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ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN TAIWAN

By

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ABSTRACT

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The main interest of my research is to explore why environmental concern, although shared by most people, never emerged as a major policy agenda in Taiwan. The state played a big role in the process. The KMT regime built its ruling legitimacy before democratization predominantly on ideology and economic performance successively. The claim of sovereignty over China by the KMT was used to justify its ruling legitimacy and its all temporarily no democratic practices in governing that island. When claim of sovereignty over China became unrealistic, the KMT's regime shifted to economic growth as source of ruling legitimacy.

Before 1990s, there was very limited contest against the KMT from the oppositions because of effectively institutional barriers. Elections did not reflect people's concern based on the KMT's dominance in the congress, which was warranted by unfair designs. Just like other important social and political issues, environmental protection was heard in society but actions were not seen in political market.

Democratization brought a new dominant issue mixed with national identity and ethnic identification. These two factors prevailed in political forum and drew clear boundaries of social cleavages. The development of Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism, associated with debate between Taiwan Independence and unification with China, pushed other significant issues away. Although a civic society is emerging, the plural interests

still have not won much recognition. Environmental concern has consistently been viewed as an essential factor for Taiwan's future, but the environmental degradation has not been stopped.

I propose combining sustainable development and civic nationalism as the guiding principle for Taiwan's future. I do not believe environmental protection can beat other important values and gain a transcendent status. Instead, I argue that all important values need to be democratically balanced. Linking sustainable development to civic nationalism can lead the conflict of identity to a common ground. Dedication to the environment truly is a meaningful way to show everybody's love for that island. If politicians stubbornly provoke identity issue and ignore the environment, one day there will no stage for all players.

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For my parents, two very humble persons

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Taiwan is the world's thirteenth largest trading country, with industrial output accounting for 94 percent of its total exports, and around US\$75 billion in foreign exchange holdings, the second largest in the world. Unlike other developing countries which undergo initial economic development but first experience increases in inequality, Taiwan has avoided that "necessary evil of growth" and successfully achieved its economic miracle. Since the late 1970s, researchers have evaluated Taiwan thorough such success and made it a remarkable case for developmental studies (Ranis 1978; Fei et al. 1979; Kuo et al. 1981; Barrett and Whyte 1982; Lau 1986; Gold 1986; Clark 1987).

It is an easy and popular trend, when reviewing a society, to pay greater attention to economic development, but pay little attention to damaging by-product of development, such as environmental degradation (Bryant 1995). This trend is seen from most advocates of Taiwan experience to emphasize only the economic aspect of development, but ignore other important aspects of development like environmental problems. Unlike the majority of developing countries, where environmental problems are mostly poverty-related, Taiwan's environmental problems have been caused mainly by rapid economic growth (Chi 1994; Arrigo 1994; Edmonds 1996). The problems encompass almost all possible

forms of environmental degradation including air pollution, water pollution, accumulations of solid and hazardous wastes, soil contamination, noise pollution, deforestation, and endangerment of many wildlife species.

For example, we find Taiwan's average dustfall concentration is much higher than that of Japan, the United States, and other Western European countries. Furthermore, the SO₂ concentration--the main cause of acid rain--in Taiwan is also higher than that of all of these countries except the United Kingdom (EPA 1990; OECD 1989). The investigation with Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) in Taiwan showed that from 1984 to 1997 the average percentage of "good" days- for PSI under 50- was 24 percent, equal to 87 days yearly. And the average days of "unhealthful" and "very unhealthful" were 37 and 9, respectively (Chen and Fang 1997). People in Taiwan were under very bad quality of air for more than a month yearly.

The major sources of air pollution are car, motorcycle, and industrial emissions, none of which has ever seemed to be reduced at all. For instance, the number of motor vehicles registered went up by 15 times between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s (Edmonds 1996). Accordingly, air pollution has become the Taiwanese people's major threat, which raised the highest concern in opinion polls (Hsiao 1989, 1999).

One often ignored form of environmental degradation is noise pollution, which

usually cannot be seen, tasted, or smelled and is considered less health-threatening. However, the long-term health and psychological effects of noise pollution can be very serious. In the major cities of Taiwan, where most people reside, a noise level over 80 decibels is not uncommon despite the fact that the acceptable measure is 65 decibels (Taiwan 2000, 1989:225). Consequently, people in Taiwan regard noise pollution as the second most serious environmental problem (Hsiao 1989).

Regarding water pollution, water quality in Taiwan has deteriorated at one of the fastest rates in the world (Edmonds 1996). According to a 1990 survey, among the seventeen major rivers in the western part of Taiwan, which contains most of the island's population, only two were not polluted. Three of them were slightly polluted, another three were moderately polluted, and the other nine were seriously polluted (EPA 1990a). The pollution comes mainly from domestic sewage, industrial wastewater, and the waste of domestic animals, mainly pigs. In 1987, these three sources contributed 25 percent, 54 percent, and 21 percent of total water pollution, respectively (EPA 1989).

Because of the bad quality of water, in cities like Kaohsiung, the second biggest city in Taiwan, people would rather buy bottled water than drink the boiled water in the 1990s. Likewise, the polluted water goes into the agricultural irrigation system, which results in damage of crops. Up to 12 percent of Taiwan's crop field area suffers from pollution

caused by using polluted irrigation water (Edmonds 1996). The fisheries are also major victims of water pollution. As a result of such pollution, people in Taiwan might face a threat of consuming poisoned rice and fish every day.

Soil contamination, including heavy metal and pesticides, has been seen in Taiwan in the last three decades. The most serious pollutants are cadmium, chromium, nickel, lead and zinc. A 1988 soil survey indicated that 12.5 percent of Taiwan's farmland has high concentrations of heavy metals and this problem was not expected to improve in the near future (Edmonds 1996).

Additionally, soil erosion is also a big concern in Taiwan. According to a survey, more than 1,000 square kilometers of Taiwan's land suffers from soil erosion (Chiang 1995). Many forested areas are planted in betelnut trees because of their higher economic value even though they do not hold the soil as well as natural vegetation and require considerable amounts of water. Furthermore, many forest lands in river catchments have been logged, converted to agriculture, housing, industrial, mining and even recreational sites. Particularly the rampant of golf courses constitute the worst threat to the forest areas (Wang 1998). Such overexploitation often occurred on steep slopes, which are prone to landslides and mud flow. Whenever heavy rain or earthquake happens, severe damage is always seen because of soil erosion (Huang 1997). For instance, in August

1997, a modest typhoon killed more than 24 people around the island, in which 12 were crushed to death when land beneath their apartment gave way and slid down a mountainside (New York Time 1997). In the earthquake of September 1999, the biggest disaster of Taiwan in the 20th century, more than 2,000 people were killed and thousands more were made homeless.

Land is the most basic natural resource of Taiwan, but land could not sustain the pace of Taiwan's rapid industrialization and urbanization. At most in the 1970s, Taiwan had more than 923,000 hectares of cultivable land but it declined fast after that. On averagely, about 4,400 hectares of farmland disappear each year, converted to industrial or infrastructural uses (Williams 1992).

Regarding the conservation of wildlife, Taiwan has been notorious for killing endangered animals. Deforestation and traditional belief in animals' nutritious value contributed most to the wildlife degeneration. Taiwan, a "naturalist paradise" (Williams 1992), used to have 62 species of mammals, 430 identified species of migratory and domestic birds, 90 different reptiles, 30 amphibians, 140 varieties of freshwater butterflies, and numerous butterflies (Williams 1992). The policy over the last decades has exploited the forest resources and converted forestlands into vegetable and fruit plantations. In the period between 1956 and 1977, the total forest lands decreased by 7.6

percent, in which most virgin forest below 2,500 meters were eliminated for cultivation or replaced with higher-value and faster-growing conifers (Lin 1989). Such deforestation practices made the wildlife settlement become very difficult and in many cases eventually extinct.

The Taiwanese traditional nutrition belief that wild animals can cure disease and supplement diet needs pushed the supply of wildlife consumption. For example, the popularity of snakes in the restaurant and in traditional herb pharmacies forced businessmen to import snakes from other countries because domestic production could not keep up with the high demand (Williams 1992). Foreign tourists are usually recommended to visit the famous "snake alley" in Taipei city, where restaurant owners will kill snakes in front of the customer for entertainment purpose and also to waive people's doubt of snake meat's freshness. Some claimed that under such circumstances, even with the best of government conservation efforts, the majority of all wildlife in Taiwan will be extinct within 60 years (Wang 1989).

In sum, after reviewing both sides of economic development and environment degradation in Taiwan, we could find completely different tones from those of the Taiwan miracle advocates: "Growth with pollution" (Wang 1998), "Environmental nightmare of the economic miracle" (Arrigo 1994), "Richest and dirtiest dragon" (Wehrfritz 1992).

"Unsustainable development" (Chi 1994), and "Green disaster" (Lin 1989). It is intriguing to find such contrasting evaluations of one society's development. Are economic growth and environmental sustainability really contradictory? In order to find the answer, I will review related literature on these two aspects of development.

Economic Growth vs. Environmental Sustainability

The interaction between economic development and environment has been the main issue of the global environment debate, which is called the Growth-Environment (GE) dilemma (Broadbent 1998). The very dominant perspective on the economic growth side, based on neoclassical economics, views environmental degradation as a reflection of policy or market failures and does not consider the environment to be relevant to economic development. The assumption of this approach is that "there is not only an infinite supply of natural resources but also of 'sinks' for disposing of the waste from exploiting these resources-provided that the free market is operating" (Porter, 1991:27). And that "decisions concerning the use of natural resources are typically made by private individuals or corporations seeking to maximize their own welfare through the operations of competitive markets and that these processes ordinarily yield allocations of resources approximating the social optimum" (Young, 1981:2). Accordingly, environmental

pollution is an example of a "negative externality"(Pearce 1986).

Derived from the above argument, the economic explanation of environmental problems is that they result from market failure. In a market model, the price system is the key mechanism linking producers and consumers. To function correctly the price system must include all factors of production and all products, including waste products. According to the economic perspective: "many if not all environmental problems are due to a breakdown in the price system: for one reason or another it fails to convey a message about the relative scarcity of environmental resources to the users of these resources; the price system does not reflect the opportunity cost of these resources to present or future firms or consumers." (Hjaalte, Lidgren and Stahl 1977:7)

Nobody bills polluters for the air and water they use as a means of waste disposal--according to this view--and so they will overuse these resources. The policy prescription recommended by economists to solve environmental problems is usually to correct for the absence of a price in the market signaling the true scarcity of resources. This is usually by the imposition of taxes or the auctioning of permits to pollute in a market created specifically for this purpose.

Ronald Coase also asserts that environmental problems are results of ill-defined property rights. He suggests that after the property rights are properly assigned, the

negative environmental externality could be internalized through negotiation among involved parties (Coase 1960). But some environmentalists argue that it is morally wrong to consider the natural environment can be bought and sold through people's negotiation. They reject the use of taxes or permits as policy instruments and argue against the economist's ignorance of the ecological degradation caused by economic growth. They tend to view the environment and economic growth as an enduring conflict. As Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) suggest, all industrial societies are built on a central belief that they can progress by conquering nature and expanding production. The political-economy system under such a belief builds a "treadmill of production" and a logic of competitive productivism which are fundamentally incompatible with the earth's ecological well-being. Such incompatible development not only occurs in developed countries, but is also seen in the developing countries where "the creation of value and access to subsistence are typically linked to sacrificing environmental quality for short-term economic gain" (Redclift and Goodman 1991:5).

In addition to those ecologists, many economists have cautiously reminded their fellow scholars to take ecological issues into consideration. Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr. wrote a book to and for economists to encourage a rethinking of economics as a discipline in light of the need to make concern for ecology and community central to

economic analysis (Daly and Cobb, 1989). Robert Goodland and George Ledec (1987) also argue that the economic values of environmental services are systematically underestimated in economists' analysis. They contend that human well-being depends on at least three categories of value: (a) economic efficiency, (b) equitable distribution of economic resources, and (c) 'non-economic' values (e.g., religious and spiritual concerns, human dignity and pride, aesthetics, and civil liberties).

They further argue that the stubborn mindset of pursuing Gross National Product (GNP) growth is a mistake because it was never intended to be a complete measure of national welfare or wealth. They raised five reasons that GNP should not be a measure of a society's development success:

- 1) GNP does not measure income distribution or even the material well-being of the bulk of a country's population.
- 2) GNP measures only market transactions, not self-sufficient production.
- 3) GNP measures the aggregate level of economic activity, but often this activity does not actually reflect social well-being.
- 4) Some of the economic activity measured by GNP is devoted to restoring, replacing, or compensating for environmental services lost through modern production systems.
- 5) GNP measures economic 'flows', rather than the standing or 'asset' value of natural

resource or other economic 'stocks' (Goodland and Ledec 1987).

Therefore it makes sense for development plans to seek to optimize among these values, rather than to maximize any one (e.g., economic efficiency or growth in production).

Sustainable Development

After the 1980s the debate of the environment-development has been transformed from "do development and environment concerns contradict each other?" to "How can sustainable development be achieved?" Sustainable development appears to have gained the broad-based support that earlier development concepts such as 'ecodevelopment' lacked, and is poised to become the developmental paradigm of the 1990s (Lele 1991). What is sustainable development? The concept of sustainable development was broadly discussed, but no agreement was reached on a definition of sustainable development. In 1983 the United Nations set up an independent Commission on Environment and Development, widely known as the Brundtland Commission in recognition of its head, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the prime minister of Norway. Its assignment was to reexamine the planet's critical environmental and development problems and "propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development by the year 2000 and

beyond." (WCED 1987:p. ix) The commission's report, *Our Common Future*, brought the environment to center stage as a public policy issue and rapidly became the most important document in the sustainable development debate.

Sustainable development is defined as a pattern of social and structural economic transformation (i.e., development) which optimizes the economic and other societal benefits available in the present, without jeopardizing the likely potential for similar benefits in the future. A primary goal of sustainable development is to achieve a reasonable and equitably distributed level of economic well-being that can be perpetuated continually for many human generations.

The report documented clearly the environmental devastation created by human society and the extent to which humans are dependent on the environment. It showed how economic growth as conventionally measured is heavily dependent on the ever-increasing use of environmental resources. In turn, economic growth is deleterious to those very same resources. The report documented the wasteful overconsumption of wealthy countries, the extent to which environmental destruction is both the cause and consequence of poverty. It also argued that current generations are depriving future generations of the possibility for a satisfying life because of waste, overconsumption, and exploding population growth. The report raised the concern of the environment's inability

to continue absorbing the waste products created by our energy consumption, which becomes the single greatest threat to future development. On the prescriptive side, the report called for a more responsible use of environmental resources, a dramatic reduction in arms expenditures, the elimination of poverty, and greater use of multilateral approaches in dealing with environmental issues. In all these respects, the commission's report made a seminal contribution in moving environmental concerns from the periphery to the center of the policy agenda. Furthermore, it should be noted that sustainable development is not a radical environmental or green concept because it accepts the prime need for economic growth and the dominance of human welfare over the needs of the environment; and it conceives the relationship between human and nature in terms of the use of the environment by and for humans.

Politicized Environment

After reviewing those debates and suggestions, I am inclined to argue that environmental issues are fundamentally political issues because they involve the establishment of property rights and their distribution. Additionally, as Nguyen (1989, 30) suggested that "given the paramount importance of the political system in providing leadership and direction for all other systems-economic, social, and administrative-the

political system's inability to fulfill its role adversely affects the performance of all other sectors." Deutsch (1977:359) also suggested, "the substance of politics is inescapably implied in almost every ecosocial problem." Similarly, Harvey (1993:25) argued "all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa. Environmental arguments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are ecologically neutral. Looking more closely at the way ecology and politics interrelate then becomes imperative if we are to get a better hand on how to approach environmental/ecological questions."

The particular way in which the political system is organized has a strong impact on the scope and effectiveness of environmental politics. Three major types of political systems, liberal-democratic representative, military dictatorship, and one-party authoritarian regimes, all have different implications on environmental politics. The liberal-democratic representative systems are characterized as people have rights and freedom to participate in politics, including freedom to speech and assembly, and universal suffrage for periodic elections. The military dictatorship usually came through *coup d'état* and became oppressive to the public and strictly limited opposition. The one-party authoritarian regimes dominated the social, economic, and political life of the country and vigorously pursuing economic development with a strong emphasis on rapid

industrialization. Elections were held in serving symbolic purpose.

The liberal-democratic systems offer better opportunities for environmental politics to be more responsive and effective to environmental problems, but not necessarily guaranteed success. The military dictatorship and the economic-oriented authoritarian regimes comparatively provided a much little scope for environmental politics, if not completely impossible.

State: the Most Dominant Actor of Environmental Politics

From the perspective of the Third World countries, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that the environmental problems are not simply a reflection of policy or market failure, but rather are a manifestation of broader political and economic forces. Different actors in this struggle share highly unequal power; including the rich and the poor, and the ruler and the ruled. Power here is defined as the ability of actors to control their own interaction with the environment and the interaction of other actors with the environment.

Among those power actors, the state is always the dominant one, especially in Third World countries (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Some even argued that the biggest threat to environmental concerns does not come from scientists or economists but from the state (Doyle and McEachern 1998).

The state's forces came from the nineteenth century through the worldwide spread of capitalism. In addition to the external forces of the global capitalist system, the developing countries also face the state's intervention in economic activities to promote environmentally destructive activities. Researchers tend to agree that the growing power of the modern state is due to the development of global capitalism (Wallerstein 1974, Wolf 1982, Johnston 1989). The state was required to provide various public goods; such as national security, currency, and social and physical infrastructure. The key activity in the capitalism is to accumulate capital, which will not be achieved without those public goods. As the state has been a facilitator of the capitalist system by supporting capital accumulation through the exploitation of nature: state "must be there to do certain things, otherwise capitalism will fail" (Johnston, 1989:70).

To some extent, the state has a dual role of protector and developer of the natural resources, which always puts the state in a difficult situation. Johnston (1989) argues that the state's role as the facilitator of the capitalist system causes contemporary environmental problems that are an essential byproduct of that system. Although the state is also the key actor involved in finding a solution to those environmental problems, yet it is largely prevented from doing so because it is more or less beholden to the interests of capitalists. In practice, however, the interests of the state and capitalists do not always

coincide. The state often has its own political, economic and strategic interests that derive from its unique socio-spatial position at the intersection of the domestic political order and the inter-state system (Skocpol 1985; Mann 1986). Accordingly, Bryant and Bailey (1997) suggested that in addition to the capitalist expansion, the ruler's interests in political power, national security or personal enrichment also play significant roles in the state's efforts to promote economic activities.

Walker (1989) also argues that state growth cannot be explained solely in terms of mechanisms endogenous to contemporary capitalism or political democracy. The striking continuity of intersocietal competition, warfare in particular, cannot be ignored. States, in pursuit of expansion, often adopt entrepreneurial roles and even actively encourage environmental degradation. These tendencies have been exacerbated by the expanded economic activity and rapidly rising population of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Furthermore, the pressure for growth in modern states comes from economic and political elites. By contrast the voter, given the choice, will often opt for stability or relatively slow change and display concern for values other than economic growth (Lauber 1978).

From the development perspective, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argued environmental conservation was a low priority immediately following the Second World War for most

states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In their early observation, Almond and Powell also suggested that a major problem in those new nations was "the cumulative revolutions they must face. People demand participation, national unity, economic betterment, law and order--simultaneously and immediately" (1966, 39).

In most new nations after the WWII, the ruling legitimacy was based on a democratic ideology that emphasized representation, which gave rise to expectations of high rates of mass participation. In Robert Jackman's (1993) argument that political legitimacy comes from political capacity which relies on institutions. He contended that Huntington's (1968) definition of political institutionalization as consisting of four components: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence was very helpful in understanding political development. In this formulation, development becomes a matter of degree. The more that political institutions can be said to be adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent, the higher their capability. Accordingly, Huntington suggested that "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government" (1968,1).

If a choice has to be made between (a) extensive but unstructured and (b) restricted but organized forms of mass political activity, Huntington concluded that the second option is to be preferred because order is ultimately the more important commodity.

Participation in a political vacuum lacks organization and continuity and therefore leads to chaos. As a result, mass participation is not to be encouraged where national political structures are weak. Huntington summarized the argument with his simple and well-known equation that specifies political instability as a function of the ratio of political participation to political institutionalization (1968, 55). Consequently, for the Third World countries the immediate goal was the assertion of political control by the state over the people living in the territory under its jurisdiction, often in a context of widespread social unrest. As a result, environmental policies developed in colonial times were often abandoned even as the management structures associated with those policies frequently remained in place. Civil unrest only encouraged political leaders to ignore the state's own environmental policies as part of a quest for political survival. Faced with the prospect of political or military defeat, few leaders had any hesitation about encouraging cut-and-run resource extraction strategies in areas controlled by the state in order to maximize short-term revenue. Environmental conservation under these conditions was merely an obstacle to the survival of the political regime itself.

An eager pursuit for economic development in the Third World after 1945 only added to the pressures on the state to neglect its stewardship role. Most states made ambitious development plans in which rapid industrialization was central to the attempt

to catch up with the First World (Peet 1991). Expensive capital goods (e.g. equipment) were required to start industrial development and to pay for these goods. Third World states had little choice but to maximize natural resource exports in order to offset soaring import bills (Elliot 1994). Concerns about environmental conservation were predictably absent from most official development plans during the 1950s and 1960s.

Other Actors of Environmental Politics

As we find from the literature, environmental problems are fundamentally power distribution problems, thus examining a society's power structure is an essential step to start. The group-oriented pluralist theory of politics assumes that power is distributed evenly among groups and that groups will mobilize quickly to protect neglected interests (Dahl 1967). According to Duverger (1972), interest groups do not participate directly in the acquisition of power or in its exercise; they act to influence power while remaining apart from it. Pressure groups seek to influence (those) who wield power, not to place their own (people) in power, at least officially.

Pluralism acknowledged that the electoral system is incapable of reflecting accurately the preferences of the people, since politicians are elected with a broad and imprecise mandate, and responsibility for any one decision is remote. Pluralism holds that

the interest group system is capable of transmitting preferences on the many issues which confront politicians, since those affected by a decision will be politically active and will ensure that there is immediate accountability to those affected by each policy, rather than the diffuse responsibility to the electorate which can occur only every time there is an election.

Duverger draws one distinction between interest groups: exclusive and partial groups. Exclusive groups are those that are only concerned with taking action in the political domain, while partial groups are those groups that exist for other purposes but which might occasionally become politically active. Duverger notes that purely exclusive groups are rare, because most groups exist for some other activity besides political activity. Mancur Olson (1965), in a classic work, provided a theoretical explanation of the problem of collective action, in which 'problem of the free rider' is the most common one. This problem is related to differences between collective (or public) and individual (or private) goods (and property). The free rider problem relates to the voluntary nature of group membership and is based on assumptions that individuals will act so as to maximize their economic welfare. The rational course of action for any individual who will share a collective benefit sought by a group is to not pay the subscription costs of joining the group. Meanwhile they still tend to enjoy the benefits anyway, since their

failure to join makes little difference to the level of the benefit they receive. Whether one individual joins Sierra Club, for example, makes little difference to the effectiveness of that group, but the individual still could enjoy the fruits of the group's effort.

The 'logic of collective action', therefore, goes against the formation of groups seeking collective benefits for their members. But we know such groups exist, and so how do they come into being? One reason is that some individuals derive benefits from group membership, which might offer a sense of social integration, and an altruistic happiness of helping others although that do not relate necessarily to the political goal sought. But many groups overcome the free rider problem either by offering an additional exclusive benefit only to those who join or by coercing individuals into joining, such as labor unions.

Regarding environmental groups, they do offer additional benefits to members. Many environmentalists are also birdwatchers, who thus derive benefits from wilderness preservation which are greater than those of the public generally. But there are factors other than self-interest which motivate people to become active in environmentalism. One such factor is morality, and many environmentalists appear to become active politically precisely because they believe wilderness preservation is morally correct. In practice, of course, it is very difficult to dissect the motivations of political activists:

birdwatch lovers might be strongly committed to a green morality, but they would probably deny that they are motivated by something else like self-interest. But this mixture of morality and self-interest is found almost everywhere in political life, and it should not surprise us that it exists in the environmental movement.

Furthermore, one useful way of analyzing interest groups is by a simple classification based upon a distinction between the kinds of interests the group seek to protect or advance. This distinction relates to the free rider problem and can be a proper indicator to see if the groups will be better organized and thus become more influential. It also could tell us which groups are likely to have to place greater reliance upon morality or charisma for their existence. The distinction between private interest groups (providing exclusive benefits) and public interest groups (providing collective benefits) is therefore significant for our understanding of interest groups. Through it we can tell how successful each kind of group is likely to be, what tactics it is likely to employ, and so on.

Groups seeking to protect or advance private interests are more likely to overcome the free rider problem and will thus tend to be better organized. They usually have more financial resources, and will be better able to get good quality human resources. Such interest groups are also likely to be key economic actors with large numbers of workers (who are voters) or a great amount of capital. They can enhance their influence by

threatening to relocate their investment somewhere else. Lindblom (1979) referred to this as the 'privileged position of business'. When groups interact with government in this fashion, they are engaging in a process we call 'bargaining'. Bargaining can be defined as 'a process by which two or more parties seek to attain incompatible ends through the exchange of compensations.' (Wilson 1973:282)

The state would not try to engage in bargaining with interest groups because it enjoys coercion power over the society. But facing the pressure of winning the election, politicians are forced to consult with powerful interest groups over policy making. Many groups are likely to enjoy the position where their cooperation is important for the implementation of policy. Therefore such groups are particularly well placed to exert influence on government through bargaining processes. Indeed, this power is likely to guarantee that such groups become members of exclusive policy communities.

Bargaining only happens to those influential interest groups which can offer substantial benefits to the state. On the other hand, public interest groups are less likely to be able to deliver benefits to the state, even if they represent values most members of society hold, but in political calculation, those major values are not equal to major votes. Public interest groups are therefore less likely to be incorporated into the process of government, and will be less likely to enjoy the warranted right to be consulted that the

more powerful groups enjoy. Under these circumstances, public interest groups and other relatively powerless groups have few options. Among them, standard political practices of protest, electioneering, litigation, coalition building, and public mobilization are most often seen (Ingram, Colnic, and Mann, 1995). But protest movement is particularly common in most cases.

Japanese environmental groups demonstrated some success in a protest movement in the 1970s, which resulted in the passage of numerous significant environmental protection laws and the recognition of the "pollution miracle" (Broadbent 1998). Nevertheless, groups which resort to protest tactics are almost by definition lacking in influence. Protests or the suppression of protests can sometimes result in violence. Moreover, protest tactics are difficult to follow successfully because protest groups must appeal simultaneously to four constituencies: the government, the media, their own members and potential third party allies (Lipsky 1968). They run a great risk of offending one constituency in their attempt to please another. For example, they might offend the government by staging a colorful protest which attracts publicity from the media and helps add to the morale of their members.

Environmental policy is an area where the pluralist assumptions can be seen to be deficient, since power does not seem to be evenly distributed and environmental interests

are often neglected. Environmentally related issues are often decided before environmental group mobilization can occur, which leaves environmental groups with few options other than protest. Even so, we still find environmental groups necessary in solving the environmental crisis. Environmental groups constitute an alternative to political parties as a source of inputs of preferences into the policy process. They are needed because political parties and the electoral system cannot provide for the fine detail of policy, cannot do well in the period between elections. And usually parties are organized along ideological lines which are not conducive to the representation of preferences that go beyond those ideological lines.

The success of the German Green Party in 1998 election inspired researchers to consider if the establishment of a distinctive Green party is essential in environmental movements. But one thing should be noted is when environmentalists complaint about the government's decisions to favor other sectors, they should know that all governments must compromise in dealing with the complexities of many competing issues. No Green Party elected to office would be able to escape the necessity of trading off environmental values against economic (or other) values (Doyle and Kellow 1995; Mayer and Ely 1998). Accordingly, the Green Party could not be single-minded on environmental issues once placed in the complex policy community.

After reviewing theoretical discussion on environmental politics, I will start my research questions for the case of Taiwan in the next chapter. Chapter 2 will also include my methodology part for this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

Research Questions and Methodology

Environmental Politics in Taiwan

As I indicated in the previous chapter, people in Taiwan have been suffering from the degrading environment in all aspects. Widespread dissatisfaction about the environment began to surface in the early 1980s. With the martial law in effect, the early environmental protest movements were localized, mainly targeting local polluting sources such as petrochemical factories and garbage dumps. Although the KMT itself was one of the biggest polluters, the central government rarely was a target in the beginning era.

The anti-DuPont incident that broke out in 1986 was the major turning point for environmental movement. Led by an energetic local leader and endorsed by many elected local officials, residents in Lukang organized to oppose DuPont's plan to build a petrochemical plant in their community (Reardon-Anderson 1992). The protest ended without violence when DuPont voluntarily withdrew its construction plan, signaling Taiwan's citizens that if they are determined and well-organized they can achieve their collective objectives even if they have to take on the KMT government.

Along with the democratization, the abolition of martial law in 1987 drastically reduced the marginal costs for individuals to participate in protests as the threat of prosecution and imprisonment diminished. Consequently, the number of environmental conflicts increased markedly. Between 1980 and 1987 there were an average of 13.75 environmental conflicts per year, the average increased to 31.33 protests per year between 1988 and 1990, and to 258 in 1991 alone (Hsiao 1994). It seemed that the environmental issue had raised the public concern; however, environmental degradation and resource depletion in Taiwan have persisted into the 1990s.

Regardless of the public concern on the environmental problems, the KMT government insists on pursuing economic growth. As Bryant and Bailey (1997) suggested, in addition to the capitalist expansion the ruler's interest in political power, national security or personal enrichment also play significant roles in the state's efforts to promote economic activities. For KMT, economic growth became an end in itself, rather than a means to achieve a better quality of life for the Taiwanese people. Specifically, for the KMT government, economic growth is an end in itself for two reasons. First, economic growth has been a means to support KMT's claim of political legitimacy since the early 1970s. It is also the means of sustaining the economic alliance between the KMT government and the capitalist elites, and it ensures the political support of the latter.

Second, the KMT itself is the biggest capitalist. It owns many private enterprises and controls state enterprises, many of them monopolistic in nature.

Since the withdrawal from representation in the United Nations in the early 1970s and the obvious impossibility of a counterattack against the mainland, economic growth gradually replaced political slogans as the KMT's main claim to legitimacy. Trade relations with other countries replaced political relations as the means to maintain Taiwan's international connections.

On the one hand, the KMT claimed credit for stability, economic growth, and a better life for a majority of the people, asserting that the KMT is the best and only option for continuing such improvement. On the other hand, as Walker (Walker 1989) argues the state must stick with economic growth because of intersocietal competition, warfare in particular; economic growth is used as political propaganda to demonstrate that the KMT government is superior to the communist regime across the Taiwan Straits. Thus economic growth in Taiwan carries important political weight for the KMT, and fear that it might slow or cease became the threat often used by the KMT as an excuse for political suppression throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Meanwhile, the KMT used nominal means to respond to the widespread dissatisfaction about environmental degradation; including making environmental

protection laws and founding governmental agencies responsible for environmental affairs. It is believed that Taiwan is not really far behind the developed countries in terms of environmental legislations. The significant passages of green legislation include:

--- In July 1974, the Water Pollution Control Act and the Waste Disposal Act were the first step of environmental initiatives.

---1975: The Air Pollution Control Act was passed.

---1981: The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system was introduced.

In the creation of public agencies dedicated to protection of the environment, the major accomplishments are:

---1971: The Bureau of Environmental Sanitation (BES), under the Department of Health (DOH), was created to take charge of environmental affairs regarding air pollution control and garbage disposal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economy controlled water pollution.

---1982: The Bureau of Environmental Protection (BEP), expanded from the BES but still under DOH , was established to handle pollution control affairs.

---1987: The BEP was upgraded to form the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA).

However, my assumptions are that the continuing environmental degradation in

Taiwan is due to the failure of policy implementation and regulation enforcement. The lack of pluralistic participation in the policy making process also contributed to the environmental problems. The American experience shows that from 1960 to 1990 environmental interest groups have become major forces in the political system. They are able to set the agenda and to win remarkable victories against the usually dominant industrial and commercial interest of the U.S. The major functions of the environmental interest groups could be seen in standard American political practices of lobbying, electioneering, litigation, coalition building, and public mobilization (Ingram, Colnic, and Mann 1995).

During the KMT rule, one of its major concerns was to restrict as much as possible people's rights to organize nationwide organizations that could potentially challenge its authority. When such organizations were occasionally approved, they were always subject to close supervision by the KMT and served as its instrument for social control. That is part of the reason why, up to the mid-1980s, there were no nationwide environmental organizations in Taiwan to facilitate and coordinate local environmental protests and address such general ecological concerns as ozone depletion and wildlife preservation. Most environmental protests were initiated by local leaders who mobilized residents by promising them such exclusive benefits as monetary compensation from

owners of pollution sources.

In Taiwan some nationwide, membership-based environmental organizations have emerged since the abolition of martial law in 1987. Because they grew bigger gradually, they became able to support and coordinate local environmental protests while promoting more aspects of environmental protection, including wildlife, forest, and water resource preservation. Because of the further democratization of the political system in the late 1980s, the environmental groups could take advantage of the opportunities to influence policy-making through active participation in electoral campaigns for candidates at local, provincial, and national levels. And the Green Party Taiwan was formed in March 1996 and aimed to integrate efforts of all environmental groups.

One of the most intriguing developments in Taiwan's environmental interest groups is the role of the local political faction plays in the issue involved. In some environment-conflicted areas, the local factions set their sight more on seeking monetary compensations from polluters than on actually improving the environmental quality of their communities. When they are offered monetary benefits by polluters, faction leaders may be equally enthusiastic in helping to dissolve a protest movement.

For example, in the case of the Fifth Naphtha Cracker case in Hou-chin of 1987, the Chinese Petrochemical began extensive public relations activities, promising to award

contracts to local contractors, hire more workers from the local community, initiate local beautification projects, and contribute to local temples and other civic organizations. The original "self-help" association eventually split into two factions, one insisting on the original goal of preventing construction, and the other, composed of such traditional local leaders as village heads, city councilors, and temple management committee members who would be the major beneficiaries of the selective benefits offered by the company, advocating conditional compromises with the central government. In the end, the government promised to establish an NT \$ 1.5 billion (US \$55 million) foundation for compensating local residents and then shut down all protest movements.

Most of the local factions are affiliated with KMT and are also part of the ruling coalition in local polities. Some of them are accused of being controlled either by gangsters or by businessmen. It became the core of the Taiwanese people's nightmare of "black politics" and "monetary politics" in the 1990s, which is seen as a very negative and unexpected outcome of democratization.

Another distinctive factor in Taiwan's environmental issues is involved with the diverse ethnicities and the debate of national identity on that island. In Taiwan, people are commonly categorized according to their place of origin, not the place they were born. Accordingly, there are two main categories of Mainlander and Taiwanese. Mainlanders

were born on the Chinese continent and came to Taiwan in the late 1940s or early 1950s after the KMT fled to take over the island. On the other hand, Taiwanese does not simply refer to everybody living in Taiwan. It is a term used to denote only those Han Chinese, including Holo and Hakka, who already lived on Taiwan prior to the wave of migration that occurred at the end of the 1940s and their offspring. Despite an earlier taboo against "mixed" marriages, there are many people who were born to one Mainlander parent (generally the father) and one Taiwanese. This group defies classification and complicates any effort to calculate the number of Taiwanese and Mainlander in Taiwan (Wachman 1994).

In demography, the Taiwanese is the majority group with 85 percent of total population. The Mainlander is about 14 percent and the aborigines constitute the other 1 percent. In the distribution of political power, however, Mainlanders were the dominant group before the so-called "localization" or "Taiwanization" within the KMT occurred in mid-1980s. Generally, Mainlanders are inclined to identify themselves as Chinese. And there is also a certain portion of Taiwanese will claim themselves as Chinese. In this research, I will use Taiwanese to represent people inhabited on the island before 1949 and their offspring, and Chinese to people who came after 1945 and their offspring. The reason for this categorization is to eliminate the implicit implication of Mainlander,

which was referred to the Mainland Chinese while there are Island Chinese within the Chinese definition. Using Mainlander fitted into the KMT's plan to unify the ethnic definition by Chinese and to impede other classifications to the Taiwanese. Moreover, the conflicting nationalisms seen in Taiwan now have very complicated interaction with ethnic identification and political identity. Classifying people in Taiwan into Chinese and Taiwanese will more consistently comply with the national identity issue.

National identity, according to John Keane (1995:186), is a “particular form of collective identity in which, despite their routine lack of physical contact, people consider themselves bound together because they speak a language or a dialect of a common language; inhabit or are closely familiar with a defined territory, and experience its ecosystem with some affection; and because they shared a variety of customs, including a measure of memories of the historical past, which is consequently experienced in the present tense as pride in the nation's achievements and, where necessary, an obligation to feel ashamed of the nation's failings.” Such definition implied a nation as a people strived to build a state. Accordingly, nation and state become interchangeably used and mixed with both political and cultural meanings.

In Chinese language, nation is translated into *min-chu*, which strongly indicates the ethnic and cultural elements and diminishes the political implication. When people use

the “Chinese nation,” they basically refer it to *chung hwa min-chu*, meaning the Chinese people who have shared a long history of elegant cultures. By definition, there is no room for people to develop other identities within the framework of the “Chinese nation,” because it will be viewed as effort to cut the ethnic and cultural connection of Chinese.

But after identity issue became one of the most salient ones in Taiwan after political democratization, researchers had commonly used “national identity” to differentiate people’s perspective on Taiwan’s stateness (Cheng 1989; Chang 1993; Shu 1995; Wu 1997; Chiang 1998). The two major competing national identities are Taiwan independence; the Taiwanese nationalism, and unification with China; the Chinese nationalism. In this research, I will follow the currently most accepted approach to use national identity in this mode.

The Chinese nationalism is manifested by the KMT and its supporters, and the Taiwanese nationalism is manifested by those who advocate that Taiwan be an independent state. This conflict has created mistrust between these two ethnic groups, and has imposed tremendous effect on political and social interaction. It also guided the attitudes, decisions, and behavior of the political elite. To the general public, uncertainty about the national identity of the island is tied to deep anxiety about the future of Taiwan (Wachman 1994). Such uncertainty and anxiety, I assume, play an important role in

people's attitude toward environmental issues. In the former Soviet Union, Goldman (1992) argued that the environmental problem has served as a catalyst for the nationalist struggles. The linkage between nationalism and environmentalism in Taiwan was never explored based on the fact that identity discussion had been prohibited for decades.

Research Questions

The main questions in this dissertation are why environmental issues were ignored of the KMT era in Taiwan. How the KMT regime resisted public dissatisfaction with the environmental condition and maintained in power until 2000? Was the public environmental concern reflected in electoral decision? What were the most salient issues in elections? How did they affect people's approach toward environmental protection? What is the linkage between environmentalism and nationalism? Is civic nationalism emerging or developed in Taiwan? Is it an effective solution to the national identity conflict? Is Taiwan Independence possible given the external pressure never receded? How could environmental issue contribute to the identity debate? Could environmentalism and nationalism supplement each other

In the following section of this chapter I will cover methodology part of this research, explaining the selection of the data sets used and the analytical method adopted

here. Chapter 3 will explore the state factor in Taiwan's environmental development since the KMT regime fled to the island in the late 1940s. The elements contributed to the KMT's ruling in the last five decades will be explained, and special attention will be put on environment-related aspects. Chapter 4 will investigate the linkage between environmentalism and nationalism in Taiwan to see how the two of the most salient cleavages in that society interact before and after political democratization. The conclusion chapter will review probable solutions of connecting the public concern to practical actions for improving environmental health of Taiwan. Among them, the very highly promoted "civic nationalism," the very intensive controversy over Taiwan Independence, and the great potential "sustainable development" will be examined for their feasibility to Taiwan.

My research should fill the gap of current literature regarding systematic studies on Taiwan's environmental politics. So far there is very little academic discussion of this topic in Taiwan, especially in environmental interest groups. The new DPP regime has shown its different plan from that of the KMT, meaning new policy windows are open to all issues, including the improvement of environmental condition in Taiwan. President Chen Shui-bian's background of fighting for social justice and protecting interests of powerless groups made him a popular leader among environmental groups (Arrigo 2000).

It is a privilege to witness the first party rotation in Taiwan's history. I expect my research could offer some in-depth investigation of the failure in the past and contribute to the policy discussion for the new era.

Methodology

In this research I will use the single country case study method. The single country case study is more amenable to developing precise and accurate constructs, that is, stronger internal validity. The method, to some extent, is what Lijphart(1971) called 'configurative' method of analysis. Its primary purpose is the thorough description of a case. It is called "thick description," i.e., using detailed description as the precursor of interpretation and theory development in the social sciences. That description would involve an understanding of the social, cultural and economic context of politics.

The strength of single case study is it permits an extensive examination of cases with limited resources (Lijphart 1971). And as Eckstein (1975) suggested, a carefully constructed analysis of a critical case can provide an invaluable opportunity to falsify the relevant hypotheses. Also single case study is essential for description, and is therefore fundamental to social science. One of the often overlooked advantages of this method is that the development of good hypotheses is complementary to good description rather

than competitive with it (King et al. 1994:45). Finally, single case study is to explicate a concept that appears to be particularly evident in one national setting and to use the country study to develop that concept. Concept-defining studies may run the risk of generating unwise conceptual stretching in the future, but they still help to build the conceptual storehouse of comparative politics (Peters 1998).

Within the frame of single case study, I will develop a solid case study on Taiwan's environmental politics. Undoubtedly, a certain portion of this research will be built on the existing literature. Some already published opinion polls and the data set collected from the Academia Sinica and the National Taiwan University will be used in this research. My major analyses of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will rely on national surveys conducted by Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University (NTU) in 1983 and 1986, and by Institute of Social Science at Academia Sinica. The selection of NTU's data sets of 1983 and 1986 is because they are the first national surveys systematically done by a researching institution. Their investigation was designed to analyze voting behavior for elections of the Legislative Yuan. But the project was discontinued in 1995. When Academia Sinica started similar surveys in 1990s, I found their surveys are more directly related to my interests in environmental and national identity issues. The availability and consistency of national survey have been a challenge for students interested in social and

political studies of Taiwan. This research has to be developed under such constraint.

In Chapter 3, I will examine the supporting bases of the KMT and the opposition forces through crosschecking the voter's demographic backgrounds and other variables like issue preferences and national identity. For further comparison, I will use logistic regression to see specific results for each independent variable. The reason of using logistic regression is based on both of my dependent and independent variables are dichotomous and their score is either 0 or 1. The logistic model is as:

$$L_i = \ln\left(\frac{p(Y_i = 1)}{p(Y_i = 0)}\right) = b_0 + b_1x_{1i} + b_2x_{2i} + \cdots + b_kx_{ki} + e_i$$

The dependent variable of the model of Table 3-2 is “party support,” aiming to see the supporting bases of the KMT and Dangwai¹ (literally outside the party). The independent variables include gender, age, ethnic background, educational attainment, issue preference, national identity, and residential area. The model of Table 3-3 uses issue preference as dependent variables. It is to investigate the environmental concerned group and compare the differences of various backgrounds, including gender, age, ethnic background, educational attainment, party support, national identity, and residential area.

The model of Table 3-5 remains the same as that of Table 3-2, only with slight

¹ Danhwai included all opposition forces against the KMT. They were in pre-party format, but legally not a political party because of the bar of forming a party under the martial law.

difference in adding economic growth into the issue selection. It is also the first survey after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded in 1986. The change for model of Table 3-6 is seen in my comparison of environmental concern with economic growth. From the addition of economic growth in issue preference, we can see if the conventional conflict of “economic growth vs. environmental protection” existed in Taiwan.

The dependent variables of Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 remain the same as the previous models of 1983 and 1986. Within the independent variables, the choice of national identity increases to 4 options, adding “status quo” and “depends.”

For models of 1998, while dependent variables remain unchanged, we have more selections in issue preference and one more independent variable of ethnic identification. They are aimed to investigate the interaction among national identity, ethnic identification, and party support.

In Chapter 4, investigation of environmentalism and nationalism, I only used crosschecking method. By combining several variables, I find out crosschecking is very helpful to get specific results.

CHAPTER 3

The State and the Environment

It is well recognized that the essence of environmental issues is political, given that they involve distribution of social resources and political power that ultimately makes decisions on the distribution. As Nguyen (1989:30) suggested "Given the paramount importance of the political system in providing leadership and direction for all other systems-economic, social, and administrative-the political system's inability to fulfill its role adversely affects the performance of all other sectors." Deutsch (1977:359) also claimed "the substance of politics is inescapably implied in almost every ecosocial problem." Similarly, Harvey (1993:25) argued "all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa. Ecological arguments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are ecologically neutral. Looking more closely at the way ecology and politics interrelate then becomes imperative if we are to get a better hand on how to approach environmental/ecological questions."

Furthermore, some argued after the first Earth Day of April 22, 1970, that environmental issues had gradually become first-order political concerns. And by the mid-1980s, environmental protection was treated as just important as vital issues like

national security, economic growth, social justice, and even democracy. And since then the environmental concern started competing with those first-order values in developed societies (Paehlke 1998).

Environmental problems cannot be viewed simply as a reflection of policy or market failure, but rather are results of broader political and economic forces. Among the different power actors, the state is always the dominant one, especially in Third World countries (Bryant and Bailey 1997). In order to find out why the state owns such dominant power, we first need to look at the justifications of its existence. Theoretically, the origin of the state is attributed to the perceived failure of individuals to behave collectively in a responsible manner within a society. When people are pursuing individual interest, it becomes inevitable that conflicts with one another will occur if lacking a state capable of imposing order in the collective interest. The British philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1968) provided the very early discussion on justification for existence of state. In a stateless world, Hobbes argued, people will fight for their own interests with the limited sources available in a chaotic fashion without mindset of being respectful with others' rights. Such collective behavior will increase the uncertainty of a society, and very probably will result in severe chaos, which eventually jeopardize everyone's interest.

To avoid such a frenzied situation occurred, Hobbes claimed, a rational individual would call for the need for a state to maintain order and security on people, who in return have to give up some of their liberty to allow the state to intervene as a price. Thus, a sovereign state with a monopoly on the means of coercion within a given territory is created. Of course, this assertion is based on the assumption that individual action in the absence of a state can lead only to anarchy.

Practically, the state's power increased significantly since the nineteenth century along with the expansion of capitalism around the world. Many scholars have tended to reach the agreement that the modern states indeed were dramatically empowered by the growth of global capitalism (Wallerstein 1974, Wolf 1982, Johnston 1989). To fulfill its responsibility, the state need to provide certain public goods which are not supposed to offer by the private sector; such as national defense, currency, and public infrastructures. These tasks will work closely with the activity of accumulating capital, which is the very basic function of the capitalism. In many cases we see the state to be a facilitator of the capitalist system by supporting capital accumulation through the exploitation of nature. As Johnston suggested that state must perform such duties otherwise capitalism will fail (Johnston, 1989).

In the process of accumulating capital, the state face the challenge of keeping

balance between its dual roles as a protector and a developer of the natural resources. Johnston (1989) argues that the state's role as the facilitator of the capitalist system causes contemporary environmental problems that are an essential byproduct of that system. Although the state is also the key actor involved in finding a solution to those environmental problems, yet it is largely prevented from doing so because it is more or less beholden to the interests of capitalists. As Lauber (1978) suggested, the pressure for growth in modern states comes from economic and political elites. On the other hand, most of the public, given the choice, will often opt for stability or relatively slow change and display concern for values other than economic growth.

In practice, however, the interests of the state and capitalists do not always coincide. The state often has its own political, economic and strategic interests that derive from its unique socio-spatial position at the intersection of the domestic political order and the inter-state system (Skocpol 1985, Mann 1986).

Accordingly, Bryant and Bailey (1997) suggested that in addition to the capitalist expansion, the ruler's interests in political power, national security or personal enrichment also play significant roles in the state's efforts to promote economic activities.

Walker (1989) also argues that state growth cannot be explained solely in terms of mechanisms endogenous to contemporary capitalism or political democracy. The striking

continuity of intersocietal competition, warfare in particular, cannot be ignored. States, in pursuit of expansion, often adopt entrepreneurial roles and even actively encourage environmental degradation. These tendencies have been exacerbated by the expanded economic activity and rapidly rising population of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

From the development perspective, Bryant and Bailey (1997) further argued environmental conservation was a low priority immediately following the World War II (WWII) for most states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In their early observation, Almond and Powell also suggested that a major problem in those new nations was "the cumulative revolutions they must face. People demand participation, national unity, economic betterment, law and order--simultaneously and immediately" (1966:39).

One very basic principle for any polity or regime to survive is to preserve its integrity against external interventions and to keep its people under control through effective self-governance. When there are no external interventions, regime needs to focus on internal control, which could be done through internal and external controls. Internal control is referred to self-induced means, such as using cultural heritages, mores, and traditions. External control, usually applied when the internal one was missing or weak, is imposed in a more aggressive way through legal regulations, material motivations, manipulation, and coercion. If the internal control is effectively in position,

then the need for the external control is relatively low. However, if a regime is lack of effectively internal control, then more external control will be imposed to maintain social stability and political order. A collapsing regime usually struggled with both control (Nuygen 1989).

In most new nations after the WWII, the ruling legitimacy was based on a democratic ideology that emphasized representation, which gave rise to expectations of high rates of mass participation. In Robert Jackman's (1993) argument that political legitimacy comes from political capacity which relies on institutions. He contended that Huntington's (1968) definition of political institutionalization as consisting of four components: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence were very helpful in understanding political development. In this formulation, development becomes a matter of degree. The more that political institutions can be said to be adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent, the higher their capability. Accordingly, Huntington suggested, "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government" (1968:1).

When a new regime facing choice between extensive but unstructured and restricted but organized forms of public participation in political issues, Huntington concluded that the latter one is more preferable because order is ultimately the more important essence

of a regime's survival. A great degree of public participation in a political domain not equipped with well-designed organization and continuity will inevitably lead to chaos. As a result, mass participation is not to be encouraged where national political structures are weak. Huntington summarized the argument with an effective equation that specifies political instability as a function of the ratio of political participation to political institutionalization (1968:55). Consequently, the immediate goal for the Third World countries was the need of political control by the state over the people living in the territory under its jurisdiction.

The implication of such mindset on environmental issues was that those environmental policies developed in colonial times were often abandoned even as the management mechanics with those policies frequently remained in place. To avoid civil unrest, the political leader choose to remain in power at the expense of environmental policies, which were viewed to cause unwanted trouble. Particularly in states facing with the prospect of political or military defeat, very few leaders would hesitate to adopt strategy of exploiting natural resources to exchange capital to sustain the regime's survival. Environmental conservation under these conditions was merely an obstacle to the survival of the political regime itself.

An eager pursuit for economic development in the Third World after 1945 only

added to the pressures on the state to disregard its stewardship role. Most states made ambitious development plans in which rapid industrialization was central to the attempt to catch up with the First World (Peet 1991). Expensive capital goods (e.g. equipment) were required to start industrial development and to pay for these goods. Third World states had little choice but to maximize natural resource exports in order to offset soaring import bills (Elliot 1994). Concerns about environmental conservation were predictably absent from most official development plans during the 1950s and 1960s.

Environmental Issues in Taiwan

The environmental development was long time ignored by the KMT regime in Taiwan. Hsiao Hsin-huang (1998), one of the most dedicated scholars in environmental studies in Taiwan, found out that there were no any concerns from the KMT's planning for economic development until the late 1970s. Part of the reason for some new industrializing countries to achieve so-called "economic miracle" was their latitude from pollution control, which turned out to be their hidden subsidy in terms of global market competition (Adams 1990). Taiwan's economic success before 1980s was related to such advantage over its major trading partners, U.S., Japan, West Germany, and other Western industrialized countries, which all had very strict regulations on environmental pollution

(Wang 1998).

However, the environmental degradation started to directly affect people's daily lives in the beginning of the 1980s (Hsiao 1998, Reardon-Anderson 1992). The dissatisfaction with the quality of environment was widely spread in the early 1980s. In Hsiao's series of investigation on the public attitude toward environmental issues in Taiwan, we found that environmental degradation had consistently been the people's most concern among all social issues. In 1983, 70 percent of respondents in the survey expressed worry with seriously environmental degradation. And the percentage went up to 88 in 1986 (Hsiao 1998). In the World Value Survey (1995-1997), we also find that when asked which one of the environmental and economic growth is more preferred (V41), more than 62 percent of respondents in Taiwan chose the former one over the latter one. The average percentage of all nations favoring environmental protection was 51.1. The 62 percent of Taiwan was higher than that of many developed countries, such as Germany (44.9%), U.S. (52.1%), Finland (41.4%), and Switzerland (47.1%).

The dissatisfaction was expressed mostly in a way of protest movement in 1980s. And in Wu's (1997) calculation, the environmental protest movement constituted nearly 20 percent of all kinds of social movements from 1983 to 1988 (quoted by Hsiao 1998:42). However, the environmental protest movements were constrained in local scale,

partly because the political climate was intimidating to any kind of mass movement, and partly because all area had different environmental problem per se. Hsiao characterized the local-oriented movements as “victim activism” based on the 1211 cases happened between 1980 and 1996 (Hsiao 1998). Most of those protests were aimed to seek compensation for existing injuries or material losses to the local residents. Only a small portion (16%) of those protests was preventive in nature (Ibid: 34). Even after the remarkable victory of residents in Lukang, a small town in central Taiwan, to stop DuPont’s plan to build a titanium dioxide plant (Reardon-Anderson 1992), most protest movements were focused more to seek monetary compensations from capitalists than to actually improve the environmental health of their residential areas.

The universal concern with environmental condition was still seen in 1990s. But the environmental degradation had not been stopped even some pattern of a civic society emerged (Chi 1994, Hsiao 1998, Chen 1994). Next, we will try to find answers for the KMT’s long-term overlook of environmental protection and the factor behind the failure of conveying the public concern into the real action and to accomplish practical improvement on environmental health.

The KMT’s Story in Taiwan after 1949

The very first major challenge for the KMT regime to govern in Taiwan was its

ruling legitimacy quest. The KMT came to a society with very little cultural and traditional sharing points with itself. That is, the degree of the KMT's internal control was very low given the ruled spoke different language and practiced different customs from the ruler. The common imagination of Chinese culture was also blurring within the Taiwanese group. Simply put, the basic rules of the game were not there for the KMT and its governed people when it first took over that island.

Therefore, the usage of strongly external control seemed inevitable for the KMT. How KMT solve legitimacy problem as being a refugee regime in Taiwan in the very beginning? During their search of a legitimacy formula, the KMT did not try to consult with the residents on that island when they first became its rulers. Although people in Taiwan originally were overwhelmed by the Japan's surrender of Taiwan to the Allied Powers and its returning to China's sovereignty. However, they felt disappointed immediately after they welcomed the KMT's soldiers who showed very little discipline and treated people on the island more like surrendered Japanese than like their own fellows. Some nostalgia sentiment toward the Japanese colonization emerged right after the frustration with the new regime. When under the Japanese ruling, Taiwan had achieved economic success and was second only to Japan in terms of modernization; like agricultural and industrial technology, communications, public health, and the provisions

for the general public welfare (Peng 1972). Most people did not like the Japanese, however, they indeed cherish the economic and social development they gained in the five decades under Japanese colonization while the people in China were suffering from revolution, warlordism, foreign invasion, and civil war. It was estimated that all of the confiscated Japanese property in Taiwan handed to the KMT government in 1945 valued approximately two billion U.S. dollars at that time (Ibid. p.59). Nonetheless, what people in Taiwan really expected from the new government was the fair treatment as a citizen, not again as a second-class citizen like being treated by the Japanese. Unfortunately, the approach the KMT adopted to take over Taiwan was closer to a group of invaders. Stories like the followings indicated the bitter relationship between the two groups of people who would constitute the ruler and the ruled on the island:

“The continent Chinese have traditionally looked upon the island of Formosa as a barbarous dependency. Addressing a large gathering of students soon after he arrived, the new commissioner of education said so, with blunt discourtesy, and this provoked an angry protest. On the other hand, Formosans laughed openly and jeered at newcomers who showed so often that they were unfamiliar with modern equipment and modern organization. I witnessed many examples of Chinese incompetence myself and heard of other extraordinary instances. There were well-advertised incidents when officials

insisted upon attempting to drive automobiles without taking driving lessons, on the assumption that if a stupid Formosan could drive any intelligent man from the continent could do so. The conscript soldiers from inland Chinese provinces were the least acquainted with modern mechanisms. Many could not ride bicycles, and having stolen them or taken them forcibly from young Formosans, they had to walk off carrying the machines on their backs.” (Peng 1972:62)

In an official report to the U.S. Department of State, one American representative in Taiwan described the behavior of Nationalist troops and corruptions among public service: “There is a similar reaction to the misbehavior of troops from the mainland, stationed among the people, who are held responsible for thievery, illegal resort to force and alleged sharp increase in venereal diseases. These troops are required to obtain their own supplies and are often accused of forcing sales at a fraction of the value of goods acquired... Police corruption is rife at all levels in the organization.” (Blake 1946:8)

What made the situation worse was the economic crisis during the first years of the KMT regime. The new administration, led by Chen I, was lack of capable experts and experienced bureaucrats to solve economic problems occurred during the transition period. The local political and economic elites were excluded from the public affairs and decision-making. Taiwan’s dependence upon Japan for chemical fertilizer, textile

materials, and machinery also made the economic development more difficult. The nightmare of inflation came immediately, with the price level rose 3.5 times in between 1945 and 1946 (Lai et al. 1991:81). The economic crisis played a significant role in diminishing people's patience and enhancing their disappointment with the new administration.

The discontent with the new ruler explored in public violence in 1947 triggered by a minor confrontation between an illegal cigarette dealer and the law enforcement, and it became remembered as the February 28 (or 228) Incident. The Incident involved a series of violent actions taken by crowds expressing grievances and anger arising from the tensions created between the Chinese and the Taiwanese. The violence continued for two weeks and was followed by several months of terror imposed by the Nationalist regime, which had thousands of soldiers sent from the mainland where they fought a civil war against the Communist. Estimates of the number of Taiwanese killed by the KMT forces range from 1,000 to 100,000. Since there is no definitive data available, this number was never an official statement (Lai et al. 1991: 155). Again, from Peng Ming-min's memoirs we can see the brutal picture of this tragedy:

"This began a reign of terror in the port town and in Taipei. As the Nationalist troops came ashore, they moved out quickly through Keelung streets, shooting and bayoneting

men and boys, raping women and looting homes and shops. Some Formosans were seized and stuffed alive into burlap bags found piled up at the sugar warehouses and were then simply tossed into the harbor. Others were merely tied up or chained before being thrown from the piers.” (Peng 1972: 69)

Another memoir from the vice speaker of the Chia-I district council Huang Wu-tung, a Taiwanese, described the slaughter happened in the southern region of Taiwan:

“After Ch’en I’s troops arrested Chia-I representatives (five of the eight-person delegations sent to meet the troops and asked them to disarm), the troops immediately left the airfield. They entered the city and began arresting many people and killing untold numbers. At the same time, everyone stopped speaking to one another and only nodded their heads in passing. Because everyone sensed the great danger, no one knew when he or she might be arrested. Among the young students, a large number had been killed in the suburbs and at Hung-mao-pei. Their bodies were then stacked in trucks, taken to fountain, and pushed into the fountain as an example for the public. The Taiwanese had never seen such a display of cruelty.... When the Nationalist troops from the airfield entered the city, they immediately shot any persons they saw on the street. People bolted their doors and locked their windows, believing that what they could not see, they could not fear.” (Lai et al. 1991:156)

This tragedy created a wedge of distrust between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. For the Taiwanese, they believed that it was the Chinese scheme to systematically wipe out the Taiwanese political and social elite and to destroy the people's determination for self-rule and democracy (Peng 1972). On the other hand, the Chinese claimed that the Taiwanese people had received a vulgar, evil education from the Japanese, and had been misled by vicious propagandists who were affiliated with the Communist to undermine the integrity of the KMT government (Lai, et al. 1991).

After such hostile opening of their ruling chapter in Taiwan, the KMT felt pressured to find out an applicable source to justify its reign and to gain its political legitimacy that can transform its notorious power into recognized authority given that force can bring political power into being but cannot maintain it. Political legitimacy is the quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime. That government is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for a society. Accordingly, the KMT need something that could bring the loyalty and harmony to different ethnic groups. What they applied to their ruling legitimacy were democratic ideology and a commitment to recovering Mainland China.

Along the path of Taiwan's democratic development, those two sources of legitimacy have been alternatively used by the KMT. Although practically it was an

authoritarian regime, the KMT has declared itself as a democracy advocate and practitioner indeed based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People; nationalism, popular sovereignty, and economic justice (Linebarger 1937). In its very early party platform, the KMT was designed as "a revolutionary and democratic political party charged with the mission of completing the National Revolution, carrying out the Three Principles of the People, recovering the Chinese mainland, promoting Chinese culture, aligning with other democratic nations, and building the Republic of China into a unified, free, peace-loving, and harmonious democracy based on the Three Principles of the People (Wachman 1994: 25)

Dr. Sun's principles are very similar to those democratic rules of the Western democracies, but he designed something particularly unique for China's condition in the early 20th century. His doctrines not only provided the theoretical basis for the KMT's revolution against the Ching dynasty, also set the extra-juridical constitution of the National Government of China. He asserted that democratic development is a long-term project for China, so a series of incremental paths are essential for its success. First, it is necessary to have a military government to assure its dependence from external powers and imperialists. After the sovereignty is secured, the next stage for the nation is a period of "political tutoring," in which the KMT would be granted with special power to rule the

nation while raising the people's civic and educational level. When the citizens, equipped with enough skills and knowledge, are ready to democratic practices then the third period of constitutional democracy will begin with the full implementation of the constitution of the Republic of China (Rigger 1999).

Before the defeat in 1949 by the Communists, the KMT had almost completed the three steps of democratic development after the victory over Japan in the Second World War and the unification of the nation. The retreat to Taiwan pulled the KMT backwards to the beginning stage again given that the national sovereignty and unity are interrupted. But nominally the KMT claimed itself as a member of the democratic world, which served both to external and to internal ends. Externally, the belonging to the democracies group won the KMT's international sympathy and support within the Cold War to against the Communist China. Internally, the KMT's claims on democracy strengthened its ruling legitimacy over the island.

To justify its delay of full democracy, the KMT used the recovery of mainland as the interruption of the development. It has been the KMT's mission to bring the China national unity and sovereignty since the party's founding in the early 20th century. The temporary stay in Taiwan was to realize the KMT's inevitable responsibility to restore legitimate government to all of the territory drawn since the birth of the Republic of

China. To complete this mission required the citizens' sacrifice of some basic rights, so the delay of full democracy is necessary for the nation's long-term goal. On the other hand, the KMT showed its determination to silent dissent by all means through the February 28 Incident, and afterwards very few people dared to publicly challenge it.

Despite the regime's best efforts to keep the dream alive, the plausibility of Taiwan to recover Mainland China by force grew increasingly remote over the years. By the end of the first decade on Taiwan it was clear that the KMT were in no place to retake the mainland. The basic element of the KMT government's relationship with the U.S. was of a defensive nature and numerous American administrations had consistently made it clear to Chiang that the American support would not go so deep as an offensive attack.

After the credibility of recovering the Mainland China decreased, the KMT shifted its efforts on building a performance legitimacy by focusing on economic development. The first political economic event of the KMT government in Taiwan was the land reform in the 1950s. Motivated by the political lessons of the civil war on mainland, the KMT expected the land reform to have the political effects of equalizing assets and creating a tacit base of rural support. Since the Chinese did not own land and the KMT was not allied with Taiwanese landlords, there were few obstacles to undertaking the reform. The other big factor is the US government's strong urge of such reform on KMT. Through the

Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), the Americans supplied experts, advice, and funds to see it through (Gold 1986:65). The legacy of this reform has proven long-lasting: because Taiwan's income distribution remains extremely equal even by developed country standard (Haggard and Kaufman 1995:277).

Though the neo-classical development economists claim that the superior economic performance of the East Asian capitalist countries has gone with a relatively neutral policy regime, and the appropriate role of government is to help create and sustain an economic environment in which price signals drive industrial change. However, some research seemed to see the development in a different way. According to Wade (1988), Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea have not maintained a close approximation to a neutral policy regime over the post-war period. Instead, they have all actively fostered the development of many new industries that have become internationally competitive. Moreover, they have an unusually well developed capacity for selective intervention.

We may start with the financial policy. Taiwan has a kind of credit-based financial systems, when compared with the market-based system of the US and the UK. In a credit-based system the capital market is weak, and firms rely mainly on credit for raising finance beyond retained earnings. Usually banks are the main suppliers who control credits. The banks may be relatively autonomous of the government or be dependent on

the government. In Taiwan, the government sets financial prices, and both through prices and the government's ability to influence the allocation of bank lending more directly, thus, the government can exercise a powerful influence over the economy's investment pattern. Accordingly, firms are induced to help implementing government's industrial strategy for opposing the government would make it very difficult to get credit (Wade 1988). One distinction between Taiwan and Korea in financial control is that the Taiwan government tends to rely on monetary rather than fiscal policies. That is, tax breaks and high-depreciation allowances rather than outright loans are used to encourage investment in particular sectors (Johnson 1987:149).

Trade control is also an important instrument of the KMT for the economic development. Like Japan and Korea, the KMT government has not allowed the domestic market for tradable to be directly integrated into the international market. They have not allowed the use of foreign change, the composition of imports, to be decided by domestic demand in relation to prices set outside the country. In Taiwan, all importable goods are classified into one of three categories: prohibited, controlled, or permissible. Prohibited items cannot be imported under any circumstances. Controlled items cannot be imported unless special permits are issued under extraordinary circumstances. Even permissible items are not totally free from administrative regulation (Baldwin, Chen, and Nelson,

1995:44-45). However, the economic elites have realized that mere protection is not sufficient to generate rapid growth. Competition should be also considered.

In addition to policy control, the state and party enterprises also play significant roles in economic development. The failure experience of being betrayed by the particularistic interests of private speculators on the mainland during the late 1940s nursed the KMT's profound distrust of private business class. It also reminded the KMT's political leaders to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen's instruction on containing the capitalist. Such tendency was reinforced by the fact that strengthening private capitalists on Taiwan was equal to empower the Taiwanese economic elites, who might in return to challenge the KMT regime. Accordingly, instead of turning Japanese properties over to the private sectors as the American advisers recommended, the KMT retained control, generating one of the largest state-owned enterprises (Evans 1992).

The KMT's enterprises have not only contributed directly to economic growth, but also provided a training institution for economic leadership in the central state bureaucracy. When compared to the development paths of Japan and Korea, Taiwan was distinguished by the lack of private sector's involvement within the core of power group in economic policy (Ibid).

Moreover, the KMT's enterprises heavily penetrated in some key sectors as

petroleum, electric power, steel, gas, railways, shipbuilding, postal and telecommunication, tobacco and spirits, and banking systems. And all these enterprises reached monopoly level. In 1990, four of the top ten businesses were state-owned, and the largest private firm, Nan-Ya Plastics, was outstripped by three state enterprises (China Petroleum, Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau, and China Steel). Furthermore, state enterprises have also diversified their investments into 40 large private business and seven foreign firms in Taiwan. Consequently, the state sector can control the directions of those firms in which they invested.

Also, the KMT owns about 50 companies, mostly through the powerful and privileged party-owned investment firms. The development of joint ventures of party investment firms and the state enterprises with the big private companies has even further empowered the party's penetration into the private sector. They become a new kind of capital bloc that is free from bureaucratic supervision and enjoys a great deal of special favors from the state through political manipulation (Hsiao 1995:82). According to the estimate of Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly (Oct. 9, 1989), about half of the total assets of Taiwan's corporations are controlled directly or indirectly by the state and the KMT.

The state and party enterprises are also used to relieve the ethnic tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese. The KMT are always worried about Taiwanese

ambitions for self-determination and independence if they are excessively empowered politically and economically. During the second Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) phase in the 1970s, the ethnic power struggle between the state and the Taiwanese economic interests led the KMT to give the state enterprises a dominant role in leading major industrial projects. The KMT wished to solve its legitimacy crisis and resume its economic domination by boosting the state-controlled sector. Additionally, in order to keep the Taiwanese business class in control, KMT recruited many rising Taiwanese elites or their sons to run for political office. Using these strategies, KMT successfully built a coalition with the Taiwanese business class, and removed the potential challenge to its regime.

It is a legitimate question; how could the KMT government enjoy such a high autonomy in controlling political domain? Firstly, we need to note that the electoral system used in Taiwan contributed significantly in the KMT's success in elections. The single nontransferable vote system (SNTV); copied from Japan, has been used for more than 50 years (Nathan 1993). After the 1996's electoral system reform in Japan, Taiwan now is the only country in the world adopts the SNTV system.

The SNTV system differs both from the single-vote, single-member constituency system found in the United States and Britain in which each district elects the one

candidate with the highest number of votes. It also differs from the proportional representation systems found in some parts of Western Europe and elsewhere in which each voter has as many votes as there are seats.

Under the SNTV system, it is rational for a party to nominate the number of candidates it expects to be able to elect with the number of votes it expects to have, and then to use the party organization to allocate its votes among the candidates so that each gets just a little more than the minimum number needed to win. The process of spreading the party vote among party candidates so that few votes are wasted on the top candidates is called “vote allocation.” Only the KMT has the organizational capability to do this.

After the 228 Incident of 1947, the KMT's new task of ruling this hostile territory required greater penetration of Taiwanese society. Whereas party cells in government organs gave the KMT political control over the state apparatus, cells in economic, educational, and social organs allowed the KMT to control and mobilize the population. Military and security forces reinforced the KMT's rule. The corporatism used by the KMT was very successful in controlling the society in almost every aspect, in which labor, farmer, and business all had a hierarchical structure from the bottom to the central levels. However, within the corporatism labor unionization was not allowed, and the dynamics of negotiation between labor and capitalist rarely existed (Wu 1987).

With the elimination of Taiwan's political elite in 1947, the KMT continued the repression throughout 1950s and 1960s as the party would not tolerate any oppositions or behavior that questioned or detracted from its preeminent goal (Peng 1990). At most KMT allowed an opposition that was individual-based, fragmented, and locally oriented, rather than collective, coalescing, and nation-wide (Cheng 1989: 479). Although minor parties existed, they were superficial parties that did not constitute a viable opposition. The KMT relied on extraconstitutional emergency provisions to ban the formation of new parties on Taiwan. An attempt to form an opposition party in 1960-the Lei Chen Incident-was suppressed and its leaders imprisoned.

As a result of the KMT's tight control, elections did not serve as a referendum on party policies because voters were not offered much of a choice among candidates. Furthermore, only local leaders were directly elected. Voters selected representatives for legislative bodies as high as the Provincial Assembly, but direct elections for executive positions were limited to the country level and below. The provincial governor and all central government ministers were appointed by the KMT, and central representative bodies; the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan, were elected on the mainland and did not face reelection on Taiwan until 1991. Although supplementary elections occasionally took place to replace legislators who died and to increase the

number of Taiwanese marginally in those organs, new elections for all posts were not called until 1992, more than forty years after most legislators had been elected.

The other efficient way for the KMT to control the political dominance was clientelism. The KMT used the electoral clientelism to patron the local politicians to solidify its ruling base (Wu 1987). Since 1946, the year of the first local elections on Taiwan, local factions have been a powerful and indispensable element of local and national politics in Taiwan. Without challenging the political legitimacy and domination of the KMT, local factions monopolize the privileges of access to local political power and economic interests through patron-client relations with the authoritarian government. By controlling most of the economic and political resources, the KMT consolidated its dominant rule with the full support of local factions (Huang 1990:84). In this manner, the politics of local factions and the KMT authoritarian regime reinforced each other.

The local factions emerged after the revision of electoral districts in the early 1950s and the dissipation of the strength of traditional local elites (mostly landlords, who lost their source of power during land reform). They have developed at the county and township levels as a separate institution that play an important role in mobilizing votes, distributing patronage, and assisting the KMT to control the island.

Many voters, especially in rural areas where social networks are more stable and

longstanding, vote according to faction because it benefits them. Factions tap social networks and trade particular political favors for votes. The family that loyally supports a faction's candidates can count on his faction's representative for help. Factions dispense patronage in the form of jobs, local improvements (e.g., roads, lights, community centers), and assistance in the bureaucratic problems of businesses (e.g., licenses, tax audits, pollution standards, land use regulations, electric power) and of ordinary citizens (e.g., population and land registration, dispute mediation, government and Farmers' Association benefits). Village faction leaders gain power, prestige, and authority by delivering votes, thereby helping candidates win and by gaining favors from officeholders, thereby serving their constituents.

As a reward to the local faction's loyalty, the KMT provided the local faction leaders with four major economic resources (Chen 1992: 8).

1. monopolistic economic activities in local areas with special permits from the government, as in banking, bus companies, credit unions, etc.;
2. special loans and credits with especially favorable terms from state-owned commercial banks;
3. local government public contracts; and
4. land speculation in connection with urban planning and zoning for

construction projects, or tacit permission to operate illegal businesses such as gambling houses and dance halls.

In choosing local candidates, the KMT retains final approval but allows local party committees and their chairmen along with local KMT officials to take part in the nomination process. Of course, the opinion from the leaders of local faction is seriously considered. After dividing the multimember district into geography zones, each zone is assigned to a single KMT candidate, and no other KMT candidates are allowed to campaign there (Winckler 1984). The local faction also joins the assignment of mobilizing the supporters in each zone. The outcome of each district (the loyalty) will determine the nomination of next election and also affect the local politicians' political future (Tan, Yu, and Chen 1996).

There is no doubt that the KMT dominated early local elections. From 1951 to 1985, the KMT candidates won from 80 percent to 100 percent of local government posts. In local legislative elections, the KMT won 70 percent to 85 percent of the seats in the provincial assembly in the 1957-1985 period, and 75 percent to 92 percent of the seats in the Taipei city council from 1969 to 1985 (Lasater 1990). The KMT's remarkable success in the Legislative Yuan elections through decades was based on those dominant local elections. It is also the local factions that helped the KMT to overcome the dilemma of

nomination and vote allocation under the SNTV system.

Basically, we can say that there was no any viable opposition to KMT. After the 2-28 massacre of 1947, Taiwan's old intellectual and political elites had been liquidated. The labor movement was never seen until the late 1980s. Indeed, the labor unions have been playing a role of auxiliary government and agent of implementation, rather than a source of pressure. The private businesses though enable to exercise some influence on the government, eventually they were manipulated by the government. The KMT did not depend on the business community for political support, and business had little formal representation in the tightly organized ruling party. Technocrats were generally insulated from business interests, and the state-corporatist organization of business actually limited the private sector's access to decision-making (Haggard and Kaufman 1995:279).

US aid also played a big role in the 1950s. During 1951 and 1965, the US provided approximately total value of 1 billion to Taiwan. The aid was aimed at preserving the Taiwan political status quo and to strengthen its ability to confront the mainland China. One of the unintended consequences of the US aid was to strengthen the system of bureaucratic capitalism in Taiwan, and the state apparatus became a central arena in which the gains and losses of private capital were decided (Evans 1987:210).

As I mention earlier, the KMT government learned the lesson from the civil war to

pay great attention to the income equality. The land reform was an important basis of Taiwan's income even distribution. The other major factor is the existing of the large numbers of small and medium enterprises. The small and medium enterprises are not just relatively small compared to big business, they are small in absolute terms, in capital, sales, production, and labor employed in individual units. They provided far more jobs than the big business did. They can be said as the dynamism behind Taiwan's export economy. The most significant function of the small and medium enterprises is that they decentralized the capital, and that can be viewed as one of the major structural reasons behind Taiwan's relatively equal income distribution at least before 1980 (Hsiao, 1995:84).

With those remarkable economic achievements, the KMT strengthened its ruling legitimacy and claimed its primacy on bringing security and wealth to the society. Although the environmental concern started to emerge within the public, however, the lack of a mature civic society brought the concerns short of practical forces to enforce regulation on environmental protection. During elections the KMT was never seriously challenged by opposition parties until the birth of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986. Given the fact that there were no national-scale public opinion polls or voting surveys before 1980s, most researches were developed in qualitative way. The following

section is aimed to fill the gap by using empirical analyses to explore the KMT's supporting base and seek the public attitude toward the environmental issue and its interaction with other issues.

Data Analyses and Findings

1983

The 1983 Legislative Yuan election was the fifth national supplementary election and was the second competitive national election after the first one of 1980 in Taiwan. In this election, 71 candidates were chosen to the Legislative Yuan, including 16 elected to represent trade, professional organizations and other groups. Additionally, 27 were chosen to represent the overseas Chinese.

The major issues adopted by the Dangwai (literally “outside the party”) candidates were democracy, greater political participation for Taiwanese, human rights and civil liberties (freedom of speech), the lifting of martial law, and the Taiwan's status in the world community. More specifically, they attacked the ruling party on corruption and ignorance of social problems like environmental pollution, traffic malfunction, and economic crimes. However, they did not offer more convincing solutions to the voter than what the KMT had done. One major question in people's mind on the Dangwai was

its ability to offer constructional policies other than its severe criticism on the KMT.

On the KMT's side, its candidates stressed the remarkable economic achievements completed by the KMT and tries to persuade the voter that any radical change might destroy all accomplishments at once. They accused the Dangwai candidates were indeed rocking the boat and were disregarding the order and security of the country given the Chinese regime remained the fatal threat which will hurt Taiwan immediately if people on the boat were not united. In short, the KMT was riding on its economic success and its ability to remain the security for the people.

The results of the election were unequivocally a victory for the KMT. KMT candidates won 62 of the 72 seats being contested; the Dangwai won only 6; others won 4. Prior to the election, the KMT held 57 of the contested seats; thus, it gained 5. The Dangwai had 9, suffering a loss of 3. The KMT won 73.1 percent of the popular vote, down slightly from 1980. Official Dangwai candidates won 19 percent of the popular vote, nearly the same as in 1980.

Table 3-1 shows that within male respondents the KMT had much more support than that of the Dangwai (79 percent to 21 percent). For female respondents, more than 76 percent chose KMT over Dangwai. The percentage of Younger generations' favor with KMT is nearly as three times of that with Dangwai (74.46 percent to 25.54 percent). If

we divide the respondents into two major groups based on ethnicity, we find that 72.83 percent of Taiwanese prefer the KMT to the Dangwai. The Chinese group has the biggest difference margin among all categories with 96.63 percent chose the KMT over the Dangwai, which is even bigger than that of unification supporters (78 percent to 22 percent). Moreover, the KMT also enjoyed big margin over the Dangwai in the education and residence categories.

After using logistic regression for further investigation of the KMT's supporting base, from the Table 3-2 we find that the probability for a Taiwanese to support the KMT is lower than the probability for a Chinese to support the KMT. Higher educated people have higher probability to support the KMT than the lower educated people do. Likewise, the chance for an urban resident to select the KMT is higher than that of a non-urban resident. In issue domain, the probability for people who were concerned with national defense to select the KMT was higher than that of environmental protection advocates. People concerned with political stability also would more probably choose the KMT than the environmental protection advocates did. These results were statistically significant. In those not statistically significant categories, we see the male had higher probability than the female to stand with the KMT. But the probability for the younger generations to support the KMT was lower than that of the elders. An advocate of unification with

China would be more inclined to support the KMT than those who did not favor unification would.

For the Dangwai, the probability for a young voter to choose it over the KMT would be higher than that of the elders. The probability for a Taiwanese to support the Dangwai was also higher than that of a Chinese. Yet a political stability pleader would be less likely to support the Dangwai when compared to the environmental protection advocates. These findings were statistically sustained through the regression analyses. In the non-significant areas, we find that the probability for a male, a higher educated person, or a urban resident to choose the Dangwai was higher respectively than that of their counterparts. Moreover, a national defense pleader would be more likely to select the Dangwai when compared to the environmental protection advocates.

From the issue preference analysis (Table 3-3) we find that the probability for a male respondent to choose the environmental protection would be high than that of a female. Likewise, the probability for a KMT supporter to prefer the environmental protection would be high than that of a Dangwai supporter. Again, these findings are statistically significant. In the non-significant areas, the younger generation, the Taiwanese, the higher educated people, the unification pleader, or the urban resident would more likely to prefer the environmental protection when compared to their counterpart respectively.

Regarding the issue of political stability, the results show that a younger voter would be more likely to prefer it than an elder would. Also, the probability for a KMT supporter to select the political stability would be higher than that of Dangwai supporter. A urban resident would also more likely to prefer this issue than a non-urban resident would. The probability for a male to prefer political stability was also higher than that of a female although it was not statistically significant. More non-significant findings are the probability for a Taiwanese, a higher educated person, or a unification advocate is lower than that of their counterpart respectively.

1986

The Legislative Yuan election of 1986 was a watershed one in Taiwan's political development with the first contestation between two major parties in a legal fashion. The newborn Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after decades of running as a informal group, could endorse its members under party title and initiated its party platform and to become a legitimate contender of the KMT.

There were 137 candidates registered to compete for 73 seats in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT gained 66.3 percent of the popular votes that equaled to 80.8 percent of the total seats (59 of 73). The DPP won 12 seats with 6 seats more than what they got in the previous election. It seemed that the public was pleased with the KMT's performance in

economic growth terms. The announcements that martial law and the ban on new political parties would be rescinded likewise helped the KMT. That the KMT has nominated a slate of candidates that was general young, reform-oriented, and Western-educated also made the KMT attractive to the voter.

From Table 3-4 we can see only one of four male voters would choose the DPP over the KMT and the other candidates. Female voters looked less interested in the DPP than the male ones did as the supporting rate remained only at 16.53 percent. Similar to the 1983 results, in most categories the KMT enjoyed a secure margin over the DPP. The only significant change was the margin became shorter, especially in categories of the Taiwanese, the higher educated voters, and the urban residents.

From the logistic analyses (Table 3-5) we can see that, again, the probability for a Taiwanese to support the KMT was lower than that of a Chinese. The probability for a social order pleader to choose the KMT was higher than that of a environmental protection advocate. In the national identity category, the finding was similar with the previous survey as the probability for a unification supporter to select the KMT was higher than that of a no supporter of unification. These findings were statistically proved in the model. Differently from the previous poll, the probability for a male to choose the KMT became lower than that of a female. Although not statistically significant, the

probability for a younger voter to choose the KMT was, again, lower than that of an elder. The probability for a higher educated person to select the KMT was also higher than that of a lower educated person, but it was not so statistically significant in this poll.

On the other hand, the DPP had significant improvements in all categories except issue preference and national identity. The probability for a male, a younger person, a Taiwanese, a higher educated person, or an urban resident to support the DPP were all higher than those of their counterparts respectively. The probability for an economic growth supporter to choose the DPP was also higher than that of a environmental protection advocate although this finding was not statistically proved. But the probability for a social order pleader or for a political stability supporter to stand with the DPP was lower than that of an environmental protection advocate.

From the Table 3-6 we can see that the probability for a younger person, a higher educated person, or a unification supporter to prefer the issue of environmental protection was higher than that of their counterparts respectively. These findings were statistically proved in the model. In the categories of gender, party support, and resident the trends remained the same with the previous survey but lost the statistical significance. That is, a male, or a KMT supporter, or an urban resident would more likely to prefer the issue of environmental protection than their counterparts would do respectively. The only

contradictory finding with the previous one lied in the ethnicity origin category as the probability for a Taiwanese to prefer the environmental protection became lower than that of a Chinese although it was not statistically significant.

In the economic growth preference model we can find that only two categories came out with statistical significance; gender and education. The probability for a male or a higher educated person to prefer the issue of economic growth was higher than that of a female or a lower educated person respectively. The probability for a younger person, or a KMT supporter, or a unification pleader, or an urban resident to prefer the economic growth was higher than that of their counterparts respectively. In the ethnicity category, the probability for a Taiwanese to prefer the economic growth was lower than that of a Chinese.

1993

The Legislative Yuan election in December of 1992 had attained one very remarkable implication to political development in Taiwan. Though it was the sixth competitive national election, it was indeed the first non-supplemental election of members in the Legislative Yuan. After years of debate and struggle among all parties, the issue of “long-live” congress was finally settled by the Supreme Court in June of 1990. The Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan ruled in its Interpretation no.

261 that all congressmen and congresswomen elected in 1947 and 1948 before the civil war in China had to retire by 31 December of 1991. Therefore, the 1992 election started a brand new chapter of political reform in Taiwan through the full representation from people on that island.

Riding on the wave of victory in the National Assembly elections of the previous year, KMT continued to attack DPP's advocacy on Taiwan Independence. KMT's candidates likewise focused on its economic record and its contribution to political stability and social order. It also took the credits of all democratic reforms; such as the introduction of new non-supplemental elections and the abolishment of the notorious Taiwan Garrison Command that used censorship and military courts to maintain social order.

On the DPP's side, it took a bitter lesson in the defeat of the previous National Assembly elections, in which it gained much less votes of 23.9 percent when compared with the average 30 percent it had got before. The lesson was to soften its stance on Independent movement and, instead, to focused on issues of substance like building a welfare state, pursuing economic policies that distinguish clearly between the public and private sector, and to help the poor and underprivileged.

The result of the elections suggested significant losses for the KMT and considerable gain for the DPP. The KMT won 61.67 percent of the popular vote that kept its ruling status by securing 59.6 percent of total seats. On the other hand, DPP won 31.03 percent of the popular vote and secured 51 seats that were equal to 32 percent of total seats. Many observers claimed that the two-party system was strengthened and would continue to grow along the political development.

The Table 3-7 shows that within male respondents the KMT had much more support than that of the DPP (61 percent to 34 percent); but the margin was shortened compared with the previous years. For female respondents, more than 69 percent chose KMT over DPP. The percentage of Younger generations' favor with KMT was than two times than of that with DPP (64 percent to 31 percent); however, the popularity of DPP was increased significantly. If we divide the respondents into two major groups based on ethnicity, we find that 59.89 percent of Taiwanese prefer the KMT to the DPP, which also dropped from 70 percent of the previous years. On the other hand, the Chinese group still strongly favors the KMT with 93 percent over DPP of 3.74 percent. In the category of national identity, the DPP only won more popularity than the KMT from people supported Taiwan Independence. For people favor with unification with China, 78 percent of them chose the KMT and only 17 percent would support the DPP. For those

carried uncertainty with Taiwan's identity, either remaining status quo or depending on certain conditions, KMT still enjoyed significant margin in support over DPP. Moreover, the KMT again enjoyed big margin over the DPP in the education and residence categories.

After using logistic regression for further investigation of the KMT's supporting base, from the Table 3-8 we find that the probability for a Taiwanese to support the KMT was lower than the probability for a Chinese to support the KMT. The male also had higher probability over the female in choosing KMT. Younger generation would less probably support the KMT than the older generation would; but it was not statistically significant. Higher educated people have higher probability to support the KMT than the lower educated people do, although it was not statistically significant. In issue domain, the probability for people who were concerned with economic growth, national defense, or public participation to select the KMT was higher than that of environmental protection advocates. The probabilities to support the KMT for those chose national identity as unification with China, status quo, or depend were all higher than that of Taiwan independence advocates. For the first time; in our findings so far, that the chance for an urban resident to select the KMT was lower than that of a non-urban resident.

For the DPP, the probability for a male, a young person, a Taiwanese, or an urban

resident to choose it over the KMT would be higher than that of their counterparts respectively. The similar trend also was seen from the higher educated people but without statistical significance. In the category of issue preference, those concerned with public participation or with economic growth had higher probabilities than environmental advocates to support the DPP, though only the former got statistical significance. The DPP only had higher chance to get support from people with environmental concern over those concerned with national defense, but it was not statistically significant.

From the issue preference analysis (Table 3-9) we find that the probability for a male respondent to choose the environmental protection would be less than that of a female. Likewise, the probability for a young person to prefer the environmental protection was higher than that of an older person. These two were significantly proved through statistical test. In the non-significant categories, we found that a Taiwanese, a higher educated person, or an urban resident would more probably support environmental protection than their counterparts respectively. But the KMT supporters would less likely to choose environmental protection than the DPP supporters would do. For people chose either unification with China or uncertain in the national identity, they were more inclined to support environmental protection than those support Taiwan independence. But the probability for status quo advocates to support environmental protection was lower than

that of Taiwan independence seekers.

Regarding the economic growth, the results show that a young person, a male, or a KMT supporter would more likely favor it than their counterparts would respectively. An urban resident or a higher educated person would also support economic growth more than their counterparts would do, but it was not statistically proved. In terms of ethnicity, a Taiwanese was less likely to choose economic growth than a Chinese was although it was not statistically significant. In the national identity category, all three groups had higher probability than the Independence advocator to choose the economic growth with statistical significance except the group of unification supporters.

1998

The 1998 survey data was the first systematic investigation after the Legislative Yuan election of 1995 and the first direct presidential election of 1996. The 1995 election was the second non-supplemental election of the Legislators in Taiwan. It was significant with the campaign debates on economic policies, environmental problems, and the close connect between the KMT and the business interests that later was known as money-politics. The opposition parties strongly attacked the KMT's inefficiency in handling environmental degradation and the increasingly widen gap of wealth distribution. The penetration of many local faction leaders with gangster background,

through the KMT's endorsement, into the central government hurt KMT's image tremendously. Moreover, the lack of control over KMT's members' involvement with special interests exercised in the Legislative Yuan invited much criticism that resulted in the public distrust with KMT's integrity and that indirectly undermined its credits in economic achievements.

The Legislative Yuan election of 1995 brought the KMT to the edge of losing its ruling status. The KMT experienced the first time not to gain more than 50 percent of the total votes in the national elections with 46.1 percent that ended up with only a 3-seat majority in the 164-member congress. The DPP added 4 more seats to the total 54 seats that came from 33.2 percent of the total votes. The biggest winner was the New Party that won 13 percent of the total vote and 21 seats that promoted them into being the decisive-minority in the congress.

The first direct presidential election of 1996 was characterized by the debate over the national identity of Taiwan and its future relations with the PRC. The KMT's candidate, Lee Teng-hui, reiterated his position that there was only one China but it was currently ruled by two separate and equal governments and reunification could be possible only after the PRC had adopted democratic institutions. The DPP's candidate, Peng Ming-min, argued that Taiwan had its own national identity and it would become a

independent country eventually. The result was a big victory for Lee Teng-hui, who won more than 54 percent of the total vote while the DPP only gained 21.1 percent.

The Table 3-10 shows that within male respondents the KMT's popularity continually decreased to only 56.4 percent if compared to the 79 percent, 72 percent, or 61 percent of previous surveys. The same trend was seen in the female respondents with the percentage of 56.89 compared to 76, 74, and 69 in the previous years. The favor margin among the KMT and opposition parties in age category also shrank significantly. On the other hand, the popularity of DPP was increased significantly. And the New Party also contributed to the KMT's loss. In the ethnicity category, we find that 55.42 percent of Taiwanese prefer the KMT to others, which also dropped from 59 percent of the previous year. The DPP gradually won popularity from the Taiwanese with increase from 36 percent of previous year to the new 42 percent. For the Chinese, the NP became one major alternative favor of the KMT given nearly 30 percent of them chose the former party. Similar observation was found in the education category, the NP took over many supporters in higher educated group, which resulted in the KMT's rapid loss from 64 percent of the previous year to the new 47 percent.

In the national identity category, the KMT won comfortable margin over the other parties from the public except in the independence group which still mainly supported

the DPP (71 percent). In the new category of ethnicity identity, people with Taiwanese identity had slightly more favor on the DPP than on the KMT and the NP. But for people identified as a Chinese, the KMT was still their choice in party support. For the biggest group of dual-identity, the KMT again won comfortable margin over the other parties. For all residents, the KMT's leading margin decreased slightly with the NP's significant gain from both groups.

From the logistic regression analysis on the KMT's supporting base, in Table 3-11, we found that a male was more probable than a female to choose the KMT. But a young person or a higher educated person will less likely to support the KMT when compared to an older person or a lower educated person respectively. A Taiwanese or an urban resident was less probable to support the KMT than their counterparts were, although it was not proved by statistical test. In the issue preference category, people concerned with economic growth, health gap, or social morality had less probability to support the DPP than the environment concerned did. People had more concern with public participation or national defense would more likely to support the KMT than those with environmental concern but this was not statistically significant. In the national identity category, people identified with unification, status quo, or uncertainty would more probably support the KMT than people identified with Taiwan independence did. For people owned a

Taiwanese identity, they tended to not to support the KMT when compared to people with dual-identity. For Chinese identity owners, they were more likely to choose the KMT than the dual-identity people did.

On the side of DPP's analysis, we found that a male, a young person, or a Taiwanese was more probable to choose the DPP when compared to their counterparts respectively. A higher educated person had higher probability than a lower educated one to support the DPP but it was not statistically proved. Also not proved by statistical test was an urban resident would less likely to support the DPP than a non-urban resident would. In the issue preference category, people concerned with economic growth or public participation had more probability to support the DPP than the environment concerned did. People had more concern with health gap, social morality, or national defense would less likely to support the DPP than those with environmental concern but this was not statistically significant. In the national identity category, people identified with unification, status quo, or uncertainty would less probably support the DPP than people identified with Taiwan independence did. For people owned the Taiwanese identity, they tended to support the DPP when compared to people with dual-identity. For Chinese identity owners, they were less likely to choose the DPP than the dual-identity people did but it was not statistically significant.

From the issue preference analysis (Table 3-12) we found that the probability for a male or a higher educated respondent to choose the environmental protection would be less than that of a female or of a lower educated person. But a young person had more probability than an old person to support environmental protection. These were statistically significant findings.

In the non-significant findings, we found that a Taiwanese was less likely to support environmental protection when compared to a Chinese. But an urban resident would more probably support environmental protection than a non-urban resident would. In terms of party support, the KMT supporters were more likely than the DPP supporter to favor with environmental protection. But the probability for a NP supporter to choose environmental protection was lower than that of a DPP supporter. In the national identity category, people chose unification, status quo, or uncertainty were less likely to support the environmental protection than people chose independence were. For people with a Taiwanese or Chinese identity would more likely to support environmental protection when compared to people with dual-identity.

Summary

We started this chapter by looking at the political essence of environmental issues

and found out the state of developing countries were inclined to adopt immediately profit-making policies to accumulate its economic and political capital and ensure its survival. Very few regimes could afford to meet the balance between ecological health and economic growth. Therefore, the developing countries were more vulnerable in environmental degradation, although some countries did achieve remarkable economic success.

Taiwan was one of the cases that fitted into such path of development, even the KMT had political capacity to maintain the balance compared to other developing counterparts. The KMT was successful in maintaining income equality and avoiding the confrontation among social classes. By declaring a democratic regime, the KMT indeed impose all basic institutions required by the doctrine of democracy. Elections and legislations were there to serve the KMT's justification as an ally of free world to against the Communist blocs during the Cold War era. However, given its authoritarian ruling, most democratic institutions were rather symbolic than practical in the governmental operations.

The formula of the KMT's success in eliminating true threat from the opposition forces included the legal barrier of electoral competition, the favoring electoral system, the tight control of local factions, and the economic achievement. The performance

legitimacy KMT used after the claim of recovering the Mainland China became impossible was completely based on the economic growth and prosperity the society benefited from it. The threat from China's invasion also helped the KMT to claim its credibility for maintaining the national security for people in Taiwan to continually enjoy the secure and better material lives.

Before the 1980s, there were no national survey of public opinion and voting behavior in Taiwan. Therefore, we can rely mainly on qualitative studies to review the KMT's manipulation on political competition and its neglect on enforcing environmental regulation. The contribution of this chapter will be the series of empirical analyses from the national surveys conducted in 1983, 1986, 1993, and 1998. Through investigations of those survey data we can build stronger assertion on issues aforementioned.

Our findings suggested that the KMT had consistently gained more support from the Chinese than from the Taiwanese. The probability of a Chinese to vote for the KMT was always higher than that of a Taiwanese, and it is proved by statistical significance except the 1998 data. People favored with unification China were also more inclined to vote for the KMT given it had always indicated its ultimate goal of reunifying China. The KMT's focus on economic growth indeed won people's recognition through the years based on our findings that the KMT enjoyed more support from people preferred with economic

growth than from people concerned with environmental protection, again, except the 1998. Regarding the other demographic categories, we find that the KMT won more support from the male and older population, which was true in all 4 surveys. In early years (1983 and 1986), the KMT gained more support from the urban residents than from the non-urban ones. However, after political reforms were introduced, the trend changed to the opposite direction with more support from the non-urban residents in 1993 and 1998. The higher educated group (college and higher) had more support for the KMT than the lower educated did until 1998. It may support the argument of middle-and-above classes were more concerned with stability and political order. But after giving the KMT so many chances, they started to feel disappointed with the KMT's no show in social improvements.

For the opposition forces, Dangwai of 1983 and the DPP afterwards, the chance for them to get a vote from the Taiwanese was higher than from the Chinese, which was true in all 4 surveys. From the 1970s the opposition forces had started to challenge the KMT's single-minded on unification with China. Such efforts had won them more support from people favored with independence than from people preferred unification. Regarding the choice between environmental protection and economic growth, we actually did not find the social cleavage reflecting in people's preference. Although the Dangwai and the DPP

had consistently attacked the KMT's failure in improving the environmental condition, however, they never won the people's confidence with them in providing leadership in this task. Only in 1983 did we see the opposition forces won more support from environmental protection concerned people than from other issues voters. Then in the other 3 surveys, we saw that the DPP indeed had more support from the pro-economic growth people than from the pro-environmental protection group.

Urban residents had higher support for the Dangwai and the DPP than the non-urban residents did until 1993. Male and younger generation consistently had higher support for the Dangwai and the DPP than their counterparts did through all surveys. The intriguing finding of the higher educated group had more support for the Dangwai and the DPP than the lower educated people did may reflect the fact that middle-and-above classes usually demand more political reforms and tend to stand with the opposition parties to push the ruling party to move toward this direction.

In the issue preference analyses we find that there were no significant differences among all categories. For environmental protection, only in age and residential categories did we see people consistently chose it over economic growth. The younger generation and the urban residents had higher support for environmental protection than their counterparts did in all surveys. In party support, we see very close comparisons

between the KMT's and the DPP's supporters in choosing economic growth over environmental protection and vice versa. For ethnicity category, we did not find a certain group particularly favor either issue. For instance, the Taiwanese had more support for environmental protection than the Chinese did in 1983 and 1993. But in 1986 and 1998, the Chinese showed more support for environmental protection than the Taiwanese did. The same pattern was also seen in national identification and educational attainment categories.

Accordingly, we seem to find the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection did not constitute to major cleavage in Taiwan. The much clearer boundaries among people in Taiwan were founded in ethnicity, national identification, and party support. In order to further investigate the lack of environmental discussion in political market, we need to put eyes on these major cleavages existing in Taiwan. Therefore, the next chapter will be developed to dissect the interaction among those major issues and its implication on environmental issue.

Tables

Table 3-1 Crosstable of Party Support and All Variables of 1983

	Pro-KMT		Pro-Dangwai	
	N	%	N	%
Gender				
Male	374	79.07	99	20.93
Female	324	76.06	102	23.94
Age				
20-49	487	74.46	167	25.54
50+	211	86.48	33	13.52
Ethnic Origin				
Taiwanese	520	72.83	194	27.17
Chinese	172	96.63	6	3.37
Education				
High school and below	530	75.28	174	24.72
College and above	167	86.53	26	13.47
Pro-Uni				
Yes	663	78.00	187	22.00
No	26	68.42	12	31.58
Resident				
Urban	206	82.07	45	17.93
Non-Urban	492	75.93	156	24.07

* Question V 5-36 of 1983

Table 3-2 Logistic Regression of Party Support and All Variables 1983

1983		Party Support		
Logit	Pro-KMT	Not Pro-KMT	Pro-Dang-wai	Not Pro-Non Dangwai
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	0.0662	1.0684	0.0215	1.0218
Age (50+)				
20-49	-0.1166	0.8899	0.5267**	1.6933
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-0.6905****	0.5013	1.8429****	6.3149
Education (high school and below)				
College and above	0.1991*	1.2203	0.1375	1.1475
Issue preference (Pro-EP)				
Pro-Defense	0.8753***	2.3997	0.5963	1.8154
Pro-Political stability	1.2199****	3.3867	-0.6472*	0.5235
National ID (not Pro-Uni)				
Pro-Uni	0.2858	1.3309	-0.1117	0.8943
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	0.4766****	1.6106	0.1347	1.1442
Constant	-0.3005		-4.0471****	
Model				
Chi-Square	125.151		57.823	
DF	8		8	
P	0.0000		0.0000	
N	698		201	
Prediction	64.13%		88.12%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 5-36 of 1983

Table 3-3 Logistic Regression of Issue Preference and All Variables of 1983

1983			Issue Preferences	
Logit	Pro-EP	Not Pro-EP	Pro-PS	Not Pro-PS
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	0.8082***	2.2438	0.3172	1.3732
Age (50+)				
20-49	0.4570	1.5793	0.3978*	1.4886
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	0.2126	1.2369	-0.3852	0.6803
Education (High school and below)				
College and above	0.3012	1.3515	-0.0473	0.9538
Party Support (Pro-Dangwai)				
Pro-KMT	0.5545**	1.7410	1.3787****	3.9699
National ID (not Pro-Uni)				
Pro-Uni	0.1044	1.1100	-0.1013	0.9036
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	0.0563	1.0579	0.4270**	1.5327
Constant	-4.8962****		-3.5294****	
Model				
Chi-Square	16.057		67.229	
DF	7		7	
P	0.0246		0.0000	
N	1692		1692	
Prediction	96.75%		92.91%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 12-48 of 1983

Table 3-4 Crosstable of Party Support and All Variables of 1986

	Pro-KMT		Pro-DPP		Others	
Gender	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	382	71.80	119	22.37	31	5.83
Female	357	74.69	79	16.53	42	8.79
Age						
20-49	552	70.59	170	21.74	60	7.67
50+	187	82.02	28	12.28	13	5.70
Ethnic Origin						
Taiwanese	601	69.80	190	22.07	70	8.13
Chinese	134	93.06	7	4.86	3	2.08
Education						
High school and below	612	73.12	157	18.76	68	8.12
College and above	119	72.12	41	24.85	5	3.03
Pro-Uni						
Yes	645	75.17	159	18.53	54	6.29
No	94	61.84	39	25.66	19	12.50
Resident						
Urban	229	70.25	75	23.01	22	6.75
Non-Urban	510	74.56	123	17.98	51	7.46

* Question V 1-57 of 1986

Table 3-5 Logistic Regression of Party Support and All Variables 1986

1986		Party Support		
Logit	Pro-KMT	Not Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Not Pro-DPP
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	-0.0033	0.9967	0.5119***	1.6684
Age (50+)				
20-49	-0.0248	0.9755	0.6204***	1.8579
EthnicOrigin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-1.0993****	0.3331	1.5961****	4.9340
Education (High school and below)				
College and above	0.0635	1.0655	0.4819**	1.6192
Issue preference (Pro-EP)				
Pro-Social Order	1.9011***	6.6933	-1.5410	0.2142
Pro-Political Stability	0.9364	2.5507	-1.0154	0.3623
Pro_Economic Growth	0.2362	1.2664	0.5719	1.7716
National ID (not Pro-Uni)				
Pro-Uni	0.7981****	2.2212	-0.14977	0.8610
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	0.0009	1.0009	0.4579***	1.5808
Constant	0.3610		-4.1645****	
Model				
Chi-Square	112.228		67.504	
DF	9		9	
P	0.0000		0.0000	
N	1430		1430	
Prediction	58.32%		86.15%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 1-57 of 1986

Table 3-6 Logistic Regression of Issue Preference and All Variables 1986

1986			Issue Preferences	
Logit	Pro-EP	Not Pro-EP	Pro-Eco	Not Pro-Eco
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	0.1408	1.1512	1.1149***	3.0494
Age (50+)				
20-49	1.2794**	3.5945	0.1715	1.1871
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-0.2347	0.7908	-0.4973	0.6082
Education (High school and below)				
College and above	1.0301****	2.8015	0.7668**	2.1529
Party Support (Pro-DPP)				
Pro-KMT	0.4703	1.6005	0.4086	1.5046
National ID (not Pro-Uni)				
Pro-Uni	1.0340*	2.8124	1.6076	4.9907
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	0.2831	1.3272	0.1715	1.1871
Constant	-5.7287****		-6.7192****	
Model				
Chi-Square	40.922		31.433	
DF	8		8	
P	0.0000		0.0001	
N	1430		1430	
Prediction	96.15%		97.55%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V3-22 of 1986

Table 3-7 Crosstable of Party Support and All Variables of 1993

	Pro-KMT		Pro-DPP		Others	
Gender	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	420	61.22	235	34.26	31	4.52
Female	431	69.18	167	26.81	25	4.01
Age						
20-49	681	64.06	329	30.95	53	4.99
50+	170	69.11	73	29.67	3	1.22
Ethnic Origin						
Taiwanese	663	59.89	394	35.59	50	4.52
Chinese	174	93.05	7	3.74	6	3.21
Education						
High school and below	652	65.27	312	31.23	35	3.50
College and above	196	63.84	90	29.32	21	6.84
National ID						
Pro-Ind	44	32.35	89	65.44	3	2.21
Pro-Uni	234	78.26	51	17.06	14	4.68
Status Quo	420	66.56	181	28.68	30	4.75
Depends	106	62.35	58	34.12	6	3.53
Resident						
Urban	444	60.49	249	33.92	41	5.59
Non-Urban	407	70.78	153	26.61	15	2.61

* Question of V 54 of 1993

Table 3-8 Logistic Regression of Party Support and All Variables 1993

1993			Party Support	
Logit	Pro-KMT	Not Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Not Pro-DPP
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	-0.2763***	0.7584	0.5340****	1.7057
Age (50+)				
20-49	-0.1194	0.8875	0.3617**	1.4358
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-1.2392****	0.2896	2.2729****	9.7078
Education (High school and below)				
College and above	0.0720	1.0747	0.0772	1.0802
Issue preference (Pro-EP)				
Pro-Economic Growth	0.3771***	1.4580	0.0288	1.0293
Pro-Defense	0.7246****	2.0640	-0.3234	0.7237
Pro-Public Participation	0.0365	1.0372	0.5813****	1.7883
National ID (Pro-Independent)				
Pro-Uni	1.3063****	3.6925	-1.0950****	0.3345
Status Quo	0.8242****	2.2800	-0.5990****	0.5494
Depends	0.6222****	1.8631	-0.5436***	0.5806
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	-0.2451**	0.7826	0.5449****	1.7244
Constant	0.1560		-3.8943****	
Model				
Chi-Square	213.061		172.473	
DF	11		11	
P	0.0000		0.0000	
N	1964		1964	
Prediction	64.92%		79.94%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 54 of 1986

Table 3-9 Logistic Regression of Issue Preference and All Variables of 1993

1993			Issue Preferences	
Logit	Pro-EP	Not Pro-EP	Pro-Eco	Not Pro-Eco
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	-0.6097****	0.5435	0.5634****	1.7566
Age (50+)				
20-49	0.2823**	1.3262	0.4900****	1.6324
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	0.1810	1.1984	-0.0944	0.9100
Education (High school and below)				
College and above	0.1693	1.1844	0.0572	1.0588
Party Support (Pro-DPP)				
Pro-KMT	-0.1228	0.8845	0.1962*	1.2167
National ID (Pro-Independent)				
Pro-Uni	0.0653	1.0675	0.2232	1.2501
Status Quo	-0.0538	0.9476	0.4289***	1.5356
Depends	0.0461	1.0472	0.4102**	1.5071
Resident (Non-Urban)				
Urban	0.0369	1.0376	0.0604	1.0623
Constant	-1.1924****		-1.5938****	
Model				
Chi-Square	42.924		70.395	
DF	9		9	
P	0.0000		0.0000	
N	1964		1964	
Prediction	74.90%		63.65%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 34 of 1993

Table 3-10 Crosstable of Party Support and All Variables of 1998

Crosstables	Pro-KMT		Pro-DPP		Pro-NP	
Gender						
Male	335	56.40	224	37.71	35	5.89
Female	289	56.89	178	35.04	41	8.07
Age						
20-49	416	52.20	318	39.90	63	7.90
50+	208	68.20	84	27.54	13	4.26
Ethnic Origin						
Taiwanese	516	55.42	387	41.57	28	3.01
Chinese	100	61.73	14	8.64	48	29.63
Education						
High school and below	481	60.50	287	36.10	27	3.40
College and above	142	46.56	114	37.38	49	16.07
National ID						
Pro-Ind	55	28.21	138	70.77	2	1.03
Pro-Uni	69	66.99	26	25.24	8	7.77
Status Quo	417	62.90	189	28.51	57	8.60
Depends	77	57.89	47	35.34	9	6.77
Ethnicity ID						
Taiwanese	199	44.92	239	53.95	5	1.13
Chinese	95	70.37	24	17.78	16	11.85
Both	319	62.55	136	26.67	55	10.78
Residence						
Urban	397	55.84	251	35.30	63	8.86
Non-Urban	227	58.06	151	38.62	13	3.32

* Question V 77 of 1998

Table 3-11 Logistic Regression of Party Support and All Variables 1998

1998			Party Support	
Logit	Pro-KMT	Not Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Not Pro-DPP
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	0.2842***	1.3286	0.3249***	1.3840
Age (50+)				
20-49	-0.4150****	0.6604	0.7249****	2.0646
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-0.1634	0.8492	1.2438****	3.4688
Education(High school and below)				
College and above	-0.5042****	0.6040	0.1832	1.2011
Issue preference (Pro-EP)				
Pro-Economic Growth	-0.3369*	0.7140	0.3847*	1.4691
Pro-Health Gap	-0.4963**	0.6088	-0.1266	0.8811
Pro-Public Participation	0.0356	1.0363	0.1638	1.1780
Pro-Morality	-0.1629	0.8497	-0.1349	0.8738
Pro-Defense	0.1785	1.1954	-0.1834	0.8324
National ID (Pro-Independent)				
Pro-Uni	1.0990****	3.0012	-1.0054****	0.3659
Status Quo	0.9235****	2.5181	-1.1380****	0.3205
Depends	0.5197**	1.6815	-1.1587****	0.3139
Ethnic ID (both)				
Taiwanese	-0.3634***	0.6953	0.6668****	1.9480
Chinese	0.4097**	1.5063	-0.0573	0.9443
Resident (non-urban)				
Urban	-0.0586	0.9431	-0.0899	0.9141
Constant	-0.7837***		-2.4750****	
Model				
Chi-Square	141.295		211.953	
DF	15		15	
P	0.0000		0.0000	
N	1798		1798	
Prediction	67.46%		79.37%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01	** p<0.05	* p<0.1		

Table 3-12 Logistic Regression of Issue Preference and All Variables of 1998

1998		Issue Preferences		
Logit	Pro-EP	Not Pro-EP	Pro-Eco	Not Pro-Eco
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Gender (female)				
Male	-0.3113**	0.7325	0.4202***	1.5223
Age (50+)				
20-49	0.7391****	2.0941	-0.0160	0.9842
Ethnic Origin (Chinese)				
Taiwanese	-0.3447	0.7084	0.2465	1.2795
Education				
High school and below)				
College and above	-0.3892**	0.6776	-0.3052*	0.7370
Party Support (Pro-DPP)				
Pro-KMT	0.1136	1.1203	-0.3503**	0.7045
Pro-NP	-0.1658	0.8472	0.0852	1.0889
National ID (Pro-Independent)				
Pro-Uni	-0.3983	0.6715	0.4995	1.6479
Status Quo	-0.3309	0.7183	0.4356**	1.5459
Depends	-0.2878	0.7499	0.7821****	2.1861
Ethnic ID (Both)				
Taiwanese	0.2392	1.2703	0.4157***	1.5154
Chinese	0.1405	1.1508	-0.2092	0.8112
Resident (Non-Urban)				
Urban	0.0286	1.0290	0.0422	1.0431
Constant	-2.0214****		-2.5797****	
Model				
Chi-Square	28.800		40.046	
DF	12		12	
P	0.0042		0.0001	
N	1798		1798	
Prediction	88.99%		84.87%	
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01				
** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

* Question V 44 of 1998

CHAPTER 4

Nationalism and Environmentalism

Theories of Nationalism

In the last three centuries nationalism figured in revolutions and wars of independence, including the French Revolution, American Independence, and the anti-colonization movements after the World War Two. After the end of the Cold War, some announced “The end of history” as the struggle between capitalism and communism since the latter one claimed the victory (Fukuyama 1992). However, even though the conflict between the two major ideologies embraced in the 20th century was over, it did not suggest that there was no longer significant source for potential global confrontation. Huntington (1996) strongly claimed that the human beings had moved to a new stage of confrontation brought by the clash among different civilizations, which was frequently intensified by nationalism. Accordingly, we still need to view nationalism as one of the most powerful forces in the world today.

It is difficult to find a working definition for a much-debated idea like nationalism. However, we still can find some well-known discussion on nationalism, which may not be universally accepted but indeed have enormous impact on the subject. Ernest Gellner,

one of the most important scholars of nationalism, suggested that:

"...nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy..... Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."(1983:3)

Eric Hobsbawn, following Gellner's argument, claimed that nationalism is used to take preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, or to invent them. Nationalism comes before nations, meaning nations do not make states and nationalism but nationalism makes nations and states (1990).

Benedict Anderson, author of "Imagined Communities," proposed that nation is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (1983).

Anthony Smith, another important scholar of nationalism, provided definition of nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation. Accordingly, a nation is a named human

population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members (1991). On the other hand, Smith disagreed with Anderson's argument of nation as an imagined community by calling it "the deconstructionist model." He argued that although we can often discern elements of deliberate planning and human creativity in their formation, nations and nationalism are also the preexisting traditions and heritages which have coalesced over the generations.

Regardless of what sources nationalism comes from, either by creation of imagination or by real traditions, most scholars tend to focus on the essence of the elite's manipulation during the formation of nationalism. Kosaku Yoshino (1999), using a case study of Japan, argued that more attention should be put on the informal and market-oriented process when nationalism is being developed. Yoshino argued that most theories of nationalism emphasized only the aspect of elites' production of national myth and ideology, which would be implanted into the people's mind through state-controlled formal education. The process of reproduction, distribution, and consumption in the marketplace for nationalism was simply neglected (Ibid).

Moreover, nationalism could be developed through minor things happened in daily lives; such as lottery in Sri Lanka, suggested by Steven Kemper (1999). Kemper argued

that when we stress the importance of ideology in creating nationalism, we tend to see only the significance of social elites in bringing national solidarity. The acceptance or resistance of the people to such “from above” manipulation deserves to be reviewed carefully. Using the example of a lottery in Sri Lanka, Kemper suggested that the mass could develop their own way in building national solidarity. For instance, when members of the guerrilla groups in the Northern and Eastern Provinces were enthusiastic with the lottery games offered by the national government, the lottery ticket “blurring the line between a political act and a consumption decision, a lottery ticket puts the nations in the hands of ordinary people” (Kemper 1999:44). Buying lottery tickets and waiting for release of the lucky number, to some extent, forced people to think of the nation in daily basis.

Linkage of Nationalism and Environmentalism

Let us now explore the nature of the linkage between nationalism and environmentalism in comparative cases. In the former Soviet Union, economic development and environmental issues closely interacted with nationalist and separatist movements from the small republics. Moscow was blamed for exploiting the republics' natural resources without any consideration on the local ecological health. Therefore,

some separatists used environmental issues as a mobilizing point for nationalism. Along with Moscow's political reforms, people in the republics became more enthusiastic in participating public affairs, in which environmental protection movements were widely involved in the process. Moreover, both environmentalism and nationalism are enhancing the differences between the ruling group and the ruled group based on geographic boundaries, in which discrimination occurred within the minority and ruled area. The national identification and ethnic identification then are closely mixed with sovereignty and the principle of self-determination, which treated external forces as having questionable legitimacy for ruling (Ziegler 1992). For instance, people in Estonia concerned with environmental protection had a very much higher preference for independence (63.7%) than for remaining in union (1.0%) with the Soviet Union (Silver and Titma, 1996:19)

In the Australian case, nationalism grew from the fact that no force in Australian politics represented the interests of the Australian people. Most existing political organizations were either anti-Australian such as cosmopolitan-internationalists or communists, or maintained a British-Australian mindset. Therefore, the call for Australian First nationalism is to oppose Non-Australian and British-Australian nationalisms. For the Australian nationalists, to pursue environmentalism is one of the

major tasks in their agenda. Through the protection of the environment, Australians will preserve the nationalism which is deeply rooted in that continent and one that can sustain a healthy environment for the future generations.

In the U.S., nationalism not only refers to patriotism against trading partners or terrorists. In Hawaii, environmentalism is used to promote the indigenous group's ethnic consciousness. They claim that the truth of humanity's relationship to their natural environment and planet home is at the root of the movement for Hawaiian independence. For the indigenous Hawaiians, sovereignty is necessary to maintain their relationships with the land and natural resources. They view the ruler's approach toward nature as completely different from their own. Native Hawaiians viewed Western colonial approaches as domination, exploitation and exhaustion, which were against the native Hawaiian central value of balance, reciprocity and sustainability. They claimed, "Independence is more than just a political status. In the same way that one might seek an independent home-off the grid, self-sufficient, and less vulnerable to the economic, political, and environmental turbulence of the surrounding world-Kanaka Maoli seek an independent homeland" (Hawaiian Independence 1999).

From those cases discussed above we find that to some extent environmentalism is related to nationalism in seeking identity of particular ethnic groups, especially in

societies with obvious majority ethnic group and minority ones.

Development of Nationalism in Taiwan after 1949

History suggests that Taiwan has not been always considered part of China given that non-Chinese have often governed Taiwan. Wachman claimed that not until the early 1990s, after Lien Chan became the prime minister, had Taiwan been ruled exclusively by people who consider Taiwan their home (1994). Such a unique history makes it an intriguing issue of national identity for Taiwan's inhabitants given that numerous regimes from different nationalities have ruled on that island--including rulers from Spain, Portugal, Holland, China, and Japan. One good example is that when under the Japanese colonization during the WWII, many Taiwanese were summoned to fight the war against China, which eventually won the war and took over the island afterwards. The former enemy then became the new ruler and people in Taiwan shifted from being Japanese to being Chinese.

The Japanese colonization of Taiwan had some other significant impact on people's imagination of a nation. Before the Japanese take-over, people in Taiwan were divided by languages used by different ethnicity groups, including Holo, Hakka, and the aborigines. The Japanese ruler terminated people's imagination of Chinese heritages by forcing

people to speak just one unified language, Japanese. And after such effort, Taiwan was for the first time confined within the main island and the remote Peng-fu Island, which geographically cut the connection with China.

The history of nation building in Taiwan had been mixed over time with characteristics of an immigrant society and the impact of external powers. Chinese nationalism has the longest history on that island, although it was not consistently dominant at all time, with competition of other nationalisms such as Spanish, Portuguese, and Japanese. After the Ching dynasty was overthrown, concepts on China and Chinese had some new definitions and implications. The term Chinese (*chunh-hwa-ming-chu*) was first promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen after the 1911 revolution and the founding of the Republic of China. In Dr. Sun's definition the Chinese would be formed through assimilation among the five different ethnicity groups; Han, Man-chu, Mongolian, Hue, and Tibetans. The new republic would bring up a new nation named Chinese through assimilation among the five racial groups; China would follow the model of America which was built upon all kinds of races from the world.

Such a design was stretched by Chiang Kai-shek through his imagination that Chinese was by nature included all five ethnicity groups. Such simplification would try to speed the process of ethnic identification change among different ethnicity groups.

According to Daniel Glaser (1958), the dynamics of ethnic identification come with three major components: ethnic ideology, association preferences, and feelings aroused by ethnic contacts. Those components will be reflected in the changing process, in which Glaser suggested four major steps: segregating, marginal, desegregating, and assimilated. Glaser reminded us that the direction of these four steps is not fixed from one end to the other end. It could go either way, depending on the working patterns of those three dynamics component. However, contact and interaction among different groups are essential in building and changing ethnic identification.

Accordingly, Chiang's claim was to skip the process suggested by Glaser and to use political forces to hasten a unified ethnic identification, which would be by nature problematic. This controversy had deep roots in modern China history because of the two World Wars and the Chinese civil war. China, *chung-kuo*, was a term represented the Han people's egocentric mindset on the world. *Chung* stands for the center in Chinese vocabulary, and *kuo* means state. The combination of these two characters reflected the perception of the Han being the core position and all other surrounding states being peripheral, with an implication of also being less civilized. The way the Han regimes named the other remote states of different ethnicity groups, *yi-di* (barbarians), simply expressed their superiority over other people. Chung (1994) suggested that *chung-kuo*

was mainly a geographic and cultural term, even though *kuo* has the political implication of a state. His argument was based on the fact that each dynasty had its own formal title to represent its regime, like Tang dynasty, Ming dynasty, and Ching dynasty. Therefore, “China” (*Chung-kuo*) meant the area inhabited or controlled by the Han people of the plains along the middle and lower sections of the Yellow River.

Chiang brought his own principle to Taiwan after his defeat by the Chinese Communists in 1949. In Taiwan, the ethnic identification issue was not involved with Han and non-Han groups. Instead, it was all about the subgroup conflicts within Han.

It is believed that Chinese and Taiwanese identities in Taiwan did not emerge until the KMT's takeover in 1949 (Gates 1981; Wang 1993). The Chinese came to Taiwan in a fashion of "immigrant superordination" (Liberson 1961), which inevitably invited ethnic conflicts and polarization. The lack of a common language between the two groups in the beginning made the interaction more difficult. Taiwanese, just freed from Japanese ruling, spoke either Japanese or Taiwanese and only a very few were able to read Chinese. To the new rulers, all visible Japanese heritages in Taiwan jogged their horrible memory of WWII. Such unhappy contact incited Chinese hostility against Taiwanese in the very beginning; it also made Taiwanese feel disappointed with the new rulers. What KMT ruling elites tried to accomplish first was to create Chinese nationalism among all

Taiwanese, prohibiting students from speaking Taiwanese in schools and limiting Taiwanese cultural practices. As a consequence, Taiwanese school kids felt ashamed of their own language and felt inferior in their culture.

Most of the Chinese who came to Taiwan after 1949 did not plan to stay for long because Chiang Kai-shek promised to fight back to regain sovereignty in China. Plus they carried a superior approach in dealing with Taiwanese and mostly lived segregated from Taiwanese; they never felt pressure to learn Taiwanese culture. That is the reason why when Taiwanization (or localization) became popular, the Chinese suddenly felt lost and insecure.

In the KMT's efforts to enhance Chinese nationalism, education was designed to serve as the means to achieve that goal. It was aimed to transform Taiwanese to citizens of the Republic of China (Wang 1993). In the first few decades, Taiwanese were educated to believe in and support KMT's plan to regain China. Later, they were expected to accept the KMT's ruling legitimacy in Taiwan, even after the goal of reclaiming over the mainland became impossible.

In order to strengthen Chinese nationalism, the KMT selectively ignored Taiwanese history and culture. All levels of education were designed to build the imagination of a Chinese history and to solidify the KMT's ruling legitimacy. Taiwanese pupils were

commanded to imagine the remote Xin-Jiang is part of their homeland, and Mao Tse-tung was the most hated person in the world. They could name all the provinces the Yangtze River goes through, but could not tell where the Jaw-shui River, the biggest one in Taiwan, is located. They could identify which five different ethnic groups constituted the Republic of China in 1911 when it was born, but very few of them were able to name the nine aboriginal groups in Taiwan.

Taiwanese Nationalism vs. Chinese Nationalism

As we reviewed in the previous section, ethnic consciousness will not be developed if there are no significant distinctions and treatment among ethnic groups. The emergence of ethnic consciousness may come from generational heritage, which was referred to as primordialism; or come from political manipulation, which was referred to as constructivism. These two sources might come in any order and contribute to people's ethnic consciousness complementarily.

The harsh start of the KMT's regime sowed the seed of a Taiwanese identity for Taiwanese after 1940s. The exclusion of Taiwanese from participating in public affairs also enhanced their perception of being second-class citizens. In governmental agencies, including the military and state-run businesses, the Chinese always had the easy channel

for promotion and had the privilege of occupying the top positions of each administration. The national legislative body was never reelected until the early 1990s and only very small amount of supplementary positions were open to periodic elections that were not fair and clean. The KMT manipulated local elections as well as central elections. Joining the KMT was essential to becoming a prominent political figure or to gaining significantly political influence. Such "ruling without delegation" mode provoked the Taiwanese's feeling of being discriminated against, with the bitter taste of not being a Chinese.

Ethnically, most inhabitants in Taiwan are of Han origin, which included two major groups that constituted 85% of the total population: Holo and Hakka. Those Hans who came after 1949 were categorized as Chinese in order to distinguish them from Holo and Hakka. Before the political reforms introduced in the late 1980s, people had never been given domain to discuss the ethnic identity issue since it was viewed by the ruler as a serious challenge to its ruling legitimacy. The superficial division between ethnicities were mainly 'mainlander' (*wai shen jen*) and 'Taiwanese' (*bun sen jen*). Very few people, except members or supporters of opposition parties, dared to claim themselves not Chinese. However, because of its politically forbidden essence, the identity issue was seldom seen in public opinion polls or even academic surveys (Wachman 1994).

Democratization in Taiwan not only allowed public participation in political operations, but also opened the ‘Pandora’s Box’ of ethnic identification and national identification. One of the main goals of democratization, while getting away from authoritarianism, was to make the official view of Taiwan's political status conform to the attitudes most Taiwanese have about their national identity (Wachman, 1994). The new tendency of having more Taiwanese politicians enter the power community of the KMT also severely challenged the once undisputed Chinese nationalism.

The definitions of Taiwanese could be categorized from the broadest one to the narrowest one as follows (Lin 1994):

- 1). Holo people. This is the narrowest definition.
- 2). People who came to Taiwan before 1949, and the native Taiwanese who were born and raised in Taiwan. All those are distinctive from people who came from China with the Nationalist government after 1949.
- 3). Whoever identifies him/herself as Taiwanese. This is a much broader definition that relates to territorial identity and is close to the meaning of “people of Taiwan.”
- 4). Those who identify with Taiwan as the permanent homeland and are willing to fight for its well-being. This concept is more like a Taiwanese nation and is distinctive from belonging to the Chinese nation.

For the concept of national identification, Wu (1993) distinguished four categories; Taiwan nationalist, China nationalist, Pragmatist, and Conservative.

1. Taiwan nationalist: people who favor Taiwan independence and oppose unification with China regardless of what will happen to China in the future. These people tend to believe that Taiwan is and should be an independent country without any consideration of the China factor.

2. China nationalist: people who favor unification with China and oppose Taiwan independence, even if China eventually accepts to let Taiwan go. Such insistence is mostly based on moral judgment, in which social, cultural, and historical linkages with China dictate its formation. They feel becoming independent from China will take away a very big portion of being a Chinese in ethnic, cultural, and even fundamental terms.

3. Pragmatists: people who do not favor one choice and oppose the other one. They will favor Taiwan independence if China will not start military actions against it. On the other hand, they also favor unification with China if China achieves the same level of democracy and economic development as Taiwan. These people basically will accept whichever of the two outcomes occurs first. If China transforms into a democratic and economically developed country like Taiwan before it abandons the use of military action to prevent Taiwan independence, these pragmatists will agree to unification with China.

But if China neither gains political and economic achievements nor abandons its threat of using military action against Taiwan, these pragmatists will choose to support Taiwan independence.

4. Conservatives: these people reject either Taiwan independence or unification with China regardless whether or not those ideal conditions are met. They prefer the status quo of letting Taiwan be the Republic of China, although it does not suggest clear sovereignty on the international stage. Neither a Republic of Taiwan nor the PRC appeals to them as a national identity.

It is commonly recognized that the Taiwan independence supporters are mostly, even exclusively, Taiwanese. And many Taiwanese and most Chinese were relatively inclined to support unification with China (Hsieh and Niou 1996). Such a simplification, however, could not really reveal the development of people's mindsets in choosing a national identity. Currently, identity with Taiwanese or Chinese is very complex and has immense impact on people's national identity choices.

Accordingly, we will use the empirical data to answer the following questions related to what we have discussed:

1) How was the environmental issue related to the nationalism issue in Taiwan, particularly after political democratization was introduced in the 1990s?

2) Who are Taiwanese? Who are Chinese? These very complicated on-going questions need to be answered based on empirical investigation rather than on instinctive perceptions.

3) What are the implications of different ethnic identifications on people's national identification?

Data Analyses and Findings

National Identity, Issue Preference, and Party Support

From Table 4-1 cross tabulation of national identification and issue preference of 1993, we can find that overall people favor "economic growth (Pro-Eco)" over "environmental protection (Pro-EP)," "national defense (Pro-DE)," and "public participation (Pro-PP)," respectively. For national identification, the general trend showed that "remaining status quo (Status)" was the first choice, followed by "pro-unification" (Pro-Uni), "depends" (Depends), and "pro-independence" (Pro-Ind), respectively.

For people whose primary concern was environmental protection, they mostly chose "remaining status quo" for their national identification (51.3%). The second choice in the group was to seek unification with China (22.%), followed by the choice of "depends" (15%). The least favored choice for environmentally concerned people was to become an

independent country (10.5%). This does not fit into our previous assumption that those whoever concerned about environmental conditions would be more inclined to pursue an independent state.

If we look into the overall preferences in choosing the national identification, the environmentally concerned group did not differ significantly from the general populace. The only difference came from that of the “Pro-PP” group, which ranked independence ahead of “depends.” The reason behind this slight difference could be that people who felt the need to expand public participation in political decision-making were more politically-oriented than the other groups were. They tended to be more involved with political activities and had a little stronger sense of making decisions, so they put the uncertain choice of “depends” in the last category.

Generally speaking, the identical preference order shared by the environmentally concerned group and “Pro-Eco” and “Pro-DE” groups suggests that issue preferences did not make significant difference in people's mindset when facing the choice of national identification. Put reversely, issue concern did not change people's selection of the national identification. Regardless of issue preferences, people tended to care more about security and stability that associated with decision of national identification. And remaining status quo and pro-unification seemed to be more promising bringing security

and stability, meanwhile, declaring support for independence would more probably invite Chinese invasion. The connection between environmentalism and nationalism we saw from other developing country cases was missing in Taiwan case.

Furthermore, when we look at Table 4-2 we can find that party support in the environmentally concerned group did not show significant differences from that of other issue groups. Among people concerned with environmental protection, 62.1 percent chose the KMT and 34.2 percent selected the DPP, which were very close to the two parties' overall supporting rates (61.7 percent and 31 percent respectively in the Legislative Yuan elections of 1992). When we cross checked this group with their national identification and party support we found that "Status Quo" still was the first choice from both parties' supporters. The rankings of other choices basically fit into the general patterns of KMT supporters putting unification ahead of other selections, and of DPP supporters' preferring independence over alternatives.

When we look into the factor of ethnicity, some findings were helpful in understanding people's development of a mindset. For Taiwanese, the issue preferences were ranked as "Pro-Eco", "Pro-EP", "Pro-PP", and "Pro-DE" in the most to the least preferred (Table 4-3). That order was exactly the same as that of the whole population. Moreover, regardless of issue preferences, the national identification rankings were very

similar-- "Status Quo," "Pro-Uni," "Depends," then "Pro-Ind"-- with only exception that those who favored public participation put "pro-independence" ahead of "pro-unification" and "depends." For Chinese, the pattern of issue preferences was very close to that of the overall population.

However, when we crosstabulated ethnicity and ethnic identification with national identification and party support, we found that significant differences emerged. As for our assumptions claimed that the Taiwanese would have higher portion of people who favored independence than the Chinese would have, our findings confirmed it as 10.9 percent of the former group chose independence while only 3.4 percent of the latter group did so (Table 4-5). For unification, ethnicity also played a major factor as we found that more than 40 percent of Chinese favored unification compared to 19.5 percent of Taiwanese.

Moreover, the ethnicity voting was manifest in party support. Ethnicity voting is a very effective tool for measuring ethnic consciousness (Wolfinger 1965). According to Donald Horowitz (1985:319-20) there are two ways of ethnic voting. The first one is shown by one ethnic group voting for one specific party. The other way is shown by people going beyond party boundaries to vote for candidates with the same ethnic background. In Taiwan, the second way was rarely seen because most candidates in all

choices (Table 4-7). This change was partly due to the steady growth of the pro-independence approach, associated with political reforms that offered people more opportunities to review the political issues, and was partly because of the military threat came from China during 1995 and 1996 that resulted in people's distrust of the Chinese regime reducing the enthusiasm of unification. Only in the economically concerned group did people put "Depends" ahead of "Pro-Ind". Not surprisingly, the majority of people (61.3%) still chose to remain status quo. In the environmentally concerned group, the percentage of people who favored independence grew to 21.2 percent from 10.5 percent of 1993. The selection of unification dropped from 21.9 percent of 1993 to 7.1 percent, which indicated that people who favored the environmental issue had very little interest in unification.

One new finding from the 1998 survey revealed that indeed many more people could have agreed with independence if not for the military threat from China. When asked "if China is willing to remain peaceful relation with Taiwan after the latter declares independent, will you agree with Taiwan independence," more than 72 percent of people chose to agree with independence (Table 4-8). Within "Pro-Ind" group, 97.8 percent would agree with independence. For people who originally favored the status quo, 69.2 percent would agree with independence under this condition. And more than 70 percent

of people in the “Depends” group would take the same position. Even in the “Pro-Uni” group, the commitment to unification was heavily shaken, as 47.4 percent of them changed to agree with independence if there would not be military invasion from China.

The other investigation with the group of people who chose the status quo came out with more support for independence also. When asked “if the status quo could not be maintained, what you would more agree with,” more people preferred independence to unification as their secondary choice (Table 4-9).

From Table 4-10 a cross tabulation of national identification and party support within the environmentally concerned group, we find that their choices of the two parties were similar to the overall rates of support. There were 52.2 percent of environmentally concerned people who chose the KMT and 42.5 percent who chose the DPP, which were not far away from the two parties' overall rates of support in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections of 46.1 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively. Likewise, independence received least popularity among the KMT supporters, and so did unification among the DPP supporters.

Like what we did with the 1993 survey, we added the factor of ethnicity into the cross checking of national identification and issue preferences in Table 4-11. The results showed that the Taiwanese's selections of national identification were the same as those

of the general population, with the order of "Status Quo," "Pro-Ind," "Depends," then "Pro-Uni." For Chinese, their choices on national identification put "Pro-Uni" as only second to "Status Quo" and followed by "Depends" and "Pro-Ind" (Table 4-12).

On cross checking of ethnicity and ethnic identification with national identification and party support, we found similar patterns to those of 1993. More than 18 percent of Taiwanese favored independence, which grew to nearly two times that of 1993 (Table 4-13). Yet the Taiwanese unification supporters dropped from 20 percent in 1993 to 7.4 percent. For Chinese, more people (68.6%) favored the status quo when compared to 1993 (44%). But the percentage of "Pro-Uni" dropped from 40.6 percent of 1993 to only 14.8 percent of 1998, although the "Pro-Ind" rate was still under 5 percent.

When we cross checked ethnic identification with the question of attitude toward independence if there will not be a military threat from China after Taiwan declares independence, the agreement with independence increased dramatically (Table 4-14). Within the Taiwanese group, more than 83 percent of people would agree with independence. For those who originally chose status quo, more than 77 percent of them would agree with independence under this new condition. Even in the original "Pro-Uni" group, most people would change to independence now.

For the Chinese group, most people did not change to agree with independence even

if the new condition is met, but the margin is not big. For people who carried dual-identity, the majority now would tend to agree with independence.

Ethnicity voting again drew a very clear boundary between two groups in party support (Table 4-15). For Chinese, more than 61 percent of them chose the KMT, which dropped significantly from 96 percent of 1993. Such a change could be attributed to the increasing popularity of the NP (29.6%) as it identified as a strong guard of Chinese nationalism, while the KMT was viewed as dominated by Taiwanese politicians. On the other hand, the DPP still won more than 96 percent support from the Taiwanese, although the Chinese support increased from 1.7 percent in 1993 to 3.5 percent in 1998.

One new category introduced in the 1998 survey was "ethnic identification," which asked people to identify him/herself as a Taiwanese, a Chinese, or both regardless of his/her ethnic origin. Such a categorization helped us to further investigate the force of nationalism in people's decisions on different issues. The findings of issue preference (Table 4-16) mostly matched rankings in the previous Table (4-12), with the order from the most to the least favored being: "pro-national defense," "pro-social morality," "pro-economic growth," "pro-environmental protection," "pro-wealth gap," then "pro-public participation." When we compared the preference of issue between the original ethnicity group and the ethnicity identity group, we did not see too much

difference.

For ethnic Taiwanese and people self-identified as Taiwanese, “pro-national defense” was still the first choice as the former group came with higher percentage (44.1% to 40.5%). More people of the Taiwanese identity group favored environmental protection than people with Taiwanese ethnicity did (12.7% to 11.1%), which suggest that nationalism does not have a great impact on people’s concern for environmental protection.

A similar tendency was seen in the comparison between ethnic Chinese and people identified as Chinese. Particularly in environmental protection, those two groups had the same percentage of people who favored it--11.1 percent. For national defense, the percentages in favor were identical also, at 48.1 percent. Again, we did not find that nationalism played a big role in people’s mindset when choosing positions.

From Table 4-17 we found that the ethnicity factor imposed a stronger influence in determining people's choices of national identification. For people with Taiwanese identity, 28.9 percent favored independence, which was 10 percent more than that among people of Taiwanese origin (Table 4-13). Meanwhile only 4.5 percent of them selected unification, which dropped from 7.4 percent of those with Taiwanese origin. For Chinese identifiers, 21.7 percent chose unification, compared to only 14.8 percent of Chinese

natives. People with dual identities were more inclined to avoid a choice between independence and unification, as the other two options held nearly 84 percent of this group.

For party support, fewer people holding a Taiwanese identification support the KMT than people who were ethnic Taiwanese (44.9% to 55.4%). The DPP won more support from people with Taiwanese identification than from ethnic Taiwanese (54% to 41.6%). On the NP's group, the support from Taiwanese identifiers was slightly lower than that from the ethnic Taiwanese (1.1% to 3%). In the Chinese category, we see the pattern of Chinese nationalists strongly supporting the KMT and staying away from the DPP. More than 70 percent of people with Chinese identity chose the KMT, which was higher than that of ethnic Chinese (61.7%). The intriguing finding was that the NP's support from Chinese identifiers was even lower than that of the ethnic Chinese (11.9% to 29.6%). Since the NP had made itself as the guardian of Chinese nationalism, we expected to see more Chinese nationalists would support it.

Consequently, we see that ethnicity and ethnic identification had a more obvious impact on party support and on national identification, but did not have significant influence on people's preferences on other issues like environmental protection and national defense. However, we need more evidence to suggest there indeed is such

tendency in Taiwan. Therefore, we will go on to further analysis of these intertwining forces.

Ethnic identification, National Identity, Issue Preference, and Party Support

The 1998 survey provides us a very good opportunity to go deep into an analysis of the interaction among original ethnicity, ethnic identification, national identification, issue preference and party support. We try to seek the formation of ethnic identification and national identification and its implications on different issues.

Original Ethnicity and Ethnic identification:

Ethnic identification, according to Daniel Glaser (1958: 31), refers to “ a person’s use of racial, national or religious terms to identify himself, and thereby, to relate himself to others.” Glaser further suggested that the dynamics of ethnic identification came with three components: ethnic ideology, association preferences, and feelings aroused by ethnic contacts. Ethnic ideology includes all those ideas and images attached to every particular ethnic group. Such ideology would apply to how a person portrays his/her own group and other ethnic groups. It usually involves superiority, inferiority or equity, or inequity among ethnic groups (Glaser 1958).

In Taiwan, the ethnic ideology the Chinese held concerning the Taiwanese in the early years was that the former group was superior because of the influence of the

advanced Chinese culture. The inferior Taiwanese had been exposed to the evil and corrupting Japanese culture before being salvaged by the great Chinese group. On the other hand, the Taiwanese viewed the Chinese as desperados from the civil war. They took over the island without consultation with native residents there and then became a privileged group occupying all social and political resources. The 228 Incident enhanced such ideology between these two ethnic groups and set the tone of their future interaction.

The second component of Glaser's ethnic identification is "association preferences," which refers to "tendencies to avoid association with persons of particular ethnic identities and to seek to limit association to persons of other ethnic identities" (1958:32). That is, people prefer to associate with members of their own group. The residential segregation between the Chinese and the Taiwanese was very obvious in the early years of history of ethnic interaction in Taiwan. The concentration of the Chinese in the specially designated villages prevented intimidation between these two groups, which also resulted in ethnic preference to stick with its own group. In business, one of the very few categories in which the Taiwanese excelled over the Chinese, the Taiwanese had a tendency to avoid engaging with the Chinese. In public agencies, the Chinese had a better chance to get promotion because the majority of the managing personnel were Chinese.

The last component of Glaser's ethnic identification is about "the totality of feelings

which distinguish a person's experiences in contact with other persons whom he categorizes as of a particular ethnic identity" (1958:32). The significant kinds of feeling seen in this aspect are like "hostility, fear, disgust, envy, affection, respect, vague uneasiness or complete indifference" (Ibid). Under this influence, people tend to feel secure, adequate and affective when with their own group. On the other hand, people will feel intimidated, hostile, disgust and/or fear when interacting with different ethnic groups.

Based on Glaser's argument, we propose here the basic assumptions of original ethnicity and ethnic identification of people in Taiwan as the follows:

1. Those whose father and mother are both Taiwanese (TT) should tend to identify themselves as Taiwanese.
2. Those who have a father and mother who both came from China after 1949 (CC) should tend to carry identity as a Chinese.
3. Those with a Taiwanese father and Chinese mother (TC) should tend to identify as the father's ethnicity of Taiwanese.
4. Those with a Chinese father and Taiwanese mother (CT) should tend to follow the father's ethnicity of Chinese.

Findings:

The distribution of the four group came out as TT the biggest group of 1491 cases,

CC second with 121 cases, CT third with 108 cases, and TC last with only 11 cases (Table 4-18). Within the TT group, 46.5 percent of them carried identity as Taiwanese; 32 percent had dual-identity with Taiwanese ahead of Chinese; 13.3 percent also with dual-identity but had Chinese ahead of Taiwanese; and only 8.2 percent viewed themselves as Chinese. In the CC group, 33.9 percent followed their original identity as Chinese; 31.4 percent felt they were Chinese as well as Taiwanese; 25.6 percent identified as Taiwanese as well as Chinese; 9.1 percent had identity as Taiwanese.

For the TC, the smallest group, 45.5 percent put the father's identity ahead of the mother's and identified themselves as Taiwanese and also Chinese. There were 18.2 percent of them identified as Taiwanese. The same percentage were also seen in Chinese, and Chinese also Taiwanese categories.

For the CT group, the most common form of interethnic marriage in Taiwan, the dual-identity with Taiwanese ahead of Chinese was the most popular choice of 39.8 percent. The second most choice was the other dual-identity with Chinese ahead of Taiwanese (29.6%). Only 18.5 percent followed the father's identity as Chinese. And 12 percent identified as the mother's ethnicity as Taiwanese.

Overall, the CT group had the highest percentage of dual-identity at 69.4 percent, followed by TC (63.7%), CC (57%), and TT (43.3%), respectively. And only in the TT

did the single identity (Taiwanese) gain more recognition than the dual-identity. The force of nationalism seemed to be manifest in the interethnic marriage groups as they were more inclined to keep the dual-identity. It was also seen in the high percentage of pure Chinese (CC) with dual-identity.

If we look into the ethnic identification category, we find that among those who identified as Taiwanese, 96 percent were from the TT group, which fit into our expectation that ethnic Taiwanese were more inclined to identify as Taiwanese. However, there were a group of TT who changed their identities into Chinese--about 7 percent of the total sample population.

Put in a different way we find that in the Chinese self-identification category, 66 percent of them also came from the TT group. This result contradicts the stereotyped impression that Chinese identification would come from only or mainly ethnic Chinese. In fact, ethnic Taiwanese constituted the biggest subgroup within Chinese identification.

Ethnic Origin, Ethnic identification, and National Identity:

The basic assumptions of this issue are:

1. Those whose father and mother are both Taiwanese (TT) should tend to favor Independence over Unification.
2. Those who have father and mother both came from China after 1949 (CC) should

prefer Unification to Independence.

3. Those with a Taiwanese father and a Chinese mother (TC) should favor Independence over Unification.

4. Those with a Chinese father and a Taiwanese mother (CT) should prefer Unification to Independence.

5. For those identified as Taiwanese regardless of their original ethnicity, the percentage favoring Independence should be higher than that of the ethnic Taiwanese.

6. For those identified as Chinese regardless of their original ethnicity, the percentage favoring Unification should be higher than that of the ethnic Chinese.

Findings:

In the TT group, our assumption is upheld, as more people chose Independence (17.9%) over Unification (7.1%). In the CC group, our assumption also held true as 16.9 percent chose Unification and only 2.4 percent chose Independence. For the TC group, our assumption that more people would favor Independence over Unification was not confirmed, as both choices shared the same percentage at 9.1. Actually, beside the "status quo," all three other choices had the exactly same percentage. It was probably due to its very small number of cases (only 11 people). For the CT group, as we expected, more people prefer Unification (12.7%) to Independence (2.7%). Although this group also

tended favor Unification over Independence as the CC did, however, their preference for Unification was not that strong, as more people (16.4%) chose "depends" over Unification, while the CC group had the opposite outcomes (16.9% to 12.1%) (Table 4-19).

For all the four groups, the choice of remaining status quo was still prevalent with 58.4 percent of the TT, 68.5 percent of the CC, 72.1 percent of the TC, and 67.3 percent of the CT favoring the status quo. Added by the choice of "depends," we can see nearly 80 percent of people in all groups shied away from the confrontation between Independence and Unification. Especially in the interethnic groups, the TC and the CT, the percentages choosing "status quo" and "depends" were 81.8 and 83.7, respectively.

For those identified with Taiwanese, the percentage favoring Independence was 10 percentage points more than that among the ethnic Taiwanese. On the other hand, the popularity of Unification dropped in this group compared to that of the ethnic Taiwanese (4.5% to 7.4%). For people identified with Chinese, consistent with our assumption, the percentage favoring Unification increased from that of the ethnic Chinese (21.7% to 14.8%). But the percentage favoring Independence actually differed only slightly compared to the ethnic Chinese group (3.7% to 2.5%) (Table 4-20).

The choice of remaining status quo still prevailed in both of Taiwanese and Chinese

identification groups. But when asked if the status quo became impossible then what would be their secondary choice, the interaction between ethnic identification and national identification was seen again, as Taiwanese tended more toward Independence while Chinese favored more with Unification. Nearly 40 percent of Taiwanese who originally chose status quo now will change to Independence as their second choice. And more than 40 percent of Chinese will put Unification as their choice next to remain status quo (Table 4-21).

Moreover, the linkage between Taiwanese identity and Independence was strengthened when we take away the military threat from China within people's consideration of national identification. More than 83 percent of people with Taiwanese identity would agree with Independence (Table 4-14). For those who originally chose status quo, more than 77 percent of them would agree with independence under this new condition. Even in the original "Pro-Uni" group, most people would change to Independence now. For the Chinese group, although most people did not change to agree with independence even the new condition is met, but the acceptance of Independence was the highest in all of our analyses (44.8%).

Ethnic Origin, Ethnic identification, and Issue Preference:

The basic assumption of this issue is that there is no significant differences among the

four groups in issue preferences, given the Chinese military threat (1995 and 1996) imposed tremendous impact on people's concern of national security. The gap between choices of "economic growth," and "environmental protection" should be within a very limited margin, again, because of the dominance of security concern. The difference between the ethnic Taiwanese and the Taiwanese identification group would not be significant, and so is that of the ethnic Chinese and the Chinese identification group.

Findings:

Our assumptions hold true in most of the four groups with only exception in the TC, which could be affected by the small size of its sample size. More than 40 percent of people in the three groups put "defense" as the most important issue in Taiwan. Even in the TC group was "defense" still one of the most popular choices along with concern of "wealth gap." The bipolarization between "economic growth" and "environmental protection" was not seen in any groups with the very slight difference of choices between them (Table 4-22).

The influence of ethnic identification was not seen here in issue preferences given that no any issue category came out with more than 5 percent difference between the two groups (Table 4-23).

Ethnic Origin, Ethnic identification, and Party Support:

1. Those whose father and mother are both Taiwanese (TT) should tend have higher portion of people support the DPP than other groups do. And the NP should be their choice behind the two major parties because of its homogeneity of Chinese-oriented and of its radical approach on pro-unification.
2. Those who have father and mother both came from China after 1949 (CC) should favor more on the KMT and the NP because of their declaration on unification with China. Their last choice should be the DPP because its radical approach on pro-independence.
3. Those with a Taiwanese father and Chinese mother (TC) should have similar trend as that of the TT group because they followed the father's ethnicity with its all implications.
4. Those with Chinese father and Taiwanese mother (CT) should have similar trend as that of the CC group because they followed the father's ethnicity with its all implications.

Findings:

In the TT group, our assumptions held true with its supporting rate of the DPP (25.2%) was the highest among all groups; while its percentage of choosing the NP was as low as 1.7, compared to 22.6 percent (CC), 18.2 percent (TC), and 18.2 percent (CT)

of the other three groups. On the other hand, the percentage of its supporting to the KMT (33.5%) was much lower than the KMT's overall supporting rate of 46.1 percent in 1995 Legislative Yuan elections. If we assumed that people vote for the KMT based on its stance on "pro-unification," then in the TT group we should see the supporting rate for the NP, a radical "pro-unification" party, remained comparative high compared that of the DPP. However, we see only 1.7 percent of the TT group chose the NP, which was much lower of that of the DPP of 25.2 percent. It might suggest that the factors for voting the KMT indeed went beyond choice between independence and unification (Table 4-24).

In the CC group, the findings confirm our assumption of Chinese tend to vote for whoever inclined to favor unification. Therefore, the two "pro-unification" parties, the KMT and the NP, totally attracted 71.8 percent of people in this group. Also confirmed was the little supporting rate the DPP gained from the pure Chinese (3.2%).

For the TC group, the three parties shared the same rate as 18.2 percent. Again, the small size of its sample could contribute to the result. For the CT group, we find the similar trend with that of the CC group as the KMT and the NP together collected the majority of support (52.7%). The DPP gained a little more support in this group, yet it was still very low (9.1%).

For people with Taiwanese identification, the KMT's supporting rate dropped nearly

10 percent (44.9% to 55.4%). But the DPP gained much support and actually became the majority choice compared to that of the ethnic Taiwanese group (54% to 41.6%).

For people with Chinese identification, the KMT won much more support than that of the ethnic Chinese (70.4% to 61.7%). However, the DPP's supporting rated also increased from that of the ethnic Chinese group. The NP won nearly 30 percent of support from the ethnic Chinese group, but surprisingly dropped to only 11.9 percent (Table 4-25).

Summary

According to our findings, we did not find that people concerned with environmental protection had a stronger preference with Taiwan independence. On the contrary, they put independence as one of the last choices and remaining status quo as the most favored one. The linkage between environmentalism and new nationalism seen from other country cases is missing here in Taiwan. Moreover, people's choice of national identification was under very little impact of issue preferences when we find that the ranking orders were all very similar with no significant differences. From the survey of 1998 we find that national defense became the most concerned issue among the six choices, while the majority of people favored remaining status quo, the pursuing of a secure and stable Taiwan seemed to be manifested.

Environmental issue did not play a major role in people's choices of party support either. We did not see this group of people had different flavor with parties from their other counterparts. Furthermore, although we find ethnic identification did influence national identification and party support, it did not affect issue preferences. Both Taiwanese and Chinese tended to chose environmental protection as the second (1993) or the third (1998) choice. The assumption of original Taiwanese would be more concerned with environmental protection than their Chinese counterparts was not confirmed by our finding either.

The interaction among ethnic identification, national identification, and party support was more obvious. The conventional assertion that Taiwanese were more inclined to support Taiwan independence than the Chinese were was proved in our analysis; especially from people identified as Taiwanese did we see the stronger flavor with independence. However, it was not correct to say that most Taiwanese favored independence over other choices. In 1993 we saw Taiwanese group put unification ahead of independence, then they switched the order in 1998. Ethnic identification enhanced the Taiwanese's support for independence, but, again, remaining status quo was still the most favored choice.

An analogous pattern was also seen in the Chinese group, with a higher percentage

favoring unification than their Taiwanese counterparts. Ethnic identification as well enhanced the Chinese's support for unification. But within the Chinese group, remaining status quo was the first choice in national identification.

Ethnic identification carried much influence in people's choice of party support, which reflected in the line of ethnic voting. The percentage of the Chinese supported for the DPP was much lower than that of the Taiwanese. The differences were even bigger between the Taiwanese identification people and the Chinese identification people. The image of the DPP represented exclusively Taiwanese identity and denied the Chinese connection, to some extent, made the Chinese reluctant to stand with it. The Chinese nationalism created and nurtured by the KMT in the last five decades still remained in the Chinese group, especially in the Chinese identification ones.

Ethnic identification changes were seen in different ways from the Taiwanese and the Chinese groups. For the Taiwanese, nearly 50 percent of them claimed themselves as Taiwanese and another 30 percent put Taiwanese identity ahead of Chinese one. We did not have any data before 1990s to compare the difference then to track the ethnicity change, however, the high percentage of the Taiwanese stuck with their original ethnicity suggested that the new Taiwanese nationalism was developing significantly.

On the other hand, the Chinese had less percentage of people identified with their

own ethnicity compared to that of the Taiwanese group. And more than one third of them identified either with Taiwanese exclusively or with dual-identity but with Taiwanese ahead of Chinese. Again, we did not have the earlier data to compare the trend of the Chinese ethnic identification change. Nonetheless, we still can daringly suggest that the Chinese nationalism was weakening and giving way to the new Taiwanese nationalism by the end of the 1990s.

Tables

Table 4-1 1993 National ID vs. Issue Preference

			Issue Preference				Total
			Pro-Eco	Pro-DE	Pro-PP	Pro-EP	
National ID	Pro-Ind	Count	53	19	46	47	165
		% within National ID	32.1%	11.5%	27.9%	28.5%	100.0%
		% within Issue	7.9%	7.2%	17.4%	10.5%	10.0%
	Pro-Uni	Count	150	75	54	98	377
		% within National ID	39.8%	19.9%	14.3%	26.0%	100.0%
		% within Issue	22.3%	28.4%	20.4%	21.9%	22.9%
	Status	Count	363	139	127	230	859
		% within National ID	42.3%	16.2%	14.8%	26.8%	100.0%
		% within Issue	54.0%	52.7%	47.9%	51.3%	52.1%
	Depends	Count	106	31	38	73	248
		% within National ID	42.7%	12.5%	15.3%	29.4%	100.0%
		% within Issue	15.8%	11.7%	14.3%	16.3%	15.0%
Total		Count	672	264	265	448	1649

Table 4-2 1993 Pro-EP: National ID vs. Party Support Cross tabulation

			party support			Total
			Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Other	
National ID	Pro-Ind	Count	8	25		33
		% within National ID	24.2%	75.8%		100.0%
		% within party support	4.3%	24.3%		11.0%
	Pro-Uni	Count	49	15	3	67
		% within National ID	73.1%	22.4%	4.5%	100.0%
		% within party support	26.2%	14.6%	27.3%	22.3%
	Status Q	Count	104	42	6	152
		% within National ID	68.4%	27.6%	3.9%	100.0%
		% within party support	55.6%	40.8%	54.5%	50.5%
	Depends	Count	26	21	2	49
		% within National ID	53.1%	42.9%	4.1%	100.0%
		% within party support	13.9%	20.4%	18.2%	16.3%
Total		Count	187	103	11	301

Table 4-3 1993 Taiwanese-National ID vs. Issue Preference

			Issue Preferen ce				Total
			Pro-Eco	Pro-DE	Pro-PP	Pro-EP	
National ID	Pro_Ind	Count	50	18	42	44	154
		% within ID	32.5%	11.7%	27.3%	28.6%	100.0%
		% within issue	8.8%	8.5%	18.1%	11.1%	11.0%
	Pro-Uni	Count	110	50	41	79	280
		% within ID	39.3%	17.9%	14.6%	28.2%	100.0%
		% within issue	19.4%	23.6%	17.7%	20.0%	19.9%
	Status Quo	Count	310	121	116	206	753
		% within ID	41.2%	16.1%	15.4%	27.4%	100.0%
		% within issue	54.7%	57.1%	50.0%	52.2%	53.6%
	Depends	Count	97	23	33	66	219
		% within ID	44.3%	10.5%	15.1%	30.1%	100.0%
		% within issue	17.1%	10.8%	14.2%	16.7%	15.6%
	Total	Count	567	212	232	395	1406

Table 4-4 1993 Chinese-National ID vs. Issue Preference

			Issue Preference				Total
			Pro-Eco	Pro-DE	Pro-PP	Pro-EP	
National ID	Pro-Ind	Count	2	1	2	2	7
		% within ID	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%	100.0%
		% within Issue	2.0%	2.0%	6.9%	4.0%	3.0%
	Pro-Uni	Count	40	24	13	17	94
		% within ID	42.6%	25.5%	13.8%	18.1%	100.0%
		% within Issue	39.6%	48.0%	44.8%	34.0%	40.9%
	Status Quo	Count	50	17	10	24	101
		% within ID	49.5%	16.8%	9.9%	23.8%	100.0%
		% within Issue	49.5%	34.0%	34.5%	48.0%	43.9%
	Depends	Count	9	8	4	7	28
		% within ID	32.1%	28.6%	14.3%	25.0%	100.0%
		% within Issue	8.9%	16.0%	13.8%	14.0%	12.2%
	Total	Count	101	50	29	50	230

Table 4-5 1993 Ethnicity vs. National ID

			National ID				Total
			Pro-Ind	Pro-Uni	Status Quo	Depends	
Ethnicity	Taiwanese	Count	166	297	820	241	1524
		% within ethnicity	10.9%	19.5%	53.8%	15.8%	100.0%
		% within national id	95.4%	75.8%	88.8%	89.6%	86.7%
	Chinese	Count	8	95	103	28	234
		% within ethnicity	3.4%	40.6%	44.0%	12.0%	100.0%
		% within national id	4.6%	24.2%	11.2%	10.4%	13.3%
	Total	Count	174	392	923	269	1758

Table 4-6 1993 Ethnicity vs. Party Support

			Party Support		Total
			Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	
Ethnicity	Taiwanese	Count	663	394	1057
		% within ethnicity	62.7%	37.3%	100%
		% within party support	79.2%	98.3%	85.4%
	Chinese	Count	174	7	181
		% within ethnicity	96.1%	3.9%	100.0%
		% within party support	20.8%	1.7%	14.6%
Total		Count	837	401	1238

Table 4-7 1998 National ID vs. Issue Cross tabulation

		Issue						Total
		Pro-Eco	Pro-EP	Pro-Gap	Pro-PP	Pro-MO	Pro_DE	
Pro-Ind	Count	39	42	14	9	55	120	279
	% within National ID	14.0%	15.1%	5.0%	3.2%	19.7%	43.0%	100.0%
	% within Issue	14.4%	21.2%	9.9%	25.0%	16.9%	15.4%	15.9%
Pro-Uni	Count	21	14	13	3	19	74	144
	% within National ID	14.6%	9.7%	9.0%	2.1%	13.2%	51.4%	100.0%
	% within Issue	7.8%	7.1%	9.2%	8.3%	5.8%	9.5%	8.2%
Status	Count	157	114	96	19	200	487	1073
	% within National ID	14.6%	10.6%	8.9%	1.8%	18.6%	45.4%	100.0%
	% within Issue	58.1%	57.6%	68.1%	52.8%	61.3%	62.4%	61.3%
Depend s	Count	53	28	18	5	52	99	255
	% within National ID	20.8%	11.0%	7.1%	2.0%	20.4%	38.8%	100.0%
	% within Issue	19.6%	14.1%	12.8%	13.9%	16.0%	12.7%	14.6%
	Count	270	198	141	36	326	780	1751

Table 4-8. Opinion on “ if China will remain peaceful relations with Taiwan after Taiwan declares Independent, then Taiwan should become Independent.”

		Agree	Disagree
Original Choice	Pro-Ind	262	6
	Pro-Uni	64	71
	Status	668	297
	Depends	122	50
Total		1116	424

Table 4-9. Secondary choice of people prefer “Status Quo” as the first choice of National ID

National ID	Pro-Uni	235 (22.0%)
	Pro-Ind	311 (29.1%)
	Depends	522 (48.9%)
Total		1068 (100%)

Table 4-10 1998 Pro-EP: National ID vs. Party Support Cross tabulation

			Party			Total
			Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Pro-NP	
National ID	Pro-Ind	Count	6	26		32
		% within National ID	18.8%	81.3%		100.0%
		% within Party	8.6%	45.6%		23.9%
	Pro-Uni	Count	7	1	1	9
		% within National ID	77.8%	11.1%	11.1%	100.0%
		% within Party	10.0%	1.8%	14.3%	6.7%
	Status	Count	49	24	6	79
		% within National ID	62.0%	30.4%	7.6%	100.0%
		% within Party	70.0%	42.1%	85.7%	59.0%
	Depends	Count	8	6		14
		% within National ID	57.1%	42.9%		100.0%
		% within Party	11.4%	10.5%		10.4%
Total		Count	70	57	7	134

Table 4-11 1998 Taiwanese-National ID vs. Issue Preference

		Issue						Total
		Pro-Eco	Pro-EP	Pro-Gap	Pro-PP	Pro-Mo	Pro-DE	
Pro-Ind	Count	37	42	13	9	54	117	272
	% within National ID	13.6%	15.4%	4.8%	3.3%	19.9%	43.0%	100.0%
	% within Issue	15.3%	25.1%	11.0%	29.0%	19.2%	17.6%	18.1%
Pro-Uni	Count	17	11	10	2	15	54	109
	% within National ID	15.6%	10.1%	9.2%	1.8%	13.8%	49.5%	100.0%
	% within Issue	7.0%	6.6%	8.5%	6.5%	5.3%	8.1%	7.3%
Status Quo	Count	139	91	81	16	168	407	902
	% within National ID	15.4%	10.1%	9.0%	1.8%	18.6%	45.1%	100.0%
	% within Issue	57.4%	54.5%	68.6%	51.6%	59.8%	61.4%	60.1%
Depend s	Count	49	23	14	4	44	85	219
	% within National ID	22.4%	10.5%	6.4%	1.8%	20.1%	38.8%	100.0%
	% within Issue	20.2%	13.8%	11.9%	12.9%	15.7%	12.8%	14.6%
	Count	242	167	118	31	281	663	1502

Table 4-12 Chinese-National ID vs. Issue Preference

			Issue Preference						Total
			Pro-Eco	Pro-EP	Pro-Gap	Pro-PP	Pro-Mo	Pro-DE	
National ID	Pro-Ind	Count	1		1		1	3	6
		% within ID	16.7%		16.7%		16.7%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within Issue	3.8%		4.8%		2.3%	2.7%	2.6%
	Pro-Uni	Count	4	3	3	1	4	20	35
		% within National ID	11.4%	8.6%	8.6%	2.9%	11.4%	57.1%	100.0%
		% within Issue	15.4%	11.5%	14.3%	20.0%	9.1%	17.7%	14.9%
	Status Quo	Count	18	20	14	3	31	76	162
		% within National ID	11.1%	12.3%	8.6%	1.9%	19.1%	46.9%	100.0%
		% within Issue	69.2%	76.9%	66.7%	60.0%	70.5%	67.3%	68.9%
	Depend s	Count	3	3	3	1	8	14	32
		% within National ID	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	3.1%	25.0%	43.8%	100.0%
		% within Issue	11.5%	11.5%	14.3%	20.0%	18.2%	12.4%	13.6%
Total		Count	26	26	21	5	44	113	235

Table 4-13 1998 Ethnicity vs. National ID

			National ID				Total
			Pro-Ind	Pro-Uni	Status Quo	Depends	
Ethnicity	Taiwanese	Count	274	112	905	226	1517
		% within Ethnicity	18.1%	7.4%	59.7%	14.9%	100.0%
		% within National ID	97.9%	76.2%	84.8%	87.3%	86.5%
	Chinese	Count	6	35	162	33	236
		% within Ethnicity	2.5%	14.8%	68.6%	14.0%	100.0%
		% within National ID	2.1%	23.8%	15.2%	12.7%	13.5%
Total		Count	280	147	1067	259	1753

Table 4-14 Ethnicity ID vs. Opinion on Independent if China will remain peaceful with Taiwan

		Taiwanese		Chinese		Both	
		Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Ind vs Pro-Ind	Pro-Ind	191	6	6	0	61	0
	Pro-Uni	15	14	14	24	33	33
	Status	258	74	45	59	357	160
	Depends	51	5	8	7	61	37
Total		515	99	73	90	512	230

Table 4-15 1998 Ethnicity vs. Party Support

			Party Support			Total
			Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Pro-NP	
Ethnicity	Taiwanese	Count	516	387	28	931
		% within Ethnicity	55.4%	41.6%	3.0%	100.0%
		% within Party Support	83.8%	96.5%	36.8%	85.2%
	Chinese	Count	100	14	48	162
		% within Ethnicity	61.7%	8.6%	29.6%	100.0%
		% within Party Support	16.2%	3.5%	63.2%	14.8%
Total		Count	616	401	76	1093

Table 4-16 1998 Ethnicity ID vs. Issue Preference

			Issue						Total
			Pro-Eco	Pro-EP	Pro-Gap	Pro-PP	Pro-Mo	Pro-DE	
Ethnicity ID	Taiwanese	Count	136	90	55	17	124	287	709
		% within Ethnicity ID	19.2%	12.7%	7.8%	2.4%	17.5%	40.5%	100.0%
		% within Issue	50.7%	45.9%	39.0%	47.2%	38.6%	37.5%	41.0%
	Chinese	Count	20	21	22	4	31	91	189
		% within Ethnicity ID	10.6%	11.1%	11.6%	2.1%	16.4%	48.1%	100.0%
		% within Issue	7.5%	10.7%	15.6%	11.1%	9.7%	11.9%	10.9%
	Both	Count	112	85	64	15	166	388	830
		% within Ethnicity ID	13.5%	10.2%	7.7%	1.8%	20.0%	46.7%	100.0%
		% within Issue	41.8%	43.4%	45.4%	41.7%	51.7%	50.7%	48.0%
Total		Count	268	196	141	36	321	766	1728

Table 4-17 1998 Ethnicity ID vs. National ID

			National ID				Total
			Pro-Ind	Pro-Uni	Status Quo	Depends	
Ethnicity ID	Taiwanese	Count	205	32	374	99	710
		% within Ethnicity ID	28.9%	4.5%	52.7%	13.9%	100.0%
		% within National ID	74.0%	22.2%	35.4%	39.4%	41.1%
	Chinese	Count	7	41	117	24	189
		% within Ethnicity ID	3.7%	21.7%	61.9%	12.7%	100.0%
		% within National ID	2.5%	28.5%	11.1%	9.6%	10.9%
	Both	Count	65	71	565	128	829
		% within Ethnicity ID	7.8%	8.6%	68.2%	15.4%	100.0%
		% within National ID	23.5%	49.3%	53.5%	51.0%	48.0%
Total		Count	277	144	1056	251	1728

Table 4-18 Original Ethnicity vs. Ethnic identification

Original Ethnicity		Ethnicity ID				Total
		Taiwanaese	Chinese	Taiwanese, also Chinese	Chinese, also Taiwanese	
TT		694	122	477	198	1491
	% within TT	46.5%	8.2%	32.0%	13.3%	100.0%
	% within Ethnicity ID	96.4%	65.9%	85.8%	73.3%	86.1%
CC		11	41	31	38	121
	% within CC	9.1%	33.9%	25.6%	31.4%	100.0%
	% within Ethnicity ID	1.5%	22.2%	5.6%	14.1%	7.0%
TC		2	2	5	2	11
	% within TC	18.2%	18.2%	45.5%	18.2%	100.0%
	% within Ethnicity ID	0.3%	1.1%	0.9%	0.7%	0.6%
CT		13	20	43	32	108
	% within CT	12.0%	18.5%	39.8%	29.6%	100.0%
	% within Ethnicity ID	1.8%	10.8%	7.7%	11.9%	6.2%
Total		720	185	556	270	1731

Table 4-19 Original Ethnicity vs. National Identification

		TT	CC	TC	CT
National ID	Pro-Ind	17.9	2.4	9.1	2.7
	Pro-Uni	7.1	16.9	9.1	12.7
	Status Q	58.4	68.5	72.7	67.3
	Depends	14.7	12.1	9.1	16.4
	Total	98.0	100.0	100.0	99.1

Table 4-20 Percentage of Original Ethnicity, Ethnicity ID, and National Identification

				National Identification	
				Status Quo	Depends
Ethnicity & Ethnic ID	Ethnic Taiwanese	18.1	7.4	59.7	14.9
	ID as Taiwanese	28.9	4.5	52.7	13.9
	Ethnic Chinese	2.5	14.8	68.6	14
	ID as Chinese	3.7	21.7	61.9	12.7

Table 4-21 Ethnicity ID vs. Choice of National ID if Status Quo is impossible

		Taiwanese ID	Chinese ID
	National ID		
	Pro-Uni	59	49
	Pro-Ind	143	16
	Depends	168	52
Total		370	117

Table 4-22 Percentage of Original Ethnicity vs. Issue Preference

Issue		TT	CC	TC	CT
	Pro-Eco	15.8	12.1	18.2	10.0
	Pro-EP	10.7	8.9	18.2	13.6
	Pro-Gap	7.7	11.3	27.3	6.4
	Pro-PP	2.0	1.6	0	2.7
	Pro-MO	18.4	14.5	9.1	23.6
	Pro-DE	43.3	50.8	27.3	43.6
	Total	97.8	100.0	100	100.0

Table 4-23 Percentage of Original Ethnicity, Ethnic identification, and Issue Preference

		Issue					
		Pro-Eco	Pro-Ep	Pro-Gap	Pro-PP	Pro-Mo	Pro-DE
Ethnicity & Ethnic ID	Ethnic Taiwanese	16.1	11.1	7.9	2.1	18.1	44.1
	ID as Taiwanese	19.2	12.7	7.8	2.4	17.5	40.5
	Ethnic Chinese	11.1	11.1	8.9	2.1	18.7	48.1
	ID as Chinese	10.6	11.1	11.6	2.1	16.4	48.1

Table 4-24 Percentage of Original Ethnicity vs. Party Support

		TT	CC	TC	CT
Party	KMT	33.5	49.2	18.2	34.5
	DPP	25.2	3.2	18.2	9.1
	NP	1.7	22.6	18.2	18.2
	Total	60.4	75.0	54.5	61.8

Table 4-25 Percentage of Original Ethnicity, Ethnic identification, and Party Support

		Party Support			
		Pro-KMT	Pro-DPP	Pro-NP	
Ethnicity & Ethnic ID	Ethnic Taiwanese	55.4	41.6	3	
	ID as Taiwanese	44.9	54	1.1	
	Ethnic Chinese	61.7	8.6	29.6	
	ID as Chinese	70.4	17.8	11.9	

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Is Taiwan a showcase for developing countries? I started asking this question when I knew that many developmental studies had applauded Taiwan's economic success and achievement in maintaining the wealth gap within very reasonable margin. However, being a member of that society I had much more direct experience with results associated with the economic success. There are many tragedies caused by natural disaster seen in national and local sections of the newspapers that will not be read by people outside that island.

Environmental degradation undermined Taiwan's success in the economy. The common source of pride for people in Taiwan came very significantly from the economic achievements accomplished in the last few decades. The so-called "economic miracle" recognition from the world was overshadowed by the collective suffering from a degrading environmental health. The quality of lives in Taiwan was not up to the level of a developed country, even to some of the developing countries. The air we breathed was polluted, the water we drank was not pure or even drinkable, the biodiversity of the river was vanishing, the mountain was roaring each time an earthquake or typhoon hits the

island and resulted in tremendous loss of human lives and natural resources. For example, in the earthquake of September 21, 1999, the biggest one in Taiwan's modern history, numerous lives were lost not only because of the force of nature but also because of human's mistakes in exploiting the landscape. The supposedly safe-and-beautiful apartment buildings (since people paid huge amount of money for them) could ruin residents' dream of having a sweet home and take away their loved ones' lives just because they were located near the over-developed hill area. While the rural and mountain areas suffered from natural disasters, the urban areas were not immune to those natural attacks. A small-scale typhoon could make Taipei city, a city desiring recognition as an Asian showcase, into a water world, and then into a big mud pond after the water finally went away. The rivers surrounding the city were not well protected in the last decades and finally lost the capacity of consuming water.

People learned hard lesson through the revenge of nature. Now people in Taiwan know that if national wealth could not guarantee the quality of daily life, something beyond economic growth needs to be done. Environmental protection is no longer a remote slogan, it is directly related everyone's survival. Some who are extremely worried about environmental degradation have called for political leaders to treat it as a national security issue. There are many researches trying to link these two issues, arguing when

environmental values are threatened the society is threatened (Westing 1988, Norman. 1993). Jessica T. Mathews (1989) argued that many globally environmental phenomenon, such as soil erosion, population growth, biodiversity loss, and climate change, will potentially affect U.S. national interest in a variety of ways. Therefore, a new thinking of treating environmental issues in a more comprehensive way should be in decision makers' mind. She built a strong link between environment and national security because the value and health of environment is vital to human life. Michael Renner (1989) also contended that environmental degradation undermined the natural support systems that sustained all human activities. Preserving a healthy environment is a public good in nature; however, natural disaster will not discriminate against people based on what they have done differently.

The environmental problems in Taiwan can be attributed to the nature factor and the human error, whose interaction has made it more challenging to overcome the problems. Taiwan has limited natural resources given its geographic size and the essence of an island. Environment provides opportunities and constraints as well. Some more fortunate regions are granted more opportunities than constraints, some otherwise receive more constraints than opportunities. For Taiwan, the constraints now prevail over opportunities after decades of aggressive usage of natural resources and the lack of good

protection of environment. Essentially, this island has very limited capacity in housing population given its geographic size and because one third of its land is covered by mountains. The mountains provided a fortunate biodiversity to Taiwan. Go deep into the mountain, and you should see a spectacular landscape full of biodiversity. But it was ruined through nonstop deforestation and the big-scale cultivating of production crops in the slope area by excavating the foundation of the mountain.

The human part includes the history of being colonized and being used as a resource-export site. Koxinga of the Ming dynasty used Taiwan as the fight back base to the Mainland, treating it as a preparation site equipped with necessary resources for the holy war. The Japanese colony period further exploited Taiwan as the raw material source for industry in Japan. Again, the KMT regime did not plan to settle down in Taiwan until the 1970s, only using it to prepare the second round of the civil war. The arrival of the KMT regime also brought the biggest human migration in history to Taiwan in 1949 when 3 millions of people fled from China with the KMT. The population of that island increased rapidly from 6 million to 9 million and gradually became one of the most densely populated areas in the world.

The KMT's lack of effort in devising planning and policies focusing on the well being of Taiwan in the first few decades imposed severe damage on the environment and

introduced an one-side mindset on economic growth at the expense of environment.

Before the 1970s, the development in Taiwan was used by the KMT to prepare the never finished mission of fighting back to the Mainland China. And when the mission became an impossible dream, the stubbornness with economic growth was associated with the goal of distinguishing the KMT from Communist China, where people suffered from poverty and little economic development. Reflecting such a mindset on policy making and institution design were superficial legislations and inattentive enforcements. Ironically, Taiwan was never far behind the advanced countries in terms of major environmental legislation. The significant passages of environmental legislation include:

--- In July 1974, the Water Pollution Control Act and the Waste Disposal Act .

---1975: The Air Pollution Control Act.

---1981: The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system.

In the creation of public agencies dedicated to protection of the environment, the major accomplishments are:

---1971: The Bureau of Environmental Sanitation (BES), under the Department of Health (DOH), created to take charge of environmental affairs regarding air pollution control and garbage disposal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economy controlled water pollution.

---1982: The Bureau of Environmental Protection (BEP), expanded from the BES but still

under DOH , was established to handle pollution control affairs.

---1987: The BEP was upgraded to form the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA).

Despite these efforts in institutionalizing environmental concerns, the general public still expressed dissatisfaction with the environmental improvement. According to a series of surveys conducted by the Environment Quality Protection Foundation (EQPF), the public “environmental pain index” indicated people bearing very high tensivity of bad environmental condition. In a scale from 0 to 100, from least pain to most pain, the national investigations showed scores of 78.7 in 1995, 74.7 in 1996, 77.2 in 1997, 75.4 in 1998, 77.5 in 1999, 78 in 2000, and 76 in 2001 (EQPF 2001). Moreover, there is no sign of significant progress over the years.

One big barrier to environmental improvement was the relatively low budget assigned to environment-related agencies. Currently, all environmental affairs are diffused into the Council of Agriculture and the EPA. The constraint of budget and delegation of authority ties all EPA’s energy and human resources with enforcing pollution regulation and leaves very little role in conservation planning. The current design of putting economic affairs in the hands of two heavyweight agencies, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Council for Economic Planning and Development,

simply overshadows the status of the EPA. And in many cases, the EPA was viewed as a rubber stamp to major economic plans which justified its validity through the EPA's nonvoluntary endorsement. The essence of decision should include a variety of points of view from different governmental agencies on a relatively equal basis. But the current institutional design of EPA really downgrades its significance in decision-making.

Moreover, the hierarchical level of the Environmental Protection Administration in the government did not empower it with necessary influence in major decision-making. It was used to endorse many national developing plans, instead of being the gatekeeper for environmental assessments. With its limited budget, waste management takes a big portion of it and leaves insufficient money for environmental regulations and enforcement (Taipei Times, December 21, 2001).

I am intentionally starting a campaign from this research to bring the environmental issue back to the political domain because I believe everything is politically related. Environmental problems not only must be analyzed from a broad interdisciplinary perspective, but also have to be understood from a political point of view. Taiwan's existing literature on environmental issues mostly comes from a non-political perspective. But we know that in order to thrive, environmental values need to compete with other social and political values. It involves one of the most important elements of

politics: authoritative allocation of values. So, it is all about politics.

In the international sphere, environmental politics has been developed into an area beyond environmental issues. It was related to issues of social justice and international justice. Many developing countries have used environmental debates to challenge the global status, in which many affluent and powerful countries have acquired and consumed inappropriately portion of the global resources. For those countries, environmental politics tends to aim at compensating the poor and improving overall living standard. The so-called struggle between the North and the South covers mostly on the equivalent accessibility to the global ecology and using to achieve comparably equal living condition.

Environmental protection is by nature a public good from the government's point of view, which usually is underprovided given the dilemma of collective action. People tend to choose free-riding to benefit the same as people indeed taking action for the problem. For the environmental interest groups, it is very difficult to offer "selective benefits" exclusively to the members since the improvement of environment actually benefit everyone. The problem here is that environmental interest groups will face more challenges to gain enough support to form influence in political processes, in which the amount of membership is equal to votes calculated in elections. For the political party, the

other institution to represent public interest, the basic cost-and-benefit rule can easily pushes them away from such issues especially there are more popular interests waiting to be served.

My findings in Chapter 3 told us that the KMT did not distinguish from its developing country counterparts to adopt immediately profit-making policies to accumulate its economic and political capital and ensure its survival. The KMT had political capacity to maintain the balance compared to other developing counterparts. The KMT was successful in maintaining income equality and avoiding the confrontation among social classes. The capability of its bureaucracy was very well recognized because of the success of numerous economic and financial policies. But the capable political machine was directed away from environmental issues. By strictly enforcing the martial law and skillfully manipulating the legal and electoral systems, the KMT eliminated opposition forces and the chance of a plural society.

The performance legitimacy KMT used after the claim of recovering the Mainland China became impossible was completely based on the economic growth and prosperity. The threat from China's invasion also helped the KMT to claim its credibility for maintaining the national security for people in Taiwan to continually enjoy the secure and better material lives. My data analyses revealed that the KMT rode with this pattern

without serious challenge until the 1990s. My findings in Chapter 3 also suggested that the main social cleavage was not seen in the traditional right and left position debate. While voting for the KMT based on economic consideration, the general public simultaneously expressed very high concern with environmental issues. But the intensity of environmental concern was very far away from being a factor in political market, in which some other issues attracted much more attention and gained tremendous significance.

My continued investigation with interaction among issue preference, national identity, ethnic identification, and party support proved that the struggle between different nationalisms and their implications in national identities draw the clear line of the social components. The conflict among different national identities was seen by many observers as the biggest barrier for consolidation of democratization in Taiwan. It was also treated as the most difficult challenge in Taiwan's future. As we see in Chapter 4, the interweaving relations among national identity, ethnic identification, and party support has dominated people's decision in every election. Beyond elections, every major issue in social and political market was not exempted from identity controversy. For example, recently the ruling DPP proposed to print "Taiwan" on passport to prevent the holder from being mistaken by foreigners for PRC national. This minor but pragmatic change

incited nationalism conspiracy theory immediately from the Chinese nationalists. They viewed it as one further step of the DPP to get rid of any Chinese connection in Taiwan, also suggesting it again revealed the DPP's ultimate goal of becoming independent. But for the Taiwanese and Taiwanese nationalists, it was a change should have been done long time ago since many people ever encountered the confusion when traveling abroad about the China and Taiwan terminology. The opposition legislators threatened to cut budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if it dared to bring it into the Legislative Yuan (Taipei Times, January 19, 2002).

Civic Nationalism

It is very commonly recognized that national identity and nationalism issue had become the most intensive social cleavage in Taiwan. Civic nationalism gains more popularity and discussion as the solution to the problems occurred in Taiwan. Moreover, given the fact that there is only about 10 percent of all countries around the world indeed nation-state and the cost is high and the chance is low to form a nation-state. Therefore, civic nationalism has been mentioned as one of the ultimate solutions to Taiwan's identity problems.

By definition, civic nationalism refers to a group of people who feel they belong to

the same community, governed by a comprehensive set of law and is following the rule of law. The sovereignty of the people is located in the individual (the citizen) whose national identity is a sense of political community within a demarcated territory defining the social space that houses a culturally homogeneous group. It requires that people and territory must belong together, and that the people are in possession of a single political will. There is a government that respects the law, rather than existing above the law, which indicates that civic nationalism is complementary to liberal democracy. The route for civic nationalism is taken from the state-to-nation. It is created by choice rather than by birth. All the members chose to join that certain political community will become equal citizens and are equal before the law. There will be no categorization of members by high-or-low or superior-or-inferior cultures. A new culture will be developed through the practice of democracy in every day life and a well-designed system of education. Citizenship is not only a legal identity, but also refers to participation and residence within the community and to a feeling of solidarity towards the community.

On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is more like a nationalist movement that draws its ideological link from the people and their ethnic background and common history. The essences of ethnic nationalism are imagination, value, myth and symbolism. From the ethnic nationalism, the nation is viewed as a community bounded by genealogical

descent. The movement will be mobilized by the elite who manipulated, rather managing, the public imagination toward those essences of ethnic nationalism. The elite need to invite the public into history, in which a common language is necessary. This manipulatory characteristic of the elite gives them very good chance to be above the law and institutional regulation. Accordingly, ethnic nationalism has been pictured as very vulnerable to authoritarian rule.

It is not appropriate to conclude that either kind of nationalism is better or more legitimate than the other one. As Margareta M. Nikolas (1999) suggested that an interplay between these two kinds of nationalism is necessary for the nationalism to be successful. Nikolas claimed "civic nationalism must draw from the characteristics of ethnic nationalism to confer popular appeal, drawing upon myths and symbols, and recognizing the importance of heritage in the will to belong and participate both socially and politically in a group" (1999:18). And each nationalism, to some extent, possess some characteristics of the other nationalism, and indeed is civic and ethnic.

The emergence of Taiwanese identity could be attributed to the Taiwanese sentiments which had long been contained began to explode after the martial law and some other suppressive measures were lifted since the late 1980s. It is very natural for the Taiwanese to emphasize the sense of Taiwanese identity and the Taiwanese language to contrast to

Chinese identity and Mandarin brought to that island by the KMT after 1949.

Our survey data suggest that there is hardly consensus seen in terms of national identity, however, they did indicate the change of people's conception on different nationalism and on implications associated with certain nationalism and national identity. Is civic nationalism emerging in Taiwan? According to Lin Chia-lung (1999), Taiwanese identity have outnumbered Chinese identity along the year, and the gap was only widening. More evidences were seen through the Legislators' change of attitude on ethnicity identity, in which 59 percent of the Legislators asked in 1995 and 1996 identified themselves as Taiwanese, 30 percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 11 percent of Chinese (Lin 1999:5). He also argued that most people in Taiwan had recognized Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as independent sovereign state which no longer claimed sovereignty over the territory and people in China. More remarkably was that fact that more and more people in Taiwan, including the Taiwanese and the Chinese, agreed with the conflicts on identity be resolved through a gradual way of democratic procedure. Therefore, a civic nationalism seems to emerge in Taiwan.

My findings also suggest that the supporting rate for unification with China had dropped significantly along the democratization period. However, independence was yet to be viewed as the majority choice given nearly half of respondents in the survey

consistently chose status quo or “depends.” Nonetheless, if we took away the consideration of military threat from China or gave people no choice of status quo, then we could really see independence accepted by most of people in Taiwan.

Could “Taiwanese” become an identification of residency and citizenship, or just a subjective group identity? And Chinese becomes an apolitical concept, only representing people’s ethnic or cultural origins? For the latter group, to give up the Chinese identity could be like people in the U.S. claimed to be Asian-American but indeed identify as American only in political conception. Michael Walzer (1990) argued that the Great Seal of the United States indicates “From many, one,” which refers to that manyness must be disregarded in order to achieve oneness. It points to the citizenship, not the nativity or nationality, of the inhabitants of that land. And through liberal approaches, like generous, tolerant, ample, and accommodating, people there can survive and even flourish from the manyness to oneness. Therefore, from the liberal (or plural) point of view, people in the U.S. are allowed to remember who they were and to insist on what they are.

Americans are free from ethnicity. American is not one of the ethnic groups adopted in the United States Census. Whoever chooses “American” is equal to ethnically anonymous, which is part of his/her rights to be an American.

If the manyness of America is cultural, its oneness is political, and it may be the case

that people who are free from their original cultures will commit themselves more fully to the American political system, in which liberal approaches are means as well as goals. As Philip Gleason (1992:32) suggested “To be or not to be an American, a person did not have to be any particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background. All he had to do was to commit himself to the political ideology centered on the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism.” These abstract ideals made for a politics separated not only from religious but from culture.

When we see Asian-Americans, German-Americans, or Italian- American, we should let the hyphen works as a plus sign. Such as those in modern marriages where two patronymics are jointed, neither the first nor the second name is dominant, instead, the hyphen works more like a symbolic of equality (Walzer 1990).

To see the applicability of the American experience to Taiwan we need to examine the barrier of differentiating political and cultural identities. Most people hesitate to identity as Taiwanese because of its implication on Taiwan Independence (TI). And resistance to TI could be simply because of its dangerous consequences inspired by China’s military threat. Therefore, we need to review TI development and evaluate its feasibility in Taiwan’s future.

Taiwan Independence: a forbidden option or a real cure?

Taiwan Independence (TI) movement has been transformed from early revolutionary to currently more practical in nature. In the 1950s and 1960s, the mainstream approach of TI was to overthrow the KMT regime, which represented an exiled and illegitimate ruler in Taiwan through the statement and agreement made by superpowers in the World War II. In the San Francisco Treaty signed by 48 countries of 1951, without the Chinese participation, there was no decision for Taiwan's legal status and made it an assignment for the United Nations Assembly in the future time (Kerr 1965). Taiwan was took over by the KMT regime based on the Cairo Declaration signed by President Roosevelt of the U.S., the Prime Minister Churchill of the Great Britain, and Chiang Kai-shek of China in 1943. The declaration stated all territories taken by Japan from China, including Manchuria, Formosa, and Pescadores, will be restored to the Republic of China. This commitment was repeated later in meetings of Teheran, Yalta and Postam, in which the Soviet Union joined with the Allied planning for the future after war (Ibid.).

Such so-called "legally undecided" status has been used by the TI advocates as theoretical basis for their mission in building Taiwan into an independent country. Because of the KMT's tight control of political actions in Taiwan, the TI movements mostly occurred overseas. After the diplomatic tie was built between PRC and Japan, the

headquarter of TI movements was moved from Japan to the U.S. in the early 1970s. However, the assassin plan to Chiang Chin-kuo, then the Premier of Taiwan, in his visit to the U.S. provoked the American government to take action against the TI organizations in the U.S. This event was viewed as a big setback for TI movement because the external pressure from the American government and the public pushed many TI sympathizers away from the movements. Internally, members of the TI organization were divided by the debate of using violence for the movement. The founding of the Formosa Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) in 1982 nonofficially abandoned the revolutionary nature of the TI movement, recognizing the impossibility of overthrowing the KMT regime through force, and shifted efforts to lobby the American Congress members to support Taiwan's interest, in which TI movement became the secondary goal.

The political reforms introduced by the KMT since the mid-1980s encouraged the TI advocates to go home to coordinate all efforts from oversea and inside Taiwan. Many of them gave up their career in the U.S. to continue the TI movement in Taiwan, and they believed any state building efforts need to happen on the land it will stand permanently.

The birth of the DPP was partly due to their firm assertion of TI's timing was approaching. Led by their insistence, the DPP declared that Taiwan was indeed an independent country and any change of the status had to be made with the principle of

self-determination by all inhabitants in Taiwan.

The TI movement tested its limit in 1991 when the DPP official adopted the goal of building a Republic of Taiwan (ROT) into its party platform. It was proved a setback to the TI movement at that moment, but it was a changing point from the long-term development. In the National Assembly elections of 1981, right after the ROT announcement, the DPP was defeated convincingly by the KMT. It inspired the debate of the future approach of the TI movement within the DPP. The pragmatist argument was that the general public was not ready for any radical change, but actually aware of the fact that Taiwan was an independent country substantially if not nominally. The zealot contended that the Taiwan independence, substantially and nominally, still the uncompromising mission of the DPP and the loss of the election just one of the setbacks the movement had encountered in the last few decades. However, during the major electoral campaigns many of the DPP candidates chose to downplayed the pursuing of TI in order to attract more votes from the middle voters.

As our findings in Chapter 4 suggest, the support for TI in Taiwan has steadily increased along the 1990s although the biggest threat of military intervention from China never receded. It could be attributed to the DPP's leadership of transforming TI into a moderate mode, which emphasized on the de facto aspect of Taiwan being an

independent country under the title of Republic of China. The DPP shunned from pushing the change all symbols related to the ROC, including the national title, the national anthem, and the national flag. The two former chairpersons of the DPP, Hsu, Hsin-liang and Sheu, Min-ter, strongly led the party out of the stereotyped image of being the “TI Party,” which bounded itself with strict ideology and belief in TI only. Sheu (1995) officially announced that the DPP would not declare Taiwan independent after it seizes the power in the near future. This statement was viewed as the turning point for the DPP and the TI movements. For the DPP, they decided to become a legitimate contender of the KMT through the transition to be a constructive opposition party. In order to win the public trust for its takeover, the DPP needs to demonstrate its capability of ruling, in which one of the most important essences is to solve the most difficult issues in the society. Independence or unification was the most challenging issue in Taiwan. The DPP needed to show their willingness to take the public concerns into consideration and not to put the state into a dangerous situation. Not to adopting radical move for TI seemed to be the testing point for the DPP to become a popular-trust party.

The victory of Chen Shui-bian, the DPP'd candidate, in the presidential election of 2000 can be seen as the public approval for the DPP to lead Taiwan without carrying its burden of declaring independence. The defeat in Taipei city mayor campaign of 1998

inspired Chen and the DPP to avoid the immediate confrontation of independence and unification issues to win the election. Chen's popularity rate was remained between 60 percent to 70 percent consistently along his tenure in Taipei city government. However, the ethnic issue outweighed the policy debate in the campaign and eventually resulted in Chen's loss. The ethnic Chinese voters chose Chen's opponent, Ma Yin-jo of the KMT, because of his very clean image and his Chinese ethnicity. The Taiwanese voted for Ma because of Lee Teng-hui's endorsement with Ma by defining Ma is a "new Taiwanese." Lee's endorsement significantly helped Ma to move across the ethnic boundary and to win the Taiwanese votes. In reviewing his setback, Chen claimed that he needed to work much harder to win the trust from the Chinese voters and the Taiwanese ones who were worried with the DPP's stance in TI. He demonstrated his willingness to be a trustworthy leader through using the title of ROC to represent Taiwan and showing full respect to the current constitution. He also distanced himself from the radical faction for TI within the DPP to blur his stance on the independence and unification issue. Is TI possible in any means under the current circumstance? Before we go to discuss its possibility, some arguments on secession movement could help to understand the TI movement's probable outcomes. According to Hechter (1992), secessionism is a demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to

independent sovereign status. For Taiwan, the call for independence is not to free itself from a central political authority, but to free from a claim of subjectivity made without consent of people in Taiwan. That is a simple fact that Taiwan was never under China's ruling in the last five decades given there has always been a formal and autonomous government as the final decision maker. Although TI essentially is not completely identical with the secession movement, their similarity might lead to very analogical outcomes.

Again, according to Hechter (1992), the history suggested that most secession movement failed in the modern times. The common failure seen from secession movement could be attributed to the original state usually owned more dominating forces and resources, and the nature of international politics does not encourage any state to support secession movement of foreign countries.

From those successful cases, we can see three different paths from varied situations. First, a successful withdraw could go through an effective state voluntarily allows the secessionist territory to become an independent polity. Examples of this kind are very few in modern history. Second, it could be achieved simply because a collapsing state could not effectively restraint the secession movement to succeed. The new countries emerged in the Eastern Europe and the Central Asia after the demise of the Soviet Union fit into

this path. The last way is a secession movement successfully overcome resistance from the state and wins the fight eventually. This kind of success was not seen very often (Ibid.).

Consequently, the fate of the TI lies significantly on the attitude of China and probably on its ruling efficiency. The first path has very little chance of happening to China to let Taiwan go. It is to challenge China's determination of remaining its sovereign integrity and of its ambition to become the next superpower. By letting Taiwan go, it might trigger the snowball effect and push Tibet and Hsin Jiang to follow the TI movement as a paradigm. Moreover, from geopolitical and strategic point of view, it definitely serves China's interest better in keeping Taiwan under its control than to making it available for the U.S. or Japan to either nominally or superficially take over Taiwan.

China's insistence with opposing TI was also seen in its continuous statement of using military force to deal with it. Beijing has announced, and repeatedly mentioned, some five "conditions" under which it would consider itself justified to use force against Taiwan:

1. Taiwan's allying with USSR.
2. Taiwan's acquiring nuclear weapon capability.

3. Taiwan declaring independence.
4. Taiwan's suffering internal disorder.
5. Taiwan's delaying entering into negotiations on reunification.

The No. 1 condition is out of dated, the No. 2 has seldom been mentioned, and the no. 4 is not very likely to happen. Yet, China has consistently stated its firm stance with the No. 3 condition and occasionally mentioned the No. 5. Although it is viewed by most people in Taiwan that China will not recklessly start military action against Taiwan, however, the threat has been enhanced through the increasing gap between the military forces of the both sides.

The second path of a collapsing state to give up sovereignty over the secession movement is not very probable to happen to China. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime has been very successfully adopting the market mechanism to develop steady growth in economy although it still insists with the Marxist doctrines. Along with the significant success in economic development the Chinese government earned more political legitimacy by claiming the credit of achieving a prosperous society. Therefore, waiting for the Communist regime to collapse to make TI movement succeed could be just a very remote idea.

The last possibility of achieving TI through victory of military confrontation also

owns very little validity. By simple calculation of military establishments of the two sides, we can see the disparity almost determines Taiwan to be captured by default (Table 5-1).

Table 5-1 Overview of PRC and ROC armed forces

	PRC	Taiwan
Troops	3,000,000	420,000
Submarines	94	4
Fighters	5,2000	450
Bombers	986	0
Surface ships	986	162
Medium-and long-range missiles	200,000	0

Source: Peter Kien-hong Yu, 2000, "Mainland China's Military Pressures on Taiwan: An Assessment," in Martin I. Lasater, and Peter Kien-hong Yu, eds. Taiwan's Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era, p.123.

For TI to succeed, the international support is essential in gaining legitimacy and substantial aids in the fight with China. Therefore, the attitude of the American government becomes the decisive factor in the result of the Taiwan Strait conflict. Although George W. Bush claimed unambiguously that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, even if that meant using U.S. military forces (Washington Post, April 26, 2001; P. A01). Taking such statement as a shield of TI could be as dangerous as counting on China for supporting TI. Basically, the doctrine established in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 that there was only one China and Taiwan was part of china remained intact since the Nixon

administration. Moreover, the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) set the other bottom line for development in Taiwan's issue with China. It clearly indicated that peace and stability in that area fit into the American best interest and any conflicts should be resolved by peaceful means. It suggested that the American would put all efforts in maintaining peace between Taiwan and China, meaning any action could result in military confrontation would be prevented and eliminated. The American doctrines strongly imply that TI, the very direct factor of military confrontation, would not be expected to happen, let alone getting any forms of support. Bush's statement could only be viewed as a little distraction, but the principle and direction of the American stance with preventing confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait remained intact.

Accordingly, declaring Taiwan Independence could provoke the Chinese military action immediately and be viewed as destruction to the American preventive policy. American involvement could be very supportive for Taiwan only if China initiates the military action for agenda other than TI. Nonetheless, people in Taiwan gradually learn that national defense could not depend on others' commitments. The American government acts following its best interest, not the moral consideration like human rights or international justice, has been seen in numerous international events. Therefore, people would rather argue how to prevent or defend the Chinese military action than guessing

what kind of engagement the American will involve in the conflict.

The reality check still worries people in Taiwan with the Chinese dominance in military forces. From the Table 5-1 we can see that China owns an inappropriate advantage over Taiwan in every category. Some argued that the cost of invading Taiwan simply outweighs its benefit for China. According to Beijing itself estimated that it would cost Renminbi 550 billion (\$66.2 billion) to attack Taiwan, which constituted about half of mainland China's gross national product. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore ever pointed out that a military attack of Taiwan would definitely slow the China's pace to modernization and capitalization.

Some other positive aspects in analyzing why China will not attack Taiwan include the fact that the Long March generation, people engaged in the Civil War, is diminishing and their mission to solve Taiwan issue is de-emphasized along their demise in the political stage. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping, the soul behind China's modernization, contended that China's overall development carried more weight than the resolution of the Taiwan issue (Pratt 1993). Therefore, if not to irritate China by radical TI actions, people tend to believe the Chinese military aggressiveness is very questionable. But on the other hand, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 and the series of missile exercises between 1995 and 1996 could not relief people's fear of China's irrationality.

Accordingly, as we found in the previous chapter, people in Taiwan hesitate to accept immediate independence is highly related to the fear of inviting China's invasion.

Summarily, I tend to claim that radical TI movements could put Taiwan into very dangerous situation and cause social unrest internally given the TI has not gained the majority support yet. Gradual and small-step attempts could lead to better result for TI movement from the long-term point of view. And I believe relating environmental issue to TI movement could help to build a more acceptable identity in Taiwan.

Sustainable Development: an ultimate solution?

The term sustainable development has become one of the most popular slogans for politicians, bureaucrats, environmental activists, international aid officials, and industry leaders in the last decade. Sustainable development is defined as a pattern of social and structural economic transformation (i.e., development) which optimizes the economic and other societal benefits available in the present, without jeopardizing the likely potential for similar benefits in the future. A primary goal of sustainable development is to achieve a reasonable and equitably distributed level of economic well-being that can be perpetuated continually for many human generations.

The core of environmental values is sustainability, which implies a drastic reduce of

dependence on non-renewable resources, a commitment to extract renewable resources no more rapidly than they are restored in nature and a minimization of human impacts on the ecosystems upon which we depend.

Frequently, environmental activists only focus on the environmental side, whereas those advocating labor rights or social justice will only focus on the social side, but the classic definition of sustainable development is people, the planet and profits. Planet has to be there, you have to take care of the environment; profits have to be there because you have to have an economy which generates wealth and abundance, or else people cannot sustain themselves. Social instability and extreme poverty cause a great drain on the public treasury, whether you feel that this is a moral issue or not, it's simply a matter of practicality.

Sustainable development requires collaboration from different sectors of a society. The state, frequently viewed as the biggest threat to the environment, needs to actively involve and takes the leadership. The KMT regime had very efficient performance in leading economic growth for Taiwan. The same efficiency and spirit could be adopted to deal with environmental issues. Even now the DPP regime is only in its sophomore year, the solid foundation of the capable bureaucracy built by the KMT is there for the DPP to utilize. Very fortunately, the first power- transfer in Taiwan's history has been going

smoothly without strong bureaucrats' resistance to the new regime.

In its very first few years, the DPP was the most dedicated partner of the environmental groups. It is understandable that DPP tried to ally with all available social forces to challenge the KMT's ruling status during the authoritarian time. Nonetheless, the DPP's officials have consistently demonstrated their enthusiasm in environmental protection and their disgust with the KMT for its lack of effort of protecting the environment. Therefore, environmental groups have viewed the DPP as the political savior for Taiwan's environmental health. The defeat of the KMT in 2000 presidential election gave many people new hope for a completely different state for Taiwan. The environmental concerned people were happy to see the candidate who had a solid image of social justice defender indeed won the election.

However, the DPP regime's compromise with the building of the No. 4 nuclear power plant (Nuke 4) broke environmentalist's dream for a nuclear-free homeland, also broken was the hope for a brand new environmental-friendly regime. To some extent, it was a good lesson for environmental group to learn not to rely on political parties for achieving sustainable development plans. The ultimate goal for political parties is to win the election then to rule the government. Special interest groups could be part of their electoral-coalition, but usually had less chance to be in the ruling-coalition than the

business did.

Business sector plays a major role for sustainable development in every society. Sustainable development was developed to avoid conflict with the economic growth. As we mentioned previously, a healthy economy is essential for the sustainable development. Therefore, it is all about conveying the idea to the business to win its interest and cooperation. Adopting the rational choice theory to promoting sustainable development to the business, we should make environmental protection not only a moral but also a profit-making or cost-saving issue. Using some successful business cases of practicing sustainable strategy by saving costs and improve quality of products should inspire the other to follow. Such selling point will grab businessmen's attention, and that's what's most urgent to them - especially small and medium sized enterprises - because if they can't make money, they're failing as a member of a family or business unit. The barrier to make people go beyond awareness to practice of environmental protection is the incentive. Civic responsibility would not outweigh consideration of profit when businessmen facing decision time.

Currently, there are three major organizations of sustainable development in Taiwan, ranging from governmental task group to corporate-initiated association. The National Sustainable Development Council, subject to the EPA, represents the governmental

commitment with such efforts. The National Sustainable Development Association is founded by numerous business groups, showing the industrial interest in maintaining the balance among the economic achievement and other concerns. The National Institute of Sustainable Development is an academic group to promote the principles and practices of sustainable development. They all share the basic idea of preserving environmental sustainability is vital to Taiwan's future, and all have many constructive suggestions of realizing the idea from their individual positions.

However, the problem does not stop here by having different level of organizations promoting sustainable development. The more important issue lies in their effectiveness and influence in spreading the idea and selling their solutions to different targets. For the National Sustainable Development Council of EPA, it faces challenge of practically imposing the principle of sustainable development on policies.

For the National Sustainable Development Association, to what extent does it represent the industry is a legitimate question. If those major polluting industries did not participate with such efforts, the Association's effort could become symbolic of being viewed as an underrepresented alternative option. Nonetheless, their demeanors should not be discouraged or discounted because at least we need some starting force.

Regarding the National Institute of Sustainable Development, it carries the very

common constraint of academic organizations, in which promoting normative ideas very frequently invites criticism of being unrealistic in telling from what-ought-to-do and what-have-to-do. However, the insistence on ideal situations is essentially important to a society addicted to short-term and immediate interests.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I will propose several new perspectives on environmental issue and its implications on national identity conflict. Environmental development can serve Taiwan in both of internal and external ends. Externally, after the demise of debate between capitalism and communism, democracy is viewed as the better way of human lives. Taiwan needs to upgrade its international recognition beyond the democracy level to build a new image among the global community. Environmental sustainability could be the new tool for Taiwan to get into the international stage, in which Taiwan has been struggling to play any political role given the repression from China never receded. Through the international network of environmental movements, Taiwan could contribute significantly to the ecological health of the earth, and also makes its existence fairly respected.

For Taiwan, it was very hard to argue against the assertion that economic

development was one of the very few distinguishing advantages Taiwan carried over China. However, as China is emerging as the superpower in both political and economic markets, Taiwan's margin of advantage in economic prosperity becomes very small or even arguably disappears. If Taiwan shifts to focus on environmental conditions, probably it can find the new source of pride and distinction from China. China has one of the greatest environmental footprints of the world with its population of 1.3 billion people and its rapidly developed industries. China is one of the world's largest contributors to both global climate change and ozone depletion (Economy 1999). It was found in 2001 that eight of the most polluted cities around the world are located in China. Accordingly, Taiwan's success in maintaining environmental health should give it new advantage in the continued struggle with China.

Meanwhile, the international environment-related organizations should not block the door for Taiwan's participation because of the political struggle between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Environmental degradation described the effect of globalization very precisely because its impact will go over national boundaries and spread to every region in a matter of time. Globalization has been under severe attack for its negative sides of asymmetric power and interest sharing and of political manipulation. Building the environmental network through the concept and organization of globalization can drop

many criticisms against it. Taiwan definitely could benefit from and contribute to this process.

On the other hand, internally, the focus on environment health could help to build a nationalism that could shy away from provoking confrontation with China and from ethnic intensity brought by different national identities. This is not a breaking idea. However, just like patriotism, it needs practical implement from the people on that island to achieve the goal. Using environmentalism to achieve other social goals is not an unrealistic idea either. Environment planning has been linked with racial interaction and social justice very frequently. Environment can serve as a means and an end as well. To some extent, the hot debate between pro-and-con nuclear power plants overwhelmed people's perceptions on environmental protection, thinking environmentalism is all about getting rid of nuclear energy. Environmental concerns could relate to other issues and include more participants to achieve a bigger goal. Currently there are around 20 national interest groups focusing on environmental and other related issues, such as women rights, consumer rights, and the aborigines' rights. It is a good path to relate environment issues to other ones to achieve multiple goals in the society. And such effort should be more encouraged and supported.

The tug of war between independence and unification has consumed too much energy

and resource for Taiwan. It is a very good development that most people assert Taiwan as an autonomous state with all conditions of being an independent country. Any radical move toward declaring independent could not guarantee more support and recognition from internal and external societies. On the other hand, time seems to have led the island away from unifying with China in political terms, although the economic ties becomes stronger in the last decade. A working formula is still under calculating, in which China needs more than just face-saving results and Taiwan needs more than political autonomy that has already been acquired. The needs and preferences of other international actors only make it more complicated and time-consuming to settle this issue. Being a small country in terms of geographic size and of political influence, Taiwan is destined to struggle for survival among superpowers. May be that was why the former president Lee Teng-hui sentimentally related that people in Taiwan are enduring unspeakable sadness for being a Taiwanese.

Political leadership is essential for Taiwan to overcome environmental and identity problems. Politicians in Taiwan never hesitated to express their love for that land and call for a harmony society for all different ethnic groups. The most consensus opinion we see in Taiwan was not in cultural or political discussion, but was in environmental concern. For the politician to show their practical commitments with environmental protection

could be a very favorable step to reflect their love for Taiwan then to win the people's trust. People in Taiwan have shown very positive approach in accepting new ideas and change. The political leadership did not utilize this characteristic in managing the environment in the past. If it keeps neglect the people concern with the environment, the rotation of power could become a frequent pattern in the future.

APPENDIX

Translation for Questionnaires in Data Set

1983

V 2-40. Do you agree with the following statement "For the purpose of unification with China, we have to abandon parochialism."

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Moderately agree
- (3) Slightly agree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Moderately disagree
- (6) Slightly disagree.

V 2-41. Do you agree with the following statement "Development in Taiwan is important than unification with China."

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Moderately agree
- (3) Slightly agree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Moderately disagree
- (6) Slightly disagree.

V 5-36. Which kind of candidate you voted for the Legislative Yuan?

- (1) KMT candidate: (a) party-endorsed; (b) non-party-endorsed
- (2) Non-partisan
- (3) Democratic Social Party candidate
- (4) Youth Party candidate

V 12-48. Which issue makes you vote for a certain candidate?

- (1) Consolidate political leadership and maintain political stability
- (2) Environmental Protection.

1986

V 1-57. Which kind of candidate you voted for the Legislative Yuan?

- (1) KMT candidate: (a) party-endorsed; (b) non-party-endorsed
- (2) DPP candidate: (a) party-endorsed; (b) non-party-endorsed
- (3) Democratic Social Party candidate
- (4) Youth Party candidate
- (5) Non-partisan
- (7) No idea
- (8) Decline to answer

V 3-22 Which issue makes you vote for a certain candidate?

- (1) Social order
- (2) Political stability
- (3) Economic growth
- (4) Environmental protection

V 5-16 Do you agree with the following statement "For the purpose of unification with

China, we have to abandon parochialism."

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Moderately agree
- (3) Slightly agree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Moderately disagree
- (6) Slightly disagree.

V 5-17 Do you agree with the following statement "Development in Taiwan is important than unification with China."

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Moderately agree
- (3) Slightly agree
- (4) Strongly disagree
- (5) Moderately disagree
- (6) Slightly disagree.

1993

V 34. (show yellow card) There are several social goals recognized by some people in our society as important. Which one you think is the most important?

- (1) Maintain economic prosperity
- (2) Maintain strong national defense
- (3) Increase mass participation in public affairs
- (4) Environmental protection
- (7) Could not decide
- (8) No idea
- (9) Decline to answer

V 38. For the relation with China in the future, some thinks "Taiwan Independence" is better, some thinks "Unification with China" is better, some thinks "Remaining status quo" is better. Which one you agree?

- (1) Taiwan Independence (continue V 38a, V 38c)
- (2) Unification with China (continue V 38a, V 38b)
- (3) Remaining status quo (continue V 38b, V 38c)
- (4) Depends (continue V 38b, V 38c)
- (8) Don't understand the question (continue V 39)
- (9) Decline to answer (continue V 39)

V 38a. Do you "agree" or "strongly agree"?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Strongly agree.

V 38b. If after declaring independence, Taiwan is still able to maintain a peaceful relation with China, then do you agree with assertion of "Taiwan Independence"?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree
- (7) No comment
- (8) Don't understand the question

(9) Decline to answer

V 38c. If China and Taiwan reach relatively close condition in all economic, social, and political aspects, then do you agree with assertion of "Taiwan Independence"?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Disagree
- (7) No comment
- (8) Don't understand the question
- (9) Decline to answer

V 54. Do you remember which party you voted for the Legislative Yuan election of last year (12/29/92)?

- (1) KMT
- (2) DPP
- (3) Non-partisan
- (4) Other (please specify)
- (5) Cast invalid vote (continue V 56)
- (8) Don't remember
- (9) Decline to answer

1998

V 44. The following goals are pursued by many people in our society. Which is the most important to you? Please rank your choice of them.

- (1) Economic growth and more prosperous lives.
- (2) Environmental protection.
- (3) Shorten the gap of wealth.
- (4) Increase the mass participation and influence in public affairs.
- (5) Social morality.
- (6) National defense.

V 59. Among those self-identity titles, which one is the most appropriate one for you?

- (1) Taiwanese
- (2) Chinese
- (3) Taiwanese, also Chinese
- (4) Chinese, also Taiwanese
- (5) Other

V 69. If after declaring independence, Taiwan is still able to maintain a peaceful relation with China, then do you agree with assertion of "Taiwan Independence"?

- (10) Strongly agree
- (11) Agree
- (12) Disagree
- (13) Strongly don't agree
- (14) No comment

V 75a. For the relation with China in the future, some asserts "Taiwan Independence," some asserts "Unification with China," some assert "Remaining status quo." What is your assertion?

- (5) Taiwan Independence (continue V 75b)
- (6) Unification with China (continue V 75b)
- (7) Remaining status quo (continue V 75c)
- (8) Depends (continue V 75c)

V 75b. Do you "agree" or "strongly agree"?

- (1) Agree
- (2) Strongly agree.

V 75c. If remaining status quo becomes impossible, with which one you agree?

- (1) Unification with China
- (2) Taiwan Independence
- (3) Depends

V 77. Which party you voted for in the last Legislative Yuan election?

- (1) KMT
- (2) DPP
- (3) NP

- (4) Non-partisan
- (5) Other (please specify)
- (6) Forgot
- (7) Did not vote
- (8) Not eligible to vote yet

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