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
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THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE *TALE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF IGOR'* AND
THE *HOMILY ON PRINCES* IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL REALITY

By

Yulia Mikhailova

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE *TALE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF IGOR'* AND THE *HOMILY ON PRINCES* IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL REALITY

By

Yulia Mikhailova

Analysis of the political development of Southern Rus' in the twelfth century (based primarily on the investigation of the Ipatievskaya chronicle) is used to suggest answers to some disputed questions related to the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* and other works of twelfth century literature. For example, what caused the contemporaries of Igor's campaign to pay so much attention to it (as indicated by the chronicle)? In addition, what are the political ideas expressed in the *Slovo* and how do they relate to the ideology of its contemporary literary works and to the political reality of the time? I suggest that the *Tale* assumed that unity could be achieved through consensus among the princes based on the hierarchy of seniors and juniors and respect of the rights of all princes and that it has parallels in other works, especially the *Homily on Princes*. The chronicle indicates that such unity was achieved by the 1180s and resulted in the successful containment of the Cumans. I suggest that Igor's campaign attracted contemporary attention because it interrupted this policy of containment and challenged the newly-created unity.

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I. Introduction

This thesis deals with two interrelated topics. The first treats the political ideology of the *Igor' Tale* as compared with that displayed in other literary works of the second half of the twelfth century, primarily the *Homily on Princes*; and the second is an evaluation of Igor's campaign against the Cumans in 1185 in the context of its contemporary political realities.

1. Scholarly Debate on the Political Ideology of the *Tale*

The interpretation of political ideas expressed in the *Igor' Tale* has been widely debated. Scholars agree that it contains a call for unity among the princes in the face of the Cuman threat, but we must ask ourselves what was to be the basis for this unity and how did the author view an ideal political system?

The answers given by most specialists in Old Russian literature fall into one of two categories. The first is best represented by a quotation from Likhachev who maintains that the author of the *Tale* was ahead of his time preaching "идею сильной княжеской власти, с помощью которой должно осуществиться единство Русской земли". He "в разных князьях рисует собирательный образ сильного могущественного князя", thus fortelling the figure of an autocrat in the future centralized state. Although, he remarks that "идея сильной княжеской власти не слилась у автора "Слова" с идеей единовластия" because "для этого не было еще реальной исторической почвы", the main difference between the ideal of the *Tale* and actual autocracy are, according to Likhachev, a matter of degree: the author was not able "yet" to incorporate the idea of the authentic autocratic state but he picked up from

his contemporary reality everything that bore any signs of this future political order. That is why he stresses the rights of the senior princes at the expense of those of the juniors, or depicts Sviatoslav as "великий" и "грозный". Likachev thinks that in fact "Святослав был одним из слабейших князей, когда-либо княживших в Киеве". But the Sviatoslav of the *Tale* - "представление идеальное, а не реальное", i.e. the author assigned to him properties of the future "strong" ruler (Likhachev 1985, 126-127).

Another point of view is expressed by Worth when he says that the *Tale* contains "авторский призыв к своим соотечественникам вновь соединиться и вести себя по той архаической модели, от которой они так далеко ушли" (Worth 35). Robinson also characterizes the political ideal of the *Tale* as "идеал ушедшей в прошлое феодальной монархии" (Robinson 1988, 11).

Lotman's approach contrasts with these two predominant points of view. According to him, the author of the *Tale* is "человек, погруженный в описываемую им атмосферу, ... настолько пропитанный представлениями своего времени, что, даже осуждая современность, он может ей противопоставить лишь "очищенный", возведенный к идеалу образ ее же." "Идея сильной централизованной власти... автору "Слова" просто неизвестна." Thus, the author sees an ideal political system not in the future or past centralized monarchy but in the cooperation of princes who believe that they have an obligation to preserve the existing degree of independence: "Он надеется на братский союз и единство действий многих князей-феодалов, а не на замену их власти какой-либо иной, политически более оправданной системой." This unity should be based on "faithfulness to kissing the Cross" (Lotman 1962, 340-341).

Related to this is the question of how realistic or utopian was the program offered by the author of the *Slovo*.

Scholars who interpret the program as an attempt to restore the past, of course, cannot consider it to be realistic. Robinson thinks that not only was the program absolutely utopian, but even the general political situation in reality had nothing in common with that depicted in the *Tale*: "Наблюдавшаяся в 1187 г. в "Руси" или "Русской земле" ... мирная обстановка русско-русских и русско-половецких союзов и браков подтверждала полное несоответствие действительности поэтически прекрасного... призыва Автора к объединению князей для общей войны с половцами", "войны..., которой, разумеется не произошло" (Robinson 1986, 159; Robinson 1988, 11).

A quite opposite point of view is expressed by Rybakov. According to him, the *Tale* is a "мудрый политический трактат"; and the author's call "to support Grand Prince Sviatoslav of Kiev" and "to unite all the Rus' princes against the Cumans" was extremely relevant for the situation of 1185. He believes, further, that this call achieved its goal: "Поэма оказала воздействие. Половецкий натиск был остановлен" (Rybakov 5-6).

Likhachev also characterizes the author of the *Tale* as "реальный политик", but he is more cautious about the immediate political result of the call. He suggests that it "achieved that for which it was intended" only "to some degree". The actual political meaning of the monument is, according to Likhachev, however, broader than the attempt to inspire certain concrete actions on the part of the princes: "... подлинный смысл призыва автора "Слова", может быть, заключался не в попытке организовать тот или иной поход, а в ... задаче объединить общественное мнение против феодальных раздоров князей... Задачей "Слова" было не только военное, но и идейное сплочение

русских людей вокруг мысли о единстве Русской земли. ... В отличие от призыва к организации военного похода против половцев, она могла охватить своим мобилизующим влиянием целый период русской истории" (Likhachev 1985, 138, 143-144).

Thus, we see that the scholarly opinions about this subject are extremely diverse. They depend on how the scholars view the political realities of the time and particularly on their approach to the central event of the *Tale* - the campaign of 1185.

2. The Igor's Campaign: Contradictory Evaluations

My primary purpose in this discussion of Igor's campaign is to suggest a plausible explanation for the significant interest in this event displayed by its contemporaries. I assume the authenticity of the *Tale*, but even if one believes it is a forgery the problem still remains because the campaign is also described in two prose tales found in different versions of the chronicle; and the authenticity of these tales, as well as their unusually detailed and emotional style, have never been questioned.

Likhachev describes the chronicle tales as "самые обширные и, может быть, самые живые из всех повестей о степных походах русских князей" (Likhachev 1972, 13). The tale found in the Lavrentevskaia edition occupies three and a half columns (PSRL 1: 397-400); and in the Ipatevskaia, it takes up 14 columns (PSRL 2: 637-651). The first is considerably longer than other similar accounts, and the latter is absolutely unprecedented. For example, the whole account of the victory won by the united Rus' princes over the Cumans in the previous year (1184) takes only two and a half columns in the Ipatevskaia (PSRL 2: 634-637) and less than two columns in the Lavrentevskaia (PSRL 1: 394-396).

The historical defeat on the Kalka took five columns in the Ipatievskaya (PSRL 2: 740-745) and less than one and half column in Lavrentevskaya (PSRL 1: 445-447). As for the accounts on "ordinary" campaigns made by Rus' princes against the Cumans, their typical size is less than one column. (See, for example, PSRL 1: 362- 363, 414-415; PSRL 2: 520- 521, 629 and many others.)

It is also worth noting that the two chronicle tales describing Igor's campaign display the opposite loyalties. The one preserved in the Ipatievskaya expresses sympathy to Igor' and seeks any possibility to excuse his defeat; the tale in the Lavrentevskaya, on the contrary, depicts Igor's conceit and recklessness so sharply that some scholars even call it satirical. (Franchuk 154-155)

Of course, the chronicles of that time often varied in their interpretation of events depending on the chronicler's political orientation, but it would be hard to give another example of such contrasting views so elaborately argued as is found in these tales. For some reason, both chroniclers felt that it was important for them to sound very convincing while treating this topic and they were certain that their readers must be very interested in the reasons for Igor's defeat.

There is no generally established explanation for this phenomenon. Most investigators of Old Russian literature consider the campaign to be militarily and politically insignificant. Worth even suggests this insignificance as the reason for making the campaign the subject of the *Tale*: "Незначительность Игоря и его похода служит символом тривиальности их эпохи; для того они и избраны сюжетом 'Слова' " (Worth 35). While this interpretation could possibly explain why a great poet would choose the campaign as the subject of his artistic work, it does not explain why ordinary people were so interested in this event.

Scholars who share the opinion about the insignificance of the campaign but who also take the prose tales into account, seek to find a reason for the high interest given it among contemporaries in some of the circumstances accompanying the event. Robinson sees the eclipse that occurred at the same time as the campaign as the reason for this interest. He created a genealogical table of the Olgovichi and compared it to the table of eclipses which occurred in Rus' in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It turns out that "12 предков и родственников Игоря, из них 5 великих князей киевских, умерли или были убиты в близких по времени промежутках от солнечных затмений." That is why Robinson thinks that the Olgovichi and their contemporaries believed in a special curse of the clan connected with the sun and its eclipses (Robinson 1988, 14-15; Robinson 1978).

This concept raises some questions. First of all, it is well known that many eclipses go unnoticed by non-astronomers. Robinson is aware of that. He writes that only four of those twelve eclipses are presented in the chronicles. As for the other eight, there is no evidence that they were viewed by contemporaries. In addition, the connection between an eclipse and a prince's death is established by the chronicler only once. All other examples of "striking coincidences" do not have any basis in the accounts. One must ask how we can know that the contemporaries connected the eclipse of 1146 with the death of Vsevolod Olgovich which happened fifty days later (Robinson 1988, 15-16)? But most importantly we should note how the eclipse of 1185 is treated in the chronicles. In the Lavrentevskaia, it is not connected with the campaign at all and is not viewed as a bad sign, because it is followed by information about the birth of a princess (PSRL 1: 396). In the Ipatievskiaia, the tale about the campaign includes the eclipse but it is interpreted entirely in a Christian manner without any pagan

connotations. According to this account, Igor's men were scared by the "sign" but Igor' encouraged them: "Таины божия никто же не весть, а знамению творецъ Богъ... а намъ что створить Богъ ... а то же намъ видети" (PSRL 2: 638).

Another view is offered by Iatsenko, who thinks that the *Tale's* contemporaries were interested in the campaign because it was mounted by people of Novgorod-Seversky. According to him, this principality played a central role in the political life of the Rus' lands at the time. "Острая борьба за Северщину", "тяжелое вхождение Северской земли в состав Руси ... породило всю литературу о походе 1185" (Iatsenko 37). Unfortunately, Iatsenko provides almost no argumentation to support his conception despite the fact that it totally contradicts the accepted scholarly picture of Rus' history in the twelfth century.

Other scholars seek the explanation in the campaign itself and not in the outside circumstances. Likhachev finds it in "черты особого трагизма" of this event: "впервые за всю историю борьбы с половцами русские князья ... оказались в плену. Впервые русское войско потерпело такое страшное поражение" (Likhachev 1972, 13). He links the choice of this tragic event as the subject of the *Tale* to the Rus' tradition of using defeats and other disasters for moral teaching: " ... церковная ... и чисто светская литература, ... нравоучение, политическая агитация находили себе повод в общественных несчастьях" (Likhachev 1985, 10). Gudziĭ also thinks that it was natural for a twelfth century author to choose a defeat as a subject for his poem because "он стремился преподать урок политической мудрости князьям" (Gudziĭ 129).

Thus, there is no generally accepted scholarly attitude to the subject matter of the *Igor' Tale* and I suggest that by investigating the chronicles'

information on Rus's political development in 1185 and by comparing the *Tale* to the *Homily on Princes* we can help to shed light on this problem.

3. On the *Homily on Princes*

The *Homily on Princes* survives in three copies, the earliest of which dates from the fifteenth century. It was discovered and published in excerpts by М. Р. Pogodin in 1843, and the first complete publication was made by Kh. М. Loparev in 1894. Its full name is "Похвала и мучение святых мученик Бориса и Глеба. Месяца мая в 2 день. Слово похвальное на перенесение святых страстотерпец Бориса и Глеба, да и прочии не враждуют на братью свою". The *Homily* was read on the saints' day of Boris and Gleb who were the patrons of unity among the princes and it delivers a stern rebuke to the princes who fail to live in peace with each other. The author calls them to stop the strife and to follow the example of David Sviatoslavich of Chernigov (died in 1123) whose long, prosperous rule is attributed to his good relations with his "brethren". It is generally accepted that the *Homily* has strong links to the Chernigov lands and, most likely, was created there. The alternative suggestion made by D. I. Abramovich about its Vyshegorod origin (Abramovich 19-20) has not been supported by other scholars (Likhachev 1985, 162; Lenhoff 174).

The *Homily* has already been compared to the *Tale* but only very broadly. Likhachev refers to it in order to support his idea that "автор "Слова" находится не вне своей эпохи - он тесными идейными узами связан с передовыми устремлениями тогдашней политической мысли." He sees the similarity of these two monuments in the praising of "идея единения русских князей перед лицом внешней опасности" and the condemnation of the strife found in the *Homily*. He also points to the two lexical parallels: firstly, according to the

Homily, military conflicts are sometimes caused by "малая обида", and in the *Tale* "начаша князи про малое се великое молвити"; secondly, the *Homily* states that princes lose their glory because of the strife and the characters of the *Tale* "выскачисте изъ дедней славе" for the same reason. And, finally, Likhachev draws attention to a traditional belief reflected in both monuments: in the *Tale* "терем без кнеса" symbolizes death and in the *Homily* "расседася верхъ теремцю" at the moment of death (Likhachev 1985, 162-163, 251-252).

The general similarity of the ideas of the *Homily* and the *Tale* has been noted by many scholars (Adrianova-Peretc, 362-363; Eremin, 330-331; Lindberg, 3, and others), but as far as I know, there has been no individual study dedicated to comparing these two monuments. Indeed, in the past, such a comparison was problematic, partly because of uncertainty in the dating of the *Homily*.

Relatively recently, however, new facts in the history of the Chernigov lands discovered by Zaitsev (Zaitsev 70-75) support the dating of the *Homily* in the 1170s which was first suggested by Golubovsky (Golubovsky 491-510). Thus, the two works are very close not only geographically (as both are linked with Chernigov) but also chronologically. Moreover, the Chernigov princes addressed by the *Homily* became the protagonists of the events of 1185 described by the *Tale*. Therefore, by examining the *Homily* we can better understand what kind of political ideas existed in the milieu the characters of the *Tale* lived in.

In addition, the comparison with the *Tale* helps us to better understand the *Homily* which, up to now has not received the scholarly attention it deserves.

II. The Comparison of the *Slovo* and the *Homily*

4. On the Dating of the *Homily*

The *Homily* could not have been created before the death of Iziaslav Davydovich because he was the last of David's sons to die; and all his sons are referred to as no longer alive in the text of the monument. Thus, the earliest possible date is 1161 (Golubovsky 496; Eremin 623). The question of the latest possible date is more complicated.

The content of the *Homily* has generally caused scholars to think that it was created before the Mongol invasion. M. A. Salmina mentions that this traditional dating does not have sufficient grounds because the central topic of the *Homily*, "необходимость подчинения "молодших" князей старшим в роде столь же остро стоял, например, и в XV-XVI вв" (Salmina 430). It should be noted, however, that the pre-Mongolian dating of the *Homily* is based not only on its central idea but also on details of the text (Golubovsky 493-499). In addition to arguments presented by Golubovsky, I would like to remark that the warning against those "поганыя на свою братию возводяще" (226) can hardly be interpreted in the context of post-Mongolian Russia. In any case, the central idea of the *Homily* is broader than that summarized by Salmina. It treats not only the subordination of juniors to seniors but also the responsibility of seniors, an idea not very popular in the fifteenth and, even less so, in the sixteenth century. In addition, of course, the *Homily* could not have been created later than its earliest surviving copy and since the earliest dates from the fifteenth century, the sixteenth century is out of the question. Thus, the general dating in the twelfth - first quarter of the thirteenth century remains valid.

1175 as the exact date was suggested by P. V. Golubovsky. He linked the *Homily* with the conflict between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich of Chernigov and his cousin Oleg Sviatoslavich of Novgorod-Seversky (Golubovsky 491-510).

The suggestion of Golubovsky was supported and slightly modified by Zaitsev (1174 instead of 1175 Zaitsev 70-75). He discovered that the struggle between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich and Oleg Sviatoslavich was the very last conflict in the Chernigov lands before the battle on the Kalka. It was followed by a long period of unity and cooperation among the Chernigov princes. The next conflict after 1174 in the Chernigov lands is mentioned by the chronicle only under 1226 (PSRL, 1:448; Zaitsev 1981, 75). Thus, the condemnation of the princely strife and the call for unity was relevant in this region after 1174 only once - in 1226; and the *Homily* sounds too politically engaged to suggest that the author is not referring to any real contemporary events that were important for him and his audience. It should be noted that the chronicle does not mention the Cumans in connection with the conflict of 1226; and their participation in Rus' events is highly unlikely after they were crushed by the Mongols. According to Pletneva, "донские и приднепровские половцы ..., по существу, были уничтожены" at Kalka and "оставшиеся...не играли уже никакой роли в истории русских княжеств" (Pletneva 299). Thus, the condemnation of the princes who resort to the help of pagans does not fit the situation of 1226. In addition, we would expect that an author who speaks about God's punishment for princely strife would mention so significant an example of this punishment as the recent defeat on the Kalka. The absence of such mention also leads us to believe that the *Homily* was pronounced before Kalka.

This leaves the period between 1161 and 1174 inclusively. Besides the struggle of 1174, discussed above, only one more conflict took place in the

Chernigov lands during this period, in 1167. Thus, the *Homily* can be linked with either 1174 or 1167. The discovery of the month when the conflict of 1174 took place provides more support for the latter dating: for it occurred in the end of April or beginning of May which fits perfectly fits May 2 as the day when the *Homily* was delivered (Zaitsev 1981, 70-75). Additional arguments for 1174 are provided by the analysis of the conflict itself and will be discussed later.

5. The *Homily on Princes* and the *Igor' Tale*: Similarities

Let us, now, begin the comparison of the *Homily* and the *Igor' Tale* with an exploration of the similarities between the two works.

A connection between interprincely struggle and the Cuman threat is the most obvious of them. The *Homily* condemns those "поганья на свою братию возводяще"; the *Tale* contains many well-known passages on the same topic, as, for example, "Вы бо своими крамолами начясте наводите поганья на землю Русскую, на жизнь Всеславию. Которою бо бяше насилие от земли Половецкыи!" (88)

The passionate call for the subordination of junior princes to seniors is another obvious parallel. The *Homily* begins with a warning against "князи, противящиеся старейшей братии". Saints Boris and Gleb are viewed in the *Homily*, in accordance with the Rus' tradition, as the patrons of princely unity and subordination: "Аще ли Сотона коли вражду ввержет между братьею, да помянет сею святою, како смерть улюбита паче прияти, нежели вражду удержати" (226). In the *Tale*, the same idea is most explicitly expressed in the well-known speech of Sviatoslav (zolotoe slovo). He complains about the "непосobie" of the princes and blames Igor' and Vsevolod because they "нечестно одолесте, нечестно бо кровь поганую пролиясте" (76).

The meaning of the complaint is obvious. The accusation levelled against Igor' and Vsevolod looks more complicated and needs some clarification. When Sviatoslav says "одолесте" he most likely refers to their initial victory over the Cumans, so the message is that the campaign is a "dishonorable" action not because it resulted in a defeat, but as even the initial victory was "dishonorable," the very concept of this campaign was wrong. We can understand why this was so if we note that the next thing Sviatoslav says is, "Се ли створисте моей сребреней седине?" Thus, he accuses Igor' and Vsevolod of disrespect to his seniority. This interpretation can be prompted by comparing this passage to the account of the Igor' campaign found in the Ipatievskiaia chronicle: "Святославъ... слыша о брати своеми оже шли соуть на Половци оутаившеся его и не любобысть ему"(PSRL 2: 645). The chronicler specifically stresses that Sviatoslav condemned the campaign before he knew about the defeat. When he was later told about it he said, "Како жаль ми бяшетъ на Игоря, тако ныне жалую больми по Игорю", that is "My pity on Igor' now is greater than my anger with him was" (PSRL 2: 645). Thus, the very fact that they "шли, утаившеся его", provoked Sviatoslav's anger. His words from an earlier Ipatievskiaia entry helps us understand why this was so. "И рече Святослав брати своеми: "Се азъ старее Ярослава, а ты, Игорю, старее Всеволода, а ныне я вамъ во отца место остался. А велю тебе, Игорю, сде остати съ Ярославом блюсти Чернигова..." (PSRL 2: 618) This statement clearly shows that it was appropriate for Igor' and Vsevolod to follow the senior and not to take independent actions. Thus, Sviatoslav was angry with Igor's violation of princely hierarchy. The definition "нечестно" in the *Tale* perfectly fits this interpretation, because one of the meanings of the word "честь" was "место в феодальной иерархии". Accordingly, "нечестность" refers to disrespect of the hierarchy. Thus, I cannot

agree with the interpretation of this passage made by Likhachev who thinks that it contradicts the notion of "честь" accepted by the contemporaries: "С точки зрения феодальной морали, Игорь и Всеволод отнюдь не нарушили представления о "чести" князей. "Честь" свою они уронили в глазах Святослава и автора "Слова" только потому, что в поисках личной славы они предали интересы Русской земли" (Likhachev 1985, 121). I suggest that, on the contrary, the author of the *Tale* in the passage in question shared his contemporary conception of "честь".

It is also worth noting that Sviatoslav in the *Ipatevskaiia* chronicle provides an argument for his right to tell other princes what to do. His argumentation, however, is not particularly eloquent, because nobody questioned his right at this point. In the *Tale*, the same argumentation is strengthened with a reference to a physical sign of seniority, "silver hair". A parallel to this can be found in the *Ipatevskaiia* account of a vehement dispute between Viacheslav and Yuri Dolgorukii in which Viacheslav uses a physical sign of seniority, his beard, as an ultimate argument: "Се азъ тебе старей есть не маломъ, но многомъ, азъ уже бородать, а ты ся еси родиль". Yuri found this argument to be undisputable (PSRL 2: 430). Thus, by mentioning his "silver hair", Sviatoslav in the *Tale* stresses his right to be the senior prince and to be properly respected by juniors.

At this point, we come to another important similarity between the two works. Images of ideal senior princes play an important part in both of them. They are the characters of Sviatoslav and Yaroslav in the *Tale* and David Sviatoslavich of Chernigov in the *Homily*. The authors of both works are concerned to demonstrate that their "model princes" legally and properly occupied the senior seats. In the *Tale*, there is one more passage (besides "silver

hair") that could possibly be interpreted in this way. It is a well-known "temnoe mesto" - an "obscure" reference to Sviatoslav as "сокол в мѣтѣх". Scholars have made various suggestions about the meaning of this image; the most widely accepted interpretation is an "aged falcon" (Institut russkoi literatury 5: 20, see references). Thus, we see at least one clear and one questionable evidence of using Sviatoslav's old age as the ground of his senior position. As for David of the *Homily*, the "parable" ("притча") about him begins with the statement: "Княжаше в Чернигове в большемъ княженьѣ, понеже бо старии братьи своей" (226). It is interesting to note that both monuments refer to the senior prince as "господин" - a term that was new for the time. According to Likhachev, it reflected "рост феодальной главы над стоящими ниже его на лестнице феодального подчинения князьями". "Принимая новый термин "господин" автор "Слова", очевидно, принимал и новое отношение к княжеской власти". Likhachev also sees the connection between this term and characteristics of the senior princes as "великие" and "грозные" found in the *Tale* (Likhachev 1985, 141).

In the *Homily*, Davyd's brethren "слушахуть его, яко отца, и покоряются ему, яко господину". This corresponds well with Likhachev's interpretation of the term cited above with one important correction. He thinks that "обращение к князю "господин" впервые стало употребляться на северо-востоке Руси, там, где складывалась новая сильная княжеская власть". It was later accepted in Galich - another center of the growing princely authority. The emergence of the term, that "имеет совершенно точную хронологию" is dated in 1170s on the basis of chronicles (Likhachev 1985, 140-141). The evidence of the *Homily* supports this dating but it contradicts the statement on the exclusive use of the term in the North-East. The *Homily* shows that it was also used in Chernigov

which Likhachev did not include as one of the centers of a "new strong princely power". The evidence of the *Homily* becomes even more important if we take into account that the Chernigov chronicle survived only in the sparse and often distorted excerpts. The term "господин" is not found in those excerpts but a Chernigov parallel to its use in the *Homily* still exists. This is the inscription on the famous cup of Davyd's son Vladimir where the latter is called "осподарь" (Medyntseva 128-135).

In the *Tale*, the term is used to refer to Yaroslav of Galich and to Rurik and Davyd Rostislavichi. They are included in the "list" of princes addressed by the author's call to unite and to set out against the Cumans (80-86). The first place in this "list" belongs to Vsevolod Big Nest who was the Monomakhovichi senior. However, he is not called "господин". The reason for this might be the use of the term "великий князь" while addressing Vsevolod. Rurik had the second position in the Monomakhovichi hierarchy, his younger brother Davyd occupied the third place. Accordingly, they go immediately after Vsevolod in the *Tale*. The formal status of Yaroslav was lower than that of the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi because he belonged to a Galician princely line whose members did not have right to compete for the Kievan throne. The rapid economic and military growth of Galicia, however, made him de facto one of the most powerful princes. Yaroslav did not personally claim Kiev, thus formally observing the dynasty rules; but his military support of some rivals against the others had great impact on the outcome of the struggle. The author of the *Tale* points to this when he says that Yaroslav "opens the gates of Kiev" (82). I suggest that this is why the *Tale* puts him immediately after Vsevolod, Rurik, and Davyd and before the other Monomakhovichi. The princes on the "list" after Yaroslav are all the Monomakhovichi who were placed in order of their seniority.

None of them is called "господин". Thus, the prince having the highest position in the hierarchy is addressed as "великий князь," the three most powerful princes after him are referred as "господа". It follows that "господин" might be the title applied to the status next to that of "великий князь". The most essential thing for the present discussion, however, is that, as Likhachev put it, "принимая новый термин "господин" автор "Слова", очевидно, принимал и новое отношение к княжеской власти"; even if the details of this terminology need further clarification.

The next and, probably, the most important parallel is the connection between the appropriate behavior of the seniors and the obedience owed to them by the juniors which is established in both works. The reference to Davyd's authority treated above, "Братья же его видяще тако суца, вей слушахуть его, яко отца, и покоряются ему, яко господину" (228) serves as a conclusion to the description of David's virtue. The remark "видяще его тако суца" is quite interesting. It assumes that if he were not "тако сущий", "like that", he couldn't expect the obedience of the junior princes.

A similar idea can be found in the *Tale*. Sviatoslav describes the power of the "сильный, и богатый, и многовой" prince Yaroslav and his victorious warriors. Immediately after that, he addresses Igor' and Vsevolod: "Но рекосте: "Мужаемся сами: преднюю славу сами похитимъ, а заднюю си сами поделим" (78). "Но" indicates that Sviatoslav sees a contradiction between the two facts - the power, wealth and the victories of Yaroslav are contrasted to the separate action of Igor' and Vsevolod. This opposition is easily explained by noting that Yaroslav sat in Chernigov and thus was an immediate senior prince for the prince of Novgorod Seversky, who was Igor'. So, by taking his own separate action, Igor' violated his obligations as Yaroslav's junior. Thus, the message of this

passage is that Igor' did not have any reason to disobey Yaroslav, who deserved all due respect from his junior princes not only because of his position, but because he had the properties necessary for a good senior. The real life circumstances of Igor's campaign, however, were more complicated. According to the *Ipatevskaia*, Yaroslav sent a military detachment to assist Igor' (PSRL 2: 638). It can only mean that Yaroslav was aware of Igor's intention and approved it. But whatever happened in reality, while analyzing a text we need to deal with the situation as it is presented and interpreted within itself; and the author of the *Tale* certainly put all the responsibility exclusively on Igor'. We will accept this attitude as far as the ideology of the *Tale* is concerned as readily as a student of, say, *Mozart and Salieri* would not care to analyze the actual historical reason for Mozart's death.

Both authors display similar attitudes towards interprincely agreements. David of the *Homily*, for example, always fulfilled the agreements he made, even if the other party broke the treaty: "Кому ли крестъ целоваше, во весь животь свои не ступаше. Аще кто к нему не исправляше целования, он же одинако исправляше" (228). Thus, strict fulfillment of the agreements is an important property of the positive role model in the *Homily*. In the *Tale*, the violation of agreement plays an important part in the negative picture of "bad times". The passionate depiction of "невеселая година" is followed by the explanation of its reasons: "Рекоста бо брат брату: 'Се мое, а то мое же'" (68). Likhachev has demonstrated that this is a satirical reference to the standard formula of interprincely treaties: "Се мое, а то твое" (Likhachev, 1985, 217-218). Thus, the disasters happened because "brothers" (that is princes) broke their agreements.

Another interesting similarity is the reference to the glory of the ancestors as a regulator for the behavior of contemporary princes. This aspect of the *Tale*

has been thoroughly studied. According to Likhachev, princes in the *Tale* "всегда являются носителями славы их родоначальников" (Likhachev 1985, 89-90; see also Lotman 1977, 98-101). Scholars link it to the pagan tradition of "культ Рода" among the princes explored by Komarovich. (Likhachev 1985, 27; Komarovich 1960), thus, it seems quite appropriate for a secular monument with as many pagan elements as are found in the *Igor' Tale*. A similar motif found in a church sermon appears more surprising. Yet, it is nevertheless present in the *Homily*. Let us take a closer look at the methods used by the author when trying to convince the princes to follow his call. His arguments fall into three categories. He cites Scripture and claims that those who fail to live in peace will be punished by God while the peaceful princes will be awarded in Heaven. This is, of course, quite normal and would certainly be appropriate for the church rhetoric. Then, he promises to those following his instruction prosperity on Earth; for they will rule as successfully as David did. Along with these two kinds of "normal" church argumentation, however, we see a quite different method of addressing the audience. "Познайте, князи, свое величество и свою честь," - exhorts the author. These "величество" and "честь" are based on the glory of the ancestors as we see from the further development of the statement: "Князя деда имать святого Володимера... Каку братью имате, сия великая чудотворца Бориса и Глеба" (228). The role played by Vladimir, Boris, and Gleb in this passage appears to be syncretic: for they act as Christian Saints and glorious ancestors at one and the same time.

5. The *Igor' Tale* and the *Homily on Princes*: Differences

Let us now turn to the ideological differences between the two monuments. First of all, the idea of the responsibility of seniors is expressed in

the *Homily* much more explicitly than in the *Tale*. It contains probably the most detailed exploration of this subject in the whole of Old Rus' literature.

The structure of the *Homily* perfectly fits this idea. The main part is almost evenly divided between addressing first the junior princes and then the seniors. The accusation against those "противящиеся старейшей братьи" is concluded with a reference to the inspiring example of Boris and Gleb already cited above: "...да помянет сею святою, како смерть улюбита паче прияти, нежели вражду удержати" (226). It is further strengthened with the statement that the princes who follow this recommendation become saint-like: "И то кто претерпеть и мир преже начнетъ, то сима (Борису и Глебу - Ю. М.) от Бога равну мзду прииметь" (226). Immediately after that, the "parable" about David is introduced: "Скажу же вам притчу о сем, не в чуже стране бывшую" (226); and a bright picture of a positive role model for seniors follows. "О сем" is obviously referring to the previous sentences praising those "кто мир преже начнетъ". But these references, at the same time, summarize the passage on juniors. In other words, the call not to take military actions and try to peacefully resolve conflicts is directed at both parties, i. e., to seniors no less than juniors.

It is also worth noting that the possibility of not having any conflicts at all seems not to come to the author's mind. They are viewed as an integral part of interprincely relationships. This is especially well demonstrated by the reasons the author provides to explain why David "ни с кем не имевше вражды": "Аще кто на нь рать воздвигнетъ, он же покорениемъ своимъ рать уставляше... Аще кто кривду к нему сотворяше от братьи, он же все на собе притираше". Thus, David was involved in the "normal" politics of his time with its "рати" and "кривды". He managed to rule peacefully, so that "в велице

тишине бысть княжение его", only because of the correct way he dealt with these situations.

The mention of "wrongdoings" (кривда) committed by David's brethren against him, however, contradicts the claim that all members of the clan "слушают его, яко отца, и покоряются ему, яко господину". This contradiction helps us to better understand the main task of the second part of the *Homily*. The author appears very eager to convince the audience that a good senior who properly treats even non-perfect juniors will be finally awarded with their obedience and cooperation. The author's concern about the equal responsibility of seniors and juniors provides an explanation for its "dubious compositional model" which, according to Lenhoff, consists of "structuring a sermon around an anecdote" about David while the Saints on whose day the *Homily* was pronounced serve only as "the point of departure"; for "the translation of relics is briefly mentioned" (Lenhoff 73-74). Boris and Gleb presented a problem for the author of the *Homily* because in addition to being the patrons of princely unity in general, they also had more specific connections with teaching a moral lesson to juniors in particular. As is well known, Boris and Gleb, according to their Vita, chose to die rather than disobey their senior prince. Thus, focusing exclusively on the Saints who were supposed to be the subject of the sermon would distort the message the author wanted to conduct. He would lack a model for seniors that could be paralleled to the model for juniors presented by Boris and Gleb. That's why he used a local legend to "make up" a saintly senior prince, thereby "matching" the junior martyrs. Such an emphasis on the responsibility of senior princes finds its explanation in the circumstances of the conflict of 1174 and presents one more piece of evidence supportive of this dating. Thus, I agree with Lenhoff when she rejects Loparev's

view positing a Greek model of the *Homily* as an explanation for its unusual composition and when she characterises the text as "shaped primarily by a constellation of vertical bonds to a localizable situation" (Lenhoff 74). Let us now turn to the real life situation that was most likely reflected in the *Homily*.

The roots of the conflict that occurred in 1174 go back to 1166-67, when Sviatoslav Vladimirovich of Vshchizh and Starodub died (Vshchizh and Starodub were volosts in Chernigov principality). As Sviatoslav did not have any legitimate heirs, the senior prince of the Chernigov lands had to decide who would get these volosts. The prince of Chernigov was then Sviatoslav Vsevolodich, the future Grand Prince of Kiev and a major character in the *Igor' Tale*. He gave Vshchizh to his son and Starodub to his brother Yaroslav. His cousin Oleg Sviatoslavich of Novgorod - Seversky argued against Sviatoslav's decision and claimed that Starodub should have been given to him. This claim seems to have been correct, because he was supported by Rostislav of Kiev and by the citizens of Starodub. Perhaps more significantly, Oleg's supporters referred to "правда": "Ростислав же оусмотривъ правду, оже Святослав обидить Олга, тем же нача помогати Олгови. Много же посылал Ростиславъ къ Святославу веля ему оу правду наделити Олга и добра имъ хотя". I agree with the scholars who interpret "правда" here as "law" and write the word with capital П, assuming that Rostislav checked with some codex when he "оусмотривъ Правду" (Zaitsev 1975, 87) Accepting or not accepting this interpretation is not, however, relevant for the present discussion. The essential fact is that the junior prince Oleg was, according to the norms of the time, offended by the senior, whether the norms existed as a written law or as an oral tradition. Oleg took military action, and then Sviatoslav gave him four cities but not Starodub. Rostislav urged Oleg to make peace (PSRL 2: 525-526). He did so but was not satisfied with this

compromise and in 1174 made another attempt to get Starodub. This time he was assisted by his younger brothers Igor' and Vsevolod, future main characters in the *Tale*. Oleg and his brothers were defeated and after that, the participants of the conflict "оумирившись" on unknown terms and the question of Starodub was never brought up again (PSRL 1: 367; PSRL 2: 579, 599-600; Zaitsev 1981, 70-75).

We see that the military actions in both cases - in 1167 and 1174 - were initiated by a junior prince, but the cause of the conflict was an illegitimate decision made by a senior. The situation of 1174, again, better fits the *Homily* with its reference to "малая обида" made by seniors to juniors. Depriving Sviatoslav of Starodub in 1166 could hardly be called a "minor" offence. According to the norms of the time, he seemed to have good reason to avenge himself militarily. Certainly, it was different in 1174 when he started the war after he had already been compensated for his loss; for this corresponds more to the condemnation of juniors who could not tolerate even a minor offence on the part of the seniors and begin wars against them, as well as to the call for seniors not to offend the juniors which is found in the *Homily*. In addition, there are more grounds to claim that the conflict occurred because of "единое злопомнение" in reference to the situation of 1174 rather than to the 1166-67. Golubovsky thinks that the author of the *Homily* refers to Oleg's unsuccessful attempt to illegally occupy the Chernigov seat that properly belonged to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich: "Олег долго не мог забыть ни неудавшегося дела с Черниговом, ни старых сомнительных отношений Святослава Всеволодовича к его отцу" (Golubovsky 502). I suggest that, although all this could have contributed to Oleg's hard feelings, "злопомнение" here primarily refers to his second attempt to get Starodub. In 1167, as we have seen, the cause of the conflict was quite serious

and could not be characterized as "единое злопомнение", in other words as something very petty. In 1174, it was quite different. The four cities received by Oleg instead of Starodub were likely to be considered as an adequate compensation. We can assume this because of the change in Rostislav's attitude. As the Kievan prince, he observed "правда" in the interprincely relationships and protected Oleg when the latter was offended. Therefore, if after the compensation Rostislav urges Oleg to make peace we can conclude that he thinks that Oleg should be satisfied and has no reason to conduct war. Under such circumstances, the action taken by Oleg in 1174, seven years after the conflict was solved, could be indeed called "единое злопомнение". Thus, we see that the difference between the *Tale* and the *Homily* in stressing the seniors' responsibility is actually caused by the difference between the two situation reflected in the both monuments.

Another difference between the two works deals with the princely ideal. The virtue of a warrior plays an important part in this ideal as pictured in the *Tale*. The *Homily*, on the contrary, does not even mention the military aspect of princely duties. It can be easily explained if we note that the *Tale* deals with the struggle against the external enemies and the author, of course, thinks that it should be continued, and the *Homily* treats the subject of internal strife and offers ways to stop it so that all the princes could rule their lands "в велице тишине."

Finally, there is a difference in the details of the dramatic consequences of the military conflicts as described in the *Homily* and in the *Tale*. The *Homily* treats them as an exclusively interprincely problem and does not mention the sufferings of the common people while the *Tale* contains a famous passage on "патаи". However, the "ideological" nature of this difference looks questionable because it might be a reference to the archaic image of a battle as a "bloody harvesting"

and thus it might have been caused by artistic reasons rather than by the social concerns expressed by the author of the *Tale*.

The next important group of differences is connected with the very different nature of the *Homily* and the *Tale* as works of literature. I am not trying, of course, to compare the literary value of the two monuments. Although the *Homily* is a good example of church rhetoric, it is unworthy of any comparison to such a masterpiece as the *Igor' Tale*. In addition, their genres are, of course, also, quite different.

Scholars do not agree on the definition of the genre of the *Tale*, but it is self-evident that first of all, it is a work of art. It is highly emotional and has a complex structure. The author does not present his ideas in a logical order but expresses them by means of artistic images. This is what makes the work so beautiful and profound but it also, of course, increases its complexity.

The *Homily* is, on the contrary, more a political treatise than an artistic work. Its structure is simple and logical. The author clearly presents his ideas and supports them with deliberate argumentation. He shows the positive consequences of following the presented ideal and argues against those who thinks that it is not practical. He states the point of view of his opponents, "Речеть ли кто, яко (Prince Davyd - Ю. М.) жены не име ... Или речеть кто, яко дома не име, того ради заповедь Господню исправи возможе? Многожды бо слышах некая невегласы глаголюща: "Съ женою и съ чады своими не можемъ спастися," (228) but shows that this is wrong because Davyd had a wife, children and "не един домъ имeаше, но многи" and still "заповедь Владычню исправи в сем животе своемъ, ни с кем вражды име" (228). The latter phrase summarizes the main idea and repeats the introductory statement to the "parabola" that reads, "Давыд ни с кем не имeаше вражды".

Thus, the goal a righteous prince should seek to achieve is first stated; then the means he should use are given (as was shown above, this is the strict fulfillment of all treaties and obligations); and finally the goal is summarized again as a theses that has been proved. This is how the central point of the *Homily* - the "parabola" - is created. This logical composition, is, of course, very different from the emotional exclamations of the *Tale*.

If we now compare the authors of the two monuments as they reveal themselves in their texts we will also find significant differences. It is well established that the author of the *Tale*, whoever he was, represents secular culture and was likely not a member of the clergy. By contrast, the author of the *Homily* is, of course, a church person. This is more than just a question of their formal status. It is interesting to compare their literary references. The author of the *Tale* is well familiar with the chronicles, especially with the *Primary Chronicle*. Besides the chronicles, he uses folklore extensively, as well as secular poetry but there are no references to any church literature in his work. A particularly good illustration of this is the passage on Rostislav's death. It was described in both the chronicle and the *Kievan Caves Patericon* but the attitude to the event is totally opposite. In the chronicle, it is presented in a lyrical and deeply sympathetic way; in the *Patericon*, on the contrary, it is depicted as God's right punishment to Rostislav for the brutality of his men. The author of the *Tale* either did not know the *Patericon* or purposely chose the version given by the chronicle. In both cases, we can clearly see his literary preferences (Likhachev 1985, 83-89).

The text of the *Homily* has, unlike the *Tale*, too few references to the concrete events and that makes it difficult to determine its sources (the source of the legend about David's death is, unfortunately, unknown.) Although, this very lack of concrete historical material suggests that the author, may not have been

very familiar with the chronicles. On the other hand, the nature of the *Homily* does not require great historical support and we should seek further evidence of the author's lack of familiarity with the chronicles. For example, he gives us information about David's sons: "Преподобный Никола Святоша его сын бе и ина два сына". In fact, however, David had not three, but at least five sons. Golubovsky thus explains this inconsistency: "Мы думаем, что проповеднику не было нужды говорить о всех пятерых: только трое из них играли в истории своей земли политическую роль, а двое ... никакого значения не имели, ... а между тем проповедь имеет в виду политические события, а стало быть, естественнее упомянуть о деятелях, игравших более или менее значительную политическую роль" (Golubovsky 495). It is true that the *Homily* as a whole treats political issues, but the passage on David's sons does not have any connection with their political activity. They are mentioned not as political figures but simply as a part of David's earthly burden along with his wife and his responsibility for the Chernigov land. The author emphasizes how big this burden was. He had "not only a wife, but also children, too", "not one "дом" but many of them". These numerous responsibilities, however, did not prevent him from living a righteous life; therefore nobody can refer to the family as an excuse for being a sinner. The greater the number of David's children the more valid the argumentation is, and it is therefore hard to imagine that the author deliberately did not mention some of them. It seems more likely that he simply did not know about the less famous sons of David. Nikola Sviatosha was a well-known monk of the Kievan Cave monastery, and there is a detailed account of his life in the *Patericon* with the references to his cell, his books, and other things that are known in the monastery as "Sviatosha's" "until now" (*Kievo-Pecherskii Paterik* 376-384). Two of Sviatosha's brothers are also mentioned in his vita included in the

Patericon. In addition, they must have been well remembered in the Chernigov lands. As for Davyd's other sons, the only source of information about them was the chronicle.

6. The *Igor' Tale* and the *Homily on Princes*: Summary

We have seen that the political ideas expressed in the two monuments are very similar. The ideal of both authors can be summarized as follows.

They both support a strong and authoritative senior prince which is indicated by their use of the new term "господин" and the idealized portraits of the model seniors. But this ideal is very different from the concept of an autocrat in the future centralized state. The power of the senior is inseparable from the power of his whole clan and is based on it. The clan is hierarchically structured; and every prince in this hierarchy, including the senior, has rights to be respected and responsibilities to be fulfilled. The subjugation of the juniors does not appear unconditional, as it became later, with the emergence of the Muscovite centralized state.

The coexistence of many princes and princely clans pursuing their own interests is taken for granted in both works, but the conflicts of those interests also seem to be inevitable. This often results in military struggles that weaken Rus' lands and encourage external enemies. Both authors condemn strife and preach internal peace and unity in the face of external threats. They do not view this harmony in the form of a unified political structure with an autocrat at the top, however, instead, they believe that their goal should be achieved through a system of princely treaties, the strict fulfillment of every prince's obligations, and respect of every prince's rights determined by his position in the hierarchy.

The responsibility of seniors is better described and is more stressed in the *Homily* than it is in the *Tale*. On the other hand, the ideal prince of the *Tale* must be a brave and victorious warrior, while the *Homily* does not mention this aspect of princely duties at all. These differences reflect the differences between the real life situations that the monuments are based on.

Thus, we see that two works of quite different genres that were created by very different people address the same problems and offer very similar political solutions. Therefore, I think we are justified in suggesting that the political program described above reflected the views existing in society and had some roots in the political reality of twelfth-century Rus', particularly, as relates to the Chernigov lands. Let us now turn to the exploration of this reality.

III. The Political Context

7. "Feudal Disintegration" Revisited

The *Tale* and the *Homily* seek to trace their contemporary problems to the end of the eleventh - the beginning of the twelfth century. They both depict the Olgovichi founding princes: Oleg Sviatoslavich (Gorislavich) in the *Tale* and his brother Davyd in the *Homily*. The choice of this chronological period seems quite appropriate for both authors; for it was the time when their contemporary system of interprincely relationships was founded.

The theoretical basis for this system was given in the "Instruction" by Vladimir Monomakh. Lotman thinks that this work is close to the *Tale* "по духу решения государственных вопросов, пониманию природы политической нравственности" (Lotman 1962, 344). An important parallel to the *Homily* can be

found in Monomakh's recommendation to his sons "старейшим покараться, с точными и меньшими любовь имети". As we know, Davyd's "junior brethren" also not only "слушают его яко отца" but "покоряются ему, яко господину", as well. This is more than just a coincidence in a word. The use of the word "покараться" in the chronicles prompts the suggestion that it was a special term related to the relationships between seniors and juniors.

The proper establishment of these relationships was of extreme importance for maintaining the political order in the Rus' lands at the time of the "feudal disintegration". It had traditionally been viewed as a time of chaos and decay. This premise of pre-revolutionary historiography was inherited by Soviet and Western scholars and had survived until extensive archeological excavations of Old Rus' began. The results of these excavations contrasted dramatically with the accepted concept of degradation caused by disintegration and interprincely wars. "The period of feudal disintegration" was definitely a time of rapid and successful economic development. First, it was noted as a paradox but further investigation showed that economic development and political instability had a cause - consequence relation. The very emergence of numerous new principalities was the result not of the "disintegration" of a certain entity into many pieces, but rather the result of the colonization of new lands and the spread of princely power, "распространение суда и дани" both in width and depth. The increase in number of centers of power required certain rules to regulate the relationships between the bearers of this power, i. e., between the princes. Those rules were not, and could not be, given by somebody at one time and in a complete form. They evolved over the course of events and were constantly improved and modified. Thus we see that it was difficult to achieve a fixed and stable political order first of all because of the rapid economic growth, for this growth led to

constant changes in the relative power and influence of the Rus' principalities and the changes, in their turn, undermined the balance of power among the princes. While new centers emerged, the old ones became less significant. New trade routes appeared, and new lands became agriculturally cultivated. This resulted in the constant redistribution of the relative "political weight" among the principalities and correspondingly among the princes. The growing political influence of the urban population made the picture even more complicated. A prince could not rule without the support of the townspeople and they did not necessarily support the person who had the most rights to their town according to the dynastic rules. Some general principles, however, still applied despite all the complications of practical politics.

It is, of course, impossible to trace the complete political history of the twelfth century in this thesis, but my two goals are to use the chronicle account of the political events so that we can see the practical application of the ideas developed in the "Igor' Tale" and in the *Homily on Princes*, and then to take a closer look at the situation in the 1180s when Igor's campaign took place.

8. Principles of Interprincely Relationships: What We Can Learn from the Chronicle

As we have seen, both the *Tale* and the *Homily* pay attention to the legitimacy of the position of senior prince and consider physical seniority as the major ground for this legitimacy. Some of the chronicle evidence related to this subject was already cited above. (See p. 15) The situation was not always as clear as it was for the Olgovichi when Sviatoslav, being the oldest in his clan, acted "в отца место" and his junior brethren followed his orders. The cause of Viacheslav's physical seniority in the Monomakhovichi clan, which has been

already briefly mentioned in connection with his argument with Yury Dolgoruky over Kiev, deserves closer attention.

Viacheslav, Monomakh's son, became the oldest among the Monomachovichi after the death of his brothers Mstislav (1132) and Yaropolk (1139). He lacked personal characteristics necessary for a senior, however, for he was a weak ruler and unsuccessful warrior. According to the dynasty rules, he had prior claims for the Kievan throne, but he never could gain the support of the Kievan townspeople. As a result, he was repeatedly defeated in the struggle for Kiev. The major competitors in this struggle were the Olgovichi, Yury Dolgoruky of Suzdal' (Viacheslav's younger brother), and Viacheslav's brave and talented nephew Iziaslav Mstislavich of Volynia. Both Yury and Iziaslav had their own chroniclers whose works survived as parts of the twelfth century Kievan chronicle. This work provides us with a valuable opportunity to see how the violation of the principle of seniority on the part of Yury and Iziaslav was presented to the public opinion.

Yury's chronicler claims that Yury, after his victory over Iziaslav, supposedly offered the Kievan throne to his elder brother Viacheslav: "Тогда князь Дюрги поваби Вячеслава на стол Киеву". His boyars, however, urged him to change his mind: "Бояре же размолвиша Дюргя, рекуче: "Брату твоему не удержать Киева, да не будет его ни тебе, ни оному". Дюргеви же послушавшю бояръ" and occupied Kiev himself, offering Viacheslav Vyshegorod as compensation. Viacheslav, who was very well aware of his inability to hold Kiev, accepted the offer (PSRL 2: 394). Thus, the chronicler presents Yury as a supporter of the seniority rule who cared about placing Kiev into the hands of the oldest member of the clan. It was only extremely unfavourable circumstances that prevented him from doing so. Trying his best to protect Yury's reputation as

much as possible, the chronicler puts the ultimate responsibility on the boyars, which suggests that an accusation of disrespect to physical seniority could seriously damage a prince's image.

As for Iziaslav, he presents a unique example of a prince who for a while seemed to challenge this very principle. He used to say: "Не идеть место къ голове, но голова къ месту" (PSLR 2: 442) and act accordingly. His chronicler justifies Iziaslav's seizure of Kiev by creating a bright picture of his knightly virtues and the unanimous support of the population which he enjoyed. He seems intent on drawing his readers to the conclusion that Iziaslav, although young, in fact deserved the Kievan throne more than the legitimate but inept Viacheslav did. According to some accounts, Iziaslav openly boasted: "Добыл есми головою своею Киева" (PSRL 2: 380) thus declaring his disrespect to the seniority of his rivals Viacheslav and Yuri. Iziaslav's struggle against his uncles in the 1140s presents a most open and persistent threat to the principle of seniority.

Thus, Iziaslav's ultimate failure is all the more remarkable. His abundant military talents along with the actual support of a significant and influential part of the population could not help him hold on to Kiev for a long time. Finally, he had to resort to the very same principle that he had previously challenged so vehemently. In 1151, when he captured Kiev again, (Berezhkov 150-151) he realised that the only way to stay there was to make his rule legitimate. Thus he turned to his former adversary, Viacheslav, and invited him to occupy the Kievan throne. Iziaslav knew, of course, that Viacheslav was not able to rule independently and wanted to have him as a legitimizing figure. The fact that Viacheslav understood this is indicated by his reaction to the offer: "Вячеславъ же рече съ гневомъ къ Изяславу: "Чему ми еси во ономъ дни не далъ, но с великомъ соромомъ ехашъ ис Киева?! Аже рать идет из Галича, а друга от

Чернигова, то ты мне Киевъ даешь"" (PSRL 2: 399). Iziaslav had to repent and to formally pronounce Viachaslav as his "father": "Отце, кланяю ти ся... ты ми еси отецъ... согрешилъ есмь...того всего каюся пред Богомъ и пред тобою". "Тебе люблю акы отца и ныне ти молвлю, ты ми еси отецъ, а Киевъ твои." (PSRL 2: 399, 417-418) Viacheslav was satisfied with this formal acknowledgment of his seniority and in exchange gave up seeking real power: "Сыну, Богъ ти помози, оже на мене еси честь возложилъ акы на своемъ отци, а я пакы, сыну, тебе молвлю: я есмь оуже старъ, а всех рядовъ не могу оуже рядити, но будеве оба Киеве, аче нам будет который ряд..., а идеве оба по месту, а дружина моя и полкъ мои, а то буди обою нама... а ты ездѣ с моимъ полкомъ и съ своимъ" (PSLR 2: 419). Viacheslav went even further after he became quite assured of Iziaslav's intention to permanently have him as a "father" and to render him all the formal honors associated with this status. In confirmation, he made a declaration that sounds most unusual: "Оже на меня еси честь възложилъ... аже се дееши, ты мои еси отецъ, а ты мои и сынъ, ты же мои братъ" (PSLR 2:418). Thus, he accepted his formal senior status by pronouncing Iziaslav his "son"; he expressed his readiness to give up real power by pronouncing the same Iziaslav as his "father"; and, finally, he confirmed that they are going to be equal co-rulers by declaring their "brotherhood". This agreement worked perfectly. Yury was defeated, and no one else questioned the legitimacy of this "duumvirate" that lasted until Viacheslav died in 1154/55. (PSRL 2: 472-473; Berezkhov 156) Thus, the principle of seniority finally came to dominate, although only formally, even under the most unfavorable circumstances.

A similar situation took place a few years later. In 1158, Iziaslav's son Mstislav of Volynia who inherited both his father's military talent and popular

support, managed to defeat the Kievan prince Iziaslav Davydovich and to take over Kiev. It was, probably, his father's unfortunate experience that taught Mstislav not to try proclaiming himself a prince of Kiev. He realized that a military victory alone was not enough to take the Kievan seat for a person who lacked legitimate rights to it. That is why he addressed his uncle Rostislav who was then the oldest among the Southern Monomashichi and invited him to Kiev. It is very likely that Mstislav hoped to follow the pattern of the Iziaslav-Viacheslav "duumvirate" and to rule on his own using his senior as a decoration of legitimacy. But Rostislav, unlike Viacheslav, would not be satisfied with the role of decorative leader, as is clear when he states his answer to Mstislav's invitation: "Оже мя в правду зовете с любовию, то я всяко иду Киеву на свою волю, яко вы имете мя отцемъ собе въ правду и въ моемъ вы послушаньи ходити". He proved this declaration to be serious by rejecting the metropolitan supported by Mstislav: "А се вы являю: не хочу Клима оу митрополъи видети..." It appears that Mstislav saw the question of who gets the real power of a Kievan prince hidden behind the argument over the metropolitan's candidacy. He "крепко пряшеся по Климе" and, in his turn, rejected Rostislav's candidate Konstantin. Finally, after "крепце речи" the princes worked out a compromise: "отложиста оба, яко не сести има на столе митрополтъстемъ и на том целоваста хрестъ, яко иного митрополита привести им из Царягорода". (PSRL 2 502-504; Berezikov 170-171)

After this agreement was achieved, Rostislav became Prince of Kiev and obtained all real power associated with this title, which is clear from the account of his conflict with Mstislav that occurred two years later. (Berezikov 171, 175) "Поеха Изяславич Мъстиславъ ис Киева, розъгневавъся на стрия своего на Ростислава и много речи вѣста межи ими", - states the chronicler. Rostislav

then confiscated Mstislav's volosts in the Kievan land in accordance with his intention to be a senior "в правду" and to keep his juniors "в послушаньи". Mstislav made an attempt to create an alliance against Rostislav but he failed, for other princes almost unanimously supported the legitimate Prince of Kiev. Thus, Mstislav had to give up and to make peace with Rostislav. After that, he received his volosts back. The fact that this conflict occurred soon after the war against Iziaslav of Chernigov is all the more remarkable. The latter attacked Rostislav and drove him out of Kiev. Rostislav retreated to Belgorod and stayed there, besieged by Iziaslav's troops, until Mstislav came to his rescue. Mstislav was so famous as a victorious warrior that Iziaslav "ни полковъ видивъ, побеже от Белгорода", when he heard that Mstislav was approaching. Thus, Mstislav first captured Kiev for Rostislav and then he secured the Kievan seat for him by defeating Iziaslav. Obvious military superiority, however, did not help Mstislav in undermining Rostislav's authority which was based on his legitimacy. (PSLR 2:515-521)

After Rostislav died in 1167 (Berezhkov 178) Mstislav repeated his attempt to get power over Kiev. He drove out Rostislav's weak and unpopular heir and took over the Kievan seat. This time he did not invite any senior prince to Kiev. This attempt to overcome the dynastic rules turned out to be disastrous. The senior Monomakhovich of the time Andrei Bogoliubsky organized a powerful coalition of numerous princes who were indignant with Mstislav's act and this led to the famous sack of Kiev in 1169 when Mstislav was defeated. This event has drawn much scholarly attention, but most of this attention has been paid to what Andrei did after he restored his rights as senior. This was, indeed, non-traditional; for, as it is well known, he did not go to Kiev, but assigned the Kievan seat to one of his "brethren" instead. We must not overlook the fact,

however, that the restoration of Andrei's position as senior was done in accordance with traditional dynastic rules.

Thus, we see that the rules based on a princely hierarchy dominated by seniors were very valid and that the authors of both the *Igor' Tale* and the *Homily on Princes* derived their principle of seniority from this contemporary reality.

Another important principle propagated in both monuments is, as we have seen, the respect of interprincely treaties. This matter also plays a very important role in Monomakh's "Instruction". Not only does he teach his sons, "Аще ли вы будете крестъ целовати к братьи или к кому, а ли управивъше сердце свое, на нем же можете устояти, то же целуйте, и целовавше блюдете, да не, преступи, погубите души своее"; but also the whole monument generated from the dramatic situation centered around the violation of an interprincely treaty (*Pouchenie Vladimira Monomakha* 152). The chronicle also provides abundant information on this subject.

Respect to the treaties is depicted by the chronicler as one of the main princely virtues as shown by the obituary of Gleb Yurievich. The first thing the chronicler states about the prince is "бе князь братолюбець, к кому любо крестъ целовашеть, то не ступашеть его и до смерти". Other good things that could be said about Gleb are mentioned later: he was "кротокъ, благонравенъ, монастыре любя, чернецкии чинъ чтяше, нищая добре набдяше". Thus, all these qualities were considered less important than the most significant one - non-violation of cross-kissing (*PSLR* 2: 563). It should be also mentioned that this quality is labeled as "братолюбие", which reminds us of the argumentation of the *Homily* with its biblical quotations preaching brotherly love used to support the author's thesis about right interprincely relationships. "Аще кто глаголет, яко

Бога люблю, а брата ненавижду, ложь есть," (226) that is why princes should live peacefully and observe the dynasty rules. (This is a kind of a play on the two meanings of the word "brother" - "neighbour", "any other person", and the word used by the princes to address each other.) The *Tale* also uses this word in the connection with interprincely treaties: "Рекоста бо брат брату: се мое, а то мое же". (See above p. 18)

If fulfilling the agreements symbolized by cross-kissing is one of the best virtues, its violation is, correspondingly, one of the worst sins a prince can commit. A mishap affecting one of the princes served him right, according to the chronicler, because he "не устояше в крестном целовании всегда" (PSLR 2: 567).

To violate a cross-kissing meant to risk one's soul. The chronicler cites the response given by two princes when they were offered to join an alliance against Iziaslav, "Целовала есве крестъ къ Изяславу Мстиспаличю... а душею не можеве играти" (PSLR 2: 377).

The chroniclers express the same ideas when they directly present their opinions on princely duties. "Богу наказавшую князе креста не переступати и старейшиго брата честити", writes the chronicler when he explains the defeat of Yaropolk who took up arms against his senior prince Mikhalko(PSLR 2: 600-602).

Extremely interesting information on this subject is contained in the conversation between prince Rostislav and the Kievan Caves' Hegumen Polikarp as it is given in the *Ipatevskaia*. This conversation deserves close attention. According to the chronicle, Rostislav wanted to take a tonsure in the Kievan Caves Monastery, but Polikarp "возборони" him from doing so because he thought that Rostislav should not abandon his princely responsibilities. When Rostislav expressed his wishes "свободитися от маловременного и суетного

света сего и мимотекущаго и многмятежнаго жития сего" Polikarp objected, "Вам Бог тако велель быти: правду деяти на сем свете, в правду суд судити и в хрестномъ целованьи вы стояти". This statement is especially valuable because, unlike the previous citation ("Богу наказавше князе..."), it is not connected with any political situation. We can suspect that the chronicler who supported Mikhalko could name not those princely duties which were really considered the most important ones but just those violated by Mikhalko's rebellious nephew. Polikarp, however, was free from such motives. His statement is purely theoretical. Thus, we can conclude that according to Polikarp princes have their specific way of salvation different from that of monks. Faithfulness to cross-kissing is an integral part of this way.¹ Rostislav insisted on his preference for the monastic path to salvation: "Ростислав же ему тако рече: Отце, княжение и мир не можетъ безъ греха быти, ... а хотель бых поревновати ... якоже и святии отци, оудручивше тело свое постом и оузкымъ и теснымъ путемъ ходивше..." Polikarp's response to that was, "Аще сего желаеши, княже, да воля Божия да будетъ". Although he did not directly object to the statement that "княжение и мир не можетъ безъ греха быти", he definitely did not agree with it. Rostislav can become a monk not because that will help him to live a more rightseous life than he does as a prince but simply because he is free to do whatever he wants: "Аще сего желаеши, княже". (PSLR 2: 529-531) Close parallel between Polikarp's attitude and the ideas of the *Homily* is self-evident.

Chroniclers not only give theoretic support to the system of interprincely treaties. They also assume that the princes relied on the cross-

¹ The reference to a prince as a just judge is also very interesting but it is not relevant for the present work because neither *Tale* nor *Homily* treats this aspect of princely duties.

kissings in their practical affairs. The Ipatovskaia explains why Monomakhovich Davyd was hunting in an area where Olgovich Sviatoslav could easily reach him: "Давыдоу же не ведоущю, ни мыслящу на ся ниоткоуду же зла, зане крестомъ честнымъ оутвердился бѣшетъ с нимъ, томоу же веряшетъ" (PSLR 2: 615). We do not know, however, whether this is an authentic description of Davyd's feelings or a statement made by the chronicler in order to stress how badly Sviatoslav acted when he violated the cross-kissing and attacked Davyd (it is a fact, though, that Davyd was caught off guard). Another example of this kind is presented by a conflict between the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi in the end of the twelfth century. The two clans had a dispute over succession to the Kievan throne. They kissed the cross in order not to start any military action before the end of the negotiations. The Olgovichi senior Yaroslav broke the agreement and attacked some junior Monomakhovichi. They were not able to properly defend themselves because their senior Rurik left "роспоустивъ братью свою и дружину свою, оума веру крестному целованию" (PSLR 2: 691).

This "вера крестному целованию" was quite reasonable as we can see from an account of the conflict between Vsevolod Sviatoslavich and Andrei in 1139/40 (Berezhkov 139). Vsevolod besieged Andrei's Pereiaslavl' but could not capture it. They started negotiations and worked out a peace treaty. The treaty should have been sealed, as usual, with the ceremony of kissing a Cross. Before Vsevolod had time to perform the ceremony, a fire accidentally started in Pereiaslavl'. It, of course, changed the military situation giving Vsevolod a chance to capture the city. He, however, did not use this chance and proceeded with the peace-making. His chronicler praised him a highly for doing so. He stresses that Vsevolod did not attack the city in spite of the fact that he had not yet kissed the cross. It is repeated twice. Vsevolod was free to attack the city, the

chronicler states, and it was only his exceptional good will and Christian feelings that prevented him from doing so. Vsevolod himself proudly said to Andrei, "Видиши, яко я к тебе креста не целовль и еще, а то ми былъ Богъ далъ, оже ся есте сами зажгли, аже бы лиха хотель, то что бы ми годно, то же бы створиль" (PSLR 2: 305-306). This passage makes us think that not breaking the peace treaty after kissing the cross would be something quite natural. There would be nothing to boast about. This case also illustrates the significance of the ceremony itself which is also well documented by what took place in Chernigov in 1164 (Berezhkov 176). The prince died, and the Chernigov leadership decided not to reveal his death (in order to get the seat inherited by the prince they preferred). Everybody had to take an oath not to inform other princes about the death and to kiss an icon of Our Savior. A very interesting remark was made about a bishop's participation in this ceremony. "Рече Гюрги тысячкыи: Нам было не лепо дати пискупу целовати святого Спаса, занеже святитель есть, а нам ся о нем не блазнити, занеже князии свои любиль." (PSLR 2: 522-523) Thus, kissing of a sacred object (a cross or an icon) can be compared to signing a document in modern times. It had to be a serious guarantee if the demand to perform the ceremony was considered a sign of mistrust. It well corresponds to what Gurevich writes about the Western medieval phenomenon, "Все важнейшие события в жизни людей ... подчинялись ритуалу, сопровождалось особыми процедурами, несоблюдение которых аннулировало акт." "Сущность акта определял ритуал" (Gurevich 185,187).

All that does not, however, mean that kissing the cross was never violated. Of course, it was, as are the norms in any society. It is interesting to compare the attitude towards violations of cross-kissing to violations of some other norm. A good example can be derived from the chronicle of Iziaslav

Mstislavich. As we remember, Iziaslav violated the principle of seniority, when he competed for the Kievan throne with his uncles. We saw, that this challenge to seniority was openly declared and that his chronicler tried to justify Mstislav's actions. The same Iziaslav happened to violate a cross- kissing, when he promised to acknowledge Igor' as the Kievan prince and after that attacked him, drove him from Kiev and later captured him. The chronicler's presentation of these events is very different from the story about the struggle against the uncles. The fact of kissing the Cross is briefly mentioned, "Изяславоу Мьстиславичю ноужа бысть целовати крестъ" (PSLR 2: 318). The description of Iziaslav's campaign against Igor' begins with the statement, "И не угоден бысть кияномъ Игорь" (PSLR 2: 322) Thus responsibility is placed on the Kievan townspeople rather than on Iziaslav. Later in the course of his story, the chronicler draws attention to the princes who violated a cross-kissings to Iziaslav and refers to Iziaslav's evident displeasure at this act. This way he creates the illusion that Iziaslav was a strong supporter of faithfulness to kissing the Cross. In other words, the chronicler does not try to openly declare the violation of cross-kissing. On the contrary, he does his best to disguise it as much as possible. We can conclude that there were no possible arguments for the defence of "крестопреступление". The chronicle of Iziaslav shows that while some parts of society could support a challenge to seniority, nobody would have supported violation of kissing the Cross.

A story about Vladimir of Galicia found in the Ipatevskaia presents additional evidence of how negatively "крестопреступление" was viewed by public opinion. This story tells us how Vladimir was punished by God when he violated his cross-kissing to Iziaslav and made fun of the ritual itself. According to Likhachev, this story belongs to what he calls "tales of a princely crime"

(Likhachev 1947, 215, 232). All other tales of this genre describe violent crimes committed by princes against other princes like murder or blinding. Making a violation of kissing the Cross the subject of such a tale shows that it was considered a serious crime.

There must have been, however, a legal procedure for breaking a treaty, and, as we shall see, it was possible. When one of the princes was called to take up arms against Yuri Dolgoruky, he answered, "Хрестъ есмь целоваль к нему, а не могу без вины на нь въстати" (PSLR 2: 490). Therefore, he could ignore his cross-kissing and act against Yuri if there were "вина" on the part of the latter (this word had two meanings - "guilt" and "reason", most likely, it means "guilt" here.)

An example of the "вина" that could lead to breaking a treaty can be found in the account of the conflict between Rostislav Mstislavich and Sviatoslav Vsevolodich. Sviatoslav thought that Rostislav was going to capture his son Oleg and to give Chernigov, which belonged to Sviatoslav, to another prince. The chronicler states that Rostislav actually did not have any hostile plans against Sviatoslav and all this was the slander of "злые человеки". It is not relevant to our purpose, however, whether Rostislav was in fact going to do anything bad to Sviatoslav or not. The essential thing is that both Sviatoslav and Oleg trusted "злые человеки" and discussed the situation with their retainers who advised them to break their treaty with Rostislav. They argued that Oleg and Sviatoslav had a right to do so: "Княже, а то ли ти добро есть, оже ты хотели Кieve яти (Rostislav was then the Kievan prince), а Чернигов отдають подо отцемъ твоимъ, а оуже есть правъ отецъ твои и ты в крестномъ целованьи", - said "мужи" to Oleg. Sviatoslav's "мужи" repeated the same arguments and added, "А оуже еси, княже, и волость свою погубиль, держася по Ростислава, а он

ти всяко лениво помагае" (PSLR 2: 513-514). Oleg and Sviatoslav were convinced by that and broke their cross-kissing. It is essential that they considered themselves "правы в крестномъ целованьи". Obviously, from their point of view, "вина" for this break was placed on Rostislav.

There were, however, some rare cases when a treaty could be legitimately broken without "вина" on the part of the other prince. This occurred when a cross-kissing was cancelled by a church hierarch for some serious reason. For example, Mstislav the Great had a treaty with Yaroslav of Chernigov to help him against his enemies. Yaroslav's nephew Vsevolod attacked him and drove him out of Chernigov. Vsevolod was helped by the Cumans; and the war against him would be very bloody. The hegumen of Saint Andrew monastery interfered and "не вдадыше Мьстиславу въстати ратью по Ярославѣ, река: "То ти менше есть, он же преступивъ хрестное целование на рать не встанешъ, нежь кровь пролити хрестыанскую",- и съвѣкупивше соборъ иереискыи (митрополита же в то время не бѣше) и рекоша Мьстиславу: "На ны будеть тотъ грехъ", - и створи волю ихъ, и соступи хреста Мьстиславъ къ Ярославу, и плакася того вся дни живота своего" (PSLR 2: 291). The latter phrase shows again how seriously cross kissing was taken.

A similar situation took place at the end of the century. It was connected with the conflict between Rurik Rostislavich of Kiev and Vsevolod Big Nest. Vsevolod was then the senior of the whole Monomakhovichi clan; and Rurik followed him in the hierarchy as the Kievan prince and the senior among the Southern Monomakhovichi (in "Русская земля"). While distributing the Southern "Русь" volosts, Rurik did not give any of them to Vsevolod. Vsevolod found this disrespectful and threatened to deprive Rurik of his military assistance. "Вы есте нарекли мя во своемъ племени... старейшего, а ныне седелъ еси в Кыеве, а

мне еси части не оучинилъ в Роуской земле, но раздалъ еси инемъ
моложьшимъ братъи свои. Даже мне в ней части нетъ, да то ... Роуская
область, а кому еси в ней часть далъ, с тем же ей и блюди, и стережи,... а
мне не надобе", - declared Vsevolod and promised to take this threat back only
if he gets the volosts that had been already given to another prince, Roman. The
situation became very complicated for Rurik because he had kissed the Cross to
Roman not to take the volosts back: "Далъ ... Романови и крестъ к нему
целовалъ, ажъ ему подъ нимъ не отдати никому же". That is why he did not
want to grant Vsevolod's request. Vsevolod was ready to start a war to avenge
his honour as a senior. Rurik consulted the metropolitan; "и рече митрополитъ
Рюрикови: "Княже, мы есмы приставлены в Роуской земле от Бога
востягивати васъ от кровопролитья ... Ажъ еси далъ волость молодьшему в
облазне предъ старейшимъ и крестъ еси к нему целовалъ, а ныне азъ
снимаю с тебе крестное целование и взимаю на ся, а ты... волость даи же
старейшему, а Романови даси иноую в тое место". After that, Rurik
discussed the situation with Roman who agreed to cancel their agreement about
the volosts for the sake of peace and unity among the Monomakhovich. "Отче, -
he said to Rurik who was his "father" in the hierarchy, - то ци про мене тебе не
жити съ сватомъ своимъ (Vsevolod's daughter was married to Rurik's son. - Yu.
M.) и в любовь не внити?! А мне любо иноую волость в тое место даси,
любо коунами даси за нее во что будет была." Finally, the volosts were taken
from Roman and given to Vsevolod (PSRL 2: 683-685). The role of the
metropolitan in this case and the remark about the absent metropolitan in the
previous example make us think that there was a formal procedure of cancelling a
cross-kissing performed by the head of the Rus' church.

All this prompts the conclusion that cross-kissing was a working institution

and it played an important role in the life of Rus' society.

Let us now turn to the final point of our comparison - the rights of juniors and the responsibilities of seniors. The chronicles contain various pieces of information related to this subject. For example, they often cite seniors who accuse their juniors of non-loyalty. In most cases the seniors try to show how thoroughly they cared for the juniors. "... Волость вам есмь изискалъ и даль Новъгородъ и Поутивль" (PSLR 2: 347). "Язъ же тя прияхъ въ правду яко достойного брата своего и волость ти есмь даль, яко ни отецъ того вдаль, что я тебе вдаль и еще есмь и Роускои земли приказалъ стеречи тебе" (the latter was a honorable assignment) (PSLR 2: 372-373). The message is clear: the senior fulfilled his duties, so there was no reason for the junior not to fulfill his. It shows the mutual character of the responsibilities. Seniors liked to stress their commitment to the interests of juniors not only in conflict situations. For example, Andrei Bogoliubsky said to the Rostislavichi, who proclaimed him their "father" thus becoming his juniors, "Нарекли мя есте собе отцемъ, а хочу вы добра, а даю Романови, брату вашему, Киевъ" (PSLR 2: 567).

There is also a remark that shows the participation of juniors in making decisions. Mstislav was planning a campaign against the Cumans. He called his "brethren" and the Olgovichi, "бяху бо тогда Ольговичи въ Мьстиславли воли" "и всим оугодна бысть дума его" (PSLR 2: 538). Mstislav was the oldest among his "brethren" and "быть в воле" of a prince meant to pronounce this prince a senior. Thus, the princes called by Mstislav were his juniors but it was still important that his intention was "угодна" to them.

The most valuable information on the relationship between seniors and juniors can be found in the account of the conflict between Andrei Bogoliubsky and the Rostislavichi. Andrei accused them of not fulfilling their responsibilities as

juniors and therefore wanted to punish them by taking away the volosts they had received from him previously. There are two different stories of this conflict - one in the Lavrentevskaia that supports Andrei and another in the Ipatevskaia supporting the Rostislavichi. According to the Lavrentevskaia, "непокоршимся Ростиславичемъ князю Андрею и в воли его не ходящим" (PSLR 1: 365). The Ipatevskaia states that the accusation was false: "Нача Андрей вины покладывати на Ростиславичи... И рече Андрей Романови: не ходиши в моеи воли с братьею своею, а поиди с Киева, а Давыд исъ Вышегорода, а Мьстиславъ из Белгорода, а то вы Смоленескъ, а темъ ся поделити" (PSLR 2: 570). (Smolensk was Rostislavichi' patrimony, so Andrei did not have right to deprive them of it.) The Rostislavichi vehemently denied the accusation: "Ростиславич же... послаша къ Андрееви, рекуче: Тако, брате, въ правду ты нарекли есмы отцемъ собе и крестъ есмы целовали к тебе и стоимъ въ крестномъ целованьи, хотяче добра тебе". We do not know whether the Rostislavichi properly obeyed Andrei as their "father" and it is not really relevant for the present discussion. It is relevant, however, that Andrei could not just take back the volosts he previously had given to them. He could only do that in the case of wrongdoing on the part of his juniors.² Even the hostile Ipatevskaia does not state that Andrei tried to simply drive the Rostislavichi out of Kiev, Vyshgorod and Belgorod; he "began to accuse" in order to make it a legal procedure. The Rostislavichi not only rejected Andrei's accusation, but they, in their turn, accused him of mistreating them: "Нам путь кажеши изъ Руськои земли без нашеи вины, да за всеми Богъ и сила крестная". Andrei did not answer; and the Rostislavichi "оузревъше на Богъ и на силу честнаго креста и

² The previously discussed case of Rurik and Roman allow us to suggest that he could have kissed the cross not to take the volosts back.

на молитву святее Богородице" took up arms against him and won a victory (PSLR 2: 569-578).

"The power of the Holy Cross" is not unintentionally mentioned twice in this passage. The reference to "крестная сила" in a context like this was usually made in order to accuse the other party of violating the kissing of the Cross. The Rostislavichi thought that Andrei did not fulfill his obligations as a senior and thus broke their treaty. Later in the course of the conflict, they added more details to their accusations. When Andrei again ordered them to leave the volosts and expressed the order in an improper and disrespectful manner, the Rostislavichi answered, "Мы тя до сихъ мечь акы отца имели по любви; аже еси съ сякими речми прислалъ, не акы къ князю, но акы къ подручнику и просту человеку, а что оумыслилъ еси, а то е деи, а Богъ за всемъ" (the latter phrase meant an accusation of serious wrongdoing and placed all the responsibility for the conflict on the other party) (PSLR 2: 573). The difference between "подручник" and a junior is stated very clearly. Unlike a "подручник" and his master, a senior and a junior are bound with mutual obligations and they both have rights that should be respected. Their relationships are regulated not by the will of a senior but by certain legal procedures. If the senior fails to act legitimately, the juniors are free from their obligations and can even defend their rights with arms.

At this point, we have examined the chronicle for all the main components of the political ideology found in the *Homily on Princes* and the *Igor' Tale* and have found that the ideas of interprincely relationships founded on the hierarchy of the seniors and juniors and the system of kissing the Cross were wide-spread in twelfth-century Rus'. Now, however, we must ask how these ideas worked in a practical sense. We have had a chance to take a look at this to some degree

while examining chronicle accounts, but let us now turn to a closer examination of the political situation in the 1170s-1180s.

9. In Search of Interprincely Unity

It is well established by scholars that Monomakh's son Mstislav (died in 1132) was the last Kievan prince whose authority was acknowledged in all the Rus' lands. Soon after his death, the Olgovichi began to fight against Mstislav's heir Yaropolk; and after this Rus' experienced a series of princely military conflicts. Those conflicts reflected the constantly changing balance of power among the principalities that resulted from the rapid economic growth of the country, on the one hand, and from the lack of communication between the lands, on the other. (See p. 31-32) Such a situation was typical for the Middle Ages. "Господствующий класс в средние века, как правило, обнаруживает неспособность к сплочению. Такова его природа. Составляющие его феодалы, их группы и прослойки постоянно соперничали между собой и были в состоянии "непрерывного бунта" против королевской власти," - observes a student of Western medieval history (Gurevich 192-193).

Nonetheless, there were, as we have seen, some general principles which were applied despite all the complications resulting from practical politics. These principles were constantly being developed and sharpened by the princes responding to new challenges. As Franklin and Shepard put it, "the idea of an emerging political culture is more appropriate to the times than that of a fixed political system" (PSLR 2: 275). When basic principles like respect for treaties and adherence to the hierarchy of seniors and juniors were violated, the consequences were usually unfortunate for the princes and for their lands. As more and more princes realized that and tried to play according to the rules, it

resulted in the increasing unity of the princely clans. We have already discussed some important stages of this process, but let us now briefly review it as whole.

A period of bloody conflicts for the Kievan throne that began soon after Mstislav's death in 1132 ended when one of the major rivals, Iziaslav, stopped exercising his principle "не идет место к голове, но голова к месту" and offered Kiev to the Monomakhovichi senior Viacheslav. (See p. 34-36) The fight over Kiev resumed after Viacheslav's death and stopped again when the winning rival, Mstislav, gave the throne to the senior Rostislav. (See p. 36-37) It resulted in the consolidation of the Monimakhovichi because Rostislav's legitimacy was indisputable. The Olgovichi did not challenge Rostislav because they were not able to fight against the united Monomakhovichi. This period is especially remarkable. Martin summarizes it as follows, "... the traditional principles of dynastic succession were restored and the feuds between dynastic branches relaxed. The two branches of Monomakhovichi jointly dominated the lands of Kievan Rus'. ... The two branches cooperated. ... This balance of power, founded on a reaffirmation and universal acceptance of the dynasty's guidelines of legitimacy, provided a basis for political and dynastic stability that lasted through the reign of Rostislav" (Martin 111).

One of the most bloody events in the internal struggle - the sack of Kiev in 1169 - occurred soon after Rostislav's death when Mstislav seized the Kievan throne ignoring the Monomakhovichi senior who was then Andrei Bogoliubsky. Andrei managed to create a powerful coalition of many princes indignant with Mstislav's illegitimate action; and the rights of the senior were restored. Mstislav retreated to his patrimony, Volynia; the Monomakhovichi were united again but now with the northern, Suzdalian, branch dominating the clan instead of the southern one as before. This unity met its most serious challenge during the

conflict between Andrei Bogoliubsky and the Rostislavichi. As we have seen, the Rostislavichi accused Andrei of mistreating them and of not fulfilling his duties as a senior. They took up arms against him and Andrei was defeated. His troops, according to a pro-Rostislavichi chronicler, "пришли бяху... высокомысляще, а смирении отидоша в дома своя". After that, "Ростиславичи... положиша на Ярославе старешинство и даша ему Киевъ" (PSLR 2: 578). It is amazing that finally, however, the Rostislavichi and Andrei managed to restore their relationships. We do not know how they worked it out, but in the next year, "прислашася Ростиславичи ко князю Андрееви... просяче Романови Ростиславича княжить въ Киеве". This manner of address used of the Rostislavichi meant that they must have acknowledged Andrei's seniority again. Andrei answered, "Пождите мало, послалъ есмь къ братьи свои в Русь. Какъ ми вестъ будетъ от нихъ, тогда ти дамъ ответъ"³ (PSLR 2: 580; Berezkhov 190). The restoration of the hierarchy after such serious trouble, as well as Andrei's intention to consult with his Southern "brethren", show the increasing unity among the Monomakhovichi. Andrei's murder in 1174 and its aftermath in Suzdalia brought new complications, but the main tendency towards the unity of the clan with the domination of its Northern branch remained.

The Olgovichi based in their patrimony Chernigov also managed to achieve a significant degree of consolidation. (See Golubovsky, Zaicev 1975, 111-117) They actively competed with the Suzdalian princes over the domination of the Rus' lands (Nasonov 1940, 6-7).

Thus, temporary coalitions made by princes pursuing their short-term goals were replaced by stable unified clans. This major change opened new perspectives. Firstly, it dramatically decreased the number of active political

³ He never did answer, because he was killed soon after that.

players; and, of course, the fewer parties are involved the easier it is to make an agreement. Secondly, neither clan was strong enough to completely defeat its rivals; and this pushed the seniors to seek a way to coexist. Rus' thus had a chance to achieve an internal peace.

The urge for such a peace was increased by the growing Cuman threat. This threat had become relatively insignificant after the numerous defeats the Cumans had suffered from the united Rus' troops led by Vladimir Monomakh. They would, probably, never have been able to attack Rus' again if not for the Rus' princes who hired Cuman troops to help them in their internal conflicts. "Русские, только что разгромившие половцев на всех направлениях, вновь помогали им набраться физических и моральных сил" (Pletneva 275). By the 1160s the Cumans had regained their former power and grew more and more aggressive. A significant part of them were united under the leadership of Konchak (Pletneva 282-293). The chronicle demonstrates the growing concern about the Cuman threat. Short matter-of-fact reports about Cuman participation in princely conflicts and about their occasional raids, typical for the 1120-1150s, are very different from pathetic descriptions of the Cuman attacks in 1170s. "Придоша иноплемьници на Роускою землю, безбожные Измаилтяне, оканьнии Агаряне, нечистии ищадыя, делом и нравом сотониным, именемъ Кончакъ злоу началникъ..." (PSLR 2: 612) "Придоша ... безбожнеи Половцы на Роусь воевать ... съ оканьнымъ Кончакомъ" (PSLR 2: 628) "Пошель бяше оканьнии и безбожнии и треклятии Кончакъ со множествомъ половець на Роусь..." (PSLR 2: 634) Pletneva thinks that "эти-то эпитеты, употреблявшиеся кроме Кончака только в отношении Боняка, и свидетельствуют о его силе и стремлении постоянно разорять русские княжества" (Pletneva 293).

The chronicle accounts of the 1170s condemns those who involve the Cumans in internal conflicts. The Cumans make harm "церквамъ, идеже имя Божие славиться, сими же погаными хоулиться. То не рекоу единемъ крестьяномъ, но и самомоу Богу врази. То аще кто любить врагы Божия, то сами что приимоутъ от Бора?" (PSLR 2: 612) Those loving the enemies of God are, of course, the princes who resort to Cuman military assistance. The chronicler also points to the connection between Cuman aggression and the lack of unity among the Rus' princes: "Се же оуведаше половци, оже князи не в любви живутъ, шедше в пороги, начаша пакостити гречникомъ" (PSLR 2: 526). ("Гречники" were the merchants trading with Byzantium) Thus, public opinion as reflected by the chronicle wanted the princes not to use Cuman military help and to live "in love" so that they could effectively defend the Rus' lands. As those ideas became wide-spread they affected political reality. Let us see how this process worked by examining the course of political events in the Southern, "Русь", lands preceding Igor's campaign.

10. Political Situation in the 1180s and the Igor' Campaign

As we remember, the Rostislavichi broke their relationships with Andrei Bogoliubsky and gave the Kievan throne to Yaroslav of Luchsk. Later, they recognized Andrei as their senior again and asked him to give Kiev to Roman Rostislavich. Andrei was killed before he had a chance to respond. An intense political and social struggle in Suzdalia followed, making it impossible for the Northern branch of the Monomakhovichi to pay attention to Southern affairs. Therefore, the Rostislavichi gave Kiev to Roman on their own. (PSLR 2: 600)

In the next year (1176), the Cumans attacked the Kievan land. Roman summoned his "brethren" for help. Davyd Rostislavich did not manage or did not

want to come in time ("бѣше не притягль"). His absence caused "распре межи братьею" and finally resulted in a defeat. "То слышавши Олговичи, Всеволодичъ Святославъ обрадовашася" because that gave him a chance to request that Davyd be deprived of his volost. He addressed Roman, "Брате, я не ищю подѣ тобою ничего же, но ряд нашъ такъ есть: оже ся князь извинить, то въ волость, а моужь оу головоу. А Давыдъ виновать". Roman did not grant Sviatoslav's request; then Sviatoslav together with his "brethren" attacked him and drove him out of Kiev. He was aware, of course, that Roman would try to get the Kievan throne back, so he summoned the Cumans for help in the forthcoming struggle. The Rostislavichi gathered their forces and attacked Sviatoslav in Kiev. Sviatoslav ran away; but his Cuman allies made a raid on Torchesk and "много людий поимаша". This raid forced the Rostislavichi to give up and to leave Kiev to Sviatoslav. According to their chronicler, they did so "не хотяче гоубити Роускои земли и крестьянской крови проливати". Even if their true motives might have been less idealistic, this kind of explanation is still remarkable (PSLR 2: 603-605; Berezhtkov 194).

Thus, the Kievan seat was now occupied by Sviatoslav Vsevolodich. He, however, could never feel safe. A new crisis broke out after only four years. In 1180, Sviatoslav interfered in a military conflict in Suzdalia where Vsevolod Big Nest had in the meantime won a victory in the struggle for Andrei's heritage. Vsevolod had a conflict with the princes of Riazan'; and Sviatoslav sent his son Gleb to help them against Vsevolod. Vsevolod captured Gleb and kept him in chains as a prisoner. Sviatoslav was anxious to liberate his son and to take a revenge but he was not able to get involved in any serious military action because he had always to guard his Kievan seat against the Rostislavichi. He then made a desperate decision to completely crush the Rostislavichi and to turn

against Vsevolod after that. Besides securing his rear, victory over the Rostislavichi would be in part revenge against Vsevolod because they belonged to the same clan of the Monomakhovichi. His reasoning is summarized by the chronicler as follows: "Святославъ располеся гневомъ и раждься яростью, и размысли во оуме своемъ, река, яко мьстилься быхъ Всеволодоу, но не лзе, Ростиславичи, а те ми во всемъ пакостять в Роускои земле, а въ Володимере племени, кто ми ближни, тотъ добръ" (i. e. whoever of the Monomakhovichi is close to me, he will do to gain my revenge). "Давыда имоу, а Рюрика выженоу изъ земле, и приимоу единъ власть Роускоюу и с братьею, и тогда мьщюся Всеволоду обиды своя". Accordingly, Sviatoslav suddenly attacked Davyd Rostislavich who was at that moment nearby him. Davyd, however, managed to escape and to inform his "brethren". Sviatoslav, who placed all his hope on an unexpected attack, could not stand against the united and well prepared Rostislavichi and escaped from Kiev. Rurik Rostislavich occupied the Kievan seat.⁴ (PSLR 2: 614-616; Berezkhov 200).

Of course, he did not stay in Kiev for long, for the next year, Sviatoslav gathered his "breathren" and the Cumans, defeated the Rostislavichi and got the Kievan throne back. The Cumans did not even have time to return when Rurik attacked them and won a victory. The Kievan seat belonged to Rurik again. The cycle was ready to repeat itself. It looked like Kiev could go on being taken back and forth forever. This time, however, the princes changed their approach. The chronicler used his high style to report what occurred after Rurik's victory: "Рюрикъ же, аче победу возма, нъ ничто же горда оучини, но возлюби мира паче рати, ибо жити хотя въ братолюбьи, паче же и хрестьянъ деля, пленяемы по вся дни от поганыхъ, и пролитъя крови ихъ не хотя видети, и

⁴ Roman had died by that time, and Rurik became the oldest brother.

размысливъ с моужи своими, оугадавъ, бе бо Святославъ старей леты, и оурядивъся с нимъ - соступи емоу старешинства и Киева, а собе взя всю Роускою землю, и оутвердишася крестомъ честнымъ, и тако живяста в любви" (PSLR 2: 621-624, Berezikov 200). Thus, they became co-rulers with Sviatoslav as a senior. This agreement broke the vicious cycle of wars over the Kievan throne and put an end to the feud between the Olgovichi and the Southern Monomakhovichi. After uniting their forces, they became very powerful. Their new power is well indicated by the reaction of Vsevolod: "Всеволодъ же Соуждальский поусты Глеба Святославича из оковъ и прия великою любовью съ Святославомъ" (PSLR 2: 624). So, the head of the Northern Monomakhovichi joined the alliance; and the long-desired peace and unity among all the Rus' princes were, finally, achieved. The princes' intention to adhere to the agreement for a long period of time was signified by the marriages that tied the three families together: in the next year one of Sviatoslav's sons was married to Rurik's daughter and his another son was married to Vsevolod's "свесь" (PSLR 2: 624-625; Berezikov 200-201).

This situation had a tremendous effect on the struggle against external enemies. The first land to take advantage of the new internal unity was Suzdalia. Vsevolod arranged a campaign against the traditional Suzdalian adversaries, the Bulgars. Sviatoslav sent him military assistance; and the united forces won a significant victory (PSLR 2: 625-626).

The success of the anti-Cuman struggle in the South was, of course, far more important. Sviatoslav and Rurik, assisted by many other princes, overwhelmingly defeated the Cumans and captured a number of their leaders. The chronicler ascribes their victory to the help of Boris and Gleb: "победоу приемша молитвами святою мученикоу Бориса и Глеба" (PSLR 2: 636). This

type of reference to Boris and Gleb is rather rare. In the whole Kievan chronicle ("Киевский свод"), I found only three.

The first is made in the account of the victory over the Cumans under 6681 (1173): Mikhalko and Vsevolod who were sent against the Cumans by their older brother Gleb of Kiev praised not only the often mentioned on such occasions, "Бога и Святую Богородицу, и силу честного креста", but also "святая мученика, помогающая на бранехъ на поганья" (PSLR 2: 563). This reference to the Saints may have been made because Gleb was the Kievan prince's patron. This suggestion becomes more plausible if we compare the two different accounts of this event (PSLR 2: 554-559, 562-563; PSLR 1: 357-361). One of them is thought to have originated from Pereiaslavl and the other from Kiev. It is only the latter one that has the reference to Boris and Gleb. This account is also more favourable to Gleb than the Pereiaslavian one (Nasonov 1969, 96-97). Thus, it seems quite appropriate that the Kievan chronicler ascribed the victory to the help of the Kievan prince's Saint patron.

The help of Boris and Gleb is mentioned again in the account on the battle for Vyshegorod which occurred during the conflict between the Rostislavichi and Andrei Bogoliubsky. Andrei's troops besieged Mstislav Rostislavich in Vyshegorod. Mstislav started the battle "оузревше на Божью милость и на святую мученику Бориса и Глеба помочь" and won a victory (PSLR 2: 576). Mstislav's hope for such help is very easy to explain: the Saints' relics were kept in Vyshegorod; and for the medieval mentality, it was natural to expect that the Saints would protect "their" town from being taken.

The case of the anti-Cumanian campaign led by Sviatoslav and Rurik is different. The Saints were not those princes' patrons: Sviatoslav's and Rurik's Christian names were Mikhail and Vasili, respectively (Ivanin 1: 125). The victory

was not won on the Saints' day, either. Yet, Boris and Gleb are not only mentioned but their "participation" is stressed even more than is done in the two other accounts discussed above. The Saints are not simply named among the other Heavenly intercessors, but the victory is said to be caused primarily by their support. I suggest that it can be interpreted as the reference to the newly created unity that made the victory possible (noting the Saints role as the patrons of princely unity and subordination). Contemporaries had every reason to celebrate this unity: not only did it bring internal peace and a victory over external enemies, but the next campaign was being planned that intended to completely crush the Cumans: "Великий князь Всеволодичъ Святослав... сбирашеть... вои, хотя ити на половци к Донови на все лето" (PSLR 2: 644-645). Rus' people could reasonably hope for a prolonged period of safety and stability.

It was at this very time then that Igor' took his unexpected action. Some scholars argue that the campaign of 1185 did not have any significant consequences for the Rus' lands (Robinson 1988, 13). The chronicle indicates that the contemporaries thought otherwise. When Sviatoslav learned about Igor's defeat, he, according to the Ipatevskaia, "оутерь слезъ своих" (PSLR 2: 645). It is extremely rare that a prince is depicted crying. The people of the Chernigov land felt "скорбь и тоуга люта, якоже николи же не бывала ... по всей волости Черниговской". The pathetic picture of this "тыга" does not have any parallels in the accounts of other unsuccessful anti-Cuman campaigns. It was, however, caused not only by the mourning for the captured princes and dead retainers. The chronicle clearly refers to the consequences of Igor's defeat. Sviatoslav expressed his concern about the damage to the Rus' land even before expressing his sympathy to Igor'. Speaking about the defeat, he addresses a

surprisingly broad audience: "О, любя моя братья, и сынове, и моужи земле Роуское!" The latter phrase sounds very unusual. The situation looks very dangerous: "Дал ми Богъ притомити поганя, но... отвориша ворота на Роусьскоую землю. Воля Господня да боудеть о всемь". A few lines later, the chronicle shows what the "opened gates" means in practice: "Половцы победивъше Игоря с братьею и взяша гордость великоу и скоупиша весь языкъ свои на Роускоую землю"(PSRL 2: 645-649). To explain such a tragic perception of this Cumanian campaign, let us compare it with their previous raids.

The Cumans used to attack travelling merchants. After a successful anti-Cuman campaign, the Rus' princes expected revenge: "Се, братье, Половцемъ есме много зла створили, ... а темь всяко пакостити гречнику нашему и залознику" (PSLR 2: 541). Thus, the trading routes were the most common object for Cuman attacks. They also made raids against the countryside, capturing people and property in rural communities. "Приехаша къ Полоному... къ граду... и къ Семьчю и взяша села безъ оучьта съ людьми... и коне, и скоты, и овце погнаша в Половцы" (PSLR 2: 556). This passage shows us the meaning of the commonly used expression "the Cumans came to such and such town" (PSLR 2: 605, 612, 628 and others). They, in fact, damaged the area, but not the town itself. Only once did they manage to take over six "городовъ Берендичъ", but the Berendian towns were, in fact, small outposts on the border and were thus much more vulnerable than other Rus' cities. When the Cumans took over the Berendian towns, the Rus' troops retreated to nearby Rostovets ("въбегоша въ Ростовець"). No battle for or near Rostovets is mentioned (PSLR 2: 603). Thus, even the victorious Cumans did not dare to attack this town which is not famous for being a strong fortress. Konchak once intended "пленити... грады Роуские и пожещи огньмъ" but he did so only because he received

technical assistance from outside: "бѣше бо обрель моужа такового бесоурменина, иже стреляше живымъ огньмъ; бѣхоу же и оу нихъ лоуци тоузи самострелнии одва н (50 - Ю.М.) моужь можашеть напращи". But all these armaments did not help; Konchak's troops were defeated by the joint forces of Sviatoslav and Rurik and "оного бесоурменина яша ... и ко Святославоу приведоша со оустроенымъ" (PSLR 2: 635-636). Thus, Rus' cities could suffer from the Cumans only if the latter were helping some Rus' princes in their struggle against other princes. The Cumans did not attack cities on their own.

The campaign following Igor's defeat made a big difference. It is stressed in the famous dialogue between Kza and Konchak found in the Ipatievskiaia, "Поидемъ на Семь... емлем же города без опаса" (PSLR 2: 646). Kza, who made this proposal, attacked Putivl. Although he did not manage to take it, he burnt down a part of it (in addition, of course, his troops "повоевавши волость и села ихъ пожгоша"). Konchak dared to besiege strongly fortified Pereiaslavl. The battle lasted the whole day, the prince of Pereiaslavl was severely wounded. The Cumans retreated only when they heard "Святослав ... съ Рюрикомъ и со инеми помочьми" coming. On their way back, they "взяша городъ Римовъ и ополонишася полоня" (PSLR 2: 646-649).

Thus, the military consequences of Igor's defeat were severe. The bloody raid provoked by it and the damage sustained by the towns must have generated hard feelings among contemporaries. The moment that it occurred, i. e. after the Cumans had suffered a defeat and were by no means expected to attack, made these feelings even worse. I suggest, however, that the major concern caused by Igor's campaign was not external aggression but the threat to internal stability.

It is well-known in history that military defeats often lead to social and political crises. Old Rus' was no exception. For example, the famous Kievan uprising in 1068 occurred after the Rus' troops were defeated by the Cumans. It is more important for the present discussion that the period of military conflicts over Kiev between Sviatoslav and the Rostislavichi was triggered, as we have seen, by the defeat for which Davyd Rostislavich was blamed. As we remember, Sviatoslav requested that Davyd's senior, Roman of Kiev, punish him by taking away Davyd's volost. Roman did not do that; and five years of interprincely wars followed. (See p. 55-57) The damage done by Igor' in 1185 was, of course, far worse than that of Davyd. Firstly, Davyd did not cause the Cuman attack; secondly, there was no guarantee that the Rus' princes would have won a victory had Davyd come in time. They may have been defeated, anyway. On the contrary, the raid of Kza and Konchak on Putivl and Pereiaslavl would have never happened if not for Igor'. The head of the clan Igor' belonged to was the senior in the Kievan "duumvirate". Was it not quite reasonable to expect that the Monomakhovichi would use their chance to debase the Olgovichi and to regain their dominance in Rus'? In addition, the defeat of the Novgorod-Seversky and Kursk military forces weakened the Olgovichi making it easier for the Monomakhovichi to initiate a struggle.

I suggest that this threat to the newly created unity can help us to explain the prominent role given to the topic of strife in the *Igor' Tale*. Its condemnation is the most explicitly and vehemently expressed part of the *Tale's* political program. Igor', however, was not involved in any conflict when he made his unfortunate campaign. His true fault was insubordination; but it is given much less attention than that paid to the condemnation of strife. It is also remarkable that all

the examples showing the damage caused by the strife are taken from the distant past.

Scholars long ago noted that the *Tale* does not mention anything that occurred after the times of Vladimir Monomakh and Oleg Gorislavich and before 1185. I think that this is consistent with the author's intention to help the princes to preserve internal peace. It can be compared with the chronicle account of the argument between Sviatoslav and Rurik. The Monomakhovichi supposed that Sviatoslav had some hostile plans against his co-ruler and they sent him a warning, "Ты, брате, к намъ крестъ целоваль на Романове ряду... Дажь стоиши в томъ рядуу, то ты намъ братъ. Пагы ли поминаешь давняя тяжа, которыи были при Ростиславе, то ступиль еси рядуу" (PSLR 2: 670).

Unfortunately, the content of "Романов ряд" is unknown, but the above citation leads us to suggest that it somehow settled the disputable questions between the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi and that it included the agreement not to raise them again. We do not know, of course, whether the author of the *Tale* took into account this agreement. But the agreement itself, as well as the cited Monomakhovichi declaration, must have reflected the existing tendency to forget "давняя тяжа" in order to keep peace; and besides all that, just simple common sense would tell us that mentioning the recent conflicts could not promote peace and unity.

That is why the author of the *Tale* turned to the past to derive his examples of disastrous interprincely feuds. I think that viewing the situation from the perspective of the potential threat of a new struggle for Kiev can help us to understand better the choice of particular examples such as the bitter fate of Vseslav and battles of Nemiga and Nezhatina Niva. The story of Vseslav serves as a warning to the princes: "Аще и вещь душа въ дръзе теле, нъ часто беды

страдаше... Ни хытру, ни горазду, ни птицю горазду суда Божиа не минути" (92). Those sufferings followed Vseslav's attempt to get the Kievan throne when he "дотчеся стружиемъ злата стола киевскаго". As is well known, Vseslav used the trouble in Kiev caused by the defeat suffered by the Rus' princes from the Cumans in 1068. I think that the author meant to call his contemporary princes not to use Igor's defeat for their political purposes. This call was addressed primarly to the Monomakhovichi; so we can suggest that it was wise not to hurt their feelings by presenting one of them as a negative example. All this made Vseslav an ideal figure to use as a warning against initiating strife.

The author turns to the origins of the two princely clans and their feud at the times of Vladimir Monomakh and Oleg Sviatoslavich and shows how harmful it was from the very beginning, "Тогда, при Олзе Гориславличи, сеяшеться и растяшеть усобицами, погибашеть жизнь Даждьбожа внука; в княжихъ крамолахъ веци човекомъ скратишась. Тогда по Руской земли ретко ратаеве кикахуть, нъ часть врани граяхуть, трупиа себе деляче, а галици свою речь говоряхуть, хотять полетети на уедие" (62). The bloody apex of this feud was the battle of Nezhatina Niva. Its depiction presents a most vehement condemnation of strife between the princes: the author does not care who won the battle and who was defeated, who was the villain and who was the hero; the only one thing to be stressed is the death of princes from the opposite sides. Both Boris Viacheslavich who supported Oleg and Iziaslav Yaroslavich who fought against him were killed. "therefore, both sides were defeated, " - thus Likhachev summarizes the main idea of this passage (Likhachev 1972, 165).

The same idea is expressed even more explicitly in connection with the battle of the Nemiga. Vseslav was defeated by the united forces of the Yaroslavichi; so, the ancestors of all Rus' princes were involved into the battle.

The author equally mourns all those killed on the Nemiga: "Немизе кровавы
брезе не бологомъ бяхуть посеяни – посеяни костями русскихъ сыновъ" (90).

Thus, I suggest that the way the author chooses and treats his examples from the past can be best explained by his concern for the threat of the strife that might break out after Igor's defeat.

IV. Conclusions

The twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries was the time when Old Rus culture had some of its greatest achievements. Literary and artistic monuments of this period have attracted a lot of scholarly attention. If we want to better understand a cultural monument, it is, of course, very helpful to know as much as possible about the life of the society in which this monument was created. The economy and the everyday life of the discussed period is being intensively studied by archeologists. However, the political history of the twelfth century, especially that of the Southern Rus' lands, still lacks thorough study by contemporary scholars.

In the present work, I attempted to show how important a political context is for understanding literary works of the twelfth century. I suggest that the choice of Igor's campaign as a subject matter of the three (or two, if one believes the *Tale* is a forgery) literary monuments can be explained by the specific political situation of the 1180s. The unity among the princes achieved by the 1180s, the resulting successful struggle against the Cumans, and then its interruption by Igor's campaign, which also challenged the unity itself, provides, I

believe, a plausible explanation for the close attention paid by contemporaries to these events.

While examining the *Homily on Princes*, I followed Golubovsky who had analyzed the political situation in the Chernigov land in order to date this monument. Recently discovered facts support Golubovsky's dating (with a slight correction).

The comparison of the *Homily on Princes* with the *Igor' Tale* has prompted me to suggest that the political ideas expressed in those two monuments have much in common. The call for the unity contained in both works assumed the achievement of this unity through consensus among the princes based on their adherence to the hierarchy of seniors and juniors, strict fulfillment of their obligations and respect to the rights of all princes. The examination of contemporary chronicles shows that this type of political program was widespread in the twelfth century and that it reflected the processes which were going on in the Rus' lands at this time.

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