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University

 

This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES IN POLICE PURSUIT:
Describing various Levels of Policy Restrictiveness

presented by

Victor W. Bumphus

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Wtice

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< Majo/rgfofessor

Date Max 24, 200].

 

MS U is an Afﬁrmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

 

PLACE IN RETURN Box to remove this checkout from your record.
To AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6/01 c-JCIFICIDaIeOuest-p. 1 5

THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES IN POLICE PURSUIT:
Describing Various Levels of Policy Restrictiveness

By

Victor W. Bumphus

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
School of Criminal Justice

2001

Professor Charles Corley

ABSTRACT

THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES IN POLICE PURSUIT:
Describing Various Levels of Policy Restrictiveness

By

Victor W. Bumphus

This dissertation examines vehicular police pursuit as an issue of
lethal force used by law enforcement ofﬁcers in the United States. The
research utilizes secondary data analysis to observe perceptual and formal
characteristics of police pursuit policy. A random probability sample of 2 14
municipal police agencies was utilized. Additionally, a content analysis of
183 randomly selected police pursuit policies was conducted. The major
purpose of the analysis was to examine police pursuit through a probability
sampling approach and within a theoretical context. The focal concern of
the major analysis was an examination of perceptual and formal pursuit
policy restrictiveness. A modified restrictiveness scale was developed which
revealed that most of the sampled policies were somewhat restrictive. The
perceptual analysis also indicated a normative level of restrictiveness.
Years of pursuit policy existence emerged as the most important factor
related to formal and perceived restrictiveness in that older policies were
viewed and categorized as more discretionary. The conclusion places police

pursuit policy changes within a theoretical context of dissipative structures.

Copyright by
VICTOR W. BUMPHUS
2001

DEDICATION

To my family who has always supported and encouraged me.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all my friends and colleagues for their
support, help, and encouragement. Though there are too many people to
thank individually, I must acknowledge a number of key persons.
Thanks to Dr. Sam Walker and Dr. Bankole Thompson who have served
as signiﬁcant mentors during important stages of my academic
endeavors. I am thankful to Dr. Chris Vanderpool, Dr. Homer Hawkins,
and Dr. Vincent Hoffman for their willingness to help with this project.
Their patience, guidance, and commitment is most appreciated. Thanks
to Dr. Charles Corley who has always supported me and helped
immensely toward the completion of this project. Finally, I acknowledge
my parents, William and Virginia , for always setting the standard and

teaching by example.

 

viii.

13.

13.
20.
23.

37.

40.
45.
48

51.
58.

62.

62.
63.
64.
66.
67.
69.

71.

71.
82.
84.
92.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables
List of Figures
Chapter One: Introduction
Research Purpose and Objectives
Signiﬁcance of the Problem
Chapter Two: Review of Literature
General Organizational Theory
Decision-Making in Complex Organizations
Social Change and Dissipative Structure Theory
Chapter Three: Research on Police Pursuit Driving
Safety Issues
Liability Issues
Cost v. Beneﬁts Analysis
Characteristics of Pursuits and Pursuit Policy
Policy Restrictiveness
Chapter Four: Methods and Procedures
Sampling Frame
Procedures and Instrumentation
Major Variables
Research Questions
Data Analysis Strategy
Research Shortcoming
Chapter Five: Analysis and Results
Descriptive and Associational Analysis
Multi variate Analysis

Content Analysis
Research Questions

vi

 

100.

113.

122.

Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion
References

Appendix

vii

var—vu- ““3““.
I
L

71.

72.

74.

75.

76.

77.

79.

80.

81.

83.

83.

85.

86.

Table 1

Table2

Table3

Table4

Table5

Table6

Table7

Table8

Table9

Table 10

Tablel 1

Table l 2

Table l 3

LIST OF TABLES

General sample characteristics
Centralization and policy type characteristics

Pursuit initiation factors, frequencies, and
emphasis

Pursuit environmental factors, frequencies, and
emphasis

Pursuit operational factors, frequencies, and
emphasis

Pursuit termination factors, frequencies, and
emphasis

Cross tabulation of centralization and policy

type

Correlations of pursuit factors, policy type,
agency centralization, and agency size

Correlations of emphasized pursuit factors,
policy type, agency centralization, and agency

size

Regression analysis of policy type by selected
independent variables

Regression analysis of centralization by selected
independent variables

Content analysis characteristics of restrictions
and prohibitions

Correlations of restrictions and with major
independent variables

viii

 

89.

90.

91.

Table 1 4

Table 15

Table 16

Modiﬁed restrictiveness scale and sample
characteristics

Correlational analysis of selected variables with
dummy-coded restrictiveness categories

Comparison of policy type and modiﬁed
restrictiveness scale

LIST OF FIGURES

102. Figure 1 Dissipative Structure Model

105. Figure 2 Dissipative Structure Model: Traditional Deadly
Force and Police Pursuit Policy Changes

 

CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction

Recent scholarship has focused needed attention on the area of
police vehicular pursuit, and as a result, a substantial body of scientiﬁc
research has emerged. The use of pursuit by law enforcement ofﬁcials is
as old as formalized policing and has involved almost every type of
transport known to man, from covered wagons to sophisticated motorized
vehicles. Anecdotal, media-based accounts of outlaws being pursued by
lawmen on horses envision the pursuit as more important than the
capture. The incorporation of automobiles into policing portrays similar
perceptions depicted in popular television shows and motion pictures
such as the Dukes of Hazard, Smokey and the Bandit, and the Fugitive.
Granted scientiﬁc veriﬁcation of police pursuit during the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century is not available, various anecdotal accounts provide
some limited information as to these occurrences.

Within the last decade or so, the emergent body of literature in this
area has questioned the appropriateness of police vehicular pursuit
under various contexts. One important concentration area has
considered safety issues as they relate to police pursuit. In this sense,
pursuit-related deaths and injuries have been the focal concern of
various scholars. A second area of contemporary research considers

legalistic factors that examine police liability as well as civil rights

violations. Third, more speciﬁc-oriented research has focused on pursuit
policies and procedures in an effort to provide comprehensive
information on the nature of vehicular pursuit. These policy-oriented
inquiries have observed operational, environmental, termination, and
initiation factors as well as discretionary and restrictive features of
formal and informal policy. Fourth, research has concentrated on the
prevalence and incidence of police vehicular pursuit. The majority of the
research observing prevalence and incidence has rarely provided
systematic, reliable data. Lastly, there has been a recent tendency for
police scholars to conceptualize police vehicular pursuit as use of deadly
force by law enforcement (see Barker 1984; Alpert 81, Anderson 1986;
Alpert 8t Fridell 1992; Whetsel 8r. Bennett 1992).

Traditionally, scholars have conceptualized police use of force in
the context of deadly and non deadly forms of force. The non deadly
category covers a wide range of tactics and strategies (such as the use of
handcuffs, batons, chemical agents, and unarmed self-defense) aimed at
the apprehension of those suspected of law violations. Deadly forms of
force used by the police inclUde tactics and strategies that carry
substantial potential to cause death or serious bodily injury. For the
most part, ﬁrearms, rifles, and shotguns have been placed in this more
serious category. While other strategies, such as the use of knives and
vehicular pursuit to effect apprehension, have substantial potential to

inflict death or serious bodily injury, rarely have these instruments been
2

conceptualized as deadly force. The rarity of police use of blunt
instruments such as knives and batanettes to aid in apprehension
explains the neglect to discuss this method of deadly force. However,
until quite recently, police use of vehicular pursuit has been considered
an anomaly to traditional characterizations of police use of force.

In the 1960’s and early 1970’s, American police scholars began to
focus attention on the use of deadly force (primarily the use of ﬁrearms)
to apprehend suspected offenders. The central question revolved around
the appropriateness of utilizing deadly force in police decision-making.
This new area of inquiry challenged conventional perceptions of what
was to be considered reasonable or excessive force in various situations.
The more recent scholarship devoted to the use of police vehicular
pursuit is conceptually, practically, and philosophically analogous to the
use of force literature in general.

Relatively speaking, both police use of ﬁrearms and vehicular
pursuits are rare events, but carry tremendous potential for lethal
outcomes, especially in situations where negligence, incompetence, or
mere ignorance of procedures are evident. There are various conceptual
rationales for categorizing police vehicular pursuit as use of deadly force.

Deadly force, as compared to non-deadly force, can logically be
differentiated by the capacity of such force to inflict death or serious
bodily injury. In the broadest sense, almost any exercise of force utilized,

in the optimal context, can seriously injure or kill. Non deadly exercises
3

of force used in policing, such as restraints, chemical agents, batons,
flashlights, physical constraints, or handcuffs, rarely lead to death. The
use of ﬁrearms directed at offenders presents a different problem. By
their very nature, ﬁrearms are designed to inﬂict serious bodily injury
that can often result in death. Whether ﬁrearms are used by police
appropriately or negligently, such use carries great potential for human
destruction. The inappropriate or negligent use of police vehicular
pursuit carries similar potential to inflict great harm or death. In fact, a
speeding, motorized vehicle may potentially cause more irreparable
damage to a greater number of individuals, including law enforcement
ofﬁcers themselves.

Because various forms of force are potentially more lethal and
others less so, this research will utilize the terms lethal and less—than-
lethal recognizing the continuum that exists in the utilization of police
force. Additionally, this research places police vehicular pursuit in the
lethal force category for the rationale aforementioned. This writing
considers an analysis of police vehicular pursuit in the United States as
one form of lethal force used by law enforcement ofﬁcers. Speciﬁcally,
the research examines population density and diversity issues relative to
police pursuit policy. Moreover, organizational factors such as size,
centrality, and environmental concerns are considered in relation to the
conceptualization, implementation, and operationalization of police

pursuit policy.

It is important to differentiate between police force and authority
with regard to this research. The authority and legitimacy of the police
as a social institution is conceptually separate from the authority of the
police to use force in the legitimate performance of their duties, though
there may be some functional overlapping between the two. The former
derives from the consent of the people having its origins in the social
contract theory. In its more contemporary context, it can be said to
depend primarily upon public perceptions of the consistency or lack
thereof of the role of the police safeguarding societal interests,
expectations, and needs. These perceptions vary from time to time.
There may be times when the authority and legitimacy of the police are
seriously called into question because of the public perception that the
police role has become more destructive, rather than protective. In
essence, the barometer for measuring police authority is tied to public
perception and conﬁdence.

However, the authority of the police to use force in maintaining law
and order as a strategy in crime prevention is of more restricted
dimension. In the strict sense, it is constrained by administrative,
constitutional, and legal limitations. Police use of force as legitimate
authority is not exclusively dependent upon conformity or lack thereof to
administratively laid down criteria and /or legally declared standards. In
this sense, there cannot logically be authority to use unauthorized force.

This research recognizes the authority of the police to use force but
5

 

observes the various contexts in which force is applied and observes the
reasonableness of police use of vehicular pursuit under these various
contexts. In this sense the potential for vehicular use of force (in
pursuing) to cause serious bodily or death, logically relates to policy
formulated measures to control the exercise of vehicular pursuit by

police ofﬁcers in the performance of their ofﬁcial duties.

Research Purpose and Objectives

The major objective of the proposed research is to provide a
national, descriptive, probability-based analysis of substantive and
perceptual factors related to police pursuit policy. Though there has
been a substantial body of scholarly attention given to police pursuit in
the last decade and a half, few studies have utilized probability sampling
frames. The norm has been the use of case studies or jurisdictional
speciﬁc samples, such as analysis of one state or region. Additionally,
many approaches have simply utilized judgmental or purposive sampling
frames. These various methodological approaches limit the level at
which generalizations can be made.

To the extent that probability sampling allows for greater
generalization and precision, the research has ﬁve additional objectives.
One primary objective will be to provide an understanding of the various
contexts in which police pursuits take place. These contexts include

organizational (i.e., level of centralization, size), administrative (i.e.,
6

presence of polices and procedures), and operational variables (i.e.,
speciﬁc environmental and procedural factors). A second objective of the
proposed research is to understand policy restrictiveness in relation to
various demographic, organizational, and contextual variables. In
essence, the research examines the nature to which these variables
inﬂuence formal and informal dimensions of perceived restrictiveness.

One major concern of past research considers the extent to which
police organizations have placed limitations upon discretionary decisions
to pursue. For the most part, research in this area has concentrated on
policies (broad postulates that inform procedures) and procedures
(speciﬁc statements that relate to process). However, there is a growing
body of research that concentrates on the restrictions (or prohibitions)
contained in police pursuit policy. The third research objective will
consider the validity of the restrictiveness scale developed by Kennedy,
Homant, and Kennedy (1992). This procedure will compare perceived
restrictiveness, policy content, and speciﬁc restrictions addressed in
policy. Related to scale validation, the fourth objective will be to
consider the reliability of organizational research by comparing informal
perceptual analysis with formal policy and other organizational variables
(i.e., agency size, years of policy existence, and sworn ofﬁcer size).

To date, the scholarly attention given to police vehicular pursuit
has been void of a theoretical context. The majority of research has been

almost exclusively policy-driven and applied. The last objective of the
7

research is to place this substantive area within a theoretical or
conceptual context. Toward this purpose, general organizational and
speciﬁc organizational perspectives will be utilized that deal with
formalization, centralization, complex systems theory, and dissipative
structures. Additionally, the research will be placed in a larger context of
lethal force, permitting theoretical and conceptual comparisons between
lethal force traditionally (utilization of ﬁrearms, shotguns, and rifles), and
contemporarily (which would include the use of vehicular police pursuit

as a lethal force issue).

giggﬁcance of the Problem

As noted, the research in the area of police vehicular pursuit has
grown substantially in recent years; however, there are various
methodological as well conceptual problems with much of this new
information. The two main shortcomings have been the failure to utilize
appropriate sampling frames and the largely atheoretical context in
which various studies have been conducted.

’ This proposed research uses a probability sampling frame capable
of providing a basis for generalization. The sample, appropriately,
represents a random selection of diverse municipal and consolidated
(municipal and county) police organizations. The primary use of
judgmental or other forms of non probability sampling in this area has

limited the validity of the information obtained. Additionally, the use of
8

more precise sampling techniques allows for more appropriate statistical
analyses, while simultaneously increasing the reliability of the research.

Most research on police vehicular pursuit has been conducted
using an organizational survey procedure, a content analysis approach,
or analysis of existing data. Some researchers have utilized multiple
methodologies to strengthen the research design. Though much of this
research has been carried out at the organizational level, very seldom
have scholars incorporated appropriate theoretical and / or conceptual
frameworks. This research utilizes organizational theory in general and
dissipative structures theory in speciﬁc to place the research in a
theoretical context capable of illuminating past practices and future
developments.

Compared to research on lethal force as police use of ﬁrearms,
riﬂes, or shotguns, similar research on police pursuit as force is less
robust. As information began to emerge that police vehicular pursuit
often ended in serious injury or death to those involved—ofﬁcers as well
as citizens, police practitioners and scholars began to rethink control
and accountability issues in this critical area of decision-making. A
subsequent increase in formal organizational policy paralleled the overall
awareness of the problem. Police scholars began to examine the nature
and context of police vehicular pursuit, and as a result, an ambitious

research agenda began.

Both national and regional studies have begun to focus on this
neglected area of research. These various studies consider the content or
existence of formal policy, pursuit-related injuries and deaths, liability
issues, demographic issues (i.e., race-speciﬁc and location factors), and
operational, environmental, organizational, and administrative factors to
name a few. More recently, issues surrounding safety have refocused
police vehicular pursuit as a lethal force issue. This new research allows
for comparisons between traditional lethal force research and police
pursuit.

As with lethal force in general, police pursuit has been subjected to
much more legal scrutiny than in the past. Liability as well as civil
rights issues have made decision-making and organizational response to
police pursuit more complex. This complexity is analogous to other
critical decision-making in policing, namely traditional lethal force
policies. In this sense, pursuit policy making is part and parcel of the
evolution of policy making in formalized policing.

There is a level complexity in decision-making and compliance in
most organizations. The complex nature of policing and the police
mandate makes decision-making and accountability issues highly
problematic. Also, the extent to which police agencies desire
formalization as compared to informalization complicate organizational

initiatives, compliance, and culture.

10

Past challenges to police practices, in the 1960’s, questioned the
use of lethal force (e.g., ﬁrearms, riﬂes, and shotguns). These various
challenges involved civil rights, safety issues, and disparate treatment.
In essence, perceptual and real changes in society prompted institutional
reform in many areas, including law enforcement. The more
contemporary challenges with respect to police pursuit are currently
challenging police scholars and practitioners in much the same way.
Therefore, it would seem natural that past challenges and contemporary
ones be conceptualized as to their commonalities, especially since lethal
force (traditionally) and police vehicular pursuit (as lethal force)
encompass the same phenomena.

In the following chapter, general organizational theory that
observes the nature of complex organizations and decision-making is
discussed. Etzioni’s analysis of complex organizations will be utilized.
The research will also be placed within the context of social change
analysis. Most social change analysis has been applied to non-public
organizations; this research applies social change theory to the evolution,
context, and nature of police lethal force policy in the United States. It is
therefore, postulated that the past attention given to lethal force provides
an appropriate framework from which to observe recent attention to
police pursuit.

Chapter three examines empirical studies at the national, regional,

and state levels on pursuit policy. Discussion of the substantive nature
11

and content of these studies isolates relevant shortcomings of the past
research. Information speciﬁc to methods and procedures, research

questions, and data analysis are addressed in chapter four.

CHAPTER TWO:

Theoretical Review

The nature by which organizations manage themselves has held
scholarly interest for social scientists in ﬁelds as diverse as economics,
political science, psychology, and sociology. A substantial portion of the
scholarship on organizational theory has been applied to nonpublic
organizations (Scott 1995; Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985). Themes
of traditional organizational research have dealt mostly with productivity,

efﬁciency, and scientiﬁc management (Scott 1995).

General Organizational Theory

Ott (198923) suggests that organizational perspectives have been
discussed primarily from three different standpoints:

the systems perspective focuses on things such as an

organization’s information systems and its decision

processes; the structural perspective emphasizes things

like structures and the procedures and rules that maintain

order; and, the power perspective looks mostly at managing

conﬂict, building, maintaining, and using coalitions, and

the nature of real and perceived power relationships.
The systems perspective can further be sub-divided. Natural system
perspectives observe to what extent organizational members share
common interests and support the survival of the system as a whole.
This perspective deals with normative levels of commitment to
organizational goals and objectives (Scott 1995; Ott 1989). From a

q

I)

natural systems perspective, the criminal justice system represents the
vested interests of society in social control. Therefore, the justice system
can be viewed as self-validating; its primary support is derived from
societal interest in civility.

An open systems perspective analyzes the interdependent nature of
the system as it engages with other sub-systems for more effective
operation. Various scholars in criminal justice and criminology have
viewed the legal system as a set of interdependent parts, where actions
or strategies in one area directly or indirectly inﬂuence other sub-
systems (Scott 1995; Ott 1989). Walker’s (2001) discussion of criminal
justice thermodynamics embraces the open systems perspective by
illustrating the long-term, “chain-reactive” consequences of new crime
and justice initiatives.

Rational systems perspectives view organizations as highly
formalized with speciﬁc, tangible goals (Scott 1995). The criminal justice
has often been depicted as a highly formalized system with speciﬁc goals
that revolve around enforcement of the criminal law. The ﬁrst systematic
study of the structure of the criminal justice system by the President’s
Crime Commission in 1967 illustrated a system that was highly
formalized and procedural (Walker 2001). It is apparent that all the
aforementioned perspectives have implications for both private and

public organizations.

14

Structural, organizational theorists emphasize maintenance, order,
and compliance to rules and procedures (Scott 1995). In A Comparative
Analysis of Complex Organizations, Etzioni (1961) observes organizations
as to their structures. From this perspective, organizations have three
primary compliance structures which entail various levels of
organizational commitment. Normative compliance indicates a moral,
natural commitment to the organization. Churches, professional
organizations, political organizations, and criminal justice agencies
would be included in this category. Calculative or renumerative
organizations utilize competitive strategies to achieve goals and
objectives. For example, a factory may offer its employees substantially
higher wages to secure productivity and survival of the system.

Finally, organizations utilize coercive means to realize goals and
objectives. Coercive systems hold almost complete control of the
decision-making abilities of organizational members; hence, there is less
need for normative or calculative persuasions (Etzioni 1961).

Normative, calculative, and coercive perspectives are all present in
modern day policing. There is an implicit normative nature to all public
organizations. Accordingly, there is general societal consensus that
policing promotes social control. The coercive nature of policing can be
illustrated by its quasi-military structure and police use of force to
ensure compliance with the law. Therefore, the consequences of

noncompliance may involve the use of ﬁrearms or high speed pursuits.
15

Coercive and normative compliance structures provide the basic
foundation of modern policing to the extent that they promote social
control and compliance with legal constraints.

Though many policing wages are sub-standard, law enforcement
salaries can offer competitive employment with other economic as well as
social beneﬁts. Many police organizations offer starting salaries that
exceed many private sector jobs that most ofﬁcers would be qualiﬁed to
perform. Relatively higher wages, social beneﬁts, such as better
retirement and insurance programs, and the level of respect given to law
enforcement ofﬁcials make calculative compliance relative to policing.
However, calculative compliance is most likely a tertiary compliance
structure, balancing coercive and normative considerations.

It is apparent that Etzioni’s normative compliance and natural
systems perspectives are similar ideologically. Both would view moral
commitment, normative compliance, and societal consensus as essential
to policing. Therefore, police organizations (in a democracy) exist
implicitly through the consent of the governed (the citizens). Since
normative compliance and natural perspectives are central to modern
policing, it important to discuss normative compliance across rational
and open systems, and rational perspectives across coercive and
calculative compliance structures.

Normative compliance as it relates to rational police systems

indicates once again that there is some agreed upon measure of police
I6

accountability within general society. Therefore, whether tangible or not,
society is committed to reducing crime and providing order. The
normative compliance as it relates to the open systems perspective
suggests that the same commitment to societal order is consistent across
the major system (the criminal justice system) and the different sub—
systems (police, courts, and corrections). There is great continuity
between Etzioni’s concept of normative commitment and natural,
rational, and open systems perspectives.

Natural systems perspectives are dependent on shared values,
interests, and beliefs. As normative compliance illuminates rational and
open systems perspectives, the natural systems perspective is related to
coercive and calculative compliance. Police use of coercive compliance is
supported by the majority of the public. It is believed to be in the
common interest of society to lockup dangerous offenders, arrest drunk
drivers, and ultimately, to eradicate dangerous violent predators by
imposing death sentences. Accordingly, American society proclaims
public service is the highest sense of duty. Hence public servants, at
least ideologically, should be paid more for difﬁcult public mandates.
This may explain why police ofﬁcers are paid more than individuals
working in similar private sector jobs with comparable qualiﬁcations (i.e.,
Security and loss assets protection duties).

Formal and informal structures are also applicable when

considering the complexity of modern organizations. One method by
17

which organizations coordinate tasks and maintain compliance is
through the creation of policies and procedures. Organizational
uncertainly, in terms of speciﬁc tasks, elevate the need for formalization.
But, the very nature of uncertainly suggests that formalization will not
anticipate all possible situations and conditions (Hodge, Anthony, 85
Gales 1996). Critical decision-making in policing involves non-routine,
unstructured events. Non-routine and unstructured tasks are extremely
difﬁcult to formalize (Robbins 1990).

Centralization relates to organizational hierarchy or at which level
organizational decisions are made. Accordingly, organizations desire
various levels of centralization. Agencies with centralized organizational
schemes vest decision-making within the upper echelons. Bureaucratic
organizations and highly formalized structures desire a locus of control
that is essentially centralized. “Centralized decision-making is typically
necessary when a broader organizational perspective is present (Hodge et
al. 1996: 43).” Within the broad mandate of democratic policing,
centralization is often seen as one way of adherence to basic principles
and organizational goals and objectives. The idea of police
professionalism as propounded by O. W. Wilson envisions the uniﬁcation
and codiﬁcation of law enforcement functions from a top-down
perspective (Wallace, Roberson, & Steckler 1996).

Other organizations value input from the lower-level and embrace

a participatory posture. In these organizations, decision-making may be
l8

quicker and can reduce the burden placed on the top level. This, in turn,
allows the organization to be more responsible to various challenges both
internal and external to the organization (Hodge et al. 1996). Community
policing, which embraces problem-solving at the street-level, relies upon
the individual actions of police ofﬁcers. These ofﬁcers make
discretionary decisions in a very decentralized fashion (Mastrofski and
Uchida 1993; Wallace et. al. 1996).

Often, large organizations manage complexity through greater
levels of formalization and centralization (Hodge et al. 1996). The
complexity of the law enforcement mandate in modern society would
naturally promote some basic level of centralization. However, police
organizations are not normatively large and may not particularly demand
a centralized locus of control.

Both systemic and structural approaches to organizational theory
are relevant to understanding modern organizations. Natural, open, and
rational perspectives all help to illuminate an understanding of how
modern organizations behave. Likewise, complex structures,
formalization, and centralization are important philosophical bases for
studying organizational behavior. These various systemic and structural
perspectives, in turn, inﬂuence the nature of speciﬁc, non-routine,
critical decision-making. The following section considers the speciﬁc
factors and contexts related to making critical or otherwise risky

decisions.

Decision-making in Complex Organizations

Traditionally, behavioral decision theory has used the terms “risky”
and “uncertain” interchangeably (Kuhn 85 Budescu 1996; Highhouse 8r.
Yuce 1996). Deﬁnitions of risk vary from one arena to the next. These
various deﬁnitions emphasize the threat of personal harm to the loss of
opportunities. However, the most common theme in conceptualizations
of risk involve the possibility of loss with some built-in strategy to avoid it
(Highhouse 8a Yuce 1996). It is obvious that an individual police ofﬁcer’s
decision to arrest includes both risks to the public and individual safety,
as well as the opportunity to apprehend a suspected offender. An
important element to understanding risk is the decision-makers point of
reference (i.e., loss or gain). Often, this point of reference is framed in
the context of existing alternatives (Highhouse 8t. Yuce 1996).

Many risk decisions are based upon vague probabilities; therefore,
gain or loss perspectives are mitigated by the uncertainty of action in
various situations (Kuhn 1997; Kuhn 8r. Budescu 1996). The effects of
vagueness and uncertainty has received a great deal of attention in the
organizational literature. It has been established by extant research that
decision-making under uncertainty or vagueness, where the probability
values are unknown, is different from making decisions where possible
risks are known. In general, the evidence suggests that individuals are
averse to taking risks where ambiguous probabilities or outcomes exist.

Uncertainty often leads to cautiousness (Kuhn 1997). In contrast, other
20

organizational behavior scholars argue that vagueness effects operate
through preferences rather than beliefs about probable outcomes.
Whether vagueness is handled through preferences or cautiousness, the
propensity toward aversion is well established in the available literature
(Highhouse 85 Yuce 1996; Kuhn 1997).

Social and cognitive factors also impact behavioral norms and
organizational decision-making. Levine et al. (2000) conclude that those
sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes engage in
more risky behavior whereas those sensitive to the presence or absence
of negative outcomes practice conservatism in judgement. Various
organizational tasks are dynamic as opposed to routinized. An important
aspect of non-routine decision-making is that it gives immediate
feedback as to the consequences of alternate courses of action (Gibson,
Fichman, and Plaut 1997). Generally, researchers have studied decision-
making that affords individuals an unlimited amount of time. Decisions
in the real world are often made under various time-related constraints.
Ordonez and Benson (1997: 122) have observed that:

Air trafﬁc controllers must make quick decisions when directing

air trafﬁc to avoid an accident. Police ofﬁcers must quickly

decide whether situations warrant the use of force. A driver,

upon seeing a yellow light, must decide whether to speed up

through the intersection or hit the brakes to stop before the
red light appears.

2]

Time constraints, vagueness, and uncertainty impact organizational
decision-making involving both routine and non-routine tasks (Ordonez
and Benson 1997).

In completion of complex tasks, individuals utilize implicit theory
and socially constructed reality. When individual implicit theory is
matched with socially constructed reality, the predisposition to choose a
certain course of action will be strengthened. Conversely, when there is
a contradiction, individuals must cope with the possibility of
substandard performance and the negative reactions of others. Implicit
theory can involve both formal and informal processes. For example,
formalized or informalized policies and procedures can enable an
individual to reconcile appropriate action after perceiving a certain event.
(Tabernero and Wood 1999). Naturally, these conceptualizations depend
upon substantive formal and informal organizational knowledge as well
as how reality is ultimately constructed.

Law enforcement ofﬁcers make both routine and non-routine
decisions on a daily basis. However, the complex, non-routine decisions
made under pressure must be guided by breadth of knowledge as
opposed to breadth of experience. This breadth of knowledge can be
obtained through organizational training and the establishment of
unambiguous policies and procedures. In essence, organizational

members need to know goals and guiding philosophies (policies),

22

behavioral standards (procedures), and improper, unwarranted
responses (restrictions).

Organizational decisions are made under various contexts which
are subject to change. The evolution of organizations parallel the social
changes in the larger society. As discussed, organizational behavior can
be viewed systemically, structurally, and as a process of non-routine and
routine decision-making; organizations can also be viewed through an
analysis of social change. The following section will discuss
organizations as dynamic, ever-changing entities. Further, social change
in the organization of modern policing will be discussed speciﬁc to

traditional lethal force policy and external review of the police.

Change and Dissipative Structure Theory

According to Klofas et al., (1989: 32), “change is a transformation,
modiﬁcation, alteration, or passing from one place, state, form or phrase
to another.” Rather than static, change is dynamic, continuous and
often complex. As a dynamic phenomena, change is variable and
happens in relation to current and past social, economic, or
organizational conditions (Hall 1982; Duncan 1978). Duncan (1978)
further uses the term organizational change in reference to any
signiﬁcant alteration of behavioral patterns or functioning of a large
segment of individuals who constitute an organization. Two components

of the change process deserve special consideration. Planned and
23

unplanned change and resistance to change are of primary import to the
present analysis.

The notion of planned or deliberate change refers to organizational
strategies designed to change individual, group, or organizational
procedures. Naturally, planned or deliberate change has the propensity
to be less traumatic to the organization. However, this does not imply
that social and environmental factors do not play a signiﬁcant role in
planned change (Klofas et al. 1989). Forces that induce change stem
from both internal and external sources. Unplanned change or change
that happens as a consequence of outside forces is probably more
disturbing to the organization (Hodge et al 1996; Klofas et a1. 1989).
Hodge et al. (1996) suggests that new, progressive or diverse individuals
entering the organization can prompt unplanned change by promoting
new administrative or managerial principles. Therefore, the prevailing
values of those at the upper echelons positively or negatively inﬂuence
the implementation of organizational change.

Change can be developmental or transitional. Developmental
change, in this view, relies upon strategic planning and recognition of
better methods of achieving organizational goals. Potentially,
developmental change can be less threatening than either planned or
unplanned change. Because transitional change consists of

implementation of new organizational schemes by rearranging or

24

disassembling older structures, it can also be traumatic (Hodge et al.
1996; Robbins 1990).

There are two common methods of producing change. Unilateral
continuum of the organization suggests a top-down, highly formalized
strategy. The second method, a bottom to top strategy, utilizes group
decision-making and is potentially less disruptive than the former
method. Whether change is planned, unplanned, developmental, or
transitional, the very notion of change is often met with substantial
opposition (Klofas et. a1 1989; Hodge et al. 1996).

Because new ideas and procedures are often speculative and
conﬂict with prior organizational goals, it is natural for organizations to
resist change (DuBrin 197 2). Technical change is resisted to a lesser
degree than philosophical change. Change that threatens the legitimacy
of the organization is met with the most resistance. Often organizations
resist change when no harmful outcomes are identiﬁed due simply to
personal anxiety and uncertainty (Hodge et al. 1996; Klofas et al. 1989).

Contained within the substantial amount of social change
literature, there is a wealth of information of organizational change and
transformation. Traditional social change evaluations rely heavily upon
equilibrium perspectives (organizational desire to maintain balance and a
high sense of order), suggesting that normal organizations seek stability
while change indicates an unbalanced condition (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85

Smith 1985; Liu 1996). Unlike equilibrium-based perspectives, the
25

dissipative structure paradigm views non-equilibrium as a catalyst for
providing a new, more efﬁcient organizational structure (Leifer 1989;
Gemmill 85 Smith 1985).

Equilibrium models suggest that organizations need rationality in
that they operate under certain prescribed and orderly conditions.
Change is, therefore, a natural threat to the organization (Leifer 1989 ;
Gemmill 85 Smith 1985; Prigogine 85 Stengers 1984; Scott 1991). Leifer
(1989:902) states:

The equilibrium model derives from the open systems perspective

and its premise is adaptation to environmental conditions. While

the model does begin to account for organizational and
environmental interdependency, it is applicable to systems
operating within certain parameters. It does not describe profound
transformational, discontinuous change brought about by
fundamental changes to basic political and cultural systems of the
organization as a result of uncontrollable environmental
turbulence.
Mitroff (1979) notes that rational organizations become overwhelmed by
social or environmental change and cope by increasing their complexity
and openness to external input. This openness, while positive on some
levels, often fragments the organizational structure. At odds with the
equilibrium perspective, the dissipative structure paradigm suggests that
an organization’s instability does not necessarily harm the organization.
Dissipative structure theory is rooted in the natural as opposed to

the social sciences (Prigogine 85 Stengers 1984; Scott 1991; Leifer 1989;

Liu 1996; Overman 1996; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985; Svyantex 85 Brown

26

1999; Wicks 1998; White et al. 2001). Prigogine and Stengers (1984212)
state:

In far-from-equilibrium conditions, we may have transformation

from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order. New dynamic

states of matter may originate, states that reﬂect the interaction
of a given system with its surroundings. We have called these

new structures dissipative structures to emphasize the

constructive role of dissipative processes in their formation.
The transition to the study of non-equilibrium and non-rationality is
predicated on the notion of environmental uncertainty. This uncertainty
occurs in both naturally and socially occurring and reoccurring
phenomena (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985). Complexity in both
natural and social settings requires adaptive responses and, at times,
environmental changes lead to periods of uncertainty (Leifer 1989). The
dissipative structure theory suggests that the presence of instabilities at
the bifurcation point (where the limits of the organization’s coping
mechanisms are exceeded) does not necessarily lead to chaotic random
behavior, but instead offers the opportunity for a new dynamic order,
which is able to handle increasing amounts of uncertainty and
complexity (Gemmill 85 Smith 1985; Leifer 1989).

According to the dissipative structure perspective, the system or
organization reaches a bifurcation point (i.e., overload) and is forced to
reorganize and accomplish needed transformation. Therefore, the
perspective views non-equilibrium as an opportunity for organizational

change in a positive sense (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985;

27

Goldstein 1988). Hence, organizations must constantly adapt and
change under dynamic environmental and social conditions (Gioia 2000).
Four aspects of the dissipative structure paradigm have been

identiﬁed. These aspects include: (1) point of singularity, (2)
transformation utilizing radical strategies, (3) ineffective or symbolic
acting and experimentation, and (4) organizational or systemic
resynthesis (Leifer 1989: 906). Modern organizations transform through
these complex processes that are not understandable through
equilibrium models, which are unable to explain dynamic processes
(Gemmill and Smith 1985).

The point of singularity refers to an overwhelming adaptive
response—some trigger event that causes the organization to take a
corrective posture. Often, the trigger event stems from environmental
inﬂuences or factors external to the system (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85
Smith 1985). However, the disequilibrium condition or singularity point
can be brought about through environmental or internal conditions or
both (Gemmill 85 Smith 1985; Prigogine 85 Stengers 1984).

Transformation utilizing radical strategies, or what Gemmill and
Smith (1985) refer to as symmetry breaking, refers to the visionary
tactics employed by organizations to increase efﬁciency, acceptability,
and accountability. This process might entail administrators revising
their objectives to correspond with available data that appears relative to

organizational prosperity (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985).
28

Transformative or nonequilibrium models imply unsuccessful replication
of prior organizational strategies and the ability to break symmetry,
allowing for greater degrees of change (Gemmill 85 Smith 1985).

The inefﬁcient acting and experimentation component of the
dissipative structural paradigm indicates that where organizations are
inefﬁcient, problem-solving postures are assumed. Through this
process, new philosophies, strategies, and tactics are discussed within
the new environmental or internal constraints with respect to
organizational bifurcation (Leifer 1989). Systems or organizations which
are best able to experiment with and retain a progressive posture have a
better probability of positive, organizational transformation (Gemmill 85
Smith 1985).

Resynthesis or reformulation refers to the openness of the
organization after procession through the aforementioned stages. This
resynthesis suggests that an organization or system will be more open
and receptive to various strategies than in the past. However, this
openness may only be relevant to the singular point or points that
caused bifurcation in the ﬁrst instance (Leifer 1989). As opposed to a
ﬁnal process, resynthesis might better be viewed as a spiral. “Once new
conﬁgurations are spawned, the autopoetic process or continual self-
renewal will again build new structures, much like it does in an
equilibrium system (Gemmill 85 Smith 1985: 759).” However, equilibrium

systems desire reformative postures, whereas nonequilibrium systems
29

must continually maintain sufﬁciently high transformative modes
(Progogine 85 Stengers 1984; Scott 1991; Gemmill 85 Smith 1985).

Therefore, the dissipative structure theory suggests that points of
singularity and bifurcation allow organizations to maintain composure
through uncertainty to transform themselves. Through organizational
transformation, qualitative and fundamental changes occur that
strengthen organizational ability to adapt (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85 Smith
1985; Progogine 85 Stengers 1984). The following section applies the
dissipative structural paradigm to developments in police use of lethal
force and external review of the police. The discussion will concentrate
on points of singularity, radical strategies, symbolic or ineffective
responses, and ﬁnally, reformulation and resynthesis.
Police Organizational Transformation and Dissipative Structures

Due to various external forces, American policing has gone through
transformative changes. In order to apply the dissipative structure
paradigm to modern policing, two critical areas are reviewed. These
critical areas concern policy changes in handling police misconduct and
the use of lethal force. While lethal force changes are consistent with the
present analysis, the discussion of dissipative structures from a different
reference point (external police review) may better verify theoretical
relativity. Therefore, the following elaborations are not meant to provide
a comprehensive review of either lethal force or external review of the

police.

External review of the police refers to any procedure whereby
civilians or persons external to the police agency have involvement in the
citizens’ complaint process. This deﬁnition may seem overly simplistic,
but the variety of review procedures that exist across the United States
demand such broad categorization. Although the term “external police
review” dates back to the late 1940’s, the impetus for external review
procedures was derived from the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967 (Walker and
Bumphus 1992; Walker 1992). The literature in this area reveals that
the politics of external police review ﬁrst surfaced through the
establishment of external review procedures in New York City and
Philadelphia in the 1960’s (Walker 1992).

The catalyst for increased external review procedures came from
three primary sources: the Presidential Crime Commission, scholarly
research that validated signiﬁcant police abuses in urban areas, and civil
rights initiatives in urban America (Littlejohn 1981; Walker 1992). Both
the 1967 and 1968 Crime Commissions noted systematic abuses of
police authority. These commissions cited abuses in some cities that
ranged from minor discourtesy to the clear use of unnecessary, often
brutal, force. The 1967 Commission advocated reforming the system by
establishing external review procedures; the 1968 Crime Commission

concluded that internal procedures for handling grievances against the

police were merely symbolic, window-dressing to appease various
disgruntled groups (Campbell et al. 1970; Reasons and Wirth 1975).

The direct inﬂuence of the 1967 Crime Commission was evident in
the establishment of a number of external review procedures; in fact, by
the late mid-1970’s, most large departments were experimenting with
review procedures. However, many of these procedures served very
symbolic objectives (Reasons and Wirth 1975; Klyman and Kruckenburg
1979)

Research conducted by police scholars also served as a catalyst for
external police review. Both Chevigny (1969) and Reiss (1968) conﬁrmed
systematic abuses of police authority in urban areas. During the same
time, minorities and disenfranchised groups gained momentum in civil
rights initiatives and began to challenge the status quo. The urban riots
of the 1960’s can be explained in part by new challenges claiming
discriminatory and disparate treatment (Walker 1992).

During the ﬁrst era of external review (roughly 1966-1974),
procedures were created by administrative or executive order; these
measures did not necessarily entail a consensus judgement on the part
of the larger community. Additionally, early boards were often manned
by former police personnel or people who had strong ties to policing.
They were in essence symbolic gestures and seldom provided

independent evaluations. These procedures were vulnerable to

b)
IQ

ﬂuctuations in political climate, and subsequently boards fell prey to
efforts from oppositionists (Walker 1992; Goldsmith 1991).

Over time external review of the police has become more
independent. The majority of the seventy-ﬁve largest cities have external
review agencies. In fact, external review of police has become a
normative component of policing, especially in larger cities (Walker and
Bumphus 1992; Goldsmith 1991).

Consistent with the dissipative structure paradigm, external points
of singularity that observed police misconduct and citizen dissatisfaction
caused major problems in police administration. A bifurcation point was
reached, whereby, citizens questioned police authority through rioting
and open rebellion. In reaction, the police created symbolic procedures
to appease various communities. Finally, a resynthesis occurred
whereby these once symbolic agencies became less so and were
integrated into the normative structure of policing. New structures of
complaint resolution have allowed police organizations to better handle
complexity caused by external stimuli.

Alpert and Fridell (1992) in Police Vehicles and Firearms:
Instruments of Deadly Force discuss changes in police policies and
procedures from a social movement perspective. Their analysis embraces
the notion that external turbulence forces drastic, often transformative,
changes within organizational processes. In speciﬁc, the authors use

the social movement perspective to analyze drunk driving and the

«a
J.)

external forces and grassroots initiatives that forced considerable
change. The social movements approach is not contradictory to the
present analysis. Both social movement and dissipative structure
paradigms consider preeminent external forces that prompt substantial
organizational change.

Though police authority to use lethal force represents one of the
most signiﬁcant powers of government, there is a lack of reliable national
information in the area (Alpert and Fridell 1992). Data consistently
reveals that only a small percentage of police actions involve the use of
force. These various exercises of force indicate non-routine tasks. A
recent study concluded that physical force is used in fewer than one of
ﬁve adult custody arrests (U. S. Department of Justice 1999). Factors
related to the situational use of police force has made decision—making
very controversial.

Similar to external police review, various external catalysts
inﬂuenced the evolution of use of force policy. These external inﬂuences
involved challenges to the appropriateness of using police force and legal
challenges involving equal protection and civil rights. In the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s, evidence was presented by a number of researchers
indicating that shots ﬁred often wounded or killed citizens. Fyfe (1979)
reported that as high as thirty-one percent of shots ﬁred injured or killed
in New York City in a given year. As evidence began to emerge that

police use of force (lethal force) often ended in death, scholars and
34

activists started to question the situational appropriateness of the use of
lethal exercises of police force.

During the same period, Fyfe (1979) concluded that police exercise
of lethal force was discriminatory. It was revealed that minority citizens
were signiﬁcantly more likely to be injured or killed by the police than
their majority counterparts. Using the Memphis, Tennessee metropolitan
area, Fyfe also found that community characteristics such as race,
gender, and social class inﬂuenced police shootings. Studies that
looked at the appropriateness of police use of lethal force served as a
catalyst for change; however, the disparate treatment issue was most
likely a more signiﬁcant point of singularity.

A number of legal challenges questioned the use of lethal force by
the police. The substantial legal challenges dealt primarily with deﬁning
excessive force in context. Various court cases and alleged civil rights
violations forced many police agencies to institute more restrictive
policies. The major change came in 1978 with the ruling in Tennessee v.
Garner. This important supreme court case established a standard for
the use of lethal force which required that the situation be of a felonious
nature, that there is no substantial risk to incident bystanders, the
offender’s conduct involve the threatened use of lethal force, and that
failure to apprehend would cause a substantial risk to personal safety.

In essence, the Garner ruling struck down the ﬂeeing felon provision and

established criteria by which lethal force could legitimately be exercised
(Alpert and Fridell 1992 ; U. S. Department of Justice 1999).

Information that brought safety, disparate treatment, and legalistic
issues to light served as catalysts or points of singularity in
transformative changes in use of force policy. Many agencies as a result
managed complexity by instituting policies reﬂecting some of the external
challenges existing procedures. Many of these policies were symbolic in
nature (ineffective acting). As external complexities mounted, especially
legal factors, a resynthesis occurred in policing that fundamentally
changed the organizational structure relative to exercising force.

The remainder of this literature review examines the current body
of research on police pursuit as a weapon of lethal force. Therefore, the
review examines police pursuit-related safety and liability issues as well
as the costs and beneﬁts of police pursuit and the nature of formalized

policies and procedures.

CHAPTER THREE:

Research on Police Pursuit Driving

The use of force (e.g., ﬁrearms or vehicular pursuit) is one of the
most critical decisions law enforcement ofﬁcers undertake (Alpert 85
Fridell 1992). Police ofﬁcers are mandated by the state to use reasonable
force to apprehend probable offenders (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992; Barker
1998; Alpert 1987). Naturally, what is to be considered reasonable force
varies from situation to situation. Bayless and Osborne (1998), Homant
and Kennedy (1994), and Alpert et al. (1997) ﬁnd that the public and
police have reasonably strong support for police pursuit. There is a
signiﬁcant amount of recent scholarship that considers various aspects
of police use of vehicular pursuit. This research examines substantive
areas such as safety and liability factors, legalistic considerations, cost
versus beneﬁts analyses, and characteristics of police decision-making,
policies, procedures, and restrictions. The following review of the extant
literature discusses both the empirical and non-empirical scholarship
relative to these speciﬁc substantive areas as well as philosophical
matters.

The utility of police pursuit is most appropriately viewed in relation
to the conﬂict between enforcement of the law and order maintenance.
All pursuits would make sense from a strict crime-control perspective to
the extent that they relate to general penal goals such as deterrence

37

(speciﬁc and general) and incapacitation. Conversely, police pursuit may
become counterproductive and antithetical to order maintenance
functions. The potential, therefore, exists that pursuits may cause more
harm than social good (Blankenship 85 Moneymaker 1991).

A number of researchers have recently began to classify police
vehicular pursuit as a lethal force issue (Alpert 85 Fridell; 1992, Barker
1998; Alpert 1987; Kenney 85 Alpert 1997). Accordingly, Alpert and
Fridell (1992) report that it was not until the 19603 that any serious
attention was given to police vehicular pursuit. In the 1960s, several
important advocacy groups began to notice and comment on the negative
aspects of police pursuit behavior. Initial perceptions of the
consequences of police pursuit were anecdotal and greatly inﬂuenced by
the political climate and media interpretation (Patinkin 85 Bingham
1986)

Early philosophical debates were not based on objective
information but entertained the need for swift apprehension of serious
offenders and protection of the general public (Hannigan 1992; Alpert 85
Fridell 1992). Police vehicular pursuit becomes more controversial when
considering the context (Hannigan 1992; Alpert 85 Fridell 1992).
Philosophical arguments involving the appropriateness of police pursuit
can be divided into two broad camps. The ﬁrst position views pursuits,
especially high-speed ones, as inherently dangerous and advocate highly

restrictive and comprehensive policies (Kennedy et al. 1992; Alpert 85
38

Dunham 1989; Charles, Falcone, 85 Wells 1992; Barker 1998; Payne 85
Corley 1994; Payne 1997). More consistent with the crime-control
model, the second position conceptualizes the dangerous consequences
of failure to pursue (California Highway Patrol 1983; Hannigan 1992).

Both positions present palatable arguments. On the one hand,
position one supporters highlight the detrimental, public consequences
of lack of control of police pursuit, citing safety and liability issues.
Those embracing position two highlight the repercussions of abolishing
or limiting police use of vehicular pursuit as constituting dereliction of
duty and creating lower levels of public safety (Britz 85 Payne 1994).

Alpert and Fridell (1992) contend that research and debate on
police pursuit follows a similar trend as traditional deadly force research.
In this sense, the state of research examining ﬁrearms could be
explaining what is known about pursuit driving (Geller 85 Scott; Alpert 85
Fridell 1992). Accordingly, scholars have recently began to conceptualize
police vehicular pursuit as deadly or lethal force (Alpert 1987; Alpert 85
Fridell 1992; Alpert et al. 1996; Barker 1984). Barker (1984: 70)
concludes “high-speed pursuit is one of the most dangerous activities
that can be engaged in by a law enforcement ofﬁcer. The police vehicle is
a potential deadly weapon and pursuit driving is often a life-or-death
situation.”

As evidence began to emerge that police pursuits often resulted in

serious physical harm or death to citizens and ofﬁcers, police ofﬁcials
39

and scholars were forced to rethink philosophical rationales for the use
of police vehicular pursuit as they related to safety and liability issues
(Charles 85 Falcone 1992). The police pursuit debate has generated a
considerable amount of scholarly interest focusing on safety and liability,
costs versus beneﬁts analyses, characteristics of pursuits, pursuit
decision—making, and restrictivensess (Alpert 85 Dunham 1990; Crew
1992; Blankenship and Monkeymaker 1991; Alpert 85 Dunham 1992;
Crew et al. 1995; Charles 85 Auten 1994).

More recent debates concerning the relevant factors related to
police pursuit is based upon better information, but data is still less than
systematic (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992). However, recent scholarship has

focused upon the following substantive areas.

Safety Issues

In 1968, the Physicians for Automotive Safety, a self-appointed,
unofﬁcial body, released a report concluding the negative aspects of
police pursuit. The document presented some disturbing ﬁndings which

included the following information:

One out of ﬁve pursuits ends in death; ﬁve out of ten pursuits
end in serious injuries; seven out of ten pursuits end in
accidents; one out of 25 killed is a law enforcement ofﬁcer;
four out of ﬁve pursuits are for minor offenses; and

pursuits cause more than 500 deaths each year.

(Alpert 85 Fridell 1992: 99).

4O

Alpert 85 Fridell (1992) report that the ﬁndings from the Physicians for
Automotive Safety Study caused signiﬁcant controversy in law
enforcement and gave way to a veritable amount of scholarly interest.

The ﬁrst ofﬁcial study of police pursuit driving soon followed.
Published in 1970, Fennessy and colleagues attempted to pool the
available data sources and provide a comprehensive examination of
police pursuit consequences. The U. S. Department of Transportation
sponsored the study which is commonly referred to as the Fennessy
Report (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992).

The Fennessy Report attacked the lack of reliable data used in the
Physicians’ Study. According to Fennessy et al. (1970), conceptual
uncertainties limited the validity of the former study. In an effort to
counteract some the negative publicity caused by the Physicians’ Study,
the U. S. Department of Transportation Study conducted a survey of
citizens in one county in Virginia and found that approximately two-
thirds (sixty—four percent) of the population agreed with the use of police
vehicular pursuit (Fennessy et al. 1970).

In their attempt to invalidate the Physicians’ Study, Fennessy and
his associates concluded that to impair the ability of the police to pursue
would be a mistake. However, they recognized the importance of
reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities. The Fennessy Report
concluded that police pursuit was a necessary element of modern

policing and that reform issues should concentrate on matters related to
4]

administrative policy and practice as opposed to abolition (Fennessy et
a1. 1970).

Though the government sponsored Fennessy Study suggested that
attention be given to policies and practices in evaluating police pursuit,
Alpert 85 Fridell (1992: 101) note that “the second generation of research
on police pursuits was not initiated until the early 1980s.” The
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Study (1983) provided a descriptive
analysis of police pursuit outcomes in 683 incidents. Data from the CHP
Study demonstrated divergent ﬁndings when compared to the Physicians’
Study. The CHP study concluded that 29 percent of pursuits ended in
an accident, 11 percent ended with injuries, and 1 percent ended in
death. The ﬁndings contradicted the Physicians’ Study, which had
concluded that around 20 percent of pursuits resulted in death and 50
percent in injuries. Additionally, the study found that around 77 percent
and 70 percent of incidents ended in apprehension and without incident,
respectively (California Highway Patrol 1983).

As with the Fennessy Report, the California Highway Patrol Study
(1983) viewed the pursuit outcome as the best method to assess risk to
public and ofﬁcer safety. Proponents and opponents utilized ﬁndings
derived from the CHP Study to further their causes. For the proponents
of police use of vehicular pursuit, the evidence suggested that very few

pursuits ended in injury, and even fewer resulted in death. Opponents,

42

once again, advocated controlling police discretion and the enactment of
more comprehensive, restrictive pursuit policies (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992).

Subsequent research examining safety issues involving police
vehicular pursuit has built upon all the aforementioned studies. The
research has, accordingly, become more methodologically and
conceptually sound. Normatively, the police pursuit research has
examined very location-speciﬁc, often state, populations. These studies
have provided more information on the nature of accidents, injuries, and
fatalities involving police use of vehicular pursuit.

Alpert and Dunham (1990) examined data from Ontario, Canada
from 1981 to 1984 and concluded that accidents happen in 33 percent of
the cases, injuries in 10 percent, and fatalities in less than 0.4 percent.
A similar study conducted in Dade County, Florida over a 3 year—period,
suggested that accidents occurred in 33 percent of the cases , injuries in
17 percent, and fatalities in 0.7 percent.

Auten (1991) reported that for 86 participating police agencies in
the state of Illinois evaluation of police pursuits reveal accidents in 41
percent of the cases, injuries in 12 percent, and fatalities in 1.4 percent.
Subsequent analysis of Illinois pursuit data provided comparable
information on the safety issues related to police pursuit (see, Charles et
al. 1992; Falcone et. al 1992). Osechsli (1992), in surveying data from
the Kentucky State Police from 1989 to 1992, concluded that the 3

fatalities during the time period involved ﬂeeing drivers, passengers, or
43

uninvolved bystanders. In an analysis of Michigan pursuit data, Payne
and Fenske (1996) examined ﬁve years of data and concluded that
fatalities occur in less than one percent of all pursuits. Personal injuries
occurred more often (around twenty-ﬁve percent of the time).

Studies conducted in Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan have
validated the relatively low occurrence of fatalities in police vehicular
pursuit with signiﬁcant levels of accidents and injuries. Therefore, the
conclusion reached by the Physicians’ Study may have exaggerated the
rate of fatalities caused by police pursuit behavior as evidenced by
subsequent state and local studies (Payne 85 Fenske 1996; Falcone et. al
1992; Charles et al. 1992; Osechsli 1992; Auten 1991; Alpert 85 Dunham
1990)

National information on police pursuit driving is available through
the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA). The N HTSA
collects data on pursuit-related fatalities and deaths on a national level.
Data used by the NHTSA is actually compiled by the Fatal Accident
Reporting System (FARS). The FARS system only observes fatalities at
the scene and collects no information on accidents or injuries separately
(Kenney 85 Alpert 1997; Geller 85 Scott 1992). Though FARS has
reported information on pursuit fatalities since 1993, the methodology
being utilized is being continually modiﬁed; as a result, there is still a
lack of systematic information on police pursuit fatalities at the national

level (Geller 85 Scott 1992).
44

Kenney and Alpert (1997) conducted the most exhaustive study to
date that examines police pursuit safety issues. This national survey of
use of police force was conducted for 7 months in late 1994 and early
1995. The sample consisted of 737 randomly selected police
organizations. Kenney and Alpert (1997) found that approximately 2.4
per 1,000 and 8.6 per 1,000 percent of police pursuits in municipal and
county agencies, respectively, ended in fatalities. Additionally, the
authors concluded that injuries occurred in 25 per 1,000 pursuits. The
available national data suggests signiﬁcantly lower rates of fatalities and

injuries than other, more localized, accounts.

Liability Issues

Several provisions of the United States Constitution are relevant to
the use of police pursuit: the 4th Amendment, the 8th Amendment, and
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has concluded that arrests
and seizures must be conducted with a reasonable amount of force in
light of the circumstances. Accordingly, the 8th Amendment, which
protects against cruel and unusual punishment, applies when the force
exercised is deemed unreasonable (Hall 1997; 1999). The Due Process
Clause “prohibits the federal and state governments, respectively, from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law (Hall 1999: 2).” Generally, the Due Process Clause is relative when

no 4th or 8th Amendment violation is evident. Since police vehicular
45

pursuit characterizes use of force, reasonable or otherwise, liability
considerations would impact both 4th and 8th Amendment provisions
(Hall 1999).

Liability claims are generally based upon three considerations
which include: 1) existence of a legal duty owed, 1) an alleged breach of
duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from the breach. The Supreme
Court has not addressed whether or not a departmental policy creates a
legal duty (Hall 1997: 1). Generally, the negligent or improper use of
vehicular pursuit would present initial liability questions. To the extent
that improper use of vehicular pursuit breaches policy and other
constitutional protections, organizational and individual factors become
important considerations (Hall 1997; 1999)

Improper or negligent use of the various law enforcement
technologies impact organizational and individual liability. Kappeler and
del Carmen (1990) examine the liability issues involved in the operation
of police emergency vehicles. They classify police use of motor vehicles
into categories of routine and non-routine use. In normal routine duties,
police ofﬁcers are afforded no special privileges or immunities; they are
held to the same standard of conduct as ordinary citizens. The non-
routine operation of police vehicles under emergency situations grant
police ofﬁcers limited statutory immunity. Because of hazards involved
in emergency driving, all states have enacted statutes that address

emergency vehicle operation.
46

The courts have concluded that the proper test for determining if
an emergency exists depends upon the nature of the situation. In this
sense, courts have ruled that the chase or attempted apprehension of a
law violator does not always constitute an emergency situation. The
condition of reasonableness must be satisﬁed in that the pursuant
perceived the situation as a true emergency (Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor,
339 NW. 2d. 413 1983; Kappeler 85 del Carmen 1990). However, the
California Supreme Court in Kisbey v. California concluded:

the purpose of the legislation was to immunize public

entities and employees from the entire spectrum of potential

injuries caused by persons actually or about to be

deprived of their freedom who take physical measures

of one kind or another to avoid the constraint or

escape from it (Kisbey v. California 682 P2d. 1093 1984).
Traditional barriers to police liability are evident in many jurisdictions,
such as in the state of Virginia, where police pursuit is considered
conduct within the scope of ofﬁcial duties. Such statutes preclude
liability for negligent operation of motor vehicles (Kappeler 85 del Carmen
1990)

In the aftermath of the Garner Case, which invalidated the ﬂeeing
felon response to criminal apprehension, Hall (1997) concluded that
federal courts have been reluctant to accept policy violations on
constitutional grounds. Therefore, the majority of the complaints
question policy violations as related to liability only. As Kappeler and del

Carmen (1990) state, liability issues in police pursuit driving have been

47

handled on a case-by-case basis, observing proximate causes and levels
of negligence. Pursuit driving legal considerations have not traditionally
rose to the level of traditional lethal force issues (Hall 1997).

Courts have viewed factors relating to proximate cause and
contributory or comparative negligence. Even if a breach of duty is
proven, the actions taken must be viewed as the proximate or most likely
cause of the injuries. Both comparative and contributory negligence
claims suggeSt that the action taken resulted in at least part of the
outcome (Kappeler 85 De Carmen 1990). For example, in Maple v. City of
Omaha, the Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that a driver’s failure
to hear emergency sirens was contributory negligence (Maple V. City of
Omaha 348, N. W. 2d. 254 1 986). Contributory or comparative negligence
considerations cover a wide range of behaviors. To date, there has been
no uniformity in applying these concepts to police pursuit driving

(Kappeler 85 del Carmen 1990).

Cost versus Beneﬁts Analyses

A number of scholars have examined the consequences of police
vehicular pursuit from a costs versus beneﬁts perspective (Payne 85
Corley 1994; Blakenship 85 Moneymaker 1991; Crew 85 Hart 1999;
Payne 85 Fenske 1996). Further, Blankenship and Moneymaker (1991)
concluded that a signiﬁcant number of pursuits involve individuals

accused of misdemeanor offenses. They suggest that the utility of all
48

pursuits must be questioned given the signiﬁcant number of serious
injuries and non-serious violations. Cost and beneﬁts of police pursuit
have traditionally been framed in comparing the beneﬁts, such as crime
prevention and deterrence, and the costs, such as the number of
accidents, injuries, and fatalities (Crew 85 Hart 1999).

The costs of police pursuits are easier to operationalize than are
the beneﬁts (Crew 85 Hart 1999; Alpert 85 Dunham 1990). As mentioned,
the literature reveals, in both state and national studies, signiﬁcant
levels of accidents, injuries, and deaths (Payne 85 Fenske 1996; Falcone
et. a1 1992; Charles et al. 1992; Osechsli 1992; Auten 1991; Alpert 85
Dunham 1990). Crew et al. (1995) examined the probabilities that
offenses end in apprehensions (as beneﬁt measure), property damages,
personal injuries, and death. The authors concluded that the probability
of capture varies by type of pursuit (i.e., perceived offense). Generally,
around 75 percent of all those pursued are apprehended. Those
pursuits involving felonies in progress or felonies absent a warrant less
often ended in capture and had higher levels of damages and injuries.
Driving while intoxicated incidents were more likely to end in capture.
Felony warrants and trafﬁc violations were likely less likely to be
apprehended. The authors found that beneﬁts versus cost ratios in some
kinds of chases are better than in others. For example, non-warrant,

felony pursuits often ended without success (in terms of capture).

49

Another potential beneﬁt of police pursuit is its likely deterrent
effect, speciﬁcally or generally (Crew et al. 1995; Alpert 85 Dunham 1990;
Crew 85 Hart 1999). It is difﬁcult to reliably measure the relation
between police pursuit and general deterrence. The knowledge that most
individuals are captured may indicate, that at least in the speciﬁc
incident, there is a level of speciﬁc deterrence. However, the question is
still open to debate whether or not the individual will desist from
participation in pursuits in the future.

Crew and Hart (1999) estimated costs versus beneﬁts by
probability of capture divided the probability of accident, injuries, and
deaths and concluded that police pursuits derive more beneﬁts than
costs. Police pursuits produce more captures than accidents, injuries,
damages, or deaths. Minnesota pursuits (for the time-period speciﬁed)
produced around 60 times greater beneﬁt than estimated costs. The
rates of negative outcomes (e. g., damages and injuries) are relatively high
in police pursuit activities. When considering the potential loss of lives,
the authors acknowledged the difﬁculty in generalizing economic and life
and death considerations.

As with lethal force in general, there is a need to balance pursuit
beneﬁts relative to situational and contextual chase factors. Research
has indicated certain chase situations are normatively less successful
than others (Crew 85 Hart 1999; Senese 85 Lucadamo 1996). Thus,

pursuits that are likely to end with a negative outcome should be highly
50

scrutinized (Crew 85 Hart 1999). The Supreme Court in Tennessee v.
Garner addressed the seriousness of the situation as it related to the use
of lethal force (Hall 1999; Alpert 85 Fridell 1992); to date, courts have not

considered similar guidelines in lethal force in the area of police pursuit.

Characteristics of Pursuits and Pursuit Policies

Alpert (1998) noted that analysis of police pursuit driving can now
be examined via a host of fact patterns and decision-making processes.
Further, Alpert et al. (1997: 371) state “fortunately there is agreement on
at least three aspects of pursuit: (1) pursuits are dangerous, (2) pursuits
must be controlled, and (3) involvement in a pursuit causes participants’
adrenaline and excitement to increase.” Organizational elements (i.e.,
existence of policies and training) and individual and situational
differences impact the nature of police pursuit decisions (Alpert 85 Fridell;
Alpert et al. 1997). In proﬁling the typical pursuit, the California
Highway Patrol Study (1983: 1-2) found that the typical chase:

is initiated by a trafﬁc violation; takes place at night; continues

for one mile; last one to two minutes; involves two police cars;

is terminated voluntarily by the offender; and involves a male

driver twenty years old.
Individual and situational aspects (i.e., ofﬁcer decision-making) have
been examined by a number of scholars using police ofﬁcer samples
(Falcone 1994; Charles 85 Falcone 1992; Alpert et al. 1997; Homant 85

Kennedy 1994; Homant et al. 1993; Alpert 85 Madden 1994).

SI

Charles and Falcone (1992) conducted face-to-face interviews with
police personnel including both municipal and sheriffs’ departments in
the state of Illinois. The non-randomized sample of 107 of patrol ofﬁcers,
sheriffs’ deputies, state troopers, and supervisory staff represented a
good measure of organizational and regional diversity across the state.
Findings suggested that factors such as weather conditions, volume of
trafﬁc, the presence of pedestrians, condition of police vehicle, and
whether a school zone was nearby inﬂuenced pursuit initiation and
continuation. Some ofﬁcers revealed that seriousness of the offense was
a factor, while others viewed eluding law enforcement as justiﬁcation
alone.

The general ﬁndings of the Illinois study suggested that pursuit
behavior was a combination of reliance upon pursuit policy and accepted
norms. Well—articulated policies, departmental training, and
administrative adherence to policy were the three factors most associated
with pursuit decision—making (Charles 85 Falcone 1992). Falcone (1994)
surveyed ofﬁcers in the Chicago metropolitan area and found that
ofﬁcers overwhelmingly felt that a “no pursuit policy” would increase
police pursuit and attempts to elude apprehension. In this sense the
ﬂight of potential offenders might serve as pursuit justiﬁcation outside of
organizational restrictions.

Homant and Kennedy (1994) measured ofﬁcer tendencies to

become involved in police pursuits in a multi-state sample of 614 sworn
52

ofﬁcers. The ﬁndings revealed that ofﬁcer perceptions of police pursuit
have more to do with their experiences within the organization as
opposed to formal policy. Therefore, some ofﬁcers had very restrictive
perceptions of permissive policies and permissive perceptions of literally
restrictive policies.

Alpert et al. (1997) found that the decision to pursue was related to
further force as evidenced by individual ofﬁcer perception. Some ofﬁcers
become excited during a pursue and extend the use of force after
capture. This observation supports the notion that the nature of ﬂight,
deﬁance of authority, and increased levels of adrenaline impact police
use of force. Research has also found a correlation between ofﬁcer
sensation—seeking and high-speed pursuit. In essence, personality
differences may impact pursuit as much as formal or informal policy
guidelines (Homant et al. 1993).

Alpert (1998) conducted a factorial analysis of variables related to
police pursuit initiation. He concluded that the most important factor
inﬂuencing ofﬁcer behavior was the nature of the offense. Accordingly,
ofﬁcers viewed trafﬁc conditions as the most important risk factor. Other
risk factors included weather conditions, type of roadway (freeway,
commercial, inner city, or residential) and population density.
Seriousness of the offense (misdemeanor or felony) served as the most
important rationale for pursuit initiation. Alpert (1998: 347) concluded

that “this one factor (offense seriousness) is more than twice as
53

important as the environmental factors such as chase area, trafﬁc
conditions, and weather.”

Recent studies have considered offender perception of police
pursuit (Dunham et al. 1998; Alpert et al. 1997). The California Highway
Patrol Study (1983) determined that individuals chose ﬂight for various
reasons, which included avoidance of arrest or citation, being caught in a
stolen vehicle, and being cited for other penal code violations.
Additionally, ﬂight was associated with fear or dislike of the police and
excitement. Dunham et al. (1998: 37) found that 32 percent ﬂed because
of driving a stolen car, 27 percent to avoid arrest, 21 percent because of
driving under the inﬂuence, and ﬁnally, 27 percent due to fear of
physical abuse by police ofﬁcers. Alpert et al. (1997) found that 57
percent of suspects claimed abuse pursuant to apprehension.

Various individual factors have been associated with police pursuit
initiation. As for suspects, Dunham et al. (1998: 38) have suggested that
high-risk suspects can be differentiated by certain characteristics “(i.e.,
age, ethnicity, being previously chased or caught by the police in other
chases, and being under the inﬂuence of drugs or alcohol during a
chase)”. Besides sensation-seeking (Homant et al. 1993), other
demographic factors have been associated with police pursuit from an
ofﬁcer perspective (Dunham 85 Alpert 1991; Alpert 85 Dunham 1989).

Dunham and Alpert (1991) found that police pursuit initiated by

female ofﬁcers differed on a number of characteristics. Differences by
54

gender suggested that female ofﬁcers chased for shorter periods of time,
used lesser speeds and were less likely to chase in evenings or at
nighttime. Additionally, female ofﬁcers were less likely to run trafﬁc
lights or to chase onto freeways. The study suggested that, all together,
female ofﬁcer exercised more caution in pursuing. Further, Alpert and
Dunham (1989) found that female ofﬁcers were less likely to become
involved in accidents.

Other ﬁndings presented by Dunham and Alpert (1991) concluded
that older ofﬁcers are more likely to pursue and for longer periods of
time. The authors found that ofﬁcers over 40 years of age were more
likely to be involved in pursuits and utilized higher rates of speed.
However, older ofﬁcers were less likely to pursue in the evenings or at
night. Alpert and Dunham (1989: 530) determined that “there is very
little difference between the chances of accidents when Anglo ofﬁcers
engage in pursuits compared to the pursuits of non-Anglo ofﬁcers.”

Because of the general lack of information of police pursuits and
pursuit driving, many police organizations are left to develop limited
inconsistent policies (Kenney 85 Alpert 1997; Alpert et. al 1996). As
addressed earlier, NHTSA compiles data on pursuit-related deaths on the
national level, but no national sources exist for other pursuit-related
information. The empirical research has addressed characteristics of
police policy (Kennedy et. al 1992; Kenney 85 Alpert 1997; Falcone 85

Wells 1999), policy content (Fyfe 1989; Kennedy et al 1992; Alpert 85
55

Fridell 1992 Crew 85 Kessler 1994, 1995; Alpert et al. 1996; Falcone 85
Wells 1999), and model policies (Wilding 1998; Auten 1990).

Fyfe (1989) examined the characteristics of pursuit driving policies
relative to three critical areas: laying back, overtaking, and roadblocks.
Laying back strategies indicate that if it becomes impossible to
apprehend one does risk lives in order to apprehend minor criminal
violators. Overtaking refers to strategies aimed at forcing an individual
off the road or attempting to pass. Since this process exposes potential
bystanders to danger, pursuit policies address the concern procedurally.
Lastly, the use of roadblocks or obstacles that prevent passage are often
contained in most policies. The measures deal with issues of safety and
risk to the general public. Auten’s (1990) analysis highlighted some of
the above substantive areas as well as additional ones. In his content
analysis of 296 agencies, the author found that the following elements
were mentioned in the majority of policies:

seriousness of offense (93.6 percent); ofﬁcer safety (100 percent);

dispatcher notiﬁcation (93.2 percent); supervisor monitoring (62

percent); ofﬁcer authority to discontinue (85 percent); supervisory

authority to discontinue (84.3 percent); physical contact between
vehicles—ramming (68.9 percent); roadblocks (37.9 percent);
limitation of number pursuit vehicles (49.8 percent); permission
to join other agency in pursuit (57 percent); written reports on

pursuits (72.8 percent); pursuit limited to marked vehicles (44.7

percent); use of ﬁrearms during pursuit (56.2 percent); and use of

occupant restraint devices required (60 percent) (p. 53-54).

The author concluded that the most alarming ﬁndings of the research

was that 61 percent of the 296 Illinois agencies had no written policy.

56

 

Kenney and Alpert (1997) found that 91 percent of a random
sample of police agencies had written policies on pursuit driving. The
authors found that one half of the sample had modiﬁed their existing
policies within the past two years. Further, the authors found that 48
percent and 16 percent of the sampled agencies allowed chases for any
offense and felonies, respectively. Kennedy et al. (1992) subjected the
written pursuit policies of 45 state law enforcement agencies and the 25
largest U. S. cities to a comparative analysis. The research concluded
that physical operation of the police vehicle, circumstances of operation,
and external factors (i.e., climate, population density, and type of
roadway) were consistently mentioned in police policy.

Shuman and Kennedy (1989) concluded that the majority of
policies make a distinction between emergency driving and high—speed
pursuance. In this sense, the dangerousness of accelerated speeds is
addressed as well as seriousness of crime and risk to public safety. The
authors concluded that almost all pursuit policies have four major
deﬁciencies which include: “(1) failure to embody the agency’s mission
statement; (2) under utilize the supervisor; (3) do not contain guidelines
on how to terminate a pursuit; and (4) do not provide mandatory
administrative view of all pursuits (Shuman 85 Kennedy 1989: 24)”.

In response to the various dangers posed by police pursuit driving,
the federal legislature has launched an effort to provide a uniform

Standard on pursuit policy. The National Pursuit Policy Act of 1997 was
57

introduced by the legislature and supported by the International
Association of Chiefs of Police. The measure required all state, county,
and local law enforcement agencies to conform to the pursuit standards
set by the Secretary of Transportation (Wilding 1998). As a restrictive
measure, the National Pursuit Policy Act attempted to place restrictions
on police pursuit driving at the national level. Recent police scholars
have also addressed pursuit policy restrictions (Kennedy et al 1992;
Kenney 85 Alpert 1997; Auten 1990; Alpert et al. 1992; Alpert 85 Fridell
1992). This body of emergent research has differentiated between

policies, procedures, and restrictions.

Policy Restrictiveness

Pursuit policies contain implicit and explicit restrictive language
(Auten 1990; Kenney 85 Alpert 1997). The analysis of explicit restrictions
acknowledged in formal policy may appear to be a logical, objective
method for assessing overall restrictiveness. However, implicit language
can also place restrictions on individual ofﬁcer discretion. Restrictive
language is often embedded in pursuit policy. Contemporary police
scholars have attempted to conceptualize both explicit and implicit
features of policy restrictiveness along a continuum from highly
restrictive to highly discretionary (Kennedy et al. 1992; Falcone 85 Wells

1999; Becknell, Mays, 85 Giever 1999).

58

 

Becknell et al. (1999) have deﬁned policy restrictiveness as related
to the degree of speciﬁcity in pursuit policy. This speciﬁcity is related to
the amount of effort police departments take to reduce the negative
consequences of pursuit. Falcone and Wells (1999) used the categories
of discretionary, restrictive, and discouraging to analyze 279 pursuit
policies collected in the state of California. The authors found that the
majority of policies were discretionary (57 percent) with restrictive
policies and discouraging policies representing 38 and 4 percents,
respectively. Similarly, Kenney and Alpert (1997) concluded that the
majority of policies were discretionary as opposed to restrictive or
discouragement. Using the categories of judgemental, restrictive, and
discouragement, Crew (1992) has noted the same general patterns.

Kennedy et al. (1992) conducted a policy content analysis of a
judgemental sample of 47 state law enforcement agencies and police
departments in the 25 largest U. S. cities. The qualitative analysis
observed restrictiveness on a greater continuum than the research
mentioned thus far. Justiﬁcation f (i.e., seriousness of offense and level
of risk), physical operation of vehicle (i.e., emergency sirens, caravaning,
ramming, or roadbloacks), circumstances of operation (i.e., weather and
visibility), and external factors (i.e., violations of policy, ofﬁcer training,
and physical condition of vehicle). The categories utilized by the authors

included: judgement pure, judgement limited, restrictive mild, restrictive

59

severe, and discouraged. Commenting on the appropriateness of the
scale, Kennedy et al. (1992) concluded:

In order to go beyond merely cataloging and counting

elements that are included in pursuit policies, it is

necessary to develop a rating system that allows those

policies to be scaled along a continuum. Furthermore,

a policy that highly restricts the pursuit process, or

one that counsels or requires termination of pursuit

under a number of conditions, is likely to inﬂuence

the initial decision to pursue(p. 239).

The ﬁndings were consistent with past research indicating that the
majority of both state and city agencies fell within the judgement pure or
limited categories (Kennedy et al. 1992).

As evident from the body of literature of police pursuit, scholarly
interest has most often involved analysis of very speciﬁc populations,
primarily analysis of state agencies. Seldom has the content and
restrictiveness of pursuit policies been discussed on a national level.
When national samples have been utilized, the conceptualizations of
restrictiveness based upon policy content have been lacking. Conversely,
research utilizing better conceptualizations have not been diverse or
representative enough. For example, the Kenney and Alpert (1997)
research utilized a national sampling frame but fell short in
conceptualizing restrictiveness of existing policy. Further, the most

comprehensive conceptualization of restrictiveness utilized a judgemental

sampling frame.

60

The present research utilizes a national probability sample to
examine the characteristics of police pursuit policy. Additionally, the
proposed research will utilize the Kennedy et a1. (1992) restrictiveness
scale (the most comprehensive scale to date) to analyze pursuit policy
across factors related to initiation, environment, termination, and

operation.

61

CHAPTER FOUR:

Methods and Procedures

This research examines police pursuit as a form of lethal across a
representative sample of municipal and consolidated (county and
municipal) law enforcement agencies in the United States. In speciﬁc,
the descriptive analysis observes perceptual and substantive
characteristics of pursuit across agencies of different sworn ofﬁcer and
service population sizes. Additionally, organizational factors such as
size, centrality, and environmental concerns are examined in relation to
the conceptualization, implementation, and operationalization of police

pursuit policy.
Sampling Frame

The research utilizes a secondary analysis of an organizational
survey sent to a random, stratiﬁed sample of law enforcement agencies in
the United States. The sampling frame for the present research included
municipal and consolidated law enforcement agencies serving county
populations of 50,000 or more. In 1997 the College of Law Enforcement
at Eastern Kentucky University sampled of 408 agencies was drawn
representing law enforcement agencies in counties between 50,000 and

250,000 in population (n=2 l7), and agencies in counties over 250,000 in

population (n=191). The sampling frame was provided by the Institute for
Law and Justice (ILJ). Sampling procedures were selected to ensure
representation of law enforcement agencies serving rural, suburban, and
urban areas. The sampling procedure also insured a degree of regional

diversity by selecting at random agencies across the entire country.

Procedures and Instrumentation

In September of 1997, the College mailed out 408 surveys. The
mailed-out packet included an introduction letter explaining the
importance of the research and was addressed to the chief executive
ofﬁcer. Each packet also included a self-addressed, pre-paid return
envelope in an attempt to maximize the rate of return. After eight weeks,
214 surveys had been returned in useable form, reﬂecting a 53 percent
response rate. Because of economic and time constraints, no follow-up
mailing were conducted by the researchers.

Social science researchers have often discussed acceptable
response rates in the context of generalizability of the ﬁndings. A
seventy-percent response is usually considered appropriate (Fink 1995;
Babbie 1998). However, as Fink (1995) and Litwin (1995) conclude,
some research projects involve complex or complicated issues that result
in a lower response rate. Also, there is generally a lower response in
unsolicited surveys. The research involved an unsolicited survey which

dealt with a critical area in policing decision-making. Granted the
63

response rate could have been increased by follow-up mailings, however,
the response rate seems appropriate within the context of the research.
Survey construction was conducted by examining various
scholarship dealing with the subject area. An attempt was made to
develop an instrument which incorporated items in past research as well
as more speciﬁc items related to pursuit initiation, environmental,
operational, and termination factors. The end result was a ﬁve-page
questionnaire aimed at gauging perceptions of organizational pursuit

policies, procedures, and restrictions.

Ma'Lor Variables

The survey included a number of different items deemed important
to the overall research objective (see attached survey instrument).
Demographic information was included in the ﬁrst section of the
instrument. Respondents were asked to record their agency type
(municipal, county, or consolidated), service, area size, number of sworn
staff, whether a formal pursuit policy existed, and tenure of existing
policy. Two organizational variables were also included: agency
centralization level and policy type. The centralization variable was
measured on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5, with 1 representing highly
centralized and 5 representing highly decentralized.

Perception of centralization is a very complex variable to measure

in organizational research. Though the current measurement has been
64

used in similar research, it fails to represent the complexity of
centralization. Hence, there may be a construct validity problem. The
purpose, however, of the research is to measure perceptual views and
attitudes on organizational structure. Individual perceptions may vary
for a number of explicit and implicit reasons. It is beyond the cope of the
research to present a constructually valid measure of centralization.
Therefore, measurement deals wholly with individual organizational
perception, however constructed.

The policy type rating category was adopted from a scale developed
by Kennedy et al. (1992 : 240). These researchers measured the level of
police pursuit policy restrictiveness on a ﬁve-point scale as follows:

Judgement: Pure. The ofﬁcer is cautioned only against
unreasonable or disproportionate danger to the public. A list
of general guidelines may be given; some restrictions, such
as no ramming and break-off pursuit of a minor trafﬁc
violator if identity is known may be included.

Judgement: Limited. The ofﬁcer is made aware of close
supervision over his or her decision-making. A long, detailed
list of criteria may be given. The general tone is

that the ofﬁcer must justify the decision to pursue, but the
policy is to apprehend law-breakers and to support police
authority as long as the risk does not outweigh the beneﬁt.

Restrictive: Mild. The policy gives some reasonably clear
guidelines regarding when not to pursue. Minimizing risk
clearly receives a higher priority than enforcing the law.
Ofﬁcer’s liability is likely to be emphasized, but the policy
places no absolute restrictions on the type of offense for
which one may pursue.

Restrictive: Severe. The burden of proof to justify the pursuit
is on the ofﬁcer. The ofﬁcer is assured that the decision not
to pursue or to break—off the pursuit would not be a cause

65

for censure. Clear restrictions are placed on the process of
pursuit, and pursuits arising from routine trafﬁc stops
typically are prohibited.

Discouraged. Pursuits must meet fairly narrow guidelines,
such as probable cause of a dangerous felony, and must be a
last resort to prevent escape. The policy states clearly that
the ofﬁcer is to avoid pursuits.

The validity of the aforementioned scale will be tested through the
analysis. Taken together, the centralization and policy type variables
allowed for two separate measures of organizational orientation.

Finally, the survey included important factors involved in police
pursuit decision-making: initiation (11 items), environmental (8 items),
termination (14 items), and operational (10 items). The designation of
police pursuit factors was derived from an exhaustive review of the
extant literature as well through the examination of a number of actual
police pursuit policies. Respondents were ﬁrst asked whether or not any
of the items were addressed in their respective policies. If items were
addressed, respondents were then asked to comment on the emphasis
placed on each. The emphasis placed upon items was measured in

likert-scale format, with 1 representing high emphasis, and 5

representing little emphasis.

66

Research Questions
A number of research questions and hypotheses are considered for
examination. These questions reﬂect various types of analyses. Below is

a list of relevant research questions.

Questions

To what extent do demographic features (i.e., size, level of
centralization, agency type, and policy type predict composition
and accumulation of factors addressed in pursuit policies?

To what extent do these demographic features relate to the
restrictiveness level of police pursuit policy?

What is the relationship between agency centralization and levels
of policy restrictiveness?

How do initiation, environmental, termination, and operational
factors relate to agency centralization and policy restrictiveness?

Do organizational perceptions of policy reliably reﬂect a
substantive content contained in policy (to be observed through a
content analysis of actual policy compared to survey responses)?
Does the Kennedy-Homant-Kennedy Restrictiveness Scale provide
a valid method in which to analyze police pursuit policy
restrictiveness?

Does the Kennedy-Homant—Kennedy Restrictiveness Scale provide

a valid method in which to analyze pursuit policy restrictiveness by
agency type and sworn ofﬁcer size?

Data Analysis Strategy

The data analysis provides descriptive information as to the nature
and characteristics of the sample as well as perceptions of centralization,

restrictiveness, and policy content. Descriptive analysis also examines

67

information contextual features of pursuit policies. This analysis isolates
relevant factors related to pursuit initiation, operational, environmental,
and termination indicators contained in pursuit policy.

The associational analysis correlates the four sets of factors
represented by cumulative measures. For example, 11 (initiation factors)
measured the cumulative number of initiation factors mentioned for each
policy (El--environmental factors, OI--operational factors, and T1--
termination factors). A second correlational analysis measures the
combined or cumulative emphasis placed upon each set of factors.
Accordingly, IlB will measure the cumulative emphasis given to all
initiation factors. ElB, 01B, and T18 considers cumulative emphasis
placed upon environmental, operational, and termination factors
respectively.

This research will descriptively examine the demographic,
perceptual, and substantive characteristics of all policies. Cross tabular
analysis will measure the relationship between centralization,
organizational size (number of sworn ofﬁcers), and policy type
perceptions. A series of cross tabular analyses will examine bivariate
relationships between policy pursuit factors and demographic and
organizational characteristics of the agencies (organizational size, policy
type, and centralization).

In an effort to predict restrictiveness, multivariate analyses

regresses policy type and centralization on cumulative factor areas
68

(initiation, termination, environmental, and operational) and on key
independent variables such as policy type, centralization, and number of
sworn ofﬁcers. Finally, to test the validity of the restrictiveness scale,
policy type is correlated with cumulative policy content, and re-coded
policy-type variables constructed by the researchers based upon a
content analysis of actual policies. Correlational analysis is used to
compare the number of restrictions found in the actual policy with
organizational perception of policy type. A modiﬁed restrictiveness is
presented subsequent to the content analysis of policies included in the

sample.

Research Shortcomings

As with most research projects, there are a number of limitations
to the research design. The exclusion of policing organizations such as
state and federal law enforcement agencies, public safety organizations
like those on college and university campuses, and county law
enforcement agencies limits to some extent, the generalizability of the
research. However, the diversity of the existing sample can be
generalized to most municipal law enforcement agencies which tend to be
more localized. Though the response rate, given the nature of the
research, seems quite adequate, a higher response rate would have

undoubtedly strengthened the generalizability of the research.

69

Organizational survey research is dependent upon competency
levels of those providing information (Babbie 1998). Though steps were
taken by the research to ensure competence (i.e., addressing request to
the chief administrative ofﬁcer), there is no way to test the competency of
individuals who ultimately provided information.

The aforementioned limitations are normative in organizational
research, especially research dealing with controversial issues. Often
sampling frames do not cover different varieties of organizations,
therefore, they are excluded. All organizational research relies heavily
upon the competence of those giving information. There are seldom
mechanisms for assessing competence in anonymous, self-administered,
mailed-out surveys.

The various limitations do not substantially affect the
appropriateness of the research design. Therefore, the design is capable
of examining police pursuit policy in the context of lethal force used by
law enforcement, and the sample represents a diverse, representative

sample of municipal and consolidated agencies in the United States.

70

CHAPTER FIVE:

Analysis and Results

Descriptive and Associational Analyses

Table 1 presents descriptive analyses of police agencies and
pursuit policies. The vast majority of departments (99%) reported having
a written pursuit policy. This observation revealed that only one
responding department had no policy. Municipal agencies serving
county populations of 50,000 or more formed the basis for the sampling

frame used in this research. However, the random list of

 

Table 1. General sample characteristics

 

 

 

 

Mean
E M Years
Policy Existence 213 l 5. l 3
(n=214) (99.5%) (.05%)
Policy Included Y_eg N2
in the packet 183 31
(n=214) (85.55%) (l4.5%)
Mean Mean
Agency Type Municipal Consolidated Ofﬁcer # Population
(n=214) 200 14 53.80 31298.22
(93.5%) (6.5%)

 

Note: No agencies reported the existence of an in formal policy.

agencies also included municipal / county or consolidated departments.
Because these agencies were a hybrid and could be classiﬁed as both

municipal and county, random consolidated agencies were included in

7]

the sample of municipal agencies. Over ninety percent (93.5 %) of the
departments were municipal only. The remaining were consolidated

departments serving both municipalities and counties.

 

Table 2. Centralization and policy type characteristics

 

 

 

 

Judgement Restrictive Discouraged
Mean
ptype PURE LIMITED MILD SEVERE
Rating
(N=214)
ll 46 62 77 18
2.79 (5.1%) (21.5%) (29.0%) (36.0%) (8.4%)
DecentraJized Moderate Centralized
Mean
central HIGHLY MILDLY MILDLY HIGHLY
Rating
(N=209)
50 62 52 31 14
2.51 (23.9%) (29.7%) (24.9%) (14.8%) (6.7%)

 

Note: The means for ptype and central were calculated based on a l to 5 scale for the categories
“pure judgement” through “discouraged” and for “highly decentralized” through “highly
centralized.”

A high percentage of policies were classiﬁed as restrictive (Table 2).
In fact, seventy-three percent were deemed to be restrictive mild or
greater. The mean policy rating on the ﬁve-point scale was 2.79 which
reﬂected a somewhat neutral position although the direction was toward
more discretion as opposed to less. Table 2 also reveals frequency

distributions for the second measure of organization type. Approximately

ﬁfty-four percent (53.6%) reported their agencies as being highly or
mildly decentralized. Another twenty-ﬁve percent (24.9%) viewed their
agencies in the moderate range. The remaining departments (21.5%)
characterized themselves as being either mildly or highly centralized.

The mean centralization rating given to departments was 2.51. Logically,
the discouraged policy type category and the highly centralized category
would entail much less ofﬁcer discretion. Accordingly, very few agencies
reported having policies (8.4%) or departments (6.7%) in these categories.

Tables 3 through 6 present the frequencies at which speciﬁc items
were addressed in policy as well the average amount of emphasis placed
upon each factor. Among the most often addressed initiation factors
were a limitation of number of vehicles (96%), the use of marked police
vehicles (91%), supervisory approval (85%), and a felony situation (81%).
Further, relatively high emphasis was placed upon the four leading
factors (see Table 3). Factors such as a non-serious trafﬁc offense (50%),
the inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs (51%), and passengers in the chase
vehicle (52%) were addressed less often.

Six of eight environmental factors were addressed with relatively
high frequency and emphasis. Table 4 illustrates that weather
conditions (95%), roadway or trafﬁc conditions (94%), presence of
vehicular or pedestrian trafﬁc (93%), time of day (84%), location, such as
business or commercial (84%), and lighting conditions (77%) were all

addressed by the vast majority of agencies in the sample. Additionally,

73

the most emphasis was placed on these factors. The likelihood of
successful apprehension (61%) and the availability of assistance (58%),

were emphasized at lower rates.

 

Table 3. Pursuit initiation factors. Frequencies, and emphasis

 

Mean

Factors Percentages(%) Emphasisb?)
Supervisory approval for continuation of the pursuit. 85 1.56
The need to apprehend outweighs the risks to citizens
in the vicinity of the pursuit. 61 2.87
Reasonable belief by the ofﬁcer that the violator is
a felon or suspected felon. 81 2.01
Reasonable belief that the violator committed a misdemeanor. 60 2.98
Reasonable belief that the violator committed a serious
trafﬁc offense. 60 3.01
Reasonable belief that the violator had committed a
non-serious traffic offense. 50 3.43
Reasonable belief that the violator is under the inﬂuence
of alcohol or drugs. 51 2.56
Primary pursuit vehicle must be a marked vehicle. 91 1.31
Secondary pursuit vehicles must be a marked vehicle. 79 1.48
A limit is placed on the number of units that can
be involved in the pursuit. 96 1.34
Pursuits are prohibited when passengers, unrelated
to the violation, are present in the vehicle. 52 2.03

 

Percentages present the number of policies containing the speciﬁc factor. Means represent the average
amount of emphasis placed upon specific items measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 representing high
emphasis.

The four most often mentioned operational factors (table 5) were

the use of police roadblocks (76%), ﬁring at a moving vehicle (75%),

74

ramming a vehicle (68%), and shooting at a vehicle to terminate a pursuit

(67%). As table 5 reveals, a higher amount of emphasis was placed on

 

Table 4. (Pursuit environmental factors, frequencies, and emphasis

 

M Percentages(%) Earhanph asis( >‘<)
The time of day. 84 1.20
Weather conditions. 95 1.05
Roadway or traffic conditions. 94 1.66
Lighting conditions. 77 1.88
Area or location such as business or commercial. 84 1.79
Presence of pedestrian or vehicular trafﬁc. 93 1.58
Availability of assistance. 58 2.09
Likelihood of a successful apprehension. 61 2.00

 

Percentages present the number of pol icies containing the speciﬁc factor. Means represent the average
amount of emphasis placed upon speciﬁc items measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 representing high
emphasis.

the four factors as opposed to the six remaining items. Designation of
maximum speed (33%), channelization of vehicles (37%), and the use
disabling devices such as tire deﬂation (46%) were addressed in less than
a majority of the policies in the sample.

Only two termination factors were addressed with great frequency.
Table 6 shows that circumstances of the pursuit in terms of public safety

was mentioned in 99 percent of pursuit policies. This factor was,

therefore, mentioned more than any other single initiation,

environmental, operational, or termination factor. Likewise, this factor

 

Table 5. Pursuit operational factors, frequencies, and emphasis

 

Mean
Factors _ Percentages(%) Emphasis( >‘<)

Firing, at or from a moving vehicle, while
engaged in the pursuit. 75 1.67
A maximum speed is speciﬁed in the policy. 33 3.00
Shooting at a vehicle to terminate a pursuit. 67 1.83
The pursuing ofﬁcer is permitted to ram the vehicle
being pursued.

62 2.00
Shooting at tires, radiators, etc in order to disable
a vehicle. 53 2.23
Forcefully stopping the vehicle by ramming it. 68 1.92
Boxing-in or surrounding the vehicle being pursued. 65 2.12
The use of disabling devices such as tire deﬂation
devices. 46 2.20
The use of police vehicles in roadblocks. 76 1.85
The channelization of the vehicle being pursued off
roadway surfaces. 37 2.36

 

Percentages present the number of policies containing the specific factor. Means represent the average
amount of emphasis placed upon specific items measured on a 35-point scale, with 1 representing high
emphasis.

76

 

Table 6. Pursuit termination factors, frequencies, and emphasis

 

Mean

Factors Percentages(%) Emphasis(>‘<)
When circumstances of the pursuit present a safety
hazard to the public, ofﬁcer, or the suspect. 99 1.27
When no supervisor or superior can be contacted
to approve the pursuit’s continuation. 37 3.21
When the ofﬁcer loses visual contact with the
suspect for an extended period of time. 72 2.38
The pursuing unit loses radio contact with the
communications dispatcher. 49 1.94
The pursuing unit is unfamiliar with the area of the pursuit. 49 2.24
The suspect travels the wrong way on an interstate
highway, divided highway, or divided roadway. 60 1.55
An ofﬁcer’s decision to terminate a pursuit for safety
reasons is not subject to a disciplinary review. 68 1.49
The pursuing vehicle travels into a residential area. 43 2.14
The pursuit travels across state lines. 43 2.37
The pursuit travel across jurisdictional lines. 58 2.28
When the violator can be identiﬁed to the point
where later apprehension can be accomplished. 86 1.79
The ofﬁcer has reason to believe the vehicle is
being operated by a juvenile. 44 2.28
The pursuing ofﬁcer has reason to believe the
suspect is intoxicated or otherwise impaired and
poses a danger to the public. 43 1.96
The policy requires pursuit termination after a
speciﬁed time occurred or distance has been traveled. 44 3.18

 

Percentages present the number of policies containing the speciﬁc: factor. Means represent the average
amount of emphasis placed upon specific items measured on a 5 point scale, with I representing high
emphasis.

77

was amOng the highest emphasized. Second, eighty-six percent of the
policies addressed identiﬁcation and later apprehension of suspects as a
termination factor. A majority of the policies addressed loss of visual
contact (72%), ofﬁcer determination of a pursuit and disciplinary review
(68%), travelling the wrong way (60%), and proceeding across
jurisdictional lines (58%). The remaining eight termination factors were
indicated in less than a majority of the policies analyzed.

In theory, various levels of centralization in decision-making and
restrictiveness should relate. For example, a highly centralized and
formalized agency would conceivably be much more likely to exercise
power form a hierarchical, top—down perspective. Conversely, the highly
discouraged policy places certain restrictions on individual decision-
making in much the same fashion. Utilizing cross tabular analysis, the
relationship between policy type and centralization was considered. Table
7 reveals that there was no signiﬁcance between these two organizational
categories. Further, these categories were subsequently collapsed into
centralized-decentralized and discouraged-not discouraged using 0-1
dummy codes. Again, there was no relationship between nominal
measurements.

Table 8 reveals the correlational analysis of pursuit factors by
policy type, agency type, centralization, departmental size (in terms of

sworn ofﬁcer number) and population of departmental service areas. As

78

 

 

Table 7. Cross tabulation centralization and policy type

 

 

Centralization

high cent mild cent moderate mild decent high decent Total
Policy type
discouraged 6 6 2 1 3 l8
restrictive 16 24 18 9 6 73
severe
restrictive 16 18 15 10 3 62
mild
judgement 10 13 12 8 2 45
limited
judgement 2 1 5 3 11
pure
Total 50 62 52 3 1 14 209

 

Note: Chi-Square test showed no signiﬁcance.

presented, all pursuit factors correlated with each other. This statistic
suggests that those agencies having substantial pursuit factors in one
category were more likely to have higher levels of items mentioned among
other factors. In this sense, high levels of initiation, environmental,
operational, and termination factors were all signiﬁcantly related at the
bivariate level; therefore, pursuit policies containing more cumulative
factors in one area were more likely to have a higher level of cumulative
factors in others. However, none of the cumulative pursuit factors were
related to other variables in the analysis. The only other signiﬁcant

correlation was between ofﬁcer number and population size, simply

79

 

indicating that the number of sworn ofﬁcers was related to the

population of the service area.

 

Table 8. Correlations of pursuit factors, policy type, agency centralization, and agency size.

 

E1 11 01 T1 Ptype Size Pop. Cent.
El 1.000 .205M .182M .526" .050 .074 .063 -.001
11 .205" 1.000 .229M .368“ .035 .049 .055 .132
OI .182M .229" 1.000 .260" -.067 -.004 .049 .131
T1 .526M .368“ .260" 1.000 .050 .044 .025 .065
Ptype .050 .035 -.067 .050 1.000 .1 13 .043 .044
Size .074 .049 -.004 .044 .l 13 1.000 .636" .005
Pop. .063 .055 .049 .025 .043 .636" 1.000 .044
Cent. -.001 .132 .131 .065 .044 .005 .044 1.000

 

Note: “Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
E1 represents the cumulative environmental factors mentioned
11 represents the cumulative initiation factors mentioned
01 represents the cumulative operational factors mentioned
Tl represents the cumulative termination factors mentioned

 

Since policy type and centralization factors neither correlated to
each other or with any other variable in the analysis. In an effort to
examine how emphasis placed upon pursuit factors correlated with the
other variables, the second correlational analysis utilized a cumulative
measure of emphasis given to pursuit factors.

The correlational analysis presented in Table 9 reveals that the
pursuit factors (based upon emphasis in policy) generally correlated with
one another with one exception. The environmental factors (ElB) did not
correlate with the initiation (11B) factors. However, the analysis did
reveal signiﬁcant correlations between pursuit factors, centralization,

and policy type. Centralization correlated (.269**) with initiation factors

80

(IIB) which indicated that more centralized departments placed

signiﬁcantly higher emphasis on the decision to initiate a police pursuit.

 

Table 9. Correlations of emphasized pursuit factors, policy type, agency centralization, and

 

agency size.

E18 118 018 T1 B Ptype Size Pop. Cent.
ElB 1.000 .084 .3 16* .568" .244“ .139 .147 -.079
118 .084 1.000 .370* .407" .119 .214 .168 269*
018 316* .370* 1.000 .401 * -.006 -.111 -.079 .150 F.
TlB .568M .407” .401* 1.000 .152 .194 .205 .034
Ptype 244* .1 19 -.006 .152 1.000 .113 .043 .044 i
Size .139 .214 -.1 11 .194 .113 1.000 .636M .005 j’
Pop. . 147 .168 -.079 .205 .043 .636“ 1.000 .044 5
Cent. -.079 269* .150 .034 .044 .005 .044 1.000

 

Note: * Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
[-118 represents the cumulative emphasis placed on environmental factors, ranked 1 to 5
118 represents the cumulative emphasis place on initiation factors, ranked 1 to 5
O] B represents the cumulative emphasis placed on operational factors, ranked 1 to 5
TIB represents the cumulative emphasis placed on termination factors, ranked 1 to 5

 

In respect to policy type, this organizational variable positively
correlated (.244**) with environmental factors (ElB). This statistic
revealed that departments with less individual discretion placed a higher
emphasis on environmental conditions and police pursuit. Again, other
organization characteristics such as ofﬁcer size and population service
area revealed no signiﬁcant correlations with other variables in the
analysis. As mentioned earlier, there was a signiﬁcant correlation
between these variables.

Critical decision-making in the ﬁeld of policing is complex to say

the least. These decisions potentially involve many variables that have

81

yet to be discerned. However, the extant literature has focused on a
number of important factors implicated in understanding critical
decision-making in this area as well as the consequences of different
courses of action.

In the present analysis, there was a substantial amount of
variation in perceptions of policy restrictiveness. However, the normative
perceptions of policy discretion were restrictive, mild or severe. In fact,
sixty-ﬁve percent of the departments perceived their policies to be in one
of the two categories. Conversely, the pure judgement and the
discouraged categories were non-normative and represented the two
categories mentioned least often. These ﬁndings suggest that most police
policies are neither highly restrictive nor discretionary but contain

elements of both orientations.

Multivariate Analysis

To test whether the major independent variables predicted
perceptions of organizational centralization and policy restrictiveness,
two multivariate analyses were conducted. Tables 10 and 1 1 present
policy type and centralization as dependent variables regressed on the
cumulative initiation, environmental, termination, and operational
factors as well as ofﬁcer size, and years of policy existence.

Table 10 reveals that the regression model using policy type as the

dependent variables was not signiﬁcant. Only one independent variable

82

 

(years of policy existence) revealed a signiﬁcant prediction, indicating
that as years of policy existence go down perceptions of restrictiveness
increase. Newer policies, or recently modiﬁed ones, were perceived to be
more restrictive than older policies. The second regression model utilized
centralization as the dependent variable and used the same independent
variables. Again, the regression model was not signiﬁcant and no

signiﬁcant predictors were found.

 

Table 10. Regression analysis of policy type by selected independent variables

 

 

Standardized beta T -Value Sign.
Cumulative # of Initiation Factors (11) -.036 -.397 .692
Cumulative # of Environmental Factors (E1) .057 .671 .503
Cumulative # of Termination Factors (T1) .075 .715 .475
Cumulative # of Operational Factors (0]) -.082 -.954 .341
Officer # -.100 -l .431 .154
Years of Policy Existence -.l39 -l .995 .047
Centralization -.045 -.650 .5 16

 

Regression Model is non-significant @ .263.

 

Table 11. Regression analysis of centralization by selected independent variables

 

 

Standardized beta T -Value Sign. .
Cumulative # of Initiation Factors (1 1) -.109 -l.l72 .243
Cumulative # of Environmental Factors (E1) .031 .357 .722
Cumulative # of Termination Factors (T1) -.045 -.421 .674
Cumulative # of Operational Factors (OI) -.040 .454 .650
Ofﬁcer # -.007 -.105 .916
Years of Policy Existence -.040 -.561 .575
Policy Type -.047 —.650 .516

 

Regression Model is non-significant @ .872.

Consistent with the correlational analysis, years of policy existence
emerged as a factor related to the restrictiveness of police pursuit policy.
As noted, there may be problems with construct validity with both the
centralization and policy type. The use of ordinal level measurements as
dependent variables (though often used in multivariate analysis) may not
have represented a necessary degree of linear variability. As presented,
the independent variables (see tables 10 and 11) did not predict

perceptual degrees of centralization or policy restrictiveness.

Content Analysis

The content analysis of pursuit policies was conducted to
supplement the survey results and to calculate alternate measurements
of policy restrictiveness. Though policies contain restrictions and
prohibitions on ofﬁcer behavior in pursuit driving, these various factors
are usually scattered throughout and not presented in a systematic
fashion. Most pursuit policies are sub-divided into policy and procedure
statements. Few pursuit policies have substantive sub-sections devoted
to restrictive statements. Additionally, prohibitive statements are
normatively contained within procedural subsections.

The content analysis utilized two independent coders and recorded
three different content areas. First, the policies were examined to see if a

sub-section entitled restrictions (or some similar category (i.e., rules) was

84

included in the document. If an appropriate sub-section was included,
the policy code was labeled 1; subsequently, if no appropriate subsection
existed, the policy was coded as 0. Second, where the restriction code
was equal to 1, coders counted the actual number of restrictions
regardless of their substantive nature. Third, coders were instructed to
read through each policy and count the number of prohibitive
statements, excluding those contained in the restriction sub-sections.
Taken together the content analysis recorded whether a restriction sub-
section existed, the number of restrictions within the sub—section, and
the number of latent prohibitive statements throughout the policies. In
cases where coding disagreements occurred, the two coders and a third
observer reconciled the differences.

Table 12 provides descriptive information on policy restrictions and
prohibitions. The table revealed that approximately 28 percent of the

policies in the sample contained a restriction sub-sections, with the

 

Table 12. Content analysis characteristics of policy restrictions and prohibitions

 

 

(n=183)
Standard
Number( %) Mean Deviation
Policy Restrictions 51 (27.9) 2.00 3.77
Policy Prohibitions 143 (78.1) 3.01 2.78

 

All percentages represent valid ones.

85

average number of restrictions being 2. With regard to prohibitive
statements, the majority (78%) of policies contained prohibitions, which
averaged about 3 per policy.

The correlational analysis in table 13 compares the numbers of
restrictions and prohibitions to ofﬁcer size, policy type, and
centralization. There is again correlation between cumulative content in
each of the factor areas. None of the cumulative factor indexes

correlated with the number of restrictions or prohibitions. The analysis

 

Table 13. Correlations of restrictions, prohibitions, and major independent
variables (n=183)

 

E1 11 T1 01 Ptype Ofﬁcer# Cent. Restr. Prohit.

El .205** .526** .182M -.050 .074 -.001 .030 -.014

II .205“ .368** .229“ -.035 .049 .132 .008 -.094
T1 .526M .368” .260" -.050 .044 .065 -.004 -.025
01 .182" .229” .260M .067 -.004 .131 .060 -.052
Ptype -.050 -.035 -.050 .067 -.l 13 -.044 -.048 -.003
Ofﬁcer# .074 .049 .044 -.004 -.l 13 .005 .134 -.079
Cent. -.001 .132 .065 .131 -.044 .005 .035 -.089
Restr. .030 .008 -.004 .060 -.048 .134 .035 -.l92**
Prohit. -.014 -.094 -.025 -.052 -.003 -.079 -.089 -l92**

 

** probability=. 001, * probability=. 05

revealed a negative relationship between prohibitions and restrictions. A
probable explanation for the inverse relationship is that if restrictions are
explicit in policies, there may be less of a need to include prohibitive
statements (or implicit restrictions). There was no signiﬁcant

correlations between restrictions, prohibitions, centralization, or policy

86

type. This observation suggested that perceptions of policy
restrictiveness are unrelated to the number of prohibitions and
restrictions contained in policy.

As mentioned in chapter three, the pursuit policy restrictiveness
measurements do not provide systematic methods by which to observe
policy type. Though some of the measurements seem conceptually
sound (e.g., the Kennedy et. a1 1992 scale used in this research), they are
wholly too subjective and present very broad parameters for
categorization. Hence, there is a need for conceptually appropriate
restrictiveness rating systems that can be subjected to some level of
quantiﬁcation. The present study, therefore, attempts such a rating
scale.

Based upon the content analysis, ﬁve rating scales were derived
that are conceptually related to the scale utilized by Kennedy et al. in
1992 as well as in the present research. The discouraged category
according to Kennedy et al. is the most restrictive. In this category,
pursuits are allowed as last resorts. These policies are (according to
Kennedy et al. 1992) clearly prohibitive and restrictive. Therefore the
ﬁrst modiﬁed rating (type 5) contains a non-normatively level of total
restrictions and prohibitions. A rating 5 policy is indicated if the number
of total restrictions and prohibitions are one standard deviation above
the mean. In the present analysis, the mean number of restrictions and

prohibitions was 5 with a standard deviation of 4. For the modiﬁed

87

scale, all policies having a total number of restrictions and prohibitions
of 9 or higher were placed in rating 5 category.

The second category created by Kennedy et al. (1992) is restrictive
severe. In this category clear restrictions are placed on the process of
pursuit and the policy lists a number of prohibitions. Since this
category again discourages police pursuit and outlines numerous
procedures, the second modiﬁed category is indicative of policies that
have average restrictions and prohibitions and the cumulative number of
factors addressed is above the mean. The mean number of cumulative
factors was calculated at 72. Therefore, policies having restrictions and
prohibitions and a mean rate of cumulative factors over 72 were placed
in the rating 4 category. The rating 3 category is founded when
restrictions and prohibitions are present and a less than average number
of factors are addressed. According to Kennedy et al. (1992), the
restrictive mild category is reasonably clear but contains fewer absolute
restrictions and / or prohibitions.

The judgement limited and judgement pure categories are the least
restrictive ones created by Kennedy et al. (1992). The judgement
limited asks personnel to justify pursuit and may incorporate a number
substantive areas but a high degree of discretion is evident. Policies in
the judgement pure category contain few procedural guidelines and allow
for a high degree of individual discretion. For the present analysis, rating

2 is where there are no restrictions or prohibitions but the policy

88

contains an above average level of content. Finally, rating 1 is where
there are no restrictions or prohibitions and the level of content
addressed is average or below.

Table 14 presents characteristics of the 183 policies in the sample.
The largest category for the sample is rating 3, followed by rating 4.
Accordingly, approximately 90 percent of all policies examined contained
some restrictions or prohibitions. More policies were in the highest
restrictive category (18%), rating 5, than in the most discretionary

category (6%), rating scale 1.

 

Table 14. Modiﬁed restrictiveness scale and sample characteristics (n=183)

 

Category Frequency Percentage
Rating 5
(prohibitions and restrictions 9 or above) 18 33
Rating 4
@rohibitions and restrictions
below 9, cumulative factors 72 or higher) 63 34.4
Rating 3

(prohibitions and restrictions
below 9, cumulative factors
below average of 72) 68 37.2

Rating 2
(no prohibitions or restrictions,
cumulative factors above average 72) 8 4.4

Rating 1
(no prohibitions or restrictions, cumulative
factors below average of 72) l l 6.0

 

All percentages represent valid ones.

89

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90

Table 15 presents correlational analysis using the dummy-coded
rating categories, policy years, policy type, and centralization. For this
analysis the modiﬁed ratings were recoded l, for being in the scaled
category and 0, for outside the scaled category. Excluding logical scale
correlations, years of policy existence correlated once again with policy
type and with one of the dummy-coded scale categories, rating 2. This
ﬁnding suggests that the longer the policy has existed the more likely it

is to be in rating 2, a less restrictive category.

 

Table 16. Comparison of policy type and modified restrictiveness scale

 

Judgement Judgement

 

 

 

Discouraged Restrictive Severe Restrictive Mild M m

15 (8.2%) 64 (35%) 55 (30%) 4O (22%) 9 (5%)
BEE-.5 Ra_ting_4 Mug; Ra_ting2 Ritiﬂgzl
33 (18.0) 63 (34%) 68 (37%) 8 (4%) ll (6%)

 

C hi-Square statistic revealed no significant relationships between categories.

Table 16 compares the modiﬁed policy rating scale to the
restrictiveness scale of Kennedy et al. (1992) for the sample of police
agencies. In both the original and modiﬁed ratings, over 65 percent of
the agencies fall with categories 3 and 4, restrictive severe or mild.

Policy agency perceptions indicate that restrictive severe is the normative
category, while the modiﬁed rating scale suggests a more neutral

normative position, indicating that most policies are mildly restrictive.

9|

There was a difference when comparing the previous scale and the
modiﬁed one in the highest restrictive category. For the modiﬁed scale,
more agencies (18%) in the sample fell within this category as compared
to the previous scale (8.2%). Conversely 27 percent and 10 percent,
respectively, were in the previous and modiﬁed scale least restrictive
categories. It should be noted that neither the previous scale nor the
modiﬁed one is capable of measuring agency compliance to the pursuit
policy. In this sense, a content analysis may indicate a relatively
restrictive policy, while informal dimensions of organizational behavior
reﬂect a “business as usual mentality.” The perceptions of police
pursuit policy in the present research indicate more discretion than the

modiﬁed scale would suggest. .

Research Questions

Several important research questions have guided the present
study. The ﬁrst research question examines whether organizational
features (i.e., ofﬁcer size, level of centralization, and policy type) predict
or associate with the composition of police pursuit in terms of the total
numbers of factors the respective policies address. For the most part,
these organizational variables neither associated with nor predicted the
composition and accumulation of factors addressed in policy.
Accordingly, there was no relationship between ofﬁcer size, and policy

type through bivariate correlational analyses. The centralization variable

correlated with the cumulative emphasis placed on initiation factors,
which indicated that more centralized agencies addressed a greater
number of pursuit initiation factors. The extent to which centralization
and formalization are associated most likely explains this correlation.
However, as mentioned earlier, the centralization variable is a complex
one and may suffer from construct validity problems. Excluding the
centralization variable, the analysis reveals that the majority of
organizational factors were unrelated to policy content and composition.

The second research question examines whether organizational
variables relate to the perceived restrictiveness of police pursuit policies.
Perceived restrictiveness measured on the Kennedy et al. (1992) scale
revealed no correlation between policy type and centralization, initiation
factors, operational factors, termination factors, and ofﬁcer size. There
was an association between the policy type and the level of emphasis
placed on environmental factors. This relationship suggests that
perceptions of restrictiveness increase as environmental factors included
in policy increase. The environmental factors included time of day,
climate, type of location, type of roadway, and level of trafﬁc. Since
safety to the public is of primary concern, this association may indicate
this value orientation with respect to the agencies in the sample.

Both the centralization and policy type factors reﬂected
organizational perceptions. More speciﬁcally, they addressed individual

perspectives that may or may not adequately reﬂect formal or informal

dimensions of the organization. The present research revealed no
relationship between policy type and centralization. Most departments
were perceived as only moderately centralized. However, more agencies
reported being highly decentralized (23.9%) as opposed to highly
centralized (6.7%). Departmental perceptions concerning centralization
might be inﬂuenced by decentralized organizational structures such as
community policing models. It might seem logical that the policy type
scale and the centralization scale relate to one another since they both
potentially involve limitations on individual ofﬁcer discretion. As
revealed, neither the bivariate analysis examining the relationship
between the two scales through cross tabulation or correlation suggested
a signiﬁcant relationship. Nothing in the present analysis can
empirically explain the lack of correlation. However, there are two
plausible explanations.

First, the centralization and policy type scales may suffer from a
criterion validity problem. In this sense, the lack of predictive validity
may indicate that one or both of the measures were invalid or inaccurate.
However, the description of each policy type category (contained in the
survey) potentially minimized the problem of miss-speciﬁcation of policy
category. Additionally, the nature of centralization and decentralization
may be more common to departmental analysis, resulting in less
perceptual confusion. It would seem that both measures possessed

adequate face validity.

94

 

A second explanation involves macro and micro organizational
perspectives. The centralization factor clearly addressed macro
organizational orientation, whereas the policy type factor reﬂected a
micro orientation. In this sense, the expectation of convergence between
policy type and centralization may reﬂect an ecological or individualistic
fallacy in applying macro orientations too deﬁnitively to micro processes
or vice versa.

This second explanation implies that there may be no substantial
relationship between policy restrictiveness and centralization. Indeed
Robbins (1990) suggests that the relationship between centralization and
formalization is often ambiguous since high formalization can be
associated with either decentralization or centralization. The variations
in pursuit policy type make this lack of association very real. The very
structure of police pursuits may make this association weak. Pursuits
are highly unstructured and non routine events containing a vast
number of task exceptions. Simply stated, police pursuits vary
dramatically in every conceivable way. Non routine and unstructured
tasks are extremely difﬁcult to rigidly formalize; therefore, they reduce
managerial ability to place restrictions on behavior simply because of
variations in the structure of pursuits facing decision-makers in the ﬁeld.
Therefore, the explanation for the lack of association is that there is
none. Both the cross tabular and correlational analysis revealed no

relationship between the two measures of orientation.

95

 

The fourth research question observes the relationship between the
policy content factors, centralization, and policy type. The ﬁrst bivariate
analysis, which observed the amount of content in each factor area,
revealed no signiﬁcant correlation between policy factors, policy type,
and level of centralization. However, the second correlational analysis,
which examined the amount of emphasis placed on the substantive
factors, reveals two signiﬁcant relationships. As addressed, there was a
positive correlation between policy type (perceived restrictiveness) and
environmental factors. There was also a correlation between the
emphasis placed on initiation factors and centralization. In this sense,
perceived centralization is related to more emphasis being placed on the
initiation of police pursuits. It would seem logical that highly centralized
agencies control critical decision more than decentralized ones.

Do organizational perceptions of policy type reliably reﬂect
substantive policy content? The research found no relationship between
policy type and substantive content. Further, the number of restrictions
and prohibitions contained in policy was unrelated to policy type. In
essence, the actual number of restrictions and prohibitions in pursuit
policy had no inﬂuence on perceived restrictiveness. Three possible
explanations are offered for this ﬁnding. First, informal processes may
be more formidable than formal ones in critical decision-making.

Second, the survey may not reﬂect overall organizational values and

96

orientations. The ﬁnal explanation involves whether the restrictiveness
scale serves as a valid measurement of policy type.

The last two research questions speciﬁcally address the validity of
the Kennedy et al. (1992) restrictiveness scale. When comparing the
modiﬁed rating scale (based upon actual policy content), the previous
scale and modiﬁed one placed the majority of the policies within the
same two, conceptually comparable, categories. Using the Kennedy et al.
(1992) scale, the majority of policies ﬁt within the restrictive mild or
restrictive severe categories. The modiﬁed scale places the majority of
policies in categories 4 and 3, which is comparable to the restrictive
categories mentioned above. However, the content-based modiﬁed scale
places more policies in the highly restrictive (4) or discouraged (5)
category than the previous scale, while the previous scale places a higher
percentage in the most discretionary categories.

The previous research conducted by Kennedy et al. (1992) suggests
that the norm for agencies would be in the least restrictive categories.
This study contradicts that ﬁnding; both the modiﬁed and the Kennedy
et al. scale suggests that policies are somewhat more restrictive. One
problem with the Kennedy et al. scale is the judgmental sampling frame
utilized in the research. Due to the probability nature of the present
research, it may be considered more comprehensive or valid.

In this research, there was no relationship between the number of

restrictive and prohibitive statements in pursuit policy and perceptions

97

of organizational restrictiveness. However, the modiﬁed (content-based)
scale compares with the perceptions of survey results for the majority of
respondents. In light of the majority consensus, the differences within
the extreme categories may be less problematic.

This research has analyzed restrictiveness in the context of
perceptions and actual policy content. It is apparent that the
perceptions of policy are less restrictive than the policies would suggest.
The importance of informal structures would most likely illuminate some
of the differences. As many scholars have noted, American policing has
a distinct and rather complex culture.

The modiﬁed restrictiveness scale attempts to quantify the
conceptual nature of the previous restrictiveness scale. Therefore,
pursuit policies that barely miss certain categories or that can barely
make others may explain the differences at the extreme.

There were two positive associations between policy type, the
modiﬁed scale, and years of policy existence. The number of years a
policy had existed was related to it being more discretionary in nature.
In sum, policies with less tenure tended to be perceived and scaled as
more restrictive. This observation would tend support a change in
policies on police pursuit toward more restrictive as opposed to less. The
dissipative structural model addressed earlier indicates that
organizations proceed through symbolic changes, then resynthesize to

manage external or internal complexity. Perceptual differences in policy

98

type compared to actual content may indicate that agencies, to some
extent, are saying one thing and doing another. The concluding chapter
examines police pursuit and traditional deadly force policy changes as a
process of dissipative structures and discusses the need for further

research on police pursuit policy.

99

CHAPTER SIX:

Summary and Conclusion

Much of the existing literature has suggested that there is a high
degree of discretion contained within police pursuit policy. In contrast,
this research has revealed that generally policies contain a substantial
amount of prohibitions and restrictions on individual ofﬁcer behavior.
Police pursuit policies, however, were perceived to be less restrictive than
their content would suggest. The available literature that examines the
discretionary nature of police pursuit policy does not necessarily
contradict the ﬁndings of this inquiry. Hence, the present analysis may
indicate a substantial change in police pursuit policy, at least in
formalized policy. As Geller and Scott (1992) observe, developmental
changes in police use of deadly force may provide the best historical
continuum for observing subsequent changes in police pursuit policy.

The dissipative structure model discussed in chapter two provides
a provocative context in which to observe developmental changes in
police use of lethal force: ﬁrearms, riﬂes, shotguns, or vehicles. In the
following paragraphs, the sequential stages of the dissipative structural
model are discussed in light of speciﬁc events related to changes in lethal
force policy in the United States.

In context of the dissipative structure model (see ﬁgure 1), a
structure reaches a point of singularity. Some trigger event causes the

organization to take a corrective posture and internal of external

100

 

pressure is exerted on the organization to take a corrective posture. As
ﬁgure 1 presents, the next step in the process is transformation using
radical strategies. This is where the organization reaches a point where
a major adaptive response is essential. In the third stage (symbolic or
ineffective acting), the system implements the radical change ineffectively
or somewhat symbolically to appease external or external inﬂuences.
The fourth step in the model is where the organization goes through a
resynthesis or transformation of sorts and some of the alternate
responses become part of the new organizational structure. The
dissipative structural process is dynamic and continues to impact and
resynthesize organizational structures over time (Leifer 1989; Gemmill 85
Smith 1985).

As Geller and Smith (1992) suggest, the evolution of traditional
deadly force policy and be the most appropriate venue from which to
observe changes in police pursuit policy. The authors conceptualize
traditional lethal force matters (i.e., the use ﬁrearms, shotguns, and
riﬂes) as being synonymous with the use of police vehicular pursuit.

In the 19603, the ﬁrst systematic research began to emerge on the
use of deadly force by law enforcement in the United States (U. S.
Department of Justice 1999; Alpert 85 Fridell 1992). The early research
revealed two problematic ﬁndings. First, a small proportion of ofﬁcers
were disproportionately involved in use of force incidents, and second,

the use of force was utilized disproportionately by race, class, and

101

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

igure 1. Dissipative Structure Model »

 

 

1. Point of Singularity

 

The organization reaches a point when
internal and/or external pressures exert
signiﬁcant pressure for systemic change.

 

 

 

 

2. Radical Transformation

 

The organization reaches a point
where radical strategies are
proposed to address problems.

 

 

 

 

3. Symbolic Instrumentation

 

The organization implements
effective, often symbolic
changes to address chaos.

 

 

 

4. Resynthesis

 

The organization is re-
synthesized where some
of structural changes
become formalized.

 

 

 

 

 

 

gender. These important ﬁndings caused various advocacy groups to
become in involved in police reform. During the same period, the 1960s
Presidential Commissions veriﬁed the use of unreasonable amounts of
force being used against citizens, especially in urban areas (Walker 85
Bumphus 1992). Fyfe (1979) found that the minorities and the poor
were much more likely to have deadly force used against them as
compared to non-whites in similar situations. These various events, in
the context of the dissipative structural model, served as important
points of singularity that exerted substantial pressure upon police
organizations to change.

As for changes in police pursuit policies, evidence in the 19603
suggested that the use police vehicular pursuit costs lives. The
Physicians for Automotive Safety Study in 1968 served as a major point
of singularity that pressured American law enforcement agencies to take
a look at the policies related to police pursuit. Though other reports
concluded (such as Fennessy et al. 197 0; California Highway Patrol
1983) that police pursuit was not as life-threatening as the earlier study
suggested, American police departments were pressured into making
changes to existing policies or creating new policies to address these
various concerns (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992). Not only safety but also liability
concerns inﬂuenced changes in police pursuit policies (del Carmen 85
Kappeler 1990; Alpert 85 Fridell 1992). The emergence of research

observing safety and liability issues served as points of singularity that

 

forced law enforcement to make changes in police pursuit policy. The
points of singularity in deadly force and police pursuit policies are
presented in ﬁgure two.

One of the radical responses to police use of deadly force
traditionally was the recommendation by the 1967 Presidential Crime
Commission to have police incidents investigated externally. The
Commission advocated the creation of external or civilian review
procedures that observed police misconduct. These strategies ﬁrst
appeared in major cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and
Washington DC, where substantial pressures for change existed
(Littlejohn 1981; Walker 85 Bumphus 1992; Walker 1992). At the same
time, the judiciary was beginning to address the problem of police use of
deadly force as an issue of due process. Both judicial and civilian
intervention in policing were radical strategies proposed to handle what
some scholars and activists viewed as substantial problems.

During the same time, scholars, practitioners, and activists began
to consider methods to control ofﬁcer discretion in critical decision
making by creating comprehensive policies that addressed appropriate
actions under various contexts. Both use of force and pursuit driving
polices were developed by law enforcement agencies across the United
States. As with deadly force traditionally, judicial intervention exerted
pressure as well on police agencies. In this sense, due process and

liability issues inﬂuenced the composition of police policies in these areas

104

 

 

 

 

 

- ’Figure 2. Dissipative Structure Model: Traditional Deadly Force—
_ _ And Police Pursuit Policnghanges

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Traditional Deadly Force Police Pursuit
Research on deadly force disparity 1. Point of Singularity Research on safety issues (i.e., Physiciansé
§(i.e., class, race, and gender issues). For Automotive Safety Study).
<1: The organization reaches a point when D
internal and/or external pressures exert
signiﬁcant pressure for systemic change.
External Review, Monitoring, 2. Radical Transformation Less discretionary policies. Review
Comprehensive Policies
The organization reaches a point
/1 , , r\
\l where radical strategies are V
proposed to address problems.
3. Symbolic Instrumentation
ESu bversion—no independent No substantial changes in pursuit
review & less than comprehensive polices Policy
<‘ﬁ The organization implements 1>

ineffective, often symbolic
changes, to address chaos.

 

 

Somewhat more restrictive
pursuit policy (short of Resynthesis)

 

4. Resynthesis

Judicial Intervention, Garner Ruling
Clear guidelines

 

 

 

v

\J
The organization is re-

synthesized where some
of structural changes
become formalized.

 

 

 

(Alpert 85 Fridell 1992). In 2001, these various changes in policing may
not seem to be radical, but they constituted fundamental philosophical
changes in American policing.

According to the dissipative structure model, organizations proceed
through periods of symbolic or ineffective acting. The radical strategies
to facilitate organization change are more likelywindow-dressing to
appease internal or external pressures. In the area of police misconduct
and deadly force, new policies and monitoring systems were developed,
but these various initiatives received limited acceptable among police
personnel and often these processes were subverted (U. S. Department of
Justice 1999). One aspect of the civilian review strategy was that the
early boards were manned with former police ofﬁcers who would not be
considered independent evaluators. As Littlejohn (1981) concluded,
many of these new review structures were symbolic and had no real
impact upon critical issues related to police misconduct.

Currently, nearly all police departments have policies addressing
both use of force and police pursuit driving. As some scholars have
noted, these policies (especially early ones) contained a signiﬁcant
amount of discretion and did little to control or regulate police behavior
on the street (Alpert 85 Fridell 1992; Kennedy et al. 1992). Recent
scholars have also suggested that the normative police pursuit policy can
be characterized as a discretionary, as opposed to restrictive, one

(Kennedy et a1. 1992).

106

A reformalization or resynthesis occurred in use of force police
largely due judicial intervention. In 1978, the Garner case (discussed
earlier) invalidated the ﬂeeing felon rule and gave speciﬁc guidelines as to
the use of deadly force by law enforcement. This important decision had
an immediate impact on policing in the United States and, for the ﬁrst
time, put signiﬁcant constraints on ofﬁcer discretion. Today all police
policies on the use of force are cognizant of the ruling made in the
Garner case.

Though there has been some judicial decision-making in the area
of police pursuit driving, these decisions (for the most part) have not
raised federal concerns as in the Garner decision. No Garner—type
decision has been handed down in relation to police pursuit policy.
Pursuit issues more often deal with liability factors and rarely consider
larger questions of constutitonality.

Changes in traditional deadly force policy are consistent with the
sequences of the dissipative structure model. There have been points of
singularity, radical strategies, symbolic acting, and resynthesis where
structural changes have occurred. The evolution of police pursuit policy
would appear at least a step behind traditional deadly force policy. In
this sense, it is less obvious that fundamental structural changes have
occurred.

If Geller and Scott (1992) are correct in assuming the

comparability among changes in deadly force and police pursuit policies,

107

 

the resynthesis within the latter category will most likely be inﬂuenced
by judicial intervention that limits organizational ability to act out
symbolically. There is however some inference from the present research
that police policies are becoming formally more restrictive than in the
past. Whether or not restrictive policies relate to individual compliance
is the important question, but answering it is beyond the scope of this
research.

With regard to complex organizational theory as propounded by
Etzioni, the coercive nature of the policing mandate as the primary
compliance structure would likely force a substantial amount of
ineffective acting. In this sense, law enforcement ofﬁcers who view their
mandate as enforcement at any cost would likely by-pass rules and
regulations that suffer from ambiguity. Absent an event such as a major
constitutional ruling, police policy regarding the use of deadly pursuit
force will continue to promote a great deal of controversy.

The present research has focused on the relationship between
pursuit factors, policy type, centralization, and sworn ofﬁcer and service
population size. In terms of policy content, all pursuit factors positively
correlated, with high content among one set of factors relating to high
content among the others. None of the pursuit factors through
substantive content correlated with other variables in the analysis (i.e.,
policy type, centralization, sworn ofﬁcer size, or service area size).

However, the correlational analysis that observed emphasis placed on

108

 

pursuit factors revealed correlations between both policy type and
centralization.

High centralization positively correlated with an increased
emphasis placed on initiation factors. Arguably, initiation factors lend
themselves to lesser degrees of discretion by administrations who seek to
maintain control over ofﬁcer behavior. These factors may be emphasized
so highly that the need to place further concentration on other
substantive factors is minimized. Hence, this may explain the lack of
correlation between centralization and operational, environmental, and
termination factors.

The correlation between policy type and increased emphasis on
environmental factors is likely best explained by examining the nature of
these factors. Environmental factors are easy to deﬁne and control since
many contain clear-cut and highly observable elements. For example, if
the roadway is wet then it is easy to observe and therefore control
ofﬁcers’ behaviors. Additionally, there seems to be increased levels of
environmental uncertainty to the point where administrative emphasis is
highly necessary. For example, there are large numbers of variations in
the occurrence of high speed chases in crowded pedestrian conditions.

There are a number of limitations to the present research. First,
though the research had over a ﬁfty percent response rate, a higher rate
of return (preferably over 60 percent) would have increased the

generalizability of the ﬁndings. Second, the research can not be

109

 

generalized to departments situated in service areas of less than 50,000
in population, since the sampling procedure excluded such agencies.
Finally, as with most organizational surveys, researchers may not always
be certain that those competent and knowledgeable responded the
questionnaire.

This research is presently the only study to utilize a national
probability sampling frame while also examining organizational factors
and associations with pursuit policy elements. While Kenney and Alpert
(1997) used a national probability sample, their primary research focus
was on pursuit policy elements and organizational mechanisms for
examining pursuits that have occurred. Although the Kennedy et al.
(1992) research involved an appropriate judgmental sample, the non
probability nature of the research does not permit broad generalizations.

In the present analysis, the single most inﬂuential factor in police
pursuit dealt with individual and ofﬁcer safety. Ninety-nine percent of
the policies addressed this important issue. Additionally, a very high
amount of emphasis was placed upon this termination factor. This
ﬁnding indicates that while most police departments support the
necessity of police pursuit there is a cost versus beneﬁts approach to
continuation in any initiated pursuit.

Years of policy existence emerged as the single most important
organizational factor related to policy restrictiveness based on both

perceptions and policy content. This ﬁnding suggested that newer

110

polices are substantively and perceptual more restrictive in nature.
Consistent with the dissipative structural model, this ﬁnding may also
indicate incremental movement toward organizational resynthesis.

The current research emphasized a national probability sample
that permits generalizations across departments with varying service
area populations. Not only does the research permit a descriptive
analysis of pursuit policy, inferential and correlational analysis were
conducted. These analyses allow for the examination of major variables
and associations between measures such as departmental centralization
and degree of emphasis placed on individual elements of the pursuit
policy. In part, this research has relied upon an associational approach.
Future research is needed to examine the nature and consequences of
police pursuit decision-making.

The present research has conceptualized police use of vehicular
pursuit as a deadly force issue. In this sense, no power is a democracy
is more direct and instant. Much of the research on police pursuit
(including the present) has concentrated on policy restrictiveness in a
formal sense. As such, the research examined restrictiveness as opposed
. to compliance to policy. A policy may be quite restrictive, but compliance
to policy may be nonexistence. While it might be hypothesized that
restrictive policies relate to better control and fewer pursuits, the
complexity of informal police structures suggest cause to reframe from

broad generalizations.

Ill

 

One way to examine restrictiveness and compliance to policy would
be to compare critical incident data to a sample of agencies and compare
policy restrictiveness to frequency, prevalence, and incidence of these
occurrences. Other variables such as the nature and frequency of in-
service training could shed some light on the relationship between
restrictiveness and compliance to police pursuit policy.

Research conducted at the organizational level assumes that the
perceptions given my one individual represent the organization. Though
organizational research is normatively carried out in this manner,
individual ofﬁcer perceptions of policy discretion may be more valid. This
type of analysis might better illuminate the complex relationship between
formal and informal police cultures.

Wells and Falcone (1997) have addressed the importance of
multiple data collection strategies speciﬁc to police pursuit research.
These multiple strategies might better include existing data, individual
and organizational surveys, ﬁeld experiments, and content analysis of
policies, procedures, and restrictions.

This research has conceptualized police pursuit consistent within
the dissipative structure perspective and as an issue of deadly force.

The body of research that examines police pursuit as a deadly force issue
is growing. Both proponents and opponents realize the need to control

the use of police pursuit; the disagreement, however, involves the level

and nature of control. The debate will likely go on for some time to come

with strong advocates on both sides.

REFERENCES

114

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Maple V. City omeaha, 348, NW. 2d. 254 1986.

APPENDIX

124

Police Pursuit Policy Questionnaire
College of Law Enforcement
Eastern Kentucky University

 

Demographic Information

 

 

 

1. What is the official name of your agency?

 

2. Please list the city and state where your agency is located.

 

3. How many sworn ofﬁcers are employed by your agency?

 

4. What is the population of your agency’s service area?

 

5. Which category applies to your agency ?
_ Municipal
__ County.
_ Consolidated Municipal/County
_ Sheriff’s Agency

6. Does your agency have a formal/written police pursuit policy?

__ Yes
__ No

7. How many years has the current policy existed?

 

8. If a formal/written policy does not exist, does your agency operate under an
informal/unwritten policy?

__ Yes
__ No
__ Not Applicable

 

If your agency has neither a written nor an unwritten policy, please stop at this
point and return the questionnaire in the envelop provided, otherwise please continue.

 

 

 

9. Using the following Centralization Scale, please check the rating that most applies to

appropriately applies to your administrative style.

__ Highly Centralized.
__ Mildly Centralized.
__ Moderate.

__ Mildly Decentralized.
__ Highly Decentralized.

 

Pursuit Policy Rating Scale

 

 

 

Using the rating scale provided below, please check the category that best
describes the level of ofﬁcer discretion in your department’s pursuit policy.

-------- Judgement: Pure. The ofﬁcer is cautioned only against unreasonable or
disproportionate danger to the public. A list of general guidelines may be given;
some restrictions, such as “no ramming” and “break-off pursuit of a minor trafﬁc
violator if identity is known,” may be included.

-------- Judgement: Limited. The ofﬁcer is made aware of close supervision over his or
her decision-making. A long, detailed list of criteria may be given. The general
tone is that the ofﬁcer must justify the decision to pursue, but the policy is to
apprehend law-breakers and to support police authority as long as the risk does
not outweigh the beneﬁt.

-------- Restrictive: Mild. The policy gives some reasonably clear guidelines regarding
when not to pursue. Minimizing risk clearly receives a higher priority than
enforcing the law. Ofﬁcer’s liability is likely to be emphasized, but the policy
places no absolute restrictions on the type of offense for which one may pursue.

-------- Restrictive: Severe. The burden of proof to justify the pursuit is on the ofﬁcer.
The ofﬁcer is assured that the decision not to pursue or to break off the pursuit
would not be a cause for censure. Clear restrictions are placed on the process of
pursuit, and pursuits arising from routine traffic stops typically are prohibited.

-------- Discouraged. Pursuits must meet fairly narrow guidelines, such as probable
cause of a dangerous felony, and must be last resort to prevent escape. The policy
states clearly that the ofﬁcer is to avoid pursuits.

 

Pursuit Policy Factor List

 

 

 

Please place a check mark in the following items if your agency includes them in
the police pursuit policy. If these factors are included in the policy, please rank the
level of training emphasis placed on each of these factors by circling the appropriate
response.

 

 

Initiation Factors

 

 

Factor

Ranking Emphasis

 

High
if Emphasis
Emphasis

----- Supervisory approval for continuation of the
pursuit.

----- The need to apprehend outweighs the risks
to citizens in the vicinity of the pursuit.

----- Reasonable belief by the officer that the
violator is a felon or suspected felon.

----- Reasonable belief that the violator committed
a misdemeanor.

----- Reasonable belief that the violator committed
a serious trafﬁc offense.

----- Reasonable belief that the violator had
committed a non-serious trafﬁc oﬁense.

----- Reasonable belief that the violator is under the
inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs.

----- Primary pursuit vehicle must be a marked vehicle.

----- Secondary pursuit vehicles must be a marked
vehicle.

----- A limit is placed on the number of units that
can be involved in the pursuit.

----- Pursuits are prohibited when passengers, unrelated
to the violation, are present in the vehicle.

127

1

Circle Choice

2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3

Low

 

Environmental Factors Associated with the Decision to Initiate the Pursuit

 

 

 

----- The time of day. 1 2 3 4
----- Weather conditions. 1 2 3 4
----- Roadway or trafﬁc conditions. 1 2 3 4
----- Lighting conditions. 1 2 3 4
----- Area or location such as business or commercial. 1 2 3 4
----- Presence of pedestrian or vehicular traffic. 1 2 3 4
----- Availability of assistance. 1 2 3 4
----- Likelihood of a successful apprehension. l 2 3 4

 

Termination Factors

 

 

 

--— When circumstances of the pursuit present a safety
hazard to the public, ofﬁcer, or the suspect. I 2

----- When no supervisor or superior can be contacted
to approve the pursuit’s continuation. l 2

----- When the officer looses visual contact with the
suspect for an extended period of time. 1 2

----- The pursuing unit looses radio contact with the
communications dispatcher. l 2

----- The pursuing unit is unfamiliar with the area of the
pursuit. 1 2

----- The suspect travels the wrong way on an interstate

highway, divided highway, or divided roadway. l 2
----- An ofﬁcer’s decision to terminate a pursuit for safety

reasons is not subject to a disciplinary review. 1 2
----- The pursuing vehicle travels into a residential area. 1 2
----- The pursuit travels across state lines. 1 2
----- The pursuit travel across jurisdictional lines. 1 2

----- When the violator can be identiﬁed to the point

where later apprehension can be accomplished. 1 2
----- The ofﬁcer has reason to believe the vehicle is
being operated by a juvenile. 1 2

----- The pursuing ofﬁcer has reason to believe the
suspect is intoxicated or otherwise impaired and
poses a danger to the public. 1 2

----- The policy requires pursuit termination after a
speciﬁed time occurred or distance has been I
traveled.

 

Operational Factors

 

 

 

----- Firing, at or from a moving vehicle, while

engaged in the pursuit. l 2 3 4 5
----- A maximum speed is speciﬁed in the policy. 1 2 3 4 5
----- Shooting at a vehicle to terminate a pursuit. 1 2 3 4 5

----- The pursuing ofﬁcer is permitted to ram the vehicle

being pursued. l 2 3 4 5
----- Shooting at tires, radiators, etc in order to disable l 2 3 4 5
----- Forcefully stopping the vehicle by ramming it. 1 2 3 4 5
----- Boxing-in or surrounding the vehicle being pursued.1 2 3 4 5
----- The use of disabling devices such as tire deﬂation. l 2 3 4 5
----- The use of police vehicles in roadblocks. l 2 3 4 5

----- The channelization of the vehicle being pursued off
roadway surfaces. 1 2 3 4 5

 

Please include a c0py of your pursuit policy with this questionnaire. Your time and
efforts are greatly appreciated. Thank you.

 

 

 

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