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THESIS
I

a) C. if) 3-

 

LIBRARY
Michlgan State
University

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
THE DICHOTOMY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:

EVALUATING THE EFFICACY 0F PROTECTION ORDERS
FOR WOMEN EXPERIENCING COMMON COUPLE VIOLENCE
VERSUS PATRIARCHAL TERRORISM

I)ate

presented by
Amanda K. Burgess-Proctor

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

M.S. degree in Criminal Justice

 

 

WW

Mama

October 18 , 2001

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6’01 C‘JCIRCJDmeDquGS-p. 15

 

THE DICHOTOMY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EVALUATING THE

EFFICACY OF PROTECTION ORDERS FOR WOMEN EXPERIENCING

COMMON COUPLE VIOLENCE VERSUS PATRIARCHAL TERRORISM
By

Amanda K. Burgess-Proctor

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Social Science

2001

ABSTRACT
THE DICHOTOMY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EVALUATING THE
EFFICACY OF PROTECTION ORDERS FOR WOMEN EXPERIENCING
COMMON COUPLE VIOLENCE VERSUS PATRIARCHAL TERRORISM
By

Amanda K. Burgess-Proctor

The purpose of this study is to gauge the efﬁcacy of protection orders for victims of
domestic violence. The theoretical basis for this analysis lies in Johnson’s theory that
there exist two distinct forms of interpersonal violence: “common couple violence”,
which consists of low-grade, mild violence that is equally perpetrated by both men
and women, and “patriarchal terrorism”, which involves severe mental and physical
abuse that is primarily used by men to control their female partners. Based on
Johnson’s dichotomous theory, it is hypothesized that orders of protection will be less
effective for women who experience patriarchal terrorism than for women who

experience common couple violence.

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Alan and Diane, for their steadfast
support and encouragement, to my sister Megan for always making me laugh, and to

my husband Bryan for keeping me sane. I love you all more than I can express.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to extend a word of sincere thanks to the members of my thesis
committee, Dr. Sheila Royo Maxwell and Dr. Vincent Hoffman, for their input and
ideas on this work. I am particularly indebted to my committee chair and mentor, Dr.
Christina DeJong, for her constant support and guidance. For all of their efforts

toward the completion of this thesis, I am eternally grateful.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................. vi
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2

PROTECTION ORDERS AND THE APPLICATION OF JOHN SON’S THEORY..6

The Development of Protection Orders .............................................. 6

Overview of Protection Orders and the PO Process ................................ 7

Studies of Protection Orders in the Academic Literature ........................ 11

What Are Victims’ Perceptions of Protection Orders? .................. 12

How Well Are Protection Orders Enforced? ............................. 13

Do Protection Orders Prevent Re-abuse? ................................. 15

Integration of Johnson’s Theory ..................................................... 16
CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS ..................................................................... 20

Dependent Variable ................................................................... 20

Independent Variables ................................................................ 21

Descriptive Statistics .................................................................. 25

Petitioner Demographics .................................................... 25

Relationship Dynamics ...................................................... 27

Respondent Arrest History .................................................. 27

Limitations ............................................................................. 28

Analysis ................................................................................. 29
CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ....................................................... 35

REFERENCES ................................................................................. 45

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1
EXISTING VARIABLES USED TO CREATE THE
RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE SCALE .................................................... 22

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ............................................................... 26

TABLE 3
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATION BY GROUP. . .30

TABLE 4

PROBABILITY OF PROTECTION ORDER VIOLATION USING
LOGISTIC REGRESSION .................................................................. 33

vi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“If no permanent injury has been inﬂicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous
violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, Shut out the public gaze,
and leave the parties to forget and forgive. ” ~ North Carolina Supreme Court, 1874
(State v. Oliver, 1874).

This quote, taken from an 1874 North Carolina Supreme Court holding regarding
the propriety of court intervention in wife-beating cases (Kurz, 1992), accurately reﬂects
public dismissal of domestic violence even now, nearly 130 years later. So often
relegated to a class of conﬂicts identiﬁed merely as “family disputes”, domestic violence
has been viewed historically as a private matter that does not warrant public or legal
intervention (Keilitz et al., 1998). Despite widespread efforts over the last thirty years to
acknowledge domestic violence as a crime worthy of prosecution, if not public
disapproval, thousands of women each year remain swathed in a cloak of silence that
tightly conceals their private victimization.

Awareness of domestic violence as a crime committed predominately against
women ﬁrst occurred in the 19705, largely due to the tireless efforts of grassroots
feminist organizations and activists within the women’s rights movement (Chaudhuri &
Daly, 1992; Grau, Pagan, & Wexler, 1985; Mills, 1998; Stith & Straus, 1995). Prior to
this time, acknowledgement of family violence was generally limited to the examination
of child victimization, and it was not until 1971 that a research initiative devoted to
family violence included topics other than child abuse or “psychiatric studies of abused
wives” (Steinmetz, 1986, p. 52). Beginning with concern that initially was reserved for

abused children, recognition of family violence eventually expanded to include adult

women’s victimization at the hands of their intimate partners (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1992).
Indeed, although modern society has long been protective of children’s rights through
measures such as mandatory reporting of abuse and protective service agencies, only
recently has that same consideration been extended to women who are assaulted by their
male partners (Binder & Meeker, 1992).

This shift in perspective to recognize the abuse of women as well as children is
primarily a result of the concerted efforts of feminist groups during the early to late 1970s
(Binder & Meeker, 1992). Outraged, the feminist movement demanded cessation of the
systematic oppression of women that allowed domestic violence to be largely ignored by
society, and facilitated awareness of this problem through the creation of shelters,
hotlines, and outreach programs for battered women. Of particular signiﬁcance is the
effect of these efforts on the legal community; as a result of their lobbying and political
activism, feminists were successful in altering the way that domestic violence cases were
handled within the criminal justice system (Mills, 1998).

At the same time that activists within the women’s movement lobbied for political
change, there occurred a quantum leap in the number of empirical studies designed to
explore intimate partner violence as the academic community began to acknowledge the
importance of conducting research related to domestic violence (Stith & Straus, 1995).
Sources ranging from academic journals to television and print media feverishly
documented the phenomenon of wife-battering in America. The results were unsettling;
estimates indicate that one in ﬁve couples experience at least one violent or abusive
incident in their lives (Schafer, Caetano, & Clark, 1998), resulting in approximately 1.6

million battered women each year (Straus & Gelles, 1995).

Not surprisingly, the sudden proliferation of domestic violence research triggered
controversy among academics regarding the etiology, frequency, and severity of intimate
partner violence in America. At odds were researchers whose studies of battered women
originated from one of two philosophical camps within the academic community:
“feminist” theory and “family violence” theory, respectively (Anderson, 1997; Giordano
et al., 1999; Hegarty & Roberts, 1998; Johnson, 1995; Kurz, 1992; Stewart, 2000).
According to Kurz (1992), “a feminist View of battering is one based on an understanding
of battering as a structural problem in which it is women, primarily, who are abused by
men” (p. 22). In other words, the etiology of violence against women can be explained
by understanding gender and power roles in society (Anderson, 1997), from which
emerge “the origins of the problem in male-female relationships and in norms about
men’s right to control women” (Kurz, 1992, p. 22). In short, feminist authors and
researchers decry the male dominance within society that facilitates the subjugation of
women, particularly within the family structure.

As an alternative research perspective on domestic violence, the “family
violence” approach stands in stark contrast to feminist philosophy (Kurz, 1992, p. 22).
Unlike feminist authors, family violence researchers “believe [that] family violence
originates in wider social norms condoning violence and in the structure of the
contemporary family” (Kurz, 1992, p. 23). Researchers who ascribe to a family violence
philosophy assert that patriarchy is but one cause of intimate partner violence (Anderson,
1997). Thus, the family violence perspective views violence against women as one

element of a larger, more general phenomenon of familial and societal violence.

As noted by many scholars, feminist- and family violence-based research tends to
differ signiﬁcantly. Whereas feminist research indicates that women are overwhelmingly
the recipients of partner violence, family violence research suggests that women and men
are equally likely to engage in violence against their intimate partners (Anderson, 1997;
Giordano et al., 1999; Hegarty & Roberts, 1998; Johnson, 1995). These divergent
ﬁndings are most frequently attributed to the methodology employed to gather and
interpret data. Feminist studies often collect qualitative data from shelters, hospitals, and
police reports, which provide accounts of serious abuse endured by women who utilize
such resources. Conversely, family violence research relies heavily upon quantitative
national survey data, which are likely to include admissions of minor acts of violence by
both male and female participants (Anderson, 1997; Giordano et al., 1999; Hegarty &
Roberts, 1998; Johnson, 1995).

Noting feminist researchers’ assertion that violence between intimates involves
severe physical and emotional abuse perpetrated by males against females, as well as
family violence researchers’ claim that couple violence is typically mild and perpetrated
by both partners, Johnson (1995) suggested the existence of two separate phenomena.
Johnson’s theory, which will be explored further in greater detail, essentially argues that
there are two types of domestic violence: low-grade, mutually combative behavior
experienced equally by men and women (what he calls “common couple violence”), and
systematic emotional, physical, and mental abuse used by men to manipulate and control
their female partners (or “patriarchal terrorism”). In short, Johnson argues that women in
violent relationships do not uniformly experience what we have come to know as

“domestic violence”.

Johnson’s theory has gained support within the academic literature, and at least
one author has incorporated Johnson’s theory into his own research (see Milardo, 1998).
However, there is one topic of interest that, to the knowledge of this author, has not been
considered within the context of Johnson’s theory. As alluded to earlier, one of the most
signiﬁcant achievements of the women’s movement during the 19705 was the
advancement of domestic violence as a matter of serious concern within the criminal
justice system (Mills, 1998). Out of this increased awareness came legislation in many
states authorizing the issuance of protection orders for victims of domestic violence. As
will be discussed more fully throughout this thesis, orders of protection are, for a variety
of reasons, being used with greater frequency as a legal remedy for battered women
(Carlson, Harris, & Holden, 1999; Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Klein, 1996).

In light of knowledge that protection orders have become a common resource for
women who experience domestic violence, Johnson’s theory gives rise to an interesting
question: If there exist two very different forms of intimate partner violence, will
protection orders be equally effective for women who experience “common couple
violence” versus women who experience “patriarchal terrorism”? The aim of this paper
is to empirically determine whether protection orders are a useful resource for female
victims of both forms of domestic violence. Based on the speciﬁcs of Johnson’s theory
to be discussed shortly, it is hypothesized that protection orders will have more utility for
women involved in common couple violence than for their counterparts who experience

patriarchal terrorism.

CHAPTER TWO: PROTECTION ORDERS AND THE APPLICATION OF
JOHN SON’S THEORY
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION ORDERS

The promotion of domestic violence during the 19705 as a legitimate societal ill
heightened not only public awareness of the problem, but awareness within the legal
system as well. As grassroots women’s organizations publicized the absence of
community resources available for battered women, they simultaneously exposed the
inadequacy of responses to domestic violence from police, prosecutors, and legislators
(Gran, et al., 1985). Most problematic was the identiﬁcation within the legal system of
domestic violence as non-criminal behavior. For example, Zalman (1992) concedes that
“in the past, spousal violence was so countenanced by custom and social thinking that, in
the minds of many, wife beating was not considered a crime” (p. 80).

In time, nearly every facet of the criminal justice system came under ﬁre for its
perceived reluctance to address domestic violence, but law enforcement and court
personnel were criticized most heavily. Speciﬁcally, police were accused of treating
domestic assaults less seriously than stranger assaults, as evidenced by an unwillingness
to arrest batterers as they would perpetrators in other criminal cases (Buzawa & Buzawa,
1992; but see Ferraro & Boychuk, 1992). Ofﬁcers were condemned for failure to
respond to domestic calls (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992), or, when they did respond, for
merely separating couples without making an arrest (Zalman, 1992). Similarly,
prosecutors and judges drew criticism as well, charged with “trivializing” battered
women’s experiences by failing to identify their victimization as criminal (Chaudhuri &

Daly, 1992, p. 229), and with discouraging prosecution of domestic assaults (Grau et al.,

1985). In accordance with the pervasive view of domestic violence as a private family
matter, many prosecutors maintained that domestic assaults were more appropriately
handled by social service agencies than in criminal courts (Lerman, 1986). In short,
“explicit refusal by police and prosecutors to sanction wife beaters has created the belief
among battered women’s advocates that wife heating is not viewed as a similar threat and
therefore is not treated with equal force of law” (Ferraro & Boychuk, 1992, p. 210).
However, the efforts of women’s organizations did not end with the criminal
justice system. Attention soon turned toward state legislatures, which activists lobbied to
pass laws funding programs for battered women, improving training for police and
prosecutors, and rescinding warrantless arrest restrictions (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1992;
Wiener, 1989). Aside from these legislative advances, women’s rights advocates
prompted perhaps an even more signiﬁcant change. In response to increasing demand for
state-sponsored condemnation of domestic violence, many states, beginning with
Pennsylvania in 1976, created legislation establishing civil orders of protection for
battered women (Grau et al., 1985; Klein, 1996; Stewart, 2000). Today, every state has
existing legislation authorizing the issuance of protection orders (POs) for victims of

domestic violence (Klein, 1996).

OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION ORDERS AND THE PO PROCESS

Protection orders are being used with increasing frequency by many states in the
ﬁght against domestic violence (Carlson et al., 1999; Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Klein,
1996). In theory, POs are court-ordered injunctions designed to restrain an individual’s

use of physical violence, threats, or intimidation against another person; practically

speaking however, relief offered by POs may vary signiﬁcantly according to state. For
example, Chaudhuri & Daly (1992) remark that Connecticut law provides for a broader
deﬁnition of abuse than many states, allowing for the inclusion of sexual assaults and
threats under the provision of PO legislation. Similarly, Grau et al. (1985) acknowledge
that state statutes may require parties in a PO to establish a recognized relationship,
potentially excluding individuals who share an intimate relationship without residing
together, or members of same-sex relationships.

Based on a variety of studies designed to identify common characteristics of
individuals who seek protection orders, a composite may be constructed that illustrates
the “typical” PO recipient. Generally speaking, she is a young, employed woman who is
involved in a relatively short-term relationship with her partner, to whom she is not
married but with whom she shares children (Grau et al., 1985; Harrell & Smith, 1996;
Kaci, 1992; Klein, 1996). She may or may not have experienced abuse over a sustained
period of time, although the event immediately preceding the request for the PO likely
involved signiﬁcant violence and may have resulted in physical injury, without
necessarily being the most severe incident of abuse (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Zoellner et
al., 2000). Finally, she has probably made at least one attempt to leave the relationship,
or adopted some other means of protecting herself prior to ﬁling for a protection order
(Grau et al., 1985; Klein, 1996).

The protection order process generally involves two steps. To begin the process,
an individual typically ﬁles a petition for a temporary (or ex parte) order to be issued
immediately and without a hearing (Chadhuri & Daly, 1992; Grau et al., 1985; Kaci,

1992; Zoellner et al., 2000). Temporary orders are signed for perhaps one to two weeks,

during which time a hearing is scheduled to determine whether the temporary order
should become permanent (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Grau et al., 1985; Kaci, 1992;
Zoellner et al., 2000). At this hearing both the petitioner (the moving party) and the
respondent (the individual whose behavior is restrained) have the opportunity to speak
with the judge. After hearing from both the petitioner and the respondent, the judge may
make a determination regarding the issuance of a permanent order, which despite its
misleading name generally is valid for no more than one year (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992;
Grau et al., 1985).

Although state statutes vary regarding the issuance of protection orders, most
states authorize protection order proceedings to occur in civil court (Grau et al., 1985).
Still, some state laws dictate that protection orders be obtained in criminal or even
concurrent jurisdictions (Grau et al., 1985). However, what makes POs different from
other civil orders (such as divorce decrees and declarations of paternity) are the criminal
sanctions that ensue from a protection order violation. Whereas violation of a civil order
yields only civil contempt charges, individuals who violate POs may face criminal
sanctions as well (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992), including arrest and incarceration.

For several reasons, this hybridization of the civil and criminal justice systems
makes protection orders a versatile resource for women who experience domestic
violence. First, POs provide a legitimate alternative when there is no criminal case in
which to pursue prosecution. However, many women are reluctant to pursue criminal
charges against their assailants, so the civil remedies offered by POs may be an attractive
substitute (Grau et al., 1985). Secondly, POs provide State protection for women who

otherwise might not be able to secure protection on their own (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992).

Third, the criminal sanctions that accompany violation of a PO have a potentially
deterrent effect on batterers, forcing them to consider the consequences of violating the
PO (Carlson et al., 1999). Lastly, enactment of PO legislation communicates to battered
women that their heretofore private victimization is no longer tolerated, and necessitates
public intervention (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992).

Despite these beneﬁts, protection orders have distinct disadvantages that must be
acknowledged. To begin with, there is often a lack of consensus among practitioners,
and between states, regarding what behaviors constitute “abuse” (Straus & Gelles, 1995).
While most states require proof of physical violence in order to obtain a PO, women may
experience abuse that is sexual, emotional, or mental as well as physical (Chaudhuri &
Daly, 1992; Grau et al., 1985; Straus & Gelles, 1995). Next, any fees that are required
before a PO petition may be ﬁled pose a signiﬁcant obstacle to women who are
ﬁnancially unable to meet such demands (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Horton, Simondis, &
Simondis, 1987). On a personal level, petitioning for a PO may prove to be a formidable
emotional task for some women, especially in light of research which suggests that
attachment to batterers is a weighty factor in women’s decision to obtain a PO (Zoellner
et al., 2000). Finally, petitioners are often responsible for serving the respondent with a
copy of the PO (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Horton et al., 1987). Both the perceived and
actual difﬁculty of locating the respondent, ﬁnding a way to serve the respondent while at
the same time avoiding contact, and ensuring that the respondent will not evade service
can be an insurmountable challenge for many women (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Horton et

al., 1987).

10

Furthermore, several studies have investigated why some women who are
involved in violent relationships decide not to pursue a protection order, or to terminate
an existing order after it has been obtained. As many authors have recognized, one of the
most frequently cited reasons for voluntarily terminating a protection order is fear of
retaliation, whether it be the result of direct threats from the respondent or rather a
general fear that obtaining an order would anger the respondent and induce further
violence (Fischer & Rose, 1995; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Zoellner et al., 2000). Indeed, a
PO is not a valid option for women if the threat of harm after obtaining it supersedes the
perceived beneﬁts of protection. Further, Fischer & Rose (1995) observe that women in
their sample frequently believed that receipt of a PO would signify the termination of
their relationships, which for many women is an undesired outcome. While every
battered woman wants the abuse to Stop, there is often a strong desire for the relationship

to remain intact, albeit without Violence.

STUDIES OF PROTECTION ORDERS WITHIN THE EXISTING LITERATURE
Despite the popularity of protection orders, several authors have recognized the
relative dearth of protection order research (Carlson et al., 1999; Klein, 1996). However,
the few studies of POs that have been conducted typically aim to evaluate their
effectiveness. For instance, factors shown to be negatively associated with the
effectiveness of protection orders include respondents’ serious criminal activity (Keilitz
et al., 1998) and violence toward strangers (Grau et al., 1985), coercion by respondents to

terminate the P0 or fear of retaliation if the PO is not dropped (Harrell & Smith, 1996),

11

petitioners’ lack of clarity regarding PO laws (Weiner, 1989), and police reluctance to
arrest respondents for protection order violations (Rigakos, 1997).

Generally speaking, efforts to assess how well POs “work” typically gauge
efﬁcacy in one of three ways: victims’ perceptions of protection orders and the PO
process, enforcement of POS by law enforcement agencies, and the success of P05 in
preventing future re-abuse. To gain a clearer understanding of how the efﬁcacy of
protection orders is evaluated, I will examine briefly each of these measures of
effectiveness.

What Are Victims’ Perceptions of Protection Orders?

Several researchers have investigated how women who obtain POs against their
partners feel about the protection they were afforded. Overall, responses tend to be
mixed. For example, consider three studies which reveal fairly high levels of satisfaction
among female petitioners. Harrell & Smith (1996) report that a majority of the women
they studied felt that obtaining a P0 was a worthwhile investment, as did 94% of the
women interviewed by Horton et al. (1987). Similarly, nearly three-quarters of the
women in a study conducted by Grau et al. (1985) stated that their POs were either
“somewhat effective” or “very effective” (p. 22). Conversely, yet perhaps more
importantly, less than half of the women interviewed by Harrell & Smith felt that their
partner would believe that he was required to comply with the terms of the order.
Similarly, one-quarter of the women questioned by Grau et al. described their orders as
being “not at all effective” (p. 22).

In light of the varied levels of satisfaction women experience with their protection

orders, it is important to consider thoughtfully the reasons why women might identify

12

their POS as being either effective or ineffective. The most obvious factor, of course, is
whether the respondent actually violated the protection order; however, research indicates
that victims’ satisfaction is at least partially determined by less immediate considerations.
Factors that may inﬂuence a woman’s perception of the effectiveness of her PO - or her
decision to complete the PO process - can include the court’s response to battered women
via judges, court staff, and legal advocates (Wan, 2000), as well as access to legal
resources and efﬁciency of the PO process (Tracy, 1997). According to Keilitz et
al. (1998), “victims’ views on effectiveness of protection orders vary with how acessible
the courts are for victims and how well established the links are between public and
private services and support resources for victims” (p. 1). Still other authors have
recognized the importance of extra-legal considerations, including both degree of
emotional attachment (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Zoellner et al., 2000) and ﬁnancial
attachment (Grau et al., 1985) to the respondent. As many women who are involved in
intimate personal relationships share children with their abusers, the magnitude of these
attachments should not be underestimated, even in relationships involving severe
emotional and physical abuse. In short, victims’ perceptions of protection orders often
depend upon a number of factors, and thus may result in varied levels of reported
satisfaction.
How Well Are Protection Orders Enforced?

One prominent theme that appears throughout much of the protection order
literature is that effectiveness equals enforceability; unfortunately, studies of POs reveal
myriad problems with their enforcement. First, ofﬁcers’ decisions to arrest men who

violate POs appear to rely heavily upon situational determinants. In his examination of

13

police response to protection order violations, Rigakos (1997) notes that the factors most
likely to result in arrest include evidence of forced entry and signs of a struggle,
“[indicating] that ofﬁcers appear more concerned with property damage than with signs
suggesting that an assault may have occurred” (p. 212). Additionally, police ofﬁcers
responding to domestic disputes often refuse to make an arrest in the absence of physical
injury to the woman or her children (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992). What is more, ofﬁcers in
the Rigakos study (1997) were considerably less inclined to make an arrest if they
believed that the woman was intoxicated, or that she allowed the respondent to enter her
property, thus shifting the burden of responsibility - and the blame - from the assailant to
the victim.

Similarly, Kane (2000) discovered that POs had the greatest impact on police
decision to arrest when the victim was at little risk of harm, but that the predictive power
of POs decreased in situations involving high risk to the victim. Summarizing his
ﬁndings, Kane writes, “. . .the data showed that even at their strongest predictive level,
[PO] violations led to arrest in less than half of all cases. . .Although the presence of a
protective order appeared to have a strong impact on police arrest patterns, that impact
was observed under very speciﬁc conditions” (p. 576-577).

Finally, particularly disturbing to many women is the frequency with which the
police do not witness violation of their orders or arrive after the respondent has ﬂed the
scene. In many jurisdictions, police ofﬁcers may make an arrest if they apprehend the
respondent on site or if there is probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.
However, Harrell & Smith (1996) discovered that only 20% of the PO violations reported

to police resulted in arrest, although many of the women claimed that the respondent was

14

present when police arrived. Nonetheless, it seems that without police observation of the
respondent “in the act” of violating the PO, ofﬁcers are reluctant to obtain an arrest
warrant or to actively pursue the respondent after he has ﬂed.

Do Protection Orders Prevent Re-abuse?

Not surprisingly, results of protection order studies that aim to predict likelihood
of re-abuse tend to be conﬂicting. At least one study has indicated that protection orders
are linked to a reduction in subsequent re-abuse. Carlson et al. (1999) compared reports
of physical assaults for the two years immediately preceding the P0 with the two years
after the P0 was obtained, and found a 66% decrease in police contacts. Further, the
authors note that socioeconomic status and length of or investment in the relationship
were both factors negatively related to risk of re-abuse.

However, other studies have indicated that POs have little to no association with
reduction of post-PO abuse. For example, Grau et al. (1985) report that only victims who
experienced a less violent relationship were likely to enjoy a reduction in post-PO abuse,
writing, “overall, post-project abuse and violence are unaffected by the presence of a
restraining order” (p. 22). Further, studies conducted by both Klein (1996) and Harrell &
Smith (1996) indicate that protection orders may do little to prevent subsequent re—abuse,
particularly if the respondent has a prior criminal history, is unemployed or holds only a
part-time job, or has a problem with substance abuse (Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992). Thus,
as with the other methods of evaluating the efﬁcacy of protection orders, data regarding

the utility of P05 in preventing subsequent re-abuse tend to be inconclusive at best.

15

INTEGRATION OF J OHNSON’S THEORY

As was discussed previously, there is often little agreement about what behaviors
constitute “abuse” within the context of domestic violence. It has been suggested that
problems with creating an operational deﬁnition of abuse result from research that is
grounded in different theoretical frameworks. According to several authors, research on
domestic violence typically is rooted in one of two competing paradigms: (1) traditionally
feminist, qualitative research that relies upon clinical data and that primarily reveals
extensive male-perpetrated abuse; and (2) traditionally non-feminist, quantitative
research that relies upon mass survey data and that tends to reveal mild violence that is
equally perpetrated by males and females (often referred to as the “family violence”
perspective) (Anderson, 1997; Giardano et al., 1999; Hegarty & Roberts, 1998;
Holzworth-Munroe, 2000; Johnson, 1995).

Johnson (1995) recognized the disharmony between these opposing perspectives,
and responded by creating terminology meant to identify the distinct types of abuse he
felt were being studied by feminist and family violence researchers, respectively. To
address the abuse typically discussed in feminist literature, he uses the term “patriarchal
terrorism”, which he asserts is the result of traditional, patriarchal attitudes that afford
men the perceived right to control “their” women as if they are possessions. He observes
that this systematic terrorization of women may involve not only physical abuse, but also
threats, isolation, economic abuse, and various other means of control. Conversely,
Johnson employs the phrase “common couple violence” to describe the type of abuse
addressed within the family violence literature. He deﬁnes common couple violence as

being “less a product of patriarchy, and more a product of the less-gendered causal

16

processes” frequently studied by family violence researchers (p. 285). According to
Johnson, common couple violence typically involves mild forms of abuse that are not
used as control tactics and that rarely escalate into serious, potentially life-threatening
assaults. To summarize his perspective, Johnson writes:
The common couple violence that is assessed by large-scale random
survey methodology is in fact gender balanced, and is a product of a
violence-prone culture and the privatized setting of most US. households.
The patriarchal terrorism that is tapped in research with the families
encountered by public agencies is a pattern perpetrated almost exclusively
by men, and rooted deeply in the patriarchal traditions of the Western
family (p. 286).

Speciﬁcally, Johnson (1995) asserts that the most salient illustration of this
theoretical disparity lies in the frequency and reciprocity of intimate personal violence
that is reported in feminist- and family violence-based literature. He believes that
discrepancies in alleged rates of female-perpetrated violence stem from methodological
differences and sampling biases within conﬂicting research designs, which inevitably
target “different, largely nonoverlapping populations” (p. 288-289). He argues that men
who exert control over their female partners by engaging in patriarchal terrorism are
unlikely to respond to mass surveys, such as the National Family Violence Survey used
by Straus & Gelles (1995), in the same manner as individuals whose domestic disputes
occasionally erupt into isolated violent incidents (i.e. common couple violence). In other
words, both male and female respondents of the NFVS may be inclined to disclose

information about disputes that resulted in (albeit mild) violence, leading to the

17

conclusion that physical assaultiveness in intimate relationships is a gender-balanced
phenomenon. Recognizing this sampling bias Johnson writes, “the presentation of survey
data that tap only common couple violence as evidence that men are terrorized as
frequently as women produces a dangerous distortion of reality” (p. 292).

Conversely, data from shelters, hospitals, police records, and court ﬁles are
undoubtedly biased in the opposite direction, indicating that men are overwhelmingly
responsible for engaging in severe forms of physical, emotional, and mental abuse against
their wives or female partners (Johnson, 1995). Further, shelter data lend support to the
feminist position that the rare instances in which women use physical aggression against
their male partners are necessitated by self-defense. In short, women who are physically
abused only on occasion are probably unlikely to seek shelter, counseling, or divorce, so
that data collected from public service agencies will reﬂect the most “egregious cases”,
nearly always involving patriarchal terrorism (p. 289).

Johnson’s dichotomous model of domestic violence is well-supported within the
academic literature, as several authors have lauded its utility in researching and
understanding intimate partner violence (see Giordano et al., 1999; Hegarty & Roberts,
1998; Holtzworth-Munroe, 2000; Lloyd & Emery, 2000; Stewart, 2000; Umberson et al.,
1998; Walker, 2000). Speciﬁcally, Johnson’s theory is examined in several studies of
protection orders. For example, Stewart (2000) found that nearly 44% of the male
subjects who had multiple POs ﬁled against them by the same woman had contact with
police for other violent offenses as well, an observation she claims is reﬂective of the use
of violence as a control tactic that is embodied in patriarchal terrorism. Secondly,

although not expressly labeled as “patriarchal terrorism” in the analysis, several studies

18

of PO efﬁcacy discuss the use of controlling, manipulative behaviors by male assailants,
such as: establishing a constantly changing set of rules of which the woman is unaware
but for which she is held accountable (Fishcer & Rose, 1995); severe physical abuse
including strangulation and forced sex, as well as emotional abuse involving harm to pets
and threats involving weapons (Harrell & Smith, 1996); and threats to kidnap or remove
children from the woman’s custody (Tracy, 1997).

It is well-documented within the academic literature that while protection orders
are an increasingly popular legal remedy for victims of domestic violence, scant research
has been conducted regarding the efﬁcacy of POs. Additionally, contemporary support
for Johnson’s theory lends credibility to his assertion that there exist distinct categories of
intimate personal violence. It is my belief that the duality of Johnson’s theory is readily
applicable to the study of protection orders, particularly if the assumption is made that
women who experience patriarchal terrorism encounter patterns of abuse that are
dissimilar to the experiences of women involved with common couple violence.
Therefore, it is my intent to utilize Johnson’s theory to assess the efﬁcacy of protection
orders for women involved with common couple violence as well as patriarchal
terrorism. The speciﬁc research hypotheses are:

Ho: Protection orders will be as effective for women who experience patriarchal
terrorism and for women who experience common couple violence.

Ha: Protection orders will be less eﬂective for women who experience patriarchal

terrorism than for women who experience common couple violence.

19

CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS

The data used in this analysis come from an existing data set originally compiled
by Keilitz et al. called “Beneﬁts and Limitations of Civil Protection Orders for Victims of
Domestic Violence in Wilmington, Delaware, Denver, Colorado, and the District of
Columbia, 1994-1995” (ISCPR #2227). The sample consists of 285 women who
received either a temporary or a permanent protection order in one of three geographic
locations: Delaware, Colorado, and Washington, DC. After removing the missing
values, a total of 228 valid cases remained for most of the analysis; however, certain
sections of the analysis were performed with signiﬁcantly fewer cases because one
variable contained a mere 135 responses. To gather preliminary information, initial
surveys were conducted via telephone interviews with petitioners approximately one
month after they obtained either a temporary or a permanent protection order, followed
by secondary surveys six months later. Additionally, information was gathered from

administrative records such as court ﬁles and case histories.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable being studied in this analysis is efﬁcacy of protection
orders (POs), or how well POs “worked” for petitioners. However, it goes without
saying that there are many ways to gauge the effectiveness of protection orders,
including victims’ satisfaction, degree of enforceability, and subsequent reduction in or
elimination of post-PO abuse. For the purposes of this study, efﬁcacy will be determined

by examining whether respondents violated their partners’ protection orders. I

 

‘ Please recall that the word “respondent” as it is used here is a legal term identifying the defending party in
a civil court action, and thus refers to offenders whose actions are restrained by P05.

20

While there is obvious merit in measuring effectiveness of POs via victim
satisfaction or police responsiveness, it is my intent to maintain focus and accountability
where it is most deserved: on the perpetrators. Thus, respondent compliance (or lack
thereof) will be assessed rather than the aforementioned alternative measures of
effectiveness. Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable measures whether a woman’s

protection order was violated by the respondent.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

It is my hypothesis that protection orders will be less effective for women who
experience patriarchal terrorism (PT) than for women who experience common couple
violence (CCV). Therefore, the key independent variable is type of relationship violence,
or whether the relationship between the petitioner and respondent is characterized by
common couple violence or patriarchal terrorism. The independent variable is a
composite variable that was created by combining several indicators of relationship
dynamics, and is measured by the Relationship Violence Scale.

First, I selected four existing variables that identiﬁed behaviors often found in
violent relationships. Those variables include: whether the respondent has ever beaten or
choked his partner; whether the respondent has ever forced his partner into sexual activity
(Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Grau et al., 1985; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Horton et al., 1987;
Klein, 1996); whether the respondent’s threats or stalking behaviors have ever made his
partner feel frightened (Johnson, 1995); and whether the respondent has ever threatened
or used weapons against his partner at any time during the relationship (Chaudhuri &

Daly, 1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996) (see Table l).

21

Table 1. Existing Variables Used to Create the Relationship Violence Scale (N=228)

 

 

Existing Variable F requencvﬁof “yes” responses
R ever beat/choke P? 121/228 (53.1%)
R ever forced P to have sex? 89/228 (39.0%)
R’s threats/stalking ever frighten P? 179/228 (78.5%)
R ever threatened/used a weapon? 82/228 (36.0%)

 

Next, petitioners received a score of zero to four according to the number of
positive responses given for the existing relationship variables. For example, a woman
who had been forced to have sex and whose partner had used a weapon during an assault
would receive a score of two (out of a possible four) on the Relationship Violence Scale,
while another woman who indicated that her relationship was devoid of all four behaviors
would receive a score of zero. That is, one point was assigned for each of the four
behaviors a woman identiﬁed as being present in her relationship.

Finally, women who score highly on this variable are believed to experience
patriarchal terrorism, whereas women whose scores rank at the low end of the scale are
presumed to experience common couple violence. It is worth noting that although type
of relationship violence is measured by the Relationship Violence Scale, there is no set
“out point” to differentiate between the two types of violence. I believe that assignment
of a value at which relationship violence shifts from common couple violence to
patriarchal terrorism would have been arbitrary and without sufﬁcient justiﬁcation, thus
type of relationship violence remains a scale and is not a dichotomous variable.

In addition to type of relationship violence, other secondary independent variables
are also included in the analysis, each of which belongs to one of three categories. First,

recent research regarding the effectiveness of protection orders involves consideration of

22

demographic characteristics, such as petitioners’ socioeconomic status and level of
education (Carlson et al., 1999; Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Grau et al., 1985; Horton et al.,
1987). Thus, this analysis controls for petitioners’ employment status, annual income,
degree of education, as well as age and race. Second, interpersonal characteristics of the
relationship (other than type of violence) are evaluated. According to several studies,
dynamics such as marital status, relationship duration, and presence of children can
inﬂuence the effectiveness of protection orders, both in terms of victim satisfaction as
well as actual re-abuse (Carlson et al., 1999; Grau et al., 1985; Harrell & Smith, 1996;
Klein, 1996). Therefore, marital status, relationship duration, living arrangement prior to
receipt of the PO, and the number of children shared by the petitioner and the respondent
will be included as secondary independent variables.

Finally, several studies of protection orders discuss a link between respondents’
prior criminal history or arrest record and post-PO abuse (e. g. Carlson et al., 1999;
Chaudhuri & Daly, 1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Keilitz et al., 1998; Klein, 1996). In his
study of court-restrained male batterers, Klein (1996) notes that nearly 80% of
respondents had records that contained at least one criminal complaint, and that the
average number of complaints was thirteen. Further, in a study conducted by Keiletz et
al. (1998) nearly two-thirds (65%) of respondents had a history of prior arrest, while
Chadhuri & Daly (1992) point out that every respondent in their analysis who had a prior
criminal history violated his PO. Thus, the third and ﬁnal category of secondary
independent variables includes whether respondents were ever arrested for abuse prior to

being restrained by the P0.

23

Based on the existing literature, I expect that the secondary independent variables
in each of the three categories - petitioner demographics, relationship dynamics, and
respondent arrest history - will bear statistically signiﬁcant relationships with the
dependent variable, protection order violation. For example, Robinson & Chandek
(2000) note that “higher rates of domestic violence are experienced by black females
compared to their white counterparts, females living in low-income households, young
women (ages 16 to 24) and women with children under the age of twelve” (p. 3-4);
therefore, I expect to see higher rates of protection order violation for women in these
categories. Additionally, Harrell & Smith (1996) report that women who lived with their
partners at the time of the offense were signiﬁcantly less likely than their counterparts to
experience re-abuse after obtaining a protection order. Thus, I will examine not only the
living arrangements of the women in the sample but also their marital status as well, in
order to determine whether a Similar pattern emerges in this analysis. Finally, as noted
earlier, several authors have identiﬁed a correlation between respondents’ prior criminal
history and likelihood of protection order violation (Carlson et al., 1999; Chaudhuri &
Daly, 1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Keilitz et al., 1998; Klein, 1996). In light of these
ﬁndings, I expect that women whose partners have been arrested for abuse prior to the
protection order will experience a higher rate of violation than other women in the

sample.

24

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Petitioner Demographics

Women in the sample range in age from 16 to 77, having an average age of 32.
The sample is fairly racially diverse: half of the women (49.1%) are Black, a third
(37.3%) are White, just over one-tenth (11.8%) are Hispanic, and a small fraction (1.8%)
report a racial background of “other”. Approximately 40% of the women are high school
graduates and a majority (62.7%) are employed full-time; however, 17.1% of the women
dropped out of high school and over one-quarter (27.2%) are unemployed. In terms of
socio-economic status, the women average a monthly income of just over $1100,

although the maximum reported income is $6200 per month (see Table 2).

25

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N=228)

 

 

 

 

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Petitioner Demographics:
Rag Employment Status
Black 112 (49.1%) Full time 143 (62.7%)
White 85 (37.3%) Part time 20 (08.8%)
Hispanic 27 (l 1.8%) None 62 (27.2%)
Other 4 (01.8%) Other 3 (01.4%)
Education (highest grade completed) Age (in years)
7‘h grade or less 1 (00.4%) Minimum = 16
8‘h to 11lh grade 38 (16.7%) Maximum = 77
High school 91 (39.9%) Mean = 32.10
Some college 60 (26.3%)
College graduate 22 (09.6%) Monthly Income (in dollars)
Post-graduate 11 (04.8%) Minimum = O
Other (tech./voc.) 5 (02.2%) Maximum = 6200

Mean = 1176.66
Relationship Dynamics:

 

 

Living Arrangement (at time of PO) Relationship Duration (in days)
Living together 1 15 (50.4%) Minimum = 51
Dating but not 28 (12.3%) Maximum = 12,775
living together Mean = 2636.14
Not dating or living 75 (32.9%)
together Number of shared children
Other 10 (04.4%) Minimum = 0
Maximum = 11
Mean = 1.18
Marital Status (at time of PO)
Married 56 (24.6%)
Separated 50 (21.9%)
Divorced 21 (09.2%)
Never been married 101 (44.3%)

Respondent Arrest History:
Respondent arrested for prior abuse ‘I

 

 

No 76 (29.4%)
Yes 59 (25.9%)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Was PO Violated?
No 161 (70.6%)
Yes 67 (29.4%)
T N=135.

26

Relationship Dynamics

Women in the sample report a mean relationship duration of 2636 days, or just
over seven years. Approximately half of the sample (50.4%) lived with their abusive
partner at the time of the PO, and nearly a quarter (24.6%) indicate that they are man'ied
to their abusers. However, it is worth noting that one third of the women (32.9) report
that they were neither dating nor living with the respondent at the time the P0 was
obtained. Finally, most couples average one child in common (see Table 2).

Respondent Arrest History

Nearly thirty percent (29.4%) of the women report that their partners were
arrested for an incident involving abuse prior to receipt of the protection order. To ensure
an accurate understanding of this variable however, it should be noted that after removal
of the 93 missing values, only 135 cases remained for analysis of this variable. Thus,
responses are either missing or invalid for an even larger percentage (37.3%) of the
sample than had prior arrests (see Table 2).

In an attempt to evaluate whether the women who were excluded from the
analysis signiﬁcantly differ from the remainder of the sample, I separately examined
petitioner demographics and relationship dynamics for those 93 cases. Although the
“missing” women are nearly identical to the sample as a whole in terms of race,
employment status, number of children, and so on, two variables produce seemingly
important differences. First, whereas in the entire sample, approximately 44% of women
had never been married, for the 93 missing cases the percentage of never-married women
jumps to 58%. Second, the average relationship length for the entire sample is 2636 days

(7.2 years), nearly two years longer (1946 days/5.3 years) than the average relationship

27

for the missing group. Thus, it appears that women who had missing or invalid responses
to the question “has your partner ever been arrested for abuse prior to the PO?” have
shorter relationships and are less likely to be married than the remaining women in the

sample.

LIMITATIONS

First, with only 228 valid responses, the size of this sample is undesirably small.
Particularly problematic is the independent variable “was respondent arrested for prior
abuse?”, which has nearly 38% of its values missing, leaving a paltry 135 valid cases for
analysis. Unfortunately, with a sample that contains a limited number of cases comes a
decreased ability to generalize ﬁndings to the population with conﬁdence, thus it is
important to use caution when extrapolating the results.

Second, the dependent variable measuring violation of protection orders was not
assessed through court ﬁles or ofﬁcial documentation of violations, but rather via
petitioners’ self-disclosure. It is possible that a woman’s response to the question “has
your partner violated your PO?” may have been inﬂuenced by the type of relationship
violence she experiences, thus jeopardizing the true independence of these two variables.

Third, while numerous items were included that gathered speciﬁc information
about petitioners, hardly any data were available that targeted similar information about
respondents, resulting in the inclusion of only one such variable (prior arrest history) in
this study. Because the theoretical framework upon which this study is based considers
severity of abuse via offenders’ behavior, it is especially perplexing that demographic

information from respondents is not available for analysis.

28

Finally, variable selection in this analysis posed particular problems.
Unfortunately, the original data collection instrument contained no questions concerning
mild or mutual violence, thus the Relationship Violence Scale was created using only
variables that identify serious forms of abuse, such as forced sex and use of weapons.
Certainly, inclusion of variables representing mild abuse as well as severe abuse would

have resulted in a more accurate measure of relationship violence.

ANALYSIS

For the bivariate analysis, ANOVA was performed to assess the direct
relationship between the key independent variable, type of relationship violence, and the
dependent variable, protection order violation. (The dependent variable is dummy coded,
thus making it possible to ﬁnd the mean percentage of PO violation). Based on the group
means, women with a score of two on the Relationship Violence Scale had the highest
percentage of PO violations (34.7%), while women who scored zero had the lowest
percentage (9.5%) (see Table 3). Unfortunately, a signiﬁcance value of 0.209 reveals no
statistically meaningful differences between the group means for type of relationship

violence.

29

Table 3. Mean Percentage of Protection Order Violations by Group (N=228)

 

Variable Mean Percentage of PO Violation:
Relationship Violence Scale:

0 09.5

1 29.6

2 34.7

3 33.3

4 29.4
Race:

Black 23.2*

Non-Black 35.3
Age in years:

16-25 38.3

26-31 26.6

32-37 27.5

38+ 24.5
Education:

Less than high school 31.8

High school graduate 28.8
Petitioner’s employment status:

Employed 24.5*

Unemployed 41 .5
Petitioner’s monthly income in dollars:

0-580 31.6

581-1000 23.4

1001-1600 40.7

1601+ 20.8
Relationship duration (in days):

1-910 27.6

911-1825 33.9

1 126-3650 ' 29.5

3651+ 26.0
Living arrangement:

Living together 23.5“

Not living together 35.4
Marital status:

Married 19.6“

Separated/Divorced 40.9

Never Married 26.7
Number of shared children:

Zero 29.6

One or more 29.3
Respondent arrested for prior abuse: 1’

ND 30.3

Yes 35.6

 

* Denotes signiﬁcance <0.05.
T N=135.

3O

Still, several of the secondary independent variables yielded signiﬁcant results as
expected. First, approximately 40% of unemployed petitioners reported PO violations,
far greater than the 24.5% of employed women (sig.=0.l 1). Additionally, women who
live with their abusers reported a mean PO violation of 23.5%, nearly 12% less than
women who do not reside with the respondent (35.4%) (sig.=0.48). Marital status also
appears to bear a signiﬁcant relationship with P0 violation. Forty percent of women who
are separated or divorced from their partners experienced a violation of their PO, as
opposed to 26.7% of non-married women and 19.6% of women who are married to the
respondent (sig.=0.24). Therefore, petitioners’ employment status, living arrangement,
and marital status appear to be negatively correlated with protection order violation, in
accordance with recent domestic violence research.

However, the mean percentage of PO violation for non-Black women is 35%,
compared to only 23% for Black women (sig.=0.007) (see Table 3). This ﬁnding is
particularly interesting in light of research which suggests that Black women typically
experience higher levels of domestic violence than their non-Black counterparts. This
unexpected reverse in mean percentage of violation based on petitioners’ race appears to
be in contrast to the contemporary literature, perhaps due to multicolinearity between
race and another variable, such as age or employment status.

Although the bivariate analysis indicates that type of relationship violence and
protection order violation are not signiﬁcantly related, a multivariate analysis was
performed to determine whether the addition of secondary independent variables would
allow any latent relationship between the key independent variable and the dependent

variable to surface. For the multivariate analysis, ordinary least squares regression could

31

not be performed because the dependent variable is dummy coded. Thus, logistic
regression, which allows the use of a dummy dependent variable, was used instead.
Besides type of relationship violence, other independent variables examined in the
regression (as in the ANOVA) include petitioner demographics, relationship dynamics,
and respondent arrest history.

Logistic regression was ﬁrst performed without including respondents’ arrest
history, and the results indicate that type of relationship violence is not signiﬁcant when
controlling for all other independent variables in the model (see Table 4). In other words,
the probability of protection order violation does not differ signiﬁcantly for women based
on their score on the Relationship Violence Scale. In addition, the Signiﬁcance of
petitioners’ living arrangement and marital status that exists in the ANOVA disappears
during the regression, perhaps because the statistical relationship was not robust enough
to survive a more comprehensive analysis. However, two factors do appear to bear a
signiﬁcant relationship with probability of violation: petitioners’ race and employment
status. The regression coefﬁcients for these two variables indicate that Black women and
women who are employed are less likely to experience a violation of their protection
order than non-Black women and unemployed women, respectively. Here again, as with
the ANOVA, petitioners’ race reveals the effect opposite of what was predicted, while
employment status bears an expected relationship based on the relevant literature.
Finally, both the Cox & Snell and Naglekerke measures of R2 are extremely low for this
portion of the analysis, indicating that between 8 and 11 percent of the variation in the

dependent variable can be explained by the full model.

32

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When respondents’ arrest history is included in the analysis, though, the
regression yields somewhat different results. To begin with, nearly all of the non-
signiﬁcant ﬁndings remain the same, including petitioners’ age, education, income,
relationship duration, marital status, living arrangement, and number of children shared
with the respondent. This time, however, petitioners’ race and employment status also
lack signiﬁcance, while type of relationship violence remains non—signiﬁcant as well.
Although the measures of R2 fare slightly better here - 11 and 16 percent, respectively,
the absence of signiﬁcant results negates the improvement in the PRE statistics.

Due to the limited number of cases in the sample, and in an effort to conﬁrm that
probability of protection order violation is equal whether a woman experiences common
couple violence or patriarchal terrorism, I ran a series of regressions pairing each of the
secondary independent variables individually with type of relationship violence. In spite
of their effect, the results of these regressions indicate that controlling for petitioners’
race and employment status does not affect the non-signiﬁcance of the key independent
variable, type of relationship violence. Meanwhile, each of the independent variables
that previously appeared to be non-signiﬁcant remained so even after the serial

regressions were conducted.

34

CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results Of this analysis indicate that type of relationship violence, that is,
whether a woman experiences common couple violence or patriarchal terrorism, is not a
good predictor of whether her protection order will be violated. Speciﬁcally, petitioners’
score on the Relationship Violence Scale proved to be a non-signiﬁcant part of the model
in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. However, several secondary independent
variables were found to be signiﬁcant, including petitioners’ race and employment status
(in both the ANOVA and the logistic regression), as well as petitioners’ income, living
arrangement at the time of the PO, and marital status (in the ANOVA only).

In light of both empirical and anecdotal support for Johnson’s theory in the
contemporary literature, the results of this study are somewhat disheartening. However,
construction of this analysis met with several obstacles, each of which may have
contributed heavily to the non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings. It is important to cautiously consider
the results of any study, especially one in which substantial limitations and challenges
present themselves.

First, the relevance of a diminished sample size cannot be emphasized enough.
To begin with 228 valid cases, only to reduce that number to 135 when incorporating
respondents’ arrest history, creates a shaky foundation for building any analysis.
However, behind the obvious restrictions placed on the generalizability of the ﬁndings
lurks a more clandestine problem. Recall that at the time of the original data collection,
the sample consisted of 285 women who had obtained either a temporary or a permanent
restraining order. However, research indicates that many women who complete the ﬁrst

phase of the PO process by obtaining a temporary order choose not to seek a permanent

35

order. For example, at least two studies have reported that nearly forty percent of
petitioners who obtained a temporary order failed to follow through with a permanent
order (Harrell & Smith, 1996; Kaci, 1992). Sadly, many of these women offered
explanations for their decisions that reﬂect the control tactics and manipulation typical of
patriarchal terrorism, including being talked out of it by the respondent, fear of
retaliation, verbal threats, or simply because the respondent forced his way back (Harrell
& Smith, 1996). Thus, it is important to bear in mind not only the immediate concerns
that accompany a small sample size, but also what factors may be at work on a larger
scale to produce such limited numbers.

Next, the method by which violation information was gathered presents concerns
about the integrity of the responses. Aside from petitioner interviews, the original data
collection also involved examination of court ﬁles, including both the civil protection
order case as well as any criminal ﬁles available for respondents. Despite the availability
of these data, PO violations were assessed by asking women in the sample whether their
partners had ever violated their protection orders, not by checking for documentation of a
violation in the court ﬁles. If, as Johnson argues, one potential component of patriarchal
terrorism is “victim deference” (p. 292), it is certainly possible that women who
experience this form of violence might in fact “defer” to their partners by indicating that
no violation of their protection order has occurred. This scenario raises important
questions about the peace-keeping strategies employed by battered women, and how
those techniques may impede truth-telling during the protection order process. While

deceptive statements to court personnel or other service providers about the severity of

36

abuse a woman experiences may interfere with her ability to obtain a protection order, for
her it may also mean the difference between safety and repeated victimization.

Further, this data set included very little information from the respondents’
criminal ﬁles. Researchers who study domestic violence frequently suggest that research
designs control for batterers’ history of arrest and prior criminality, particularly when
studying the efﬁcacy of protection orders (see Carlson et al., 1999; Chaudhuri & Daly,
1992; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Keilitz et al., 1998; Klein, 1996). Unfortunately, while this
analysis allowed for inclusion of respondents’ prior arrest history, the extremely small
number of valid responses calls for strong caution to be used when interpreting the
results. Even more perplexing are the variables that are not included in this data set at all.
Thinking about Johnson’s theory and his emphasis on batterers’ behavior, demographic
information about respondents would have been particularly insightful in this analysis.
From a practical perspective, knowledge of socioeconomic conditions, employment
stability, education level, and other important quality-of-life characteristics could prove
extremely valuable in the context of understanding batterers’ use of violence, as well as
their response to orders of protection.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the difﬁculty in creating an accurate,
robust measure of relationship violence must be addressed. According to Johnson:

...some, if not all, of the causal factors involved in patriarchal terrorism may also

be involved in common couple violence and vice versa. . .[and] many of these

factors are best conceptualized as continuous variables. . .All [factors] could
conceivably be involved in the generation of particular cases of either patriarchal

terrorism or common couple violence... (p. 292-293).

37

Ideally, interviews with petitioners would include questions that assess not only serious
abuse, but also more mild behaviors, including whether the women had ever used
physical force against their partners, whether physical violence was typically minor (such
as slapping or pushing), or perhaps whether altercations escalated to the point of violence
only on occasion. As alluded to previously, the absence of such items rendered it
impossible to create a truly continuous measure of violence spanning both ends of the
spectrum.

A similarly desirable (and equally absent) consideration is a measure of the
frequency with which abusive behaviors of any magnitude occur during the relationship.
Obviously, an understanding of how often disputes erupt into violence is as important as
knowing what kinds of behaviors are involved in the abuse. Unfortunately, although a
frequency of abuse item was included in the original data set, the overwhelming number
of missing or invalid responses rendered it useless for this analysis. Thus, the creation of
a robust and fully functional measure of violence was hindered even further.

The lack of an all-encompassing measure of relationship violence is particularly
disturbing in light of the theoretical framework of this analysis. Indeed, the belief that
battered women who seek protection orders can experience dissimilar, non-overlapping
types of violence is the cornerstone of this analysis, making the handicap created by an
inadequate measure of relationship violence all the more disabling.

It would seem that I am not alone in my desire to accurately identify and measure
the various types of violence in domestic relationships. In an apparent rethinking of his
original theory, Johnson recently expanded and revised his dichotomous model into one

that includes four types of intimate partner violence (Johnson & Ferraro, 2000). This

38

newest incarnation of Johnson’s theory identiﬁes the following types of domestic
violence: (1) the familiar “common couple violence”, which remains essentially
unchanged; (2) “violent resistance”, a term that is preferred over “self-defense”; (3)
“intimate terrorism”, which is essentially a gender-neutral version of patriarchal
terrorism; and (4) “mutual violent control”, a little-understood phenomenon in which
both partners engage in controlling, violent behavior (Johnson & Ferraro, 2000).

Johnson’s revised model is important to domestic violence research on many
levels, yet deserves particular attention here based on the inherence of the original theory
to this analysis. Johnson and Ferraro (2000) make it clear that recognizing the various
types of violence that can exist in intimate relationships is paramount to producing
relevant research and to creating effective public policy. While few would disagree, the
transformation of Johnson’s theory is sure to elicit responses from both critics and
supporters alike.

First, Johnson’s revisions may provoke criticism from feminists for his apparent
desertion of the “patriarchal” element of his original theory. Although undoubtedly an
attempt to create a more inclusive theory, Johnson may in fact alienate members of the
feminist community by eliminating a concrete identiﬁcation of serious, systematic male-
perpetrated violence against women. However, many anti-domestic violence advocates,
including those who are active in the feminist movement, may herald Johnson’s switch
from “patriarchal terrorism” to “intimate terrorism” as a step toward the recognition and
legitimization of violence within the gay and lesbian communities. Although Johnson
and Ferraro (2000) state that intimate terrorism is predominately perpetrated by men

against women, the gender-neutral terminology of the revised theory may prove

39

particularly applicable to the study of same-sex domestic violence. Further, the inclusion
of “violent resistance”, or the acknowledgement that victims often resort to physical
violence as a means of protection, is sure to elicit praise from victims’ rights advocates
while perhaps frustrating loyalists of the family violence phi1050phy who strongly believe
in the gender-symmetry of domestic violence.

Whether employing Johnson’s theory or not, the idea of making distinctions
between the various forms of domestic violence has important implications for future
research as well as for public policy strategies. Speciﬁcally, a richer understanding of the
disparity between battered women’s experiences with violent relationships bears a direct
inﬂuence on the protection order process. Future objectives in both the public sector as
well as within the academic community should include:

Providing tailored services for both petitioners and respondents. Service
providers who are cognizant of the speciﬁc circumstances and particular needs of each
client stand a better chance of successfully helping theirclients than providers who
aggregate all abusive relationships into one category. For counselors who work with
batterers, this means identifying the kinds of behaviors involved in violations of their
partners’ protection orders. For instance, a man who denies his wife access to money,
clothes, or even their children to coerce her into rescinding her protection order will
likely beneﬁt from different intervention strategies than, say, another man who uses
physical force against his partner but who does not engage in ﬁnancial manipulation.
Certainly, this example is not meant to imply that one form of domestic violence is more

or less severe than another, but rather emphasizes that awareness of the particular

40

manner in which batterers victimize their partners gives the shrewd practitioner an upper
hand in providing effective treatment.

Similarly, advocates for battered women who work within the court system
should become familiar with the behaviors each client experiences in her abusive
relationship. For example, imagine a woman whose partner is moderately abusive, both
physically and mentally, but who has not exhibited any of what are often referred to as
“lethality indicators” (i.e. threats to kill either the woman or himself, or comments such
as, “If I can’t have you, no one will”). For this client, recommending a protection order
may be an appropriate action, perhaps in addition to professional counseling or other
legal services. Conversely, a woman appearing in court to request a protection order
whose husband has recently exhibited many of the aforementioned lethality indicators
requires dramatically different services. Before the paperwork for a protection order is
started, safety-planning must begin immediately, and the practitioner should discuss the
option of shelter for both the client and her children.

Thus, we see that by differentiating between the various forms of abuse in
intimate relationships, practitioners involved in all aspects of the protection order
process can effectively render appropriate services on an individualized basis for each
client. Hopefully this will mean that women who seek personal protection orders as a
means of ending their abusive relationships, as well as their partners who receive
counseling and batterers’ intervention therapy, can obtain the individualized attention
they require to put an end to the abuse.

Directing resources toward individuals who have the greatest need. There are

many examples within the protection order process of individuals who demonstrate

41

particular needs that warrant assistance over and above what may be required by other
clients. For example, research indicates that women who are unemployed or who are
ﬁnancially dependent upon their abusive partners may tend to withdraw from the
protection order process more frequently than other women. Similarly, this analysis
reveals that employed women are less likely than their unemployed counterparts to
experience a violation of their PO. Given this information, court advocates working
with unemployed or ﬁnancially dependent women can address the temptation to
terminate their protection orders honestly and earnestly. To offer appropriate assistance,
advocates might place their clients in contact with local agencies such as the Family
Independence Agency or the Welfare Department in order to help them establish
ﬁnancial independence. Or, a practitioner may simply recognize a woman’s perceived
need to return to her relationship to regain economic stability, and help her to identify an
alternative course of action. Awareness of the particular difﬁculties faced by women
who remain ﬁnancially bound to their partners even after obtaining a protection order
allows for more directed access to particular resources for each individual client.
Alternatively, judges can utilize research that emphasizes the strong emotional

attachments formed to partners with whom victims share children to identify women who
may be at particular risk of having their protection orders violated. For example, the
results of this analysis indicate that women who live with or are married to their abusive
partners are more likely than other women to experience violations of their protection
orders. Thus, judges who preside over cases involving couples who are married, live
together, or share children together can incorporate awareness of these emotional issues

into their decisions, perhaps forbidding contact between the respondent and the petitioner

42

during exchange of the children or refusing to allow the respondent access to his partner’s
residence. In addition, judges may impose stiffer sentences for protection order
violations in situations involving children. As with advocates who deal directly with
women during the early stages of the protection order process, judges have the ability to
empower women to complete the protection order process by exhibiting support and
making petitioners aware of their rights throughout the court proceedings.

Undoubtedly, women involved in every step of the protection order process can
beneﬁt from resources that are speciﬁcally directed to meet their needs. Application of
information gathered from contemporary research regarding domestic violence,
protection orders, and the complexities that exist in abusive relationships is essential to
coordinating the direction of resources toward those who are in the greatest need of
assistance.

Continuing research endeavors that build upon our existing body of knowledge.
As crucial as practical interventions are to affecting change for battered women, research
is equally important, for it is where the cultivation of information used to shape public
policy occurs. Certainly, as Johnson and Ferraro (2000) suggest, researchers in the
coming years must recognize that victims of domestic violence do not share identical
experiences with their abusive relationships. Of course, dissimilarities between types of
relationship violence exist not only in terms of common couple violence and patriarchal
terrorism. For example, Johnson’s revised theory provides a foundation for researching
various types of domestic violence beyond the dichotomy of patriarchal terrorism and
common couple violence. Indeed, the mutual use of control tactics by both partners as

well as the frequency with which women engage in violent resistance are both subject

43

areas that are ripe for exploration within the academic literature. Additionally, as
violence in lesbian and gay relationships receives more public attention, so should current
research explore the nature of violence within same-sex relationships. Further, as the
racial and ethnic fabric of our nation becomes increasingly more intricate, opportunities
abound for studies that seek to understand more fully the perpetration of intimate abuse
within various cultures and ethnic groups. Finally, the inability of this analysis to
accurately examine the efﬁcacy of protection orders based on type of relationship
violence may serve as a challenge for future studies to construct a more robust research
design in which to incorporate the concepts proposed by Johnson.

Indeed, it is my hope that issues surrounding the efﬁcacy of protection orders will
receive particular attention in future research. As indicated previously, studies
examining the utility of protection orders for victims of domestic violence have been
relatively scarce until recently. Although a great deal of time and effort have been spent
studying the causes and effects of domestic violence, investigation into the effectiveness
of protection orders leaves much to be desired. Furthering our understanding of how
victims experience the PO process, how and why police ofﬁcers make decisions about
enforcing protection orders, what behaviors serve as risk factors for re-abuse, and so on
will undoubtedly aid battered women in ending their victimization. To be sure, the
commitment of those who work daily to eradicate domestic violence deserves equivalent
effort within the academic community to produce research that provides more detailed

insight into the phenomenon of domestic violence.

44

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