would really be that he had not, strictly speaking, chosen himself; he had no doubt, chosen himself, but outside himself; he had conceived of choosing altogether abstractly and had not grasped himself in his concretion. (EO, 2: 230-31)

That is, Augusto has come to a great deal of self-revelation through his painful encounter with Eugenia, and has accepted what he has learned as part of himself. All of that is what has happened "outside himself." In order to choose

himself, he must undertake the self as a task. The task requires a future, and Augusto cannot see any future. The consequence of Augusto's not having grasped himself in his concretion is his contemplation of suicide. The Judge would say that he is "infatuated with himself" and that "no power is able to tear him from himself." The consequence is fatal. "Such a condition has not infrequently ended in suicide" (EO, 2: 231). Augusto has chosen the self he is rather than becoming the self he can become. According to the Judge, Augusto has not come into real existence because he has not chosen himself in freedom. "If he does that, then at the very moment he chooses himself he is in motion" (EO, 2: 232).

But would Unamuno agree with the Judge's evaluation of Augusto, that he has not chosen himself in freedom and so remains within the esthetic? The answer to the question about choosing himself in freedom is bound up, I believe, in the issue of free will and how one reads the end of *Niebla*. The answer to the question of Augusto's remaining in the esthetic is a separate question which deserves a separate answer. We will deal with the problem of freedom first, by looking at the ending of *Niebla*.

At the conclusion of the discussion with Víctor within which Augusto declares that he is certain of his own existence and Víctor responds, throwing more doubt and confusion into his mind, Augusto resolves to kill himself. "Quería acabar consigo mismo, que era la fuente de sus desdichas propias" (2: 665). ("He wanted to do away with himself, that self that had been the source of all his own misfortunes.") But before he does, he believes that he needs to consult

with the dramatized author of his story, Don Miguel. What transpires during the visit is one of the most innovative chapters in novelistic history.

Don Miguel lets Augusto know that he knows why he has come, to discuss his impending suicide. Then Don Miguel lets the squirming Augusto know that his contemplated act of suicide is impossible because he doesn't exist. In order to commit suicide one must first be alive, and Augusto isn't. Augusto is outraged and turns on his author to question the author's existence. Isn't it possible that Don Miguel is a fictitious entity who is nothing more than "un pretexto para que mi historia llegue al mundo. . ." (2: 666)? ("a pretext for bringing my story into the world. . .") As Don Miguel gets more and more uncomfortable with Augusto's line of reasoning, which uses Don Miguel's own statement that as characters Don Quijote and Sancho are more real than Cervantes and the fact that Don Miguel has entered into conversation with him (Augusto) proves his own existence, Don Miguel retaliates by saying that he will kill Augusto off.

Augusto is terrified and pleads for God to help him, to which Don Miguel replies that there is no God who can help him because he (Don Miguel) alone is the character's maker. Augusto says that he now wants to live. "Quiero vivir, vivir. . ., y ser yo, yo, yo. . ." (2: 669). ("I want to live, to live, and be myself, myself, myself.") Augusto leaves, telling Don Miguel that he, too will die. "¡Morirá usted, don Miguel, morirá usted y morirán todos los que me piensen! ¡a morir, pues!" (2: 670). ("You will die, Don Miguel, you will die as will all of those who create me in thought. To die, then!") Augusto then goes back to his home and essentially eats himself to death. Does Augusto kill himself, or does the

dramatized author, Don Miguel, kill off his own character? Víctor Goti, the writer of the prologue assures the reader that it was Augusto himself who brought about his own death. Augusto's housekeeper, Liduvina, swears it was a suicide. But Don Miguel enters the narrative to claim responsibility and to wonder whether he should bring Augusto back to life.

There are some critics who equate the dramatized author Don Miguel with Unamuno. Carlos Blanco Aguinaga believes that Unamuno puts himself into the novel so that as a fictional character, he, too, can be immortal. Along with Geoffrey Ribbans, I question Blanco Aguinaga's equation of the dramatized author Don Miguel with Unamuno because Don Miguel is too much of an outrageous caricature of Unamuno. Ribbans says, "Unamuno's swaggering portrayal of himself, in which he deliberately exaggerates his own characteristics both linguistic and ideological, is an image, of great compressed ironic power, of the capricious God, or worse arbitrary fate, who apparently determines the life and death of human beings" (403). Ribbans goes on to argue for the possibility that Augusto killed himself, contrasting Augusto's telegram to Don Miguel to be opened after his death which read, "Se salió con la suya. He muerto." (2: 674) ("You got your way. I have died."), with Liduvina's declaration, "Lo de mi señorito ha sido un suicidio y nada más que un suicidio. ¡Se salió con la suya!" (2: 676). ("What my master has done has been a suicide, nothing more than a suicide. He got his way!") At the very least, whether the creator or the character has had his own way is ambiguous.

Whether or not Augusto killed himself turns, of course, on whether or not he has the freedom to do so, whether or not free will exists. We are aware that the question of free will is an important issue in *Niebla* from the start when Víctor Goti says in the Prologue, "Sin haber yo llegado al extremo de escepticismo hamletiano de mi pobre amigo Pérez, que llegó hasta a dudar de su propia existencia, estoy por lo menos firmemente persuadido de que carezco de eso que los psicólogos llaman libre albedrío, aunque para mi consuelo creo también que tampoco goza don Miguél de él" (2: 544). (Without having arrived at the extreme of Hamletian skepticism of my poor friend Pérez, who came to the point of doubting his own existence, I am, at least, firmly persuaded that I lack what psychologists call free will, although it also consoles me to believe that Don Miguel also does not enjoy it.") Interpreting this statement depends on separating the career author, Miguel de Unamuno from the dramatized author, Don Miguel.[4] Víctor is certainly right that the dramatized author of Don Miguel does not allow for free will because as he appears in the story, he is the grand puppeteer who controls and manipulates all of his creation. However, the views of the career author, Miguel de Unamuno, are different than those of the dramatized author, Don Miguel.

It seems to me that Unamuno is satirizing the view of Don Miguel, based on what we have seen of Unamuno's view of the self as achievement, his

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[4] The terms used here are those developed by Wayne Booth in *Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism*. The career author is what is represented by "the sustained creative center implied by a sequence of implied authors" (270). The dramatized author is a character who takes the voice of the author in the relation of the narrative but who is just that, a created character who may or may not "reveal anything directly about the writer" (269). The implied author is defined as "the creating person who is implied by the totality of a given work when it is offered to the world" (269).

purpose in writing and his stated distance from his own literary creation. We have seen that for Unamuno there is a substantial self that is given that includes the ability for self-reflection. However, the content of the self is the self one becomes through using the ability for self-reflection. Unamuno's statement about a man only being a man when he wants to be "more than a man" makes no sense without the possibility of free will. Unamuno's desire to awaken his compatriots from their deadly slumber into authentic existence would make no sense if they were fated to remain in that slumber. Don Miguel's desire to manipulate and control his creation is the opposite of Unamuno's statement in *Como se hace una novela* about a written work no more belonging to its author than does his skeleton belong to him after he has died. In the same book Unamuno invites the reader to recreate the work for herself so that she may make the novel of her own life, and he concludes, "Nuestra obra es nuestro espíritu y mi obra soy yo mismo que me estoy haciendo día a día y siglo a siglo, como tu obra eres tú mismo, lector, que te estás haciendo momento a momento [. . .]" (8: 760). ("Our own work is our spirit; my work is myself, who I am making day after day, century after century, as your work, reader, is yourself, you who are making and creating yourself moment by moment [. . .]") The career author, Unamuno believes he enjoys free will, even if his dramatized author, Don Miguel does not allow for it.

Going beyond Geoffrey Ribban's judgement that Augusto's death is *possibly* a suicide, I would claim that Augusto's death is *probably* a suicide, an act chosen deliberately by a person who is free to choose his own self and his

own end. From Unamuno's point of view, Augusto ironically comes into authentic existence by choosing his own death. In an article written after the appearance of *Niebla* entitled "Una entrevista con Augusto Pérez," Unamuno is still playing with the ambiguity in the death of Augusto, but he has Augusto insist to him in a dream, "Me afirmé muriendo" (8: 365). ("I affirmed myself in dying.") In choosing his own death, Augusto acts passionately for the first time in his life.

A passage from *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* which Unamuno underlined may have helped to form the character of Augusto as a "pure thinking" individual whose logical end was suicide. The context is that the pseudonymous author, Johannes Climacus, is talking about the difficulty of existing, of living simultaneously in the eternal and the present, and how abstract thinking has been substituted in the present day for the process of becoming a person.

> If it were the same with thinkers in our day, pure thinking would have led to one suicide after another, because suicide is the only existence-consequence of pure thinking if, in relation to what it means to be a human being, this thinking is not to be something merely fractional and ready to make a deal with ethical and religious existing, but is to be everything and the highest. *We do not praise suicide, but certainly the passion.* Now, however, a thinker is a creature worth seeing, who at certain times of the day is singularly ingenious but otherwise has nothing in common with a human being. (CUP 308) (Emphasis added.)

Unamuno has created a protagonist who seems "singularly ingenious" at times and with his tendencies to "pure thinking" seems to have "nothing in common with a human being" as he careens through life reacting to its vagaries in his abstract way. Only in his decision to kill himself does Augusto leave the world of contemplation and act within time. According to the passage above, the act is not to be praised, but the passion needed to commit such an act is to be praised.

Why then are there so many conflicting signals that indicate that Augusto did not have control over his own life? Unamuno's dramatized narrator[5], Don Miguel, becomes a clear agent in the process of the narration, not a mere observer. If, as I have indicated, the implied author's values are the opposite of the dramatized narrator, then we can conclude that Don Miguel is an unreliable narrator and his account of Augusto's end is in error. Augusto is free to choose his own end as Víctor indicates in the Prólogo. Don Miguel contradicts his own dramatized narrator, Víctor. But neither Don Miguel nor Víctor can be equated with Unamuno.

What is going on here? I believe that Unamuno is using indirect communication for the purpose of helping the reader to think about her own existence. Unamuno's multiple narrators work in the same way that Kierkegaard's pseudonyms do. They are not cover-ups for the real author. They are characters in and of themselves with opinions and ideas that may or may not coincide with those of the career author. They are the means by which

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[5] This is the term Booth previously gave to "dramatized author" in *The Rhetoric of Fiction* where he describes more in detail the possible functions of this narrator who is the "I" telling the story. This narrator can be in first, second or third person, an agent or an observer of his action and can be reliable or unreliable. See pp. 152-165.

the career author can best bring to light conflicting views on how one can exist in this life. Booth says, "From the author's viewpoint, a successful reading of his book must eliminate all distance between the essential norms of his implied author and the norms of the postulated reader" (Rhetoric 157). A "successful reading" from Unamuno's point of view requires his reader to be disturbed by his multiple, dramatized narrators which will lead the reader to examine her own existence.

In the last conversation that Augusto has with Víctor there is a telling exchange about the liberating effect of art. Augusto says, "Ya he oído que lo más liberador del arte es que le hace a uno olvidar que exista. Hay quien se hunde en la lectura de novelas para distraerse de sí mismo, para olvidar sus penas. . ." (2: 664). ("I have heard that the most liberating aspect of art is that it makes one forget that one exists. There are those who bury themselves in the reading of novels to distract themselves from themselves, in order to forget their sorrows. . .") Víctor replies, "No, lo más libertador del arte es que le hace a uno dudar de que exista" (2: 664). ("No, the most liberating aspect of art is that it makes one doubt that one exists.") Víctor certainly is the mouthpiece of Unamuno here (though he cannot be said to be that in all places).[6] For Unamuno, that his novel, his art, would make one doubt that one exists is a way of opening up that wound and keeping it open so that the reader may be awakened to authentic existence. In order for a self to develop into authentic existence, that self must have the freedom to make significant choices.

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[6] In the same essay, "Una entrevista con Augusto Pérez," Unamuno states that Víctor is certainly right when he says this (8: 361).

The question about whether or not Augusto remains in the esthetic from Unamuno's point of view remains to be answered. Many of the characters of *Niebla* live out the categories of the esthetic as outlined by Judge William. Mauricio can be seen as the crass esthete who is non-reflective and grabs at what is immediately at hand. He is certainly like the Don Juan of the beginning of *Either/Or* I. Eugenia herself is an esthete whose disregard for Augusto sounds like the Judge's indictment of A, "You can be more heartless than anyone; you can make a jest of everything, even a person's pain" (EO, 2: 232). Víctor's marriage of connubial bliss before the child arrives is a form of esthetic marriage. He and his wife did not decide to marry, did not decide to commit themselves to love each other for the long term. They were forced to marry by their parents. As good esthetes they have made interesting what life arbitrarily dealt to them, as A instructs in "Rotation of Crops." Augusto is the hyper-contemplative esthete who corresponds to Johannes the Seducer in his highly intellectualized approach to life. I believe that Unamuno shares the values of Judge William in the hierarchy of these different examples of the esthetic life. The more cerebral and reflective, the more refined is the esthetic life.

There is no denying that Augusto himself says that he has awakened to existence through the pain of his relationship with Eugenia, but I believe that Unamuno understands that awakening still to be entirely within the esthetic. In *Stages on Life's Way* Unamuno underlines part of Victor Eremita's speech at the banquet of esthetes, "In *Vino Veritas*." Eremita says, "The highest ideality woman can awaken in man is really to awaken the consciousness of immortality"

(SLW 60). Eremita goes on to explain that "woman's entire meaning is negative" because the only thing she is good for is to "awaken the consciousness of immortality" and the only way she can do that is to be a negative influence in his life. Fate makes sure that she arrives at precisely the right moment, just as Eugenia arrived at precisely the right moment for Augusto. Victor Eremita continues,

> But now comes the greatest thing she can do for a man—that is to be unfaithful to him, the sooner the better. The first ideality will help him to an intensified ideality, and he is helped absolutely. To be sure, this second ideality is purchased with the deepest pain, but it is also the greatest blessing. To be sure, he can by no means wish it before it has happened, but this is why he thanks her that it has happened, and since he, humanly speaking, does not have much reason to be so very thankful, all is well. But woe to him if she remains faithful to him! (SLW 63)

Unamuno's Augusto is the literary yet living result of Victor Eremita's advice. Augusto is awakened to consciousness of his own mortality through a negative relationship with a woman, but like Eremita, he remains an esthete to the end.

It may be that Unamuno even sees Augusto as being "situated at the perilous point at which the esthetic is to pass over into the ethical" that the Judge describes (EO, 2: 232). Augusto might have gone on to the ethical if he had chosen to stay alive as he says he wants to do in his interview with Don Miguel. Augusto equates living with becoming a self. Don Miguel questions Augusto's

ability to do that by saying, "Pero si tú no eres sino lo que yo quiera. . ." (2: 669). ("But if you are not anything more than what I want. . .") Augusto replies, "Quiero ser yo, ser yo! ¡Quiero vivir!" (2: 669). ("I want to be myself, to be myself! I want to live!") Don Miguel's insinuation that only he [Don Miguel] will decide what sort of self Augusto will be is a challenge to the contemplative esthete to act. It would seem that Augusto's maturation has not come to the point of believing enough in his own existence to choose to live and enter into the ethical life. But Augusto's maturation has come to the point of wanting decisively to show that he, at the very least, is doing the choosing, and therefore he chooses to die. The choice here is what is crucial and what was crucial for Unamuno from the start. As long as the choice is a real choice in freedom, then for Unamuno the person has come into authentic existence. The category of the esthetic or the ethical is not as important as the choice, even the choice to kill oneself. Unamuno's view is different than that of Judge William on this point. While Judge William recognizes a hierarchy of esthetic life views, for him real choice begins in the ethical sphere.

San Manuel Bueno, mártir: A Study in the Ethical Life

Of all of Unamuno's novels, *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* is the most puzzling to commentators because it seems to negate much of what Unamuno set out to do in the rest of his voluminous corpus. The story is of a rural priest who, on the basis of his remarkable, sacrificial life and work, is about to be canonized. The story is told as a "confession" by one of his devoted

parishioners, Angela. It is a confession because Angela believes it is necessary to tell the whole story of Don Manuel, the story of his inner torment and his unbelief which he hides from all the villagers save Angela and her brother, Lázaro. Don Manuel hides the truth, that there is no life after death, so that his parishioners may live in their dream of immortal life and be happy. Frances Wyers says,

> The man who constantly preached strife seems here to be proposing not just a truce but unconditional surrender. The man who vehemently attacked "blind faith" ("la fe del carbonero") seems suddenly to be upholding the value of delusion. The Unamuno who took it as his personal mission to awaken the sleeping here creates a character who spends his life protecting the dreams of others. It looks as if the *agonista* has abandoned the battlefield to seek permanent solace in the countryside. (104-105)

M. Gordon, in his article, "The Elusive Self," notes that some critics, especially A. Sánchez Barbudo, have seen in *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* a turnabout in Unamuno's thinking, an almost complete personality change. To see this novel as a complete reversal of Unamuno's previous thought, these critics are "apt to assume that its eponymous hero is yet another mouthpiece or fictional alter ego of his creator" (147). However Gordon goes on to show, convincingly in my opinion, that Unamuno did not see any radical change in his authorship in the publishing of this book, fairly late in his career. Gordon points out that in the Prologue to *San Manuel Bueno, mártir y tres historias más*

Unamuno comments on the place of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* in the range of his authorship. Unamuno is reacting to Gregorio Marañón's review of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* and agrees with the reviewer when he says,

> [. . .] esta novelita, ha de ser una de mis obras más leídas y gustadas en adelante como una de las más características de mi producción toda novelesca. Y quien dice novelesca—agrego yo—dice filosófica y teológica. Y así como él pienso yo, que tengo la conciencia de haber puesto en ella todo mi sentimiento trágico de la vida contidiana" (2: 1115).

> [. . .] this little novel will be from now on one of my most read and best liked works, as it is one of the most characteristic of all of my novelistic production. And whoever says novelistic—I add—also says philosophical and theological. So I think, as he [Marañón] does, that I have consciously put in it all of my tragic sense of everyday life.

Unamuno even seems to go out of his way in the Prologue to unite the theme of the present works that he is publishing—"el pavoroso problema de la personalidad" 'the terrifying problem of personality—with his previous work. Unamuno writes, speaking about this unifying theme,

> Claro está que no obedece a un estado de ánimo especial en que me hallara al escribir, en poco más de dos meses, estas tres novelitas, sino que es un estado de ánimo general en que me encuentro, puedo decir que desde que empecé a escribir. Ese

problema, esa congoja, mejor, de la consciencia de la propia personalidad—congoja unas veces trágica y otras cómica—es el que me ha inspirado para casi todos mis personajes de ficción. (2: 1123)

It is clear that it [the taking up of this theme] does not conform to some special state of mind that I found myself in while writing these three little novels in less than two months. Rather, they conform to a general state of mind that I have found myself in, I can say, since I started to write. That problem, or better, that anguish of the consciousness of one's own personality—anguish that is sometimes tragic and sometimes comic—is what has inspired me for almost all of my fictional characters.

If Unamuno did not see any great change in his novelistic, philosophical or theological views embodied in this novel, how is the reader to make sense of the "unconditional surrender" of the protagonist to the "value of delusion" which seeks to go about "protecting the dreams of others," as Frances Wyers put it? Clearly, viewing the hero, Don Manuel, as a mouthpiece or fictional alter ego of his creator, as Gordon suggests others have done, is not a helpful way to begin to understand this work. Carlos Blanco Aguinaga warns that this novel is very complex in his article, "Sobre la complejidad de San Manuel Bueno, mártir, novela." This critic concludes that Unamuno has created in this novel a free, fictitious world with so many paradoxes and contradictions that the reader is left "sin sostén conceptual definido, como en la realidad misma impenetrable" (588).

("without defined, conceptual support, like impenetrable reality itself.") While agreeing that the reader finds herself in a labyrinth of multiple meanings, I would like to offer the following as one way to find a conceptual framework for the novel.

I believe it would be much more helpful in the overall understanding of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* if we were to understand the character of Don Manuel as Unamuno's fictional rendering of the Kierkegaardian sphere of the ethical. It is not a great stretch of credulity to believe that Unamuno was thinking in Kierkegaardian categories of the esthetic and the ethical when he wrote *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* because Unamuno quotes from "Balance between Esthetic and Ethical" of *Either/Or* II in the Prologue to *San Manuel Bueno, mártir y tres historias más.*[7] Though the quote is taken out of context, it strongly suggests a profile for Don Manuel.

> It would be the consummate mockery of the world if the person who had propounded the most profound truth was not a visionary but a doubter. And that is not inconceivable, because no one can present the positive truth as superbly as a doubter, except that he does not believe it himself. If he were a hypocrite, the mockery would be at his own expense. If he were a doubter who himself perhaps wanted to believe what he was presenting, the mockery

[7] In the Prologue Unamuno mentions that he has just finished reading *Either/Or* by his "favorite" Søren Kierkegaard. Of course, the Prologue was written after the writing of the novel, but Unamuno mentions *Either/Or* as early as the 1907 essay "Kierkegaard y Ibsen." Ruth House Webber suggests that *Either/Or* is a book that Unamuno came back to again and again and that his mentioning his having finished *Either/Or* at the writing of this Prologue in no way suggests a first meeting of Kierkegaard. Perusal of the copy of the Kierkegaardian text that Unamuno read confirms a careful, line by line reading based on the copious gloss that is included in the margins.

> would be completely objective, existence would mock itself through him. **He would present a doctrine that could explain everything; the whole human race could rest in it, but this doctrine could not explain its own founder.** If a person were mad but so clever that he could hide his madness, he could make the whole world mad. (EO, 2: 320) (Emphasis added.)

The doctrine that Don Manuel preaches and lives is the life of the ethical, doing good. In his last sermon to his congregation Don Manuel says, "Sed buenos, que esto basta," (2: 1149) ("Be good, that is enough,") and that is how Don Manuel lives his life. He heals the sick and effects reconciliation between husbands and wives, between rebellious children and their parents. He goes with the village doctor on his rounds. He participates in the feasts as well as the funerals of the town. He make toys for the children. He loves the unlovely, especially the village idiot, Blasillo. He does not preach against heretics or unbelievers but rather against gossip and envy—evils that destroy relationships. In what ways can we see that Don Manuel's life is the embodiment of the existence sphere of the ethical?

In *Either/Or* II Judge William enjoins A, the young esthete, to choose despair in order to choose himself. To choose himself is the beginning of the ethical life.

> Choose despair, then, because despair itself is a choice, because one can doubt [*tvivle*] without choosing it, but one cannot despair [*fortvivle*] without choosing it. And in despairing a person chooses

> again, and what then does he choose? He chooses himself, not in his immediacy, not as this accidental individual, but he chooses himself in his eternal validity. (EO, 2: 211).

Despair here is understood as the realization that one has failed to become a self because one has no focus, no identity that is grounded in commitments. It is contrasted with doubt because doubt remains at the level of speculation and abstraction. Despair involves the whole person who is brought to the point of choosing and changing as a result of willing to do the good.

It is clear that Unamuno understood the difference between the abstract doubt and the despair that brings one to a choice. He underscored the following, "Doubt is thought's despair; despair is personality's doubt" (EO, 2: 211). The Judge continues, "That is why I cling so firmly to the defining characteristic 'to choose,' it is my watchword, the nerve in my life-view, and what I do have, even if I can in no way presume to have a system" (EO, 2: 211). Unamuno's Don Manuel has chosen a life based on commitments. His entering into the priesthood is motivated by his commitment to his widowed sister and the desire to help her support her sons. It is said that Don Manuel could have had a brilliant career in the church hierarchy if he had wanted it, but he chooses to serve a humble, isolated parish. In a passage Unamuno underlines the Judge says,

> The person who lives ethically knows that what counts is what one sees in each situation, and the energy with which he considers it, and the one who thus disciplines himself in the most insignificant life situation can experience more than the one who has been a

witness to—indeed, been a participant in—the most noteworthy events. (EO, 2: 252)

Don Manuel explains to Angela that he could not have stood the life of the monastery. He says, "Yo no debo vivir solo; yo no debo morir solo. Debo vivir para mi pueblo, morir para mi pueblo ¿Cómo voy a salvar mi alma si no salvo la de mi pueblo?"(2: 1135). ("I was not meant to live alone, or die alone. I was meant to live for my village, and die for my village. How am I going to save my own soul if I do not save the soul of my village as well?") In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* Johannes Climacus says in a passage underlined by Unamuno, "If an individual throws himself away in order to grasp something great, he is esthetically inspired; it he gives up everything in order to save himself, he is ethically inspired" (CUP 390).

Ultimately, what is the life of the ethical? The Judge says, "The esthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and immediately is what he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes" (EO, 2: 178). Augusto Pérez is a person who spontaneously and immediately is what he is. Don Manuel, however, has taken on the task of selfhood, has chosen to become a self by making the commitments that the esthete eschews, by willing to love and serve his parishioners. Judge William's paradigm of the ethical life is marriage. Don Manuel has made the parish of Valverde de Lucerna his bride.

Don Manuel clearly embodies the life of the ethical, but what are we to make of his lack of faith? The quote from *Either/Or* in the Prologue to *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* says of the doubter who is the source of the most profound

truth, "He would present a doctrine that could explain everything, the whole human race could rest in it, but this doctrine could not explain the founder" (EO, 2: 320). We can see Don Manuel's encouraging his congregation to live the ethical life as he says, "Vivid en paz y contentos," ("Live in peace and contentment,") but he adds, "esperando que nos veamos un día, en la Valverde de Lucerna que hay allí, entre las estrellas de la noche que se reflejan en el lago, sobre la montaña" (2: 1149). ("hoping that we will all see each other again some day in the Valverde de Lucerna that is there, among the stars of the night that are reflected in the lake, above the mountain.") The ethical life Don Manuel leads his parishioners in is conducted in the context of the church whose central belief is in "the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting," a belief which Don Manuel does not share.

From a Kierkegaardian point of view, it is possible to move and live within the sphere of the ethical without having religious faith. The sort of existence that Don Manuel practices is precisely what Judge William has in mind when he talks about the duty-relationship.

> My intention, what I have tried to do to the best of my ability, was rather to throw some light on the absolute significance of duty, the eternal validity of duty-relationship for the personality. That is, as soon as the person in despair has found himself, has chosen himself absolutely, has repented of himself, he then has himself as his task under an eternal responsibility, and in this way duty is posited in its absoluteness. But since he has not created himself

> but has chosen himself, duty is the expression of his absolute dependence and his absolute freedom in their identity with each other. (EO, 2: 270)

However, as we saw in the explanation of the Kierkegaardian existence spheres in Chapter Two, Johannes de Silentio writes *Fear and Trembling* to show that Judge William's understanding of authentic existence—making commitments like marriage, completing one's obligations, performing one's role or one's duties in society—is **not** equivalent to faith. The knight of faith, Abraham, is contrasted with the tragic hero, Agamemnon, who is also required to sacrifice a child for the good of the state but whose actions are understandable to the society around him. Abraham is utterly alone before the Absolute in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, because such an act goes beyond the demands of the ethical, beyond the demands of society. Such an act can only be done in faith.

In Angela's recounting of the life of Don Manuel much is made of Don Manuel's ceaseless activity and constant desire **not** to be alone. "Su vida era activa y no contemplativa, huyendo cuanto podía de no tener nada que hacer. [. . .] Así es que estaba siempre ocupado, y no pocas veces en inventar ocupaciones"(2: 1133). ("His life was active and not contemplative, fleeing whenever possible from being left with having nothing to do. [. . .] So he was always busy, and not a few times invented things to do.") Angela suspects that Don Manuel is fleeing from himself, whom he would have to confront if left alone. In the exchange about why he didn't serve God in a monastery, Don Manuel acknowledges, "La soledad me mataría el alma" (2: 1135). ("Solitude would kill

my soul.") So he has chosen Valverde de Lucerna as his monastery. There he has people around him that can support him and be grateful for his sacrifice of serving them, as Agamemnon had those who supported his difficult task. Both Agamemnon and Don Manuel are tragic heroes, not knights of faith. If they were knights of faith, they would be able to be alone with the Absolute who requires the "teleological suspension of the ethical."

In the creation of Don Manuel, Unamuno represents the ethical life as an option for authentic existence, even if it is not accompanied by faith. The reasons for Don Manuel's inability to believe are not spelled out clearly in the novel, but a passage from *Stages on Life's Way* may help us to understand more of the complexity of the character. In the section of *Stages* that is entitled "Guilty/Not Guilty" an odd entry appears on March 5 in the diary of Quidam, the writer who has fallen in love with a girl and then broken their engagement. The passage seems to have nothing to do with the failed love relationship.[8] It is entitled, "Solomon's Dream," and it is clear that it caught Unamuno's attention because much of the short chapter is underlined. The passage talks about the agony of being ashamed of one's father, "of the person one loves the most and to whom one owes the most" (SLW 250-1).

Solomon goes to David's room at night because he hears what he thinks are intruders, bent on harming his father. What he finds instead is "David, crushed in spirit," and "he hears the cry of despair from the penitent's soul" (251).

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[8] Kierkegaard interpreters, while careful not to equate Quidam with Kierkegaard in the whole, have pointed to the entries on the 5th of the month as those that are more autobiographical. (Kierkegaard was himself born on May 5.) The passage may represent an attempt by

Aware now of his father's sin and his own birth as a result of the sin, Solomon returns to his room. The following is all underlined in Unamuno's copy of *Stages.*

> Faint, Solomon goes back to his bed; he falls asleep, but he does not rest. He dreams—he dreams that David is an ungodly man, rejected by God, that the royal majesty is God's anger with him, that he must wear the purple as a punishment, that he is condemned to rule, condemned to listen to the people's approval, while the righteousness of the Lord secretly and hiddenly passes judgment upon the guilty one. And the dream intimates that God is not the God of the godly but of the ungodly, and that to be singled out by God one has to be an ungodly person, and the horror of the dream is this contradiction.
>
> As David lay on the ground crushed in spirit, Solomon rose from his bed, but his mind was crushed. Horror seized him when he thought of what it means to be God's chosen one. He suspected that the saint's intimacy with God, the uprightness of the pure and faultless man before God, was not the explanation, but that secret guilt was the secret that explained everything.
>
> And Solomon became wise, but he did not become a hero; he became a thinker, but he did not become a man of prayer; and he became a preacher, but he did not become a believer; and he could help many people, but he could not help himself [. . .]. (251-252)

Kierkegaard to explain his inability to marry Regine as a result of his problematic relationship with his own father.

The result of Solomon's realization of the sin of his father and the subsequent dream is that Solomon is crippled. He is unable to believe in the God of his father. He is cursed with the fact that he, too, was "chosen," but he cannot repent as his father had and therefore, "he became crushed but not raised up again, for the power of the will had been overstrained in lifting what was beyond the lad's strength" (252). Don Manuel also carried the affliction of his father, and it also seemed to crush him.

Don Manuel explains to Lázaro that his greatest temptation was his father's greatest temptation—to take his own life. The temptation is at its greatest when he is near the placid waters of the lake which call to him to end his life. It is there that he explains to Lázaro,

> Mi pobre padre, que murió de cerca de noventa años, se pasó la vida, según me lo confesó él mismo, torturado por la tentación del suicidio, que le venía no recordaba desde cuando, *de nación*, decía, y defendiéndose de ella. Y esa defensa fué su vida. Para no sucumbir a tal tentación extremaba los cuidados por conservar la vida. Me contó escenas terribles. Me parecía como una locura. Y yo la he heredado. (2: 1144)

> My poor father, who died near the age of ninety, spent his life, according to what he himself confessed to me, tortured by the temptation of suicide that came to him he didn't remember when, from birth, he would say, defending himself from it. And that defense was his life. In order not to succumb to such a temptation

he went to great lengths to conserve his life. He told me terrible scenes. It seemed to me madness. And I have inherited it.

Don Manuel goes on to talk about "la enfermedad de muerte," 'the sickness unto death' that he has observed in the eyes of the simple villagers whom he has helped to die "well." He says that the sickness unto death is the blackness of the abyss of the tedium of living that is a thousand times worse than hunger. He then says to Lázaro, "Sigamos, pues, Lázaro, suicidándonos en nuestra obra y en nuestro pueblo y que sueñe éste su vida como el lago sueña el cielo" (2: 1144). ("Let us continue then, Lázaro, killing ourselves in our work and in our village and may the village dream its life as the lake dreams the sky.") Killing oneself by continuing to work in and for the village is preferable to succumbing to the waters of the lake. Doing so may perpetuate the dream that the villagers have that they will live beyond this life, but Don Manuel calls himself and Lázaro to the ongoing task.

This is Don Manuel's "cruz de nacimiento" 'cross of birth' which he must somehow bear. Knowing Don Manuel's struggle to stay alive, we can better understand his response to Angela when she asks what sin it is that everyone has committed for which she automatically prays when she prays the Ave María. Don Manuel says, "el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido" (2: 1147). ("The greatest sin of man is to have been born.") Don Manuel gives the source for the answer to that question as one of the great doctors of the church, Calderón and his play *La vida es sueño*. In answer to Angela's question about whether or not one could ever be absolved from such a sin, Don Manuel says, "Sí, al fin se cura

el sueño,. . . al fin se cura la vida. . . al fin se acaba la cruz del nacimiento. . . Y como dijo Calderón, el hacer bien, y el engañar bien, ni aun en sueños se pierde . . ." (2: 1147-48). ("Yes, the dream is atoned at the end. . .life is atoned at the end. . .finally the cross of birth ends. . .And as Calderón said, doing well and even feigning good is not lost, even in dreams.")

Calderón's character, Segismundo, comes to this conclusion after his frightful forays into multiple worlds not of his making, and he feels the weight of his sin of having been born. But he is not crippled, as Quidam's Solomon was, or as Don Manuel is, by the affliction of his father. In addition to Calderón's character, I believe that Unamuno had in mind the passage quoted above from *Stages on Life's Way*. Segismundo ends acting nobly and putting right all the wrongs that had been done to him. The Solomon of "Solomon's Dream" is a divided man. "There was a split in his being, and Solomon was like the invalid who cannot carry his own body," (252) even though he dispensed wisdom that impressed the Queen of the East. In this Solomon we have a clearer image of Don Manuel who is "split in his being" by the weight of his father's temptation and his own attempts to fight the temptation.

If Unamuno has created for his readers in Don Manuel a viable option for authentic existence, the essence of the ethical, how are we to understand the many indications that the priest is perpetrating a fraud, that he is duping simple, gullible people to believe things that he himself cannot believe? One of the ways that Carlos Blanco Aguinaga tries to reconcile Don Manuel's deception of the people with his otherwise exemplary life is to say that he deceived them out of

love ("Complejidad," 570). Though Unamuno delighted in contradiction he would not condone the hypocrisy or the potential danger of purposeful deception. Don Manuel's view of how to deal with the truth is antithetical to Unamuno's. He says to Lázaro, "¿La verdad? La verdad, Lázaro es acaso algo terrible, algo intolerable, algo mortal; la gente sencilla no podría vivir con ella. [. . .] Yo estoy para hacer vivir a las almas de mis feligreses, para hacerles felices, para hacerles que se sueñen inmortales y no para matarles" (2: 1142). ("The truth? The truth, Lazarus, is perhaps so terrible, something intolerable, something mortal; the simple people would not be able to live with it. [. . .] I am here to make the souls of my parishioners live, to make them happy, to make them dream that they are immortal, not to kill them.") This hardly sounds like the author whose goal for his reader is that the wound of life be kept constantly open.

Later, in failing health, Don Manuel tries to tell Lázaro that religion will not solve the economic and political conflicts in society. "Piensen los hombres y obren los hombres como pensaren y como obraren, que se consuelen de haber nacido, que vivan lo más contentos que puedan en la ilusión de que todo esto tiene una finalidad" (2: 1146). ("Let men think and act as they will, let them console themselves for having been born, let them live as happily as they can in the illusion that all this has a purpose.") Nor does this sound like the Unamuno of *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* where he embraces doubt, uncertainty and struggle as the way to live or the Unamuno who says in *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho*, "[. . .] si existieran de verdad, sufrirían de existir y no se contentarían con ello. Si real y verdaderamente existieran en el tiempo y el espacio, sufrirían

de no ser en lo eterno y lo infinito" (3: 52). ("[. . .] if they truly existed, they would suffer and they would not be content. If really and truly they existed in time and in space, they would suffer from not being in the eternal and the infinite.")

Did Unamuno, indeed, change his mind at the end of his life? Given that Unamuno saw this work as containing all of his tragic sense of life, for critics to claim that in weariness Unamuno is content to embrace a frictionless *intrahistoria* as authentic existence at the end of his career is unwarranted and unfair to his entire authorship. So what is happening here? I believe that Unamuno is using indirect communication in order to make his reader think and appropriate existential truth. He is practicing that maieutic ideal of which we spoke earlier. He has chosen a complex, conflicted character to show possibilities for authentic and inauthentic existence.

There is no question but that there is much in Don Manuel to be admired, but what, precisely? Don Manuel has made the choice of commitment to his people, the sort of commitment that makes life authentic and meaningful. Unamuno admires the passion of Don Manuel. Unamuno says in the essay that precedes the second edition of *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho*, "Procura vivir en continuo vértigo pasional, dominado por una pasión cualquiera. Sólo los apasionados llevan a cabo obras verdaderamente duraderas" (3: 58). ("Seek to live in continuous, passionate vertigo, dominated by whatever passion. Only the passionate carry out works that are truly enduring.") Here Unamuno is holding Don Quijote up as an example of authentic existence. At the end of the Prologue to *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* Unamuno equates Don Manuel and Don Quijote.

"Y no quiero aquí comentar ya más el martirio de Don Quijote ni de Don Manuel Bueno, martirios quijotescos los dos" (2: 1123). (And I don't want to comment anymore here on the martyrdom of Don Quijote and Don Manuel Bueno, quixotic martyrs, the two of them.")

Nevertheless, Unamuno's own stated desire to embrace the struggle and keep the wound of existence open would call into question Don Manuel's attempt to deceive his parishioners into a false sense of security. In combining the loving deceit, as Blanco Aguinaga would have it, with the sacrificial life of Don Manuel, Unamuno shows how seductive and attractive the movement into illusion is. It does not follow that in making Don Manuel winsome and beloved by his people Unamuno betrays his values. Rather, he makes clearer the pain involved in facing one's death honestly. I don't believe that Unamuno is embracing illusion as a way of life. Unamuno risks being misunderstood here because as a midwife for the truth he knows that existential truth must be acquired and appropriated indirectly in order for it to have validity. In *Como se hace una novela* Unamuno says, "Con todo lo cual creo a-sistir a mis prójimos, a mis hermanos, a mis co-hombres, a que se encuentren a sí mismos y entren para siempre en la historia y se hagan su propia novela. ¡Estar conformes! ¡Bah!; hay animales hervíboros y hay plantas carnívoras. Cada uno se sostiene de sus contrarios" (8: 725). ("In all, I believe I do as-sist my neighbors, my brothers, my fellow men, assist them to find themselves, and to enter history forever, and to make their own novel. But in some sort of easy agreement? No! Some animals are herbivorous and some plants are carnivorous. Everything sustains itself on its opposites.")

The end of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir* throws doubt on the entire confessional diary of Angela, the narrator. Throughout the story Don Manuel's belief or lack of it has been a central tension. At the end of the narrative, Angela questions her own recollection of the people and events she has recorded. "¿Es que sé algo? ¿es que creo algo? ¿Es que esto que estoy contando aquí ha pasado y ha pasado tal y como lo cuento? ¿Es que pueden pasar estas cosas? ¿Es que todo esto es más que un sueño soñado dentro de otro sueño?" (2: 1152-53). ("Do I really know anything? Do I really believe anything? Is it that what I am telling here has happened and has happened just as I say it did? Is it possible that such things happen? Is all of this more than a dream that was dreamed within another dream?") In addition to doubts about Don Manuel's belief, Unamuno now gives the reader cause to believe that his narrator may be unreliable, as well. Why so many untied ends at the conclusion of this story? Frances Wyers notes Unamuno's proclivity to "prevent his works from coming to any conclusion" (47). I think that she is right when she says, "The unwillingness to let go of the story might account both for his disdain for plots and for the self-reflective structure of those fictions [. . .] in which he tries to suggest a continual, never-ending circular relation between reader and writer" (47).

The relation between reader and writer is paramount, but the communicator about authentic existence must maintain his distance in order to be the midwife for truth. That distance is maintained through the lack of a tidy conclusion here, in *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, as it is in so many of Unamuno's novels. In *Como se hace una novela* Unamuno says, "Todo lector que leyendo

una novela se preocupa de saber cómo acabarán los personajes de ella sin preocuparse de saber cómo acabará él, no merece que se satisfaga su curiosidad" (8: 750). ("Any reader who in reading a novel concerns himself with how the characters will turn out without concerning himself with his own end does not deserve to have his curiosity satisfied.") Unamuno is practicing the maieutic ideal as explained by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.* Johannes says as he comments on the other pseudonymous works, "But the absence of a conclusion is expressly a qualification of inwardness, because a conclusion is something external, and the communication of a conclusion an external relation between a knower and a nonknower" (289). For both Unamuno and the pseudonymous writers, the goal is inwardness, authentic existence, and a conclusion that removes ambiguity removes the opportunity for the nonknower to appropriate anything in inwardness.

Abel Sánchez: A Study in Possibilities for Religious Existence

There is a passage from *Fear and Trembling* that Unamuno underlined and that clearly demarcates Johannes de Silentio's understanding of the three existence spheres. It says,

> No one who was great in the world will be forgotten, but everyone was great in his own way, and everyone in proportion to the greatness of that which *he loved.* He who loved himself became great by virtue of himself and he who loved other men became

> great by his devotedness, but he who loved God became the greatest of all. (16)

He who loved himself is the esthete, and he who loved other men is the person who lives in the sphere of the ethical. He who loved God is that person who dwells within the realm of the religious. We have seen Augusto Pérez as the character that Unamuno creates to live out the life of the esthete, even to his unfortunate end. Don Manuel Bueno is the character who loved other men and became great by his devotedness. Is there a character in the work of Unamuno who can be said to have loved God and therefore became greatest of all?

To my knowledge, there is no main protagonist who unreservedly believes in God, but Unamuno does have many characters on the road to belief in God. Whether they get to the destination or not is not as important as their varying degrees of proximity to the life of faith. On the basis of his inability to love anyone, even himself, Joaquín Monegro would seem to be an unlikely candidate to turn to as an example of a person living authentic existence near the sphere of the religious. He is one of the most demonic of Unamuno's characters, but he is also much closer to faith than Augusto Pérez.

How can a character so consumed with envy as Joaquín be close to the religious life? In Unamuno's view, the person who struggles the most with the realities of life and death is the closest to God. The individual who struggles often finds herself in despair. As we saw previously in Chapter Two, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus calls despair "the sickness unto death,"

but he is very careful to explain how the different forms of despair can lead to faith or away from it. Anti-Climacus says at the end of his Preface,

> Once and for all may I point out that in the whole book, as the title indeed declares, despair is interpreted as a sickness, not as a cure. Despair is indeed that dialectical. Thus, also in Christian terminology death is indeed the expression for the state of deepest spiritual wretchedness, and yet the cure is simply to die, to die to the world. (6)

In calling despair dialectical Anti-Climacus means to point to the opposite possibilities inherent in despair, i.e., despair can lead both to faith in God and defiance of God. Keeping in mind this dialectical nature of despair, passages from *The Sickness Unto Death* can help us see how Joaquín Monegro emerged in Unamuno's thinking.[9]

Anti-Climacus sees the self as "the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, which can be

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[9] One must at least acknowledge Unamuno's statement in the Prologue to the second edition of *Abel Sánchez* where he declares that neither Lord Byron's *Cain* nor any other source provided him with the material for his characters. Unamuno says that his characters do not come from books, "sino de la vida social que siento y sufro—y gozo--en torno mío y de mi propia vida" (2: 685). ("but from the social life which I feel, suffer and enjoy around me and from my own life.") What Unamuno is reacting to, I think, is the idea of wholesale theft from one author to another. To say that Unamuno's voluminous reading did not affect his thought and creation is absurd, but we can understand when Unamuno wants to claim that his characters are "hijas naturales y legítimas de su autor" (2: 685). ("natural and legitimate children of their author.")

Other critics have posited other sources for *Abel Sánchez*. Carlos Clavería sees the Cain and Abel myth as foundational throughout Unamuno's work. Nelson Orringer claims that Croce and Stapher provide the "modern" view of envy that is contrasted with the Catholic understanding of envy that Unamuno gleans from Quevedo. The resulting conflict provides the tension in the protagonist which is a metaphor for the envy that is causing the internal strife in Spain. The article carefully documents Unamuno's having read Croce and Stapher, but the author's conclusions are not convincing. Unamuno didn't need Quevedo to understand the Biblical view of envy, and Croce and Stapher add little new or unique to Unamuno's already well-formed view of the importance of passion in authentic existence.

done only through the relationship to God" (29-30). Not to become a self is to live in despair, but there are levels of despair that bring the person nearer to or farther from God and to being a self. If the self does not grasp the need for this synthesis between the finite and the infinite as a task for life, if one is ignorant that there is a disjunction between the finite and the infinite, then the person is ignorant of his own despair. "Compared with the person who is conscious of his despair, the despairing individual who is ignorant of his despair is simply a negativity further away from the truth and deliverance" (44). At the beginning of *Niebla* Augusto Pérez is ignorant of his own despair and is a long way from "truth and deliverance." Joaquín Monegro, on the other hand, realizes the dimensions of the struggle and his inability to become the person he wants to become very early in life.

Anti-Climacus goes on to describe two more levels of despair once a person is made aware of his despair. The first is in despair *not to will to be oneself* in weakness and the second is in despair *to will to be oneself* in defiance, and the two are related.[10] When a person despairingly fails to will to be herself, she despairs first over externals, what life has dealt the individual, and then despairs over her weakness, that part of the self that cannot give itself over to the

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[10] Gemma Roberts misinterprets the first sort of despair in Joaquín. She says that in wanting to be Abel, Joaquín does not will to be himself in the sense that he does not accept himself for who he is. Anti-Climacus' meaning of not to will to be oneself goes much deeper than an inferiority complex. Not to will to be oneself is not to take on the task of becoming a self before God.

Roberts does an admirable job of bringing the text of *Sickness Unto Death* to bear on *Abel Sánchez*, but her claims of harmony between Kierkegaard and Unamuno are unwarranted. She concludes that Unamuno is a Christian existentialist based on the *Diario Intimo* which was written during and after his religious crisis of 1897 when Unamuno tried to regain the faith of his childhood. Sánchez Barbudo points out that Unamuno later called this return to faith through a renewal of daily religious practice, "false," and claims that Unamuno wanted to believe but was not, in fact, a believer (97-98). There are dissenters from Sánchez Barbudo's strong statement,

eternal in faith. There is a level of this despair called "inclosing reserve" or *Indesluttethed* in Danish, in which the weakness one feels is very carefully hidden from anyone else.[11] Joaquín is clearly aware of his weakness from very early in his life. He is jealous of Abel from their boyhood when Abel excels at everything social that happens outside of school while Joaquín must console himself with his success inside the school. When Joaquín learns that Abel and Helena have become lovers he names his weakness as his loathing of Abel and purposes to conceal it. "Con el día y el cansancio de tanto sufrir volvióme la reflexión, comprendí que no tenía derecho alguno a Helena, pero empecé a odiar a Abel con toda mi alma y a proponerme a la vez ocultar ese odio, abonarlo, crialo, cuidarlo en lo recóndito de las entrañas de mi alma" (2: 697). ("With daylight and the weariness of so much suffering, reason returned to me and I understood that I had no right to Helena, but I began to hate Abel with all my soul, and at the same time purposed to hide that hate, feed it and cultivate it in the darkest corners of my soul.")

The person who lives with inclosing reserve is described by Anti-Climacus as the upright citizen who goes about his duties with no indication of his weakness given to the outside world. If someone were privy to his weakness and he were told that his weakness was really a matter of pride, "Alone with

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but one can say at the very least that the *Diario Intimo* is not representative of Unamuno's entire work which carried on until 1936.

[11] Unamuno would have been familiar with this term from his reading of *Stages on Life's Way.* Quidam, the writer of "Guilty/Not Guilty," is also said to suffer from inclosing reserve. However, there is a difference in the use of the concept in *Stages* and *Sickness Unto Death.* In *Stages* Quidam thinks that his inclosing reserve is a good thing, something that is a central part of his religious experience. It is what keeps him from marrying, but Quidam believes that he is using his inclosing reserve for good. In *Sickness Unto Death* Anti-Climacus is clear that inclosing reserve

himself, he no doubt would confess that there is something to it, but the passionateness with which his self has interpreted his weakness would soon lead him into believing that it cannot possibly be pride [. . .]" (65). There are moments in which Joaquín realizes the depth of his weakness, and they affect his sense of self. He attends the wedding of Helena and Abel with great hate in his heart for both of them. When he hears them say "I do" his hate becomes overwhelming. "Me sentí peor que un monstruo, me sentí como si no existiera, como si no fuese nada más que un pedazo de hielo. Y esto para siempre. Llegué a palparme la carne, a pellizcármela, a tomarme el pulso. '¿Pero estoy vivo? ¿Yo soy yo?' me dije" (2: 699-700). ("I felt worse than a monster. I felt as though I didn't exist, as if I were nothing more than a piece of ice. And this forever. I came to the point of touching my flesh, of pinching myself, of taking my pulse. 'But am I alive? Am I, I?' I asked myself.") Anti-Climacus points out that such a painful experience can break through the inclosing reserve to bring a person to faith, which is the opposite of despair, or it can intensify the inclosing reserve and bring the person to greater despair, the despair of defiance.

The despair of defiance is the despair in which a person wills to be what he is in defiance of what God wants him to be. Anti-Climacus describes such a person whose inclosing reserve has been intensified into defiance. "A person in this kind of despair will hurl himself into life, perhaps into the diversion of great enterprises; he will become a restless spirit whose life certainly leaves its mark, a restless spirit who wants to forget [. . .]" (65-66). He may even go back to living

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is a stumbling block on the road to becoming a self before God. Rather than enhancing the religious experience, it ultimately prevents the person from moving into the religious sphere.

in immediacy and sensuality, "but always with the consciousness of the self he does not want to be" (66). Nothing could describe Joaquín more accurately. After Helena and Abel's wedding he writes in his *Confession,*

> Yo me hundí en mis libros, en mi estudio, en mi clientela, que empezaba ya a tenerla. El despejo mental que me dió aquel golpe de lo ya irreparable, el descubrimiento en mí mismo de que no hay alma, moviéronme a buscar en el estudio, no ya consuelo—consuelo, ni lo necesitaba ni lo quería—, sino apoyo para una ambición inmensa. Tenía que aplastar con la fama de mi nombre la fama, ya incipiente, de Abel; mis descubrimientos científicos, obra de arte, de verdadera poesía, tenían que hacer sombra a sus cuadros. (2: 700)
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> I buried myself in my books, in my study, in my clients who now began to come to me. The mental clarity caused by that irreparable blow, the discovery within myself that I had no soul, moved me to seek in study, not really comfort—comfort I neither needed nor wanted—but the impetus for immense ambition. I had to crush with the fame of my name the fame, already growing, of Abel; my scientific discoveries, my work of art, of real poetry, had to overshadow his paintings.

But the pursuit of fame cannot entirely consume him, and when Joaquín hears that the artist Abel is having affairs with some of his models he thinks he should have an open door to Helena. What marvelous revenge it would be if he could

seduce her! But he is emphatically rebuffed by Helena and pushed into further despair.

Joaquín has moved from the despair of weakness into the despair of defiance. Paradoxically, the despair of defiance is a despair that is still closer to truth, to faith. Anti-Climacus explains that the despair of defiance is only possible through the aid of the eternal. How is that? Only through the aid of the eternal does the existing person realize that he can choose, that he has the freedom to choose to be himself, but the despair of defiance is a "misuse of the eternal within the self to will in despair to be oneself" (67). But precisely "because it is despair through the aid of the eternal, in a certain sense it is very close to the truth" (67). The freedom the eternal gives as part of the substance of the self can be used through despair to bring about faith. "The despair that is the thoroughfare to faith comes also through the aid of the eternal; through the aid of the eternal the self has the courage to lose itself in order to win itself" (67). But in the case of the despair of defiance, the freedom given by the eternal is used to choose despair over faith. "Here, however, it is unwilling to begin with losing itself but wills to be itself" (67).

In the despair of defiance there is a greater consciousness of self than in any other sort of despair. For that reason, too, it brings the person in despair closer to the truth. This is a despair that is "conscious of itself as an act; it does not come from the outside as a suffering under the pressure of externalities but comes directly from the self" (67). Joaquín's declaration of his intention to make ambition and fame his sole goal in life is a conscious act motivated by his

realization that he has no soul. Fame will be his soul, and the external cause of this act is almost forgotten. Speaking of Helena and Abel, Joaquín says, "Hasta llegué a creer que los olvidaría! Quise hacer de la ciencia un narcótico y a la vez un estimulante! (2: 700). ("I came to believe that I would forget them [Abel and Helena]. I wanted to make science a narcotic and a stimulant at the same time.")

The person who despairs in defiance embraces his weakness and glories in it.

> He has convinced himself that this thorn in the flesh gnaws so deeply that he cannot abstract himself from it (whether this is actually the case or his passion makes it so to him), and therefore he might as well accept it forever, so to speak. He is offended by it, or more correctly, he takes it as an occasion to be offended at all existence, [. . .] he wills to be himself with it, takes it along, almost flouting his agony. (70-71)

At first Joaquín seems to despair over his affliction and longs for it to be taken away. "Vi mi ciencia a través de mi pecado y la miseria de dar vida para propagar la muerte. Y vi que aquel odio inmortal era mi alma. Ese odio pensé que debió de haber precedido a mi nacimiento y que sobreviviría a mi muerte. Y me sobrecojí de espanto al pensar en vivir siempre para aborrecer siempre" (2: 713). ("I saw my science through my sin and the misery of giving life in order to propagate death. I saw that that immortal hate was my soul. That hate, I thought, must have preceded my birth and will probably survive my death. I was overcome with fear at the thought of living forever in order to hate forever.") But

after Joaquín has effected the marriage of Abelín and Joaquina and seems to have the upper hand on Abel at the moment, the narrator says of the *Confession* that Joaquín is writing that Joaquín hoped that his daughter or his grandchildren would make the diary known to the world so that the world

> [. . .] se sobrecojiera de admiración y de espanto ante aquel héroe de la angustia tenebrosa que pasó sin que le conocieran en todo su fondo los que con él convivieron. Porque Joaquín se creía un espíritu de excepción, y como tal, torturado, y más capaz de dolor que los otros, un alma señalada al nacer por Dios con la señal de los grandes predestinados. (2: 746)

> [. . .] might be taken with admiration and terror by that hero of dark anguish who passed through life without anyone around him really profoundly knowing him. Because Joaquín thought of himself that he was an exceptional spirit, and as such, tortured and more capable of pain than others, a soul who was given by God the sign of predestined greatness at birth.

Joaquín's flouting his agony and his offense at existence is seen in the entry in his diary that comes immediately after this commentary by the narrator.

> Mi vida, hija mía, ha sido un arder continuo, pero no la habría cambiado por la de otro. He odiado como nadie, como ningún otro ha sabido odiar, pero es que he sentido más que otros la suprema injusticia de los cariños del mundo y de los favores de la fortuna.

> [. . .] Todos, todos me amargaron la vida. Y comprendí que el mundo es naturalmente injusto y que yo no había nacido entre los míos. Esta fué mi desgracia, no haber nacido entre los míos. La baja mezquindad, la vil ramplonería de los que me rodeaban me perdió. (2: 746-7)
>
> My life, my daughter, has been a continual suffering, but I would not change it for another. I have hated like no one else, like no other I have known how to hate, but it is because I have felt more than others the supreme injustice of the affections of the world and of the favors of fortune. [. . .] Everyone, everyone has embittered my life. And I understood that the world is naturally unjust and that I had not been born among my own. This was my misfortune, not to have been born among my own. The low meanness, the vile coarseness of those who surrounded me was my downfall.

Such a person who is offended by existence and flouts his agony will find it hard to receive any sort of proffered help to alleviate the suffering. To accept help from someone makes that someone superior, and the one helped inferior. Anti-Climacus says there is the fear of "becoming a nothing in the hand of the 'Helper' for whom all things are possible, or the humiliation of simply having to yield to another person, of giving up being himself as long as he is seeking help" (71). Joaquín refuses help saying, "—consuelo, ni lo necesitaba ni lo quería—" (2: 700). ("—comfort I neither needed nor wanted—.")

At one point Antonia persuades Joaquín to go to church to confess as a way of expiating his demon. Under pressure Joaquín goes to see the priest, curious to see if the Church could cure him, even if he did not believe. But in order to be helped by the priest, Joaquín must believe that he can be helped, that he can change, and be willing to give up his weakness. He must accept a paradigm for life that as a physician and scientist he has rejected. Joaquín says to the priest, "No, no creo en la libertad humana, y el que no cree en la libertad no es libre. ¡No, no lo soy! ¡Ser libre es creer serlo!" (2: 719). (No, I do not believe in human freedom, and he who does not believe in freedom isn't free. I am not free. To be free is to believe that you are free!") Though the priest tells Joaquín that he was made free, Joaquín insists that he was born to doubt God and to be free only to do evil. Joaquín believes of himself what he had said previously about Cain, that God has made him envious and has abandoned him. Joaquín, upon leaving the priest, asks why he had been born. The priest says it's better to ask to what purpose he was born. Joaquín cannot accept the help of the Church.

Anti-Climacus notes the consequence of Joaquín's type of suffering and the unwillingness to give it up.

> The more consciousness there is in such a sufferer who in despair wills to be himself, the more his despair intensifies and becomes demonic. [. . .] So now he makes precisely this torment the object of all of his passion, and it finally becomes a demonic rage. [. . .] Once he would gladly have given everything to be rid of this agony,

> but he was kept waiting; now it is too late, now he would rather rage against everything and be the wronged victim of the world and all of life [. . .]. (71-72)

After Helena rejects Joaquín's overtures a second time, Joaquín's despair goes even deeper. Now there is no turning back. The path toward the demonic is in place. Many times through the narrative Joaquín is referred to as a sick man, an incurable invalid, but the demonstrations of his illness grow more serious and pronounced.

A maid who is particularly devout comes to work in Joaquín's home. By now he is so evil, just having the righteous maid in their home is an affront to him. He taunts her and asks why she doesn't rebel. He calls her a hypocrite and says that he won't be used as an occasion for her to win points in heaven. "Es una canallada tomar las flaquezas del prójimo como medio para ejercitarnos la virtud. Que me replique, que se insolente, que sea persona . . . y no criada" (2: 724). (It is a mean thing to do to take the foibles of someone else as a way to exercise virtue. Let her talk back to me. Let her get insolent. Let her be a person . . . and not a maid.") But she doesn't talk back. Joaquín calls her an idiot and dismisses her. Anti-Climacus comments on the phenomenon of the demonic being repulsed by the good. "Confronted by someone stronger in the good than himself, the demoniac, when the good is described by that one in all its sublimity, can plead for himself, can tearfully plead that that one will not speak to him, that he will not—as he phrases it—make him weak" (108). After Joaquín dismisses the maid he worries whether she will tell everyone that he is mad. He

asks Antonia if he is mad. She tells him not to get that way, but he insists that he is mad and that she should have him put away. Joaquín's consciousness of his weakness has reached a new height of desperation, but there would be even more serious indications of his madness, including the attempted murder of Abel.

It becomes more and more clear that Joaquín is a perfect example of what Anti-Climacus calls a self who in despair wills to be itself in defiance. Anti-Climacus says of such a self, "Rebelling against all existence, it feels that it has obtained evidence against it, against its goodness. The person in despair believes that he himself is the evidence, and that is what he wants to be, and therefore he wants to be himself, himself in his torment, in order to protest against all existence with his torment" (73-74). And that is certainly how Joaquín lives out his life. However, Joaquín also shows that he is ever so close to salvation at his deathbed. Anti-Climacus says of the self who wills himself in defiance that the person is afraid of eternity for a strange reason. He is afraid that eternity "will separate him from his, demonically understood, infinite superiority over other men, his justification, demonically understood, for being what he is. [. . .] What demonic madness—the thought that most infuriates him is that eternity could get the notion to deprive him of his misery" (72). To these lengths, Joaquín does not go.

On his deathbed Joaquín is still wondering why he was made to be so evil. "¿Qué hice para ser así? ¿Qué leche mamé? ¿Era un bebedizo de odio? ¿Ha sido un bebedizo de sangre? ¿Por qué nací en tierra de odios? En tierra en que el precepto parece ser: 'Odia a tu prójimo como a ti mismo.' ¿Porque he vivido

odiándome?" (2: 758). ("Why was I made this way? What milk did I suck from my mother's breast? Was it a potion of hate? Has it been a potion of blood? Why was I born in the land of hate? In the land in which the main precept seems to be, 'Hate your neighbor as you hate yourself.' Why have I lived hating myself?") But then he asks for the child to be brought to him and he asks the child's forgiveness. There are no more self-justifications about how the other grandfather had stolen the boy's affection. There is just a request for forgiveness. Then Joaquín says something remarkable to the assembled company. He says that Antonia is the real victim and that she could not cure him because he did not love her. If he had just been able to love her he might have been saved. But Joaquín does not rail against eternity for taking away his ability to hate. Rather, he welcomes death as a way in which the hate can stop. He does not defiantly choose to hate into eternity, and that, perhaps, is his salvation.

I have claimed that these passages from *Sickness Unto Death* helped to form the character of Joaquín in the mind of Unamuno. The *afinidades* and *coincidencias*, as Gemma Roberts calls them, are so striking that, as you are reading Anti-Climacus' description of the self who in despair wills to be himself in defiance, you believe that you are seeing Joaquín's story in outline form. But can one claim that Unamuno had these passages in mind when he was writing *Abel Sánchez*? There is no way to know that for certain, of course. Even if we could ask Unamuno he might disavow any link just as he disavowed a link between *Abel Sánchez* and Byron's *Cain*. But there are two passages which Unamuno underlined in *Sickness Unto Death* which help to substantiate my claim that the

book was formative in the creation of Joaquín. The first has to do with being able to place Joaquín within the sphere of the religious. It says of the poet, "His relation to the religious is that of an unhappy love, not in the strictest sense that of a believer; he has only the first element of faith—despair—and within it an intense longing for the religious" (78). As noted in Chapter One, Unamuno's underscoring of text for the most part consisted of horizontal or vertical line in the margins marking a sentence or a passage. This time, unusually, Unamuno actually draws a line under the Danish words "*han har kun det Forste af Troe: Fortvivlelsen*" 'he has only the first element of faith: despair.' Unamuno recognized despair as a first element of faith and embodied despair in the character of Joaquín.

The second important passage that Unamuno underlined from *Sickness Unto Death* has to do with the nature of Joaquín's weakness.

> For what is offense? Offense is unhappy admiration. Thus it is related to envy, but it is an envy that turns against the person himself, is worse against oneself to an even higher degree. The uncharitableness of the natural man cannot allow him the extraordinary that God has intended for him; so he is offended.
>
> The degree of offense depends on how passionate a man's admiration is. The more prosaic people, lacking in imagination and passion and thus not particularly given to admiration, are also offended, but they limit themselves to saying: Such a thing I just can't understand; I leave it alone. They are the skeptics. But the

> more passion and imagination a person has—consequently, the closer he is in a certain sense (in possibility) to being able to believe, N.B., to humbling himself in adoration under the extraordinary—the more passionate is his offense, which finally cannot be satisfied with anything less than getting this rooted out, annihilated, trampled into the dirt. (86)

There are two elements within this quote that are worthy of attention. The first is its emphasis on passion. In order to even bring admiration to the level of envy, one must have imagination and passion. The second is the indication once again that the passionate one, the one who is most offended, is the one who is closest to being able to believe.

The offense being spoken of in the first paragraph of this quote is the offense of Christianity. The next paragraph after these two that are underlined shows the link between the offense and envy.

> To understand offense, it is necessary to study human envy [. . .]. Envy is secret admiration. An admirer who feels that he cannot become happy by abandoning himself to it chooses to be envious of that which he admires. So he speaks another language wherein that which he actually admires is a trifle, a rather stupid, insipid, peculiar, and exaggerated thing. Admiration is happy self-surrender; envy is unhappy self assertion.

> It is the same with offense, for that which between man and man is admiration/envy is adoration/offense in the relationship between God and men. (86)

Joaquín is a perfect embodiment of both these dichotomies. His passion has turned his admiration for Abel into envy and that in turn is linked with his sense of offense, of having been abandoned by God. The link between envy and offense suggested by Anti-Climacus proved to be a fruitful image for Unamuno who powerfully portrays both in his character Joaquín.

I have maintained that Augusto Pérez, Don Manuel Bueno and Joaquín Monegro represent the esthetic, the ethical and the religious existence spheres respectively. I have also said that Unamuno does not privilege one of the existence spheres over the other but provides them all as possibilities for authentic existence. Given the demonic nature of Joaquín, can it be that Unamuno really proffers this protagonist as an example of authentic existence? There is no question but that Unamuno's sympathies lie with Joaquín. In the Prologue to the second edition he writes, "Y ahora, al releer por primera vez mi *Abel Sánchez* para corregir las pruebas de esta segunda—y espero que no última edición, he sentido la grandeza de la pasión de mi Joaquín Monegro y cuán superior es moralmente a todos los Abeles" (2: 686). ("And now upon rereading for the first time my *Abel Sánchez* in order to correct the galleys of this second, and I hope not the last, edition, I have felt the greatness of the passion of my Joaquín Monegro and how superior he is morally to all of the Abels.") Unamuno claims that Joaquín is *morally* superior to Abel, and that is also clear

from the unfolding of the story. Abel's motivation for the art that he produces is base—money—though he claims later that it is also his religion. Abel does not love his wife but uses her as much as she uses him. He is unfaithful. He has no interest in his son and doesn't even care enough about him to discipline him. But in the quote cited above none of those things are mentioned. Rather, Unamuno focuses on the moral superiority of Joaquín based on his passion. Abel is the one who can be swayed to anyone's opinion as long as he remains the popular one in the process. He refuses to take a position that will cause an argument. He seems incapable of either love or hate. But Joaquín is passionate. It is Joaquín's passion that leads him to envy so deeply, but it is his passion that also leads him closer to truth and to belief.

CONCLUSION

It is safe to say that questions about the substance, nature and functioning of the self are still very much with us today. The novelist Walker Percy has written a book about the self entitled *Lost in the Cosmos* to which he mockingly appends the subtitle, *The Last Self-Help Book*. It is a compendium of alternative ways of perceiving ourselves expressed through artfully contrived multiple-choice quizzes. One of his first points is that our knowledge of ourselves is not like any other knowledge that we have of our world (5-13). Kierkegaard and Unamuno would agree, though they lived and wrote more than a half century apart and though they never reached the "advanced" culture of the twenty first century. Those still seeking answers to questions about the meaning of existence would do well to look to both of these authors for their insights into the substance, nature and functioning of the self.

In this dissertation I have read Unamuno's novels through a Kierkegaardian lens. Of course, it is not the only way in which to read these multi-voiced texts. However, I have shown that a Kierkegaardian reading is both justifiable and profitable. We have seen that in evaluating the relationship between Kierkegaard and Unamuno scholars have disagreed about the extent of the influence of Kierkegaard on Unamuno and/or the unanimity in their views. I have chosen to focus on the understanding of the self in these two authors as a way to clarify the issues and problems involved in comparing them, but I have also chosen the concept of the self because I believe it is central to the authorship of both of these writers.

The first problem that must be addressed when trying to compare the thought of Kierkegaard and Unamuno is being clear about what Kierkegaardian thought really is, as differentiated from the thought of his pseudonyms. The key to understanding Kierkegaardian thought is understanding his concept of indirect communication and his purpose in using the pseudonyms. Kierkegaard believed that to communicate existential truth, a writer must be a midwife for that truth through an artful, indirect communication that would allow for the uncertainties of existence to be presented to the reader with sufficient distance to allow that single individual to appropriate the existential truth into her life. The pseudonyms provide Kierkegaard with the opportunity to say things that he would not say with his own voice and provide the reader with the distance from the author that is necessary for the appropriation of existential truth. However, Kierkegaard says clearly in "A First and Last Declaration" and *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* that the purpose for using the elaborate scheme of indirect communication and the pseudonyms was to "reintroduce Christianity to Christendom" and to dispel the illusion that all are Christians. The existential truth Kierkegaard seeks to communicate is the truth of the Christian gospel. When he sees that his project of indirect communication has been misunderstood, he decides that from that point on in his authorship, he will be a "direct witness" to the truth of Christianity.

Though Kierkegaard asked that the ideas and opinions of his pseudonyms not be attributed to him, the scholarly community, including the commentators on the relationship of Kierkegaard and Unamuno, has largely ignored his request

until the last twenty-five years. We have seen the difficulties of Collado's equation of the esthete A with Kierkegaard, Roberts equation of Judge William with Kierkegaard, and Batchelor's and Palmer's equation of Johannes de Silentio with Kierkegaard. That Unamuno read these pseudonymous writers and in some cases incorporated their views is an important contribution to Unamuno scholarship, but the critics' conclusions about whether or not Unamuno is in agreement with Kierkegaard cannot be based on these pseudonymous writers.

We can reasonably hypothesize that Unamuno understood the concept of indirect communication for the expression of existential truth based on the evidence that he carefully read *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, where Johannes Climacus outlines the need for such a method. The heavy gloss of the Danish words into Spanish and German, plus the extensive underscoring, show that Unamuno was interested in the text. There are also a number of quotes from *Postscript* throughout Unamuno's work. The hypothesis is further strengthened by evidence that Unamuno practiced indirect communication by distancing himself from his own text and thereby fulfilling the maieutic ideal of being the midwife for the truth. The reader is free to make of his writings her own novel and is not coerced in any way with dogmatism.

However, though Unamuno understood and practiced the indirect method and the maieutic ideal as outlined by the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, he seems not to have read, and therefore not to have understood, Kierkegaard's explanation of *his* use of the indirect method, i.e., "to reintroduce Christianity to Christendom." It is seems highly probable from the complete lack of gloss in the

Danish text that Unamuno stopped reading before he came to Kierkegaard's "A First and Last Declaration" at the end of *Postscript*, so he would not have known of Kierkegaard's request to carefully ascribe the views of his pseudonyms to them and not to him. The same lack of gloss stands out by contrast in Volume XIII where *From the Papers of One Still Living* and *The Concept of Irony* are fairly heavily glossed while the newspapers articles in which Unamuno got bogged down show a decreasing number of vocabulary words glossed and finally stop before *The Point of View for My Work as an Author.* It is in the *Point of View* that Kierkegaard specifically explains the need to dispel the illusion that all are Christians with indirect communication and where he declares, so that there is no misunderstanding, that from the first to the last he is a "religious author." If Unamuno's declaration that Kierkegaard is his "spiritual brother" cannot be construed as affirming Kierkegaard's singular task "to become a Christian" found in the *Point of View*, is there another way in which the two authors can be seen to hold similar views?

It is my contention that it is Kierkegaard's view of the self with which Unamuno most resonated. We began the study of the self by differentiating between two views of the self, the view of the self as substance and the view of the self as an achievement. The view of the self as substance is that view which perceives the self as a given, an entity which is determined at birth whether what is given at birth is construed as a material being, as a thinking being, or as a being that is a combination of the material and spiritual. The view of the self as achievement is that view which perceives the self as formed by the choices one

makes and the status one acquires, for example, the status of self-understanding as a prerequisite for personhood. We have seen that both Kierkegaard's and Unamuno's fundamental view of the self is the latter type of view, the self as achievement, but there are elements of the self as substance view as well. Kierkegaard addresses the single individual and challenges her to see the self as a task, a becoming that one chooses. Unamuno's view of the self is less clear, but whether writing or speaking he says that he also addresses the individual listener/reader. Unamuno sees the self as fragmented, internal and external selves that are kept in constant tension through monodialogue with the goal of keeping the contraries of life in constant tension so that the wound of existence can remain open. In both authors, there is an assumption that the individual is free to choose, that there is something fundamental to personhood about self-reflection and the ability to act based on self-reflection.

The goal of the becoming is different in the two authors, however. For Kierkegaard, that task of selfhood is one that is accomplished before God. God is the fundamental relation that both gives me the substance of what I am and gives me the freedom to choose whether or not I will become the self He intends for me to be. For Unamuno, the goal of the becoming is acquiring self-consciousness that takes seriously the problem of immortality that the heart desperately seeks and that reason says is impossible. The self-consciousness deepens through the struggle between the fragmented selves and living passionately, but there are no solutions to the problem of immortality. The two

warring sides of the person must be kept in constant, creative tension. For Unamuno, there is no single choice that a person has, but many.

I believe that the Kierkegaardian existence spheres–the esthetic, the ethical and the religious–represented rich possibilities for authentic existence for Unamuno. They are explained in depth by Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* but come to life in other of the pseudonymous works as characters embody the different modes of existence. A, Don Juan, Johannes the Seducer, and the speakers at the banquet in "In Vito Veritas" all live the life of the esthete. The esthetic is where most people begin, in immediacy, in desiring passionately and fulfilling those desires without regard to other people or other commitments. There is a range in the esthetic that goes from the immediate to the highly reflective but the esthete always seeks immediate satisfaction.

Judge William is the ethical, married man who tries to persuade A to leave the esthetic life because it depends on externals. The Judge enjoins A to choose himself by choosing the ethical, making commitments such as the commitment of marriage and fulfilling those commitments and duties as the only meaningful way in which to live. Abraham provides the model for the person of faith who has gone beyond the ethical. Abraham does something that no man could do by himself. He exemplifies the utter dependence on God for faith that is the characteristic of Religiousness B. Although there are no conclusions drawn about the spheres in the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard sees the spheres as progressing toward the goal of becoming a self before God. The progression is by no means natural or inevitable. At every step there is a choice, a decision that

needs to be made. Unamuno finds in the spheres a wealth of possibilities for existence. For Unamuno, there is no hierarchy of values represented in the spheres, because in each of them life can be lived passionately, struggling with the problem of immortality.

What we see in the protagonists of *Niebla*, *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, and *Abel Sánchez* are three persons doing just that, living life passionately while struggling with the problem of immortality. They each are living out one of the Kierkegaardian existence spheres, but they are all agents of their own authentic existence. Augusto Pérez, the protagonist of *Niebla*, is seen as living in a pre-esthetic state at the beginning of the novel. He is the somnambulant transient who hasn't even acquired enough self to have desires that are worthy of satisfying. For Unamuno, Augusto's move into the esthetic life is a choice, though Kierkegaard would not see it that way. Once Augusto is smitten with Eugenia, his life acquires passion. He believes that he wants to marry, but he is distracted by multiple love interests. He suffers at the hand of Eugenia and awakens to his own mortality as a result, but he remains within the esthetic. His death is his means of affirming himself, that he has a choice in existing or not. Unamuno's use of various dramatized authors are a means to bring to light multiple, conflicting views of existence which the reader can then evaluate for herself. In so doing, Unamuno practices the art of indirect communication and maintains the maieutic ideal.

Don Manuel, the protagonist of *San Manuel Bueno, mártir*, is seen as living in the ethical sphere, though also still struggling with the problem of

immortality. Don Manuel embodies the ethical in his dedication to his parish, healing the sick, reconciling husband and wife, errant child and parents, and helping his parishioners to die well. He is a man of commitments, commitments which define meaningful existence. The problem with interpreting the novel has been in Don Manuel's apparent lack of faith in the beliefs that he promotes for his parishioners. This is less of a problem if we understand the ethical sphere in the Kierkegaardian sense where we can see that the ethical life is not equal to the religious life, i.e., a person can live out the ethical life without having faith. But the conflicted nature of the protagonist and the lack of conclusion in the novel are more ways in which Unamuno uses indirect communication both to confront the reader with existential possibilities and also to maintain authorial distance to allow the reader to make her own judgments.

Joaquín Monegro, the protagonist of *Abel Sánchez*, is seen as the character closest to being able to live within the religious sphere, closest to a relationship with God because of the depth of his struggle with the weakness of envy. The weakness of envy is seen as a mode of despair, the despair described in *Sickness Unto Death* as the despair not to be oneself before God. With the intensification of inclosing reserve as Joaquín hides his weakness from others and cultivates it, he progresses to the ultimate despair, the despair to be oneself in defiance of God wants one to be. Even in that ultimate despair Joaquín has the best possibility of breaking through to faith because there is a greater consciousness of self. Whether or not Joaquín on his deathbed truly asks for forgiveness or feels forgiven is again ambiguous. Unamuno's focus is

on Joaquín's passion and on his struggle with God as a result of that passion, not on any facile resolution.

I have read Unamuno's novels through a clear Kierkegaardian lens that is not distorted by the problem of the pseudonymous character of Kierkegaard's authorship. That is, I have plainly differentiated between the voices of the pseudonyms and the voice of Kierkegaard. There is no doubt that Unamuno gained much from his close reading of the texts, but it should be just as clear that he absorbed and appropriated more from the pseudonymous writings than from Kierkegaard's Christian writings, the ones to which Kierkegaard affixed his own name. Unamuno's understanding of indirect communication, the existence spheres and the maieutic ideal came from the pseudonymous texts. All of these Unamuno skillfully used to communicate his own vision of authentic existence for the freely chosen self. However, we have seen that Unamuno's ultimate vision for authentic existence is radically different from Kierkegaard's.

The problem with claiming "spiritual brotherhood" for these two authors is that with that term one would expect unanimity in ultimate values. It is impossible to know what was in the mind of Unamuno when he claimed "spiritual brotherhood" with Kierkegaard, but as we have seen, Unamuno seemed to be unaware of Kierkegaard's (though not his pseudonyms') values. Kierkegaard saw his entire authorship as an attempt to answer the question, "How do I become a Christian?" Kierkegaard believed in the singular truth of Christianity. While sensitive to Unamuno's desire for his thought not to be regularized, one might say that his entire authorship was an attempt to answer the question,

"What does it mean to exist?" The answers that Unamuno gives to that question are multiple and contradictory because in his view, that is the essence of existence—contradiction. If there is one value to which he holds without contradiction it is that of living passionately, always struggling with the problem of immortality. We have seen his novels as portrayals of just such passionate living within the context of the Kierkegaardian existence spheres. The existence spheres enrich Unamuno's possibilities for authentic existence, but none of them has an ultimate value over the other.

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