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Myoung-Ho Park

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AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL PARTISAN FRAGMENTATION IN SINGLE-
MEMBER SIMPLE PLURAILTY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS:
A MACRO AND MICRO ANALYSIS OF CANADA AND KOREA

BY

Myoung-Ho Park

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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL PARTISAN FRAGMENTATION IN SINGLE-MEMBER SIMPLE PLURAILTY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: A MACRO AND MICRO ANALYSIS OF CANADA AND KOREA

By

Myoung-Ho Park

The current understanding of party system development within the tradition of the diversity of political institutions has focused on data from the national level and if any provincial level. However, the basic unit of electoral competition for legislative seats is the local electoral district. This study is the first attempt to analyze the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in Single-Member Simple Plurality electoral systems under different institutional contexts (decentralized unitary presidential vs. federalist parliamentary systems). Utilizing district-level data from national, provincial, and local elections, it examines the sources of partisan fragmentation at the district and national level in Canadian and Korean parliamentary elections. It then deepens this study of the sources of political cleavages and partisan fragmentation through the utilization of micro-level survey data. This study first confirms the necessity of sub-national and/or district-level analysis of the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections, especially under the SMSP. Then, it argues that the local/district partisan characteristics from local elections are crucial for understanding the degrees and patterns of electoral partisan competition at the local district level. These points, furthermore, are supported by the micro-level analysis that in both cases there exists a concentration of electoral support at the individual level following regional lines.

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INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the degree of electoral competition at the district level in the Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP) electoral systems in the comparative institutional contexts of Canadian and Korean parliamentary elections. Utilizing legislative electoral district-level data from national, provincial, and local elections in both countries, it first examines the sources of electoral partisan fragmentation at district vs. national levels. Next, we take a closer look at the source of political cleavage and partisan fractionalization at the individual level through the utilization of micro-level survey data.

Existing scholarship suggests that it is important to explain why some polities have more fragmented electoral (or legislative) party systems than others and what factors work to determine the level of electoral partisan fragmentation, in our cases, in Canada and Korea. One of the most interesting and controversial questions in the field of comparative electoral systems is the extent to which, in the words of Siavelis, “majority/plurality electoral formulae or small magnitude electoral systems have the capacity to exercise a reductive effect on the number of parties and whether such systems encourage centripetal drives within party systems” (Siavelis 1997: 652).

The influence exercised by different electoral systems on the degree of electoral partisan competition in legislative elections become a topic of great debates in the field¹

¹ However, the institutionalist approach does not hold a monopoly of influence in determining the degree of electoral partisan fractionalization. Some scholars argue that social cleavage is the primary force that structures the development of party systems (Rokkan 1970). Furthermore, an interactive approach emerges in which the influence of electoral systems is conditioned on the content of social cleavages in a polity (Jones 2001; Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepara 2000). Discussion of the competing approaches will be detailed in the next chapter of theoretical consideration.

(Duverger 1954; Jones 1995, 1997, 1999; Rae 1971; Sartori 1976; Riker 1982; Lijphart 1984, 1994; Taagepara and Shugart 1989). One line of research in the “institutionalist” approach to party system development takes into account the variety of political institutions in the broader context of a political system, in order to understand the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections.

The basic premise behind incorporating the diversity of political institutions of a polity into a study is to explain the degree of legislative electoral multipartism and interdependence of political institutions within a given country. In other words, national legislative elections and legislative institutions do not exist in institutional isolation within their political systems (Shugart and Carey 1992).

Thus, much research has emerged on the interrelationship between different types of national/sub-national and legislative elections in determining the patterns of electoral partisan fragmentation with respect to legislative seats. The degree of electoral partisan competition for national (as with the presidency) and/or sub-national (as with the governorship) political offices appears to have an important effect on the level of electoral multipartism in legislative elections. Specifically, while most studies focus on the importance of presidential elections (Coppedge 2000; Cox 1997; Jones 1995; Lijphart 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Shugart 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992), a small number of researchers have emphasized the importance of sub-national, local elections (Jones 1997; Samuels 2000 a/b).

The degree of electoral competition emanating from electoral systems in presidential and gubernatorial elections and their relative concurrence in legislative elections, have been found to have a significant influence on the level of electoral

multipartism in legislative elections. The influence of presidential elections on legislative electoral multipartism has been analyzed in most cases at the ‘national’ level with respect to electoral competition for the presidency. In contrast, those studies emphasizing gubernatorial elections have focused on sub – national (provincial) electoral competition for governorship and legislative seats, especially under the “party list PR” electoral system found in federalist contexts.

However, legislative elections in most cases (especially under the single member simple plurality electoral system) are basically held at the local electoral district level across a country. This becomes especially evident when legislative members are elected under SMSP electoral systems. If there is any influence of electoral competition patterns in important national and sub-national local elections on the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections within a broader institutional context, then it is important to focus on the legislative electoral district in which legislative elections are held. Since electoral partisan competitions for legislative seats takes place at local legislative electoral districts, the appropriate unit (or level) of analysis for party system developments in national legislative elections must be ‘local’ districts (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Cox 1997; Gaines 1997, 1999; Jones 1997, 2001).

Most studies on the effects of presidential elections on legislative electoral multipartism have been conducted at the national level. Furthermore, most research on the interrelationships between different types of elections is implicitly based on an assumption that a national party system more or less represents the pattern of electoral partisan competition for national legislative seats across all local electoral districts. In other words, explanations of the relationship between electoral systems and structures of

social cleavage in the shape of party system development have mainly focused on the party system at the 'national' level as the dependent variable.

However, given that legislative elections are held in local districts across a country, electoral partisan competition patterns appear to be different from district to district, contributing in different ways to the formation of a national-level party system. Thus, in the words of Jones: "Any analysis of legislative elections must either be conducted at the district level or else make several assumptions regarding the distribution of the vote and influence of electoral laws in aggregate at the national level" (Jones 2001: 4). Our understanding, therefore, of the political consequences of electoral systems (and social heterogeneity as well) in national legislative elections can profit from analyses at the electoral district level. As Duverger contended, "The true effects of the simple majority system [in legislative elections] is limited to local bipartism" (p. 28). In short, the mechanism at work in legislative elections, given the broad diversity of political institutions appears to be driven by events at the local electoral district level (Taagepara 2000).

All of this suggests that any attempt to understand the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in national legislative elections requires a district-level (or at least sub-national local level) analysis. Since the basic unit for electoral partisan competition for national legislative seats is the local electoral district, the appropriate level of research on the interrelationship between national/sub-national elections and legislative elections should be at the local district. Previous studies have been concerned with the impact of national and/or sub-national elections on legislative electoral multipartism and the level

of electoral competition at the national level (presidential elections) and/or at the provincial level (gubernatorial elections), not that of the legislative electoral district.

Incorporating presidential elections in our explanation of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections involves focusing on the effects of patterns of ‘national-level’ electoral competition for the presidency on legislative electoral party system developments across a country. In contrast, taking into account sub-national elections put an emphasis on the influence of patterns of ‘local-level’ electoral competition for the governorship on legislative electoral partisan fragmentation across districts. Electoral competition for legislative seats in a given local legislative electoral district is subject not only to the usual institutional or national-level influences at work, but also by the local forces like electoral competition patterns in races for prominent sub-national, provincial political offices (Kernell and Jacobson 1981).

Presidential elections are basically ‘national-level’ electoral partisan competitions representing ‘national-level’ electoral partisan strength and fragmentation. However, local elections are ‘local-level’ electoral partisan competitions more or less representative of ‘local – level’ partisan strength and fractionalization, presumably different from that of the national level, across localities. Different types of sub-national local party systems may coexist, given a certain form of institutional structure (federalism or decentralized unitary system) and social/political diversity following regional lines across a country.

Electoral competition patterns at the local or district level, therefore, appears relevant for explaining district-level electoral partisan fragmentation for legislative seats across a locality. *‘Local/district partisan characteristics’*, based on the degree of electoral competition in prominent local elections in a given district, help to shed light on district-

level electoral multipartism in legislative elections in which basic electoral competition for legislative seats emerges (especially under the SMSP electoral system).

Using the local district in legislative elections as the basic unit of electoral competition for legislative seats, the degree of electoral partisan competition across a locality provides different incentives or motives for voters and candidates to associate with any given party for electoral purposes across a locality. Among these incentives or motivations are the local strength of a party and the subsequent degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the local level that is relevant for voters and politicians for deciding which party to associate with in a given locality. Thus, sub-national elections are more reflective of local-level (or district – level) partisan strength and subsequent electoral partisan fragmentation. Also, local (or district)-level electoral competition patterns in local (as well as presidential) elections appears most adequate for understanding the degree of electoral multipartism across local district levels in legislative elections.

Despite of the possibility that local elections are highly reflective of local partisan characteristics in influencing the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections, there have existed to date only ‘two’ studies of the phenomenon (Jones 1997; Samuels 2000a/b). Jones and Samuels both suggest that federal systems allow for sub-national political and social diversity and the presence of political power at multiple levels across a country. Then, institutional structures and political diversity influence the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections within sub-national units. Jones and Samuels specifically argue that electoral competition patterns in gubernatorial elections are influential in determining the degree of electoral partisan

fragmentation in a given provincial-level district in legislative elections under the party list proportional representation electoral system for legislative elections.

However, there is a void in the literature that should be filled to achieve a more systematic understanding of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections. There have been few attempts to extend to a district-level analysis of legislative elections under the single member simple plurality rule electoral system in a ‘decentralized unitary presidential democracy’ (Korea)’ and in a ‘federalist parliamentary context’ (Canada). Current district-level studies of electoral partisan fragmentation with local elections focus on federalist presidential institutions such as in Argentina and Brazil, as well as the party list PR electoral system for legislative elections. Therefore, this study is the first comparative attempt to analyze the degree of electoral competition at the district level in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems in different institutional contexts. Our understanding of party system development in legislative elections can be greatly strengthened by the district-level analyses of party system development for which adequate district-level data are available.

This research, therefore, is structured as follows: *Chapter One* reviews the existing scholarship on party system developments in national legislative elections. Given the importance of understanding party system fractionalization in a polity, we focus first on the general theoretical development of the determinants of the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections, especially current understandings of the interrelationship between different types of elections at the national level. Next we discuss what should be the appropriate unit (or level) of analysis for the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections.

Legislative elections under the SMSP electoral system are basically “district-level phenomena.” Thus, local and district-level partisan strength and fractionalization is highly influential in determining the electoral multipartism in a given district in legislative elections. If the *local (or district)- level pattern of electoral competition* is relevant for explaining the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in a given district in legislative elections, then prominent sub-national elections appear to be the best indicator of local (or district) partisan characteristics. Finally, Chapter One discusses research design, cases, data, variable descriptions and research methodology for the macro analysis chapters.

Chapters Two and Three represent macro analyses of the sources of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level using electoral data from different types of sub-national elections while controlling for other district-level factors. The cases of Canada and Korea represent quite different institutional contexts (a decentralized unitary presidential and a federalist parliamentary democracy). However, both Canada and Korea seem to produce a “patchwork” type of party system at the national level, indicating that electoral competition patterns across localities seem to influence the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections at the district (or riding²) level.

The shape of electoral partisan fragmentation in a given locality is basically based on the distribution of individual votes cast in elections (i.e., partisan preference). While the previous two chapters focus on sources of partisan fragmentation at the district and national levels, *Chapters Four and Five* represent searches for sources of partisan fragmentation and political cleavage across a country using survey data from both

² “Riding” is a Canadian term for legislative “constituency” or “district.”

Canada and Korea. Macro as well as micro-level analysis is called for in order to achieve a balanced understanding of electoral competition patterns in legislative elections in Canada and Korea.

Chapter Six is the concluding chapter, which recapitulates the major findings of the macro- and micro-analyses of Canadian and Korean cases and discusses possible future arenas for the development of a more systematic understanding of party system developments in legislative elections, in particular, and comparative political institutions in general.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Chapter One puts the primary research question raised in the previous chapter in a larger theoretical context by reviewing the theoretical development on the shape of party system in legislative elections. First of all, this chapter discusses the existing literature on what is a political party and how they are developed as a party system in a country. While there have been two competing arguments on the development of party system:

Institutionalisit vs. *Sociological views*, a new approach recently emerges advocating the interactive influence of electoral systems and underlying social cleavage structure on party system developments. After admitting the importance of political institutions, this chapter reviews the current understandings on the interrelationship between different types of elections (mainly presidential elections) in explaining the party system fragmentation in legislative elections.

The basic unit of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats is the local legislative electoral district, especially under the SMSP electoral system. Thus, the appropriate level of analysis for the electoral multipartism in legislative elections is the local district across a country. The ‘local/district partisan characteristics’ representing local (or district) – level electoral competition pattern appears important in understanding the degree of electoral multipartism across districts level in legislative elections. Furthermore, sub – national level electoral competitions for local political offices seem more adequate in identifying the local/district partisan characteristics that are presumably

different from locality to locality under certain institutional contexts, and influence the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections.

After discussing the existing scholarships on the sub – national level analysis of legislative elections with local elections to the legislative electoral multipartism, this chapter finds a void in the current literature that should be filled out for our systematic understanding of party system development at the district and national level in legislative elections. Then, a brief discussion of cases, data and measurements will follow for empirical analysis.

Political Party and Party System Development

Political Party and Its Origin

Political parties are political organizations that are able to participate in elections as well as to choose do so (Sartori 1976; Mainwaring Scully 1995). Political party has critical functions despite its declining importance in both established and emerging democracies (Dalton et al 1984; Nie et al 1976; Wattenberg 1990). Political party is intrinsic to every representative democracy and the study of its function and form is one of the most dynamic areas within contemporary scholarships of political science.

However, scholars disagree about the origins of political parties. The modernization schools have argued that political parties emerged when public policy could no longer be made by a small number of cadres of political elites who were not concerned with public opinion (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966). Accordingly, the advent of mass suffrage that was combined with the complexity of social problems after the Industrial Revolution finally required political party.

Other political scientists focus on the mass suffrage as a key factor in the development of political parties. Political parties link society and the political world by mediating the cleavages of a society. This line of argument leads to “the sociological view of party system development.” According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the social cleavage structure of the 1960’s in Western Europe is virtually identical to those of forty years of later. More specifically, Epstein (1980) explicitly denies the institutional influence on party system development, referring to party systems’ proximity to civil service reforms and their relationship to social/cultural and geographical cleavages. However, the development of party system outside of Western society undermines the external validity and explanatory power of the argument.

Contrary to those traditional scholars that put an emphasis on the social cleavages in the development political party and party systems, researchers in the tradition of the rational choice suggest that political parties emerge as tools for rational politicians to gain political offices and make public policy. According to this view, political parties are created since politicians consider political party as useful for their electoral and political successes (Aldrich 1994; Downs 1957; Schlensinger 1991). They argue that political parties are to address collective action problems in election campaigns and in the legislative body.

If political party emerges as a response to the social/political changes and to mediate social conflicts, its primary function is to provide voters with a link to the legislature and government. In contrast, political parties’ communication with the electorate is to be subsumed under their role as political instruments for taking care of collective action problem as long as political parties are tools for rational politicians. The

underlying assumption of political party and subsequent party system development for this research is that the main role of political party is to help politicians win elections and govern, and voters associate with a party for their political representation.

The Development and Shape of Party System

Whenever political party emerges, it cooperates as well as competes with one another for gaining political offices or making public policies. According to Sartori (1976: 44), the “System of interactions resulting from inter – party competition” mainly constitutes a party system in a country. As the development of individual political parties respond to the institutional features of electoral systems and social cleavages, so does the party system.

Political scientists have developed two general measures for defining party systems. They are ‘the (effective) number of political parties’ and ‘their ideological distance.’ The classification of party systems has focused on the number of parties (Duverger 1954). Then, scholars expanded the analysis to the number and ideological distance between parties (Sartori 1976) and the number of parties and majority formation (Rokkan 1968). As suggested, the (effective) number of parties has consistently played a significant role in understanding party system development.

The (effective) number of parties in a polity is consequential in determining who attain political power to make public policy. According to Sartori (1976: 120), “It does matter how many are the parties. For one thing, the number of parties immediately indicates, albeit roughly, an important feature of the political system: the extent to which political power is fragmented or non – fragmented, dispersed or concentrated.”

In addition, the comparative studies of regime stability and governmental performance have suggested that the nature and structure of political party systems do matter. The higher the degree of partisan fractionalization, the more likely national governments are to falter (Lijphart 1984, 1994). Furthermore, presidential democracies tend to experience executive – legislative stalemate (Jones 1995; Linz 1994), if there is a higher level of legislative partisan fragmentation. Also, structural economic reforms can be abandoned since there are highly volatile party systems.

Furthermore, if our study of comparative electoral systems is concerned with the degree of representativeness in representative democracies, it is “expected to be fairly closely related to the number of parties” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 208). Depending on the number of political parties in a polity, the extent and quality of representation and the stability, and the effectiveness of political system do varies. Because of these reasons, it is very important to understand why some countries have more fragmented electoral or legislative party systems than others, and what factors work in determining the level of partisan fragmentation in a polity. In a word, elections lie at the heart of representative democracy. Since political parties organize electoral competition in most representative democracies, a vital party system seems to be essential to democratic process (Katz 1997).

Whether a polity contains two or more parties depends on (1) the nature of the limit on the introduction of new parties and (2) the shape of the distribution of voters. The first indicates how strong or permissive an electoral system the political system adopts is (*Institutionalist view*), and the second implies how many social/political cleavages there are in the polity (*Sociological view*). While the former approach focuses on the primary influence of electoral institutions on the shape of party system, the latter

approach puts an emphasis on the importance of underlying social cleavages in a country to determine the number of parties. Scholars such as Duverger (1954), Rae (1971), Sartori (1976), Riker (1982), Lijphart (1984; 1994), Taagepara and Shugart (1989), Myerson and Weber (1993) and Cox (1997) emphasize the importance of institutions (electoral systems). In contrast, some researchers like Grumm (1958), Lipset and Rokan (1967) and Fukui (1988) stress historical and social factors.

Proponents of the sociological approach argue that social cleavages better explain the development of party system in a country. According to this view, the number of social/political cleavages in a society ultimately determines the shape of the party system, number of relevant political parties. According to Evans and Whitefield (1993) and Randall (1995), political parties need deep social roots and have to be internally united. That is, salient social/political¹ cleavages form political groups like political parties.

In addition to the challenges to the institutionalist arguments, some scholars assert that the direction of causal relationship between electoral systems and party system development is not correct. Electoral systems do not determine the party system; rather, the existing party system determines the electoral systems. Recent analyses indicate that existing institutional features structure institutional choices, including electoral systems (Bawn 1993; Remington and Smith 1996; Fish 1998).

Both electoral systems and social cleavage structures are essential in determining how many political parties a given democracy will contain when it reaches equilibrium.

¹ Coppedge (1997) uses “political cleavage” rather than “social cleavage,” since “political cleavages are more specific than social cleavages and more general than party identification. Political cleavages are the divisions between general political orientations that are derived, in part, from social characteristics but are mediated by culturally defined identities and perceptions of conflict and shared interest. The most familiar examples of the blocs defined by political cleavages are positions on the left – right dimensions; however, blocs based on religious, ethnic, or gender identities, or perhaps even personalistic loyalties, are also possible” (pp. 169-174).

Recent research shows that both institutional and social factors affect the development of party system. Duverger himself indicates that electoral systems “Act as an accelerator or a brake” (1986: 73), putting an emphasis on national and social factors. It underscores the influence of institutional variables as well as sociological factors in the party system development. The interactive approach suggests that the influence of electoral systems on the degree of multipartism is conditional on the extent of social cleavages in a polity² (Cox 1997; Jones 1997, 2001; Lijphart 1994; Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepara 2000).

Among the approaches on the development of party systems, this research admits the importance of political institutions in determining the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections. The primary assumption of sociological view on party system development is that the social cleavages salient in a country will lead to the formation of political groups – political parties. However, collective action problems may undermine or retard the translation of social cleavages into political parties. Additionally, it is not clear what makes a social cleavage salient in a polity. While some social cleavages are strong enough to help develop parties, others may not be as important. Furthermore, focusing on institutionalist explanations on party system development does not deny the important role of social cleavages in the political process (Lijphart 1994).

² They find that both electoral systems and social heterogeneity have an effect. On whether the effects of heterogeneity and electoral systems additive or multiplicative, Powell (1982) used an addition of two factors, but Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), and Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) indicate that a multiplicative interaction superior. Specifically, “Low heterogeneity puts a lid on the number of parties even in the presence of very permissive electoral systems, because there will be no demand for many parties. Similarly, a low magnitude (single – member districts) tends to put a lid on the number of parties even in the presence of strong heterogeneity, because few parties can gain representation. This mutual limitation can be obtained by multiplying the two effects, but not by adding them” (Taagepara 2000: pp. 534-535).

Institutional Explanation on Party System Development

Political scientists have sought universal and general theories that explain individual and group behaviors that are involved in political processes. While required to develop a research program encompassing and improving upon previous researches, scholarly works sometimes pursue independent research agendas, and they do not directly contribute to the development of general and universal theories in political science. According to Geddes (1991), this kind of tendency in political science research is particularly evident in the field of comparative politics, in which the variety of researches has been historically tied to a researcher's ideological preference, and theories are transitory.

However, there exists at least one exemption to the tradition. Riker (1982) suggests that the study of political institutions and their impact on political party system development follow a "Lakatosian" path of scientific research program. Since Duverger's theorization of the interrelationship between electoral institutional systems and the degree of partisan fragmentation, comparative study of electoral and party systems have moved forward by improving and incorporating previous research for our general understandings. Specifically, scholars have investigated how Duverger's law and hypothesis works in explaining party system development (Fey 1997; Feddersen et al 1990; Palfrey 1989; Taagepara and Shugart 1989). Researchers have also applied the theory of electoral institutions and party systems development to the variety of countries (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Cox 1997; Jones 1995, 1997, 1999; Lijphart 1994; Neto and Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvestova 1994).

Political institutions are the array of formal and informal institutional arrangements that define the rules of the game in politics and establish how different elements of the state relate to each other and how individuals attain positions of authority (North 1990). Political institutions determine who are in a position of policy decision – making, what views are represented at the highest levels of government and what kinds of mechanisms are at work to resolve social conflicts in a society. Political institutions have a “genetic code that programs the kinds of bureaucracies, leadership structures, personal arrangements and the other properties that will ultimately make up its government” (Moe and Caldwell 1994: 192). Therefore, decisions to select or alter the existing institutions are not taken lightly and the developments of new political institutions are based on the desires of competing constituencies (Bawn 1993; Remington and Smith 1996). .

Among the political institutions, electoral institutions³ have been considered as the most important in determining the shape of party system in a polity. Electoral institutions play a significant role in structuring partisan electoral competition for political offices. They directly affect the strategic behavior of political elite and voters by establishing the rules for political contests. As shown in Duverger’s theorization of the relationship between electoral systems and party system development, institutional variables become the primary determinants of the shape of party system. While sociological and historical factors can also influence how electoral partisan competition develops in a country, electoral institutions are primarily determinants of the party system development.

³ It is also referred as “electoral rules,” “electoral laws” or “electoral systems.”

It was Duverger that ‘first⁴’ formalized the direct link between electoral institutions and the number of parties in a polity. Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis assert that a plurality ballot system tends to produce a two – party system at the district level and proportional representation leads to multipartism. Specifically, Duverger’s Law states that, “[T]he simple – majority single – ballot system... favors the two – party system” (Duverger 1954: 217). And Duverger’s Hypothesis indicates that, “[T]he simple majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favors multipartyism” (Duverger 1954: 239).

According to Shugart and Carey (1992), “When Riker (1982b) wanted to demonstrate that political science has a history of cummulation of knowledge like the “hard science, he returned to the set of reformulations know as Duverger’s law..... It is Duverger (1951, 1954) who normally gets the credit for having made questions about the influence of electoral rules on party systems a major concern for political science” (p. 206). In short, “Duverger’s law and hypothesis become one of the most famous and cited generalizations in the field of comparative politics” (Gaines 1999: 835). The main message of Duverger’s theory as an institutionalist understanding of electoral and party systems is that political institutions do restrict individual voters’ political choice and thus influence the structure of party system in a country (Taagepara 2000).

The institutional arguments on the shape of party system in legislative elections stand up to empirical scrutiny. Scholars find that such institutional variables as electoral

⁴ Duverger was ‘the first’ in the sense that scholars before him based their arguments on logic rather than empirical evidence. John Stuart Mill suggested that the adoption of proportional representation in the Great Britain would undermine the two – party system. Henry Droop also posited that two – party electoral competition would result from the use of a plurality rule for seat allocation in single member district races (Cox 1997; Riker 1982)

formula (majoritarian vs. proportional), district magnitude (effective threshold), assembly size, apparentment and presidentialism explain most of the variances in party system fragmentation and proportionality between votes and seats (Jones 1995, 1997, 1999; Lijphart 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Taagepara and Shugart 1989). Among the factors, district magnitude and electoral formula become evident in their influence on party system development. However, the variable of district magnitude has a very modest impact on average on the level of multipartism in legislative elections especially in the context of presidential democracies (Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).

Diversity of Political Institutions in Explaining Legislative Electoral Multipartism

Why Incorporating ‘Other’ Political Institutions

Shugart and Carey (1992) explains why it is necessary to focus on other political institutions like presidential elections and federalist structure of a country in order to understand the shape of political party systems in national legislative elections. They argue, “The usual understanding of Duverger’s rule has suffered from a narrowness of scope in the sense that studies of electoral systems have tended to assume implicitly that the only institutions that mattered were electoral rules for [national] assemblies, taken in isolation from other institutions. Such isolation of assembly from the process of [national] executive formation may distort our understanding of the number of parties even in parliamentary systems; it especially is certain to do so in the case of presidential democracies” (p. 207).

National legislative institutions do not exist in institutional isolation within their political systems. Specifically, national legislative members are elected either to form a

national executive (in the context of parliamentary system), or to co – exist with a national executive (in the context of presidential system). Therefore, it appears necessary to focus on other political institutions such as “presidentialism” and “federalism” to explain the development of electoral party systems in legislative elections in the broader context of a political system.

Presidentialism, Presidential Elections and Electoral Multipartism in Legislative Elections

Scholars shed light on the presidential electoral systems among the political institutions that possibly influence the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections. For example, Lijphart (1994) introduced the variable of regime type – presidentialism⁵ vs. parliamentarism to identify its impact on the degree of partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. According to him, to be influential for presidential elections to electoral multipartism in legislative elections, the presidency must be relevant political actor.

Discussions of the impact of presidential elections on the legislative electoral party system fragmentation have been based on the “coattail effects” of presidential candidates. The “coattail effects” in the context of American politics is defined as “the ability of a candidate at the top of the ticket to carry into office... his party’s candidates on the same ticket” (Beck 1997: 251). It becomes more evident when it comes to presidential democracy.⁶

⁵ Sartori (1994) stipulates that a political system is a “presidential” if “the head of the state (president): (1) results from popular election, (2) during the pre – established tenure cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and (3) heads or otherwise directs the governments that he or she appoints” (p. 84).

⁶ According to Shugart and Carey (1992), most studies of the interrelationship between vote shares and seat allocations in legislative elections have not taken into account the feasibility that presidential and parliamentary democracies must be differ on the relationships that have been investigated.

While the legislative elections in the context of parliamentary democracy are to form a national executive office, the congressional elections in presidential democracy have nothing to do with national executive formation. This fundamental difference in the ways of constituting a national executive office can be expected to influence the degree of partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. Therefore, The nature of electoral competition in the presidential elections has enough potential to influence the number of relevant political parties in the legislative body in 'pure' presidential systems. The greater the effective numbers of presidential candidates (parties), the greater the effective numbers of legislative parties (Cox 1997; Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In turn, the effective number of legislative parties has a strong effect on the level of presidential support in the legislature. The larger the effective number of parties, the smaller the level of partisan support⁷ (Jones 1995, 1999; Linz 1994).

Also, academics generally assume that coattail effects emanate from the more important elections (president) to the less important offices (legislature and local offices), connecting the electoral fortunes of legislative candidates to their parties' presidential candidates (Jones 1999). That is, "Because presidential candidates typically obtain the lion's share of campaign finance and of national media attention and because the national

⁷ Furthermore, Jones (1995) focuses on the interactions between legislative party system fragmentation and presidential power: he impacts of (1) the rules for executive election in non – established democracies, and (2) the interplay between executive type and legislative power on the fragmentation of legislative party system. Then, he prescribes suggestions for the best way of constructing a presidential arrangement. They are plurality rule for presidential election, unicameral legislative system, PR in moderate sized districts, and concurrency of legislative and presidential elections. This will more likely to provide a president with a legislative (or near) majority. While small parties will gain representation, the incentives for party system fragmentation are constrained. Also, as for the relationship between presidential electoral formula and partisan fragmentation in legislative elections, he also indicates that "The presence of a majority system results in a level of multipartism which is 1.331 times the level of multipartism of a plurality system (holding other factors constant)" (p. 149). Moreover, the non – concurrent runoff combination leads to the "highest levels of multipartism," compared to "high levels of multipartism" for non – concurrent plurality elections (p. 159).

party typically organizes presidential nominations, candidates for legislative office may seek organizational and financial support from the national party and/or its candidate. The relative importance of the presidential campaign thus creates strong incentives for congressional candidates to line up behind the presidential candidate of their party during the campaign” (Samuels 2000b: pp. 3-4).⁸

Therefore, how presidents are elected and when presidential elections are held in relation to legislative elections become consequential in determining the level of partisan fractionalization in legislative elections. Accordingly, there have emerged many studies on the interrelationship between presidential and legislative elections (Coppedge 2000; Cox 1997; Jones 1995, 1999; Lijphart 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992).

For example, Shugart and Carey (1992) emphasize the role of electoral rules for president⁹ and national legislative members in presidential democracies. Specifically, they demonstrate the ways in which presidents and legislative members are elected play a crucial role in determining the shape of party system fragmentation, political agenda, and the prospects for cooperation and conflict between presidents and national legislatures. That is, Plurality presidential elections and concurrent elections with legislative elections

⁸ In other words, the causality would, if ever, primarily go from presidential elections to congressional or other elections of lower profile, and not the way around (Cox 1997). Accordingly, the synchronization or proximity of presidential and congressional elections has little effects on presidential party systems. The impact of concurrent elections of presidents under plurality with legislative elections is to reduce party system fragmentation, more specifically, reduce the number of parties and increase the vote shares of the largest ones. On the other hand, majority runoff for presidential election tends to have more parties in legislative elections.

⁹ According to Coppedge (2000), the electoral formula for president refers to the “plurality election” in which the first – place candidate wins whether he wins a majority of the votes or not and the “runoff formula” in which a second round is held between the top finishers if no one wins a majority in the first round. Other formula includes “electoral college, a runoff in congress, a 40% threshold, the double simultaneous vote, the double complement rule, or concurrent majorities, which are less common than two basic options.

“allow congressional candidates to enjoy two advantages simultaneously: identification with a national presidential candidate, and the freedom to pursue local particularism” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 223), reducing the number of effective electoral parties in legislative elections.¹⁰

While presidential electoral formula influences significantly the level of electoral and legislative party system fragmentation, it also affects the effective number of presidential candidates itself. Jones (1999) shows the importance of presidential electoral formula as well as the presence (or absence) of incumbent president in determining the electoral competition patterns in presidential elections. In addition, the relative timing of elections for presidents and legislative members, “electoral cycles,” is critical in affecting the patterns of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats (Coppedge 2000; Shugart 1995). The closer the presidential election is to the legislative election, the greater is the coattails effect of the former on the latter, and therefore, the greater its potential reductive influence on the degree of electoral partisan fractionalization.

In short, among the political institutions scholars consider to explain the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections, “presidential electoral formula” and “presidential – legislative election timing (concurrence)” are two main factors of presidential democracies (Coppedge 2000). The above discussions suggest that the level of electoral partisan competition in legislative elections can also be influenced by the

¹⁰ On the contrary, the concurrence of relatively high district magnitude proportional representation legislative elections encourages considerable electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. While plurality elections of the presidency tends to lead to the formation of two big blocs to contest in presidential elections, majority run – off presidential elections are often considerably more fragmented in the effective number of electoral presidential parties (or candidates).

electoral institutions for other political offices. Taking into consideration of the electoral competition pattern for the presidency emanating from the specific presidential electoral institutions in a broader institutional context of a country contribute to our understanding of the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections.

Nature of Electoral Competition in Legislative Elections

Controversies over the Appropriate Level for Legislative Electoral Multipartism ***Explanation***

Political scientists have debated whether the inertia toward two – party electoral competition in legislative elections under the single member simple plurality electoral systems is at the national or district level. The main assumption that the institutional explanations on the shape of party system is a national – level phenomena underlies the discovery of empirical anomalies in which the SMSP electoral systems do not lead to a two – party competition at the national level (Rae 1971; Riker 1982; Taagepara and Shugart 1989).

Thus, those scholars imply that the party aggregation at the national level in Canada and India¹¹ to more than two parties suggests that the Duverger's Law/Hypothesis malfunction in these cases. Furthermore, Duverger himself indicates that the exceptions to the institutional arguments can be explained by the evaluation of the ideological dispositions of political parties. There might exist multiple parties representing slight variations of the two general ideological positions. Therefore, a kind

¹¹ Following the Lakkso – Taagepara Index for the effective number of electoral parties, the degree of multipartism at the national level is “4.11” in the 1997 House of Commons elections for Canada and “7.11” in the 1998 House of the People elections for India.

of “Bipolar multipartism” (Duverger 1986) emerges at the national level that approximates a two party system.

However, the mechanisms at work in the institutional arguments take place at the district level in which the electoral competition for legislative seats basically exists. Politicians and candidates reckon the possibility of winning a single seat(s) and base their strategic entry decisions upon the expected local (or district) performance. Thus, it is logical to understand that the Duverger’s Law in particular and the institutional explanations on the shape of party system in general are district – level phenomena (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Leys 1959; Sartori 1986; Cox 1997; Jones 1997). The relative multipartism at the national level is possibly compatible with the development of a two – party electoral competition across local districts. The national – level party system is an aggregation of sub – national (regional and district) party systems.

Unit of Electoral Partisan Competitions in Legislative Elections

As suggested, most current studies on the effects of presidential elections on legislative electoral multipartism have been conducted at the ‘national level.’ The electoral competition for the presidency in presidential elections exists at the national level, indicating that a whole nation is one electoral district. Thus, its impact on the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections has been studied at the national level – the national level effective number of parties.

In addition, researches on the development of party system is implicitly based on an assumption that a national party system more or less represents the pattern of electoral partisan competition for national legislative seats across all local electoral districts within a country (Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Cox 1997; Gaines 1999). The current

explanations seem to assume that there exists one representative pattern of electoral competition across local districts. Therefore, where data available have been introduced, they have almost been party system fragmentation at the national level, or if any, provincial level (Gaines 1999).

According to Cox (1997), the main dependent variable in most of previous research, “the effective number of electoral parties at the national level,” results from two – steps processes. First of all, votes by each party (or candidate) at the local electoral district levels are aggregated and subsequently, there emerges a certain degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in each local constituency level. Then, those local electoral district level party systems are aggregated into a ‘national – level’ degree of electoral partisan fragmentation.

If it is the case, our current understanding of the impact of electoral systems on party system development may fail to adequately explain the dependent variable, since the main thrust of the institutional arguments – Duverger’s “mechanical” and “psychological effects” – operate basically at the local electoral district level (Taagepara 2000). The mechanisms at work in the Duverger’s law appear to take place at the local district level. That is, the “Duverger’s law and its theoretical descendants essentially deal with district – level phenomena” (Chhibber and Kollman 1998: 330). Therefore, it is logical to understand that the Duverger’s Law/Hypothesis is an ‘electoral district – level’ concept and phenomenon.

Legislative elections are held at the local electoral districts ‘in most cases’ within a polity and the electoral partisan competition patterns appear to be different from district to district and from province to province, contributing differently to the formation of a national – level party system. For instance, studies on the US state – level legislative

elections have also suggested that the state – level measure of electoral competition pattern is different from those based on district – level electoral returns in state legislative elections (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Van Dunk and Weber 1997).¹²

Therefore, the district – level analysis of electoral competition patterns is conceptually and empirically distinct from the conventional studies of electoral multipartism in legislative elections at the national level. Use of the district – level data (like candidate and district – level conditions) will definitely add greater precision to our analysis of electoral competition for national legislative seats across a polity. Such an approach also makes it possible to identify electoral competition patterns in a manner consistent with most congressional studies (Hogan 2001; Jacobson 2001).¹³

Gaines (1997) points out “Oddly, most authors appear to have overlooked a simple, important point. When elections are fought over several districts, as in most democracies, such formulae [for measuring the effective number of parties] can be applied to vote shares at the aggregate level or at the constituency level.” (p. 49). His argument indicates that the appropriate unit of analysis for the extent of electoral partisan fractionalization in national legislative elections must be ‘the local electoral district.’ The resulting figures for the effective number of parties at both national and local electoral

¹² Furthermore, in trying to explain why midterm losses for the incumbent party in the US House elections happen, Gaines and Nokken (2001) argue that virtually all the current explanations “seem to imply that midterm losses are largely independent of members’ actions in office. Thus, it has become common to neglect the electoral consequences of individual – level member roll – call voting behavior when explaining congressional election results” (p. 2). When one wants to explain why some legislators are re (elected), while other are not, district – level analysis should be conducted.

¹³ In addition, in their efforts to find the electoral roots of “conditional party government” across time, Carson, Jenkins and Schickler (2001) support for the use of constituency – based measures of partisan preference for party system characteristics at the district level.

district levels in a nation can vary depending on the degree of inter – district variances in vote divisions among parties (or candidates).

Therefore, it becomes clear that any attempt to understand legislative elections must either be conducted at the district level or else make several assumptions regarding the aggregate process of local party systems at the national level. Understanding the political consequences of electoral systems (and social heterogeneity as well) in national legislative elections can profit from the district – level analyses (Wildavsky 1959). Focusing on national – level party system fragmentation is to disregard how rich a picture of partisan electoral competition across local electoral districts in a polity.¹⁴

It becomes clear that the appropriate unit of analysis for the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections is the local electoral district. Thus, a national – level party system should be understood as an aggregation of sub – national (provincial/electoral district) party systems. Nevertheless, most previous studies on electoral systems have focused on a whole nation, rather than on the local electoral district level. It seems the time to fill “The gap between our electoral theories (mostly district – level) and data (mostly national – level)” (Cox 1997: 12) with an emphasis on the electoral district level analysis.

Local Elections, Local/District Partisan Characteristics and the Degree of Electoral Competition at the District Level in Legislative Elections

Not all the studies taking into consideration of the diversity of political institutions put an emphasis on the importance of national – level electoral competition (presidential elections) on the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections.

¹⁴ For example, Reed (2001) shows that a district – level analysis of the Italian case indicates that the Duverger’s law works at the district level while it doesn’t work at the national level.

While much research has focused on the degree of national – level electoral competition like presidential elections, only a few, if any, shed light on the effects of sub – national level – electoral competition like local elections on the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections (Jones 1997; Samuels 2000a/b).

As mentioned earlier, to understand the district – level electoral competition in legislative elections can profit from the consideration of local (or district) – level electoral competition. In this sense, the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the local level such important local elections as ‘gubernatorial, mayoral or local council elections’ appear important to explain the legislative electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections, given the necessity of district – level analysis of legislative elections. Why one should incorporate the electoral competition pattern at the local (or district) level to understand the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections can be explained in terms of both institutional and individual aspects.

The diversity of political institutions in a polity obscures the issue of interrelationship between the pattern of partisan electoral competition for local offices and legislative electoral party system fragmentation. It becomes evident when it comes to a federalist country, in which there exist multiple electoral arenas with a variety of electoral systems. Federalism may reflect “social diversity of the sort that can support separate parties” and encourage “party elites to maintain smaller regional parties rather than fuse with others” (Blais and Carty 1991: 85).¹⁵ Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer that there emerges different types of party systems coexisting within sub – national

¹⁵ See Gaines (1999) and Jones (1997).

units (Gaines 1999) and it is influential in determining the variety of electoral partisan competition at the local (or district) level across a country for national legislature.¹⁶

Furthermore, Dahl and Tufte (1973) assume that the size of political entity affects party system fragmentation. Because a relatively bigger country is likely to adopt federalist system, the possibility of increased party system fragmentation becomes higher when it comes to a federalist country. Also, Anckar (2000), the size of a country in terms of population or area, not only in terms of federalist or unitary system, significantly influences the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative election while controlling for such traditional institutional and non – institutional variables as “effective threshold,” “presidentialism,” and “social diversity.”

In a centralized unitary system in which political power is concentrated at the national – level government, focusing on the national – level party system seems safe in understanding the nature of party system of the polity under review. However, many countries have multiple electoral arenas across a country with varied level of partisan electoral competition for offices. However, “In a federal (or decentralized unitary) system, political power exists at both the national and subnational levels. It is likely that these multiple levels of [electoral partisan] competition influence each other” (Jones 1997: 540).

The logic behind the importance of sub – national elections in understanding the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections is that a certain type of institutional structure (i.e., federalism or decentralized unitary system) tends to help social/political diversity following regional lines across a polity emerge. Then, there may coexist different types of sub – national party systems. It seems

¹⁶ In addition, Jones (1997) suggests that “federalism complicates the task of scholars studying the impact of electoral rules on national party systems” (p. 538).

to influence the level of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections. Therefore, it is the local elections to represent the local/district partisan characteristics that directly affect the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections.

On the other hand, the importance of local – level electoral competition pattern (especially that of local elections) for the district – level electoral multipartism in legislative elections can be explained in terms of individual political actors, rank and file of a party and individual voters. If sub – national elections for local political offices influence local political party elites and individual voters, it is expected that the electoral partisan competition should have significant impact on the degree of electoral multipartism in national legislative elections. The logic behind the importance of local elections is that affiliating with strong ‘local’ politicians, political parties, or factions in a given locality can bring substantial benefits to legislative candidates running in that local area.

If we assume that most politicians are motivated both by power seeking like winning political office or spoils of office, and by policy goals, to associate with locally strong parties or politicians will increase their chances of winning elections or getting offices in elections that are held in the locality. For example, the great visibility of the gubernatorial candidate in the race indicates that local voters are likely to focus on the candidate’s own party as the main vehicle, by which to support their preferred national legislative candidates. Thus, rational – office (or political power) seeking politicians,

regardless of their policy goals, will be better off being on the gubernatorial candidates' slate of proponents in legislative elections.¹⁷

According to Shugart (1995), in the context of presidential democracy, legislative elections that are held 'not concurrently' with presidential elections tend to have a feature that encourages the locality – oriented voting notwithstanding that what is being elected a national legislative body. This point suggests that legislative elections especially under the SMSP electoral system in presidential democracy and not concurrent with presidential elections are more susceptible to the local – level influences.

Political parties and party systems are formed largely on the basis of voters' and candidates' incentives to coordinate on common party labels" (Chhibber and Kollman 1998: 329). Cox (1997) also indicates "Candidates value possession of [valuable party] labels both because they convey a certain number of habitual voters into their camp and because they publicly certify the candidates' viability, thus insuring them against strategic desertion" (p. 152). Therefore, given the institutional context to allow the coexistence of different types of party systems across a country mentioned above, there appear different individual incentives for rational politicians to associate with a particular party depending on the local/district partisan characteristics across localities.

Existing studies help us understand the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections. However, there is a void in the literature that should be filled for a more systematic explanation of electoral partisan fragmentation across local

¹⁷ Furthermore, even a party whose chance of winning is very slim in a given local area may present a candidate in the area in order to institutionalize itself in local voters' minds as potential future national legislative seat holders. This logic can be applied to independent candidates for local offices. That is, an independent candidate may run for a local office for the purpose of making him or her known to local voters so that he or she will have higher probability of winning political office in future legislative elections. They do so in part to present long – term alternative political force in the area, hoping that they may win elections at some future.

districts in legislative elections. Current research focuses on the legislative elections under the PR electoral systems at the provincial level. As suggested, the appropriate unit of analysis for the party system development in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems is the local districts. When the basic unit of competition in legislative elections is the local districts, the local/district partisan characteristics appear to be relevant to explain the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. The sub – national elections among others are more reflective of the local/district partisan characteristics as current studies show.¹⁸

We have accumulated important evidence in our understanding of electoral and party systems that sub – national factors, provincial or local electoral district, affect national – level elections for presidency or legislative seats in such countries as Argentina (Jones 1997), Brazil (Samuels 2000a/b), Canada (Gaines 1999; Sharman 1994), India (Chhibber and Kollman 1998), Russia (Ordeshook 1996), Spain (Linz and Stepan 1992), and the US (Chhibber and Kollman 1998). With the district – level analysis of legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems in a decentralized unitary presidential and a federalist parliamentary context, this study would contribute to our understanding of the source of political cleavages and partisan fragmentation.

Research Design: Cases, Data, and Measurement

Selection of Cases

Inherent in the field of comparative politics is the necessity of choosing the

¹⁸ While focusing on the importance of sub – national elections, it does not mean that the degree of electoral competition in national – level elections (like presidential) does not influence that of legislative elections. But the impact of presidential elections on legislative elections should be analyzed at the legislative district level as suggested since what we want to know is the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections. The legislative district – level degree of electoral competition in presidential elections will be supplementary used to show the necessity of district – level analysis in the following chapter.

specific cases for research. It is rarely feasible to incorporate the entire universe of all the possible cases. Therefore, comparative research is open to bias emanating from the manner by which cases are selected for testing hypotheses (Geddes 1991). Nevertheless, it is unavoidable to choose some cases for analysis.

The cases that are selected for this research are Korea and Canada. Both countries use the SMSP electoral systems in which citizens elect one national legislative member who gets the most votes cast in the district. It indicates that the basic electoral district for national legislative seats is sub – provincial (or sub – metropolitan) local district. Thus, this study is to extend the current understanding of interrelationship between local and national legislative elections to the legislative elections under different electoral systems (Party List PR vs. SMSP).

Furthermore, it is unrealistic to presume that the federalist institutional context ‘only’ promotes the sub – national political and social diversity, and allows the presence of political powers at multiple levels within a country. Focusing on a national – level pattern of electoral competition to explain the determinants of legislative electoral party system fragmentation seems safe in a ‘centralized unitary system’ in which political powers are centralized at the national level (Jones 1997). However, many countries have multiple electoral arenas with varied level of electoral partisan competition for political offices.

The more decentralized political or governmental power in a nation like Korea, the less complete a research will be if it does not consider the degree of electoral

competition in direct elections of local political offices (governor or mayor)¹⁹. Given the decentralized unitary institutional context and regionalist party politics of the Korean case (Kang and Jaung 1999; Lee and Brunn 1996; Morris 1996), there might exist different types of electoral competition along regional lines that influence the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections.

Extending the current scholarships on the interrelationship between sub – national elections and national legislative elections, it is expected that the Korean case study shows the importance of electoral competition patterns in prominent sub – national (and sub – provincial) elections in explaining the degree of electoral multipartism across local electoral districts in legislative elections. That is, the ‘local/district partisan characteristics’ – *different levels of partisan strength and subsequent partisan fragmentation in a given district* – influence the degree of electoral competition at the district in legislative elections, while all other district – level factors are held constant.

While the Korean case study appears to be the first attempt to extend the current understandings on the importance of local elections to the legislative elections under the SMSP electoral system in a ‘decentralized unitary context,’ there are also legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems in a different institutional context. Thus, it is necessary to assess the current theoretical expectations based on the presidential democracies against the legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems in a federal ‘parliamentary’ institutional context.

¹⁹ Even though Korea adopts a unitary system, it allows local self – government by directly electing the governor and mayor with popular vote. Also, Korean voters elect their local council representatives. In this sense, Korea is a ‘decentralized’ unitary system with the presence of political powers at multiple levels within a country.

Canada appears to be appropriate in the sense that it adopts the SMSP electoral system to elect its national legislative members and has a long history of federalism. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Canadian provinces often feature strikingly different national and provincial party systems as in Korea. Both Canada and Korea seem to produce a “patchwork” national – level party system that is an aggregation of strong regional political parties across local districts. Thus, incorporation of the Canadian case would contribute to comparative study of electoral and party systems with the comparison of cases from advanced and fledging democracies.

Data and Measurement

This research utilizes two sets of data from both cases: Micro and Macro – level data. The micro – level analysis utilizes the survey data on individual demographics and political attitudes/preferences (*Korean Election Studies* and *Canadian Election Studies*)²⁰ All the data used for the macro – level investigation are measured at the legislative districts. The usage of district – level data is appropriate theoretically and empirically since the appropriate unit of analysis for the extent of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections is the local legislative electoral districts. Focusing on the district – level electoral competition for legislative seats seems to help understand how variable a picture of electoral partisan fractionalization across districts is in a country.²¹

²⁰ While relying on conventional variables, each data set provides country – specific factors to identify the sources of political cleavage and partisan fragmentation at the individual level. Specifics on data and measurement will be discussed in each section.

²¹ The divergence of the effective number of parties at both national and local levels in a polity can vary depending on the degree of inter – district variances in vote divisions among parties (or candidates) (Gaines 1997).

1) *Degree of Electoral Partisan Fragmentation in Legislative Elections at the District Level*

The dependent variable for the macro – level analysis is the degree of electoral multipartism in a given local legislative district. As Sartori (1976) indicates, inter – party competition constitutes a party system. Among the measures for party systems, the effective number of parties has been generally used in the literature.²² It refers to how many politically relevant parties (or candidates) exist in a given unit (country or district). Also, it represents the extent to which political power is fragmented or not fragmented, dispersed or not dispersed.²³

The number of effective ‘electoral’ parties is the main dependent variable. In this study, I use ‘the proportion of popular votes cast in an election at the local legislative district level.’ The dependent variable is operationalized utilizing a measure based on the percentage of the electoral votes won by the various parties (or candidates) in a given district in a given legislative election.

Scholars have developed formulae for converting the vote shares won by multiple political parties into single number of “effective parties” indices, in which each party weight according to its relative size, the relative electoral strength in the aggregate. “Effective” refers to the number of parties, which must be reckoned with in electoral competition. Laakso and Taagepara (1979) proposed an index, which has become the

²² The district – level electoral partisan competition for legislative seats is regarded as conceptually and empirically distinct from the aggregate level (national or provincial/state) (Bibby et al. 1990). Thus, some scholars of American state legislative elections have developed different measures of electoral competition at the district level. For example, some scholars use the marginality of state legislative district for constituency – level electoral competition (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). However, Van Dunk and Weber (1997) utilize the proportion of seats both the Democratic and Republican parties contested in the state legislative general elections. As explained later in this chapter, these measures are American context – related ones, indicating that they seem not to be applicable outside of the US.

standard measure of “the effective number of parties.” When K parties split the total vote in the proportions P_1, P_2, \dots, P_k then:

$$N = (\sum p_i^2)^{-1}$$

(When P is the proportion of popular votes for party (or candidate) i)

N is a continuous measure that weights relatively larger parties which gain more seats or votes significantly more than smaller parties. The use of any simple indicator conceals some information and reveals other. But we maintain that, “ N does a reasonably good job of capturing the trade off between electoral efficiency and representativeness” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 179). This measure is used for the effective number of ‘electoral’ and ‘legislative’ parties. While the former is based on the proportion of votes cast in an election, the latter depends on the proportion of seats a party held in a legislative body. The effective number of electoral parties at the district level in legislative elections for the Korean National Assembly and the Canadian House of Commons is used in this research.

2) Degree of Electoral Multipartism across Districts

The average of N across local legislative electoral districts provides a measure of the effective number of parties at the local electoral district level (D_N) for legislative elections. Unlike N , which is based on the vote shares of each party ‘across a nation,’ this measure shows how the degrees of electoral partisan fractionalizations are distributed across the local electoral districts. If there are d districts in a given election, the D_N for the

²³ See Gaines (1997, 1999) and Anckar (2000) for a variety of measures for the degree of electoral competition and legislative multipartism.

election is calculated as follows: $D_N = (\sum N_i) / d$ (When N is the effective number of parties at district i)

3) Local/District Partisan Characteristics

The primary independent variable under consideration is the local/district partisan characteristics. It refers to the different levels of partisan strength and subsequent electoral partisan fragmentation in a given local legislative district. The local/district partisan characteristics pertain to the basic partisan behavior/preference of voters in a given district: in some districts, voters are overwhelmingly Republican or Democrat, but in other districts, voters are more evenly balanced between the parties in the US context.

Understanding local or district – level partisan characteristics has been considered as important in explaining the degree of electoral partisan competition in general and incumbency advantages in US State legislative and congressional elections in particular. Scholars of American politics have developed different measures for the local/district partisan characteristics in a given local legislative electoral district.

Powell (1993) uses the difference between the two party presidential vote shares in each district to explain congressional election outcomes. Gaines and Nokken (2001) utilize the president's share of the two – party vote from the previous presidential election as a proxy for district partisan characteristics. According to them, the congressional districts where the president ran strong ought generally to be safe constituencies for that party in congressional elections.

In contrast, some researchers employ such local elections as state legislative elections to measure the local/district partisan characteristics.²⁴ It is also an outcome – dominated model to measure incumbency advantage among state legislators. That is, Berry and his colleagues (1997), and Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) use the previous vote margin in the last state legislative elections as a measure of district partisan characteristics in a given district. Hogan (2001) uses the percentage of the two – party vote shares received by the state legislative candidate or his/her party in the last local elections.

The above discussions suggest that the local/district partisan characteristics are important in explaining the incumbency advantage and the emergence of experienced candidates (Bianco 1984; Canon 1990) in both American congressional and state legislative elections. While some scholars focus on the importance of national – level elections, others put an emphasis on the local elections. Since the local/district partisan characteristics is “viewed as a relatively stable, long – term influence, researchers typically average party vote percentages across elections” (Bond et al. 1997: 285).

Whether one regards national elections or different types of elections for the local/district partisan characteristics, most studies in the US context have used the measures based on either Democratic or Republican performance in elections. Specifically, all the measures used in the previous studies are the Democratic share of the two party vote shares in the most recent presidential elections (or state – level elections),

²⁴ While focusing on the state legislative elections for explaining the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections, Carey and his colleagues (2000) use an “improved method of controlling for the underlying partisan makeup of districts.” According to them, “Directly estimating the likelihood that a district will elect a candidate of a particular party, given an open – seat contest, is a better way of controlling for the underlying partisan effects of a district’s population than simply including the immediately previous partisan vote share” (p. 675).

the difference between the two party vote shares in the last presidential election (or state – level elections), or the average Democratic vote at the constituency level across a number of different types of elections (for president, governor, senator and state legislative) over years.

It may be reasonable to focus on one party's vote share (Democrat or Republican), or the difference between two parties' vote shares in either national or local elections to understand the district – level partisan characteristics given the nature of American party and electoral systems. With the primary system for electing partisan candidates for political offices and the historical tradition of two party competitions in most elections in the US, using partisan performance from either presidential elections, local elections, or combining different types of elections appears sufficient for identifying the underlying partisan makeup at the district level.²⁵

However, it is unrealistic to believe that the measures developed in the American politics context are applicable under any circumstances. As in most comparative political research, the same concept that is used in one context can be measured with other instruments in another case keeping the validity and reliability of the measures. Putting an emphasis on one party's electoral performance appears sufficient given the tradition of relatively stable two party systems in most electoral arenas over time.

In contrast, under the brief history of political parties (Korea) and different partisan strength along regional lines (Canada and Korea), incorporating all the competing parties (or candidates) seems necessary for identifying the underlying partisan

²⁵ For the measures of the degree of electoral competition at the district level, electoral marginality or incumbent vote share are used in the study of American congressional or state legislative elections. See Koetzle (1998) and Bond et al (2001).

characteristics at the district level. In other words, if there are more than two parties competing for political offices nationally or locally, the effective number of parties based on the relative proportion of vote share of each party in a given unit is more relevant than the measure focusing on one party's performance to measure the local/district partisan characteristics. Given the sub – national elections as representing the local/district partisan characteristics, the district – level electoral returns in such local elections as gubernatorial, mayoral and local council elections are used.

4) District – Level Control Variables

While focusing on the impact of the local/district partisan characteristics, this study also introduces possible district – level factors that presumably influence the level of electoral partisan competition in legislative elections. The first variable to consider is *the degree of electoral multipartism at the district level in the last legislative elections*. the inclusion of the previous degree of multipartism in a given district allows us to control for the enduring and expected level of electoral partisan fragmentation along with the underlying partisan composition or characteristics of the district (Gierzynski and Breaux 1991; Hogan 2001). All other things being equal, we would theoretically expect that the higher the degree of electoral competition in previous legislative elections, the higher the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in a given district in the next election.

However, Achen (2000) indicates the danger of lagged variables by showing that lagged dependent variables does bias the substantive coefficients and artificially inflate the effect of lagged dependent variable. Specifically, “When one or more lagged dependent variables are added as explanatory factors, the autoregressive terms take on strongly significant coefficients which improve the fit but squash the effects of the other

variables” (p. 21). Therefore, this variable will be complementarily used for additional support for the main argument of this research.²⁶

Unlike parliamentary systems in which electoral competition between parties generally takes precedence between individual candidates like the United Kingdom, electoral competitions for legislative seats between candidates in legislative elections in presidential democracies take precedence over competition between parties like the U.S. (Hickman 1992). In this sense, research has suggested that such individual candidate – related factors as incumbency of candidates and challenger quality (Brown and Woods 1991) are influential.

Therefore, this research introduces two more control variables: *the presence/absence of the incumbent legislator* in a given district and *the quality of challenger*. It is likely that there emerges more intense inter – party (or inter – candidate) electoral competition for legislative seats if an electoral district has ‘no incumbent candidate’ running for reelection (*open seat*). Incumbent candidates in most cases tend to have well – organized and carefully tended bases of personal electoral support among local elites and voters. Incumbent candidates have obvious electoral advantages over challengers. Successes in previous campaigns, previous experience in legislative office, and higher publicity in the district tend to make incumbent candidates stronger opponents.²⁷

²⁶ The same formula utilized for the dependent and the main independent variables is used for this measure. The effective number of parties across districts in the previous legislative election is used to measure the district – level previous multipartism in legislative elections.

²⁷ This seems to come from the fundamental difference originates from the different purpose of legislative elections depending on different governmental types (Shugart and Carey 1992). In parliamentary systems, legislative elections are to form a national executive branch. On the contrary, the legislative elections of presidential democracy in most cases are not related to national government formation. While campaigns

The difference in electoral competition patterns between parliamentary and presidential systems suggests that there will be more intense intra – party competition among candidates for party nomination in a parliamentary system if there is an open seat in a given electoral district. Also, it is likely that there emerges more intense inter – party (or inter – candidates) electoral competition for legislative seats if an electoral district has no incumbent candidate running for reelection. Incumbent candidates have obvious electoral advantages over challengers. After all, the presence of incumbents in a given district tends to have a depressing effect on the degree of electoral multipartism (Jones 1997; Van Dunk and Weber 1997).

In addition, contemporary theories of legislative elections focus on the quality of challenger. Studies on U.S. congressional elections (Cox and Katz 1996; Jacobson 1990 and 2001) suggest that *challenger quality*, measured in terms of possessing previous elective office experience, influences district – level electoral competition pattern for legislative seats. Jacobson suggests that US congressional election outcomes are strongly influenced by the presence of quality challengers. Especially when it is an open seat,²⁸ experienced candidates are more likely to emerge (Bond, Fleisher and Talbert 1997).

Some district – level control variables are used only in one case depending on the data availability. Also, the operationalization of the same concept is based on different instruments depending on data availability. For example, the variable of district nature (rural vs. urban) is measured by the official administrative standards in the Korean case. However, the district diversity index will be used for the Canadian case that incorporates

are party – centered in parliamentary systems, presidential democracy tends to have “candidate – centered campaigns,” and thus, “legislative individualism” in legislative behavior after elections.

²⁸ Even though there is an incumbent legislator seeking reelection in a given district, it also seems reasonable to expect that quality challenger(s) increase the level of electoral competition in a given district. Carson and his colleagues (2001) even find that the effects of quality challengers on constituency – level electoral outcomes are not confined to postwar congressional elections in the US in their analysis of the 1862 congressional elections. Therefore, whether an experienced challenger(s) emerge in the district should have a positive impact on the degree of electoral multipartism.

demographic variables measured at the riding level. Accordingly, the degree of electoral multipartism at the district level in legislative elections will be expressed with the following equation:

$$Y = \Theta F(P \text{ and } Q),$$

where Y is the effective number of parties at the electoral district level in legislative elections; P is the local/district partisan characteristics, Q is the district – level control variables and Θ is a stochastic factor. Function F is assumed to be linear and the above function can be transformed into a regression equation as specifically shown in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

MACRO ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN CASE

Introduction

This chapter is a macro-level analysis of the Korean case. As a decentralized unitary system, South Korea allows for the presence of political powers at multiple levels within a federalist-like polity. Korean voters directly elect their governor, mayor, and local legislative members through popular vote. Furthermore, the regionalist nature of party politics since the restoration of procedural democratic requirements suggests that political and social diversity tends to follow along regional lines. Regional influences, therefore, have an impact on the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections across local legislative electoral districts.

As stated above, the unit of analysis in the macro analysis entailed in this research is the local legislative electoral district, since the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the national level represents an aggregate of diverse electoral multipartism at the local level. If the basic unit of electoral competition for legislative seats is a local district, any attempt to better understanding the level of electoral competition should be concentrated at the local district level. Thus, this chapter first provides a preliminary analysis of party system developments at both national and sub-national (regional and district) levels. Then, it proceeds to an analysis of the determinants of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level with an emphasis on local/district partisan characteristics, while controlling for other district-level confounding factors.

Degree of Electoral Multipartism at National and Sub -National Levels

The Korean case appears to be an outlier from the dominant or typical form of electoral system – centered explanations of party system development, reflected in the electoral multipartism of the four legislative elections that have taken place since democratization. Table 2-1 compares the effective number of electoral parties in the legislative elections of certain countries that use the SMSP electoral systems.

Table 2-1 Comparison of the Degree of Electoral Multipartism^a

Country	Degree of Electoral Multipartism
Canada ^b	4.09
Jamaica ^c	2.16
India ^d	7.19
USA ^e	2.16
Korea ^f	3.83

^a These countries under the SMSP electoral systems for legislative elections are selected for example, for more comparison see Taagepera and Shugart (1989); ^b House of Commons election in 1997; ^c House of Representatives election in 1997; ^d House of the People election in 1998; ^e House of Representatives election in 1998; ^f the degree of electoral multipartism in Korea is an average of four legislative elections under review. Source: calculated from the data provided by “Political Resources on the Net.”

As Duverger’s Law would suggest, the plurality rule with a single member district is expected to lead to a two party system. However, the degree of electoral multipartism at the national level has exceeded theoretical expectation and reached to three or even four party systems in the Korean legislative elections since 1987. The number of electoral parties has been 4.22, 3.51, 4.24 and 3.33, respectively. The national-level shape of the party system in Korean legislative elections has a distinct multiparty character.

However, if we look at the average level of electoral partisan fragmentation across local districts, it has been relatively closer to a two party system than that of the national level. Table 2-2 compares the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at

national and district levels in the four legislative elections under consideration. It suggests a relative tendency towards two party systems at the district level¹ (2.87, 2.77, 3.08 and 2.57, respectively), whereas there is a greater likelihood of multiparty systems at the national level. Therefore, one could say that the Duverger's Law does work in the Korean case, but only at the district not the national level

Table 2-2 Comparison of Electoral Multipartism at National and District Levels

1988 Election		1992 Election		1996 Election		2000 Election	
National	District	National	District	National	District	National	District
4.22	2.87	3.51	2.77	4.24	3.08	3.33	2.57

Note: the district level degree of electoral multipartism is an average of all the local districts following the formula: $D_N = (\sum N_i) / d$ (When N is the effective number of parties at district id is the total number of local electoral districts)

The two tables indicate that a national-level analysis of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections is likely to be problematic. The comparison of the degree of electoral multipartism at national and district levels clearly shows what would be the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems.

The shape of the party system at the national level is an aggregation of local, district-level party systems. The national party system represents a mixture of dynamic patterns of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats across localities that are different from district to district, and, furthermore, province to province (as an aggregation of local districts), contributing, in turn, to the shape of the party system at the

¹ The average effective number of electoral parties across districts is calculated as follows: *1/sum of each party or candidate's vote share squared at each district and the sum of the effective number of parties of all the districts is divided by the total number of districts for the election.*

national level. The degrees of electoral multipartism of some districts or regions are higher than that of the national district average, and relatively closer to that of the national level. Multiparty electoral competition is very evident in these cases. The levels of electoral partisan fragmentation in other districts or regions, however, are lower than that of the national level. Relatively two-party electoral competitions tend to emerge in those districts.²

Table 2-3 shows how the degrees of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats are different from region to region (metropolitan area, provinces, etc.). Relatively high degrees of electoral multipartism have existed across local districts in some regions (relatively closer to the national level of electoral partisan fragmentation). In contrast, certain districts have less than two parties competing in legislative elections (relatively closer to the district average level of electoral competition).³

Table 2-3 indicates that the degree of electoral multipartism across districts is closer to a two-party system (district-level electoral competition) or closer to a multiparty system (national-level electoral multipartism) following regional lines. For example, the Honam region (Kwangju, Chonrabuk-do and Chonranam-do) is far below the national average in its degree of electoral partisan competition. This implies that the local strength of a certain party is dominant in the region. The capital area (Seoul, Incheon and Kyunggi-do), however, has had more than three parties competing for legislative seats, indicating that there is no dominant party, but multiple parties vying for partisan support.

² Thus, when we focus on the degree of electoral competition at sub-national levels, we can find more dynamics in the levels of electoral multipartism across a nation (Chibber and Kollman 1998; Cox 1997; Jones 2001). This point also suggests that there might exist local parties surviving geographically, and thus different types of party systems following regional lines (Rae 1971; Riker 1986).

³ These points also suggest that the local or district-level partisan strength of a party is different from region to region. While a party is relatively strong in a region, there are also districts in which more than two parties compete with each other for legislative seats.

Table 2-3 Provincial – Level Comparison of Electoral Multipartism
in Recent Legislative Elections

Regions/ Elections	1988 Election	1992 Election	1996 Election	2000 Election	Regional Mean
Seoul	4.01(42)	3.14(44)	3.26(47)	2.51(45)	3.23
Pusan	2.45 (15)	2.58 (16)	2.53 (21)	2.35 (17)	2.48
Taegu	2.71 (8)	2.66 (11)	3.71 (13)	2.27 (11)	2.84
Inchon	3.68 (7)	3.46 (7)	3.52 (11)	2.75 (11)	3.35
Kwangju	1.30 (5)	1.71 (6)	1.30 (6)	1.79 (6)	1.53
Ulsan				2.44 (5) ^b	
Taejon	3.09 (4)	3.41 (5)	2.97 (7)	3.45 (6)	3.23
Kyunggi-do	3.28 (28)	3.04 (31)	3.62 (38)	2.80 (41)	3.19
Kwangwon-do	2.83 (14)	3.06 (14)	3.61 (13)	3.02 (9)	3.13
Chungchongbuk-do	2.63 (9)	2.72 (9)	3.22 (8)	3.42 (7)	3.0
Chungchongnam-do	2.65 (14)	2.93 (14)	2.64 (13)	3.01 (11)	2.81
Chonrabuk-do	2.17 (14)	2.35 (14)	2.20 (14)	2.08 (10)	2.2
Chonranam-do	1.79 (18)	2.18 (19)	1.80 (17)	1.93 (13)	1.93
Kyongsangbuk-do	2.42 (21)	2.47 (21)	3.90 (19)	2.48 (16)	2.82
Kyongsangnam-do	2.59 (22)	2.57 (23)	2.90 (23)	2.54 (16)	2.65
Cheju	2.82 (3)	2.51 (3)	3.70 (3)	2.21 (3)	2.81
National District Average	2.87 (224)	2.77 (237)	3.08 (253)	2.57 (227)	2.82

^a The number of districts for each region is in the parentheses.

^b Before the election, Ulsan Metropolitan area was included in the Kyongsangnam-do.

Source: calculated from the “Data Book for the 1988, 1992 and 1996 and National Assembly Elections” and “the Press Releases for the 2000 National Assembly Election” by NEC.

Table 2-4 Provincial Comparison of Electoral Multitpartism
in Recent Presidential Elections

Regions/ Elections	1988 Election ^b	1992 Election	1997 Election ^b	Regional Mean
Seoul	3.45 (42)	3.18 (44)	2.57 (47)	3.07
Pusan	2.25 (15)	1.77 (16)	2.45 (21)	2.16
Taegu	1.80 (8)	2.43 (11)	1.80 (13)	2.01
Inchon	3.34 (7)	3.39 (7)	2.91 (11)	3.21
Kwangju	1.25 (4)	1.09 (6)	1.06 (6)	1.13
Taejon	3.72 (4)	3.66 (5)	2.88 (7)	3.42
Kyunggi-do	3.16 (28)	3.36 (31)	2.86 (38)	3.13
Kwangwon-do	2.30 (14)	3.08 (14)	2.89 (13)	2.76
Chungchongbuk-do	2.96 (9)	3.48 (9)	3.13 (8)	3.19
Chungchongnam-do	2.90 (14)	3.44 (14)	2.71 (13)	3.02
Chonrabuk-do	1.42 (12)	1.27 (14)	1.18 (14)	1.29
Chonranam-do	1.22 (18)	1.18 (19)	1.12 (17)	1.17
Kyongsangbuk-do	1.91 (19)	2.15 (21)	2.26 (19)	2.11
Kyongsangnam-do	2.22 (22)	1.78 (23)	2.45 (23)	2.15
Cheju	2.90 (3)	3.27 (3)	2.94 (3)	3.04
National Average	2.55 (219)	2.56 (237)	2.40 (250)	2.50

^a Number of 'legislative districts' for each region are in the parentheses; ^b There is differences between the number of electoral districts for 13th Legislative and Presidential elections and 15th Legislative and presidential elections because of administrative boundary changes. Source: calculated from the "Data Book for the 13th, 14th and 15th Presidential Elections" by NEC.

In 37 out of 61 provinces fall below the national district average in terms of electoral multipartism across districts, coming closer to that of the national level. The last column of the table indicates the regional average level of electoral partisan competition across four legislative elections. This also suggests that the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation varies along regional lines. Also, regionally distinct patterns of electoral partisan competition appear across elections. The shape of the development of the party system at the national level represents a mixture, therefore, of those different party systems that hold power at regional and district levels.⁴

The comparative analysis of the degree of electoral multipartism across regions in legislative elections suggests that different regional patterns of electoral partisan competition have emerged in Korean legislative elections. Furthermore, if different degrees of partisan strength run along regional lines within a country, then it should be evident as well in other types of elections than legislative elections. If indeed Korea has a region-based party system, we should see the same regional patterns in terms of degree of electoral partisan fragmentation, regardless of election types.

Table 2-4 shows how the degree of electoral multipartism varies depending on localities in presidential elections. It indicates that the effective number of parties is closer to a two-party system or closer to a multiparty system, contingent on regions in presidential elections. For instance, the Honam regions fall far below the national average in degree of electoral partisan competition. Among the 45 regions across elections, 20

⁴ While it is beyond the scope of this research, “there is another (little – explored) logic that drives across district alliance formation, thereby combining a variety of district-conditioned patterns of party competition into a larger national aggregate” (Cox 1997: 275). That is, why the relative two party system at the district level leads to the relative multiparty system at the national level, is another research question to be answered. It is argued in a separate study that a national party system appears to be different from that of sub-national localities and the geographic variation of electoral partisan competition across a country contributes to the formation of the national party system, and that the political/social cleavages of a polity plays a significant role in linking the different levels of electoral partisan competition across local districts and with respect to national-level electoral partisan fragmentation. Irrespective of institutionalist expectations, the intra-country comparative analysis of party systems suggests the importance of regionalism or provincial favoritism – geographic concentration of electoral supports – in the aggregation process of party systems from local to national levels under the same electoral systems.

regions fall below the national average, indicating regionally different patterns of partisan strength or fragmentation in the presidential elections.

Table 2-5 Provincial Comparison of Electoral Multipartism
in Recent Local Elections

Regions/ Elections	1991 Election	1995 Election ^a	1998 Election
Seoul	3.20 (44)	2.91 (47)	2.32 (23)
Pusan	3.30 (16)	2.46 (19) ^b	2.26 (16)
Taegu	3.18 (11)	3.10 (13)	2.16 (8)
Inchon	4.23 (7)	3.31 (11)	2.80 (8)
Kwangju	2.20 (6)	1.41 (6)	1.52 (2)
Taejon	5.43 (5)	2.53 (7)	2.25 (5)
Kyunggi-do	3.49 (31)	3.70 (38)	2.55 (30)
Kwangwon-do	4.32 (14)	4.54 (13)	2.61 (18)
Chungchongbuk-do	3.42 (9)	3.93 (8)	3.36 (10)
Chungchongnam-do	3.86 (14)	2.68 (13)	2.46 (14)
Chonrabuk-do	2.29 (14)	2.59 (14)	2.10 (13)
Chonnam-do	2.50 (19)	2.78 (17)	2.13 (18)
Kyongsangbuk-do	2.95 (21)	4.04 (19)	2.35 (18)
Kyongsangnam-do	3.46 (23)	4.04 (23)	2.56 (17)
Cheju	4.38 (3)	3.44 (3)	2.39 (4)
National Average	3.32 (237)	3.23 (251) ^b	2.44 (209) ^c

^a Based on municipal elections in 1995 and 1998, and provincial council election in 1991. Both 1991 and 1995 elections are recoded following the 1992 and 1996 National Assembly elections' legislative electoral district, respectively; ^b Two districts with only one candidate in Pusan; ^c Among the 232 municipal districts, there are 23 districts with only one candidate, and in the Kyongsangnam-do province, the metropolitan area of Ulan is created. It's regional average is 2.99 with 5 municipal districts. Source: calculated from "Data Book for 1991, 1995 and 1998 Local Elections" by NEC.

These kinds of differences in the patterns of partisan strength across regions and subsequently different degrees of electoral partisan competition following regional lines also appears when we see the average effective number of electoral parties at the local legislative district levels in local Korean elections held since 1987. Local elections are more reflective of the local strength of a party than a national-level election since the basic electoral district for local elections (especially for mayoral elections) is in most cases ‘identical’ to that for legislative elections.⁵ All local elections since the restoration of procedural democratic requirements in 1987 show almost the same regional patterns in the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation as shown in Table 2-5.

Therefore, it appears to be clear why it is important to focus on the district-level electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. The national-level party system is a mixed picture since it includes different patterns of local (districts and regions) electoral competition across the country. A two party system in some electoral districts, where a certain party has relatively dominant electoral support, is counter-balanced by a multiparty system in other districts, where no party has sufficient support to be dominant.

Determinants of District – Level Electoral Multipartism in Legislative Elections

Data and Method

The basic premise underlying a focus on prominent local elections in order to explain the level of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections is the presence of political powers at multiple levels and political/social diversity within sub-national units. However, it would not be reasonable to expect that ‘the federalist structure of a country’ alone allow for sub-national, social/political diversity and the presence of

⁵ Korea held the 16th National Assembly elections in April 2000. The ‘regionally concentrated political support of a party’ still seems to exist since the number of nomination applications in each party’s regional stronghold exceeded its national average. Digital Chosun Daily (Korean), February 8, 2000. Accessed on February 9, 2000.

political powers at multiple levels across a country. Korea is not a federal but a unitary system reflecting the fact that it is a totally homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity and language. Nevertheless, it allows for local self-government by directly electing the governor and local administrative manager⁶ through the popular vote. Also, Korean voters directly elect the local council representatives of metropolitan areas or provinces, as well as local administrative districts.

All of this would suggest that Korea is a ‘decentralized’ unitary system in which political power exists at multiple levels, like federal systems. Thus, the more decentralized, the higher probability that local/district-level electoral partisan competition patterns in prominent local elections affect district-level electoral multipartism in legislative elections. Or, the more decentralized governmental power is in a nation like Korea, the less complete scholarly research will be if it does not take into consideration the pattern of electoral partisan competition in elections of local offices to explain district-level electoral multipartism in legislative elections (Jones 1997).

Korea is also well known for its stridently “region-based party systems and regionalist politics” since democratization (Clark 1987; Kang and Jaung 1999; Lee and Brunn 1996; Morris 1996). Hence, there is relatively less social/political diversity following regional lines in the country, indicating that there might exist different types of party systems across sub-national units as in federal systems. With the presence of a ‘decentralized’ unitary system and ‘regionalist’ party politics, ‘the local/district partisan characteristics’ of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the quest for prominent local political offices, appears to be influential in deciding the level of electoral multipartism across local districts when electing the members of the Korean National Assembly.

⁶ The local administrative managers consist of “mayors, ward and county heads” in Korea and will be referred to as “mayors” hereafter.

This study focuses on the four national legislative elections in Korea since 1987.⁷

There are two reasons to include these four elections (1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000). With the 13th National Assembly election in 1988, Korea adopted the SMSP electoral system to elect its national legislators.

Table 2-6 Division of Seats in Korean National Assembly Elections

Election/Seats	Local District	National Constituency	Total
1988	224	75	299
1992	237	62	299
1996	253	36	299
2000	227	46	273

As shown in Table 2-6, the total number of national legislators was 299 for the 1988, 1992 and 1996 elections, and 273 for the 2000 election, including the legislators from the ‘national constituency.’ District elections are governed by the SMSP, whereas the national constituency is based on the national vote share of a party with a closed party list.⁸ The number of national constituency (PR component) has changed from 75, 62, 36 to 46. The number of local electoral districts has also changed from 224, 237, 253 to 227. Therefore, local districts have altered from election to election through redistricting and administrative boundary changes, clearly indicating that local electoral districts are not identical from election to election. The dependent variable is the effective number of

⁷ It was the first election under the new electoral system. See Brady and Mo (1992) and Grofman et al (1999) about electoral system changes in Korea.

⁸ However, the specifics (especially, threshold and 1st party premium) have changed over time as shown below.

Table 2-7 Specifics on National Constituency Seats Allocation

	Threshold	1 st Party Premium
1988	5 seats from Local Districts	½ of PR Seats for 1 st Party if not 50% of Districts
1992	Sam as above	No Premium; Based on # of Local Districts Won
1996/2000	5 Seats or 5% of Votes	No Premium; Based on National Vote Shares

electoral parties at the district level in those four legislative elections, following the Laakso- Taagepara Index.

The primary independent variable under consideration is the local/district partisan characteristics – *local or district – level electoral competition patterns that are evident in local elections*.⁹ This study has a special focus on two types of local elections for the Korean case study to identify the ‘local/district partisan characteristics’ that influence the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections across districts: “*gubernatorial and municipal elections*.”

Table 2-8 Elections in Korea since Democratization

Year/Month	Types of Elections
1987 December	Presidential Election
1988 April	National Assembly Election
1991 March	Local Elections for City, County and Ward Councils ^a
1991 June	Local Elections for Metropolitan and Provincial Councils
1992 March	National Assembly Election
1992 December	Presidential Election
1995 June	Local Elections for Councils (city ^a , county ^a , ward ^a , metropolitan and provincial), and Governors, Mayors, Ward and County Head
1996 April	National Assembly Election
1997 December	Presidential Election
1998 June	Local Elections ^a (same as 1995)
2000 April	National Assembly Election

^a non-partisan election.

⁹ Local elections consist of four types of offices: *governors* for metropolitan areas and provinces, *mayors* for cities and counties of a province, *wards of metropolitan areas*, *provincial council members* for metropolitan areas and provinces, and *municipal council members* for cities, counties and wards. The elections for governors and mayors are under the simple plurality rule. The single member simple plurality rule system is used to elect council members and a small portion of them is elected with proportional representation based on the vote share of parties.

The 'local' partisan characteristics are measured by the electoral returns from gubernatorial elections that are disaggregated to match the electoral districts of legislative elections. In contrast, the 'district' partisan characteristics are measured utilizing the electoral returns from municipal elections. Using the formula utilized for the dependent variable, the effective number of electoral parties at the legislative electoral district level, from the 'closest' local elections (gubernatorial and municipal), is used for the local/district partisan characteristics. Table 2-8 shows all the national and local elections held in Korea since 1987.

The focus on electoral partisan fragmentation in gubernatorial elections helps us to identify the local (provincial) partisan characteristics that affect the degree of electoral multipartism across a province in legislative elections. While electoral competition in gubernatorial elections represents a certain type of local-level party system fragmentation across a province, it also represents an aggregation of sub-provincial units across the province. It is not a 'legislative district-level electoral partisan competition', but a province-level electoral competition. Unlike Argentina (Jones 1997) and Brazil (Samuels 2000a/b) that use the proportional representation electoral systems at the 'province level', the basic unit for legislative elections in Korea is sub-provincial (and sub-metropolitan) with local legislative electoral districts under the SMSP electoral system.

Therefore, if there are sub-provincial local elections held at the legislative electoral district level, this appears to be relevant for understanding district-level electoral partisan characteristics. The Korean case provides us with an adequate measure for identifying 'district-level partisan characteristics': *municipal elections*. These elections are not only sub-national but sub-provincial. That is, the basic electoral district for electing local administrative managers is in most cases 'identical' to those districts for national legislative elections. Hence, the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in municipal elections is reflective of the district-level dynamics of electoral partisan

competition that affect legislative elections across districts. Introduction of two complementary measures for local/district partisan characteristics in ‘a decentralized and regionally heterogeneous case’ can contribute to expanding our understanding of interrelationships between different types of elections.

This analysis introduces certain control variables to identify the impact of local/district partisan characteristics on the degree of district-level electoral competition in legislative elections. The presence of control variables improves the fit of the model. These variables are first, the presence (or absence) of an incumbent legislator and quality challenger, followed by the distinction between urban vs. rural district. The first variable – presence of incumbent legislator in a given district – controls for whether or not an incumbent ran in the election under review. Districts where incumbents ran were coded zero while open seats were coded one. The absence of incumbent(s) is expected to have a increasing effect on the degree of electoral multipartism across districts. In contrast, whether or not a quality challenger with previous elective experience in a given district runs for a legislative seat appears to have an increasing impact on the level of electoral competition in the district. Thus, districts where a quality challenger ran were coded one whereas districts without a challenger with previous elective experience were coded zero.

Another possible district-level control variable to take into consideration for the Korean case is whether a district is in *a rural or an urban area*. Korea has undergone rapid economic growth over the last 30 years. Urban areas are mixed with many people from all over the country, leading to less regional identity than in rural areas. There is also more mobility among people who live in urban areas. Before the emergence of regionalist party politics in the 1987 presidential election, urban areas had tended to vote for opposition parties and rural areas for the incumbent party; this had long been a dominant voting pattern in Korea (Cho 1998; Kim and Browne 2001; Kim and Khil 1988). This appears to suggest that there would be a relatively small number of parties

competing for legislative seats in a rural district, while there would be more parties in urban districts. Hence, there may be more parties or candidates representing a variety of interests in an urban district, decreasing regionalist partisan strength but increasing the degree of electoral partisan competition.¹⁰

These three control variables (*urban/rural, open districts, and quality challengers*) should have a positive influence on the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections at the district level. Accordingly, the effective number of electoral parties in legislative elections at the district level can be expressed with the following equation:

$$Y = \Theta F(P, U/R, I, Q)$$

where Y is the effective number of parties at the electoral district level in legislative elections, P represents local/district partisan characteristics, U/R and I stand for whether a local legislative district is rural or urban, and whether there is an incumbent legislator or not. Q represents challenger quality and Θ is a stochastic factor. Function F is assumed to be linear and the above function can be transformed into a regression equation as follows:

$$Y = B_1 + B_2X_1 + B_3X_2 + B_4X_3 + B_5X_4 + u$$

in which B's are unknown but with fixed parameters, X's 1 through 4 represent chosen independent variables (local/district partisan characteristics, urban/rural, open seat/or not, challenger quality), and u represents the stochastic factor, Θ .

¹⁰ For the analysis of the impact of rural vs. urban districts, the hybrid districts (urban + rural) have been excluded from the analyses.

Analysis and Discussion

Table 2-9 *Local Partisan Characteristics and Legislative Electoral Multipartism across Districts*

<i>Elections/Variables</i>	1988	1992	1996	2000	1988/ 1992/ 1996/ 2000
Urban/Rural	.133 (.089)	.277*** (.084)	-.036 (.164)	.162 (.109)	.211*** (.061)
Open Seat Or Not	.179** (.086)	-.278*** (.093)	.025 (.117)	-.034 (.142)	.002 (.059)
Challenger Quality	.124 (.108)	-.062 (.089)	.370*** (.113)	.270*** (.080)	.205*** (.054)
<i>Local Partisan Characteristics^a</i>	.765*** (.056)	.262*** (.050)	.707*** (.082)	-.139 (.119)	.499*** (.038)
1988 Election					.202*** (.070)
1992 Election					-.364*** (.077)
1996 Election					.250*** (.070)
Constant	.811*** (.130)	1.80*** (.157)	1.16*** (.203)	2.60*** (.272)	1.29*** (.087)
R ²	.6015	.2100	.3542	.0718	.3224
N	196	207	234	203	840

* significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; regression coefficients are unstandardized ones; robust standard error of the estimates is in the parentheses; ^a Two provinces had one candidate in gubernatorial elections in 1998, thus, 'the local partisan fragmentation' measure is alternatively from local council elections. The 1991 local elections were for electing 'provincial (metropolitan) council members' only and it was used for the local partisan characteristics. Also, this analysis used the 1987 presidential election for the 1988 legislative election as a proxy measure.

Table 2-9 shows how 'local' partisan characteristics affect the degree of electoral multipartism at the district level in legislative elections, while controlling for other

district-level confounding factors. The level of electoral partisan fragmentation across electoral districts in legislative elections seems to be a function of ‘local partisan characteristics’.

The degree of electoral partisan fractionalization from the closest provincial-level elections (gubernatorial) in a given district is significantly influential in determining the effective number of parties in the district-level legislative elections. Where the level of ‘local’ electoral partisan fragmentation is relatively high (more parties) in a given district, the degree of electoral multipartism in the district tends to be high in the subsequent legislative elections (more parties). Conversely, a district in which the level of electoral partisan fragmentation is relatively low (fewer parties) tends to have fewer parties in the following legislative elections (fewer parties).¹¹

It is important to note that the estimate coefficients for the variable of local partisan characteristics remain very stable across elections. Local partisan characteristics have a strong positive impact on the degree of electoral multipartism in a given district in legislative elections. The estimated regression coefficients for this variable are significant at the .01 levels for a two-tailed *t* test. For example, the estimated coefficient of .765 for the 1988 legislative election indicates that in an average district an increase in the local partisan characteristics from 1 to 2 would, all other factors remaining constant, result in an increase of approximately .765 of an effective number of electoral parties across districts in the legislative elections.

¹¹ Separate analyses were conducted focusing only on the local elections of any type (for 1992, 1996 and 2000 legislative elections) and the gubernatorial elections (1996 and 2000 elections) to isolate the confounding effects of using a proxy measure (legislative district level presidential electoral returns for the 1988 legislative election). Those analyses confirm that local elections are consequential in determining the nature of district-level electoral competition in legislative elections.

Accordingly, the ‘provincial (and metropolitan)-level partisan characteristics’ that are seemingly different from province to province exerts a significant influence on candidates’ incentives to coordinate with a political party in a given district in a given province (or metropolitan area). The degree and shape of electoral competition in the last gubernatorial elections provided a major motive for rational politicians or candidates to associate with a party for their electoral successes in the next legislative elections.

The occurrence of a relatively strong party in a province indicates that there are relatively *fewer parties* competing in provincial-level local elections. Under these circumstances, most candidates try to associate with the dominant party, probably decreasing the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the province and increasing the level of within-party competition for party nominations. On the contrary, where no parties have strong support, there are relatively *more parties* competing in provincial-level local elections. Then, politicians tend to associate with any party they consider to be the most likely party to serve as a vehicle for their electoral success. This tends to increase the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation, but to decrease the level of within-party competition for partisan nominations.

Following Leamer’s logic, the control variables are not considered consequential to the analysis (Leamer 1990). However, their independent impact on the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections does merit a brief discussion and it will additionally add support the principal thrust of what is being argued here. The factors of whether or not a district contains an open seat and the quality of challenger(s) across districts show mixed results. Challenger quality and the absence of an incumbent legislator in a given district were statistically significant factors in the last

two legislative elections (2000 and 1996), as well as in the first two elections (1988 and 1992), respectively.

For example, a legislative contest without incumbents in a given district resulted in a .179 increase in the level of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats, compared to a legislative election in the district that had incumbents running in the 1988 legislative election. This finding is statistically significant at the .05 level for a two-tailed *t* test. Also, the presence of quality challenger(s) in a given district resulted in a .270 increase in the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation compared to a district without no quality challenger(s) running. This is statistically significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed *t* test.

The presence of incumbents and a quality challenger(s) in a given district are not consistently significant across elections. This seems to be related to the local partisan characteristics that are different within sub-national units, and electoral system changes in 1988. As mentioned before, Korea adopted a SMSP electoral system in 1988. Before democratization, two legislators were elected from each local electoral district. The change of the electoral system from a 'two-member district' to a 'single-member district' produced many districts without an incumbent legislator in the first election under the new system, and it seems to have induced relatively higher degrees of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats in the 1988 election.

With successive elections under the same electoral system, the quality of challenger(s) becomes significant, increasing the degree of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections as expected.¹² With the introduction of local elections in

¹² This can be also attributed to the changing nature of regionalist party systems since the 1991 merge of three parties as explained later in this section.

1991, candidate(s) emerged with previous experience (to local councils or local administrative offices) in legislative elections. Also, politicians who had earlier been elected to the National Assembly in a given district, but failed to get partisan nominations from major political parties for an upcoming election, decided to run as independents. All of this tended to increase the level of electoral partisan competition across districts in the last two legislative elections.

Interestingly, the factor of whether or not a district contained an open seat for the 1992 election yielded results directly opposed to conventional or theoretical expectations. A district having an open seat tended to ‘decrease’ the level of electoral multipartism across districts. The 1992 legislative election, for example, was held after three out of four major regionally-based political parties had merged into one party in 1991, complicating party politics still further. The bottom line, of course, for any rational politician, is to be (re) elected in an election (Mayhew 1974).

Politicians try, therefore, to associate with a party they believe will enhance their chance of electoral success. Given the highly regionalist character of the party system in the 1992 election, for example, the only reasonable choice for most politicians was to get party nominations from the party that was regionally strong in the area. Thus, there were more intense ‘intraparty’ competitions for party nomination than ‘interparty’ electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in the 1992 legislative election, indicating that even a district with an open seat did not experience an increase in the level of electoral multipartism.

This point is also confirmed when we look at the ‘temporal effects of election years’ in the pooled analysis section. The inclusion of multiple election years serves to

control for any effects that are associated with a specific election year. The 'year' variable helps control for potential temporal effects such as serial correlation. Also, it controls for events or circumstances in a given election year that might possibly boost or decrease the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. Binary election year dummy variables for the elections since 1987 are employed to control for temporal effects, with all districts during a particular election year coded one, and all other elections coded zero (Stimson 1985).

Three temporal dummy variables are included in the statistical analyses with the remaining year, 2000, as a base reference. All the variables are measured in terms of difference from the 2000 legislative election year. The 1988 legislative election, for instance, yielded a .202 increase in the degree of electoral multipartism, compared to the legislative election of 1992, which registered a decrease in the level of electoral partisan competition across districts by .364 when compared with the election in 2000. The 1988 and 1992 elections registered a significantly different degree of electoral partisan fragmentation than in the 2000 legislative election. The legislative election of 1996, as well, showed an increase of .250 in the level of electoral competition compared to the legislative election of 2000.

These points are in need of further substantive historical explanation. There were four major regionally-based political parties (DJP, UDP, PPD and NDRP) that participated and survived in the 1988 legislative election. The 1992 legislative election, however, was held with only the DLP (a merger of the DJP, the UDP and the NDRP) and the DP (from the PPD). The merger of three parties in 1991 into a regional coalition of region-based parties was done to achieve a majority in the national legislative body (Kim

1997). Excluding one major opposition party (PPD and later DP), the merger of these three parties changed the number of parties based on regional supports from four to two in the 1992 legislative election. One faction of the DLP (formerly the NDRP before the 1991 merger) formed a new opposition party (CLD) in the middle of political power struggles in 1995, and participated in the 1996 legislative election with the NKP (formerly the DLP) and the NCNP (formerly the DP).

The above explanation of a longitudinal party system change suggests how ‘local’ partisan characteristics within the changing nature of a region-based political party system, have an influence, over time, on the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. Therefore, the concentration of electoral support for a party along regional lines and, subsequently, different partisan characteristics within sub-national units becomes important in determining the degree of electoral multipartism at the district level in Korean legislative elections.

Table 2-10 shows how the ‘district’ partisan characteristics are influential in explaining the degree of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections. District partisan characteristics are based on the ‘legislative district-level’ for the 1996 and 2000 legislative elections. Partisan fragmentation at the district level appears more reflective of legislative district-level partisan dynamics, which affect the district-level electoral multipartism in legislative elections since the mayoral electoral district is in most cases ‘identical’ to that of legislative elections. The ‘district-level’ partisan fragmentation in legislative district-level local elections influences the degree of electoral partisan competition in a given district in legislative elections while other factors remain constant.

Table 2-10 *District Partisan Characteristics* and Legislative Electoral Multipartism
across Districts

Elections/Variables	1996	2000	1996/ 2000	1992/ 1996/ 2000	1988/ 1992/ 1996/ 2000
Urban/Rural	.286* (.159)	.259** (.107)	.282*** (.097)	.267*** (.067)	.329*** (.056)
Open Seat Or Not	-.022 (.133)	-.061 (.131)	-.038 (.100)	-.112 (.075)	.008 (.061)
Challenger Quality	.350*** (.126)	.263*** (.080)	.313*** (.074)	.209*** (.060)	.205*** (.055)
<i>District Partisan Characteristics</i>	.255*** (.052)	.169*** (.056)	.232*** (.040)	.244*** (.032)	.343*** (.030)
1992 Election					-.453*** (.066)
1996 Election				.257*** (.069)	-.202*** (.077)
2000 Election			-.355*** (.074)	-.089 (.064)	-.453*** (.066)
Constant	1.90*** (.205)	1.83*** (.187)	1.99*** (.159)	1.76*** (.111)	1.82*** (.086)
R ²	.1450	.1039	.2154	.2005	.2693
N	234	205	439	646	843

* significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; regression coefficients are unstandardized ones; robust standard error of the estimates is in the parentheses.

Put another way, where the level of district-level partisan fragmentation is relatively low (*fewer parties*), the degree of electoral multipartism in a given district tends to decrease in subsequent legislative elections. Conversely, a district in which the level of electoral partisan competition is relatively high (*more parties*) seems to have

more parties in subsequent legislative elections. Thus, the district-level partisan characteristics, utilizing the sub-provincial local elections that are held at that unit, directly influence candidates' incentives to coordinate a party for their electoral success in a given district, increasing or decreasing the degree of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections.

The estimated regression coefficients for the variable of 'district' partisan characteristics are statistically significant in the hypothesized direction across elections. For example, the estimated coefficient of .244 for the district partisan characteristics indicates that an increase in the variable by 1 would, while all other factors being equal, result in an increase of approximately a quarter of an effective number of electoral parties across districts in the legislative election of 2000. The 'local' partisan characteristics do not achieve statistical significance for the 2000 legislative election. However, district partisan characteristics are statistically significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed *t* test for the 2000 election. This suggests that sub-provincial or district-level local elections are more adequate for understanding the district-level electoral multipartism in national legislative elections under a SMSP electoral system.

The variable of quality challenger becomes statistically significant for the third legislative elections held under the current electoral system. Table 2-10 confirms that a district with a quality challenger(s) tended to have a higher degree of electoral multipartism in the elections of 1996 and 2000. Unlike the previous model focusing on local partisan characteristics, the distinction between rural vs. urban district is consistently significant across elections. Whether a district is rural or urban is important in determining the degree of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections.

There tend to be more parties or candidates competing in urban districts with quality challenger(s). This finding suggests that the traditional phenomenon of an 'urban/rural divide in electoral competition' has continued to exist even after democratization, and that it increases the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections.

For instance, a legislative contest without a quality challenger(s) in a given district results in a .313 drop in the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation compared to a legislative election in a district that has a quality challenger(s) running for legislative seats in the pooled analysis of 1996 and 2000 legislative elections. This finding is statistically significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed t test. Whether a district is urban or rural also makes a difference in the level of electoral multipartism in legislative elections. As expected, the urban districts tended to have .286 degree higher electoral partisan competition for legislative seats than rural districts in the 1996 legislative election. This finding is statistically significant at the .10 level for a two-tailed t test.

As mentioned above, the legislative electoral district-level presidential election returns were used to measure the local/district partisan characteristics for the 1988 legislative election, since there were no prior local elections of any kind. This kind of proxy measure may not be adequate in identifying local/district-level partisan fragmentation that would serve to explain district-level electoral multipartism in legislative elections, since the electoral competition takes place at the national level. One of the main arguments of this study has been that sub-national and sub-provincial local elections are more meaningful in explaining local or district-level electoral multipartism in legislative elections. In order to understand the degree of electoral partisan

fragmentation across districts in legislative elections, therefore, one must understand electoral partisan competition patterns in ‘sub-national or sub-provincial elections.’

While the fourth column of Table 2-10 focuses on legislative elections where there had been some type of prior sub-national local election (provincial council elections for the 1992 legislative election), the third column deals mainly with two legislative district-level local elections (1996 and 2000). Two models confirm that the degree of electoral partisan competition in sub-provincial local elections (provincial councils and mayoral elections) has a strong positive impact on the level of electoral multipartism at the legislative district level in legislative elections.

The estimated regression coefficient of .232 for the district partisan characteristics in the 1996 and 2000 legislative elections (.244 for the 1992, 1996, and 2000 legislative elections) suggests that an increase in the district partisan characteristics from 1 to 2, holding other factors constant, would result in an increase of approximately one quarter of an effective number of electoral parties in the legislative elections under consideration. These findings are statistically significant at the .01 level for two-tailed *t* tests.

The above discussion suggests that the local/district partisan characteristics from the level of electoral competition in sub-national and sub-provincial local elections becomes critical for understanding the district-level electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. The local/district partisan characteristics are statistically significant in explaining the degree of electoral multipartism across districts in legislative elections while controlling for other potentially confounding factors at the district level.¹³

¹³ However, one control variable remains to be considered. This is the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the previous legislative elections. Studies on the constituency- level electoral competition for US state legislative seats suggest the necessity of including the “electoral multipartism in previous elections” (Gierzynski and Breaux 1991; Hogan 2001). However, Achen (2001) warns about the danger of

Table 2-11 *District - Level Presidential Partisan Strength* and Legislative Electoral Multipartism across Districts

<i>Elections/Variables</i>	1988	1992	1996	2000 ^a	1988/ 1992/ 1996/ 2000
Urban/Rural	.123 (.089)	.140* (.083)	.072 (.162)	.041 (.091)	.122** (.057)
Open Seat Or Not	.188** (.087)	-.217** (.074)	-.001 (.124)	.051 (.103)	.054 (.056)
Challenger Quality	.132 (.105)	-.011 (.081)	.315** (.117)	.262*** (.071)	.217*** (.051)
<i>Presidential Partisan Strength</i>	-3.327*** (.210)	-1.625*** (.184)	-2.223*** (.266)	-1.601*** (.203)	-2.191*** (.119)
1988 Election					.426*** (.059)
1992 Election					.289*** (.052)
1996 Election					.552*** (.061)
Constant	4.571*** (.153)	3.639*** (.146)	4.158*** (.237)	3.290*** (.157)	3.563*** (.096)
R ²	.5914	.3371	.2594	.2876	.3815
N	197	207	231	201	836

* significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; regression coefficients are unstandardized ones; robust standard error of the estimates is in the parentheses; ^a The electoral returns for the 1997 Presidential elections were used as a proxy since the next presidential election will be in 2002.

The analyses so far have focused on the importance of the distinction between local/district partisan characteristics in affecting the degree of electoral multipartism at

using a lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables. They show that controlling for the effect of previous legislative electoral multipartism does not change the importance of local/district partisan characteristics.

the district level in legislative elections. The variable was measured through the local or district-level electoral competition (gubernatorial or municipal elections) since these local elections represent local or district-level partisan electoral characteristics. However, the preliminary analysis found that different patterns of electoral competition exist along regional lines regardless of election types. This indicates that the shape of electoral partisan competition in presidential elections that are measured at the legislative district level, is similar to that of the local/district partisan characteristics of prominent local elections.

Table 2-11 shows how presidential partisan strength affects the degree of electoral multipartism at the district level in legislative elections, controlling for other district-level variables. The main independent variable under review has been measured somewhat differently than has been the case with previous research. District-level presidential partisan strength is measured through the first party's vote share in the last (or upcoming) presidential elections in a given district. Thus, the higher the presidential partisan strength, the lower the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in presidential elections in the district. Or, the lower the level of partisan presidential strength, the higher the level of electoral competition. It is expected that partisan presidential strength will have a strong negative impact on the effective number of electoral parties across districts in legislative elections.¹⁴

As expected, the variable of presidential partisan strength shows a strong influence in the negative direction. The estimated regression coefficients for presidential partisan strength are significant at the .01 levels for a two-tailed *t* test. For instance, the estimated coefficient of -3.327 for the 1988 legislative election indicates that, on average, an increase of presidential partisan strength from 1 to 2 would, other factors remaining

¹⁴ The use of a traditional measure for the degree of electoral multipartism following the Laakso-Taagepara Index is not likely to alter the main argument of this analysis.

constant, results in an decrease of 3.327 of an effective number of electoral parties in the legislative election of 1988. It is also important to note that the variable of presidential partisan strength remains very stable across elections.

As for the control variables, the variables of open seat and quality challenger(s) are statistically significant and show the same trends as in the previous models. The presence of quality challenger(s) is likely to decrease the level of electoral competition. In addition, the presence of incumbent legislator(s) tends to decrease the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. That is, a legislative contest without a quality challenger(s) in a given district results in a .315 drop in the degree of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats, compared to a legislative election in a district that had a quality challenger(s) in the 1996 legislative election. Additionally, the presence of an incumbent(s) results in a decrease of .217 in the level of electoral competition for legislative seats at the district level, compared to a legislative contest without reelection-seeking incumbent(s) in the 1992 legislative election.¹⁵

This chapter has sought to understand electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections at the district level under the SMSP electoral system in a ‘decentralized’ unitary context - the case of Korea. It has suggested that local/district partisan characteristics significantly influence the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. As in federalist systems, provincial and sub-provincial elections have a profound impact on district-level electoral partisan competition for legislative seats, especially in a decentralized unitary system in which political powers exists at multiple levels and social/political diversity follows regional lines.

¹⁵ As in the previous models emphasizing local elections, the variable of previous electoral multipartism is also introduced. The inclusion of this previous level of electoral competition does not change the main argument of the study. See Appendix.

CHAPTER THREE

MACRO ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN CASE

Introduction

This chapter is a macro-level analysis of the Canadian case. The main assumption behind incorporating sub-national elections into our exploration of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections is based on the nature of federalist institutions. The particular structure of a country may foster sub-national diversity, leading to a variety of different types of electoral party systems across the nation. Canada is an important example for our purposes insofar as it has adopted the SMSP electoral system to elect members to its national legislature and has a long history of federalism. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Canadian provinces often feature strikingly different national and provincial party systems (Gaines 1999; Palfrey 1989; Taagepara and Grofman 1985) as in Korea. Thus, incorporation of the Canadian case contributes to our understanding of electoral and party systems from a comparative perspective.

This Canadian case study utilizes the 37th federal general elections held in 2000 for the House of Commons. The provincial elections of legislative members to provincial legislatures will be used to identify the local/district partisan characteristics. While Koreans directly elect representatives to provincial political offices (governors), Canadians indirectly choose their provincial premiers by electing provincial legislative members as with parliamentary systems. Both gubernatorial elections in Korea and provincial legislative elections in Canada represent different local partisan characteristics

across the country and influence the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections across “ridings”¹ in any given region.

This chapter first provides a preliminary analysis of party system developments at both national and sub-national levels. Then, it proceeds to the analysis of the determinants of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level with an emphasis on the local/district partisan characteristics, while controlling for other district-level confounding factors.

Degree of Electoral Multipartism at National and Sub-national Levels

Table 3-1 Division of Seats and Vote Shares at the National Level in Canada

Elections/ Parties	1997 Election Seats	Votes	2000 Election Seats	Votes
Bloc Quebecois	44	10.7%	38	10.7%
Reform Party/ Canadian Alliance*	60	19.4%	66	25.5%
Liberals	155	38.5%	172	40.8%
New Democratic Party	21	11.0%	13	8.5%
Progressive Conservative	20	18.8%	12	12.2%
Total	300	98.4%	301	97.7%

Note: * the Canadian Alliance was “Reform Party” in 1997; the total number of seats is 301 for both elections.

The Canadian case has been considered to be an exception to the conventional understanding of the relationship between electoral and party system development

¹ “Riding” is the Canadian term used for district or constituency. The term will be used in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

² $N = (\sum p_i^2)^{-1}$ (When P is the proportion of popular votes for party (or candidate) i)

(Gaines 1999; Palfrey 1989; Taagepara and Shugart 1985, 1989). Contrary to traditional, institutionalist expectations, the degree of electoral multipartism at the national level has resulted in a multiparty instead of a two-party system. The effective numbers of electoral parties at the national level are 4.09 for the 1997 election and 3.77 for the 2000 election, following the Laakso-Taagepara Index.²

Table 3-1 shows the division of seats and vote shares in recent parliamentary elections at the national level in Canada, indicating that there have been five major parties involved. These five parties occupy all the legislative seats and more than 95% of vote shares at the national level. These two elections are no exception of Canadian norms. The average effective number of electoral parties at the national level in Canada from 1935 to 1993 was 3.1 (Gaines 1999), suggesting that there have been more than three parties in the Canadian national political landscape for some time.

Table 3-2 Comparison of Electoral Multipartism at National and Riding Levels

1997 Election		2000 Election	
National	Riding	National	Riding
4.09	2.90	3.77	2.68

Note: The riding level degree of electoral multipartism is an average of all the local ridings following the formula: $D_N = (\sum N_i) / d$ (When N is the effective number of parties at district i , d is the total number of local ridings)

However, one finds a different picture when we introduce the average degree of electoral competition across ridings, as shown in Table 3-2 above. The average levels of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding level in the 1997 and 2000 elections are relatively closer to two-party electoral competitions across ridings than those at the national level. These two elections are also no exception to Canadian political history.

The average degree of electoral competition at the riding levels in Canada has been relatively closer to two-party systems.³ Therefore, it appears safe to say that the institutional argument also works in the Canadian case at the riding, although not the national level

The simultaneous comparison of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at national and riding levels clearly shows that the appropriate unit of analysis is the local ridings, in order to better understand the degree of electoral competition in the Canadian legislative elections under SMSP electoral systems. The level of electoral competition at the riding level is clearly different from that of the national level. While a relatively multiparty system emerges at the national level, the degree of electoral competition at the riding level seems to be relatively closer to a two-party competition.

As suggested above, the shape of party systems at the national level is an aggregation of local-level party systems (Chibber and Kollman 1998). In this sense, the relative two party electoral competitions across ridings in Canada appear to lead to multiparty systems at the national level. Also, the patterns of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats across local ridings, differs from riding to riding, and, subsequently, province to province (as an aggregation of ridings), contributing in a variety of ways to the formation of the party system at the national level.

The degrees of electoral multipartism of some ridings, or a region, are higher than that of the riding average, and relatively closer to that of the national level. In these cases, one sees multiparty electoral competition (high electoral competition). The levels of electoral partisan fragmentation in other ridings or regions, on the other hand, are lower than that of the national-level, and closer to the average competition at the riding level.

³ The average effective number of electoral parties at the riding levels from 18 legislative elections (1935 to 1993) is 2.54 (Gaines 1999).

We can see relative two party electoral competitions in those ridings (low electoral competition). Thus, when we focus on the degree of electoral competition at sub-national levels, we find more dynamics in the levels of electoral multipartism across a nation (Cox 1997).

A clue emerges here for understanding the “Canadian exception” in terms of electoral and party system developments. As mentioned earlier, the interaction between federalism and party system development have generated a wide range of important questions for comparative political research. Numerous research questions have been raised concerning the impact that a federalist polity structure has in providing multiple arenas for electoral competitions for political offices within a given country.

Since there are a variety of institutional contexts and electoral systems where electoral partisan competition occurs, the possibility arises of differing patterns or degrees of electoral competition in the various constituent elements of the federation. The Canadian federalist system has historically seen local provincial governments maintain or increase their autonomy in many areas of public policy (Sharman 1994).

In this sense, such scholars as Palfrey, Taagepara, and Grofman have maintained that Canada has bipartisan provincial politics, while it is a kind of multiparty system at the national level. Palfrey (1989) represents the conventional view concerning the Canadian exception by arguing that “The most well-known exception is Canada, where provincial party systems are bipartisan, but not all provinces have the same two dominant parties. This produces a patchwork national party system that is a conglomeration of strong regional parties” (p. 69).

Table 3-3 Provincial-Level Comparison of Electoral Multipartism
in Canadian Legislative Elections

Province	1997 Election	2000 Election	Average 1935-93*
Alberta	2.63	2.43	3.1
British Columbia	3.26	2.95	3.4
Manitoba	3.85	3.80	3.1
New Brunswick	3.55	3.28	2.4
New Found Land	3.05	2.94	2.2
Northwest Territories	3.61	3.12	**
Nova Scotia	3.60	3.51	2.4
Nunavut		1.93	**
Ontario	3.04	2.87	2.7
Prince Edward Island	2.70	2.64	2.1
Quebec	3.05	2.76	2.7
Saskatchewan	3.42	2.93	3.0
Yukon	4.44	3.45	**

Note: * provided by Gaines (1999); ** Not included in Gaines' analysis. The provincial-level degree of electoral competition is based on parties' vote share at the province level.

Taagepara and Grofman (1985) agree with Palfrey, saying that "Canada, which might appear another exception, with three major parties, has at the local level two-party politics - the parties are simply not always the same two throughout the country" (p. 342). Furthermore, Rae (1971) identifies a possibility of regional parties surviving locally and contributing to a national-level multiparty system. He indicates that: "Intense hostility

between overlapping regional, cultural, and linguistic groups produced a strong basis of support for locally strong minority parties” (p. 94).

Therefore, with different (mostly) two parties competing, Canadian provinces have two party electoral competitions, producing multipartism at the national level. The very reason why Canada has a multiparty system at the national level is the provincial-level two party competitions for legislative seats with alternating regional combinations of the two competing parties. Conventional arguments simply do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. For example, Gaines argue that “This claim about Canadian federal elections, as a “stylized fact,” emphasizes the adjective at the expense of the noun—it is scarcely a fact at all” (Gaines 1999: 842). With the national legislative elections from 1935 to 1993 in Canada, the degree of electoral competition, using the data on ‘provincial-level election returns’, clearly indicate that provincial-level electoral multipartism is consistently above 2 and almost always above 3. With exactly two parties in an electoral competition, the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation cannot exceed 2. However: “There are only 9 cases out of 177 (roughly 5%) of a province having an *N* of 2 or less” (p. 842).

The elections of 1997 and 2000 were no exception to the trend of multiparty electoral competition at the province level in Canada. The average degree of electoral competition at the provincial level for the 1997 election was 3.35 and 2.97 for the 2000 election. This suggests that more than two parties competed at the provincial level for seats in Canada’s national legislature.

We can find dynamic electoral competition across provinces as shown in Table 3-3. Some provinces show relatively higher degrees of electoral partisan fragmentation

than the riding average, closer to national-level multipartism. A relatively lower level of electoral multipartism emerges than with the national-level party system and closer to the riding-level average in electoral competition in some provinces.

Table 3-4 Riding-Level Comparison of Electoral Multipartism
in Canadian Legislative Elections

Province	1997 Election	2000 Election
Alberta	2.54 (26)	2.31 (26)
British Columbia	3.06 (34)	2.78 (34)
Manitoba	3.24 (14)	3.05 (14)
New Brunswick	3.01 (10)	2.85 (10)
New Found Land	2.42 (7)	2.55 (7)
Northwest Territories	3.43 (2)	3.12 (1)
Nova Scotia	3.36 (11)	3.14 (11)
Nunavut	*	1.93 (1)
Ontario	2.88 (103)	2.72 (103)
Prince Edward Island	2.61 (4)	2.59 (4)
Quebec	2.75 (75)	2.55 (75)
Saskatchewan	3.25 (14)	2.74 (14)
Yukon	4.48 (1)	3.45 (1)
National Average	2.90 (301)	2.68 (301)

Note: * the province of Nunavut was included in the Northwest Territories in the 1997 election; () are the number of ridings allocated in the province; The riding-level degree of electoral competition is an average degree of electoral multipartism at the riding level in each province using formula: $Dp = (\sum N_i) / d$ (When N is the effective number of parties at district i , d is the total number of local ridings in a province)

The provincial-level degree of electoral multipartism is an aggregation of riding-level electoral competition across a province. A riding is a basic unit of electoral competition from which a national-level party system is formed under the SMSP electoral system. Canadian ridings have historically had more than two parties competing for legislative seats. According to Gaines (1999), “Most of these elections do not seem to fit the generalization that Canada has bipartisan electoral districts” (pp. 843-855). Specifically, at the riding level where “the bite of single member simple plurality electoral systems is felt,” the degree of electoral competition spans the two-to-four-party continuum and, furthermore, it hasn’t changed over time until 1993.

Table 3-4 shows the average degree of electoral competition at the riding level across a province. The table clearly indicates the dynamics of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding level. The ridings of some provinces experience relatively multiparty types of electoral competition like that of the national level, while relatively two-party competition also emerges as reflected in the national riding average. There are around three or four parties competing with each other for legislative seats in some provinces. At the same time, two or three major parties emerge in other provinces. There are 10 out of 25 provinces where the degree of electoral competition is closer to the national riding average, but quite distant from the national-level partisan fragmentation. The remaining 15 provincial cases are closer to the national level party system and distant from that of the national riding average.

We find evidence here that is contrary to conventional wisdom. Canadian party systems have not been two-party competitions at the provincial level throughout history. There have also been more than two parties competing ‘at the riding level’ in Canadian

parliamentary elections. Divergent degrees of electoral competition across ridings and provinces following regional lines have emerged. Some ridings and provinces are relatively closer to two-party systems (national riding average) whereas others are closer to the national-level degree of electoral competition (multiparty systems). Thus, the national-level party system in Canada is an aggregation (or mixture) of local-level (riding and provincial) electoral partisan fragmentations.

Furthermore, when one reviews electoral returns at the riding and provincial levels, it seems that there have been different combinations of parties competing at the provincial level, indicating that there have existed 'regionally strong but nationally weak parties' in Canada. There have been a variety of political parties in Canada. But, the liberals (Liberal Party of Canada) and conservatives (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada) are the only two ever to have formed the national government. Overall, Canadian parties in Canada have been strong in certain regions and weak in others (Arseneau 1994).

The "minor" party with the greatest longevity has been the NDP (New Democratic Party). Its national election performance has always been best in the west, in which it has formed several provincial governments, having only moderate strength in Ontario, dismal in Quebec, and generally bad on the Atlantic Canada.⁴ According to Morley (1994), the transition from a party with a highly centrist ideology (majoritarian approach to government) to a party with a commitment to protect the influence of provincial governments, explains the relative lack of success of the NDP at the national

⁴ Provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia

level when compared with its success in forming provincial governments in some provinces.

Table 3-5 Regional Bases of Canadian Parties (Seats)

Parties	Atlantic (32)	Western* (88)	Ontario (103)	Quebec (75)	Party's Total Seats
BQ	-	-	-	38	38
CA	-	64	2	-	66
Liberal	19	14	100	36	169
NDP	4	8	1	-	13
PC	9	2	-	1	12

Note: * Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

Table 3-6 Regional Bases of Canadian Parties (Vote Shares)

Parties	Atlantic	Western	Ontario	Quebec
BQ	-	-	-	39.9%
CA	-	49.9%	23.6%	-
Liberal	40.7%	25.3%	51.5%	44.2%
NDP	16.6%	12.3%	14.4%	-
PC	31.3%	9.97%	-	5.6%

First-past-the-post electoral systems generally reward the winning party and penalize the second and especially third place parties. Yet, the same electoral systems can work to a third party's advantage, if the party's political support is regionally (or geographically) concentrated. Pluralistic electoral systems can also over represent

regional parties. This is true in the Korean as well as the Canadian case.⁵ The CA (Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance) has thrived in the west, the base of 64 out of a total of 66 seats (50% of vote shares) in the 2000 general elections.

Table 3-5 and 3-6 show the division of seats and vote shares across Canada. While the CA is dominant in the Western provinces, it competes with the Liberals and the NDP for legislative seats in the region. Even though the CA is not on the ballot in Atlantic Canada, it is the main contender with the NDP against the Liberals in the province of Ontario. There emerge three major parties competing in Atlantic Canada (Liberals, Conservatives and NDP). The province of Quebec has two major parties competing—Bloc Quebecois and Liberals. The BQ is the classical regional party whose seats are totally from one province, yet is the third largest party in the Canadian House of Commons.

It appears to be clear, therefore, why we should focus on riding-level electoral competition in Canadian legislative elections. The party system at the national level shows a mixed picture since it includes different local (ridings and regions) electoral partisan fragmentation across the country. Furthermore, the combination of parties competing for legislative seats changes from province to province in Canada. Thus, a relative two party system in some ridings (provinces), where a certain party (or two parties) has relatively strong electoral support, blends with a multiparty system in other

⁵ According to Arseneau (1994), the rise of the Reform Party (until the 1997 general elections, changing to CA before the 2000 general elections) as a new party of the right represents a case that makes use of the federal system. First of all, it came from the province of Alberta, a prairie province with a history of producing new political parties on the right of the political spectrum. The regional unresponsiveness of the (5 cont'd) traditional parties led to the formation of a new regionally sensitive political party to run provincially. Then, the party used regional dissatisfaction to reinforce its partisan appeal for radical change of the political agenda at the national level, eschewing provincial politics. Therefore, Arseneau describes the CA (former Reform Party) as a strange hybrid of regional and national components, drawing political support from one element of the federalist system, but operating in another.

ridings (provinces), where three or four major parties are competing. Recent Canadian parliamentary elections saw different levels of partisan strength and, subsequently, different degrees of electoral competition along regional lines.

Determinants of Riding-Level Electoral Multipartism in Legislative Elections

Data and Method

Under a federalist institutional context political powers exist at multiple levels and political/social diversity emerges along regional lines. As shown in the preliminary analysis section of the chapter, different patterns of electoral partisan fragmentations follow regional lines in Canada, and, therefore, it is highly likely that the local/riding partisan characteristics affect the degree of electoral competition when electing the members of the Canadian House of Commons across local ridings.

The dependent variable is the effective number of electoral parties at the riding level in the 2000 general elections, based on the Laakso-Taagepara Index. The primary independent variable under review is the local/riding partisan characteristics. The variable is reflected in different levels of partisan strength and electoral partisan fragmentation in a given riding. It is measured through the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding level in provincial legislative elections.

Canadians elect provincial legislative members so that the majority party of the provincial legislative body forms the provincial local government. While Koreans elect their governor directly, Canadians elect their provincial prime minister (governor) through provincial legislative members. Provincial elections are used to measure the local/riding partisan characteristics in a given riding following the same formula used for

the dependent variable. The most recent provincial elections for the 2000 legislative election are used for the local/riding partisan characteristics.

Table 3-7 Provincial Elections in Canada

Province	Year of Provincial Election	Electoral Division	Riding (301)
Alberta	1997	83	26
British Columbia	1996	75	34
Manitoba	1999	57	14
New Brunswick	1999	55	10
Newfoundland	1999	48	7
Northwest Territories	1999	19	1
Nova Scotia	1999	52	11
Nunavut	1999	19	1
Ontario	1999	103	103
Prince Edward Island	1996	27	4
Quebec	1998	124	75
Saskatchewan	1999	58	14
Yukon	2000	17	1

Table 3-7 summarizes the information about provincial legislative elections in Canada. The electoral returns for electoral divisions in provincial elections in a province are aggregated to match each riding allocation in the province. With the exception of the

⁶ According to Shugart and Carey (1992), legislative elections in parliamentary democracies (like United Kingdom or Canada) are more party – centered since they are to form a national government unlike presidential systems. Thus, the aggregation of electoral returns of electoral divisions in a given riding seems not to distort the analysis. However, a separate analysis of the province of Ontario will be performed because the ridings in the province are the electoral divisions for provincial legislative elections.

province of Ontario, each riding consists of several electoral divisions across a province. Therefore, the electoral returns of electoral divisions in each riding are aggregated following partisan affiliations in each riding in accordance with the local/riding partisan characteristics.⁷

Since the presence of control variables improves the fit of the model, this analysis introduces control variables. First, the presence (or absence) of incumbent legislative members running for re-election in a given riding controls for the impact of a candidate running for re-election on the level of electoral competition in the riding. Ridings where incumbents ran were coded zero while open seats were coded one. The absence of incumbents is expected to exert an increasing effect on the level of electoral competition across ridings.

While the Korean case provides measures for challenger candidate quality⁸ and the nature of districts, the Canadian case supplies more in-depth information about the nature of ridings, called “district diversity.” Students of congressional elections have offered theoretical reasons to expect heterogeneous districts to be more competitive than homogeneous districts (Fiorina 1974). District diversity – *the mix of social demographic characteristics in a given congressional district* – is a central trait that underlies the degree of electoral competition for legislative seats in elections to the U.S. House.

There are clear theoretical reasons to believe that district diversity should have discernible ramifications for electoral politics. Certain types of social, economic, and

⁷ According to Shugart and Carey (1992), legislative elections in parliamentary democracies (like United Kingdom or Canada) are more party – centered since they are to form a national government unlike presidential systems. Thus, the aggregation of electoral returns of electoral divisions in a given riding seems not to distort the analysis. However, a separate analysis of the province of Ontario will be performed because the ridings in the province are the electoral divisions for provincial legislative elections.

⁸ Given the party-centered electoral politics of parliamentary systems and the regionally different combinations of parties competing for legislative seats in Canada, the presence (or absence) of a quality challenger seems not to exert an important impact on the degree of electoral competition.

demographic characteristics are positively (or negatively) related to support for parties of the left or right. The set of traits associated with one or another political party seems to have implications for the distribution of political opinion within a district. In turn, the level of district diversity will influence the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the district (Koetzle 1998).

For example, Fiorina's (1974) examination of U.S. Senate elections demonstrates in general that the diversity of a state does not affect the levels of electoral competition. Nevertheless, state-level diversity, in particular, increased the competitiveness of senate races in the South. Bond (1983), however, using the same measure for district diversity, found no significant relationship between constituency diversity and electoral competition for House elections in the 1970's. On the other hand, Herrnson and Gimpel (1995) found evidence that district diversity did have electoral consequences, but only in Democratic House primaries. Therefore, empirical research so far has failed to find systematic evidence that the population diversity of congressional districts has a direct impact on the level of electoral competition in U.S. congressional elections.⁹

The typical measure for riding diversity is the Sullivan index. Sullivan (1973) offered a straightforward index of district diversity, which allows for the inclusion of key

⁹ Given these unexpected empirical findings, there have been a variety of efforts to revise district diversity measures. For example, Koetzle (1998) suggests the use of "political diversity" that takes into account the differential partisan impact of district diversity. With an assumption that American party support is closely tied to certain demographic groups, he developed a measure of political diversity that is informed by the relationship between certain demographic variables and electoral outcomes, and finds that diverse districts experienced significantly more electoral competition in the U.S. House elections held between 1962 and 1996. On the other hand, Bond and his colleagues (2001) argue that we should view constituency diversity as a context in which electoral competition occurs rather than a direct cause of it. Since the population characteristics that make a district homogeneous or heterogeneous are "prepolitical," these prepolitical characteristics are unlikely to have political consequences unless there are conditions present that make the incumbent candidate vulnerable (unfavorable partisan forces and contrary voting records) and there is a challenger with the skills and resources (campaign spending and prior elective experience) necessary to exploit the incumbent's vulnerabilities in a vigorous campaign (Bond 1983).

social demographic characteristics. The index is an expression of the probability of the average proportion of unshared characteristics between any two members of a population. Therefore, the closer to one the index, the more diverse the district is. The diversity index developed and used in this chapter is based on five variables that are considered to tap ethnic, educational, generational and economic dimensions of district characteristics (Table 5-8 summarizes the variables used for the index in this study). The formula for constructing a district diversity index is:

$$A_w = 1 - \{\sum Y^2/V\},$$

Where:

A_w = the index of diversity within a population

Y^2 = the proportion of the population within a given category of each variable used in the index

\sum 1 through P, where P is the total number of categories within all variables

V = the number of variables used in the index

Table 3-8 Construction of Riding Diversity Index

Variables	Categories
Age	Seniors (Older Than 65); Non Seniors
Education	College Education; Less than College Education
Home Ownership	Home Owner; Rent
Employment	Employed; Not Employed
Language	English; French; Other Languages

Note: All the statistics used for the construction of riding diversity index are based on the 1996 Canadian Census data.

The control variables should have a positive influence on the degree of electoral competition across ridings in the 2000 election. Accordingly, the level of electoral competition at the riding level is expressed in the following equation:

$$Y = \Theta F(P, D, I),$$

Where Y is the effective number of electoral parties in a given riding in the 2000 election, P is the local/riding partisan characteristics, D is the riding diversity combining the variables of age, education, home ownership, employment and language. I is whether there is an incumbent(s) and Θ is a stochastic factor. Function F is assumed to be linear and the above function can be transformed into a regression line as follows:

$$Y = B_1 + B_2X_1 + B_3X_2 + B_4X_3 + B_5X_4 + u,$$

in which B's are unknown but fixed parameters, X's 1 through 4 represent chosen independent variables (local/riding partisan characteristics, riding diversity and open seat/or not) and u represents the stochastic factor, Θ .

Analysis and Discussion

Table 3-9 *Local Partisan Characteristics* and Legislative Electoral Multipartism Across Ridings in the 2000 Canadian Elections

Variables	Unstandarized Coefficients	Robust Standard Error
Riding Diversity	-.629	.415
Open Seat or Not	.143*	.087
Local Partisan Characteristics	.180**	.074
Constant	2.552***	.236

$R^2 = .039$, $N = 299$; * Significant < .10, ** Significant < .05, *** Significant < .001

Table 3-9 shows how local partisan characteristics influence the level of electoral competition across ridings in the 2000 Canadian parliamentary elections, while

controlling for potentially confounding factors at the riding level. It also shows the relevancy of the local partisan characteristics from sub-national elections for understanding the degree of electoral competition at the riding level in the Canadian case. The level of electoral competition from the closest provincial election in a given riding is significantly influential in deciding the effective number of electoral parties in the riding in the legislative election. Given the basic unit of electoral competition in legislative election under the SMSP electoral system, it appears to be the case that the local/riding district partisan characteristics decide the degree of electoral competition across ridings in legislative elections.

Where the degree of local partisan characteristics is relatively high (more parties in the last local elections) in a given riding, for example, the degree of electoral competition in the riding tends to be higher (more parties) in the following legislative election. In contrast, a riding in which the level of electoral partisan fragmentation is relatively low (fewer parties), tends to have fewer effective electoral parties in the subsequent legislative election. The estimated regression coefficient for the variable is significant at the .05 level for a two- tailed t test. The estimated coefficient of .180 indicates that, in an average riding, an increase in riding partisan characteristics from 1 to 2 would result in an increase of approximately .180 of an effective number of electoral parties at the riding level, other factors remaining constant.

As mentioned earlier, previous empirical research of U.S. congressional elections has failed to find systematic evidence that the population diversity of a congressional district has a direct influence on the level of electoral competition (Bond 1983; Bond et al 2001). The sign on the regression coefficient is not in the predicted direction, and the

models that have been developed have little explanatory power (Koetzle 1998). One can also find the same pattern from the Canadian case. The variable of riding diversity is not statistically significant either, and the relationship runs in the opposite direction from what was expected. The estimated coefficient indicates that the more diverse ridings are likely to have a lower degree of electoral competition.

However, the presence of an incumbent(s) running for re-election is statistically significant at the level of 90% for a two-tailed *t* test and indicates that the absence of incumbent candidates in a given riding tends to increase the level of electoral partisan fragmentation in the riding. For instance, a legislative contest without incumbents in a given riding results in a .143 increase in the effective number of electoral parties in the riding.

Table 3-10 Riding Partisan Characteristics and Legislative Electoral Multipartism Across Districts in the 2000 Canadian Elections (*Ontario Only*)

Variables	ENPV	Electoral Margin
Riding Diversity	-3.572*** (.604)	95.408*** (24.708)
Open Seat or Not	.159 (.260)	2.192 (10.623)
Riding Partisan	.334** (.117)	-8.494* (4.768)
Characteristics		
Constant	3.203*** (.394)	15.142 (16.127)
R ²	.282	.139
N	103	103

* Significant < .10, ** Significant < .05, *** Significant < .001; () are robust standard error of the estimate.

As Korea's mayoral elections are held at the same district boundary as the district for legislative elections, this provides a good monitor of district-level partisan

characteristics; the elections of provincial legislative members in Ontario are held at ‘the same riding boundary’ as the federal parliamentary elections. Therefore, this could be said to reflect the riding-level dynamics of electoral competition or partisan fragmentation in influencing legislative elections in a given riding.

The variable of riding partisan characteristics is statistically important, indicating that a riding with relatively high level of electoral partisan fragmentation in local elections tends to have a higher level of electoral competition in legislative elections, while controlling for other factors. Specifically, the change from 1 to 2 in the effective number of electoral parties across ridings in local elections results in a .334 increase in the level of electoral multipartism in a legislative election.

While the presence of incumbent legislators has no impact on the degree of electoral competition, riding population diversity becomes statistically significant for both models. Table 3-10 introduces two different dependent variables to measure the same concept-*the degree of electoral competition at the riding level*. They are the effective number of electoral parties and the electoral margin between the vote shares of the top two finishers. Even though riding diversity is statistically important at 99% for both models, they are different in terms of substantive implications.

The second column of the table indicates that a riding with relatively higher population diversity tends to have a lower degree of electoral competition. This runs directly counter to the theoretical expectation that district diversity leads to a higher degree of electoral competition. However, if we use the effective number of electoral parties as our dependent variable, a relatively high number of electoral parties (or candidates) indicate a higher degree of electoral competition.

There have been a variety of indicators used to measure the degree of electoral competition at the district level.¹⁰ Some scholars used the electoral margin, while others incumbents' vote share. Also, the number of candidates in a given district is utilized as a dependent variable. Under the SMSP electoral system, the nature of duality prevails in voters' choice and would-be third-party candidates could anticipate their candidacies being ruined by strategic voting (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). This indicates the emergence of two main contenders in most electoral districts, "M+1" when M (district magnitude) equals one.

According to Gaines (1999), "We should make use of appropriate measure of the extent of party competition, according to whether their theories apply to constituency competition or to national competition (p. 56). If our purpose is to know the degree of electoral competition under the electoral system in which two candidates "by nature" compete for a legislative seat, the answer appears to be the electoral margin between the top two finishers (winner and runner-up). However, we find the same patterns when we use the electoral margin as our dependent variable. The variable of riding diversity runs directly counter to our theoretical expectations."¹¹

¹⁰

Table 3-11 Different Measures of Degree of Electoral Competition

Research	Measure Used for Electoral Competition
Fiorina (1974)	Electoral Marginality
Bond (1983)	Pre-election Forecasts (Safe/Unsafe Seats)
Herrnson/Gimpel (1995)	Number of Candidates
Koetzle (1998)	Electoral Marginality
Bond et al (2001)	Incumbent's Vote Share

¹¹ In this sense, we are supposed to develop and use different measures for the degree of electoral competition depending on cases and purpose of research. Given the nature of multiparty competition at the national level and regionally different combinations of parties competing at the province level, the total number of candidates at the riding level appears to be a relevant measure in the Canadian context. Separate analysis shows that population diversity tends to increase the number candidates across ridings controlling for other factors.

Nonetheless, riding partisan characteristics show statistical and substantive importance in explaining the degree of electoral competition in the form of electoral margins. This point indicates the robustness of the riding partisan characteristics in explaining the degree of electoral competition across ridings. A riding in which there is a relatively high degree of electoral partisan fragmentation tends to have smaller electoral margins indicating relatively high degrees of electoral competition in legislative election. For example, the change from 1 to 2 in the effective number of electoral parties in a provincial legislative election leads to an 8.5 percentage point decrease in the electoral margin between the top two finishers.

This analysis seeks to apply the findings from the Korean case to the Canadian case - the same electoral system but different institutional contexts. This chapter has suggested that the local /riding partisan characteristics, to some extent, the degree of electoral competition across ridings in the recent Canadian parliamentary elections. Macro analyses of Canadian and Korean cases clearly indicate that we should focus on the local/district-level partisan characteristics if we want to understand the degree of electoral competition for legislative seats under the SMSP electoral system at the district level. Local elections appear to be accurate reflections of the local or district-level partisan characteristics.

CHAPTER FOUR

MICRO ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN CASE

Introduction

The preceding macro-analysis of the Korean case sought to better understand the sources of partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections with various data at the district level. In fact, I have argued that the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections must be understood at the local district level since the local/district partisan characteristics of prominent local or district-level elections are of crucial importance for determining the level of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in the recent Korean legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems while controlling for other district – level factors.

In addition, the macro analysis of the Korean case has found that the local/district partisan characteristics across districts are variable following regional lines. Some regions have relatively higher degree of electoral competitions, while other show relatively low level of electoral partisan fragmentation. These kinds of variations in the degree of electoral competition patterns across districts ultimately depend on the distribution of electoral supports at the individual level. Therefore, the districts that have relatively low degree of electoral competition pattern are those in which the electoral supports at the individual level are concentrated to a relatively small number of parties. However, those districts that have relatively higher levels of electoral competition patterns tend to have more dispersed electoral supports at the individual level.

This chapter is specifically to identify whether there exists the concentration of electoral supports at the individual level following regional lines across districts, making the degree of electoral competition across districts to be high or low. When the shape of a party system within a democracy is built on the distribution of votes cast by individual voters in a given election, it is important to seek as full an understanding as possible concerning how individual voters decide whom to vote for in elections, and according to which key factors. This will also contribute to our understanding of sub-national-level analyses of the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections.

This chapter, therefore, represents a micro-level analysis of the Korean case utilizing individual-level survey data related to the legislative elections under consideration, in search of a more refined understanding of the dynamics surrounding recent parliamentary elections and sources of partisan fragmentation at the individual level. This chapter also seeks to identify the existing political cleavages upon which the shape of the Korean political, electoral, and party systems is based. In what follows, therefore, necessary information is presented concerning data, measurement and methodology. Next, we proceed to an analysis of the determinants of partisan choices in Korean legislative elections.

Data and Measurement

This analysis utilizes the Korean Election Survey (KES) data for the three most recent legislative elections (1992, 1996 and 2000).¹ This includes individual post-election

¹ There was no publicly accessible public opinion survey data for the 1988 legislative elections, which was the first parliamentary election after the restoration of procedural democratic requirements in 1987.

surveys of around 1200 Korean voters for each election, which help us to better understand how Koreans make their political decisions.

Table 4-1 2000 Legislative Election

Partisan Choices	KES	Official Result	Difference
Grand National Party	43.4	38.96	4.44
New Millennium Democratic Party	32.8	35.87	-3.07
Coalition for Liberty and Democracy	6.1	9.84	-3.74
Democratic National Party	1.7	3.68	
Minor Parties	.6		
Independents	7.5	9.39	
No Answer	7.8		
Total	100.0	97.74	

Table 4-2 1996 Legislative Election

Partisan Choices	KES	Official Result	Difference
New Korea Party	42.8	34.52	8.28
National Congress for New Politics	24.9	25.30	-.04
Democratic Party	8.3	11.23	
Coalition for Liberty and Democracy	14.8	16.17	-1.37
Minor Parties	.2		
Independents	8.9	11.85	
Total	100.0	99.07	

Table 4-3 1992 Legislative Election

Partisan Choices	KES	Official Result	Difference
Democratic Liberal Party	39.0	38.49	.51
Democratic Party	33.6	29.17	4.43
Unification National Party	14.8	17.37	-2.57
Party for New Politics	.6	1.79	
People's Party	2.3	1.55	
Independents	9.3	11.52	
Minor Parties	.4		
Total	100.0	99.89	

Before proceeding to the analysis of individual voting behavior, however, it is important to check the validity of the data by comparing the differences between aggregate and individual levels. Tables 4-1 through 4-3 compare the proportion of vote choices at both levels to illustrate how they diverge from each other. The tables show that a 3.2 percentage point difference exists, on average, between aggregate and individual levels. Among the elections under review, the 2000 election shows the largest average difference (3.75 percentage points), as opposed to only 2.5 percentage points, on average, for the 1992 election. This is especially important insofar as non-negligible differences between aggregate and individual levels may cause serious problem in terms of validity.

Apparently, our data is not flawed in this way. The 3.2 percentage point average difference is not great.² Thus, using this survey data is not likely to endanger the validity of the research since the distribution of partisan preference at the individual level in each legislative election is highly reflective of that of the aggregate level. However, those who do not express a vote intention or those who indicate a preference for small parties or independent candidates are not included in the following analyses.

There is probably no subject that has been as thoroughly studied by political scientists as elections, in general, and voting behavior in particular. To identify the sources of partisan preference at the individual level, we examine various sets of variables. Specifically, these variables include demographic characteristics, party identification, political ideology, political leadership evaluation, policy issues, evaluation of the economic situation, and certain country-specific factors. Table 4-4 shows the list of

² For example, the difference between official electoral returns and American National Election Studies for the presidential elections in 1996 is 7.64 percentage points on average. See the Canadian micro – level analysis chapter for the comparison of KES, ANES and CES in terms of the survey data validity.

variables across elections. Data for some variables are available for certain elections but not others.

Table 4-4 Categorization of Variables across Elections in KES

Category	Variable	1992	1996	2000
Demographics				
	Gender	x	x	x
	Age	x	x	x
	Education	x	x	x
	Income	x	x	x
	Size of Residence	x	x	x
Regionalism				
	Place of Birth	x	x	x
	Regional Antipathy	-	-	x
Party Identification				
	Partisanship	x	-	-
	Partisan Tendency I/O*	x	x	x
Presidential Job Approval		x	x	x
Political Ideology				
	R/L Self Placement	-	-	x
	Social Order vs. Individual Freedom	-	x	-
Retrospective Economic Voting				
	Personal	x	x	-
	National	-	x	-
3 Party Merge (1990)		x	-	-

Note: * Incumbent or Opposition parties.

Among the demographic variables, residence size (*urban vs. rural*) is especially relevant to the Korean case. Korea has undergone rapid economic growth over the last 40 years. Unlike rural areas, urban areas are mixed with many people from all over the country, resulting in weaker regional identities than in rural areas. There is also more mobility among people who live in urban areas, and they tend to be younger and more highly educated than their rural counterparts. Before the emergence of regionalist party politics with the 1987 presidential election, urban areas had tended to vote for opposition parties and rural areas for the incumbent party. This urban-rural distinction in terms of electoral support for certain parties has long been an established voting pattern in Korea (Cho 1998; Kim and Browne 2001; Kim and Khil 1988).

While urban residents tend to support opposition parties, they are not as likely to vote as rural residents. According to Brady and his colleagues (1992), there is a greater voter turnout in rural as opposed to urban areas. People from rural areas tend to be more participatory because of the way in which rural residents are mobilized to participate (Kim and Khil 1988). The relatively low voter turnout in urban areas reflects the dissatisfaction of urban residents with the undemocratic politics of the pre-democratization period,³ and, therefore, urban residents tend to support opposition parties if they participate at all.

It is important to test to what extent urban residents are still likely to support an opposition rather than an incumbent party in the legislative elections that have occurred since democratization. There have been more than two opposition parties against the incumbent parties in the recent Korean parliamentary elections. In this sense, given the asymmetry in electoral supports for opposition and incumbent parties between urban and rural areas, there tends to compete relatively more parties in urban areas than rural areas. It is to know whether the size of residence makes difference in terms of the degree of

³ It is called as an “alienation hypothesis” that is directly opposite to the “mobilization hypothesis” (Brady, Mo and Ro 1992).

electoral competition across districts at the individual level. That is, the urban areas tend to have more competing parties, whereas the rural areas are likely to have fewer parties.

Another important, Korea-specific variable is regionalism⁴ or provincial favoritism. Regions are of special political significance since they represent convenient units to which parties or politicians can appeal for electoral success. As the macro-analysis of the Korean case suggests, the SMSP electoral systems render the geography of electoral support especially consequential. Along with class, religion, and ethnicity, regionalism has proven to be one of the most consistent influences on individual political behavior (McAllister and Studlar 1992).

As stated above, Korea has become well known for its stridently “region-based” party systems and “regionalist politics” following democratization (Clark 1987; Kang and Jaung 1999; Lee and Brunn 1996; Morris 1996). Its electoral politics after democratization have resulted in struggles among regionally-based political factions or parties. Regional concentrations of electoral support along regional lines within the country were particularly pronounced in the 1987 and 1992 presidential elections and the elections to the National Assembly in 1988 and 1992.

Since the 1987 presidential elections, most parties have had their own strong regional bases. Generally speaking, a political party based in a specific region gets almost all the seats allocated to the region in legislative elections. This is particularly evident in Yungnam and Honam regions. In fact, regionalism has become the most dominant political cleavage line for framing political appeals and voter decisions in Korea (Kang

⁴ Why regionalism appears is beyond the scope of this research since we focus on the political consequences (partisan preference) of regionalism. In explaining the rise (cause) of regionalism, analysts have focused on excessive underdevelopment between regions, the biased recruitment of elites by military regimes and the manipulation of regional sentiment by political elites. David Kang, “The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics,” in *Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction*. Eds. Soong Hoon Khil and Chung-in Moon (State University of New York Press, 2001).

and Jaung 1999). People from the Yungnam region have traditionally been very supportive of local parties and people from the Honam region have been very supportive of a regional party. Frequently, divisions between two particular regions have been the main factors determining individual vote choices (Cho 1998).

While Regionalism has typically been understood as the geographic concentration of electoral supports for a party at the aggregate level in terms of the electoral politics, there have been some attempts to gauge its importance at the individual level. Surveys have been taken, for example, asking respondents to identify their place, so as to better understand how this makes a difference in terms of partisan political support. Place of birth was the principle variable studied for the 1992 and 1996 elections. Since the politics of regionalism generally involves at least two regions, however, it should be coded as two different variables. Here, whether a respondent is from the Honam (*Regionalism 2*) or Yungnam regions (*Regionalism 1*) will be used for our analysis of the 1992 and 1996 legislative elections. If someone is from one of these regions, the variable is coded one, otherwise zero.

The survey in 2000, however, rather than asking respondents their places of birth, asked them whether they had a certain antipathy towards people from certain regions. Relying on development in the field of social psychology, this survey focused on the individual psychological sentiments, either attachment to or antipathy towards certain regions, namely Yungnam and Honam, and the impact that this had on voting decisions. The concentration of electoral supports along regional lines is based on the political support of people from certain regions. The political support of those who are not from a given region is more difficult to explain.

Thus, it seems most appropriate to measure the impact of regionalism according to individual regional sentiment or antipathy towards people from certain regions. Either

way, these variables had a profound influence on individual voting choices in recent legislative elections. Our survey asked respondents how they would like to have someone from the Yungnam (*Regional Antipathy 2*) or Honam regions (*Regional Antipathy 1*) as their business partner. If one would prefer not to have someone from a certain region as one's business partner, we can classify him or her as having a certain antipathy towards a certain region. Clearly, the presence (or strength) of antipathy towards people from a certain region has a profound influence on individual, partisan voting decisions.

Along with the variable of residence size, the regionalism – related variables are to know the sources of political cleavage in general and of electoral partisan fragmentation in particular at the individual level. It specifically tests the impact that the nature of a district (urban vs. rural; concentration of electoral supports along regional lines) has on individual partisan preference at the individual level. If there exists a concentration of electoral supports at the individual level along regional lines, we can understand why there exist different degrees of electoral competition following regional lines in the Korean case. It is the extent to which the concentration of electoral supports at the individual level along regional lines that determines the degree of electoral competition at the district level in legislative elections. This point will clearly confirm the existence of the geography of elections in Korea at the individual level.

One of the factors that have traditionally influenced the choices of individual voters choices is identification with a particular political party. Partisan identification is an enduring and stable component of mass political behavior in presidential and congressional elections in the US, for example. The relative strength of Korean political parties, however, since the restoration of procedural democratic requirements in 1987 has been much less stable than in the US. Parties tend to emerge, merge, and disappear from

one election to the next. There has been little consistency in terms of parties' names and histories in Korean politics.

Thus, it is difficult to identify individual partisan identification with certain parties over time. While the 1992 survey did include partisan identification with specific party names that existed at the time of survey,⁵ here, we have used an alternative measure for individual partisanship, asking respondents about their partisan tendency (or leaning) towards incumbent vs. opposition parties. Rather than providing respondents with specific party names (like Democrat or Republican in the US), we asked respondents to identify whether their partisan views or leaning were relatively closer to either the current incumbent or opposition party.⁶ Given the brief history of democratic politics and high fluidity of parties, this measure of partisan tendency seems appropriate for Korean electoral politics (Cho 1988). Thus, it is expected that people who aligned themselves closer to the incumbent or opposition party were likely to support that party in the legislative elections.

Political ideology is an important factor in deciding individual voting choices. It is used as an information shortcut (or heuristic device) to make sense of politics and political decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Political ideology is measured with different variables in this analysis. While the 1996 survey asked respondents to locate themselves on a left-right continuum, the 2000 survey used a proxy measure to identify individual political ideology on a continuum of maintaining social order on one extreme and individual freedom on the other. When one emphasizes maintaining social order over

⁵ According to the list of party names available at that time, this survey asked respondents to pick a party that they liked. The variable was recoded into three dummy variables; where someone identified his/herself as belonging to a certain party, the variable was coded 1, otherwise 0.

⁶ There have been more than two opposition parties in Korean legislative body. Thus, the reference of "opposition party" in the survey refers to all the parties when they are not the incumbent party at the time of survey.

individual freedom he or she can be categorized as conservative, or leaning to the political right of the spectrum. Giving priority to individual freedom, on the other hand, is closer to the liberal ideology of the political left. This variable was chosen because of the way in which it serves to distinguish ideological divisions among the electorate in terms of partisan choices. It is expected that there exists a possibility of ideological divisions in the electorate in terms of its partisan preference given the severe influence of regionalism in legislative elections.

While the variables of party identification and political ideology are representative of long-term individual psychological preferences or attachments that influence one's political decision - makings, retrospective economic evaluations are based on issues and relatively short-term factors, especially the economic situation at the aggregate and individual levels. It also represents the most straightforward statement of the "revisionist" position that regards partisanship as merely a cumulative tally of issues, based on retrospective evaluations (Witheley 1988). Two different kinds of voting behaviors have been identified that are based on economic considerations: "pocket book voting" and "sociotropic voting." Between these two types of economic voting, it is collective national economic judgments rather than one's personal economic situation evaluation that mainly influence individual voting choices (Lewis – Beck 1985; Weisberg 1991).⁷

Lastly, among Korea-specific variables the "three party merge" was specific to the 1992 legislative election alone. The 1992 election was held after the three main parties that participated in the 1988 parliamentary elections merged into one party in

⁷ There is another type of economic voting, prospective voting, that is based on an individual's prospective evaluation of which party or candidate's economic program is seen as more relevant to future economic prosperity. However, the KES data doesn't include items that measure prospective economic voting.

1990. Very heated political debates took place over whether the merger was politically right or not, and this was seen as one of the main factors influencing the electoral fortunes of the parties concerned. It is expected that individuals who supported the party merger would be likely to support the “big” incumbent party. In contrast, voters who criticized the merger were more likely to support the main opposition party in the 1992 legislative election.

Along with the substantive factors mentioned above, this study also introduces certain demographic control variables such as age, gender, level of education and income. Level of education is categorized into elementary, middle, high school and college educations. Income is respondents’ monthly income. These variables are relevant to the traditional cleavage structures upon which a party system can be based. Depending on age, gender, and social class (determined by both education and income level), individuals are likely to vote for a certain party.

For example, older people and the poor tend to support the incumbent party, since they tend to see the incumbent party’s legislative majority in the National Assembly as a necessary condition for political stability and economic prosperity in Korea (Cho 1998). In contrast, the well-educated and younger people are more likely to support opposition parties rather than endorsing the incumbent party because they tend to be critical of the sitting president and incumbent party. These demographic variables provide possible general political cleavages upon which a party system may be based and sources of partisan fragmentation at the individual level.

Finally, the dependent variable for this analysis is the individual choice of a certain party in the legislative elections under consideration. The major goal of this

chapter is to better understand how an individual voter makes his or her partisan choice. Thus, a logistic regression analysis using a dichotomous dependent variable (1=choice of a certain party; 0= no choice of the party) is employed to determine the influence of the set of independent variables. Separate logistic regressions will be performed for each major party participating in an election (see Table 4-5).

In the case of a binary dependent variable, the effects of any single independent variable are best evaluated with respect to a particular point on the probability distribution for a certain voting choice. I generally examine the magnitude of change in the predicted probability of choosing a particular party across the range of one variable, with an estimation of maximum likelihood, other variables being held constant at typical values (usually the mean). The associated change in terms of the predicted probabilities is calculated from a baseline model using the Tomz, Wittenberg, and King's (1999) CLARIFY program.

Specifically, the interval and ordinal-level variables in the model are held at the mean and the binary dichotomous variables are held at the value of 0 (the absence of certain characteristics). For the interval (ordinal)-level variables, the change reflects an increase of one standard deviation from the mean value of the variable. The associated changes in terms of the predicted probabilities range from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. However, for the dichotomous variables, the values reported reflect the associated changes in its predicted probabilities from one category (absence of certain characteristics) to another category (presence of certain characteristics)⁸ (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000).

⁸ From female (0) to male (1), for instance.

The logistics regression coefficients provide direction for the relationship as well as the statistical significance of the relationship. But they are not directly interpretable, making it necessary to assess how each variable changes the probability of a partisan choice, while holding all other factors constant at their mean values. It is necessary to have a procedure that enables us to understand the relative impact of the variety of independent variables. Thus, I will take into account changes in the predicted probability (either positive or negative to the dependent variable) when there is a corresponding change in the selected independent variable that is statistically significant. Therefore, the individual choice of a certain party can be expressed in the following equation:

$$Y = B_1 + B_2X_1 + B_3X_2 + B_4X_3 + B_5X_4 + B_6X_5 + B_7X_6,$$

in which Y represents the individual choice of a certain party or not and B's are unknown but with fixed parameters. X's 1 through 6 represent the chosen set of independent variables: *demographic characteristics, regionalist attitudes, party identification, president job approval, political ideology, and retrospective evaluation based on economic issues.*

At least three major parties have been key players in Korea's recent legislative elections. This indicates that voters have been faced with multiple choices, not binary choices. When there are only two parties, however, for the electorate to choose from, "The electoral space can be represented as a single dimension since the probability of voting for one party is directly related to the probability of voting for the other party" (Whitten and Palmer 1996: pp. 232-233). However, if more than two parties, exist, as in

multiparty systems, electoral space becomes more complex because it is multi-dimensional.

Therefore, statistical models need to capture the multifaceted process of choosing one party among multiple available parties. A statistical model should allow us to make inferences about the electoral dynamics of a multiparty system. The empirical results should help us to assess what factors in the model are most influential for determining the distribution of electoral support between particular parties at the individual level. In this sense, a less restrictive model, *multinomial logistic regressions*, will incorporate the variables that affect voters' probability of choosing among the parties competing in any given election (Aldrich, Magaloni and Zechmeister 2001; Seligson and Carrion 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1996). Thus, I will perform a logistic regression analysis first and then use a multinomial logistic regression to arrive at more in-depth explanations.

Analysis and Discussion

Table 4-5 indicates how individual voters arrive at their partisan preferences in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Generally speaking, Korean voters follow their partisan loyalty to a certain party. For example, the associated change in predicted probabilities is .535 for those who identify themselves closer to the incumbent party, indicating that the probability of choosing the incumbent party is more than fifty percentage points higher when an individual identifies him or herself as a supporter of the incumbent party, while other factors remaining constant. This becomes especially evident when we look at the variable of partisan tendency (the relative closeness on a continuum to either the incumbent or opposition parties at both extremes).

Table 4-5 Determinants of Partisan Choice in 1992 Legislative Election

Election/ Variable	Incumbent Party Probability Change		1 st Opposition Party Probability Change		2 nd Opposition Party Probability Change	
Age	.10 (.17)	-	-.03* (.02)	-.15	.02 (.02)	-
Gender	.01 (.01)	-	.09 (.34)	-	.03 (.40)	-
Education	-.42 (.32)	-	-.13 (.21)	-	.33*(.19)	.15
Income	-.24***(.09)	-.132	.11 (.11)	-	.09 (.13)	-
Big Cities	.87**(.36)	.174	1.27 ***(.35)	.28	-1.15***(.40)	-.19
Counties	1.07**(.47)	.223	-.20 (.46)		-.95*(.49)	-.16
Regionalism 1 ^a	.44 (.35)	-	-1.29***(.39)	-.15	-.99**(.39)	-.17
Regionalism 2 ^b	.08 (.43)	-	1.65***(.37)	.37	-2.06***(.56)	-.26
Incumbent	2.41***(.57)	.535	-1.94***(.62)	-.18	-.32 (.73)	-
1 st Opposition	-.57 (.61)	-	2.10***(.47)	.48	-1.73***(.57)	-.24
2 nd Opposition	.14 (.63)	-	-1.07*(.56)	-.13	1.84***(.57)	.43
Partisan Tendency	-.76***(.28)	-.183	.15 (.26)	-	.73**(.34)	.23
President Approval	-.47*(.28)	-.10	.35 (.25)	-	.40 (.30)	-
Personal Economy	.10 (.17)	-	-.5***(.17)	-.15	.03 (.20)	-
3 Party Merge	-.24 (.35)	-	-.34 (.48)	-	.05 (.48)	-
Constant	1.94 (1.48)		.18 (1.66)		-5.53 ***(.197)	
Pseudo R ²	.46		.51		.37	
Wald Chi ²	170.22***		145.25***		112.08***	
Log Likelihood	-171.10		-162.08		-131.67	
% Correction	86.1%		85.7%		84.9%	
Base Probability	.307		.203		.062	
N	490		490		490	

Note: * significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Robust standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses; ^a from Yungnam Provinces; ^b from Honam provinces.

People who are closer to the incumbent party are more likely to vote for that party, whereas those who consider themselves as to be closer to the opposition camp tend to

support the opposition parties. The associated change in the predicted probabilities is $-.18$, suggesting the odds of voting for the incumbent party is almost twenty percentage points higher when some feels closer to the party, while other factors are held constant.

As expected, the variable of regionalism appears to be influential in determining the electoral fortunes of a party at the individual level. The most popular opposition party in the Honam region and least preferred party in the Yungnam region serves to illustrate the stark divisions of regionalist politics at the individual level. Specifically, when the associated change in predicted probabilities is $-.15$, this suggests that the probability of voting for the 1st opposition party is about fifteen percentage points lower when an individual is from the Yungnam region. However, it is almost forty percentage points higher when one is from the Honam region while holding other factors at their means.

The 2nd most popular opposition party, with no strong regional base like other parties, was not preferred by those who are from either the Yungnam or the Honam regions. When one identifies oneself as from either of these two regions, the probability of choosing the 2nd most popular opposition party declines by seventeen or twenty-six percentage points while controlling for other factors. Thus, the 2nd opposition party gets its electoral support from non-Yungnam and non-Honam regions. However, the 2nd opposition party does seem to do well in the mid-sized cities. The table shows that the associated change in the predicted probability of voting for that party is $-.19$ and $-.16$, indicating that the probability of choosing the 2nd opposition party is about twenty percentage points lower when an individual voter resides in either a big cities or in the countryside.

Other demographic variables such as income and age are also important in the decision of which political party to support. The main opposition party, for example, has the most electoral support from young people (Cho 1998). Table 4-5 confirms this point. More specifically, for example, when the associated change in predicted probabilities is $-.15$, this suggests that the probability of choosing the 1st opposition party is fifteen percentage points lower when an individual gets old. This indicates very clearly that those who are relatively younger are more likely to support the 1st opposition party. This kind of generational division in partisan supports seems to continue since the 1992 election.

In addition to the generational divisions, there are also divisions between the wealthy and the poor. For example, when the associated change in predicted probabilities is $-.132$, this indicates that the probability of choosing the incumbent party is about thirteen percentage points lower when an individual voter has a low income, which means that wealthy people are more likely to support the incumbent party. The division of political support between generations and income levels seems to have continued in subsequent elections. While the older and the wealthy are likely to support the incumbent party, the younger and poor tend to support the opposition parties in Korean politics.

We have seen how the electorate chooses its partisan preference in legislative elections according to certain factors. But we do not know the relative impact of a series of independent variables between particular parties. Logistic regression appears to be inadequate for describing the effects of independent variables in changing individual partisan supports from the incumbent party to the 1st or 2nd opposition parties.

Table 4-6 Multinomial Logistic Estimation of 1992 Election

Election/ Variable	1 st Opposition/ Incumbent	2 nd Opposition/ Incumbent	1 st Opposition/ 2 nd Opposition
Age	.02 (.018)	.02 (.019)	-.038* (.02)
Gender	-.68 (.442)	-.57 (.48)	-.10 (.49)
Education	.057 (.26)	.36 (.26)	-.30 (.30)
Income	.21 (.13)	.26* (.14)	-.054 (.14)
Big Cities	-.68 (.50)	-1.26** (.49)	1.94*** (.52)
Counties	.36 (.57)	-1.51** (.61)	1.15** (.65)
Regionalism 1 ^a	-1.40*** (.49)	-1.11 ** (.49)	.29 (.55)
Regionalism 2 ^b	-.75 (.48)	-1.93 *** (.72)	-2.67*** (.68)
Incumbent	-.036 (.52)	-1.82** (.80)	.095 (.62)
1 st Opposition Identifiers	1.19 *** (.70)	1.25 (.83)	2.44 *** (.66)
2 nd Opposition Identifiers	1.01 (.77)	- 1.02 (.78)	-2.04 *** (.65)
Partisan Tendency	.65 ** (.33)	1.15*** (.34)	-.49 (.37)
President Approval	.62* (.33)	.63* (.36)	.015 (.37)
Personal Economy	-.47** (.23)	-.085 (.24)	.091 (.62)
3 Party Merge	.21** (.08)	.33 (.30)	.32 (.28)
Constant	-4.07* (2.33)	-12.61*** (2.68)	8.54***
Pseudo R ²		.67	
Chi Square		478.33***	
Log Likelihood		413.64	
N		433	

Note: * significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses; ^a from Yungnam Provinces; ^b from Honam Provinces

Table 4-6 specifically shows which factor becomes more relevant to the individual choice of a certain party amongst competing parties in the 1992 legislative elections. It provides us with a more in-depth explanation of the impact of independent variables on individual partisan preferences. Thus, the multinomial model allows us to evaluate the different calculi made by individual voters supporting different parties.

The respondents who support the incumbent party comprise the baseline category of the dependent variable except for the last column where the category of choosing the 2nd opposition party is used as a reference group for comparing individual partisan choices between the two main opposition parties. The task here is to identify what set of predictors make it more likely for a respondent to support the 1st or “2nd” opposition party rather than the incumbent party. We have two sets of independent variables:

ordinal/interval and nominal-level measures. In the case of ordinal/interval variables, the interpretation of coefficients is straightforward, representing the relative change in the odds of a person falling into a certain category of the dependent variable relative to the baseline category for each incremental unit of the independent variable. However, in the case of nominal variables, the multinomial logistic regression coefficient indicates the change in the odds of falling into a given category relative to a reference category of the dependent variable (Seligson and Carrion 2002).

The findings from a multinomial logistic analysis, in general, confirm those from a logistic regression analysis. This indicates how regionalism changes the combination of parties competing with each other along regional lines. For people from Yungnam region, for example, the critical issue seems to be electoral competition between the incumbent party and the 2nd opposition party. The main opposition party is the least preferred party

for people from that region. In this situation, the newly formed 2nd opposition party becomes the main contender against the incumbent party. Specifically, where the Democratic Party (DP) was the least preferred and the incumbent Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was also less popular than in other regions, the newly-created Unification National Party (UNP) became a viable contender against the DLP, indicating that the rise of a third party was also associated with political cleavage along regional lines (Kang 1998).

As it has been identified in the macro-level analysis of the Korean case, different degrees of electoral competition have existed along regional lines. While some regions have a relatively high level of partisan fragmentation, other regions show a relatively low degree of partisan fragmentation. The macro – level findings are confirmed by the micro – level analysis. Specifically, where a given party is relatively strong, as in the Honam and Yungnam regions, there appears to be a relatively low level of electoral competition since people of either region tend to be very supportive of the one party that is based in that region. The micro-level analysis makes it clear that the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections is based on the distribution of electoral supports along regional lines at the individual level.

The generational division also becomes clearer in this light. The multinomial analysis confirms that young people are generally more likely to support the opposition and they are generally more supportive of the 1st rather than the 2nd opposition party. This may be due in part to the negative image of the 2nd opposition party (UNP) among young people, since it was founded by one of the country's largest conglomerates, *Chaebol*. However, the 2nd opposition party does receive a great deal of political support from the

wealthy who are generally considered to focus more on the national economy than any other group. The binary logistic regression shows that the wealthy tend to vote for the incumbent party rather than the opposition parties (see Table 4-5). However, when faced with a choice between the incumbent and the 2nd opposition party, many wealthy people do endorse the 2nd opposition party.

While the variable of “three party merge” is not statistically relevant to the logistic analysis, it does become consequential in the multinomial analysis. Those who are critical of the three party merge are likely to support the 1st opposition rather than the incumbent party. This variable benefits the main opposition party at the expense of the incumbent party. This seems reasonable since the three party merge has been intended to exclude the 1st opposition party alone, combining the remaining three parties into one. When voters face a partisan choice between the incumbent and the 1st opposition parties, positive or negative evaluations of political events become critically important in deciding the electoral fortunes of a party. Also, the fact that the younger tend to support the 1st opposition party rather than the 2nd opposition party is important here.

Table 4-7 shows how individuals tended to make political decisions in the 1996 legislative elections. Along with the strong influence of regionalism on individual partisan choices, the 1996 election saw the revival of old-fashioned voting behavior in Korea (Cho 1988; Browne and Kim 2001). Specifically, the change in the probability of choosing the incumbent party is .20, indicating that the odds of voting for the incumbent party are twenty percentage points higher when an individual voter is older, other factors remaining constant. This results in a generational gap in terms of partisan support: the young for the main opposition party, the old for the incumbent party.

Table 4-7 Determinants of Partisan Choice in 1996 Legislative Election

Election/ Variable	Incumbent Party Probability Change		1 st Opposition Party Probability Change		2 nd Opposition Party Probability Change	
Age	.34*** (.09)	.20	-.12 (.12)	-	-.06 (.11)	-
Gender	-.065 (.18)	-	-.21 (.29)	-	.30 (.22)	-
Education	.065 (.11)	-	-.05 (.15)	-	-.37*** (.14)	-.06
Income	.081* (.42)	.09	-.10* (.05)	-.06	.02 (.06)	-
Big Cities	-.09 (.19)	-	1.33*** (.27)	.26	-.63** (.25)	-.04
Counties	.91* (.34)	.22	-.38 (.37)	-	-.68 (.42)	-
Regionalism 1 ^a	-.11 (.22)	-	-2.19*** (.45)	-.15	.01 (.28)	-
Regionalism 2 ^b	-1.03*** (.28)	-.235	2.11*** (.29)	.46	-2.28*** (.51)	-.08
Regionalism 3 ^c	-.69*** (.25)	-.16	-.61* (.32)	-.07	1.32*** (.29)	.18
Partisan Tendency	-.93*** (.09)	-.50	.89*** (.11)	.30	.44*** (.10)	.09
President Approval	-.67*** (.16)	-.20	.13 (.20)	-	.64*** (.20)	.06
Personal Economy	.07 (.13)	-	-.04 (.18)	-	-.19 (.17)	-
National Economy	.48*** (.12)	.22	-.32* (.16)	-.08	-.14 (.15)	-
Political Ideology	-.02 (.20)	-	-.42 (.27)	-	.38 (.26)	-
Constant	1.15 (.77)		-2.51* (1.04)		-2.32*** (1.01)	
Pseudo R ²	.26		.43		.18	
Wald Chi ²	174.62***		189.24***		107.32	
LogLikelihood	-410.11		-260.53		-282.08	
% Correction	76.8%		87.7%		85.2%	
Base Probability	.383		.119		.101	
N	818		818		818	

Note: * significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Robust standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses; ^a from Yungnam Provinces; ^b from Honam Provinces; ^c from Chungchong Provinces.

Along with this generational division in partisan support, the concentrations of electoral support in metropolitan areas and the countryside (urban areas for the opposition

and rural areas for the incumbent party) reappears in the 1996 election. For example, when the associated change in the predicted probability of voting for the incumbent party is .22, this means that the probability of choosing the incumbent party is around twenty percentage points higher when one identifies oneself as a resident of a rural area, other factors remaining constant.

In contrast, the main opposition party seems to garner more political supports than the incumbent party in urban areas. The probability of choosing the 1st opposition party is .26, indicating that the odds of voting for the main opposition party are around one-quarter percentage points higher if a respondent resides in an urban area, other factors remaining constant.

The impact of regionalism, therefore, becomes very clear. For example, the probability of choosing the incumbent party declines by around twenty-five percentage points when an individual identifies oneself as from the Honam as opposed to the Yungnam region. However, the odds of voting for the 1st opposition party increase by about fifty percentage points under the same situation. This indicates that regionalism is the single most important factor influencing individual partisan choice in the election.

Furthermore, it becomes clear why the degree of electoral competition between parties is low in these regions. Therefore, the degree of electoral competition in those regions where a certain party is relatively strong tends to be lower than that of the national level and closer (or even lower) than that of the average district-level electoral competition. We can find the same phenomena with the individual survey data. These points clearly show the existence of the geography of politics at the individual level.

Economic voting was also quite visible in the 1996 legislative elections. Between pocketbook and sociotropic voting, the findings show that individual evaluations of the national economic situation are indeed quite consequential. The probability of voting for an opposition rather than the incumbent party is around twenty percentage point higher when one is quite dissatisfied with the national economic situation, other factors remaining constant. The electorate tends to attribute the weak national economy to the policies of the incumbent party. The same patterns appear when we look at the impact of presidential job approval on individual partisan choices. Those who are not satisfied with the President's job are more likely to support one of the opposition parties.

Choices between the incumbent and main opposition party seems to be based a little on one's income level. It is likely that people who have relatively high incomes tend to support the incumbent party, whereas people from the lower classes are more likely to endorse the main opposition party. For example, the associated change in the predicted probabilities of choosing the incumbent party is around .09, suggesting that the probability of voting for the incumbent party is almost ten percentage points higher when one has a relatively high income (the odds are around six percentage points higher for choosing the 1st opposition party when a respondent has a relatively low income) other factors remaining constant.

All of this becomes clearer when we review the findings of the multinomial analysis. A relatively low income level benefits the main opposition party at the expense of the incumbent party. While the main opposition party gets more support from lower class people, this party is also considered as to be more liberal than the 2nd opposition

party. Conservatives, therefore, tend to support the 2nd opposition party at the expense of the 1st opposition party.

Table 4-8 Multinomial Logistic Estimation of 1996 Election

Election/ Variable	1 st Opposition/ Incumbent Party	2 nd Opposition/ Incumbent Party	1 st Opposition/ 2 nd Opposition
Age	-.37** (.14)	-.31* (.13)	.065 (.16)
Gender	.23 (.27)	-.25 (.26)	.48 (.31)
Education	.14 (.17)	-.40* (.17)	.26 (.20)
Income	-.15** (.07)	.028 (.06)	-.12 (.08)
Big Cities	1.8*** (.33)	.30 (.28)	2.1*** (.36)
Counties	.76 (.48)	-1.28*** (.45)	-.46 (.55)
Regionalism 1 ^a	- 2.25*** (.46)	.007 (.34)	- 2.24*** (.49)
Regionalism 2 ^b	2.1*** (.37)	-.92* (.54)	3.02*** (.53)
Regionalism 3 ^c	.019 (.39)	.147*** (.33)	- 1.49*** (.40)
Partisan Tendency	1.36*** (.14)	.93*** (.13)	.43*** (.15)
President Approval	.30 (.25)	.83*** (.23)	-.54** (.28)
Personal Economy	-.16 (.20)	-.16 (.20)	.11 (.23)
National Economy	-.59*** (.18)	-.59*** (.18)	-.22 (.21)
Political Ideology	.41 (.31)	.41 (.31)	- .70** (.35)
Constant	-1.5 (.133)	-2.73* (1.29)	
Pseudo R ²		.56	
Chi Square		551.92***	
Log Likelihood		813.81	
N		675	

Note: 8 significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses; ^a from Yungnam Provinces; ^b from Honam Provinces; ^c from Chungchong Provinces.

In contrast, people who consider themselves to be liberal are more likely to endorse the main opposition party. Similarly, young people are more likely to support opposition parties at the expense of the incumbent party. Therefore, in the face of a decline in the influence of regionalism, the possibility emerges of a party system based on ideological rather than regional divisions.

Urban areas appear to benefit the main opposition party at the expense of the incumbent party, as shown in the logistic analysis. The 1st opposition party gets more electoral support than the incumbent party and the 2nd opposition party in urban areas. The national economic situation also becomes important in generating political support for one party over another. Those who are critical of the current national economy situation tend to support the opposition parties at the expense of the incumbent party since they believe that a poor economy is the fault of the ruling party and president.

The legislative elections of 1992 and 1996 had three major parties at the national level. The third party received more than 15% of the national vote and comfortably maintained a legislative bloc in the Korean National Assembly in those two parliamentary elections. The legislative election of 2000, however, shows a different picture. The third party (CLD) received less than 10% of the national vote and failed to become a legislative bloc in the national legislative body. The two major parties together garnered more than 75% of the national vote at the aggregate and individual levels. Thus, the third party can be removed from the analysis of the election for purposes of logistic regression analysis.⁹

⁹ However, a separate multinomial analysis renders results that are almost identical to the logistic regressions of the two major parties.

Table 4-9 Determinants of Partisan Choice in 2000 Legislative Election

Election/ Variable	Opposition Party Probability Change		Incumbent Party Probability Change	
Age	-.013 (.01)	-	.013 (.01)	-
Gender	.18 (.22)	-	.05 (.22)	-
Education	-.14 (.18)	-	-.06 (.15)	-
Income	.11* (.06)	.10	-.02 (.06)	-
Big Cities	.20 (.25)	-	.01 (.25)	-
Counties	-.33 (.31)	--	.02 (.31)	-
Regionalism 1 ^a	1.8*** (.28)	.42	-1.38*** (.31)	-.19
Regionalism 2 ^b	-1.02*** (.33)	.18	.22 (.27)	-
Regional Sentiment 1 ^c	.80*** (.20)	.25	-.83*** (.22)	-.23
Regional Sentiment 2 ^d	-.47* (.26)	-.12	.32 (.25)	-
Partisan Tendency	.54*** (.12)	.22	-.83*** (.12)	.30
President Approval	.46** (.20)	.12	-.37** (.20)	-.09
Left Ideology	-.38 (.26)	-	.15 (.25)	
Right Ideology	.40 (.26)	-	-.90*** (.28)	-.14
Constant	-3.58*** (1.1)		3.36*** (1.11)	
Pseudo R ²	.31		.27	
Wald Chi ²	141.75***		141.75***	
Log Likelihood	-275.91		-274.99	
% Correction	76.2%		78.3%	
Base Probability	.508		.266	
N	580		580	

Note: significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Robust standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses; ^a from Yungnam Provinces; ^b from Honam Provinces; ^c Antipathy toward People from the Honam Provinces; ^d Antipathy toward People from the Yungnam Provinces

Table 4-9 above shows how individual voters decided their partisan preferences in the 2000 legislative elections. The findings indicate the continuity of the importance of the following factors: regionalism, residence size, income level, and individual partisan tendency toward the incumbent or opposition party. As suggested earlier, in addition to the relatively strong influence of regionalism, we also find that the level of income becomes an important factor.

For example, the associated change in the predicted probability is .10, indicating that the probability of voting for the opposition party is more than ten percentage points higher when a respondent has a relatively high income, while other factors are being held constant. The electoral division following income level has been consistent in the Korean parliamentary elections.

The main opposition party in the 2000 legislative election was the incumbent party in the 1996 legislative elections. Older and more wealthy people were more likely to support the old incumbent party (the current main opposition party). If we assume that, generally speaking, the old and the wealthy are more likely to be conservative, then the supporters for the main opposition party were more likely to be conservative than the supporters of the incumbent party in the 2000 elections. This point becomes clearer when we see the associated change in the predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent party. Specifically, the probability of choosing the incumbent party is almost fifteen percentage points lower when we identify someone as having a right wing or conservative political ideology. This suggests that conservative people are more likely to vote for the main opposition party and liberals to support the incumbent party.

However, the impact of regionalism is still strong and seems dominant. The associated change in the predicted probability of choosing the main opposition party is .42. This point suggests that the probability of voting for the opposition party is more than forty percentage points higher when someone is from the region where the opposition party is based, while other variables remaining constant.

Unlike previous surveys, the 2000 survey introduced a variable designed to measure individual antipathy towards people from either of the two typical regions. Those who have relatively high levels of antipathy towards the region where the incumbent party is based are more likely to support the opposition party. For instance, the probability of voting for the opposition party is one-quarter percentage point higher if a respondent has strong antipathy towards the people from the incumbent party's regional strongholds.

In contrast, those who feel less antipathy towards people from the incumbent party's regional bases are more likely to endorse the incumbent party. The associated change in the predicted probabilities is .28, suggesting that the probability of voting for the incumbent party is almost one-third percentage points higher when someone feels antipathy towards the people from the region(s) in which the opposition party is traditionally based while we held other factors constant at their means.

In overall, we find a slim ideological division among the Korean electorate based on income, age, and political ideology. The young, liberal, and those with low incomes tend to support the party that is regionally based in the Honam region. Whereas, older, more conservative people with higher incomes are more likely to support the party that is regionally based in the Yungnam region. For this reason, therefore, a party system based

on ideological division may appear and it may contribute to the institutionalization of the party system on its road to a fuller democratic participation in Korea.

However, the three legislative elections under discussion serve to illustrate the dominant influence of a certain nature of region and regionalism on the distribution of electoral supports across the nation at the individual level. The findings of the micro-level analysis specifically show a clear concentration of electoral support along regional lines at the individual level. Also the nature of one's residence (*urban or rural*) has a direct implication in deciding individual partisan preferences. These points suggest that certain characteristics within sub – national units in the country (i.e., urban vs. rural; degree of concentration of electoral supports along regional lines) are the major source of political cleavages and partisan fragmentation at the individual level in the Korean electoral politics.

The local/district partisan characteristics that determine the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections at the aggregate level appear to have the firm roots in the distribution of electoral supports at the individual level. In turn, the concentration of electoral supports along regional lines at the individual level determines the level of electoral competition across districts in the Korean legislative elections. Furthermore, the micro – level analysis indicates that the local/district partisan characteristics are variable following regional lines in determining the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in most elections. For example, those districts in which there exists relatively strong support for a certain party at the individual level tend to have relatively low degree of electoral partisan fragmentation, or vice versa.

The micro – level analysis of the determinants of partisan choice in the recent Korean legislative elections also indicates the necessity of district – level analysis of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. We found the dynamics of the local/district partisan characteristic at the individual level. Therefore, an understanding of the degree of electoral competition at the district as opposed to the national level is clearly called for with respect to legislative elections. The macro and micro-level analysis of the Korean case clearly supports the district-level analysis of the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections.

CHAPTER FIVE

MICRO ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN CASE

Introduction

In addition to comparing cases under the same electoral system (SMSP) but under different institutional contexts (decentralized unitary presidential vs. federalist parliamentary systems), it is useful to compare the micro-level analyses—here, the Korean and Canadian cases. It is also important to analyze how the variations in electoral support and the different combinations of parties competing along regional lines at the macro level in Canada has an impact on the distribution of partisan choices at the individual-level. Furthermore, this chapter is to know whether the analysis of the sources of political cleavage and electoral partisan fragmentation at the individual level in the Canadian case support the necessity of sub-national (district and regional level) analyses of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections as in the Korean case.

This chapter, therefore, represents a micro-level analysis of the Canadian case by utilizing the individual-level survey data related to the most recent legislative elections under consideration. We seek a more refined understanding of the dynamics surrounding the most recent Canadian parliamentary elections and the sources of partisan fragmentation that occurred at the individual level in this country. This chapter also seeks to identify the existing political cleavages upon which the current shape of the Canadian political, electoral, and party system is based. In what follows, therefore, relevant information is presented concerning data, measurement, and methodology. Next, I

proceed to an analysis of the determinants of partisan choices in Canadian legislative elections.

Data and Measurement

This chapter utilizes the 2000 Canadian Election Studies (CES) data that surveyed around 3000 Canadians to verify how they made their political decisions in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Table 5-1 Comparison of Partisan Choices at Individual and Aggregate Levels

Parties	CES	Official Result	Difference
Other	2.12%		
Liberal	43.32%	40.82	2.48
Alliance	24.69%	25.46	-.77
Conservative	8.13%	12.21	-4.08
NDP	7.84%	8.51	.67
Bloc Quebecois	13.90%	10.72	3.18
Total	100%	97.72%	

Table 5-1 represents the difference between individual (reported) and aggregate (official) electoral returns in terms of partisan preferences. There is a 2.24 percentage point difference, on average, for five partisan choices, between individual and aggregate levels. The largest difference, for the New Democratic Party (NDP), is more than four percentage points, whereas the smallest difference, for the Canadian Alliance (CA), is less than one percentage point.

While the average difference between individual and aggregate levels is 3.2 percentage points in the Korean case, the deviation of 2.24 in the Canadian case, on average, between reported and official electoral returns, indicates that the data is not

flawed for our analysis. This point becomes clearer when we compare the difference between individual reported partisan preferences and aggregate official electoral results from comparative perspective.

Table 5-2 Comparisons of Survey and Official Data in Comparative Perspective

Surveys	Average Difference
CES2000	2.24%
KES*	3.20%
NES 1996	7.64%
NES 2000	2.36%

*Average difference of three election surveys (1992, 1996 and 2000)

Table 5-2 compares the average difference between individual and aggregate level electoral partisan preferences in comparative perspective. There existed five – percentage point difference, on average, in the American National Election Studies (1996 and 2000 combined). However, we found the deviations of 2.24 and 3.2 percentage points from the Canadian Election Studies and Korean Election Studies, respectively. The degrees of deviation of individual reported partisan preference from the official electoral returns in Canada and Korea appear to be negligible.

Thus, using the CES 2000 survey data in this analysis is not likely to endanger the validity of the research since the distribution of partisan preference at the individual level, in this parliamentary election, is highly reflective of what is shown by the official election returns at the aggregate level. However, those who do not express a vote intention or those who indicate a preference for small parties or independent candidates are not included in the following analyses. In this sense, the Bloc Quebec (BQ) is also excluded from the analysis since it is on the ballot for the province of Quebec alone. The Bloc Quebec is a typical example of regional party, with all of its 38 legislative seats

coming from the province of Quebec (75 seats total for the province); it does not field a candidate outside of the province. Nevertheless, the Bloc Quebec has become the third largest party in the Canadian national legislative body. Here, however, our focus is on partisan choices among the significant 'national' political parties that are viable on a national level.

The dependent variable in this analysis is the individual vote choice of a certain party in the 2000 legislative elections. Since our major goal is to better understand how an individual voter makes his or her partisan choice, a logistic regression analysis using a dichotomous dependent variable (1=choice of a certain party; 0=no choice of the party) is employed to determine the influence of the set of independent variables. Separate logistic regressions are performed for each major party participating in an election (Liberal, Canadian Alliance, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic Party).

As with the micro-level Korean case study, this chapter provides the associated changes in the predicted probabilities for selected variables while controlling for other variables; logistic regression analysis will show the associated changes for the variables when they change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for the interval/ordinal variables, and from the absence to the presence of certain characteristics while holding other variables at their mean values.¹

As suggested, the Canadian voters were faced with a multiple choices of parties. The macro – level analysis indicates that there have existed more than four parties at the national level. Therefore, it seems necessary to take into account the nature of multiparty system in Canada. Binary logistic regressions will be supplemented by a multinomial logistic analysis in order to assess what factors in the model are most influential for

¹ CLARIFY program is used for the calculation of the associated changes in the predicted probabilities.

determining the distribution of electoral support between particular parties at the individual level in the 2000 parliamentary election.

Understanding the individual partisan choice in the most recent Canadian legislative elections also involves a variety of variables. First, we expect that a substantial portion of the Canadian electorate has developed a long-term attachment to a particular party and this type of psychological attachment almost always determines individual vote choices. While evaluations of personal and national economic situations tend to revolve around short-term issues that influence individual voting choices, partisan identification, in the words of Miller and Shanks, is “the most enduring of political attitudes, responsible for shaping a wide variety of values and perceptions, and therefore, an appropriate starting point for an analysis of partisan political preference, such as the choice of presidential candidates” (1996: 117).

However, the long history of multiparty system in Canada prevents the use of traditional measure for partisan identification since we have more than 2 major parties. Rather than using the traditional party identification measure, this analysis uses the feeling thermometer for each major party. If two major parties exist, we can put those two parties at the two extremes and identify where each is located on the continuum. However, Canada has a multiparty system consisting of four or five parties. Therefore, the degree of individual attachment to a particular party expressed in the form of a feeling thermometer appears to be more relevant for measuring individual partisan attachment. We asked respondents how much they like or dislike a particular party on a scale where zero indicates that the person dislikes the party and 100 means that he or she likes this party the best.

While the partisan feeling thermometer is relatively long-term factor to influence individual vote choice, I focus on feelings about the economy as a short-term factor: personal vs. national and retrospective vs. prospective. The conventional wisdom found in the empirical literature suggests that the political fate of the incumbent government depends to a large extent upon economic conjunctures at the time the election is held (Lewis-Beck 1985). When the economy is in good shape, the incumbent party is likely to be reelected; however, in times of economic downturn, the party in power may be in political trouble (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).

I introduce two different types of variables to tap into the Canadian perceptions of the economy: personal and national economic situation. The first two variables are concerned with the individual or personal economic situation: one retrospective and the other a prospective evaluation. The other two variables deal with individual perceptions of the Canadian economy as a whole, retrospective and prospective. It is expected that those who have positive attitudes about their personal and the national economic situation are likely to support the incumbent party in the 2000 parliamentary election. Also, people who have positive prospects about their personal and national economic situations tend to support the incumbent Liberal party in the election.

Given the nature of its parliamentary democratic institutions, the Canadian electorate chooses the party that will form its national government through the election of local legislative members. Therefore, individual evaluations of party leadership, who may become prime minister, appear to be consequential in determining individual partisan choice in the election. There is a vast amount of literature that suggests that individual voters make up their political minds about a party on the basis of how they feel about its

leader (McAllister and Studlar 1996). Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests that how the electorate feels about party leaders is particularly important in Canada (Gidengil, Blais, Nadeau and Nevitte 2000).

As there exist multiple parties, multiple party leaders appear. Like the partisan thermometer, we asked our respondents how much they liked or disliked a particular party leader on a scale where zero indicates that the person dislikes the leader and 100 means that he or she sees this leader as the best candidate. I included four party leaders for the four major parties under consideration: *Chretien* for the Liberals, *Day* for the Canadian Alliance, *Clark* for the Progressive Conservatives and *McDonough* for the New Democratic Party.

As the macro-level analysis of the Canadian case shows, it is a well-established fact that political parties do not get the same level of electoral supports from voters from different regions in Canada. The role of regions is actually more important than it was thirty years ago (Blais et al 2001) and this depth of regional division is clearly evident in election returns at the aggregate level. The Liberals obtained 52% of the vote in the province of Ontario, for example, and only 25% in the provinces of the Canadian West. The Canadian Alliance, on the other hand, got 50% of the vote in the western provinces but only 10% in the Atlantic Canada. The Progressive Conservatives garnered 31% of the vote in Atlantic Canada and 10% in the West. Finally, the New Democratic Party obtained 17% on the Atlantic coast and 8% in the province of Ontario.

The primary variable that we need to focus on in this micro-level analysis is the regional variation of electoral support for a particular party at the individual level: the concentration of electoral supports at the individual level following regional liens in

Canada. The macro-level analysis found that the local/riding-level partisan characteristics that can be measured through local or riding-level electoral competition patterns are the main determinants of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the Canadian national legislative elections at the riding level. This suggests that the sources of electoral partisan fragmentation in particular and political cleavages in general at the individual level are certain sub-national units (provinces and ridings). Furthermore, this point indicates that a concentration of electoral supports exists along regional lines at the individual level in the country.

Therefore, I introduce the region dummy variables to test for the presence of geographical factors influencing electoral choices at the individual level. For this purpose, I categorize the 13 provinces of Canada into several regions and then introduce the region dummy variables of Western and Atlantic provinces along with the province of Ontario following the general divisions of provinces in Canada. These variables serve to test the extent to which sources of partisan fragmentation in Canada are also represented by certain sub-national units at the individual level.

I also introduce the variable of political ideology. As in the Korean case, this is a dummy variable: respondents were asked to identify themselves as belonging to the right or the left. Along with the substantive factors mentioned so far, this analysis includes such demographic control variables as gender, education, income, religiosity (protestant or catholic) and union membership. While Korea is a relatively homogeneous society, Canada appears to be more diverse in terms of ethnicity, language, religion and cultures. Therefore, it is expected that certain demographic characteristics be related to the electoral support to a certain party. Table 5-3 summarizes the factors that were mentioned

so far to influence the individual vote choice in the 2000 Canadian parliamentary elections.

Table 5-3 Categorization of Variables in 2000 CES

Category	Variable
Demographics	Gender
	Age
	Level of Education
	Monthly Income
	Religiosity (Protestant/Catholic)
	Union Membership
Regional Dummy	Western
	Atlantic
	Ontario
Partisan Feeling Thermometer	Four Parties
Leadership Thermometer	Four Parties
Political Ideology	Right
Prospective Economic Voting	Personal
	National
Retrospective Economic Voting	Personal
	National

Finally, I will take into account the associated changes in the predicted probabilities (either positive or negative with respect to the dependent variable) when there are corresponding changes in the selected independent variable that are statistically

significant. Therefore, the individual choice of a certain party can be expressed in the following equation:

$$Y = B_1 + B_2X_1 + B_3X_2 + B_4X_3 + B_5X_4 + B_6X_5 + B_7X_6,$$

in which Y represents the individual choice of a certain party or not and B's are unknown but with fixed parameters. X's 1 through 6 represent the chosen set of independent variables: *demographic characteristics, partisan feeling thermometers, party leadership feeling thermometers, political ideology, personal economic evaluation, national economic evaluation, and regional dummies.*

Analysis and Discussion

Tables 5-2 and 5-3 show how Canadians made their political decisions in the most recent legislative elections. The first table is concerned with two major parties (Liberal and Alliance), which obtained 238 out of 301 total seats (80%). The second table deals with relatively small parties, the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties, which together had only 25 seats in the Canadian House of Commons. Both tables indicate that the variables chosen explain the variation of individual partisan preference in the most recent Canadian parliamentary elections. For example, the pseudo R^2 ranges from .313 to .558, indicating that the model can explain more than fifty percent of the variation in the dependent variable at the maximum.

Table 5-4 Determinants of Partisan Choice (Two Major Parties)

Parties/ Variables	Liberal		Canadian Alliance	
	Probability Change		Probability Change	
Gender	-.213 (.149)	-	.855***(.226)	.03
Education	-.010 (.027)	-	-.028**(.015)	-.003
Income	.00002 (.0001)	-	.0003 (.0002)	-
Leadership	.018***(.005)	.21	.027***(.010)	.04
Partisanship	.066***(.007)	.65	.068***(.010)	.12
Personal Economy Retrospective	-.008 (.041)	-	.021 (.060)	-
Personal Economy Prospective	.023 (.0370)	-	.006 (.050)	-
National Economy Retrospective	-.019 (.040)	-	-.005 (.053)	-
National Economy Prospective	-.114***(.037)	-.11	.126**(.054)	.012
Atlantic Regions	-.088 (.288)	-	.162 (.508)	-
Western Regions	-.086 (.227)	-	2.07***(.414)	.14
Ontario	.46**(.217)	.12	1.13***(.403)	.05
Protestant	-.631***(.205)	-.15	.075 (.266)	-
Catholic	.197 (.215)	-	-.595**(.322)	-.01
Union Membership	-.314**(.152)	-.08	.032 (.221)	-
Right Ideology	-.558***(.172)	-.13	.928***(.207)	.04
Constant	-4.28***(.584)		-8.54***(.857)	
Pseudo R ²	.362		.558	
Wald Chi ²	252.99***		223.14***	
Log Likelihood	-550.48		-307.12	
% Correction	81%		89.6%	
Base Probability	.467		.026	
N	1246		1079	

Note: significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Robust standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses

Table 5-5 Determinants of Partisan Choice (Two Minor Parties)

Parties/ Variables	PC		NDP	
		Probability Change		Probability Change
Gender	-.224 (.228)	-	.021 (.236)	-
Education	.014 (.018)	-	.019 (.032)	-
Income	.0001 (.0002)	-	-.0003 (.0003)	-
Leadership	.026***(.008)	.02	.021**(.010)	.04
Partisanship	.057***(.009)	.05	.055***(.010)	.10
Personal Economy Retrospective	.008 (.068)	-	.106 (.064)	-
Personal Economy Prospective	.056 (.059)	-	.034 (.058)	-
National Economy Retrospective	-.029 (.061)	-	.110**(.062)	.11
National Economy Prospective	.107** (.057)	.008	.033 (.061)	-
Atlantic Regions	1.76***(.410)	.08	1.26***(.474)	.03
Western Regions	.020 (.434)	-	.914**(.432)	.08
Ontario	.538 (.384)	-	.770 (.433)	-
Protestant	.392 (.321)	-	-1.12***(.304)	-
				.03
Catholic	.447 (.360)	-	-1.21***(.309)	-
				.03
Union Membership	-.165 (.263)	-	.439**(.252)	-
				.03
Right Ideology	.055 (.260)	-	-1.85***(.569)	-
				.03
Constant	-8.55***(.825)		-7.69***(.858)	
Pseudo R ²	.313		.369	
Wald Chi ²	144.87***		159.50***	
Log Likelihood	-266.82		-231.04	
% Correction	92.2%		92.2%	
N	1249		1096	

Note: significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Robust standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses

As expected, the individual evaluative perceptions of the party leadership and individual attachment to a particular party play a significant role in determining the electoral fortunes of each party. For example, the relevant associated change in the predicted probabilities is .21 for those who evaluate Liberal party leadership positively, indicating that the probability of choosing the incumbent Liberal party in the 2000 election is more than twenty percentage points higher when a person likes the party's leader (Chretien), with the other variables set at their mean values.

However, the party leadership variable appears to be most the important for the Liberals among parties. The individual evaluative perceptions of the Alliance party leader (Day) appear to be less important for the individual choice of the party even though it is statistically important at the level of 99% for a two-tailed test. For instance, the associated change in the predicted probabilities is .04, suggesting that the odds of choosing the Canadian Alliance is four percentage points higher when someone evaluates the party leadership positively while other factors are held constant.

The electorate's perception of the party as gauged by the partisan feeling thermometers is also statistically significant. The associated change in the predicted probabilities is .65 for those who feel close to the Liberal party, suggesting that the odds of voting for the Liberal party are almost seventy percentage points higher when the person likes the party, other factors remaining constant. The same patterns appear for the Canadian Alliance. The associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who like the party is .114. This means that the probability of choosing the Canadian Alliance is more than ten percentage points higher when someone likes the party, while other factors held at their means.

We can identify ideological division among the electorate based on partisan preference. Those who identify themselves as belonging to right side of the spectrum tend to support the Canadian Alliance rather than the Liberal or New Democratic Party. In contrast, people who classify themselves as liberal are likely to support the Liberal party candidate. The associated change in predicted probabilities for those who are liberal is .13, suggesting that the probability of choosing the Liberal party is around thirteen percentage points higher when one identifies oneself as liberal, while controlling for other factors.

Similarly, we can also find the impact of economic concerns in the Canadian voting pattern. Rather than pocketbook voting, it is sociotropic economic voting. However, it appears statistically significant only for the minor opposition party. For example, those who are not satisfied with the retrospective national economy are likely to support the New Democratic rather than any other party. The associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who evaluate the national economy negatively is .11, indicating that the probability of voting for the NDP is more than ten percentage points higher when someone is dissatisfied with the national economic situation, while controlling for other factors.

Unlike previous studies on prospective economic voting in the advanced democracies (Lewis-Beck 1985; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000), we find the importance of prospective national economic evaluation from the Canadian case. Those who are positive about the future of the Canadian national economy are likely to support the incumbent Liberal party. People who have negative attitudes or evaluations about the national economy, on the other hand, tend to vote for either the Canadian Alliance or the

Progressive Conservative parties. For example, the associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who have positive feelings about the national economy is .10, indicating that the probability of choosing the Liberal party in the election is ten percentage points higher when people anticipate a positive national economy, while other factors are held constant.

However, we find the most important impact of regional dummy variables in the 2000 Canadian parliamentary elections. Most parties seem to have their regional stronghold and to become a major party at the national level with regionally concentrated electoral supports. This point especially becomes true for the Canadian Alliance party. For instance, the largest associated change in terms of the predicted probabilities for those who chose the Canadian Alliance involves one of the regional dummy variables, especially the variable of Western provinces. The macro-level analysis already indicated that the Canadian Alliance party obtained 64 out of its total of 66 seats from the Western provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.²

The micro – level analysis also shows the existence of the concentration of electoral supports at the individual level following regional lines in Canada. The associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who reside in the provinces of Western Canada is .14, indicating that the probability of voting for the Canadian Alliance was almost fifteen percentage points higher when one resided in the Western provinces, controlling for other factors constant. The Canadian Alliance became the main opposition party (and second largest party) in the Canadian House of Commons with strong regional support from the Canadian Westerns.

² The total seats allocated to the Western provinces are 88.

The Liberal party is no exception with respect to the concentration of electoral support along regional lines at the individual level in Canada. The Liberal party appears to be stronger in the province of Ontario. The associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who reside in the province of Ontario is .11, suggesting that the odds of choosing the Liberal party in the 2000 parliamentary elections were more than ten percentage points higher when we identified someone as residing in Ontario rather than another region, while other factors are held at their means.

These factors become even more salient as we review the electoral returns from the Western provinces and the province of Ontario at the aggregate levels. While the Canadian Alliance obtained more than 70% of the total seats allocated to the entire region of Westerns, the Liberal party got 100 seats out of 103 seats from the province of Ontario. The micro – level analysis of Canadian case confirms that the geography of elections clearly exists at the individual level.

The concentration of electoral supports at the individual level along regional lines is not common to the major parties alone. The other two minor parties (Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Party) also have their regional strongholds. The New Democratic Party is relatively strong in Western Canada, whereas the Progressive Conservative party is strongest in the Atlantic Canadian provinces. For example, the associated change in the predicted probabilities for those who reside in both regions is around .8, indicating that the probability of choosing either the Conservative or the NDP is almost eight percentage points higher when someone resides in either the Western or the Atlantic provinces of Canada, while controlling for other factors.

Table 5-6 Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Partisan Choice

Parties/ Variables	Alliance/ Liberal	Conservative/ Liberal	NDP/ Liberal
Gender	-.741 (.485)	-.048 (.420)	-.011 (.476)
Education	-.249**(.098)	-.0008 (.037)	.054 (.046)
Income	.0005 (.001)	-.0002 (.001)	.0004 (.001)
Liberal Leadership	-.044**(.013)	-.04*** (.013)	-.02 (.015)
Alliance Leadership	.060***(.016)	.006 (.014)	.014 (.017)
Conservative Leadership	-.016 (.014)	.03**(.016)	-.031*(.018)
NDP Leadership	.009 (.014)	.006 (.015)	.059**(.019)
Liberal Partisanship	-.130***(.017)	-.108 (.017)	-.123***(.019)
Alliance Partisanship	.125***(.020)	-.013 (.016)	-.013 (.019)
Conservative Partisanship	.028 (.017)	.127***(.020)	.006 (.018)
NDP Partisanship	-.050**(.017)	-.02 (.016)	.098***(.020)
Personal Economy Retrospective	.084 (.113)	.079 (.115)	.183 (.138)
Personal Economy Prospective	-.125 (.105)	.147 (.107)	-.077 (.125)
National Economy Retrospective	-.117 (.115)	-.159 (.109)	.120 (.131)
National Economy Prospective	.116 (.103)	.065 (.098)	.056 (.123)
Atlantic Regions	.220 (.872)	-.610 (.700)	-.845 (.982)
Western Regions	1.32**(.742)	.276 (.703)	-1.204 (.934)
Ontario	-.349 (.733)	.292 (.642)	-1.08 (.919)
Protestant	1.22**(.537)	1.27** (.591)	-.107 (.577)
Catholic	.206 (.555)	.996* (.592)	.185 (.598)
Union Membership	.119 (.445)	.138 (.441)	1.285**(.470)
Right Ideology	-.475 (.474)	-.244 (.516)	16.8 (.176)
Constant	3.63* (2.14)	.268 (2.04)	15.92*** (17.3)
Pseudo R ²		.857	
Chi Square		1489.50***	
Log Likelihood		598.696	
N		766	

Note: significant < .10, ** significant < .05, *** significant < .01; Standard error of the estimate is in the parentheses

Table 5-6 presents the findings from the multinomial logistic analysis that takes into account the relative impact of variables on individual partisan preference between particular parties competing in the 2000 parliamentary elections (CA vs. Liberals, NDP vs. Liberals and PC vs. Liberals). The multinomial logistic analysis confirms the existence of the geography to influence on electoral decision - making at the individual level. For example, the Western provinces of the country benefit the Canadian Alliance party at the expense of the Liberals. By contrast, the province of Ontario benefits the Liberals at the expense of the CA, even though this difference is not statistically significant.³

Overall, the micro-level analysis makes clear that the concentration of electoral support along regional lines is a source of political cleavage and partisan fragmentation at the individual level in Canada. This finding is in line with those from the macro-level analysis that the local/riding electoral partisan characteristics are the main determinant of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding level in legislative elections. As suggested, the Local/district partisan characteristics refer to the existing patterns or degrees of electoral competition in a given riding or locality, and they can best be measured on the basis of sub-national elections.

Given the concentration of electoral support and the different combinations of political parties competing along regional lines in Canada at the individual level, the local/riding partisan characteristics are the primary determinant of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding levels in the most recent Canadian parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the local/riding partisan characteristics seem to represent a

³ The statistical insignificance of the region dummy variables for the New Democratic Party and the Progressive Conservatives can be attributed to the relatively low levels of electoral supports for these parties (12% and 8%, respectively), compared with those of the Liberals and the Canadian Alliance.

particular type or pattern of electoral competition in a given sub – national unit in most elections since it is localized pattern of electoral competition in a given locality.

It is also highly likely that local and/or riding-level patterns of electoral competition differ from district to district and from locality to locality (as an aggregation of local legislative districts) because of the geography of elections at the individual level. Therefore, there emerges relatively high degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in the ridings (regions) where the concentration of electoral supports at the individual level is relatively low. In contrast, those ridings that show relatively high concentration of electoral supports at the individual level are likely to have relatively low levels of electoral competition.

The micro-level analysis of the Canadian case also shows that different combinations of parties compete against each other in the Canadian provinces. For example, even though the Canadian Alliance as the dominant party in the West, the Liberals and the New Democratic Party are also major competing parties in this region. However, the Liberals, as the predominant party, and the Progressive Conservatives are also major competitors in Atlantic Canada.

While the Liberals are predominant in the province of Ontario, it competes mainly with the Bloc Quebecois for national legislative seats in the province of Quebec. As also suggested above, the probability of choosing the New Democratic Party increases when someone resides in the provinces of Western Canada, other factors held constant. Furthermore, the odds of voting for the Progressive Conservative increase when someone resides in Atlantic Canada, other factors constant.

Combined with the concentration of electoral supports following regional lines at the individual level, the different combinations of political parties competing each other along regional lines shed light on the importance of the local/riding partisan characteristics. For instance, the combination of the Canadian Alliance, Liberals, New Democratic Party and Progressive Conservatives in the Western provinces of Canada results in four-party electoral competition. However, we find relative two-party competition in the province of Ontario (Liberals and Canadian Alliance) and Quebec (Liberals and Bloc Quebec). The Atlantic Canada shows relative three-party electoral competition in most elections (Liberals, New Democratic Party and Progressive Conservatives).

These points, furthermore, support the necessity of a sub-national level (riding and province) analysis of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections. Given the dynamics of the riding/local partisan characteristics within the country, the level of electoral competition at the riding level in legislative election under the SMSP electoral systems appear to be different from riding to riding and from locality to locality. The macro and micro-level analysis of the Canadian case confirms the riding-level analysis of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in national legislative elections.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The current understanding of party system development within the tradition of the diversity of political institutions has focused on data from the national level and if any provincial level. However, the basic unit of electoral competition for legislative seats is the local electoral district. While most research has focused on the impact of the national-level election on the degree of electoral multipartism in legislative elections, there are two studies to date that put an emphasis on local elections in understanding the level of electoral competition in legislative elections under the federalist presidential democracies.

Extending the current research on the levels of electoral competition in legislative elections, this study has analyzed the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in the Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP) electoral systems in both a presidential decentralized unitary (Korea) and a parliamentary federalist system (Canada). This final chapter first summarizes the major empirical findings from previous macro and micro-level analyses and then looks toward avenues for future research.

Relying on the legislative district-level electoral data from national, provincial, and local elections in these two cases, we first examined the sources of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district and national levels in Canadian and Korean legislative elections. The main arguments of the study were then supplemented by micro-level analysis of the sources of political cleavage and partisan fractionalization at the individual level, through the utilization of micro-level survey data.

What theoretical implication can be added from this study to the scholarly literature on the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections? The starting point for this study is to acknowledge the importance of other political institutions in understanding the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections either at the national or at the district level. Unlike much research that has focused on the influence of such national-level elections as that for President on the party system development in legislative elections, this study puts an emphasis on sub-national and sub-provincial elections.

Most legislative elections are held at the local level and this is especially evident under the SMSP electoral system. Given the local district as a basic unit of electoral competition in legislative elections, it is of the utmost consequence to incorporate the local pattern of electoral competition to understand the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections in a given locality. The local voting patterns for other levels of government such as gubernatorial, municipal, or provincial legislative elections appear to be reflective of the local (or district)-level pattern of electoral competition.

Overall, this study found significant correlations between local elections and the degree of partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. The local/district partisan characteristics based on the closest local elections in a given district or province is reflective of the local partisan strength and subsequent patterns of electoral competition in a given locality. The current pattern or level of electoral partisan competition in a given legislative district from the closest provincial or district-level local elections is the primary determinant of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level

in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. The existence of dynamic local/district partisan characteristics across localities in both Canada and Korea was substantiated by the district and individual-level analysis of the sources of partisan fragmentation.

Specifically, the local elections appear to provide different incentives or motives for voters and rational politicians to associate with any given party for electoral success in legislative elections across a locality. Among the incentives or motives are the local strength of a party and subsequent pattern of electoral competition in a given locality. Thus, such prominent local elections as gubernatorial, municipal and provincial legislative elections are very reflective of local-level partisan strength and subsequent partisan fragmentation. Analyses of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections can benefit from the consideration of local elections within the diversity of political institutions.¹

The major findings are as follows: First, this study confirms the necessity of sub-national and district-level analysis of the degree of electoral partisan competition in legislative elections, especially under the SMSP electoral systems. In our macro-level study, we found that the party system at the national level is an aggregation of the dynamics of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts and localities within a country. In other words, the party system at the national level of a polity is a product of electoral partisan fragmentations across the local district.

¹ In addition, the importance of local elections in understanding the level of electoral competition across local districts in legislative elections became more evident when we considered a particular type of institutional context that may foster political and social diversity following regional lines within a country. We found, however, that other institutional systems like decentralized unitary admit the existence of diverse local party systems within a polity.

More specifically, the comparative analysis of the levels of electoral partisan competition for legislative seats indicates that different patterns or degrees of electoral partisan fragmentation along regional lines have emerged in the Korean legislative elections. Furthermore, the dynamic patterns of electoral competition following regional lines in the Korean case suggests that these phenomena would happen for other types of elections. We found how the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation varies depending on localities in both presidential and local elections since 1987.

In most types of elections in Korea, for example, the effective number of electoral parties across a province (and local districts) is closer either to a relative two party system or a relative multiparty system depending on locality. Furthermore, local elections are more reflective of the local strength of a party since the basic unit of electoral competition under the SMSP electoral systems is the local district. Given the regional dynamics of electoral competitiveness in most types of elections, the national-level party system in the Korean legislative elections is a mixture of diverse local (province and district) party systems.

As suggested, the particular structure of a country (i.e., federalism) may foster sub-national political and social diversity, and lead to a variety of electoral party systems across a nation. As in the case of Korea, the degree of electoral partisan competition at the riding level in Canada has been relatively closer to two-party systems, while at least more than four major parties have competed at the national level. Thus, the national-level party system incorporates the dynamics of local-level electoral partisan fragmentations across ridings and provinces.

Furthermore, we found that the very reason Canada has a relative multiparty system at the national level is the provincial-level two-party competitions for legislative seats with alternating regional combinations of the competing parties. Given the multiparty electoral competition across provinces, the major competing parties vary following regional lines. Specifically, some Canadian provinces show relatively higher degree of electoral partisan fragmentation than the riding average (relative two party systems), approaching the national-level of multipartism. In contrast, other provinces display relatively lower levels of electoral competition than the national-level party system and are closer to the riding-level average.

Therefore, it is evident why we should focus on the district-level degree of electoral competition in national legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. The party system at the national level is a mixed picture that includes dynamic local (districts and/or provinces)-level electoral partisan fragmentations across the country. While the Korean case shows differing partisan strength along regional lines, the Canadian case indicates that the different combinations of parties competing for legislative seats follows provincial lines. However, both cases clearly suggest that there have existed dynamic degrees/patterns of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. Thus, the national-level party system is an aggregation of local-level electoral partisan fragmentations that are diverse along regional lines.

Given the dynamic variation of electoral competition following regional lines (mostly provincial level) in national and sub-national elections, the local/district partisan characteristics are the key factor for understanding the degree of partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. Since the

basic unit of electoral competition for legislative seats is the local district, across a polity, the currently existing pattern of electoral competition in a given district or locality, *local/district partisan characteristics*, can be best measured through district and/or local-level elections, which is critical for explaining the levels of electoral partisan fragmentation across the districts in legislative elections.

The Korean case study specifically shows that it is the degree/pattern of electoral partisan competition in prominent local elections (gubernatorial and municipal) that determine the degree of partisan fragmentation at the district level in legislative elections. While the provincial-level gubernatorial elections represent local (provincial)-level partisan characteristics, Korean municipal elections tend to turn on district-level partisan characteristics. These two measures are highly complementarily for explaining the degree of electoral competition across districts in national legislative elections.

This study, therefore, extends the findings from the Korean case to the Canadian case, where there is a long history of federalism characterized by strong regionalist party systems at the national level. The importance of local elections for explaining the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections is highlighted by the presence of political powers at multiple stages and subsequent political/social diversity along regional lines in a federalist system. The Canadian case also illustrates the variations of local/riding partisan characteristics along regional lines, which has a significant influence on the level of electoral partisan fragmentation at the riding level in the most recent Canadian legislative elections.

The national-level party system, therefore, can be seen as a “patchwork” of localized (or regionalized) party systems in both countries, because a variety of types of

electoral partisan characteristics follow regional lines. In Korea, there is a relatively low degree of electoral partisan competition in most elections across the locality where a certain party is especially strong. Relatively high levels of electoral partisan fragmentation emerge, however, across the locality in regions where no particular party is especially strong and several regional parties compete for electoral supports in most elections. As a result of the concentration of electoral support along provincial lines in the Canadian case, we found different combinations of parties competing within sub-national units.

We can identify the dynamics of local/district partisan characteristics following regional lines, therefore, in most types of elections in both Canada and Korea. Local and district-level elections are representative of the existing pattern of local and/or district level electoral competition in a given sub-national unit. These local/district partisan characteristics play a critical role in determining the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation at the district level in national legislative elections. Furthermore, given the different types of party systems or patterns of electoral competition across provinces, we can suggest that different types and patterns of electoral partisan competition have existed along regional lines in Canada and Korea in most local and national elections.

Second, utilizing survey data, this study has extended the district-level analysis to individual-level analysis of the sources of partisan fragmentation in particular and political cleavage generally in these two cases. Since the shape of a party system depends on the distribution of votes cast by individual voters, this serves to confirm the major findings of the macro-level analysis. In other words, the finding that local/district partisan characteristics are the primary source of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative

elections are confirmed by the micro-level analyses. Furthermore, we found that certain sub-national units (district, province and region) represent the major source of political cleavage and electoral partisan fragmentation in Canada and Korea.

Concentrations of electoral support for parties following regional lines at the individual level in Canada and Korea have a substantial history. The degree of partisan competition across districts in legislative elections appears to change depending on the degree of concentration of electoral partisan support along regional lines. Levels of electoral competition are low when a relatively high degree of electoral support concentration exists, and vice versa. Also, we established the existence of different combinations of parties competing with each other along regional lines in the Canadian case.

All of these empirical findings suggest that there have existed certain types or patterns of partisan competition at certain sub-national units in local and national elections. The micro-level analysis confirms the existence of different degrees of electoral competition and local/district partisan characteristics at the individual level following regional lines in both Canada and Korea. The individual-level analysis of the sources of partisan fragmentation also makes clear the necessity of studying the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections at the sub-national level, since the national-level analysis of the degree of partisan fragmentation in legislative elections does not serve to identify the dynamics of electoral competition within sub-national units. Both macro and micro-level analyses of the Canadian and Korean cases contribute to our understanding of the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in national legislative elections.

This research is intended to serve as a starting point for future research. First, there should be more study of the dynamics of levels of electoral competition across legislative districts in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. The degree of electoral competition in legislative elections can be better understood at the district level by data collected at that level. If we want to understand better the interrelationships between different types of elections, the basic unit of analysis for the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections should be the local legislative electoral district.

This study has focused on cases under the institutional context of decentralized unitary presidential democracy (Korea) and federalist parliamentary system (Canada). It does not directly speak to the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections in federalist presidential institutions and unitary parliamentary democracies. It seems necessary to analyze the impact of different institutional contexts on the degree of electoral competition across districts in legislative elections. By analyzing the social and cultural diversity following regional lines in a country, we may better understand the existence of dynamics of local-level electoral partisan competitions.

Related to the above point, it is also required to develop more relevant measures for the local/district partisan characteristics that are presumed to influence the degree of electoral partisan fragmentation across districts in legislative elections. This study used the closest local elections (gubernatorial/municipal for Korea and provincial legislative elections for Canada) to measure the concept. The local/district partisan characteristics refer to the existing pattern or degree of electoral partisan competition in a given locality or district. While the closest local elections are reflective of the current pattern of

electoral competition in a given locality, there also exists a possibility of a regionalized type of electoral competition. For example, we found two-party competition in the province of Quebec (Liberals and Bloc Quebecois). The same pattern appears in most types of elections in the provinces of Canada. Therefore, combining two or more local elections might be relevant to accurately measure the local/district partisan characteristics in a given locality.

Further research is also called for with respect to how a party system at the national level is formed on the basis of diverse local party systems, through “aggregation” or the “linkage process of party systems.” If the national-level party system represents an aggregation of local-level electoral partisan fragmentation, which differs from locality to locality, then it is necessary to provide adequate explanation of how the national party systems of Canada and Korea have formed. While the existence of federalism is the main reason for diverse local party systems within sub-national units in Canada (Gaines 1999) and possibly Argentina (Jones 1997) and Brazil (Samuels 2000a/b) as well, we can also identify the impact of certain political/social cleavage structures on the development of diverse local party systems. Given the importance of political institutions to party system development, further research is also called for with respect to the cleavage structure of a country, so as to understand better the process of party system linkage between local and national levels.

We have identified several measures of the degree of electoral competition at the district level in legislative elections. Depending on the substantive purpose of the research in question, it is important to choose the appropriate measures for the variables under consideration (Gaines 1997). Studies of the influence of district population

diversity on levels of electoral competition in legislative elections have found that the impact of district diversity is conditioned by candidate-related characteristics (Bond 1983; Bond et al 2001). While the Canadian macro-level analysis found no direct influence of district diversity on legislative electoral competition patterns in this study, it is still quite possible that district diversity becomes consequential when we use different types of dependent variables to assess the degree of electoral partisan competition across districts in legislative elections.

In choosing which measure to use for the dependent variable, one must take into account the nature of party systems in any given country. Given the two-party competition that exist in most cases of SMSP electoral systems, as in the US, the electoral margin or the incumbent vote share are the appropriate measures. However, we find different types of party systems coexisting within the sub-national units in Canada. Given the different combinations of parties competing along regional lines, therefore, the number of candidates in each riding, rather than the electoral margin or incumbent vote share, may be more appropriate for measuring the degree of electoral competition in Canada. In light of the need for district-level analyses of legislative elections from a comparative perspective, additional analysis of riding population diversity in Canada is called for.

Finally, our micro-level analysis found that the concentration of electoral support along regional lines is the main determinant of electoral fortunes for parties in both Canada and Korea. However, we do not yet know to what extent sub-national units in these two cases act as surrogates for a wide variety of other factors related to partisan preference. There may be regional concentrations of certain demographic characteristics

or different distributions of political attitudes and orientations that help to determine individual partisan preference along regional lines.² It seems important, however, to uncover the political implications of regional variations of electoral support for parties in these two countries. Also, the possibility of party system institutionalization should be probed further, especially in light of the regionalist party system in the case of Korea. In fact, party system institutionalization may occur through the unification of regionalist party systems with respect to ideological divisions.

These are the primary questions that need to be answered to achieve a more systematic understanding of party system development in particular, and of political institutions in general. This study of the sources of electoral partisan fragmentation in legislative elections at the macro- and micro-levels is intended to contribute to our understanding of the degree of electoral competition in legislative elections under the SMSP electoral systems. Our understanding of party system development in legislative elections can be greatly strengthened by district-level analyses of party system development wherever adequate district-level data are available.

² For example, Blais and his colleagues (2001) and McAllister and Studlar (1996) address whether the regional gap in electoral supports reflects the difference in political attitudes/orientations or concentration of demographic characteristics in Canada and United Kingdom, respectively .

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