THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY IN SAUDI ARABIA DURING THE 20$^{\text{TH}}$ CENTURY: A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF *THE LONDON TIMES* AND *THE NEW YORK TIMES*

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ABSTRACT

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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently considered one of the most conservative countries in the world with regards to the role of religion in shaping both internal politics and international relations. This dissertation focuses on how *The London Times* and *New York Times,* two opinion-leading newspapers in their respective countries, have covered the issue of authority in Saudi Arabia from 1901 to 2005. The conceptual framework begins with Weber's work on authority, and extends this work by drawing on both contemporary conceptualizations of authority and the history of Saudi Arabia. The methodological framework is based on articles drawn from newspaper archives, which help to develop an understanding of how the public in Britain and America were being told about politics and religion in Saudi Arabia. Given that Weber was basing his notions of authority on western societies, this project will offer a way to test Weber and his notions of authority structures in a non-Western setting over a hundred year time span. This will provide insights to determine if Weber's three types of authority—traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal—are useful in studying the presentation of the Kingdom by the leading newspapers from countries considered to be the most important allies of the Saudi state.

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CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction

"Journalism is the rough draft of history" (Zelizer, 1993).[1] This popular quote is one of

the conceptual foundations of this project, as the newspaper articles we read today become

tomorrow's history. Much of the material that is used to construct contemporary historical books

was once news stories, reported at the time – and thought of as active events. In a very real sense,

journalists are the witnesses to and scribes of events that become what we refer to as history.

Analyzing historical accounts taken from newspaper stories is common in the writings of

the Frankfurt School.[2] This is especially true for one of the Frankfurt School's inspirations—

Max Weber who did a great deal of research in comparative historical analysis of Western

rationalism in religion, secular scientific endeavors, authority, modern state structures, and

capitalism. His work on types of authority included analyzing the forms of legitimacy throughout

history. This became the foundation for his three general forms of legitimate power: traditional,

charismatic, and rational-legal. The last of these is the basis of modern bureaucracies, the form

that dominates much of Weber's research. The hermeneutical study of historical accounts has

become one of the preferred methods of sociological research concerning the analyses of nations

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[1] I cite Zelizer (1993) in this project, however, there are some writers who attribute this idea to others, including Alan Barth in 1944. Please see, Jack Shafer (August 30, 2010) "Who Said It First? Journalism is the 'first rough draft of history.'" *The Slate Group LLC*. Access June 2, 2014 http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2010/08/who_said_it_first.html

[2] See for example, Martin Jay's 1996 book, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950.*

and their histories, and is often the preferred methodological choice in the social sciences more generally.

It is from this standpoint that I undertake the task of providing an in-depth analysis illustrating authority structures in Saudi Arabia during the 20th Century as presented in two leading Western newspapers, *The London Times* and *The New York Times*.[3] This project differs to some extent from other studies that have used a range of historical texts and international references. My analysis of events reported in the newspaper stories—which evolve into historical accounts of Saudi Arabia—shall disclose not only the ways in which authority in the Middle East was presented to western audiences, but also the ways in which this coverage captured various political agendas in the U.K. and the U.S. with regards to their national/international policies and agendas.

As the largest oil producer, perceptions of Saudi Arabia are important in the global economy, thus analyzing Western media coverage from a Weberian standpoint is a worthwhile undertaking. However, studying the presentation of authority in Saudi Arabia in the Western media is not a simple task. Not only are the structures of the Saudi state complex, but so are the ways in which Saudi Arabian authority is presented in the media—by policy makers, social scientists, and others—all of whom have a vested interest in how the nation and its inner workings are framed. As Saudis have built strong international relationships with the western countries of interest, first with the U.K. then the U.S., questions arise concerning why and how such democratic states/societies can build alliances with a monarchy. While there is little doubt that this would be played out in numerous ways by those most intimately involved, it is the presentation of these alliances with the authority in Saudi Arabia to lay audiences that is of

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[3] I abbreviate *The New York Times* as *NYT*.

interest to this project. To be sure, negative publicity on such a topic could be detrimental to elected officials in the U.K. and U.S., and therefore they have an interest in the framing of the Saudi authorities and their relationships with these individuals. This is what should be understood when studying media presentations—such coverage is rarely without political or social biases, as people's lives and livelihoods can be challenged if reports are presented in certain ways. Given the growing importance of the Middle East in the international community, it is imperative to understand how authority in Saudi Arabia—which controls the Muslims' holiest lands of Mecca and Medina—is used to create and maintain power structures, as well as how religious, economic, and political power are presented to audiences in the U.K. and U.S. These western governments are important allies of Saudi Arabia from both military and economic standpoints. Still, relationships have not been without controversies, and by comparing these controversies within press coverage, we can begin to understand how authority in the Middle East is presented to Western audiences from the standpoint that these presentations are part of a performance that involves state officials, religious spokespersons, business interests, and others.

Postcolonialist studies generally considers those states ruled by tribal chiefs as non-institutional states (*cf.*, Said, 1979); an irrational way of ruling, according to Weber. This lead us into postcolonialist literature that dismissed Arabs as members of backward societies, especially the oil states. Thus, this paper raises this question: did newspapers of record in the U.S. and U.K. use an orientalist perspective when depicting the Saudi monarch and the emerging Saudi state in early to mid-20th century—as a key period in state formation?

Chapter Two provides a brief history of Saudi Arabia to create a larger context for my study before turning to an analysis of the Western media coverage of Saudi Arabian authority

between 1901 and 2005. The historical account begins with the Saudi-Wahhabi pact in 1744 between the founder of the First Saudi State, Mohamed Bin Saud, and the pioneer of the Wahhabi movement, Sheikh Mohamed Bin Abdul-Wahhab. I will provide a brief background of this alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi clergy in the First Saudi State (Emirate of Diriyah, 1744-1818) and the Second Saudi State (Emirate of Nejd, 1824-1891). However, the main focus of this chapter concerns the years of the news coverage I will be studying which includes beginning the building the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1901—when Ibn Saud left his exile in Kuwait to recover Riyadh back from Al-Rasheed's rule—until the death of King Fahd in 2005. The chapter tracks the development of authority in the Kingdom, including Ibn Saud's struggle to create the Kingdom, the transition of power from king to king, and the evolution of the Saudi role in the international community.

Chapter Three discusses the theoretical framework of this dissertation, specifically Weber's original conception of power, including the three types of authority mentioned above. *Traditional authority* is based on customary values giving particular elites respect and is often derived from patrimonial structures wherein domination tends to emphasize the sacredness of such authority. *Charismatic authority* is based on the personal features and popularity of a leader among the masses, rather than inheriting the former leader's position of authority. *Rational-Legal authority* is based on rules and regulations rather than subservient obedience to a particular leader (as in the other two forms of authority). It should be understood that while I am basing this study on this typology, the three types of authority are not to be taken for granted. There are a number of scholars, Thompson (1961) and Coser (1977) for example, who offer cogent and coherent challenges to Weber's theory, and I do address these challenges and critiques. The most

significant point of this discussion is the idea of the intermingling of the three types of authority, rejecting notions of the *purity* and *exclusivity* of those ideal types.

Chapter Four is a review of the sociology of media and media studies. I start by discussing the media's role in setting agendas and its influence on public opinion, including the role of the media in social control with regards to political power, as society's elite often control access to media outlets as a way to influence public opinion and legitimate their hegemonic dominion over the masses. Linking this mechanism with Weber's work, we begin to understand how those elites enjoy money, respected social status, and/or close access to other officials (that is to say, class, status, and party). The chapter also reviews a number of content analysis methods, in addition to the importance of newspapers in the current electronic era. Finally, I explain the particular methodology of collecting, coding, and the approaches of analyzing the data of this research.

To help make sense of the analysis of news coverage that covers more than a century, this project divides the timeline into four eras based on significant turning points in Saudi history. Chapter Five focuses on the first era—the "building of the kingdom"—which started at the beginning of the 20th century (January 1, 1901) when Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (hereafter abbreviated to Ibn Saud) left his exile in Kuwait to return to Riyadh and build the core of his empire. This era ended one day before the declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 23, 1932. Newspaper stories regarding Ibn Saud's wars and treaties that were signed during this critical building stage of the kingdom are covered in this chapter. Because of the small number of articles found in this era, every one is used in the analysis. Potentially missed coverage is addressed in this chapter as a part of the agenda setting of *The London Times* and *The New York Times*.

Chapter Six focuses on the second era, beginning with Ibn Saud's declaration of the Kingdom on September 23, 1932 until the day before his death on November 9, 1953. The newspapers' stories regarding the shift from *building* to *ruling* the monarchy under King Ibn Saud are thus covered in this chapter. This includes building the bureaucracy, finalizing the skirmishes on the borders (especially with Yemen), and shifting the primary alliance from the U.K. to the U.S. It is here that we expect to find a move from *charismatic* to *rational-legal* authority, if western reporters are using their own sense of authority.

Chapter Seven focuses on the third era, beginning with the new King, Saud, who took over the reins of power from his father on November 9, 1953 until the day before the assassination of King Faisal on March 25, 1975. The newspapers' stories regarding the conflict among Ibn Saud's sons over rights to power—including overthrowing King Saud, the rivalry with the Arab Military Revolutionary regimes, and the Oil Embargo—are covered in this chapter. It is interesting to find that the Saudi Arabian image was generally not demonized in *The London Times* or *The New York Times* because of the Oil Embargo which caused a good deal of consternation in Western countries.

Chapter Eight focuses on the fourth era, beginning with the new King; that is, after the assassination of King Faisal by his nephew on March 25, 1975 until the day before the death of King Fahd on August 1, 2005. Stories regarding the challenges faced by the Saudi authorities concerning revivalist Islamic movements including a siege of the Holy Mosque in Mecca in 1979, the uprisings against the Western military involvement in the Gulf crisis in 1990-1991, and the consequences of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. are covered. In addition, the chapter covers the development of Saudi Arabia as a major diplomatic force in the Arab world under the leadership of King Fahd, who expanded the Saudi sphere of influence throughout the Middle East.

Chapter Nine provides a summary of the analyses provided in chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight. This includes a number of charts summarizing the data analysis of the project, such as the types of authority discussed in a general sense, specific types mentioned, and the sources of news stories, which shall provide an insight into the agenda setting of both *The London Times* and *The New York Times* during these years.

One may wonder how democratic states can build alliances with absolute monarchies; those living in monarchies may also wonder if questions might be raised regarding Western democracies themselves. In either case, we must investigate how democracies and monarchies establish "values" or "cultural codes" utilized by elites to rule their societies; methods of distributing wealth and control of power know no geographies within and often between contemporary nation states. These are questions which may have their answers revealed in the Western newspapers investigated. Additionally, messages found in Western accounts may be discovered to both reinforce Western interventionism, hostilities, and stereotypical portrayals, as well as to indicate the evolution of those portrayals from Saudi Arabia's inception until the 9/11 attacks. It should be stated at this point, however, that this dissertation is not a study of public opinion, but rather a study of the authority of Saudi Arabia using a discursive analysis of two Western newspapers.

CHAPTER TWO:

A Historical Account of Saudi Arabia

General Overview

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest state in Western Asia in terms of land (approximately 2,150,000 km^2), with an approximate population of 30 million including 9.72 million non-nationals (CDSI, 2013).[4] The country is comprised of the following five major regions:

1. Hejaz (The Western Region): is on the west coast and houses Islam's holiest cities of Mecca and Al-Madina to which millions of Muslim pilgrims journey every year. In addition, Hejaz is one of the oldest commercial centers on the Arabian Peninsula. The major city in this province, Jeddah, is an important commercial capital city in Saudi Arabia.

2. Al-Hasa and Al-Qatif (The Eastern Region): is located on the east coast and is the country's primary source of wealth owing to large oil reserves. This region is known for its agriculture and bountiful fishing. It is also where most of the *Shia* minority in the country reside.

3. Northern Region: this is the least populated region of the country and borders Iraq and Jordon. This province is known historically for animal production due to its abundant pastures.

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[4] According to the official website of the Central Department of Statistics and Information in Saudi Arabia (CDSI), estimates of population in the Kingdom for the census of 2013 is 29,994,272 [≈30,000,000] including 9,723,214 non-citizen immigrants. http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/socandpub/resd

4. Southern Region: borders Yemen, and the people have strong ancestral relations with Yemen. Some researchers (e.g., Salameh, 1980) maintain that people in southern Saudi Arabia are more like Yemenis than Saudis. This region is also densely populated by followers of diverse Islam sects such as Sunni, *Ismaily*, and *Zaidi*.

5. Najd (Central Region): is the home region of the House of Saud. Riyadh, the capital city, represents the base upon which the country was founded; it may lack in natural resources but it is rich in politics.

Figure 1: Map of Saudi Arabia's 14 Administrative Provinces

Every region had its own social and cultural traditions before the unification by Ibn Saud into present-day Saudi Arabia. These traditions spill over into today's social climate, as Menoret (2005: 32) argues for "the impossibility that Saudis should ever think of themselves as Saudi." Instead, they would choose to affiliate more with the supranational "Islam- world economy" over

the narrower and imposed "Bedouin, ethnic, or regional affiliation." This project will investigate how the authority of Saudi Arabia has been presented to western media audiences in an attempt to test this argument. This chapter provides a brief history of Saudi Arabia to give the reader a fuller understanding of how the country became what it is today.

The Beginning (the First Saudi State, Emirate of Diriyah 1744-1818)

For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the suzerain power over the Middle East. The Ottomans began controlling the area as a consequence of occupying Egypt -the former guardian of Hejaz- in 1517 (Al-Rasheed, 2010). At that time, Najd was not an attractive region to colonize, thus it enjoyed a certain level of autonomy led by its local *emirs* (rulers) who belonged to indigenous tribes. However, in the middle of the 18th century, an emerging power referred to as the "Saudi-Wahhabis" started challenging the Ottomans. This challenge took place on the Arabian Peninsula and in the southern territories of Iraq and Transjordan.

Arguably contemporary Saudi history started in the middle of the 18th century when the founder of the first Saudi state, Mohamed Bin Saud, the fourth great grandfather of Ibn Saud and the *emir* of a small town in Najd called "*Dariya*"[5] met Sheikh Mohamed Bin Abdul-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi movement and made a pact (Steinberg, 2005; Al-Rasheed, 2010). The agreement aimed to spread Whabbi doctrine by bringing the House of Saud to power (Benoist-Mechin, 1957, Lacey, 1981). Within this agreement and its implementation, power was divided into two realms: politics for the House of Saud, and religion for Abdul-Wahhab and his disciples who later became the scholars, *Ulama*, of the state. According to Leatherdale:

> Wahhabism accepted Al Saud as a legitimate and hereditary
> Islamic government. The Saudi ruler was no longer simply a

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[5] Diriyah is located in northwestern Riyadh. Today, it has become part of the capitol city of Riyadh rather than an independent city.

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secular authority but, ostensibly, the representative of God and his Divine law on earth. From the time of Mohammad ibn Saud's conversion the Al Saud were no longer referred to as "sheikhs" or "emirs" but imams, having *religious authority* over populace (1983: 14, emphasis added).

Madawi Al-Rasheed (2010: 15) argues that during that time the House of Saudi was lacking in two respects (1) "identifiable tribal origin that would have guaranteed a strong association with a tribal confederation"[6] and (2) "any great surplus of wealth." Thus, religious authority was the best choice for the Saudi *emirs* to extend their hegemony over the Najdi tribes, including those who believed themselves as having a higher rank than the Saudi emir and his family. On the other hand, Sheikh Mohamed Bin Abdul-Wahhab's doctrine focused on a lack of tolerance as he adopted a strict view of sharia law and monotheism, *Tawheed*, though it was not easy to find a guardian for his beliefs. I argue that both the Saudi *emir* and the Wahhabi Sheikh needed each other to reach their goals of establishing the Islamic state and imposing *Sharia*. It was a matter of integration between the "sword" and the "pulpit."

This new power integrating tribal and religious values was able to combine the existing cultural codes of the tribes by emphasizing notions such as *jihad* ("war's glory"), the tribal chief's status affecting the "honor of all tribe members," the "shame of being behind," and so on,

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[6] As'ad Abukhalil goes further and argues for the importance of the tribe for the superpowers who were involved in Arabian lands (i.e., British and Ottoman) in terms building alliances with local Arab rulers.

> The formation of the Saudi state has been closely related to tribes and tribal associations, which should not be understood in themselves but as an expression of regional alliances and extensions of colonial rules and politics. Thus, the Ottomans aligned themselves with Ibn Rasheed and the British with As-Subah, As-Sa'ud, the Idrisi of Asir, and the Hashemites of Hijaz [*sic*]. Alliance translated into subsidies, arms, and favored status when possible (Abukhalil, 2004: 45-46).

with the influence and specific interpretations of Islam to offer incentives to other tribal leaders to honor the pact.

The consolidation of power on the Arabian Peninsula forced people who lived in the region to follow a leader who did not belong to their tribes. These Bedouin tribes, through the codes offered by Islam, became subject to leadership through an outside political *wali al-amr*, the leader of the Muslim community or the *Imam*, rather than their traditional tribal leaders (Mackey, 2002; Glosemeyer, 2005; Bowen, 2008). The tribal leaders, in turn, gained material and status-raising benefits by bringing their tribes into the fold of Bin Saud.

The pact was not without opposition. Yet, Mohamed Bin Saud further extended his power through expansionist wars using the Najdi tribes under the religious legitimacy provided by Abdul-Wahhab. For his part, Abdul-Wahhab's previously issued *fatwas* (forbidding practices) which had been considered acceptable by other Muslim sects such as admiring saints' graves, wearing talismans, smoking, and so on. These edicts became the basis of Wahhabi jurisprudence for the new state (Bowen, 2008), which legitimized attacking other tribes and making them accept Saudi rule. As the new state grew under Mohamed Bin Saud and Abdul-Wahhab, the spoils of these wars were replaced by taxes paid by their subjects (Menoret, 2005). Under this developing mechanism of a Saudi/Wahhabi empire, Mohamed Bin Saud and his successors' (sons and grandsons) titles grew from leaders of a Bedouin/tribal group to the leaders of a religious and political entity which shaped the current Saudi elite—"Najdi-Wahhabis"—by combining three elements: the royal family, Islamic clerics, and tribal adherents (Alrebh, 2011). In this era, the title of the Saudi leaders was "Imam" which is a religious title. To call the ruler *imam al muslimeen*, was to put him in a position of *wali al amr*.

The growth of the Saudi-Wahhabi power provoked the Ottoman Empire to be concerned with what was happening in the region, especially when Saudi-Wahhabi forces raided other tribes and brought them under Saudi authority (Al-Rasheed, 2010), as well as the eventual capture of the holy cities of Medina in 1805 and Mecca in1806 (Akgündüz and Öztürk, 2011). In 1818, the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa IV ordered a retaking of the area controlled by the House of Saud. The task was assigned to the Ottomans viceroy in Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha, who sent an army led by his sons Tusun Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha to fight the Saudis. The army besieged Diriyah, the capitol of the Saudi state, which had grown into a large city in Najd, and finally succeeded in the mission by destroying the power of the Saudis and ending their state. The Saudi *emir* Abdullah bin Saud was sent to Istanbul and beheaded (Al-Rasheed, 2010).

The Role Of Wahhabism: The Saudi Religious Doctrine

To understand the historical significance of religion in Saudi Arabia, it is imperative that we understand Wahhabism. This religious group and the doctrines it follows are considered a conservative branch of Sunni Islam. Originally, it was a reform movement founded by Sheikh Mohamed Bin Abdul-Wahhab (1703-1792). The principle base of the Wahhabism movement is the defense of *Tawhid* (the Arabic word for monotheism).[7] This movement fought most of the Arabian population which had different interpretations of *Tawhid* (Moussalli, 2009). Moreover, the Wahhabism movement put itself in the position of the Prophet Mohamed, whose "mission was to show that straight path of Islam" (Metcalf, 1999: 222). The monotheism of Allah (*Tawhid*) is the primary concept that Wahhabis declare as the matter they most want to clarify and bring other Muslims to accept.

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[7] The title of the most popular book by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab is *Kitab At-Tauhid*. The formal English translation of the book is available on the Riyadh City Website: http://www.arriyadh.com/Eng/Islam/index.aspx/?1=1&menuId=5873

As a concept, *Tawhid* started with the *Shahadah*, the Islamic pledge of the conviction of one's faith: "I bear witness that there is no deity but Allah and I bear witness that Muhammad is His Messenger." All Muslims claim to adopt this pledge, though Wahhabis claim that other Muslims do not follow the truest path of this pledge. This perhaps best illustrates that the most contentious matter Wahhabis address regarding the faith of their Muslim enemies is that of shirk, or "idolatry."

Kurzman and Browers (2004:2) citing Blunt (1881), all of whom were influenced by Weber, linked Wahhabism with Protestant Christianity in terms of religious reformation, argued, "just as the Lutheran reformation in Europe, though it failed to convert the Christian church, caused its real reform, so Wahhabism has produced a real desire for reform if not yet reform itself in Mussulmans." On the other hand, Kurzman and Browers, citing Wilson (1916), contend, "just as the Protestant Reformation was followed by a counter-reformation in Roman Catholicism, so Wahhabism was the instrument for arousing Sunni Moslems" (2004:2). In this vein, the Wahhabis struggle against the notion of the miraculous and the sacred power of saints, as they believe saints are no more than dead people.[8]

It is again worth noting that *shirk* refers to "idolatry" or associating profane things with God, Allah, which in practice is considered nothing short of polytheism (Izutsu, 2006: 44). Addressing people by the "title" of shirk means giving permission and justification to fight them

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[8] Peter Berger (1967) argues that Protestantism brought about an inevitable tendency to shrink the miraculous power of the saints. Similarly, Wahhabism calls for cutting irrational relations with the dead, and Wahhabis will fully disrespect the graves of Muslim saints (Moussalli, 2009). Peter Beyer (2006: 161) summarized the Wahhabis' attitude: "submission (Islam) as obedience to God was not to be done on the basis of imitating a human authority, thereby creating another intermediary between God and Human beings." Both Wahhabis and Protestants look at the relationship between people and God as a personal one to be kept individually (*c.f.*, Hegel, 1944: 417).

as heretics, as people who are a danger to true Islam. Furthermore, they would be considered more dangerous than "mere infidels" who obviously never believed in Islam. In this vein, Wahhabis utilized the concept of *shirk* against people who did not follow them and fought them by declaring *jihad* against non-Muslims and those Muslims whose Islam did not conform to the reformer's teachings" (Al-Rashedd, 2010: 17; *c.f.*, Leatherdale, 1983: 13-14).

In terms of authority, Wahhabis believe in *al-umma* and *wali al-amr*—Arabic words for "nation" and "Muslim supreme leader"—as the head of the nation.[9] He is the Imam "king" who is elected by elites *or* obtained the rule by sword and he does not have to be a cleric. This requires full loyalty to *al-umma*—the nation of Islam—and *wali al-amr*, the state and the king and disloyalty to their enemies who are considered the enemy of Allah/Islam.

Wahhabism succeeded in keeping tribalism in place as the concept of loyalty moved from the tribe to loyalty to the *al-umma,* state, and from loyalty for the tribal chief to loyalty for *wali al-amr,* the king, both of which became religious entities. This change in loyalties also appears in some of the social values that come from the tribal customs such as rules for marriage that allow higher status tribes to refuse to give their daughters to men belonging to lower tribes to avoid losing their sense of honor and status. Religious leaders legitimize this cultural practice as they claim that the couple should be socially qualified for each other. Needless to say, many of these tribal values legitimated by religious power are completely rejected in Islamic literature; however, it is a matter of exchanging interests between those two powers—tribe and religion (Bligh, 1985; Al-Rasheed and Al-Rasheed, 1996)**.**

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[9] It is interesting to note that in Wahhabis' view, nobody has the right to challenge *wali-almr*; however if someone does and wins, he becomes the new Imam that must be obeyed (Ibn Qudamah, 1999: Vol.9: 5).

The Revival (the Second Saudi State, Emirate of Nejd 1824-1891)

Beheading Abdullah bin Saud did not end the Saudi-Wahhabi dream. Six years later Turki ibn Abdullah -the son of the beheaded *emir*- returned to claim authority in Najd, but this time in Riyadh rather than Diriyah. The Saud family was not alone in this revival, as Abdul-Wahab's family was there to support the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In 1825, Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Sheikh – a grandson of Abdul-Wahhab– returned from exile in Egypt to support Turki ibn Abdullah and fight what Wahhabis consider "polytheistic practices" (Dore Gold, 2013). Again, the words "sword" and "preach" were integrated to reestablish the Saudi Wahhabi state.

The Saudi state at this time had a great deal of "interior" challenges. The House of Saud members were not of one mind, so they fought each other and weakened the state. This included overthrowing rulers either by Saud's family members or other Najdi tribes. For example, the founder of the state, Turki ibn Abdullah, was forced to relinquish his rule by Ibn Mua'mer in 1820 before coming back to rule in 1824. More internal fighting started taking place in 1834, when Mushari ibn Abd al-Rahman -Turki's nephew- assassinated his uncle and became the Imam of the state before his cousin Faisal ibn Turki returned from a battle in eastern Arabia to revenge his father and become the *Imam*. In the carrying out of his revenge, Faisal was assisted by the Rasheedi family of Hail (Al-Rasheed, 2010). However, the House of Saud continued their infighting until the Rasheedi ruler of Hail defeated them and forced the last Saudi *emir* Abdul Rahman bin Faisal –the father of Ibn Saud– to leave Najd for *Rub' al Khali,*[10] then Kuwait in 1891.

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[10] Also known as "Empty Quarter," it is the largest sand desert in the world "with an area of about 640,000 km^2" (Vincent, 2008: 141), located in the southeastern Arabian Peninsula,

Al Rasheed is a noble clan of Shammar the dominant tribe of Hail, which is housed north of Arabia. In terms of the difference between Al Rasheed and Al Saud, Madawi Al-Rasheed (2010) argues that Al Saud lacked the tribal status that Al Rasheed enjoyed. Therefore, they had to resort to the religious alliance with the Wahhabi doctrine to bolster their claims of authority.[11]

This epoch was replete with conflicts that led to the end of the second state by the former ally Al Rasheed. The religious title of the ruler –*Imam*– did not prevent opposition from arising both within and outside the Saudi family. Such conflicts among the brothers provided a good lesson for Abdul Aziz ibn Saud –Ibn Saud– in the next version of the Saudi State.

Ibn Saud, The Nomadic Hero: Building of the State (1901-1932)

Overthrowing the Al Saud family and forcing them to live under the patronage of Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti rulers, was nothing more than another chapter in their rise to power. In Kuwait, Abdul Rahman Al Saud (1850–1928), the last Saudi *emir,* raised his son, Abdul Aziz (1876-1953), with a dream of reviving the family's honor. At the same time, Kuwaiti rulers were watching the growth of Al Rasheed with serious concerns about a potential attack, so it came as no surprise when they supported Ibn Saud against Rashidis (Al-Rasheed, 2010) when Ibn Saud was 25 years old.

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encompassing a third of Arabia. Most of the lands belong to the Saudi Arabian territories. The rest of it belongs to Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

[11] Madawi Al-Rasheed is a professor of Anthropology at King's College in London, and belongs to the Al Rasheed family. The following is her argument regarding the difference in legitimacy between Al Rasheed and Al Saud:

> The Rashidi emirs were themselves drawn from the tribe and
> were tied into it through marital alliances. In contrast, the
> Sa'udi leadership in Riyadh lacked tribal depth, which obliged
> it to depend on the alliance with Muhammad ibn Abd al-
> Wahhab and his followers (2010: 25).

In January 1901, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud launched his trip from Kuwait to Riyadh accompanied by sixty men, followers and slaves. The mission was a success, as Ibn Saud killed Ajlan –the Rashidi representative in Riyadh– on January 15, 1901 (Ochsenwald, 2004). Thus, the core of the modern Saudi state started with recapturing Riyadh. There were also signs of learning from past mistakes, as Abdul Rahman did not try to take the rule from his son, but instead accepted living under his son's patronage. This attitude, I argue, helped Ibn Saud to impose his authority among his family and the rest of followers with no challenges.

After settling in Riyadh, Ibn Saud started capturing towns located in southern Najd before moving to the north and into Qasim. He fought the Rashidis until he defeated them, at which, "Ottomans confirmed Ibn Sa'ud as de facto ruler of Qasim and southern Najd... The Ottomans seem to have accepted the partition of Najd between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid" (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 38).

The next step was to go east to Al Ahsa and Qatif, the region that contained a majority of Shia. In 1913, Ibn Saud captured the whole eastern coast of Arabia, except those emirates who had already signed pledges with the British. At the time, Ibn Saud continued to recognize the Ottoman authority and accepted an Ottoman representative as the governor of the region (Leatherdale, 1983). The relationship between Ibn Saud and the British was not yet settled, though "[t]he outbreak of the First World War dramatically changed the situation" (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 39).

The outbreak of WWI in 1914 turned out to be an opportunity for Ibn Saud to practice diplomacy with the great powers (i.e., Ottomans and British). He first signed a convention with the Ottomans recognizing him as the ruler of the territories he already controlled. This convention gave him the right to pass the rule to his progeny (Al-Rasheed, 2010). On the other

hand, Ibn Saud had an obligation that forbade him from signing conventions with other powers (i.e., British) at any level (Leatherdale, 1983; Al-Rasheed, 2010).

This did little to stop negotiations and the British sent their Political Agent in Kuwait, Captain Shakespear (1878-1915), to negotiate a treaty with Ibn Saud but Shakespear was killed during the Battle of Jarrab between Saudis and Rashidis in January 1915 (Leatherdale, 1983:16). This battle was considered part of WWI because the Rashidis were on the Ottoman's side, while the Saudis sided with the British. Jarrab was not the end of hostility between these Arabian tribes. In 1917, the British encouraged Ibn Saud to attack Hail –the Rashidi's homeland– because "its rulers were seen as Ottoman allies" (Al-Rasheed, 2010:40). Finally, Ibn Saud defeated the Rashidi's in 1921 and became the only power in Najd. This short period of gaining power and territory reflected the pragmatic tendency of Ibn Saud toward political changes. It appears that Ibn Saud's awareness of the geopolitical changes is the primary element in the persistence of his state, especially as the British subsidized him with financial backing (Leatherdale, 1983:18; Al-Rasheed, 2010:43).

After defeating the Rashidi emirate, Ibn Saud began planning to capture Hejaz, the kingdom ruled by the Hashemite dynasty.[12] Sharif Hussein ibn Ali (1854-1931) had proclaimed himself king of an independent Hejaz in 1916 after the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. At the time, Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, a former ally of the British, was the king of Hejaz and had declared himself as the King of all Arabs based on his position within the Arab Revolt. Such a declaration provoked Ibn Saud who enjoyed less tribal rank than the Sharif and had adopted

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[12] A tribal title refers to the clans that belong to the Banu Hashim, the clan of Quraysh tribe. This is the clan of Prophet Mohammed. The Hashemite dynasty that ruled Hejaz in that time is considered as a part of the Prophet's dynasty because their late great grandmother is Fatimah the Daughter of Prophet Mohammed. This clanship gave them high respect among Muslims.

different religious beliefs in Sunni Islam. The situation got worse as Sharif Hussein declared

himself the Caliph of Muslims right after the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1922

(Teitelbaum, 2001). *The London Times* reported a telegraph being sent from the last Ottoman

sultan Mehmed VI supporting the Sharifian Caliphate (Teitelbaum, 2001: 240). Apparently, such

Ottoman support –even after the collapse of their empire– was enough to shift the British alliance

with Sharif to Ibn Saud. In addition, Captain Shakespear, in a report made before the Battle of

Jarrab, stated: "[t]he Arabs have now found a leader who stands head and shoulders above any

other chief, and in whose star all have implicit faith" (Leatherdale, 1983:17). Thus, Ibn Saud was

able to capture Mecca, and then the entire region of Hejaz in 1925, and ascended to the Hejazi

throne. This represents the turning point of recognizing the Wahhabi state by other powers (*NYT*,

November 24, 1929).

Controlling the largest part of Arabia enabled Ibn Saud to move southward and easily

controlled Asir and Jizan, as the local rulers, Idrisis, signed a treaty with him acknowledging His

Majesty Ibn Saud's authority over their land and accepting rule under his suzerainty.[13] This

included forbidding Idrisis from any sort of negotiation with other governments (Leatherdale,

1983; Al-Rasheed, 2010). Idrisis signed this treaty with Ibn Saud after they failed to achieve an

agreement with the Zidi Imam of Yemen to rule Asir and Jizan under his suzerainty. The Zidi

Imam wanted to expel Idrisis from the region because he considered them foreigners as they are

originally Moroccan (Jacob, 1923). Finally, on September 23, 1932, Ibn Saud declared the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

All of this did not happen without opposition both within and outside the Arabian

Peninsula. The interior challenge came from the *Ikhwan* rebels. Those fighters had actually

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[13] This is called "The Treaty of Mecca," signed on October 21, 1926.

helped Ibn Saud build the kingdom before they began to push back. They criticized Ibn Saud for accepting some signs of modernity such as automobiles, the telegraph, and telephones. Furthermore, they embarrassed Ibn Saud by attacking the neighboring states he had signed treaties with, such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Transjordan (Howarth, 1964). These raids also affected Anglo-Saudi relationships (Leatherdale, 1983). The challenge reached its critical point when *Ikhwan* faced Ibn Saud on the battlefield. Several battles with the rebels took place in Arabia until the Battle of Sabilla in March 1929, when Ibn Saud defeated the *Ikhwan*.

Soon thereafter *Ikhwan* found themselves facing British troops, mainly aircraft. The leaders of *Ikhwan* surrendered to the British who sent them to Ibn Saud after he pledged not to execute them and thus guaranteed their raids would stop. While they were not executed, the leaders (e.g., Faisal al-Duwaish and Sultan bin Bajad) spent the rest of their lives in jail (Leatherdale, 1983; Al-Rasheed, 2010).

It is interesting to note how authority was being played out during the era. Ibn Saud was addressed in several different ways as indicated in Table 1:

Table 1: Ibn Saud's Titles Over Time[14]

Year	The Title of Ibn Saud
1902-1921	The Imam, the Chief of Najdi Tribes and Clans
1921	The Sultan of Najd
1922	The Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies
1926	The King of Hejaz and The Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies
1927	The King of Hejaz and of Najd and its Dependencies
1932	The King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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[14] According to the formal Saudi academic institution "King Abdul Aziz Foundation" http://www.darah.info/WebTrAdminBody.aspx?trtype=7 Access 16 October 2013

As one moves from the beginning of Ibn Saud's efforts to the establishment of Saudi

Arabia as a nation, we see a move from charisma with some traditional backing to the claim of

leader to one steeped in tradition.

Ibn Saud, The Monarch of the KSA (1932-1953)

The last war with regards to building the kingdom was after the declaration of the birth of

the new state. The Yemeni *Imam* sent his troops to Asir and Jazan after he became an ally with

the local rulers, the Idrisis in 1931. Ibn Saud sent his troops led by his son and Crown Prince

Saud who defeated the Yemenis and captured Najran and made it part of the Saudi territories. In

1934, the Yemeni king recognized Ibn Saud's sovereignty over the former Idrisis' lands in

addition to Najran (Leatherdale, 1983).

In this era, the *fighter* turned into the *ruler*. Ibn Saud focused on maintaining the kingdom

as a strong Arab state after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This era was a critical time as

WWII took place from 1939-1945, an event that challenged the sovereignty and strength of

many new states. In addition, the development and growing importance of the Middle Eastern oil

industry and the developing Jewish-Palestinian conflict, made Saudi Arabia an important area in

terms of both strategic and tactical location. The new Arab state began to create a modern

governing structure rather than the traditional Bedouin one, which recalls Weber's conception of

bureaucracy. In this era, oil was discovered in neighboring states such as Iran, Iraq and Bahrain,

which encouraged Ibn Saud to think more deeply about this modern source of income. The

British were not that optimistic, but the Americans were willing to take the risk in 1933. "The

American SOCAL offered Ibn Saud what the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had declined ... a

yearly rental of £5,000 in gold and an immediate loan of £100,000" (Al-Rasheed, 2010:88).

Hourani argues:

> The discovery and exploitation of oil had led to a replacement
> of British by American influence, but had also made it possible
> for the patriarchal rule of the Saudi family to begin the process
> of turning itself into a more fully developed system of
> government; by the time King Abdul Aziz died in 1953 (1991:
> 365).

The oil concession and replacement of British influence is associated with Ibn Saud's advisor St John Philby. Indeed, most of the literature at this juncture was attributed to him (e.g., Leatherdale, 1983; Hourani, 1991; Abukhalil, 2004; Al-Rasheed, 2010). Philby was secretly paid by SOCAL but his primary loyalty was to Ibn Saud (Yergin, 2012). It was at this time that economic power began to replace the military. Money helped Ibn Saud to maintain his status after ending the expansion wars. A strong linkage with the U.S. was formed when Ibn Saud met Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945 on board of the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal (Eddy, 1954).

The growing economic prosperity in the kingdom quickly led to bureaucratic expansion of the state's institutions (Weberian rational-legal authority). During the 1930s and 1940s, Saudi Arab had only two ministries (i.e., Foreign and Finance). In the last three years of Ibn Saud's era, he created five more: Interior, Health, Communication, Agriculture, and Education. Those ministries were headed by the Council of Ministries that has been inaugurated a month before Ibn Saud's death (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 91).

This era also represents the shift from establishing a kingdom to building a state. To accomplish this, Ibn Saud needed to find economic sources, enhance international relations, and shape state structures to promote his interests. By the end of this era, his senior sons, Saud and Faisal were already involved in the state's rule (Al-Rasheed, 2010). Ibn Saud died leaving a strong and wealthy state for his sons. However, the horizontal system of succeeding (brother to brother) rather than the vertical one (father to son) caused Ibn Saud's sons to deal with the State

as a family business, as it was thought that all of Saud's family members should care about the continuation of the state to maintain their privileges.

The Brothers' Conflict: Saud and Faisal (1953-1975)

The new kingdom of the brothers started the post-Ibn Saud era. The senior sons Saud and Faisal became the king and the crown prince respectively through traditional means of authority legitimated to some extent through the legal rationalization of Saudi Arabia being recognized and governed as a modern state. However, the brothers rivaled each other for power. Sole authority no longer existed in Riyadh. This was happening at a time when the Arab world was experiencing a revolutionary era that is reflected to some extent by the Arab Spring that began in 2010. Monarchies collapsed in Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, and Yemen in 1962. This era was critical in maintaining the Saudi monarchy.

Most of the literature confirmed that Saud was not qualified to be king as much as his younger brother Faisal in terms of leadership features and involvement in political affairs (e.g., Mansfield, 1991; Al-Rasheed, 2010). The conflict between those brothers became more serious as Saud placed his own sons in many vital positions, especially the military, which was a sign of his intention to marginalize his brother's sons (Al-Rasheed, 2010). The brothers carried different responsibilities during their father's era. One month before Ibn Saud's death, he founded the Council of Ministers headed by Saud; yet, the king –Ibn Saud– remained the absolute monarch. The fact that Saud did not enjoy the same authority of his father was the main point of conflict between the two brothers. However, there were more challenges to the royal authority from the public.

These challenges started shortly after the death of the founding king. For example, in 1953, ARAMCO's workers organized a demonstration demanding their right to better work

conditions and wages (Wilson and Graham, 1994). Two years later, the Saudi government discovered a plot for a coup attempt by officers who were trained in Egypt (Al-Rasheed, 2010). Furthermore, in 1961 a group of young princes –Ibn Saud's sons– led by prince Talal launched an external opposition group called the Free Princes, much like the Free Officers revolutionary group in Egypt who wanted to abolish the monarchy.

The officers' plot and the Free Princes movement can be considered effects of the revolutionary wave in the Arab world that was especially influenced by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970), the father of Pan-Arabism, a Left-wing movement. Religion and the idea of Islamic *ummah* were the slogans of the Saudi kingdom against such Leftist movements inspired by Marxism, which were equal to atheism in Arab minds at that time (Salem, 1994).

This stage required a strong leader to handle the kingdom and impose royal authority. Thus, Faisal sought legitimacy from the Wahhabi scholars to strip Saud's religious title –wali al amr– and proclaim himself king of Saudi Arabia. The clergy "retain the right to declare a king unfit to govern, and they exercised this right in 1964 when they approved the disposing of King Saud" (Anderson, Seibert, and Wagner, 2001:44). Faisal utilized the same cultural tool that his father utilized to build the kingdom—religion. This step helped Faisal to take over without questioning the authority of the royal family. Saud had no choice but to abdicate and left to spend his remaining days abroad until he died in Greece on February 23, 1969.

During the conflict between Saud and Faisal, Saud's sons occupied numerous positions of power. This led to Faisal and his allies' brothers struggling to exclude their nephews. By 1963, Faisal's camp "pushed all of Saud's sons out of their official positions, with the expectation of Mansur bin Saud, commander of the Royal Guard" (Herb, 1999: 97).

The Crown Prince position was a problem. Prince Mohammed, the next senior son of Ibn Saud, the man who delivered the message to the deposed king, was to be the Crown Prince and the future king. However, the royal family was not in favor of this choice, even though he had proven to be a leader and had participated in his father's wars alongside Saud and Faisal. This negative attitude toward Prince Mohammed was based on his nickname Abu Sharayn "father of two evils"—a bad temper and drinking. Eventually, he conceded the position to his only full-brother, Prince Khalid who became the Crown Prince (Herb, 1999). This solution reduced the potential of any future conflict over power.

Faisal took the next step to resolve the rivalry for the throne among the sons of Ibn Saud. He appointed his half brothers to vital positions; Khalid as the Crown Prince, Fahd as the Second Deputy, Sultan as the Minister of Defense, and Nayef as the Minister of State for Internal Affairs, in addition to keeping Fahd the Minister of Interior and Abdullah the Commander of National Guard, positions they had been appointed to in the last two years of Saud's reign. Thus, power was distributed among the strongest sons of Ibn Saud, which established the compatibility method of ruling in Saudi Arabia that still exists. The king is the absolute monarch, but he cannot marginalize his brothers to favor his sons.

Faisal combined a political conservatism with a modern view regarding technology and education. He was not in favor of the Arab mainstream discourse of Pan-Arabism because it represented a threat to the monarchy, thus, "Faisal adopted the discourse of modernization with an Islamic framework" (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 119). On the other hand, Faisal practiced his authority as a king, challenging conservative Wahhabis by launching girls' schooling and television stations.

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One of the better known events that took place during Faisal's reign was the Oil Embargo in October 1973. Arab oil-producing countries –including Saudi Arabia– used oil as a weapon to support Egypt and Syria in their war against Israel (Golub, 1985, Parra, 2004). In addition to the political victory (i.e., gaining respect among the Arab public), Saudi Arabia received an economic benefit as the oil prices increased, which helped boost "government spending on infrastructure" (Al-Rasheed, 2010:133).

In March 1975, Prince Faisal Bin Musaid, King Faisal's nephew, assassinated Faisal. There are many stories regarding the interpretation of the motives of this assassination, some of them regarding personal "family" reasons because the King caused the death of the brother of the assassin a few years earlier (Al-Rasheed and Al-Rasheed, 1996), others recalled the conspiracy as revenge for the Oil Embargo. The rivalry for the throne has no place among these. The most important point to note is the smooth transition of power to King Khalid and the new Crown Prince Fahd as a sign of stability within the royal government.

The International Involvements: Khalid and Fahd (1975-2005)

As a personality and leader, Khalid was not considered strong (Harb, 1999), mostly due to a heart ailment. Thus, "[h]e accepted his honorary role as a ceremonial king while letting his brother Fahd run state affairs and make major decision" (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 143). Therefore, we can label this era as Fahd's era.[15] Khalid's reign was the time of rising of the "Sudairi Seven,"

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[15] Some sources describe Prince Fahd as the actual ruler of Saudi Arabia during King Khalid's reign. For example, Yaroslav Trofimov started his book, *The Siege of Mecca,* with a section titled "Cast of Principal Characters," and wrote (2007: x): "Crown Prince Fahd: Saudi Arabia's day-to-day ruler.... King Khalid: King of Saudi Arabia."

which consisted of Fahd and his six full brothers (Mordechai, 1987).[16]King Khalid died in June

13, 1982 and King Fahd succeeded him until his death in 2005, leaving the throne to the current

King Abdullah.

This era was full of critical events starting in 1979 with the Iranian Islamic revolution

when Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers forced Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to abdicate

and escape to exile in Egypt. This event was the start of the Islamic revival in the Muslim world.

Saudi authority faced a strong challenge on November 20 of the same year when a group of

radical youths –most of whom were Saudis and led by a young preacher Juhayman al-Otaibi,

invaded the holiest Mosque in Mecca and proclaimed that al-Mahdi—the Muslims' messiah—

had arrived. They demanded the rule over the holy places, challenging Saudi authority.

Juhayman's followers seized the holy mosque and took hostages. Assisted by foreign troops, the

Saudi government liberated the holy mosque, arrested Juhayman and his followers, and beheaded

them (Trofimoy, 2007).

The Siege of Mecca was not the only rebellion against Saudi authority. In the same

month, November 1979, on the Eastern Coast which is a region comprised of a majority of Shia,

groups there chose the season of Muharram/Ashura rituals –Shia mourning their Imam Hussain–

as a time to challenge the government. Saudi Shias who believe that the Wahhabi government

was denying them their basic religious, social, and economic rights started to push their identity

in different ways after the success of the Shia revolution in Iran. Ashura Day was the time of

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[16] The "Sudairi Seven" – the seven sons of King Abdulaziz and Hassa Bint Ahmed Al- Sudairi. This group of full-brothers is the largest bloc of Ibn Saud's sons. They integrated their power and supported each of other. In addition to King Fahd, three of them occupied the position of Crown Prince, Sultan (died in 2011), Nayef (died 2012), and Salman (the current Crown Price). Mai Yamani (2008) called those three Crown Princes *Thaluth* – the Arabic word of the trio – as a sign of their powerful status after the death of their senior full-brother King Fahd in 2005.

social mobilization when believers joined their preachers in their mosques and *hussainiyahs*.[17]

Some of the preachers encouraged masses to demonstrate and demand their rights. Thus, "in

Qatif on 28 November, the Shi'is [*sic*] decided to resist and went on the rampage, and eventually

the trouble spread to various parts of Qatif and Hasa" (Ibrahim, 2006: 120).[18] The Saudi

government suppressed the protests. Later, between 1980-1993, the leaders of the Shia protest

continued their opposition from exile.

The siege of Mecca was more than a terrorist operation, as most of those involved had

been educated in Saudi schools. Hence, it is possible that the threat may come again. On the

other hand, the Shias rebellion did not reflect a serious challenge as the Shia themselves are a

small minority (approximately 15%) of the total population of Saudi Arabia, and they do not

have the means, mainly weapons, to pose a threat to the Kingdom. In addition, most of the Shia

oppositionists left for other countries. It would seem that the Saudi government was more

concerned about fanatic Sunnis as they had tried to hijack the holy mosque and there is a long

history of rebellion within the group against the Kingdom (e.g., Ikhwan during Ibn Saud days).

Thus, the Saudi administration must find ways to distract such fanatic youth and satisfy their

fundamentalist tendencies in order to get rid of potential challenges to government authority.

In December 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan to support the pro-Soviet

regime in Kabul in response to a pro-American revolution. This event was not unprecedented, as

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[17] *Hussainiyah* is a place where Shia Muslims gather to celebrate religious events. It is different from a mosque as the mosque is a place for prayers. So, *hussainiyah* has a special status. For example, menstruating women are not allowed inside the mosque, however, they are allowed to enter the *hussainiyah*.

[18] Qatif and Hasa are the oldest parts of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the entire region used to be called "the Qatif and Hasa."

Soviets had been involved in Afghan affairs several times prior to 1979 (Rubin, 1995). However, this critical time of the Cold War was different, as the U.S. government took the action of supporting *mujahedeen*, as they fought the Soviet troops. The Afghan issue grew out of the Reagan Doctrine to fight the global influence of the USSR, which ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Saudi Arabia was fully involved by that time, favoring U.S. interventionist policies (Simpson, 2006). Indeed, Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars supporting the *Mujahedeen* in addition to encouraging youth to travel to Afghanistan and fight the infidel atheist communist enemies who attacked a Muslim land (Graham and Nussbaum, 2004). It was a great opportunity for the Saudi government to get rid of those fanatic youth by keeping them busy with a greater holy war (*Jihad*) against *kuffar* (infidels).

There were other regional issues that broke out between 1979-1982 such as the Egyptian and Israeli treaty of 1979, the Camp David Accords, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon War of 1982, and the establishment of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf in 1981. Indeed, this period reshaped Middle Eastern policies, as those events caused significant changes in the region including changing some regimes and the balance of power. The 1980s were also a time of conflict between the Islamists and the Modernists. The government tried to be neutral without losing the religious camp as a primary source of legitimacy. In this context, in 1986, King Fahd changed his title from "His Majesty" to "the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques." This religious title reflected a desire to Islamize the king's position as the guardian of the nation.

Most of the conflicts ended by the early 1990s, though this was also the time when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait (August 2, 1990). This represented a threat to Saudi Arabia, as the Iraqi army was considered to be very strong, having experienced fighting for eight years in

the Iraqi-Iranian War, which ended on August 20, 1988. The Saudi royal government decided to seek assistance from its allies, led by the U.S., to liberate Kuwait and keep the Iraqi forces out of Saudi Arabia. The hardest part of this issue was dealing with the religious rebel youths who had been socialized to hate infidels and fight to expel them from Muslim lands. This was an ideology instilled by the Afghan Arabs, or the Afghan Alumni, the most (in)famous of which was Osama Bin Laden.

Playing on the prestige he acquired as a leader of the *mujahedeen*, Bin Laden asked several members of the Saudi Royal family to let him take care of the war against the Saddam regime, but they ignored him (Bodansky, 2011). This action angered Bin Laden and his adherents who could not accept the idea of being under the protection of the infidels. Bin Laden argued that the House of al-Saud should prioritize and concentrate on securing their long-term Islamic legitimacy even when facing an immediate threat from Iraq (Bodansky, 2011: 29-30).

A number of young Wahhabi preachers started to criticize the Saudi policy of letting Jews and Christians –meaning American and European troops–come to the Arabian Peninsula, the homeland of the Two Holy Mosques. It was a challenge to Al Saud's authority by representatives of one of their most useful tools, religion (i.e., Wahhabi doctrine). However, King Fahd responded to this rebellion by seeking the legitimization of inviting the non-Muslim troops to fight a neighboring Muslim army. The Grand Mufti Shaikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz issued a fatwa which supported King Fahd decision of inviting foreign troops to participate in the Gulf War that was later referred to as Desert Storm.

Despite the Saudi government's ability to survive Saddam's threat, the idea of failing to defend the country was not an easy matter to accept among some Saudis. "In the eyes of many Saudis, this amounted to humiliation brought about by government mismanagement" (Al-

Rasheed, 2010: 160). Saudis started to discuss their state's politics for the first time which became a challenge to the Saudi authorities as it led to acts of civil disobedience, such as women driving cars, criticism of state policy in the mosques, and the submission of petitions for reform to the King. Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) reported on the petitions submitted to King Fahd during the 1990s:

- November 1990: 43 businessmen –including three former ministers– submitted a petition to King Fahd calling for political reforms with full respect to Sharia law. The demands included the public participation in state's affairs and the rule of law.

- In the same month, 50-70 Saudi women drove their cars in the Riyadh streets, and act that has been considered a demonstration. The government stopped them, confiscated their passports and fired those holding university positions.

- May 1991, 453 Saudi clergy—including scholars, judges, and university professors— submitted a petition to King Fahd calling for a restoration of Islamic values. This petition used the direct language of preaching. A month later, the Supreme Council of Scholars – the highest formal religious institution- "condemned the publication and circulation of the petition" (Okruhlik, 1999: 304).

- July 1992, 107 religious scholars submitted a 46-page document called *muzakharat al-nasiha*" the Memorandum of Advice" to King Fahd. This petition challenged the royal authority as it *advises* the guardian of Islam directly. The King refused to receive it.

- May 1993, six academics at King Saud University in Riyadh launched the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights calling for the first human rights organization in Saudi Arabia. This group moved to London in 1994 seeking more freedom of speech.

One of the most effective results of the post-Gulf War rebellions was the launching of the dissident religious group in 1993 called *The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights* (CDLR) opposing the Saudi government as a non-Islamic state (Gilles, 2002). Numerous members of the CDLR were arrested (Kapiszewski, 2006) before two of its leaders –Mohammed Sa'ad Al-Masari and Al-Faqih- escaped to London to use that country's media (mainly radio) to criticize the Saudi administration and call into question its religious authority. In 1996, Al-Masari and Al-Faqih began working separately. Later in 2003, Al-Faqih started his network "*Islah*" which means reform in Arabic. Islah started in 2002 as the radio station of his new organization called *The Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia*, which was considered by some Saudi citizens as the first tool to criticize the Saudi administration publicly with total impunity through modern technology (Abdelhadi, 2002). It still exists but suffers from a primitive level in the profession because it relies on the founder, Al-Faqih, as the only source talking to audience members and receiving telephone calls from them. Although Saudis could easily receive Islah, it has become less interesting because of its limited programming. The government of Saudi Arabia maintains hegemony among Arabic satellite channels, starting with the establishment of the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT) housed in Riyadh and for which the Saudi government was the main source of financing (Kraidy, 2002).

In 1992, King Fahd established *Majlis al Shura*, the Consultative Council with 60 appointed members.[19] In addition, he launched Basic System of Governance which can be considered as the constitution of the kingdom because it is the only document explaining the mechanism of transferring the throne after the death of a king and the way of governing the state. In addition to its structure that includes nine chapters consisting of 83 articles all reflecting

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[19] The number has increased gradually until becoming 150, including 30 women, in 2013.

Sharia (Al-Majed, 2012), "[i]t is considered the most important legislative document of the three inaugurated in 1992 and comes, in terms of authority, just after the Shari'ah law" (Al-Majed, 2012: 212).

Even though this is not a real parliament or a real constitution, such steps by King Fahd, I would argue, reflect changes in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The Basic System of Governance is a written explanation of what the royal family has been doing since declaration of the kingdom. The non-elected Consultative Council is a way of creating honored positions for competition among Saudi elites.

In 1995, King Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke. Prince Abdullah became the *de facto* ruler of the kingdom until the king died in August 2005, at which point Abdullah became the king and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. During the 1990s, some terrorist operations occurred targeting Western –mainly American– interests in Saudi Arabia that reflected a challenge to the state's esteem. In addition, power was divided among the senior princes who controlled the military institutions (Al-Rasheed, 2005).

During the shift from the stage of Crown Prince and *de facto* ruler to the King of Saudi Arabia, King Fahd's full brothers, Sudairis, did all they could to keep their senior brother alive, even with his disability (Bear, 2003).[20] It is a part of the brothers' rivalry between Sudairis Princes with their half-brother Abdullah, with a hope of getting him away from the throne. On the other hand, Abdullah burnished his image as the future reformer of the nation in that he supported democracy, dialogue, tolerance, and women's rights. By the end of the 20th century Saudi Arabia was consumed with the brothers' rivalry over the Saudi throne.

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[20] Former CIA operative Robert Bear reported the Sudairis' hope of skipping Abdullah to Sultan. "The only way to keep him [Abdullah] at the bay was to keep Fahd alive—God willing, until Abdullah died" (2003:81).

The September 11, 2001 attack was an event that shocked the entire world, and Saudi Arabia was directly affected by the attack (Peterson, 2002). Fifteen of the nineteen suicide hijackers were Saudis as well as their leader Osama Bin Laden. These facts put the Saudi state under pressure from the Bush Administration who declared a War on Terrorism. In fact, this event put Saudi Arabia under attack from the international media as never before (Glosemeyer, 2005).

During this time a number of awkward questions were raised about the Kingdom of Silence. These included questions about Saudi commitment to education, human rights, and democracy. This was suddenly more than an internal matter because the country appeared to have supported, or at least ignored, a domestic environment capable of feeding the forces of international terrorism (Malik & Niblock, 2005). Additionally, the Bush Administration changed its attitude towards Saudi Arabia and subjected its inveterate ally to intense scrutiny (Lippman, 2004).

The Saudi education system with its harsh religious curriculum was often brought up as a point of contention within western media as the source of hatred towards the west, especially knowing that religion represented 35% of curriculum in some schools (Prokop, 2005). "Islam" in Saudi formal institutions, including education, is completely based on a Wahhabi curriculum, which has a harsh attitude towards non-Muslims, and was the doctrine of Osama bin Laden. Mosques as well as the school curriculum provide lessons based on hatred and calling for *Jihad* against infidels (Lippman, 2004). Thus, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, announced in October 2002 that his government was working to remove some aspects of the educational curriculum considered objectionable. These constituted approximately 5% of the curriculum

(Prokop, 2005). It was a notable achievement to get a formal recognition that there was something wrong with the Saudi curriculum.

On June 9, 2003, the first National Meeting for Intellectual Dialogue gathered Intellectuals from all sides, including women. At this event, for the first time in Saudi history, there was recognition of "confessional diversity" (Menoret, 2005). In addition, in the same year, Saudi Arabia hosted its first human rights conference and the government permitted the first visit of an international human rights organization (DG External Policies of The Union, 2004). The Government officially approved the country's first human rights association in March 2004 (DG External Policies of The Union, 2004).

In November 23, 2004, Saudi citizens who are 21 years old or older began registering as candidates for the country's first nationwide municipal elections. Of the 178 local council seats that would be voted upon, half would be chosen by elections, the other half would be appointed by the government. Elections were slated to take place between February and April 2005. While this was an historical event, women and military members were excluded from this election as voters and candidates (U.S. Department of State, 2005).

As a result, I argue that the 9/11 attacks were the main external motivation for reshaping Saudi discourse in the beginning of the 21st century, while technological advancements in communications provided internal forces for change. The first put pressure from western countries on the Saudi government, while the other meant that Saudi people were no longer silent as they had been given the tools needed to communicate to the world and deliver their concerns. Thus, King Abdullah started his reign in August 2005 with a new challenge of how to maintain his legitimacy in the face of information that could challenge the traditional authority on which the Saudi entity was built. This led to finding a method to continue family succession to the

Saudi throne, as all of the Ibn Saud's sons were considered older, as all were now in their 70s and 80s.

The above historical account is meant to provide a background to the study of authority in Saudi Arabia before reading about the media coverage. It is hoped that the reader now has a working comprehension of Saudi Arabia as I turn to an analysis of the newspapers' coverage of the state.

CHAPTER THREE:

Weber's Tripartite Classification of Authority

> The major difference between power and authority rests in the fact that power is essentially tied to the personal characteristics of individuals or groups, whereas authority is always tied to social positions or roles.
> —John A. Coleman, S.J.

Max Weber (1864-1920) was a German philosopher and political economist probably best known for theoretical frameworks associated with the Protestant Ethic and capitalism, ideal types, rationalism, social action, and—for the sake of this project—types of authority. Weber is notable for his focus on culture and individualism, rather than the more "grand scheme" brand of sociology espoused by such predecessors as Durkheim and Marx. His work in economic history, theory, and methodology analyzed modernity in terms of the significant rationalization which influenced the critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School.

Weber challenged Marx's view of "historical materialism" as the basis of social classification. Weber was a product of his time when the Industrial Revolution and German aggression were in high form. The political structures of authority and economics were in flux during his formative years. Studies in Hegelian philosophy inspired him to question the bases of authority within the Western state structures throughout history. Weber took into account the rules of cultural elements of society affecting these classifications, giving much attention to religion.

The starting point of a Weberian sociology of religion was his 1904 book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. This work discussed the impact of religious

beliefs upon material life and investigated world religions, including those of China, India, Islam, and ancient Judaism. Weber's study of religion concerned its influence on economies, particularly the developments of market and capitalism, focusing on the question of the formation of social stratification.

As shall be made clear, Weber's employment of authority structures is the most useful paradigm available when making sense of the political entity in Saudi Arabia, most especially in terms of investigating western media coverage of authority in the Arabian monarchy. For this reason, I tracked media presentations of authority in Saudi Arabia based on Weber's three authority types, concepts I turn to next.

Weber's Original Conception of Power

Weber argued that power could be manifested in a variety of forms; an obvious revision of Marx's view of power being in the hands of those who own the means of production, and that social stratification entailed more than control over economic/material resources (Weber, 1978: 100 ff). To expand on issues of power and authority, Weber described three separate but interrelated dimensions of stratification: class, status, and party (power). These three have come to be known as the "multidimensional view" of social stratification (Stronks, 1997: 3-4; Kerbo, 2009: 100).

While all three aspects of stratification are important, my focus is on the authority of political parties to influence others in society, as well as their depictions in the west. This often begins with economic strength that gives members of a group an opportunity to penetrate the institutions of state administration and thus acquire power at a macro level. According to Weber, "parties" live in a house of "power" (Gerth and Mills 1958: 194). "Their actions are oriented toward the acquisition of social 'power', that is to say,

toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be" (Gerth and

Mills 1958:194). Harold R. Kerbo (2009:104) comments on Weber's statement:

> The most important aspect of this party (or power) dimension
> of stratification is organization, or "rational order," and a
> staff with which to dominate or influence others for whatever
> goal. Thus, it is the political party or the bureaucratic form of
> organization that most typifies this dimension of
> stratification.

Thus, coming through bureaucratic forms, party organization legitimizes the

power of the state and its leadership by acknowledging those who come from a certain

party, and their decisions are couched in rational terms grounded in power differentials.

Weber's Three Types of Authority

Weber distinguished three types of authority—traditional, charismatic, and

rational-legal—and presented them in a hierarchical developmental order (Trubek, 1972).

Weber argued that authority is power accepted as legitimate by those subjected to it

(Sihanya, 2011:5). Beetham (2012:21) identifies Weber's source of his thoughts on

legitimacy,[21] echoing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote, "the strongest is never strong

enough to be the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty"

(2004 [1762]: 4). Furthermore, Weber linked the concept of "salvation" with "authority"

based on the concept of "rationality," wherein

> … all kinds of practical ethics that are systematically and
> unambiguously oriented toward fixed goals of salvation are
> "rational," partly in the same sense as formal method is
> rational and partly in the sense that they distinguish between
> "valid" norms and what is empirically given. (Gerth and
> Mills, 1958:294)

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[21] Beetham (2012:21) is quite succinct on this matter of legitimacy: "where there is
general recognition of the legitimacy of authority, its commands will be followed without
the widespread use of coercion, or the constant fear of disobedience or subversion."

Thus we see how Weber championed authority offered by rational-legal systems as salvation itself.

Traditional authority is based on customary values that give particular elites respect, which in turn supports their control of power (Gerth and Mills, 1958). These elites might be institutional, such as sacred or religious, clannish or tribal, or familial. This type of authority requires two conditions, a claim of this right by the leaders and a belief from followers (Ritzer, 2005:55). This type of authority is derived from patriarchal—mainly patrimonial—structures and domination tends to emphasize a belief that "the system of inviolable norms is considered sacred; an infraction of them would result in magical or religious evils" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 296). From Weber's perspective, this type of authority was enhanced by traditions and religions that prevented people from challenging authority, and was supported by cultural contexts. In other words, power within the hands of the few becomes the reality or truth for its followers. Thus, any challenge to it is a challenge to the authority of higher powers (i.e., God).

Weber describes charismatic leaders as those individuals who "in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 245) are seen to be "holders of specific [indeed, supernatural] gifts of the body and spirit," serving without remuneration. They are unlike the traditional patriarchal leader of daily routine in the bureaucratic structure. Indeed, "[p]ure charisma is contrary to all patriarchal domination" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 248), as the charismatic leader derives his legitimacy from his personal features and popularity among the masses rather than inheriting the former leader's position of authority. Weber points out those charismatic leaders are "the bearers of charisma, the oracles of prophets, or the edicts of charismatic

war lords [and they] alone could integrate 'new' laws into the circle of what was upheld by tradition" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 297). Regardless of its rationality, charisma denotes a special relationship between leaders and their followers that conjures up the image of the individual hero. However, "the charismatic leader simply has an indeterminate number of intimates who share in his charisma or who possess charisma of their own" (Giddens, 1971: 161). Engler (2004:303) compares Weber's view of charisma with Sohm: "for Sohm, charisma is a real spiritual gift that causes faith; for Weber, 'on the contrary, charisma is an ulterior, socially constructed reality, the result of popular faith rather than cause.'" Thus, Engler's statement puts charisma in the Weberian manner of rationality as it is a social matter with some reasoning behind it and not a metaphysical one wherein people are completely mesmerized, a state that would be very short-lived.

Rational-legal authority is an impersonal form of power that aims to separate the "private sphere" from the "official sphere" in order to formalize the function of "duty of office" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:295-299). This type of authority is based on rules and regulations rather than giving obedience to a particular leader like the traditional and charismatic forms of leadership. In this manner, law is at the top of the hierarchy, which is the case in most modern states governed by modern institutions. Indeed, this is the type of authority Weber believed was reflected in the bureaucracy as the typical system of the modern state where the rational-legal state sets the "law" as the means of any update— whether in the social, economic, or political spheres. By definition, authority organizes the economic system according to the policy makers' values and beliefs. Thus, it is important for us to understand how a religious ethic can shape the worldview of policy

makers and how those values can also shape larger societal trends that affect the distribution of wealth and power.

Weber's three types of authority are summarized in Table 2 regarding their bases and their degree of personal and institutional anchoring:

Table 2: Weber's Forms of Authority

Rationalism = absence of metaphysics OR systematized belief/conduct
➞ Needing an ideal-typical form of authority "legitimization"
➞ Three types:

Type of Authority	Base of Legitimization	Personal *vs.* Institutional
Charismatic	The real or presumed qualities of a particular person	Personal
Traditional	Habitual deference	Personal
Rational-Legal	Rules, offices, and areas of jurisdiction	Institutional

The critical point among these types is the idea of succession, and to some extent consistency. Weber considers the personalistic types as irrational because there is no clear rule of succession, especially with the charismatic type that actually turns out to be a traditional one after the death of the charismatic leader if the group hopes to continue to function (passing laws on leadership succession would be difficult in such a situation). Regardless of who would be the successor, s/he would be unlikely to experience the same level of authority as the original charismatic leader. In such a case, there are other criteria to select the new leader, usually a strong familial or political link with the death of the

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charismatic ruler[22] (e.g., the system in North Korea where the republic is ruled by a president who succeeds his father who succeeded the grandfather; North Koreans claim it to be a self-reliant republic ["*juche*"] rather than a monarchy, which theoretically gives an opportunity for a successor outside the Kim family). In the traditional type, the loyalty is to the ruler rather than to the nation. Thus, Weber preferred the legal type that develops a rational form of authority as it institutionalizes the state rather than personalizing it.

Weber acknowledges that "[he does] not claim to use the only possible approach nor [does he] claim that all empirical structures of domination must correspond to one of these 'pure' types" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:299). It is transitional to presenting his *multidimensional view* of social stratification in the sense that such a transition to a broader approach provides a useful tool in helping to understand the complex nature of social stratification (*c.f.*, Kerbo, 2009: 100). Simply put, this turning from political matters to social matters expresses Weber's sociological concern going beyond political and historical aspects. Discussing the types of authority in the Weberian context is a step towards comprehending the deep complexities within society. However, these types are usually found in combination with each other, as will be illustrated later.

Weber's typology is a century old. Thus, it is normal to find more challenges than unquestioning acceptance in today's literature on the subject. Societies and the social sciences are more complicated than they were in Weber's time. Scholars who are influenced by Weber's three types are mostly critiquing, adding, or modifying one more type or idea, as illustrated in the following section. Few scholars offer full support for

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[22] Links are typically tied to kinship or the leading party figures occupying positions close to the dead leader (e.g., Vice President and members of the secretariat of the ruling party; *c.f.,* Gerth and Mills, 1958).

Weber's original typology; more common are challenges to the stability of those three

types or doubting its applicability in certain contexts (Zhao, 2009).

Those scholars who acknowledge Weber's influence over the sociology of power

usually support bureaucracy as the rational way of rule and administration (e.g., Udy,

1959; Turner, 1993; Breiner, 1996). In his discussion of theories of bureaucratic power,

David Beetham (1996:52) argues,

> Weber left no organized school of followers behind him, but
> many sociologists have been influenced either directly or
> indirectly by his ideas. The concept "Weberian" thus
> designates a recognizable theoretical tendency, reaching
> beyond the work of Weber himself.

Beetham (1985) agrees with Weber's view of bureaucracy as the "ideal" type of

authority, largely due to its impersonal allegiance with the other two types. Bendix

expressed his admiration to Beetham's work as "the best extant treatment of Weber as a

theorist of modern politics" (1977: xxvii). This is also applied to Scott and Davis (2007)

in their discussion of organizations and administration. Wolfgang Schluchter (1985) links

Weber's types of authority with his concept of rationality when discussing the rules of

interaction between the types of law (i.e., norms and regulations) and the types of

domination (i.e., authority).[23]

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[23] Schluchter (1985:84) maintains:

> The central question is whether he had in mind two basically
> different modes of legitimation under the heading of rational
> domination when he contrasted the natural law of reason and
> a positive law enacted by the legislature, and whether an
> explicit distinction should therefore be made between types
> of value-rational and instrumentally rational legitimation, that
> is, between enactment on the basis of value-rational and of
> instrumentally rational domination.

Reinterpretations of the Three Types of Authority

A number of scholars have analyzed Weber's types of authority and revised or even rejected some of his ideas. For example, contemporary management theory has benefitted from reinterpreting Weber's framework of authority (*c.f.*, Houghton, 2010).

Collins and Makowsky discuss the conflict among different social groups fighting for dominance in terms of economic resources, power, and cultural factors. For example, "the wealthy try to become powerful and cultured" and so on (2010: 113). In addition, they consider the development from patriarchal/personal authority to bureaucracy through shifting from absolute monarchy to industrial states. Weber provided three components of politics: (1) groups contending for power; (2) the organizations through which power is sought and exercised; and (3) the ideas and ideals that legitimate authority. The question of "who should rule?" (Collins and Makowsky, 2010:117), is key to socio-political conflicts. The cultural tools of fighting such conflicts are either material/ideas or power/ideals, and people fight for both. When they list the three Weberian types of authority, they further categorize them as *personalized* vs. *bureaucratized.* That is to say, people justify their actions in one or the other category. Another country in the region, Egypt, provides an interesting example of the shifts of justification of action among the three types of authority.

An historical account of the Egyptian state clearly demonstrates the shifts among the three types of Weberian authority, as illustrated below:

1. Egypt was a monarchy ruled by Muhammad Ali and his descendants under the control of the Ottomans (1867–1914), then by the British as a sultanate (1914-

1922), then declared a Kingdom in 1922 until 1952 when the Free Officers

Movement revolted against King Farouk. (Traditional authority)

2. In 1952, the revolution of the Free Officers Movement, a group of army

officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the country was led by army officers until

the Arab Spring of 2011. (Charismatic authority)

3. The first free-democratic election that chose the first civilian president was held

in 2012. (Rational-legal authority)

These three stages exemplify the three types of authority. First, the monarchy was

a "traditional authority." Second, the revolution brought about by Nasser, one of the most

charismatic leaders ever known in the Middle East, led to rule through charisma. After

his death, Nasser was succeeded by his vice president, Anwar Sadat, who did not enjoy

the same charismatic aura. The same thing happened after Sadat died and his vice

president, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded him. This action fits with Weber's claim regarding

the demise of a charismatic leader—it usually turns out to be a traditional one right after

the death of the charismatic leader as there are no clear "rules" on having a new

charismatic leader. Finally, the collapse of the Mubarak regime brought about a free

election with the hope of establishing a state ruled by laws instead of persons; this would

be the first time in Egyptian history that the country was ruled by what Weber calls

"rational-legal authority."

Consistent with the example above, the following model expresses Collins and

Makowsky's overview of the development-line of the three Weberian types:

Traditional ➔ Charismatic ➔ Rational-Legal

According to Collins and Makowsky, Weber found the social outline of world history via modern capitalism comes from the industrial economy.[24] Therefore, the market is different with modernity because things are changed in three ways: (1) risk/security; (2) widespread financial systems; and (3) distrust of "others."[25] From this vantage, Weber found the Protestant ethic as a natural development of the history of Europe when religious belief motivates rationality. He called this historical phenomenon of modernity "bureaucracy," and secularization in the Western society "disenchantment of the world," as opposed to the "great enchanted garden [i.e., the traditional society]" (Weber, 1993:270), believing the Protestant ethic was not dead, but merely *secularized* (Collins and Makowsky, 2010). This simply means religion is utilized to justify seeking power via intolerance—a negative use of a sacred belief. In this regard, Collins and Makowsky indicate, "[n]o one saw more clearly than Weber the ways in which our lives are 'haunted by the ghosts of dead religious beliefs'" (2010:124).

Collins and Makowsky argue that Weber cares about politics more than other matters. They inferred that he founded the first Democratic Party in Germany and he declared "ideals alone are not enough, they must be accompanied by hard realism, sympathetic imagination, and an unyielding sense of responsibility" (2010:125). Such a view is in line with a Weberian calling for rationality.

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[24] According to Weber, "With the triumph of *formalist* juristic rationalism, the legal type of domination appeared in the Occident at the side of the transmitted types of domination. Bureaucratic rule was not and is not the only variety of legal authority, but it is the purest" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 299).

[25] Collins and Makowsky discuss the history of humanity in the areas of economy, politics, and religion and end up with the philosophical breakthrough and rationality of Weberian categories (2010: 119-122).

Additionally, Ritzer and Goodman (2004) outline the Weberian multidimensional factors of social stratification, and how they differ from Marxist thought. Ritzer and Goodman support Weber's argument regarding the integration between "class" and "honor" as each enhances the other. They cite Weber, "[m]oney and entrepreneurial position are not in themselves status qualifications, although they may lead to them; and the lack of property is not in itself a status disqualification, although this may be a reason for it" (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004:124). However, Kerbo argues "Weber saw that in modern societies the party or power dimension gained importance" [over class and honor] (2009:104-105). Political party and bureaucratic organizations are increasingly important as a basis for stratification in modern societies; such an increment reflects the development of the history of social stratification, as the earlier stages were witness of the superiority of class and/or status "honor" (*c.f.* Gerth and Mills, 1958: 194-195). Those three dimensions of social stratification are integrated to build authority over societies in the following way; first, the corporation of economy and social status (i.e., class and honor), then, the rich-honored elite would have the highest chance to create the strongest parties which have a higher opportunity to rule. This is the best interpretation to Weber's statement mentioned above, as "parties," live in a house of "power." Therefore, it could be said economic and socially privileged groups wrestle to gain power to become the dominant group using such a model.

Ritzer and Goodman further built on Mommsen (1974) and argued "Weber preferred democracy as a political form not because he believed in the masses but because it offered maximum dynamism and the best milieu to generate political leaders" (2004:125). Weber's sociological interests in the structure of authority were influenced

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by his own political interests. For example, in his assumptions of the nature of action he studied the political element of domination and authority. Weber was interested in authority as it legitimated domination. Table 3 summarizes Weber's assumptions:

Table 3: The Legitimacy of the Three Types of Authority

Type of Authority	Legitimation
Rational-Legal	The rule of law establishes authority. Bureaucracy is the ideal-type form. *Weber believes there is no alternative; bureaucracy or incompetence.*
Traditional	Derived from established beliefs in the sanctity of immemorial traditions for certain groups of leaders (e.g., religious, royal, or gerontocracy). *Weber sees personal loyalty to the "master" as a barrier to rationality.*
Charismatic	An individual with exceptional sanctity, exemplary heroism, or other alluring features. Weber sees it as a revolutionary force that threatens the other types of authority because it leads to dramatic changes in the minds of a populace.

Obviously, Weberian types of authority and rules of successive leadership may also be applied to the contemporary political realm. Rational-Legal authority is best applied to both constitutional monarchies (e.g., the U.K.) and democratic republics (e.g., the U.S.). Additionally, traditional authority is best applied to absolute or semi-absolute monarchies (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Jordan). Charismatic authority, however, is best applied to non-monarch totalitarian and/or dictatorial regimes (e.g., Cuba and North Korea). The Weberian model of succession works in these applications (*c.f.*, Gerth and Mills, 1958).

Weber himself was willing to reinterpret his own authority triptych. As Breiner (2012: 24) pointed out, "… in the opening of *Economy and Society*, Weber does speak of a fourth kind of legitimate domination based on voluntary popular consent…. And when

he does discuss it as an institutional form … as direct democratic rule, [it succumbs] to the rule of administration." Therefore, "voluntary popular consent" may serve as a form of "super Rational-Legal" authority, which decays into the more standard administrative Rational-Legal authority.

Critiques of the Three Types

According to Collins (1986), these three types of authority "do not exist merely for the sake of labeling and classifying history; they are embedded in a larger network of concepts and in an image of how they work" (Collins 1986, 6). Dana Williams argues

> Weber's three types of authority match up to his three categories of inequality: class, status groups, and parties. Traditional authority is the basis for status groups. Charismatic authority lends itself to a market scheme (such as the potential for life chances), and Weber considered it to be the outcome of class. Finally, parties are the codification of legal-rational authority, especially in the case of bureaucracies.[26]

Yet, it could be possible to match traditional authority with a social status (i.e., accepting a certain family as the *royal* family), and matching rational-legal authority with the concept of party (i.e., accepting the rule of the *party* winning election). However, linking charismatic authority with the concept of class is a matter in need of review, especially as Williams argues, "Weber considered it [charismatic authority] to be the outcome of class." Indeed, reviewing the history of charismatic leadership would show that some of those leaders did not come from higher classes; in fact, a noteworthy number may have originally come from the poor or middle class (e.g., Ataturk, Nasser, Castro, and Hassan Nasrallah). Thus, I consider the economic concept of "exchanging" as the thematic link

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[26] This source is available online: http://danawilliams2.tripod.com/authority.html

between charismatic authority and class. In Table 4, I illustrate the links between Weber's types of authority and social stratification.

Table 4: Matching the Type of Authority with the Category of Stratification

Type of Authority	Category of Stratification	Matter of Matching
Traditional	*Status*	Elites derive their claims from their social status. Traditional leaders come from the prestigious status groups.
Charismatic	*Class*	A market is concerned with the *exchange of goods and services*. By using the term "market scheme" in relation to charismatic authority, Collins is saying that in return to the loyalty to the charismatic leader, followers will receive some sort of life benefits such as money, freedom, or salvation.
Rational-Legal	*Party*	Parties are the political groups who claim authority based on the law through bureaucratic systems.

Spencer points out that the Weberian theory of legitimacy and authority deals with different aspects of a single phenomenon—the forms that underlie all instances of ordered human "interaction" (1970:124). He differentiates between norms and authority. "Norms are rules of conduct toward which actors orient their behavior ... [while] authority is a relationship between two or more actors in which the commands of certain actors are treated as binding by others" (1970:124). It means that norms are about acceptable behaviors of the whole group, while authority is about the interaction among individuals and subgroups according to their relative levels of authority.

For a long time these types of authority were accepted as Weber stated them. However, scholars began questioning the "purity" of these types. In his introduction to Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Parsons (Weber and Parsons,

1964) based his critique of Weber's conception of purity of types on what he saw as an internal inconsistency. On one hand, Weber argued that authority is based on "technical competence" (Weber and Parsons, 1964). On the other hand, Parsons pointed out that Weber indicated "powers of coercion" as another source of authority. At this point, Parsons reasoned that Weber's definition of purity of types does not match his descriptions. Therefore, Parsons came to the conclusion that Weber's types of authority are not pure.[27]

Some scholars have suggested additional types of authority that are "ideological" which might be called the "missing" type(s), for example, ideological commitment (Thompson, 1961), professional organizations (Satow 1975), cooperatives (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986), and collegiality (Waters, 1989). Those missing types could always be considered under the canopy of the three Weberian types, making the argument that those types are no more than a convoluted typology. For instance, Thompson (1961) presents an "ideological type" of authority where the authority resides with faith and systems of values. Willer (1967:231) expands:

> Here the gap left by the undeveloped fourth type, to be
> referred to as the "ideological" type: could be filled by
> viewing examples of that type as mixtures; dogma could be
> conceived either as the content of tradition or as the mission
> associated with routinized charisma, while the attendant
> bureaucratic organization could be referred to the legal-
> rational type. The implied fourth type seems more "clear cut"
> today, however, than it apparently did to Weber.

Following Willer, most of those additional types look to have been derived from the three Weberian types.

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[27] Additional critiques of the "purity" of the Weberian types of authority are found in Thompson (1961) and Bower (1971).

In his critique of Weber's idea of "pure types," Coser (1977) points out that in "empirical reality," "mixtures" of those types exist. Coser includes an example from Germany, stating that "Hitler's domination was based to a considerable extent on his charisma, elements of rational-legal authority remained in the structure of German law, and references to Germanic Volk tradition formed a major element in the appeals of National Socialism" (Coser, 1977:227). Coser's point of rejecting the idea of "purity" is tolerable as many examples support such a view, including military regimes or dictatorships. Despite examples of communist states such Cuba and Venezuela, there are regimes that claim democratic "rationality," while particular institutions control the entire state. For example, a military institution has influence in Turkey and a religious institution controls Iran, while both declare themselves as modern republics.

One may find it helpful to consider Beetham's (1991) critique of Weber as having three parts, all hinging upon the word "*and*." "Political power," he writes, "is legitimate … to the extent that:

a) it is acquired and exercised in accordance with the rules or the laws; *and*

b) the rules or laws embody an acknowledged principle of political authority, in terms of which they can be justified; *and*

c) there is evidence of expressed consent to authority on the part of those qualified to give it." (1991:42, emphasis added).

These conditions are required for the legitimation of authority, though a certain set of elements will have a stronger integration, and this will determine which of the three Weberian types of authority would be legitimized within that context.

The *Dominant* Rather than the *Only* Type

Various combinations of Weber's types of authority can be found in today's global village. For instance, in the Arabic tribal system, which is a traditional type, the new successor of the tribe's Sheikh "greybeard" patriarch is not necessarily the son of the former Sheikh. The tribe's members select the strongest individual of the leading clan to be their new leader. This leads to a mix of tradition/hereditary leadership with charismatic/personal features (e.g., in Kuwait there are two clans that can inherit the throne; the members of each clan select whom they consider the best member to be the Amir or the Crown Prince). Such mixtures occur even in rational-legal "bureaucratic" systems when the political party selects its candidate based on their charismatic features (e.g., Kennedy, Reagan, Obama), or based on kinship ties (e.g., the Bush family). Figure 2 below illustrates the interaction among Weber's classification of types of authority with one being the dominant.

As seen in Figure 2, when people in a society are aware of the prestige of the elite (e.g., royalty and clergy) as part of the national culture, traditional authority is achieved. However, there will clearly be elements of the other authoritative states. A traditional leader may well be somewhat charismatic in her/his dealings with underlings and there may well be elements of rationality in these matters.

When a leader promises followers benefits such as money, freedom, or salvation—and followers accept this promise as legitimate—charismatic authority is reached. Yet, there will be elements of the other authoritative types. A charismatic leader might come from a respected background, which gives him/her more opportunity for success, and there may well be rationality with regards to processes in these groups.

Where norms of law generally fit with the people's needs and these norms and laws are seen as valid, rational-legal authority is reached, though there will be elements of the other authoritative states. A rational leader may well be somewhat charismatic in her/his dealings; furthermore, s/he may come from a prestigious background that bestows more credit among society. In this regard, Ritzer and Goodman argue, "Weber was well aware that in the real world, any specific form of authority involves a combination of all three" (2004:131). This is true, as Weber admitted, "the great majority of empirical cases represent a combination or a state of transition among several such pure types" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:299-300). Furthermore, Scott Greer (1969: 134) argues, "no particular case would exactly fit an ideal type, yet the case would be illuminated by the characteristics of the type it was identified with."

Figure 2: Intermingling of the Three Weberian Types of Authority

In the same manner, Coleman (2013: 38) argues that:

… despite the fact that all three forms of authority intermingle to some extent in any concrete organization or societal institution, Weber thought that one ideal-type always predominates and tends to subvert or subordinate the competing forms of authority. The rational-legal looks askance at charismatic authority as non-rational, even if it can never totally tame or routinize it. The logics behind each type of authority are, in the main, incompatible. You cannot, simultaneously, predominantly follow more than one type. The hegemonic or regnant form tends to drive out the alternative types.

O'Kane (1993) draws from Beetham's view of Weber's theoretical framework of legitimacy (1991) including several interesting themes regarding the

Weberian view of legitimacy as based on "belief in legitimacy" and at the same time opens the way for consideration of moral authority, the contribution of political theory. A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs (O'Kane, 1993: 472).

Moreover, O'Kane illustrated Beetham's power relationships in his model, which essentially may be summarized as follows: the top level, *legitimacy* (in the forms of "validity," "justifiability," and/or "consent") leads downward to a *moral ground of compliance*, which in turn leads to a cadre of *subordinates* who demonstrate a *particular quality of compliance*, inexorably leading upward again to *enhanced order, stability, effectiveness* (O'Kane, 1993:473). Therefore, according to O'Kane, Beetham recognizes "three criteria of legitimacy—legal validity, shared beliefs and expressed consent" (1993: 474). Here is the question: does Beetham bring up a model of categorizing types of authority that is quite different from Weber? In Table 5 below, I match up those three criteria with the three Weberian types of authority:

Table 5: Matching Weberian Types with Beetham's Criteria

Weberian Type of Authority	Beetham's Criteria of Legitimacy	Matching Matters
Traditional	*Shared Beliefs*	People in society are aware of the prestige of the elite (e.g., royalty and clergy) as part of the national culture. Therefore, it is a shared belief in such authority.
Charismatic	*Expressed Consent*	Charismatic leader promises his followers will receive some sort of benefit such as money, freedom, or salvation. They accept this promise as the legitimize reason for accepting this ruler.
Rational-Legal	*Validity*	The norms of law-generally-fits with the people needs, so these norms and laws are valid.

Beetham might have paraphrased Weber's categories, but the three types still exist in his approach. The only idea that he disagreed with Weber was the "purity" of those three types. However, the idea of "pure" or "ideal" types should be considered as dealing with only extreme phenomena or a starting point for theory, ignoring the intersection—and interaction—among them, noting that it is very difficult to find a 100% pure/ideal [German: *reinen/ideal*] type of authority. In addition, this concept of "purity" in Weberian literature needs to be studied as an individual theme to come up with a conclusion illustrating the boundary among those three standardized forms.

This complexity becomes more obvious in today's world. Turner argues the complexity of globalization—particularly information systems—requires rethinking many "conventional conceptual structures" of power and authority such as Weber's three-forms of authority which "do not adequately describe the emerging norms of legitimacy

in web-based systems" (2007:122). Turner considers "the authority and legitimacy of

information" as an example of the failure of Weber's theory of authority

> [1] E-democracies are not traditional and make no claim to traditional legitimacy. [2]The network is not charismatic because it cannot be legitimized by a single person, and no routinized charisma could significantly influence the web. [3]The new forms of authority are not legal-rational, however, because the authority of a site or flow of information is not the product of the hierarchical organization of a set of offices issuing commands in a linear chain of officers. (Turner, 2007:124).

Turner's example is a hyperbolic expansion of the types of authority. Weber

argues about the authority of people claiming the right of *herrschaft*, "rule, control, and

dominion," this term also has been translated as "*authority and domination*" (J. H.

Turner, 2013: 126), not ideas as in Turner's case of media/information as a separate form

of authority.[28] The authority of an information network is a matter beyond the scope of

Weber's theory, though it is a topic elaborated upon in the following chapter. Indeed,

media are considered from a classical perspective as cultural tools—as well as education,

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[28] Such an argument from Bryan Turner raises a question about Weber's original words; David Beethan indicates his concerns regarding the problematic nature of the translation of the German term "*Herrschaft*" to the English word "authority" (*c.f.* Andreski, 1984: 96-98). In addition, Jonathan H. Turner indicates, "in German, the term *herrschaft* connotes both domination and authority, and Weber probably meant this to be the case" (2013: 126). According to Beethan,

> As Weber makes clear, legitimacy is not a necessary condition of "*Herrschaft,*" since obedience to commands may under certain circumstances be predictably secured on the basis of coercion alone. This makes the English translation of "*Herrschaft*" problematic, since "authority" is usually defined as "legitimate power" (so that "legitimate authority" would be pleonastic [using more words than needed]), whereas "domination" is simply too strong a term, "rule" too specifically political and "power" far too general. (1991: 35).

language, and music—utilized by the "power elite" rather than considered as the "power elite" itself. Turner derives his argument from Castells (1997, 1998) who argues that within the globalization perspective, the state becomes no longer the primary source of power, so, "nation-states will survive, but not so their sovereignty" (1998:355). Such views add to the debate of whether Weber missed a type—or more than one type—in his "ideal types" (*c.f.*, Blau, 1963; Spencer, 1977; Satow, 1975; Parsons, 1964; Thompson, 1961). However, one should consider that in the historical era of Weber state hegemony was the primary one before the globalization era which has impacted the state's sovereignty in ways he could not have imagined.

Weber considered both traditional and charismatic as irrational types of authority; the rational type is the one most discussed in Weberian studies. Gorski and Altinordu (2008:62) discuss "the reality of secularization and the future of religion":

> First, levels of Christian observance and belief in Western Europe are now much lower than they used to be. Second, the levels of decline vary considerably by country and region, as do the patterns of decline, their onset and rhythm. Third, ecclesiastical organizations and elites throughout the west perform fewer social functions than they used to.

The rational type encourages election to political office, based on a collection of individuals' votes and working in capitalist economic conditions, often rewarding individualistic behavior. By the end of his discussion in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber argued that the Protestant ethic has been secularized (*c.f.*, Beder, 2001).

Gorski and Altinordu (2008: 63) wonder if the Christian state still exists in Europe, taking as examples the crosses on the flags of such European constitutional monarchies as the U.K, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, as well as such European

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republics as Finland, Iceland, and Switzerland, in addition to very small states,[29] it

appears as if they could still be counted as a part of some religious realm. Indeed, it could

be an aspect of what Weber called "traditional authority"—when religious beliefs and

royal families (or another sort of elites "party" or "status") meet to maintain a traditional

state. Therefore studying the political history of an empire such as Britain is important in

understanding the secularization of the state while maintaining religious symbols to

highlight legitimacy through tradition. In the 17th century, for example, their Parliament

limited royal authority, shifting the balance of power of the sovereignty to Parliament.

With regard to the U.S., Weber appreciated the American political system more

than the Germany's as "he wanted the German president to be elected not by the

legislature, but by the people, as in America" (Raadschelders, 2010: 310). Ghai (1991),

would point out that in a system of rational-legal authority, law is to be the basis of state

power.

> Drawing upon Weber's notion of rational-legal domination,
> one may say that the system was to be characterized by
> impersonal authority defined and limited by the law.... The
> law was to be the basis of state power, to be exercised by a ...
> bureaucracy ... pursuing national goals; it was to be
> accountable for the manner in which it exercised its powers.
> (Ghai, 1991:16)

Unlike traditional authority, legal-rational authority is as dynamic as the law. Unlike

charismatic authority, legal-rational is as impersonal as the bureaucracy. Blau (1963:

307-310, 314) indicates that traditional authority is quite "un-dynamic" and charismatic is

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[29] For example, Faroe Islands, Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands, and Åland Islands.

overly personal. This may explain the reason for the popularity of Weber's rational works

such as *The Protestant Ethic* and *Economy and Society*. According to Raadschelders,

> Of all his massive writings, most references to Weber in the
> American public administration literature are limited to his
> ideal type of bureaucracy and his ideal types of authority,
> while in the social sciences in general, *The Protestant Ethic*
> has attracted much attention (2010:310).

Weber's conception of rational authority, as impersonal, minimizes the role of

ideology (i.e., religion) in order to build a modern state based on rational norms releasing

the masses from the control of individuals (either charismatic or traditional). The more

secular a state is, the more opportunity to be rational—unless adopting another sort of

ideology such as communism—which leads to establishing the state of norms and laws.

Weber's substantive appreciation of the U.S. fits with the capitalism the country adopts

as the best way for reaching democracy.

Weber's typology of authority is a modern theoretical formation that is hard to

find clearly stated in a religious heritage, regardless of faith type. As this project concerns

media presenting of authority in a Muslim country, Muslim concepts of authority will be

discussed.

Islamic Authority: *Hakimiah*

The term *Hakimiah* (the best translation from Arabic is "governance"), referring

to the right to rule and make laws, might be applied to the Western social science term

"authority." The Persian theologian and Sunni-mystic philosopher Imam Ghazali (1058-

1111) described *Hakimiah* as "obedience to Allah and obedience to those whose

obedience is duty according to Allah." Khatab (2006: 139) translates the term to

"Sovereignty," which "belongs to Allah alone, and He alone legislates." Therefore, Allah

is the source of *Hakimiah* and nobody practices duty of obedience to His authority in any other way. At this point, we recall the term *wali al-amr*—the "guardian" or Muslim religious ruler—how his rule is legitimated by Islam, and how the Sunni and Shia sects differ in this regard (Al-Atawneh, 2009: 721).

The history of this term *Hakimiah*[30] has been debated among scholars. For instance, Halliday submits that this concept "was an Ottoman invention of, at the earliest, the eighteenth century and was introduced into Islamist thinking by the twentieth-century thinkers al-Maududi and Seyyid Qutb" (1995: 404). However, Al-Atawneh proves the term actually belongs to the early Islamic era, meaning al-Maududi[31] and Seyyid Qutb[32] were not the pioneers of this term in Islamic culture (2009: 725). Qutb linked *Hakimiah* with *jihad* (struggle) in order to get rid of the *jahiliyyah* (religious ignorance) in order to impose God's will via *Shariah* law (Toth, 2013).

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[30] Authors use different spellings of this term (ex., *Hakimiah* , *Hakimiyyah*). Note that there is no single sacred citation from Quran or Hadith referred to such a term. The closest term might be "*Hukm*" which means to rule or govern.

[31] Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979) a Pakistani Muslim revivalist thinker and leader and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamic revivalist party in Pakistan, published over 120 books. In his popular book *The Islamic Law and Constitution* (1955), he sets his conceptualization of the modern "Islamic state." He expressed his view of the Islamic State and applying of Sharia law in his book *Islamic Way of Life* (1948).

[32] Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was an Egyptian Islamist theorist, poet, and the leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. He published 24 books including his most popular *Social Justice* and *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq*. He is counted as one of the most radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see: Schneider and Silverman, 2006: 202, 266). He was executed by Nasser's regime in 1966.

The term *amr* (approximate meanings would include order, legislation, ordinance, affair, decree, and instruction) refers to the governing of the *Ummah*.[33] As mentioned above, the term *wali al-amr* means the Muslim religious ruler. Therefore, these terms—*Hakimiah* and *al-amr*—are beyond the political structure as they have been accepted as part of religious beliefs. However, the applications of these terms are different according to the Muslim sects, *Sunni* and *Shia.*

While Shia Muslims believe in the divine assignment of succession of the Prophet Muhammad, Sunni Muslims do not believe that God has chosen particular successors, known as "caliphs." These theological beliefs interpret the variation of the clergy's power upon the masses. In the Shia perspective, the successors of the Prophet are the twelve Imams[34] that he listed in his *Hadiths*. The last Imam—or caliph (al-Mahdi)—has been called by Allah to hide until He calls him again to come as the savior ("messiah") of this world. Before starting his occultation, he left a testament to his followers referring them to the religious scholar who had the greatest knowledge of the religion. Thus, Shias believe in the clergy as the successors of their last Imam. On the other hand, Sunnis

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[33] The Arabic word meaning "nation" or "community" shares a common history. For example, the term *al-Ummah al-Islamiah* means the whole Muslim nation or community in the global perspective. In the same manner, *alUmmah al-arabyah* means the entire Arab world.

[34] A historical note is in order here. The majority of Shia identify with the "Twelvers," sharing most other Muslims' beliefs, though with some specific differences. They believe in the "khalifa" or "caliph," which means the successor to the Prophet as appointed by God. Those successors are *only* Ali Bin Abi-Talib (the cousin of the Prophet Mohamed, 632 AD) and 11 of his descendants; thus they are called "Twelvers," referring to the first 12 Imams. They look at those 12 Imams as sacred, infallible people selected by God Himself to take care of Islam after the prophet passed away. Furthermore, the last Imam, Al-Mahdi (born 869 AD), was hidden by the order of God and is the messiah who will rid the world of injustice alongside Jesus.

believe in the stability of Muslim nations under a strong ruler, regardless of his level of religiosity, as long as he does not deny a principle of Islam (i.e., monotheism, prayer, fasting, *etc*…). All Muslims—including the clergy—must obey him. Therefore, the clergy have the divine legitimacy as *wali al-amr* in Shia, while for the Sunni this legitimacy is reserved for the political ruler.

To put it another way, Shia maintain that the most important type of authority is traditional in all aspects of political and religious concerns, requiring the leader to have direct connections to Mohammed or one of his Twelve Imams; elections are thus restricted to keep clergy at the top of the hierarchy. For Sunni, any form of authority wherein a leader is chosen is viewed as being appropriate. Modern Sunni governments range from the traditional (e.g., the Saud family) to legal rational in the post-Arab Spring era—Sunni governments have no choice regarding the imposition of traditional authority as it regards Sharia law (e.g., Egypt ,Tunisia, and Libya). Muslim Brotherhood parties come to power via free elections, for even though they do not believe in democracy in theory they still benefit from it in practice.

The focus of this project is Saudi Arabia, a Wahhabi Sunni conservative state. I use Weber's theoretical framework of authority, keeping in mind that no "pure" type exists in one state, each state experiences the three types of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority. However, one might hypothesize the "Traditional" type is the dominant, as Al-Atawneh argues,

> It must be noted that in Saudi Arabia authoritarian power can be unwittingly drawn not only from religion/the sacred, but also from tribal or clan social structures and from long-standing cultural norms. This resembles Weber's notions of "traditional authority" and the dominance/subordination relationship. (2009: 726)

The outcome of this project would reveal the credibility of such a hypothesis. The research would also test the statement about the Arab "as warrior more than anything else," and whether it applied to Saudi authority which "established of basis of repeated military campaigns" (Salame, 1990: 56).[35]

Taking Saudi History into Account

To create an understanding of authority in Saudi Arabia using Weber's theoretical framework, we need to briefly revisit the country's history. During the early 20th century, when Ibn Saud started building his state, the Arabian Peninsula was ruled by different families who controlled limited territories and followed patriarchal systems (Lacey, 1981; Menoret, 2005). Therefore, the only way to gain power in Arabia during that period was by military force. Such patriarchal rule fits with Weber's model of traditional authority. Just as Saudi families followed the patriarchal system with the father of the family as the highest authority, at the top of the national patriarchal hierarchy were the male Saudi rulers (Federal Research Division, 2004).

Religious authority supported this military action, as the King is the father of the nation whose Islamic title is *wali-almr* (the guardian with authority over his dependents). In Islamic literature, in the case of state affairs, *wali-almr* is the leader of the Muslim nation; it is normal for the father to control the economic functions of his family—or in the case of a state, its citizens—and manage the sources of production and distribution. Saudi Arabia is a rentier-economy state. The state owns and controls the natural resources

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[35] Ghassan Salame attributes this statement to Weber, however I did not find it in Weber's writing.

and provides public services such as education, health care, and so on (Niblock and Malik, 2007).

In addition, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy (Mackey, 2002; Brown, 2008) which gives the King and his circle the authority to control the wealth coming from oil, helping to keep political power connected to economic power for the Saudi elite. Saudi society has never experienced an administration other than this absolute monarchy. Thus, having never experiencing democracy, any advocacy to democracy would be considered a challenge to the Islamic government.

A Summary

Weber listed three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority. The abstraction of those three types fit with most forms of western political systems throughout history. Some of the literature written about this theoretical framework concerns the applicability of it on political systems, both across history and in current political entities. Others argue about the abstraction of these types. There is no clear failure in Weberian types of authority according to the literature reviewed in this study. In addition, the critiques studied failed to come up with a significant type other than those developed by Weber. Indeed, critiques purported to come up with a new matter were forced to rely on hyperbole (e.g., Turner, 2007: 2).

The problematic concept of Weberian theory is "purity." What does it mean, what are its limitations? To answer this question I look to conduct research that illustrates the boundary among those three types considering Beetham's critique (1991) and developing a format for potential future research drawn from Figure 2. At this point, I argue that

Weber's theoretical framework is still persuasive; thus, I am using those three types to track the Western media presentation of authority in Saudi Arabia during the 20th century.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Media Content Analysis

This chapter begins with a review of the role of the media in social control, and as part of building and maintaining power by dominant groups who aim to influence public opinion regarding the legitimacy of their superordinate position. In addition, attention is given to a methodological approach used in media discourse analysis. Second, it provides an in-depth discussion of the methodological approach used in this project concerning data collection and analysis. Through these techniques the intention is to provide an overview and analysis of a century of print news stories offered for consumption by publics in the U.K. and U.S.

Media and Setting Agenda

Broadly speaking, the audience consists of consumers of news stories (Shoemaker and Reese 1996), and these stories should be either important, interesting, or both as the ideal type (Gans, 1979). Dotson, et al. (2012:66), argue that the frequent repetition of the same story can convince the public to think about a particular issue as "very important, whereas few and infrequent stories can cause the subject to be ignored" (*c.f.*, Jacobson et al., 2012). What is consumed and considered important becomes an aspect of our social world. Postman (1985:63) argues this has been part of society for a long time, stating, "[t]he American mind submitted itself to the sovereignty of the printing press."[36] If the

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[36] A situation that is now relatable to the Internet (Nisbet and Myers, 2010: 359).

media process is about communication between senders and receivers, the question

becomes one of controlling the message.

The literature points to a tendency for powerful groups to control media outlets

(Couch, 1990) by setting a very specific agenda and making themselves the primary

sources for shaping culture and using the media as a tool to legitimize authority.

Kostadinova and Dimitrova (2012), for example, argue that stories of statehood are often

based on specific social or political agendas. As Edward Said has stated (1997:153-154),

> Knowledge and coverage of the Islamic world . . . are defined
> in the United States geopolitical and economic interests on–for
> the individual–an impossibly massive scale, aided and abetted
> by a structure of knowledge production that is almost as vast
> and unmanageable.

Moreover, there is a growing body of literature indicating and/or discussing the

influences over media by elites such as business, government, and religious leaders

(Schiller, 1974; Postman, 1985, Gamson, et al., 1992; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996;

Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Price, 2002; Cornwell and Dokshin, 2014).

Elites tend to promote their agendas via public opinion devices, including the

mass media. These efforts can be seen in work such as Gamson, et al. (1992:376) who

cited Sigal's argument, journalists "are exploited by their sources either to insert

information into the news or to propagandize." The bias of agenda setting could be

applied to local, national, and international news coverage, and the agendas are passed on

to audiences whose awareness and familiarity of any story will act as a filter for what is

and what is not thought of as truthful. News coverage of international affairs are often all

the information the public has of these events, which played a role in the George W. Bush

administration's ability to pass its agenda of invading Iraq in 2003, since many audiences

are unfamiliar with the Middle East, except for some who might be aware of events such as the 1973 Oil Embargo, the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, and the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001, all of which point to the Middle East as problematic (*cf.,* Kumar, 2006).

News may be seen as a social activity produced by professional workers (reporters) who are ruled by editors and publishers who make the final decisions regarding what should be presented to the audience (Tuchman, 1978). The media exist in a commercial market, which represents a window on the world that has the power to help set political agendas. Schudson argues that so-called "news sources" are the deep dark secret of the "power of the press" (2003:143). Such power is exercised by those sources that supply information to news outlets. Therefore, the news is not what actually happens, but what is reported/broadcast as what has happened or will happen, and these processes contains numerous filters constructed by vested interests sometimes to the point of being scripted by the "newsmakers" and delivered verbatim. In many ways, "the news provides, at best, a superficial and distorted image of society" (Bennet, 2003: 10), a situation that can be exacerbated by the location of a wire service or reporter at any given time (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986, citing Danzger, 1975). That is, time and place are matters of concern for the "symbol-handlers" who organize "media frames."

Media frames, as defined by Todd Gitlin, are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organized discourse, whether verbal or visual" (1980: 7). Gitlin argues that journalists are the symbol-handlers who can maintain the hegemonic culture by reporting news stories in a way that serves their dominant agenda. The way media present

the themes generates the potential opportunities for awareness and knowledge regarding these themes (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014), as media coverage becomes a knowledge source and agenda setter for the public as well as policymakers (Putnam & Shoemaker, 2007; Ten Eyck & Williment, 2004). In this regard, Tuchman explains how professional biases are stronger than personal biases because "[p]rofessional practices, as frames, dismiss some analyses of social conditions as soft-news novelties and transform others into ameliorative tinkering with the status quo" (1978:180).

Zelizer (1992, 1993) contended that once a storyline was developed and rewarded, other reporters follow suit; thus—in opposition to Gans (1979: 66)—she argued that reporters are members of interpretative communities who produce the "facts" via a news story. "Work on the McCarthy–Murrow conflict, JFK assassination, and the Watergate scandal highlight how reporters follow certain leads and often ignore contradictory evidence" (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014: 133). Noting there is always a potentiality that as the evidence grows against a certain storyline, the reports may eventually change so journalists still need to watch their sources (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1989).

However, the dominant agenda does not always fit with public interests; thus the dominant need to convince the public that their agenda supports national interests. The battle of shaping "public opinion" and "media discourse" appears in every active society seeking its freedom. Gamson and Modigliani (1989:2) expand Gitlin's view by differentiating the two terms—as they indicate, "media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize meaning in public

discourse." From this vantage point, one may argue that the whole game is about the social construction of meanings to affect attitudes (*c.f.* Berger and Luckmann, 1990). It is simply a matter of attempting to influence people via reshaping their consciousness.

The idea of such media processes reshaping the public's consciousness on matters that might not be in their favor (via autocratic contextualizing; Couch 1990) is a matter of social construction. That is, the media are a good way to practice contextualizing by setting certain agendas as phenomena or objects of consciousness to watch them develop in social contexts. However, this may not always be true; there are others who argue we cannot claim the existence of causal relationships between media content and public opinion, as Ten Eyck (2001) argues. Ten Eyck's argument contrasts with both Gitlin's (regarding demonstrators) and Gamson & Modigliani's (1989, about the attitudes toward nuclear power), as Ten Eyck argues the public is able to have opinions beyond the media coverage of events and/or issues.

Media and Public Opinion

While it is not my intention to argue that I have captured public opinion about the Middle East between 1901 and 2005, it is important to highlight connections between media and how the public thinks about issues (Hardt 1992). In this section, I consider studies dealing with mass media as a tool of social construction with an emphasis on news coverage that shape the masses' awareness of specific topics favoring agenda setting (*c.f.* Postman, 1985), including the idea of domination, portrayal, and the shaping of public opinion. While my focus is on newspapers given the time period under study, these ideas can be used to approach other forms of media such as television, radio, and movies.

Bagdikian discusses President Bush's actions in the Iraq War as an example of utilizing financial power in mass media to influence public opinion. This discussion may be used to explain how politicians exploited public concerns about terrorism after the 9/11 attacks to build misleading claims regarding WMDs and the alleged terrorism of Iraq. In this way, Bagdikian supports Hardt's claim of a political agenda behind the media coverage (2008: 76-80). While this does not mean the general public was absolutely supportive of the Bush Administration's actions, it does show how agenda about what should be done and where are created and maintained.

Others argue that media may also allow challengers such as social movements to gain support from the public and contest the construction of reality in a way that might go beyond simple media imagery (Gamson, et al; 1992). From this vantage point, one may question the size of this margin of freedom and its effectiveness after the hegemonic agenda has already been established. For example, it is not hard to tell that a significant number of Americans were against Bush's policies after 9/11 and considered the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as new problems. Such attitudes did not generally harm Bush's administration; they had already done what they had set out to do and were reelected after another round of media manipulation.[37]

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[37] We may consider Bin Laden's audiotape broadcast a few days before the 2004-election one which helped polish Bush's image as the "terrorism fighter." See: CNN's report "Bin Laden: Al Qaeda motivated to strike U.S. again" (October 30, 2004) http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/29/binladen.tape/index.html also Maureen Dowd's *NYT* article "Will Osama Help W?" (October 31, 2004) http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/opinion/31dowd.html?_r=0 The full transcript of bin Ladin's November 1, 2004 speech is available here http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html

Building a successful media image is more effective in accomplishing political goals than providing information. Gamson et al, "emphasize the production of images rather than facts or information because this more subtle form of meaning construction is at the heart of the issue" (1992:374), and this is a point made in popular culture as well as what passes as news. Joseph, et al, make the point quite clearly when they state that "[w]hile the trope of the 'violent Muslim' has a long history, rooted in imperialist and orientalist representations, it has appeared with greater force and persistence since 9/11" (2008: 230). Jack Shaheen's 2001 text *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* underscores this and reminds us that distortions and lies under the pretext of dramatic license are poor excuses for filmmakers.

For instance, in the movie *Five Fingers* (2006), a white hero initiates a program to feed poor Moroccan kids, but terrorists kidnap him and murder his tour guide. The movie mostly focuses on the torture of the hero by a bearded Muslim man and a veiled Muslim woman, including severing four of his fingers. In the end, the truth is disclosed: the man and woman were faking their Muslim identities. One may say there is nothing in the movie demonizing Muslims once the truth is revealed; yet the image of Muslim terrorists had already been created during the torturing of a white hero. This example emphasizes the importance of the visual that affects the message. As Gamson et al. (1992:380) argue, "[t]he media images produced by the process can be treated as texts that take many forms-visual imagery, sound, and language."

These images and effects are often reflected in the popular culture. For example, films such as *Five Fingers*, alongside Gamson's statement, clarify the media attitudes and actions in events such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, when the media quickly

announced that Arabs-Muslims' were responsible for the attack. Though this was later proven to be false, the negative emotions and actions that were found among the residents of the city and nation against Arabs specifically and Muslims generally, point to how quickly the media can get us thinking about a group of people. Events are subjected to the agenda, not the opposite. This applies to the newspapers and TV news stories regarding specific themes. Audiences consume these stories as a "large image"—an entire *gestalt*—that affects their consciousness regarding these themes.

Monica Soderlund (2007) argues that the news uses two methods to persuade audiences and expand their understanding of a topic. First is "the central route of elaborating on information uses facts and logical arguments to influence a person's thinking" (2007: 169) using contextualization, whether accurate or not. Second, "the peripheral route explains how superficial triggers influence thought, for example, by manipulating a person's opinion through the use of cues" (2007: 169). That would frame the story and its actors in the way editors (and other "gatekeepers") want which affects the public perception of these actors. In this regard, we can understand the effects on the American Muslim community of perceiving the Muslim world through negative images in U.S. media, noting that the majority of American audiences have no source of information on the topic other than these mass media contexts and cues. This sort of image primarily plays with the emotional part of audiences' minds when it appears as a logical matter. By contrast, Lau and Schlesinger (2005) find that a primarily emotional message is more likely to persuade audiences than a primarily logical message. This raises a question about media as *the* source of knowledge on particular topics.

Soderlund's argument emphasizes the idea of an *agenda* behind building media images in order to guide public opinion to serve particular interests.

By considering such cases as "the presentation of Saudi authorities" in terms of economic, political, and strategic issues, the agenda will be transmitted by media through the presentation of symbols and metaphors. Gamson emphasizes, "[e]very political issue has a relevant public discourse—a particular set of ideas and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meaning" (1988: 165). Ten Eyck (2005) asked about the media's ability to bring issues to public attention. Dearing and Rogers (1996) and Gamson (1992) agree with such media manipulation by noting that people are still able to think about a variety of issues in a variety ways. Such an "agenda-setting approach though, still favors a strong linkage between the media and the public" (Ten Eyck, 2005:307). On the other hand, David Morley (1980) disagrees, as he argues people often do not find these issues affecting their daily lives, so they mostly ignore those issues. Others argue that media are, at least, a reflection of existing public readers' lives (or life potentials) as Bourdieu has suggested. Either one of these three attitudes (believing media, not finding direct effect, or even believing it reflects the public opinion), confirm the political role of media coverage, which is in the main concern of this project.

Content Analysis Method

Content analysis is challenging because there is no single set of guidelines for analysis. According to Cole, "content analysis is a method of analyzing written, verbal or visual communication messages" (Cole, 1988, cited in Elo and Kyngas, 2007:107). "Content analysis as a research method is a systematic and objective means of describing

and quantifying phenomena" (Elo and Kyngas, 2007:108). Nevertheless, as a methodology, it

> [A]llows the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data. Through content analysis, it is possible to distill words into fewer content-related categories. It is assumed that when classified into the same categories, words, phrases and the like share the same meaning (Elo and Kyngas, 2007:108).

This pushes the researcher to be very mindful of definitions, allowing for the concretizing of concepts to maintain consistent meanings.

Qualitative content analysis is a research method for interpreting texts regarding case studies, and this is no less the case for studies in mass media. Kohlbacher (2006) adds, "the development of content analysis is fundamentally connected to the development of mass media and international politics" (2006:36). He further adds, "qualitative content analysis claims to synthesize two contradictory methodological principles: openness and theory-guided investigation" (2006:40). As such, qualitative content analysis is a method to build a comprehensive perception for the agenda-setting of media devices concerning a particular case.

Amer and Amer (2011) have developed a approach they call "contextual analysis", and use this method to account for the political, economic and cultural contexts which they maintain influenced the way two major American newspapers—the *NYT* and *Washington Post*—covered the ongoing situation in Jerusalem regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. They conclude the consistent patterns of "selection," "inclusion" and "exclusion" generally favor Israeli rationales and terminology. For example, these newspapers never mention the Israeli measures targeting the holy city of Jerusalem, which are in violation of international law and UN resolutions. This sort of study reflects

the usefulness of *lexical selections* in content analysis. Such a linguistic approach enables researchers to investigate the media presentation of issues. One of the primary purposes of the present analysis is to further illustrate the need for watchfulness with regard to these lexical selections when contextualizing the presentation of "facts" in Western media.

Why These Newspapers?

I selected *The London Times* and *NYT* because of their well-established, long-running international circulations and their respected positions in the U.K. and the U.S. as opinion leading newspapers (Gitlin 198). In addition, these two nations represent the dominant Western superpowers of the 20th century, and had numerous vested interests in the Middle East.

The London Times is perhaps particularly useful when reviewing the earliest Saudi state. A British-Saudi alliance was built as the British helped the Saudis to create their state free from Ottoman control (Al-Rasheed, 2010), whereupon the British military established regional leaders and signed agreements with those new entities. According to Leatherdale (1993), the most open British-Arab agreement at that time was with Ibn Saud, a useful ruler for controlling the desert. As'sad Abukhalil (2004) argues Saudi Arabia was created as a result of an alliance between British and the Saudi royal family.[38] He adds, "[t]his alliance became viable only due to outside sponsorship by the

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[38] Abukhalil tries to summarize the relationship between British and Ibn Saud without providing many details. Shafi Aldamer (2003) explains the reasons behind Ibn Saud's desire to be linked with British right after capturing Riyadh:

> First, he believed that Britain's relations with the Gulf
> sheikhs had been in the interest of the rulers concerned.
> Second, the British Empire was viewed as the greatest power

United Kingdom, sponsorship that was later replaced by the United States" (2004: 41).

This replacement occurred at the end of WWII, when Ibn Saud met President Franklin D.

Roosevelt and set their Petro-Political agenda. In fact, according to Stephen Kinzer,

"Churchill was livid when he learned of [the meeting between FDR and Ibn Saud], but by

then it was too late" (2004: 145).

Therefore, *The London Times* and *NYT* were selected in an effort to focus on

leading-opinion newspapers of each nation collaborating with Saudi Arabia. It will be

shown that this is a useful perspective of the dominant media's "lexical selections"

regarding types of authority—and how that authority is portrayed—in the Kingdom. One

may easily see that this is especially true considering the political agendas that might

affect the presentation of Saudi Arabia—such as the supplementation and substitution of

the British by the Americans, the depiction of Muslims, and the growing oil industry.

Practical Methodology

Sources: The methodological component of this project is based on a systematic

sample of articles retrieved via ProQuest (for *NYT*) and GALE CENGAGE (for both *The

London Times* and *The Sunday Times*—please note GALE CENGAGE required the use

of separate archives for each paper, from which articles were drawn in proportion to the

keyword hits).[39] The key words used to search for articles were chosen because they

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in the Middle East, according to Ibn Saud's calculations. That
power could protect Ibn Saud's state against any threat, and
supply in with subsidies and weapons. Finally, the British
Empire was the only power in the area that had no direct
interest in conquering any of Ibn Saud's territories (2003: 4).

[39] For example, if *The London Times* has 300 articles and *The Sunday Times* has 200
articles, the proportion might be 60 articles from the first and 40 from the other.

most clearly focus on the topics of authority, politics, and religion in Saudi Arabia and are thus considered the most viable for determining relevant newspaper articles. Extraneous materials (including commercial ads, banners, birth notices, sports, and comics) are excluded from the research sampling. This approach grants the researcher more opportunity to have a useful sample that focuses on the socio-political aspects of the coverage of Saudi Arabia during the 20th century.

Keywords: The next phase of the study involved a two-step process of keyword searches determining geography and authority:

(1) The following primary keywords were used to determine geographic location:

"Saudi," "Arabia," "Arabian," "Ibn Saud," "Bin Saud," "Sa'ud."

(2) The second set of keywords fit the specifics of the research topic (i.e., authority in Saudi Arabia) within the results of the primary key words: "Wahhabism." "Wahhabi," "Wahabi," "sharia," "authority," "charisma," "charismatic," "traditional," "rational," "rationality," "legal," "ally," "allies," "conflict," "oil," "petrochemical," "Armco."

Both lists were modified throughout the collection phase of this project to ensure that as many salient combinations of the terms were captured.

Timeline: The study spans from January 1, 1901 (the beginning of the 20th Century, a year before Ibn Saudi started to build the Kingdom) through August 1, 2005 (the death of King Fahd). I divided this period into four eras (explained below), and then created systematic samples from each era.

A technical issue of note is the capturing of data from older documents. Specifically the Optical Character Recognition programs used by the search engines often misrecognize keywords, creating a "false positive" result. For example, when searching

for "Saud" in *The London Times*, the word "and" (or other such "false positives") might potentially show up (see Figure 3 below). As a result, I eliminated documents with this issue and instead followed a procedure that maintains the integrity of the systematic sampling. For example, if article number 230 does not include a key word that is related to the research topic, I ignored it and included article number 231; if 231 has the same problem, I instead included 232, and so on (the selection of articles will be discussed below).

Figure 3: An Example of an Optical Character Recognition Computer Error

Following Ten Eyck's methodology (2005), I started with the idea of collecting 100 articles from each newspaper in each of the four targeted eras for a total of 800 articles if a sufficient number of articles existed. The selection is "based on the number needed to code divided by the total number of articles published in each newspaper for each year" (2005: 309). For example, if there were 1,000 articles in the *NYT* in a given era, I would choose every tenth article to code. Any article that does not deal with authority in Saudi Arabia would be replaced with the following article –as explained

above– until an article is found to meet the criteria of this study.[40] Because the first era had so few articles devoted to the region of interest (167 from *The London Times* and 91 from the *NYT*), all articles that clearly applied to this research were included.

This systematic sampling takes into account the variation of numbers in the eight groups of articles (4 eras x 2 newspapers). I decided to follow a simple formula to collect the sample; n/100. If the word search resulted in 1832 articles, every 18th article would be selected. However, I found 186 articles from *The London Times* and 145 from *NYT* for the first era. After reviewing each article and excluding those unrelated to the interest of the research topic, I ended with 152 articles for *The London Times* and 91 for *NYT*. All articles were analyzed and coded for this time period. The rest of the three eras will follow the same procedure.

As indicated above, the timeline used for this project—1901 to 2005—is based on shifts within and between eras, as defined in Table 6.

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[40] As I decided to analyze and code the 258 articles of the first era and 188 articles of the second era, the total is actually 846 articles.

Table 6: Delineation of Eras Investigated

Era	Start	End
Building of the State	**January 1, 1901** Beginning of the 20th Century, a year before the reconquest of Riyadh.	**September 22, 1932** A day before declaring the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Monarch Ibn Saud	**September 23, 1932** Declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	**November 9, 1953** Death of Ibn Saud
Building of the Bureaucracy	**November 10, 1953** Accession of King Saud	**March 25, 1975** Assassination of King Faisal by his nephew
International Involvements	**March 26, 1975** Accession of King Khalid	**August 1, 2005** Death of King Fahd

The first era represents the building of the Saudi state and the conditions for claiming and justifying "authority" by Ibn Saud as he invaded lands and came to rule based on religious, tribal, political, and economic conditions and justifications. This period represents the foundation of the authority of the Saudi royal family before declaring the modern kingdom as a state.

The second era represents the establishment of the modern Saudi state and includes the creation and spreading of bureaucracies, a legitimate political regime, the distribution of power, and the start of public services. During these years, Ibn Saud set clear rules for passing the throne among his sons and cut the potential of an individual monopolizing power and perhaps passing the throne to his children in an effort to skip the other immediate sons of Ibn Saud.

The third era represents the state after the death of Ibn Saud. During this time, King Faisal was the only truly official ruler—even during his eldest brother's (Saud)

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epoch. During this period, Faisal worked on building Saudi Arabia as an influential state in the region. In addition, two critical events involving royal conflict occurred. The first was the forcing of the king (Saud) to leave the throne to his crown prince in 1964, the second was the assassination of King Faisal by his nephew, Faisal bin Musaid, in 1975.

The fourth era encompasses the years during and after the oil boom. During this time, Fahd was the only ruler even during his eldest brother's (Khalid) epoch. During these 30 years, Saudi Arabia generated a great deal of wealth from oil which enabled the regime to bolster its image inside and outside the country. This period saw a number of critical events in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East such as the siege of Mecca in 1979, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Afghan War with USSR during the 1980s, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 followed by the "liberation" of Kuwait in 1991 during the first "postmodern" war led by the United States. This era ends with the death of King Fahd in August 1, 2005.

Regarding authority, the articles will be coded as shown in Table 7, noting that a single article will be coded only one time according to its applicability to the categories. To be clear, no journalists ever used Weber's three labels in their reportage; this categorization is applied by the current research as a way to begin to understand how authority was portrayed in the West.

Table 7: Newspapers' Data Coding

Code	Code's Description
T **(Traditional)**	• King's titles (religious, majesty, glory, guardian, etc.) • The religious identity of the state • Religion as justification for authority
C **(Charismatic)**	• Praising the personality of the king or other members of the royal family by focusing on their special features (wisdom, openness, courage, knighthood, etc.) • Ability of leader to rally people due to personal characteristics such as speaking or past conquests
R **(Rational-Legal)**	• Bureaucratic character of the state that introduces Saudi Arabia as the "institutionalization state" • Voting • Rules defining authority

In order to provide another level of depth to the analysis, I established criteria for categorizing the articles as indicating traditional (T), charismatic (C), or rational-legal (R) types of authority. Such a determination increases the objectivity—and complexity—of the research. Establishing the types of authority, however, is worthwhile as it is revealing with regard to the intent of the writer of the article. While some determinations of authority could be questioned, I am seeking the "base" of authority in each article. For example:

- An article that reports the prohibition of alcohol in Saudi Arabia (due to Sharia law) reflects *traditional authority* (T), as it based on religious norms not parliamentary law.

- An article that presents the development projects and interior spending as a "grace granted," reflects *charismatic authority* (C), as it presents the ability of

an individual (e.g., "the king") or a small group ("the royal family") to mobilize people to follow them.

- An article that reports public participation—such as municipal elections—reflects *rational authority* (R), as it is based on norms and legal activities rather than individual motives or religious edicts.

The general image of authority that Western media aim to present to its audience leads to the question of what the reasoning behind presenting Saudi Arabia as this particular type of authority might be. In other words, do *The London Times* and/or *NYT* have a political agenda in portraying the Saudi Kingdom in a specific way? Alternatively, do British and/or American political agendas affect the coverage? To look more closely at these questions, I compare and contrast accounts from the newspapers. For example, I categorize articles regarding charismatic authority based on a number of features including personal traits (e.g., chivalry, vigor, generosity, and wisdom); the masses' perception of the king or other members of the royal family, such as expressions of their love, admiration, and respect for the royals.

The leading newspapers of the U.K. and the U.S. might be expected to present audiences with agendas fitting the political landscape of their own countries, and we can treat this as another form of authority. In this regard, I take the next step in my analyses by linking the media coverage with such geopolitical events as oil discovery, the Siege of Mecca, the Iranian Revolution, Afghan War, Regan Doctrine, and so on. It is expected that this will illustrate media concerns with authority within Western societies, and as a beginning to uncovering media agendas. An illustration of this would be the differing coverage of oil concessions given to an American company rather than a British one. I

also expect to find articles that portrayed Saudi authority as charismatic mostly in terms of relating this kind of authority to that of the dictatorships that have ruled communist regimes.

This added layer of interpretation should help to further illustrate each type of authority which can then be linked to features of each category, especially traditional and charismatic, as types based on individuals. Such links might well provide an argument regarding Weber's theoretical framework. As mentioned in the theory chapter, Weber considers individual types of authority irrational, and argued only the legal type was rational because of its credibility and clear ways of succession.

In addition to coding for types of authority, I also identify which newspaper the articles appeared in (i.e., *The London Times* or *NYT*) and discuss the significance behind the appearance of this story in that particular newspaper, source of information (e.g., Saudi, British, American or other official, military leader, religious leader, media pundit, etc.), the date of publication (to investigate possible clusters within each era and how coverage may be influenced by a major event such as elections, insurgencies, wars, acts of terrorism, and invasions), and the "slant" (i.e., positive or negative valence).[41] It is expected that these findings will provide a conception of the sociopolitical culture of the Kingdom in this current critical era (since 2001), as all of Ibn Saud's sons are over 70 years old. Hence, we may inquire how the royal government will create a new mechanism to maintain their rule without internal conflicts. Will the post-Arab Spring

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[41] Individual authors were not considered for the purposes of this analysis as the thesis deals with the two newspapers' editorial positions, rather than the positions of their authors.

Saudis continue to accept absolute monarchical authority?[42] How will the Western media—which mostly favor the Saudi administration—face the challenge of social media bringing about another sort of story which might be in conflict with their agendas?

Finally, it is understood that selecting 800 articles from 100 years might miss some major events. For this reason, I add a chapter to discuss potential gaps. For example, if there is no article selected between 1990-1993—quite possible as the time line is 100 years—this means missing three major events: (1) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, (2) Operation Desert Storm, and (3) the fanatic youth remonstrance toward the Western (mainly American) military involvement in this operation. Such events affect the legitimacy of Saudi authorities, as it comes from the main source of legitimation (i.e., religious institutions). At this point, it is important to include such events, even if the initial data selection misses it.

Approach of Analysis

To carry out an analysis of the data, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches will be undertaken. On the quantitative side, a macro-level view is best used as one peruses the raw percentages based on the number of news stories collected from *The London Times* and *NYT*. This macro-level analysis traces the outcomes of trends indicated in the above tables. For example, if the largest portions of these data indicate that the authority in Saudi Arabia has been mostly presented as a "traditional" type, then

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[42] Mark L. Samuel (2013: 259) breaks this term down:
- "Unitary" due to the fact that the government is a single unit with the king delegating authority to all agencies below him.
- "Islamic" since they derive all of their laws from the Quran and the Sharia, Islamic Law, which places responsibility on the king as a ruler of an Islamic state, essentially the maintenance of the nation and adherence to Islam.
- "Absolute Monarchy" wherein the King is the absolute ruler.

the result would indicate Saudi Arabia as primarily a traditional authority state. As mentioned in the theoretical section, Saudi Arabia—like any other political entity—is not based on a single type of authority. Thus, I will present proportions of Weber's three types of authority in terms of general trends in the articles.

A micro-level examination of specific instances will be undertaken using selected, representative news articles focusing upon the following three issues: the job title of the source (e.g., military leader, political official); the era of news story (i.e., "State Building", "Monarch Ibn Saud," "Bureaucracy Building," or "International Involvements") and significant political events of the time (e.g., 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo); and of course the type of Weberian authority indicated. As with the macro section, I expect to find responses that echo the proportion in the micro section to further substantiate my findings. For example, if an American official reports that the oil embargo reflected the fundamental religious thinking of King Faisal, this would indicate Saudi Arabia is primarily a traditional authority state according to Weber's theoretical framework. However, an article might include in its description of King Faisal, his "wisdom" and "pride" leading him to engage in the oil embargo in order to support the Arab countries fighting Israel, indicating an appropriation of charismatic authority. Alternatively, if the Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia discussed the 1973 War and decided to embargo the oil in order to put pressure on the West, this would be an example of rational authority.

Finally, it should be understood that the presentations are outcomes of performances and agendas filtered through media organizations. While this research is not focused on media organizations (e.g., Gitlin 1980), I will continue to reflect on why

certain events were reported from the perspective of the media as a player within the

political arena of both the home countries (the U.K. or the U.S.) and Saudi Arabia. We

cannot forget that these stories were typically written and edited by actors in the West,

and not by those who were the focus of the news.

CHAPTER FIVE:

First Era 1901-1932: Building of the Kingdom

After cleaning the data from 1901 to 1932, I coded 167[43] articles from *The London Times* and 91 from *NYT*. The main concern with coding was to determine the type of authority discussed in each article. In addition, I determined themes regarding the rise of power, challenging and imposing royal authority, ruling titles, religious authority, royal control of oil and development, and slavery, all of which were coded as *traditional* authority. Articles focusing on positions and not individuals—regardless of any royal title—were considered *rational-legal* authority. This includes articles discussing diplomatic issues including international recognition and signing treaties, interior conferences where Ibn Saud let the other tribal chiefs decide whether to select another king, other interior issues of reforms, and developments and building bureaucracies. Articles discussing Ibn Saud's features such as physical appearance, generosity, dignity, restraint, and wisdom were considered to be using *charismatic* authority. However, determining themes and slants of any given article is always tenuous (Gans, 1993). To provide an in-depth reading, I will provide a qualitative discussion of the articles after explaining general trends within the news reports.

Table 8 highlights the news content of *The London Times* and *NYT*. In both newspapers, articles tend to use traditional authority. Mentions of rational-legal authority can be found, though to a much smaller degree, and even less so for charismatic

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[43] 152 from *The Times* archive and 15 from *The Sunday Times* archive, in addition to 145 from *NYT*.

authority. It should also be noted that many of the articles reported at least two forms of authority, though only one is reported in Table 8 (*cf.,* Figure 2).

Table 8: Types of Authority in Saudi Arabia in *The London Times* & the *NYT* Coverage Between 1/1/1901-9/23/1932

Newspaper	*Traditional*	*Charismatic*	*Rational-Legal*	Total
The London Times	133 *(79.64%)*	5 *(2.99%)*	29 *(17.37%)*	167 *(100%)*
NYT	76 *(83.51%)*	5 *(5.5%)*	10 *(11%)*	91 *(100%)*
Total	209 *(81%)*	10 *(3.88%)*	39 *(15.11%)*	258 *(100%)*

As mentioned, each article presented at least two types of authority. For example, on May 24, 1931, *NYT* reported America's recognition of the dual Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz under the leadership of Ibn Saud. The article described Ibn Saud as "a single Arab who combines the qualities of warrior, religious leader and politician" (*charismatic*). A brief history of building the kingdom is given (*traditional*), in addition to describing the bureaucracy in Hejaz (*rational-legal*). The article is coded as charismatic because the main focus was on the personality of Ibn Saud.[44] On the same day, John Philby reported about his adventures in Arabia, which involved crossing *Rub' Al Khali*, the Empty Quarter-Desert. "He owed much to King Ibn Saud, who supplied the necessary ways and means at a time which his country was suffering from economic depression. He could only say that the debt to Ibn Saud was unrepayable; yet Ibn Saud would not want him to make any return for such a simple thing as hospitality." Such a statement reflects the

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[44] The headline for this article reads, "ARAB STATE A MONUMENT TO GENIUS OF IBN SAUD: *Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, Recognized by US, Has Cost Its Ruler Thirty Years of Struggle Origins of the Present State*. Growth of the Kingdom."

traditional authority of Ibn Saud as a King who has the right to use the country's budget in any way he sees fit. However, an overwhelming charismatic feature is obvious in this story as it is stated how generous Ibn Saud is, in addition to other words such as "the great name of Ibn Saud." The article also reported, "among those present were Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Hejaz Minister in London...." This is a *rational-legal* twist, due to the presentation of an official by using his position's title attributed to a *national* name rather than that of a *tribal* name. The article is thus coded as *charismatic* because of the heavy focus on the personality of Ibn Saud.[45]

Table 9 shows the various categories generated from articles considered to be framed as using traditional authority. *The London Times* and *NYT* most frequently used this theme to describe the rise of the empire, including articles concerning Ibn Saud's war victories while building his state. Articles focusing on governing "royal" titles were the second most frequent theme, followed by the wars that saved the empire from rebels found within its borders. As demonstrated in Table 9, the articles showing the empire's rise being "imposed by the sword" (i.e., through battles) represents the majority of the articles in both presses (88 instances in *The London Times* and 51 in *NYT*). Upon a closer examination of Table 9, a majority of the articles illustrate a narrative of traditional authority, that is to say, the empire's sovereignty was built and imposed by military power under the aegis of a noble chief. Such results recall the idea of the "Empire state" as argued by Hamza Al-Hassan (2006), though he is not the first who posited such an argument. In an *NYT* article covering Ibn Saud's annexation of Hejaz and withdrawal of

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[45] Great Arabian Desert: *Lost City in The Sand, Mr. Philby's Adventure*

Hasheites after the British ignored the conflict, it was mentioned that the adoption of the

traditional Muslim empire could be compared to the Ottomans (Jan10, 1926).

Table 9: Traditional Authority in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 1/1/1901-9/23/1932

Categories from articles of Traditional Authority (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
The Rise of the Empire	55 (41.35%)	14 (18.42%)	69 (33.1%)
Ruling Titles	30 (22.56%)	12 (15.79%)	38 (20.01%)
Imposing Royal Authority	18 (13.53%)	19 (25%)	37 (19.76%)
Challenging Royal Authority	15 (11.28%)	18 (23.68%)	33 (15.79%)
Religious Authority	12 (9.02%)	12 (15.79%)	24 (11.48%)
Royal Control of Oil and Development	3 (2.25%)	0	3 (1.43%)
Slavery	0	1 (1.31%)	1 (0.48%)
Total	133 (100%)	76 (100%)	209 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation

between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell

counts were less than 5. However, I ran Z-tests between both newspaper results for each

category and found the only significant difference is in "The Rise of the Empire," as the

Z-Score= 3.391 (the p-value= 0.0007), the result is significant at $p < 0.05$. The rest

categories were not significant at $p < 0.05$.

From this table it should be understood that Ibn Saud was being presented to British and American audiences as the Wahhabi King who was a strong individual, had good relations with the West, and was winning wars leading to the building and saving of the state. Therefore, I argue, British and American readers would have had no reason to concern themselves about these events, as well as the recognition of a Muslim monarchy that was adopting a conservative religious doctrine, since it would seem to have little effect on them.[46]

Reports about Saudi authority in the Arabian Peninsula at this time began with the seizing of Riyadh in 1902. Neither newspaper reported this event, though there were differences in the amount of attention given to the area. *NYT* gave only 102 words to Riyadh, stating that, "Abdul Aiz Bin Feisal [Ibn Saud] a descendant of the old Wahabi Ameers with an Army of 2,000 men, has captured the city El Riad [Riyadh].... Many tribes are flocking to the banner of Abdul Aziz" (March 3, 1902). On the other hand, *The London Times* reported this event in two detailed pieces. Bearing in mind there was no mention of this group having a global reach at that time, one stated "Riadh [Riyadh] has been seized by a member of its subjugated Wahabite Dynasty who has been a refugee on Ottoman territory ... [which] will have for certain one very important result—the revival throughout the oases of Central and Eastern Arabia of the dangerous fanatical Wahabism" (March 31, 1902). This piece described the former rule of Ibn Saud's enemy as a "pure beduin [*sic*] rule of the Sheikhs of the great Shammar tribe, the noblest of the

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[46] The only non-victorious war found in this research was reported in *The Sunday Times*, in which the Hashemite army failed to defeat the Wahhabis: "Forces of Ibn Saud, the Emir of Southern Arabia, have been making raids against the King of the Hejaz, but the latter's forces had been dispatched and driven them off" (January 16, 1920).

desert men." A few months later, *The London Times* reported, "Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman, a grandson of the blind old Emir Feisal has taken his revenge upon the usurper's son by seizing the stronghold of Riad [Riyadh]" (December 26, 1902). The report went further, saying that Ibn Saud had a stronghold on Riyadh and many tribesmen were joining him.

These differences in coverage reflect the national interest of Britain and the US. At the time, the US had no official involvement in the region, an area seen as controlled by the British and Ottomans. In addition, Ibn Saud was a political refugee in Kuwait, a British protectorate in the early 20th century. British officials and *The London Times* had a good understanding of this event which enabled them to predict future events better than American officials and *NYT* (e.g., *The London Times*: March 31, 1902).[47] This also applies to media reports favoring Ibn Saud, as *The London Times* increased favorable articles after Ibn Saud declared his kingdom on September 23, 1932 (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014).

Emphasizing the "religious" identity of Ibn Saud's rule, both newspapers kept addressing him as "the Wahhabi King/Sultan/ruler" in the same manner of calling the King of Yemen *Zidi* Imam. This use of religious titles rather than national titles reflects the identity of the government in the name of Islam. However, in Ibn Saud's case, there are multi geographical names under his control (e.g., Najd, Hejaz, Al Hasa and Al Qatif, Asir, and so on), while Yemen is a single geographical area, which makes it easier to use

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[47] As presented in the above paragraph, the siege of Riyadh "will have for certain one very important result—the revival throughout the oases of Central and Eastern Arabia of the dangerous fanatical Wahabism [*sic*]."

the national and geographical name as it is. This also applies to Jordan and its royal

family (its full title is the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" and citizens are called

"Jordanian," not "Hashemi" or "Hashemian"). In addition, the title of "Arab" or

"Arabian" goes well beyond the Arabian Peninsula; hence, "Arabia" was not an

appropriate name of the state at that time. The term *Jazeerah*—the Arabic word for

"peninsula"—was not presented in the media coverage, or even the other sources as an

option.[48]

    As was mentioned in Chapter Three, religious legitimacy is an element of

Weber's traditional authority model. I would argue Wahhabism is the driving source of

legitimacy—in terms of traditional power—for Ibn Saud and his followers. However,

Najdi tribesmen would not accept being addressed in such a limited way as "Wahhabi"

while also claiming to represent pure Islam. The term Wahhabism would distinguish this

group from the largest Muslim sect, the Sunni, and be open to sub-sectarian debates that

might not favor the new monarchy that hosts the holiest of Muslim places. Wahhabis

always call themselves *Ahl-sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Schubel, 1993; Ibn Taymiyah, 1989:

219).[49] This title refers to the saved sect because it follows the purest rules of Islam in

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[48] Arabs frequently use the term *Jazeerah* or *al Jazeerah* as an abbreviation of "*Jazeerat al Arab*" or "*al Jazeerah al Arabiah*."

[49] *Ahlus sunnah wal Jama'ah* "refers to those who follow the Prophet (saw) and the understanding of the *Sahabah* (companions) and those that followed them *bil Ihsaan* i.e., the *Tabi'een* and *Tabi' Tabi'een*" (Muhammad, 2004: 49). According to Ibn Taymiyah, whom Wahhabis admire as *Sheikh ul-islam* (the highest scholar of Islam), *Ahlus sunnah wal Jama'ah* are the people who

        have faith in the same manner as they have faith on the
        information given about them by *Allah* in His Book without
        distortion and negation and without adding quality and

the same way as those who were alive during Prophet Muhammad's life (Sheikh Omar

Bakri Muhammad, 2004: 11). To expand their authority, Ibn Saud and his followers

assert the title of Sunni Muslims. Therefore, the Wahhabism title was not the best option

for naming the state and its leader.

Ibn Saud used his family name "Al Saud" for his state, a traditional choice that

fits with the history of Islamic empires built on expanding wars under royal families

following specific sect (Bosworth, 1996). It is true that most of the Islamic empires were

named after royal families (e.g., Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, Fatimid, Safavid, Seljuk,

and so on), though it should be noted that this typically referred to the name of the state

and not the labels used for its citizens.

For centuries, people were addressed by geographic affiliation regardless of the

state that controlled them. In the modern era that is characterized by diplomatic relations

among states people need to be attributed to countries. For instance, people who lived

under the Ottomans were called Ottoman citizens.[50] This is referred to in Arabic as

Tabe'yah, meaning subordination to a certain ruler. A Saudi is the one who is *Tabe'e*, and

therefore subordinate to Ibn Saud, or whoever is ruling Saudi Arabia. Even today, older

people (i.e., 60+ years old) still call the nation, *Tabe'yah*. Furthermore, in Article 3 of the

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resemblance. In fact, among all the sects of the *Ummah*, this
sect alone is moderate just as the community of Muslims is a
moderate one among all the communities (Ibn Taymiyah,
1989: 144).

[50] This may not have been the case in every situation. The Ottoman Empire was listed as
Turkey in the Olympic Games in 1908 (Cook, 1909), so, the athletes may have been
referred to as "Turkish." This is also true of the 1912 Olympic Games. I was unable to
ascertain what these athletes would have labeled themselves.

System of Arabic Saudi Citizenship,[51] dated in 1954, defines "Saudi" as "the one who is subordinated to His Majesty the King according to the rules of this system." Article 4 continues, "this is included the one whose subordinate is Ottoman in 1914 and he is an indigenous of the land of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Furthermore, Article 29 clearly demonstrates that

> His Majesty the King is the only one who has the right to granting the Saudi citizenship to those whose cases do not apply to the conditions listed in Article 9, as well as dropping citizenship of any Saudi that does not apply to the provisions listed in Article 13 of this system.

As argued elsewhere (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014), Ibn Saud was successful in naming the state after his family because people accepted the term "Saudi" as their national title.

The term "Saudi" was similar to the title reporters and foreign governments had been using to refer to "Ibn Saud" authorities, in addition to the use of Wahhabis. For example *The London Times* used a report from the Iraqi Press Bureau concerning negotiations between Iraqi authorities and His Majesty Ibn Saud to prevent the latter's tribesmen from raiding Iraq (January 1, 1929). This is the same style of reporting that took place during negotiations between Transjordan authorities and Ibn Saud regarding similar issues (January 28, 1929). This juxtaposing of Ibn Saud to neighboring nations would have justified naming the country Saudi, as its authority was called Ibn Saud's rule. Such presentations of Ibn Saud as the national title of parts of Arabia is obvious in

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[51] The System of Arabic Saudi Citizenship, http://www.mofa.gov.sa/aboutkingdom/saudigovernment/regimesinkingdom/civilstatussystem/documents/87757_جنسية2.pdf Accessed 20 November 2013

both newspapers when they reported British subsidies to the region and diplomatic trips made by Saud's sons Faisal and Saud. An example of this can be found in *NYT*, "Ibn Saud and his household have for several years made the journey between Hejaz and Riyadh in a royal fleet of twenty-five to thirty automobiles" (May 30, 1932).

Considering the Arabic tribal and sectarian differences listed above, the best choices other than "Saudi," were likely "Arabia" or "Wahhabi." The first is too general and might reflect suspected interests of Ibn Saud to expand the country under a new Arab union. Furthermore, it would not be acceptable to monopolize the pan-ethnic title of "Arab" which is proclaimed by people inhabiting regions from Western Asia to North Africa who identify themselves as Arab, even in those regions that include other ethnicities such as Kurds and Berber. In addition,

> Ibn Saud was avoiding sectarian titles [Wahhabis] in order to maintain his grip over the largest Muslim sect (Sunni) on the one hand, and legitimize his regime under the title of 'Saudi' as their national identity on the other. His success is obvious as people accepted being addressed by the royal family name - a tribal name- as their national identity" (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014: 135).

As the data show, the majority of the coverage at this time of Saudi authority is framed as traditional. However, there are articles that demonstrate rules found within Ibn Saud's state. Table 10 highlights the various themes generated from articles discussing rational-legal authority. The majority of these article, 66.7%, concerned the foreign relations Ibn Saud needed to deal with those countries as a "state" rather than a "tribe." This included the international recognizing of the state, diplomatic negotiations and signing treaties. Such authority had been legalized by the "representatives" of the allied tribes who accepted Ibn Saud as their ruler. For example, in the Wahhabi conference held

in Riyadh in 1928, the chiefs confirmed the "full sovereign rights of Ibn Saud to control the foreign policy of the Arabian Desert tribes" (*NYT*: December 30, 1928).

Table 10: Rational-Legal Authority in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 1/1/1901-9/23/1932

Categories from articles of <u>Rational-Legal</u> Authority (*R*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Diplomatic, International recognizing and Treaty	20 (68.96%)	6 (60%)	26 (66.66%)
Interior Conferences (including letting people decide the leadership)	6 (20.69%)	3 (30%)	9 (23.08%)
Reforms and Developments	1 (3.45%)	0	1 (2.56%)
Sovereignty and Building the Bureaucracy	2 (6.9%)	1 (10%)	3 (7.69%)
Total	29 (100%)	10 (100%)	39 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell counts were less than 5. However, running a Z-test between both newspaper results for each category found no significant difference at $p < 0.05$ among these categories.

Some articles reported the internal conferences that Ibn Saud put together for his allied chiefs were a sign of his willingness to consider their opinions, including his offer to resign and allow the other chiefs to select another King—a decision he said he would obey only if the new ruler was a Najdi man—but the chiefs urged him to stay (*NYT*: January 2 and 20, 1929). This "election by fiat" by the tribal chiefs strengthened his executive authority in these conferences, as it provided a pseudo rational-legal

background to his position as Saudi Arabia's political leader. For an American audience, this news may have been interpreted in the same way as learning that a politician has been elected through the American Electoral College, where leaders are not elected directly by the masses/voters but by "electors" who supposedly represent the masses.[52]

Conferences determining the fate of the entire Wahhabi kingdom were never reported in *The London Times*. Instead of reporting on these conferences, the British newspaper published six articles reporting on conferences to decide the future of Hejaz, the homeland of the Muslims' holy sanctuaries in Mecca and Madinah. The reports claim, "he has no designs on the Hejaz or the Caliphate.... The question of the Holy Places is left to a consultation of Moslems" (October 20, 1924), and these reports go on to emphasize that the Muslim congress—representatives of the Muslim World—would decide the future of Hejaz (February 10, 1925). Ibn Saud welcomed 59 delegates of Muslim communities (June 9, 1926), including the mufti of Jerusalem (June 1, 1926). However, Ibn Saud was proclaimed King of Hejaz before the conference started. At this point, a British diplomat with an Indian-Afghan background wrote an article reporting that Ibn Saud vindicated his actions and was seeking a common good for all Muslims, including 100 million British subjects living in the region (July 21, 1926). Such a link with British interests reflects the political agenda in Arabia. These interests can be understood by not only what is reported but what is not. *The London Times* failed to report anything on the Taif massacre conducted by Nejdi troops where thousands of men

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[52] In the case of the United States, masses "elect" the "electors" to be their representatives in the American Electoral College. In this Saudi particular case, it appears as if the tribal chiefs played the "electors" role, as their position -representatives of the masses- is guaranteed because of their traditional legitimized status.

were killed, as these were deemed not to be true followers of the Prophet.[53] In such a case, his majesty has the right to take their lives, as reported by the same British author Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah in *NYT* a month later (August 15, 1926).

Because the majority of the articles are either reporting on Traditional or Rational-Legal authority, Saud's authority seems to be sufficiently stable (Scott and Davis, 2007:47, emphasis added).

> During recent centuries, particularly in Western societies, traditional structures are viewed as gradually giving way to rational-legal structures, *most notably* "the modern state" and in "the most advanced institutions of capitalism," due to their "purely technical superiority over any other form of organization."

The "most notably" Scott and Davis argue for does not exist in Saud's state. It is also worth mentioning that the data support Weber's idea of Patrimonialism as a form of traditional domination. Weber considers patrimonial monarchies and similar forms of government as projections of patriarchy where the rule is top-down. The power flows directly from the leader's blending of the public and private sectors in autocratic, or even oligarchic, governance where the society members are excluded from power. To ensure such absolute power, rulers rely on loyal armies rather than mass acceptance.

In the political sphere, election by a "National Party" does not always illustrate "rational-legal" authority, as the choice always comes from a noble-traditional family. The logic of selecting "Kings" in the colonial era fits with Weber's insistence of a correlation between hierarchical position and the degree of technical competence. Such

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[53] In 1924, Saudis win the first major standoff of the Second Hashemite-Saudi War after the Hashemite troops withdraw. The Wahhabi troops entered the city of Taif and massacred 300-400 unarmed inhabitants (Sicker, 2001:98).

noble-traditional families as the Hashemite and Al Saud were the most frequent sources of rulers during the first quarter of the 20th century, explaining the position of King Hussain (the King of Hejaz) and his sons, Abdullah (the King of Transjordan) and Faisal (the King of Iraq) who ruled three states simultaneously. There is a report in *NYT* (July 15, 1928), stating that Faisal, the son of Ibn Saud, was a candidate to become a King of Syria. The report states that the French would strongly object to him in view of the fact that he, like his father, was largely under the influence of the British. However, the younger leaders of the Syrian National Party favored Faisal "because of the glorious conquests of his father in the Arabian peninsula in recent years." It is worth noting that Faisal Bin Hussain, the first King of Iraq, was the King of Syria before the French expelled him after the Battle of Maysalun in July 1920 when French troops defeated Syrian revolutionaries. The Syrian National Party that favored Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was the same party that proclaimed Faisal Bin Hussain the Hashemite King of Syria. The French rejected both Arab leaders for the same reason: British influence. Colonists considered the ruling Arab noble families as their agents to stop any potential national rebels. This is also applied to other Arab monarchies at that time.

Transitioning From the Ottoman Empire

In the early 20th century, when the Ottoman Empire was considered the "Sick Man" of Europe, European powers, especially Britain and France, were colonizing most of the Middle East, while the United States was "popular and respected throughout the Middle East" (Hudson, 2013: 322). According to Alrebh and Ten Eyck (2014: 135), *NYT* was less favorable of the Saudi-Wahhabis than *The London Times* between 1927 and

1937. Table 11 below shows the sources of news stories for both presses. The sources

reflected the agenda setting based on political interests.

Table 11: The Sources of News Stories in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 1/1/1901-9/23/1932

Source of News		# AND % of *T*	# AND % of C	# AND % of *R*	# AND % of Total
Saudi Official	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	1 (1.31%)	0	1(10%)	2 (2.2%)
British Official	*Times*	19 (14.28%)	3 (60%)	13 (44.83%)	35 (20.96%)
	NYT	9 (11.84%)	1 (20%)	0	10 (10.99%)
British Journalist/Writer	*Times*	4 (3%)	0	0	4(2.39%)
	NYT	0	0	0	0
British Newspapers	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	3 (3.95%)	0	0	3 (3.3%)
Reuter	*Times*	2 (1.5%)	0	0	2 (1.2%)
	NYT	0	0	0	0
American Official	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	5 (6.58%)	0	1 (10%)	6 (6.6%)
American Journalist/Writer	*Times*	0	1 (20%)	0	1 (6%)
	NYT	15	2 (40%)	1 (10%)	18 (19.78%)
Soviet Official	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	1 (1.31%)	0	1 (10%)	2(2.2%)
Iraqi Official	*Times*	2 (1.5%)	0	0	2(1.2%)
	NYT	0	0	0	0
Iraqi Press Bureau	*Times*	4 (3%)	0	0	4 (2.4%)
	NYT	0	0	0	0
Jewish Telegraphic Agency	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	3	0	0	3 (3.3%)
Jewish Journalist/Writer	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	2	0	0	2(1.2%)
Letter to the Editor	*Times*	2 (1.5%)	1(20%)	0	3(1.79%)
	NYT	0	0	0	0

Table 11 (cont'd)

Total of Known	*Times*	33 (24.81%)	5 (100%)	13 (44.83 %)	51(30.54%)
	NYT	39 (51.32%)	3 (60%)	4 (40%)	45(49.45%)
Total of Unknown	*Times*	100 (75.19%)	0	16 (55.17 %)	116 (69.46%)
	NYT	37 (48.68%)	2 (40%)	6 (60%)	46 (50.55%)
Total	*Times*	133 (100%)	5 (100%)	29 (100%)	167(100%)
	NYT	76 (100%)	5 (100%)	10 (100%)	91(100%)

One may note the number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown" category) declined during these years. *NYT* was more likely to demonstrate the source of stories than was *The London Times*—identifying sources in 45 of the 91 articles (49.45%), while *The London Times* only identified sources in 51 of the 167 selected articles (30.54%). A chi-square test shows that there is a statistical significance difference between these newspapers and their willingness to identifying sources (χ^2 = 9.2, df =1, 258, sig. = 0.002675).

To be clear, there are a number of sources being used among the newspapers, including: writers, reporters, and individuals potentially representing institutions (e.g., the government, media agencies). The multiplicity of sources used by *NYT* reporters may have affected its coverage. Among *NYT* sources are American intellectuals (i.e., writers and journalists) and other media agencies such as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and three British newspapers including *The London Times*. However, British public interests in the region led to letters to the editor of *The London Times* that included three related specifically to authority. The involvement of British officials is obvious in both presses, while American officials never showed up in *The London Times*. That said there are only six articles in *NYT* reporting press releases from American officials, with four of them

concerned with Wahhabis murdering an American missionary in southern Iraq. However, as Table 11 indicates, *NYT* was more likely to demonstrate the source of stories than *The London Times*, clearly identifying sources in 43 of the 91 articles (47.25%), while *The London Times* only identified sources in 51 of its 167 articles (30.54%).

The traditional authority reported in *The London Times* and *NYT* reflects the strong relationship between state and religion as has been discussed in Islamic heritage. In *The Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) wrote, "Arabs can obtain royal authority only by making use of some religious coloring, such as prophecy, or sainthood, or some great religious event in general" (2005:140; Rosenthal, 1967:305). He argued that Arabs would not subordinate themselves to each other as they have their tribal pride and the eagerness to lead others. To maintain order, they would have to respect religious authority, as it holds sacred respect. If we consider the fourteenth century historical context of *The Muqaddimah*, I argue that this reference to statehood in general (not merely monarchy) better captures the Wahhabis' support of a royal rule similar to structures found in other Islamic empires, such as Umayyad and Abbasid. Furthermore, the terms "Arab" and "Muslim" were basically synonyms as the identifiers used in general literature and conversation (al-Jabiri, 1992). Therefore, a theocracy is the most salient political concept among Arabs during pre-colonization times. As Talal Asad has said, the theocratic Islamic state "is the product of modern politics and the modernizing state" (1997: 190).

The terms "authority" and "sovereignty" have no place in Muslim sacred texts. Rather, we find terms such as *Hakimiah* and *amr*. Islam is a religion with a set of norms regarding the public sphere. In fact, it is the Muslims' duty to make the world better. Ibn

Khaldun (2005: 212-216) argues that Islam is the only religion whose religious leaders involve politics and lead the nation, ... the person in charge of religious affairs (in other religious groups) is not concerned with power politics at all" (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 213; Rosenthal, 1958: 473). In this regard, he compares Islam and the Quran with Christianity and the Bible. While this may be an overstatement in some respects, especially given the history of the Catholic Church in European history, it points to how those who follow Islam view the world in terms of connections between politics and religion.

To summarize this era, the religious authority ties into Weber's notion of traditional authority. In Islam, the *Hakimiah* of Allah deals with applying Sharia law as the duty of the *wali-al-amr*, the Muslim ruler. In this regard, there are six articles in *NYT* that described Wahhabis as "puritans" and/or "fanatic" Muslims. *The London Times* reported such "fanaticism" by describing the "Sword of God" policy of Ibn Saud (May14, 1931). With this policy, *NYT* described Ibn Saud as "[t]he leader of Wahabis [*sic*], a fanatically religious sect of Moslems" (August 7, 1932). *NYT* described Ibn Saud as the new King of Arabia who rules according to the Quran, yet shuns the additions and reservations of the priesthood (August 15, 1926). According to *The London Times*, Ibn Saud owes much of his strength to his Wahhabi followers (May 4, 1920).

Both newspapers reported the imposition of Sharia law's traditional authority in the Wahhabi state. The main themes within these articles were the prohibiting of alcohol and tobacco[54] and the strictly negative attitude toward admiring saints' tombs by the Wahhabis. *The London Times* mentioned these prohibitions in two articles, while *NYT*

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[54] All Muslims are strictly prohibited from consuming alcohol, yet not all of them consider smoking tobacco as a sin. Wahhabis, however, have a harsh attitude toward tobacco.

covered this matter of religious "zealotry" in three reports. Honoring tombs is a debated topic among Muslims. Wahhabis have always been strictly against any special treatment of the saints' tombs, as they believe in such practice as worshipping false idols. In this regard, *The London Times* reported the damaging of tombs based on Wahhabi beliefs (August 29, 1925 and September 11, 1925), while Ibn Saud denied the responsibility and argued that Wahhabis are "the most devoted of Moslems in defense of the Holy Places" (September 8, 1925). *NYT* reported Ibn Saud's efforts to protect the Prophet's tomb from Wahhabis as they were damaging tombs (October17, 1926).

The religious basis of rule within the Saudi territories, according to *The London Times* and *NYT,* supports Zelizer's conception of reporters as an interpretive community (1993). They reported upon the importance of religion in the Middle East during the critical period of the first quarter of the 20th century. This was, of course, as a Muslim state (i.e., Caliphate) was collapsing at the end of the Ottoman Empire, which in turn led to the establishment of other national entities, often under Western mandates or influences—a matter of some consequence to its reportage. "In establishing authoritative views of an event long after it took place, they [reporters] generate contemporary standards of action for other members of the interpretive community" (Zelizer, 1993: 232-233). Indeed, it had by this time long been a standardized trope of reportage in the region; Zelizer might agree that religion—here identified as a matter of traditional authority—was important to reporters at this time; in no small part, as they had seen other reporters using it to frame their stories.

The coverage of the building and establishment of authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia clearly follows the British/American agenda in the Middle East. The image

of Ibn Saud and Wahhabis was more positive in *The London Times* than in *NYT*, even

with the domination of the traditional authority theme in both presses. It is not surprising

that Britain considered Ibn Saud a political ally and his territories geographically

important in the post-WWI years, while Americans still had very little involvement in the

region. Thus, 17.37% of *The London Times* articles present Saudi rule as rational-legal

authority versus 11% in *NYT*. Furthermore, the oil and interior developments had no

place in *NYT* coverage in this particular era, while *The London Times* had three articles

reporting Ibn Saud's control of this national resource. This also explains the focus of the

Wahhabi "fanaticism" in *NYT* versus the "role" of Wahhabis in building Ibn Saud's

authority in *The London Times*. For instance, *NYT* reported that Wahhabis looked at the

Arab population as either Wahhabi or non-believers—nothing in between—giving them

the right to raid and kill non-believers, raising suspicions that Ibn Saud was behind the

attacks of Faisal al Dawish[55] on northern neighbors, a matter completely denied by Ibn

Saud (April 8, 1928). Such suspicion had no place in *The London Times*. As shall be

illustrated in the next chapter, however, when Ibn Saud went from building the state to

ruling the state as its monarch, suspicions—and reportage—would evolve.

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[55] Faisal al Dawish was the chief of the Mutair tribe and one of the Ikhwan (Wahhabi troop) leaders that assisted Ibn Saud to build the kingdom. He disliked the idea of state borders. Thus, he had a desire to pursue the attacks, which led to the Ikhwan Revolt against the authority of Ibn Saud and committed cross-border raids upon Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait. Ibn Saud destroyed them in the Battle of Sabilla in 1929 (Lacey, 1981).

CHAPTER SIX:

Second Era 1932-1953: Monarch Ibn Saud

A preliminary search for news stories from September 23, 1932 to November 9, 1953 resulted in 355 articles from *The London Times* and 2733 from *NYT*.[56] After reading through each article to determine relevancy for this project, 88 articles remained for *The London Times* and 100 were systematically selected from *NYT*.

As in the first era, the main concern with coding articles was to determine the type of authority being discussed. It quickly became obvious that no single theme would emerge from the coverage. For example, when *NYT* reported that during World War II Ibn Saud decided to support the Allies (March 2, 1945), the article reported the King's choice as an individual decision, thus this article is coded as traditional authority. On the other hand, *NYT* reported a discussion between the governments of Saudi Arabia and the US regarding economic and political issues. Only positions were listed in this article (August 2, 1945), thus this article is coded as rational-legal authority. For readers interested in stories about this region, authority would come to them in various forms.

It is typical to find authority to be divided among the three types in significantly more complicated ways when compared with the first era. From this vantage point, the themes concerning sovereignty, oil and development, diplomatic affairs, and the Palestine issue could be categorized as traditional or rational-legal based on presentation. Thus, I determined themes regarding the "royal" control of the state as traditional authority.

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[56] The gap between these two numbers makes sense when looking at what was available in the archives. There were 231,467 archived articles for *The London Times* and *The Sunday Times*, and a hefty 3,867,371 *NYT* articles for this time period.

Articles focused on positions—even if the positions were held by Al Saud's members—are considered rational-legal authority. However, there are only five of 188 articles coded as presenting charismatic authority, as they were based on the personal attributes of Ibn Saud or one of his sons. I turn now to an analysis of the trends in the coverage before looking more closely at what was being written.

Table 12 highlights news content of *The London Times* and *NYT* for the second era. In both newspapers, articles tended to emphasize traditional authority and rational-legal authority, while charismatic authority was far less represented. Furthermore, traditional authority occupied considerably greater space in *The London Times* (63.64%) than *NYT* (42%). This could be a reflection of the state structure of each newspaper's homeland, i.e., the U.K. monarchy and the U.S. republic. It should also be noted that most of the articles reported at least two forms of authority—most typically traditional blended with rational-legal, though instances of charismatic authority were present. However, only the predominant type is reported in Table 12.

Table 12: Types of Authority in Saudi Arabia in *The London Times* & the *NYT* Coverage Between 9/23/1932 and 11/9/1953

Newspaper	*Traditional*	*Charismatic*	*Rational-Legal*	Total
The London Times	56 *(63.64%)*	3 *(3.41%)*	29 *(32.95%)*	88 *(100%)*
NYT	42 *(42%)*	2 *(2%)*	56 *(56%)*	100 *(100%)*
Total	98 *(52.13%)*	5 *(2.66%)*	85 *(45.21%)*	188 *(100%)*

As with the first time period, charismatic authority was not a major type of authority discussed. Five articles focused on the heroic character of Ibn Saud as the "warrior King" (*The London Times*, November 10, 1935), another that emphasized the

king's positive personal features (*The London Times*, March 11, 1934) [57] and those of his eldest sons Saud and Faisal (*The London Times*, July 19, 1950). The *NYT* articles presenting charismatic authority reported the heroic language of Ibn Saud as he announced that Palestine was "his own case" (May 5, 1948), which recalls the romantic image of the prideful Arabian chief. Such an image was emphasized by John Philby in his article addressing Ibn Saud's greatness (August 20, 1953).

The bureaucratic, rational-legal nature of authority in the U.K. and the U.S. might play a role in the overall presentation of Saudi authority during a time of war. Saudi Arabia announced joining the Allies against the Axis, and the Axis states were linked with charismatic authority (i.e., Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito), hence, the adherents of Allies may have looked for other ways to report on charismatic allies such as Ibn Saud. The Allies states' structures were republics or constitutional monarchies with elected parliaments. Thus, it was not a surprise to find that *The London Times* and *NYT* avoided presenting a member of the Allies as a charismatic authority figure, further enhancing rational-legal authority.

It is worth underscoring that this era is rather different than the first largely because the dominant topics may not emphasize the same types of authority. As

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[57] This article is a review of the book titled *Ibn Saud the Puritan King of Arabia* by Kenneth Williams. There is another article (*The London Times*, September 17, 1933) that reported the discussion of the rise of Ibn Saud and Wahhabism, acknowledging Philby and Rihani—a Lebanese American writer—as his main sources. Those sources were in favor of Ibn Saud. Philby converted to Islam, became a Saudi citizen, and then became Chief Adviser to Ibn Saud. Amin al-Rihani (1928) was also biased towards Ibn Saud. This is clear from his language of the heroic (or even "epic") description of winning wars. However, Williams counts him as one of the prominent dictators who have made history after the Great War. According to *Foreign Affairs*, a "good general account of the Wahabis [*sic*] and the rise of Ibn Saud, through the writer does not disclose much that adds to our knowledge."

explained above, in the first era the topic of "diplomatic affairs and signing treaties" was always tied to rational-legal authority. However, in the second era—after the declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the presentation of foreign relations could be traditional or rational-legal. In 1953, for example, there was a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Oman over the Buraimi oasis (Cordesman, 2003). According to *The London Times,* the British supported the Sultan of Oman.[58] What is interesting to note is the same newspaper also reported that a Saudi spokesman claimed sovereignty for King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud over the disputed territory" (March 10, 1953). A week later, *The London Times* reported:

> [a] statement [that] claims that Saudi Arabian sovereignty over the area goes back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, and that "the continuity of the Saudi authority and the direct and effective Saudi influence" are recognized by the inhabitants (March 17, 1953).

The first article is coded as traditional authority, as sovereignty was assigned in the story to the personal character of King Ibn Saud, rather than the Saudi state. The later article is coded as rational-legal authority because sovereignty was claimed to the Saudi state without personalization. This rationale is clearer when an article reported just a few months later that the "Saudi government" claimed authority over the disputed territory. The report insisted the Saudi government "protest[ed] about incidents at the [Buraimi] oasis in which British forces are alleged to have attacked the local inhabitants" (September 26, 1953). Thus, the same issue could be presented as a different form of

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[58]According to Cordesman (2003:70), Saudis were expelled by British and Trucial Oman Scouts.

authority. That is to say, news coverage became considerably more complicated in terms of packaging and presenting Saudi authority.

After the simplistic exposition during the "state building" era (1901-1932), the news topics became a less effective means to categorize articles in terms of types of authority. Table 13 shows the various categories generated from articles coded as using traditional authority. *The London Times* and *NYT* most frequently used the theme of "diplomatic affairs," including articles concerning relations with the West, the relations with Arab states (i.e., Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria), and the Palestine issue in the era of establishing the state of Israel.[59]

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[59] The state of Israel was established May 14, 1948.

Table 13: Traditional Authority in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 9/23/1932 and 11/9/1953

Categories from articles of <u>Traditional Authority</u> (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Diplomacy with the West	15 (26.79%)	6 (14.29%)	21 (21.43%)
Oil and Development	6 (10.71%)	9 (21.43%)	15 (15.31%)
Sovereignty	7 (12.5%)	6 (14.29%)	13 (13.27%)
Diplomacy with the Arab	3 (5.36%)	10 (23.81%)	13 (13.27%)
Ruling Titles and Royal Family Affairs	8 (14.29%)	3 (7.14%)	11 (11.22%)
War's Glory	9 (16.7%)	1 (2.38%)	10 (10.20%)
Palestine Issue	3 (5.36%)	5 (11.9%)	8 (8.16%)
Religious Authority	5 (8.93%)	2 (4.76%)	7 (7.14%)
Total	56 (100%)	42 (100%)	98 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell counts were less than 5. Running a Z-test between both newspaper results for each category illustrated significant differences in:

(1) "Diplomacy with the Arab" as the Z-Score= -2.6645, (the p-value= 0.00782)

(2) "War's Glory" as the Z-Score= 2.2824, (the p-value= 0.0226)

Both results are significant at p <0.05. The rest of the categories were not significant at p <0.05.

The British and American state agendas in the region are obvious as each newspaper has a different focus. For example, *The London Times* was more likely to report stories regarding the Palestine issue as a matter of *diplomacy* with regard to Arab states (5.36%). Conversely, *NYT* published five articles (11.9%) focusing on the Palestine issue *alongside* other articles regarding Palestine within the larger matter of Arab League affairs.

The British and American political agendas were reflected in a number of other ways. Oil and Saudi interior development are reported together in nine *NYT* articles (accounting for 21.43% of the traditional authority articles in this sample), explaining the rise of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and the importing of American specialists on interior development, including agriculture and infrastructure development (e.g., building the first airport in Dhahran). On the other hand, *The London Times* published only six articles (10.71%) in the *entire* era. This gap could be understood as part of the national interests of the homeland of each newspaper. As there were already a number of American experts and workers in the oil industry and other development projects in Saudi Arabia, there were thus two important matters that led *NYT* to focus on this topic: (1) economics, and (2) social concerns, as there were already thousands of Americans living in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the British were focusing on oil in Iraq and Iran because there was little hope of finding oil in Saudi territories before Americans took the risk and drilled. Such reporting is key to understanding the social construction of "news reality" (Schudson 2003).

Studies of the sociology of news demonstrate that "making news" is a reality constructing activity ruled by the elites (Schudson, 2003). The public does not distinguish the media's power from the power of the actors and the events the media covers. Indeed, it is not clear whether the media exercise much freedom or autonomy in producing news or simply relay to the general public what the powerful elites do. In this vein, media are no more than the visible tip of the iceberg of social influences on human behavior. According to Schudson (2014:143), "news sources" are the deep dark secret of the power of the press. Such power is exercised by the sources that supply information to "the news institutions." That is, the news is not what actually happens, but what is reported/broadcasted as having happened or is to happen.

Considering the timeline of the building of the kingdom, the only war reported by either paper in the second era was the war with the Yemeni Imam (monarch), when Ibn Saud sent his eldest sons Saud and Faisal—both of whom later inherited the Saudi throne—to fight the Yemenis and annexed parts of Yemen to Saudi Arabia (i.e., Najran). This particular event recalls the wars of the first era of building the kingdom, as explained in the previous chapter. After this war, it would appear Ibn Saud became satisfied with his achievement of placing nearly 80% of Arabia under his rule.

It should be noted that the ways in which the articles were collected from each newspaper influences some of the findings. The best example is the theme of "war's glory." In *The London Times*, there are nine articles reporting Ibn Saud's victory in his war with the Yemeni monarch, while in *NYT* there is only one article reporting this event (May 8, 1934). This could lead one to think there is a gap in covering this event. However, with an in-depth search of the entire *NYT* coverage of this time period, I found

24 articles focusing on the Saudi-Yemeni war with many details compared to the nine

articles in *The London Times*. That said, the reverse could also be the case with other

themes regarding *The London Times*, e.g., appearing to be more focused than *NYT*

concerning ruling titles and royal family affairs as well as diplomacy with the Western

world.

From Table 13, it should be understood that the Saudi Kingdom was being

presented to the British and American audiences as a strong Arab state with a growing oil

industry benefiting American companies, had good relations with the U.K. and the U.S.,

and was playing a leading role in the Middle East favoring British and American policies.

In addition, there were no reports of "excessive violence" by Wahhabis against their

enemies (e.g., *al-Taif* incident). Therefore, I argue, British and American readers would

believe—based on the reporting of the dominant news media—they had very little need

for concern about this new Muslim state in the Middle East. Gitlin (1980) reminds us that

journalists are symbol-handlers maintaining the hegemonic culture with their reporting of

news stories serving the dominant agenda. To be sure, those of the dominant media need

to convince the public their agenda supports national interests. The battle of shaping

"public opinion" and "media discourse," aspects of the social construction of reality,

appears in every active society seeking its freedom.[60]

After declaring the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the sobriquet of Ibn Saud was

shifted from "the Wahhabi King" to "the King of Saudi Arabia." The religious title

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[60] Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 2) further extend Gitlin's ideas, stating
media discourse is part of the process by which individuals
construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process
by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop
and crystallize meaning in public discourse.

disappeared to underscore the new political entity and reality. This reflects the stability of the state identity as "Saudi" rather than "Arabian" or "Wahhabi." The internationally recognized term "Saudi" as the national title of this geographical scale helped Ibn Saud to solidify the royal authority as the national sovereignty. Hence, I argue this was the first step of shifting the news coverage from the "traditionally-slanted" to the "semi-traditionally-slanted," as the rational-legal authority became more obvious.

The term "Wahhabism" takes up very little ink in the reporting during these years. When used, it is mostly linked to the idea of war. In *The London Times*, the term was reported in 13 articles, including nine regarding "war glory" and two regarding diplomatic relations with the U.K. On the other hand, *NYT* reported the term only twice, assigning it with the term "puritanism" (March 3, 1944) and the readiness to fight for Palestine (July 19, 1940). It could therefore be deduced that "Wahhabism" was reserved for the representation of only "fanatical" Muslim fighters to be perceived as the "historic inheritors"—or perhaps the "ancient devils"—of the Arabian deserts. Thus, the decline of this term was likely due to the decline of war.

In the second era, there is a complete absence of the challenge from the conservative Wahhabis to the royal authority of Ibn Saud, with one exception—a plot against Ibn Saud in both papers. *NYT* announced a message from the Saudi Legation in Egypt that King Ibn Saud smashed a plot to overthrow his regime by a Hashemite member named Abdl Hamid Ibn Ohn who was sentenced to death before being commuted to life imprisonment "because of his ancient lineage and his royal connections." His chief aide was executed, the report insisting, "the supposed conspirators had no popular support" (December 30, 1940). On the other hand, *The*

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London Times reported a plot to assassinate King Ibn Saud, which caused the arrest of a

number of political figures in Saudi Arabia and the leader "Sherif Abdul Hamid has

already been sentenced and executed" (December 29, 1940). Regardless of the

contradictory coverage of the two papers in terms of Ohn's fate, this story reflects the

stability of Ibn Saud's authority over the state as almost nobody attempted to seize it

from him.[61]

In the Saudi interior there were reports of formal practices conflicting with

Wahhabi lessons, such as celebrating the golden jubilee of King Ibn Saud as the leader

(*The London Times*: July 19, 1950; *NYT*: July 20, 1950). According to Wahhabi beliefs,

such a practice is considered heresy and has no place in Islamic traditions. Furthermore,

the same article in *NYT* reported that the Saudi Ambassador to the U.K.'s wife showed up

unveiled with a western style dress to the jubilee. Such non-Islamic practices by Saudi

officials and their wives might provoke the conservative Wahhabis. Hence, I argue, the

conservatives were isolated from Western media coverage. Furthermore, they had very

limited access to the diplomatic affairs because the positions of delegations were

dominated by people not originally from the Arabian Peninsula.[62]

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[61] I have found nothing concerning this story—or anything naming Abdl Hamid Ibn
Ohn—in other historical accounts.

[62] The mentioned Saudi Ambassador, Hafiz Wahaba (1889-1969), is an example of non-
Arabian (i.e., Egyptian) origin, holding the diplomatic position in Saudi Arabia. In
addition, *The London Times* mentioned that few ministers of Ibn Saud government who
are eloquent in the English tongue (June 16, 1935); again, the mentioned Saudi minister
Fuad Hamza (1899-1951) who was described as eloquent in English was originally
Lebanese.

Indeed, it is hard to take the above argument for granted, as similar practices occurred inside the Kingdom. For example, *NYT* published an article titled "Arabian Tradition Broken As U.S. Woman Met King" reporting that she "was avoided when she accepted an invitation to join the ladies of his harem (the women's section) instead of eating with the king, and twenty-six of his sons..." (June 19, 1946). Yet, a non-Muslim woman sitting with the Muslim leader in the Muslim land, instead of sitting with women of the harem, is something absolutely contrary to the Arabian/Islamic traditions as the article indicated in its title. However, such stories could be good indicators of the Wahhabi surrender to Ibn Saud's authority as the leader who has the right to adjust foreign relations with non-Muslims.

Contrarily, *NYT* published an article titled "Arabian Prince's $500 Tip Shocks Airport Protocol" (November 25, 1951). The article presented a Saudi prince tipping an American policeman for what would be considered a rather exorbitant amount. In Saudi Arabia, the royals grace people through the giving of cash or gifts as a part of practicing their traditional authority. The Prince, who is the Saudi Minister of Defense, did this as an expression of his appreciation to the American policeman, which is normal "traditional authority" in the Saudi context. In the American context, it is not because the policeman did his job that he gets paid for within a rational-legal system. Such news stories present the Saudi royal family as the *Arabian Nights'* Sultans who spend from the state's treasury as it pleases them. The image became more traditional with noting "that one of his [the prince] secretaries had pressed a roll of bills totaling $500 into a base policeman's hand just before the party took off". Handing a "roll of bills" by one of the prince's entourage recalls the image of "money in a bag" handled by an entourage

member accompanying one of the *Arabian Nights'* Sultans who ruled through absolute monarchy.[63] This story supports Said's argument (1979) of orientalism as a "lens" used by westerners to understand the unfamiliar and the strange "Orientals." Such an approach, Said argues, positions Orientals as different from and threatening to Westerners regardless of other plots in the story or its coverage.

The royalty of Ibn Saud and his sons did not prevent them from building a sort of bureaucracy to manage state affairs. As mentioned earlier, the state's structure had been developed after declaring the Kingdom in 1932. Table 14 highlights the various themes generated from articles discussing rational-legal authority. It is worth noting that the decline of the representation of the traditional authority in the second era compared with the first era is greater in *NYT* (41.51%) than *The London Times* (-15.96%). This decline favored the rational-legal authority that increased in *NYT* (+45%) and *The London Times* (+14.53%). Hence, it is clear that while *The London Times* emphasized traditional authority, the *NYT* presentation of the Saudi authority had a radical shift toward rational-legal authority.

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[63] Both papers reported Mansour bin Abdulaziz Al Saud the Minister of Defense visits to the U.K. and the U.S. as a guest of British and American governments. This raises a question of whether such invitations were to negotiate arms deals.

Table 14: Rational-Legal Authority in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 9/231932-11/9/1953

Categories from articles of <u>Rational-Legal Authority</u> (*R*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Oil and Development	8 (27.59%)	21 (37.5%)	28 (33.73%)
Diplomacy with the West	8 (27.59%)	13 (23.21%)	21 (25.30%)
Palestine Issue	3 (10.34%)	15 (26.79%)	17 (20.48%)
Sovereignty	8 (27.59%)	4 (7.14%)	12 (14.46%)
Diplomacy with the Arab	2 (6.89%)	2 (3.57%)	4 (4.82%)
Diplomacy with the Others	0	1 (1.76%)	1 (1.20%)
Total	29 (100%)	56 (100%)	85 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell counts were less than 5. However, after running Z-tests between both newspaper, results for each category showed the only significant difference is in "Sovereignty" with the Z-Score= 2.5672 (the p-value= 0.01016); the result is significant at $p < 0.05$. The rest of the categories were not significant at $p < 0.05$.

Oil and Development

A small majority of these articles concerned oil and the development of the country (33.73%). *NYT* focused more on this topic than *The London Times*. As previously

mentioned, Americans were involved in the oil industry in the Saudi territories while

British were not. The states' agendas of the U.K. and the U.S. played a clear role in this

coverage. *The London Times* articles were "reporting" the economic aspect of the

Arabian American Oil Company, especially the fifty-fifty agreement with the Saudi

government, which increased the Saudi share of the oil revenue.[64] *NYT* went beyond

economic aspects of the oil industry by including the development of the Saudi

infrastructure caused by oil. This included the Saudi intention to open a port to facilitate

the transport of oil (March 10, 1939), building an airport in Saudi Arabia (November 9,

1945), and importing American expertise to develop the country. Such importing

represented a good investment for Americans who could get a share of the Saudi oil,

which meant most petrodollars moved back to the US as the Saudi government paid for

American expertise and goods.

According to *NYT*, the American experts were helping Saudi Arabia in terms of

improving Bedouin living conditions (February 10, 1941), agriculture/water sources

(March 26, 1942), military affairs (February 25, 1948), and economic affairs (June 9,

1951). In terms of economic development, *NYT* reported that the Export-Import Bank of

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[64] See *The London Times* issues: October 30, 1951; two articles from November 28, 1951; January 1, 1952; October 13, 1952. In addition, a Muslim Indian British writer wrote an article in *The London Times* linking the Saudi oil wealth with the Hajj (Muslim pilgrimage) in terms of ability to offer better services. The article has a traditional authority slant because of mentioning Ibn Saud's sons' role in the Kingdom. However, it is coded as rational-legal because of its main focus on rational-legal authority. *The Sunday Times* reported a Japanese hope of oil concession in Saudi Arabia. This article is categorized as "diplomacy with others," because its main focus was on the diplomatic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Japan (April 9, 1939). One more article published in *The London Times* reported ARAMCO Arab workers'' protest demanding the equality with the American workers. The article reported the "martial law [was declared in] Saudi Arabia after an attack on American Army vehicles by a crowd of demonstrators" (October 19, 1953).

the US informed the Saudi Finance Minister about approving $10,000,000 credit to the

Saudi government. The amount "would be used [to] modernize Saudi Arabian transport

and agriculture with equipment and supplies purchased here [US]" (August 6, 1946).[65]

Still, the loan is from the Americans, and would be used to purchase American products.

Also, most of the infrastructure the Saudi government financed was to facilitate the oil

industry, i.e., the airport and the seaport. However, these articles represent the Saudi

government rather than the character of Ibn Saud as the other party dealing with the

American government. This bureaucratic structure of the Saudi state was presented to the

American audience who live within a capitalistic, bureaucratic government.

The presentation of the oil industry and interior development is more detailed in

NYT than *The London Times*. This interest extended to guaranteeing a strong friendship

with the House of Saud to keep the oil concession on one hand and develop a long-term

strategic alliance on the other. Thus, *NYT* reported on the economic news stories about

Saudi Arabia and insuring the presentation of the rational bureaucracy of the

administration. Such an agenda needs to address the American audience's economic

concerns in the post-Great Depression environment. In this regard, *NYT* reports positive

economic and political news stories about Saudi Arabia such as "Saudi national income is

growing [and] ... the government invest 270 million on internal projects," (July 28, 1947);

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[65] Another example of the *NYT* coverage of the Saudi-American economic relation (June 30, 1947):

> The Saudi Arabian Government has requested a loan from the
> United States of more than $100,000,000 primarily for the
> construction of a railway from the Arabian American Oil
> Company installations at Dhahran, on the Persian Gulf coast, to
> one of King Ibn Saud's capitals at Riyadh, in the heart of the
> plateau region of Nejd.

and "Saudi Arabia in the throes of modernization.... Saudi government made many development projects" (April 8, 1950).

In addition, the Saudi government is introduced as a progressive state that helps the tribal and intensely conservative Muslims adjust to the impact of sudden wealth (January 12, 1953).[66] This reflects the intent of the Saudi government to civilize the society and build a modern state based on the creation of bureaucracies that function as aspects of rational-legal authority. Thus, American public opinion would support their state agenda in Saudi Arabia.[67] Therefore, the foreign agenda (i.e., American and British) in Saudi Arabia leads to a discussion of Saudi diplomacy in this second era.

Saudi Foreign Policy

Saudi diplomacy is another leading theme at this time. Most focus is on diplomacy with the West, particularly the U.K. and the U.S. *The London Times* focuses on diplomatic meetings, especially officials' trips to London. What differentiates articles coded as rational-legal from those coded as traditional authority in *The London Times* is the emphasis of the positions rather than the members of a royal family. For instance, *The London Times* covered the trip of Amir Mansur to London in 1949. Some articles present him as a son of King Ibn Saud (August 22, 1949) and this was coded as traditional

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[66] Gamson, et al. (1992) informs us that audiences are given information through a sort of "lens"—perhaps even merely a fragment of the whole truth. As they write, "[t]he lens through which we receive these images is *not* neutral but evinces the power and point of view of the political and economic elites who operate and focus it" (1992:374, emphasis added).

[67] This also would attract Americans to invest their skills in this developing country. For instance, an article reported that a former American policemen left to work on ARAMCO security. "A company spokesman said the main security job was done by a force supplied by the Arabian Government" (December 17, 1950).

authority. Articles that presented him as the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense (September 14, 1949) were coded as rational-legal authority. The quantity of the articles in this section, eight, is about half of those concerning the Saudi Western diplomacy in the traditional authority section. The articles coded as traditional authority tended to be photographs, which were captioned with royal titles that fit within the British monarchical context.

NYT has a higher quantity of the articles in this section (thirteen), which is more than twice those concerning Saudi diplomacy in the traditional authority section (six). Furthermore, *NYT* articles go deeper in this coverage by presenting Saudi diplomacy as rational authority, as it mentioned the institutional positions rather than names. For instance, in an article reporting American-Saudi discussions of economic and political matters, there are no names listed, only positions (August 2, 1945). In addition, articles presented the role of the Saudi embassy in Washington, DC as a platform for Saudi political attitudes. For example, an article published on November 25, 1950 stated "Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington called attention yesterday to official denials made by the Saudi Arabian government of charges that it had financed Arab terrorism in Syria." Two years later, the embassy announced an official denial regarding responsibility in raiding neighbor states (October 12, 1952). *NYT* continued by reporting the Saudi involvement in the international community, "Saudi Arabian offers legal group definitions of crime for international usage, seeking to coordinate various resolutions before the General Assembly's Legal Committee requesting steps to outlaw and punish genocide, the delegate from Saudi Arabia submitted today a list of points" (November 29, 1949). Such a presentation would introduce Saudi Arabia in a more bureaucratic structure

than that presented in *The London Times*, which enhances the rational-legal presentation qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

In terms of Saudi-Arab relationships, both papers were less concerned with covering Saudi relationships with other Arab countries than the relationships with their respective homelands. There are two articles in each newspaper reporting the negotiations and treaties between governments of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This topic was very critical as Iraqis used to suffer from Wahhabis raids. Furthermore, the Saudi-Iraqi treaty in 1936 was the beginning of other treaties with other Arab countries, such as Yemen and Egypt, before establishing the Arab League in 1945 (Seabury, 1949). This sort of presentation reflects the traditional authority of dealing with Arab affairs, since most Arab states were monarchies, especially in *NYT* [68] where ten articles fell in the "traditional authority" category and two were coded as rational-legal. [69] The presentation of the Saudi state in both papers fit contexts of both the Arab World (mostly traditional authority) and the western world, which is mostly bureaucratic when thinking about and discussing state structures and policies.

The Palestine issue was, and continues to be, one of the hottest topics in the Middle East. This theme became more critical at this time which witnessed the birth of

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[68] A good example of this traditional tendency in *NYT* is the article reporting Ibn Saud's—rather than the Saudi government's—pressures on other Arab states regarding what can be considered as their interior affairs. This article reported "Fouad Hamza arrived to Damascus to start the fight on behalf of King Ibn Saud against the union of two countries [Syria and Iraq]. The problems between Saudi and Hashimite dynasties" (October 2, 1949). The background of the royal dynastic conflicts is clear.

[69] In *The London Times*, the number of articles coded as traditional—regarding the same topic—were three, while the rational-legal contained only two.

the state of Israel in 1948. The diplomatic aspect of the Palestine issue is multi-leveled, including Palestinian, Arabic, Jewish—and later Israeli—and Western concerns. Saudi Arabia, as a leading figure in the Arab world, had a heavy duty to balance its own interests with its Arabic-Islamic obligations. The articles coded as traditional authority reflect King's Ibn Saud's attitude as an Arabian chief expressing his support to Palestinians. However, the articles coded as rational authority reflect the practical steps toward this complicated issue.

The London Times, for its part, presented Saudi diplomatic efforts to solve the issue peacefully with limited details. For example, the paper reported the efforts of the King of Saudi Arabia with other Arab rulers. "The King of Saudi Arabia offered to use his good offices acting in concert, if their cooperation could be secured, with other Arab rulers" (September 8, 1936). Such diplomatic language did not prevent Saudi Arabia from denouncing the subject of Jewish settlement in Palestine (June 22, 1943), and even moving further to challenge the United Nations' decision regarding the Palestinian-Jewish conflict (December 14, 1947).[70]

The topic was covered with more details in *NYT*, which reported on an exchange of letters between King Ibn Saud and Presidents FDR and later Truman discussing the conflict in Palestine. The "rational" language is clear in these letters, as the King explained the Arab rights in Palestine trying to impugn the Jewish claims based on a historical background. There are several examples in *NYT*, such as a letter reported on

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[70] This article reported, "Prince Feisal Saud, of Saudi Arabia, then denounced the vote as the destruction of the United Nations charter, and said Saudi Arabia would not be bound by the decision."

January 5, 1938 that includes a legal argument in diplomatic language mentioning the institution—Saudi Arabian Legation—rather than an individual. In addition, another letter written by Ibn Saud was published in October 19, 1945 explaining to President Truman the reasons behind claiming the Arab's right in Palestine. This moved further when "King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia charged in a letter to President Truman that the latter's call for opening the gates of Palestine to more Jews was in "complete contradiction" to a Presidential assurance" (October 18, 1946). In addition to those articles a number of reports pointed to the leading role of Saudi Arabia as the official representative of the Arab League regarding the Palestine issue. [71]

This Saudi supportive attitude toward the Palestine issue versus the Anglo-American supportive attitudes toward Jewish—Israelis later—invokes a question regarding the oil embargo. Such a question becomes more interesting with reading the *NYT* article reporting Ibn Saud's comment that "I have said brother, that I am ready to sacrifice myself and my sons for Palestine. I say again oil is not dearer than my sons. I am ready to cancel the oil concessions if it will be necessary" (Jul13, 1948). [72] Hence, even if the idea of an embargo was a topic of discussion among Arab rulers, the Saudi Arabian attitude toward this idea was clear, regardless of the Saudi claims of the willingness to cancel the American oil concessions. *NYT* published an article titled

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[71] For example, *NYT* reported, "Prince Faisal, chief delegate of Saudi Arabia and the leader of the Arab bloc at the Assembly session, is the most outspoken antagonist of the partition or federation of Palestine" (September 23, 1947).

[72] This article is coded as "traditional authority" because it reflects the traditional power of the King as the absolute monarch controlling the oil with no challenge or even partnership from other forms of power within the Saudi state.

"Arabs Had Sanction Plan: But Saudi Arabia Refused to Cut Off Oil to U.S. and Britain" (Nov26, 1948). This attitude fits with a former article which reported a Saudi official's emphasis on separating the Palestinian issue with interests tied to the US (December 20, 1947). However, any positive relationship with Israel was not an option for Saudis. [73]

This attitude toward Palestine reported by *The London Times* and *NYT* presents the Saudi government as a nation that has placed its own priorities over Pan-Arab interests. Such a presentation supports Al-Rasheed's argument of the "desire to remain aloof from Arab crisis that Ibn Saud considered irrelevant to the preservation of his realm" (2010: 99). This leads to thinking about state sovereignty and the national interests from a bureaucratic—rational-legal—perspective. This statement by Al-Rasheed gets more support in the data, as an article from *The London Times* reported that some of the American officials described Ibn Saud as a moderate leader because of his attitude toward Palestine (February 22, 1948).[74]

Saudi Sovereignty

The articles concerning sovereignty were presented as different forms of authority. The example mentioned earlier of the Saudi claim over Buraimi was not the only conflict regarding the claiming of sovereignty over pieces of Arabian territories

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[73] The Saudi government faced rumors of dealing with Israelis, though the Saudis denied them. For example, *NYT* reported, "Saudi Arabian Legation here [Egypt] issued a statement from King Ibn Saud's Cabinet, denying reports that his Government was willing to ship oil to Haifa [Israel]" (Aug28, 1949).

[74] This article was issued just three months before the declaration of the state of Israel on the Palestinian territories.

between Saudis and their neighbors. Indeed, such conflict is the dominant topic of the articles concerning sovereignty in this data.

The difference from earlier articles coded as traditional authority is the focus upon the offices and positions rather than the monarchical sovereignty. While it is true that monarchies are typically traditional authority, the emphasis on the institutions and bureaucratic structure by the media makes this more like Weber's description of rational legal authority. This recalls Figure 2 in Chapter 2 of the intersections among Weberian types of authority. In this regard, concerning a border problem with Oman, a neighboring state supported by the British, Prince Faisal speaks as the Foreign Minister not as the son of King Ibn Saud (March 12, 1953). Simply, the character presented in *NYT* was for a Saudi official not a royal member of the House of Saud.

This also applied to debates with the British government that was protecting some of the neighbor states. For instance, *The London Times* reported that the Saudi government tended to "protest about incidents at the oasis in which British forces are alleged to have attacked the local inhabitants." It claimed British authority over the disputed territory (September 26, 1953). The "legal" sovereignty claims moved further as *NYT* reported, "Saudi Arabia accused British authorities here today of committing new 'acts of aggression' in the disputed area of the Buraimi Oasis, and warned once again that she might bring the lingering territorial quarrel to the United Nations" (September 24, 1953). Such direct debates reflect the strong sovereignty of the Saudi state regardless of the presented type of authority.

Presenting Saudi sovereignty brings up various other topics. *The London Times* reported that stories of practicing sovereignty within the Saudi Embassy in London,

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including bureaucratic news, especially substituted officials during the absence of the

Ambassador (August 7, 1936; February 8, 1938). Such news introduces a bureaucratic

Saudi Arabia. *NYT* went further by reporting other news stories of practicing sovereignty.

For instance, the Saudi government refused pilgrimage visas for Chinese because of a

suspicion of engagement with communism (August 31, 1952). Such action fits with

American anti-communist policies, especially McCarthyism. In another news story

detailing increasing Saudi sovereignty challenging the British, *NYT* reported, "according

to *Pick's World Currency Report*, by Saudi Arabia's refusal of delivery on 60,000

"British" sovereigns, worth $675,000" (October 25, 1952), the Saudi officials attributed

this action to the illegality of this currency. *The London Times* did not report this story

even though the UK was part of it. This raises a question concerning the reasons behind

ignoring such events.[75]

There is an absence of sovereignty and authority in Saudi Arabia among some of

the reports about this nation. These articles reported superpower negotiations and

agreements, which included some decisions regarding Saudi Arabia, yet made no

mention of official participation from the Saudi state. *The London Times* reporting on an

agreement between the U.K. and Italy listed, "a comprehensive agreement regarding

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[75] The British challenge was evident in the articles coded as traditional authority. In an article titled "Week in Hands of Wahabis," In July 21, 1935, *The London Times* reported that a British official was arrested by Ibn Saud's Wahhabi subjects because he crossed the borders without permission. This official was Captain Joseph Chamberlain, son of Sir Austen Chamberlain, himself the nephew of Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister from 1937-1940. This article was followed with another titled "Captain Chamberlain" reported that Captain Joseph Chamberlain who was detained by Wahabi troops refused food (July 28, 1935). However, those articles were coded as traditional authority because they presented the royal and religious authority of Ibn Saud as a King and Wahhabis as "fanatic religious solders."

Middle East interests, the two parties bind themselves to respect the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen" (April 17, 1938). Another article regarding the distribution of the Middle East oil interests between the U.K. and U.S. reported an Anglo-American agreement that the concession of Saudi oil would go to the Americans, while the concession of Iranian oil would go to the British (March 12, 1944). The topic moved further with a *London Times* article titled: "De Gaulle May join the 'Big Three' [FDR, Churchill, & Stalin]." The last paragraph of this article reported "among the economic questions that will call for delicate handling is the future of Persian oilfields and possibly those of Saudi Arabia" (January 07, 1945).

The American interest in Saudi's oil industry is a good test of Saudi sovereignty in this era. The articles related to this topic were coded rational-legal. In November 28, 1951, *The London Times* reported an agreement of a fifty-fifty (after collecting American tax income) split between the Arabian American Oil Company and the Saudi Government. That is to say, the US government was collecting a tax from a half-American firm - the Arabian American Company, while the report made no mentioned of taxation for the Saudi government. Hence, *The London Times* did not position Saudi Arabia as a strong sovereignty imposing a tax over a company benefiting from the oil being taken from the country.

NYT reported that "Saudi Arabia had established a 20% income tax covering oil exploitation in certain other undertakings" (January 4, 1951). Four days later, it reported that the Saudi government collected a large tax from ARAMCO (January 8, 1951). The *NYT* presentation of Saudi sovereignty over Saudi oil is quite different from *The London Times*, which might reflect the different views of colonialism in the U.K. and the US. The

British regret of losing control of Persian Gulf oil is tied to colonial interests, whereas the Americans looked at Saudi oil as a business investment. *The London Times* clearly presented a colonial view toward the Middle East generally, while *NYT* presented a capitalist view, looking for a "trading partner" rather than a "client."

Newspaper Source and Agenda Setting

This second era witnessed the growth of the oil industry in the Persian Gulf and challenging Arab thrones, which led to changes in some neighboring state structures, such as Egypt in July of 1952. Table 15 shows the sources of news stories for both papers. The sources reflect agenda-setting based on political interests.

Table 15: The Sources of News Stories in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 9/231932-11/9/1953

Source of News		# and % of *Traditional*	# and % of *Charismatic*	# and % of *Rational-legal*	# and % of Total
Saudi Official	*Times*	5 *(8.93%)*	0	5 *(17.24%)*	10 *(11.64%)*
	NYT	6 *(14.28%)*	2 *(100%)*	13 *(23.21%)*	*(21%)*
British Official	*Times*	14 *(25%)*	1 *(33%)*	13 *(44.83%)*	28 *(31.82%)*
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	*(1%)*
British Journalist/Writer	*Times*	6 *(10.71%)*	0	0	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.76%)*	1 *(1%)*
ARAMCO	*Times*	0	0	1 *(3.44%)*	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	1 *(1%)*
American Official	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	6 *(14.28%)*	0	3 *(5.36%)*	9 *(9%)*
American Journalist/Writer	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	8 *(19.05%)*	0	10 *(17.85%)*	18 *(18%)*
American Businessman	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	1 *(1%)*

Table 15 (cont'd)

Arab Official	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	2 *(4.76%)*	0	3 *(5.36%)*	5 *(5%)*
Arab Newspaper	*Times*	0	0	1 *(3.44%)*	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	2 *(4.76%)*	0	0	2 *(2%)*
Reuters	*Times*	4 *(2.56%)*	0	0	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	1 *(2.38%)*	0	0	1 *(1%)*
American Presses	*Times*	1 *(1.78%)*	0	0	0
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	1 *(1%)*
Picture Gallery	*Times*	12 *(21.43%)*	0	2 *(6.7%)*	14 *(20.89%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
United Nations	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	1*(1%)*
Pick's World Currency Report	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	0	0	1 *(1.78%)*	1 *(1%)*
Financial Provider	*Times*	1 *(1.78%)*	0	0	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
Italian Newspaper	*Times*	1 *(1.78%)*	0	0	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
Abyssinian Official	*Times*	1 *(1.78%)*	0	0	1 *(1.34%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
Total of Known	*Times*	45 *(80.36%)*	1 *(33%)*	22 *(75.86%)*	68 *(77.28%)*
	NYT	25 *(59.52%)*	2 *(100%)*	36 *(64.29%)*	63 *(63%)*
Total of Unknown	*Times*	11 *(19.64%)*	2 *(67%)*	7 *(24.14%)*	20 *(18.18%)*
	NYT	17*(40.78%)*	0	20 *(35.71%)*	37*(37%)*
Total	*Times*	56 *(100%)*	3 *(100%)*	29 *(100%)*	88 *(100%)*
	NYT	42 *(100%)*	3 *(100%)*	56 *(100%)*	100 *(100%)*

One may note the number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown" category) declined during these years. *The London Times* only identified sources in 68 of the 88 selected articles (77.28%), while *NYT Times* was more likely to demonstrate the source of stories than was *The London Times*—identifying sources in 63 of the 100

articles (63%). A chi-square test shows that there is a statistically significance difference between these newspapers and their willingness to identifying sources ($\chi^2 = 4.51$, df =1, 188, sig. = 0.034).

The sources of the news stories in this second era became more complicated in terms of the variation between the two papers. There was an increase in news stories attributed to British officials in *The London Times* from 20.96% in the first era to 31.82% in the second, while they declined in *NYT* from 10.99% to 1%. American officials remained absent in *The London Times*, while it had one more article in the *NYT* (five articles in the first era versus six in the second), yet this counted as a decline in terms of percentage of articles coded.[76] It is a sign of the American increased engagement in the region, much of which was positive between the Saudi state and the US. In addition, the number of articles sourced from non-official Americans in *NYT* was still 19 articles.[77] The articles sourced by Saudi officials increased from a complete absence in *The London Times* to ten articles (11.64%) balanced between traditional and rational-legal authority. Moreover, the *NYT* articles sourced by Saudi officials increased from two (2.2%) to 21 (21%). This is an outcome of the bureaucratic development in the Saudi state after declaring the Kingdom.

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[76] The reason for the decrease of the percentage is the difference of the total articles coded in those two eras, in the First Era, the *NYT* articles number is 91, while in the Second Era it is 100. Thus, 5 out of 91 represents 6.6%, while 6 out of 100 represents 6%.

[77] Counting both the American journalists/writers (18 articles) and the American businessmen (one article).

The London Times' picture gallery published 14 articles in this era, 12 of which were framed as traditional authority. In both eras, *The London Times* has a section called Picture Gallery, while *NYT* attached photographs to the articles. The tendency in *The London Times'* picture gallery reflects the sorts of events which were covered in this era, particularly royal visits.

Hence, the royal identity of the Saudi state was clear in *The London Times*, which targeted an audience steeped in a history of royal families and events. On the other hand, *NYT* emphasized the bureaucratic structure of the Saudi state. This includes the diversity of the institutional sources found in news stories reported by *NYT* (i.e., the U.N., *Pick's World Currency Report*, and ARAMCO). This follows the British/American agenda in the Middle East. This is not too surprising, as the Saudi diplomatic direction had shifted from the U.K.to the US. This shift began with a shift in economics but evolved to include other political affairs, as was witnessed in the exchange of letters regarding the Jewish-Palestinian conflict that took place between Ibn Saud and the American presidents.

Thus, Saudi Arabia became a strategic ally to the US in the post-WWII years, while British influence declined because of that nation's interest in other Persian Gulf states such as Iran, Oman and Bahrain. Thus, 56% of the *NYT* articles present Saudi rule as rational-legal authority versus 32.95% of *The London Times*. Furthermore, oil and interior developments received coverage in this particular era. *NYT* published 30 articles regarding oil and other interior development projects, mostly engaged with American experts, while these issues received less attention in *The London Times*—14 articles. This also explains the decline of the theme of "Wahhabi fanaticism" in both papers, especially in *NYT,* versus the First Era of building the Kingdom. Thus, the term "Wahhabism" is

always associated with the wars in the second era, and because of the limited theme of "war" in this era, the term declined compared to the first era. Following this trend, one might expect a complete, nor nearly complete absence of the term "Wahhabism" in the Third Era, as no war was fought at that time. As shall be illustrated in the next chapter, when Ibn Saud died and his sons inherited the throne, Saudi Arabia was seen as a stable monarchy.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

Third Era 1953-1975: Saud and Faisal

Keyword searches between the dates of November 10, 1953 and March 25, 1975 identified 3885 articles from *The London Times*[78] and 8909 from *NYT.* A systematic random sample of 100 articles was selected from both newspapers. As with the other eras, the main concern with coding was to determine the type of authority discussed in each article. Again, categorizing the news stories as themes is a problematic matter, as they could frequently be traditional or rational-legal, based upon the way they were presented—to say nothing of how they might be interpreted by readers.

The themes in this third era divided among the three types in significantly more complicated than the first era. From this vantage point, the themes concerning sovereignty, oil and development,[79] as well as diplomatic affairs with both Arab and Western countries, mainly the U.K. and the U.S., could be categorized as traditional or rational-legal. Articles that present the House of Saud as a family or individuals controlling the state are coded as traditional authority. Those that present governmental institutions and positions, even if the royals held these positions, are coded as rational-legal authority. The presentation of charismatic authority has declined, as there are only two articles in the sample that focused on the personal attributes of Saudi Kings, one for

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[78] *The Times*   3,715 articles
   The Sunday Times   170 articles

[79] Most articles focused on oil affairs, with very few exceptions of reporting some non-petroleum developments linked with authority.

King Saud in *The London Times* (July 6, 1965) and the other for King Faisal in *NYT* (July 29, 1973). An in-depth qualitative discussion of these articles will be presented in addition to an explanation of general trends as an attempt to reduce the tenuousness of determining the slant of any given article (Gans, 1993).

Table 16 highlights content of the coverage for the third era. In both newspapers, articles tended to emphasize traditional authority over rational-legal authority, while charismatic authority was not well-represented. Furthermore, traditional authority occupied a greater space in *The London Times* (64%) than *NYT* (54%). Rational authority occupied a greater space in *NYT* (45%) than *The London Times* (35%). As indicated in the second era, such a slant might be a reflection of the state structure of each newspaper's homeland, i.e., the U.K. "monarchy" versus the U.S. "republic." It should also be noted that many of these articles reported at least two forms of authority—most typically traditional blended with rational-legal. Charismatic authority was used only rarely. Only the predominant type is reported in Table 16.

Table 16: Types of Authority in Saudi Arabia in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 11/10/1953 - 3/25/1975

Newspaper	*Traditional*	*Charismatic*	*Rational-Legal*	Total
The London Times	64 *(64%)*	1 *(1%)*	35 *(35%)*	100 *(100%)*
NYT	54 *(54%)*	1 *(1%)*	45 *(45%)*	100 *(100%)*
Total	118 *(59%)*	2 *(1%)*	90 *(40%)*	200 *(100%)*

The themes of the articles are limited. Determining the type of authority as traditional or rational-legal is based on how Saudi officials were presented. Considering that, this era witnessed a number of critical facts affecting the presentations of authority.

These include the rivalries of power between the two wings of the Saudi family—Saud

and Faisal. Such rivalry in absolute monarchies was parallel with the successful military

revolutions against the other Arab monarchies such as Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Unlike

the case of those revolutionary Arab states, the struggle between Saud and Faisal does not

fit with Collins and Makowsky's (2010) overview because it existed among the same

social group members (i.e., the royal family). Collins and Makowsky focus on conflict

among different social groups fighting for dominance over economic resources, power,

and cultural factors. Additionally, these internal conflicts in the other Arab states were

developed alongside the Arab-Israeli conflict, including two major wars (1967 and 1973).

Furthermore, the Saudi oil industry was growing and affecting the international economy

in direct ways, especially during the Oil Embargo, which occupied considerable

coverage.

Such a critical series of events required a strong hold on of power. Therefore, it is

not surprising to find individual-based authority presented more clearly than institutional-

based in a Middle Eastern country such as Saudi Arabia. Still, the relative absence of

charismatic authority is strange as King Faisal was admired in the Arab and Muslim

world as a charismatic leader, especially after the Oil Embargo in 1973 (*NYT*, June 21,

1973).[80] The influence Faisal wielded cannot be underestimated. As Rudiger Graf (2012)

points out in citing Daniel Yergen's *The Prize* (1991), the impact of the "oil weapon" was

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[80] In 1974, *Time* magazine selected King Faisal as "Person of the Year" because of the
role he played in the oil crisis of 1973–1974. Faisal's picture made the cover of *Time* on
January 6, 1975; the main article titled "FAISAL AND OIL Driving Toward a New
World Order." http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,912630,00.html
Accessed 19 February 2014.

not merely convincing, but overwhelming, and far greater than even its proponents might have dared to expect. It had recast the alignments in the Middle East and the entire world. It had transformed world oil and the relations between producers and consumers, and it had remade the international economy (cited in Graf, 2012: 189).

The only two articles mostly presenting Faisal as charismatic include one from each paper. First, in the beginning of his reign, *The London Times* reported on July 6, 1965, "King Faisal of Saudi Arabia who is another important figure of the story of Yemen" alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser, the most charismatic leader in the Arab world at that time. Pitting Faisal against Nasser in such an epic story as the Yemeni war is a sign of charismatic leadership. Eight years later, two months before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, *NYT* reported King Faisal's personal support to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), including his personal critique of American politics (July 29, 1973). In addition, while not prominent, the personal features referring to the charismatic character of Faisal existed in a number of articles. However, the main focus is still either traditional or rational, and points to the need for examining authority from an intersectional perspective.

Much like the second era, this time period is characterized by changes in how authority is presented across topics. The themes of oil, sovereignty, and diplomacy could be either traditional or rational-legal according to how they were presented. Table 17 shows the various categories generated from articles considered to be framed as using traditional authority. *The London Times* and *NYT* most frequently used the theme of "oil affairs," including articles concerning exploration, shipping, prices, and embargo, which caused the Oil Crisis of the 1970s.

Table 17: Traditional Authority in *The London Times* & The *NYT* Coverage Between 11/101953-3/25/1975

Categories from articles of *Traditional Authority* (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Diplomacy with Arabs	22 *(34.38%)*	23 *(42.59%)*	45 *(38.14%)*
Sovereignty	20 *(31.25%)*	11 *(20.37%)*	31 *(26.27%)*
Religion	9 *(14.10%)*	6 *(11.11%)*	15 *(12.71%)*
Oil & Development	5 *(7.81%)*	7 *(12.96%)*	12 *(10.17%)*
Diplomacy with West	4 *(6.25%)*	6 *(11.11%)*	10 *(8.47%)*
Diplomacy with others	3 *(4.69%)*	1 *(1.85%)*	4 *(3.39%)*
Slavery	1 *(1.56%)*	0	1 *(0.85%)*
Total	64 *(100%)*	54 *(100%)*	118 *(100%)*

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell counts were less than 5. However, I ran Z-tests between both newspaper results for each category and found no significant difference at $p < 0.05$ among these categories.

Traditional Sovereignty

The London Times' emphasis on royal sovereignty makes more sense in light of the news stories of Al Saud's affairs. Six articles reported stories of members of the royal

family, such as the graduation of five Saudi princes from the Royal Air Force College (August 16, 1967). Furthermore, *The London Times* mentioned the kinship of those royals, especially their specific relationship to the Saudi King. Placing their names with the title of prince alongside such kinship terms as "son/brother/nephew"[81] of the King of Saudi Arabia delivered a clear message of an absolute monarchy ruled by a family enjoying full power. However, such a theme was not found in *NYT*, even as it reported "Saud is a Moslem and probably the most absolute monarch in the world" (November 12, 1956).

The royal sovereignty in Saudi Arabia recalls the heroic story of Ibn Saud's building of the nation. Such linking would deliver to the Western audience a legitimacy of the royal sovereignty in terms of protecting their father's accomplishments. In this regard, *NYT* referred to this story in an article reporting Saud succeeding Ibn Saud "who won a desert kingdom with his sword and huge revenues by shrewd oil leases" (November 10, 1953). The legitimacy of kinship is clear in this article, as the new King is the son of the founder of the state. In the same manner, *The London Times* recalled Ibn Saud's conquering of Hejaz and proclaiming himself the King of the holy land, "[t]hirty years ago, when King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was fairly newly installed as lord of the Holy Places..." (July 9, 1957). British and Americans audiences would have been expected to

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[81] For example:
- A son of Emir Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia visiting the U.K.(September 30, 1958).
- A cousin of King Saud, Prince, was shot and killed in a Parisian hotel. He was a member of the royal suite accompanying King Saud during a treatment trip (April 17, 1963).
- The princes' or King's brothers (May 17, 1967).
- A nephew of King Faisal, Prince Sultan Bin Nasser (January 19, 1973).

understand that authority in Saudi Arabia was based on the legitimacy of the kinship of the founder.

The conflict between Ibn Saud's sons, Saud and Faisal, was another critical issue of this era. Such rivalry recalls the history of the First and Second Saudi states and brothers' rivalry, which ended with their eventual defeat at the hands of their enemies. The coverage of this conflict was in the context of the big picture of the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s, including the military revolutions deposing monarchs in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. The Western media were observing the interior conflicts in the Middle Eastern states including Saudi Arabia, possible looking for something to change with regards to who controlled power. At this point, we can understand Faisal's prior attitude rejecting the overthrow of his brother's Kingship which emphasizes traditional authority, thus avoiding placing Saudi Arabia in the context of other Arab revolutions dominated by charismatic leaders.[82]

Faisal enjoyed power over his brother the King from the beginning of Saud's reign; in March 28, 1958, *The London Times* published an article titled "Crown Prince Faisal had forbidden two of the King's advisers to travel with him." This article reflects Faisal's influence inside the Kingdom, beyond even Ibn Saud's decision dividing the state's responsibilities between his senior sons; the younger Saud is the King taking care

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[82] This is reported in a *NYT* article published on November 1, 1964. This article is not coded because it was not captured in the random sampling.

of interior affairs, while Faisal is the Crown Prince dealing with foreign policy.[83] This division of labor did not last long, as Crown Prince and Premier Faisal "was granted vastly increased powers in foreign and domestic affairs last month" (*NYT,* April 20, 1958). Faisal was presented as the *de facto* ruler of Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, shortly after the death of his father.

The patriarchal hierarchy—in the expected manner of traditional authority—was respected in the kingdom, as "Faisal still considers his half-brother, the King, the head man in Saudi Arabia" (*NYT* August 21, 1958). A few months before he formally claimed the throne, *The London Times* indicated Faisal's superiority over Saud: "[a] disagreement between King Saud and his brother, Crown Prince, the Saudi Prime Minister, over their respective powers has been ended, ... Prince Faisal enjoyed full control of power in the Kingdom" (March 31, 1964).

Even after the death of Saud in 1968, the deposing of the "King" by his family still attracted *The London Times* which reported a similar story of the successful coup by Qaboos in 1970 against his father, Sultan Said bin Taimur of Oman. Titled "Change At Last In Muscat," it reported, "King Saud of Saudi Arabia—deposed by family council and replaced with his brother, King Faisal, but lesser sheikhs along the Gulf have suffered the same fate" (July 27, 1970).

On the other hand, only two articles in the *NYT* sample bothered to be concerned with this conflict. One titled "Saud Stripped of Power; Faisal Takes Full Control: King Saud Loses Power to Faisal" (March 29, 1964). The other reported Nasser utilizing the

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[83] As a *NYT* article (mentioned above, November 1, 1964) reported, "This division of labor broke down in 1958. At that time the family for the first time called upon Faisal to take charge to get the Kingdom out of trouble caused by King Saud's mismanagement."

deposed King Saud, who moved to live in Cairo, against King Faisal. Saud called on his

former "subjects" to take action against the deterioration taking place within his country

(April 28, 1967). This is not necessarily a sign that *NYT* is ignoring the conflict; it is the

methodological effect upon these data's result in terms of neglecting or misrepresenting

some important topics. Indeed, *NYT* has more focus on this conflict than *The London*

Times, though these particular *NYT*'s articles were not selected in the sample.[84]

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[84] Looking more closely at all the *NYT* articles, I found the first article covering the formal deposing of King Saud was on November 1, 1964—mentioned in the former footnote. The article was titled "Saudis Insisting on Deposing King: Councils Bid Faisal Accede—Announcement Awaited." I stated: "Councils of the Saudi Arabian royal family and of religious elders meeting in Riyadh have resolved to depose King Saud and to proclaim Crown Prince Faisal as King, an official of Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry disclosed today." In addition, Prince Faisal "has in the past repeatedly rejected such proposals [deposing his brother to be a King]." "In February [1964], Prince Faisal declined to accept the title of King on the ground that it would set a bad precedent, placing Saudi Arabia on the same level as countries that had coup d'état."
    I found *three* articles reporting that religious scholars and the National Guard supported Faisal over Saud. On March 24, 1964, in an article titled, "King Saud Seeking Return of Powers," reported that the King handed the power to his brother Faisal who rejected the King's demand, "The council [of the religious leaders] meeting in Riyadh is the group that decided that King Saud might reign but that Prince Faisal should rule." On March 26, 1964, in an article titled, "Saudi Parley Backs Faisal In Power Fight With King," it was confirmed that the council "had fully upheld the authority of Crown Prince against King Saud." A third article appeared on March 29, 1964, titled "Saud Stripped of Power; Faisal Takes Full Control: King Saud Loses Power to Faisal," and a fourth on April 1, 1964 titled "Faisal Assumes Title of Viceroy: He Orders King's 7 Sons to Leave Saudi Arabia." This article indicates, "Crown Prince Faisal has conferred upon himself all the powers of the Saudi monarchy and has named himself Viceroy." Another article on April 2, 1964 reported that those seven princes kissed Faisal's hand asking for forgiveness, and he gave them his pardon. He preferred to keep them in Saudi Arabia rather than letting Nasser take advantage of their exile.
    On November 4, 1964, it was reported that, "King Faisal will continue to be Premier of the government of Saudi Arabia ... [he] made it clear that he would retain all authority in his own hands." On February 24, 1969, in an article titled "King Saud of Saudi Arabia Dies; Ruled Oil-Rich Land 1953-64: King Saud of Saudi Arabia Dies; Ruled Oil. Rich Land 1953-64,"includes the following: "Former King Saud of Saudi Arabia, the tall bearded monarch who ruled his vast, oil-rich land from 1953 to 1964,

In the same manner of the Saud-Faisal conflict, there was a "Free Princes" movement led by Prince Talal (once in Saud's camp) inspired by Nasser's "Free Officers" revolution in Egypt in 1956. It is curious that I did not find articles reporting such organized opposition led by one of Ibn Saud's sons. This "Free Princes" movement called for many rational reforms—including a constitutional monarchy—challenging the traditional authority in the kingdom.[85] In that time, Nasser counted on support from the Communists, while Saudi Arabia was strongly anti-Communist. What is unsurprising is that leftist officers led the military revolutions in the Arab countries. At this point, *The London Times* reported the Saudi attitude toward Communism as one in which, "It was pointed out that the danger was not only to the stability of Saudi Arabia but also to the Saudi dynasty" (November 24, 1956).[86] At this point *The London Times* reported cooperation among Arab monarchs—Saud and Hussain of Jordan—against Communism (May 11, 1957). On April 29, 1957, *NYT* described King Saud as "staunchly anti-

died of a heart attack today at a suburban Athens hotel, which had been his residence since 1965."

[85] The only thing I found related to the "Free Princes" that did not mention this title was an article in *The London Times*, titled "Saudi Prince To End Exile." Prince Talal acknowledged he was wrong, and he and four other brothers returned to Saudi Arabia. On November 3, 1964, in an article titled "King Deposed In Contest For Power In Saudi Arabia" reported that Faisal "has been proclaimed King. An official broadcast over Mecca radio today said that the Council of Ministers and Consultative Assembly had decided to depose King Saud and proclaim Prince Faisal King. ... The petition conveyed the Saudi family's decision to dethrone King Saud and make his brother Prince Faisal King of country and Imam of Muslims, and asked the *ulemas* to rule on this from the viewpoint of Muslim law" (February 21, 1964).

86 As mentioned in the former chapter, Saudi Arabia had a semi-McCarthyist policy against Communism. The government refused giving pilgrimage visas to Chinese because of a suspicion of engagement in communism (*NYT* August 31, 1952).

Communist, he supports the young Hashemite King." Thus, such cooperation is a sign of traditional authority.

The presentation of traditional sovereignty of the Saudi King included his personal authority, having the right to decide everything. For example, *NYT* reported on the importance of obtaining King Saud's permission for the entry of comedic performers of the Jewish faith into Saudi Arabia (February 6, 1957). However, as there was no law denying Jews from entering the country; that was a decision was made by the king based solely upon his "personal" authority. This is clearer in a matter of King's graces, such as when King Saud ordered the release of "a large number" of prisoners in Saudi Arabia to coincide with the end of Ramadan (*The London Times*, February 27, 1962). The King might even be involved in matters of fashion. *NYT* reported, "King Faisal of Saudi Arabia has banned the Miniskirt and other 'indecent dress' for women such as shorts, trousers and the like, the Saudi Arabian press reports" (May 5, 1970).[87]

A more "traditional" image of Saudi authority is found in reports of the public beheading of convicted prisoners. *NYT* reported on the execution of three men who murdered a policeman who was trying to stop them from smuggling prohibited alcohol into the country (January 13, 1968). Such a story recalls medieval authorities and public executions, which introduced Saudi Arabia to the American audiences as a traditional authority where the King had control over individual lives.

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[87] As women in Saudi Arabia are required to cover most of their bodies, I assume such decisions were applied to Western residents in Saudi Arabia.

Diplomacy with Arabs

The monarchic image of the Saudi kings as traditional authorities was enhanced in this coverage when compared to the charismatic and/or rational presidency of the new revolutionary Arab states. The reports of Arab monarchs' meetings (*NYT* September 6, 1955, and *The London Times* March 30, 1968), including luxury hunting trips (the *NYT* March 3, 1957),[88] and the visual presentation of the traditional Arabic dress—including the head-accessory of the golden *Agal*—versus the western suit of the other Arab rulers. Such photographs presented Saudi Arabia as a traditional Arab monarchy ruled by a traditional king.[89] In addition, both papers continually identified Saud and Faisal's families by their royal titles (i.e., King, Monarch, his Majesty, Crown Prince).

The image of *traditional* Arab monarchs versus the *charismatic* or *rational* image of Arab presidents in this era contributed to the rivalry between Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz and Gamal Abdul Nasser. They never fought each other face-to-face, but joined in a "proxy war" in Yemen between 1962-1970.[90] During that time, as the *NYT* reported, Nasser appealed for a model of a Pan-Arab state under his leadership using socialist slogans, while King Faisal sought Islamic solidarity (September 3, 1966). Both used the Palestine issue in their approaches. However, Saudi diplomacy confirmed, "that it has no desire for territorial expansion of any kind" (*The London Times*, September 25, 1956). On

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[88] The article mentioned King Saud and the Moroccan monarch were spending time together in a hunting party.

[89] *The London Times* (March 13, 1956, and June 21, 1971).

[90] It is known in Yemen as "the Revolution of September 26."

the other hand, Nasser's expansionist ambitions were clear when he took rule of Syria

and Egypt after declaring the establishment of the U.A.R.[91] According to *NYT,*

> The rulers of other Arab states like King Saud of Saudi Arabia
> admired Nasser and approved of his Pan-Arabism. But they
> feared his ambitions and the dangers to which he was
> exposing them by opening the door to republicanism and
> perhaps to the Russians (July 20, 1958).

At this point, Saudi Arabia—as a rich monarchy—was anxious about Nasser's

Pan-Arab project and saw it as a challenge to traditional authority.

While *The London Times* was focused on the traditional monarchy of Saudi

Arabia, *NYT* focused on the rivalry with Nasser, especially noting that Saud was less

concerned about Nasser than Faisal, as the above quote illustrates. *NYT* did report a

rumor of rebellions:

> There has been no evidence from Saudi Arabia, that King Saud
> does not have a firm control of his country. No reports have
> come of demonstrations there in favor of union with either the
> new republic or the monarchical federation (February16, 1958).

The conflict between Nasser and Saudi monarchs could be understood as a part of

the Cold War when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were mobilizing the world to favor capitalist

West or communist East, considering the Saudi-American oil partnership on one hand,

and the Egyptian-Soviet military socialist ideology on the other. Thus, a conflict between

a rich state ruled by a pro-imperialist royal family versus a poor state ruled by

revolutionary anti-imperialist officers could not be separated from the larger image of the

Cold War. This is illustrated in a quote from *NYT*:

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[91] United Arab Republic.

> Saudi Arabia- conservative yet reformist, pro-American, anti-
> Communist, militantly Moslem, the leading *traditionalist*
> power of the Middle East, which engaged in a power struggle
> with modernist, revolutionary, neutralist, sometimes pro-Soviet
> Egypt (Nov13, 1966, emphasis added)

Describing Saudi Arabia as a reformist country—in an American leading-opinion newspaper—with other features such as pro-American and anti-Communist narratives delivered a positive message to the American audience about their militantly Muslim conservative ally. The American agenda of demonizing Nasser as a backer of communism followed by polishing their ally as part of the American anti-communist propaganda during the Cold War.

Conflict with Nasser's regime included an anti-Saudism propaganda by leftist regimes and media in the Arab world. *NYT* reported some leftist's accusations of Saudi rulers—including personal attacks—charging them with supporting imperialists (July 6, 1957), having a flagrant conspiracy against the revolution (November 9, 1962), and misusing oil money for their personal expenses and financing plots against Nasser (August 23, 1959, and January 27, 1962).[92] The last accusation is symbolic of envy by leftists of the bourgeoisie. This was a perception throughout the Arab Gulf region—including Saudis—as reactionary Bedouins who became rich by luck, while the progressive intellectual Arab suffered in poverty.

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[92] According to *NYT,* "President Nasser and King Saud fell out when the Cairo leader charged that a relative of the King had tried to take the President's life" (August 23, 1959). Also, *NYT* was clear on this point by mentioning King Saud's regime versus Nasser, however, "royalties enrich King Saud's treasury" (August 18, 1957).

This conflict was not a primary concern of *The London Times* when reporting that King Faisal had armed his monarchy against Nasser's threats (April 18, 1967). In addition, the only Saudi reaction toward the leftists' propaganda reported in *The London Times* was King Saud harsh criticism of the Egyptian media for their attitude toward his country (August 9, 1962).

As the Palestine issue was semi-absent in this coverage,[93] Yemen was the location of the proxy war between Nasser and Faisal. Both papers covered this war. The Yemeni revolutionaries were supported by the Soviets, while the royals were supported by the British. Hence, this war was beyond Arabs, it was a part of the Cold War between the superpowers. Saudis and Egyptians were the contractors for supplying the warring parties with both bodies and narratives. This leads to the next theme of the traditional authority in this era, Saudi diplomacy with the West.

Diplomacy with the West and Oil

As was indicated in Table 17, contrariwise to the diplomatic relation with Arabs, the theme of diplomatic relation with the West is poorly covered in the articles, which were framed as traditional authority (four articles in *The London Times*, and six articles in *NYT*). These articles mostly focused on the relationship with the U.S and U.K. such as

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[93] Palestinians were presented very negatively in this third era. While Faisal supported the PLO and Arafat, Palestinians were choosing Saudi Arabian embassies as targets for attacks. *The London Times* reported one of these attacks and mentioned that Palestinians thought they could put pressure on King Faisal to make him force King Hussain of Jordan in order to obtain the release of Palestinian militants imprisoned in Jordan (September 7, 1973). In addition, I found a number of articles from both papers that were not in the sample that reported a Palestinian attack on the Saudi Embassy in Sudan killing three American diplomats.

formal visits, the border conflicts with neighbors in which the British were involved,[94]

and the U.S military base in Dhahran. In addition, there are 12 articles focused on oil

(five in *The London Times* and seven in *NYT*), which included the effects upon the

diplomatic relations with Western customers, especially during the Oil Embargo.

Both papers covered news stories presenting King Saud as an *Arabian Night*'s

Sultan rewarding people who satisfied him. *The London Times* published an article titled

"Trouble 'Askance' Over Gift by King Saud to an American Official" (October 31,

1957). The article reported King Saud handing expensive gifts and cash to an American

official named Victor Purse who accompanied him during his journey to America. In

October 29, 1957, *NYT* reported King Saud gave expensive gifts (wristwatches and a car)

and cash to American protocol officials and their families, which caused trouble in the

US State Department. In the Western context, Mr. Purse was doing his job as an

American official (reflecting Purse's rational-legal authority), however, King Saud acted

as usual by expressing his satisfaction via gracing a man who had done a good job (by

expressing traditional authority). In another article, *The London Times* reported that Saudi

royals "traditionally sweetened tribes by gifts from the royal treasury" (March 7, 1958).[95]

Such action from the Saudi royal family support Ritzer and Goodman's (2004)

interpretation of Weber's view of the *integration* between "class" and "honor," as each

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[94] According to *The London Times*, Buraimi was the trouble of restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain (April 17, 1959).

[95] On January 11, 1959, *NYT* published a number of flags; the Saudi flag was placed next to the Israeli with this statement: Saudi Arabia- In white on a green field is a sword, symbol of the power of Islam, and the Muslim profession of faith: "There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is His Prophet."

enhances the other. This mechanism of integration of Weber's three dimensions of social stratification (class, honor, party) should build authority over Saudi society through social status (honor) and economy (class) reincorporation. Thus, the rich and honored elite would have the highest chances to create the strongest parties supporting the royal family. Simply, those tribes have the honor of the Arabic pride of tribal origins, improving their class status via royal graces, and therefore get the best opportunity to hold good positions. Thus, they should be the political party supporting the royal authority to maintain their rule.

This mechanism of integration recalls Weber's view of the development of the history of social stratification when the superiority of class and/or status (honor) used to dominate societies (*c.f.* Gerth and Mills, 1958:194-195). The case of Saudi Arabia is an interesting and useful application of Weber's viewpoint of "parties" living in a house of "power" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:194). That is to say, socially and economically privileged groups wrestle to gain power to become the dominant group using a model not unlike this.

The image of the absolute monarch—who has the right to apply the national wealth as he sees fit—goes beyond rewarding servants as symbolic of how the national wealth (i.e., oil) is also the personal wealth of the king. On February 23, 1955, *NYT* reported King Saud "the monarch" was interested in buying an oil tanker from Mr. Onassis.[96] Such personalization of Saudi oil wealth is clearer in this statement from *The London Times*, "The *King Saud I, of more than 45,000 tons*, launched last year for Mr.

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[96] Aristotle Onassis (1906-1975) was a Greek Argentine businessman, and his prominent activity was as a shipping entrepreneur. During the 1950s, he was the primary shipper of Saudi oil.

Onassis and intended to form the first unit of his Saudi Arabia fleet..." (March, 1955,

emphasis added), hence the favoring of Onassis—against the Western will—was

presented in these papers as "personal" rather than rational-legal. Such "personalization"

of involvement in the national economy enhances the traditional authority of the *Arabian

Night*'s Sultans.

In the same manner, *NYT* reported that Emir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince

and Premier, was "rethinking" the oil agreement with the Japanese because they offered

to increase the Saudi share from 50% to 57% (January 3, 1958). Assigning the verb

"rethinking" to a person (i.e., Faisal) carrying a royal title (i.e., Emir) alongside his

formal position (i.e., Premier) would justify the American policy toward an absolute

monarchy such as Saudi Arabia that is ruled by individuals rather than institutions;

otherwise, other parties (ex., Japan) who were wailing to deal with the monarchy might

win oil concessions. In this regard, the full-authority of the royal family is practiced, as

the title of people they rule is *subjects* rather than *citizens* (*NYT* January 2, 1957).[97]

The most critical topics of the Saudi-Western relationship at this time were Israel

and oil. While the West—led by the U.S.—supported Israel, the Arabs—led by Saudi

Arabia—had the option of using oil as a means of pressuring Americans and other

Western countries. During 1973-1974, Arabs enforced the Oil Embargo. King Faisal was

the well-known leader whose name was familiar in Western media as the cause of the Oil

Crisis. On October 15, 1973, *The London Times* reported that King Faisal had warned

America that if Israel received more Phantoms, he would impose an oil embargo.

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[97] This article was discussing the oil company's relations with King Saud and the King's relations with "his subjects" (January 2, 1957).

Furthermore, "King Faisal warns Dr. Kissinger that oil embargo and output cuts will go on despite ceasefire" (*The London Times*, November 10, 1973). In the same manner, *NYT* reported that King Faisal had threatened to curb production increases if the United States did not modify its position toward Israel (October 9, 1973). On December 15, 1973, *NYT* described Faisal as the traditional King that needed to be convinced to solve the problem; "King Faisal regards himself as a spiritual leader of the Moslem world."

Nevertheless, the Oil Crisis was not always a topic of traditional authority in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, there were a number of articles that introduced the Saudi bureaucracy led by the Saudi Minister of Petroleum Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani. These articles are discussed later.

Traditional *Religious* Authority

As explained in Chapter Three, religion is the primary source of authority in Islam. Even though Saudi Arabia is a Kingdom build on the sword, it was the Wahhabi clergy that legitimized the Holy Wars. In this regard, both newspapers recognized the religious influence upon Saudi authority. *The London Times* introduced Saudi Arabia as the "Islamic land of extremes where paradox abounds … Koran as the constitution." (January 28, 1974). In another article, *The London Times* described the Koran as "the country's Bible and constitution, and the puritanical Wahabi Muslim sect has firmly upheld its spiritual and social traditions" (May 30, 1974). This usage of Christian terms to explain the Saudi Muslim paradigm goes further to describe Wahhabis as the Muslim Calvinists (*The London Times*, February 5, 1968) and puritanical Muslims (*NYT*, December 14, 1965), as discussed elsewhere (Alrebh, 2011).

This religious authority explained—perhaps justified—some Saudi policies as strange in the West. For example, *NYT* reported "Saudi envoy's wives must avoid parties ... the confinement of women in the home as it is applied in Saudi Arabia under the fanatically *puritanical* code of the Wahabi sect" (December 14, 1965, emphasis added). In the same manner, *The London Times* published a report about the gender politics in Saudi Arabia, including Saudi women's long march from behind the veil, restriction of their locomotion based on the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam (May 30, 1974).

Religious authority in Saudi Arabia existed even in the articles concerning the economy, such as "Because the Moslem religion forbids interest, the Saudi Arabian technically call their return on the loan a 'commission'" (*NYT*, December 18, 1974).

The values of such religious authority might shock Western audiences in terms of a judicial system based on the Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia. Of course, such a presentation is not always neutral. However, this research focuses on the ways that Saudi authority was presented to British and American audiences. In the article mentioned above, *The London Times* mentioned some Islamic penalties for theft and adultery that would have seemed cruel to readers in the West (May 30, 1974). On December 30, 1959, *NYT* mentioned the religious authority of the Grand mufti who appointed judges, amputation of thieves' hands, conducting public beheadings, in addition to prohibiting non-Muslim missionary activities.[98] On June 11, 1966, *NYT* reported some Saudi religious conservative attitudes such as public punishments like beheading and amputation of thieves' hands, though it should be noted that stoning never did take place.

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[98] According to *The London Times*, Saudi Arabia as a Muslim nation strictly prohibited missionary activities and put it under the death penalty (September 16, 1963).

In addition, because of the "conservative" attitudes among elites, TV in Saudi Arabia is constantly criticized, and those same attitudes caused the banning of movie theaters. The report continued to explain that because of traditional disapproval and non-Islamic religious practices, women were forbidden to drive.[99]

Religious authority was superior not only to interior policy, but affected diplomatic relations as well. Saudi authority had an extremely negative attitude toward Judaism to the point that Jews were not welcome in the country (Bronson, 2006), even those doing military or diplomatic jobs for their nations. *NYT* reported "Saudis Bar a Briton as Envoy on Basis Of Jewish Lineage," upholding a long standing Saudi policy of excluded almost all Jews (April 10, 1968). Horace Phillips is another example of a diplomat excluded from the Saudi territories because of his Jewish background as *The London Times* reported (September 11, 1968).[100] This attitude toward Jews caused many problems for the American administration within the American Jewish community, as explained below in the section of rational-legal authority.

Following its anti-communist attitude, Saudi authorities always linked communism with atheism. The country, based on pure monotheism, maintained its dogmatic attitude toward communism as an enemy of Islam. This attitude was publicized

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[99] *NYT* published a report about the veiled lives of the women of Riyadh. The report discussed the imposing of *Hijab* by Wahhabis. Furthermore, it mentioned a social value; Saudi children are brought up to believe that an unveiled woman outside the home is a prostitute (February 11, 1967). In the same manner, *The London Times* mentioned the religious identity of the Saudi education system, including the opening of girls' schools and the Wahhabi control (September 28, 1970).

[100] The article stated, "Saudi Arabia [as] having had second thoughts about accepting him back as ambassador."

frequently, including in the holy place during the holy season as *The London Times* reported on February 4, 1971, "King Faisal of Saudi Arabia last night bitterly attacked communism in his annual speech at Mecca at the height of the pilgrimage season. He described it as an atheist movement which was led by Zionists." *NYT* explained this attitude as King Faisal acting as the protector of the two holiest cities, Mecca and al-Madinah (February 6, 1971). Such an attitude, publicized in a religious context, reduced the negative impression of the Western audiences about Islam, as this Islamic authority joined them against their harshest enemy, Communism and Soviets. In addition, British and Americans had little to worry about what they might have considered a puritanical Islam in Saudi Arabia, as there were bigger concerns being reported.

Rational-Legal Authority

The majority of the coverage at this time regarding Saudi authority is framed as traditional. However, there are some articles focused on bureaucracy and institutions. Table 18 highlights the various themes generated from articles presenting the bureaucracy as a form of rational-legal authority. Additionally, it is worth noting that the representation of rational-legal authority in *NYT* declines substantially (11%), while *The London Times* has a minor increase (2.05%). It is clear that while *The London Times* continues to emphasize traditional authority in Saudi Arabia, *NYT* presentation of the Saudi authority had a considerable shift toward the traditional.[101]

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[101] For the sum of the articles, the representation of traditional authority has been increased by +6.87%, while rational-legal authority declined by -5.21%.

Table 18: Rational-Legal Authority in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 11/101953-3/25/1975

Categories from articles of *Traditional Authority* (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Oil & Development	12 (34.29%)	24 (53.33%)	36 (45%)
Sovereignty	8 (22.85%)	12 (26.67%)	20 (25%)
Diplomacy with Arab	8 (22.85%)	6 (13.33%)	14 (17.5%)
Diplomacy with West	7 (20%)	3 (6.67%)	10 (12.5%)
Total	35 (100%)	45 (100%)	80 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories. The relationship was not significant (χ^2 =5.52, df 3,80, p = 0.137. The number of articles that appear in each newspaper does not depend on the category. After running Z-tests between both newspaper results for each category, finding no significant difference at p <0.05 among these categories.

Oil and Development

This theme represents the bulk of the articles coded as rational-legal authority (45%). However, no articles reported non-petroleum development in Saudi Arabia. *NYT* focused more on this topic than *The London Times*. As previously mentioned, Americans were heavily involved in the Saudi oil industry, while British had less involvement.[102]

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[102] The only article I found in this era reporting British involvement in the Saudi oil industry was in *The London Times* reporting Petromin—a state owned Saudi Arabian

The primary concern of these articles was ensuring the flow of oil at reasonable prices to Western industrial countries, mainly the U.S.[103]

In the 1950s, there was a debate concerning the Onassis' shipping monopoly of Saudi oil. British and Americans were not satisfied with this monopolization. *The London Times* indicated this objection in its report of the oil tanker agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and Mr. Onassis (May 20, 1954, and July 20, 1954). *NYT* described this agreement as a sovereign action of the Saudi Government rather than as an aspect of the King's personality, which reflected the bureaucracy—rational-legal authority—of the kingdom (February13, 1954). The Saudi bureaucracy was clearer in an *NYT* report concerning the signing of the agreement between the Saudi official and Onassis, a contract that included a clause that stated there was to be "no dealing with Israel or Jewish" (June 23, 1954).

The rationality of the Saudi authority concerning its oil was enhanced in the discussion of the legality of oil contracts versus a pious ethical perspective of fulfilling agreements. In October 20, 1960, *NYT* reported a statement by the American legal adviser of the Saudi Arabian Government directorate of petroleum and mineral affairs who,

> opened the debate with a speech insisting that countries had
> the right to change their contracts or treaties if this was in
> the interest of their citizens ... a Muslim lawyer said, Sharia
> law does not approve of the violation of contract, but

company specializing in lubricant oils—participating with British in companies (May 9, 1967).

[103] According to *NYT*, Saudi Arabia is considered by many observers to hold the key to the future. With the largest proven reserves in the world, placed at 145 billion barrels, the desert kingdom has more oil than the United States and Latin America combined, and much exploration remains to be done (Apr16, 1973).

implies violation is permissible where the needs are of the nation.

In this case, the legal language used by an "American legal adviser" alongside a religious ethical view by a Muslim lawyer, legitimated the Saudi action as rational-legal authority. This also applied to other actions such as the "Saudi Arabia's Decision to refuse oil payment on sterling" (*The London Times*, December 13, 1974), and the Saudi government control of oil prices and taxes (*The London Times*, December 1, 1974).

This was also the period in which audiences witnessed the Oil Embargo. As discussed above, King Faisal was the traditional figure of this crisis. However, there was another figure whose name was popular in the Western media as the "legal" representative of the Saudi oil affairs, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani the well-educated Saudi official who was the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources during this crisis.[104] Yamani's press statements tended to be anticipated throughout the world. Headlines such as Arab Aide Outlines Options on Oil Cuts, followed by Yamani's statements emphasizing "his Government would cut output by 80 per cent—the cut is now 25 per cent—oilfields would be blown up if the United States took military action" (*NYT*, November 24, 1973). This sovereign attitude by a non-royal Saudi official put Saudi Arabia in the context of a country seeking to protect its national interests.

However, Yamani's statements were not always negative from a Western perspective. In March 21, 1974, *NYT* reported "Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, Saudi

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[104] Doctor Yamani holds various Law degrees from American and British schools including New York University, Harvard, and a Ph.D. from the University of Exeter. He was the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources between 1962-1986, and a leading figure in OPEC. His distinguished diplomatic character was frequently mentioned in Western media.

Arabia's oil minister declared the price is too high and his country may set its own price ... The Secretary General said: "surely this must be up to the sovereign Government of Saudi Arabia." The last sentence introduces Saudi Arabia as a country ruled by a "sovereign Government" rather than a "sovereign monarch." The linguistic differences of these articles from those coded as traditional are points of differentiation in the presentation of Saudi authority.

During this third era, Yamani's role went beyond his position as the Oil Minister, as he was involved in other state affairs such as 'arms for oil' agreements (*The London Times*, December 31, 1973). Such agreements require both the Foreign Minister and Oil Minister. How this played out was that King Faisal kept the Foreign Ministry position for himself. This left other ministers to deal with foreign affairs that the King would not deal with directly. As a petroleum state, the Minister of Oil was acting as the key figure of Saudi Diplomacy.

The Oil Embargo instigated discussions of the legality of the Saudi action. In an article titled "Saudi Oil Embargo is Termed Breach of '33 Treaty with U.S.: Recalled by Kennedy," *NYT* accentuated that "Specialists in international law in and out of the Government have concluded that the oil embargo against the United States imposed by Saudi Arabia violates a little-known 1933 treaty between the two countries" (December 19, 1973). Nevertheless, oil was the reflection of Saudi authority and its international influence. This also instigated discussions of the relationship between interior sovereignty and foreign policy.

Interior Sovereignty and Foreign Policy

The border dispute with Britain concerning Buraimi was a critical point in Anglo-Saudi relationships. Saudis claimed sovereignty over the oasis, while British supported their protected Sheikhdoms, Abu Dhabi and Oman. In 1954, Saudis and British agreed to refer the dispute to an International Arbitration Tribunal (Lucas, 1997). *The London Times* reported the hearing had been deferred (September 6, 1954). *NYT* indicated that the British might engaged in direct negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the Buraimi conflict (February 13, 1956). However, the Saudi government doubted British seriousness in solving the problem legally, and *The London Times* reported that Saudi Arabia would take the Buraimi dispute before the United Nations Security Council if Britain did not show a willingness to reach a solution on the basis of the recommendations of the special envoy (December 18, 1962). This dispute presented the workings of the Saudi Arabian bureaucracy in a detailed way. For example, *The London Times* article published on July 26, 1964, mentioned various roles of Saudi institutions including government, Ministry of Petroleum and the Embassy in London.

The dispute between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. was based on what Americans considered Saudi Anti-Semitism policy of banning Jewish people from entering Saudi territories. This caused an interior problem for a number of U.S. congressional representatives and senators and Jewish citizens who criticized their government for its passive attitude toward discrimination (Lippman, 2004: 215-217). As Thomas Lippman explained, this Saudi policy did not make an exception for the Jewish diplomats representing their countries. An example would include a *NYT* story titled, "Saudi Arabia

within its Sovereign Rights in Barring Jewish Airmen from the American Air Force at

Dharan." (March 1, 1960).

This was an issue for the U.K. as well, as already noted. *NYT* reported that,

"Saudis Bar a Briton [Horace Phillips[105]] as Envoy on Basis of Jewish Lineage,"

illustrating that the Saudi government has for many years excluded almost all Jews (April

10, 1968). A few months later, *The London Times* reported "Saudi Arabia having had

second thoughts about accepting him [Horace Phillips] back as ambassador" (September

11, 1968), the article mentioned the reason was due to his Jewish background.

This policy could be described as what Thompson (1961) called an ideological

type of authority, though I disagree with Thompson. The authority of an ideology is

based in other structures, and in this case it is a type of legal-rational authority given that

these decisions are tied to Saudi law. For example, *NYT* commented, "Saudi Government

had the right to bar Jews from its territory." However, the article continued by stating that

Jews could work in the New York office of ARAMCO. (September 28, 1962). The

American administration justified its attitude by putting the responsibility upon the Saudi

government that practiced its sovereignty. "Any restrictions that may exist with regard to

entry into Saudi Arabia are imposed by the Saudi Arabian Government and are entirely

outside the company's control" (*NYT* Aug3, 1956).[106]

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[105] Phillips (1917-2004), a Scotsman, had already been a British ambassador to other
Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Tanzania.

[106] I found a number of *NYT* articles discussing this issue, mostly what Jews considered a
passive attitude of the American administration toward protecting American citizens who
were exposed to discrimination. Here are some examples:

One of the topics that caused criticism of Saudi Arabia during this era was slavery. Indeed, there were "international demands for the emancipation of slaves in Saudi Arabia" (Abukhalil, 2004:191; *c.f.*, Lippman, 2004:112). In an article published on May 12, 1962, *NYT* criticized Saudi Arabia for the existence of slavery. *The London Times* reported:

> Present estimates are that there are 500,000 chattel slaves in Saudi Arabia, and they are still arriving and being openly sold there. Saudi Arabia was not a signatory to the 1926 convention, and is unlikely to sign the supplementary convention now being negotiated here at any rate, not in its present form. According to one authority, however, she [Saudi Arabia] is leaning towards the abolition of practice which is flagrantly at variance with her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations (August 21, 1956).

Responding to international demands, Faisal—the Crown Prince and Premier—abolished slavery in 1962, "although human rights organizations continued to report slavery in the Kingdom" (Abukhalil, 2004:96). This lack of credibility concerning the abolishment of slavery was reported after a decade in *The London Times*, as "Many Slaves, in fact, end up in Saudi Arabia and they are put to work in the desert where no one ever sees them" (April 12, 1973).[107] Thus, Saudi authorities enacted a law to abolish slavery as "obligations under the Charter of the United Nations" on one hand, and still

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- Plea by Jewish Units: Congress Is Asked to Oppose Aid for Saudi Arabia because of the discrimination against Jewish. (July 26, 1959)
- Saudi Arabia "racist" includes banning Jewish working in the related oil companies and the American airbase in Dhahran (August 6, 1959).
- ARAMCO' Appeal on Religion Loses: Court Again Declares That S.C.A.D. Should Review Exemption in Bias Law (April 20, 1960).
- Hearing regarding the issue (September 25, 1961)

[107] This article was coded "traditional authority." I cite it here because it fits with Abukhalil's statement of the existence of slavery in Saudi Arabia after its formal abolishion.

cannot control those bringing slaves "to work in the desert" on the other. Abolishing slavery is a good example of foreign influences upon the Saudi authorities to enact laws and fit with the rational-legal norms ruling in the West, even if the letter of the law is not followed.

Newspapers' Source and Agenda Sitting

In the previous chapters, I discussed the relationship between the various sources of news stories and the British-American agendas in Arabian lands. This third era witnessed the oil crisis and revolutions that overthrew some Arab thrones, which changed the state structure of an important neighboring state, Yemen, in 1962. Table 19 below shows the sources of news stories for both papers. The sources reflect agenda-setting based on political interests.

Table 19: The Sources of News Stories in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 11/101953-3/25/1975

Source of News		# AND % of *Traditional*	# AND % of Charismatic	# AND % of *Rational-legal*	# AND % of Total
Saudi Official	*Times*	4 *(6.25%)*	0	6 *(17.14%)*	10 *(10%)*
	NYT	2 *(3.70%)*	0	8 *(17.78%)*	10 *(10%)*
British Official	*Times*	0	0	2 *(5.71%)*	2 *(2%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
British Journalist/Writer	*Times*	12 *(18.75%)*	0	7 *(20%)*	19 *(19%)*
	NYT	0	0	0	0
American Official	*Times*	1 *(1.56%)*	0	2 *(5.71%)*	3 *(3%)*
	NYT	5 *(9.26%)*	0	4 *(8.89%)*	9 *(9%)*
American Journalist/Writer	*Times*	0	0	0	0
	NYT	22 *(40.74%)*	1(100%)	15 *(42.86%)*	38 *(38%)*
Arab Official	*Times*	3 *(4.69%)*	0	4 *(11.43%)*	7 *(7%)*
	NYT	3 *(5.55%)*	0	1 *(2.22%)*	4 *(4%)*

Table 19 (cont'd)

Saudi Media	*Times* *NYT*	3 *(4.69%)* 5 *(9.26%)*	0 0	0 2 *(4.44%)*	3 *(3%)* 7 *(7%)*
Arab Media	*Times* *NYT*	0 1 *(1.85%)*	0 0	0 0	0 1 *(1%)*
Reuter	*Times* *NYT*	4 *(6.25%)* 2 *(3.70%)*	0 0	1 *(2.86%)* 5 *(11.11%)*	5 *(5%)* 7 *(7%)*
American Presses	*Times* *NYT*	0 0	0 0	0 2 *(4.44%)*	0 2 *(2%)*
Picture Gallery	*Times* *NYT*	3 *(4.69%)* 0	0 0	0 0	3 *(3%)* 0
ARAMCO	*Times* *NYT*	0 0	0 0	0 1 *(2.22%)*	0 1 *(1%)*
Other Official	*Times* *NYT*	1 *(1.56%)* 0	0 0	0 3 *(6.67%)*	1 *(1%)* 3 *(3%)*
Agence France-Presse	*Times* *NYT*	0 1 *(1.85%)*	0 0	0 0	0 1 *(1%)*
Slave Trader	*Times* *NYT*	1 *(1.56%)* 0	0 0	0 0	1 *(1.56%)* 0
Israeli Media	*Times* *NYT*	0 0	0 0	1 *(2.86%)* 0	1 *(1%)* 0
A Greek Businessman	*Times* *NYT*	0 0	00	0 1 *(2.22%)*	0 1(1%)
Total of Known	*Times* *NYT*	32 *(50%)* 41 *(75.93%)*	0 1 *(100%)*	23 *(65.71%)* 42 *(93.33%)*	55 *(55%)* 84 *(84%)*
Unknown	*Times* *NYT*	32 *(50%)* 13 *(24.07%)*	1 *(100%)* 0	12 *(34.29%)* 3 *(6.67%)*	45 *(45%)* 16 *(16%)*
Total	*Times* *NYT*	64 *(100%)* 54 *(100%)*	1 *(100%)* 1 *(100%)*	35 *(100%)* 45 *(100%)*	100 *(100%)* 100 *(100%)*

One may note the number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown"
category) declined during these years. *NYT Times* was more likely to demonstrate the

source of stories than was *The London Times*—identifying sources in 84 of the 100 articles (37%), while *The London Times* only identified sources in 55 of the 100 selected articles (77.28%). A chi-square test shows that there is a statistically significant difference between these newspapers and their willingness to identifying sources ($\chi^2 =$ 19.84, df =1, 200, sig. = 8E-06).

The number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown" category) increased compared with the second era. However, the number of source-identified articles in this third era is still greater than the first era. *NYT* was more likely to demonstrate the source of stories (87%) than was *The London Times* (68%).

As in the second era, the sources of the news stories are complicated in terms of the variation between the two papers. The data show the considerable decline of articles attributed to British officials in both papers, as only two articles in *The London Times* and no articles from *NYT* are found in this sample. The presence of American officials appearing in *The London Times* was found in three articles, while the articles sourced from American officials in *NYT* increased to nine articles. This is a sign of the increasing American engagement in the region with a positive development in the relationship between the Saudi state and the U.S. versus the gradual decline of British engagement. In addition, there were ten articles that used sourced by Saudi officials in *The London Times*.[108] *NYT* articles sourcing Saudi officials decreased to ten articles from the previous time period.

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[108] Ten articles in *The London Times* in the second era represent (11.64%). The Saudi officials were absent in the first era.

Bearing in mind the reporter or writer is considered a "source," and as such may have a vested interest in the content of the coverage, the most radical change in the sources of these articles can be seen in the increase in British and American writers and journalists. In fact, each paper sourced *only* its nationals. *NYT* sourced 38 of its articles by American writers and journalists, while 19 of *The London Times* articles were sourced by British writers and journalists. This might be seen as an evolution of the style of the coverage in this "modern" time as reporters and writers have more credentials than previously.

The London Times' picture gallery reported only three articles in this era, all of which were coded as traditional authority. Still, the tendency in *The London Times'* picture gallery reflects the sorts of events were covered in this era (i.e., royal visits).

The royal identity of the Saudi state was very clear in both papers. The Oil Embargo did not lead to the demonization of Saudis in any of these papers. Indeed, the presentation of Saudi Arabia as anti-Communism reflects the British/American tendencies to avoid attacking Saudis. This can be considered as a long-term policy as the embargo was abolished within a year, while the anti-Communism policy grew in Saudi Arabia which eventually joined the Reagan Doctrine opposing the influence of communism. In this regard, I argue, presenting Saudi Arabia as mainly founded and maintained on traditional authority helped the western—especially American—audiences to accept their national policy toward a country which embargoed oil and practiced discrimination against Jews.

The seemingly disregard for the Palestine issue reflects the dilemma for Arabs during the wave of the military coups, as well as a possible oversight on the part of the

newspapers being studied. Indeed, the Arab countries were concerned with their own regimes more than helping their "brothers." The articles of 1967 are the best evidence of such claims, noticing the great efforts by Saudis and Egyptians in the Yemeni War. This dilemma enhanced the traditional authority of Saudi Arabia, the monarch supporting royals against revolutionaries. In this regard, Prince/King Faisal was the symbol of traditional authority, while Sheikh Yamani was the symbol of Saudi bureaucracy.

In both papers, the theme of "Wahhabi fanaticism" continued to decline, especially in *NYT,* compared with the first era of building the Kingdom and even the second era. The term "Wahhabism" was only found three times in *The London Times* and one in *NYT.* This focus on linking Wahhabism and Puritanism by *The London Times* supports an argument made by Alrebh and Ten Eyck (2014) that applies Zelizer's (1993) idea of reporters comprising an interpretative community. As Alrebh and Ten Eyck found, *The London Times* compared Puritans to the Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia during the 1930s which tells us how little these reporters understood the latter and how willing they were to use the former as a mode of reference, as earlier reporting informs later coverage.

This sort of coverage is consistent. Two articles in *The London Times* concerned the conservative gender rules restricting Saudi women[109] while two additional articles introduced Wahhabism in Christian terms such as "Calvinism"[110] and "puritanical."[111] The term Wahhabism started to decline in the second era compared to the first era, and its

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[109] *The London Times*, February11, 1967, and May 30, 1974.

[110] *The London Times*, February 5, 1968.

[111] *NYT,* December 14, 1965

further decline during the third era might be due to the absence of the previously ubiquitous narrative of "war." As found in the previous chapter, the lack of focus given to the term "Wahhabism" is clear, as there is no direct war with that group. However, one might expect the revival of the term in the fourth era with the wave of Islamic revivals following the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

Fourth Era 1975-2005: Khalid and Fahd

A search for news stories from March 26, 1975 to August 1, 2005 resulted in

12,303 articles from *The London Times*[112] and 28,938 from *NYT*. Using a systematic

sampling frame, 100 articles were selected from both *The London Times* and *NYT*. As in

the second and third eras, the themes in this era are divided among the three authority

types in significantly more complicated ways when compared with the first era. The news

article themes concerning sovereignty, oil and development, as well as foreign affairs

could be categorized as traditional or rational-legal based on the presentation. Articles

presenting the members of the Saudi Royal Family controlling the state are coded as

traditional authority. The articles presenting the governmental institutions and

positions—even if royals held these positions—are coded as rational-legal. The

presentation of charismatic authority has declined, as there were no articles in this data

selection mainly focusing on charismatic characteristics of those in power.

Table 20 highlights news content of *The London Times* and the *NYT* for the

Fourth Era. Traditional authority occupied considerably greater space in *NYT* (66%) than

The London Times (60%). As in the formers eras, it is worth mentioning that most of the

articles reported at least two forms of authority—most typically traditional blended with

rational-legal, though charismatic authority was occasionally blended in as well, which is

addressed more fully in Figure 2. However, only the predominant type is reported in

Table 20.

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[112] *The Times* -11,114 articles; *The Sunday Times* - 1,189 articles

**Table 20: Types of Authority in Saudi Arabia in *The London Times & NYT*
Coverage Between 3/26/1975 - 8/1/2005**

Newspaper	*Traditional*	*Charismatic*	*Rational-Legal*	Total
The London Times	60 *(60%)*	0	40 *(40%)*	100 *(100%)*
NYT	66 *(66%)*	0	34 *(34%)*	100*(100%)*
Total	126 *(63%)*	0	74 *(37%)*	200*(100%)*

The decline of charismatic authority reaches its lowest point with the absence of *fully* charismatic articles in this era, which reflects the limitation of the presentation of Saudi Arabia as a "Kingdom" and/or "modern state" with no personality or "Godfather" such as Ibn Saud,[113] supporting Weber's argument of charismatic leaders and their causes becoming viewed as traditional authority types. Saudi Arabia, as with many countries at the turn of a new century, faced many challenges. These events include the beginning of religious challenges to the authority of the House of Saud, including a siege of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, rebellions by young Wahhabi clergy against the foreign (mainly American) forces in the Saudi territories, and Al-Qaeda's terrorist operations against both the Saudi government and the American interests in Saudi Arabia. These incidents might be seen as aspects of a global village in transition after the Cold War which had utilized radical Islam—mainly Wahhabism—against Communism under the

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[113] Chukwu agues that, "[n]o authority structure, Weber wrote, could actually be exclusively bureaucratic, because some positions would be held by a variety of charismatic leaders. He also stated that non-bureaucratic legal authority could be found in organizations that have rotating office holders, such as 'Parliamentary and committee administration and all sorts of collegiate and administrative bodies'" (2013: 41, citing Weber, *The Three Types Of Legitimate Rule*, 1958:3).

rubric of Jihad.[114] These challenges to Saudi authority as a typical Muslim state that followed traditional Sunni-Islam represent a questioning of the authority of the House of Saud by a part of the group—Wahhabis—that had been serving them. Additionally, the regional conflicts in the neighboring states developed beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988), Operation Desert Storm (1990), and the Iraq War (2003). Such events affected the Saudi oil industry which in turn influenced the international economy in direct ways, especially during the oil boom in the late 1970s which gained considerable space in this coverage.

This timeline required a solid grasp on power for Saudi state control. It is thus not surprising to find absolute monarchical authority clearer than bureaucratic authority, as the Saud family consolidated their sovereignty as the royal family with support from the formal religious institution.[115] This is a continuation of my hypothesis in finding the presentation of traditional authority greater than rational authority in this coverage. However, the absence of *fully* charismatic authority is strange as King Fahd was one of the most important players in the Middle East as he was the *de facto* ruler of the country since being named the Crown Prince for his half-brother King Khalid (Byman, 2005: 66). This is especially the case during his 1981 peace initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli

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[114] For a detailed analysis, see Rafīʿ ʿU<u>s</u>mānī, *Jihad in Afghanistan Against Communism*, 2003.

[115] Thus, coming through bureaucratic forms, party organization legitimizes the power of the state and its leadership by acknowledging those who come from a certain party, and their decisions are couched in rational terms grounded in power differentials. As indicated earlier, traditional authority is derived from patriarchal structures (*c.f.* Gerth and Mills, 1958: 296). As Weber pointed out, this authority type was enhanced by traditions and religions and prevented people from challenging authority, as any challenge to it is a challenge to the authority of God.

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conflict,[116] and his strong attitude regarding the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 when he accepted assistance from the U.S. and other allies to liberate Kuwait and cut off Saddam Hussein's way to Saudi territories.

The first comment by *NYT* of the authority in Saudi Arabia after the assassination of King Faisal was, "King Faisal was succeeded on the throne by his Crown Prince Khalid, 62 years old... But the new Crown Prince, Fahd, who has been Minister of Interior, is expected to be the real power" (March 26, 1975). On the same day, *The London Times* published an article about the new Crown Prince "Fahd," with an article titled "New Man of Power in Saudi Arabia." The article reported that, "[r]eal power in Saudi Arabia will now be wielded by the new Crown Prince, Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, with the support of the numerous Saudi royal family, and more particularly, of his full brothers known as 'the Sudairi Seven.'" The article focused on Fahd with a marginal mention of Khalid who "has never devoted much time to government, except for ceremonial occasion [and he] has not attended the Council of Ministers, possibly because of friction with Prince Fahd." Sharing power among the sons of Ibn Saud was under the guardianship of their senior brother Prince Mohammed who regarded himself "as the protector of traditional values in the Kingdom" (*The London Times*, June 14, 1982). Thus Prince Mohammed may be seen as a sort of *éminence grise* for the royal family.

As during the second and third eras, the dominant topics are not framed by a specific type of authority. Table 21 shows the various categories generated from articles considered to be framed as presenting traditional authority. *The London Times* and *NYT*

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[116] This is known as Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's Eight Point Peace Plan (Al-Mashat, 1983).

most frequently used the theme of "sovereignty" including articles concerning state control, royal affairs, security affairs, and interior policies other than development.

Table 21: Traditional Authority in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 3/26/1975 - 8/1/2005

Categories from articles of *Traditional Authority* (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Sovereignty	28 (46.67%)	20 (30.3%)	48 (38.1%)
Diplomacy with West	8 (13.33%)	15 (22.73%)	23 (18.25%)
Religious	10 (16.67%)	11 (16.67%)	21 (16.67%)
Diplomacy –Involvements	3 (5%)	11 (16.7%)	14 (11.11%)
Diplomacy with Arabs	8 (13.33%)	4 (6.06%)	12 (9.52%)
Oil and Development	3 (5%)	5 (7.57%)	8 (6.35%)
Total	60 (100%)	66 (100%)	126 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories. The relationship was not found to be significant (χ^2 = 9.65, df =1, 200, sig. = 0.086). The number of articles that appear in each newspaper does not depend on the category. Z-tests between both newspaper results for each category found the only significant difference is in "Diplomacy—Involvements" as the Z-Score= -2.0857 (the p-value= 0.03662); the result is significant at p <0.05. The rest of the categories were not significant at p <0.05.

Traditional Sovereignty

The sovereignty of the House of Saudi is the largest category of traditional authority in this fourth era. *The London Times* published 28 articles (46.67% of traditional authority) concerning royal sovereignty; *NYT* has 20 articles (30.3% of traditional authority). These articles focus on strengths of the Saudi monarchy, the kings' health, succession and transfer of power, royal control of institutions, and challenging royal authority.

The stability of the Saudi throne was the primary concern of Ibn Saud in his later life. He thus insured the sharing of power among his sons in order to maintain the solidarity of the House of Saud. In the third era, the rivalry between brothers affected this solidarity, dividing the brothers into factions led by Saud and Faisal. Such a rivalry did not really exist in this fourth era. Indeed, Fahd was the genuine ruler of the country, while King Khalid was but a ceremonial king. Fahd was the actual head of state until he started suffering health problems in 1995, at that time his Crown Prince Abdullah acted as *de facto* ruler. This stability was clear in both papers, which never recorded any rivalry among brothers (at least not in the data selected for this research). Moreover, *The London Times* underscored national stability, arguing that "[t]he most powerful monarchy in the region is undoubtedly that of Saudi Arabia, where the Saud family controls almost all aspects of Saudi public life" (July 28, 1981). *NYT* added that, "[t]he Saudi royal house has far deeper political roots in that country than the Shah had in Iran and is therefore not ripe for a coup" (October 28, 1981).

Royal control of the country is obvious in the articles categorized as "oil and development," as six of the eight articles present the Saudi royal members as controllers

of the national infrastructure, including the oil industry. One of these articles mentioned the richness of the House of Saud as a result of control over oil (*The London Times*, April 28, 1989). Moreover, one of those articles referred to the House of Saud instead of the Saudi state (*NYT*, Sep 14, 1980).[117] Saudi Arabia is a rentier-economy state, which owns and controls all natural resources and provides all public services (Niblock and Malik, 2007). This sort of state lends itself to the legitimacy of tradition. Indeed, as Chukwu (2013:41) states, "[t]raditional authority is legitimated by the sanctity of tradition. The ability and right to rule is passed down, often through heredity. It does not change overtime, does not facilitate social change, tends to be irrational and inconsistent, and perpetuates the status quo."

Both newspapers presented Fahd as the actual ruler of the Kingdom. However, the expectation of Fahd's proclaiming himself as king at any moment—repeating Faisal's action against Saud—was a subject of discussion. For example, *The London Times* reported the "ailing King Khalid wants to give up Saudi throne" (June 28, 1977). Such rumors had no reliable sources, as the writer of this article cited only an anonymous Saudi businessman. *The London Times* gave more space to the Saudi throne than *NYT*. Even after two decades, *The London Times* recalled the story of Saud and Faisal to compare it with contemporary events. In his article "The Tragedy that Gave Me the Keys to the Arab Kingdom," Jonathan Aitken wrote, "Prince Fahd had no likelihood so far as I

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[117] The rest of the articles regarding "oil and development" emphasized the religious authority upon (1) the banking system in the "traditional authority, especially prohibiting usury (*NYT*, January 28, 1986). (2) Gender affairs, as "Saudi women may not be allowed to vote or to drive, but Islamic law does grant them the right to control their finances. A few years ago, Saudi banks started opening social branches for women" (*NYT*, March 7, 2005).

was aware of succeeding to the throne" (*The London Times*, April 2, 2000). Such

attention from a British newspaper might reflect the history of the House of Saud and

Great Britain that had been the guardian of this Arab royal family, which would still be of

interest to a British audience living within a country where news about their own royal

family was closely watched.[118]

The stability of Saudi Arabia is important to the world, especially regarding its

strategic allies and oil consumers. This became clear after the deterioration of Fahd's

health in the mid-1990s. In (June 8, 1996), *NYT* reported that,

> King Fahd, the country's ruler and Prime Minister, has been in
> failing health since he had a stroke last December. He
> transferred his authority to Crown Prince Abdullah for several
> weeks earlier this year. The King, who is about 74, has since
> reclaimed those powers, but Crown Prince, who is about two
> years younger and in better health, still presides over many
> official functions. The presence of Crown Prince Abdullah as
> Saudi Arabia's representative here was seen as a further
> indication that his status as the King's designated successor is
> not in dispute. Diplomats in Saudi Arabia have said that the
> Crown Prince would again take the helm if King Fahd leaves
> Saudi Arabia to convalesce in his holiday palace in Spain.

The London Times went further by arguing that the "succession is clear in Saudi

Arabia" and listed the princes' names, positions, and their opportunity to rule (July 27,

1999). As time passed, the discussion of the future of the Saudi throne continued to be

discussed. *NYT* agreed with *The London Times* about the stability of the House of Saud,

as it reported on the Saudi traditional way of rule that was different from others (May 6,

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[118] The following, which might be thought of as humorous, was published by *The
Sunday Times*: "Idi Amin [the deposed Ugandan dictator lived in exile in Saudi Arabia]
expressed his delight that Major Bob was free, and told him he had spent his time in
Saudi Arabia "studying democracy" (December 15, 1985).

2003). The only argument about a potential crisis upon the throne made by *The London Times* concerned a coup in a neighbor state and its potential effects in Saudi Arabia,

> Peacefully disposing of Emir of Qatar recalls the disposing of King Saud in 1964. But across the isthmus in Saudi Arabia, the local tremor may reverberate as an earthquake. King Fahd and his entourage should pay careful heed (June 28, 1995).

A deeper look into the coverage of this fourth era shows an emphasis on royal control of the state as an absolute monarchy. As *NYT* reported earlier, "[y]ou cannot distinguish between the House of Saud and the Saudi State" (August 11, 1990), recalling the story of Ibn Saud's development of the kingdom and state by the House of Saud. In the same manner, *NYT* made it a point to address the names of Saudi officials by their long, "royal" titles (January 16, 1991). There are many articles in this era presenting Princes as "officials of the State," even in such extremely sensitive issues such as the post-1991 Gulf War plans for an expanded American military presence in the kingdom (*NYT*, September 30, 1991). Such a presentation reflects the absolute control of the state. In the same manner, *The London Times* reported the "personal" decisions of King Fahd regarding the deals with the Kingdom (June 30, 1987).

As indicated in Chapter Two, the historical account of Saudi Arabia highlights some Saudi opposition organizations calling for reforms or even the deposing of the royal family. Some of these organizations are still active, especially in the U.K. However, the data do not show a great deal of attention toward this theme. Even during the siege of the Holy Mosque in Mecca (1979), there is only one article that reported any criticism, which was perhaps gloating from the Egyptian regime arguing that "Ruling Saudi family in trouble after the attack of the grand mosque" (*The London Time*, January 29, 1980). It

worth noting that the Egyptian-Saudi relationship was tense after the Camp David Accord as Saudi Arabia led the Arab boycott against Egypt.

The tension with neighboring states is an opportunity for opposition groups seeking a platform to deliver their anti-regime messages. The only instance that was found in this data was reported by *The London Times* on October 16, 2000 when two Saudi guards hijacked a Saudi aircraft and forced the pilot to land in Baghdad—as Saudi-Iraqi diplomatic relations had been completely severed as a result of the 1990's Gulf Crisis. The guards went on to express their anti-monarchy attitude by calling for a complete collapse of the rule of House of Saud.[119]

The minimal coverage regarding Saudi opposition in both papers might reflect influences upon Western media favoring the royal administration. One more article found among these data reporting criticism of the Saudi government was by the former Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, as he "poses threat to Saudi embattled royals." The article indicated the corruption in Saudi Arabia and the number of Saudi royal family members (allegedly "6,000"), in addition to the types of opposition to the Saudi administration, such as national secularism and both the Sunni and Shia Islamists (*The London Times*, November 27, 1994). Inside the Kingdom, there was no serious challenge to Saudi authority reported in this coverage. The only action reported was in *NYT* (February 20, 2002) regarding a "rebellion" among bored youths being waged on the streets and highways of two Saudi cities. The report explained the non-political

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[119] According to the BBC Arabic Homepage (October 15, 2000), the aircraft was carrying a number of passengers, including 40 Britons. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/newsid_973000/973084.stm Accessed April 30, 2014.

background of this action as it was no more than activities by the youth who had few other entertainment options. The article reported,

> theocratic Kingdom that bans dating, cinemas, concert halls, discotheques, clubs, theaters and political organizations and offers few oases like museums, libraries or gyms. Young people are expected to conform to the dictates of both tradition and religion, despite their exposure to the diverse world they discover from media.

I would argue that such a report emphasizes traditional sovereignty in the Kingdom that still affects the "personal" lives of the new generation (*c.f.* al-Otaibi and Menoret, 2010).

Another more organized challenge was led by the radical religious groups influenced by Al-Qaeda especially right after the 9/11 attacks. *The London Times* reported that "the Saudi Royal House will fear the strengthening of anti-Western forces attitude" (September 12, 2001). *The London Times* mentioned the personal tension between Bin Laden and the Saudi royal house (March 23, 2002). This tension led to a series of terrorist attacks inside the Kingdom which caused deaths and material damages. *NYT* reported one of these attacks as it "was orchestrated to display that the royal family cannot maintain security in the heart of its own oil patch" (May 31, 2004). On the other hand, Saudi authorities fought such attacks, killed a number of these groups' members, and sometimes executed them publicly, which is what happened to four men who admitted bombing a military building in Riyadh killing six people, five of whom were Americans.[120] Such a response by the Saudi authorities recalls the largest public beheading that took place in nine of the Saudi cities simultaneously in 1980 when the

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[120] See: CNN, "Ambassador: Car bomb destroyed military building" http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/saudi_blast/11am/ Accessed April 30, 2014.

Saudi government beheaded 63 members of the group that hijacked the Holy Mosque in Mecca (Trofimov, 2007). However, this story was not found in the selected data.

Public beheading is one of the controversial topics about Saudi Arabia found in the Western media, especially when it is supported by photographs (e.g., *The London Times*, February 1, 2005). It is a traditional method of execution, based on Islamic traditions—alongside hand amputation for theft—still practiced in Saudi Arabia. *The London Times* appears to be more interested in this topic than *NYT*, which has only one report about such punishments and that was about the beheading of Prince Faisal bin Musaid after the assassination of King Faisal. The report stated, "Public beheading is a traditional form of execution for murder in Saudi Arabia" (June 22, 1975). *The London Times* was interested in another execution of a royal member, Misha'al Bint Fahd, a granddaughter of Prince Muhammad bin Abdulaziz, the eldest member of the royal family.[121] *The London Times* described the public execution as it "horrified the world" by beheading the Princess' lover. The article, supported by a picture, argued that the execution was because tribal laws, and not Islamic law, had been broken (January 29, 1978).

This story attracted the attention of the British audience even more after the premier of the film *Death of a Princess* in 1980. The film caused serious diplomatic tension between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. as *The London Times* reported, "the Saudi authorities requested the withdrawal of the British Ambassador from Jiddah in April [1980] in protest against the showing on television of the film *Death of a Princess*" (July

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[121] As mentioned earlier, *The London Times* refers to him "as the protector of traditional values in the Kingdom" (June 14, 1982).

26, 1980). This is an aspect of formal Saudi sensitivity toward what they considered

media offensiveness, as it criticized both religious and tribal authorities in the kingdom,

including royal family affairs, which is a highly sensitive issue, especially when it

concerns a female royal member.[122] The British government apologized several times to

the Saudi royal family, and expressed its passive attitude by stating that the government

cannot ban the film because of freedom of expression. This also applied to another

documentary film about Saudi history from its warrior origins to its present affluence

(*The London Times*, May 22, 2004).[123]

The story of females' public beheading and the Saudi judicial system attracted

much international attention sixteen years after *Death of a Princess*. For the first time a

western woman was sentenced to execution by the Saudi authorities. In 1996, two British

nurses, Lucille McLaughlan and Deborah Parry, murdered (by asphyxiating with a

pillow) Yvonne Gilford, an Australian nurse. "While Deborah Parry was found guilty of

murder and was facing a public execution, Lucille McLauchlan was judged to have

played a lesser role in the killing and was sentenced to eight years and 500 lashes."[124]

According to *NYT*, this case "set off the most serious diplomatic crisis between Saudi

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122 This also can be applied to the 2013's movie *King of the Sands* the biography of Ibn Saud, which still faces problems in many countries including the U.S. However, it was shown in the U.K.

123 For more discussion of the film, see White, T., & Ganley, G. D. (1983), *The "Death of a Princess" Controversy*. Harvard University, Center for Information Policy Research; Said, E. W. (1997). *Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. New York: Vintage Books. Pp. 69-79.

124 See "Freed nurses return to UK" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/97815.stm Accessed April 30, 2014.

Arabia and Britain in years" (September 25, 1997). The Saudi government convinced the victim's family to accept blood money, which amounted to £750,000 paid by the Saudi government. The British nurses were released after 17 months even though Saudi law requires forgiven murderers to serve five years in prison. *The London Times* reported a TV interview with the two nurses telling the story of their confession, attacking the Saudi judicial system, and emphasizing its ties to religion (May 22, 1998).

Reports of beheading, flagellation, and blood money presents Saudi Arabia to the Western audiences as based on medieval and traditional authority. On the other hand, Saudi authorities attribute such approaches to Sharia law aiming to ensure justice and security for society, which makes religion a fundamental part of traditional authority in the Kingdom.

Religious Authority

As explained earlier, religion is the primary way of legitimating authority in Islam. The Saudi Kingdom built by the Holy Wars was legitimized by the Wahhabi clergy who addressed the royal family as the guardians of Islam.[125] In 1986, King Fahd replaced the "secular" royal title of *His Majesty*, to signify an "Islamic title" *Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques*. Such an action enhances religious authority by tying the ruler to the most important religious symbols, the Two Holy Mosques. This is further underscored when King Abdullah inherited this title alongside the throne in 2005. In the early 1980s, *NYT* recognized this status of the House of Saud, reporting, "Saudi royal family regard themselves as the guardians of the Islamic holy places," and the article

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[125] On November 24, 1979, during the siege of the Holy Mosque of Mecca, *NYT* published a report indicated "Attackers will be executed after the approval of King Khalid and religious leaders."

recalled the story of the Wahhabis capture of holy places under the leadership of Ibn Saud (October 29, 1980).

Controlling these holy places gives an advantage to the Saudi authorities by utilizing sermons preached to further legitimize their politics. For example, during Operation Desert Storm, "[t]he Imam of holiest mosque called in a sermon for the overthrow and punishment of Saddam" (*NYT*, Jan 26, 1991). This image is compounded with the theocratic flag that includes the Islamic testimony (i.e.,*Shahadah*) of declaration that "there is no god except Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger." Thus, it is not surprising to see Saudi authorities attributing all their actions to Islamic traditions, particularly *Sharia* law.

Figure 4: Saudi Arabia's Flag (white images on a green field)

Both papers recognized the religious authority in Saudi Arabia during these years, as 16.67% of the traditional authority articles of each paper were focused on religious authority. *The London Times* discussed the "puritanical" nature of dominant Wahhabism,

recalling the religious role of raising "the single authority of Ibn Saud" (October 21, 1977). Later in this coverage, on February 22, 2003, the same paper described Saudi Arabia as an "extreme form of Wahabbite."[126] Such extremism was presented in this coverage via explaining the theocratic attitude toward what Wahhabi institutions considered as taboos (*c.f.* Alrebh, 2011).

Theocracy and divine law often recall taboos. Many Saudi taboos were presented in this coverage, especially those that both papers considered non-tolerant attitudes toward other religions. Banning non-Muslim religious activities is the most common theme of criticizing Saudi Arabia. This criticism increased when the Western troops came to Saudi Arabia to participate in Operation Desert Storm. Both papers criticized Saudi authorities' denying people the freedom of worship, especially Christians and Jews.[127] Right after the 9/11 attacks, *NYT* reported a complaint that "[f]reedom of religion does not exist there and noted that Saudi authorities had even taken action against non-Muslims seeking to worship privately" (October 27, 2001). *The London Times* reported another complaint by a religious institution regarding the Christian solders in Saudi Arabia who were denied religious materials, "[t]he Catholic paper *The Universe* is not to be sent to our forces in Saudi for fear of offending the Saudi Muslims" (February13, 1991). *NYT* goes further by criticizing Saudi Arabia for denying non-Muslims the

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[126] Saudi Arabia has been used as the symbol of extreme fundamentalist as Simon Jenkins wrote in *The London Times* "Texas is more fundamentalist than anywhere west of Saudi Arabia (it must be the oil)" (February 9, 2001).

[127] For example see, *NYT* (September 11, 1990) and *The London Times* (November 24, 1990).

opportunity to approach Mecca (November 9, 1997).[128] In the Saudi view, these

prohibitions legitimize the King's role as the protector of the faith.

Religious authority in Saudi Arabia extends its taboos to non-religious Western

practices such as "Valentine's Day" which is banned (*The London Times*, February 14,

2004). Such practices are enhanced by religious authority upon the Saudi media and

educational practices (*The London Times*, Nov17, 1978). Thus, this coverage introduces

Saudi society to British and Americans as those who follow Wahhabi lessons, or at least

accept the prohibiting of foreigner matters based on their religious overview.[129] This also

applied to gender rules[130] that were challenged during the Desert Strom Operation when

western female officers acted according to their military ranks. *NYT* reported on a female

American officer in a "Muslim culture [which] offers women little role in the

military…she gave orders to Saudi soldiers who were unaware that ranking military

women had the authority to give orders" (February 24, 1991). The report introduced such

a matter as a sort of culture shock, as solders still see the officer as a "woman" rather than

a "boss."

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[128]This is not only because of Wahhabi fundamentalism, but based on a citation from the Quran prohibiting non-Muslim approaching these areas. Any conservative ruler of Mecca, regardless of their sect, would consider this as a taboo.

[129] Three months later of the 9/11 attacks, *NYT* published a letter to the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs criticizing the educational system, claiming it teaches people the hatred (December12, 2001).

[130] See for example *The London Times* (September 6, 1990).

The emergence of a new theocracy in the Persian Gulf (Islamic Republic of Iran) created in Saudi Arabia a rivalry based on sectarian bonds.[131] *The London Times* reported, "Saudi Arabia fears Iranian fundamentalist influence in any Shia state on its borders" (August 28, 1992). This explains the Saudi attitudes toward some Islamic concerns that require clear actions from the larger Muslim nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. For example, Salman Rushdie's 1988 novel *The Satanic Verses* caused a crisis in the Muslim world because of what was considered by Muslims a disrespectful portrayal of the prophet Muhammad. While Iranian religious authority treated this very seriously with Ayatollah Khomeini issuing a fatwa calling for the killing of Rushdie, Saudi action was softer. According to *NYT*, "Saudi Muslim Weighs Rushdie Trial." The article explains that "Religious authority in Saudi Arabia [is] avoiding the Iranian attitude" (February 23, 1989).

Such an attitude reflects the politicization of religious authorities regarding the sectarian rivalry in the Persian Gulf. This report also presents Wahhabis as a non-aggressive group who would only resort to violence to express their disagreement with "others." This an example of the American-British agenda in the Middle East regarding the demonizing of a certain group while ignoring others based on western interests. The coverage shifted after the 9/11 attacks when Wahhabism was demonized and Shiasm was ignored. Looking at both events, we can see journalistic slants based on when Wahhabis were fighting the Soviets and favoring Western capitalist policy, and when Iranian Shias were cheering "death to America" in the late 1980s. To be clear, a group of Wahhabis attacked America on 9/11/2001. As an interpretative community (Zelizer, 1993) "early

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[131] Iran, as a Shia theocracy, does not favor Wahhabism.

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reports will shape subsequent news," (Alrebh and Ten Eyck, 2014: 130), and thus one may expect consistency in a state agenda as media provide readers a "sense of reality" for many issues (Gamson, 1992).

Traditional Authority of Foreign Policy

The post-Oil Embargo era puts Saudi Arabia in an interesting diplomatic position, and Saudi foreign policy was involved in various international issues beyond the states' diplomatic relations. This included foreign policy in the Arab world, with the West, and other issues that Saudi authorities were involved in as international players. These are issues marked as "Diplomacy-Involvements." I separated those articles from the Saudi - Arabic and Western relations because of their complications that include dealing with Arab, Western, and other countries.

The "diplomacy with the West" is the larger group of articles dealing with Saudi foreign policies that are coded as "traditional authority." These articles make up 22.73% of *NYT* and 13.33% of *The London Times*. As in the former chapters, "West" mostly refers to the U.S. and the U.K. While the third era witnessed some tensions in these relations because of the American-British attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict that led to the Oil Embargo, this fourth era involved other sorts of tensions.

As mentioned above, the film *Death of a Princess* caused a diplomatic crisis between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. The problem could be understood within the Saudi context of the government's sensitiveness toward any media critique which is considered as an attack on the entity. *The London Times* paid more attention to this than *NYT*. On May 23, 1980, *The London Times* published an article titled "An offensive film hurting royal family's feelings" and mentioned the religious and cultural traditions causing

diplomatic problems with Saudi Arabia. Even after three years, the British paper recalled

the story as an example of Arabs responding to the British,

> The Arabs in response to this British insult should take a leaf
> from the actions of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the crisis
> over the showing of the film Death of a Princess on British
> television a few years ago, the Government of King Khalid
> sent the Ambassador of Great Britain scurrying home. A fat
> contract with Saudi Arabia was in the balance and cooler hands
> in Britain prevailed (January 3, 1983).

This is a matter of Arabic tribal dignity which set clear guidelines for such

sensitive matters, especially religion and the royal family. This sort of tension has never

occurred with the U.S. which acts in a careful way concerning Saudi royal affairs. The

Saudi-American tensions are usually based on political matters.

The most serious crisis between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in this fourth era was

in 1988 when Americans discovered that Saudi Arabia bought medium-range ballistic

missiles from China. The American Ambassador, Hume Horan delivered a strong

demarche of his government to King Fahd regarding this deal. Horan felt King Fahd's

wrath when he was expelled from Saudi. *NYT* published, "The United States recalled its

ambassador to Saudi Arabia two weeks ago following indicators that the Saudi royal

family would no longer deal with him" (April 15, 1988).[132]

Such serious attitudes toward what Saudi royal family considered as a sovereign

matter negate most pressures that might be brought against the Saudi government

regarding such matters as democracy and human rights. On May 7, 1986, *NYT* reported

that "Americans would prefer it [Saudi Arabia] to be more demonstrative and more

democratic ally, we rely on the Kingdom, its oil and strategic value." Such tendencies

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[132] *NYT*, Hume Horan story (October 17, 1993).

have little to do with the Saudi interior policy dominated by the traditional government headed by the King. In this regard, *NYT* reported, "America's unquestioning support for some of the region's least democratic, most conservative regimes, like Saudi Arabia [would continue]" (April 26, 1998). Such support was called into question after the 9/11 attacks, as *NYT* described Saudi authority as an "authoritarian regime" reporting "FDR assured King Ibn Saud of American protection in exchange for guaranteed supplies of oil—helping make the world safe for Wahhabis" (March 9, 2003).[133]

After 9/11, the Saudi image in the American media was negative, focusing on the faults of Saudi rulers—"the royal family"—especially Ambassador Prince Bandar and the Muslim charity institutions sponsored by Saudis (*NYT*, July 26, 2003). *The London Times* reported some American anger towards Saudis. For example, on August 30, 2002, it reported,

> 15 Saudis were among the September 11 hijackers. Now their
> Government hopes a gift of the Kentucky Derby winner will
> heal families' wounds. Saudi Royal Family members'
> Princes own horse, give money to America after 9/11. Bin
> Laden chose to use Saudis to ruin the relations.

The royal family existed as a sign of the traditional authority in Saudi Arabia.[134] American audiences in particular would perceive this as a traditional monarchy because the Saudi Ambassadors were members of the royal family during this era. *NYT* reported,

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[133] *NYT* described Saudi Arabia as "a repressive monarchy" (November 8, 2003).

[134] On April 19, 1976, *NYT* reported an arms deal listing four Princes as the Saudi high official. The article mentioned that they are sons of Ibn Saud, and presented Crown Prince Fahd as the operating head of the Saudi Government. Moreover, on September 4, 2004, *NYT* reported that an American firm lost 658 in Twin Towers and sued Saudi officials, all of whom were princess.

"Saudi Arabia's Longtime Ambassador to the U.S. is Resigning and be replaced by *another royal family member* Prince Turki al-Faisal the brother of the Saudi foreign minister and the former Saudi intelligence chief" (July 21, 2005, emphasis added).

On the other hand, British readers may be given a different view of Saudi royal sovereignty. *The London Times* reported a "Secret allied deal" set up for the release of Britons who had been arrested for perpetrating a bombing attack in Riyadh. This presented an instance of "Royal clemency" rather than beheadings for the condemned British citizens (July 4, 2004), much like the case with the two British nurses who had been charged with murder.[135]

Such attitudes by those papers favoring their national foreign policies support Tuchman's view (1978) considering news as a social activity and reporters as workers for this cause. Thus, news is a product of professional workers who are overseen by editors and publishers who decide what should be presented to the audience. The media industry produces an important product by representing a window on the world which has an influence on political agendas. However, biases might take place due to differing institutional, political, or religious agendas across sources, reporters, and their respective vested interests.

The "diplomacy with Arabs" is the smaller group of articles coded as "traditional authority," and includes eight articles from *The London Times* and four *NYT* articles. In all these articles, the members of the Saudi royal family act as the officials representing the state, which reflects the traditional grip of power in an absolute monarchy by the party living in the house of power. As Weber argues, party can be based on class and

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[135] The Saudi government has never recognized the British claims of torturing.

status distinctions (Gerth and Mills 1958, *c.f.* Kerbo, 2009: 104). This brings the discussion again to Weber's view of the integration among the three dimensions of social stratification, "class, honor, party" (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004) in terms of building royal authority within Saudi society. In this regard, Saudi Arabia was described as "an ideal example of non-democratic society" (*NYT*, March 10, 1991).[136] There are three main themes of the traditional Saudi authority in terms of relationships with Arab states.

First, there is royal support for Arab "leaders" regarding the challenges they face. For instance, *The London Times* reported, "King Khalid expressed his support for Iraq's battle with the enemies of Arabs" (October 10, 1980).[137] This support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s shifted in the 1990s after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, as King Fahd announced his full support of the Emir of Kuwait "after Saddam invaded Kuwait" (*The London Times*, August 3, 1990). This priority in the Saudi Arab's policy leads to the second theme of the solidarity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The London Times presented the GCC's countries as traditional Arab Sheikhdoms. In an article titled "Sheikhs waver on Gulf role," it made a statement about "Saudi's traditionally forceful leadership" (November 14, 1982). In addition to the

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[136] The article is headlined "Kuwaitis vent anger on the Emir." Comparing the Kuwaiti issue with Saudi Arabia would enhance the democratic image of Kuwait as a parliamentary state versus such an absolute monarchy as Saudi Arabia.

[137] More examples of Saudi support to Arab leaders can be found in *NYT*. An article titled "Sadat Said to Allay Saudis' Fears," explained the Egyptian appreciation of Saudi policy in its support and considered the Saudi attitude in the Arab-Israeli conflict (December 6, 1977). An article covered King Fahd meeting with Hafez al-Assad regarding Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis. In this article, four sons of Ibn Saud were introduced by their royal titles and bureaucratic positions (July 5, 1982).

"royal" similarity among the six states, religious authority is another sort of similarity that helped explained the solidarity. For instance, *The London Times* argued "Qatar's good relations with Saudi Arabia are traditional and based on a religious tie as both populations are Sunni Muslims of the orthodox Wahhabi sect" (September 3, 1976). The British paper went further by indicating of the Qataris' "Wahhabi traditions reliev[ing] them of Saudi religious pressures and they have been glad to accept the Saudi military umbrella" (November 12, 1985).

The last theme is the negative relationship Saudis have with Arab states. *NYT* reported a protest by some Egyptians against their government who left its citizens working at the mercy of what they said was a "Bedouin," "primitive" and "dark-age culture" (August 28, 1995). In addition, *The London Times* reported Yemeni protests toward what they called Saudi interference in Yemeni affairs stating "stirring the pot of mutual suspicion, was also suspected because of deep anxiety among the ruling Saudi royal family about Yemen's march towards pluralism and its decision to allow women a strong political role" (May 9, 1994). The second article explained the suspicion of Saudi interference in neighboring countries, as the Saudi authorities were concerned about reforms in those states because of the potential for transference of the protests to the Kingdom.

Some articles coded as traditional authority discuss Saudi foreign policy beyond the diplomatic relations with Arabs and the West (*NYT* = 11; *London Times* = 3. Most of

these articles dealt with involvement with different countries, including the Palestine

issue, Persian Gulf tensions, and Islamists fighting around world.[138]

Following the third era, the Saudi attention to the Palestine issue continued its

decline based on regional political developments. However, the financial support to PLO

still exists in this era, as *The London Times* reported King Fahd's promise of cash

backing for Arafat (September 9, 1993).[139] Such financial support came under suspicion

in the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks, because Americans thought money provided by Saudis

to the Palestinians might be used for terrorist activities. *NYT* discusses that the "nations

that both fund all the terrorism in the world ... [including] Saudi Arabia where the royal

family on Thursday joined in a telethon supporting Palestinian Martyrs" (April 13, 2002).

As an additional outcome of 9/11, Saudis offered, for a second time, a peace plan

with Israel by the Crown Prince Abdullah to become King Abdullah in 2002. *The London

Times* reported Abdullah's initiative in two articles (March 6, 2002; and March 17, 2002).

This initiative came 20 years after Fahd's first efforts failed to reach peace with Israel.

Such an initiative represents a serious shift in the Saudi attitude toward Israel, as Saudis

did not favor the Egyptian-Israeli treaty in Camp David as *NYT* reported Fahd's leading

role in isolating Sadat's regime from Arab solidarity (March 16, 1979).

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[138] The only exception is an article dealing with the Saudi-Taiwan relations (*NYT* July 11, 1977).

[139] This promise is dated ten days later than the Oslo Accords between the Israeli government and the PLO. Such a promise by King Fahd reflects the Saudi favoring of such agreements shepherd by Clinton administration. The American agenda is very clear in the *NYT*'s report.

Political developments in the Middle East pulled much of the Arabs' attention away from the conflict with Israel. The revolution in Iran, including the war with Iraq, supported by most of the Arab states and led by Saudi Arabia, gained attention in the 1980s. The Saudi-Iranian conflict reached its height during the 1987 Hajj (pilgrimage) session.[140] *NYT* reported demonstrations in Tehran with crowds cheering "down to America, down King Fahd" (August 6, 1987). Placing King Fahd's name along with America underscores the traditional authority of the absolute monarch alongside the national entity of the U.S. Such cheering reflected the Iranians' view of Saudi Arabia as Fahd's country rather than as a large neighboring country. King Fahd was the leader of the security institution facing Iranian pilgrims who broke the Saudi proscriptions against demonstrations. Thus, Iranians personalized the Saudi action as Fahd's action, not unlike those illustrated by Collins and Makowsky (2010) when considering the patriarchal/personal authority as part of the absolute monarchy as opposed to a bureaucracy that characterizes industrial states.

Ironically, the Iraqi regime turned out to be the harshest enemy of Saudi Arabia two years later after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam Hussein's regime invaded Kuwait and threatened other nations including Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi slogans broadcast by national radio were attacking what they called the reactionary royal regimes supporting American imperialism. In this vein, the "sheiks and kings" who rule the six

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[140] On July 31, 1987, a group of Iranian pilgrims took over the streets of Mecca, to demonstrate against the U.S. The Iranians demonstrators were carrying slogans and photos of Ayatollah Khomeini as a part of what they believed was "Distancing Ourselves from *Mushrikīn*." Saudi security forces stopped the demonstration. This led to the deaths of over 400 people, mostly Iranians. While Iranians called this incident a "massacre," Saudis called it "sabotage" (see: Hunter, 1991: 156-157).

member states of the GCC met to prevent the Iraqi threats (*NYT*, December 23, 1990).

This crisis presents the "personal" rivalry between Saddam Hussein and King Fahd in a

very traditional way. According to *NYT*, "Saddam Hussein and King Fahd have got a

personal problem and, somehow, it's got to be resolved" (February 7, 1992). Unlike a

rational-legal authority system where norms and laws control the state's policies, the

personal authority of rulers is the measure of policies. This is different from charismatic

authority, as there is nothing about the personal features of King Fahd in this report.[141]

    As mentioned earlier, the former fighters in Afghanistan were upset with the

western military presence in Saudi territories, which led to a series of rebellions and even

terrorist attacks. To deal with this threat, Saudi authorities encouraged and supported the

mujahedeen to travel to defend Muslims in Yugoslavia (Merdjanova, 2013). In an article

titled "Muslims from Abroad Join in War against Serbs," *NYT* reported, "[a]id from

Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries is commonplace in Bosnia Herzegovina"

(November 14, 1992). However, the "fundamentalists" focused their anger on the Saudi

administration, which increased after the 9/11 attacks as Saudi authorities supported the

American War on Terrorism, especially criticizing the Taliban and cut diplomatic ties

with the organization (*NYT*, September 26, 2001).[142] Unfortunately, the data collected

has very little on this topic of challenging the Saudi authority by Wahhabis, who no

longer recognized the Saudi King as the legitimate guardian of the Muslim nation.

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[141] The article started with the headline, "Gates, in Mideast, is said to Discuss Ouster of Hussein: Next turn of the screw seeks Saudi and Egyptian help in scaring, then deposing the recalcitrant Iraqi. Gates will reportedly confer on Hussein's ouster. No carrots, just sticks, political and military."

[142] The article refers to Saudi Arabia as "the kingdom."

Rational-Legal Authority

This section focuses on the articles presenting the bureaucracy and institutions in Saudi Arabia. Table 22 highlights the various themes found in the coverage, and it is worth noting that the representation of rational-legal authority in *NYT* declined (-11%), while in *The London Times* it increased (5%). The decline in *NYT* was balanced by an increase in mentions of traditional authority (12%), while *The London Times'* coverage of traditional authority decreased (-6%), but still was the majority of mentions of the Kingdom. It is clear that both papers tended to emphasize traditional authority in Saudi Arabia in the post-Oil Embargo era.

Table 22: Rational-Legal Authority in *The London Times* & *NYT* Coverage Between 3/26/1975 - 8/1/2005

Categories from articles of *Traditional Authority* (*T*)	*Times*	*NYT*	Total
Oil and Development	12 (30%)	24 (70.6%)	36 (48.65%)
Sovereignty	17 (42.5%)	4 (11.76%)	21 (28.38%)
Diplomacy –Involvements	7 (17.5%)	2 (5.88%)	9 (12.16%)
Diplomacy with West	3 (7.5%)	3 (8.82%)	6 (8.11%)
Diplomacy with Arabs	1 (2.5%)	1 (2.94%)	2 (2.7%)
Total	40 (100%)	34 (100%)	74 (100%)

A chi-square test of independence could not be performed to examine the relation between the newspapers and categories because more than 20% of the expected cell

counts were less than 5. After running Z-tests between both newspapers, results for each category found significant differences in:

(1) "Oil and Development" as the Z-Score= -3.4823, (the p-value= 0.0005).

(2) "Sovereignty" Z-Score= 2.9232, (the p-value= 0.0005).

Both results are significant at p <0.05. The rest categories were not significant at p <0.05.

Oil and Development

Oil and development represent almost half of the articles coded as rational-legal authority. *NYT* focused more on this topic than *The London Times* (70.6% and 30%, respectively). Oil is the dominant topic with an emphasis on government monopolization of the national oil industry (*c.f.* Yergin, 2011). This included nationalizing the oil sector by ensuring that the governmental held all of ARAMCO stocks as reported in the late 1970s. "Aramco is 60 percent owned by the Saudi Arabian Government, which is expected to take over the remaining 40 percent of producing assets later this year [1978]" (*NYT*, March 7, 1978). Even in the 21st century, the Saudi government still controls this sector, echoed by a *The London Times* report that stated, "Saudi Arabia's Oil Council controls the oil industry in Saudi Arabia" (November 3, 2003).

The primary concern of these articles was prices, as eight of the *NYT*'s articles were concerned the Saudi influence upon oil prices.[143] The American paper presents Saudi government as a reasonable "rational" figure that tends to keep oil at an acceptable price for Western industrial countries, mainly the U.S. *NYT* reported "Saudi Oil Minister lead OPEC and tends to reduce the price" (June 3, 1985). Even in case of crude shortages

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[143] Regarding *The London Times*, there is an article focused on oil that was concerned with oil prices, mainly Saudi influence upon oil prices by its overproduction. The article mentioned some Saudi officials as a sign of the bureaucracy in oil sector (April 8, 1986).

caused by political issues in other producer countries, Saudi officials have a clear policy

of helping their allies to get non-expensive oil. For example, on September 23, 1985, *NYT*

reported Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister announcing that "[h]is

country has threatened to raise production and undermine world oil price." *NYT* presents

this Saudi attitude as a long-term policy. Daniel Yergin, a researcher on oil-economy

emphasizes, "Fahd made clear that the opposition to higher oil prices was not Yamani's

position alone, but Saudi policy" (2011: 624).[144] The only exception in these reports was

on October 2, 1977, when it was reported that "[t]he Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, Sheik

Zaki Yamani, spoke of freezing Saudi oil production in a bid to get Western backing for

the Middle East peace the Arabs want." Such a hint of using oil as a mean of pressure

upon Western powers fits with the 1970s context, as Saudi Arabia led the Oil Embargo

four years earlier.

The Saudi oil policy was not always favored by American writers. Some of them

criticized oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, for what they described as high prices

benefiting undeveloped countries. At this point, a Saudi official identified himself as an

Adviser to the Oil Minister rather than a Prince and wrote an article titled "A Saudi

Explanation of Oil Pricing." In it, Abdul-Aziz Salman Al-Saud responded to an article

written by an American scholar, mentioning the developments in educational and training

systems in Saudi Arabia as a sign of properly investing oil revenue (November 25, 1990).

There is only one article reporting on Saudi investment plans for the development of the

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[144] An example of the kingdom's willingness to increase its crude output to undermine
the prices comes from an article titled, "Saudi Asks Joint Effort On Pricing: Yamani Ties
Rise By His Nation to Cuts by Others Iraqi Minister's Proposal Oil Meeting Differing
Views of Outlook" (*NYT*, June 10, 1980). In addition, other articles reported Saudi
influences upon oil prices and OPEC.

oil sector. *NYT* reported, "Saudis Plan Oil Refining Contracts: B.P. Signs Contract, Saudis Ready to Sign Oil Refining Agreements, Aramco Dominates Production, Petromin to Develop Operations" (January 9, 1980).

The British and American political agendas were reflected in this coverage. Saudi oil affairs are reported in 13 *NYT* articles, and two in *The London Times*. This is typical as American companies are involved in the Saudi oil industry much more than British, which leads me to argue that each paper tends to focus on its own national interests.

The papers do, however, have the same level of interest in the development of non-petroleum sectors in Saudi Arabia (ten articles in *The London Times* and eleven in *NYT*). These articles focused on British and American cooperation with the Saudi government to construct some of the Saudi infrastructure, arms deals, banking and other economic agreements, in addition to an article from each paper reporting Saudi importing specialists on interior development. All these articles present the Saudi Arabian bureaucracy by introducing Saudi officials by their positions rather than royal titles. Indeed, many of those officials are not members of the Saudi royal family (e.g., Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani).

National interests might lead to a rivalry between British and American companies which might have caused some reaction in the media coverage. *The London Times* reported an allegation that bribery was involved in a contract to build a university

campus in Saudi Arabia after a British company lost this project in favor of an American

company (February 20, 1976).[145]

NYT presents the Saudi pro-Americanism economic policy in this era. For

instance, "Saudi Arabia devalued its riyal to the United States dollar effective

immediately, the Saudi monetary agency said today" (June 9, 1981). The Saudi

government took this step after it nationalized ARAMCO in 1980. On the other hand, *The*

London Times reported the nationalization of the banking system in two articles. An

article reported the nationalization of foreign banks working in the country by

announcing that at least 60% of the stocks must be held by Saudi investors (April 10,

1978). The same topic is reported in *The London Times* again on March 6, 1981.

In terms of arms deals, the AWACS sold by Americans to the Saudi government

was the lead topic in terms of rational-legal authority.[146] *The London Times* published an

article discussing this deal (October 3, 1981), while *NYT* published two articles regarding

the deal as a victory for the Saudi government. The rational-diplomatic negotiation

between Saudis and American ended up favoring the Saudis after a long debate in the

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[145] Bribes could be introduced in different terms. In a *The London Times* article on the Al-Yamamah deal, it was stated that a Saudi official indicated, "the commission is part of such a deal as it is a part of the traditional Arab generosity" (October 12, 1994).

[146] There is little in this data regarding Al-Yamamah, an arms deal between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. The only article mentioning it was coded as traditional authority (October 12, 1994).

U.S.[147] Addressing the Saudi officials and institutions regarding the development of the state leads this discussion to the bureaucratization of sovereignty of Saudi Arabia.

Sovereignty

The governmental sovereignty in Saudi Arabia, as reported in this coverage, focused on four primary areas. This includes dealing with Saudi citizens, foreign nationals, foreign embassies, and border issues. *The London Times* seems to be more interested in the Saudi interior bureaucracy than *NYT*.

The London Times reported a development in the Saudi security system by introducing a computer database for citizens and visitors in an article titled "Big brother gets ready to key in" (May17, 1984). The article discusses the development of state-control by the Saudi government enabling the security system to gain access to information regarding all of Saudi Arabia via a computer system. Such modernization of the state facilities was introduced to British readers by linking it to George Orwell's *1984*. The novel describes how every citizen is under constant surveillance by authorities via their "telescreens," thus the expression "Big Brother is watching you"—and not "watching *for* you"—was very popular in the novel (and has since gained global recognition as an expression of fearsome state vigilance over its subjects). Saudi authority, mainly via the security system, was introduced as having the potential of being a similar tyrannical authority.

The impact of state sovereignty upon citizens in Saudi Arabia was introduced during these years. This included reporting laws affecting people's daily lives, such as

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[147] On October 1, 1981 *NYT* published an article with the following partial headline: "Issue and Debate—Awacs for Saudi Arabia: In the National Interest?; Renegotiation Effort Dramatizes Dispute on Awacs Sale The Background Change in Southwest Asia."

banning tinted car windows (*The London Times*, October 18, 2004). Such a law in as hot a country as Saudi Arabia serves the security system and is a clear sign of state control. Other efforts at such control can be found, such as the *NYT*'s article reporting "*Saudi Arabian government* stripped Bin Laden of his citizenship in 1994" (October 8, 1998; emphasis mine). Having the right to strip a person of their citizenship is a sign of governmental sovereignty rather than the sovereignty of the monarch, as the action was assigned to the bureaucratic "government" rather than individual "royals." However, the coverage of Saudi state sovereignty was not always negative. On May 17, 2005, *The London Times* reported the first elections in Saudi Arabia for the Municipal Councils, a apparent move towards democratic processes.

The reports of Saudi governmental sovereignty upon foreign nationals are more numerous than reports covering governmental sovereignty upon Saudi citizens. Eight articles in *The London Times* and two in *NYT* focused on Saudi governmental intuitions' dealing with foreign nationals. One issue was dealing with Iranian pilgrims and their desire to demonstrate in Mecca during the Hajj (pilgrimage) season. Three articles reported this issue as a legal matter associated with Saudi sovereignty, specifically the law prohibiting demonstrations. This is not only limited to the 1987's Hajj season crisis mentioned earlier. On September 15, 1982, *The London Times* reported that "Saudi Arabia has deported 18 Iranian Muslim pilgrims who were arrested there on Friday during an 'anti-American, anti-Zionist demonstration." The same topic was discussed in *NYT* (September 25, 1982), and *The London Times* (July 31, 1988). The sovereign right of excluding unwanted foreigners was also reported in the case when Saudi Arabia

deported 76 girls to India because, according to a Saudi police officer, they were illegally begging (*The London Times*, January 15, 1997).

Such legal actions are reported in some articles covering Western nationals, mostly British. In addition to the case of the two British nurses in 1997,[148] there are other articles criticizing the Saudi judicial system based on its approach to Western prisoners. *The London Times* reported the story of British and Belgian men who were charged with murdering a British man. According to the article, all three men were engaged in the *illegal* production of alcohol and the defendants murdered the victim to reduce competition (October 10, 2001). A few years later, "Michael Theodoulou reported a criticism upon the Saudi judicial system and work system" (*The London Times*, July 16, 2004) questioning the credibility of the judicial system's effectiveness.

Saudi law does not always hurt those westerners, as explained earlier in the nurses' case. Moreover, when *The London Times* reported a story headlined "Briton breaks out of Saudi Arabian jail," no mention was made of religious elements in Saudi law (December 29, 1980). On the other hand, *NYT*, reporting a story about an American man imprisoned in Saudi Arabia, complained about the poor help from his government (i.e., U.S.). The article indicated, "Saudi law allows the accused to be detained until a dispute is resolved" (February 23, 1983). The Saudi legal system is applied, in theory, equally to westerners, yet no harsh punishment was reported against a Western national.

In the same manner of the Saudi dealings with westerners from a sovereign perspective, *The London Times* reported a story of "Prevent[ing] England players with

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[148] Two articles from *The London Times*' in this data tied to this case addressed Saudi law. Within these one can read, "Adjourned the trial of British Nurses in Saudi case" (July 28, 1997), and "sentencing one of them to prison and lashes" (December 22, 1997).

Israeli stamps in their passports from being denied entry to Saudi Arabia" (October 18, 1988). This story recalls the anti-Semitism discussed earlier. The presentation of Saudi sovereignty is enhanced in the story which reported King Fahd's request for replacing the American Ambassador Hume Horan after his criticism of the Saudi-Chinese arms deal (*The London Times*, April 2, 1988).

Finally, the border conflicts get precious little coverage in this fourth era. The only case mentioned is a *The London Times'* report on February 24, 1982,

> Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia—which leased the two islands to Egypt in the 1950s to facilitate the blockade of the Tiran Strait—was quoted as telling Saudi university students that the Egyptian government was responsible for returning them to the mother country.[149]

In the same manner of practicing sovereignty within national territories, *The London Times* reported an action taken by the Saudi government in which they turned an Iraqi tanker away from the Saudi Red Sea oil terminal (August 14, 1990). The Saudi government did this after Iraq invaded Kuwait. This brings us to a discussion of bureaucracy and Saudi foreign policies.

Bureaucracy of the Saudi Foreign Policies

The oil industry, interior development, religious and judicial issues are matters which involved other countries. The articles concerning Saudi diplomatic relations and policies are fewer than other themes coded as rational-legal authority, especially those that focus on relations with Arab countries. There are only two articles related to this

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[149] The Tiran Strait is located between the peninsulas of Sinai and Arabian separating the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea. There is long debate over ownership of its islands and whether they belong to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Israel. They are currently under Israeli control. Saudis and Egyptian deny any responsibility over these islands to avoid conflict with Israel.

subject and both could be counted as consequences of the Gulf crisis. On December 21, 1981, *NYT* published an article titled "Security Accord Signed by Saudis and Bahrain." The article discussed the precautions of Iranians threatened in the Gulf States during the Iran-Iraq War, with Saudi Arabia acting as the superpower of the GCC. The article mentioned the "causeway to the Saudi mainland" that opened in 1986. This agreement to support the allied rulers, including building a bridge between two countries, emphasizes the nature of the bureaucracy of Saudi foreign policy. In the same manner, the Saudi government issued financial claims against Iraq as a consequence of invading Kuwait (*The London Times*, February 27, 1991). This article presents the Saudi government as the defender of national interests rather than royal desires.

Each paper has a different interest in Saudi diplomatic affairs with the West. *The London Times* looks as if it was not in favor of Saudi policies as some diplomatic crises took place between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. The paper criticized Saudi Arabia, recalling the film *Death of a Princess* (October 10, 1986). Even after the 9/11 attacks, *The London Times* criticized Saudi Arabia in a way that led the Saudi Ambassador to challenge a British writer, asking him to prove his claim of the existence of anti-Americanism in the Saudi educational system (November 21, 2001). Indeed, such an attitude could be counted as part of the national interests of the British paper, especially when an article reported the American interests in Saudi Arabia were getting stronger, "the best base America has ever had" (February 21, 1977). On the other hand, *NYT* published three articles related to Saudi relations with Western countries, including the Saudi financing of an Islamic center in the U.S. and Americans' concerns regarding such an activity (August 28, 1979). The situation became different in 1990s when the Saudi

government expressed its concerns to the U.S. administration regarding their suspicion of bombings in Saudi territories (March 31, 1997).[150]

During this fourth era, Saudi foreign policy was an important element for both national and international relations, and the country was involved in many diplomatic issues, especially the mediations to solve other countries' problems. The primary topic of such mediations is the Arab-Israeli conflict and its consequences in Lebanon. This included a diplomatic change when the Saudi envoy confirmed the peace plan accepting the recognition of Israel (*The London Times*, November 16, 1981).[151] This Saudi tendency toward achieving peace in the Middle East presented itself in a very clear way after the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqis, as *NYT* cited James Baker in his Outlines Peace Approach indicating "Saudis Say They Will Be 'Active'" (March 9, 1991). However, the focus on Lebanon in this era was greater than the focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this regard, *The London Times* reported on the Americans who were seeking "diplomatic aid of the moderate Saudi Government in trying to resolve the Lebanon Crisis" (August 3, 1983). *NYT* reported the Saudi pressure on the Lebanese by denying aid in order to force some Lebanese politicians to follow the Saudi-American path

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[150] There is one more article in *NYT* that reported on the Saudi-Austrian Pact. It mentioned loaning $850 million and was signed by the Saudi Finance and Economy Minister (March 24, 1982).

[151] The article attributes this news story to *NYT*. This second article was not analyzed in this research.

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(February 16, 1983). Moreover, *The London Times* reported on successful Saudi efforts

to end the Lebanese conflict (October 24, 1989).[152]

The coverage of the Saudi involvement in international affairs also included

attempts to solve problems among African countries (*The London Times*, June 30, 1975),

as well as including negotiations with Soviets regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

This latter article reported the Saudi state sent an envoy acting on behalf of the Saudi

foreign office presenting the institutionalized view of Saudi authorities (*The London*

Times, August 23, 1990).

These articles reflected the bureaucratic face of Saudi foreign policy, which is

counted as rational-legal authority because of the authority of office rather than certain

individuals acting based on their traditional status or charismatic features.

Newspapers' Source and Agenda Setting

In the former chapters I discussed the relationship between the various sources of

news stories and the British-American agendas in Saudi Arabia. This fourth era witnessed

two major wars in the Persian Gulf, alongside developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict,

in addition to issues inside the Saudi royal family affecting state policies toward these

developments. Table 23 shows the sources of news stories for both papers. The sources

reflect agenda-setting based on political interests.

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[152] This involvement caused Saudi Arabia some problems such as threats against its
diplomats in Lebanon. On January 18, 1984, *The London Times* reported the Saudi
Consul's kidnap led to fears of a Beirut terror campaign against Saudis.

Table 23: The Sources of News Stories in The Times & The NYT Coverage Between 3/26/1975 - 8/1/2005*

Source of News		# AND % of *T*	# AND % of *R*	# AND % of Total
American Journalist/Writer	*Times*	2 (33.33%)	1 (2.5%)	3 (3%)
	NYT	47 (71.21%)	8 (23.53%)	55 (55%)
British Journalist/Writer	*Times*	35 (58.33%)	18 (45%)	53 (53%)
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	0	1 (1%)
Saudi Officials	*Times*	3 (5%)	4 (10%)	7 (7%)
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	11 (32.35%)	12 (12%)
American Officials	*Times*	2 (33.33%)	2 (5%)	4 (4%)
	NYT	2 (30.03%)	2 (11.76%)	4 (4%)
Saudi Media	*Times*	1 (1.67%)	1 (2.5%)	2 (2%)
	NYT	2 (30.03%)	3 (8.82%)	5 (5%)
Arab Writers	*Times*	1 (1.67%)	0	1 (1%)
	NYT	3 (4.54%)	3 (8.82%)	6 (6%)
Reuter	*Times*	3 (5%)	2 (5%)	5 (5%)
	NYT	0	0	0
American Media	*Times*	1 (1.67%)	0	1 (1%)
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	1 (2.94%)	2 (2%)
Cypriot Journalist	*Times*	1 (1.67%)	0	1 (1%)
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	0	1 (1%)
German Official	*Times*	0	0	0
	NYT	0	1 (2.94%)	1 (1%)
Japanese Photographer	*Times*	0	0	0
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	0	1 (1%)
French Newspapers	*Times*	0	0	0
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	0	1 (1%)
Italian Journalist	*Times*	1 (1.67%)	0	1 (1%)
	NYT	0	0	0
Book Review	*Times*	0	0	0
	NYT	1 (1.51%)	1 (2.94%)	2 (2%)

Table 23 (cont'd)

Known	*Times*	50 *(83.33%)*	28 *(70%)*	78 *(78%)*
	NYT	61 *(92.42%)*	30 *(88.24%)*	91 *(91%)*
Unknown	*Times*	10 *(16.67%)*	12 *(30%)*	22 *(22%)*
	NYT	5 *(7.58%)*	4 *(11.76%)*	9 *(9%)*
Total	*Times*	60 *(100%)*	40 *(100%)*	100 *(100%)*
	NYT	66 *(100%)*	34 *(100%)*	100 *(100%)*

* No articles found to code as *C*, (dominated by Charismatic authority)

One may note the number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown" category) declined during these years. *NYT Times* was more likely to demonstrate the source of stories than was *The London Times*—identifying sources in 91 of the 100 articles (91%), while *The London Times* only identified sources in 78 of the 100 selected articles (78%). A chi-square test shows that there is a statistically significance difference between these newspapers and their willingness to identifying sources ($\chi^2 = 6.45$, df =1, 200, sig. = 0.011085).

The number of articles with unreported sources (the "Unknown" category) has been declined compared with the third era. However, the number of source-identified articles is still greater than the first era. *NYT* was more likely to identify the source of stories (89%) than was *The London Times* (83%).

Gitlin (1980) contends journalists may be seen as symbol-handlers maintaining hegemony by reporting news in a manner that best serves the dominant agenda (*c.f.* Tuchman, 1978). As in the third era, British and American writers and journalists dominate the sources of these articles as each paper is *mostly* attributed to its own nationals. *NYT* attributed 55 articles to American writers and journalists and three by

British, while 53 of *The London Times* articles were attributed to British writers and journalists, as well as a single article by an American journalist.[153]

The articles sourced by Saudi officials in *The London Times* decreased to seven articles, while the *NYT* articles sourced by the Saudi officials increased to 12 articles. Articles sourced by American officials decreased in this era (four in each paper) compared with 13 articles in the third era. However, no British official was cited as a source in these articles. This is a sign of the continuing increase of American engagement in the region with the positive growth in the relationship between the Saudi state and the U.S. versus the continuing gradual decline of British engagement in Saudi affairs. This can be considered a long-term policy as the Saudi state supported the War on Terrorism led by the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. Presenting Saudi Arabia as mainly a traditional authority explains American policy towards the homeland of most of the participants in these attacks.

The royal identity of the Saudi state was very clear in both papers as it represents 60-66% of the sample analyzed. The 9/11 attacks did not lead to the demonization of Saudis in any of this data. Indeed, the articles dated after September 11, 2001 mostly reported stories about interior matters in Saudi Arabia.

The continued dearth of articles covering the Palestine issue reflects the dilemma Arabs were in during the events of the 1980s and 1990s, including the three Gulf wars and the Lebanese crisis. This is understandable as a conflict with strong neighbors such as Iraq and Iran represents a direct threat to the Saudi entity, leading the government to seek assistance from an American ally to ensure the security of the Saudi throne.

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[153] *The London Times*' picture gallery is not reported in this fourth era.

The term "Wahhabism" increases somewhat in this coverage, as it appeared in seven articles compared to four in the third era. Still, this coverage does not emphasize the term as much as it did in the first and second eras. The term "Wahhabism" was mentioned four times in *The London Times* and two in *NYT*. The term used to be used to label the fighters who built the Kingdom and defended it from enemies in the holy wars. In this era, there is no holy war (Operation Desert Storm would not apply, as most of the troops were non-Muslims, and the focus was on national, not religious, interests).

By this time period Wahhabis had turned their role as the fighters for the Kingdom to the orthodoxy of preachers focusing on marginal matters in the lives of ordinary people. It is not surprising to see those preachers concern themselves with women's affairs, education, media, and personal piety. It is known that religious police, called *mutaween*[154] are involved in the daily lives of various people to check on their behaviors and morality (Al-Rasheed, 2010). However, there is nothing in the data selected for this research reporting such practices. This might be attributed to the methodology. In the former chapter, I expected the revitalization of the term because of the wave of Islamic revivals, especially those groups who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and the 9/11 attacks. However, the coverage appears to avoid labeling these "fanatic" groups under the umbrella term "Wahhabi," favoring Saudi religious authority, as those groups do not belong to religious institutions. This attitude by both newspapers is understood because those "fanatical" groups frequently attack the Saudi royal family and formal religious institutions, doubting the "purity" of their religion.

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[154] Also known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.

CHAPTER NINE:

Conclusion

The coverage of Saudi authority in *The London Times* and *NYT* is an interesting and timely topic, as the Kingdom itself holds an important position in the Middle East as well as in the global village. Using Weber's typology of power helps to understand Western portrayals of authority concerning the conservative Muslim Kingdom. Weber's three types of authority might look simple on the surface, though a deeper analysis illustrates the complexity of these authority structures. For this reason, I reiterate my approach to Weber's three types of authority as illustrated in Figure 2—The Intermingling of the Three Weberian Types of Authority. The combination of types of authority seems more helpful than idea types that are rarely found in real world situations (*c.f.*, Gerth and Mills, 1958:299-300).

The analyses show that most of the articles in this project from both newspapers, and for the 104 years under study, tended to emphasize traditional authority and rational-legal authority, while charismatic authority was far less prevalent. Traditional authority occupied greater space in *The London Times* (66.82%) than *NYT* (61.38%),[155] while rational-legal authority was found more often in *NYT* (36.5%) than *The London Times* (31.33%). Charismatic authority occupied very limited space in both *The London Times* (1.85%) and *NYT* (2.12%).

[155] The total articles coded in this research are 846:

The London Times	455
NYT	391

The lack of appearance of charismatic authority in this coverage rejects one of my hypotheses, as charismatic authority was expected to be more highly represented. This hypothesis was based on the characters of Saudi Kings, especially Kings Ibn Saud, Faisal, and Fahd, as those kings enjoyed, and continue to do so, a reputation of strength, firmness, fluency, and political sagacity within Saudi folklore. There are many stories about Ibn Saud and Faisal, describing them as exceptional leaders with special abilities that at times seem nearly superhuman. Such images are enhanced by the educational curricula in Saudi Arabia.[156] Still, Western media coverage had another agenda in presenting Saudi leadership, as presenting the royal family and others as charismatic was rarely discussed. Charismatic authority was often blended in the coverage, but was rarely the prominent form of authority presented.

Figure 5 tracks the timeline of this research and the tension of the three types of authority during the four eras of Saudi history. Traditional authority is the dominant type throughout the project, with the single exception of rational-legal authority in *NYT* coverage in the second era. This era—building the Saudi bureaucracy (1923-1953)— presented Saudi authority as a more bureaucratic government than any other era.

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[156] As described in a previous work (Alrebh, 2011), an instance of these abilities, is illustrated in the tenth-grade Reading Classes lesson: "His Majesty al-Faisal Describes His Great Father." In it, King Faisal describes the courage and strength of his father, Ibn Saud, when he was severely injured in a battle with the Ajman tribe. Despite being eviscerated by an enemy's lucky bullet that ignited the shells on the cartridge belt around his waist, he merely cinched his belt and successfully led his warriors to victory. This story fits with Weber's description of the charismatic leader as someone who is great and beyond normal human abilities and actions. "The genuinely charismatic ruler is responsible precisely to those whom he rules. He is responsible for but one thing, that he personally and actually be the God-willed master" (Gerth and Mills, 1958, p. 249).

Figure 5: Types of Authority in Saudi Arabia in The London Times & the NYT Coverage Between January1, 1901 to August 1, 2005

The dominance of traditional authority during the first era is understandable given the means of building the kingdom by sword and faith. Wars, tribal bands, and religion are traditional elements of the legitimacy that emerged with statehood in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, it is not surprising to find 83.51% of *NYT*'s articles and 79.64% of *The London Times*' articles in the first era presented Ibn Saud's power as traditional authority, as the young tribal leader was fighting to build his kingdom legitimated by Wahhabi clergy. Therefore, the first era can be considered an exceptional part of this timeline, as strictly historical conditions made traditional authority the dominant type.

In the other three eras, *The London Times* coverage appears to be stable with a range of articles between 60-64% regarding traditional authority, and 32.95-40% using

rational-legal authority. Alternately, *NYT* shifted its focus, as the range varied from 42-66% presentations of traditional authority, and 40-56% using rational-legal authority. Unlike *The London Times*, this gap between traditional and rational-legal authority in *NYT* presentations reflects a seemingly volatile change of public presentation of Saudi authority in this American newspaper.

At this point, I argue the reflection of an American political agenda in *NYT* is clearer than the reflection of a British political agenda in *The London Times*. This might also reflect the level of interest of the U.K. and the U.S. The growth of *NYT*'s presentation of Saudi Arabia as traditional authority in the third and fourth eras was concurrent with the development of the Saudi attitude toward some of the Western (mainly American) interests, such as the Oil Embargo in the third era and the radical Wahhabi attacks on the American interests in the fourth. *The London Times* remained relatively stable, as the perception of the Arab monarchy is clear in the British press. In addition, the U.K. voluntarily quit drilling for oil in Saudi Arabia which left the door open for Americans to advance their involvement in this field, changing the alliances within the region.

Figure 6 shows the various categories generated from the selected articles that used traditional authority to present power in Saudi Arabia. *The London Times* and *NYT* most frequently used these themes to describe the patriarchal, royal, tribal, and religious background of Saudi authority. This includes royal control of oil and development, diplomacy and international involvement, interior wars and conflicts, royal sovereignty over interior affairs, and finally religious authority.

Figure 6: Categories from articles of Traditional Authority in *The London Times* and *NYT* Coverage January1, 1901 to August 1, 2005

Within the coverage we can see how the various stages of the Saudi state evolved. Internal wars and conflicts was the primary theme in the first era before considerably declining in the second era, only to disappear completely in the last two eras. This is understandable since the wars of building the state was at the core of Saudi authority during the first era, and the quelling of tribal rebellion was one of Ibn Saud challenges in the second. After that, there was no serious challenge to Saudi authority within the country requiring military action. Contrarily, the diplomatic theme, which was rarely part of the first era's coverage, was a major component of in the second and third eras before declining in the last era. Clearly, the topic of foreign policy is an important theme of rational-legal authority as Figure 7 shows.

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Royal sovereignty over interior policies grew as time progressed, as the range ascended throughout the timeline (22.56-46.67% *The London Times* and 17.1-30.3% *NYT*). Religious authority appears to increase slightly in *The London Times*. This same theme started high in *NYT* in the first era, declined in the second and third, before increasing again in the fourth. The royal control of oil and development was low throughout the eras, except in the second, when it occupied 21.43% of the articles coded as traditional authority in *NYT*, and 10.71% in *The London Times*. This was the era of exploring oil in the Saudi territories, and the time of growth of the Saudi bureaucracy into a modern state. As illustrated in the previous chapters, most the articles concerning oil and developmental affairs were coded as rational-legal authority because of the focus of the bureaucratic approaches of oil, infrastructure, and professional training.

The themes in Figure 6 present Saudi Arabia as an absolute monarchy ruled by a strong royal family legitimized by a religious institution. The absolute rulers govern the country and shape its international relations without needing approval from a parliamentary body. The traditional authority reported in *The London Times* and *NYT* reflects the strong relationship between state and religion as discussed in Islamic heritage, as Ibn Khaldun (2005:140; Rosenthal, 1967:305) and Talal Asad (1997) argue. As previously stated, data from *The London Times* and *NYT* supports Zelizer's conception of reporters as an interpretive community, in terms of generating "contemporary standards of action for other members of the interpretive community" (1993: 232-233).

Figure 7 shows the various categories generated from articles considered to be framed as using rational-legal authority. *The London Times* and *NYT* most frequently used these themes to describe bureaucratic approaches of governance by Saudi

authorities. This includes the state's sovereign and interior policy, foreign policy, as well

as oil and development.

Figure 7: Categories from articles of Rational-Legal Authority in *The London Times* and *NYT* Coverage January1, 1901 to August 1, 2005

As with the coverage using traditional authority, the stages of Saudi state clearly affect

the presentation of rational-legal authority. For example, the theme of oil and

development was absent in the first era before increasing throughout the rest of the

timeline.

The few articles coded rational-authority in the first era (17.37% in *The London

Times* and 11% in *NYT*) may lead the viewer to emphasize certain topics in a way which

appears to be greater than their actual size in terms of numbers rather than percentage

shown in Figure 7. For example, the theme of diplomacy and international involvement is

at its highest level during the first era as Figure 7 shows (68.96% in *The London Times* and 60% in *NYT*). During the first era, however, there are only 26 articles concerning this theme (20 in *The London Times* and 6 in *NYT*). The same number of articles concerning Saudi foreign policy in *NYT* during the fourth era represents no more than 17.64% of article coded rational-legal authority. Thus, the data displayed in Figures 6 and 7 could be better understood when considering that Figure 5 illustrates the *actual representation* of three types in the whole timeline. That is to say, Figure 5 provides the bigger picture of the data outcome, while Figures 6 and 7 detail this big picture and provide more in-depth and comprehensive view of this coverage over the timeline of this research.

Bearing in mind the American political-economic agenda regarding Saudi oil, the *NYT*'s graph concerning this theme in Figure 7 is moving in an upward direction era by era, while in *The London Times* there is a drop in coverage from the third to the fourth eras. This reflects the deep American involvement in the Saudi oil industry compared to the British. Such international economic relations were mostly presented to audiences as bureaucratic processes accomplished by institutions rather than individuals, which might serve to explain to the public that fuel shortages were caused by economic conditions of the market and not someone with a grudge or point to prove. In addition, this might also reflect the level of interest of the U.K. and the U.S. in Saudi Arabia as an ally in the Middle East.[157]

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157 As explained earlier, the oil's theme in articles coded as rational-legal authority: the third era was 34.29% (see Table 18), and the fourth era was 30% (see Table 22).

Newspapers' Source and Agenda Setting

This dissertation includes an investigation of the attribution of articles, including

information sources as individuals (e.g., writers, reporters, officials, diplomats, etc.) or

institutions (e.g., Foreign Ministry, Reuters).[158] As Figure 8 indicates, *NYT* was more

likely to report on the source of stories than *The London Times*, with one exception in the

second era. *NYT* clearly identifies sources in 278 of the 391 articles (69.5%), while *The

London Times* identified sources in 262 of 455 articles (62.8%).

**Figure 8: Identified Sources Articles Concerning Saudi Authority in The London
Times & the NYT Coverage January1, 1901 to August 1, 2005**

Both newspapers cited multiple sources in their articles. Figure 9 shows the five most

cited source categories.

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[158] Articles attributed to such sources as "Special Correspondent in Cairo" were marked
as "unknown."

Figure 9: The Most Cited Sources Concerning Saudi Authority in *The London Times* and *NYT* Coverage January 1, 1901 to August 1, 2005

The tendency of depending on national sources, either official or intellectual, is clear in both newspapers. Saudi officials have been cited in both newspapers, with more emphasis in *NYT* than *The London Times*. It is interesting to see *NYT* depending on American writers and reporters from the beginning to the end of the timeline. On the other hand, *The London Times* started by emphasizing British politicians over British writers and reporters in the first and second eras, before shifting in the opposite direction in the third and fourth eras. As previously stated, media sources are typically writers and reporters who are often dependent on other sources.

The historical context plays an important role in the sourcing of news stories. In the first half of the 20th century, the British government was more involved in the region than the American government. Hence, it was typical to cite British officials, as they were more likely to be witnesses to events regarding Saudi Arabia. *NYT* itself cited British officials in 10.99% of the articles in the first era, reflecting the influence of British politicians in the presentation of Saudi authority to British and American audiences. In the second half of the 20th century, American officials become a typical news source for both papers. The tendency towards depending on the non-official national intellectual sources in the third and fourth eras is the common denominator between the two newspapers as Figure 9 shows.

Generally, the articles coded in this research were neither critical of nor biased toward Saudi authorities. That said, there were two articles written by Saudi officials defending the Saudi government against specific criticisms. Those articles (coded as rational-legal authority) concerned the educational system and public spending, and were a reflection of concerns towards the Saudi government and its image in Western media. Of course, there are some articles attacking Saudi Arabia, or at least criticizing it in light of the 9/11 attacks, but such articles are not found in the data sample of this research. In any case, articles defending Saudi official attitudes represent a sign of debate both for and against the Saudi administration. I considered the language used in this coverage as *neutral,* as there are neither celebrations nor attacks on Saudi authorities, even in terms of critiquing Saudi policies, such as those denying Jews entrance to Saudi territories.

The Orientalist view of the tribal rule of the Saudi royal family is clear in both newspapers in that they emphasize the *power of the royals* versus the *absence of*

representation of Saudi society. British and American audiences saw Saudi Arabia through the lens of Orientalism both in terms of favoring and disfavoring the Saudi monarch. The three types of authority were shaping Ibn Saud as an Arabian Sultan at the control of the state's will—despite the bureaucracy under his full control—according to this coverage.

This coverage supports Said's view of Orientalism (1979), especially regarding the "standardized models of the Orient" serving the Western commercial and political interests, all considering the Orient as a subject to the Occident (al-Jabiri, 1995). Such models framing the Middle East have been developed to fit with the national interests of the Western superpowers. Therefore, the presentation of authority in Saudi Arabia—as a monarch building an emergent state bureaucracy—is a matter of the support of an ally.

Clearly, more research is called for in this area. My next step is to work on a project studying authority in Saudi Arabia from historical accounts written by different parties with varied narratives. The present narrative's results reflect the *public presentation* of Saudi authority in two leading Western newspapers and not necessarily the *actual practical* authority in Saudi Arabia, or interpretations of that authority from other Western, Middle Eastern, or Eastern sources. Additional potential sources of data would include official statistics published in the Saudi press with approval from the government. It would be interesting, for example, to compare the results of such future research with the results of this dissertation.

Finally, I should mention shortcomings of my efforts. Creating a complex narrative from samples of newspapers is a tenuous process. Not only will samples miss important events, but also the datasets themselves are likely to have gaps in coverage

(such as advertisements extolling the virtues of traveling to an exotic destination such as Saudi Arabia or other places in the Middle East or Northern Africa). Additionally, future research into the media coverage of these historical events may benefit from investigations into the biases, editorial positions, authoritarian/forbearing mindsets, and authority of the reporters, their editors, and those who owned the news sources. Much like nations, all of these actors have vested interests in how certain stories are told.

Many events that took place in Saudi Arabia, or at least involved the country, both major and minor, never appeared in the articles I coded. In addition, only one person—the author—coded these articles, and while I took every precaution to withhold biases while developing my coding schemes and the actual coding, it is likely that my background as an individual who grew up and was educated in Saudi Arabia influenced the findings. In the end, I believe I have provided the reader with some knowledge of how authority was discussed in Saudi Arabia by western media sources between 1901 and 2005, the historical contexts in which these portrayals were constructed, and the efficacy of Weber's work on authority structures. It is with such knowledge that the reader can now understand the construction of media portrayals of governments and others with power in both ancient and modern societies.

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