This dissertation consists of three essays that seek to improve upon theoretical and empirical accounts of the three dimensions of party system institutionalization: (i) emergence of new parties; (ii) party nationalization; and (iii) ideological congruence between parties and voters. In explaining these aspects of the party system, my approach highlights the role of the informal mechanisms of clientelism. My dissertation argues that clientelism exerts centrifugal forces on the relationships among key actors, which in turn has negative effects on institutionalization.The first essay investigates why new parties emerge in an environment where clientelism is widespread, if clientelist practice empowers the ruling parties as conventional wisdom suggests. To answer this question, I highlight the structural aspect of clientelism. Drawing upon bargaining theory, I contend that when extensive clientelist practice is coupled with a decentralized resource structure, abundant resources actually reduce political actors' incentives to pledge allegiance to the incumbent party, as in this situation their resource needs can be easily met by alternative resource channels. I demonstrate that the combination of clientelist resources and decentralized clientelist structure creates an incubator for the birth of new parties.In the second essay, I ask why some parties are competitive throughout the country, while others appeal to only a few specific regions. In this study, I examine if and how much informal mechanisms of clientelism mediate the impact of formal party structure on party nationalization, i.e. the patterns of territorial vote distribution of parties. To this end, I explore the relationship among three variables: party structure, effectiveness of clientelism, and party nationalization. I hypothesize that extensive party structure enhances the effectiveness of parties' clientelist efforts, which in turn decreases party nationalization. Where clientelist efforts are effectively translated into electoral gains, elites and voters are more likely to establish relationships beyond party organizations. Therefore, I argue that effective clientelism undermines a party's organization as a collective entity. As existing studies suggest, parties with extensive organization tend to have higher levels of party nationalization. However, I find that this positive impact is suppressed to the extent that these organizational attributes improve the effectiveness of clientelism.Finally, the third essay examines the impact of clientelism on the level of congruence. Conceptualizing clientelism as a tool of persuasion employed by political parties, I maintain that elites distribute clientelist rewards in order to alter the preferences and behaviors of voters who would otherwise hold different or no views about parties' policies. In response to the rewards, I argue, some voters will develop an affinity to a patron party, and subsequently vote for that party despite it being located further than other parties from their ideal points. Consequently, clientelism systematically widens the gap between voters' preferences and their vote choices, thereby undermining congruence. I suggest that voters' utility is a function of both issue position and material inducement. I find that clientelism serves as a crucial predictor of congruence.This dissertation contributes to the understanding of party system institutionalization by emphasizing the under-explored role of informal institutions. By demonstrating how informal rules constrain and modify the way formal institutions function, this dissertation also offers important insights into the literature on the relationship between formal and informal institutions. Thus, this dissertation provides an opportunity to advance our understanding of to what extent formal institutions explain or predict political outcomes.
Read
