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The Political Ideology of the Tale of the Campaign of Igor
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Yuila Mikhailova

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THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE TALE OF THE CAMPAIGN 0F IGOR 'AND
THE HOMIL Y 0N PRINCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL REALITY

By

YuIia Mikhailova

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Linguistics and Germanic, Slavic,
Asian and African Languages

2002

ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE 7’ALE OF
THE CAMPAIGN 0F IGOR’ AND THE HOMII. Y
0N PRINCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL REALITY
By

Yulia Mikhailova

Analysis of the political development of Southern Rus' in the twelfth
century (based primarily on the investigation of the Ipatevskaia
chronicle) is used to suggest answers to some disputed questions
related to the Slovo o pol/(u Igoreve and other works of twelfth
century literature. For example, what caused the contemporaries of
Igor's campaign to pay so much attention to it (as indicated by the
chronicle)? In addition, what are the political ideas expressed in the
5/ovo and how do they relate to the ideology of its contemporary
literary works and to the political reality of the time? I suggest that
the Tale assumed that unity could be achieved through consensus
among the princes based on the hierarchy of seniors and juniors
and respect of the rights of all princes and that it has parallels
other works, especially the Homily on Princes. The chronicle
indicates that such unity was achieved by the 11805 and resulted in
the successful containment of the Cumans. I suggest that Igor's
campaign attracted contemporary attention because it interrupted

this policy of containment and challenged the newly-created unity.

Copyright by
YULIA MlKHAlLOVA
2002

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Prestel,
Dr. Sendich, and Dr. Raskolnikov. Their encouragement and support
has been invaluable. Suggestions and encouragement that Dr.
Prestel, my chair, has given to me has been of inestimable
assistance. His time, patience, and consideration are greatly
appreciated. I would also like to thank Dr. Zaitsev (Moscow) for his

assistance in bringing about this project.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ................................................................................. 1
1. Scholarly Debate on the Political Ideology of the Tale ........................... 1
2. The Igor's Campaign: Contradictory Evaluations ................................. 4
3 . On the Homily on Princes .............................................................. 8

II. The Comparison of the Slave and the Homily ...................................... 10
4. On the Dating of the Homily ......................................................... 10
5. The Homily on Princes and the Igor' Tale: Similarities ............................ 12
6. The Igor' Tale and the Homily on Princes: Summary ............................. 28

Ill. The Political Context ................................................................... 29
7. "Feudal Disintegration" Revisited .................................................... 29

8. Principles of lnterprincely Relationships: What We Can Learn from the

Chronicle ..................................................................................... 31
9. In Search of lnterprincely Unity ....................................................... 49
10. Political Situation in the 11805 and the Igor' Campaign ........................ 53
lV.Conclusions .............................................................................. 64
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 66

I. Introduction

This thesis deals with two interrelated tOpics. The first treats the political
ideology of the Igor' Tale as compared with that displayed in other literary works
of the second half of the twelfth century, primarily the Homily on Princes; and the
second is an evaluation of Igor's campaign against the Cumans in 1185 in the

context of its contemporary political realities.

1. Scholarly Debate on the Political Ideology of the Tale
The interpretation of political ideas expressed in the lgor' Tale has been

widely debated. Scholars agree that it contains a call for unity among the princes
in the face of the Cuman threat, but we must ask ourselves what was to be the
basis for this unity and how did the author view an ideal political system?

The answers given by most specialists in Old Russian literature fall into
one of two categories. The first is best represented by a quotation from
Likhachev who maintains that the author of the Tale was ahead of his time
preaching "uneio cnanoii KHmKeCKoii anacm, c HOMOLLthO Koropofi AOIDKHO
ocymeCTBHTbcn enm-ICTBO Pyccxofi semnu". He "3 pasHbe KHfl3bflX pucye'r
coénpareanbIfi 06pa3 CHJ'IbHOI'O moryuiecrseHHoro KHnan", thus fortelling the
figure of an autocrat in the future centralized state. Although, he remarks that
"men cnanofi KHnmeCKofi anacm He cnunacs y aaTOpa "Cnoaa" c mneefi
enm-Ioanacmn" because "gm 3Toro He 6bIno eme peaanofi ucropmecuoii
nOHBbI", the main difference between the ideal of the Tale and actual autocracy
are, according to Likhachev, a matter of degree: the author was not able "yet"

to incorporate the idea of the authentic autocratic state but he picked up from

his contemporary reality everything that bore any signs of this future political
order. That is why he stresses the rights of the senior princes at the expense of
those of the juniors, or depicts Sviatoslav as "aenmtbifi" H "rpoaanii". Likahchev
thinks that in fact "CBnTocnaB 65in om-IMM H3 cna6eiituux Kunseii, Korna-nnéo
KI-Inxmetuux B Kneae". But the Sviatoslav of the Tale - "npencraaneHHe
uneaanoe, a He peaanoe", i.e. the author assigned to him properties of the
future "strong" ruler (Likhachev 1985, 126-127).

Another point of view is expressed by Worth when he says that the Tale
contains "aaTopCImFI an3b|B K CBOHM cooreHeCTBeHHHKaM BHOBb coenm-Imbca H
aecm ce6n no TOFI apxamecxoii Monenn, OT Koropofi OHM TaK naneito yuum"
(Worth 35). Robinson also characterizes the political ideal of the Tale as "unean
ywenuieii a npoumoe cpeonanbnoii MOHapXHH" (Robinson 1988, 11).

Lotman's approach contrasts with these two predominant points of view.
According to him, the author of the Tale is "I-IenoaeIt, norpymeHHini a
OHMCbIBaeMYtO HM aTMoccpepy, Hacronbxo nponuTaHHbIfi npencraanei-mnmu
caoero apemeHvI, HTO, name ocymnan COBpeMeHHOCTb, OI-I mower eii
npomaonOCTaeuTb nvILub "oquuleHI-Ibiii", aosaeAeHHbIfi K nneany 06pa3 ee me."
"Vines cnanoFI ueHTpannsoaaI-IHOFI anacm... aeropy "Cnoaa" npocro
HCH3BeCTHa." Thus, the author sees an ideal political system not in the future or
past centralized monarchy but in the cooperation of princes who believe that
they have an obligation to preserve the existing degree of independence: "OH
HaneeTcn Ha 6paTCI<m3i coro3 M enm-ICTBO neiicraufi MHOI’HX KHnseii-cpeonanoe, a
He I-Ia 3aMeHy ux enacm KaKofi-nuéo MHOB’I, nonvITw-Iecxu Oonee onpaanaHi-Iofi
chCTeMoiFI." This unity should be based on "faithfullness to kissing the Cross"

(Lotman 1962, 340-341).

Related to this is the question of how realistic or utOpian was the program
offered by the author of the Slovo.

Scholars who interpret the program as an attempt to restore the past, of
course, cannot consider it to be realistic. Robinson thinks that not only was the
program absolutely utOpian, but even the general political situation in reality had
nothing in common with that depicted in the Tale: "Ha6nIop,aaI.uancn B 1187 r. a
"Pycn" arm "Pyccxoii 3eMne" MMpHafl O6CTaHOBKa pyccxo—pyccxux H pyccno-
nonoaetumx COIoaoB I4 6paKoa nonTaepxtnana nonHoe HeCOOTaeTCTaue
neicremenbnocm noamuecxu nperaCI-Ioro... an3b|Ba ABTOpa K OébeAHHel-Mto
KHaaefi p.119 o6u.I,eii BoiiHbI c nonosuaMH", "BofiHbI..., KOTopofi, pasyMeeTcn He
npousotuno" (Robinson 1986, 159; Robinson 1988, 11).

A quite opposite point of view is expressed by Rybakov. According to
him, the Tale is a "MyAprii nonmmecxufi TpaIcTaT"; and the author's call "to
support Grand Prince Sviatoslav of Kiev" and "to unite all the Rus' princes against
the Cumans" was extremely relevant for the situation of 1185. He believes,
further, that this call achieved its goal: "l'loama oxaaana aoaneiicrane.
l'lonoeeuimfi HaTHCK 6bIn OCTaHoaneH" (Rybakov 5-6).

Likhachev also characterizes the author of the Tale as "peaan-Ibiii
nonmmt", but he is more cautious about the immediate political result of the call.
He suggests that it "achieved that for which it was intended" only "to some
degree". The actual political meaning of the monument is, according to
Likhachev, however, broader than the attempt to inspire certain concrete actions

on the part of the princes: nonnm-II-IEIITI CMblCfl an3blBa aeropa "Cnoaa",
momer 6blTb, saunioqancn He 3 HOHblTKe opraHuaoaaTb TOT nnu MHOFI noxon, a a
sanaqe oébemmmb oémecraeHHoe MHeI-me npoma (peonaanbe pasnopoa

KHRBefi... Banaqeii "Cnoaa" 6!:an He roano aoeI-II-Ioe, HO H unei'moe Cl'II‘IOHeHMe

pyccuux monefi aoxpyr MbICI‘IH o emIHCTBe Pyccxoii semnu. B Oan-me OT
an3blBa K opraHusaum aoeHHoro noxona npome nonoauea, OI-Ia Morna oxaarwrb
CBOHM MOéunusyioumm anuaHHeM uenbiii nepnop, pyccxoii Hcropm" (Likhachev
1985, 138, 143-144).

Thus, we see that the scholarly opinions about this subject are extremely
diverse. They depend on how the scholars view the political realities of the time

and particularly on their approach to the central event of the Tale - the campaign

of1185.

2. The Igor's Campaign: Contradictory Evaluations
My primary purpose in this discussion of Igor's campaign is to suggest a

plausible explanation for the significant interest in this event displayed by its
contemporaries. I assume the authenticity of the Tale, but even if one believes it
is a forgery the problem still remains because the campaign is also described in
two prose tales found in different versions of the chronicle; and the authenticity
of these tales, as well as their unusually detailed and emotional style, have never
been questioned.

Likhachev describes the chronicle tales as "caMbIe 05prHble H, Momer
6blTb, caMbIe ”meme H3 acex noaecrefi o CTenglX noxonax pyccmx KHnseI‘i"
(Likhachev 1972, 13). The tale found in the Lavrentevskaia edition occupies three
and a half columns (PSRL 1: 397-400); and in the Ipatevskaia, it takes up 14
columns (PSRL 2: 637-651). The first is conciderably longer than other similar
accounts, and the latter is absolutely unprecedented. For example, the whole
account of the victory won by the united Rus' princes over the Cumans in the
previous year (1184) takes only two and a half columns in the Ipatevskaia (PSRL

2: 634-637) and less than two columns in the Lavrentevskaia (PSRL 1: 394-396).

The historical defeat on the Kalka took five columns in the Ipatevskaia (PSRL 2:
740-745) and less than one and half column in Lavrentevskaia (PSRL 1: 445-447).
As for the accounts on "ordinary" campaigns made by Rus' princes against the
Cumans, their typical size is less than one column. (See, for example, PSRL 1:
362- 363, 414-415; PSRL 2: 520- 521, 629 and many others.)

It is also worth noting that the two chronicle tales describing Igor's
campaign display the opposite loyalties. The one preserved in the Ipatevskaia
expresses sympathy to lgor' and seeks any possibility to excuse his defeat; the
tale in the Lavrentevskaia, on the contrary, depicts Igor's conceit and
recklessness so sharply that some scholars even call it satirical. (Franchuk 154-
155)

Of cou rse, the chronicles of that time often varied in their interpretation of
events depending on the chronicler's political orientation, but it would be hard to
give another example of such contrasting views so elaborately argued as is found
in these tales. For some reason, both chroniclers felt that it was important for
them to sound very convincing while treating this topic and they were certain
that their readers must be very interested in the reasons for Igor's defeat.

There is no generally established explanation for this phenomenon. Most
investigators of Old Russian literature consider the campaign to be militarily and
politically insignificant. Worth even suggests this insignificance as the reason for
making the campaign the subject of the Tale: "HeaHaHuTean-Iocrb Mropn u ero
noxona cnyxcm CMMBOHOM Tpnsnaanocm ux anoxu; p.112 Toro OHM u H36paHbl

CioxceTOM 'Cnoaa (Worth 35). While this interpretation could possibly explain
why a great poet would choose the campaign as the subject of his artistic work,

it does not explain why ordinary people were so interested in this event.

Scholars who share the opinion about the insignificance of the campaign
but who also take the prose tales into account, seek to find a reason for the high
interest given it among contemporaries in some of the circumstances
accompaning the event. Robinson sees the eclipse that occurred at the same
time as the campaign as the reason for this interest. He created a genealogical
table of the Olgovichi and compared it to the table of eclipses which occured in
Rus' in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It turns out that "12 npenxoe u
pOACTBeI-IHHKOB Mropa, M3 HHX 5 aenmmx KHnsefi Kneacmx, YMean mm 65th
y6vITbI a 6HH3KMX no apemeI-m npomemy'rxax OT conHeHHbe 3aTmeHMfi." That is
why Robinson thinks that the Olgovichi and their contemporaries believed in a
special curse of the clan connected with the sun and its eclipses (Robinson 1988,
14-15; Robinson 1978).

This concept raises some questions. First of all, it is well known that many
eclipses go unnoticed by non-astronomers. Robinson is aware of that. He writes
that only four of those twelve eclipses are presented in the chronicles. As for the
other eight, there is no evidence that they were viewed by contemporaries. In
addition, the connection between an eclipse and a prince's death is established
by the chronicler only once. All other examples of "striking coincidences" do not
have any basis in the accounts. One must ask how we can know that the
contemporaries connected the eclipse of 1146 with the death of Vsevolod
Olgovich which happened fifty days later (Robinson 1988, 15-16)? But most
importantly we should note how the eclipse of 1185 is treated in the chronicles.
In the Lavrentevskaia, it is not connected with the campaign at all and is not
viewed as a bad sign, because it is followed by information about the birth of a
princess (PSRL 1: 396). In the Ipatevskaia, the tale about the campaign includes

the eclipse but it is interpreted entirely in a Christian manner without any pagan

connotations. According to this account, Igor's men were scared by the "sign"
but lgor' encouraged them: "Tam-Tm 60mm: HHKTO me He near», a 3Ha~IeHmo
Teopeub Born... a HaM'b HTO CTBOpHTb 50H: a To me HaM'b annem" (PSRL 2:
638).

Another view is Offered by latsenko, who thinks that the Ta/e's
contemporaries were interested in the campaign because it was mounted by
people of Novgorod-Seversky. According to him, this principality played a
central role in the political life of the Rus' lands at the time. "Ocrpan éopbéa 3a
CeaepumI-Iy", "Tamenoe axomneime Ceaepcxofi 3eMnM a cocraa Pycu
noponuno BCIO nvITepaTypy o noxone 1185" (latsenko 37). Unfortunately,
Iatsenko provides almost no argumentation to support his conception despite the
fact that it totally contradicts the accepted scholary picture of Rus' history in the
twelfth century.

Other scholars seek the explanation in the campaign itself and not in the
outside circumstances. Likhachev finds it in "HeprI ocoOoro Tparnsma" of this
event: "anepabie 3a acno acropmo 60pb6bl c nonosuaMH pyccxue Runabn
oxasanucs a nneHy. Bnepabie pyccxoe aoiicxo norepneno TaKoe crpaLuI-Ioe
nopameime" (Likahchev 1972, 13). He links the choice of this tragic event as the
subject of the Tale to the Rus' tradition of using defeats and other disasters for
moral teaching: " uepKOBHan H HHCTO caercxan nvITepaTypa,
HpaaoyHeHne, nonwmqecxan armatmn Haxonnrm ce6e noaop, a oémecraeHHbe
HeCHaCTbflX" (Likhachev 1985, 10). Gudzii also thinks that it was natural for a
twelfth century author to choose a defeat as a subject for his poem because "OH
CTpeMann npenonarb ypox nonmmecxoii Mynpocm anabnM" (Gudzii 129).

Thus, there is no generally accepted scholarly atitude to the subject

matter of the Igor’ Tale and I suggest that by investigating the chronicles'

information on Rus's political development in 1185 and by comparing the Tale to

the Homily on Princes we can help to shed light on this problem.

3 . On the Homily on Princes
The Homily on Princes survives in three copies, the earliest of which dates

from the fifteenth century. It was discovered and published in excerpts by M. P.
Pogodin in 1843, and the first complete publication was made by Kh. M. Loparev
in 1894. Its full name is "l'loxaana H myHeHHe CBSITbIX MyHeHHK BopHca H l'neéa.
Mecnua man a 2 new». Cnoao noxaaanoe Ha nepeHeceHHe casrrbix
crpacrorepneu. BopHca H l'ne6a, 11.3 H npOHHH He apamnyior Ha 6pa'l’bt0 caOIo".
The Homily was read on the saints' day of Boris and Gleb who were the patrons
of unity among the princes and it delivers a stern rebuke to the princes who fail
to live in peace with each other. The author calls them to stop the strife and to
follow the example of David Sviatoslavich of Chernigov (died in 1123) whose
long, prosperous rule is attributed to his good relations with his "brethren".

It is generally accepted that the Homily has strong links to the Chernigov lands
and, most likely, was created there. The alternative suggestion made by D. I.
Abramovich about its Vyshegorod origin (Abramovich 19-20) has not been
supported by other scholars (Likhachev 1985, 162; Lenhoff 174).

The Homily has already been compared to the Tale but only very broadly.
Likhachev refers to it in order to support his idea that "asTop "Cnoaa" HaXOAHTCSI
He aHe caoeii anoxu - OH TECHbIMH Hnei‘ii-IEIMH y3aMH cansaH c nepeAOBblMH
ycheMneI-IHnMH TornamHefi nonHTHHecxofi MblCflH." He sees the similarity of
these two monuments in the praising of "Hnen eAHHeHHn pychHx KHnsefi nepep,
nHLtOM aHeuJHei'I onaCHocm" and the condemnation of the strife found in the

Homily. He also points to the two lexical parallels: firstly, according to the

Homily, military conflicts are sometimes caused by "Manan 06Hp.a", and in the
Tale "HaHaLua KHnva npo manoe ce eenHItoe MOJ'IBHTH"; secondly, the Homily
states that princes lose their glory because of the strife and the characters of the
Tale "abICKOHHcTe M31: nenHeii cnaae" for the same reason. And, finally, Likhachev
draws attention to a traditional belief reflected in both monuments: in the Tale
"TepeM 6e3 KHeca" symbolizes death and in the Homily "paccemcn Ber'b
TepeMLuo" at the moment of death (Likhachev 1985, 162-163, 251-252).

The general similarity of the ideas of the Homily and the Tale has been
noted by many scholars (Adrianova-Peretc, 362-363; Eremin, 330-331; Lindberg,
3, and others), but as far as I know, there has been no individual study
dedicated to comparing these two monuments. Indeed, in the past, such a
comparison was problematic, partly because of uncertanty in the dating of the
Homily.

Relatively recently, however, new facts in the history of the Chernigov
lands discovered by Zaitsev (Zaitsev 70-75) support the dating of the Homily in
the 11705 which was first suggested by Golubovsky (Golubovsky 491-510).
Thus, the two works are very close not only geographically (as both are linked
with Chernigov) but also chronologically. Moreover, the Chernigov princes
addressed by the Homily became the protagonists of the events of 1185
described by the Tale. Therefore, by examining the Homily we can better
understand what kind of political ideas existed in the milieu the characters of the
Tale lived in.

In addition, the comparison with the Tale helps us to better understand

the Homily which, up to now has not received the scholarly attention it deserves.

II. The Comparison of the Slovo and the Homily

4. On the Dating of the Homily
The Homily could not have been created before the death of lziaslav

Davydovich because he was the last of David's sons to die; and all his sons are
refered to as no longer alive in the text of the monument. Thus, the earliest
possible date is 1161 (Golubovsky 496; Eremin 623). The question of the latest
possible date is more complicated.

The content of the Homily has generally caused scholars to think that it
was created before the Mongol invasion. M. A. Salmina mentions that this
traditional dating does not have sufficient grounds because the central topic of
the Homily, "HeoéxonHMocrb nonHHHeHHn "Mononmux" KHasefi CTapLUHM a pone
CTOI'Ib me ocrpo cronn, Hanpumep, H B XV-XVI Ba" (Salmina 430). It should be
noted, however, that the pre-Mongolian dating of the Homily is based not only
on its central idea but also on details of the text (Golubovsky 493-499). In
addition to arguments presented by Golubovsky, I would like to remark that the
warning against those "noraHbIe Ha CBOIO 6paTHIo aoaaonnme" (226) can hardly
be interpreted in the context of post-Mongolian Russia. In any case, the central
idea of the Homily is broader than that summarized by Salmina. It treats not only
the subordination of juniors to seniors but also the responsibility of seniors, an
idea not very popular in the fifteenth and, even less so, in the sixteenth century.
In addition, of course, the Homily could not have been created later then its
earliest surviving copy and since the earliest dates from the fifteenth century, the
sixteenth century is out of the question. Thus, the general dating in the twelfth -

first quarter of the thirteenth century remains valid.

10

1175 as the exact date was suggested by P. V. Golubovsky. He linked
the Homily with the conflict between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich of Chernigov and
his cousin Oleg Sviatoslavich of Novgorod-Seversky (Golubovsky 491-510).

The suggestion of Golubovsky was supported and slightly modified by
Zaitsev (1174 instead of 1175 Zaitsev 70-75). He discovered that the struggle
between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich and Oleg Sviatoslavich was the very last
conflict in the Chernigov lands before the battle on the Kalka. It was followed by
a long period of unity and cooperation among the Chernigov princes. The next
conflict after 1174 in the Chernigov lands is mentioned by the chronicle only
under 1226 (PSRL, 1:448; Zaitsev 1981, 75). Thus, the condemnation of the
princely strife and the call for unity was relevant in this region after 1174 only
once - in 1226; and the Homily sounds too politically engaged to suggest that
the author is not referring to any real contemporary events that were important
for him and his audience. It should be noted that the chronicle does not mention
the Cumans in connection with the conflict of 1226; and their participation in Rus'
events is highly unlikely after they were crushed by the Mongols. According to
Pletneva, "AOHCKHe H annHenpoacxne nonoaubi ..., no cymecrey, 65mm
yHHHTomeHbI" at Kalka and "ocraaLuHecn...He HrpanH yxce HHKaKofi ponH a
HcropHH pchKHx KHmKecre" (Pletneva 299). Thus, the condemnation of the
princes who resort to the help of pagans does not fit the situation of 1226. In
addition, we would expect that an author who speaks about God's punishment
for princely strife would mention so significant an example of this punishment as
the recent defeat on the Kalka. The absence of such mention also leads us to
believe that the Homily was pronounced before Kalka.

This leaves the period between 1161 and 1174 inclusively. Besides the

struggle of 1174, discussed above, only one more conflict took place in the

11

Chernigov lands during this period, in 1167. Thus, the Homily can be linked with
either 1174 or 1167. The discovery of the month when the conflict of 1174 took
place provides more support for the latter dating: for it occured in the end of
April or beginning of May which fits perfectly fits May 2 as the day when the
Homily was delivered (Zaitsev 1981 , 70-75). Additional arguments for 1174 are

provided by the analysis of the conflict itself and will be discussed later.

5. The Homily on Princes and the Igor' Tale: Similarities
Let us, now, begin the comparison of the Homily and the lgor' Tale with

an exploration of the similarities between the two works.

A connection between interprincely struggle and the Cuman threat is the
most obvious of them. The Homily condemns those "noraHbIn Ha CBOIO 6paTHIo
aosaomme"; the Tale contains many well-khown passages on the same topic, as,
for example, "Bbl 60 cBOHMH KpamonaMH HaanTe HaaonHTH noraHbIn Ha 3eMnio
Pychon, Ha )KH3t-Ib Bcecnaanio. KOTopOIo 60 Onme HacunHe or semnu
I'lonoeeuKbIH!" (88)

The passionate call for the subordination of junior princes to seniors is
another obvious parallell. The Homily begins with a warning against "ItHnva,
npOTHBSILLLeCfl crapeiiuiefi 6paTbH". Saints Boris and Gleb are viewed in the
Homily, in accordance with the Rus' tradition, as the patrons of princely unity and
subordination: "Ame rm COTOHa KonH epamy aaepmerb memy 6pa'rbeio, p,a
nOMflHeT‘b ceIo canTOIo, KaKO CMepr anOOHTa naHe annTH, HemenH apaxmy
ynepmam" (226). In the Tale, the same idea is most explicitly expressed in the
well-known speech of Sviatoslav (zolotoe slovo). He complains about the
"Henocoéue" of the princes and blames lgor' and Vsevolod because they

"HeHeCTHo ononecre, HeHecrHo 60 KpOBb noraHon npoanC're" (76).

12

The meaning of the complaint is obvious. The accusation levelled against
lgor' and Vsevolod looks more complicated and needs some clarification. When
Sviatoslav says "ononecre" he most likely referes to their initial victory over the
Cumans, so the message is that the campaign is a "dishonorable" action not
because it resulted in a defeat, but as even the initial victory was "dishonorable,"
the very concept of this campaign was wrong. We can understand why this was
so if we note that the next thing Sviatoslav says is, "Ce nH CTaopHcre moeii
cpe6peHei7I cenHHe?" Thus, he accuses lgor' and Vsevolod of disrespect to his
seniority. This interpretation can be prompted by comparing this passage to the
account of the lgor' campaign found in the Ipatevskaia chronicle: "Casi'rocnaa'b...
canLua 0 OPEN»! csoeH once LunH COYTb Ha I'lonoauH oyTaHaLuecn ero H He moOo
6bICTb emy"(PSRL 2: 645). The chronicler specifically stresses that Sviatoslav
condemned the campaign before he knew about the defeat. When he was later
told about it he said, "KaKo mam: MH Onwerb Ha Mropn, TaKO HblHe manyio
OonbMH no Virope", that is "My pity on lgor' now is greater than my anger with
him was" (PSRL 2: 645). Thus, the very fact that they "u.InH, yTaHBLuecn ero",
provoked Sviatoslav's anger. His words from an earlier Ipatevskaia entry helps us
understand why this was so. "l4 peHe Canrocnaa 6paTbH caoeH: "Ce 831: crapee
Slpocnaaa, a Tbl, Mropio, crapee Bceaonona, a Home a BaM'b so O'rtta MecTo
ocrancn. A aenIo Te6e, Mropio, cne OCTaTH c1: SlpocnaBOM 6nIOCTH
l“lepHvIroaa...” (PSRL 2: 618) This statement clearly shows that it was appropriate
for lgor' and Vsevolod to follow the senior and not to take independent actions.
Thus, Sviatoslav was angry with Igor's violation of princely hierarchy. The
definition "HeHecrHo" in the Tale perfectly fits this interpretation, because one of
the meanings of the word "Hecrb" was "Mecro a cpeonaanoii Hepapxm".

Accordingly, "HeHeCTHocrb" refers to disrespect of the hierarchy. Thus, I cannot

13

agree with the interpretation of this passage made by Likhachev who thinks that
it contradicts the notion of "Hecrb" accepted by the contemporaries: "C TOHKH
3peHHsI daeonaanoH MopanH, Mropb H Bceaonop, OTHIonb He HapyLanH
npeACTaaneHHa o "HeCTH" KHnseH. "'-IeCTb" ceoro OHH ypOHHnH a rnasax
CBaTocnaBa H aaTopa "Cnoaa" TOflbKO noromy, H10 3 nOHCKax nHHHoH CI‘laBbI OHH
npenanH HHTeperl Pyccon 3eMnH" (Likahchev 1985, 121). I suggest that, on the
contrary, the author of the Tale in the passage in question shared his
contemporary conception of "Hecrb".

It is also worth noting that Sviatoslav in the Ipatevskaia chronicle provides
an argument for his right to tell other princes what to do. His argumentation,
however, is not particularly eloquent, because nobody questioned his right at
this point. In the Tale, the same argumentation is strengthened with a reference
to a physical sign of seniority, "silver hair". A parallel to this can be found in the
Ipatevskaia account of a vehement dispute between Viacheslav and Yuri
Dolgorukii in which Viacheslav uses a physical sign of seniority, his beard, as an
ultimate argument: "Ce 83b Te6e crapeH eCTb He ManOMb, Ho MHOTOMb, a3b
y>Ke Oopona'r'b, a 11:1 cn ecH pOAMfl'b". Yuri found this argument to be
undisputable (PSRL 2: 430). Thus, by mentioning his "silver hair", Sviatoslav in the
Tale stresses his right to be the senior prince and to be properly respected by
juniors.

At this point, we come to another important similarity between the two
works. Images of ideal senior princes play an important part in both of them.
They are the characters of Sviatoslav and Yaroslav in the Tale and David
Sviatoslavich of Chernigov in the Homily. The authors of both works are
concerned to demonstrate that their "model princes" legally and properly

occupied the senior seats. In the Tale, there is one more passage (besides "silver

14

hair") that could possibly be interpreted in this way. It is a well-known "temnoe
mesto" - an "obscure" reference to Sviatoslav as "coxon a Mbl‘l’ex". Scholars have
made various suggestions about the meaning of this image; the most widely
accepted interpretation is an "aged falcon" (lnstitut russkoi literatury 5: 20, see
references). Thus, we see at least one clear and one questionable evidence of
using Sviatoslav's old age as the ground of his senior position. As for David of
the Homily, the "parable" ("anTHa") about him begins with the statement:
"KHmItauJe a HepHHroae a 60nblueM'b «HameHbe, nOHthe 60 crapHH 6paTbH
caoeii" (226). It is interesting to note that both monuments refer to the senior
prince as "I’OCI‘IOAHH" - a term that was new for the time. According to
Likhachev, it reflected "pocr daeonaanoro rnaebi Hap, croanMH HHHte ero Ha
necrHHLte (peonaanoro nonHHHeHHn KHnsbnMH". "anHHMafl HOBEIH TepMHH
"rocnonHH" aa'rop "Cnoea", OHeBHnHO, anHHMan H Hoaoe OTHOLueHHe K
KHnmeCKoH anacrH". Likhachev also sees the connection between this term and
characteristics of the senior princes as "aenHItHe" and "l'pO3I-lble" found in the Tale
(Likhachev 1985, 141).

In the Homily, Davyd's brethren "cnymaxyTb ero, nxo OTua, H nOItopsIIOTcsI
emy, nKo rocnonHHy". This corresponds well with Likhachev's interpretation of
the term cited above with one important correction. He thinks that "06pau.teHHe
K HHsIsIo "rocnop.HH" anepable crano ynorpeénn'rbcn Ha cesepo—aocroxe PyCH,
TaM, me cxnanblaanacb Hoaan CHanan «Hamecxaa anaCTb". It was later accepted
in Galich - another center of the growing princely authority. The emergence of
the term, that "HMeeT COBepLUeI-IHO TOHHon xpOHonorHIo" is dated in 11705 on
the basis of chronicles (Likahchev 1985, 140-141). The evidence of the Homily
supports this dating but it contradicts the statement on the exclusive use of the

term in the North-East. The Homily shows that it was also used in Chernigov

15

which Likhachev did not include as one of the centers of a "new strong princely
power". The evidence of the Homily becomes even more important if we take
into account that the Chernigov chronicle survived only in the sparse and often
distorted excerpts. The term "rocnop,HH" is not found in those excerpts but a
Chernigov parallel to its use in the Homily still exists. This is the inscription on the
famous cup of Davyd's son Vladimir where the latter is called "ocnonapb"
(Medyntseva 128-135).

In the Tale, the term is used to refer to Yaroslav of Galich and to Rurik
and Davyd Rostislavichi. They are included in the "list" of princes addressed by
the author's call to unite and to set out against the Cumans (80-86). The first
place in this "list" belongs to Vsevolod Big Nest who was the Monomakhovichi
senior. However, he is not called "rocnonHH". The reason for this might be the
use of the term "aenHKHH KHn3b" while addressing Vsevolod. Rurik had the
second position in the Monomakhovichi hierarchy, his younger brother Davyd
occupied the third place. Accordingly, they go immediately after Vsevolod in the
Tale. The formal status of Yaroslav was lower than that of the Monomakhovichi
and the Olgovichi because he belonged to a Galician princely line whose
members did not have right to compete for the Kievan throne. The rapid
economic and military growth of Galicia, however, made him de facto one of the
most powereful princes. Yaroslav did not personally claim Kiev, thus formally
observing the dynasty rules; but his military support of some rivals against the
others had great impact on the outcome of the struggle. The author of the Tale
points to this when he says that Yaroslav "opens the gates of Kiev" (82). I
suggest that this is why the Tale puts him immediately after Vsevolod, Rurik, and
Davyd and before the other Monomakhovichi. The princes on the "list" after

Yaroslav are all the Monomakhovichi who were placed in order of their seniority.

16

None of them is called "rocnop,HH". Thus, the prince having the highest position in
the hierarchy is addressed as "aenHKHH KHnsb," the three most powerful princes
after him are refered as "rocnona". It follows that "rocnop.HH" might be the title
applied to the status next to that of "BenHKHH mass". The most essential thing for
the present discussion, however, is that, as Likhachev put it, "anHHMan HoabIH
TepMHH "rocnonHH" aa'rop "Cnoaa", OHeaHnHo, anHHman H Hosoe OTHOLueHHe K
KHHJKeCKoH anacrH"; even if the details of this terminology need further
clarification.

The next and, probably, the most important parallel is the connection
between the appropriate behavior of the seniors and the obedience owed to
them by the juniors which is established in both works. The reference to Davyd's
authority treated above, "BpaTbn me ero BHmute TaKO cyma, Beii cnytuaxyrb
ero, RKO orLta, H noxopmorcn eMy, SIKO rocnonHHy" (228) serves as a conclusion
to the description of David's virtue. The remark "emanate ero TaKO cyma" is quite
interesting. It assumes that if he were not "TaKO cyulHH", "like that", he couldn't
expect the obedience of the junior princes.

A similar idea can be found in the Tale. Sviatoslav describes the power of
the "CHanbIH, H 6oraTbIH, H MHOTOBOHH" prince Yaroslav and his victorious
warriors. Immediately after that, he addresses Igor' and Vsevolod: "Ho peItoc're:
"Myxtaemecn caMH: npeAHtOtO cnaay caMH I'IOXHTHM'b, a 3aAHIOIo CH caMH
nonenHM" (78). "Ho" indicates that Sviatoslav sees a contradiction between the
two facts - the power, wealth and the victories of Yaroslav are contrasted to the
separate action of Igor' and Vsevolod. This opposition is easily explained by
noting that Yaroslav sat in Chernigov and thus was an immediate senior prince for
the prince of Novgorod Seversky, who was Igor'. So, by taking his own separate

action, Igor' violated his obligations as Yaroslav's junior. Thus, the message of this

17

passage is that Igor' did not have any reason to disobey Yaroslav, who deserved
all due respect from his junior princes not only because of his position, but
because he had the properties necessary for a good senior. The real life
circumstances of Igor's campaign, however, were more complicated. According
to the Ipatevskaia, Yaroslav sent a military detachment to assist Igor' (PSRL 2:
638). It can only mean that Yaroslav was aware of Igor's intention and approved
it. But whatever happened in reality, while analyzing a text we need to deal with
the situation as it is presented and interpreted within itself; and the author of the
Tale certainly put all the responsibility exclusively on Igor'. We will accept this
attitude as far as the ideology of the Tale is concerned as readily as a student of,
say, Mozart and Salieri would not care to analyze the actual historical reason for
Mozart's death.

Both authors display similar attitudes towards interprincely agreements.
David of the Homily, for example, always fulfilled the agreements he made, even
if the other party broke the treaty: "KOMY nH Itpecr'b uenoaame, 80 secs )KHBOT'b
CBOH He crynawe. Ame KTO K HEMY He chpaanmue uenoaaHHn, OH )Ke enHHaKo
chpaenntue" (228). Thus, strict fulfillment of the agreements is an important
property of the positive role model in the Homily. In the Tale, the violation of
agreement plays an important part in the negative picture of "bad times". The
passionate depiction of "Heaecenan ronHHa" is followed by the explanation of its
reasons: "PeKOCTa 6o 6paT 6paTy: 'Ce Moe, a T0 Nice me'" (68). Likhachev has
demonstrated that this is a satirical reference to the standard formula of
interprincely treaties: "Ce moe, a T0 Tsoe" (Likhachev, 1985, 217-218). Thus, the
disasters happened because "brothers" (that is princes) broke their agreements.

Another interesting similarity is the reference to the glory of the ancestors

as a regulator for the behavior of contemporary princes. This aspect of the Tale

18

has been thoroughly studied. According to Likhachev, princes in the Tale "acerna
nannIOTcn HOCHTennMH Cl'laBbl Hx pOAOHaHaanHKOB" (Likhachev 1985, 89-90; see
also Lotman 1977, 98-101). Scholars link it to the pagan tradition of "Kyan Pona"
among the princes explored by Komarovich. (Likhachev 1985, 27; Komarovich
1960), thus, it seems quite appropriate for a secular monument with as many
pagan elements as are found in the Igor’ Tale. A similar motif found in a church
sermon appears more surprising. Yet, it is nevertheless present in the Homily. Let
us take a closer look at the methods used by the author when trying to convince
the princes to follow his call. His arguments fall into three categories. He cites
Scripture and claims that those who fail to live in peace will be punished by God
while the peaceful princes will be awarded in Heaven. This is, of course, quite
normal and would certanly be appropriate for the church rhethoric. Then, he
promises to those following his instruction prosperity on Earth; for they will rule
as succesfully as David did. Along with these two kinds of "normal" church
argumentation, however, we see a quite different method of addresseng the
audience. "I'losHaHTe, KHn3H, caoe BenHHeCTBo H CBOIO Hecrb," - exhorts the
author. These "aenHHecrao" and "Hecrb" are based on the glory of the ancestors
as we see from the further development of the statement: "KHnsn nena HMaTb
canroro BononHMepa... KaIty 6paTbIO HMaTe, CHn aenHKan Hionoraoptta BopHca H
I'neéa" (228). The role played by Vladimir, Boris, and Gleb in this passage
appears to be syncretic: for they act as Christian Saints and glorious ancestors at

one and the same time.

5. The Igor' Tale and the Homily on Princes: Differences
Let us now turn to the ideological differences between the two

monuments. First of all, the idea of the responsibility of seniors is expressed in

19

the Homily much more explicitly than in the Tale. It contains probably the most
detailed exploration of this subject in the whole of Old Rus' literature.
The structure of the Homily perfectly fits this idea. The main part is almost evenly
divided between addressing first the junior princes and then the seniors. The
accusation against those "npomanumcn CTapeHmeH 6paTbH" is concluded with a
reference to the inspiring example of Boris and Gleb already cited above: "...na
I'IOMSII-IeT ceio csnTOIo, KaKO CMepr anOOHTa naHe annTH, HemenH epamy
ynepmaTH" (226). It is further strengthened with the statement that the princes
who follow this recomendation become saint-like: "V1 TO KTO npeTeanT‘b H MHp
npexce HaHHeTb, To cHMa (BopHcy H I'ne6y - IO. M.) OT Bora paeHy Many
anHMeTb" (226). Immediately after that, the "parable" about David is
introduced: "0(3th we saw anTHIO o ceM, He a nyte CTpaHe 6blBLUtO" (226);
and a bright picture of a positive role model for seniors follows. "O ceM" is
obviously refering to the previous sentences praising those "KTO MHp npeme
HaHHeTb". But these references, at the same time, summarize the passage on
juniors. In other words, the call not to take military actions and try to peacefully
resolve conflicts is directed at both parties, i. e., to seniors no less than juniors.
It is also worth noting that the possibility of not having any conflicts at
all seems not to come to the author's mind. They are viewed as an integral
part of interprincely relationships. This is especially well demonstrated
by the reasons the author provides to explain why David "HH c IteM He HMeaLue
apamppi": "Ame KTO Ha Hb paTb BOBABHI‘HeTb, OH me l'IOKOpeHHeM'b CBOHM‘b paTb
yCTaannLue... Ame KTO KpHBAY K HeMy cOTBopnme OT 6paTbH, OH )Ke ace Ha
c06e anTHpawe". Thus, David was involved in the "normal" politics of his time

with its "paTH" and "KpHBAbI". He managed to rule peacefully, so that "a aenHue

20

THmHHe 6blCTb KHnHteHHe ero", only because of the correct way he dealt with
these situations.

The mention of "wrongdoings" (KpHana) commited by David's breathren
against him, however, contradicts the claim that all members of the clan
"cnyLLIaxyTb ero, nKo OTLIa, H noxopnIOTcsI eMy, nKo rocnonHHy". This
contradiction helps us to better understand the main task of the second part of
the Homily. The author appears very eager to convince the audience that a good
senior who properly treats even non-perfect juniors will be finally awarded with
their obedience and cooperation. The author's concern about the equal
responsibility of seniors and juniors provides an explanation for its "dubious
compositional model" which, according to Lenhoff, consists of "structuring a
sermon around an anecdote" about David while the Saints on whose day the
Homily was pronounced serve only as "the point of departure"; for "the
translation of relics is briefly mentioned" (Lenhoff 73-74). Boris and Gleb
presented a problem for the author of the Homily because in addition to being
the patrons of princely unity in general, they also had more specific connections
with teaching a moral lesson to juniors in particular. As is well known, Boris and
Gleb, according to their Vita, chose to die rather then disobey their senior
prince. Thus, focusing exclusively on the Saints who were supposed to be the
subject of the sermon would distort the message the author wanted to conduct.
He would lack a model for seniors that could be paralleled to the model for
juniors presented by Boris and Gleb. That's why he used a local legend to
"make up" a saintly senior prince,thereby "matching" the junior martyrs.

Such an emphass on the responsibility of senior princes finds its explanation in the
circumstances of the conflict of 1174 and presents one more piece of evidence

suportive of this dating. Thus, I agree with Lenhoff when she rejects Loparev's

21

view positing a Greek model of the Homily as an explanation for its unusual
composition and when she characterises the text as "shaped primarily by a
constellation of vertical bonds to a localizable situation" (Lenhoff 74). Let us now
turn to the real life situation that was most likely reflected in the Homily.

The roots Of the conflict that occured in 1174 go back to 1166-67, when
Sviatoslav Vladimirovich of Vshchizh and Starodub died (Vshchizh and Starodub
werevolosts in Chernigov principality).As Sviatoslav did not have any legitimate
heirs, the senior prince of the Chernigov lands had to decide who would get
these volosts. The prince of Chernigov was then Sviatoslav Vsevolodich, the
future Grand Prince of Kiev and a major character in the Igor' Tale. He gave
Vshchizh to his son and Starodub to his brother Yaroslav. His cousin Oleg
Sviatoslavich of Novgorod - Seversky argued against Sviatoslav's decision and
claimed that Starodub should have been given to him. This claim seems to have
been correct, because he was supported by Rostislav of Kiev and by the citizens
of Starodub. Perhaps more significantly, Oleg's supporters refered to "npaana":
"PocTchaB )Ke OYCMOTpHB'b npasny, once CanTocnaa OOHAHT'b Onra, TeM )Ke
HaHa nOMOTaTH OnroaH. MHoro me nocslna POCTHCl'IaB‘b K‘b CaaTocnaBy Benn emy
oy npaany HanenHTH Onra H noépa HMT: xom". I agree with the scholars who
interpret "npaana" here as "law" and write the word with capital l"l, assuming that
Rostislav checked with some codex when he "yCMOTpHa'b l'lpaep,y" (Zaitsev 1975,
87) Accepting or not accepting this interpretation is not, however, relevant for
the present discussion. The essential fact is that the junior prince Oleg was,
according to the norms of the time, offended by the senior, whether the norms
existed as a written law or as an oral tradition. Oleg took military action, and
then Sviatoslav gave him four cities but not Starodub. Rostislav urged Oleg to

make peace (PSRL 2: 525-526). He did so but was not satisfied with this

22

compromise and in 1174 made another attempt to get Starodub. This time he
was assisted by his younger brothers Igor' and Vsevolod, future main characters
in the Tale. Oleg and his brothers were defeated and after that, the participants
of the conflict "oyMHpHBLUch" on unknown terms and the question of Starodub
was never brought up again (PSRL 1: 367; PSRL 2: 579, 599-600; Zaitsev 1981,
70-75).

We see that the military actions in both cases - in 1167 and 1174 - were initiated
by a junior prince, but the cause of the conflict was an illegitimate decision made
by a senior. The situation of 1174, again, better fits the Homily with its reference
to "Manan 06Hna" made by seniors to juniors. Depriving Sviatoslav of Starodub in
1166 could hardly be called a "minor" offence. According to the norms of the
time, he seemed to have good reason to avenge himself militarily. Certainly, it
was different in 1174 when he started the war after he had already been
compensated for his loss; for this corresponds more to the condemnation of
juniors who could not tolerate even a minor Offence on the part of the seniors
and begin wars against them, as well as to the call for seniors not to offend the
juniors which is found in the Homily. In addition, there are more grounds to claim
that the conflict occured because of "enHHoe 3nonOMHeHHe" in reference to the
situation of 1174 rather than to the 1166-67. Golubovsky thinks that the author of
the Homily referes to Oleg's unsuccessful attempt to illegaly occupy the
Chernigov seat that properly belonged to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich: "Oner
nonro He mor 336w“. HH Heynaatuerocn nena c "lepHHl'OBOM, HH CTaprx
COMHHTeanbIX OTHOLueHHH' CanTocnaaa BceaonoppaHHa K ero OTuy" (Golubovsky
502). I suggest that, although all this could have contributed to Oleg's hard
feelings, "anonOMHeHHe" here primarily referes to his second attempt to get

Starodub. In 1167, as we have seen, the cause of the conflict was quite serious

23

and could not be characterized as "ep,HHoe 3nonOMHeHHe", in other words as
something very petty. In 1174, it was quite different. The four cities received by
Oleg instead of Starodub were likely to be considered as an adequate
compensation. We can assume this because of the change in Rostislav's attitude.
As the Kievan prince, he observed "npaana" in the interprincely relationships and
protected Oleg when the latter was offended. Therefore, if after the
compensation Rostislav urges Oleg to make peace we can conclude that he
thinks that Oleg should be satisfied and has no reason to conduct war. Under
such circumstances, the action taken by Oleg in 1174, seven years after the
conflict was solved, could be indeed called "enHHoe 3nonOMHeHHe". Thus, we
see that the difference between the Tale and the Homily in stressing the seniors'
responsibility is actually caused by the difference between the two situation
reflected in the both monuments.

Another difference between the two works deals with the princely ideal.
The virtue of a warrior plays an important part in this ideal as pictured in the Tale.
The Homily, on the contrary, does not even mention the military aspect of
princely duties. It can be easily expalined if we note that the Tale deals with the
struggle against the external enemies and the author, of course, thinks that it
should be continued, and the Homily treats the subject of internal strife and offers
ways to stop it so that all the princes could rule their lands "a aenHLte THLuHHe."

Finally, there is a difference in the details of the dramatic consequences of
the military conflicts as described in the Homily and in the Tale. The Homily treats
them as an exclusively interprincely problem and does not mention the sufferings
of the common people while the Tale contains a famous passage on "paTaH".
However, the "ideological" nature of this difference looks questionable because it

might be a reference to the archaic image of a battle as a "bloody harvesting"

24

and thus it might have been caused by artistic reasons rather than by the social
concerns expressed by the author of the Tale.

The next important group of differences is connected with the very
different nature of the Homily and the Tale as works of literature. I am not trying,
of course, to compare the literary value of the two monuments. Although the
Homily is a good example of church rhethoric, it is unworthy of any comparison
to such a masterpiece as the Igor' Tale. In addition, their genres are, of course,
also, quite different.

Scholars do not agree on the definition of the genre of the Tale, but it is
self-evident that first of all, it is a work of art. It is highly emotional and has a
complex structure. The author does not present his ideas in a logical order but
expresses them by means of artistic images. This is what makes the work so
beautiful and profound but it also, of course, increases its complexity.

The Homily is, on the contrary, more a political treatise than an artistic
work. Its structure is simple and logical. The author clearly presents his ideas and
supports them with deliberate argumentation. He shows the positive
consequences of following the presented ideal and argues against those who
thinks that it is not practical. He states the point of view of his opponents,
"PeHeTb nH KTO, SIKO (Prince Davyd - IO. M.) )KEHbI He HMe MnH peHeT'b KTO,
SIKO noma He HMe, Toro panH sanoaepp TocnoAHIo chpaBH BoaMome?
MHorathbI 6o canLuax Hexbln Heaernacu rnaronIoma: "C1: )KeHOtO H Cb Ham»
CBOHMH He MomeMb cnacTch," (228) but shows that this is wrong because
Davyd had a wife, children and "He ep,HH nOMb Hmeauie, Ho MHorH" and still
"sanoaenb BnaanHHio chpaaH a can )KHBOTe caoeMb, HH c KeM apambi Hme"
(228). The latter phrase summarizes the main idea and repeats the introductory

statement to the "parabola" that reads, "flaabm HH c KeM He HMeaLue spaml".

25

Thus, the goal a righteous prince should seek to achieve is first stated; then the
means he should use are given (as was shown above, this is the strict fulfillment
of all treaties and obligations); and finally the goal is summarized again as a
theses that has been proved. This is how the central point of the Homily - the
"parabola" - is created. This logical composition, is, of course, very different from
the emotional exclamations of the Tale.

If we now compare the authors of the two monuments as they reveal
themselves in their texts we will also find significant differences. It is well
established that the author of the Tale, whoever he was, represents secular
culture and was likely not a member of the clergy. By contrast, the author of the
Homily is, of course, a church person. This is more than just a question of their
formal status. It is interesting to compare their literary references. The author of
the Tale is well familiar with the chronicles, especially with the Primary Chronicle.
Besides the chronicles, he uses folklore extensively, as well as secular poetry but
there are no references to any church literature in his work. A particularly good
illustration of this is the passage on Rostislav's death. It was described in both the
chronicle and the Kievan Caves Pater/con but the attitude to the event is totally
opposite. In the chronicle, it is presented in a lyrical and deeply sympathetic
way; in the Patericon, on the contrary, it is depicted as God's right punishment
to Rostislav for the brutality of his men. The author of the Tale either did not
know the Pafericon or purposly chose the version given by the chronicle. In both
cases, we can clearly see his literary preferences (Likhachev 1985, 83-89).

The text of the Homily has, unlike the Tale, too few references to the
concrete events and that makes it difficult to determine its sources (the source of
the legend about David's death is, unfortunately, unknown.) Although, this very

lack of concrete historical material suggests that the author, may not have been

26

very familiar with the chronicles. On the other hand, the nature of the Homily
does not require great historical support and we should seek further evidence of
the author's lack of familiarity with the chronicles. For example, he gives us
information about David's sons: "l'lpenono6HbIH Honna CenTouJa ero CblH 6e H
HHa naa CbIHa". In fact, however, David had not three, but at least five sons.
Golubovsky thus explains this inconsistency: "Mbl nyMaeM, HTO nponoaenHHKy He
6bIno Hymnal roaopHTb o acex nnTeprx: TOflbKO Tpoe H3 HHx HrpanH a HCTopHH
caoeH semnH nonHTHHeCHon ponb, a neoe HHKaKoro 3HaHeHHa He HmenH, a
memy TeM nponoaenb HmeeT a may nonHTHHecxHe coébITHn, a CTano 6bl'l’b,
eCTeCTBeHHee ynOMSIHYTb o nenTennx, HrpaaLuHx éonee HnH MeHee 3HaHHTeanon
nonHTHHeCKyIO ponb" (Golubovsky 495). It is true that the Homily as a whole
treats political issues, but the passage on David's sons does not have any
connection with their political activity. They are mentioned not as political figuers
but simply as a part of David's earthly burden along with his wife and his
responsibility for the Chernigov land. The author emphasizes how big this burden
was. He had "not only a wife, but also children, too", "not one "AOM" but many
of them". These numerous responsibilities, however, did not prevent him from
living a righteous life; therefore nobody can refer to the family as an excuse for
being a sinner. The greater the number of David's children the more valid the
argumentation is, and it is therefore hard to imagine that the author deliberately
did not mention some of them. It seems more likely that he simply did not know
about the less famous sons of David. Nikola Sviatosha was a well- known monk of
the Kievan Cave monastery, and there is a detailed account of his life in the
Patericon with the references to his cell, his books, and other things that are

known in the monastry as "Sviatosha's" "until now" (Kievo-Pechersltii Pater/1' 376-

384). Two of Sviatosha's brothers are also mentioned in his vita included in the

27

Pafericon. In addition, they must have been well remembered in the Chernigov
lands. As for Davyd's other sons, the only source Of information about them was

the chronicle.

6. The Igor’ Tale and the Homily on Princes: Summary
We have seen that the political ideas expressed in the two monuments

are very similar. The ideal of both authors can be summarized as follows.

They both support a strong and authoritative senior prince which is
indicated by their use of the new term "rocnop.HH" and the idealized portraits of
the model seniors. But this ideal is very different from the concept of an autocrat
in the future centralized state. The power of the senior is inseparable from the
power of his whole clan and is based on it. The clan is hierarchically structured;
and every prince in this hierarchy, including the senior, has rights to be
respected and responsibilities to be fulfilled. The subjugation of the juniors does
not appear unconditional, as it became later, with the emergence of the
Muscovite centralized state.

The coexistence of many princes and princely clans pursuing their own
interests is taken for granted in both works, but the conflicts of those interests
also seem to be inevitable. This often results in military struggles that weaken
Rus' lands and encourage external enemies. Both authors condemn strife and
preach internal peace and unity in the face of external threats. They do not view
this harmony in the form of a unified political structure with an autocrat at the
top, however, instead, they believe that their goal should be achieved through a
system of princely treaties, the strict fullfilment of every prince's obligations, and

respect of every prince's rights determined by his position in the hierarchy.

28

The responsibility of seniors is better described and is more stressed in the
Homily than it is in the Tale. On the other hand, the ideal prince of the Tale must
be a brave and victorious warrior, while the Homily does not mention this aspect
of princely duties at all. These differences reflect the differences between the real
life situations that the monuments are based on.

Thus, we see that two works of quite different genres that were created
by very different people address the same problems and offer very similar
political solutions. Therefore, I think we are justified in suggesting that the political
program described above reflected the views existing in society and had some
roots in the political reality of twelfth-century Rus', particularly, as relates to the

Chernigov lands. Let us now turn to the exploration of this reality.

Ill. The Political Context

7. "Feudal Disintegration" Revisited
The Tale and the Homily seek to trace their contemporary problems to the

end of the eleventh - the beginning of the the twelfth century. They both depict
the Olgovichi founding princes: Oleg Sviatoslavich (Gorislavich) in the Tale and
his brother Davyd in the Homily. The choice of this chronological period seems
quite appropriate for both authors; for it was the time when their contemporary
system of interprincely relationships was founded.

The theoretical basis for this system was given in the "Instruction" by
Vladimir Monomakh. Lotman thinks that this work is close to the Tale "no nyxy
peLueHHn rocynachaeHI-Ibix Bonpocoa, nOHHMaHHIo anpoan nonHTHHeCKoH

HpaBCTaeHHOCTH" (Lotman 1962, 344).An important parallel to the Homily can be

29

found in Monomakh's recomendation to his sons "CTapeHLuHM nOKapaTch, c
TOHHEIMH H MeHbUJHMH moOoab HMeTH". As we know, Davyd's "junior brethren"
also not only "cnytuaxyTE ero aKo OTu,a" but "noxopniorcn emy, nHo rocnonHHy",
as well. This is more than just a coinsidence in a word. The use of the word
"noxapnTch" in the chronicles prompts the suggestion that it was a special term
related to the relationships between seniors and juniors.

The proper establishment Of these relationships was of extreme importance
for maintaining the political order in the Rus' lands at the time of the "feudal
disintegration". It had traditionally been viewed as a time of chaos and decay.
This premise of pre-revolutionary historiography was inherited by Soviet and
Western scholars and had survived until extensive archeological excavations of
Old Rus' began. The results of these excavations contrasted dramatically with the
accepted concept of degradation caused by disentegration and interprincely
wars. "The period of feudal desintegration" was definitely a time of rapid and
successful economic development. First, it was noted as a paradox but further
investigation showed that economic development and political instability had a
cause - consequence relation. The very emergence of numerous new principalities
was the result not of the "disintegration" of a certain entity into many pieces, but
rather the result of the colonization of new lands and the spread of princely
power, "pacnpOCTpaHeHHe cyp,a H naHH" both in width and depth. The increase in
number of centers of power required certain rules to regulate the relationships
between the bearers of this power, i. e., between the princes. Those rules were
not, and could not be, given by somebody at one time and in a complete form.
They evolved over the course of events and were constantly improved and
modified. Thus we see that it was difficult to achieve a fixed and stable political

order first of all because of the rapid economic growth, for this growth led to

30

constant changes in the relative power and influence of the Rus' principalities and
the changes, in their turn, undermined the balance of power among the princes.
While new centers emerged, the old ones became less significant. New trade
routes appeared, and new lands became agriculturally cultivated. This resulted in
the constant redistribution of the relative "political weight" among the
principalities and correspondingly among the princes. The growing political
influence of the urban population made the picture even more complicated. A
prince could not rule without the support of the townspeople and they did not
necessarily support the person who had the most rights to their town according
to the dynastic rules. Some general principles, however, still applied despite all
the complications of practical politics.

It is, of course, impossible to trace the complete political history of the
twelfth century in this thesis, but my two goals are to use the chronicle account
of the political events so that we can see the practical application of the ideas
developed in the "Igor' Tale" and in the Homily on Princes, and then to take a

closer look at the situation in the 11805 when Igor's campaign took place.

8. Principles of lnterprincely Relationships: What We Can Learn from the
Chronicle

As we have seen, both the Tale and the Homily pay attention to the
legitimacy of the position of senior prince and consider physical seniority as the
major ground for this legitimacy. Some of the chronicle evidence related to this
subject was already cited above. (See p. 15) The situation was not always as
clear as it was for the Olgovichi when Sviatoslav, being the oldest in his clan,
acted "a cute MeCTO" and his junior brethren followed his orders. The cause of

Viacheslav's physical seniority in the Monomakhovichi clan, which has been

31

already briefly mentioned in connection with his argument with Yury Dolgoruky
over Kiev, deserves closer attention.

Viacheslav, Monomakh's son, became the oldest among the
Monomachovichi after the death of his brothers Mstislav (1132) and Yaropolk
(1139). He lacked personal characteristics necessary for a senior, however, for he
was a weak ruler and unsuccessful warrior. According to the dynasty rules, he
had prior claims for the Kievan throne, but he never could gain the support of
the Kievan townspeople. As a result, he was repeatedly defeated in the struggle
for Kiev. The major competitors in this struggle were the Olgovichi, Yury
Dolgoruky of Suzdal' (Viacheslav's younger brother), and Viacheslav's brave and
talented nephew lziaslav Mstislavich of Volynia. Both Yury and lziaslav had their
own chroniclers whose works survived as parts of the twelfth century Kievan
chronicle. This work provides us with a valuable opportunity to see how the
violation of the principle of seniority on the part of Yury and lziaslav was
presented to the public opinion.

Yury's chronicler claims that Yury, after his victory over lziaslav,
supposedly Offered the Kievan throne to his elder brother Viacheslav: "Toma
KH3b flioer noaaéH BnHecnaaa Ha CTon KHesy". His boyars, however, urged him
to change his mind: "Bonpe )Ke pasmonaHuJa flioprn, peKyHe: "EpaTy Taoemy He
ynepxcaTb KHeaa, p,a He OYAeT ero HH To6e, HH OHOMY". fliopreaH )Ke
I'IOCJ'IYLlJaBUJI'O éonpb" and occupied Kiev himself, offering Viacheslav Vyshegorod
as compensation. Viacheslav, who was very well aware of his inability to hold
Kiev, accepted the offer (PSRL 2: 394). Thus, the chronicler presents Yury as a
supporter of the seniority rule who cared about placing Kiev into the hands of
the oldest member of the clan. It was only extremely unfavourable circumstances

that prevented him from doing so. Trying his best to protect Yury's reputation as

32

much as possible, the chronicler puts the ultimate responsibility on the boyars,
which suggests that an accusation of disrespect to physical seniority could
seriously damage a prince's image.

As for lziaslav, he presents a unique example of a prince who for a while
seemed to challenge this very principle. He used to say: "He HneT'b MeCTo K‘b
ronoae, HO ronoaa K'b MeCTy" (PSLR 2: 442) and act accordingly. Hi5 chronicler
justifies lziaslav's seizure of Kiev by creating a bright picture of his knightly virtues
and the unanimous support of the population which he enjoyed. He seems intent
on drawing his readers to the conclusion that lzaislav, although young, in fact
deserved the Kievan throne more than the legitimate but inept Viacheslav did.
According to some accounts, lziaslav Openly boasted: "floébln ecMH ronoaoro
caoeio KHeaa" (PSRL 2: 380) thus declaring his disrespect to the seniority of his
rivals Viacheslav and Yuri. lziaslav's struggle against his uncles in the 11405
presents a most open and persistent threat to the principle of seniority.

Thus, lziaslav's ultimate failure is all the more remarkable. His abundant
military talents along with the actual support of a significant and influential part of
the population could not help him hold on to Kiev for a long time. Finally, he had
to resort to the very same principle that he had previosly challenged so
vehemently. In 1151 , when he captured Kiev again, (Berezhkov 150-151) he
realised that the only way to stay there was to make his rule legitimate. Thus he
turned to his former adversary, Viacheslav, and invited him to occupy the Kievan
throne. lziaslav knew, of course, that Viacheslav was not able to rule
independently and wanted to have him as a legitimizing figure. The fact that
Viacheslav understood this‘ is indicated by his reaction to the offer: "BnHecnaBb
)Ke peHe c1: l'HeBOMb Kb Msncnaay: "HeMy MH eCH so OHOMb AHH He hams, Ho c

BenHKOM'b COpOMOMh exax'b Hc KHeaa?! Ame paTb HneT H3 f'anHHa, a npyra OT

33

HepHHroaa, To Tbl MHe KHeBb ,qaeLub'm (PSRL 2: 399). lziaslav had to repent and
to formally pronounce Viachaslav as his "father": "Once, IcnaHnIo TH cn... Tbl MH
eCH OTeub... corpeLanb eCMb...TOl‘O acero Icancn ripen BOI’OM‘b H npen
TOGOIO". "Te6e nio6nio achI OTua H HblHe TH Monamo, Tbl MH eCH OTeub, a Kblea'b
TBOH." (PSRL 2: 399, 417-418) Viacheslav was satisfied with this formal
acknowlegment of his seniority and in exchange gave up seeking real power:
"CblHy, Borb TH nOMosH, once Ha meHe eCH HeCTb aosnonch. aKbl Ha caoeMb
OTLI,H, a n nachI, CblHy, Toée MonanIo: a ech oynce CTap'b, a acex puppet. He
Mory oynce pnnHTH, Ho Gyneae 06a KHeee, aHe HaM 6yp.eT KOTOprH pnn..., a
Hneae 06a no many, a npyncHHa Mon H I'lOflK'b MOH, a To 6yp,H OOOIO Hama... a
Tbl ean c MOMM‘b l'lOl'lKOM'b H C'b CBOHMB" (PSLR 2: 419). Viacheslav went even
further after he became quite assured of lziaslav's intention to permanently have
him as a "father" and to render him all the formal honors associated with this
status. In confirmation, he made a declaration that sounds most unusual: "Once
Ha MeHsI eCH HeCTb abanoncHnb... ance ce neeLuH, Tbl MOH eCH OTeub, a Tbl MOH H
CblH‘b, Tbl nce MOH 6pa1’b" (PSLR 2:418). Thus, he accepted his formal senior
status by pronouncing lziaslav his "son"; he expressed his readiness to give up
real power by pronouncing the same lziaslav as his "father"; and, finally, he
confirmed that they are going to be equal co-rulers by declaring their
"brotherhood". This agreement worked perfectly. Yury was defeated, and no
one else questioned the legitimacy of this "duumvirate" that lasted until
Viacheslav died in 1154/55. (PSRL 2: 472-473; Berezhkov 156) Thus, the
principle of seniority finally came to dominate, although only formally, even under
the most unfavorable circumstances.

A similar situation took place a few years later. In 1158, Iziaslav's son

Mstislav of Volynia who inherited both his father's military talent and popular

34

support, managed to defeat the Kievan prince lziaslav Davydovich and to take
over Kiev. It was, probably, his father's unfortunate experience that taught
Mstislav not to try proclaiming himself a prince of Kiev. He realized that a military
victory alone was not enough to take the Kievan seat for a person who lacked
legitimate rights to it. That is why he addressed his uncle Rostislav who was then
the oldest among the Southern Monomashichi and invited him to Kiev. It is very
likely that Mstislav hoped to follow the pattern of the lziaslav-Viacheslav
"duumvirate" and to rule on his own using his senior as a decoration of
legitimacy. But Rostislav, unlike Viacheslav, would not be satisfied with the role
of decorative leader, as is clear when he states his answer to Mstislav's
invitation: "Once M51 3 npaany soaeTe c moOoaHIo, To a acnico Hp,y I-(Heay Ha CBOIO
aonIo, nIco Bbl MMETe Mn OTLteMb coée B‘b npaeny H B‘b MoeMb Bbl I'IOCJ'IYLLIaHbH
XOAHTH". He proved this declaration to be serious by rejecting the metropolitan
supported by Mstislav: "A ce Bbl nanaio: He xouy KnHma oy MHTponoan
BHneTH..." It appears that Mstislav saw the question of who gets the real power
of a Kievan prince hidden behind the argument over the metropolitan’s
candidacy. He "IcpenIco npauJecn no KnHMe" and, in his turn, rejected Rostislav's
candidate Konstantin. Finally, after "Icpenu,e peHH" the princes worked out a
compromise: "OTnoncHCTa 06a, mco He ceCTH HMa Ha CTone MMTpOl‘IOflTbCTEMb H
Ha TOM uenoaaCTa xpeCT'b, nico HHoro MHTpononHTa anaeCTH HM H3
Llapnropona". (PSRL 2 502-504; Berezhkov 170-171)

After this agreement was achieved, Rostislav became Prince of Kiev and
obtained all real power associated with this title, which is clear from the account
of his conflict with Mstislav that occured two years later. (Berezhkov 171 , 175)
"I'loexa MsncnaaHH MbCTHCI‘IaB'b Hc KHeaa, pos'brI-Ieaaabcn Ha chbIn caoero Ha

Pocmcnaaa H MHoro peHH BbCTa mencH HMH", - states the chronicler. Rostislav

35

then confiscated Mstislav's volosts in the Kievan land in accordance with his
intention to be a senior "3 npaany" and to keep his juniors "a HOCI'IYLIJaHbM".
Mstislav made an attempt to create an alliance against Rostislav but he failed, for
other princes almost unanimously supported the legitimate Prince of Kiev. Thus,
Mstislav had to give up and to make peace with Rostislav. After that, he
received his volosts back. The fact that this conflict occured soon after the war
against Izialav of Chernigov is all the more remarkable. The latter attacked
Rostislav and drove him out of Kiev. Rostislav retreated to Belgorod and stayed
there, besieged by lziaslav's troops, until Mstislav came to his rescue. Mstislav
was so famous as a victorious warrior that lziaslav "HH nonicoab BWBB, noéence
OT Eenaropona", when he heard that Mstislav was approaching. Thus, Mstislav
first captured Kiev for Rostislav and then he secured the Kievan seat for him by
defeating lziaslav. Obvious military superiority, however, did not help Mstislav in
undermaining Rostislav's authority which was based on his legitimacy. (PSLR
2:515-521)

After Rostislav died in 1167 (Berezhkov 178) Mstislav repeated his
attempt to get power over Kiev. He drove out Rostislav's weak and unpopular
heir and took over the Kievan seat. This time he did not invite any senior prince
to Kiev. This attempt to overcome the dynastic rules turned out to be disastrous.
The senior Monomakhovich of the time Andrei Bogoliubsky organized a powerful
coalition of numerous princes who were indignant with Mstislav's act and this led
to the famous sack of Kiev in 1169 when Mstislav was defeated. This event has
drawn much scholarly attention, but most of this attention has been paid to what
Andrei did after he restored his rights as senior. This was, indeed, non-
traditional; for, as it is well known, he did not go to Kiev, but assigned the

Kievan seat to one of his "brethren" instead. We must not overlook the fact,

36

however, that the restoration of Andrei's position as senior was done in
accordance with traditional dynastic rules.

Thus, we see that the rules based on a princely hierarchy dominated by
seniors were very valid and that the authors of both the Igor' Tale and the
Homily on Pn'nces derived their principle of seniority from this contemporary
reality.

Another important principle propagated in both monuments is, as we have
seen, the respect of interprincely treaties. This matter also plays a very
important role in Monomakh's "Instruction". Not only does he teach his sons,
"Ame nH Bbl 6yp.eTe erCT'b uenoaaTH Ic 6paTbH HnH Ic KOMY, a m ynpaaHa'buJe
cepnue caoe, Ha HeM nce MO>IceTe yCTonTH, Tonce LienyHTe, H uenosastue
6nIop.eTe, na He, npeCTynH, nory6HTe nymH caoee"; but also the whole
monument generated from the dramatic situation centered around the violation of
an interprincely treaty (Pouchenie Vladimira Monomakha 152). The chronicle also
provides abundant information on this subject.

Respect to the treaties is depicted by the chronicler as one of the main
princely virtues as shown by the obituary of Gleb Yurievich. The first thing the
chronicler states about the prince is "6e IcHn3b 6paTonI06eLtb, K KOMY moéo
erCT‘b uenoaatueTb, To He CTynauJeTb ero H no CMepTH". Other good things that
could be said about Gleb are mentioned later: he was "KpOTOKb, 6nar0HpaeeH'b,
MaHaCTpre nIOOn, HepHeuIcHH HHH'b HTnLLIe, HHman p.06pe Haénnwe". Thus, all
these qualities were considered less important than the most significant one -
non-violation of cross-kissing (PSLR 2: 563). It should be also mentioned that this
quality is labeled as "6paTonI06He", which reminds us of the argumentation of the
Homily with its biblical quotations preaching brotherly love used to support the

author's thesis about right interprincely relationships. "Aule IcTo rnaroneT, mo

37

Bora nioénio, 3 Spam HeHaBanio, noncb eCTb," (226) that is why princes should
live peacefully and observe the dynasty rules. (This is a kind of a play on the two
meanings of the word "brother" - "neighbour", "any other person", and the word
used by the princes to address each other.) The Tale also uses this word in the
connection with interprincely treaties: "PeIcOCTa 6o 6paT 6paTy: ce Moe, a To
Moe nce". (See above p. 18)

If fulfilling the agreements symbolyzed by cross-kissing is one of the best
virtues, its violation is, correspondingly, one of the worst sins a prince can
commit. A mishap affecting one of the princes served him right, according to the
chronicler, because he "He yCTonuJe a erCTHOM uenoaaHHH acerna" (PSLR 2:
567).

To violate a cross-kissing meant to risk one's soul. The chronicler cites the
responce given by two princes when they were offered to join an alliance against
lziaslav, "Llenoaana ecse erCTb K'b Mancnaay MCTchanHHIo... a nytueio He
monceae HrpaTH" (PSLR 2: 377).

The chroniclers express the same ideas when they directly present their
opinions on princely duties. "Bory Haicaaaamio IcHnse erCTa He nepecTynaTH H
CTapeHero 6paTa HeCTHTH", writes the chronicler when he explains the defeat of
Yaropolk who took up arms against his senior prince Mikhalko( PSLR 2: 600-602).

Extremely interesting information on this subject is contained in the
conversation between prince Rostislav and the Kievan Caves' Hegumen Polikarp
as it is given in the Ipatevskaia. This conversation deserves close attention.
According to the chronicle, Rostislav wanted to take a tonsure in the Kievan
Caves Monastery, but Polikarp "BO360pOHH" him from doing so because he

thought that Rostislav should not abandon his princely responsibilities. When

Rostislav expressed his wishes "CBOOOAHTHCSI OT ManoepemeHHaro H cyeTHaro

38

caeTa cero H MHMOTeKymaro H MHorOMHTencHaro ncHTHrI cero" Polikarp objected,
"BaM Eor TaKO senenb 6bl‘l’H: npaany nenTH Ha ceM CBeTe, a npaarty cyn cyp,HTH
H a XpeCTHOM'b uenoaaHbH Bbl CTonTH". This statement is especially valuable
because, unlike the previous citation ("Bory HaIcasaauJe IcHnae..."), it is not
connected with any political situation. We can suspect that the chronicler who
supported Mikhalko could name not those princely duties which were really
considered the most important ones but just those violated by Mikhalko's
rebellious nephew. Polikarp, however, was free from such motives. His statement
is purely theoretical. Thus, we can conclude that according to Polikarp princes
have their specific way of salvation different from that of monks. Faithfulness to
cross-kissing is an integral part of this way.1 Rostislav insisted on his preference
for the monastic path to salvation: "POCTchaa nce emy TaIco pet-Te: OTue,
KHnnceHHe H MHp He MonceT'b 6e31: rpexa 6bITH, a XOTel'I'b 6be nopeaHoaaTH

. niconce H canTHH OTuH, oynpyHHauJe Teno caoe nOCTOM H OY3KbIM'b H TeCHbIM'b
”YTeM'b xonHaLue..." Polikarp's responce to that was, "Ame cero ncenaeuJH,
IcHnnce, p,a Bonn BoncHn na 6yneTb". Although he did not directly object to the
statement that "IcHnnceHHe H MHp He MonceTb 6e3'b rpexa 6bITM", he definitely did
not agree with it. Rostislav can become a monk not because that will help him to
live a more rightseous life than he does as a prince but simply because he is free
to do whatever he wants: "Ame cero ncenaetuH, IcHnnce". (PSLR 2: 529-531)
Close parallel between Polikarp's attitude and the ideas of the Homily is self-
evident.

Chroniclers not only give theorethical support to the system of

interprincely treaties. They also assume that the princes relied on the cross-

 

' The reference to a prince as a just judge is also very interesting but it is not relevant for the
present work because neither Tale nor Homily treats this aspect of princely duties.

39

kissings in their practical affairs. The Ipatevskaia explains why Monomakhovich
Davyd was hunting in an area where Olgovich Sviatoslav could easily reach him:
"flaabmoy nce He BenOYLIJJO, HH MbIcnnmy Ha ca HHOTIcoyppy nce 3na, 3aHe
IcpeCTOMb HGCTHbIM'b oyTaeanncn GameTb c HHMb, TOMoy nce aepntueTb" (PSLR
2: 615). We do not know, however, whether this is an authentic description of
Davyd's feelings or a statement made by the chronicler in order to stress how
badly Sviatoslav acted when he violated the cross-kissing and attacked Davyd (it
is a fact, though, that Davyd was caught off guard). Another example of this kind
is presented by a conflict between the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi in the
end of the twelfth century. The two clans had a dispute over succession to the
Kievan throne. They kissed the cross in order not to start any military action
before the end of the negotiations. The Olgovichi senior Yaroslav broke the
agreement and attacked some junior Monomakhovichi. They were not able to
properly defend themselves because their senior Rurik left "pOCl'IOYCTHB'b 6paTbl-O
caoro H npyncHHy caoro, oyMa aepy IcpeCTHOMy LtenoaaHHIo" (PSLR 2: 691).

This "Bepa erCTHOMY uenOBaHHIo" was quite reasonable as we can see
from an account of the conflict between Vsevolod Sviatoslavich and Andrei in
1139/40 (Berezhkov 139). Vsevolod besieged Andrei's Pereiaslavl' but could not
capture it. They started negotiations and worked out a peace treaty. The treaty
should have been sealed, as usual, with the ceremony of kissing a Cross. Before
Vsevolod had time to perform the ceremony, a fire accidentally started in
Pereiaslavl'. It, of course, changed the military situation giving Vsevolod a chance
to capture the city. He, however, did not use this chance and proceeded with
the peace-making. His chronicler praised him a highly for doing so. He stresses
that Vsevolod did not attack the city in spite of the fact that he had not yet

kissed the cross. It is repeated twice. Vsevolod was free to attack the city, the

40

chronicler states, and it was only his exeptional good will and Christian feelings
that prevented him from doing so. Vsevolod himself proudly said to Andrei,
"wa14, mo n K To6e IcpecTa He Ltenoam: H eme, a To MH 6mm. Eons nan'b,
once ca eCTe caMH 3ancrnH, ance 6b! ona xorenb, To HTO 6bl MH ronHo, To nce
6H CTBOpW‘I'b" (PSLR 2: 305-306). This passage makes us think that not breaking
the peace treaty after kissing the cross would be something quite natural. There
would be nothing to boast about. This case also illustrates the significance of the
ceremony itself which is also well documented by what took place in Chernigov
in 1164 (Berezhkov 176). The prince died, and the Chernigov leadership
decided not to reveal his death (in order to get the seat inherited by the prince
they prefered). Everybody had to take an oath not to inform other princes about
the death and to kiss an icon of Our Savior. A very interesting remark was made
about a bishop's participation in this ceremony. "Peue I'Ioer TbIanchIH: HaM
ObIno He neno naTH nHCIcyny uenoaaTH canToro Cnaca, 3aHence casITHTenb eCTb, a
HaM cn o HeM He 6naaHHTH, 3aHence IcHsI3HH CBOH nioéHms." (PSLR 2: 522-523)
Thus, kissing of a sacred object (a cross or an icon) can be compared to signing
a document in modern times. It had to be a serious guarantee if the demand to
perform the ceremony was considered a sign of mistrust. It well corresponds to
what Gurevich writes about the Western medieval phenomenon,"Bce aanmeiiume
coébITHn B ncH3HH nIOAeH HOAHHHMHCb pHTyany, cnpoaoncnanHCE ocoébIMH
npouenypaMH, HecoénioneHHe KOTOprX aHHyanoaano aIcT." "Cyu.I,HOCTb aIcTa
onpenennn pHTyan" (Gurevich 185,187).

All that does not, however, mean that kissing the cross was never
violated. Of course, it was, as are the norms in any society. It is interesting to
compare the attitude towards violations of cross-kissing to violations of some

other norm. A good example can be derived from the chronicle of lziaslav

41

Mstislavich. As we remember, lziaslav violated the principle of seniority, when he
competed for the Kievan throne with his uncles. We saw, that this challenge to
seniority was openly declared and that his chronicler tried to justify Mstislav's
actions. The same lziaslav happened to violate a cross- kissing, when he
promised to acknowledge Igor' as the Kievan prince and after that attacked him,
drove him from Kiev and later captured him. The chronicler's presentation of
these events is very different from the story about the struggle against the
uncles. The fact of kissing the Cross is briefly mentioned, "Vlsncnaaoy
MbCTHCI'IaBW-IIO Hoynca 6blCTb uenOBaTH IcpeCT'b" (PSLR 2: 318). The description of
lziaslav's campaign against Igor' begins with the statement, "V1 He yroneH 6blCTb
KMSIHOM‘b Viropb" (PSLR 2: 322) Thus responsibility is placed on the Kievan
townspeople rather than on lziaslav. Later in the course of his story, the
chronicler draws attention to the princes who violated a cross-kissings to lziaslav
and refers to lziaslav's evident displeasure at this act. This way he creates the
illusion that lziaslav was a strong supporter of faithfulness to kissing the Cross. In
other words, the chronicler does not try to openly declare the violation of cross-
kissing. On the contrary, he does his best to disguise it as much as possible. We
can conclude that there were no possible arguments for the defence of
"IcpeCTonpeCTynneI-IHe". The chronicle of lziaslav shows that while some parts of
society could support a challenge to seniority, nobody would have supported
violation of kissing the Cross.

A story about Vladimir of Galicia found in the Ipatevskaia presents
additional evidence of how negatively "IcpecTonpeCTynneHHe" was viewed by
public opinion. This story tells us how Vladimir was punished by God when he
violated his cross-kissing to lziaslav and made fun of the ritual itself. According to

Likhachev, this story belongs to what he calls "tales of a princely crime"

42

(Likhachev 1947, 215, 232). All other tales of this genre describe violent crimes
commited by princes against other princes like murder or blinding. Making a
violation of kissing the Cross the subject of such a tale shows that it was
considered a serious crime.

There must have been, however, a legal procedure for breaking a treaty,
and, as we shall see, it was possible. When one of the princes was called to
take up arms against Yury Dolgoruky, he answered, "Xpecns eCMb uenoaanb Ic
Hemy, a He MOI'Y 6e3 BMHbI Ha Hb B‘bCTaTH" (PSLR 2: 490). Therefore, he could
ignore his cross-kissing and act against Yury if there were "mm" on the part of
the latter (this word had two meanings - "guilt" and "reason", most likely, it
means "guilt" here.)

An example of the "aHHa" that could lead to breaking a treaty can be
found in the account of the conflict between Rostislav Mstislavich and Sviatoslav
Vsevolodich. Sviatoslav thought that Rostislav was going to capture his son Oleg
and to give Chernigov, which belonged to Sviatoslav, to another prince. The
chronicler states that Rostislav actually did not have any hostile plans against
Sviatoslav and all this was the slander of "mine HenoeeIcH". It is not relevant to
our purpose, however, whether Rostislav was in fact going to do anything bad
to Sviatoslav or not. The essential thing is that both Sviatoslav and Oleg trusted
"3ane HenoeeKH" and discussed the situation with their retainers who advised
them to break their treaty with Rostislav. They argued that Oleg and Sviatoslav
had a right to do so: "KHsInce, a TO M TH noépo eCTb, once Tn x0TenH KHese nTH
(Rostislav was then the Kievan prince), a LlepHHroe ornaIOTb nono OTueMb
TBOHM'b, a oynce eCTb npaab OTeub TBOH H Tbl a erCTHOMb LienoaaHbH", - said
"MyncH" to Oleg. Sviatoslav's "My)IcH" repeated the same arguments and added,

"A oynce eCH, IcHnnce, H aonoch caoro FIOI’YOHH‘b, nepncacn no POCTchaaa, a OH

43

TH acsIIco neHHBo nomoraeTb" (PSLR 2: 513-514). Oleg and Sviatoslav were
convinced by that and broke their cross-kissing. It is essential that they
considered themselves "npaabl 3 IcpeCTHOM'b uenoaaHbH". Obviously, from their
point of view, "mm" for this break was placed on Rostislav.

There were, however, some rare cases when a treaty could be
legitimately broken without "mm" on the part of the other prince. This occured
when a cross-kissing was cancelled by a church hierarch for some serious reason.
For example, Mstislav the Great had a treaty with Yaroslav of Chernigov to help
him against his enemies. Yaroslav's nephew Vsevolod attacked him and drove
him out of Chernigov. Vsevolod was helped by the Cumans; and the war against
him would be very bloody. The hegumen of Saint Andrew monastery interfered
and "He ananntue MbcrchaBy B‘bCTaTH paTbIO no flpocnase, peIca: "To TH MeHuJe
eCTb, OH nce npeCTynHab XpeCTbt-Ioe uenoaaHHe Ha paTb He BCTaHeLIJb, Hench
KpOBb nponHTH xpecranCIcyio",- H CbB'bKYI'IHBuJe COOOp'b HepeHCchIH
(MHTpononHTa nce B To apemn He Game) H peIcOLua MbCTchaay: "Ha Hbl 6yp,eTb
TOT'b rpexn", - H CTaopH some HX'b, H COCTynH xpecTa MbCTchaa'b K1: Slpocnaay,
H nnaicacn Toro Bcn nHH ncHBOTa caoero" (PSLR 2: 291). The latter phrase shows
again how seriously cross kissing was taken.

A similar situation took place at the end of the century. It was connected
with the conflict between Rurik Rostislavich of Kiev and Vsevolod Big Nest.
Vsevolod was then the senior of the whole Monomakhovichi clan; and Rurik
followed him in the hierarchy as the Kievan prince and the senior among the
Southern Monomakhovichi (in "Pyccxas semnn"). While distributing the Southern
"Pycs" volosts, Rurik did not give any of them to Vsevolod. Vsevolod found this
disrespectful and threatened to deprive Rurik of his military assistance. "Bbl eCTe

HapeIan M51 80 CBOEMb I'IJ'IEMGHH... CTapeHUJel'O, a HbIHe cenem: GCH B KbleBe, a

44

MHe eCH HaCTH He oyHHHHnb B PoyCIcOH 3emne, Ho pasnanb eCH HHeMb
mononcbuJHMb 6paTbH caoeH. fiance MHe a HeH HaCTH Hens, p.a To Poycxan
06naCTb, a KOMY em a HeH Hacrb nanb, c TeM nce eH H 6nIop,H, H crepencH,... a
MI-le He Hanoée", - declared Vsevolod and promised to take this threat back only
if he gets the volosts that had been already given to another prince, Roman. The
situation became very complicated for Rurik because he had kissed the Cross to
Roman not to take the volosts back: "£13111: POMaHOBH H erCT'b Ic HBMOY
uenoaanb, ancb emy nom. HHM'b He omaTH HHIcOMoy nce". That is why he did not
want to grant Vsevolod's request. Vsevolod was ready to start a war to avenge
his honour as a senior. Rurik consulted the metropolitan; "H peHe MHTpOI‘IOflHT‘b
PIopHIcoaH: "KHnnce, Mbl eCMbl anCTaBneHbI a POYCKOH semne OT Bora
BOCanHaaTH aacn OT KpoaonponHTbn Ancb eCH 11am: BOI'IOCTI: mononcbtuemoy a
o6na3He npenb CTapeHUJHM‘b H erCT‘b eCH K HeMoy uenoaanb, a HblHe 831:
CHHMatO c Te6e IcpeCTHoe LienosaHHe H 33Hman Ha ca, 3 Tbl... BonOCTb naH nce
CTapeHLuemoy, a POMaHoaH naCH HHoyio a Toe MeCTo". After that, Rurik
discussed the situation with Roman who agreed to cancel their agreement about
the volosts for the sake of peace and unity among the Monomakhovichi. "OTHe, -
he said to Rurik who was his "father" in the hierarchy, - To uH npo meHe T06e He
ncHTH c1: CBaTOM'b CBOMM'b (Vsevolod's daughter was married to Rurik's son. - Yu.
M.) H a nioéoab He aHHTH?! A MHe nioéo HHoon BOI‘IOCTb B we MeCTO naCH,
nioéo IcoyHaMH naCH 33 Hee BO HTO SyneT Oblna." Finally, the volosts were taken
from Roman and given to Vsevolod (PSRL 2: 683-685). The role of the
metropolitan in this case and the remark about the absent metropolitan in the
previous example make us think that there was a formal procedure of cancelling a
cross-kissing performed by the head of the Rus' church.

All this prompts the conclusion that cross-kissing was a working institution

45

and it played an important role in the life of Rus' society.

Let us now turn to the final point of our comparison - the rights of juniors
and the responsibilities of seniors. The chronicles contain various pieces of
information related to this subject. For example, they often cite seniors who
accuse their juniors of non-loyalty. In most cases the seniors try to show how
thoroughly they cared for the juniors. "... BonOCTb BaM eCMb MBHCKan‘b H 11am.
Hoa'bropoms H I'onTHanb" (PSLR 2: 347). "Slab nce Tn annXTs B'b npaany slico
nocTOHHoro 6paTa caoero H BOI'IOCTb TH eCMb nanb, nIco HH OTeub Toro ananb,
HTo n T06e ananb H eme eCMb H PoyCIcOH 3eMnH anIcaaanb CTepeHH T06e" (the
latter was a honoroble assignment) (PSLR 2: 372-373). The message is clear: the
senior fulfilled his duties, so there was no reason for the junior not to fulfill his. It
shows the mutual character of the responsibilities. Seniors liked to stress their
commitment to the interests of juniors not only in conflict situations. For example,
Andrei Bogoliubsky said to the Rostislavichi. who proclaimed him their "father"
thus becoming his juniors, "HapeIan Mn eCTe c06e OTLteMb, a xOHIo Bbl no6pa, a
13,an POMaHoaH, 6paTy Batuemy, KHea'b" (PSLR 2: 567).

There is also a remark that shows the participation of juniors in making
decisions. Mstislav was planning a campaign against the Cumans. He called his
"brethren" and the Olgovichi, "Osixy 6o Toma OnbroaHHH B1: MbcrchaanH aonH"
"H BCHM oyronHa 6bICTb nyma ero" (PSLR 2: 538). Mstislav was the oldest among
his "brethren" and "65m, B none" of a prince meant to pronounce this prince a
senior. Thus, the princes called by Mstislav were his juniors but it was still
important that his intention was "yronHa" to them.

The most valuable information on the relationship between seniors and
juniors can be found in the account of the conflict between Andrei Bogoliubsky

and the Rostislavichi. Andrei accused them of not fulfilling their responcibilities as

46

juniors and therefore wanted to punish them by taking away the volosts they had
received from him previously. There are two different stories of this conflict - one
in the Lavrentevskaia that supports Andrei and another in the Ipatevskaia
supporting the Rostislavichi. According to the Lavrentevskaia, "HenOIcopmHMcn
POCTchaBHHeMb IcHn3Io AaneIo H a BonH ero He onanM" (PSLR 1: 365). The
Ipatevskaia states that the accusation was false: "HaHa ApreH aHHbI
nOIcnanEIaaTH Ha POCTchaaHHH... V1 peHe AaneH POMaHoaH: He xonHuJH a MoeH
eonH c 6paTbeIo caoeio, a DOMAH c KHeaa, a flaBblp, HC‘b Bblmeropona, a
MbCTHCHaB‘b H3 Eenaropona, a To Bbl CmoneHecch, a TeMb cs: I‘IOAenHTH" (PSLR
2: 570). (Smolensk was Rostislavichi' patrimony, so Andrei did not have right to
deprive them of it.) The Rostislavichi vehemently denied the accusation:
"POCTchaBHH nce... nocnaLua K'b AaneeaH, peIcyHe: TaIco, 6paTe, B‘b npaany Tn
HapeIan eCMbI OTLLeMb coée H erCT'b eCMbI uenoaanH Ic Toée H CTOHMb B'b
erCTHOMb uenoaaHbH, xomHe p.06pa T06e". We do not know whether the
Rostislavichi properly obeyed Andrei as their "father" and it is not really relevant
for the present discussion. It is relevant, however, that Andrei could not just take
back the volosts he previously had given to them. He could only do that in the
case of wrongdoing on the part of his juniors.2 Even the hostile Ipatevskaia does
not state that Andrei tried to simply drive the Rostislavichi out of Kiev,
Vyshgorod and Belgorod; he "began to accuse" in order to make it a legal
procedure. The Rostislavichi not only rejected Andrei's accusation, but they, in
their turn, accused him of mistreating them: "HaM l'IYTb IcanceLUH H3‘b PYCbKOH
3eMnH 6e3 HaLuee BHHbI, na 3a BCHMH Eon: H CHrIa erCTHan". Andrei did not

answer; and the Rostislavichi "oy3peabtue Ha BOF'b H Ha CHny HeCTbHaro IcpeCTa H

 

2 The previously discussed case of Rurik and Roman allow us to suggest that he could have kissed
the cross not to take the volosts back.

47

Ha MonHTay canTee BoroponHLte" took up arms against him and von a victory
(PSLR 2: 569-578).

"The power of the Holy Cross" is not unintentionally mentioned twice in
this passage. The reference to "IcpeCTHan CHna" in a context like this was usually
made in order to accuse the other party of violating the kissing of the Cross. The
Rostislavichi thought that Andrei did not fulfill his obligations as a senior and thus
broke their treaty. Later in the course of the conflict, they added more details to
their accusations. When Andrei again ordered them to leave the volosts and
expressed the order in an improper and disrespectful manner, the Rostislavichi
answered, "Mbl Tn no CHX'b MeCT'b anal cum HMeI'IH no nIo6BH; ance eCH Cb
cnchIMH peHbMH ancnan'b, He achI ch IcHnaio, Ho aIcH ch nonpyHHHIcy H npOCTy
Henoaeicy, a HTO OYMbICI'IHI'I‘b em, a Toe neH, a EOF'b 3a aceMb" (the latter phrase
meant an accusation of serious wrongdoing and placed all the responsibility for
the conflict on the other party) (PSLR 2: 573). The difference between
"nop,pyHHHIc" and a junior is stated very clearly. Unlike a "nop,pyHHHIc" and his
master, a senior and a junior are bound with mutual obligations and they both
have rights that should be respected. Their relationships are regulated not by the
will of a senior but by certain legal procedures. If the senior fails to act
legitimately, the juniors are free from their obligations and can even defend their

rights with arms.

1'

At this point, we have examined the chronicle for all the main components of
the political ideology found in the Homily on Princes and the Igor' Tale and have
found that the ideas of interprincely relationships founded on the hierarchy of the
seniors and juniors and the system of kissing the Cross were wide-spread in
twelfth-century Rus'. Now, however, we must ask how these ideas worked in a

practical sense. We have had a chance to take a look at this to some degree

48

while examining chronicle accounts, but let us now turn to a closer examination of

the political situation in the 11705-11805.

9. In Search of lnterprincely Unity
It is well established by scholars that Monomakh's son Mstislav (died in

1132) was the last Kievan prince whose authority was acknowledged in all the
Rus' lands. Soon after his death, the Olgovichi began to fight against Mstislav's
heir Yaropolk; and after this Rus' experienced a series of princely military
conflicts. Those conflicts reflected the constantly changing balance of power
among the principalities that resulted from the rapid economic growth of the
country, on the one hand, and from the lack of communication between the
lands, on the other. (See p. 31-32) Such a situation was typical for the Middle
Ages. "l'ocnop,CTBonuJ.HH Knacc a cpenHHe aeIca, IcaIc npaaHno, 06HapyncHaaeT
Hecnocoéi-IOCTE Ic cnnOHeHHIo. TaIcoaa ero anpona. COCTaennmmHe ero
cbeonanbi, Hx rpynan H npocnoH'IcH nOCTonHHO conepHHHanH mencpy coéoii H
6bInH a COCTonHHH "HenpeprBHoro 6yHTa" npOTHs IcoponeBCIcoH anaCTH," -
observes a student of Western medieval history (Gurevich 192-193).
Nontheless, there were, as we have seen, some general principles which
were applied despite all the complications resulting from practical politics. These
principles were constantly being developed and sharpened by the princes
responding to new challenges. As Franklin and Shepard put it, "the idea of an
emerging political culture is more appropriate to the times than that of a fixed
political system" (PSLR 2: 275). When basic principles like respect for treaties
and adherence to the hierarchy of seniors and juniors were violated, the
consequences were usually unfortunate for the princes and for their lands. As

more and more princes realized that and tried to play according to the rules, it

49

resulted in the increasing unity of the princely clans. We have already discussed
some important stages of this process, but let us now briefly review it as whole.
A period of bloody conflicts for the Kievan throne that began soon after
Mstislav's death in 1132 ended when one of the major rivals, lziaslav, stopped
excercising his principle "He HneT MeCTo K ronoae, Ho ronoaa K MeCTy" and
offered Kiev to the Monomakhovichi senior Viacheslav. (See p. 34—36) The fight
over Kiev resumed after Viacheslav's death and stopped again when the winning
rival, Mstislav, gave the throne to the senior Rostislav. (See p. 36-37) It resulted

in the consolidation of the Monimakhovichi because Rostislav's legitimacy was

if.“ i

indisputable. The Olgovichi did not challenge Rostislav because they were not
able to fight against the united Monomakhovichi. This period is especially

remarkable. Martin summarizes it as follows, the traditional principles of
dynastic succession were restored and the feuds between dynastic branches
relaxed. The two branches of Monomakhovichi jointly dominated the lands of
Kievan Rus'. The two branches cooperated. This balance of power,
founded on a reaffirmation and universal acceptance of the dynasty's guidelines of
legitimacy, provided a basis for political and dynastic stability that lasted through
the reign Of Rostislav" (Martin 111).

One of the most bloody events in the internal struggle - the sack of Kiev

in 1169 - occurred soon after Rostislav's death when Mstislav seized the Kievan

f

throne ignoring the Monomakhovichi senior who was then Andrei Bogoliubsky.
Andrei managed to create a powerful coalition of many princes indignant with
Mstislav's illegitimate action; and the rights of the senior were restored. Mstislav
retreated to his patrimony, Volynia; the Monomakhovichi were united again but
now with the nothern, Suzdalian, branch dominating the clan instead of the

southern one as before. This unity met its most serious challenge during the

50

conflict between Andrei Bogoliubsky and the Rostislavichi. As we have seen, the
Rostislavichi accused Andrei of mistreating them and of not fulfilling his duties as a
senior. They took up arms against him and Andrei was defeated. His troops,
according to a pro-Rostislavichi chronicler, "anI.urIH 6nxy... abICOKOMbIcnnme, a
CMHpeHHH OTMAOLIJa a AOMbI caon". After that, "POCTchasHHH... nononcHuIa Ha
Slpocnaae CTapeLlJHI-IbCTBO H nawa emy KbleB'b" (PSLR 2: 578). It is amazing that
finally, however, the Rostislavichi and Andrei managed to restore their
relationships. We do not know how they worked it out, but in the next year,
"ancnaLuacn POCTchaaHHH Ico KHn3io AaneeaH... npoane POMaHOBH
POCTchaaHHa IcHnncHTb B'b KHeae". This manner of address used of the
Rostislavichi meant that they must have acknowledged Andrei's seniority again.
Andrei answered, "I'loncp,HTe Mano, nocnanb eCMb ch 6paTbH caoeH a Pycu. KaKb
MH BeCTb 6yneTb OT HHXb, Toma TH AaM‘b 0138115" 3 (PSLR 2: 580; Berezhkov
190). The restoration of the hierarchy after such serious trouble, as well as
Andrei's intention to consult with his Southern "brethren", show the increasing
unity among the Monomakhovichi. Andrei's murder in 1174 and its aftermath in
Suzdalia brought new complications, but the main tendency towards the unity of
the clan with the domination of its Northern branch remained.

The Olgovichi based in their patrimony Chernigov also managed to
achieve a significant degree of consolidation. (See Golubovsky, Zaicev 1975,
111-117) They actively competed with the Suzdalian princes over the domination
of the Rus' lands (Nasonov 1940, 6-7).

Thus, temporary coalitions made by princes pursuing their short-term goals
were replaced by stable unified clans. This major change opened new

perspectives. Firstly, it dramatically decreased the number of active political

 

3 He never did answer, because he was killed soon after that.

51

players; and, of course, the fewer parties are involved the easier it is to make an
agreement. Secondly, neither clan was strong enough to completely defeat its
rivals; and this pushed the seniors to seek a way to coexist. Rus' thus had a
chance to achieve an internal peace.

The urge for such a peace was increased by the growing Cuman threat.
This threat had becom relatively insignificant after the numerous defeats the
Cumans had suffered from the united Rus' troops led by Vladimir Monomakh.
They would, probably, never have been able to attack Rus' again if not for the
Rus' princes who hired Cuman troops to help them in their internal conflicts.
"PyccrcHe, TOJ'IbKO HTo pa3rpOMHBLuHe nonoeuea Ha acex HanpaaneHan, BHOBb
nOMoranH HM Ha6paTbcn ¢H3HHeCIcHx H Mopaanbe cHn" (Pletneva 275). By the
11605 the Cumans had regained their former power and grew more and more
aggressive. A significant part of them were united under the leadership of
Konchak (Pletneva 282-293). The chronicle demonstrates the growing concern
about the Cuman threat. Short matter-of-fact reports about Cuman participation
in princely conflicts and about their occasional raids, typical for the 1120-11505,
are very different from pathetic descriptions of the Cuman attacks in 11705.
"l'lpHnoma HHonneMeHbHHuH Ha Poycrcoon 3eMnIo, 6e36onchIe V13MaHnTnHe,
OIcaHbHHH Araane, HeHHCTHH Hmanbn, nenOM H HpaBOM COTOHHHbIM, MMGHeMb
KOHHach 3noy HaHanHHch..." (PSLR 2: 612) "l'lpHnouJa 6e360ncHeH I'lonoattbl
Ha Poycs aoeeaTb C'b OKaHbeIM'b KOHHaIcOMb" (PSLR 2: 628) "l'lowem: 6ntue
OKaHbeIH H 6e36onchIH H TpeIcnnTbIH KOHHaIc'b co MHonceCTBOMb nonoaettb Ha
Poycb..." (PSLR 2: 634) Pletneva thinks that "3TH-To 3I1HTeTbI, ynOTpeénnaLuHecn
IchMe KOHHaIca TOJ‘IbKO a OTHouJeHHH BOHnIca, H ceHneTenECTayIOT o ero CHne H

cheMneHHH nOCTorIHHo pa30pflTb pchIcHe KHnnceCTBa" (Pletneva 293).

52

The chronicle accounts of the 11705 condemns those who involve the
Cumans in internal conflicts. The Cumans make harm "LtepIcBaMb, Hp,ence HMn
EoncHe cnaBHTbcn, CHMH nce l'lOl'aHblMH xoynHTEcn. To He percoy enHHeMb
IcpechnHOMb, Ho H caMOMoy Bory Bpa3H. To are no nI06HTb Bpal'bl BoncHn, To
caMH HTo anHMOYTb OT Bora?" (PSLR 2: 612) Those loving the enemies of God
are, of course, the princes who resort to Cuman military assistance. The
chronicler also points to the connection between Cuman aggression and the lack
of unity among the Rus' princes: "Ce nce oyaenasuie nonoauH, once IcHsT3H He 3
nio6aH )KHBYTb, memue a noporbi, HaHaLua naIcOCTHTH rpeHHHIcOMb" (PSLR 2:
526). ("l'peHHHIcH" were the merchants trading with Byzantium) Thus, public
Opinion as reflected by the chronicle wanted the princes not to use Cuman
military help and to live "in love" so that they could effectively defend the Rus'
lands. As those ideas became wide-spread they affected political reality. Let us
see how this process worked by examining the course of political events in the

Southern, "Pyce", lands preceding Igor's campaign.

10. Political Situation in the 11805 and the Igor' Campaign
As we remember, the Rostislavichi broke their relationships with Andrei

Bogoliubsky and gave the Kievan throne to Yaroslav of Luchsk. Later, they
recognized Andrei as their senior again and asked him to give Kiev to Roman
Rostislavich. Andrei was killed before he had a chance to respond. An intense
political and social struggle in Suzdalia followed, making it impossible for the
Northern branch of the Monomakhovichi to pay attention to Southern affairs.
Therefore, the Rostislavichi gave Kiev to Roman on their own. (PSLR 2: 600)
In the next year (1176), the Cumans attacked the Kievan land. Roman

summoned his "brethren" for help. Davyd Rostislavich did not manage or did not

53

want to come in time ("Onwe He anannb"). His absence caused "pacnpe MencH
6paTbeIo" and finally resulted in a defeat. "To canLuaBLuH OnroaHHH, BceaonoAHHb
CanTocnaBb oépanoaatuacn" because that gave him a chance to request that
Davyd be deprived of his volost. He addressed Roman, "Spam, 2 He MLUJO nonb
TOOOIO HHHero nce, Ho pap, Hamb TaK'b eCTb: once ca IcHnsb HBBHHHTb, To 31:
BOI‘IOCTb, a Moyncb oy ronoaoy. A Hashim: BHHOBaTb". Roman did not grant
Sviatoslav's request; then Sviatoslav together with his "brethren" attacked him
and drove him out of Kiev. He was aware, of course, that Roman would try to
get the Kievan throne back, so he summoned the Cumans for help in the
forthcoming struggle. The Rostislavichi gathered their forces and attacked
Sviatoslav in Kiev. Sviatoslav ran away; but his Cuman allies made a raid on
Torchesk and "MHoro HIOAHH nOHMaLua". This raid forced the Rostislavichi to give
up and to leave Kiev to Sviatoslav. According to their chronicler, they did so "He
xomHe roy6HTH PoyCKOH 3eMnH H IcpecranCIcOH IcpoaH nponHeaTH". Even if their
true motives might have been less idealistic, this kind of explanation is still
remarkable (PSLR 2: 603-605; Berezhkov 194).

Thus, the Kievan seat was now occupied by Sviatoslav Vsevolodich. He,
however, could never feel safe. A new crisis broke out after only four years. In
1180, Sviatoslav interfered in a military conflict in Suzdalia where Vsevolod Big
Nest had in the meantime won a victory in the struggle for Andrei's heritage.
Vsevolod had a conflict with the princes of Riazan'; and Sviatoslav sent his son
Gleb to help them against Vsevolod. Vsevolod captured Gleb and kept him in
chains as a prisoner. Sviatoslav was anxious to liberate his son and to take a
revenge but he was not able to get involved in any serious military action
because he had always to guard his Kievan seat against the Rostislavichi. He then

made a desperate decision to completely crash the Rostislavichi and to turn

54

against Vsevolod after that. Besides securing his rear, victory over the
Rostislavichi would be in part revenge against Vsevolod because they belonged
to the same clan of the Monomakhovichi. His reasoning is summarized by the
chronicler as follows: "CBnTocnaBT: pacnonecn rHeBOMT: H pancnbcn npOCTbIo, H
paaMbIan so oyMe caoeMb, peica, nIco MbCTHnbcn 65m: Bceaononoy, Ho He nae,
POCTchaaHHH, a Te MH BO aceMb naIcOCTnTI: a PoyCIcOH 3eMne, a 31: BononHMepe
nneMeHH, KTO MH 6ancHH, TOTT: p.06p'b" (i. e. whoever of the Monomakhovichi is
close to me, he will do to gain my revenge). "flashina HMoy, a PIopHIca
abInceHoy H31: 3eMne, H anHMoy eAHH'b anaCTI: PoycIcoon H c 6paTbeIO, H Toma
Mbmiocn Bceeonony OOHAbI cson". Accordingly, Sviatoslav suddenly attacked
Davyd Rostislavich who was at that moment nearby him. Davyd, however,
managed to escape and to inform his "brethren". Sviatoslav, who placed all his
hope on an unexpected attack, could not stand against the united and well
prepared Rostislavichi and escaped from Kiev. Rurik Rostislavich occupied the
Kievan seat.4 (PSLR 2: 614-616; Berezhkov 200).

Of course, he did not stay in Kiev for long, for the next year, Sviatoslav
gathered his "breathren" and the Cumans, defeated the Rostislavichi and got the
Kievan throne back. The Cumans did not even have time to return when Rurik
attacked them and won a victory. The Kievan seat belonged to Rurik again. The
cycle was ready to repeat itself. It looked like Kiev could go on being taken
back and forth forever. This time, however, the princes changed their approach.
The chronicler used his high style to report what occurred after Rurik's victory:
"PropHIcT: nce, aHe noéenoy BosMa, H‘b HHHTo nce ropna oyHHHH, Ho aosmo6H
MHpa naHe paTH, H6O ncHTH xom B‘b 6paTonIo6bH, naHe nce H xpeCTanT: gens,

HUGHfleMbI no BCfl 11H" OT l'lOl'aHle'b, H l'lpOl'lHTbfl KpOBH HX'b He XOTSI BHAeTH, M

 

" Roman had died by that time, and Rurik became the oldest brother.

55

pa3MbIana'b c MoyncH CBOHMH, oyranaa'b, 6e 60 CanTocnaBT: CTapeH neTI:I, H
oypnnHBbcn c HHMI: - COCTynH eMoy CTapeuJHHbcraa H KHeaa, a c06e 339 BCIO
PoyCIcoon 3eMnIo, H oyTaeanLuacn IcpeCTOMT: HeCTHbIM'b, H TaKO ncHasIcra a
nioéaH" (PSLR 2: 621-624, Berezhkov 200). Thus, they became co-rulers with
Sviatoslav as a senior. This agreement broke the vicious cycle of wars over the
Kievan throne and put an end to the feud between the Olgovichi and the
Southern Monomakhovichi. After uniting their forces, they became very powerful.
Their new power is well indicated by the reaction of Vsevolod: "Bceaonom: nce
CoyncnanbcIcHH noyCTH I'ne6a CanTocnaaHHa H3 OKOB'b H ann eenHIcoyto moSoaI: ll
c1: CanrocnaBOMb" (PSLR 2: 624). So, the head of the Northern Monomakhovichi El
joined the alliance; and the long-desired peace and unity among all the Rus'
princes were, finally, achieved. The princes' intention to adhere to the agreement
for a long period of time was signified by the marriages that tied the three
families together: in the next year one of Sviatoslav's sons was married to Rurik's
daughter and his another son was married to Vsevolod's "CBeCTb" (PSLR 2: 624-
625; Berezhkov 200-201).

This situation had a tremendous effect on the struggle against external
enemies. The first land to take advantage of the new internal unity was Suzdalia.
Vsevolod arranged a campaign against the traditional Suzdalian adversaries, the
Bulgars. Sviatoslav sent him military assistance; and the united forces won a
significant victory (PSLR 2: 625-626).

The success of the anti-Cuman struggle in the South was, of course, far
more important. Sviatoslav and Rurik, assisted by many other princes,
overwhelmingly defeated the Cumans and captured a number of their leaders.
The chronicler ascribes their victory to the help of Boris and Gleb: "noéenoy

aneMuJa MonHTaaMH canTOio MyHeHHIcoy BopHca H f'ne6a" (PSLR 2: 636). This

56

type of reference to Boris and Gleb is rather rare. In the whole Kievan chronicle
("KHeBCIcHH caon"), I found only three.

The first is made in the account of the victory over the Cumans under 6681
(1 17 3): Mikhalko and Vsevolod who were sent against the Cumans by their older
brother Gleb of Kiev praised not only the often mentioned on such
occasions,"Bora H CBnTon BoroponHLLy, H cHny HeCTHoro IcpeCTa", but also
"canTan MyHeHHIca, nOMoranma Ha 6paHex1: Ha noraHbIn" (PSLR 2: 563). This
reference to the Saints may have been made because Gleb was the Kievan
prince's patron. This suggestion becomes more plausible if we compare the two
different accounts of this event (PSLR 2: 554-559, 562-563; PSLR 1: 357-361).
One of them is thought to have originated from Pereiaslavl and the other from
Kiev. It is only the latter one that has the reference to Boris and Gleb. This
account is also more favourable to Gleb than the Pereiaslavian one (Nasonov
1969, 96-97). Thus, it seems quite appropriate that the Kievan chronicler
ascribed the victory to the help of the Kievan prince's Saint patron.

The help of Boris and Gleb is mentioned again in the account on the battle
for Vyshegorod which occured during the conflict between the Rostislavichi and
Andrei Bogoliubsky. Andrei's troops besieged Mstislav Rostislavich in
Vyshegorod. Mstislav started the battle "oyspeatue Ha BoncbIo MHnOCTI: H Ha
canTon MyHeHHIcy BopHca H l'ne6a nOMOHb" and won a victory (PSLR 2: 576).
Mstislav's hope for such help is very easy to explain: the Saints' relics were kept
in Vyshegorod; and for the medieval mentality, it was natural to expect that the
Saints would protect "their" town from being taken.

The case of the anti-Cumanian campaign led by Sviatoslav and Rurik is
different. The Saints were not those princes' patrons: Sviatoslav's and Ruriks'

Christian names were Mikhail and Vasilii, respectively (Ianin 1: 125). The victory

57

was not won on the Saints' day, either. Yet, Boris and Gleb are not only
mentioned but their "participation" is stressed even more than is done in the two
other accounts discussed above. The Saints are not simply named among the
other Heavenly intercessors, but the victory is said to be caused primarily by
their support. I suggest that it can be interpreted as the reference to the newly
created unity that made the victory possible (noting the Saints role as the
patrons of princely unity and subordination). Contemporaries had every reason to
celebrate this unity: not only did it bring internal peace and a victory over
external enemies, but the next campaign was being planned that intended to
completely crush the Cumans: "BenHIcEIH IcHnab BceaononHHb CanTocnaa...
c6HpaLueTb... BOH, XOTn HTH Ha nonoeuH K LIOHOBH Ha ace neTO" (PSLR 2: 644-
645). Rus' people could reasonably hope for a prolonged period of safety and
stability.

It was at this very time then that Igor' took his unexpected action. Some
scholars argue that the campaign of 1185 did not have any significant
consequences for the Rus' lands (Robinson 1988, 13). The chronicle indicates that
the contemporaries thought otherwise. When Sviatoslav learned about Igor's
defeat, he, according to the Ipatevskaia, "oyTepT: cne31: CBOHx" (PSLR 2: 645). It
is extremely rare that a prince is depicted crying. The people of the Chernigov
land felt "CKop6I: H Toyra niora, suconce HHIconH nce He 6|:Iaana no aceH
eonOCTH I-lepHHTOBCIcOH". The pathetic picture of this "Tyra" does not have any
parallels in the accounts of other unsuccessful anti-Cuman campaigns. It was,
however, caused not only by the mourning for the captured princes and dead
retainers. The chronicle clearly refers to the consequences of Igor's defeat.
Sviatoslav expressed his concern about the damage to the Rus' land even before

expressing his sympathy to Igor'. Speaking about the defeat, he addresses a

58

 

 

surprisingly broad audience: "0, nIo6a Mon 6paTI:n, H CbIHOBe, H MoyncH 3eMne
PoyCKoe!" The latter phrase sounds very unusual. The situation looks very
dangerous: "flan MH Eon: anTOMHTH noraHbIn, Ho... OTaopHma sopOTa Ha
POYCbCKOYlO 3eMnIo. Bonn l'ocnoan p.a GoyneTI: o aceMI:". A few lines later,
the chronicle shows what the "opened gates" means in practice: "I'lonoaLtbl
noOeAHabLue Viropn c 6paTbeIo H Bantua ropnocn: BenHKoy H CKoynHma BCb
$13!:le CBOH Ha PoyCKoon 3eMnIo"(PSRL 2: 645-649). To explain such a tragic
perception of this Cumanian campaign, let us compare it with their previous raids.

The Cumans used to attack travelling merchants. After a successful anti-
Cuman campaign, the Rus' princes expected revenge: "Ce, 6paTbe, HonoaueMt:
eCMe MHoro 3na CTaopHnH, a TeMI: acnKo naKOCTHTH rpeHHHKy HameMy H
3an03HHKy" (PSLR 2: 541). Thus, the trading routes were the most common
object for Cuman attacks. They also made raids against the countryside,
capturing people and property in rural communities. "l'lpHexaLua Kb l'lonOHOMy...
KI: rpany... H K'b CeMbHio H abanma cena 6e31: oyHbTa CI: nIonMH... H KOHe, H
CKOTbl, H oaue norHauJa a l'lonoaLth" (PSLR 2: 556). This passage shows us the
meaning of the commonly used expression "the Cumans came to such and such
town" (PSLR 2: 605, 612, 628 and others). They, in fact, damaged the area, but
not the town itself. Only once did they manage to take over six "roponoat:
BepeHnHHb", but the Berendian towns were, in fact, small outposts on the border
and were thus much more vulnerable than other Rus' cities. When the Cumans
took over the Berendian towns, the Rus' troops retreated to nearby Rostovets
("31:6eroma B'b POCToaeLtb"). No battle for or near Rostovets is mentioned (PSLR
2: 603). Thus, even the victorious Cumans did not dare to attack this town which
is not famous for being a strong fortress. Konchak once intended "nneHHTH...

rpanbi POYCKbIe H ”OMEN," OI'Hbe" but he did so only because he received

59

technical assistance from outside: "éntue 60 o6pen1: Moynca TaKOBOI'O
6ecopreHHHa, H>Ke CTpensILue )KHBbIMb oerMb; Onxoy nce H oy HHx1: nothH
Toy3H caMOCTpenHHH onaa H (50 - IO.M.) Moy)KI: Mo>KaLueTb Hanpan". But all
these armaments did not help; Konchak's troops were defeated by the joint
forces of Sviatoslav and Rurik and "OHoro 6ecopreHHHa sILua H Ko
CBnTocnaaoy anBenouJa co OYCTpoeHbIM‘b" (PSLR 2: 635-636). Thus, Rus' cities
could suffer from the Cumans only if the latter were helping some Rus' princes in
their struggle against other princes. The Cumans did not attack cities on their
own.

The campaign following Igor's defeat made a big difference. It is stressed

E_“Ifihg

in the famous dialogue between Kza and Konchak found in the Ipatevskaia,
"I'IOHp,eMI: Ha CeMb... eMneM nce roponbl 6e3 onaca" (PSLR 2: 646). Kza, who
made this proposal, attacked Putivl. Although he did not manage to take it, he
burnt down a part of it (in addition, of course, his troops "noaoeaaaLUH aonocn: H
cena Hx1: noncrouJa"). Konchak dared to besiege strongly fortified Pereiaslavl.
The battle lasted the whole day, the prince of Pereiaslal was severely wounded.
The Cumans retreated only when they heard "CanTocnaB c1: PtOpHKOM'b H co
HHeMH nOMOHbMH" coming. On their way back, they "Banwa ropom: PHMOB'b H
ononOHHLuacn nonOHa" (PSLR 2: 646-649).

Thus, the military consequences of Igor's defeat were severe. The bloody

 

raid provoked by it and the damage sustained by the towns must have
generated hard feelings among contemporaries. The moment that it occured,

i. e. after the Cumans had suffered a defeat and were by no means expected to
attack, made these feelings even worse. I suggest, however, that the major
concern caused by Igor's campaign was not external aggression but the threat to

internal stability.

60

It is well-known in history that military defeats often lead to social and
political crises. Old Rus' was no exception. For example, the famous Kievan
uprising in 1068 occurred after the Rus' troops were defeated by the Cumans. It
is more important for the present discussion that the period of military conflicts
over Kiev between Sviatoslav and the Rostislavichi was triggered, as we have
seen, by the defeat for which Davyd Rostislavich was blamed. As we remember,
Sviatoslav requested that Davyd's senior, Roman of Kiev, punish him by taking
away Davyd's volost. Roman did not do that; and five years of interprincely wars
followed. (See p. 55-57) The damage done by Igor' in 1185 was, of course, far
worse then that of Davyd. Firstly, Davyd did not cause the Cuman attack;
secondly, there was no guarantee that the Rus' princes would have won a
victory had Davyd come in time. They may have been defeated, anyway. On the
contrary, the raid of Kza and Konchak on Putivl and Pereiaslavl would have never
happened if not for Igor'. The head of the clan Igor' belonged to was the senior
in the Kievan "duumvirate". Was it not quite reasonable to expect that the
Monomakhovichi would use their chance to debase the Olgovichi and to regain
their dominance in Rus'? In addition, the defeat of the Novgorod-Seversky and
Kursk military forces weakened the Olgovichi making it easier for the
Monomakhovichi to initiate a struggle.

I suggest that this threat to the newly created unity can help us to explain
the prominent role given to the topic of strife in the Igor’ Tale. Its condemnation
is the most explicitly and vehemently expressed part of the Ta/e's political
program. Igor', however, was not involved in any conflict when he made his
unfortunate campaign. His true fault was insubordination; but it is given much less

attention than that paid to the condemnation of strife. It is also remarkable that all

61

 

the examples showing the damage caused by the strife are taken from the distant
past.

Scholars long ago noted that the Tale does not mention anything that
occurred after the times of Vladimir Monomakh and Oleg Gorislavich and before
1185. I think that this is consistent with the author's intention to help the princes
to preserve internal peace. It can be compared with the chronicle account of the
argument between Sviatoslav and Rurik. The Monomakhovichi supposed that
Sviatoslav had some hostile plans against his co-ruler and they sent him a
warning, "TbI, 6paTe, K HaMT: ercTT: nenoaam: Ha POMaHOBe puny... flanci:
CTOHLUH a TOM‘b pnnoy, To Tbl HaM'b 6paT1:. naKbl nH nOMHHaeLUI: naaHbIn Tnnca,
KOTOprH 6I:InH an POCTchaee, To CTynHm: eCH pnnoy" (PSLR 2: 670).
Unfortunately, the content of "POMaHoa pan" is unknown, but the above citation
leads us to suggest that it somehow settled the disputable questions between
the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi and that it included the agreement not to
raise them again. We do not know, of course, whether the author of the Tale
took into account this agreement. But the agreement itself, as well as the cited
Monomakhovichi declaration, must have reflected the existing tendency to forget
"naBHbIn Tnnca" in order to keep peace; and besides all that, just simple common
sense would tell us that mentioning the recent conflicts could not promote peace
and unity.

That is why the author of the Tale turned to the past to derive his
examples of disastrous interprincely feuds. I think that viewing the situatian from
the perspective of the potential threat of a new struggle for Kiev can help us to
understand better the choice of particular examples such as the bitter fate of
Vseslav and battles of Nemiga and Nezhatina Niva. The story of Vseslav serves

as a warning to the princes: "Ame H aema nqua 81: npb3e Tene, H‘b HaCTo 6ean

62

CTpanawe... HH Xblpr, HH ropaany, HH nTHqu ropaany cyna EoncHa He MHHyTH"
(92). Those sufferings followed Vseslav's attempt to get the Kievan throne when
he "nOTHecn CprncHeM'I: 3naTa cTona KHeBbCKaI'O". As is well known, Vseslav
used the trouble in Kiev caused by the defeat suffered by the Rus' princes from
the Cumans in 1068. I think that the author meant to call his contemporary
princes not to use Igor's defeat for their political purposes. This call was
addressed primaraly to the Monomakhovichi; so we can suggest that it was wise
not to hurt their feelings by presenting one of them as a negative example. All
this made Vseslav an ideal figure to use as a warning against initiating strife.

The author turns to the origins of the two princely clans and their feud at
the times of Vladimir Monomakh and Oleg Sviatoslavich and shows how harmful if
was from the very beginning, "Torna, an On3e l'opchaanHHH, centueTbcn H
paCTsILueTI: yco6HLtaMH, norH6atueTI: )KHBHb flamnbéonca BHYKa; a KHsIncHXT:
KpaMOl'laX‘b BettH HenoaeKOMb CKpaTHUJaCb. Torna no PyCKoH 3eMnH peTKo
paTaeae KHKaXYTb, H‘b HaCTI: apaHH rpanxyTb, prnHa ce6e nennHe, a ranHLtH
caoro peHb rosopnxyTb, XOTnTI: noneTeTH Ha yenHe" (62). The bloody apex of this
feud was the battle of Nezhatina Niva. Its depiction presents a most vehemant
condemnation of strife between the princes: the author does not care who won
the battle and who was defeated, who was the villain and who was the hero; the
only one thing to be stressed is the death of princes from the opposite sides.
Both Boris Viacheslavich who supported Oleg and lziaslav Yaroslavich who fought
against him were killed. "therefore, both sides were defeated, " - thus Likhachev
summarizes the main idea of this passage (Likhachev 1972, 165).

The same idea is expressed even more explicitly in connection with the
battle of the Nemiga. Vseslav was defeated by the united forces of the

Yaroslavichi; so, the ancestors of all Rus' princes were involved into the battle.

63

3

 

The author equally mourns all those killed on the Nemiga: "HeMH3e KpOBaBbl
6pe3e He 6onOTOM1: OnxyTI: nocenHH - nocenHH KOCTbMM pyCKHx1: CbIHOB'b" (90).
Thus, I suggest that the way the author chooses and treats his examples from
the past can be best explained by his concern for the threat of the strife that

might break out after Igor's defeat.

lV.Conclusions

The twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries was the time
when Old Rus culture had some of its greatest achievements. Literary and artistic
monuments of this period have attracted a lot of scholarly attention. If we want
to better understand a cultural monument, it is, of course, very helpful to know
as much as possible about the life of the society in which this momument was
created. The economy and the everyday life of the discussed period is being
intensively studied by archeologists. However, the political history of the twelfth
century, especially that of the Southern Rus' lands, still lacks thorough study by
contemporary scholars.

In the present work, I attempted to show how important a political
context is for understanding literary works of the twelfth century. I suggest that
the choice of Igor's campaign as a subject matter of the three (or two, if one
believes the Tale is a forgery) literary monuments can be explained by the
specific political situation of the 11805. The unity among the princes achieved by
the 11805, the resulting successful struggle against the Cumans, and then its

interruption by Igor's campaign, which also challenged the unity itself, provides, I

64

believe, a plausible explanation for the close attention paid by contemporaries to
these events.

While examining the Homily on Princes, I followed Golubovsky who had
analyzed the political situation in the Chernigov land in order to date this
monument. Recently discovered facts support Golubovsky's dating (with a slight
correction).

The comparison of the Homily on Princes with the Igor’ Tale has prompted
me to suggest that the political ideas expressed in those two monuments have
much in common. The call for the unity contained in both works assumed the
achievement of this unity through consensus among the princes based on their
adherence to the hierarchy of seniors and juniors, strict fulfillment of their
obligations and respect to the rights of all princes. The examination of
contemporary chronicles shows that this type of political program was wide-
spread in the twelfth century and that it reflected the processes which were

going on in the Rus' lands at this time.

65

 

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