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EDUCATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF
NONFORMAL EDUCATION IN PROMOTING CIVIC ORIENTATIONS IN
SENEGAL

By

Michelle Therese Kuenzi

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

2003

ABSTRACT

EDUCATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF NONFORMAL EDUCATION IN PROMOTING CIVIC ORIENTATIONS IN SENEGAL

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Michelle Therese Kuenzi

Education has been considered an important factor in the establishment and consolidation of democratic forms of government, and many researchers have attempted to document the impact of formal education on democratization and democratic consolidation. However, little attention has been paid to the relationship between nonformal education (NFE) and democracy. Given the prominence that NFE has gained in countries with non-performing formal educational systems, such as those in Africa, this inattention is unfortunate. Based on the results of a survey involving a probability sample of 1484 adults drawn in five regions of Senegal, I find that nonformal education and formal education tend to have similar effects on many political orientations. More specifically, nonformal education significantly increases the likelihood that one will participate in the community, register to vote, vote in elections, and generally be engaged and interested in politics. Nonformal education also increases the likelihood that one will report having opinions that differ from family members and friends, support democratic values and have an internal locus of control. On the other hand, nonformal education decreases the likelihood that one will have authoritarian attitudes.

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For my mother, Marilyn J. Kuenzi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was very fortunate to have had a superlative dissertation committee. Mike Bratton has been a conscientious advisor. He provided me with absolutely critical guidance with regard to my survey effort in Senegal as well as very insightful feedback on the drafts of my dissertation. He has been an excellent role model in survey research. Nicolas van de Walle has been very generous with his time and ideas and always read my papers and grant proposals. I am grateful to him for all of the helpful suggestions, information and assistance he has given me vis-à-vis my projects over the past seven years, including the dissertation. Mark Jones has provided me with excellent suggestions, especially with regard to the methods I employed in my dissertation. He has also regularly read my work and provided me with very useful feedback. I owe special thanks to Brian Silver for all of the help, support and guidance with which he has provided me throughout my career as a graduate student. Without all of his encouragement, it is hard to imagine how I would ever have made it to this point.

I am grateful to my friends and colleagues who saw me through all of the ups and downs I encountered during my years as a graduate student. I had an excellent Africanist and comparativist peer group. Gina Lambright has been an outstanding co-author and long-standing friend. Kimberly Smiddy generously shared information and resources. Misa Nishikawa has been a steadfast friend and source of support, and I have especially appreciated her consistency, sound advice, and no nonsense approach to life. Shannon Vance helped me to maintain good humor, always finding a way to make me laugh, even during some of the tough times. Erik Herron has earned my gratitude for helping me

print my dissertation before my defense. I would like to thank Ko Maeda for all of the logistical help he gave me when it came time to file the dissertation.

I have many people in Senegal to thank for their generous help and cannot begin to name them all here. I wish to acknowledge the members of ARED for all of the support they have given me in my study of NFE. I am very grateful to Sonja Fagerberg Diallo for providing me with many opportunities to do research on NFE and showing me generous hospitality. Mamadou Ly has always facilitated my research efforts and been a kind and unwavering friend. Awa Ka, Kebe, Sow, Diol, Njora, Nancy, and the other members of the team have always been kind and helpful. Mamadou Ndiaye has always been willing to lend a hand when I have needed help.

Numerous members of the PDS leadership were supportive of my study of the 2000 presidential election. I am grateful to Kader Sow, Mbaye Ndiaye, and several other members of the PDS in this regard. His Excellency President Wade allowed me to follow the *Marche Bleu* and granted me a couple of interviews.

My first experience with NFE was in Medina Cherif. I wish to thank the honorable El Hadji Kiekoto Baldé for all of his kindness. Abdoulaye Baldé was a perfect host, and, his wives, Kutuyal Mballo and Juldé Baldé, rendered my experience a wonderful one. I wish to acknowledge the kindness of all of my friends in Medina Cherif although I can only name but a few here: Juhé Baldé, Daouda Baldé, Kajjatu Baldé, and Aissatou Baldé.

I wish to acknowledge the Fulbright IIE Program, Social Science Research Council and the Senegal USAID mission for their support of my research. I would also like to thank the many people who contributed to the successful completion of the survey.

Boubacar Tall did an exceptional job acting as project coordinator for the survey effort. It is hard to imagine how the survey could have been administered without all of his efforts. The interviews were conducted by eight enumerators: Saidou Norou Sall, Hamet Ly, Rougiatou Dia, Penda Sy, Cheikh Seck, Cheikh Aidara, Fatou Diop and Saliou Ciss. Saidou Norou Sall's diligent and careful work during the project was much appreciated. Alhousseynou Sy meticulously entered the data from the questionnaires. Sidy Cissokho, Alioune Ndiaye, Marie-Claire Sow and Roger Yochelson at USAID were very helpful and supportive throughout the research effort, as was the entire USAID team.

Thanks are due to the leadership of PIP and all the members of PIP who facilitated the survey work, especially Ismaila Diawo and Moussa Niang. I thank Thierno Ba for making our research in PIP villages possible. The leadership of Tostan was most supportive of our efforts. Molly Melching is due special thanks for having faith in my abilities and incorporating me into "the team" when I first went to Senegal as a "green" but enthusiastic Watson Fellow and volunteer fourteen years ago. Meissa Diegne served as a much needed resource person for the research team while we worked in Thies, and Abdoulaye Thiam generously made his assistance available. Saidou Balde of Tostan assisted us during part of our work in St. Louis.

Those at DAEB were very helpful and forthcoming with information. The members of PAPA have always graciously provided assistance and information upon my visits to this organization. I wish to especially thank Mr. Monteiro, Abdoulaye Conte, and Mr. Diagne. My thanks to the leadership of PAPF for allowing our research to be conducted and to the PAPF teachers who facilitated our research in the villages of study. The members of CIED, especially Bocar Sy, were helpful throughout the project. The

people in the villages included in our study made conducting this research not only possible but also a pleasure. It is impossible for me to express sufficient gratitude to the innumerable people in all of the villages of study who freely and generously offered their assistance to the research team. I do take this opportunity, however, to offer my heartfelt thanks to them.

I also wish to thank my siblings, Nicole Doan and David Kuenzi, for always showing confidence in me. My niece and nephews have kept me in good spirits. My uncle, Carroll Multz, was supportive of my graduate school experience. My father demonstrated the virtues of hard work, honesty, and integrity. Finally, my mother is due very special thanks for the constant and complete support she has given me throughout my graduate career and life in general.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

Now that the exuberant decade of Africa's "democratic" transitions, the 1990s, is over, scholarly attention is focused on the consolidation of democracy. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) define the consolidation of democracy as:

...the more or less total institutionalization of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict. It requires that political actors so fully internalize the rules of the game that they can no longer imagine resorting to nonelectoral practices to obtain office. (235)

Although the vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries experienced some type of political transition in the 1990s, only a small number of these countries appear to be on a trajectory toward the consolidation of democracy. Many countries appear to be at a point of stagnation and others appear headed toward endpoints that are little understood (see van de Walle 2002 and Herbst 2001). In fact, only 14 of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries qualify as at least "electoral democracies" in Diamond's (2002) classificatory scheme. As can be seen from Bratton and van de Walle's definition, the practices and attitudes of a country's citizens are a critical aspect of the consolidation of democracy. In this study, I assess the extent to which nonformal education fosters the type of civic orientation among citizens that is critical for the consolidation of democracy.

Education has been considered an important factor in the establishment and consolidation of democratic forms of government, and many researchers have attempted to document the impact of formal education on democratization and the consolidation of

democracy. Education has been shown to have a significant influence on civic culture (Almond and Verba 1959), and numerous studies link education to democratic behavior and attitudes. The literature connecting formal education to behavior change has deep roots in the modernization literature (e.g., see Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Cutright 1969; Inkeles 1983).

On the other hand, little attention has been paid to the relationship between nonformal education (NFE) and democracy. In this study, NFE refers to the programs intended to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills on participants, usually adults who have been left out of formal educational systems, or dropouts from formal schools. Given the prominence that NFE has gained in countries with non-performing formal educational systems, such as those in Africa, this inattention is unfortunate. How does the relationship between education and political orientation change when the educational system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates? Do more “authentic” forms of education (i.e., nonformal education conducted in national languages) affect civic/political participation differently than formal education? Do nonformal education programs reinforce traditional norms and increase the insularity of the villages in which they are found? On the other hand, does formal education produce rootlessness in its recipients, so that those with formal education tend to be alienated and unengaged in their communities?

Political and Civic Engagement

Hadenius sums up the rationale of the modernization theorists well: “...the belief was that economic and social development would result in greater literacy and a generally higher educational level among the masses of the population, which would promote

openness and deeper insight into political issues” (1992, 78). Consciousness and openness, emanating not only from literacy, but also from exposure to mass media, along with other positive aspects of modernization, such as industrialization and urbanization, would pave the way for the formation of democratic regimes (Hadenius, 1992, 78-9).

Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) is an excellent exemplar of the modernization school of thought. Lerner describes the process by which traditional societies are transformed into modern democratic states, and focuses on the Middle East, in particular. He explicates how literacy is linked to active political participation. Literacy increases one’s participation in every form of mass communication. Literacy opens up the possibility of vicarious experience through the printed media, allowing one to experience different worlds. It is the interaction between the variables of literacy and mass media that lead to political participation in the form of voting. Consumption of mass media not only increases the spread of “empathy,” but also heightens demands that one expresses through participant institutions, such as voting. Lerner concludes, “Thus literacy becomes the sociological pivot in the activation of psychic mobility, the publicly shared skill which binds modern man’s varied daily round into a consistent participant lifestyle” (1958, 64). In his study which involved data from 54 countries, Lerner finds that the correlations of literacy with urbanism, voting, and media were .64, .80, and .82, respectively (1958, 58). As Lerner notes, other studies had already established a link between literacy and economic development.

Lipset (1959) also argues that the levels of economic development and education help determine whether democracy will emerge and take root in a particular country. Lipset (1959) contends that the empirical evidence supports the notion that higher

educational levels facilitate the establishment of democratic forms of governance. Lipset (1959) compares literacy rates between the “more democratic” and “less democratic” European countries and between the “more dictatorial” and “less dictatorial” Latin American countries. He notes that, at the time, the lowest literacy rate for the “more democratic” European countries was 96%, while the average for the “less democratic” countries was 85%. In Latin America, the average of the “less dictatorial” countries was 74%, while that for the “more dictatorial” countries was 46%. Further, Lipset argues that the relationship between education and democratic attitudes within countries is especially strong, and cites several national studies.

Education has a strong influence on civic culture. While the time frame required to develop a civic culture is, according to Almond and Verba (1959), a long one, they duly note that many of the “new nations” do not have this kind of time to dedicate to the development of a civic culture. In such a case, Almond and Verba see education as the best substitute for time. Indeed, according to their data, education is the most important determinant of political attitudes (370). However, Almond and Verba go on to point out that while education can help to supply an individual with important political skills and knowledge, it cannot completely supplant the other components of the socialization process in terms of inculcating democratic attitudes and behavior (370-371).

After controlling for such characteristics as income, status of occupation, gender, among others, Almond and Verba (1959) still find educational groups to differ in each of the five nations studied on nine dimensions of political orientation. These dimensions include level of political knowledge, subjective feelings of political competence, frequency of engaging in political discussion, level of interpersonal trust and trust in the

social environment, for example (316-318). Interestingly, Almond and Verba (1959) find that differences among lower educational groups on the nine relationships are much more substantial than differences among higher educational groups. They conclude, “That higher education tends to reduce national differences suggests that the nature of political culture is greatly determined by the distribution of education” (320). This finding would tend to support Lerner’s contention that education is associated with some type of “universal transformatory effect.” In trying to explain the impact of education, Almond and Verba note that education has numerous effects. They point out that students actually do learn in school, be it about the political system, democratic norms, etc. In addition, at school, individuals have an opportunity to interact with others of the same educational level which tends to reinforce political lessons (316). Almond and Verba seem to emphasize the role of the content of the educational experience in affecting attitudes and behavior as opposed to the effects of simply gaining literacy and numeracy skills. Indeed, the fact that differences among educational groups decreases as level of education increases would seem to indicate that education is a strong socializing force which tends to blot out the effects of national cultures.

Although the tenets associated with modernization theory were thoroughly excoriated for their Eurocentric and teleological assumptions, they have been largely revalidated in recent years. In his 1992 article in the *American Behavioral Scientist*, Diamond reassesses Lipset’s thesis “that democracy is related to the state of economic development.” He finds a significant relationship between regime type and level of development, especially when the Human Development Index (HDI)¹ is used to measure development instead of GNP (Diamond, 1992, p. 458). Diamond notes the consistent

¹ HDI is a composite index that incorporates measures of educational levels, life expectancy and income.

manner in which Lipset's thesis has stood the test of time. Numerous studies have generated the same finding, that there is a strong positive relationship between economic development and democracy. In his words:

Given the considerable variation in quantitative methods in countries and years tested, in measures of democracy employed, and the vast array of different regression equations (testing more than 20 different independent variables), this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative national development (468).

Hadenius has also reconsidered the tenets of the modernization theory and attempted to test the relationship between 17 of the variables associated with modernization including exposure to the media, level of education and literacy. Employing an index of democracy based on the dimensions of elections and political liberties, Hadenius regresses these indicators against degree of democracy for one-hundred and thirty-two of the world's third world countries. He finds that the literacy rate is the most definitive of the indicators of democracy (although, as he continues his analyses, the effects of literacy wash out a bit) (Hadenius, 1992). Given his method of stepwise regression, the conclusions he draws are not that firm, however.

Other, more recent studies also offer support for modernization theory. Based on data for 43 countries, Inglehart (1997) finds support for the modernization thesis that level of economic development and democracy are integrally linked and positively correlated. Vanhanen (1997) also finds that modernization² and democracy are positively linked. While both of these studies have been attacked on methodological grounds, they do offer support for the modernization thesis, and no recent study has offered evidence to

² As one reviewer notes (Arat 1999), what Vanhanen calls "resource distribution" is essentially what others call level of modernization. Indeed, he uses indicators such as percentage of the adult population that is literate, percentage of population that is urban, etc.

undermine this thesis. Based on their analyses of an extensive data set that covers 141 countries between the years 1950 and 1990, Przeworski et al. (2000) also find conclusive support for the notion that there is a positive relationship between economic development and democracy. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) attempt to clarify the relationship between democracy and economic development, arguing that democracy can emerge at any stage of economic development but is simply much more likely to take root in richer countries. They find empirical support for this argument.

How Does Literacy Affect Citizenship?³

From the “autonomous” theoretical perspective,⁴ the very process of becoming literate engenders certain changes in psychological and cognitive processes that have implications for how people perceive themselves and others. Oxenham (1980) offers many reasons for why literacy makes people better citizens than they would otherwise be. According to Oxenham (1980), people’s sense of personal efficacy is increased as they gain confidence and a sense of control over their lives. Such is the case because they are able to do more for themselves than they were prior to attaining literacy skills. They begin to think more for themselves and not just accept things on authority. To this extent, they seem have more of a tendency to become involved in voluntary associations and

³ DiRenzo summarizes some of the character traits thought necessary for the establishment and maintenance of modern democracy: “...belief in the efficacy of science and technology, control over nature, assertion of increasing independence from traditional authority figures, orientation to the future, aspirations for self and family, planning ahead, active citizenship in community affairs and local politics, secularism, tolerance for diversity, and an openness to new experience and social change” (1990, 40). Nearly all of these characteristics have been linked to literacy in the literature.

⁴ The autonomous perspective views changes in attitudes and behavior as simply coming from being able to read and write without considering the context in which literacy skills are learned and used.

politics.⁵ Moreover, they become less parochial and less intolerant of others as they are able to have vicarious experience through reading material (1980, 51).

At the level of the individual, myriad studies have linked education to democratic behavior and attitudes. In several U.S. studies, education has been shown to increase political participation (e.g., Bennet and Klecka 1970; Teixeira 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Many early studies also established a link between education and democratic attitudes and orientations. Stouffer (1955) found that education had a positive impact on the willingness to tolerate nonconformists. Williams, Nunn and Peter (1976) had the same findings when they reanalyzed Stouffer's 1954 U.S. data set and when they replicated his study using data collected in a 1974 nationwide survey (n=3546). Converse et al. (1972) found that education was associated with attitudinal stability and sophistication. Muller, Seligson, and Turan (1987) found that, although the effects of political participation on support for democratic norms varied across contexts, the effect of education on support for democratic norms was positive in the U.S. (New York), Costa Rica (San Jose) and Turkey.

More recently, Gibson et al. (1992) attempt to assess the extent to which the "cultural requisites to democracy" exist in the USSR by looking at levels of "support for core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions" (329). Based on survey data of 504 Moscow Oblast citizens, they find, "The best predictors of attitudes toward general

⁵ Almond and Verba (1965) find that the rate of participation in voluntary organizations, which boosts political competence, increases as "one moves up the educational ladder" (248). They also contend that the fact that citizens of countries such as the U.S. and Britain are characterized by high levels of interpersonal trust which spills over into the political arena helps to promote the stability of the democratic political system (1965, 239-243). Such trust is seen by some as being fostered primarily in civil society (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).

democratic values are education, gender, and age. The better educated, males, and the young tended to be more supportive of democratic institutions and processes” (329). However, among the explanatory variables just mentioned they find that “the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes is level of education...” (359). Similarly, based on their public opinion survey of seven republics of the former Soviet Union, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) find that the more educated, men, and the young are most likely to support political change. However, the relationship between education and democracy is more complex than the above would imply. Indeed, the effects of education on democratic processes are not straightforward and unidirectional.

Several studies find the effects of education on democratic attitudes to be more variable than do those just described and point to the role context plays in determining the effects of education. Based on the results of a nation-wide study (n=1,507), Phelan et al. (1995) find that education has a positive effect on tolerance for the homeless but a negative effect on support for aiding the homeless economically. They conclude that the results support the socialization model in that “education socializes students to the ‘official culture,’ which in the United States includes values of equal opportunity and respect—but not equal outcomes” (p. 126). Using data from the U.S.A., France, Germany, and Austria, Weil (1985) looks at the effects of education on anti-Semitism and finds that the effect of education on liberal attitudes varies across countries, supporting the idea that “socialization” is what drives the effects of education.

Numerous factors render the effects of both formal education and NFE uncertain. While studies have consistently found relationships between years of formal education and political participation and democratic attitudes, the strongest effects often appear to

manifest themselves at the highest educational levels. For example, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) report that only 38% of the respondents in their study with fewer than five years of formal education voted, compared to 69% of those who had only completed high school, 86% of those who completed college, and 91% of those who completed at least one year of graduate school (17-18).

Similarly, with reference to support for the new democratic regimes in post-communist countries, Rose et al. (1998) find that it is only between those who have university degrees and those that do not that one sees a difference between educational groups. Their study is based on the data emanating from the New Democracies Barometer 1993-4 survey implemented by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society (n=9,087). With reference to support for nondemocratic alternatives, they find that: "Among university graduates, 70 per cent reject all undemocratic alternatives; the proportion falls to half among those with academic and secondary qualifications and to less than two-fifths among those with no academic qualifications" (132).

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) point out that formal education actually encapsulates many attributes and processes. Formal education enhances cognitive skills that allow an individual to understand and learn about politics. Reading is an obvious example. Formal education also increases one's ability to handle complex and abstract material. In addition, education increases the skills an individual needs to manage the logistical demands surrounding political participation. Moreover, American schools incorporate messages related to citizenship into the curriculum, and thus, education might help instill feelings of civic duty. Further, because the better educated tend to be more skilled at grappling with political information and issues, they often obtain more

psychological gratification from voting than those who are not as well educated. Years of formal schooling also tends to capture family background. Those with high levels of education often have relatively more prosperous, well-educated, politically aware parents than those with low levels of education (18-20).

Similarly, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) describe the “direct and indirect” effects education has on political participation. Within the school, students acquire communication and organizational skills, as well as perhaps an interest in politics. They might also assimilate civic values in this setting. Education also indirectly affects political participation in numerous ways. Among all variables, level of education has the strongest influence on the type of occupation one will have. One’s job largely determines the type of civic skills one will use and hone as well the type of social networks to which one will be exposed. In short, “...educational attainment thus has an indirect impact on the acquisition of several crucial political resources” (420). Moreover, they point out that education also has a positive affect on involvement in organizations, which in turn affects civic skills.

La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) observe that the production of human capital and the production of social capital⁶ are often correlated. Those with high levels of education are likely to find themselves in milieus where they have the opportunity to be included in the type of social networks in which “politically relevant social capital” abounds. In short, very similar to the processes described by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995), education has a positive relationship with social capital, which in turn increases political participation.

⁶ Putnam defines social capital as “...features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions...” (1993,167).

Education in Africa

Many of the processes and attributes that underlie the relationship between education and political participation, however, do not exist in some African countries. Harber describes the “authoritarian nature of schooling” in Africa and argues that “The present educational structures have within them many features which tend to reproduce the unvirtuous authoritarian cycle” (1997, 49). Social scientists of all disciplines have emphasized the important role education plays in the socialization/culturation process. Many scholars have assumed that the educational system of interest is an outgrowth of the society in which it is embedded. However, in the case of countries like Senegal, formal educational systems have their roots in colonial times, and the language of learning is not the maternal language of the learners. Many argue that, in these types of situations, learning in a second language obstructs the cognitive development of children (e.g., Vandewiele 1983; Magnus 1984; Awoniyi 1976). Magnus (1984) explains:

The use of foreign language in formal education in countries with a high rate of illiterate population does not encourage normal growth of cognitive development in the child, in that very little reinforcement takes place of the norms, values and beliefs experienced by the child outside the school environment within the school's formal environment. In addition, the cultural bias of the new language helps accentuate this problem. (397)

Magnus (1984) also observes that formal education creates a schism between the schooled and unschooled, and particularly between children and their unschooled parents. Sabatier also notes that West African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic to western education or those associated with it through the mid-1940s (1978, 7). In fact, during the colonial period, according to Boahan (1987), one of the ways rural Africans resisted colonialism was by shunning colonial “innovations” such as formal schools. To the extent that those obtaining diplomas in the formal educational system were put on a

different (and mistrusted) trajectory than the vast majority of people, formal education would appear not to be associated with the inculcation of social and moral responsibility connected to political participation in the American context. The school experience appears to be an especially stressful one for most students largely because of the aforementioned discontinuity. In fact, a 1981 study conducted by Vandwiele found that "school fears" were much more important among students in Senegal than students in the United States and France (1981:281).⁷

In the context of rural Senegal where only a minority of adults have any formal schooling and where those that do have, on average, six or fewer years, one must question whether formal education would generate the social capital needed to stimulate political activity. It is worth noting that years of formal education does not serve as a proxy for socio-economic class in contexts like that of rural Senegal.⁸ Indeed, there is no relationship between years of formal education and income in this sample.

Nonformal Education in Africa

Nonformal education is often considered a more "authentic" form of education in Africa since it is usually conducted in African languages and informed by the culture and exigencies of the learners. For many of those involved in the educational arena, these NFE programs are the key to empowering the majority of the population and rendering members of the public productive and active participants in the political and development process. They contend that it is only through such "mother tongue language programs" that most people in these countries can be reached:

⁷ Vandwiele attributes the high level of anxiety experienced by students to the requirement that they learn in a second language. Of course, a rival explanation for the high level of anxiety among Senegalese secondary students could be the frequent use of corporal punishment in the school setting.

⁸ Clignet claims that initially a number of schools drew their student body from generally marginalized groups (1970).

If education through the school system is not designed simply to replenish the ranks of the educated elite, it is obvious that something will have to be done for the large majority who have no opportunity of going to school or who drop out of the school system before they have had a chance to master the magic second language. This is why education in the mother tongue cannot be neglected--for the majority of the population, it will be the only passport to literacy (Bamgbose 1976:12).

NFE classes are often held in the relevant village itself, and often the “facilitator” (as opposed to teacher) is from the village. Participatory methods are emphasized, and often these programs are associated with goals involving the empowerment of the target population. NFE is thought to increase feelings of self-esteem and efficacy among participants and therefore inspire their active participation in civil and social life. Moreover, the NFE experience encourages interaction and communication among the participants, thereby generating social capital. There is some sparse support for these notions. For example, a pilot study (n=333) of Pulaar speakers in northern Senegal found that those who had had NFE were more likely to engage in behaviors related to community participation and personal empowerment than those without NFE (Kuenzi 1997). Nonetheless, the effects of NFE have not been established.⁹

On the other hand, NFE may serve to accentuate the insularity of villages, failing to encourage rural inhabitants to connect with national political institutions or political representatives. Many of the village facilitators are poorly trained and equipped and therefore tend to replicate the authoritarian teaching style of teachers in formal schools. The level of reading and writing skills attained through these programs is usually quite shallow. Thus, the NFE experience may fail to produce the feelings of efficacy and self-esteem as well as the civic skills thought to inspire communal and political participation. In addition, many of those who complete an NFE program find themselves in a

⁹ The attention that has been dedicated to NFE has focused on the degree to which NFE programs transmit literacy and numeracy skills. Many in the development community consider NFE a failure in this regard.

nonliterate environment where their new found capacities are in no way reinforced.

Oxenham notes,

It seems to be the case also that many adults who complete literacy courses do not make much use of their laboriously acquired skills either because reading matter is not easily available or because the occasions for writing are infrequent. Relapses into illiteracy are apparently not uncommon. (1980, 43)

Between the dearth of reading materials in African languages and shallow literacy skills produced by NFE, neophytes are not likely to have the vicarious experiences that broaden their vision.

In addition, according to the socialization “postulate” of the political culture perspective, those experiences one has as a child serve as a filter for later experiences (Eckstein 1988). Much of the socialization literature posits that there will be significant continuity in political behaviors and attitudes throughout an individual’s lifetime. Based on socialization theory, we would therefore not expect NFE to have a significant effect on political behaviors and attitudes since the NFE experience takes place in adulthood.

Education, Civil Society, and Democracy

One important consideration is the link between education, civil society and democracy. Increasingly, political scientists are giving serious attention to examining the development and maintenance of the social capital within states and communities. Indeed, a lively debate has emerged concerning the role that various factors play in what Francis Fukuyama (1996) has referred to as “spontaneous sociability” and Robert Putnam has referred to as “social capital.” In his seminal work on governance in northern and southern Italy, Putnam claims that social capital is “the key to making democracy work” (1993,185). Putnam defines social capital as “...features of social organization,

such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions...” (1993,167). Coleman observes that social capital allows goals to be achieved that could not otherwise be achieved. Putnam notes that in small, highly personalized communities, the threat of expulsion from the socio-economic system is a powerful threat which induces economic cooperation among people (1993,168). Social trust must exist in order for cooperation to occur. According to Putnam, social trust is generated via norms of reciprocity and civic engagement. Social capital is fostered primarily in civil society.¹⁰

In fact, participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other educational effects. Brady et al. (1995) find that education increases ones involvement in voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one’s civic skills, which in turn increases one’s level of political participation. In the long run, participation in the community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic values.

However, Goody and Watt note that differentiating people on the basis of the degree to which they have mastered reading and writing skills becomes an important means of social stratification with the introduction of literacy (1968, 58). Durkheim claims that oral cultures manifest “mechanical solidarity” (cited in Goody 1968, 62), but literacy tends to produce individualization. Oxenham (1980) and Ong (1991) have claimed that simply being able to read and write renders one more self-conscious and introspective. Coleman contends that the stability of a social structure is a critical variable in the creation and destruction of social capital. In his words, “Disruptions of social organization or of social relations can be highly destructive to social capital” (320). In

¹⁰ I will adopt Linz and Stepan’s definition of civil society as “...that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests” (1996,17).

Streets scathing critique of the literacy imperative,¹¹ he points out that those associated with the literacy movement have created "...the construction of a 'stigma' where [previously] many people operated in the oral domain without feeling that it was a problem" (1995, 14). In the African context where competition for scarce resources is fierce and often zero-sum in nature, perhaps obtaining literacy skills through nonformal education programs can be seen as one way in which people maximize their advantage relative to others. Street claims that literacy (i.e., NFE) programs do not create jobs and thus they may actually lead to a situation in which those who have gained literacy skills through NFE simply "leap frog" over those who have not (1995, 18).

While scholars have emphasized the positive nature of civil society, some students of Africa tend to be skeptical of the positive characteristics associated with civil society. In the case of Africa, Woods notes that ascriptive associations often compete with civic organizations. Ethnic based associations, he contends, are likely to persist in Africa. While such organizations drive solidarity and collective action, in many cases, they also enhance the threat of ethnic violence (1992, 94). In the words of Woods (1992):

In many African countries, it is ascriptive, vertically organized associations which have so far played an important role in shaping the character of civil society. Social organizations in Africa are still conditioned by clientelistic interactions. They are limited in geographic scope; therefore, these groups can best be understood as subnational or local in nature (94).

Fatton strongly cautions against seeing civil society in solely positive terms and comments on its often regressive nature in Africa. Fatton's concerns are relevant to the case of Senegal. Based on her observations of rural Senegalese organizations, Patterson

¹¹ I define the literacy imperative as all of the discourse advocating the spread of literacy and eradication of "illiteracy", as articulated in all of its manifestations, from official development doctrine, to conversations among those in anyway involved with the literacy issue.

(1998) argues that participation in civil society does not engender democratic values because “legitimate, inclusive and accountable” modes of decision-making are not employed (423).

In the case of Africa, many scholars recognize the important role that civil society has played in the process of democratic transitions and could play in the democratic consolidation processes (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) note that organizational strength and resource base are determining factors in the amount of influence an association will have. If education boosts involvement in voluntary organizations as many claim, civil society could be one of the vehicles through which education facilitates democratic consolidation. On the other hand, if education serves to accentuate hierarchy and social cleavage, it could lead to associations which fail to nurture the norms of reciprocity Putnam deems so critical to a healthy democracy.

Institutional trust, or trust in the institutions of society, is considered critical for the viability of a democratic government. At the same time, scholars have begun to point out that a certain amount of skepticism can be healthy for democracy when that skepticism is based in realism as opposed to cynicism (Holmberg 1999). In addition, Putnam (2000) points out that trusting when there is not a good reason to trust is simply gullibility. When considering the role NFE plays in developing civic orientations, therefore, it is also important to examine how NFE affects institutional trust.

Problem Statement

I intend to explore the effects of education on communal and political behavior and attitudes in the context of Senegal, West Africa. I will look at the impact of both formal and nonformal education on the political attitudes and behaviors of interest.

The Setting

Senegal, West Africa is an ideal context in which to look at these issues. Through the establishment of a network of patron-client relationships involving the ruling party/government, marabouts¹² and Senegalese citizens, the first president of Senegal, Senghor, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990) and establish a de facto one party during the first 15 years after Senegal's independence. The economic distortions emanating from these networks eventually led to enough peasant "malaise" to force the government to engage in political liberalization (Boone 1990). Senghor began this process in 1976, and true "multipartyism" was established by his successor, Abdou Diouf, in 1981 (Vengroff and Creevey 1997, 206-7).

Already being a "semi-democracy" (Coulon 1990), Senegal did not undergo a democratic transition in the early 1990s, but the government did undertake several initiatives which appeared to enhance the possibilities for the establishment of a more completely democratic regime than that which existed (Villalon 1994). However, both the 1993 and 1998 elections were a great disappointment as no alternation of power took place, and abuses were alleged.¹³ Ironically, Senegalese citizens appeared to have a great deal of mistrust toward the entire political system (Villalon 1994; Kante 1994) at a time

¹² That is, Islamic religious leaders.

¹³ In fact, Vengroff and Creevey (1997) argue that the 1993 elections were perhaps some of the cleanest in Africa, and my observations (as did those of other international observers) found the 1998 elections to be relatively clean and transparent. However, perhaps the perceptions of opposition and general public are key with regard to this issue.

when the dominant party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), was liberalizing itself out of political power.

The outcome of Senegal's 2000 presidential election stunned international and national observers alike. In the second round of the Senegal's presidential election, long-standing opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade defeated the incumbent Abdou Diouf. The victory of Abdoulaye Wade in the presidential election of 2000 was a watershed in Senegal's political history. After nearly 40 years of de facto one-party rule by the PS, this event seemed to catapult Senegal from semi-democratic to democratic status.¹⁴ Given the fragility of democratic advances in Africa, distilling the factors that could facilitate or impede democratic processes in Senegal is critical.

On a more micro political level, Schaffer (1998) observes that the Senegalese (actually, the Wolof) notion of democracy (in Wolof, *demokaraasi*) is associated with the values of evenhandedness, mutuality or consensus. These three terms are related to the idea of "interdependence and community-wide solidarity" and comprise a concept of 'community caretaking.' Because of this conception of democracy, Schaffer argues, the goals associated with participating in the electoral process are often very different for Wolof villagers than for Americans. Elections present an opportunity for *demokaraasi* to be either strengthened, when villagers all vote together for the same candidate, or undermined, when different political preferences among villagers result in social splintering. In order to avoid the splintering scenario, some villagers simply opt not to

¹⁴ Following the 1993 elections, Villalón (1994) observed that Senegal had nearly all of the accoutrements of a democracy except an alternation in power. Of course, as Villalón observes, power alternation is considered a critical requisite for full democratic status.

vote. The syndrome of behaviors and attitudes Schaffer observes are associated with nonliterate¹⁵ Wolof villagers.

Although many times those in the same family or village do vote for the same candidate or party, the reasons that they do so are not necessarily those outlined by Schaeffer, a subject to be discussed in Chapter 3. However, this study will allow us to see if and how different types of education transform villagers' sets of political behaviors and attitudes.

In the past, ethnicity has never provided a point of political mobilization in Senegal (Cruise O'Brien 1998; Villalon 1995).¹⁶ The spread of the Wolof language and identity has been able to proceed with little resistance. The emphasis on Wolof literacy, however, may reverse this trend. According to Cruise O'Brien, the literacy movements in African languages could inspire conflict along ethnic/linguistic lines. The literacy movement among Pulaar speakers¹⁷, which really started in earnest in the 1980s, has been the most zealous of all of the literacy movements and has emerged largely as a response to the threat of "Wolofisation". The work of others and my own preliminaries studies have revealed a tendency of those in any type of leadership positions in the Pulaar literacy movement to link Pulaar literacy to the elevation of Pulaar-speaking people. In the words of Cruise O'Brien (1998):

The emergence of the Halpulaaren movement in the 1980s, defending the cause of the Pulaar language, working to unite the ethnic Peul and Toucouleur behind the

¹⁵ The word 'illiterate' is thought to be pejorative and thus I describe those who cannot read and write as nonliterate.

¹⁶ One ethnic group, the Diola, is, nonetheless, primarily responsible for the secessionist movement in the south.

¹⁷ Official sources report that Pulaar-speakers comprise 26 percent of the population, but I think this figure is an underestimate. According to Dr. Fagerberg-Diallo, across the Sahel, between 20 and 25 million people speak the language Pulaar (or Fulfude – the misnomer is Fulani), and around one third of the population of Senegal speaks Pulaar as a first language (1993:1).

Halpulaaren banner, on the other hand, is a possible indicator of a culturally conflictual future. (39)

Moreover, Senegal had its first brush with political ethnic mobilization in the 1998 legislative elections when the URD, a party splintered off from the PS, was able to obtain the majority of Pulaaraphones' votes based on the founder's (Djibo Ka) Peul ethnicity. Vengroff and Creevey (1997) note that the mores that used to determine how members of Senegal's different ethnic groups related to each other are in flux. Hence, the time is ripe to examine the relationship between nonformal literacy programs in African languages and ethnic awareness and pride.

The Formal Educational System of Senegal

The history of its educational system also renders Senegal a perfect case in which to examine the aforementioned issues. According to the UNESCO Institute of Education, "...'education' as an institution is recognized by the state [of Senegal] as a resource which must sustain all cultural advancement, technological progress, the raising of awareness among the masses, and the construction of a more just social edifice" (Badiane 1984:120). Unfortunately, the formal educational system has hardly served as such a resource in Senegal. Indeed, although education is seen to be both a key to successful development and an objective of development, the results of the formal educational system have been disappointing. Having been under French influence for three centuries, many of the institutions of the small, coastal West African country resemble those of France. Since education is one the principal ways through which culture is transmitted, the French established an educational system in Senegal modeled after that in France.

Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resemble the French school system. However, much of the Senegalese population is incapable of

using French as an effective means of communication. Dr. Fagerberg-Diallo notes that "...roughly 75% of the population in Senegal is not capable of using French as a language through which they have access to information, whether it be written or oral" (1993:4). D'Hondt, et al.'s 1980 study found that only 1.8% of the 896 secondary students in his sample spoke French at home, including 2.6% in Dakar. Bourgi's study found that only 1 to 5% of the Senegalese population spoke French "correctly" (studies quoted in Vandeweylle 1983:511).

Currently, six years of primary schooling is officially compulsory for children of seven to 13 years of age. In fact, according to *Africa South of the Sahara*, 58% of those in this age group were enrolled in primary schools in 1992. The difference between primary and secondary school attendance rates is instructive, however. Secondary school, which students usually begin at age 13, is comprised of a four-year and three-year cycle. In 1992, only 16% of those in the eligible age group were enrolled in secondary school (1997, 834). Unfortunately, students leaving primary school may not have even fully developed and consolidated their literacy and numeracy skills. While the formal education system has created a Senegalese elite, nearly 70% of the population of Senegal does not possess basic literacy skills. Among women, 77% are not literate (Direction de l'Alphabetisation et de l'Education de Base 1995).

Nonformal education programs have emerged to fill the gaps left by the formal education system. Most of these programs are administered by national or international nongovernmental organizations, although the Senegalese government has begun to become active in the nonformal education sector. Many of those spear-heading the Pulaar literacy movement are very committed Muslims and conservative on social issues. This

conservative outlook is somewhat in conflict with many of the ideas and models on which nonformal education is based. Nonetheless, traditional messages are often passed to students in nonformal education situations.¹⁸ Thus, it is critical to assess the effects of NFE on political behavior and orientation.

Statement of Hypotheses

Based on the literature and the author's own past exploratory research on NFE, it was hypothesized that:

- 1) NFE has a positive effect on rural Senegalese citizens' level of civic engagement.
 - a) On average, those who have participated in NFE will exhibit higher levels of community participation and leadership than will those who have never participated in an NFE program.
 - b) On average, those with NFE will be more engaged and interested in the political sphere than will those without NFE.
 - c) On average, those with nonformal education will have higher levels of electoral participation than will those without NFE.
- 2) On average, those with nonformal education will feel more politically efficacious than will those without nonformal education.
- 3) On average, those with NFE will express more progressive (i.e., less authoritarian and traditional) attitudes than those without NFE.
- 4) On average, those with NFE will be more supportive of democratic values than will those without NFE.
- 5) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit more institutional trust than will those without NFE will.
- 6) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit less interpersonal trust than will those without NFE.

¹⁸ For example, I interviewed one young woman in northern Senegal who said that before learning to read and write in Pulaar, she wore clothing that would be unacceptable in a traditional setting and went out dancing with her friends. However, now that she has participated in the program, she wears traditional clothing and does not engage in activities such as dancing. Hence, it seems that she was sort of re-socialized into traditional Haalpulaar values via the Pulaar literacy-teacher training program.

- 7) On average, those who have had NFE will exhibit more individualism than will those without NFE.
- 8) On average, those who have NFE will be more likely to express ethnic pride than will those who have not had NFE.

In her review of the literature on education, Moulton (1997) observes that numerous studies conducted across the globe have revealed a positive relationship between education and self-esteem/autonomy. Many of these studies found that self-esteem/autonomy mediated the effects of education on other behaviors and attitudes. I see increased self/esteem autonomy as being one of the mechanisms through which NFE affects the political orientations of interest. Several mechanisms and processes underlie the relationship between NFE and the orientations of interest. First, NFE increases self-esteem. Many times, people interact regularly with people outside of the household for the first time in the NFE classes. This social experience gives them a new sense of self. In addition, they gain confidence because of the new skills they acquire¹⁹ (see Chapter 7). Second, NFE has strong network effects. NFE participants not only get to know those in the NFE classes, but also usually began to join other village associations. They also tend to be recruited into other development projects by NGOs. Third, their new reading and writing skills do allow NFE participants to obtain and exchange information in a way that they could not do in the past. That is, the literacy skills obtained from the classes matter as well.

¹⁹ Sometimes this confidence appears inflated. For example, one woman who had completed an NFE program told me that prior to the NFE program, she had no confidence. However, now that she has completed the program, she is educated and her opinion should hold as much weight as those with university degrees.

I, therefore, expect to find a positive relationship between participation in a nonformal education program and civic/community involvement. Nonformal education increases people's feelings of self-esteem and efficacy, and therefore they are more likely to take action with others to effect change on their environment than those with no education. I do not expect to find such a relationship between formal education and community involvement, especially in rural settings. Those with high levels of formal education tend to leave their natal villages or tend to feel a distance between themselves and unschooled villagers. I expect to find a positive relationship between both types of education and political participation. Given this more active and engaged stance, I would expect those with NFE to feel more politically efficacious than those without NFE.

I expect the effects of both nonformal and formal education on tolerance and support for democratic values to be somewhat contradictory. While most U.S. studies support the notion that education promotes political tolerance and democratic political values (e.g., see Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; Lawrence 1976), in their study of political culture in Zambia, Bratton and Liatto-Katunda (1994) found that on average, respondents with higher levels of education tended to be "less attached to political equality" than their less well-educated counterparts. Bratton et al. (1999) had similar findings in their study of Ghana.²⁰ People may indeed become more tolerant of those from the outside because of the vicarious experiences made possible through reading, as Oxenham suggests (1980, 51). However, Street notes that in the current international political and social climate, non-literate people are being denigrated partly as the result of the extreme rhetoric employed in zealous literacy campaigns (1995). It seems that such

²⁰ While this finding was based on only one item, it does suggest a potentially fruitful line of inquiry.

rhetoric could only heighten the intolerance of those who have achieved some education toward those who have not.

I expect levels of institutional trust to increase with nonformal education. Nonformal education increases the amount of information available about institutions to those who formally had very little access to that information. People tend to feel less powerless before such institutions because of the increase in their knowledge and skill levels. Moreover, nonformal education increases people's contact with those from outside one's particular village or neighborhood. However, nonformal education may decrease interpersonal trust due to the disruptions in social relations emanating from their experience in the literacy program.

I expect there to be a negative relationship between formal education and ethnic awareness and identity. On the other hand, based on my preliminary research, I would expect there to be a positive relationship between nonformal education and ethnic consciousness and pride since the programs are conducted in national languages and attempt to valorize the culture of the participants.

The conceptualization of key concepts and their operationalization are found in Appendix D.

Chapter 2

THE POLITICS OF SENEGAL

Table 1: Chronology of Salient Events in the Political History of Senegal

1000	Area of Senegal focal point of political activity (Johnson 1971)
c. 1100	King of Tekrou (Fouta Tooro) and his entourage converted to Islam by Muslims from Mauritania (Johnson 1971)
Mid-15 th Century	Senegal comes into contact with Portuguese traders
16 th Century	French began to involve themselves in Senegal
1820	Al Hajj Umar Tall (Haalpulaar leader) initiated into Tidiane Brotherhood during pilgrimage to Mecca
C. 1850s	Al Hajj Umar Tall leads “jihad” against “pagans,” weak Muslims, and the French (Johnson 1971)
(Late) 19 th Century	Large-scale conversion to Islam among the Wolof (Johnson 1971)
1885- 1960	Senegal is a French colony
1886	Lat Dior, Wolof “warlord,” is killed in battle with the French → power vacuum (Cruise O’Brien 1975)
C. 1886	Cheikh Ibra Fall vows devotion to the great Muslim leader Amadu Bamba → birth of the Mouride Brotherhood
1914	Blaise Diagne is the first Black African elected to the French National Assembly
1962	Mamadou Dia charged with coup attempt and imprisoned
1964 - 1975	Rise of the one-party state (Gellar 1995)
1968	Student protests forcefully suppressed
1974	Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS → “first legal opposition” since 1966
1976	Limited Multipartyism re-established
1980	Leopold Senghor resigns from the presidency
1981	Abdou Diouf sworn into office
1982	Start of the secessionist movement in the Casamance
1983 and 1988	Huge victories for Diouf and PS in presidential and legislative elections
1988	Mauritania crisis → massacre of Mauritians in Senegal in response to massacre of Senegalese in Mauritania
1991	Opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade enters Government
1991	Senegal is the first Black African country to host Organization of the Islamic Conference (Gellar 1995)
1991/2	New electoral rules established
1993	Diouf wins presidential election; margin of victory plummets
1993	Assassination of Babacar Sèye, Vice President of the Constitutional Council
1994	Five policemen killed during Moustarchidines’ demonstration

Table 1 (cont'd)

1998	PS wins majority in the legislative elections
2000	Opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade wins presidential election
2001	New constitution approved in referendum
2001	President Wade's party, the PDS, sweeps legislative elections

Sources: Beck 2001; Behrman 1970; Gellar 1995; Johnson 1971; O'Brien 1975; Schumaker 1975

Background

Those familiar with Senegalese social and political life would probably agree that there is perhaps no better place to study the dynamics of political maneuvering and interest-seeking behavior than Senegal. The small, coastal West African country of Senegal shares borders with Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east and Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry in the south. Senegal is one of the Sahelian countries. The Gambia, a very small country that is a former British colony, separates northern and southern Senegal. This division seems almost symbolic of and has probably contributed to some of the social, cultural and political divisions between northern and southern Senegal. In the north, Senegal is basically comprised of savannah lands, but, in the south, one finds forests and lush vegetation (Johnson 1971). The desert is steadily taking over the area in the north, however.

The hybrid nature of Senegal's culture is emphasized by Gellar (1995): "Senegal's geography has brought its people into close contact with North Africa and the West and has made Senegal a crossroads where Black African, Islamic, and European civilizations have met, clashed, and blended" (p. 1). Although it is fair to call Senegal an

ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse country, four or five main ethnic comprise around 86% of its population of about 10 million people²¹:

Table 2: Ethnic Composition of the Population

Ethnicity	Percent of Population
Wolof	43%
Serer	15
Fulbe	14
Halpulaar	9
Diola	5
Other ethnic groups	14
Total	100%

Source: *Africa South of the Sahara* 2001

Johnson (1971) observes that the Wolof, Halpulaar and Serer shared a great deal in terms of culture and “have maintained close ties” (7). That largely those of the Diola ethnic group comprise the movement for an independent Casamance is perhaps not so surprising, given the way in which the Casamançais have been excluded by the networks that connect the other ethnic groups (see Galvin 2001).

Senegal is a relatively poor country, although its GNP per capita, \$520, is one of the highest in West Africa (Hodgkinson 2001). Around 54% of the Senegalese population lives in rural areas (Hodgkinson 2001), and agriculture accounts for about 19% of the GNP.²² Senegal ranks 145 out of 174 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure that takes into account income, educational

²¹ Although the Fulbe and Halpulaar are often listed separately, they are related ethnic groups and the members of both groups often claim they are one ethnic group. Halpulaar is the correct term for “Tukulor” or “Toucouleur,” and it literally means “speaker of Pulaar.” Fulbe (the appellation for the “Fulani,” “Peul” or “Peuhl”) also speak Pulaar. In this study, I refer to both the Fulbe and Halpulaar as “Pulaar speakers” and include them in one group. At times I just say “Pulaars,” although Pulaar technically refers to the language as opposed to the people.

²² “Senegal” *The World Factbook* 2002: <http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html>

attainments, and life expectancy. The HDI has a maximum value of one and a minimum value of zero. Senegal's actual HDI value is 0.423. Thus, although Senegal may be better off than many of the other Sahelian countries, when viewed from a global perspective, Senegal is far from being an affluent country.

The vast majority of Senegal's population (95%) is Muslim. Only 4% of the population is Christian, and about 1% adheres to traditional religions.²³ The majority of Senegalese belong to one of two Muslim brotherhoods or Sufi orders: the Tijaniyya or the Muridiyya.²⁴ To some extent, these brotherhoods cross-cut ethnic cleavages, but not completely. The relationship is somewhat similar to that which Cruise O'Brien (1975) described several decades ago. Basically, nearly all Pulaar-speakers are Tidianes but not all Tidianes are Pulaar-speakers. Indeed, the Serer and Wolof, as well as other groups, are well-represented in the Tidiane brotherhood. On the other hand, although most Mourides are Wolof, not all Wolof are Mourides. The Tijjans used to be more numerous than the Mourides, but now they are nearly equal in number, which probably means that people of other ethnic groups are joining the Muridiyya (Creevey 1985). Senegal has been noted for its "shallow" (Creevey 1985) and unorthodox Islam. The brotherhoods have played an important role in the political life of Senegal, and I will discuss them in greater depth.

The Political Institutions of Senegal

The Republic of Senegal has a multiparty, democratic regime. Many of Senegal's political institutions resemble those of France. A new constitution was approved by an

²³ "Background Notes: Republic of Senegal." U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/senegal_0298_bgn.html

²⁴ The Layéne order and the Qadiriyya are also present in Senegal, but these orders have a relatively small membership.

overwhelming majority of the vote on January 7, 2002.²⁵ Like France, Senegal has a semi-presidential system (although President Wade may call what exists now a “semi-parliamentary” system). In this system, the president is the chief of state and is unquestionably the most powerful actor in the political system. The presidential term is now five years, changed from seven years.²⁶ The president has the power to dissolve the National Assembly, but only after the members of the NA have served at least two years of their term.²⁷ The prime minister is the head of government and she “appoints the council of ministers in consultation with the president.”²⁸

Senegal once again has a unicameral legislature. Deputies are elected to the National Assembly for five-year terms. Fifty of the 120 seats are allocated via the plurality formula in multimember districts ranging from one to five seats and seventy seats are allocated via a proportional representation formula in a nationwide district.

Neopatrimonialism and the Nature of Senegalese Politics

Bratton and van de Walle’s description of neopatrimonialism across African states in the postcolonial period captures many of the features of Senegalese politics. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) contend that neopatrimonialism was the “institutional hallmark” of the pre-transition political regimes in sub-Saharan African (61). They define neopatrimonial regimes as “those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (1997,

²⁵ For a treatment of all of the changes in electoral rules throughout Senegal’s postcolonial history, see Mozzafar and Vengroff 2002.

²⁶ Until 2000, when the presidential term was changed to five years in a referendum, the presidential term in France was seven years. In Senegal, Wade campaigned to change the presidential term from seven years to five years, but claims the change, which was approved in the 2001 referendum, only applies to those elected in elections subsequent to the election of 2000.

²⁷ “Senegal: Institutional Situation,” http://www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr/etat/_anglais/chronologie/senegal.html

²⁸ “Senegal” *The World Factbook 2002*: <http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html>

62). According to Bratton and van Walle (1997), three institutions support these neopatrimonial regimes: “presidentialism,” “clientelism” and “state resources.” In these regimes, the right to rule is attributed to a person, not an office, notwithstanding the existence of a constitution. The political system is dominated by one figure who is “above the law.” The government, including the administration, is permeated by “relationships of dependence and loyalty” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 62). Bureaucratic positions are occupied not with a view of performing public service but with a view of self-enrichment. The president and his most intimate entourage use state resources for “systematic patronage and clientelistic practices in order to maintain political order” (62). Bratton and van de Walle (1997) observe that “personal relationships constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa” (p. 62).

Neopatrimonialism is very much at the core of Senegalese politics.

Neopatrimonialism in Senegal has its roots in both traditional Senegalese culture and the colonial experience. Although I agree with Bratton and van de Walle (1997) that the “nature of political authority” and political institutions in Africa are different from those found in most other areas of the world (p.61), I think it is important to emphasize that the political scene of Senegal is very comprehensible once one takes into account these institutions.

Senegalese Politics in Historical Perspective

Early History

Based on the written accounts of Arab and European travelers, Johnson contends that the area that now constitutes modern day Senegal was a focal point of “organized

political activity since A.D. 1000" (1971, 7). Therefore, although Johnson acknowledges that a direct connection cannot be made between traditional politics and the politics of more recent times (specifically, that of the communes), he does note that the "...the concept of the political process as one of a struggle for power was familiar to every African" (1971, 7). Most of the cultures in Senegal were characterized by rigid social stratification. People were divided into three basic categories: "freemen, servile artisan castes, and slaves" (Gellar 1995, 3). According to the estimates of some researchers, perhaps nearly one half or two thirds of the societies were slaves. The Diola and other groups occupying the Casamance region tended to be more egalitarian than the Wolof and Halpulaar, for example (Gellar 1995, 3-4).

Having converted to Islam around the eleventh century, the Halpulaar were the first of Senegal's principal ethnic groups to convert to Islam. This early conversion contrasts quite strikingly with the more recent conversion to Islam by most of the Wolof in the late nineteenth century. One of the most prominent Halpulaar "Muslim clerical warriors," Al Haj Umar Tall, was responsible for establishing the Tidiane brotherhood in Senegal, after he himself was initiated into the Tidiane brotherhood when he made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1820 (Gellar 1995, 5-6; Johnson 1971). In contrast, the Mouride brotherhood is an "indigenous institution," having emerged around the personality of Amadou Bamba at the time of colonial conquest.

Rise of the Marabouts

The significant political role played by the marabouts has perhaps been one of Senegal's most noted characteristics. The power of the marabouts has its origin in the

period of the French conquest of Senegal. Senegal was in contact with France for over three centuries and was a formal colony of France between 1885 and 1945. Subsequent to World War II, De Gaulle recognized a need to change the nature of rule in the colonies, but Senegal did not achieve full independence from France until 1960 (Gellar 1995).

When those of the warrior class were defeated in battle with the French in the late 19th century, a “power vacuum” arose (Cruise O’Brien 1975). The Senegalese turned toward the emerging marabouts to offer some type of leadership and point of cultural reference in the face of the social disruption created by the French conquest. Berhman (1970) notes that this was a phenomenon that cut across all social castes. The case of Amadu Bamba as described by Cruise O’Brien (1975) is illustrative. After the great Wolof “warlord”, Lat Dior, was killed in a battle against the French in 1886, many of his Wolof followers turned to the “saint,” Amadu Bamba to provide them with leadership (Cruise O’Brien 1975). Although the French initially viewed Amadu Bamba and his religious movement as a potential menace to colonial authority, Robinson (1999) argues that:

...the pattern of relationship [between Amadu Bamba and the Mourides and the French colonial authorities] – a simultaneous combination of close surveillance by the French, constant communication between the two sides, and the collaboration in the economic development of the peanut basin – was established by the early twentieth century and remained consistent for the rest of Bamba’s life. (193)

Robinson (1999) goes on to argue and offer evidence that this pattern was applicable to the relationship between the French and other marabouts and their followers. Indeed, as Cruise O’Brien (1975), Berhman (1970) and other scholars point out, the marabouts were instrumental in operationalizing the French’s desire to transform the Senegalese economy

from a subsistence economy to a cash crop economy monoculturally based on the cultivation of peanuts. The followers of Amadu Bamba worked his fields with the promise that they would receive their own parcel of land after ten years of labor (Cruise O'Brien 1975). When the expansion of the activities of the marabouts and their disciples brought them into conflict with the Fulbe pastoralists, the French "turned a blind eye" to the Mourides' actions taken to expunge the Fulbe from the land. Marabouts were granted vast tracks of land to be exploited by their followers, on occasion (Cruise O'Brien 1975).²⁹ Indeed, the marabouts and their families prospered under colonial rule (Schumacher 1975).

Electoral Politics in the Pre-Independence Period

Senegal's experience with electoral politics under colonialism had a decisive impact on the politics of the postcolonial period (Schumacher 1975; Cruise O'Brien 1975). Senegal had a certain type of importance as far as the French West African colonies went, and it contained the capitol of French West Africa (AOF). With regard to colonial administration, the official policy of the French was "assimilation" while the policy of the British was "indirect rule." Many claim that although the French did not actually implement their policy of "assimilation," to the extent that that they did, it was in the four communes of Senegal. All of the inhabitants of the communes of Dakar, Goree, Saint Louis, and Rufisque were considered French "citizens," while those outside of the communes were considered "subjects." Senegal had a territorial assembly and representation in the Chamber of Deputies in France, and those within the communes had

²⁹ Ironically, within the last decade, President Diouf granted one of the last remaining forest areas to a marabout for exploitation. This land was being used by the Fulbe in their pastoral activities at the time.

a right to vote in the relevant elections (Gellar 1995; Schumacher 1975; Cruise O'Brien 1975).

Although it took some time before the Senegalese in the communes mastered the foreign political apparatus, in 1914, Blaise Diagne surprised many by becoming the first Black African elected to the French national Assembly (Gellar 1995; Johnson 1971). Many of the political phenomena observed in recent years were already manifest during this early electoral period. "Negative campaigning" had its roots in the pre-independence elections (Cruise O'Brien 1975, 69). Cruise O'Brien observes that "...a survey of the Senegalese political press for the period 1914-40 reveals a remarkably low salience of broad policy issues" (1975, 170).

When the franchise was extended to the rural areas after WWII, the nature of politics was somewhat transformed. Gellar (1995) notes the difference in the political leaders who arose in rural and urban areas: "In the communes, the prototype of the political leader was the urbane, Western-educated Senegalese intellectual; in the countryside, it was the marabout" (9). In the communes, politicians had to fulfill certain French cultural, educational and language requisites (Gellar 1995), while such was not the case in rural areas.

Although Lamine Gueye's party had constructed a dense network of clan of ties, it lost its dominant positions to a splinter party. In 1948, Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia left the "Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party, the SFIO, headed by Lamine Gueye" and created the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (BDS) (Schumacher 1975, 6). "...ethnic arithmetic and geographic and factional criteria of representation" informed the construction of the BDS party lists and party positions, and

by 1951, the BDS leadership had “managed to forge a heterogeneous, territorywide pyramid of such clan alliances...” (Schumacher 1975, 11). According to Schumacher, the “foundations” for the former ruling party had been put in place by the mid 1950s (1975, 16). In 1958, Gueye and Senghor reconciled, and the merger party was renamed the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS) (Schumacher 1975). In addition, elections during the colonial period were characterized by irregularities and electoral tricks (Schumacher 1975) like those that became so renown in the postcolonial era.

Politics in the Post-Independence Period

Political life in the post-independence period exhibits much continuity with that of the preceding period. By about 1951, Léopold Senghor was the central figure in Senegalese political life (Cruise O’Brien 1975) and he remained so until he resigned as president in 1980, to be replaced by his *dauphin*, Abdou Diouf in 1981. Through the establishment and maintenance of a network of patron-client relationships involving the ruling party/government, marabouts, party barons, and Senegalese citizens, Senghor, the first president of Senegal, was able to consolidate his power (Boone 1990; Schumaker 1975).

The marabouts were (and, to a lesser degree, still are) a critical part of the party machine and made significant contributions to the stability of political life both in the colonial and postcolonial state. Many observers have been highly critical of the “maraboutic system” because of its seeming blatant exploitation of the peasantry. Cruise O’Brien (1975), however, very aptly describes the rational nature of the master-disciple between marabouts and their followers (talibés). When it comes to candidate choice for an election, the more votes a marabout delivers, the greater his power. The greater the

power of the marabout, the more effectively he can make demands on the state.

Normally, the demands he makes on the state will involve policy outcomes or benefits for his respective locality. Thus, voters render marabouts powerful advocates on their behalf. Cruise O'Brien notes, "The hostility of the rural people to the state and its urban controllers is thus tempered by the hope that they may be the lucky ones if their local patron plays his cards right" (1975, 177). If a patron is unsuccessful in obtaining benefits and outcomes for his following on too many occasions, his followers will look for someone else to whom they can attach themselves (Cruise O'Brien 1975). Thus, as Tiebout would say, they can "vote with their feet."

From the period spanning from 1964 to 1975, Senegal became essentially a one-party state (Gellar 1995, 22). Indeed, the *Union Progressiste Sénégal* (UPS) absorbed many of the opposition parties (Cruise O'Brien 1975). There was, however, intra-party competition among the *tendances*.

In 1976, Senghor re-established limited multiparty politics: the constitution was amended to establish a three-party system. Essentially, one party was to be to the left of the ruling party and one party was to be to the right. The UPS changed its name to the *Parti Socialist* (PS) at this time, and Abdoulaye Wade's *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) was selected be the "liberal" party, while a nominally Marxist-Leninist party (PAI) was chosen to be the party on the left (Gellar 1995). Since 1976, when multiparty politics, albeit limited, was re-established, Senegal has been slowly liberalizing and democratizing.

President Senghor was the first African leader to give up power of his own accord (Gellar 1995). He did this in 1980 when he resigned from the presidency. His *dauphin*,

Abdou Diouf, replaced him as president. The 1983 and 1988 presidential and legislative elections produced big victories for both Diouf and the PS. The 1988 elections elicited accusations of fraud and irregularities, as well as protest. Throughout the 1980s, Diouf refused to implement electoral reform. In the 1990s, Diouf skillfully deflated the opposition by inviting opposition members to join the government (and several, including Wade, did so) and agreeing to electoral reform (Gellar 1995). The coalition government constructed and implemented several important reforms. The new electoral code provided for the secret ballot, right of each political party to be represented at voting centers, presence of international election observers, and equal access to state-controlled media among political parties (Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

Diouf and the PS were successful in the 1993 presidential and legislative elections, but Diouf's margin of victory fell. The opposition made vociferous accusations of electoral fraud and abuse against the PS, and these elections seem to be what sparked some of the more violent events in Senegal's political history. The opposition also cried foul in the 1998 legislative elections although, by my own observations, they seemed relatively free and fair.

From "Semi-Democracy" to Democracy? The Implications of the Senegalese Presidential Election of 2000

The alternation in executive power that was produced by Senegal's 2000 presidential election was a watershed event in Senegal's political history. In the second round of the presidential election, long-standing opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, defeated the incumbent Abdou Diouf. At the time of his defeat, Abdou Diouf had been president for 19 years, and his party, the Socialist Party (PS), had been in power for 40.

Prior to the 2000 election, there was a notable bifurcation in the electoral predictions of Senegalese and international observers. While those in the international community almost unanimously opined that Diouf would win the election, Senegalese were much more likely to predict a victory for the opposition. From a distance, the level of “malaise” in Senegal did not seem much greater than it had been before past elections. Moreover, opposition parties did not seem to have improved their level of penetration into the various regions by any significant measure. Thus, while Dakar and some of the urban areas might fall to the opposition, those in the countryside, it seemed, would still vote for the PS. Although many Senegalese correctly diagnosed the PS’s enfeebled grip on power, envisioning the collapse of the great party machine was difficult, nonetheless. Through a combination of fraud and machine politics, many believed that the PS would secure yet another electoral victory in the presidential competition of 2000. What accounts for the unexpected outcome?

The Election. Several factors explain Wade’s victory in the recent election. One important contributing factor to the electoral outcome was the high level of cooperation among the opposition parties. The winning coalition was a motley group comprised of parties representing socialist, Marxist, and liberal orientations. There may have been little convergence on matters of policy among members of the coalition, but they did agree on the imperative to remove the obstruction to democracy, incarnated in former President Abdou Diouf. Although eight candidates ran for the presidency, the degree of cooperation manifested by members of the opposition in this election was higher than in any other since the commencement of full multipartyism in 1981.

The *Coalition Alternance 2000* (CA), which was comprised of eight parties, was formed before the first round of the presidential election. The leaders of the opposition parties in the coalition decided that the only criterion for deciding who the coalition candidate for the presidential election should be was vote share in the past elections. The selection of the candidate was then a straightforward process as the vote share of Abdoulaye Wade, who had already contested four presidential elections, was substantially higher than those of any of the other potential candidates. A second coalition (FAL) of 21 parties formed before the second round of the election and included the parties of five of the six presidential contenders who were eliminated after the first round. Obtaining the support of the other first-round opposition candidates was crucial to Wade's victory in the second round.

For years, one of the greatest challenges for Wade and his supporters was to translate Wade's popularity in the streets into an electoral victory. The CA's campaign strategy, called the *Marche Bleu*, was enormously successful in creating a great deal of enthusiasm and momentum around Wade's candidature. In the *Marche Bleu*, Wade, some of the other CA political leaders and their entourage, traveled across the country, stopping to make campaign speeches and hold short campaign rallies in countless neighborhoods and communities. Music animated these dynamic rallies, and people were exhorted to obtain their voting cards and vote. In addition, these energetic meetings left people with the impression that Wade could actually win the election.

Many have pointed to the change in the voting age from 21 to 18 as an important factor in Wade's victory as the overwhelming preference among youth was for an

alternation in power. Although the voting age was lowered in 1992, the mobilization of young voters appeared to reach an all-time high in the most recent election.

The electoral reforms initiated in 1991 and 1992 under the coalition government, which included several members of the opposition, contributed significantly to the ability of the FAL candidate to achieve electoral victory. The interaction of the blossoming private press and explosions in communication and information technology (e.g., the spread of cellular phones, telephone and fax centers, and internet access) contributed to the transparency and fairness of the election and, thus, to Wade's victory.

Perhaps the question can be reformulated to ask why Diouf lost. One of the proximate and most obvious causes of Diouf's defeat was the defection of two highly ranked members of the PS and government. Diouf's former minister of interior, Djibo Ka, left the PS in 1997, taking several other high-ranking members of the PS with him, and set up a rival party. Diouf's former minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse, largely repeated this sequence of action in 1999. Diouf's campaign director observed three parties were sharing the same electorate in the first round of the election: Djibo Ka's *Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique* (URD) and Moustapha Niasse's *L'Alliance des Forces de Progrès* (AFP) both drew from the same group of voters as the PS. The underlying causes of the defections were the noxious factionalism and clan politics that plagued the PS.

Furthermore, as numerous commentators have noted, Diouf's campaign strategies were wrong-headed, given the political climate of the country. Not only did the glossy billboards and large-scale political meetings that comprised Diouf's campaign fail to

generate enthusiasm and support among the public, but they seemed to indicate just how out-of-touch Diouf was with the majority of the population.

Yet all of these reasons are ancillary to one: the economic stagnation and crisis brought about by distorted economic policy, corruption and structural adjustment. The economic crisis that really seized Senegal in the 1980s depleted the government of the resources needed to fulfill the demands of the numerous state clients (Boone 1991). Moreover, the economic crisis resulted in a deterioration of the living standards of the Senegalese people and intensified their dissatisfaction with the government

Despite the support of the leaders of some of the leftist parties, Wade's vote share changed very little between the election of 1993 and the first round of the presidential election of 2000. In 1993, Wade received 32% of the vote, while in 2000 he received 31.01, for a difference of 0.99%. What did change in the last elections was Diouf's level of support, which fell by 17.1% between the last two presidential elections. In 1993, Diouf received 58.4% of the vote while in the first round of the last election he received only 41.3% of the vote. A comparison between the first and second rounds of the presidential election is instructive. Wade obtained 31.01% of the vote, Diouf received 41.3%, while Ka and Niasse received 7.08% and 16.77%, respectively. However, while Diouf's score increased by only .21% between the first and second rounds of the election, Wade's increased by 27.48 percentage points, implying that Wade received nearly all of the 27.69% of the vote that went to the other first-round opposition candidates.

These electoral scores reflect the strong desire the people of Senegal had simply to have change. Despite his expressed anti-corruption stance, Diouf came to symbolize a political system driven by graft, corruption, inefficiency and incompetence. At a certain

point, popular opinion converged with the conviction among opposition leaders that in order for Senegal to move forward on many fronts, the de facto one-party rule by the PS had to come to an end. The high levels of voter turnout and engagement in the electoral processes of the day reflected this desire for change. At 62.23%, the voter turnout rate of the presidential election of 2000 constitutes a break in what seemed to some like a downward trend in voting turnout rates (e.g., Gellar 1997). The voter turnout rates in the presidential elections of 1983, 1988 and 1993 were 56.2%, 58.8% and 51.5%, respectively, while only 44% of the registered voters voted in the 1996 local elections and 39.28% of registered voters voted in the 1998 legislative. The high level of voter participation in the election of 2000 also indicated that people did have some confidence that change could occur via the ballot box.

Implications for Senegal's Democratic Future

Senegal has been able to boost of several characteristics thought favorable to democracy, and some of the events associated with the last election would seem to give rise to more optimism. The magnanimous behavior of both Wade and Diouf just after the elections reflects a general ethic of comity among Senegalese political elites and bodes well for Senegal's democratic future. Diouf made the first courteous move when he called Wade to congratulate him on his victory before the election results were even in. Some have speculated that Diouf's call was intentionally made in order to forestall attempts by other PS members to deprive the opposition of its victory by means of a coup or other extra-electoral measures. Whatever the case, this action seemed to prompt a virtuous circle of noble acts and gestures on the part of the election winner and loser.

Wade paid a brief visit to Diouf's mother, who received her son's replacement with the utmost of graciousness. Diouf demonstrated complete willingness to facilitate Wade's task of taking over as head of state. Wade asked Diouf to represent Senegal at the first European-African Summit in Cairo at the beginning of April. Finally, Wade granted Diouf and his entire family clemency for any wrongdoings committed during Diouf's tenure in office.

More and more, primary identities seem irrelevant to political action and organization in Senegal. In a continent rived by ethnic strife, as many have observed, Senegal has seen little mobilization along ethnic lines. While Djibo Ka's entrance onto the political scene in 1997 may have initially given rise to what appeared to be some ethnic voting, this tendency toward ethnic identification was not robust. Indeed, in the first round of the presidential elections, Djibo Ka, who is of Fulbe origin, failed to win majorities in numerous departments inhabited mainly by Pulaar-speaking peoples.

The ethnic and regional arithmetic applied to choosing ministers appears to have remained constant across the Diouf and Wade governments. While the language may seem a bit disconcerting, the attention paid to representing different groups in the government may well be one of the reasons Senegal has been free from spontaneous and continuous ethnic strife. (Although Beck's (1996) more pessimistic twist might be the most appropriate interpretation: patronage is more important than ethnicity in Senegal.)

The declining importance of religion in the electoral process is also notable. One obvious indicator of this decline is the reluctance marabouts now exhibit in assigning ndigels or commands on how their followers should vote. This hesitancy was obvious in the 1988 elections, and then again in the elections of 1993. Perhaps more significantly,

the marabouts' respective disciples generally did not follow the commands that were given. In the most recent election, Serigne Modou Kara lived to regret both his command to vote for Diouf and his prophecy of Diouf's victory, and Cheikh Tidiane Sy would have done better to remain silent on issue of the candidate to be chosen, as well. In addition, in presidential elections of 2000, those candidates with explicitly religious orientations and agendas captured only a miniscule proportion of the vote: the two candidates who presented religious platforms received a combined total of a mere 2.08% of the vote.

However, one should not be overly sanguine on this point. That religious political parties are not receiving very much support is probably unequivocally positive when viewed in terms of democracy in Senegal. The situation with the marabouts is slightly more ambiguous. Although it seems that individuals should make their own political decisions based on their preferences and interests, Villálon (1995) argues that the Sufi brotherhoods have fostered stability and democracy in Senegal by serving as a counterweight to the state (what Foley and Edwards 1996 call the Civil Society II argument). Cruise O'Brien (1975) also demonstrates how, in the past, following the political cues of the marabouts was rational. Perhaps now what we see is that marabouts are not giving commands that are consistent with the interests of their followers and, therefore, the followers are not following the commands. This development also seems positive for democracy.

Creevey (1985), however, points out some of the changes that differentiate the pre- and post-1980 period in terms of religious life. The "informed" Muslim elite is growing in Senegal. Different Arab countries are financing construction of mosques in Senegal, religious education, and students' education. Religious families in Senegal have

sent sons to be educated in North Africa and the Middle East who “come home vocally aware of the laxity of some Senegalese practices” (717). Creevey (1985) points to the start of a “Khoumeni-type purist” movement that is very critical of the marabouts and unorthodox religious practices. Villálon (1999) also notes the challenges that are being made to “the maraboutic model” by an inchoate reformist movement. This reformist movement is reflected in the striking increase in the number of female university students who are now taking the veil. In 1990, only a negligible number of students were wearing the veil, but in 1999, perhaps up to 10% of female students were doing so (Villálon 1999). In short, although the effects of “the maraboutic model” on development and democracy are equivocal, the maraboutic model might be preferable to other potential social and religious arrangements.

Many have claimed that most Senegalese people have a plethora of social relationships that tie them to others and are therefore not predisposed to act violently. Although Senegal has seen relatively little political violence in comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries, several events over the past fifteen years call that contention into question (Vengroff and Creevey 1997). While the alternation of power in Senegal was essentially bloodless, the rhetoric before the election certainly did not always reflect a conviction that elections should be the unique method of determining who governs. Hence, part of Senegal’s democratic achievement must be attributed to serendipity.

Challenges for Democracy: Particularism, Neopatrimonialism and Political Parties

Senegal’s political scene is not without forces that tend to impede the establishment of a fully democratic system of governance. Patrimonialism has proven to

be a resilient organizational form in Senegal as it has managed to “reinvent” itself across different historical periods and circumstances. In Senegal, the notion of transaction is embedded into each political action and affair. Although the ethnic and regional arithmetic applied to political representation serves a desirable end, perhaps what is disconcerting is the language of reward woven into discussions of regional/ethnic representation. People speak of areas receiving only so many ministers although Wade received a high proportion of the vote in that particular location. Indeed, members of groups that “delivered” a large number of votes to Wade feel that they deserve some type of recompense. Although the idea of exchange in politics is ubiquitous, the particularism, extreme self-interest and short time horizons surrounding people’s expectations and demands are striking in the Senegalese context. Personal relationships of all kinds are pursued with the hopes that they will offer some type of material pay-off.³⁰ The expansion and intensification of poverty due to the economic crisis has also served to inspire and reinforce the desire for immediate gratification among many Senegalese citizens. This individualistic and myopically instrumental behavior seems at odds with the solidarity and collective orientation so prevalent in Senegalese culture.

Although, in the past, Senegalese may have been indeed very instrumental in their political behavior, such instrumentalism was not nearly as short-term in nature as it is today. Clients developed relationships with potential patrons with the hopes of obtaining payoffs in the long-term. Thus, even in fundamentally unequal, hierarchical relationships, long-term reciprocity was the rule. The tendency to defer gratification

³⁰ On a more micro level, one incident I heard recounted in Dakar exemplifies this point very well. One American man apparently asked a Senegalese woman with whom he worked out on a date to have dinner and go to a movie. She replied that she could not go that evening but asked if he would give her the money he would have spent on her dinner and admission to see the movie.

generated some stability in the relationships and, therefore, voting behavior among people, especially in regions like the Fouta Toro in northern Senegal. Those in the new generation appear to have much more of a short-term orientation than those of the preceding generations.

The clash between individual interests and aspirations and party interests and aspirations has also been nearly ubiquitous across time and space. However, with the onslaught of this short-term orientation, the viability and meaningfulness of political parties in Senegal must be questioned. Defection from one party to another by party leaders as well as rank and file party members has become commonplace. These defections almost never seem motivated by issues of ideology or policy, but rather by individual interest-maximizing calculations. Moreover, because most party attachments are based on personal relationships, as soon as a leader leaves a party, s/he takes her/his base with her/him. As noted earlier, the defections of Niasse and Ka and the subsequent loss of support of their followers largely induced Diouf's defeat. The PS has experienced innumerable defections at all levels of the party since the defeat of Abdou Diouf.

Although the profundity of party attachments in Senegal has perhaps never been great, in the past, the vote shares captured by various parties remained fairly stable from one election to the other. However, as the political system has become more and more competitive, political behavior and attachments have become less stable. Pedersen's index of electoral volatility measures the net change in each party's seat or vote share from election to election.³¹ In this article, I look at vote share. The level of presidential electoral volatility between the 1983 and 1988 elections was 12.35%, while it climbed

³¹ Pedersen's index is calculated by summing the net changes in the percentage of seats (or votes) won or lost by all of the parties from election to election and dividing by two (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 6).

slowly to 14.35% for the next electoral period (i.e., between the 1988 and 1993 presidential elections). Presidential volatility then increased sharply to 25.65% in the last electoral period, that is between the 1993 and 2000 elections.

Legislative volatility is generally higher than presidential volatility, although not by a great deal. Legislative volatility for the first electoral period is 13.01%, 16.45% for the second, and 20.92% for the third (i.e., the volatility between the 1993 and 1998 elections). The average difference between political parties' legislative and presidential vote shares for the 1983, 1988, and 1993 elections is only 12.8%. However, the presidential/legislative difference in vote shares for the last electoral period (i.e., 1998/2000) is 30.28%! Clearly, in the past, party attachments did not manifest huge fluctuations from election to election. However, party identification is now in flux among party militants as well as the general public.

At the same time, the practice of power sharing has helped stimulate the proliferation of political parties. Political nobodies often establish a political party in the hope of becoming a representative or minister in the government. As opposed to generating cohesion, power-sharing, as practiced in Senegal, has given rise to party fragmentation and proliferation. Of course, the electoral system is also responsible for the high level of fragmentation and proliferation among parties.

The phenomenon of personal rather than party attachments has also contributed to party fractionalization and splintering. Party politics in Senegal seem relatively unaffected by considerations of ideology and political conviction. Not surprisingly, rank and file members of parties do not seem to have much of a comprehension of the platforms and policy orientations of the parties for which they militate. The perception a

person has of the head of the party largely determines his/her affectation toward the particular party. Furthermore, the prevalence of personal attachments within parties has given rise to factions and clan politics. During the PS's long tenure in power, receiving political rewards and payoffs was often not only dependent on whether one supported the PS, but also whether one had supported the correct *tendance* or party leader (Beck 1997). The issues of "*tendance*" not only continue to plague the PS, but have also been reborn in the AFP.

Although the instrumentalism and extreme particularism that seem to characterize people's political orientations may pose problems for the consolidation of democracy on the one hand, on the other hand, these forces seem to help suppress mobilization along more emotionally laden identities, such as ethnicity. Thus, there may be some type of a trade-off between this individualized instrumentalism and the importance with which ethnic and religious identities are imbued. According to Cruise O'Brien (1975), Senegal's communal harmony emanates from the existence of cross-cutting cleavages and "the framework of clan competition," and Schumacher (1975) largely echoes this point. In short, as others have noted (e.g., Cruise O'Brien 1975), the challenges and obstacles to the development of an orderly and viable nation-state Senegal has confronted have been considerable. During the 1990s, the world has seen several sub-Saharan African states descend into anarchy and horrific violence. That Senegal has emerged into the twenty-first century as nearly a full democracy with only one baleful communal conflict in the south is, indeed, no mean achievement.

Prospects for the Future: Consolidation or Politics as Usual

To be sure, the outcome of the election injected new vitality and energy into a lethargic political system and public. The rise in energy and excitement is perceptible to all of those able to witness the pre- and post-election periods in Senegal. In fact, in comparison to the US context, the level of political engagement among Senegalese during the campaign season was incredibly high. On the days of the first and second election rounds, finding someone without a portable radio glued to one ear was difficult in any urban area. People clearly believed that who occupied the position of president would make a difference in their lives. The Wade Government has appeared energetic and communicative, and the public seems appreciative of this government's break with the past.

Still, those more skeptical about the new government are quick to point out that alternation does not necessarily mean change. To put it somewhat banally, governing is no easy task, and the Wade government has already begun to find that fulfilling all of the pre-election promises is not easy. The press has, not surprisingly, been able to identify campaign promises that have an extremely low probability of being kept. For example, one pledge of the CA was the establishment of a parliamentary form of government. Yet, Wade quickly declared his intention to propose a semi-parliamentary form of government. Reducing the presidential term from seven years to five years was also a tenet of the CA. President Wade pursued this change but he also has expressed his intention to rest the full seven years of his term in office. One of the basic parts of the program for the *Coalition pour l'Alternance* (CA) was the dissolution of the senate. Only

after a great deal of equivocating did this change become incorporated in the new constitution.

The Wade government has been forthcoming on its promises to hold new elections. Three elections have already been held under the Wade Government: 1) the referendum on the elections in January 2001, 2) the legislative elections in April 2001, and 3) the municipal and local elections in 2001. Although the elections seemed to have been relatively free and fair, the outcomes lead one to question the extent to which Senegal is progressing toward consolidation. The alternation in power that was achieved in 2000 in many ways seemed like the final event needed for Senegal to be considered a democracy. However, the PDS swept the legislative elections winning nearly 75% of the seats. These results lead one to ask: Could Senegal be considered what van de Walle (2002) calls a “dominant executive” regime? In this type of regime, an alternation in executive power has been achieved but there is not an effective opposition. Perhaps the next set of elections will help us address this question.

Although some have faulted Wade for opting to maintain the National Election Organization (ONEL) as an observatory body to oversee the elections as opposed to establishing an independent electoral commission (CENI) to administer and oversee elections, others have acknowledged that ONEL did appear effective in the most recent presidential election. Given that ONEL’s power and autonomy is to be augmented, the public seems optimistic that ONEL will be able to ensure free and fair elections.

President Wade’s preoccupation with manifesting the full extent of his “Mourideness” has been disconcerting to many Senegalese who are not in the Mouride brotherhood and political observers alike. Subsequent to his election, President Wade

made several high profile trips to see “his marabout,” the Khalife Général of the Mourides, and even knelt before him. On one occasion, he made a special trip to Touba to receive prayers before a trip to France, and said that, had his marabout told him that it was an inauspicious moment to go to France, he would not have gone. The political public was probably much more comfortable with the very close relationship President Senghor, who was a Christian, had with the late Mouride Khalife Général Faliou Mbacke, who was perhaps the most powerful marabout after Amadu Bamba. Senghor attended the major Mouride holiday celebrations in Touba, and Faliou Mbacke is photographed in the seat of honor next to him at one of these ceremonies (in Behrman 1970). The relationship between President Senghor and Faliou Mbacke was clearly completely instrumental in nature and so it did not seem threatening to those who were not Mouride.

On the other hand, the rhetoric of the P.S. has scarcely indicated that its party leaders have undergone any democratic maturation or learning. Instead, their rhetoric indicates that not only do they see power as an end itself, but also that they do not even perceive a need to pretend otherwise. The idea that the government should be working for the general public good does not seem to have penetrated the consciousness of most party officers. For example, although many would say that Tanor Dieng, the general secretary of the PS and director of the Diouf presidential campaign, was, in the words of one PDS officer, “the engine that drove Diouf’s defeat,” he refuses to accept such responsibility. Demonstrating a complete lack of introspection, Dieng insists that he did his share in the elections by delivering the majority of votes to Diouf in his “fief.” The approach of the PS more generally has indicated a lack of reflection as party leaders have been occupied with no loftier a goal than identifying the strategic errors made in the

campaign so that victory can be achieved in the next competition. The PS leadership has refused to resign.

Senegal is at a critical point in its political life. After what seemed like years of torpidity, the Senegalese political sphere is in a state of rapid change and fluctuation. The auxiliary position of issues concerning policy and ideology in the political debates is not so surprising given the more basic institutional questions that are currently being treated in Senegal. According to Gellar (1995):

Skillful political leadership, the support of Senegal's Muslim leaders for the regime, the commitment to democratic values and traditions on the part of most of the Senegalese elite, the professionalism of the military, and a political culture that prefers to resolve conflicts through dialogue are all factors contributing to Senegal's long-standing political stability. (21)

The extent to which these forces are being reinforced or eroded is a critical question. The institutional questions addressed in the work surrounding the adoption of the new constitution are significant. Now, attention must be dedicated to the other forces that impinge on the prospects for the consolidation of democracy.

Djibo Ka's entrance into the political scene at the end of 1997 shattered Senegal's "bipolar" political world, with Abdou Diouf at one end and Abdoulaye Wade at the other. While Ka's political importance plummeted precipitously after his decision to support Diouf following the first round of the election, other political actors, such as Moustapha Niasse, have emerged as formidable political figures. A tripartite coalition led by the three of the poorest-performing candidates in the 2000 presidential election has formed with the goal of promoting honesty, integrity and transparency in government. This grouping is almost reminiscent of the progressive movement in the United States earlier in this century. In short, political life in Senegal is replete with action and activity.

Given that this new energy can be channeled toward the construction of a more fully democratic regime, Senegal's democratic future is promising.

Like all complex phenomena, the state in which African countries find themselves can be attributed to many causes. The effects of colonialism and international factors on the politics and political outcomes of Africa should not be ignored. But domestic factors also clearly play a prominent role in generating political, social and economic outcomes (Chazan et al. 1999). Much has been written about the "cleptocrats" and autocrats that have monopolized political power and drained state resources in countries across sub-Saharan Africa. The public in general and the peasants in particular have been the big losers in the postcolonial state. Yet, does the citizenry, who, in many cases, has suffered so much, not need to transform itself to some degree? Are people willing to accept a situation of "fair play," where they have no possibility of getting ahead through social connections? Will they accept a political leader who does not make grandiose displays of generosity as well as opulence? Are they willing to allow members of their social networks to do their jobs without pressuring them to deliver special benefits? Are people willing to do all that they can for themselves before relying on and fatiguing family members and members of their social network? In short, are citizens any less attached to clientelism than politicians? The idea that that leaders should be generous with their followers precedes colonialism and is thought to still influence the way some view politics, and colonialism has certainly reinforced this view. Although it may seem perverse to look in any way toward citizens when addressing the situations of countries like Senegal, in his political novel about the postcolonial West African state, *Anthills of the Savannah*, Chinua Achebe (1987) makes clear that any type of societal transformation

requires change at the level of the individual citizen, and *everyone* must be accountable for their actions.

In his description of the Senegalese political scene, Schumacher (1975) uses a quote from a one of President Senghor's speeches before the UPS National Council to capture the predicament faced by the political leaders trapped in the system they have helped create:

When I say "politics," you guess it, it is not, alas, a question of the etymological meaning of the word. It is not a question of the *art of governing the State for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations*. It is a question of politician politics: the struggles of clans—not even [ideological] tendencies—to place well oneself, one's relatives and one's clients in the *cursus honorum*, that is the race for preferments.³²

What makes political reform so difficult is that it is not rational for any one party to repudiate clientelism when others continue to engage in it. In order for well-intended political leaders to be able to reform the political system in Senegal, citizens have to manifest a certain level of "civicness." On the other hand, citizens would be even more severely exploited if they did not make forceful demands on political officials who were enriching themselves and their entourage with the state resources. It seems that citizens and politicians are trapped in some sort of existential prisoner's dilemma from which there is no exit.

Linda Beck (2001) offers an interesting (and, I would imagine, what most political scientists would say bizarre) interpretation of the Mouride merchants' refusal to pay taxes to develop the Mouride's holy city of Touba in 1997. According to Beck (2001), this refusal shows the revival of the "civic" (unfortunately, she does not define

³² Originally quoted in *Unité Africaine*, May 11, 1967.

the term in her article, so one can only assume what she means) since it shows citizens are trying to render the government accountable. It seems a more straight-forward interpretation is that this act shows an utter lack of civicness since the “citizens” of Touba rejected their responsibility to contribute to the public goods and services of which they were to be beneficiaries.³³ Clearly, if the consolidation of democracy is to occur in Senegal, citizens will need to manifest a degree of “civicness” in their political orientation.

From this discussion, it should be clear that the intentions of the political leaders are not all that matter. Achebe’s protagonist in *Anthills of the Savannah* probably speaks the truth when he observes, “Experience and intelligence warn us that man’s progress in freedom will be piecemeal, slow and undramatic” (1987, 90). By inspiring a more active political and civic orientation, NFE is thought to be one of the those forces that help drive this slow and mundane progress and, thus, it is critical to begin to assess the effects NFE actually has on participants’ political orientations.

³³ Beck (2001) also mentions that scholars like Cruise O’Brien were wrong for predicting that the Mouride merchant *talibes* were likely to be less obedient to their marabouts as they became more affluent. Since Beck interprets the merchants’ refusal to pay taxes as “an unprecedented challenge to the authority of the *Khalife-General* of Mouridism,” it seems that the event that constitutes the subject of her article vindicates Cruise O’Brien’s prediction.

Chapter 3

HISTORY OF THE SENEGALESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Formal education is more often than not responsible for the cultural dichotomy characteristic of these [African] countries, which have, on the one hand, a privileged, alienated, imitative culture and, on the other, the neglected, national, culture of the people. In most cases there is no contact between these two cultures, which take no notice of each other, although they live side by side. –Babacar Sine

Education has long been recognized as a requisite, if not the key, to elite status. Critical theorists, such as Bourdieu, have dedicated manifold pages to explicating the social reproduction function of education, and social scientists of all disciplines have emphasized the important role education plays in the socialization/culturation³⁴ process. Many of these scholars, however, have assumed that the educational system of interest is an outgrowth of that society in which it is embedded. How does the relationship between education and variables such as those just mentioned change when the educational system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates? Such is the question one must ask when problematizing the colonial educational systems of French-speaking West Africa. The quote from Sine would have us to believe that the rupture created by the formal education system between the schooled and unschooled is absolute and irreparable. Yet such a stark depiction of formal education and its effects does not seem to comport well with the complex and ambiguous reality it is meant to describe.

³⁴ Direnzo defines socialization as “ the process by which biologically human organisms are transformed into functionally human beings” and culturation as “ the transmission of the ‘way of life’ of the respective society” (1990, 26).

While the French prominently displayed their civilizing mission, many are extremely skeptical about the extent to which the French really set out to create “black Frenchmen.” Indeed, many would instead claim that the French intended for the formal educational system to produce loyal auxiliaries to implement the colonial imperative on the African masses. Still others would claim that the French colonialists were most interested in creating a productive work force. In short, identifying the goals of the French is a complex, ambiguous task.

The “Civilizing Mission”

Assimilation and Direct Rule

The French policy of direct rule and assimilation has been the subject of much discourse on colonialism, especially as it was configured in French West Africa. Many have pointed out that the British, who were in theory committed to indirect rule, ended up practicing direct rule in some places, while the French found themselves ruling through power structures already in place in some of their colonies. However, Crowder makes the important point that whatever these colonial powers did in practice, their stated goals were different. The French claimed the cultural and political assimilation of those colonized as their objective, while the British maintained that their goal was to render those colonized ready for self-government (1962, 1). Indeed, Conklin notes that the French actually raised their self-articulated mission to civilize the indigenous people in their colonies to official imperial doctrine. Implicit in this doctrine were the underlying beliefs of the superior nature of French culture and “the perfectability of mankind.” Hence, while members of the colonized population were unable to rule themselves, they could be transformed (1989, 1).

Creating an elite was seen as the first stage in the assimilation process (Mercier 1965, 167).

In his 1970 article, Clignet critiques the idea of assimilation in African colonial education, noting that assimilation is one possible outcome of colonial education. He offers accommodation as the other likely response. According to Clignet, assimilation is "...a process of generalisation, inward-oriented, incorporating new situations into a pre-existing framework or analysis of action" (1970, 426). According to Clignet, "...accommodation involves a process of specification. As such it is outward-oriented, modifying pre-existing schemes of analysis and action in order to maximize their fitness to for a new situation" (1970, 427). These two concepts have important implications both for the Africans and the colonizers. Assimilationist strategies on the part of the colonizers implies essentially transplanting metropolitan structures and modes of operation from the metropole to the African scene. Accommodation on the part of the colonizer would mean adopting practices and structures which differ from those of the metropole. For the Africans, assimilation involves "a generalisation of traditional cultural responses to stimuli presented in the educational context" (1970, 426). Accommodation, on the other hand, requires Africans to leave behind their traditional practices and ways of operating in order to adopt European ones. Clignet contends, "...an 'assimilationist' policy carried out successfully by European powers involves accommodation by Africans, while an 'accommodationalist' policy allows African assimilation of European practices" (1970, 426). While we may not expect the configuration of European/African interaction to be as clear-cut this, Clignet's model does provide a useful lens through which we can view colonial/African interaction in education. Yet the above discussion

applies mostly to questions of overt ideology held by the French colonialists. How, if at all, does the idea of 'assimilation' apply to colonial educational policy?

Goals of Colonial Education in A.O.F.

Sabatier identifies two principal goals for the colonial education system in French West Africa: 1) to spread the French language and a basic education suited to the African milieu, and 2) to create "a carefully limited number of indigenous auxiliaries whose loyalty as well as competence would be beyond question" (1978, 247). It is this latter goal that was most successfully met by the French, according to Sabatier. On the other hand, Sabatier claims that underneath all of the "rhetoric" of assimilation and the black Frenchman:

...the French never intended to create indigenous elites who might effectively compete with them, nor did they want Africans so Gallicized that they could not work effectively as mediators between French colonial civilization and their untutored compatriots. (1978, 248).

Sabatier claims that whatever the rhetoric wrapped up in the "civilizing mission," the primary goal of the French educational system was to supply the manpower needed for the operation of the colonial state as inexpensively and efficiently as possible (1978, 13). The ambiguity Sabatier identifies in the goals held by the French with respect to colonial education is reflected in ambiguous and conflicting educational policies.

According to Clignet, French educational policy vacillated between being assimilationist and accommodationist in nature. Upon the failure of teaching methods imported directly from France, some teachers tried to Africanize some of the curriculum. After World War II, however, in response to the complaints of West African elites about the inferior nature of colonial schools, the French colonialists adhered fairly closely to an

assimilationist policy so that education in the A.O.F. paralleled closely that of France (1970, 429). Yet this may still be too linear a depiction of French educational policy. Conklin takes the position that educational policies (among those of other domains) illustrate that the Government General did not see transforming Africans into Frenchmen as part of the civilizing mission (1989, 79). In fact, French ideology as manifested in education revealed a commitment to idea that Africans should evolve in African culture not French culture (81). I will examine key features and events in the evolution of colonial education in Senegal and the A.O.F. below.

The Roots of Public Education in Senegal

Education in the nineteenth century was largely supplied by missionaries. Faidherbe, who was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854, was especially dedicated to spreading “French civilization.” While ideally he may have wanted religious conversion to be part of the planned cultural colonization, he perceived that, given the overwhelming adherence to Islam, that would not be possible. Hence, he saw the French language as the primary median through which French civilization could be transmitted, particularly in the schools (de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981). He augmented the educational institutions in Senegal, creating a school for the sons of chiefs and secular schools (Crowder 1962, 12).

1841-1903³⁵ The Schools of the Ploermel Brothers and the Trading Post Schools

Much of the teaching was confided to the Ploermel Brothers who opened Catholic schools on Goree and in Dakar, Rufisque, and Ziguinchor. Not until 1899, however,

³⁵ The designation of this time period is drawn from Vandewiele (1983) who identifies this period as that of “Missionary and Trading-post Schools.”

was the curriculum brought in line with those of France (Vandewiele 1983, 508). According to de Lauture and Doria Husser, they taught between 25,000 and 30,000 students by 1903 (1981, 31). Conklin points out that the schools of the four Senegalese Communes (Goree, St. Louis, Dakar, and Rufisque) stand in stark contrast to the “poor educational record” held in the rest of French West Africa prior to 1903 (1989, 83). By 1903, the whole of the Christian population in the four communes had been educated (Conklin 1989, 84).

The educational system was secularized in 1901 and was incorporated into a wider system that was for all of the French West African Federation. The need for post-primary schooling was recognized and several such institutions were subsequently created between 1903 and 1913: L'Ecole Faidherbe, L'Ecole normale de St. Louis, L'Ecole Pinet-Laprade, and many other institutions.

Appointed as head of the federation in 1902, Ernest Roume, and those who came after him, stood in opposition to assimilationist policy. Curriculum was to mix Western technical know-how and French morality with African cultural references (Conklin 1989, 87). In the ten-year period from 1903 to 1913, around 200 new schools were created and the number of students jumped from 5,000 to between 11,000 and 12,000 (96). Figures from 1913-14 indicate that Senegal benefited disproportionately from colonial educational efforts: it had 48 schools, 4,500 students, and 100 teachers (from a Gouverneur General report cited in Conklin 1989, 96-7). Conklin notes that most of those educated did not go on to be efficient farmers but rather found employment in the administration or engaged in commerce (1989, 97).

The Period of Development: 1913 - 1960³⁶

According to Bouche, when Georges Hardy arrived in Dakar in 1912 as Inspector for French West African Education, he found “contested institutions which were struggling to get along” (1974, 7).³⁷ He wanted to invigorate the educational system. The governor at that time, William Ponty, redefined the objectives of public schools. According to him, the goal was not to create bureaucrats or workers, but to render one aware of the economic activities of the region. Thus, “village schools should transform without uprooting the inhabitants” (Ponty cited in de Lauture and Doria-Husser 1981, 72).³⁸ Moreover, Hardy started a educational bulletin, expanded the number of schools serving the interior, and tried to make the curriculum relevant to the lives of the students. His very attempts to render schooling more accessible and relevant led him to be criticized for “cheapening” the schools by other colonialists and elite Africans alike.

Still, as Kelly points out, the vast majority of the population of West Africa did not have access to schooling. By 1938, in Senegal, only 9.5 out of every 1,000 potential students went to school (AOF Bulletin statistics cited in Kelly 1986, 172). In 1947, only 12.4% of school age children went to school in Senegal. However, this rate was much higher than those for Guinea and what was formally called Soudan, which were 1.3% and 5% respectively (Crowder 1962, 4).

Further, although the curriculum may have come to include more material on Africa, such material did not necessarily create an authentically African experience for the students. Kelly critically assesses the way in which African society and culture is depicted in the curriculum. She contends that although indigenous institutions were not

³⁶ The designation of this time period comes from de Lauture and Doria-Husser, 1981.

³⁷ Translation is my own.

³⁸ Translation from French to English mine.

disparaged, most institutions were simply not mentioned. African societies were portrayed as though they were "...lacking in history, identity, and coherence" (1984, 535).

In a later article, Kelly makes a stronger argument regarding the marginality schooling generates on the part of the learner. Based on her study of interwar French Africa, Kelly argues that students learned that they were neither like uneducated Africans nor like the French. Hence, they were in a school culture apart from all others to which they were linked. Through the school texts, they learned to see themselves and their cultures "through the eyes of an outsider" (1986, 173).

Assessing the Results of Colonial Education

Formal Education and Social Stratification

According to Sabatier, under colonialism western education was the key to social mobility in the modern sphere of the A.O.F. (1978, 6). Wallerstein echoes this point, "The great medium of advancement was the educational system and the great goal of advancement was administrative work" (1965, 3). Wallerstein notes that the centralized nature of the educational system augmented its coherence. In the immediate pre-independence period, Mercier observes a trend toward less social mobility (1965, 170). He notes that social groupings are tending to become more crystallized. This trend is reflected in the stabilization of employment across generations. Mercier cites a survey implemented in urban Dakar that yielded results showing that of the respondents were largely in the same occupational categories as their fathers (1965, 171).

Mercier notes the emergence of a new, relatively small intellectual elite that can be differentiated from the former colonial elite. This more educated elite possessed greater professional expertise and was able to occupy positions hitherto only held by Europeans. Western education, especially that of a nontechnical type, did in fact appear to drive social stratification in the modern sector. In the words of Mercier, "...high prestige, more or less definitely acknowledged by the whole population, crystallizes around professions, functions or situations which are considered to be 'intellectual' –implying in fact a minimum of Western-type learning" (1965, 168).

Formal Education and Cultural Schisms

The results of Fatou Sow's 1966 study of 234 bureaucrats in the central administration of Senegal point to links between formal education, lifestyles and elite status. Sow also looks at the relationship between level of education and life style. She finds that there is a positive relationship between level of education and adoption of European ways of life. For example, the percentage of administrators claiming to wear only European or European and African clothes as opposed to just African clothes increases quite steadily with educational level. While a full 45% of those with only primary education claim to wear African clothes only, none of those with doctorates claim to do so (1972, 187). The same type of relationship exists for the manner in which one eats. Sow notes that it is those with the highest level of education that are the most influenced by western lifestyles. She also observes that level of instruction often corresponds to salaries levels (1972, 188). Hence, Sow's study indicates important relationships among education, life-style choices and elite status.

In fact, the formal educational system created a sort of hybrid social group that was composed neither of “black Frenchmen” nor those simply trying to imitate Frenchmen. It seems fairer to say that colonial schools introduced an extremely powerful means of social stratification onto the African scene. In retrospect, as others have alluded, the elite it created seems more like a semi-elite, always below the French in status. It seems as though embarking on the formal educational route was a socially and psychologically ambiguous experience.

As part of her multifaceted study of Dakar high school students in 1962, Francoise Flis-Zonabend surveyed 314 high school students. Flis-Zonabend finds that the chances of pursuing secondary school have a clear correlation with the residence of the respondent, the occupation of the respective head-of-household, and whether or not one belongs to the majority ethnic group (1968, 149). Flis-Zonabend did find there to be major ruptures between the schooled and unschooled and the schooled and their respective families. As evidence for this rupture, she points to the fact that only 48.1% of students’ fathers and 9.2% of their mothers even spoke French. More striking still is that 89.5% of students would never address their fathers in French and 96.5% would never speak in French to their mothers (1968, 86).

Mercier argues that because of the foreign nature of the colonial educational system, it did not promote the incorporation of an individual into “his group”, but rather created a rupture (1965, 167). According to him, the assimilationist policies of the French tended to widen the chasm between the indigenous elite and the “masses” who were still very attached to their traditional culture (1965, 168). In his words, “The real problems are those of the true integration of education into a developing social environment, its

adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the Senegalese people's conception of education" (1965, 169). Sabatier also notes that West African villagers tended to be indifferent or antagonistic to western education or those associated with it through the mid 1940s (1978, 7). To this extent, it seems that those obtaining diplomas in the formal educational system were put on a different (and mistrusted) trajectory than the vast majority of people.

Did education disrupt or reinforce traditional hierarchies? Clignet claims that initially a number of schools drew their student body from generally marginalized groups and, therefore, according those with formal education with some type of a formal position of employment altered the traditional hierarchies. He continues, "Further, although schooling did not necessarily destroy traditional networks, it changed both the direction and the content of obligations traditionally binding individuals to one another" (1970, 441). On the other hand, we know that the children of notables were also directed into educational institutions. The unsatisfactory and incomplete answer to this question at this stage appears to be that it did both.

The Legacy of the Colonial Educational Institution: A "Limited" Elite

In the words of Sylla, "At the time of the independence in 1960, Senegal inherited a modern educational system that had been in operation for a long time, and covered the entire national territory" (1993, 372). However, Sabatier's assessment of the colonial educational system is condemning:

...it can be argued that by limiting both the number and types of indigenous auxiliaries, as well as the work they were trained to do, the French also severely retarded the development of French West Africa, to the loss of the metropole as well as the colonies themselves (1978, 255).

The French's fear of creating dangerous uprooted types (*déracinés*) caused them create a sort of era of limits in the colonial educational system which they did by limiting the number of educational slots and limiting the content of the education provided Africans (Sabatier 1978, 247). Sabatier identifies four critical limitations in the French educational system, "...the numbers of students educated, in their curriculum and their diplomas, and in the careers that awaited graduates" (1978, 255).

On the one hand, the French wanted the formal educational system to serve as one of the primary means of acculturation. On the other hand, the colonialists wanted the educational system to prepare Africans for the type of work that was seen as appropriate for them to do. Perhaps more importantly, the French did not truly want full assimilation to take place. The ambiguity of the goals of the French is reflected in the ambiguous effects generated by the French educational system (Conklin 1989 also makes this point). Let's examine the balance sheet for colonial education as it looked around the time of independence. What did the French do? They succeeded in creating a group of Senegalese semi-elites who could act as mediators vis-à-vis the African masses and fill administrative positions. What did the French not do? They did not succeed in fully acculturating those schooled. They did not succeed in internalizing in the Senegalese what was to be their constrained role and inferior status in the colonial system. Finally, they did not succeed in providing an education that would render large numbers of Senegalese more efficient in the primary economic activities of the time. That is, formal education failed to contribute, to any significant degree, to the "*mis en valeur*" imperative of the time.³⁹

³⁹ According to Conklin (1989), *mis en valeur* became the "new priority" of the colonial administration in French West Africa in 1895 (12).

The Current Educational System in Senegal

Formal education in Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resemble the French school system. Ironically, much of the Senegalese population is incapable of using French as an effective means of communication. Dr. Fagerberg-Diallo notes that "...roughly 75% of the population in Senegal is not capable of using French as a language through which they have access to information, whether it be written or oral" (1993, 4). Currently, six years of primary schooling is officially compulsory for children of seven to 13 years of age. In fact, according to Africa South of the Sahara, 58% of those in this age group were enrolled in primary schools in 1992. The difference between primary and secondary school attendance rates is instructive, however. Secondary school, which students usually begin at age 13, is comprised of a four year and three year cycle. In 1992, only 16% of those in the eligible age group were enrolled in secondary school (1997, 834). Unfortunately, students leaving primary school may not have even fully developed and consolidated their literacy and numeracy skills. While the formal education system has created a Senegalese elite, nearly 70% of the population of Senegal does not possess basic literacy skills. Among women, 77% are not literate (Direction de l'Alphabetisation et de l'Education de Base 1995).

According to Rideout et al. (1997), Senegal is currently confronting "a staggering educational problem" (5). Senegal has adopted the goal that 75% of school-aged children will be enrolled in school. However, the number of school-aged children is expanding, Senegal cannot achieve that goal now, and it is doubtful that, given that Senegal already allocates 35% of its budget to education, Senegal will be able to allocate any additional resources to education. In addition, Rideout et al. (1997) identify many of the problems

associated with the nature of formal education aside from enrollment levels: “the quality of the education provided,” “the internal efficiency,” “the external efficiency,” and “the value and relevance of schooling” (5). Many have criticized formal education in Africa for being overly academic and not teaching the skills and subjects needed for people to be productive participants in the economy (e.g., Griffiths 1992). These issues have been especially salient in Senegal.

Nonformal education programs have emerged to fill the gaps left by the formal education system. These programs are conducted in African languages and usually informed by the culture and exigencies of the target populations. Most of these programs are administered by national or international nongovernmental organizations, although the Senegalese government has begun to become active in the nonformal education sector. As of 2001, around 1,322, 381 Senegalese people had been touched by a literacy program.⁴⁰ Most of the programs covered by this estimate are basically adult literacy programs.⁴¹ In other words, a reasonable estimate of the percentage of those 15 years of age and older who have had some type of NFE is about 25%. Based on estimates using the entire Senegalese population, around 15% of Senegalese have been involved with NFE.

In this study, I examine the relationship between formal education and political participation and attitudes in a context where the educational system of interest did not spring from the society in which it actually operates. I will also be able to explore

⁴⁰ This information was kindly provided by DAEB.

⁴¹ PAPA also has recently put in place a program intended to reach young people who have dropped out or never been a part of the educational system in the hopes of reintegrating them into the educational system. It is not clear whether some of these younger people are included in the estimate to which I just referred.

whether “authentic” forms of education (i.e., nonformal education conducted in national languages) affect civic/political participation differently than formal education.

The Four NFE Programs of Study

The study focuses on four NFE programs, each of which is characterized by attributes that make it especially interesting for examination and comparison.

PIP

The Programme Intégré de Podor (PIP), a Senegalese non-governmental organization (NGO), has had a strong presence in the Fouta Tooro, where it was established in 1975 as a measure to help counter the negative effects of the Sahelian drought. PIP is active in two departments in St. Louis: Podor and Matam. Although PIP’s activities initially centered on ameliorating physical infrastructure and hydraulics, its scope of activity has expanded to include work in the areas of health, agro-forestry, savings and credit, environmental protection, and literacy. Since it began working in the area of literacy in 1986, it has been responsible for training upwards of 37,537 people. PIP has worked almost exclusively in the area of Pulaar literacy (classes are taught in Pulaar in 96% of its centers) and has had the benefit of having its work supported by a zealous and dynamic Pulaar literacy movement.

The PIP methodology is comprised of three levels. In the first level, one masters writing, reading and very basic arithmetic. This part of the program lasts 240 hours. In the second level, one masters grammar, spelling and more advanced arithmetic. This phase is estimated to take 240 hours to complete. Most centers administer the first two phases of the program. In the third level, one engages in more advanced study of the

subjects mentioned and begins the study of different topical areas such as health, the environment, community management, etc. While some have claimed the PIP program can be done in six months, the duration of most classes seems to be two years.

Two NGOs that also work in the area of Pulaar literacy have served to strengthen PIP's performance in the field. ARED (Associates for Research and Education for Development) and CERFLA (*Centre d'Etudes pour la Recherche et la Formation en Langues Africaines*) are two related NGOs that work in areas related the Pulaar language in Senegal. PIP uses the very well respected basic literacy curriculum developed by ARED. ARED's curriculum modules range from modules on basic literacy and math skills to those on subjects pertaining to leadership, health, legal and environmental issues.⁴² ARED and now CERFLA have trained many of the PIP teachers. Part of this training covers how to use the participatory method of teaching.

Aside from decreasing the illiteracy rates in the Fouta and transmitting reading writing, and math skills, PIP has two rather interesting goals: 1) "reinforcing the cultural identity of the populations," and 2) "opening a window to the world."⁴³

Tostan

Tostan, an international NGO, has been a prominent actor in the area of nonformal education for the last ten years. During this time, Tostan has trained over

⁴² On the basis of the sales and testimonies in the field, it appears that ARED's basic literacy modules have filled what was a glaring dearth of quality literacy and post-literacy materials in national languages. The vast majority of the 70 teachers I interviewed in 1993 and 1996 found ARED's curriculum materials to be extraordinarily helpful. Moreover, most of the teachers I interviewed during the 1990s claimed that their students did not have a problem following and understanding the material found in these books. A few said that the grammar was a "a little dense." In a two year period (1994-1996), ARED sold 19,550 basic literacy books in Pulaar.

⁴³ Some of the information on PIP was gleaned from an assessment of *Union pour la Solidarité et l'Entraide* by Jose Ruijter (1997).

18,834 adult villagers in nine regions of Senegal. Working mostly in Wolof and Pulaar, Tostan has a solid curriculum and pedagogy. According its mission statement, Tostan is “focused on empowering villagers to take charge of their own development and participate fully in society.”⁴⁴ Tostan’s program is organized around “community development” themes. The basic Tostan program is comprised of six modules, each of which represents a thematic area such as problem solving, water, health, leadership or financial management. Each module lasts two months, and the timeline for the basic program is 24 months.⁴⁵ Tostan has also produced four continued education modules, including one on human rights. One of Tostan’s goals is to “promote self-development through the use of adapted educational materials.”

Indeed, the underlying themes of Tostan’s program include social transformation and mobilization. These themes are reflected in the program methodology. In Module 1, learners are introduced to problem-solving skills. A five-step problem-solving process is presented, beginning with “identifying and analyzing the problem” and ending with “implementing the solution” and “evaluating the results.” The problem-solving skills gleaned in Module 1 are reinforced throughout the remainder of the program, and it is fair to say that the “problem-solving” approach informs the entire program.

In the program documents, the importance of allowing debate and deliberation in the literacy classes is emphasized. Tostan uses “social mobilization activities” to buttress

⁴⁴ <http://www.tostan.org/mission.htm>

⁴⁵ Traditionally, the basic program took 18 months to complete. However, according to the most recent information I have received, the basic program now takes 24 months to complete.

that which is learned in the actual classes. Such activities include theater, poetry readings and debates. Tostan is a vibrant program that has received international attention.⁴⁶

PAPA and PAPF

Only recently has the Senegalese government become a notable force in the area of basic literacy and nonformal education. In 1993, the Senegalese government created a five-year action plan that included as one of its planks the reduction in the illiteracy rate by 5% each year. Two of the large-scale efforts initiated in the area of nonformal education include *Projet d'Appui au Plan d'Action en matière d'éducation non formelle* (PAPA) and *Projet Alphabétisation Priorité Femmes* (PAPF). PAPA covers the regions of Ziguinchor, Kaolack, Tambacounda, Thies, and Saint Louis, while PAPF covers the remaining five regions: Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda, Louga, and Dakar. Both PAPA and PAPF adhere to the strategy “*faire faire*.” That is, instead of administering literacy classes themselves, PAPA and PAPF use local “*opérateurs*” or organizations to implement the classes in the field and thereby promote civil society. Since it began to administer its programs in 1996, PAPA has trained more than 200,000 adults. Although PAPA has recently developed a model curriculum, basically the local organizations have total freedom in choosing the curriculum and content for the classes they administer. PAPA’s program follows two different timelines. Some classes meet five months a year for two years while others meet for only six months during one year. PAPF’s major objective is to train 135,000 people between fifteen and thirty-nine years of age of whom

⁴⁶ Much of this information is drawn from program reports and documents such as “Tostan News – Education: Program Methodology”, <http://www.tostan.org/news-edu2.htm>, “Breakthrough in Senegal: The Process That Ended Female Genital Cutting in 31 Villages” as well as personal interviews and observations.

75% should be women (PAPA's objective was to have classes of at least 65% women).

PAPF also offers models of ideal programs, but freedom is left to the local *opérateur* to establish the timeline and content of the program. Until recently, *opérateurs* have administered the program in 10 months, 12 months, or, at most, 18 months. PAPF is contemplating changing to a 24-month model.

Chapter 4

METHOD AND SAMPLE

The objective of the study is to assess the effects of nonformal education on civic participation and orientation in rural Senegal. A probability sample of 1484 Senegalese citizens was drawn in the regions of Thies, St. Louis, Diourbel, Louga and Kaolack. The design was intended to generate a sample that would allow one to assess the effects of four different nonformal education programs in the rural areas of the five regions mentioned above. The four programs are Tostan, PIP, PAPA, and PAPF. These five regions were selected because they have a fairly high concentration of literacy programs and also contain largely the same ethnolinguistic groups.

Sampling

Target Population

Senegalese citizens who were at least 18 years old and who lived in rural areas in the five regions of study constituted the target population.

Sample Design

A multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sample design was employed.

Selection Of Primary Sampling Units. The village constituted the primary sampling unit (PSU). Selection of PSUs was stratified by region and NFE program. Villages were selected with probability proportionate to size (PPS). In other words, the probability of selection associated with any particular village was exactly proportional to its share of the total population in its respective region.

Selection of control sampling units was administered at four levels:

1. PSU: village
2. starting points
3. households
4. individuals

Sampling Villages. One thousand four hundred and eighty four questionnaires were administered in 94 villages randomly selected with probability proportionate to size in St. Louis, Thies, Louga, Diourbel and Kaolack between the end of October 2000 and the beginning of April 2001. These villages included “treatment” villages (i.e., villages where nonformal education (NFE) programs had been conducted) and control villages.

Sampling Frame: Sampling Lists for NFE Villages by Region. Several sampling lists were created. Sampling lists which contained all of the PAPA villages in the relevant region were created for the regions of Thies, St. Louis, and Kaolack. Sampling lists of all of the Tostan villages were created for St. Louis, Thies, and Diourbel. Sampling lists containing PAPF villages were created for Louga and Diourbel. Finally, a sampling list of PIP villages was created for the Region of St. Louis. From these sampling lists, a predetermined number of villages were selected with probability proportionate to size in excel. “Control” lists that contained all of the villages in a region were also created for the five regions covered in the study. The control villages were also selected with probability proportionate to size, that is, with reference to the population size of a particular region.

The Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of the selected villages and respondents by region and NFE program.

Table 3: Number of Villages by Region and Program

	PAPA	PAPF	Tostan	PIP	Control	TOTALS
SL	4		10	15	6	35
Louga		6			5	11
Kaolack	5				5	10
Diourbel		4	2		5	11
Thies	6		12		9	27
	15	10	23	15	30	94

Table 4: Number of Respondents by Region and Program

	PAPA	PAPF	Tostan	PIP	Control in NFE Villages	Control in Non-NFE Villages	Totals
SL	48		120	180	116	96	560
Louga		72			24	61	157
Kaolack	60				20	79	159
Diourbel		48	24		24	80	176
Thies	72		144		72	144	432
Totals	180	120	288	180	256	460	1484

PIP and Tostan were important foci of study. Both of these programs employ a respected curriculum and attend to the issue of pedagogy. On the other hand, the philosophies behind the approaches differ, and thus useful comparisons can be drawn. I determined the number of villages to sample based on the concern of having enough respondents in different subgroups to be able to do effective subgroup analysis. In the case of Tostan, the number of villages selected per region also reflects the weight of Tostan's presence in the three regions.

To complete in my description of the sampling process, I should mention that compiling the sampling lists required several steps. Numerous visits were made to DAEB, PAPF, PAPA and Tostan. Lists of all of the villages that have completed literacy

programs with PIP, TOSTAN, PAPF, and PAPA were eventually obtained or constructed. Unfortunately, PAPA does not have a comprehensive list of the villages that have had the PAPA program. All of the IDEN Departmental representatives in the regions of interest were contacted and asked for this information. A short trip week was required to collect this information. Members of the research team and I were required to return to the majority of the offices at least once or use other follow-up measures. Moreover, we rarely simply received a list of villages, but instead were given numerous papers, letters, memos, among other things, with short lists of villages that had to be organized and aggregated⁴⁷. Most of the lists associated with the other organizations required some organization, aggregation and follow-up. In short, creating the sampling frame involved many steps, and, in a few cases, we could not be sure that our lists were completely exhaustive, although we took every step possible to ensure that they were as complete as possible.

Starting Points. PIP guides accompanied us to the PIP villages and a Tostan guide accompanied us to the Tostan villages.⁴⁸ In each NFE village, four “control” households were randomly selected through a walking pattern (*pas de sondage*). That is, a particular part of the village was selected randomly: north, south, east, west or center. In this part of the village, the supervisor or primary researcher identified a mosque, water

⁴⁷ In one case, the IDEN official left us in his office to search through masses of dusty, disorganized papers on the floor and shelves. Nonetheless, by the end of our investigation, we appeared to have compiled a relatively complete list of the PAPA villages in the department.

⁴⁸ Having Tostan and PIP guides with us facilitated our work by inspiring immediate cooperation and mobilization on the part of those in the village. They also helped us to locate some of the villages that were especially remote (it took us six hours to reach one village after we stayed over night in a town that we thought was very close to the relevant village). There is, however, no reason to believe that appearing with people from these organizations in anyway biased the responses to the questionnaire. The questions on the questionnaire in no way pertain to the NFE programs, and the initial presence of the guides would have in no way indicated that certain types of responses were more socially desirable than others. If anything, appearing with them seemed to create immediately an atmosphere of trust. Respondents appeared relaxed, and I would argue that having the guides only improved the quality of the interviewing process.

spigot, school or other landmark that could be used as a starting point. At the starting point, the first interviewer walked in the direction of the sun, the second interviewer walked in the opposite direction, the third proceeded at a right angle from the first and the fourth interviewer walked in the direction opposite of the third. The interviewers selected every third household on their right.

Households. The respondent was then randomly selected at the household level. In the NFE villages, a list of all those who had participated in the relevant NFE program was taken with the aid of the person/people in charge of the class in that village or someone else knowledgeable about the program. Twelve of those who had participated in the program were randomly drawn from that list.

In the non-NFE villages, sixteen households were randomly selected in one of two ways. Households were either selected via the walking pattern or, when the village did not contain a large number of households, a list of households was created with the help of a knowledgeable villager, usually the chief of the village. Sixteen households were then randomly selected from the list.

This method of selection was chosen to minimize threats to the validity of the study. On the one hand, had we chosen all of those in the “control” group⁴⁹ from the NFE villages, one could have argued that those who live in a village where there is an NFE village but did not participate in it are somehow different than those in the NFE program from the start. Hence, any differences between NFE and non-NFE respondents could be attributed to differences that preceded the NFE program. On the other hand, had we

⁴⁹ Although the term “control group” is usually used in experiments, I use the terms “control group” and “comparison group” interchangeably throughout the text to refer those who have not had any NFE through one of the four programs under study.

chosen all of our respondents from non-NFE villages, one could claim that differences in villages were responsible for the observed differences between “treatment” and “control” groups. In fact, both types of control respondents are found in the sample. In addition, the threats just mentioned seem minimal. Those non-NFE respondents coming from NFE villages often had plans to participate in a literacy class in the near future or simply did not join the original class because they were not in the village at the time the class began. In addition, Tostan explicitly trains program participants to share information gleaned in class with others in the village. This diffusion of messages militates against finding differences when respondents come from NFE villages. In the case of the non-NFE villages, many of the villages had requested classes. In other cases, classes were to begin nearly at the time of the survey.

In Chapter 7, the threats to the internal validity of the study are explicitly addressed.

Substitutions

Seven substitutions were made:

Kaolack. Ida Mmbayene was selected as a control village in the region of Kaolack.

Although it did not appear on any of the PAPA lists, upon arriving at Ida Mmbayene, the research team found that at least one member of nearly every household had participated in the PAPA literacy program. Dara Niassene was randomly selected as the substitution village.

Thies. Although Ndiouffene was on the list for PAPA Thies, the research team found that no PAPA class had been established in this village. Diass (Ndiass) was randomly selected with (PPS) as the substitution village.

St. Louis. Aere Lao was selected as a Tostan village. However, three days prior to that on which the research team was supposed to conduct work in Aere Lao, Tostan and the Senegalese government attempted to organize a discussion on female genital cutting (FGC) in that village. The discussion was not able to take place because several marabouts and their followers came to the discussion with weapons waiting to attack should anyone have dared to raise the issue of FGC. Our Tostan guide and members of the research team feared a hostile and potentially violent reception from the inhabitants of this village, so Aere Lao was substituted by Aram. Senobowal had not had a PIP class and was therefore substituted by Thianaff.

Diourbel Control. Tene was substituted by Mbadiane SAD Thiade and Kholkhotrane was substituted by Sessene. Although these villages were chosen as control villages, they both had actually been recipients of the PAPF program, and nearly every household contained a participant in the program. This situation arose because, despite all the work dedicated to assembling the sampling frame, the sampling lists were not exhaustive.

Louga. Because the marabout refused the research team access to this village, Merina Ndiaye was substituted by Coki Dakhar.

Characteristics Of The Sample

Seven hundred and nine respondents are classified as *not* having had NFE and constitute the “control” group (48% of the sample), while 774 respondents are classified

as having had NFE (52% of the sample) and constitute the treatment group. Included in the non-NFE, or “control” group, are 25 respondents who have had some type of nonformal education training. However, because the training was not supplied by one of our programs of interest, they cannot be included in the treatment group. The mean years of NFE among those with NFE is 2.4 years with a standard deviation of 1.6 years. The overall sample mean was 1.27 years with a standard deviation of 1.7 years. The most NFE any respondent reported having is 10 years.⁵⁰

Women comprise 72% of the sample. Women constitute an even larger percentage of those with NFE. As we can see in Table 3, 83% of the NFE respondents are women compared to only 60% in the non-NFE group. The overrepresentation of women among those with NFE is not difficult to explain given that the vast majority of the participants in the programs under study are women. PAPF has a rule that at least 75% of the NFE participants must be women, and many times over 90% of the NFE classes are comprised of women.

Table 5: Crosstabulation of Gender and NFE

Gender	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Male	40%	17%
Female	60	83
Totals	(709) 100%	(773)* 100%

⁵⁰ Collecting precise data on the amount of time spent in class was not easy. Although respondents were asked about each increment of time spent in class (i.e. respondents were asked about the number of months a year, weeks a month, days a week, and hours a day), the most accurate information respondents gave seemed to be about the years in class. If a class met for nine months out of the year for two years, for most respondents, they have had two years of NFE. Indeed, most classes did not meet every month of the year. Moreover, across all of the programs, respondents seemed to inflate the amount of time spent in class.

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.

In addition, about 40% of the respondents without NFE are men. This result is also not at all surprising. In many of the villages covered in our study, the 1988 census specifies that men comprise between about 46 to 49% of the villages. Desertification has rendered the one-time productive farmlands of Fouta Tooro of northern Senegal barren. In northern Senegal, it is well-known that a substantial proportion of working-age men leave their villages (and families) to find work. Many men will leave their homes for at least part of the year when they can find work in a particular sector. Therefore, these men are officially part of the household, but they are rarely in their home villages. Some of the villages in this area of Senegal are almost completely depopulated of working-age men. In fact, among the control group respondents who live in St. Louis, only 30% are men. Men represent 44% of the control group for the remainder of the sample.

The average age for the sample is 32 years. At around 13 years, the standard deviation is quite high. However, at 29 years with a standard deviation of 10 years, the mean age of NFE respondents was lower than that of non-NFE respondents. For the non-NFE group, the average age is 36 years with a rather high standard deviation of 15 years. In order to clarify the relationship between age and NFE, respondents were classified into one of the following categories, depending on their age: 1) 18 to 20 years, 2) 21 to 35 years, 3) 36 to 49 years, and 4) 50 years and older.

Table 6: Percentage of Respondents in Age Categories

Age	Frequency	Percent
18 to 20	333	22.62
21 to 35	657	44.63
35 to 49	307	20.86
50+	175	11.89
Total	1472	100

We can see from Table 6 that the modal category is 21 to 35 years of age as 45% of our sample falls into that category. It is important to see how NFE relates to these categories.

Table 7: Crosstabulation of Age Categories and NFE

Age Category	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
18 to 20	17%	28%
21 to 35	41	48
35 to 49	23	19
50+	19	5
Totals	(700) 100	(771)* 100

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.

As we can see from Table 7, those in the younger age categories are slightly overrepresented among the NFE respondents, while the opposite is the case for those from the category representing the oldest respondents. In fact, the distribution of age is not all surprising; younger people tend to participate in NFE programs at higher rates than older people do, and this reality is reflected in our sample.

How NFE is distributed across ethnolinguistic group is also important to examine.

Table 8: Crosstabulation of Ethnolinguistic Group and NFE

Ethnolinguistic Group	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Pulaar	34%	52%
Wolof	44	30
Serer	13	13
Other	8	5
Totals	(709) 100%	(774)* 100%

*Figure in parentheses is the base from which percentages are calculated.

As can be seen from Table 8, 52% of the respondents with NFE are Pulaar speakers. Pulaar speakers are highly represented in the sample because one of the programs of great interest, PIP, works almost exclusively among Pulaar speakers. Moreover, a large number of the Tostan participants in the regions of interest are Pulaar-speakers, and the other two programs have at least some classes in Pulaar villages. Pulaar-speakers have in many ways spearheaded the literacy movement in Senegal, and thus it is perhaps not surprising that they are highly represented in the sample. Indeed, since the ethnolinguistic composition of the control and treatment sampling lists was not the same and villages were drawn randomly, the distribution of respondents across ethno linguistic groups is not symmetrical. In bivariate analyses, I look at specific subgroups and therefore physically “control” for ethnicity and region in many analyses. In multivariate analyses, I control for ethnicity statistically.

Taking into account the proportion of respondents drawn from each region, the ethnolinguistic composition of the “comparison group” is very close to what one would expect, given the ethnolinguistic composition of the population of the five regions (note that this is not identical to the ethnic composition of all of Senegal).

Table 9: Expected Versus Actual Percentages of Ethnolinguistic Groups

Ethnolinguistic Group	Respondents without NFE	Percentage Expected Based on Composition of the Population
Pulaar	34%	30%
Wolof	44	49
Serer	13	15
Other	8	6
Totals	100%	100%

The “expected” percentage of Pulaar-speakers is just a little lower than the sample percentage and the “expected” percentage of Wolof-speakers is just a little higher due to the fact that I use the percentages for the overall regions although the sample is rural. In the case of the Region of St. Louis, this means that the city of St. Louis, which is in the Department of Dagana, is included in the statistics for the region. Only a minority of the residents of the city of St. Louis are Pulaar, and the Department of Dagana, which contains two additional urban zones, is only 25% Pulaar. In contrast, the two other mostly rural departments (Podor and Matam) in the Region of St. Louis, which are well represented in the sample, are both nearly 90% Pulaar. Nonetheless, the sample percentages and the population percentages are quite close, and were one to exclude the urban zones of Dagana, the differences would nearly completely disappear.

The same explanation regarding the asymmetry across ethnic groups is also relevant to the distribution of NFE respondents across regions.

Table 10: Crosstabulation of Region and NFE

Region	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Diourbel	15%	9%
Thies	30	28
St. Louis	29	46
Louga	12	9
Kaolack	14	8
Totals	(709) 100%	(774) 100%

As is clear from Table 10, the respondents from Saint Louis are “over-represented” in the treatment group. Such is the case because PIP works nearly exclusively in Saint Louis, Tostan’s program is very prominent there, and PAPA also operates in Saint Louis. The dynamic Pulaar literacy movement actually began among the Halpulaar in Mauritania, and then came to down to northern Senegal. Halpulaar from the north (e.g., the Region of St. Louis) have been the driving force for the movement in Senegal, and it is really the energy of the Pulaar literacy movement that has inspired the NFE in national languages movement in Senegal more generally.

In general, from all of the information available, the sample of NFE respondents appears very representative of the population from which it was drawn and the sample of the comparison respondents appears to match the population on salient characteristics as well.

Creating the Questionnaire

Development of a Draft of the Questionnaire

One of the first steps in this project was to develop a draft of the questionnaire that would be used to assess the relationship between education and civic and political participation. This step in the research project involved intensive work in constructing

questions and scales. Some of the questions were formulated based on my past experience with and knowledge of Senegal, while others were borrowed from questionnaires such as the Afrobarometer and World Values Survey. A few of the scales dealing with attitudes and dispositions were taken from *Measures of Social-Psychological Attitudes*. In all cases, I spent significant amounts of time modifying the questions so that they would be appropriate for the Senegalese context. I asked several survey experts to read the questionnaire and give me their feedback, and also solicited the advice of experts on Senegal. I then used mock interviews to see how the questionnaire flowed and modified it accordingly. Prior to the pretest, the questionnaire had 220 variables.

Translation of the Questionnaire into Pulaar, Wolof, and French

The questionnaire was translated into Pulaar, Wolof, and French. Many steps were taken to ensure the integrity, consistency and validity of the research instrument. The questionnaire was first translated into French from English. Because this is a critical translation (all of the national language questionnaires were translated from this translation), the French translation was given to an editor who used the English version to edit and correct this translation. The French translation was then backtranslated into English. The English backtranslation and the original English questionnaire were then compared. Inconsistencies between these versions were identified, and the French translation was then corrected and modified once again. The questionnaire was then translated into Pulaar and Wolof. The Wolof and Pulaar questionnaires were then given to two other translators so that they could be backtranslated into French.

Pretest

The pretest was successfully conducted in the suburbs of Dakar and villages of Thies during September 2000. The 39 pretest returns were carefully scrutinized and then entered into a database. Based on the results of the pretest, the questionnaire was modified.

The testing of these materials revealed that much of the language was overly sophisticated and inaccessible. Also, some of the vocabulary employed was region-specific. Numerous additional work sessions were scheduled with members of the research team so that the practical viability of these translations could be assessed and ameliorated. The translations of the questionnaires were edited and corrected with painstaking care. The research team received additional days of training after the pretest so that the lessons of the pretest could be disseminated among and assimilated by the members of the research team.

The data generated by the pretest was analyzed. Variances were checked, and most of the questions with low variances were excluded on the final questionnaire. The validity of the questions was assessed. Factor analysis was employed to check dimensionality and Cronbachs alphas were checked so that the internal reliability of the scales could be assessed. Certain questions were reformulated (i.e., categories were collapsed, question working was changed, etc.), as well as some of the scales. The pretest also allowed us to close a couple open-ended questions.

Development of the Research Team and Research Protocol

Eight interviewers were hired to administer the questionnaire. Altogether, the interviewers received seven days of training. Materials that would introduce the interviewers to the project and principles of survey research and instruct the interviewers on their role in the research process were developed and presented. Interviewers were trained on the use of acceptable probes and clarifications, and the list of standardized probes was translated into French, Wolof, and Pulaar for their use. The supervisor and interviewers learned how to draw a random sample of households at the village level and how to randomly select a respondent at the household level.

Several measures were taken to minimize interviewer error. Either the supervisor or primary researcher accompanied each team of interviewers to the research location. Interviews were observed and all returns were examined. I went over the returns, if there were any issues, and my notes from the interviewing process with the interviewers so that they would improve their performance with each round of interviews and “debriefing” sessions were held every evening or every other evening.

External Validity

It is likely that many of the findings of this study would be generalizable to Senegal as a whole and to other contexts, especially those in Africa. First, that part of the Senegalese population not included in the study resemble those in the study in many ways with regard to ethnicity, age, gender, and income, among other characteristics. Second, many of the patterns of relationships found in this study are very comprehensible

and are likely to be applicable to other contexts. Third, education does appear to have some sort of universal effects. That is, the findings of this study are consistent with the findings of qualitative studies and other quantitative studies on the subject. Fourth, many of the forces affecting those in the study, such as traditional culture, extended family structures, a rural setting, and a low QOL are applicable in other settings. On the other hand, I would expect certain relationships found in this study not to be applicable in urban settings, for example.

As noted earlier, a conservative estimate of the percentage of adults who have been involved with NFE in Senegal is 25%. NFE is in no way unique to Senegal. NFE programs are found in the majority of sub-Saharan African countries. NFE has been a significant force in countries across West Africa, and some attempts have been made to share information and strategies pertinent to NFE among practitioners in the different countries in this region. In addition, NFE programs are found all the way down to Africa's southern most tip. Although it is difficult to find any global estimates of the percentage of the population of people across sub-Saharan Africa who have been touched by NFE, some of the information on individual programs is instructive. In South Africa, NFE reaches about 30 percent of adults who are not functionally literate (Walters 1999).

Nonformal education or adult education programs are spread across the globe, and exist in significant numbers in the developing world and developed world alike. Because of the need to address low literacy rates in developing countries, NFE has gained a certain salience in such countries. Nonformal education has been a prominent force in Latin America since the 1970s (Liam 2001). Nonformal education has also become a presence in Asia. Subasi and Kehrberg (1998) report that one nongovernmental

organization, the United Mission to Nepal (UMN), began a district-wide program in Jajarkot District (population 120,000) in 1991/1992. Between the start of the program and 1996, women's literacy rate increased from between 2% and 8% to between 12% and 23%. Mens literacy rate went from between 12% to 32% to somewhere between 51% and 58%, according to Subasi and Kehrberg (1998). In short, the findings of this study have implications not only for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, but for countries across the globe.

Chapter 5

IN THE WORDS OF THE NFE PARTICIPANTS

Before examining the results of the quantitative analyses of the survey data, which focus on the effects of NFE on political behavior and attitudes, it is important to have an idea of some of the more general effects NFE has on villagers' orientations. In this chapter, I report the findings emanating from the various qualitative research methods I employed in order to establish and explicate the processes and mechanisms that underlie the relationship between NFE and the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of interest. In light of the qualitative nature of my approach in this chapter, I am primarily concerned with identifying and exploring the themes and constructs emanating from the interviews conducted. Where appropriate, I have tried to include as many direct quotes from respondents as possible because it is their experience that I am largely trying to capture in this section. The observations made in this chapter are based on several methods of inquiry.

Methods

Participant/Observation Study

In 1989/90, I spent eight months in one of the 50 villages in the Region of Kolda participating in the Culture of African Development (CAD) Pulaar literacy/NFE program. CAD was actually a precursor to Tostan. The program lasted nearly three years, from 1989-1992, and stood out as one of the lengthier literacy programs in the country of Senegal. I observed the dynamics of the literacy program as implemented in this village. This stage was a truly exploratory stage of my research strategy, as the subject I was to study was not well defined. Indeed, I was trying to view life and the NFE program through the eyes of the village participants which precluded my having any pre-

conceived notion of the issues on which to focus. However, during my stay, certain questions emerged which appeared to be the ones I should be asking.

In-Depth Interview with NFE Participants

During the summer of 1993, I conducted a survey of 11 out of 13 participants in one Pulaar NFE class in Guedewaye, a low-income suburb of Dakar. I also surveyed 32 PIP village literacy teachers who were being trained by ARED in the northern city of Ndoum. From these responses, it became clear that personal control and independence, personal efficacy, ethno-cultural pride, and developing a personal identity, among others, were all important themes for NFE participants.

In-depth Interviews, Groups Interviews, and Examination of Documents

The majority of the direct observations I make in this chapter are based on the fieldwork I conducted in the summer of 1996. As noted earlier, Associates for Research and Education for Development (ARED) has worked closely with PIP, supplying PIP's curriculum and training PIP's village teachers and trainers. Established in 1990, ARED is a not-for-profit organization working in the area of education and research in national languages, particularly Pulaar. ARED's multifarious programs and activities fall into three basic categories: 1) the editing and publishing of books, usually, in the Pulaar language; 2) the development of training modules or educational curriculum to be used by literacy programs throughout the nation of Senegal, and 3) the provision of trainings for literacy teachers. I will explore the perspectives of PIP teachers who have been trained in ARED teaching seminars and the perspectives of current and former

participants in PIP literacy courses that follow the ARED method. It is important to note that, in many cases, the “teachers” or “facilitators” did not have advanced literacy and numeracy skills and had themselves been participants in NFE literacy programs in the not too distant past. In the case of the teacher training observed at St. Louis, the majority of those participating had some, albeit, in many cases, only a little, French schooling.

Before going to the field (i.e., leaving the capital city of Dakar to go to the Fouta Tooro in northern Senegal), I examined ARED’s records and reports. I then conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews with several of ARED’s staff members and the director of the organization. Near the middle of July, 1996, I made my first trip to the field. I chose to visit sites located in St. Louis, Richard Toll, Ross Bethio, Dagana, Keur Momar Sarr and Linguere.⁵¹ During this time, I was able to conduct semi-structured interviews with twenty-four PIP literacy teachers in northern Senegal. Respondents were asked numerous questions meant to “get at” the effects of the teacher training seminars and the literacy classes many of the respondents teach. For example, teachers were asked how the seminar had influenced their teaching style, what they gleaned from the training program, and many other questions of this nature. Respondents were also asked about any changes in the behavior they observed among adult learners in the classes they taught (given that they were teaching) either during the course or once they completed the course. The questionnaire contained thirty-eight questions and was administered in a flexible manner in order to let respondents emphasize those areas that they perceived as

⁵¹ While I had the option to choose among a multitude of possible sites, I chose these six for various reasons. First, teacher training seminars were taking place at two of the sites at the time of my trip, and I wanted to observe at least part of these trainings. Second, one of these sites is known for having dynamic literacy campaigns. Third, these zones are known to differ on a range of socio-economic characteristics, and I felt that the diversity would help me “tease out” the impact of teacher trainings from the effects of other events and variables.

most important. I also interviewed several of those involved in coordination and administration of NFE literacy courses in St. Louis, Richard Toll, Dagana, and Ross Bethio.

In addition, I conducted fourteen unstructured group interviews in fourteen villages found in the Departments of Dagana, Richard Toll, Ross Bethio, and Ndioum. Several of these villages had had no literacy class. It was hoped that by visiting villages untouched by literacy campaigns, it would be possible to more accurately assess how literacy classes had affected communities that did have such programs.

Outcomes of Teacher Training

A recurring theme among respondents was that they had gained courage to teach from participating in the seminar. One respondent noted that he had been afraid to teach before being trained by ARED. However, after receiving the “foundation” from the training, he even had the “audacity” to teach for pay for a non-governmental organization. Yet this new-found confidence was not constrained to only the classroom. One respondent noted that the training had changed her demeanor in her marriage as she had become much more of an “advocate.” She also noted that the training allowed her to reinforce the education of her children.

To my surprise, perhaps one of the most repeated themes by the respondents was that the training seminars taught them how to better relate to other people, ranging from family members to those of different ethnic groups and ways of life. One respondent commented, “It helps us to have a new comportment. It shows how an individual should be in a group and in social and collective life.” Another spoke of developing “cultural

competence.” Numerous others spoke simply of learning how to live with others. One said that the training taught her to be open to everyone.

Financial Payoffs

Many of the teachers with whom I interacted spoke of the economic benefits that they had attained from their studies of Pulaar. For example, numerous teachers felt that the ARED training program was responsible for the fact that they had received paid positions as teachers. One respondent had commented that the training had improved his work in commerce. The responses of many respondents indicated that ARED training had helped them manage, financially and otherwise, a wide range of activities.

The Efficiency of Learning in Pulaar

The findings of the survey reveal that one year of NFE appears to have a stronger effect on the level on most civic and political behaviors than one year of French. Material from the interviews with NFE teachers and participants both support this finding and help explicate some of the reasons such is the case. Literacy teachers noted the massive efficiency gains that are gleaned by learning in Pulaar as opposed to French. When asked whether, if given a choice, they would have preferred to have been trained in Pulaar or French, not one responded French. A curious theme that emerged from the interviews was that French schooling was simply not sufficient. One respondent who had had six years of French schooling noted that despite her formal schooling, she was unable to “resolve her problems.” “I can do a lot, all of my business, everything, I can do with Pulaar.” Ironically, several respondents noted that studying Pulaar facilitated their learning process in French. Many participants commented on the fact that the training had allowed them to understand much of that which they had been exposed to in formal

schooling but had never fully grasped. Some noted that they were learning grammatical rules in Pulaar that they had never learned in French.⁵²

When asked about the language in which they thought non-literate people should be taught, the overwhelmingly majority of teachers thought that literacy classes should be in Pulaar. One teacher noted, “In Pulaar, you can learn to do mathematical computations in six months but in another language you can study for three years and learn nothing.” Another particularly poignant quote came from a literacy teacher of fourteen years: “[in French]...they wouldn’t have even understood the letter A.” One teacher put it well: “...[adult learners] do not know how to speak or write French. With Pulaar, at least they have 50%.” The “multiplier effects” associated with learning Pulaar were highlighted in one teacher’s story: “After one year [of studying Pulaar] I was able to teach, after four years, my students made rapid progress—I could not have done that in French.”⁵³

Out of the twenty-four teachers interviewed in July, 1996, nineteen were teaching basic literacy classes of their own at that time. Eleven out of the twenty-four teachers were women. The average class size for these teachers was around thirty-two, with women representing an overwhelming majority of the learners in most places.⁵⁴ Indeed, while women were often underrepresented among teachers in various zones, they were almost always significantly over-represented among students. For example, in the Zone of Richard Toll, only thirteen out of the forty-four teachers were women, whereas 790 out

⁵² Perhaps another indicator of the insufficiency of the French language as a medium of education and communication is the fact that a significant number of the female respondents with six or more years of formal education insisted on having an interpreter when speaking with me. One respondent who had ten years of formal education claimed that she could speak French “only a little.”

⁵³ Many of the neo-literate respondents echoed these points. One observed, “If I were to start to read French now, I wouldn’t lose all of the time that those who start immediately with French lose.”

⁵⁴ Linguere was a notable exception to this observation. Indeed, women were present in only small numbers in the classes observed in this zone. The explanation for this situation is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

of 1096 students were female. I will now explore the impacts participants or former participants in PIP literacy courses taught by ARED trained teachers who use the basic ARED literacy program felt literacy training had on their lives.

Empowerment Through Literacy

Efficacy and Control Over Self

Overall, the respondents seemed to feel empowered by their experience with literacy.

That is, in general, literacy training appeared to augment people's feelings that they could effectively handle the situations with which they were confronted in daily life. Many of the respondents' replies pertained to issues of personal efficacy and independence.

Numerous respondents noted that, after literacy training, they were able to read and write their own letters. Many respondents stressed that being able to do so allowed them to keep their secrets. While some might dismiss these oft-heard remarks as rather trivial in light of the magnitude of the problems facing villagers and their communities, one would be in error to do so. The sheer frequency with which respondents recounted this new found ability indicates that it represents something important to people. Indeed, being able to read and write one's own letters appears to be associated with the ideas of being able to protect one's interests and keep one's personal business to oneself, thereby maintaining control over self. Throughout all of the topics discussed with respondents who participated in a literacy program, the theme of no longer needing an intermediary was emphasized.

The idea of guarding one's interests was also reflected in many of the examples pertaining to economic transactions. One woman gave the example of keeping a record

of what one owes to a shop owner. She notes that if one writes down what she has paid and what she owes, it is impossible for the shop owner to make her pay more than she actually owes. The theme of gaining courage was also echoed by neo-literates.

Self and Group Awareness

Many respondents expressed the idea that literacy training had allowed them to explore and get to know themselves. They also spoke of being generally more aware and conscious than they had been previous to their literacy training. Interestingly, the metaphor of sleeping was frequently used by many when asked about the impact of literacy. In describing the effects of literacy on villagers, one respondent commented, “They are now more awake. They are able to document things, they are aware of everything that is happening in the world. The others [non-literates] are sleeping.” Another respondent referred to the individual responsibility required in the learning process in rather interesting terms: “Knowledge is not hereditary, you have to learn it. Also, you can’t borrow it.”

Yet at the same time that the idea of getting to know oneself was stressed, respondents also strongly emphasized that they had become more social as a result of the training. Many of the same themes regarding changes in demeanor and an openness to the outside emerged in these interviews just as they had in those with literacy teachers. One theme highlighted in the interviews was the idea that literacy allowed one to share more effectively. One respondent noted that one could share one’s ideas with another even when one was not present through the written word. Another respondent noted that

a great deal of knowledge among the Fulbe had been lost because it was not written down. Hence the Fulbe adage, “When an old person dies it is like a library that burns.” Ong captures the dialectic between the heightened sense of self generated by participation in the literacy program and the heightened sense of sociability. He writes, “Writing introduces division and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It intensifies the sense of self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness raising” (1991, 179). The process by which literacy leads to such concepts as autonomy and empowerment is much debated. According to Oxenham:

The two preceding paragraphs imply that the technology of literacy has served not simply the intended practical purposes of storing and communicating information. Vastly more important, it seems to have enabled the growth and development of the human reason and its power to combine different sources of information to produce even more understanding and inspiration. It has been potent, too, in the growth of self-consciousness and self-understanding (1980, 43).

One respondent who had no French education and only a year of Pulaar literacy training noted echoed many of Oxenham’s and Ong’s contentions regarding literacy. He observed:

The fact that I have pursued literacy has helped me in my work. It has given me courage to go all the way with things, to be more rigorous and curious. I used to do things by routine. Before, I couldn’t give the dates of your visit. I didn’t have memory, precision or observation. Writing has been the most important thing because I can fix firmly on something.

However, Oxenham and others are forced to admit the context in which learning occurs often has a substantial effect on the type of cognitive and psychological processes that take place on the part of the learner. Indeed, Street is critical of the autonomous model of education and claims that it is difficult to distinguish between the positive

effects resulting from literacy and those resulting from a particular social and cultural experience (1995, 22-23).

Daily Tasks

The respondents conceptualized literacy as helping them in performing daily tasks in countless ways. Perhaps the mundane nature of some of the examples enumerated by respondents indicates the fact that reading and writing has been integrated into nearly every aspect of people's daily lives. For example, one woman noted that when she is cooking and finds that she lacks a key ingredient, she sends a note with a child who can then procure the missing item.

Changes in the Community Due to Literacy

Literacy training has not only worked at the micro-level, rendering individuals more efficacious and independent, but has also had a macro-level effect on the community. According to those interviewed, the changes that have taken place in communities with literacy programs are substantial, and these changes are attributed directly to the literacy programs. One of the ARP officials commented that it is easier to address and solve social problems in communities that have had a literacy program because it is easier to talk to someone who is literate than someone who is not. "There is a difference. In villages that have had a literacy class, all that you bring, people understand; in other villages, you have to explain to make people understand."

Efficacy. The theme of being able to manage or better manage development projects due to literacy skills was one repeated throughout the interviews. Respondents in Ross Bethio brought up the example of agriculture. They recounted that before becoming

literate in Pulaar, SAYED⁵⁵ had to do all of the administration and paperwork for the 448 members of the association working in the domain of agriculture. However, now that there has been a literacy class in this community, the members of the association are able to do all of the administrative tasks by themselves and thus the association has become self-managed. Respondents in a group interview in the zone of Dagana noted that once they gained literacy skills they were able to deal with donors and banks directly, whereas before they had to use the government as an intermediary.

The president of a women's association in Ross Bethio notes that the association "had problems" before its members had participated in a literacy program. However, now that they have participated, the members are able to effectively record all credits and debts. Moreover, she claims, they are able to write projects for donors themselves now. In addition, their literacy skills have facilitated their ability to organize and call meetings.

Further, many respondents noted that their literacy skills helped them be more effective in work they did before literacy training. The idea of being able to be precise in one's activities was often repeated by respondents. In fact, although they did not call it by such, respondents essentially described doing their own micro cost-benefit analyses. Several of those interviewed said that they would calculate the costs of purchasing some type of input, the benefits they expected to obtain from purchasing the input, and then make a decision on whether to go ahead with the purchase based on the expected profits or losses associated with doing so. Others noted that they would be able to read books that would teach them how to do their work more effectively. For example, one person noted that they could now read books on how to take care of animals.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ SAYED is a Senegalese parastatal working in the area of agriculture.

⁵⁶ One of the books published and sold by ARED addresses this issue precisely.

Sociability. Other important changes in the level of sociability among NFE participants have also been reported in other reports and evaluations. In the Ferlo area of Senegal, men initially brought arms (e.g., machetes) to the NFE classes. (Based on my knowledge, the Ferlo is the only area of Senegal where this behavior occurs). The village “facilitators” and program participants reported that men have stopped bringing arms to class, largely because of the positive socialization effects emanating from the NFE experience.⁵⁷

Economic Benefits and Incentives

One theme that ran through the interviews was that becoming literate was critical for advancement. One respondent commented that to be successful in economic life, it is absolutely necessary to be literate. Hence, financial incentives were seen as motivating people to join literacy programs.

Many of those who participated in literacy programs listed the new types of activities in which they are able to engage now that they have gained basic literacy skills. For example, in a group interview in a small Fulbe village in Keur Momar Sarr, those being interviewed noted that they were able to participate in tie-dying, animal husbandry and sowing projects because of their newly acquired skills. These skills allowed them to manage projects that they could not manage before obtaining literacy skills.

Many respondents exhibit at least a degree (and some, quite a bit) of altruism. While I in no way want to diminish the competitive nature of economic relations or the strong economic incentives driving many to pursue their education in Pulaar, it is also important to point out that many literacy teachers are not paid. When asked why they teach, several of those interviewed responded that they wanted to help their family

⁵⁷ Personal communication from Mamadou Ly, member of ARED.

members, friends, and/or those in the community reach the same level of knowledge and fulfillment that they had reached through the study of Pulaar.

Ethno/Cultural Identity and Advancement

However, advancement was not limited to the individual. Many teachers and class participants alike responded that they wanted to “push the Pulaar language forward” or develop the Pulaar language. Moreover, many respondents noted that they benefited from NFE because they were able to “master Pulaar” or “master their maternal language” through the training that they received. In fact, the idea of bettering oneself and further developing one’s language were intertwined for some. One respondent contended, “To respect yourself, you must respect your language; a language drives a culture. Therefore, when one doesn’t know one’s language, one is not cultivated.” One neo-literate man in the northern region of Senegal echoed this point of not being able to respect oneself without fully knowing one’s language (i.e., reading and writing as well as speaking a language), but added the point that when one does not respect oneself, one cannot respect another. Further, others expressed the notion that a country cannot advance unless the people know their own language.

The Impact of Literacy on Women

While the illiteracy rate of Senegal is 68%, women comprise a disproportionately large part of that group. Indeed, the rate of female illiteracy is 77% while that for men is 59%.⁵⁸ Given the extent to which females are overrepresented in these nonformal

⁵⁸ These rates were reported in the *Bilan de la Campagne Nationale d’Alphabetisation 1995*, which is put out by the Direction de l’Alphabetisation et l’Education de Base of the Senegalese government.

literacy classes due to limited access to formal schooling, it is important to assess the impact of Pulaar literacy specifically on women. When asked about the impact of literacy training on women in particular, the president of a women's association with a substantial membership listed a plethora of differences she perceived between literate women and their non-literate counterparts. For example, she found the women who had participated in a literacy program to be more aware of that going on in the world around them and to be more likely to speak in meetings. Moreover, she found that literate women run their homes differently than those who are not literate. Those who are literate tend to take their children to the clinic more often than those who are not. They also have a greater proclivity to actively teach their children things. Finally, the president was convinced that those who were literate are, on average, more likely to engage in family planning than those who are not literate. In fact, this respondent's observations are consistent with the findings of some qualitative studies on nonformal education programs (e.g., see Comings, Smith and Shretha 1994).

Further, these observations are corroborated by the statements of other respondents. One respondent commented on the fact that women of the village could now identify illnesses and follow the appropriate procedures to respond to the illnesses whereas they could not do so before their literacy training. The attitudinal change in women generated by the women's participation in literacy class seemed to mediate between literacy and some of the behavior changes noted above. As noted elsewhere, many women themselves felt that their demeanor had changed as a result of their participation in a literacy class. One woman commented that becoming literate had

helped her get over her shame when speaking in front of others. Other women noted that they had gained confidence from participating in a literacy program.

The testimonies of students and the theoretical literature suggest that the group experience associated with nonformal education helps to generate many of the positive outcomes associated with these programs.

Implications

NFE may well serve a critical mission in the development process in Senegal. According to Ake, the current way of conceptualizing development "...discourages any belief in the integrity and the validity of African societies and offers the notion that African societies can find validity only in their transformation, that is in their total self-alienation" (1996, 16). Indeed, this conceptualization of development has been an underlying assumption of many the development programs and formal educational systems in African countries. It is this very chasm between the modern/western and the traditional/African that NFE seeks to diminish. For example, organizations such as ARED claim to be dedicated to creating a dialogue between these two ends of the modern/traditional continuum. Indeed, the testimonies of participants in both teacher training seminars and literacy classes indicate that involvement in these programs increases not only participants' feelings of individual efficacy, but also their cultural pride. Is the type of cultural pride it instills is a healthy one? Those trained in literacy appear to not only have an enhanced sense of their cultural identity, but also an increased openness to those from the exterior and new ways of doing things. This issue demands more examination.

The many personal stories of those who had participated in teacher training programs and basic literacy classes seem to lead to the following conclusions. Participation in trainings and classes appears to have enriched the lives of respondents by rendering them more efficacious, empowered, independent, and confident. It seems that involvement in these programs has generally inspired respondents to participate in social life more fully. Moreover, on the basis of the stories offered by those interviewed, it appears that literacy programs have provided villagers with the means to constantly increase their knowledge on issues pertinent to their lives as they can now read about such issues. Furthermore, perhaps one can draw the conclusion that both the teacher trainings and the basic literacy trainings transform participants' relationships with other people and institutions from being characterized by passive dependence to constructive interdependence.

Chapter 6

NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS

In the qualitative interviews, respondents enthusiastically described the many ways in which NFE had changed them and their lives. Now, we must assess whether NFE does, in fact, have the effects it is claimed to have. Are those villagers with NFE more likely to be active in the community, attending village meetings, occupying positions of leadership in local associations, and cooperating with others to solve the problems, than villagers without NFE? Are those with NFE more likely to be politically active than those without NFE? Does NFE promote the adoption of democratic, progressive attitudes? Does NFE facilitate or hinder the development of interpersonal trust? In this chapter, the results of the bivariate analyses are examined and assessed. The crosstabulations allow us to obtain an idea of the degree to which those with NFE and those without NFE really differ in terms of political behavior and attitudes. The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in the next chapter.

In these bivariate analyses⁵⁹, those who have participated in one of the four programs of interest (had NFE) are compared with those who have not had NFE through one of the four programs. The bivariate tests are actually quite conservative in some ways. Those with less than a year of NFE are still included in the “treatment” group. Moreover, those respondents with no more than a year of literacy training comprise 28% of the treatment group.

⁵⁹ The 0.05 level of significance will serve as the benchmark of significance.

Several comparisons are made. First, the differences between those with NFE and those without NFE are examined for all respondents (see Table 19, which presents of the summary of results). Second, since many programs target women, the effects of NFE on women are examined specifically (see Table 20 for the summary of results for women respondents). The effects of the individual programs are also examined in the bivariate analyses (see the tables summarizing all of the results for the individual programs in Appendix A). As noted earlier, in the bivariate analyses, I look at specific subgroups and therefore physically “control” for ethnicity and region in many analyses. In multivariate analyses, I will control for ethnicity and other characteristics statistically. For the specific programs, the objective is to compare those who have participated in the program with those who reasonably could have, but did not. That is, I want to compare those who have participated in the program with those who resemble them in terms of key characteristics even in the bivariate analyses.⁶⁰ Therefore, I look at the following subgroups:

- 1) The analyses involving PIP are confined to Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. I also look simply at the subgroup of women Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis.
- 2) In the case of Tostan, I look specifically at the
 - a. subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies since the vast majority of participants in the Tostan program are female and since all of the participants in these two regions were trained in Wolof.
 - b. I also look at the effects of Tostan training on the subgroup of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. In this case, the analyses are not restricted to just women.

⁶⁰ It should also be noted that in the analyses individual programs and subgroups, only those who had the specific program being examined and those with no NFE at all were included. Hence, those who had NFE from a program other than one of the four were excluded.

- 3) In the case of PAPF, the analyses involved women in the regions where PAPF is active: Louga and Diourbel.
- 4) When looking at PAPA, the analyses are restricted to women in the regions where PAPA is active: St. Louis, Thies, and Kaolack.⁶¹

While the intention is to render the comparison groups as similar as possible, in some cases the sizes of the subgroups are relatively small and, therefore, relationships are more difficult to detect.

Civic Engagement

Community Participation

It was hypothesized that those villagers in the regions of study with NFE would exhibit higher levels of community participation than their counterparts without NFE. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of the bivariate analyses. One indicator of community participation is whether people have ever cooperated to solve a community problem. The chi square test of independence is used to determine whether relationships are statistically significant in these bivariate analyses. The percentage difference of those reporting to have cooperated to solve a community problem between those with NFE and those without is large and statistically significant ($p = .000$) (see Table 19). Although only 38% of those without NFE report having cooperated to solve a community problem, 58% of those with nonformal education report having done so. The relationship remains statistically significant when the analysis is restricted to women (see Table 20): while only 35% of women without NFE report having cooperated, 56% of women with NFE report having done so. This relationship between NFE and cooperation

⁶¹ The overwhelming majority of participants in both PAPA and PAPF are women. Indeed, 87 percent of the respondents who have had PAPF training are women and 92 percent of those with PAPA training are women.

to solve a community problem is replicated across all four of the programs and all of the subgroups of interest (see tables in Appendix A). Among women in Diourbel and Thies, the difference in the percentage of those reporting having cooperated between the group with Tostan training and the group without Tostan training is thirty percentage points (see Table A.4).

Cooperation is a key variable since it is through collective action that the general welfare of communities can be pursued, and cooperation is a core aspect of “social capital.” I, therefore, carefully interrogate this finding. This finding is consistent the testimonies of NFE participants who claim to that NFE has led villagers to engage with each other in addressing the problems that confront the community. In addition, Kuenzi (1997) found a strong, positive relationship between NFE and cooperating to solve a community problem among Pulaar-speakers in northern Senegal in a small pilot study. It could be the case, however, that people consider being involved in NFE a way to confront the problem of illiteracy in the village and respond to the question with that in mind. This would mean that NFE was not actually affecting any behavior outside of being engaged in NFE. Respondents were asked to describe the nature of the problem they had addressed and were allowed to give up to three examples. Twenty-five respondents report that they helped to address the problem of illiteracy, but only one respondent gave this as her sole example. In fact, the most commonly cited problem respondents reported cooperating to address was that pertaining to keeping the village clean. The second most commonly cited problem was addressing issues surrounding water (e.g., digging wells, etc.). Respondents also reported addressing problems related

to development more generally, health (e.g., building a health hut), contributing to a group vegetable garden, building mosques, among other “problems.”

Although the relationship between having NFE and responding affirmatively to the cooperation question seems strong and consistent, it could be the case that more active people tend to get involved in NFE. Under this scenario, those with nonformal education exhibited high levels of community participation before ever becoming involved in a NFE program. In order to assess the extent to which “selection” poses a threat to the findings, I examine the level of cooperation at different levels of NFE.

The first level of NFE is comprised of those who have had one year or less of nonformal education (but more than zero years). It is worth noting that this group contains 33 respondents who have had less than six months of NFE. The second group contains those who have had no more than two years but more than one (in reality, all of those in this group have had two years of NFE). The third group contains those who have had no more than three years but more than two years. And, finally, the fourth group is comprised of those who have had more than three years of NFE. Below is a cross tabulation of the cooperation responses and level of literacy.

Table 11: Crosstabulation of Cooperating to Solve Community Problem and Level of NFE

Reported Cooperating with Others	0 years of NFE	0<NFE≤1	1<NFE≤2	2<NFE≤3	Over 3 years of NFE
No	61%	58%	38%	34%	33%
Yes	39	42	62	66	67
Totals	(706)* 100	(216) 100	(293) 100	(122) 100	(143) 100

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

The idea that selection and not NFE may be responsible for the high level of cooperation among NFE respondents is not supported by this crosstabulation. Were selection responsible for the effects that are attributing to NFE, we would expect those in the first level of NFE to have a similar rate of cooperation as those in the other groups. In fact, we see in Table 11 that the rate of cooperation of those with little NFE is not a lot greater than that of those without any NFE. The percentage of those reporting cooperation increases by 20% when one moves to the level of two years of NFE, and increases slightly as we move to the next two levels of NFE. In this case, two years of NFE seems like a threshold.

Membership in a community organization is also an indicator of community participation. Those respondents with NFE are more likely to be members of community organizations than are those without NFE. Indeed, there is a statistically significant relationship between having NFE and reporting that one is a member of a community organization ($p = .000$). Eighty-six percent of those with NFE report belonging to a community organization while only 61% of those in the “control” group (i.e., those without NFE) do. The relationship is still statistically significant when the analysis is restricted to only women ($p = .000$). Each individual NFE program registers a significant

relationship with membership in a community organization, as those in each of the programs are more likely to belong to a community organization than their counterparts in the control group.

Information was taken on up to three organizations in which the respondent reported being a member. With reference to the first organization (1097 respondents report membership in at least one organization, compared to 395 and 113 reporting membership in two organizations and three organizations, respectively, so it seems reasonable to look at just the first set of responses) to which people claimed membership, the preponderance report membership in a village development association (31%). The second most popular type of organization is the woman's credit circle (23%). From there, the membership is thinly spread across different types of organizations: youth groups, religious groups, *Groupeement d'Interet Economique* (GIE), official women's groups that are associated with *Federation Nationale des Groupements Feminins*, among others.

Although the testimonies of those involved in the NFE sector support the finding that NFE renders one more likely to be member in a community organization, I wondered if maybe people considered PIP or Tostan classes to be "village development organizations" and therefore responded yes to the membership question. This seems unlikely because, when asked about solving a community problem, only twenty-five respondents mentioned anything about NFE and only one respondent mentioned exclusively NFE. Still, I compare the distribution of responses between the NFE and non-NFE respondents who report associational membership. Among the NFE respondents claiming to be members of an organization, 31% say that they are in a village

development organization. Among the non-NFE respondents reporting membership in an association, 31% claim to be in a village development organization. The “other” category could also be a repository of the responses of those thinking of NFE as a “community organization.” In fact, the difference in the percent of NFE respondents choosing the “Other” category and percent in the comparison group doing so is less than a percentage point. In short, the relationship between NFE and group membership appears real.

Respondents were also asked if they occupied a leadership position in the associations to which they belonged (Question 21D). As we see in Table 19, while only 19% of those without NFE report that they occupy a leadership position, 47% of those with NFE do. This relationship is almost perfectly replicated when we look at only the women respondents. The difference between “treatment” and “control” groups is perhaps most salient in the case of Pulaar speakers in Saint Louis. Only 17% of those without PIP report occupying leadership positions compared to 57% of those with PIP training. The relationship is largely the same when the analysis is restricted to just women (see Table A.2).

Attending village-wide meetings is also related to NFE; those respondents with NFE are more likely to attend village meetings at least occasionally than are their counterparts in the control group. When one looks at the subgroups, the relationship holds for all of the programs but PAPF. It is worth noting that the rate of reported attendance is very high for the women with PAPF: 93% report attending at least on occasion. However, because the level of reported attendance in the comparison group is very high as well (87), no relationship is detected.

Respondents were also asked about the frequency with which they speak out at meetings. There is a big difference between the proportion of NFE and non-NFE respondents who report that they never speak out. Thus, I specifically compare the percent of both groups that report ever speaking out at meetings. While only 43% of those without NFE report speaking out at meetings at least occasionally, 67% of those with NFE do. The difference between NFE and non-NFE respondents is also large and statistically significant when we look at just women; while only 32% of those without NFE report that they speak out at meetings at least occasionally (i.e., do not respond never), 63% of those with NFE report doing so. The relationship between speaking out and nonformal education is statistically significant for all four of the programs and for all of the subgroups. Once again, among the subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies, the difference between those with Tostan and those without is striking: only 28% of those in the control group report speaking in meetings at least occasionally compared to 75% in the Tostan group, for a difference of 47 percentage points.

I was also interested in whether respondents had gotten together with others to raise issues. The chi square test of independence reveals that there is a statistically significant relationship between reporting to have raised an issue at least once and having NFE. As can be seen in Table 19, 71% of those with NFE report that they have gotten together with others to raise an issue compared to 52% of those with no NFE. Similarly, 69 % of women with NFE report raising an issue compared to only 47% of women without NFE. This relationship is statistically significant across all of the programs and subgroups.

Since a flourishing civil society is an important requisite for a healthy democracy, I was interested in assessing the number of organizations to which people belonged. Respondents were asked about membership in up to three organizations. As can be seen in the cross tabulation below, the percentage of respondents with NFE exceeds the corresponding percentage of non-NFE respondents for every number but zero. The relationship between number of organizations to which one belongs and NFE is statistically significant when the analysis is restricted to just women (see Table 20) and is statistically significant for all of the individual programs of study.

Table 12: Crosstabulation of Number of Community Organizations in which one has Membership and NFE

Number of Organizations	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
0	39	14
1	46	48
2	11	26
3	3	12
Totals	(707) 100%	(773) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 176.0594$ $p = .000$

Electoral Participation

It was hypothesized that, on average, levels of electoral participation would be higher among those with NFE than among those without. The bivariate analyses indicate that the only relationship that exists with NFE in this area is that with being registered to vote. As noted earlier, younger people are over represented in the group that has had NFE, and age has a statistically significant, positive relationship with electoral

participation (many of the respondents in the NFE group were not of age to vote in some of the elections about which they were asked).

As we can see from Table 20, when we restrict our analysis to women, the relationship between registering to vote and NFE is no longer statistically significant. Being registered to vote is related to participation in Tostan, as we see in Table A.4, for the regions of Thies and Diourbel. However, the bivariate analyses do not show any of the other specific programs to have a statistically significant relationship with being registered to vote. Reporting having voted in the first round of the presidential election, in the second round of the presidential election, and in the parliamentary elections are also indicators of electoral participation. Chi square tests of independence show all of these indicators to be independent of NFE and all of the individual programs. Voting in local elections is independent of NFE and PAPA. The relationship between this indicator and participation in PAPF is statistically significant but a smaller percentage of those with PAPF than those without PAPF report being registered to vote. The same is the case for PIP when we restrict the test to only women in Saint Louis and for Tostan when we restrict the test to St. Louis. The most likely explanation for these results is that age is a confounding factor, and there are forces much more prominent than NFE driving voting behavior in local elections. The multivariate relationships allow the confounding effects of age to be addressed.

Political Interest and Engagement

Respondents were also asked other questions intended to tap their level of political engagement. Being at least somewhat interested in politics is not statistically significantly related to the general NFE variable. However, having PAPA training is

related to this variable: those respondents who have had PAPA training are more likely to report being at least somewhat interested in politics than those respondents with no NFE. PAPF training is also related to this variable, but a smaller percentage of those with PAPF claim to be at least somewhat interested in politics than those without PAPF. The variable discussing politics at least sometimes (see Question 70) is statistically significant with the aggregate NFE variable when all respondents are included in the analysis and when one looks at only women. Those with NFE are more likely to report discussing politics at least sometimes than are those without NFE. There is also a statistically significant association between discussing politics and all of the program variables except PAPF. That these political variables do not have the expected relationship is actually not surprising given that PAPF's respondents have the lowest average age (although PIP's mean is nearly exactly the same).

Whether or not one feels close to a party is also related to NFE. Those with NFE are more likely to feel close to a political party than those in the control group are. This relationship is statistically significant for all of the specific programs except PAPF. Since this is the program with the lowest average age, controlling for age is especially important. When one restricts the analysis of PIP to only women, this relationship is also not statistically significant. In fact, average age is nearly the same for PIP as for PAPF, and it was felt that controlling for age would probably change to nature of the results. When logit models were run that controlled for age, the relationship was indeed statistically significant for PIP but not for PAPF.

Social and Political Attitudes

Political Efficacy

It was hypothesized that those with NFE would tend to feel more politically efficacious than would those without NFE. The findings from the bivariate analyses do not offer support for this hypothesis. Paired statements were used to assess respondents' feelings of efficacy (see Questions 45-48 in Appendices B or C). For example, respondents were asked to choose between these two statements:

- 1) In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others.
- 2) As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me.

Feeling capable of influencing the political opinions of others, as measured by this question, is not related to the general NFE variable, years of NFE, or any of the specific programs, even when one just looks at various subgroups therein. Respondents were also asked about the extent to which they were able to understand the way government operates (see question 46). No relationship between feeling like one is generally able to understand the way government operates and NFE is found, nor are any statistically significant relationships found between this indicator and any of the four programs. Respondents were also asked about whether they felt that they could make elected representatives listen to them. Again, feeling capable of making elected representatives listen is not significantly related to NFE or participation in any of the individual programs. Finally, respondents were asked to choose between:

- 1) No matter whom we vote for, things will not get any better in the future.
- 2) We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives.

Opting for the second declaration is not related to NFE or participation in any of the individual programs.

Authoritarianism/Progressiveness

It was hypothesized that those respondents with NFE would be more progressive (or less authoritarian and less traditional) than their counterparts without NFE. This hypothesis is supported. Respondents were also asked a set of questions that were intended to measure their level of progressiveness or authoritarianism and traditionalism. For example, respondents were asked to choose between the declaration that all members of a family should hold the same political opinions and the declaration that all family members should be free to make up their own minds on political issues (see Question 69 in Appendices B or C). Those with NFE are more likely to choose the declaration that family members should be free to make up their own minds than are those without NFE. The relationship between NFE and choosing free to make up own mind is statistically significant, as are those between choosing free to make up own mind and PIP (although when we restrict the analysis to women it is not) Tostan and PAPF. Participation in PAPA is not related to this indicator.

With the next indicator (see Question 70 in Appendices B or C), I attempt to see whether the respondent believes that a married woman should vote the way her husband does or that everyone should decide for him/herself for whom to vote. This indicator is related to NFE generally, participation in PIP, and participation in Tostan, with a higher percentage of those in the treatment groups choosing that everyone should make their own choice than of the comparison group. This indicator is independent of PAPA and PAPF.

The third indicator of “progressiveness” (see Question 71) again focuses on views toward women. Respondents were asked to choose between two declarations:

- 1) A woman's place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics.
- 2) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics even if her husband disagrees.⁶²

Those with NFE are more likely to opt for the second declaration than are those in the control group. NFE has a statistically significant relationship with this indicator when all respondents are included in the test as well as when the test is restricted to just women, and all of the programs register a significant relationship with this indicator except PAPA.

Two indicators are intended to measure the extent to which people are open to change (see Questions 72-3). Respondents were asked to select the statement with which they agreed most between the following two:

- 1) Our customs and ethnic heritage are things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.
- 2) We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development.

Those with NFE are more likely to opt for the second declaration than are those in the control group. This indicator is related to NFE when one looks at all respondents and when only women are included in the analysis. As for individual programs, participation in PIP and PAPA are related to this indicator, while participation Tostan and PAPF are not.

The next indicator deals with the types of values to be nurtured in children: obedience and respect for authority or curiosity and open-mindedness (the latter option

⁶² In the first 100 interviews, the part of the phrase "even if her husband disagrees" was left off of the questionnaire. This omission did appear to increase the likelihood of choosing the second response slightly. However, the relationship between NFE and this indicator is significant when these cases are excluded.

representing the progressive choice). Those with NFE are more likely to choose that curiosity and open-mindedness are the most important values to nurture in children than are those without NFE. Bivariate analyses showed this indicator to be related to NFE both when we looked at all respondents and just women, PIP and Tostan for the region of St. Louis (the relationship was not statistically significant when we looked at women in the regions of Thies and Diourbel).

Trust

Interpersonal Trust. It was hypothesized that interpersonal trust would decrease with NFE. This hypothesis finds some support in the results of the bivariate analyses. Again, forced choice questions were used to measure levels of trust. Respondents were asked whether they thought that nobody is going to care much about what happens to you or that you could depend on people to help you, when in a pinch. In fact, those with NFE are *less* likely to opt for the more trusting response than those without NFE, and the relationship between the general NFE variable and this indicator is statistically significant (see Question 53). Respondents were then asked if generally speaking, most people can be trusted or if you can't be too careful in dealing with people (see Question 54). This second indicator does not register a significant relationship with any of the programs except PIP. When the test for PIP is restricted to just women, the relationship with PIP is statistically significant, and the percentage of those with PIP who opt for the more trusting response is smaller than that of the control group. Moreover, although the other programs do not register significant relationships, for both the subgroups of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis and women in Diourbel and Thies, those with Tostan are less likely to choose the trusting response than are those in the control group. Finally, respondents

were asked whether people were more inclined to help others or to look out for themselves. Participation in Tostan has a significant association with the third indicator of interpersonal trust for the subgroup of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis, with a higher percentage of the Tostan group choosing the trusting response (i.e., that people are more inclined to help others).

Institutional Trust. Interestingly, the results of my analyses are somewhat similar to those of Rose et al. 1998 in their studies of the postcommunist countries. Rose et al. find that the churches and the army are the most trusted institutions. I find that the Muslim religious brotherhoods are by far the most trusted in Senegal. After the Muslim brotherhoods, the army is one of the most trusted institutions. I will now look at the effect of NFE on trust in this institutions as well as political parties.

Table 13: Crosstabulation of Trust in Political Parties and NFE

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	20	21
Distrust a little.	13	14
Trust Somewhat.	19	29
Trust a lot.	48	37
Totals	(636) 100%	(733) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 26.5257$ Pr = 0.000

From the results of this crosstabulation, we can see that the hypothesis about institutional trust was not supported: trust appears to decrease with NFE. However, we can see that the biggest shift seems to occur between trusting political parties a little and a lot. That is, NFE appears to increase the likelihood that people will trust political parties somewhat as opposed to a lot, but it does not appear to increase the likelihood that one will distrust

parties. As opposed to rendering people distrustful, NFE appears to introduce a little realism into people's perspectives, engendering a type of healthy skepticism.

Table 14: Crosstabulation of Trust in the Army and NFE

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	5	7
Distrust a little.	3	7
Trust Somewhat.	7	14
Trust a lot.	84	72
Totals	(666) 100%	(742) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 30.5285$ Pr = 0.000

From the table, we can see that those with NFE trust the army less than those without NFE. However, NFE appears to be especially associated with causing people to trust somewhat as opposed to a lot.

Since the membership in the Mouride brotherhood is primarily Wolof in membership and association with the brotherhoods is not evenly distributed across the ethnic groups, I look at the effect of NFE on trust levels for the Wolof and Pulaar respondents separately.

Table 15: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof Respondents

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	0	0
Distrust a little.	0	0
Trust Somewhat.	3	3
Trust a lot.	97	97
Totals	(206) 100%	(332) 100%

From Table 15, we can see that NFE has no effect on Wolof respondents' level of trust in the Mouride brotherhood. This trust level is extremely high; not one Wolof respondent reports distrusting the Mouride brotherhood even a little.

Table 16: Trust in the Mouride Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarophones

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	18	26
Distrust a little.	11	17
Trust Somewhat.	9	23
Trust a lot.	62	34
Totals	(206) 100%	(332) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 42.8013$ Pr = 0.000

In contrast to the situation with Wolof respondents, NFE appears to have a substantial impact on Pulaarophones level of trust in the Mouride brotherhood, which is much lower than that of the Wolof respondents in the first place. On average, those with NFE are much less likely to report a high level of trust in the Mouride brotherhood than are those without NFE.

Table 17: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Wolof-Speakers

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	1	1
Distrust a little.	1	1
Trust Somewhat.	5	5
Trust a lot.	94	93
Totals	(298) 100%	(229) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 0.6738$ Pr = 0.879

NFE appears unrelated to Wolof respondents' level of trust in the Tidiane brotherhood, which is quite high. Indeed, only 2% of the Wolof-speaking respondents expressed any distrust in the Tidiane brotherhood.

Table 18: Trust in the Tidiane Brotherhood and NFE for Pulaarphones

Level of Trust	Respondents without NFE	Respondents with NFE
Do not trust at all.	.42	.5
Distrust a little.	.84	0
Trust Somewhat.	1.68	4
Trust a lot.	97.06	95.51
Totals	(238) 100%	(401) 100%

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 5.9715$ Pr = 0.113

Similar to what we saw above, NFE appears to be unrelated to Pulaar respondents' level of trust in the Tidiane brotherhood, which is very high. We see some clear differences in the patterns of trust between the Wolof and Pulaar respondents. The Wolof are more trusting of the brotherhood with which they are the most closely associated than are the Pulaar respondents of the Tidiane brotherhood. The Wolof respondents are also much more trusting of the brotherhood with which they are not as closely affiliated (the Tidiane brotherhood) than are the Pulaar of the Mouride brotherhood. It seems that NFE may have less of an effect on those attachments that people hold as sacred.

Individualism/Social Distance

It was also hypothesized that those who participated in NFE programs would exhibit higher levels of individualism than would those who have not participated in NFE

programs. The respondents were therefore asked about the frequency with which they perceived that their opinions differed from (1) their relatives, (2) their friends, (3) other people in the village, and (4) other people in the country. In the bivariate analyses I look specifically at those who feel like their opinions differ from the relevant group at least on occasion (i.e., those who did *not* choose “never”). Those with NFE are much more likely to report that their views differ at least occasionally from their relatives, friends, fellow villagers and fellow Senegalese than are the respondents in the control group. When we look at women in Diourbel and Thies (see tables in Appendix A), we see that only 59% of those without Tostan report that their opinions ever differ from their families, compared to 88% of those with Tostan. With the exception of PAPA, NFE and all of the individual program variables are found to be associated with all of these indicators. Although chi square tests of significance indicate that all of these indicators are independent of participation in PAPA, those who have PAPA are more likely to report having opinions that at least occasionally differ from the aforementioned reference groups than are those in the comparison group.

Support for Democratic Values

It was hypothesized that those with NFE would, on average, exhibit higher levels of political tolerance than those without NFE, although the relationship was not thought to be straightforward. Based on survey data from other countries in Africa, the author suspected that those with NFE would feel that those without NFE, or those who are not literate, should not have the right to vote. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that those with NFE would, on average, be more supportive of democratic values than those who do not have NFE. Five indicators are used to measure support for democratic

values. The hypotheses find only mixed support in the results of the bivariate analyses. First, respondents were asked whether those who are not literate should have the right to vote (see Question 49). When we look at all respondents, the percent of NFE and non-NFE respondents who think that those who are not literate should have a right to vote is identical. In fact, the only statistically significant relationship that is found is that with Tostan when one looks at the subgroup of Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. In this subgroup, although 82% of those without Tostan feel that those who are not literate should have the right to vote, only 72% of those with Tostan feel this way.

Similarly, respondents were asked to choose between the following declarations:

- 1) All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.
- 2) Only those who are sufficiently well educated should vote.

NFE is related to this indicator, with a larger percentage of NFE respondents choosing the first option than of non-NFE respondents. That is, those with NFE tend to opt for the more tolerant declaration with greater relative frequency than do those without NFE. The relationship remains statistically significant when the analysis is restricted to only women. However, the only individual program with which this indicator is statistically significant in bivariate analyses is Tostan, and then it is only statistically significant for subgroup of women in Thies and Diourbel (See Table A.4).

Respondents were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party” (see Question 50A). Those who have NFE are much more likely to disagree with this statement than those in the control group. The relationship between this indicator and NFE is statistically significant, with, among women, only 12% of those

in the non-NFE group disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement, compared to 26% of those in the NFE group. This relationship is statistically significant for all of the programs and subgroups at which we looked with the exception of PAPA.

Respondents were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “To compromise with one’s opponents is dangerous because you betray your own side.” The relationship between having NFE and this indicator is in fact statistically significant when all respondents are included in the test but a smaller percentage of those in the NFE group than those in the control group chose the more democratic response. When the analysis is restricted to women, however, the relationship is not statistically significant. The relationship is not statistically significant for any of the individual programs. The fifth indicator is also based on a forced choice question (see Question 51), which asked about people’s rights to express dissenting views. While a few the relationships between NFE participation and this indicator approach significance, none are in fact statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Locus of Control

It was hypothesized that, on average, people with NFE would be more likely to exhibit an internal locus of control than would those without NFE. That is, NFE is theorized to have an empowering effect on people. Therefore, people who have NFE, it is thought, are more likely to feel that they are active agents in creating their own life conditions than are those without NFE. This hypothesis finds some support in the results of the bivariate analyses.

The first indicator pertains to whether respondents see the government as being primarily responsible for their well-being or they see themselves as being primarily

responsible (see Question 67). Although the general NFE variable is not related to this indicator, participation in PAPA is, as is participation in Tostan for women in Diourbel and Thies. That is, those who have PAPA training are more likely to see themselves as responsible for their own well-being than are their counterparts in the control group. Among the subgroup of women in Diourbel and Thies, those with Tostan training are also more likely to see themselves as opposed to the government as responsible for their well-being than are those in the comparison group.

The next indicator is based on a question in which respondents had to choose between whether accidental events or they themselves were primarily responsible for the way their lives had gone (See Question 64). Only participation in Tostan is related to this indicator, and this relationship is statistically significant among Pulaar-speakers in St. Louis. Among respondents in this subgroup, we can see that while only 33% of those without Tostan feel they are primarily responsible for what has happened in their lives, 49% of those who have Tostan feel this way.

The third indicator was based on a question in which respondents either had to choose between the declarations that they were often unable to protect their interests from bad luck happenings or almost certain to make their plans work (Question 65). No statistically significant relationships are found between this indicator and participation in NFE or the individual programs.

Finally, the last indicator of locus of control was based on the forced choice question:

- 1) Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.
- 2) With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals.

While this indicator is not related to the aggregate NFE variable or participation in PAPA and PAPF, it is related to participation in PIP and Tostan across all of the subgroups examined. Those with PIP training are much more likely to choose the declaration that goals can be obtained through work and effort than are those in the comparison group. When we look at Pulaar speakers in St. Louis, we see that although only 59% of those without NFE choose this response, 78% of those with PIP do, and 71% of those with Tostan do.

Contacting Public Officials

Community Contacting

Those with NFE are much more likely to report having contacted an official about a community problem than those without NFE. Although 55% of those with NFE report having contacted an official regarding a community matter, only 38% of those without NFE report having done so for a difference of 17 percentage points. While only 30% of women respondents without NFE reported contacting an official about a community problem, 53% of women with NFE reported doing so.

Particularized Contacting

Those with NFE are also more likely to report having contacted an official regarding a personal problem than those without NFE. However, the difference is not as great as it is for community contacting, and a larger percentage of respondents appear to engage in particularized contacting. Fifty-two percent of those without NFE report having contacted an official about a personal problem versus 63% of those with NFE. Similarly, 44% of women respondents without NFE report contacting an official about a personal problem versus 60% of those with NFE.

Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a marabout for help with personal problems with much greater frequency than they report soliciting the help of any other public official. In addition, the Wolof respondents report soliciting the help of a marabout more often than did the Pulaar respondents. These findings are consistent with the institutional trust findings that the Wolof are generally more trusting of the Muslim brotherhoods than the Pulaar respondents.

Although I do not report the results of these analyses, perhaps it is worth noting that I used logit to examine the effect of years of NFE on all of the indicators included in the bivariate analyses. In these multivariate analyses, I controlled for potentially confounding variables such as income, age, gender, years of formal education, and ethnolinguistic group. All of the relationships found to be statistically significant in the bivariate analyses for the aggregate NFE variable are also statistically significant in the multivariate analyses⁶³ and, not surprisingly, several relationships that do not appear statistically significant in the bivariate are statistically significant once controls are introduced. More specifically, three of the voting variables are related to years of nonformal education in the hypothesized direction. In any case, the bivariate relationships will be more carefully scrutinized in multivariate analyses in the next chapter.

⁶³ I should note that in the case of one indicator of progressiveness, years of NFE and the ethnicity variables together seemed to engender some collinearity problems, and therefore the coefficient for years NFE was not significant when the ethnic variables were included in the equation. When the ethnic variables were dropped, it was highly significant.

Table 19: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for All Respondents

	Those without NFE		Those with NFE	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	707	39	773	58*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	709	61	774	86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	708	83	774	93*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	594	43	724	67*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	709	52	774	71*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	708	19	773	47*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	709	66	774	71*
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	463	82	549	84
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	463	79	548	81
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	461	64	549	64
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	463	54	551	52
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	705	75	773	79
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	709	67	774	77*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	701	64	771	71*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	684	80	763	82
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	683	49	767	45
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	682	70	767	70
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	691	80	766	78
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness				

Table 19 (cont'd).

Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	694	61	772	72*
Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	698	34	771	44*
Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees." (Question 71)	644	34	670	47*
Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	691	52	769	60*
Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	694	47	769	59*
Trust				
Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	699	81	769	75*
Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	676	31	762	27
Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	695	45	767	44
Individualism/Cultural Distance				
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	709	68	774	89*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	709	67	774	79*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	708	64	774	79*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	709	63	773	77*
Support for Democratic Values				
Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	702	75	771	75
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	692	19	760	28
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	684	37	754	30*

Table 19 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	698	44	772	52*
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	678	74	768	77
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	698	57	769	52
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	675	36	757	38
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	678	68	763	69
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	697	74	770	79
Individual Contacting				
Ever Contacted An Official About Community Problem	706	38	765	55*
Ever Contacted An Official About Personal Problem	705	52	763	63*

*Difference in percentages between non-NFE and NFE respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table 20: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having NFE and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Female Respondents

	Those without NFE		Those with NFE	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	426	35	639	56*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	428	68	640	86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	427	82	640	92*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	354	32	593	63*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	428	47	640	69*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	427	16	639	43*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	428	64	640	68
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	273	84	438	84
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	273	79	437	81
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	272	60	438	62
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	272	51	440	49
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	425	78	639	79
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	438	64	640	76*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	421	57	637	71*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	413	78	629	81
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	416	48	633	45
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	410	70	634	71
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	416	76	633	77

Table 20 (cont'd)**Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness**

Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	418	55	638	71*
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Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	423	26	637	39*
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Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her	390	32	568	48*
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right to speak out about politics, even if her

husband disagrees." (Question 71)

Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	402	51	572	62*
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Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	403	48	571	56*
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Trust

Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	424	77	637	77
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Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	408	32	631	26*
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Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	419	48	634	47
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Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	428	65	640	82*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	428	64	640	77*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	427	59	640	78*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	428	59	639	75*
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Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	423	73	638	74
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Table 20 (cont'd)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	420	12	628	26*
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	414	35	627	31
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	420	43	639	49*
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	405	71	636	77
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	423	48	635	52
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	408	34	626	37
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	406	67	630	70
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	421	73	637	78*
Individual Contacting				
Contacted Official About Community Problem	425	30	633	53*
Contacted Official About Personal Problem	426	44	631	60*

*Difference in percentages between non-NFE and NFE respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Chapter 7

NFE AND CIVIC ORIENTATIONS: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

In the last chapter, we were able to obtain an idea of whether NFE affects different political behaviors and attitudes. We were also able to get an idea of the difference between the percentage of those with NFE engaging in a certain behavior or holding a certain attitude and the percentage of those in the comparison group doing so. Yet many important questions remain unanswered. How do the effects of NFE compare to those of formal education with regard to our political orientations of interest? How much effect does each year of NFE or formal education have on the political orientation of interest? How might other factors affect the relationship between NFE and the political orientations of interest?

The multivariate analyses allow us compare the effects of NFE and formal education on the behaviors and attitudes of study. Multivariate analyses are used to check whether the results observed are actually due to variables not included in the analyses, such as age, income, gender, ethnolinguistic identity, and years of formal education.⁶⁴ Also, it is important to see if the introduction of controls allows certain relationships to be detected that were not detected in the bivariate analyses. In addition, this chapter will examine the how much each year of education affects the likelihood of having some of the political orientations of greatest interest. Indices were created from the indicators of the constructs enumerated in the in the last chapter (see Appendix D for a description of the indices). Thus, there are indices for community participation,

⁶⁴ Years of NFE and years of formal education are moderately correlated ($r = 0.11$).

political interest/engagement, electoral participation, political efficacy, trust, progressiveness/authoritarianism, distance/individualization, support for democratic values, and locus of control.

Community Participation

Although all of the indicators of community participation are related to NFE and all of the individual programs, I want to see how variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, income and formal schooling affect the observed relationships. An index of community participation was created by adding all of the indicators of community participation included in the bivariate analyses except number of organizations. Because the community participation variable is qualitative and ordinal in nature, ordered logit is used to estimate the effects of the variables of interest on community participation.

Table 21: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Community Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.4726276	.033777	13.993	0.00
Years of formal Schooling	.0495131	.0151311	3.272	0.001
Income	.1066507	.0332923	3.203	0.001
Age	.030552	.0040277	7.585	0.000
Gender	-.1369436	.1159877	-1.181	0.238
Pulaar	.146132	.1300121	1.124	0.261
Wolof	-.125848	.1329082	-0.947	0.344

Number of observations = 1390
chi2(7) = 295.42
Prob > chi² = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -2427.3969
Pseudo R² = 0.0574

The estimated model is statistically significant. As is evident in Table 21, the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables years of NFE, years of formal education, income and age of respondent are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The estimated coefficients for gender and ethnicity⁶⁵ are not statistically significant. As we can see in Table 21, the relationship between years of NFE and community participation is highly statistically significant in the hypothesized direction when the effects of other variables are controlled. Years of formal education, income and age also have a positive impact on the likelihood of participating in the community. Thus, it appears that those with more resources, be they social or financial, are more likely to be involved in the community. That age is associated with community involvement is not surprising given the way prestige and responsibilities increase concomitantly with age in traditional culture.

Since it is hard to assess the effects of NFE on community participation in the above model in any precise way, I examine how the likelihood of someone receiving the highest score possible on the community participation scale changes when the values for all of the explanatory variables but years of NFE are held constant.⁶⁶ The sample mean is used for formal education and age, while the modal category was used for income. In Table 22, the effects of NFE on the likelihood of having the highest level of community

⁶⁵ In order to control for ethnolinguistic group in this model, dummy variables (i.e., variables that take on the value of 0 or 1 depending on whether they have the attribute of interest) were used for two out of the three major ethnolinguistic groups covered in the study (the other ethnic groups are grouped with Serer since they represented only 6 percent of the sample). Hence, two of the control variables in this model represent ethnic groups. One of the three variables representing ethnicity is, of course, always excluded from the model as including it would create a situation of perfect multicollinearity and estimation would be impossible. In addition, to avoid collinearity problems, I could not control for region and ethnicity in the same model. I felt ethnolinguistic group was more pertinent than region.

⁶⁶ CLARIFY was the software package used to calculate the marginal probabilities: Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (1999). CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 1.2.1 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, June 1. <http://gking.harvard.edu/>.

participation possible as measured on our scale is examined for Pulaar women. Since formal education is of interest as well, changes in the likelihood of high community participation are also examined at different levels of formal education while the other variables, including NFE, are held constant.

Table 22: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of High Community Participation for Pulaar Women

Number of Years of Education	Likelihood of High Community Participation Level for NFE	95% Confidence Interval for NFE	Likelihood of High Community Participation Level for Formal Education	95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education
0	.09	.07 to .11	.14	.12 to .16
1	.13	.11 to .15	.14	.12 to .17
1.27	.15	.13 to .17	*	*
1.7	*	*	.15	.12 to .17
2	.19	.17 to .23	.15	.13 to .18
2.4	.22	.19 to .26	*	*
3	.28	.24 to .32	.16	.13 to .19
4	.38	.33 to .44	.16	.14 to .19
6	.61	.54 to .69	.18	.15 to .22
10	.91	.87 to .95	.21	.16 to .27
12	*	*	.23	.17 to .29
20	*	*	.31	.20 to .44

From Table 22, it is evident that NFE increases the likelihood of having a very high level of community participation at an increasing rate. The likelihood of a high level of community participation increases by only 4% with the first year of NFE but increases by another 6% with an additional year of NFE. The likelihood of engaging in all of the behaviors associated with community participation is about 15% at the mean number of years of NFE. We can also see that each year of NFE has a much larger effect on community participation than formal education: formal education increases the

probability of being highly engaged in the community by only about 1% per year. Thus, the “pay-off” of formal education in this area appears minimal.

This finding is consistent with the commonly held idea among NFE advocates that nonformal education is more based in the community than formal education and therefore tends to stimulate participation in activities that improve the community in ways that formal education does not. NFE does, indeed, appear to have “network” effects. Those in NFE classes become involved with those in their NFE class as well as sometimes those in other classes. Frequent contact with others in the community is likely to spur one to become involved in other community activities. In addition, sometimes those in NFE classes are sought out for participation in other projects because of their newly acquired skills. In addition, based on the testimonies, it seems that NFE imbues participants with a confidence that inspires them to seek out new activities that put them in contact with others. On the other hand, those with formal education might have the skills that render them efficacious in community work, but they have not had the same chance to become involved in a network.

Seeing if the individual programs included in the study are also related to community participation in the direction hypothesized once controls are introduced is important too. All of the individual programs have a statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of participating in the community (see Appendix E).

Interest/Engagement in Politics

The values of three of the indicators discussed earlier were added to create the index of interest/engagement in politics: 1) whether one is at least somewhat interested in politics, 2) whether one discusses politics at least sometimes, and 3) whether one feels

close to a political party. Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE on interest in politics while controlling for other variables.

Table 23: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Interest/Engagement in Politics

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.1239269	.0324385	3.820	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0592879	.0170383	3.480	0.001
Income	.0088026	.0343135	0.257	0.798
Age	.0142532	.0042568	3.348	0.001
Gender	-.1497423	.1233939	-1.214	0.225
Pulaar	-.1431247	.1393614	-1.027	0.304
Wolof	.140106	.1449684	0.966	0.334

Number of observations= 1382

chi2(7) = 42.64

Prob > chi² = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1617.4502

Pseudo R² = 0.0130

As we can see from Table 23, the estimated coefficients for years of nonformal education, years of formal schooling and age are all statistically significant, as is the model as a whole. NFE increases the probability that one will be interested and engaged in politics, as does formal schooling. This finding is consistent with the vast literature relating education to political participation. Curiously, income does not appear related to interest in politics. When multivariate models are used to assess the effects of the individual programs, years of PIP, Tostan, and PAPA all have a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of being interested and engaged in politics, although PAPF does not.

Once again, in order to better understand the effects of NFE on the probability of being engaged in politics, the effects of different levels of NFE on the probability of being highly engaged in politics are examined while all of the control variables are held constant. Since formal education is of interest as well, changes in the likelihood of engagement are also examined at different levels of formal education while the other variables, including NFE, are held constant. Table 24 displays the probabilities for Wolof men.

Table 24: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Engaged in Politics for Senegalese Men

Number of Years of Education	Likelihood of Engagement in Politics for NFE	95% Confidence Interval for NFE	Likelihood of Engagement in Politics for Formal Education	95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education
0	.51	.42 to .60	.53	.44 to .62
1	.54	.45 to .63	.54	.45 to .63
1.27	.55	.46 to .64	.55	.46 to .63
1.7	.56	.47 to .65	.55	.46 to .64
2	.57	.48 to .66	.56	.46 to .64
2.4	.58	.50 to .67	.56	.47 to .65
3	.60	.51 to .69	.57	.48 to .66
4	.63	.54 to .72	.58	.49 to .67
6	.69	.58 to .78	.61	.51 to .70
6.6	.70	.60 to .79	.62	.52 to .71
7	.71	.64 to .82	.63	.52 to .72
10	.78	.66 to .87	.67	.55 to .76
12	*	*	.69	.56 to .79
20	*	*	.78	.63 to .88

As we can see in Table 24, the probability of having all three attributes of high political engagement increases by about 3% with each year of NFE. At the mean level of NFE for the sample, the probability of having such high engagement is about 58% for Wolof men.

At the mean level of NFE among those with NFE (2.4 years), it is about 61%. The difference in the probability of exhibiting a high level of political engagement between someone with no NFE and someone with the maximum number of years is 28%. On the other hand, we can see the probability of having high political engagement increases by only between one and 2% for each year of formal education.

Efficacy

All four of the political efficacy indicators were added to create the political efficacy index. It was thought that multivariate analysis might clarify the relationship between feelings of political efficacy and NFE. However, none of the estimated coefficients in this model are statistically significant. Moreover, the model is not statistically significant. When ordered logit is used to assess the effects for the individual programs, both Tostan and PAPF are found to have statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of feeling politically efficacious. However, the models are not statistically significant.

Thus, although individuals may feel efficacious in terms of those activities in their more immediate vicinity, they may not feel like they can affect those structures distant from them. NFE appears to increase personal efficacy as evidenced in the qualitative interviews and the results showing that those with NFE were more likely to report speaking out in meetings and holding leadership positions in associations. However, NFE does not appear to have a strong effect on feelings of political efficacy.

Authoritarianism/Progressiveness

The progressiveness/authoritarianism index was created by adding the values of all of the indicators discussed under this rubric in the bivariate analyses. Again, ordered

logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE and other control variables on progressiveness.

Table 25: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Authoritarianism/ Progressiveness

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.2590025	.0324575	7.980	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.132987	.0163941	8.112	0.000
Income	.0669317	.033615	1.991	0.046
Age	-.0069791	.0041437	1.684	0.092
Gender	-.5279267	.1204361	-4.383	0.000
Pulaar	.3451935	.1383548	2.495	0.013
Wolof	.0319089	.1432115	-0.223	0.824

Number of observations: 1340
 $\chi^2(7) = 190.70$
 $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$
 $\text{Log Likelihood} = -1735.3705$
 $\text{Pseudo } R^2 = 0.0521$

From Table 25, we can see that nonformal education increases the likelihood that one will express progressive ideas. The estimated coefficients for years of formal schooling, gender, and the Pulaar variable are also statistically significant. Formal schooling also has a positive effect on the likelihood of being progressive. That gender has a negative coefficient reflects the fact that the women in the sample tend to opt for responses that indicate a less progressive/more authoritarian orientation with greater frequency than do men. This finding is consistent with other studies that find that women are more conservative than men are (e.g., Gibson et al. 1992; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992). The positive relationship for Pulaar reflects the fact that Pulaar respondents opted for

responses that indicate a more progressive orientation with greater frequency than did Wolof and Serer respondents and those in other ethnic groups. When similar multivariate models were run for the individual programs, only Tostan and PIP were found to have a positive impact on the probability of having progressive attitudes. In order to see the effects of NFE on the probability of having a progressive orientation with greater clarity, once again the changes in the probability of scoring highly on the progressive/authoritarian scale are examined at different levels of NFE while the values for the other explanatory variables are held constant. The same is done for formal education.

Table 26: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Having Progressive Orientation in Politics for Pulaar Men

Number of Years of Education	Likelihood of Having Progressive Orientation for NFE	95% Confidence Interval for NFE	Likelihood of Having Progressive Orientation for Formal Education	95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education
0	.23	.19 to .27	.25	.20 to .29
1	.28	.23 to .32	.28	.23 to .32
1.27	.29	.24 to .34	*	.
1.7	*	*	.29	.24 to .34
2	.33	.27 to .38	.30	.25 to .35
2.4	.36	.29 to .41	.31	.26 to .36
3	.39	.33 to .45	.33	.28 to .38
4	.45	.38 to .52	.36	.30 to .41
6	.58	.49 to .67	.43	.36 to .49
10	.79	.68 to .87	.56	.47 to .64
12	*	*	.62	.52 to .71
20	*	*	.82	.72 to .90

From Table 26, we can see that NFE has a substantial impact on the likelihood of having a progressive social orientation: with each year of NFE, the likelihood increases by

around 5%. After a two year NFE program, the likelihood of having a progressive social orientation is 42%. By contrast, after two years of formal education, the likelihood would be around 39%. We can see that one year of NFE has a greater impact on the likelihood of having progressive social values than does one year of formal education.

Trust

The trust index was created by adding the values of the trust indicators.

Table 27
Ordered Logit Estimates of Trust Models
Dependent Variable: Social Trust Index

Model Variable	Model 1: Trust: Entire Sample	Model 2: Trust Among Pulaaro- phones	Model 3: Trust Among Wolof- Speakers	Model 4: Trust Among Serer and Other Small Minority Groups
Years of nonformal education	-.0206186 (.0307682)	-.0914524* (.0420063)	.0128272 (.0580936)	.1540555* (.0760041)
Years of Formal Schooling	-.0753654** (.0159388)	- .0797249** (.0247746)	-.0568734* (.0278607)	-.0895232** (.0318396)
Income	-.0897423** (.0347991)	-.0677639 (.0526662)	-.0118086 (.0583644)	-.2467515** (.0799715)
Age	-.014045** (.0041804)	- .0157966** (.0064311)	-.0133993* (.0067269)	-.0141331 (.0097797)
Gender	-.0111811 (.1214942)	.0410796 (.1791359)	.1227517 (.2076476)	-.5267887 (.2958386)
Pulaar	-1.135496** (.1415963)			
Wolof	.0936686 (.1415278)			
<i>Number of obs.</i>	1344	601	480	263
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.0483	0.0152	0.0083	0.0398
Log Likelihood	-1620.2663	-726.84494	-574.67805	-307.2751
Chi ²	164.38	22.51	9.59	25.50
Prob > Chi ²	0.0000	0.0004	0.0876	0.0001

Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses.

** $p < .01$ for two tailed test; * $p < .05$ for two tailed test

There are some observations that must be considered. First, the Pulaarophones have the lowest level of trust of any group. Second, NFE renders Pularophones even less trusting than they were initially. Third, NFE appears to actually have a positive effect on the trust levels of the Serer and other minority groups. On the other hand, the other “modernity” variables have a consistent, negative effect on the trust levels on all ethnic groups and the overall sample. Thus, as we can see, the directions of the effects of all the variables besides NFE are consistent across subgroups of the sample. It is only the sign of NFE that changes.

That age has a significant negative relationship with social trust is easily comprehensible given that those of the older generations are likely to feel less secure than those in the younger generations and overwhelmed by the changes that have taken place around them and the development process more generally. They have also had the opportunity to have more experiences with other people so that they would be likely to give more realistic responses. In addition, age confers upon one a certain power in traditional society, and thus, as one gets older, one may be more likely to speak one’s mind.

That the coefficient for gender (1=woman) is negative across subgroups is also not surprising given that women tend to be the most parochial in a society and therefore probably have more insecurity about the world around them. Perhaps more importantly, all of the societies covered by the study are highly patriarchal and stratified (the Serer are matrilineal – descent is reckoned via the woman’s line – but Serer society is patriarchal, nonetheless). Women are often vulnerable and exploited in these societies. In

particular, women are often exploited or mistreated by their mother in laws and the relatives of their husbands. Thus, although women are in some ways the most traditional, NFE appears to make women more aware of their feelings and more willing to express them.

Banfield (1958) finds that in certain cases, one must cut certain types of deep ties in order to get people to act in a way that is individually rational. This could be the process that is operative in the setting of Senegal. Although “thin trust” can help one pursue relationships that open up new opportunities and knowledge, excessive “thick trust” might render one too tied to those in one’s primary group to effectively exploit the opportunities before one.

As noted earlier, Bratton and van de Walle describe the neopatrimonial regimes of Africa as being characterized by “relationships of loyalty and dependence” (1997, 62). Relationships of loyalty and dependence seem to especially characterize social life among Pulaar-speakers. Indeed, when asked whether the people themselves or the government was most responsible for ensuring their well-being, 58% of Wolof respondents and 61% of the Serer respondents and respondents of other ethnic groups said the government, but only 49% of the Pulaar thought the people themselves were responsible. Although Pulaar-speakers are just as likely as Wolof-speakers, and more likely than those in other ethnic groups, to opt for the response that they are almost certainly able to make their plans work (see Q65), they are less likely to chose the “empowered” response to the following forced choice question:

- 1) Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.
- 2) With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals.

In addition, among the Pulaar-speakers who have not had NFE, only 63% chose the “empowered” response while 37% responded that getting what they want requires pleasing the people above them. Thus, it seems that many of the Pulaar respondents might think they can make their plans work by pleasing those above them.

The fall in levels of interpersonal trust among the Pulaar might indicate that the traditional constraints on individual initiative might be loosening. NFE has a significant impact on this variable for Pulaar-speakers, with a full 75% of the NFE respondents choosing the empowered response to this question.

Social Distance/Individualization

The individualization index is an index created by adding all of the values of the indicators for individualization that were examined in the bivariate analyses. Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of years of NFE and other variables on individualization.

Table 28: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Social Distance/Individualization

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.1263885	.0347521	3.637	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0500165	.0176024	2.841	0.004
Income	.1746412	.03902	4.476	0.000
Age	-.0140643	.0041971	-3.351	0.001
Gender	-.3694644	.1275433	-2.897	0.004
Pulaar	-.2414142	.1469972	-1.642	0.101
Wolof	-.4309615	.149631	-2.880	0.004

Number of observations = 1317

chi² (7) = 76.06

Prob > chi² = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1648.5183

Pseudo R² = 0.0225

The estimated coefficients for all but one of the explanatory variables are statistically significant; that is, only the variable representing Pulaar is not statistically significant. I hypothesized that nonformal education would increase “individualization.” People with nonformal education become more aware of themselves and their ideas and therefore acknowledge that their ideas are not always the same as those around them. Years of formal schooling functions in much the same way. Income is a classic force of stratification and differentiation, so it is not at all surprising that it is statistically significant in this model. That the coefficient for age is negative is also not surprising since we would expect older people to have more of a traditional, collectivist orientation than younger people. Women have also had less access to the type of experiences that would encourage individualization than men have, so the negative sign in front of the coefficient for gender is not surprising.

That formal education and nonformal education both inspire people to think more independently can only be interpreted as positive for democracy. When people simply take things on authority, they can be led in any direction. Such a tendency could allow people to acquiesce to actions and situations that are bad for them or others. That people are willing to acknowledge that they have different views from others could also lead them to accept other people when they express dissenting views.

Support for Democratic Values

Since the results of the bivariate analyses do not give a very clear picture of the relationship between nonformal education and support for democratic values, I use multivariate analyses to further examine the relationship. The index of support for

democratic values was created by adding all but one of the indicators for democratic values included in the bivariate analyses. The indicator concerning compromise (Question 50E) was *not* found to be related to the other democratic value indicators and was therefore not included in the index. Once again, an ordered logit model is used to assess the effects of NFE while controlling for years of formal schooling, income, age, gender and ethnicity.

Table 29: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Support for Democratic Values

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.1303295	.0311116	4.189	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.1711642	.0169658	10.089	0.000
Income	.0319587	.0336174	0.951	0.342
Age	.0159169	.0040893	3.892	0.000
Gender	-.4330685	.1191054	-3.636	0.000
Pulaar	.223445	.1367746	1.634	0.102
Wolof	-.2353479	.1410534	-1.669	0.095

Number of observations: 1332
 $\chi^2(7) = 172.21$
 $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$
 $\text{Log Likelihood} = -1853.9682$
 $\text{Pseudo } R^2 = 0.0444$

From Table 29, it is evident that the estimated coefficients for years of NFE, years of formal schooling, age and gender are all statistically significant. Therefore both NFE and formal schooling increase the likelihood that one will support democratic values. Again, that the coefficient for gender is statistically significant is consistent with the findings that women are, on average, more conservative than men are. When similar analyses were done to assess the effects of the individual programs, both years of PIP and

years of Tostan were found to have statistically significant effects in the hypothesized direction. Neither years of PAPA nor years of PAPF were found to be related to support for democratic values.

In order to clarify the results of NFE on the probability of supporting democratic values and compare the effects of NFE with formal schooling, the changes in probability of supporting democratic values are examined at levels of NFE with the other explanatory variables held constant. This procedure is repeated for formal education.

Table 30: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Being Highly Supportive of Democratic Values for Senegalese Women

Number of Years of Education	Likelihood of Supporting Democratic Values For NFE	95% Confidence Interval for NFE	Likelihood of Supporting Democratic Values For Formal Education	95% Confidence Interval for Formal Education
0	.08	.06 to .11	.07	.05 to .10
1	.09	.06 to .12	.08	.06 to .11
1.27	.09	.07 to .12	.09	.06 to .12
1.7	.10	.07 to .13	.09	.07 to .12
2	.10	.07 to .13	.10	.07 to .13
2.4	.10	.08 to .14	.10	.07 to .14
3	.11	.08 to .15	.11	.08 to .15
4	.12	.09 to .17	.13	.09 to .17
6	.16	.11 to .22	.17	.12 to .23
6.6	.17	.11 to .24	.19	.13 to .25
7	.17	.11 to .27	.20	.14 to .26
10	.24	.15 to .37	.29	.21 to .39
12	*	*	.37	.27 to .49
20	*	*	.69	.54 to .82

As we can see from Table 30, when the values of all other variables are held constant, and years of NFE is 0, the probability of choosing the democratic response for all four of the indicators is only 6%. With each year of NFE, the probability increases by about one

percentage point among women. At the maximum number of NFE years reported, the probability of exhibiting a high level of support for democratic values is 24%. Formal education appears to have a stronger effect on support for democratic attitudes than nonformal education. Although there is little change in the probability for supporting democratic attitudes for the first few years of education, the “payoff” of each year of formal education starts to increase after about six years. This result makes a great deal of sense given that primary schooling lasts for six years.

Electoral Participation

Voting

Using multivariate analyses to assess the effect of NFE on electoral participation seemed especially important since age was suspected to be a confounding factor in the bivariate analyses. The electoral participation index was created by adding the scores of the four voting indicators.

Table 31: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Electoral Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.0902742	.036342	2.484	0. 013
Years of Formal Schooling	.0191904	.0193407	0.992	0. 321
Income	.0634766	.0391501	1.621	0. 105
Age	.0763887	.0062949	12.135	0.000
Gender	.427492	.1476845	2.895	0. 004
Pulaar	.0495215	.1703725	0.291	0. 771
Wolof	.2427183	.1739983	1.395	0. 163

Number of observations= 947

$\chi^2(7) = 193.79$
 $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$
 $\text{Log Likelihood} = -1213.5589$
 $\text{Pseudo } R^2 = 0.0739$

As is evident from Table 31, the estimated coefficients for nonformal education, age, and gender are statistically significant. Interestingly, while years of nonformal education appears have a positive effect on the probability of voting, formal education does not. As suspected, the relationship between age and voting is statistically significant. When similar analyses were done for the individual programs, Tostan, PAPA and PAPF were also found to have statistically significant, positive relationships with electoral participation. No relationship was found for PIP.

Table 32: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Having a High Level of Electoral Participation for Rural Senegalese Women

Number of Years of NFE	Likelihood of Highest Level of Electoral Participation	95% Confidence Interval
0	.46	.36 to .57
1	.49	.39 to .59
1.27	.49	.39 to .60
2	.50	.41 to .60
2.4	.52	.42 to .61
3	.53	.44 to .63
4	.55	.45 to .65
6	.60	.48 to .71
10	.68	.52 to .81

As we can see in Table 32, the probability of having the highest level of electoral participation as measured by the voting index increases by about two to 3% with each

year of nonformal education.⁶⁷ At the average number of years of NFE for the whole sample, 1.27 years, the probability of having a high level of electoral participation is 43%. After two years of NFE, the probability is 50%. The probability of having a high level of electoral participation increases notably between the minimum and maximum years of NFE. At one year of NFE, the value is 46% while at ten years it is 68% for a difference of 22 percentage points.

Registering to Vote

Again, since age was an obvious confounding factor in the bivariate analyses, a logit model is used to assess the effects of years of NFE on the probability of registering vote while other variables are controlled for.

Table 33: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Registering to Vote

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.2204829	.0436484	5.051	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0015913	.019757	0.081	0.936
Income	.1605332	.0508719	3.156	0.002
Age	.0984739	.0078448	12.553	0.000
Gender	.1680074	.158888	1.057	0.290
Pulaar	.1540842	.1795096	0.858	0.391
Wolof	.0155594	.1835093	0.085	0.932
Constant	-2.832594	.3271469	-8.658	0.000

Number of observations=1319

chi²(7) = 278.53

Prob > chi² = 0.0000

⁶⁷ The respondents in the study sample almost certainly over-reported their electoral participation, and therefore the figures for electoral participation will be somewhat inflated. The inflation of voting rates is common in this type of study (e.g., see Bratton 1999).

Log Likelihood = -686.00117
Pseudo R² = 0.1688

The model as a whole is statistically significant, and three of the seven estimated coefficients are statistically significant: those for years of NFE, age and income. When similar multivariate analyses were done to clarify the relationships of the individual programs, all of the programs were found to have a statistically significant, positive impact on the probability of registering to vote. That NFE and income are statistically significant fits nicely with the resource theory of political participation, according to which, those with the most resources, both social and financial, will be most likely to participate politically. The likelihood of registering to vote is examined at different levels of NFE in Table 34.

Table 34: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Registering to Vote for Pulaar Women

Number of Years of NFE	Likelihood of Registering to Vote	95% Confidence Interval
0	.70	.63 to .75
1	.74	.69 to .79
1.27	.75	.70 to .79
1.7	.77	.72 to .81
2	.78	.74 to .82
2.4	.79	.75 to .83
3	.82	.77 to .85
4	.85	.80 to .88
6	.89	.85 to .93
6.6	.91	.86 to .94
7	.91	.86 to .95
10	.95	.90 to .98

As we can see in Table 34, the likelihood of registering to vote increases by about four percentage points among Pulaar women for each year of NFE. After a two-year NFE program, the likelihood of registering to vote is 78%. The difference in likelihood of

registering to vote at the minimum number of years of NFE is 74%, while the likelihood at the maximum number of years reported is 95%, for a difference of 21 percentage points.

Contacting Public Officials

Community Contacting

Based on the results of the bivariate analyses, there appears to be a highly significant relationship between NFE and contacting a public figure regarding a community problem. However, multivariate analysis allows us to see whether other potentially confounding variables affect the relationship between NFE and community contacting. In addition, multivariate allows us to assess the effects of formal education on community contacting, as well as assess the magnitude of the impact of NFE on the likelihood of contacting a public official regarding a community problem.

Table 35: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Contacting an Official about a Community Problem

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.2844766	.0372857	7.630	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0001182	.017542	0.007	0.995
Income	.0599262	.0371888	1.611	0.107
Age	.0103899	.0045195	2.299	0.022
Gender	-.5098383	.1318488	-3.867	0.00
Pulaar	-.2431152	.1520089	-1.599	0.110
Wolof	-.1143973	.1550367	-0.738	0.461
Constant	-.3855001	.2503262	-1.540	0.124

Number of observations=1384

$\chi^2(7) = 83.95$
 $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$
 $\text{Log Likelihood} = -915.02967$
 $\text{Pseudo } R^2 = 0.0439$

As Table 35 reveals, the coefficient for years of NFE is positive and highly significant. On the other hand, formal education appears completely unrelated to contacting an official about a community problem. The coefficient for age is positive and significant. As noted earlier, prestige and power increase with age in traditional society, so it is not surprising that those who are older would be more likely to contact a public official. We would also expect those who are older to be leaders in their communities who would need to address community problems. The coefficient for gender is significant and negative. This result reflects the limitations put upon women's mobility and interactions in the societies of study. The coefficient for Pulaar is negative and comes close to being significant.

Table 36: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Official about a Community Problem for Rural Senegalese Women

Number of Years of NFE	Likelihood of Contacting an Official	95% Confidence Interval
0	.30	.22 to .38
1	.36	.28 to .45
1.27	.38	.30 to .46
2	.42	.34 to .52
2.4	.45	.37 to .54
3	.49	.41 to .59
4	.56	.46 to .66
6	.69	.58 to .79
10	.87	.77 to .93

The effect each year of NFE has on increasing the probability that one will contact an official about a community problem is considerable. Each year of NFE increases the probability of community contacting by about 6%. Thus, after completing a two-year program, the probability that a woman will contact a community official is about 42%.

Personal Contacting

Again, multivariate analysis is used to assess the effects of both NFE and formal education on the likelihood of contacting a public figure regarding a personal problem.

Table 37: Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Contacting an Official about a Personal Problem

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.205023	.0385028	5.325	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0203376	.018143	1.121	0.262
Income	.0407634	.0389685	1.046	0.296
Age	.0144816	.0047144	3.072	0.002
Gender	-.726214	.1395225	-5.205	0.000
Pulaar	.5319989	.1540126	3.454	0.001
Wolof	-.1815459	.1550819	-1.171	0.242
Constant	-.1091727	.257206	-0.424	0.671

Number of observations=1381

LR χ^2 (7) = 108.22

Prob > χ^2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -885.68885

Pseudo R^2 = 0.0576

As we can in Table 37, the coefficient for NFE is in the hypothesized direction and highly significant. This finding is consistent with the notion that NFE empowers women, thereby rendering them more assertive in the social world. The coefficients for age and

gender are also significant, probably for the same reasons noted in the discussion of community contacting. Interestingly, the coefficient for Pulaar in the community-contacting model is negative, although not quite significant, yet it is significant and positive in the personal contacting model. Thus, it seems that while community contacting and personal contacting are similar types of behaviors, they are far from being identical.

Table 38: The Effects of NFE on the Likelihood of Contacting an Official about a Personal Problem for Rural Senegalese Women

Number of Years of NFE	Likelihood of Contacting an Official	95% Confidence Interval
0	.51	.42 to .61
1	.56	.47 to .65
1.27	.58	.49 to .66
2	.61	.52 to .70
2.4	.63	.54 to .72
3	.66	.57 to .74
4	.70	.61 to .79
6	.78	.68 to .86
10	.89	.79 to .95

From Table 38 we can see that rural Senegalese women are much more likely to contact an official regarding a personal problem than they are regarding community problem.

For the first few years, each year of NFE increases the likelihood that one will contact a community official by about 5% per year. After about three years, the magnitude of the increase starts to decrease slightly. The difference in likelihood of contacting an official between those with no NFE and those who had two years is 10 percentage points. In short, NFE has a substantial impact on the probability of engaging in this behavior. Nonetheless, each year of NFE appears to increase the probability of contacting an

official about a community problem to a slightly greater degree than it does the probability of contacting an official about a personal problem.

Ethnic Pride

How does NFE affect levels of ethnic pride? Ordered logit is used to assess the effects of NFE and formal education on the likelihood of expressing ethnic pride.

Table 39: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Nonformal Education and General Control Variables on Ethnic Pride

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of nonformal education	.268792	.1172129	2.29	0.022
Years of Formal Schooling	-.1049364	.017545	-5.98	0.000
Income	-.0863009	.0354469	-2.43	0.015
Age	-.003358	.0044166	-0.76	0.447
Gender	.4194246	.1316451	3.19	0.001
Pulaar	.6310688	.1534262	4.11	0.000
Wolof	-.5141264	.1540156	-3.34	0.001

Number of observations = 1256

LR χ^2 (7) = 151.50

Prob > χ^2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -1205.8779

Pseudo R^2 = 0.0591

The “modernity variables,” formal education and income, have significant negative impacts on level of ethnic pride while nonformal education has a positive effect on level of ethnic pride and identification. NFE’s positive relationship with ethnic pride is undoubtedly related to the fact that NFE is usually conducted in the participant’s

maternal language. In addition, as noted earlier, the preservation of language and culture are goals explicitly associated with the Pulaar literacy movement.

Ruling Out Rival Hypotheses

I am able to assess the effects of what some call endogeneity and others call selection by comparing those who have had no NFE with those who have had less than a year of NFE on the relevant dimensions. Where these two groups are very similar, we can rule out selection as a threat to internal validity.

Table 40: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Community Participation and Level of NFE

Reported Doing All Six Activities	0 years of NFE	0<NFE≤1	1<NFE≤2	2<NFE≤3	Over 3 years of NFE
Yes	8%	14%	27%	30%	35%
Totals	(704)* 100	(215) 100	(293) 100	(122) 100	(143) 100

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

$$\text{Pearson } \chi^2(24) = 267.4197 \quad \text{Pr} = 0.000$$

Were selection responsible for the effects attributed to NFE, we would expect those in the first level of NFE to report having the all six of the community participation attributes at the same rate as those with higher levels of NFE. As can be seen in the cross tabulation, there is a small difference in the percentage of respondents with no NFE who have had a year or less of NFE (six percentage points), but there is a much greater difference between those with at most one year and those with between two years of NFE. Although only 14% of those with at most one year of NFE report having

participated in all six of the community participation activities, 27% of those in the two-year category report doing so, for a difference of thirteen percentage points. The percent increases to 30% in the three-year category, and to 35% for those with over three years of NFE. The percent of those with over three years of NFE who report having all six of the community participation attributes exceeds those with no NFE by 27 percentage points. Two years of NFE appears to be a threshold.

Table 41: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Political Engagement and Level of NFE

Reported Having All 3 Attributes	0 years of NFE	0<NFE≤1	1<NFE≤2	2<NFE≤3	Over 3 years of NFE
Yes	49%	49%	57%	57%	62%
Totals	(696)* 100	(213) 100	(293) 100	(122) 100	(143) 100

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

Pearson $\chi^2(12) = 23.4204$ Pr = 0.024

Once again, I assess the extent to which the effects attributed to NFE are actually due to selection. As we can see from the crosstabulation, there is essentially no difference in the likelihood that those with no NFE and those with only a little NFE will have a high level of political engagement. The threshold again appears to be at two years.

Table 42: Crosstabulation of Highest Level of Progressiveness and Level of NFE

“Progressive” Response for all 4 Questions	0 years of NFE	0<NFE≤1	1<NFE≤2	2<NFE≤3	Over 3 years of NFE
Yes	15%	14%	25%	33%	43%
Totals	(660)* 100	(208) 100	(292) 100	(121) 100	(141) 100

*number in parentheses serves as the base from which the percentages are calculated

Pearson $\chi^2(12) = 89.6352$ Pr = 0.000

Once again, selection does not appear responsible for the effects on progressiveness attributed to NFE. In fact, at 15%, the percentage of those with no NFE who opted for the “progressive” response on all four questions is nearly the same as the percentage of those with one-year or less of NFE and actually exceeds the percentage of those with one-year or less by one percentage point. On the other hand, 25% of those in the two-year category fell into the progressive category. Thus, once again, two years of NFE appears to be a threshold. The percentage opting for the “nonauthoritarian” response for all four questions increases to 33% for those in the three-year category, and climbs another 10 percentage points to 43% for the category of respondents who had over three years of NFE. Thus, the relationship between authoritarianism/progressiveness and level of NFE appears to be strong and monotonic, with each dose of NFE having a substantial impact on people’s level of authoritarianism after a threshold is met.

The relationships between NFE and the variables of interest seem remarkably similar in form. For the most part, there is very little difference between those with no NFE and those with only a little NFE. Of course, we would expect there to be some difference between these two groups since certain programs are designed to last for only

one year or less than a year and are still intended to have an effect on participants. We would expect the immediate effect to be the strongest on certain dimensions, such as community participation for numerous reasons. Many of those in NFE programs are recruited into other community development projects either by other organizations or villagers. After one year, members of these programs are often given responsibilities in community meetings. Thus, we do in fact see a small difference between these two groups on some dimensions such as community participation. The biggest effects seem to often come with two years of NFE, and two years seems like a threshold for many effects.

Thus, given the comparisons, “selection” or “endogeneity” seems highly unlikely as an alternative explanation for the effects observed. Perhaps someone could argue that in fact the effect could be caused by a combination of “selection and treatment” so that those in the NFE programs would not appear different at first, but actually are more likely to be active among other things, and then NFE simply adds to this base. This explanation seems implausible. First, one would expect this difference to be observable initially. Second, the effects of NFE go together in a coherent way. The same pattern of change is observed across nearly all of the dimensions of interest. It seems highly unlikely that these differences would all preexist but all nearly be invisible prior to the start of the program. Second, there is no theoretical reason to think that someone more supportive of democratic values would be more likely to join an NFE program than those less supportive of NFE. People usually join NFE programs in the hope of improving their lot in life without knowing much about them. For some, pursuing NFE functions as a way to contribute to the preservation of traditional culture, an end not in the least positively

connected to “progressiveness” or “support for democratic values.” Second, NFE appears to affect people in a very linear fashion after a certain threshold is met.

Perhaps one could argue that those with the most perseverance stay in the program the longest and therefore have more years of NFE than the others. Again, this explanation involves some type of selection/combination effect. However, there is no reason to believe that those with more years of NFE have greater amounts of perseverance than others. First, those with a year or less of NFE were not dropouts. I intended for the sample to include a certain number of people who were just beginning the program specifically so that selection effects could be assessed. Second, as noted, one of the programs only lasts for five or six months. Thus, many of those with less than a year of NFE successfully completed their programs.

In addition, the findings associated with the numerous in-depth qualitative interviews I conducted across Senegal from 1989 to 2000 all support the findings.

Moreover, I compared those in the control group who came from villages that had NFE and those in the control group who came from villages that did not have NFE with respect to the dependent variables. Chi square tests reveal no significant difference between these groups with regard to any of the dependent variables. In short, in many cases those with only a little NFE resemble those with no NFE, and the two groups of control respondents are nearly identical with regard to the dimensions of interest.

Finally, when asked why they did not participate in the relevant NFE program, those without NFE often said that they had been away from the village when the program started or that there was some type of impediment to joining the program. Many said that they would be involved in the future wave of classes for the program. In numerous cases,

classes were going to open in the “control” villages in the study. Thus, there do not seem to be many reasons to think that those in the control village differed from those in the NFE villages in any fundamental way. In short, the preponderance of evidence supports the notion that NFE has an impact on social capital, political behavior and attitudes.

Chapter 8

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study support the tenet that education is good for democracy. They also support the notion that education has a “universal transformatory effect,” as scholars like Lerner claimed. Both nonformal education and formal education could play important roles in the consolidation of democracy in Senegal. Nonformal education works much the same as formal education in instilling democratic attitudes. The results of this study indicate that nonformal education and formal education tend to have similar effects on many political orientations. However, in most cases, one year of NFE has a stronger effect on the orientation of interest than does formal education. Of course, formal education is intended to last much longer than NFE. Moreover, the target populations for these two types of education are different. All of the NFE programs at which I looked targeted adults, but formal education obviously targets children.⁶⁸ Overall, NFE seems to inspire more of a “civic” orientation than formal education, while formal education might have a stronger positive impact on some of the values associated with classical liberalism.

Community Participation

The effect of NFE on community participation is one of the notable findings. Those with NFE are more likely than those without NFE to report: 1) cooperating with others to solve a community problem; 2) belonging to a community organization; 3) holding a leadership position within an organization; 4) attending organizational meetings at least

⁶⁸ That is not to say that these organizations did not have components that worked with children. However, I was specifically interested in the programs centered on adults.

occasionally; 5) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally; and 6) getting together with others to raise an issue. NFE is also positively related to the number of community organizations to which an individual belongs.

The relationships involving nonformal education and community participation are strong and robust. First, nearly all of the indicators are statistically significant across all of the programs and subgroups (that is, across ethnolinguistic groups and regions of the country). Second, years of NFE registers statistically significant relationships with all of the indicators of community participation in multivariate analyses that control for formal education, gender, age, ethnicity, and income. Third, years of NFE and all of the individual program variables register statistically significant, positive relationships with the index of community involvement and leadership in multivariate analyses that include the control variables. In other words, each year of NFE increases the probability that one will have a high level of community involvement and leadership. Mondak and Gearing (1998) observe that “People who do not interact with one another may fail to develop an appreciation for any form of communal good, and thus they may be limited in their capacity to see politics in terms of general rather than purely personal interests” (p. 616). NFE encourages high levels of participation in the community and thus encourages individuals to interact with others, perhaps outside the immediate family. Such interactions should help to hone an appreciation of the public good. Moreover, the high level of communal participation on the part of those with NFE is evidence that NFE in itself hones an appreciation of the public good.

The findings indicate that the NFE experience engenders something other than simple collectivism and togetherness. In fact, from the results of this study, it would seem that

NFE does increase individual consciousness. As noted earlier, those with nonformal education find that their views differ from those around them with greater frequency than those do those in the control group. At the same time, NFE encourages higher levels of participation in the community and thus encourages interactions with others, perhaps outside the immediate family. NFE seems to promote an understanding that one can interact and have fruitful relationships with others without having to be identical with them in terms of outlook. In addition, this consciousness of individuality may lead one to respect the individual integrity of others to greater to degree. In fact, reporting that one has opinions that differ from others is positively related to reporting progressive and democratic values and community participation. Although formal education also has an impact on community participation, it is not as strong as that of NFE for reasons discussed earlier.

Political Participation

NFE does indeed appear to have a positive impact on political participation. Those who have nonformal education are more likely to discuss politics with others and belong to a political party. In multivariate analyses, PAPA, Tostan, and PIP are also found to have a statistically significant, positive relationship with engagement/interest in politics. NFE also increases the likelihood that one will register to vote. Participation in all of the individual programs in the study is positively associated with registering to vote. PAPA and PAPF appear to be the programs most strongly related to electoral participation. Of course, electoral participation and civic participation are not necessarily synonymous in Senegal. In Senegal, citizens tend to pursue narrow individual interests via electoral participation as opposed to more generalized interests. Indeed, the lack of

policy debate during electoral campaigns reflects the sometimes personal-interest driven, myopic nature of the political sphere in Senegal.

NFE also increases the probability that an individual will contact a public figure regarding both community and personal problems. This contacting behavior seems to imply that NFE endows people with additional confidence to negotiate in the social world. In terms of democracy, it is more favorable to have people exhibiting a civic orientation by contacting officials about a community rather than personal problem. The problems associated with narrowly self-interested behavior were discussed earlier. The consolidation of democracy necessitates that people have some sense of the public good. It also necessitates that they manifest the correct balance between engaging with the state and self-reliance.

Political Efficacy

There does not appear to be a relationship between feelings of political efficacy and NFE. That the effects of nonformal education are ambiguous at most in regard to feelings of political efficacy is perhaps, upon reflection, not so surprising. An empirical evaluation of the performance of the political system would not necessarily lead one to be an optimist about direct change occurring at the level of the community due to electoral behavior. Tostan's objectives are imbued with notions of empowering participants and inspiring the types of feelings of efficacy like those about which we ask, so it is not too surprising that Tostan is one of the programs to show a relationship with this variable in multivariate analyses (the other program showing a relationship is PAPF). Still the relationships appear weak and do not seem to be robust across different specifications of

the model. Thus, I cannot speak with much confidence about the relationship between political efficacy and NFE.

As noted earlier, NFE appears to inspire feelings of individual efficacy in terms of grappling with the problems and situations within the more immediate environment. Perhaps villagers simply realistically perceive the little impact they are likely to have on the governmental process, or perhaps the structures of government seem too distant for them to feel like they can have an impact.

Progressive and Democratic Attitudes

Those who have had NFE are likely to be more progressive and less authoritarian and traditional than those who have not had NFE. These findings are striking. The Halpulaar communities covered by the survey are very conservative. Islam is deeply established in these communities, and the Halpulaar culture is perhaps the most patriarchal in Senegal. That formal education would tend to mitigate the very conservative social values that characterize the milieu is not too surprising. However, NFE appears to have a positive impact on the likelihood that people will opine that, for example, women should be able to make their own political choices.

When the effects of individual programs were examined, the relationships are limited to the programs of Tostan and PIP, but the effects are consistent across regions and ethnolinguistic groups. What is particularly interesting about the findings regarding the authoritarianism indicators is that a program that does not explicitly attempt to impart social messages tended to have the same effects as one that does. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that these effects are closely tied to the content (i.e., in terms of topics covered in the class) of the program since PIP does not explicitly address these types of

issues in its program. However, PIP “facilitators,” like those of Tostan, have been trained in participatory methods. Perhaps there is something about having the experience of being part of a participatory learning environment that encourages a more progressive way of thinking. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, PIP uses the very well respected curriculum developed by ARED. ARED also has a strong record in the area of literature in national languages as well, which means that those who have participated in the PIP program have material to read. It has published translations of great literary works, such as *Ambiguous Adventure* by Cheikh Hamidou Kane, and published novels and sets of traditional children’s stories already written in Pulaar. In the two-year period between June, 1994 and June, 1996, ARED sold 10,933 reading books in Pulaar and 1,784 books in national languages other than Pulaar. The reach of ARED has increased considerably since 1996. ARED now sells between 30,000 and 50,000 reading books (literature), most of which are in Senegalese languages, each year (Easton and Fagerberg-Diallo 2001).

Thus, not only are organizations like ARED producing and publishing materials for those literate in Pulaar, but these materials are indeed being consumed, as indicated by the sales of written materials. In addition, without being directly asked about their reading habits, in the qualitative interviews, many respondents volunteered that they had consulted various books published and sold by ARED in the course of addressing problems or issues in their lives. As noted below, some of these books were work related, while others were related to health, or legal rights.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ For example, in a group interview in Ross Bethio, much to the seeming embarrassment of some of the men in the group, one female respondent exuberantly volunteered the information that she had read a book about childbirth. She noted that she had explained everything she learned to several other women.

NFE also has a positive relationship with support for democratic values, although the relationship was not as strong as with authoritarianism/traditionalism. Formal education had a stronger effect on the likelihood of holding democratic values. This finding seems to make sense. The democratic values about which respondents were asked reflect classical liberal western values. That these values would be more effectively instilled in a school setting inspired by the western model is not too surprising. What is most striking is that NFE does have a positive effect on the likelihood of expressing such democratic values.

Once again, when I looked at the individual programs using multivariate analyses, only the programs of PIP and Tostan were found to have a statistically significant relationship with support for democratic values. This finding might indicate what I suspected. PAPA and PAPF are relatively shallow programs and tend to generate network effects. PIP and Tostan have more intensive programs that appear to have a more profound effect on individuals.

The findings that NFE has significant effects on the values associated with democracy are of tremendous importance. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) observe:

In general, cultural theories suggest that democratization will develop most rapidly in the nontraditional sectors of the nation—that is, among the young and better-educated; in the cities, rather in the rural areas; in the service, rather than the agricultural, sectors in the economy; and probably among men, as compared to women (858).

This study covers the most traditional sectors of Senegal. All of the respondents are from rural areas, the vast majority of respondents are women, and the vast majority of the male respondents are farmers. Among those women who did not report being a housewife as their primary occupation, the majority said they were farmers. In addition, all but twenty of the respondents are Muslim. Hence, the substantial effect NFE has had on those in the

most traditional sectors of society seems quite extraordinary and points to the prominent role NFE could play in social transformation more generally.

The results of this study indicate that nonformal education and formal education tend to have similar effects on many political orientations. However, the effects of formal education and NFE on ethnic pride and salience are nearly opposite in nature. Formal education has a significant negative effect on the level of ethnic pride. On the other hand, NFE has a significant positive effect on ethnic pride. It is in this area that the effects of education appear to be contextual as opposed to universal. The Pulaar exhibit the highest levels of ethnic pride, and this pride appears intensified by the NFE experience. In many ways, the Pulaar were marginalized during the colonial experience. The Pulaar, according to many, fear acculturation, so it is not surprising that they would assert their pride in being Pulaar when asked. Moreover, Pulaar literacy is seen as a vehicle through which the Pulaar language can be preserved and elevated.

Therefore, on the one hand, PIP, for example, is indeed fulfilling its goal of “opening a window to the world.” Although promoting literacy in national languages may not function as the integrative force that the modernization scholars theorized, NFE has seemed to decrease levels of traditionalism and authoritarianism. On the other hand, it also appears to be promoting its goal of elevating the Pulaar language. Programs, such as PIP, appear to increase the level of ethnic pride people express. What must be examined is whether this is a positive pride that endues people with the confidence that translates into achievement or whether the effects are not so positive.

Implications for Socialization Theory

The findings of this study are important for another reason. According to socialization theory, those experiences one has as a child serve as a filter for later experiences (Eckstein 1988). Stolle and Hooghe (2002) point out that youth experiences are very much related to the types of activities in which adults engage. They cite the political socialization literature, which finds that the political attitudes and behavior of adults are shaped by youth experiences. These attitudes and behavior then tend to stay fairly constant during adult life (1). Stolle and Hooghe's results largely corroborate the socialization school of thought and support the notion that social participation among adults produces predominantly "network effects" as opposed to "attitudinal effects." Therefore, research efforts on social capital that focus on youth promise to be more fruitful than those that focus on adults, they contend. This study shows that Stolle and Hooghe's (2002) contention is unwarranted. The experiences of adulthood can have significant effects on political behavior and attitudes, and so it is therefore worthwhile to study the effects of adult experiences.

Policy Implications

From a policy-making standpoint, this study shows that interventions for adults can have significant positive effects and thus such interventions should be maintained and pursued. As for the policy-making implications for NFE more specifically, this study shows that NFE can have important impacts on behaviors and attitudes. The attitudinal effects seem at least somewhat tied to the content of the NFE program. Thus, the curricula of NFE programs appear to be worthy of significant attention. NFE could be a potent force in the promotion of democratic and civic orientations. On the other, it seems

possible that NFE could potentially promote values not so positive vis-à-vis democracy in certain circumstances.

While the findings do seem to indicate that the content of a program matters vis-à-vis certain types of effects, they also indicate that simply participating in a nonformal education program has important effects. Two years appeared to be the threshold period for many of the important effects of literacy programs to take place. That is, an additional year of literacy training still generates desirable effects as does only a year of training, but two years seems to be key for certain effects (*but not all*) to manifest themselves. PAPF is considering moving to a 24-month program. The findings of this study indicate that such a move could be beneficial to participants. Although civic education classes may teach specific lessons on democratic behavior, nonformal education might potentially have a strong impact on democratic orientation without explicitly incorporating political lessons into its curriculum. Of course, were programs to include such lessons, perhaps the impacts would be even greater than those which we have seen in this study.

NFE Contributes to Women's Empowerment

Women are over represented in NFE programs partly because of their exclusion from formal education. Thus, NFE is in some ways a compensatory measure taken to help improve the situation of women. The results of this study indicate that NFE makes a significant contribution to the empowerment of women. NFE increases the probability that women will participate in the community and take on leadership positions. NFE also increases the likelihood that women will become politically active. As noted, participation in community organizations leads women to acquire civic skills and

generally renders them more efficacious in the political realm. Hence, it is likely that the initial effects of NFE will be built upon by women's experiences in community organizations and activities.

Effects Likely to Intensify Over Time

It seems reasonable to assume that not all of NFE's effects are immediate or direct. An important consideration is the link between education, civil society and democracy. NFE heightens participation in civil society both in terms of breadth (the number organizations to which one belongs) and depth (taking on leadership positions and actively participating in meetings). Participation in civil society should mediate and intensify other educational effects. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) find that education increases ones involvement in voluntary organizations and activities, which increases one's civic skills, which in turn increases one's level of political participation. In the long run, participation in the community is theorized to increase interpersonal trust and support for democratic values.

Conclusion

The findings regarding the effects of NFE on political behaviors and attitudes are strong, robust and consistent. Although it is true that analyses of larger samples tend to show even small relationships, nearly all of the relationships identified in the analyses of all respondents were also statistically significant when these analyses were restricted to small subgroups of the sample. Moreover, the findings of the bivariate analyses were largely consistent with those of the multivariate analyses.

NFE walks a line between two forces: being an authentic manifestation of the local culture and serving as "a window to the world." On the one hand, NFE can serve

to affirm and valorize indigenous culture and language. In so doing, NFE can draw upon and reinforce local knowledge and capacities. At the same time, NFE programs can allow people to connect with forces outside of their families and villages and thereby decrease the insularity of villages. Generally speaking, it does seem that people want to connect with something beyond their village and widen their horizons. By allowing people to make this connection and feel this dynamism in their own village, NFE could make migration to cities and towns less attractive.

Many of those who have studied NFE programs have been unimpressed by testimonies that increased solidarity and mutual aid resulted from literacy programs. Since cooperation is at the heart of addressing community issues and self-governance, these effects have not received the attention they merit. Indeed, it is human beings inability to voluntarily cooperate to achieve coordinated action in the pursuit of the public good that necessitates government in the first place. What does seem clear from the results of the study is that NFE is about much more than acquiring literacy skills or learning about thematic areas of importance. NFE seems to contribute to the construction of “civic community.” NFE constitutes a social experience that confers a type of social capital upon the learners and community alike. And it is social capital that Putnam claims is “the key to making democracy work” (1993, 185).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS

Table A.1: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar Respondents in St. Louis

	Those without PIP		Those with PIP	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	140	34	168	46*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	140	62	168	86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	140	81	168	95*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	115	49	159	71*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	140	54	168	73*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	140	17	168	57*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	140	66	168	67
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	91	79	114	78
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	91	73	113	76
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	91	66	113	55
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	92	60	115	43
At least somewhat interested in politics. Question 33	140	51	168	47
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	140	60	168	74*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	140	54	167	69*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	138	80	168	79
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	136	44	168	34
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	135	70	168	66

Table A.1 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	137	82	167	77
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness				
Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	139	68	168	79*
Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	139	32	168	50*
Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees." (Question 71)	114	32	85	52*
Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	140	46	101	60*
Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	139	65	168	79*
Trust				
Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	140	62	167	58
Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	138	26	167	19
Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	138	22	167	25
Individualism/Cultural Distance				
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	140	67	168	86*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	140	64	168	83*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	139	59	168	83*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	140	62	168	82*
Support for Democratic Values				
Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	136	82	167	80

Table A.1 (cont'd)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	138	18	165	33
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	138	22	166	21
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	139	58	167	68
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	137	75	168	80
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	139	50	168	40
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	140	33	167	38
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	139	71	167	71
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	140	59	168	78*

*Difference in percentages between non-PIP and PIP respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table A.2: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PIP Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar Women Respondents in St. Louis

	Women without PIP		Women with PIP	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	97	24	114	40*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	97	66	114	84*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	97	79	114	93*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	78	36	106	68*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	97	51	114	69*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	97	18	114	54*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	97	68	114	61
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	66	79	70	81
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	66	71	69	78
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	66	64	69	54
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	66	56	71	35*
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	97	70	114	70
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	97	57	114	71*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	97	55	113	67
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	96	77	114	75
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	96	42	114	34
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	93	70	114	68
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	94	82	114	75
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness				
Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	97	68	114	76

Table A.2 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	97	29	114	44*
Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees." (Question 71)	83	31	61	57*
Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	97	44	114	64*
Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	97	68	114	81*
Percent choosing, "Thanks to modernization, the caste system is now obsolete." (Question 74)	95	17	113	18
Trust				
Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	97	62	114	60
Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	96	30	114	18*
Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	95	23	114	32
Individualism/Cultural Distance				
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	97	64	114	83*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	97	60	114	80*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	96	54	114	80*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	97	56	114	78*
Support for Democratic Values				
Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	93	80	114	75
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	95	14	111	28*
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	97	23	113	22

Table A.2 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	96	59	114	61
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	94	74	114	79
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	97	42	114	41
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	97	31	114	35
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	96	67	114	72
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	97	57	114	79*

*Difference in percentages between non-PIP and PIP respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table A.3: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having Tostan Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Haalpulaar Respondents in St. Louis

	Respondents without Tostan		Respondents with Tostan	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	140	31	124	59*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	140	62	124	85*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	140	81	124	92*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	115	49	116	77*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	140	54	124	68*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	140	16	123	40*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	140	66	124	63
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	91	79	78	82
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	91	73	78	77
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	91	66	78	56
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	92	60	78	37*
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	140	70	124	73
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	140	60	124	83*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	140	54	124	69*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	138	80	123	82
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	136	44	124	40
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	135	70	124	75
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	137	82	123	79

Table A.3 (cont'd)**Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness**

Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	139	68	124	83*
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Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	139	32	124	54*
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Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her	114	32	124	48*
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right to speak out about politics, even if her

husband disagrees." (Question 71)

Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	140	46	123	54
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Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	139	65	123	82*
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Trust

Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	140	62	124	58
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Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	138	26	124	30
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Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	138	22	123	34*
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Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	140	67	124	90*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	140	64	124	83*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	139	59	124	85*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	140	62	124	81*
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Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	136	82	124	72*
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Table A.3 (cont'd)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	138	18	123	36*
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	138	22	123	19
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	139	58	124	60
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	137	75	123	78
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	139	50	124	56
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	140	33	122	49*
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	139	71	124	77
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	140	59	124	71*

*Difference in percentages between non-Tostan and Tostan respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table A.4: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having Tostan Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Female Respondents in Diourbel & Thies

	Respondents without Tostan		Respondents with Tostan	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	169	39	152	70*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	170	72	152	90*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	169	86	152	97*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	147	28	147	75*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	170	48	152	82*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	169	17	152	56*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	170	62	152	81
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	104	88	123	87
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	104	82	123	84
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	103	64	123	72
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	103	53	123	59
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	168	83	152	81
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	170	66	152	81*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	165	56	151	77*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	159	83	147	87
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	159	50	149	53
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	158	77	151	70
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	162	75	151	81

Table A.4 (cont'd)**Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness**

Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	165	47	152	75*
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Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	168	23	151	47*
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Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her	157	31	150	55*
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right to speak out about politics, even if her

husband disagrees." (Question 71)

Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	161	59	150	63
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Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	164	40	151	43
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Trust

Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	166	86	150	91
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Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	154	37	148	27*
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Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	164	65	150	57
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Individualism/Cultural Distance

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	170	59	152	88*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	170	63	152	83*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	170	56	152	85*
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At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	170	56	151	81*
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Support for Democratic Values

Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	170	67	152	74
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Table A.4 (cont'd)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	165	11	148	34*
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	162	41	146	45
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	166	39	151	50*
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	155	70	152	80
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	165	50	152	63*
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	158	27	145	37
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	155	65	150	73
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	164	79	151	87*

*Difference in percentages between non-Tostan and Tostan respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table A.5: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PAPA Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Regions of Thies, St. Louis and Kaolack

	Respondents without PAPA		Respondents with PAPA	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	309	34	165	49*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	309	66	166	86*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	308	80	166	90*
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	250	33	150	49*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	309	48	166	58*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	308	16	166	31*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	309	64	166	70
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	198	83	115	88
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	198	77	115	86
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	197	60	116	63
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	197	47	116	57
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	308	77	165	85*
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	309	61	166	71*
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	306	54	165	68*
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	298	78	162	85
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	301	46	163	50
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	293	69	161	68
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	300	74	161	75
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness				
Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	303	57	164	56

Table A.5 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	306	26	165	29
Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees." (Question 71)	278	32	160	37
Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	300	50	164	63*
Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	304	49	163	47
Trust				
Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	306	75	165	82
Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	296	31	162	31
Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	304	42	163	52
Individualism/Cultural Distance				
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	309	67	166	75
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	309	66	166	69
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	308	62	166	67
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	309	61	166	68
Support for Democratic Values				
Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	304	75	166	74
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	303	15	164	12
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	305	34	162	33
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	302	47	166	41

Table __ (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	293	71	163	69
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	306	49	162	46
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	297	34	162	32
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	294	64	162	60
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	304	70	164	71

*Difference in percentages between non-PAPA and PAPA respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

Table A.6: Summary of Findings Regarding the Relationship Between Having PAPF Training and Exhibiting Certain Civic Behaviors and Orientations for Respondents in Diourbel & Louga

	Respondents without PAPF		Respondents with PAPF	
	n	%	n	%
Community Participation				
Ever cooperated to solve community problem. (Question 24)	104	34	104	62*
Belong to a community organization. (Question 20)	106	73	104	87*
Attend at least some organizational meetings. (Question 22)	106	87	104	93
Speak out at meetings at least on occasion. (Question 23)	92	24	97	54*
Gotten together with others to raise issue at least once. (Question 38B)	106	42	104	67*
Hold at least one leadership position in an organization. (Question 21D)	106	14	104	43*
Political Participation				
Registered to vote. (Question 27)	106	61	104	63
Voted in first round of presidential election. (2000) (Question 29A)	65	86	66	85
Voted in second round of presidential election (2000) (Question 29B)	65	85	66	82
Voted in parliamentary elections. (1998) (Question 29C)	65	62	66	61
Voted in local elections. (1996) (Question 29 D)	65	63	66	45*
At least somewhat interested in politics. (Question 33)	104	68	104	44
Discuss politics at least sometimes. (Question 34)	104	69	104	74
Feel close to a political party. (Question 35)	102	64	104	69
Political Efficacy				
Percent choosing, "In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinion of others." (Question 45)	102	79	103	83
Percent choosing, "I can usually understand the way government works." (Question 46)	102	55	104	46
Percent choosing, "As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems." (Question 47).	104	74	104	76
Percent choosing, "We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives." (Question 48)	103	80	104	80
Authoritarianism/Traditionalism or Progressiveness				

Table A.6 (cont'd)

Percent choosing, "Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues." (Question 69)	102	49	104	71*
Percent choosing, "Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote for him/herself." (Question 70)	104	24	104	30
Percent choosing, "A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees." (Question 71)	101	31	104	47*
Percent choosing, "We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development." (Question 72)	104	54	104	63
Percent choosing, "In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness." (Question 73)	102	45	104	51
Trust				
Percent choosing, "For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch." (Question 53)	105	85	104	85
Percent choosing, "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted." (Question 54)	100	35	104	31
Percent that thinks that "people more inclined to help others than to look out for themselves." (Question 55)	102	65	104	52
Individualism/Cultural Distance				
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58A)	106	57	104	77*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives. (Question 58B)	106	59	104	74*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)	106	49	104	74*
At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)	106	52	104	72*
Support for Democratic Values				
Think those who are not literate should have the right to vote. (Question 49)	106	67	104	74
DISAGREE or strongly disagree that if people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party. (Question 50A)	104	8	101	21*

Table A.6 (cont'd)

DISAGREE or strongly disagree that to compromise is dangerous because you betray your own side. (Question 50E)	97	39	102	32
Percent choosing, "All people should be permitted to voted, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election." (Question 52)	105	29	104	38
Percent choosing, "If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them." (Question 51)	100	73	103	76
Locus of control				
Percent choosing, "People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life." (Question 67)	104	44	103	58*
Percent choosing "For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me." (Question 64)	100	33	103	36
Percent choosing, "When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work." (Question 65)	100	77	101	73
Percent choosing, "With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals." (Question 66)	104	82	104	83

*Difference in percentages between non-PAPF and PAPF respondents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH

CIVIC PARTICIPATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Village Number _____ Respondent Number _____

Civic/Political Attitudes Questionnaire

Hello. My name is [INTERVIEWER: SAY YOUR NAME]. I am working on behalf of _____. I do not represent the government or any other political party. I would like to examine citizens' views on community and political participation in Senegal. As part of this research project, I would like to ask you a few questions. The information that we are gathering will be used in a report for USAID.

There are no right or wrong answers. Instead, we are interested in what you think.

You are not obligated to take part in the survey and you may refuse to answer any particular question. You can stop participating in the interview at any time and previously collected data will not be used. The data emanating from this survey will only be reported in aggregate form. Your name will not be used and your answers will be kept strictly confidential, so you can feel free to answer openly and honestly. The interview will take about one hour. Do you wish to proceed?

[IF YES, FILL IN THE FOLLOWING]

Date _____	Name of Enumerator _____	
Region _____	Department _____	Arrondissement _____
Communauté rurale _____	Village _____	

1. How old were you at on your last birthday? <i>[If respondent cannot answer] In which year were you born?</i>	
<i>[Write in age]</i>	
<i>[Write in year born]</i>	
Could not determine age <i>[Enter DK for "Don't Know"]</i>	

2. [Enumerator: indicate the respondent's gender]:	
Male	0
Female	1

3. What is your marital status? Are you currently:	
Married	1
Never married.	2
Divorced	3
Widowed	4
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

4. Do you have any children?	
<i>[If No, _____ and go to Q. _____]</i>	
No	0
Yes	1

5. What is your ethnicity?	
HaalPulaar	1
Fulbe	2
Wolof	3
Sonninke	4
Bamabara	5
Majak	6
Serer	7
Other, please specify _____	8
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

6. Now, I have a few questions about the languages you are able to speak. For each of the following languages of communication, please indicate if:

- If you are only able to speak the language.
- You are also able to read a little in the language.

- You are able to write in the language.

A. French	
No proficiency whatsoever	0
You speak French.	1
You speak and read French.	2
You speak, read and write in French.	3
Don't know <i>[Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]</i>	9

B. Wolof	
No proficiency whatsoever	0
You speak Wolof.	1
You speak and read Wolof.	2
You speak, read and write in Wolof.	3
Don't know <i>[Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]</i>	9

C. Pulaar	
No proficiency whatsoever	0
You speak Pulaar.	1
You speak and read Pulaar.	2
You speak, read and write in Pulaar.	3
Don't know <i>[Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]</i>	9

6D. Serer	
No proficiency whatsoever	0
You speak Serer.	1
You speak and read Serer.	2
You speak, read and write in Serer.	3
Don't know <i>[Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]</i>	9

6E. Arab	No	Yes	DK
1) You speak Arab. =parlarab	0	1	9
2) You read Arab. =readarab	0	1	9
3) You write Arab. =writearab	0	1	9

6F. Other, specify:	
No proficiency whatsoever	0
You speak _____.	1
You speak and read _____.	2
You speak, read, and write _____.	3
Don't know <i>[Item not to be communicated to the interviewee]</i>	9

7. What is your religion, if any?	
None [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	0
Islam [<i>If Islamic, go to Q9</i>]	1
Catholic [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	2
Protestant (mainstream) [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	3
Protestant (evangelical/pentecostal) [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	4
Traditional religion [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	6
Don't know [PUT 999 POUR Q9]	9

8. To which brotherhood do you belong, if any?	
None	0
Tidjane	1
Mouride	2
Khadir	3
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]	9

9. How much formal education have you had?	
No formal schooling	1
Some primary schooling	2
Primary school completed	3
Some high school	4
High school completed	5
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university	6
Some university, college	7
University, college completed	8
Post-graduate	9
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]	10

10. How many years of formal education have you had?	
[Enumerator: record the number of years]	
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]	99

11. How many years of Coranic schooling have you had?	
[Enumerator: record the number of years; if none, record 0 years]	
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]	99

12. Have you ever had any literacy training in a national language?	
No <i>[If No, enter 00 for questions 13-18.]</i>	0
Yes	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

13. Who sponsored this literacy program?	
[Enumerator: write down the organization here]	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

14. In what language were you trained?	
NA	0
Pulaar	1
Wolof	2
Sonninke	3
Bambara	4
Majak	5
Serer	6
French	7
Other, specify _____	8
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

15. How many years of literacy training have you had?	
[Enumerator: record the number of years]	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

16. How many months out of the year did your class meet?	
[Enumerator: record the number of months]	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

17. How many weeks per month did your class meet?	
[Enumerator: record the number of weeks]	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

18. How many hours per week did your class meet?	
[Enumerator: record the number of hours]	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

19. What is your main occupation?	
Unemployed	00
Farmer	01
Informal Marketeer	02
Businessperson	03
Clerical Worker	04
Artisan	05
Domestic Worker	06
Miner	07
Technical Worker	08
Teacher	09
Government Worker	10
NGO Worker	11
Professional	12
Retired	13
Housewife	14
Student	15
Marabout, clergyman	16
Commercial	17
Other <i>[Enumerator: Specify on this line]</i>	99

[Community Involvement]

20. Are you a member of any community association or organization? <i>[If no, continue with question _____].</i>	
No <i>[IF NO, PUT 999 FOR QS 24A-D]</i>	0
Yes	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

<p>21. A. Please list the associations and organizations to which you belong. [ENUMERATE OR: USE LINES BELOW].</p>	<p>21. B. What type of association is this?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Village Development Association 2) Youth Group 3) Sports and Cultural Association 4) Women's Group (affiliated with Fédération Nationale des Groupements Féminins) 5) Women's Tontine or credit circle 6) Groupement d'Intérêt Économique (GIE) 7) Religious organization 8) Parent-teacher association (APE) 9) Cellule école milieu 10) Cultural movement or association 11) Local health committee 12) Local water management committee 13) Trade union/farmer organization 14) Other, please specify_____ 	<p>21. C. In the past year, how often have you attended the meetings of your community organizations?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Always 2) Often 3) Sometimes 4) Rarely 5) Never 9) <i>DK (Don't Read)</i> 	<p>21. D. Which leadership position, if any, do you hold or did you hold in any of these organizations?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) None 2) President 3) Vice-President 4) Treasurer 5) Secretary 6) Other, please specify_____
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22. How often do you attend village-wide meetings: always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never?					
Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never [IF NEVER PUT 999 FOR Q26]	DK [Do not read]
1	2	3	4	5	9

23. How often do you speak out in public at these meetings: always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never?					
Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	DK [Do not read]
1	2	3	4	5	9

24. A. Have you ever worked or cooperated with others in this village/town to try to solve some of the problems of this village/town?	
No [IF NO, PUT 999 FOR Q24B]	0
Yes	1
Don't know [Do not read]	9

[IF YES] 24. B. Describe:

25. During the last five years, how often have you contacted--that is gone to see or spoken to--any of the following leaders or government officials to obtain help in resolving a personal problem?				
	Never	Only once	Sometimes	Often
A. a village chief	0	1	2	3
B. a member of the rural council	0	1	2	3
C. a National Assembly representative	0	1	2	3
D. the governor	0	1	2	3
E. an official of a government ministry	0	1	2	3
F. a marabout	0	1	2	3
G. the prefet	0	1	2	3
H. the sous-prefet	0	1	2	3
I. some other influential person, please specify	0	1	2	3

26. During the last five years, how often have you contacted--that is gone to see or spoken to--any of the following leaders or government officials to obtain help in resolving a community problem?				
	Never	Only once	Sometimes	Often
A. a village chief	0	1	2	3
B. a member of the rural council	0	1	2	3
C. a National Assembly representative	0	1	2	3
D. the governor	0	1	2	3
E. an official of a government ministry	0	1	2	3

F. a marabout	0	1	2	3
G. the prefet	0	1	2	3
H. the sous-prefet	0	1	2	3
I. some other influential person, please specify	0	1	2	3

Political Participation

27. Are you a registered voter?	
No	0
Yes <i>[If yes, go to Q.]</i>	1

28. <i>[If yes, circle 0 = not applicable.] [If no] Why not?</i>	
Not applicable	0
Missed registration	1
Ill health	2
Absent from area	3
Voter card lost	4
No I.D. card	5
No birth registration	6
Under 18 during registration	7
Not interested in voting	8
Otherwise engaged	9
Other <i>[Specify]</i>	10
<i>[Go to Q.]</i>	

29. Understanding that some Senegalese choose not to vote, let me ask you: Did you vote:	No	Yes
A. In the first round of the Presidential election of February 2000? <i>[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: that is, the last elections for President.]</i>	0	1
B. In the second round of the Presidential election of March 2000? <i>[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: that is, the last elections for President.]</i>	0	1
C. In the National Assembly elections of May 1998? <i>[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: that is, the last elections for Parliament.]</i>	0	1
D. In the local government elections of 1996?	0	1

30. For whom did you vote in the first round of the presidential election of 2000?

Not Applicable	0
Abdou Diouf	1
Abdoulaye Wade	2
Moustapha Niasse	3
Djibo Ka	4
Ibder de Thiam	5
Osseny Fall	6
Cheikh Dieye	7
Mademba Sock	8
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9
Prefer not to say <i>[Do Not Read]</i>	10

32. For whom did you vote in the second round of the presidential election of 2000?	
Not Applicable	0
Abdou Diouf	1
Abdoulaye Wade	2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9
Prefer not to say <i>[Do Not Read]</i>	10

32. When you voted for the National Assembly, did you do it to support an individual or a party?	
Individual	1
Party	2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

33. How interested are you in politics and government?	
Not interested	0
Somewhat interested	1
Very interested	2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

34. How often do you discuss politics and government with other people?	
Never	0

Sometimes	1
Often	2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

35. Do you feel close to a political party ? <i>[If No, mark -99 for Q 40 and continue with 41]</i>	
No	0
Yes	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

36. [IF YES] To which party do you feel close?	
Parti Socialiste (PS)	01
L'Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP)	02
Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS)	03
And Jef/Parti pour la Democratique et le Socialisme (AJ/PADS)	04
Convention des Democratres et des Patriotes/ Garab-gi (CDP-Garab-gi)	05
Defense de l'Unite Senegalaise (DUS)	06
Front pour le Socialisme et la Democratie Benno Jubel (FSD/BJ)	07
Ligue Democratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD/MPT)	08
Mouvement Democratique Populaire (MDP)	09
Mouvement Republicain Senegalais (MRS)	10
Parti Africain de l'Independence (PAI)	11
Parti Democratique Senegalais / Renovation (PDS/R)	12
Parti pour l'Independance et du Travail (PIT)	13
Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple (PLP)	14
Parti Populaire Senegalais (PPS)	15
Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA)	16
Rassemblement National Democratique (RND)	17
Union Democratique Senegalaise / Renovation (UDS/R)	18
Union Populaire Senegalaise / Renovation (UDS/R)	19
Union Populaire Senegalaise (UPS)	20
URD	21
Other <i>[Enumerator: Specify on this line]</i> _____	22
Don't Know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99
Not Applicable <i>[Do not read]</i>	-99

37. Did your party affiliation change after the most recent presidential election?	
No	0
Yes	1

Not Applicable <i>[Do not read]</i>	9
-------------------------------------	---

38. Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me how often you, personally, have done any of these things during the last five years.				
	Never	Only once	Sometimes	Often
A. attending a community meeting	0	1	2	3
B. getting together with others to raise an issue	0	1	2	3
C. attending an election rally	0	1	2	3
D. working for a political candidate or party	0	1	2	3
E. signing a petition	0	1	2	3
F. writing a letter to a newspaper	0	1	2	3
G. attending a demonstration	0	1	2	3

Political Knowledge and Exposure

39. When you hear the word “democracy”, what is the first thing that comes to your mind? <i>[Enumerator: Prompt if necessary: “What, if anything, does ‘democracy’ mean to you?”]</i>		

40. People associate democracy with many different meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, how important is each of these: <i>[Probe for strength of opinion]</i>					
	Very Important	Important	Not Very Important	Not At All Important	DK <i>[Do not read]</i>
A. Majority rule	1	2	3	4	9
B. Complete freedom for anyone to criticize the government	1	2	3	4	9
C. Regular elections	1	2	3	4	9
D. At least two political parties competing with each other	1	2	3	4	9

E. Basic necessities like shelter, food and water for everyone	1	2	3	4	9
F. Jobs for everyone	1	2	3	4	9
G. Equality in education	1	2	3	4	9
H. A small income gap between rich and poor	1	2	3	4	9

<i>[Enumerator: Ask only if respondent has some idea what democracy is]</i>	
45. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Senegal today?	
Not a democracy	0
Major problems, but still a democracy	1
Minor problems, but still a democracy	2
Full democracy	3
Not applicable	9

42. Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Senegal?	
<i>[Enumerator: Probe to see how strongly opinion is held]</i>	
Very dissatisfied	1
Somewhat dissatisfied	2
Somewhat satisfied	3
Very satisfied	4
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

43. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?	
A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.	1
B. In certain situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable.	2
C. To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have.	3
Don't Know.	9

44. How often do you get news from:							
	Never	Less than once a month	About once a month	About once a week	Several times a week	Every day	DK <i>[Do not read]</i>

A. The radio?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. Television?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Newspapers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9

[Political Efficacy]

45. I am now going to give you several pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: In discussions about politics with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others.	2	1
B: As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbors do not listen to me.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

46.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: The way the government operates sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on.	2	1
B: I can usually understand the way that government	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

47.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: As a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems.	2	1
B: We are usually unable to make our elected representatives listen to us.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

48.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: No matter who we vote for, things will not get any better in the future.	2	1
B: We can use our power as voters to choose leaders	3	4

who will help us improve our lives.		
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

[POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES]

49. Should those who are not literate have the right to vote?		
No	0	
Yes	1	

50. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	DK <i>[Do not read]</i>
A. If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party.	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. The only way to get along in this world is if we accommodate each other.	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. People are too easily led.	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. In this country, one must be very careful about one says and does regarding politics.	1	2	3	4	5	9

E. To compromise with one's opponents is dangerous because you betray your own side.	1	2	3	4	5	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

51. Now we will return to pairs of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]

	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression of too many different points of view.	2	1
B: If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

52.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.	2	1
B: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to vote.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

[TRUST]

[FAITH IN PEOPLE SCALE]

53.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: No one is going to care much about what happens to you, when you get right down to it.	2	1
B: For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

54.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
------------	----------------	----------------

A Generally speaking, most people can be trusted.	2	1
B: Generally speaking, you can't be too careful in dealing with people.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

55. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?	
To help others.	1
To look out for themselves.	2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

56. I am now going to read you a list of people. I would like to know whether, generally speaking, you trust them to do what is right.					
<i>[Enumerator: Probe to see whether or not views are held strongly.]</i>					
How much do you trust the following people and institutions?					
	I do not trust them at all	I distrust them somewhat	I trust them somewhat	I trust them a lot	DK <i>[Do not read]</i>
A. Serigne Saliou Mbacke	1	2	3	4	9
B. Serigne Mansour Sy	1	2	3	4	9
C. Secretary of State Idrissa Seck	1	2	3	4	9
D. Premier Ministre Moustapha Niasse	1	2	3	4	9
E. President Wade	1	2	3	4	9
F. traditional rulers	1	2	3	4	9
G. the conseil rurale	1	2	3	4	9
H. the police	1	2	3	4	9
I. courts of law	1	2	3	4	9
J. political parties	1	2	3	4	9
K. the army	1	2	3	4	9
L. the douane	1	2	3	4	9
M. the banks	1	2	3	4	9
N. merchants	1	2	3	4	9
O. the Mouride brotherhood	1	2	3	4	9
P. the Tidiane brotherhood	1	2	3	4	9

57. In the past, when you did something which depends upon cooperation with others, did you have the feeling that it surely wouldn't get done or were you sure that it would get done?	
Surely wouldn't get done.	1
Sure it would get done.	2
Don't know. [Do not read]	9

[INDIVIDUALISM]

58. Now, I am going ask you some questions about how frequently you have a certain feeling, and I would like you to tell me if you never, rarely, sometimes, usually, always feel that way.					
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Usually	Always
A. According to your general impression, how often do your ideas and opinions about important matters differ from those of your relatives?	0	1	2	3	4
B. How often do your ideas and opinions differ from those of your friends?	0	1	2	3	4
C. How often do your ideas and opinions differ from those of other people in your village?	0	1	2	3	4
D. Those of most people in the country?	0	1	2	3	4

[ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS]

59. Now we will return to <u>pairs</u> of statements. Please tell me which one you agree with most. Choose Statement A or Statement B. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: I wish people would be more honest with you.	2	1
B: I find that most people are pretty straight-forward.	3	4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]	5	
Don't know [Do not read]	9	

60. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Most people are pretty smug about themselves, never really facing their bad points.	2	1
B: Everyone tries to do their best.	3	4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]	5	
Don't know [Do not read]	9	

[ACCEPTABILITY TO OTHERS]

61. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: I feel "left out," as if people don't want me around.	2	1
B: People seem to like me.	3	4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]	5	
Don't know [Do not read]	9	

62. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Most people seem to understand me and my way of doing things.	2	1
B: People are quite critical of me.	3	4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]	5	
Don't know [Do not read]	9	

63. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: People seem to respect my opinion about things.	2	1
B: Often, people do not give my ideas the consideration that they merit.	3	4
Do not agree with either [Do not read]	5	
Don't know [Do not read]	9	

[LOCUS OF CONTROL]

64. [Enumerator: Probe: "Do you agree strongly or just somewhat?"]		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: To a great extent, my life is controlled by accidental happenings.	2	1

B: For the most part, I am responsible for what happens to me.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

65.		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Often there is almost no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck happenings.	2	1
B: When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

66.		
	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.	2	1
B: With a lot of work and effort, I can obtain nearly all of my goals.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

67.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life.	2	1
B: The government should bear the main responsibility for ensuring the well-being of people.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

[TRADITIONALISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM]

68. Would you say that most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women, that men and women are equally suited, or that women are better suited than men in this area?
--

Men better suited	1
Men and women equally suited	2
Women are better suited	3
Don't know <i>[Do Not Read]</i>	9

69. Again, please choose A or B. <i>[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]</i>	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: All members of a family should hold the same political opinions.	2	1
B: Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

70. <i>[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]</i>	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote.	2	1
B: A wife does better to vote the way her husband does, because he probably knows more about such things.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

71.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: A woman's place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics.	2	1
B: A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	

Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9
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72.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Our customs and ethnic heritage are things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.	2	1
B: We may need to abandon some of the traditions that have blocked our development.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

73.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	2	1
B: In this age of rapid change, the most important virtues for a child to learn are curiosity and open-mindedness.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

74.	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
A: Thanks to modernization, the caste system is now obsolete.	2	1
B: The system of castes should be maintained in order to keep the social peace.	3	4
Do not agree with either <i>[Do not read]</i>	5	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9	

[ETHNIC IDENTITY QUESTIONS]

75. Here are a series of things people might say about how they see their group in relation to other Senegalese. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree or agree with these statements. *[Enumerator: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	DK [Do not read]
A. You feel proud to be _____.	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. You would want your children to think of themselves as _____.	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Of all the groups in this country, _____ people are the best.	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. You feel much stronger ties to _____s than to other Senegalese.	1	2	3	4	5	9
E. It makes you proud to be called a Senegalese.	1	2	3	4	5	9
F. You would want your children to think of themselves as Senegalese.	1	2	3	4	5	9

76. If you had to chose between these two identities, [the ethnic identity group of the respondent] or Senegalesee, which would you choose ?	
[the ethnic identity group of the respondent]	1
Senegalese	2
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

77. Are _____s' [RESPONDENT'S IDENTITY GROUP] economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country? [Probe for strength of opinion]	
Much worse	1
Worse	2
About the same	3
Better	4
Much better	5
Don't know [Do Not Read]	9

78. In your opinion, how often are _____ people treated unfairly by the government?	
Always	1
To a large extent	2
To some extent	3
Hardly at all	4
Never	5
Don't know [Do Not Read]	9

79A. Do you think that the government represents the interests of all Senegalese, or of one group only?	
All Senegalese [Skip to Q. 94]	1
One group only	2
Don't know [Do Not Read]	9

[If one group] Which group is that?	

[EVALUATION OF CURRENT SITUATION]

80. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you gone without:				
	Never	Occasional ly	Frequentl y	Always
A. Food for your family?	0	1	2	3
B. Water for domestic use?	0	1	2	3
C. Schooling for children?	0	1	2	3
D. Health care for your family?	0	1	2	3

81. To whom do you usually turn when you are unable to get:
--

	No-one	Kin	Community group	Private provision	Gov't provision	Illicit provision	Not applicable
A. Food for your family?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. Water for domestic use?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Schooling for children?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. Health care for your family?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9

82. How satisfied are you:				
<i>[Enumerator: Probe for strength of opinion]</i>	Not at all satisfied	Not very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
A. with the general state of the Senegalese economy today?	1	2	3	4
B. with your own living conditions today?	1	2	3	4

83. Would you say that your own living conditions are worse, the same, or better than other Senegalese?	
<i>[Enumerator: Probe for strength of opinion]</i>	
Much worse	1
Worse	2
About the same	3
Better	4
Much better	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

84. When you look at your life today, how satisfied do you feel compared with five years ago?	
Much less satisfied	1
Slightly less satisfied	2
About the same	3
Slightly more satisfied	4
Much more satisfied	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

85. When you look forward at your life's prospects, how satisfied do you expect to be in one year's time?	
Much less satisfied	1

Slightly less satisfied	2
About the same	3
Slightly more satisfied	4
Much more satisfied	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

86. In your opinion, who is responsible for the current economic conditions in Senegal?	
The previous government	1
The current government	2
The IMF/World Bank	3
We, the people	4
Structural Adjustment Programme	5
Internal opposition forces	6
International economic forces	7
Other <i>[Specify]</i>	8
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

87. How well would you say the government is handling the following problems?					
	Very Badly	Fairly Badly	Fairly Well	Very Well	DK <i>[Do not read]</i>
A. Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	9
B. Keeping prices low	1	2	3	4	9
C. Narrowing income gaps between different groups	1	2	3	4	9
D. Reducing crime	1	2	3	4	9
E. Addressing the educational needs of all Senegalese	1	2	3	4	9
F. Improving basic health services	1	2	3	4	9
G. Fighting corruption in government	1	2	3	4	9

88. What is your overall assessment of the performance of the current government?	
Very bad	1
Bad	2
Neither bad nor good	3
Good	4
Very good	5
It's too early to say. <i>[Do not read]</i>	6
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

89. How long do you think it will take:						
	Within two years	Within four years	Within eight years	More than eight years	Never	DK [Do not read]
A. before the government fulfills the promises it has made?	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. before your own living standards meet your expectations?	1	2	3	4	5	9

90. What is your monthly income?	
No income	0
Less than 10,000	1
Between 10,000 and 30,000	2
Between 31,000 and 50,000	3
Between 51,000 and 100,000	4
Between 101,000 and 150,000	5
Between 151,000 and 200,000	6
Between 201,000 and 300,000	7
Between 301,000 and 400,000	8
Between 401,000 and 500,000	9
Between 501,000 and 700,000	10
Between 701,000 and 900,000	11
Between 901,000 and 1,100,000	12
More than 1,100,000	13
Prefer not to say [Do not read]	14
Don't Know [Do not read]	-8

Thank you so much. Your answers have been very helpful. Please be assured that they will remain confidential.

Time Interview Ended /Enumerator: Enter hour and minute. then						A	P
---	--	--	--	--	--	---	---

END INTERVIEW

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH

Questionnaire sur l'Engagement Civique et Politique

Village n° _____

Répondant n° _____

Procédure de selection des maisons

Choisir la maison en fonction des pas de sondage établie (troisième maison à droite). S'il n'y a personne dans la maison ainsi selectionnée, repasser au moins une deuxième fois avant de la substituer par une autre. S'il n'y a personne à la seconde tentative, substituez cette maison par une autre que vous trouverez toujours selon les pas de sondage.

[Enquêteur: Encercler le numero correct pour les tentatives sans succès seulement.]

Tentatives sans succès Raison de la substitution:	Maison n 1	Maison son 2	Maison son 3	Maison n 4	Maison son 5	Maison son 6	Maison 7
A refusé d'être interviewé	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
La personne tirée (procédure de tirage par carte) n'est jamais chez elle	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Maison vide pendant la période de l'enquête	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sourd-muet/ne parle qu'une langue étrangère	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Ne correspond pas à la logique de quota genre	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Autre	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

Introduction

Bonjour, bonsoir, Je m'appelle *[nom de l'enquêteur]*. Je travaille dans le cadre d'une enquête qu'on fait pour mieux vous connaître. Je ne représente pas le gouvernement, ni un parti politique. Je voudrais recueillir l'opinion des citoyens sur la participation politique au Sénégal ainsi que l'engagement communautaire. Les informations recueillies seront utilisées dans un rapport d'enquête par l'USAID et

dans la thèse d'une étudiante américaine en sciences politiques.

Les Senegalais ont, chacun, une égale d'être inclus dans cette étude. Votre famille a la chance d'avoir été choisie. Mais nous devons choisir au hasard un adulte parmi vous. Voudriez-vous nous aider à le faire?

[Si l'interview est refusée dans une maison, marchez dans la direction établie par les pas de sondage et substituez par la troisième maison.]

Procédure de sélection du répondant

Enquêteur: encrer le nombre correct

	Homme	Femme
L'interview précédent était avec:	1	2
Cette interview doit être avec:	1	2

S'il vous plaît, indiquez-moi les noms de tous les citoyens Sénégalais de plus de 18 ans vivant présentement dans cette maison. Y compris vous même.

S'il vous plaît choisissez une carte. La personne qui correspond au numéro tiré sera celle qu'on devra interviewer.

RAPPEL: Mettez une croix sur le numéro de la personne choisie.

La personne à laquelle je voudrais parler est [lire le nom] _____. Cette personne est-elle présentement à la maison?

Si oui: Puis-je s'il vous plaît l'interviewer maintenant?

Si non: Cette personne reviendra-t-elle ici dans la journée?

Si non: Merci beaucoup. Je vais choisir une autre maison. Substituez par la prochaine maison selon les pas de sondage. NOTE: VOUS DEVEZ SUBSTITUER DES MAISONS, NON DES INDIVIDUS.

Si oui: S'il vous plaît, dites à cette personne (absente pour le moment) que je reviendrai pour l'interview à [Indiquer l'heure correcte]. Revenez une fois comme convenu. Si le répondant sélectionné au hasard n'est pas là à votre seconde visite, remplacer ce ménage par la prochaine maison selon les pas de sondage..

Si la personne sélectionnée est autre que la personne à laquelle vous vous êtes adressé au départ, repetez l'introduction.

Bonjour, bonsoir, Je m'appelle [nom de l'enquêteur]. Je travaille dans le cadre d'une enquête qu'on fait pour mieux vous connaître. Je ne représente pas le gouvernement, ni un parti politique. Je voudrais recueillir l'opinion des citoyens sur la participation

politique au Sénégal ainsi que l'engagement communautaire. Les informations recueillies seront utilisées dans un rapport d'enquête par l'USAID et dans la thèse d'une étudiante américaine en sciences politiques. Dans le cadre de cette étude je vous saurai gré de bien vouloir répondre à quelques questions. Il n'y a pas de réponses vraies ou fausses. Nous sommes plutôt intéressés par votre point de vue.

Vous n'êtes pas obligé de prendre part à cette enquête et vous avez le loisir de refuser de répondre à telle ou telle question selon votre bon vouloir. Vous pourrez mettre fin à votre participation à l'interview à tout moment, et les informations recueillies ne seront pas utilisées. Les informations issues de cette enquête ne seront présentées que d'une manière globale. Votre nom ne sera mentionné nulle part dans cette enquête et vos réponses resteront confidentielles, donc vous pouvez vous sentir à l'aise et répondre ouvertement et honnêtement. L'interview durera environ une heure. Etes vous d'accord?

Combien de visites ont été faites à la maison ou l'interview a finalement été réalisées?	1	2
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Date de l'interview [<i>Enquêteur: indiquez le jour et le mois</i>]					0	0
Heure à laquelle l'interview a commencée [<i>Indiquez l'heure et les minutes en utilisant le système 24 heures</i>]					X	X

[Si oui, remplissez la case ci-dessous]

Date _____	Nom de l'Enquêteur _____
Région _____	Département _____ Arrondissement _____
Communauté rurale _____	Village _____

Avant de commencer, permettez-moi de vous parler peu de la procédure de l'interview, étant donné que la plupart des gens ne sont pas familiers de ce genre d'enquête. Il vous sera posé deux types de questions dans cette enquête. Dans quelques cas, je vous demanderai de répondre à mes questions avec vos propres mots, tout seul. Dans ces cas-là, j'aurais à transcrire fidèlement votre réponse.

Le deuxième type de questions est différent car là il vous sera donné une série de réponses et on vous demandera de choisir celle que est la plus proche de votre opinion. Il vous sera également prié, souvent, de dire à quel degré vous êtes d'accord ou non, par exemple, afin d'apporter plus de précision. Mais, même si aucune des réponses ne correspond pas textuellement à votre pensée, le choix de celle qui est la plus proche de ce que vous pensez nous permettra de comparer vos réponses plus facilement avec celles d'autres gens.

Questionnaire sur l'engagement civique

[Données démographiques]

Je voudrais, s'il vous plaît, commencer par vous poser quelques questions sur vous-même.

1. Quel âge avez-vous?	
<i>[Si l'enquêté ne peut pas répondre à cette question] En quelle année êtes-vous né?</i>	
<i>[Inscrire l'âge]</i>	
<i>[Inscrire l'année de naissance]</i>	
Si l'âge est impossible à déterminer <i>[Inscrire NSP pour "Ne Sais Pas"]</i>	
Age <i>[usage officiel seulement]</i>	PC

2. [Enquêteur: indiquez le genre de la répondant]:	
Masculin	0
Féminin	1

3. Quel est votre statut matrimonial? Etes-vous présentement jamais marié(e), marié(e), divorcé(e) ou veuf (veuve) ?	
Jamais marié(e).	1
Marié(e)	2
Divorcé(e)	3
Veuf, veuve	4
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

4. Avez-vous des enfants?	
Non	0
Oui	1

5. A quelle ethnie appartenez-vous?	
HaalPulaar	1
Fulbe/Peul	2
Wolof	3
Sonninke	4
Bambara	5
Majak	6

Serer	7
Autre, précisez _____	8
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

6. A présent, j'ai quelques questions à vous poser à propos des langues de communication. Pour chacune de vos langues de communication indiquez si:

- Vous n'avez aucune compétence dans la langue.
- Vous êtes seulement capable de parler la langue.
- Vous êtes capable de lire (un peu) dans la langue.
- Vous êtes capable d'écrire dans la langue.

A. Français	
Aucune compétence	0
Vous parlez le français.	1
Vous parlez et lisez le français.	2
Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez le français.	3
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

B. Wolof	
Aucune compétence	0
Vous parlez le wolof.	1
Vous parlez et lisez le wolof.	2
Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez le wolof.	3
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

C. Pulaar	
Aucune compétence	0
Vous parlez le pulaar.	1
Vous parlez et lisez le pulaar.	2
Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez le pulaar.	3
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

D. Serer	
Aucune compétence	0
Vous parlez le serer.	1
Vous parlez et lisez le serer.	2
Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez le Serer.	3
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

E. Autre, précisez:	
Aucune compétence	0
Vous parlez le _____.	1

Vous parlez et lisez le _____.	2
Vous parlez, lisez, et écrivez le _____.	3
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

7. Quelle est votre religion?	
Aucune [Cochez 999 à Q8 et Allez à Q9]	0
Islam [Si c'est l'Islam, allez à Q8]	1
Catholique [Cochez 999 à Q8 et Allez à Q9]	2
Protestante [Cochez 999 à Q8 et Allez à Q9]	3
Religion traditionnelle [Cochez 999 à Q8 et Allez à Q9]	6
Autre, précisez _____	7
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

8. [Si Islam] À quelle confrérie appartenez vous, si tel était le cas?	
Aucune	0
Tidjane	1
Mouride	2
Khadir	3
Autre, précisez _____	4
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9
Pas concerné	999

9. Quel est le niveau académique atteint?	
Pas d'éducation formelle [Mettez 0 à Q10 et allez à Q11]	1
Vous avez fréquenté un peu l'école primaire	2
Vous avez terminé le primaire	3
Vous avez fait un peu le secondaire	4
Vous avez terminé le secondaire	5
Vous avez suivi une formation post-secondaire, non universitaire	6
Vous avez fait un peu l'université	7
Vous avez un diplôme universitaire	8
Vous êtes allé au-delà de la maîtrise	9
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	10

10. Combien d'années avez-vous été à l'école (éducation formelle)?	
[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre d'années ici]	

Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	99

11. Combien d'années d'études coraniques avez-vous fait?	
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[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre d'années ici; si aucune, indiquez 0]	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

12. Avez-vous été alphabétisé dans une langue nationale?	
Non <i>[Si Non, mettez 0 à Qs13 à Q18 et allez à Q 19]</i>	0
Oui	1
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

[Si oui]

13. Quel programme vous a alphabétisé?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nom de l'organisme ici]</i>	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

14. Dans quelle langue avez-vous été alphabétisé?	
Pas concerné	0
Pulaar	1
Wolof	2
Sonninke	3
Bambara	4
Majak	5
Serer	6
Français	7
Autre, précisez _____	8
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

15. Combien d'années d'alphabétisation avez-vous eu?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre d'années ici]</i>	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

16. Combien de mois dans l'année avez-vous fait classe?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre de mois ici]</i>	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

17. Combien de semaines dans le mois avez-vous fait classe?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre de semaines ici]</i>	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

18. Combien d'heures par semaine avez-vous fait classe?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquez le nombre d'heures ici]</i>	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

A présent, parlons s'il vous plaît de vos activités économiques.

19. Quelle est votre occupation principale?	
Sans emploi	00
Cultivateur	01
Commerçant informel	02
Homme d'affaire, Femme d'affaire	03
Employé de bureau	04
Artisan	05
Travailleur domestique	06
Mineur	07
Technicien/ouvrier	08
Enseignant	09
Fonctionnaire/agent de l'Etat	10
Agent non gouvernemental	11
Professionnel	12
À la retraite	13
Ménagère (femme au foyer)	14
Etudiant, élève	15
Marabout, homme d'église	16
Commerçant(e)	17
Autre <i>[L'enquêteur: indique ici l'occupation]</i>	99

20. Etes-vous membre d'une association ou d'une organisation communautaire?	
<i>[En cas de réponse négative, aller à la question Q22]</i>	
Non	0
Oui	1
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

<p><i>(Si oui à Q20)</i></p> <p>21. A.</p> <p>Indiquez ci-dessous les noms des associations auxquelles vous appartenez.</p> <p><i>[Enquêteur: utilisez les cases ci-dessous]</i></p> <p>Nom de l'association :</p>	<p>21. B. Quelle genre d'association est-ce?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Association villageoise de développement. 2) Mouvement de jeunesse. 3) Association sportive et culturelle 4) Groupement de femmes (membre de la fédération nationale des groupements féminins) 5) Tontine de femme ou groupement de crédit mutuel 6) Groupement d'intérêt économique (G.I.E.) 7) Mouvement religieux (association religieuse) 8) Associations de parents d'élèves (APE) 9) Cellule école milieu 10) Mouvement culturel 11) Comité local de santé communautaire 12) Comité local de gestion de l'eau (ou du forage) 13) Mouvement syndical de paysans 15) Autre, préciser s'il vous plaît <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>21. C. Avez-vous, durant l'année dernière participé aux réunions de votre association communautaire?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6) Toujours 7) Souvent 8) De temps en temps 9) Rarement 10) Jamais 9) NSP (à ne pas communiquer) 	<p>21. D. Quelle position de responsabilité avez-vous occupez ou occupez-vous dans votre association?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7) Président 8) Vice-président 9) Trésorier 10) Secrétaire 11) Aucune 12) Autre (précisez)_____ <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>
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22. Vous arrive-t-il d'assister aux assemblées villageoises : toujours, souvent, de temps en temps, rarement ou jamais?					
Toujours	Souvent	De temps en temps	Rarement	Jamais <i>[Si Jamais, allez à Q24A]</i>	Ne sait pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>
4	3	2	1	0	9

23. Vous arrive-t-il de prendre la parole lors de ces rencontres: toujours, souvent, de temps en temps, rarement ou jamais?					
Toujours	Souvent	De temps en temps	Rarement	Jamais	Ne sait pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>
4	3	2	1	0	9

24. A. Vous est-il arrivé de travailler ou de coopérer avec d'autres personnes dans ce village/ville pour tenter de résoudre quelques-uns des problèmes du village/ville dans les deux dernières années? <i>[En cas de réponse négative, cocher 00 à Q24B aller à la question 25]</i>	
Non	0
Oui	1
NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

[Si oui] 24. B. Quelle était la nature du problème ?

On peut dire aujourd'hui que tout le monde a des problèmes personnels. Nul ne peut échapper aux difficultés inhérentes à la vie. Quelquefois on est obligé de demander l'aide des autres. Parlons, à présent des problèmes personnels.

25. Combien de fois avez-vous, durant les cinq dernières années, contacté – c'est à dire rencontré ou parlé à – quiconque des leaders, des dirigeants ou des agents de l'Etat ci-après listés pour obtenir de l'aide dans la résolution d'un problème personnel? Vous me direz à chaque fois si c'est jamais, une fois seulement, de temps en temps ou souvent.				
	Jamais	Une fois seulement	De temps en temps	Souvent
A. un chef de village	0	1	2	3
B. un membre de conseil rural	0	1	2	3
C. un député de l'Assemblée Nationale	0	1	2	3
D. le gouverneur	0	1	2	3
E. un agent d'un ministère	0	1	2	3
F. un marabout	0	1	2	3
G. le préfet	0	1	2	3
H. le sous-préfet	0	1	2	3
I. une autre personne influente, précisez	0	1	2	3

Parlons, à présent des problèmes de la communauté.

26. Combien de fois avez-vous, durant les cinq dernières années, contacté – c'est à dire rencontré ou parlé à – quiconque des leaders ou des agents de l'état ci-après listés pour obtenir de l'aide dans la résolution d'un problème communautaire?				
	Jamais	Une fois seuleme nt	De temps en temps	Sou vent
A. un chef de village	0	1	2	3
B. un membre de conseil rural	0	1	2	3
C. un député de l'Assemblée Nationale	0	1	2	3
D. le gouverneur	0	1	2	3
E. un agent d'un ministère	0	1	2	3
F. un marabout	0	1	2	3
G. le préfet	0	1	2	3
H. le sous-préfet	0	1	2	3
I. une autre personne influente, précisez	0	1	2	3

27. Etes-vous inscrit sur les listes électorales?	
Non	0

Oui [Si oui, mettre 0 pour la question 28 et aller à la question Q29]	1
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28. [Si Non] Pourquoi?	
Pas concerné	0
	1
Raté les inscriptions.	
Problèmes de santé	2
Absent de ma circonscription	3
Perdu ma carte électorale	4
Pas de carte d'identité	5
Pas de bulletin de naissance	6
Moins de 18 ans	7
Pas intéressé par les élections	8
Autrement engagé	9
Autre [Précisez]	10
[Cocher 9 à 29A-D, cocher 0 aux Qs 30, 31, & 32 et aller à Q 33.]	

29. Etant donné qu'il y a des Sénégalais qui choisissent de ne pas voter, dites-moi s'il vous plaît: Avez-vous voté:	Non	Oui
A. Lors du premier tour des élections présidentielles de février 2000? [Si non, cochez 0 pour Q30] [L'enquêteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu'il s'agit des dernières élections présidentielles]	0	1
B. Lors du second tour des élections présidentielles de mars 2000? [Si non, cochez 0 pour Q31] [L'enquêteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu'il s'agit des dernières élections présidentielles]	0	1
C. Aux élections législatives de mai 1998 ? [Si non, cochez 0 pour Q32] [L'enquêteur doit ici si nécessaire préciser qu'il s'agit des dernières élections législatives]	0	1
D. Aux élections locales de 1996?	0	1

30. [Si oui à 29A] Pour qui avez-vous voté au premier tour des dernières élections présidentielles de Février 2000?	
Non concerné [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	0

Abdou Diouf	1
Abdoulaye Wade	2
Moustapha Niasse	3
Djibo Ka	4
Iba der Thiam	5
Ousseynou Fall	6
Cheikh Ablaye Dieye	7
Mademba Sock	8
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9
Autre <i>[Item à ne pas suggérer au répondant]</i>	10
Vous préférer m'abstenir de répondre. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	11

31. <i>[Si oui à Q29B]</i> Pour qui avez-vous voté au second tour des dernières élections présidentielles de Février 2000?	
Non concerné <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	0
Abdou Diouf	1
Abdoulaye Wade	2
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9
Autre <i>[Item à ne pas suggérer au répondant]</i>	10
Préfère ne rien dire <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	11

32. <i>[Si oui à Q29C]</i> Aux élections législatives, lorsque vous avez voté pour un candidat, l'avez-vous fait pour soutenir un individu ou pour soutenir un parti?	
Non concerné <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	0
L'individu	1
Parti	2
Autre raison énoncée <i>[Item à ne pas suggérer au répondant]</i>	10
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

33. Vous intéressez-vous à la politique et aux affaires gouvernementales? Etes-vous très intéressé, quelque peu intéressé, pas intéressé ?	
Vous n'êtes pas intéressé	0
Vous êtes quelque peu intéressé	1
Vous êtes très intéressé	2

NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9
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34. Vous arrive-t-il de discuter de politique et d'affaires gouvernementales avec d'autres gens : jamais, de temps en temps, ou souvent?	
Jamais	0
De temps en temps	1
Souvent	2
NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

35. Vous sentez-vous proche d'un parti politique ? <i>[Si Non cochez 00 à Q36 et cochez 9 à Q37 et allez à Q.38]</i>	
Non	0
Oui	1
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

36. <i>[Si oui à la question 35]</i> De quelle formation politique vous sentez-vous le plus proche?	
Non concerné <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	00
Parti Socialiste (PS)	01
L'Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP)	02
Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS)	03
And Jef/Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (AJ/PADS)	04
Convention des Démocrates et des Patriotes/ Garab-gi (CDP-Garab-gi)	05
Défense de l'Unité Sénégalaise (DUS)	06
Front pour le Socialisme et la Démocratie Benno Jubel (FSD/BJ)	07
Ligue Démocratique/Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD/MPT)	08
Mouvement Démocratique Populaire (MDP)	09
Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais (MRS)	10
Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (PAI)	11
Parti Démocratique Sénégalais / Renovation (PDS/R)	12
Parti pour l'Indépendance et du Travail (PIT)	13
Parti pour la Libération du Peuple (PLP)	14
Parti Populaire Sénégalais (PPS)	15
Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA)	16
Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND)	17
Union Démocratique Sénégalaise / Renovation (UDS/R)	18
Union Populaire Sénégalaise / Renovation (UPS/R)	19
Union Populaire Sénégalaise (UPS)	20
Autre <i>[L'enquêteur indiquez le nom de parti ici]</i>	21
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	99

37. [Si oui a Q35] Avez-vous changé de parti politique après les élections présidentielles?

Non	0
Oui	1
Non concerné <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

38. Il y a ci-dessous une liste de comportements propre à un citoyen. Dites-moi, s'il vous plaît, la fréquence à laquelle vous avez adopté l'un de ces comportements durant les cinq dernières années.

	Jamais	Une fois seulement	De temps en temps	Souvent
A. Participer à une réunion dans la communauté	0	1	2	3
B. Participer avec d'autres à la soumission d'un problème	0	1	2	3
C. Participer à un meeting politique	0	1	2	3
D. Travailler pour un candidat ou parti politique	0	1	2	3
E. Signer une pétition	0	1	2	3
F. Ecrire une lettre à un journal	0	1	2	3
G. Participer à une marche	0	1	2	3

[Connaissance politique]

39. Lorsque vous entendez le mot « démocratie », qu'est-ce qui vous vient, en premier, à l'esprit ?
[L'enquêteur: Si nécessaire: Précisez "que veut dire démocratie pour vous"]

40. En général, les gens associent la démocratie avec les différents éléments mentionnés ci-après. Pour qu'une société soit dite démocratique, quelle est l'importance de chacun d'entre eux? *[Enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion]*

	Très important	Important	Pas vraiment important	Pas du tout important	NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>

A. La règle de la majorité	1	2	3	4	9
B. Liberté totale pour quiconque de critiquer le gouvernement	1	2	3	4	9
C. La tenue régulière d'élections	1	2	3	4	9
D. L'existence d'au moins deux partis politiques rivaux.	1	2	3	4	9
E. Les besoins de première nécessité: habitat, nourriture, eau pour tous	1	2	3	4	9
F. Des emplois pour tous	1	2	3	4	9
G. L'équité en matière d'éducation	1	2	3	4	9
H. Une différence négligeable de revenus entre riche et pauvre	1	2	3	4	9

[L'enquêteur ne traite cette question que si la cible a quelque idée de ce qu'est la démocratie]

41. À votre avis, à quel point le Sénégal est-il une démocratie aujourd'hui?

Pas une démocratie.	0
Des problèmes majeurs mais quand même une démocratie	1
Des problèmes mineurs mais quand même une démocratie	2
Démocratie totale	3
Non concerné	9

42. Dans l'ensemble, à quel point êtes-vous satisfait ou insatisfait de la manière dont la démocratie fonctionne au Sénégal?

[Enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion]

Très insatisfait	1
Quelque peu insatisfait	2
Quelque peu satisfait	3
Très satisfait	4
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer à la cible]</i>	9

43. Laquelle des déclarations suivantes se rapproche le plus de ce que vous pensez?	
A. La démocratie est préférable à toute autre forme de gouvernement.	1
B. Dans certains cas, un gouvernement non-démocratique est préférable.	2
C. Pour les gens comme moi, la forme de gouvernement importe peu.	3

44. Vous arrive-t-il de vous informer à partir de :							
	Jamais	Moins d'une fois par mois	Environ une fois par mois	Environ une fois par semaine	Plusieurs fois par semaine	Tous les jours	NSP [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]
A. La radio?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. La télévision?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Les Journaux?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9

[Efficacité Politique]

45. Je vais, à présent vous proposer, par paires, plusieurs déclarations. Dites-moi s'il vous plaît, sur laquelle des déclarations vous êtes le plus d'accord? Choisissez la déclaration A ou la déclaration B. [Enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion : "Êtes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]		
	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Je peux influencer les autres, quant à leur opinion, dans une discussion politique entre amis et voisins.	2	1
B: Dès lors qu'il s'agit de politique, mes amis et voisins ne m'écoutent pas.	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations [Item à	5	

<i>ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

46.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Les façons de faire du gouvernement semblent, quelques fois si compliquées que je ne comprends pas vraiment ce qui se passe.	2	1
B: D'habitude, je ne comprends pas la manière dont le	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

47.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: En général, nous sommes capables, en tant que communauté, de faire en sorte que nos élus nous entendent sur nos problèmes.	2	1
B: D'habitude, nous sommes incapables de nous faire entendre par nos élus.	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

48.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Quelque soit celui pour qui nous votons, les choses ne risquent pas de s'arranger dans l'avenir.	2	1
B: Nous sommes en mesure d'utiliser notre pouvoir en tant qu'électeurs pour choisir des dirigeants capables de nous aider à améliorer nos conditions d'existence.	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

Merci beaucoup. Maintenant, dites-moi s'il vous plaît .

49. Ceux qui ne sont ni alphabétisés, ni lettrés devraient-ils avoir le droit de voter?	
Non	0
Oui	1

50. S'il vous plaît, dites-moi si vous êtes d'accord ou pas sur les déclarations suivantes. <i>[L'enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion]</i>						
	Pas du tout d'accord	Pas d'accord	Ni pour, ni contre	D'accord	Tout à fait d'accord	NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>
A. Si les gens veulent créer une association dans leur communauté, ils devraient s'affilier au parti au pouvoir.	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. La seule façon de s'en sortir dans ce monde c'est de s'accommoder les uns les autres.	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Les gens se laissent diriger trop facilement.	1	2	3	4	5	9

D. Dans ce pays, on doit être très prudent sur ce que l'on dit et fait en ce qui concerne la politique.	1	2	3	4	5	9
E. Il est dangereux d'accepter un compromis avec un adversaire car c'est trahir son propre camp.	1	2	3	4	5	9

51. Revenons à présent aux déclarations par paires. Dites-moi s'il vous plaît, sur laquelle des déclarations vous êtes le plus d'accord? Choisissez la déclaration A ou la déclaration B.

[L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]

	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: C'est dangereux et cela peut prêter à la confusion de permettre l'expression de trop de point de vue ou d'opinion	2	1
B: Si des personnes ont des opinions différentes de la mienne, elles devraient avoir le droit de les exprimer.	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

52.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
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A: Tout le monde devrait avoir le droit de voter même ceux qui ne comprennent rien aux enjeux électoraux.	2	1
B: Seuls ceux qui sont suffisamment bien éduqués devraient être autorisés à voter.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
D: Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

53.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Dans le fond, les gens se moquent de ce qui peut vous arriver.	2	1
B: En règle générale, on peut compter sur les autres pour nous venir en aide lorsque nous sommes dans le besoin.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
D: Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

54.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: De manière générale, la plupart des gens sont dignes de confiance.	2	1
B : De manière générale, on n'est jamais trop prudent avec les gens.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
D: Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

55. Diriez-vous que la plupart des gens sont enclins à aider les autres ou qu'ils s'occupent plutôt de leur propre personne?		
A aider les autres.		1
A s'occuper d'eux-mêmes.		2
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>		9

56. Voici une liste de personnes et d'institutions. Je voudrais savoir à quel point vous faites confiance en leur capacité à faire ce qui est juste. A quel point faites-vous confiance aux personnes et institutions suivantes?					
	Vous ne leur faites pas du tout confiance	Vous vous méfiez quelque peu d'eux	Vous leur faites quelque peu confiance	Vous leur faites entièrement confiance	NSP [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]
A. Serigne Saliou Mbacke	1	2	3	4	9
B. Serigne Mansour Sy	1	2	3	4	9
C. Ministre d'Etat Idressa Seck	1	2	3	4	9
D. Premier Ministre Moustapha Niasse	1	2	3	4	9
E. Le Président Wade	1	2	3	4	9
F. Les chefs traditionnels	1	2	3	4	9
G. Le conseil rural	1	2	3	4	9
H. La police	1	2	3	4	9
I. Les tribunaux	1	2	3	4	9
J. Les partis politiques	1	2	3	4	9
K. L'armée	1	2	3	4	9
L. La douane	1	2	3	4	9
M. Les banques	1	2	3	4	9
N. Les commerçants	1	2	3	4	9
O. La confrérie Mouride	1	2	3	4	9
P. La confrérie Tidiane	1	2	3	4	9

57. Avez-vous eu l'impression, dans le passé, lorsque vous réalisiez des tâches nécessitant la coopération d'autres personnes, que cela n'allait sûrement pas se réaliser ou que cela allait sûrement se réaliser?	
Cela n'allait sûrement pas se réaliser.	1
Cela allait sûrement se réaliser.	2
Ne sais pas. [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

[Aliénation Culturelle]

58. A présent, je vais vous poser quelques questions sur la fréquence à laquelle il vous arrive d'éprouver certains sentiments. Vous me direz si cela vous arrive rarement, de temps en temps, souvent, toujours ou jamais?					
	Jamais	Rarement	De temps en temps	Habituellement	Toujours
A. De manière générale, combien de fois avez-vous eu l'impression d'avoir des idées ou des opinions différentes de celles de vos proches parents [bandiraab'e ; mbok] sur des questions importantes?	0	1	2	3	4
B. Combien de fois vos idées et opinions diffèrent-elles de celles de vos amis?	0	1	2	3	4
C. Combien de fois vos idées et opinions diffèrent de celles des autres habitants de votre village?	0	1	2	3	4
D. De celles de la plupart des gens dans le pays?	0	1	2	3	4

59. Revenons à présent aux déclarations par paires. Dites-moi s'il vous plaît, sur laquelle des déclarations vous êtes le plus d'accord? Choisissez la déclaration A ou la déclaration B.

[L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]

	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: J'aurais souhaité que les gens soient plus honnêtes.	2	1
B: Je trouve que la plupart des gens vont droit au but.	3	4
C : Vous n'êtes d'accord sur aucune de ces déclarations <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

60. *[L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]*

	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Les gens sont plutôt satisfaits avec eux-même et n'acceptent jamais leurs défauts.	2	1
B: Tout le monde fait son possible pour faire de son mieux.	3	4
C. Je ne suis d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

61.

[L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]

	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Je me sens rejeté tout comme si les gens ne voulaient pas de moi.	2	1
B: Les gens semblent m'apprécier.	3	4
C. Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

62. [L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]		
	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: La plupart des gens semblent d'être accord avec moi et ma façon de faire.	2	1
B: Les gens sont assez critiques avec moi.	3	4
C. Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	5	
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9	

63. [L'enquêteur: indiquez la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]		
	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: J'ai l'impression que les gens respectent mon opinion en général.	2	1
B: Souvent, les gens ne donnent pas à mes idées la considération qu'elles méritent.	3	4
C. Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	5	
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9	

64.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A. Pour une large part ma vie dépend d'événements accidentels.	2	1
B: Pour la plupart, je suis responsable de ce qui m'arrive.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	5	
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9	

65.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A. Souvent, je suis presque incapable de protéger mes intérêts personnels de la malchance.	2	1
B: Lorsque je fais des plans, je suis presque toujours certain que je vais les faire marcher.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

66.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A. On n'obtient ce qu'on veut qu'en faisant plaisir à ceux qui sont au dessus de soi.	2	1
B: On n'obtient ce qu'on veut que par le travail et la persévance.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

67.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A: Les gens devraient s'occuper d'eux-mêmes et être responsable de leur propre succès dans la vie.	2	1
B: Le gouvernement devrait avoir la responsabilité principale dans l'assurance du bien être des gens.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au]</i>		

<i>répondant]</i>	9
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68. Diriez-vous que la plupart des hommes sont mieux fait, émotionnellement parlant, pour la politique que la plupart des femmes, ou que les hommes égalent les femmes ou alors que les femmes sont mieux faites que les hommes dans ce domaine?	
Hommes mieux faits	1
Hommes égalent femmes	2
Femmes mieux faites	3
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

69. S'il vous plaît, choisissez à nouveau A ou B. <i>[Enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion: "Etes-vous tout à fait d'accord ou quelque peu d'accord."]</i>	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A: Tous les membres d'une famille doivent avoir les mêmes opinions politiques.	2	1
B: Chaque membre d'une famille devrait être libre de son opinion sur les questions politiques.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

70.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A. Chacun devrait décider pour qui il ou elle doit voter.	2	1
B. Une épouse ferait de voter pour le candidat de son mari car celui-ci connaît probablement mieux ces choses qu'elle.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

71.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A: La place de la femme est à la maison; les femmes ne devraient pas essayer de parler tout haut de politique.	2	1
B: Une femme devrait exercer son droit de parler tout haut de politique, même si son mari n'est pas d'accord.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

72.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A. Notre héritage ethnique et nos coutumes sont des choses qui ont fait de nous un grand peuple et certaines personnes devraient être amenés à leur montrer un plus grand respect.	2	1
B. Nous devrions peut-être abandonner certaines de nos traditions qui ont bloqué notre développement.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

73.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout á fait d'accord
A. Le respect et l'obéissance à l'autorité sont les vertus les plus importantes que les enfants devraient apprendre.	2	1
B. Dans cette époque de changements rapides, les vertus les plus importantes pour les enfants sont la curiosité et l'ouverture d'esprit.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces		

déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

74.	Quelque peu d'accord	Tout à fait d'accord
A. Le système de caste est aujourd'hui une réalité dépassé grâce à la modernisation.	2	1
B. Le système de caste devrait être maintenu afin de préserver la paix sociale.	3	4
C: Vous n'êtes d'accord avec aucune de ces déclarations. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	5	
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9	

75. Il y a listée, ci-après, une série de déclarations que les gens pourraient faire à propos des autres Sénégalais. Il n'y a pas de réponse juste ou fausse. Nous voulons simplement recueillir votre opinion. Dites-moi s'il vous plaît si vous êtes d'accord ou pas. <i>[L'enquêteur: indique la valeur de l'opinion]</i>						
	Pas du tout d'accord	Pas d'accord	Ni pour, ni contre	D'accord	Tout à fait d'accord	NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>
A. Vous êtes fiers d'être _____	1	2	3	4	5	9
_____.						

B. Vous souhaitez que vos enfants se considèrent comme _____.	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. De tous les groupes du pays, les _____ sont les meilleurs.	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. Vous vous sentez plus proche des _____ que des autres Sénégalais.	1	2	3	4	5	9
E. Vous êtes fiers d'être qualifié de sénégalais.	1	2	3	4	5	9
F. Vous souhaitez que vos enfants se considèrent comme Sénégalais.	1	2	3	4	5	9

76. Si on devait vous classer dans une de ces deux indentités, [le groupe identitaire du répondant] ou sénégalais, lequel choisiriez-vous ?	
<i>[le groupe identitaire du répondant]</i>	1
Sénégalais	2
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

77. Est-ce que les conditions économiques des _____ [groupe auquel la répondant dit appartenir] sont pires, pareilles, ou meilleures que les autres groupes dans ce pays? [Indique la valeur de l'opinion]	
Absolument pires conditions économiques	1
Pires conditions	2
Pareilles	3
Meilleures	4
Absolument meilleures conditions	5
NSP [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

78. À votre avis, arrive-t-il au gouvernement de traiter inégalement les _____	
Toujours	1
Pour une large part	2
Un peu	3
À peine	4
Jamais	5
Ne sais pas [Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]	9

79. A. Estimez-vous que le gouvernement gère les intérêts de tous les Sénégalais ou alors seulement ceux d'un seul groupe social?	
Tous les sénégalais [Aller à Q.80]	1
Un seul groupe	2

79. B. [Si un seul groupe] Lequel _____	P	
	C	

80. Durant ces dernières années, combien de fois vous est-il arrivé d'être sans:					
	Jamais	Occasionn ellement	Fréquem ment	Toujo urs	Non concer né
A. Nourriture pour votre famille?	0	1	2	3	9
B. Eau pour usage domestique?	0	1	2	3	9
C. Moyens pour l'éducation de nos enfants?	0	1	2	3	9
D. Soins de santé pour votre famille?	0	1	2	3	9

81. À qui vous adressez vous en général lorsque vous êtes incapable d'obtenir:							
	À person ne	Pare nts et allié s	Au group e comm unauta ire	À un organis me privé	Au gouverne ment	Origin e illicite	Non conc erné
A. De la nourriture pour votre famille?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. De l'eau pour usage domestique ?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. De moyens pour scolariser vos enfants?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. De moyens pour assurer la santé de votre famille?	0	1	2	3	4	5	9

82. À quel point êtes-vous satisfait:				
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquer la valeur de l'opinion]</i>	Pas du tout satisfait	Pas très satisfait	Quelque peu satisfait	Très satisfai t
A. de l'état général de l'économie Sénégalaise?	1	2	3	4
B. de vos conditions de vie actuelles?	1	2	3	4

83. Estimez-vous que vos conditions de vie sont pires, pareilles, ou meilleures que celles des autres Sénégalais?	
<i>[L'enquêteur: indiquer la valeur de l'opinion]</i>	
Absolument pires	1
Pires	2

À peu près les mêmes	3
Meilleures	4
Absolument meilleures	5
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

84. Quelle appréciation faites-vous de vos conditions de vie actuelles comparées à celles cinq ans auparavant ? Êtes-vous :	
Beaucoup moins satisfait	1
Sensiblement moins satisfait	2
À peu près les mêmes conditions	3
Sensiblement plus satisfait	4
Beaucoup plus satisfait	5
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

85. Lorsque vous considerez l'avenir et vos potentialités dans la vie, quel degré de satisfaction pensez-vous obtenir dans un an?	
Beaucoup moins satisfait	1
Sensiblement moins satisfait	2
À peu près les mêmes conditions	3
Sensiblement plus satisfait	4
Beaucoup plus satisfait	5
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

86. À votre avis, qui est responsable des conditions actuelles de l'économie sénégalaise?	
Le gouvernement précédent	1
L'actuel gouvernement	2
Le FMI/Banque Mondiale	3
Le peuple sénégalais	4
Le programme d'ajustement structurel	5
Les forces internes d'opposition	6
Les forces économiques internationales	7
Autre [<i>à préciser</i>]	8
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	9

87. Comment, à votre avis, le gouvernement traite-t-il les questions suivantes?					
	Très mal	Assez mal	Assez bien	Très bien	NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>
A. La création d'emploi	1	2	3	4	9
B. Le maintien de prix bas	1	2	3	4	9
C. La diminution des différences de revenus entre les différents groupes.	1	2	3	4	9
D. La réduction de la criminalité	1	2	3	4	9
E. Le traitement des besoins éducatifs des sénégalais	1	2	3	4	9
F. L'amélioration des services de santé primaires	1	2	3	4	9
G. La lutte contre la corruption dans l'Administration publique	1	2	3	4	9
H. La gestion de l'économie	1	2	3	4	9

88. Quelle appréciation globale faites-vous des performances du gouvernement actuel?	
Très mauvaise	1
Mauvaise	2
Ni mauvaise, ni bonne	3
Bonne	4
Très bonne	5
Il est trop tôt pour se prononcer. <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	6
Ne sais pas <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>	9

89. À votre avis, combien de temps faudra-t-il:						
	Dans les deux ans	Dans les quatre ans	Dans les huit ans	Plus de huit ans	Jamais	NSP <i>[Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant]</i>

						<i>ant]</i>
A. avant que le gouvernement ne tienne les promesses faites lors de la campagne électorale?	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. avant que vos conditions de vie changent conformément à vos attentes?	1	2	3	4	5	9

90. Quel est votre revenu mensuel?	
Pas de revenu	0
Moins de 10,000	1
Entre 10,000 et 30,000	2
Entre 31,000 et 50,000	3
Entre 51,000 et 100,000	4
Entre 101,000 et 150,000	5
Entre 151,000 et 200,000	6
Entre 201,000 et 300,000	7
Entre 301,000 et 400,000	8
Entre 401,000 et 500,000	9
Entre 501,000 et 700,000	10
Entre 701,000 et 900,000	11
Entre 901,000 et 1,100,000	12
Plus de 1,100,000	13
Préfère de ne pas dire [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	14
Ne sais pas [<i>Item à ne pas communiquer au répondant</i>]	-8

Merci beaucoup. Vos réponses m'ont été d'une grande utilité. Soyez assurés que leur confidentialité sera préservée.

Moment de la fin de l'interview: [<i>L'enquêteur: indiquez l'heure et la</i>				
Le système de 24 heures.				
<i>Fin de l'Interview</i>				

APPENDIX D

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION

Putnam (1993) delineates the characteristics of the type of society that “makes democracy work.” According to Putnam, in a civic community, people pursue “...self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is ‘enlightened’ rather than “myopic,” self-interest that is alive to the interests of others” (1993, 88).

Putnam identifies several dimensions of **civic community**: 1) civic engagement or active participation in public affairs; 2) political equality/reciprocity; 3) solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and 4) the “vibrancy” of associational life. Since the individual will be my unit of analysis, I will look at **civic behavior and attitudes**. More specifically, I will be concerned with levels of individuals’ 1) political participation; 2) interpersonal and institutional trust; 3) tolerance/support for democratic values, 4) involvement in civil/social affairs, 5) authoritarianism/traditionalism, 6) feelings of political efficacy, and 7) locus of control.

Political participation is a multidimensional concept (Verba, Nie and Kim 1971; Bahry and Silver 1990). Verba, Nie and Kim (1971) identify four modes of political activity: campaign activity, communal activity, and voting and particularized contacts (contacting public officials regarding a personal problem). They then assess these different “modes” of political activity with reference to several dimensions, such as the scope of the outcome, initiative involved, and degree to which cooperation with others is necessary. In this study, I will look at all of the modes of political participation except campaign activity (campaign activity in the population of study is too rare to be of

interest). I will also assess the extent to which individuals are engaged and interested in politics.

Communal Participation

The indicators for communal participation include whether one reports 1) cooperating with others to solve a community problem; 2) belonging to a community organization; 3) holding a leadership position within an organization; 4) attending organizational meetings at least occasionally; 5) speaking out at meetings at least occasionally; and 6) getting together with others to raise an issue.

Political Participation

The indicators for political participation include registering to vote, voting in four different elections, and individual contacting. Specifically, individuals were asked whether they had contacted nine different public figures in order to obtain help with regard to both community and personal problems. Although Verba, Nie and Kim (1971) include contacting officials regarding a social problem (what I call “community contacting”) as part of communal activity, I do not since this behavior does not involve interaction with others in the community. Both communal participation and community contacting involve a concern with the public good, which is reflected in their level of correlation ($r = .39$). Particularized contacting and community contacting are highly correlated ($r = .54$) because they are similar types of behavior requiring similar levels of initiative, but the scope of the goals associated with the activities is very different.

The indicators of **interest/engagement in politics** include the degree to which one is interested in politics, the frequency with which one discusses politics with others and feeling close to a political party.

Tolerance/Support for Democratic Values

Tolerance/support for democratic values is measured by one question requiring a yes/no response, one question measured on a Likert scale, and three forced choice questions:

Should those who are not literate have the right to vote?

If people want to form a community organization, they should affiliate with the ruling party.

1) All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.

2) Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to vote.

1) It is dangerous and confusing to allow the expression of too many different points of view.

2) If people have different views than I do, they should be allowed to express them.

Two questions meant to assess feelings about whether those who are not literate, educated or knowledgeable should be able to participate in the political process are included because, as noted above, the education dimension appears salient in the African context. On numerous occasions during the many months I devoted to qualitative data collection, I heard those with literacy skills obtained either through formal or nonformal schooling refer to even the most venerable members of the community in the most derogatory terms because they had not had any schooling. The rhetoric is often more noxious than this. At times, literacy neophytes or literacy teachers who had themselves only had several months of literacy training called all those who were not literate animals or beasts, incapable of serious thought or reflection. Such virulent words were often spoken for all to hear, literate and nonliterate alike.

Authoritarianism/Traditionalism

Three questions are used to measure authoritarianism/traditionalism:

- 1) All members of a family should hold the same political opinions.
- 2) Every family member should be free to make up his or her own mind on political issues.
- 1) Everyone should decide for whom he or she is going to vote.
- 2) A wife does better to vote the way her husband does, because he probably knows more about such things.
- 1) A woman's place is in the home; women should not try to speak out about politics.
- 2) A woman should exercise her right to speak out about politics, even if her husband disagrees.

These questions measure the extent to which one thinks that a traditional authority figure should dictate political behavior and the extent to which one accepts the rights of women to engage in the political sphere in an independent manner.

Individualization

Education has also been associated with individualization and even alienation in the African context. In order to assess the degree of individualism or distance one has from others, we asked respondents about the frequency with which their opinions differed from others in social groups at different proximities to themselves. We asked four questions of this nature:

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives.
(Question 58A)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of their relatives.
(Question 58B)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of other people in their village. (Question 58C)

At least occasionally have ideas or opinions that differ from those of most other people in the country. (Question 58D)

Interpersonal Trust

Three commonly used forced choice questions were used in the measurement of interpersonal trust:

- 1) No one is going to care much about what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
- 2) For the most part, you can depend on people to help you out, when you are in a pinch.
- 1) Generally speaking, most people can be trusted.
- 2) Generally speaking, you can't be too careful in dealing with people.

Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?

These questions allow one to see whether others can be trusted as well as how one views others' orientations toward responding to the needs of others.

Ethnic Pride

Three questions, two of which are measured on a Likert scale, are used to measure ethnic pride (the ethnic group identified the respondent identified as being her/his own was inserted into the blanks):

Of all the groups in this country, ____ people are the best.

You feel much stronger ties to ____s than to other Senegalese.

If you had to choose between these two identities, [*the ethnic identity group of the respondent*] or Senegalese, which would you choose?

Literacy versus education

Generally speaking, **literacy** refers to the ability to read and write, but it has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Oxenham defines literacy as "...a means of embodying language in visual form" (1980, 19). Many of the modernization theorists appear to have conflated the effect of literacy with that of schooling. Literacy is the building block of most types of education. However, based on their study of the effects

of the three different literacies operative among the Vai of Liberia⁷⁰ (n=650), Scribner and Cole (1981) conclude that one cannot separate the effects of literacy from the manner in which it is used. They distinguish between schooled and nonschooled literacy. Scribner and Cole (1981), like Street (1995), point out that much more than simply reading and writing is learned in school. Hence, it is often difficult to distinguish between the effects of literacy and the particular social conditions associated with an educational experience, whether nonformal or formal. In this study, I will focus on the effects of education as opposed to literacy, *per se*.⁷¹

Formal Education versus Nonformal Education

I examine the effects of both formal and nonformal education on various dimensions of civic behavior. I would expect the effects of these two educational forms on participants to differ for several reasons. First, the social experiences associated with these two educational forms are very different. As noted above, formal schooling in Senegal is conducted in French and mimics that of France. In contrast, nonformal education is usually conducted in African languages and follows a more participatory format than does formal education. Second, those who do actually attend formal schools usually spend more time pursuing their education than those who attend nonformal programs. Third, the age during which an individual has the relevant educational experience differs between NFE and formal education.

I operationalize formal education as the years spent in a degree-granting learning institution officially sponsored or recognized by the state. I operationalize NFE as having

⁷⁰ The three literacies are 1) Vai literacy based on the Vai script, 2) Arabic/Qur'anic literacy, and 3) English literacy learned in public schools.

⁷¹ Scinto (1986) is not in agreement with the idea that one can sort out schooling and nonschooled literacy. He argues that, in the case of the "essayist" type of literacy, the profundity of one's literacy skills corresponds very closely to the amount of schooling one has had.

participated in one of four community based NFE programs intended to impart basic literacy and numeracy skills to participants. I also assess the effects of number of years one has spent in one of the four programs.

APPENDIX E

EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Table E.1 : Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Tostan Training and General Control Variables on Community Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of Tostan	.5166301	.0471032	10.968	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.059499	.01978	3.008	0.003
Income	.0736728	.0420506	1.752	0.080
Age	.0291201	.0046187	6.305	0.000
Gender	-.0210018	.1363296	-0.154	0.878
Pular	-.0861053	.1658665	-0.519	0.604
Wolof	-.1527565	.1619334	-0.943	0.346

Number of observations = 854

chi2(7) = 180.88

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1511.2808

Pseudo R2 = 0.0565

Table E.2: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of PAPA Training and General Control Variables on Community Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of PAPA	.4985042	.0865756	5.758	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0554096	.0208232	2.661	0.008
Income	.1017272	.0434966	2.339	0.019
Age	.0243165	.0047907	5.076	0.000
Gender	-.0725058	.1481212	-0.490	0.624
Pular	.0828158	.1637054	0.506	0.613
Wolof	-.2988067	.1623576	-1.840	0.066

Number of observations = 780

chi2(7) = 79.62

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1394.9702

Pseudo R2 = 0.0277

Table E.3: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PAPF Training and General Control Variables on Community Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of PAPF	.6029411	.0722537	8.345	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0451542	.0209392	2.156	0.031
Income	.1283716	.0446771	2.873	0.004
Age	.025762	.004944	5.211	0.000
Gender	-.1081496	.1492336	-0.725	0.469
Pular	.065596	.184923	0.355	0.723
Wolof	-.1621782	.1753782	-0.925	0.355

Number of observations = 726

chi2(7) = 107.49

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -1289.3985

Pseudo R2 = 0.0400

Table E.4: Ordered Logit-Estimated Effects of Years of PIP Training and General Control Variables on Community Participation

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	Z score	P> z
Years of PIP	.4972177	.0717594	6.929	0.000
Years of Formal Schooling	.0659841	.032445	2.034	0.042
Income	.0643003	.0697424	0.922	0.357
Age	.0217597	.0082584	2.635	0.008
Gender	-.5530441	.2437145	-2.269	0.023

Number of observations = 290

chi2(5) = 77.37

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log Likelihood = -497.36661

Pseudo R2 = 0.0722

APPENDIX F

MAP OF SENEGAL



Figure 1: Map of Senegal

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