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The Shifting Sands of Authority and Ambiguity in
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THE SHIFTING SANDS OF AUTHORITY AND AMBIGUITY IN NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EASTERN MAURITANIA
By
Beth Pennock Dunford
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulï¬llment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILSOPHY
Department of Sociology
2003
ABSTRACT
THE SHIFTING SANDS OF AUTHORITY AND AMBIGUITY IN NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EASTERN MAURITANIA
By
Beth Pennock Dunford
There have been far-reaching legal changes in Mauritania that allow new
possibilities for traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women and Haratines
to access natural resources upon which they depend for their livelihoods.
Community-based natural resource management schemes and increasing
privatization have become important avenues for less powerful groups to obtain
access to land and other natural resources. However, these new laws often
fundamentally contradict traditional hierarchies, which remain powerful forces in
natural resource access negotiation. This research examines the nature and
impacts of power in social relations on natural resource access. It focuses on the
ability of different social groups to negotiate access to natural resources within a
strong tradition of hierarchy and new state laws and policies favoring
privatization, either at the individual or community level. This research ï¬nds that
disadvantaged groups are more able to maintain control over resources when
they have geographic and institutional distance from groups favored within
traditional hierarchy.
To Dad,
for taking the time to read everything I ever wrote
and for knowing just how to guide me.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, David Wiley, for providing me with
endless encouragement and insight through every stage of this research and my
graduate career. I would also like to thank Marilyn Aronoff for her valuable
suggestions and guidance regarding this research and her continued interest in
my studies. Anne Ferguson and Larry Busch have been active members of my
committee and have provided me with guidance and insightful critique. I am
especially grateful to Dirk Thies of the GTZ in Mauritania who introduced me to
the Hodh, and provided me with access to people, information, and logistical
resources without which I would not have been able to conduct the research.
Tara Shine of the GTZ was an inspirational research partner whose knowledge of
the wetlands in eastern Mauritania and relationships with the people who lived
there made my research possible. Her friendship, encouragement, commitment
to her work, and generous sharing of resources, information and ideas was
invaluable to me in the ï¬eld. I am also indebted to the Social Science Research
Council that funded my ï¬eld research, and the Foreign Language Area Studies
program administered through the Center for Advanced Study of lntemational
Development at Michigan State University that funded my graduate classes and
Arabic study. I would also like to thank Julia Frazier for her friendship and
support during my research. Finally, I would like to thank my mother for always
being proud of me, and Polly Dunford and Moha Zahar who allowed me the
space and provided me with the encouragement to write this paper.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................ viii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
CHAPTER TWO
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAURITANIA ............................................. 9
2.1 Livelihood and Environment ............................................ 9
2.2 Hierarchy in Pre-Colonial Mauritania ................................. 12
2.3 Gender in Pre-Colonial Mauritania .................................... 19
2.4 Tenure Changes in Pre-Colonial Mauritania ....................... 22
2.5 Hierarchical Changes in Colonial Mauritania ...................... 24
2.6 Economic Changes in Colonial Mauritania ......................... 27
2.7 Political Changes in Colonial Mauritania ............................ 31
CHAPTER THREE
POWER AND NATURAL RESOURCE TENURE: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE ............................................................................ 35
3.1 Legal and Institutional Approaches to Resource Tenure ........ 37
3.2 Common Property Resource Advocates ............................ 39
3.3 Tradition, Community and the Environment ........................ 44
3.4 Social Networks and Land Tenure .................................... 51
3.5 National and Global Networks .......................................... 59
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................ 63
CHAPTER FIVE
CONTEMPORARY LAND USE IN MAURITANIA .............................. 71
5.1 Drought ....................................................................... 71
5.2 Rural Sector Components ............................................... 76
5.3 Abolition of Slavery ........................................................ 82
5.4 Land Tenure Laws ......................................................... 89
5.5 International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Programs 92
5.6 Women in Contemporary Society ..................................... 96
CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ...........
6.1 Community-Based Natural Resource Management as a
Development Tool ..........................................................
6.2 Community in Eastern Mauritania ......................................
6.3 Tenure Implications of a Village Centered Project ................
6.4 The Creation of New Institutions .......................................
6.5 Participation in Community Based Natural Resource
Management ................................................................
6.5.1 Gender and Participation .............................................
6.5.2 Social Stratiï¬cation and Participation ..............................
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCEPTS OF NATURAL RESOURCE TENURE ............................
7.1 General Tenure Concepts ..............................................
7.2 Development Investment and Tenure Concepts ...................
7.3 Status and Tenure Concepts ............................................
7.4 The Complexities of Resource Tenure ...............................
CHAPTER EIGHT
NEGOTIATIONS AND NETWORKS ...............................................
8.1 Social Hierarchy and the Implementation of New Land
Tenure Laws .................................................................
8.2 Tenure Security Gains for Disadvantaged Groups ................
8.3 Women Gaining Access to Resources Through Institutional
Distance ............................................................................
8.4 Negotiations for Access ...................................................
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION ............................................................................
ENDNOTES ...............................................................................
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................
APPENDICES ............................................................................
1. 1983 Land Tenure Legislation in Mauritania ..........................
2. Mauritania Country Map ...................................................
3. Map of the Hodh el Gharbi Province with Research Sites
Indicated by Bullets ........................................................
vi
102
103
106
111
114
118
121
125
129
130
134
139
142
144
151
153
168
174
178
186
188
198
199
204
205
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
LIST OF FIGURES
Social Hierarchy in the Mauritanian Kabila System ............ 22
Perceived Resiliency to Drought in the Sahel ................... 72
Primary Source of Income ........................................... 82
Education by Social Status .......................................... 89
Participation in Community Development Associations ...... 126
Concept of Resource Ownership ................................... 132
Resource Tenure Concept by Level of Development
Investment ................................................................ 135
Resource Tenure Concept by Status .............................. 140
Pre-Colonial Networks ................................................ 151
Contemporary Networks .............................................. 152
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Livestock in Hodh El Gharbi ......................................... ‘ 77
Table 2 Fencing and Resource Ownership ................................. 138
viii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
There have been far-reaching legal changes in Mauritania that allow new
possibilities for traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women and
Haratines1 to access natural resources upon which they depend for their
livelihoods. Community-based natural resource management (CBRNM)
schemes and increasing privatization have become important avenues for less
powerful groups to obtain land and other natural resources. However, these new
laws often fundamentally contradict traditional hierarchies, which remain powerful
forces in natural resource access negotiation. This research examines the
nature and impacts of power in social relations on natural resource access. It
focuses on the ability of different social groups to negotiate access to natural
resources within a strong tradition of hierarchy and new state laws and policies
favoring privatization, either at the individual or community level. In addressing
this question, I highlight the misconceptions of diverse strands of theories within
the resource tenure literature. Although the majority of this literature focuses on
the promise of legal and institutional reform on the management of resources
from an environmental perspective, much also can be learned from natural
resource literature on the implications for social relations or resource access
within the legal and institutional systems of which they are writing. My analysis of
resource tenure in eastern Mauritania shows that there are important omissions
from this literature. A more complete analysis must focus on the complex
linkages between networks of global influences, national polices and legal .
reform, and ï¬rmly-rooted social networks that influence resource tenure realities
in Mauritania and much of sub-Saharan Africa.
Mauritania is a country located at the western edge of the Sahara,
bordered on the north by Morocco and Algeria, on the east and southeast by
Mali, on the south by Senegal and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean. Today, the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania occupies a vast land area of over one million
square km with a sparse population of 2.3 million (IBRD 1997). Mauritania is an
arid country where nearly 90% of the country is desert, receiving less than
150mm of rain annually. The rural economy is based on the raising of livestock
including cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. Herding is the most important
agricultural occupation, accounting for nearly 80% of the agricultural GDP. This
ï¬gure has remained remarkably stable. Even during the mid 19803 drought
years when large number of animals died or were slaughtered for lack of fodder,
it declined to 74%, only to rise again to 81% in the wetter years following 1985.
14 million ha of Mauritania’s land is suitable for grazing, and according to latest
World Bank estimates, there are approximately eight million sheep and goats, 1.4
million cattle, and one million camels (World Bank 1997z2).
Crop production contributes less than 20% to agricultural GDP. Over two-
thirds of the population depends on agriculture and herding which together
consists of one-third of the country’s GDP (World Bank 1997). Availability of
water dictates farming In Mauritania, and only about 0.5% of Mauritania's land
can support rainfed agriculture. Where there is enough rainfall, about 120,000
ha of rainfed crops are harvested here annually. Where there is less rainfall
(<450mm), cropping depends on supplementary water supplies. Supplementary
water is mostly in the form of flood recession cropping that relies on residual soil
moisture after flood waters have receded. Recession agriculture accounts for
35,000 ha in bottom lands and behind retention dams. Millet and sorghum are
the main crops, often rotated with cowpeas. In addition, the Senegal River Valley
contains 19,000ha of rice that is irrigated by the river (World Bank 199722). The
rich typically eat Rice, with poorer people depending upon sorghum, millet and
cowpeas for important protein in their diet.
Mauritania is an excellent place to conduct research on natural resource
access because of its harsh environment that renders such resources scarce.
Mauritania is located at the western edge of the Sahara desert, between the
Maghreb and the Sudan, “...culturally dominated by the former and, until
independence, economically and administratively a part of the latter" (Stewart
1972:375). Mauritania is extremely diverse, with the northern desert regions of
Atar and Tagant where sparse rainfall makes the population entirely dependent
upon scattered cases. The coastal regions rely on ï¬shing as their livelihood.
Southwestern Mauritania rests on the Senegal River valley where the recent
construction of irrigation has promoted rice farming.
The area of focus for this study is eastern Mauritania, speciï¬cally the
Province of Hodh El Gharbi. The Hodh (meaning basin) is surrounded by cliffs of
the Assaba and Tagant to the north and west and Tichit and Walata to the north
and east. Eastern Mauritania has relatively high rainfall ranging from 150—
550mm per year. The increased rainfall in eastern Mauritania makes the region
uniquely suited to support an active rural economy, based on herding and
agriculture. In addition to the relative abundance of fodder and the possibility for
rainfed agriculture in pockets of high rainfall, there are a high number of semi-
permanent wetlands in eastern Mauritania that from in depressions after
seasonal rains.
Wetlands in eastern Mauritania currently play an important role in animal
herding, agriculture, forestry and biological diversity. Wetlands provide a
strategic water source that enables transhumant herds to exploit surrounding
pasturelands in addition to providing cold season pasture for grazing and
browsing. Farmers plant the humid clay soils of the wetland areas as the
wetland (much like a pond) dries up at the end of the rainy seasonz. This
recession agriculture allows for greater security in agricultural production in low-
rainfall years when rainfed agriculture fails. The abundance of woody vegetation
made possible by the wetland moisture provides an important source of
construction wood, ï¬rewood, and forestry by—products such as the seeds used for
tanning leather, wild foods, and medicinal plants. The dependence upon
wetlands becomes even more important during drought years, which are part of
the natural climatic cycle of the region.
In addition to the high levels of rainfall, eastern Mauritania provides an
interesting location for this research as the region has only recently seen
development intervention. In previous years, the government and development
agencies have focused their resources on the development of the Senegal River
valley. The’potential for irrigation and the projected gains in agricultural
productivity and the ability to plant rice that is consumed by the urban elite
focused all attention in this area. As the farming land around the Senegal River
valley gained in value due to new development infrastructure, violent ï¬ghts broke
out among multiple claimants to the land. The conflict grew into a full-scale war
in the early 19903 when hundreds of thousands of farmers on the land were
forced to flee their homes into neighboring Senegal. With increasing
development investment in eastern Mauritania, systems of land tenure also have
become more conflictual and warrant in-depth study.
Mauritanian society has experienced radical and rapid change in the past
30 years, beginning with the devastating Sahelian drought from 1969 to 1973.
la“
The enormous loss suffered during this drought in conjunction with an
increasingly modernizing economy transformed the country from a primarily
nomadic society (over 80 percent before 1970) to an increasingly sedentary
population. By 1990 less than 20 percent of the population was nomadic (Salihi
1996). However, herding is still one of the most important livelihood activities in
Mauritania. Most herds in Mauritania are as mobile as they have ever been
because mobility is still required for survival in Mauritania’s sporadic rainfall both
in space and in time. Although animals are still moving along traditional
migration routes, most people have a home base where women, children, and
those men rich enough to hire shepherds remain to be close to schools and other
amenities that sedentary life allows. This construction of sedentary residences
changes land tenure realities, both in customary and national legal tenure
regimes.
In addition to the radical change of sedentarization experienced by
Mauritania in the last 30 years, slavery was abolished in 1980. This seminal
event greatly altered the relations between Bidan3 (former master) and Haratine
(former slave). Additionally, gender relations have been rapidly evolving as
women have become more active in the regional economy. These severe
shocks to Mauritanian social structure have occurred in the context of national
policy that produced an upheaval of traditional tenure systems. Traditional
tenure was based upon kabila rule. Kabila is an Arabic word that is often
translated as ‘tribe.’ Traditional, kabila-based land tenure was abolished by
national decree in 1983, allowing those who worked the land to lay claim to the
land. There has been a recent influx of development assistance that attempts to
alter rural livelihoods and governance. New development interventions have
established new institutions of community-based natural resource management .
(CBNRM) and focus on agricultural production, which is not suited to Mauritania’s
arid climate. The shocks described above of sedentarization, shirting, and the
altering of relations between social strata and between men and women have
had an increased impact due to their occurrence in the context of globalization
and increased development intervention. The 1983 land tenure law explained in
greater depth in Chapter Five is one such example.
The traditionally advantaged noble herding class in Mauritania may have
the most to lose when traditional access to natural resources changes. The 1983
law abolished traditional kabila control of land and natural resources and allows
for private ownership of land by anyone who improves the land. This tenure
regime change has the potential to help traditionally disadvantaged groups,
especially the Haratines who were the traditional cultivators. However, the noble
class usually has the means to manipulate new systems of land tenure to their
advantage. These ‘new’ arrangements may completely leave out disadvantaged
groups who before at least had some tributary access to land. In addition,
privatization advocated by international organizations may come into conflict with
the communal nature of survival embedded in customary law. Although
administrators may try to enforce privatization, difï¬culties arise because of a
fundamental contradiction between individualistic exclusionary land tenure and
the local interpretation of Islamic law (shari’a), which forbids exclusionary access 3
to water, ï¬re, and pasture, and group rights to customary land.
In the following chapter, I provide a brief overview of Mauritanian history
that provides a context from which to analyze the changes that have occ'urred in
the country with the arrival of colonialism and Independence. In this chapter, I
outline the traditional hierarchical structure and the economic and political base
of the society. I focus attention on the impact of the colonial period and the
foundations laid for the signiï¬cant changes that have occurred since
independence. In Chapter Three I review the literature relating to power and
natural resource tenure. In Chapter Four, I provide a detailed explanation of the
methodology I used to collect data for this research.
Chapter Five is devoted to providing an overview of present day
Mauritania, highlighting the changes that have occurred since the pre-colonial
and colonial periods. In this chapter, I examine the important events that have
impacted and changed pre-colonial Mauritanian society. In Chapter Six I begin
my data analysis focusing on the impact of community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) on resource tenure. The increasing decentralization of
natural resource control has had a signiï¬cant impact on natural resource tenure
in eastern Mauritania. In Chapter Seven I analyze resource tenure concepts.
Chapter Five details the legal changes in land tenure that have occurred since
independence, but Chapter Seven focuses on the realities of tenure on the
ground. Concepts or perceptions of land tenure heavily impact the actual
practice of tenure on the ground. Especially in a country such as Mauritania
where distances are great and legal ofï¬cials are few and far between in the rural
areas, local perceptions and practice of tenure customs provide the basis from
which land tenure is implemented. In Chapter Eight I focus on negotiations for
natural resource tenure, focusing on the ability of women and Haratines to ï¬nd
ways to increase their tenure security. In Chapter Nine, l summarize my ï¬ndings
and propose research questions for the future.
CHAPTER TWO
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAURITANIA
The Mauritanian political system consisting of an elected president and a
congressional body is ï¬rmly rooted in the country's kabila system. Mauritania’s
kabila system has remained relatively intact although somewhat altered after
remarkable political and environmental upheavals experienced in the 20th
century. To understand the effects of recent events upon the Mauritanian
political, social, and economic system, it is necessary to ï¬rst examine
Mauritanian society as it existed before the arrival of colonialism.
2.1. Livelihood and Environment
The success of nomadism4 in the Sahara traditionally was ensured by a
diverse economy based on a strong trans-Saharan trade, a mobile lifestyle well
adapted to the environment, and a hierarchical society that rigidly secured
access to vital resources, primarily through warfare. Territory is a foundation of
kabila identity and remains an important keystone to Mauritanian social structure
and politics today. The importance placed on territory stems from its importance
in the livelihood system of Mauritania.
Mauritanian livelihood before colonialism was dominated by nomadism
and trans-Saharan trade. The dispersion of pasture throughout the seasons and
the variation in pasture relies upon a highly mobile population able to follow the
scarce and sporadic rainfall. The extensive livestock raising through high
mobility and extensive pasture exploitation characterized Mauritanian nomadism
that was well adapted to the scarcity and fragility of the Saharan-Sahelian
environment (Ould Mey 1996). The ability of camels to move quickly and
withstand several days’ travel without water made them central to the nomadic
economy. Sheep and goats are also drought resistant. Cattle are also valuable,
but are not able to travel great distances without water or green pasture, thus
limiting their practicality in the Mauritanian environment. The high degree of
spatial mobility was based upon kabila controlled seasonal migration routes from
the north to the south sometimes extending thousands of miles. Their search for
better pasture fueled by rain required traveling great distances and gave these
nomads the nickname Oulad Al Minzah (children of the clouds) (Ould Mey 1996:
74).
Nomads also were dependent upon cases and wetlands for crucial
drought year pasture and for products such as dates and grain to supplement
their diet. Although nomads gain many of their nutrients from their herds by
drinking the milk and often blood of their animals, a dietary supplement is crucial
for their survival. A Tuareg nomadic family consumes on average 50% of their
calories from millet (Bernus 19902165), and a similar percentage of Moorish
nomad's food also came from outside sources. Nomads obtained products from
cases and wetlands under very favorable terms of trade, ensured by a strict
hierarchy that delegated tasks through relationships of authority and submission,
protection, and allegiance (Toupet 19772175).
Nomads have traditionally practiced seasonal migrations in the Sahara,
and their knowledge of the desert, ownership of transport animals, and control
10
over route areas enabled them to diversify their economies through trade and the
linkage of remote and sedentary populations to become rich and powerful
people. Much commerce was aimed at Morocco where they sold products such
as wool, animals, and salt. Trade also extended south into Mali and Senegal.
Recurrent and severe drought required elaborate risk aversion strategies,
such as economic diversiï¬cation, mobility, diverse and large herds, and tributary
relations enforced by military supremacy. Herd management objectives were
aimed at sustaining a community rather than maximizing of returns. Short-term
meat was sacriï¬ced for long term milk, thereby decreasing uncertainty by risk
aversion. Resilient herd growth was favored over cash sales, and males were
culled in favor of milk producing females (Galaty and Johnson 1991:20). In her 3,
study in the Malian Sahel, Susanna Davies (1996:28-29) veriï¬es that nomadic
survival in crisis situations such as droughts is aided by people’s emphasis on
protecting their future livelihoods (increased resilience) at the cost of current
consumption.(increased sensitivity or fewer buffers against sharp reductions in
production). The aforementioned pre-colonial nomadic diversiï¬cation strategies
had evolved to maximize resilience against recurring drought, adopting an
“uncertainty as norm" attitude (Mortimer 1989:214 In Davies 1996). Many
relations between kabilas, territory control, and trade that created buffers for
drought periods were agreed upon peacefully. However, a powerful military base
forcibly created an atmosphere of favorable relations. Military force was used as
a last resort to gain access to resources. The diversiï¬cation strategies were vital
to survival and were created and maintained through force, making military
11
prowess a fundamental and vital aspect of Saharan nomadic society.
2.2. Hierarchy in Pre-Colonial Mauritania
The mobility of the nomadic lifestyle, diversiï¬ed with trade and sedentary
agriculture, was well adapted to the uncertainty of life in the desert. However,
as emphasized by Bonte (1981 ), the form of agropastoral production that
evolved in Mauritania is related to the climate, yet not uniquely related. Other
combinations or types of agro-pastoral production are possible within the
Mauritania climate, yet did not evolve within the historical and cultural context.
The particular pattern of relationships between people, animals and vegetation
known as nomadic pastoralism is a product of history and is distinct to
‘3';
Mauritania. The nomadic pastoralism that developed in Mauritania is ï¬rmly
rooted in a hierarchical social structure.
Mauritanian hierarchical society is based upon a distinct status within
different kabilas based in theory on family heritage and pure blood. The ‘white’
Bidan nobles trace their heritage back to the prophet, using pure blood as a
rationale for dominance. Within the larger category of nobles, there are two
groups, the religious leaders (Zwaya or Marabout), and the warriors (A ’rab or
Guerriers). The social stratiï¬cation between these two noble groups is
explained in the settlement of the Shurr Bubba war in the 17th century (Stewart
1973:54) whereby the victorious retained the right to bear arms and the
defeated were dedicated to trade and scholarly devotion. Although the
divisions between the two groups remain important to the identity of the
12
Mauritanian people, in reality, the divisions are not strict, and there has always
been signiï¬cant lateral movement between the two groups. The well-known
Mauritanian historian Charles Stewart (1973:63) uses a functionalist argument
to describe the segmentary principles of Moorish society based on opposition
and complementarity that balanced the numerically superior religious leaders
against the warriors. The pastoral economy was balanced against the raiding
economy and the spiritual was balanced against physical protection. However,
more recent scholarship (Ould Cheikh 1985) has dismissed the functionalist
argument, citing numerous examples of zawaya and hassan changing roles
temporarily or even permanently.
The hierarchy of Mauritanian society shown in Figure 1 is constructed
within the kabila. The kabila is a collective form of social organization held
together by a combination of ideological, material, and symbolic means.
Ideology, the notion of common descent from the founder (kinship) legitimizes
the kabila’s existence. “Despite the prevalence of the metaphor of common
descent, the kabila is best characterized as a political confederation that absorbs
individuals and even entire groups who are not descendants of the founder.â€
Materially, land and wells in zones of pasture are controlled by kabila, and when
blood crimes are committed, the group is held collectively accountable and is
required to pay blood money (Bhrane 1997254).
Economic supremacy was controlled by the religious leaders, and political
supremacy was enforced by the warriors (see Figure 1, Caratiniz1989). The
religious leaders in Moorish society traditionally were the wealthiest group and
13
Figure 1. Social Hierarchy in the Mauritanian
Kabila System (Caratini 1989)
Warriors Mutual Respect
‘ Religious Leaders
(A 'rab, Hasan)
(Zwaya!)
Exchange
Musicians
(lggawn)
Smiths
(Ma 'allim)
Haratine Labor
Gift to
disciples
Labor
Slaves
Payment for
protection
Tributaries
(Znaga)
were feared due to their religious powers. The religious leaders were herders
and merchants, and thus controlled wells and the majority of the slaves and
sharecroppers who worked the ï¬elds in the cases. Speciï¬cally, they were in
control of the gum Arabic trade, which was very lucrative.
Additional commerce involved salt trading among other goods. Some
religious leaders were powerful enough to become equals of the warriors, yet
most paid tribute for their protection or for rights to caravan access routes for
their goods. Although the religious leaders were greater numerically, they were
vulnerable to warriors because of their dispersion in small groups in search of
14
29
pasture for their animals. Like the warriors, they were paid tribute for the
religious protection of their tributaries.
The warrior class was the most powerful although they produced little of
tangible value. They were responsible for defending the territory of the kabila
group, which was crucial to their ability to gain access to resources and survive
(Caratini 1989232). To be a warrior, in theory one had to be born a member of a
kabila not already subservient to another kabila. Tradition dictated that noble
warriors could not engage in activities such as trade, agriculture, or other manual
labor (Ould Cheikh 1987). They gained their revenue through razzia or pillaging
expeditions directed at weaker kabilas and though tributary payments (hurma) by
subservient tribes or payments for passage by caravans passing through their
territory. Warriors bore arms and levied taxes, ensuring their superiority by
raiding or protecting rivals (Stewart 1973255).
Domestic security was obtained by creating alliances across ecological
zones, distributing livestock among family and other members of a clan, and by
securing rights to dry season pastures (Galaty 1990221 ). These political and
economic alliances were created during times of great military success and were
called upon in times of crisis, namely when drought caused the failure of dry
season pastures, necessitating departure from directly controlled territory to ï¬nd
green pastures and water near agriculture producing cases and wetlands. It was
not uncommon for nomads to demand hospitality from oasis dwellers during
several years of drought before gathering their dependents and animals to return
to the rangeland.
15
Most noble families were served by a number of tributaries whose service
of ï¬ghting or herding depended upon the status of their master. There were
Bidan tributaries of the warriors called Lhama (translated as meat, implying their
use for labor) and Znaga (a name stemming from their Berber roots) who were
tributaries to the Zawaya. Both retained some degree of independence but were
forced to pay tribute to their masters in return for spiritual or military protection.
Artisans (Maalem) and musicians (Griots or Igguen) were also tributary and paid
for their protection through their specialization.
The shifting of alliances among tributaries was common; sometimes
tributaries experienced a great deal of independence from their noble masters.
They were known to negotiate for their rights with masters or seek advice or
counsel outside their tribe. Negotiations were motivated by the 1) burden of
tribute, 2) geographical proximity of some other tribe able to defend their
interests, 3) security or prestige that would come with joining a neighbor tribe, or
4) genealogical connections which might be discovered or already known to exist
between the subservient group and their new patrons. Thus, although usually
remaining subservient, there was considerable lateral mobility for tributaries.
Often the defection of one group could decide the outcome of a battle between
two kabilas. Thus, in some ways tributary needs were catered to, aiming to keep
them on their side (Stewart 19732383).
Although not common, there was occasional vertical mobility for
individuals within the tributaries, including Haratines. A gifted man by service to
a master or via education could be elevated by marriage or fabrication of his
16
H
genealogy to become noble. The strict hierarchy of Mauritania has been often
compared to the caste system existing in India. However, the existence,
although rare of vertical mobility for individuals suggests that the extremely rigid
boundaries existing in the Indian caste system do not appropriately describe the
Mauritanian social structure (Ould Cheikh 1985).
The wealth of tributaries was dependent upon the wealth and status of
their masters. The lowest of the tributaries were the slaves who were directly
owned by their masters and had no personal property or independence. With the
exception of slaves, Haratines were the most disadvantaged of the tributaries.
Haratines are characteristically black in color, but culturally Arab, even to the
point of calling themselves Bidan. They have adopted the culture and language
of their masters. However, the distinction between Bidan and Haratine is not
genetic but is a product of history and society. The importance of social
deï¬nition in hierarchy is exempliï¬ed by the ‘Chorfa’ who, black in color, claim
they are direct descendents from the Prophet and are thus accorded higher
status. Although difï¬cult to trace directly, most Chorfa are likely to have been
slaves or the descendents of slaves. However, due to extreme loyalty,
intelligence, or hard work, some may have been able to link their genealogy to
the Prophet and move vertically upward in the social hierarchy. Additionally,
many Haratine are light in color, suggesting a decline in status by a White Moor
tributary or their ancestors (Stewart 1973; Bhrane 1997).
Although ‘Haratine’ is today often translated directly as Black Moor and
implies slave ancestors, Haratines were historically distinct from slaves.
17
Although subservient to Bidan nobles, they were free, some being former slaves
and some coming from families with no slave ancestors. However, the Haratine
identity was deï¬ned in terms of their white masters or nobles from whom they
Ieamed their language and culture. As is stated by Bhrane (1997244), the sense
of identiï¬cation that Haratines felt for one another was minimal due to the limited
communication and contact among them through which the notion of this
collectively imagined community could be diffused.
Haratines were either connected to one family within a kabila by living in
or next to their tent, or those who lived independently were connected to the
entire kabila by living in an area dominated by the kabila. Haratines were
members of the kabila and showed solidarity by participating in diya (or blood
money paymentsS), yet their genealogy did not ï¬t within the heritage of the kabila
itself. Thus, although bound by obligations, Haratines were not full members of
I the kabila (Bhrane 1997256).
The traditional role of the Haratine in the kabila is one of cultivator.
Haratines worked as indentured peasants who forcibly donated a portion of their
harvest to speciï¬c Bidan families or to the tribe as a whole depending upon their
afï¬liation. This practice maintains the lower social status of Haratines because it
implies payment of tribute as this donation gave Haratines the right to services
and protection.
Slaves were located at the very bottom of the Moorish hierarchy, although
their work and subservient status were crucial to the pre-colonial Moorish
economy. In the pre-colonial period, the majority of Bidans had slaves. In a
18
previous era, any Bidan with no slave would be very poor (Ould Cheikh
19852427). Indeed, “...survival in the harsh desert climate necessitated a variety
of labor intensive tasks most often carried out by slaves.†They dug wells,
farmed the land, and harvested gum Arabic for their masters. Slaves were
responsible for all domestic chores including cooking and setting up the tent
(Bhrane 1997280). Most slaves were bought or grabbed during raids in the
Senegal basin.
2.3. Gender in Pre-Colonial Mauritania
As in most Arab countries, women traditionally are relegated to the home.
The divide between the public male sphere and the female domestic sphere
forms the basis for gender relations. Women do not play a role in formal kabila
politics and cannot shake the hand of a man who is not a relative. Like most
Arabs, Moors adhere to the ideal of a man marrying his father’s brother’s
daughter, thus acknowledging the patrilineality of power of the male gender in
lineage and inheritance that is commonly found in Muslim Arab societies.
Although Mauritanian women historically have not enjoyed the same rights
as men, Bidan women have always been distinct from other Arab women
because “they live with conï¬dence, not with terror, with afï¬rmation and not
negation, in evolution and not in stagnation†(Simard 1996278). Women have
liberty that is not compatible with orthodox Islam; most signiï¬cant is the lack of
veils on Mauritanian women (Ould Cheikh 1987). Bidan women traditionally
have enjoyed more freedom than women to the south in sub—Saharan Africa and
19
than their neighbors to the north in Morocco. The anomaly of Bidan women and
their relative freedom has been the subject of much debate. Simard (1996:79-
80) has outlined four theories that have emerged as dominant.
One important theory on Bidan women’s relative freedom in Mauritania
maintains that prior to the arrival of the Arabs, the Mauritanian Berber society
was matriarchal and influences from this society remained strong after their
defeat. The rationale for this theory stems from the similarities between the
Moors and their Tuareg neighbors who remain Berber and matriarchal.
Additionally, some Moorish kabilas today are tied together by alliance to a female
ancestor. Matrilineal rights exist, and women are very important in mediation.
Finally, there is evidence of matrilocal residence due to the fact that Moorish
women have the right to chase their husbands from their tent should tensions
rise.
A second theory regarding women in Mauritania rests upon the image of .
the good father. Bidan women are protected in Mauritania because they are
seen as vulnerable. Indeed, Bidan women are protected and limited from
manual labor. This also is related to the feeding of Bidan women. Because
plumpness is desirable for women, mothers and female family members expend
great effort to eat enough to maintain excessive weight as compared to Bidan
men, or Haratine men or women.
A third theory suggests that Bidan women do not need to veil or practice
other demure behavior required of women in more populated areas. The need
for the veil arises when outsiders threaten masculinity or when women are
20
I'J
vulnerable to foreign harm. In the isolated and sparse country of Mauritania,
male identity has never been contested. Increasing foreign intrusion into the
country is changing these circumstances.
A ï¬nal theory suggests that Mauritania operates under a ‘better’ Islam
where Bidan women are respected through a more enlightened interpretation of
the Koran. Mauritania always has been always a center of Muslim theology and
Suï¬sm, thus making logical their different understanding of Islam.
Haratine and slave women did not have the luxury to be protected or force
fed, as they were often struggling to ï¬nd enough food to feed their families.
Although subservient to men, the necessity of their labor with their husband’s in
order to survive provided them with as much freedom they needed to perform the
domestic, agricultural and herding tasks of which they were responsible. Their
freedom greatly depended upon their status as Haratine or slave. However, both
Haratine and Slave women struggled for survival usually in partnership with men.
Women were the productive force of the slave society where they were
often preferred to men, reflected in their higher price. Women performed the
same tasks that men performed and, in addition, performed tasks that were
unique to women. They tended and milked animals, fetched water from great
distances, produced milk products, treated skins for use in leather goods, wove
goat and camel hair into tents, and pounded millet among many other tasks.
Women usually were born Haratine or slave. It was difï¬cult for women to
move upwards from slave status. It was common for Bidan who liberated slaves
to provide them with a bit of property such as a few animals or ï¬elds to farm to
21
enable them to live independently. In the case of slave women, there was no
incentive to let them free because any property given to them would
automatically become the property of their husbands when they married or if they
were already married. Their husbands could be slave themselves thus negating
the property gift. Also, Haratine women did not pay communal tax as did the
Haratine men. Due in part to these disincentives, women could only change their
status vertically from slave to Haratine by becoming concubines (male children
were born with their father’s status) or by wet nursing Bidan children. The
recognized bond between a woman who nurses and the child enabled wet
nurses to increase their status through their close connection to the Bidan
children they nursed. Women could improve their situation by cultivating
relations and a cherished place within their master’s families. “Women
experienced power, domination, and resistance ...in gendered ways†(Bhrane
1997:77).
2.4. Tenure in Pre-Colonial Mauritania
The apparent liberty or even anarchy that seemed to preside over
nomadic movement in pre-colonial times disguises a system that was quite
complex. Tenure in pre-colonial Mauritania was based upon kabila collective
appropriation which when examined carefully has many complicated facets.
Spatial control and usage rights were directly connected to status and social
networks. Political and social constraints limited mobility within hierarchical
organization. Thus, territory is more than a geographic entity in Mauritania, it is a
22
value system tied into the role of spatial mobility in the Moorish political system
(Ould Cheikh 198722.37).
Possession of water points was the most important element in making
boundaries for territories. Because water is needed to exploit surrounding
pasture, the placement and control of water points effectively creates territorial
boundaries. In pre-colonial Mauritania, wells belonged to the religious leaders
but were subject to the warriors who had military supremacy to gain access to
the wells and forage when they were needed. The settlement of the Shurr Al
Bubba War in the 17th century that provides the foundation of Moorish identity
states that although wells were controlled by the religious leaders, warriors were
entitled to one third of the water (thuth alma) (Ould Cheikh 19852212). Although
known to belong to a certain kabila, water was liberally available to all with the
owner kabila having priority. This flexible system became more rigid when there
was a war or in severe drought conditions.
Agricultural land and forest products were collectively owned by the kabila
that controlled the territory, often dictated by well placement. Wetlands also were
important water points and were controlled by kabilas. For the most important
wetlands, tenure conflicts often were settled by two or more kabilas controlling
different sections of the wetland. Wetlands were not fenced to keep other groups
out. Rather, alliances of protection or, alternatively, fear of retribution effectively
controlled access to wetlands.
Haratine access to agricultural land depended upon the good graces of
leaders and importance of the gifts given by the potential users (Ould Cheikh
23
19872170). Although certain Haratine families or groups stayed on some
agricultural plots for generations, the access to the land was always tenuous as
it was reinforced by the obligatory yearly donations given to the noble leaders of
their kabila who effectively controlled the ownership, management, harvest, and
use of the land. These forced donations, often called zakat, or religious
offerings, constituted an informal rent payment on the part of the Haratine. This
payment varied from year to year depending upon the success of the season
or, more often, the needs of the masters.
2.5. Hierarchical Changes in Colonial Mauritania
Until independence in 1960, there were few alterations to traditional
patterns of political authority and social stratiï¬cation. Mauritania was of minimal
political and economic interest to the French colonializers, and thus the French
did not have a large presence or radical impact upon the Moorish social, political
and economic systems. However, there were some important changes that
occurred under colonization. Although the French colonization of Mauritania
remained relatively short, and in reality had little impact on daily life, its influence
still was important and had ramiï¬cations for social relations in Mauritania still
evident today.
In Mauritania, as was the case in much of the Sahel, the colonial
administration formally recognized kabila authority and territories while removing
the system of mobility based upon shifting alliances and armed conflict that had
kept kabila territories fluid and ever changing (Grayzel 1988). Thus, by freezing
24
and reinforcing what they thought was ‘traditional,’ the French introduced new
power and support to speciï¬c sectors of the society (Colson 19712196). Chanock
(1991) further explains that colonial administrators codiï¬ed law, placing strict
rules and individualist leanings on communal institutions that had been flexible,
thereby diminishing the communal solidarity of customary laws. Formalized
tenure did not replace customary tenure but added a different set of rules and
regulations through which society’s relations could be deï¬ned (Mackenzie 1988).
Introducing more national security that effectively eliminated armed
conflict and raids (razzia) among kabilas, the French increased the security of
non-warriors. Furthermore, the French purchased tributary payment (hurma)
rights from warriors and sunk wells for tributaries to free them from their eternal
servitude. The French cemented wells and thus further reduced the fluidity of
territory. Communication improved with an increase of motorized transport that
left a decline in camel breeding.
The resulting power shift in the traditional hierarchy is obvious. Hassani
warriors lost their source of income that usually came from those paying for
protection. Thus, they were forced to take up livestock and commerce.
Tributaries were able to gain some degree of independence; however, today
their status is still much lower than the Bidan (Stewart 19732386).
In protecting religious leaders against warriors, the colonial administration
reinforced the weak by weakening the strong. The colonial monopolization of
violence left the warriors no reason to exist (Marchesin 1992274). A Bidan from a
warrior kabila tells of their quest to enter into agriculture when it became
25
apparent that warring would no longer pay after the French arrived. He
describes the complex relationships between those rising and falling in
dominance in Leweija, one of the best and longest-cultivated areas in eastern
Mauritania (interview6 at Leweija October 1999).
Leweija had been cultivated by the Tenwajib kabila long before
1940. The marabouts had people who farmed for them in Leweija
and this agriculture was a big source of income. In 1940, my
ancestors began to realize that there was no future in warring and
that agriculture was a good way to support ourselves. Before they
used to go south to take grain by force, but then the French said
you couldn’t do that any more. So they went to Leweija to tell the
Tenwajib to get off the land that they wanted to farm. There were
many problems and ï¬nally the colonial administration had to
become involved. The French governor came with the Tenwajib
kabila chief and our chief, and they divided up Leweija between the
two kabilas. You see, we had always owned Leweija, but had
never farmed it. Because we were the warriors, we owned
everything. The Tenweijib were just reluctant to give us our land
when we decided we wanted it.
Perhaps the most important change that came with colonization was the
introduction of Western education. The French imposition of Western education
met with strong resistance from the Mauritanian elite. In spite of opposition, the
French mandated school attendance, especially for the noble families each of
which were each required to send at least one son to school. Their great distrust
of this education system led many Bidan kabila leaders to send one of their slave
or Haratine boys instead. Although they initially were manipulated to enroll in
Western education, these Haratines or slaves were served very well by their
education. At the time of independence (and even before), they were among the
very few Westem-educated in Mauritania and were well placed to participate in
top level colonial (and subsequently new governmental) positions (Levrossier
26
19872387).
Colonization did not penetrate slavery, but instead laid the groundwork
that would in the future enable the abolition of slavery. During colonization
money began to circulate in the country derived from new taxes, salaries, and
schooling. Slaves had a new important role in bringing in money so their masters
could pay taxes. Some slaves were sent to be salaried workers or manual
laborers. Thus, although they did not at ï¬rst keep their earnings, the introduction
of salaried labor provided an avenue for increased independence and freedom.
Another important result of the increasing colonial tax burden was the migration
of many Bidan families. Migration outside Mauritania was a good way to make
money to pay needed taxes if herds were too small. Traveling Bidan brought
their slaves with them across West Africa to help them in their trading and daily
lives. Although most slaves returned with their masters, this experience provided
a larger worldview outside Mauritania where slavery was insigniï¬cant. Finally,
the creation of modern political parties in 1948 was the last contribution of the
French effort towards the creation of a viable state political entity (Levrossier
19872387).
2.6. Economic Changes in Colonial Mauritania
The trans-Saharan trade through which Saharan nomads supplemented
their incomes was changed drastically in the late nineteenth century, dropping
from one million francs of trade in 1878 to under 540,000 francs after 1880
(Caratini 1989297). The decline in trans-Saharan trade caused the decline of the
27
desert-edge economic sector, which is one of the most underestimated impacts
of colonialism (Lovejoy and Baler 19762145). The Industrial Revolution made
sea transport by steamer more efficient than caravan transport and thereby took
away from the Sahara the control of lucrative markets, while effectively
eliminating Morocco from its middleman position in Western Saharan trade
(Caratini 1989297). In pre-colonial times this sector had provided an extensive
market for grain and other imported products from further south, was a good
source of salt and animals, and connected peoples with North Africa (Lovejoy
and Baler 19762145). This decline rendered less effective one of the critical ways
that nomads traditionally had diversiï¬ed their economy. The decline in wealth
weakened their power over sedentary populations, and also made their long
migrations in search of water and fodder for their herds a difï¬cult task without
payments that often were received for transportation on these migrations.
As Europe gained control over the commerce in West Africa, the '
indigenous economy was changed because the colonial powers developed the
economic sectors most suited to their needs (Campbell 1977283). The French
began to influence sedentary groups controlling the means of production In
wetlands, particularly the gum Arabic trade in Mauritania. European intervention
in this area reinforced the political powerof the oasis leaders and religious
aristocracy by freeing them from military and economic domination by the warrior
class as the colonial power prepared to take ultimate control of trade (Hames
19792375).
Domination by the warrior classes had been crucial to secure access to
28
needed resources in oases. After colonization, many resources, such as grain
and pastures, especially drought year pastures, were more difï¬cult to obtain
through tributary relations. This shift in power away from the groups led by the
nomadic warriors signiï¬cantly altered the desert economy. Whereas the terms of
trade had long favored services that the nomads could provide such as
protection, transport and animal products, now they were products with
unfavorable terms of trade. Since colonialism, animal prices have risen slightly,
but grain prices have increased signiï¬cantly due to the exportation of goods to
areas with higher purchasing capacity, and to the reorientation of agriculture from
subsistence to cash crops (Sandford 19832137).
Taxes imposed by colonial governments also contributed to the integration
of nomads into the cash economy. Where they were forced to raise cash, they
had to sell their animals, which conveniently created a cheap source of meat for
the growing urban populations. Nomads were taxed by the worth of their herd,
as estimated by a colonial ofï¬cial. These ‘values’ were set while no
consideration was given to the large herd size required for minimal survival.
These prices were set as if all animals of the herd were in excess and could be
sold at the market on any given day. In Mauritania, the governor set the herd
value, and people were required to pay 1/100 of the total herd value to the
colonial government (Caratini 19892237).
Taxation provides a good example of the political-economic concept of the
margin as explained by Blaikie and Brookï¬eld (1987) where land managers are
often marginalized through the imposition of taxes that result in surplus
29
extraction. Surplus extraction in the case of nomads can be dangerous, as the
large size of their herds is necessary to withstand prolonged drought and
therefore future security. While being forced to sell part of their herds to pay
taxes, a crucial strategy for risk aversion was destroyed. As Doombos and
Markakis (1991) explain:
Little thought and no effort was expended in the post colonial
period to improve production in the traditional livestock sector,
although efforts were made to persuade pastoralists to sell their
animals in order to provide the urban and export markets with
cheaply priced meat.
Mixed results of commercialization efforts were blamed on emotional and
traditional cultural reasons for not wanting to sell. The traditional importance of
risk management or unfair terms of trade with the modern sector were not
considered (Doornbos and Markakis 19912271). In addition, the creation of
outside markets for ‘excess animals’ broke up a traditional social security system
where wealthier nomads would farm out some animals for their poor relatives to
herd, thus solving a labor problem and providing a livelihood to less fortunate
members of the group (Toupet 19772185).
Traditionally, nomads were the hardest people to conquer due to their
historical military supremacy and their mobile lifestyle, causing colonial powers to
aggressively seek to break nomadic power. Taxation and direct requisition of
animals for butchery or army transport were effective ways of decreasing herd
size and weakening the nomad economy and ability to survive. In 1926, the
French army requisitioned 1,500 camels in Mauritania out of a population of
9,000. Not only were these animals requisitioned; they had to be kept by their
30
owners on the edge of the oasis for easy access, disregarding the lack of pasture
there for the requisitioned or other herd animals to feed on. The governor
himself recognized that this extreme tax was contributing to the famine that was
occurring during this time (Ould Cheikh 1986231 ).
2.7. Political Changes in Colonial Mauritania
The colonial powers sought to defeat the nomadic armies in order to gain
complete control over their territory. By 1880, migratory utilization of rangeland
was politically incompatible with the expectations of colonial powers interested in
preventing tribal disputes over rangeland occupancy (Bennett 1988231 ).
Overpowering the sedentary communities was easier and was achieved early in
the colonial process. The conquering of the sedentary population aided in the
complete conquest of the nomadic populations, as their decreased access to
sedentary resources negatively impacted nomadic life. Adrar, an important
nomadic dietary source of grain and dates, and the only major oasis in Northern
Mauritania, was completely occupied by French armies in 1914. The French
allowed the warrior kabilas to come to the wetland cases, but they were not
allowed to bear arms, thereby forcing warriors to accept the domination by
groups they once controlled. As a result, warrior kabilas found it difï¬cult to obtain
the resources that they required in the oasis (Caratini 19892126). Pre-colonial
freedom of movement was restricted only by each group’s capacities for self-
defense and networks of alliances. New restrictions imposed by the colonial
government with a differing agenda and often superior military force interfered
31
with their migrations and access to traditional sources of food and pasture (Ould
Cheikh 19912213). Colonial wars involving mineral wealth were restricting
access to resources, such as the territory battle between Morocco, Algeria, and
Mauritania in the Western Sahara where an actual wall was built across
migratory routes to protect Moroccan territory. This wall made of sand and
rubble was equipped with land mines. Defenses bordering the Western Sahara
now extend more than 1,600 km from southern Morocco to the Mauritanian
border, sealing off major towns, water sources, good pasturage, migration
patterns, and ï¬sheries of the Saharan coast (Arkell 19912164).
The colonial and neo-colonial govemments' containment of nomads
greatly affected their ability to continue to herd animals as the environment of the
desert required. The paciï¬cation of their armies decreased their ability to ensure
access to needed resources and also decreased the functionality of nomadic
government. Nomadic groups tended to move quite far from one another in
search of pastures and would reunite for governmental purposes only when the
strength of the entire group was needed. The council of elders would discuss
war strategies and or migratory patterns. As migrations were restricted and
warfare was eliminated, there was no longer a need or possibility for this group to
meet. The Cheikh, a powerful member of the council who once had the ï¬nal
word on migration patterns, was reduced to a hated tax collector for the French
(Hodges 1983214).
Another political change was in the French colonial interpretation of
resource tenure. The usefulness of the image of the customary law of land
32
NI
tenure was not lost on the rulers of the postcolonial states. In the name of ’
customary land tenure and protection of African customs as identiï¬ed by colonial
rulers, post-colonial governments in Africa have commonly asserted a total
control over vast amounts of territory that formally was communally owned. A
customary veil has been drawn over national conï¬scation of rights and increasing
scarcity, and the inequality of existing holdings has been disguised by the
assertion of rights for all. “Not only have people been deprived of full land rights
in terms of the dominant, imported legal system, but the dominant system also
has distorted the rights recognizable and assertable in the customary one"
(Chanock 1991282), thus relegating Africans to a legal rightlessness in land
(Berry 1988258). In addition to state governments appropriating land, traditional
law codified by colonial rulers was easy for the elite to manipulate to concentrate
their land holdings. Land disputes often were settled under the supervision of
colonial ofï¬cials that beneï¬ted loyal traditional leaders who were able (without
traditional checks and balances) to claim more property. As is explored in
greater depth in Chapter Six, community-based natural resource management
(CBNRM) advocates try to recapture the virtues of traditional community
management by using modern legal systems.
Mauritania’s social structure is rooted in a strong history of hierarchy that
still is evident today. Although the basic structure has remained intact through
colonization and independence, there are important changes that allow for
different negotiations of relations and hierarchies. The altered and newly-created
33
opportunities for people at all levels of Mauritanian hierarchy have their roots in
the colonial period. Although the French influence was seemingly short and
superï¬cial, some important elements of Mauritania’s society were solidiï¬ed and
altered during that period. As I examine in subsequent chapters, this pre-colonial
and colonial history plays an important role in the negotiations for resource
tenure in present day eastern Mauritania.
34
CHAPTER THREE
POWER AND NATURAL RESOURCE TENURE:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
People’s ability to access, control and use natural resources effectively is
crucial to their livelihoods (Berry 1989241). Natural resource institutions through
which control over natural resources is mediated have been the subject of much
scholarship, debate, and experimental policy-making on the part of
development agencies and of pre- and postcolonial governments. Community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) has emerged in recent years as
a new development paradigm. This new paradigm has caught the eye not only
of development scholars, but also of development practitioners working in a
wide-range of organizations such as large multi-Iateral institutions (e.g., the I"
World Bank) to small, grass-roots, non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
CBNRM emerged from the concept that people who live near a resource and
who depend upon it for their survival are more likely to use the resource in a
sustainable manner (Benjaminsen 1997).
Making the concept of CBNRM increasingly attractive is the realization
that state bureaucracies in much of the Third World have limited ï¬nancial and
human resources and have been unable to live up to the exigencies of
centralized planning and administration. Because of their generally poor
performance, these bureaucracies have come under increasing pressure from
the international community to relinquish control over many social and technical
services to local communities and civil society. Furthermore, scholars such as
Bromley (1991) have led scholars and development practitioners alike to realize
35
that communal property closely resembles private property in that both groups
and individuals can exclude outsiders from access to their property. For those
seeking the goal of ultimate privatization, CBNRM is a logical step along the
path to development.
The appeal of CBRNM to such diverse players in international
development has led the concept to be widely implemented over the developing
world with much lauded success and potential. The concept has moved to the
stage that Latour (1987) terms ‘the black box’, whereby the rationale and
assumptions leading to CBNRM have been taken for granted and no longer are
open for discussion. Thus, CBNRM has become difï¬cult to deconstruct and
critique, because the concept of increased participation is now taken as a
universal good.
This study attempts to open the black box and reconsider the concept.
Mainstream research and policy on natural resource institutions led by the
advocates of CBNRM have misconceptualized the realities of resource tenure in
two important ways. First, the centrality of power as a variable in resource tenure
is analyzed only as it pertains to the legal power of an institution, disregarding the
informal7 and traditional avenues of power that remain regardless of nationally-
recognized legal efforts to the contrary. Second, natural resource institutions are
placed into rigid and clearly deï¬ned categories of tenure regimes, which mask
the complexities of social relations and networks that play an important role in
natural resource access in contemporary Africa and in other parts of the world.
To address the disjuncture between mainstream theoretical understandings of
36
natural resource institutions and the actual on the ground realities, I use the
social network (Berry 1989) and political ecology (Blaikie 1987) frameworks. An
examination of the relevant literature on resource tenure follows.
3.1. Legal and Institutional Approaches to Resource Tenure
Scholars focusing on legal and institutional aspects of land tenure argue
that efï¬cient use and management of resources is dependent upon appropriate,
clear tenure regimes (Bates 1989). Because property rights are insecure in
African customary systems (Feder 1987), they contend that African governments
should create conditions of secure tenure in which property rights determine
patterns of resource allocation. The conditions of secure tenure should be
created through law and policy formation (Berry 19932102). Most contemporary
scholars focusing on legal and institutional approaches to resource tenure
advocate CBNRM when appropriate to the culture and production system.
Legal and institutional approaches to resource tenure were based
originally on Hardin’s 1968 work “The Tragedy of the Commons.’ This work was
based upon the assumption that people always tend to maximize their own self-
interest. Due to this individual drive, people ignore the implications of their
actions on others and thus communal property will eventually lead to over-
exploitation of natural resources (Pearce 1988). To support his argument,
Harden detailed an example of a herding economy dependent upon common
pasture. Because each herder is primarily interested in proï¬t maximization, each
herder will add sheep to their flock when possible, even when they know that the
37
addition of more sheep will degrade the pasture. While receiving all the proï¬t
from each additional sheep they add to their flock, the herder bears only a small
portion of the cost of the degradation because the pasture is owned communally.
Thus, herders would not have the incentive to protect their commons from a
tragic overexploitation. Using this example, Hardin asserted “...freedom in the
commons brings ruin to all†(Hardin 1968:1244). “This ‘tragedy’ is due to the
failure of the market to develop properly, which forces people to internalize
externalities†(McCay 1998). Although Hardin recognized that communities are
able to influence the management of common property, the commons dilemma
arises when the beneï¬ts of individualistic behavior outweigh community
pressures and people will pursue resource extraction in ways that will harm the
community (including themselves) in the long run. The conclusion of Hardin’s
argument is that only private property leads to a sustainable exploitation of
natural resources.
A second major assumption of critics of communal management maintains
that tenure evolves in a linear progression in which tenure becomes increasingly
deï¬ned, individualistic, and schre. This assumption is in part rooted in Rostow's
(1993) stages of growth that is based in the modernist ideal that all countries
move towards modernization in similar stages along similar paths. The need for
institutional arrangements to describe and enforce property rights is common in
countries that are making the transition to a modernized economy. Prior to
modernization, land typically is abundant and the population is small, which
enables easy exchange and access to information regarding who customarily
38
uses and manages resources. At this stage, the gains afforded by enhanced
property rights often are less than the transaction costs of deï¬ned property rights.
When countries begin to develop, mobility increases, which creates an
asymmetry in information and requires more deï¬nition of tenure arrangements.
When growth begins, communal tenure is seen by critics as an obstacle to
progress, particularly in relation to the ability to use one’s land as collateral for
agricultural credit. Thus, one requirement for development is the evolution of
private property (Cousins 2000; Platteau 1996).
3.2. Common Property Resource Advocates
Common property resource advocates (also called institutionalists) have 1»
moved away from Hardin’s original arguments to dispute the polarity of
communal (disregarded as traditional by critics) and individual (lauded as
modern) tenure regimes. Instead, they argue that there are several types of
tenure regimes, all with different possibilities for tenure control. Communal
tenure regimes can in fact be quite organized and can effectively implement
controls against over-exploitation of a resource. These communal regimes offer
the possibility of incorporating local traditions within modern legal reforms to
provide natural resource institutions that are appropriate to diverse local
situations in the context of diverse histories, social strata, and ecologies.
Bromley (1991) argues that rather than two, there are four broad
categories of land tenure regimes. The ï¬rst is open access, in which each user
has privilege regarding the use of the resource and there is no authority system
39
to exclude users or to enforce behavioral norms among participants concerning
the natural resource. The second category is common preperty, in which a group
of people has private ownership and management of a resource and others can
either use the resource or make decisions about it. The third category is private
property, in which a person or corporation has exclusive ownership and
management rights to a resource. The fourth category of land tenure regimes is
state property, in which the state owns and controls use. State property regimes
can quickly become open access regimes if the state does not have the means
or desire to closely manage the resources. These four categories make clear a
fundamental misconception in the analyses of communal critics that confused
common property with open access. Whereas open access to a resource has
obvious consequences for the overuse of a resource, common property can be
efï¬ciently and exclusively managed by a group to avoid such problems. There
has been a drastic increase in CBNRM schemes stemming from the increasing
acceptance of CBNRM policy and scholarship. For example, in Mauritania as in
much of the Sahel, the World Bank has been implementing projects (Gestion de
Terroir Villageoise)8 based on village control and management of their
surrounding natural resources.
Ostrom (1996) asserts that sustainable use and management of resources
does not necessarily require the ability to sell and use the resource for collateral.
She explains in further detail the types of rights or contractual arrangements9 to
natural resources which include: 1) access or non subtractive beneï¬ts
(authorized entrant), 2) withdrawal, or ability to remove resource (authorized
40
user), 3) management, or right to regulate the internal use of the resource and to
transform the resource by making improvements (claimant), 4) exclusion, or the
ability to determine who has rights to the resource and how these rights transfer
(proprietor), and ï¬nally 5) alienation, or the right to sell or lease a resource
(owner). Communal critics have interpreted the concept of a well-established
property rights system to refer only to systems that include alienability. Ostrom
(19962138) cites evidence from Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda that alienation is not
a necessary condition for promoting sustainable use. A second key assumption
of common property advocates is that those who can exclude other users but
cannot sell (as is the case with many communal property arrangements) also
make decisions in the interest of the long-term sustainability of their resources.
They have even been shown to have more interest in the long-term health of
their resources than those involved in legal private ownership conflicts.
In addition to having the capacity to function as well as private property
regimes, another assumption of common property advocates is that common
property regimes are in some circumstances more appropriate for local and
regional conditions than the Western-based ideology of private property.
Additionally, as Mehta (1999216) maintains, theorists advocating private property
do not take into consideration ecological realities of Sahelian Africa. For
example, herding, an important livelihood strategy in the Sahel, is dependent
upon mobility to search for different pastures during different times of the year.
Privatization of land usually forces settlement of pastoralists, which is likely to
cause them “to suffer from extreme poverty and social dysfunction’ because they
41
cannot opportunistically search for pasture over large areas (Lane 19982ix).
Even those not forcibly settled by anti-communal tenure policies will be pushed
aside as the best forests, the best range land, and the best water access points
are privatized, squeezing the existing commons to land of less quality and
quantity. Thus, nomadic people and other marginalized groups dependent on
the commons, either due to a mobile livelihood strategy or a lack of access to
other land, will lose access to resources crucial to their survival (Lane 1994;
Rocheleau 1996). Thus, common property allows more people access to a
greater range of resources.
CBNRM advocates, in agreement with the range science and pastoral
development literature, have recently begun to call into question the previously
dominant view that local people were largely responsible for the destruction of
their natural environment through misuse (Sandford 1983; Behnke 1995; Styles
1995). Both theorists and pastoral development practitioners are increasingly
advocating the recognition of local expertise in environmental management.
Studies have shown that introducing Western-style range management
techniques are ineffective in most African environmental and cultural contexts.
Locally derived customs and practices, in fact, have proven much more effective
as a basis for local ecological management (Sandford 1983).
Ostrom (1990) asserts that it is important to craft institutions that will result
in collective action and efï¬cient management of natural resources. Her research
on existing long-enduring common property resource (CPR) institutions uncovers
important design principles. One important design principle is the provision of
42
“collective-choice arrangements’ that allow for most individuals who are affected
by operational rules to participate in modifying those rules.
CPR institutions that use this principle are better able to tailor their
rules to local circumstances, because the individuals who directly
interact with one another and with the physical world can modify the
rules over time so as to better ï¬t them to the speciï¬c characteristics
of their setting (Ostrom 1990293).
Additionally, it is necessary to ensure a clear deï¬nition of boundaries, both
of resources and people using resources. If the resource endowment is
randomly distributed, there are additional incentives for joint use. The fairness
implicit in joint access is highly assuring (Runge 19862631 ). Agarwal
(unpublished) warns that for CBNRM to be effective, there must be a true
commitment to the decentralization of power. With examples from natural
resource management projects in Africa, he illustrates their likelihood of failure
when local authority is not downwardly accountable. It is only when local people
actually have the power to manage all aspects of their natural resources that they
will make decisions in the interest of sustaining the resource over the long-term.
Viewed from another angle, people involved in community management
may ï¬nd it difï¬cult to regulate the multiple resource uses and users (Feeney
1990214). Thus, devolution of extra-community control may not be appropriate.
Often, it Is necessary for the state to continue to play a role in resource
conservation and allocation among communities of users. Ostrom (1996)
advocates in some circumstances a co-management system between local users
and the state. Involving both the state and local users can be advantageous
because it can capitalize on local knowledge and interest in resources while the
43
larger reach of the state provides low transaction cost coordination with other
resources users who may be situated over a large geographical area. The
‘nesting’ of local natural resource management institutions in state institutions is
especially important where resources are migratory or overlap jurisdiction
(McCay 19962119). Ostrom (19962147) maintains that state intervention can
reduce time, money, negotiation, and antagonistic behavior.
Still advocating for community-based management of natural resources,
some scholars have questioned the strict reliance on legalistic terms of
communal management to achieve community involvement. Social capital
theorists maintain that social capital can substitute for well-deï¬ned legal property
rights in both private and common property resources (Katz 20002114). In this
framework, in the absence of a formal legal system (which is advocated by both
common and private property advocates) that can guarantee resource tenure
rights for either individuals or for groups of users, social capital can act as a
substitute. Social capital can provide a non-market solution to the problems of
negative externalities, information asymmetry and moral hazard that can be
expected to arise when property rights are not well deï¬ned...’ and can substitute
for costly monitoring of rules (1 17).
For scholars adhering to the ‘community is good’ assumption, a
breakdown in the communal management of resources is due to a breakdown in
the system. This can be due to market influences (Runge 1986) or other causes
of social dysfunction within the community. Like social capitalists, McCay places
less importance than Ostrom and other common property advocates on legalistic
44
natural resource institutions. She relates community failure in natural resource
management to Giddens’ (1994 in McCay 1998) concept of ‘disembeddedness,’
whereby local communities lose critical points of control over both economic
matters and governance. In contrast to communal property critics that see
rational behavior as motivated by a desire to maximize individual gains, rational
behavior is “...anchored within the social context†(24). Thus, community norms
have a strong role in dictating behavior and maintaining rights. The user is
restrained by a number of concerns in her or his role as community member.
Social conditions required for tragedies of the commons occur where “...resource
users ï¬nd themselves without the social bonds that connect them to each other
and to their communities and where responsibilities and tolls for resources
management are absent...†(McCay 1998224). Communal critics assert that
community norms will only influence individuals when the gain of being part of a
community is more than the possibility of personal gain. McCay’s positioning of
rationality in the social context counters this assumption of economistic rationality
by asserting that community norms will always heavily influence behavior to
positively manage natural resources unless communities become disembedded.
3.3. Tradition, Community, and the Environment
In addition to the problems examined above, the movement towards
CBNRM is driven in part by an unexamined assumption that a community’s
involvement in natural resource management is beneï¬cial to community
members. This assumption fuels a desire to return to the virtues of community in
45
’10 scholars. In India,
natural resource management led by the ‘new traditionalist
new traditionalist thought upon which much CBRNM is based maintains that
traditional or pre-colonial societies enjoyed harmonious social relationships,
ecologically-sensitive resource use practices, and had fewer problems with
gender, economic, and environmental exploitation which concern India today
(Gadgil and Guha 1992: Ch 4; Shiva 19882 Chs 1 and 2). These scholars
suggest that colonial rule imposed a pervasive and alien set of social, economic,
and ecological relationships on India, which have been continued by post-
independence governments. Alien practices disrupted traditional ecological and
social relationships. The revalorization of ‘traditional’ society and ‘indigenous’
knowledge in new traditionalist discourse aims to recover a socially-responsible -.,
and ecologically-harmonious alternative to conventional development strategies
(Sinha 1997267).
The desire to return to the virtue of community and its management of
natural resources (compounded with an overall trend towards decentralization)
has focused much scholarly and development effort on the community as an
increasingly attractive alternative to state or private economistic trends.
However, much of this attention to community is based on questionable analyses
such as Gadgil and Guha’s (1992) analysis of the Indian caste system. Rather
than critiquing the system based on oppression and domination, they describe
these relationships to be ‘sympatric.’ Gadgil and Guha use this term to equate
the Indian caste system to an ecosystem. Each caste is like an organism that
performs an important function in the ecosystem. At the same time, each
46
organism is dependent upon other organisms in the system, just as each caste is
mutually dependent upon other castes in the Indian system. Although coming
from different perspectives, the new traditionalist discourse and community
based natural resource management advocates both suffer from a lack of critical
analysis of their assumptions about the inherent good of community and tradition.
In addition to questionable harmony with the environment, the pre-colonial period
was not a “...period of social harmony; caste and class divisions were deeply
oppressive, especially as experienced by the poorest and lowest castes, and
caste (and class) -Iinked sexual exploitation of women was common" (AganNaI
1998261 ). Sinha (1997266) sharply criticizes the new traditionalist project for its
“...implications for social relations, for the distribution of beneï¬ts from resource
use, and indeed for ecological sustainability.†Similarly, CBRNM advocates do
not examine the hierarchies existing in the communities upon which they wish to
bestow new powers.
Salihi (1996212) contributes to the new traditionalist discourse with his
description of the traditional Mauritanian pastoral system that evolved over time
to accommodate the climatic conditions of the region. He asserts that this
system is built upon climate-mandated permanent mobility, diversiï¬cation of
animal species, and an effective mechanism for maintaining a relatively
homogenous distribution of animals (zakat, or religious charity). However,
Salihi’s description of harmonious nomadic interaction with the environment in
Mauritania also was based on strict hierarchies, which included nobles and
slaves. Inequalities existing in customary tenure have always existed, thus
47
refuting the ideal of a harmonious egalitarian traditional society in Africa.
Although it is difï¬cult to argue against increased local participation, it is
incorrect to assume that if you increase local involvement, increased equity will
follow. It is easy to underestimate the persistence of inequality and unequal
access to power (Adams 19922197). Local institutions often are reflective of
extant power structures in a society. Newly-strengthened local institutions,
especially those involved with common pool resources have tended to be
dominated by local elites, often interested in their own self-promotion (McCay
19962117). Self promotion can also motivate differing interpretations of custom.
In Mauritania, for example, urban-based herders deï¬ne tradition from the
Koranic-based Sharia that forbids denying others the water, ï¬re, and pasture,
which they need for their flocks. This increasingly influential view contradicts
kabila custom in which kabila members defended exclusive access to their
territories for their members (Ould Zeidane 1998; Bonte 1987).
Some critics of new traditionalists argue that outside intervention in
traditional systems can be liberating for those who were traditionally oppressed.
Ould Cheikh (1985) argues that in Mauritania land titling to those improving the
land has liberating potential for farmers marginalized within a strict hierarchical
caste system traditionally dominated by noble herders. However, current
attempts to implement CBNRM have also been used as new avenues of power
for traditional elites.
In addition to their lack of attention to hierarchy and oppression, both new
traditionalist and CBNRM advocates focus heavily on communities, without
48
examining what their deï¬nition of community entails. As opposed to the rigid
boundaries advocated by CBNRM scholars, communities often are ambiguous
and difï¬cult to delineate with a rigid boundary in territory or afï¬liation, which is
examined in greater depth in chapter 6.2. The fluidity of community boundaries
often is necessitated by spatial and temporal variations in geography, as is
evidenced by the fluidity of groups and boundaries in dryland Africa (Behnke
1995:148-49).
Gusï¬eld (1975) insightfully reorients community theory by emphasizing
mixtures rather than conflicts inherent in dichotomies that are often used to
analyze communities. He argues that the problem with deï¬ning community
according to categories such as territory or number of services is in the
dichotomies inherent in these categories. The repeated use of dichotomies such
as rural versus urban, traditional versus modem or community versus society
concentrates on conflict and polarities among co-existing elements. Gusï¬eld
(1975) calls for analyzing community as a multidimensional ordinal variable in
which, he suggests, communal elements and the emergence of social institutions
can exist as a mixture, rather than always being in conflict. Gusï¬eld’s reoriented
theory allows for a more appropriate analysis of the many different elements that
constitute a community without necessarily devaluing one aspect or another. He
also eliminates the major CBNRM problem of deï¬ning what is community and
what is excluded from that community.
In summary, the new traditionalist and CBNRM frameworks base their
theories upon several assumptions left unanalyzed. These theorists assert that
49
environmental degradation reflects a disjunction between a community and its
natural resources. Thus local management will restore harmony to people and
environment relations. However, this assertion is based upon the questionable
assumptions that a distinct, homogeneous community exists and that there is a
distinct and stable local environment. A further requisite to the CBNRM rationale
is the assumption that there is ‘...harmony, equilibrium, and balance between
community livelihoods and natural resources’ (Aganlval 19982238). Refuting
these assumptions are the realities existing in Africa and in many other parts of
the world. Communities are dynamic rather than static entities in changing
climate and ecological conditions, and the environmental priorities and natural
resources claims of social actors in differing power relations (gender, caste, age,
wealth) may be highly contested and may not always enhance environmental
sustainability (236).
Community advocates have made an important contribution to scholarship
concerning natural resource access. They have argued that the four-category
analysis of tenure regimes more accurately describes tenure realities and
demonstrates that community management can be efï¬cient and often is more
appropriate to African contexts. Also, the community based structures created
by outside intervention can be liberating for those who were traditionally
oppressed.
Although positive in their ability to focus attention on local people,
community advocates still rely on a static and formal deï¬nition of institutions.
Additionally, the notion of community is not deconstructed, with critics calling for
50
analysis of the boundaries of communities and the examination of the
assumption that communities are homogeneous. Finally, the power implications
of resource tenure are not addressed due to their assumption that if resources
are managed communally, all in the community will beneï¬t. The power
differentials existing within and between communities at the local, regional,
national, and global level are not addressed. The policy implications of the
institutional argument have been to create local institutions for natural resource
management, often operating alongside existing structures of authority.
3.4. Social Networks and Land Tenure
Social network theorists focus their analysis of resource tenure in
developing societies on the social networks through which people negotiate to
obtain access to natural resources. They ï¬ll the gap left by CBRNM scholars
who neglect the . .many everyday contexts within which institutions are located
and their rootedness in local history and society†(Mehta 199925). CBRNM
advocates view institutions as rules, regulations or conventions imposing
constraints on human behavior to facilitate collective action. Instead, less formal
arenas where production, authority, and obligation are contested and negotiated
also are important institutions that influence natural resource management.
“Rather than mere rules or regulations, institutions are seen to be what people
regularly ‘do’ or how people ‘behave’ (Berry 1989 in Mehta 1999213).
Problematic in the CBNRM analysis and prescriptions of institutions is their
assumption that there is a non-interactive divide between formal and informal
51
institutions, and local, national, and international arrangements. This neglects
“...the ‘messy middle’ where different institutional domains overlap and are beset
by ambiguity.†Instead there should be an increased awareness of overlapping
jurisdictions, which cross formal-informal and global-local divides that include
contested knowledges (Mehta 199929).
Social network theorists shift their focus from the virtue of communities in
natural resource management to the locus of power in determining access to
natural resources. Although the contemporary African state may allocate
resources either by state law or through a mix of state and local initiatives, social
networks in the end will influence access to these natural resources. Inequalities
existing in current customary tenure have always existed in one form or another, 9;.
thus refuting the stereotype of an idealized, harmonious and egalitarian
traditional society in Africa. Traditionally, hierarchical relationships affect tenure
even with property owned by the state, community, or clan. Resource ownership
“...remains effectively under the managerial control of selected men through their
dominance in both traditional and modern institutions" (AganNal 199421458). The
limited impact of tenure reform (both individual and communal, state and local)
on patterns of control and access in relation to land suggests that land access
and control are the outcomes of social processes, negotiations, and conflict
resolution (Cousins 200021).
Social network theorists analyze resource tenure in a complex manner
and take into consideration interaction between a diverse set of institutions that
influence natural resource tenure. Rather than being able to classify resource
52
tenure types into two (communal tenure critics) or four (communal tenure _
advocates) types of tenure regimes, the division between these categories
cannot be so rigidly deï¬ned. Several institutions at once can manage one
resource. A farmer may control his ï¬eld next to a seasonal wetland at the same
time that herding communities manage their access to that wetland and while
also maintaining rights to gleaning crop remains after harvest. Simultaneously,
others may have rights to harvest forest products In and around the ï¬eld.
Moreover, due to the speciï¬city of each tenure regime to its social and natural
environment, it is impossible to transfer one regime to another place. Like the
critics of the new traditionalists, they view as flawed the romanticizing of
customary social structures and environmental interactions, and expose the
hierarchical structures of customary tenure regimes.
The most important addition of the social networks theorists to the
resource tenure literature is their focus on social networks that were previously
overlooked in resource tenure study. Although my research shows that both
social networks and policy and laws influence tenure, this initial focus on
networks highlights an important issue. Social network theorists argue that social
networks are so strong that externally imposed laws or economic changes
cannot signiï¬cantly alter natural resource tenure regimes. Thus, social network
theorists argue that it is difï¬cult to externally create a tenure regime. Berry
(1993) argues there is no proof that African governments can actually change or
control land tenure. Even with all of their efforts to control the tenure system,
land tenure has remained ambiguous and is ‘subject to ongoing interpretation.’
53
The signiï¬cance of ambiguous land rights is not that they cause land use to be
inefï¬cient, “but that people’s access to land depends on their participation in
processes of interpretation and adjudication, as well as on their ability to pay’
(Berry 19932103). The informal institutions through which social network
theorists maintain that natural resource access is negotiated are rooted in the
context of social inequality that pervades all aspects of society. Agarwal
(1998284) argues that women’s negotiating strength regarding natural resource
tenure and environmental concerns in general would be enhanced by changes in
the gendered division of labor and in the distribution of political power. She
suggests that these changes are dependent upon women’s ability to “...bargain
for a better deal within the household, as well as with the community, the market,
and the state.â€
The limited impact of legal tenure reform is evidence that land and natural
resource tenure is a social process (Fortmann 1996). In fact, people use land for
many purposes beyond the production of the requirements for material survival
and enrichment. Land and other natural resources are used to gain control over
others and to deï¬ne personal and social identities. In Mauritania for example,
agricultural land is generally of such poor quality that it cannot uniquely sustain
nobles or their former slaves (Haratines), thus making the struggle over the land
not only an economic but a political struggle for symbolic control over the other
party (Bonte 19872213). James C. Scott’s (1985) “Weapons of the Weak"
asserts that peasant rebellions and revolutions are few and far between, rather
the weak assert themselves in ordinary ways requiring little coordination and
54
planning (29). Scott suggests that common forms of ‘everyday resistance’ ‘
employed by powerless groups are . .foot dragging, dissimulation, false
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance..." In Mauritania, Haratines who resist
sharecropping from their former nobles are employing one such tactic in their
resistance to domination. Even when good quality agricultural land is available to
borrow for free from noble former masters (Bidans), Haratines often create their
own plots on marginal lands, preferring to harvest less than further submit
themselves to their former nobles. Thus, as they are creating new ï¬elds in land
previously considered too marginal for agriculture, they are asserting their
independence. Property rights are subject to change with changing social
relations; thus power is an integral part of land tenure. -,
Changes in the natural resource base also can impact social relations and
their resulting tenure regimes. As Latour (1987) maintains, non-human things
impact humans and human relationships. As seen violently in the Senegal River.
basin, improved irrigation systems that rendered the Senegal River basin
agriculture more proï¬table caused a war over tenure rights. In eastern
Mauritania, the impoverishment of several noble white herders due to recurring
drought has increased Bidan interest in farming. This has led to a tightening of
access to agricultural plots that previously were allotted through the kabila elders
to anyone who desired to engage in the socially-disgraceful work of working the
land.
Because resource tenure is a social process, it often is necessary to
invest in social relationships to gain access to these resources. Individuals
55
frequently invest in social relationships in the form of ceremonies, education, or
gifts in efforts to establish or reafï¬nn advantageous identities for themselves that
strengthen their connections or claims to resources (Berry 1988267). “Investment
in social relations as channels of access may divert surplus from investment in
directly productive activities and direct the management of production towards
fostering loyalty rather than maximizing physical output†(Berry 1989243). In
Mauritania for example, Haratines regularly give a portion of their harvest to
Bidan members of their kabila. Although this yearly ‘contribution’ can impose
severe hardship on families, it is important because this contribution ensures
Haratines access to their kabila and ensures that there will be no problems for
them to stay and plant on the kabila land the following year. In times of extreme
difï¬culty such as drought they can count on aid from the group.
The main policy implication of the social network framework is that it is
necessary to shift state and development policy to focus on intervention in the
informal institutional arenas through which “. . .negotiations take place and power
relations assert themselves†(Cousins 2000211). This focus on informal
Institutions assumes that laws are inefï¬cient in the face of social relations, which
dictate behavior and ultimately decide how resources are accessed and
distributed. Thus, land tenure reforms do not signiï¬cantly clarify indigenous
tenure or achieve Increased equity. Legalistic tenure reforms will simply induce
new arguments and debates over access to land.
The social network framework of natural resource access isflexible and
provides the framework for critical analyses of natural resource access in diverse
56
ecologies and social strata. The examination of networks in this theory ï¬lls. a gap
in the existing frameworks for natural resource tenure with its recognition that
institutions are loci of power that are negotiated and renegotiated constantly and
give rise to different ways of accessing natural resources. Although the four
categories advocated by CBNRM advocates of private, communal, state property
and open access are useful ideal types to describe natural resource tenure, they
obscure the complexities of multiple institutions and networks that influence
resource tenure. In actuality, resource tenure regimes usually will not neatly ï¬t
into one category or another. Furthermore, the dry climate of Mauritania makes it
impossible to ï¬nd one tenure solution that will work each year, because the
quantity and location of rain changes drastically each year. Most importantly, a
social network analysis deconstructs the homogeneous community that forms the
basis of mainstream resource tenure literature and focuses on power and
negotiation in resource access. The recognition of hierarchy and difference in
community is an important and necessary point of departure for analysis of
Mauritania. Finally, the extremely hierarchical societies inhabiting much of the
Sahel and other parts of Africa make it difï¬cult to produce one resource tenure
solution for all groups, notwithstanding the difï¬culty of deï¬ning the group
boundanes.
Depending on the local environment and land use practices, there
is a vast array of land tenure regimes, which result not only from
physical, geographical or economic factors, but also from the user
communities’ forms of social organization. There can be a vast
body of rights over a resource ranging from occasional, seasonal
gathering rights through to priority and exclusive rights. In the
same way, between the two extremes of access, open to a large
number of user and to a restricted community or even one family,
57
one may also ï¬nd a plurality of users, sometimes of the same
resource (Thebaud 19952i).
Social network theorists have attempted to focus on social relations that
pervade all types of societies. This framework, importantly focused attention on
informal institutional areas that were previously excluded from analysis of tenure.
However, Cousins (2000) critiques social network theorists for disregarding the
power of laws in tenure. He maintains that in a place such as South Africa,
disregarding the influence of legal institutions is to disregard the history of the
country. Although social networks may be pervasive, the legal discrimination
under South African apartheid and colonial law is intense and must be countered
in legal and in other ways. Similarly, Agarwal (1998) argues that it is possible for
legal protections to provide a buffer to women from the stronghold of community
patriarchy. Decentralization and increased community control over resources
empower local communities that are neither unitary nor ungendered, which can
strengthen local pockets of patriarchal and other hierarchical powers. As
decentralization increases, it is important that state institutions, NGOs, and
political bodies outside the local power nexus provide an arena for strengthening
women’s bargaining power in relation to the community and the family (Agarwal
1998285). Legal measures should be recognized as potential mitigators of local
hierarchies, while recognizing their limited powers in this respect. Thus, my
analysis of natural resource tenure must focus on informal and formal institutions,
laws, and policies.
58
3.5. National and Global Networks
In this analysis, I use a social relations framework, which ï¬lls the gaps of
CBNRM by analyzing the distribution of power in social networks, focusing on
informal institutions and negotiations that influence resource access. However, it
is important to look not only at power in local networks and formal and informal
institutions, but also at economics and of the state and global politics that
influence from a distance the availability of resources and who can use those
resources, even in small villages distant from the source of power. In an era of
increasing globalization, global and state economics and politics will affect local
governance, access, and use of natural resources, and thus must be considered
in any analysis. For example, colonial introduction of strict borders between
geographical areas that previously had little other social cohesiveness has
signiï¬cantly impacted social relations and tenure access among Mauritania’s
nomadic groups. Similarly, distant policies introduced by the World Bank
favoring agricultural and village-based development also had an effect on power
relations.
Political ecology adds to the examination of social networks. Political
ecology combines the concerns of ecology with a broadly-deï¬ned political
economy (Blaikie 1987). This approach contends that the integration of local
economies into the global economy has transformed their basic structure
(Campbell 1991213); yet, the global economic system is not responsible alone for
environmental change because the state also intervenes in economic activity to
promote environmentally destructive activities. This intervention may result from
59
I}
market expansion or from a ruler’s interest in extending political power, national
security, or personal enrichment (Bryant 199223).
Current environmental problems are not simply a reflection of local
misuse as often is advocated by large development organizations. Political
ecology posits a broader national and global study of environmental problems
because their causes can rarely be relegated only to local-level activity. Thus,
while it is important to analyze local level environmental use and access, this
must be accompanied by an analysis of the global and national contexts.
Furthermore, rather than mere failure of policy or the market, environmental
problems are a manifestation of broader political and economic forces (Bryant
1997). Latour (1987), in his description of a Brazilian computer scientist,
describes the often-devastating impact of networks outside the realm of
influence. In his example, the computer scientist struggles to create a Brazilian
computer industry that must be bolstered by networks with a common interest.
However, he. is drained of force by decisions taken by the military to liberalize
import control and by advances in the Japanese computer industry, both
networks in which he has no participation or influence. By consequence of
these decisions made at considerable distance from his Brazilian computer
works, his network shrinks considerably, leaving him isolated in his failed
endeavors. Using the same concept, natural resource use and the social
networks that determine resource access will be fundamentally altered if World
Bank-funded projects pour money into agriculture, which is traditionally
marginal in the economy. Investing in agriculture not only upsets a power
60
balance between wealthy herders and poor farmers, it also negatively impacts
the environment by damaging wetlands crucial to the survival of the herding
economy well-suited to the region.
Although it is useful to focus on local resource negotiations, it is crucial to
analyze the root of the change that reaches far beyond the local community.
Economic policy or legal measures from distant networks may meet resistance
from local social networks and may be altered by this resistance, but they will
have some effect nonetheless. As seen with colonial codiï¬cation of indigenous
institutions, legal measures can bolster inequalities. Also, the global push
towards democracy resulting in the community territory management schemes
(gestion de terroir) has served to beneï¬t settled populations. Not only does this
increase the power and natural resource access of the settled over nomadic
groups, but it also upsets mobile natural resource management, which is well-
suited to the spatially and temporally varied rainfall in the region. However,
national and global laws and policies also can reduce the force of local elites, as
exempliï¬ed by the reform of apartheid laws in South Africa (Cousins 2000).
Whether working to intensify or diffuse entrenched social norms, legalistic
measures for natural resource access cannot be discarded in any analysis of
natural resource tenure. The political ecological framework provides an analysis
of the social and environmental consequences of macro-level forces, while
looking at local level negotiations for natural resource access.
In conclusion, a review of the natural resource literature reveals that a
central issue is the extent to which state and global laws and policies influence
6]
resource tenure and resource access. Questions that emerge from this literature
include the following: What is the impact on the local level of national and global
policy directives concerning natural resource management? Have members of
the elite been able to use new laws to increase their power and prestige, and if
so, how? In what circumstances have traditionally marginalized populations
been able to use these laws to loosen the grip of their oppression? In which
types of network memberships does the ability of members to negotiate for
natural resource increase?
Mauritania provides an excellent case study with which to analyze this
issue. The passage of a law in 1983 dictated a radical change in resource tenure
systems that has yet to be fully implemented. However, as I show, this national
law has had a signiï¬cant impact upon resource tenure and access. I analyze the
degree and type of influence that global and national policies have had on natural
resource management in the Hodh El Gharbi Province in eastern Mauritania.
From this analysis, I draw conclusions regarding the circumstances that lend
themselves more easily to national and global law and policy influences, and
those circumstances that do not.
62
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on the negotiation for access to resources in
Mauritania in the context of 1) contemporary natural resource law, 2)
development interventions, 3) changing livelihood strategies, and 4) social
relations anchored in traditional hierarchies. This study was conducted in
eastern Mauritania but may be relevant for other populations that derive
subsistence from agriculture and herding and have mixed land-use systems.
This research includes on sedentary and nomadic populations who use land in
multiple ways including herding, cultivation, household energy supply, forest by-
products, and harvesting traditional medicine.
I conducted research in Mauritania from May 1999 through April 2000. I
spent the ï¬rst three months of my time in Mauritania in the capital, Nouakchott.
While in Nouakchott l was able to spend time researching documents, meeting
with government ofï¬cials, international organization leaders and Mauritanian
scholars. During this time I also conducted intensive language study to help me
adapt my knowledge of Arabic to the local dialect spoken in the country. At the
end of my research I returned to Nouakchott to conduct further documentary
research and to discuss preliminary ï¬ndings with many of the people I
interviewed upon arrival. The rest of my time was spent in the Hodh El Gharbi
Province in eastern Mauritania. While in Hodh El Gharbi, l was based in the
Provincial capital, Aioun El Atrouss. I spent most of my time in the bush staying
with families in villages and in tent encampments. Eastern Mauritania is remote,
63
la"
connected by a severely potholed paved road that is over 800 kilometers from
the capital. Within the Hodh El Gharbi, travel is extremely difï¬cult with tracks in
the sand serving as main travel routes. During the rainy season, many of these
roads become impassible, necessitating long detours to reach destinations. The
year of my research was a wet one, with most wetlands ï¬lled far beyond
capacity, which made travel difï¬cult. Village water sources were submerged,
leaving the village and my research team without safe water to drink.
I conducted my research in close collaboration with Tara Shine, an
environmental scientist working with the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
on their Natural Resource Management Project (GIRNEM) in Hodh El Gharbi.
My collaboration with the GTZ and with Tara Shine in particular was crucial to my
ability to conduct my research. The GTZ has been working in the region for
several years resulting in an in-depth understanding of the people and
environment. In addition, their relations with the people in the region were
important in providing me insider access to people in local government and
throughout the region. The majority of the data I collected for my research was
supported either materially or intellectually though my collaboration with the GTZ.
Survey
The locus of my research includes people using natural resources in 11
wetlands in the Hodh El Gharbi province in eastern Mauritania. These wetlands
were chosen to provide a representative sample of the 128 wetlands existing in
Hodh El Gharbi (see Appendix 3). In the area of each wetland, one village was
64
chosen at random for the completion of 20 surveys. Because there are no.
population registrars In Mauritania, it was necessary to use the cluster sampling
method. After choosing a central location within the village, I threw a pencil in
the air to indicate a random direction. After pulling a number from one to 10 from
a hat, the interviewer began walking in the direction of the pencil, counting
houses until coming to the number drawn from the hat. This was the ï¬rst house
interviewed. After leaving the ï¬rst house, the interviewer then proceeded to the
closest house in any direction and began interviewing, continuing this process
until ï¬ve people were interviewed in that cluster area. Subsequently, the
interviewer would return to the central location to throw the pencil once again to
indicate a new direction, and then count houses in this direction until reaching the
number pulled out of the hat. This process was repeated four times, producing
20 respondents. In order to ensure that the sample was representative, the
interviewer had 4 cards, one for older women (35 and up), one for younger
women (18 - 34), and two similar cards for men. When the interviewer found a
younger woman to be interviewed, he then put the card in his pocket, and could
not interview a younger woman until he had ‘used up’ the other cards. If the next
house he selected only had a younger woman at home, he was required to skip
this house and proceed to the next nearest house.
In addition to the 20 people living at each of the 11 wetlands included in
the study (220 respondents), it was necessary to include respondents who
currently are nomadic. The 1988 Mauritanian census reported that of 159,296
residents of Hodh El Gharbi, 41,207 were nomadic (25.9%). This number has
65
certainly declined since the latest census; thus, we conducted 50 interviews with
nomads (18.5% of surveys). At the time of interviewing, (three month period,
intermittent) we could ï¬nd nomads at only six of the wetlands. However, most of
these respondents frequent several of the wetlands and could provide us with
information about their access to and use of many wetlands and their
surrounding areas. Because of their scarce and mobile nature, we interviewed
who we could ï¬nd, taking a snowball sample that took recommendations from
one tent as to how we could ï¬nd other nomadic tents. In total, we interviewed
270 people, 220 at the wetlands at the time of the interview, and 50 in tents in the
larger area.
The survey has the potential to be biased towards the settled people of
the area. To address this bias, I interviewed nomadic populations. The selection
of the entire sample was not random. However, within the difï¬cult circumstances
of conducting research in a remote area, many precautions were taken to limit
these biases. Due to the number of clusters sampled (11), the bias of cluster
sampling should be reduced.
I used the data from this survey to provide basic livelihood statistics for the
region that l have used primarily in Chapter Four, but also to provide information
in the data analysis chapters. Chapter Six is based on data from the survey
regarding membership in cooperatives and community development associations
(CDAs). Data from the survey regarding concepts of natural resource tenure
form the basis of Chapter Seven. Data regarding the amount of land owned
provide important supporting ï¬gures for my analysis in Chapter Eight.
66
Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups
In addition to the questionnaire, we conducted in-depth interviews with two
or more people in each of the survey areas (27 interviews total). We conducted
interviews using an interview schedule, although diversions in topics were
frequent, depending upon the course of the interview. Although we did interview
some young women and men in this fashion, we usually chose older men and
women who knew much about the history of the area and who could explain in
detail how their livelihoods, resources access and environment had changed. In
addition, I interviewed four key informants to gain their insight on the land tenure
issues in their regions. In total, I conducted 31 in-depth interviews.
In addition, at each research site I conducted informal focus groups or
group discussions with mixed and homogeneous groups including Haratine and
Bidan men and women, young and old. I would talk with women at the well, or
around the cooking ï¬re at night, or with groups of farmers. These discussions
were countless, occurring at all times of the day. Because these discussions
were much less formal, much of my best information came from these candid
discussions. The semi-structured interviews and the group discussions provided
information for all chapters, especially Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight.
Archival Work
I reviewed Mauritanian laws regarding land tenure and how tenure was
applied in the past. I attempted to review legal cases surrounding the
appropriation of new land, but I was denied access to these documents. Land
67
tenure is an extremely sensitive topic in Mauritania and regularly suspicious
government ofï¬cials become even more suspicious when the subject is
broached. However, I was able to interview people to obtain information
regarding the history of land tenure in the Hodh El Gharbi. Additionally, my
interviews in the ï¬eld shed light on these issues.
Wetland Histories
For six of the wetlands (again chosen to be representative of the wetlands
in Hodh El Gharbi), we conducted in-depth studies. This included obtaining
livelihood data such as animal counts, agricultural production, and ï¬eld area.
Additionally, we researched in-depth the history of the wetland. This involved
interviewing people from each settlement around the wetland, as well as
seasonal users of the wetland. This history focuses on land tenure conflicts
surrounding the wetland and illuminates the negotiation process surrounding
natural resource access. In addition to my own interviews at each wetland I
visited, Cherif N’Diaye of the GTZ Aioun interviewed over 30 people to inform the
wetland histories. As he is from the region and is well known and respected, he
was able to gather key data and provide insightful analysis of the history of each
wetland. The data from the wetland histories provided much of the information
used in Chapter Eight.
68
Village Settlement Study
Steve McCracken of the GTZ surveyed in 1999 103 villages in Hodh El
Gharbi to determine the date of settlement and the reason for settlement. The
study illuminates the phenomenon of settling to gain increasingly private
ownership of important resources. Chapter Eight draws heavily on this data.
Participant Observation
During the period of ï¬eldwork, I lived with families in all 11 wetland areas,
and camped with nomads throughout the area. During this time I was able to
observe daily activities and to talk to many people with whom I was living and
interacting throughout my stay in the Hodh. I had the opportunity to be present
during many development project visits and to be present after they left to obtain
other reactions from the visits. Participant observation provides many important
insights to my entire study and provided me with a context within which to
analyze all of my data.
Language and Research Assistants
All of the research was conducted in Hassinya, the local dialect of Arabic
spoken in Mauritania. I conducted ten percent of the structured surveys and 50%
of the semi-structured interviews. I had two male research assistants, one
Haratine and one Bidan who were both from the area in which I was researching.
They both spoke Hassinya as their mother language. I interviewed ï¬ve Peul
herders (a minority ethnic group located mainly to the south of my research area)
69
during which time a male Peul research assistant provided translation. I
conducted most of the informal discussion focus groups; however, because the
entire research team stayed together, I often beneï¬ted from the participation of
my research assistants. I would have liked to have a female research assistant,
but I was not able to ï¬nd a woman who was willing to travel with me. Cultural
norms do not encourage women traveling for work, especially when away from
family. Thus, my results have the potential to be biased by the male research
assistants.
7O
CHAPTER FIVE
CONTEMPORARY LAND USE
Colonization set the stage for the radical changes that occurred in
Mauritania after independence. The severe drought that hit Mauritania less than
a decade after Independence was a catalyst to impending changes that altered
social relationships and economic systems. Additionally, government actions
such as the abolition of slavery and the 1983 land tenure law also have been
important actors in the shaping of present day Mauritania. Furthermore,
government sponsored globalist economic policies, which increased the
importance of export minerals and the adoption of IMF measures, also have had
a profound effect. These changes influence land use in present day Mauritania
and are discussed below.
5.1. Drought
The Mauritanian social and economic structure has changed dramatically
since independence was declared in 1960. In addition to the profound influence
of independence, 3 severe drought catastrophically shocked social and economic
systems that had already begun to transform or breakdown. The drought was
the worst in over two centuries, beginning in some places in 1968 and continuing
through 1973 (Lovejoy 1976). Mauritania suffered greatly during the drought. An
estimated 80 percent of Mauritania’s economy centered on livestock
71
.4
Figure 2. Perceived Resiliency to Drought in the Sahel (Davies 1996).
Livelihood
socurlty HIGH RESIUENCE
Low SENSITIVITY
1911-14 1931-4
\
1987 â€9°
Low RESIDENCE
HIGH sensmvmr
{>- Time
before the drought. During the drought an estimated 30 percent of animals were
lost, and many people were forced to sell their herds (Ould Mey 1996282). Over
the centuries, a nomadic lifestyle has enabled nomadic people to survive in
marginal lands and to weather periods of drought, yet it seems that this lifestyle
is threatened under current conditions. In people’s own perceptions, their
sensitivity to shocks has increased over time as the severity of shocks has
increased, and their ability to deal with the shocks resiliently has not returned to
pre-shock levels (see Figure 2, Davies 1996226).
A major consequence that had not occurred during previous droughts was
urban migration. Many nomads turned to sedentary life with rural to urban
72
migration increasing at an unprecedented scale. In 1965, 78 percent of
Mauritania’s population was nomadic, 15 percent were sedentary in rural areas,
and only eight percent were urban. In 1988 only 12 percent of the population
remained nomadic, 41 percent were sedentary in rural areas, and 47 percent of
the population lived in cities. As a result, Nouakchott is one of the fastest
growing cities in the world with its population increasing from a mere 5,000
inhabitants in 1960 to 581,238 in 1991. Rapid and chaotic urbanization without
industrialization has rapidly transformed a largely nomadic society into a society
of environmental refugees (Ould Mey 1996282).
There has been a decided decrease in rainfall in the Sahara and Sahel
during the past 25 years, yet there is no concrete evidence that this occurrence
alone is an indicator of changing conditions. It is more likely that this most recent
drought is the latest in a series of droughts in a long environmental cycle of
signiï¬cant increases and decreases in rainfall (Lovejoy and Baier 19762147).
The examination of environmental causes of the decline in nomadic
sustainability is crucial, yet it does not explain why nomadic strategies that have
evolved over centuries have suddenly ceased to be viable during a severe,
although not unprecedented, drought. Political ecology contends that the
integration of local economies into the global economy has transformed their
basic structure (Campbell and Olson 1991213). Galaty and Johnson (1990),
explain further:
The political ecology of pastoralists became the process of
adjusting resources, the modes of production and patterns of social
life to these demands of requiring citizens to live in one place,
73
receive social services and intensively utilize resources in order to '
maximally contribute to productivity in the country.
Prior to colonization, nomadic relations had evolved to ensure access to
resources, provide opportunities for wealth, and safeguard against crises of
which serious and prolonged drought was the most frequent. The evolution of
societal relations “...was disrupted by the impact of colonialism which forced the
people of the area to adapt to conditions different from their past experiences.â€
The collapse of traditional societal relations within the desert-side economy may
be critical to understanding recent failures of traditional coping strategies during
droughts (Berry et al. 1977283).
The origins of the crisis in Mauritania are complex, involving drought and
population pressure. However, pre-colonial and post-colonial policies regarding
nomadic peoples have been uniquely detrimental. Whatever the suffering due to
previous droughts, this had never been the point of departure for a radical
mutation or life change such as rural exodus or sedentarization as has happened
in Mauritania. As discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two, colonization set the
groundwork for Mauritania’s insertion into the world economy by solidifying
relations with France, introducing salaried positions and taxes, etc. As Ould
Cheikh argues, a more complete insertion of Mauritania into the world capitalist
economy as a peripheral member (as described by Wallerstein 1993) was
necessary before recent climatic change would have the force to engulf the
country in a societal crisis (Ould Cheikh 1985224).
74
During the disastrous drought of the 1970’s, the most visible cause of
famine was a lack of rainfall. However, the lack of rainfall was compounded by
increased population pressure, which had begun many years before but had yet
to have a substantial impact. Taxation began early this century, yet the far-
reaching effects of the decrease in herd size that was forced due to the burdens
of producing cash to pay the colonial government taxes was deeply felt during
serious drought when larger herd security was needed. In the Western Sahara,
the combined effects of an economic pull factor from industrializing towns and a
drought that decimated camel herds left the nomadic population weak enough
that the subsequent war nearly ended all forms of nomadism in that region (Arkell
19912163).
Although the post colonial ruling government in Mauritania is comprised
primarily of the noble herding class, they have nevertheless followed a colonial
trend favoring sedentarization. Colonial and post-colonial governments in many
African countries had several reasons for justifying their upheaval of nomadic
livelihoods through taxation and forced settlement. The so called humanitarian
desires of the governments aimed to make the nomadic populations
economically self-sufï¬cient and increase their standard of living; however, the
nomadic populations were considered to be wealthier than farmers although they
did not have as many material possessions. Other, more strategic objectives of
administrative policies were concerned with nomadic integration into national
society and easing state administration of nomadic populations that enabled their
forced contributions to the national economy. Perhaps the most important
75
administration goal of pastoral sedentarization aimed to prevent nomadic military
threats to the state (Bennett 1984236). Nomadic populations defended their
territory with guns and warriors that were often used against the colonial
administration that was threatening their territory.
Colonial and postcolonial administrators have progressively eroded and
radically altered the traditional pastoral system, which did not ï¬t into the national
framework. Pasture, to which access had been carefully regulated by
agreements between tribes and emirates, was reclassiï¬ed as public domain
(Swift 1976 in Salihi 19962110). State property regimes differ from common
property regimes in that the state removes most managerial discretion from the
user and generally conveys no long-term expectations in terms of tenure security
(Bromely 1991223). The result in Mauritania has been unsustainable exploitation
of rangeland resources. The destruction of traditional grazing arrangements
initiated a free-for-all system of rangeland use entailing neglect of the
environment (Salihi 19962110).
5.2. Rural Sector Components
Whatever the underlying causes, the drought was a catalyst for profound
change in the Mauritanian social structure and economic systems. The lasting
dramatic impact of the 1968-73 drought has transformed Mauritania, yet as
described in Chapter One, its rural economy dominated by herding remains
important.
76
Eastern Mauritania is ideally suited for herding due to its relatively high
rainfall. It is home to the majority of the nation’s animals, mostly cattle, camels,
goats, and sheep. Livestock is responsible for 80% of the revenue in Hodh El
Gharbi Province in eastern Mauritania (MEMAU 1999 in Shine 2002). The meat
production of Hodh El Gharbi contributes 17% of the total production in
Mauritania (Bureau Statistiques Agricoles/SSP/DRAP/MDRE, HG 1999 in Shine
2002). Goats and sheep are the most commonly herded animal, followed by
cows, camels and donkeys and horses (see Table 1).
Table 12 Livestock in Hodh El Gharbi
(MORE 1998 in Shine 2002)
Livestock I Numbers
Goats and Sheep 560,000-600,000
Cows 190,000
Camels 65,000-70,000
Donkeys and Horses >2,000
Central to eastern Mauritania’s ability to support its rural economy are
semi-permanent wetlands located through the area. Wetlands provide easy
access to drinking water. Because on average, animals can not exploit pasture
more than 12 kilometers from a water source, each water source then allows
access to 45,000 ha of pasture (OECD/CILSS 1987 in Shine 2002). The
importance of the numerous wetlands in Hodh El Gharbi comes not only from the
freestanding water source that easily allows animals access to important zones
of pasture, but wetlands also replenish ground water level that is close to the
surface. It is easy to dig shallow traditional wells at the wetland edge even when
the wetland itself has dried up. These shallow traditional wells can be dug
77
quickly during a stop over visit to wetland pasture. This also enables easier
access to clean drinking water for area residents, even during the dry season.
According to survey data, 46 percent of respondents with animals water
their animals in wetlands in winter as opposed to 96 percent in rainy season.
Although water is necessary for survival, fodder found in wetlands is perhaps
more important to herders. Replacement of the high quality fodder found in and
around wetlands is nearly impossible. Available on the market are straw and
feed supplements; however, these do not match the quality of fodder located in
wetlands. Herders in the rich wetlands of Tali and Tamachekett reported that
their goats reproduce three times in 15 months, which is an exceptionally high
reproduction rate. In fact, in all of my focus group interviews with herders, there
was unanimous agreement that the fodder around wetlands was the most
valuable and crucial resource they depended upon in wetlands. A transhumant
herder camped at Oum Lelli wetland emphasizes the importance of the wetland
(Jan 2000),
We come here for the water and we come here for the fodder. But
we are always able to ï¬nd water somewhere. Even if all the
wetlands have dried up and the traditional wells have gone dry,
there is someplace to get water. We will have to work harder to get
the water, but we have always been able to ï¬nd water somewhere
even if it is difï¬cult and tiring for us. But the fodder. You cannot get
good quality fodder in the dry season except in the wetlands. The
seeds and good fodder are irreplaceable anywhere else. If our
animals don’t eat here, they will be weak and it is less likely that
they will survive.
Agriculture is important for the local population’s diversiï¬cation of revenue.
There are several shallow wetlands in which water recedes quickly that are well
78
suited to recession agriculture. Recession agriculture uses soil that was formerly
under water because it remains moist even after water recedes. Seeds planted
in the soil will grow using moisture remaining in the soil. Leweija, a traditional
‘breadbasket’ wetland has the highest number of cultivable acres and is
completely ï¬lled with over 20,000,000m2 of ï¬elds (Shine 2002). Other wetlands
that retain water longer do not allow for timely planting of crops before the onset
of the hot and dry season. Pastoralists heavily frequent these wetlands that have
a negligible amount of agriculture. For many cultivating families, agriculture is
merely a diversiï¬cation of activities; however, there are other more marginal
families that depend heavily upon agriculture. For example, 100 percent of all
the Haratines sampled practiced agriculture. Many poorer families that are
forced to depend upon agriculture use this activity as a means of survival and
also as a means of gaining a surplus to invest. Any extra earnings made from
agriculture are immediately invested in animals. This practice allows poorer
people to invest in herding, which will give them the potential to acquire more
wealth in the future, rather than just living hand to mouth each year. A former
farmer who invested in animals and has become a successful herder in Tali
explains (December 1999).
This village used to depend more on agriculture. We didn’t have
any animals when we ï¬rst moved here, but we worked hard in our
ï¬elds and we were able to save money to buy animals. Herding is
not as difï¬cult as farming and we are able to make more money.
Our women don’t have to work beside their husbands in the ï¬elds;
they can do other things like vegetable gardening and housework.
When our women don’t have to work so hard, we feel better.
Animals are much more important to us than agriculture because
farming is so unpredictable. One year you get a good crop; another
year you don’t get a crop at all. Animals always have next year. If
79
our ï¬elds don’t do well one year, then we can always sell a few
animals to buy grain - no problem.
Farming families have on average 55% of their ï¬elds in recession
agriculture, and 45% of their ï¬elds outside of the wetland using rainfed
agriculture techniques. However, the concentration of ï¬elds in recession or
rainfed agriculture varies by wetland. For example, Gongel has most of its ï¬elds
actually in the wetland (94%) while others such as Chlim have a smaller
percentage of ï¬elds in the wetland (40%) (Shine 2002). Just as diversiï¬cation of
livelihood strategies is important in the varied climate of the northern Sahel, it
also is important to diversify agricultural production. In dry years, farmers are
able to rely heavily on recession agriculture and in wet years on rainfed
agriculture, which is not hampered by an abundance of standing water.
Residents of these six wetlands explained that in a good year, recession
agriculture produced a yield three times higher than in the rainfed ï¬elds. Millet is
the predominant crop in the rainfed ï¬elds, and sorghum and cowpeas dominate
recession agriculture. The production of millet, sorghum, and cowpeas are both
for home consumption and for sale in local markets. The price of the grain varies
according to the area in which it was grown. Grain from the well-known
breadbasket of Leweija obtains the highest price on the market (Shine 2002).
Another important agricultural activity is vegetable gardening. Recently
introduced by development projects, 36% of the population sampled (n=270) was
involved in vegetable gardening, 70% of whom were women. This activity is
made possible by the shallow wells that result from the high water table near the
80
wetland. This activity has had positive effects on both the nutrition and the cash
flow of those growing vegetables.
Forest products are abundant in wetlands. The Acacia Nilothica is the
biggest tree in the region and is found in wetlands. The wood of this tree
provides important building materials as well as fuelwood. Additionally, the
seeds from this tree (sa/aha) are used for tanning leather. Gum Arabic is also
found in Acacias and is important because its sap is sold as valuable gum
Arabic, which is the forest product most sold by survey respondents. Berries and
other wild foods found in wetlands provide needed nutrition, and many types of
medicinal plants are found all over the wetland. The mud in the wetlands is used
for brick-making. The many important and diverse uses of forest products in the
wetlands is underlined by the fact that only 10 percent of 270 people in the
sample surveyed did not report using or selling any forest products.
The Hodh El Gharbi in eastern Mauritania where the research was
conducted is. considered to have the conditions most favorable for herding and
can support some agriculture in its many wetlands. In the sample for this study,
which did not include the provincial capital Aioun El Atrouss. an equal number of
households received their primary income from herding (43.3%) and agriculture
(43.3%). Other primary income sources included salaried positions, forestry
products, manual labor, artisanal work, commerce, and teaching (13.4%). As
mentioned in Chapter Four, 25% of the population of Hodh El Gharbi were
nomadic in 1990 (Bureau Statstiques Agricoles/SSP/DRAP/MDRE/NKT 1990).
However, it is important to remember that although sedentary, most who are
81
involved in herding still migrate with their animals or hire someone to migrate with
their animals, still following a transhumant migration pattern. My data show that
of those involved in herding, 48.3% still migrate with their animals, yet very few of
those are actually nomadic (21.3%), deï¬ned as having no permanent home.
Herding, the prized livelihood system of the Bidan, has been transformed
since independence. Although still an important activity in eastern Mauritania,
many former herders have been forced to support themselves in other ways.
There still are as many animals in eastern Mauritania as there were before the
drought, yet these animals are concentrated among fewer owners. Even those
with substantial herds have now become sedentary, usually sending a herder
with their animals or leaving the family at home and going themselves.
Figure 3. Primary Source of Income
70 see
6O
50
40 _
a Bidan
30 ; I Haratine
percent of respondents
20
10 6.8 5.2
l 0.72'6
Herding Agriculture Salary Labor Trade Other
n=270
Although agriculture and herding are both of equal importance in providing
a source of primary income, agriculture is much more important for Haratines,
82
providing a primary source of income for 65.8% of those surveyed, whereas
26.1% of Bidan relied on agriculture for their primary source of income. Thus,
social status is strongly connected to the primary livelihood occupation.
However, more than one quarter of Bidans surveyed in Hodh El Gharbi reported
that agriculture was their primary source of income. The large numbers of
Bidans reporting agriculture as their primary activity signiï¬es an important
change. Traditionally, agriculture was reserved strictly for Haratine and slave
members of the social hierarchy as the menial labor was undesirable for Bidan.
A Bidan from Gongel explained how his life had changed (November
1999)
Before, when we spent more than two days in one place, we said
that we were stir-crazy and tired of being there so we had to move.
But now our wings are cut so we can’t move. The camels we
traveled on are gone, and what we traveled for is gone, so there is
a big open gap in our lives. Now we are forced to stay in one place
all the time. For us, the herders, we are now in prison. We have
no means with which to move. I remember that the most beautiful
thing in life was to leave an area when you have been camped
where the animals have eaten all the pasture. Then you move and
arrive to a new, untouched area where the pasture is abundant.
Just you, your animals, and all of the pasture you would ever need.
It was beautiful. But now we just sit and wear holes in the place
where we stay.
The drought and loss of animals is one impetus behind the increasing
number of Bidans turning to agriculture for their livelihood. Additionally the
increased independence of Haratines has made it more difï¬cult to ï¬nd workers to
farm their land. Thus, many Bidan are now farming the land themselves.
Furthermore, many Bidan have realized the potential to make money with
agriculture. A Bidan farmer in Chilkha explained (Nov 12, 1999),
83
Before, when we saw people (Haratines) farming the land, we used .
to laugh at them. We used to say, ‘look at those rats scratching the
earth.’ But now we have realized the value of agriculture. We used
to be only herders here, but now agriculture and herding are equal.
Life has changed here.
Also indicating change, over 20 percent of Haratines surveyed reported
herding as their primary livelihood occupation. However, in the survey, no
Haratines reported being nomadic (having no permanent base), and among
those 180 Haratines involved with herding, only 16.9% of Haratines migrated with
their animals compared with 63.6% of Bidan (“Difference signiï¬cant at p=.000).
Because larger herds must migrate to survive in Mauritania due to sparse
pasture, the lack of Haratine migration leads to the conclusion that they have
smaller herds than the Bidan. Data on the number of animals owned was difï¬cult
to collect due to cultural sensitivities.
5.3. Abolition of Slavery
An important political event after independence was the abolition of
slavery. The declaration of 5 July 1980 abolished slavery with the ordinance of
November of 1981. The resistance from powerful members of Mauritania’s
hierarchical society to the abolition of slavery was intense, and the beneï¬ts to
slaves and Haratines have been slow to appear. Although there was much
resistance to abolishing slavery, as analyzed in Chapter Two, the ground had
been laid since colonial times for this abolition. The arrival of independence
served to accentuate colonial initiatives with increasing access to salaries and
industrialization. The period of drought forced migration and often created
84
distance between master and slave. Distance from hierarchical oppressors
made domination increasingly difï¬cult. Many Haratines who had been able to
proï¬t from new opportunities within the altered system formed an anti-slave
movement, El Hor (meaning the Free). El Hor was successful in agitating for
freedom. A slave was sold on the market in Adrar in March of 1980, creating
new pressures for an end to slavery. These factors combined with a signiï¬cant
amount of lntemational pressure brought about the declaration that ofï¬cially
abolished slavery (Levroissier 1987263).
Rather than guaranteeing change rapidly, the laws passed by the
government have built an important foundation for increasing equality within the
social system. However, change has been slow, and traditions remain in many
ways entrenched. The ordinance did not implement measures that paid for
freedom. The objections to paying for freedom are obvious; however, there were
many within the movement advocating for a payment. Realizing the strength of
tradition, a slave Is a slave until his master sets the slave free or the slave has
paid for freedom. The absence of a signed and sealed certiï¬cate for the former
slave results in ambiguity that can be taken advantage of by powerful slave
owning elites (Bhrane 1997298).
Regardless, the abolition of slavery has provided the foundation for
freedom. One woman‘l interviewed explained to me that she was not a Haratine
(free person) because she still was . .well integrated into the family...†Although
she would not describe herself as independent or free, she exclaimed (Gongel
Nov. 1999),
85
Of course things are better now. We didn’t used to have a life; they.
used to buy and sell us like animals. They used to hit us to make us
work. At least things are better now, and we can work in peace.
We have a life now.
In response, a Bidan who accompanied me to the ï¬eld where the woman was
working admonished ‘dhak ma y’ngar (that is not said).
Haratines still are disadvantaged and are struggling with their subservient
position within the Moor social hierarchy. The hierarchy pervades, because the
bonds between former master and slave remain close. In the village of Dreiga
where all the Bidan had departed for a nearby city in search of a better life when
the drought came, Haratines stayed behind to continue farming the land. A
Haratine woman in Dreiga explained that they are much happier farming by
themselves. “Instead of running after people who are telling us what to do, we
are farming the land, just for us and not for someone else.†However, the family
bonds and the bonds of subservience remain. Because the Bidan help them
when they are in need, they remain beholden to them. When asked if she gives
a portion of the harvest to the Bidan who previously lived in Dreiga, she replied
(Dreiga December 1999),
Of course we do. We give them what we can. We love them
(nbriouhoum!) and they are our brothers (grabbing her breast —
signifying that she breastfed many of them). They are very nice to
us. When we have a wedding and we don’t have anything, they
give us a sheep that we can celebrate with. When we have hard
times, they give us tea and a little money. So we give them what
grain we can. But still, it is better to work for ourselves than to work
for ‘our family’".
86
Scott (19852307) interprets such acts of kindness on the part of the _
wealthy and more powerful as a form of social control. The wealthy Bidan give
some of their wealth to Haratines, which in turn gives them increased status and
social control although acting as if their intentions were voluntary acts of
generosity. This social control will ultimately be converted back into wealth in the
form of labor or ‘gifts.’ He explains further:
The euphemization of economic power is necessary both where
direct physical coercion is not possible and where the pure indirect
domination of the capitalist market is not yet sufï¬cient to ensure
appropriation by itself. In such settings, appropriation must take
place through a socially recognized form of domination. Such
domination is not imposed by force but must assume a form that
gains social compliance.
Many Haratines with whom I spoke still identiï¬ed themselves with the
noble Bidan of their kabila. Like the woman above who called the Bidan her
family, others still identify with Bidan leadership. Upon my arrival in the Haratine
village of Chara, I asked to see the village leader in order to properly introduce
myself. They replied that their leader was in Agjert, a Bidan village over 50 miles
away, where the powerful Bidan Cheikh of their kabila fraction lives. Although
there was in fact a village leader who was responsible for local affairs, the
residents identiï¬ed with their traditional kabila leader as their ruler, rather than a
village resident upon whom they had bestowed the responsibility for their daily
village affairs.
Bhrane’s (1997) work on Haratine identity found that 50% of black Moors
(black in skin color and, but culturally Arab Moors, wearing the same clothes and
speaking the same language) describe themselves as Haratines, where as 23%
87
describe themselves as Bidan. Bidan is a term that was traditionally reserved for
‘white’ Moors, but increasingly is used to describe the entire Moorish population,
both black and white. Fourteen percent describe themselves as a member of a
kabila. Although a recognized term for black Moors, Haratines often seek to
distance themselves from their subservient place in society by referring to
themselves as something other than Haratine, which has negative connotations.
It is common for a Haratine to be in daily contact with their former masters and
most know who their former masters are (Bhrane 1997).
The signiï¬cant difference in education level between Haratines and Bidan
emphasize the disadvantaged position of Haratines in eastern Mauritania. More
Haratines (see Figure 4) have attended Koranic school (87.2%) than Bidans
(47.7%). When reaching the higher levels of education, Bidans show a higher
level of education with 11.8% having attended middle school and 5.8% having
attended post middle school as opposed to Haratines with only 8.5% who
attended middle school and 0.9% who attended post middle school.
88
Figure 4. Education by Social Status
90 , 87.2
80
70
60 .
50 .Bidan
: lfl‘i‘EFI'le.
40
percent of respondents
30
20
10
None Koran Grade school Middle school Post Middle
School
n=270 signiï¬cant at p = .000
5.4. Land Tenure Laws
A second important political event after independence was the abolition of
traditional tenure. The land tenure law announced on 5 June 1983 asserts in
Article 3 (see Appendix One) “the traditional land tenure system is abolished.†In
its ï¬rst article, the law states that land belongs to the nation and that all people
can, without discrimination, within the law become owners of the land. Article 6
speciï¬es that where traditional collectives governed the land, those who have
improved the land (by installing fences, sowing agricultural ï¬elds, etc) can take
private ownership of the land. All wells and grazing land situated outside of
private property are declared to be the property of the state.
89
The principle of the new law on paper seems to favor Haratines. The
majority of Haratines practice agriculture, which is on land that noble Bidan still
consider theirs. Thus, this law has the potential to dramatically improve the
tenure security of Haratines. As cultivators. they are constantly working the land;
therefore, in theory, under the new law they should be able to appropriate the
land upon which they have been working as their own. However, the law leaves
a loophole that allows for the perpetuation of kabila owned territory. In Article 5
the ordinance states that tenure rights registered in the name of kabila leaders
and nobles is reputed to have the consensus of the kabila leaders. Furthermore,
in Article 23 the ordinance states that there can be a village territory, which is
neither state nor individually owned (Ould Cheikh 1997). Thus, kabila leaders
who traditionally controlled all land can now legally register this land.
The 1983 land tenure law provides a legal base for profound social
change that Mauritania already had been experiencing since political
independence and a prolonged period of drought. The law abolished traditional
tenure and provided the legal framework for all those who were previously
marginalized within the kabila system to gain access to resources independently.
The 1983 law provides opportunity for private ownership in areas
previously controlled by kabila territory. The most secure tenure offered by the
law is in the form of individual title to land, which was not possible within the
kabila territory system of resource control. This title provides to the title holder
the right of access to resources, withdrawal of the resources, and the ability to
make management decisions regarding the resources. Furthermore, those with
90
title can exclude others from using the resources and can sell the land. This type
of tenure is the most comprehensive and is, in addition, more secure because it
is backed by a legal document authorized by the Mauritanian government. Most
frequently, people gain individual title through the legal system. The legal system
formally recognizes private owners of resources through an investigation of their
prior customary tenure of the land. Private land is purchased only when a
recognized customary user or legal owner already has rights to the land. More
commonly, the person who wishes to gain title only needs to prove their
customary use of the land. Cash purchase provides only marginally more secure
tenure than does a land title gained through customary user rights because both
can be contested on the same grounds.
Resources can be owned collectively under the new law, which can also
provide secure tenure. Although most of the same rights apply to the collective
as to the individual, due to the nature of a collective (often based upon kabila
groups) tenure rights must be exercised as a group. Due to the nature of group
dynamics where unanimous decisions are rarely made, all members of the
collective will not be able to always manage, use and control resources in their
preferred manner.
Membership within a collective that has gained title to land most often is
based on membership in a village or a kabila. The group of people or the plot of
land is usually connected to village territory, and can have the entire village as
members, not usually more than 1,000 people. Although the name ‘collective’
suggests an equal distribution of resources among collective members, in fact
the division often closely mirrors the hierarchy of the kabila. Where powerful
Bidan are involved, the resources often were divided long ago among the
wealthy families in the area. These traditional divisions often remain the way by
which the cooperative resources are divided. Thus, the ‘collectives’ set forth in
the 1983 law are most often in name only substitutes for the traditional kabila
communal territory systems.
Non-agricultural resources such as fodder and forest resources are
typically ‘unimproved,’ meaning that no person has invested inputs of labor or
materials and thus are technically state property that everyone can use within the
limits of the law. The law limits important activities traditionally practiced by
Haratines such as cutting wood and harvesting Arabic gum. However, locally,
the traditional user rights of Haratines to continue these activities are informally
recognized until their value increases to the point of interesting others and
increasing competition for this activity. Water sources are state controlled,
guaranteeing equal access to everyone except in cases where a water source
such as a well is constructed on private property. The implementation and
impact of this law will be explored in greater depth in chapters six, seven and
eight.
5.5. International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Plan in Mauritania
Mauritania achieved independence in 1960 and subsequently entered into
a period of nationalist development planning, which was centered on the
development of national industries such as ï¬shing and mining and the strong
92
regulation of foreign trade. During this period, Mauritania withdrew from the
West African currency system of former French colonies (the CFA zone) and
created its own currency, the Ougiya. This nation-building attempt was severely
challenged by a ï¬scal crisis of the late 1970’s fueled by a recession in Europe’s
steel industry, the main buyer for Mauritania’s iron ore. Additionally, recurring
drought after the long drought ending in 1973, pushed the country into crisis.
The severity of the crisis fueled a series of military coups, which continued into
1984. The new military government in 1984 adopted “without hesitation or
ambiguity†a full-scale structural adjustment program in collaboration with the IMF
and the World Bank (Ould Mey 1996287).
On April 12, 1985 in Washington, the Mauritanian government signed a
short-term standby arrangement of $12 million. Subsequently, the World Bank
provided several sectoral loans, including a $20 million loan signed in January
1986. This adjustment and development package was based on the analysis
and projections by IMF and the World Bank trained experts. Thus began the
transition in Mauritania from a national state-centered economic plan to a world-
centered economic planning system. This is a new ‘global command’ economy
in which the government has “...less control in policy formation, articulation of
development strategies, the engineering of ï¬scal policy, the management of
foreign debt, and the design of public investment programs" (Ould Mey 1996289).
It is the World Bank, not the government that did the diagnosis and
prescribed the solution in both the economic and institutional arenas. The
Mauritanian state issued the necessary decrees and regulations and set up the
93
appropriate government structures, units, and ad hoc committees for the
implementation of economic and institutional reforms that are based on studies
and evaluations conducted by international consulting ï¬rms approved by the
World Bank. All development projects within the framework of adjustment are
identiï¬ed and implemented in this way, which leaves an auxiliary role to the
government in terms of policy formulation. By losing the ability to formulate
policy, the state lost an important tenet of sovereignty and statehood. The
economic and sectoral memoranda allow the World Bank to maintain a
continuous dialogue with government ofï¬cials and further penetrate the state
bureaucracy to formulate policies and ultimately to shape the strategy of
development at both the central and sectoral levels (Ould Mey 19962103).
Common to all structural adjustment programs is the implementation of
austerity programs that divert funds away from the public sector. This diversion
of funds produces negative impacts on employment and standards of living. The
austerity program incurred the resistance of many social groups “...and the social
policy of adjustment all brought about deep sociopolitical adjustments, the most
dramatic of which remains the process of democratization and sociopolitical
fragmentation†(Ould Mey 19962195). Unemployment rose, and Mauritanians
with connections outside the country rose in power.
One important result of the IMF and World Bank involvement in Mauritania
is the increasing emphasis on democratization and a multi-party state. The
concept of democracy and the process of democratization are very much in
fashion around the Western world today both intellectually and politically (Ould
94
Mey 19962213). As in much of Africa, governments introduce political reforms
with external factors serving as precipitating conditions (Bratton 19922420). “In
the end, African governments moved to multipartyism to keep the flow of
Western loans and grants and to avoid defamatory reports on human rights
violations†(Ould Mey219962215).
The decentralization of power has been an important change in rural
areas. By 1989 there were mayors not only in cities but also in Moughtaa’2 and
in rural communes. lmportantly, rural people then had a closer connection to the
government. As the mayor of the rural commune of Sevaa explained (personal
interview December 1999),
It is very important for the rural population to have a connection to
the government. Before, their only connection was the Hakem13
and back then many people would die before they would ever see
the Hakem. They never traveled to the Moughtaa you see. He was
so far away and was in charge of so many people.
However, it is also argued that democratization in Mauritania has led to
increased tribalism. As democratic leaders must receive votes in order to be
elected, politicians in Mauritania must solicit votes from constituents. The kabila
is the most organized system in the country, and politicians are playing to
different kabilas to request their support in elections. Thus, in Mauritania, where
government must cater to the kabila system to maintain power, in effect it loses
power by empowering the kabila. “Thus, the question remains, how can you
build democracy in Mauritania and a strong central government that is lacking at
the same time?†(interview with World Bank agronomist in Nouakchott, July
1999).
95
Although they have a role in the present day governmental power system,
traditional kabila leaders feel that their power has been diminished since
independence. An interview with the traditional leader of an influential and
wealthy kabila fraction in Benamane reveals his interpretation of his changed role
as the mayor of a rural commune. He explained to me that he had lost his
traditional powers and now must rely on democratic processes to maintain
power. “My father was the Cheikh , I am just the mayor†(interview Nov 1999).
External pressure exerted by the IMF and World Bank pushing for
decentralization has also come in the form of development assistance. As will be
explored in greater length in Chapter Seven, the increasing amounts of
development investment poured into the country in projects centered around
CBNRM has also served to increase the power of kabila elites. The mayor
mentioned above now controls signiï¬cant development investment in his town.
Thus development investment is introducing new and powerful resources into
rural areas. The increase in resources increases the power of local leaders.
5.6. Women in Contemporary Mauritanian Society
Mauritanian Bidan women have long been reputed for being strong and for
the respect they invoke from their families. The changes in Mauritanian society
have served to increase women’s status in some ways as they begin
participating in the increasing market economy. However, Bidan and Haratine
women still live in a patriarchal society, and their gains in the current economy
frequently have been less substantial than the gains of men. Still, in comparison
96
with other Arab women, Bidan women have a signiï¬cant amount of freedom and
influence. A Hassinya proverb states, “On what the braids spent the night, the
beard will do in the morning,†i.e., what the woman decided during the night, the
man will act upon the following day (Simard 1996283). Although women’s power
in Mauritania is not signiï¬cant in macroeconomic statistics due to their sparse
involvement in the public sphere, Simard (1996) outlines several important
dimensions of the power and prestige of Moor women. For example, although
Islam allows polygamy, even the richest families are monogamous because Moor
women demand monogamy as a precondition to marriage. In the marriage
contract, women often are divorce initiators, and the divorce rate is 37%, much
higher than in other Arab countries. Importantly, the rate of remarriage is 72.5%.
Additionally, there is no dowry reimbursement custom by the woman’s family if
there is a divorce. A wealthy Bidan woman in Nouakchott explained the beneï¬ts
of divorce for women.
I am married now, but I am sure I will get married at least four more
times. Each time you marry, you get more presents. Men try to
give you things to keep you. But it only makes other men want you
more. I have already divorced twice and each time I came away
with a lot more than I started with. Why would you want to stay with
one man all your life? You would gain nothing and you would get
bored (interview July 1999).
Domestic violence is rare in Mauritania, and women often are seen to
contradict their husbands in public. Women are not required to contribute to the
family, which allows them to accumulate wealth when they engage in economic
activity. In recent times women have had more opportunity to do this, resulting in
an increase in their power. However, as the market economy becomes more
97
and more important, women still have limited ways to participate. Women are
uniquely disadvantaged by the increased importance of the market economy.
Men’s greater association with herding and formal political processes was
traditionally balanced by women’s domestic responsibilities and by their
participation in herd-related tasks, which granted them a measure of autonomy
and social status. Cultural values attached to marriage, fecundity, and seniority
further legitimized women’s power. However, as in other agro-pastoral societies,
the increased importance of commercial production and changes in household
labor and herd composition have paralleled a steady erosion of traditional female
rights and a marked increase in gender-based differential access to property and
cash (Talle 1988).
Growing commercialization has strengthened opportunities for men, while
women’s social networks upon which they depend have declined (Rocheleau
19962290). Money has always been considered men’s responsibility, but' now
men have greater opportunities to earn cash while women continue to be
inhibited by cultural and structural prohibitions from gaining access to new
opportunities generated by the cash economy (Mehta 19962182). These
changes in economic opportunities and constraints often are rendering women’s
work invisible, which is increasing spatial and gender division and affecting
relationships within and between households. These changes are shaped in part
by the structure of local gender roles as they allocate authority and
responsibilities. They also are shaped by class, race, and ethnicity (Thomas-
Slayter 1995:91).
98
In addition to meal preparation, women also were in charge of milk and
the care of sick animals. Most Bidan women had workers to help them who
performed the most menial tasks. However, only the most wealthy were afforded
the luxury of complete inactivity, burdened only with supervision of the many
workers. Less wealthy Bidan women would help, completing activities that were
less labor intensive. Many women emphasized the Improvement in their lives,
but some expressed regret at losing the active role they once played in nomadic
life. A Bidan woman in Gongel explained (interview Nov 1999),
Life is much better now. We didn’t used to know houses. We were
very tired from moving. We didn’t know doctors. People would just
die, or, if God willed, they would live because there was nothing you
could do. We didn’t know schools or anything. Camels were our
only transport. But you know we were healthier then because we
were more active. We were in charge of many things. We knew
how to do many things that are not important anymore. Now, we
don’t do anything; we just sit and get weak like me.
With the attention given to women in Mauritanian Bidan society, women
still live in a patriarchal society. Residence and inheritance are ï¬rmly rooted in
the patriarchal system, and there is a belief that women are a danger to social
order. Hassinya proverbs show the distrust of women such as “ask for women's
advice and do the opposite†and “the turban precedes the braidsâ€, i.e. men are
superior to women (Simard 1996288).
Thus, Bidan women’s power and respect exist but in gendered ways. One
such example is that of force-feeding. Females are given the best portions of
food, and women constantly look after their daughters to be sure that they have
eaten well. It is desirable for women to gain weight, while men are thin. Girls eat
99
before boys and are fed several snacks throughout the day. The focus on ,
women and girls eating enough food is seemingly a positive deviation from
cultures in which women often sacriï¬ce their own nutrition by giving the best food
to their husbands and sons. However, the obsession with women’s excessive
weight leads to abuse as girls are forcibly fed often using painful reprimands
when they do not eat ‘enough.’ Girls are often force-fed to the point of tears and
vomiting. Additionally, Bidan women suffer from health problems due to their
extreme inactivity and obesity.
Indeed, these ideas remain today. Wealthy Bidan women retain the ideal
that women should have no physical activity. As one Bidan woman explained
(Benamane Nov 1999):
We don’t have to do anything that we don’t want to do because we
are a big tent . We just sit and others wait on us. An important
woman should never have to get up to do anything. She should sit
and just distribute all the wealth she has among the dependents.
Khadamas (workers) do all of the hard work like washing cooking. I
just sit and say, ‘bring me this and bring me that’. l have never
cooked rice in my life. I have never prepared one meal. But we eat
well, and we can always rest.
In contrast to their Bidan counterparts, rather than worrying if they can
become obese, many Haratine women work hard to be sure that their family has
enough to eat. Many Haratine families eat only one or two meals per day, even
while working a full day in extreme heat in the ï¬elds. Haratine women farm along
side their husbands, performing most of the same tasks as their husbands.
Among the farming tasks, only the clearing of land or the building of earthen
bunds is traditionally reserved for men. Haratine women are expected to work on
100
their husband’s ï¬eld. In addition, they farm their own ï¬elds. To earn extra
money, women often pound grain for Bidan in the area. Haratine women have
gained the most through their increasing independence. However, their gains
have been in relation to the Bidan due to their increased freedom, rather than
increased equality with men. A Haratine woman in Boichiche explained
(September 1999):
We work so much more than they (our parents) used to work. We
do agriculture, and we collect forest products and wood. We do so
much more. Before, just herding for the whites was easier. But still
today is better. There is no comparison. We used to work under
the rule of the white people. We would put up their tents and pound
their grain and answer their beck and call. Now, we work harder,
but the work is for us, not for them. We can be proud to be working
for ourselves and we can see the results of our labor. We are
independent
There have been substantial changes in Mauritania since the arrival of
Independence in 1960. Mauritania still lives with strong traditions of hierarchy
and difference. Yet, the structures bolstering the hierarchy are showing signs of
decay, and some have already given way. New government policies and
increasing international involvement in Mauritania have laid the groundwork for
substantial change. However, Mauritania’s social hierarchy is very influential and
the powerful have been able to adapt themselves to the changing economic and
political climates to maintain power.
101
CHAPTER SIX .
COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
After many decades of failed attempts to reverse rangeland degradation,
there has been a surge in interest in community management approaches to
rangeland resources (Joekes 1996238). This decentralization of natural
resource management assumes that homogenous communities will make
jointly beneï¬cial decisions regarding the use and management of natural
resources. However, in reality, in each community there are many differing
livelihood strategies that are dependent upon the same natural resources.
“Participatory management†initiatives often ignore or mute the fundamental
difference in environmental relations caused by the strict status and gendered
division of labor in nomadic societies and the inequality of access to and tenure
over natural resources. Community based natural resource management
development approaches implemented in Mauritania by international
development agencies provide alternative avenues for power and control over
resources that have the potential to be more inclusive but often become yet
another mechanism for the traditional elite to gain control over more natural
resources. Additionally, the development investment that usually accompanies
these externally created associations adds value to resources thus increasing
the competition for often previously neglected natural resources. The unequal
participation in externally created community based organizations has
significant resource tenure implications favoring a settled elite able to
manipulate the new system of governance.
102
6.1. Community Based Natural Resource Management as a Development
Tool
The World Bank funded Mauritanian Rainfed Natural Resource
Management (RNRM) project provides an important and interesting example of
CBRNM implementation and impacts due to Mauritania’s extremely hierarchical
society that is economically and socially tied to movement. Important legal
change in tenure that contradicts traditional practices complicates this initiative.
The focus of this chapter will be on the tenure implications of CBRNM in
Mauritania and the impacts of CBNRM on different sectors of the population.
The Mauritanian Rainfed Natural Resource Management project aims to
improve herding and agricultural production combined with range conservation
through a village based territory management (gestion de terroir villageoise or
GTV). The project has been designed upon the premise of CBRNM supporters
that those living near natural resources will be better equipped and will have
more incentive to protect the resources. Under this GTV version of CBRNM, a
village territory is delineated with the help of village residents. Within the territory
designated as village territory, the village is responsible for making decisions
regarding improving the health of their natural resources and the use of the
resources for subsistence or economic gain. GTV removes state control of
empty lands surrounding the village, which is thought to improve the
environmental management of these lands. As is examined in greater depth in
Chapter Four, the 1983 resource tenure law designated all unimproved land to
the state. The GTV village territory was designed to take control over the land
103
through the 1983 law provision for collectives (in this case villages) registering
land as a group and thus taking away state control of the land. Rather than the
state poorly controlling important resources (often wood) and inviting illegal
cutting and often bribery, village control would allow the village to proï¬t while
taking care of their resources in their best interest.
The increased participation of local people in pastoral development
projects is an important step. The RNRM project has made a conscious effort to
address participation in newly created institutions more appropriately than
previous projects. “During project identiï¬cation and preparation, this participatory
method was tested with the aid of participatory rural appraisal tools (eg. social
assessment) that made it possible to establish a dialogue with some future
beneï¬ciaries...â€(World Bank 1997213). Before beginning work in a village,
RNRM staff meet with villagers to conduct an in-depth Participatory Rural
Appraisal (PRA) where villagers and project staff identify village strengths,
opportunities and needs. Although a positive step towards participation, the
often rushed nature of these activities, as well as a failure on the part of the staff
to talk separately to different sectors of the population limits its effect. For
instance, in one village where l was present for the initial village contact, PRA
activities were always village wide and were not divided by gender or social
status. After two days of PRA activities, artisan community members
(considered to be of lower status) explained to me that all of the activities
revolved around agriculture and thus had little relevance for them. Furthermore,
they explained how they did not feel comfortable expressing their concerns in
104
such large groups.
Newly strengthened local institutions, especially those involved with
common pool resources have tended to be dominated by local elites, often
interested in their own self-promotion (McCay 19962117). Moreover, as Adams
(19921195) reminds us, development problems are often not technical but social
and increased knowledge from local decision-making may not reverse
inequalities. The kind of participation people are involved in should be examined.
In Mauritania, it is unlikely that noble elites will share decisions with other
subservient locals at the bottom of the hierarchical system. The discussion of
CBRNM evokes a fundamental question. Who is participating? For development
to be meaningful, it must be open and participatory and reflect on the needs of
several different groups, which are often not compatible (Adams 19922205).
The general character of the RNRM project is in theory participatory, yet it
suffers from the same top-down character that has been prevalent in other World
Bank Projects (Shanmugaratnam 1992:24). Indeed, the Bank writes of needing
to avoid the mistakes of previous top down development design (IBRD 199729),
although there is no set strategy for an improved participatory CBA strategy.
Additional concerns are that participation is often used to cast a positive
light on the failure of the government to provide services. The transfer of social
services from the government to the private sector is a familiar pattern that is
forced upon countries by structural adjustment policies that necessitate severe
reduction in government services across many sectors. These ‘participatory’
CBNRM associations prescribed by the World Bank in Mauritania will now be in
105
charge of supplying veterinary services and maintaining wells. These formerly
state provided services have in effect been privatized. While it is good for people
to be involved with the services and activities they require, the negative
consequence of such moves are many. As the government absolves itself of
social spending responsibilities, poorer people will now have to pay for vital
services that they often cannot afford.
Faced with a serious economic crisis, the government has adopted
a policy of privatization of the livestock sector, encouraging private
individuals and institutions to assume greater responsibilities for
livestock development activities. Policy levels have thus been
compelled to address pastoral institution building as a serious issue
(Shanmugaratnam 1992223).
6.2. Community in Eastern Mauritania
Although there are problems with equal participation, CBRNM is a positive
step towards more inclusive environmental management. However, especially in
the case of Mauritania with a hierarchical nomadic system, the concept of the
local must also be questioned. Current attempts to institutionalize customary
tenure in practical applications of CBRNM in the ï¬eld are experiencing difï¬culty in
deï¬ning community (Benjaminsen 1997). Within this delineation, power relations
are involved. By deï¬ning one group as ‘community’ and excluding others,
usually the nomadic people, state or development agencies give those included
in the community power. The gestion de terroir villageoise (GTV), approach
often is implemented in areas where villagers and nomadic pastoralists
frequently use the same resources. Because pastoralists are typically nomadic,
they are not deï¬ned as belonging to the village territory because their use of the
106
land is not always continuous. This arrangement is problematic because .
sedentary villagers under the gestion de terroir management scheme now have
the right to exclude pastoralists from using the resources in their villages to which
they have always had customary temporary access. This program is threatening
pastoralists’ reliance on opportunistic grazing strategies that necessitate
occasional access to resources over a large area and that reduce risk in spatially
and temporally varied landscapes.
The concept of ‘community’ upon which CBNRM is based draws from a
narrow, western, and traditional deï¬nition of community that is often no longer
appropriate to present day realities in rural Africa, or perhaps was never
appropriate. As rural Africa has been seen by western development scholars to
be less developed or less modem than the west, they envision community in a
very traditional sense. As has been described by Tonnies’s (1963) concept of
Gemeinschaft, a ‘traditional’ community is territorially grounded and is “...a
relatively self-contained social environment supplying its members with a wide
range of services†(Effrat 197425). Although there has been much sociological
work analyzing the further complexities of community beyond Tonnies’s
Gemeinschaft, development practitioners have designed their CBNRM around
this concept of traditional community. Community organizations are created
within this framework where a community is assumed to be conï¬ned to a small
geographical area and where the social environment is also contained in that
area.
107
Sociologists have broadened the concept of community with theories that
differ in their views on two questions. Effrat (1974) groups community theories
according to their views on two dichotomies: 1)community as society versus
community as territory and 2)community as provider of many functions versus
community as provider of few functions. The ï¬rst group of theories is called the
“Compleat Territorial Community†in which territorial grounding is necessary and
the community performs many functions. The community is a relatively self-
contained social environment that supplies its members with a wide range of
services (Effrat 197425). Tonnies’ Gemeinschaft ï¬ts well into this category, as
does the community as microcosm, human ecology, and the rural-urban
continuum. On the other end of the number of functions axis is the “Community
of Limited Liability†in which territorial grounding is necessary, but the number of
functions performed by the community are relatively few. Janowitz created this
theory which showed that the “...urban neighborhood was becoming a more
specialized, more voluntaristic, and a more partial institution†(Effrat 1974215). Of
those theories that did not believe in the necessity of territorial grounding, a
portion believed that the community had little function. The “Personal
Community†theory has primarily been pursued through research on informal
participation in voluntary organizations and interaction with friends, and social
networks. Finally, the “Community as Society†theorists assumed that
community provided its members with many functions although territory was not
a deï¬ning variable. Weber and Durkheim are some of the well known theorists in
this category.
108
It is difï¬cult to translate the word ‘community’ into the context of eastern
Mauritania. The Arabic word for community is rarely used in the local dialect of
Arabic, Hassinya. Instead, people refer to their kabila or to subdivisions within
the kabila when speaking of groups to which they belong. The kabila is based
primarily on family, but also on social, political, and territorial linkages.
Territory has traditionally been important and remains important to the
kabila today even in the face of substantial legal changes. Territory is based on
the kabila and access to territory is dependent ï¬rst on membership in the kabila.
However, territory as a place in the nomadic herding economy of eastern
Mauritania is not small and conï¬ned to one village. A territory is traditionally
based upon a large area stretching hundreds of kilometers that is required for
extensive seasonal migrations. Although important to herding life and kabila
identity, territory boundaries were always fluid. Not only did kabila members
travel throughout the large territory of their kabila (often over hundreds of
kilometers from one end to the other), but kabila members regularly moved their
herds in and out of their territory, depending upon seasonal migration routes and
alliances with neighboring people. Territorial boundaries would often shift with
the military rise and fall of kabilas. Territorial boundaries no longer change with
warrior might and the 1983 law has abolished traditional tenure based upon
kabila territories.
Although the centrality of the kabila to mainstream life argues against a
geographically based deï¬nition of community in eastern Mauritania, increasing
sedentarization is placing more importance on place as the village become an
109
important part of life. Kabila membership is still the central determinant for. land
tenure and for social identity and traditional kabila controlled territories are still a
reality in eastern Mauritania. I often asked who owns this hill, this grazing land,
this wetland, or these ï¬elds. People always responded with kabila names.
Indeed, local authorities explained to me that the kabila is still important in
settling territory disputes. ln Mauritania, access to resources is still dependent
upon kabila membership, regardless of geographical location within the kabila
territory. Although people have recently begun to settle near a resource to have
greater access, other nomadic and sedentary kabila members still have a
traditional right to the resource. Membership in the kabila has traditionally been
and is still commonly believed to be the criteria for resource access and thus for
community membership. A man from Chara explained:
You know, when we wanted to settle here, we had to ask the kabila
fraction leader for this area. This area is his land and if we want to
live here we have to get his permission. Otherwise he would see to
it that we leave. There is no other way we could stay here.
In summary, the simplistic deï¬nition of community upon which CBNRM
activities are based does not match the basis upon which tenure is based in
Mauritania. The two level problem of a fluid kabila based society where kinship
is crucial to life within a history of territory now exists in the context of increasing
sedentarization. The historical tie to territory and place is becoming more rigid as
the village gains in importance. Thus, any deï¬nition of community in eastern
Mauritania must be complex enough to account for the kinship and place bases
upon which society is currently based.
110
6.3. Tenure Implications of a Village Centered Project
The assumption of the RNRM project that people living near a resource
will manage it better has led to a project design that forms associations within
project villages. However, as is discussed above, many resource users who do
not have sedentary houses within the project village nearest the resource are
excluded from project decisions and attractive outside ï¬nancial and material
resources. 87.4% of the villages surveyed†in eastern Mauritania have been
settled since independence in 1960, and 42% of the villages surveyed have only
been settled since 1980. Although these ï¬gures show that many villages have
been recently settled, villagers have been given managerial control by the RNRM
over their proximate resources excluding others that have not yet chosen to
settle. This control has been given regardless of the traditional and seasonal
rights of many others who do not reside in the village. For example, two villages
border the wetland of Chlim with a population of around 500 inhabitants.
However, on average 1,687 cows drank from the wetland daily during 1999-2000
(Shine 2002). Most of the cattle belong to people who do not live in the village.
A village based structure is clearly not adequate to represent the interests of
people from all over the region that depend upon the wetland for their survival.
The RNRM project has conducted a legal consultancy to explore land
tenure issues. The ï¬ndings of this consultancy maintain that the current
regulatory framework of laws and regulations allows for the allocation of land,
water and vegetation (rangeland, fuelwood) to well identiï¬ed users’ groups under
certain conditions and the government has acknowledged the existence of this
111
legislation, and has committed itself to implementation under the project
(Abdelkader 1996). However, in addition to mobile users being excluded from
village controlled resources, the project does not consider customary rights to
resources, especially for Haratines. One notable example is the newly
formalized access to gum Arabic. Harvesting gum is traditionally a job for
Haratines and is still looked upon as an undesirable task ï¬t only for Haratines.
Kabila territory traditionally allowed Haratines to freely harvest gum. Even as the
state strictly regulated gum harvesting as it began protecting the forests since
independence, it was commonly understood that Haratines did harvest the gum
and some even looked the other way to allow the Haratines to continue
collecting.
Villages located near large gum Arabic forests have incorporated the trees
into their village territory thus making them eligible for project funds. In two of the
sample villages, the project ï¬nanced the fencing of gum forests thus protecting
them from grazing. Additional gum trees were also in the process of being
planted. The increased development investment made more attractive the
harvesting of gum as the trees were likely to be in better health when protected
from animals and harvested responsibly. More importantly, the involvement of
the development project created Community Development Association (CDA)
changed the tenure of the trees. Although it had long been illegal to harvest
gum, poor Haratines would illegally harvest their gum without much reprimand.
After the involvement of the CDA, which organized work parties to plant trees
and install project-ï¬nanced fences, the forests became CDA property. The CDA
112
was now allowed to harvest their forests legally for the ï¬rst time. The gum that is
harvested is set aside to fund village development activities. Although Haratines
explained that they would probably still be expected to harvest the gum (as a
Bidan would never lower himself to do this menial task), they would no longer
keep the proï¬t. They did not see the ‘village development fund’ as a good
substitute for their earnings from gum harvests. One important source of income
for very poor people has been eliminated in some villages by the project. A
Bidan in Gongel explained:
Nobody was ever interested in harvesting our big gum forest before
the project came. It was looked down upon. It was really just the
work of blacks that had no animals or other source of income that
would sneak around illegally to harvest the gum or to make
charcoal. They would do it at night, and either try to sell it in our
village or they would even take it to Aioun15 to make money and not
get caught. But now we have the power to regulate this practice.
In this quote we see not only the change in interest in the use of gum, but
also the increased regulatory power that has come to the village via the CDA.
In addition to territorial misconceptions regarding community, CBNRM
development interventions have not examined the heterogeneity of communities.
The hierarchical and gender based divisions within communities have important
implications for development projects that are communally managed. Within the
kabila there are nobles, and then tributaries of several forms, including Haratines
who are among the least powerful tributaries. Although in some way they are
members of the kabila, they are secondary members. This secondary status
may be in the process of evolving, yet it is still entrenched in tradition and is a
reality when development project ï¬nancing is invested. No matter how well the
113
association is designed it is difï¬cult to ensure equal participation by noble Bidan
kabila members and Haratines, as their membership in the kabila was never
equaL
It is hoped that legal reforms and the creation of local governing bodies
will decrease the impact of the hierarchical kabila system. The integration into a
global economy has been assumed to weaken communal systems of
stratiï¬cation although in fact they typically serve to increase stratiï¬cation within
populations, reinforcing and intensifying traditional wealth and power divisions
(Gusï¬eld 1975279). In Mauritania, rather than replacing kabila hierarchies, the
CDA provides a new forum in which the customary kabila can assert its power.
6.4. The Creation of New Institutions
In addition to the problems encountered when trying to delineate a
community, the creation by outsiders of a new association is not without difï¬culty.
A development worker explained to me that Mauritania is a ‘graveyard’ of
associations created by numerous development projects. He explained that if all
of the previously created associations were actually functional and members
attended their meetings, people in the area would not have any time to conduct
their livelihood activities.
As the RNRM project is still in its implementation phase, it is yet to be
seen if the CDAs organized by the project will remain after project funding and
follow up is discontinued. However, to date, they are active at least in their
implementation of project activities. Among my sample of those with CDA in their
114
village (n=120), 62.4% of the people interviewed participated in the CDA in. their
village. Although the project extension agents who helped to organize the
associations provided guidelines and oversaw the writing of a constitution for the
association, each CDA acted differently. In some villages, board members were
elected. In other villages, the council of elders nominated board members. On
average, there were 10 board members in jobs such as external relations,
secretary, president and so on. In some villages, all village residents were
invited to meetings. In other villages, representatives were selected to attend
meetings. An CDA ofï¬cer in Chilkha explained:
The CDA has totally changed the mentality of people here. You
see, it’s the young people who can really get things done in this
village and now we are organized. We have the energy and the will
to do good work for our village. Now we have an organization that
is independent of the traditional council of elders of the village. The
ministry of the interior gave the CDA the power to really take
charge of the village. For example, we have the right to catch
poachers in our forest. The traditional chief didn’t have the power
to do that, but we do. Also the traditional chiefs didn’t have the
power to oblige the villagers to work. For example, if we wanted to
build a dam, the chief could tell people to go to work on the dam,
but no one would go and the chiefs couldn’t do anything. But now
we can really get people out there to work. Because they know that
this is for the good of the village, but also because we have
instituted a ï¬ne system and they know that they will have to pay if
they don’t go to work. It’s the organization that makes this project
good. If it only does this, it has done something good for us. We
used to have occasional meetings about our village development,
but it was nothing like it is now.
However, other in-depth interviews revealed more complexity in villagers’
attitudes towards the CDA (interview September 1999, Gongel). “We are just
stuck in the sand with all of the project activities. I just see us sunk in deep sand.
I don’t see any results yet.â€
115
Many people were very positive about the role of the CDA in terms of
creating an alternative governing system. The president of the CDA in Gongel
explained that in order to implement the project a new organized body was
necessary (interview September 1999).
The cheikhs are too old to run around and do all the work that this
project requires. I have worked with all of the projects that have
come here because I am young and I can do the work that it takes.
When the RNRM ï¬rst came here, I spent one whole week going
around to talk to every family in Gongel in order to explain the
project to them. The people all know that I am serious and that I will
be careful with the project resources. You see, it’s the young
people who really want to work and who have the energy so that is
why they have to work with the projects, not the cheikhs.
Another interview with the secretary general of the Chilkha CDA (and also
director of the local school) expressed a similar sentiment (interview November
1999),
The role of the CDA is to develop into an institution, and this has
really happened here in Chilkha. Little by little, the CDA is
changing how people think about development. We can already
see change because the cheikhs were not chosen to run the CDA,
people in the village chose young good honest people who they
knew would work. The CDA has brought us rules and a structure at
a time when the traditional kabila leadership was becoming less
powerful. This is really good for the village. Through the
association, we can get people to do community work. We have
imposed ï¬nes on those who don’t work, and this has helped to
motivate people to come work. I am sure that after the project, the
CDA will continue to be an important institution in the village.
Indeed, a World Bank employee in Mauritania (interview June 1999)
explained that it is necessary to create a new association because the local tribal
councils are not legally recognized. The CDA brings a legally recognized
structure to the people within which they can go to the law if they have problems.
116
IsaL
The CDA broadens the traditional government and brings in the young, the.
women and the disadvantaged groups. There has been a rejuvenation of local
politics and the inclusion of younger people in association structures; however it
is not clear that the participation is widening beyond the families that have
traditionally dominated local politics for generations.
Village associations have made documented legal gains. With the help of
the project and since organizing the CDA in Gongel, the association has obtained
a paper from the government that gives them the power to run their own forest.
Because most forests in the country are under the domain of the state, this new
legal right is important for the village as they have a lucrative gum Arabic forest
that could bring substantial income if properly used and maintained. According
to one board member, this new legal right obtained by the CDA is one of the
biggest advantages. Now they have the power to really manage their territory,
which they didn’t before. “Before this legal right, even the village chief did not
have the power to catch violators of their territory.†The village now plans to
harvest the gum trees and to use the money for community development
activities, or use the money to help poor people of the village. As examined
earlier in the chapter, the new collective rights can displace other informal rights
upon which the marginalized often depend.
Although we have seen increased legal recognition and a rejuvenation of
local politics in some villages, other villages have had different experiences. The
village of Benamane has an incredibly strong and powerful traditional leader. As
the chief of a very wealthy and well-revered fraction of an important kabila in
117
eastern Mauritania, the traditional power structure of Benamane has remained
strong and relatively unchanged. Membership in the traditional council and the
CDA is very similar and the traditional leader has the ï¬nal say in the CDA. An
interview with the traditional chief and current CDA president revealed that he
was happy to have new legal recognition, similar to others with whom I talked in
other villages. “You see, as the chief I am not legally recognized, but now as the
president of the CDA it is easier for me to accomplish the tasks I have in mind for
the village.†Yet, the management structure in Benamane in the CDA in reality
functions almost identically to the management structure of the traditional
governance in Benamane. '
The above example illustrates that the possibility of creating a CDA that is
more inclusive is greater when traditional power structures are less entrenched.
However, both in the case of the village with the strong traditional leader and the
villages where traditional leadership has a weakening power structure, we are left
with the question of who exactly is participating in the CDA. Although perhaps
expanded to younger people of the village, the next section will examine the
notion of who is participating. The difference in participation between Bidan and
Haratines in Bidan controlled villages indicates that the inclusion of new
members is not substantially changing the village power structure. Rather it is
merely including younger members of customarily powerful families. For the
CDAs to truly be more inclusive, they must include and distribute power among
all sectors of society residing within one village territory.
118
g;
6.5. Participation in Community Based Natural Resource Management
Project goals show a bottom-up commitment, even through a fundamental
part of the project (such as the decision to have a project, project objectives, and
CDA formation) did not involve local participation. However, 71% of the people
interviewed reported that the CDA represented the interest of the village. Key
elements of the project, such as natural resource management plans are in
principle decided by the associations. “Under the NRM approach, the ï¬nal
choice of technologies to be implemented in each community is made by the
community concerned, based on its own goals and ecological constraints†(World
Bank 1997:14). Dissatisï¬ed villagers and my own observation of project
operations in the ï¬eld dispute this claim from project documents.
A resident in Gongel expressed frustration that although the project talks
of participation, it seems that the project has its own agenda independent of the
wishes of the villagers. Although many initially responded that the CDA '
represents village interests when asked a simple question in the survey, deeper
probing in in-depth interviews revealed more negative answers. People have
long ï¬gured out that development projects avoid villages that have become
labeled ‘problem’ villages and thus may have intentionally biased their answers
to avoid such categorization. To provide an example, it is a RNRM policy that if
villagers cannot agree on tenure or other issues, the project will cease working in
the village. Thus, where entrenched hierarchies are questioned and conflict
arises, the project will withdraw development investment. Because villagers want
to maintain the reputation of being an ‘easy’ village to work with so as to keep
119
development funds, there is an incentive to suppress dissent and to agree to the
priority activities of the Bank project rather than insist upon their own village plan.
Village leaders often agreed to participate in activities that were not high on their
priority list.
The RNRM detailed a list of ï¬rst projects that they themselves could easily
implement in accordance with their ability to ship materials and provide support
during the proper seasons (e.g., rainy season for tree planting, dry season for
dam building). Tree planting was the ï¬rst activity in all of the villages I visited due
to several convenience factors. Project staff did not invite input. Rather, they
informed villagers of their ï¬rst activities and explained that the activities in which
they expressed interest would follow as time and materials allowed. Villagers
were given the opportunity to opt out of the ï¬rst tree planting activity. Many
villagers felt that if they did not express gratitude for the ï¬rst activity, others in
which they were more interested were unlikely to follow. Although the tree
planting activity involved a substantial commitment of time and labor on the part
of the villagers, few could explain why this was good for the village. In fact, due
to a lack of interest on the part of the villagers, and often inappropriate planting
timing, many tree planting activities were a dismal failure. In three villages the
seedlings in the tree nurseries created to facilitate to planting of trees were dead.
Nobody would take responsibility for watering the seedlings after the project
extensionists left. One participant expressed his frustration:
The project talks of their participatory philosophy; that we will create
our own project with our own needs, ideas and work. But they just
say that and then they do what they want. I won’t say that we don’t
want this tree plantation. Of course it may ultimately be good for
120
the village, but it isn’t our priority. The project (ofï¬cials) wrote down
all our priorities and then they just do what they want. We are
herders here. That is how we live primarily. We just need our
health and our animals’ health. Our priority is clean drinking water.
Our wells are flooded by the wetland and so we have to drink the
water from the wetland. You have seen it; you know that it’s not
good to drink. The entire village is sick; you see that house, those
people left to go to Aioun because they said they could not stand to
drink the water anymore. We just need clean water. If we are sick,
we can’t do anything. But the project doesn’t make that their
priority.
6.5.1. Gender and Participation
There has been a special focus of gender and participation in the RNRM
project documentation. The Bank acknowledges that the increase in male
migration to the cities makes women even more important resource managers.
The RNRM project aims to make gender a daily concern for project staff.
Women will have their own technical committees at the village level and key
decisions such as location and operation of water points. Project documents
state that land-use planning, the movement and management of livestock, and
the choice, location and operation of collective food-processing equipment will
only be made after being discussed and accepted by these women’s committees.
The document further states that women’s participation in the village level
implementation process will be facilitated by a project commitment to hire female
extension agents (World Bank 1997244).
The focus on differences in resource use is important. Great differences
exist in modes of natural resource investment and exploitation among subgroups
within the communities. For example, the women, environment, and
development (WDE) scholars maintain that, among the many users of natural
121
resources, it is women whose responsibilities make them especially dependent
upon natural resources and therefore women who are particularly invested in the
stewardship of natural resources. Women are responsible for important tasks in
agropastoral production, such as vegetable gardening, the collection of animal
fodder and the watering and feeding of small ruminants and both young and sick
large livestock. They also collect water and fuelwood and often are involved in
tree planting and management (Shanmugaratnam 1992250).
A community-based approach to natural resource management that fails
to assure women’s access to decision-making structures will most likely move in
directions that do not beneï¬t women. And in addition to affecting subsets of the
local population differently, the lack of full participation by all members of a
community also results in poor managerial performance in general. Gender-blind
approaches to local institution-building may not incorporate the resources of
women’s labor, skill, and knowledge (Joekes et al. 1996). If local communities
are to become the foundation of decentralized natural resource management,
then local institutions must be conï¬gured in such a way that each of the
community subgroups - deï¬ned by gender, class, or mode of production - must
be assured equitable access to collective decision-making structures. The
exclusion of women and other marginalized user groups from decision making
processes is likely to result in less effective decision-making structures because
the structure will lack legitimacy among users. If local communities are to
become the foundation of decentralized natural resource management, then local
institutions must be conï¬gured in such a way that each of the community
122
" ‘w..."‘—"‘e' —
— â€I'm-v". -.-- ~J._-‘—Lï¬m . ._.__.____.___ __ __.,.~__.-._—_ _.,.,,
subgroups - deï¬ned by gender, class, or mode of production - are assured
equitable access to collective decision-making structures.
The “Social Impact Study†conducted by the World Bank prior to the
project, acknowledges potential conflict over village delineation, access to water,
access to rangelands, and competition over natural resources within the
community itself and between the community and outsiders. But it also asserts
that the project will protect the women and the poor (World Bank 1997234). It has
proven to be difficult for this project to ensure equal treatment of groups that
have been severely discriminated against in existing social hierarchies. Redclift
(1995:13) asserts that “It is ultimately the agency of local people and the existing
institutional structure that determines social conflict and the way the environment
is managed.†The World Bank has little control over agency after it has
attempted to put institutions in place.
There is no signiï¬cant difference between the level of participation in CDA
by gender. There was also no signiï¬cant difference between the belief that the
CDA represented the village’s interests by gender. However, many women
expressed privately to me later that the only reason they participated was
because of their husbands. Undoubtedly, men asked their wives to come
knowing that the project placed an emphasis on gender participation. However,
they were enticed to participate and even if the depth of their participation can be
questioned, women attending CDA meetings has been an important step.
Currently, in my sample (n=120) there was only one woman in a position
of leadership of a CDA. Not by coincidence alone, her husband was the
president of the CDA and his wife was nominated to be in charge of ‘women’s
affairs.’ Although the RNRM project documents the importance of considering
gender in project activities, women must be better included in positions of
decision-making power within village associations.
Many women also explained to me the beneï¬ts of the cooperative
businesses that were begun with the project. Although participation in the
associations has not been equal, women have made some gains through the
new trend towards associations and the RNRM project. The formation of
cooperatives as part of a village management plan has become a favorite tool of
development agencies. The new women’s cooperative movement has had
signiï¬cant implications for their members. Through the newly formed
cooperatives growing in numbers, women have gained formal recognition of their
networks, most importantly through development investment. Most development
organizations working in Mauritania have an employee or a project targeting
women’s cooperatives. This formal recognition provides them with funding for
their activities and technical support often in the form of agricultural extension
and marketing techniques. Often their status as a cooperative can give them
access to credit, which many women expressed as a great beneï¬t. Furthermore,
through legal bodies such as CDA created by development projects women are
now guaranteed a seat and a voice.
Although their inclusion is often symbolic or forced, the success and
growth of the number of women’s cooperatives has led to their increased
participation in legal and development networks. The creation of institutions of
124
which women are leaders and through which women can become involved-in the
larger economic world has been a signiï¬cant factor leading to women gaining
independence and access to resources. The new law has enabled women to
organize not only politically but also with some land to reinforce their unity and
possessions.
6.5.2. Social Stratification and Participation
While optimistically reviewing the project’s design, it is important to
remember that efforts to achieve wider participation have well entrenched
obstacles in Mauritania. Mauritanian society is based upon unequal social
stratiï¬cation in addition to unequal gender relations, which discourages
£3»
democratic processes. Community Based Associations are formed using a mix
of traditional organizations and new organizations. The potential is that these
associations will be able to draw upon local experience and will to manage their . '
natural resources sustainability within a system that ï¬ts today’s reality. The
project-imposed structure has attempted to achieve greater equity by widening
participation. The mix of old and new organizations has the potential to draw
upon past indigenous knowledge and expertise, yet can attempt to equalize
some the marked social inequalities that have existed in Mauritania.
The pattern of existing social stratiï¬cation in Mauritania does not lend itself
to equal participation in CBA activities. This ï¬nding is consistent with the writings
by Michels explored by Edwards and Hulme (1996) in their book, “Beyond the
Magic Bullet. Michels asserts that organizations tend to oligarchy. Michaels
125
found that the longer someone remains in a leadership position, the greater will
be the gap between leaders and members (now transformed into followers) in
terms of economic, social, and informational resources. This is happening to
CBAs as the traditionally wealthy noble herding class assume leadership
positions (Shanmugaratnam 1992227) and then have the potential to secure
access to resources from which to increase their own wealth, without regard for
the association as a whole. The more power outside agencies give to such
organizations, the more beneï¬ts may be skimmed off for people in leadership
positions or those they favor.
Figure 5. Participation in Community
Development Associations
E
a)
B
d)
0.
g. Bidan 7 V ‘
Controlled
Villages
I All
Villages
Bidan Haratine
n=120 Participation in CDA among Bidan and Haratines in Bidan
Controlled Villages Sig at p=0.024
In the overall sample of those with project-created community
126
development associations (n=120), there was not a signiï¬cant difference in the
participation in CDA between Bidan and Haratine, with 66.1% of Bidans
interviewed participating and 55.2% of Haratines participating (see Figure 5).
These ï¬gures change when looking only at Bidan controlled villages where 62.7
% of Bidan participate and only 28.6% of Haratines participate (sig. at p=.024).
There are two predominant types of villages in eastern Mauritania. One
type is the Bidan controlled village where Bidan and Haratine live together in one
village. The other is the eddabai where only Haratines live. There are no Bidan
only villages, due to the fact that wealthy Bidans do not traditionally engage in
manual labor and Haratines must be present to perform menial tasks of the
village. There is a great difference in autonomy between the Haratines living in
their separate eddabai and those living in close proximity to Bidan who were
most likely their former masters. Haratines who have placed geographical
distance between themselves and their former masters or from Bidan in general
have gained increased independence which can be seen by their participation
levels in eddabai based CDA (85%). Those living in Bidan villages are more
marginalized and do not have the same voice in village affairs.
Additionally, participant observation in project activities in both Bidan and
Haratine villages showed clearly that in Bidan villages Haratines conducted the
difï¬cult manual labor for project activities where many Bidan only supervised,
made a small show of labor for a few minutes or sat in the shade to make tea for
the workers. Although some Bidan men (and even women) participated in
manual labor, it was by no means equal. In the eddabai, village participation in
127
work activities was widespread with all members participating equally in labor
tasks.
Although lauded as the new participatory method that will at the same time
increase local agency and improve environmental management, CBNRM is a
development tool that can impose signiï¬cant changes in resource tenure
especially in areas where village based management does not ï¬t with the
economic and social realities of the country. Additionally, these new institutions
often provide additional avenues for the elite to increase their power. However,
the World Bank CDAs have created some opportunity for Haratines and women
to participate. Although far from competing with the hierarchical nature of
Mauritania, these new institutions have an important role in providing new
networks in which Haratines and women in particular can operate as more equal
members.
128
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCEPTS OF NATURAL RESOURCE TENURE
In eastern Mauritania, the 1983 land tenure law has not been implemented
completely and important differences exist between the law and practice of
tenure in reality. Within these differences, there are important distinctions
between resource tenure concepts among different sectors of the population.
The laws were created to govern land tenure and there are lengthy governmental
procedures to determine ownership and the right of access to land. However,
these processes remain ambiguous or simply ignored. There exists great
uncertainty and difference of opinion about actual ownership and user rights to
land. These differences of opinion regarding land rights are important because
they highlight the ambiguous nature of the current land tenure situation. More
importantly, these differing concepts of land ownership affect actual tenure
practices because people often ï¬nd themselves enforcing their own concept of
property rights and regimes. Thus, a village that believes that only village
residents are allowed to use their natural resources will cause problems for
outsiders who want to use the resources, even if the village concerned has no
legally recognized claims to exclusive use of these natural resources. In addition
to varying interpretations of ‘improved land’ as deï¬ned by the law and sometimes
multiple ownership claims to a single resource, the law has provided a
‘cooperative’ loophole through which the elite can maintain the status quo.
Great differences exist in modes of natural resource investment and
exploitation among the population of eastern Mauritania. Within the territory of a
village, for example, wetlands are used for farming, gardening, herding, domestic
129
purposes, and sometimes even ï¬shing. Additionally, transhumant populations
depend upon many wetlands strategically located along migration routes to
provide them with water and high quality pasture during much of the year. The
many subsistence and economic activities made possible by wetlands in eastern
Mauritania enable diversiï¬cation of livelihood strategies, not only within villages
or nomadic regions but also within families.
Wetlands in eastern Mauritania are the keystone resource not only for
human survival but also for the maintenance of biodiversity. The majority of
wetland users in eastern Mauritania currently exploit their wetland using low
impact, traditional systems. This traditional extensive use of resources supports
many people with differing livelihood strategies and at present poses no real
threat to the rich biodiversity centered in wetlands. According to the
environmental characteristics of each wetland, some are used primarily for
agriculture, and others are primarily reserved for herding; however most combine
these activities. Thus, although conflicts do exist between those with differing
livelihood strategies, using traditional low impact techniques there are enough
resources to practice many activities within a single wetland, or within a region.
Resource tenure in and around these wetlands is analyzed below.
7.1. General Tenure Concepts
The 1983 law has radically changed land tenure legally; however, on the
ground realities differ from the legal prescription. Although the written law has
had some impact on tenure realities, important differences remain. To
130
understand these differences I asked respondents how they viewed the tenure of
the resources they used. The user’s view and interpretation of tenure law and
practice is important because beliefs determine how people use and access
resources. Although concepts of resource tenure may differ from national laws,
directives from local leaders, recognized customary rights, and the prevailing
concepts of tenure dictate everyday use and access to the resources. In
addition, the differences between resource tenure concepts, legal measures, and
the concepts of local ofï¬cials provide an important description of the influence of
legal matters on the ground. Furthermore, disaggregation of resource tenure
concept by status and the level of development investment will provide important
insight into tenure realities on the ground.
I asked an open-ended question regarding the impact of tenure on four
different resources; 1) animal drinking water, 2) agricultural ï¬elds, 3) forest by-
products, and 4) wood. I later grouped these responses for ease of analysis into
four categories that resemble Bromley’s (1991) four categories of tenure: 1) open
access, 2) communal property, 3) private property, and 4) state controlled. After
reviewing the responses, I modiï¬ed the categories to exclude state property and
instead substituted ‘use prohibited’ because none of the respondents told me that
the state actually ‘owned’ resources. When questioned further, some
respondents would agree that state guards might prohibit the cutting of wood, but
they would not go so far as to say that the state owned the resources, although
by law the state does control most of them. Although the two categories are not
mutually exclusive, l revised the categories to more accurately reflect the views
131
and concepts of the people I interviewed.
Figure 6. Concept of resource ownership
(all respondents)
90 _. 844 -~-*
_ 80.6 i
80 . l
70 , 67.3
E 'lopen
8. 50 access
E I. _ . village
“5 4o - , property
g gindividual
8 30 property
as
20 l -9199???"
10 l
o . §
watering animals agricultural ï¬elds forest by-products wood
n=265
The concept of ownership changes for different types of natural resources
(see Figure 6). Sixty-seven percent of respondents reported that it was forbidden
to cut wood. Under the 1983 land tenure law, forests are state property and
people, even those living near the forest, are ï¬ned heavily for cutting this wood.
The state has regulatory powers and hires guards at some of the biggest forests
(e.g. Tamachekett). Although the law provides a means for groups to gain
ownership over their land in the form of cooperatives, few have been able to gain
the rights to their surrounding forests because it is more difï¬cult to show land
improvement as is required by the law. In the face of widely-publicized natural
resource degradation that has been questionably blamed on over use rather than
132
.4."—..-w;-a-r_
e . .
simply on the drought, the government has been pursuing policies to limit the use
of wood for any purpose. Although people need to obtain wood with which to
cook and for the construction of their homes, in most cases obtaining this wood is
illegal. On occasion, the government has given a community the rights to their
forest usually after substantial investment in either tree planting or fencing. The
views of 67% of respondents sampled are in accordance with the written law.
However, as discussed above, respondents do not locate ownership with the
state, rather they refer to the guards as policemen. Moreover, 22.4% of
respondents reported, in sharp contradiction with the 1983 law, that cutting wood
was open to all; 6.3% thought their wood was private property; and 4% thought
wood was communal property.
Forest by-products and water for animals are resources that are
predominately seen as open-access resources (80.6% and 74.8% of
respondents respectively). Due to the nature of the resource, it is difï¬cult to limit
access to them. Additionally, especially in the case of water, use by one person
does not usually limit the use by another person. Both water and forest product
resources become scarce when there are many people using the resource or
when drought occurs. Although technically state owned (excluding wells and
other improved water sources on private property), the state has not made any
attempt to limit access and thus for these resources, the law is not in
contradiction with the views of the respondents on the realities of tenure.
Agricultural ï¬elds are commonly viewed as private property (84.4% of
respondents). Due to the type of resource, it is logical that one person will invest
133
labor into one speciï¬c area and will not only reap the harvest of that year, but
also will be able to farm in future years. As the 1983 law regards any improved
land as the property of the person who worked to improve it, this ï¬nding shows
that a large majority of the population view agricultural ï¬eld tenure in accordance
with the law. When asked to briefly state the nature of resource tenure for ï¬elds,
water, wood, and forest products, the majority of respondents provided answers
that ï¬t well within the current laws regarding the tenure of the resources. Thus, a
preliminary analysis leads to the conclusion that with the exception of wood, for
which the state is referred to as a policing force rather than proprietor, tenure law
and practice are the same or at least very similar.
7.2. Development Investment and Tenure Concepts
There was not complete agreement among respondents regarding the
tenure of the resources around each wetland. One factor influencing tenure
concepts is the level of development investment. Expensive development
investments increase the value of a resource thereby making that resource
eligible for exclusive ownership under the 1983 law; it also increases the
competition for what now is a more valuable resource.
134
Figure 7: Resource Tenure Concept by Level of
Development Investment
In Open Access" . coramuhar “b‘ifn‘vale noisily“ {3 ugepmmmied .
90 . n ‘
80—
m _._
E 70
Q)
E 60. T
Q.
93 50 T
“6
E 40
8
5 30
Q.
20 4I
10 I ‘
0I m .
g g E. 5 I 5 j g i 23;
3 s E E ; 3 3 5
3 j I E . E
Agricultural : Wood* ‘ Forest l Water“
Land" ; L Products '
n=265 Level of developmentinvestment * Sig. at P=0.05
As is evidenced by the data in Figure 7, concepts of resource tenure differ
signiï¬cantly between respondents living in areas with substantial development
investment and those living in areas without that investment. Substantial
development investment is deï¬ned as outside ï¬nancial resources invested in
improving the economic viability or environmental sustainability of natural
resources. Common examples are fencing around agricultural ï¬elds, clearing
and damming of wetlands.
There is a signiï¬cant difference between the tenure concept of people
using resources with and without development investment. Those with
signiï¬cant development investment generally have a more exclusive view of their
135
tenure. 92.9% of respondents using resources with signiï¬cant development
investment reported that agricultural ï¬elds were owned privately. In contrast,
only 74.8% of respondents using resources with minimal development
investment reported that their ï¬elds were owned privately. Similarly, 64.4% of
respondents using resources with signiï¬cant development investment reported
that trees were not for the general public to use and it was forbidden to cut down
trees. A smaller percentage, 52.8% of those without signiï¬cant development
investment reported the same. Development investment increases the value of
the resources, and thus it is logical that those using the resource will think of their
resource in a more exclusive manner.
There was also a signiï¬cant difference regarding water access; however,
in this case those with more development investment reported a more inclusive
access. 91.3% reported that water was open to all, where as only 75.6% of
those without development investment reported the same. Although seemingly
contradictory to the ï¬ndings regarding agricultural ï¬elds and wood, the concept of
water access that is more inclusive has an important connection to development
investment. Many development projects have raised the question of water
access with many users fearing that water access would be constricted after the
implementation of the project. Agricultural project farmers especially have a
keen desire to keep animals who need the water access far away from ï¬elds.
However, herders have been very vocal and aggressive regarding their right to
maintain their traditional access to water sources. Because of the well-known
potential problems with this issue, those with development investment always
136
were quick to explain how the water has remained open access. There was no
signiï¬cant difference in the tenure concept of those with and without
development investment regarding forest by-products.
One currently popular and sought after development investment is a fence
that encircles the wetland. 56.6% of respondents reported that fencing was their
ï¬rst priority for development investment. Although many people are interested in
this type of development intervention (both development organizations and
populations living at the edge of wetlands), to date fencing has only completely
encircled one wetland, Boichiche. This small wetland was fenced by a project
over 15 years ago with the aim of protecting the wetland and ensuring the
population beneï¬ts of forest products because the products are protected from
animal grazing. Additionally, their ï¬elds would be protected from animals.16
This fence around Boichiche has clearly affected the way people use this
resource although ofï¬cially, resource tenure remains unchanged. Gates on
either end of the wetland are designated to allow important wetland access to all
populations, although the fence clearly creates a barrier of access that a small
gate will not rectify. Herders from the surrounding area with whom I spoke were
very angry that the fence had been built. Several research visits in the fall of
1999 revealed that villagers consistently have problems with outsiders cutting
their fence to let their cows and camels in to drink and graze. “We have been
coming here for generations. Why would they put up a fence to stop us? We will
keep coming, fence or no fence. It is our right.†(interview with a herder near
Boichiche, December 1999). Interviews with area residents suggest that the
137
construction of the fence has increased conflict among users of the wetland with
differing livelihood strategies. Survey respondents’ views of resource ownership
clearly show how development intervention has influenced opinions about
resource ownership. The chart below shows how residents of Boichiche believe
that their resources are more exclusively owned. Consistently, survey
respondents from Boichiche believed that they owned their resources more
exclusively than the general population surveyed using wetlands not surrounded
by a fence.
Table 2. Fencing and Resource Ownership n=265
Watering Agricultural ï¬elds Forest by- Wood
animals/fodder products
percent all Boichiche all Boichiche all Boichiche all Boichiche
(â€/6)
open 75 60 4 O 8 l 60 22 1 5
access
village 20 15 1 1 5 6 15 4 10
property
individ 5 25 84 95 13 25 6 25
property
Use 0 O 0 O O O 67 50
forbidden
Fencing can prevent environmental degradation from overgrazing and can
protect crops and forest products. However, tenure problems inherent with
fencing (e.g., Boichiche) are dangerous for mobile populations central to the
economy whose livelihood depends upon some access to these wetlands.
Additionally, tenure conflicts, uncertainties or exclusivity of ownership in some
cases can cause serious problems for the environmental health of the wetland.
Low-impact, extensive agriculture as currently practiced poses little threat to the
biodiversity and ecological health of wetlands. However, increasingly intensive
138
agriculture causes problems by cutting down trees to clear more ï¬elds in
wetlands, which damages important forest resources. When there is not enough
space around the wetlands, people create earthen bunds17 outside the wetlands
to trap enough water with which to farm. This diverts water from the wetland
and, as a result, the wetland may not ï¬ll properly. Privatization through land
improvement is one drive fueling increasing agriculture. An interview with the
assistant Mayor of Sevaa near Tamachekett wetland (September 1999) reveals
the increasingly common pro-development attitude towards the development of
wetlands.
Wetlands are for the general population who live around them. But
if you improve the land around the wetlands, then it becomes your
property. It used to be that kabilas cultivated the wetland areas and
considered them to be their communal property. Then the French
came, and then the modern state. Now we have passed a law that
says when anyone improved the land it became theirs. So, in
theory, if I can cultivate the entire wetland, the entire wetland
should be mine. I can own the whole thing, and it will be my private
property. But in reality, it is difï¬cult to keep people out of the
wetlands because people still have ideas about kabila territory.
And many people say they need to use the wetlands. There are
two ideas, one is that anyone can bring their animals to drink here,
and the other is that people are afraid that animals will ruin their
crops so they don’t let animals drink in their wetlands. In reality,
this happens, people keep others from drinking from their wetlands.
7.3. Status and Tenure Concepts
As examined in greater depth in chapter four, the 1983 land tenure laws
produced mixed results for marginalized populations in Mauritania. To begin
analysis of the differential impact of the law on varying sectors of the
populations, it is ï¬rst important to examine variations in the concept of resource
tenure. There were signiï¬cant differences between resource tenure concept
139
categories according to status.
Figure 8. Resource Tenure Concept by Status
. a oï¬Ã©hleééé ‘. commah‘a'r Ejï¬ï¬vaimd‘pé‘r‘iy 5 Use prohibited
100
90
80 fl _"
7O
60
50
40
percent of respondents
30
20
10 i
o .y ; z 2 ; l |.
Bidan i Haratine ‘ Bidan Haratine l Bidan " Haratine Bidan { Haratine '
Fields : Wood* 5 Forest Products" 3 Water
n=265 " = Signiï¬cant at p<0.05
As is shown in Figure 8, the resource concept for wood and forest
products differs signiï¬cantly by status. Of the four resources listed, wood and
forest products are two resources that traditionally have been left for Haratines.
The harvesting of these resources requires substantial manual labor, which was
thought not to be culturally appropriate for the prestigious Bidan and these
products do not readily produce large proï¬ts. 46.6% of Bidan reported that
wood-use was prohibited, whereas a greater number (69.2%) of Haratines
reported the same. Because Haratines are more familiar with wood harvesting
and, in many cases, are dependent upon this income for survival, Haratines have
a greater ï¬rst-hand knowledge of the tenure of the resource. Haratines are more
140
likely to have been ï¬ned by forestry ofï¬cials for cutting wood illegally because
cutting wood generally is done by Haratines.
Forest products in Mauritania include fruits, seeds used for tanning
leather, Arabic gum etc. Forest products are relied upon more heavily during
difï¬cult times and in times of drought. Haratines relied more heavily upon forest
products in times of drought (14.4%) as opposed to the 7.4% of Bidan.18
Although these ï¬gures might seem low, the poor returns and stigma of forest
products result in people only turning to these products if there is great need.
Those who are continually reliant upon these products to supplement their
livelihood activities are among the poorest of the poor. 3% of Bidan reported
supplementing their everyday livelihood activities with the collection of forest
products and 15% of Haratines reported the same. Only one Haratine
respondent out of a sample of 270 reported collecting forest products as a
primary source of income or livelihood activity. Similar again to wood cutting,
there is a signiï¬cant difference between the Bidan and Haratine concept of forest
product tenure. Again, Bidans who are less dependent upon the resources
report that the resource is easier to access than report the Haratines. 88.5% of
Bidan interviewed responded that forest products were open access, where as
only 76.9% of Haratines had the same view.
There was not a signiï¬cant difference between Haratine and Bidan
concepts of agriculture ï¬eld and water tenure. Although agriculture is a
predominately Haratine activity, increasingly more Bidan are taking up agriculture
and herding (of which animal drinking water is a crucial element) is increasingly
141
practiced by Haratines. In part due to the importance of water and agricultural
ï¬elds for both Bidan and Haratines, there is no signiï¬cant difference in their
tenure concept regarding these resources.
7.4. The Complexities of Resource Tenure
The way in which I have categorized the data is a slight adaptation of
Bromley’s four category (1991) description of resource tenure. Bromley’s
categories aimed to allow for the important distinction between communal
property and open access property. In contrast to Hardin’s tragedy of the
commons, Bromley has insightfully highlighted the difference between open
access and communal property and has shown that communal property can be
quite exclusionary and can indeed promote environmentally sustainable
management of natural resources.
However, the categorization of resources into the four types of tenure
patterns serves to hide important complexities of the tenure situation in
Mauritania. One important example of the complexities hidden by such a narrow
deï¬nition of tenure types is agricultural ï¬elds. When asked a short answer
question, 84% of respondents reported that ï¬elds were individual property.
Within the Bromley categorization, ï¬elds would then be classiï¬ed as private
property. However the term private property can be used in many ways. Only in
two of the 12 villages in which I conducted my research were people allowed to
sell their land. In a survey of 78 villages in eastern Mauritania, 20% reported that
ï¬elds were individual property that remained the same from generation to
142
generation (this does not mean that people are allowed to sell their land)
(McCracken 1999). 44% reported that their ï¬elds were divided between different
families. 36% reported that ï¬elds were divided equally among kabila members.
In this case, ï¬elds may be privately managed and can function like private
property, yet if the wetland changes or there are new people who need ï¬elds, the
chief will have to re-divide the ï¬elds to maintain equity among members. The
difference between private property that includes selling rights and land which is
managed privately but ultimately belongs to a larger group is one nuance that is
lost in the simple category of private property.
There was no signiï¬cant difference in the tenure concept of men and
women when respondents were asked a short question. However, in-depth
interviews with men and women revealed that while men saw that women
controlled their own ï¬elds, women thought they were merely borrowing their
husband’s ï¬elds (this point is explored in greater depth in Chapter Eight). Thus,
important differences in tenure are hidden by such simple categories. The
remainder of the data analysis chapter will explore in greater depth the nuances
of resources tenure in Mauritania. Through examining the avenues of power and
negotiation that different sectors in the society actively pursue to gain access to
more resources, I will show how ambiguous tenure can be, and how flexible are
the rules for negotiation.
143
CHAPTER EIGHT
NEGOTIATIONS AND NETWORKS
Territory is more than a geographic grouping; in addition it is a value
system that is based upon livelihood systems and social structure (Ould Cheikh
1985). Land use and land tenure are part of social organization. The new spatial
division that is evolving in Mauritania is related to changing identities and
changing social structures. The strong kabila identity in Mauritania is gradually
opening to allow the establishment of identities independent of the hierarchical
kabila structure. However slowly, social hierarchies are evolving, with
traditionally marginalized groups such as women and Haratines gaining access
to resources via avenues outside the hierarchical kabila structure. In the
province of Hodh El Gharbi in eastern Mauritania, new avenues in the form of
changing government policies for entry into new networks of influence and power
for the traditionally marginalized has had some limited but positive effects by
providing the marginalized more tools with which to negotiate. However, the
political and economic structure through which access to new networks is gained
is heavily influenced by the kabila system, thus perpetuating traditional
hierarchies. Although kabila hierarchical influence remains strong, traditionally
marginalized populations have made important gains regarding resource tenure.
This section will focus on the ways in which those without power in the strong
kabila system have negotiated to secure access to the natural resources upon
which their livelihood and identity depend.
Social networks theorists argue that social networks are so strong that
144
externally imposed laws or economic changes cannot signiï¬cantly impact .
resource tenure. Berry (1993) argues that governments have had little success
in passing laws that substantially change land tenure. The 1983 land tenure law
in Mauritania is argued by many to be one such failed government attempt to
implement policy to change tenure. However, the experience in eastern
Mauritania shows that while laws do not radically alter the existing social
structure, resource tenure laws can play a role in providing small windows of
opportunity for the excluded. Results from research collected in Hodh El Gharbi
in eastern Mauritania (1999-2000) show that some women and Haratines have
been able to increase the security of their resource tenure. Women and
Haratines are gaining access to resources to own and to manage, thus allowing
them to gain access to new networks of identity and power existing somewhat
independently of their kabila status. However, their marginalized locus in the
social hierarchy makes these advances precarious and difï¬cult to maintain in
times of resource competition.
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, often there is a disjuncture
between the legal framework and the actual practice of tenure on the ground. In
the case of Mauritania, the 1983 land tenure law provides enormous opportunity
for those sectors of society that had been excluded from equal access to natural
resources, especially regarding agricultural land. The law states that adding
value to land is a sufï¬cient prerequisite to ownership; however, negotiations for
secure tenure are more complex. Often, villages negotiate for village owned
communal land. The 1983 law loophole that allows for land to be communally
145
owned by a village can increase tenure security for Haratine eddabai villages, or
can reinforce the status quo as Bidan kabila leaders keep control of their village
land. Private individual resource ownership requires more negotiation with the
authorities and within village membership. Those that have added value to land
do not necessarily gain private ownership unless they have influence to take
advantage of new laws.
Sedentarization has been increasing at an unprecedented scale in part
due to the prolonged drought as well as the changing economy in Mauritania. In
addition, to negotiate the terms of the new 1983 law, land grabbing has become
common. People have been settling on land to stake their claim to individual
property not previously recognized in kabila-controlled areas. Similarly, entire
villages have moved location to be closer to valuable resource in order to lay
claim to it. People often make feeble attempts to show that they have ‘improved’
the land by fencing or marking the territory over which they wish to claim private . '
tenure. Of increasing importance are wetlands, which provide vital water and
pasture for animals and often provide good agricultural land. Even seasonal
visitors to wetlands scurry to prove their permanent residence when development
teams arrive. At the seasonal wetland of Boutiktik, a woman living in a tent who
obviously camped in that area for the short rainy season attempted to claim
ownership (October 1999).
Oh no! We are here all year round. We do agriculture, and our
animals are here all the time. We never move from this place. My
parents have been coming here forever too. Ask anyone around
and they’ll tell you that we have always been here. We’re always
here.
146
In most cases, settling and improving the land to own must be donein
conjunction with political and social negotiation that is still ï¬rmly connected to
kabila hierarchy. The 1983 land tenure law policy has shifted emphasis away
from the traditional kabila afï¬liation to a more independent social identity. As
people are more able to claim rights to land and resources due to their own labor
and placement and not merely through their afï¬liation with a kabila, they also are
able to deï¬ne themselves through their independent labor.
The vast majority of villages have taken advantage of the new law to
obtain formal recognition of their customary rights to the land and resources
surrounding the village. In a survey of 103 villages in the Hodh El Gharbi
Province in eastern Mauritania, 71% reported having an ofï¬cial government
document that proves their ownership to the land as a village. The remaining
29% of the villages surveyed have customary rights to the land surrounding their
villages (McCracken 1999). The customary rights of the transitory herders and
forest gathers are not recognized with the formal property designation obtained
by 71 % of the villages.
Often, more important than village ownership for disadvantaged members
of the kabila is the way in which resources, particularly agricultural land, are
divided among the community members. Only 20 % of the villages surveyed
reported that land in their village was divided into recognized individual private
property. 36 % of the villages surveyed reported that land within their village
territory was communal and was divided evenly among kabila members. In 44%
of the villages, land is divided among different families, although not evenly.
147
These data cannot be disaggregated to determine the types of villages
concerned. However, among the 11 villages where I conducted my survey, the
six Haratine eddabai villages divided their land equally among members. Of the
remaining ï¬ve Bidan controlled villages, four divided their land among different
families in a manner that was not equal, and in the ï¬fth village, land was divided
into individual private property.
Within the Bidan controlled villages, land is divided unevenly, with the
traditional kabila leaders controlling a much greater portion of the most valuable
land in the wetlands. In my sample of farmers (n=153), on average Bidans
(n=60) had ï¬elds in the more valuable wetland area equaling 50,000 meters
squared. In contrast, Haratines (n=93) on average had a much smaller area to
farm in the wetland of 30,412 meters squared (difference signiï¬cant at p=.001).
To provide another example of the inequality of distribution of land, of the 43% of
the population surveyed who farm poor quality land in rainfed areas by
constructing small, earthen dams to trap meager rainfall, 84% were Haratine.
Thus, in the majority of cases, the 1983 law has not been implemented to
increase private property of those working on the land as was its original
intention. In most cases, the law was used in a manner that would protect the
interests of the elites, using the window provided by the provision for collectively
owned land. Rather than opening tenure access to those who were traditionally
excluded, Bidan were able to manipulate the law to beneï¬t the status quo.
The system that is set up for the privatization of the land is not rigid. While
148
trying to implement the new laws of privatization, politicians and lawmakers have
taken pains to recognize the importance of traditional tenure claims over land.
Although in Article 3 the 1983 law states that the traditional system of land tenure
is abolished, the implementation of the law emphasizes traditional claims to the
land. People who have worked to add value to land have the right to bring their
case to the provincial ofï¬ce. If the interested party does not already have some
legal document linking them to this land, then the proposed site for privatization
is posted outside the Hakem’s ofï¬ce, and the public has 60 days in which to
protest the ofï¬cial privatization of this land. If protesters have legal
documentation proving the land already is theirs, then there is little problem
resolving the dispute. However, more commonly, the protester merely believes
that the land is his traditional land. In this more common case, it is difï¬cult to
settle disputes (interview with the Hakem of Aioun October 1999).
In the majority of tenure disagreements, the dispute involves one person’s
word against another. Typically, one person has begun to cultivate some land.
When he approaches the Hakem for title to the land, the other man comes to say
that this is his traditional land. In the case of contested land, the more powerful
win disputes. The more powerful are more connected to the networks of politics
and maneuver more freely in this arena.
The Hakem recognizes that it is difï¬cult to make a decision. He maintains
that the case is investigated with visits to the land and interviews with people
surrounding each case. However, the Hakem laments that if they make a
decision that is not popular among powerful people (Bidan elite), they have little
149
power with which to implement their decision. If people do not see a traditional
link to the current laws regarding tenure, then these laws will be impossible to
implement (interview with Hakem, Aioun19 October 1999).
For land to be privatized under the 1983 law, the Bidan who had traditional
control over kabila lands is given the task of dividing the land for individual title.
Due to the serious internal conflicts that the government wanted to avoid, and in
part because the Bidan did not usually want to give up their control over their
kabila lands, most were only transferred to cooperatives.
Not only did elite Bidan resist giving up their control over their kabila lands
to individual members of the kabila, they also resisted giving up their territorial
rights to grazing land. In a society that bases so much of its livelihood and
revenue on herding, the seemingly worthless ‘empty’ unimproved land is
extremely valuable. This wild brush feeds animals that make several people very
rich in eastern Mauritania. To maintain control over these lands, many Kabilas
registered all of their traditional land (including unimproved grazing lands and
non-agricultural wetlands) in the name of their kabila leader in a village
communal agreement (Interview with Hakem, Aioun August 1999). Under the
law, only improved lands can be registered, yet these Bidan are able to evade
this detail when registering their own land. According the Hakem of Aioun:
People are accustomed to the way things used to be. They don’t
understand why the state wants to regulate their land or control the
empty grazing land. They don’t want people to be able to get
individual plots because that goes against the nature of the kabila
and its identity with its territory. It will be a longtime before people
change their mentality about these matters. Until the mentality of
the people changes, there will be no change brought about as the
1983 law had intended. Still some change is happening.
150
In matters concerning land tenure, kabila networks and the social
hierarchies within them remain strong. The strength of the kabila network is
evidenced by its influence in the political and legal system through which the new
1983 law must be implemented and interpreted. Through the often-biased
interpretation of the new tenure law in favor of the traditionally-powerful Bidan,
Bidan are able to use the new law to increase their economic and political power
through the solidiï¬cation and acquisition of important land resources in the area.
8.1. Social Hierarchy and the Implementation of New Land Tenure Laws
New laws and policies have been implemented in the context of massive
changes and upheavals and the hierarchical kabila system that still plays a
signiï¬cant role in all aspects of Mauritanian political, economic, and social life.
Figure 9: Pre-Colonial Networks
Political
BM \
Religious
BM
Kabila
BM
(hm hW \
bw
Trade
BM
B=Bidan, H=Haratine, W=woman, M=man
‘ CAPITAL LETTERS = full member
lower case letters = subservient member
Rather than an abstract discussion of power that allows elites to manipulate a
legal system to their advantage, Latour (1987) provides us with the opportunity to
151
provide a material conceptualization of power through the mapping of these
networks. Figure 9 represents the networks that existed before independence in
1960.
The Kabila was the central network that provided access to all other
networks. Bidan men were full members, and thus were allowed access to
political, religious, economic and military networks. Bidan women and all
Haratines were secondary kabila members and were denied access to other
powerful networks portrayed in ï¬gure nine due to their inferior status in the
kabila.
\ Figure 10: Contemporary Network
National
Political
Today, the kabila is still the most dominant network in eastern Mauritania,
and Bidan men and still the full members of the kabila. Bidan women and all
Haratines have not been able to move into positions of authority within the kabila
and are thus still excluded from the connections to other networks that full kabila
152
membership enables. However, in the context of increasing development .
assistance, new laws and policies and economic globalization, women and
Haratines have been able to gain access to networks outside the kabila where
their membership is less dependent upon their subservient role within the kabila.
Most importantly, Haratine males have become political leaders within their own
eddabai villages. Additionally, women have become leaders within their
economic cooperatives. Leadership or even full membership in these networks
increases their negotiation power as their connection to other larger networks
increases. The remainder of this chapter treats ï¬ndings related to increased
network access.
8.2. Tenure Security Gains for Disadvantaged Groups
Settling in villages is an important way to gain recognition independent of
the kabila. Villagers are recognized as being a member of a certain village as
well as holding membership and status within in the kabila. In a survey of 103
villages in Hodh El Gharbi,20 66% stated that they settled in their villages to gain
a political identity not offered within the larger kabila. As one resident of
Chilkha explained,
With a central government, you have to settle, or else they won’t
know you. We wanted to be known. If there weren’t Chilkha, a
place where people knew we were, then you would never have
come to visit us. You never would have come here. We wanted to
proï¬t from government services like schools.
In addition to political reorganization, people also settle to be close to
resources. Because wetlands are so rich in resources, these areas have been
153
increasingly settled. In addition to the ease of access that proximity allowsfor
those living next to the wetlands, settlement also is a key move in the struggle for
increasingly secure and exclusive tenure. Indeed, 57% of the villages surveyed21
in Hodh El Gharbi chose their locations due to the proximity to a wetland.
Villagers in Tamachekett explained, if the wetland did not exist, nobody would
live there. The Haratine village of Mzreiga actually moved closer to a wetland
and then changed their village name from Mzreiga to Chlim, naming themselves
after the wetland. The village chief explained that settlement in this location was
necessary because others were moving in and ‘taking’ land that they had
previously used and considered to be their own. This move made herders in the
area angry because they feared that their access to the wetland would become
more precarious with settlers claiming ownership. Indeed, this can cause
problems due to the competing interests of herders and agriculturalists. Both use
the wetlands, yet animals frequently damage crops as they graze in ï¬elds near
their watering sites. Additionally, villagers often become protective of the pasture
surrounding their village. One nomadic herder near Chlim explained (Sept 1999)
It’s not that there isn’t enough pasture, but we have trouble
navigating around ï¬elds and villages. Before there was more
liberty, and you could go anywhere not worrying about ï¬elds or
villagers chasing you away. Now many villages send us away
because they don’t want us to use the pasture near their village.
They give us water from the well, but warn us not to set up camp.
They can chase us away, or often they lock their wells so we won’t
use them, and they make sure we don’t use the pasture near their
village.
The new laws also provided Haratines with some legal avenues with
which to claim their legitimacy and rights to exist in roles not subservient to their
154
former masters or to the nobles to whom they have traditionally paid tribute
ï¬nancially, symbolically, or with their work. Even prior to the 1983 law,
Haratines often moved away from the nobles with whom they were afï¬liated to
live in Haratine-only eddabai villages near their ï¬elds. This small geographic
distance allows Haratines some freedom from the hierarchy because they are
too far away to respond to daily demands and reminders of their status.
Haratines living in their own villages expressed great satisfaction with their
relative independence. For example, a Haratine woman in the Tamachekett
area22 explained (November 1999):
It’s much better now because we work for ourselves with our own
bodies. Now what we plant is for us, so even if we are poor, we
can see the profits of our hard work. We used to work for the
Bidan, but they only proï¬ted from our work, and they ordered us
around all the time. Every second they would call us to come and
do something else for them. Now we just get things and do things
for ourselves.
Increasing sedentarization produced a great break with past tradition
because it provided an outlet for political recognition that was not solely
dependent upon the kabila hierarchy. The 1983 law legally recognized many
sedentarization claims. This alternative political recognition is especially
desirable for Haratines due to their marked subservience within the traditional
hierarchical structure. According to a foreign grassroots development worker
who has lived in the area for over ï¬ve years and works primarily with Haratine
farmers (interview August 1999):
...if [Haratines] want to get out of their feudal relationship with the
Bidan, they have to remove themselves physically from their
presence. No matter how much money they make or what they
155
have, they will always be subservient in the eyes of their masters,
and that is impossible to shake unless they move.
Geographic distance from Bidan is essential for Haratines to gain access
to networks outside the kabila. As shown in ï¬gure 10, the village is a new
network in which Bidan and Haratine men both participate as full members.
Although all villages are still considered to be part of one kabila or another, each
village has political recognition in its own right. In Haratine-only eddabai villages,
Haratine men are full leaders of their villages, although they do not have full
membership within their kabila. For Haratine men who are leaders of their
village, they are allowed access to political networks, as they become local
political representatives. Village leaders are also the point of contact for
international development agencies with substantial resources. Additionally,
village leaders are involved with the organization of weekly markets that link
them to economic networks. It is important to remember that the kabila is still the
most powerful network in the area, and thus, Bidan village leaders are able to
use their powerful position within the kabila to pursue even greater gains as
village leaders themselves. However, the gains in relative independence from
the hierarchical kabila made by Haratines are important and have contributed to
their tenure security. The increased network membership of Haratines living
independently and their tenure gains will be explored through case studies later
in the chapter.
As described above, geographical distance is perhaps the most
important element that adds to the relative independence of Haratines.
156
Haratines who can rely on themselves during times of trouble have also gained
more independence. If Haratines do not have to receive loans, charity or favors
during important events such as weddings or difï¬cult times such as droughts,
they are able to assert more independence. Additionally, the amount of time
that Haratines have achieved a greater distance economically and
geographically adds to the relative independence of the Haratines from the
Bidan in their kabila.
Just being able to lay claim to some land in whatever form, whether
formally recognized by the state or not, also provides a degree of geographic
distance thus increasing Haratine independence. For example, in agriculturally
rich zones such as Leweija, Haratines do not own land within the wetland,
because this land was divided long ago among powerful Bidan kabilas. In Hodh
El Gharbi, Leweija is known as one of three ‘bread basket’ areas where
agriculture has been truly successful. Due to the past importance of this land, it
was divided among people whose descendents are among the wealthiest in the
area. Thus, many Bidan who own the land are not willing to farm the land
themselves because farming is a. task seen to be below their status. Due to
their inability to ï¬nd cheap labor that their former slaves previously provided,
many Bidan elite infrequently farm their land. Thus, today land within this
wetland is available to be loaned at no cost to willing farmers in the area. The
land in the wetlands is reported by farmers to be three times more productive
than land created outside the wetlands by earthen bunds. However, many
Haratines that I interviewed resisted borrowing the Bidan land because of the
157
reinforcement of subservience that accepting this favor would entail.
Mohamadou’s story in the following text box provides an in depth example of a
Haratine farmer’s desire to claim his own land.
Land outside the wetland not only is less productive, but is extremely labor
intensive to create, necessitating the construction of large earthen dams to retain
moisture. Haratines explained to me that this was a small price to pay for a
chance to stake a claim to land that they could pass on to future generations,
land of which they could be proud.
In addition to being labor intensive, the creation of earthen bunds outside the
wetland can damage the productivity of the wetland. In several of the wetlands
in Hodh El Gharbi, there have been so many bunds created that rainwater that
normally ï¬lls the depression is diverted elsewhere, and the wetland below does
not ï¬ll properly. This not only impacts the wetland environment, it also reduces
the productivity of the ï¬elds in the wetlands because less water reaches the
wetland ï¬elds. In Leweija for example, farmers explained that the productivity
in the wetland has decreased signiï¬cantly over the years due to the increase of
earthen dams. They say that the wetland ï¬lls with signiï¬cant water only when it
is a heavy rainfall year, and the force of water breaks many of the earthen
dams. Several Bidan who have ï¬elds in Leweija protested against the earthen
bunds built by the Haratines (Nov 1999).
158
Mohamadou Farms His Own Land
Mohamadou is a Haratine farmer who grew up farming around the wetland
of Leweija. During the dry season, he lives with his family in the Bidan village of
Benemane, about 7 kilometers away. Benemane is located on a wetland that is only
used for herding. But people come to Leweija to farm during the rainy season
because it is reputed to be the best farmland in all of Hodh El Gharbi. For years,
Mohamadou farmed millet in Leweij a, with good returns for most years. Ever since
he can remember, noble Bidan families owned all of the agricultural land within
Leweija. Noble Bidan families typically do not farm and increasingly have had
difï¬culty ï¬nding people to farm their land for them. Thus, it was always easy for
Mohamadou and his family to ï¬nd land to borrow for the growing season.
Although there was no ofï¬cial rent asked of those borrowing the land,
Mohamadou and his family always gave a portion of the harvest to the people who
lent them the land. Mohamadou claimed they donated a portion of their harvest ‘To
say thank you’ and to ‘give zakat (alms).’ But as Mohamadou grew older and began
to see his children grow up, he wanted more and more to be farming his own land so
that he could give his children something. He wanted to ï¬nd a way to become more
independent. Because all of the land in Leweija was already ‘owned’, Mohamadou
was forced to create a ï¬eld outside of Leweija. With the help of some other
Haratines from the village, Mohamadou built an earthen bund slightly above
Leweija. The bund was build big enough to trap water to provide moisture to his
ï¬elds. To better explain his reasons for giving up agriculture in the more productive
wetland, he explained,
I know that the land in Leweija produces a lot of millet. But it’s not
mine. I don’t have any land there. I can make my own ï¬eld here (in
the higher land surrounding the wetland of Leweija) and then I don’t
have any problems with anyone. I don’t want to borrow land; I want to
create my own land so that I have something to pass onto my children.
People built earthen dams because they don’t have land in Leweija.
Big families yelled and protested when the digs were built, but the
state can’t tell the poor not to build the dams and do agriculture
because it is their livelihood. There is the idea in the government
that improving new land is good, and it allows you to gain title to
property. The Haratines are encouraged by this new law that will
allow them to gain title to land. The big tents went to the Hakem
and to the mayor and protested, but they couldn’t do anything.
The creation of earthen bunds emphasizes the point that Haratines have
made efforts to take advantage of the 1983 law even when strongly opposed by
159
more influential members of the community. With its provision for people to
obtain legal title to the land they improve, Haratines are in theory well placed.
Within their tradition of agriculture, they are most likely to improve land (as
plowing ï¬elds is one of the easiest ways to improve land). However, as is seen
in the case of Leweija, the most productive agricultural land is traditionally
kabila property. When land is somewhat valuable, kabilas have easily been
able to use the provision of the 1983 law for the collective ownership of kabila
land. As seen in the above example, subservient members of the ‘new
collective’ must be creative to obtain access to the resource. Haratines have
been going outside the traditionally recognized agricultural land to farm new
land that has not yet been claimed under the 1983 law due to its low
productivity. Even when stepping outside the bounds of traditional agricultural
land in eastern Mauritania, there has been resistance to the Haratine ownership
of land. However, in cases where Haratines have established relative
independence and have a very clear claim to resources, some have been able
to stand their ground with the backing of the new 1983 law and a government
favorable to the new appropriation of land. Although the potential exists for
Haratine and women to obtain rights to their own land, women and Haratines
must be creative to ï¬nd ways to take advantage of the new law.
Legrayer Case Study: Haratines Successfully Holding their Ground
The above example illustrates the importance of gaining tenure, at any
cost. The case of Legrayer (N’Diaye 2000) shows that in the case of a
160
strategically placed village with substantial time residing near and working on
good wetland ï¬eld, Haratines have been successful in obtaining secure tenure
to their land. The village of Legrayer is situated on the banks of a seasonal
wetland and it is one of three breadbaskets in Hodh El Gharbi (Leweija and
Sawanaa are the other two). The colonial administration had divided the land in
the area among the kabilas and Legrayer went to Ehel Jiddou of the Leghlal
kabila leaders in the area. Although the French aimed to clearly divide the land
to avoid further dispute, as time wore on the tenure situation outlined by the
French was questioned. To solidify their claim to the land in the face of
increasing challenge, the Leghlal leaders asked their Haratines to farm the land
and to settle there. Thus, the current residents of Legrayer village moved to the
Legrayer at the request of the nobles of their kabila.
Soon after moving next to Legrayer wetland in 1951, Legrayer residents
constructed an earthen dam to transform the wetland into cultivable landf After
constructing the dam, the Haratine village residents divided the farmland
amongst themselves and began farming the entire wetland. The Spanish
company ONATER reconstructed the dam in 1968. The new and improved
cement dam greatly improved the agricultural possibilities of the wetland.
After the reconstruction of the dam, the nobles of the kabila then began
protesting the division of the ï¬elds. They claimed that the ï¬elds should more
appropriately be divided among all kabila members. The nobles were newly
interested in land that had increased in value and now wanted to regain control
over the land that they had given freely to the Haratine residents. The residents
161
of Legrayer village refused to give up any of their land, claiming that their labor
had built the ï¬rst dam, and they had worked to prepare the land for farming.
The strong protest of the Haratines was important. Perhaps more influential
was the Ehel Jiddou kabila leader who strongly defended the claims of the
Haratines. With great effort, he was able to convince the nobles of the kabila
that the Haratines did have a legitimate claim to the land because of their work
and loyalty that was put into the creation of Legrayer as the breadbasket that it
is known as today. The Haratines living in Legrayer have managed to register
their land in the name of their village collective. This case study shows that it is
possible for Haratines to secure tenure to the land upon which they have been
working for generations. Geographic distance from their kabila leaders was an
important element in their ability to negotiate more secure tenure.
Chara Case Study: Tenuous Tenure Gains
The Haratine village of Chara, has also been able to secure legal tenure
to their land after the passing of the 1983 law. The people of Chara left the
village of Agjert and the noble Bidan leaders of their Kabila fraction between 35
and 40 years ago to herd animals they had managed to obtain for themselves
over the years. Thus, they had gained some independence as they had
geographically removed themselves from their former masters early on. Finally,
in 1981 they chose to settle in a small depression within their kabila fraction
territory. They requested permission from their kabila leader to build a dam to
create a semi-permanent wetland to increase their agricultural potential. With
162
the permission of their kabila and the Hakem, they were able to secure
cooperative title to their land in 1984.
Mohamadi, a resident of Chara explained to me that they moved away
from Agjert and eventually came to the place that became Chara because
. .the ï¬elds we farmed weren’t good, and there were too many animals there.â€
However, the village chief, Mantalla, (see following text box) explained that with
the agreement of all around “...we came here to work for ourselves.†The
following text box further describes his life and how he became chief. Upon
questioning people about the tenure status of their village, the man who had
been elected to represent their village presented the actual paper that gives
them legal tenure to the land. With pride, he explained, “We have papers, we
have the legal right to this land. This land is our land, and nobody can take it
away from us.†When I asked if the Kabila is involved in their ownership he
replied, “No, this is our land for our village, see, it says it on the paper, can’t you
see?"
As I have shown, women and Haratines have made progress towards
achieving some rights and independence, explicitly for access to natural
resources. However, even when they have been able to gain access to land with
legal tenure, this access remains precarious due to their subservient position in
society. The most notable examples are Haratines and agricultural land. In the
Haratine village of Chara, their legal tenure to their land proved to be weaker
than their obligations to their Kabila and fraction.
In 1999, some powerful Bidan members of their fraction tired of the
163
nomadic life and looked for someplace to settle. Members of these Bidan tents
explained that they were tired of moving and wanted to settle to take advantage
of new political and schooling opportunities. Rich with animals, they needed a
place where they could settle and their animals could ï¬nd water, at least during
much of the year. Because they were nobles of the kabila fraction that the
Haratines belong to, they came and placed their tents near the wetland on the
edge of Chara. Original Haratine residents of Chara protested. They had
obtained title to their land, and it was theirs. Diplomatically, Chara villagers
explained that they were proud to have their own land. But the Hakem
impressed upon them the fact that they should share with these people from their
own extended family. The Bidan refused to move and, after lengthy discussions
with the Hakem in the area (Kobeni), a portion of Chara’s land was deeded over
to the nobles in 1999. One Chara villager explained,
It is our land. We came here in the 19805, and we have registered
the land. We have worked with our muscles and sweat to clear the
land and to build the dam that you see here. Without our hard work
this place would be nothing. We moved far away to make our own
way. But it was difï¬cult to refuse this request of the Hakem. We
had to let the Bidan come to live by us.
Thus, even though the people of Chara had legal tenure to their land, they
were bound by social tradition to let the Bidan nobles of their fraction settle and
take a portion of their land, regardless of the deed paper that was so proudly
displayed by their leader. With this act, the Haratines of Chara have given up a
portion of their land on which they worked hard for independence. Living in
closer proximity to the Bidan further embeds them in the subservient roles they
164
have been trying to escape for so long. More importantly, for their livelihood, the
presence of the Bidan animals that drink from the same wetland around which
the Haratine practice agriculture signiï¬cantly harms their agricultural production.
As is common in areas where both herding and agriculture are prominent,
problems continually arise when animals eat the crops of farmers. Because the
Bidan animals are drinking from the same seasonal wetland around which the
Haratine are doing agriculture, the chance of crop loss due to animal grazing
increases greatly. Any manure that might be dropped 0n the ï¬elds when animals
graze is little compensation for the extensive crop damage. Agriculturalists are
required to guard their ï¬elds during the day and herders watch over their animals
at night. But conflicts are still frequent during periods of pasture scarcity
(Shanmugaratnam 1992224). The high cost of fencing makes guarding
agricultural ï¬elds extremely difï¬cult, especially when herders are minimally
motivated to closely control their animals.
The ability of the Bidan nobles to obtain land that was already legally
owned emphasizes the strength of traditional social hierarchies in Mauritania.
Although the state may give the Haratines the legal right to their land, under the
traditional tenure system they were ‘given’ this land by their kabila leaders who
controlled the larger territory that included the land on which they settled. In all
sample cases where Haratines or women were able to get land, the permission
of Bidan leaders was necessary regardless of the law or whether or not the land
was purchased. Especially because the residents of Chara did not buy this land,
it was still a gift or a loan that does not come without its social obligations. Legal
165
deed cannot remove them from their social hierarchy and the from fact that, at
some time, they may be called upon to repay the favor.
As we have seen in the Legrayer example, when development resources
arrive in a village, competition increases for the natural resources that are now
increasing in value. In Haratine villages, Bidan elite often appear when
development resources are being distributed or new projects are being
discussed. In Chara, Haratine village leaders were intimidated neither by the
threats or the aggressive actions of the Bidans trying to get their share of the
development project. Chara villagers refused to let the newly settled Bidan
participate in the project labor, in order to lessen their claims to the proï¬ts of the
project. As these and the above example portray, marginalized groups are using
both overt and covert tactics to resist domination, especially with respect to
access to resources. The case studies and research data show that Haratines
living at a geographic distance from Bidan have more leverage in their
negotiations for secure tenure but are not always successful.
Both Chara and Legrayer were Haratine villages that had established
themselves at a geographic distance from their kabila leaders. Although both
were successful in gaining tenure to the resources upon which they depended,
Chara's tenure has been increasingly threatened by kabila leaders encroaching
upon their land, and are thus less successful in their tenure negotiations. The
fact that the residents of Legrayer had been living and working their land longer
than the people of Chara is one contributing factor to their success. However,
more importantly, the people of Legrayer received the backing of an important
166
Bidan kabila member who was able to help them in their negotiations. Again,
the strength of the kabila in negotiations is evident.
Mantalla: A Haratine Village Chief
Mantalla’s father left their Bidan village of Agjert over 40 years ago. As a
Haratine, he wanted to exercise his freedom and to be farther away from the Bidan.
With a few animals he had acquired through his work as a herder, he set out with
some other Haratines to begin herding on their own. As a teenager in 1983,
Mantalla came to Chara wetland with his father to settle. After much work, they
built an earthen dam to make the wetland suitable for farming. Although he lost his
entire meager herd in the drought, he was able to continue fanning. Aï¬er years of
hard work in the ï¬elds supplemented by trade and a small village bakery, Mantalla
was able to buy a few animals. Last year he was chosen to lead the village aï¬er
villagers decided that the last chief was not doing a good job. Villagers stated that
“We chose Mantala because he is a hard worker and because he has a level head.
But if we don’t like what he is doing, we’ll have another meeting and throw him out
too!†Mantala said,
I didn’t really want to be village chief. The noble chief in Agjert was
always our chief. But when we settled here we had to choose a leader
to put on the land license. Se we got together as a group to choose
someone to represent the authorities. When the project came to the
village, the village thought that I would be a good, active person who
could oversee the project activities and receive all of the guests that
come. That’s how I became village chief last year.
Being village chief with the project has been very difï¬cult. It’s
difï¬cult because we are doing a project with two villages. The village
of whites wants to be with us because they think they can proï¬t from
the project. Whites registered as CDA members since the beginning
of the project, but they never wanted to be a part of this village until
the project came. They just wanted the land. Now they want to be
considered as the same village. I may be weak but my heart is strong.
They will never take our village or our land.
167
8.3. Women Gaining Access to Resources Through Institutional Distance
As shown in above in the analysis of Haratines and negotiation for secure
tenure, geographic distance is plays a central role in their success. Distance
from the Bidan provides Haratines some avenue for access to a network with
less influence of their subservient status as Haratines. Women live with men and
thus are less able to distance themselves from men geographically. However,
women have had some success in gaining access to networks other than the
kabila network. Institutional distance in the form of economic cooperatives
provides their access to networks with distant reaches.
Cooperatives are primarily small businesses jointly owned by a small
group of usually not more than 30 people. Common cooperative activities are
petty trade and vegetable gardening. Men and women, both Bidan and Haratine
form cooperatives. However, the cooperative has been especially successful for
women. Through the access it provides to development and larger economic
market networks. The international development community has been promoting
the formation of cooperatives. In fact, most development agencies have a
person in charge of only cooperatives in each ï¬eld ofï¬ce. Development
resources aid in the formation of cooperatives by supplying of credit, providing of
tools, training members in gardening techniques and business practices, etc.
36 percent of people surveyed (n=270) were members of cooperatives,
and 70 percent of coop members were women. Cooperatives usually consiSt of
10-30 members. This formal organization has given status to the traditional
network that existed among women. To obtain tenure, many women’s
168
cooperatives pooled resources coming either from familial sources or from .
money they had earned themselves in petty trade to purchase plots of land on
which they grow their vegetables. In some villages, women’s cooperatives
requested plots of land and were given them without charge to use for their
gardening activities. However, when talking to the women who purchased their
land, they expressed great pride in their ownership (interview in Gongel, Jan
2000)
Now we are sure that this is our land and that no one can decide to
use it next year. You know, we have put a lot of work into working
the ground and fencing the area. We want to be sure that we can
always use it.
The formation of cooperatives also is a way that women obtain access to
land, because cooperatives gather resources and obtain rights to or ï¬nance the
purchase of land. Also, their formal recognition by development associations
provides them a more secure basis from which to gain tenure, ï¬nancially and in
regards to informal recognition. Often, women are able to use the money gained
from these ventures to increase their status and generally make their lives easier.
We feed our kids with this money, and we can buy clothes if we
have any left over. Life is much better for women now. We were
all nomads, and women only did the housework. They ground
millet for cous cous. Women didn’t have their own identity, or a
personality. If her husband said, ‘go to town’, she went to town. If
he said ‘stay home’, she stayed home. There were no questions
asked. Now women are powerful. She does her own ï¬eld, and she
doesn’t have to wait for a man to give her food and clothing.
Women can be independent now (interview Jan 2000).
In some cases such as the village of Saveni (see the following text box
on Aminata) where agricultural land was privatized, some women have
169
gathered money or loans to buy their own ï¬elds for sorghum or millet. The
purchasing of land with money is quite important and was boasted by several
women who had managed to do so. In the same village that divided their land
into individual property units, women were very proud to explain to me that their
cooperative bought land by obtaining a loan. In addition, several women had
bought individual land on which they grew staple crops for their families and for
sale. The ability to purchase land is very important because it formally
legitimizes their claims to land. As seen in the quote above, if you have bought
a piece of land, it is more certain that everyone recognizes the same claim.
The example of Saveni shows that only slowly are women ï¬nding ways to take
advantage of the 1983 law.
170
Aminata and Her Cooperative
Aminata, a Bidan woman from Saveni is a member of the village women’s
cooperative. The cooperative has 52 female members and focuses on vegetable
gardening. The cooperative members Ieamed how to do vegetable gardening from
development agents who conducted trainings in the village. People did not grow
vegetables before, and people were not used to eating them. Now, there are many
people growing vegetables, and more and more people are using vegetables when
they cook. Onions are especially popular, but squash, carrots and tomatoes are also
increasing in demand. Their production of vegetables has been good and they have
been earning money.
Land is privately owned in Saveni. The cooperative had to buy its own land,
which it did with the help of village leaders who identiï¬ed a good piece of land for
their vegetables, and the development agency that facilitated their loan for the land.
Aminata and her fellow cooperative members are proud to have their own land and
to have their own business.
Aminata has used the money from her proï¬ts to invest in more money-
making ventures. Although Bidan women do not traditionally farm, she has invested
in her own individual plot of land that is 150 meters squared where she now grows
sorghum. Aminata said that she began farming during the hard times following the
1985 drought when her family lost most of their animals. In order to make it through
the hard times they had to learn to farm, a new activity for them. Her family did not
want her to be working out in the ï¬elds, but their herd had become so small, they
knew that they would need her help. Although she found the work difï¬cult, it
became evident that it was possible to make money by farming after the rains
returned. As times improved she was able to borrow farmland to plant her own
sorghum ï¬eld. With the proï¬ts ï¬om this farming, she has saved and borrowed
enough to purchase her own plot'of land.
Although her husband will not help with the farm labor on her own plot, she
ï¬nds help among the c00perative members, and she helps many of them who also
have their own ï¬elds. Saveni is the only village in my sample where women own
their own land. Aminata keeps the money that she earns from her cooperative and
from her own ï¬elds. She is not expected to contribute to the family needs. She has
used her proï¬ts primarily to buy new clothes and to invest in future agricultural
opportunities. She has contributed to the family by buying medicine and clothes for
the children.
For the Bidan, farming of any type is completely new, but as evidenced
by Aminata’s story above, Bidan women show a new willingness or perhaps
171
necessity submit to physical labor to increase income. As is seen in Figure 10,
forming a cooperative provides women not only with a way to make some
money, but also with a formal organization through which they can participate in
the rural economy as equal members.
In contrast to the few Bidan women who have very recently begun
farming, most Haratine women have grown up farming. Haratine women have
had to work very hard to contribute to their family’s subsistence. Although
Haratine women traditionally work on their husband’s plot of land along side
with their husband, women have also farmed ï¬elds by themselves. In the
village of Sawanaa, focus group interviews with village men revealed that
women have individual plots that are recognized as their own. However, focus
groups with women revealed that they did not see the land they farmed as their
own, rather they worked on their husband’s land, and sometimes he gave them
ï¬elds to farm for themselves.
In Chlim, land is distributed by the village chief, and both men and
women alike explained that women are distributed ï¬elds towards the bottom of
the wetland. This land is highly undesirable because planting begins very late
and often has trouble coming to maturity before the weather becomes too hot
for the crops. Men explained that women could only farm this land because it
required less clearing. Land clearing reportedly is difï¬cult work that requires the
strength of men. Women explained to me that (interview in Chlim, October
1999)
...of course we get the land at the bottom. We get what is left over
after the men of the village have their land to farm. Its not usually a
172
problem until a wet year like this year when we can’t plant until the _
season is over. This year we will have to rely on the rainfed crops
over there.
Women use the proceeds from their ï¬elds to help out with the family’s
subsistence. “We throw all of the grain in together, and we keep what we need
to eat, and sell what we can to buy supplies†(Chilm October 1999). However,
women do have more control over the proceeds from the ï¬elds they farm. They
are able to be sure that there is enough grain to eat during leaner periods and
also they can sell some of their grain if they need to buy something important
for the family.
The cooperative has provided the Haratine woman with an important
avenue through which to enter into the economic realm, and to increase their
family’s often meager resources. Haratine women are not new to farming, yet
they may be new to vegetable farming or to petty trade. These new skills
enable Haratine women to play a more important role in the family income.
Additionally, cooperatives have become more important to the village economy
and village leaders are paying more attention to the need of these cooperatives
to have their own resources.
The experience of Haratine women in Chlim and Sawana reiterate the
importance of women’s legal recognition, both in land ownership and in their
cooperative organization. With the legal recognition of the cooperative as an
institution independent of the kabila, it is much more difï¬cult for their land to be
taken away. Cooperatives are gaining recognition and prevalence with the
ever-increasing presence of development projects. The entry into this network
173
is especially important because they receive important beneï¬ts such as
agricultural loans, provision of seeds and farming equipment, and, often, (and
perhaps most important) the tools with which to fence their ï¬elds from the ever
present grazing animals.
8.4. Negotiations for Access: Contestation
Resource tenure is never secure as it will always be contested. The
contestation of land tenure is rarely channeled through legal paper deeds.
Although formal protests or claims to land are frequently submitted to the local
authorities, most contestations are less formal. As is evidenced by the examples
provided below, resource tenure is often challenged by the destmctive use of a
resource. I
The Haratine village of Boichiche settled near this wetland because they
were given permission by the traditional kabila territory controllers. They have
lived on this land since the time of independence with few problems. However, in
1982, a development agency came to build a fence around the wetland. This
fence greatly increased the security of tenure for the people of that village (as
explored in Ch 6.1). Although the fence served many goals, it was designed to
protect the valuable forest resources, upon which the poor villagers depend, from
the animals that destroy them. However, the fence is routinely cut, allowing
animals in to destroy the forest products. When I talked to villagers, they
expressed disappointment in the destruction of valuable resources, but they
explained to me that they were powerless to do anything about it. One villager
174
explained. “We can’t go to the authorities, we don’t want any trouble, you know.â€
Thus, challenges to tenure can be made outside the legal system. Merely by
cutting a fence, frequently grazing animals, or using resources the Bidan assert
their tenure rights by proving that there is no way to keep them from using
resources thought to be controlled by others.
Although the membership in the Kabila network forms a tight web that
invades all aspects of life in eastern Mauritania, there are visible forms of
resistance to the kabila’s control over natural resources, termed ’weapons of the
weak’ (Scott 1985). Haratines who go to great lengths to create land outside of
the traditional agricultural ï¬elds that they can claim as their own is a major form
of resistance. Rather than farm the more productive land of their former masters,
Haratines prefer to assert their independence and also to obtain the more secure
long-term tenure.
Another form of resistance existing in the Hodh El Gharbi is the ‘animal
prison’ system organized by farmers in Sawanaa who were dismayed at having
their crops destroyed by passing herds. Although, in theory, herders are
responsible for keeping their animals out of agricultural ï¬elds, it is a difï¬cult task.
Furthermore, herders are typically Bidan and farmers are often Haratines, thus
making herders less likely to respect the wishes of the farmers, knowing that they
have little recourse or possible redress within the social structure. In an unusual
course of events, the Haratine farmers in Sawanaa went to the Hakem and
requested permission to detain in a gated area the animals that were destroying
their crops, charging their owners a ï¬ne when they come to retrieve their
175
animals.23 When this new ‘policy’ was implemented, herders were incensed and
threatened the Haratine farmers. But the Haratine farmers of Sawanaa held their
ground, citing permission from the legal authorities. After a few irate herders
went to the authorities to complain without success, herders began paying the
ï¬nes. As the news spread, Sawanaa residents found that there were fewer
animals in or near their ï¬elds, and they had fewer animals to detain. Although-
not directly threatening their recognized tenure of their ï¬elds, the presence of
animals eating their crops decreased the ability of Sawanaa farmers to harvest
ï¬elds and thus decreased tenure security. To my knowledge, these are the ï¬rst
Haratines to ï¬nd a successful method to protect their ï¬elds from animals without
investing in very expensive fences that few farmers can afford. By keeping
animals from destroying their crops, the farmers of Sawanaa have also increased
their security of their tenure because they were able to control the access to their
own ï¬elds.
The passing of the 1983 land tenure law has opened new networks and
stages of influence that reach beyond the kabila system. For groups
marginalized within the kabila system, new networks pose an important
alternative to their low status within the traditional hierarchy. However, access to
the new networks is heavily influenced by the hierarchical kabila system that still
is heavily entrenched in the region. The women and Haratines who have gained
land tenure in some small way have challenged the strongly influential kabila
system to become landowners and increase their tenure security. The constant
176
contestation and negotiation for resources is continually testing the tenure gains
of marginalized groups. However, as l have shown in this chapter, the
opportunities to gain tenure and resist challenges have been increased as
women and Haratines have access to larger networks of power.
177
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
Changes in natural resource access change power relations. Rather than
the static, individualistic private property systems that are envisioned by western
ideal, land tenure is a fluid process. Shipton and Green (1992 in Fortmann
1996:538) maintain that people use land “for many purposes; not just to produce
the material conditions of survival and enrichment, but also to gain control over
others and to deï¬ne personal and social identities.†Because different kinds of
property systems beneï¬t different people, power is central to the enforcement or
imposition of property rights.
No matter how explicit the law, no matter how well documented, no matter
how entrenched are user rights; natural resource tenure is not secure. Tenure
will always be contested and those seeking more secure tenure will always have
to negotiate and renegotiate the terms of their tenure. However, sometimes
tenure is less secure and the avenues to secure tenure are more ambiguous
than others. In Mauritania, strong customary tenure based upon strict
hierarchical categories has been replaced by legislation that in theory promoted
equal access to resources among those improving the land. The new law
imposed upon customs deeply rooted in the society has multiplied the avenues
for natural resource contestation. In the contestation and negotiation for more
secure tenure and increased access rights to natural resources, membership in
more networks provides a clear advantage due to the increased social resources
upon which they have to draw.
178
As the ways in which to secure tenure have changed with increasing
development investment and new laws, members of subservient kabila status
levels have had mixed success in gaining more secure access to the natural
resources upon which they depend. The contestations of natural resource tenure
can be legal. Powerful people protesting to the political authorities, usually
making claims of their kabila territory and the user rights to lands within the
previously recognized kabila territory can seek to overturn seemingly secure
tenure with legally recognized deeds. Similarly, kabila elite often claim that the
person who tilled the soil for years was working for their family and thus their
family should now be accorded title to the land.
Contestations of natural resource tenure can also take other forms.
Continuous and unauthorized used of resources is not only destructive, but also
makes a claim against the tenure security of the resource. For example, when
herders graze their animals inside a farmer’s ï¬eld, the farmer suffers great crop
damage and thus does not have secure tenure over the ï¬eld because it is
impossible to protect the ï¬eld and prohibit access. Other ways to diminish tenure
security are to levy a tax or strongly suggest a donation of the beneï¬ts from the
production on the land. The expected ‘donation’ to Bidan from Haratine farmers
not only diminishes their production take home, but it is also a symbolic reminder
of their subservience and tenuous tenure on their land within the kabila system.
Most contestations of natural resource tenure are based upon traditional user
rights within the hierarchical kabila structure.
Customarily, membership in a kabila, and membership in a hierarchical
179
level within that kabila were the most important networks to which to belong.
Bidan members were not only the leaders of the kabila and were solely
responsible for politics. Membership in the Bidan network also accorded entry
into the religious and warrior networks, both of which were very powerful. Being
a woman or a Haratine did not allow for full membership in such powerful
networks. Haratines were members of the kabila network in that they shared
their harvests with the kabila, and wealthier members of the kabila would help
them with resources to help them survive during especially difï¬cult times.
However, Haratines were not allowed membership in the important and
powerful religious, military, and political networks. Women participated in
subsistence activities and were restricted close to home.
Since the time of independence, more networks are now appearing with
new ways to become members of all types of networks. With the increase in
sedentarization, villages are now an important political entity and the leaders of
each village can now represent the people of their village in political affairs.
The increase in CBRNM schemes is also increasing the importance of the
village because now it not only provides access to political networks, but to the
lntemational development community as well.
Due to their position of power within the traditional hierarchy, Bidans are
well placed to increase their influence and power by entering into new networks.
Their prestige is a key factor in influencing development projects to seek their
help to implement a development project. Traditional kabila leaders easily
become government ofï¬cials. In fact, the increasingly popular Western ideal of
180
decentralization and democratization pushed by international development.
agencies has opened the door for an increasingly strengthened hierarchical
kabila system. As power, decisions, and influence are returned to local regional
decision-making arenas, the kabila is the most recognized structure within
which to ï¬t the process of decentralization and democratization. The newly
created mayoral positions ï¬rst in regional cities, then in all rural areas are posts
naturally occupied by known leaders of powerful kabilas. Thus, rather than
relying on traditional avenues of power, newly sanctioned democratic processes
aimed to broaden the power base in may centralized government in the
developing world have in fact served to solidify traditional avenues of power.
Although Haratines are still disadvantaged by their membership in the
subservient Haratine status, they have also been able to increase their power
and influence by gaining access to membership in some new networks. In
Haratine-only eddabai villages, the Haratine leader has gained entry into a
political network as the leader of a village. In eddabai where development
agencies have invested, they are also members of the development network,
with connections to far away development agencies with substantial resources.
The entry into development networks has been formalized with the creation of
community development associations responsible for natural resource
management and development investment and projects. Community
development associations located in Haratine only villages with a more
homogeneous status, wealth and livelihood systems result in the ability of the
association to better represent what might be the interests of the village. Due to
181
the value of the resources and the power to which this network is connected,
membership in this network greatly increases negotiation power. Thus, the
trend towards decentralization and democratization increased network
opportunities and has increased the ability of Haratines to secure tenure over
the resources they use. When tenure contestations arise, Haratines in their
own villages have been more successful in retaining their tenure.
Haratines living in Bidan-controlled villages do not have the advantage of
geographical distance and have been less successful in securing resource
tenure. Living in close contact with the Bidan, they are more entrenched in
traditional hierarchies. Thus, their membership in the subservient Haratine
network deï¬nes how they interact with other networks. As subservient
members of the village, their contact with politics and with development is not in
leadership roles and thus they are not accorded membership in these important
networks. They have few social resources upon which to call when their tenure
to a certain resource is threatened. Additionally, although they are often
members of the community development associations created by development
interventions, their participation is minimal or disregarded and the associations
are less responsive to their needs.
Because women live in villages with men, they do not have the opportunity
to distance themselves geographically from men who dominate tenure decisions
and negotiation. Distance plays an important role in excluding the more powerful
Bidan from taking over key leadership roles in eddabai thus allowing Haratines to
take over key leadership and network entrance positions. Although not
182
geographic, the formations of “women’s cooperatives’ by development agencies
has provided women with the institutional ‘distance’ from men with which to
organize themselves and to take leadership roles in institutions recognized within
development organizations and to a lesser degree in political networks. To date,
Haratines living within Bidan villages have not yet achieved institutional distance
from the Bidan. Development intervention targeted speciï¬cally at Haratines
would be a political and sensitive subject that would meet with much resistance.
The restriction of some projects to ‘women only’ has general support.
Although targeting of special development assistance to women in some cases
marginalizes their membership and participation in the mainstream development
network, the creation of women only institutions is important because it
guarantees them direct access to development networks. Women would almost
certainly be denied full access if they were only left to participate in mainstream
development activities that are controlled by men. Additionally, through these
cooperatives, women also enter into economic and trade networks through the
sale of their goods in local markets and in village based stores. When connected
to cooperative activities, women have in many cases been successful in securing
tenure overland they use for farming or vegetable gardening. Without these
cooperatives, it is still rare to see women farming land they consider to be their
own. Thus, the cooperative has enabled signiï¬cant tenure gains for women
members. However, because this gain is limited to cooperative activities, women
have not been as successful as Haratines in obtaining more secure tenure in the
context of new laws, policies and development interventions.
183
The 1983 land tenure law opens the door for the contestation of
customary tenure. The fundamental changes occurring in Mauritania since the
time of independence have increased the opportunity of disadvantaged groups to
gain membership in political, economic and development networks. Through
their increased access to networks and the increased negotiation power that this
brings, Haratines and women have made important gains using the provisions of
the new law to gain secure tenure to natural resources. By doing this, they have
then accorded themselves membership in land owning networks.
However, although the law increases opportunities for subservient groups
to gain tenure notwithstanding their kabila status, opportunities for poWerful elite
to further increase their tenure and power over resources have also increased.
The new networks available to women and Haratines are also available to Bidan
men. Due to their superior position in the kabila, they are well placed to take
advantage of new avenues for power. However, the liberating aspects of new
networks for women and Haratines are having a greater impact on the
empowerment of women and Haratines. This impact outweighs the additional
gains made by the traditional elite, the Bidan.
Change no matter how positive will always be accompanied by tragedy for
some. In the case of Mauritania and land tenure changes, the increased ability
of disadvantaged groups to manage their own resource independent of their
kabila status is an extremely important step towards lessening the subservience
of disadvantaged groups. This gain outweighs the tragedy that the Bidan will
also be able to increase their power. It also outweighs the tragedy that CBRNM
184
systems are focused on static geographic areas that do not suit the fluid nature
of the resources being managed. The advances made in Mauritania will be
enhanced if the tragedies of the advances are translated into lessons learned for
the future.
This study has focused on eastern Mauritania, which is a rural area still
entrenched in tradition. I have found that disadvantaged groups are more able to
become members in new networks that increase influence and power if they are
able to gain relative independence economically and geographically. The
increasing urbanization of Mauritania provides new arenas where people can
contest for jobs and patronage further distant from their kabila hierarchy.
Ethnicities and status in Nouakchott have evolved as people look for new ways to
reorganize in ways that are less dependent upon their kabila. Future research
should compare the existence of and the ability of disadvantaged groups to gain
access to new networks that increase power and influence in regard to land
tenure between those who still reside in their traditionally held kabila territory,
and those who have migrated.
185
ENDNOTES
’ ‘Haratine’ means free person of second class in Arabic. The majority of
Haratines were former slaves and occupy a low position within Moorish
hierarchies, second only to actual slaves (slavery was ofï¬cially abolished in
1980)
2 This technique is called recession agriculture. Soil that was formerly under
water remains wet even after the water recedes. Seeds planted in the soil will
grow using moisture remaining in the soil.
3 Bidan is the Hassiniya Mauritanian Arabic word for Moor. The word is derived
from the Arabic word meaning ‘white.’
" Nomadism: a term often used as shorthand for pastoral nomadism, which
implies both subsistence herding and wide spatial mobility, often in cyclic
movements (Windstrand 1975).
5 Blood money is paid by the kabila of a person who killed a member of another
tribe. Blood money is paid to maintain peace and to avoid killing retribution.
6 Research methods are explained in Chapter Four.
7 I use the term ‘informal’ to describe an institution that is not legally recognized
on a national level, and ‘formal’ to describe an institution that is legally
recognized at the a national level.
8 Abbreviated as GTV, meaning village territory management.
9 The type of resources that share the following characteristics are often called
common property resources: 1) it is costly to develop institutions to exclude
potential beneï¬ciaries from the resource and 2) the resource obtained by
someone or some group is not available to others (Ostrom 1996). However,
Ostrom (1977 in McCay 1996) makes the case for the labeling them “common
pool resources.†This corrects a common error that confuses the natural
characteristics of a resource and the social and cultural arrangements that
people devise to lay claim to these resources (McCay 1996:112). Although these
resources may physically lend themselves more easily to a common property
claim, societies may enter into other contractual relationships regarding common
pool resources.
’0 Term coined by Sinha, Gururani and Greenberg 1997.
This technique is called recession agriculture. Soil that was formerly under water
remains wet even after the water recedes.
186
1’ Bidan and Haratines refer to each other as family, even if they are not related
by blood, they are related by hierarchical bonds.
'3 A political boundary equivalent to a county.
’3 A political leader of a Moghtaa.
‘4 Data gathered by McCracken in 1999. n= 103 villages.
15 Provincial capital of Hodh El Gharbi.
’5 It is interesting to note that although the fencing installed around Boichiche
fully encloses their ï¬elds, 50% of respondents stated that fencing was the
development intervention they most desired in Boichiche. The current fencing
around the entire wetland is sufï¬cient to keep camels and cows (the most
destructive to agriculture) out of their ï¬elds, but is not tightly woven enough to
keep away goats and sheep which are also capable of inflicting considerable
crop damage.
’7 Earthen bunds are small dams or mounds of dirt laid across a sloped ï¬eld
designed to trap water.
’8 Difference signiï¬cant at p=.000.
‘9 Aioun El Atrouss is the provincial capital of Hodh El Gharbi.
2° Data gathered by Steve McCracken in 1999 for Projet GIRNEM of the crz.
2’ Data gathered by Steve McCracken in 1999 for Projet GIRNEM of the GTZ.
22 Interview Sept 27, 1999.
23 Cows in particular are left to graze and wander on their own without
supervision. Often a herder goes for days without seeing their cows, making
supervision very difï¬cult.
187
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APPENDICES
198
APPENDIX ONE
1983 LAND TENURE LEGISLATION IN MAURITANIA
Ordonnance 83-127
Portant Reorganisation Fornicére et domaniale
Le Comité Militaire de Salut National
A déliberé et adopté;
Chef de I’Etat, promulgué
L’ordonnance don’t la Teneur suit:
Article 1:
La terre appartient a la nation et tout Mauritanien, sans discrimination d’aucune
sorte, peut, en se conformant a la loi, en devenir propriétaire, pour partie.
Article 2:
L’Etat reconnait et garantit la propriété fonciere privée qui doit, conformément a
la Chariaa, contribuer au développement économique et social du pays.
Article. 3:
Le systeme de la tenure traditionnelle du sol est aboli.
Article 4:
Tout droit de propriété que ne se rattache pas directement a une personne
physique ou morale et qui ne résulte pas d'une mise en valeur juridiquement
protégée est inexistant.
Article 5:
Les immatriculations foncieres prises au nom des chefs et notables sont
reputées avoir été consenties a la collectivité traditionnelle de rattachement.
Article 6:
Les droits collectifs Iégitimement acquis sous le regime antérieur, préalablement
cantonnés auz terres de culture, bénéï¬cient a tous ceux qui, soit participé a la
mise en valeur initiale, soit contribué a la périnnité de I’exploitation.
L’individualisation est de droit. A défaut d’accord sur Ie partage, et si I’ordre
sociale I’exige, Ies operations de redistribution seront réalisées par
l’administration.
I99
Article 7:
Les actions foncieres collectives sont irrecevables en justice.
Les aftaires de méme nature actuellement pendantes devant Ies cours et
tribunaux seront radiés des r6les sur decision spéciale de la juridiction saisie.
Les arréts ou jugements de radiation sont inattaquables.
Article 8:
Toute forme d’affermage de la terre non conforme a la Chariaa est prohibée ; Ies
parties ne peuvent, par leurs conventions ,déroger a cette disposition d’ordre
public.
Article 9:
Les terres « mortes » sont la propriété de I’Etat.
Sont reputées mortes Ies terres qui n’ont jamais été mises en valeur ou dont la
mise en valeur n’a plus laissé de traces évidentes.
L’extinction du droit de propriété par « I’indirass » est opposable aussi bien au
propriétaire initiale qu’a ses ayants droit, mais ne s’applique pas bien au
propriétaire initial qu’a ses ayants droit, mais ne s’applique pas bien au
propriétaire initia qu’a ses ayants droit, mais ne s’applique pas cependant aux
immeubles immatriculés.
Article 10:
Les terres qui ont appartenu a I’Etat en vertu des dispositions de la Ioi 60 139 du
2 Aout 1960 demeurent domaniales, et Ies prescriptions des articles 12 et 13 ci-
dessous leur sont applicables.
Article 11 :
Les biens fonciers vacants et sans maitre sont acquis a I’Etat dans Ies conditions
déï¬nies par la Chariaa.
Article 12:
Quiconque désire accéder a la propriété d’une terre domaniale doit
impérativement en obtenir au préalable Ia concession.
Article 13:
La mise en valeur d’une terre domaniale sans concessions préalable ne confere
aucun droit de propriété a celui que I’a faite.
En pareil cas, I’Etat peut soit reprendre Ie terrain soit régulariser l’occupation.
Lorsque Ie terrain ne comporte pas de plantations, constructions ou ouvrages, Ia
reprise n’ouvre droit a aucune indemnité.
Dans le cas contraire, I’occuant irrégulier sera indemnisé pour ses impenses, a
moins qu’il ne préfére enlever ou détruire a ses frais sses plantations,
constructions ou ouvrages.
Dans tous les cas et conformément a la Chariaa, l’indemnisations tien
uniquement compte des matériauz pouvant étre récupérés apres enlévement ou
destruction de I’immeuble.
200
A défaut d’accord amiable sur le montant de I’indemnité, ceIIe-ci est ï¬xée par la
juridiction civile compétente saisie a la diligence de I’occupant évincé.
Article 14:
L’Etat procede par voie administrative pour la preservation de ses droits fonciers.
II appartient a celui que en conteste I’existence de se pourvoir en justice pour
faire Ie preuve que Ie terrain n’est pas domanial. L’action en contestation doit
étre impérativement introduite, sous peine de déchéance, dans un délai d’un
mois apres la notiï¬cation de la mise en demeure de Iibérer Ies Iieux.
Le demandeur en contestation dispose seulement de deux mois pour produire
ses moyens de preuve ; ce délai de forclusion ne peur étre prorogé.
Les jugements rendus sur la contestation ne sont pas susceptible d’appel.
Le pourvoi en cassation formé contre ces decisions n’a pas d’effet suspensif.
Article 15:
L’Etat est obligatoirement cité en qualité de partie intervenante dans toute
instance visant a faire reconnaitre a des particuliers des droits de propriété sur le
sol.
Cette regle ne s’applique pas, et I'Etat n'a pas a éte cite, lorsque le terrain a déja
fait l'objet d’une cession domaniale devenue deï¬nitive.
Article 16:
Les tribunaux doivent se déclarer imcompétents toutes Ies fois que la
revendication porte sur une terre domaniale.
Article 17:
L’exception tirée du caractere domanial du terrain Iitigieux peur etre proposée
concurremment par I’Administration ou par les défenseurs en revendication, le
juge peur aussi Ia soulever d’ofï¬ce.
A défaut d’acquiescement, le tribunal doit surseoir a statuer au fond et renvoyer
Ies parties devant Ia juridiction compétente pour la solution de cette question
préjudicielle. La juridiction de renvoi est saisie en contestation de domanialité, a
la diligence du demandeur en revendication.
Article 18:
Le juge des contestations se Iimite a dire si la terre est domaniale ou ne I'est pas.
Defense Iui est faite dans ce demier cas de se prononcer sur le droit de propriété
et d’en designer, meme indirectement, le titulaire.
Article 19:
Les jugements rendus en application des articles 14 et 17 ci-dessus ne sont
contradictoires a I’égard de I’Etat que si I’administration a été représentée ou a
déposé des conclusions écrites.
201
Articles 20:
Les concessions de grande superï¬cie ne seront accordées que si
l’investissement projeté présente un impact économique et social appreciable et
seulement dans la mesure ou Ies intéréts Iégitimes des petits propriétaires sont
sauvegardés.
Article 21:
Le droit de propriété ne peut empécher Ia realisation d’un projet d’intérét national
ou regional et ne saurait en particulier entraver l’expansion harmonieuse d’une
agglomeration urbaine.
Nul ne pourra cependant étre contraint de céder ses droits si ce n’est pour cause
d’utilité publique et moyennant une juste compensation.
Article 22:
Tous puits et forage situés en dehors des propriétés privées sont declares
d’utilité et l’usage publique.
Article 23:
L’espace vital des agglomérations rurales est protégé. Les modalités de cette
protection seront précisées par voie réglementaire.
Article 24:
Les droits individuels régulierement constitués sur des fond de terre de toute
nature sont facultativement soumis au regime de l’immatriculation.
L’immatriculation devient cependant obligatoire a I’occasion de certains transferts
de propriété Iimitavement énumérés par la réglementations fonciere.
Article 25:
Les droits qui ne résultent pas d’une concession déï¬nitive sont assujettis,
préalablement a leur inscription, a une procedure administrative de veriï¬cation.
Article 26:
Les contestations domaniales relevent exclusivement de la competence des
chambres mixtes des tribunaux régionaux.
Les regles de la procedures civile ordinaire s’appliqueront chaque fois qu’elles ne
sont pas contraires aux dispositions sus-énoncées.
Article 27:
Le regime juridique de la propriété fonciere demeure ï¬xé par la Chariaa pour tout
ce qui n’a pas été réglé par la présente ordonnance.
Article 28:
Des décrets pris en Conseil des Ministres préciseront en tant que de besoin Ies
modalités d'application de cette ordonnance, qui abroge et remplace Ia Ioi 60-
139 du 2 aout 1960.
202
Article 29:
La présente ordonnance sera publiée suivant la procedure d’urgence et exécutée
comme Ioi de I’Etat.
Nouakchott, Ie 5 juin 1983
Pour le Comité Militaire de Salut National
Le President
Lt. Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah
203
APPENDIX TWO
MAURITANIA COUNTRY MAP
‘HRW ZEMMO
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HODHV
ECH
CHARGUI
204
ANNEX THREE
MAP OF THE HODH EL GHARBI PROVINCE
WITH RESEARCH SITES INDICATED BY BULLETS
205
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