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

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RACE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: WOODROW WILSON AND THE PHILIPPINES

By

William Christopher Hamel

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfilment of the requirements
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2002

ABSTRACT

RACE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT:
WOODROW WILSON AND THE PHILIPPINES

By

William Christopher Hamel

Woodrow Wilson never wavered in his belief that "Americanism," his term for the Americanization of the international mind, constituted the best path to progress at home and abroad. Accepting the myth of American exceptionalism, he believed that America should not become entangled with Europe lest its character become eroded. A new foreign policy, "thoroughly American" in purpose, had to be devised. Wilson sought acceptance of American democratic values by other societies in order to "redeem" them. This would permit American leadership in the world without involving the United States in the Old World's diplomacy and wars. Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism is evident in his ideas about how to regenerate the world through the proliferation of democracy. He translated the experiences of America's democratic growth into principles that were universally applicable throughout the world. Wilson believed that if the twentieth-century world was to be open, safe and free, then it must become more like America. Democracy had to be based on "civic manhood," the cultural and political requisite of political stability. "Civic manhood," the quintessential virtue of mature races and the cornerstone of Americanism, involved a demonstrated commitment to Anglo-Saxon culture; an observance of progressive change from above; a faith in free enterprise; and an embrace of Protestant Christianity. Wilson considered the propagation of this blueprint for nation-building to be America's mission in the world. Americanism transcended Anglo-Saxonism, the "White Man's Burden," and the Social Gospel

movement. While its dimensions were complex and often contradictory, the objective of Americanism was simple: the fusion of American and world conceptions of progress, security, and prosperity through the worldwide extension of American-style democracy. Wilson first articulated his view of America's mission in the world in association with the Philippine question. He believed it was critical to keep Philippine policy in line with America's redemptive mission in the world. Failure to do so would yield disastrous consequences for democracy in the Philippines and America's credibility as "redeemer nation."

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Introduction

There can be little doubt that the twentieth century has been a century of Americanization. The world has come under America's economic and cultural influence to a far greater extent than any other nation's. Appropriately enough, the twentieth century opened with the publication of an essay by an Englishman, William T. Stead, forecasting the "Americanization of the World." Stead documented the outpouring of American economic and cultural influence beyond the United States' continental boundaries since 1890, creating the basis for America's emerging global preeminence.[1]

Since the publication of Stead's essay in 1900, the process of Americanizing the world through cultural and economic expansion has never ceased, irrespective of shifts and turns in official United States foreign policy. In 1941, in a famous *Life* editorial entitled "The American Century," prominent publisher Henry Luce characterized America as "the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, . . the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, . . the Good Samaritan. . . and the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice." Reflecting the views of many twentieth-century policy makers and citizens, Luce suggested that American expansion, always benign, always uplifting, seemed based not on military force or government design but on the wonders of its private industry, the skill of its experts, the goodness of its philanthropists.[2] The collapse of communism and socialism throughout much of the Eurasian continent and America's military victory against a "Mesopotamian

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[1] William T. Stead, "Americanization of the World" (1900), in Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (Toronto, 1982), 15.

[2] Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: United States Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (New York, 1981), 42-43.

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megalomaniac"[3] near the end of the century inspired former President George H. W. Bush to proclaim that the moment had finally arrived for America to complete its mission of Americanizing the world through the establishment of a "new world order."[4] In recent months, President George W. Bush, responding to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, followed in his father's footsteps and raised the unspoken mandate for Americanization as perhaps the only means to bring order, stability, predictability and security to the world. Americanism, or the idea of Americanizing the international mind as a panacea for solving the world's problems, has persisted among American policy makers throughout the twentieth and into the early twenty-first centuries.

Woodrow Wilson, one of the chief architects of Americanism, began thinking about Americanism in the decade before the Spanish-American War in the context of American national development amidst the turmoil of an industrializing world. He labored to turn ideology into policy, first as a prominent academic and then as president, leaving a mark on American foreign policy still recognizable in the twenty-first century: America still sees itself as exceptional, believes it is the "redeemer nation," and seeks to convert the rest of the world to its particular brand of democracy. Wilson expressed the principles of Americanism in the twentieth century in political, gender and racial terms; the underlying principles of globalization, though now discussed in cultural and commercial language, propose a Western view of cultural superiority and uniformity in the twenty-first century that reflect Wilson's concept of Americanism. Wilson's development of political theory as an academician at Princeton, especially his "discovery"

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[3] *New York Times*, February 11, 1991.

[4] Robert W. Tucker, "Brave New World Orders: Woodrow Wilson, George Bush, and the 'Higher

of Edmund Burke during that pivotal period of United States history at the end of the western frontier, was to shape the policies he implemented as president of the United States. It is possible to trace the evolution of Wilson's statecraft from its early theoretical influences, from Burke and others, to his own practical application of his refined theories in the Philippines during America's empire years. Although Wilson's ideas about America's redemptive mission evolved and matured between 1890 and 1912, the primary principles associated with his concept of Americanism found expression in his foreign policy between 1913 and 1921.

Traditionally, historians and biographers have contended that Wilson did not seriously consider the place and role of the United States in the world before his ascent to the presidency. For these scholars, Wilson's preconceptions and patterns of behavior in dealing with Mexico from 1913 on formed his general approach to foreign affairs. Given this perspective, it naturally follows that Wilson's Mexico policy was critical in shaping the parameters of his European wartime diplomacy and that, in turn, his policies vis-à-vis the belligerents in Europe molded the debate over the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, for those historians who subscribe to this view of how Wilsonian statecraft evolved, it would seem that little changed in Wilson's mind between 1913 and 1921: immoral autocracies attacked moral democracies which necessitated the eradication of the former.[5]

This approach to understanding Wilson and his thinking about foreign affairs,

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Realism'" *New Republic* 206, No. 8 (February 24, 1992), 24-34.

[5] For this perspective, see John M. Cooper, Jr., "'An Irony of Fate': Woodrow Wilson's Pre-World War I Diplomacy" *Diplomatic History* III, No. 4 (Fall 1979), 425-438; Arthur S. Link, editor, *Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921* (Chapel Hill, 1982); Kendrick A. Clements, *Woodrow Wilson, World Statesman* (Boston, 1987), especially 124-146; and Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, 1992).

however, is fundamentally flawed. This reductionist perspective compartmentalizes Wilson's conception of and approach to foreign affairs into tightly organized, logical models from which he never deviated. Indeed, such compartmentalization dominates both ends of the historiographical spectrum concerning the history of Wilson's statecraft. On one end, Wilson, seen as the champion of national self-determination, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, best epitomizes liberal internationalism.[6] On the other end, Wilson's worldview is portrayed as having as its central themes large-scale corporate capitalism at home and economic expansion abroad in order to shore up the new industrial world order.[7]

This traditional perspective also presumes that Wilson had not given any systematic attention to foreign affairs or to America's role in the world before "fate" forced the problems of the world upon him after his election to the presidency. This "irony of fate" perspective originated in the opening volume of Ray Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, published in 1931, when Baker opened his narrative on Wilson's foreign policy by quoting a remark that the president-elect had reportedly made to a friend before his inauguration in March 1913: "It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs." Since 1931, that remark and the implications behind it have shaped the conventional view of Wilson's conception of and approaches to American

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[6] Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I* (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Arthur S. Link, ed., *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace* (Arlington Heights, IL, 1979); John M. Cooper, Jr. and Charles E. Neu, eds., *The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link* (Arlington Heights, IL, 1991), especially the essays by Cooper, Neu, and Thomas J. Knock.

[7] N. Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (London, 1968); Robert Freeman Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932* (Chicago, 1972); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923* (London, 1984); Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago, 1981); David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean* (Madison, WI, 1988); and Linda B. Hall, *Oil, Banks, and Politics: The United States and Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1917-1924* (Austin, TX, 1995).

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Those scholars who have investigated the evolution of Wilson's thinking about foreign affairs before his presidency have in general approached the problem from the perspective of his foreign policies as president. As a result, their attention has tended to focus on particular strands of Wilson's thinking concerning foreign affairs, usually out of the context in which Wilson originally conceived them. The classic example of this approach is Harley Notter's *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*. Although Notter's analysis of the evolution of Wilson's conception of world affairs is insightful in parts, he adheres strictly to the view that Wilson had always championed anti-colonialism and national self-determination in the world.[9]

An examination of Wilson's papers, edited and unedited, reveals, however, that Wilson began to conceptualize systematically what should be America's relationship with the rest of the world long before he became president. Also, his ideas about American foreign relations underwent numerous revisions throughout his career, although some core ideas remained constant. Concern about the viability and integrity of democracy at home and abroad constituted one of these constants. Several events in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – the "loss" of the continental frontier in the early 1890s, the relatively quick and decisive American victory over a presumably corrupt European power in 1898, and the decision to annex the Philippines – prompted Wilson to consider and reconsider

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[8] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (Garden City, 1931) IV, 55. See also Richard W. Leopold, "The Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retrospect" *World Politics* II (April 1950), 405-425; Daniel M. Smith, "National Interest and American Intervention, 1917: An Historio-Geographical Appraisal" *Journal of American History* LII (June 1965), 5-24, and Cooper, "'An Irony of Fate,'" 425-437.

[9] Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore, 1937).

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democracy's seemingly changing fortunes in the United States and the world.

Following the "loss" of the frontier line in 1890, Wilson, then an academic and a popular orator on the nation's lecture circuit, expressed considerable "frontier anxiety" and feared the erosion of what he considered to be America's exceptional character. Although Wilson eschewed overseas expansion before 1898 as a means of replicating the benefits of the continental frontier, he sought other instruments of regeneration that were more in keeping with America's traditional "beneficient isolationism" and "exemplar role" in the world. He embraced and expounded the "enlightened conservatism" of Edmund Burke to still the revolutionary fervor of an industrializing America, and he developed a new paradigm, called "civic manhood," to address the emasculating effects of industrialization, urbanization, and unrestricted immigration in a "frontierless" society. For Wilson, the cultivation and maintenance of "civic manhood," or the mature political character and moral discipline that Americans had acquired over centuries of democratic development, remained necessary for continued national growth and stability. Before the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898, Wilson conceived "civic manhood" only in an American context. In this respect, he evaluated and elucidated "civic manhood's" regenerative qualities only as a part of his dialogue on the "university ideal," proposing that the chief mission of Princeton and other universities in post-frontier America was to prepare America's intellectual elite for meaningful contributions as administrators and reformers by training them in specially designed university programs and through leadership from the top.

Although the war against Spain was a brief affair, Wilson understood that the conflict and its consequences marked a "defining moment" not only in the course of American national development but also in international history. In short, the Spanish-

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American War revolutionized America's position and role in the world. The rise to prominence in the world meant the end of America's "exemplar role" and the beginning of a "crusader role" for the United States in achieving its mission to "redeem" politically immature peoples with the blessings of American-style democracy. In the years following the war with Spain, Wilson wrote dozens of essays and delivered numerous addresses on what he called "the practical question of democracy," or how democratic principles and values were put into actual use in the conduct of governments.

Wilson's faith in American exceptionalism is clearly evident in his ideas about how best to regenerate the world through the proliferation of democracy. He translated the experiences of America's democratic growth since the early seventeenth century into political principles that were, at least in his mind, universally applicable in societies throughout the world. Wilson believed that if the twentieth-century world was to be open, safe and free, then it must become more like America. Democracy, if it was to be viable and durable, had to be based on "civic manhood," which was a cultural as well as a political requisite. According to Wilson, "civic manhood," the quintessential virtue of politically mature races and the cornerstone of Americanism, involved a demonstrated commitment to Anglo-Saxon democratic principles and practices; a consistent observance of slow, deliberate, progressive change from above for the purpose of eradicating society's inequities; a faith in free enterprise which included support for free and open access for commerce and investment; and an embrace of Protestant Christianity, viewed by Wilson as the spiritual precondition for modernity. Wilson considered the propagation of this blueprint for nation-building to be America's mission in the world. Possessing both secular and religious roots, Americanism transcended the doctrine of Anglo-

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Saxonism, the "White Man's Burden," and the Social Gospel movement at home and abroad. While its dimensions were complex and often contradictory, the objective of Americanism, according to Wilson, was simple: the fusion of American and world conceptions of progress, security, and prosperity through the worldwide extension of American-style democracy and Anglo-Saxon civilization. Indeed, Wilson consistently embraced Americanism as the panacea for the nation's and the world's ills.

Wilson first articulated his view of America's "crusader role" in the world in association with American-East Asian relations in general and the Philippine question in particular. He declared that while the war in Cuba had opened his eyes to the multitude of iniquities and antagonisms in the world and to the part that the United States was to play in ameliorating them, the acquisition of the Philippines dictated that East Asia would be the first place American leadership and influence was to be felt. Wilson's center of attention in East Asia, however, did not focus on China. While many contemporary American elites and subsequent scholars viewed China as a *tabula rasa* for progressivism abroad, Wilson argued that it would be in the Philippines, as a dependency of the United States, where America's regenerative efforts in East Asia would be felt first. More than anywhere else in the region, it would be in the Philippines that America's image would be remade and the "moral basis" of American foreign policy established and vindicated for the rest of the world to observe. By fulfilling its obligation to the Filipino people, Wilson declared, the United States could then "patent to all the world" Burke's "spoken but forgotten truths" about how societies acquire liberty and democracy.

How did the nation propose to accomplish its duty in the Philippines? "This we shall do," Wilson wrote in 1899, "not by giving them out of hand our codes of political

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morality or our methods of political action, the generous gifts of complete individual liberty or the full-fangled institutions of American government, -- a purple garment for their nakedness, -- for these things are not blessings, but a curse, to undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their political growth." Rather, the United States would fulfill its duty in the Philippines by providing a colonial government that "shall moralize them by being itself moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and steadfast, inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom." Filipinos, Wilson reasoned, needed the aid of American political character and the spirit of disinterested service in their preparation for nationhood, not the premature extension of American democratic institutions and practices. Only after Filipinos had acquired "civic manhood," a process requiring generations of slow maturation, could they then govern themselves as a free people in an independent nation.[10]

Wilson argued that American colonial policy in the Philippines should concentrate on creating conditions in the Islands that would be conducive to the establishment and growth of "civic manhood," the moral basis of self-government, among Filipinos. This task required the United States to identify all attitudes, customs, and institutions in the Philippine political and cultural landscape that might impede the development of a democratic spirit among the Filipino people. For Wilson, cultivating democracy in the Philippines, where he saw a parallel to frontier conditions, would require American "acts of redemption," or purging the Filipino cultural and political environment of its many vices and iniquities in order to pave the way for democracy. These acts, he argued, could

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[10] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, in Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* [hereafter, *PWW*], 69 volumes (Princeton, 1966-1994), XII, 19.

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not be accomplished by mere example. They would require the supervision of men with mature "civic manhood" – that is, Anglo-Saxon Protestants nurtured for generations in democracy. Thus, the entire solution to the Philippine question "lay, less in our methods than in our temper. We must govern as those who learn; and they must obey as those who are in tutelage. They are children and we are men in these deep matters of justice and government."[11]

Wilson saw in the Philippine question an opportunity for the United States to provide the world with a blueprint for implementing conservative democratic values and institutions. Doing so, he believed, would strengthen democracy in the United States as well as demonstrate democracy's intrinsic excellence in the world. For Wilson, therefore, the Philippines not only represented a nation that needed to be rescued by the United States but also America's newest safety valve which he believed would yield the same benefits as the continental frontier. These objectives were not seen as mutually exclusive, but as mutually fulfilling. America, as a nation with maturity and exceptional character, had the responsibility to assist and supervise the Philippines in becoming a mature democracy. Doing so not only reinforced "civic manhood" among American elites at home but also demonstrated American leadership in the world as the "redeemer nation." Thus, it is with Wilson's understanding of and approach to the Philippine question, beginning long before his political career and following through to the passage of the second Jones bill in 1916, that we can see the consistent underlying principles of his conception of America's place and role in world affairs.

As president, Wilson's approach to the Philippine question, while not in support of

[11] Ibid., 14-15, 19. Quotation on 19.

the Republican Party's policy of indefinite retention of the Islands, also differed from the Democratic Party's traditional platform. Wilson, the first Democratic president since the annexation of the Philippines, did not support immediate and complete independence for the Islands as anti-imperialist Democratic policy dictated. In the national elections of 1900, 1904 and 1908, the Democratic Party's plank on the Philippines called for release of the Archipelago at the earliest juncture. It is important to look back to Wilson's intellectual development and beyond political expediency to understand his decision to pursue a different policy in the Philippines than that of his Republican predecessors. Between 1913 and 1916 Wilson sought to redefine the Filipino-American colonial bond, not render it more permanent by continuing the Republican policy of attracting retentionist constituencies or sever it by fulfilling the Democratic Party's pledge to grant immediate and complete independence once Democrats ascended to power in Washington. Instead, Wilson supported only those colonial policy initiatives that extended greater domestic autonomy to Filipinos to prepare them for eventual independence at some unspecified time in the future. Although Wilson made eventual independence the official objective of American policy in the Philippines, he remained firm in his view, held since 1898, that Filipinos required several generations of American-supervised experience in self-government before they would possess the mature political character necessary for governing themselves in a responsible manner. Wilson also made it clear in those years before the United States entered the First World War that it was critical to bring America's Philippine policy back into line with America's redemptive mission in the world. Failure to do so, he believed, would have disastrous consequences for democracy in the Philippines and America's credibility as the world's "redeemer nation."

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Chapter One
Before Manila Bay

Students of American history generally view the last decade of the nineteenth century as the "Great Divide" – on one side lies "old America" and on the other lies "modern America."[1] While historians disagree about the exact dates of this "historical watershed,"[2] one can construct a strong case that the 1890s saw the gradual disappearance of old America and the rather less gradual emergence of the new. Few American elites, defined by virtue of their greater influence, advantage and authority, had expressed concern about the deleterious effects of America's rapid industrial and economic expansion before the nineties. The Panic of 1893, however, jarred them out of their complacency. The next four years of depression, the worst economic collapse the nation had experienced up to that time, revealed that the country was on the threshold of a quickly changing environment in which labor unrest, corporate malfeasance, and social upheaval seemed to threaten the very fabric of American democracy. Confronted by southern and western populism, labor socialism, the traumatic Pullman strike, bloody textile and coal mine strikes, and the marching bonus armies, the conservative power structure in the United States could easily imagine the worst in the nineties. Not least among those considerations accounting for elites' anxieties at the end of the nineteenth century was

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[1] Henry Steele Commager discusses the 1890s as a "watershed" in *The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s* (New Haven, CT, 1950), 41-54. See also, Marcus Cunliffe, "American Watersheds," *American Quarterly* XIII (Winter 1961), 480-494; Harold U. Faulkner, *Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900* (New York, 1956), 1-22; and David Healy, *US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison, WI, 1970), 99-109.

[2] Henry F. May assigns the dates of the "Great Divide" to the years between 1912 and 1917 during which "our time" is separated from "a completely vanished world." See his masterful *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917* (New York, 1969).

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their fear that America's uniqueness and exceptional character seemed to be in its final moments.[3]

The 1890s became the occasion for reviewing society's weaknesses, articulating the nation's stresses, and expressing concern over the presumed erosion of American exceptionalism. Discussions of race relations, the immigrant question, urban reform, and the direction of foreign policy led to a more fundamental questioning of the durability and quality of American democracy, and whether or not it had begun to degenerate. Some observers even raised the disconcerting possibility that the economic depression and the social strife of the 1890s might prove permanent. At the heart of this fear was the assumption that the boom times of the years before the Panic of 1893 had resulted from special and non-recurring factors, and could not be expected to return. Chief among these special considerations had been the continental frontier and its presumed regenerative impact on national character and development. Because the dynamism of the frontier had begun to fade in the 1870s and 1880s, some American elites, experiencing what became known as "frontier anxiety,"[4] began re-examining old assumptions, ideas, and policies to determine whether or not they had become obsolete. The preservation of American exceptionalism, which, presumably, had been intrinsically tied to the course of western

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[3] Faulkner, *Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900*, 72-93; John W. Chambers II, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920* 2nd edition (New York, 1992), 1-24; and Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919* (New York, 1987), 110-140.

[4] David Wrobel's *The End of American Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety from the Old West to the New Deal* (Lawrence, KS, 1993) is by far the best analysis of the anxiety Americans experienced about the "loss" of the frontier in the half-century after 1890. See also, Lee Benson, "The Historical Background of Turner's Frontier Essay," *Agricultural History* XXV (April 1951), 50-82; Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, MA, 1950), 201-210, 250-260; and David Johnson, ed., "Special Issue: American Culture and the American Frontier," *American Quarterly* XXXIII, No. 5(1981).

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expansion since the early seventeenth century, was of critical importance to these conservative elites. They searched for new instruments of national regeneration that would render the nation's character, values, and institutions immune to the changing conditions of national life. In their search for other regenerative principles to replace the vanishing frontier line, they often proved willing to promote and adopt various internal and domestic solutions. Touted as progressive reform, some of these "remedies" fundamentally altered the nature and course of national development as the United States moved into the twentieth century.

Not least among those American elites who experienced "frontier anxiety" and searched for new instruments of national regeneration in the last decade of the nineteenth century was Woodrow Wilson, then a professor of political economy and jurisprudence at Princeton. People can and do transcend their environment but even the most reclusive scholar responds to the events and trends of the day. In the case of Wilson, the loss of the western safety valve and the turbulence throughout the United States resulting from the Panic of 1893 intertwined to shape significantly his ideas and values. Wilson acknowledged the vital role played by the western safety valve in stabilizing and safeguarding American democratic growth before 1890. But with the frontier gone, he understood that America would have to adjust its national life and leadership to ensure continued democratic growth. Attributing unrestricted immigration, mounting urban problems, and the rise of the "new sectionalism" to the closing of the frontier, Wilson warned his students and the general public that it would be much more difficult for the

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American people to live up to the responsibilities of citizenship at the end of the nineteenth century than at the end of the eighteenth. Wilson, in response to the crisis of the 1890s, thought long and hard about how best to safeguard conservative reform and change, national regeneration, and continued democratic growth in a frontierless society. He ultimately adopted Edmund Burke as his new political master to guide him through the troubled political seas, echoing Burke's exaltation of "enlightened conservatism" with its emphasis on respect for order, obedience to law, and pursuit of progressive reform from above, all hallmarks of Wilson's political thought in the nineties.

The End of Exceptionalism

On April 20, 1891, the Superintendent of the Eleventh Census (1890) issued a bulletin declaring that the "frontier line" had vanished: "In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc, it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports."[5] While expressions of "frontier anxiety" had been common in the 1870s and 1880s, the superintendent's report crystallized concerns over America's future as a frontierless democracy. As David Wrobel has written, "What many feared, the census confirmed."[6]

Although scholars now acknowledge that significant portions of the North American continent remained unsettled by 1890 and that the potential for further expansion of the domestic market system remained considerable, to the mind of the 1890s

[5] U.S. Census Office, 11th Census, 1890, "Distribution of Population According to Density: 1890," *Extra Census Bulletin* No. 2 (April 20, 1891), 1.

[6] Wrobel, *The End of American Exceptionalism*, 30-31.

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the disappearance of the "frontier line" possessed tremendous emotional and symbolic importance. "The American people," a brooding Henry Adams wrote in his autobiography, "were wandering in a wilderness in the last decade before the new century much more sandy than the Hebrews had ever trodden about Sinai; they had neither serpents nor golden calves to worship. They had already lost the sense of worship." Adams, grandson and great-grandson of past presidents, suggested that more than anything else "the closing of the frontier" accounted for the general malaise that gripped the nation in the 1890s.[7] The English world-traveler and future statesman, James Bryce, drove this point home more clearly: "The West is the most American part of America; that is to say, the part where those features which distinguish America from Europe come out in the strongest relief." Watching America's frontier era draw to a close, Bryce asked what many Americans believed would become the central question of the day: where in the future could the American people find "a land of freedom and adventure and mystery" to equal the vanishing "frontier line?" Where could men "discover a field in which to relieve their energies when the Western world of adventure is no more?" Bryce declared that an "epochal age" was coming to an end in the course of American national development.[8]

Nothing synthesized the prevailing anxieties about the loss of the "frontier line" more succinctly than Frederick Jackson Turner's seminal paper on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," presented on a hot July evening before a session of the American Historical Association at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago.

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[7] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York, 1906, 1931), 328.

[8] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* 2 volumes (New York, 1888), II, 681, 930.

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Turner began and ended his long exposition with the assertion that the loss of the frontier marked "the closing of a great historic movement" – "the first period of American history." He told his audience that "the crucible of the frontier" had functioned as an instrument of national regeneration during this formative period of American development. "Westering," or the process of constant westward expansion, had served as the nation's life force, shaping the contours of America's exceptional character. Accordingly, the frontier had eroded class distinctions, dissolved the corrupting influence of the Old World, cultivated a strong commitment to political and economic equality, and "prompted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people." The struggle of man against nature on the untamed frontier in the West had also developed "the stalwart and rugged qualities of the frontiersman," making him more disciplined and self-reliant than his more urbane counterpart in the eastern cities. Furthermore, the abundance of opportunity secured by the store of free or cheap land promoted democratic thought and action. As long as there remained opportunity, Turner argued, democracy could thrive. "And each frontier" had furnished "a new field of opportunity, a gate of escape from the bondage of the past." In this way, continental expansion over the course of the nineteenth century had steadied national development and democratic growth in the United States by creating a balanced society in which tensions that might have yielded social strife were dissipated westward along with surplus capital, goods, and people.[9]

Historians have keenly debated both the meaning and validity of Turner's frontier thesis since he first presented his paper in the closing decade of the nineteenth century.

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[9] Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," first published in the *Proceedings of the Forty-first Annual Meeting of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin* (Madison, 1894), 79-112, and reprinted in *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920), 1-38.

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The analysis here offered is not intended to evaluate the problems and perspectives of this rich and long-running debate in American historiography. Instead, it is concerned with the idea that Turner's essay was not only an original historical synthesis of the American past, but also a classic expression of frontier anxiety. The frontier, the wellspring of American patriotism, socioeconomic mobility, optimism, nationalism and individualism, had vanished. American exceptionalism, the product of a long continuous history of "westering," would begin to erode unless new instruments of national regeneration were located. Thus, Turner's paper not only shook up the American historical profession concerning the genesis of America's democratic spirit and thought, but also exacerbated fears that the nation had reached a critical juncture in its development. America's political and social institutions would stagnate, Turner said, without the economic energy created by expanding the frontier.[10]

Many Americans looked ahead with much apprehension to a nation without free land in the west to regenerate it. Notwithstanding the fact that the western safety valve never operated in the direct manner that its proponents imagined,[11] its "loss" seemed to serve as an explanation for every adverse development of the decade.[12] So persistently did

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[10] Wrobel, *The End of American Exceptionalism*, 35-37, and Allan G. Bogue, *Frederick Jackson Turner: Strange Roads Going Down* (Norman, OK, 1998), 91-99.

[11] Even as devoted a defender of Turner as Ray Allen Billington has written that a "direct safety valve" did not operate as most people assumed in nineteenth-century America. See his *America's Frontier Heritage* (New York, 1966), 23-46.

[12] The literature on the safety valve concept is vast. Most of it has been referenced in annotated form in Vernon E. Mattson and William E. Marion, *Frederick Jackson Turner: A Reference Guide* (Boston, 1985). Notable examples include Joseph Schafer, "Concerning the Frontier as a Safety Valve," *Political Science Quarterly* LII (September 1937), 407-420; Norman J. Simler, "The Safety-Valve Doctrine Re-Evaluated," *Agricultural History* XXXII (October 1958), 250-257; Ellen von Nardoff, "The American Frontier as a Safety Valve: The Life, Death, Reincarnation, and Justification of a Theory," *Agricultural History* XXXVI (July 1962), 123-142; and William F. Deverell, "To Loosen the Safety Valve: Eastern

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Americans of the nineties call attention to the disappearance of the "frontier line" that it seemed at times to be exercising a greater influence on history as a memory than it ever did as a fact. Thus, although a review of the historical literature demonstrates that the reality of the frontier as a direct safety valve is unconvincing, the qualitative evidence suggests that most Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries believed that the frontier did indeed serve as a direct safety valve. In this respect, the frontier was viewed as the greatest, most benign force in American life – the source of America's greatness and exceptionalism. Its perceived termination caused much agony over the loss of qualities that the frontier had supposedly generated, compelling some American reformers to attempt to offset those losses with replacements for the western safety valve. As a result, a closed-frontier theme became an integral part of the great debate on reform and renewal in the United States throughout the nineties and after.[13]

Among Turner's first converts to the frontier thesis was his friend and teacher, Woodrow Wilson. Intellectual interaction between the two scholars stimulated their thinking about American history. In 1889, Wilson, who offered a course under the general title "Administration" over a five-week period each spring at Johns Hopkins from 1888 to 1898, had befriended Turner when they had lived in the same boardinghouse in Baltimore. A graduate student at that time, Turner not only attended the lectures but also enjoyed long discussions with Wilson after dinner. He had written of Wilson in a letter to his fiancée, "Dr. Wilson is here. Homely, solemn, young, glum but with that fire in his face and eye that means that its possessor is not of the

Workers and Western Lands," *Western Historical Quarterly* XIX (August 1988), 269-285.

[13] Wrobel, *The End of American Exceptionalism*, 29-67, and Smith, *Virgin Land*, 250-260.

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common crowd."[14] The two provincials, Wilson from the South and Turner from the West, spent many evenings discussing American history and the role of the sections in the nation's development. The influence went in both directions. Wilson credited Turner for "all I ever wrote on the subject of the West."[15] For his part, Wilson encouraged and guided Turner as the latter worked out his frontier thesis. Wilson contributed to Turner's "general conceptions of history," especially by interesting him in the ideas of Walter Bagehot, a nineteenth-century English political theorist. Bagehot's theory of the organic growth of institutions deeply impressed Turner which, in turn, helped him explain the transformation of the United States from a traditional, rural society into a modern, urban nation. Nearly thirty years later, Turner would recall, "All my ideas and ambitions were broadened and enriched by Woodrow Wilson's conversations."[16]

A few days after Turner had presented his famous paper to the American Historical Association, he read it to Wilson, who was visiting the young historian's home in Madison, Wisconsin. Wilson accepted Turner's conclusion that the western frontier had shaped both American society and character since the earliest colonial times. Indeed, Wilson, as a leading political scientist and historian at that time, became the first

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[14] Letter, Turner to Caroline Sherwood, February 13, 1889, *PWW*, VI, 88.

[15] Letters, Wilson to Turner, August 23, 1889, ibid., 368-371; Turner to Wilson, January 23, 1890, ibid., 478-479; Wilson to Turner, December 10, 1894, ibid., IX, 101-102; and Report of Proceedings, Herbert Baxter Adams, 12th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 31, 1896, ibid., X, 89-90.

[16] Letter, Turner to William E. Dodd, October 7, 1919, in Wendell H. Stephenson, "The Influence of Woodrow Wilson on Frederick Jackson Turner," *Agricultural History* XIX (October 1945), 249-253, and Bogue, *Frederick Jackson Turner*, 356-357. See also, Letters, Turner to Wilson, December 20, 1893, *PWW*, VIII, 417, and Turner to Wilson, December 24, 1894, ibid., IX, 118-119.

prominent scholar to endorse the frontier thesis.[17]

Like Turner, Wilson understood the West not so much as a section but as a "stage of development," one that had quickened American life, given it a more democratic spirit, and widened the practical meaning of freedom in the nation.

A distinct sensitivity to the western frontier and its regenerative impact upon American national development became a basic element in Wilson's view of American history. In the first chapter of *Division and Reunion* (1893), a volume written for the Longmans, Green series "Epochs of American History" covering the years from 1829 to 1889, Wilson explained "his own vision" of the significance of continental expansion in American national development. He offered a firm rejoinder to those Europeans who criticized the American tendency to equate "mere bigness and wealth" with greatness. In a subchapter on American development entitled "A Material Ideal," Wilson attempted to disclose the secret of the history of the country and the ambitions of its people:

> The obvious fact is that for the creation of the nation conquest of her proper territory from Nature was first necessary; and this task, which is but recently completed, has been idealized in the popular mind. A bold race had derived inspiration from the size, the difficulty, the danger of the task. . . .
>
> *Expansion had meant nationalization; nationalization had meant strength and elevation of view* [emphasis mine]. "Be strong backed, brown-handed, upright as your pines; by the scale of a hemisphere shape your designs," is the spirited command of enthusiasm for the great physical undertaking upon which political success was conditioned.[18]

Wilson later referred to the passage above as "an inspiring programme" and as

[17] Letters, Turner to Wilson, July 26, 1893, ibid., VIII, 278-279; Wilson to Ellen A. Wilson, July 29, 1893, ibid., 293; and Wilson to Caleb T. Winchester, August 17, 1893, ibid., 312-313.

[18] Wilson, *Division and Reunion, 1829-1889* 2nd edition (New York, 1893, 1929), 4.

"the moral of our history."[19] Rather than writing a more conventional sort of history, Wilson sought to formulate principles, emotions, and practices that identified society as a whole both to itself and in relation to the rest of the world. For him, the most important historical principle of the American experience was that the expansion of the country, besides being an impetus to the growth of nationalism, ensured the "expansion of the correct sort of democratic feeling and method," the very thing that made America unique in the world.[20]

In an article in *Forum*, Wilson elaborated further on the regenerative influence of America's "intense and expanding western life." Continental expansion, he argued, had ameliorated the divisive problems associated with sectionalism and, in part, had settled the slavery question. Furthermore, America's frontier experience had produced "the typical Americans" – men like George Washington, who, Wilson wrote, had got his experience and his ideas of what ought to be done for the country through his contact with the wilderness. He added that Washington "had conceived the expansion of the country much more liberally than others of his generation" and had "looked confidently forward to many a great national enterprise which even yet we have not had the spirit to undertake."[21] The passage above is representative of how Wilson turned historical actors into symbols of forces that molded America's national character. Wilson intended his reconstruction of the "national design" to convey important meanings about what he

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[19] Wilson, Address, "The Course of American History," May 16, 1895, *PWW*, IX, 273.

[20] Wilson, *Division and Reunion*, 15.

[21] Wilson, "Mr. Goldwyn Smith's Views on Our Political History," *Forum* XVI (December 1893), 489-499. Quotation on 497.

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considered the exceptional qualities of the American nation. In this respect, Washington's vision, as explained by Wilson, involved the transformation of America from a country plagued by private and regional visions of progress and prosperity into a single nation that was genuinely national in its approach to political and economic development. Wilson contended that an examination of Washington's life made it clear that only continental expansion had made such a vision of national maturity possible; westward expansion, "the secret of nationality in America," had reconciled the essential contrasts in the young republic's political economy by forging a pact between interest and polity that resulted in "national perfection."[22]

Wilson understood that the close of the frontier raised new challenges for the American polity. America's exceptional character would have to be preserved and developed further without the unique perspective borne of the frontier, and socioeconomic pressures would increase as the migrating nation turned back on itself. "The free lands are gone," Wilson warned. Americans would have to "make their life sufficient without this easy escape."[23] At the same time that the nation was losing the safety valve of the frontier, it was being buffeted by the escalating pressures of industrialization and urbanization, a growing number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, mounting labor strife, and a surge in sectional and populist unrest. Clearly, Wilson interpreted the loss of the frontier as a significant event in American national development. In his mind, everything else paled in comparison as modernization,

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[22] Wilson, *George Washington* (New York, 1897), 64-66, 142, 242, 245, and Essay, "The Making of the Nation," April 15, 1897, *PWW*, X, 225-226.

[23] Wilson, "The Course of American History," May 16, 1895, ibid., IX, 257-274.

or what he called "continued progress toward mastery over nature,"[24] threatened to transform American society beyond recognition in the absence of a western safety valve to temper its excesses.

The Crisis of a Frontierless Democracy

The root cause of Wilson's anxiety about the changing character of the United States in the post-frontier era was the unprecedented growth of the economy in the decades following the Civil War. The four-year war powerfully stimulated the economy, although historians disagree about how much expansion would have occurred anyway. The growth continued apace during the tumultuous years of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. Between 1865 and 1900 the population of the United States more than doubled to 71 million, and the nation's gross domestic product nearly tripled. Raw statistics concerning the incredible growth in the production of staple crops, raw materials, and basic manufactures during this period offer convincing evidence of rapid economic expansion: wheat, 256 percent; corn, 222 percent; refined sugar, 460 percent; coal, 800 percent; and steel rails, 523 percent. In the textile industry the number of spindles more than quadrupled. The "estimated true value" of taxable property increased by over 446 percent. Investments in railroad securities, most of it European in origin, rose by over 470 percent and miles of track in operation by over 567 percent.[25] In newer industries the growth,

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[24] Wilson, Notes for Lectures, "Politics," March 5, 1898-April 29, 1900, ibid., X, 464-476. Quotation on 466.

[25] Percentages are compiled from statistics in U.S. Bureau of Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* 2 volumes (Washington, D.C., 1975), I, 8, 224, 512, 590, 592-594; II, 693-694. See also, Robert Higgs, *The Transformation of the American Economy, 1865-1914: An Interpretation* (New York, 1971); Edward G. Kirkland, *Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and*

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starting from near zero, was so great as to render percentages meaningless. The production of crude petroleum rose from three million barrels in 1865 to over fifty-five million barrels in 1898, making America the world's largest producer of oil within a single generation. By 1900 the United States produced ten million tons of steel per year, surpassing the annual production of Britain and Germany combined. As Paul Varg has written, by the end of the nineteenth century the American nation "had become the Hercules of the economic world."[26]

Modernization, however, proved to be a mixed blessing for the United States. Industrial growth, which continued unabated into the new century, produced major problems and inequities as well as substantial gains. Harsh urban life, perilous factory conditions, a scarred physical environment, and an unprecedented concentration of wealth in the hands of a few accompanied America's postwar economic expansion. The rise and spread of big business, the maturation of the industrial base, and the explosion of corporate mergers which tripled the number of trusts between 1895 and 1904 all stirred anxiety that equality of economic opportunity was fast approaching an eclipse.[27] Also, the strains of transition from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial nation, together with massive flows of foreign immigration and internal migration, exacerbated tensions along class, race, and ethnic lines. Wilson feared that the nation seemed to be acquiring a

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Public Policy, 1860-1897 (New York, 1961), 52, 164, 400; and David M. Pletcher, "1861-1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment" in William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., *Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789* (New York, 1984), 119-171.

[26] Paul A. Varg, *America from Client State to World Power: Six Major Transitions in United States Foreign Relations* (Norman and London, 1990), 103.

[27] Glenn Porter, *The Rise of Big Business, 1860-1920* 2nd edition (Arlington Heights, IL, 1992), 75-90, and Naomi R. Lamoreaux, *The Great Merger in American Business, 1895-1904* (New York, 1985).

large, unruly proletariat composed mainly of recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe who possessed little understanding of or loyalty to American democratic principles and institutions. The signs of disorganization, even disintegration, seemed to be everywhere, directly threatening Wilson's middle-class America that had been dominated by a homogeneous Anglo-Saxon Protestant political culture. American cultural exceptionalism, especially the distinct absence of class conflict, seemed at an end.[28]

In spite of Wilson's faith in the potential of human progress and continued democratic growth in the post-frontier era, this faith often betrayed a failure to accept the pluralism of a modern urban society. Wilson viewed policies that promoted strict racial control and the aggressive assimilation of ethnic minorities as vital to the preservation of American cultural exceptionalism. The prospect of a frontierless nation exacerbated his fears over the assimilative capacity of America, particularly in lieu of the fact that the number of immigrants was increasing in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Nearly four million immigrants (not including Canadians and Mexicans)[29] entered the United States between 1891 and 1900. Although Wilson himself never advocated restriction, he did note in his 1889 address commemorating the centennial of George Washington's inauguration that "there is no longer that quick reception and Americanization of these immigrants which we see in earlier days." Wilson warned that though the United States had proven democracy possible in a large nation by its success in integrating sixty million

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[28] Faulkner, *Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900*, 72-93; Chambers, *The Tyranny of Change*, 1-24; and Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 110-140.

[29] Immigration authorities in the United States ceased to count "overland immigration" from Canada and Mexico after 1884.

people into one representative system, its national character was being "diluted" by the "heterogeneous horde of immigrants" arriving at America's shores. "We are receiving into our own equable blood," he declared, "the most feverish blood of the restless old world."[30]

Wilson lamented the changing ethnic character of the "new immigration" because it threatened to change the character of American democracy. For him, the maintenance of political consensus in the United States rested in large part upon racial culture and conditioning rather than upon a relationship between economic and social conditions. Thus, Wilson asserted, "the ultimate danger of variety and heterogeneity" in the American population in the post-frontier era was "national disintegration." An increasing proportion of immigrants originated from southern and eastern Europe as well as East Asia while a steadily diminishing proportion came from northwestern Europe. This demographic shift had begun in the late 1870s and gained momentum in the 1880s and 1890s. By 1896, immigration from southeastern Europe surpassed that from northwestern Europe for the first time in American history. By 1900, more than ten million people of foreign birth were living in the United States, of whom more than seven million came from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.[31] Wilson claimed that these "new immigrants," in contrast to the "old immigrants" from northern Europe who first settled and built America, were less intelligent and energetic and therefore less deserving or capable of

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[30] Wilson, "Speech on the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Inauguration of George Washington," April 30, 1889, *PWW*, VI, 176-182.

[31] *Reports of the Immigration Commission* (Washington, D.C., 1911), III, 8-12; *Statistical Atlas of the United States, 1900* (Washington, D.C., 1903), 70-75; and Walter F. Wilcox, *Studies in American Demography* (Ithaca, NY, 1940), 159-174.

assimilation. He dreaded the contaminating influence of the "new immigrants" on American political culture: "Immigrant minds cast in every mould of race – minds inheriting every basis of environment, warped by the diverse histories of a score of different nations, threatens our Saxon habits of government." Wilson felt Anglo-Saxon institutions had to be preserved by honoring the traditions from which "our first strength was derived," but they were threatened by "restless forces" and "anarchic turbulence" of European democracy brought to the United States by immigrants who did not have the benefit of Anglo-Saxon conditioning. Without the western frontier the United States no longer seemed able to assimilate and acculturate the incoming flood. "Yearly," he wrote, "our own temperate blood, schooled in self-possession, and to the measured conduct of self-government," was receiving a "partial corruption of foreign blood." Europe was exporting its "habits," and its political philosophy, "a readiness to experiment in forms of government."[32]

Wilson assumed that industrialization would ultimately transform the United States into a more unified and homogeneous nation. Although he anticipated that America's new industrial cities would eventually emerge as the new frontier, absorbing the immigrants and "Americanizing" them, in the meantime the different stages of industrialization in the various regions of the country heightened sectional antagonisms. Wilson, therefore, viewed "a sectional struggle for supremacy in the control of

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[32] Wilson, "The Nature of Democracy in the United States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXIV (November 1889), 577-588. See also, Wilson, Public Lecture, "The Evils of Democracy," November 25, 1890, *PWW*, VII, 80-82; Untitled Address, June 12, 1895, ibid., IX, 287-291; and Untitled After-Dinner Speech, December 21, 1896, ibid., X, 82-85.

government" as the gravest threat to national development in the post-frontier era.[33]

A southerner himself, Wilson believed he understood the perils associated with the sectionalization of the national idea. Having been reared in the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction era, he had witnessed first hand the tragedy of disunion and the long painful road to reunion, still incomplete in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In an address on Abraham Lincoln in 1909, Wilson confided in the audience that his earliest recollection was "standing at my father's gateway in Augusta, Georgia, when I was four years old, and hearing someone pass and say that Mr. Lincoln was elected and there was to be war."[34] Also, in his study of American history, Wilson had concentrated much of his attention on the sectional crisis of the 1850s that culminated in one of the bloodiest wars of the century. Although Wilson defended the South's constitutional right to secede from the Union in 1861, he depicted secession as a misguided solution that ultimately led to ruinous consequences for southern civilization. In an early essay on John Bright, he wrote "because I love the South, I rejoice in the failure of the Confederacy." Wilson's view of secession as "misguided," however, did not derive solely from his conviction that slavery constituted an immoral institution, as some of his biographers claim,[35] but also from his conclusion that an independent South would still have been dominated by a more powerful, industrializing North. Throughout, Wilson maintained

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[33] Wilson, Essay, "The Making of the Nation," ca. April 15, 1897, ibid., X, 217-236. Quotation on 219.

[34] Wilson, Address, "Abraham Lincoln: A Man of the People," February 12, 1909, ibid., XIX, 33-46. Quotation on 33.

[35] See, for example, Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson: The American as Southerner," *Journal of Southern History* XXVI (February 1970), 3-17, and John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation* (Princeton, 1978), 69.

that the South could prosper only as part of the United States, not separate from it.[36]

The memories and lessons that Wilson discerned from the Civil War and Reconstruction era shaped his perception of the political crisis then looming just beyond the horizon in the United States. He believed that the absence of a community of interests in the 1880s and 1890s between radicalized farmers in the South and West and reactionary manufacturers and industrialists in the Northeast allowed the prospect of bloody sectional conflict to rear its ugly head once again in the American political landscape. The "new sectionalism," as he described it, developed from an unprecedented diversification of economic interests throughout the country in which "some sections [were] at one stage of development, some at another; some with one hope and purpose for America, some with another." Unfettered economic growth had created regions of backwardness in the United States. Industrialization, coupled with the termination of the frontier, had destroyed the "common standard" in opinion and policy that underlay national life.[37]

The victims and victors of the "new sectionalism" polarized into two intransigent camps that, according to Wilson, facilitated the rise of new sectional politicos on the national scene. Like the sectional leaders of the 1850s and 1860s, each possessed a

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[36] Wilson, Oration, "John Bright," ca. March 1880, in Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *College and State: Literary and Political Papers (1875-1913)* (New York, 1925), I, 43-59. Wilson wrote Albert Bushnell Hart, editor of the "Epochs of American History" series, that concern about the danger of renewed sectional conflict in the absence of a frontier was one of the reasons why he decided to write *Division and Reunion, 1829-1889*. Letter, Wilson to Albert Bushnell Hart, December 20, 1892, *PWW*, VIII, 60-61.

[37] Wilson, Essay, "A Calendar of Great Americans," ca. September 15, 1893, ibid., VIII, 368-380; Minutes, Meeting of the Alumni of the University of Virginia, June 12, 1895, ibid., IX, 286-287; Untitled Address, June 12, 1895, ibid., 287-291; and Essay, "The Making of the Nation," April 15, 1897, ibid., X, 217-236.

distinctly parochial vision of American national development that failed to take into account the national interest. In one camp the Populists, led by William Jennings Bryan, seemed to threaten revolution with their loud demands for immediate and sweeping change. In the other the entrenched legal-political establishment, represented by Tammany Hall bosses and their allies in Washington, persisted in undermining any movement toward substantive reform for fear that it would produce changes in the political *status quo*. A despairing Wilson sounded the tocsin: "The conviction is becoming painfully distinct among us . . . that these contrasts of condition and differences of interest between the several sections of the country are now more marked and emphasized than ever before."[38]

Wilson placed the lion's share of the blame for the "new sectionalism" in the United States at the doorstep of the federal government. The western safety valve was gone and the national government lacked the authority to devise policies that treated the diverse parts of the country separately. Wilson painted a bleak picture of the political situation in Washington in his essays and lectures: while the grave social and economic problems of the day indicated that the American system was maturing, demonstrating the need for decisive national leadership, the federal government seemed rudderless, staying a course of drift and reaction. Instead of acknowledging that the nation was in the grips of a serious domestic crisis that required far-reaching reform, America's political leaders responded to the increasing sectionalization of the national interest only with haste, ignorance, intemperance and fatuity. Wilson warned that if leaderless government

[38] Wilson, Essay, "The Making of the Nation," April 15, 1897, ibid., 217-236.

persisted and Washington continued to abdicate its responsibilities in locating a new safety valve for the nation's excesses, then the processes of change transforming America would become even more perilous, making another sectional conflict inevitable.[39]

Wilson identified the acrimonious relationship that existed between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government as the chief source of inefficiency in late nineteenth-century America: "Congress and the President now treat one another almost like separate governments. . . . What we need is harmonious, consistent, responsible party government, instead of a wide dispersion of function and responsibility."[40] The president's ability to lead the nation had been severely curtailed by Congress in the decades after the Civil War, but Congress, dominated by partisan politics and special interest groups, had failed to provide a coherent plan for national regeneration as well. Wilson pointed out that both houses suffered from a notable lack of efficient organization in which unrelated standing committees determined all legislation, with no clear plan, no single definite purpose. Because the speaker appointed all the members of the standing committees in the House of Representatives, he tended to govern that chamber in "an autocratic manner," precluding any serious debate about the national polity. Wilson often referred to the speaker of the House as "the silent master of men and policies" whose agenda mirrored his own concerns about maintaining the political *status quo* rather than initiating constructive reform.[41]

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[39] Ibid.; Public Lecture, "Political Liberty, Political Expediency, Political Morality, in a Democratic State," December 24, 1894, ibid., IX, 106-118; Address, "Ideals of Democracy," October 15, 1896, ibid., X, 6-9; and Address, "Leaderless Government," August 5, 1897, ibid., 288-304.

[40] Wilson, Essay, "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," ca. March 17, 1893, ibid., VIII, 160-178.

[41] Wilson, Address, "Leaderless Government," August 5, 1897, ibid., X, 288-304. Quotation on

Similarly, Wilson contended that the Senate had acquired "a sort of Romo-Polish character" since the Civil War in which its administrative powers had become magnified over the years at the expense of the president. Members of the Senate's standing committees behaved in a manner that expected the president and his cabinet to acquiesce to them, especially in the realm of financial and foreign affairs. The standing committees, however, did not constitute the locus of power in that upper chamber. Instead, Wilson declared, "a few senators of distinction" presided over the affairs of the nation through a wide network of patronage that extended into the standing committees. Such an arrangement prevented the emergence of disinterested leadership in governing the national agenda, Wilson charged, and it resembled anything but checks and balances in government. Such an arrangement constituted nothing less than "government without order, showing a confused interplay of forces in which no man stands at the helm to steer, whose course is beaten out by the shifting winds of personal influences and popular opinion."[42]

Clearly, Wilson was convinced that the future of American democratic institutions hung in the balance in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Before 1890, the frontier had tempered the pace and nature of change in the United States, ensuring slow but steady democratic growth. Westward expansion had served as the organizing principle upon which the whole of American national development had been based for more than two centuries: "The idea of manifest destiny furnished that standard of political expediency in America. Westward expansion taught Americans how to be masters . . . and provided

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[42] Ibid. Quotation on 298-299.

them with experience in becoming democratic."[43] He insisted that only the unbounded economic prosperity and unprecedented freedom from social disorder and discontent afforded by the western safety valve had made it possible for the government to conduct national affairs in spite of the dysfunctional relationship between the president and Congress. Thus, for Wilson, the disappearance of the frontier near the close of the nineteenth century held serious implications for the continuation of American democratic growth and stability into the next century. A new regenerative principle upon which future political action could be based had to be located before the specter of social revolution, produced by the throes of industrialism and the "new sectionalism," could sweep the country.[44]

America's Edmund Burke

Wilson's frontier-based historical synthesis of American national development seemed to provide a clear justification for overseas expansion. In reality though, Wilson did not believe that the loss of the frontier could be offset by an expansionist foreign policy. Instead, Wilson's attention in the years immediately preceding the Spanish-American War focused exclusively on locating and propagating "internal solutions" to the problem of national degeneration in the absence of a western safety valve. It was in this frame of mind that Wilson abandoned his long-time mentor Walter Bagehot after whom he had

[43] Wilson, "Political Liberty, Political Expediency, Political Morality, in a Democratic State," December 20, 1894, *PWW*, IX, 106-118. Quotation on 108.

[44] Wilson, "Leaderless Government," August 5, 1897, ibid., X, 288-304. See also, Niels A. Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910* (Princeton, 1988), 52-69, and Henry W. Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years* (Cambridge, MA, 1967), 263-265.

self-consciously modeled himself up to that time, and turned back to the more pragmatic, eighteenth-century British statesman Edmund Burke to find the political principles that would guide the nation through the storm of political, economic, and social upheaval.[45]

After rereading Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in 1893, Wilson composed a public lecture on him. Wilson's discussion of Burke's reactions to the popular excesses of the French Revolution in the 1790s offers much insight into his own fears about the increasing potential for social revolution in America in the 1890s. He considered Burke's message about good government, democratic growth, and the cultivation of strong political character "timeless," possessing "a quality of permanence." For Wilson, the universal quality of Burke's prescription for national regeneration derived from the fact that his generalizations about political development were never based on abstract propositions, but upon "the great principles of conduct . . . [and] the general experiences of the English-speaking race." A master of the principles of conduct and habit, Wilson argued that Burke represented the authentic voice of Anglo-Saxon peoples and that his words, still valid a century after they were first written, should serve "as a sort of motto of the practical spirit of our race in the affairs of government."[46]

Wilson viewed himself as "America's Edmund Burke." He believed that Burke's

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[45] Wilson's gradual shift from Bagehot to Burke in his political thought can be traced in the following three addresses: Wilson, Public Lectures, "Democracy," December 5, 1891, *PWW*, VII, 344-369; "Edmund Burke: The Man and His Times," ca. August 31, 1893, ibid., VIII, 318-343; and "Walter Bagehot," January 16, 1896, ibid., IX, 381-383. See also, David P. Fidler and Jennifer M. Welsh, eds., *Empire and Community: Edmund Burke's Writings and Speeches on International Relations* (Boulder, CO, 1999).

[46] Wilson, "Edmund Burke: The Man and His Times," ca. August 31, 1893, ibid., VIII, 318-343. Shortly before Wilson composed this lecture, he was asked to edit Burke's private and public papers. Wilson declined the offer because "though Burke be my master in all things political, he bristles with allusions that would call -- would cry out -- for annotation. It would be the death of me, if I were to undertake it." Letter, Wilson to Caleb T. Winchester, May 29, 1893, ibid., 219-220.

principles of "enlightened conservatism" could provide the American people with a road map to guide the nation out of the chaos and disorientation of the 1890s. Acknowledged as one of the country's leading political scientists and most accomplished orators, Wilson delivered more than a hundred addresses in various cities across the United States throughout the decade before the Spanish-American War, expounding upon what he considered the core Burkean virtues of respect for order, obedience to law, and pursuit of progressive reform from above. His purpose was to offer the American people a program of national regeneration in the absence of a frontier. America in the 1890s, like Burke's England in the 1790s, had to be made immune to radical and unproven political theories that had found their fullest and most devastating application in the French Revolution.[47]

Throughout the nineties, Wilson told his audiences that the critical question confronting the nation was not whether a reorganization of the national polity was necessary, but what approach to reorganization should be adopted. For him, the choices seemed only too clear: Americans could embrace either the "speculative innovation" of the Populists and other proponents of radical change from below, or Burke's doctrine of gradual, constructive reform from above. Wilson equated the former with eighteenth-century French radical thought. Populists, he argued, relied too heavily on the literary and theoretical genius of the French *philosophes* which, in the end, proved to be nothing more than misleading generalizations based on abstract principles devoid of any practical understanding of democratic institutions or how they developed. Mirroring observations made by Burke a century earlier, Wilson warned that "revolutionary liberty" was nothing

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[47] Wilson, "Edmund Burke and the French Revolution," *The Century Magazine* LXII (September 1901), 784-792. See also, Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson*, 143-145; Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson*, 126-128; and August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1991), 112.

more than a delusion:

> To innovate is not to reform. . . . The former alters the substance of the objects themselves, and gets rid of their essential good as well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them; reform is not a change in the substance or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of.[48]

In this respect, Wilson pointed out that the chief flaw in the ideological politics of the Populists, like their French predecessors, stemmed from their failure to understand that republican institutions could not be "made over at will." Democratic growth could never be achieved through a revolution from below: "Neither Rousseau, the apostle of all that was forceful, unreal, and misleading in politics, nor the gospel of the Rights of Man, with its irrational talk of majority rule and of the paramount significance of reason, possessed any understanding of the true nature of liberty." Wilson, therefore, deemed the Populist vision of American national development as "radically evil and corrupting, unfit for free men."[49]

Clearly, Wilson believed that the Populist approach to the regeneration of American democracy posed a direct threat to America's exceptional character because it contradicted every principle concerning the growth of liberty that had been revealed in the course of the American experience. Burke's explication of practical politics marked the only correct and durable road to national regeneration. Genuine democratic growth, possessing an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary character, could only be achieved

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[48] Wilson, "Edmund Burke: The Man and His Times," ca. August 31, 1893, *PWW*, VIII, 318-343. Quotation on 336.

[49] Ibid. Quotation on 340-341. See also Wilson, Public Lecture, "Edmund Burke," October 22, 1897, ibid., X, 326-329, in which Wilson explains in detail the parallel between the Populists of the 1890s and the French *philosophes* of the 1790s.

through Burke's prescription of "slow progressive modification, deliberate adjustment and patient accommodation of general opinion and purpose to changing social and political conditions from generation to generation."[50] The Burkean approach to national regeneration, as interpreted by Wilson, required that all laws and reforms be shaped according to the historical, physical, intellectual, and accidental conditions of the nation. Change, if it was to be constructive and progressive, had to be efficient, that is, prudent, based on established tradition and rooted in the national experience.[51]

Wilson, upon his adoption of a Burkean approach to national reform, listed the injection of "disinterested national statesmanship" into the American polity as an essential prerequisite to "liberating" the national government from the stranglehold of sectional-partisan politics and redeeming American democratic values: "The frontier is gone; it has reached the Pacific. The key to the conduct of our democracy now is leadership."[52] In light of the absence of the frontier, American national development into the twentieth century depended upon the cultivation and rise of a new political elite who possessed "the ideals of the English-speaking race, .. [and] the inspirations of character, spirit and thought of the nation which they would serve." Wilson prescribed a new

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid. Wilson promoted a Burkean approach to national regeneration in a number of essays and addresses throughout the 1890s. See especially, Wilson, Essay, "The True American Spirit," October 27, 1892, ibid., VIII, 37-40; Address, "The Ethics of the State," October 30, 1894, ibid., IX, 99-100; Public Lecture, "Political Liberty, Political Expediency, Political Morality, in a Democratic State," December 30, 1894, ibid., 106-118; Address, "The Nature of the State in Its Relation to Society," February 21, 1895, ibid., 211-213; Address, "Montesquieu," December 13, 1895, ibid., 361-363; Public Lecture, "De Tocqueville, the Student of Democracy," January 10, 1896, ibid., 374-377; Address, "Liberty," February 5, 1897, ibid., X, 145-149; Notes for an Address, "Forms of Government," October 29, 1897, ibid., 332-333; and Public Lecture, "Alexis de Tocqueville," November 5, 1897, ibid., 336-338.

[52] Wilson, "A Calendar of Great Americans," ca. September 15, 1893, ibid., VIII, 368-380. Quotation on 380.

American statesman: "The great men of our future must be of the composite type of greatness: sound-hearted, hopeful, disinterested, confident of the validity of liberty, tenacious of the deeper principles of American institutions." Only after such leadership emerged on the national scene could Americans "be of one mind, our ideals fixed, our purposes harmonized, our nationality complete."[53]

As a common theme in his public addresses throughout the nineties, 'civic manhood,' the idea of nurturing patriotism through character formation, quickly emerged as the centerpiece of Wilson's effort to redeem American democratic institutions and preserve American exceptionalism in the absence of the frontier. Wilson elucidated his views concerning the cultivation of "patriotic citizenship" in a widely reported-on address commemorating Princeton's sesquicentennial in October 1896. Throughout the speech, he particularly emphasized the important role that universities would play in imparting a sense of national duty to a budding modern American elite. Educators possessed the responsibility of not only providing their students with a fundamental body of knowledge, but also of instilling in them a "spirit of service to the nation." Wilson charged universities with the task of aiding society in the difficult but imperative transition from an agrarian set of values to an industrial set. Theirs was a mission of character regeneration among students who, in turn, would eventually lead the effort to redeem America through constructive reform from above. Throughout his life, Wilson never wavered in his conviction that disinterested public service comprised the principal component of national regeneration: "The life of service provides the only road to

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[53] Ibid.

freedom and liberty."[54]

Wilson also proposed that the education of a patriotic and service-oriented elite required the development of a uniquely American "university ideal." Such an ideal involved the establishment of a core curriculum based on instruction in national history and in democratic thought and institutions. For Wilson, the study of history offered instructive practical wisdom to Americans because it illuminated for them those characteristics that raised the nation to greatness: Anglo-Saxon racial stock, America's geographic isolation, and mature political character, which he described as "civic manhood." Because "the days of glad expansion" were gone, Wilson argued, the university had to replace the vanished frontier in teaching "each man his place in the republic," and in instilling in America's future leaders a nationalistic point of view that included an understanding of and unwavering devotion to distinctly American democratic institutions, values, and practices.[55]

To ensure the rise of "civic manhood" in politics to "stand firm against the crowd," Wilson declared that the administration of national policy had to be liberated from the spoils system. For Wilson, patronage undermined American political character. The "moral rottenness" that patronage spawned in American political life threatened not only governmental efficiency, but "the fundamental virtues of our civilization" as well. A

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[54] Wilson, Address, "Princeton in the Nation's Service," October 21, 1896, ibid., X, 11-31.

[55] Ibid. See also, Wilson, Address, "Should an Antecedent Liberal Education Be Required of Students of Law, Medicine, and Theology?" July 26, 1893, ibid., VIII, 285-292; Essay, "University Training and Citizenship," ca. June 20, 1894, ibid., 587-596; Address, "Legal Education of Undergraduates," ca. August 23, 1894, ibid., 646-657; Outline for an Address, "Patriotic Citizenship," September 29, 1897, ibid., X, 320-321; Public Lecture, "What Patriotism Means," December 11, 1897, ibid., 351-352; Address, "Patriotism in the Time of Peace," December 14, 1897, ibid., 353-355; and Address, "Patriotism, The Duty of Religious Men," December 20, 1897, ibid., 365-366.

symbol of national shame and degeneration, the spoils system destroyed the confidence of ordinary citizens in democratic institutions and saddled the nation with a despotic bureaucracy bent on retaining control of the machinery of government. Patronage undermined morality in government, Wilson argued, and without "Christian character" in public affairs, all efforts at reform were futile.[56] After 1894, Wilson became active in the "municipal reform movement," especially in Baltimore. Describing the spoils system as "undemocratic," he argued that the practice of patronage allowed city bosses to dominate nearly every aspect of Baltimore's municipal life. As a remedy, Wilson called for the "thorough reform" of the nation's civil service in which standards of honesty and efficiency for public officials were established and observed. Like other progressive reformers, he considered the adoption of the merit system for political appointments as the *sine qua non* of good government. In addition, Wilson emphasized the need to "relearn the virtues" inherent in the earlier frontier communities by reintroducing the institutions of the "common council" and the "town meeting" in municipal government. Doing so would temper the designs of self-interested urban bosses with public opinion.[57]

Wilson also argued that the centralization of power in the executive branch of the federal government and the reinstitution of meaningful debate in Congress were

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[56] Wilson, Address, "Patriotic Citizenship," September 29, 1897, ibid., 320-321.

[57] Ibid.; Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* II (June, 1887), 197-222; Public Lectures, "Good Government in Cities," February 20, 1896, *PWW*, IX, 437; "Modern City and the Organization of Its Government," February 26, 1896, ibid., 449-454; "City Departments and Commissions," February 28, 1896, ibid., 461-465; "Problems of City Government," February 29, 1896, ibid., 468-473; "Organization of Cities," March 3, 1896, ibid., 477-480; and "The City and the State," March 4, 1896, ibid., 482-483. For Wilson's involvement in Baltimore's municipal reform movement, see Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest*, 60; Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson*, 195-199; and James B. Crooks, *Politics and Progress: The Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore, 1895-1911* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1968), 13-47.

important keys to ridding the nation of the spoils system. To achieve both of these political reforms, Wilson promoted the idea of emulating the British practice of appointing the most capable members of Congress to the president's cabinet which, in turn, would allow them to present and argue the executive's policies in the legislature. A cabinet-style government would provide a mechanism for an efficient and healthy relationship between the two branches and, more importantly, would give the president more latitude and power in directing national affairs.[58] The reinstitution of substantive debate in Congress, Wilson estimated, would eventually reduce the influence of blind partisanship and special interests in government, and induce "the best men" to seek office based upon merit, not patronage ties. The natural selection of debate would therefore ensure that only the nation's most qualified and skillful elites rose to positions of government leadership in Washington.[59]

Wilson described his proposal for centralizing political power in the executive branch as "the nationalization of the motive power of government." Accordingly, the president represented the interests of the nation, the homogeneous state, while Congress represented only sectional and special interest constituencies. For Wilson, giving the executive "an originative voice" in determining national policies would simply mark "a return to our first models of statesmanship and political custom" that had existed during the formative years of the American republic. Congress would be relegated to a consulting body once again, thus allowing for a genuinely national vision to emerge to

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[58] Wilson, "Government Under the Constitution," ca. June 26, 1893, *PWW*, VIII, 254-270.

[59] Ibid. See also, John G. Sproat, *"The Best Men": Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age* (New York, 1968), 257-271.

guide the United States into the next century.[60]

As the United States stumbled toward the twentieth century, little occurred to encourage Wilson to believe that his message of conservative national regeneration was having much of an impact on people's attitudes toward reform and development. Instead, evidence abounded that American elites were turning to other approaches to constructive change. In this regard, Wilson noted that many in America looked to the principles of "scientific management" as well as to technical education to serve as the new standard of political efficiency. At the center of the efficiency craze, Frederick W. Taylor fashioned methods after the exact sciences -- experiment, measurement, generalization -- to find the laws of management, like the laws of nature, that would be impartial and above sectional and class prejudice. The objective of "scientific management" was to produce a society in which all human activity would become planned, coordinated, and controlled under the continuous supervision of "efficiency experts." The supposed promise it held for Americans concerned about national development in the late nineteenth century was a world in which political corruption and incompetence, sectionalism, and class conflict would be absent.[61] Wilson objected to this proposed panacea, however, contending that science could have at best only a limited effect in resolving the nation's problems. Science," he declared, "has not changed the laws of social growth and betterment."[62]

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[60] Wilson, "Leaderless Government," August 5, 1897, *PWW*, X, 288-304.

[61] For the principles of "scientific management," see Samuel Hays, *The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914* (Chicago, 1957), 48-70, and Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920* (Chicago, 1964), 99-116.

[62] Wilson, "Princeton in the Nation's Service," October 21, 1896, *PWW*, X, 11-31. Quotation on 12.

Instead, Wilson argued, national regeneration through character formation should be at the heart of all progressive reform in America. For him, individual character and national success were bound together in an inseparable compact that left little room for science.[63]

As "frontier anxiety" continued to mount throughout the decade of the nineties, some American elites began to question whether the various "internal solutions" to the vanishing frontier were sufficient by themselves in preventing the further erosion of American exceptionalism. Perhaps inevitably, attention turned to various "external solutions," including the creation of new territorial frontiers outside the continental United States, to augment the effort at home to end the deterioration in national character. For these reform-minded Americans, expansionism, whether continental or extra-continental, would remain the principal instrument of national regeneration. While there was no single, overriding frontier-based argument for overseas expansion, several manifestations of the closed-frontier theme surfaced frequently in expansionist rhetoric and became more common as the crisis of the nineties worsened. Some proponents of overseas expansion asserted that new frontiers were required to keep alive those "rugged manly virtues" that had been fostered in the American wilderness.[64] Others articulated the need to locate new fields of action abroad to prevent the development of a dangerous surplus of energy that had been necessary in the development of the continent.[65] For his

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Roosevelt championed this theme in *The Wilderness Hunter* (New York, 1893), reprinted in *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt* 23 volumes (New York, 1926). See also, David H. Burton, "The Influence of the American West on the Imperialist Philosophy of Theodore Roosevelt," *Arizona and the West* XIV (January 1962), 5-26; Frank Ninkovich, "Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology," *Diplomatic History* X (Summer 1986), 221-245; and Richard Slotkin, "Nostalgia and Progress: Theodore Roosevelt's Myth of the Frontier," *American Quarterly* XXXIII (Winter 1981), 608-637.

[65] See General Thomas Jordan, "Why We Need Cuba," *Forum* XI (June 1891), 559-567, and

part in the emerging debate on American overseas expansion, Wilson described himself as "an anti-jingo" though he acknowledged "the jingo may have his uses – to shake us out of a too comfortable lethargy."[66]

Opposition to Empire

As the crisis of the nineties deepened, many elites in the United States had reached the conclusion that overseas expansion was critical to the future of national development and to the preservation of the nation's unique character. Influential expansionists of the day, including Josiah Strong, Brooks Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred T. Mahan, Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican-MA), Orville Platt (Republican-CT) and Albert J. Beveridge (Republican-IN), placed great emphasis on the "loss" of the continental frontier in their arguments for securing a greater share of the world's commerce and annexing an overseas empire in the Caribbean and Pacific. Their arguments ensured that the closed-frontier *leitmotif* would become an integral part of the debate on an American "large policy" in the late nineteenth century.

For those expansionists who linked the closing of the frontier with the need for further territorial expansion, it was simply a question of offsetting domestic land exhaustion through the acquisition of new territories. Most frontier-related expansionist designs in the 1880s and early 1890s were directed towards Canada. Articles and editorials appearing in the *North American Review*, *Review of Reviews* and other popular

Arthur C. James, "Advantages of Hawaiian Annexation," *North American Review* CLXV (December 1897), 758-760.

[66] Wilson, Address, "Patriotism in Time of Peace," *PWW*, X, 353-355. Quotation on 354.

journals through the mid-1890s made much of "Canadian opportunities" in the light of land exhaustion in the United States. Arguments wavered between "Continental Union" and outright annexation, but always emphasized the vastness of Canada's resources that presumably could alleviate the "frontier anxiety" then being experienced in the United States. Although such arguments dwindled following the triumph of the British-oriented Tories over Canada's Liberal Party in the 1891 general election, the territorial designs on America's northern neighbor established a precedent for expansionists' overseas schemes in the nineties.[67]

Throughout the nineties, American expansionists' demands grew to include annexation of Hawaii, construction of an American-controlled isthmian canal through Central America, development of a first-class navy based upon a heavy battleship force rather than commerce-raiding light cruisers, acquisition of a larger share of the world's commerce, especially in East Asia, eradication of the European presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere, and the extension of "Anglo-Saxon Christian Civilization" to the far corners of the earth through increased missionary activity and enlightened colonization schemes. Such an assertive foreign policy was necessary, expansionists argued, because the technological revolution in armaments, warships, and communications had made the world smaller and more threatening. Notwithstanding the

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[67] Prosper Bender, "The Annexation of Canada," *North American Review* CXXXIX (July 1884), 42-50; Justin S. Morrill, "Is Union with Canada Desirable?" *Forum* VI (January 1889), 452-464; Erastus Wiman, "Has Not the Time for the Capture of Canada Come?" *North American Review* CXLVIII (August 1890), 212-222; and S.A. Thompson, Editorial, "The Great Canadian Northwest," *Review of Reviews* X (November 1894), 545. For historians' evaluations of the movement to annex Canada in the 1880s and 1890s, see Gordon T. Stewart, *The American Response to Canada Since 1776* (East Lansing, MI, 1992), 17, 103; Donald Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893* (Lexington, KY, 1960), 226-238; Karel D. Bicha, *The American Farmer and the Canadian West* (Lawrence, KS, 1968); and Harold M. Troper, *Only Farmers Need Apply: Official Canadian Government Encouragement of Emigration from the United States* (Toronto, 1972).

fact that the United States, insulated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, was not menaced by strong neighbors and faced the smallest visible threat to its national security of all the great powers, the competitive ethic of Social Darwinism had strengthened the perception that the world was rapidly contracting, being divided between winners and losers. In this respect, proponents of a "large policy" believed that America had reached an important milestone in its national development; the nation either had to assert its place among the great powers or decline into relative obscurity.[68]

While expansionists sought justification for their designs in Turner's writings about the critical role of the frontier in American national development, they had easier access to similar arguments in the writings of Wilson. Ironically, though both of these young scholars bemoaned the loss of the frontier because of continental expansion's "proven" restorative qualities, neither viewed extracontinental expansion as a potential panacea to the nation's ills. Both Turner and Wilson opposed overseas expansion.[69]

Despite his writings on the regenerative qualities of continental expansion, Wilson consistently opposed calls for an assertive foreign policy and extracontinental expansion

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[68] These factors are discussed at length in Robert L. Beisner's excellent *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900* (Arlington Heights, IL, 1986), 72-95. See also, Healy, *US Expansionism*, 99-209; Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (New York, 1968); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca and London, 1963); Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York, 1963), 228-266; and Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 170-200.

[69] Some historians have argued that Turner was an avowed expansionist in the 1890s. See, for example, William A. Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," *Pacific Historical Review* XXIV (August 1955), 379-395, and Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Frederick Jackson Turner and Imperialism," *Social Science* XXVII (January 1952), 12-16. Both these historians, however, overestimate Turner's own imperialism in their efforts to determine his role in shaping the expansionist temper of the nineties. In fact, Turner opposed overseas expansionism. See, Turner, "The Problem of the West" in *The Frontier in American History*, 205-221; Ambrosius, "Turner's Frontier Thesis and the Modern American Empire," 332-339; and Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Frederick Jackson Turner's Views on International Politics, War and Peace," *Australian National University Historical Journal* VI (November 1969), 10-15.

before 1898. He believed that while an expansionist foreign policy aimed at securing greater access to overseas markets may in fact lessen economic tensions at home in the short term capturing a larger share of overseas commerce did not address the more fundamental issue at hand in the 1890s: how to regenerate democratic institutions and ensure an equality of economic opportunity in a rapidly industrializing America that no longer possessed a frontier. In this respect, Wilson opposed the adoption of a "large policy" because it was devoid of any regenerative qualities and principles.

Wilson, in the years before the Spanish-American War, was always more distressed by the loss of the domestic frontier than he was optimistic about the prospects of new compensatory frontiers overseas. He characterized the agitation for an expansionist foreign policy as "reckless and misguided," reasoning that neither the United States nor the world would be served by the adoption of such a policy. Responding to scaremongers like Roosevelt who frightened the public with alarmist rhetoric about potential aggressors in the Western Hemisphere, Wilson contended that the "common danger" to America was not the threat of foreign invasion, but the harsh reality that Americans were divided and not of a "common mind" on the question of national regeneration. For him, the threat of revolution and anarchy within the United States seemed more credible than an invasion by some foreign enemy. Any distraction from addressing the ominous tensions and imbalances at home would certainly hold dire consequences for the American polity.[70]

At the heart of Wilson's opposition to ending what he called "beneficient

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[70] See for example, Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland as President," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXIX (March 1897), 289-300, and "The Making of the Nation," ca. April 15, 1897, *PWW*, X, 217-236.

isolationism" before 1898 was his conception of the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs as essentially antagonistic and competitive. He identified at least two areas of antagonism. First, Wilson feared that the adoption of a "large policy" would ultimately divert precious resources, including reform-minded administrators, away from reform initiatives needed at home. His admonishment of Cleveland in 1893 for appointing Walter Q. Gresham, an experienced judge from the West, as secretary of state is indicative of this attitude: "It seems a pity to waste so fine a Secretary of Interior, as it seems certain Mr. Gresham would have made, on the novel field of foreign affairs."[71] Gresham's experience and administrative talents could have been better utilized, at least to Wilson, in spearheading domestic reform rather than overseeing foreign affairs.[72] Later that same year, however, he applauded the Democratic administration's handling of the "Hawaiian matter," largely because Cleveland stood firm in not allowing the distant crisis to overshadow or circumvent his commitment to securing civil service reform and a viable currency policy.[73]

Second, Wilson contended that an expansionist foreign policy would ultimately entangle the United States in the Old World's diplomacy that, in turn, would create more problems for America in the world. Although the extension of American influence abroad might yield access to greater foreign markets and enhance the prestige of the United

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[71] Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," ca. March 17, 1893, ibid., VIII, 160-178. Quotation on 164.

[72] According to Wilson, Gresham's experience as a western judge afforded him "a minute knowledge of questions of the interior, the questions of interstate commerce, of railway monopoly on the grand scale, of land grants and agricultural depression." On the other hand, Gresham possessed no experience in foreign affairs: "The experienced officials of the State Department will find their new chief *naïf* and ignorant about many things which seem to them obvious arrangements of Providence." Ibid., 164, and Letter, Wilson to Albert Shaw [editor of *Review of Reviews*], March 4, 1893, ibid., 158.

[73] Wilson, "A Calendar of Great Americans," ca. September 15, 1893, ibid., 368-380.

States in the eyes of the great powers, it would do so only at a terrible cost. Recalling the diplomatic principles outlined by George Washington in his "Farewell Address," Wilson warned that adoption of a "large policy" would tragically embroil the nation in imperial scrambles, colonial wars, entangling alliances and general war scares that marked late nineteenth-century international relations.[74]

Wilson pointed to recent developments within the British Empire to underscore his apprehensions about the "entanglements" inherent in a policy of overseas expansion. Since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Britain had increasingly become committed to far-reaching foreign and imperial policies resulting in the addition of over four million square miles and sixty-six million people to her empire. A concomitant of this expansion had also been near continuous British involvement in costly colonial conflicts in Egypt and Sudan, West and South Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and in many other remote regions of the world. Wilson noted two other events in the mid-1890s that further complicated Britain's international position: the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, which united Britain's two most formidable adversaries; and, partly as a consequence of the stalemate produced in Europe by this alliance, the sudden enthusiasm by all the great powers for imperial and naval expansion. Britain was placed on the defensive as relations with the other powers became strained over conflicting national interests and imperial claims. International antagonisms deepened, threatening the world with perpetual political instability and general war. Confronted throughout the world by new rivalries, new pressures, and the ever-increasing burden of imperial defense, Britain's era of "splendid

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[74] Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," March 17, 1893, ibid., 160-178; *George Washington*, 117-121; and "The Making of a Nation," ca. April 15, 1897, *PWW*, X, 217-236.

isolationism" seemed to be in its final moments. Given Wilson's assumptions and misgivings about what he viewed as the liabilities of a "large policy," it is not difficult to understand why he wished to see the United States spared from a fate similar to that of Britain.[75]

Moreover, Wilson's belief that the United States was a model for other nations to emulate strengthened his conviction that America needed to remain aloof from the Old World. Identifying the nation's destiny with the fate of freedom in the world, he eschewed any international crusades for America. Only by avoiding the enormous economic and constitutional threats produced by entangling alliances and foreign wars, regardless of how small, could America fulfill its mission as an example to oppressed peoples everywhere. Professing what political scientist Robert Tucker has called "an exemplar role" for the United States in the world,[76] Wilson believed that America was destined to set an example to the world both in the principles of society it entertained at home and in the policies it pursued abroad. Although this myth in the American diplomatic tradition, originating in the first decades of the American republic in order to strengthen the perception of separateness between the Old and New Worlds, was clearly being challenged in the late nineteenth century by those who emphasized the importance of expanding America's foreign markets and acquiring new sources of cultivable land, Wilson strictly adhered to it in the years before the Spanish-American War.[77]

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[75] Ibid.; Wilson, "Government Under the Constitution," ca. June 26, 1893, ibid., VIII, 254-270; and Untitled Memorandum for an Interview, ca. December 18, 1895, ibid., IX, 365-366.

[76] Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1990), 11.

[77] For Wilson as "the great exemplar" of the national conviction that America stood for something

Wilson often held up the Cleveland administration as a model of caution and self-restraint in the conduct of foreign affairs in the 1890s. Cleveland, in opposing Republican plans to create a protectorate over Nicaragua, announced that such a policy contradicted "the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day, which proscribe entangling alliances with foreign states."[78] Such statements drew praise from Wilson. He especially lauded Cleveland's determination to resolve through international arbitration Canadian-American disagreements regarding the fur seals dispute in the Bering Sea, as well as the president's refusal to annex Hawaii after the American-engineered "Honolulu revolution" in January 1893.[79] Following the resumption of the Cuban revolution in February 1895 after Spain suspended the island's constitutional guarantees of 1878, Wilson lauded Cleveland's wisdom of avoiding hostilities with Madrid and its European allies while still making the Spanish insular authorities "feel the pressure of our own opinion."[80] Ironically, when approached by Henry M. Alden, editor of *Harper's Magazine*, to write a feature article on "Spain vs. America," Wilson declined. He wrote Alden that the Cleveland administration's diplomatic skill and tact in handling the "Cuban problem" would preclude any "lingering interest" in Spanish-American relations.[81]

Wilson, however, found himself out of sorts with the Cleveland administration's

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Order (Princeton, 1992), 1-14.

[78] George Roscoe Dulebohn, *Principles of Foreign Policy under the Cleveland Administration* (Philadelphia, 1941), 91.

[79] Wilson, "Mr. Clevelands Cabinet," ca. March 17, 1893, *PWW*, VIII, 160-178.

[80] Wilson, "Mr. Cleveland as President," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXIX (March 1897), 289-300.

[81] Letters, Henry M. Alden to Wilson, May 14, 1896, and Wilson to Alden, May 15, 1896, *PWW*, IX, 502 and 503-504, respectively.

response to the Anglo-Venezuelan imbroglio in 1895. In a memorandum for an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, he criticized Cleveland for being "too blunt" in his demand for immediate arbitration of the boundary dispute. Wilson viewed the administration's efforts to force the issue by broadening the scope of the Monroe Doctrine during the crisis as perilous to long-standing American interests and objectives in the Western Hemisphere.[82]

He contended that precluding a European presence in the region would ultimately require that the United States either establish "a protectorate or dictatorship over South America . . . [or] let the internal rivalries and disorders of that Continent run what course they will, provided no European Power have any interest in them." Such a course of action seemed to Wilson not only impractical in light of America's own domestic problems but dangerous as well. On one hand, direct intervention into the internal affairs of Latin America would constitute not only a contravention of international law, but also would entangle the United States in a politico-military quagmire of immense proportions for an indefinite period of time. On the other hand, interference in European interests in the region not only threatened hemispheric stability, but almost certainly would precipitate a serious international crisis, perhaps even a general war, in America's backyard. Wilson questioned whether a boundary dispute in tropical America warranted bringing about "a deadly war between the two branches of the English race, in whose hands lie, if they be united, the future destinies of the world." Such a conflict, he portended, would have dire consequences for civilization itself: "The disaster of it, . . no man can adequately imagine;

[82] Wilson's concern about the distortion of the "original meaning" of the Monroe Doctrine can be traced to the early 1880s. See, Wilson, Notes for a Debate, "Was the Monroe Doctrine Founded upon a Wise Policy?" ca. May 4, 1880, ibid., I, 652-653.

the disgrace of it, if provoked on a slight cause, no man could speak."[83]

Notwithstanding Wilson's repeated caveats about the adoption of an assertive foreign policy, events moved quickly towards war between the United States and Spain following the destruction of the armored cruiser *Maine* in early 1898. At 9:40 on the evening of February fifteenth *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor, killing 260 Americans. Soon afterward, the jingo press in the United States screamed for vengeance. Most newspapers carried the couplet of the hour: "Remember the *Maine*! To hell with Spain!"[84] Not everyone became caught up in the emotion of the moment, however. In correspondence with his spouse, Ellen Axson Wilson, Wilson proclaimed the explosion in the warship's interior in Havana harbor "a most inoportune [*sic*] accident," an extraordinary coincidence likely caused by "an unknown chemical reaction." Although the exact cause of this naval disaster remained unknown, he feared that "some Senators and their friends" would endeavor to use the incident "to cause a still worse explosion in Cuba!" Accordingly, Wilson correctly predicted that "a disastrous war" between the United States and Spain would erupt within the year.[85]

As it turned out, the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain in 1898 caused an even greater furor than Wilson could have imagined. The conflict not only transformed America into a world power but also compelled Wilson to reconceptualize the relationship between overseas expansion and national development. In this respect,

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[83] Wilson, Untitled Memorandum for Interview, ca. December 18, 1895, ibid., 365-366.

[84] David Traxel, *1898: The Birth of the American Century* (New York, 1998), 100-113.

[85] Letters, Wilson to Ellen Axson Wilson, February 16, 1898, and Ellen Axson Wilson to Wilson, February 17, 1898, ibid., X, 397 and 400-401, respectively.

the events of 1898 proved to be a "defining moment" in the evolution of Wilson's political thought. In the months and years following the Battle of Manila Bay, Wilson offered extensive commentary on the significance of the Spanish-American War for American national development, extolled the creation of an extracontinental frontier in the Philippines, and articulated America's new role in world affairs. Shifting America's mission in the world from one of "exemplar" to "crusader," Wilson consistently maintained after 1898 that Americans, having mastered the art of self-government more extensively and effectively than any other people in the history of the world, were duty-bound to proliferate the doctrine and practice of self-government throughout the globe. Doing so, he believed, would strengthen democracy at home.

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Chapter Two
War, Empire, and Regeneration

After completing *Problems of the Far East* shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, George Nathaniel Curzon, the future viceroy of India, inscribed the book "to those who believe that the British Empire is, under Providence, the greatest instrument for good that the world has seen." Hoping that war in Northeast Asia could be averted, he avowed that the best hope of salvation for the "old and moribund institutions of Asia" was to be derived from the ascendancy of British character in that part of the world."[1]

Curzon readily acknowledged that empire had a "reflex influence upon England" as well. The ponderous responsibilities of empire affirmed British character by cultivating qualities such as loyalty, duty, and superiority among young Englishmen entrusted with overseeing British interests in distant lands. Curzon noted that the Englishman he met on his "investigative missions" to East Asia was "the finest of his type;" the imperial experience had "fired a fine glaze on manly characters originally molded at home." The larger atmosphere of life and sense of responsibility engendered by overseas expansion inculcated in him "broader views of men and things," and freed him from the pettiness of a home existence that was apt to be consumed in party conflict and class strife. It was expected, Curzon wrote, that when these colonial elites returned to England after serving the empire they would bring with them their administrative experience and their polished character, both requisites for the moral regeneration of Victorian society.[2]

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[1] George Curzon, *Problems of the Far East: Japan-Korea-China* (London, 1894), xiv.

[2] Ibid., 414-422. Quotation on 417.

Curzon's analysis of empire as an instrument of regeneration abroad and at home offers insight into why Wilson embraced the imperial idea after 1898. To a degree incomprehensible at the beginning of the twenty-first century, empire at the end of the nineteenth century formed an indispensable part of a people's confidence in their nation and in themselves. Possession of overseas colonies seemed to demonstrate almost any desirable characteristic anyone cared to name – commercial enterprise, disinterested leadership, good government, individual self-sacrifice, etc. Experiencing the throes of industrialization at home and great-power competition abroad in the late nineteenth century, Wilson placed a premium on such empire-engendered attributes. He viewed the rekindling of patriotism, that part of the moral code that bound a people together socially and nationally, as essential to national survival. For Wilson, empire seemed but a "larger patriotism," an instrument of regeneration that provided a constructive and systematic critique of the *status quo*.

After 1898, Wilson embraced what British imperial historian Bernard Porter has called "constructive imperialism," or the idea that empire benefited the colonizer, the colonized, and the world in general.[3] He assumed that empire could regenerate not only a "backward world" but also American society. Overseas expansion held out the promise of realigning human social character with the changing conditions of material life at home following the "loss" of the frontier. Thus, for Wilson, the Spanish-American War and subsequent acquisition of an overseas empire not only compelled him to rethink his position on the future of the United States as a colonial power, but also called into

[3] Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1983* 2nd edition (New York and London, 1984), 188-195.

question the proper relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. He wrestled not only with the problems directly raised by the conflict but inquired into how empire might ameliorate the increasing fragmentation of society, ensure the durability of American democratic institutions in a rapidly changing world, and redefine the nation's role in world affairs.

War with Spain

Historians often describe the war with Spain as America's shortest, most popular, and least painful war.[4] At its outset, Americans flocked to recruiting stations and enlisted in what they heralded as a glorious expedition to demonstrate American right and might. According to one observer, the Spanish-American War "was as hard to get into as later world wars were hard to keep out of."[5] Although the regular army rejected seventy-five percent of all applicants, some 77,000 out of 102,000 men, and the volunteer units refused twenty-five percent in pre-muster physicals and an equal proportion after induction, the commanding general still complained that the Army had admitted 100,000

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[4] The Spanish-American War and the events surrounding it have been the subject of scores of books. H. Wayne Morgan's *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion* (New York, 1965) remains the most succinct and balanced study; David F. Trask's *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York, 1981) is the most comprehensive single-volume work; and John L. Offner's *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992) is the best international history of the war. Other useful volumes include Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1983); David Traxel, *1898: The Birth of the American Century* (New York, 1998); Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York, 1998); and Philip S. Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902* 2 volumes (New York and London, 1972).

[5] Edward Thornton Heald, Typescript of Radio Broadcast, "'McKinley's Own' and the Spanish-American War," February 12, 1950, in Gerald F. Linderman, *The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1974), 63.

more men than were needed or could be equipped.[6]

War almost seemed healthy and many treated the conflict as if it were a necessary commodity in very short supply.[7] American elites from all political persuasions were not immune to such lofty assumptions. John Hay, the American ambassador to Britain, later recalled to his friend Theodore Roosevelt that the conflict with Spain had been "a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives, carried on with great spirit, favored by that fortune which loves the brave."[8] In Nebraska, William Jennings Bryan, the "Great Commoner" who had spearheaded the Populist crusade, was no less swept away by the call to arms. He offered his services to President William McKinley and soon thereafter assumed command of the Third Nebraska Regiment.[9] Roosevelt, who resigned as assistant secretary of the navy to command a contingent of the colorful Rough Riders in Cuba, declared: "This is going to be a short war. I am going to get into it and get all there is out of it."[10] And that he did. In the words of historian John Milton Cooper, Jr., "except for the acquisition of the Philippines, the political making of Theodore Roosevelt looms

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[6] "Report of the Adjutant General, US Army, 1899," 11, as quoted in Army War College Study No. 20, *Resources of the United States – Men* (Washington, DC, 1900), 40, and Nelson A. Miles, *Serving the Republic* (New York and London, 1911), 270.

[7] On the immense popularity of the Spanish-American War, see Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York, 1959), 151-193; Marcus M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War Propaganda* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1931, reprint edition, 1967); Joseph E. Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898* (New York, 1934); and George W. Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* XXVI (March 1940), 523-534.

[8] Letter, John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, July 27, 1898, quoted in William R. Thayer, *The Life and Letters of John Hay* 2 volumes (Boston, 1915), II, 337.

[9] William J. Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Philadelphia, 1925), 119.

[10] Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1979), 612-613.

as the most significant consequence of the Spanish-American War."[11]

In reality, however, the "splendid little war" consisted of little more than two overly glamorized naval victories at Manila Bay in the Philippines in May 1898 and at Santiago Bay in Cuba the following July. Spanish naval genius had all but vanished by 1898. Although the Spanish navy had appeared reasonably strong on paper, its ships were antiquated and poorly maintained. Spain's coastal defenses in Cuba were in even worse shape. When Spanish forces at the climax of the war prepared to train their coastal batteries on American warships lying off Santiago, they discovered that five cannon were relics of the eighteenth century and a sixth bore the date 1668. The American navy, three times as large as Spain's, comprised newer, faster, and more powerful warships, including four first-class modern battleships, chiefly because of the influence of Captain Alfred T. Mahan and his coterie of naval enthusiasts on congressional appropriations in the 1890s. Spain possessed nothing remotely comparable, nor could it even match the lone American second-class battleship and the several armored cruisers. Consequently, there was never any doubt about the outcome of the naval war. Commodore George Dewey and the Asiatic squadron fell on Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo's Philippine squadron in the early hours of May 1 and destroyed all seven Spanish warships. Two months later, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson's naval force intercepted and destroyed Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete's squadron as it sortied out of Santiago. At a cost of three American casualties, Spanish sea power in the western Pacific and Caribbean had been destroyed.[12]

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[11] Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest*, 38-39.

[12] French Ensor Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American*

On land, the Marines landed at the mouth of Guantánamo Bay and secured a temporary harbor for coaling and replenishing Sampson's blockading fleet off Santiago.[13] The Army's only significant campaign, however, ended in near disaster that merely demonstrated the ineptness of its commander, General William R. Shafter, and of the War Department in procuring and transporting supplies to fight a war outside the continental United States. Supplies had been quickly dispatched to Florida, but since no one knew anything about logistics a jam of nearly a thousand boxcars crammed every siding from Tampa to Columbia, SC. More often than not, the equipment that seeped through to the troops proved inadequate. Shoes fell apart on the first march, ponchos disintegrated in the tropical rain, and rations were spoiled. Not surprisingly, the supply problems turned into a great scandal and several political and military careers were ruined. Actually, the era itself was mostly to blame for the logistics nightmare. The Spanish-American War occurred during the high noon of unbridled capitalism. Unscrupulous contractors, trying to expand their profit margins, produced inferior military equipment, and an unregulated packing industry shipped spoiled rations to the war front.[14]

In spite of these deficiencies, American forces, after landing successfully at Siboney and Daiquiri, advanced toward Santiago. Uncoordinated attacks against fierce

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War 2 volumes (New York, 1911), I, 39; William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (Austin, TX, 1958), 21-32; and Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898*, 95-107, 257-285.

[13] Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York, 1980), 132-134, and Bernard C. Nalty, *The United States Marines in the War with Spain* revised edition, Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet (Washington, D.C., 1967).

[14] Traxel, *1898*, 154-170.

opposition left the Americans bloodied but in possession of San Juan Hill and El Caney on the outskirts of the city. Shafter, shaken by a thousand casualties and a near-debilitating attack of gout, decided to halt the advance and opened negotiations for the city's surrender. Day by day the Army extended its trenches until a horseshoe of works invested Santiago. The Cuban adventure came to an abrupt end on July 17 when McKinley, displaying some skill in diplomacy, promised a quick trip back to Spain for all enemy troops who surrendered unconditionally. Spanish soldiers hauled down their ensign over the Governor's Palace, ending four centuries of rule in Cuba.[15]

The Spanish capitulation in Cuba occurred not a moment too soon. Disease had begun to decimate Shafter's command. Battle deaths in the Spanish-American War were relatively light as wars go: less than four hundred Americans fell to enemy fire. American soldiers and sailors faced far greater danger from diseases contracted at staging areas in the American South and on station in Cuba and the Philippines. More than ten times as many, over five thousand Americans, succumbed to typhoid, malaria, yellow fever, and dysentery as to Spanish bullets. So inadequate were the field hospitals and sanitation conditions in the camps that George Kennan, a writer and vice-president of the American Red Cross, cried out in frustration: "If there was anything more terrible in our Civil War, I am glad I was not there to see it!"[16] Also, thousands of American troops fell victim to the notion that there existed a link between moral force and physical vitality, causing many to ignore basic sanitary precautions. As a result, widespread illness remained this

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[15] Ibid., 171-236.

[16] George Kennan, *Campaigning in Cuba* (New York, 1899), 133.

war's constant companion.[17]

Notwithstanding these stark military realities, American elites wasted little time in locating reasons for self-congratulation. Prewar advocates of an American "large policy" spoke of vindication as their long-time agitation for an expansionist foreign policy finally paid off. For them, the war with Spain, in spite of the heavy casualties due to disease and mismanagement, indicated that the United States had ascended to world power. Again, it was Roosevelt who best expressed this essential paradox of the war. Roosevelt, in the same week that he drafted his famous "round-robin" letter (signed by General Shafter and the entire Fifth Corps staff) to the Associated Press complaining of the War Department's apparent unwillingness to evacuate the Army in the face of "absolute and objectless ruin" due to the deteriorating health situation in Cuba, also wrote to Lodge with equal passion that because American forces had not lost a battle on land or sea in the sixteen weeks of war, the military prowess of the United States as a great power had been firmly and irrevocably established.[18]

Moreover, the war with Spain alleviated American elites' anxieties over the future development of the nation. A surprising number of them believed that the conflict had occurred at a propitious moment in the course of American national development. For them, the significance of the Spanish-American War and the decision to acquire an

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[17] "Annual Report of the Adjutant-General to the Secretary of War, 1 November 1898" in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1898* (Washington, DC, 1899), 273. See also, Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, 245-294, and A.B. Feuer, *The Santiago Campaign of 1898: A Soldier's View of the Spanish-American War* (Westport, CT, 1993), 111-120.

[18] Letters, Roosevelt to Shafter, August 3, 1898, in Elting E. Morison and John Blum, eds., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* 8 volumes (Cambridge, MA, 1951-1954), II, 865-866, and Roosevelt to Lodge, July 31, 1898, ibid., 861-864.

overseas empire was that these events had led to the articulation of a set of values that had little appeal in the normal course of liberal politics, with their emphasis on prudence, instrumental action, and self-interest. The events of 1898 had engendered a higher plane of thought and action in America, turning men's minds from parochial, self-centered interests to more national and international concerns.

For some Americans, therefore, the most significant development arising from the war was not successful military action abroad in the Caribbean and East Asia but the unmistakable impulse toward selfless and disinterested behavior that was expressed as a consequence of popular patriotism in the wake of the conflict. As a result, American elites, including those responsible for policy in the McKinley administration, devoted more attention and energy to reflecting upon the vitality of national emotions emanating from the experience of waging a successful war against a European power than to clarifying the ambiguities inherent in America's war aims.[19] The turn of international events had stirred unselfish patriotism among the American people, inculcating in them the principles of duty, self-discipline, and disinterested service to the nation that, in turn, evaporated the sectional animosities, class divisions, and the politics of drift and evasion that had pervaded much of the decade before the war. According to one observer, the

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[19] Much of the historiography concerning the Spanish-American War and subsequent acquisition of an overseas empire continues to center on the formulation and evolution of American war aims, especially the still sketchy facts surrounding the timing of McKinley's decision to annex the entire Philippine Archipelago. See, Paolo Coletta, "McKinley, the Peace Negotiations, and the Acquisition of the Philippines," *Pacific Historical Review* XXX, No. 4 (1961), 341-350; H. Wayne Morgan, *William McKinley and His America* (Syracuse, NY, 1963), 374-423; Joseph A. Fry, "Essay Review: William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish-American War: A Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image," *Diplomatic History* III, No. 1 (Winter 1979), 77-97; Lewis Gould, *The Presidency of William McKinley* (Lawrence, KS, 1980), 123-152; Offner, *An Unwanted War*, 195-196; Ephraim K. Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands" in James C. Bradford, ed., *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath* (Annapolis, MD, 1993), 205-250; and Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *The War of 1898: The United States*

events of 1898 had engendered a "new civic spirit" among Americans which broadened their understanding of "true statesmanship . . . [and] national duty."[20] In short, America's new "large policy" seemed to offer a way out of the morass and confusion that characterized much of the last decade of the nineteenth century.[21]

Not just prewar advocates of a "large policy" thought along these lines in 1898. Americans across the political spectrum, including those who had opposed American adventurism in the world throughout the eighties and nineties, viewed the significance of the war in this same prism: the war with Spain, waged ostensibly to liberate other peoples, had redeemed American society and institutions as well. Evidence of the emergence of such a consensus among elites, albeit a brief one, abounds. At one end of the political spectrum, many American Socialists and Fabians supported the war. They rationalized that the conflict had not been unleashed upon the people by their government but instead had been demanded by the people themselves. Although the Spanish-American War was of such brief duration as to preclude any significant outpouring of socialist criticism with respect to its conduct, after the cessation of hostilities Marxist and non-Marxist Socialists alike attempted to place the war and what they believed would be its consequences in a "proper" historical perspective.[22] While a few anti-war Fabians

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and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998).

[20] L. S. Rowe, "Influence of the War on Public Life," *Forum* XXVII (March 1899), 52-60. Quotation on 53.

[21] Morgan, *America's Road to Empire*, 111-115; Lewis L. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence, KA, 1982), 121-138; Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New*, 107-135; and Varg, *America, From Client State to World Power*, 128-166.

[22] Howard H. Quint, "American Socialists and the Spanish-American War," *American Quarterly* X (1958), 131-141; David A. Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America* (New York, 1955), 81-98; and Daniel Bell, "Marxian Socialism in the United States" in Donald Egbert and Stow Persons, eds., *Socialism*

resorted to Social Darwinian tenets to dwell on the physical and moral degeneration accompanying armed conflict, Charlotte Perkins Stetson (Gilman), the acknowledged "poetess laureate of American Socialism," elicited considerable poetic license to arrive at a diametrically opposite conclusion: "Never was the force of natural selection used to better advantage" than in war, she declared. War developed "physical strength, hardihood, courage, and endurance" while leaving "the coward, the weakling, and the fool" on the field of battle. War brought out the "tenderest [sic] and noblest emotions . . . and the highest virtues." Mirroring the sentiments of Roosevelt who proclaimed that all the great masterful races had been fighting races, Stetson described war as the world's greatest "socializer."[23]

At the other end of the political spectrum, Wilson, who had been active since the Panic of 1893 in promoting a strict Burkean approach to national reform and regeneration, painted a similar picture of the war's significance for American national development. This nation, Wilson said, was forced "by history and the implications of the census of 1890 onto the world scene." The United States gained "new frontiers . . . beyond the seas." Commemorating the 125th anniversary of the battle of Trenton in the American War for Independence, Wilson summed up a common sentiment about the war with Spain, an opinion that has been generally shared by historians from his day to ours in thinking about American foreign policy before the First World War: "No war ever

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and American Life 2 volumes (Princeton, 1952), I, 313-316.

[23] *American Fabian* IV (June 1898), 6. See also, Mary A. Hill, "Charlotte Perkins Gilman: A Feminist's Struggle with Womanhood," *Massachusetts Review* XXI (Fall 1980), 503-526, and Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago, 1995), 121-169.

transformed us quite as the war with Spain transformed us. We have witnessed a new revolution. We have seen the transformation of America completed. The battle of Trenton was not more significant than the battle of Manila. The nation that was one hundred and twenty-five years in the making has now stepped forth into the open arena of the world."[24]

Wilson thought deeply about the domestic implications and consequences of America's war with Spain. He participated actively in the heated arguments about overseas expansion swirling throughout the country in the months and years following the Battle of Manila Bay, and articulated what he considered to be a constructive imperialist ideology for the United States. Wilson often invoked the saving grace of the imperial commitment in his public essays and lectures, arguing that America's one hope in an age of increasing degeneration of character was the creation of an empire in order to continue to draw upon the regenerating spirit of expansionism. His was a generalized vision of overseas expansion, a worldview that rendered the principal elements of American patriotism, or what he called "civic manhood," distinctly imperial. For Wilson, the idea of empire as an instrument for motivating people and activating the best traits of individual character subsumed all other meanings of empire. Although he understood the burden that acquiring and sustaining an empire imposed on the United States, he firmly believed the benefits worth that burden.

Wilson, in the months following the war, emerged as a champion of what he considered to be the tangible merits of the newly-forged relationship between overseas

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[24] Wilson, Address, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 208-227. Quotation on 215-216.

expansion and national development. Wilson believed he possessed a vital, if not an entirely new, historical insight to reveal, whose purpose was to effect a positive change in American attitudes about the relationship between empire abroad and reform at home. Through his public lectures and essays on the nature and character of American history in general and American expansion in particular, Wilson proffered his audiences a constructive vision of empire after 1898: overseas expansion in the twentieth century, like continental expansion during the nineteenth, would serve as an instrument for the political regeneration of the United States.

"What Ought We to Do?"

Despite his opposition to a "large policy" before 1898 and his initial reservations about fighting a war against a European power outside the continental United States, Wilson claimed that "wartime revelations" about Cuban and Filipino suffering at the hands of the Spanish ultimately convinced him that the Spanish-American War was both inevitable and correct.[25] In an unpublished personal memorandum entitled "What Ought We to Do?," written just before the cessation of hostilities, Wilson curtly dismissed allegations that the war with Spain had been fought for territorial aggrandizement, economic opportunity, or strategic advantage: "We did not enter upon a war of conquest. We had neither dreamed of nor desired victories at the ends of the earth and the spoils of war had not entered our calculations." He rejected all arguments that viewed the war as the beginning of American imperialism, at least what he perceived as "European chauvinistic

[25] It is impossible to determine precisely what Wilson's immediate response to the outbreak of war had been. There exists an unusual gap in both the edited and unedited versions of his *Papers* from April 21 to May 28, 1898.

imperialism."[26]

Instead, Wilson asserted that American action against Spain had been motivated by "an impulse of human indignation and pity." Americans witnessed at their doorsteps a government unmindful of justice and mercy, contemptuous both in its observance of individual liberty and in its practice of democratic principles. Americans took up arms only when compelled to choose between a just war of liberation or acquiesce in cruelty and barbarism. Clearly, Wilson argued, Spanish colonial authorities in Cuba and the Philippines revealed themselves as oppressive and thus, not fit to govern other peoples. Widespread corruption, insensitive policies, and insatiable greed had cost Spain its empire, not American dreams of glory. Wilson concluded his memorandum: "We have not made ourselves a nation of jingoes by undertaking this war."[27]

Although such altruistic assertions were common enough in the United States in the summer of 1898, this particular memorandum is significant because it marked a fundamental shift in Wilson's conception of the relationship between American foreign relations and national regeneration. The public display of nationalistic zeal before and during the conflict, the celebration of a quick and relatively inexpensive victory against a European power, and the general determination to retain the Philippines despite the Tagalog uprising of Emilio Aguinaldo convinced Wilson that an imperial foreign policy contained the key to a restoration of national unity. No longer did the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs seem remote and antagonistic to him. The "brief

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[26] Wilson, Personal Memorandum, "What Ought We to Do?" ca. August 1, 1898, *PWW*, X, 574-576.

[27] Ibid. Quotation on 576.

season of war" demonstrated that the two spheres were interrelated and complementary, parts of a comprehensive whole.[28]

The closed-frontier *leitmotif* formed an important part of Wilson's conception of American expansionism after 1898. For him, the nation had conquered its domestic frontier and then had ventured outward to extend the boundaries of the republic to the Philippines. In June 1899, Wilson, addressing the problem of what to do with the nation's new overseas colonies, emphasized the continuity of purpose between continental and extracontinental expansion. America had for nearly three hundred years followed a single law of development, he wrote, "the law of expansion into new territory." Although the acquisition of noncontiguous territory appeared to be a departure from traditional American expansionism, Wilson was confident that the ideals and principles that had been worked out in the course of the "old expansion" would ensure the satisfactory resolution of any problems that might arise in the "new expansion." In short, Wilson expected that the Philippines would serve adequately as America's newest safety valve.[29]

Later that year Wilson seemed even more assured that the nation's imperialist thrust was in keeping with its original democratic purpose. In an address entitled "The

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[28] For the evolution of Wilson's thinking about the constructive relationship between overseas empire and domestic reform after the Spanish-American War, see Wilson, Untitled Address, January 14, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 93-94; Address, "Our Obligations," December 14, 1899, ibid., 297-300; Public Lecture, "Americanism," December 7, 1900, ibid., XII, 42-44; Essay, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 6-20 [published in *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXXVII (March 1901), 289-299]; Address, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 208-227; Edward G. Elliott [a PhD candidate at Princeton], Memorandum, "Conversation with Woodrow Wilson," January 5, 1903, ibid., XIV, 320-325; and Wilson, Address, "The Expansion and Character of the United States," April 29, 1903, ibid., 433-434.

[29] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 11. Although this important essay was not published until 1901, Wilson had set down his first thoughts in shorthand in his pocket notebook in June 1899. Wilson, Pocket Notebook, undated, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 12. See also, Wilson, "Our Last Frontier," *Berea Quarterly* IV (May 1899), 5-6.

Ideals of America," Wilson remarked that the extension of America's frontier across the Pacific to the Philippines was not an aberration for the nation. Overseas expansion could be expected to yield the same benefits for American national development as continental expansion: "Inevitably, we made new frontiers for ourselves beyond the seas, accounting for the seven thousand miles of ocean that lie between us and the Philippine Islands no more than the three thousand which once lay between us and the coasts of the Pacific." The great pressure of a people moving always to new frontiers, he argued, "ruled our course and formed our policies like a Fate. It gave us, not Louisiana alone, but Florida also. It forced war with Mexico upon us, and gave us the coasts of the Pacific. It swept Texas into the Union. It made for Alaska a territory of the United States. Who shall say where it will end?"[30] After reading the article version of this address that appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1902, Roosevelt, now president following the assassination of McKinley the year before, invited Wilson to meet with him at the White House to discuss the merits of America's new overseas empire.[31]

Although Wilson never ventured to Washington to become part of Roosevelt's inner circle, he participated actively in the "great debate" on American imperialism. Wilson, however, did not believe he fit easily into either of the two highly vocal general positions that emerged on the Philippine question. He argued that while "the bombastic [imperialist] majority" erred on the side of an uncritical embrace of all things imperial, including becoming involved in the Old World's rivalries and alignments, "the

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[30] Wilson, Address, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 208-227. Quotation on 215.

[31] Letter, Roosevelt to Wilson, December 6, 1902, ibid., XIV, 265. The article version of "The Ideals of America" appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* XC (December 1902), 721-734.

pessimistic [anti-imperialist] minority" remained too narrow-minded in its reactionary distaste of any overseas commitments. In his mind, neither end of the spectrum was founded upon any serious consideration because neither correctly linked the ideology of American expansionism to the preservation of American exceptionalism. In this respect, Wilson worried that only a few seemed to understand that America's victory over Spain and subsequent imperial venture had reaffirmed the intrinsic relationship that had existed between territorial expansion and national regeneration. Accordingly, although he described the events of 1898 as a revolution, they were actually more a revelation, a manifestation of the crystallizing and strengthening of the principles and traditions that had gone before. Wilson argued that those who grasped the crucial theme of expansion in American national development would find within themselves a heightened and practical historical consciousness, binding together the past of America and her future.[32]

Not everyone was in agreement, however. Americans who feared the implications and consequences of an overseas empire – who believed that colonial expansion would propel the United States into the vortex of international power politics, contradict its democratic principles, and reverse the entire course of its national development – launched an anti-imperialist movement, a campaign of opposition that flourished for two years before losing momentum after the election of 1900. Hundreds of politicians, academics, labor leaders, and private citizens denounced American overseas expansion in newspapers and magazines, made countless speeches on the perils of colonial expansion, opposed the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in congressional

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[32] Wilson, Untitled Address, January 14, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 93-94; Essay, "The Significance of American History," September 9, 1901, ibid., XII, 179-184; and Public Lecture, "Americanism," November 20, 1904, ibid., XV, 536-539.

debates, and organized anti-imperialist leagues and associations at the municipal, state, regional and national levels. Organized in June 1898, the Anti-Imperialist League (reconstituted as the American Anti-Imperialist League in 1899) became the most potent force opposing overseas empire in the aftermath of the war with Spain. Fear provided the undercurrent of the anti-imperialists' opposition to overseas expansion, and the variety of their apprehensions mirrored the diversity and heterogeneity of the movement's membership. If some feared for the "timeless principles" of the Declaration of Independence, others feared for the national debt with the existence of a large peacetime army and navy, the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine, the tradition of civilian rule in the United States, the international reputation of the nation as a beacon of anti-colonialism, the political prospects of the Democratic party, the incorporation of inferior "tropical races" into the American polity, and the distraction of resources and leadership away from domestic reform.[33]

Although a myriad of concerns shaped the American anti-imperialist mind, Wilson took particular exception to the idea that a republic and an empire were antithetical entities and that the United States could not be both at the same time. Wilson countered that America's expansionist policy had evolved quite naturally out of the nation's past. Wherever he spoke in the early years of the century, Wilson reminded his audiences that the idea of expansion had been the only appropriate instrument available

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[33] Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York, 1968); E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, 1970), 95-235; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Imperialists vs Anti-Imperialists: The Debate Over Expansionism in the 1890s* (Itasca, IL, 1972); Roger Bresnahan, ed., *In Time of Hesitation: American Imperialists and the Philippine-American War* (Quezon City, 1981); Lewis Feuer, *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind* (Buffalo, NY, 1986); and Jim Zwick, "Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, and the Anti-Imperialist League, 1899-1920," *Proceedings of the 1994 Maxwell Colloquium* (Syracuse, NY, 1995), 105-110.

for the task of regeneration throughout the course of American development. He maintained that little difference existed in the nature and purpose of overseas expansion from that of continental expansion. The same adventurous impulse that created English America in the seventeenth century had propelled the United States into Latin America and East Asia over two centuries later. Wilson claimed that the year 1898 constituted a benchmark in American development not because it signaled the beginning of the end of the republic as propounded by some anti-imperialists, but because 1898 marked the beginning of the next stage of national growth. He indicated that the country had experienced three major "processes of development" divided by centuries up to the moment when Dewey's naval squadron entered Manila Bay: the seventeenth century had been devoted to "getting a foothold on the continent;" the eighteenth century to "getting rid of the French;" and the nineteenth to "the making of the Nation." The acquisition of the Philippines marked the beginning of the next stage of national development, America's rise to world power.[34] Thus, whereas Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, Henry B. Fuller and other critics of empire feared the implications and consequences of extracontinental expansion, contending that the annexation of the Philippines reversed the whole progression of American democratic growth up to that time,[35] Wilson asserted the

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[34] Wilson, Public Lecture, "Americanism," November 20, 1904, *PWW*, XV, 536-539. Quotation on 537. See also, Wilson, Address, "Democracy," June 15, 1898, ibid., X, 556; Address, "What It Means to be an American," January 17, 1902, ibid., XII, 238-239; and Address, "The Expansion and Character of the United States," April 29, 1903, ibid., XIV, 433-434.

[35] Jim Zwick, "An Empire is not a Frontier: Mark Twain's Opposition to United States Imperialism," *Over Here: Reviews in American Studies* XV (Summer-Winter 1995), 58-70; Philip S. Foner, *Mark Twain: Social Critic* (New York, 1958), 239-307; William M. Gibson, "Mark Twain and Howells: Anti-Imperialists," *New England Quarterly* XX (December 1947), 435-470; Henry B. Fuller, *The New Flag* (Chicago, 1899); and Robert Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 26-33.

opposite. He denied that there had been any meaningful departure from traditional values and principles in 1898 when Dewey steamed into Manila Bay. Rather, Wilson viewed empire and democracy as complementary: "There has been a singular unity in our national task, . . and these new duties thrust upon us will not break that unity. They will instead perpetuate it, . . [and] make it complete, if we keep but our integrity and our old-time purpose."[36]

Wilson also challenged the anti-imperialist contention that acquisition of an overseas empire meant the denigration of America's finest documents – the Declaration of Independence which spoke against the holding and governing of alien peoples without their consent; Washington's Farewell Address which warned against entangling alliances with European powers or active intervention in European affairs; the Monroe Doctrine which cautioned against an active foreign policy outside the Western Hemisphere. Most galling to Wilson were the arguments of Moorfield Storey (president of the Anti-Imperialist League), Senator George F. Hoar (Republican-MA), and other anti-imperialists that the acquisition of the Philippines marked a violent break with constitutional precedent.[37] Promoting a broad constructionist perspective, Wilson claimed "the Constitution was not made to fit us like a strait-jacket." The founding fathers had intended for the Constitution to be an organic entity, capable of responding constructively to the constantly changing American political economic landscape. In this way, Wilson argued, the Constitution was designed to facilitate national development, not confine it.

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[36] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 11.

[37] See, for example, "Prospectus," *Springfield Daily Republican*, January 6, 1900. For "the fight over the fathers," see Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, CT, 2000), 156-179.

Republican institutions, analogous to living tissue, needed to experience "normal growth and healthful expansion" to survive. The powers of democratic government must therefore "make shift to live" and adapt themselves to the new circumstances of development: "It would be the very negation of wise conservatism to throttle them with definitions too precise and rigid." Thus, Wilson concluded that it was the elasticity of the Constitution and the principles upon which it was based that served as the key to America's ability to overcome all obstacles to national development, including the challenges posed by overseas expansion. "If it were not so," he argued, "we would long ago have snapped the chords."[38]

Wilson promoted the imperial idea after the war, lending his active support to "constructive imperialism." Indeed, it was Wilson's belief that the new "large policy" gratified national self-esteem and possessed certain specific regenerative qualities that constituted the most important part of his emerging perspective on overseas empire. The Philippines, he argued, provided "a new frontage for the nation, -- the frontage toward the Orient." And this "new frontage," Wilson declared without reference to the nearly eight million Filipinos who lived in the Islands, would serve as America's "new region beyond, unoccupied, unappropriated [*sic*] – an outlet for its energy, a new place of settlement and of achievement for its people." Empire in Asia, like the continental frontier before 1890,

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[38] Wilson, Notes for Lectures, "Constitutional Government," September 19, 1898-November 20, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 4-30; Public Lecture, "Constitutional Government," October 28, 1898, ibid., 44-47, 49-52, 57-62; Address, "The Expansion and Character of the United States," April 29, 1903, ibid., XIV, 433-434; and Address, "Our Elastic Constitution," January 28, 1904, ibid., XV, 142-143. For a scholarly assessment of Wilson's interpretation of the Constitution, see Christopher Wolfe, "Woodrow Wilson: Interpreting the Constitution," *Review of Politics* XLI (January 1979), 121-142; John A. Rohr, "The Constitutional World of Woodrow Wilson" in Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman, eds., *Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public Administration* (New York, 1984), 31-49; and Daniel D. Stid, *The President as Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the Constitution* (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 6-65.

would provide a field of political action for the United States where the political character, capacity, principles, and organizations of the nation could be tested and strengthened. Just as the British had sought colonies at the ends of the earth to unleash their energy and give vent to their enterprise, Americans, "a like people in every impulse of mastery and achievement," also needed to expand into new territories "to keep the wholesome blood of sober and strenuous systematic work warm within us." Wilson contended that an empire in the Caribbean and the western Pacific would "perpetuate within us the spirit of initiative and energy" that, in turn, would make American democracy more efficient, and hence, more durable.[39]

Although Wilson did not view himself as part of a dialogue on gender politics, he employed the language of gender to discuss the regeneration of American statesmen at home and abroad. He demonstrated a concern about American masculinity, his own, and the nation's. He called for American renewal in terms of "civic manhood" and deprecated American mediocrity by describing it as unmanly. For Wilson, strengthening the United States into a recognized power meant inculcating the character of men and meant reinvigorating the masculine character of the country, in contrast to what he perceived as "feminization" in other parts of the world.[40]

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[39] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 12.

[40] For the scholarly discussion of the place of gender in the age of American imperialism, see Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 107-155; Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 1-44; Amy Kaplan, "Romancing the Empire: The Embodiment of American Masculinity in the Popular Historical Novel of the 1890s," *American Literary History* III (December 1990), 659-690; Laura Wexler, *Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 266-268; and Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC, 1993).

"Civic Manhood" and Reunion

Wilson noted in his essays and addresses as well as in his private correspondence that evidence of America's national transformation in 1898 seemed to abound. In an address called "Our Obligations," Wilson declared that the patriotic fervor of the Spanish-American War had transformed "civic manhood" in the United States, giving a much-needed boost to the nation's virility. When the nation faced a foreign challenge, Americans from all walks of life and every region of the country, impelled by the pull of God, glory, and love of country, stepped to the front to offer their services to their nation for the first time since the Civil War. Wilson explained that the war with Spain offered American men an opportunity to celebrate their manhood, to take a stand and uphold the honor and dignity of the nation. Without hesitation, without stopping to negotiate or arbitrate, Americans responded to the call of arms to defend the nation's honor and reputation. And this "splendid outburst of Americanism," he explained, provided the catalyst for ending the general malaise that had pervaded much of public life in the nineties. Wilson asked: "What does the conquest of the Philippines mean?" Answering his own rhetorical question, he declared that it meant this country has young men who prefer dying in the ditches of the Philippines to spending their lives in idleness behind the counters of a dry goods store in our eastern cities. I think I should prefer that myself."[41] In his comparative biography of Wilson and Roosevelt, Cooper contends that Wilson, like Roosevelt, wanted to fight in the war against Spain. He had apparently confided in his brother-in-law Stockton Axson that "he regretted he was not free to enlist in the Armed

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[41] Wilson, Address, "Our Obligations," December 14, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 297-300. Quotation on 299.

Forces and fight."[42] Later, as president-elect, Wilson conveyed a somewhat romantic view of death in combat to his closest political adviser, Colonel Edward M. House. While Wilson denounced the "economic proposition of war" as ruinous, he surprised House with his admission that "there was no more glorious way to die than in battle."[43]

Yet, for Wilson, "civic manhood" involved much more than the then-current idea of patriotism as a chauvinistic sentiment of military glory and conquest. He described "civic manhood" as an important political principle marked by the core values of balance, order, restraint, and disinterested opinion and action. Constant and vigilant patriotic thought and action cultivated individual character within the patriot himself, transforming him into a mature public-minded citizen who could then contribute to the regeneration of American national character by serving his nation. Although this particular conception of patriotism brought Wilson to high levels of abstraction, he described "civic manhood" as the cornerstone of future progress at home and abroad.[44]

Foremost, the impulse toward patriotism produced by the war seemed to have dispelled the sectional illusions of self-confidence and self-sufficiency that had worried

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[42] Ray S. Baker biography, September 1931, *Papers of Ray Stannard Baker*, Box 100, as quoted in Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest*, 57-58, 374n.

[43] Edward M. House, Diary Entry, February 14, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 112-116. Quotation on 113.

[44] "Civic manhood" constituted an important theme in Wilson's public lectures throughout the "great debate" on empire. See Wilson, Address, "What Patriotism Means," December 11, 1897, *PWW*, X, 351; Notes for an Address on Patriotism, January 16, 1898, ibid., 365; Public Lecture, "Patriotism," November 19, 1898, ibid., XI, 86-87; Public Lecture, "Patriotism," February 22, 1899, ibid., 107-108; Address, "Spurious versus Real Patriotism," October 13, 1899, ibid., 244; Newspaper Report, "Patriots and Politics," January 3, 1900, Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, January 3, 1900, in ibid., 356-357; Newspaper Report, "Patriotism," February 2, 1900, Richmond *Dispatch*, February 2, 1900, in ibid., 382-383; Newspaper Report, "Patriotism," November 30, 1901, *Greenville News*, November 30, 1901, in ibid., XII, 204; Newspaper Report, "Patriotism," January 30, 1902, *Worcester Daily Telegram*, January 30, 1902, in ibid., 258-264; and Newspaper Report, "Patriotism," April 26, 1902, *Indianapolis News*, April 26, 1902, in ibid., 350-351.

Wilson before the outbreak of the war. In an article entitled "The Reconstruction of the Southern States," Wilson joined President McKinley and others in declaring that the Spanish-American War had signaled the triumph of a reconciled union nearly thirty-five years after the Civil War. The conflict had rendered the vision of American nation-building national in scope and purpose once again: "A government which had been in its spirit federal became, almost of a sudden, national in temper and point of view." Not since the Jacksonian era, Wilson wrote, had the nation been so united; southerner and northerner, conservative and liberal, all came together to support the conflict in genuine patriotic fashion.[45]

Several historians have described the war with Spain as the culminating point for much of the reunion-oriented ideology that had been building in the preceding decades.[46] Politicians, journalists, and sectional apologists depicted soldiers in blue and gray standing together for the cause of humanity, freedom, and civilization. In the weeks following the destruction of the *Maine* and the publication of the condescending De Lôme letter, the New York *World* emerged as an important outlet for southern writers who elucidated Dixie's dedication to upholding America's honor in 1898.[47] In an article

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[45] Wilson, "The Reconstruction of the Southern States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXXVII (January 1901), 1-15. Quotation on 2-3. See also, Wilson, Historical Essay, "State Rights (1850-1860)," ca. December 20, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 303-348.

[46] Ella Lonn, "Reconciliation Between the North and South," *Journal of Southern History* XIII, No. 1 (February 1947), 3-26; Paul H. Buck, *The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900* (Boston, 1937); Dewey A. Grantham, *Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition* (Knoxville, TN, 1983), 126-127; and Nina Silber, *The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900* (Chapel Hill, 1993), 178-185.

[47] Silber suggests that the letter authored by Spanish ambassador Enrique Dupuy de Lôme in February 1898, describing McKinley as "a weak man, a bidden for the admiration of the crowd" and denigrating the character of American womanhood, did more to galvanize southern support for war than the sinking of the *Maine*. Silber, *The Romance of Reunion*, 182-185.

suggestively entitled "Against a Foreign Foe the Nation Is as One Man," Varina Davis, Jefferson Davis' widow, explained that "Southern men can never cease to be Americans, and are for Americans against the world in arms."[48] In another article, *Leslie's Weekly* announced that the actions of Dewey, a northeasterner, at Manila and Fitzhugh Lee, a southerner and relation of the Old South's "marbleman" Robert E. Lee, at Havana had made the country "forget everything of the past, excepting our national glory, and are proving that, after all, we are a nation and not a mere collection of states." Veterans on both sides, the article concluded, could now acknowledge that the Civil War belonged to a bygone age and celebrate their reunions together.[49]

Though Wilson espoused the ideology of reunion, he criticized some of the more colorful depictions of southerners at war in Cuba and the Philippines as jingoistic and silly. Wilson declined to write articles on two "southern heroes" of the war, Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson and Major General Joseph Wheeler, explaining to Albert Shaw, editor of *Review of Reviews*, that he did not wish to contribute to such hagiography. An article on "the hero of Santiago," Wilson wrote, seemed a bit of an exaggeration since Hobson (of Alabama) failed in his mission to lock Cervera's squadron in Santiago harbor by sinking a collier in the narrow part of the harbor entrance. The fact that the failed exploit by Hobson had captured the hearts and minds of the southern press

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[48] Varina Davis, "Against a Foreign Foe the Nation Is as One Man," *New York World*, April 3, 1898.

[49] Even McKinley noted the war's healing effect on the nation's sectional divisions. See Letter, William McKinley to John B. Gordon [commander-in-chief of the United Confederate Veterans], July 23, 1898, *Papers of William McKinley* [hereafter cited as *McKinley Papers*], series 2, reel 18, and Letter, H. C. Burleigh [Union veteran] to McKinley, August 22, 1898, ibid., reel 4.

hardly constituted a reason to lionize the "splendid fellow" of Alabama.[50] Commenting on the "true blue Unionism of General Wheeler at San Juan," he reminded Shaw that in the excitement of the charge up the hill, Wheeler yelled, "Give it to the damn Yankees, boys; give it to them!"[51] A couple of years later, Wilson shared the stage with Hugh Gordon Miller, a fellow alumnus of the University of Virginia, in extolling the many masculine virtues of Abraham Lincoln and his statesmanship. He took exception, however, to his colleague's claim for Virginia "all the credit for what was good and noble and patriotic in Lincoln." Wilson claimed much less for Virginia, arguing that it had been the western frontier and all of its challenges that made Lincoln the man he was – "a typical American." Describing Miller's speech as nothing more than "a plea for the New South," Wilson told the audience that Miller's analysis must have received its inspiration from "Aesop's Fables, the Bible, and Pilgrim's Progress."[52]

Wilson embraced more freely the implications of race within the new patriotic consensus.[53] He viewed the patriotic reconciliation of northerners and southerners during the war as the reunion of the Anglo-Saxon race in America, a confirmation of the natural racial unity of northerners and southerners. In an after-dinner speech before the New England Society of New York City, Wilson contrasted the Puritan contribution to American character, "the single principle of discipline, of order, of polity," with the sense

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[50] Letters, Albert Shaw to Wilson, June 13, 1898, *PWW*, X, 560-562; Wilson to Shaw, June 20, 1898, ibid., 566.

[51] Letter, Wilson to Shaw, October 14, 1898, ibid., XI, 32-33.

[52] Fragmentary Report of a Lincoln Birthday Dinner, February 13, 1902, ibid., XII, 267-271.

[53] For the debate on race within the context of the "gospel of reunion" in 1898, see David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

of adventure and "the spirit of restless seeking" of the Scotch-Irish of his own southern ancestry. His forebears, he claimed, provided the aspiration, the daring, and the restlessness that pushed the United States across the continent. Placing himself squarely in the tradition of American expansionism, Wilson said he prayed that the time might never come "when we are not ready to do new things, when we are not ready to acknowledge that the age has changed." He concluded: "Now gentlemen, will you follow the Scotch-Irish across the continent and into the farther seas of the Pacific? Will you follow the Star of Empire with these men who will follow anything which they think will drop profit or amusement?"[54]

In his call for the nation to follow the Scotch-Irish "to the ends of the earth," Wilson emphasized southern racial purity and homogeneity, a point that became increasingly significant in the nation's emerging racial discourse. Southern whites, Wilson pointed out, stood in sharp contrast to the North's own motley mixture of immigrant groups that was then diminishing the old Puritan stock in New England. The South had always been more homogeneous than the North, Wilson argued, and perhaps more distinctly American in its characteristics, because Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the South had never been challenged and overcome by the hordes of new immigrants arriving in the United States. In Wilson's estimation, the war had demonstrated that the nation could no longer ignore or reject the South, steeped in its proud Anglo-Saxon heritage, especially in light of the continuing influx of foreign immigrants into northern cities and the acquisition of an overseas empire inhabited by millions of nonwhites. In his article

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[54] Wilson, After-Dinner Speech, December 22, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 52-58.

"The Reconstruction of the Southern States," he argued that it would be difficult to find a population more American, that is, Anglo-Saxon, than in the South. Because of their racial heritage, southern whites could better protect and teach the principles of freedom and democracy at home and abroad, certainly better than those who descended from alien cultures. None of the immigrant communities in America, Wilson wrote, possessed "the same love for the United States, the same love of liberty," as Anglo-Saxon southerners, whose fathers had always been free.[55]

Wilson celebrated the fact that the war-engendered "gospel of reunion" had encouraged Americans throughout the nation to re-evaluate southern white civilization in a more approving light. This fresh perspective was especially evident in the area of race relations. He wrote to a former student in September 1900 that the men who favored acquiring the Philippines on the grounds that Filipinos were unfit for self-government could hardly have afforded to apply another logic to the "Negro Question" in the South. The new manifest destiny seemed to confirm Wilson in his view, held since his twenties, that because southerners possessed an innately better understanding of the "Negro Question," the nation should acquiesce in the South's judgment on what form race relations in the United States should take. He wrote with a hint of smugness that the acquisition of an overseas empire compelled Lodge and other Republicans to look upon the so-called "force bill psychology"[56] that had lingered in Congress for most of the

[55] Wilson, "The Reconstruction of the Southern States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXXVII (January 1901), 1-15, and Historical Essay, "State Rights (1850-1860)," ca. December 20, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 303-348.

[56] In 1888, President Benjamin Harrison recommended that Congress pass a federal elections bill to restore the integrity of the Fifteenth Amendment by supervising congressional elections in the South. In 1890 Lodge, then chair of a special committee in the House, introduced such a bill, precipitating some of the fiercest sectional battles in Congress since Reconstruction. Southern Democrats quickly labeled the

nineties threatening to resurrect "Carpetbagger rule" in the South as "a youthful indiscretion" which it was now prudent to forget. Like many southern middle-class whites, Wilson interpreted the nation's embrace of empire as signaling the transformation of the "Mississippi Plan" of racial segregation, educational discrimination, and political subordination into America's approach to race relations.[57]

"Civic Manhood" and Regeneration

Wilson observed that the sudden transformation of the United States into a world power had registered an immediate impact on the nation's federal system of government. The issues of war and foreign affairs reversed the traditional distrust of executive power. This change was manifested in the shift in the location of authority within the national government from congressional dominance to presidential leadership. Wilson noted that once the nation became embroiled in war, McKinley was propelled into a position of genuine leadership to steer the United States through the stormy seas of international relations. Assessing the impact of the events of 1898 on American political institutions in

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proposed legislation as a "Force Bill" aimed at eroding their hold over the South's electorate, and some even propagated the rumor that, if passed, the US Army would reoccupy the South to enforce the law. The bill's defeat in 1891 meant that the last genuine effort by Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the South was abandoned until 1957. *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st session, 6934; Henry Cabot Lodge and Terrence V. Powderly, "The Federal Election Bill," *North American Review* CLI, No. 406 (September 1890), 257-273; and Homer E. Socolofsky and Allan B. Spetter, *The Presidency of Benjamin Harrison* (Lawrence, KS, 1987), 62-65.

[57] Letter, Wilson to Allen W. Corwin, September 10, 1900, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 12. Historians generally identify "the nadir of the black experience in America" with America's imperial moment at the turn of the century. See John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans* 7th edition (New York, 1994), 247-263; Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898-1903* (Urbana, IL, 1975), 1-40; Daniel Walden, "Race and Imperialism: The Achilles Heel of the Progressives," *Science and Society* XXXI, No. 2 (Spring 1967), 222-232; Rubin F. Weston, *Racism in United States Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946* (Columbia, SC, 1972), 4-36; and Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), 46-91.

a new preface for the fifteenth edition of *Congressional Government*, Wilson wrote: "Much of the most important change to be noticed is . . . the greatly increased power and opportunity for constructive statesmanship given the President by the plunge into international politics and into the administration of distant dependencies, which has been the war's most striking and momentous consequence."[58]

Wilson now viewed the adoption of an American "large policy" as a manifestation of strong government, a condition emanating from a consciousness of matured strength and resolve. He asserted, "As long as we have only domestic subjects we have no real leaders, but we cannot have a foreign policy without the leadership of the executive." In this respect, Wilson argued that the translocation of authority should be interpreted as a return to the political reality that had existed during the first twenty-six years of the republic. This period of American history had been marked by the nation's struggle to survive in an unsympathetic and hostile international environment, a time when foreign affairs predominated over domestic issues. The necessity of an active foreign policy in that era had elevated the president to a position of national prominence, providing him with an "originative voice" in directing national affairs: "Once more it is our place among the nations that we think of; once more our Presidents are our leaders. . . . And this centring [sic] of our thoughts, this looking for guidance in things, this union of our hopes,

[58] Wilson, Untitled Address, January 14, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 93-94, and *Congressional Government* 15th edition (Boston, 1900), xi. See also Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York, 1908), 59, 78; "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 9-10; and "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 227. Captain French E. Chadwick, commander of the battleship *New York*, corresponded with Wilson about the need to do away with checks and balances in the American federal government. A member of Roosevelt's inner circle, Chadwick had managed to convince the assistant secretary of the navy (before he resigned to join the Rough Riders) to order a copy of Wilson's *Congressional Government* to be placed aboard every active US warship as mandatory reading for serving American naval officers. Letters, Captain French E. Chadwick to Wilson, November 10, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 275-276, and Chadwick to Wilson, November 24, 1899, ibid., 289-290.

will not leave us what we were. Here is a new life to which to adjust our ideals."[59]

The hallmark of Wilson's "constructive imperialism" was his view of the new colonial empire as a training ground for America's future statesmen. Because colonial administrators possessed mature character forged from governing multitudes of alien peoples in the distant tropics, as demonstrated by the British imperial experience, Wilson claimed that the eventual rise of such a select group of administrators to positions of responsibility in the United States would foster a new, vigorous tone in public affairs: "Although we have forgot our own preparatory discipline of governance . . . these new tasks will undoubtedly teach us that same discipline."[60] Propounding the ideas and sentiments of Curzon, Sir Charles Dilke, James Anthony Froude, and others in Britain who espoused a constructive imperialist ideology,[61] Wilson proposed that American civil servants, after obtaining experience in colonial administration, should return to the United States to put to good use their talents as administrators and reformers. Mirroring Curzon's view of "the reflex influence" of empire, Wilson expected American tutelage in the Philippines to not only lead to the eventual "civilization" of Filipinos but also the rise of able, seasoned administrators to spearhead progressive reform in the United States, the professionalization of America's civil service, and the end of boss politics in American

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[59] Wilson, Untitled Address, January 14, 1899, ibid., 93-94, and Public Lecture, "Americanism," November 20, 1904, ibid., XV, 536-539.

[60] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 17-18. Quotation on 17.

[61] Porter, *The Lion's Share*, 188-195. See also, Sir Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain* 2 volumes (London, 1869); James Anthony Froude, *Oceana, or England and Her Colonies* (New York, 1886); and Curzon, *Problems of the Far East*, 414-422.

cities.[62]

Although Wilson anticipated that the number of American elites employed in governing America's overseas empire would be small, he stated that they should be well educated, selected by competitive examination, and schooled in the practices of colonial government. To help meet this need for a new colonial elite, Wilson, still espousing the "university ideal" about which he said much in the years before the war with Spain, argued that the events of 1898 had made it even more imperative that universities like Princeton restructure their curricula to provide the central training ground for America's future statesmen. In an address before the Princeton alumni of St. Louis, Wilson sounded very much like a mugwump when he declared that the twentieth-century university in America should prepare young men to draw useful lessons from the history of the nation and apply them to the needs of the country in the present. Universities like Princeton should "look back to the past and while fitting young men for useful work should especially build up character, i.e. civic manhood, and instill in them the best ideas of the part [past] and the principles which have guided them to the highest achievements."[63]

To help make sure Princeton did its part in training an American colonial elite to govern the new dependencies, Wilson solicited funding for the creation of a chair in

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[62] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XIV, 17-18. E. L. Godkin made a similar observation in "The Conditions of Good Colonial Government," *Forum* XXVII (April 1899), 190-203.

[63] News Report of a Talk, November 21, 1901, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, November 22, 1901, in *PWW*, XII, 202-203. For more on Wilson's conception of the "university ideal" in the age of empire, see Wilson, Public Lecture, "Politics," May 18, 1899, ibid., XI, 119; News Report, "Annual Literary Banquet," May 7, 1901, ibid., XII, 140-141; Inaugural Address, "Princeton for the Nation's Service," October 25, 1902, ibid., XIV, 170-185; and Address, "The True University Spirit," November 6, 1902, ibid., 201-202.

"Colonial Politics."[64] He wrote to friends and colleagues throughout the United States and Britain soliciting nominations for a suitable candidate to occupy a chair in colonial politics at Princeton. To Walter Hines Page, editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*, Wilson wrote that he wanted to avoid locating someone who could only "teach politics from the politician's point of view." Instead, his principal concern was to secure a candidate who "understood the new world affairs into the midst of which we find the country thrown." To Shaw, Wilson reiterated that he did not want a "professional politician," but "a scholar, a man of culture, a man tolerant of accomplished fact (i.e., not an anti-imperialist). Our chief practical purpose is to study the new problems of government which expansion has brought us face to face." To James Bryce, Wilson added that the two brothers, John W. and Robert Garrett (both graduates of Princeton) who endowed the chair, were "not at all sorry to see the United States make her venture in foreign war and the government of dependencies." The brothers' principal objective in making the gift was "to provide lectures of a thorough sort on Administration as a Science and on the government of dependencies in particular as an experience, – on the actual methods, i.e. of success (England's success, for example) in that manner of half rule, half coaching in slow development and gradual self-help." In concluding his letter to Bryce, Wilson suggested, "We have thought it not unlikely that we should find the man we wanted in England."[65]

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[64] "Anonymous donors" gave Princeton a gift of $100,000 to create an endowed chair in Politics. Letter, Francis L. Patton [president of Princeton University] to Nancy F. McCormick [widow of Cyrus McCormick], April 4, 1899, ibid., XI, 113.

[65] Letters, Wilson to Walter Hines Page, June 7, 1899, ibid., 126-127; Wilson to Shaw, June 8, 1899, ibid., 127; and Wilson to Bryce, August 10, 1899, ibid., 217-218.

Indeed, in the summer of 1899, Wilson combined a holiday in England with a somewhat casual search for a suitable Englishman who might be available to fill the new chair at Princeton. At Oxford, Wilson met with Sir William J. Ashley, Sir William Markby (Reader in Indian Law), and Professor Albert V. Dicey (Vimerian Professor of English Law) to solicit their recommendation of "some young, or youngish, English university man who would be worth considering." The three endorsed Hugh E. Egerton, the author of *A Short History of British Colonial Policy*,[66] because they believed he would accept the position at Princeton if offered. Wilson was not entirely unfamiliar with Egerton; his name had first been suggested to him by A. Lawrence Lowell, then a lecturer on Government at Harvard, the previous spring. Shortly after his meeting with the three Oxford professors, Lowell wrote Wilson that Charles P. Lucas of the Colonial Office and noted author of the seminal *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies*[67] also endorsed Egerton's candidacy.[68]

Wilson wrote to Bryce, then on holiday in Italy, to inquire further into Egerton's credentials. Admittedly, Wilson wrote that all he knew about Egerton was that he was British and an affirmed imperialist. Bryce effectively killed Egerton's candidacy, however, writing that Wilson should take his time in making the appointment as "no person occurs to me off-hand in England as specially well-suited for the post." While acknowledging that there would "certainly be sure advantages in getting an Englishman if

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[66] Hugh Edward Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (London, 1897).

[67] Charles P. Lucas, *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies* 5 volumes (Oxford, 1888-1901).

[68] Letter, A. Lawrence Lowell to Wilson, August 6, 1899, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 12.

he were plainly of the right sort," Bryce suggested a different search strategy to Wilson. Rather than secure an inexperienced young graduate from Oxford or Cambridge for the position, he proposed that it might be possible to locate an experienced colonial official "who had been in India and retired early because the climate did not suit him." Finding a candidate with first-hand experience in colonial administration, Bryce surmised, would be a far greater asset to Princeton than a young university graduate. He, therefore, urged Wilson to write to Sir Arthur Godley, the under secretary of state for India, for a recommendation.[69]

While Wilson may have been attracted to the idea of finding a British colonial administrator to fill the new chair, he acknowledged in a letter to Ellen that his colleagues at Princeton might have "one or two serious objections."[70] There is no evidence that he ever wrote Godley or any other official in the India Office or Colonial Office. A demanding schedule in the fall of 1899 forced Wilson to suspend his search for a suitable candidate until the following spring. In March and April, he renewed his search with a new vigor, soliciting recommendations from Roosevelt (then governor of New York), Turner, Shaw, Franklin H. Giddings (a sociologist at Columbia University), Arthur T. Hadley (president of Yale University), and Jacob G. Schurman (president of Cornell University and former president of the First Philippine Commission). Roosevelt, expressing "the greatest interest" in Wilson's search, replied that while he knew exactly "the type of man you want, . . I am not at all sure that I know the man." [emphasis

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[69] Letters, Wilson to James V. Bryce, August 10, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 217-218, and Bryce to Wilson, August 7, 1899, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 12.

[70] Letter, Wilson to Ellen Wilson, August 4, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 204-207. Quotation on 205.

Roosevelt's] Thus, he only offered Wilson some "essentially Burkean advice" on what manner of candidate he should secure for Princeton:

> He must be a scholar, a man of broad culture – emphatically an academic man in the sense of having received a thorough training and being in hearty sympathy with the men who know that from the days of the Federalists down and up, the theorist is the safe guide for the practical man; and yet he must also be thoroughly practical in the sense that he must understand that theories have to be proved in practice. Now to combine these traits with the capacity to teach would be a rather difficult problem.[71]

Although Roosevelt wrote that he could not think of a single man to put forward for the new chair, Turner replied to Wilson's request with three potential candidates: Henry Morse Stephens, Paul S. Reinsch, and Carl Becker. Turner described Stephens, a British professor of Modern European History at Cornell who was then teaching a course entitled "World Empires" at the University of Wisconsin, as "a force" because of his "influence over students." Stephens was scheduled to offer a special course on "Colonial Politics" at Madison later in the spring. Though Turner admitted that he had never heard Stephens lecture, Wilson should become acquainted with him because "he is full of ideas."[72] Turner, however, preferred Reinsch, a former student and colleague at the University of Wisconsin who was then laboring on a manuscript on comparative colonial administration.[73] Indeed, he was probably the first scholar to examine colonialism from the standpoint of both colonial powers and subjugated peoples. Reinsch's only weakness,

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[71] Letters, Roosevelt to Wilson, March 13, 1900, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 12, and Wilson to Ellen Wilson, March 15, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 515-516.

[72] Letter, Turner to Wilson, March 12, 1900, ibid., 506-507. Quotation on 506.

[73] Paul S. Reinsch, *Colonial Government: An Introduction to the Study of Colonial Institutions* (New York, 1902).

Turner wrote, was his young age (31 in 1900) and his rudimentary understanding of the principles of administration. As it turned out, Reinsch eventually rejected formal colonialism as constructive for either the colonizer or the colonized, but remained an ardent economic expansionist who firmly believed in the potential of the China market. He later served as Wilson's minister to China between 1913 and 1921.[74] Turner listed Becker as his last recommendation. Becker, another one of Turner's students, was considered an authority on British colonial politics in America in the eighteenth century.[75] Turner thought Wilson should consider him for the chair should Stephens and Reinsch decline. In his reply, Wilson thanked Turner for his suggestions, reminding him once again that it was "one of the abiding disappointments of my life that we cannot be colleagues" at Princeton. Concerning the candidates, Wilson agreed that Stephens seemed "the very man" for the position, but now thought better of hiring an Englishman: "He is an Englishman, and in this absurdly sensitive country of ours I feel confident it would create a bad impression to set an Englishman up in one of our universities to teach us Politics, -- especially the colonial politics concerning which we must, whether we will or

[74] Reinsch's first major work on the international relations of East Asia, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century, as Influenced by the Oriental Situation* (New York, 1900), had already caught the eye of expansionists who were concerned about the growth of foreign markets, especially in China. See Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China* (East Lansing, MI, 1968), 36-57.

[75] Becker's dissertation, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776*, not published until 1909, was a meticulous reconstruction of politics in a colony long known for its divisive public affairs. In it, Becker introduced the idea that the American Revolution should be studied as a dual movement: the revolt was an imperial struggle over "home rule," particularly over what types of rights colonists possessed; and it was also concerned with the distribution of power in the colonies – or as Becker put it in his most famous formulation, "of who should rule at home." One can only speculate what his impact on the contours of America's colonial policies in its dependencies might have been had Becker been offered the chair in Colonial Politics at Princeton.

not, take our lesson from England in any case."[76]

Wilson received from Giddings, who was himself writing a book on the relationship between empire and democracy,[77] a "short list" of five candidates: Jeremiah W. Jenks, a professor of political economy at Cornell; Henry Jones Ford, a journalist and lecturer who was then managing editor of the *Pittsburgh Chronicle Telegraph*; Westel W. Willoughby, a political science professor at Johns Hopkins; Leo S. Rowe, a political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania; and Isaac A. Loos, a political science professor at the State University of Illinois. Giddings topped the list with Jenks because of his excellent research on English and Dutch colonies in Asia.[78] Though listed second, Giddings described Ford as an excellent candidate because he "possessed a clearer grasp and a sounder knowledge of colonial politics than anyone."[79]

Before Wilson could narrow the list to a few candidates, Francis L. Patton, president of Princeton University, settled on John Huston Finley, a journalist and former president of Knox College, as his candidate for the chair. Patton, from the very beginning of the search, had not possessed the donors' or Wilson's conviction that the new chair should focus on colonial administration. Instead, his sole interest in the search centered

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[76] Letters, Turner to Wilson, March 12, 1900, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 13, and Wilson to Turner, March 10 and April 4, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 498-499 and 531-533, respectively.

[77] Franklin H. Giddings, *Democracy and Empire* (New York and London, 1900).

[78] Jeremiah W. Jenks, "English Colonial Fiscal Systems in the Far East," *American Economic Association Publications* III (1900), and *Economic Questions on the English and Dutch Colonies in the Orient* (New York, 1902). Wilson had already eliminated Jenks as a possible candidate. Without explanation, he wrote Shaw that Jenks was "just a little to [*sic*] much of a philistine for us." Letter, Wilson to Shaw, June 8, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 127.

[79] Letter, Franklin H. Giddings to Wilson, April 4, 1900, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 13. Lawrason Riggs, an 1883 graduate of Princeton and attorney in Baltimore, had first suggested Ford to Wilson in October 1899. Letter, Lawrason Riggs to Wilson, October 16, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 262.

on locating "a man as good as Professor Woodrow Wilson" to strengthen Princeton's rather emasculated Department of Jurisprudence and Politics.[80] Finley's reputation as a reform-minded educator who had transformed Knox College into a modern institution of higher education seemed to fit the bill for Patton and the Board of Trustees, and he was soon hired.[81] Wilson, who had taught Finley at Johns Hopkins in the early 1890s, did not oppose his candidacy and reportedly found in him "the gentleman and scholar in the broad and genial meanings of those words" for which he had been searching.[82] Finley remained at Princeton for three years, teaching innovative courses on imperial expansion. When he left Princeton in June 1903 to become president of the City College of New York and then editor of the *New York Times*, Wilson, now president of Princeton, replaced him with Harry A. Garfield, the son of the twentieth president of the United States, James Garfield. As an attorney in Cleveland, Garfield had immersed himself in municipal reform, civil service reform, and the reorganization of the US consular service. He shared Wilson's commitment to the "university ideal" of training privileged young men in the liberal arts for leadership in community, national, and world affairs. Throughout his career at Princeton, Garfield offered an annual senior lecture course entitled "Government of Dependencies" for aspiring students of colonialism. Some of his graduates, as well as Wilson's, eventually made their way to the Philippines and other overseas outposts to serve America's interests abroad.[83] Also in 1903, Princeton, through

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[80] Letter, Patton to Nancy F. McCormick, April 4, 1899, ibid., 113.

[81] Letter, Francis Patton to John W. Garrett and Robert Garrett, June 15, 1900, ibid., 551-552.

[82] Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson*, 227.

[83] Letter, Wilson to the Board of Trustees of Princeton University, March 9, 1904, *PWW*, XV,

an initiative designed by Wilson to engender "civic manhood" in America's wards, began admitting Filipino students. Called *pensionados*, these Filipino students comprised the best and brightest that the Philippines had to offer for training as the Islands' future leaders.[84] When Garfield retired as professor of politics in 1908, Wilson hired Ford to replace him because of his reputation as an authority on the relationship between political parties and nation building.[85]

While the search for a chair in "Colonial Politics" continued, Wilson, with a portion of the funds provided by the Garrett brothers, organized a series of public lectures at Princeton on the subject of colonial administration to further his ideals of "civic manhood" more immediately during the patient process of implementing proper university training for future leaders. He inquired whether or not W. Alleyne Ireland, a distinguished author of several books on comparative colonialism, might consent to offering several lectures in this series. Ireland had caught Wilson's eye in the fall of 1899 with the publication of his seminal *Tropical Colonization*, a book that delineated Ireland's "principles of white colonization in the dark Tropics." These principles were the culmination of nearly a dozen years research by Ireland in British, Dutch, and French colonies in Southeast Asia, the West Indies, and South America.[86] Other contributors to

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183-184, and Lucretia G. Comer, *Harry Garfield's First Forty Years: Man of Action in a Troubled World* (Cleveland, 1965).

[84] Letter, Wilson to Charles McAlpin, May 27, 1903, *PWW*, XIV, 464.

[85] Letter, Wilson to Garfield, April 10, 1908, ibid., XVIII, 259.

[86] Letter, Wilson to Walter Hines Page [editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*], October 4, 1899, *PWW*, XI, 243-244. Alleyne Ireland, *Tropical Colonization: An Introduction to the Study of the Subject* (New York and London, 1899). In 1901, Ireland was appointed "Colonial Commissioner" of the University of Chicago and returned to Southeast Asia to continue his study of British, French, Dutch, and American colonial systems. He published a synthesis of his multi-volume report to the University of Chicago as *The*

the lecture series included former President Grover Cleveland who spoke on the 1895 Venezuelan boundary dispute, and Toyokichi Iyenaga, one of Wilson's former students who offered a succession of lectures entitled "The Situation in the Far East" and "Two Thousand Miles on Horseback Across Persia and Asiatic Turkey."[87]

Wilson offered a public lecture in this series as well. Simply entitled "Self-Government," Wilson delivered his lecture on December 13, 1900 at Princeton's Leavenworth Hall in which he warned that the army in the Philippines was in danger of supplanting America's stated colonial policy of "benevolent assimilation" with their "vindictive ruthlessness" in pacifying the Islands. Here Wilson contrasted the ideal of the disinterested benevolent government of dependencies with the reality of personal agendas in the Philippines characterized by the antithesis of "civic manhood." Dismayed by published accounts in the nation's major newspapers of American war atrocities, accusing soldiers of torture, indiscriminate killing and the butchery of entire villages, he declared that "a dark cloud" hung over the American colonizing effort in the Philippines. While clearly unwilling to abandon the Islands and leave them to their own fate, Wilson called for an end to the Army's brutal counterinsurgency campaign.[88] The subsequent congressional investigation into army abuses against Filipino citizens ultimately led to the courts-martial and forced retirement of several military commanders. Among them was

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Far Eastern Tropics: Studies in the Administration of Tropical Dependencies (Boston, 1905). See also Ireland's less well-known *The Province of Burma: A Report Prepared on Behalf of the University of Chicago* (Boston, 1907).

[87] Wilson, Personal Memorandum, March 27, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 114-115, and Letter, Tokoyichi Iyenaga to Wilson, February 14, 1902, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 13.

[88] Wilson, Public Lecture, "Self-Government," December 13, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 48.

Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, commander of the Sixth Separate Brigade, who ordered one of his subordinates to turn the island of Samar into a "howling wilderness" and to shoot any male inhabitant over the age of ten.[89]

For Wilson, however, the removal of such commanders in the field often came too late. The numerous reports of wartime atrocities, including American soldiers' resort to the much-publicized "water cure" to obtain enemy intelligence, not only threatened public support for the colonizing mission at home but also undermined America's credibility as a benevolent power in the Philippines and throughout much of the rest of the world. In this respect, Wilson reminded his audiences throughout the "great debate" on empire that there was much more at stake in the pacification of the Filipino insurrection than the effective transition of Philippine sovereignty from Spain to the United States. America's reputation as the world's "redeemer nation" hung in the balance as well. America's mission to spread democracy to the four corners of the world depended upon the United States assuming a disinterested disposition. In the Philippines, this meant pursuing a colonial policy aimed at uplifting Filipinos, not asserting American interests at the point of a bayonet.

[89] The savagery of the Philippine-American War and the still controversial issue of wartime atrocities committed by both Americans and Filipinos during its course are documented in John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT, 1973), 248-269; Stuart C. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven, 1982); Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979), 133-149; and Brian M. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989).

Chapter Three
Apostle of Americanism

In an address called "The Expansion and Character of the United States," Wilson explained to the University Club of St. Louis that while he expected the new colonies in the Caribbean and western Pacific to function as the United States' newest safety valve much like the Trans-Mississippi West had done before 1890, this "new expansion" differed from the "old expansion" in at least one significant way. The war with Spain and the subsequent annexation of overseas colonies marked an important milestone in America's status and role in the world.[1] For him, the events of 1898 signaled a "defining moment" in international history in which the United States, no longer immune to ominous forces then emerging on the world scene, had assumed its place among the great powers. "There is no masking or concealing the new order of the world," Wilson wrote in an article that was eventually published in *The Atlantic Monthly*. "A new era has come upon us like a sudden vision of things unprophesied [*sic*], and for which no polity has been prepared."[2]

Yet Wilson, though convinced that America could not remain oblivious to the rest of the planet, still did not wish to see the nation dragged into Europe's imperial rivalries or forced to rely on a large standing army or on alliances with other powers. Accepting the myth of American innocence and virtue, he believed that the United States must not become entangled with the Old World lest its exceptionalism become eroded. Instead, a

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[1] Wilson, Address, "The Expansion and Character of the United States," April 29, 1903, *PWW*, XIV, 433-434.

[2] Wilson, "Article, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 6-20. Quotation on 11.

new foreign policy, dynamic in nature and "thoroughly American" in purpose, had to be devised. Thus, once the ascent of the United States to world power rendered it impossible to maintain America's traditional separation from the Old World, Wilson actively sought universal acceptance of American democratic values and institutions by other societies in order to "redeem" them. This would, in his view, permit American leadership and control over international relations without involving the United States in the Old World's diplomacy and wars. Wilson never wavered in his belief that "Americanism," his term for the Americanization of the international mind, constituted the best path to progress and prosperity at home and abroad.[3]

Wilson's conception of the Philippine question and America's redemptive mission in the world reflected progressive America's arrogance toward the nonwestern world. Wilson believed that the United States possessed the moral right and duty to intervene whenever and wherever it deemed necessary to safeguard democracy. The Philippines had fallen into the lap of the United States. Whatever the circumstances of the Archipelago's acquisition, America was duty bound to democratize the Islands. According to Wilson, the completion of America's mission in the Philippines possessed

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[3] For Wilson's concept of "Americanism" before his ascent to the presidency, see Wilson, Personal Memorandum, "What Ought We to Do?" ca. August 1, 1898, ibid., X, 574-576; Article, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 6-20; Public Lecture, "Americanism," December 7, 1900, ibid., 42-44; Address, "Americanism," February 27, 1901, ibid., 98-99; Essay, "The Real Idea of Democracy: A Talk," ca. August 31, 1901, ibid., 175-179; Address, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 208-227; Untitled Address, May 3, 1902, ibid., 359-363; Address, "The Expansion and Character of the United States," April 29, 1903, ibid., XIV, 433-434; Public Lecture, "Americanism," November 20, 1904, ibid. 536-539; Untitled Address, June 11, 1905, ibid., XVI, 120-121; Untitled Address, February 23, 1906, ibid., 315-318; and Address, "Americanism," March 22, 1906, ibid., 340-341. See also, Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy: A History of Their Growth and Interaction* (New York, 1966), 22-39; Ernest L. Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago, 1968), 173-175; Sidney Bell, *Righteous Conquest: Woodrow Wilson and the Evolution of the New Diplomacy* (Port Washington, NY, 1972), 10-44; and Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994), 37-59.

significant implications for America's credibility as "redeemer nation" in East Asia and the world.

The real problem in Wilson's thinking about foreign affairs in general and the Philippine question in particular derived from his provincial, culture-bound biases. Wilson assumed the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and civilization, and hence, the inferiority of others. He failed to see the weaknesses of his own society in the context of other cultures and the strengths of other cultural values. He simply could not imagine a society that did not desire American-style democracy. In this respect, Wilson was hardly different from other American progressive imperialists.[4] Embodying cultural absolutism, he assumed that all societies, in recognizing the intrinsic excellence of American values and institutions, endeavored to adopt the American blueprint for national development and democratic growth.

Merging nineteenth-century tenets with the historical experience of America's political, economic, and social development, Wilson elevated the beliefs and experiences of America's "exceptional historical circumstance" into general developmental laws that he believed were universally applicable to societies throughout the world. Thus, in order to become a modern democratic state, Wilson contended that it was necessary for a

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[4] The relationship between progressivism, imperialism, and racism has been a topic of much discussion among historians. See, William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* XXXIX, No. 3 (December, 1952), 483-505; Barton J. Bernstein and Franklin A. Leib, "Progressive Republican Senators and American Imperialism, 1898-1916: A Re-Appraisal," *Mid-America* L, No. 3 (1968), 163-205; Joseph M. Siracusa, "Progressivism, Imperialism, and the Leuchtenburg Thesis, 1952-1974," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* XX, No. 3 (1974), 312-325; Gerald W. Markowitz, "Progressivism and Imperialism: A Return to First Principles," *Historian* XXXVII, No. 2 (1975), 257-275; Robert M. Crunden, *Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920* (New York, 1982), 225-273; Michael Pearlman, *To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive Era* (Urbana, IL, 1984); and Robert Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 23-33.

society to replicate as near as it could America's own developmental experience. Generally speaking, this process included a demonstrated commitment to Anglo-Saxon democratic principles and practices; a consistent observance of slow, deliberate, progressive change from above for the purpose of eradicating society's inequities; a faith in free enterprise which included support for free and open access for commerce and investment; and an embrace of Protestant Christianity, viewed by Wilson as the spiritual precondition for modernity. Wilson considered the propagation of this blueprint for nation-building to be America's mission in the world. Possessing both secular and religious roots, "Americanism" transcended the doctrine of Anglo-Saxonism, the "White Man's Burden," and the Social Gospel movement at home and abroad. While its dimensions were complex and often contradictory, the objective of "Americanism," according to Wilson, was simple: the fusion of American and world conceptions of progress, security, and prosperity through the worldwide extension of American-style democracy and Anglo-Saxon civilization. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate the degree of confidence that Wilson consistently exhibited in "Americanism" as the panacea for the nation's and the world's ills.

"The Practical Question of Democracy"

Wilson's chief interest in America's redemptive mission following the Spanish-American War focused almost exclusively on how best to regenerate the world through the proliferation of American democratic principles and institutions. This problem called into question the international dimensions of what Wilson called "the practical question of democracy," or how democratic principles were put into actual use in the conduct of

governments.[5] Whereas most agreed that democracy was the best form of government, considerable disagreement existed whether or not it was the strongest, especially given the spotty record of the world's march toward democracy since the late eighteenth century. Wilson lamented the historical fact that although the nineteenth century had been "above all others a century of democracy," the world seemed no more convinced of its efficacy at the end of the century than it had been at the beginning.[6]

Wilson was convinced that the chief dilemma in the modern world movement toward democracy stemmed from the general misconception about how democratic principles were adopted, put into action, and spread. In his opinion, too many societies had relied on "the literary genius" of Jean-Jacque Rousseau and the other French *philosophes* that was devoid of any practical understanding of democratic institutions or how they developed over time.[7] Wilson was consistently critical of French democratic thought because it held that the republican form of government, assumed to be as old as the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, was simply a matter of contract and deliberate arrangement, a political condition that could be adopted or discarded overnight. This approach to democracy seemed extremely dangerous to Wilson because it advanced the misguided tenet that governments could be made over at will which, in turn, promoted the idea that revolution from below constituted a natural and legitimate concomitant of democratic growth. Also, he noted that the *philosophes*' treatises on democracy were

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[5] Wilson, Address, "The Real Idea of Democracy: A Talk," ca. August 31, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 175-179.

[6] Ibid. See also, Wilson, "Democracy," June 15, 1898, ibid., X, 556.

[7] Wilson, "The Real Idea of Democracy: A Talk," ca. August 31, 1901, ibid., XII, 177.

devoid of any discussion of "civic manhood," or a society's political character, in determining the possibility or potential durability of self-government in various cultures. One only needed to examine the nineteenth century, he contended, to see the destructive consequences of this essentially French conception of democracy. Democratic revolution had failed miserably throughout the European continent and elsewhere, resulting more often than not in chaos rather than order, individual bondage rather than liberty, and anarchy rather than democracy.[8]

Democracy's "eccentric influence" in France in the late eighteenth century and "revolutionary operation" in the South American republics in the early nineteenth century had engendered suspicions and doubts about democracy's durability and stability. Those historical episodes seemed to demonstrate that democracy possessed only the power to intoxicate, not regenerate. The root of the problem, according to Wilson, derived from the fact that too few had adopted "the masculine and practical genius of the English mind" or "hard experience" when coming to terms with the "practical question of democracy." No one had effectively articulated in those societies the principles upon which democracy rested and achieved a synthesis of its parts: "For lack of proper synthesis, [democracy] limps and is threatened with incapacity for the great social undertakings of our modern time." In this respect, Wilson implied that democracy's proper synthesis involved more than mere political organization; a "synthesis of principle" must precede a "synthesis of

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[8] For Wilson's criticism of the French *philosophes* and their conception of democracy, see Wilson, Public Lecture, "Self-Government," December 13, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 46-48; Address, "The Real Idea of Democracy: A Talk," ca. August 31, 1901, ibid., XII, 175-179; Address, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 217; and Address, "Thomas Jefferson," April 16, 1906, ibid., XVI, 362-369. See also, Wilson's published essay "Edmund Burke and the French Revolution," *The Century Magazine* LXII (September, 1901), 784-792.

form."[9] For him, self-government was the end result of a specific set of conditions and not a mere doctrine that anyone could embrace. It was the product of slow development, conservative habit, mature political character; it was not an outcome of violent upheavals like the French Revolution and the Latin American Wars for Independence.[10]

Wilson believed that the United States was uniquely qualified to teach the world "the essential and permanent principles and structures of self-government." Americans, who had known nothing but self-government since the colonies had been founded, understood that "discipline, the long drill of order and obedience to law," an essential component of "civic manhood," comprised the basis of democracy.[11] Expounding upon a progressive philosophy of history, he reminded his audiences that only the American democratic experience had demonstrated that "continued and progressive evolution of constitutional institutions" lay behind the development of self-government. The seeds of this organic process had originated in the institutions of local government where individuals slowly learned the habits of self-government. This local political training, when continued for several generations, prepared people for full participation in their national affairs. Thus, Wilson concluded, the logical outcome of "local self-direction" after several centuries of preparation was "national self-direction," better known a decade later as "national self-determination."[12]

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[9] Wilson, "The Character of Democracy in the United States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXIV (November, 1889), 577-588. Quotation on 588.

[10] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, *PWW*, XII, 6-7.

[11] Ibid., 14.

[12] Wilson, "Editor's Study," ca. January 1901, *PWW*, XII, 60-64. For Wilson's philosophy of history, see Wilson, Unpublished Historical Essay, "On the Writing of History," ca. June 17, 1895, PWW,

Wilson, ever the Turnerian enthusiast, maintained that there was something exceptional about America's first settlers – chosen men who possessed initiative, energy, courage, and sagacity – who left their European homes to create something better in the New World. The American environment, with its particular conditions and challenges, transformed these men in which all that was decadent and degenerate of the Old World fell away.[13] Yet this transformation did not constitute a radical break with the past. While Wilson went to great pains to demonstrate that American democratic institutions were not indebted to earlier European revolutionary movements that lacked organic development, he extolled the British origins of self-government in the United States. For him, the American system was simply "the logical fulfillment of the English political system" in that the American people, after inheriting the essentials of British political institutions, values and practices, eventually acquired the necessary experience to govern themselves and then broke away from the mother country. Wilson, however, denied that there had been anything revolutionary about America's democratic development. The American people had only expanded the process of local self-government until it had become a deeply ingrained quality of American national life. Britain, Wilson pointed out, "had had self-government time out of mind, but in America English self-government had become popular self-government."[14] In this respect, Wilson maintained that America's democratic experience had set the nation apart from the rest of the world. He told his audiences that

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IX, 293-305; Letter, Wilson to John Genung [professor of rhetoric at Amherst College], May 30, 1900, ibid., XI, 543; and Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft*, 3-10.

[13] Wilson, Address, "What It Means to be an American," April 26, 1902, *PWW*, XII, 351-354.

[14] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., XII, 220.

even Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville[15] had recognized and praised the exceptional character of American democracy, noting its potential for redeeming European political institutions.[16]

Wilson argued that there was much more to America's exceptionalism than the mere growth and spread of self-government "from coast to coast across the great continent."[17] Underlying the genius of American self-government was "civic manhood," the presence of individual self-government, or what Wilson referred to as "self-mastery." For him, "civic manhood" was the moral basis of self-government – that is, control over one's self – which preceded and made possible the development of its political form.[18] Since the late 1880s, Wilson consistently maintained that some degree of maturity in a people's character was essential to the formation of an independent, self-governing community:

> Democracy is not merely a body of doctrine, or simply a form of government. It is a stage of development. It is not created by aspirations or by a new faith. It is built up by slow habit; its process is experience, its basis old want, its meaning national organic unity and effectual life. . . . Immature peoples cannot have it, and the maturity to which it is vouchsafed is the maturity of freedom and self-control, and no other. It is

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[15] In his lectures, Wilson insisted that De Tocqueville was not a Frenchman but a "Northman" [Norman], an important distinction, at least in Wilson's mind, because "the things that make us steady in government we get from the Normans." See, Wilson, Review of De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, ca. January 19, 1883, *PWW*, II, 295-296; Lecture, "De Tocqueville, The Student of Democracy," January 10, 1896, ibid., IX, 374-377; Notes, De Tocqueville's *Recollections*, April 11, 1897, ibid., X, 214-215; Lectures, "Alexis De Tocqueville," November 5, 1897, ibid., 336-338; and "Alexis De Tocqueville," March 19, 1901, ibid., XII, 111.

[16] Wilson, "Edmund Burke and the French Revolution," *The Century Magazine* LXII (September, 1901), 784-792; Lecture, "Alexis De Tocqueville," March 19, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 111; and "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., 6-7.

[17] Wilson, "The Significance of American History," in *Harper's Encyclopedia of American History* (New York, 1901), I, xxviii.

[18] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 221-222.

conduct and its only stable foundation is character.[19]

Wilson argued that human character could be developed only under proper authority and tutelage. The British, for instance, always obeyed their king and Parliament. Obedience, therefore, formed the basis of effective government, and the essential prerequisite to obedience was discipline, or self-control and love for order. The ideal free man was one who possessed self-control, or the power to keep his "natural desires and instincts under his command in order to produce a well-balanced personality." In this sense, Wilson held that self-control or "individual self-government," encompassing within itself the qualities of self-cultivation, self-discipline and self-direction, comprised the fundamental basis of "civic manhood," the essential component of political character required for democracy.[20]

Indeed, Wilson's writings from the late 1880s until his death in 1924 are replete with expositions on the essential relationship between "civic manhood" and democratic development. For him, character constituted the very spirit of self-government, the center around which the entire democratic system revolved. Reasoning that character composed the critical element both in those who govern and in the governed, Wilson argued that laws and constitutions in themselves were not enough to sustain democracy. He believed the excesses of the "Great Terror" during the French Revolution had borne out that political maxim. Instead, "civic manhood," or the moral duty of a person to take the right action according to his conscience influenced by a mature sense of justice and a healthy

[19] Wilson, "The Character of Democracy in the United States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXIV (November, 1889), 577-588. Quotation on 582.

[20] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 218.

regard for the common good, formed the basis of self-government.[21]

In this sense, Wilson distinguished sharply between self-government and self-determination. Although the term "national self-determination" did not emerge until the First World War, Wilson had been aware of the basic principle since the late 1880s. He referred to it as "national self-direction." It is likely that he first came across the idea that self-government is a matter of "character-training" from his reading of Bagehot, and then Burke. In any case, the question of readiness for self-government was no mere academic exercise in political philosophy for Wilson. He firmly believed that every people or nation possessed an abstract right to self-government in the political sense, but only if they demonstrated that they were capable of self-government in the ethical sense could that right be exercised. That is, only those people with mature character, who possessed control over themselves as individuals, were qualified to govern themselves. Thus, Wilson argued that the critical issue for the proliferation of democratic principles abroad involved the relationship between liberty and government.[22]

Liberty, defined by Wilson as "the privilege of maturity, of self-control, of self-mastery, and a thoughtful care for righteous dealings," was something that all cultures could develop, but only after cultivating it over a long period of time under proper tutelage: "Liberty is not itself government. In the wrong hands, – in hands unpracticed

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[21] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., 14, and Address, "Religion and Patriotism," July 4, 1902, ibid., 474-478.

[22] For Wilson's pre-war understanding of "national self-determination" and the concept's eighteenth-century origins, see Derek Heater, *National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy* (New York, 1994), 1-14. Although Alfred Cobban's *National Self-Determination* (London, 1944) remains the standard work on the intellectual origins and political history of national self-determination, see also Berch Berberoglu, *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia, 1995), and John Lynch, *Latin America Between Colony and Nation* (New York, 2001).

and undisciplined, – it is incompatible with democratic government. Discipline must precede it, if necessary, the discipline of being under masters."[23] Democracy, the apex of the long evolution of constitutional government, was analogous to human adulthood in that self-government developed in those societies which had achieved the maturity of freedom tempered by self-command. Thus, all societies seeking democracy must first cultivate "civic manhood" or "adult self-reliance, self-knowledge, and self-control, adult soberness and deliberateness of judgment and sagacity in self-government, adult vigilance of thought and quickness of insight" in its citizens. Real progress toward democracy could occur only in those societies that had been adequately prepared for democratic institutions. Societies that did not first establish what Wilson called the "moral basis" of democracy could not have it.[24]

Race constituted an important criterion in Wilson's consideration of whether or not a society possessed the mature political character necessary for self-government and self-determination. He gave little attention, however, to the biological considerations of race (eugenics) or to religious-based justifications of racial inequality. Instead, Wilson expressed interest principally in the socio-political aspects of race, particularly the role of race in the rise and fall of civilizations. To be sure, he did draw distinctions among the various peoples of the world on the basis of physical features, above all skin color. Guided by the poles of black and white, Wilson ranked the various peoples of the world and their cultures: those with the whitest skin were positioned on the highest rung of the

[23] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 218.

[24] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., 7.

racial ladder, while those with the darkest skin were relegated to the lowest rung. This hierarchical view of race proved attractive to Wilson because it offered a ready and useful way to understand the larger world and America's place in it. Rather than dissect the complex and subtle patterns of other cultures, this worldview required no more than an understanding of easily grasped polarities and superficial characteristics.[25]

Significantly, Wilson held that skin color implied a specific level of political and moral development in which the "Anglo-Saxon race" provided the unquestioned standard of measurement. Thus, for Wilson, "superior races" spoke English, possessed "civic manhood" and exercised democratic rights and privileges responsibly, and enjoyed both material abundance and high moral standards. He deemed "inferior races" woefully deficient in all of these standards of civilization. Yet, Wilson, in the context of the two main varieties of "Social Darwinism," subscribed to "Reformed Darwinism" rather than "Conservative Darwinism."[26] In this respect, he argued that all races possessed the capacity to "progress" and become "civilized." Political and moral progress for "inferior races" was possible but only through "acts of redemption," acts that required the direct

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[25] Wilson's concept of race is delineated in Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft*, 4-7; Henry Blumenthal, "Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question," *Journal of Negro History*, XLVIII, No. 1 (January, 1963), 1-21; and Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson*, 3-4, 14-15. For an excellent analysis of the concept of racial hierarchy that informed Americans' attitudes toward race during this period, see Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 46-91; Frank Furedi, *The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race* (New York, 1999), 25-45; Michael Krenn, *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Ages of Territorial and Market Expansion*, 1840-1900 (New York, 1998); Walter B. Michaels, *Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism* (Durham, NC, 1995); and Paul Kramer, "Empire, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910" *Journal of American History* LXXXVIII, No. 4 (March 2002), 1315-1353.

[26] The distinctions between "Conservative Darwinism" (the proposition that "immature races" were irredeemable) and "Reformed Darwinism" (the proposition that "immature races" were redeemable) are delineated in Robert C. Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought* (Philadelphia, 1989), 137-163, and Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945* (Cambridge, 1997), 104-122, 151-183.

assistance of those races already knowledgeable and skilled in the art of democracy.[27]

Wilson's writings on the place of African Americans in American society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offer much insight into the importance of race in his political thought. Since the 1870s, Wilson had echoed the popular but misguided notion held by southern middle class whites that the chief danger inherent in the "Negro Question" derived from the premature extension of political privileges to African Americans after the Civil War.[28] Nearly two generations after the war, however, Wilson still could not detect any progress in African Americans' political maturity; he viewed them as completely devoid of "civic manhood." In 1901, Wilson described the freedmen as:

> a vast, laboring, landless, homeless class, once slaves, now free; unpracticed in liberty, unschooled in self-control; never sobered by the discipline of self-support, never established in any habit of prudence; excited by a freedom they did not understand, exalted by false hopes; bewildered and without leaders, and yet insolent and aggressive; sick of work, covetous of pleasure, -- a host of dusky children untimely put out of school.[29]

A gradual and carefully measured approach to the questions of black suffrage and economic opportunity was required because African Americans, in Wilson's mind, did

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[27] Wilson, Notes for an Address, "Forms of Government," October 29, 1897, *PWW*, X, 332-333. See also, Ronald L. Numbers' chapter on Darwinism in the American South in *Darwinism Comes to America* (Cambridge, 1998), 58-75.

[28] Wilson, Diary Entry, July 19, 1876, PWW, I, 156; Marginal Notes to Letter by A.H.H. Stuart in Philadelphia *American*, ca. February 5, 1881, ibid., II, 19-25; Unpublished Articles, "Stray Thoughts from the South," ca. February 22, 1881, ibid., 26-31; "The Politics and Industries of the New South," ca. April 30, 1881, ibid., 49-55; Marginal Notes to De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, ca. January 19, 1883, ibid., 293-295; Unpublished Article, "Culture and Education at the South," March 29, 1883, ibid., 326-332; Review of James Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, January 31, 1889, ibid., VI, 61-76; and Untitled Address, June 12, 1895, ibid., IX, 287-291.

[29] Wilson, "The Reconstruction of the Southern States," *The Atlantic Monthly* LXXXVII (January, 1901), 1-15. Quotation on 6.

not yet possess the mature moral character or political discipline necessary for participation in responsible government. As African Americans demonstrated their fitness for citizenship and self-government, such privileges should be granted to them, but not before. Wilson contended that the South had been "solid" on this issue which, in turn, doomed Reconstruction to fail: "It is a simple enough matter to understand what choice an English people would make when the alternatives presented to them were, to be ruled by an ignorant and inferior race, or to band themselves in a political union not to be broken till the danger had passed."[30]

Despite his benevolent paternalism towards African Americans, Wilson's racial prejudice often got the better of him. He remained deeply conscious of racial differences in all social contexts throughout his life and disapproved strongly of any attempt to establish the social equality of whites and blacks. As president of Princeton, Wilson saw no practical role for African Americans in higher education and continued the long-established policy at Princeton of refusing them admittance.[31] In a letter to a subordinate at Princeton, dated October 30, 1903, he wrote of the need to reserve "all menial services" on campus for blacks because whites, in doing such work, would suffer an inevitable loss of self-respect.[32] When addressing the plight of African Americans in his

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[30] Letter, Wilson to William A. MacCorkle [governor of West Virginia], January 31, 1901, *PWW*, XVI, 565. Wilson's interesting letter was an affirmative response to MacCorkle's address the previous spring before the Southern Conference on Race Problems in Alabama in which the governor declared that the central question confronting the South was "how to give the Negro the Franchise without imperiling Southern Civilization." Both men agreed that African Americans should not be given the vote until they were qualified for it "by education and the acquisition of property," until they possessed the necessary character for the exercise of political rights. In the meantime, southern whites should remain "solid" in their opposition to black suffrage.

[31] Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson*, 35-36.

[32] Letter, Wilson to Morgan P. Robinson, October 30, 1903, *PWW*, XV, 32.

public speeches about democracy and liberty at home and abroad, Wilson often did so in the context of well-worn "darkey jokes," making blacks the butt of his political humor.[33] While on holiday in Scotland in 1908, Wilson, in a conversation with a friend, condemned all social intercourse between the races because it would inevitably lead to intermarriage, a development that "would degrade the White nations, for in Africa the Blacks were the only race who did not rise."[34]

Underlying Wilson's racial prejudice was his assumption that Anglo-Saxon civilization formed the high point of racial development. In this context, he believed that it was not an accident or simple act of good fortune that the English-speaking race had succeeded in establishing and preserving the most liberal, yet stable, form of popular government in the world. Only the United States, Britain, and the so-called "white settlement" colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa fully realized that modern democracy was actually no older than the late eighteenth century, a product of the Enlightenment.[35] Only these societies understood that democracy was a stage of political development built up by slow habit, not merely a form of government to be adopted in a moment of sweeping change: "Democracy is a principle within us, not a mere form of government."[36] Extolling the virtues of democracy's evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, nature, Wilson believed that the stability of democracy in Anglo-

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[33] See for example, Wilson, Notes for an Address, June 30, 1904, ibid., 400, and News Report of an Address in Providence, Rhode Island, February 10, 1906, ibid., XVI, 309-310.

[34] Diary Entry, Mary Yates, July 31, 1908, ibid., XVIII, 386.

[35] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 7.

[36] Ibid., 9.

Saxon civilization rested upon its suitability to the moral character, political temperament, and mature stage of racial development of the English-speaking world. Those societies possessed the ethical qualities and mature character necessary for self-government and self-determination. No other society could expect to obtain democracy without first cultivating "civic manhood," as did the English-speaking world, over a period of several generations.[37]

Thus, Wilson believed that the American democratic experience exemplified the proper relationship between self-determination and self-government. Grossly oversimplifying early American history, he argued that Americans broke away from British sovereignty only after centuries of cultivating democratic institutions and practices under British tutelage. Because the leaders of the American Revolution had been patient and allowed liberty to mature in the colonies before breaking away from the British Empire, he contended that they should be viewed not as revolutionaries but as a "generation of statesmen." During the course of the American War for Independence, "the Founding Fathers fought, not to pull down, but to preserve liberty, . . a familiar thing they had and meant to keep."[38]

The dismal record of the world's failure in cultivating democracy, however, seemed proof enough to Wilson of the general ignorance of the proper relationship between self-determination and self-government. He deduced that the chief lesson to be discerned from democratic struggle outside the United States was that democratic institutions and proper habits of thought could not be adopted in any simple or quick

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[37] Ibid., 14-15.

[38] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., XII, 213.

manner. Democracy, more a reflection of character and experience than political organization, could not be exported throughout the world in any conventional sense. The success of democratic growth on a global scale depended upon qualities and conditions that it did not itself create, but only obeyed. Thus, democracy's stability and durability hinged upon its suitability to the particular social, political, racial, and economic conditions of the people for whose benefit and administration it had been framed, not upon democracy's intrinsic excellence as expounded by the French *philosophes*.[39]

Wilson insisted in the years after the Spanish-American War that despite the obvious failures of democracy in the nineteenth century, the world must continue to make strides toward developing democratic institutions. He firmly believed that democracy, under proper leadership and guidance, could still have a progressive impact on the international environment. Unlike previous world systems, a world order based on democratic growth would "emphasize the virtues of character, exalt the purposes of the average man to some high level of endeavor, and promote the principle of assent and the ideals of patriotism, duty, and brotherhood."[40] Democracy would have a unifying effect on the divided nations and regions of the world, much like it had on the United States, forged on the frontier, tested by the Civil War, and reaffirmed by the war with Spain.[41]

Before the healing could commence, however, the world first needed to learn

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[39] Ibid.; Wilson, "Liberty in the Light of Experience," January 14, 1900, ibid., XI, 374-375; "Freedom," February 24, 1900, ibid., 439-441; "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 7; and "The Real Idea of Democracy: A Talk," ca. August 31, 1901, ibid., 175-179.

[40] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 8.

[41] Ibid., 14-15; Wilson, Public Lecture, "Americanism," December 7, 1900, ibid., 42-44; Untitled Address, May 3, 1902, ibid., 359-363; and Public Lecture, "Americanism," November 20, 1904, ibid., XV, 536-539.

what democracy was and how to obtain it. This comprised the context in which Wilson thought about America's redemptive mission in the world. Although Britain had assumed much of the responsibility for promoting and facilitating the development of democracy in the world up to that time, Wilson declared that the twentieth century would be marked by active American leadership and a closer union with the English-speaking peoples in achieving this mission.[42]

"Errand to the World"

Wilson first articulated his new view of America's role and mission in the world in association with American-East Asian relations in general and the Philippine question in particular. He declared that while the war in Cuba had opened his eyes to the multitude of iniquities and antagonisms in the world and to the part that the United States was to play in ameliorating them, the acquisition of the Philippine Islands dictated that East Asia would be the first place American leadership and influence was to be felt. It was only after the decision to annex the Philippines, Wilson argued, "that we awakened to our real relationship with the rest of mankind." Before the Battle of Manila Bay "only a few Europeans who were burrowing and plotting and dreaming in the mysterious East" understood that the world was in the throes of dramatic change and that a new international order was on the threshold of emerging.[43]

Wilson was referring to the unprecedented shift in the balance of power in East

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[42] Wilson, Public Lecture, "The Theory of Organization," November 2, 1898, ibid., XI, 66; Public Lecture, "Liberty in Light of Experience," January 14, 1900, ibid., 374-375; and Public Lecture, "Freedom," February 24, 1900, ibid., 439-441.

[43] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 18-19.

Asia, precipitated by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. The war ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which China relinquished all claims to Korea, paid Japan an indemnity, and ceded it Taiwan and the Pescadores, thus starting the formation of the Japanese empire. China's display of weakness in the war against Japan had also set in motion an imperialist scramble for special rights and privileges in which Russia, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan struggled to carve out their respective spheres of influence on the Asian continent in case China collapsed completely. The concessions extracted from China were economic and political. The powers forced loans on the Chinese government which were secured by Chinese tax revenues, such as maritime customs. Long-term leases of Chinese territory were granted, including the right to develop economic resources such as mines and railroads. Germany leased territory in Shandong; Russia leased Port Arthur in the southern Liaodong Peninsula and received special rights in Manchuria; France held leases on land around Guangzhou Bay; and Britain acquired Weihaiwei and the New Territories, adjacent to the Kowloon area of Hong Kong. Often the powers combined leaseholds, railroad rights, and commercial privileges to create a "sphere of interest," an area that the respective powers policed with their own troops, dispensed their own justice, and perpetuated their own cultural norms. As a result of the scramble to carve up "the Chinese melon," the international environment in East Asia had become fraught with uncertainty and intense rivalries, a situation that made the region susceptible to turmoil and perhaps even war.[44]

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[44] For the dramatic shift in the balance of power in East Asia after 1895, see William L. Langer's classic, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* 2nd edition (New York, 1951), 167-191, 385-412, 445-480; Paul Kennedy's excellent synthesis, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987), 249-256; and William R. Keylor's insightful, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* 2nd edition (New York, 1992), 14-20.

In his reflection on these events in East Asia, Wilson reasoned that America's rise to power in the region in 1898 had been as timely as it was inevitable.[45] He believed that the "scramble for Asia" by the great powers at the end of the nineteenth century, like the scramble for colonies and concessions in Africa earlier in the century, marked the unleashing of the "dark . . . undemocratic forces" of Europe into the region. Abhorring the prospect of the "Europeanization" of Asia as much as he did the "Europeanization" of America, Wilson defended the McKinley administration's decision to annex the Philippines as an honorable course of action because "only the United States represented the light of day" in East Asia. Thus, Wilson described the events culminating in the acquisition of an empire in the western Pacific as "unexpected but necessary, . . as if part of a great preconceived plan for changing the world." The events of 1898 had demonstrated that the international community was becoming more interdependent so that no nation, not even the United States, could remain aloof indefinitely: "The whole world is now a single vicinage; each part has become a neighbor to the rest."[46] In his personal memorandum, "What Ought We to Do?," Wilson summed up most succinctly the dilemma confronting the United States in East Asia:

> The world into which they [the armored cruisers of the US Asiatic Squadron] have brought us is a very modern world. It is not like any other the nations have lived in. In it civilization has become aggressive, and we are made aware that choices are about to be made as vital as those which determined the settlement and control of North America. The question is not, Shall the vital nations of Europe take possession of the territories of those which are less vital and divide the kingdoms of Africa and Asia? The question is now, Which nations shall possess the world? England, Russia, Germany, France, these are the rivals in the

[45] Wilson, "What Ought We to Do?," ca. August 1, 1898, *PWW*, X, 574-576.

[46] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 12-13, 18.

> new spoliation: -- perhaps only England, Germany, and Russia, for France cannot keep the same course for two months together. . . . Of a sudden we stand in the midst of these. What ought we to do?[47]

With these words, Wilson believed he had proclaimed the end of traditional American isolationism and its concomitant "exemplar" role for the United States. Such a policy had been appropriate while America matured into adulthood in the nineteenth century. The war with Spain, however, signaled the completion of America's third century of national development and awakened Americans from their "provincial slumber." The "new era" in world politics, Wilson argued, would be marked by the United States' new role as "redeemer nation":

> We dare not stand neutral. All mankind deems us the representatives of the moderate and sensible discipline which makes free men good citizens, of enlightened systems of law and a temperate justice, of the best experience in the reasonable methods and principles of self-government, of public force made consistent with individual liberty; and we shall not realize these ideals at home, if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress. We should lose heart ourselves, did we suffer the world to lose faith in us as the champion of these things.[48]

Wilson explained to his audiences that traditional American isolationism had died a natural death at the Battle of Manila Bay. The nation's diplomatic principles had not been scrapped arbitrarily by the McKinley administration in prosecuting its war with Spain and in acquiring an overseas empire. Those principles had simply evolved in response to the new international environment in which the country found itself after peace had been concluded. Wilson underscored his emphasis on the continuity of

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[47] Wilson, "What Ought We to Do?," ca. August 1, 1898, ibid., X, 576.

[48] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 10-11. See also, Wilson, Public Lecture, "Our Obligations," December 14, 1899, ibid., XI, 297-300, and Untitled Public Lecture, January 30, 1904, ibid., XV, 147-149.

American diplomatic principles with the following interpretation of Washington's Farewell Address:

> Washington never said that America should never [emphasis Wilson's] stand in the competition of foreign powers. Instead, Washington seems to have meant: "I want you to discipline yourselves and stay still and be good boys until you grow up, until you are big enough to stand the competition of foreign countries, until you are big enough to go abroad in the world. Wait . . . until you not need be afraid of foreign influence, and then you shall be ready to take your part in the field of the world."[49]

Wilson elaborated on this perspective of Washington's Farewell Address at an annual banquet of the Sons of the Revolution four years later. He told his audience that Washington never counseled against the United States assuming a "crusader" role in the world; he only cautioned as to what alliances America formed. Indeed, Wilson argued, Washington, as a product of America's frontier experience, was far too practical to have ever insisted that his advice on foreign policy for one generation of statesmen be pertinent to another and later generation. Instead, "the keynote" of Washington's last public address as president did not touch on any "imperative standards of policy," only on what "precepts of character" were required for each generation of American statesmen when confronting the world's dangers. In other words, Washington, according to Wilson, had not prescribed "the whole policy of the nation." He had merely addressed the need for each generation to develop "thoughtful citizens" who understood the value of disinterested statesmanship when safeguarding America's interests abroad.[50]

Yet, among American imperialists in 1898, Wilson's emphasis on the leadership of the United States in the international relations of East Asia differed from that of the

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[49] Wilson, After-Dinner Speech, December 22, 1900, ibid., XII, 57.

[50] Wilson, Address, "George Washington," February 22, 1905, ibid., XVI, 11-12. Quotation on 12.

better-known Roosevelt-Lodge circle. Whereas the latter group tended to view the war with Spain and the annexation of the Philippines as evidence of America's capability and willingness to share in the responsibilities of the other great powers in maintaining a balance of power on the Asian continent, Wilson, however, perceived those same events as a signal to the rest of the world that the United States intended to redeem East Asia by nurturing and safeguarding democratic growth in the region. These two divergent views, one no less imperialist in outlook than the other, derived from fundamentally different conceptions of what the chief guiding principle of American diplomacy should be. Roosevelt and his circle of intimates believed that America's paramount concern in East Asia was the maintenance of a balance of power in which no single power or combination of powers would be permitted to dominate the Asian continent.[51] Wilson, on the other hand, argued that it should be the proliferation of democratic principles and practices, or the effective Americanization of the region. Although Wilson never rejected power politics out of hand, including the resort to war as an instrument of national policy,[52] he refused to believe that Roosevelt's approach to international relations would ever produce a more progressive world order because of its association with militarism and navalism. Wilson reminded his audiences that it was America's "high ideals," or "[its] love of liberty and the ambition to show other nations the road to happiness and how to be rid of

[51] Roosevelt's policies in East Asia have been the subject of a number of fine monographs. See, for example, Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore and London, 1956, 1984), 172-334; Raymond A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle and London, 1967); David H. Burton, *Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist* (Philadelphia, 1968), 58-131; Oscar M. Alfonso, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines, 1897-1909* (Quezon City, PI, 1970); and Lewis L. Gould, *The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 73-99, 173-195.

[52] See Frederick S. Calhoun's insightful treatment of this question in, *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy* (Kent, OH, 1986).

tyranny and injustice," that constituted the source of American great-power status, not the nation's "practical aptitudes." Only steady progress towards achieving an open and democratic world based on American values and institutions could ensure international tranquility and stability in the long term.[53]

Wilson, alarmed by the prospect of China and the rest of the Asian continent becoming partitioned like Africa, criticized the great power scramble for East Asia as unenlightened and inefficient, at least in the sense that such scrambles required the maintenance of a large military and naval presence in the region. In his mind, such imperialist behavior failed to distinguish between progressive and regressive influences, a fact that even Britain had failed to understand when staking out its imperialist interests in Africa after the Treaty of Berlin.[54] Wilson pointed to the growing power of czarist Russia in East Asia after 1895 to illustrate his point. China's crushing defeat in its war with Japan opened the door for "autocratic Russia" to become a keen competitor with the "democratic powers" (the United States and Britain) for influence in northeast Asia. Wilson warned that a "Russian-dominated Chinese Empire," based on "policies of exclusiveness and a tradition of irresponsible authority," not only threatened to limit or even eliminate valuable American commercial opportunities in the so-called "China market," but "the Slav" also posed a significant threat to the presence of Anglo-Saxon civilization in the region. If left unchecked, Wilson warned, the world would soon be

[53] Wilson, Address, "The Statesmanship of Letters," November 5, 1903, *PWW*, XV, 41. See also, Wilson, "Americanism," December 7, 1900, ibid., XII, 42-44; "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 211-213; and Address, "This is True Patriotism," February 17, 1904, ibid., XV, 169-173.

[54] Wilson, "Government Under the Constitution," ca. June 26, 1893, ibid., VIII, 254-270, and Untitled Memorandum for an Interview, ca. December 18, 1895, ibid., IX, 365-366.

confronted with "another Caesar or Napoleon" on the Eurasian continent.[55]

Wilson argued that the United States should do all it could to prevent China from being absorbed into the already vast Russian empire. He did not believe, however, that an increase in the American navy's presence in the region or the establishment of naval stations along the Asian littoral would achieve the desired end. Instead, it was much better to open "the stagnant civilizations of the East" and redeem them with the benevolent and uplifting blessings of American civilization. To this end, Wilson endorsed the "Open Door" policy, promulgated by the United States in two unilateral declarations to the powers in 1899 and 1900, demanding equal access for American and other foreign nationals to markets in an undivided China. Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door Notes" to the powers expressed well the United States' twin aims in China of upholding the principle of unfettered access to markets within the powers' respective spheres of influence (September 1899) and preserving China's territorial and administrative integrity following the Boxer Rebellion (July 1900).[56] In keeping the door open in northeast Asia,

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[55] Wilson, Address, "Americanism," February 27, 1901, ibid., XII, 98-99. Quotation on 99. For Wilson and the Russian menace in northeast Asia, see Wilson, "The Theory of Organization," November 2, 1898, *PWW*, XI, 6; "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 18-19; and "Our Elastic Constitution," January 28, 1904, ibid., XV, 143. For the Russo-American rivalry in northeast Asia before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), see Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912* (East Lansing, 1968), 58-71; Michael H. Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895-1911* (New Haven and London, 1973), 53-85; and Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations* 3rd edition (New York, 1990), 50-53.

[56] The first "Open Door Note" is located in Memorandum, John Hay to Joseph H. Choate, September 6, 1899, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*], *1899* (Washington, DC, 1900), 131-133. The second "Open Door Note" is located in John Hay, Circular to the Powers, July 3, 1900, in *FRUS*, *1900* (Washington, DC, 1901), 299. For the events surrounding their promulgation, see William H. Becker, "1899-1920: America Adjusts to World Power," in William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., *Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789* (New York, 1984), 173-223; Kenton J. Clymer, *John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1975), 143-156; and Varg, *The Making of a Myth*, 24-26.

Wilson told his audiences, the United States could begin to "play its part, and a leading part at that," in "moderating the export of European standards to the East." Wilson, as did many Americans, proved utterly naive about what the United States could actually hope to accomplish with its "Open Door" policy in China. Nevertheless, he delighted in the fact that America's redemptive mission, reaffirmed by the war with Spain, bound the nation to such a course of action in East Asia.[57]

Later, in a public address on the relationship between the Constitution and American foreign policy, Wilson pointed to the Senate's ratification (December 1903) of a Sino-American commercial treaty as "clear evidence" of the benefits of "Americanism" in northeast Asia. The commercial treaty, much broader in scope than the title implied, had been concluded in October 1903 between the United States and China in spite of the ill will in Beijing regarding Chinese exclusion laws in America. The agreement extended certain rights to American citizens in China and contained an article ensuring comprehensive protection for missionaries and their converts. The treaty also addressed tariff questions, including the regressive *likin* (a tax on commerce) that was to be abolished, mining regulations, protection of patents, copyrights and trademarks. It also called for the creation of a uniform national currency, the reform of the Chinese judicial system, and the prohibition of the importation of morphine and other addictive narcotics into Chinese cities.[58] Most importantly, Wilson argued, the Manchurian cities of Mukden

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[57] Wilson, Address, "Americanism," February 27, 1901, *PWW*, XII, 99. See also, Wilson, Citation for an Honorary Degree, "John Hay," October 20, 1900, ibid., 28-29.

[58] The text of the treaty is located in *FRUS, 1903* (Washington, DC, 1904), 91-119. See also, *New York Times*, December 19, 1903, which described the treaty as "the most important convention made by the United States with any Oriental country." According to several scholars, the Chinese understood that they were offering major concessions to the United States regarding potential modification of Chinese exclusion

and Antung were to be opened to American residence, trade, and "the free flow of American ideas." Wilson declared that the agreement marked an important milestone in progressive reform in northeast Asia which, in turn, bolstered China's ability to resist further Russian encroachments into Manchuria: "We hear that a door is going to shut in Manchuria, and we slapped a wedge in it so it could not while everybody else among the nations waited to hear it slam." Wilson also claimed that America's new assertive but disinterested role in China, as represented by the Sino-American commercial treaty, had given "foreign statesmen pause" because they now understood that Americans were serious about redeeming the region: "Now, we so confidently walk into complicated situations and do what occurs to us. . . . We are a sort of pure air blowing in world politics, destroying illusions and cleansing places of morbid miasmatic gases."[59]

Wilson's center of attention in East Asia, however, did not focus on China. While many contemporary American elites and subsequent scholars viewed China as a *tabula rasa* for progressivism abroad, Wilson argued that it would be in the Philippine Islands, as a dependency of the United States, where America's regenerative efforts in East Asia would be felt first. More than anywhere else in the region, it would be in these Islands that America's image would be remade and the "moral basis" of American foreign policy established and vindicated for the rest of the world to observe. By fulfilling its obligation to the Filipino people, Wilson declared, the United States could then "patent to all the

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laws in America, but signed the treaty any way in the hope – never to be realized – of securing American assistance in moderating Russian ambitions in Manchuria. Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door*, 68-76; Clymer, *John Hay*, 151-153; and Delber L. McKee, *Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906: Clashes Over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era* (Detroit, 1977), 15-27.

[59] Wilson, Address, "Our Elastic Constitution," January 28, 1904, *PWW*, XV, 142-143. Quotations on 143.

world" Burke's "spoken but forgotten truths" about how societies acquire liberty and democracy.[60]

"A Purple Garment for Their Nakedness?"

Wilson believed that much of the focus and energy of the "great debate" on empire in the United States was misplaced. For him, the central issue of the Philippine question was not whether or not the United States should have acquired the Islands, a topic about which much was said and written during the "great debate." Months before McKinley decided to annex the Archipelago,[61] Wilson had already reached the conclusion that acquisition of the Philippines was a *fait accompli* that could not be undone without damaging the nation's honor.[62] He argued that the American people, particularly the anti-imperialists, should cease their unending debate about the right and wrong of acquiring an overseas empire and concentrate instead on the chief question confronting the United States as a colonial power, that is, how to tutor "immature peoples" in the art of self-government.

Although the United States proposed to grant some measure of self-government

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[60] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 19, and "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 211-213.

[61] Although the documentary record is incomplete, the best surviving evidence suggests that McKinley did not finally decide to annex the entire Philippine archipelago until late October 1898. Before that time, the president supported only the cession of "a port and the necessary appurtenances selected by the United States" (June 1898), and then later, the entire island of Luzon (July 1898). On October 25, McKinley finally instructed Secretary Hay to cable the American peace commissioners in Paris that "the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, having the rest of the Islands subject to Spanish rule, can not be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required." Cable, William Day to John Hay, June 3, 1898, *Papers of John Bassett Moore*, Box 192; McKinley, Personal Memorandum, July 26, 1898, *McKinley Papers*, series 1, reel 4; Telegram, Hay to Day, July 28, 1898, ibid.; Memorandum, Day to the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, July 30, 1898, ibid.; and Memorandum, McKinley to Hay, October 25, 1898, *FRUS, 1898* (Washington, DC, 1899), 931-935.

[62] Wilson, "What Ought We to Do?," ca. August 1, 1898, *PWW*, X, 575.

to the Filipino people under the provision of the Treaty of Paris, Wilson worried that policy makers in Washington did not know how to go about it. In a letter to Allen Corwin, a former student, he explained that the intellectual confusion surrounding "the practical question of democracy" stemmed from the near complete lack of attention afforded it by scholars. Wilson, in response to Corwin's inquiry about the Supreme Court's deliberations on whether or not the Constitution "followed the flag" to the new overseas possessions, offered the following rejoinder:

> The "Consent of the Governed" is a part of constitutional theory which has, so far, been developed only or chiefly with regard to the adjustment or amendment of established systems of government. Its treatment with regard to the affairs of politically undeveloped races, which have not yet learned the rudiments of order and self-control, has received next to no attention. . . . I shall have to tackle the problem myself more formally than I have yet tackled it.[63]

How did the nation propose to accomplish its duty in the Philippines? "This we shall do," Wilson wrote in 1899, "not by giving them out of hand our codes of political morality or our methods of political action, the generous gifts of complete individual liberty or the full-fangled institutions of American government, -- a purple garment for their nakedness, -- for these things are not blessings, but a curse, to undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their political growth." Rather, the United States would fulfill its duty in the Philippines by providing a colonial government that "shall moralize them by being itself moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and steadfast, inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom." Filipinos, Wilson reasoned, needed the aid of American political character and the spirit of disinterested service in their

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[63] Letter, Wilson to Allen W. Corwin [Princeton, Class of 1895], September 10, 1900, ibid., XI, 573. Concern about the general ignorance of how to cultivate democracy in areas inhabited by "immature peoples" had, in part, informed Wilson's efforts to establish a chair of "Colonial Politics" at Princeton in 1899-1900.

preparation for nationhood, not the premature extension of American democratic institutions and practices. Only after Filipinos had acquired "civic manhood," a process requiring generations of slow maturation, could they then govern themselves as a free people in an independent nation.[64]

Wilson argued that American colonial policy in the Philippines should concentrate on creating conditions in the Islands that would be conducive to the establishment and growth of "civic manhood," the moral basis of self-government, among Filipinos. This task required the United States to identify all attitudes, customs, and institutions in the Philippine political and cultural landscape that might impede the development of a democratic spirit among the Filipino people. For Wilson, cultivating democracy in the Philippines, where he saw a parallel to frontier conditions, would require American "acts of redemption," or purging the Filipino cultural and political environment of its many vices and iniquities in order to pave the way for democracy. These acts, he argued, could not be accomplished by mere example. They would require the supervision of men with mature "civic manhood" – that is, Anglo-Saxon Protestants nurtured for generations in democracy. Thus, the entire solution to the Philippine question "lay, less in our methods than in our temper. We must govern as those who learn; and they must obey as those who are in tutelage. They are children and we are men in these deep matters of justice and government."[65]

In his understanding of Filipino deficiencies, Wilson proved shortsighted and stubborn. He ascribed the manifold problems the United States would face in

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[64] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., XII, 19.

[65] Ibid., 14-15, 19. Quotation on 19.

institutionalizing the rule of law in the Philippines to the racial character of the predominant Malay stock. Although Wilson relegated Malays above Africans and African Americans on the racial ladder, he believed that most Filipinos were devoid of virtue and mature character. Malays, according to Wilson, were superstitious, self-interested, unprincipled liars and thieves. Some of these deficiencies in character, he maintained, were the products of having been colonized for centuries by an inferior Spanish civilization that inculcated few virtues and many vices among its subjects:

> No people can form a community or be wisely subjected to common forms of government who are as diverse and heterogeneous as the people of the Philippine Islands. . . . They are of many races, many stages of development, economically, socially, politically disintegrate, without community of feeling because without community of life, contrasted alike in experience and in habit, have nothing in common except that they have lived for hundreds of years together under a government which held them always where they were when it first arrested their development.[66]

Only the Ottoman empire surpassed that of the Spanish in "miseducating [*sic*] its subjects."[67] Wilson argued that one did not have to look far to see that Filipinos bore the scars of colonial subjugation, especially a weak political character and degraded sense of morality which ran counter to the prerequisite of "civic manhood." Like all other "immature races," Wilson surmised, Filipinos did not possess the political character or experience necessary to govern themselves.[68]

Wilson chided anti-imperialists and Filipino *independistas* who argued that the Philippine people should be awarded home rule or complete independence right away. It

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[66] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 224.

[67] Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., 8. See also, Address, "The Statesmanship of Letters," November 5, 1903, ibid., XV, 41.

[68] Ibid., and Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 220-222.

would be useless, he said, to extend to them American codes of political morality, methods of political action, or democratic institutions without first preparing them for it. The apparatus of self-government had to be preceded first by the development of character. In Wilson's view, American sovereignty in the Philippines did not restrict Filipino freedom, but provided the basis for it. Premature separation, severing the bonds too soon, would not make Filipinos free, but would render the Philippines "a rudderless boat adrift." Wilson declared that Filipino resistance to American rule constituted a direct challenge to "the entire mystique of manifest destiny" upon which two centuries of American expansion and democratic growth had rested. America's was a proven, "reliable democracy." For Filipinos to attempt to break away in insurrection before they had been adequately prepared for self-government invited anarchy, not democracy.[69]

Because America's status as a great power and its mission as the redeemer nation hung in the balance, Wilson never wavered in his support of the Philippine War. Yet, he remained critical of reports of extreme brutality and censorship of the press in the Philippines. In an address called "Self-Government," Wilson, in reference to the army's efforts to censor the press's coverage of the war, insisted that Washington should not pursue its policies in secret. The very guarantee of popular government lay in publicity, in the public's faith in and knowledge of the government's present and future attitudes and actions. He criticized the military policy of censorship as unwarranted in that it was inconsistent with every principle of self-government in the American democratic experience. This was hardly the way to begin the process of regenerating Filipino institutions and attitudes. Wilson offered American colonial authorities a caveat: if the

[69] Wilson, Address, "Americanism," February 27, 1901, ibid., 98-99.

United States failed in the Philippines, then it would fail in the rest of the world.[70]

Yet, despite his concerns about brutality and censorship, Wilson made it clear that the United States could hardly afford to lose the war in the Philippines. Sounding more like John Foster Dulles' expositions on the critical nature of the domino theory in Cold War strategy than Burke's reflections on the excesses of the French Revolution, Wilson warned that "Aguinaldo's Insurrection" menaced the development of American-style democracy not only in the Philippines, but also throughout East Asia. If successful, the insurrection threatened to become the harbinger for the introduction of the radical and "unproven" French vision of democracy in the region. Its spread, therefore, had to be contained and rooted out before it destroyed the prospects of "genuine democracy" in East Asia. Wilson also warned that if American colonial authorities allowed the Philippine War to devolve into a long, violent war of attrition, then America's credibility as a disinterested power in the region and the world would suffer. He, therefore, viewed a quick and decisive conclusion to the Philippine insurrection as imperative.[71]

Wilson labeled the ideology of the Philippine Revolution as radical and misguided. He offered as evidence of Filipino political immaturity the fact that leaders of the *Katipunan*, the chief revolutionary organization, had based their constitutional ideas upon the precedents set in Latin America in the early nineteenth century.[72] Only the United States, Wilson explained in a public lecture at Princeton, could teach Filipinos "to love order and instinctively yield to it;" only the United States could give them discipline

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[70] Wilson, "Self-Government," December 13, 1900, ibid., 46-48.

[71] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., XII, 217.

necessary for the attainment of the true and lasting form of freedom."[73] The only hope for democracy in the Philippines required Filipino *insurrectos* and their American sympathizers [the anti-imperialists] to abandon French revolutionary ideology and embrace the reality that, "The consent of the Filipinos and the consent of the American colonists to government . . . are radically different things."[74] As for the Philippine insurrection, Wilson referred to it as an unfortunate movement in which the vast majority of Filipino peasants had been duped by a few Tagalog elites who successfully cajoled them into rebellion. Although their poor political training prevented them from realizing it, Filipinos needed American redemption.[75]

It was in this context that Wilson rejected the popular image of General Emilio Aguinaldo, the young president of the Philippine Republic, as "the Philippine George Washington." He denied that Filipino *insurrectos* were fighting their American Revolution. In July 1899, Mrs. Wilson wrote her husband of her attendance at an "illustrated lecture on the Phillipines [*sic*] . . . at the most aristocratic church in Chicago." She recounted how a portrait of Aguinaldo, dressed like George Washington, received wild applause from the congregation while that of Dewey, dressed in the uniform of an eighteenth-century British admiral, received only silent scorn. Wilson sent a curt reply to his wife, branding the congregation "foolish and ignorant." Describing Aguinaldo as a

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[72] G. F. Zaide, *Philippine Constitutional History* (Manila, 1970), 86.

[73] Wilson, "Freedom," February 23, 1900, *PWW*, XI, 439.

[74] Letter, Wilson to Allen W. Corwin, September 10, 1900, ibid., 573.

[75] Wilson, "Self-Government," December 13, 1900, ibid., XII, 46-48; "Americanism," February 27, 1901, ibid., 98-99; and Untitled Address, May 3, 1902, ibid., 359-363

"subtile youth," Wilson seemed to take offense to Aguinaldo being likened to the more mature and statesmanlike Washington.[76] In "The Ideals of America," he wrote that Aguinaldo seemed more like Napoleon, "a little dictator" seeking power at the expense of the people. The Philippine insurrection then, in its "leaderless excesses," seemed more like the French Revolution. Like France, Wilson contended, the Philippines were quickly devolving into "a nation frenzied, distempered, seeking it knew not what, – a nation which poured its best blood out in vain sacrifice, which cried of liberty and self-government until the heavens rang and yet ran straight and swift to anarchy."[77]

Thus, Wilson counseled his audiences that the only appropriate way to understand the Philippine war was to view it in the manner that Burke had looked upon the French Revolution in the late eighteenth-century. American anti-imperialists should suspend their support of Aguinaldo's government in Malolos until they had learned how liberty was to be combined with government, public force and the maintenance of an army, the protection of property, fiscal stability, social and civil manners, and religious freedom. Wilson posited that if it had taken France over a century to effect the combination it originally sought in the 1790s, then the Philippines could not possibly be prepared for complete self-government after centuries of corrupt and ineffective colonial rule by Spain.[78] Even in England, many generations of slow, patient political development had been required before self-government could take hold. Wilson asserted that although the

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[76] Letters, Ellen A. Wilson to Wilson, July 13, 1899, ibid., XI, 167-168, and Wilson to Ellen A. Wilson, July 23, 1899, ibid., 183-186.

[77] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., XII, 217.

[78] Ibid., 217-218.

origins of English local self-government could be traced to the *Magna Carta* in 1215, complete self-government remained elusive in England until 1832 when reforms transformed the House of Commons into a model of representative government. The Filipino people, he declared, should not hope to achieve self-government any sooner or in any other manner.[79]

Wilson declared that much of the confusion in the United States and the Philippines about the American military presence in the Islands derived from a lack of understanding of what America's mission in the Archipelago entailed. He therefore determined to set the American and Filipino peoples straight on the matter. In numerous public speeches and essays, Wilson pleaded for patience with respect to settlement of the Philippine question, declaring that much more was at stake for the United States than many people seemed to realize. Foremost, America's credibility as a leader in proliferating the correct sort of liberty throughout the world, which he described as the cornerstone of America's salvation in a hostile international environment, depended in large part on the establishment of a benevolent colonial policy in the Philippines that successfully cultivated democratic principles and practices. The American people should realize that affairs in the Philippines could not be settled quickly because "the natives are still too inexperienced to undertake to carry on a government so intricate as that with which we govern ourselves." To pull out of the Archipelago too soon would yield disastrous consequences for the United States in the region and in the world because it would signal that Americans had lost faith in the correct type of liberty. But when would American tutelage in the Philippines end? Wilson argued that day lay in the distant future.

[79] Ibid.

He maintained that Americans would "instinctively know," as "apostles of liberty and self-government" when to make the separation. The decision, however, should not be left to the Filipinos to decide. In one estimate at the turn of the century, Wilson stated that it would take at least three or four generations of diligent effort on the part of the Filipino people before they would be prepared for self-government, and much longer before they were capable of self-determination and independence.[80]

In the meantime, Filipinos were to undergo a long and arduous process of national development. Wilson outlined the basic elements of making a nation in the Philippines. First and foremost, the Filipino people, plagued by tribalism and geographical isolation, needed to be "knit together" into a homogeneous, organic community. This community would gradually come to understand the balance between authority and freedom at the individual and societal levels. Universal education, Wilson wrote in "The Ideals of America," provided the key to melding such a diverse people and culture together. As in the United States, the teacher in the Philippines would play a crucial role in shaping the future nation's political and economic leaders by inculcating "civic manhood" within them and acquainting them with the character and spirit of democratic institutions. Just as importantly, Wilson argued that education was not enough: "Books could but set the mind free, can but give it the freedom of the world of thought." For Filipinos to become schooled in the practical affairs of democracy, they must be permitted to participate in the day-to-day workings of their government. This contact with their polity, Wilson believed, if intelligently utilized, would transform Filipinos into citizens whose politics and ethics would be informed by "civic manhood." Participation in the insular government, Wilson

[80] Wilson, "Americanism," February 27, 1901, ibid., 98-99.

concluded, was critical if Filipinos were to govern their own affairs some day. "And once they accepted the compulsions of American character and the standards of life, they would be entitled to partnership with us, and they shall have it." Finally, Wilson wrote, if Filipinos remained true to the course the United States set out for them, then they would have "an advantage we did not have until our hard journey was more than half made."[81]

"The Good Citizen's Burden"

Between 1902 and 1912, Wilson took up what one of his colleague's called the "Good Citizen's Burden."[82] Although Wilson became preoccupied with the responsibilities associated with being president of Princeton (1902-1910) and then governor of New Jersey (1910-1912), he remained very much in demand as a popular lecturer on political issues of the day. In that capacity, Wilson tried to keep the Philippine question in front of the public with speeches and several essays. Though he was not nearly as prolific in his writing or as available for public lectures, Wilson continued to speak about what he considered the key points in "Americanism" regarding America's responsibilities in the Philippines and the world throughout this period. Although it is not possible to discern from his remarks any real concern about the specifics of the colonial administrative apparatus that the United States established in the Islands after 1898, it is clear that he consistently held that the nation's primary task in the Philippines was to prepare the Filipino people for self-government. As long as the United States remained true to its

[81] Wilson, "The Ideals of America," December 26, 1901, ibid., 222, and "Democracy and Efficiency," ca. October 1, 1900, ibid., 14-15.

[82] Letter, Henry C. Gollan to Wilson, November 10, 1910, ibid., XXII, 14.

purpose in the Islands, Wilson wrote, then the other nations of the world would know America as its true self, a disinterested power.[83]

Although Wilson continued to emphasize the important themes of pursuing only gradual progressive democratic development from the top down in the Philippines, there were two new emphases in his discussion of the Philippine question. First, on April 16, 1906, in an address on Thomas Jefferson, Wilson told an attentive New York audience that he no longer viewed the Philippines as America's safety valve. Although he argued that distance and climate were the main culprits that prevented the Islands from developing into an outlet for American surplus goods, population and energy, Wilson cited yet another reason that would assume more importance in his political thought as he began to move into national politics.[84]

Beginning in 1906, Wilson emerged as an important critic of the Republican administration in the Philippines. Though he remained convinced that the United States had no recourse but to annex the Islands in 1898, Wilson chided Republicans for not subordinating American material interests in the Philippines to the far more critical mission of preparing Filipinos for self-government. To direct policy in the Philippines in such a manner that American interests are served rather than those of the Filipino people, Wilson argued, threatened America's integrity as a disinterested power in the world. This new Republican policy in the Philippines, a manifestation of the emerging foreign policy

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[83] Wilson's major addresses on the Philippine question during this period include the following: Wilson, Untitled Address, February 3, 1906, *PWW*, XVI, 292-299; Untitled Address, February 23, 1906, ibid., 315-318; Address, "Americanism," March 22, 1906, ibid., 340-341; Address, "Thomas Jefferson," April 16, 1906, ibid., 362-369; Presidential Address, November 29, 1907, ibid., XVII, 529-545; and Treatise, "Constitutional Government in the United States," March 24, 1908, ibid., XVIII, 69-216.

[84] Wilson, Address, "Thomas Jefferson," April 16, 1906, ibid., XVI, 362-369.

known as "dollar diplomacy," compelled Wilson to renounce the Islands as America's outlet. Although "dollar diplomacy" did not come into full fruition until the Taft administration (1909-1913), Wilson opposed Republican policies that subordinated Filipino national development to American business interests in the Philippines as early as 1906. Although Wilson did not abandon the idea that the United States needed to continue its occupation of the Philippines in order to continue its mission of guiding Filipinos to nationhood, thereafter, however, he never spoke of the Philippines as America's frontier, except in the context of ending that part of America's emerging "special relationship" with the Islands.[85]

In some ways, Wilson's last years at Princeton were years of disappointment and decline. As he moved into his fifties after 1905 he had to come to grips with the possibility of retiring from Princeton without accomplishing many of his goals.[86] The opportunity to enter politics in the winter of 1909-1910 as an aspirant for the gubernatorial nomination of the Democratic party in New Jersey presented Wilson with what must have seemed like a godsend, another avenue for implementing the ideas he had spent a lifetime developing. It was at this time, some of his biographers claim, that Wilson, faced with the necessity of positioning words and ideas to please rather than put off thousands of voters, abandoned all commitment to any basic set of issues. Beginning with Wilson's repudiation of the Philippines as America's safety valve as early as 1906 and ending with his electrifying statement in December 1912 that he expected the United

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson*, 31-39; Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson*, 312-404; Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson*, 187-228; and Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson*, 155-204.

States to soon abandon its frontier in the western Pacific, some historians have emphasized these episodes to confirm the picture of Wilson as an opportunistic politician seeking election as a Democrat.[87]

For these scholars, Wilson rendered his perspective on the Philippine question as expendable, a necessary move to bring his views into line with those of the Democratic Party. Another more considered perspective, however, is that Wilson saw the potential of the political arena to be a more immediate and more effective forum for his ideas to create meaningful change at home and abroad. The presidential campaign of 1912 illuminates this perspective. Wilson refashioned the position of the Democratic Party on the Philippine question to align more closely with his evolving understanding of what America's role in the Philippines should be.

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[87] Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson*, 41-51, and Bell, *Righteous Conquest*, 29-44.

Chapter Four
Return to First Principles

Scholars generally claim that Wilson said very little about foreign affairs during the presidential campaign of 1912.[1] Yet, it is clear that in a number of campaign speeches Wilson continued his castigation of the Taft administration's "dollar diplomacy" and financial imperialism. "We must," he announced at a Democratic rally in early November, "shape our course of action by the maxims of justice and liberality and good will, think of the progress of mankind rather than of the progress of this or that investment, of the protection of American honor and the advancement of American ideals rather than always of American contracts, and lift our diplomacy to the levels of what the best minds have planned for mankind." Although Wilson assumed that free trade benefited all concerned, he called for the subordination of the pursuit of material wealth to the "higher goal . . . [of] serving mankind in humanity and justice." To that end, he pledged to "redeem" American foreign and economic policy by rooting out all vestiges of "dollar diplomacy," including its Republican supporters, wherever he found them.[2]

Wilson repeated this theme in the first of two addresses at a daylong event in Staunton, Virginia (his birthplace) commemorating his fifty-sixth birthday on December 28. Standing on the steps of the main building of the Mary Baldwin Seminary, Wilson told a cheering audience "the world was facing the future with a new attitude and a new

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[1] Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson*, 228-263; Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917* (New York, 1954), 1-24; and Kendrick A. Clements, *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson* (Lawrence, 1992), 15-30.

[2] Wilson, Message to Democratic Rallies, November 2, 1912, *PWW*, XXV, 502-503. See also, Wilson, "A Non-Partisan Talk to the Commercial Club of Omaha," October 5, 1912, ibid., 341.

outlook upon the opportunities of life." The United States in the early twentieth century, he said, had begun to assume the attitude it possessed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a time when "humanity, the rank and file of men, . . [was] served, and honestly served, by the institutions of government." Wilson declared that the recent breath of fresh air into the American polity [ie, his election as president] had occurred not a moment too soon because in recent years too many businessmen had "got drunk with the mere wine of prosperity, and for a little while forgot that our mission was not to pile up great wealth, but to serve mankind in humanity and justice." So now, he explained, "we are learning again that the service of humanity is the best business of mankind," and that only by serving the world in a disinterested manner could the United States achieve for itself "the honors of the world." Wilson put American businessmen on notice: "They are not going to be allowed to make money except for a *quid pro quo*, that they must render a service or get nothing." Businessmen and their political allies must be reminded, "It is service that dignifies, and service only."[3]

Throughout the presidential campaign of 1912, Wilson continued his attacks on the Taft administration's "dollar diplomacy." He viewed it as an anathema to the spread of American-style democracy in the world because it called into question America's position and reputation as a disinterested power. Following his election to the presidency, Wilson sought to make good his campaign promise and began "rehabilitating" America's relations with the rest of the world. Although passage of his "New Freedom" legislative agenda of domestic reform remained his principal focus, Wilson moved to disassociate the United States from "dollar diplomacy" in Mexico, Latin America, China, and the

[3] Wilson, Untitled Address, December 28, 1912, ibid., 626-632.

Philippines. While historians have explained his successes and failures in East Asia and the Western Hemisphere in this effort, an assessment of the formation of Wilson's Philippine policy in 1912 and 1913 remains incomplete.

In Whose Image?

Although foreign affairs did not figure prominently in the presidential election of 1912, voters were offered several distinct options regarding the Philippine question. Each of these alternatives not only spoke to the question of Philippine independence, but involved different approaches to nation building. Because of the split between Taft and Roosevelt in the Republican Party and the existence of considerable disaffection among moderate and conservative Democrats regarding the predominance since 1896 of William Jennings Bryan and the agrarian wing in the Democratic Party, the political platforms of the parties reflected a wider range of perspectives on the key issues of the election. As a result, candidates possessed greater latitude in shaping their respective party's plank regarding the Philippine question than ever before.

Republicans, standing pat on Taft's retentionism, declared in their party platform that America's "special relationship" with the Filipino people should remain insulated from partisan politics. Supported by the colonial officers of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA), the part of the War Department responsible for administering the Islands, Republicans emphasized the need for continuity in America's Philippine policy.[4] Taft, the Republican incumbent, was hardly ambivalent on the Philippine question. Although Taft

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[4] Republican National Committee, *Republican Textbook, 1912* (New York, 1912), 276.

had originally opposed annexation of the Philippines in 1898, his service as president of the Second Philippine Commission (1900), the first civil governor of the Islands (1901-1904), Roosevelt's secretary of war (1904-1908) and Roosevelt's hand-picked successor as president (1909-1913), earned him the reputation as America's foremost authority on Philippine affairs. While on the campaign trail to win re-election, Taft and his circle of supporters boasted that he possessed more intimate knowledge of the Philippines than any other "living individual."[5] But while Taft had coined the phrase "the Philippines for the Filipinos," had worked diligently to inaugurate an "era of good feelings and cooperation" in the Islands following the devastating Philippine War, and had waged a successful political campaign to secure legislation authorizing the creation of the Filipino Assembly, all facts he wanted propagated during the election campaign, his perspective on Filipino self-government and independence mirrored that of the most staunch retentionist who desired holding on to the Philippines indefinitely. To him, several generations of patient effort on the part of both American insular authorities and Filipino elites were required before Filipino self-government, much less complete independence, could become anything more than academic.[6]

Throughout the so-called "Taft era" in Philippine-American relations, Taft had consistently adhered to the Republican Party's unspoken objectives in the Philippines. First, the United States, emphasizing good American government over Filipino self-

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[5] Letter, William Taft to Horace Taft, December 10, 1912, *Papers of William Howard Taft* [hereafter *Taft Papers*], series 3, reel 126.

[6] Oscar Alfonso, "Taft's Early Views on the Filipinos," *Solidarity* IV (June 1969), 52-58, and Ralph Eldin Minger, *William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900-1908* (Urbana, IL, 1975), 26-101.

government, extended gradually a sort of autonomy to Filipinos by slowly Filipinizing the insular government from the bottom up. In this way, aspiring Filipino elites would be afforded some measure of self-government, but only in the municipal and provincial levels of government, the lower ranks of the Philippine Civil Service (PCS), and the Assembly, the lower chamber of the Philippine Legislature. American insular authorities, however, would continue their tight hold over the machinery of colonial government by maintaining a permanent American majority on the Philippine Commission, the upper house of the Legislature, and by retaining a decisive American presence in the executive bureaus of the PCS.[7]

Second, Taft and his Republican successors believed that economic development of the Philippines must precede political independence. Taft was convinced that without the creation of a solid economic infrastructure, self-government would quickly degenerate into either dictatorship or anarchy. W. Cameron Forbes, who served as secretary of commerce and police (1906-1909) and then as governor general (1909-1913) during the Taft administration, best exemplifies this particular view of nation building in the Philippines. As far as Forbes was concerned, a free soul meant economic solidarity. Looking to the future in 1912, he estimated that when the rate of wages in the Philippines had reached two pesos per day and exports and imports had increased five times per capita above that year's levels, then the Islands might be strong enough to sustain an

[7] A good treatment of Republican policies in the Philippines between 1900 and 1913 can be found in, Stanley, *A Nation in the Making*, 51-176; Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 60-103; and Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Westport, CT, 1980), 41-73, 129-175.

independent government.[8]

Finally, Republicans, including Taft, refused to address publicly the issue of Philippine independence, and took particular care to avoid any specific statement about the conditions and timing of American withdrawal from the Islands. Taft's views on Philippine independence reflected those held by the majority of his party and by retentionists in the United States and the Philippines.[9] As early as 1902 he testified before a closed hearing of the Senate Committee on Philippine Affairs that complete independence was not a realistic objective of American policy in the Islands, "at least for the remainder of the twentieth century."[10] Indeed, the United States should not even consider the introduction of congressional legislation that held out the promise of independence. To do so, Taft argued, would precipitate continuous agitation among Filipinos for immediate separation which, in turn, would undermine American nation-building programs in the Islands. "My own judgment," he told the Senate Committee, "is that the best policy, if a policy is to be declared at all, is to declare the future intention of the United States to hold the Islands indefinitely, until the people shall show themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing popular government."[11] Popular self-government, however, was not the same thing as independence. Indeed, Taft never believed it likely that Filipinos would ever gain complete independence. Instead, he

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[8] *Cablenews American*, February 8, 1912.

[9] Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., *The Manila Americans, 1901-1964* (Manila, PI, 1974), 1-101.

[10] Taft, Confidential Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Philippine Affairs, February 20, 1902, Senate Document No. 331, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 325.

[11] Ibid. See also, House Committee on Insular Affairs, *Committee Reports, Hearings, and Acts of Congress Corresponding Thereto* [hereafter HCIA, *Committee Reports, 1901-1903*] 57th Congress, 1st and

reasoned that if the United States provided stable, efficient government in the Islands, then Filipinos would eventually recognize that the advantages of continued American sovereignty – defense against a foreign power, peace and order in the countryside, a preferential tariff – outweighed those of independence. If promises to the Filipino people were to be made, Taft argued, then the United States should promise to extend only dominion status, or what he described as "quasi-independence," to the Philippines in the distant future.[12]

Even after his tenure in the insular government Taft continued to offer further explanation of his views on American nation building in the Philippines and the prospect of eventual withdrawal. Amidst increasing agitation for independence among Filipino elites during the Russo-Japanese War, Taft wrote to a colleague in Washington:

> The policy of the Administration is the indefinite retention of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of developing prosperity and the self-governing capacity of the Filipino people. The policy rests on the conviction that the people are not now ready for self-government, and will not be for a long time; certainly not for a generation, and probably not for a longer time than that, and that until they are ready for self-government it would be a violation of trust for the United States to abandon the Islands.[13]

Taft eventually took his retentionism public but only after Democrats secured a majority in the House in the 1910 congressional elections and made Philippine independence part of their legislative agenda. In an after-dinner address before the Military Order of the Carabao, an organization of American army veterans who had fought in various Philippine campaigns since 1898, Taft declared:

2nd sessions, 1901-1903, I, 322-323.

[12] HCIA, *Committee Reports, 1901-1903*, I, 327.

[13] Letter, Taft to John N. Blair, March 16, 1905, *BIA Records*, File 364/72.

"My judgment is that we are likely to retain the Philippines for a considerable time . . . we cannot honorably part with them until they are able to have a government in which due process of law will be observed and able to meet responsibilities toward all the nations of the world." Predicting that the colonial bond would actually never be severed, the president reassured his retentionist-leaning audience, "I am very certain that as they go on and learn the commercial advantage of their enjoyment of the markets of the United States, as they appreciate what has come to them under the guiding hand of the United States, they will not be anxious to have that absolute separation which may be dangerous to them, and dangerous to all those who are concerned in the separation."[14]

Renegade Republicans, disaffected Democrats and odd others who made up the Progressive coalition in the election of 1912 offered a second, albeit less uniform, perspective on the Philippine question. Reflecting the diversity of the so-called "Bull Moose" Party's rank and file, members of the Progressive coalition embraced a wide variety of views on the issue ranging from indefinite retention to immediate separation. Thus, failing to locate a plank broad enough for all to stand on, the Progressive Party downplayed the Philippine question in its bid to capture the presidency.[15]

At first glance, the Progressive Party's catholic approach to the Philippine question is difficult to comprehend given the fact that most Americans and Filipinos viewed its presidential candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, as the person most responsible for

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[14] Taft, After-Dinner Speech, February 22, 1911, *Cablenews-American*, February 23, 1911.

[15] Progressive National Committee, *A Contract with the People* (New York, 1912).

the American acquisition of the Islands in 1898.[16] But Roosevelt proved more ambivalent on the Philippine question than commonly believed. On the one hand, Roosevelt contended that Filipinos would be better off if they remained under American tutelage until democratic institutions and values could take root. He estimated that American nation building in the Philippines would require at least a century of diligent effort and considerable investment before Americans could withdraw. On the other hand, Roosevelt began to speak out in favor of Philippine independence, beginning in 1902 and more frequently after 1905, but only if independence could be guaranteed by international treaty.[17]

Several considerations account for this gradual but decisive shift in Roosevelt's thinking about the Philippine question. First, the experience of the Philippine War in which the United States resorted to "civilizing Filipinos with a Krag" seriously dampened Roosevelt's and the American public's enthusiasm for holding on to the Philippines. He, like McKinley, had not bargained for a war that ultimately involved at one time or another nearly all the units of the US Army and eventually claimed the lives of nearly 4000 Americans and more than 220,000 Filipinos. Sickened by the news of the ruthless devastation of the Philippine countryside as a result of America's reconcentration

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[16] In explaining how the United States, "like a lady throwing a stone," aimed at Cuba and hit the Philippines in 1898, the American public and subsequent historians traditionally emphasized the role played by Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the navy, in instructing Dewey to prepare to undertake offensive operations against Spanish naval forces in Manila Bay. Upon the declaration of war, Dewey carried out Roosevelt's orders and the Philippines fell to the United States. Variations of this account of how the United States came to possess an empire in the Philippines persisted in American and Filipino history texts until the 1970s. See Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy* revised edition (New York, 1969), 393-394; Samuel E. Morison, Henry S. Commager and William Leuchtenburg, *The Growth of the American Republic* (Boston, 1975), II, 255; and Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People* 5th edition (Quezon City, PI, 1977), 188-189.

[17] Alfonso, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines*, 49-76.

strategy, Roosevelt confided to his friend James Cardinal Gibbons, the archbishop of Baltimore, that he wished Dewey had spared the United States of its burdensome responsibilities in the Philippines by steaming back to Hong Kong after destroying the Spanish naval squadron in Manila Bay.[18] After the war, the absence of substantial American financial investment in the Philippines compounded by the slow growth of Philippine-American trade informed Roosevelt's growing apathy towards the Philippine question. Even more important in this respect was Japan's stunning victory over Russia in 1905, an event that prompted American war planners to begin postulating a war between Japan and the United States over hegemony in the western Pacific. Afterwards, Roosevelt began to speak more freely of the possibility of an American withdrawal from the Philippines. He offered his most notorious statement on this issue immediately following the Japanese-American "war scare" in 1907:

> The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. . . . Personally I should be glad to see the Islands made independent, with perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order we would have to interfere again; this among other reasons because I would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress.[19]

Lest he alienate potential supporters from the Republican ranks at the election polls, Roosevelt preferred to remain silent on the Philippine question while on the campaign trail in 1912.

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[18] Letter, Roosevelt to James Cardinal Gibbons, March 22, 1902, in John J. Gallagher, "The Theodore Roosevelt Letters to Cardinal Gibbons," *The Catholic Historical Review* XLIV, No. 4 (January 1959), 440-456.

[19] Letter, Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, in Alfonso, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines*, 74-75.

Democrats marked out a position distinctly different from those of Republicans and most Progressives. Reaffirming the Democratic Party's plank on the Philippine question since the election of 1900, party leaders characterized American imperialism as "an inexcusable blunder" which had incurred enormous loss of life and property for both Americans and Filipinos, rendered the United States a more vulnerable power in Asia, and laid the nation open to the charge of abandoning the American principles of anti-colonialism, anti-militarism, and self-government based on the "consent of the governed." Democrats, therefore, pledged to grant independence to the Philippines as soon as a stable insular government controlled by Filipinos could be established. The archipelago's territorial integrity would be guaranteed by the United States until its "neutralization" could be arranged by international treaty. To provide adequate insular defense until the details of neutralization could be worked out, the Democratic platform stipulated the retention of such territory in the Islands as may be necessary for coaling stations and naval bases. Apparently, Democrats assumed that they would encounter little difficulty in transforming the Philippines into the "Belgium of Asia" through international treaty because they offered no alternative plan of insular defense if the neutralization initiative failed.[20]

Actually, the Democratic Party's platform on the Philippine question, adopted on July 2, 1912 at the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore, represented a compromise between the left-wing members of the party who desired a plank calling for immediate and complete independence and moderate-conservative Democrats who sought a plank pledging only eventual independence in the distant future. Originally,

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[20] Democratic National Committee, *The Democratic Textbook, 1912* (New York, 1912), 30.

Bryan, supported by other western and southern Democrats, had intended to inject the date of July 4, 1921 into the platform as the date when the United States would withdraw its sovereignty from the Philippines. House Democrats had proposed this date in their deliberations of Representative William A. Jones' (Democrat-Virginia) Philippine independence bill, known as the first Jones bill, which he had introduced on the House floor in March 1912. Senator James O'Gorman (Democrat-New York), however, opposed the idea as "decidedly impractical." Surveying his party's losses in the 1900, 1904 and 1908 presidential elections, O'Gorman pointed out that "Republican imperialism" in the Philippines had hardly served Democratic presidential candidates as a successful campaign issue. Thus, rather than estrange voters at the polls with such a radical plank, he thought it wise to replace the pledge to early independence with a plank calling for eventual independence under American protection. The stage seemed to be set for Democrats to split once again over the Philippine question.[21]

The intervention of Manuel Luis Quezon, the young Filipino resident commissioner who represented Philippine interests in the House, into the emerging controversy between Bryan and O'Gorman ultimately saved the Democratic Party from a potentially embarrassing schism. Although Quezon had worked tirelessly since 1910 to push the Philippine question to the head of the congressional docket, he reportedly confided in Bryan and Senator John Sharp Williams (Democrat-Mississippi), the principal author of the party's national platform, that Filipinos would not object to a pledge of eventual independence. The Philippine people would be better served, the

[21] William J. Bryan, *A Tale of Two Conventions: Being an Account of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions of June 1912* (New York, 1912), 12-14.

resident commissioner contended, if the Democrats adopted a less specific platform in order to win the presidential election; afterwards, with a Democrat in the White House supported by a Democratic majority in Congress, a more specific date for independence could be determined in a Philippine independence bill. Bryan bowed to Quezon's logic and acquiesced in the adoption of the more open-ended plank concerning Philippine independence.[22]

Wilson's candidacy for the presidential nomination may have been saved by Quezon's timely intervention at the Baltimore convention. Wilson had already decided to side with O'Gorman and other moderate Democrats during the controversy in Baltimore. He deemed it essential to support the effort to dilute Bryan's Philippine plank which promised "guaranteed independence" in eight years time once the Democrats won the presidency. Wilson still believed Filipinos lacked sufficient cultural homogeneity and mature political character to govern themselves responsibly. American tutelage, albeit in a new form to offset the retentionist constituencies then in control of insular affairs, would have to continue for an unspecified length of time.[23]

As it turned out, a number of Democrats, including several prominent veterans of the anti-imperialist campaign, also supported the effort to "soften" the Philippine plank. No longer viewing the Philippine question as a burning issue in the Democratic Party, these dissenters encouraged party leaders at the Baltimore convention to focus on other problems, including the tariff, the trusts, and militarism. It was along these lines that David Starr Jordan, one of the most respected veterans of the anti-imperialist movement

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[22] Letter, Charles W. Bryan to Wilson, July 25, 1912, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 29.

[23] Letter, Wilson to Oscar Underwood, July 22, 1912, ibid.

at the turn of the century, wrote to Wilson just before the opening of the National Democratic Convention in Baltimore. He pleaded with the New Jersey governor not to allow his candidacy to become bogged down in "the Philippine quagmire." Instead, Jordan argued that the Democratic Party should focus its attention on more important domestic issues, especially the "elimination of monopoly business" within the American political economy. As for foreign affairs, Jordan advised that Democrats should work to empty the State Department of all pro-business forces, especially Secretary Knox.[24]

Ignoring the pet issues of the agrarian wing of the Democratic Party, however, was politically dangerous for any Democrat seeking election into the White House in the first decade of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the "softening" of some anti-imperialists' positions on the Philippine question, Wilson certainly would have faced an uphill battle to secure Bryan's endorsement for the nomination had Quezon not stepped into the fray and supported a more moderate plank. Wilson, well aware that he would have to secure the "Great Commoner's" blessing if he wanted to be president, had already laid the foundation for a political rapprochement when he met with Bryan the previous summer to discuss the key issues of the upcoming presidential campaign. During one of "the hour-long consultations" at the governor's mansion in Trenton, Bryan had produced a letter written by Wilson in August 1911 declaring, "I do not believe the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are prepared for independence. I believe that they should be prepared for independence by a steadily increasing measure of self-government."[25] Bryan

[24] Letter, David S. Jordan to Wilson, June 25, 1912, ibid., reel 28.

[25] Letter, Wilson to Unidentified Person [William F. McCombs], August 15, 1911, *PWW*, XXIII, 267.

had solicited the letter from Wilson himself by having William F. McCombs, a loyal partisan within the Democratic Party, send Wilson a list of nineteen questions on various national issues, including the Philippine question, to which all potential candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912 were to provide responses. The query had been published in *The Commoner* in July 1911.[26] Wilson reportedly stood his ground with Bryan on the Philippine question. Bryan responded by urging Wilson to read the Democratic platforms of the 1900, 1904 and 1908 campaigns as well as his much published speech called "Imperialism" which he had delivered on the occasion of his acceptance of the Democratic presidential nomination in 1900.[27] According to at least one political biography of Wilson, Bryan made it clear that it was necessary for Wilson to reconsider his position on Philippine independence, especially if he wanted to be the Democratic candidate in the 1912 election.[28]

Actually, it had been Erving Winslow, the long-time secretary of the Anti-Imperialist League, who had suggested to Bryan that Wilson might be politically vulnerable on the Philippine question. Winslow had written to Wilson in the spring of 1910, asking him to use his popularity as a public lecturer to "put forward, for

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[26] *The Commoner*, July 21, 1911, in Paolo E, Coletto, *William Jennings Bryan* II: *Progressive Politician and Moral Statesman, 1909-1915* (Lincoln, NE, 1969), 211, and "Mr. Bryan's List," *Literary Digest* XLIII (July 29, 1911), 156.

[27] Following Wilson's nomination as the Democratic candidate for president at the Baltimore convention, Bryan instructed his brother Charles, publisher of *The Commoner*, to send Wilson copies of his articles and speeches on the Philippine question. Letters, Charles W. Bryan to Wilson, July 25, 1912, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 29; William J. Bryan to Wilson, July 26, 1912, ibid.; and Wilson to Charles Bryan, August 5, 1912, ibid.

[28] Letter, Bryan to Wilson, August 20, 1911, *PWW*, XXIII, 284. See also, James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1926), 161-166, and Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton, 1947), 317-318.

continuance until a satisfactory result is attained, the well established Democratic doctrine that outlying possessions are impossible under the Government of the United States." Winslow argued that the anti-imperialist movement in the United States needed to spare no effort in the next session of Congress to bring the American chapter on imperialism to a close. Taft, "a believer in permanent colonialism," had begun the process of removing the legal barriers in the Philippines preventing the "exploitation and the control of the [friar] lands by forces that would be inflexibly opposed to independence." Although Wilson declined Winslow's invitation to join the ranks of the Anti-Imperialist League, he requested further information on the League's position concerning the Philippine question, especially anything the secretary may have on the friar lands controversy. Winslow quickly dispatched a copy of his soon-to-be-published essay "Perverted Philippine Policy"[29] as well as copies of Representative John A. Martin's speeches on the House floor condemning the Republican Party's exploitation of Philippine resources.[30]

Wilson, realizing that he did not fit perfectly within the Democratic anti-imperialist tradition, saw the merits in not elevating the potentially divisive Philippine question into an important campaign issue. He was well aware from his experience in the "great debate" on empire at the turn of the century that the Philippine question was a particularly sensitive issue among southern and western Democrats. These fellow Democrats had already challenged his nontraditional views on the issue of empire.

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[29] Erving Winslow, "Perverted Philippine Policy," Buffalo *National Monthly* I (April, 1910), 312-313.

[30] Letters, Winslow to Wilson, March 31, 1910, *PWW*, XX, 309; Wilson to Winslow, April 1, 1910, ibid., 309n; Winslow to Wilson, April 2, 1910, ibid., 312-313.

Wilson knew that to speak out strongly against Philippine independence, raising the hackles of these strong dissenters prior to the election, would bode ill not only for his election as the Democratic presidential candidate, but ultimately for the long term interests of the Philippines.

Ending America's Frontier in the Philippines

The election of 1912 proved to be an unmitigated disaster for Republicans, who were split between party regulars and "Bull Moose" progressives. Wilson received 435 electoral college votes compared with 88 for Roosevelt and 8 for Taft. But Wilson was elected president of the United States with less than forty percent of the popular vote. He polled 6.3 million votes against the combined Roosevelt-Taft total of 7.6 million. In Congress, Democrats won 51 of the 96 seats in the Senate and 291 of the 435 House seats.[31] The Philippine question had played a negligible role in the campaign of 1912, as Wilson's campaign centered on economic issues. Even the Anti-Imperialist League, though content with a Democratic victory, acknowledged that precious few voters took notice of the issue at the polls that November.[32] Five weeks after the election, however, Wilson included a short but electrifying statement about the fate of the Philippines in his second "Staunton address" (December 28, 1912). The president-elect's remark that afternoon suggested to many people in the United States and the Philippines that Wilson intended to make good on the Democratic party's pledge to withdraw from the Islands as

[31] Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era,* 1-24.

[32] *Record Book of the Executive Committee Meetings of the Anti-Imperialist League, from March 25, 1909 to September 25, 1914* (Boston, 1915), 219.

soon as possible.

Indeed, historians have traditionally pointed to Wilson's second "Staunton address" to mark his most definitive statement on what policy he intended to pursue in the Philippines. Delivered before a cheering crowd at the Military Academy in Staunton, much of what the president-elect said that afternoon was unimpressive. But then, in the middle of "a very grotesque story" about a barroom fight between "an eastern blacksmith and a western bully" in an unnamed frontier community, Wilson offered the following aside: "The Philippines are our present frontier, and we don't know what rich things are happening out there, and are presently, I hope, to deprive ourselves of that frontier."[33] Though Wilson had not intended to say anything specific about the future destiny of the Philippines that day, his words precipitated a fierce political firestorm in the United States and the Philippines concerning the future course of Philippine-American relations. While *independistas* discerned from the president-elect's statement that he intended to fulfill the Democratic party's pledge to grant independence to the Philippines, making the Jeffersonian principle of "consent of the governed" his new siren call in insular affairs, retentionists interpreted the remark as an official proclamation that Wilson planned to pursue a "policy of scuttle" in the Islands, abandoning Filipinos to their own fate in a hostile international environment.[34]

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[33] Wilson, Untitled Address, December 28, 1912, *PWW*, XXV, 632-640. Quotation on 635.

[34] Traditional accounts of Wilson's "Staunton Address" as the "clearest statement" of the new president's approach to the Philippine question can be found in, Roy W. Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy 1913-1921* (New York, 1968), 69-70; Brands, *Bound to Empire*, 104-107; Charles B. Elliott, *The Philippines To the End of the Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy* (Indianapolis, 1917), 418; Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 227-228; Daniel R. Williams, *The United States and the Philippines* (Garden City, NY, 1925), 145-148; Ruth Cranston, *The Story of Woodrow Wilson: Twenty-Eighth President of the United States, Pioneer of World Democracy* (New York, 1945), 137-138; William E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and His Work* 6th edition (Garden City, NY, 1924),

In reality, Wilson had not intended to communicate either message to the interested parties. To better understand what the president-elect meant that afternoon, it is necessary to examine the other speeches Wilson made on the campaign trail in which he hinted at his thoughts and concerns regarding the Philippine question. In an address on August 7, 1912 that criticized the Taft administration's "dollar diplomacy," Wilson explained that it was necessary for the United States to "return to the first principles" it had outlined for itself in 1898 in holding and governing the Islands. The nation needed to remember its disinterested duty in the Philippines, that is to prepare Filipinos for self-government and assist them in their efforts to achieve nationhood:

> In dealing with the Philippines, we should not allow ourselves to stand upon any mere point of pride, as if, in order to keep our countenance in the families of nations, it were necessary for us to make the same blunders of selfishness that other nations have made. We are not the owners of the Philippine Islands. We hold them in trust for the people who live in them. They are theirs, for the uses of their life. We are not even their partners. It is our duty, as trustees, to make whatever arrangement of government will be most serviceable to their freedom and development.[35]

Nearly two months later, in an address on the importance of conservation delivered to the National Conservation Congress in Indianapolis, Wilson again repudiated his earlier position that overseas empire in the Philippines served as America's safety valve following the "loss" of the continental frontier in 1890. He told the crowd of professionals that the absence of a territorial frontier had prompted the United States to acquire the Islands in "a moment of unreflective reaction." Wilson argued: "We were so eager for a frontier that we established a new one in the Philippines, in order, as Mr.

117, 132-133; and Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York, 1946), 126.

[35] Wilson, Campaign Speech in Sea Girt, NJ, August 7, 1912, *PWW*, XXV, 3-18. Quotation on 14-15.

Kipling would say, to satisfy the feet of our young men." He regretted that the enduring image of the Philippines as America's frontier had culminated in a policy that placed American economic and financial interests in the Islands above the future welfare of the Filipino people. Not only had the attempt to transform the Philippines into a safety valve for America's surplus goods, population and energy failed due to distance and climate, but the view that America possessed a frontier in the Islands had distorted the overriding American mission to act as a disinterested power in preparing Filipinos for self-government. Wilson, in perfect Turnerian form, proclaimed its termination.[36]

Taken collectively, Wilson's remarks about the Philippine question in 1912 do not suggest that he intended to abandon the Philippines at the earliest opportunity. In 1912-1913, he still did not believe Filipinos ready for complete self-government, much less independence. Wilson had made this clear to the different factions of the Democratic party in the presidential campaign. Nor did his comments about the Philippine question while on the campaign trail suggest that Wilson was in concurrence with the Republican approach to nation building in the Philippines, one that emphasized fostering economic development over engendering democratic growth. In fact, he viewed the Taft administration's pursuit of "dollar diplomacy" in the Philippines, as much as he condemned Taft's policies in Mexico and China, as an anathema to America's mission in the world. Simply put, Wilson, in a most abstract and open-ended way, declared on December 28 an end to a policy that placed American interests above those of Filipinos,

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[36] Wilson, Untitled Address, October 3, 1912, ibid., XXV, 312-321. Quotation on 316. See also Wilson's address before an audience in Richmond, Virginia in which he argued that because of the limited benefits of overseas expansion, the United States needed to locate "a new *modus vivendi* in America for happiness . . . something to replace the frontier." Wilson, Untitled Address, February 1, 1912, ibid., XXIV, 101-117. Quotation on 105.

but without severing the colonial bonds between the two countries. His grappling with the issues of policy and personnel in his efforts to remake America's approach to the Philippine question bear this fact out.

The Question of Policy

Although Wilson decided very early on in his presidential campaign that he needed to reverse the current trend in Philippine-American relations, he understood silence was his best ally until he learned exactly what the conditions were in the Philippines. His Staunton address, however, had produced waves of praise and criticism in the United States and the Philippines. Worse still were the wild speculations in the national press about what extreme courses of action he intended to pursue in the Islands. According to one retentionist-leaning newspaper, the central question of the day was, "Would the United States abandon the Philippines tomorrow, next month, or next year?"[37] Even before Wilson was elected president, correspondence began to pour in daily, inundating him with unsolicited advice about how best to resolve the Philippine question.[38]

Actually, Wilson sought to steer a middle course in the Philippines. He wanted to redirect policy away from its essentially economic emphasis to one that focused on preparing Filipinos for home rule and eventual independence. Before announcing any

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37 *Washington Post*, January 3, 1913.

38 See for example, Letters, Edwin D. Mead [director of the World Peace Foundation] to Wilson, June 12, 1912, *PWW*, XXIV, 494-495; Leon Lambert [member of the Philippine delegation to the Democratic National Convention] to Wilson, July 2, 1912, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 28; William Oldham [secretary for the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church] to Wilson, August 7, 1912, ibid., reel 30; Christian Hanlin ["the oldest Princeton man serving in the Philippines"] to Wilson, September 7, 1912, ibid.; and James Ross [prominent Manila attorney] to Wilson, November 28, 1912, ibid., reel 34.

policy, however, Wilson understood that he first needed to learn what conditions existed in the Islands. In this respect, he pleaded for patience, instructing his closest advisers to downplay the issue in public until he could decide upon a proper course of action for the Philippines that was based on accurate and detailed knowledge of conditions in the Archipelago. But even among the members of his Cabinet, there was no consensus. Their opinions on the Philippine question varied widely, ranging from Secretary of State Bryan's fervent anti-imperialism to Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield's outspoken retentionism.[39]

After being deluged from all quarters with unsolicited and contradictory information concerning conditions in the Philippines and what alterations in policy and personnel were necessary there, Wilson quickly came to the conclusion that he would have to go outside official channels if he was to have the benefit of accurate information about the Islands. The president-elect decided to dispatch a personal envoy on an "unofficial tour" of the archipelago to provide him with "fresh and unbiased information" about conditions in the Philippines. He turned to Henry Jones Ford. In their discussion of the proposed mission, Wilson advised Ford not to present himself as the president-elect's personal envoy, but to introduce himself as an academic seeking information for a new manuscript. This cover, Wilson reasoned, would allow Ford to investigate the political and cultural landscape in the Philippines free from the influence of either American colonial authorities or Filipino political leaders. Once Ford accepted the assignment, Wilson moved to secure private financing for the confidential mission.[40]

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[39] Letter, William C. Redfield to Wilson, March 24, 1913, ibid., series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[40] The Princeton Bank advanced Ford $7,000 for his mission to the Philippines. Letter, Edward

Ford seemed well suited to the task before him. Born in Baltimore, he established himself as a journalist and reformer in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. He came to Wilson's attention in 1898 with the publication of *The Rise and Growth of American Politics: A Sketch of Constitutional Growth*, the first and most important of several books he wrote on American government and history. In this book, Ford documented the failure of political parties in America to initiate and implement disinterested reform because, as reflections of human nature, parties were self-seeking and acquisitive. Yet, political parties remained necessary in the United States because they carried out political functions more effectively than any other institution or organization. The breakthrough contribution of this book, however, was Ford's analysis of how disparate peoples, like the new immigrants arriving in the United States, came to view themselves as belonging to a homogeneous whole, unified by common interests. The party system, Ford wrote, served as the mechanism by which immigrants in America were drawn into the political life of the nation. The interaction between parties and immigrants resulted in a political apparatus that eventually became structurally cosmopolitan and composed of immigrant populations characterized by multiple layers of identity. These identities were expressed in various allegiances: to their particular ethnic group, their neighborhood, communities of interest, and finally, the party machines that, in turn, fused them into large-scale groups whose interests transcended ethnicity and locality.[41] Wilson believed that Ford's analysis possessed implications for understanding how Filipinos, a people strongly affected by

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Howe to Wilson, September 5, 1913, ibid.

[41] Henry Jones Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics: A Sketch of Constitutional Development* (New York, 1898).

ethnic diversity and geographical isolation, might forge a nation for themselves under American tutelage. Also, he and Ford were close friends and professional colleagues. Wilson had placed Ford on his shortlist of candidates for the chair of Politics at Princeton in 1900, and eventually hired him in 1908 when Garfield retired from that position. Wilson and Ford also served together as members of the first advisory board of the Short Ballot Association in 1909. In 1912, Governor Wilson appointed Ford to the New Jersey Banking and Insurance Commission, where he became a trusted political adviser. Ford, as a Catholic, a conservative Democrat, an experienced reformer and an authority on democratic government, seemed just the man Wilson wanted for carrying out "a secret mission of investigation and evaluation" in the Philippines.[42]

While enroute to Manila aboard the Pacific Mail steamship *Mongolia*, Ford had ample time to plan his two-month junket in the Philippines. After interviewing a number of his fellow passengers, "Philippine officials from whom I obtained information of value," Ford decided on an itinerary that would eventually take him to most of the principal Islands of the archipelago. Upon his arrival in Manila (March 14, 1913), Ford found the city still buzzing with excitement from Wilson's "Staunton address" and the president's support for "free sugar." After spending a day in the capital, he wrote to the president that he thought better of dallying too long in Manila because of the Manila American community's anxious ruminations about their fate under a Democratic president. Most Americans in the city seemed keen only on dispensing to anyone who would listen "copious supplies of fact and comment" about Filipino incapacities for self-

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[42] Richard S. Corwin, "Henry Jones Ford," *American Political Science Review* XIV, No. 4 (1925), 813-816.

government.[43]

Ford traveled extensively throughout the Philippines. Accompanied by his Spanish-speaking son Howard (who had served with the army in the Philippines) as secretary, Ford first toured the troubled province of Pampanga in Luzon where he had heard rumors of an impending mutiny by the Philippine Constabulary. He then made his way to the Muslim South where he described the American community in Jolo as "virtually in a state of siege." Despite the vigorous efforts of the US Army under General John Pershing to disarm "the Moros," Ford wrote that it had been impossible for him to travel into the countryside without a heavily armed escort. At the end of April, some six weeks after arriving in the Islands, Ford sent his first recommendations to Wilson. Expecting to find Filipinos divided, uneducated, and even primitive, Ford discovered otherwise: "The notions with which I came from the States have long since been thrown overboard and I have acquired new ones that are now in . . . orderly shape." Without explanation, Ford described the situation in the Philippines as "very grave," requiring "radical treatment." The replacement of the governor general seemed necessary, he concluded, but it alone would not suffice as a solution: "The defects are such as rise naturally out of the policy adopted, and the remedy lies far more in a change of policy than in a change in men."[44]

After a three-week tour of the central and southern Islands, Ford journeyed to the American hill station at Baguio where he interviewed Governor Forbes and other American officials about various points of insular administration on which he had heard

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[43] Letter, Henry J. Ford to Wilson, March 15, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 188-189.

[44] Letter, Ford to Wilson, April 30, 1913, ibid., 370-371.

critical comment. During the course of his interviews, Ford apparently made his real purpose in the Philippines known to the governor general, a fact Forbes related in his journal.[45] Following the week-long series of interviews, Forbes dispatched a long cable to the BIA, explaining how Ford admitted that he had been "favorably impressed" with the political and economic conditions in the Islands, especially the absence of any serious misconduct by him or his administration. According to the governor general, Ford also expressed his view that Filipinos were not ready for home rule or anything akin to independence.[46] In the end, however, Forbes decided not to risk what Ford might report to Wilson or the American people, and took steps to discredit him and his findings. The governor general released several articles for publication in retentionist newspapers in the Philippines and the United States that he had found "the anti-imperialist Ford" ill-informed about Filipino culture and, therefore, completely unsuited for the mission with which he had been assigned by the president. In one article, Ford's conclusions about Filipino capacities for self-government were dismissed as "wholly imaginary."[47]

On May 19, Ford departed the Philippines for the United States. The next day, he stopped over at Hong Kong and wrote a hurried but significant letter to Wilson. Ford

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[45] Forbes, Journal Entry, May 16, 1913, *Journal of W. Cameron Forbes* [hereafter *Forbes' Journal*], V, 236. Forbes later wrote that he believed, erroneously as it turned out, that Ford had revealed his true purpose in visiting the Islands because he had been won over to the insular government's point of view about the Filipino people's shortcomings in respect to self-government. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* 2 volumes (Boston, 1928), II, 268.

[46] Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, chief of the BIA, related this correspondence to Wilson, via Tumulty. See, Memorandum, McIntyre to Tumulty, May 5, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[47] Letter, Bertha Ford to Wilson, June 2, 1913, ibid., series 2, reel 49. Mrs. Ford enclosed various newspaper articles from the *New York Herald*, the *Washington Post*, *Newark Evening News*, and *Trenton State Gazette*, all dated May 20, 1913, which condemned her husband's "findings" in the Philippines before he reported them in an official report to the president the following September.

headed his missive *"Private – Personal – Unofficial"* and requested the president to destroy the letter after reading it. The tone of Ford's letter was sharp and direct as he finally revealed to Wilson the root of the problem in the Philippines as he found it. Ford alleged that the Forbes' administration had misrepresented the facts about conditions in the Philippines in order to justify the Republican policy of indefinite retention. Many Americans in the Islands, including those in the highest positions of the insular government, "would be gratified if the situation here should be embroiled so as to make trouble for you." Warning of "partisan exploitation" and even "sedition," Ford counseled Wilson that "in administrative circles there are evidences of a desire to block independence and discredit the Filipino Assembly and put the leaders in a hole." Ford wrote of "an orchestrated plot" by Dean C. Worcester, one of the most out-spoken retentionists in the insular government, to launch a highly visible "anti-slavery crusade" in the Philippines. The purpose of the crusade was to illuminate for the American people the existence of "slavery" in the Islands, a revelation likely to railroad any independence campaign in the near future. Also, Worcester, by implying that several of the Assembly's most prominent leaders were indeed slaveowners, sought to impugn Filipino character and discredit the Assembly as a legitimate governing body. Ford wrote that he believed Worcester would release his "findings" on Filipino slavery when Congress moved to take action on Philippine independence.[48]

Ford did not deliver the final version of his report to Wilson until September 1913, after the appointment of Francis Burton Harrison as governor general and the inauguration of a new policy in the Philippines. The president apparently never read the

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[48] Letter, Ford to Wilson, May 20, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 49.

document, which numbered nearly one hundred pages. But Wilson was aware of the report's conclusions from his correspondence with Ford while the latter was in the Islands. The report reviewed the impact of popular education and the "gradual initiation in the practice of government according to American ideas" on the Philippine people. Ford found that the initial impact had been positive, but the "indefinite postponement of self-government" had contributed to growing unrest in the Philippines. He rejected the arguments that tribalism, linguistic diversity, and illiteracy were so troublesome as to preclude greater self-government or even independence. The discord in the Philippines, according to the official Ford report, was caused by the failure of previous colonial administrations to comply with the avowed purpose of the United States in the Islands. Ford argued that the time had come to recognize the mature political character of the Filipino people. Their capacity for self-government had been consistently undervalued because American colonial officials in Washington and Manila had been guided by an "excessively narrow view" of constitutional government. The successive Republican administrations in the Philippines, Ford wrote, had insisted upon "Filipino adherence to American political traditions in a country where they have no historical basis and are incompatible with social conditions." While the Filipino people might have been incapable of maintaining a "just and effective government" under an American constitution, Ford insisted that they were "capable of carrying on successfully a government of the type they desire." Finally, Ford concluded that the United States should end the "temporary commission government" established in 1900, and allow Filipinos to draft a constitution that would go into effect at the discretion of the

president.[49]

While Ford investigated conditions in the Islands, the War Department had already begun to take steps to put its stamp on Wilson's Philippine policy. Charged with manifold tasks – raising and training an army, undertaking public works, and administering the nation's colonial empire – the War Department in 1913 was a loose collection of independent fiefdoms, bereft of centralized direction. Cabinet secretaries came and left with the regularity of presidential elections, while the bureau chiefs, closely tied to key committees in the Congress, endured and prospered within their separate bailiwicks. Lindley M. Garrison, the new secretary of war, was a prominent attorney from Camden, New Jersey who was serving as vice chancellor of the state when Wilson was elected governor. Although Garrison did not possess any evident convictions on the Philippine question when he assumed office in March 1913, he quickly adopted the BIA's position of indefinite retention as his own.[50]

Garrison looked to the Bureau of Insular Affairs for guidance on the Philippine question. The official position of the BIA reflected that of its new chief, Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, who had served as Major General Clarence Edwards' assistant before becoming chief of the BIA. McIntyre praised the achievements of the previous Republican administrations in the Philippines. On the issue of Filipinization of the insular government, he wrote to Garrison: "Briefly, the Filipino as distinguished from a small class of ambitious caciques has been given more power in his government than is

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[49] Henry Jones Ford, Memorandum for the President, September 26, 1913, *Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs* [hereafter , *BIA Records*], Record Group 350, National Archives, File 364/295-296.

[50] Daniel R. Beaver, "Lindley M. Garrison (1864-1932)," *American National Biography* (New York and Oxford, 1999), VIII, 758-759.

exercised by any oriental people, and all the agencies which are supposed to work advancement of a people in popular self-government are being used to the greatest practicable extent for the Filipino." As for changes and future policy, he recommended five actions, economic in emphasis: the removal of all suspension of the friar land sales in order to create economic opportunity in the Islands; an increase in the maximum size of the blocs of public land that could be sold to private individuals from 40 acres to 1,235 acres (from 16 hectares to 500); the elimination of all remaining restrictions and limitations on reciprocal free trade; the acquisition of congressional authority to issue $10 million in new bonds to finance public improvements; and the acquisition of authority from Congress to revise the complicated arrangement of currency reserve funds, so as to make them a liquid resource of the government. In short, McIntyre desired a continuation of Taft's policy of emphasizing economic development of the Philippines over political programs aimed at preparing Filipinos for self-government.[51]

To supplement this economic analysis by McIntyre, Garrison turned to Felix Frankfurter for recommendations regarding administrative reforms in the insular government. At that time, Frankfurter was a young attorney serving in the War Department as special assistant in charge of the BIA's legal affairs. As the bureau's chief legal representative, he had defended executive authority and the prerogatives of imperial administration in the Philippines on several occasions in the last years of the Taft administration.[52] Not surprisingly, Frankfurter's advice on how to proceed in the

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[51] Memorandum, McIntyre to Garrison, March 1, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 119/72.

[52] Michael E. Parrish, *Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years* (New York and London, 1981), 44-45.

Philippines was notably more conservative than that beginning to come in from Ford. When it came to models of colonial rule, Frankfurter preferred that of Lord Cromer in Egypt. Cromer, who had served as British proconsul in Egypt from 1883 and 1907, had extended to Egyptian authorities a wide breadth of freedom in administration under the umbrella of British rule. Quoting often from Cromer's *Modern Egypt,*[53] Frankfurter sought to incorporate Cromer's principles of colonial rule, particularly the principal tenets of indirect rule, into American governance of its dependencies.[54]

In Frankfurter's view, the insular government was by virtue of the organic act of 1902 "*pro tanto*, an autonomous government." He therefore argued that the existing structure would serve adequately for future evolution toward full Filipino self-government. Like McIntyre, he distinguished between the people as a whole and what he called "a small, masterful, highly educated, wealthy minority, who have on the whole, but little community of interest and little sympathy with the great masses." The responsibility of the United States was to the whole people, and therefore devolution of control into the hands of Filipinos must be slow enough to allow the emergence of a broad-based polity. Otherwise there would be unrepresentative, oligarchical government. Nevertheless, the government must be purposeful and energetic in meeting its responsibility; it must not allow further loss of momentum such has had recently occurred. As for the future, Frankfurter recommended that wholesale changes either in personnel or institutions be avoided, as compromising America's instruction of Filipinos in "the value of continuity

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[53] Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring Cromer), *Modern Egypt* 2 volumes (London, 1908).

[54] Felix Frankfurter, Diary Entries, October 24, 1911 and November 6, 1911, in Joseph P. Lash, *From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter* (New York, 1975), 107-109 and 118, respectively.

and stability in political administration." Instead, the existing vacancy in the office of insular secretary of commerce and police should be filled by a man in perfect agreement with administration policy, who in due course could be promoted to replace Forbes as governor general. In the meantime, the Wilson administration should clarify national policy toward the Philippines, ending the evasiveness of the past, but being careful to stress continuity and to avoid demoralizing American civil servants in the Islands.[55]

By mid-April, Garrison had reached his own conclusions about how best to proceed in the Philippines with respect to policy. Improving upon the advice of McIntyre and Frankfurter, he recommended to the president a four-point plan: first, appoint a new governor general of exceptional vigor, judgment, and insight; second, in commissioning the new governor general, end the prevailing uncertainty and define clearly the administration's intentions; third, after the governor general had been given an opportunity to break into his new office, appoint a Filipino majority on the Commission; fourth, avoid any commitment to a specific date for independence, so as to preserve flexibility to respond to unforeseeable circumstances. This plan, Garrison reasoned, had the advantage of enabling the administration to act in highly visible ways to end the existing stalemate between the Commission and the Assembly without having to seek any additional congressional action. Indeed, to a Democratic president seeking to vindicate party criticism of Republican policies in the Philippines without severing the colonial bond, giving Filipinos an immediate majority on the Commission, which, in effect, extended to them control of the legislative process, seemed a satisfactory solution. Yet,

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[55] Memorandum, Felix Frankfurter to the Secretary of War, March 12, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 141/76.

awarding Filipinos control of the legislative process hardly constituted a surrender of American authority in the Philippines. The Filipino majority on the Commission would be counterbalanced by continued American executive review and control. Although the governor general could not veto legislation, such a check could be exercised by the secretary of war or, in the last resort, by Congress.[56] Of critical importance to the Wilson administration was the fact that reconstituting the Commission did not require any action by Congress. While structural changes of the insular government required congressional amendment of the organic act of 1902, the president, through his appointive power, could alter the Commission membership at will. In late May or early June, Garrison explained his ideas to Bishop Brent, still in the United States lobbying for retention, who in turn tried them out on Quezon. The resident commissioner found them acceptable and predicted they would satisfy Filipino public opinion. Garrison was elated. He believed he had found the formula for resolving the Philippine question, and for the rest of his tenure as secretary of war he stuck to this view. Garrison met with Wilson at the end of April, about the time when the president began receiving his first alarming reports from Ford. Wilson kept his own counsel until passage of the Underwood bill which provided for the downward revision of the tariff and established free trade between the United States and the Philippines. In his conference with Garrison, however, Wilson adopted Ford's recommendation that there would have to be significant changes in personnel as well as policy in the Philippines.[57]

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[56] Although there seems to have been no instance of a secretary of war exercising veto power, there is evidence that American colonial officials assumed that such power existed. See report of an interview between Forbes and Taft in 1912. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 103n.

[57] Garrison, Memorandum for the President, Subj.: "Concerning the Philippines," April 24, 1913,

The Question of Personnel

Wilson ran through an extensive list of potential candidates for the position of governor general shortly after his election. The position carried with it an annual salary of $20,000, making it the highest paid position that the president could appoint. Thus, there was no shortage of applicants for the position of governor general.[58]

Before his selection of Francis Burton Harrison as governor general in August 1913, Wilson considered a dozen or more potential candidates for the position of governor general. The president-elect first offered the post to William McAdoo, who promptly rejected the offer. "For McAdoo," Colonel Edward House wrote in his diary, "it was a Cabinet place or nothing."[59] In mid-January 1913, the *New York Times* reported that Wilson was considering New York City police commissioner Rhinelander Waldo because of his experience in the Islands as a soldier and administrator, but nothing came of the rumor.[60] In March, Henry Ide, former governor general of the Philippines, wrote to Wilson from the American embassy in Madrid to express serious misgivings about James H. Blount's candidacy for the position. Blount had been lobbying for the appointment, via Bryan, since November 1912, using his new book, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* as his springboard. Although Blount possessed considerable experience in the Islands and was an avowed anti-imperialist, Ide wrote, "the former

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BIA Records, File 141/78, and Letter, Garrison to Wilson, June 13, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[58] The salaries of ambassadorships to Britain, Japan, Germany, and the other great powers topped $17,500 per year, some $2500 less than that of the governor general of the Philippines. Letter, Bryan to Wilson, with enclosure, ca. January 1, 1913, ibid., series 2, reel 48.

[59] Edward M. House, Diary Entry, January 8, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 20-24.

[60] *New York Times*, January 14, 1913.

judge's mind is in a haze, under the influence of a drug [opium]." Ide's letter effectively killed Blount's candidacy.[61]

By April, a potentially serious rift emerged between Wilson and Garrison over the issue of appointing a new governor general in April. Rumor in the Philippines had it that Wilson planned to offer the post to Joseph E. Davies in return for his strong support during the election campaign.[62] Alarmed by the prospect of patronage being injected into the colonial government, Garrison wrote a long letter to the president on April 2, detailing the reasons why he opposed Davies' appointment. He described him as a young lawyer who had made himself a reputation as "an energetic, political worker" who did an outstanding job as secretary of the National Committee of the Democratic Party in the election of 1912, but he had accomplished nothing of substance. The position of governor general required the services of "a man of the very highest capacity." It seemed hardly fitting to Garrison to reward "a political worker" with "probably the most important position outside of your Cabinet," and, most importantly to Garrison, "a position which, above all things, should be free from the suggestion of politics." To appease Wilson, the secretary of war recommended Ford as a good candidate for the position: "His character, his aloofness from politics, his seasoning, the maturity of his judgment, the searching quality of his mind, and the irresistible way in which he pursues things to their ultimate reaches . . . would gratify the expectations of the public concerning the man who should

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[61] Letter [Confidential], Henry Ide to Wilson, March 11, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191. See also, Letters, Blount to Joseph Tumulty [the president's executive secretary], January 28, 1913, ibid., series 2, reel 41; Blount to Tumulty, ca. January 30, 1913, ibid.; and Blount to Wilson, March 24, 1913, ibid., reel 42.

[62] See for example, *The Manila Times*, April 12, 1913.

occupy that position." Garrison suggested that Ford should consult Forbes about the situation, learn everything he could from Forbes about conditions in the Philippines, and "then go in at the appointed date." Garrison surmised that even if Ford served as governor general for only a short time, "it would tide us over the existing embarrassment" until a more permanent candidate could be found. In the meantime, Davies could be appointed governor of Puerto Rico, "a most practical school in the business of colonial administration."[63] Later that spring, Garrison wrote the president that he was in the process of compiling a list of suitable candidates, but advised Wilson to wait to make the appointment until more was known about conditions in the Philippines. Wilson concurred, writing that he wanted to "cover the whole field" before deciding.[64]

Finally, at the beginning of August, Wilson was ready to move on the Philippine question. In mid-August, Francis Burton Harrison, a New York congressman who served as the second-ranking Democrat on the House Committee on Ways and Means and an outspoken anti-imperialist, called upon Quezon in behalf of the candidacy of Oscar Crosby, his friend. Quezon was struck by the idea of winning the job for Harrison himself. His qualifications seemed right from the Filipino perspective, and, as a member of Congress, he was almost sure to be confirmed easily. Quezon broached the idea and Harrison assented. Quezon then spoke to Representative Jones about Harrison's candidacy and then mentioned it to Bryan as if it had been his own idea. On August 16, Bryan passed Harrison's name to Wilson, with his own and Jones' endorsement. That

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[63] Letter, Garrison to Wilson, April 2, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 48.

[64] Letters, Garrison to Wilson, April 8, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 274, and Wilson to Garrison, April 10, 1913, ibid., 282-283.

same day, Quezon saw Bryan and gave Harrison his support. Bryan asked him to put it in writing and on August 19, after having received a receptive acknowledgment of his first note from Wilson,[65] forwarded this expression of support from the resident commissioner to the president.[66] In the meantime, Quezon met with Oscar Underwood, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, both of whom added their endorsement of Harrison. That left only Garrison to be heard from. The secretary of war was at that moment out of town on a tour of army posts in the west. Wilson sounded him out by cable and received his endorsement on August 19. The following day, Harrison's nomination was decided upon.[67]

Once the Senate confirmed his nomination, Harrison, then vacationing in Maine, faced the practical problems associated with a sudden move more than halfway around the world. From the BIA, he received a stream of miscellaneous information and advice on various problems in the Philippines.[68] From friends, relatives, and importunate strangers came a flood of congratulatory letters and telegrams that had to be packed for answer from Manila. Returning to Washington, he received instructions from Wilson

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65 Letter, Wilson to Bryan, August 18, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 2, reel 49.

66 Letters, Quezon to Bryan, August 16, 1913, enclosed in Bryan to Wilson, August 19, 1913, ibid., and Wilson to Bryan, August 20, 1913, ibid.

67 The key documents for understanding this much misunderstood episode are Letters, Quezon to Storey, August 22, 1913, *Papers of Manuel L. Quezon* [hereafter *Quezon Papers*], Bentley Historical Library [hereafter BHL], reel 4; Quezon to Willis, August 23, 1913, ibid.; Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, August 20, 1913, ibid.; Letters, Bryan to Wilson, undated, received at the White House on August 16, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191; and Garrison to Wilson, August 20, 1913, ibid.

68 Memorandum on the Philippine Tariff, August 23, 1913, *Papers of Francis Burton Harrison* [hereafter *Harrison Papers*], Box 50, and Letter, Frank McCoy to Harrison, August 30, 1913, ibid.

before taking the oath of office on September 2.[69] Meanwhile, the BIA had turned its attention to the problem of obtaining, on very short notice, suitable accommodations for Harrison, his wife, and four children on the Pacific Mail steamer *Manchuria*, scheduled to depart San Francisco on September 10.

[69] Letter, McIntyre to Harrison, August 27, 1913, ibid. Roy W. Curry says that Harrison received his instructions from Wilson the preceding Sunday, citing Francis B. Harrison, *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years* [hereafter *Cornerstone*] (New York, 1922), 5. See Roy W. Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921* (New York, 1957), 76. While the discrepancy is relatively minor, it illustrates the fact that Harrison's *Cornerstone* must be used with care. While it seems to be generally accurate in the outline of events and is an excellent source for Harrison's attitudes, it is strongly biased and polemic in tone and purpose as are most of the writings on the Philippine question during this period. Harrison collected material for such a manuscript off and on during his tenure in the Philippines. He may have begun *Cornerstone* before leaving the Islands in 1921, but he completed the book in haste while in Scotland. His publisher and friend, Morgan Shuster, wanted to take advantage of public interest in the Philippines, aroused by the Wood-Forbes investigation then in progress, and pressed Harrison for "a quick manuscript." As a result, Harrison seems to have relied more on memory than the evidence, even the evidence of his own files deposited in the Library of Congress, as his guide in many cases and details. In short, much of what can be found in *Cornerstone* is inaccurate. See, Letters, Norbert Lyons to Harrison, April 21, 1917, *Harrison Papers*, Box 41, and Morgan Shuster to Harrison, July 18, 1921, ibid., Box 43.

Chapter Five
Shifting the White Man's Burden

The "new era" in the Philippine-American encounter began with long blasts from the ice plant whistle on October 6, 1913. On that day, a US naval escort of four destroyers, assembled off the island fortress of Corregidor, sighted the steamer *Manchuria* as it steamed across Manila Bay with Harrison, the new American governor general, as its most distinguished passenger. At the familiar signal, thousands of Filipinos, Americans, and curious foreigners swarmed into the streets and went down to the Luneta, Manila's largest park, to catch a glimpse of the new chief executive. It would be several hours before the *Manchuria* could dock, but the crowds remained cheerful, filling the plazas and boulevards with noise and excitement. Along the waterfront, bands assembled with ostentatious flourishes of brass and drums, while the harbor itself came alive with gaily decorated vessels of all shapes and sizes. Years later, Harrison would remember the festive spirit of this day with pride and affection. Never had an incoming governor general been accorded such a welcome. And if this was partly because previous chief executives were already serving in the Islands when appointed, it was equally true that none had so appealed to the hopes and dreams of most Filipinos.[1]

As Harrison's appointment and inauguration had broken precedent,[2] so did the policy he announced upon his arrival. Speaking through Quezon, who translated, the new

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[1] Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 50-51; *The Manila Times*, October 7, 1913; *Philippine Free Press*, October 11, 1913; and *La Vanguardia*, October 7, 1913.

[2] Not only did Harrison not possess any first-hand experience in the Philippines before his appointment as governor general but he also had taken the oath of office in Washington rather than in Manila. *The Washington Post*, September 3, 1913.

governor-general delivered a three-point message prepared by Wilson for the Filipino people. First, Harrison outlined for the cheering throng the president's official position on "colonial stewardship," declaring "we consider ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the Philippine people." All future policy initiatives in the Archipelago would focus on serving Filipino interests, not preserving American advantages. Second, Harrison read Wilson's pledge that eventual independence would constitute the ultimate objective of America's Philippine policy. The president eschewed any commitment to a specific timetable for the United States' withdrawal from the Philippines. Yet, Wilson's words made it clear how he intended to proceed in resolving the Philippine question: "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands . . . and after each step taken experience will guide us to the next." Finally, Harrison declared that Wilson, to demonstrate good faith on the previous two promises, had ordered that an immediate step be taken toward Filipino home rule in the form of granting Filipinos a majority on the Philippine Commission. The eight-member Commission (in addition to the governor general who presided over it as president) served as both the upper house of the Philippine Legislature and the executive body of the insular government. As Filipinos already controlled the Assembly, the lower chamber of the Legislature, granting Filipinos an immediate majority on the Commission would afford Filipinos considerable autonomy in directing the legislative affairs of the Islands. Harrison told the enthusiastic crowd that Wilson had proposed this important step toward Filipino self-government "in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will thereby be given, in the action of the Commission, of the political capacity of those native citizens who have already come forward to

represent and lead their people in affairs."[3]

After delivering Wilson's personal message, Harrison read his own carefully prepared address. Promising that his administration would be forward-looking, optimistic, and insistent upon Filipino partnership rather than American domination, the governor general expressed that he was in "complete accord" with the president's approach to the Philippine question. Harrison did not stop there, however. Describing himself as "an instrument in the further spread of democratic government," he proclaimed the dawn of "a new era" in Philippine-American relations:

> We do not believe that we can endow you with the capacity for self-government. That you must have acquired for yourselves; the opportunity for demonstrating it lies before you now in an ever widening field. Thus, we place within your reach the instruments of your own redemption. The door of opportunity stands open and under Divine Providence the event is in your hands.[4]

Not surprisingly, Filipino reaction to Harrison's "inaugural address" was euphoric. Thousands erupted in jubilation, welcoming the Democratic governor general as the harbinger of a new era of Filipino-American cooperation. The newspaper *La Vanguardia*, a resolute opponent of American retentionism, attracted widespread attention in Manila and Washington with an editorial claiming that Harrison's address had done more to "dissolve existing prejudices and obstacles" in Philippine-American relations than all the combined speeches of the previous American colonial

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[3] For the complete text of Harrison's speech, see *Inaugural Address and Message of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison to the Third Philippine Legislature, Delivered in October 1913* (Manila, 1913), 7-9. With slightly different punctuation, the same message appears in the *Philippine Free Press*, October 11, 1913. For Wilson's message to the Philippine people, read by Harrison, see Telegram, Wilson to Harrison, September 25, 1913, *PWW*, XXVIII, 323-324.

[4] *The Manila Times*, October 7, 1913.

administrations. According to the laudatory editorial, Harrison's statements that day "revived in a most admirable and complete manner the faith of Filipinos in the justice of the American people."[5] In the days and weeks that followed, many of the published Filipino accounts of the governor general's remarks painted a similar picture. Harrison, in less than a day, had seemingly managed to disarm much of the antagonism and suspicion that had pervaded Philippine-American relations since 1898. At the opening of its new session on October 16, the Assembly went so far as to pass a resolution commemorating the arrival of the Democratic governor general and his new policy: "We believe that happily the experiments of imperialism have come to an end, and that colonial exploitation has passed into history. Hence, in only a few days, a good understanding has been arrived at between Americans and Filipinos, which in the past thirteen years could not take root."[6]

Such pronouncements were not wasted on Harrison. They seemed to fill him with an overwhelming sense of self-importance. In a letter to his friend James W. Gerard, Wilson's ambassador to Germany, Harrison wrote unabashedly that his "inaugural address" marked an important milestone in Philippine-American relations. The immediate result seemed to be "an entire cessation of most of the ill-feeling toward the United States on the part of Filipinos." Overnight, Philippine newspapers had ceased attacking the continued American presence in the Islands and adopted "a most enthusiastic frame of mind about President Wilson and his Philippine policy." More

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[5] *La Vanguardia*, October 8, 1913, quoted in Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, October 8, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Cablebook, 1913-1914.

[6] A copy of this resolution is located in Cable, Philippine Assembly to the Secretary of War, October 18, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

importantly, Harrison wrote, the stalemate that had existed between Filipino legislators in the Assembly and American colonial authorities on the Commission since 1907 had already begun to dissipate. Somewhat naively, the new governor general portended that once the process of selecting Filipinos to serve on the Commission was finished, a necessary reform to end the "racial divisions" that had stultified the work of the insular government, then Americans and Filipinos could finally get on with the business of preparing the Philippines for independence.[7]

In spite of the predominantly glowing images emanating from Manila concerning the end of American colonialism and the beginning of a new Filipino-American partnership aimed at preparing the islanders for independence as soon as possible, it soon became clear that Filipinization of the insular government would hardly be a smooth and painless affair. While enroute to Manila, Harrison had only a month in which to master memoranda and books on the Philippines furnished by the BIA, to prepare his "inaugural address," and to begin planning a program of Filipinization, the cornerstone of Wilson's Philippine policy. With the Philippine Legislature scheduled to convene on October 16, just ten days after *Manchuria* was due to dock in Manila, there would be scant time for dealing with administrative problems, particularly with delicate matters of personnel. Yet, Wilson's commitment to granting Filipinos an immediate majority on the Commission and Harrison's pledge to implement a comprehensive Filipinization program throughout the Philippine government suggested that immediate and sweeping changes both in the Commission and in the insular government would be the hallmark of the new

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[7] Letter (Confidential), Harrison to James W. Gerard, December 15, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Box 31.

administration. As Harrison soon learned, however, neither could be accomplished without inviting trouble both in the Philippines and in the United States.

"The Dreaded Policy"

During the first couple of years of Harrison's administration, the question of personnel – Filipinization of the Commission and the PCS, salaries, bureau reorganization, and job security – constituted the most explosive issue with which he had to deal. The issue was also relevant to the legislative situation that he had inherited from the previous Republican administration. For two years, a deadlock between the American-dominated Commission and the Filipino-dominated Assembly had prevented passage of an appropriations act. Throughout the insular revenue crisis, Governor Forbes, empowered by the organic act of 1902, extended by proclamation the appropriation of the preceding year. As a result, when Harrison arrived in the Philippines in October 1913, the appropriation bill of 1911 remained in effect.[8]

Meanwhile, an additional source of friction had developed in the insular government. Forbes believed that his administrative authority included the power to reapportion funds, so long as he did not exceed the total appropriation of 1911. By careful management, he had been able to provide salary increases for some American colonial administrators as a means of retaining them in the insular government. Other funds were expended on recruiting Americans for the PCS and even creating new positions for Americans. Filipino leaders denounced this as a usurpation of authority, unwarranted by

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[8] Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 282-283; II, 143-148.

the organic act of 1902, but the question never reached the courts nor was it officially considered in Washington. The matter was simply left to Harrison to sort out.[9] Much of the friction that existed could be traced to the structure of the insular government, particularly to the fact that legislative power was divided between the Assembly, elected by and responsible to Filipino voters, and the Commission, appointed by and responsible to the president of the United States. In the face of Forbes' efforts to strengthen the retentionist constituencies in the insular government, conflict between the Assembly and the Commission, if not inevitable, certainly became predictable. Moreover, it should be noted that the famed "deadlock" over appropriation bills was less irresponsible than it appeared. The work of the insular government had continued, appropriations had been extended by proclamation, and Osmeña, the speaker of the Assembly, had remained on cordial terms with Forbes.[10]

It is not surprising that Harrison, recently warned by McIntyre of a need for economy and fresh from a legislative career of his own in Congress, should have sympathized with the Assembly and deplored what appeared to be executive presumption. Later, he wrote Bryan that the Republicans had effectively stalled Filipinization of the insular government by being "enthusiastically imperialistic" in their appointment of retentionist-leaning Americans.[11] Harrison already had been irritated to discover that a number of positions, including that of assistant executive secretary, had been filled only a few weeks before his arrival. Although Harrison allowed several of the

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[9] Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 48-49, and *The Manila Times*, October 8, 1913.

[10] Hayden, *The Philippines*, 173-174, and Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, II, 145.

[11] Letter, Harrison to Bryan, May 28, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 32.

appointments to stand, he dismissed the new assistant executive secretary, Thomas Cary Welch, after serving a single month.[12]

During the new governor general's first week in Manila, therefore, while several Filipinos were being considered for appointment to the reconstituted Commission, further changes in government personnel began making headlines. It was not changes within the classified civil service that attracted the most immediate and venomous criticism of the Manila American community and their friends in the United States, however. Far more dramatic were resignations submitted by non-classified officials, the bureau chiefs and their assistants. Five days after dismissing Welch, Harrison fired two senior Americans in the PCS: Charles H. Sleeper, the director of lands, who had originated the scheme under which sales of unoccupied friar lands in large tracts were legalized; and the collector of customs, Henry B. McCoy, who was *persona non grata* with the new administration because of his political activities as Republican national committeeman in the Philippines. A few days later, Harrison dismissed without explanation the prosecuting attorney and chief of police for Manila,[13] and accepted the resignation of John R. Wilson, assistant director of lands, who refused to serve under a Filipino.[14] A week later, on

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[12] Cables, Harrison to McIntyre, September 30, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 397/62-63; McIntyre to Harrison, October 1, 1913, Ibid.; Harrison to McIntyre, October 2, 1913, ibid. *The Manila Times* reported a rumor that Harrison even suggested that Welch not accept the increase over his former salary for the month he served as assistant executive secretary. *The Manila Times*, October 8, 1913.

[13] Despite headlines in *The Manila Times*, the dismissal of the Manila city officials did not have any political overtones. The chief of police and other municipal officials were implicated in a bribery scandal involving prostitution that had been exposed late in the Forbes administration. See Diary Entry, Forbes, January 11, 1912, *Forbes Journal*, V, 96-97. The documents, including carbons and digests of testimony, relating to the 1912 investigations of the police chief and several other City of Manila employees are located in *Harrison Papers*, Box 28.

[14] Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, November 7, 1913, ibid., Cablebook, 1913-1914.

October 11, Harrison announced that no more resignations of Americans in the insular government would be requested, but the next day he fired the director and assistant director of printing. These two officials were dismissed for insubordination, as they had introduced a petition to Bureau of Printing employees protesting the reduction in salaries proposed by Harrison to deal, in part, with the seven million peso deficit confronting the colonial government. Although further dismissals were few and stemmed from non-political causes, the damage had already been done. These limited number of dismissals of Americans in the insular government with political overtones provided an introduction to the Harrison administration that was to obscure more important aspects of Democratic rule in the colony.[15]

Rumors of mass resignations and firings, punctuated by some genuine dismissals, soon followed and inspired a mood of hysteria if not panic within the Manila American community.[16] Anticipating the resignations of civil service executives quickly became a favorite pastime among Manila Americans. Reporting Harrison's statement of October 11, *The Manila Times* commented that it had been "a week of wild speculation in official circles. During that period nearly every man of importance on the civil list was figuratively decapitated."[17] Since Harrison often acted abruptly, with little forewarning and rarely much explanation, he was partly responsible for the continuing apprehension

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[15] Ibid. For the impact of these dismissals on the Manila American community, see, Letters, General Franklin Bell [commander of the Philippine Division] to General Leonard Wood, November 9, 1913, ibid., Box 29, and James Ross [chairman of the Democratic Party in the Philippines] to J. F. Bromfield [manager, China Mutual Life Insurance Company], August 25, 1917, ibid., Box 33.

[16] See especially *The Manila Times*, October 8-20, 1913. In the United States, Dean Worcester and other retentionists greatly exaggerated the number of dismissals and resignations in their interviews with the press. See, *New York Times*, November 18, 1913, and New York *Sun*, March 28, 1914.

[17] *The Manila Times*, October 12, 1913.

and excitement.[18] On the other hand, the English-language press and the vast majority of resident Americans actively opposed Harrison and his policies. It seems possible, therefore, that the issue of personnel was seized upon as the first legitimate outlet for the Manila American community's dissatisfaction with the new governor general.[19]

Press criticism of Harrison in the United States mounted steadily following these initial dismissals. The predominantly Republican press carried frequent interviews of disgruntled Americans arriving back in the United States following their resignation or termination.[20] Taft and other prominent retentionists used these interviews as backdrops for their attacks on Wilson's "New Freedom" policy in the Philippines. Taft even blasted Wilson in an interview because the president had taken offense at the blatant racism of the skits and songs at the annual "wallow" of the Military Order of the Carabao. Wilson had instructed Garrison and Josephus Daniels, the secretary of the navy, to reprimand

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[18] Harrison refused to defend himself or his actions in public against attacks from the press or private citizens, although he expressed gratitude to those who spoke on his behalf. His brother Fairfax Harrison recommended employment of a competent writer to handle publicity and public relations, but the governor general took no action. Harrison claimed that because most of the attacks were based upon inaccurate information, once the true facts became known then opposition would cease or at least be discounted properly. This seems a bit naive for a former congressman, but it was a position consistently expressed in private correspondence and in reports to the War Department. Letters, Harrison to Fairfax Harrison, November 1, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 32; Harrison to Garrison, February 19, 1914, ibid., Box 51; Harrison to Garrison, November 5, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 59/89. In one letter, Harrison explained that he had not responded to the attacks against his administration, which he believed was the work of an organized group, because he felt it best to make his reports to the secretary of war or the president rather than to the press. Letter, Harrison to A.P. Stokes, April 30, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 31.

[19] McIntyre, writing in 1915, thought that the hostility of the Manila American community, openly expressed from the first day of Harrison's arrival in the Philippines until his departure eight years later, may have confirmed the governor general in his radicalism. Senate Document 242, *Special Report of Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, upon His Recent Trip to the Philippine Islands, December 1, 1915* [hereafter, *Special Report of McIntyre, 1915*], 64th Congress, 1st session, 6, in *BIA Records*, File 7519/33½.

[20] See for example, *New York Times*, October 12, 1913, November 15, 1913, November 18, 1913, and December 3, 1913.

army and navy officers who were responsible for the Military Order of the Carabao program.[21]

The situation was not as straightforward as Harrison's critics often claimed. Harrison's Filipinization of the civil service was connected to several larger, more perennial, issues involving the insular government. The Philippine Civil Service Law, when passed in 1900, had been one of the most progressive in the world. Colonial authorities throughout the world recognized the colonial bureaucracy that evolved from that act as one of the most efficient and well trained in all of Asia.[22] Wilson, Harrison, and *Nacionalista* leaders, however, protested that Republican colonial administrators had forgotten that the chief mission of the American presence in the Philippines was to train Filipinos in the art of self-government and prepare them for eventual independence. The Democratic and *Nacionalista* criticism of Republican attitudes and actions regarding Filipinization was not without foundation. The permanent directors of the PCS agreed that Filipinization of the insular government had not progressed satisfactorily under the successive Republican administrations, although the report of 1909 suggested that a major reason was the lack of qualified Filipinos for higher positions in the service.[23]

Another aspect of the problem involved a proposed general reorganization of the bureaus and offices. McIntyre had suggested this as one way of meeting the insular fiscal

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[21] Ibid., December 20, 1913.

[22] Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines* (Quezon City, PI, 1957), 236.

[23] *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1909 (Washington, 1910), 70. The issue of Filipinization concerned only the insular government because municipal and provincial governments had always included large numbers of Filipinos among their officials. By 1913, Filipinos controlled nearly all of the municipal and provincial government positions in the Philippines. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 153-154, 160-163.

deficit. Critics of the insular government charged that some bureaus had outlived their usefulness in whole or in part, that others overlapped one another, and that many had more workers than work. In addition, the original distribution of the bureaus among the departments had reflected the first commissioners' personal inclinations rather than any internal logic. A general reorganization in 1905, inspired by problems similar to those facing Harrison in 1913, had redistributed some of the bureaus and had reduced the percentage of Americans as well as the total number of employees. As a solution, reorganization had proved unpopular in 1905 and would be equally so in 1913. Yet, it was not a prospect that seemed to concern either Harrison or McIntyre.[24]

Finally, there was the perennial headache of the high rate of turnover of Americans in the civil service. Since 1903, the number of voluntary separations or resignations in any twelve-month period had ranged from a low of 376 (14 percent of Americans employed in the service) in 1909 to 787 (24 percent of Americans employed in the service) in 1904. In order to maintain the number of Americans in the service, it had been necessary to bring large numbers of new employees from the United States each year, always at considerable expense. Nor was it always the misfits who voluntarily left the civil service. According to the Director of the Civil Service in 1906, good men rarely wanted to stay more than two to five years, whereas it often proved difficult to induce the inefficient to resign.[25]

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[24] Memorandum, McIntyre to Harrison, September 4, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 1998/84.

[25] Director of Philippine Civil Service, *Annual Report, 1906*, quoted in *Special Report of McIntyre, 1915*, 13, *BIA Records*, File 7519/33½. See also, Letter, Garrison to Forbes, November 18, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 46.

To these more or less familiar problems, Harrison brought what was less a new policy than a new tempo. Armed with Ford's report on conditions in the Philippines, the governor general believed that the insular government had been transformed into an entrenched retentionist-leaning bureaucracy that retarded unnecessarily the employment of capable Filipinos. Harrison moved quickly to remedy the problem with a vigorous Filipinization program. But the governor general knew he would soon have on his hands a public relations war for the hearts and minds of the American people. He later wrote in *Cornerstone* that American retentionists in the Philippine government "stood together upon the issue of Filipinization, like the Old Guard at Waterloo, ready to die, but never to surrender."[26]

Harrison saw in the normally high resignation rate within the insular service an opportunity to replace Americans with Filipinos while acting within the bounds of civil service regulations. That this was accomplished to a considerable extent is supported by the statistics. There were 475 fewer Americans in the permanent civil service on July 1, 1914, than there had been on January 1, 1913, yet during the same eighteen-month period, 665 Americans had resigned, a fairly normal number. Meanwhile, 253 had been separated from the service on an "involuntary" basis, a category that included a few who had died while in service, those dismissed "for cause" under civil service rules, and those whose jobs were eliminated in the drive for economy. It seems apparent that a high proportion of

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[26] Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 76.

the reduction in American personnel must have resulted from filling vacancies, arising from normal occurrences, with Filipinos rather than with Americans.[27]

Yet, it should be understood that there was little need for Harrison to put pressure upon the lower level employees of the service. The resignations that normally occurred each year were enough to provide opportunity for Filipinization of the PCS. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the new regime, including salary cuts approved by the legislature, certainly increased the number of vacancies. Also, Harrison's defenders and critics often overlooked the impact of the First World War in draining even more American personnel from the PCS. Not only was recruitment made more difficult by the war, but also the rate of separations increased enormously as Americans left the Islands for military service and business opportunities.[28] Wholesale persecutions and violations of the law, as were alleged in the press, were hardly necessary.

As governor general, Harrison was limited in his power of appointment and dismissal of bureau chiefs, their assistants, and a few other high officials.[29] Harrison and his supporters sometimes used this technical fact to refute charges that he had dismissed hundreds of Americans from the service. Actually, the governor's influence was

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[27] Of the 155 "involuntary" separations from the insular government in 1914, 10 employees had died, 18 were separated "for cause," and 127 were dismissed because of a reduction in force or the abolition of their positions. *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1916, 28-29.

[28] For the impact of the First World War on the PCS, see Letter, Worcester to the Wood-Forbes Mission, August 4, 1921, in "Selected Letters from Prominent and Representative Businessmen of Long Residence in the Philippines Regarding the Islands. Characteristic of American Sentiment in the Philippines." *BIA Records*, File 22639/A-B-1. This document is part of the unpublished portion of the Wood-Forbes exhibits.

[29] BIA, *Philippine Civil Service: Revised Act and Rules, March 1912* (Washington, DC, 1915). For the powers of the governor general vis-à-vis the insular service, see Sections 1, 14, and 17 of the *Revised Civil Service Act*, 3, 8-9. See also, *Civil Service Rules*, Rule 10 ("Appointment and Employment") and Rule 12 ("Procedure in Reductions, Separations, and Suspensions"), 21-22.

considerable, and Harrison demonstrated on more than several occasions that he was not shy about wielding it. A month after arriving in the Islands, he wrote Garrison a long letter requesting him to terminate all civil service examinations in the United States for appointments to the insular service, "except for really technical positions." Harrison explained why he believed such a dramatic move was necessary:

> Filipinization of the service, although so often promised in the past, has made very little headway. The bureaus are top heavy with Americans and the Filipinos really have very little share in the management of their own government. If they are ever to be tested as to their political capacity, I conceive it to be my duty to give them a chance to fill whatever vacancies may occur in offices for which they are palpably fitted.[30]

The governor general also wasted little time in introducing legislation to make life in the insular government less attractive to Americans already serving. He extended existing regulations prohibiting American officials from participating in Philippine politics to participation in American political parties in the Islands.[31] Harrison also moved to put an end to the Republican policy of encouraging insular officials to engage in business activities in the Philippines. He issued an executive order announcing that the authority to permit government employees to engage in business "will not be favourably [sic] exercised except under most exceptional cases." Harrison explained in his first annual report his principal reason for issuing such an order:

> Under policies announced by all [Washington] administrations, that American occupation of the Islands is not to be permanent, the official with investments here is apt to be unduly influenced in his attitudes towards such a policy, as well as to

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[30] Letter, Harrison to Garrison, October 24, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51.

[31] Circular of the Director of the Civil Service, December 9, 1913, in *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1914*, 31.

> believe he was being forced to suffer unfair hardship if his turn came to return to the United States under the process of filipinization.[32]

In December, however, the governor general learned that a group of army officers, including General Pershing who was governor of Moro Province, and Americans in the insular government had received Forbes' permission to join British nationals in obtaining a large timber concession in Mindanao. The Kolambugan Company acquired a twenty-year concession of nearly 94,000 square acres of prime timberland on the shore of Iligan Bay in Lanao Province. Supported by the War Department, Harrison threatened to withdraw the concession, which forced the Americans to drop out of the consortium. Soon after, Garrison issued an order prohibiting army officers from "entering into any commercial enterprise" or taking part in any enterprise involved "in the use of any right, privilege or concession [to] the property or public right of the Philippine people."[33]

The New Commission

Harrison's arrival in Manila and his dramatic pronouncement of a "new era" in Philippine-American relations also precipitated much maneuvering among Filipino elites for influence with the Democratic governor-general. While the Manila American community focused its attention on the sweeping changes then occurring within the ranks of the PCS, Filipino political rivals and partisan leaders competed with one another for Harrison's ear, especially concerning whom among their countrymen should be appointed

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[32] *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1914*, 30.

[33] Harrison, Executive Order No. 103, in ibid., 30-31. See also, Cables, Harrison to the Secretary of War, December 12, *Harrison Papers*, Cablebook, 1913-1914; Garrison to Harrison, December 16, 1913, ibid.; Harrison to the Secretary of War, December 17, 1913, ibid.; and Harrison to the Secretary of War, January 7, 1914, ibid.

to the Commission. Harrison was immediately drawn into the *Nacionalista* party's bid to dominate both houses of the Philippine Legislature.

Since both Forbes and Worcester had already resigned from the insular government, the Commission in October 1913 included only three Americans: the new governor general, Acting Governor Newton W. Gilbert, and Acting Secretary of Commerce and Police Frank Branagan. As anticipated, Gilbert and Branagan resigned within a few days after Harrison's arrival.[34] More unexpectedly, however, three of the four Filipino commissioners also submitted their resignations, obviously upon request by the governor general. In view of his "inaugural address" at the Luneta, it is not surprising that both the American and Filipino press expressed bewilderment and indignation over this executive action. Harrison defended the sacking of both American and Filipino commissioners by arguing that he needed colleagues willing to give unqualified and vigorous support to the new administration. *The Manila Times*, recalling his reputed Tammany connections, countered that Harrison simply wanted to "clear the decks" in order to appoint commissioners who would "accept the Tammany boss of southern origin as their undisputed political master." Other retentionist-leaning newspapers quickly followed suit and accused the Democrats of inaugurating "an era of partisan politics" in Philippine-American relations.[35]

Harrison's "clearing of the decks," however, involved more than partisan

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[34] Instructions to ask for Branagan's resignation came from the BIA. See Cable, McIntyre to Harrison, October 6, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 3828/1581. Harrison, on the other hand, asked for Gilbert's resignation himself in order to smooth the way for further policy changes. Cable, Harrison to McIntyre, October 8, 1913, ibid., Gilbert Personnel File.

[35] *The Manila Times*, October 8, 9, 10, 1913, quotation from October 10, 1913; *Philippine Free Press*, October 9, 1913; and *Cablenews-American*, October 12, 14, 1913.

housecleaning. Indeed, his explanation for requesting the resignation of all the commissioners rather than just the Americans possessed considerable merit. Retentionists who emphasized the importance of maintaining continuity of personnel or of selecting men with previous experience in the insular government could not have been unaware that such policies would have institutionalized resistance to the Democratic administration and its Filipinization program. They themselves ignored the fact that the Manila American community comprised the Republican Party's largest and most loyal retentionist constituency. At best, it was misleading for the local American press to suggest "for the first time party politics has been allowed to enter into the consideration of the Philippine question."[36]

Nevertheless, the motive for demanding resignations of the Filipino commissioners was in part political, but it was Philippine rather than American politics that played the role of partisan villain in this case. The *Partido Nacionalista*, already in control of four-fifths of the Assembly seats, took advantage of Harrison's sweep of the Commission to eradicate political opposition in the executive body. *Nacionalista* leaders in the Assembly, especially Osmeña, viewed three of the four sitting Filipino commissioners, Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda and Jose Luzuriaga, as political adversaries because they were leaders in the *Partido Progresista Nacional*, the party that had collaborated with American retentionists. Without noting his own excellent relationship with Forbes before the Democrats ascended to power, Osmeña charged that because *Progresistas* no longer possessed the confidence of the Filipino people, they should be removed from power. The speaker pointed out that Benito Legarda, one of the

[36] *The Manila Times*, August 25, 1913, in *Harrison Papers*, Box 27.

first resident commissioners sent to Washington, had lost his bid for re-election in 1911 because he had persistently and vocally opposed independence. More likely, the speaker insisted upon the dismissal of the three *Progresistas* rather than permit them to remain on the Commission where they could possibly frustrate the *Partido Nacionalista's* legislative agenda.[37]

Whatever the motivation, this precipitant pruning of the Commission threw an intolerable workload upon Harrison and Rafael Palma, the one remaining commissioner. Since Wilson would appoint the new American commissioners, Harrison could do little to hasten the completion of the process of establishing a new Commission. In the meantime, the BIA authorized the new regime to begin searching for qualified Filipino candidates to serve on the Commission. Turning to Osmeña for suggestions, Harrison's original plan called for submitting a list of ten or twelve names, furnished by the speaker, to the Assembly for approval. From the approved list of candidates the secretary of war would recommend five for appointment to the Commission.[38]

Unwittingly, Harrison's proposal for a selection process for the Filipino commissioners put him at odds with Garrison and the War Department who resisted relinquishing any authority or influence over the membership of the Commission. The secretary of war wanted to maintain control of the selection process, desiring to appoint only conservative Filipinos who supported American retention of the Philippines and embraced gradual Filipinization of the insular government. Garrison not only disapproved of Harrison's consulting the Assembly on an official basis in the matter of appointments,

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[37] Liang, *Philippine Parties and Politics*, 89-93.

[38] Ibid.

but also wished to avoid precedents implying that the governor general possessed final authority in the selection of commissioners. He wanted it clearly understood that final executive authority concerning Philippine affairs would continue to rest with the BIA in the War Department. Garrison ordered Harrison to submit to him a list of ten Filipino candidates, arranged in order of preference, from which he would choose five commissioners.[39]

Without officially consulting the Assembly, Harrison entered into several lengthy conversations with Osmeña about potential candidates. The speaker impressed upon him the need to sit a majority of *Nacionalista*s on the Commission to ensure a smooth legislative process. Harrison also consulted a number of other Filipino leaders including Cayetano S. Arellano, chief justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, the two resident commissioners, and at least one American, Colonel James G. Harbord, the chief of the Philippine Constabulary. While the documents do not reveal the full range of counsel received by Harrison, it is clear that Osmeña's recommendations won the day. Harrison submitted a list of twelve candidates,[40] the majority of whom were *Nacionalista*s, to the secretary of war with the recommendation that at least two of the five receive portfolios, preferrably the secretaries of public instruction and of finance and justice. Following "a brief but loud conference" with Wilson in the White House, a livid Garrison reluctantly

[39] Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, October 11, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Cablebook, 1913-1914.

[40] In order of preference, the list included Rafael Palma of Manila, Victorino Mapa of Iloilo, Jaime C. de Veyra of Leyte, Vicente Ilustra of Batangas, Vicente Singson-Encarnacion of Ilocos Sur, Alberto Barretto of Zambales, Einisio Jakosalem of Cebu, Espiridpo Guangco of Iloilo, Francisco Ortigas of Manila, Leon Guerrero of Manila, Rafael Corpus of Zambales, and Galicano Apacible of Batangas. Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, October 11, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Cablebook, 1913-1914.

approved the five Filipinos who headed the final list.[41] The secretary of war's attempt to exert influence over the Commission through the appointment of the Filipino commissioners came to an abrupt end when Wilson sent their names to the Senate on October 15. Confirmation followed in due course and, on October 30, the new commissioners were sworn into office.[42]

By virtue of his previous administrative experience and his position as the third ranking member of the *Partido Nacionalista*, Rafael Palma topped the short list submitted to the secretary of war. Typical of *Nacionalista* leaders, he had studied law at the University of Santo Tomas in the early 1890s where he had become acquainted with Osmeña and Quezon. After graduation, he had held office under the Spanish but had turned to journalism before the Philippine Revolution of 1896. He served on the editorial staff of General Antonio Luna's newspaper *La Independencia* and, during the early years of the American occupation, worked on *El Renacimiento*. During these same years, Palma practiced and taught law in Manila. In 1907, however, he entered politics as a member of the First Assembly and the following year was appointed to the Commission. He and Osmeña founded *El Ideal*, the *Partido Nacionalista* organ since 1907, but did not play an active role in its management. Harrison had recommended that Palma be made secretary of public instruction, but the BIA refused. American public education policy, the

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[41] Rafael Palma, *My Autobiography* (Manila, 1953), 97, and Hayden, *The Philippines*, 170-172. Note that Osmeña, not Quezon, played the decisive role in selecting the new Filipino commissioners. Although he was consulted before the list was submitted to Washington, the resident commissioner seems to have had little or no voice in the matter.

[42] Cables, Harrison to McIntyre, October 8, 1913; McIntyre to Harrison, October 8, 1913; Harrison to McIntyre, October 11, 1913; McIntyre to Harrison, October 11, 1913; Harrison to McIntyre, October 13, 1913; Harrison to McIntyre, October 15, 1913, *BIA Records*, Files 397/64-397/68. *The Manila Times*, October 16, 31, 1913.

cornerstone of America's "civilizing" effort in the Philippines, would remain firmly in the hands of American colonial administrators. Later, the Jones Act of 1916 would require that the vice-governor, who presumably would always be an American, head the Department of Public Instruction.[43]

Victorino Mapa of Iloilo, second on the short list, possessed both administrative and judicial experience, having served both as *alcalde* (mayor) of Iloilo and, since 1901, as associate justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. Osmeña, supported by Arellano, had insisted upon Mapa, a member of the minority *Partido Progresista Nacional*, because of his known sympathy for the *Partido Nacionalista's* legislative agenda. Appointed secretary of finance and justice as well as commissioner, Mapa was the only Filipino to receive a portfolio. Third on Harrison's list was Jaime C. de Veyra, who, like Palma, was a prominent journalist turned politician. He helped found *El Nuevo Dia* and served on the staffs of *El Renacimiento* and *El Ideal*. De Veyra had acquired political experience as governor of Leyte Province for one term and as a member of the Assembly for two terms. Because of his "unusual eloquence" on the issue of Philippine independence as well as his loyalty to the *Partido Nacionalista*, Quezon had employed de Veyra briefly as editor of *The Filipino People*, the *Nacionalistas*' principal organ in the United States.[44]

In contrast to the previous three candidates, Vicente Ilustre, a brilliant attorney and talented poet, possessed no previous government experience. Having been a prominent member of the Hong Kong junta in the 1890s he was credited with helping to direct the revolution against Spanish authority in the Islands. Indeed, American colonial

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[43] Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, October 13, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 397/66.

[44] Ibid.

authorities still considered him an *insurrecto* in 1913. Politically independent, Ilustre proved more suspicious of American intentions in the Philippines and more aggressive in his agitation for immediate and complete independence than his *Nacionalista* colleagues. Yet Osmeña desired his appointment in order to maintain close tabs on Ricarte's revolutionary organization in Hong Kong. The final selection, Vicente Singson-Encarnacion, who, like Palma, had known Quezon and Osmeña at the University of Santo Tomas, was also something of a political enigma. Having served in the Assembly since its creation in 1907, Singson was a prominent member of the *Partido Progresista Nacional* in 1913. Distinctly conservative and largely interested in Philippine economic development, Harrison contended that Singson's commercial and financial knowledge would be helpful to the Commission's efforts to reorganize American economic policy in the Philippines.[45]

Thus, by the end of October 1913, less than a month after Harrison's arrival in the Islands, the *Nacionalistas* secured most of the seats on the Commission, giving them effective control of both the upper and lower houses of the Philippine Legislature. Of the five Filipinos sitting on the Commission, only two, Mapa and Singson, were members of the opposition. Harrison revealed later, however, that Mapa and Singson had been chosen because of their sympathy for the *Partido Nacionalista's* legislative agenda. For Harrison, giving the majority party the lion's share of the seats on the Commission seemed the best way to end the existing stalemate between the Commission and the Assembly, and then set a course for eventual independence. Apparently, it never dawned on him that he was

[45] Ibid.

helping to lay the foundation of single-party rule in the Philippines.[46]

Notwithstanding the complexity of Philippine politics at the beginning of the twentieth century,[47] it seems reasonable to conclude that most Filipino elites acquiesced in *Nacionalista* domination of the legislative process for the same reason as the new governor general. After all, at the heart of the two issues that had split the Commission and Assembly since 1907 (control of appropriations and the alleged existence of slavery in the Islands) was the capacity of Filipinos to govern themselves. Not surprising, following the end of the long deadlock and the restoration of harmony between the two houses, the Third Philippine Legislature aggressively attacked these two problems, passing the first appropriations act since 1910 and enacting a sweeping anti-slavery law. Also, before the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the Legislature created a Public Utility Commission, supported Harrison's efforts to reorganize the top-heavy PCS, established for the first time a civilian government in Moroland, reorganized the judiciary, and ended the policy of selling friar lands in large tracts to American corporations, effectively frustrating Republican machinations to attract American investment capital to the Philippines.[48]

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[46] Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 65. See also, Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," *New Left Review* 169 (May/June 1988), 3-31; Harry J. Benda, "Political Elites in Colonial South-East Asia: An Historical Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Sociology and History* VII (1965), 233-251; and Dale S. Miyagi, "Neo-Caciquismo: Origins of Philippine Boss Politics, 1875-1896," *Pacific Asian Studies* I (April 1976), 20-34.

[47] See, for example, Michael Cullinane's insightful dissertation '*Ilustrado* Politics: The Response of the Filipino Educated Elite to American Colonial Rule, 1898-1907' unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1989.

[48] Letter, Harrison to Garrison, May 28, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 32. Concerning the divisive issues confronting the Assembly and Commission between 1907 and 1913, see Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920* (Quezon City, PI, 1977); Rodney J. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester* (Ann Arbor, MI,

Yet, another consideration, often overlooked by students of Philippine politics, helps explain why Filipino elites acquiesced in the *Nacionalistas'* monopoly on the Commission. Notwithstanding their political affiliations, the five Filipinos appointed to the Commission imparted ethnic and, to some degree, regional balance to the upper house of the Legislature. Palma and Ilustre were Tagalogs from Luzon; Mapa was Ilongo (or Western) Visayan; de Veyra was a Wari-wari (or Eastern) Visayan; and Singson an Ilocano. Filipino elites viewed the presence of such an ethnic and regional balance on the new Commission as the first step to overcoming the Philippines' tremendous ethnocultural and regional diversity, then looked upon in Washington as an obstacle to Philippine nation building.[49]

Adding four Filipinos to the Commission on October 30 had raised the total membership of that body to six, but it had also left three vacancies, including three of the four departmental secretaryships. Mapa's assumption of his duties as secretary of finance and justice provided a distinct improvement over the preceding month in which Harrison and Palma had sat together as the upper house of the Legislature while dividing the executive responsibilities between themselves. During the interim before the arrival of the new American commissioners, Palma served as acting secretary of public instruction, and Harrison retained personal control over both the Department of Interior and the Department of Commerce and Police. For a time, Harrison apparently

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1991), 171-176; Frank Jenista, Jr., "Conflict in the Philippine Legislature: The Commission and the Assembly from 1907 to 1913," in Norman G. Owen, et al., eds., *Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations, 1898-1946* (Manila, PI, 1971), 35-48; and Vicente A. Pacis, "The Enduring Relevance of Sergio Osmeña," *Bulletin. American Historical Collection* (Manila), VI, No. 3 (July-September 1978), 26-41.

[49] Letter, Harrison to Garrison, October 24, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51.

expected, and may have even hoped, that additional appointments would be delayed until the following spring, affording him time to forge a working relationship with the Filipino commissioners before their American colleagues arrived.[50]

Garrison, however, would hear none of it. Still reeling from his failed attempt to exercise authority over the Commission through the selection of Filipino commissioners who would support only slow, conservative change in the insular government, he decided to secure the selection of at least one of the American commissioners who would have a moderating influence within the Harrison administration. Despite the fact that only one Filipino commissioner possessed a portfolio, Garrison deemed it necessary to impose some balance on the Commission by securing the appointment of American commissioners who would temper Harrison's, and the *Nacionalistas*', legislative agenda. Ultimately, the secretary of war's efforts to manipulate the membership of the Commission produced an administrative crisis within the Commission that very nearly culminated in a new, more explosive Filipino-American administrative stalemate.

The Harrison-Riggs Administrative Crisis

Since his election, Wilson had received numerous suggestions for appointments to the Philippine Commission. Equating the position with the rank and prestige of a third assistant secretary of state, Wilson and House sifted through scores of potential appointees during the winter and spring of 1912-1913. There is some evidence that House might have considered the Commission a political dumping ground for "deserving

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[50] Letter, McIntyre to Joseph P. Tumulty, October 30, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

Democrats" who were considered inappropriate for other more sensitive posts. In this respect, House suggested that Governor John E. Osborne of Wyoming be appointed to the Commission just so Secretary of State Bryan could not appoint him as first assistant secretary of state. Neither House nor Wilson believed Osborne fit for service in the State Department because he had "neither the culture nor the training for it."[51] Other potential candidates included Captain A.M. Wilson, a member of the Democratic State Central Committee of Oregon, who had campaigned vigorously for Wilson in the Pacific Northwest, and Dudley Field Malone, also an enthusiastic supporter of Wilson's "New Freedom" platform in the election of 1912. When asked by the press on May 15, 1913 whether he was approaching the moment when he would appoint new commissioners, Wilson responded that he had not "lost sight of it." He simply had not located the "best men" for the job.[52]

Garrison, however, became increasingly vexed by the continuing vacancies on the Commission, especially after the Philippine Legislature opened a new session following the appointment of the Filipino members of the Commission. Garrison wanted to round out the Commission with conservative Americans before Harrison could effect any radical changes in Philippine policy. Therefore, the secretary of war resolved to locate "suitable" American candidates with all dispatch, urging Wilson to immediate action. Already under fire from Republicans and Progressives for not filling key government posts with qualified Americans within a reasonable time frame since his inauguration,

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[51] House, Diary Entry, February 21, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 125-127.

[52] Letters, B.E. Haney to Wilson, December 7, 1912, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, file 44A, reel 192; W.H. Cochran to Wilson, December 12, 1912, ibid.; Wilson, Miscellaneous Notes, ca. March-April, 1913, ibid.; and Wilson, Press Conference (Washington, DC), May 15, 1913, *PWW*, XXVII, 430-435.

Wilson gave in. In less than a month after the Senate's confirmation of the Filipino commissioners, Wilson completed the Commission by appointing Henderson S. Martin of Kansas as Harrison's vice-governor and secretary of public instruction, Winfred T. Denison of New York as secretary of interior, and Clinton Riggs of Maryland as secretary of commerce and police.[53]

Unfortunately for Garrison, however, American political considerations rather than candidates' interest in or knowledge of the Philippines dictated two of the three American appointments to the Commission, namely Martin and Denison. Since Harrison, Riggs, and Denison all came from the eastern part of the United States, Martin's midwestern origins offered regional balance. More importantly, Wilson needed to reward Kansas Democrats for their narrow victory in swinging the state to the Democratic party in the 1912 presidential election. A well known Democrat and attorney, Martin had served as chairman of the state central committee for six years and as campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate George H. Hodges, a loyal supporter of Wilson. By November 1913, the president had begun to consider Martin for the Philippine Commission to repay his political debt to Hodges' and Martin's friends in the Kansas Democratic party. Although no record exists of Garrison's reaction to Martin's candidacy, Wilson did encounter some opposition from Senator William H. Thompson (Democrat-Kansas). Thompson feared Martin's appointment might prejudice his case for a "Mr. Caldwell," who had solicited a diplomatic post in Persia. The president insisted, however, writing to Thompson "I [have] had in mind for Kansas something much bigger than a diplomatic

[53] *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 1st session, 6010, and Letter, Harrison to Garrison, September 30, 1913, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51.

appointment, namely, a Commissionership to the Philippines, for which I hoped to secure Mr. Henderson Martin. This is one of the most important appointments I shall have to make, and I am sure you will appreciate my feeling in the matter." Thompson yielded, apparently with good grace.[54]

A semblance of bipartisanship was introduced with the appointment of Denison, a Republican who had bolted to the Progressives in 1912. Born in Maine, the Harvard-educated Denison first gained political prominence in connection with his investigation of the American Sugar Refining Company as assistant attorney general of New York. Denison's anti-trust crusading, however, earned him political enemies in New York, including Thomas S. Sharrette, the powerful member of the New York Board of General Appraisers. When the Wilson administration expressed interest in the young attorney as a candidate for the Philippine Commission, Sharrette and his allies recruited the aid of Senator Reed Smoot (Republican- Utah) to block Denison's appointment. Again, unforeseen circumstances forced Wilson to expend valuable political capital to secure his candidate's appointment to the Philippine Commission. While Denison waited in San Francisco, Wilson maneuvered behind the scenes to secure his confirmation by the Senate. Reservations for the long ocean voyage to Manila were made by Denison on seven separate occasions, only to be canceled at the last minute when no word came from Washington. Wilson eventually prevailed and the Senate confirmed him on January 27,

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[54] Letters, Wilson to Bryan, November 21 and 22, 1913, *Papers of William J. Bryan* [hereafter *Bryan Papers*], microfilm series, and Wilson to Senator William H. Thompson, November 24, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44A, reel 192. Although no third party had organized in Kansas in the 1912 presidential election, the Republican split between Roosevelt and Taft paved the way for a narrow Democratic victory there. See June G. Cabe and Charles A. Sullivant, *Kansas Votes: National Elections, 1859-1956* (Lawrence, KS, 1957), 30, 56.

1914. Denison left San Francisco for Manila on February 3, arriving there two weeks later.[55]

Garrison had managed to engineer only Riggs' appointment to the Commission. The secretary of war had suggested Riggs to Wilson in order to give "political balance" to the Commission. Cognizant of the retired Baltimore manufacturer's firm opposition to any relaxation of American political or economic controls in the Philippines, Garrison hoped that Riggs' presence on the Commission would offset any radical departure from existing insular policies. Suspicious of Harrison's relationship with Quezon and uncertain of the new governor general's precise views concerning a timetable for Philippine independence, Garrison thought it necessary to appoint to the Commission someone with a "conservative outlook on the Filipino question" who could neutralize the *Partido Nacionalista's* influence on the new colonial administration. More importantly, Garrison saw in Riggs a way for him to keep tabs on Harrison and to exert a moderating influence in the Commission. Although it is not clear to what extent Wilson agreed with his secretary of war on the need to "balance" the Commission with a retentionist, the president consented to Riggs' appointment and the Senate confirmed him without incident.[56]

Riggs' appointment to the Commission, however, proved to be far more troublesome than Garrison or Wilson could have imagined. First, Riggs' conservatism on

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[55] Letters, McIntyre to Harrison, November 30, 1913, *BIA Records*, Denison Personnel File; Wilson to Senator Thomas J. Walsh, January 21, 1914, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191; Wilson to Senator Willard Saulsbury, January 21, 1914, ibid.; Saulsbury to Wilson, January 23, 1914, ibid.; and Telegram, McIntyre to Denison, January 27, 1914, *BIA Records*, Denison Personnel File.

[56] Letter, Garrison to Wilson, October 17, 1913, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191; *The Manila Times*, November 25, 1913; and Cable, Quezon to Harrison, June 23, 1914, *Harrison Papers*,

the Philippine question very quickly alienated him from his more liberal-minded colleagues on the Commission. His unwavering defense of the Republican policy of indefinite retention became a source of embarrassment for the Harrison administration and an object of resentment for *Nacionalista* leaders. Indeed, McIntyre later wrote: "Mr. Riggs was probably, on the Philippine question, more conservative than any man who had ever been on the Commission, Republican or Democrat."[57] Moreover, because the secretary of war had personally lobbied for his appointment, Riggs' staunch retentionism called into question Garrison's commitment to Wilson's Philippine policy, ultimately creating an embarrassing situation for both the War Department and the White House that was not completely resolved until Garrison's resignation in early 1916. Second, and most important, Riggs, as secretary of commerce and police, believed he held a position of power virtually equal to that of the governor general. This notion inevitably precipitated a serious administrative crisis in the Islands in which both Riggs and Harrison called upon their respective allies in Manila and Washington for support.[58]

This administrative crisis, emanating from the appointment of Riggs to the Commission rather than the retentionist public relations campaign then being waged in Washington and Manila, very nearly led to Harrison's resignation as governor general. The crisis is significant in that it illuminates the extent of the efforts by Garrison, McIntyre and the War Department to temper Harrison's policy of rapid Filipinization which, in their estimation, threatened the efficiency of the colonial government and

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Box 34.

[57] *Special Report of McIntyre, 1915*, 74, in *BIA Records*, File 7519/33½.

[58] Ibid.

moved Filipinos dangerously close to a date of separation from the United States. Had this little-known crisis ended with Harrison's resignation rather than that of Riggs, another stalemate between the Commission and the Assembly would certainly have materialized and the credibility of Wilson's "New Freedom" policy in the Philippines would have been damaged beyond repair.

The genesis of the administrative crisis can be discerned in a series of conversations between Riggs and War Department officials before the former departed the United States for his post in the Philippines. While in Washington, Riggs had apparently been informed by McIntyre that the organic act of 1902 specified that the governor general was simply first among equals in the Commission with no special executive powers. Riggs failed to take notice, however, that, in practice, the executive power of the governor general had been assumed, exercised, and accepted with little or no question for over twelve years. As events turned out in 1914 and 1915, the chief of the BIA lost his nerve when it came to experimenting with commission government in the absence of an effective executive.[59]

Riggs also claimed to draw authority from an interview he had with Garrison before leaving Washington. At that time, the secretary of war reportedly had promised him a free hand in running the Department of Commerce and Police without interference from Harrison. Although Garrison left no comment or memorandum from their meeting, making it impossible to determine precisely what had transpired between the two men, it seems incredible that he would have authorized a single commissioner to by-pass the

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[59] James C. Biedzynski, 'Frank McIntyre and the Philippines,' unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio University, 1990, 158-159.

chief insular executive, ignoring traditional lines of authority, and report directly to the War Department. Yet, it should be remembered that Garrison had been only mildly supportive of Harrison's appointment as governor general, believing him to be in Quezon's pocket. Also, Riggs had been Garrison's personal choice for the position. Perhaps in discussing their general agreement on the need for only slow, conservative change in the Philippines, and in expressing interest in any personal observations his friend might offer, Garrison had given Riggs some grounds for belief that he was being accorded a special position on the Commission.[60]

In any case, the fact that Riggs believed he did not need to report to or accept the directions of Harrison guaranteed a clash with the governor general. Unfortunately, such a clash was not long delayed because Riggs arrived in Manila with a grievance on his lips. In December 1913, the Philippine Legislature abolished the Bureau of Navigation, which had been part of the Department of Commerce and Police. While the reorganization seemed justified on the whole, both McIntyre and Garrison suspected that personal grudges toward "persons formerly connected with the Department of Commerce and Police and with the Bureau of Navigation" had been partly responsible for the abolition of the bureau, the sale of some of its assets, and the dispersal of its functions.[61] The

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[60] Letters, Harrison to Garrison, May 31, 1914 and July 6, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34. The following cables contain the best descriptions of what Harrison understood Riggs to be claiming concerning authority conferred upon him by Garrison. Although Riggs complained that Harrison's characterizations of his claims to special authority were misleading, Riggs' own discussion of the authority to be exercised by department secretaries and by the governor general confirm Harrison's general statement on this point. See Cable, Riggs to Garrison, June 18, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4150/69. See also the report of a conversation between Harrison's personal secretary, Samuel Ferguson, and McIntyre, in which the chief of the BIA reported that Garrison thought some of the difficulty between Harrison and Riggs "due to the fact that he had not been definite enough with Riggs in outlining to him the feature of subordination." Cable, Ferguson to Harrison, December 21, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 32.

[61] Letter, Garrison to Harrison, August 7, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4150/70. One of these persons

legislation required that some of the bureau's assets, notably the marine railways and repair shops, be put on the auction blocks. In addition, the bureau's Division of Port Works and Lighthouse Construction was transferred to the Bureau of Public Works while the Division of Navigation and Lighthouses somewhat illogically was transferred to the Bureau of Customs within the Department of Finance and Justice, now under the supervision of the lone Filipino commissioner with portfolio.[62]

Riggs had heard about these changes while still in the United States. After taking the oath of office, he protested vigorously against permitting a reduction in his department before he could reach the Islands. To appease Riggs, Garrison suggested that the commissioner investigate the situation when he arrived in Manila and, if the facts warranted it, the legislation could be vetoed in Washington. It was with this in mind that Riggs arrived in the Philippines in February 1914, several weeks after the legislation had been put into effect. Harrison had supported the abolition of the Bureau of Navigation and, while obliged to allow an investigation into the facts by Riggs, he believed that he was simply humoring the newest commissioner in an unnecessary project. If, however, he had hoped that Riggs would eventually drop the matter, Harrison became disillusioned by the report submitted by his secretary of commerce and police to the War Department in May 1914. Riggs not only concluded that the Bureau of Navigation had been both

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was Captain Frank Helm, chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who was in the United States when the Philippine Legislature passed the bill and who apparently met with Riggs in Washington to inform him about conditions in the Islands. Another retentionist targeted by Filipino legislators may have been Riggs' predecessor, Frank Branagan.

[62] *Philippine Commission Report*, 1914, 8, 121, and Letter, Harrison to Garrison, January 11, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51. For a summary of the controversy, including an evaluation of the legislation abolishing the Bureau of Navigation, see McIntyre, "Memorandum: Bureau of Navigation -- Philippine Islands," August 7, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4150/70C.

effective and efficient before its "unwarranted reorganization," but he also contended that the legislation abolishing the bureau had been illegal. In response to Riggs' findings, Garrison decided to meet the commissioner halfway, ordering the return of the Division of Navigation and Lighthouses to the Department of Commerce and Police but refusing to accept Riggs' conclusion that the legislation had been illegal.[63]

No sooner had Garrison penned his response to Riggs, however, that the political sparring between Harrison and his secretary of commerce and police took a more serious turn and developed into a major administrative crisis that threatened to disrupt the newly-found spirit of Filipino-American cooperation. To be sure, Garrison's apparent vindication of Riggs' allegation that the new governor general had exceeded his authority in reorganizing the Department of Commerce and Police made Harrison unsure of his position with the War Department, especially in any conflict with Riggs. He could hardly help wondering to what extent Garrison would support Riggs or whether there had been some secret understanding between the two when he secured a Philippine commissionership for him. After all, the secretary of war's opposition to any radical departure in American policy in the Philippines that pushed the Islands closer towards complete independence was well known. In addition, the absence of a clear statement of support by Garrison for the governor general in the face of a barrage of attacks by retentionists in Manila and Washington since his arrival in the Philippines simply confirmed Harrison in his bewilderment. He believed that at best he lacked support in the War Department and at worst he was being undermined, perhaps with Riggs as a potential

[63] Letter, Riggs to Garrison, May 26, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4150/67; Cables, Harrison to Garrison, January 11, March 31, and May 8, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51; Garrison to Harrison, July 2, 1914, ibid., Box 46; and Garrison to Harrison, August 7, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4150/70.

successor.[64]

Quezon exacerbated Harrison's misgivings with frequent cables elucidating his distrust of Riggs and his War Department benefactors. In one such cable, Quezon complained that Riggs, before departing the United States for the Philippines, refused to confer with Congressman Jones about the impending Philippine independence bill in Congress. Riggs reportedly described the second Jones bill as "a dead letter," explaining that he had already met with Taft and Forbes on numerous occasions and they had provided him with all the counsel he required on the subject of Philippine independence.[65]

In addition, knowledge that the Manila American community endeavored to make good use of the strained relations between Harrison and Riggs by supporting the latter's efforts to curb, if not completely thwart, Filipinization of the insular government exacerbated the emerging crisis within the Commission. Prior to Riggs' arrival in Manila, retentionists had attempted to recruit Martin, a Republican, to their cause, hoping to drive a wedge between the new vice-governor and governor-general. The retentionist ploy backfired, however, as both Martin and Harrison ultimately saw through it and moved even closer together on policy matters.[66] Because Denison held views similar to those of Harrison concerning Filipino capacities for self-government, the Manila American community was forced to center its hopes on Riggs to restrain Harrison and wreck his

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[64] Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 70-71.

[65] Cable, Quezon to Harrison, May 10, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51.

[66] Cable, Harrison to Garrison, March 31, 1914, ibid.

Filipinization program.[67]

Throughout, Riggs maintained that he was not subject to Harrison's direction in the management of the Department of Commerce and Police. He argued that the governor general's official relationship with the insular department heads was entirely advisory in nature, not supervisory. Harrison ultimately decided to chance it and cabled the secretary of war, requesting that the War Department issue an official memorandum outlining in detail the proper relationship between the governor general and the executive department secretaries. Certain of Wilson's confidence in him, Harrison also requested that the president be consulted.[68] Garrison's reply, however, only stipulated that the organic act of 1902 required the governor general to have direct authority within the insular bureaus and departments:

> Secretaries of Departments exercise their executive control under the general supervision of the Governor General. This general rule applies in all cases where the performance of a specific duty by a particular person is not required by law. In many cases, the Governor General, by law, is given direct authority within bureaus and departments.[69]

Clearly, Garrison had consulted only BIA files for such a vague and indecisive statement that allowed both Harrison and Riggs to interpret it favorably. Even more alarming to Harrison, however, was the fact that he could discern no evidence that the secretary of war had ever consulted Wilson about the emerging crisis within the Commission.[70]

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[67] Cable, Harrison to Quezon, May 11, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4, and Letter (Personal and Confidential), Harrison to Andrew Peters, May 2, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 31.

[68] Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, May 31, 1914, ibid., Box 34.

[69] Letter, Garrison to Harrison, June 8, 1914, ibid.

[70] Letter (Personal and Confidential), Harrison to Peters, May 2, 1914, ibid., Box 31.

Thoroughly dismayed by the secretary of war's apparent refusal to censure Riggs' challenges to his executive authority as governor general, Harrison became despondent and contemplated resigning in protest. He wrote to his brother Fairfax Harrison, the new director of the Southern Railroad Company, that Riggs was "trying to destroy my administration, being used as a political medium for special interests here, and appears to believe himself the especially delegated and empowered representative of the Secretary of War. . . . Only direct intervention by the President himself can prevent my position from becoming untenable."[71] It was at this point in the crisis that Harrison, uncertain of the War Department's support for him or his policies, decided to break with the established chain of command and reach out indirectly to the secretary of state for backing in Washington. After all, it had been Bryan, presumably at the urging of Quezon, who first brought Harrison's nomination for governor general to Wilson's attention the year before. Harrison reasoned that Bryan could be trusted to do what Garrison and the War Department seemed unwilling to do -- intercede on his behalf with the president. To this end, the governor general cabled his brother in Baltimore, instructing him to deliver a message, encrypted in classified diplomatic code, to the State Department describing the impending administrative crisis in Manila.[72]

Fairfax, upon receipt of the message, reported that Bryan expressed sympathy for the governor general's predicament and promised to see Wilson before anyone else, presumably Garrison. No evidence exists, however, that Bryan ever met with the president to discuss the administrative controversy in the Philippines. Perhaps the

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[71] Cable, Harrison to Fairfax Harrison, May 31, 1914, ibid., Box 34.

[72] Ibid., and Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 70-71.

secretary of state thought twice about becoming embroiled in an affair that did not directly concern the State Department. In any case, nothing came of Harrison's approach to Bryan for assistance.[73]

As it turned out, *Nacionalista* leaders saved the day for Harrison. Osmeña, convinced that Riggs was "thoroughly anti-Filipino," complained to Quezon that the Filipino members of the Commission no longer had confidence in Riggs as an administrator who had the best interests of the Philippines at heart. Indeed, most Filipino elites, Osmeña advised, looked upon the secretary of commerce and police as an "uncompromising retentionist" determined to unseat Harrison and to impede Filipinization of the insular government at every opportunity. Upon receipt of this information, Quezon took it upon himself to inquire into the War Department's perspective on the emerging administrative crisis in Manila. Garrison's response that the Harrison-Riggs conflict was nothing more than a "petty hassle between two stubborn colonial administrators" infuriated the resident commissioner. Quezon quickly deduced that his only recourse was to bring the administrative crisis into "the light of day" on the House floor and inform the White House that the conflict between Harrison and Riggs constituted a direct political confrontation between American retentionists and "the most liberal proconsul that the Islands had ever witnessed in nearly three centuries of colonial subjugation." Quezon cabled Osmeña that it was clear that the objective of the retentionists acting in concert in Washington and Manila was to compel Harrison to resign as governor general, an act that would delay the achievement of Filipino home rule

[73] Letters, Fairfax Harrison to Harrison, June 24, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34, and Fairfax Harrison to Samuel Ferguson, June 1, 1914, ibid.

for at least a decade. Like Harrison, Quezon concluded that only decisive executive action by Wilson could rescue the situation and save the governor general from the War Department's retentionist machinations.[74]

Quezon bypassed Garrison as he often preferred to do and conferred with Wilson in the White House in June 1914 about the political crisis in Manila. Earlier that spring, the president had begun conferring with Jones and other congressional leaders about the need to pass a revised version of the Jones bill in the next session of Congress to provide the Philippines with a new organic act that would insulate the Filipinization process from partisan politics and retentionist back-sliding. Notwithstanding Wilson's expressed support for the so-called second Jones bill, the resident commissioner understood that, by advising the president in person that Riggs "had positively lost the confidence of the Filipino commissioners," he was testing the president's commitment to Filipinization and the movement towards greater Filipino autonomy. So did Wilson. Without hesitation, Wilson reportedly instructed Quezon to do everything within his power to make it emphatically clear to all parties in the Philippine Legislature that he possessed complete confidence in Harrison. In the meantime, he would communicate to the War Department his strong support for the governor general and his actions. Wilson subsequently wrote to Garrison, "I would back him [Harrison] up in <u>everything</u> unless the Governor was absolutely wrong [emphasis Wilson's]. . . . I would back him up to the extent of asking everybody's resignation before I would overrule him." Wilson expressed his fears concerning the administrative crisis in Manila in a confidential memo to Tumulty. "Any

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[74] Cables, Osmeña to Quezon, June 20, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4; Quezon to Osmeña, June 22, 1914, ibid.; and Quezon to Harrison, n.d. [ca. June 20, 1914] and June 23, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34.

kind of trouble in the Islands," he wrote, could "undermine all the administration's hard work" for the cultivation of democracy in the Islands.[75] Nevertheless, upon learning of the president's endorsement of him, Harrison cabled Quezon that all doubts had been dispelled "in the minds of any persons in this community that he was working along the lines desired by the President."[76]

The Harrison-Riggs administrative crisis, however, was hardly over. The controversy reached its apex in August 1914 when Riggs challenged the governor general's authority over control of the Philippine Constabulary. Upon an appeal by two American residents, Riggs dispatched all available Constabulary troops, supported by reserves from the City of Manila Police Department, to San Juan, a poverty-ridden suburb of Manila, to suppress a rumored Filipino insurrection. Although American fears of such an event proved illusory, the affair brought the crisis within the Commission to a head because Riggs never informed his superior about the seemingly impending insurrection or about the measures he proposed to take to suppress it. Retentionists had long promulgated rumors of an impending second general insurrection in the Philippines as part of their efforts to discredit the argument that peace and order prevailed in the Islands and that Filipinos, as a mature and disciplined race who embraced peaceful progress, were capable of greater autonomy or independence. Riggs' deployment of the Constabulary to suppress the long-awaited insurrection received widespread coverage by the press in the

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[75] Letters, Wilson to Garrison, June 8, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 2026/24, and Wilson to Tumulty, July 5, 1914, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[76] Cables, Quezon to Harrison, June 25, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34; Quezon to Osmeña, June 26, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4; Quezon to Samuel Ferguson, July 6, 1914, ibid.; and Harrison to Quezon, July 2, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 51.

Philippines and the United States, lending a certain quality of legitimacy to the retentionist rumors.[77]

Outraged that he had been kept in the dark about "the threat" of insurrection and incensed over Riggs' unilateral decision to deploy the Constabulary, Harrison reprimanded his subordinate and insisted that he be informed about all questions concerning public order in the Islands. Thereafter, Riggs was instructed to brief the governor general each morning regarding all threats, real and imagined, that might affect the safety of the public and was ordered never to dispatch the Constabulary without first obtaining the governor general's official consent. Of course, Riggs considered Harrison's dressing him down as an infringement upon his authority as secretary of commerce and police and confidently requested that the question of the governor general's proper authority over the executive departments once again be submitted to the secretary of war for clarification.[78]

In addition to cabling Garrison for further clarification of the lines of authority, Harrison asked his brother to appeal once more to Bryan for support. Still disappointed in the secretary of state's response earlier in the summer, Fairfax decided to meet with Garrison instead. Following two lengthy conversations, the secretary of war convinced Fairfax that his subsequent inaction in resolving the crisis derived from a memorandum from Vice-Governor Martin, reporting that the tension between Harrison and Riggs was

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[77] *The Manila Times*, August 24 and 26, 1914. Even the outbreak of general war in Europe failed to push news of the "insurrection" in the Philippines off the front pages of American newspapers. See *New York Times*, August 26, 1914, and *Washington Evening Star*, August 29, 1914. See also, Harrison, *Cornerstone*, 150-151.

[78] Cable, Harrison to the Secretary of War, August 28, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34.

not serious but merely a matter of learning to work together.[79] More importantly, Garrison assured Fairfax that if the crisis ever devolved into having to make a choice about retaining either Harrison or Riggs, the War Department would recall Riggs.[80]

Clearly, the secretary of war's tune had changed. Believing Riggs had overstepped his bounds, Garrison cabled Harrison that the governor general possessed direct authority over the Constabulary. His ruling on the subject proved sufficiently sharp in tone to carry its own warning to Riggs. Although no further direct clashes between Harrison and Riggs occurred afterward, the fact that Riggs had alienated himself from the remaining commissioners meant that he would have to go. Some talk of finding a diplomatic post for Riggs, perhaps in Siam [Thailand], surfaced, but by the spring of 1915, ill health forced Riggs to return to the United States on medical leave. He never returned to the Philippines and eventually resigned from public office on October 31, 1915.[81] Of course, Riggs' departure from the Islands angered many within the Manila American community who blamed Harrison personally for his demise.[82]

The resolution of the Harrison-Riggs administrative controversy in the governor general's favor proved doubly significant. First, not only had Harrison maintained control over his department secretaries, but he also thwarted the Manila American community's

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[79] Cable, Martin to Garrison, July 3, 1914, *BIA Records*, Martin Personnel File.

[80] Letter, Fairfax Harrison to Harrison, September 15, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Box 34.

[81] Letter, Harrison to Fairfax Harrison, November 1, 1914, ibid., Box 32; Cables, Quezon to Osmeña, December 18, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4; McIntyre to Harrison, February 24, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 32; Letter, Mary Cromwell Riggs to Lawrason Riggs, March 20, 1915, *BIA Records*, Riggs Personnel File; Cables, McIntyre to Harrison, March 24, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 38; Garrison to Harrison, May 6, 1915, ibid.; and McIntyre to Harrison, October 30, 1915, ibid.

[82] See for example, *The Manila Times*, November 8, 1915, in *Harrison Papers*, Box 35.

and the War Department's efforts to temper his ambitious Filipinization program. More than the public attacks by retentionists in the United States and the Philippines, the Harrison-Riggs imbroglio had very nearly culminated in the governor general's resignation. Only Wilson's support for Harrison, at Quezon's suggestion, saved the situation for the supporters of Filipinization. The controversy had prompted the president to make clear his support for the fundamental shifts then occurring in American policy and personnel in the Philippines.

Second, Harrison's triumph ensured that the *Nacionalista*s would possess hegemony over the legislative process in the insular government. With the crisis over and the potential for a new stalemate ended, Harrison and the *Nacionalista* oligarchy turned their attention to ousting retentionist constituencies in other parts of the Philippine government. Afterwards, Filipinization of the insular government continued unabated without further serious challenges from within the Philippines.

Before his tenure as governor general ended in 1921, Harrison, now safely at the helm, directed the gradual transformation of the insular government from one of Americans aided by Filipinos, to one of Filipinos assisted by Americans. But whether or not Filipinization of the Philippine government would survive beyond Harrison's tenure depended upon the success of Wilson and his advisers in redefining the colonial bond. In the end, everyone with a vested interest in the Philippine question understood that the long-term success of Harrison's efforts to shift "the White Man's Burden" rested upon the Wilson administration's ability to secure passage of a new organic act in Congress that declared eventual independence as the objective of America's Philippine policy and reorganized the insular government to provide greater self-government for the Filipino

people.

Chapter Six
Redefining the Colonial Bond

On December 2, 1913, Wilson, in his first state of the union address before both houses of Congress, announced that his administration would formulate a new organic act for the Philippines aimed at redefining America's colonial bond with its Filipino wards. Contrasting the "mere military despotism" that existed in Mexico under Victoriano Huerta to which the president adamantly opposed and his administration's Filipinization program in the Philippines which was laying the cornerstone of Filipino self-government in "a thoughtful and permanent manner," Wilson declared that he intended to transform the Islands into a showcase for democracy in Asia. He stated that the successful transformation of the Philippines into an Asian dominion formed an important part of his emerging foreign policy towards the nonwestern world. In this respect, Wilson asserted that the cultivation of genuine Filipino self-government under American tutelage would not only demonstrate America's disinterestedness as a world power whereby the United States acted as the "friend and champion of constitutional government" throughout the world, but the establishment of a stable Philippine government controlled by Filipinos and assisted by a few Americans would also serve as an effective blueprint for how other nonwestern societies, such as Mexico, should approach democratic reform. Thus, Wilson concluded, his administration's ultimate objective in the Philippines was "to set up as quickly as possible a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their own control." As for when the United States would relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines, Wilson never alluded to any specific timetable nor offered details about any necessary preconditions before final separation

could be completed. Instead, the president spoke only in general terms, declaring that his administration would continue to "extend and perfect step by step the system of self-government in the Islands, making test of them and modify them as experience discloses their successes and failures."[1]

Some historians, in explaining Wilson's apparent unwillingness to delineate a precise timetable for Philippine independence, have emphasized the role of domestic politics in tempering the president's public remarks about the issue. In the year between Wilson's Staunton address in which the president-elect declared that America's frontier in the Islands was at an end and his first state of the union address, the debate on the Philippine question had become polarized into two camps at opposite ends of the political spectrum. At one end, southern and western Democrats under Secretary of State Bryan, Representative William A. Jones (Democrat-Virginia), and Senator John S. Williams (Democrat-Mississippi), supported by the aging but still vocal leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League, continued to argue for the adoption of a policy of immediate and complete independence. At the other end, conservative Progressives and Republicans under former President Taft, supported by the Catholic Church, the War Department and the business community in the United States and the Manila American community in the Philippines, remained solid in their support for permanent retention. Wilson and moderate Democrats found themselves stuck in the middle with little room to maneuver in redefining America's relationship with the Philippine people. For these historians then, the existence of a serious rift not only between Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives

[1] Wilson, Annual Message before Congress, December 2, 1913, *PWW*, XXIX, 3-11. Quotations on 8.

over the future status of the Philippines, but also within the Democratic ranks in Congress and within Wilson's own cabinet, dictated that prudence govern the president's actions on the issue lest he court disaster for his "New Freedom" legislative agenda and his party's political future.[2]

While it is clear that polarization among Democrats and others concerning Philippine independence did indeed shape the debate on the provisions of a new organic act, Wilson's support for early separation cannot be assumed. On the contrary, Wilson never publicly entertained a specific date for Philippine independence; his general statements on the question since 1898 were consistent in supporting complete separation only after several generations of American tutelage. Also, Wilson still did not equate self-government with self-determination or independence. Instead, he wanted to forge a new organic act in Congress that would extend more self-government to Filipinos without severing the colonial bonds until some unspecified date in the future. Yet, accomplishing this political feat required the president to create and maintain a new consensus on the Philippine question, one that embraced a more moderate and gradual approach to separation.

December 1913 – February 1914

When the regular session of the Sixty-third Congress convened in December 1913, the prospects that any Philippine legislation would reach the floor were not bright. In spite of his call for action on the Philippine question in his first annual message to Congress,

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[2] Johnson, *Peace Progressives*, 34-70, and Golay, *Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946* (Madison, WI, 1998), 183-184.

Wilson had already attached priority to passage of his central banking and antitrust measures which he expected to be controversial and time consuming. Impatient to act, however, Quezon and Osmeña moved forward to shape the contours of any new Philippine legislation, including the definition of the conditions and timetable for the withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Islands. For them, the determination of the timing and circumstances of independence constituted the most critical part of any new organic act. Although the exigencies of Filipino politics had dictated that the two *Nacionalista* leaders make immediate and complete separation from the United States their magnetic slogan to ride to political power in the Islands, neither supposed the Philippines ready for absolute independence. Instead, both Quezon and Osmeña desired only two objectives: an official American assurance of eventual independence, and the achievement of complete Filipino home rule under American protection. Although they understood that public support for anything less than immediate and complete independence was tantamount to political suicide in the Philippine political landscape, they believed American withdrawal from the Islands would yield even more disastrous consequences not only for the *Partido Nacionalista* but also for the Archipelago itself.[3]

Wilson's personal ambiguity and vague public rhetoric concerning the Philippine question since his inauguration had only added to the *Nacionalista* leadership's anxiety. Even after the controversy over the selection of a governor general had been resolved with Harrison's appointment, the president had continued to desist from offering any definitive statement on the timing of and conditions for Philippine independence. As a

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[3] Dapen Liang, *The Development of Philippine Political Parties* (Hong Kong, 1939), 88-89.

result, worried Filipino leaders could only grope in the dark about what would be the Democratic administration's timetable for complete American separation.

The rapid pace and sweeping nature of Harrison's Filipinization program reinforced the *Nacionalista* leaders' sense of urgency. On the one hand, Osmeña feared that continued precipitate action by the Harrison administration would eventually impair the efficiency of the insular government that, in turn, would jeopardize Filipino claims that they were prepared for home rule. When presented with a list of American employees in the Philippine Civil Service by Harrison and asked to identify those who should be replaced by Filipinos, Osmeña refused. Instead, the speaker advised that radical changes should be delayed until the governor general could acquire personal knowledge of men and conditions in the Philippines. Harrison, however, remained undeterred. He responded to Osmeña's plea for moderation by stating that since he had already started the job of rooting out American retentionists in the insular government, he had to be thorough.[4] Quezon, on the other hand, interpreted the governor general's genuine devotion to early independence and the vigor and speed with which he pursued that end as a possible opening phase of "a policy of abandonment" by the Wilson administration.[5]

Even more alarming to the resident commissioner was the nascent but growing threat posed to the Quezon-Osmeña hold over the *Partido Nacionalista* by Teodoro Sandiko's growing radical wing within the party. Sandiko, a revered veteran of the Philippine Revolution who maintained close ties with Emilio Aguinaldo's *Katipunan* and

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[4] Hayden, *The Philippines*, 100-101; Kalaw, *Aide-de-Camp*, 105; and Stanley, *A Nation in the Making*, 212-213.

[5] Cables, Osmeña to Quezon, May 20, 1913, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 3; Quezon to J. McDill, July 3, 1913, ibid.; and Letter, Maximo M. Kalaw to A.V. Villanueva, November 17, 1913, ibid., reel 4.

General Artemio Ricarte's revolutionary junta in Hong Kong and Japan, ultimately broke away from the *Nacionalista* fold and formed a third populist-based party, the *Partido Democrata Nacional*. Commonly referred to as *Terceristas*, loyal Sandiko supporters waged a campaign of criticism through their newspaper, *Consolidacion* (edited by Pedro Gil and published in Tagalog), against the emerging Harrison-Osmeña condominium of power in Manila. The *Terceristas*, suspicious of the speaker's meteoric ascendance as the governor general's chief political adviser, charged that the current leadership of the *Partido Nacionalista* failed to represent "the spirit of Filipino democracy." The "Osmeña oligarchy," rather than an executive committee, dictated party affairs, and deluded the Filipino people with promises of greater self-government that were never delivered. Both Osmeña and Quezon rationalized that a new Philippine bill was needed if the domestic political threat from the left was to be neutralized and the alliance between the Harrison administration and the leaders of the *Partido Nacionalista* preserved.[6]

While enroute to Washington to resume his duties as resident commissioner after escorting Harrison to Manila, Quezon had an encounter with Japanese officials in Yokohama that further exacerbated his apprehension about early Philippine independence. According to a report filed with the State Department by the American consul general in Yokohama, Quezon was approached by "two Japanese agents" who "informed the Resident Commissioner" that if the Wilson administration granted independence to the Philippines in the near future, an outcome that appeared likely given the president's public rhetoric on the issue, then "there would be an immediate beginning of officially assisted emigration of Japanese to the Philippine Islands." Documenting

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[6] Liang, *The Development of Philippine Political Parties*, 96-99.

Japan's long-time interest in the Philippines as a critical element in Japanese southern expansion, the consul general's report stated that political leaders in Tokyo, following Japan's acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, developed a multifaceted colonization scheme to dispatch commercial agents to the Philippines, open up markets for Japanese goods, establish a "close, paternalistic relationship with the Filipinos," and prepare for a time when, after Philippine independence, more direct Japanese influence could be asserted in the Islands' affairs. More importantly, because the Chinese community controlled much of the economic life of the Islands, Japanese merchants endeavored to supplant their position, not necessarily with a view to immediate territorial seizure but in order to facilitate Japanese economic penetration. In its conclusion, the consular report predicted that if Japanese emigrants succeeded in establishing a viable Japanese community in the Archipelago, then it would not be long before "an independent Philippine republic became the emperor's largest colony."[7]

Thoroughly alarmed by the time he arrived in Washington in late December 1913, Quezon quickly made his way to McIntyre's office to inquire what Wilson had in store for the Philippines. The BIA chief's response could hardly have reassured the resident commissioner as McIntyre confessed that he too possessed only vague notions about the president's ultimate plans for the Islands. He told Quezon, "Independence could come tomorrow or in the next millennium." Although McIntyre indicated that Wilson desired

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[7] Report No. 441, American Consulate General, Yokohama, December 12, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 364/160. For Japan's long-time interest in the Philippines, see Josefa M. Saniel, *Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898* (Quezon City, PI, 1969); Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), 48-49, 57-59, 148-149; Mark R. Peattie, "The *Nanyo*: Japan in the South Pacific, 1885-1945" in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, 1984), 172-210; and Henry P. Frei, *Japan's Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II* (Honolulu, 1991), 65-73.

the opinion of the secretary of war before moving forward on the Philippine question, Garrison subsequently informed the resident commissioner that he had already passed the provisions for a new organic act on to the president for consideration. Quezon then contacted Wilson who blamed all inaction on Congress.[8]

Fearing that the threat of Japanese expansionism into the western Pacific might provide an additional incentive to abandon the Islands, Quezon, in subsequent discussions with McIntyre, Garrison and Wilson, underscored the need for immediate "conservative legislation" that pledged the United States to a policy of eventual Philippine independence with American guarantees for insular defense.[9] First, Quezon contended that the introduction of conservative legislation was necessary to allay talk of immediate and complete independence by the "southern Democratic block" in Congress. A recent meeting with James L. Slayden (Democrat-Texas) convinced him that this small but vocal contingent in Congress wanted "to get rid of the Philippine Islands, caring not a bit what happened to us." Quezon even told McIntyre that it had been commonly assumed in Manila in 1911 and 1912 that Jones supported such a "policy of scuttle" when he argued for American withdrawal by 1921 in his first Philippine bill.[10]

In the absence of any clear proposal by the Wilson administration and assuming that the first Jones bill would not be reintroduced in Congress following its demise in the Senate in 1912, Quezon prepared a draft bill of his own. He confided in McIntyre that the

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[8] Memorandum, McIntyre to Garrison, December 29, 1913, *BIA Records*, File 4325/158.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Memorandum, McIntyre to Garrison, January 17, 1914, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

principal objective of his bill was to delay Philippine independence for at least a quarter century.[11] A shrewd politician, the resident commissioner's idea for a new independence bill sought to neutralize the challenge of the *Terceristas* in the Philippines and the southern peace progressives in the United States without disrupting the political *status quo* in Manila or Washington. The contours of Quezon's plan to reorganize the Philippine government soon emerged in his discussions with McIntyre in January 1914. While the president of the United States would continue to appoint the governor general and the justices of the Philippine Supreme Court, all legislative authority in domestic matters would become concentrated in an elected bicameral legislature. The new Philippine Legislature would exercise power over public lands, natural resources, and tariff relations other than those with the United States, subject to the approval of the American president. In all legislative matters, the governor general would possess a reversible veto and the president an absolute veto. As for independence, Quezon suggested that a census of the Philippines be taken in 1915 and every tenth year thereafter. Whenever such a census should indicate that seventy-five percent of adult males could read and write in any language, or sixty percent of adult males were literate in English, then, provided that peace, political stability and financial responsibility existed throughout the Philippines, the president could call a referendum on the question of independence. If the outcome warranted it, then the Philippine Legislature could convene a constitutional convention to

[11] This discussion of Quezon's proposal for a new organic act is based upon General Frank McIntyre's memoranda of nine private conversations between Quezon and himself in late December 1913 and early January 1914. McIntyre, Memorandum, January 17, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4325/158.

determine the necessary steps leading to eventual withdrawal of American sovereignty and the recognition of Philippine independence.[12]

Clearly, Quezon's plan was a measure for achieving nearly complete home rule, at least on domestic matters, not obtaining complete independence. Aware that the necessary organization of personnel and resources could not be secured in time for conducting a census in 1915, the resident commissioner's proposal would effectively postpone the issue of American withdrawal until 1925. Yet such a plan involved great political risk for Quezon in that he was promoting independence rhetorically without pushing for it in practice. He requested, therefore, that McIntyre incorporate his ideas into a draft bill and propose it as the BIA's plan for resolving the Philippine question. McIntyre expressed concern whether or not Osmeña and the other *Nacionalistas* in the Philippine Legislature would support the resident commissioner's plan, especially if it was proposed as "the BIA's plan." Quezon replied that vast majority of the members of the Legislature would lend their support to the conservative proposal "under the right circumstances."[13]

Harrison's support for Quezon's proposal, however, could not be assumed. When McIntyre asked if the governor general had been informed about the plan, Quezon replied: "My God, no! I think he believes in independence. He thinks he can turn us loose in about four years." Although McIntyre warned that it would be difficult to obtain the administration's commitment to any proposal for achieving Filipino home rule and eventual independence which did not have the endorsement of the governor general, he

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[12] Ibid., and Memorandum, McIntyre to Garrison, January 17, 1914, ibid.

[13] Ibid.

nevertheless agreed to draft such a bill. During the third week of January, the BIA chief circulated a detailed memorandum on Quezon's proposal to both Garrison and Wilson, both of whom read it. In a personal memorandum to the president, Quezon pointed out the proposed literacy prerequisite for independence, emphasizing the necessity of its inclusion as not so much a precondition for independence but as a necessary measure to preclude the introduction of a fixed date for separation in any independence bill. The resident commissioner also stressed the need to include American guarantees of Filipino autonomy in any such measure given the dangerous reality of Japanese expansionism and great-power competition on the Asian continent. After all, Quezon wrote Wilson, Filipino apprehension concerning early independence derived "largely from the conduct of Japan in the region."[14]

As it turned out, Wilson received Quezon's plan for resolving the Philippine question with genuine enthusiasm. House had already informed the president about Quezon's "secret mission" of seeking a pledge for "qualified independence" on December 29. House also indicated to Wilson that some retentionists supported the resident commissioner's efforts. Among them, Bishop Brent had confided in House that he would endorse an official pledge to grant eventual independence to Filipinos because it was the only measure that could silence the growing clamor for immediate and complete separation from the Philippines. Brent warned that if Wilson "bowed to the *imediatistas*" and granted independence to the Islands prematurely, he could expect "Mexican history to

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[14] Ibid., and Letter [Confidential], Quezon to Wilson, January 16, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4. Wilson's papers are replete with numerous letters and newspaper clippings from both *independistas* and retentionists expressing anxiety over Japan's alleged plan to seize the Philippines. An example of such anxiety can be found in Letter, Laeton Irwin to Wilson, August 20, 1914, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

repeat itself in the Philippines."[15] Wilson found the resident commissioner's diffidence regarding early independence especially interesting. Although he failed to see merit in the idea of holding a census every ten years or the requirement of a literacy qualification as a precondition for independence, he understood well the implications of Quezon's proposal for his own political dilemma regarding the Philippine question vis-à-vis southern and western Democrats in Congress. Although Wilson consistently held to the premise that it would require at least several generations before Filipinos could possibly work out the kinks in their own democracy, he understood that opposing early Philippine independence would place him at odds with the agrarian wing of the Democratic party, a development that could wreck havoc with his other foreign policy initiatives, especially in Latin America, as well as his "New Freedom" legislative agenda. Quezon's idea of postponing the issue for twenty-five years seemed to offer the president a way out of this domestic political vice.[16]

On January 19, when Wilson met with Quezon in the White House, the president "conceded" that he would not support immediate independence or any bill committing his administration to an inflexible timetable or a specific succession of steps leading to separation. Yet the president affirmed his commitment to eventual independence in principle and pledged to entertain legislation in that session of Congress to extend even greater autonomy to Filipinos in the insular government. Such a bill, Wilson agreed,

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[15] Letter, Brent to House, December 28, 1913, *PWW*, XXIX, 164-167; House, Diary Entry, December 29, 1913, ibid.; and Letter, House to Wilson, January 23, 1914, ibid.

[16] Wilson's reactions to Quezon's proposal can be found in the marginalia on his copy of the draft. Quezon, Draft Proposal, no date, *BIA Records*, File 4325/56.

should also include a statement declaring eventual independence of the Islands as the ultimate objective of America's Philippine policy.[17]

Once assured that Wilson would not sign any bill that specified early independence, Quezon turned his attention to convincing his political allies in the Anti-Imperialist League to support a measure that pledged only eventual independence rather than immediate and complete separation. The resident commissioner resorted to misrepresenting the facts to win over the League's leadership. Portraying the president as the author, Quezon sent his draft proposal to both Storey and Winslow for comments.[18] The ploy seemed to have failed when Storey responded with a strong note of disapproval. He especially objected to the idea of holding a census before addressing the Philippine question because it would "likely postpone for ten years at least the independence of the Islands." The aging anti-imperialist recommended that either the census be taken more often "or else provide in some other way for establishing the independence of the Islands." Even better, he argued, the White House should scrap the scheme in its entirety and formulate another bill that was more in keeping with the Democratic party's traditional platform on the Philippine question:

> The bill as a whole is unwise. . . . It looks to me as if it was calculated to postpone rather than hasten independence. I should be disposed to continue the pressures for a bill more like the Jones bill than to definitely dispose of the subject by a bill like this one which relieves Congress from

[17] What exactly transpired between Wilson and Quezon in the White House is not known. Quezon, however, reported his version of what was said in detail to both Erving Winslow and Osmeña. Letter, Quezon to Winslow, January 19, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4, and Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, January 20, 1914, ibid.

[18] Letters, Quezon to Storey and Winslow, February 3, 1914, ibid.

the necessity of acting, and thereby fulfilling its platform promises. At the same time, it gives us nothing which is in the least degree certain.[19]

In another calculated move, Quezon used Storey's angry response to the proposal as a vehicle for making sure that Wilson would make good on his promise to include a preamble in the Philippine bill that proclaimed eventual independence as the unequivocal objective of America's policy in the Islands. Upon receipt of Storey's scolding letter, the resident commissioner relayed it to the president with a personal note attached. The Anti-Imperialist League and its Democratic allies in Congress, he argued, would certainly oppose such legislation unless the promise of eventual independence was made its guiding principle: "If we can not have a definite promise with regard to the time when independence shall be granted, we shall accept a mere declaration on the part of the Congress that it is the purpose of the United States to grant eventual Philippine independence."[20] After Wilson agreed a second time to endorse such a preamble, Quezon then turned to disarm Storey and the other anti-imperialists: "The question is not what bill will best suit us," the resident commissioner wrote, "but what bill will suit the President that can be accepted by us. . . . I am of the opinion that we had better accept any kind of bill, provided it is in the right direction, rather than, with the determination of taking only what we would like to have, get nothing at all."[21] Quezon had reported earlier to Winslow that both Representative Jones, still chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, and Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, chairman of the Senate Committee on Philippine Affairs,

[19] Letter, Storey to Quezon, February 9, 1914, ibid.

[20] Letter, Quezon to Wilson, February 11, 1914, ibid.

[21] Letter, Quezon to Storey, February 12, 1914, ibid.

would not consider any legislation on the Philippine question unless they knew it had the support of the president.[22] Knowing that it would be impossible to obtain any legislation without the approval of Wilson who wielded much influence among congressional Democrats, Storey ultimately acquiesced in Quezon's request that the energies of the Anti-Imperialist League be redirected to induce the president to send "a special message" to Congress recommending passage of legislation definitely promising eventual independence but without a specific timetable.[23]

Whereas Quezon's draft proposal had stirred anxiety among anti-imperialists in the United States and certain *Nacionalistas* in Manila, McIntyre and the BIA embraced it. Perhaps McIntyre's assessment that Quezon's proposal "apparently intended to provide for a permanent relationship of the Philippine Islands to the United States" best explains why.[24] Yet there was some concern expressed over several of the draft bill's administrative provisions, especially those that sought to circumscribe the governor general's power to appoint and remove Philippine government officials. McIntyre suggested that the bill be amended so as to strengthen the governor general's control of the executive departments to maintain the existing balance of power between Americans and Filipinos in the Philippine government.[25]

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[22] Cable, Quezon to Winslow, January 17, 1914, ibid.

[23] Letters, Quezon to Storey, February 12, 1914, ibid., and Quezon to Winslow, February 19, 1914, ibid.

[24] Memorandum, BIA, subj.: "Bill to Provide a More Popular Government for the Philippine Islands, Submitted by Messrs. Quezon and Earnshaw" February 21, 1914, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[25] Ibid.; McIntyre, Memorandum, May 13, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4325/158; Cable, McIntyre to Harrison, June 5, 1914, ibid., File 4325/64; and Letter, Garrison to Wilson, June 9, 1914, ibid., File 4325/70-71.

One last obstacle to the emerging consensus on a new organic act for the Philippines had to be surmounted. While Quezon had been in Washington conferring with Wilson and the War Department, Osmeña had been busy drafting his own proposal for resolving the Philippine question. The speaker offered a radical departure from Quezon's scheme with his idea of convening a constitutional convention in Manila for the purpose of allowing Filipino legislators to create their own governmental structure and institutions. Upon ratification of a Philippine constitution and the establishment of a stable Philippine government, the United States should then transfer the sovereignty of the Islands to the Filipino people. Though he did not fix a date for independence in his draft proposal, Osmeña's principal concern was to create a process that shifted the responsibility of establishing a timetable for separation from Washington to Manila. In this way, Filipinos could wrest control of their political destiny away from American politicians who, at least from the *Nacionalista* perspective, tended to view the Philippine question only in the context of American political exigencies.[26]

Quezon received the speaker's draft proposal with mixed emotion. If passed by Congress, the "Osmeña bill" would authorize the convening of a constitutional convention at an early date, thus moving the Philippines down the road to independence sooner rather than later. Fearing that southern Democrats in Congress would embrace the "Osmeña bill" as their own and push for early separation, Quezon decided not to lend his support to the plan. He cabled Osmeña on February 25 that Wilson had "rejected" his proposal for a constitutional convention to settle the Philippine question. Actually, there

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[26] The contents of the Osmeña draft proposal are described in Cables, Osmeña to Quezon, February 19 and 22, 1914, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 4.

is no evidence to suggest that the resident commissioner ever bothered to raise the idea with either McIntyre or Wilson. Nevertheless, Quezon wrote to the speaker that he had managed to wrangle two "valuable concessions" from the president: a preamble in a Philippine bill that pledged the United States to a policy of eventual independence; and a promise to create a "Philippine Congress with full power of legislation concerning domestic matters." Rather than quibble about a constitutional convention, Quezon advised that the wise course of action was to accept Wilson's "concessions" without argument or amendment. Moreover, the declaration of a new policy that aimed to settle the question of independence would undoubtedly permit further discussion of the timing of ultimate separation. Perhaps then, Quezon suggested, could Osmeña's request for a Filipino constitutional convention be "reconsidered by the President."[27] The speaker's cabled reply was short but to the point: "My opinion is that the bill should be accepted if nothing better possible to secure."[28]

By the end of February 1914 then, Wilson, with considerable assistance from Quezon, had managed to achieve a consensus in Washington and Manila on what the new Philippine organic bill should include. Under pressure from both Osmeña and the anti-imperialists, Quezon eventually agreed to edit his bill, deleting the census and literacy requirements but significantly retaining a vague preamble in which the United States pledged to grant independence when a stable government could be established. In this respect, Quezon had altered the proposed bill's tone but not its substance. In May, the

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[27] Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, February 25, 1914, ibid.

[28] Cable, Osmeña to Quezon, February 25, 1914, ibid.

BIA submitted the resident commissioner's draft bill as its own measure to the House Committee on Insular Affairs for consideration.

May – October 1914

Leaders in the House had not planned to take up the Philippine question that session of Congress. But once it became clear that the Senate was lagging far behind the House in handling the nation's business, the House leadership instructed Jones, the committee chair, to report a Philippine bill. Throughout the month of June, Jones consulted with Wilson, Garrison, and Hitchcock to flesh out the fine details of the Philippine bill.[29] Garrison also cabled a copy of the draft bill to Harrison in Manila to obtain the reactions from the commissioners. Harrison, Martin, Denison, and the Filipino commissioners quickly endorsed the measure; Riggs dissented. Quezon sent a copy to Osmeña who secured the *Partido Nacionalista's* enthusiastic endorsement of the bill. *Nacionalistas* then moved to organize a broad campaign to solicit resolutions of approval from provincial boards and municipal councils throughout the Philippines.[30]

Garrison, however, could not find much in the House bill to support. Reluctant to authorize any further action in the Philippines until the fallout from Harrison's policy of vigorous Filipinization had dissipated, he instructed McIntyre to omit the proposed preamble, which stated in its original version that it was the purpose of the United States

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[29] Letters, Wilson to Jones, June 8, 1914, *PWW*, XXX, 160-161; Wilson to Jones, June 11, 1914, ibid., 172; Wilson to Jones, June 25, 1914, ibid., 213; Jones to Wilson, June 26, 1914, ibid., 215-216; Garrison to Wilson, June 26, 1914, ibid., 216; and Garrison to Wilson, June 30, 1914, ibid., 230.

[30] Cables, Harrison to the Secretary of War, May 28, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4325/79; Harrison, Martin, and Denison to Garrison, June 8, 1914, ibid., File 4325/66; Harrison to the Secretary of War, July 17, 1914, *Harrison Papers*, Cable Book, 1913-1914; and *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 2nd session,

to recognize Philippine independence as soon as a stable government could be established. In the meantime, the secretary of war sought Wilson's counsel on the matter, hoping the president would opt for an even more conservative course of action.[31] The president, however, refused to budge on the preamble. He had already given Quezon his word twice on the matter. Besides, because the vague pledge of eventual independence in the preamble was patterned after the 1912 Democratic plank on the Philippines, Wilson believed that its rejection by him would smack of hypocrisy by the Democratic Party. As the Washington press corps had already begun to hound him on the issue at every opportunity, he did not want to offer them any more fodder for criticism.[32] More importantly, however, the president understood that the omission of the preamble would have meant returning to ground zero with Quezon and the *Nacionalistas* on the Philippine question. He could ill afford to alienate the *Nacionalista* leadership as their collaboration was essential not only to securing conservative legislation on Philippine independence, but also to the successful completion of American social engineering programs in the Islands.[33]

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[31] Memorandum, Garrison to Wilson, June 19, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4325/70-71, which includes Garrison's harsh analysis of the Jones bill. For the attempts of the War Department to influence the second Jones bill as it emerged from the House Committee on Insular Affairs, see *BIA Records*, File 4325/63, 64, 68,69, 74, 75, 85.

[32] Wilson responded to numerous questions concerning a new organic act for the Philippines in no less than nine press conferences between April 2, 1914 and January 12, 1915. See Wilson, Press Conferences, April 2, 1914, *PWW*, XXIX, 397-400; June 8, 1914, ibid., XXX, 158-160; June 25, 1914, ibid., 208-209; July 6, 1914, ibid., 259-260; September 28, 1914, ibid., XXXI, 87-89; October 26, 1914, ibid., 233-235; December 1, 1914, ibid., 373-375; January 5, 1915, ibid., XXXII, 13-17; and January 12, 1915, ibid., 54-58.

[33] Memoranda, Garrison to McIntyre, May 13, 1914, *BIA Records*, File 4325/158, and McIntyre to Garrison, May 26, 1914, ibid., File 4325/159.

Yet Garrison had to be placated as well. Wilson conferred with his secretary of war and assured him that in addition to including an ambiguously worded pledge to eventual independence in the preamble, the Philippine bill would contain specific provisions aimed at strengthening the executive power of both the president and the governor general in determining the course of America's Philippine policy. Doing so meant that the colonial bond would not be severed, only redefined, and that the precise timing and circumstances of separation would remain firmly in the hands of the president and the War Department. In this respect, Wilson made it clear that he did not intend to extend the principle of national self-determination to the Philippines, but only the extension of Filipino self-government under the supervision of an empowered American governor general.[34]

After sorting out his cabinet on the issue, Wilson announced in late June that he desired passage of a Philippine bill in the current session of Congress extending "home rule" to the Islands. When Jones introduced the House bill in early July, the president endorsed it but hedged his commitment by stating that the bill "would not be insisted upon as an administration measure."[35] Consideration of Jones's bill by the House committee resulted in extensive modification, and Jones ultimately reintroduced a revised version of the measure in August, which became known as the second Jones bill.[36] The preamble soon emerged as the most significant and controversial component of the bill

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[34] Letter, Wilson to Garrison, June 4, 1914, *PWW*, XXX, 144.

[35] *Washington Post*, June 25, 1914.

[36] House Report No. 1115, "Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands" 63rd Congress, 2nd session, in House Reports, Miscellaneous, Serial 6560, 3 volumes (Washington, DC, 1914), III, 14-15. [Hereafter cited as "Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands."]

because it sought to redefine the relationship between the Philippines and the United States by declaring eventual independence as the official objective of American policy and by increasing Filipino participation in the insular government:

> Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence.[37]

The second Jones bill also proposed significant changes in the form of government then operating in the Philippines. Jones argued that greater "control of their affairs" should be granted Filipinos so they could "be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all of the privileges of complete independence."[38] Of critical importance to the *Nacionalistas*, the new organic bill provided for the abolition of the appointive Philippine Commission, replacing it with a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. With the exception of two senators in the upper chamber and nine representatives in the lower chamber who were appointed by the governor general to represent "the Non-Christian Areas," the Legislature would be elective. Although the *Partido Nacionalista* stood to gain the lion's share of seats in the Senate which would ensure that party's predominance in Philippine politics, the second

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[37] *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, 16020.

[38] Ibid., 16027.

Jones bill also reinforced the right of the United States to intervene and abrogate any undesirable measures passed by the Legislature. Both Wilson and Garrison deemed this check on Filipino self-government essential to preserving the colonial bond. The governor general, who together with the justices of the Philippine Supreme Court would be appointed by the president, would possess considerably more executive power in the new government configuration. The insular chief executive would appoint the heads of all executive departments, subject, however, to the approval of the new Philippine Senate. He also would supervise budget preparation and retain broad veto powers, including the power to veto specific items in the annual appropriation bills.[39] All Philippine legislation, therefore, would remain subject to a "conditional veto" by the governor general and an "absolute veto" by the president. Clearly, the second Jones bill did not threaten to sever the essential tentacles of American colonialism in the Philippines.[40]

In addition, existing law prohibited the Philippine government from enacting tariff legislation, raising income tax rates or issuing bonds, since these powers remained firmly in the hands of the Congress. Congress also reserved the right to annul any legislation passed in Manila if it was of a "dubious financial nature." McIntyre, in his annual report to the secretary of war, had brought to congressional attention the need for customs, tariff and currency reforms, but as he had pointed out, Congress had previously failed to enact or consider such legislation due to heavy legislative loads.[41] The problem became more

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[39] "Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands," 14-15.

[40] Ibid. See also, Letter, Wilson to Garrison, June 4, 1914, *PWW*, XXX, 144.

[41] McIntyre, *Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs to the Secretary of War, 1914* (Washington, DC, 1915), 4-5.

acute in 1914. Tariff receipts had comprised the major source of revenue for the insular government, but since a state of free trade existed between the United States and the Philippines following passage of the Underwood Tariff in 1913 insular customs duties had diminished rapidly. According to the majority report of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, if the proposed legislation failed to gain approval, some type of financial assistance to the Philippines would become necessary. Under the proposed bill the Philippine Legislature acquired the authority to pass acts relating to the tariff and currency laws, disposition of public lands, timber and mining rights, regulation of immigration, and redistricting the Islands, subject, however, to the president's approval. In addition, all trade relations between the United States and the Philippines remained under the strict purview of Congress.[42]

Also, it was expected that the expansion of the voting franchise, provided by the second Jones bill, would increase the representative nature of the Philippine government but only slightly. Previously only adult men able to read either Spanish or English voted, but the second Jones bill dropped this restriction and proposed to extend voting privileges to men able to read and write in Tagalog or any other Filipino dialect.[43] If Congress passed the House measure without amendment, then the number of Filipinos eligible to vote would increase only marginally from about 750,000 to 900,000, a figure still far less than ten percent of the population.[44]

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[42] "Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands," 11-12.

[43] Ibid., 14-15.

[44] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st session, January 31, 1916, 1799.

Indeed, the second Jones bill was hardly a radical measure. The debate in the House revealed few objections to the administrative features of the bill as majorities on both sides of the aisle proved ready to grant Filipinos greater autonomy over their domestic affairs. The minority report, authored by Clarence Miller (Republican-Minnesota), Horace Towner (Republican-Iowa) and Simeon Fess (Republican-Ohio), even agreed that there existed "a great need just now of legislation that would immediately and materially benefit the Filipinos." In effect, these Republican members of the House Committee on Insular Affairs praised the conservative tone of the proposed bill's administrative provisions.[45]

The main point of contention of the second Jones bill was the measure's preamble. As written, the preamble pledged "it is the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein." Knowing that the "purpose" of the United States in the Philippines had been the key issue in the "great debate" on empire at the turn of the century, Jones devoted considerable space in the House committee report to defending the preamble of his bill. The preamble's pledge of eventual independence, he wrote, not only paralleled very closely the Philippine plank of the Democratic party in 1912, but also conformed to the prevailing attitudes of both parties on the question of Philippine independence. Jones reviewed statements by former Presidents McKinley and Taft to illustrate this line of argument, concluding that permanent retention of the Islands disregarded declarations by prominent Republicans as

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[45] House Report No. 1115, "Government of the Philippines" August 31, 1914, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, in *House Reports, Miscellaneous*, Serial 6888, 3 volumes (Washington, DC, 1914), III, 2. [Hereafter cited as "Government of the Philippines."]

well as Democrats. Jones also pointed to the American people's consistent opposition to the idea of retaining the Philippines indefinitely. This opposition, he wrote, was reflected in the public's "enthusiastic support" for the first Jones bill in 1912. That bill had proposed the immediate establishment of a practically independent government and a grant of full independence on July 4, 1921. Although the first Jones bill had failed to gain approval in Congress, the dissenting arguments of the Democrats revealed that the American public's opposition to indefinite retention of the Philippines was broadly based: the American people viewed the possession of overseas colonies in the western Pacific as an anathema to traditional diplomatic principles and ideals; they believed that Filipinos, having demonstrated their capacity for home rule, were deserving of complete independence; they feared that retention of the Philippines invited disaster in view of the fact that the Archipelago could not be defended adequately against foreign invasion and occupation; and they assumed the Islands constituted an intolerable burden upon the American treasury. The preamble, Jones concluded, reflected the sentiments of the American people and its political leaders, embodied the hopes of Filipinos, and fulfilled the promises made by the Democratic Party since 1900.[46]

For the first time since the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898, Republicans found themselves in a minority opposing an administration-sponsored bill calling for a major change in colonial policy. But the Republican leadership in the House did not panic. It was apparent that Congress, which had been in almost continuous session since April 1913, would adjourn soon for the congressional elections of November. Presented

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[46] Ibid., September 28, 1914, 15834, and "Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands," 3-9.

with an opportunity to inflict a legislative defeat on the Wilson administration, House Republicans decided to filibuster the second Jones bill with amendments and charges that the majority party intended to abandon the Philippines to an uncertain fate.[47] Over the eight days of debate during which the bill was open to revision, Republicans introduced ninety-four amendments to the twenty-six sections of the bill and three amendments to the preamble. All were painstakingly discussed and brought to a vote.[48]

Republicans also attacked what they viewed as the Democratic Party's inconsistent position on the Philippine question. According to the dissenting minority report, "The fact that this bill is so much less radical than the bill of two years ago" demonstrated the wisdom of Republican policy during the Taft era. House Republicans attempted to embarrass the Democratic majority by indicating how much of a retreat the new bill really was from the first, and asked why, since remarkable progress in Filipino political capacities had been made since Harrison's arrival in the Islands, the new legislation remained so conservative.[49] Jones responded that while he and other southern peace progressives personally favored immediate and complete independence, the majority of Democrats, including the president and most of his cabinet, did not. The second Jones bill reflected the moderate aims of the Wilson administration and

[47] "Government of the Philippines," 4.

[48] *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, 16082-16097, 16123-16138, 16213-16243, 16381-16403, 16424-16440, 16473-16502.

[49] "Government of the Philippines," 6.

conservative Democrats, not those of the peace progressives, their allies in the Anti-Imperialist League, or the vast majority of Filipinos.[50]

Finally, Republicans criticized the timing of the introduction of the Democratic measure. Between the reporting of the bill by Jones and the time it came before the House, war broke out in Europe. As a result, Republicans insisted that a public discussion of the relationship between the United States and the Philippines was hardly appropriate at that time because "the nations involved in the struggle have many interests and territorial possessions in close proximity to the Philippines." Even the mere discussion of American withdrawal from the Islands, Republicans charged, might incite nationalist uprisings in the nearby Dutch, British, and French colonies. Also, the seemingly irresistible German offensive in Belgium and northern France, then taking place during the House debate on the second Jones bill, had rendered moot all consideration for a neutralization scheme to assure Philippine independence. Thus, Republicans argued that any discussion of or move to grant independence to the Philippines would most likely be viewed by the other powers as an American retreat from the region, a development that might "lead nations with opposing interests to believe that the United States would not go far in defense of possessions so lightly regarded by those in control of the government." Since some members of Wilson's cabinet and congressional leaders in both houses regarded the American presence in the Philippines as the linchpin to protecting United States' interests in the western Pacific and East Asia, House Republicans, such as James R. Mann (Republican-Illinois), anticipated that this perspective would carry considerable

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[50] *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, September 28, 1914, 15842-15845.

weight in the debate.[51] Actually, the argument backfired. A small but vocal group of southern and western Democrats took the House floor and urged the Wilson administration to get the United States out of the Philippines "without strings," that is, without a commitment to guarantee the independence of a new Philippine republic.[52]

Notwithstanding the arguments of the Republican minority and some Democrats, the House approved the second Jones bill with the preamble intact on October 14, 1914 by a margin of 212 to 60. For the first time, a majority in a house of Congress affirmed its intention to grant independence to the Philippines. The Philippine Commission and the Assembly passed a joint resolution expressing "their highest appreciation and satisfaction to the House of Representatives . . . for the favorable action taken in the matter of the Jones Bill."[53] Although the second Jones bill was sent to the Senate Committee on Philippine Affairs for consideration, Congress adjourned ten days later without further action on the measure.[54]

December 1914 – March 1915

Despite the Democratic Party's failure to secure passage of the second Jones bill in the second session of the Sixty-third Congress, Wilson and his advisers hoped to translate the domestic legislation passed in 1913 and 1914 into Democratic gains in Congress in the

[51] Ibid., 16473.

[52] Ibid., 16542-16562.

[53] House Report No. 1350, "Resolution Expressing Appreciation of the Philippine Legislature for the Passage of the Jones Bill" December 14, 1914, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, in *House Documents, Documents of a Public Nature* serial 6888, 2 volumes (Washington, DC, 1915), I, 1-2.

[54] Ibid., 16628-16629.

mid-term elections. The president drafted a long, carefully prepared statement summing up his administration's achievements that was widely circulated as a campaign document.[55] Despite his efforts, the Democrats suffered significant losses in the House in 1914, which sorely disappointed Wilson. The president lamented to Colonel House that the defeats would result in a decline of prestige for him both in Congress and in Europe. House responded with a more optimistic assessment of the situation, arguing that the Democrats fared better among farmers and labor in the West than anticipated. He also underscored the fact that the Democrats were now facing a united Republican party unlike in 1912. To prepare for victory in the next major federal election – the presidential election of 1916 – House advised Wilson to "make your foreign policy the feature of your administration during the next two years."[56]

That Wilson embraced House's advice is clearly evident in his second annual message to Congress on December 8, 1914. After announcing to members of Congress that his "New Freedom" program for regulating business was "virtually complete," the president declared that he intended to shift his focus to mediating an end to the war in Europe before either the Central Powers or the Allies achieved victory. If the war continued, Wilson argued, then either Russia or Germany would eventually emerge as the master of the European continent, an outcome he labeled as an anathema to the development of constitutional democracy in the world.[57] While a discussion of Wilson's

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[55] This campaign document can be found in Letter, Wilson to Oscar Underwood, October 17, 1914, *PWW*, XXXI, 168-174.

[56] House, Diary Entry, November 4, 1914, ibid., 265, and Letter, House to Wilson, November 30, 1914, ibid., 369-370.

[57] Wilson, Annual Message to Congress, December 8, 1914, ibid., 414-424.

diplomatic initiatives to mediate an end to the First World War does not fall within the scope of this study,[58] his assumption that resolution of the Philippine question possessed significant implications for his overall foreign policy with the belligerent powers requires explanation.

Wilson, nearing the end of his long message to Congress, addressed the relationship between the Philippine question and his efforts to mediate an end to the war in Europe and provide the world with a durable peace. Emphasizing the tradition of American exceptionalism in the world, he described the United States as a disinterested power destined to "counsel and obtain . . . a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations."[59] Because of America's redemptive mission, Wilson explained that more than America's credibility in the Philippines hung in the balance with passage of the second Jones bill then awaiting action in the Senate. Its quick passage by the Senate without major revisions and amendments, the president declared, would send an unmistakable signal to the warring powers that the American people were "the champions of peace and concord, . . a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none." Wilson asked the members of Congress:

> How better, in this time of anxious questioning and perplexed policy, could we show our confidence in the principles of liberty, as the source as well as the expression of life; how better could we demonstrate our own self-possession and

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[58] For Wilson's diplomatic initiatives to mediate an end to the First World War, see David S. Patterson, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mediation Movement," *The Historian* XXXIII (August, 1971), 535-556; Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft*, 35-96; Knock, *To End All Wars*, 44-47, 67-69; Patrick Devlin, *Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality* (New York and London, 1975), 217-282, 344-471; and Clements, *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson*, 115-141.

[59] Wilson, Annual Message to Congress, December 8, 1914, *PWW*, XXXI, 422.

> steadfastness in the courses of justice and disinterestedness than by thus going forward to fulfill our promises to a dependent people, who will now look more anxiously than ever to see whether we have indeed the liberality, the unselfishness, the courage, the faith we have boasted and professed.[60]

Hinging America's greatness on its ability to convince the world of its genuine disinterestedness, Wilson described the resolution of the Philippine question as a necessary prerequisite for establishing the United States' reputation as a credible neutral power devoid of imperial interests. The president concluded his address with a caveat: failure to pass the second Jones bill when the Senate reconvened could mean the unnecessary continuation of the Great War until all the nations, including the United States, became embroiled in its destruction.[61]

Following Wilson's strong appeal for action, the Senate Committee on Philippine Affairs commenced hearings on the strengths and weaknesses of the second Jones bill on December 14, 1914. The hearings, however, were dominated by testimony of the nation's most influential retentionists. Worcester began the hearings with a lecture and a presentation of lantern slides collected during his long supervision of non-Christian Filipinos to illustrate the "backwardness of the Filipino race."[62] Taft followed with a negative assessment of Filipino capacities for complete self-government. Separation, he argued, remained over a century away.[63] Newton Gilbert, the former vice-governor in the Forbes administration, attacked the preamble as a dangerous precedence in Western

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[60] Ibid. Quotation on 417.

[61] Ibid., 423-424.

[62] Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the U.S. Senate on House Resolution 18459, in "Government of the Philippines," 63rd Congress, 3rd session, 287-294.

[63] Ibid., 364-369.

colonialism and blasted the Harrison administration for wrecking the Philippine government's efficiency with his Filipinization program.[64] Only Morgan Shuster, who had served with Taft on the Philippine Commission, broke ranks with retentionists to become the first member of the Commission under Republican rule to testify in favor of the second Jones bill.[65]

Retentionists in the Philippines, however, provided a solid front against passage of the second Jones bill. In December 1914, they stepped up their campaign to discredit the Harrison administration in the Islands and thereby undermine the second Jones bill. As part of their larger effort to disparage Filipino capacities for self-government, American counterintelligence personnel in the army and the Constabulary leaked stories to leading American newspapers during the Senate committee hearings that a Filipino rebellion alleged to involve disaffected Philippine Scouts was imminent. The accounts reported that agents of Artemio Ricarte, a revolutionary general in exile in Japan, were recruiting Filipinos and selling commissions in an army that would rise in a revolt when Ricarte returned to lead it. Ricarte's rebellion culminated in the "Christmas Eve Uprising" in which a small number of unarmed Filipinos meeting in downtown Manila were picked up by the police for sedition. Although the revolt failed to materialize, leading Republican newspapers maintained a flood of stories predicting the start of a bloodbath in the Philippines, the likes of which had not been witnessed in Asia since the "Great Mutiny" in India in the 1850s.[66] Eventually, Garrison was forced to give a press

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[64] Ibid., 567-575.

[65] Ibid., 543-550.

[66] See for example the succession of front-page stories in the *New York Times*, December 15,

conference to challenge the veracity of such stories. He told the press corps that "this sort of information is being cabled to the United States for the purpose of influencing the legislation now pending in Congress . . . for I am unable to ascertain that there is any truth whatever in these stories."[67]

As it turned out, the second Jones bill proved controversial in the Senate committee and was not reported until February 2, 1915, only thirty days before the Sixty-third Congress was scheduled to expire. The committee amended the House bill extensively to strengthen the American governor general's ability to supervise the insular government by enlarging his veto power over acts of the Philippine Legislature. Executive power in the Philippine government was further augmented by amendments providing for presidential appointment of the insular vice-governor, an auditor with independent powers, and the director of the PCS. In addition, the Senate committee recommended that the executive responsibility of the vice-governor, presumably always an American, be expanded to include the Department of Public Instruction, which supervised the Bureau of Education, the Bureau of Health, the Bureau of Science, and the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.[68]

Although most members of the Republican minority on the Senate committee favored striking the so-called "radical preamble" from the bill, Hitchcock managed to

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December 23, December 25, and December 26, 1914.

[67] Ibid., December 28, 1914.

[68] Senate Report No. 942, "Future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands" February 2, 1915, in *Senate Reports, Miscellaneous* 2 volumes (Washington, DC, 1915), I, 3-7, II, 212-214. [Hereafter cited as "Future Political Status of the Philippine People."] See also, Cables, Jones to Harrison, March 10, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 35; Hitchcock to Harrison, March 8, 1915, ibid.; Quezon to Harrison, March 1, 1915, ibid.; and McIntyre, Memorandum, March 14, 1915, *BIA Records*, File 4325/155-158.

convince them that dropping the preamble completely "would be construed in the Philippine Islands as a declaration that independence was never to be given." Furthermore, Hitchcock argued that such an action would result in "widespread disappointment and discontent among the majority of the natives which could end in another general insurrection." Notwithstanding the Senate committee's support for the administrative provisions of the second Jones bill, a small block of Republican senators remained unmoved and threatened to filibuster the measure unless the pledge of eventual independence was qualified in more specific terms or omitted altogether.[69]

Hitchcock, desperate to avoid a deadlock in the Senate committee, negotiated a compromise in which the committee members agreed to change the preamble to state that it was the purpose of the United States "to grant independence to the Philippine Islands when in the judgment of the United States, the Filipino people have become fitted for its enjoyment." Although the committee chairman described the amendment of the preamble as a necessary evil to secure the ten-to-three vote by which the Senate committee reported the bill, for many, however, the favorable vote seemed small compensation for the emasculation of the preamble. In its watered down form, the preamble precluded any future move by Filipinos to wrest control of the timing and conditions of independence away from Washington in order to determine their own political destiny. In fact, the Senate version of the preamble could permit unsympathetic administrations in the White House to postpone independence indefinitely.[70]

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[69] Ibid., I, 1-4.

[70] Ibid. See also, Cables, Jones to Harrison, March 10, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 35; Hitchcock to Harrison, March 8, 1915, ibid.; Quezon to Harrison, March 1, 1915, ibid.; and McIntyre, Memorandum, March 14, 1915, *BIA Records*, File 4325/155-158.

Once the second Jones bill had been reported to the Senate, Quezon cabled Manila to reassure his *Nacionalista* colleagues that its revised preamble differed very little from the House version. He added that none of the Senate committee's revisions affected any part of the bill deemed most important by Filipinos. These features included the creation of an elective senate, the extension of the franchise to adult males literate in any language, and a provision for the Philippine Legislature to reorganize the executive departments and for the proposed Senate to confirm all cabinet-level appointments.[71] Osmeña replied, however, that he opposed the new preamble because it called into question Filipino capacities for self-determination. The speaker of the Assembly sent a second cable to Quezon the next day warning that "spontaneous opposition to preamble is growing rapidly." He also expressed concern that the *Progresista* opposition in the Assembly had poised itself to capitalize upon any endorsement by the *Nacionalistas* of the revised preamble. Quezon cabled back that he understood Osmeña's predicament in the Assembly and promised to see the president about the need to amend the preamble still further. He cautioned Osmeña, however, "that we should not go as far as to defeat the bill if we fail."[72]

Once it became clear that the debate on the second Jones bill in the Senate committee had begun to bog down into partisan infighting, Wilson decided to enter the fray to lend the full weight of his office to the pending legislation. During a brief train stop in Richmond, Indiana, the president took the opportunity to "remind the Senate"

[71] Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, January 26, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 29.

[72] Cables, Osmeña to Quezon, January 27 and 28, 1915, in Vicente A. Pacis, *President Sergio Osmeña: A Fully Documented Biography* 2 volumes (Quezon City, PI, 1971), I, 200-201, and Quezon to Osmeña, January 30, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 29.

publicly of the importance of the Philippine bill to his foreign policy. Wilson told the small crowd that had gathered at the rear platform of his train that it was imperative for the United States to do what it had promised the Filipino people, that is, prepare them for self-government by allowing them to become skilled in the practice and custom of democracy, and then grant complete independence to the Philippines. The completion of the next stage in America's mission in the Islands, Wilson declared, was critical at that time because it would serve as a reminder to the world that "a nation that is habitually true to its own exalted principles of action will know how to serve the rest of mankind when the opportunity offers."[73] Four days later, Wilson, with his best poker face, confidently told the Washington press corps that he had seen or heard nothing from Hitchcock to suggest that the Senate might fail to push the second Jones bill through in the last moments of the Sixty-third Congress.[74]

Wilson expressed less confidence behind the scenes, however. Once the strength of retentionist opposition to the measure became more evident, the president conferred with Garrison and Jones about the possibility of withdrawing the preamble from the bill, which presumably would remove the major objection to its passage. In the end, Wilson rejected this course of action because it would render the legislation meaningless in the minds of most Filipinos.[75] Even more threatening to Wilson than the staunch retentionism of Republicans in the Senate was Garrison's "decision" to resign as secretary of war.

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[73] Wilson, Remarks from a Rear Platform, January 8, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 28-29.

[74] Press Conference, January 12, 1915, ibid., 54-58.

[75] Memorandum, Garrison to Wilson, February 26, 1915, ibid., 291-292, and Letter, Tumulty to Wilson, February 26, 1915, ibid., 293.

Citing his continuous disagreements with the administration concerning Philippine policy and Harrison's "poor treatment" of Riggs which had culminated in his resignation, Garrison wrote a memorandum to Henry S. Breckinridge, the assistant secretary of war, stating that he believed the time had come to resign himself.[76] On February 4, Wilson met with Breckinridge in the White House to discuss the matter. Both agreed that Garrison's resignation would hurt the administration by wrecking havoc with the effort to secure passage of the second Jones bill that session of Congress. But more than the fate of the Philippine bill was at stake, at least in the president's mind. Garrison's abrupt departure from the administration might even precipitate hard questions about the soundness of Wilson's approach to the Philippine question in general which could call into question his "New Freedom" initiatives in the Islands. And news of the nation's failure to keep its word to the Filipino people, he feared, would stain America's honor, a development that was certain to wield a negative impact on House's diplomatic efforts in Europe to explore avenues for American mediation to an end of the war.[77] At the very least, retentionists in Washington and Manila would make much of the secretary of war's resignation. Wilson told Breckinridge that he could already imagine the newspaper headlines billing Garrison as retentionism's newest martyr.[78]

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[76] Memorandum, Garrison to Henry S. Breckinridge, February 1, 1915, ibid., 168-169.

[77] Wilson expressed his concerns about the implications of "a failed Philippine policy" for House's peace mission to Europe in a long letter to Senator John Shafroth. Letters, Wilson to John Shafroth, February 3, 1915, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191, and Shafroth to Wilson, February 10, 1915, ibid.

[78] Breckinridge, Memorandum, "Interview with the President," February 4, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 538-540.

Although Garrison ultimately wrote to Wilson that he decided not to resign, the president understood that he needed to make every effort to win the secretary of war over to his perspective. Accordingly, Wilson wrote Garrison a long personal letter explaining in detail why he believed passage of the second Jones bill was critical to the nation's, and the world's, interests:

> I feel it is my duty to urge the passage, if it is at all possible at this session of the Senate, of the Philippine bill, because, deeply important as the general power and the conservation bills are, they do not touch, as the Philippine bill does, the general world situation, from which I think it is our duty to remove every element of doubt or disturbance which can possibly be removed. Such communication as that we have received from the Governor General of the Philippines shows that a very important element of native disturbance indeed will be removed if we can get the Philippine bill through. If it must be a choice, therefore, among the bills, I must give my preference to the Philippine bill.[79]

But time had run out. The second Jones bill came before Congress on the unanimous consent calendar the day before mandatory adjournment. Senator John Shafroth (Democrat-Colorado) made an impassioned plea for a vote on the measure. Shafroth's gesture, however, was a futile one, as the much-amended bill had no possibility of passage in the time remaining. The Republicans in the Senate to whom he appealed cut him short by objecting to consideration of the measure. Consequently, momentum for the passage of the second Jones bill stalled in partisan bickering and ultimately vanished with the Sixty-third Congress in March 1915.[80]

After the Senate failed to act on his Philippine bill, an angry Wilson briefly toyed with the idea of recalling the Senate for an extra session to secure passage of the measure. Tumulty suggested that the president reconsider this idea as the American people's

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[79] Letter, Wilson to Garrison, February 24, 1915, ibid., 285.

[80] *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 3rd session, 5342-5343.

attention was then focused on Germany's decision to resume its campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, not the Philippine question.[81] Wilson apparently agreed and instead turned his attention to shoring up his own Philippine constituencies. He cabled Harrison to assure the governor general that the second Jones bill had received the full support of the administration and the party, and had "failed only because it was blocked by Republican leaders . . . who would yield only if we withdrew assurance of ultimate independence contained in the preamble." This, Wilson promised, he would never do. Sympathetic to Filipino sensibilities following such a public debate about their racial maturity, Wilson also asked Harrison to extend his regards to the Filipino people, assuring them that the vast majority of Americans, including those serving in Congress, possessed a deep and abiding interest in their welfare. He requested that the governor general convey his view to Filipinos that, "The people of the Islands have already proved their quality and in nothing more than in the patience and self-control they have manifested in waiting for the fulfillment of our promises." The president concluded his letter with a personal pledge to the Filipino people: "The bill will have my support until it passes and I have no doubt of its passage at the next session of Congress."[82]

September 1915 – May 1916

The Sixty-third Congress expired in March 1915 with no plans to convene again until December. McIntyre departed Washington to spend the summer investigating conditions

[81] Letter, Tumulty to Wilson, February 26, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 293.

[82] Cable, Wilson to Harrison, March 6, 1915, *BIA Records*, File 4325/157. Several days later, Wilson wrote Quezon a similar letter. Letter, Wilson to Quezon, March 12, 1915, *PWW*, XXXII, 369.

in the Philippines. Reports of rumors of an imminent Filipino insurrection were still finding their way into American newspapers when he boarded ship in San Francisco.[83] Quezon joined McIntyre in Manila later in the summer to prepare Harrison and Osmeña for passage of a new government law patterned on the second Jones bill as amended by the Senate Committee on the Philippines. The committee had emasculated the preamble of the bill passed by the House and strengthened the American-dominated executive branch in the transitional government that would replace the commission government.

Retentionists were hardly idle during the interim as well. Certain that the Philippine question would reemerge in the new Sixty-fourth Congress, prominent retentionists in the United States and the Philippines revived their public campaign to discredit the Harrison administration and rail against the radicalism of the second Jones bill. In a Labor Day speech, Taft blasted Harrison for "wrecking the insular government" in Manila with his Filipinization program.[84] Taking his cue from the former president, Congressman Miller, fresh from his own investigating mission to the Philippines, made numerous addresses to virtually anyone who would listen about the graft and cronyism that riddled the insular government under the Democrats. He offered his most colorful assessment of the Democratic administration in the Philippines to a correspondent of the New York *Sun*: "Not Attila of the Huns nor Theodoric of the Goths ever laid such destructive hands upon human institutions. The result is complete governmental chaos."[85]

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[83] McIntyre, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, January 25, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325, after 181.

[84] Taft, Untitled Address, September 6, 1915, as reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 7, 1915.

[85] The New York *Sun*, November 9, 1915.

Taft escalated the controversy over the merits of Filipinization even further when he accused Harrison of "enthroning the Filipino politician . . . at the command of Wilson" which had demoralized the insular government. "It is a government which is running down hill," Taft wrote, "and one that is failing utterly in doing the good for the Filipino people which the United States promised when it assumed guardianship over them which is the only justification for our being there."[86] The charges and countercharges continued until Congress reconvened in December.[87]

In his third annual message to both houses of the new Congress, Wilson urged immediate action on the Philippine bill.[88] Again, he linked resolution of the Philippine question to the "question of national safety and defense" and America's mission in the world: "Our treatment of them [the Filipino people] and their attitude toward us are manifestly of the first consequence in the development of our duties in the world and in getting a free hand to perform those duties." Wilson recommended passage of the bill "with the sincere conviction that there are few measures you could adopt which would more serviceably clear the way for the great policies" which establish the American "right to lead in enterprises of peace and good will in the world."[89] The president did not have long to wait. Shortly after Congress convened, the Senate Committee on the Philippines

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[86] Taft, Editorial, *The Press* (Philadelphia), November 13, 1915.

[87] See for example, *New York Times*, November 7, 1915, November 30, 1915, December 2, 1915, and December 7, 1915. Harrison's response to these "unwarranted attacks" on his administration can be found in Cables, Harrison to the Secretary of War, September 8, 1915 and December 1, 1915, *Harrison Papers*, Box 37.

[88] House noted in his diary that Wilson was intent on pushing the Philippine bill through the 64th Congress as its first order of business even if it required delaying consideration of the critical Conservation and Shipping bills. House, Diary Entry, November 4, 1915, *PWW*, XXXV, 175-177.

[89] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st session, 98.

held hearings for one day on a piece of legislation similar to the second Jones bill as amended by the committee in the previous Congress. The only significant change in the so-called "Hitchcock bill" was a further weakening of the preamble, which stated that it was the purpose of the United States to grant independence to the Filipino people "when in the judgment of the United States it will be in the permanent interests of the Philippine people."[90]

It had been McIntyre, after conferring with Garrison and Quezon, who had persuaded the Senate committee to dilute the preamble even further and include revisions that strengthened the power of the American governor general vis-à-vis the Philippine Legislature in the new insular government. Satisfied with his handiwork, McIntyre wrote to General Clarence Edwards, his predecessor as the chief of the BIA, that the Philippine bill "is about in the condition which the War Department recommended . . . . Forget that the bill is called an 'independence bill' in the newspapers and I think you will realize it is a good, conservative bill."[91] To strengthen the credibility of the revisions requested by the War Department, Quezon went before the Senate committee and testified that the preamble in the new Hitchcock bill was even "more agreeable" to him. He announced that he would support the Hitchcock bill despite "attacks" he was certain to incur from his political opponents in the Philippines for doing so. Quezon assured the committee that once the *Partido Nacionalista* finished informing Filipinos about the measure's

[90] Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Philippines on Senate Document 381, "Government of the Philippines," 64th Congress, 1st session, December 15, 1915, 1.

[91] Letter, McIntyre to Brigadier General Clarence Edwards, December 21, 1915, *BIA Records*, File 4325/181.

advantages he would not be surprised to learn that ninety-five percent of the people would ultimately favor it over all previous versions of an independence bill.[92]

When the committee reported the Hitchcock bill to the Senate in early January 1916, Democrats expressed a keen sense of unhappiness with the watered-down preamble. On January 11, 1916, Senator James P. Clarke (Democrat-Arkansas) introduced an amendment to the bill for the purpose of restoring the preamble to its original meaning.[93] The Clarke amendment, however, proved much more radical than either of the two Jones bills introduced in the House. Clarke's amendment provided for the withdrawal from the Islands of "all the supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty now possessed or exercised by the United States . . . within two years from the date of the approval of this act." Furthermore, the Clarke amendment required the president to enter into negotiations with "the principal nations interested in the affairs of that part of the world" and attempt to obtain an international agreement that would recognize and respect the sovereignty and independence of a Philippine republic. The United States would guarantee Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity for the first five years of its existence or until a "neutralization pact" could be concluded.[94]

The unexpected introduction of such a radical amendment by a fellow Democrat greatly alarmed Wilson. He had viewed Democratic calls for "scuttling" the Philippines

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[92] Hearings before the Senate Committee of the Philippines on Senate Document 381, "Government of the Philippines," 64th Congress, 1st session, December 15, 1915, 71-77.

[93] According to an undated memorandum by McIntyre, the Clarke amendment originated in a "Senate cloakroom discussion" between Clarke and fellow southern Democrats. The memorandum states that upon learning that all those present desired complete withdrawal from the Philippines in the near future, the Arkansas senator immediately returned to the Senate floor and introduced his amendment. McIntyre, Memorandum, no date, *BIA Records*, File 4325/204.

[94] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st Session, 846.

as unrealistic and dangerous as were Republican calls for permanent retention of the Islands. The Clarke amendment, he wrote to Tumulty, seemed even more dangerous than the first Jones bill because it failed to address three important considerations. First, Wilson did not believe the Filipino people ready for complete independence. Filipinos, he argued, required a longer period of tutelage before the United States could responsibly extend complete self-government and self-determination to them. Second, Wilson doubted that the "interested powers" would agree to neutralize the Philippines. Germany's blatant disregard for Belgian neutrality in 1914 underscored the vulnerability of such an approach to maintaining the *status quo*, especially since the Japanese government had given ample evidence of its expansionist designs during the war. With the major powers embroiled in the European war, which from all indications would continue for at least two more years, the chances for reaching a neutralization agreement seemed remote at best. Finally, the provision calling upon the United States to provide for the protection of an independent Philippine republic seemed politically foolish to Wilson. He did not think it wise to put American troops in peril in the western Pacific if the United States had relinquished sovereignty over the Philippines. Also, American military and naval forces in the region were weak compared to Japanese strength.[95]

Wilson, who consistently opposed Philippine independence "any time soon," interceded to seek out a middle road. Using Tumulty as a confidential envoy, he formally requested Clarke to modify his original amendment, fixing the time for transferring sovereignty at not less than two years nor more than four years, but, significantly, affording the president discretion to extend the time limit of separation to the end of the

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[95] Letter, Wilson to Tumulty, January 23, 1916, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

next session of Congress after the expiration of four years if he judged conditions in either the Philippines or East Asia too tumultuous. If such a revision of the amendment was forthcoming, he declared, he would accept the Clarke amendment if Congress were to pass it. Clarke agreed to modify his amendment in the manner the president proposed about midway through the Senate's three-week debate on the Hitchcock bill. Wilson, knowing that the War Department would not approve of his action, sent a note to Garrison explaining "this is the best we can do under the circumstances."[96]

The secretary of war's reaction to what he considered to be a serious retreat by the president on the Philippine question was immediate. At a cabinet meeting on January 25, Garrison explained that he was in complete agreement with McIntyre and the entire BIA staff who judged that four years hardly constituted an adequate amount of time for the completion of America's nation-building mission in the Islands. He told his colleagues that the War Department stood united in its opposition to any statement in the Hitchcock bill that specified a date for Philippine independence. Instead, the United States should shirk political expediency and return to a reasonable course of action that would continue to guide Filipinos safely through the process of preparing for independence. Filipinos themselves wanted this, he argued, wishing for a more measured progress toward final separation than the one proposed in the Hitchcock bill. In a rather feeble attempt to assuage his secretary of war, Wilson explained that while he was in complete sympathy with Garrison's position on the Philippine question he believed it would be improper for him to comment publicly on the measure before Congress had an opportunity to act on it. Garrison, however, would have none of it. As far as the secretary of war was concerned,

[96] Letter, Wilson to Garrison, January 25, 1916, ibid.

he could no longer count on the president to support the War Department's efforts to sponsor a moderate bill that addressed the sensibilities of both Filipino nationalists and American retentionists.[97]

For Clarke and other Democrats in the Senate, the decision to omit the neutrality provision from his amendment hardly constituted a matter of concern. Like other southern Democrats, he had been promoting American withdrawal from the Philippines "without strings" since 1913. Indeed, Clarke even argued that Japanese annexation of the Islands might not be disastrous for all concerned. He confided in a reporter from the *Boston Globe* that Japan had accomplished much for Korea (which it had annexed in 1910), "and because of racial similarities" could accomplish much more for Filipinos than American colonial authorities. Beyond that, the senator argued, because the United States had prevented Japan from acquiring a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, American policy makers should be willing to offer Japan a *quid pro quo* and "keep out of Asiatic countries."[98]

Along similar lines, Senator Willard Salisbury (Democrat-Delaware) offered his support for the Clarke amendment because it meant avoiding war with Japan. Arguing that the American occupation of the Islands encroached upon Japan's "proper sphere," Salisbury saw "much reason" in what Japan might term the "White Peril in Asia." The speeches of various senators favoring retention of the Islands as a way to ensure

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[97] Garrison, Memorandum for the President, January 25, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325/215.

[98] Manuel Earnshaw [Philippine resident commissioner], Memorandum, March 1916, *Harrison Papers*, Box 40; Letters, Hitchcock to Tumulty, January 11, 1916, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191; Tumulty to Wilson, January 22, 1916, ibid.; Wilson to Tumulty, January 23, 1916, ibid.; and *Boston Globe*, January 30, 1916.

American dominance in the western Pacific, Salisbury declared, had not added to Japan's respect for America's ambitions in East Asia. Other southern Democrats who supported the Clarke amendment cited racial antagonisms with Japan as ample evidence for the abandonment of the region to "the Asiatics." More explicitly, Senator Robert L. Owen (Democrat-Oklahoma) declared that if the United States did not withdraw from the Philippines in short order, a disastrous race war between the United States and Japan seemed likely.[99]

Republican opponents to the Clarke amendment were equally adamant in their argument that retention of the Philippines held the key to American security and prosperity in the region. Senator Thomas J. Walsh (Republican-Montana) pointed out that America's hold on the Philippines was essential to an American victory over Japan in the impending struggle for control of China. Senators William A. Smith (Republican-Michigan) and William J. Stone (Republican-Missouri) criticized Senate Democrats for pursuing a "policy of scuttle" in East Asia that would render irreparable harm to American credibility in the region.[100]

Not surprisingly, the introduction of the Clarke amendment paralyzed Quezon and other *Nacionalistas* who did not relish the idea of independence sooner rather than later. McIntyre cabled Harrison in Manila that "the Clarke amendment has so upset Quezon that he had found it necessary to take to bed."[101] The Assembly debated the merits of the

[99] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st session, 2109-2110, 2110-2111.

[100] Ibid., 2111-2112, 2115-2116, 2119, 2125. See also, Letter, William J. Stone to Wilson, March 25, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 366-369.

[101] Cable, McIntyre to Harrison, February 14, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 1239/135.

measure for two weeks before unanimously approving a resolution endorsing the Clarke amendment. Passage of this resolution was due primarily to the "strong-arm tactics" of Osmeña who had moved quickly to organize support among *Nacionalistas* for the Clarke amendment. [102] In explaining his actions to Quezon, the speaker wrote: "Inasmuch as we favored the Jones bill only as a step toward independence, we would naturally prefer any other measure that will more promptly give us our independence."[103]

When the Clarke amendment came to a vote on February 2, a tie resulted. Vice-President Thomas Marshall, after conferring with Wilson, cast the deciding vote in favor of the amendment. Ten Democrats, including four members of the Committee on the Philippines, voted against the measure while five Republicans supported it. The following two days saw a number of moves to obtain reconsideration of the vote on the Clarke amendment, but support for the measure grew rather than waned. On February 4, the Senate approved the Hitchcock bill, with the Clarke amendment intact, by a vote of fifty-two to twenty-four. All Democrats voting supported the measure as did six Republicans.[104]

Passage of the Hitchcock bill with the Clarke amendment in place did not come cheaply for Wilson, however. The president's support for the amendment proved to be the proverbial last straw for Garrison. The secretary of war had been at loggerheads with the president and congressional Democrats for some time over the Philippine question as well

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[102] *Philippine Free Press*, January 29, 1916.

[103] Letter, Quezon to Wilson, January 25, 1916, ibid., File 4325/203a, and Cable, Osmeña to Quezon, January 12, 1916, published in *The Filipino People* III (March, 1916), 10.

[104] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st session, 2107-2108, 2116-2125.

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as other issues, especially American military preparedness. Following the outbreak of war in Europe, Garrison, supported by senior military advisers, had urged "preparedness" on Wilson. Supported by Bryan and the peace progressives in Congress, the president had consistently resisted the War Department's pressure to prepare for war. Instead, he remained committed to the policy of strict neutrality that he had proclaimed at the outset of the war.[105] In the fall of 1915 the War Department maneuvered to take advantage of the anger in the United States following the sinking of the *Lusitania* by a German U-boat to again convince Wilson of the necessity of "preparedness," but the president refused to budge.[106]

Wilson wanted to play the role of mediator and peacemaker in the world crisis, not warrior. In late January and early February, he offered several speeches on the issue of "preparedness" to clarify why he opposed preparing for war, at least in the manner recommended by the War Department. Wilson's argument that American and world interests would benefit more from the United States remaining aloof and disinterested

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[105] Some scholars have pointed to Wilson's abandonment of strict neutrality early in the war as evidence that he was engaging in domestic political posturing with his pronouncements of American disinterestedness. See, Ernest R. May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917* (Cambridge, MA, 1959), 34-53, and Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson*, 61-63. A more plausible view is offered by John W. Coogan in *The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915* (Ithaca, NY, 1981). Coogan argues persuasively that while Wilson abandoned neutrality early in the war, his sacrifice of neutral rights, resulting in a pro-British or anti-German bias in American policy, did not mean that he favored intervening in the war on one side or the other. Instead, Wilson saw no contradiction between his public pronouncements of American disinterestedness and neutrality and his unneutral actions toward the belligerents on maritime issues. Accordingly, Wilson's neutrality policy toward the belligerents, his unfailing opposition to "preparedness," and his efforts to resolve the Philippine question by securing legislation that promised Filipinos eventual independence suggest that he was genuinely committed to promoting American disinterestedness. See John W. Coogan, *The End of Neutrality*, 194-220, especially 217.

[106] On three occasions in January 1916, Garrison urged Wilson to support the "preparedness" program. Letters, Garrison to Wilson, January 2, 4, and 7, 1916, all printed in their entirety in *New York Times*, February 11, 1916.

rather than preparing for and entering into the war as a belligerent also provides important evidence for the continuity of his thought about American exceptionalism, empire, and mission since 1898. In Cleveland, the president spoke of imperialism as one of the principal causes of the Great War. But while Wilson described Europe's scramble for colonies before the war "as ruinous" in that it precipitated a deadly arms race and solidified the alliance system, he defended America's pre-war efforts in empire-building as constructive and beneficial for both Americans and their wards. What distinguished America's imperial experience from that of the other powers, he argued, was its emphasis on "the rights of men, . . not the rights of property." In this respect, Wilson continued to maintain that America's empire was exceptional, that is, qualitatively superior to other empires.[107]

In Topeka, Wilson went even further in connecting the events and themes of 1898 to his foreign policy in early 1916. The world at war, "now trying to make up its mind about America," needed "a few more demonstrations like the demonstration in Cuba, . . . a few more vindications of the American name" before it recognized the United States as a disinterested power. In 1898, Americans went to war to liberate the Cuban people from Spanish tyranny. When the United States planted its flag, few statesmen in the European capitals believed the American government would ever really haul it down and return Cuba to her own people. Now, Wilson pointed out, many of those same statesmen doubted America's sincerity about its purpose in the Philippines:

> When the American people saw that the time had come when her promises were to be fulfilled, down came the fluttering emblem of our sovereignty, and we were more honored in its lowering than we had been in its hoisting. The American

[107] See Wilson, Address, "Preparedness," January 29, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 41-48.

> people feel the same way about the Philippines, though the rest of the world does not yet believe it. We are the trustees for the Filipino people, and just as soon as we feel that they can take care of their own affairs without our direct interference and protection, the flag of the United States, will again be honored by the fulfillment of a promise.

Thus, resolution of the Philippine question, Wilson argued, was tied to America's effort to offer the world a brighter future:

> The American flag stands for honor, not for advantage. The flag stands for the rights of mankind, no matter where they be [*sic*], no matter what their antecedents, no matter what the race involved. It stands for absolute right to political liberty and free government, and wherever it stands for the contrary, American traditions have begun to be forgotten.

He explained that when the nations of the world accepted this political truth, then America's "vindication" as a disinterested power would be at hand, making possible a just and durable peace at the end of the war.[108]

Notwithstanding Wilson's private and public words on the issues of preparedness and empire, Garrison was convinced that Wilson would continue to "sacrifice sound judgment" for political expediency on both military preparedness and the Philippine question. One week after the Senate voted to approve the Clarke amendment, he wrote to the president: "I consider the principle embodied in the Clarke amendment an abandonment of the duty of this nation and a breach of trust toward the Filipinos, so believing, I cannot accept it or acquiesce in its acceptance."[109] In replying to the ultimatum implicit in Garrison's letter, Wilson attempted to give his secretary of war an avenue of escape stating that:

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[108] Wilson, Untitled Address, February 2, 1916, ibid., 87-96.

[109] Letter, Garrison to Wilson, February 9, 1916, ibid., 143-144.

> It is my judgment that the action embodied in the Clarke amendment to the bill extending further self-government to the Philippines is unwise at this time, but it would clearly be most inadvisable for me to take the position that I must dissent from that action should both Houses of Congress concur.[110]

Garrison submitted his resignation as secretary of war upon receiving Wilson's letter.[111]

Wilson's decision to take a forthright position on the Clarke amendment derived to a large extent from the fact that he believed the measure was more conservative than it appeared. First, Wilson's single stipulation, which Clarke had to incorporate into the amendment before he would approve it, permitting the president to delay the grant of independence for the period of one session of Congress if conditions in the Philippines and the general region did not seem ripe ensured that the ultimate destiny of the Islands would continue to remain in the president's hands. If, at the assigned time of review, the president determined that conditions did not lend themselves to separation, then Congress would be afforded an opportunity to amend the bill and postpone independence. Second, Wilson approved the Clarke amendment because it left intact American guarantees of Philippine independence against external dangers for at least five years. By doing so, the United States avoided being subjected to the charge of abandonment in the face of Japanese expansionism in the region. Third, assuming that the United States would retain sovereignty for the entire four years allowed in the revised version of the amendment, Wilson noted that Filipinos could count on nine years in which to complete their

[110] Wilson drafted a reply to Garrison and submitted it to Tumulty for comments and revisions. See, Drafts of Letters, Wilson to Garrison, February 9, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 144-145, and Tumulty to Wilson, February 9, 1916, ibid., 145-147. For Wilson's reply to Garrison containing Tumulty's suggested revisions, see Letter, Wilson to Garrison, February 10, 1916, ibid., 162-164.

[111] Letter, Garrison to Wilson, February 10, 1916, ibid., 164.

organization of a fully self-sustaining government. This would bring them to 1925, time enough, he assumed, for Harrison's Filipinization program in the Islands to take root.[112]

Garrison and most retentionists, however, remained unconvinced. Their response to the Clarke amendment was both swift and vigorous. On the day that Clarke introduced his measure, Taft, who had been on intimate terms with Catholic leaders in the United States and the Philippines for over a decade, moved to mobilize the American hierarchy of the Catholic Church to oppose the measure. The former president enlisted the support of his friends James Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore and William Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, both of whom were fearful that an independent Philippine government would confiscate the Church's still extensive property holdings in the Islands (valued at nearly $44 million). Cardinal Gibbons pledged to do everything he could to defeat the Hitchcock bill in the Senate as he had done three years earlier when he helped smother support for the first Jones bill in the House. Cardinal O'Connell also promised to do what he could to torpedo the Clarke amendment. Time was too short, however, for the American Catholic hierarchy to influence the decision of the Senate, which adopted the Clarke amendment three weeks after it was introduced.[113]

The two months that elapsed before the Hitchcock bill was brought up in the House enabled opposition to the Clarke amendment to crystallize. The brief interim also provided time for the Church hierarchy in the Philippines to organize and join in the

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[112] Letter, Wilson to Tumulty, January 23, 1916, *Wilson Papers*, series 4, case file 44, reel 191.

[113] Letters, Taft to James Cardinal Gibbons, January 11 and 16, 1916, *Taft Papers*, series 1; Gibbons to Taft, January 12, 1916, ibid. See also, *New York Times*, April 27 and 28, 1916, and the New York *World*, April 29, 1916. Wilson became aware of the tactic in early April, but elected not to expose it for fear of a negative Catholic reaction in an election year. Letter, Baker to Wilson, April 4, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 414.

retentionist crusade. Archbishop Harty of Manila and a variety of American and Japanese business firms in the Philippines retained William N. Kinkaid, a former member of the Texas House of Representatives and former justice of the Court of the First Instance in the Philippines who was then practicing law in Manila, to journey to Washington to lobby for an "acceptable bill." An avowed apologist for Taft's policy of attracting retentionist constituencies to the Islands, Kinkaid spent his first two months in Washington discreetly preaching, apparently without very much success, the gospel of retentionism to mainstream Republicans.[114] His dismal results on Capitol Hill prompted a change in tactics. In the hopes of intimidating Wilson with Catholic disaffection in an election year, Kinkaid drafted a long letter to the president warning that the Hitchcock bill threatened the prestige and the property of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. Every Christian in the United States and the Philippines, he wrote, understood that "the Senate Bill is a threat to every Christian Church in the Philippine Islands and is a violation of the promises under which they entered the field." All of them would be watching to see if the president permitted passage of legislation that jeopardized the Church and hence, the prosperity and security, of the Philippines.[115]

On March 1, 1916, the House Committee on Insular Affairs voted eleven to eight to report the Hitchcock bill. The vote came on the heels of a bitter partisan debate within

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[114] Theodore Roosevelt's endorsement of early withdrawal from the Philippines effectively neutralized some Republican opposition to the Clarke amendment. Letter, Wilson to Newton Baker [secretary of war], May 5, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325/237.

[115] Letter, Kinkaid to Wilson, February 11, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVI, 172. As "evidence" of the threat to the Catholic Church in the Philippines, Kinkaid enclosed two retentionist-leaning newspaper clippings nearly three years old with his letter to the president: "Bishop Brent on the Philippines," Milwaukee *Wisconsin*, April 24, 1913, and "What of the Philippines?," Columbus [Ohio] *Dispatch*, April 23, 1913. See also, The New York *Sun*, April 28, 1916, and Cable, McIntyre to Harrison, April 17, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325/221.

the committee in which Republicans sought to replace the Clarke amendment with the preamble of the second Jones bill of the previous Congress. The bill did not come before the entire House until early May. The additional two-month interval provided retentionists with more time to organize. The opposition gathered strength until Jones and Democratic leaders in the House, alarmed by signs that the bill was in trouble, decided to call a Democratic caucus to consider a resolution making the bill a party measure.[116]

When the caucus met at the end of April, Jones read a brief message from Wilson urging approval of the Hitchcock bill. Jones then introduced a resolution that bound Democrats to vote for the bill without amendment. This calculated move by the chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs produced widespread dissension among the Democratic rank and file. The only thing agreed upon that first day of the caucus was to meet the next day to discuss Jones' resolution. Significantly, the first caucus session disclosed that opposition to the measure was concentrated in House members from New York, Boston, and Chicago. Not surprisingly, most of the Hitchcock bill's opponents in the House were either Irish Catholic themselves or represented large blocks of Irish Catholic voters.[117]

Jones and House supporters of the Hitchcock bill did not have a better time of it in the second caucus session. Although the caucus voted 140 to 35 in favor of the measure, the vote on the resolution binding party members to support it without amendment saw twenty-eight Democrats, all but two from large cities, refuse to accept the mandate. Because the Democratic majority in the House was only twenty-one, there was little

[116] *New York Times*, April 23, 1916.

[117] Ibid., April 28, 1916.

chance that the bill would be enacted that session of Congress. With the parties' nominating conventions scheduled to be held that summer and Republicans projected to do well in the November elections, the House Republicans needed only to hold firm against any Philippine measure in order to hand Wilson a serious legislative defeat. Understanding that the Hitchcock bill would meet certain defeat if introduced under a rule precluding amendments, Democratic leaders in the House decided to try and save the situation by limiting the debate but permitting amendments. The House debate on the Hitchcock bill commenced on May 1, 1916, the eighteenth anniversary of the Battle of Manila Bay. When the measure came up for amendment, the Clarke amendment was rejected. Jones offered the second Jones bill as a substitute for the Hitchcock bill. House members voted a straight party line and the bill, with the preamble intact, passed 199 to 152.[118]

May – August 1916

Congress adjourned for the nominating conferences before the conference committee could reconcile all the differences between the Senate and House bills. During the summer months, Quezon launched a campaign to restore the consensus that he had labored so hard to construct before January 1916. The resident commissioner worked diligently to close the ranks and secure some legislation before the presidential election that November. He understood only too well that walking away empty-handed after the Wilson administration and the majority of Congress had publicly declared their support for an independence bill would yield only dire political consequences for the

[118] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st session, 7205-7212.

Nacionalistas.[119] In a similar vein, Newton Baker, the new secretary of war, urged quick action among congressional Democrats on the issue. He feared that if Wilson failed to secure passage of a Philippine bill that session of Congress, then Republicans would be able to exploit the issue in the 1916 presidential election.[120] In July, Hitchcock, following considerable prodding by Wilson and Quezon, arranged for a compromise measure to be adopted. Republicans insisted upon retaining provisions of the Hitchcock bill strengthening the hand of the American governor general while Democrats urged retention of the preamble of the second Jones bill. After some inevitable legislative delay, the Senate passed the measure on August 16 with the House following its lead two days later.[121]

On August 29, 1916, Wilson signed into law the second organic act of the Philippines in the presence of a number of army and navy officers as well as several members of Congress. After laying pen aside, the president declared: "The Philippine bill excites peculiar feelings in me, because there have been times when the people of the Philippine Islands doubted our intention to be liberally just to them. I hope and believe that this bill is a sufficient earnest to them of our real intentions." Clearly, Wilson hoped that passage of the Jones act would put an end to any further debate in Washington and Manila about his nation-building program in the Philippines. Thereafter, the United States

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[119] Cable, Quezon to Osmeña, May 2, 1916, *Quezon Papers*, BHL, reel 5.

[120] Letter, Baker to Wilson, May 3, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325/236.

[121] *Congressional Record*, 64th Congress, 1st Session, 12732, 12844, and Cable [Confidential], McIntyre to Harrison, September 1, 1916, *BIA Records*, File 4325/ 263-270. See also, Stanley, *A Nation in the Making*, 224-225.

would remain committed to a strictly Burkean policy of "gradually extending to . . . [Filipinos] genuine self-government and control of their own affairs."[122]

In another address delivered in Topeka while on the campaign trail for re-election, Wilson reminded his audience in less lofty terms that the object of the Jones act had been twofold: first, it sought to end America's longtime policy of drift and evasion concerning the Philippines' future political status by pledging the United States to a policy of eventual independence; and second, it mandated the reorganization of the Philippine government, replacing the commission government, which had governed the islands since 1901, with one that placed more responsibility in the hands of Filipinos. Thus, the president concluded, "just as soon as we feel that they can take care of their own affairs without our direct interference and protection, the flag of the United States will again be honored by the fulfillment of a promise."[123] Wilson also indicated in this campaign speech that passage of the Jones act possessed serious implications not only for cultivating the right kind of democracy in the Philippines but also for his emerging wartime diplomacy. Before passage of the Philippine bill, he declared, America could only claim to be the "trustees" of the Filipino people; with the bill's passage, however, "the entire world can now believe it as do the Filipinos."[124]

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[122] Wilson, Address, August 29, 1916, *PWW*, XXXVIII, 101-102. Quotation on 102.

[123] Wilson, Address, October 7, 1916, ibid., 211-213.

[124] Ibid. Quotation on 213.

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