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6/01 cJCIRC/DateDuo.p65-p.15

EDUCATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF
NONFORMAL EDUCATION IN PROMOTING CIVIC ORIENTATIONS IN
SENEGAL

By

Michelle Therese Kuenzi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHH.OSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2003

ABSTRACT

EDUCATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF
NONFORMAL EDUCATION IN PROMOTING CIVIC ORIENTATIONS IN
SENEGAL

By

Michelle Therese Kuenzi

Education has been considered an important factor in the establishment and
consolidation of democratic forms of government, and many researchers have attempted
to document the impact of formal education on democratization and democratic
consolidation. However, little attention has been paid to the relationship between
nonformal education (NF E) and democracy. Given the prominence that NFE has gained
in countries with non-performing formal educational systems, such as those in Africa,
this inattention is unfortunate. Based on the results of a survey involving a probability
sample of 1484 adults drawn in ﬁve regions of Senegal, I ﬁnd that nonformal education
and formal education tend to have similar effects on many political orientations. More
speciﬁcally, nonformal education signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood that one will
participate in the community, register to vote, vote in elections, and generally be engaged
and interested in politics. Nonformal education also increases the likelihood that one will
report having opinions that differ from family members and friends, support democratic
values and have an internal locus of control. On the other hand, nonformal education

decreases the likelihood that one will have authoritarian attitudes.

C0pyn'ght by
Michelle Therese Kuenzi
2003

For my mother, Marilynn J. Kuenzi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was very fortunate to have had a superlative dissertation committee. Mike
Bratton has been a conscientious advisor. He provided me with absolutely critical
guidance with regard to my survey effort in Senegal as well as very insightful feedback
on the drafts of my dissertation. He has been an excellent role model in survey research.
Nicolas van de Walle has been very generous with his time and ideas and always read my
papers and grant proposals. I am grateful to him for all of the helpful suggestions,
information and assistance he has given me vis-a-vis my projects over the past seven
years, including the dissertation. Mark Jones has provided me with excellent
suggestions, especially with regard to the methods I employed in my dissertation. He has
also regularly read my work and provided me with very useful feedback. I owe special
thanks to Brian Silver for all of the help, support and guidance with which he has
provided me throughout my career as a graduate student. Without all of his
encouragement, it is hard to imagine how I would ever have made it to this point.

I am grateful to my friends and colleagues who saw me through all of the ups and
downs I encountered during my years as a graduate student. I had an excellent Africanist
and comparativist peer group. Gina Lambright has been an outstanding co-author and
long-standing ﬁ’iend. Kimberly Smiddy generously shared information and resources.
Misa Nishikawa has been a steadfast friend and source of support, and I have especially
appreciated her consistency, sound advice, and no nonsense approach to life. Shannon
Vance helped me to maintain good humor, always ﬁnding a way to make me laugh, even

during some of the tough times. Erik Herron has earned my gratitude for helping me

print my dissertation before my defense. I would like to thank Ko Maeda for all of the
logistical help he gave me when it came time to ﬁle the dissertation.

I have many people in Senegal to thank for their generous help and cannot begin
to name them all here. I wish to acknowledge the members of ARED for all of the
support they have given me in my study of NFE. I am very grateful to Sonja Fagerberg
Diallo for providing me with many opportunities to do research on NFE and showing me
generous hospitality. Mamadou Ly has always facilitated my research efforts and been a
kind and unwavering friend. Awa Ka, Kebe, Sow, Diol, Njora, Nancy, and the other
members of the team have always been kind and helpful. Mamadou Ndiaye has always
been willing to lend a hand when I have needed help.

Numerous members of the PDS leadership were supportive of my study of the
2000 presidential election. I am grateful to Kader Sow, Mbaye Ndiaye, and several other
members of the PDS in this regard. His Excellency President Wade allowed me to follow
the Marche Bleu and granted me a couple of interviews.

My ﬁrst experience with NFE was in Medina Cherif. I wish to thank the
honorable El Hadji Kiekoto Baldé for all of his kindness. Abdoulaye Baldé was a perfect
host, and, his wives, Kutuyal Mballo and J uldé Baldé, rendered my experience a
wonderful one. I wish to acknowledge the kindness of all of my friends in Medina Cherif
although I can only name but a few here: J uhé Baldé, Daouda Baldé, Kajjatu Baldé, and
Aissatou Baldé.

I wish to acknowledge the Fulbright 1113 Program, Social Science Reasearch
Council and the Senegal USAlD mission for their support of my research. I would also

like to thank the many people who contributed to the successful completion of the survey.

vi

Boubacar Tall did an exceptional job acting as project coordinator for the survey effort.
It is hard to imagine how the survey could have been administered without all of his
efforts. The interviews were conducted by eight enumerators: Saidou Norou Sall, Hamet
Ly, Rougiatou Dia, Penda Sy, Cheikh Seck, Cheikh Aidara, Fatou Diop and Saliou Ciss.
Saidou Norou Sall’s diligent and careful work during the project was much appreciated.
Alhousseynou Sy meticulously entered the data from the questionnaires. Sidy Cissokho,
Alioune Ndiaye, Marie-Claire Sow and Roger Yochelson at USAID were very helpful
and supportive throughout the research effort, as was the entire USAID team.

Thanks are due to the leadership of P1P and all the members of PIP who
facilitated the survey work, especially Ismaila Diawo and Moussa Niang. I thank
Thiermo Ba for making our research in PIP villages possible. The leadership of Tostan
was most supportive of our efforts. Molly Melching is due special thanks for having faith
in my abilities and incorporating me into “the team” when I ﬁrst went to Senegal as a
“green” but enthusiastic Watson Fellow and volunteer fourteen years ago. Meissa
Diegne served as a much needed resource person for the research team while we worked
in Thies, and Abdoulaye Thiam generously made his assistance available. Saidou Balde
of Tostan assisted us during part of our work in St. Louis.

Those at DAEB were very helpful and forthcoming with information. The
members of PAPA have always graciously provided assistance and information upon my
visits to this organization. I wish to especially thank Mr. Monteiro, Abdoulaye Conte,
and Mr. Diagne. My thanks to the leadership of PAPF for allowing our research to be
conducted and to the PAPF teachers who facilitated our research in the villages of study.

The members of CIED, especially Bocar Sy, were helpful throughout the project. The

vii

people in the villages included in our study made conducting this research not only
possible but also a pleasure. It is impossible for me to express sufﬁcient gratitude to the
innumerable people in all of the villages of study who freely and generously offered their
assistance to the research team. I do take this opportunity, however, to offer my heartfelt
thanks to them.

I also wish to thank my siblings, Nicole Doan and David Kuenzi, for always
showing conﬁdence in me. My niece and nephews have kept me in good spirits. My
uncle, Carroll Multz, was supportive of my graduate school experience. My father
demonstrated the virtues of hard work, honesty, and integrity. Finally, my mother is due
very special thanks for the constant and complete support she has given me throughout

my graduate career and life in general.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xvi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORY ............................................................................... 1
Political and Civic Engagement ......................................................................... 2
How Does Literacy Affect Citizenship? ............................................................ 7
Education in Africa ............................................................................................ 12
Education, Civil Society, and Democracy ......................................................... 15
Problem Statement ............................................................................................. 19
Statement of Hypotheses .................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF THE SENEGALESE POLITICAL SYSTEM ....................................... 28
Background ........................................................................................................ 29
The Political Institutions of Senegal ...................................................... 31
Neopatrimonialism and the Nature of Senegalese Politics .................... 32
Senegalese Politics in Historical Perspective ..................................................... 33
Early History .......................................................................................... 33
Rise ofthe Marabouts .................................... 34
Electoral Politics in the Pre-Independence Period ................................. 36
Politics in the Post-Independence Period ............................................... 38
From Semi-Democracy to Democracy? ................................................. 40
Implications For Senegal's Democratic Future .................................................. 45
Challenges For Democracy ....................................................................... 48
Prospects for the Future ..................................................................................... 52
CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF THE SENEGALESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ............................... 60
The "Civilizing Mission" ................................................................................... 61
Assimilation and Direct Rule ..................................................................... 61
Goals of Colonial Education in A.O.F. ..................................................... 63
The Roots of Public Education in Senegal ............................................................. 64
Assessing the Results of Colonial Education ......................................................... 67
The Current Educational System in Senegal .......................................................... 72
The Four Nonformal Education Programs of Study .......................................... 74
CHAPTER 4
METHODS AND SAMPLE .......................................................................................... 79
Sampling ............................................................................................................ 79
Characteristics Of The Sample .......................................................................... 85
Creating the Questionnaire ................................................................................. 91

Development of the Research Team and Research Protocol ............................. 94

External Validity ................................................................................................ 94
CHAPTER 5
IN THE WORDS OF THE NFE PARTICIPANTS ....................................................... 97
Methods .............................................................................................................. 97
Outcomes of Teacher Training .......................................................................... 100
Empowerment through Literacy ......................................................................... 103
The Impact of Literacy on Women .................................................................... 109
Implications ........................................................................................................ 1 l 1
Chapter 6
NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS ..................... 113
Civic Engagement .............................................................................................. 115
Community Participation ....................................................................... 1 15
Electoral Participation ............................................................................ 122
Political Interest and Engagement .......................................................... 123
Social and Political Attitudes ............................................................................. 124
Political Efﬁcacy .................................................................................... 124
Authoritarianism/Progressiveness .......................................................... 126
Trust .................................................................................................... 128
Individualism/ Social Distance ............................................................... 132
Support for Democratic Values .............................................................. 133
Locus of Control .................................................................................... 135
Contacting Public Ofﬁcials ................................................................................ 137
Chapter 7
NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES ....................... 145
Community Participation ................................................................................... 146
Interest And Engagement In Politics .................................................................. 149
Efﬁcacy .............................................................................................................. 152
Authoritarianism/Progressiveness ...................................................................... 1 52
Trust ................................................................................................................ 155
Individualization/Social Distance ...................................................................... 158
Support for Democratic Values .......................................................................... 159
Electoral Participation ........................................................................................ 162
Contacting Public Ofﬁcials ................................................................................ 166
Ethnic Pride ........................................................................................................ 171
Ruling Out Rival Hypotheses ............................................................................ 171
Chapter 8
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 177
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 189
Appendix A: Summary of Results For Individual Programs ............................. 190
Appendix B: Questionnaire in English .............................................................. 208

Appendix C: Questionnaire in French ............................................................... 235

Appendix D: Conceptualization and Operationalization ................................... 270
Appendix E: Effects of Programs on Community Participation ........................ 277
Appendix F: Map of Senegal ............................................................................. 280
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 281

xi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Chronology of Salient Events in the Political History of Senegal ................... 28
Table 2: Ethnic Composition of the Population ............................................................. 30
Table 3: Number of Villages by Region and Program ................................................... 81
Table 4: Number of Respondents by Region and Program ............................................ 81
Table 5: Crosstabulation of Gender and NFE ................................................................ 86
Table 6: Percentage of Respondents in Age Categories ................................................ 87
Table 7: Crosstabulation of Age Categories and NFE ................................................... 88
Table 8: Crosstabulation of Ethnolinguistic Group and NFE ........................................ 88
Table 9: Expected Versus Actual Percentages of Ethnolinguistic Groups .................... 90
Table 10: Crosstabulation of Region and NFE .............................................................. 91
Table 11: Crosstabulation of Cooperating to Solve Community Problem and Level of
NFE ................................................................................................................................ 118
Table 12: Crosstabulation of Number of Community Organizations in which one has
Membership and NFE .................................................................................................... 122
Table 13: Crosstabulation of Trust in Political Parties and NFE ................................. 129
Table 14: Crosstabulation of Trust in the Army and NFE ........................................... 130
Table 15: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof Respondents .......... 130
Table 16: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarophones ................... 131
Table 17: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof-Speakers .................. 131
Table 18: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarophones .................... 132

Table 19: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE and
Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for All Respondents .................. 139

Table 20: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE and
Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Female Respondents ............ 142

xii

Table 21: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Community Participation .......................................................................... 146

Table 22: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of High Community Participation for
Pulaar Women ................................................................................................................ 148

Table 23: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Interest/Engagement in Politics ................................................................ 150

Table 24: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Engaged in Politics for
Senegalese Men .............................................................................................................. 151

Table 25: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Progressiveness/ Authoritarianism ........................................................... 153

Table 26: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Having Progressive Orientation in
Politics for Pulaar Men .................................................................................................. 154

Table 27: Ordered Logit Estimates of Trust Models Dependent Variable: Social Trust
Index .............................................................................................................................. 155

Table 28: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Social Distance/Individualization ............................................................. 158

Table 29: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Support for Democratic Values ................................................................ 160

Table 30: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Supportive of
Democratic Values for Senegalese Women ................................................................... 161

Table 31: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Electoral Participation .............................................................................. 162

Table 32: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of High Level of Electoral Participation
for Rural Senegalese Women ......................................................................................... 163

Table 33: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Registering to Vote ................................................................................... 164

Table 34: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Registering to Vote for Pulaar
Women ........................................................................................................................... 165

Table 35: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a Community Problem ............................... 166

xiii

Table 36: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a
Community Problem for Rural Senegalese Women ...................................................... 167

Table 37: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a Personal Problem ..................................... 168

Table 38: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a
Personal Problem for Rural Senegalese Women ........................................................... 169

Table 39: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Ethnic Pride .............................................................................................. 170

Table 40: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Community Participation and Level of
NFE ................................................................................................................................ 171

Table 41: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Political Engagement and Level of NFE
....................................................................................................... 1 72

Table 42: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Progressiveness and Level of NFE ...... 173

Table A. 1: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar
Respondents in St. Louis ................................................................................................ 190

Table A2: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar Women
Respondents in St. Louis ................................................................................................ 193

Table A.3: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having Tostan
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar
Respondents in St. Louis ................................................................................................ 196

Table A.4: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having Tostan
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Female
Respondents in Diourbel & Thies .................................................................................. 199

Table A5: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PAPA
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Regions of Thies,
St. Louis and Kaolack .................................................................................................... 202

Table A6: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PAPF
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Respondents in
Diourbel & Louga .......................................................................................................... 205

Table E.1: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Tostan Training and General Control
Variables on Community Participation .......................................................................... 277

xiv

Table E.2: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of PAPA Training and General Control
Variables on Community Participation .......................................................................... 278

Table E.3: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PAPF Training and General
Control Variables on Community Participation ............................................................. 278

Table E.4: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PIP Training and General
Control Variables on Community Participation ............................................................. 279

XV

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Senegal ............................................................................................... 280

xvi

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

Now that the exuberant decade of Africa’s “democratic” transitions, the 19905, is
over, scholarly attention is focused on the consolidation of democracy. Bratton and van
de Walle (1997) deﬁne the consolidation of democracy as:

...the more or less total institutionalization of democratic practices, complete only

when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as

the only way to resolve conﬂict. It requires that political actors so fully
internalize the rules of the game that they can no longer imagine resorting to

nonelectoral practices to obtain ofﬁce. ( 235)

Although the vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries experienced some type of
political transition in the 19905, only a small number of these countries appear to be on a
trajectory toward the consolidation of democracy. Many countries appear to be at a point
of stagnation and others appear headed toward endpoints that are little understood (see
van de Walle 2002 and Herbst 2001). In fact, only 14 of the 48 sub-Saharan African
countries qualify as at least “electoral democracies” in Diamond’s (2002) classiﬁcatory
scheme. As can be seen from Bratton and van de Walle’s deﬁnition, the practices and
attitudes of a country’s citizens are a critical aspect of the consolidation of democracy.

In this study, I assess the extent to which nonformal education fosters the type of civic
orientation among citizens that is critical for the consolidation of democracy.

Education has been considered an important factor in the establishment and

consolidation of democratic forms of government, and many researchers have attempted

to document the impact of formal education on democratization and the consolidation of

democracy. Education has been shown to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on civic culture
(Almond and Verba 1959), and numerous studies link education to democratic behavior
and attitudes. The literature connecting formal education to behavior change has deep roots
in the modernization literature (e.g., see Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Cutn'ght 1969; Inkeles
1983)

On the other hand, little attention has been paid to the relationship between
nonformal education (NF B) and democracy. In this study, NFE refers to the programs
intended to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills on participants, usually adults who
have been left out of formal educational systems, or dropouts from formal schools.
Given the prominence that NFE has gained in countries with non-performing formal
educational systems, such as those in Africa, this inattention is unfortunate. How does the
relationship between education and political orientation change when the educational
system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates? Do more
“authentic” forms of education (i.e., nonformal education conducted in national languages)
affect civic/political participation differently than formal education? Do nonformal
education programs reinforce traditional norms and increase the insularity of the villages in
which they are found? On the other hand, does formal education produce rootlessness in its
recipients, so that those with formal education tend to be alienated and unengaged in their
communities?

Political and Civic Engagement
Hadenius sums up the rationale of the modernization theorists well: “. . .the belief was
that economic and social development would result in greater literacy and a generally

higher educational level among the masses of the population, which would promote

openness and deeper insight into political issues” (1992, 78). Consciousness and
openness, emanating not only from literacy, but also from exposure to mass media, along
with other positive aspects of modernization, such as industrialization and urbanization,
would pave the way for the formation of democratic regimes (Hadenius, 1992, 78-9).

Lemer’s The Passing of Traditional Society (195 8) is an excellent exemplar of the
modernization school of thought. Lerner describes the process by which traditional
societies are transformed into modern democratic states, and focuses on the Middle East,
in particular. He explicates how literacy is linked to active political participation.
Literacy increases one’s participation in every form of mass communication. Literacy
opens up the possibility of vicarious experience through the printed media, allowing one
to experience different worlds. It is the interaction between the variables of literacy and
mass media that lead to political participation in the form of voting. Consumption of
mass media not only increases the spread of “empathy,” but also heightens demands that
one expresses through participant institutions, such as voting. Lerner concludes, “Thus
literacy becomes the sociological pivot in the activation of psychic mobility, the publicly
shared skill which binds modern man’s varied daily round into a consistent participant
lifestyle” (1958, 64). In his study which involved data from 54 countries, Lerner ﬁnds
that the correlations of literacy with urbanism, voting, and media were .64, .80, and .82,
respectively (1958, 5 8). As Lerner notes, other studies had already established a link
between literacy and economic development.

Lipset (1959) also argues that the levels of economic development and education
help determine whether democracy will emerge and take root in a particular country.

Lipset (1959) contends that the empirical evidence supports the notion that higher

educational levels facilitate the establishment of democratic forms of governance. Lipset
(1959) compares literacy rates between the “more democratic” and “less democratic”
European countries and between the “more dictatorial” and “less dictatorial” Latin
American countries. He notes that, at the time, the lowest literacy rate for the “more
democratic” European countries was 96%, while the average for the “less democratic”
countries was 85%. In Latin America, the average of the “less dictatorial” countries was
74%, while that for the “more dictatorial” countries was 46%. Further, Lipset argues that
the relationship between education and democratic attitudes within countries is especially
strong, and cites several national studies.

Education has a strong inﬂuence on civic culture. While the time frame required
to develop a civic culture is, according to Almond and Verba (1959), a long one, they
duly note that many of the “new nations” do not have this kind of time to dedicate to the
development of a civic culture. In such a case, Almond and Verba see education as the
best substitute for time. Indeed, according to their data, education is the most important
determinant of political attitudes (370). However, Almond and Verba go on to point out
that while education can help to supply an individual with important political skills and
knowledge, it cannot completely supplant the other components of the socialization
process in terms of inculcating democratic attitudes and behavior (3 70-371).

After controlling for such characteristics as income, status of occupation, gender,
among others, Almond and Verba (1959) still ﬁnd educational groups to differ in each of
the ﬁve nations studied on nine dimensions of political orientation. These dimensions
include level of political knowledge, subjective feelings of political competence,

frequency of engaging in political discussion, level of interpersonal trust and trust in the

social environment, for example (316-318). Interestingly, Almond and Verba (1959) ﬁnd
that differences among lower educational groups on the nine relationships are much more
substantial than differences among higher educational groups. They conclude, “That
higher education tends to reduce national differences suggests that the nature of political
culture is greatly determined by the distribution of education” (320). This ﬁnding would
tend to support Lerner’s contention that education is associated with some type of
“universal transforrnatory effect.” In trying to explain the impact of education, Almond
and Verba note that education has numerous effects. They point out that students
actually do learn in school, be it about the political system, democratic norms, etc. In
addition, at school, individuals have an opportunity to interact with others of the same
educational level which tends to reinforce political lessons (316). Almond and Verba
seem to emphasize the role of the content of the educational experience in affecting
attitudes and behavior as opposed to the effects of simply gaining literacy and numeracy
skills. Indeed, the fact that differences among educational groups decreases as level of
education increases would seem to indicate that education is a strong socializing force
which tends to blot out the effects of national cultures.

Although the tenets associated with modernization theory were thoroughly
excoriated for their Eurocentric and teleological assumptions, they have been largely
revalidated in recent years. In his 1992 article in the American Behavioral scientist,
Diamond reassesses Lipset’s thesis “that democracy is related to the state of economic
development.” He ﬁnds a signiﬁcant relationship between regime type and level of
development, especially when the Human Development Index (HDI)1 is used to measure

development instead of GNP (Diamond, 1992, p. 458). Diamond notes the consistent

 

' HDI is a composite index that incorporates measures of educational levels, life expectancy and income.

manner in which Lipset’s thesis has stood the test of time. Numerous studies have
generated the same ﬁnding, that there is a strong positive relationship between economic
development and democracy. In his words:

Given the considerable variation in quantitative methods in countries and years

tested, in measures of democracy employed, and the vast array of different

regression equations (testing more than 20 different independent variables), this
must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of

comparative national development (468).

Hadenius has also reconsidered the tenets of the modernization theory and
attempted to test the relationship between 17 of the variables associated with
modernization including exposure to the media, level of education and literacy.
Employing an index of democracy based on the dimensions of elections and political
liberties, Hadenius regresses these indicators against degree of democracy for one-
hundred and thirty-two of the world’s third world countries. He ﬁnds that the literacy
rate is the most deﬁnitive of the indicators of democracy (although, as he continues his
analyses, the effects of literacy wash out a bit) (Hadenius, 1992). Given his method of
stepwise regression, the conclusions he draws are not that ﬁrm, however.

Other, more recent studies also offer support for modernization theory. Based on
data for 43 countries, Inglehart (1997) ﬁnds support for the modernization thesis that
level of economic development and democracy are integrally linked and positively
correlated. Vanhanen (1997) also ﬁnds that modernization2 and democracy are positively

linked. While both of these studies have been attacked on methodological grounds, they

do offer support for the modernization thesis, and no recent study has offered evidence to

 

2 As one reviewer notes (Arat 1999), what Vanhanen calls “resource distribution” is essentially what others
call level of modernization. Indeed, he uses indicators such as percentage of the adult population that is
literate, percentage of population that is urban, etc.

undermine this thesis. Based on their analyses of an extensive data set that covers 141
countries between the years 1950 and 1990, Przeworski et a1. (2000) also ﬁnd conclusive
support for the notion that there is a positive relationship between economic development
and democracy. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) attempt to clarify the relationship
between democracy and economic development, arguing that democracy can emerge at
any stage of economic development but is simply much more likely to take root in richer

countries. They ﬁnd empirical support for this argument.

How Does Literacy Affect Citizenship?3
From the “autonomous” theoretical perspective,4 the very process of becoming literate
engenders certain changes in psychological and cognitive processes that have
implications for how people perceive themselves and others. Oxenham (1980) offers
many reasons for why literacy makes people better citizens than they would otherwise be.
According to Oxenham (1980), people’s sense of personal efﬁcacy is increased as they
gain conﬁdence and a sense of control over their lives. Such is the case because they are
able to do more for themselves than they were prior to attaining literacy skills. They
begin to think more for themselves and not just accept things on authority. To this extent,

they seem have more of a tendency to become involved in voluntary associations and

 

3 DiRenzo summarizes some of the character traits thought necessary for the establishment and
maintenance of modern democracy: “ ...belief in the efﬁcacy of science and technology, control over
nature, assertion of increasing independence from traditional authority ﬁgures, orientation to the future,
aspirations for self and family, planning ahead, active citizenship in community affairs and local politics,
secularism, tolerance for diversity, and an openness to new experience and social change” (1990, 40).
Nearly all of these characteristics have been linked to literacy in the literature.

’ The autonomous perspective views changes in attitudes and behavior as simply coming from being able to
read and write without considering the context in which literacy skills are learned and used.

politics.5 Moreover, they become less parochial and less intolerant of others as they are
able to have vicarious experience through reading material (1980, 51).

At the level of the individual, myriad studies have linked education to democratic
behavior and attitudes. In several US. studies, education has been shown to increase
political participation (e. g., Bennet and Klecka 1970; Teixeira 1987; Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Many early studies also
established a link between education and democratic attitudes and orientations. Stouffer
(1955) found that education had a positive impact on the willingness to tolerate
nonconformists. Williams, Nunn and Peter (1976) had the same ﬁndings when they
reanalyzed Stouffer’s 1954 US. data set and when they replicated his study using data
collected in a 1974 nationwide survey (n=3546). Converse et al. (1972) found that
education was associated with attitudinal stability and sophistication. Muller, Seligson,
and Turan (1987) found that, although the effects of political participation on support for
democratic norms varied across contexts, the effect of education on support for
democratic norms was positive in the US. (New York), Costa Rica (San Jose) and
Turkey.

More recently, Gibson et al. (1992) attempt to assess the extent to which the
“cultural requisites to democracy” exist in the USSR by looking at levels of “support for
core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions” (329). Based on survey data of 504

Moscow Oblast citizens, they ﬁnd, “The best predictors of attitudes toward general

 

5 Almond and Verba (1965) ﬁnd that the rate of participation in voluntary organizations, which boosts
political competence, increases as “one moves up the educational ladder” (248). They also contend that the
fact that citizens of countries such as the US. and Britain are characterized by high levels of interpersonal
trust which spills over into the political arena helps to promote the stability of the democratic political
system (1965, 239-243). Such trust is seen by some as being fostered primarily in civil society (Putnam,
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).

democratic values are education, gender, and age. The better educated, males, and the
young tended to be more supportive of democratic institutions and processes” (329).
However, among the explanatory variables just mentioned they ﬁnd that “the strongest
predictor of democratic attitudes is level of education. . .” (359). Similarly, based on their
public opinion survey of seven republics of the former Soviet Union, Finifter and
Mickiewicz (1992) ﬁnd that the more educated, men, and the young are most likely to
support political change. However, the relationship between education and democracy is
more complex than the above would imply. Indeed, the effects of education on
democratic processes are not straightforward and unidirectional.

Several studies ﬁnd the effects of education on democratic attitudes to be more
variable than do those just described and point to the role context plays in determining
the effects of education. Based on the results of a nation-wide study (n=1,507), Phelan et
al. (1995) ﬁnd that education has a positive effect on tolerance for the homeless but a
negative effect on support for aiding the homeless economically. They conclude that the
results support the socialization model in that “education socializes students to the
‘ofﬁcial culture,’ which in the United States includes values of equal opportunity and
respect—but not equal outcomes” (p. 126). Using data from the U.S.A., France,
Germany, and Austria, Weil (1985) looks at the effects of education on anti-Semitism and
ﬁnds that the effect of education on liberal attitudes varies across countries, supporting
the idea that “socialization” is what drives the effects of education.

Numerous factors render the effects of both formal education and NFE uncertain.
While studies have consistently found relationships between years of formal education

and political participation and democratic attitudes, the strongest effects often appear to

manifest themselves at the highest educational levels. For example, Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone (1980) report that only 38% of the respondents in their study with fewer than
ﬁve years of formal education voted, compared to 69% of those who had only completed
high school, 86% of those who completed college, and 91% of those who completed at
least one year of graduate school (17-18).

Similarly, with reference to support for the new democratic regimes in post-
communist countries, Rose et al. (1998) ﬁnd that it is only between those who have
university degrees and those that do not that one sees a difference between educational
groups. Their study is based on the data emanating from the New Democracies
Barometer 1993-4 survey implemented by the Paul Lazarfeld Society (n=9,087). With
reference to support for nondemocratic alternatives, they ﬁnd that: “Among university
graduates, 70 per cent reject all undemocratic alternatives; the proportion falls to half
among those with academic and secondary qualiﬁcations and to less than two-ﬁfths
among those with no academic qualiﬁcations” (132).

Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) point out that formal education actually
encapsulates many attributes and processes. Formal education enhances cognitive skills
that allow an individual to understand and learn about politics. Reading is an obvious
example. Formal education also increases one’s ability to handle complex and abstract
material. In addition, education increases the skills an individual needs to manage the
logistical demands surrounding political participation. Moreover, American schools
incorporate messages related to citizenship into the curriculum, and thus, education might
help instill feelings of civic duty. Further, because the better educated tend to be more

skilled at grappling with political information and issues, they often obtain more

10

psychological gratiﬁcation from voting than those who are not as well educated. Years
of formal schooling also tends to capture family background. Those with high levels of
education often have relatively more prosperous, well-educated, politically aware parents
than those with low levels of education (18-20).

Similarly, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) describe the “direct and indirect”
effects education has on political participation. Within the school, students acquire
communication and organizational skills, as well as perhaps an interest in politics. They
might also assimilate civic values in this setting. Education also indirectly affects
political participation in numerous ways. Among all variables, level of education has the
strongest inﬂuence on the type of occupation one will have. One’s job largely determines
the type of civic skills one will use and bone as well the type of social networks to which
one will be exposed. In short, “. . .educational attainment thus has an indirect impact on
the acquisition of several crucial political resources” (420). Moreover, they point out that
education also has a positive affect on involvement in organizations, which in turn affects
civic skills.

La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) observe that the production of human capital
and the production of social capital6 are often correlated. Those with high levels of
education are likely to ﬁnd themselves in milieus where they have the opportunity to be
included in the type of social networks in which “politically relevant social capital”
abounds. In short, very similar to the processes described by Brady, Verba and
Schlozman (1995), education has a positive relationship with social capital, which in turn

increases political participation.

 

6 Putnam deﬁnes social capital as “...features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks,
that can improve the efﬁciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions...” (1993,167).

11

Education in Africa

Many of the processes and attributes that underlie the relationship between
education and political participation, however, do not exist in some Aﬁican countries.
Harber describes the “authoritarian nature of schooling” in Aﬁica and argues that “The
present educational structures have within them many features which tend to reproduce
the unvirtuous authoritarian cycle” (1997, 49). Social scientists of all disciplines have
emphasized the important role education plays in the socialization/culturation process.
Many scholars have assumed that the educational system of interest is an outgrth of
the society in which it is embedded. However, in the case of countries like Senegal,
formal educational systems have their roots in colonial times, and the language of
learning is not the maternal language of the learners. Many argue that, in these types of
situations, learning in a second language obstructs the cognitive development of children
(e.g., Vandewiele 1983; Magnus 1984; Awoniyi 1976). Magnus (1984) explains:

The use of foreign language in formal education in countries with a high rate of

illiterate population does not encourage normal growth of cognitive development

in the child, in that very little reinforcement takes place of the norms, values and
beliefs experienced by the child outside the school environment within the
school's formal environment. In addition, the cultural bias of the new language

helps accentuate this problem. (397)

Magnus (1984) also observes that formal education creates a schism between the
schooled and unschooled, and particularly between children and their unschooled parents.
Sabatier also notes that West African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic to
western education or those associated with it through the mid-19403 (1978, 7). In fact,
during the colonial period, according to Boahan (1987), one of the ways rural Aﬁicans

resisted colonialism was by shunning colonial “innovations” such as formal schools. To

the extent that those obtaining diplomas in the formal educational system were put on a

12

different (and mistrusted) trajectory than the vast majority of people, formal education
would appear not to be associated with the inculcation of social and moral responsibility
connected to political participation in the American context. The school experience
appears to be an especially stressful one for most students largely because of the
aforementioned discontinuity. In fact, a 1981 study conducted by Vandwiele found that
"school fears" were much more important among students in Senegal than students in the
United States and France (1981:281).7

In the context of rural Senegal where only a minority of adults have any formal
schooling and where those that do have, on average, six or fewer years, one must
question whether formal education would generate the social capital needed to stimulate
political activity. It is worth noting that years of formal education does not serve as a
proxy for socio—economic class in contexts like that of rural Senegal.8 Indeed, there is no
relationship between years of formal education and income in this sample.
Nonformal Education in Africa

Nonformal education is often considered a more “authentic” form of education in
Africa since it is usually conducted in Aﬁican languages and informed by the culture and
exigencies of the learners. For many of those involved in the educational arena, these
NFE programs are the key to empowering the majority of the population and rendering
members of the public productive and active participants in the political and development
process. They contend that it is only through such “mother tongue language programs”

that most people in these countries can be reached:

 

7 Vandwiele attributes the high level of anxiety experienced by students to the requirement that they learn
in a second language. Of course, a rival explanation for the high level of anxiety among Senegalese
secondary students could be the frequent use of corporal punishment in the school setting.

8 Clignet claims that initially a nrunber of schools drew their student body from generally rrrargalized groups
(1970).

13

If education through the school system is not designed simply to replenish the ranks of the
educated elite, it is obvious that something will have to be done for the large majority who have no
opportunity of going to school or who drop out of the school system before they have had a
chance to master the magic second language. This is why education in the mother tongue cannot
be neglected--for the majority of the population, it will be the only passport to literacy (Bamgbose
1976: 12).

NFE classes are often held in the relevant village itself, and often the “facilitator” (as
opposed to teacher) is from the village. Participatory methods are emphasized, and often
these programs are associated with goals involving the empowerment of the target
population. NFE is thought to increase feelings of self-esteem and efﬁcacy among
participants and therefore inspire their active participation in civil and social life.
Moreover, the NFE experience encourages interaction and communication among the
participants, thereby generating social capital. There is some sparse support for these
notions. For example, a pilot study (n=333) of Pulaar speakers in northern Senegal
found that those who had had NFE were more likely to engage in behaviors related to
community participation and personal empowerment than those without NFE (Kuenzi
1997). Nonetheless, the effects of NFE have not been established.9

On the other hand, NFE may serve to accentuate the insularity of villages, failing
to encourage rural inhabitants to connect with national political institutions or political
representatives. Many of the village facilitators are poorly trained and equipped and
therefore tend to replicate the authoritarian teaching style of teachers in formal schools.
The level of reading and writing skills attained through these programs is usually quite
shallow. Thus, the NFE experience may fail to produce the feelings of efﬁcacy and self-
esteem as well as the civic skills thought to inspire communal and political participation.

In addition, many of those who complete an NFE program ﬁnd themselves in a

 

9 The attention that has been dedicated to NFE has focused on the degree to which NFE programs transmit
literacy and numeracy skills. Many in the development community consider NFE a failure in this regard.

14

nonliterate environment where their new found capacities are in no way reinforced.
Oxenham notes,
It seems to be the case also that many adults who complete literacy
courses do not make much use of their laboriously acquired skills either
because reading matter is not easily available or because the occasions for

writing are infrequent. Relapses into illiteracy are apparently not
uncommon. (1980, 43)

Between the dearth of reading materials in African languages and shallow literacy skills
produced by NFE, neophytes are not likely to have the vicarious experiences that broaden
their vision.

In addition, according to the socialization “postulate” of the political culture
perspective, those experiences one has a child serve as a ﬁlter for later experiences
(Eckstein 1988). Much of the socialization literature posits that there will be signiﬁcant
continuity in political behaviors and attitudes throughout an individual’s lifetime. Based
on socialization theory, we would therefore not expect NFE to have a signiﬁcant effect
on political behaviors and attitudes since the NFE experience takes place in adulthood.

Education, Civil Society, and Democracy

One important consideration is the link between education, civil society and
democracy. Increasingly, political scientists are giving serious attention to examining the
development and maintenance of the social capital within states and communities.
Indeed, a lively debate has emerged concerning the role that various factors play in what
Francis Fukuyama (1996) has referred to as “spontaneous sociability‘ ’ and Robert
Putnam has referred to as “social capital.” In his seminal work on governance in northern
and southern Italy, Putnam claims that social capital is “the key to making democracy

work” (1993,185). Putnam deﬁnes social capital as “...features of social organization,

15

such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efﬁciency of society by
facilitating coordinated actions...” (1993,167). Coleman observes that social capital
allows goals to be achieved that could not otherwise be achieved. Putnam notes that in
small, highly personalized communities, the threat of expulsion from the socio-economic
system is a powerful threat which induces economic cooperation among people
(1993,168). Social trust must exist in order for cooperation to occur. According to
Putnam, social trust is generated via norms of reciprocity and civic engagement. Social
capital is fostered primarily in civil society.10

In fact, participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other
educational effects. Brady et al. (1995) ﬁnd that education increases ones involvement in
voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one’s civic skills, which in turn
increases one’s level of political participation. In the long run, participation in the
community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic values.

However, Goody and Watt note that differentiating people on the basis of the
degree to which they have mastered reading and writing skills becomes an important
means of social stratiﬁcation with the introduction of literacy (1968, 58). Durkheim
claims that oral cultures manifest “mechanical solidarity” (cited in Goody 1968, 62), but
literacy tends to produce individualization. Oxenham (1980) and Ong (1991) have
claimed that simply being able to read and write renders one more self-conscious and
introspective. Coleman contends that the stability of a social structure is a critical variable
in the creation and destruction of social capital. In his words, “Disruptions of social

organization or of social relations can be highly destructive to social capital” (320). In

 

1° I will adopt Linz and Stepan’s deﬁnition of civil society as “...that arena of the polity where self-
organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to
create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (1996,17).

16

Streets scathing critique of the literacy imperative,11 he points out that those associated
with the literacy movement have created . .the construction of a ‘stigma’ where
[previously] many people operated in the oral domain without feeling that it was a
problem” (1995, 14). In the African context where competition for scarce resources is
ﬁerce and often zero-sum in nature, perhaps obtaining literacy skills through nonformal
education programs can be seen as one way in which people maximize their advantage
relative to others. Street claims that literacy (i.e., NFE) programs do not create jobs and
thus they may actually lead to a situation in which those who have gained literacy skills
through NFE simply “leap frog” over those who have not (1995, 18).

While scholars have emphasized the positive nature of civil society, some
students of Aﬁ'ica tend to be skeptical of the positive characteristics associated with civil
society. In the case of Aﬁica, Woods notes that ascriptive associations often compete
with civic organizations. Ethnic based associations, he contends, are likely to persist in
Aﬁica. While such organizations drive solidarity and collective action, in many cases,
they also enhance the threat of ethnic violence (1992, 94). In the words of Woods
(1992):

In many African countries, it is ascriptive, vertically organized associations which

have so far played an important role in shaping the character of civil society.

Social organizations in Africa are still conditioned by clientelistic interactions.

They are limited in geographic scope; therefore, these groups can best be

understood as subnational or local in nature (94).

F atton strongly cautions against seeing civil society in solely positive terms and

comments on its often regressive nature in Aﬁica. F atton’s concerns are relevant to the

case of Senegal. Based on her observations of rural Senegalese organizations, Patterson

 

” I deﬁne the literacy imperative as all of the discourse advocating the spread of literacy and eradication of
“illiteracy”, as articulated in all of its manifestations, from ofﬁcial development doctrine, to conversations
arrrong those in anyway involved with the literacy issue.

17

(1998) argues that participation in civil society does not engender democratic values
because “legitimate, inclusive and accountable” modes of decision-making are not
employed (423).

In the case of Africa, many scholars recognize the important role that civil society
has played in the process of democratic transitions and could play in the democratic
consolidation processes (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Bratton and
van de Walle 1997). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) note that organizational strength
and resource base are determining factors in the amount of inﬂuence an association will
have. If education boosts involvement in voluntary organizations as many claim, civil
society could be one of the vehicles through which education facilitates democratic
consolidation. On the other hand, if education serves to accentuate hierarchy and social
cleavage, it could lead to associations which fail to nurture the norms of reciprocity
Putnam deems so critical to a healthy democracy.

Institutional trust, or trust in the institutions of society, is considered critical for
the viability of a democratic government. At the same time, scholars have begun to point
out that a certain amount of skepticism can be healthy for democracy when that
skepticism is based in realism as opposed to cynicism (Holrrrberg 1999). In addition,
Putnam (2000) points out that trusting when there is not a good reason to trust is simply
gullibility. When considering the role NFE plays in developing civic orientations,

therefore, it is also important to examine how NFE affects institutional trust.

18

Problem Statement
I intend to explore the effects of education on communal and political behavior and
attitudes in the context of Senegal, West Africa. I will look at the impact of both formal
and nonformal education on the political attitudes and behaviors of interest.
The Setting
Senegal, West Africa is an ideal context in which to look at these issues. Through the
establishment of a network of patron-client relationships involving the ruling
party/government, marabouts12 and Senegalese citizens, the ﬁrst president of Senegal,
Senghor, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990) and establish a de facto one
party during the ﬁrst 15 years after Senegal’s independence. The economic distortions
emanating ﬁ'om these networks eventually led to enough peasant “malaise” to force the
government to engage in political liberalization (Boone 1990). Senghor began this
process in 1976, and true “multipartyism” was established byhis successor, Abdou
Diouf, in 1981 (Vengroff and Creevey 1997, 206-7).

Already being a “semi-democracy” (Coulon 1990), Senegal did not undergo a
democratic transition in the early 19905, but the government did undertake several
initiatives which appeared to enhance the possibilities for the establishment of a more
completely democratic regime than that which existed (Villalon 1994). However, both
the 1993 and 1998 elections were a great disappointment as no alternation of power took
place, and abuses were alleged.13 Ironically, Senegalese citizens appeared to have a great

deal of mistrust toward the entire political system (Villalon 1994; Kante 1994) at a time

 

‘2 That is, Islamic religious leaders.

'3 In fact, Vengroff and Creevey (1997) argue that the 1993 elections were perhaps some of the cleanest in
Africa, and my observations (as did those of other international observers) found the 1998 elections to be
relatively clean and transparent. However, perhaps the perceptions of opposition and general public are
key with regard to this issue.

19

when the dominant party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), was liberalizing itself out of political
power.

The outcome of Senegal’s 2000 presidential election stunned international and
national observers alike. In the second round of the Senegal’s presidential election, long-
standing opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade defeated the incumbent Abdou Diouf. The
victory of Abdoulaye Wade in the presidential election of 2000 was a watershed in
Senegal’s political history. After nearly 40 years of de facto one-party rule by the PS,
this event seemed to catapult Senegal from semi-democratic to democratic status.14
Given the ﬁ'agility of democratic advances in Aﬁica, distilling the factors that could
facilitate or impede democratic processes in Senegal is critical.

On a more micro political level, Schaffer (1998) observes that the Senegalese
(actually, the Wolof) notion of democracy (in Wolof, demokaraasi ) is associated with
the values of evenhandedness, mutuality or consensus. These three terms are related to
the idea of “interdependence and community-wide solidarity” and comprise a concept of
‘community caretaking.’ Because of this conception of democracy, Schaffer argues, the
goals associated with participating in the electoral process are often very different for
Wolof villagers than for Americans. Elections present an opportunity for demokaraasi
to be either strengthened, when villagers all vote together for the same candidate, or
undermined, when different political preferences among villagers result in social

splintering. In order to avoid the splintering scenario, some villagers simply opt not to

 

‘4 Following the 1993 elections, Villalén (1994) observed that Senegal had nearly all of the accoutrements
of a democracy except an alternation in power. Of course, as Villalon observes, power alternation is
considered a critical requisite for full democratic status.

20

vote. The syndrome of behaviors and attitudes Schaffer observes are associated with
nonliterate15 Wolof villagers.

Although many times those in the same family or village do vote for the same
candidate or party, the reasons that they do so are not necessarily those outlined by
Schaeffer, a subject to be discussed in Chapter 3. However, this study will allow us to
see if and how different types of education transform villagers’ sets of political behaviors
and attitudes.

In the past, ethnicity has never provided a point of political mobilization in
Senegal (Cruise O’Brien 1998; Villalon 1995).'6 The spread of the Wolof language and
identity has been able to proceed with little resistance. The emphasis on Wolof literacy,
however, may reverse this trend. According to Cruise O’Brien, the literacy movements
in African languages could inspire conﬂict along ethnic/linguistic lines. The literacy
movement among Pulaar speakers”, which really started in earnest in the 19805, has been
the most zealous of all of the literacy movements and has emerged largely as a response
to the threat of “Woloﬁsation”. The work of others and my own preliminaries studies
have revealed a tendency of those in any type of leadership positions in the Pulaar
literacy movement to link Pulaar literacy to the elevation of Pulaar-speaking people. In
the words of Cruise O’Brien (1998):

The emergence of the Halpulaaren movement in the 19805, defending the cause of
the Pulaar language, working to unite the ethnic Peul and Toucouleur behind the

 

'5 The word ‘illiterate’ is thought to be pejorative and thus I describe those who cannot read and write as
nonliterate.

'6 One ethnic group, the Diola, is, nonetheless, primarily responsible for the secessionist movement in the
south.

'7 Ofﬁcial sources report that Pulaar-speakers comprise 26 percent of the population, but I think this ﬁgure
is an underestimate. According to Dr. F agerberg-Diallo, across the Sahel, between 20 and 25 million
people speak the language Pulaar (or Fulf'ude — the misnomer is Fulani), and around one third of the
population of Senegal speaks Pulaar as a ﬁrst language (1993: 1).

21

Halpulaaren banner, on the other hand, is a possible indicator of a culturally
conﬂictual future. (39)

Moreover, Senegal had its ﬁrst brush with political ethnic mobilization in the
1998 legislative elections when the URD, a party splintered off from the PS, was able to
obtain the majority of Pulaaraphones’ votes based on the founder’s (Djibo Ka) Peul
ethnicity. Vengroff and Creevey (1997) note that the mores that used to determine how
members of Senegal’s different ethnic groups related to each other are in ﬂux. Hence,
the time is ripe to examine the relationship between nonformal literacy programs in
Aﬁican languages and ethnic awareness and pride.
The Formal Educational System of Senegal
The history of its educational system also renders Senegal a perfect case in which to
examine the aforementioned issues. According to the UNESCO Institute of Education,
"...‘education' as an institution is recognized by the state [of Senegal] as a resource which
must sustain all cultural advancement, technological progress, the raising of awareness
among the masses, and the construction of a more just social ediﬁce" (Badiane
1984:120). Unfortunately, the formal educational system has hardly served as such a
resource in Senegal. Indeed, although education is seen to be both a key to successful
development and an objective of development, the results of the formal educational
system have been disappointing. Having been under French inﬂuence for three centuries,
many of the institutions of the small, coastal West Aﬁican country resemble those of
France. Since education is one the principal ways through which culture is transmitted,
the French established an educational system in Senegal modeled after that in France.

Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resemble

the French school system. However, much of the Senegalese population is incapable of

22

using French as an effective means of communication. Dr. F agerberg-Diallo notes that
“. . .roughly 75% of the population in Senegal is not capable of using French as a
language through which they have access to information, whether it be written or oral”
(1993:4). D'Hondt, et al.'s 1980 study found that only 1.8% of the 896 secondary students
in his sample spoke French at home, including 2.6% in Dakar. Bourgi's study found that
only 1 to 5% of the Senegalese population spoke French "correctly" (studies quoted in
Vandeweille 1983:511).

Currently, six years of primary schooling is ofﬁcially compulsory for children of
seven to 13 years of age. In fact, according to Africa South of the Sahara, 58% of those in
this age group were enrolled in primary schools in 1992. The difference between primary
and secondary school attendance rates is instructive, however. Secondary school, which
students usually begin at age 13, is comprised of a four-year and three-year cycle. In
1992, only 16% of those in the eligible age group were enrolled in secondary school
(1997, 834). Unfortunately, students leaving primary school may not have even fully
developed and consolidated their literacy and numeracy skills. While the formal
education system has created a Senegalese elite, nearly 70% of the population of Senegal
does not possess basic literacy skills. Among women, 77% are not literate (Direction de
l’Alphabetisation et de l’Education de Base 1995).

Nonformal education programs have emerged to ﬁll the gaps left by the formal
education system. Most of these programs are administered by national or international
nongovermental organizations, although the Senegalese government has begun to become
active in the nonformal education sector. Many of those spear-heading the Pulaar literacy

movement are very committed Muslims and conservative on social issues. This

23

conservative outlook is somewhat in conﬂict with many of the ideas and models on
which nonformal education is based. Nonetheless, traditional messages are often passed
to students in nonformal education situations.18 Thus, it is critical to assess the effects of
NFE on political behavior and orientation.

Statement of Hypotheses
Based on the literature and the author’s own past exploratory research on NFE, it was
hypothesized that:

1) NFE has a positive effect on rural Senegalese citizens’ level of civic engagement.

a) On average, those who have participated in NFE will exhibit higher levels of community
participation and leadership than will those who have never participated in an NFE

program.

b) On average, those with NFE will be more engaged and interested in the political sphere
than will those without NFE.

c) On average, those with nonformal education will have higher levels of electoral
participation than will those without NFE.

2) On average, those with nonformal education will feel more politically efﬁcacious than
will those without nonformal education.

3) On average, those with NFE will express more progressive (i.e., less authoritarian and
traditional) attitudes than those without NFE.

4) On average, those with NFE will be more supportive of democratic values than will
those without NFE.

5) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit more institutional trust than will those
without NFE will.

6) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit less interpersonal trust than will those
without NFE.

 

'8 For example, I interviewed one young woman in northern Senegal who said that before learning to read
and write in Pulaar, she wore clothing that would be unacceptable in a traditional setting and went out
dancing with her friends. However, now that she has participated in the program, she wears traditional
clothing and does not engage in activities such as dancing. Hence, it seems that she was sort of re-
socialized into traditional Haalpulaar values via the Pulaar literacy-teacher training program

24

7) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit more individualism than will those
without NFE.

8) On average, those who have NFE will be more likely to express ethnic pride than will
those who have not had NFE.

In her review of the literature on education, Moulton (1997) observes that
numerous studies conducted across the globe have revealed a positive relationship
between education and self-esteem/autonomy. Many of these studies found that self-
esteem/autonomy mediated the effects of education on other behaviors and attitudes. I
see increased self/esteem autonomy as being one of the mechanisms through which NFE
affects the political orientations of interest. Several mechanisms and processes underlie
the relationship between NFE and the orientations of interest. First, NFE increases self-
esteem. Many times, people interact regularly with people outside of the household for
the ﬁrst time in the NFE classes. This social experience gives them a new sense of self.
In addition, they gain conﬁdence because of the new skills they acquire19 (see Chapter
7). Second, NFE has strong network effects. NFE participants not only get to know
those in the NFE classes, but also usually began to join other village associations. They
also tend to be recruited into other development projects by NGOs. Third, their new
reading and writing skills do allow NFE participants to obtain and exchange information
in a way that they could not do in the past. That is, the literacy skills obtained ﬁom the

classes matter as well.

 

'9 Sometimes this conﬁdence appears inﬂated. For exanrple, one woman who had completed an NFE
program told me that prior to the NFE program, she had no conﬁdence. However, now that she has
corrrpleted the program, she is educated and her opinion should hold as much weight as those with
university degrees.

25

I, therefore, expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between participation in a
nonformal education program and civic/community involvement. Nonformal education
increases people’s feelings of self-esteem and efﬁcacy, and therefore they are more likely
to take action with others to effect change on their environment than those with no
education. I do not expect to ﬁnd such a relationship between formal education and
community involvement, especially in rural settings. Those with high levels of formal
education tend to leave their natal villages or tend to feel a distance between themselves
and unschooled villagers. I expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between both types of
education and political participation. Given this more active and engaged stance, 1
would expect those with NFE to feel more politically efﬁcacious than those without NFE.

I expect the effects of both nonformal and formal education on tolerance and
support for democratic values to be somewhat contradictory. While most US. studies
support the notion that education promotes political tolerance and democratic political
values (e.g., see Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; Lawrence 1976), in their study
of political culture in Zambia, Bratton and Liatto-Katunda (1994) found that on average,
respondents with higher levels of education tended to be “less attached to political
equality” than their less well-educated counterparts. Bratton et al. (1999) had similar
ﬁndings in their study of Ghana.20 People may indeed become more tolerant of those
from the outside because of the vicarious experiences made possible through reading, as
Oxenham suggests (1980, 51). However, Street notes that in the current international
political and social climate, non-literate people are being denigrated partly as the result of

the extreme rhetoric employed in zealous literacy campaigns (1995). It seems that such

 

2° While this ﬁnding was based on only one iterrr, it does suggest a potentially fruitful line of inquiry.

26

rhetoric could only heighten the intolerance of those who have achieved some education
toward those who have not.

I expect levels of institutional trust to increase with nonformal education.
Nonformal education increases the amount of information available about institutions to
those who formally had very little access to that information. People tend to feel less
powerless before such institutions because of the increase in their knowledge and skill
levels. Moreover, nonformal education increases people’s contact with those from
outside one’s particular village or neighborhood. However, nonformal education may
decrease interpersonal trust due to the disruptions in social relations emanating from their
experience in the literacy program.

I expect there to be a negative relationship between formal education and ethnic
awareness and identity. On the other hand, based on my preliminary research, I would
expect there to be a positive relationship between nonformal education and ethnic
consciousness and pride since the programs are conducted in national languages and
attempt to valorize the culture of the participants.

The conceptualization of key concepts and their Operationalization are found in

Appendix D.

27

Chapter 2

THE POLITICS OF SENEGAL

Table 1: Chronology of Salient Events in the Political History of Senegal

1000
c.1100

Mid-1 5th Century
16th Century
1820

C. 18505

(Late) 19th Century
1885- 1960
l 886

C. 1886
1914

1962

1964 - 1975
1968

1974

1976

1980

1981

1982

1983 and 1988

1988

1991
1991

1991/2
1993
1993

1994

Area of Senegal focal point of political activity (Johnson 1971)
King of Tekrour (Fouta Tooro) and his entourage converted to
Islam by Muslims from Mauritinia (Johnson 1971)

Senegal comes into contact with Portuguese traders

French began to involve themselves in Senegal

Al Hajj Umar Tall (Haalpulaar leader) initiated into Tidiane
Brotherhood during pilgrimage to Mecca

Al Hajj Umar Tall leads “j ihads” against “pagans,” weak Muslims,
and the French (Johnson 1971)

Large-scale conversion to Islam among the Wolof (Johnson 1971)
Senegal is a French colony

Lat Dior, Wolof “warlord,” is killed in battle with the French -)
power vacurun (Cruise O’Brien 1975)

Cheikh Ibra Fall vows devotion to the great Muslim leader Amadu
Bamba -) birth of the Mouride Brotherhood

Blaise Diagne is the ﬁrst Black Aﬁican elected to the French
National Assembly

Mamadou Dia charged with coup attempt and imprisoned

Rise of the one-party state (Gellar 1995)

Student protests forceﬁrlly suppressed

Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS 9 “ﬁrst legal opposition” since 1966
Limited Multipartyism re-established

Leopold Senghor resigns from the presidency

Abdou Diouf sworn into ofﬁce

Start of the secessionist movement in the Casamance

Huge victories for Diouf and PS in presidential and legislative
elections

Mauritania crisis-) massacre of Mauritanians in Senegal in
response to massacre of Senegalese in Mauritania

Opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade enters Government

Senegal is the ﬁrst Black Aﬁican country to host Organization of
the Islamic Conference (Gellar 1995)

New electoral rules established

Diouf wins presidential election; margin of victory plummets
Assassination of Babacar Séye, Vice President of the
Constitutional Council

Five policemen killed during Moustarchidines’ demonstration

28

Table 1 (cont’d)

1998 PS wins majority in the legislative elections

2000 Opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade wins presidential election
2001 New constitution approved in referendum

2001 President Wade’s party, the PDS, sweeps legislative elections

Sources: Beck 2001; Behrman 1970; Gellar 1995; Johnson 1971; O’Brien 1975;
Schumaker 1975

Background

Those familiar with Senegalese social and political life would probably agree that
there is perhaps no better place to study the dynamics of political maneuvering and
interest-seeking behavior than Senegal. The small, coastal West Aﬁican country of
Senegal shares borders with Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east and Guinea-Bissau
and Guinea Conakry in the south. Senegal is one of the Sahelian countries. The
Gambia, a very small country that is a former British colony, separates northern and
southern Senegal. This division seems almost symbolic of and has probably contributed
to some of the social, cultural and political divisions between northern and southern
Senegal. In the north, Senegal is basically comprised of savannah lands, but, in the south,
one ﬁnds forests and lush vegetation (Johnson 1971). The desert is steadily taking over
the area in the north, however.

The hybrid nature of Senegal’s culture is emphasized by Gellar (1995):
“Senegal’s geography has brought its people into close contact with North Aﬁica and the
West and has made Senegal a crossroads where Black Aﬁican, Islamic, and European

civilizations have met, clashed, and blended” (p. 1). Although it is fair to call Senegal an

29

ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse country, four or ﬁve main ethnic

comprise around 86% of its population of about 10 million peopleZ':

Table 2: Ethnic Composition of the Population

 

 

 

 

 

Ethnicity Percent of
Population

Wolof 43%

Serer 15

Fulbe 14

Halpulaar 9

Diola 5

Other ethuiggroups 14

[Total 1 100% T

 

Source: Africa South of the Sahara 2001

Johnson (1971) observes that the Wolof, Halpulaar and Serer shared a great deal in terms
of culture and “have maintained close ties” (7). That largely those of the Diola ethnic
group comprise the movement for an independent Casamance is perhaps not so
surprising, given the way in which the Casamancais have been excluded by the networks
that connect the other ethnic groups (see Galvin 2001).

Senegal is a relatively poor country, although its GNP per capita, $520, is one of
the highest in West Africa (Hodgkinson 2001). Around 54% of the Senegalese
population lives in rural areas (Hodgkinson 2001), and agriculture accounts for about
19% of the GNP.22 Senegal ranks 145 out of 174 countries on the Human Development

Index (HDI), a composite measure that takes into account income, educational

 

2' Although the F ulbe and Halpulaar are often listed separately, they are related ethnic groups and the
members of both groups often claim they are one ethnic group. Halpulaar is the correct term for “Tukulor”
or “Toucouleur,” and it literally means “speaker of Pulaar.” Fulbe (the appellation for the “Fulani,” “Peul”
or “Peuhl”) also speak Pulaar. In this study, I refer to both the F ulbe and Halpulaar as “Pulaar speakers”
and include them in one group. At times I just say “Pulaars,” although Pulaar technically refers to the
language as opposed to the people.

22 “Senegal” The World F actbook 2002: http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html

30

attainments, and life expectancy. The HDI has a maximum value of one and a minimum
value of zero. Senegal’s actual HDI value is 0.423. Thus, although Senegal may be
better off than many of the other Sahelian countries, when viewed from a global
perspective, Senegal is far from being an afﬂuent country.

The vast majority of Senegal’s population (95%) is Muslim. Only 4% of the
population is Christian, and about 1% adheres to traditional religions.23 The majority of
Senegalese belong to one of two Muslim brotherhoods or Suﬁ orders: the Tijaniyya or the
Muridiyya.24 To some extent, these brotherhoods cross-cut ethnic cleavages, but not
completely. The relationship is somewhat similar to that which Cruise O’Brien (1975)
described several decades ago. Basically, nearly all Pulaar-speakers are Tidianes but not
all Tidianes are Pulaar-speakers. Indeed, the Serer and Wolof, as well as other groups,
are well-represented in the Tidiane brotherhood. On the other hand, although most
Mourides are Wolof, not all Wolof are Mourides. The Tijjans used to be more numerous
than the Mourides, but now they are nearly equal in number, which probably means that
people of other ethnic groups are joining the Muridiyya (Creevey 1985). Senegal has
been noted for its “shallow” (Creevey 1985) and unorthodox Islam. The brotherhoods
have played an important role in the political life of Senegal, and I will discuss them in
greater depth.

The Political Institutions of Senegal
The Republic of Senegal has a multiparty, democratic regime. Many of Senegal’s

political institutions resemble those of France. A new constitution was approved by an

 

23 “Background Notes: Republic of Senegal.” US. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/www/back2round notes/senegal_0298_bgn.html

2‘ The Layéne order and the Qadiriyya are also present in Senegal, but these orders have a relatively small
membership.

31

overwhelming majority of the vote on January 7, 2002.25 Like France, Senegal has a
semi-presidential system (although President Wade may call what exists now a “semi-
parliarnentary” system). In this system, the president is the chief of state and is
unquestionably the most powerful actor in the political system. The presidential term is
now ﬁve years, changed from seven years.26 The president has the power to dissolve the
National Assembly, but only after the members of the NA have served at least two years
of their term.27 The prime minister is the head of government and she “appoints the
council of ministers in consultation with the president.”28
Senegal once again has a unicarneral legislature. Deputies are elected to the
National Assembly for ﬁve-year terms. Fifty of the 120 seats are allocated via the

plurality formula in multimember districts ranging from one to ﬁve seats and seventy

seats are allocated via a proportional representation formula in a nationwide district.

Neopatrimonialism and the Nature of Senegalese Politics

Bratton and van de Walle’s description of neopatrimonialism across Aﬁican states
in the postcolonial period captures many of the features of Senegalese politics. Bratton
and van de Walle (1997) contend that neopatrimonialsm was the “institutional hallrnar ”
of the pre-transition political regimes in sub-Saharan Aﬁican (61). They deﬁne
neopatrimonial regimes as “those hybrid political systems in which the customs and

patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (1997 ,

 

25 For a treatment of all of the changes in electoral rules throughout Senegal’s postcolonial history, see
Mozzafar and Vengroff 2002.

26 Until 2000, when the presidential term was changed to ﬁve years in a referendum, the presidential term
in France was seven years. In Senegal, Wade campaigned to change the presidential term from seven years
to ﬁve years, but claims the change, which was approved in the 2001 referendunr, only applies to those
elected in elections subsequent to the election of 2000.

27 “Senegal: Institutional Situation,” http://www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr/etat/_anglais/chronologie/senegal.html
28 “Senegal” The World Factbook 2002: http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html

32

62). According to Bratton and van Walle (1997), three institutions support these

9’ 6‘

neopatrimonial regimes: “presidentialism, clientelism” and “state resources.” In these
regimes, the right to rule is attributed to a person, not an ofﬁce, notwithstanding the
existence of a constitution. The political system is dominated by one ﬁgure who is
“above the law.” The government, including the administration, is permeated by
“relationships of dependence and loyalty” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 62).
Bureaucratic positions are occupied not with a view of performing public service but with
a view of self-enrichment. The president and his most intimate entourage use state
resources for “systematic patronage and clientelistic practices in order to maintain
political order” (62). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) observe that “personal
relationships constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in
Africa” (p. 62).

Neopatrimonialism is very much at the core of Senegalese politics.
Neopatrimonialism in Senegal has its roots in both traditional Senegalese culture and the
colonial experience. Although I agree with Bratton and van de Walle (1997) that the
“nature of political authority” and political institutions in Aﬁica are different from those
found in most other areas of the world (p.61), I think it is important to emphasize that the
political scene of Senegal is very comprehensible once one takes into account these
institutions.

Senegalese Politics in Historical Perspective
Early History
Based on the written accounts of Arab and European travelers, Johnson contends

that the area that now constitutes modern day Senegal was a focal point of “organized

33

political activity since AD. 1000” (1971, 7). Therefore, although Johnson
acknowledges that a direct connection cannot be made between traditional politics and
the politics of more recent times (speciﬁcally, that of the communes), he does note that
the “. . .the concept of the political process as one of a struggle for power was familiar to
every Aﬁican” (1971 , 7). Most of the cultures in Senegal were characterized by rigid
social stratiﬁcation. People were divided into three basic categories: “freemen, servile
artisan castes, and slaves” (Gellar 1995, 3). According to the estimates of some
researchers, perhaps nearly one half or two thirds of the societies were slaves. The Diola
and other groups occupying the Casamance region tended to be more egalitarian than the
Wolof and Halpulaar, for example (Gellar 1995, 3-4).

Having converted to Islam around the eleventh century, the Halpulaar were the
ﬁrst of Senegal’s principal ethnic groups to convert to Islam. This early conversion
contrasts quite strikingly with the more recent conversion to Islam by most of the Wolof
in the late nineteenth century. One of the most prominent Halpulaar “Muslim clerical
warriors,” A1 Haj Umar Tall, was responsible for establishing the Tidiane brotherhood in
Senegal, after he himself was initiated into the Tidiane brotherhood when he made a
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1820 (Gellar 1995, 5-6; Johnson 1971). In contrast, the Mouride
brotherhood is an “indigenous institution,” having emerged around the personality of

Amadou Bamba at the time of colonial conquest.
Rise of the Marabouts

The signiﬁcant political role played by the marabouts has perhaps been one of

Senegal’s most noted characteristics. The power of the marabouts has its origin in the

34

period of the French conquest of Senegal. Senegal was in contact with France for over
three centuries and was a formal colony of France between 1885 and 1945. Subsequent
to World War 11, De Gaulle recognized a need to change the nature of rule in the
colonies, but Senegal did not achieve full independence from France until 1960 (Gellar
1995)
When those of the warrior class were defeated in battle with the French in the late
19th century, a “power vacuum” arose (Cruise O’Brien 1975). The Senegalese turned
toward the emerging marabouts to offer some type of leadership and point of cultural
reference in the face of the social disruption created by the French conquest. Berhman
(1970) notes that this was a phenomenon that cut across all social castes. The case of
Amadu Bamba as described by Cruise O’Brien (1975) is illustrative. After the great
Wolof “warlord”, Lat Dior, was killed in a battle against the French in 1886, many of his
Wolof followers turned to the “saint,” Amadu Bamba to provide them with leadership
(Cruise O’Brien 1975). Although the French initially viewed Amadu Bamba and his
religious movement as a potential menace to colonial authority, Robinson (1999) argues
that:
...the pattern of relationship [between Amadu Bamba and the Mourides
and the French colonial authorities] — a simultaneous combination of close
surveillance by the French, constant communication between the two
sides, and the collaboration in the economic development of the peanut
basin — was established by the early twentieth century and remained
consistent for the rest of Bamba’s life. (193)

Robinson (1999) goes on to argue and offer evidence that this pattern was applicable to

the relationship between the French and other marabouts and their followers. Indeed, as

Cruise O’Brien (1975), Berhman (1970) and other scholars point out, the marabouts were

instrumental in operationallzing the French’s desire to transform the Senegalese economy

35

from a subsistence economy to a cash crop economy monoculturally based on the
cultivation of peanuts. The followers of Amadu Bamba worked his ﬁelds with the
promise that they would receive their own parcel of land after ten years of labor (Cruise
O’Brien 1975). When the expansion of the activities of the marabouts and their disciples
brought them into conﬂict with the Fulbe pastoralists, the French “turned a blind eye” to
the Mourides’ actions taken to expunge the Fulbe from the land. Marabouts were granted
vast tracks of land to be exploited by their followers, on occasion (Cruise O’Brien
1975).29 Indeed, the marabouts and their families prospered under colonial rule

(Schumacher 1975).

Electoral Politics in the Pre-Independence Period

Senegal’s experience with electoral politics under colonialism had a decisive
impact on the politics of the postcolonial period (Schumacher 1975; Cruise O’Brien
1975). Senegal had a certain type of importance as far as the French West African
colonies went, and it contained the capitol of French West Aﬁica (AOF). With regard to
colonial administration, the ofﬁcial policy of the French was “assimilation” while the
policy of the British was “indirect rule.” Many claim that although the French did not
actually implement their policy of “assirrrilation,” to the extent that that they did, it was in
the four communes of Senegal. All of the inhabitants of the communes of Dakar, Goree,
Saint Louis, and Ruﬁsique were considered French “citizens,” while those outside of the
communes were considered “subjects.” Senegal had a territorial assembly and

representation in the Chamber of Deputies in France, and those within the communes had

 

29 Ironically, within the last decade, President Diouf granted one of the last remaining forest areas to a
marabout for exploitation. This land was being used by the Fulbe in their pastoral activities at the time.

36

a right to vote in the relevant elections (Gellar 1995; Schumacher 1975; Cruise O’Brien
1975)

Although it took some time before the Senegalese in the communes mastered the
foreign political apparatus, in 1914, Blaise Diagne surprised many by becoming the ﬁrst
Black Aﬁican elected to the French national Assembly (Gellar 1995; Johnson 1971).
Many of the political phenomena observed in recent years were already manifest during
this early electoral period. “Negative campaigning” had its roots in the pre-independence
elections (Cruise O’Brien 1975, 69). Cruise O’Brien observes that “. . .a survey of the
Senegalese political press for the period 1914-40 reveals a remarkably low salience of
broad policy issues” (1975, 170).

When the franchise was extended to the rural areas after WWH, the nature of
politics was somewhat transformed. Gellar (1995) notes the difference in the political
leaders who arose in rural and urban areas: “In the communes, the prototype of the
political leader was the urbane, Western-educated Senegalese intellectual; in the
countryside, it was the marabout” (9). In the communes, politicians had to fulﬁll certain
French cultural, educational and language requisites (Gellar 1995), while such was not
the case in rural areas.

Although Larnine Gueye’s party had constructed a dense network of clan of ties,
it lost its dominant positions to a splinter party. In 1948, Leopold Senghor and
Mamadou Dia left the “Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party, the SF 10,
headed by Lamine Gueye” and created the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS)
(Schumacher 1975, 6). “. . .ethnic arithmetic and geographic and factional critieria of

representation” informed the construction of the BDS party lists and party positions, and

37

by 1951, the BDS leadership had “managed to forge a heterogeneouos, territorywide
pyramid of such clan alliances...” (Schumacher 1975, 11). According to Schumacher,
the “foundations” for the former ruling party had been put in place by the mid 19505
(1975, 16). In 1958, Gueye and Senghor reconciled, and the merger party was renamed
the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS) (Schumacher 1975). In addition, elections
during the colonial period were characterized by irregularities and electoral tricks
(Schumacher 1975) like those that became so renown in the postcolonial era.

Politics in the Post-Independence Period

Political life in the post-independence period exhibits much continuity with that
of the preceding period. By about 1951, Léopold Senghor was the central ﬁgure in
Senegalese political life (Cruise O’Brien 1975) and he remained so until he resigned as
president in 1980, to be replaced by his dauphin, Abdou Diouf in 1981. Through the
establishment and maintenance of a network of patron-client relationships involving the
ruling party/ government, marabouts, party barons, and Senegalese citizens, Senghor, the
ﬁrst president of Senegal, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990; Schumaker
1975).

The marabouts were (and, to a lesser degree, still are) a critical part of the party
machine and made signiﬁcant contributions to the stability of political life both in the
colonial and postcolonial state. Many observers have been highly critical of the
“maraboutic system” because of its seeming blatant exploitation of the peasantry. Cruise
O’Brien (1975), however, very aptly describes the rational nature of the master-disciple
between marabouts and their followers (talibés). When it comes to candidate choice for

an election, the more votes a marabout delivers, the greater his power. The greater the

38

power of the marabout, the more effectively he can make demands on the state.
Normally, the demands he makes on the state will involve policy outcomes or beneﬁts for
his respective locality. Thus, voters render marabouts powerful advocates on their
behalf. Cruise O’Brien notes, “The hostility of the rural people to the state and its urban
controllers is thus tempered by the hope that they may be the lucky ones if their local
patron plays his cards right” (1975, 177). If a patron is unsuccessful in obtaining beneﬁts
and outcomes for his following on too many occasions, his followers will look for
someone else to whom they can attach themselves (Cruise O’Brien 1975). Thus, as
Tiebout would say, they can “vote with their feet.”

From the period spanning from 1964 to 1975, Senegal became essentially a one-
party state (Gellar 1995, 22). Indeed, the Union Progressiste Sénégal (UPS) absorbed
many of the opposition parties (Cruise O’Brien 1975). There was, however, intra-party
competition among the tendances.

In 1976, Senghor re-established limited multiparty politics: the constitution was
amended to establish a three-party system. Essentially, one party was to be to the left of
the ruling party and one party was to be to the right. The UPS changed its name to the
Parti Socialist (PS) at this time, and Abdoulaye Wade’s Partz' Démocratique Sénégalais
(PDS) was selected be the “liberal” party, while a nominally Marxist-Leninist party (PAI)
was chosen to be the party on the left (Gellar 1995). Since 1976, when multiparty
politics, albeit limited, was re-established, Senegal has been slowly liberalizing and
democratizing.

President Senghor was the ﬁrst Aﬁican leader to give up power of his own accord

(Gellar 1995). He did this in 1980 when he resigned from the presidency. His dauphin,

39

Abdou Diouf, replaced him as president. The 1983 and 1988 presidential and legislative
elections produced big victories for both Diouf and the PS. The 1988 elections elicited
accusations of fraud and irregularities, as well as protest. Throughout the 19805, Diouf
refused to implement electoral reform. In the 19905, Diouf skillfully deﬂated the
opposition by inviting opposition members to join the government (and several, including
Wade, did so) and agreeing to electoral reform (Gellar 1995). The coalition government
constructed and implemented several important reforms. The new electoral code
provided for the secret ballot, right of each political party to be represented at voting
centers, presence of international election observers, and equal access to state-controlled
media among political parties (Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

Diouf and the PS were successful in the 1993 presidential and legislative
elections, but Diouf’s margin of victory fell. The opposition made vociferous accusations
of electoral fraud and abuse against the PS, and these elections seem to be what sparked
some of the more violent events in Senegal’s political history. The opposition also cried
foul in the 1998 legislative elections although, by my own observations, they seemed
relatively free and fair.

From “Semi-Democracy” to Democracy? The Implications of the Senegalese
Presidential Election of 2000

The alternation in executive power that was produced by Senegal’s 2000
presidential election was a watershed event in Senegal’s political history. In the second
round of the presidential election, long-standing opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade,
defeated the incumbent Abdou Diouf. At the time of his defeat, Abdou Diouf had been

president for 19 years, and his party, the Socialist Party (PS), had been in power for 40.

40

Prior to the 2000 election, there was a notable bifurcation in the electoral
predictions of Senegalese and international observers. While those in the international
community almost unanimously opined that Diouf would win the election, Senegalese
were much more likely to predict a victory for the opposition. From a distance, the level
of “malaise” in Senegal did not seem much greater than it had been before past elections.
Moreover, opposition parties did not seem to have improved their level of penetration
into the various regions by any signiﬁcant measure. Thus, while Dakar and some of the
urban areas might fall to the opposition, those in the countryside, it seemed, would still
vote for the PS. Although many Senegalese correctly diagnosed the PS’s enfeebled grip
on power, envisioning the collapse of the great party machine was difﬁcult, nonetheless.
Through a combination of fraud and machine politics, many believed that the PS would
secure yet another electoral victory in the presidential competition of 2000. What
accounts for the unexpected outcome? 1
The Election. Several factors explain Wade’s victory in the recent election. One
important contributing factor to the electoral outcome was the high level of cooperation
among the opposition parties. The winning coalition was a motley group comprised of
parties representing socialist, Marxist, and liberal orientations. There may have been
little convergence on matters of policy among members of the coalition, but they did
agree on the imperative to remove the obstruction to democracy, incamated in former
President Abdou Diouf. Although eight candidates ran for the presidency, the degree of
cooperation manifested by members of the opposition in this election was higher than in

any other since the commencement of full multipartyism in 1981.

41

The Coalition Alternance 2000 (CA), which was comprised of eight parties, was
formed before the ﬁrst round of the presidential election. The leaders of the opposition
parties in the coalition decided that the only criterion for deciding who the coalition
candidate for the presidential election should be was vote share in the past elections. The
selection of the candidate was then a straightforward process as the vote share of
Abdoulaye Wade, who had already contested four presidential elections, was
substantially higher than those of any of the other potential candidates. A second
coalition (FAL) of 21 parties formed before the second round of the election and included
the parties of ﬁve of the six presidential contenders who were eliminated after the ﬁrst
round. Obtaining the support of the other ﬁrst-round opposition candidates was crucial
to Wade’s victory in the second round.

For years, one of the greatest challenges for Wade and his supporters was to
translate Wade’s popularity in the streets into an electoral victory. The CA’s campaign
strategy, called the Marche Bleu, was enormously successful in creating a great deal of
enthusiasm and momentum around Wade’s candidature. In the Marche Bleu, Wade,
some of the other CA political leaders and their entourage, traveled across the country,
stopping to make campaign speeches and hold short campaign rallies in countless
neighborhoods and communities. Music animated these dynamic rallies, and people were
exhorted to obtain their voting cards and vote. In addition, these energetic meetings left
people with the impression that Wade could actually win the election.

Many have pointed to the change in the voting age from 21 to 18 as an important

factor in Wade’s victory as the overwhelming preference among youth was for an

42

alternation in power. Although the voting age was lowered in 1992, the mobilization of
young voters appeared to reach an all-time high in the most recent election.

The electoral reforms initiated in 1991 and 1992 under the coalition government,
which included several members of the opposition, contributed signiﬁcantly to the ability
of the PAL candidate to achieve electoral victory. The interaction of the blossoming
private press and explosions in communication and information technology (e.g., the
spread of cellular phones, telephone and fax centers, and intemet access) contributed to
the transparence and fairness of the election and, thus, to Wade’s victory.

Perhaps the question can be reformulated to ask why Diouf lost. One of the
proximate and most obvious causes of Diouf’s defeat was the defection of two highly
ranked members of the PS and government. Diouf’s former minister of interior, Djibo
Ka, left the PS in 1997, taking several other high-ranking members of the PS with him,
and set up a rival party. Diouf’s former minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse,
largely repeated this sequence of action in 1999. Diouf’s campaign director observed
three parties were sharing the same electorate in the ﬁrst round of the election: Djibo
Ka’s Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique (URD) and Moustapha Niasse’s L ’Alliance
des Forces de Progre‘s (AF P) both drew ﬁom the same group of voters as the PS. The
underlying causes of the defections were the noxious factionalism and clan politics that
plagued the PS.

Furthermore, as numerous commentators have noted, Diouf’s campaign strategies
were wrong-headed, given the political climate of the country. Not only did the glossy

billboards and large-scale political meetings that comprised Diouf’s campaign fail to

43

generate enthusiasm and support among the public, but they seemed to indicate just how
out-of-touch Diouf was with the majority of the population.

Yet all of these reasons are ancillary to one: the economic stagnation and crisis
brought about by distorted economic policy, corruption and structural adjustment. The
economic crisis that really seized Senegal in the 19805 depleted the government of the
resources needed to fulﬁll the demands of the numerous state clients (Boone 1991).
Moreover, the economic crisis resulted in a deterioration of the living standards of the
Senegalese people and intensiﬁed their dissatisfaction with the government

Despite the support of the leaders of some of the leftist parties, Wade’s vote share
changed very little between the election of 1993 and the ﬁrst round of the presidential
election of 2000. In 1993, Wade received 32% of the vote, while in 2000 he received
31.01, for a difference of 0.99%. What did change in the last elections was Diouf’s level
of support, which fell by 17.1% between the last two presidential elections. In 1993,
Diouf received 58.4% of the vote while in the ﬁrst round of the last election he received
only 41.3% of the vote. A comparison between the ﬁrst and second rounds of the
presidential election is instructive. Wade obtained 31.01% of the vote, Diouf received
41.3%, while Ka and Niasse received 7.08% and 16.77%, respectively. However, while
Diouf’s score increased by only .21% between the ﬁrst and second rounds of the election,
Wade’s increased by 27.48 percentage points, implying that Wade received nearly all of
the 27.69% of the vote that went to the other ﬁrst-round opposition candidates.

These electoral scores reﬂect the strong desire the people of Senegal had simply
to have change. Despite his expressed anti-corruption stance, Diouf came to symbolize a

political system driven by graft, corruption, inefﬁciency and incompetence. At a certain

44

point, popular opinion converged with the conviction among opposition leaders that in
order for Senegal to move forward on many fronts, the de facto one-party rule by the PS
had to come to an end. The high levels of voter turnout and engagement in the electoral
processes of the day reﬂected this desire for change. At 62.23%, the voter turnout rate of
the presidential election of 2000 constitutes a break in what seemed to some like a
downward trend in voting turnout rates (e.g., Gellar 1997). The voter turnout rates in the
presidential elections of 1983, 1988 and 1993 were 56.2%, 58.8% and 51.5%,
respectively, while only 44% of the registered voters voted in the 1996 local elections
and 39.28% of registered voters voted in the 1998 legislative. The high level of voter
participation in the election of 2000 also indicated that people did have some conﬁdence

that change could occur via the ballot box.

Implications for Senegal’s Democratic Future

Senegal has been able to boost of several characteristics thought favorable to
democracy, and some of the events associated with the last election would seem to give
rise to more optimism. The magnanimous behavior of both Wade and Diouf just after the
elections reﬂects a general ethic of comity among Senegalese political elites and bodes
well for Senegal’s democratic future. Diouf made the ﬁrst courteous move when he
called Wade to congratulate him on his victory before the election results were even in.
Some have speculated that Diouf’s call was intentionally made in order to forestall
attempts by other PS members to deprive the opposition of its victory by means of a coup
or other extra-electoral measures. Whatever the case, this action seemed to prompt a

virtuous circle of noble acts and gestures on the part of the election winner and loser.

45

Wade paid a brief visit to Diouf‘s mother, who received her son’s replacement with the
utmost of graciousness. Diouf demonstrated complete willingness to facilitate Wade’s
task of taking over as head of state. Wade asked Diouf to represent Senegal at the ﬁrst
European-Aﬁican Summit in Cairo at the beginning of April. Finally, Wade granted
Diouf and his entire family clemency for any wrongdoings committed during Diouf’s
tenure in ofﬁce.

More and more, primary identities seem irrelevant to political action and
organization in Senegal. In a continent rived by ethnic strife, as many have observed,
Senegal has seen little mobilization along ethnic lines. While Djibo Ka’s entrance onto
the political scene in 1997 may have initially given rise to what appeared to be some
ethnic voting, this tendency toward ethnic identiﬁcation was not robust. Indeed, in the
ﬁrst round of the presidential elections, Djibo Ka, who is of Fulbe origin, failed to win
majorities in numerous departments inhabited mainly by Pulaar-speaking peoples.

The ethnic and regional arithmetic applied to choosing ministers appears to have
remained constant across the Diouf and Wade governments. While the language may
seem a bit disconcerting, the attention paid to representing different groups in the
government may well be one of the reasons Senegal has been free from spontaneous and
continuous ethnic strife. (Although Beck’s (1996) more pessimistic twist might be the
most appropriate interpretation: patronage is more important than ethnicity in Senegal.)

The declining importance of religion in the electoral process is also notable. One
obvious indicator of this decline is the reluctance marabouts now exhibit in assigning
ndigels or commands on how their followers should vote. This hesitancy was obvious in

the 1988 elections, and then again in the elections of 1993. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly,

46

the marabouts’ respective disciples generally did not follow the commands that were
given. In the most recent election, Serigrre Modou Kara lived to regret both his command
to vote for Diouf and his prophecy of Diouf’s victory, and Cheikh Tidiane Sy would have
done better to remain silent on issue of the candidate to be chosen, as well. In addition,
in presidential elections of 2000, those candidates with explicitly religious orientations
and agendas captured only a miniscule proportion of the vote: the two candidates who
presented religious platforms received a combined total of a mere 2.08% of the vote.

However, one should not be overly sanguine on this point. That religious political
parties are not receiving very much support is probably unequivocally positive when
viewed in terms of democracy in Senegal. The situation with the marabouts is slightly
more ambiguous. Although it seems that individuals should make their own political
decisions based on their preferences and interests, Villalon (1995) argues that the Suﬁ
brotherhoods have fostered stability and democracy in Senegal by serving as a
counterweight to the state (what Foley and Edwards 1996 call the Civil Society II
argument). Cruise O’Brien (1975) also demonstrates how, in the past, following the
political cues of the marabouts was rational. Perhaps now what we see is that marabouts
are not giving commands that are consistent with the interests of their followers and,
therefore, the followers are not following the commands. This development also seems
positive for democracy.

Creevey (1985), however, points out some of the changes that differentiate the
pre- and post-1980 period in terms of religious life. The “informed” Muslim elite is
growing in Senegal. Different Arab countries are ﬁnancing construction of mosques in

Senegal, religious education, and students’ education. Religious families in Senegal have

47

sent sons to be educated in North Africa and the Middle East who “come home vocally
aware of the laxity of some Senegalese practices” (717). Creevey (1985) points to the
start of a “Khoumeni-type purist” movement that is very critical of the marabouts and
unorthodox religious practices. Villalon (1999) also notes the challenges that are being
made to “the maraboutic model” by an inchoate reformist movement. This reformist
movement is reﬂected in the striking increase in the number of female university students
who are now taking the veil. In 1990, only a negligible number of students were wearing
the veil, but in 1999, perhaps up to 10% of female students were doing so (Villalon
1999). In short, although the effects of “the maraboutic model” on development and
democracy are equivocal, the maraboutic model might be preferable to other potential
social and religious arrangements.

Many have claimed that most Senegalese people have a plethora of social
relationships that tie them to others and are therefore not predisposed to act violently.
Although Senegal has seen relatively little political violence in comparison to other sub-
Saharan Aﬁican countries, several events over the past ﬁfteen years call that contention
into question (Vengroff and Creevey 1997). While the alternation of power in Senegal
was essentially bloodless, the rhetoric before the election certainly did not always reﬂect
a conviction that elections should be the unique method of determining who governs.

Hence, part of Senegal’s democratic achievement must be attributed to serendipity.

Challenges for Democracy: Particularisnr, Neopatrimonialism and Political Parties

Senegal’s political scene is not without forces that tend to impede the

establishment of a fully democratic system of governance. Patrimonialism has proven to

48

be a resilient organizational form in Senegal as it has managed to “reinvent” itself across
different historical periods and circumstances. In Senegal, the notion of transaction is
embedded into each political action and affair. Although the ethnic and regional
arithmetic applied to political representation serves a desirable end, perhaps what is
disconcerting is the language of reward woven into discussions of regional/ethnic
representation. People speak of areas receiving only so many ministers although Wade
received a high proportion of the vote in that particular location. Indeed, members of
groups that “delivered” a large number of votes to Wade feel that they deserve some type
of recompense. Although the idea of exchange in politics is ubiquitous, the particularism,
extreme self-interest and short time horizons surrounding people’s expectations and
demands are striking in the Senegalese context. Personal relationships of all kinds are
pursued with the hopes that they will offer some type of material pay-off.3O The
expansion and intensiﬁcation of poverty due to the economic crisis has also served to
inspire and reinforce the desire for immediate gratiﬁcation among many Senegalese
citizens. This individualistic and myopically instrumental behavior seems at odds with
the solidarity and collective orientation so prevalent in Senegalese culture.

Although, in the past, Senegalese may have been indeed very instrumental in their
political behavior, such instrumentalism was not nearly as short-term in nature as it is
today. Clients developed relationships with potential patrons with the hopes of obtaining
payoffs in the long-term. Thus, even in fundamentally unequal, hierarchical

relationships, long-term reciprocity was the rule. The tendency to defer gratiﬁcation

 

3° On a more micro level, one incident I heard recounted in Dakar exempliﬁes this point very well. One
American man apparently asked a Senegalese woman with whom he worked out on a date to have dinner
and go to a movie. She replied that she could not go that evening but asked if he would give her the money
he would have spent on her dinner and admission to see the movie.

49

generated some stability in the relationships and, therefore, voting behavior among
people, especially in regions like the Fouta Tom in northern Senegal. Those in the new
generation appear to have much more of a short-term orientation than those of the
preceding generations.

The clash between individual interests and aspirations and party interests and
aspirations has also been nearly ubiquitous across time and space. However, with the
onslaught of this short-term orientation, the viability and meaningﬁrlness of political
parties in Senegal must be questioned. Defection from one party to another by party
leaders as well as rank and ﬁle party members has become commonplace. These
defections almost never seem motivated by issues of ideology or policy, but rather by
individual interest-maximizing calculations. Moreover, because most party attachments
are based on personal relationships, as soon as a leader leaves a party, s/he takes her/his
base with her/him. As noted earlier, the defections of Niasse and Ka and the subsequent
loss of support of their followers largely induced Diouf’s defeat. The PS has experienced
innumerable defections at all levels of the party since the defeat of Abdou Diouf.

Although the profundity of party attachments in Senegal has perhaps never been
great, in the past, the vote shares captured by various parties remained fairly stable from
one election to the other. However, as the political system has become more and more
competitive, political behavior and attachments have become less stable. Pedersen’s
index of electoral volatility measures the net change in each party’s seat or vote share
from election to election."1 In this article, I look at vote share. The level of presidential

electoral volatility between the 1983 and 1988 elections was 12.35%, while it climbed

 

3' Pedersen’s index is calculated by surmning the net changes in the percentage of seats (or votes) won or
lost by all of the parties from election to election and dividing by two (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 6).

50

slowly to 14.35% for the next electoral period (i.e., between the 1988 and 1993
presidential elections). Presidential volatility then increased sharply to 25.65% in the last
electoral period, that is between the 1993 and 2000 elections.

Legislative volatility is generally higher than presidential volatility, although not
by a great deal. Legislative volatility for the ﬁrst electoral period is 13.01%, 16.45% for
the second, and 20.92% for the third (i.e., the volatility between the 1993 and 1998
elections). The average difference between political parties’ legislative and presidential
vote shares for the 1983, 1988, and 1993 elections is only 12.8%. However, the
presidential/legislative difference in vote shares for the last electoral period (i.e.,
1998/2000) is 30.28%! Clearly, in the past, party attachments did not manifest huge
ﬂuctuations from election to election. However, party identiﬁcation is now in ﬂux
among party militants as well as the general public.

At the same time, the practice of power sharing has helped stimulate the
proliferation of political parties. Political nobodies often establish a political party in the
hope of becoming a representative or minister in the government. As opposed to
generating cohesion, power-sharing, as practiced in Senegal, has given rise to party
fragmentation and proliferation. Of course, the electoral system is also responsible for
the high level of fragmentation and proliferation among parties.

The phenomenon of personal rather than party attachments has also contributed to
party fractionalization and splintering. Party politics in Senegal seem relatively
unaffected by considerations of ideology and political conviction. Not surprisingly, rank
and ﬁle members of parties do not seem to have much of a comprehension of the

platforms and policy orientations of the parties for which they militate. The perception a

51

person has of the head of the party largely determines his/her affectation toward the
particular party. Furthermore, the prevalence of personal attachments within parties has
given rise to factions and clan politics. During the PS’s long tenure in power, receiving
political rewards and payoffs was often not only dependent on whether one supported the
PS, but also whether one had supported the correct tendance or party leader (Beck 1997).
The issues of “tendance” not only continue to plague the PS, but have also been reborn in
the AF P.

Although the instrumentalism and extreme particularism that seem to characterize
people’s political orientations may pose problems for the consolidation of democracy on
the one hand, on the other hand, these forces seem to help suppress mobilization along
more emotionally laden identities, such as ethnicity. Thus, there may be some type of a
trade-off between this individualized instrumentalism and the importance with which
ethnic and religious identities are imbued. According to Cruise O’Brien (1975),
Senegal’s communal harmony emanates from the existence of cross-cutting cleavages
and “the framework of clan competition,” and Schumacher (1975) largely echoes this
point. In short, as others have noted (e. g., Cruise O’Brien 1975), the challenges and
obstacles to the development of an orderly and viable nation-state Senegal has confronted
have been considerable. During the 19905, the world has seen several sub-Saharan
Aﬁican states descend into anarchy and horriﬁc violence. That Senegal has emerged into
the twenty-ﬁrst century as nearly a full democracy with only one baleﬁrl communal

conﬂict in the south is, indeed, no mean achievement.

52

Prospects for the Future: Consolidation or Politics as Usual

To be sure, the outcome of the election injected new vitality and energy into a
lethargic political system and public. The rise in energy and excitement is perceptible to
all of those able to witness the pre- and post-election periods in Senegal. In fact, in
comparison to the US context, the level of political engagement among Senegalese
during the campaign season was incredibly high. On the days of the ﬁrst and second
election rounds, ﬁnding someone without a portable radio glued to one ear was difﬁcult
in any urban area. People clearly believed that who occupied the position of president
would make a difference in their lives. The Wade Government has appeared energetic
and communicative, and the public seems appreciative of this government’s break with
the past.

Still, those more skeptical about the new government are quick to point out that
alternation does not necessarily mean change. To put it somewhat banally, governing is
no easy task, and the Wade government has already begun to ﬁnd that fulﬁlling all of the
pre-election promises is not easy. The press has, not surprisingly, been able to identify
campaign prorrrises that have an extremely low probability of being kept. For example,
one pledge of the CA was the establishment of a parliamentary form of government. Yet,
Wade quickly declared his intention to propose a semi-parliamentary form of
government. Reducing the presidential term from seven years to ﬁve years was also a
tenet of the CA. President Wade pursued this change but he also has expressed his
intention to rest the full seven years of his term in ofﬁce. One of the basic parts of the

program for the Coalition pour l’Alternance (CA) was the dissolution of the senate. Only

53

after a great deal of equivocating did this change become incorporated in the new
constitution.

The Wade government has been forthcoming on its promises to hold new
elections. Three elections have already been held under the Wade Government: 1) the
referendum on the elections in January 2001, 2) the legislative elections in April 2001,
and 3) the municipal and local elections in 2001. Although the elections seemed to have
been relatively free and fair, the outcomes lead one to question the extent to which
Senegal is progressing toward consolidation. The alternation in power that was achieved
in 2000 in many ways seemed like the ﬁnal event needed for Senegal to be considered a
democracy. However, the PDS swept the legislative elections winning nearly 75% of the
seats. These results lead one to ask: Could Senegal be considered what van de Walle
(2002) calls a “dominant executive” regime? In this type of regime, an alternation in
executive power has been achieved but there is not an effective opposition. Perhaps the
next set of elections will help us address this question.

Although some have faulted Wade for opting to maintain the National Election
Organization (ONEL) as an observatory body to oversee the elections as opposed to
establishing an independent electoral commission (CENT) to administer and oversee
elections, others have acknowledged that ONEL did appear effective in the most recent
presidential election. Given that ONEL’s power and autonomy is to be augmented, the
public seems optimistic that ONEL will be able to ensure free and fair elections.

President Wade’s preoccupation with manifesting the full extent of his
“Mourideness” has been disconcerting to many Senegalese who are not in the Mouride

brotherhood and political observers alike. Subsequent to his election, President Wade

54

made several high proﬁle trips to see “his marabout,” the Khalife Général of the
Mourides, and even knelt before him. On one occasion, he made a special trip to Touba
to receive prayers before a trip to France, and said that, had his marabout told him that it
was an inauspicious moment to go to France, he would not have gone. The political
public was probably much more comfortable with the very close relationship President
Senghor, who was a Christian, had with the late Mouride Khalife Général F aliou Mbacke,
who was perhaps the most powerﬁrl marabout after Amadu Bamba. Senghor attended
the major Mouride holiday celebrations in Touba, and F aliou Mbacke is photographed in
the seat of honor next to him at one of these ceremonies (in Behrman 1970). The
relationship between President Senghor and Faliou Mbacke was clearly completely
instrumental in nature and so it did not seem threatening to those who were not Mouride.
On the other hand, the rhetoric of the PS. has scarcely indicated that its party
leaders have undergone any democratic maturation or learning. Instead, their rhetoric
indicates that not only do they see power as an end itself, but also that they do not even
perceive a need to pretend otherwise. The idea that the government should be working
for the general public good does not seem to have penetrated the consciousness of most
party ofﬁcers. For example, although many would say that Tanor Dieng, the general
secretary of the PS and director of the Diouf presidential campaign, was, in the words of
one PDS ofﬁcer, “the engine that drove Diouf’s defeat,” he reﬁrses to accept such
responsibility. Demonstrating a complete lack of introspection, Dieng insists that he did
his share in the elections by delivering the majority of votes to Diouf in his “ﬁef.” The
approach of the PS more generally has indicated a lack of reﬂection as party leaders have

been occupied with no loftier a goal than identifying the strategic errors made in the

55

campaign so that victory can be achieved in the next competition. The PS leadership has
refused to resign.

Senegal is at a critical point in its political life. After what seemed like years of
torpidity, the Senegalese political sphere is in a state of rapid change and ﬂuctuation.

The auxiliary position of issues concerning policy and ideology in the political debates is
not so surprising given the more basic institutional questions that are currently being
treated in Senegal. According to Gellar (1995):

Skillﬁrl political leadership, the support of Senegal’s Muslim leaders for the

regime, the commitment to democratic values and traditions on the part of most of

the Senegalese elite, the professionalism of the military, and a political culture
that prefers to resolve conﬂicts through dialogue are all factors contributing to

Senegal’s long-standing political stability. (21)

The extent to which these forces are being reinforced or eroded is a critical question. The
institutional questions addressed in the work surrounding the adoption of the new
constitution are signiﬁcant. Now, attention must be dedicated to the other forces that
impinge on the prospects for the consolidation of democracy.

Djibo Ka’s entrance into the political scene at the end of 1997 shattered Senegal’s
“bipolar” political world, with Abdou Diouf at one end and Abdoulaye Wade at the other.
While Ka’s political importance plummeted precipitously after his decision to support
Diouf following the ﬁrst round of the election, other political actors, such as Moustapha
Niasse, have emerged as formidable political ﬁgures. A tripartite coalition led by the
three of the poorest-performing candidates in the 2000 presidential election has formed
with the goal of promoting honesty, integrity and transparency in government. This

grouping is almost reminiscent of the progressive movement in the United States earlier

in this century. In short, political life in Senegal is replete with action and activity.

56

Given that this new energy can be channeled toward the construction of a more fully
democratic regime, Senegal’s democratic future is promising.

Like all complex phenomena, the state in which African countries ﬁnd themselves
can be attributed to many causes. The effects of colonialism and international factors on
the politics and political outcomes of Africa should not be ignored. But domestic factors
also clearly play a prominent role in generating political, social and economic outcomes
(Chazan et al. 1999). Much has been written about the “cleptocrats” and autocrats that
have monopolized political power and drained state resources in countries across sub-
Saharan Aﬁica. The public in general and the peasants in particular have been the big
losers in the postcolonial state. Yet, does the citizenry, who, in many cases, has suffered
so much, not need to transform itself to some degree? Are people willing to accept a
situation of “fair play,” where they have no possibility of getting ahead through social
connections? Will they accept a political leader who does not make grandiose displays of
generosity as well as opulence? Are they willing to allow members of their social
networks to do their jobs without pressuring them to deliver special beneﬁts? Are people
willing to do all that they can for themselves before relying on and fatiguing family
members and members of their social network? In short, are citizens any less attached to
clientelism than politicians? The idea that that leaders should be generous with their
followers precedes colonialism and is thought to still inﬂuence the way some view
politics, and colonialism has certainly reinforced this view. Although it may seem
perverse to look in any way toward citizens when addressing the situations of countries
like Senegal, in his political novel about the postcolonial West Aﬁican state, Anthills of

the Savannah, Chinua Achebe (1987) makes clear that any type of societal transformation

57

requires change at the level of the individual citizen, and everyone must be accountable
for their actions.

In his description of the Senegalese political scene, Schumacher (1975) uses a
quote from a one of President Senghor’s speeches before the UPS National Council to
capture the predicament faced by the political leaders trapped in the system they have
helped create:

When I say “politics,” you guess it, it is not, alas, a question of the etymological

meaning of the word. It is not a question of the art of governing the State for the

public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations. It is a question
of politician politics: the struggles of clans—not even [ideological] tendencies—-
to place well oneself, one’s relatives and one’s clients in the cursus honorum, that
is the race for preferments.32
What makes political reform so difﬁcult is that it is not rational for any one party to
repudiate clientelism when others continue to engage in it. In order for well-intended
political leaders to be able to reform the political system in Senegal, citizens have to
manifest a certain level of “civicness.” On the other hand, citizens would be even more
severely exploited if they did not make forceful demands on political ofﬁcials who were
enriching themselves and their entourage with the state resources. It seems that citizens
and politicians are trapped in some sort of existential prisoner’s dilemma from which
there is no exit.

Linda Beck (2001) offers an interesting (and, I would imagine, what most

political scientists would say bizarre) interpretation of the Mouride merchants’ refusal to

pay taxes to develope the Mouride’s holy city of Touba in 1997. According to Beck

(2001), this refusal shows the revival of the “civic” (unfortunately, she does not deﬁne

 

’2 Originally quoted in Unité Africaine, May 11, 1967.

58

the term in her article, so one can only assume what she means) since it shows citizens
are trying to render the government accountable. It seems a more straight-forward
interpretation is that this act shows an utter lack of civicness since the “citizens” of Touba
rejected their responsibility to contribute to the public goods and services of which they
were to be beneﬁciaries.33 Clearly, if the consolidation of democracy is to occur in
Senegal, citizens will need to manifest a degree of “civicness” in their political
orientation.

From this discussion, it should be clear that the intentions of the political leaders
are not all that matter. Achebe’s protagonist in Anthills of the Savannah probably speaks
the truth when he observes, “Experience and intelligence warn us that man’s progress in
freedom will be piecemeal, slow and undramatic” (1987, 90). By inspiring a more active
political and civic orientation, NFE is thought to be one of the those forces that help drive
this slow and mundane progress and, thus, it is critical to begin to assess the effects NFE

actually has on participants’ political orientations.

 

3’ Beck (2001) also mentions that scholars like Cruise O’Brien were wrong for predicting that the Mouride
merchant talibes were likely to be less obedient to their marabouts as they became more affluent. Since
Beck interprets the merchants’ reﬁrsal to pay taxes as “an unprecedented challenge to the authority of the
Khalife-General of Mouridisrn,” it seems that the event that constitutes the subject of her article vindicates
Cruise O’Brien’s prediction.

59

Chapter 3

HISTORY OF THE SENEGALESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Formal education is more often than not responsible for the cultural dichotomy
characteristic of these [African] countries, which have, on the one hand, a privileged,
alienated, imitative culture and, on the other, the neglected, national, culture of the
people. In most cases there is no contact between these two cultures, which take no
notice of each other, although they live side by side. —Babacar Sine

Education has long been recognized as a requisite, if not the key, to elite status.
Critical theorists, such as Bourdieu, have dedicated manifold pages to explicating the social
reproduction function of education, and social scientists of all disciplines have emphasized
the important role education plays in the socialization/culturation34 process. Many of these
scholars, however, have assumed that the educational system of interest is an outgrth of
that society in which it is embedded. How does the relationship between education and
variables such as those just mentioned change when the educational system of interest did
not spring ﬁom the society in which it actually operates? Such is the question one must ask
when problematizing the colonial educational systems of French-speaking West Aﬁica.
The quote from Sine would have us to believe that the rupture created by the formal
education system between the schooled and unschooled is absolute and irreparable. Yet
such a stark depiction of formal education and its effects does not seem to comport well

with the complex and ambiguous reality it is meant to describe.

 

3" Direnzo deﬁnes socialization as “ the process by which biologically human organisms are transformed
into functionally human beings” and culturation as “ the transmission of the ‘way of life’ of the respective
society” (1990, 26).

60

While the French prominently displayed their civilizing mission, many are
extremely skeptical about the extent to which the French really set out to create “black
Frenchmen.” Indeed, many would instead claim that the French intended for the formal
educational system to produce loyal auxiliaries to implement the colonial imperative on the
African masses. Still others would claim that the French colonialists were most interested
in creating a productive work force. In short, identifying the goals of the French is a
complex, ambiguous task.

The “Civilizing Mission”
Assimilation and Direct Rule

The French policy of direct rule and assimilation has been the subject of much
discourse on colonialism, especially as it was conﬁgured in French West Africa. Many
have pointed out that the British, who were in theory committed to indirect rule, ended up
practicing direct rule in some places, while the French found themselves ruling through
power structures already in place in some of their colonies. However, Crowder makes the
important point that whatever these colonial powers did in practice, their stated goals were
different. The French claimed the cultural and political assimilation of those colonized as
their objective, while the British maintained that their goal was to render those colonized
ready for self-government (1962, 1). Indeed, Conklin notes that the French actually raised
their self-articulated mission to civilize the indigenous people in their colonies to ofﬁcial
imperial doctrine. Implicit in this doctrine were the underlying beliefs of the superior
nature of French culture and “the perfectability of mankind.” Hence, while members of the

colonized population were unable to rule themselves, they could be transformed (1989, 1).

61

Creating an elite was seen as the ﬁrst stage in the assimilation process (Mercier 1965,
167)

In his 1970 article, Clignet critiques the idea of assimilation in African colonial
education, noting that assimilation is one possible outcome of colonial education. He
offers accomodation as the other likely response. According to Clignet, assimilation is
"...a process of generalisation, inward-oriented, incorporating new situations into a pre-
existing framework or analysis of action" (1970, 426). According to Clignet,
"...accommodation involves a process of speciﬁcation. As such it is outward-oriented,
modifying pre-existing schemes of analysis and action in order to maximize their ﬁtness
to for a new situation" (1970, 427). These two concepts have important implications both
for the Africans and the colonizers. Assimilationist strategies on the part of the
colonizers implies essentially transplanting metropolitan structures and modes of
operation from the metropole to the African scene. Accommodation on the part of the
colonizer would mean adopting practices and structures which differ from those of the
metropole. For the Africans, assimilation involves "a generalisation of traditional cultural
responses to stimuli presented in the educational context" (1970, 426). Accommodation,
on the other hand, requires Africans to leave behind their traditional practices and ways
of operating in order to adopt European ones. Clignet contends, "...an 'assimilationist'
policy carried out successfully by European powers involves accommodation by
Africans, while an 'accommodationalist‘ policy allows Aﬁican assimilation of European
practices" (1970, 426). While we may not expect the conﬁguration of European/African
interaction to be as clear-cut this, Clignet's model does provide a useful lens through

which we can view colonial/African interaction in education. Yet the above discussion

62

applies mostly to questions of overt ideology held by the French colonialists. How, if at

all, does the idea of ‘assimilation’ apply to colonial educational policy?

Goals of Colonial Education in A.O.F.

Sabatier identiﬁes two principal goals for the colonial education system in French
West Aﬁica: 1) to spread the French language and a basic education suited to the Aﬁican
milieu, and 2) to create “a careﬁrlly limited number of indigenous auxiliaries whose loyalty
as well as competence would be beyond question" (1978, 247). It is this latter goal that
was most successfully met by the French, according to Sabatier. On the other hand,
Sabatier claims that underneath all of the "rhetoric" of assimilation and the black
Frenchman:

...the French never intended to create indigenous elites who might effectively

compete with them, nor did they want Africans so Gallicized that they could not

work effectively as mediators between French colonial civilization and their

untutored compatriots. (1978, 248).
Sabatier claims that whatever the rhetoric wrapped up in the "civilizing mission," the
primary goal of the French educational system was to supply the manpower needed for the
operation of the colonial state as inexpensively and efﬁciently as possible (1978, 13). The
ambiguity Sabatier identiﬁes in the goals held by the French with respect to colonial
education is reﬂected in ambiguous and conﬂicting educational policies.

According to Clignet, French educational policy vacillated between being
assirrrilationist and accomodationist in nature. Upon the failure of teaching methods
imported directly from France, some teachers tried to Aﬁicanize some of the curriculum.

After World War II, however, in response to the complaints of West African elites about

the inferior nature of colonial schools, the French colonialists adhered fairly closely to an

63

assirnilationist policy so that education in the A.O.F. paralleled closely that of France
(1970, 429). Yet this may still be too linear a depiction of French educational policy.
Conklin takes the position that educational policies (among those of other domains)
illustrate that the Government General did not see transforming Aﬁicans into Frenchmen as
part of the civilizing mission (1989, 79). In fact, French ideology as manifested in
education revealed a commitment to idea that Africans should evolve in Aﬁican culture not
French culture (81). I will examine key features and events in the evolution of colonial

education in Senegal and the A.O.F. below.

The Roots of Public Education in Senegal

Education in the nineteenth century was largely supplied by missionaries.
Faidherbe, who was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854, was especially dedicated to
spreading “French civilization.” While ideally he may have wanted religious conversion
to be part of the planned cultural colonization, he perceived that, given the overwhelming
adherence to Islam, that would not be possible. Hence, he saw the French language as
the primary median through which French civilization could be transmitted, particularly
in the schools (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981). He augmented the educational
institutions in Senegal, creating a school for the sons of chiefs and secular schools
(Crowder 1962, 12).
1841-190335 The Schools of the Ploermel Brothers and the Trading Post Schools

Much of the teaching was conﬁded to the Ploermel Brothers who opened Catholic

schools on Goree and in Dakar, Ruﬁsique, and Zinguinchor. Not until 1899, however,

 

’5 The designation of this time period is drawn from Vandewiele (1983) who identiﬁes this period as that of
“Missionary and Trading-post Schools.”

64

was the curriculum brought in line with those of France (Vandewiele 1983, 508).
According to de Lauture and Doria Husser, they taught between 25,000 and 30,000
students by 1903 (1981, 31). Conklin points out that the schools of the four Senegalese
Communes (Goree, St. louis, Dakar, and Ruﬁsque) stand in stark contrast to the “poor
educational record” held in the rest of French West Africa prior to 1903 (1989, 83). By
1903, the whole of the Christian population in the four communes had been educated
(Conklin 1989, 84).

The educational system was secularized in 1901 and was incorporated into a
wider system that was for all of the French West Aﬁican Federation. The need for post-
primary schooling was recognized and several such institutions were subsequently
created between 1903 and 1913: L’Ecole Faidherbe, L’Ecole normale de St. Louis,
L’Ecole Pinet-Laprade, and many other institutions.

Appointed as head of the federation in 1902, Ernest Roume, and those who came
after him, stood in opposition to assimiliationist policy. Curriculum was to mix Western
technical know-how and French morality with Aﬁican cultural references (Conklin 1989,
87). In the ten-year period from 1903 to 1913, around 200 new schools were created and
the number of students jumped from 5,000 to between 11,000 and 12,000 (96). Figures
from 1913-14 indicate that Senegal beneﬁted disproportionately from colonial educational
efforts: it had 48 schools, 4,500 students, and 100 teachers (from a Gouvemeur General
report cited in Conklin 1989, 96-7). Conklin notes that most of those educated did not go
on to be efﬁcient farmers but rather found employment in the administration or engaged

in commerce (1989, 97).

65

The Period of Development: 1913 - 196036

According to Bouche, when Georges Hardy arrived in Dakar in 1912 as Inspector
for French West African Education, he found “contested institutions which were
struggling to get along” (1974, 7).37 He wanted to invigorate the educational system.
The governor at that time, William Ponty, redeﬁned the objectives of public schools.
According to him, the goal was not to create bureaucrats or workers, but to render one
aware of the economic activities of the region. Thus, “village schools should transform
without uprooting the inhabitants” (Ponty cited in de Lauture and Doria—Husser 1981,
72).38 Moreover, Hardy started a educational bulletin, expanded the number of schools
serving the interior, and tried to make the curriculum relevant to the lives of the students.
His very attempts to render schooling more accessible and relevant led him to be
criticized for “cheapening” the schools by other colonialists and elite Aﬁicans alike.

Still, as Kelly points out, the vast majority of the population of West Aﬁica did
not have access to schooling. By 1938, in Senegal, only 9.5 out of every 1,000 potential
students went to school (AOF Bulletin statistics cited in Kelly 1986, 172). In 1947, only
12.4% of school age children went to school in Senegal. However, this rate was much
higher than those for Guinea and what was formally called Soudan, which were 1.3% and
5% respectively (Crowder 1962, 4).

Further, although the curriculum may have come to include more material on
Africa, such material did not necessarily create an authentically African experience for
the students. Kelly critically assesses the way in which Aﬁican society and culture is

depicted in the curriculum. She contends that although indigenous institutions were not

 

’6 The designation of this time period comes from de Lauture and Doria-Husser, 1981.
37 Translation is my own.
38 Translation from French to English mine.

66

disparaged, most institutions were simply not mentioned. Aﬁican societies were
portrayed as thought they were “. . .lacking in history, identity, and coherence” (1984,
535)

In a later article, Kelly makes a stronger argument regarding the marginality
schooling generates on the part of the learner. Based on her study of interwar French
Africa, Kelly argues that students learned that they were neither like uneducated Aﬁicans
nor like the French. Hence, they were in a school culture apart from all others to which
they were linked. Through the school texts, they learned to see themselves and their

cultures “through the eyes of an outsider” (1986, 173).

Assessing the Results of Colonial Education

Formal Education and Social Stratiﬁcation

Acccording to Sabatier, under colonialism western education was the key to social
mobility in the modern sphere of the A.O.F. (1978, 6). Wallerstein echoes this point, "The
great medium of advancement was the educational system and the great goal of
advancement was administrative wor " (1965, 3). Wallerstein notes that the centralized
nature of the educational system augmented its coherence. In the immediate pre-
independence period, Mercier observes a trend toward less social mobility (1965, 170).
He notes that social groupings are tending to become more crystallized. This trend is
reﬂected in the stabilization of employment across generations. Mercier cites a survey
implemented in urban Dakar that yielded results showing that of the respondents were

largely in the same occupational categories as their fathers (1965, 171).

67

Mercier notes the emergence of a new, relatively small intellectual elite that can be
differentiated from the former colonial elite. This more educated elite possessed greater
professional expertise and was able to occupy positions hitherto only held by Europeans.
Western education, especially that of a nontechnical type, did in fact appear to drive social
stratiﬁcation in the modern sector. In the words of Mercier, “. . .high prestige, more or less
deﬁnitely acknowledged by the whole population, crystallizes around professions,
functions or situations which are considered to be ‘intellectual’ —implying in fact a

minimum of Westem-type learning” (1965, 168).

Formal Education and Cultural Schisms

The results of Fatou Sow’s 1966 study of 234 bureaucrats in the central
administration of Senegal point to links between formal education, lifestyles and elite
status. Sow also looks at the relationship between level of education and life style. She
ﬁnds that there is a positive relationship between level of education and adoption of
European ways of life. For example, the percentage of administrators claiming to wear
only European or European and African clothes as opposed to just Aﬁican clothes
increases quite steadily with educational level. While a full 45% of those with only
primary education claim to wear Aﬁican clothes only, none of those with doctorates claim
to do so (1972, 187). The same type of relationship exists for the manner in which one
eats. Sow notes that it is those with the highest level of education that are the most
inﬂuenced by western lifestyles. She also observes that level of instruction often
corresponds to salaries levels (1972, 188). Hence, Sow’s study indicates important

relationships among education, life-style choices and elite status.

68

In fact, the formal educational system created a sort of hybrid social group that was
composed neither of “black Frenchmen” nor those simply trying to imitate Frenchmen. It
seems fairer to say that colonial schools introduced an extremely powerful means of social
stratiﬁcation onto the African scene. In retrospect, as others have alluded, the elite it
created seems more like a semi-elite, always below the French in status. It seems as though
embarking on the formal educational route was a socially and psychologically ambiguous
experience.

As part of her multifaceted study of Dakar high school students in 1962, Francoise
F lis-Zonabend surveyed 314 high school students. Flis-Zonabend ﬁnds that the chances of
pursuing secondary school have a clear correlation with the residence of the respondent, the
occupation of the respective head-of-household, and whether or not one belongs to the
majority ethnic group (1968, 149). Flis—Zonabend did ﬁnd there to be major ruptures
between the schooled and unschooled and the schooled and their respective families. As
evidence for this rupture, she points to the fact that only 48.1% of students’ fathers and
9.2% of their mothers even spoke French. More striking still is that 89.5% of students
would never address their fathers in French and 96.5% would never speak in French to
their mothers (1968, 86).

Mercier argues that because of the foreign nature of the colonial educational
system, it did not promote the incorporation of an individual into “his group”, but rather
created a rupture (1965, 167). According to him, the assimilationist policies of the French
tended to widen the chasm between the indigenous elite and the "masses" who were still
very attached to their traditional culture (1965, 168). In his words, "The real problems are

those of the true integration of education into a developing social environment, its

69

adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the
Senegalese people's conception of education" (1965, 169). Sabatier also notes that West
African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic to western education or those
associated with it through the mid 19405 (1978, 7). To this extent, it seems that those
obtaining diplomas in the formal educational system were put on a different (and
mistrusted) trajectory than the vast majority of people.

Did education disrupt or reinforce traditional hierarchies? Clignet claims that
initially a number of schools drew their student body from generally margalized groups
and, therefore, according those with formal education with some type of a formal position
of employment altered the traditional hierarchies. He continues, "Further, although
schooling did not necessarily destroy traditional networks, it changed both the direction and
the content of obligations traditionally binding individuals to one another" ( 1970, 441).
On the other hand, we know that the children of notables were also directed into
educational institutions. The unsatisfactory and incomplete answer to this question at this

stage appears to be that it did both.

The Legacy of the Colonial Educational Institution: A “Limited” Elite

In the words of Sylla, “At the time of the independence in 1960, Senegal inherited a
modern educational system that had been in operation for a long time, and covered the
entire national territory‘ ’ (1993, 372). However, Sabatier's assessment of the colonial
educational system is condemning:
...it can be argued that by limiting both the number and types of indigenous auxiliaries,
as well as the work they were trained to do, the French also severely retarded the

development of French West Aﬁica, to the loss of the metropole as well as the colonies
themselves (1978, 255).

70

The French's fear of creating dangerous uprooted types (déracinés) caused them create a
sort of era of limits in the colonial educational system which they did by limiting the
number of educational slots and limiting the content of the education provided Aﬁicans
(Sabatier 1978, 247). Sabatier identiﬁes four critical limitations in the French educational
system, "...the numbers of students educated, in their curriculum and their diplomas, and in
the careers that awaited graduates" (1978, 255).

On the one hand, the French wanted the formal educational system to serve as one
of the primary means of acculturation. On the other hand, the colonialists wanted the
educational system to prepare Africans for the type of work that was seen as appropriate for
them to do. Perhaps more importantly, the French did not truly want full assimilation to
take place. The ambiguity of the goals of the French is reﬂected in the ambiguous effects
generated by the French educational system (Conklin 1989 also makes this point). Let’s
examine the balance sheet for colonial education as it looked around the time of
independence. What did the French do? They succeeded in creating a group of Senegalese
semi-elites who could act as mediators vis-a-vis the Aﬁican masses and ﬁll administrative
positions. What did the French not do? They did not succeed in ﬁrlly acculturating those
schooled. They did not succeed in internalizing in the Senegalese what was to be their
constrained role and inferior status in the colonial system. Finally, they did not succeed in
providing an education that would render large numbers of Senegalese more efﬁcient in the
primary economic activities of the time. That is, formal education failed to contribute, to

any signiﬁcant degree, to the “mis en valeur” imperative of the time.39

 

’9 According to Conklin (1989), mis en valeur became the “new priority” of the colonial administration in
French West Aﬁica in 1895 (12).

71

The Current Educational System in Senegal

Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resemble
the French school system. Ironically, much of the Senegalese population is incapable of
using French as an effective means of communication. Dr. F agerberg-Diallo notes that
“. . .roughly 75% of the population in Senegal is not capable of using French as a
language through which they have access to information, whether it be written or oral”
(1993, 4). Currently, six years of primary schooling is ofﬁcially compulsory for children
of seven to 13 years of age. In fact, according to Africa South of the Sahara, 58% of
those in this age group were enrolled in primary schools in 1992. The difference between
primary and secondary school attendance rates is instructive, however. Secondary
school, which students usually begin at age 13, is comprised of a four year and three year
cycle. In 1992, only 16% of those in the eligible age group were enrolled in secondary
school (1997, 834). Unfortunately, students leaving primary school may not have even
fully developed and consolidated their literacy and numeracy skills. While the formal
education system has created a Senegalese elite, nearly 70% of the population of Senegal
does not possess basic literacy skills. Among women, 77% are not literate (Direction de
l’Alphabetisation et de l’Education de Base 1995).

According to Rideout et al. (1997), Senegal is currently confronting “a staggering
educational problem” (5). Senegal has adopted the goal that 75% of school-aged children
will be enrolled in school. However, the number of school-aged children is expanding,
Senegal cannot achieve that goal now, and it is doubtful that, given that Senegal already
allocates 35% of its budget to education, Senegal will be able to allocate any additional

resources to education. In addition, Rideout et al. (1997) identify many of the problems

72

associated with the nature of formal education aside from enrollment levels: “the quality
of the education provided,” “the internal efﬁciency,” “the external efﬁciency,” and “the
value and relevance of schooling” (5). Many have criticized formal education in Africa
for being overly academic and not teaching the skills and subjects needed for people to be
productive participants in the economy (e. g., Grifﬁths 1992). These issues have been
especially salient in Senegal.

Nonformal education programs have emerged to ﬁll the gaps left by the formal
education system. These programs are conducted in Aﬁican languages and usually
informed by the culture and exigencies of the target populations. Most of these
programs are administered by national or international nongovermental organizations,
although the Senegalese government has begun to become active in the nonformal
education sector. As of 2001, around 1,322, 381 Senegalese people had been touched by
a literacy program.40 Most of the programs covered by this estimate are basically adult
literacy programs.41 In other words, a reasonable estimate of the percentage of those 15
years of age and older who have had some type of NFE is about 25%. Based on
estimates using the entire Senegalese population, around 15% of Senegalese have been
involved with NFE.

In this study, I examine the relationship between formal education and political
participation and attitudes in a context where the educational system of interest did not

spring from the society in which it actually operates. I will also be able to explore

 

’0 This information was kindly provided by DAEB.

4' PAPA also has recently put in place a program intended to reach young people who have dropped out or
never been a part of the educational system in the hopes of reintegrating them into the educational system
It is not clear whether some of these younger people are included in the estimate to which 1 just referred.

73

whether “authentic” forms of education (i.e., nonformal education conducted in national

languages) affect civic/political participation differently than formal education.

The Four NFE Programs of Study

The study focuses on four NFE programs, each of which is characterized by
attributes that make it especially interesting for examination and comparison.
PIP

The Programme Intégré de Podor (PIP), a Senegalese non-governmental
organization (N G0), has had a strong presence in the Fouta Tooro, where it was
established in 1975 as a measure to help counter the negative effects of the Sahelian
drought. PIP is active in two departments in St. Louis: Podor and Matam. Although
PIP’s activities initially centered on ameliorating physical infrastructure and hydraulics,
its scope of activity has expanded to include work in the areas of health, agro-forestry,
savings and credit, environmental protection, and literacy. Since it began working in the
area of literacy in 1986, it has been responsible for training upwards of 37,537 people.
PIP has worked almost exclusively in the area of Pulaar literacy (classes are taught in
Pulaar in 96% of its centers) and has had the beneﬁt of having its work supported by a
zealous and dynamic Pulaar literacy movement.

The PIP methodology is comprised of three levels. In the ﬁrst level, one masters
writing, reading and very basic arithmetic. This part of the program lasts 240 hours. In
the second level, one masters grammar, spelling and more advanced arithmetic. This
phase is estimated to take 240 hours to complete. Most centers administer the ﬁrst two

phases of the program. In the third level, one engages in more advanced study of the

74

subjects mentioned and begins the study of different topical areas such as health, the
environment, community management, etc. While some have claimed the PIP program
can be done in six months, the duration of most classes seems to be two years.

Two NGOs that also work in the area of Pulaar literacy have served to strengthen
PIP’s performance in the ﬁeld. ARED (Associates for Research and Education for
Development) and CERF LA (Centre d ’Etudes pour la Recherche et la Formation en
Langues Africaines) are two related NGOs that work in areas related the Pulaar language
in Senegal. PIP uses the very well respected basic literacy curriculum developed by
ARED. ARED’s curriculum modules range from modules on basic literacy and math
skills to those on subjects pertaining to leadership, health, legal and environmental
issues.42 ARED and now CERF LA have trained many of the PIP teachers. Part of this
training covers how to use the participatory method of teaching.

Aside ﬁ'om decreasing the illiteracy rates in the Fouta and transmitting reading
writing, and math skills, PIP has two rather interesting goals: 1) “reinforcing the cultural

identity of the populations,” and 2) “opening a window to the world.” 43

Tostan
Tostan, an international NGO, has been a prominent actor in the area of

nonformal education for the last ten years. During this time, Tostan has trained over

 

’2 On the basis of the sales and testimonies in the ﬁeld, it appears that ARED’s basic literacy modules have
ﬁlled what was a glaring dearth of quality literacy and post-literacy materials in national languages. The
vast majority of the 70 teachers I interviewed in 1993 and 1996 found ARED’s curriculum materials to be
extraordinarily helpful. Moreover, most of the teachers I interviewed during the 19905 claimed that their
students did not have a problem following and understanding the material found in these books. A few said
that the grammar was a “a little dense.” In a two year period (1994-1996), ARED sold 19,550 basic
literacy books in Pulaar.

’3 Some of the information on PIP was gleaned from an assessment of Union pour la Solidarité et
l'Entraide by Jose Ruijter (1997).

75

18,834 adult villagers in nine regions of Senegal. Working mostly in Wolof and Pulaar,
Tostan has a solid curriculum and pedagogy. According its mission statement, Tostan is
“focused on empowering villagers to take charge of their own development and
participate fully in society.”44 Tostan’s program is organized around “community
development” themes. The basic Tostan program is comprised of six modules, each of
which represents a thematic area such as problem solving, water, health, leadership or
ﬁnancial management. Each module lasts two months, and the timeline for the basic
program is 24 months.“ Tostan has also produced four continued education modules,
including one on human rights. One of Tostan’s goals is to “promote self-development
through the use of adapted educational materials.”

Indeed, the underlying themes of Tostan’s program include social transformation
and mobilization. These themes are reﬂected in the program methodology. In Module 1,
learners are introduced to problem-solving skills. A ﬁve-step problem-solving process is
presented, beginning with “identifying and analyzing the problem” and ending with
“implementing the solution” and “evaluating the results.” The problem-solving skills
gleaned in Module 1 are reinforced throughout the remainder of the program, and it is fair
to say that the “problem-solving” approach informs the entire program.

In the program documents, the importance of allowing debate and deliberation in

the literacy classes is emphasized. Tostan uses “social mobilization activities” to buttress

 

“ http://www.tostan.org/mission.htm
‘5 Traditionally, the basic program took 18 months to corrrplete. However, according to the most recent
information I have received, the basic program now takes 24 months to complete.

76

that which is learned in the actual classes. Such activities include theater, poetry readings

and debates. Tostan is a vibrant program that has received international attention.46

PAPA and PAPF

Only recently has the Senegalese government become a notable force in the area
of basic literacy and nonformal education. In 1993, the Senegalese government created a
ﬁve-year action plan that included as one of its planks the reduction in the illiteracy rate
by 5% each year. Two of the large-scale efforts initiated in the area of nonformal
education include Projet d ’Appui au Plan d ’Action en matiére d ’éducation non formelle
(PAPA) and Projet Alphabétisation Priorité F emmes (PAPF). PAPA covers the regions
of Zinguinchor, Kaolack, Tambacounda, Thies, and Saint Louis, while PAPF covers the
remaining ﬁve regions: Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda, Louga, and Dakar. Both PAPA and
PAPF adhere to the strategy “fairefaire.” That is, instead of administering literacy
classes themselves, PAPA and PAPF use local “operateurs” or organizations to
implement the classes in the ﬁeld and thereby promote civil society. Since it began to
administer its programs in 1996, PAPA has trained more than 200,000 adults. Although
PAPA has recently developed a model curriculum, basically the local organizations have
total freedom in choosing the curriculum and content for the classes they administer.
PAPA’s program follows two different timelines. Some classes meet ﬁve months a year
for two years while others meet for only six months during one year. PAPF’s major

objective is to train 135,000 people between ﬁfteen and thirty-nine years of age of whom

 

‘6 Much of this information is drawn from program reports and documents such as “Tostan News —
Education: Program Methodology”, hgp://www.tostan.org[news-edu2.htrn, “Breakthrough in Senegal: The
Process That Ended Female Genital Cutting in 31 Villages” as well as personal interviews and
observations.

77

75% should be women (PAPA’s objective was to have classes of at least 65% women).
PAPF also offers models of ideal programs, but freedom is left to the local ope'rateur to
establish the timeline and content of the program. Until recently, opérateurs have
administered the program in 10 months, 12 months, or, at most, 18 months. PAPF is

contemplating changing to a 24-month model.

78

Chapter 4

METHOD AND SAMPLE

The objective of the study is to assess the effects of nonformal education on civic
participation and orientation in rural Senegal. A probability sample of 1484 Senegalese
citizens was drawn in the regions of Thies, St. Louis, Diourbel, Louga and Kaolack. The
design was intended to generate a sample that would allow one to assess the effects of
four different nonformal education problems in the rural areas of the ﬁve regions
mentioned above. The four programs are Tostan, PIP, PAPA, and PAPF. These ﬁve
regions were selected because they have a fairly high concentration of literacy programs

and also contain largely the same ethnolinguistic groups.

Sampling

Target Population

Senegalese citizens who were at least 18 years old and who lived in rural areas in
the ﬁve regions of study constituted the target population.
Sample Design

A multi-stage, stratiﬁed, area cluster probability sample design was employed.
Selection Of Primary Sainpling Units. The village constituted the primary sampling unit
(PSU). Selection of PSUs was stratiﬁed by region and NFE program. Villages were
selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). In other words, the probability of
selection associated with any particular village was exactly proportional to its share of the

total population in its respective region.

79

Selection of control sampling units was administered at four levels:
1. PSU: village
2. starting points

3. households
4. individuals

Sampling Villages. One thousand four hundred and eighty four questionnaires were
administered in 94 villages randomly selected with probability proportionate to size in St.
Louis, Thies, Louga, Diourbel and Kaolack between the end of October 2000 and the
beginning of April 2001. These villages included “treatment” villages (i.e., villages

where nonformal education (NF B) programs had been conducted) and control villages.

Sampling Frme: Sampling Lists for NFE Villages by Region. Several sampling lists
were created. Sampling lists which contained all of the PAPA villages in the relev ant
region were created for the regions of Thies, St. Louis, and Kaolack. Sampling lists of all
of the Tostan villages were created for St. Louis, Thies, and DiOurbel. Sampling lists
containing PAPF villages were created for Louga and Diourbel. Finally, a sampling list
of PIP villages was created for the Region of St. Louis. From these sampling lists, a
predetermined number of villages were selected with probability proportionate to size in
excel. “Control” lists that contained all of the villages in a region were also created for
the ﬁve regions covered in the study. The control villages were also selected with
probability proportionate to size, that is, with reference to the population size of a
particular region.

The Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of the selected villages and respondents

by region and NFE program.

80

Table 3: Number of Villages by Region and Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PAPA PAPF Tostan PIP Control TOTALS

SL 4 1 0 1 5 6 3 5
Louga 6 5 1 1
Kaolack 5 5 1 0
Diourbel 4 2 5 1 l
Thies 6 1 2 9 27
15 1 0 23 l 5 30 94

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4: Number of Respondents by Region and Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PAPA PAPF Tostan PIP Control in Control Totals
NFE Villages in Non-
NFE
Villages
SL 48 120 180 116 96 560
Louga 72 24 61 157
Kaolack 60 20 79 159
Diourbel 48 24 24 80 1 76
Thies 72 144 72 144 432
Totals 180 120 288 180 256 460 1484

 

PIP and Tostan were important foci of study. Both of these programs employ a
respected curriculum and attend to the issue of pedagogy. On the other hand, the
philosophies behind the approaches differ, and thus useful comparisons can be drawn. I
determined the number of villages to sample based on the concern of having enough
respondents in different subgroups to be able to do effective subgroup analysis. In the
case of Tostan, the number of villages selected per region also reﬂects the weight of

Tostan’s presence in the three regions.

To complete in my description of the sampling process, I should mention that
compiling the sampling lists required several steps. Numerous visits were made to

DAEB, PAPF, PAPA and Tostan. Lists of all of the villages that have completed literacy

81

 

programs with PIP, TOSTAN, PAPF, and PAPA were eventually obtained or
constructed. Unfortunately, PAPA does not have a comprehensive list of the villages that
have had the PAPA program. All of the IDEN Departmental representatives in the
regions of interest were contacted and asked for this information. A short trip week was
required to collect this information. Members of the research team and I were required to
return to the majority of the ofﬁces at least once or use other follow-up measures.
Moreover, we rarely simply received a list of villages, but instead were given numerous
papers, letters, memos, among other things, with short lists of villages that had to be
organized and aggregated“. Most of the lists associated with the other organizations
required some organization, aggregation and follow-up. In short, creating the sampling
ﬁ'ame involved many steps, and, in a few cases, we could not be sure that our lists were
completely exhaustive, although we took every step possible to ensure that they were as

complete as possible.

Starting Points. PIP guides accompanied us to the PIP villages and a Tostan guide
accompanied us to the Tostan villages.48 In each NFE village, four “control” households
were randomly selected through a walking pattern (pas de sondage). That is, a
particular part of the village was selected randomly: north, south, east, west or center. In

this part of the village, the supervisor or primary researcher identiﬁed a mosque, water

 

’7 In one case, the IDEN ofﬁcial left us in his ofﬁce to search through masses of dusty, disorganized papers
on the floor and shelves. Nonetheless, by the end of our investigation, we appeared to have compiled a
relatively complete list of the PAPA villages in the department.

’8 Having Tostan and PIP guides with us facilitated our work by inspiring immediate cooperation and
mobilization on the part of those in the village. They also helped us to locate some of the villages that were
especially remote (it took us six hours to reach one village after we stayed over night in a town that we
thought was very close to the relevant village). There is, however, no reason to believe that appearing with
people from these organizations in anyway biased the responses to the questionnaire. The questions on the
questionnaire in no way pertain to the NFE programs, and the initial presence of the guides would have in
no way indicated that certain types of responses were more socially desirable than others. If anything,
appearing with them seemed to create immediately an atmosphere of trust. Respondents appeared relaxed,
and I would argue that having the guides only improved the quality of the interviewing process.

82

spigot, school or other landmark that could be used as a starting point. At the starting
point, the ﬁrst interviewer walked in the direction of the sun, the second interviewer
walked in the opposite direction, the third proceeded at a right angle ﬁ'om the ﬁrst and the
fourth interviewer walked in the direction opposite of the third. The interviewers

selected every third household on their right.

Households. The respondent was then randomly selected at the household level. In the
NFE villages, a list of all those who had participated in the relevant NFE program was
taken with the aid of the person/people in charge of the class in that village or someone
else knowledgeable about the program. Twelve of those who had participated in the

program were randomly drawn from that list.

In the non-NFE villages, sixteen households were randomly selected in one of
two ways. Households were either selected via the walking pattern or, when the village
did not contain a large number of households, a list of households was created with the
help of a knowledgeable villager, usually the chief of the village. Sixteen households
were then randomly selected from the list.

This method of selection was chosen to minimize threats to the validity of the
study. On the one hand, had we chosen all of those in the “control”group49 from the NFE
villages, one could have argued that those who live in a village where there is an NFE
village but did not participate in it are somehow different than those in the NFE program
ﬁ'om the start. Hence, any differences between NFE and non-NFE respondents could be

attributed to differences that preceded the NFE program. On the other hand, had we

 

’9 Although the term “control group” is usually used in experiments, I use the terms “control group” and
“corrrparison group” interchangably througout the text to refer those who have not had any NFE through
one of the four programs under study.

83

chosen all of our respondents from non-NFE villages, one could claim that differences in
villages were responsible for the observed differences between “treatment” and “control”
groups. In fact, both types of control respondents are found in the sample. In addition,
the threats just mentioned seem minimal. Those non-NFE respondents coming from NFE
villages often had plans to participate in a literacy class in the near future or simply did
not join the original class because they were not in the village at the time the class began.
In addition, Tostan explicitly trains program participants to share information gleaned in
class with others in the village. This diffusion of messages militates against ﬁnding
differences when respondents come from NFE villages. In the case of the non-NFE
villages, many of the villages had requested classes. In other cases, classes were to begin
nearly at the time of the survey.

In Chapter 7, the threats to the internal validity of the study are explicitly

addressed.

Substitutions

Seven substitutions were made:

KM. Ida Mmbayene was selected as a control village in the region of Kaolack.
Although it did not appear on any of the PAPA lists, upon arriving at Ida Mmbayene, the
research team found that at least one member of nearly every household had participated
in the PAPA literacy program. Dara Niassene was randomly selected as the substitution

village.

84

M- Although Ndiouffene was on the list for PAPA Thies, the research team found that
no PAPA class had been established in this village. Diass (Ndiass) was randomly
selected with (PPS) as the substitution village.

St. Louis. Aere Lao was selected as a Tostan village. However, three days prior to that
on which the research team was supposed to conduct work in Aere Lao, Tostan and the
Senegalese government attempted to organize a discussion on female genital cutting

(F GC) in that village. The discussion was not able to take place because several
marabouts and their followers came to the discussion with weapons waiting to attack
should anyone have dared to raise the issue of FGC. Our Tostan guide and members of
the research team feared a hostile and potentially violent reception from the inhabitants of
this village, so Aere Lao was substituted by Aram. Senobowal had not had a PIP class
and was therefore substituted by Thianaff.

Diourbel Control. Tene was substituted by Mbadiane SAD Thiade and Kholkhotorane
was substituted by Sessene. Although these villages were chosen as control villages, they
both had actually been recipients of the PAPF program, and nearly every household
contained a participant in the program. This situation arose because, despite all the work
dedicated to assembling the sampling frame, the sampling lists were not exhaustive.
M. Because the marabout refused the research team access to this village, Merina

Ndiaye was substituted by Coki Dakhar.

Characteristics Of The Sample

Seven hundred and nine respondents are classiﬁed as not having had NFE and

constitute the “control” group (48% of the sample), while 774 respondents are classiﬁed

85

as having had NFE (52% of the sample) and constitute the treatment group. Included in
the non-NFE, or “control” group, are 25 respondents who have had some type of
nonformal education training. However, because the training was not supplied by one of
our programs of interest, they cannot be included in the treatment group. The mean years
of NFE among those with NFE is 2.4 years with a standard deviation of 1.6 years. The
overall sample mean was 1.27 years with a standard deviation of 1.7 years. The most
NFE any respondent reported having is 10 years.50

Women comprise 72% of the sample. Women constitute an even larger
percentage of those with NFE. As we can see in Table 3, 83% of the NFE respondents
are women compared to only 60% in the non-NFE group. The overrepresentation of
women among those with NFE is not difﬁcult to explain given that the vast majority of
the participants in the programs under study are women. PAPF has a rule that at least
75% of the NFE participants must be women, and many times over 90% of the NFE

classes are comprised of women.

Table 5: Crosstabulation of Gender and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gender Respondents Respondents with
without NFE NFE
Male 40% 17%
Female 60 83
Totals (709) (773)*
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

 

5° Collecting precise data on the amount of time spent in class was not easy. Although respondents were
asked about each increment of time spent in class (i.e. respondents were asked about the number of months
a year, weeks a month, days a week, and hours a day), the most accurate information respondents gave
seemed to be about the years in class. If a class met for nine months out of the year for two years, for most
respondents, they have had two years of NFE. Indeed, most classes did not meet every month of the year.
Moreover, across all of the programs, respondents seemed to inﬂate the amount of time spent in class.

86

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.

In addition, about 40% of the respondents without NFE are men. This result is
also not at all surprising. In many of the villages covered in our study, the 1988 census
speciﬁes that men comprise between about 46 to 49% of the villages. Desertiﬁcation has
rendered the one-time productive farmlands of Fouta Tooro of northern Senegal barren.
In northern Senegal, it is well-known that a substantial proportion of working-age men
leave their villages (and families) to ﬁnd work. Many men will leave their homes for at
least part of the year when they can ﬁnd work in a particular sector. Therefore, these
men are ofﬁcially part of the household, but they are rarely in their home villages. Some
of the villages in this area of Senegal are almost completely depopulated of working-age
men. In fact, among the control group respondents who live in St. Louis, only 30% are
men. Men represent 44% of the control group for the remainder of the sample.

The average age for the sample is 32 years. At around 13 years, the standard
deviation is quite high. However, at 29 years with a standard deviation of 10 years, the
mean age of NFE respondents was lower than that of non-NFE respondents. For the
non-NFE group, the average age is 36 years with a rather high standard deviation of 15
years. In order to clarify the relationship between age and NFE, respondents were
classiﬁed into one of the following categories, depending on their age: 1) 18 to 20 years,
2) 21 to 35 years, 3) 36 to 49 years, and 4) 50 years and older.

Table 6: Percentage of Respondents in Age Categories

 

 

 

Lége Frequency Percent
18 to 20 333 22.62
21 to 35 657 44.63
35 to 49 307 20.86
50+ 175 11.89

[ Total 1472 100

 

87

We can see from Table 6 that the modal category is 21 to 35 years of age as 45% of our
sample falls into that category. It is important to see how NFE relates to these categories.

Table 7: Crosstabulation of Age Categories and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Age Category Respondents Respondents with
without NFE NFE
18 to 20 17% 28%
21 to 35 41 48
35 to 49 23 19
50+ 19 5
Totals (700) (771)*
100 100

 

 

 

 

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.
As we can see from Table 7, those in the younger age categories are slightly
overrepresented among the NFE respondents, while the opposite is the case for those
from the category representing the oldest respondents. In fact, the distribution of age is
not all surprising; younger people tend to participate in NFE programs at higher rates
than older people do, and this reality is reﬂected in our sample.

How NFE is distributed across ethnolinguistic group is also important to examine.

Table 8: Crosstabulation of Ethnolinguistic Group and NFE

 

 

Ethnolingusitic Group Respondents Respondents with
without NFE NFE

 

 

 

 

Pulaar 34% 52%
Wolof 44 30
Serer 13 13
Other 8 5
Totals (709) (774)*
1 00% 1 00%

 

 

 

 

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.

88

As can be seen from Table 8, 52% of the respondents with NFE are Pulaar speakers.
Pulaar speakers are highly represented in the sample because one of the programs of great
interest, PIP, works almost exclusively among Pulaar speakers. Moreover, a large
number of the Tostan participants in the regions of interest are Pulaar-speakers, and the
other two programs have at least some classes in Pulaar villages. Pulaar-speakers have in
many ways spearheaded the literacy movement in Senegal, and thus it is perhaps not
surprising that they are highly represented in the sample. Indeed, since the
ethnolinguistic composition of the control and treatment sampling lists was not the same
and villages were drawn randomly, the distribution of respondents across ethno linguistic
groups is not symmetrical. In bivariate analyses, I look at speciﬁc subgroups and
therefore physically “control” for ethnicity and region in many analyses. In multivariate
analyses, I control for ethnicity statistically.

Taking into account the proportion of respondents drawn from each region, the
ethnolinguistic composition of the “comparison group” is very close to what one would
expect, given the ethnolinguistic composition of the population of the ﬁve regions (note

that this is not identical to the ethnic composition of all of Senegal).

89

Table 9: Expected Versus Actual Percentages of Ethnolinguistic Groups

 

 

Ethnolingusitic Group Respondents Percentage
without NFE Expected Based on
Composition of the

 

 

 

 

Population
Pulaar 34% 30%
Wolof 44 49
Serer 1 3 1 5
Other 8 6
Totals
1 00% 1 00%

 

 

 

 

The “expected” percentage of Pulaar-speakers is just a little lower than the sample
percentage and the “expected” percentage of Wolof-speakers is just a little higher due to
the fact that I use the percentages for the overall regions although the sample is rural. In
the case of the Region of St. Louis, this means that the city of St. Louis, which is in the
Department of Dagana, is included in the statistics for the region. Only a minority of the
residents of the city of St. Louis are Pulaar, and the Department of Dagana, which
contains two additional urban zones, is only 25% Pulaar. In contrast, the two other
mostly rural departments (Podor and Matam) in the Region of St. Louis, which are well
represented in the sample, are both nearly 90% Pulaar. Nonetheless, the sample
percentages and the population percentages are quite close, and were one to exclude the
urban zones of Dagana, the differences would nearly completely disappear.

The sarrre explanation regarding the asymmetry across ethnic groups is also

relevant to the distribution of NFE respondents across regions.

90

Table 10: Crosstabulation of Region and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Region Respondents Respondents with
without NFE NFE

Diourbel 1 5% 9%
Thies 3O 28
St. Louis 29 46
Louga 12 9
Kaolack 14 8
Totals (709) (774)

l 00% 1 00%

 

 

 

 

As is clear from Table 10, the respondents from Saint Louis are “over-represented” in the
treatment group. Such is the case because PIP works nearly exclusively in Saint Louis,
Tostan’s program is very prominent there, and PAPA also operates in Saint Louis. The
dynamic Pulaar literacy movement actually began among the Halpulaar in Mauritania,
and then came to down to northern Senegal. Halpulaar from the north (e.g., the Region
of St. Louis) have been the driving force for the movement in Senegal, and it is really the
energy of the Pulaar literacy movement that has inspired the NFE in national languages
movement in Senegal more generally.

In general, from all of the information available, the sample of NFE respondents
appears very representative of the population from which it was drawn and the sample of
the comparison respondents appears to match the population on salient characteristics as
well.

Creating the Questionnaire
Development of a Draft of the Questionnaire

One of the ﬁrst steps in this project was to develop a draft of the questionnaire

that would be used to assess the relationship between education and civic and political

participation. This step in the research project involved intensive work in constructing

91

questions and scales. Some of the questions were formulated based on my past
experience with and knowledge of Senegal, while others were borrowed from
questionnaires such as the Afrobarometer and World Values Survey. A few of the scales
dealing with attitudes and dispositions were taken from Measures of Social-
Psychological Attitudes. In all cases, I spent signiﬁcant amounts of time modifying the
questions so that they would be appropriate for the Senegalese context. I asked several
survey experts to read the questionnaire and give me their feedback, and also solicited the
advice of experts on Senegal. I then used mock interviews to see how the questionnaire
ﬂowed and modiﬁed it accordingly. Prior to the pretest, the questionnaire had 220
variables.
Translation of the Questionnaire into Pulaar, Wolof, and French

The questionnaire was translated into Pulaar, Wolof, and French. Many steps
were taken to ensure the integrity, consistency and validity of the research instrument.
The questionnaire was ﬁrst translated into French from English. Because this is a critical
translation (all of the national language questionnaires were translated from this
translation), the French translation was given to an editor who used the English version to
edit and correct this translation. The French translation was then backtranslated into
English. The English backstranslation and the original English questionnaire were then
compared. Inconsistencies between these versions were identiﬁed, and the French
translation was then corrected and modiﬁed once again. The questionnaire was then
translated into Pulaar and Wolof. The Wolof and Pulaar questionnaires were then given

to two other translators so that they could be backtranslated into French.

92

Pretest

The pretest was successfully conducted in the suburbs of Dakar and villages of
Thies during September 2000. The 39 pretest returns were carefully scrutinized and then
entered into a database. Based on the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was
modiﬁed.

The testing of these materials revealed that much of the language was overly
sophisticated and inaccessible. Also, some of the vocabulary employed was region-
speciﬁc. Numerous additional work sessions were scheduled with members of the
research team so that the practical viability of these translations could be assessed and
ameliorated. The translations of the questionnaires were edited and corrected with
painstaking care. The research team received additional days of training after the pretest
so that the lessons of the pretest could be disseminated among and assimilated by the
members of the research team.

The data generated by the pretest was analyzed. Variances were checked, and
most of the questions with low variances were excluded on the ﬁnal questionnaire. The
validity of the questions was assessed. Factor analysis was employed to check
dimensionality and Cronbachs alphas were checked so that the internal reliability of the
scales could be assessed. Certain questions were reformulated (i.e., categories were
collapsed, question working was changed, etc.), as well as some of the scales. The

pretest also allowed us to close a couple open-ended questions.

93

Development of the Research Team and Research Protocol

Eight interviewers were hired to administer the questionnaire. Altogether, the
interviewers received seven days of training. Materials that would introduce the
interviewers to the project and principles of survey research and instruct the interviewers
on their role in the research process were developed and presented. Interviewers were
trained on the use of acceptable probes and clariﬁcations, and the list of standardized
probes was translated into French, Wolof, and Pulaar for their use. The supervisor and
interviewers learned how to draw a random sample of households at the village level and
how to randomly select a respondent at the household level.

Several measures were taken to minimize interviewer error. Either the supervisor
or primary researcher accompanied each team of interviewers to the research location.
Interviews were observed and all returns were examined. 1 went over the returns, if there
were any issues, and my notes from the interviewing process with the interviewers so that
they would improve their performance with each round of interviews and “debrieﬁng”

sessions were held every evening or every other evening.

External Validity
It is likely that many of the ﬁndings of this study would be generalizable to
Senegal as a whole and to other contexts, especially those in Africa. First, that part of the
Senegalese population not included in the study resemble those in the study in many
ways with regard to ethnicity, age, gender, and income, among other characteristics.

Second, many of the patterns of relationships found in this study are very comprehensible

94

and are likely to be applicable to other contexts. Third, education does appear to have
some sort of universal effects. That is, the ﬁndings of this study are consistent with the
ﬁndings of qualitative studies and other quantitative studies on the subject. Fourth, many
of the forces affecting those in the study, such as traditional culture, extended family
structures, a rural setting, and a low QOL are applicable in other settings. On the other
hand, I would expect certain relationships found in this study not to be applicable in
urban settings, for example.

As noted earlier, a conservative estimate of the percentage of adults who have
been involved with NFE in Senegal is 25%. NFE is in no way unique to Senegal. NFE
programs are found in the majority of sub-Saharan Aﬁican countries. NFE has been a
signiﬁcant force in countries across West Aﬁica, and some attempts have been made to
share information and strategies pertinent to NFE among practitioners in the different
countries in this region. In addition, NFE programs are found all the way down to
Africa’s southern most tip. Although it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd any global estimates of the
percentage of the population of people across sub-Saharan Aﬁica who have been touched
by NFE, some of the information on individual programs is instructive. In South Africa,
NFE reaches about 30 percent of adults who are not functionally literate (Walters 1999).

Nonformal education or adult education programs are spread across the globe, and
exist in signigicant numbers in the developing world and developed world alike. Because
of the need to address low literacy rates in developing countries, NFE has gained a
certain salience in such countries. Nonformal education has been a prominent force in
Latin America since the 19705 (Liam 2001). Nonformal education has also become a

presence in Asia. Subasi and Kehrberg (1998) report that one nongovernmental

95

organization, the United Mission to Nepal (UMN), began a district-wide program in

J ajarkot District (population 120,000) in 1991/1992. Between the start of the program
and 1996, women’s literacy rate increased from between 2% and 8% to between 12% and
23%. Mens literacy rate went from between 12% to 32% to somewhere between 51%
and 58%, according to Subasi and Kehrberg (1998). In short, the ﬁndings of this study
have implications not only for the countries of sub-Saharan Aﬁica, but for countries

across the globe.

96

Chapter 5

IN THE WORDS OF THE NFE PARTICIPANTS

Before examining the results of the quantitative analyses of the survey data,
which focus on the effects of NFE on political behavior and attitudes, it is important to
have an idea of the some of the more general effects NFE has on villagers’ orientations.
In this chapter, I report the ﬁndings emanating from the various qualitative research
methods I employed in order to establish and explicate the processes and mechanisms
that underlie the relationship between NFE and the attitudinal and behavioral orientations
of interest. In light of the qualitative nature of my approach in this chapter, I am
primarily concerned with identifying and exploring the themes and constructs emanating
from the interviews conducted. Where appropriate, I have tried to include as many
direct quotes from respondents as possible because it is their experience that I am largely
trying to capture in this section. The observations made in this chapter are based on
several methods of inquiry.

Methods
Participant/Observation Study

In 1989/90, I spent eights months in one of the 50 villages in the Region of Kolda
participating in the Culture of Aﬁican Development (CAD) Pulaar literacy/NF E program.
CAD was actually a precursor to Tostan. The program lasted nearly three years, from
1989-1992, and stood out as one of the lengthier literacy programs in the country of
Senegal. I observed the dynamics of the literacy program as implemented in this village.
This stage was a truly exploratory stage of my research strategy, as the subject I was to
study was not well deﬁned. Indeed, I was trying to view life and the NFE program

through the eyes of the village participants which precluded my having any pre-

97

conceived notion of the issues on which to focus. However, during my stay, certain

questions emerged which appeared to be the ones I should be asking.

In-Depth Interview with NFE Participants

During the summer of 1993, I conducted a survey of 11 out of 13 participants in
one Pulaar NFE class in Guedewaye, a low-income suburb of Dakar. I also surveyed 32
PIP village literacy teachers who were being trained by ARED in the northern city of
Ndioum. From these responses, it became clear that personal control and independence,
personal efﬁcacy, ethno-cultural pride, and developing a personal identity, among others,

were all important themes for NFE participants.

Iu-depth Interviews, Groups Interviews, and Examination of Documents

The majority of the direct observations I make in this chapter are based on the ﬁeldwork I
conducted in the summer of 1996. As noted earlier, Associates for Research and
Education for Development (ARED) has worked closely with PIP, supplying PIP’s
curriculum and training PIP’s village teachers and trainers. Established in 1990, ARED
is a not-for-proﬁt organization working in the area of education and research in national
languages, particularly Pulaar. ARED’s multifarious programs and activities fall into
three basic categories: 1) the editing and publishing of books, usually, in the Pulaar
language; 2) the development of training modules or educational curriculum to be used
by literacy programs throughout the nation of Senegal, and 3) the provision of trainings
for literacy teachers. I will explore the perspectives of PIP teachers who have been

trained in ARED teaching seminars and the perspectives of current and former

98

participants in PIP literacy courses that follow the ARED method. It is important to note
that, in many cases, the “teachers” or “facilitators” did not have advanced literacy and
numeracy skills and had themselves been participants in NFE literacy programs in the not
too distant past. In the case of the teacher training observed at St. Icuis, the majority of
those participating had some, albeit, in many cases, only a little, French schooling.
Before going to the ﬁeld (i.e., leaving the capital city of Dakar to go to the Fouta
Tooro in northern Senegal), I examined ARED’s records and reports. I then conducted
semi-structured and unstructured interviews with several of ARED’s staff members and
the director of the organization. Near the middle of July, 1996, I made my ﬁrst trip to the
ﬁeld. I chose to visit sites located in St. Louis, Richard Toll, Ross Bethio, Dagana, Keur
Momar Sarr and Linguere.51 During this time, I was able to conduct semi-structured
interviews with twenty-four PIP literacy teachers in northern Senegal. Respondents were
asked numerous questions meant to “get at” the effects of theteacher training seminars
and the literacy classes many of the respondents teach. For example, teachers were asked
how the seminar had inﬂuenced their teaching style, what they gleaned from the training
program, and many other questions of this nature. Respondents were also asked about
any changes in the behavior they observed among adult learners in the classes they taught
(given that they were teaching) either during the course or once they completed the
course. The questionnaire contained thirty-eight questions and was administered in a

ﬂexible manner in order to let respondents emphasize those areas that they perceived as

 

5’ While I had the option to choose among a multitude of possible sites, I chose these six for various
reasons. First, teacher training seminars were taking place at two of the sites at the time of my trip, and I
wanted to observe at least part of these trainings. Second, one of these sites is known for having dynamic
literacy campaigns. Third, these zones are known to differ on a range of socio-economic characteristics,
and I felt that the diversity would help me “tease out” the impact of teacher trainings from the effects of
other events and variables.

99

most important. I also interviewed several of those involved in coordination and
administration of NFE literacy courses in St. Louis, Richard Toll, Dagana, and Ross
Bethio.

In addition, I conducted fourteen unstructured group interviews in fourteen
villages found in the Departments of Dagana, Richard Toll, Ross Bethio, and Ndioum.
Several of these villages had had no literacy class. It was hoped that by visiting villages
untouched by literacy campaigns, it would be possible to more accurately assess how
literacy classes had affected communities that did have such programs.

Outcomes of Teacher Training

A recurring theme among respondents was that they had gained courage to teach
from participating in the seminar. One respondent noted that he had been aﬁaid to teach
before being trained by ARED. However, after receiving the “foundation” from the
training, he even had the “audacity” to teach for pay for a non-governmental
organization. Yet this new-found conﬁdence was not constrained to only the classroom.
One respondent noted that the training had changed her demeanor in her marriage as she
had become much more of an “advocate.” She also noted that the training allowed her to
reinforce the education of her children.

To my surprise, perhaps one of the most repeated themes by the respondents was
that the training seminars taught them how to better relate to other people, ranging from
family members to those of different ethnic groups and ways of life. One respondent
commented, “It helps us to have a new comportment. It shows how an individual should

be in a group and in social and collective life.” Another spoke of developing “cultural

100

competence.” Numerous others spoke simply of learning how to live with others. One
said that the training taught her to be open to everyone.
Financial Payoffs

Many of the teachers with whom I interacted spoke of the economic beneﬁts that
they had attained from their studies of Pulaar. For example, numerous teachers felt that
the ARED training program was responsible for the fact that they had received paid
positions as teachers. One respondent had commented that the training had improved his
work in commerce. The responses of many respondents indicated that ARED training
had helped them manage, ﬁnancially and otherwise, a wide range of activities.
The Efficiency of Learning in Pulaar
The ﬁndings of the survey reveal that one year of NFE appears to have a stronger effect
on the level on most civic and political behaviors than one year of French. Material from
the interviews with NFE teachers and participants both support this ﬁnding and help
explicate some of the reasons such is the case. Literacy teachers noted the massive
efﬁciency gains that are gleaned by learning in Pulaar as opposed to French. When asked
whether, if given a choice, they would have preferred to have been trained in Pulaar or
French, not one responded French. A curious theme that emerged from the interviews
was that French schooling was simply not sufﬁcient. One respondent who had had six
years of French schooling noted that despite her formal schooling, she was unable to
“resolve her problems.” “I can do a lot, all of my business, everything, I can do with
Pulaar.” Ironically, several respondents noted that studying Pulaar facilitated their
learning process in French. Many participants commented on the fact that the training

had allowed them to understand much of that which they had been exposed to in formal

101

schooling but had never fully grasped. Some noted that they were learning grammatical
rules in Pulaar that they had never learned in French.52

When asked about the language in which they thought non-literate people should
be taught, the overwhelmingly majority of teachers thought that literacy classes should be
in Pulaar. One teacher noted, “In Pulaar, you can learn to do mathematical computations
in six months but in another language you can study for three years and learn nothing.”
Another particularly poignant quote came from a literacy teacher of fourteen years: “[in
French]. . .they wouldn’t have even understood the letter A.” One teacher put it well:
“. . .[adult learners] do not know how to speak or write French. With Pulaar, at least they
have 50%.” The “multiplier effects” associated with learning Pulaar were highlighted in
one teacher’s story: “After one year [of studying Pulaar] I was able to teach, after four
years, my students made rapid progress—I could not have done that in French.”53

Out of the twenty-four teachers interviewed in July, 1996, nineteen were teaching
basic literacy classes of their own at that time. Eleven out of the twenty-four teachers
were women. The average class size for these teachers was around thirty-two, with
women representing an overwhelming majority of the learners in most places.54 Indeed,
while women were often underrepresented among teachers in various zones, they were

ahnost always signiﬁcantly over-represented among students. For example, in the Zone

of Richard Toll, only thirteen out of the forty-four teachers were women, whereas 790 out

 

’2 Perhaps another indicator of the insufﬁciency of the French language as a medium of education and
communication is the fact that a signiﬁcant number of the female respondents with six or more years of
formal education insisted on having an interpreter when speaking with me. One respondent who had ten
years of formal education claimed that she could speak French “only a little.”

3 Many of the neo-literate repondents echoed these points. One observed, “If I were to start to read French
now, I wouldn’t lose all of the time that those who start irrrrnediately with French lose.”
5" Linguere was a notable exception to this observation. Indeed, women were present in only small
numbers in the classes observed in this zone. The explanation for this situation is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.

102

of 1096 students were female. I will now explore the impacts participants or former
participants in PIP literacy courses taught by ARED trained teachers who use the basic

ARED literacy program felt literacy training had on their lives.

Empowerment Through Literacy

Efficacy and Control Over Self
Overall, the respondents seemed to feel empowered by their experience with literacy.
That is, in general, literacy training appeared to augment people’s feelings that they could
effectively handle the situations with which they were confronted in daily life. Many of
the respondents’ replies pertained to issues of personal efﬁcacy and independence.
Numerous respondents noted that, after literacy training, they were able to read and write
their own letters. Many respondents stressed that being able to do so allowed them to
keep their secrets. While some might dismiss these oft-heard remarks as rather trivial in
light of the magnitude of the problems facing villagers and their communities, one would
be in error to do so. The sheer frequency with which respondents recounted this new
found ability indicates that it represents something important to people. Indeed, being
able to read and write one’s own letters appears to be associated with the ideas of being
able to protect one’s interests and keep one’s personal business to oneself, thereby
maintaining control over self. Throughout all of the topics discussed with respondents
who participated in a literacy program, the theme of no longer needing an intermediary
was emphasized.

The idea of guarding one’s interests was also reﬂected in many of the examples

pertaining to economic transactions. One woman gave the example of keeping a record

103

of what one owes to a shop owner. She notes that if one writes down what she has paid
and what she owes, it is impossible to for the shop owner to make her pay more than she

actually owes. The theme of gaining courage was also echoed by neo-literates.

Self and Group Awareness

Many respondents expressed the idea that literacy training had allowed them to explore
and get to know themselves. They also spoke of being generally more aware and
conscious than they had been previous to their literacy training. Interestingly, the
metaphor of sleeping was frequently used by many when asked about the impact of
literacy. In describing the effects of literacy on villagers, one respondent commented,
“They are now more awake. They are able to document things, they are aware of
everything that is happening in the world. The others [non-literates] are sleeping.”
Another respondent referred to the individual responsibility required in the learning
process in rather interesting terms: “Knowledge is not hereditary, you have to learn it.
Also, you can’t borrow it.”

Yet at the same time that the idea of getting to know oneself was stressed,
respondents also strongly emphasized that they had become more social as a result of the
training. Many of the same themes regarding changes in demeanor and an openness to
the outside emerged in these interviews just as they had in those with literacy teachers.
One theme highlighted in the interviews was the idea that literacy allowed one to share
more effectively. One respondent noted that one could share one’s ideas with another

even when one was not present through the written word. Another respondent noted that

104

a great deal of knowledge among the Fulbe had been lost because it was not written
down. Hence the Fulbe adage, “When an old person dies it is like a library that burns.”
Ong captures the dialectic between the heightened sense of self generated by participation
in the literacy program and the heightened sense of sociability. He writes, “Writing
introduces division and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It intensiﬁes the sense of
self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness
raising” (1991, 179). The process by which literacy leads to such concepts as autonomy
and empowerment is much debated. According to Oxenham:
The two preceding paragraphs imply that the technology of literacy has served not
simply the intended practical purposes of storing and communicating information.
Vastly more important, it seems to have enabled the growth and development of
the human reason and its power to combine different sources of information to
produce even more understanding and inspiration. It has been potent, too, in the
grth of self-consciousness and self-understanding (1980, 43).
One respondent who had no French education and only a year of Pulaar literacy training
noted echoed many of Oxenham’s and Ong’s contentions regarding literacy. He
observed:
The fact that I have pursued literacy has helped me in my work. It has given me
courage to go all the way with things, to be more rigorous and curious. I used to
do things by routine. Before, I couldn’t give the dates of your visit. I didn’t have
memory, precision or observation. Writing has been the most important thing
because I can ﬁx ﬁrmly on something.
However, Oxenham and others are forced to admit the context in which learning
occurs often has a substantial effect on the type of cognitive and psychological processes

that take place on the part of the learner. Indeed, Street is critical of the autonomous

model of education and claims that it is difﬁcult to distinguish between the positive

105

effects resulting from literacy and those resulting from a particular social and cultural
experience (1995, 22-23).

Daily Tasks

The respondents conceptualized literacy as helping them in performing daily tasks in
countless ways. Perhaps the mundane nature of some of the examples enumerated by
respondents indicates the fact that reading and writing has been integrated into nearly
every aspect of people’s daily lives. For example, one woman noted that when she is
cooking and ﬁnds that she lacks a key ingredient, she sends a note with a child who can
then procure the missing item.

Changes in the Community Due to Literacy

Literacy training has not only worked at the micro-level, rendering individuals more
efﬁcacious and independent, but has also had a macro-level effect on the community.
According to those interviewed, the changes that have taken place in communities with
literacy programs are substantial, and these changes are attributed directly to the literacy
programs. One of the ARP ofﬁcials commented that it is easier to address and solve
social problems in communities that have had a literacy program because it is easier to
talk to someone who is literate than someone who is not. “There is a difference. In
villages that have had a literacy class, all that you bring, people understand; in other
villages, you have to explain to make people understand.”

m. The theme of being able to manage or better manage development projects due
to literacy skills was one repeated throughout the interviews. Respondents in Ross

Bethio brought up the example of agriculture. They recounted that before becoming

106

literate in Pulaar, SAYED55 had to do all of the administration and paperwork for the 448
members of the association working in the domain of agriculture. However, now that
there has been a literacy class in this community, the members of the association are able
to do all of the administrative tasks by themselves and thus the association has become
self-managed. Respondents in a group interview in the zone of Dagana noted that once
they gained literacy skills they were able to deal with donors and banks directly, whereas
before they had to use the government as an intermediary.

The president of a women’s association in Ross Bethio notes that the association
“had problems” before its members had participated in a literacy program. However,
now that they have participated, the members are able to effectively record all credits and
debts. Moreover, she claims, they are able to write projects for donors themselves now.
In addition, their literacy skills have facilitated their ability to organize and call meetings.

Further, many respondents noted that their literacy skills helped them be more
effective in work they did before literacy training. The idea of being able to be precise in
one’s activities was often repeated by respondents. In fact, although they did not call it
by such, respondents essentially described doing their own micro cost-beneﬁt analyses.
Several of those interviewed said that they would calculate the costs of purchasing some
type of input, the beneﬁts they expected to obtain from purchasing the input, and then
make a decision on whether to go ahead with the purchase based on the expected proﬁts
or losses associated with doing 50. Others noted that they would be able to read books
that would teach them how to do their work more effectively. For example, one person

noted that they could now read books on how to take care of animals.56

 

’5 SAYED is a Senegalese parastatal working in the area of agriculture.
56 One of the books published and sold by ARED addresses this issue precisely.

107

Sociability. Other important changes in the level of sociability among NFE participants
have also been reported in other reports and evaluations. In the Ferlo area of Senegal,
men initially brought arms (e. g., machetes) to the NFE classes. (Based on my
knowledge, the Ferlo is the only area of Senegal where this behavior occurs). The village
“facilitators” and program participants reported that men have stopped bringing arms to
class, largely because of the positive socialization effects emanating from the NFE
experience.57
Economic Benefits and Incentives

One theme that ran through the interviews was that becoming literate was critical
for advancement. One respondent commented that to be successful in economic life, it is
absolutely necessary to be literate. Hence, ﬁnancial incentives were seen as motivating
people to join literacy programs.

Many of those who participated in literacy programs listed the new types of
activities in which they are able to engage now that they have gained basic literacy skills.
For example, in a group interview in a small F ulbe village in Keur Momar Sarr, those
being interviewed noted that they were able to participate in tie-dying, animal husbandry
and sowing projects because of their newly acquired skills. These skills allowed them to
manage projects that they could not manage before obtaining literacy skills.

Many respondents exhibit at least a degree (and some, quite a bit) of altruism.
While I in no way want to diminish the competitive nature of economic relations or the
strong economic incentives driving many to pursue their education in Pulaar, it is also
important to point out that many literacy teachers are not paid. When asked why they

teach, several of those interviewed responded that they wanted to help their family

 

’7 Personal cormnunication from Mamadou Ly, member of ARED.

108

members, ﬁiends, and/or those in the community reach the same level of knowledge and

fulﬁllment that they had reached through the study of Pulaar.

Ethno/Cultural Identity and Advancement

However, advancement was not limited to the individual. Many teachers and
class participants alike responded that they wanted to “push the Pulaar language forwar ”
or develop the Pulaar language. Moreover, many respondents noted that they beneﬁted
from NFE because they were able to “master Pulaar” or “master their maternal
language” through the training that they received. In fact, the idea of bettering oneself
and further developing one’s language were intertwined for some. One respondent
contended, “To respect yourself, you must respect your language; a language drives a
culture. Therefore, when one doesn’t know one’s language, one is not cultivated.” One
neo-literate man in the northern region of Senegal echoed this point of not being able to
respect oneself without fully knowing one’s language (i.e., reading and writing as well as
speaking a language), but added the point that when one does not respect oneself, one
cannot respect another. Further, others expressed the notion that a country cannot

advance unless the people know their own language.

The Impact of Literacy on Women
While the illiteracy rate of Senegal is 68%, women comprise a disproportionately large
part of that group. Indeed, the rate of female illiteracy is 77% while that for men is

59%.58 Given the extent to which females are overrepresented in these nonformal

 

’8 These rates were reported in the Bilan de la Campagne Nationale d ’Alphabetisation 1995, which is put
out by the Direction de l’Alphabetisation et l’Education de Base of the Senegalese government.

109

literacy classes due to limited access to formal schooling, it is important to assess the
impact of Pulaar literacy speciﬁcally on women. When asked about the impact of
literacy training on women in particular, the president of a women’s association with a
substantial membership listed a plethora of differences she perceived between literate
women and their non-literate counterparts. For example, she found the women who had
participated in a literacy program to be more aware of that going on in the world around
them and to be more likely to speak in meetings. Moreover, she found that literate
women run their homes differently than those who are not literate. Those who are literate
tend to take their children to the clinic more often those who are not. They also have a
greater proclivity to actively teach their children things. Finally, the president was
convinced that those who were literate are, on average, more likely to engage in family
planning than those who are not literate. In fact, this respondent’s observations are
consistent with the ﬁndings of some qualitative studies on nonformal education programs
(e. g., see Comings, Smith and Shretha 1994).

Further, these observations are corroborated by the statements of other
respondents. One respondent commented on the fact that women of the village could
now identify illnesses and follow the appropriate procedures to respond to the illnesses
whereas they could not do so before their literacy training. The attitudinal change in
women generated by the women’s participation in literacy class seemed to mediate
between literacy and some of the behavior changes noted above. As noted elsewhere,
many women themselves felt that their demeanor had changed as a result of their

participation in a literacy class. One woman commented that becoming literate had

110

helped her get over her shame when speaking in front of others. Other women noted that
they had gained conﬁdence ﬁom participating in a literacy program.

The testimonies of students and the theoretical literature suggest that the group
experience associated with nonformal education helps to generate many of the positive
outcomes associated with these programs.

Implications

NFE may well serve a critical mission in the development process in Senegal.
According to Ake, the current way of conceptualizing development “. . .discourages any
belief in the integrity and the validity of African societies and offers the notion that
Aﬁican societies can ﬁnd validity only in their transformation, that is in their total self-
alienation” (1996, 16). Indeed, this conceptualization of development has been an
underlying assumption of many the development programs and formal educational
systems in African countries. It is this very chasm between the modern/westem and the
traditional/African that NFE seeks to diminish. For example, organizations such as
ARED claim to be dedicated to creating a dialogue between these two ends of the
modem/traditional continuum. Indeed, the testimonies of participants in both teacher
training seminars and literacy classes indicate that involvement in these programs
increases not only participants’ feelings of individual efﬁcacy, but also their cultural
pride. Is the type of cultural pride it instills is a healthy one? Those trained in literacy
appear to not only have an enhanced sense of their cultural identity, but also an increased
openness to those from the exterior and new ways of doing things. This issue demands

more examination.

111

The many personal stories of those who had participated in teacher training
programs and basic literacy classes seem to lead to the following conclusions.
Participation in trainings and classes appears to have enriched the lives of respondents by
rendering them more efﬁcacious, empowered, independent, and conﬁdent. It seems that
involvement in these programs has generally inspired respondents to participate in social
life more fully. Moreover, on the basis of the stories offered by those interviewed, it
appears that literacy programs have provided villagers with the means to constantly
increase their knowledge on issues pertinent to their lives as they can now read about
such issues. Furthermore, perhaps one can draw the conclusion that both the teacher
trainings and the basic literacy trainings transform participants’ relationships with other
people and institutions from being characterized by passive dependence to constructive

interdependence.

112

Chapter 6

NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS

In the qualitative interviews, respondents enthusiastically described the many
ways in which NFE had changed them and their lives. Now, we must assess whether
NFE does, in fact, have the effects it is claimed to have. Are those villagers with NFE
more likely to be active in the community, attending village meetings, occupying
positions of leadership in local associations, and cooperating with others to solve the
problems, than villagers without NFE? Are those with NFE more likely to be politically
active than those without NFE? Does NFE promote the adoption of democratic,
progressive attitudes? Does NFE facilitate or hinder the development of interpersonal
trust? In this chapter, the results of the bivariate analyses are examined and assessed.
The crosstabulations allow us to obtain an idea of the degree to which those with NFE
and those without NFE really differ in terms of political behavior and attitudes. The
results of the multivariate analyses are presented in the next chapter.

In these bivariate analyses”, those who have participated in one of the four
programs of interest (had NFE) are compared with those who have not had NFE through
one of the four programs. The bivariate tests are actually quite conservative in some
ways. Those with less than a year of NFE are still included in the “treatment” group.
Moreover, those respondents with no more than a year of literacy training comprise 28%

of the treatment group.

 

59 The 0.05 level of signiﬁcance will serve as the benchmark of signﬁcance.

113

Several comparisons are made. First, the differences between those with NFE and
those without NFE are examined for all respondents (see Table 19, which presents of the
summary of results). Second, since many programs target women, the effects of NFE on
women are examined speciﬁcally (see Table 20 for the summary of results for women
respondents). The effects of the individual programs are also examined in the bivariate
analyses (see the tables summarizing all of the results for the individual programs in
Apprendix A). As noted earlier, in the bivariate analyses, I look at speciﬁc subgroups
and therefore physically “control” for ethnicity and region in many analyses. In
multivariate analyses, I will control for ethnicity and other characteristics statistically.
For the speciﬁc programs, the objective is to compare those who have participated in the
program with those who reasonably could have, but did not. That is, I want to compare
those who have participated in the program with those who resemble them in terms of
key characteristics even in the bivariate analyses.60 Therefore, I look at the following
subgroups:

1) The analyses involving PIP are conﬁned to Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. I also
look simply at the subgroup of women Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis.
2) In the case of Tostan, I look speciﬁcally at the
a. subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies since the vast majority of
participants in the Tostan program are female and since all of the
participants in these two regions were trained in Wolof.
b. I also look at the effects of Tostan training on the subgroup of Pulaar-

speakers in St. Louis. In this case, the analyses are not restricted to just
women.

 

‘0 It should also be noted that in the analyses individual programs and subgroups, only those who had the
speciﬁc program being examined and those with no NFE at all were included. Hence, those who had NFE
from a program other than one of the four were excluded.

114

3) In the case of PAPF, the analyses involved women in the regions where PAPF is
active: Louga and Diourbel.

4) When looking at PAPA, the analyses are restricted to women in the regions where
PAPA is active: St. Louis, Thies, and Kaolack.61
While the intention is to render the comparison groups as similar as possible, in some
cases the sizes of the subgroups are relatively small and, therefore, relationships are
more difﬁcult to detect.
Civic Engagement
Community Participation
It was hypothesized that those villagers in the regions of study with NFE would
exhibit higher levels of community participation than their counterparts without NFE.
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of the bivariate analyses. One
indicator of community participation is whether people have ever cooperated to solve a
community problem. The chi square test of independence is used to determine whether
relationships are statistically signiﬁcant in these bivariate analyses. The percentage
difference of those reporting to have cooperated to solve a community problem between
those with NFE and those without is large and statistically signiﬁcant (p = .000) (see
Table 19). Although only 38% of those without NFE report having cooperated to solve a
community problem, 58% of those with nonformal education report having done so. The
relationship remains statistically signiﬁcant when the analysis is restricted to women (see
Table 20): while only 35% of women without NFE report having cooperated, 56% of

women with NFE report having done so. This relationship between NFE and cooperation

 

6’ The overwhelming majority of participants in both PAPA and PAPF are women. Indeed, 87 percent of
the respondents who have had PAPF training are women and 92 percent of those with PAPA training are
women.

115

to solve a community problem is replicated across all four of the programs and all of the
subgroups of interest (see tables in Appendix A). Among women in Diourbel and Thies,
the difference in the percentage of those reporting having cooperated between the group
with Tostan training and the group without Tostan training is thirty percentage points (see
Table A4).

Cooperation is a key variable since it is through collective action that the general
welfare of communities can be pursued, and cooperation is a core aspect of “social
capital.” 1, therefore, careﬁrlly interrogate this ﬁnding. This ﬁnding is consistent the
testimonies of NFE participants who claim to that NFE has led villagers to engage with
each other in addressing the problems that confront the community. In addition, Kuenzi
(1997) found a strong, positive relationship between NFE and cooperating to solve a
community problem among Pulaar-speakers in northern Senegal in a small pilot study. It
could be the case, however, that people consider being involved in NFE a way to
confront the problem of illiteracy in the village and respond to the question with that in
mind. This would mean that NFE was not actually affecting any behavior outside of
being engaged in NFE. Respondents were asked to describe the nature of the problem
they had addressed and were allowed to give up to three examples. Twenty-ﬁve
respondents report that they helped to address the problem of illiteracy, but only one
respondent gave this as her sole example. In fact, the most commonly cited problem
respondents reported cooperating to address was that pertaining to keeping the village
clean. The second most commonly cited problem was addressing issues surrounding

water (e. g., digging wells, etc.). Respondents also reported addressing problems related

116

to development more generally, health (e.g., building a health hut), contributing to a
group vegetable garden, building mosques, among other “problems.”

Although the relationship between having NFE and responding afﬁrmatively to
the cooperation question seems strong and consistent, it could be the case that more
active people tend to get involved in NFE. Under this scenario, those with nonformal
education exhibited high levels of community participation before ever becoming
involved in a NFE program. In order to assess the extent to which “selection” poses a
threat to the ﬁndings, I examine the level of cooperation at different levels of NFE.

The ﬁrst level of NFE is comprised of those who have had one year or less of
nonformal education (but more than zero years). It is worth noting that this group
contains 33 respondents who have had less than six months of NFE. The second group
contains those who have had no more than two years but more than one (in reality, all of
those in this group have had two years of NFE). The third group contains those who have
had no more than three years but more than two years. And, ﬁnally, the fourth group is
comprised of those who have had more than three years of NFE. Below is a cross

tabulation of the cooperation responses and level of literacy.

117

Table 11: Crosstabulation of Cooperating to Solve Community Problem and Level
of NFE

 

 

 

 

 

Reported 0 years of 0<NFE51 1<NFE§2 2<NFE53 Over 3

Cooperating NFE years of

with Others NFE

No 61% 58% 38% 34% 33%

Yes 39 42 62 66 67

Totals (706)* (216) (293) (122) (143)
100 100 100 100 100

 

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

The idea that selection and not NFE may be responsible for the high level of
cooperation among NFE respondents is not supported by this crosstabulation. Were
selection responsible for the effects that are attributing to NFE, we would expect those in
the ﬁrst level of NFE to have a similar rate of cooperation as those in the other groups. In
fact, we see in Table 11 that the rate of cooperation of those with little NFE is not a lot
greater than that of those without any NFE. The percentage of those reporting
cooperation increases by 20% when one moves to the level of two years of NFE, and
increases slightly as we move to the next two levels of NFE. In this case, two years of
NFE seems like a threshold.

Membership in a community organization is also an indicator of community
participation. Those respondents with NFE are more likely to be members of community
organizations than are those without NFE. Indeed, there is a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between having NFE and reporting that one is a member of a community
organization (p = .000). Eighty-six percent of those with NFE report belonging to a
community organization while only 61 % of those in the “control” group (i.e., those
without NFE) do. The relationship is still statistically signiﬁcant when the analysis is

restricted to only women (p = .000). Each individual NFE program registers a signiﬁcant

118

 

 

relationship with membership in a community organization, as those in each of the
programs are more likely to belong to a community organization than their counterparts
in the control group.

Information was taken on up to three organizations in which the respondent
reported being a member. With reference to the ﬁrst organization (1097 respondents
report membership in at least one organization, compared to 395 and 113 reporting
membership in two organizations and three organizations, respectively, so it seems
reasonable to look at just the ﬁrst set of responses) to which people claimed membership,
the preponderance report membership in a village development association (31%). The
second most popular type of organization is the woman’s credit circle (23%). From
there, the membership is thinly spread across different types of organizations: youth
groups, religious groups, Groupement d ’Interet Economique (GIE), ofﬁcial women’s
groups that are associated with Federation Nationale des Groupements F eminins), among
others.

Although the testimonies of those involved in the NFE sector support the ﬁnding
that NFE renders one more likely to be member in a community organization, I wondered
if maybe people considered PIP or Tostan classes to be “village development
organizations” and therefore responded yes to the membership question. This seems
unlikely because, when asked about solving a community problem, only twenty-ﬁve
respondents mentioned anything about NFE and only one respondent mentioned
exclusively NFE. Still, I compare the distribution of responses between the NFE and
non-NFE respondents who report associational membership. Among the NFE

respondents claiming to be members of an organization, 31% say that they are in a village

119

development organization. Among the non-NFE respondents reporting membership in an
association, 31% claim to be in a village development organization. The “other”
category could also be a repository of the responses of those thinking of NFE as a
“community organization.” In fact, the difference in the percent of NFE respondents
choosing the “Other” category and percent in the comparison group doing so is less than
a percentage point. In short, the relationship between NFE and group membership
appears real.

Respondents were also asked if they occupied a leadership position in the
associations to which they belonged (Question 21D). As we see in Table 19, while only
19% of those without NFE report that they occupy a leadership position, 47% of those
with NFE do. This relationship is almost perfectly replicated when we look at only the
women respondents. The difference between “treatment” and “control” groups is perhaps
most salient in the case of Pulaar speakers in Saint Louis. Only 17% of those without PIP
report occupying leadership positions compared to 57% of those with PIP training. The
relationship is largely the same when the analysis is restricted to just women (see Table
A2).

Attending village-wide meetings is also related to NFE; those respondents with
NFE are more likely to attend village meetings at least occasionally than are their
counterparts in the control group. When one looks at the subgroups, the relationship
holds for all of the programs but PAPF. It is worth noting that the rate of reported
attendance is very high for the women with PAPF: 93% report attending at least on
occasion. However, because the level of reported attendance in the comparison group is

very high as well (87), no relationship is detected.

120

Respondents were also asked about the frequency with which they speak out at
meetings. There is a big difference between the proportion of NFE and non-NFE
respondents who report that they never speak out. Thus, I speciﬁcally compare the
percent of both groups that report ever speaking out at meetings. While only 43% of
those without NFE report speaking out at meetings at least occasionally, 67% of those
with NFE do. The difference between NFE and non-NFE respondents is also large and
statistically signiﬁcant when we look at just women; while only 32% of those without
NFE report that they speak out at meetings at least occasionally (i.e., do not respond
never), 63% of those with NFE report doing so. The relationship between speaking out
and nonformal education is statistically signiﬁcant for all four of the programs and for all
of the subgroups. Once again, among the subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies, the
difference between those with Tostan and those without is striking: only 28% of those in
the control group report speaking in meetings at least occasionally compared to 75% in
the Tostan group, for a difference of 47 percentage points.

I was also interested in whether respondents had gotten together with others to
raise issues. The chi square test of independence reveals that there is a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between reporting to have raised an issue at least once and having
NFE. As can be seen in Table 19, 71% of those with NFE report that they have gotten
together with others to raise an issue compared to 52% of those with no NFE. Similarly,
69 % of women with NFE report raising an issue compared to only 47% of women
without NFE. This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant across all of the programs and

subgroups.

121

Since a ﬂourishing civil society is an important requisite for a healthy democracy,
I was interested in assessing the number of organizations to which people belonged.
Respondents were asked about membership in up to three organizations. As can be seen
in the cross tabulation below, the percentage of respondents with NFE exceeds the
corresponding percentage of non-NFE respondents for every number but zero. The
relationship between number of organizations to which one belongs and NFE is
statistically signiﬁcant when the analysis is restricted to just women (see Table 20) and is
statistically signiﬁcant for all of the individual programs of study.

Table 12: Crosstabulation of Number of Community Organizations in which one
has Membership and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of Respondents without Respondents with
Organizations NFE NFE

0 39 14

1 46 48

2 1 1 26

3 3 12
Totals (707) (773)

100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson ch12(3) = 176.0594 p=.000

Electoral Participation

It was hypothesized that, on average, levels of electoral participation would be
higher among those with NFE than among those without. The bivariate analyses
indicate that the only relationship that exists with NFE in this area is that with being
registered to vote. As noted earlier, younger people are over represented in the group that

has had NFE, and age has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive relationship with electoral

122

participation (many of the respondents in the NFE group were not of age to vote in some
of the elections about which they were asked).

As we can see from Table 20, when we restrict our analysis to women, the
relationship between registering to vote and NFE is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
Being registered to vote is related to participation in Tostan, as we see in Table A.4, for
the regions of Thies and Diourbel. However, the bivariate analyses do not show any of
the other speciﬁc programs to have a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with being
registered to vote. Reporting having voted in the ﬁrst round of the presidential election,
in the second round of the presidential election, and in the parliamentary elections are
also indicators of electoral participation. Chi square tests of independence show all of
these indicators to be independent of NFE and all of the individual programs. Voting in
local elections is independent of NFE and PAPA. The relationship between this indicator
and participation in PAPF is statistically signiﬁcant but a smaller percentage of those
with PAPF than those without PAPF report being registered to vote. The same is the case
for PIP when we restrict the test to only women in Saint Louis and for Tostan when we
restrict the test to St. Louis. The most likely explanation for these results is that age is a
confounding factor, and there are forces much more prominent than NFE driving voting
behavior in local elections. The multivariate relationships allow the confounding effects
of age to be addressed.

Political Interest and Engagement

Respondents were also asked other questions intended to tap their level of

political engagement. Being at least somewhat interested in politics is not statistically

signiﬁcantly related to the general NFE variable. However, having PAPA training is

123

related to this variable: those respondents who have had PAPA training are more likely to
report being at least somewhat interested in politics than those respondents with no NFE.
PAPF training is also related to this variable, but a smaller percentage of those with
PAPF claim to be at least somewhat interested in politics than those without PAPF. The
variable discussing politics at least sometimes (see Question 70) is statistically signiﬁcant
with the aggregate NFE variable when all respondents are included in the analysis and
when one looks at only women. Those with NFE are more likely to report discussing
politics at least sometimes than are those without NFE. There is also a statistically
signiﬁcant association between discussing politics and all of the program variables except
PAPF. That these political variables do not have the expected relationship is actually not
surprising given that PAPF’s respondents have the lowest average age (although PIP’s
mean is nearly exactly the same).

Whether or not one feels close to a party is also related to NFE. Those with NFE
are more likely to feel close to a political party than those in the control group are. This
relationship is statistically signiﬁcant for all of the speciﬁc programs except PAPF. Since
this is the program with the lowest average age, controlling for age is especially
important. When one restricts the analysis of PIP to only women, this relationship is also
not statistically signiﬁcant. In fact, average age is nearly the same for PIP as for PAPF,
and it was felt that controlling for age would probably change to nature of the results.
When logit models were run that controlled for age, the relationship was indeed
statistically signiﬁcant for PIP but not for PAPF.

Social and Political Attitudes

Political Efﬁcacy

124

It was hypothesized that those with NFE would tend to feel more politically
efﬁcacious than would those without NFE. The ﬁndings from the bivariate analyses do
not offer support for this hypothesis. Paired statements were used to assess respondents’
feelings of efﬁcacy (see Questions 45-48 in Appendices B or C). For example,
respondents were asked to choose between these two statements:

1) In discussions about politics with ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the
opinions of others.

2) As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me.
Feeling capable of inﬂuencing the political opinions of others, as measured by this
question, is not related to the general NFE variable, years of NFE, or any of the speciﬁc
programs, even when one just looks at various subgroups therein. Respondents were also
asked about the extent to which they were able to understand the way government
operates (see question 46). No relationship between feeling like one is generally able to
understand the way government operates and NFE is found, nor are any statistically
signiﬁcant relationships found between this indicator and any of the four programs.
Respondents were also asked about whether they felt that they could make elected
representatives listen to them. Again, feeling capable of making elected representatives
listen is not signiﬁcantly related to NFE or participation in any of the individual
programs. Finally, respondents were asked to choose between:

1) No matter whom we vote for, things will not get any better in the future.
2) We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.
Opting for the second declaration is not related to NFE or participation in any of the

individual programs.

125

Authoritarianism/Progressiveness

It was hypothesized that those respondents with NFE would be more progressive
(or less authoritarian and less traditional) than their counterparts without NFE. This
hypothesis is supported. Respondents were also asked a set of questions that were
intended to measure their level of progressiveness or authoritarianism and traditionalism.
For example, respondents were asked to choose between the declaration that all members
of a family should hold the same political opinions and the declaration that all family
members should be free to make up their own minds on political issues (see Question 69
in Appendices B or C). Those with NFE are more likely to choose the declaration that
family members should be free to make up their own minds than are those without NFE.
The relationship between NFE and choosing free to make up own mind is statistically
signiﬁcant, as are those between choosing free to make up own mind and PIP (although
when we restrict the analysis to women it is not) Tostan and PAPF. Participation in
PAPA is not related to this indicator.

With the next indicator (see Question 70 in Appendices B or C), I attempt to see
whether the respondent believes that a married woman should vote the way her husband
does or that everyone should decide for him/herself for whom to vote. This indicator is
related to NFE generally, participation in PIP, and participation in Tostan, with a higher
percentage of those in the treatment groups choosing that everyone should make their
own choice than of the comparison group. This indicator is independent of PAPA and
PAPF.

The third indicator of “progressiveness” (see Question 71) again focuses on views

toward women. Respondents were asked to choose between two declarations:

126

1) A woman’s place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics.

2) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics even if her husband
disagrees.’32

Those with NFE are more likely to opt for the second declaration than are those in the
control group. NFE has a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with this indicator when all
respondents are included in the test as well as when the test is restricted to just women,
and all of the programs register a signiﬁcant relationship with this indicator except
PAPA.

Two indicators are intended to measure the extent to which people are open to change
(see Questions 72-3). Respondents were asked to select the statement with which they
agreed most between the following two:

1) Our customs and ethnic heritage are things that have made us great, and certain
people should be made to show greater respect for them.

2) We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development.
Those with NFE are more likely to opt for the second declaration than are those in the
control group. This indicator is related to NFE when one looks at all respondents and
when only women are included in the analysis. As for individual programs, participation
in PIP and PAPA are related to this indicator, while participation Tostan and PAPF are
not.

The next indicator deals with the types of values to be nurtured in children:

obedience and respect for authority or curiosity and open-mindedness (the latter option

 

62 In the ﬁrst 100 interviews, the part of the phrase “even if her husband disagrees” was left off of the
questionnaire. This omission did appear to increase the likelihood of choosing the second response
slightly. However, the relationship between NFE and this indicator is signiﬁcant when these cases are
excluded.

127

representing the progressive choice). Those with NFE are more likely to choose that
curiosity and open-mindedness are the most important values to nurture in children than
are those without NFE. Bivariate analyses showed this indicator to be related to NFE
both when we looked at all respondents and just women, PIP and Tostan for the region of
St. Louis (the relationship was not statistically signiﬁcant when we looked at women in
the regions of Thies and Diourbel).

Trust

Interpersonal Trust. It was hypothesized that interpersonal trust would decrease with
NFE. This hypothesis ﬁnds some support in the results of the bivariate analyses. Again,
forced choice questions were used to measure levels of trust. Respondents were asked
whether they thought that nobody is going to care much about what happens to you or
that you could depend on people to help you, when in a pinch. In fact, those with NFE
are less likely to opt for the more trusting response than those without NFE, and the
relationship between the general NFE variable and this indicator is statistically signiﬁcant
(see Question 53). Respondents were then asked if generally speaking, most people can
be trusted or if you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (see Question 54). This
second indicator does not register a signiﬁcant relationship with any of the programs
except PIP. When the test for PIP is restricted to just women, the relationship with PIP is
statistically signiﬁcant, and the percentage of those with PIP who opt for the more
trusting response is smaller than that of the control group. Moreover, although the other
programs do not register signiﬁcant relationships, for both the subgroups of Pulaar-
speakers in St. Louis and women in Diourbel and Thies, those with Tostan are less likely

to choose the trusting response than are those in the control group. Finally, respondents

128

were asked whether people were more inclined to help others or to look out for
themselves. Participation in Tostan has a signiﬁcant association with the third indicator
of interpersonal trust for the subgroup of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis, with a higher
percentage of the Tostan group choosing the trusting response (i.e., that people are more
inclined to help others).

Institutional Trust. Interestingly, the results of my analyses are somewhat similar to those
of Rose et al. 1998 in their studies of the postcommunist countries. Rose et al. ﬁnd that
the churches and the army are the most trusted institutions. I ﬁnd that the Muslim
religious brotherhoods are by far the most trusted in Senegal. After the Muslim
brotherhoods, the army is one of the most trusted institutions. I will now look at the
effect of NFE on trust in this institutions as well as political parties.

Table 13: Crosstabulation of Trust in Political Parties and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. 20 21

Distrust a little. 13 14

Trust Somewhat. 19 29

Trust a lot. 48 37

Totals (636) (733)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson chi2(3) = 26.5257 Pr = 0.000

From the results of this crosstabulation, we can see that the hypothesis about institutional
trust was not supported: trust appears to decrease with NFE. However, we can see that
the biggest shift seems to occur between trusting political parties a little and a lot. That
is, NFE appears to increase the likelihood that people will trust political parties somewhat

as opposed to a lot, but it does not appear to increase the likelihood that one will distrust

129

parties. As opposed to rendering people distrustful, NFE appears to introduce a little

realism into people’s perspectives, engendering a type of healthy skepticism.

Table 14: Crosstabulation of Trust in the Army and NFE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. 5 7

Distrust a little. 3 7

Trust Somewhat. 7 14

Trust a lot. 84 72

Totals (666) (742)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson ch12(3) = 30.5285 Pr = 0.000

From the table, we can see that those with NFE trust the army less than those
without NFE. However, NFE appears to be especially associated with causing people to
trust somewhat as opposed to a lot.

Since the membership in the Mouride brotherhood is primarily Wolof in
membership and association with the brotherhoods is not evenly distributed across the
ethnic groups, I look at the effect of NFE on trust levels for the Wolof and Pulaar
respondents separately.

Table 15: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof Respondents

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. 0 0

Distrust a little. 0 0

Trust Somewhat. 3 3

Trust a lot. 97 97

Totals (206) (332)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

130

From Table 15, we can see that NFE has no effect on Wolof respondents’ level of trust in
the Mouride brotherhood. This trust level is extremely high; not one Wolof respondent
reports distrusting the Mouride brotherhood even a little.

Table 16: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarophones

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. 18 26

Distrust a little. 1 1 17

Trust Somewhat. 9 23

Trust a lot. 62 34

Totals (206) (332)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson chi2(3) = 42.8013 Pr = 0.000

In contrast to the situation with Wolof respondents, NFE appears to have a
substantial impact on Pulaarophones level of trust in the Mouride brotherhood, which is
much lower than that of the Wolof respondents in the ﬁrst place. On average, those with
NFE are much less likely to report a high level of trust in the Mouride brotherhood than
are those without NFE.

Table 17: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof-Speakers

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. 1 1

Distrust a little. 1 1

Trust Somewhat. 5 5

Trust a lot. 94 93

Totals (298) (229)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson chi2(3) = 0.6738 Pr = 0.879

131

NFE appears unrelated to Wolof respondents’ level of trust in the Tidiane brotherhood,
which is quite high. Indeed, only 2% of the Wolof-speaking respondents expressed any

distrust in the Tidiane brotherhood.

Table 18: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarophones

 

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Trust Respondents without Respondents with
NFE NFE

Do not trust at all. .42 .5

Distrust a little. .84 0

Trust Somewhat. 1.68 4

Trust a lot. 97.06 95.51

Totals (238) (401)
100% 100%

 

 

 

 

Pearson chi2(3) = 5.9715 Pr = 0.113
Similar to what we saw above, NFE appears to be unrelated to Pulaar

respondents’ level of trust in the Tidiane brotherhood, which is very high. We see some
clear differences in the patterns of trust between the Wolof and Pulaar respondents. The
Wolof are more trusting of the brotherhood with which they are the most closely
associated than are the Pulaar respondents of the Tidiane brotherhood. The Wolof
respondents are also much more trusting of the brotherhood with which they are not as
closely afﬁliated (the Tidiane brotherhood) than are the Pulaar of the Mouride
brotherhood. It seems that NFE may have less of an effect on those attachments that

people hold as sacred.

Individualism/Social Distance
It was also hypothesized that those who participated in NFE programs would exhibit

higher levels of individualism than would those who have not participated in NFE

132

programs. The respondents were therefore asked about the frequency with which they
perceived that their opinions differed from (1) their relatives, (2) their friends, (3) other
people in the village, and (4) other people in the country. In the bivariate analyses I look
speciﬁcally at those who feel like their opinions differ from the relevant group at least on
occasion (i.e., those who did not choose “never”). Those with NFE are much more
likely to report that their views differ at least occasionally from their relatives, ﬁiends,
fellow villagers and fellow Senegalese than are the respondents in the control group.
When we look at women in Diourbel and Thies (see tables in Appendix A), we see that
only 59% of those without Tostan report that their opinions ever differ from their
families, compared to 88% of those with Tostan. With the exception of PAPA, NFE and
all of the individual program variables are found to be associated with all of these
indicators. Although chi square tests of signiﬁcance indicate that all of these indicators
are independent of participation in PAPA, those who have PAPA are more likely to
report having opinions that at least occasionally differ from the aforementioned reference
groups than are those in the comparison group.
Support for Democratic Values

It was hypothesized that those with NFE would, on average, exhibit higher levels of
political tolerance than those without NFE, although the relationship was not thought to
be straightforward. Based on survey data from other countries in Aﬁica, the author
suspected that those with NFE would feel that those without NFE, or those who are not
literate, should not have the right to vote. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that
those with NFE would, on average, be more supportive of democratic values than those

who do not have NFE. Five indicators are used to measure support for democratic

133

values. The hypotheses ﬁnd only mixed support in the results of the bivariate analyses.
First, respondents were asked whether those who are not literate should have the right to
vote (see Question 49). When we look at all respondents, the percent of NFE and non-
NFE respondents who think that those who are not literate should have a right to vote is
identical. In fact, the only statistically signiﬁcant relationship that is found is that with
Tostan when one looks at the subgroup of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. In this subgroup,
although 82% of those without Tostan feel that those who are not literate should have the
right to vote, only 72% of those with Tostan feel this way.

Similarly, respondents were asked to choose between the following declarations:

1) All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.

2) Only those who are sufﬁciently well educated should vote.
NFE is related to this indicator, with a larger percentage of NFE respondents choosing
the ﬁrst option than of non-NFE respondents. That is, those with NFE tend to opt for the
more tolerant declaration with greater relative frequency than do those without NFE. The
relationship remains statistically signiﬁcant when the analysis is restricted to only
women. However, the only individual program with which this indicator is statistically
signiﬁcant in bivariate analyses is Tostan, and then it is only statistically signiﬁcant for
subgroup of women in Thies and Diourbel (See Table A4).

Respondents were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement: “If people want to form a community organization, they should afﬁliate with
the ruling party” (see Question 50A). Those who have NFE are much more likely to
disagree with this statement than those in the control group. The relationship between

this indicator and NFE is statistically signiﬁcant, with, among women, only 12% of those

134

in the non-NFE group disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement, compared
to 26% of those in the NFE group. This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant for all of
the programs and subgroups at which we looked with the exception of PAPA.

Respondents were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “To
compromise with one’s opponents is dangerous because you betray your own side.” The
relationship between having NFE and this indicator is in fact statistically signiﬁcant when
all respondents are included in the test but a smaller percentage of those in the NFE group
than those in the control group chose the more democratic response. When the analysis is
restricted to women, however, the relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of the individual programs. The ﬁfth
indicator is also based on a forced choice question (see Question 51), which asked about
people’s rights to express dissenting views. While a few the relationships between NFE
participation and this indicator approach signiﬁcance, none are in fact statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
Locus of Control

It was hypothesized that, on average, people with NFE would be more likely to
exhibit an internal locus of control than would those without NFE. That is, NFE is
theorized to have an empowering effect on people. Therefore, people who have NFE, it
is thought, are more likely to feel that they are active agents in creating their own life
conditions than are those without NFE. This hypothesis ﬁnds some support in the results
of the bivariate analyses.

The ﬁrst indicator pertains to whether respondents see the government as being

primarily responsible for their well-being or they see themselves as being primarily

135

responsible (see Question 67). Although the general NFE variable is not related to this
indicator, participation in PAPA is, as is participation in Tostan for women in Diourbel
and Thies. That is, those who have PAPA training are more likely to see themselves as
responsible for their own well-being than are their counterparts in the control group.
Among the subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies, those with Tostan training are
also more likely to see themselves as opposed to the government as responsible for their
well-being than are those in the comparison group.

The next indicator is based on a question in which respondents had to choose
between whether accidental events or they themselves were primarily responsible for the
way their lives had gone (See Question 64). Only participation in Tostan is related to
this indicator, and this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant among Pulaar-speakers in St.
Louis. Among respondents in this subgroup, we can see that while only 33% of those
without Tostan feel they are primarily responsible for what has happened in their lives,
49% of those who have Tostan feel this way.

The third indicator was based on a question in which respondents either had to
choose between the declarations that they were often unable to protect their interests from
bad luck happenings or almost certain to make their plans work (Question 65). No
statistically signiﬁcant relationships are found between this indicator and participation in
NFE or the individual programs.

Finally, the last indicator of locus of control was based on the forced choice question:

1) Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.
2) With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals.

136

While this indicator is not related to the aggregate NF E variable or participation in PAPA
and PAPF, it is related to participation in PIP and Tostan across all of the subgroups
examined. Those with PIP training are much more likely to choose the declaration that
goals can be obtained through work and effort than are those in the comparison group.
When we look at Pulaar speakers in St. Louis, we see that although only 59% of those
without NFE choose this response, 78% of those with PIP do, and 71% of those with
Tostan do.

Contacting Public Ofﬁcials
Community Contacting
Those with NFE are much more likely to report having contacted an ofﬁcial about a
community problem then those without NFE. Although 55% of those with NFE report
having contacted an official regarding a community matter, only 38% of those without
NFE report having done so for a difference of 17 percentage points. While only 30% of
women respondents without NFE reported contacting an ofﬁcial about a community
problem, 53% of women with NFE reported doing so.
Particularized Contacting
Those with NFE are also more likely to report having contacted an ofﬁcial regarding a
personal problem then those without NFE. However, the difference is not as great as it
is for community contacting, and a larger percentage of respondents appear to engage in
particularized contacting. Fifty-two percent of those without NFE report having
contacted an ofﬁcial about a personal problem versus 63% of those with NFE. Similarly,
44% of women respondents without NFE report contacting an ofﬁcial about a personal

problem versus 60% of those with NFE.

137

Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a marabout for help with personal
problems with much greater frequency than than they report soliciting the help of any
other public ofﬁcial. In addition, the Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a
marabout more often than did the Pulaar respondents. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the institutional trust ﬁndings that the Wolof are generally more trusting of the Muslim
brotherhoods than the Pulaar respondents.

Although I do not report the results of these analyses, perhaps it is worth noting
that I used logit to examine the effect of years of NFE on all of the indicators included in
the bivariate analyses. In these multivariate analyses, I controlled for potentially
confounding variables such as income, age, gender, years of formal education, and
ethnolinguistic group. All of the relationships found to be statistically signiﬁcant in the
bivariate analyses for the aggregate NFE variable are also statistically signiﬁcant in the
multivariate analyses63 and, not surprisingly, several relationships that do not appear
statistically signiﬁcant in the bivariate are statistically signiﬁcant once controls are
introduced. More speciﬁcally, three of the voting variables are related to years of
nonformal education in the hypothesized direction. In any case, the bivariate
relationships will be more carefully scrutinized in multivariate analyses in the next

chapter.

 

63 I should note that in the case of one indicator of progressiveness, years of NFE and the ethnicity variables
together seemed to engender some collinearity problems, and therefore the coefficient for years NFE was
not signiﬁcant when the ethnic variables were included in the equation. When the ethnic variables were
dropped, it was highly signiﬁcant.

138

Table 19: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE
and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for All Respondents

Those without Those with

NFE NFE
n % n %

Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. 707 39 773 58*
(Question 24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20) 709 61 774 86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. 708 83 774 93*
(Question 22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 594 43 724 67*
23)
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least 709 52 774 71 *
once. (Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an 708 19 773 47*

organization. (Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27) 709 66 774 71 *
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 463 82 549 84
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) 463 79 548 81

(Question 29B)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 461 64 549 64
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 463 54 551 52
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 705 75 7 73 79
33)

Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 709 67 774 77*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 701 64 771 71 *
Political Efficacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics with 684 80 763 82
ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the opinion of

others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the way 683 49 767 45
government works.” (Question 46)

Percent choosing, “As a community, we are 682 70 767 70

generally able to make our elected representatives

listen to our problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters 691 80 766 78
to choose leaders who will help us improve our

lives.” (Question 48)

Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or

Progressiveness

139

Table 19 (cont’d).

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for
whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself.”
(Question 70)

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her
right to speak out about politics, even if her husband
disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of
the traditions that have blocked our development.”
(Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are
curiosity and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)
Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend
on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.”
(Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people
can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to help
others than to look out for themselves.” (Question
55)

Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of other people in their village.
(Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of most other people in the country.
(Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right
to vote. (Question 49)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want
to form a community organization, they should
afﬁliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise
is dangerous because you betray your own side.
(Question 50B)

140

694

698

644

691

694

699

676

695

709

709

708

709

702

692

684

61

34

34

52

47

81

31

45

68

67

64

63

75

19

37

772

771

670

769

769

769

762

767

774

774

774

773

771

760

754

72*

44*

47*

60*

59*

75*

27

44

89*

79*

79*

77*

75

28

30*

Table 19 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to
vote, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views
than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”
(Question 51)

Locus of control

Percent choosing, “People should look after
themselves and be responsible for their own success
in life.” (Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am
responsible for what happens to me.” (Question 64)
Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am almost
certain to make them work.” (Question 65)

Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I
can obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)
Individual Contacting

Ever Contacted An Ofﬁcial About Community
Problem

Ever Contacted An Ofﬁcial About Personal Problem

*Difference in percentages between non-NFE and NFE respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

141

698

678

698

675

678

697

706

705

74

57

36

68

74

38

52

772

768

769

757

763

770

765

763

52*

77

52

38

69

79

55*

63*

Table 20: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE
and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Female Respondents

Those without Those with

NFE NFE

n % n %
Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. 426 35 639 56*
(Question 24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 428 68 640 86*
20)
Attend at least some organizational meetings. 427 82 640 92*
(Question 22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. 354 32 593 63*
(Question 23)
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least 428 47 640 69*
once. (Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an 427 16 639 43*

organization. (Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27) 428 64 640 68
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 273 84 438 84
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election 273 79 437 81
(2000) (Question 29B)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 272 60 438 62
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 272 51 440 49
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 425 78 639 79
33)

Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 438 64 640 76*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 421 57 637 71*
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics 413 78 629 81

with ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the
opinion of others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the 416 48 633 45
way government works.” (Question 46)
Percent choosing, “As a community, we are 410 70 634 71

generally able to make our elected representatives

listen to our problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters 416 76 633 77
to choose leaders who will help us improve our

lives.” (Question 48)

142

Table 20 (cont’d)
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or
Progressiveness

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for
whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself.”
(Question 70)

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her

right to speak out about politics, even if her
husband disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some
of the traditions that have blocked our
development.” (Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are
curiosity and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)
Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can
depend on people to help you out, when you are in
a pinch.” (Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most
people can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to
help others than to look out for themselves.”
(Question 55)

Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question

5 SB)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of other people in their village.
(Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of most other people in the
country. (Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the
right to vote. (Question 49)

143

418

423

390

402

403

424

408

419

428

428

427

428

423

55

26

32

51

48

77

32

48

65

64

59

59

73

638

637

568

572

571

637

631

634

640

640

640

639

638

71*

39*

48*

62*

56*

77

26*

47

82*

77*

78*

75*

74

Table 20 (cont’d)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people
want to form a community organization, they
should afﬁliate with the ruling party. (Question
50A)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to
compromise is dangerous because you betray your
own side. (Question 50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted
to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views
than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”

(Question 51)

Locus of control
Percent choosing, “People should look after
themselves and be responsible for their own

success in life.” (Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am
responsible for what happens to me.” (Question 64)
Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am
almost certain to make them work.” (Question 65)
Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I
can obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)
Individual Contacting

Contacted Ofﬁcial About Community Problem
Contacted Ofﬁcial About Personal Problem

420

414

420

405

423

408

406

421

425
426

12

35

43

71

48

34

67

73

30
44

628

627

639

636

635

626

630

637

633
631

26*

31

49*

77

52

37

70

78*

53*
60*

*Difference in percentages between non-NFE and NFE respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

144

Chapter 7

NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

In the last chapter, we were able to obtain an idea of whether NFE affects
different political behaviors and attitudes. We were also able to get an idea of the
difference between the percentage of those with NFE engaging in a certain behavior or
holding a certain attitude and the percentage of those in the comparison group doing 50.
Yet many important questions remain unanswered. How do the effects of NFE compare
to those of formal education with regard to our political orientations of interest? How
much effect does each year of NFE or formal education have on the political orientation
of interest? How might other factors affect the relationship between NFE and the
political orientations of interest?

The multivariate analyses allow us compare the effects of NFE and formal
education on the behaviors and attitudes of study. Multivariate analyses are used to
check whether the results observed are actually due to variables not included in the
analyses, such as age, income, gender, ethnolinguistic identity, and years of formal
education.64 Also, it is important to see if the introduction of controls allows certain
relationships to be detected that were not detected in the bivariate analyses. In addition,
this chapter will examine the how much each year of education affects the likelihood of
having some of the political orientations of greatest interest. Indices were created from
the indicators of the constructs enumerated in the in the last chapter (see Appendix D for

a description of the indices). Thus, there are indices for community participation,

 

6’ Years of NFE and years of formal education are moderatley correlated (r = 0.11).

145

political interest/engagement, electoral participation, political efﬁcacy, trust,
progressiveness/authoritariani5m, distance/individualization, support for democratic
values, and locus of control.
Community Participation

Although all of the indicators of community participation are related to NFE and
all of the individual programs, I want to see how variables such as gender, age, ethnicity,
income and formal schooling affect the observed relationships. An index of community
participation was created by adding all of the indicators of community participation
included in the bivariate analyses except number of organizations. Because the
community participation variable is qualitative and ordinal in nature, ordered logit is used
to estimate the effects of the variables of interest on community participation.

Table 21: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Community Participation

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of . 4726276 . 033777 13.993 0.00

nonformal

education

Years of .0495131 .0151311 3.272 0.001
formal

Schoohng

Income . 1066507 .0332923 3.203 0.001
Age . 030552 . 0040277 7.585 0.000
Gender -.l369436 . 1159877 -1.181 0.238
Pulaar . 146132 . 1300121 1.124 0.261
Wolof -.125848 . 1329082 -0.947 0.344

 

Number of observations = 1390
chi2(7) = 295.42

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -2427.3969
Pseudo R2 = 0.0574

146

The estimated model is statistically signiﬁcant. As is evident in Table 21, the estimated
coefﬁcients for the explanatory variables years of NFE, years of formal education,
income and age of respondent are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. The
estimated coefﬁcients for gender and ethnicity65 are not statistically signiﬁcant.

As we can see in Table 21 , the relationship between years of NFE and community
participation is highly statistically signiﬁcant in the hypothesized direction when the
effects of other variables are controlled. Years of formal education, income and age also
have a positive impact on the likelihood of participating in the community. Thus, it
appears that those with more resources, be they social or ﬁnancial, are more likely to be
involved in the community. That age is associated with community involvement is not
surprising given the way prestige and responsibilities increase concomitantly with age in
traditional culture.

Since it is hard to assess the effects of NFE on community participation in the
above model in any precise way, I examine how the likelihood of someone receiving the
highest score possible on the community participation scale changes when the values for
all of the explanatory variables but years of NFE are held constant.66 The sample mean is
used for formal education and age, while the modal category was used for income. In

Table 22, the effects of NFE on the likelihood of having the highest level of community

 

65 In order to control for ethnolinguistic group in this model, dummy variables (i.e., variables that take on
the value of 0 or 1 depending on whether they have the attribute of interest) were used for two out of the
three major ethnolinguistic groups covered in the study (the other ethnic groups are grouped with Serer
since they represented only 6 percent of the sample). Hence, two of the control variables in this model
represent ethnic groups. One of the three variables representing ethnicity is, of course, always excluded
from the model as including it would create a situation of perfect multicollinearity and estimation would be
impossible. In addition, to avoid collinearity problems, I could not control for region and ethnicity in the
same model. I felt ethnolinguistic group was more pertinent than region.

6" CLARIFY was the software package used to calculate the marginal probabilities: Michael Tomz, Jason
Wittenberg, and Gary King (1999). CLARIF Y: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical
Results. Version 1.2.1 Cambridge, MA: Havard Univesity, June 1. http://gking.harvard.edu/.

147

participation possible as measured on our scale is examined for Pulaar women. Since
formal education is of interest as well, changes in the likelihood of high community
participation are also examined at different levels of formal education while the other
variables, including NFE, are held constant.

Table 22: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of High Community Participation
for Pulaar Women

 

 

Number Likelihood of 95% Likelihood of 95%
of Years High Conﬁdence High Conﬁdence
of Community Interval Community Interval for
Education Participation for NFE Participation Formal
Level for Level for Education
NFE Formal
Education
0 .09 .07 to.11 .14 .12to.16
1 .13 .11to.15 .14 .12to.17
1.27 .15 .13to.17 * *
1.7 * * .15 .12to.17
2 .19 .17to.23 .15 .13 to.18
2.4 .22 .19 to .26 * *
3 .28 .24 to .32 .16 .13to.19
4 .38 .33 to .44 .16 .14to .19
6 .61 .54 to .69 .18 .15 to .22
10 .91 .87 to .95 .21 .16 to .27
12 * * .23 .17 to .29
20 * * .31 .20 to .44

 

From Table 22, it is evident that NF B increases the likelihood of having a very high level
of community participation at an increasing rate. The likelihood of a high level of
community participation increases by only 4% with the ﬁrst year of NFE but increases by
another 6% with an additional year of NFE. The likelihood of engaging in all of the
behaviors associated with community participation is about 15% at the mean number of
years of NFE. We can also see that each year of NFE has a much larger effect on

community participation than formal education: formal education increases the

148

probability of being highly engaged in the community by only about 1% per year. Thus,
the “pay-off” of formal education in this area appears minimal.

This ﬁnding is consistent with the commonly held idea among NFE advocates
that nonformal education is more based in the community than formal education and
therefore tends to stimulate participation in activities that improve the community in
ways that formal education does not. NFE does, indeed, appear to have “networ ”
effects. Those in NFE classes become involved with those in their NFE class as well as
sometimes those in other classes. Frequent contact with others in the community is likely
to spur one to become involved in other community activities. In addition, sometimes
those in NFE classes are sought out for participation in other projects because of their
newly acquired skills. In addition, based on the testimonies, it seems that NFE imbues
participants with a conﬁdence that inspires them to seek out new activities that put them
in contact with others. On the other hand, those with forrnal education might have the
skills that render them efﬁcacious in community work, but they have not had the same
chance to become involved in a network.

Seeing if the individual programs included in the study are also related to
community participation in the direction hypothesized once controls are introduced is
important too. All of the individual programs have a statistically signiﬁcant positive

effect on the likelihood of participating in the community (see Appendix E).

Interest/Engagement in Politics
The values of three of the indicators discussed earlier were added to create the
index of interest/engagement in politics: 1) whether one is at least somewhat interested in

politics, 2) whether one discusses politics at least sometimes, and 3) whether one feels

149

close to a political party. Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE on

interest in politics while controlling for other variables.

Table 23: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Interest/Engagement in Politics

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|

Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of . 1239269 .0324385 3.820 0.000
nonformal

education .

Years of . 0592879 .0170383 3.480 0.001
Formal

Schooling

Income . 0088026 . 0343135 0.257 0.798
Age . 0142532 . 0042568 3.348 0.001
Gender -.1497423 . 1233939 -1.214 0.225
Pulaar -.1431247 . 1393614 -1.027 0.304
Wolof . 140106 . 1449684 0.966 0.334

 

Number of observations: 1382
chi2(7) = 42.64
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -1617.4502
Pseudo R2 = 0.0130

As we can see from Table 23, the estimated coefﬁcients for years of nonformal
education, years of formal schooling and age are all statistically signiﬁcant, as is the
model as a whole. NFE increases the probability that one will be interested and engaged
in politics, as does formal schooling. This ﬁnding is consistent with the vast literature
relating education to political participation. Curiously, income does not appear related to
interest in politics. When multivariate models are used to assess the effects of the
individual programs, years of PIP, Tostan, and PAPA all have a statistically signiﬁcant

positive effect on the probability of being interested and engaged in politics, although

PAPF does not.

150

Once again, in order to better understand the effects of NFE on the probability of
being engaged in politics, the effects of different levels of NFE on the probability of
being highly engaged in politics are examined while all of the control variables are held
constant. Since formal education is of interest as well, changes in the likelihood of
engagement are also examined at different levels of formal education while the other
variables, including NFE, are held constant. Table 24 displays the probabilities for
Wolof men.

Table 24: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Engaged in Politics
for Senegalese Men

 

 

Number Likelihood 95% Likelihood 95%
of Years of Conﬁdence of Conﬁdence
of Engagement Interval for Engagement Interval for
Education in Politics NFE in Politics Formal
for NFE for Formal . Education
Education
0 .51 .42 to .60 .53 .44 to .62
1 .54 .45 to .63 .54 .45 to .63
1.27 .55 .46 to .64 .55 .46 to .63
1.7 .56 .47 to .65 .55 .46 to .64
2 .57 .48 to .66 .56 .46 to .64
2.4 .58 .50 to .67 .56 .47 to .65
3 .60 .51 to .69 .57 .48 to .66
4 .63 .54 to .72 .58 .49 to .67
6 .69 .58 to .78 .61 .51 to .70
6.6 .70 .60 to .79 .62 .52 to .71
7 .71 .64 to .82 .63 .52 to .72
10 .78 .66 to .87 .67 .55 to .76
12 * * .69 .56 to .79
20 * * .78 .63 to .88

 

As we can see in Table 24, the probability of having all three attributes of high political
engagement increases by about 3% with each year of NFE. At the mean level of NFE for

the sample, the probability of having such high engagement is about 58% for Wolof men.

151

At the mean level of NFE among those with NFE (2.4 years), it is about 61%. The
difference in the probability of exhibiting a high level of political engagement between
someone with no NFE and someone with the maximum number of years is 28%. On the
other hand, we can see the probability of having high political engagement increases by
only between one and 2% for each year of formal education.

Efficacy

All four of the political efﬁcacy indicators were added to create the political
efﬁcacy index. It was thought that multivariate analysis might clarify the relationship
between feelings of political efﬁcacy and NFE. However, none of the estimated
coefﬁcients in this model are statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the model is not
statistically signiﬁcant. When ordered logit is used to assess the effects for the individual
programs, both Tostan and PAPF are found to have statistically signiﬁcant positive effect
on the likelihood of feeling politically efﬁcacious. However, the models are not
statistically signiﬁcant.

Thus, although individuals may feel efﬁcacious in terms of those activities in their
more immediate vicinity, they may not feel like they can affect those structures distant
from them. NFE appears to increase personal efﬁcacy as evidenced in the qualitative
interviews and the results showing that those with NFE were more likely to report
speaking out in meetings and holding leadership positions in associations. However,
NFE does not appear to have a strong effect on feelings of political efﬁcacy.

Authoritarianism/Progressiveness

The progressiveness/authoritarianism index was created by adding the values of

all of the indicators discussed under this rubric in the bivariate analyses. Again, ordered

152

logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE and other control variables on

progressiveness.

Table 25: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Authoritarianism/ Progressiveness

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .2590025 . 0324575 7.980 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .132987 .0163941 8.112 0.000
Formal

Schooling

Income .0669317 .033615 1.991 0.046
Age -.0069791 . 0041437 1.684 0.092
Gender -.5279267 . 1204361 -4.383 0.000
Pulaar .3451935 . 1383548 2.495 0.013
Wolof .0319089 . 1432115 0223 0.824

 

Number of observations: 1340

chi2(7) = 190.70

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1735.3705

Pseudo R2 = 0.0521

From Table 25, we can see that nonformal education increases the likelihood that one
will express progressive ideas. The estimated coefﬁcients for years of formal schooling,
gender, and the Pulaar variable are also statistically signiﬁcant. Formal schooling also
has a positive effect on the likelihood of being progressive. That gender has a negative
coefﬁcient reﬂects the fact that the women in the sample tend to opt for responses that
indicate a less progressive/more authoritarian orientation with greater frequency than do
men. This ﬁnding is consistent with other studies that ﬁnd that women are more

conservative than men are (e. g., Gibson et al. 1992; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992). The

positive relationship for Pulaar reﬂects the fact that Pulaar respondents opted for

153

responses that indicate a more progressive orientation with greater frequency than did
Wolof and Serer respondents and those in other ethnic groups. When similar multivariate
models were run for the individual programs, only Tostan and PIP were found to have a
positive impact on the probability of having progressive attitudes. In order to see the
effects of NFE on the probability of having a progressive orientation with greater clarity,
once again the changes in the probability of scoring highly on the
progressive/authoritarian scale are examined at different levels of NFE while the values
for the other explanatory variables are held constant. The same is done for formal
education.

Table 26: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Having Progressive Orientation
in Politics for Pulaar Men

 

 

Number Likelihood 95% Likelihood . 95%
of Years of Having Conﬁdence of Having Conﬁdence
of Progressive Interval for Progressive Interval for
Education Orientation NFE Orientation Formal
for NFE for Formal Education
Education
0 .23 .19 to .27 .25 .20 to .29
1 .28 .23 to .32 .28 .23 to .32
1.27 .29 .24 to .34 * .
1.7 * * .29 .24 to .34
2 .33 .27 to .38 .30 .25 to .35
2.4 .36 .29 to .41 .31 .26 to .36
3 .39 .33 to .45 .33 .28 to .38
4 .45 .38 to .52 .36 .30 to .41
6 .58 .49 to .67 .43 .36 to .49
10 .79 .68 to .87 .56 .47 to .64
12 * * .62 .52 to .71
20 * * .82 .72 to .90

 

From Table 26, we can see that NFE has a substantial impact on the likelihood of having

a progressive social orientation: with each year of NFE, the likelihood increases by

154

around 5%. After a two year NFE program, the likelihood of having a progressive social

orientation is 42%. By contrast, after two years of formal education, the likelihood

would be around 39%. We can see that one year of NFE has a greater impact on the

likelihood of having progressive social values than does one year of formal education.

Trust

The trust index was created by adding the values of the trust indicators.

 

Table 27
Ordered Logit Estimates of Trust Models
Dependent Variable: Social Trust Index

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Model Variable Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:
Trust: Entire Trust Trust Trust
Sample Among Among Among
Pulaaro- Wolof— Serer and
phones Speakers Other Small
Minority
Groups
Years of nonformal -.0206186 -.0914524* .0128272 .1540555*
education (.0307682) (.0420063) (.0580936) (.0760041)
Years of Formal -.0753654** - -.0568734* -.0895232**
Schooling (.01 593 88) .0797249** (.0278607) (.0318396)
(.0247746)
Income -.0897423** -.0677639 -.01 18086 -.2467515**
(0347993 (0526662) (.0583644) (.0799715)
Age -.014045** - -.0133993* -.0141331
(.0041804) .0157966** (.0067269) (.0097797)
(0064319
Gender -.0111811 .0410796 .1227517 -.5267887
(.1214942) (.1791359) (.2076476) (.2958386)
Pulaar -1.135496**
(1415963)
Wolof .0936686
(1415278)
Number of obs. 1344 601 480 263
Pseudo R2 0.0483 0.0152 0.0083 0.0398
Log Likelihood -1620.2663 -726.84494 -574.67805 -307.2751
Chi2 164.38 22.51 9.59 25.50
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0004 0.0876 0.0001

 

155

Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
** p < .01 for two tailed test; * p < .05 for two tailed test

There are some observations that must be considered. First, the Pulaarophones have the
lowest level of trust of any group. Second, NFE renders Pularophones even less trusting
than they were initially. Third, NFE appears to actually have a positive effect on the trust
levels of the Serer and other minority groups. On the other hand, the other “modernity”
variables have a consistent, negative effect on the trust levels on all ethnic groups and the
overall sample. Thus, as we can see, the directions of the effects of all the variables
besides NFE are consistent across subgroups of the sample. It is only the sign of NFE
that changes.

That age has a signiﬁcant negative relationship with social trust is easily
comprehensible given that those of the older generations are likely to feel less secure than
those in the younger generations and overwhelmed by the changes that have taken place
around them and the development process more generally. The have also had the
opportunity to have more experiences with other people so that they would be likely to
give more realistic responses. In addition, age confers upon one a certain power in
traditional society, and thus, as one gets older, one may be more likely to speak one’s
mind.

That the coefﬁcient for gender (1=woman) is negative across subgroups is also
not surprising given that women tend to be the most parochial in a society and therefore
probably have more insecurity about the world around them. Perhaps more importantly,
all of the societies covered by the study are highly patriarchal and stratiﬁed (the Serer are
matrilineal - descent is reckoned via the woman’s line —- but Serer society is patriarchal,

nonetheless). Women are often vulnerable and exploited in these societies. In

156

particular, women are often exploited or mistreated by their mother in laws and the
relatives of their husbands. Thus, although women are in some ways the most
traditional, NFE appears to make women more aware of their feelings and more willing
to express them.

Banﬁeld (1958) ﬁnds that in certain cases, one must cut certain types of deep ties
in order to get people to act in a way that is individually rational. This could be the
process that is operative in the setting of Senegal. Although “thin trust” can help one
pursue relationships that open up new opportunities and knowledge, excessive “thick
trust” might render one too tied to those in one’s primary group to effectively exploit the
opportunities before one.

As noted earlier, Bratton and van de Walle describe the neopatrimonial regimes of
Aﬁica as being characterized by “relationships of loyalty and dependence” (1997, 62).
Relationships of loyalty and dependence seem to especially characterize social life
among Pulaar-speakers. Indeed, when asked whether the people themselves or the
government was most responsible for ensuring their well-being, 58% of Wolof
respondents and 61% of the Serer respondents and respondents of other ethnic groups
said the government, but only 49% of the Pulaar thought the people themselves were
responsible. Although Pulaar-speakers are just as likely as Wolof-speakers, and more
likely than those in other ethnic groups, to opt for the response that they are ahnost
certainly able to make their plans work (see Q65), they are less likely to chose the

“empowered” response to the following forced choice question:

1) Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.

2) With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals.

157

In addition, among the Pulaar-speakers who have not had NFE, only 63% chose the
“empowered” response while 37% responded that getting what they want requires
pleasing the people above them. Thus, it seems that many of the Pulaar respondents
might think they can make their plans work by pleasing those above them.
The fall in levels of interpersonal trust among the Pulaar might indicate that the
traditional constraints on individual initiative might be loosening. NFE has a signiﬁcant
impact on this variable for Pulaar-speakers, with a ﬁrll 75% of the NFE respondents
choosing the empowered response to this question.

Social Distance/Individualization
The individualization index is an index created by adding all of the values of the
indicators for individualization that were examined in the bivariate analyses. Ordered
logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE and other variables on individualization.

Table 28: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Social Distance/Individualization

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard 2 score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .1263885 .0347521 3.637 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .0500165 .0176024 2.841 0.004
Formal

Schooling

Income . 1746412 .03902 4.476 0.000
Age -.0140643 .0041971 -3.351 0.001
Gender -.3694644 . 1275433 -2.897 0.004
Pulaar -.2414142 . 1469972 -1.642 0.101
Wolof -.4309615 .149631 -2.880 0.004

 

Number of observations = 1317
chi2 (7) = 76.06
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

158

Log Likelihood == -1648.5183
Pseudo R2 = 0.0225

The estimated coefﬁcients for all but one of the explanatory variables are statistically
signiﬁcant; that is, only the variable representing Pulaar is not statistically signiﬁcant. I
hypothesized that nonformal education would increase “individualization.” People with
nonformal education become more aware of themselves and their ideas and therefore
acknowledge that their ideas are not always the same as those around them. Years of
formal schooling functions in much the same way. Income is a classic force of
stratiﬁcation and differentiation, so it is not at all surprising that it is statistically
signiﬁcant in this model. That the coefﬁcient for age is negative is also not surprising
since we would expect older people to have more of a traditional, collectivist orientation
than younger people. Women have also had less access to the type of experiences that
would encourage individualization then men have, so the negative sign in front of the
coefﬁcient for gender is not surprising.

That formal education and nonformal education both inspire people to think more
independently can only be interpreted as positive for democracy. When people simply
take things on authority, they can be led in any direction. Such a tendency could allow
people to acquiesce to actions and situations that are bad for them or others. That people
are willing to acknowledge that they have different views from others could also lead
them to accept other people when they express dissenting views.

Support for Democratic Values
Since the results of the bivariate analyses do not give a very clear picture of the
relationship between nonformal education and support for democratic values, I use

multivariate analyses to further examine the relationship. The index of support for

159

democratic values was created by adding all but one of the indicators for democratic
values included in the bivariate analyses. The indicator concerning compromise
(Question 50E) was not found to be related to the other democratic value indictors and
was therefore not included in the index. Once again, an ordered logit model is used to
assess the effects of NFE while controlling for years of formal schooling, income, age,

gender and ethnicity.

Table 29: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Support for Democratic Values

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .1303295 .0311116 4.189 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .1711642 .0169658 10.089 0.000
Formal

Schooling

Income .0319587 .0336174 0.951 0.342
Age .0159169 .0040893 3.892 0.000
Gender -.4330685 .1 191054 -3.636 0.000
Pulaar .223445 .1367746 1.634 0.102
Wolof -.2353479 .1410534 -1.669 0.095

 

Number of observations: 1332
chi2 (7) = 172.21
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -l853.9682
Pseudo R2 = 0.0444

From Table 29, it is evident that the estimated coefﬁcients for years of NFE, years
of formal schooling, age and gender are all statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore both NFE
and formal schooling increase the likelihood that one will support democratic values.
Again, that the coefﬁcient for gender is statistically signiﬁcant is consistent with the

ﬁndings that women are, on average, more conservative than men are. When similar

analyses were done to assess the effects of the individual programs, both years of PIP and

160

years of Tostan were found to have statistically signiﬁcant effects in the hypothesized

direction. Neither years of PAPA nor years of PAPF were found to be related to support

for democratic values.

In order to clarify the results of NFE on the probability of supporting democratic

values and compare the effects of NFE with formal schooling, the changes in probability

of supporting democratic values are examined at levels of NFE with the other

explanatory variables held constant. This procedure is repeated for formal education.

Table 30: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Supportive of
Democratic Values for Senegalese Women

 

 

Number Likelihood 95% Likelihood 95%
of Years of Conﬁdence of Conﬁdence
of Supporting Interval for Supporting Interval for
Education Democratic NFE Democratic Formal
Values For Values For Education
NFE Formal
Education
0 .08 .06 to .11 .07 .05 to .10
1 .09 .06 to .12 .08 .06 to .11
1.27 .09 .07 to .12 .09 .06 to .12
1.7 .10 .07 to .13 .09 .07 to .12
2 .10 .07to.13 .10 .07 to.13
2.4 .10 .08 to .14 .10 .07 to .14
3 .11 .08 to.15 .11 .08 to.15
4 .12 .09to.17 .13 .09to.17
6 .16 .11to.22 .17 .12to.23
6.6 .17 .11 to .24 .19 .13to.25
7 .17 .11 to .27 .20 .14 to .26
10 .24 .15 to .37 .29 .21 to .39
12 * * .37 .27 to .49
20 * .69 .54 to .82

 

As we can see from Table 30, when the values of all other variables are held constant,

and years of NFE is 0, the probability of choosing the democratic response for all four of

the indicators is only 6%. With each year of NFE, the probability increases by about one

161

percentage point among women. At the maximum number of NFE years reported, the
probability of exhibiting a high level of support for democratic values is 24%. Formal
education appears to have a stronger effect on support for democratic attitudes than
nonformal education. Although there is little change in the probability for supporting
democratic attitudes for the ﬁrst few years of education, the “payoff” of each year of
formal education starts to increase after about six years. This result makes a great deal of
sense given that primary schooling lasts for six years.

Electoral Participation
Voting
Using multivariate analyses to assess the effect of NFE on electoral participation seemed
especially important since age was suspected to be a confounding factor in the bivariate
analyses. The electoral participation index was creating by adding the scores of the four
voting indicators.

Table 31: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General
Control Variables on Electoral Participation

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .0902742 .036342 2.484 0. 013
nonformal

education

Years of .0191904 .0193407 0.992 0. 321
Formal

Schooling

Income .0634766 .0391501 1.621 0. 105
Age .0763887 .0062949 12.135 0.000
Gender .427492 . 1476845 2.895 0. 004
Pulaar .0495215 .1703725 0.291 0. 771
Wolof .2427183 .1739983 1.395 0. 163

 

Number of observations= 947

162

chi2(7) = 193.79
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1213.5589
Pseudo R2 = 0.0739

As is evident from Table 31, the estimated coefﬁcients for nonformal education, age, and

gender are statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, while years of nonformal education

appears have a positive effect on the probability of voting, formal education does not. As

suspected, the relationship between age and voting is statistically signiﬁcant. When

similar analyses were done for the individual programs, Tostan, PAPA and PAPF were

also found to have statistically signiﬁcant, positive relationships with electoral

participation. No relationship was found for PIP.

Table 32: The Effects of N FE on the Likelihood of Having a High Level of Electoral
Participation for Rural Senegalese Women

 

Number Likelihood of 95%

 

of Years Highest Conﬁdence
of NFE Level of Interval
Electoral
Participation
0 .46 .36 to .57
1 .49 .39 to .59
1.27 .49 .39 to .60
2 .50 .41 to .60
2.4 .52 .42 to .61
3 .53 .44 to .63
4 .55 .45 to .65
6 .60 .48 to .71
10 .68 .52 to .81

 

As we can see in Table 32, the probability of having the highest level of electoral

participation as measured by the voting index increases by about two to 3% with each

163

year of nonformal education.67 At the average number of years of NFE for the whole
sample, 1.27 years, the probability of having a high level of electoral participation is
43%. After two years of NFE, the probability is 50%. The probability of having a high
level of electoral participation increases notably between the minimum and maximum
years of NFE. At one year of NFE, the value is 46% while at ten years it is 68% for a
difference of 22 percentage points.

Registering to Vote

Again, since age was an obvious confounding factor in the bivariate analyses, a logit
model is used to assess the effects of years of NFE on the probability of registering vote
while other variables are controlled for.

Table 33: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Registering to Vote

 

Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|

 

Explanatory

Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .2204829 .0436484 5.051 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .0015913 .019757 0.081 0.936
Formal

Schooling

Income .1605332 .0508719 3.156 0.002
Age .0984739 .0078448 12.553 0.000
Gender .1680074 .158888 1.057 0.290
Pulaar .1540842 .1795096 0.858 0.391
Wolof .0155594 .1835093 0.085 0.932
Constant -2.832594 .3271469 8658 0.000

 

Number of observations=13 1 9
ch30) = 278.53
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

 

’7 The respondents in the study sample almost certainly over-reported their electoral participation, and
therefore the ﬁgures for electoral participation will be somewhat inﬂated. The inﬂation of voting rates is
common in this type of study (e.g., see Bratton 1999).

164

Log Likelihood = -686.00117
Pseudo R2 = 0.1688

The model as a whole is statistically signiﬁcant, and three of the seven estimated
coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant: those for years of NFE, age and income. When
similar multivariate analyses were done to clarify the relationships of the individual
programs, all of the programs were found to have a statistically signiﬁcant, positive
impact on the probability of registering to vote. That NFE and income are statistically
signiﬁcant ﬁts nicely with the resource theory of political participation, according to
which, those with the most resources, both social and ﬁnancial, will be most likely to
participate politically. The likelihood of registering to vote is examined at different
levels of NFE in Table 34.

Table 34: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Registering to Vote for Pulaar
Women

 

Number Likelihood 95%

 

of Years of Conﬁdence

of NFE Registering Interval
to Vote

0 .70 .63 to .75

1 .74 .69 to .79

1.27 .75 .70 to .79

1.7 .77 .72 to .81

2 .78 .74 to .82

2.4 .79 .75 to .83

3 .82 .77 to .85

4 .85 .80 to .88

6 .89 .85 to .93

6.6 .91 .86 to .94

7 .91 .86 to .95

10 .95 .90 to .98

 

As we can see in Table 34, the likelihood of registering to vote increases by about four
percentage points among Pulaar women for each year of NFE. After a two-year NFE

program, the likelihood of registering to vote is 78%. The difference in likelihood of

165

registering to vote at the minimum number of years of NFE is 74%, while the likelihood
at the maximum number of years reported is 95%, for a difference of 21 percentage
points.

Contacting Public Officials

Community Contacting

Based on the results of the bivariate analyses, there appears to be a highly
signiﬁcant relationship between NFE and contacting a public ﬁgure regarding a
community problem. However, multivariate analysis allows us to see whether other
potentially confounding variables affect the relationship between NFE and community
contacting. In addition, multivariate allows us to assess the effects of formal education
on community contacting, as well as assess the magnitude of the impact of NFE on the
likelihood of contacting a public ofﬁcial regarding a community problem.

Table 35: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a Community Problem

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .2844766 .0372857 7.630 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .0001182 .017542 0.007 0.995
Formal

Schooling

Income .0599262 .0371888 1.611 0.107
Age .0103899 .0045195 2.299 0.022
Gender -.5098383 .1318488 -3.867 0.00
Pulaar -.2431152 .1520089 -1.599 0.110
Wolof -.1143973 .1550367 -0.738 0.461
Constant -.3855001 .2503262 -1.540 0.124

 

Number of observations=1 384

166

chi’(7) = 83.95

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -915.02967

Pseudo R2 = 0.0439

As Table 35 reveals, the coefﬁcient for years of NFE is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, formal education appears completely unrelated to contacting an
ofﬁcial about a community problem. The coefﬁcient for age is positive and signiﬁcant.
As noted earlier, prestige and power increase with age in traditional society, so it is not
surprising that those who are older would be more likely to contact a public ofﬁcial. We
would also expect those who are older to be leaders in their communities who would
need to address community problems. The coefﬁcient for gender is signiﬁcant and
negative. This result reﬂects the limitations put upon women’s mobility and interactions

in the societies of study. The coefﬁcient for Pulaar is negative and comes close to being

signiﬁcant.

Table 36: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Official about a
Community Problem for Rural Senegalese Women

 

Number Likelihood 95%

 

of Years of Conﬁdence

of NFE Contacting Interval
an Ofﬁcial

0 .30 .22 to .38

1 .36 .28 to .45

1.27 .38 .30 to .46

2 .42 .34 to .52

2.4 .45 .37 to .54

3 .49 .41 to .59

4 .56 .46 to .66

6 .69 .58 to .79

10 .87 .77 to .93

 

167

The effect each year of NFE has on increasing the probability that one will contact an
ofﬁcial about a community problem is considerable. Each year of NFE increases the
probability of community contacting by about 6%. Thus, after completing a two-year
program, the probability that a woman will contact a community ofﬁcial is about 42%.
Personal Contacting

Again, multivariate analysis is used to assess the effects of both NFE and formal
education on the likelihood of contacting a public ﬁgure regarding a personal problem.

Table 37 : Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control
Variables on Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a Personal Problem

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .205023 .0385028 5.325 0.000
nonformal

education

Years of .0203376 .018143 1.121 0.262
Formal

Schooling

Income .0407634 .03 89685 1.046 0.296
Age .0144816 .0047144 3.072 0.002
Gender -.726214 .1395225 -5.205 0.000
Pulaar .5319989 .1540126 3.454 0.001
Wolof -.1815459 .1550819 -1.171 0.242
Constant -.1091727 .257206 -0.424 0.671

 

Number of observations=1381

LR chi2 (7) = 108.22

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -885.68885

Pseudo R2 = 0.0576

As we can in Table 37, the coefﬁcient for NFE is in the hypothesized direction and
highly signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that NFE empowers women,

thereby rendering them more assertive in the social world. The coefﬁcients for age and

168

gender are also signiﬁcant, probably for the same reasons noted in the discussion of
community contacting. Interestingly, the coefﬁcient for Pulaar in the community-
contacting model is negative, although not quite signiﬁcant, yet it is signiﬁcant and
positive in the personal contacting model. Thus, it seems that while community
contacting and personal contacting are similar types of behaviors, they are far from being
identical.

Table 38: The Effects of N FE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Ofﬁcial about a
Personal Problem for Rural Senegalese Women

 

Number Likelihood 95%

 

of Years of Conﬁdence
of NFE Contacting Interval
an Ofﬁcial
O .51 .42 to .61
1 .56 .47 to .65
1.27 .58 .49 to .66
2 .61 .52 to .70
2.4 .63 .54 to .72
3 .66 .57 to .74
4 .70 .61 to .79
6 .78 .68 to .86
10 .89 .79 to .95

 

From Table 38 we can see that rural Senegalese women are much more likely to contact
an ofﬁcial regarding a personal problem than they are regarding community problem.
For the ﬁrst few years, each year of NFE increases the likelihood that one will contact a
community ofﬁcial by about 5% per year. After about three years, the magnitude of the
increase starts to decrease slightly. The difference in likelihood of contacting an ofﬁcial
between those with no NFE and those who had two years is 10 percentage points. In
short, NFE has a substantial impact on the probability of engaging in this behavior.

Nonetheless, each year of NFE appears to increase the probability of contacting an

169

ofﬁcial about a community problem to a slightly greater degree than it does the

probability of contacting an ofﬁcial about a personal problem.

Ethnic Pride

How does NFE affect levels of ethnic pride? Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of

NFE and formal education on the likelihood of expressing ethnic pride.

Table 39: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General

Control Variables on Ethnic Pride

 

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error
Years of .268792 .1172129 2.29 0.022
nonformal
education
Years of -.1049364 .017545 -5.98 0.000
Formal
Schooling
Income -.0863009 .03 54469 -2.43 0.015
Age -.003358 .0044166 -0.76 0.447
Gender .4194246 .1316451 3.19 0.001
Pulaar .6310688 . 1534262 4.1 1 0.000
Wolof -.5141264 .1540156 -3.34 0.001

Number of observations = 1256

LR chi2 (7) = 151.50

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -1205.8779

Pseudo R2 = 0.0591

The “modernity variables,” formal education and income, have signiﬁcant negative

impacts on level of ethnic pride while nonformal education has a positive effect on level

of ethnic pride and identiﬁcation. NFE’s positive relationship with ethnic pride is

undoubtedly related to the fact that NFE is usually conducted in the participant’s

170

maternal language. In addition, as noted earlier, the preservation of language and culture

are goals explicitly associated with the Pulaar literacy movement.

Ruling Out Rival Hypotheses
I am able to assess the effects of what some call endogeneity and others call selection by
comparing those who have had no NFE with those who have had less than a year of NFE
on the relevant dimensions. Where these two groups are very similar, we can rule out
selection as a threat to internal validity.

Table 40: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Community Participation and Level
of NFE

 

 

 

 

Reported 0 years of 0<NFE§1 1<NFE_<_2 2<NFE_<_3 Over 3
Doing All Six NFE years of
Activities NFE
Yes 8% 14% 27% 30% 35%
Totals (704)* (215) (293) (122) (143)
100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

Pearson ch12(24) = 267.4197 Pr = 0.000

Were selection responsible for the effects attributed to NFE, we would expect
those in the ﬁrst level of NFE to report having the all six of the community participation
attributes at the same rate as those with higher levels of NFE. As can be seen in the cross
tabulation, there is a small difference in the percentage of respondents with no NFE who
have had a year or less of NFE (six percentage points), but there is a much greater
difference between those with at most one year and those with between two years of

NFE. Although only 14% of those with at most one year of NFE report having

171

participated in all six of the community participation activities, 27% of those in the two-
year category report doing so, for a difference of thirteen percentage points. The percent
increases to 30% in the three-year category, and to 35% for those with over three years of
NFE. The percent of those with over three years of NFE who report having all six of the
community participation attributes exceeds those with no NFE by 27 percentage points.
Two years of NFE appears to be a threshold.

Table 41: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Political Engagement and Level of
NFE

 

 

 

 

 

Reported 0 years of 0<NFE§1 1<NFE_<_2 2<NFE§3 Over 3
Having All 3 NFE years of
Attributes NFE
Yes 49% 49% 57% 57% 62%
Totals (696)* (213) (293) (122) (143)
100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which thepercentages are calculated

Pearson chi2(12) = 23.4204 Pr = 0.024

Once again, I assess the extent to which the effects attributed to NFE are actually
due to selection. As we can see from the crosstabulation, there is essentially no
difference in the likelihood that those with no NFE and those with only a little NFE will
have a high level of political engagement. The threshold again appears to be at two

years.

172

Table 42: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Progressiveness and Level of NFE

 

 

 

 

“Progressive” 0 years of 0<NFE§1 1<NFE§2 2<NFE§3 Over 3
Response for NFE years of
all 4 Questions NFE
Yes 15% 14% 25% 33% 43%
Totals (660)* (208) (292) (121) (141)
100 100 100 100 100

 

 

 

*number in parentheses serves as the base item which the percentages are calculated

Pearson chi2(12) = 89.6352 Pr = 0.000

Once again, selection does not appear responsible for the effects on
progressiveness attributed to NFE. In fact, at 15%, the percentage of those with no NFE
who opted for the “progressive” response on all four questions is nearly the same as the
percentage of those with one-year or less of NFE and actually exceeds the percentage of
those with one-year or less by one percentage point. On the other hand, 25% of those in
the two-year category fell into the progressive category. Thus, once again, two years of
NFE appears to be a threshold. The percentage opting for the “nonauthoritarian”
response for all four questions increases to 33% for those in the three-year category, and
climbs another 10 percentage points to 43% for the category of respondents who had over
three years of NFE. Thus, the relationship between authoritarianism/progressiveness and
level of NFE appears to be strong and monotonic, with each dose of NFE having a
substantial impact on people’s level of authoritarianism after a threshold is met.

The relationships between NFE and the variables of interest seem remarkably
similar in form. For the most part, there is very little difference between those with no
NFE and those with only a little NFE. Of course, we would expect there to be some

difference between these two groups since certain programs are designed to last for only

173

one year or less than a year and are still intended to have an effect on participants. We
would expect the immediate effect to be the strongest on certain dimensions, such as
community participation for numerous reasons. Many of those in NFE programs are
recruited into other community development projects either by other organizations or
villagers. After one year, members of these programs are often given responsibilities in
community meetings. Thus, we do in fact see a small difference between these two
groups on some dimensions such as community participation. The biggest effects seem
to often come with two years of NFE, and two years seems like a threshold for many
effects.

Thus, given the comparisons, “selection” or “endogeneity” seems highly unlikely
as an alternative explanation for the effects observed. Perhaps someone could argue that
in fact the effect could be caused by a combination of “selection and treatment” so that
those in the NFE programs would not appear different at ﬁrst, but actually are more likely
to be active among other things, and then NFE simply adds to this base. This explanation
seems implausible. First, one would expect this difference to be observable initially.
Second, the effects of NFE go together in a coherent way. The same pattern of change is
observed across nearly all of the dimensions of interest. It seems highly unlikely that
these differences would all preexist but all nearly be invisible prior to the start of the
program. Second, there is no theoretical reason the think that someone more supportive
of democratic values would be more like to join an NFE program than those less
supportive of NFE. People usually join NFE programs in the hope of improving their lot
in life without knowing much about them. For some, pursuing NFE ﬁrnctions as a way to

contribute to the preservation of traditional culture, an end not in the least positively

174

connected to “progressiveness” or “support for democratic values.” Second, NFE
appears to affect people in a very linear fashion after a certain threshold is met.

Perhaps one could argue that those with the most perseverance stay in the
program the longest and therefore have more years of NFE than the others. Again, this
explanation involves some type of selection/combination effect. However, there is no
reason to believe that those with more years of NFE have greater amounts of
perseverance than others. First, those with a year or less of NFE were not dropouts. I
intended for the sample to include a certain number of people who were just beginning
the program speciﬁcally so that selection effects could be assessed. Second, as noted,
one of the programs only lasts for ﬁve or six months. Thus, many of those with less than
a year of NFE successfully completed their programs.

In addition, the ﬁndings associated with the numerous in-depth qualitative
interviews I conducted across Senegal from 1989 to 2000 all support the ﬁndings.

Moreover, I compared those in the control group who came from villages that had
NFE and those in the control group who came from villages that did not have NFE with
respect to the dependent variables. Chi square tests reveal no signiﬁcant difference
between these groups with regard to any of the dependent variables. In short, in many
cases those with only a little NFE resemble those with no NFE, and the two groups of
control respondents are nearly identical with regard to the dimensions of interest.

Finally, when asked why they did not participate in the relevant NFE program,
those without NFE often said that they had been away from the village when the program
started or that there was some’type of impediment to joining the program. Many said that

they would be involved in the future wave of classes for the program. In numerous cases,

175

classes were going to open in the “control” villages in the study. Thus, there do not seem
to be many reasons to think that those in the control village differed from those in the
NFE villages in any fundamental way. In short, the preponderance of evidence supports

the notion that NFE has an impact on social capital, political behavior and attitudes.

176

Chapter 8

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ﬁndings of this study support the tenet that education is good for democracy.
They also support the notion that education has a “universal transformatory effect,” as
scholars like Lerner claimed. Both nonformal education and formal education could play
important roles in the consolidation of democracy in Senegal. Nonformal education
works much the same as formal education in instilling democratic attitudes. The results
of this study indicate that nonformal education and formal education tend to have similar
effects on many political orientations. However, in most cases, one year of NFE has a
stronger effect on the orientation of interest than does formal education. Of course,
formal education is intended to last much longer than NFE. Moreover, the target
populations for these two types of education are different. All of the NFE programs at
which I looked targeted adults, but formal education obviously targets children.68
Overall, NFE seems to inspire more of a “civic” orientation than formal education, while
formal education might have a stronger positive impact on some of the values associated
with classical liberalism.

Community Participation
The effect of NFE on community participation is one of the notable ﬁndings. Those

with NFE are more likely than those without NFE to report: 1) cooperating with others to
solve a community problem; 2) belonging to a community organization; 3) holding a

leadership position within an organization; 4) attending organizational meetings at least

 

68 That is not to say that these organizations did not have components that worked with children. However,
I was speciﬁcally interested in the programs centered on adults.

177

occasionally; 5) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally; and 6) getting together
with others to raise an issue. NFE is also positively related to the number of community
organizations to which an individual belongs.

The relationships involving nonformal education and community participation are
strong and robust. First, nearly all of the indicators are statistically signiﬁcant across all
of the programs and subgroups (that is, across ethnolinguistic groups and regions of the
country). Second, years of NFE registers statistically signiﬁcant relationships with all of
the indicators of community participation in multivariate analyses that control for formal
education, gender, age, ethnicity, and income. Third, years of NFE and all of the
individual program variables register statistically signiﬁcant, positive relationships with
the index of community involvement and leadership in multivariate analyses that include
the control variables. In other words, each year of NFE increases the probability that one
will have a high level of community involvement and leadership. Mondak and Gearing
(1998) observe that “People who do not interact with one another may fail to develop an
appreciation for any form of communal good, and thus they may be limited in their
capacity to see politics in terms of general rather than purely personal interests” (p. 616).
NFE encourages high levels of participation in the community and thus encourages
individuals to interact with others, perhaps outside the immediate family. Such
interactions should help to hone an appreciation of the public good. Moreover, the high
level of communal participation on the part of those with NFE is evidence that NFE in
itself hones an appreciation of the public good.

The ﬁndings indicate that the NFE experience engenders something other than simple

collectivism and togetherness. In fact, from the results of this study, it would seem that

178

NFE does increase individual consciousness. As noted earlier, those with nonformal
education ﬁnd that their views differ from those around them with greater frequency than
those do those in the control group. At the same time, NFE encourages higher levels of
participation in the community and thus encourages interactions with others, perhaps
outside the immediate family. NFE seems to promote an understanding that one can
interact and have fruitful relationships with others without having to be identical with
them in terms of outlook. In addition, this consciousness of individuality may lead one to
respect the individual integrity of others to greater to degree. In fact, reporting that one
has opinions that differ from others is positively related to reporting progressive and
democratic values and community participation. Although formal education also has an
impact on community participation, it is not as strong as that of NFE for reasons
discussed earlier.
Political Participation

NFE does indeed appear to have a positive impact on political participation.
Those who have nonformal education are more likely to discuss politics with others and
belong to a political party. In multivariate analyses, PAPA, Tostan, and PIP are also
found to have a statistically signiﬁcant, positive relationship with engagement/interest in
politics. NFE also increases the likelihood that one will register to vote. Participation in
all of the individual programs in the study is positively associated with registering to
vote. PAPA and PAPF appear to be the programs most strongly related to electoral
participation. Of course, electoral participation and civic participation are not necessarily
synonymous in Senegal. In Senegal, citizens tend to pursue narrow individual interests

via electoral participation as opposed to more generalized interests. Indeed, the lack of

179

policy debate during electoral campaigns reﬂects the sometimes personal-interest driven,
myopic nature of the political sphere in Senegal.

NFE also increases the probability that an individual will contact a public ﬁgure
regarding both community and personal problems. This contacting behavior seems to
imply that NFE endows people with additional conﬁdence to negotiate in the social
world. In terms of democracy, it is more favorable to have people exhibiting a civic
orientation by contacting ofﬁcials about a community rather than personal problem. The
problems associated with narrowly self-interested behavior were discussed earlier. The
consolidation of democracy necessitates that people have some sense of the public good.
It also necessitates that they manifest the correct balance between engaging with the state
and self-reliance.

Political Efﬁcacy

There does not appear to be a relationship between feelings of political efﬁcacy
and NFE. That the effects of nonformal education are ambiguous at most in regard to
feelings of political efﬁcacy is perhaps, upon reﬂection, not so surprising. An empirical
evaluation of the performance of the political system would not necessarily lead one to be
an optimist about direct change occurring at the level of the community due to electoral
behavior. Tostan’s objectives are imbued with notions of empowering participants and
inspiring the types of feelings of efﬁcacy like those about which we ask, so it is not too
surprising that Tostan is one of the programs to show a relationship with this variable in
multivariate analyses (the other program showing a relationship is PAPF). Still the

relationships appear weak and do not seem to be robust across different speciﬁcations of

180

the model. Thus, I cannot speak with much conﬁdence about the relationship between
political efﬁcacy and NFE.

As noted earlier, NFE appears to inspire feelings of individual efﬁcacy in terms of
grappling with the problems and situations within the more immediate enviromnent.
Perhaps villagers simply realistically perceive the little impact they are likely to have on
the governmental process, or perhaps the structures of government seem too distant for
them to feel like they can have an impact.

Progressive and Democratic Attitudes

Those who have had NFE are likely to be more progressive and less authoritarian
and traditional than those who have not had NFE. These ﬁndings are striking. The
Halpulaar communities covered by the survey are very conservative. Islam is deeply
established in these communities, and the Halpulaar culture is perhaps the most
patriarchal in Senegal. That formal education would tend to mitigate the very
conservative social values that characterize the milieu is not too surprising. However,
NFE appears to have a positive impact on the likelihood that people will opine that, for
example, women should be able to make their own political choices.

When the effects of individual programs were examined, the relationships are
limited to the programs of Tostan and PIP, but the effects are consistent across regions
and ethnolinguistic groups. What is particularly interesting about the ﬁndings regarding
the authoritarianism indicators is that a program that does not explicitly attempt to impart
social messages tended to have the same effects as one that does. Indeed, it would be
hard to argue that these effects are closely tied to the content (i.e., in terms of topics

covered in the class) of the program since PIP does not explicitly address these types of

181

issues in its program. However, PIP “facilitators,” like those of Tostan, have been trained
in participatory methods. Perhaps there is something about having the experience of
being part of a participatory learning environment that encourages a more progressive
way of thinking. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, PIP uses the very well respected
curriculum developed by ARED. ARED also has a strong record in the area of literature
in national languages as well, which means that those who have participated in the PIP
program have material to read. It has published translations of great literary works, such
as Ambiguous Adventure by Cheikh Hamidou Kane, and published novels and sets of
traditional children’s stories already written in Pulaar. In the two-year period between
June, 1994 and June, 1996, ARED sold 10,933 reading books in Pulaar and 1,784 books
in national languages other than Pulaar. The reach of ARED has increased considerably
since 1996. ARED now sells between 30,000 and 50,000 reading books (literature), most
of which are in Senegalese languages, each year (Easton and F agerberg—Diallo 2001).
Thus, not only are organizations like ARED producing and publishing materials
for those literate in Pulaar, but these materials are indeed being consumed, as indicated
by the sales of written materials. 111 addition, without being directly asked about their
reading habits, in the qualitative interviews, many respondents volunteered that they had
consulted various books published and sold by ARED in the course of addressing
problems or issues in their lives. As noted below, some of these books were work

related, while others were related to health, or legal rights.69

 

6’ For exarrrple, in a group interview in Ross Bethio, much to the seeming embarrassment of some of the
men in the group, one female respondent exuberantly volunteered the information that she had read a book
about childbirth. She noted that she had explained everything she learned to several other women.

182

NFE also has a positive relationship with support for democratic values, although
the relationship was not as strong as with authoritarianism/traditionalism. Formal
education had a stronger effect on the likelihood of holding democratic values. This
ﬁnding seems to make sense. The democratic values about which respondents were
asked reﬂect classical liberal western values. That these values would be more
effectively instilled in a school setting inspired by the western model is not too
surprising. What is most striking is that NFE does have a positive effect on the
likelihood of expressing such democratic values.

Once again, when I looked at the individual programs using multivariate analyses,
only the programs of PIP and Tostan were found to have a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship with support for democratic values. This ﬁnding might indicate what I
suspected. PAPA and PAPF are relatively shallow programs and tend to generate
network effects. PIP and Tostan have more intensive programs that appear to have a
more profound effect on individuals.

The ﬁndings that NFE has signiﬁcant effects on the values associated with

democracy are of tremendous importance. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) observe:

In general, cultural theories suggest that democratization will develop most rapidly in the
nontraditional sectors of the nation—that is, among the young and better-educated; in the cities,
rather in the rural areas; in the service, rather than the agricultural, sectors in the economy; and
probably among men, as compared to women (858).

This study covers the most traditional sectors of Senegal. All of the respondents are from
rural areas, the vast majority of respondents are women, and the vast majority of the male
respondents are farmers. Among those women who did not report being a housewife as

their primary occupation, the majority said they were farmers. In addition, all but twenty

of the respondents are Muslim. Hence, the substantial effect NFE has had on those in the

183

most traditional sectors of society seems quite extraordinary and points to the prominent
role NFE could play in social transformation more generally.

The results of this study indicate that nonformal education and formal education
tend to have similar effects on many political orientations. However, the effects of
formal education and NFE on ethnic pride and salience are nearly opposite in nature.
Formal education has a signiﬁcant negative effect on the level of ethnic pride. On the
other hand, NFE has a signiﬁcant positive effect on ethnic pride. It is in this area that the
effects of education appear to be contextual as opposed to universal. The Pulaar exhibit
the highest levels of ethnic pride, and this pride appears intensiﬁed by the NFE
experience. In many ways, the Pulaar were marginalized during the colonial experience.
The Pulaar, according to many, fear acculturation, so it is not surprising that they would
assert their pride in being Pulaar when asked. Moreover, Pulaar literacy is seen as a
vehicle through which the Pulaar language can be preserved and elevated.

Therefore, on the one hand, PIP, for example, is indeed fulﬁlling its goal of
“opening a window to the world.” Although promoting literacy in national languages
may not function as the integrative force that the modernization scholars theorized, NFE
has seemed to decrease levels of traditionalism and authoritarianism. On the other hand,
it also appears to be promoting its goal of elevating the Pulaar language. Programs, such
as PIP, appear to increase the level of ethnic pride people express. What must be
examined is whether this is a positive pride that endues people with the conﬁdence that

translates into achievement or whether the effects are not 50 positive.

184

Implications for Socialization Theory
The ﬁndings of this study are important for another reason. According to socialization
theory, those experiences one has a child serve as a ﬁlter for later experiences (Eckstein
1988). Stolle and Hooghe (2002) point out that youth experiences are very much related
to the types of activities in which adults engage. They cite the political socialization
literature, which ﬁnds that the political attitudes and behavior of adults are shaped by
youth experiences. These attitudes and behavior then tend to stay fairly constant during
adult life (1). Stolle and Hooghe’s results largely corroborate the socialization school of
thought and support the notion that social participation among adults produces
predominantly “network effects” as opposed to “attitudinal effects.” Therefore, research
efforts on social capital that focus on youth promise to be more fruitful than those that
focus on adults, they contend. This study shows that Stolle and Hooghe’s (2002)
contention is unwarranted. The experiences of adulthood can have signiﬁcant effects on
political behavior and attitudes, and so it is therefore worthwhile to study the effects of
adult experiences.
Policy Implications

From a policy-making standpoint, this study shows that interventions for adults
can have signiﬁcant positive effects and thus such interventions should be maintained and
pursued. As for the policy-making implications for NFE more speciﬁcally, this study
shows that NFE can have important impacts on behaviors and attitudes. The attitudinal
effects seem at least somewhat tied to the content of the NFE program. Thus, the
curricula of NFE programs appear to be worthy of signiﬁcant attention. NFE could be a

potent force in the promotion of democratic and civic orientations. On the other, it seems

185

possible that NFE could potentially promote values not so positive vis-a-vis democracy in
certain circumstances.

While the ﬁndings do seem to indicate that the content of a program matters vis-a-vis
certain types of effects, they also indicate that simply participating in a nonformal
education program has important effects. Two years appeared to be the threshold period
for many of the important effects of literacy programs to take place. That is, an
additional year of literacy training still generates desirable effects as does only a year of
training, but two years seems to be key for certain effects (but not all) to manifest
themselves. PAPF is considering moving to a 24-month program. The ﬁndings of this
study indicate that such a move could be beneﬁcial to participants. Although civic
education classes may teach speciﬁc lessons on democratic behavior, nonformal
education might potentially have a strong impact on democratic orientation without
explicitly incorporating political lessons into its curriculum. Of course, were programs to
include such lessons, perhaps the impacts would be even greater than those which we
have seen in this study.

NFE Contributes to Women’s Empowerment

Women are over represented in NFE programs partly because of their exclusion from
formal education. Thus, NFE is in some ways a compensatory measure taken to help
improve the situation of women. The results of this study indicate that NFE makes a
signiﬁcant contribution to the empowerment of women. NFE increases the probability
that women will participate in the community and take on leadership positions. NFE also
increases the likelihood that women will become politically active. As noted,

participation in community organizations leads women to acquire civic skills and

186

generally renders them more efﬁcacious in the political realm. Hence, it is likely that the
initial effects of NFE will be built upon by women’s experiences in community
organizations and activities.
Effects Likely to Intensify Over Time
It seems reasonable to assume that not all of NFE’s effects are immediate or direct. An
important consideration is the link between education, civil society and democracy. NFE
heightens participation in civil society both in terms of breadth (the number organizations
to which one belongs) and depth (taking on leadership positions and actively participating
in meetings). Participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other educational
effects. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) ﬁnd that education increases ones
involvement in voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one’s civic skills,
which in turn increases one’s level of political participation. In the long run, participation
in the community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic
values.
Conclusion

The ﬁndings regarding the effects of NFE on political behaviors and attitudes are
strong, robust and consistent. Although it is true that analyses of larger samples tend to
show even small relationships, nearly all of the relationships identiﬁed in the analyses of
all respondents were also statistically signiﬁcant when these analyses were restricted to
small subgroups of the sample. Moreover, the ﬁndings of the bivariate analyses were
largely consistent with those of the multivariate analyses.

NFE walks a line between two forces: being an authentic manifestation of the

local culture and serving as “a window to the world.” On the one hand, NFE can serve

187

to afﬁrm and valorize indigenous culture and language. In so doing, NFE can draw upon
and reinforce local knowledge and capacities. At the same time, NFE programs can
allow people to connect with forces outside of their families and villages and thereby
decrease the insularity of villages. Generally speaking, it does seem that people want to
connect with something beyond their village and widen their horizons. By allowing
people to make this connection and feel this dynamism in their own village, NFE could
make migration to cities and towns less attractive.

Many of those who have studied NFE programs have been unimpressed by
testimonies that increased solidarity and mutual aide resulted from literacy programs.
Since cooperation is at the heart of addressing community issues and self-governance,
these effects have not received the attention they merit. Indeed, it is human beings
inability to voluntarily cooperate to achieve coordinated action in the pursuit of the public
good that necessitates government in the ﬁrst place. What does seem clear from the
results of the study is that NFE is about much more than acquiring literacy skills or
learning about thematic areas of importance. NFE seems to contribute to the construction
of “civic community.” NFE constitutes a social experience that confers a type of social
capital upon the learners and community alike. And it is social capital that Putnam

claims is “the key to making democracy wor ”(1993, 185).

188

APPENDICES

189

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS

Table A.1: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar
Respondents in St. Louis

Those without Those with

PIP PIP
n % n %

Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. 140 34 168 46*
(Question 24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20) 140 62 168 86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. 140 81 168 95*
(Question 22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 115 49 159 71*
23)
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least 140 54 168 73*
once. (Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an 140 17 168 57*

organization. (Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27) 140 66 168 67
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 91 79 114 78
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) 91 73 113 76
(Question 298)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 91 66 1 13 55
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 92 60 115 43
At least somewhat interested in politics. Question 33 140 51 168 47
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 140 60 168 74*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 140 54 167 69*
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “111 discussions about politics with 138 80 168 79
ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the opinion of

others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the way 136 44 168 34
government works.” (Question 46)

Percent choosing, “As a community, we are 135 70 168 66
generally able to make our elected representatives

listen to our problems.” (Question 47).

190

Table A.1 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters
to choose leaders who will help us improve our
lives.” (Question 48)
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or
Progressiveness

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for
whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself.”
(Question 70)

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her
right to speak out about politics, even if her husband
disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of
the traditions that have blocked our development.”
(Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are
curiosity and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)
Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend
on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.”
(Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people
can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to help
others than to look out for themselves.” (Question
55)

Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of other people in their village.
(Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of most other people in the country.
(Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right
to vote. (Question 49)

191

137

139

139

114

140

139

140

138

138

140

140

139

140

136

82

68

32

32

46

65

62

26

22

67

64

59

62

82

167

168

168

85

101

168

167

167

167

168

168

168

168

167

77

79*

50*

52*

60*

79*

58

19

25

86*

83*

83*

82*

80

Table A.l (cont’d)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want
to form a community organization, they should
afﬁliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise
is dangerous because you betray your own side.

(Question 50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to
voted, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views
than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”
(Question 51)

Locus of control

Percent choosing, “People should look after
themselves and be responsible for their own success
in life.” (Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am
responsible for what happens to me.” (Question 64)
Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am almost
certain to make them work.” (Question 65)

Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I
can obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

*Difference in percentages between non-PIP and PIP respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

192

138

138

139

137

139

140

139

140

18

22

58

75

50

33

71

59

165

166

167

168

168

167

167

168

33

21

68

80

40

38

71

78*

Table A.2: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP
Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar
Women Respondents in St. Louis

Women Women with
without PIP PIP
n % n %

Community Participation

Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 97 24 114 40*
24)

Belong to a community organization. (Question 20) 97 66 1 14 84*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 97 79 114 93*
22)

Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23) 78 36 106 68*

Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. 97 51 114 69*
(Question 38B)

Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. 97 18 114 54*
(Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27) 97 68 114 61
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 66 79 70 81
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) 66 71 69 78
(Question 29B)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C) 66 64 69 54
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 66 56 71 35*
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33) 97 70 114 70
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 97 57 114 71 *
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 97 55 113 67
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics with 96 77 114 75
ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the opinion of

others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the way 96 42 114 34
government works.” (Question 46)

Percent choosing, “As a community, we are generally 93 70 114 68

able to make our elected representatives listen to our

problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters to 94 82 114 75
choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.”

(Question 48)

Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be free 97 68 114 76
to make up his or her own mind on political issues.”

(Question 69)

193

Table A.2 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for whom he
or she is going to vote for him/herself.” (Question 70)
Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her right

to speak out about politics, even if her husband
disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of the
traditions that have blocked our development.”
(Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the most
important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and
open-mindedness.” (Question 73)

Percent choosing, “Thanks to modernization, the caste
system is now obsolete.” (Question 74)

Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend on
people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.”
(Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people can
be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to help
others than to look out for themselves.” (Question 55)
Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of other people in their village. (Question
58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of most other people in the country.
(Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right to
vote. (Question 49)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to
form a community organization, they should afﬁliate
with the ruling party. (Question 50A)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is
dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question
50E)

194

97

83

97

97

95

97

96

95

97

97

96

97

93

95

97

29

31

44

68

17

62

30

23

64

60

54

56

80

14

23

114

61

114

114

113

114

114

114

114

114

114

114

114

111

113

44*

57*

64*

81*

18

60

18*

32

83*

80*

80*

78*

75

28*

22

Table A.2 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to
voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues
in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views than I
do, they should be allowed to express them.” (Question

51)

Locus of control
Percent choosing, “People should look after themselves
and be responsible for their own success in life.”
(Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am responsible for
what happens to me.” (Question 64)

Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am almost
certain to make them work.” (Question 65)

Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I can
obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

*Difference in percentages between non-PIP and PIP respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

195

96

94

97

97

96

97

59

74

42

31

67

57

114

114

114

114

114

114

61

79

41

35

72

79*

Table A.3: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having
Tostan Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for

Haalpulaar Respondents in St. Louis

Community Participation

Ever cooperated to solve community problem.
(Question 24)

Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)
Attend at least some organizational meetings.
(Question 22)

Speak out at meetings at least on occasion.
(Question 23)

Gotten together with others to raise issue at least
once. (Question 38B)

Hold at least one leadership position in an
organization. (Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27 )

Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000)
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election
(2000) (Question 29B)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question
33)

Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics
with friends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the
opinion of others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the
way government works.” (Question 46)

Percent choosing, “As a community, we are
generally able to make our elected representatives
listen to our problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters
to choose leaders who will help us improve our
lives.” (Question 48)

196

Respondents

without

Tostan

n %

140 31
140 62
140 81
1 15 49
140 54
140 16
140 66
91 79
91 73
91 66
92 60
140 70
140 60
140 54
138 80
136 44
135 70
137 82

Respondents
with Tostan
n %
124 59*
124 85*
124 92*
1 16 77*
124 68*
123 40*
124 63
78 82
78 77
78 56
78 37*
124 73
124 83*
124 69*
123 82
124 40
124 75
123 79

Table A.3 (cont’d)
Authoritarianism/'I‘raditionalism or
Progressiveness

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for
whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself.”
(Question 70)

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her

right to speak out about politics, even if her
husband disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some
of the traditions that have blocked our
development.” (Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are
curiosity and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)
Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can
depend on people to help you out, when you are in
a pinch.” (Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most
people can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to
help others than to look out for themselves.”
(Question 55)

Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question
58B)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of other people in their village.
(Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of most other people in the
country. (Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the
right to vote. (Question 49)

197

139

139

114

140

139

140

138

138

140

140

139

140

136

68

32

32

46

65

62

26

22

67

64

59

62

82

124

124

124

123

123

124

124

123

124

124

124

124

124

83*

54*

48*

54

82*

58

30

34*

90*

83*

85*

81*

72*

Table A.3 (cont’d)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people
want to form a community organization, they
should afﬁliate with the ruling party. (Question
50A)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to
compromise is dangerous because you betray your
own side. (Question 50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted
to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views
than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”
(Question 51)

Locus of control

Percent choosing, “People should look after
themselves and be responsible for their own
success in life.” (Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am
responsible for what happens to me.” (Question 64)
Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am
almost certain to make them work.” (Question 65)
Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I
can obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

138

138

139

137

139

140

139

140

18

22

58

75

50

33

71

59

123

123

124

123

124

122

124

124

36*

19

60

78

56

49*

77

71*

*Difference in percentages between non-Tostan and Tostan respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

198

Table A.4: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having
Tostan Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for
Female Respondents in Diourbel & Thies

Respondents Respondents

without with Tostan
Tostan
n % n %

Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. 169 39 152 70*
(Question 24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 170 72 152 90*
20)
Attend at least some organizational meetings. 169 86 152 97*
(Question 22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. 147 28 147 75*
(Question 23)
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least 170 48 152 82*
once. (Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an 169 17 152 56*

organization. (Question 21D)

Political Participation

Registered to vote. (Question 27) 170 62 152 81
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 104 88 123 87
(Question 29A)

Voted in second round of presidential election 104 82 123 84
(2000) (Question 293)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 103 64 123 72
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 103 53 123 59
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 168 83 152 81
33)

Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 170 66 152 81*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 165 56 151 77*
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics 159 83 147 87

with ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the
opinion of others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the 15 9 50 149 53
way government works.” (Question 46)
Percent choosing, “As a community, we are 158 77 151 70

generally able to make our elected representatives

listen to our problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters 162 75 151 81
to choose leaders who will help us improve our

lives.” (Question 48)

199

Table A.4 (cont’d)
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or
Progressiveness

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for
whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself.”
(Question 70)

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her

right to speak out about politics, even if her
husband disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some
of the traditions that have blocked our
development.” (Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are
curiosity and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)
Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can
depend on people to help you out, when you are in
a pinch.” (Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most
people can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to
help others than to look out for themselves.”
(Question 55)

Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of their relatives. (Question
583)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of other people in their village.
(Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that
differ from those of most other people in the
country. (Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the
right to vote. (Question 49)

200

165

168

157

161

164

166

154

164

170

170

170

170

170

47

23

31

59

40

86

37

65

59

63

56

56

67

152

151

150

150

151

150

148

150

152

152

152

151

152

75*

47*

55*

63

43

91

27*

57

88*

83*

85*

81*

74

Table A.4 (cont’d)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people
want to form a community organization, they
should afﬁliate with the ruling party. (Question
50A)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to
compromise is dangerous because you betray your
own side. (Question 50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted
to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views
than I do, they should be allowed to express them.”
(Question 51)

Locus of control

Percent choosing, “People should look after
themselves and be responsible for their own
success in life.” (Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am
responsible for what happens to me.” (Question 64)
Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am
almost certain to make them work.” (Question 65)
Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I
can obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

*Difference in percentages between non-Tostan and Tostan respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

201

165

162

166

155

165

158

155

164

ll

41

39

70

50

27

65

79

148

146

151

152

152

145

150

151

34*

45

50*

80

63*

37

73

87* _

Table A5: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having
PAPA Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for

Regions of Thies, St. Louis and Kaolack

Respondents
without PAPA
n %

Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 309 34
24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20) 309 66
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 308 80
22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23) 250 33
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. 309 48
(Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. 308 16
(Question 21D)
Political Participation
Registered to vote. (Question 27) 309 64
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 198 83
(Question 29A)
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) . 198 77
(Question 29B)
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C) 197 60
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 197 47
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33) 308 77
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 309 61.
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 306 54
Political Efﬁcacy
Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics with 298 78
ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the opinion of
others.” (Question 45)
Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the way 301 46
government works.” (Question 46)
Percent choosing, “As a community, we are generally 293 69
able to make our elected representatives listen to our
problems.” (Question 47).
Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters to 300 74
choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.”
(Question 48)
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness
Percent choosing, “Every family member should be free 303 57
to make up his or her own mind on political issues.”
(Question 69)

202

Respondents
wdﬂrPAJhA

n 96
165 49*
166 86*
166 90*
150 49*
166 58*
166 31*
166 70
115 88
115 86
116 63
116 57
165 85*
166 71*
165 68*
162 85
163 50
161 68
161 75
164 56

Table A.5 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for whom he
or she is going to vote for him/herself.” (Question 70)
Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her right to

speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees.”
(Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of the
traditions that have blocked our development.”
(Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the most
important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and
open-mindedness.” (Question 73)

Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend on
people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.”
(Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people can
be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to help
others than to look out for themselves.” (Question 55)
Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of other people in their village. (Question
58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of most other people in the country.
(Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right to
vote. (Question 49)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to
form a community organization, they should afﬁliate
with the ruling party. (Question 50A)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is
dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question
50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to
voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues
in an election.” (Question 52)

203

306

278

300

304

306

296

304

309

309

308

309

304

303

305

302

26

32

50

49

75

31

42

67

66

62

61

75

15

34

47

165

160

164

163

165

162

163

166

166

166

166

166

164

162

166

29

37

63*

47

82

31

52

75

69

67

68

74

12

33

41

Table _ (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views than I
do, they should be allowed to express them.” (Question
51)

Locus of control

Percent choosing, “People should look after themselves
and be responsible for their own success in life.”
(Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am responsible for
what happens to me.” (Question 64)

Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am almost
certain to make them work.” (Question 65)

Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I can
obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

*Difference in percentages between non-PAPA and PAPA respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

204

293

306

297

294

304

71

49

34

64

70

163

162

162

162

164

69

46

32

60

71

Table A.6: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having
PAPF Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for
Respondents in Diourbel & Louga

Respondents Respondents
without PAPF with PAPF
n % n %

Community Participation
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. 104 34 104 62*
(Question 24)
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20) 106 73 104 87*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. 106 87 104 93
(Question 22)
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 92 24 97 54*
23)
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. 106 42 104 67*
(Question 38B)
Hold at least one leadership position in an 106 14 104 43*
organization. (Question 2 1 D)
Political Participation
Registered to vote. (Question 27) 106 61 104 63
Voted in ﬁrst round of presidential election. (2000) 65 86 66 85

(Question 29A) .
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) 65 85 66 82
(Question 29B)

Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 65 62 66 61
29C)

Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D) 65 63 66 45*
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33) 104 68 104 44
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34) 104 69 104 74
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35) 102 64 104 69
Political Efﬁcacy

Percent choosing, “In discussions about politics with 102 79 103 83
ﬁiends and neighbors, I can inﬂuence the opinion of

others.” (Question 45)

Percent choosing, “I can usually understand the way 102 55 104 46
government works.” (Question 46)

Percent choosing, “As a community, we are generally 104 74 104 76

able to make our elected representatives listen to our

problems.” (Question 47).

Percent choosing, “We can use our power as voters to 103 80 104 80
choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.”

(Question 48)

Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or

Progressiveness

205

Table A.6 (cont’d)

Percent choosing, “Every family member should be
free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.” (Question 69)

Percent choosing, “Everyone should decide for whom
he or she is going to vote for him/herself.” (Question
70) ~

Percent choosing, “A woman should exercise her right

to speak out about politics, even if her husband
disagrees.” (Question 71)

Percent choosing, “We may need to abandon some of
the traditions that have blocked our development.”
(Question 72)

Percent choosing, “In this age of rapid change, the
most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity
and open-mindedness.” (Question 73)

Trust

Percent choosing, “For the most part, you can depend
on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.”
(Question 53)

Percent choosing, “Generally speaking, most people
can be trusted.” (Question 54)

Percent that thinks that “people more inclined to help
others than to look out for themselves.” (Question 55)
Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
ﬁom those of their relatives. (Question 58A)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of other people in their village. (Question
58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ
from those of most other people in the country.
(Question 58D)

Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right
to vote. (Question 49)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to
form a community organization, they should afﬁliate
with the ruling party. (Question 50A)

206

102

104

101

104

102

105

100

102

106

106

106

106

106

104

49

24

31

54

45

85

35

65

57

59

49

52

67

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

‘ 104

104

104

104

101

71*

30

47*

63

51

85

31

52

77*

74*

74*

72*

74

21*

Table A.6 (cont’d)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is
dangerous because you betray your own side.
(Question 50E)

Percent choosing, “All people should be permitted to
voted, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.” (Question 52)

Percent choosing, “If people have different views than
I do, they should be allowed to express them.”

(Question 51)

Locus of control
Percent choosing, “People should look after themselves
and be responsible for their own success in life.”
(Question 67)

Percent choosing “For the most part, I am responsible
for what happens to me.” (Question 64)

Percent choosing, “When I make plans, I am almost
certain to make them work.” (Question 65)

Percent choosing, “With a lot of work and effort, I can
obtain nearly all of my goals.” (Question 66)

97

105

100

104

100

100

104

39

29

73

44

33

77

82

102

104

103

103

103

101

104

32

38

76

58*

36

73

83

*Difference in percentages between non-PAPF and PAPF respondents is statistically

signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.

207

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH

CIVIC PARTICIPATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Village Number Respondent Number

Civic/Political Attitudes Questionnaire

Hello. My name is [INTERVIEWER: SAY YOUR NAME]. I am working on behalf of

. I do not represent the government or any other political party. I would like
to examine citizens’ views on community and political participation in Senegal. As part
of this research project, I would like to ask you a few questions. The information that we
are gathering will be used in a report for USAID.

There are no right or wrong answers. Instead, we are interested in what you think.

You are not obligated to take part in the survey and you may refuse to answer any
particular question. You can stop participating in the interview at any time and
previously collected data will not be used. The data emanating ﬁ'om this survey will only
be reported in aggregate form. Your name will not be used and your answers will be kept
strictly conﬁdential, so you can feel free to answer openly and honestly. The interview
will take about one hour. Do you wish to proceed?

[IF YES, FILL IN THE FOLLOWING]

 

 

 

 

 

Date Name of Enumerator
Region Department Arrondisement
Communauté rurale Village

 

 

 

 

208

 

 

1. How old were you at on your last birthday?
[If respondent cannot answer] In which year were you born?

[Write in age]

 

 

[Write in year born]

 

Could not determine age [Enter DK for “Don 't Know "]

 

 

 

 

 

2. [Enumeraton indicate the respondent's gender]:
Male
Female

 

 

t—‘O

 

 

 

3. What is your marital status? Are you currently:
Married

Never married.

Divorced

Widowed

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

\O-AUJNH

 

 

 

4. Do you have any children?

[If No, and go to Q. I
No

Yes 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. What is
HaalPulaar
F ulbe
Wolof
Sonninke

Bamabara
'ak

Serer

Other lease

 

\OOOQQLII-§UJNr—I

Don’t know not read

. Now, I have a few questions about the languages you are able to speak. For each of
the following languages of communication, please indicate if:

If you are only able to speak the language.
You are also able to read a little in the language.

209

You are able to write in the language.

 

A. French

 

No proﬁciency whatsoever

 

You speak French.

 

You speak and read French.

 

You smak, read and write in French.

 

 

Don’t know [Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]

 

\OWNr—bo

 

 

B. Wolof

 

No proﬁciency whatsoever

 

You speak Wolof.

 

You speak and read Wolof.

 

You speak, read and write in Wolof.

 

Don’t know [Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]

 

\OWN—‘O

 

 

C. Pulaar

 

No proﬁciency whatsoever

 

You speak Pulaar.

 

You speak and read Pulaar.

 

You speak, read and write in Pulaar.

 

 

Don’t know [Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]

 

\OUJN—‘O

 

 

I 6D. Serer

 

No proﬁciency whatsoever

 

You speak Serer.

 

You speak and read Serer.

 

You speak, read and write in Serer.

 

Don’t know [Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]

 

\ObJNr-‘O

 

 

6E. Arab

Yes

DK

 

1) You speak Arab.=parlarab

 

2) You read Arab. =readarab

 

 

3) You write Arab. =writearab

 

COO

 

Hp—ay—a

 

\O\O\O

 

 

6F. Other, specify:

 

No proﬁciency whatsoever

 

You speak

 

You speak and read

 

You speak, read, and write

 

 

Don’ t know [Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]

 

\OUJN—‘C

 

210

 

 

 

 

 

7. What is your religion, if any?

 

None [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

Islam [If Islamic, go to Q9]

 

Catholic [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

Protestant (mainstream) [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

Protestant (evangelical/pentecostal) [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

Traditional religion [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

 

Don’t know [PUT 999 POUR Q9]

 

\OQ-bLAN—‘O

 

 

8. To which brotherhood do you belorﬁ if any?

 

None

 

Tidjane

I—l

 

Mouride

 

Khadir

U)

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

9. How much formal education have you had?

 

No formal schooling

 

Some gimary schooling

 

Primary school completed

 

Some high school

 

High school completed

 

Post-secondary qualiﬁcations, other than university

 

Some university, college

 

University, college completed

 

Post- graduate

\OOO\IONKIIJ>DJNu—u

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

.—a
O

 

 

10. How many years of formal education have you had?

 

[Enumeratorz record the number of years]

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

99

 

 

11. How many years of Coranic schooling have you had?

 

[Enumeratorz record the number of years; if none,
record 0 years]

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

99

 

211

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12. Have you ever had any literacy training in a national language?
NﬂIfNo, enter 00 for questions 13-18.] 0

Yes 1
Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

 

 

 

13. Who sponsored this literacy program?

 

[Enumerator: write down the organization here]

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read] I 9

 

14. In what Ian were trained?
NA

Pulaar

Wolof

Sonninke

Bambara

M 'ak

Serer

French

Other,

Don’t know not read

\DOONQU’t-hWNF—‘O

 

 

15. How many years of literacy traininihave you had?
[Enumerator: record the number of years]

 

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read] I 99

 

 

16. How many months out of the year dirLyour class meet?
[Enumerator: record the number of months]

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read] ] 99

 

 

 

17. How many weeks per month did your class meet?
[Enumerator: record the number of weeks]

 

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read] I 99

 

 

18. How many hours per week did your class meet?
[Enumerator: record the number of hours]

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read] T 99

 

 

212

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19. What is your main occlmation?

Unemployed 00
Farmer 01
Informal Marketeer 02
Businessperson 03
Clerical Worker 04
Artisan 05
Domestic Worker 06
Miner 07
Technical Worker 08
Teacher 09
Government Worker 10
NGO Worker 11
Professional 1 2
Retired 13
Housewife 14
Student 15
Marabout, clergyman 16
Commercial 17
Other [Enumerator: Specify on this line] 99

 

[Community Involvement]

 

20. Are you a member of any community association or organization? [If no,

 

 

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

continue with question I.

No [IF NO, PUT 999 FOR QS 24A-D] 0

Yes 1
9

 

213

 

 

 

 

21. A. Please
list the
associations
and
organizations
to which you
belong.
[ENUMERAT
OR: USE
LINES
BELOW].

 

21. B. What type of

association is this?

1) Village
Development
Association

2) Youth Group

3) Sports and Cultural
Association

4) Women’s Group
(afﬁliated with
Federation Nationale
des Groupements
Féminins)

5) Women’s Tontine
or credit circle

6) Groupement
d’Interét
Economique (GIE)

7) Religious
organization

8) Parent-teacher
association (APE)

9) Cellule école milieu

10) Cultural movement
or association

1 1) Local health
committee

12) Local water
management
committee

13) Trade union/ farmer
organization

14) Other, please

specify

21. C. In the past
year, how often
have you attended
the meetings of
your
communityorganiza
tions?

1) Always

2) Often

3) Sometimes

4) Rarely

5) Never

9) DK (Don ’t
Read)

 

 

21. D. Which
leadership
position, if
any, do you
hold or did
you hold in
any of these

organizations
a"

1) None

2) President

3) Vice-
President

4) Treasurer

5) Secretary

6) Other,
please
specify—

 

 

22. How often do you attend village-wide meetings: always, often, sometimes,

rarely, or never?

 

 

 

Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never DK
[IF NEVER PUT [Do not
999 FOR Q26L read]
1 3 4 5 9

 

 

 

 

 

 

214

 

 

 

 

sometimes, rarely, or never?

23. How often do you speak out in public at these meetings: always, often,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never DK
[Do not
read]
1 2 3 4 S 9

 

 

24. A. Have you ever worked or cooperated with others in this village/town to

try to solve some of the problems of this vMe/town?

 

 

 

No [IF NO, PUT 999 FOR Q24B] 0
Yes 1
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

 

 

[IF YES] 24. B. Describe:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

25. During the last ﬁve years, how often have you contactednthat is gone to see
or spoken to—any of the following leaders or government ofﬁcials to obtain help
in resolving a personal problem?

Never Only Sometimes Often

once

A. a viﬂlge chief 0 ' l 2 3
B. a member of the rural council 0 l 2 3
C. a National Assembly representative 0 l 2 3
D. the governor 0 1 2 3
E. an ofﬁcial of a government ministgy 0 1 2 3
F. a marabout 0 1 2 3
G. the prefet 0 l 2 3
H. the sous-prefet 0 1 2 3
1. some other inﬂuential person, please 0 1 2 3
specify
26. During the last ﬁve years, how often have you contacted—that is gone to see
or spoken to—any of the following leaders or government ofﬁcials to obtain help
in resolvinga community problem?

Never Only Sometimes Ofte

once 11

A. a village chief 0 1 2 3
B. a member of the rural council 0 1 2 3
C. a National Assembly representative 0 1 2 3
D. the governor 0 1 2 3
E. an ofﬁcial of a government ministry 0 1 2 3

 

 

215

 

 

 

 

 

F. a marabout

 

G. the prefet

 

H. the sous-prefet

 

COCO
r—Ir—iu—tr—h

I. some other inﬂuential person, please
snacifr

 

 

 

 

NNNN

 

wuww

 

Political Participation

 

27. Are ﬁll a registered voter?

 

No

 

 

 

Yes [If yes, go to Q. ]

 

 

28. [If yes, circle 0 = not applicable. ] [If no] Why not?

 

Not applicable

 

Missed registration

 

111 health

 

Absent from area

 

Voter card lost

 

No ID. card

 

No birth registration

 

Under 18 during registration

 

Not interested in voting

 

Otherwise engaged

\OOO\10\M&U)N—‘O

 

Other [ Specify]

.—o
O

 

 

 

[Go to Q]

 

 

29. Understanding that some Senegalese choose not to vote, let me
ask you: Did you vote:

No

Yes

 

A. In the ﬁrst round of the Presidential election of February
2000?

[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: that is, the last elections for
President. ]

 

B. In the second round of the Presidential election of March
2000?

[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: that is, the last elections for
President. ]

 

C. In the National Assembly elections of May 1998?
[Enumerator: Prompt If necessary: that is, the last elections for
Parliament. ]

 

D. In the local Lovernment elections of 1996?

 

0

 

 

 

 

2000?

30. For whom did you vote in the ﬁrst round of the presidential election of

 

216

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not Applicable 0
Abdou Diouf 1
Abdoulaye Wade 2
Moustapha Niasse 3
Djibo Ka 4
Ibder de T hiam 5
Ossenyou Fall 6
Cheikh Dieye 7
Mademba Sock 8
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
Prefer not to say [Do Not Read] 10

 

 

 

32. For whom did you vote in the second round of the presidential election of

 

 

 

 

 

 

2000?

Not Applicable 0

Abdou Diouf l

Abdoulaye Wade 2

Don’t know [Do not read] 9

Prefer not to say [Do Not Read] 10

 

 

 

32. When you voted for the National Assembly, did you do it to support an

individual or a party?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Individual 1
Party 2
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
33. How interested are you in politics antljovernment?

Not interested 0
Somewhat interested 1
Very interested 2
Don’t know [Do not ray] 9

 

 

 

34. How often do you discuss politics and government with other people?

 

 

Never I

0

 

217

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sometimes 1
Often 2
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

35. Do you feel close to a political party ?

[IfNo, mark —99 for Q 40 and continue with 41]

No 0

Yes 1
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

36. [IF YES] To which party do you feel close?

Part1 Socialiste (PS) 01
L’Alliance des Forces de Progres (AFP) 02
Part1 Democratique Senegalais (PDS) 03
And J ef/Parti pour la Democraticpre et le SocialismelAJ/PADS) 04
Convention des Democrates et des Patriotes/ Garab-gi (CDP-Garab-gi) 05
Defense de l’Unite Senegalaise (DUS) 06
Front pour le Socialisme et la Democratie Benno J ubel (F SD/BJ) 07
Ligue Democratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD/MPT) 08
Mouvement Democratique Populaire (MDID 09
Mouvement Republicain Senegalais (MRS) 10
Parti Aﬁicain de l’Independence (PAI) 11
Parti Democratique Senegalais / Renovation (PDS/R) ’ 12
Parti pour l’Independance et du Travail (PIT) 13
Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple (PLP) 14
Part1 Populaire Senegalais (PPS) 15
Parti du Regroupement Aﬁicain (PRA) 16
Rassemblement National Democratique (RNQ 17
Union Democratique Senegalaise / Renovation (UDS/R) 18
Union Populaire Senegalaise / Renovation msm) 19
Union Populaire SenegalaiselUPS) 20
URD 21
Other [Enumerator: Specify on this line] 22
Don’t Know [Do not read 99
Not Applicable [Do not read] -99

 

 

 

37. Did your party afﬁliation change after the most recent presidential election?

 

No 0

 

 

Yes 1

 

 

218

 

 

 

 

 

Not Applicable [Do not read]

 

 

 

38. Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me
how often you, personally, have done any of these things during the last ﬁve

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

years.
Never Only Sometimes Ofte

once 11
A. attendinglcommunity meeting 0 1 2 3
B. getting together with others to raise 0 1 2 3
an issue
C. attending an election rally 0 l 2 3
D. working for a political candidate or 0 1 2 3
Party
E. signing a petition 0 l 2 3
F. writingpletter to a newspaper 0 1 2 3
G. attending a demonstration 0 1 2 3

 

Political Knowledge and Exposure

 

39. When you hear the word “democracy”, what is the ﬁrst
thing that comes to your mind?
[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: “What, if anything, does
‘democracy ' mean to you? ’1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for strength of opinion]

40. People associate democracy with many different meanings such as the ones
I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, how
important is each of these:JProbe

 

 

 

 

 

political parties
competing with each
other

 

 

 

219

 

 

 

Very Irnportan Not Not At DK
Important t Very All [Do not
Irnporta Irnportan read]
nt 1

A. Majority rule 1 2 3 4 9
B. Complete 1 2 3 4 9
freedom for anyone

to criticize the

ﬂernment

C. Regular elections 1 2 3 4 9
D. At least two 1 2 3 4 9

 

 

 

 

E. Basic necessities
like shelter, food and
water for everyone

 

F. Jobs for everyone

N

4:.

O

 

G. Equality in
education

 

 

H. A small income
gap between rich and

poor

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Enumerator: Ask only if respondent has some idea what democracy is]

45. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Senegal toda ?

 

Not a democracy

 

Major problems, but still a democracy

 

Minor problems, but still a democracy

 

Full democracy

 

 

Not applicable

 

\OUJNr-‘O

 

 

42. Overall, how satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed are you with the way democracy works

in Senegal?

[Enumerator: Probe to see how strongly opinion is held]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Very dissatisﬁed 1
Somewhat dissatisﬁed 2
Somewhat satisﬁed 3
Very satisﬁed 4
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
43. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. 1
B. In certain situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 2
C. To people like me, it doesn’t matter what form of government we have. 3
Don’t Know. 9
44. How often do you get news from:
Never Less About About Several Every DK
than once a once a times a day [Do
once a month week week not
month read]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

220

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. The 0 1 2 3
radio?

 

B. 0 l 2 3
Television?

 

 

C. 0 1 2 3
Newspapers?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Political Efﬁcacy]

 

45. I am now going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which
one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator:

Probe: “Do you agree strongly or just somewhat? ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

221

 

 

Agree Agree
Somewhat Strong
1y
A: In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, 2 1
I can influence the opinions of others.
B: As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors 3 4
do not listen to me.
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
46, Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: The way the government operates sometimes seems 2 1
so complicated that I cannot really understand what is
going on.
B: I can nsnallv understand the wev that gnvernment j 4
Do not agree with eitheL/Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
47, Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: As a community, we are generally able to make our 2 1
elected representatives listen to our problems.
B: We are usually unable to make our elected 3 4
representatives listen to us.
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
48. Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: No matter who we vote for, things will not get any 2 1
better in the future.
B: We can use our power as voters to choose leaders 3 4

 

 

 

 

who will help us improve our lives.

1

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

5

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

9

 

[POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES]

 

49. Should those who are not literate have the right to vote?

 

No

 

 

Yes

 

 

 

50. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

 

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

DK
[Do not
read]

 

A. If people
want to form
a community
organization,
they should
afﬁliate with
the ruling

Pam-

1

3

5

9

 

B. The only
way to get
along in this
world is if we
accommodat
e each other.

 

C. People
are too easily
led.

 

 

D. In this
country, one
must be very
careful about
one says and
does
regarding
politics.

 

 

 

222

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E. To 1 2 3
compromise
with one’s
opponents is
dangerous
because you
betray your
own side.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?:]

51. Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you
agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator: Probe:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression 2 1
of too many different points of view.
B: If people have different views than I do, they should 3 4
be allowed to express them.
Do not agee with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
52. Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they 2 1
do not fully understand all the issues in an election.
B: Only those who are sufﬁciently well educated should 3 4
be allowed to vote.
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
[TRUST]
[FAITH IN PEOPLE SCALE]
53. Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: No one is going to care much about what happens to 2 1
you, when yoget right down to it.
B: For the most part, you can depend on people to help 3 4
you out, when you are in a pinch.
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
54. Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly

 

 

 

 

223

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Generally speamhmost people can be trusted.

H

 

B: Generally speaking, you can’t be to careful in

dealilg with pepple.

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

M

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

55. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more
inclined to look out for themselves?

 

 

 

 

 

To help others. 1
To look out for themselves. 2
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

 

 

56. I am now going to read you a list of people. I would like to know whether,
generally speaking, you trust them to do what is right.
[Enumerator: Probe to see whether or not views are held stronglyj

 

How much do you trust the following

eople and institutions?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I do not I distrust I trust I trust DK
trust them them them a [Do not
them at somewhat somew lot read]
all hat

A. Serigge Saliou Mbacke 1 2 3 4 9
B. Serige Mansour SL 1 2 3 4 9
C. Secretary of State 1 2 3 4 9
Idrissa Seck

D. Primier Ministre 1 2 3 4 9
Moustapha N iasse

E. President Wade 1 2 3 4 9
F. traditional rulers 1 2 3 4 9
G. the conseil rurale 1 2 3 4 9
H. the police 1 2 3 4 9
I. courts of law 1 2 3 4 9
J. political parties 1 2 3 4 9
K. the army 1 2 3 4 9
L. the douane 1 2 3 4 9
M. the banks 1 2 3 4 9
N. merchants 1 2 3 4 9
O. the Mouride 1 2 3 4 9
brotherhood

P. the Tidiane 1 2 3 4 9
brotherhood

 

 

 

 

 

 

224

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

57. In the past, when you did something which depends upon cooperation with

others, did you have the feeling that it surely wouldn’t get done or were you sure

that it would get done?

Surely wouldn’t get done. 1

Sure it would get done. 2

Don’t know. [Do not read] 9
[INDIVIDUALISM]

 

58. Now, I am going ask you some questions about how frequently you have a
certain feeling, and I would like you to tell me if you never, rarely, sometimes,
usuagy, always feel that wa .

 

Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Always

 

A. According to your 0 1 2 3 4
general impression, how
often do your ideas and
opinions about important
matters differ from those
of your relatives?

 

B. How often do your 0 1 2 3 4
ideas and opinions differ
from those of your
friends?

 

C. How often do your 0 1 2 3 4
ideas and opinions differ
from those of other
people in your village?

 

D. Those of most people 0 1 2 3 4
in the country?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS]

 

59. Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you
agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator: Probe:
“Do you agree strongly or just somewhat? "]

 

Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

y
A: I wish people would be more honest with you. 2 1
B: I ﬁnd that most people are pretty straight-forward. 3 4
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

 

 

225

 

60. [Enumerator: Probe: "Dgyou agree strongly or just somewhat? ']

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: Most people are pretty smug about themselves, never 2 1
really facing their bad points.
B: Everyone tries to do their best. 3 4
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
[ACCEPT ABLITY TO OTHERS]
61. [Enumerator: Probe: “Do you agree strongly or just somewhat? ”]
Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: I feel “left out,” as if people don’t want me around. 2 1
B: People seem to like me. 3 4
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t knoﬂDo not read] 9
62. [Enumerator: Probe: “Do you agree strorgly or just somewhat? ”]
Agree Agree
, Somewhat Strongly
A: Most people seem to understand me and my way of 2 1
doing things.
B: People are quite critical of me. 3 4
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
63. [Enumerator: Probe: “Do you agree strongly or just somewhat? '7
Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: People seem to respect my opinion about things; 2 1
B: Often, people do not give my ideas the consideration 3 4
that they merit.
Do not agree with either [Do not read] 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
[LOCUS OF CONTROL]
64. [Enumerator: Probe: “Do you agree strongly or just somewhat? ”]
Agree Agree
Somewhat Strongly
A: To a great extent, my life is controlled by accidental 2 1
happenings.

 

 

226

 

 

 

 

 

 

B: For the most part, I am responsible for what
happens to me.

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

£11

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

65.

 

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongl

 

A: Often there is almost no chance of protecting my
personal interests from bad luck happenings.

2

 

B: When I make plans, I am almost certain to make
them work.

3

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

LII

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

66.

 

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongly

 

A: Getting what I want requires pleasing those
people above me.

2

 

B: With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly
all of npygoals.

3

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

(It

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

67.

Agree
Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

 

A: People should look after themselves and be
responsible for their own success in life.

2

 

B: The government should bear the main
responsibility for ensuring the well-being of people.

3

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

LII

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

[TRADITIONALISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM]

 

 

68. Would you say that most men are better suited emotionally for politics
than are most women, that men and women are equally suited, or that women

are better suited than men in this area?

 

227

 

 

 

 

 

 

Men better suited

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Men and women equally suited 2
Women are better suited 3
Don’t know [Do Not Read] 9
69. Again, please choose A or B. Agree Agree
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion L Somewhat Strongly
A: All members of a family should hold the
same political opinions. 2 1
B: Every family member should be free to make
up his or her own mind on political issues. 3 4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]
Don=t know [Do not read]

Agree Agree
70. [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion] Somewhat Strongly
A: Everyone should decide for whom he or she 2 1
is going to vote.
B: A wife does better to vote the way her 3 4
husband does, because he probably knows more
about such things.
Do not agree with either [Do not recgl]
Don=t know [Do not read]

Agree Agree
71. Somewhat Strongly
A: A woman’s place is in the home; women
should not try to speak out about politics. 2 1
B: A woman should exercise her right to speak
out about politics, even if her husband 3 4

 

 

disggees.

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

 

 

228

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Don=t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

72.

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongly

 

A: Our customs and ethnic heritage are things that
have made us great, and certain people should be
made to show greater respect for them.

2

 

B: We may need to abandon some of the traditions
that have blocked our development.

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

(It

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

 

73.

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongly

 

A: Obedience and respect for authority are the
most important virtues children should learn.

2

 

B: In this age of rapid change, the most important
virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-
mindedness.

3

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

tit

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

 

74.

Agree
Somewhat

Agree
Strongly

 

A: Thanks to modernization, the caste system is
now obsolete.

2

 

B: The system of castes should be maintained in
order to keep the social peace.

3

 

 

Do not agree with either [Do not read]

'Jt

 

 

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

[ETHNIC IDENTITY QUESTIONS]

 

 

for strength of opinion]

75. Here are a series of things people might say about how they see their
group in relation to other Senegalese. There are no right or wrong
answers. We are simply interested in y_ou_r opinions. Please tell me
whether you disagree or agree with these statements. [Enumerator: Probe

 

 

229

 

 

 

 

Strongl

Disagre

Disagre

Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agre

Strongly
Agree

DK
[Do not
read]

 

A. You feel
proud to be

3

 

B. You would
want your
children to
think of
themselves as

 

C. Of all the
groups in this
country, _
people are the
best.

 

D. You feel
much
stronger ties
to __5 than
to other
Senegalese.

 

E. It makes
you proud to
be called a
Senegalese.

 

 

F. You would
want your
children to
think of
themselves as
Senegalese.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

76. If you had to chose between these two identities, [the
ethnic identity group of the respondent] or Senegalesee,

which would you choose ?

 

[the ethnic identity group of the respondent

p—I

 

Senegalese

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

230

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

77. Are 5’ [RESPONDENT 'S IDENTITY GROUP] economic
conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this
country? [Probe for strength of opinion]
Much worse 1
Worse 2
About the same 3
Better 4
Much better 5
Don’t know [Do Not Read] 9
78. In your opinion, how often are people treated unfairly by the
_government?

Always 1
To a large extent 2
To some extent 3
Hardly at all 4
Never 5
Don’t know [Do Not Read] 9

79A. Do you think that the government represents

the interests of all Selrpgalese, or of one goup only?

All Senegalese [Skip to Q. 94] 1

One group only

Don’t know [Do Not Read] 9

[If one group] Whiclgroup is that? L

 

 

 

 

[EVALUATION OF CURRENT SIT UA TION]

 

80. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you gone without:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Never Occasional F requentl Always
1y y
A. Food for your family? 0 1 2 3
B. Water for domestic use? 0 1 2 3
C. Schooling for children? 0 l 2 3
D. Health care for your family? 0 1 2 3

 

 

B1. To whom do you usually turn when you are unable to get:

231

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

today?

 

 

 

 

No- Kin Communi Private Gov’t Illicit Not
one ty group provisio provisio provisio appli
n n 11 cable
A. Food for 0 1 2 3 4 5 9
your family?
B. Water for 0 1 2 3 4 5 9
domestic use?
C. Schooling 0 1 2 3 4 5 9
for children?
D. Health 0 1 2 3 4 5 9
care for your
family?
82. How satisﬁed are you:
Not at Not very Somewh Very
[Enumerator: Probe for strength of all satisﬁed at satisﬁe
opinion] satisﬁed satisﬁed d
A. with the general state of the 1 2 3 4
Senegalese economy today?
B. with your own living conditions 1 2 3 4

 

 

83. Would you say that your own living conditions are worse, the same, or

better than other Senegalese?

[Enumerator: Probe for strength of opinion]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Much worse 1
Worse 2
About the same 3
Better 4
Much better 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

 

 

 

84. When you look at your life today, how satisﬁed do you feel compared with

ﬁve years ago?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Much less satisﬁed 1
Slightly less satisﬁed 2
About the same 3
Slightly more satisﬁed 4
Much more satisﬁed 5
Don’t know [Do not read] 9

 

 

 

85. When you look forward at your life’s prospects, how satisﬁed do you expect

to be in one year’s time?

 

 

Much less satisﬁed

l

1

 

232

 

 

 

 

 

Slightly less satisﬁed

 

About the same

 

Slightly more satisﬁed

 

Much more satisﬁed

 

 

 

\OM-th

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

 

86. In your opinion, who is responsible for the current economic conditions in
Senegal?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The previous government 1
The current government 2
The IMF/World Bank 3
We, the people 4
Structural Adjustment Programme 5
Internal opposition forces 6
International economic forces 7
Other [Specify] 8
Don’t know [Do not read] 9
87. How well would you say the government is handling the following problems?
Very Fairly F airl Very DK
Badl Badly y Well [Do not
y Well read]
A. Creating jobs 1 2 3 4 9
B. Keeping prices low 1 2 3 4 9
C. Narrowing income gaps 1 2 3 4 9
between different groups
D. Reducing crime 1 2 3 4 9
E. Addressing the educational 1 2 3 4 9
needs of all Senegglese
F. Improving basic health 1 2 3 4 9
services
G. Fighting corruption in 1 2 3 4 9
_gwernment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

88. What is your overall assessment of the performance of the current
_government?

 

Very bad

 

Bad

 

Neither bad nor good

 

Good

 

Very good

 

It’s too early to say. [Do not read]

 

 

 

\OONUIADJNr—t

Don’t know [Do not read]

 

 

233

 

89. How long do you think it will take:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Within Within Within More Neve DK
two four eight than r [Do
years years years eight not
years read]
A. before the government 1 2 3 4 5 9
fulﬁlls the promises it has
made?
B. before your own living 1 2 3 4 5 9
standards meet your
expectations?
90. What is your monthly income?
No income 0
Less than 10,000 1
Between 10,000 and 30,000 2
Between 31,000 and 50,000 3
Between 51,000 and 100,000 4
Between 101,000 and 150,000 5
Between 151,000 and 200,000 6
Between 201,000 and 300,000 7
Between 301,000 and 400,000 8
Between 401,000 and 500,000 9
Between 501,000 and 700,000 10
Between 701,000 and 900,000 11
Between 901,000 and 1,100,000 12
More than 1,100,000 13
Prefer not to say [Do not read] 14
Don’t Know [Do not read] -8

 

Thank you so much. Your answers have been very helpful. Please be assured that
they will remain conﬁdential.

 

I lime lntemiew Ended [Ennmerntgn' Enter honr and minute. then

END INTERVIEW

234

l

l l

l lAJPl

 

 

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH

Questionnaire sur l’Engagement Civique et Politique

Village n° Répondant n°
Procedure de selection des maisons

Choisir la maison en fonction des pas de sondage établie (troisiéme maison c‘t droite).
S ’il n ’y a personne dans la maison ainsi selectionée, repasser au moins une deuxiéme
fois avant de la substituer par une autre. S ’il n 'y a personne (‘1 la seconde tentative,
subsituez cette maison par une autre que vous trouverez toujours selon les pas de
sondage.

[Enquéteur: Encercler le numero correct pour les tentatives sans succés seulement]

 

Tentatives sans succes Maiso Mai Mai Maiso Mai Mai Maison

 

 

Raison de la n 5011 son n 5011 son 7
substitution: 1 2 3 4 ‘ 5 6

A refusé d’étre 1 l 1 l l 1 l
interviewé

La personne tirée 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

(procedure de tirage par
carte) n’est jamais chez
elle

 

Maison vide pendant la 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
periode de l’enquéte

 

Sourd-muet/ne parle 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
qu’une langue étrangere

 

Ne correspond pas a la 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
logique de quota genre

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Autre 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

 

 

 

Introduction

Bonjour, bonsoir, Je m’appelle [nom de l’enqué’teur]. J c travaille dans le cadre
d’une enquéte qu’on fait pour mieux vous connaitre. J c ne représente pas le
gouvemement, ni un parti politique. J e voudrais recueillir l’opinion des citoyens sur
la participation politique au Sénégal ainsi que l’engagement communautaire. Les
inforrnations recueillies seront utilisées dans un rapport d’enquéte par l’USAID et

 

 

 

235

 

dans la these d’une étudiante américaine en sciences politiques.

Les Senegalais out, chacun, une égale d’étre inlcus dans cette etude. Votre
famille a la chance d’avoir été choisie. Mais nous devons choisir au hasard un
adulte Errmi vous. Voudriez-vous nous aider h Ie faire?

 

 

 

[Si l’interview est refusée dans une maison, marchez dans la direction établie par les pas
de sondage et subsituez par la troisiéme maison]

Procedure de selection du répondant

Enque‘teur: encercler le nombre correct

 

 

 

Homme Femme
L’interview precedant était 1 2
avec:
Cette interview doit étre 1 2
avec:

 

 

 

 

 

S’il vous plait, indiquez-moi les noms de tous les citoyens Sénégalais de plus de 18
ans vivant presentement dans cette maison. Y compris vous méme.

S’il vous plait choissisez une carte. La personne qui correspond au numero tiré sera
celle qu’on devra interviewer.

RAPPEL: Mettez une croix sur le numero de la personne choisie.

La personne a laquelle je voudrais parler est [lire le nom] . Cette
personne est-elle presentement a la maison?

Si oui: Puis-je s’il vous plait l’interviewer maintenant?

Si non: Cette personne reviendra-t-elle ici dans la journée?

 

Si non: Merci beaucoup. Je vais choisir une autre maison. Substituez par la
prochaine maison selon les pas de sondage. NOTE: VOUS DE VEZ S UBS T I T UER
DES MAISONS, NON DES INDIVID US.

Si oui: S’il vous plait, dites a cette personne (absente pour le moment) que je
reviendrai pour l’interview a [Indiquer l’heure correcte]. Revenez unefois comme
convenu. Si le répondant selectionnée au hasard n ’est pas Id (3 votre seconde visite,
remplacer ce ménage par la prochaine maison selon les pas de sondage.

Si la personne selectionnée est autre que la personne d laquelle vous vous étes adressé
au depart, repetez l’introduction.

Bonjour, bonsoir, Je m’appelle [nom de l’enqué‘teur]. Je travaille dans le cadre d’une

enquéte qu’on fait pour mieux vous connaitre. Je ne représente pas le gouvemement, ni
un parti politique. Je voudrais recueillir l’opinion des citoyens sur la participation

236

politique au Sénégal ainsi que l’engagement communautaire. Les informations recueillies
seront utilisées dans un rapport d’enquéte par l’USAID et dans la these d’une étudiante
américaine en sciences politiques. Dans le cadre de cette étude je vous saurai gré de bien
vouloir répondre a quelques questions. 11 n’y a pas de réponses vraies ou fausses. Nous
sommes plut6t interessés par votre point de vue.

Vous n’étes pas obligé de prendre part a cette enquéte et vous avez le loisir de reﬁrser de
répondre a telle ou telle question selon votre bon vouloir. Vous pourrez mettre ﬁn a votre
participation a l’interview a tout moment, et les informations recueillies ne seront pas
utilisées. Les informations issues de cette enquéte ne seront présentées que d’une
maniere globale. Votre nom ne sera mentionné nulle part dans cette enquéte et vos
réponses resteront conﬁdentielles, donc vous pouvez vous sentir a l’aise et répondre
ouvertement et honnétement. L’interview durera environ une heure. Etes vous d’accord?

 

Combien de visites ont été faites a la maison ou l’interview a ﬁnalement été 1 2
réalisées?

 

 

O
C

Date de l’interview [Enque‘teun' indiquez lejour et le mois]
Heure a laquelle l’interview a commencée [Indiquez l’heure et X X
les minutes en utilisant le syste‘me 24 heures]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Si oui, retrylissez la case ci-dessous]

 

 

 

 

 

Date Nom de l’Enquéteur
Region Département Arrondissement
Communauté rurale Village

 

 

 

 

 

Avant de commencer, permettez-moi de vous parlez peu de la procedure de
l’interview, étant donné que la plupart des gens ne sont pas familiers de ce genre
d’enquéte. Il vous sera pose deux types de questions dans cette enquéte. Dans
quelques cas, je vous demanderai de répondre a mes questions avec vos propres
mots, tout seul. Dans ces cas-Ia, j’aurais a transcrire ﬁdelement votre réponse.

Le deuxieme type de questions est different car la 11 vous sera donné une serie de
réponses et on vous demandera de choisir celle que est la plus proche de votre
opinion. I] vous sera également prié, souvent, de dire a quel degré vous étes
d’accord on non, par exemple, aﬁn d’apporter plus de precision. Mais, méme si
aucune des réponses ne correspond pas textuellement a votre pensée, le choix de
celle qui est la plus proche de ce que vous pensez nous permettra de comparer vos
réponses plus facilement avec celles d’autres gens.

237

Questionnaire sur l’engagement civique

[Données démographiques]

Je voudrais, s’il vous plait, commencer par vous poser quelques questions sur vous-

méme.

 

1. Quel age avez-vous?

Si l'enqué'té ne peut pas répondre t‘z cette question] En quelle année étes-vous né?

 

[Inscrire l’cige]

 

[Inscrire l’année de naissance]

 

Pas ”]

Si l’age est impossible at determiner [Inscrire NSP pour “Ne Sais

 

Age [usage oj‘iciel seulement]

[PC

 

 

 

2. [Enquéteun indiquez le genre de la répondant]:

 

Masculin

 

Féminin

 

 

1

 

 

marié(e), divorcé]e) ou veuf (v_euve) ?

3. Quel est votre statut matrimonial? Etes-vous presentement jamais marié(e),

 

Jamais marié(e].

 

Marié(e)

 

Divorcé(e)

 

Veuf, veuve

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

\D-hUJNv-t

 

 

4. Avez-vous des enfants?

 

Non

 

 

Oui

 

_l

 

 

5. A quelle ethnic appartenez-vous?

 

HaalPulaar

 

F ulbe/Peul

 

Wolof

 

Sonninke

 

Bambara

 

 

Majak

 

 

QM-hUJN—t

 

238

 

.0

 

Serer 7

 

OO

Autre, précisez

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

A présent, j’ai quelques questions a vous poser a propos des langues de
communication. Pour chacune de vos langues de communication indiquez si:
Vous n’avez aucune competence dans la langue.

Vous étes seulement capable de parler la langue.
Vous étes capable de lire (un peu) dans la langue.
Vous étes capable d’écrire dans la langue.

A. Fran

Aucune ence

Vous le '

Vous ez et lisez le

Vous ' et écrivez 1e
Ne sais tem ti ne

B. Wolof

Aucune

Vous ez le wolof.

Vous et lisez le wolof.

Vous ' et écrivez 1e wolof.
Ne sais tem c‘z ne

C. Pulaar

Aucune

Vous le .

Vous et lisez le

Vous ' et écrivez 1e
Ne sais Item d ne

D. Serer

Aucune

Vous 1e serer.

Vous ez et lisez le serer.

Vous ' et écrivez 1e Serer.
Ne sais Item (1 ne

 

 

E. Autre, précisez:

 

Aucune competence

 

 

 

Vous parlez le . 1

 

239

 

 

 

 

Vous parlez et lisez 1e . 2

 

DJ

Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez 1e

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

 

 

7. Quelle est votre region?

 

Aucune [Cochez 999 (1 Q8 et Allez c‘z Q9L

 

Islam [Si c ’est 1 ’Islam, allez 81 Q8]

 

Catholique [Cochez 999 dQ8 et Allez cl Q9]

 

Protestante [Cochez 999 (‘1 Q8 et Allez (‘1 Q9]

 

Religion traditionnelle [Cochez 999 cl Q8 et Allez (‘1 Q9

 

Autre, precisez

 

 

 

\OﬂQwN—‘O

Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

8. [Si Islam] A quelle confrérie appartenez vous, 5i tel était le cas?

 

Aucune 0

 

p—a

Tidj ane

 

Mouride

 

Khadir

 

Autre, precisez

 

\O-D-UJN

Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondaﬂ .

 

 

Pas concemé 999

 

 

 

9. Quel est le niveau académique atteint?

 

Pas d’éducation formelle [Mettez 0 cl Q10 et allez d Q11]

 

Vous avez fréquenté un peu l’école primaire

 

Vous avez terminé 1e primaire

 

Vous avez fait un peu 1e secondaire

 

Vous avez terminé le secondaire

 

GM-hb-DNH

Vous avez suivi une formation post-secondaire, non
universitaire

 

Vous avez fait un peu l’université

 

Vous avez un diplome universitaire

 

\OOO\I

Vous étes allé au-dela de la maitrise

 

 

 

...a
O

Ne saispas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

10. Combien d’années avez-vous été a l’école (education formelle)?

 

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre d’années ici]

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] ] 99

 

 

 

I 11. Combien d’années d’études coraniques avez-vous fait?

240

 

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre d ’années ici; 5i aucune,
indiquez 0]

Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] I 99

 

 

 

 

 

12. Avez-vous été alphabétisé dans une langue nationale?
Non [Si Non, mettez 0 a 0513 a Q18 et allez a Q 19]
Oui

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 nepas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

 

 

\0—‘0

 

 

[Si oui]

 

13. Quel progamme vous a alphabétisé?
[L’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nom de I’organisme ici ]

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] L 9

 

l4. Dans uelle e avez-vous été ?
Pas concemé

Pulaar

Wolof

Sonninke

Bambara
'ak

Serer

F

A
Ne sais tem it no au

 

\OOO\IO\UI-I>WNHO

 

15. Combien d’années d’alphabétisation avez-vous eu?
[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre d’années icr]

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] I 99

 

 

16. Combien de mois dans l’année avez-vous fait classe?
[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre de mois ici]

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] I 99

 

 

17. Combien de semaines dans le mois avez-vous fait classe?
[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre de semaines ici]

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] I 99

 

241

 

18. Combien d’heures par semaine avez-vous fait classe?

 

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez Ie nombre d’heures ici]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item 61 ne pas communiquer au répondant] I 99

A present, parlons s’il vous plait de vos activités économiques.
19. Quelle est votre occupation principale?
Sans emploi 00
Cultivateur 01
Commercant inforrnel 02
Homme d’affaire, Femme d’affaire 03
Employé de bureau 04
Artisan 05
Travailleur domestique 06
Mineur 07
Technicien/ouvrier 08
Enseignant 09
Fonctionnaire/agent de l’Etat 10
Agent non gouvememental 11
Professionnel 12
A la retraite 13
Ménagére (femme au foyer) 14
Etudiant, éleve 15
Marabout, homme d’église 16
Commercant(e) 1 7
Autre [L ’enque‘teur: indique ici [occupation] 99
20. Etes-vous membre d’une association ou d’une organisation
communautaire?
[En cas de réponse negative, aller (‘1 la question Q22]
Non 0
Oui 1
Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondantL 9

 

242

 

 

 

 

 

(Si out 81 Q20)
21. A.
Indiquez ci-
dessous les
noms des
associations
auxquelles
vous
appartenez.

[Enquéteur:
utilisez les
cases ci-
dessous]

Nom de
l’association :

 

 

 

21. B. Quelle genre
d’association est-cc?

1)

2)
3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

10) Mouvement culturel
1 1) Comité local de santé

12) Comité local de

13) Mouvement syndical

15) Autre, préciser s’il

Association
villageoise de
développement.
Mouvement de
jeunesse.
Association Sportive
et culturelle
Groupement de
femmes (membre de
la fédération
nationale des
groupements
féminins)

Tontine de femme ou
groupement de crédit
mutuel

Groupement d’intérét
économique (G.I.E.)
Mouvement religieux
(association
religieuse)
Associations de
parents d’éleves
(APE)

Cellule école milieu

communautaire

gestion de l’eau (ou
du forage)

de paysans

vous plait

 

 

 

 

 

21. C. Avez-vous,

durant l’année

derniére participé

aux réunions de

votre association

communautaire?

6) Toujours

7) Souvent

8) De temps en
temps

9) Rarement

10) Jamais

9) NSP (d ne pas

communiquer)

 

21. D. Quelle
position de
responsabilité
avez-vous
occupez ou
occupez-vous
dans votre
association?

7) President
8) Vice-

president
9) Trésorier
10) Secrétaire
11)Aucune
12) Autre

(précisez)—

 

 

 

 

243

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

22. Vous arrive-t-il d’assister aux assemblées villageoises : toujours, souvent,
de term en temps, rarement ou jamais?
Toujours Souvent De temps en Rarement J amais Ne sait pas
temps [Si Jamais, [Item a‘ ne pas
allez a' Q24A] communiquer
au répondant]
4 3 2 1 0 9
23. Vous arrive-t-il de prendre la parole lors de ces rencontres: toujours,
souvent, de temps en tern s, rarement ou 'amais?
Toujours Souvent De temps en Rarement J arnais Ne sait pas
temps [Item a‘ ne
pas
communiqu
er au
répondant]
4 2 0 9

 

 

 

24. A. Vous est-il arrive de travailler ou de coopérer avec d’autres personnes

dans ce village/ville pour tenter de résoudre quelques-uns des problemes du

village/ville dans les deux derniéres années?
En cas de réponse négative, cocher 00 d Qg4B aller (‘1 la question 25]

 

 

Non
Oui

 

 

NSP [Item a‘ ne pas communyuer au répondant]

 

\0-‘O

 

[Si oui] 24. B. Quelle était la nature du probleme ?

On peut dire aujourd’hui que tout le monde a des problémes personnels. Nul ne
peut échapper aux difﬁcultés inherentes a la vie. Quelquefois on est obligé de
demander I’aide des autres. Parlons, a present des problémes personnels.

244

 

 

 

 

25. Combien de fois avez-vous, durant les cinq dernieres années, contacté -
c’est a dire rencontré ou parlé a — quiconque des leaders, des dirigeants ou
des agents de I’Etat ci-aprés listés pour obtenir de l’aide dans la resolution
d’un probleme personnel? Vous me direz a chaque fois si c’est jamais, une
fois seulement, de temps en tem s ou souvent.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jamais Une fois De temps Souvent
seulement en temps

A. un chef de village 0 1 2 3
B. un membre de conseil rural 0 1 2 3
C. un député de l’Assemblée 0 1 2 3
Nationale

D. le gouverneur 0 1 2 3
E. un aggt d’un ministere 0 1 2 3
F. un marabout 0 1 2 3
G. le préfet 0 1 2 3
H. le sous-prefet 0 1 2 3
I. une autre personne 0 1 2 3
inﬂuente, précisez

 

Parlons, a present des problémes de la communauté.

 

26. Combien de fois avez-vous, durant les cinq derniéres années, contacté -
c’est a dire rencontré ou parlé h — quiconque des leaders ou des agents de
l’état ci-aprés listés pour obtenir de l’aide dans la resolution d’un probleme

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

communautaire?

J arnais Une fois De temps Sou

seuleme en temps vent
nt

A. un chef de villag 0 1 2 3
B. un membre de conseil rural 0 1 2 3
C. un député de l’Assemblée 0 1 2 3
Nationale
D. le guverneur 0 1 2 3
E. an agent d’un ministere 0 1 2 3
F. un marabout 0 1 2 3
G. le préfet 0 l 2 3
II. le sous-prefet 0 1 2 3
I. une autre personne influente, 0 1 2 3
précisez
27. Etes-vous inscrit sur les listes électorales?
Non I 0

 

245

 

 

 

 

 

Oui [Si oui, mettre 0 pour la question 28 et aller (‘1 la question

2291

 

 

 

28. [Si Non] Pourquoi?

 

Pas concemé

 

Rate les inscriptions.

ﬂ

 

Problemes de santé

 

Absent de ma circonscription

 

Perdu ma carte électorale

 

Pas de carte d’identite’

 

Pas de bulletin de naissance

 

Moins de 18 ans

 

Pas intéressé par les elections

 

Autrement engagé

\OWNGM-hWN

 

Autre [Précisez]

—a
O

 

 

[Cocher 9 (‘1 29A-D, cocher 0 aux Q5 30, 31, &. 32 et aller a‘ Q
33.]

 

 

 

29. Etant donné qu’il y a des Sénégalais qui choisissent de ne
pas voter, dites-moi s’il vous plait: Avez-vous voté:

Non

Oui

 

A. Lors du premier tour des elections présidentielles de
février 2000? [Si non, cochez 0 pour Q30]

[L ’enquéteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu ’il s 'agit des
demiéres élections présidentielles]

 

B. Lors du second tour des elections présidentielles de mars
2000? [Si non, cochez 0 pour Q31]

[L ’enquéteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu ’il s ’agit des
derniéres élections présidentielles]

 

C. Aux élections législatives de mai 1998 ? [Si non, cochez 0
pour Q32]

[L ’enquéteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu ’il 5 'agit des
derniéres élections législatives]

 

D. Aux elections locales de 1996?

 

 

 

 

 

 

30. [Si out 81 29A] Pour qui avez-vous voté au premier tour des dernieres

elections présidentielles de Février 2000?

 

 

Non concemé [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

0

 

246

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abdou Diouf 1
Abdoulaye Wade 2
Moustapha Niasse 3
Djibo Ka 4
Iba der Thiam 5
Ousseynou Fall 6
Cheikh Ablaye Dieye 7
Mademba Sock 8
Ne sais gas [Item 81 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9
Autre [Item 52 ne pas suggérer au répondant] 10
Vous préférer m’abstenir de répondre. [Item a ne pas 11

communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

31. [Si oui ti Q2981 Pour qui avez-vous voté au second tour des dernieres

elections présidentielles de Février 2000?

 

 

 

 

Non concemé [Item [I ne pas communiquer au répondant] 0
Abdou Diouf l
Abdoulaye Wade 2
Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

Autre [Item (‘1 ne pas suggérer au répondapt]

 

 

Préf‘ere ne rien dire [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

32. [Si out (i Q29C] Aux elections législatives, lorsque vous avez voté pour un
candidat, l’avez-vous fait pour soutenir un individu ou pour soutenir un parti?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Non concemé [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant] 0

L’individu l

Parti

Autre raison énoncée [Item 21 ne pas suggérer au répondant] 10
Ne sais pas [Item 81 nepas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

 

33. Vous intéressez—vous a la politique et aux affaires gouvernementales? Etes-

vous tres intéressé, quelque peu intéressé, pas intéressé ?

 

Vous n’étes pas intéressé

 

Vous étes quelque peu intéressé

 

 

Vous étes tres intéressé

 

NHO

 

247

 

 

 

 

 

IESP [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer auﬂondant] I 9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

34. Vous arrive-t-il de discuter de politique et d’affaires gouvernementales avec
d’autres gens : jamais, de temps en temps, ou souvent?

Jamais 0

De temps en temps 1
Souvent 2
NSP [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

35. Vous sentez-vous proche d’un parti politique ?

[Si Non cochez 00 d Q36 et cochez 9 d Q37 et allez (i Q38]

Non 0

Oui 1

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

36. [Si out a la question 35] De quelle formation politique vous sentez-vous le
plus proche?

Non concemé [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 00
Parti Socialiste (PS) 01
L’Alliance des Forces de Progres (AFP) 02
Parti Democratique Sénégalais (PDS) 03
And Jef/Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (AJ/PADS) 04
Convention des Democrates et des Patriotes/ Garab-gi (CDP-Garab-gi) 05
Defense de l’Unité SénégalaiseiDUS) 06
Front pour le Socialisme et la Democratic Benno J ubel (FSD/BJ) 07
Ligue Démocramue/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD/MPT) 08
Mouvement Democratique Populaire QvaP) 09
Mouvement Republicain Sénégalais (MRﬁ 10
Parti Aﬁicain de l’Indépendance (PAI) 11
Part1 Démocratﬂre Senegalais / Renovation (PDS/R) 12
Part1 pour l’Indépendance et du Travail (PIT) 13
Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple (PLP) 14
Parti Populaire Sénégalais (PPS) 15
Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA) 16
Rassemblement National Democratique (RND) 17
Union Democratique Sénégalaise / Renovation (UDS/R) 18
Union Populaire Sénégalaise / Renovation (UPS/R) 19
Union Populaire Sénégalaise (UPS) 20
Autre [L 'enquéteur indiquez le nom de parti icr] 21
Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant] 99

 

 

 

 

248

 

 

I

37. [Si out a Q35] Avez—vous change de parti politique apres les elections

 

 

 

 

 

présidentielles?

N on 0
Oui 1
Non concemé [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

 

38. 11 y a ci-dessous une liste de comportements propre a un citoyen. Dites-moi,
s’il vous plait, la fréquence a laquelle vous avez adopté l’un de ces
comportements durant les cinq derniéres années.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

J amais Une fois De temps en Souvent
seulement temps

A. Participer a une reunion dans 0 1 2 3
la communauté
B. Participer avec d’autres a la 0 1 2 3
soumission d’un probleme
C. Participer a un meeting 0 1 2 3
politique
D. Travailler pour un candidat 0 1 2 3
cu parti politique
E. Signer une petition 0 1 2 3
F. Ecrire une lettre a un journal 0 1 2 3
G. Participer a une marche 0 1 2 3

 

 

[Connaissance politique]

 

vous ”I

39. Lorsque vous entendez le mot « democratic », qu’est-ce qui
vous vient, en premier, a l’esprit ?
[L ’enquéteur: Si nécessaire: Précisiez “que veut dire démocratie pour

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

40. En général, les gens associent la democratic avec les différents elements
mentionnés ci-aprés. Pour qu’une société soit dite démocratique, quelle est
l’importance de chacun d’entre eux? [Enquéteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion]

 

Tres
important

 

 

 

Important

249

Pas
vraiment
important

 

Pas du
tout
important

 

 

NSP
[Item (‘1 ne
pas
communiq
uer au
répondant]

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.. La regle de la 1 2 3 4 9
majorité
B. Liberté totale 1 2 3 4 9

pour quiconque de
critiquer le
_gouvernement

 

C. La tenue 1 2 3 4 9
réguliere
d’élections

 

D. L’existence 1 2 3 4 9
d’au moins deux
partis politiques
rivaux.

 

E. Les besoins de 1 2 3 4 9
premiere nécessité:
habitat, nourriture,
eau pour tous

 

F. Des emplois 1 2 3 4 9
pourtous

 

G. L’équité en 1 2 3 4 9
matiere
d’éducation

 

H. Une difference 1 2 3 4 9
négligeable de
revenus entre riche
et pauvre

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[L ’enquéteur ne traite cette question que si la cible a quelque idée de ce qu ’est la
démocratie]

41. A votre avis, a quel point Ie Sénégal est-i1 une democratic au'ourd’hui?

 

Pas une democratic. O

 

Des problemes maj eurs mais quand méme une democratic

 

Des problemes mineurs mais quand méme une démocratie

 

 

 

1
2
Democratie totale 3
Non concemé 9

 

 

42. Dans l’ensemble, h quel point étes—vous satisfait ou insatisfait de la maniere
dont la democratie fonctionne au Sénégal?
[Enquéteun indique la valeur de l'opinion]

 

Tres insatisfait

 

Quelque peu insatisfait

 

Quelque peu satisfait

 

Tres satisfait

 

 

 

\O-hUJNr-i

Ne sais pas [Item d ne pas communiquer (‘1 la cible]

 

 

250

 

43. Laquelle des declarations suivantes se rapproche le plus de ce que vous

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ensez?
A. La democratie est preferable a toute autre forme de 1
gouvernement.
B. Dans certains cas, un gouvernement non-democratique est 2
preferable.
C. Pour lesgens comme moi, la forme de gouvernement importe peu. 3
44. Vous arrive-t-il de vous informer a partir de :
Jamais Moins Environ Environ Plusieurs Tous NSP
d’une une fois une fois fois par les [Item ti
fois par par semaine jours ne pas
par mois semaine comma
mois niquer
au
répond
ant]
A. La 0 1 2 3 4 5 9
radio?
B. La 0 l 2 3 4 5 9
télévisio
n?
C. 0 l 2 3 4 5 9
Les
Journau
x?
[E ﬂicacité Politique]

 

45. Je vais, a present vous proposer, par paires, plusieurs declarations. Dites-
moi s’il vous plait, sur laquelle des declarations vous étes le plus d’accord?
Choisissez la declaration A ou la declaration B. [Enqué'teur: indique Ia valeur de
l'opinion : “Etes-vous tout a‘fait d ’accord ou quelque peu d’accord. ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout
peu a fait
d’accord d’acc
ord
A: Je peux inﬂuencer les autres, quanta leur opinion, dans 2 1
une discussion politique entre amis et voisins.
B: Des lors qu’il s’agit de politique, mes amis et voisins ne 3 4
m’écoutent pas.
C : Vous n’étes d’accord sur aucune de ces declarations [Item (‘1 5

 

251

 

 

 

 

 

f—‘J‘ ~. . -

 

ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9
46. Quelque Tout a
pen fait
d’accord d’accord
A: Les facons de faire du gouvernement semblent, 2 1
quelques fois si compliquées que je ne comprends pas
vraiment ce qui se passe.
’ ahi ' ne ' r l 3 4
C : Vous n’étes d’accord sur aucune de ces declarations [Item
(‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]
47. Quelque Tout a
peu fait
d’accord d’accord
A: En général, nous sommes capables, en taut que 2 1
communauté, de faire en sorte que nos élus nous entendent
sur nos problemes.
B: D’habitude, nous sommes incapables de nous faire 3 4
entendre par nos élus.
C: Vous n ’etes d’accord sur aucune de ces declarations [Item
a ne pas communiquer au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]
I 48. Quelque Tout a
‘ peu fait
d’accord d’accord
A: Quelque soit celui pour qui nous votons, les choses ne 2 1
risquent pas de s’arranger dans l’avenir.
B: Nous sommes en mesure d’utiliser notre pouvoir en 3 4
tant qu’électeurs pour choisir des dirigeants capables de
nous aider a améliorer nos conditions d’existence.
C : Vous n’étes d’accord sur aucune de ces declarations 5
[Item d ne pas communiquer au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondang] 9

 

 

 

 

Merci beaucoup. Maitenant, dites-moi s’il vous plait .

252

 

 

 

 

de voter?

49. Ceux qui ne sont ni alphabétisés, ni lettrés devraient-115 avoir le droit

 

Non

 

 

Our

 

 

ﬂ

 

 

50. 8’11 vous plait, dites-moi si vous étes d’accord ou pas sur les declarations

suivantes.

[L ’enque‘teur: indique la valeur de l’opinion]

 

 

 

 

 

Pas du tout Pas Ni pour, D’accor Tout NSP
d’accord d’accor ni contre d in [Item (1
d fait ne pas
d’ac commu
cord niquer
au
réponda
nt]
A. Si les gens 1 2 3 4 5 9
veulent créer
une
association
dans leur
communauté,
ils devraient
s’afﬁlier au
parti au
pouvoir.
B. La seule l 2 3 4 5 9
facon de s’en
sortir dans ce
monde c’est
de
s’accommode
r les uns les
autres.
C. Les gens 1 2 3 4 5 9
se laissent
diriger trop
facilement.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

253

 

 

 

D. Dans ce 1 2 3 4 5 9
pays, on doit
étre tres
prudent sur
ce que l’on
dit et fait en
ce qui
conceme la
politique.

 

 

E. Il est 1 2 3 4 5 9
dangereux
d’accepter un
compromis
avec un
adversaire car
c’est trahir
son propre
camp.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

51. Revenons a présent aux declarations par paires. Dites-moi s’il vous
plait, sur laquelle des declarations vous étes le plus d’accord?
Choisissez la declaration A ou la declaration B.

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez la valeur de l’opinion: “Etes-vous tout dfait d 'accord

ou quelque peu d ’accord. "]

Quelqu Tout a
e peu fait
d’accor d’accord
d

A: C’est dangereux et cela peux préter a la 2 1

confusion de permettre l’expression de trop de

point de vue ou d’opinion

B: Si des personnes ont des opinions differentes de 3 4

la mienne, elles devraient avoir le droit de les I

exprimer.

C : Vous n’étes d’accord sur aucune de ces 5

declarations [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au

répondant]

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au 9

répondant]

52. Quelque Tout it

peu fait
d’accord d’accord

 

 

 

 

 

254

 

A: Tout le monde devrait avoir le droit de voter
méme ceux qui ne comprennent rien aux enjeux
électoraux.

 

B: Seuls ceux qui sont sufﬁsamment bien éduqués
devraient étre autorisés a voter.

 

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

 

D: Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

 

 

53.

Quelque
peu
d’accord

Tout a
fait
d’accord

 

A: Dans le fond, les gens 5e moquent de ce qui
peut vous arriver.

2

 

B: En regle générale , on peut compter sur les
autres pour nous venir en aide lorsque nous
sommes dans le besoin.

3

 

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

D: Ne sais pas [Item (1 ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

 

 

54.

Quelque
peu
d’accord

Tout h
fait
d’accord

 

A: De maniere générale, la plupart des gens sont
dignes de conﬁance.

2

1

 

B : De maniere générale, on n’est jamais trop
prudent avec les gens.

3

 

4

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

D: Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au
re'pondantL

 

 

 

 

55. Diriez—vous que la plupart des gens sont enclins a aider les autres ou

qu’ils s’occyent plutfrt de leur propre personne?

 

A aider les autres.

l

 

 

A s’occuper d’eux-mémes.

 

Ne sais pas [Item (‘1 ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

9

 

255

 

 

 

 

56. Voici une liste de personnes et d’institutions. Je voudrais savoir a quel
point vous faites conﬁance en leur capacité a faire ce qui est juste. A quel
point faites-vous conﬁance aux personnes et institutions suivantes?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vous ne Vous vous Vous Vous NSP
leur faites méﬁez leur leur [Item
pas du quelque faites faites (i ne
tout peu d’eux quelq entiere pas
conﬁance ue peu ment comm
conﬁa conﬁan uniqu
nce ce er au
répon
dant]
A. Serigne Saliou 1 2 3 4 9
Mbacke
B. Serigne 1 2 3 4 9
Mansour Sy
C. Ministre d’Etat 1 2 3 4 9
Idressa Seck
D. Primier Ministre 1 2 3 4 9
Moustapha N iasse
E. Le President 1 2 3 4 9
Wade ,
F. Les chefs 1 2 3 4 9
traditionnels
G. Le conseil rural 1 2 3 4 9
H. La police 1 2 3 4 9
1. Les tribunaux 1 2 3 4 9
J. Les partis 1 2 3 4 9
politimles
K. L’armée 1 2 3 4 9
L. La douane 1 2 3 4 9
M. Les banques 1 2 3 4 9
N. Les 1 2 3 4 9
commercants
0. La confrérie 1 2 3 4 9
Mouride
P. La confrérie 1 2 3 4 9
Tidiane

 

 

 

 

 

 

256

 

 

57. Avez-vous eu l’impression, dans le passe, lorsque vous réalisiez des tr’iches
nécessitant la cooperation d’autres personnes, que cela n’allait sﬁrement pas se
réaliser ou que cela allait sﬁrement se réaliser?

 

 

 

 

Cela n’allait sﬁrement pas se réaliser. 1
Cela allait sﬁrement se réaliser. 2
Ne sais pas. [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

[A liénation C ulturelle]

 

 

 

'amais?

58. A present, je vais vous poser quelques questions sur la fréquence h laquelle
il vous arrive d’éprouver certains sentiments. Vous me direz si cela vous arrive
rarement, de temps en tem s, souvent, toujours ou

 

J amais

Rarement

De temps
en temps

Habitue Tou j
llement ours

 

A. De maniere générale, 0
combien de fois avez-
vous eu l’impression
d’avoir des idées ou des
opinions différentes de
celles de vos proches
parents [bandiraab’e;
mbok] sur des questions
importantes?

1

2

3 4

 

B. Combien de fois vos 0
idées et opinions
different-elles de celles
de vos amis?

 

C. Combien de fois vos 0
idées et opinions
different de celles des
autres habitants de votre
village?

 

D. De celles de la 0
plupart des gens dans le

pays?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

257

f1:

 

59. Revenons a présent aux declarations par paires. Dites-moi s’il vous plait,
sur laquelle des declarations vous étes le plus d’accord? Choisissez la

declaration A ou la declaration B.

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez la valeur de l’opinion: “Etes-vous tout afait d ’accord ou

ggelque peu d 'accord. ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout a
peu fait
d’accord d’accord
A: J ’aurais souhaité que les gens soient plus honnétes. 2 1
B: Je trouve que la plupart des gﬂ vont droit au but. 3 4
C : Vous n’étes d’accord sur aucune de ces declarations 5
[Item a‘ nepas communiquer au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas commumguer au répondant] 9

 

 

60. [L ’enquéteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: “Etes-vous tout afait

d ’accord ou quelgtepeu d ’accord. ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout a
peu fait
d’accord d’accord
A: Les gens sont plutot satisfaits avec eux-méme et 2 1
n’acceptent jamais leurs défauts.
B: Tout le monde fait son possible pour faire de son 3 4
meiux. '
C. J e ne suis d’accord avec aucune de ces declarations 5
[Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au Lépondaﬂ 9

 

 

61.

[L ’enquéteur: indiquez la valeur de l’opim'on: “Etes-vous tout afait d ’accord ou

quelque peu d ’accord. ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout a
peu fait

d’aecord d’accord

A: Je me sens rejeté tout comme si les gens ne voulaient 2 1

pas de moi.

B: Lesgens semblent m’apprécier. 3 4

C. Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces declarations 5

LItem a ne pas communiquer au répondant]

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

258

 

 

 

 

62. [L ’enquéteur: indiquez la valeur de I'opinion: “Etes-vous tout afait d ’accord

ou quelque peu d 'accord. "]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout a
pen fait
d’accord d’accor
d

A: La plupart des gens semblent d’étre accord avec moi et 2 1

ma facon de faire.

B: Les gens sont assez critiques avec moi. 3 4

C. Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces declarations 5

[Item a: ne pas communiquer au repondani

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9

 

 

63. [L 'enque‘teur: indiquez la valeur de l’opinion: “Etes-vous tout a‘fait d 'accord

ou quelque peu d ’accord. ”]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque Tout a
pen fait
d’accord d’accord
A: J’ai l’impression que les gens respectent mon opinion 2 1
enJgnéral.
B: Souvent, les gens ne donnent pas a mes idées la 3 4
consideration qu’elles méritent.
C. Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces declarations 5
[Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] '
Ne sais pas [Item 2: nepas communiquer au répondant] 9
Tout a
64. Quelque fait
peu d’accor
d’accord d
A. Pour une large part ma vie dépend d’événements
accidentels. 2 1
B: Pour la plupart, je suis résponsable de ce qui m’ 3 4
arrive.
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces declarations.
[Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 5
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]
9

 

 

259

 

 

 

Tout a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque fait
65. pen d’accor
d’accord d
A. Souvent, je suis presque incapable de protéger
mes intéréts personnels de la malchance. 2 1
B: Lorsque je fais des plans, je suis presque toujours 3 4
certain que je vais les faire marcher.
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a ne pas communiquer au 5
répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]
9
Tout a
Quelque fait
66. peu d’accord
d’accord
A. On n’obtient ce qu’on veux qu’en faisant plaisir
a ceux qui sont au dessus de soi. 2 1
B: On n’obtient ce qu’on veux que par le travail et 3 4
la perservance. '
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a ne pas communiquer au 5
répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au
répondant] 9
Tout a
Quelque fait
67. peu d’accord
d’accord
A: Les gens devraient s’occuper d’eux-mémes et 2 1
étre résponsable de leur propre succés dans la vie.
B: Le gouvernement devrait avoir la responsabilité 3 4
principale dans I’assurance du bien étre des gens.
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au 5
répondant]

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au

 

 

260

 

 

 

 

I répondant] I 9

 

 

68. Diriez—vous que la plupart des hommes sont mieux fait,
emotionellement parlant, pour la politique que la plupart des femmes, ou
que les hommes égalent les femmes ou alors que les femmes sont mieux
faites que les hommes dans ce domaine?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hommes mieux faits 1
Hommes égalent femmes 2
Femmes mieux faites 3
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9
Tout a
69. S’il vous plait, choissisez a nouveau A on B. Quelque fait
[Enque‘teun' indique la valeur de 1 ’opinion: “Etes— peu d’accord

vous tout aﬁit d ’accord ou quelque peu d ’accord. ’7 d’accord

 

A: Tous les membres d’une famille doivent avoir 2 1
les mémes opinions politiques.

 

B: Chaque membre d’une famille devrait étre 3 4
libre de son oiinion sur les questions politiques.

 

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

declarations. [Item a ne pas communiquer au 5
répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au
répondant] 9
Tout a
Quelque fait

peu d’accor
70. d’accord d
A. Chacun devrait décider pour qui il ou elle doit
voter. 2 1
B. Une épouse ferait de voter pour Ie candidat de
son mari car celui-ci connait probablement mieux 3 4
ces choses qu’elle.

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces

 

 

 

declarations. [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au 5
répondant]

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au

répondant] 9

 

 

261

 

Tout a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quelque fait
peu d’accord
71. d’accord
A: La place de la femme est a la maison; les
femmes ne devraient pas essayer de parler tout 2 1
haut de politique.
B: Une femme devrait exercer son droit de parler
tout haut de politique, meme si son mari n’est pas 3 4
d’accord.
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au
répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au
répondant]
Tout a
Quelque fait
peu d’accord
72. d’accord
A. Notre héritage ethnique et nos coutumes sont
des choses qui ont fait de nous un grand peuple et 2 1
certaines personnes devraient étre amenés a leur
montrer un plus grand respect.
B. Nous devrions peut-étre abandonner certaines
de nos traditions qui ont bloqué notre 3 4
développement.
C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a: ne pas communiquer au
répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au
répondant]
Tout a
Quelque fait
peu d’accord
73. d’accord
A. Le respect et l’obéissance a l’autorité sont les
vertus les plus importantes que les enfants 2 1
devraient apprendre.
B. Dans cette epoque de changements rapides, les
vertus les plus importantes pour les enfants sont 3 4

la curiosité et l’ouverture d’esprit.

 

 

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces

 

 

262

 

 

 

 

declarations. [Item a ne pas communiquer au

répondant]

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

 

 

74.

Quelque
peu
d’accord

Tout a
fait
d’accord

 

A. Le systéme de caste est aujourd’hui une réalité
dépassé grace a la modernisation.

2

 

B. Le systeme de caste devrait étre maintenu afin
de préserver la gix sociale.

 

3

 

C: Vous n’étes d’accord avec aucune de ces
declarations. [Item a ne pas communiquer au
répondantL

 

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au
répondant]

 

 

 

75. Il y a listée, ci-apres, une série de declarations que les gens pourraient
faire a propos des autres Sénégalais. ll n’y a pas de réponse juste ou
fausse. Nous voulons simplement recueillir votre opinion. Dites-moi s’il

vous plait si vous étes d’accord ou pas.
L ’ergue‘teur: indiqie la valeur de I ’opim'on]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pas du Pas Ni D’acc Tout a NSP
tout d’accor pour, ni ord fait [Item 6
d’accord d contre d’accor ne pas
d commu
niquer
au
réponda
nt]
A. Vous 1 2 3 5 9
étes ﬁers
d’étre

 

 

 

263

 

 

 

 

B. Vous 1 2 3 4
souhaiterie
z que vos
enfants se
considérent
comme

 

 

C. De tous 1 2 3 4
les groupes
du pays, les

 

sont
les
meilleurs.

 

D. Vous 1 2 3 4
vous sentez
plus proche
des

 

_ que des
autres
Sénégalais.

 

E. Vous 1 2 3 4
étes fiers
d’étre
qualifié de
sénégalais.

 

 

F. Vous 1 2 3 4
souhaitez ‘
que vos
enfants se
considerent
comme
Senegalais.

 

 

 

 

 

 

76. Si on devait vous classer dans une de ces deux
indentités, [1e groupe identitaire du répondant] ou
sénggalais, lequel choisiriez-vous ?

 

[le groupe identitaire du répondant]

 

Sénégalais

 

 

Ne sais pas ﬂtem a ne pas communiﬂter au répondant]

 

264

 

 

 

N

 

 

 

77. Est-ce que les conditions économiques des
auquel la répondant dit appartenir] sont pires, pareilles, ou meilleures que les
autres groupes dans ce pays? [Indique la valeur de l’opinion]

 

[groupe

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Absolument pires conditions économiques 1
Pires conditions 2
Pareilles 3
Meilleures 4
Absolument meilleures conditions 5
NSP [Item a nepas commutMuer au répondant] 9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

78. A votre avis, arrive-t-il au gouvernement de traiter
inéquitablement les
Toujours 1
Pour une large part 2
Un pen 3
A peine 4
Jamais 5
Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9
79. A. Estimez—vous que le gouvernement gere les intéréts
de tous les Sénégalais ou alors seulement ceux d’un seul
ﬂupe social? I
Tous les sénéﬂlais [Aller a Q. 80]
Un seul groupe
79. B. [Si un seul groupe] Lequel P
C
80. Durant ces derniéres années, combien de fois vous est-il arrivé d’étre
sans:
J amais Occasionn Fréquem Toujo Non
ellement ment urs concer
né

A. Nourriture pour O 1 2 3 9
votre famille?
B. Eau pour usage 0 1 2 3 9
domestique?
C.Moyens pour O 1 2 3 9
l’éducation de nos
enfants?
D. Soins de santé pour O 1 2 3 9
votre famille?

 

265

 

 

 

 

 

 

81. A qui vous adressez vous en général lorsque vous étes incapable

d’obtenir:

 

A
person
ne

Pare Au
nts group
et e
allié com
S unauta
ire

A un
organis
me
pﬁvé

Au
gouveme
ment

Origin
e
illicite

Non
conc
emé

 

A. De la 0 l 2
nourriture
pour votre
famille?

 

B. De l’eau O 1 2
pour usage

domestique
a)

 

C. De 0 1 2
moyens
pour
scolariser
vos
enfants?

 

 

D. De 0 1 2
moyens
pour
assurer la
santé de
votre
famille?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

82. A quel point étes-vous satisfait:

 

[L ’enquéteur: indiquer la valeur de

1 ’opinion]

Pas du
tout
satisfait

Pas tres
satisfait

Quelque
peu
satisfait

Tres
satisfai
t

 

A. de l’état général de l’économie
Sénégglaise?

l

2

3

4

 

 

B. de vos conditions de vie

actuelles?

 

1

 

2

 

3

 

4

 

 

83. Estimez—vous que vos conditions de vie sont pires, pareilles, ou meilleures
que celles des autres Sénégalais?
[L ’enqle‘teur: indiquer la valeur de 1 'opinion]

 

Absolument pires

 

 

Pires

 

Nu—A

 

266

 

 

 

 

A peu pres les memes

 

Meilleures

 

Absolument meilleures

 

 

\OKII-bw

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

84. Quelle appreciation faites-vous de vos cpnditions de vie actuelles
comparées a celles cinq ans anaravant ? Etes-vous :

 

Beaucoup moins satisfait

 

Sensiblement moins satisfait

 

A peu pres les memes conditions

 

Sensiblement plus satisfait

 

Beaucoup plus satisfait

 

 

 

out-pun).—

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

85. Lorsque vous considerez l’avenir et vos potentialités dans la vie, quel
(ljgré de satisfaction pensez-vous obtenir dans un an?

 

Beaucoup moins satisfait

 

Sensiblement moins satisfait

 

A peu pres les memes conditions

 

SensiblementJilus satisfait

 

Beaucoup plus satisfait

 

 

\OM-kUJNt-d

 

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

 

86. A votre avis, qui est responsable des conditions actuelles de l’économie
Sénégalaise?

 

Le gouvernement precedent

 

L’actuel gouvernement

 

Le FMI/Banque Mondiale

 

Le peuple sénégglais

 

Le programme d’ajustement structurel

 

Les forces internes d’opposition

 

Les forces économiques internationales

 

Autre [a préciserj

 

 

 

\OOOQO‘NLI’I-bWN—‘l

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant]

 

267

 

 

 

 

 

 

87. Comment, a votre avis, le gouvernement traite-t-il les questions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

suivantes?
Tres Assez Assez Tres NSP
mal mal bien bien [Item a
ne pas
comma
niquer
au
répond
ant]
A. La création d’emploi 2 3 4 9
B. Le maintien de prix has 2 3 4 9
C. La diminution des differences 2 3 4 9
de revenus entre les differents
_groupes.
D. La reduction de la criminalité 2 3 4 9
E. La traitement des besoins 2 3 4 9
éducatifs des sénéjalais
F. L’amélioration des services de 2 3 4 9
santé primaires
G. La lutte contre la corruption 2 3 4 9
dans l’Administration publique
H. La gestion de l’economie 2 ~ 3 4 9
88. Quelle appreciation globale faites-vous des performances du
_gouvernement actuel?
Tres mauvaise 1
Mauvaise 2
Ni mauvaise, ni home 3
Bonne 4
Tres home 5
Il est trop tét pour se prononcer. [Item a ne pas communiquer 6
au répondant]
Ne sais pas [Item a‘ ne pas communiquer au répondant] 9
89. A votre avis, combien de temps faudra-t-il:
Dans Dans Dans Plus de J amai NSP
les les les huit huit ans 8 [Item .2
deux quatre ans ne pas
ans ans commu
niquer
au
répond

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

268

 

 

 

ant]

 

A. avant que le 1 2 3 4
gouvernement ne
tienne les
promesses faites
lors de la
campagne
électorale?

 

B. avant que vos 1 2 3 4
conditions de vie
changent
conformément a
vos attentes?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

90. QJlel est votre revenu mensuel?

Pas de revenu 0

Moins de 10,000 1

Entre 10,000 et 30,000 2

Entre 31,000 et 50,000 3

Entre 51,000 et 100,000 4

Entre 101,000 et 150,000 5

Entre 151,000 et 200,000 6

Entre 201,000 et 300,000 7

Entre 301,000 et 400,000 8

Entre 401,000 et 500,000 9

Entre 501,000 et 700,000 10
Entre 701,000 et 900,000 11
Entre 901,000 et 1,100,000 12
Plus de 1,100,000 13
Préfére de ne pas dire [Item a: ne pas communiquer au 14
répondant]

Ne sais pas [Item a ne pas communiquer au répondant] -8

 

 

Merci beaucoup. Vos réponses m’ont été d’une grande utilité. Soyez assures que

leur confidentialité sera préservée.

 

Mgment de la ﬁn g1: I’jntemiew; [L 'enggéteur; tadiauez 1 ’hegre et la

Le svsteme de 24 heures.

 

11]]

 

Fin de l'Interview

269

 

1'.” ." ' 0.

APPENDIX D

 

 

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION

Putnam (1993) delineates the characteristics of the type of society that “makes
democracy work.” According to Putnam, in a civic community, people pursue “. . .self-
interest deﬁned in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is ‘enlightened’
rather than ”myopic,” self-interest that is alive to the interests of others” (1993, 88).
Putnam identiﬁes several dimensions of civic community: 1) civic engagement or active
participation in public affairs; 2) political equality/reciprocity; 3) solidarity, trust, and
tolerance; and 4) the “vibrancy” of associational life. Since the individual will be my unit
of analysis, I will look at civic behavior and attitudes. More speciﬁcally, I will be
concerned with levels of individuals’ 1) political participation; 2) interpersonal and
institutional trust; 3) tolerance/support for democratic values, 4) involvement in
civil/social affairs, 5) authoritarianism/traditionalism, 6) feelings of political efficacy, and
7) locus of control.

Political participation is a multidimensional concept (V erba, Nie and Kim 1971;
Bahry and Silver 1990). Verba, Nie and Kim (1971) identify four modes of political
activity: campaign activity, communal activity, and voting and particularized contacts
(contacting public ofﬁcials regarding a personal problem). They then assess these
different “modes” of political activity with reference to several dimensions, such as the
scope of the outcome, initiative involved, and degree to which cooperation with others is
necessary. In this study, I will look at all of the modes of political participation except

campaign activity (campaign activity in the population of study is too rare to be of

270

interest). I will also assess the extent to which individuals are engaged and interested in

 

‘I.

politics.
Communal Participation

The indicators for communal participation include whether one reports 1)
cooperating with others to solve a community problem; 2) belonging to a community
organization; 3) holding a leadership position within an organization; 4) attending
organizational meetings at least occasionally; 5) speaking out at meetings at least
occasionally; and 6) getting together with others to raise an issue.
Political Participation
The indicators for political participation include registering to vote, voting in four
different elections, and individual contacting. Speciﬁcally, individuals were asked
whether they had contacted nine different public ﬁgures in order to obtain help with
regard to both community and personal problems. Although Verba, Nie and Kim (1971)
include contacting ofﬁcials regarding a social problem (what I call “community
contacting”) as part of communal activity, I do not since this behavior does not involve
interaction with others in the community. Both communal participation and community
contacting involve a concern with the public good, which is reﬂected in their level of
correlation (r = .39). Particularized contacting and community contacting are highly
correlated (r = .54) because they are similar types of behavior requiring similar levels of
initiative, but the scope of the goals associated with the activities is very different.

The indicators of interest/engagement in politics include the degree to which
one is interested in politics, the frequency with which one discusses politics with others

and feeling close to a political party.

271

Tolerance/Support for Democratic Values

Tolerance/support for democratic values is measured by one question requiring a
yes/no response, one question measured on a Likert scale, and three forced choice
questions:
Should those who are not literate have the right to vote?

If people want to form a community organization, they should afﬁliate with the ruling

Party-

1) All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the
issues in an election.

2) Only those who are sufﬁciently well educated should be allowed to vote.

1) It is dangerous and conﬁising to allow the expression of too many different points of
2,;el‘flpeople have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them.

Two questions meant to assess feelings about whether those who are not literate,
educated or knowledgeable should be able to participate in the political process are
included because, as noted above, the education dimension appears salient in the Aﬁ'ican
context. On numerous occasions during the many months I devoted to qualitative data
collection, I heard those with literacy skills obtained either through formal or nonformal
schooling refer to even the most venerable members of the community in the most
derogatory terms because they had not had any schooling. The rhetoric is often more
noxious than this. At times, literacy neophytes or literacy teachers who had themselves
only had several months of literacy training called all those who were not literate animals
or beasts, incapable of serious thought or reﬂection. Such virulent words were often

spoken for all to hear, literate and nonliterate alike.

Authoritarianism/Traditionalism

272

Three questions are used to measure authoritarianism/traditionalism:
1) All members of a family should hold the same political opinions.
2) Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political
issues.
1) Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote.
2) A wife does better to vote the way her husband does, because he probably knows more
about such things.
1) A woman’s place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics.
2) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband
disagrees.
These questions measure the extent to which one thinks that a traditional authority ﬁgure
should dictate political behavior and the extent to which one accepts the rights of women
to engage in the political sphere in an independent manner.
Individualization

Education has also been associated with individualization and even alienation in
the Aﬁican context. In order to assess the degree of individualism or distance one has
from others, we asked respondents about the frequency with which their opinions differed
from others in social groups at different proximities to themselves. We asked four
questions of this nature:
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives.

(Question 58A)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives.
(Question 583)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their
village. (Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in
the country. (Question 58D)

273

Interpersonal Trust
Three commonly used forced choice questions were used in the measurement of
interpersonal trust:

1) No one is going to care much about what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
2) For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.

1) Generally speaking, most people can be trusted.
2) Generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with people.

Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to
look out for themselves?
These questions allow one to see whether others can be trusted as well as how one views

others’ orientations toward responding to the needs of others.

Ethnic Pride

Three questions, two of which are measured on a Likert seale, are used to measure ethnic
pride (the ethnic group identiﬁed the respondent identiﬁed as being her/his own was
inserted into the blanks):

Of all the groups in this country, people are the best.

You feel much stronger ties to s than to other Senegalese.

If you had to choose between these two identities, [the ethnic identity group of the
respondent] or Senegalesee, which would you choose?

Literacy versus education

Generally speaking, literacy refers to the ability to read and write, but it has been
conceptualized in a variety of ways. Oxenham deﬁnes literacy as “. . .a means of
embodying language in visual form” (1980, 19). Many of the modernization theorists

appear to have conﬂated the effect of literacy with that of schooling. Literacy is the

building block of most types of education. However, based on their study of the effects

274

of the three different literacies operative among the Vai of Liberia70 (n=650), Scribner
and Cole (1981) conclude that one cannot separate the effects of literacy from the manner
in which it is used. They distinguish between schooled and nonschooled literacy.
Scribner and Cole (1981), like Street (1995), point out that much more than simply
reading and writing is learned in school. Hence, it is often difﬁcult to distinguish
between the effects of literacy and the particular social conditions associated with an
educational experience, whether nonformal or formal. In this study, I will focus on the
effects of education as opposed to literacy, per se."
Formal Education versus Nonformal Education
I examine the effects of both formal and nonformal education on various dimensions of
civic behavior. I would expect the effects of these two educational forms on participants
to differ for several reasons. First, the social experiences associated with these two
educational forms are very different. As noted above, formal schooling in Senegal is
conducted in French and mimics that of France. In contrast, nonformal education is
usually conducted in Aﬁ'ican languages and follows a more participatory format than
does formal education. Second, those who do actually attend formal schools usually
spend more time pursuing their education than those who attend nonformal programs.
Third, the age during which an individual has the relevant educational experience differs
between NFE and formal education.

I operationalize formal education as the years spent in a degree-granting learning

institution ofﬁcially sponsored or recognized by the state. I operationalize NFE as having

 

7° The three literacies are l) Vai literacy based on the Vai script, 2) Arabic/Qur’ranic literacy, and
3)English literacy learned in public schools.

7' Scinto (1986) is not in agreement with the idea that one can sort out schooling and nonschooled literacy.
He argues that, in the case of the “essayist” type of literacy, the profundity of one’s literacy skills
corresponds very closely to the amount of schooling one has had.

275

participated in one of four community based NFE programs intended to impart basic
literacy and numeracy skills to participants. I also assess the effects of number of years

one has spent in one of the four programs.

276

APPENDIX E

EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Table E.1 : Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Tostan Training and General
Control Variables on Community Participation

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .5166301 .0471032 10.968 0.000
Tostan

Years of .059499 .01978 3.008 0.003
Formal

Schooling

Income .0736728 .0420506 1.752 0.080
Age .0291201 .0046187 6.305 0.000
Gender -.0210018 .1363296 0154 0.878
Pular -.0861053 .1658665 -0.519 0.604
Wolof -.1527565 .1619334 -0.943 0.346

 

Number of observations = 854
chi2(7) = 180.88

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1511.2808
Pseudo R2 = 0.0565

277

 

Table E.2: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of PAPA Training and General
Control Variables on Community Participation

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .4985042 .0865756 5.758 0.000
PAPA

Years of .05 54096 .0208232 2.661 0.008
Formal

Schooling

Income .1017272 .0434966 2.339 0.019
Age .0243165 .0047907 5.076 0.000
Gender -.0725058 .1481212 -0.490 0.624
Pular .0828158 .1637054 0.506 0.613
Wolof -.2988067 .1623576 -1.840 0.066

 

Number of observations = 780
chi2(7) = 79.62

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -l394.9702
Pseudo R2 = 0.0277

Table E.3: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PAPF Training and
General Control Variables on Community Participation

 

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of .602941 1 .0722537 8.345 0.000
PAPF

Years of .0451542 .0209392 2.156 0.031
Formal

Schooling

Income .1283716 .0446771 2.873 0.004
Age .025 762 .004944 5.21 1 0.000
Gender -.1081496 . 1492336 -0.725 0.469
Pular .065596 .184923 0.355 0.723
Wolof -.l621782 .1753782 0925 0.355

 

Number of observations = 726
chi2(7) = 107.49

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1289.3985
Pseudo R2 = 0.0400

278

Table E.4: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PIP Training and General
Control Variables on Community Participation

 

 

Explanatory Estimated Standard Z score P>|z|
Variable Coefﬁcient Error

Years of PIP .4972177 .07 l 7 594 6.929 0.000
Years of .065 9841 .032445 2.034 0.042
Formal

Schooling

Income .0643003 .0697424 0.922 0.357
Age .0217597 .00825 84 2.635 0.008
Gender -.5530441

.2437145 -2.269 0.023

     

Number of observations = 290
chi2(5) = 77.37

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -497.36661
Pseudo R2 = 0.0722

279

APPENDIX F

MAP OF SENEGAL

 

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Figure 1: Map of Senegal

280

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281

 

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